

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600



Université d'Ottawa • University of Ottawa

**NATIONALIST TERRORISM AND POLITICAL PARTIES:
THE CHALLENGE TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES**

by

Philippe J. Gratton

532875

Thesis paper submitted to
the School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts

Director: Professor Ronald D. Crelinsten

University of Ottawa
December, 1997

© Philippe J. Gratton, University of Ottawa, Canada, 1997



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-28426-3

Canada

Acknowledgments

Thanks to my parents, Professor Crelinsten, friends in high *and* low places, and just about anyone who had an opinion on the subject, however radical or extremist.

Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between terrorist groups and their political counterparts. It finds that changes in world events have allowed terrorist groups to include legitimate political participation as part of their overall strategy. It is proposed that some groups, while not completely abandoning their terrorist activities, come to realize the potential behind legitimate political participation, and adapt accordingly. This not only holds important consequences for the terrorists, but also for the liberal democracies that are host to their actions. Two known terrorist groups are compared – the Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organization – in order to demonstrate how they are evolving towards legitimate political participation. One important realization is that such a move towards legitimacy is not always a unidirectional movement; therefore, groups may waver back and forth from legitimacy to subversion. The implications for liberal democracies are also examined. While these countries have been remarkably resilient in dealing with the terrorist threat, the acceptance to negotiate suggests that some changes have been effected on the host countries' regimes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Reflections on terrorist groups and democracy	6
The Problem of Definition	10
A Word on Certain Moral Aspects	13
Chapter 1: Selection of Groups	17
I. INTRODUCTION	17
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON NATIONALIST TERRORIST GROUPS	18
III. SUCCESS STORIES: THE IRA AND THE PLO	22
A. TROUBLES IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY	23
The IRA Today	24
Insight on Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland	30
A) British Authorities' Actions to Resolve Conflict	30
B) IRA Actions to Resolve Conflict	32
C) International Intervention - Europe and the World	35
B. "WHO WAS THERE FIRST?": THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION	37
The Conflict	38
The International Context	42
Insight on Conflict Resolution in the Middle East	43
A) Western Initiatives	44
B) PLO Initiatives	45
C) Israeli Initiatives	46
IV. CONCLUSIONS	47
A. The IRA	47
B. The PLO	48

Chapter 2: How do they measure up?	
Comparing the IRA and the PLO	52
I. INTRODUCTION	52
i) Wide support from the population	54
ii) Organized terrorist campaigns	55
iii) Government action	57
II. THE COMPARISON	58
A. Internal Dynamics	61
B. External Dynamics	70
III. CONCLUSION	77
Chapter 3:	
Nationalist Terrorism and its Implications for Democracy	81
I. INTRODUCTION	81
II. TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY	84
III. DOES DEMOCRACY ENCOURAGE SECESSION BY LEGITIMIZING TERRORIST GROUPS?	
.....	86
IV. THE "THREAT" OF NATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY	94
V. CONCLUSION: LINKS TO THE PLO AND THE IRA	99
Conclusion	102
Appendix A	108
Bibliography	112

Introduction

Contemporary terrorist groups have added a new weapon to their arsenal: *legitimate* political participation. This change in attitude and orientation is a result of many factors, including improved communications, greater public awareness, changes in government perceptions, and increased sophistication on the part of those using terrorism. What remains for the researcher, however, is the complexity of the study of terrorism in the present era of globalization. Why has terrorism changed? We can infer from current events that there are two principle contributing factors.

First, a general trend of democratization may be altering the way radical pressure groups seek change in the system.¹ Protection of minority rights and political recognition for radical movements are characteristics of the democratization process, even in regimes where "ideal" democracy is absent. Second, as they grow more sophisticated, terrorist groups themselves will want to improve their chances of success by using a greater variety of means.² Groups are unlikely to risk violent conflict when a more peaceful and effective alternative presents itself, unless the violence itself serves other purposes (as with revolutionary terrorism, for example). Terrorists are now realizing that they can fight their battle in the political arena through public consultation and legal actions. This second factor is quite possibly a result of the first, but the realization of groups that legitimate response can

¹Pressure groups denote organizations which aim to influence the behaviour of governments by applying or threatening to apply "pressure" (or sanctions) should the claim or demand advanced by the group be denied. Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass (eds.) *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, London, Collins, 1977, p.316.

²For more specific examples of recent trends in terrorist behaviour, see Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures*, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.25-33 and 50-57.

also be effective remains a convincing argument that violence is more likely a method rather than an objective.³

During exploratory research, we examined the evolution of contemporary terrorism to find out how terrorist groups changed. Out of this research emerged the following problem: while it is true that ethnically motivated terrorist activity is on the rise, particularly with the lifting of authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe⁴, it appears that certain conflicts are moving closer to some form of resolution, even though current events paint a picture of a wavering peace process. If this is true, we can analyse the reasons behind this relatively recent trend to see if there is a general pattern that may point to solutions.

Theories of terrorist decline appear occasionally in the literature, although most of these theories are never elaborated to any great extent. This thesis will follow up on and further examine one of Martha Crenshaw's suggested theories on terrorist decline. She proposes that in many cases terrorist organizations are dissolved through a process of "self-defeat" and finds that a particular way

³See Jean-François Gayraud, "Définir le terrorisme: Est-ce possible, est-ce souhaitable?," *Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique*, 2/88, pp.185-201.

⁴It remains debatable whether terrorist activity has increased or declined considerably since the late 1980s. Wilkinson notes that the lifting of authoritarian rule in many countries has led to the discovery of a great number of "hidden" conflicts that have emerged (or re-emerged), particularly in third world countries. Counter-balancing these new numbers are findings in Europe and the Middle East that indicate that, because of various factors such as drops in lethal incidents and factionalization, some situations are abating. See Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order," Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Conflict Studies 236 (December 1990) pp.7-9.

that terrorist groups collapse is by the formation of replacement associations that continue the main struggle through other means.⁵

Therefore, we submit the following hypothesis:

We propose that some groups, while not completely quitting their terrorist activities, come to realize the potential behind legitimate political participation. Thus, these groups begin as terrorist entities⁶, become known through their violent actions⁷, and use this recognition to legitimize their demands. Once the demands are made legitimate, a legal political fight may be a more effective alternative to the violence.⁸ This not only means that the terrorist groups have changed, but that liberal democracy has been altered as well.

In this thesis, we will discuss how the groups have changed and how democracies have coped with this adaptation. We also recognize that our hypothesis is not an absolute. Our cases will show that things are more complex than that. The dynamics of the situations will waver from peace to conflict, from goodwill to backlash.

There have been many theories as to why certain groups or individuals decide to adopt a terrorist strategy. The motivations must indeed be quite powerful for people to lash out violently against others in order to effect some sort of change. One would think that in liberal democracies such

⁵Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 1991) p.69.

⁶It must be pointed out that some groups do not begin as terrorist entities, but emerge from other "legitimate" or "protest" groups.

⁷Via the media and three types of communication relationships proposed by Crelinsten (1989), for example. See Appendix A for further discussion.

⁸This chain of events can, however, lead to conflicting internal dynamics within the terrorist groups. We will relate to some of these instances in the coming chapters of this thesis.

as those in Europe (where a great deal of terrorism takes place), dissatisfied groups would be able to find other ways to voice objections. Not only does violent action seem like an overreaction to a changeable situation, but it can also prove to be counterproductive, unreasonable and ineffective.³

The common rationalizations behind the use of terrorism are many. Researchers speak of the relative inexpensiveness of terrorist operations (“terrorism is the weapon of the poor”), the more level battleground secret subversive action affords against the state (“the weapon of the weak”), and the shock value of surprise violent action against apparently innocent targets (“terrorism as a strategy of disorder”⁴).

One would believe, given the incredible odds and the meagre assets of most terrorists, that dissatisfied groups would rather use available political means to alter their present condition. In the case of Western liberal democracies at least, there are mechanisms that *should* ensure the right to minority self-determination. Where groups think that these mechanisms have failed or do not provide results quickly enough, terrorism becomes an attractive alternative. But some groups defy widely held perceptions of terrorist entities and demonstrate a high degree of organization both in terms of objectives and methodology. The following sections will provide insight into the motivations behind the actions of our two research units. Through brief historical accounts and analysis of trends, the reader will hopefully gain a better understanding of how these groups are evolving towards the realization of their goals by using a variety of different tactics.

³William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg. “Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.6, No.4 (Winter 1994) pp.419-421.

⁴See David Rapoport. “The Politics of Atrocity” in Y. Alexander and S.M. Finger (eds.) *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, New York, McGraw-Hill, John Jay Press, 1977, pp.46-61.

We have divided this thesis into three major chapters. The first chapter will present an analysis of why we have chosen the IRA and the PLO as the two groups most likely to succeed with their new (or renewed) efforts towards legitimate political participation. It will also give the reader a general background on some of the theories and events that have inspired our hypothesis.

Chapter two turns to comparative politics to examine how our two terrorist groups differ and resemble each other. This section will serve to confirm the findings of our first chapter and expand on the notion of legitimate political participation in the case of terrorist organizations. One important realization is that governments do play a part in the legitimation and transition of the groups. Both because of its demands and its actions, the IRA can be considered a classic example of a nationalist terrorist organization. Its fight to reunite Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic in the south is rooted in a long history of political participation, both licit and illicit. The PLO, as we shall see, presents a different set of problems as the organization itself is much more difficult to delineate. In both cases, we shall see that the move towards legitimacy is not exactly a unidirectional movement. The relationship between terrorist group and political party is more complex than that.

In our final chapter, we will examine the implications that the legitimation of terrorist groups might have, or rather, *will have* for democracy. As such, we proceed in an *inductive* manner, drawing broader conclusions from more specific situations. In many cases, terrorist activity is declining because of governments' acceptance to negotiate. However this trend does not exclude the possibility of a resurgence of violence when groups (or group factions) decide that legitimate participation does not provide the desired results. Current events provide us with enough examples of this. Furthermore, we will examine the consequences for the evolution of liberal democracies. The acceptance to

negotiate with former terrorist groups suggests that changes have been effected on the host countries' regimes. Over the course of our research, it became apparent to us that terrorism in liberal democracies perpetuates a kind of cycle causing a socio-political situation to vacillate between a relative stability and conflict. These challenges to liberal democracies will more than likely become very important as more groups see their future in a more "independent" light.

Reflections on terrorist groups and democracy

If terrorist organizations are to take an active role in the democratic process, they must prepare to make changes in their structure and objectives. This is particularly important for nationalist terrorist groups who have, for the most part, perceived that armed struggle was the only way to achieve their goals. Espousing legal tactics would mean, for instance, that the groups must come to the realization that the democratic process may be slower and more gradual than the shocking tactics employed in the past. The IRA, for example, has adapted a military-type structure, a form not particularly well-suited to democratic operation. Consequently, the use of a *legitimate* political party would become of prime importance; once a regime decides that minority groups can also voice their demands, then it must allow for these groups to form legitimate structures (*i.e.*, parties) in order to use existing channels (representation in Parliament, for example) which can take considerably more time. As we will see, some terrorist groups often already exist alongside legitimate political parties and benefit from this somewhat symbiotic relationship.

Furthermore, our hypothesis may suggest to the reader a unidirectional evolution towards legitimate political participation. But there are also instances where movement may occur in both

directions, i.e., groups can move towards terrorism or away from it. Ronald D. Crelinsten's model covers a range of behaviour, from legitimate protest to criminal activity, and allows for a back-and-forth movement.¹¹ So we admit that it is possible for groups to regress and return to terrorist activity (the IRA's on-and-off cease fire is one example).

Thus, the relationship between legitimate and illegitimate groups with the same objective is a very complex relationship indeed. The need for surreptitiousness surrounding terrorist groups and the problems of factionalization facing decentralized leadership weaken the structure of any organization. Moreover, strong belief in a cause among supporting populations does not imply that these same populations support any means to that end. Divergences may occur depending on which organization (legitimate or otherwise) is supported. For instance, nationalist Basques consistently support political parties pressuring for Basque autonomy; however, the support is considerably weaker for terrorist organizations struggling for similar objectives.¹²

Furthermore, there are few terrorist groups that have successfully accomplished the switch from terrorist organization to legitimate political party. Notable cases include the Irgun organization (which violently fought the British mandate over Palestinian lands and eventually reconstituted itself as the legal Herut party, headed by Menachem Begin, the Irgun's leader, in the independent state of Israel); and, the 1960-70's terrorist Tupamaros in Uruguay, which returned in a few years later as a

¹¹Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.1, No.2 (April 1989) p.253.

¹²A recent survey by the regional government showed 40 percent of Basques support the idea of an independent state, but only 11 percent believe violence is justified as a means to achieve it. Reuters Information Service, 10 July 1996.

conventional political party.¹³ Even Pierre Vallières, the former FLQ member turned political activist, appealed to Quebec nationalists in 1971 to support the Parti Québécois rather than any violent organization dedicated to the same cause.¹⁴

The decision to abandon terrorism is rarely a definite one. In the cases we have seen, most groups that possess a political offshoot continue to wage a terrorist campaign. It is difficult to tell whether a terrorist group has a strategy for its own future, if ever its demands are met. Moreover, it is difficult to predict the effects of the transition to legitimacy on the internal dynamics of the groups, including possible changes or replacements in leadership.¹⁵ Some more structured organizations, such as the PLO, already possess the attributes and composition necessary to rule a nation. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate on the future of terrorist groups if their demands are met. What becomes of them after that is another matter entirely.

This kind of transition leads us to conclude that terrorist groups may be abandoning some of their violent tactics in order to concentrate on legitimate political participation. This is not to say, however, that the violence is at all extinguished. In some cases, for example, group members find it difficult to deal with change and thus resist any attempt to alter their original intentions. These internal conflicts can lead to breakdowns in leadership, and possibly perpetuate the cycle of violence. Furthermore, groups may continue to use terror as a way to show determination in their goals. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army did decide to end their first declared cease-fire in the

¹³William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg "Political Parties and the Formation of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.2, No.2 (Summer 1990) pp.130-131.

¹⁴See Pierre Vallières, *L'Urgence de Choisir*. Montreal, Parti Pris, 1971.


¹⁵Issues of internal dynamics will be dealt with in coming chapters.

face of British government inaction. When groups do choose to “go legitimate,” these actions seem to complement the violence rather than replace it altogether.

The consequences for democracy are paramount. Because of a resurgence in ethnic demands, democracies must now try to compromise between two of their basic tenets: the accommodation of majority rule and the protection of existing minority groups.

Terrorist action in these cases becomes a sort of catalyst for government action. The extremists believe that the use of violence will, in effect, “speed up” their legitimate entry on the political scene. The whole process can be summed up in the following diagram (figure 1):

Figure 1.



* This link appears only in the case of nationalist terrorism. In other instances of terrorism (revolutionary, for example), recognition does not follow counter-terrorism, in fact, it never enters the equation.

Crenshaw also notes that “[t]he study of terrorism can be organized around three questions: why terrorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are.”¹⁵ This thesis will seek to answer the last two questions. It seems that nationalist terrorism is indeed influencing the way we govern ourselves. In liberal democracies, mechanisms are in place that

¹⁵Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism” in Edward Moxon-Browne (ed.) *The International Library of Terrorism 3: European Terrorism*, New York, G.K. Hall & Co., 1994, p.379.

allow groups to contest the government's decisions. Governments have now begun to consider nationalist claims as legitimate, a tactic that, as we shall see, has proven successful as a sort of "pressure valve" to relieve mounting tensions.

Since it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of terrorist group decline with any degree of precision, relative comparisons must be employed. This thesis compares two major terrorist groups, the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the context of their participation within their own legal political processes in their respective countries or territories. Both these groups were chosen because of i) their conformity to a certain definition (see below), ii) the existing data that is more readily available on their activities and progress, and iii) preliminary research on the subject that determined that these groups share similar demands and utilize similar tactics (both legal and illegal) to see that these demands are met (this research forms chapter one of our thesis).

The Problem of Definition

Terrorism is indeed a difficult subject to study because, while similar trends emerge, they also vary considerably from group to group and from one region of the world to another (much like the governance of states follows similar patterns while each country differs substantially). No two cases are alike and, even though the terrorist phenomenon can be sub-categorized (*e.g.*, nationalist or revolutionary), comparisons between analogous experiences are troublesome at best.

As with all works on the subject of terrorism, complete and workable definitions must be given. After consulting many members of the research community, Alex P. Schmid was able to summarize

the common points of many ideas on the subject. Thus, Schmid's precise (if lengthy) definition states that:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.¹⁷

However, because this is what can *generally* be said about terrorism, and since our study is limited to nationalist terrorism¹⁸, the following definition will be used to supplement the previous one:

Nationalist terrorism is the systematic use of violence or terror to assert a specific social cause, requiring a change in the existing political order or state, in order to establish political self-determination for a specific population.

This specificity is important because the kind of terrorism we are about to study differs in many ways from other types of terrorism (*e.g.*, revolutionary, anarchist, state, etc.). Also, what happens to that population after it acquires self-determination is another matter altogether. Some groups wish to form

¹⁷Alex P. Schmid, "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem" in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.) *Western Responses to Terrorism*, Frank Cass, London, 1993, p.8.

¹⁸We are giving preference to *nationalist* terrorism over other forms of terrorism because it appropriately suits the study of post Cold War international politics. This is not to say that ethnic conflict was absent during the Cold War, but it had been relegated to the back burner while world attention was drawn to the tense conflict of the bipolar world. The resurgence of nationalism and the persistence of violence demonstrate the changing focus of comparative politics and conflict regulation. Other forms of terrorism cannot be neglected, but they do not reflect the recent changes and trends of the post Cold War era. See Albert Legault, *The End of a Military Century?*, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 1992, pp.65-78, for further analysis on contemporary terrorism trends.

their own state (the PLO is one example of an *autonomist* or *sovereignist* organization), while others seek to break away from a particular sovereign state to join another—under a different government, but still on the same land (the IRA conforms to this *irredentist* model).¹⁹

Furthermore, one must be careful to distinguish between general acts of violence and specific acts of terrorism; indeed, both may stem from ethnic conflict (as in our cases) but might differ in method of action. While the former may suffer from a lack of structure and productive calculation, the latter is always planned and aimed at specific goals. For instance, in the case of Northern Ireland, Protestant groups may clash with Catholics without involving actual incidents of terrorism. Similarly in Israel, Palestinian youth regularly confront Israeli soldiers for the sole purpose of voicing their opposition to the current regime. Specific acts of terrorism imply a distinct organization dedicated to the fulfillment of definite goals. Determining these goals is a matter of ideology: terrorism in itself is a

¹⁹The PLO does not fall into the irredentist category because it has not reached the status of a fully *sovereign* state. Article 1 of the *Declaration of Principles* (signed in 1993 during a secret meeting in Oslo between Arafat and Rabin) itself states that it seeks to “establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement...” This conveys the idea that Palestinians will eventually be allowed complete self-rule after an appropriate transition period had passed. However, this is not a declaration of sovereignty, nor a pledge of support for the creation of a Palestinian state (similar to the Balfour Declaration, which conferred British support to the Jews for the creation of the state of Israel in 1922). Special powers over jurisdictions normally attributable only to states (*e.g.*, militarism, diplomatic relations, foreign policy) have been reserved for Israel under additions to Article IV of the *Declaration of Principles*. The condition of sovereignty refers to an inescapable essence: the absence of a higher authority in international relations (See Philippe Braillard and Mohammad-Reza Djalili, *Les relations internationales*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1988, p.33.) Thus, as long as Israel still maintains some form of authority over Palestinian autonomous regions, the PLO continues to seek the creation of a fully sovereign state of its own, and therefore cannot be referred to as an irredentist organization.

means to an end.²⁰ This thesis will approach terrorist organizations as radical pressure groups who use terror as a method of action rather than as an ideology. This is particularly relevant for nationalist terrorists who resort to violence and intimidation as a way to make their demands known to the government and the alienating majority populations. The legitimate participation of terrorist groups in the form of political parties reflects the tendency of some more well-organized pressure groups who rally together to form political bodies in order to assert their objectives or fight the government directly, but legally. Terrorists choose not to or are unable to form these legitimate entities, and resort to violence to achieve similar goals.²¹

A Word on Certain Moral Aspects

It is quite common to hear of law enforcement agencies and some countries having a policy of non-negotiation with terrorists. Even the debate on definitions given to terrorism poses difficulties in these matters. It is difficult, for example, to consolidate a crime model of terrorism, which focuses on the illegal means only, with a war model, which portrays terrorism as a continuation of politics.²² Wide-ranging definitions to include any violence of a political nature become objectionable and the popular "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" dilemma remains too ambiguous for any practical legal purpose (the debate is academic at best). Unquestionably, some national liberation

²⁰Gayraud, pp.193-195.

²¹See Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.5, No.4 (Winter 1993) pp.213-251.

²²Schmid, p.7.

movements do have merit, but should all effective definitions of terrorism extend to cover such movements?²³

There are many legal implications, not the least of which is that the trouble in finding a precise but easily applicable definition to terrorism means that it is difficult to codify it in terms of any criminal justice system. Thus, though terrorism might be unjustified in most contexts, one could conceive of situations where the term could still apply to actions with a more legitimate purpose, such as national liberation causes. This reflects Gayraud's concept of terrorism as a means rather than an end. In the case of nationalist liberation causes, the goal may be worthy while the methods may not.

Popular perceptions of terrorist activity (those based on graphic news reporting, for example) have often served to transform a localized conflict into a frightening imagery of crazed radicals committing random acts of violence for no reason. This kind of stereotyping has promoted the idea of liberation groups as radical sectarian organizations bent on achieving their own private agenda. IRA and PLO terrorists have been deemed as such in the popular mind. However, Robert W. White believes that some groups are more than mere sectarian organizations (those that adhere to the central interests of a sect -- usually religious -- rather than to the interest of a wider collective) and that their plight of national liberation may be based on more than a single issue (he cites the IRA's case as dealing with more than just religion).²⁴ But British and Israeli governments have repeatedly denied the legitimacy of these groups by narrowing the breadth of the terrorists' goals. Consequently, exceptions

²³The question is examined in Wardlaw, pp.105-114.

²⁴See Robert W. White, "The Irish Republican Army: An Assessment of Sectarianism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.9, No.1 (Spring 1997) pp.20-55.

to the “non-negotiation” policies may be a desired recourse in such cases. Of course, the debate is further complicated where liberal democracies are concerned. How does one justify an act of political terror when other options are available?

Although this thesis does not seek to address the moral issues of negotiating with present and former terrorist organizations, some light should nevertheless be shed on the matter. Remember that Crelinsten’s model suggests that groups who choose to “go legitimate” may also regress to their terrorist past.²⁵ It is possible that the legitimate political representatives may return to the terrorism if their demands are not met. Furthermore, there is always a danger when negotiating with terrorists: some studies have shown that terrorist groups may escalate their demands even if governments make concessions to them.²⁶ This brings us back to the debate on the validity of negotiating with terrorists.

However, we believe that negotiation does not mean capitulation, nor does it mean compromising national security. In the passage from terrorist organization to legitimate political party, it does remain unclear whether the groups will completely abandon the terrorist (illegal) tactics to become full fledged legal representatives: but it is important to recognize that the government will be dealing with the political representatives of the terrorist organizations and will be doing so only under very special conditions (such as a cease fire or a promise of mutual recognition).²⁷ It might seem

²⁵See Crelinsten, “Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats.” 1989.

²⁶Wardlaw, p.71.

²⁷The British government has very recently decided to allow Sinn Fein to take part in peace talks in Northern Ireland under the understanding that it make a formal public declaration that it is committed to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. *The Ottawa Citizen*, 30 August 1997, p.A6.

idealistic to base trust on such possibly ephemeral beliefs, but it is one possible peaceful solution that has yet to be explored to an otherwise intractable and often lethal situation.

Chapter 1

Selection of Groups

I. INTRODUCTION

It is never easy to attempt to measure something that, by its very nature, does not lend itself to conventional methods of analysis. This is the case with terrorism. As people and the media become more aware of events in conflict ridden regions, we believe there is a trend towards legitimization. Over the years, the world has become better informed through improved communications, the media, and watch groups, such as Amnesty International. The result has been that a more balanced view of the situations has emerged. People can now see for themselves how governments have sometimes used over-repressive means to smother internal strife. This more balanced and informed view has also increased support for populations under government pressure. And thus, the terrorist groups have also benefited from this trend towards legitimization. As we shall see, the IRA and the PLO are outstanding examples of this trend. This chapter will provide insight on the selection of our two units of research and the theoretical background used in our analysis. We will see how they correspond to the nationalist terrorist model and how they fit in with more general theories of group conflict. In this chapter, each group will be dealt with separately to familiarize the reader with current events and to give analytical insight on conflict resolution in each region.

Generally, studies on terrorism use concepts that relate to the particular elements of an analysis (*e.g.*, they will examine a group in one region or methods particular to a single group). It is mostly the scope of the study that changes in relation to its objective. For instance, researchers may examine a single group, a geopolitical region, or even a specific form of terrorism. Inside these three very different areas, they highlight related elements that may (or may not) be relevant to the analysis.

Most of the studies also examine the problem from a confrontational angle, that is, they see the problem as one group (the terrorists) opposing another group (the government) in a battle where there is no room for negotiation. We submit that an important factor of legitimation of the existence of groups is the willingness of host country authorities to accept the groups as negotiators.

In the case of the IRA and the PLO, both have political wings dedicated to the fulfillment of claims similar to those of the terrorist groups. This is not a recent phenomenon, but we believe it to have developed as terrorist groups evolved and acquired better organization. Sometimes, legal political entities fell victim to factionalization and resorted to terrorism.²⁸ However, it is not always necessary that terrorist groups possess legal entities to negotiate rationally. Many terrorist groups entertain some dialogue with authorities, even without official acknowledgment.²⁹

II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON NATIONALIST TERRORIST GROUPS

Peter C. Sederberg aptly summarizes the ideological reasoning behind nationalist groups:

*Typically, [these groups] demand greater autonomy and self-determination, ideas, though vague, which serve as powerful inducements for political mobilization.*³⁰

²⁸See Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," pp.69-87.

²⁹The "secret" Oslo Accords are one example. It is one way that unofficial dialogue could be conducted.

³⁰Peter C. Sederberg, *Terrorist Myths: illusion, rhetoric, and reality*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1989, p.54.

Nationalist and separatist terrorist movements rationalize that the denial of political participation by authorities justifies their use of violence as part of a strategic campaign to accede to power.³¹ In most cases, the terrorists are motivated by historical circumstances that are handed down from generation to generation. This serves to reinforce behaviour amongst the members of the groups and provides a clarity of purpose for the cause.

One important consideration is the unusually greater staying power of nationalist terrorist groups (as opposed to other types of terrorists). Walter Laqueur notes that this staying power was "vastly underrated" by many researchers, including theorists like Marx and Engels, who would contend that class would be a greater incentive to struggle than ethnicity.³² Indeed, nationalist sentiment knows no classes and characterizes the entire spectrum of a given ethnic society.

Generally, groups differ by their degree of social organization, by their numbers and by the location of their targets. Individual groups will also vary from region to region and any classification of terrorist groups is almost certain to simplify a complex reality³³, but some, like the IRA and the PLO, share many common attributes worthy of further exploration.

The IRA has openly advocated a terrorist campaign against British authorities in Northern Ireland since 1916. Like other groups of its kind, its activities are divided between the use of violence and political participation via its legal political wing, Sinn Fein. With the PLO, we must often tread

³¹Peter F. Janke, "Nationalist and Separatist Terrorism: Conditions for Success and Failure," in Anat Kurz (ed.) *Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1987, p.16.

³²Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1987, p.233.

³³*Ibid.*, p.205.

through "gray areas" of international geopolitics. We have explained before how difficult it can be to classify it as a terrorist organization; however, most experts agree that, like the IRA, the PLO has waged a terrorist campaign while leading a legal political campaign for official acceptance as claimant of territories in Israel, Lebanon and Egypt. During the last four years, the Israeli government has shown itself ready to concede certain demands to the Palestinians in exchange for a cessation to the violence that the PLO and its splinter groups have sponsored in the Occupied Territories.

The PLO has since acquired the status of legitimate political party by Israeli authorities, but the hostilities continue. The Palestinians also suffer from an ailment plaguing Republicans in Northern Ireland; that is, the territories in question are not homogeneous in population, unlike the Basque regions and those in the Punjab.³⁴ This issue greatly contributes to the problem and makes it difficult for leaders to come up with an acceptable solution.

As we have discussed before, we consider the PLO to be a terrorist organization because it incorporates a multitude of factions that possess similar aims and wage violent terrorist campaigns. Sederberg alleges that the PLO constitutes "*an umbrella organization, riven by factions that have not been above attacking one another, as well as the Israelis and their supporters (especially Americans)*."³⁵

Other nationalist terrorist groups with legitimate political wings were also considered; however, they were deemed as less likely to succeed in their goals, especially in light of their acceptance as negotiating bodies for certain minorities. Groups such as the Akali Dal (AD), a Sikh organization

³⁴Conor Gearty, *Terror*. London, Faber and Faber, 1991, p.112.

³⁵Sederberg, p.56.

demanding, among other things, the creation of a Punjabi state (in northern India) have had problems obtaining results. The Sikhs represent about 2% of the total Indian population, but do not constitute an impoverished minority. On the contrary, Sikhs occupy influential positions in the high echelons of Indian society, particularly in the armed forces. The AD is an official political party in India and has a strong influence on the Punjabi population and its surrounding countryside. Sikh extremists were responsible for the failed hijacking of an Air India Boeing 737 in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1981; they are also under investigation for the 1985 Air India flight 182 bombing which killed 329 people off the coast of Ireland.³⁶

Another group, the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) began its terrorist activities in the 1960s. The group is demanding the creation of a Basque state. It numbers approximately 1,000 members throughout the region but does not have wide support in its activities throughout Spain. Even the Catalans, another people demanding special status, do not seem to lend them solidarity support. ETA's activities intensified during the 1992 World's Fair in Seville and the Olympic Games in Barcelona, but they quickly waned and lost their impact when its leader, Francisco Garmendia, was arrested by French authorities.³⁷

In selecting the IRA and the PLO, we first wanted to discover similarities between the groups. Common traits highlighted affinities about the nature of the terrorist groups. We also found that differences attested to the diverse methods used and the degree of success obtained. Similarities

³⁶At the present time, it remains unclear whether a Sikh organization was responsible or not. However, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have arrested, charged and convicted a Sikh individual (residing in Canada) in the bombing, and claim they are close to laying charges against four others.

³⁷*L'État du monde 1993*. Montreal, Boréal, 1992, pp.156-157.

between groups would also indicate that the evolution of the two groups were aptly chosen and that their evolutions corresponded to a truly "international" form of nationalist terrorism. (More comparative elements will be featured in chapter two.)

In our opinion, the IRA and the PLO seem the most likely to succeed and this is explained by two reasons: a) these groups benefit from greater exposure and support at the international level³⁸, and b) they benefit from a more elaborate social and political internal organization³⁹, which greatly facilitates the supervision and coordination of activities (terrorist or not).

III. SUCCESS STORIES: THE IRA AND THE PLO

An examination of the two groups underlined interesting trends. In some respects, results were not at all surprising. For example, some trends demonstrated the advanced social cohesion and highly evolved internal organization we have discussed earlier. (More on this in the next chapter.)

Even today, however, neither of the groups has attained its primary objective (the creation of a nation-state or, in the IRA's case, reunification with the Republic of Ireland); however, other "secondary" goals have been attained. Above all, the host countries have begun talks with the political wings of the groups. The lifting of the ban against parties such as Sinn Fein has facilitated negotiations

³⁸See James Adams, *The Financing of Terror: Behind the PLO, the IRA, Red Brigades and M19 Stand the Paymasters*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986, pp.130-184.

³⁹Kenneth G. Robertson, "Northern Ireland: Change, Continuity, and Trends" in Anat Kurz (ed.) *Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1987, p.32.

and reduced rampant acts of terrorism.⁴⁰ Other more short-term objectives such as occupying forces pull-outs, world-wide attention and morale building have also been achieved.⁴¹

A. TROUBLES IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

The 1990s marks a renewed effort by British authorities to negotiate a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. In 1989, Peter Brooke, then minister responsible for Northern Ireland, arrived in Belfast to get a consensus from Irish parties in the North; however, he had no intention of meeting with Sinn Fein to protest against IRA actions (at the time, a policy of strict non-discussion with terrorist groups was in place).⁴² At the beginning of 1991, the IRA precipitated its terrorist activities in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. These actions, combined with the acquittal of six Republican sympathizers (unjustly condemned in the 1974 Birmingham bombing) by British authorities, helped to inform world opinion about the Troubles. With an increase in international recognition, a turnabout in official British policy occurred, which thereafter permitted negotiations with Sinn Fein in 1993. Dialogue was further facilitated more recently with the election of Tony Blair's Labour government in Britain. Blair's more progressive vision of the Troubles would be seen as a "fresh start" for peace talks. But there remains the danger of dissatisfied Republicans who still see the British as the enemy.

It is difficult to determine whether IRA tactics were successful in retaining support by the populations, nor if living conditions among Catholics in Northern Ireland increased because of IRA

⁴⁰It has not eliminated the violence completely, as current events prove, but it has put the onus on the groups to curb their own behaviour and keep potential radical factions in check.

⁴¹Wardlaw, pp.39-42.

⁴²*L'État du monde 1992*, Montreal, Boréal, 1991, p.466.

activity. Ironically, the Catholics benefit from government subsidies that, in many cases, increase their standard of living to about that in the Irish Republic.⁴³ Furthermore, Sinn Fein received only 15.5% of the vote in Northern Ireland during the 1996 elections. These gains correspond to only one third of the Catholic population. However, not unlike the Palestinians, many Catholics are growing impatient with politicians' inability to react rapidly and decisively.

The IRA Today

The colloquialism "Ulsterization" is meant to convey the idea of an intractable intercommunity conflict and reflects a unique character that is part of a greater scheme of social behaviour.⁴⁴ New ways and concepts are similarly created when an element of instability is introduced to a relatively stable and normalized situation. Such is the case with the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the idea of democracy in a country that represents the epitome of stability and security. With the emergence of a known terrorist organization on the legitimate political scene, British parliamentarism has forever been altered.

Concomitant to the idea of terrorism as "warfare tactics for the poor," radical Republican forces began by employing the most basic forms of insurrection. Militias were formed to fight what was in essence a civil war, one that opposed two communities of different religious and ethnic backgrounds, but sharing the same land under the same government. It was only when British

⁴³*The Economist*, 5 February 1994, p.13.

⁴⁴Dermot Keogh and Michael Hartzel, Introduction to *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.1.

authorities decided to step in that a more coherent fighting machine would have to be assembled. Thus, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) came into being. The "Provos" applied modern dissident tactics but rejected the left-wing ideology that was permeating Republican politics at the time (thus splitting from the more conventional "Official" IRA).

If there has been a terrorist organization that has evolved and grown more sophisticated with time, it is the PIRA. The most obvious trend in its methodology has been the deliberate use of violence to maintain a deep division between the Republican and Unionist forces. Not only is this consistent with their main objective, it is also a way to prevent any sort of permanent order from settling in the region, something that British authorities have tried to establish throughout the decades. However, the number of terrorist-related incidents and casualties reveal that this is a tactic employed as much by the Loyalists as the IRA.

Gerty proposes that the violence has an even more important effect for the Republican cause: it serves to "polarize the two communities of Northern Ireland," thus creating a climate of hate and fear among the two groups.⁴⁵ In this sense, the polarization of the two communities serves the purpose of focussing the efforts of each ethnic group. Charles Tilly calls this *mobilization*, the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action.⁴⁶ The IRA has succeeded in directing nationalist movements very effectively throughout the Catholic populations of Northern

⁴⁵Gerty, p.120.

⁴⁶Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley, 1978. p.7.

Ireland, primarily, we believe, because it has embodied the republican cause and thus become part of the collective consciousness.

There are enough examples of common citizens willing to become martyrs for the cause to confirm how deeply the IRA's plight is entrenched.⁴⁷ Thus, even though there have been instances of opposition to the IRA within the Catholic community, the organization has rallied support for the cause by offering resistance to the Protestants and occupying forces and, perhaps just as importantly, by keeping potential dissenters in check within the community.⁴⁸ The tightly knit, oppressed and impoverished Catholic communities in Northern Ireland provide prime conditions for this kind of mobilization.⁴⁹

But Gearty admits that though the use of violence may help to achieve some objectives, it is not the most prevalent tactic. Provocation seems to be the preferred IRA stratagem.⁵⁰ Unlike many terrorist organizations, *deliberate* targeting of the innocent (even Protestants) has not been utilized. The violence has been specifically directed at government people and resources in order to draw gross over-repressive action that would in effect martyr their cause. Ariel Merari sums up the idea like this:

Terrorist attacks tend to draw repressive responses...These measures, in turn, make the government unpopular, thus increasing public support of the terrorists and their cause. When government counter-terrorism actions are not only draconic but ineffective as well, anti-government sentiment is bound to be even more prevalent.⁵¹

⁴⁷See Tim Pat Coogan. *The I.R.A.*. London, Harper Collins, 1995, pp.411-428.

⁴⁸See *Ibid.*, pp.235-236.

⁴⁹See Tilly for explanations on the general conditions for mobilization, pp.81-84.

⁵⁰Gearty, pp.122-123.

⁵¹Merari, p.235.

This is quite true of the IRA, but discounts most violence perpetrated by non-IRA Republicans, like bouts of hooliganism or violence by civilian Unionists.

In essence, the "official" IRA methodology has been one of orchestrating actions enabling them to point the finger of blame at the government for any bloodshed. It has been suggested that the IRA does not look for attention but rather seeks to "hurt" the British government specifically.⁵² However, many of their recent coups lead us to believe that the IRA has realized that a goal-oriented approach alone could be detrimental to its cause. Thus it has sought to expand its strategic arsenal by garnering outside attention. This relates to what is perhaps the most relevant dimension of the conflict: the use of communications as a weapon.

It is a well-known fact that the IRA receives a great deal of support, both emotionally and financially, from Irish emigrants throughout the world, and particularly from the United States. This, plus the fact that the Troubles are occurring in a relatively well-known and modern part of the world, ensures that incidents and developments on the situation are well-reported.

Presently, Northern Ireland remains one of the more troubled parts of the world, although the problem is not primarily one of war and famine (not yet, anyway), but rather of a widening gap between two social classes. The conditions under which most Irish Catholics live in Northern Ireland have not improved for the most part; they still remain one of the poorest people in Western Europe. The IRA continues to wage violent attacks on British targets and interests, and authorities are finding it

⁵²Laqueur, p.211.

more and more difficult to deal with the terrorists. The conflict seems to be raging as strongly as ever, yet some political analysts admit it has never been closer to resolution. What has changed?

For one thing, mass communications have allowed a much broader view of the situation. Policy makers and the general public are much more aware of the goings on in Northern Ireland. Good or bad, incidents are instantly reverberated around the world, and reactions are felt almost as quickly. The IRA manipulates the media quite well and knows how to appeal to supporters. The visit of Gerry Adams to the United States in 1994 and his ensuing interview on CNN served to bring the Republican cause to an important audience, without making headlines about actual terrorist activity.

The result has been a slight change in the IRA's methodology; it has had to narrow its list of targets in an effort to reduce negative international public opinion. Weimann and Winn classify the IRA as a traditional (as opposed to media-oriented) terrorist group because it does not seek to sensationalise its cause with attacks on more "neutral" targets.⁵³ This is an appropriate classification, however one could argue that the IRA is somewhat media-oriented in spite of itself. This could account for the extensive coverage the media confer to it: it is second only to the Palestinian conflict, in terms of media coverage around the world.⁵⁴

Another aspect of change in the conflict in Northern Ireland has been the quiet acceptance by British authorities of many IRA demands. This could be a direct result of the afore-mentioned improved communication process, but it is also a result of Great Britain's participation in the European

⁵³Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*, New York, Longman, 1994, p.48.

⁵⁴*Ibid.* p.83.

Community. In fact, both mass-communications and regional integration have contributed greatly to the IRA's cause. In addition to the obvious fact that Britain gives a negative impression of itself when it is shown repressing some of its own people, there are many other factors that point to answers as to why resolution could be near.

Accordingly, the European Community is also a powerful incentive to reconciliation. It has been described as a way to unite the various peoples of Europe while respecting individual national identities. British MP John Hume notes these important consequences for the Anglo-Irish conflict:

[Many have come to realize] the growing integration of the European Community based on the realization that the democratic nation-state is no longer a sufficient political entity to allow people to have adequate control over the economic and technological forces that affect people's opportunities and circumstances.⁵⁵

Consequently,

The transforming scene in Eastern and Central Europe has opened the prospect of the Common European Home....The process represented by the Paris Charter [signed at a meeting of the CSCE in 1990] marks a fundamental change in the nature of the defence and security debate in Europe. That has significance in British and Irish relationships because it underscores the fact that whatever strategic considerations inspired British attitudes toward Ireland in the past are obsolescent if not already obsolete.⁵⁶

These arguments may effectively weaken Britain's stance on justifying its need for Northern Ireland, by raising other issues, such as human rights. Furthermore, as the world moves towards globalization and power is increasingly relegated to partnerships—the European Union being a prime example—the

⁵⁵ John Hume, "A new Ireland in a new Europe" in D. Keogh and M.H. Haltzel (eds.) *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.227.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

monopolization of governance by a single state is weakened.⁵⁷ Economic interests invariably supplant political authority in this new era where states can no longer maintain completely impermeable borders. Consequently, the ability to determine one's *appartenance* becomes less of a matter for the state to decide and more a concern, or rather a choice, that confronts the individual and the groups.

Insight on Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland

Current events promise a difficult peace—if there is to be one at all—for a deeply entrenched war of identities and stubborn personalities. Not only does the problem in Northern Ireland threaten peace and security, it also threatens European Unity and, as we hope to point out in Chapter 3 of this thesis, liberal democracy itself. There are many proposed plans for a resolution to the conflict besides a military solution. In fact, both sides seem to be realizing that a legal, perhaps even constitutional option can indeed be found.

A) British Authorities' Actions to Resolve Conflict

That the Troubles in Northern Ireland are a complicated issue is quite an understatement. Not only are both sides quite immovable on the situation, neither seems to know what form the important first step towards a solution should be. The short-lived IRA cease-fire (and its recent resurrection) was such a step, but government inaction precluded any meaningful outcome.

⁵⁷Gearty, p.130.

Not surprisingly, British authorities can be held responsible to a great extent for the continuing clashes. Indeed, it is difficult to find an example of a people that would willingly subject itself to another that flourished through a long history of Imperialism. However, it is simplistic to accuse British authorities alone. Brendan O'Duffy proposes that "the British government's overriding emphasis upon containing the conflict through security initiatives is a primary obstacle to the achievement of lasting regulatory mechanisms because they entrench rather than marginalise proponents of violence."⁵⁸ At first glance, one might be left with an image of a powerful Protestant majority bent on crushing a much weaker Catholic minority that is merely reacting to the excesses of a centralizing force. However, O'Duffy correctly identifies the problem as a threat to an established political order, or as Joanne Wright puts it, "the British Isles security complex."⁵⁹

Wright's approach to the problem leads to the conclusion that both sides are essentially at fault and that a resolution to the conflict can only be sought through a more complete understanding of the situation.⁶⁰ Her multidimensional analysis of the conflict encourages a more "holistic" picture, rather than suggesting British intransigence or IRA violence are the only causes of the deadlock. In its present state, the conflict is a result of uneasy relationships not only between Protestants and Catholics but also between Northern Ireland Protestants and Great Britain, Northern Ireland Catholics

⁵⁸Brendan O'Duffy, "Containment or Regulation? The British approach to ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland" in J. McGarry and B. O'Leary (eds.) *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, London, Routledge, 1993, p.128.

⁵⁹Joanne Wright, "Northern Ireland—A British Isles Security Complex," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.5, No.6 (Winter 1993) p.269.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p.284.

and the Irish Republic, and whatever other relationships exist between any of these groups. Simply put, Wright's approach explains how change in one area affects other areas.⁵⁷

There also exists the perception that the use of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the police force in Northern Ireland) and the Army in Northern Ireland is an obvious attempt by the British government to take sides on the issue. Many believe that, even though Northern Ireland is under British control, the Westminster government should remain more neutral. In fact, the Troubles are believed to be a problem that should be resolved within its own boundaries, without British interference. However, in recent years, it appears as though the British government has indeed refrained from over-emphasizing its presence in Northern Ireland, much to the dismay of Protestants in the region. This middle-of-the-road approach has not been entirely without criticism by both sides, but it does suggest support for a peaceful resolve to the conflict.

B) IRA Actions to Resolve Conflict

Though recent developments in conflict resolution do stem from an acceptance to negotiate by government forces, the IRA is also working towards an end to the Troubles. There are many indications that the Unionist position in Northern Ireland is weakening. John Whyte lists these factors as: a growing Catholic population; a failing economic situation for the unionist population; a lack of

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.271.

unionist political clout; and, a push for independence by the British Labour Party.⁶² Sinn Fein has acted cleverly in recent years, taking advantage of these factors to promote its cause.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 is an attempt to address the constitutional structure of Northern Ireland and it owes its existence at least partly to IRA actions. The accord gave the Republic of Ireland a consultative role in the administration of Northern Ireland, and it was and is championed by non-violent nationalist political opinion in Northern Ireland, though the republican movement rejects it. Gearty notes that "the effect of separatist violence has usually been the political advancement of moderate opinion..."⁶³

Today, legitimate political participation is working for the IRA when, in the past, it had failed miserably in its attempts to win elections. Presumably, the long-lasting terrorist campaign has had the effect of softening the government's position on non-negotiation. When, in 1993, it was discovered that British authorities were secretly dialoguing with Sinn Fein and the IRA, both sides agreed to increase talks, the IRA was officially recognized, and the veil was lifted.⁶⁴ This new-found acceptance of Sinn Fein as the legitimate representative of the Republican Movement not only provided the struggling political party with much-needed support from the electorate, but it also removed many of the obstacles that had, in the past, prevented it from achieving any measure of success. Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has made no apologies for the IRA's violent past and would probably admit that it

⁶²John Whyte, "Dynamics of Change in Northern Ireland" in D. Keogh and M.H. Haltzel (eds.) *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.103-106.

⁶³Gearty, p.129.

⁶⁴See Peter Taylor, *States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence*. London, Penguin, 1993, pp.322-327.

was necessary to garner attention. However, he seems unable to reconcile the past with the present: terrorist activity still appears to be part of the IRA's approach to achieving peace, despite the on-and-off cease fires.

Great Britain has continued to pay close attention to the demands of Sinn Fein ever since it recognized the republican party's mandate in 1993. Sinn Fein's main demand has been the request of a single referendum to be held on the issue (as opposed to the double-referendum, one in Ireland and one in Ulster, as originally proposed by London).⁶⁵ Protestant opposition to this motion resulted in violence by both groups. Time and again, the situation has met with obstacles which threaten the peace process.

On 31 August 1994, after 25 years of fighting, the IRA made a surprising move by officially declaring an unconditional cease-fire and announcing it would allow peace talks to continue unhindered. This marked a renewed effort by the IRA and Sinn Fein to engage in a dialogue with the British government. The IRA hoped that, in turn, the government would reach out to them and give serious consideration to their demands.⁶⁶ Occasional protest by more radical republican splinter groups had to be expected, but all in all, the IRA remained true to its word. British authorities responded by demanding the IRA surrender its arms in order for peace talks to begin; but the IRA and Sinn Fein remained wary of any initiative from the government.⁶⁷ Concessions had been made by both

⁶⁵*L'État du monde 1995*, Montreal, Boréal, 1994, p.559.

⁶⁶See Martha Crenshaw, "Decisions to Abandon Terrorism: A Preliminary Case Study of the IRA." American Political Science Association, 1995 (unpublished) for an examination of the IRA's decision to declare a cease fire.

⁶⁷Frederick Painton, "Silent Guns Still Speak," *Time Magazine*, 8 September 1995, p.44.

sides and dialogue appeared to be evolving, but Gerry Adams warned that the peace process would be at an end if Great Britain continued to insist upon the surrender of IRA weapons. "I have no doubt republicans are committed to the peace process," said Adams, "but how long that patience remains I have no idea."⁶⁸

Sure enough, the cease-fire ended on February 9, 1996, when a bomb was detonated in London's east end, injuring some 35 people. True to its word, the IRA claimed responsibility for the bombing, admitting it was only responding to Britain's intransigence.

C) International Intervention - Europe and the World

We have seen that the European Union (EU) can provide Great Britain and the IRA with the incentive to put a stop to the violence by positive (*e.g.*, economic assistance and opportunities) or negative (*e.g.*, economic and political sanctions) reinforcement. Peter Chalk addresses the issue from the angle of the European Community's effort to counter terrorism in liberal democracies.⁶⁹ It seems there is a widespread fear that terrorism will somehow more easily cross borders now that Europe has gone through the process of integration and that, particularly in the cases of Irish and Palestinian terrorism, nations will have to mount a collective vigil to protect the union.

Chalk notes that Great Britain has, for the most part, treated the terrorist problem as a criminal instance, and has deployed its army as a *post-facto* solution to the violence.⁷⁰ Though his analysis is

⁶⁸*The Ottawa Citizen*, 13 July 1995, p.A3.

⁶⁹Peter Chalk, "EU Counter-Terrorism, the Maastricht Third Pillar and Liberal Democracy Acceptability," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.6, No.2 (Summer 1994) pp.103-145.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p.108.

broader in context, he correctly points out that the EU does have a role to play in the case of Northern Ireland.

If the EU has provided incentive for Britain, then there is hope for negotiations with the IRA as well. For example, it is unlikely that the Troubles reflect positively on the state of the European Union. It would not be surprising that Great Britain and Ireland be under pressure to resolve their conflict before any negative repercussions are felt by other members of the EU. Accordingly, delegations from abroad have offered to help in the peace process. Both Canada and the United States, as well as other nations, have sent representatives to Northern Ireland in the hope of mediating the peace talks, following a successful trend established in the Middle East. This particular aspect of the conflict is open to greater analysis, particularly as it relates to democracy. Sean Byrne proposes that some form of peace is attainable through third-party intervention and grassroots movements, the idea being that governments (both the British and the Irish) can only serve to compound a deeply-entrenched problem of conflicting cultures.⁷¹

While the IRA seeks to remove the six counties of Ulster from British hands, the Palestine Liberation Organization is struggling to create a state of its own. But the distinction between irredentist and autonomist groups is subtle at best because the Arab-Israeli conflict also involves one people breaking away from another, taking with it land and institutions that still belong to others. And while

⁷¹Sean Byrne, "Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third-Party Intervention in the Northern Ireland Conflict—Prospects for Peace," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.7, No.2 (Summer 1995) pp.1-24.

the Palestinians have no territory to re-join, they are as militant about their national heritage as are the Irish Republicans. Furthermore, the Israelis are taking measures similar to those of the British in their dealings with nationalist demands.

B. "WHO WAS THERE FIRST?": THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

As in Northern Ireland, Israel has shown itself favourable to peace talks with Palestinian groups who wish to put an end to the conflict. The PLO, henceforth officially recognized by the international community, has also put forward a motion to negotiate. The 1990s were sullied by multiple massacres on and from both sides of the conflict. Israel has not hesitated to use force to repress indignant Palestinians. While all of this was happening, there was a renewed interest by the United States to end the conflict: President Bush, succeeded by President Clinton, showed interest in beginning peace talks. This outside involvement demonstrates a complete success in regards to international recognition and acceptance of the PLO as representative by the authorities.

These talks signaled the coming of important concessions by the Israelis in regards to the Occupied Territories. However, the meeting of the various heads of state involved did not attenuate popular unrest. Differences as to how the conflict should be resolved are an obstacle to immediate success: while Palestinians insist on the necessity of defining the entirety of territorial concessions, the Israelis (who, admittedly, have more to lose) are demanding a more gradual approach.⁷² Nonetheless, occupying forces have indeed been pulling out of key Arab territories. In November 1995, Palestinians

⁷²International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey, 1992-1993*. London, Brassey's, 1993, p.116.

took control of Jenin, an important West Bank city and stronghold of Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. This time, the Israeli pullout was quick and orderly, a far cry from the mayhem that characterized the Gaza withdrawal a year before. With the implementation of the Autonomy Council in the West Bank in early 1996 and the confirmation of Yasir Arafat as its head, the Palestinians have gained much ground on their road to national independence. Such successes are evidence of changing priorities and global trends. However, the hardline approach of a newly elected rightist government and the breakdown in current negotiations could deny that possibility in the short-term at least.

The Conflict⁷³

This particular examination of the Middle East conflict will limit itself to the fighting in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (although they are not the only regions involved in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute). We will avoid the Golan Heights and the South of Lebanon even though they are also "hot" regions. However, the problems do have their similarities and the reader may be able to apply ideas and recommendations provided here to those areas as well. The PLO asserts that the Israelis are the illegitimate owners of Arab lands in the disputed areas. The Israelis, on the other hand, can argue that their presence is the result of outside pressures that pushed them into emigrating to the region.

⁷³Warning: The reader must understand that the best works on the subject of the Middle East conflict often come from Arab or Israeli sources. Hence, an examination of the situation in the Middle East is always difficult because research materials (particularly the quantitative kind) often contain biases that must be filtered with a careful eye. Some important studies do exist, however, particularly in the area of terrorism, that are not as hindered by authors' opinions.

Politically, the case for who deserves the land the most is of prime importance. The legitimacy of both peoples is somewhat valid and verifiable. It does seem that the Palestinians have more to gain in the situation; but, though they were once deprived of their own territory, they have now acquired parcels of land via the 1993 Oslo Accords. Many have viewed the accords as major concessions, however Palestinian acts of violence continue in formerly occupied territories to the wonder of many disaffected Israelis who feel that they have given away too much already. On the other hand, support for the Oslo Peace Accords has risen steadily. A January 1996 Gallup Poll showed that out of 730 Israeli residents, 59.2% supported the Oslo Accords.⁷⁴ This newly found support, attributed to the 1996 Palestinian elections, had hinted at improvements for peace. The January 20th elections were a clear triumph for the Oslo peace process.⁷⁵ Incidentally, there were no massive violent outbreaks after the elections.

Economically, the Israeli government is focussing on dominating Jerusalem. Better paid jobs in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank go to Israelis.⁷⁶ Deprived of an official army up until recently, Palestinian men did not have the option of a "last resort" military life has traditionally permitted. Conditions have only slightly improved since recent peace talks and concessions.

Culturally, the divisions are highly visible. Israel is accused of wanting to spread Zionism across the world, and the Arab countries are uniting in opposition. In fact, apart from rare exceptions,

⁷⁴Source: "Gallup Poll: 59 Percent Support For Oslo Accords," from *Israel Line*, Consulate General of Israel, New York, <http://math.technion.ac.il/israeline/1996/01-26-96.html>

⁷⁵On a side note, even though Arafat attempted to intimidate opposition candidates, several anti-Arafat candidates were elected to the Palestinian Council, and ten percent of the votes for the position of Chairman went to Arafat's opponents.

⁷⁶Victor Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy, *By Way of Deception*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990, p.333.

notably Egypt, other Arab countries do not recognize the legal existence of Israel ever since the signing of an accord during the League of Arab States Summit held in Libya in December 1977.⁷⁷ But because of the more intense current peace talks, steps have been taken towards mutual recognition.

However, the conflict has reached such levels that pointing the finger of blame at a particular side no longer seems relevant. It is apparent that both sides make solid cases to consolidate their position; in addition, neither wants to stand down before the other. This climate of open hostility and confrontation inevitably shuts down possible windows of opportunity for reconciliation.

It is quite probable the actual form of the conflict is partly a reason of both sides' intransigence and necessitates further study. In fact, escalation of the conflict has led Israel to wage wars against neighbouring Arab countries from the 40s to the 80s (e.g., the 1982 invasion of Lebanon). The result was the creation of a vicious circle in which Arab populations were forced to retaliate.

The Palestinian uprising did not really manifest itself to present-day levels until 1987 with the advent of the *Intifada*. On 9 December 1987, riots occurred in the Gaza Strip, accompanied by violent confrontations between Palestinians and occupying Israeli military forces.⁷⁸ The *Intifada* appeared to be an imitation of other revolutionary revolts in European societies oppressed by monarchies at the turn of the century. Originally conceived as a non-violent form of protest⁷⁹, it quickly became an opportunity to physically attack Israeli soldiers. The *Intifada* was more than a popular uprising: it

⁷⁷Yehuda Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.466-469.

⁷⁸Andrew Rigby, *Living the Intifada*. London, Zed Books, 1991, pp.1-2.

⁷⁹The Intifada was inspired by Dr. Fathi Shakaki, a medical student from Gaza who felt that grassroots actions against Israel was lacking. See Robert Young Pelton, *The World's Most Dangerous Places*, Redondo Beach, CA, Fielding Worldwide, 1997, p.290.

became a new form of *jihad*, or "Holy War". In fact, similarities have been observed between many great Islamic wars and the Palestinian situation; among others, the tendency to make martyrs out of those killed in action to attract sympathy from other Arab nations.³⁰

The *Intifada* took both the Israeli government and the PLO by surprise. It raised the costs of the Occupation, forced Israel to consider Palestinian nationalism a significant concern, and contributed to Jordan's 1988 decision to cut its links with the West Bank. Conversely, it also drove the PLO to acknowledge Israel's right to exist in 1988. It is an example of how social forces are at work to eventually accommodate change and find a middle ground amid all the chaos.

The Israelis, on the other hand, have the advantage. They hold the army and the resources to fight the uprising. However, on 8 October 1990, a shootout occurred at the Al-Aqsa Mosque and 17 Palestinians were killed. The incident sparked a strong reaction from the international community, and the Israelis realized just how closely the world was watching. They discovered that their options were not limited by their ability to react to crisis situations, but rather by their aversion to unpopular media attention, particularly in Europe and the United States. As such, their inability to act effectively to counter the *Intifada* had a harmful effect on the morale of Israeli soldiers, to the point of almost neutralizing armed response.

³⁰Beverley Milton-Edwards, "The Concept of *Jihad* and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques," *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.19, No.1, 1992, p.48.

The International Context

A look at the international context affords a broader view of the situation. Given the important concentrations of Jewish and Arab peoples outside the Middle East, it is easy to understand why there is such an interest about the conflict around the world. But the concern goes beyond simple curiosity: the Middle East represents important stakes. During the Cold War for example, Israel was a prominent ally for the United States who needed a presence in the area to prevent a potential invasion of the Middle East by the Soviet Empire.³¹ With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the United States has found new allies in the region (especially since the Gulf War); but the US still would like to see a peaceful settling of the dispute in order to maintain a strong influence in the region.³²

In addition, the European Community also holds interests in the area. Western Europe is the main trading partner of the Arab world, participating in more than 50% of total trading in the Middle East.³³ A resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential to insure a minimum of regional security. Europe finds itself at the doorstep of the Middle East and any attempt against Middle East security has consequences for European security.³⁴

Finally, other Middle Eastern countries also want an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Egypt, in particular, remains neutral in an effort to promote a smooth transition in the region and a

³¹ John Sigler. "Conflict in the Middle East" in A. Legault and J. Sigler, *Les conflits dans le monde 1991-1992*, Quebec City, Centre québécois des relations internationales, 1992, pp.72-73.

³² Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, *Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*, New York, Harper Perennial, 1992, p.134.

³³ Bichara Khader, "The European Economic Community and the Arab World," *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Vol.12, No.1, 1993, p.1.

³⁴ Timothy Niblock, "The European Community and Regional Cooperation/Integration in the Middle East," *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Vol.12, No.1, 1993, pp.45-46.

peaceful end to the fighting. Other countries, like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, while recognizing the PLO and Palestinian demands, seek to stay on the sidelines of the conflict (unless their own security is threatened).⁸⁵

Insight on Conflict Resolution in the Middle East

Given the great number of issues, it is evident that a resolution to the conflict is essential, not only for the region's security and stability, but also for the security and stability of much of the world. The problem stems from the unwillingness of the two groups to sacrifice this security (or lack of) and their well-being (or lack of) to retain (or take) control of the disputed territories. Because of this, conflict resolution becomes of prime importance, but under one condition: it must be through peaceful means. There have been many unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a lasting peace in the Middle East and perhaps outside intervention is warranted.

Despite the great number of these attempts both by Arabs and Israelis, clashes persist when talks are immobilized around unsolvable points (often of little logic or reason), protocol oversights, or because certain persons would not continue in the presence of others (*e.g.*, in 1985, Israel refused to negotiate in the presence of the PLO).

⁸⁵Chaliand and Rageau. p.142.

A) Western Initiatives

Western initiatives (*i.e.*, *American* initiatives) received limited success in the early 1990s. US President George Bush did promise a lasting peace through UN accords that would guarantee, he said, security for Israel while insuring political rights for Palestinians.⁸⁵ But even as they promised to be the most successful, they became tremendous failures. In fact, at the end of 1991, negotiations were halted because of intransigence from both sides. The whole incident was, to say the least, most embarrassing for Bush who thought himself almost infallible after his success in the Gulf War. The new rounds of talks during the Clinton administration were conversely quite successful, though many admit they have not changed things at the social and economic levels.

Recent years have been witness to rapid change in the Middle East; for all the increase in violence and the failure of past peace talks, the 1990s have seen a rekindling of interest in finding a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The period 1993-94 has been a turning point for Israel because of the implementation of an accord with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the instituting of new peace proposals with Syria and Jordan by the late Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin.

In January 1993, Israel repealed its ban on PLO contact by Israelis. On 9 September 1993, Arafat and Rabin met in secret in Oslo, Norway, and agreed to the signing of an historic peace accord that would pave the way for limited Palestinian self-rule in the Occupied Territories. Arab states criticized the two sides, as well as the international community, for not informing them of these

⁸⁵Sigler, p.72.

developments. Four days later in Washington, the *Declaration on Standby Agreements for Autonomy* was signed by Arafat and Rabin, and by Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, member of the PLO Executive Committee. The handshake between Arafat and Rabin at the White House symbolized a new-found trust between Arab and Israeli leaders.⁸⁷

The accord was a plan for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Enclave in the West Bank, and for the election of an "Autonomy Council"⁸⁸ by Palestinians, in waiting for negotiations on the status of the Occupied Territories. In September 1995, another accord was signed granting autonomy to Palestinians in certain parts of the West Bank. In January 1996, the Autonomy Council elected its Executive and began its administration over the newly "released" territories.

B) PLO Initiatives

While the IRA has traditionally received moral and monetary support from American sources, the PLO's activities have had a negative effect on Western nations. Palestinians generally view the US with a suspicious eye, knowing them to be an important ally to Israel. The PLO's dubious reputation in the West is consequently exacerbated because of its association with other Islamic terrorist groups who have traditionally adopted the notion of the West as the enemy, and who conduct their particular

⁸⁷*L'État du Monde 1995*, pp.42-43.

⁸⁸The Autonomy Council, composed of 88 Palestinian-elected members, was created to manage territories in the West Bank put under Palestinian control. The Council does not have authority over Israelis in the area, nor is it responsible for defense, foreign policy or further autonomy negotiations. Arafat, in his capacity as head of the PLO, acts as the Chief Executive of the Autonomy Council. See *L'État du Monde 1997*. Montreal, Boréal, 1996.

brand of terror across borders in the form of kidnappings, bombings, and hijackings. The result has been considerable bad press for the Palestinian cause:

Possibly PLO leaders hoped that their campaign of guerrilla action and terrorism within Israel and the occupied territories would educate Western public opinion. In fact, the opposite seemed to be true. PLO violence became the best argument for continuing to give the Israelis the support they demanded.⁸⁹

In 1974, the PLO tried to transcend its terrorist image. Yasir Arafat gave a speech at the United Nations in which he implored the international community to acknowledge the Palestinian problem. He placed emphasis on misconceptions about the PLO's mission and blamed Israeli intransigence for the continuing situation in the Occupied Territories. This reversal had two effects: first, it did indeed draw world attention to the Palestinian plight; but secondly, this softer approach by Arafat became the primary cause of factions going their own way. Hardliners were not about to give away what they believed to be rightfully theirs, and the troubles continue today.

C) Israeli Initiatives

In May 1989, Israel presented a new peace initiative. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War produced a change in the basic political order of the Middle East, prompting the Arab world to reassess its attitude toward Israel and to enter into negotiations to build a new future for the Middle East.

⁸⁹Gearty, p.52.

In October 1991, a conference was convened in Madrid to inaugurate direct peace talks. Multilateral talks on key regional issues continue to be held on and off as Israel views these negotiations as pivotal in its efforts to advance the Middle East peace process.⁹⁰

On September 28, 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed in Washington. The main object of the Interim Agreement was to broaden Palestinian self-government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority – the Palestinian Council – for an interim period not to exceed five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (*i.e.*, no later than May 1999). This would allow the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and open a new era of cooperation and co-existence.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. The IRA

It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the number of deaths has not decreased considerably (in fact, it wavers up and down through the years) in the eighties and early nineties, the number of persons charged with terrorist offences has decreased dramatically.⁹¹ This almost exactly coincides with a new approach to dealing with the terrorists. Clearly, the use of terrorism has been a strong factor in garnering attention to the republican plight. More importantly, the IRA appears to have espoused the merits of legitimate political participation. Until the 1990s, most governments had

⁹⁰From files from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found at <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/peace/>

⁹¹Coogan, p.671.

followed a strict policy of non-negotiation (at least in public), but because of this newfound legitimacy, the peace process seems to be evolving. The future of the IRA as a terrorist entity is most uncertain. As Gearty puts it, IRA tactics are "violent anachronisms in a changing political world."⁹²

B. The PLO

Even as Arafat's pleas fell upon deaf ears in the 1970s and 1980s, recent developments suggest there could be a glimmer of hope. The PLO has now begun to actively pursue negotiations with authorities who seem to have changed their perception of the PLO and its leaders. Harold M. Cubert credits the transformations to many inter-relating events: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1991 Gulf War, Syria's pullout from the Golan Heights conflict, and the US-led peace talks in the region.⁹³ It appears that the popularity of the plight of the Palestinians declined in world public opinion as Israel suffered Iraqi attacks.⁹⁴ The end result was an apparent failure by the PLO leadership to garner the necessary sympathy for the effectiveness of violent revolt, leaving peaceful negotiations as the only remaining option.

It seems as though the PLO might have decided to cooperate with Western peace initiatives and negotiate with Israel as chief representative of Palestinian interests (a move that hasn't gone without suspicion among hard-line Palestinians) as a means of survival. Many signs point to this idea, including the renunciation of terrorism, the move towards cooperation and the concession of important

⁹²Gearty, p. 130.

⁹³Harold M. Cubert, "The Militant Palestinian Organizations and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1992) pp.22-23.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

stakes (including control over the city of Jerusalem). Middle East expert Anat Kurz admits that "PLO groups are unlikely to resort to blatant terrorist campaigns as long as their role in future talks has not been ruled out."³⁵ The PLO is in a difficult situation: abandon the peace talks and renew the cycle of violence in the Middle East; or, continue with the talks and risk opposition (possibly of the violent kind) from hard-line factions.

These factions are on the increase and opponents of peace are pressuring the PLO leadership back to its violent roots. The PLO is struggling under internal tensions. From an Israeli point of view, leaving Gaza was not a particularly painful loss, but the West Bank presents an entirely different set of problems. For example, the city of Hebron, which was only recently handed over to the Palestinians, still poses administrative as well as social and political complications both for the Palestinians and the Israelis.

What can be drawn from attempts at conflict resolution? First, both sides remain rigidly set in their positions. The intransigence displayed by Palestinians and Israelis are typical of the problems associated with negotiations where very little leeway is permitted. Second, both sides have a right to legitimate claim. History in the "Holy Land" is born out of shared links between Muslims and Hebrews. From this, we see that the religious dimension is extremely important and that an absence of prejudice towards one side or the other is necessary for the smooth progress of the talks.

³⁵Anat Kurz, "Palestinian Terrorism—The Violent Aspect of a Political Struggle" in Yonah Alexander (ed.) *Middle East Terrorism, Current Threats and Future Prospects*, New York, G.K. Hall & Co., 1994, p.115.

It remains to be seen whether the current peace talks will serve to resolve the problem. Internal attempts to achieve peace have for the most part failed miserably. The rise to power of the rightist Likud party in the Israeli Knesset in May 1996 combined with further economic troubles in the Occupied Territories (78% unemployment in the Gaza and more than 50% in the West bank⁹⁶), do not serve to foster an atmosphere conducive to peace talks.

A most striking trend resides in the evolution of the very nature of the terrorist groups who seem to garner the greatest successes (*i.e.*, the PLO and the IRA). As these two groups obtain more political legitimacy and official acceptance by host country authorities, their demands are receiving greater attention. Some are even accepted. It seems also that this phenomenon encourages groups to focus their efforts less towards violence and more towards the use of peace talks and negotiations within political forums in consensus with authorities. In a similar manner, Ted Robert Gurr proposes that transformation to peaceful activity can be a function of the alleviation of discontent. He asserts that groups

are most likely to shift toward instrumental activity once they obtain the means to satisfy the value expectations of their members, either from their own resources or by the development of regularized and effective means of bargaining and participation.⁹⁷

This does not mean that the degree of violence is decreasing; however, the groups are realizing that open negotiation (like the 1994 White House Summit) can also bring about positive results. Gurr concludes that

⁹⁶*L'État du Monde 1997*, p.431.

⁹⁷Ted Robert Gurr. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970, p.316.

[w]hen dissidents acquire through violence the means to work constructively toward the permanent resolution of their discontent, violence has contributed to its own demise rather than its recurrence.⁹⁸

Terrorist groups use violence to make their cause known (to the national authorities and to the international community) and, eventually, gain access to the legitimate political arena where they can negotiate peacefully, while abandoning their violent activities (officially, at least). This is the way the IRA and the PLO are evolving, as shown by the degree of success they have received. As we shall see in the third chapter of this thesis, the evolution of the groups is part of a greater scheme of societal and national evolution.

In the next chapter, we will also see that the existence of pro-government or anti-separatist groups, in addition to the secessionists, further compounds the difficulties. It will become apparent that nationalist terrorists do not have the monopoly over violence: direct action by Protestant radicals in Northern Ireland and extremist right-wing Jews in Israel are waging their own brand of violent terror.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*

Chapter 2

How do they measure up?

Comparing the IRA and the PLO

I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis argues that some terrorist groups have come to realize the potential behind legitimate political participation. We believe that a general trend of democratization is altering the way radical pressure groups seek change in the system and that, as they grow more sophisticated, they will want to improve their chances of success by using a greater variety of means – i.e., they will form legitimate political offshoots to further their cause in the legal political arena.

In so doing, these groups have had to change in many respects and the magnitude of this variation is more or less controlled by host country governments. But there are also internal dynamics at work. Through comparison, this chapter will examine these forces.

At first glance, comparing the IRA and the PLO seems a relatively straightforward exercise. Both groups share common attributes that, in our opinion, create the feeling of “solidarity” amongst terrorist entities around the world (*e.g.*, fervor for a cause, social exclusion, ideological commitment, etc.). The IRA and the PLO both fit into our definition of a nationalist terrorist group (see page 11), and both seem to be evolving along parallel paths. The comparison exercise sought to demonstrate a progression or a movement in the groups’ efforts. It has been found that, under certain conditions, terrorism can indeed bring about limited success.

Nevertheless, the actual process of determining differences and similarities proved somewhat problematic because of factors ranging from variations in culture and context, to groups involved, to lack of data. There has been some comparative work done on the IRA and the PLO, but very little of it deals with the aspect of legitimate political participation. Much of it compares how the host countries deal with the threat of terrorism⁹⁹ or how each group operates at a tactical level.

Although any complete analysis of common elements between the groups cannot neglect means and effects, it must strive to understand the decision-making process behind the cloak of terrorism. In other words, though these groups use terrorism as a means to an end, the end itself is at least as important if not more. Groups may use terrorism both in order to obtain their demands or to accede to a stage where they can present these demands and further the political status of the people they claim to represent. Weinberg remarks that

"[t]here are a variety of ways in which political parties and political terrorism intersect. The most clear-cut situation is one in which the party as an organization pursues its goals through terrorist violence. And, as with other types of party-related violence, the party involved may use terrorism on a continuing basis or intermittently as the perceived need for it arises...[but.] just as parties may use terrorism, so too terrorist groups can make use of party politics. That is, violent political organizations may find it advantageous to form 'political wings' to pursue their goals, at least in part, through the electoral process."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹See Menachem Hofnung, "States of Emergency and Ethnic Conflict in Liberal Democracies: Great Britain and Israel," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.6, No.3 (Autumn 1994) pp.340-365.

¹⁰⁰Leonard Weinberg, Introduction to Special Issue on Political Parties, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.4, No.2 (Summer 1992) pp.3-4.

Consequently, terrorist groups may make legal political participation a part of their tactics, adding a new dimension to their struggle. The IRA and the PLO, as we shall see, are perfect examples of this type of seemingly paradoxical behaviour.

As we go through the process of comparing the two groups, it should be understood that there are many forces at work in each situation. We believe that the state of both conflicts has been the result of at least three important factors. How each situation has evolved is a matter of the interplay between these three factors, and would also account for the differences between the two groups.

i) Wide support from the population

Both Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have deemed it necessary to fuel the fires of conflict in their respective homelands. The ideology of liberation has dominated the social consciousness of each community which in turn has produced a consistent source of people willing to fight for land they perceive to be rightly theirs. Laqueur suggests that both Irish Republicans and Palestinian separatists continue in their fight because they are possessed by an intention to liberate countries against the desire of the majority of their inhabitants: in this respect, the terrorist groups argue that once upon a time, the situation was different and that they have been reduced to minority status and that it is their right and duty to fight this injustice.¹⁰¹

This "historical" aspect has important implications for the continuation of the conflict, including the creation of a continuous supply of members ready to fight for the cause. The appeal that conflict

¹⁰¹Laqueur, p.215.

hold for youth is particularly important in the way these communities have evolved. For example, the Intifada movement, started in 1987, continues to have a profound effect on the way the situation is developing in Palestine.

In terms of effects on legal political action, a wider support from the population translates very simply into a greater number of votes. There are of course the usual difficulties with the electoral system. For instance, in Northern Ireland, Catholics find that they are marginalised on many fronts, especially at the political and social levels. They are kept from senior positions in the civil service and alienated via gerrymandering in the electoral system.¹⁰² In addition, the police force in Northern Ireland is 92% Protestant.¹⁰³ Faced with such opposition, minority pressure groups have had to find more effective ways to organize their fight. Giving a political voice to the minorities may be the only way of achieving a solution without resorting to violence.

ii) Organized terrorist campaigns

The unrest of the population combined with the leadership skills of charismatic personalities has led to the creation of terrorist groups who see themselves as true representatives of the people. The existence of these groups goes beyond filling the void created by an absence of legitimate political entities. The terrorists' actions have not always benefitted the population as a whole and have had enormous consequences for the states of emergency that exist in our two case studies. Terrorists have

¹⁰²John Whyte, *Interpreting Northern Ireland*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1991, p.256. Also, see Taylor, p.198.

¹⁰³*L'État du Monde 1995*, p.560.

found it difficult to strike a balance between what helps their cause and what hinders it, accounting for much of the instability and unpredictability associated with their campaigns. This in turn has led local governments to overreact on many occasions where, as a cautionary measure, individual rights had to be sacrificed in the interest of collective security. Of course, this may have been what the terrorists were after.¹⁰⁴

We believe a protest group can improve its status as an acceptable political interlocutor by involving itself at the popular level. This has already been accomplished by the IRA and the PLO, as they already busied themselves with the welfare of their respective communities. However, it must receive acknowledgement from the political institutions in charge – i.e., the Government – in order to function properly, even at the lower levels. Hence, the leadership aspect of the group is very important. Hamas, for example, appears to suffer from weak, decentralized leadership and is thus less effective as a legitimate political entity. The PLO and Sinn Fein, on the other hand, with Arafat and Adams at their respective helms, benefit from a wealth of experience, resources and support, thus reinforcing group cohesion.

However, once status is conferred by the authorities, some of the more disaffected factions within the group may choose to go their own way. Factions may perceive that the goals have not been sufficiently attained and that a return to past violent tactics may be their only alternative.

¹⁰⁴See Rapoport, pp.46-50.

Laqueur admits that the terrorist actions most likely to succeed are the ones used within the framework of a wider strategy, including active political participation.¹⁰⁵ As such, the terrorist activity may only serve a limited purpose. We have mentioned how it could be used as communication, but it can also be used as provocation. As we shall see, this is particularly true of the IRA. Again, the degree of organization of any terrorist group can be linked to its success. In other forms of terrorism, such as revolutionary or single-issue terrorism, the belief in the cause is not so widely held, affecting the effectiveness of the campaign. With nationalist terrorism, a greater population may share the objective, if not the means to achieve it. We believe this broad base from which the terrorist group can more easily operate greatly increases the probability of success of the overall strategy, including the legal political struggle.

iii) Government action

In response to public rebellion and the threat posed by nationalist terrorism, governments have had to react promptly and firmly, culminating into the situation of "states of emergency". The term is normally reserved for cases of natural disasters or foreign invasion, and thus ordinarily applies only for a short period of time.¹⁰⁶ In the case of Northern Ireland and Israel, however, the state of emergency has endured over many decades, giving way to frustration after frustration for governments, pressure groups and populations alike. Schmid believes that "the main dilemma posed when democracies are

¹⁰⁵Laqueur, p.75.

¹⁰⁶Hofnung, pp.340-341.

confronted by terrorism is the one between ACCEPTABILITY and EFFECTIVENESS". by which he means that any response to terrorist activity will almost inevitably put the general population at risk in terms of civil liberties and even possibly in terms of physical danger.¹⁰⁷ The effectiveness of counter-terrorist and anti-terrorist government action will undoubtedly affect the evolution of the terrorist campaign. More about the balancing of collective rights and individual liberties will be discussed in chapter three.

Also of importance is the role the international community has played in the evolution of the situation in Northern Ireland and Israeli-occupied territories. Admittedly, very few or none of the great strides accomplished by the groups would have happened were it not for the international community and the exceptional communication opportunities it has provided. These additional factors have been briefly discussed in sections of chapter one dealing with conflict resolution and outside intervention.

II. THE COMPARISON

The definition we have given to nationalist terrorism (see page 11) describes in general terms what the IRA and the PLO aspire to, mainly the creation of, or re-unification to, their own homeland through the systematic use of violence. Chapter one of this thesis was an effort to show that the groups in question had enough in common to permit legitimate comparison. Furthermore, this

¹⁰⁷Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.), *Western Responses to Terrorism*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, p.15.

comparison of the two groups should help to understand how they are evolving in their efforts to realize their goals.

For our comparative purposes, we will borrow from Reilly's article on political violence management in Northern Ireland and Canada in the 1970's.¹⁰⁸ His work sought to elucidate why the management of the Troubles in Northern Ireland was so unsuccessful compared to the successful management of the FLQ crisis, given that the two groups (the IRA and the FLQ) were so similar. His model for comparison included elements taken from Ross and Gurr's scheme¹⁰⁹ and modified to offer a way of conceptualizing the initiation or decline of political violence. We have further modified the scheme to emphasize the "decline" aspects of the process, in keeping with Ross and Gurr's original ideas, and in order to be applicable to our cases.

Reilly's and Ross & Gurr's studies relate very well to our cases because the motivations underlying the resort to terrorism were the same: small groups aimed at influencing their political environment, terrorism as one tactic among a number of alternative means, and terrorist campaigns emerging out of a larger social movement.¹¹⁰ And, while these studies focus more on the decline of terrorist activity, we submit that they can also apply to the increase in political activity.

In an effort to compare both groups in an orderly and significant manner, we have chosen to do so at two separate yet interrelated levels. Reilly suggests that there are psychological and

¹⁰⁸See Wayne G. Reilly, "The Management of Political Violence in Quebec and Northern Ireland: A Comparison," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.6, No.1 (Spring 1994) pp.44-61.

¹⁰⁹Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," *Comparative Politics*, Vol.21, No.3 (July 1989) pp.405-426.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p.407.

environmental dimensions to the decision to continue or abandon a terrorist strategy^{***} and so we will examine our two groups in a similar framework. In our cases, however, we submit that the psychological dimension forms a direct link to the *internal* dynamics of the groups, while the environmental dimension corresponds to the *external* dynamics of the conflicts. In trying to discover factors leading to the decline of terrorist activity and to an increase in political participation, we found that Reilly's modified model did benefit our research, particularly in the context of our examination in chapter one of this thesis.

^{***}Reilly, p.46.

A. Internal Dynamics

Reilly's "internal" component dealt with the considerations affecting the use of violence to achieve a political objective.¹¹² In all, it encompassed the belief among potential terrorists about the likelihood of achieving their goals and the appropriateness of the methods used to do it. We interpret this internal component as including the prevalent *ideology*, which forms the reasoning behind the collective action, the internal *organization* of the group, which, as Gamson notes, relates to the coherence of the group¹¹³, and the *method of action*, which can be used to demonstrate that the terrorist campaign is aimed more at communication, rather than intimidation.

An important distinction must be drawn between the IRA and the PLO in that the IRA (more precisely, the Provisional IRA) is a more easily definable unit. The PLO, as we have seen, serves mainly as an umbrella organization, forming a web that links terrorists and peaceful factions alike throughout the Arab community and the world. While groups like Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), or even Black September¹¹⁴ (responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre), can be categorized as PLO groups (at least, that is the organization that spawned these factions), they can also be thought of as separate entities operating at a level similar to that of the IRA but still with the common goal of creating a sovereign Palestine and bringing about the end of the State

¹¹²*Ibid.*

¹¹³William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Homewood, Illinois, Dorsey, 1975, pp.103-107.

¹¹⁴Although Black September has been described as a Palestinian terrorist faction working alone, it has been linked to the PLO. See Gearty, p.54.

of Israel. However, for the purposes of this comparison we will group the different factions under the PLO label.

The first unit of comparison is *ideology*, which loosely translates to the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world.¹¹⁵ The consciousness of the nationalist terrorist is set on "liberating" his homeland and his people from the occupying forces of the host country's government. The use of violence becomes the means to that end.

J. Bowyer Bell lists three points of IRA ideology that have given the Irish struggle a reason for being.¹¹⁶ First, the terrorists contend that the source of all Irish political evils has always been the English. This has given a "face" to the enemy, an easily identifiable trait that gives the struggle a black and white distinction. Second, the only way to vanquish this evil is through armed struggle. And third, once the goal is attained, that is, the annexation of Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic, any distinction between religion or political views should be eliminated to make way for the united and free appellation of "Irishmen". Thus, IRA ideology not only aims to overthrow, but also to establish a new common contract and identity¹¹⁷ amongst the people of Ireland.

¹¹⁵Terry Eagleton, *An Introduction to Ideology*, Verso, New York, 1991, p.2.

¹¹⁶J. Bowyer Bell, *IRA Tactics and Targets*, Poolbeg, Dublin, 1990, pp.10-11.

¹¹⁷The issue of identity is an important one in the case of Northern Ireland. John Whyte provides an excellent round-up of academic discussions on the subject (Whyte, *Interpreting Northern Ireland*, pp.97-101). Labels given to the clashing groups affect the way they perceive themselves and each other. Whyte explains that, contrary to popular impression, it is the Protestants who have more difficulty in deciding what their identity is. While Catholics overwhelmingly describe themselves as "Irish," Protestants were split between labeling themselves "British," "Ulster" and "Irish." Whyte concludes that if Protestants are psychologically troubled by this ambiguity, then uncertainty about identity may be part of the problem. Consequently, the issue may have repercussions on how the "opposition" is perceived as well. Religion alone does not seem to be as deciding a factor as it was

Similarly, the PLO's driving force has been the ousting of the occupying presence through armed struggle. As with the IRA, PLO groups and factions view the Israeli persona as the enemy; hence, an illusory perception of Israeli citizens as the evil to be rooted out is created. This could account for the disproportionate number of attacks on civilians (in contrast with the PIRA). In addition to this opposition, the PLO, at least at its inception, faced opposition by most of the Western World as Israel had been created out of the will of a number of Western States backed by UN approval. If the Palestinians belonged to the State of Israel, one could speak of civil war; but deprived of citizenship and any real political power, the Palestinians have been popularized as being an outside enemy. There is a feeling that Israel faces a daily threat of invasion by the Arabs living within its own borders. Consequently, the Arab-Israeli conflict has bordered on outright war, making the struggle itself part of everyday life.

As Anat Kurz observes,

Palestinian organizations—rejectionist and PLO mainstream groups alike—have viewed the armed struggle as included in, in fact inseparable from, the comprehensive framework of the struggle itself.¹¹⁸

Jerrold Post presents a similar analysis and, by observing how deeply entrenched the ideology of liberation is in these groups, casts doubt on their ability (IRA included) to stop the violence once the goal is attained:

once thought to be.

¹¹⁸Anat Kurz, "Palestinian Terrorism — The Violent Aspect of a Political Struggle" in Y. Alexander (ed.) *Middle East Terrorism: Current Threats and Future Prospects*. New York, G.K. Hall & Co., 1994, p.109.

On a number of occasions Yasir Arafat...[could] have placed major pressure on Israel and might well have achieved the beginnings of a partial territorial solution to the Palestinian problem. But on each of these occasions, when push came to shove, he opted to be leader of the unified Palestinian resistance movement, yielding to the radical left, who were committed to winning their struggle through violence. The espoused cause—a Palestinian homeland—did not seem to be the PLO's primary goal. Similarly, on how many occasions in Northern Ireland, on the threshold of a move to conciliation, did the proponents of violence so act as to perpetuate the cycle of violence?¹¹⁹

This often results in factionalization, the creation of terrorist splinter groups that have parted from the mainstream organizations in order to pursue similar goals with different tactics. Factions have often been responsible for many of the more nefarious incidents (Hamas' tactic of planting explosives in civilian buses, for example).

Our second unit of comparison relates to the *organization* of the terrorist groups. In order to function as a coherent association of individuals and associations, a structure must exist to coordinate operations and prevent counter-productive or contradictory behaviour. In other words, to make sure the members toe the party line.

In the case of the PLO, its wide-reaching base makes for a very stable organization. It has successfully sold itself as the party representing all Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and continues to garner popular support.¹²⁰ Contrary to the popular image of terrorists living in minimalist

¹¹⁹Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces" in W. Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*. New York, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990, p.37.

¹²⁰Yasir Arafat's PLO won 87.1 % of the vote during the last Palestinian elections on January 20, 1996. *L'État du Monde 1997*, p.430.

conditions under the constant threat of capture, the PLO is a very broad, relatively open and affluent organization. The functions of the PLO are carried out by three main organs: an Executive Committee, a Central Committee and a National Council. As a political entity, this structure has been responsible for the "coming of age" of the PLO, transforming it into the powerful political pressure group we know today.

Additionally, this structure has allowed greater control over the many factions that seek to continue the armed struggle and threaten the peace process. This has resulted in the reining-in of "loose cannons" and the focusing of aims and objectives, although it certainly has not been effective in putting an end to much of the violence. Gamson states that groups that possess a centralized organization and a working bureaucracy will have a greater chance of escaping factionalization and thus be more likely to succeed.¹²¹ Factions have been able to act outside the reach of the PLO, through support provided by more radical portions of the population and money that trickles through bank accounts of "legitimate" groups who receive support from the PLO. The PLO's assets number in the billions of dollars, wealth accumulated for the most part from a wide variety of investments around the world. James Adams, who conducted a thorough examination of PLO (and IRA) funding activities, astutely observes that:

[a]ll those terrorist groups that survived the Sixties, when world revolution seemed just around the corner, have modified their political stand with a healthy dose of sound capitalism. None has been as successful as the PLO, bu[sic] all are rapidly following the PLO's lead.

¹²¹Gamson, pp.103-107.

The PLO have become the principal terrorist players on the international investment scene. No other group has shown the PLO's vision and industry; they instead tend to limit their activities and successfully turn to their own advantage the conventional approach of government forces to countering terrorism.¹²²

By contrast, Irish Provisionals have benefitted from a subtler form of organization because of their long history of organized resistance. The fashioning of units in the military mold (hence the term Irish Republican *Army*) has provided volunteers with discipline and an illusory¹²³ status of honour and duty towards the homeland.

However, while the IRA has organized itself as an integral military entity at the strategic level, its terrorist operations have been carried out by individuals working in a cellular structure at the tactical level. The cellular structure is a throwback to methods employed in the 19th century by Fenian resistance fighters¹²⁴ and successfully applied by the "Provos" during the past three decades.¹²⁵ Coogan aptly remarks that the modern troubles (from 1970 on) are a result of applying a military solution to what is essentially a political problem.¹²⁵ In the 1960s and 70s, the military structure was established because nationalists did not possess the political alternative (because of limits established by the Government). That military structure provided the necessary alternative.

According to Bell,

The IRA is structured as a democratic, if secret, army, power in theory flowing from volunteers into the center... [A] twelve-man Executive, which usually meets twice a

¹²²Adams, p.127.

¹²³Charles Townshed, "The Process of Terror in Ireland." 1986, (unpublished) p.13.

¹²⁴Charles Townshed, *Political Violence in Ireland*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p.165.

¹²⁵See also Coogan, p.466.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, p.344.

year. [serves as] an advisory body that selects the army Council, the key and core of the IRA...This Council in secret chooses a Chief of Staff who then selects his own staff [consisting of various military titled personnel]...Real power, based on consensus, tacit agreement, like minds, remains at the center within the Army Council, the nexus of the system and still for some the legitimate government of Ireland.¹²⁷

This hierarchical arrangement of key players provides a stable structure allowing decisions to be taken at the top and applied, through chain of command, by the cell structure which forms the base of the pyramid.

If, however, at first glance, the IRA appears to be a well-run military operation, with all the necessary components, it has yet to reach a level of tip-top performance. It has lacked the organizational qualities of a true army because of lack of resources and its clandestinity. Thus, while Republicans involved with the IRA try to create a true fighting force, British authorities have not had a particularly difficult time defeating it. Even with a relatively abundant supply of arms from the United States (the famous Armalite rifles, for example) it has suffered from a lack of any real military-style training that would certainly make the most of its assets. For all its covert and unpredictable tactics, the IRA has not been able to effectively deal with trained soldiers. Arrests, mistakes and blunders attest to the IRA's unreliability as a military unit.¹²⁸

Further proof of the IRA's lack of structure lies in the criminal actions of some of its less scrupulous members. We have mentioned that the PLO draws on its massive investments and holdings to finance its activities; however, the IRA has not been as self-sufficient as it would have

¹²⁷Bell, pp.13-14.

¹²⁸For an evaluation of military response to IRA threats, see Mark Urban, *Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*, London, Faber and Faber, 1992.

liked. For many reasons (lack of disciplined leadership and a narrower international support base being two) the IRA and its factions have had to resort to gangster-style activities, much to the dismay of many Catholic neighbourhoods.¹²⁹

The increased presence of Sinn Fein, however, has shifted the attention away from the terrorist activity. In 1981, while it was still an outlawed party, Sinn Fein served to bring the IRA's cause to the foreground of legitimate political participation by contesting elections after a wave of Catholic disgust over government handling of republican hunger strikes.¹³⁰ The party presently accounts for 15.5% of the vote in Northern Ireland. Being a socialist-rooted party (*i.e.*, left wing), Sinn Fein has been known to help implement beneficial initiatives through the various local councils where it is present in surprising numbers.¹³¹ It is particularly active on issues such as education, women's issues (*e.g.*, domestic violence), and helping people get government benefits. And so, while Sinn Fein continues to maintain strong ties to its terrorist counterpart, it has been able to focus the attention on the benefits of negotiations, rather than violent opposition.

We now come to our third unit of comparison at the internal dynamics level: *method of action*. Without going into specifics, it is fair to say that terrorism—the act itself—takes on many forms: bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, theft, all have been used by both groups at one point or another. The main difference lies in the location of the incidents. In the case of the IRA, strikes are accomplished within the boundaries of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, and almost never

¹²⁹See Adams for more in-depth examination of IRA racketeering, smuggling and drug dealing.

¹³⁰O'Duffy, p.134.

¹³¹Crenshaw, "Decisions to Abandon Terrorism: A Preliminary Case Study of the IRA," p.8.

beyond that. True, some fund-raising, training, and various other decidedly less lethal activities are sometimes conducted abroad, but never with any intent to harm non-British interests.¹³²

The PLO, on the other hand, has had no such qualms about acting outside the areas of contention. There have been many documented attacks by Palestinian groups outside Israel, most notably the 1972 Olympic Massacre and the 1970 triple hijacking of airplanes containing 475 passengers bound for New York from Europe.¹³³ The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the actions, but world-wide opinion against Palestinian groups, including the PLO, was significantly altered.

We believe the differences in location of targets are important because they relate to the use of terror as a communications tool. The target audience for the IRA is situated closer to home, that is, in Great Britain. That is why British military installations and personnel are so often the victims of IRA bombings. There are also some civilian casualties (the Canary Wharf bombing that ended the IRA's first cease fire, for example), but they are fewer and far between. The PLO, on the other hand, is trying to reach a wider audience; and so, Palestinian acts of terror take place in much more varied locations. If we continue to perceive the campaign of terror as acts of communication, we can see how the locations of the targets relate to the objective.

¹³²In 1988, for example, an IRA attempt to bomb a changing of the guard ceremony in Gibraltar was thwarted by British special forces. See Coogan, pp.578-579, and Bruce W. Warner, "The Use of Intelligence by the Irish Republican Army: Michael Collins to the PIRA", International Studies Association Annual Conference, Toronto, March 18-22, 1997, p.24 (not published), for other instances of IRA activities abroad.

¹³³Gearty, pp.53-54.

However, all differences aside, both groups aim to accomplish their goals by committing acts that draw attention to their respective communities. During early phases of the conflicts, when the terrorist groups still somewhat sought to define themselves, attacks were mostly directed at occupying governments or were intended as acts of defiance or resistance. Methods and means could be further explored, but this would go beyond the immediate scope of this thesis.

B. External Dynamics

This second level at which we continue our comparison deals with the *social context* in which the situations have evolved. Considering that the two conflicts take place in very different parts of the world, it is appropriate that we examine the forces out of which the terrorist groups have emerged. The same forces have had a role in the process by which the groups have moved towards legitimacy. In his article, Reilly includes concepts such as *support*, *backlash*, *deterrence*, and *preemption* as psychological and environmental factors affecting the initiation or continuation of political violence.¹³⁴ Reilly used these in bidirectional continua, but for our purposes, we will examine them as they relate to the progression towards legitimate political participation.

We chose to combine Reilly's factors to make them applicable to our cases and found that two major forces combine to result in the current situations. Northern Ireland and Israeli-occupied territories both suffer from effects directly related to the *legal institutions* in place and a *climate of oppression* that serve to prevent the peace process from occurring. The legal institutions are

¹³⁴Reilly, p. 46.

embodied in the host countries' legislative instances, while the climate of oppression stems from mistrust between opposing forces.

There is no question that each host country has a grand tradition of upholding sound democratic government in the form of parliamentarism. Consequently, these countries resort to legislative means that not only allow expanded measures in the case of terrorist instances but also to bring the results of these actions within the realm of a pre-established penal system. Chalk explains that the emergence of these measures is linked to the state's desire to protect its monopoly over coercive violence and also to maintain "the reciprocal relationship between political obligation and responsibility that lies at the heart of the liberal democratic state's system of criminal law."³⁵

In Great Britain, where institutionalized parliamentarism has replaced centuries of monarchic rule, precautions have been taken to ensure terrorism does not get out of hand. The British government has seen fit to pass legislation that would curtail terrorist activity. Historically, however, the use of unpopular bills that constrained civil liberties, such as the oft-invoked *Special Powers Act*, has created a climate of suspicion and defiance amongst the populations of Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, the government has not always had the option of negotiating because the organization with which it hoped to discuss changes remained hidden. The emergence of legitimate representatives (*i.e.*, political parties and non-terrorist negotiators) is touted as a remedy to this problematic situation and hailed by Sinn Fein members as a way to protect Irish Catholic interests in Northern Ireland.

³⁵Peter Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1995) pp.22-23.

Before the 1994 cease-fire was declared, legislative responses played a key role in curbing terrorist activity and promoting public safety. The renewed *Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions)*¹³⁶ and the 1991 *Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act* sought to discourage terrorism by criminalizing acts which, in the past, had escaped prosecution because of legal loopholes.¹³⁷ Key to the legislations was a wider definition of terrorism to include "borderline" acts. There is still considerable debate as to whether these legal measures were effective, or if they were responsible at all for the declared cease-fire. Chalk admits that legislative measures may only be appropriate in the short term and that protest from citizens and groups may dampen their effectiveness and further escalate hostilities between groups.¹³⁸

Under Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein claims to have a solid electoral mandate but its legitimacy continues to be put to the test because of its backing of IRA activity. For the record, Sinn Fein officially maintains that

the partitioning of Ireland in 1921 has had a distorting and deforming effect on Irish political development and has been recognized as a grave historical mistake. Partition, by any criteria, is a political failure... Sinn Fein's ultimate goal is to build a new, prosperous, and dynamic thirty-two county Ireland that eliminates partition, division, domination, discrimination, disadvantage, economic failure and injustice...¹³⁹

¹³⁶The act was enacted in 1974 and required annual renewals as it was originally sought as a temporary measure.

¹³⁷David Bonner, "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism" in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.) *Western Responses to Terrorism*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, p.179.

¹³⁸Chalk, p.23-24. Citing examples in Northern Ireland, Chalk describes opposition to what he terms the "'politization' of the criminal justice system where the rule of law was effectively used to the explicit advantage of one community (the Protestants) over another (the Catholics)."

¹³⁹"Introduction to Sinn Fein," at Internet site
<http://www.ma.utexas.edu/~sponge/apm/archive/releases/intro.html>

And so the decision to allow Sinn Fein to participate in peace talks is greeted with much skepticism, unless Sinn Fein itself denounces the IRA or at least promises that it will respect its end of the deal.¹⁴⁰ Protestant indignation at the IRA's refusal to disarm continues to be a key stumbling block.

Similarly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, legislative attempts culminating in the creation of a veritable long-term state of emergency have often served to increase tensions and resulted in further acts of terror. Not unlike British legislation, Israeli laws governing the countering of terrorism have professed a criminal image to what are essentially acts of political protest (albeit in a more violent form), resulting in increased suspicion, mistrust and non-cooperation among Palestinian populations.

Hofnung observes that

[t]he existence of a permanent state of emergency means that exceptional conditions continuously prevail, necessitating resorting to means which differ from those employed as a rule under ordinary conditions. In fact, the exception is becoming the rule and the legal system is functioning according to so-called temporary rules which actually change the nature of domestic constitutional and criminal law.¹⁴¹

In keeping with colonial tradition, Israel has adopted many of the laws that were enacted to combat ethnic conflict by British authorities during the 1940s. Particularly after the 1967 Six Day War, Israel has been adamant about the necessity of including special provisions to facilitate coping with terrorists or any other threat to the state. For example, a bill was enacted in 1988 to deal with the Intifada uprising, which gave police and military forces increased powers of arrest, detainment and on-the-spot punishment in the Occupied Territories.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰*The Ottawa Citizen*, 20 July 1997, p.A5.

¹⁴¹Hofnung, p.344.

¹⁴²Hofnung, pp.351-352.

The PLO vehemently opposed such legislative arrangements, claiming that the bills were passed too quickly in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) and that such powers could only aggravate the situation. Palestinian outrage at the increased powers received some media attention; consequently, the legitimacy of the Knesset as a democratic institution suffered.

In addition, active Israeli counter-terrorist attacks have also been used in an attempt to stem the proliferation of Palestinian revolt. To a much greater extent than in Northern Ireland, this use of violence to end violence has entrenched armed response as a solution to the terrorist problem. Unlike the British response, which has been for the most part reactive,¹⁴³ Israeli pro-active measures to retaliate against past PLO sponsored attacks are part of an on-going effort by authorities to break down Palestinian resistance. Again, experts agree that these tactics, while achieving their purpose in the short term, do not provide for a long term solution.¹⁴⁴ Not surprisingly then, legislative attempts to end terrorist actions have proved somewhat disappointing. In the long run, for both Israel and Great Britain, terrorism has defied legal frameworks and left groups at a loss on both sides. But the presence

¹⁴³The British government still cringes at the mention of an alleged "shoot to kill" policy that was supposed to have been implemented in the mid-1980's. During that time, close to fifty people (almost all Catholics and many of whom were unarmed) died by RUC and Special Air Services (SAS) gunfire. The SAS, an elite army unit, had been brought in, in 1976, as a counter-terrorist measure to increase RUC efficiency. However, the SAS men were trained to shoot to kill and many deaths were linked to their characteristic ambush/hunt tactics. The fact that the British government denied the use of such methods only served to increase suspicions among Northern Irish Catholics (see Coogan, pp.575-580, and Urban, pp.204-205).

¹⁴⁴For an evaluation of Israeli retaliatory strikes, see Reuben Miller, "Responding to Terrorism's Challenge: the Case of Israeli Reprisals" in Y. Alexander (ed.) *Middle East Terrorism*, pp.109-123. Also see Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet" in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.), *Western Responses to Terrorism*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp.307-340, for general trends and options in dealing with terrorism.

of political representatives for the Palestinians and the Irish Catholics could very well shift the legal framework of the host countries towards the protection of minority rights, something that was too often left ignored.

This brings us to our second unit of comparison at the social context level: the *climate of oppression*. This is a consequence of efforts by the host countries and their institutions and dominant populations to minimize the impact minorities have on the development of their culture and national character. The climate of oppression is the environment in which one group (usually, but not always, the minority) is excluded from participating in regular everyday society or has this participation rendered difficult by another group through constant shunning and opposition. It emanates from a tightly woven societal fabric which, because of hatred, prejudice and fear, relegates a certain maligned group to the status of second class citizens, if not always in fact then in conviction.¹⁴⁵ It is more than a consequence of repressive policies by the government and its legal institutions. It radiates from the whole of the community in power.

Much in the same way that terrorism can communicate a political message (its ends going beyond damaging an enemy's material resources¹⁴⁶), without necessarily resorting to actual violence, the climate of oppression serves as a reminder to minorities of their place in society. In its extreme manifestation, majority groups, motivated partly by self-preservation, partly by loathing of the minorities, will turn to vigilante-style tactics to exhibit their dominance. But it is not always evidenced

¹⁴⁵See Laqueur, pp.203-207.

¹⁴⁶Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p.379.

by violence. Indeed, the climate of oppression is most often expressed in more subtle ways. Nations have shown themselves resistant to change within their territories and minorities who have been kept from emancipation are proving difficult to contain.

We have seen earlier that Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are largely excluded from participating in political life. Furthermore, jobs are much scarcer for those who wish to remain in Palestinian enclaves. During the early 1990s, the Israeli government sought to increase funds encouraging Israeli settlers to move into the West Bank in the hope of increasing Israeli presence in Palestinian-dominated territories.¹⁴⁷ And while Israelis are not about to withdraw from Jerusalem, Palestinians feel that their presence in the Holy City remains a major obstacle to peace. These factors contribute to a feeling of oppression on behalf of the Palestinian populations, resulting in conflict. The intractable nature of the conflict is reflected in the high number of revenge-inspired acts committed by both sides.

In Northern Ireland, while British authorities have tried to contain IRA activity, Protestant groups have also been waging a campaign of terror against Irish Catholics. This backlash, which has endured for many decades, has further alienated Irish minorities, increased the death toll, and crippled government action in an already difficult situation. Protestant mistrust (as embodied in Orange extremism) has grown dramatically in recent years and, as Paul Wilkinson explains,

the Ulster Protestants have the mentality of a beleaguered minority. They have never shaken off the fear that someday the overwhelmingly Catholic Republic of Ireland will try to absorb or annex them. Far from being reassured by direct rule from

¹⁴⁷ *L'État du Monde 1993*, Montreal, Boréal, 1992, pp.231-233.

Westminster, since the abolition of the Stormont government in 1972, their sense of insecurity has been increased because they feel they no longer have direct control over their affairs.¹⁴⁸

As both sides are on the verge of negotiations, Protestants are increasingly wary of any attempt to resolve the issue through concessions. The Israeli government faces a similar problem with Jewish settlers in the Syrian contested Golan Heights and elsewhere (Hebron, for example). In 1994, then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that he was ready to give up the Golan Heights and dismantle Jewish settlements in exchange for a normalization in diplomatic relations with Syria.¹⁴⁹ Rabin was quickly denounced by settlers as being too radical in his approach to peace and the deal rapidly fell through (which, consequently, alienated the Syrian government). Two years later, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaffirmed a hard stance on contested territories, favoring Jewish settlers. He has made it clear that negotiations could continue only with the assurance, by Arafat and neighboring Arab states, that Palestinians would reduce (if not cease) terrorist activity.

III. CONCLUSION

Efforts by governments to stem the flow of terrorism have had enormous influence on the way the terrorist groups have had to change in order to survive, the main consequence of this being the change of course during the early 1990s towards legitimate political participation. Terrorist groups are now only beginning to realize that world-wide attention brought on by mass media has empowered

¹⁴⁸Paul Wilkinson, "The Orange and the Green: Extremism in Northern Ireland" in M. Crenshaw (ed.) *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power*, Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1983, pp.111-112.

¹⁴⁹*L'État du Monde* 1995, p.229.

them to gain more political control. Their acts are no longer directed solely at the government.

Research has shown that the media may provide terrorist groups with an incentive to reach out to a wider audience. The groups are in effect conferred a special status by *any* news coverage, be it negative or positive. As Weimann and Winn explain,

[t]he mere allocation of valuable time and space may suffice as evidence that the terrorists should be regarded as important and noteworthy. Given that coverage of terrorist events should be broad enough to encompass the various causes that apparently motivate the terrorist as well as their demands for redress, the phenomenon of status conferral extends beyond the terrorists alone to include the political, social, and/or religious movements associated with their actions.¹⁵⁰

We have said before that it is difficult to establish whether repressive government tactics have had a hand in the creation and legitimating of nationalist political parties. We tend to believe that the groups realized the great potential of legitimate participation themselves but that, until lately, governments had stifled any such initiative. However, because of external factors such as media coverage, groups were able to generate the necessary political clout.

One important realization from our comparison was that *targeting* is an important aspect of our two groups' terrorist and political campaign. On the one hand, we have the IRA, which has primarily sought to provoke the British government by deliberately targeting government and military installations and personnel.¹⁵¹ It is interesting to note that when it does decide to attack public and civilian installations, it will do so with regards to the protection of the population. For example, the IRA will warn police before setting off a bomb in a public area so that the people may be given the chance to

¹⁵⁰Weimann and Winn, p.152.

¹⁵¹See Bell, pp.29-44.

escape injury. This still creates a climate of fear among the populations¹⁵², but it also prevents any "bad press" that may result from senseless killings: the public still takes notice, but no one is hurt (physically, anyway). This works to the advantage of Sinn Fein by communicating the extent to which radical republicans may go if heed is not paid to the more rational and pacific movements – i.e., Sinn Fein itself.

Palestinian terrorist groups on the other hand, seem to have had fewer reservations about civilian targeting. We believe that early PLO-sponsored strikes were aimed more at causing or giving the impression of a general breakdown in the current regime, demoralising Israeli citizens and causing them to lose faith in the ability of their government to maintain order and guarantee their safety.¹⁵³ This is consistent with a group operating under a severe climate of oppression where, not only are the occupying forces making it difficult for their people to exist, but also where the populations in power (in our case, the Israeli citizens) serve to maintain this kind of environment. And so, the enemy is not only the government who institutionalizes the situation, but also the people who benefit from it.

We find that these tactics hold two important considerations for the current legal representatives of the IRA and the PLO. First, the legal representatives must show that by securing government acknowledgement and that by being allowed to participate in negotiations, the violence can be avoided. And second, they must provide assurances to the governments that they are acting in all sincerity in order to protect the populations, and that they will not revert to their terrorist past. This

¹⁵²Wardlaw, pp.34-38.

¹⁵³See Wardlaw, pp.39-41.

is one of the most difficult promises to keep, especially when governments renege on the own commitments.

Eubank and Weinberg briefly mention that in some cases, political parties do indeed emerge from terrorist groups but that in most cases, the opposite occurs (terrorist groups form out of dissatisfied political party factions).¹⁵⁴ This is also compatible with Crelinsten's model (1989) and Reilly's (1994). However, we have argued earlier that this is true mostly with revolutionary groups and that, in the case of nationalism, political parties are the "legitimate" offsprings of the terrorist groups.

The presence of legitimate political offshoots issuing from terrorist organizations has caused a change in the way minority concerns are negotiated in conflict laden regions of the world. In chapters one and two, we sought to give the reader insight into the process of how these groups are evolving and how well they are succeeding at advancing their cause. The next chapter deals with the final point of our hypothesis dealing with the implications for democracy itself.

¹⁵⁴See William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Political parties and the formation of terrorist groups." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.2, No.2 (Summer 1990) pp.125-144.

Chapter 3

Nationalist Terrorism and its Implications for Democracy

I. INTRODUCTION

The collective actions of the IRA and the PLO have had tremendous impact on the way democracies accommodate demands for autonomy. The final element of our main hypothesis contends that “*liberal democracy has been altered*” because of it (see page 3). In an inductive fashion, this chapter will examine how democracies decide to cope with demands of secession and how these decisions affect the evolution of democracy and of the terrorist groups themselves. We shall see that terrorism in liberal democracies perpetuates a cycle from stability, to subversion, to acceptance, then back to stability.

By stability, we mean a “relative” stability, referring to a status quo effected by the majority in power. In our cycle, radical pressure groups push for acceptance of their demands. When governments fail to do this, the groups turn to subversive activity (*i.e.*, terrorism) to get their point across and to garner attention to their concerns (terrorism as communication). Governments react to this in one of two ways: 1) they repress the terrorist group, or 2) they heed the concerns.¹⁵⁵

Once the terrorist message is sent and *if* it is received (acceptance), illegal terrorist groups may form legitimate entities to accede to the legal stage, usually (but not always) by forming a legal

¹⁵⁵There could be a variety of reasons why governments would decide to do so, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse this in greater detail.

political party. But by allowing the groups to do so and, in effect, accepting to negotiate with former terrorist groups, liberal democracies, embodied by their governments, have changed. The terrorist groups have taken a shortcut to resolve their dispute with the government, and the government has permitted them to do so. In any case, relative stability is returned, and the cycle may begin again, depending on how the situation is resolved. Consequently, not only have the terrorist groups had to adapt to "the system," but liberal democracies have been altered as well.

We have seen how our two units of study, the IRA and the PLO, are now beginning the grand task of participating in the legal political arena. The recognition of these organizations as legitimate negotiators is an important event because it demonstrates how governments are not only acting on minority concerns, but also how authorities are showing themselves more flexible, something that could have tremendous repercussions if other pressure groups with similar demands decide to act. How are democracies coping with these new participants? While these groups were once treated as subversives, they—or rather, their political offshoots—are now being permitted to join the political forum along with other parties. What should governments of liberal democracies expect from this type of situation?

Observers of international politics will notice that terrorism is something to be expected in any democratic regime.⁵⁶ Indeed, the systematic use of violence by pressure groups who feel alienated by their government has become commonplace in many countries where citizens choose their leaders by majority rule. Without delving into deep philosophical discourses on the merits of terrorism and its

⁵⁶See Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Changes in Political Party Systems," pp.125-139.

inevitability in modern democracy, we can examine the reasons behind the flourishing of terrorist organizations in liberal democratic regimes.

One seemingly new concept in the evolution of modern terrorism (that is, post-World War II) is its application by groups demanding autonomy or separation from the ruling majority. One might think it due to the fact that liberal democracies are a relatively new phenomenon on the world political scene. Indeed, with the advent of democracy and its expansion throughout the world, many long-oppressed members of society are grouping together in an effort to validate their claims. And because of the relatively sudden freedom of action brought on by the emergence of liberal democratic regimes, a new multitude of options becomes available. Violence is oftentimes selected.

But there are historical instances of this behaviour. For example, the Corsicans rebelled against Genoa and France in an effort to establish themselves as a sovereign entity during the 18th century. Today, similar behaviour can be observed in Chechnya where the fight for independence from Russia is raging. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that democracy alone has served to incite rebellion among marginalised groups. The virtues of democracies, however, have been extolled to no end, particularly in light of recent changes in regimes in Eastern Europe, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that the democratic process is failing both the majorities and the minorities in its attempts to cope with demands of nationalism. As Fukuyama explains, true democracy will have a difficult time in countries where the nationalism or ethnicity of its constituent groups "is so highly developed that they do not share a sense of nation or accept one another's rights."¹⁵⁷ It would appear then that a strong sense of

¹⁵⁷Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, Avon Books, 1992, p.216.

unity is required for the emergence of a truly liberal democratic state.¹⁵⁸ And so, while democracy itself is not at the root of nationalist conflict, its sweeping *misapplication* can be.

II. TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY

If democracies are not a direct cause of terrorism *per se*, they do provide the appropriate climate for the development of protest activity leading to violence. In the case of totalitarian regimes, unrest is quickly and effectively quelled by repressive government action. Furthermore, terrorist activity in non-democratic states can often be linked to widespread government oppression. It can also exist as *state-sponsored* terrorism. In our cases, nationalist terrorism occurs when legitimately-elected majority governments deny pressure groups' demands for political self-determination (the validity of these demands is another matter altogether).

Eubank and Weinberg have extensively studied the subject of terrorist groups in democracies, and, confirming our earlier statement about the presence of terrorism in democracies, they conclude that terrorist groups are less likely to be found in non-democratic settings than in democratic ones.¹⁵⁹

However, they caution that:

To say that democracies provide settings within which it is relatively easy for terrorists to commit violent acts is not identical to asserting that there is something about democratic politics that promotes terrorist violence¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸It is one of the problems undermining the Canadian government's ability to promote federalism today.

¹⁵⁹Eubank and Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?," p.417.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p.419.

While democracies do (or should) provide measures for groups to present their demands, such measures must at least be considered. Gilbert suggests that governments habitually make the mistake of taking for granted the presence of those measures and deeming minority-instigated violence a political crime, thus foregoing any necessary discussion on the merits or weaknesses of secession.¹⁶¹ He remarks that often a democracy may offer no way of protecting a minority, "especially if that minority comprises or is included within a more or less permanently smaller group...[D]emocracy is no guarantee of liberalism."¹⁶² Consequently, the existence of a pressure group representing an oppressed minority could signify that protection is lacking.

Furthermore, terrorist groups prosper in democratic states because, as Schmid admits, the very basic principles of a liberal democratic society are the causes of its weaknesses: freedom of movement, freedom of association, open governmental relations, and a rigid legal system that greatly constrains efforts to counter terrorism.¹⁶³ Consequently, it takes little time for groups to decide that violence is a very viable alternative and an obvious answer to their woes. When governments add fuel to the fire by undermining any pressure group effort to accede to legitimate political participation (as has been the case with the IRA and the PLO), frustrations are intensified because options become more and more limited. This can lead to subversion by terrorist groups and an increase in social and political instability.

¹⁶¹ Paul Gilbert, *Terrorism, Security & Nationality*, London, Routledge, 1994, p.93.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," p.18.

III. DOES DEMOCRACY ENCOURAGE SECESSION BY LEGITIMIZING TERRORIST GROUPS?

One would like to think that, if the driving force of democracy relies on the wishes of the majority, and that, if demands for secession are made by less than significant minorities, then the democratic system itself would ensure that a country “stays together,” to borrow a popular Canadian expression. It is difficult to imagine that democracy would possess an inherent flaw that could lead to the erosion of its popular base (which includes the majority *and* the minorities). Nevertheless, there are a variety of contributing factors to the weakening of the rule of the majority. Some are the result of pressure group action, while others are due to the internal dynamics of the regime itself, for instance, when respect of minority concerns becomes an issue.

On the surface, it would seem that a multiparty political system is more efficient and effective in reconciling (at least partially) minority disputes by giving them a representative voice in Parliament, something that a one- or two-party system cannot (not as efficiently at least).

There is a kind of paradox, but is it intractable? In the case of conjunctural minorities (groups that share most of the characteristics of the majority, but differ on more abstract issues, such as viewpoint or ideology), there is less of a problem because they can often agree with the majority anyway.¹⁶⁴ However, in the case of objective minorities (those that differ in ethnicity, language and culture), the problem is more complex because such minorities will only interact and mediate disputes with the majority by three ways:

¹⁶⁴Vincent Lemieux, “Les minorités et l’État: Quelques propositions générales,” in P. Guillaume, J.M. Lacroix, R. Pelletier and J. Zyberberg (eds.) *Minorités et État*, Laval, Presse de l’Université Laval, 1986, p.18

- accepting the status of minority and relying on constitutional or pressure group protection (*dissymmetry*);
- acquiescing to legal (and therefore legitimate) majority rule (*assimilation*); and.
- exiting the polity, through a variety of means, legal or not, and not excluding violence (*autonomy*).¹⁶⁵

In the first two options, problems related to tensions between nationalism and liberalism arise. In our cases, the political systems themselves are liberal, that is, based on the individual as a citizen, implying a cultural "status-quo" and therefore suggesting that culture exists outside of politics. In a truly homogenous (ideal) nation-state, everything is fine; but this becomes problematic for non-dominant cultures (*i.e.*, minorities) in a multiple nationality state. In such a case, where cultural identity is embodied by the majority, any minority protection based on collective right would contradict the ideals of an individual-liberal philosophy. The incongruity evolves out of the fact that such a protection can only be given by the legitimately-elected government, in other words, the majority.

The third option (autonomy) seems to suggest that the only irrevocable way to resolve the problem is through separation; however, there are certain obstacles to such an endeavour. The problem of minorities can be partly blamed on an international system that is based on the idea of the nation-state. It is not a coincidence that the resurgence in nationalism coincides with movements of decolonisation. Minority groups who identify themselves as nations realize that the only way to lay claim to their share of the international system is to form their own state.

¹⁶⁵*ibid.*

The reasons for separation are as varied as the groups who seek it. In the case of the IRA and the PLO (and to some extent ETA and the Akali Dal), where democracy is intrinsic to the host countries, the majorities in power have been able to suppress pressure group claims by restricting political participation. Because the groups posed a problem for the will of the majority, measures like gerrymandering and provisions on universal suffrage kept the minorities from electing representatives who could bring forth demands. Kept away from the legitimate political arena, groups have had to turn to other methods varying from peaceful protest to outright violence.

Again, this begs the question: why do they want to separate, anyway? In simple terms, it is the inevitable reality of democracy that the majority will win and the minorities will lose. As Spencer explains, "this creates a powerful incentive for each minority to demand its own sovereign state where, as the majority, it will always win."¹⁶⁶

Schmid's tally of the weaknesses of liberal democracies facing the threat of terrorism echoes Wilkinson's argument about why democracies are so vulnerable to terrorist violence. However, Wilkinson goes further and asserts that democracies have "an overwhelming source of strength compared to dictatorships and colonial regimes."¹⁶⁷ For him, the "unqualified" support of the majority of the population against the terrorists and for the government accounts for the undying resilience of the liberal democratic regime. But he also warns that even the smallest groups can resort to effective

¹⁶⁶ Metta Spencer, "How to Enhance Democracy and Discourage Secession" in Canadian Pugwash Group (eds.) *World Security: The New Challenge*, Toronto, Dundurn, 1994, p.162.

¹⁶⁷ Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism vs Liberal Democracy," *Conflict Studies*, January 1976, p.4.

terrorist tactics, causing disturbances on a much larger scale. We would argue that over-repression by the majority can only lead to an exacerbation of discontent amongst minority groups.

This does not mean, however, that the terrorist threat is an inevitability, nor that the democratic process need be restructured to compensate the minorities. The principles of democracy allow rights for the minorities and these should be respected; that they have not been is a matter of injustice born out of the social realities of multi-ethnic states. The fact remains that majority rules and that individuals of both the majority and the minorities have a right to protection from the state. The problem lies with the way the states manage the balance between democratic rule and civil liberties.¹⁵⁸

This paradox is further exemplified in the options open to western democracies. If the rule of law is to be respected, then these democracies must be careful not to infringe upon individual rights. In other words, the delicate balance between the interest of the state and the interest of the citizen is in constant danger of being compromised. Responses to terrorist threats must not become threats themselves. As Crelinsten explains, “[t]errorism poses a threat to democracy not only by virtue of the violent acts directed against specific targets, but also and more importantly by virtue of the response such acts invoke.”¹⁵⁹ It is a question of gauging repression to avoid oppression.

In the case of nationalist terrorism, governments face the dilemma of increasing repressive action to counter the terrorist threat while, at the same time, inevitably antagonizing the peaceful portions of the minority groups; or, withdrawing from the conflict and allowing terrorists to threaten

¹⁵⁸Gearty, p.131.

¹⁵⁹Crelinsten, “Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats,” p.244.

members of the majority. Counter-terrorist responses to the problem are made legal through special bills and amendments dealing with the terrorist threat, and countries like Israel and Great Britain have already implemented such measures, though their long term impact has been subject to much criticism because they address the effects of the problem while ignoring the causes. The answer undoubtedly lies in political solutions, but governments have been at a loss to implement them.

A political solution to the matter may take several forms. First and foremost, dialogue between opposing forces must be established. The lack of communication is often incentive enough for terrorists to act out on building frustrations. Unlike other forms of terrorism (for example, anarchist terrorism where ideology and reason can be limited to violence for the sake of violence), *nationalist* terrorism has a specific goal. Governments must acknowledge the existence of this goal as a first step towards finding a solution. However, this does not imply that allowing separation is an answer. There is a difference between acknowledging the problem and giving in to it. Because the rule of the majority has been expressed in the selection of a decision-making body (*i.e.*, the government), it is up to the minorities to garner the support needed for the realization of their own goals.

Lately, it would seem that there is a tendency for governments to allow nationalist demands to be met by circumventing the democratic process and in effect giving in to possibly violent pressure groups. This is not as alarming as it may seem, but it does demonstrate the importance of the "right" to self-determination, and underlines governments' efforts to recognize it. The recent Quebec referendum and the actions of radical separatists is one example of this tendency. By not addressing the problem through internal structural reform, governments have treated self-determination as a

collective human right, something that can be interpreted as a right to secession.¹⁷⁰ However, Fukuyama asserts that democracy and nationalism are not mutually exclusive.¹⁷¹ He suggests that, combined with liberalism, democracy could indeed legitimize (and even *normalize*) the separation of nations:

...liberalism combined with democracy implies the principle of universal recognition or universal individual rights. If...liberalism is about the universal and equal recognition of every citizen's dignity as an autonomous human being, then the introduction of a national principle necessarily introduces distinctions between people. Persons who do not belong to the dominant nationality *ipso facto* have their dignity recognized in an inferior way to those who do belong—a flat contradiction of the principle of universal and equal recognition.

Therefore, it seems that cases can be made for groups, most notably the Palestinians, the Irish Republicans, and to some extent some nationalist Québécois, who i) have a long history and established distinct tradition, ii) have in the past and still somewhat today been maligned by federal and provincial or majority authorities, and iii) possess mechanisms already in place for the proper governance of a newly formed nation-state. These groups are in a better position to lay legitimate claim to separation (other groups include the Basques, the Sikhs, some Native groups, and the warring factions in the former Yugoslavia).

A final problem is caused by the trend towards globalization, which weakens the state (concretely and symbolically), liberates sub-state entities, and, most importantly, transforms democracy into a means, rather than an end. In this case, minorities can use the state against the

¹⁷⁰Spencer, p.162.

¹⁷¹Francis Fukuyama, "Comment on Nationalism and Democracy" in L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner (eds.) *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp.23-25.

state. An example of this is Canada's multiculturalism policy, which attempts to redress the situation by recognizing a variety of minority concerns (emphasizing *dissymmetry*) and making majorities aware, or forcing recognition, of these concerns. This empowerment of minorities forces a sort of assimilation of the *majority* into the minority, which can further contribute to tensions.

One possible solution is a constitutional protection which *forces* the majority into a system which requires compliance with minority rights. However, this is difficult enough in a federal system, let alone a more unitarian one like the United Kingdom. For instance, Catholics in Northern Ireland are protected individually, but not culturally: each can practice their religion as they see fit, but Catholicism as a community could very well disappear under a tide of Protestantism, even without the state's intervention. Furthermore, this kind of system does not ensure success. One need look no further than the problem of Quebec independence, and even partition within Quebec, to realize that constitutional protection has its limits.

Another solution would be to fragment the state and establish a more "asymmetrical" system, not unlike the European Community. At the local (or provincial) level, democracy would be preserved and still remain based on the individual. At the "federal" level, the union would be a confederation wherein nations have sovereign status to insure ethnic identity. But some researchers point to the inabilities of "sovereignty-association" to resolve conflicts that have become "ethnicized."¹⁷² In a way, it is a compromise between a lackluster constitutional protection and full independence. And of

¹⁷²See Philip Resnick, *Toward a Canada-Quebec Union*. Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991, pp.54-62. Resnick points out the flaws of sovereignty-association in the context of Canada-Quebec relations, but there are striking similarities with the Northern Ireland and Palestinian problems.

course, this also spells the end for the state as it was before. Furthermore, such a model would be unsuitable in a situation of potential irredentism.

In many cases, terrorist activity is declining because of governments' acceptance to negotiate. One cannot ignore the fact that the IRA did issue (and respect—for a while, at least) a cease-fire in a show of good faith towards the British government¹⁷³, and that Yasir Arafat has repeatedly (and publicly) reaffirmed his commitment to peace in the Middle East (in 1994, he shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres). Terrorist activity does not, however, preclude the resurgence of violence by other minorities. The problem here lies with the presence of pressure groups within the minorities who represent those that, because of migrations or abandonment, do not wish to choose between losing their citizenship or losing their land. Spencer notes that

"[o]ften grave conflicts have arisen because liberal, progressive people have underestimated the destructiveness of partitioning nation states, and have assumed that any group wanting its own homeland is, *ipso facto*, entitled to it."¹⁷⁴

The cycle to which we alluded at the beginning of this chapter is perpetuated by this resurgence of violence through a process of internal fragmentation, or factionalization. Chances are that relative stability would only be subverted by another group. Simply giving in completely to the pressure groups does not serve to put an end to the cycle. It will perpetuate itself as newly created minorities resort to violence to further their own causes (Protestant minorities in a reunited Ireland are

¹⁷³As of July 20, 1997, the IRA has issued another cease-fire following concessions made by the Protestants in Northern Ireland. It remains to be seen whether this will have any impact on further negotiation or if it will simply deteriorate. Protestant groups remain skeptical. *The Ottawa Citizen*, 20 July 1997, p.A5.

¹⁷⁴Spencer, p.163.

a hypothetical example). And until ethnicity is all but “purified,” we suspect that *ad hoc* solutions will continue to fail.

IV. THE “THREAT” OF NATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY

Governments may be reluctant to examine the issue of secession because they see democracy and nationalism as opposing concepts. Indeed, the fight against terrorism often becomes a fight against nationalist sentiment, alienating a group that in essence is merely manifesting its right to self-affirmation under democratic principles. Notwithstanding that opposition of nationalism by ruling majorities is only one tactic in the ongoing efforts to prevent violence, many see this as interference by the government into permissible behaviour under law. The fact that other states often condemn over-repressive strategies by host countries upon their minorities reinforces this notion. For instance, the United States condemned Indian actions against Sikh demands for secession in late 1993.¹⁷⁵ President Clinton vowed to protect the “Sikh people’s” right to the creation of a sovereign Khalistan in the Punjab.

The perception that nationalism and democracy are anathema to each other is damaging for those on both sides of the issue. While governments try to subdue rampant nationalism by taking a tough stance against its many manifestations, the terrorist groups are by-passing the democratic process by utilizing violent alternatives. Nodia remarks that:

Democracy is supposed to be a highly rational enterprise... [It] is a system of rules legitimated by the will of the people: it is presumed that the people will generally

¹⁷⁵*L’État du Monde 1995*. p.95.

choose what seems to be in their best interest. Thus anything that seems insufficiently rational, be it irrationalist philosophy or irrational human sentiments, is commonly understood as contrary to the idea of democracy. Nationalism is [an] example of an “irrational” phenomenon that supposedly cuts against the democratic grain.¹⁷⁵

Thus, the *threat* of nationalism is often tangible enough for governments to take action if its territorial integrity is at stake. The threat can also be assessed at a more theoretical level: “many scholars have expressed profound skepticism about the possibility of stable democracy in societies in which ethnicity has become politicized.”¹⁷⁷ But is it democracy or territory that is threatened?

Before current peace talks in Israel and (eventually) Great Britain, the ramifications of terrorist activity were felt at many levels. First, the well-being of the public was under attack (physical level); second, the emotional or mental state of citizens and public officials was threatened; and third, democracy itself was under attack because it could not cope with a problem that it had itself created. This was because the “enemy” was difficult to discern. Today, with the acceptance of legal representatives for the terrorist groups, the threat has become much more tangible as people are beginning to realize that these groups not only have a legitimate chance at obtaining their demands, but also that their own elected government is allowing them to do so. Terrorism and democracy may both struggle for legitimacy, but maintaining the latter is more important for governments than winning short-term victories through quick solutions which may prove counterproductive—even detrimental to democracy itself.¹⁷⁸ If this is so (and we believe that it is) then the majorities might have reason to

¹⁷⁵Ghia Nodia, “Nationalism and Democracy” in L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner (eds.) *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy*. London, John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p.6.

¹⁷⁷Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Introduction to *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy*. London, John Hopkins University Press, 1994, p.xix.

¹⁷⁸See Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy”.

worry. Once the terrorists have been legitimized, then they are free to proceed with the implementation of their demands, with the only provision being that they follow legal methods.

But we suggest that the acquiescence of pressure group demands necessarily implies that the democratic process has been altered in some fashion. In order to accommodate terrorist-associated political parties into the legal political arena, governments must, at one point, have revoked any laws barring these parties and acknowledged the validity of their claims as a legitimate concern of a segment of the overall population. What all of this means is that, not only have the pressure groups (embodied in terrorist groups) made changes in their strategies (by the creation of legal political parties), but that the liberal democratic society has done so as well. This relates to the debate on the effectiveness of a terrorist strategy¹⁷⁹ and on how concessions are made by the groups to begin negotiations.

We mentioned earlier the importance of democratization for the decision of these groups to go legitimate. Democratization is the process by which groups are made democratic by external or internal influences. As it stands, the groups' desire to participate in the democratic arena is central to the adoption of a legal strategy. We believe it is a measure of their willingness to become legitimate representatives that they have taken it upon themselves to become more democratic (internal influence).

In a brief essay on the relationship that exists between terrorism and liberal democracy, Wilkinson states that "[a]lthough it is demonstrably true that the growth of open liberal democratic

¹⁷⁹For an examination of this debate, see Laqueur, p.137.

societies increases the opportunities for terrorists to organize and initiate acts of violence, it is also clear that vigorous and effective democracies are particularly resilient in the face of terrorist efforts to overthrow them.”¹⁸⁰ This further demonstrates that liberal democracy in itself is capable of effecting change on groups that would normally oppose it while at the same time allowing these same groups to evolve. In some respects, the liberal democratic system acts much like a steam valve on a pressure cooker, moderating the more radical aspects of nationalist groups while still permitting their existence. Thus the democratization process channels (or perhaps converts) the energies expended by these organizations.

From a purely theoretical point of view, Wilkinson's statement makes sense. Once the democratization process is set in motion, it becomes very difficult to stop it. With the slowing of the colonial movements at the beginning of the 20th century, new states, nations, and pressure groups emerged, all demanding greater autonomy and territorial claims. And while the democratization process does (or did) allow certain exclusive rights to newly created states (as the colonial powers pulled out), nations and minority groups still remained without proper representation. The emergence of terrorist groups seems to have corresponded with the realization by these minorities that they were being left out.

Wardlaw links the emergence of terrorism in colonial struggles to influence from non-colonial governments.¹⁸¹ Colonial powers were in effect “persuaded” to provide the necessary tools for self-

¹⁸⁰Paul Wilkinson, “Some Observations on the Relationships between Terrorism and Freedom” in M. Warner and R. Crisp (eds.) *Terrorism, Protest and Power*, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1990, p.50.

¹⁸¹Wardlaw, p.44.

determination. The particular form of terrorism that was created by the withdrawal of the colonial powers is one that can be more easily examined and measured. Unlike revolutionary terrorism, which was prevalent (and still is) throughout Europe for many centuries, nationalist terrorism can be seen as a rather recent phenomenon (in part because the modern nation-state is also a relatively recent phenomenon). Wardlaw proposes that anti-colonial struggles (*i.e.*, those fought by colonial freedom fighters) have indeed been successful.¹⁸² Old empires die hard, however, and many newly “independent” states continue to struggle with ties left over from the colonial era. Northern Ireland is a prime example. While the Republic of Ireland became completely independent in 1949, Great Britain refused to give up its control over one fifth of its territory. In this view, the IRA’s irredentist struggle takes on an anti-colonial character.

We submit that the creation of the Irish Republic and the independence imparted upon the vast majority of Irish Catholics overshadowed the remaining clutch Britain still maintained over the Island of *Eire*, albeit to a lesser, if still important, degree. Under the guise of protecting territorial interests for its Protestant population in Northern Ireland, Britain had succeeded in dodging the opinion of other non-colonial states and their governments which, as Wardlaw explained, were becoming more and more unsympathetic towards colonial rule. The IRA, however, would see to it that such a slight would not go unnoticed. Similarly, the modern problems of ethnic conflict in the Middle East can be traced back to the end of the British mandate over Palestine in 1948. However, we admit that it is difficult to link the

¹⁸²*Ibid.*, p.45.

acceptance of governments to negotiate with newly legitimized political parties to past anti-colonial struggles.

Definitional and terminological conflicts once again appear. The problem becomes one of legitimacy. As the colonial powers withdraw, groups strive for a certain recognition and make their tactical choices accordingly. This is particularly true for pluralistic regimes in which nationalist terrorism is present. Wardlaw asserts that "while it is easier for governments than for terrorists to legitimate their activities, terrorists often strive for legitimacy."¹⁸³ In liberal democratic regimes, terrorist groups are confronted with the reality that their actions may actually undermine their struggle. Faced with this paradox, groups may turn to more "acceptable" forms of expression, but may not necessarily abandon their terrorist activities.

V. CONCLUSION: LINKS TO THE PLO AND THE IRA

Today, the British government has officially recognized the demands of the IRA and mediation is underway to enter into unprecedented negotiations with avowed terrorists (that is, if the present deadlock can be overcome). At the same time, in the Middle East, Israel has begun the handing over of land parcels to Arab individuals who have maintained a hatred for the Israeli government since its inception. By signing the Declaration of Principles in 1993, the PLO "recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security", and has committed itself to the Middle East peace process¹⁸⁴:

¹⁸³*Ibid.*, p.6.

¹⁸⁴From a letter by PLO Chairman Y. Arafat to then Israeli Prime Minister Y. Rabin, dated 9 September, 1993. Source: America-Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1996.

negotiations continue despite a new hardline approach by the new government, led by Binyamin Netanyahu. What is it that has changed, and most important of all, what are the implications for democracy as we know it?

The long term consequences of terrorism for liberal democracies can be devastating: limited freedoms, financial loss and political instability. These effects also put strain on international relations; other countries show themselves reluctant to get involved (unless the terrorism affects them as well). At this level, there is always the danger that terrorists could provoke an international conflict.¹⁸⁵ This was and still might be a very real threat in the Middle East. Prime candidates for such actions are the powerful Arab factions who still oppose the peace process.

Domestically, terrorism threatens liberal democracy by weakening national security, eroding the rule of law and undermining government authority.¹⁸⁶ However, terrorists have been unsuccessful in overthrowing governments of such regimes in the past. Even today, with many experts pointing to a rise in the lethality of terrorist activity, it is unlikely that democracies are about to cave in to terrorist demands.¹⁸⁷ The emotional, physical and financial damage continues, however, and even the strongest of governments cannot guarantee its citizens complete immunity from acts of terror. Potential backlash from extremists on the side of the majority further compound the problem. The

¹⁸⁵Wilkinson, "Terrorism vs Liberal Democracy," p.5.

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p.4.

¹⁸⁷According to the United States Department of State, even if the incidence of international terrorism has dropped in the last decade, the overall threat of terrorism remains very serious. The death toll from acts of international terrorism rose from 163 in 1995 to 311 in 1996. The trend continued toward more attacks on mass civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs. U.S. Department of State. "1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report," 1997, pp.1-2.

Ulster Freedom Fighters in Northern Ireland and the Kach movement in Israel (a radical outlawed group responsible for the 1994 Hebron Massacre) come to mind. These groups have opposed most attempts at a lasting peace resulting from any concession given to the minorities. Finding a way to deal with this additional threat is only one other challenge among many brought on by the phenomenon of terrorism.

Britain and Israel have been remarkably resilient in dealing with these threats, but now they face a new challenge: the acceptance of terrorist (or formerly terrorist) organizations as legitimate negotiators of dissatisfied minorities. The world community is carefully observing the peace talks in Israel and developments in Great Britain to see what the outcome will be, but also to analyse the process—the way things are happening—in order to gauge the success of “dialoguing with the enemy.”

Conclusion

Though governments have been able to resist terrorist groups, they (the terrorists) have shown a particular brand of flexibility and adaptability by demonstrating that they *will* do battle with opponents using legal means. As a general trend of democratization changes the way these groups seek more rapid change in the system, their strategies must evolve as well. In the case of Northern Ireland and the Middle East, nationalist terrorists are beginning to understand that the alternatives to violent conflict may be even more effective than the sole use of past tactics of intimidation.

We have seen that, while not completely abandoning their terrorist activities, the IRA and the PLO have come to realize the potential behind legitimate political participation. And so, even as these groups began as terrorist entities, they used the attention-drawing power of political violence to make themselves known, and now use this recognition to legitimize their demands.

One important realization, however, was that these groups were not becoming extinct by adopting other tactics. Crelinsten's research demonstrated how the process was bidirectional rather than unidirectional in that the terrorist groups could move away from legitimacy as well as towards it. The IRA's wavering cease-fires are one example of this back-and-forth behaviour. There were many reasons why this could happen: factionalization, government intransigence, and public opinion are some of them.

However, the groups have also discovered that taking an active role in the democratic process has meant making changes in their structure and objectives. The democratic process may be slower and more gradual than some shocking tactics employed in the past; consequently, the use of a legitimate political party became of prime importance. Once the host countries' regimes decided that

pressure groups could also voice demands (without fear of retaliation or of being ignored), then they had to allow the formation of legitimate structures by these groups in order for them to use existing channels.

But allowing these groups to take part in the negotiation process means that liberal democratic regimes have had to be altered.

The three chapters of this thesis contributed to our hypothesis in the following manner. The first chapter provided insight into the selection of our two units of study, the IRA and the PLO. Hopefully, we provided enough evidence of their progression towards legitimate political participation through their legal political wings. The chapter also served to highlight certain problems that are making it difficult for these political parties to effect change.

In chapter two, we compared the two terrorist groups in order to confirm the findings of our first chapter and expand on the notion of legitimate political participation in the case of terrorist organizations. In the case of the IRA it was found that violent tactics had become counter-productive and that increased communications between Government and Republican forces cut down on the number of terrorist offences (by both sides). For the PLO, dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians has already led to the relinquishing of parcels of land to newly created Palestinians authorities. In both cases, international influence also played an important role. Another important realization was that, while governments sought to silence the pressure groups, their efforts played a part in the very legitimation of these same groups.

In our final chapter, we examined the implications that the legitimation of terrorist groups has had for democracy. In many cases, we found that terrorist activity declined because of governments'

acceptance to negotiate; however, this trend did not exclude the possibility of a resurgence of violence when groups (or group factions) decided that legitimate participation did not provide the desired results (witness, for example, the splintering occurring within the IRA). We knew that terrorist groups would have to modify their strategy to include political solutions, but it is also important to realize that liberal democracies were affected by the transition of terrorist groups towards legitimate political participation. We found that, while these countries have been remarkably resilient in dealing with the threat of terrorism, they could not help but be altered by their acceptance to negotiate with the new parties. These are the complex factors involved as groups move towards legitimacy.

However, as much as we strove to provide answers to important questions, this thesis paper raises a great many others regarding nationalist terrorist groups. As we have said before, these groups are, by their very nature, clandestine organizations with complex agendas. How they affect local, national and international populations and how they affect governmental decision-making processes is still not clearly understood. Certainly, there are consequences for larger geo-political issues. For instance, the role of regionalism ought to be examined in greater detail. In the case of Northern Ireland, for example, pressures from the European Community seek an accelerated solution to the conflict, even as Britain has tried to resist European integration. In an era of globalization, economic concerns may be superceding political interests. And even if nationalist movements seek to identify themselves more clearly as owning distinct territories, they also recognize that a decentralized "Europe of the

Regions” may be a plausible economic solution to a long-term political conflict.¹⁸⁸ Similarly, there may also be alternatives to bilateral negotiations through regional treaty organizations like NATO.

Questions also remains as to whether terrorist groups will simply extinguish themselves as a legal political solution approaches. We have touched briefly on the possibility of former terrorist groups having a greater role in the governance of newly formed nation-states (remember that the PLO refers to itself as a “government in exile”). On the other hand, it could also be that the terrorist groups would simply disintegrate following the dissolution of radical nationalistic activity. In any case, there appear to be solid bases for democratic government. Each host country is relatively competent in its application of the democratic regime and there are no real obstacles to the creation of a multi-party regime within the new nation-states. Factions that, for the moment, are thought to be impediments to the peace process, could pave the way for a new multi-party system. For us at least, it appears unlikely that the groups will disappear (remember the bidirectional movement from legitimacy back to illegitimacy).

Outcomes are difficult to predict for existing states of emergency. In the Middle East, Palestinians are pushing hard as they seek to accelerate the process of partitioning land. They might feel the “Homeland” to be close at hand and that it is impossible to turn back. The Israelis on the other hand will “concede” as little as possible. And while the Palestinians see newly created settlements as provocation, the Israelis see their actions as a reduction of losses rather than an all-out halting of the peace process.

¹⁸⁸Michael Newman. *Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996, pp.116-117.

In Northern Ireland, there appears to be a renewed interest in promoting peace. The new Labour government is keen on engaging in meaningful dialogue and this time Sinn Fein has been invited to participate. For the moment, Protestant groups remain sceptical about this approach and are suspicious of any talks with groups linked to terrorist organizations. Radical Unionist groups are an ever-present danger.

However, there is hope to be found in greater cooperation between sides. Increased communications can only lead to a better understanding of each other's perspective, and this understanding could ultimately bring about a resolution to costly, long-standing conflicts.

Appendix A:

Terrorism and the Media:

R.D. Crelinsten's analysis of a complex relationship

The world press is keenly interested in covering terrorist activity. It seems that people are inclined to watch or read about the phenomenon for various reasons. Indeed, the media fulfils an important function in the way terrorist groups are portrayed, both to the general public and government officials. And although the government can rely on its own sources (intelligence) for information about the terrorists, it must also take into account media reports because it forms public opinion.

Crelinsten's analysis of this complex interaction provides insight on how each actor behaves.

In his "Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions, and Counterproblems." Crelinsten examines each relationship separately to place emphasis

on the nature of terrorism itself, as a form of political communication that uses threat and violence against one set of targets, the victims, to compel compliance or allegiance from another set of targets, including opponents and supporters, and to impress a wider audience that at times includes the mass media itself.¹⁸⁹

It is important for the terrorists to broadcast their message and garner world attention, be it positive or negative. As Crenshaw explains, "[t]he most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention[...] In fact, publicity may be the highest goal of some groups."¹⁹⁰ Western liberal democratic governments have had to modify their strategy to avoid bad press when dealing with terrorists. No

¹⁸⁹Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions, and Counterproblems," *Political Communication and Persuasion*, Vol.6, 1989, p.312.

¹⁹⁰Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Vol.13, No.4 (July 1981) p.386.

longer can they limit their response to strong arm tactics. On the other hand, citizens also demand protection and even sometimes retribution for terrorist attacks. The government must perform a very precarious juggling act.

Thus, the first relationship examined is the one between the Terrorist and the Government. A key aspect of the terrorist campaign is the selection of targets. As Crelinsten explains, “[t]he selection of victims is symbolic and instrumental.”¹⁹¹ At its most basic form, the Terrorist’s actions will transmit a message to the Government. In the cases examined in this paper, the PLO and the IRA have used violent tactics to try and weaken majority resolve, intimidate citizens and, hopefully, gain sympathy for their cause. Because terrorists find themselves without legal representation in Parliament they resort to cheap but effective ways to convey demands. The intention is to shock and hopefully incite change, or at least acknowledgment. However, in order to get their message across, terrorists have had to rely on media support.

Which brings us to Crelinsten’s second relationship, the one between the Terrorist and the Media. Shock without a message is useless and analogous to reprimanding a pet for something it did a week ago: the message is lost because of lack of communication. The Terrorist realizes the immense potential and power of the media and avoids alienating it. The Terrorist must therefore understand how best to “promote” his plight through the media. However, if the message is to be properly transmitted to the government (via the media) it must be made not only newsworthy, but meaningful as well. As Crelinsten explains, “[t]he central element in the relationship between terrorists

¹⁹¹ Crelinsten, p.313.

and media is therefore the struggle for legitimation between those seeking power [the terrorists] and those holding power [the government]."¹⁹² By being selective about their coverage of events, the media "become vehicles for these legitimation struggles." Thus, we see the media themselves affecting the way the Terrorist's plight is portrayed. This in turn affects not only the public's perception but the government's as well. The media are not all-powerful, as we shall see, and sometimes become valuable tools for the Government.

The third relationship at play is the one between the Media and the Government. Here, the advantage is with the Government. It benefits from expert public relations officers and, above all, possesses the legitimacy that exempts it from immediate scrutiny. In other words, the relationship is greatly facilitated. Unless the media outlets sympathize with his cause, the Terrorist must actively strive to gain attention. Governments make it easy for the press to cover them.¹⁹³ However, the relationship between the Media and Government goes beyond the dissemination of information; the creation of public consent in order to effect policy is also at stake.¹⁹⁴ The Government will seek to avoid media criticism to remain popular among the constituents.¹⁹⁵

This tripartite relationship structure forms the basis for the communication process at work where terrorist incidents occur. The ease with which messages are conveyed within each relationship can determine the effectiveness of the Terrorist's actions. Problems appear when power balances

¹⁹²*Ibid.*, p.317.

¹⁹³*Ibid.*, p.319.

¹⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p.320.

¹⁹⁵This is true for opposition parties as well. Let us not forget that they too participate in policy forging by kindling debate.

within the relationships shift too far to one side. For example, the media may choose to delay coverage of a certain event (or not cover them at all) thus diminishing the impact of the message. Furthermore, the media may focus on the act itself and not the motivations behind it (this is often the case with today's sensational "thirty second sound bite" type of reporting); thus, the negative impact of the terrorist's action is broadcast without the reasons behind it being explained.¹⁹⁶ In other cases, terrorists may overestimate the communicative potential of their actions and, in effect, adversely influence public opinion or, more importantly, fail to impress the government.¹⁹⁷ These issues are dealt with by Crelinsten, but they have less relevance to our topic and so will not be discussed here.

The communication process, however, is important in understanding why terrorists would want to access a legal political forum where their demands could be legitimated. The terrorists see the media (with its influence on citizens and, by extension, on the Government) as a point of entry into such a forum.

¹⁹⁶Michael Stohl, "Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Fashions and Fundamentals" in *The Politics of Terrorism*, M. Stohl (ed.), New York, Dekker, 1988, p.581.

¹⁹⁷Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*, New York, Longman, 1994, pp.146-147.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ADAMS, James. *The Financing of Terror: Behind the PLO, the IRA, Red Brigades and M19 Stand the Paymasters*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986.
- ALEXANDER, Yonah and John M. GLEASON (eds.). *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*. New York, Pergamon Press, 1981.
- BELL, J. Bowyer. *IRA Tactics and Targets*. Dublin, Poolbeg, 1990.
- BONNER, David. "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism" in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.), *Western Responses to Terrorism*. London, Frank Cass, 1993. pp.171-205.
- BRAILLARD, Philippe and Mohammad-Reza DJALILI. *Les relations internationales*. Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1988.
- BULLOCK, Alan and Oliver STALLYBRASS (eds.) *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*. London, Collins, 1977.
- BYRNE, Sean. "Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third-Party Intervention in the Northern Ireland Conflict—Prospects for Peace," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.7, No.2 (Summer 1995) pp.1-24.
- CHALIAND, Gérard and Jean-Pierre RAGEAU, *Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*. New York, Harper Perennial, 1992.
- CHALK, Peter. "EU Counter-Terrorism, the Maastricht Third Pillar and Liberal Democracy Acceptability," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.6, No.2 (Summer 1994) pp.103-145.
- CHALK, Peter. "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.7, No.4 (Winter 1995) pp.10-44.
- COOGAN, Tim Pat. *The I.R.A.*, London, Harper Collins, 1995.
- CRELINSTEN, Ronald D.. "Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions, and Counterproblems." *Political Communication and Persuasion*, Vol.6, 1989, pp.311-339.
- CRELINSTEN, Ronald D., "Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.1, No.2 (April 1989) pp.242-269.

- CRELINSTEN, Ronald D. and Alex P. SCHMID, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet" in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.), *Western Responses to Terrorism*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp.307-340.
- CRENSHAW, Martha, "The Causes of Terrorism" in Edward Moxon-Browne (ed.) *The International Library of Terrorism 3: European Terrorism*, New York, G.K. Hall & Co., 1994, pp.15-35.
- CRENSHAW, Martha, "Decisions to Abandon Terrorism: A Preliminary Case Study of the IRA," American Political Science Association, 1995 (unpublished).
- CRENSHAW, Martha, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 1991) pp.69-87.
- CUBERT, Harold M., "The Militant Palestinian Organizations and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring 1992) pp.22-43.
- EAGLETON, Terry, *An Introduction to Ideology*, New York, Verso, 1991.
- EUBANK, William Lee and Leonard WEINBERG, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.6, No.4 (Winter 1994) pp.417-443.
- EUBANK, William and Leonard WEINBERG, "Political Parties and the Formation of Terrorist Groups," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.2, No.2 (Summer 1990) pp.125-144.
- EUBANK, William Lee and Leonard WEINBERG, "Terrorism and Changes in Political Party Systems," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.4, No.2 (Summer 1992) pp.125-139.
- FLEMMING, Peter A., Michael STOHL and Alex P. SCHMID, "The Theoretical Utility of Typologies of Terrorism: Lessons and Opportunities" in M. Stohl (ed.) *The Politics of Terrorism*, New York, Dekker, 1988, pp.153-195.
- FUKUYAMA, Francis, "Comment on Nationalism and Democracy" in L. Diamond and M. Plattner (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp.23-31.
- FUKUYAMA, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, Avon Books, 1992.
- GAMSON, William A., *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Homewood, Illinois, Dorsey, 1975.
- GAYRAUD, Jean-François, "Définir le terrorisme: Est-ce possible, est-ce souhaitable?," *Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique* (February 1988) pp.185-201.

- GEARTY, Conor. *Terror*, Faber and Faber. London, 1991.
- GILBERT, Paul. *Terrorism, Security & Nationality*. Routledge. London, 1994.
- GURR, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970.
- HEWITT, Christopher. *The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies*, New York. University Press of America, 1984.
- HOFNUNG, Menachem. "States of Emergency and Ethnic Conflict in Liberal Democracies: Great Britain and Israel." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vol.6, No.3 (Autumn 1994) pp.340-365.
- HUME, John. "A new Ireland in a new Europe" in D. Keogh and M.H. Haltzel (eds.) *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.226-233.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey, 1992-1993*. London, Brassey's, 1993.
- KEOGH, Dermot and Michael HALTZEL (eds.) *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- KHADER, Bichara. "The European Economic Community and the Arab World." *Journal of Arab Affairs*. Vol.12, No.1, 1993.
- KHALIDI, Rashid. "The Future of Arab Jerusalem." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol.19, No.2, 1992.
- KURZ, Anat. "Palestinian Terrorism — The Violent Aspect of a Political Struggle" in Y. Alexander (ed.) *Middle East Terrorism: Current Threats and Future Prospects*, New York, G.K. Hall & Co., 1994, pp.109-115.
- LAQUEUR, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1987.
- LEGAULT, Albert. *The End of a Military Century?*. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 1992.
- LEMIEUX, Vincent. "Les minorités et l'État: Quelques propositions générales." in P. Guillaume, J.M. Lacroix, R. Pelletier and J. Zylberberg (eds.) *Minorités et État*. Laval, Presse de l'Université Laval, 1986.
- L'État du Monde 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996*, Montreal, Boréal.







- LUKACS, Yehuda, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- MERARI, Ariel, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.5, No.4 (Winter 1993) pp.213-251.
- MICKOLUS, Edward F., *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events*. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1989.
- MICKOLUS, Edward F., *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968-1979*. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980.
- MILTON-EDWARDS, Beverley, "The Concept of *Jihad* and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques." *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.19, No.1, 1992.
- NIBLOCK, Timothy, "The European Community and Regional Cooperation/Integration in the Middle East." *Journal of Arab Affairs*, Vol.12, No.1, 1993.
- NODIA, Ghia, "Nationalism and Democracy" in L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner (eds.) *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy*. London, John Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp.3-22.
- O'DUFFY, Brendan, "Containment or Regulation? The British approach to ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland" in J. McGarry and B. O'Leary (eds.) *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict ation*, London, Routledge, 1993, pp.128-150.
- OSTROVSKY, Victor and Claire HOY, *By Way of Deception*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990.
- PAINTON, Frederick, "Silent Guns Still Speak," *Time Magazine*, September 8, 1995, p.44.
- PELTON, Robert Young, *The World's Most Dangerous Places*. Redondo Beach, CA, Fielding Worldwide, 1997.
- POST, Jerrold M., "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces" in W. Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*. New York, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990, pp.25-40.
- RAPOPORT, David, "The Politics of Atrocity" in Y. Alexander and S.M. Finger (eds.) *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. New York, McGraw-Hill, John Jay Press, 1977, pp.46-61.

- REILLY, Wayne G., "The Management of Political Violence in Quebec and Northern Ireland: A Comparison," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.6, No.1 (Spring 1994), pp.44-61.
- RESNICK, Philip, *Toward a Canada-Quebec Union*, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.
- RIGBY, Andrew, *Living the Intifada*, London, Zed Books, 1991.
- RODINSON, Maxime, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?*, New York, Anchor Foundation, 1973.
- ROSS, Jeffrey Ian and Ted Robert GURR, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," *Comparative Politics*, Vol.21, No.3 (July 1989) pp.405-426.
- SCHMID, Alex P. and Albert J. JONGMAN, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books, 1988.
- SCHMID, Alex P., "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem" in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.), *Western Responses to Terrorism*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp.7-13.
- SCHMID, Alex P., *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books, 1983.
- SCHMID, Alex P., "Terrorism and Democracy" in A.P. Schmid and R.D. Crelinsten (eds.), *Western Responses to Terrorism*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, pp.18.
- SEDERBERG, Peter C., *Terrorist Myths: illusion, rhetoric, and reality*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1989.
- SIGLER, John, "Conflict in the Middle East" in A. Legault and J. Sigler (e.s.) *Les conflits dans le monde 1991-1992*, Quebec City, Centre québécois des relations internationales, 1992, p.71-106.
- SPENCER, Metta, "How to Enhance Democracy and Discourage Secession" in Canadian Pugwash Group (eds.) *World Security: The New Challenge*, Toronto, Dundurn, 1994, pp.161-178.
- STOHL, Michael, "Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Fashions and Fundamentals" in M. Stohl (ed.) *The Politics of Terrorism*, New York, Dekker, 1988, pp.579-599.
- TAYLOR, Peter, *States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence*, London, Penguin, 1993.

- THACKRAH, John Richard, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, London, Routledge, 1987.
- TILLY, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley, 1978.
- TOWNSHED, Charles, *Political Violence in Ireland*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.
- TOWNSHED, Charles. "The Process of Terror in Ireland," 1986 (unpublished).
- United States, Department of State. "1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report." 1997.
- URBAN, Mark. *Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*, London, Faber and Faber, 1992.
- VALLIÈRES, Pierre. *L'Urgence de Choisir*, Montreal, Parti Pris, 1971.
- WARDLAW, Grant. *Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures*, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- WARNER, Bruce W.. "The Use of Intelligence by the Irish Republican Army: Michael Collins to the PIRA", International Studies Association Annual Conference, Toronto, March 18-22, 1997 (unpublished).
- WEIMANN, Gabriel and Conrad WINN. *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*, New York, Longman, 1994.
- WEINBERG, Leonard. Introduction to Special Issue on Political Parties, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.4, No.2 (Summer 1992) pp.1-7.
- WHITE, Robert W.. "The Irish Republican Army: An Assessment of Sectarianism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.9, No.1 (Spring 1997) pp.20-55.
- WHYTE, John. "Dynamics of Change in Northern Ireland" in D. Keogh and M.H. Hartzel (eds.) *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.103-116.
- WHYTE, John. *Interpreting Northern Ireland*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1991.
- WILKINSON, Paul. "The Orange and the Green: Extremism in Northern Ireland" in M. Crenshaw, *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power*, Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1983, pp.111-112.

- WILKINSON, Paul. "Some Observations on the Relationships between Terrorism and Freedom" in M. Warner and R. Crisp (eds.) *Terrorism, Protest and Power*, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1990. pp.44-53.
- WILKINSON, Paul. "Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order." Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. *Conflict Studies* 236, December 1990.
- WILKINSON, Paul. "Terrorism vs Liberal Democracy." *Conflict Studies*, January 1976.
- WRIGHT, Joanne, "Northern Ireland—A British Isles Security Complex." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.5, No.6 (Winter 1993) pp.266-287.
- YODFAT, Aryeh Y. and Yuval ARNON-OHANNA. *PLO Strategy and Tactics*. New York, St.Martin's Press, 1981.

TEST TARGET (QA-3)



APPLIED IMAGE, Inc
1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989

© 1993, Applied Image, Inc. All Rights Reserved