SOVIET POLICY FORMULATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO YUGOSLAVIA 1955-1964

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

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INTRODUCTION

From a historical and political perspective, the countries of Eastern Europe form an area of special significance in the international system. Historically, the two world wars originated from that region; politically, it serves as a reminder of the present division of Europe where any change in the equilibrium could produce unpredictable consequences, that may affect the centers of world politics. To the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe constitutes, geographically and strategically, a "cordon sanitaire" acting as a shock absorber of any threats against their security[1]. Thus, the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites (i.e. the Eastern European countries) is of importance to students of international politics. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to analyze the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the period 1955-1964, and to delineate the factors which influenced the former's policy towards the latter. But the study will center round one major question: Under what circumstances can a satellite state succeed in pursuing policies which are at variance with the preferences of the Soviet leadership?

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1 Ionescu, G., The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, England, 1965, p. 168.

Since the era of the French Revolution two opposites to policy analyses have dominated Western thought[2]: First, historical approach and secondly the analytical approach. The historical approach is mainly concerned - as the name implies - with analyzing particular political events from a historical perspective. Essentially descriptive, it focuses on isolated aspects of state behaviour, and emphasizes the study of major diplomatic events. As an approach, it is virtually stripped of any rigid theoretical criteria in evaluating political developments. Preoccupied with the "unique" and the "anecdotal" it does not attempt to formulate general theories of state behaviour. According to H. McClosky, the historical approach merely piles up narratives which in themselves do not yield systematic knowledge about classes of events and, therefore, do not contribute much to the growth of science:

> There is a tendency for the fields to be mainly concerned with the investigation of individual phenomena instead of classes of phenomena, treating events as though each of them were unique instead of searching out among them the uniformities and the parallels required for generalization. It is doubtful that very much of a science can emerge from a preoccupation with questions which attempt merely to describe, or to ascertain the causes of, single events[3].

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2 Thompson, K.W., "Theories and Problems of Foreign Policy", in Macridis, R.C., (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959, p. 351.

3 McClosky, H., "Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics", in Snyder, R.C., Bruck, H.W., Sapin, B., (ed.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962, p. 189.

And because this approach to foreign policy analysis provides no adequate conceptual framework, it does not make for a meaningful comparative study; therefore, many students have felt the need for a more rigorous approach.

Consequently, the analytical approach to foreign policy study has gained more ground among political scientists during the last decades. It also became evident that, since the analytical approach sought to bring forth generalizations about state behaviour, the development of theoretical guidelines to the study of foreign policy has gained added attraction. What was sought in effect was,

> some way to coordinate the intellectual efforts of its (the field's) numerous practitioners, so that they can address themselves to a related set of problems, employing a common set of assumptions and concepts, collecting comparative sets of data, and applying common standards for testing the validity of their interpretations. In short, a common frame of reference is required which would make it possible to specify what data ought to be collected and how those data could most fruitfully be ordered.[4]

Although many serious attempts at theorizing have been made[5], there still exists widespread disagreement and uncertainty among scholars about the criteria, prospects, and the methods to be used in the discipline of international relations[6].

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4 McClosky, op. cit., p. 193.

5 See: Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free Press, New York, 1969; Hoffmann, S.H., (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Inglewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960.

6 Hoffmann, S.H., (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Inglewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960, p. 1.

And since the international system is not integrated, the use of hastily conceived and weak models would be less fruitful and in some cases perhaps misleading. As Stanley H. Hoffmann observes:

> Many of the mistakes of contemporary theoretical attempts in international relations... come from the systematic misapplication of the model of the integrated "Rechtsstaat" - the modern state characterized by a sense of common purpose, a rational organization of power, a bureaucracy and the rule of law - to the decentralized international milieu either as a norm for analysis or as a goal[7].

A foreign policy model should, among other things, recognize the leading factors in the field, and thus focus attention on the most important and "real" problems. Granted that a theory per se might not at once divulge the inner working of world politics; it should, nevertheless, enhance understanding and make data more intelligible. Theory, according to Barrington Moore, is no more than "a set of tools whose usefulness is tested in their ability to solve concrete problems"[8]. However, to solve these problems, the possession of suitable tools is a sine qua non of serious analysts; for a mere accumulation of facts without attempts to relate them to general questions, would not be enough. Thus, data should be related to a theoretical framework "if the study of foreign policy is to progress beyond the bounds of historical survey and to induce rigorous comparative

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7 Hoffmann, S.H., op. cit., p. 3.

8 Moore, B., Jr., "Social Theory and Contemporary Politics", American Journal of Sociology (Sept., 1955), pp. 107-15, quoted in Hoffmann, S.H. (ed.), op. cit., p. 8.

analysis and efforts at prediction worthy of a discipline"[9]. However, in spite of these endeavors, no general theory, providing a set of working hypotheses, has yet been furnished. To be sure, there is no pivotal frame or system of integrated theory, a core, or a "principle of order" around which the discipline could be organized. Thus, a general theory of foreign policy will have to be postponed until greater knowledge and many more partial explanations are available.

In view of the growing importance of adapting models to the study of foreign policy, we will rely on Michael Brecher's efforts in this direction. To a considerable extent, his scheme isolates the major factors which influence state behaviour. As a central theme he advances the proposition that policy rests on multiple factors or determinants, like, for example, geographical location, ideology, political system, economy, actors, motivations, perceptions, and so on. Needless to say, an in-depth inquiry into <u>the totality</u> of factors influencing state behaviour would not only impose a huge burden upon the analyst but could even render his efforts rather ineffectual, since he would be faced with a prospect

> of having to collect data about a great number of variables whose relative importance he can only guess at and whose influence he cannot easily

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9 Brecher, M., "Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices", in <u>Pacific Affairs</u>, XL, Nos. 1 and 2, 1967-68, pp. 60-92.

> measure in any event. What he faces in effect is a situation in which everything is treated as a variable, in which neither the conditions nor the constants are specified or, alternatively, left to chance[10].

Obviously, there is no uniformity in the major factors that influence the behaviour of all states. Thus, factors which affect the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. may not necessarily be the same as those influencing the conduct of foreign relations of, say, Canada. Furthermore, the absence of a coherent theory and, therefore, the lack of guides for deciding objectively which variables are the most important in any particular case, causes much concern to the analyst, thus leaving the matter open to his own judgment and interpretation. As the Sprouts have argued, "there being no omniscient observer, there are in practice no infallible criteria as to which factors are the most significant. Different observers may bring different criteria to bear"[11]. Consequently, we have chosen only those factors which, in our judgment appear significant as determinants of the policy process in the Soviet Union with special reference to its relations with Yugoslavia during the period under study.

Brecher has argued that foreign policy may be viewed as a system of action, and, like all social systems, it includes an environment, group of actors, decision-initiating structures, and processes which sustain or alter the

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10 McClosky, op. cit., p. 201.

11 Sprout, H. and M., The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1965, p. 30.

flow of demands of the system as a whole. Furthermore, he argues that it is possible and even necessary, for analytical purposes, to explore the content and interrelations of the above variables, all set within a framework of demands on policy or inputs, and products of policy or outputs[12]. Thus, a short analysis of some of his "basic components"[13] that are present in all systems of foreign policy will be briefly outlined, and the sub-components evaluated within the context of their relative importance to the present study.

The formulation and success of policy is invariably determined by two factors: the operational environment and the psychological milieu. The operational environment consists of those factors which are most significant and relevant in relation to the success of any decision[14]. Furthermore, by creating external givens that affect both the content and the conduct of policy, the operational milieu determines whether or not a particular course of action will be successful[15]. Thus, it influences the results of decisions, but affects the choice of these decisions only through the images of decision-makers.

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12 Brecher, loc. cit., pp. 60-92.

13 In fact Brecher lists six basic components. For a detailed discussion on them, see: Ibid., pp. 60-92.

14 Sprout, op. cit., p. 30.

15 Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia", in Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free Press, New York, 1969, pp. 156-57.

On the other hand, the choice of policy action is independent of the operational environment, but is influenced by the psychological milieu or the image of the decision-maker. Such variables as geopolitical position of a state, economic and military capability, political structure, are all components of the operational environment, but do not, by themselves, influence the decision-maker's action. It is only after the "objective" facts of a situation have been perceived and coordinated that they can knowingly influence a decision-maker's foreign policy choices. For, it is the "image" and not the "reality" of a situation that enables the élite to organize facts and to formulate meaningful policies. Thus,

> we must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their "image" of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour. If our image of the world is in some sense "wrong", of course we may be disappointed in our expectations, and we may, therefore, revise our image; if this revision is in the direction of the "truth", there is presumably a long-run tendency for the "image" and the "truth" to coincide. Whether this is so or not, it is always the image not the truth, that immediately determines behaviour. We act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it "is"[16].

However, significant images in the international system are those which a state has of itself and other bodies in the system which together constitute the

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16 Boulding, K.E., "National Images and International Systems", in Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free Press, New York, 1969, p. 423.

international environment. While nations are composed of many individuals, they nonetheless, tend to have a common image of themselves and of their society. The national image is fundamentally a historical image - an image "which extends through time, backward into a supposedly recorded or perhaps mythological past and forward into an imagined future"[17]. It would appear that the more conscious a people is of its history (and geography), the stronger the national image might be. Consequently, the national leaders would be able to present the world as seen from the vantage point of their nation, thus accomplishing certain political objectives more easily. Boulding argues that "there is usually a continuum of power among the persons of a society ... but this continuum can be compressed into two boxes, labeled 'the powerful' and the 'ordinary'..."[18]. It is the small group of powerful people whose images are instrumental in producing the most important decisions which make up the major events in international decisions. On the other end of the spectrum, however, is the image of the bulk of ordinary people who, although deeply affected by these decisions, take hardly any direct part in making them. This is particularly true under totalitarian regimes.

An important dimension of the national image is the geographical shape or location of the national territory, for,

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17 Boulding, op. cit., p. 424.

18 Ibid., p. 423.

similarly to historical legacy, it can affect the general frame of mind of the nation. Thus, long and exposed frontiers like those of the Soviet Union, might create a feeling of insecurity in the national mind. It is partially the reaction to this feeling of insecurity and the quest for physical defence that has produced an additional dynamism in Soviet foreign policy[19].

Another major factor in the national image formation is the ideology of the élite. However, the precise relationship between Soviet ideology and foreign policy is a subject of great controversy, ranging from the opinion that it is substantially irrelevant to the conviction that foreign policy is rigidly dictated by ideology[20]. It would appear, however, that in the case of Soviet foreign policy, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism provides an action strategy for the transformation of the existing social order, and serves as a cover to justify or conceal the gap that may develop between theory and practice. In other words, the ideology may "adapt" itself to "reality" if only by doing so it helps the policy to achieve its objective. Thus, the image, being closely connected with "reality" is always influenced by the latter just as it tries to change it. Rarely, however, does the image exactly coincide with

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19 Aspaturian, V.V., "Soviet Foreign Policy", in Macridis, R.C., (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959, p. 135.

20 Aspaturian, Ibid., p. 142.

reality[21]. In the majority of cases, a big chasm exists between the "image" held by the élite and the "objective" reality. It is precisely because the images of Stalin and Khrushchev were not as close to reality (i.e. their psycho-milieu did not coincide with the operational environment) that they had difficulty in their attempts to bring Yugoslavia under Soviet control.

Thus, the "image" is an important factor in the explanation of state behaviour. Contrary to the "realist" school of international relations, which believes that "politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws" over which men have practically no control[22], the concept of images emphasizes "the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe"[23]. How then does the image originate and what is its nature? According to Boulding,

> the image is always in some sense a product of messages received in the past. It is not, however, a simple inventory or "pile" of such messages, but a highly structured piece of information capital, developed partly by its inputs and outputs of information and partly by internal messages and its own laws of growth and stability[24].

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21 Frankel, J., The Making of Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963, p. 4.

22 Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967, (4th Ed.), p. 4.

23 Boulding, op. cit., p. 423.

24 Ibid., p. 423.

It would appear that in the case of the U.S.S.R., the major components of élite images are the historical legacy and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviet-Yugoslav relations must be analyzed within the global system because some international events influenced the course of these relations. The global system does not merely involve the exclusive relationship between the leaders of the two major military blocs, but also includes the sum of relations within the world order. Consequently, the whole spectrum of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in general, and Khrushchev's drive for reconciliation with Tito in particular, was influenced to a great extent by the former's policy of détente and "peaceful coexistence" with the West; the emergence of the developing countries; and the general deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations[25].

Khrushchev was hopeful that because of Tito's close cooperation with the West (especially between 1950-1955)[26], Yugoslavia could be used as a "bridge" between the Soviet Union and the United States, and use her "good offices" to bring the two antagonists closer together[27].

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25 For a detailed discussion on the above, Cf. Linden, C.A., Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1966; Sorensen, T.C., Kennedy, Harper and Row, Pub., New York, 1965; Rubinstein, A.Z., Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970; Mackintosh, J.M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.

26 Hoffman, G.W., Neal, F.W., Yugoslavia and the New Communism, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962, pp. 417-18.

27 Ibid., p. 428. See also: Rubinstein, A.Z., Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970, esp. pp. 104, 142 and 246.

Contrary to Stalin's negative attitude toward the former colonial nations of Asia and Africa[28], the post-Stalin leadership sought to draw these countries closer to the Soviet bloc, and, at the same time, to undermine the influence of the West in these regions. Since Yugoslavia was the only European nation embraced by nonaligned Third World nations, Khrushchev sought to "use" Tito as intermediary between the Soviet Union and the nonaligned nations[29].

Equally important in M. Brecher's framework would be the degree to which the subordinate state system influenced the Soviet-Yugoslav relations. For, he argues that "it is dangerous to assume that the elephants (i.e. the superpowers) are the only members of the system or to ignore the squirrels (i.e. the lesser states) by virtue of a specious claim that the elephants determine all or most of their actions"[30].

According to M. Brecher, the subordinate system requires six conditions: its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region; there are at least three actors; they are recognized by other actors as constituting a distinctive community; the members identify themselves as

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28 Tucker, R.C., The Soviet Political Mind, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963, p. 191.

29 For an excellent analysis of Yugoslavia's involvement and influence in the Third World, see: Rubinstein, A.Z., Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970.

30 Brecher, op. cit., p. 155.

such; the units of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System (i.e. Bipolar Bloc System); changes in the Dominant System have greater effect on the Subordinate System than the reverse[31].

Who else, for instance, was influential in the subordinate system of Eastern Europe during the period under study? Besides the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia (the two major contestants), it would appear that China exercised a substantial control over the whole gamut of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. For, claiming ideological parity with the Soviet Union[32], the Chinese bitterly attacked Yugoslav "revisionism" as "anti-Marxist" and "bourgeois rightist"[33], and were constantly exerting on Khrushchev all possible pressure to break with Tito once and for all.

While attention will be paid on the impact of the global and subordinate systems in the case under study, our main focus, nevertheless, will be on the bilateral system, i.e. the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The latter comprises all interactions between two states, with the exception of a superpower. When, however, a superpower is involved (as in our case), then the bilateral system becomes the dominant bilateral system.

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31 Brecher, op. cit., p. 157.

32 Mackintosh, J.M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963, p. 246.

33 Ibid., p. 249.

At this point, however, it only suffices to mention that the Yugoslavs, while willing to cooperate with the U.S.S.R., had, since their break with Stalin, opposed all forms of integration; in its stead they were favouring a loose network of informal ties based on common interests and attitudes. As their position remained unchanged until present, Khrushchev, in spite of all his efforts, could not achieve his cherished dream of total unity of his "Socialist Commonwealth".

This, therefore, is the modified framework of Brecher which we intend to use in the analysis of this present case. Hopefully, this would enable us to gain a greater appreciation of the conditions under which a satellite state can succeed in advancing its interests in defiance of the Soviet Union.

This study will consist of two Chapters. In Chapter One we shall examine factors which influenced the U.S.S.R.'s policy towards Yugoslavia. In Chapter Two the policy itself will be examined within the context of Brecher's framework as outlined above. If through this analysis we contribute to clarify some of the problems which beset these two states, then our efforts will not be in vain.

CHAPTER I

DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA

1. Political System Around the Time of Stalin's Death.

The degree to which the domestic system can influence the formulation of foreign policy invariably depends on the extent to which formal and non-formal institutions are allowed to participate in the policy process. In democratic countries, where political power is relatively diffused, the activities and pressures of non-governmental bodies can, to some extent, be instrumental in influencing the foreign policy of a state[1]. In totalitarian one-party political systems, however, public participation in the policy process is extremely limited, since all aspects of social and political life are subjected to rigid Party control[2].

As the political system of the Soviet Union is a one party dictatorship, the existence of any official opposition is not permitted. The Soviet ideology has never recognized the legitimate existence of factions within the Party, and

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1 Milbrath, L.W., "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy", in Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, The Free Press, New York, 1967, pp. 231-51.

2 Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", p. 169.

has always opposed doctrinal schisms. As Barrington Moore argues, "when the Communists do get power, it is not within the framework of their doctrine to establish an open society composed of competing interest groupings. Instead, they attempt to eliminate opposition groups as rapidly as possible..."[3]. Furthermore, it was difficult to imagine even a semblance of opposition during the Stalin era, especially in the last years of his rule[4]. His neurotic character and pathological personality made him to favour total control[5]. Nevertheless, paradoxical as it may sound, some interest groups did indeed exist during Stalin's regime, although in a totally different context from a Westerner's standpoint.

As a rule, Soviet interest groups do not constitute separate organizations, but rather operate as formless clusters of vested interests, since "within the context of Marxist-Soviet ideology an interest group can only be a social class with economic interests that conflict with the interests of other classes"[6]. In other words, the Communist Party, instead of representing only the interests of the working class, is, in reality, representing the aspirations

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3 Moore, B., Jr., Soviet Politics - The Dilemma of Power, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 375.

4 Tucker, op. cit., p. 42; Also: Djilas, M., Conversations avec Staline, Ed. Gallimard, Paris, 1962, p. 73.

5 Ulam, A.B., Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 434.

6 Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", p. 169.

of all Soviet social classes whose interests have presumably merged into a single identity. However, separate and autonomous existence of these groups is not tolerated or - to put it more concretely - an interest group is allowed to exist as long as it does not deviate from the general Party line, and as long as it operates within the confines of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Another phenomenon which is representative of the Soviet system, is the existence of various sociological strata, like the collective-farm peasantry, armed forces, intelligentsia, the "apparatchiki", and so on. These strata, subsequently, try to force doctrine and policy <u>through</u> the Communist Party (but never outside of it) which, in effect, becomes a competition for the largest representation within the Party Central Committee or the Politburo[7]. Thus, according to Aspaturian, "the Communist Party, under the pressures of diverse groups seeking political articulation and accommodation, has become a conglomeration of interests whose basic incompatibilities are only partially obscured by a veneer of monolithic unity"[8]. This, then, would very briefly summarize the extent and form of interest group competition in the Soviet Union.

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7 The Politburo's title was changed to "Presidium" at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952, and changed back to Politburo at the Twenty-third Party Congress in April, 1966. Throughout our thesis, however, we use the more familiar term "Politburo" indiscriminately, since "Presidium" could be easily confused with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, or the Presidium of the Party Congress. Shortly before Stalin's death, the Party <u>Apparatus</u> dominated the composition of the Politburo.

8 Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", p. 170.

As all features of political life in the U.S.S.R. are strictly controlled by the Party, such vital prerequisites to the functioning of constitutional democracies as the mass media and public opinion, have no appreciable influence on the Soviet policy process. Contrary to Western countries, where it is taken for granted that news should be presented in an impartial way and that government policies are not immune from criticism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union expresses the view that truth is only relative. It could, and in fact, should be distorted if the interests of the society are in jeopardy. Thus, "in a Communist society... all means of communication should deliberately contribute to the success of Soviet endeavors"[9]. And since the Party is the prime mover of these endeavors, it is up to the Party to determine which communication media should or should not be used. Especially during the Stalin regime, the uniformity which permeated the entire mass media reached absurd proportions[10].

In order to prevent the spread of undesirable ideas (and thus give public opinion a certain direction), all publications, messages, etc. have to pass government censorship office or "Glavlit" for approval. On the other hand, the "propaganda and agitation" or "Agitprop" section of the

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9 Carter, G.M., The Government of the Soviet Union, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., New York, 1949, p. 22.

10 Shapiro, L., The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1960, p. 472.

Party is set up to coordinate the mass mind with the regime's policies and stop at its source popular criticism of actions which the government has taken,

At this point it should be mentioned that the Communists make a clear distinction between propaganda and agitation. While the former spreads the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin in schools, universities, training courses, etc. and is aimed at higher strata in Communist society, the latter, on the other hand, explains to the masses the government's decisions and policies. In addition to verbal propaganda and agitation, the Soviet people receive an abundant quantity of party-selected information on domestic and foreign events. Daily and weekly newspapers, wall newspapers, posters, public loudspeakers tell people what their leaders want them to know. Since politics is seen in the Soviet Union through Marxist-Leninist eyes, objectivism is condemned, and public opinion has, therefore, no chance to develop[11].

So far, the above analysis has shown that the prime mover and regulator of all social and political life in the Soviet Union is unquestionably the CPSU. However, it is a fact that a political organization, indeed any organization, changes with time, and tries to adapt itself to the requirements of reality in order to better achieve its goal.

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11 London, K., The Making of Foreign Policy: East and West, J.B. Lippincott Co., New York, 1965, p. 62.

The CPSU in this respect is certainly no exception. What then, one could ask, were the main features of the Party that Malenkov, and subsequently Khrushchev, inherited following Stalin's death? According to L. Shapiro[12], six major characteristics were distinguishable in the Party around 1952. To begin with, it became a mass party (although selective) seeking talent from all walks of life, and freeing itself from the preference for proletarian membership. While on the one hand, it admitted worker and peasant members into its ranks, it aimed, on the other hand, to gather into its folds persons who were in positions of authority in various fields. Furthermore, the Party was dominated by the "apparatchiki" who imposed their authority inside all Party organizations throughout the country. Although the Party apparatus itself was highly centralized and topped by the secretaries of the Central Committee, it was in fact the Secretariat (the origional function of which was merely administrative) of the Central Committee, headed by its First Secretary (i.e. the leader of the Party), which assumed all the control of the day-to-day activities[13]. However, the personal ascendancy of Stalin, who could govern either through the Party or without it, and whose "personality

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12 Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 547-50.

13 The Secretariat kept growing in importance since 1922, when Stalin, as its First Secretary, made use of his position to begin his drive for the supremacy of the Party.

was the focal force of Soviet politics, the sun around which the whole Soviet political universe revolved"[14], inevitably caused a corresponding decline in the influence of the Party. And finally, the last major characteristic of the CPSU at the time of Stalin's death was the interpenetration and, ipso facto the control, by its members of all institutions and activities within the Soviet Union. Thus, it would appear that, following Stalin's death, his successors inherited a highly centralized Party, controlling all aspects of Soviet political life, and the First Secretary emerged as its most important and powerful member.

2. Locus of Power: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The CPSU is the dominant institution in the Soviet Union, as it regulates and controls all aspects of social and political life in that country[15]. In order to establish and consolidate the communist power in Russia, Lenin used the centralized, well disciplined revolutionary Party as a vanguard of the working class. While Marx only believed in the historical inevitability of the victory of the proletariat, Lenin, on the other hand, provided the tool for its realization. Stalin, however, further improved its organization, and emerged as an undisputed master of the professional Party apparatus men (the "apparatchiki"). Since

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14 Tucker, op. cit., p. 53.

15 For an excellent study of the CPSU, Cf. Shapiro, op. cit., Conquest, R., Power and Policy in the USSR, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., New York, 1961.

Stalin understood the role of the Party and its potential, he shaped it to become an instrument of total control over society[16].

Considering the fact that for almost a generation, final and unquestionable authority in the U.S.S.R. rested with Stalin, one is tempted to ask whether one-man dictatorship is a necessary characteristic of the Communist system, or is it developing (after Stalin's death) into an oligarchy? It appears to be a controversial question; some scholars believe that one-man rule is essential to a communist system; others, however, anticipate the emergence of an oligarchy, with minor oligarchs leading competing factions, continually engaged in a power struggle. These competing factions may form temporary alliances, whose leader may be regarded as primus inter pares, and who, in order to gain personal support may rely on prestige and persuasion rather than on physical terror[17]. This would appear to be the characteristic trend since Stalin's death.

Administratively, the CPSU is pyramidal and centralist in structure. A wide network of cells form the base of the pyramid, while its apex is occupied by the all-powerful Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

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16 Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 399 ff.

17 Rubinstein, A.Z., Communist Political Systems, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966, pp. 104-05.

In addition, there is the Secretariat of the CC CPSU. Although not as important a body as the Politburo, it occupies, nonetheless, the second most important and influential tier in the Soviet policy-making process. Originally designated by the Party Rules as merely an administrative body ("to direct current work"), it grew in importance since 1922, when Stalin, as its First Secretary, made use of his position to begin his drive for Party supremacy. Its main functions today consist mainly of spreading and interpreting Party decisions to both Party and non-Party members; securing the implementation of Party and government policies; mobilizing economic and other pressures for the implementation of Party policies; and allocating manpower and resources of the Party. The Secretariat is headed by its First Secretary, whose position provides the critical key to power. At this juncture it is very important to note that the power of the First Secretary does not stem from any monopoly over senior-level appointments, but because the position of the incumbent provides a channel of information and communication to the Politburo, and supplies ways of continuing contact with lower and upper-level personnel[18]. As we shall see in the following section, control of the flow of communications is of utmost importance and could be decisive in any power struggle.

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18 Rubinstein, op. cit., pp. 105-06.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the organizational principle of the CPSU is democratic centralism. In essence it means that the effects of changes of leadership at the top are passed downward the Party. Therefore, if a change of leadership occurs, it is imposed by the top, and never comes as a result of low-level Party revolt.

In principle, two institutions can issue orders in the U.S.S.R.: the government and the Party. In actual fact, however, it is the Party that gives the directives, and the government merely implements the Party's policy. Furthermore, as a rule, the high Party members also occupy important government positions. This interrelation, of course, assures the Party control of the government hierarchy. In theory, the highest organ of authority in the CPSU is the Party Congress, composed of approximately 4,400 delegates. In practice, nevertheless, it is the Politburo of the Central Committee which is the wielder of effective power. Although charged by the Party Statute with merely directing the work of the Central Committee between plenary meetings, the Politburo is the supreme and the only policy-making body in the Soviet Union. It is the real center of power which can, when required, manipulate the Central Committee. Headed by the leader of the Party, the Politburo is the dominant body responsible for initiation, formulation, coordination and execution of domestic and foreign policies. From 1917 to 1964 there have been 55 members[19]. During the Stalin regime

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19 Crowley, E.L., Lebed, A.L., Schulz, H.E. (ed.), Party and Government Officials of the Soviet Union 1917-1967, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, N.J., 1969, passim.

the membership of the Politburo was represented by a group of cool administrators, who were not specialists in any particular field. As opposed to the fiery orators and brilliant theoreticians of the pre-Stalin era, their value rested especially on their organization and administrative skills. In addition to party work, the then Politburo members were also required to have a certain amount of experience in police functions. A similar trend, of course, prevailed throughout Khrushchev's years in power; however, this time more emphasis was put on the necessity of a member's specialization in a "concrete" field, preferably technology or economics.

Over the years, there have been significant changes concerning the role of the Party. In Lenin's time, the Party was not bound by the views of the intelligentsia. It formulated and implemented policies without much regard for the latter. Today, on the other hand, the Party must take account of various interest groups within its structure, which emerged as a consequence of the Soviet Union's modernization and industrialization. Thus, the Party's ruling circles are becoming increasingly dependent on the technological élite's support, and, it could be assumed, even consult the latter on policies affecting their domain[20]. The more the economy develops, the more differentiated interest groups it creates, the more the political leadership

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20 Rubinstein, op. cit., p. 109.

may have to cater to the demands of the technological élite. However, in spite of all the evolutionary changes, the CPSU remains the source of power in the country, while its First Secretary occupies the most important and powerful post within the Party organization itself.

3. Khrushchev's Position and Policy Preferences.

In spite of a façade of unified leadership, following Stalin's death, his heirs in the Politburo were engaged in a ruthless struggle for political control. This struggle culminated only four years later with Khrushchev's emergence as the undisputed leader. In order to appreciate the weight of Khrushchev's victory in June, 1957, it should be noted that the latter had to overcome not only the opposition of two formidable rivals in the persons of G. Malenkov and V. Molotov[21], but had also to manoeuvre between the reforming and conservative trends in the regime that were competing against each other[22]. Thus, in order to depose Malenkov, Khrushchev first attacked the latter's New Course, and appeared as a defender of the conservative line of the Party. He subsequently turned against Molotov, and accused him of opposing all attempts at policy reforms. This could lead

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21 Malenkov was the head of the state apparatus (government) and emerged as Stalin's personal choice to succeed him. Molotov, one of the closest collaborators of Stalin, and who personally knew Lenin, held many high posts throughout the Stalin era.

22 Linden, C.A., Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1966, pp. 22-3.

one to conclude that Khrushchev was a mere political opportunist, who was engaged in a pure and simple power struggle. This simplified conclusion, however, would not do full justice to his political outlook in general, and his political personality in particular. For in actual fact, Khrushchev's political actions were influenced by three imperatives. As Linden observes,

> political necessity occasionally led Khrushchev to assume the colors of an orthodox militant; expediency frequently put him in a centrist position, but personal conviction moved him more and more toward radical reform within the context of the party regime. He took up the latter cause whenever possible and undertook grave risks for its sake[23].

It may be asked how Khrushchev reached the top and what were the forces behind his success. We shall briefly outline the circumstances. During the Central Committee plenum of September, 1953, where he obtained the title of First Secretary, he came up with a program of agricultural reform and concessions to the peasantry, thereby taking away the limelight from Malenkov who only a month before had also announced his own agricultural measures. By stressing the importance of a substantial and quick food output which, according to him, would eventually lead to an increase in consumer goods, Khrushchev took the emphasis away from industry toward agriculture. In order to undermine further Malenkov's position, he criticized the latter's emphasis on consumer goods, arguing that the population needed food more than washing machines.

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23 Linden, op. cit., p. 23.

Significantly enough, his intention was to put the Party, not the government apparatus under Malenkov, in charge of carrying out his agricultural program. Thus, Khrushchev wanted to shift the focus of the Party from its ideological function to an economic role[24]. It was, therefore, the nature of the reform and the means by which it could be carried out that was the base of the rivalry between Khrushchev and Malenkov. Consequently, when Khrushchev had decided to topple the latter, accusing him of damaging the industrial and the military power of the Soviet Union, he allied himself temporarily with the hard-liner Molotov, who tipped the balance in Khrushchev's favour. Malenkov was forced by the Supreme Soviet to resign in February, 1955, and was replaced as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by one of Khrushchev's then closest supporters, Marshal Bulganin[25]. However, shortly after Malenkov's ouster, Khrushchev began undercutting the hard line of Molotov, who in turn was purged in 1957.

Nonetheless, following Malenkov's defeat, Khrushchev wanted to make it clear that, although he was against the essence of Malenkov's reforms, he was not against his own reform policy. He proved his point more than enough at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February, 1956, when he

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24 During the Stalin era, it was the state apparatus that was entrusted with the management of the economy.

25 For a detailed analysis of the above events, Cf. Leonhard, W., The Kremlin Since Stalin, Frederick A. Praeger, Pub., New York, 1962.

unleashed an all-out attack on Stalin, thus inaugurating his famous policy of de-Stalinization and "peaceful coexistence". At first sight it would appear that the said policy was a mere tactical device to make his transition to power more popular. In fact, however, it was the result of the discovery of nuclear weaponry which by its very nature altered the old Stalinist concepts of class struggle, the uneveness of political and economic developments of capitalism, and the concept of labour theory of value[26]. Furthermore, Leninist theory on the inevitability of war was rendered obsolete, as thermonuclear war would not be the continuation of policy but its end. Hence, Khrushchev decided to accept this new reality. His concept of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition to socialism, therefore, was dictated by necessity.

If one would ask what was the decisive event in Khrushchev's struggle for personal primacy the answer would appear to be his onslaught on Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and his subsequent de-Stalinization policy. With his attack on Stalin, Khrushchev asserted himself as a champion of reform. As such, he could attract dissatisfied elements from outside the immediate ruling élite (e.g. Party secretaries in the territorial apparatus) who would take up the struggle

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26 Toma, P.A., "Introduction", in Toma, P.A., (ed.), The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Ariz., 1970, p. 5.

against his opponents, with the hope of achieving more prominence in the center[27]. Thus, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy proved to be the steppingstone to his greater control of the Party, as well as a tool by which he could adjust the old regime to the changing realities of the atomic age. Moreover, by concentrating on Stalin's persecution of reliable, dedicated and faithful Party members, Khrushchev ipso facto wanted to discredit his two closest rivals - Molotov and Malenkov - who happened to be closely associated with Stalin's deeds.

But, as a result of a general decline of Soviet prestige throughout the satellites, following the tumultous events in Eastern Europe (i.e. the Polish and Hungarian revolts), Khrushchev's position became seriously compromised. For, eight major figures[28] of the Politburo (known as the "anti-Party group"), opposing Khrushchev's economic reorganization, his agricultural policy and his reconciliation with Yugoslavia, voted, in mid-1957, to remove him from power[29]. Khrushchev, however, claimed that, since he was elected by the Central Committee, he could not be removed by any other body. Henceforth, he dispatched his men all over the Soviet Union,

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27 Linden, op. cit., pp. 34-5.

28 The so-called "anti-Party group" consisted of Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Shepilov, Voroshilov, Saburov, and Pervukhin. For a detailed account of their activities, see Morton, H.W., "The Structure of Decision-Making in the USSR", in Juliver, P.H. and Morton, H.W., Ed., Soviet Policy-Making: Studies in Communism in Transition, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967, pp. 5 ff.

29 Shapiro, L., op. cit., p. 561.

in order to call a Central Committee plenum in Moscow. Almost all members rushed in by planes with the help of the KGB and the Army[30], and voted Khrushchev in. He thus assumed clear supremacy for the first time. It was once more, therefore, that his recourse to the middle-level elements of the territorial Party organizations proved to be successful. This then would briefly summarize Khrushchev's rise to power and indicate the forces which facilitated his success.

What were the main factors that influenced Khruchchev's perception of Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia? It has been said that "a representative statesman is the product of his country's civilization"[31], which, in turn, is formed by natural and social environment and the political atmosphere which has historically prevailed. Since civilization is a part of history, it would appear then that the historical legacy plays a significant part in influencing the views of men in responsible policy-making positions. Russia's fear of invasion and her agelong quest for security equally influenced Khrushchev's foreign policy as any other Russian leader's in the past. Thus, by initiating the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, Khrushchev hoped that, on the one hand, he could strengthen the Eastern

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30 Penkovskiy, O., The Penkovskiy Papers, Doubleday and Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1965, p. 206.

31 London, op. cit., p. 39.

European "cordon sanitaire" and, on the other hand, detract Tito from the anti-Soviet Balkan Pact, which militarily bound Yugoslavia to Turkey and Greece.

A second major factor which influenced Khrushchev's policies was, of course, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Having a great faith in it, he sincerely believed that free and independent Communist countries could somehow find a way to harmony and political amalgamation. He thus hoped that ideological reconciliation with Tito would pave the way to that end. On a larger scale, Khrushchev believed in the eventual universality of socialism. Therefore, in order to speed up and facilitate its advance, diversity between various nations, or groups of nations, had to be recognized. Hence, the idea of "different roads to socialism" had been accepted as an old Leninist tenet. By acknowledging its existence, Khrushchev thus opened the door to "revisionist" Yugoslavia. For he hoped that if Tito could be persuaded to re-join the bloc, other "neutral" states might follow.

Finally, Soviet motives cannot be separated from the character and personality of the principal leaders, since the personal factor could be of crucial significance in any evaluation of Soviet foreign policy[32]. Thus, the Soviet drive for reconciliation with Yugoslavia, from shortly after Stalin's death through 1964, was undoubtedly dominated by Khrushchev's personality; it was an important

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32 Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy", p. 138.

factor in shaping the relationship between these two countries.

Although harboring similar goals to Stalin's, Khrushchev had realized, nevertheless, that the latter's methods and style, and indeed the whole Stalinist outlook, were rather hindering the development of Communist power in the world. Thus, having perceived the necessity for new methods and approaches, the Soviet leader thought that the first step in improving the position of the Soviet Union should be the relaxation of the whole realm. A reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia could, at this juncture demonstrate to the world that Communism, after all, is a doctrine that respects individual rights of other Communist states, no matter whether the state in question agrees or disagrees with the Soviet line. The creation of such an image would greatly enhance his efforts to relax tensions.

Furthermore, the new Soviet boss voluntarily associated himself with the masses and, contrary to Stalin, engaged in extensive travelling at home as well as abroad (e.g. his trip to Yugoslavia in 1955). He had a colorful personality and was using it to the fullest extent. He had also an assertive personality but, unlike Stalin, who was never rash or foolhardy, and who arrived at his most important decisions cautiously and empirically, Khrushchev's prevailing qualities were rashness, lack of prudence, and a tendency to bully[33].

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33 Frankland, M., Khrushchev, Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, England, 1966, p. 209.

Having great and sincere faith in the ultimate victory of world Communism, he thought, nevertheless, that the latter could be achieved more by conviction and education than by force. He was a great pragmatist who, in spite of many voices of opposition, had adopted Lenin's tenets to the realities of the world he lived in. Khrushchev also knew that personally he was missing Stalin's stature, prestige, and influence. And this is why he put much more emphasis on the role of the Party (which he restored to its former prestige and power) in intra-bloc relationships. Thus, unlike Stalin, who preferred to deal with the top-satellite leaders on a personal basis, Khrushchev chose to conduct his relations with Eastern European countries on a Party-to-Party basis. This then were the traits of the man who ruled the Soviet Union for over ten years.

In summary, the following points should be noted: Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia was primarily determined by the nature of its political system. Insofar as various social strata can express their policy preferences this can only be done through the Party. As the prime mover and regulator of all social and political life, the Party is the locus of power, and Marxism-Leninism entitles it to a perpetual monopoly of that power. During the Stalin era, the Party was highly centralized, but thereafter, it has experienced a partial diffusion. Nevertheless, as the leader of the Party, the First Secretary remains its most

powerful member. In the power struggle that followed Stalin's death, Khrushchev emerged as the undisputed leader, and his subsequent policy of détente and "peaceful coexistence" led to his quest for reconciliation with Tito. How and why he sought to normalize relations with Yugoslavia will be examined in greater detail in the chapter that follows.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF POLICY

1. Bloc Hegemony or Soviet Dominance in the Subordinate System of Eastern Europe?

The origin of Soviet interest in Eastern Europe could be traced to the pre-Bolshevik era. Historically, the region acted as a buffer zone - a shock absorber between Russia and her enemies, and for the past two centuries, Russia strove to exert a dominant influence in the area[1]. History and geography could suffice as a basis to interpret the motives for Soviet policy of Gleichschaltung of Eastern European countries after the Second World War. However, the specific nature and manner[2] of the subjection of these countries to Soviet hegemony warrant the view that other elements were also involved. One of them - and perhaps the most important one - is the history of the relationship between the Communist

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1 Aspaturian, V.V., "East European Relations With the USSR", in Toma, P.A., (ed.), The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Ariz., 1970, p. 285.

2 Shortly after the Second World War, it appeared for a while that the countries that came under the sway of the Red Army would be eventually incorporated into the U.S.S.R. as Union Republics. This, however, never happened. One could assume that Stalin was aware of the fact that the Western Powers might have resisted outright annexation of these states, and he could not risk a war with his powerful former allies. One can, furthermore, speculate that in the early 1950's Stalin could have developed some doubts as to the practicability of ruling alien states ad infinitum. For these reasons, therefore, he chose instead to keep these countries under tight political and economic control and appointed his satraps to govern them.

Party of the Soviet Union and the prewar Communist parties of Eastern Europe. Thus, it is this particular factor which characterizes the Soviet Union not only as a Great Power but also as "the center of an ideological movement with ecumenical pretentions"[3]. And, it is because of this dichotomous Soviet interest in Eastern Europe that no satisfactory answer as to the precise motives of postwar Soviet policies in that region of Europe can be found[4]. Was Stalin's primary interest the security and protection of the Soviet state, or was the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe motivated by ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism to communize the world? On what basis could predictions of Soviet intentions be made at that time? For, if Stalin was motivated mainly by security interests, then it would be reasonable to assume that the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe constituted a final act in the former's hegemonic policy in Europe. If, on the other hand, the Soviet leader was motivated mainly by ideology, then the possibility that Eastern Europe was used as a stepping stone for the further extension of Communism, was very plausible indeed.

But, regardless of which motive was of paramount importance, the establishment of a satellite domain in Eastern Europe equally satisfied the two major Soviet political

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3 Aspaturian, "East European Relations With the USSR", p. 285.

4 Jamgotch, N., Soviet-East European Dialogue, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, p. 29.

imperatives, as it concurrently acted as a "cordon sanitaire" against any possible invasion, and an area from which further expansion of Communism could be accelerated.

Yet, as the Soviet position and role in international Communism came increasingly under criticism, especially in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies[5], the Kremlin deemed it necessary to reevaluate the grounds on which the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe could be justified. It became clear, nevertheless, that following the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization[6], the smothering by the Red Army of the Hungarian uprising, and the invigoration of the Comecon, Khrushchev denoted his resoluteness to preserve the territory of Eastern Europe in the customary hegemonic power sense, with a security priority similar to that of the Soviet Union herself. Thus, Aspaturian concludes that,

> the Soviet state (is) a traditional imperialistic state, whose influence and role in the world is determined not by the attractiveness of its ideology but the enormity of its power and its determination to employ it in its self-interest[7].

However, with the advent of nuclear weaponry and the ICBM's, the strategic importance of Eastern Europe has noticeably declined. For, it is likely that in general war

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5 For more on the above, Cf. Löwenthal, R., Khrouchtchev et la Désagrégation du Bloc Communiste, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1964; Bennet, E.M. (ed.), Polycentrism: Growing Dissidence in the Communist Bloc? Washington State University Press, Washington, D.C., 1967.

6 The WTO, similarly to NATO, bound its members to a commitment that an attack upon one member state would be regarded as an attack upon all, i.e. the Soviet Union including.

7 Aspaturian, "East European Relations With the USSR", p. 287.

between the United States and the Soviet Union, the former would make a direct and initial attack upon home territory, without passing through Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, in spite of this apparent strategic downgrading of the satellites, they still remain as a high-priority Soviet security interest[8]. The question remains why. It would appear that Eastern Europe represents a new defense imperative, this time tied not so much to the military as to the political requirements of the U.S.S.R., i.e. the protection and advancement of interests related to the continuation and the fulfilment of the present Soviet political system. In this sense, therefore, the satellites acquire a doctrinal utility, quite independent of their military strategic value. Once the Soviet Union has embarked on a mission of spreading her ideology throughout the world, with a hope of eventual global Communist victory[9], the protection of her regime substance (as opposed to her territory) becomes a major imperative. It is in this particular sense, therefore, that the Eastern European satellites are as much important to the Soviet Union today, as they were at the time of their incorporation into the Soviet sphere of influence. Thus, one could conclude that the motives of the Soviet Union in preserving her satellite domain appear to be dictated, in various degrees, by

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8 Jamgotch, op. cit., p. 31.

9 Tomasic, D.A., National Communism and Soviet Strategy, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 174.

three major imperatives: First, the protection of her own territory; second, her self-appointed ideological mission that has set out to prove the correctness of Marxism-Leninism; and, last but not least, the defense of her internal political institutions, i.e. her regime.

2. Brief Historical Overview of Relations: 1941-1955.

In order to add more clarity to the events under study, it would be necessary to turn a brief examination of Soviet--Yugoslav relations in the preceding years. The beginning of the Russo-Yugoslav conflict could be tentatively traced to the period of the war. This point, however, should be qualified by the fact that during the war the two parties to the conflict were conscious of nothing else but the harmony of their common aims and interests.

During the war Tito's Partisans fought for Yugoslavia, but they also fought, with no lesser zeal, for the Soviet Union and Stalin. The devotion of Yugoslav Communists to the "first socialist country" and its leader was boundless. According to Milovan Djilas "le caractère idolâtre du culte de la personnalité de Staline et de tout ce qui touchait, de près ou de loin, à l'Union soviétique, prenait une forme et des proportions absurdes"[10]. The slightest criticism of Yugoslavia's great ally was, therefore,

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10 Djilas, M., Conversations avec Staline, Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1962, p. 18.

inconceivable during the war. And yet it does not mean that the relations between the two countries were always blameless during that period. Tito became disillusioned with Stalin's hesitation to let the Partisan movement become openly Communist, and his failure to find any way of sending Tito military aid took the latter by surprise. Yet Stalin refrained from openly supporting Tito for two reasons: First, during this crucial period, he did not know who amongst the Yugoslav rivals would come out on top[11] and secondly, he avoided the possibility that the Western Powers might criticize him for planning a Communist zone in the Balkans[12]. However, it was only after the war that some of Tito's discoveries caused him particular grief.

The fact that Yugoslavia was the only satellite country that defeated the Nazis unaided and the first to set on the road to socialism, made her overambitious leaders headed by Tito, very sensitive to any form of criticism. At the conclusion of the war they saw their country as the leader of the People's Democracies and the center of the projected Balkan Federation. Being a Stalinist, Tito attempted to adapt Soviet institutional forms in all

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11 The complexity of the general situation in Yugoslavia during the war could be epitomized by the fact that at least three wars were in progress simultaneously: the patriotic war against Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria; the longstanding feud between the Croats and the Serbs; and the social war between Communists and anti-Communists.

12 Djilas, op. cit., p. 84.

their aspects and tried to develop a state that would be an exact replica of the Soviet Union[13]. However, since Stalin did not relish the idea of having a "competitor" within the "Socialist camp", he did not approve of Tito's eagerness. Besides, Stalin wanted to cool the Yugoslavs off, since their precipitated realization of the Marxist utopia might well have put the Soviets in an embarrassing position[14]. Hence, the official voice of the U.S.S.R. started to speak contemptuously about the Partisans' record during the war and about their pretentions to military glory. In the spring of 1947, Tito, considering his country as the leading industrial power in Eastern Europe, promulgated an overambitious and unrealistic Five-year Plan, with an apparent hope that Stalin would be able and willing to support it[15]. However, "the Five-year Plan turned out to be the economic equivalent of... Trieste. Stalin wanted Yugoslavia to remain a colonial source of raw materials; Tito wanted to convert it into a Little Russia overnight"[16]. While, on the one hand, the Yugoslavs asked the Soviet Union for maximum assistance in order to achieve industrial and economic independence, the Soviets, on the other hand, wanted to integrate and subordinate Yugoslavia's economy into their own Five-year Plans.

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13 Yugoslavia actually modelled herself more on the RSFSR than on the USSR, in an anticipation of becoming an eventual "Republic" of the USSR.

14 Zaninovich, M.G., The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1968, p. 57.

15 For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the first Yugoslav Five-year Plan, see F. Fejtö, Histoire des Démocraties Populaires (L'Ere de Staline), Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1952, Vol. 1, pp. 4 and 165-69.

16 White, L., Balkan Caesar, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1951, pp. 207-08.

Thus, needless to say, Stalin did not approve of the project, and this fact subsequently became the basis for some of Tito's most bitter comments about Soviet policy and one of his principal reasons given for his eventual break with the Soviet Union[17].

A rather interesting feature in the whole series of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was the creation of two Yugoslav--Soviet enterprises, "Juspad", a Danubian navigation company and "Justa", a civil airline. While the two governments agreed to contribute capital equally and share equally in the management, with all the profits and losses split on a 50-50 basis, in reality, however, all control and half the profits went to Russia and all the losses and half the profits whent to Yugoslavia[18]. Since, this was obviously a case of pure and simple exploitation, Tito did not hesitate to point out this fact to the Soviets following the "break". As a result, the Soviet Government consented, in the spring of 1949, to liquidate the above "mixed" companies in Yugoslavia[19].

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17 At this point a technicality could be raised, namely who broke off relations with whom. According to Tito, his refusal to put in an appearance before the "fraternal" tribunal of the Cominform on June 20, 1948, forced that body to expell him from the community of the "fraternal Communist Parties". On this basis, it was him, therefore, that split with the Soviet Union.

18 Dedijer, V., Tito Speaks, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1953, pp. 290-94.

19 Dallin, D.J., Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, J.B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1961, p. 192.

A further source of Yugoslav discontent was the fact that, during the immediate postwar years, the Soviets attempted to organize a net of informers in the Party, in the secret police, and in the Partisan Army. Since, alongside with the Party, the army was the bulwark of Tito's regime and, therefore, one of the two main instruments of his power, it seemed only logical that the effort to subvert that regime started with the subversion of the army. Reportedly, many high-ranking Yugoslav officers were approached by the Soviet "advisers" and urged to join the Russian intelligence service[20]. It would be difficult to estimate the exact success of those Russian activities within the Yugoslav Army. The Soviets, however, were successful in recruiting one of the highest officers of the army - General Arso Jovanovich - but to no avail. He was shot while trying to cross into Rumanian territory (presumably to establish a "Free", i.e. anti-Titoist but pro-Moscow, Yugoslav government on satellite territory). Officially, the said "advisers" were sent to Yugoslavia on a bona fide basis to teach the Partisans the techniques of modern strategy and to help in the administration of the armed forces. Their salaries, however, were in reality almost four times as high as those of a Yugoslav army commander or a federal minister, and were paid exclusively by the Yugoslav Government[21]. This, of course, Tito found untolerable.

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20 Tomasic, op. cit., p. 122.

21 White, op. cit., p. 209.

In foreign policy, one of Tito's most cherished postwar aims was the annexation of Trieste and the surrounding territories. As a result, Trieste proved to be, between 1945 and 1948, one of the most sensitive spots in Europe, as Tito was not unwilling at times to risk a major military adventure in support of his claims against Italy and Austria. Undoubtedly, wanting to justify his position at home, Tito was doing everything possible to redress the national grievances of the Yugoslavs. In this respect, he pleaded Stalin's support and suggested furthermore that Russia should not hesitate to go to war with the Anglo-Americans in order to force the Trieste issue in his favour. Stalin's attitude at this juncture seemed to hint that Tito should occupy as much territory as possible but only by methods short of actual warfare. Thus, "so long as Tito avoided embarrassing Stalin to the point of inciting the Western Allies to take defensive counteraction, Stalin was prepared to support Tito to the utmost"[22]. However, Stalin refused to force the issue of Trieste in the interest of Yugoslavia, and only agreed to the establishment of a free territory[23]. Interpreting this as Russia's ingratitude toward her most faithful ally or conceivably as some prearranged conspiracy with the West, Tito, in his "Ljubljana Speech" (May, 1945), hinted in the

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22 White, op. cit., p. 140.

23 It is conceivable that this gesture was made in the hope to gain Italy's gratitude and thereby assist the Italian Communists to obtain control of Italy.

direction of Moscow that henceforth he intended to remain independent not only from the influence of the West but from that of the East as well:

> It is said that this war is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that every one shall be master in his own house; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest[24].

Considering the usually complying tone of the satellites, such talk was interpreted in Moscow as a sign of disobedience and, as such, was considered pure heresy.

Furthermore, the year 1945 saw the emergence of three Communist states in the Balkans. Since Albania (not a Slavic nation) was already a protégé of Yugoslavia and clearly within the Yugoslav "sphere of interest", it was illogical (according to the Yugoslavs) that Bulgaria, a fellow Slavic nation, should remain separated from other South Slav nations. Thus, the idea of a union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria[25], a union which could have provided a solution to one of the most difficult dilemmas of the Balkans and would have created a real "Yugoslavia", made a particular appeal to Tito. At the very beginning, the idea of

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24 "Letter from CC CPSU to CC CPY", May 6, 1948, in The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948, p. 35, quoted in Tomasic, op. cit., p. 119.

25 It was doubtful, however, that a lasting union between these three states could be achieved at this juncture, since, in spite of outer similarities, the differences between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were substantial: the Bulgarians were traditionally pro-Russian and dependent on the USSR; the Yugoslavs, on the other hand, had anti-Russian feelings and were politically independent; as for the Albanians, they were predominantly anti-Yugoslav, not of Slavic stock and politically non-committed.

the federation had the enthusiastic approval of Moscow[26], for Stalin, on his part, thought that the Bulgarians and the Albanians could serve, in the regime of the new federation, as a channel of infiltration by loyal pro-Russians, thus neutralyzing any great-power moves on the part of the new regime. Besides, Stalin reasoned, the federation could have also served as an effective counterbalance to the British-American influence in the Balkans. However, as the years went by, it became clear that this kind of association was totally unacceptable to Stalin, for it could have developed a strength and significance of its own. Nevertheless, this did not seem to be the chief reason for Stalin's opposition to the formation of the South Slav bloc. After all, even the combined capabilities of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could not possibly have matched the power of the Soviet Union. What was really unforgivable by Stalin was Tito's arrogation that he could assume, in addition to his domestic duties, international responsibilities as well. Thus, on January 28, 1948, a short article in "Pravda" announced that the editors were against the whole idea of the said federation. But, only a short month after this public rebuke, Stalin called a conference of Soviet, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian representatives and requested that a federation between Yugoslavia (this time excluding Albania) and Bulgaria should

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26 As early as November 22, 1944, Kardelj, Simich and Shubashich, while in Moscow, put forward the idea of the project to Stalin, who wholeheartedly supported it, and, shortly after the war, Zhdanov was tirelessly sponsoring it behind the scenes.

immediately be created[27]. This dramatic reversal of policy could most likely be interpreted by the fact that, since the top leadership of a newly created Yugoslav-Bulgarian Communist Party would have to be composed of both Yugoslav and Bulgarian representatives, such a situation would per se increase the chances for personal and political conflicts, which in turn would result in the formation of factions within the top leadership. Such a state of affairs would obviously "dilute" Tito's influence within the federation and in the Balkans in general, while the faithful Stalinist Dimitrov would steer the destinies of the new country according to Moscow's wishes. Tito, however, was not willing to accept such a subordinate role and, having rightly guessed Stalin's intentions, refused to participate in the project.

Consequently, Tito's refusal to form the Balkan federation was interpreted by Stalin as an act of insubordination. Therefore, in order to curb and control more easily the increasing self-reassurance of Yugoslavia, Stalin decided to revive the old Comintern, this time, however, under the disguise of a Communist Information Bureau or Cominform. Originally he might have thought of the new agency as broader in scope, but, as it turned out, it included only the French and Italian Communist Parties, in addition to Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria,

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27 At this time Stalin was also of the opinion that, in all, three federations should be created in Eastern Europe; one between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, another between Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the third between Rumania and Hungary.

Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. itself[28]. Thus, early in 1948, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU deemed it advisable to open consultations with other members of the Cominform (mainly as a formality, but possibly to accentuate the "collective" character of some eventual decision) about what should be done to curb the excessive independence of the Yugoslav Party leaders. The decision had been reached quickly[29] and, on March 18, 1948, the Soviets notified Tito by letter that the Soviet government had irrevocably decided to withdraw all military advisers and instructors on the grounds of hostility. Tito, apparently perplexed, asked Moscow for explanation. On March 27, 1948, the Soviets replied to Tito's request. Their reply, however, was less than encouraging, for the tone of the first letter was not only insulting but also suggested that the latter might be labelled a Trotskyite. The same letter unleashed a series of ideological attacks, one of them aiming at the lack of "democracy" in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia or rather its Central Committee. Thus began a series

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28 Ironically enough, the only country, apart from the USSR, that was in favour of the establishment of the Cominform, was Yugoslavia.

29 There is no evidence, however, whether the action initiated by the Cominform had been approved unanimously by the Soviet Politburo, since Zhdanov, the then Secretary-general and organizer of the Cominform disagreed with Stalin. It would seem reasonable to presume, nevertheless, that Stalin was on the side of Russian power and nationalism, while Zhdanov could have wanted to preserve the Cominform where he was exercising great influence. For a good description of Stalin's idiosyncrasy and motivations as regards Yugoslavia at this particular period, see Khrushchev, N.S., Texte Intégral du Rapport Secret de M. Khrouchtchev, Corréa-Buchet/Chastel, Paris, 1956, passim.

of letters between the two Central Committees, their tone growing harsher as the months passed by. Finally, on May 17, 1948, the Soviets suggested that the proper place to discuss their differences would be the Cominform and summoned Tito to attend the conference in Bucharest. Tito, sensing that this could be his end, rejected the "invitation" but, at the same time, pledged loyalty to the U.S.S.R. Stalin interpreted the former's unwillingness to appear before the "fraternal Communist Parties" as a tacit admission of guilt and, on June 28, 1948, came the news that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from membership. The charges that the Russians chose to emphasize could be summarized as follows:

> In Yugoslavia where individual peasant farming predominates, where the land is not nationalized, where there is private property in land and where land can be bought or sold, where much of the land is concentrated in the hands of kulaks... there could be no question of correct Marxist policies being applied... The Party's nationalist line could only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of independence and to its transformation into a colony of imperialist countries[30].

Such strong and grave accusations obviously betrayed Stalin's ire at the man who dared to oppose the former's dictates. Furthermore, Stalin evoked a sense of frustrated anger that, for reasons explained below, he could "only" expel Yugoslavia from the Communist camp instead of, as he probably would have wished, invade it.

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30 Bass, R., ed., The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record, Prospect Books, New York, 1959, pp. 41-6.

Tito's defection in 1948 was a major political defeat for the Soviet Union and the former's continuation in power was considered a personal challenge to Stalin. And yet, despite utmost provocation, despite the fact that the ferocity of the propaganda was almost suggesting a military intervention, and despite the fact that the country was open to invasion from several directions, the Soviet troops did not march on Yugoslavia. It is not unreasonable to assume that Stalin's unprecedented inaction was caused by his fear of the USA. For, the entrance of the Red Army into Yugoslavia, could have prompted the Americans to intervene, as they did in Greece. The best action, therefore, that the Soviet Union could have undertaken under existing circumstances was to expel refractory Yugoslavia from the Cominform.

By excommunicating the Yugoslavs from the Communist community, Stalin obviously expected that such a drastic move would set in motion forces among the rank-and-file that would seek to redress relations with the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, he hoped for, and expected that internal disturbances in Yugoslavia would precipitate the fall of Tito[31]. However, nothing of the sort happened. Tito was the true master in his house and was proud of it. His remarkable resourcefulness and determination managed to transform the Communist Party of Yugoslavia into a fighting body with overwhelming

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31 Hoffman; Neal, op. cit., p. 138.

peasant support. Since very few "old" Communists survived to see the end of the war, almost none of Tito's followers during that critical period knew any leader but him. More than any Communist Party in the world, the Yugoslav Party was the creation of one man; during the crisis its members looked first to Tito and only through him to Stalin. And the former, on his part, refused to permit Yugoslavia to be incorporated into the Soviet command-and-control structure. Thus, it was not any deviation on Tito's part that caused his break with Stalin, but rather his resistance to the latter's claim to absolute Soviet control of Yugoslavia.

In the years that followed, Stalin's fight against Yugoslavia continued on an unprecedented scale, while the Soviet press unleashed exceptionally harsh anti-Tito propaganda. Hence, in the adversity of various charges, the Yugoslavs were compelled to reassess their own system and, out of desperation or most likely as a measure of self--defence, reversed the charges. It was their position, they claimed, that was orthodox, while the Soviet system was condemned as heretical and representing a form of "state capitalism" which, in order to survive, was compelled to exploit. Consequently, as a natural reaction to a bitter disillusionment with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs started to move away from the East toward closer ties with the West. "Peaceful coexistence" and trade with Western states was, therefore, emphasized[32]. Furthermore, the noncommittal

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32 Total American grants and economic loans between 1950 and 1962, and military aid until 1959 given Yugoslavia amounted to nearly $2.5 billion.

attitude of the Yugoslavs opened for them the way for leadership of the neutralist bloc while "the Soviet Union could only stand aside and watch the bold defiance and even arrogance of its former satellite"[33]. However, shortly after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union began to move toward a rapprochement with Yugoslavia and, in 1954, Khrushchev initiated a series of moves which ultimately led to the alliance of the two countries - mainly on Yugoslavia's terms.

The above events lead us to conclude that two essential themes emerged during the Stalin-Tito controversy, namely the nature of national independence in a socialist world, and the nature of Stalinism as compared with true Marxism. According to the Yugoslavs, the People's Front, grouping together the middle-class farmers, the poor farmers, and even some members of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia[34], corresponds to the particular historical conditions of the liberation struggle; it is thus a stage of the proletarian dictatorship that is applicable to the specific conditions of Yugoslavia[35]. They assert, therefore, that each nation has the right to decide on its own the nature of proletarian dictatorship, without having to imitate the Soviet model; it should, therefore, follow its own path to socialism, without outside interference. So, the first major topic of the

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33 Zaninovich, op. cit., p. 89.

34 Hoffman; Neal, op. cit., pp. 84-5.

35 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950-52, p. 10912.

controversy was the principle of self-determination and the question of national independence in a socialist world.

The second subject of the controversy was the dubiousness of the nature of Stalinism in relation to Marxian socialism. Following their expulsion from the Cominform, the Yugoslavs engaged in a study of the nature of socialism which concluded that Stalinism was a deviation of Marxism and had to be contested as such. Furthermore, they went over to the Trotskyist position and advocated the necessity of the revolution by the working classes within the Soviet Union and the satellites[36].

Consequently, Tito set in motion a polycentric trend within the Soviet bloc, a trend that at one time threatened the ideological foundations of the Soviet power. It is from this position, therefore, that the Yugoslav leader accepted to negotiate his rapprochement with Khrushchev.

3. Impact of Global Setting.

To a considerable extent, the nature of the international scene had an impact on the whole gamut of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. With the apparent thaw in Soviet domestic policies following Stalin's death, it looked like the same trend would be equally reflected in the foreign policy process. But, even if the nature of policy changed, and the

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36 Macridis, R., "Stalinism and the Meaning of Titoism", in Goldwin, R.A., (ed.), Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1959, pp. 513-15.

transition of leadership - from Malenkov to Khrushchev - brought with it numerous innovations, nevertheless, it was strictly contained within the framework of Communist philosophy. It should be mentioned at the outset that, in foreign affairs, Khrushchev took over Stalin's main goals and ideas and "remained faithful to the magnificent imperial image of the growing and prosperous 'socialist camp' as it had emerged out of Stalin's fantasy and ambition"[37]. Furthermore, Stalin's famous "two camp" image was not exclusively his prerogative, for Khrushchev too had a similar vision. While reporting to the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, he declared that

> two lines, two historical tendencies in social development, are becoming more and more evident. One of them is the line of social progress, of peace and creative activity. The other is the line of reaction, oppression and war[38].

It would appear, therefore, that Khrushchev's foreign policy moves, no matter how accommodating or reconcilable they might have been to the West, were made with one objective in mind: to weaken the Western states and to strengthen the Soviet camp[39].

One of such moves was aimed at Yugoslavia's membership in the Balkan Pact. After Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, the Soviet beligerancy became more violent, with

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37 Dallin, op. cit., p. VI.

38 Khrushchev, N., Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Oct. 17, 1961), Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Vol. 1, Crosscurrents Press, New York, 1961, p.9.

39 Penkovskiy, O., The Penkovskiy Papers, Doubleday and Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1965, p. 212.

the result that the former sought regional security arrangements with other states. Hence, in February, 1953, a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" was signed with two NATO members - Turkey and Greece. Although meant at first to emphasize economic and cultural aspects, it developed a year later, into a full-fledged military alliance - the "Balkan Pact". The most peculiar thing about this alliance was the fact that, by joining it, Yugoslavia turned ipso facto all her military potential against the Soviet Union and her Communist neighbors[40]. The Turkish-German press at the time argued that "the Balkans, considered a powder keg only a few years ago, have become today a bulwark against Russian expansionist policies"[41]. Obviously, Yugoslavia's membership in the Pact was viewed by the Soviet Union as detrimental to her security. For, a possibility existed that the former might have joined the NATO Alliance as a full-fledged member[42], thus link the chain of states threatening the U.S.S.R. from the South. It would appear, therefore, that the Soviet overtures toward normalization of relations between the two countries were calculated moves, aimed at, among other things, detracting Tito from the Pact. The importance of the former's leaving the Pact was further magnified by the American Secretary of

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40 Hoffman; Neal, op. cit., pp. 419-20.

41 Türkisch-deutsche Post, Istanbul, Nr. 48/1954, quoted in Strobel, G.W., Der Warschauer Vertrag und die Nationale Volksarmee, Studiengesellschaft für Zeitprobleme, Bonn, 1965, p. 17. (My translation).

42 Hoffman; Neal, op. cit., p. 419.

State J.F. Dulles' proclamation that the West's aim of mere containment of Communism was no longer sufficient, and, in order to win the East-West struggle America should be more aggressive and actively contribute to the liberation of captive nations[43]. As these words were viewed by the Soviet Union as a major and serious threat to her security, the return of Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc would increase the defensive potential of the latter.

However, Khrushchev's drive at reconciliation with Tito was prompted by other international developments as well. Since rapid economic development had transformed the Soviet Union from a country that had practically nothing or little to lose from confusion and disorder into one for which a potential war would threaten more loss than gain, the revolutionary zeal ceased to be the sine qua non of the leadership. Furthermore, a new generation of technocrats and technological intelligentsia had come to the fore, demanding modern interpretation of Marxist dogma, and a fresh and more assertive approach to foreign affairs. Thus, the leadership of the Soviet Union felt that a major revamping of both internal and external policies was not only desirable but even necessary in the light of new realities. Consequently, Khrushchev's government had decided on a policy of world-wide relaxation of tensions, yielding its foreign

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43 Stoessinger, J.G., The Might of Nations, Random House, New York, 1966, p. 150.

policy objectives to an unprecedented amount of accommodating moves[44]. Since, for various reasons[45], Khrushchev was anxious to achieve a period of "peaceful coexistence" with the West, a reconciliation with Yugoslavia at this stage would serve the Soviet leader a double purpose: Because Yugoslavia herself was pursuing a policy of "active peaceful coexistence" (i.e. nonalignment) and believed in a genuine and lasting coexistence of the two social systems, Khrushchev hoped that the former would be willing to serve as a "bridge" between the Soviet Union and the United States, thus expediting the desired rapprochement between the two antagonists[46]. Furthermore, the restoration of harmony between Khrushchev and Tito would help the former to regain credence of his good intentions.

As the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union increased and the development of the hydrogen bomb put her almost at par with the United States, Khrushchev inaugurated, in 1955, a lengthy crusade for world disarmament. The main motive for this move was not so much the fear of the

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44 Wesson, R.G., Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill., 1969, p. 222.

45 The post-Stalin leadership hoped, inter alia, that by promoting a détente in the international sphere, the West would be less motivated to form a common front against the USSR and, therefore, become less dangerous to the latter. Furthermore, Khrushchev's emphasis on economic expansion and preparation for an eventual war required a great amount of time. In order to achieve these objectives, a period of relative peace or "peaceful coexistence" was, therefore, peremptory.

46 Hoffman; Neal, op. cit., p. 428.

United States - for the Soviets were almost certain that the Americans would not strike first[47] - as the rearmament of Germany and her eventual admittance to NATO[48]. For, ten short years after her total and most devastating defeat in war, Germany (Western part only - to be sure) resurged again as a continental power and her militarism and alleged revanchism was at times perceived by the Soviet Union as the biggest threat. Hence the Soviets put forward concrete and more realistic disarmament proposals, hoping that, if accepted by the West, the ensuing disarmament would halt or at least control German rearmament. Furthermore, it should be noted at this point that the Soviets were always countenancing disarmament, for, apart from an excellent propagandistic value, they believed that, while the capitalist economy depended on armaments, their own economy needed all the resources for civilian use[49]. Thus, by seeking reconciliation with Tito, Khrushchev also hoped that the Yugoslav leader would back up the Soviet proposals for disarmament. He proved to be right, for Tito was an ardent crusader for the cause of disarmament and spoke many a times for the Soviet Union[50].

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47 Brodie, B., Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1959, p. 301.

48 Dmytryshyn, B., USSR: A Concise History, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1965, pp. 258, 304 ff.

49 Wesson, op. cit., p. 219.

50 Christman, H.M., The Essential Tito, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1970, p. 111.

Realizing that by protracting Stalin's attitude toward nations which had recently won their independence[51] would before long become an obstacle in the conduct of Soviet foreign affairs, the Khrushchev-Bulganin government took advantage of a climate of relaxation in the world and relative stability in Europe, and once more deviated from the former's policy, this time by making strenuous and largely successful efforts at a rapprochement with the "neutral" countries of Asia and Africa. Hitherto viewed by the Soviets as being opposed to the West, it was felt that these former colonies could be easily drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence. Therefore, a major Soviet diplomatic offensive began in the Third World, with an explicit intention to undermine the influence of the West in that part of the globe.

Simultaneously, as a result of his "active coexistence" policy, as well as of his assumption of continued hostility from the Soviet Union, Tito began to court the

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51 Stalin believed that any Asian or African country that acquired independence without a military conflict with the mother country, or under non-Communist leadership was necessarily still a dependency of the former imperialists. Thus, according to Stalin, the Burmese premier U Nu won power only after a number of Burmese ministers had been murdered "at the instigation of British military circles", Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Encyklopedia, (Moscow), 2nd Ed., Vol. 5 (1950), pp. 245, 246. "The National Congress of India, Quirino and Romulo in the Philippines are obedient executors of the will of the British-American imperialists", Ibid., Vol. 6 (1951), p. 316. In Egypt, "power in Cairo was seized (in 1952) by a group of reactionary officers connected with the United States", Ibid., Vol. 15 (1952), p. 460.

nonaligned world[52]. Subsequently his prestige among the Afro-Asian nations soared, and Yugoslavia became the only European nation accepted by the Third World nations. At this stage, it became almost a necessity for the Soviet Union to promote settlement with Yugoslavia, in order to dispel any suspicion of the former's intentions among the Third World nations, and free them of fears for their independence.

Thus, in final analysis, it would appear that Khrushchev's drive for reconciliation with Yugoslavia was influenced by his desire to weaken the NATO Alliance and, at the same time, to strengthen the Soviet bloc; by his coexistence and disarmament policy; and last but not least, by his interest in the Third World. But an equally important factor in the whole gamut of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was China's challenge of Soviet ideological primacy and the resulting deterioration of relations between these two countries.

4. The Role of China.

The whole spectrum of Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the period under study was overshadowed by the Sino--Soviet conflict. This prompts us to ask the question: What influence did China exert in the subordinate system of

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52 Rubinstein, A.Z., Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970, p. 69.

Eastern Europe, and what effect did her policy have on the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement? In order to answer this question, we must look, first of all, for the causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It would appear that the roots of the split could be found in the communist regimes themselves, and should not be attributed simply to traditional animosities or to racial or geographic factors. Following Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders, in order to maintain their power and win the competition with the capitalist West, sought to modernize the totalitarian party rule, to adapt their economies to the conditions of the second industrial revolution, and to protect these measures against outside interference with the foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence"[53]. China's economic conditions, however, were not yet ripe for such a modernization from above; furthermore, party rule itself was still on a shaky basis. Thus, in order to consolidate their rule and to remain in power, the Chinese leaders opted for Stalinist methods. And, to keep the masses in line, they obviously needed an "objective enemy" with whom "peaceful coexistence" (as advocated by the U.S.S.R.) was, at this stage, unimaginable[54].

To be sure, nevertheless, the Soviets and the Chinese were still doing everything in their power to preserve the

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53 Kux, E., "Eastern Europe's Relations with Asian Communist Countries", in London, K., (ed.), Eastern Europe in Transition, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966, p.290.

54 Ibid., p. 290-01.

alliance and to appear before the external world as a monolithic bloc[55]. While the Soviet Union was helping China financially and economically, the Chinese, on the other hand, were ready to acknowledge Soviet leadership of the Communist world, an admission which enhanced Soviet prestige in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the Chinese did see no objection why they could not have a bigger voice in international affairs, in general, and in intra-bloc affairs, in particular. Thus, following the Hungarian uprising, Chou En-lai, while supporting the Soviet action, came up with an addition to Marxist philosophy. He claimed that in fact, there are two kinds of contradictions - basic ones, between Communist and capitalist countries, and non-antagonistic ones between Communist countries themselves[56]. This ideological explanation to cover Soviet action in Hungary, however, was regarded by the Soviets as an encroachement on the formers' ideological supremacy and Chinese interest in ideological parity. This, therefore, was the first seed of discord which was to grow to unmanageable proportions. It would eventually provoke the whole series of Soviet-Yugoslav disputes and reconciliations, which, in turn, would contribute to the Sino-Soviet split.

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55 MacKintosh, op. cit., p. 245.

56 Ibid., p. 246.

For, one of the major causes that led to the final chasm between China and the Soviet Union[57] was in fact the Yugoslav revisionism, which essentially stressed the belief in separate roads to Socialism and advocated peaceful coexistence with the West. The Chinese being violently opposed to all forms of coexistence with capitalist countries, found in Tito the symbol of everything they hated most. In their eyes he was a revisionist, and in Communist jargon, it is equated with a traitor. They were, therefore, exerting on Khrushchev all possible pressure to break with Tito once and for all. They temporarily succeeded in estranging Khrushchev from Tito, when the former called in 1957, in Moscow, a meeting of the twelve ruling Communist parties, which sharply denounced revisionism and, at the same time, stressed the leading role of the Soviet Union[58]. And, a few

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57 The other major factors which contributed to the Sino-Soviet dispute were: the refusal of the Chinese to join the Warsaw Pact; the establishment of the People's Communes with an almost heretical claim to have embarked on a short cut to Communism; the Sino-Indian border clashes, during which the Soviets emphasized the close ties between India and the U.S.S.R.; Khrushchev's policy of rapprochement with the United States, a policy which the Chinese violently opposed; the differences in attitude to war and peace (the Chinese believed that war could help to bring about a Communist Revolution more quickly; and last, but not least, the Chinese belief that the non-Communist neutral regimes in the Third World were useless to the Communist cause. For more information on the above, Cf. Mackintosh, J.M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.

58 Oddly enough, it was Mao Tse-tung who proposed the formula expressing this Soviet primacy. However, it was a calculated move, for the Chinese hoped, later on, to be able to criticize the Soviet Union, as the leader of the camp, for all the eventual troubles and misdeeds within it.

months later the Chinese even managed to provoke a new Soviet-Yugoslav break. They were helped, nevertheless, by the Yugoslavs themselves, who, in March 1958, published the draft programme for the forthcoming Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, which stressed Yugoslavia's belief in separate roads to Socialism, her willingness to maintain good relations with the West, and in fact denying the primacy of the Soviet Union in international Communism. This particular event, paradoxically enough, did eventually more harm to the Sino-Soviet than to the Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The Chinese, fearing revisionism as much as the whole principle of coexistence between Communism and the West,

> had come to regard the policies of Tito's Yugoslavia as a touchstone and as the embodiment of everything they most disliked. They condemned Tito's internal policies as "revisionism" of basic Marxist-Leninist principles, and they opposed any efforts by Khrushchev to effect a rapprochement with Tito[59].

They consequently unleashed a devastating attack on the Yugoslavs, calling their programme "anti-Marxist", "out-and-out revisionist", "a wild attempt to induce the working class to surrender to capitalism", and accused the Yugoslavs of "having violently slandered the dictatorship of the proletariat"[60].

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59 Slusser, R.M., "America, China, and the Hydra-Headed Opposition: The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy" in Juviler, P.H. and Morton, H.W. (ed.), Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1967, p. 197.

60 "Contemporary Revisionism", People's Daily, Peking, 5 May, 1958, quoted in, Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 249.

Why then did this Chinese attack on Yugoslavia help to deteriorate relations between China and the U.S.S.R.? The fact that the Chinese assault on Yugoslavia preceded the Soviet one and that it was much more destructive and bitter, gave rise to Soviet speculations that China took the ideological lead ahead of the U.S.S.R.[61]. And this, of course, the Soviets were not prepared to accept. However, another reason of the Chinese attack could have equally been the fact that at that time the Chinese Party was waging an internal struggle against its own "bourgeois rightists"; thus, the more aggressive tone of her condemnation of the Yugoslavs could partly be attributed to the relevance of revisionism to China's internal situation.

From then on, the relations between the Soviet Union and China kept on deteriorating and an irreconcilable split appeared to be inevitable. In the summer of 1960, however, Khrushchev made a final great effort to save the situation. Notwithstanding the fact that, ultimately, he had little hope of succeeding to convert the Chinese to the Soviet line, Khrushchev decided, nevertheless, to reach compromise on key ideological sore points, and to present to the outside world a united Communist front. Hence followed the entangling preparatory negotiations which culminated in a conference in Moscow, where eighty-one Communist parties (except the Yugoslavs, who were not invited) attended the greatest

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61 Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 249.

Communist rally since approximately three decades. Obviously, the Conference was called to appease the Chinese, since, after condemning "the personality cult, which shackles creative thought and initiative", the final Declaration denounced "the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism" and asserted that "further exposure of the leaders of the Yugoslav revisionists, and active struggle to safeguard the Communist and working-class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remains an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist parties". It repeated the formula of the 1957 Declaration that "revisionism... remains the main danger" but that "dogmatism and sectarianism in theory and practice can also become the main danger at some stage of development of individual parties", and called for "a determined struggle" against both[62]. However, in order not to unnecessarily alienate the Yugoslavs, the Soviets, immediately after this Declaration was adopted, made it clear to the former that they did not attach too much weight to the above passages. For, Khrushchev must have felt that at this stage nothing more could have prevented the inevitable split, which indeed did occur, when the latter failed in his attempt to bring Peking into line through economic pressures.

What conclusions then can we draw from the Sino-Soviet conflict? It is reasonable to assume that the whole issue revolved around ideology, or more precisely, around ideological

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62 Treaties and Alliances of the World, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1968, p. 120.

supremacy of the Soviet Union; and the main ideological "culprit" seemed to be the Yugoslav revisionism. Since China was experiencing her own problems with "bourgeois rightist" revisionism, she was violently opposed to Tito's own brand of revisionism and, consequently, her policy was aimed at hindering the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. At times she was successful, but ultimately her efforts failed and, as a result, Yugoslavia's position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. became even stronger[63]. Furthermore, as a result of the apparent power dilution of the Moscow center, the smaller East European countries, including Yugoslavia, were able to play the two Communist giants against one another, consequently acquiring greater individual latitude within the Communist bloc.

5. Reconciliation and the Aftermath.

After the break with the Soviet Union in 1948, the Yugoslav leaders, having been rejected and their country excommunicated, were forced to produce on their own and to develop, what they thought to be, a rival model to that of the U.S.S.R. Hence, they decided to give preference to their own national needs in detriment to those of the Kremlin. Moreover, ostracized by the rest of the Communist bloc, Yugoslavia was forced to seek association and help outside. Thus, released from the Soviet bond, Yugoslavia reoriented her foreign policy toward cooperation with the West. It would

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63 Brown, J.F., "A Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement?", in The World Today, XVIII, No. 9 (September 1962), pp. 365 ff.

appear, in retrospect, that one of the major factors which contributed to Tito's policy reorientation was the generous response of the United States to the Yugoslav leader's request for economic aid. However, it should be mentioned at this point that Yugoslavia's theoretical reorientation occurred not as a direct result of the American dollars per se, but rather because the United States' policy helped Tito "to take the curse off capitalist nations"[64].

Thus, seeing Yugoslavia drift increasingly toward the West, the Soviet leaders, soon after Stalin's death, began to recognize the futility of the latter's policies. They came to the conclusion that both economic and military pressures exerted upon Yugoslavia were, in effect, wasted. They also realized that by continually employing power tactics, they would alienate Tito even further, and eventually drive him into the Western orbit. Hence, in order to lessen organizational and ideological aspects of their quarrel and thus "restore at least a veneer of unity in the Communist camp"[65], the Soviet leadership decided on reconciliation - indispensable to Khrushchev's idea of reviving the "International" albeit on a different basis.

It should be noted at this point that, at this conjuncture the Soviets did not yet have a clear picture regarding economic and political integration of their domain.

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64 Hoffman; Neal, op. cit., p. 418.

65 Bennet, (ed.), op. cit., p. 28.

Nevertheless, in order to strengthen the unity of the Socialist camp and thus enhance its power on the world scene, Khrushchev was projecting more attractive forms of intra-bloc relationships. Contrary to Stalin's method of wanting to impose central authority of a totalitarian party in power on the international movement, he wanted to transform, in the spirit of de-Stalinization,

> le vieux modèle d'un parti totalitaire mondial en une organisation plus souple mais dépendant d'une autorité centrale; dorénavant, les partis et gouvernements communistes seraient autonomes, tout en restant soumis à l'autorité idéologique du "parti dirigeant"66.

Hence, the new Communist camp was conceived by Khrushchev as a "commonwealth" (sodruzhestvo) of independent (as long as they would act within the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and not thwart Soviet interests) socialist states, whose future relationships would be empirically decided[67]. While, such a scheme, in order to be successful, required of course the unity of all the Communist states, a reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia became, henceforth, an imperative.

In the light of the above, the trend toward normalization of relations between the two countries began to emerge and, in effect, only two months after Stalin's death, Molotov

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66 Löwenthal, R., Khrouchtchev et la Désagrégation du Bloc Communiste, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1964, p. 271.

67 Aspaturian, V.V., The Soviet Union in the World Communist System, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., 1966, pp. 21-2.

proposed to Yugoslavia a resumption of normal diplomatic relations. Consequently, the same summer, the Soviet Union resumed conventional (i.e. state-to-state) relations with the Yugoslav Government, while at the same time, the increasingly frequent border incidents, with the satellites, came to an end. Meanwhile, in October of 1954, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Bulganin went to Peking and signed a treaty with the Chinese, proclaiming equality and respect for national sovereignty. It could be implied that the above treaty condemned the principle of predominance, and, as such, opened the way for Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation.

So, it became clear that, when Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov raised, at the Yugoslav embassy reception on November 28, 1954, a toast to "Comrade Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia", they were trying to make their hosts understand that the Soviet leadership was endeavoring to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the Soviet bloc, this time, however, on the basis of communist solidarity, and as an independent partner, whose "equality of rights" would be recognized. The Yugoslavs, although accepting the suggestion at reconciliation and even looking forward to it[68], had, since 1948, rejected all forms of integration. Although not opposed to a universal Communist system per se, the Yugoslav leaders thought that Communist unity could best be achieved by means of a network of informal ties of

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68 Tomasic, op. cit., p. 168.

interests and attitudes. They did not approve of centralized unity because such unity, they claimed, would not be able to adapt itself to ever-changing revolutionary movements. Furthermore, their basic approach was geared primarily to a national framework of unity rather than to one that is international[69]. This, in a gist, was the Yugoslav position at the eve of their reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Hence, the progressive easing of tensions between the two countries culminated in May, 1955, with the Khrushchev-Bulganin[70] visit to Belgrade[71]. That year, therefore, marked the beginning of a new stage in relations between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs.

On arrival in Belgrade, Khrushchev delivered an unusually conciliatory, although forceful speech. In it, he referred to the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and admitted the Soviet responsibility for the seven-year break between the two regimes. The guilt, however, was put not on Stalin, but on "unmasked enemies of the people" Lavrenti Beria, the chief of the MVD,

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69 Popovich, N., Yugoslavia: The New Class in Crisis, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y., 1968, p. 106.

70 Other members of the Soviet delegation were: A. Mikoyan, D. Shepilov, A. Gromyko, P. Kumikin and V. Volkov.

71 Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade was preceded by a series of letters, between the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the LCY, in which Khrushchev had proposed that the two countries assume a part of responsibility in the previous conflict. While the Soviets would blame L. Beria, the Yugoslavs should accuse M. Djilas for all the wrongs. Tito, however, did not accept this proposition.

and his lieutenant Abakumov. Khrushchev, in fact, laid the exclusive blame on Beria for the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. The soviet leader surprised the Yugoslav reception party at the airport, when he started his speech with an apology:

> We are sincerely sorry for what happened in the past and resolutely repudiate all that accumulated in that period. We, on our part, there is no doubt about it, realize the provocative role played in relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. by the now unmasked enemies of the people - Beria, Abakumov and others. We have thoroughly studied the materials underlying the grave accusations and insults directed at the Yugoslav leadership. The facts show that these materials were fabricated by the enemies of the people... On our part we are ready to do all that is necessary to remove all obstacles which hinder full normalization of relations between our States and the strengthening of friendly relations between our peoples...72.

This apologetic statement was no doubt intended at creating an image of generosity beyond compare, and Khrushchev took it assuredly for granted that Tito would be so overcome by this gesture that he would not hesitate to agree to whatever Khrushchev asked of him. However, the fact that the Soviet leader did not put the blame for the break on Stalin himself, was such a faux pas on his part that it alone nearly caused the failure of his special mission to bring Tito back into the fold. In the course of the same address, Khrushchev further chilled his Yugoslav hosts by

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72 Quoted in: "Relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.", in Yugoslav Survey, (Belgrade), XI, No. 3 (August, 1970), pp. 121-55.

proposing the resumption of Party-to-Party relations:

> We would fail in our responsibility toward our peoples and the working people of the world if we would not strive to establish mutual agreement between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist League of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism73.

And this is precisely what Tito, at least at the beginning of the rapprochement, was opposed to, for he always insisted on the divergence of principle between the two Parties. Thus, the latter would have been much more satisfied if Khrushchev, instead of blaming the rupture on personalities, would have presented the 1948 break as a result of differences of opinion. Khrushchev, on the other hand, believed that by maintaining that the Yugoslav Party remained genuinely Marxist-Leninist, an impression would be created that no divergences of principle ever existed, and, therefore, it would be so much easier for the latter to join the ranks of the socialist commonwealth. On this point, however, Khrushchev was wrong, for, when Tito later resumed Party-to--Party relations, he did so, but for different reasons. (Discussed later in this section). Later in the speech, Khrushchev also came upon one of the most sensitive spots in Soviet-Yugoslav retorts before and after the split. Contrary to previous claims, he conceded that the Red Army did not liberate Belgrade alone, but that this capital was liberated by joint efforts of both the Yugoslav and Soviet

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73 Pravda, May 27, 1955.

armies. Finally, the Soviet leader openly accepted the "Titoist" principle and stated that each Communist country can indeed, in its own way, contribute to the success of the World Revolution. Moreover, he was of the opinion that moderate independence of each Communist state would strengthen rather than weaken the Communist cause[74].

Thus, the ensuing "Belgrade Declaration" stressed the principle of "indivisibility of peace... respect for sovereignty... recognition and development of peaceful coexistence... non-interference in internal affairs... promotion of mutual economic cooperation... condemnation of any aggression and of any attempt to impose political and economic domination over other countries..." and so on[75].

What was the major significance of the Belgrade Conference? First of all, it marked a shift in Soviet policy of enormous proportions. By legalizing the "different roads to Socialism", the Soviet Union indicated that she was willing to yield, albeit in order to promote her goals of World Revolution. On the other hand, the said Conference proved that, although Khrushchev was attempting to move away from Stalinist policies, he was unable to divorce himself completely from the latter's

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74 The New York Times, May 27, 1955.

75 Quoted in "Relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.", in Yugoslav Survey, (Belgrade), XI, No. 3 (August 1970), pp. 121-55.

pretences, for he was continuously striving to disassociate the Soviet Union from the pretended equality of his contemplated Socialist Commonwealth. Thus, the phrase (in the communiqué) "different forms of development of socialism are an exclusive matter for the peoples of individual countries" was clearly intended by Khrushchev to point out that, by implication, the Soviet Union had already achieved socialism and was now in an active stage of transition to Communism; that "she was still the mentor and the guide, because a stage further on the journey to Utopia"[76]. It is conceivable that, by restoring communications with Belgrade, Moscow hoped to open up possibilities which eventually could lead to a reassertion of Soviet influence and domination.

Nevertheless, the Conference successfully concluded the first stage of reconciliation (although to the detriment of American-Yugoslav relations). The two governments were in full agreement, and now the way was cleared to a total "spiritual" union of the two Parties, a process which culminated by signing the "Moscow Declaration" in June 1956.

In the meantime, however, two major events of special importance for the development of Soviet-Yugoslav political relations occurred prior to the Moscow meeting. One of them was the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU with a no less important Plenum of the Central Committee, held

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76 Crankshaw, E., Khrushchev: A Career, The Viking Press, Inc., New York, 1966, p. 210.

six months prior to the Congress. It was during this Plenum that the epoch-making decision to incriminate Stalin was made, and, after Khrushchev had presented a report on his Belgrade meeting, the issue of Yugoslavia was one of the most controversial single issues (after Austria) discussed. It is here that Khrushchev defended his "new policy" toward Yugoslavia. What argument did he put forth? He was convinced, he said, that the latter was indeed building socialism; that Yugoslavia's complaints were, after all, substantiated, since documents that served to incriminate Tito in 1948 were forged by Beria; that the misconduct of Soviet specialists in Yugoslavia during that time was indeed a proven fact. But Khrushchev's main argument appeared to be that the estrangement of Yugoslavia meant the loss of forty divisions to the Soviet camp.

However, Molotov, Khrushchev's most important rival in the Politburo and an arch-Stalinist, was opposed to the Yugoslavs' readmission. Accusing Tito of anti-Soviet behaviour, he also pointed out that, as a member of the Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia ipso facto was allied with NATO. Thus, all he was willing to approve was merely a normal relationship on a government-to-government basis (like with any other capitalist state). Mikoyan, nevertheless, was siding with Khrushchev; but his accusations of Stalin's policies toward Yugoslavia were of economic nature. He declared that it was the Soviet Union that forced Yugoslavia to defect; it was the U.S.S.R. that set up an

anti-Yugoslav economic bloc and that the former's policies were indeed imperialist; as far as the mixed companies were concerned, Mikoyan noted, they were the worst form of Soviet exploitation and an expression of Soviet economic nationalism. Thus, as can be judged from the above, the Plenum had set the stage for full rehabilitation of Tito at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February, 1956, where Khrushchev tried to present Tito in the best light possible. He mentioned, inter alia, that

> les problèmes posés par l'"affaire yougoslave" auraient pu être résolus grâce à des discussions entre partis et camarades. Il n'existait pas de fondement significatif de nature à justifier la suite prise par cette "affaire". Il était tout à fait possible d'empêcher la rupture des relations avec ce pays (emphasis added)[77].

If Stalin thought, Khrushchev went on, that by lifting his small finger there would be no more Tito, he was wrong, for

> cela n'a pas marché avec Tito... Pourquoi? La raison en est que, dans ce cas de désaccord avec les camarades yougoslaves, Tito avait derrière lui un Etat et un peuple qui avait été à la rude école des combats pour la liberté et l'indépendance, un peuple qui soutenait ses dirigeants[78].

But, he went on,

> nous avons soigneusement examiné le cas de la Yougoslavie et nous avons trouvé une solution convenable... Il a été procédé à la liquidation des rapports anormaux avec la Yougoslavie dans l'intérêt de la consolidation de la paix dans le monde entier[79].

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77 Khrushchev, N.S., Texte Intégral du Rapport Secret de M. Khrouchtchev, Corréa-Buchet/Chastel, Paris, 1956, p. 65.

78 Ibid., p. 66.

79 Ibid., p. 66.

Thus, with the conclusion of the Twentieth Congress, Kremlin's cold war against Yugoslavia was temporarily over.

What impact did the Congress have on Soviet-Yugoslav relations? Naturally, Khrushchev's above declarations were enthusiastically received by Tito, and he consequently interpreted the outcome of the Congress as the former's victory over Molotov or, indirectly, a victory of Titoism over Stalinism. Certainly the announcements regarding independent roads to socialism were in line with Yugoslav policy, and some charges brought up against Stalin were seen as "positive and decisive moves"[80]. The relaxation of some totalitarian aspects and the trend towards administrative decentralization was regarded by the Yugoslavs as bringing the Soviet Union closer to the former's position[81]. Nevertheless, there seemed to be some restraint in the Yugoslav position, for, there was an important contradiction between their theory and the way they viewed the Soviet Union. Since 1948 the Yugoslav theory maintained that the U.S.S.R. deviated from Marxism-Leninism not only because it withheld the right of other socialist states to pursue their own path to socialism but also because of the anatomy of Soviet society. For, according to the Yugoslav theory, a state is not socialist

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80 Neal, F.W., Titoism in Action, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1958, p. 263.

81 "Significance of the Soviet 20th Congress", Yugoslav Review, VI, Nos. 3-4 (March-April, 1956), p. 6, in Ibid., p. 263.

unless it initiates the process of "withering away". Simply state ownership of the means of production, without transfering control to the workers, is "state capitalism". Since the Soviet state was not "withering away" but in fact was becoming increasingly state capitalist, the U.S.S.R. was seen by the Yugoslavs as having deviated onto the path of imperialism[82].

Nonetheless, Tito hoped that the new course initiated by Khrushchev would lead to more basic reforms. Hence, he became increasingly eager to help the latter to put the communist movement on the path of liberalization and to confirm Khrushchev's status within the socialist camp. Furthermore, Tito wanted to serve as a mediator in Khrushchev's new policy of rapprochement with the West. However, an additional reason that prompted Tito to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. was the internal Yugoslav situation, as his regime was badly in need of at least some normalization of relations with orthodox Communism. For, after the break with the socialist camp, an ideological vacuum increasingly sapped the foundation of his rule. In view of the fact that the Party was virtually losing control, and as more and more voices claimed greater freedom and even the abandonment of the one-party system, a drastic change in the Party's international policy became a necessity. Thus, a renewal of

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82 Neal, op. cit., p. 265.

links with the "camp of socialism" would, at this conjuncture, be most convenient[83].

The second event that expedited the reconciliation and that, in a sense was a sine qua non for the latter, was the dissolution, on April 17, 1956[84], of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). However, in order to succeed with andappease Tito, Khrushchev went still further, as on June 1, 1956, he dismissed Molotov as Foreign Minister[85]. However, this was not the whole price that Khrushchev had to pay. In order to show that the Soviet desire for reconciliation was genuine and sincere, the former acceded to Tito's request to reduce the armed forces of the southern satellites (i.e. Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria) and to grant him at least some influence in the regimes of these nations. Since these southern satellites were economically less advanced than the northern ones (E. Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), and were, therefore, less important to the Soviet Union than to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev did not mind Tito to "have a certain influence in the selection of party and government leaders in the southern

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83 Ulam, op. cit., p. 563. Also, Tomasic, op. cit., p.168.

84 The official dissolution was delayed for so long, in order to minimize Khrushchev's concession.

85 Librach, J., The Rise of the Soviet Empire: A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy, Frederick A. Praeger, Pub., New York, 1964, p. 307; also, Rosser, R.F., An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969, p. 299.

cluster, a privilege which had up to now been exclusively Russia's"[86].

This final acquiescence of Khrushchev prompted Tito[87] to pay an official visit to Moscow from June 1-23, 1956, and to sign the so-called "Moscow Declaration", which, in effect, erased all previous animosity between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and reconciled the two countries in fraternal collaboration. Besides stressing the permissibility of each Communist country, and in particular Yugoslavia, to seek its own way to socialism, and containing many ingredients hinting at the re-establishment of Party-to--Party relations with Yugoslavia, the Declaration obviously indicated that the U.S.S.R. openly renounced her claim to infallibility. This fact sent a shock throughout Eastern Europe and henceforth opened even larger channels of disintegration of the bloc.

What prompted Khrushchev to offer Yugoslavia accommodations of such magnitude? What did he hope to accomplish by restoring harmony between the two countries? First of all, he was eager to demonstrate to the world that Communism is a healthy doctrine, not ashamed to confess its past mistakes, and agreeable to national sovereignty of other members of the socialist camp. Thus, Khrushchev felt that

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86 Dallin, op. cit., p. 352.

87 Other members of the Yugoslav delegation were: E. Kardelj, K. Popovich, M. Todorovich, J. Blasevich, and V. Mikunovich.

by renewing fraternal ties with Tito, he could find a key to the new image of Communism. On the other hand, by bringing the LCY back into the fold, thus neutralizing it, Khrushchev could avert the danger of the example of the Titoist heresy, and in this way secure a solid position for the CPSU on the international scene. Furthermore, if the unity in ideas and objectives within the Socialist camp could be achieved, it would be so much easier for the Soviet Union to infiltrate with her "experts" various political organizations, the government apparatus, and the general staff of the satellites, by using more refined methods than she had done in the past. However, Khrushchev's more immediate reason for reconciliation was to disengage Yugoslavia from the Balkan Pact, since, by belonging to it, she acted as a bulwark of the Western position in the whole Balkan region. Thus, a Soviet-Yugoslav agreement would help to terminate the Pact and, thereby, make Yugoslavia a buffer against the threat from the South. Finally, we could conclude that Khrushchev's desire to re-establish relations with Yugoslavia was not so much motivated by the actual need to harmonize them with that country, as by the need of improving relations - through Yugoslavia - with the People's Republic of China.

However, as the ensuing events were to show, the restoration of harmony was based on an actual misunderstanding, if not on an intentional misinterpretation. Six days after Tito's departure from Moscow, the Poznan riots broke

out, and immediately (and to a certain extent rightly), they were blamed by the Stalinist faction, headed by Molotov and Kaganovich, on Titoism. Furthermore, as the general situation throughout the satellites continued to deteriorate, Khrushchev's position within the Politburo became very precarious, while he was in actual danger of being overthrown. Hence, in order to save his position, Khrushchev decided to make a move, unprecedented in the history of Soviet Communism: he appealed to Tito, a foreign leader, asking the latter to come to his aid to win a fight with his own associates in the Politburo. Relying on Tito's extraordinary authority among the satellites, Khrushchev wanted the former to convey to the satellite Parties that if they would proceed too far and too fast with their de-Stalinization, he would be overthrown, to their great disadvantage, by a Stalinist faction. In an ensuing struggle Khrushchev won but, at the same time, he created an awkward situation; by asking Tito to help him (although indirectly) against his Politburo colleagues, Khrushchev acknowledged the former's importance within the Socialist camp. Since, according to Khrushchev, it was an abnormal situation, it had to be redressed, and the latter's authority reasserted. Thus, it would appear that Khrushchev's call for Tito's help was the underlying (and real) cause of all their future discords. For, a new, though gradual, deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations began to take place immediately after. In his famous "Pula Speech" on November 11, 1956, Tito complained that "when

the Poznan affair happened... there occurred among the Soviet people a sudden change of attitude toward us. They started to grow colder. They thought that we, the Yugoslavs, were to blame"[88]. Subsequently, in September of the same year, the Central Committee of the CPSU sent a so-called "Circular letter" to the satellite Parties, criticizing anew the Yugoslav Communists and warning them against Tito's independent course. Furthermore, it stipulated that the Yugoslav Party was not a pure Marxist-Leninist organization and that it had certain social-democratic tendencies[89].

In retrospect, however, it seems that Khrushchev, at this point, still wanted to dissipate the "misunderstanding", since, by retaining Tito's fidelity, he hoped to use the latter's help to deal with the impairment of the situation in Eastern Europe. This partially explains his unofficial visit to Belgrade from September 19-27, 1956, and Tito's consecutive visit to Crimea from September 27 - October 4, 1956. These visits, however, marked the level of political relations attained by the two countries, for, the ensuing Soviet intervention in Hungary had soured Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and put Tito in a quandary; he was not sure whether to approve of the action and thus gain Khrushchev's favour or, to act according to his conviction, and oppose it. Nevertheless, he ceded to the pressures of

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88 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955-56, p. 15258.

89 The New York Times, 30 September, 1956.

conservative bureaucrats[90] and decided to support the Soviets[91].

Following the insurrection, Tito, in his speech at Pula, tried to assess the whole situation. While, on the one hand, he could hardly be expected to abandon his insistence on national Communism, on the other hand, since Hungary had renounced the "socialist path", Nagy's revolution had to be condemned. In other words, the Soviets were wrong in intervening against a whole nation, while Nagy erred in calling the people to arms against the Soviet Army, and in invoking West's help. Thus, according to Tito, "the justified revolt against a clique turned into an uprising of the entire nation against Socialism and against the Soviet Union". And then, in order to further appease the Soviets, Tito said: "I know these people in the new government (i.e. Kadar), and in my opinion they represent all that is most honest in Hungary"[92]. However,

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90 This group within the Yugoslav Politburo, headed by the Secret Police Chief A. Ronkovich, viewed the recent internal unorthodox reforms with increasing anxiety. They thought that if these reforms went unchecked, they could threaten their personal power, as well as the Party itself. In this respect, according to them, good relations with the USSR could halt this dangerous tendency. Thus, during the initial outbreaks in Budapest, some of these leaders went even so far as to advocate a Yugoslav intervention in case the Soviets would hesitate.

91 Immediately prior to their intervention, the Soviets wanted to obtain from the Yugoslavs political support for their action. To that end Khrushchev flew secretly to the island of Brioni and obtained Tito's total backing.

92 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955-56, p. 15258.

this endorsement came too late to make good Tito's previous malevolence. Shortly after the Hungarian affair, the gap between the viewpoints of Belgrade and Moscow was disclosed, and Kremlin soon resumed its ideological condemnation of Tito's Yugoslavia[93]. Even as late as March 28, 1957, Bulganin (the then Premier) declared that Tito's attitude in the Hungarian question did not "in essence differ from that of the imperialists"[94].

On another plan, Tito's continuous refusal to adhere to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (i.e. to the Soviet camp's military schemes) was not entirely viewed by Khrushchev as the former's refusal to support Kremlin's foreign policy; the fact, nevertheless, that Yugoslavia was not bound by the discipline of the bloc, was a cause of Khrushchev's growing dissatisfaction, for that meant that at any moment Tito was free to withdraw his support. Thus, as Khrushchev's dissatisfaction with Tito grew stronger, Titoism was no longer considered as a remedy for nationalism but, on the contrary, as a poison that might induce it. Hence, a shift in Soviet foreign policy toward Yugoslavia

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93 The immediate cause, however, of the sharp decline in bilateral relations was E. Kardelj's speech on December 7, 1956, in which he declared that the Hungarian uprising demonstrated to which point a Party, that is tied to the governmental apparatus, could become alienated to the working class. He proposed, therefore, that the Yugoslav Party distantiate itself from the government and try instead to influence the self-managing bodies (e.g. the Workers' Councils).

94 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955-56, p. 15731.

became apparent, but in spite of it, there was no return to Stalinism and a new break did not occur. It is reasonable to assume that, in spite of all their misunderstandings, Khrushchev might have counted on Tito's ultimate support in case of the former's predicament and simply did not want to "destroy the bridges behind him".

Meanwhile, as Khrushchev's pet project for a new "Comintern" was collapsing and the authority of the Soviet Union sagging, he decided that somehow he had to patch together his disintegrating domain, check the spread of Titoism, and restore the role of the Soviet Union as the undisputed leader of the communist world. Thus, taking advantage of the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution, Khrushchev called in Moscow, in November of 1957, a meeting of the twelve ruling Communist parties[95]. Prior to the meeting, however, the Soviet leader prepared and circulated a resolution on communist unity to be presented and signed in Moscow. Apart from presenting the United States as "the center of world reaction", the document defined the socialist camp in terms of the Warsaw Pact and declared revisionism as the greatest danger. Learning of this, Tito refused to attend the meeting, but designated E. Kardelj to lead the Yugoslav delegation, with instructions not to sign the resolution.

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95 The "Moscow Conference" of the twelve ruling Communist parties was immediately followed by a broader but less important conference of all the Communist parties at which a vague "Peace Manifesto" was adopted.

The ensuing Declaration, contrary to the views of the Yugoslav Party and the principles of Belgrade and Moscow Declarations, once again revived the idea of a bloc with one country (the U.S.S.R.) playing the leading role. Furthermore, it indirectly condemned Yugoslav revisionism, while at the same time failed to follow up the de-Stalinization action by not criticizing the revision of Marxism-Leninism made by Stalin. Obviously the Yugoslavs could not sign this declaration, since doing so they would have impaired their relations with the West and severely limited their freedom of action in foreign policy. But was this not precisely Khrushchev's aim? Nevertheless, the Moscow Meeting demonstrated two major points. It showed that regardless of how much Tito would compromise in the interest of socialist unity, there was a limit beyond which he would not go. It also indicated (by calling for a "centralist" position but urging to refrain from both "dogmatism" and "revisionism") that in future a satellite could not become another Yugoslavia, nor, on the other hand, could it be administered in the Stalinist way. Yet, because of inevitable differences current among some leaders, the 1957 Moscow Conference, apart from condemning revisionism and re-establishing the Soviet supremacy within the Socialist camp, did not achieve the expected resurrection of an international Communist organization.

For, now the Yugoslavs were ostentatiously on the outside. And only a few short months after the Conference,

a new Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel erupted, following the publication, in March 1958, of the draft programme for the forthcoming Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists. Since the programme stressed Yugoslavia's attempt to maintain good relations with both the West and the Soviet bloc, her determination to follow her own way to Socialism, etc., it was strongly criticized in an article published in Kommunist, the theoretical journal of the CPSU. It charged the Yugoslavs with petty-bourgeois nationalism, ignorance of the basic tenets of Lenin's teachings, and with mistakingly putting "the peaceful policy of the Socialist countries on a level with the aggressive policy of the ruling circles of the imperialist States"[96]. Consequently, the Yugoslav Seventh Congress was boycotted not only by the Soviet Union, but by all the ruling Communist parties as well, and a new campaign of anti-Tito vilification began afresh. Thus, "Pravda" said that

> every Communist is wondering why the United States imperialists, the worst enemies of Socialism, deem it profitable to help Yugoslavia. For what services? Is it not because the Yugoslav leaders try to weaken the unity of the international Communist working class movement?[97]

And Khrushchev, on his part, speaking at the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in June, 1958, stated that the 1948 condemnation of the Yugoslavs by the Cominform had

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96 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1957-58, p. 16171.

97 Pravda, May 11, 1958.

been "basically correct". And then (having of course Yugoslavia in mind) asked:

> But is it possible for the sake of victory of socialism, to make full use of the rich possibilities possessed by the socialist countries, if each of them acts alone and "stews in its own juice", so to speak? Is it possible, in the present international conditions, to ensure the reliable defense of the gains of socialism, if the socialist countries act in an uncoordinated way? Of course not.[98]

Notwithstanding all the harsh language and hints at the renewal of the break, Khrushchev's heart, nevertheless, was not truly in the dispute, as the real reason for the latter's strong stand, was his desire to appease the Chinese. The whole trouble, therefore, was stemming from the Chinese negative attitude toward revisionism and from their hatred and fear of the whole principle of coexistence of which Tito was the symbol par excellence and apparently the most successful beneficiary[99].

Hence, Tito's new estrangement sent a wave of near panic throughout the satellites and provoked a flood of international debates revolving around theoretical problems, tenets of Marxism-Leninism, class struggle and social revolution. However, the real issue behind all the agitation, was, as Tito rightly stated in Labin on June 15, 1958, his refusal to vow obedience to the Soviet Union as the supreme

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98 Khrushchev, N.S., For Peaceful Competition and Cooperation, International Arts and Sciences Press, New York, 1959, p. 25.

99 Yielding to the Chinese pressure, the Soviet Government suspended, on May 27, 1958, its credit commitment of $285 million to Yugoslavia.

leader. According to him, therefore, it was not the Yugoslav Party programme (as alleged by the Soviets) that was the cause of the controversy but (apart from the desire to appease the Chinese) the fact that

> we refused to sign the 12-nation declaration in Moscow in November 1957 and refused to enter the so-called Socialist camp for reasons which have already been familiar to everybody for a long time, and which boil down to the fact that we are opposed to the division of the world into camps[100].

This, nevertheless, was the period of nadir in the post-1956 Soviet-Yugoslav relations. For, as the rift between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China became wider, following Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959, Yugoslavia's chances of improving her relations with the U.S.S.R. became bigger. It is difficult to pinpoint as to when exactly the scales changed in Yugoslavia's favour, although a convenient date would be the September 1960 session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York which Tito attended at Khrushchev's suggestion and who assisted the latter's policy by co-sponsoring a resolution asking President Eisenhower to meet with Khrushchev again (after the latter had torpedoed the Summit Conference in Paris a few months earlier). Subsequently, to be sure, Tito's revisionism had been attacked by Khrushchev several times, most notably in the Moscow Declaration of the Eighty-one Communist Parties in December, 1960 and at

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100 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1957-58, p. 16395.

the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in October of 1961 (probably due to Chinese pressures, or in order not to expose himself to Chinese-inspired charges that he himself was a revisionist), but the general trend, nevertheless, was toward a new reconciliation.

After the Congress, apparently feeling that at that time he could ignore the Chinese reactions, Khrushchev stepped up in earnest his attempt to win Tito back. Thus, in April, 1962, Soviet Foreign Minister A. Gromyko came to Belgrade, and five months later, the then Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, L. Brezhnev, paid Tito an official visit. However, the most obvious evidence of the new Soviet course of reconciliation was contained in Khrushchev's speech in Varna, Bulgaria, in May of the same year. He then declared:

> We now have normal relations with Yugoslavia - I would say even more - good relations... We as a country that is building socialism shall do everything to co-operate with Yugoslavia and thus help her people to consolidate their socialist positions...101.

Khrushchev kept his word and during the remaining two years of his stay in power the Soviet-Yugoslav relations were marked by a steady expansion of mutually profitable cooperation in many fields.

In concluding this section, we might say that Khrushchev was almost certain that, at some time, from

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101 Rabotnichesko Delo, Sofia, May 17, 1962, quoted in J.F. Brown, "A Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement?" in The World Today, XVIII, No. 9 (September, 1962), pp. 365 ff.

1962 on, Tito would be willing and even eager to join the Soviet camp on a solid basis. For that, Khrushchev thought, Tito had many reasons: first, the Yugoslav economy was heading towards crisis and the threat from the Common Market was looming; second, the growing irritation of the Americans would make their future generosity less certain; and finally, the nationalities problem, coupled with factions in the Party, was again a cause of anxiety. Thus, Khrushchev thought that the above reasons plus Tito's advanced age might impel the latter to seek Soviet help. Furthermore, as Khrushchev perceived Yugoslavia to be, at this conjuncture, more vulnerable than ever before, he reasoned that the Yugoslav leadership would once again be willing to take shelter inside the Soviet bloc, thereby alleviating many problems appearing on the horizon.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis we have analyzed the factors that influence Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia and the nature of the policy itself. In conclusion we will make some generalization as to when states within the Eastern European bloc - in our case Yugoslavia - can succeed in pursuing policies which differ from the preferences of the Soviet leadership.

Contrary to other satellite states (with the possible exception of Albania), the Yugoslav Communist regime consisted of foreign and domestic elements. While the ideology was a Soviet import, the organizational foundation was laid by the Yugoslav guerrilla movement with overwhelming peasant support. This fact gave the regime a national flavour. However, not all Socialist bloc regimes could claim indigenous elements; yet this has been a decisive factor in their relationship with the Soviet Union.

Following the break with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia espoused an autonomous form of Communism which was shaped by Tito to suit local conditions. Moreover, Titoism not only stressed its complete independence from the Soviet Union, but also started a trend which was later to be known in the Communist world as "polycentrism". Thus, the main significance of Titoism lies not so much in its substance

as in its form. It stresses the idea of various independent socialist states, starting from the same point of departure, but following different paths to socialism in accordance with their own local needs and not the prescriptions of Moscow. Consequently, Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet bloc did not result in ideological laxity but it merely undermined the credibility of bloc monolithism.

One factor that hastened Tito's success was the relaxation by the Soviet leadership of bloc relationship; this could be attributed to the fact that some of the totalitarian features of Stalinism underwent modifications with the latter's death, and authority became more de-centralized. Furthermore, the momentous announcement at the 20th Congress of the CPSU of "separate roads to socialism" raised some hopes, albeit false, among the satellites. Although the notion of national diversity did not deviate from Leninist dogmas, nevertheless, it was not intentionally promoted by the Soviet Union. More than a decade after the "de-Stalinization" Congress, Soviet leaders made continuous realistic adjustments to accommodate the growing demands for greater national freedom and diversity among the East European nations.

It is doubtful whether national Communism in Yugoslavia would have achieved such great success had the Soviet "New Course" not been complemented by the internal power struggle in the U.S.S.R. Obviously, Khrushchev's faction needed as much satellite support as it could muster

and, therefore, was willing to concede to Tito many ideological irregularities. However, this proposition begs the question: If Khrushchev yielded to Yugoslavia, why was not he ready to accept, say, Poland's or any other satellite's demands? The answer appears to rest in the nature of Tito's foreign policy and the degree to which the success of Khrushchev's own policies was contingent on the former.

Contrary to other satellites, the Yugoslavs undertook an ambitious role in international politics; simultaneously they were involved in East-West struggle, the ideological disputes between Moscow and Peking, the relations of the developing and the developed countries, the neutrals and the committed, arms control and disarmament, and so on. Furthermore, having become persuaded that the Soviet Union was less of a threat and, at the same time, believing in the peaceful aims of the West, the Yugoslavs contemplated the possibilities for "peaceful coexistence". But they believed that peaceful coexistence should be active, i.e. pursued with vigour. The result was that they embarked upon a course of action which eventually linked them with both the East and West. This unique position was seen by Khrushchev as a "bridge" that he could use in his search for rapprochement with the Western bloc. Equally, Yugoslavia's ties with the Third World countries and her prestigious position among them, could be advantageous in advancing Soviet interests in that

region, which the latter had called the "Zone of Peace". The success of national Communism in Yugoslavia can be attributed to no lesser extent to Tito's charismatic personality. Besides being a Communist leader, Tito was also a national leader in his own right. His strength stemmed not only from his Communist following but also from thousands of non-Communists who served in the Partisan organization. Thus, the unique position which Tito occupied within the Socialist camp was in large measure responsible for his success in defying the Soviet leadership.

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APPENDIX

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (1955-1964) [1]

Economic Cooperation

- Trade and Payments Agreement, Moscow, January 5, 1955.

- Exchange of letters on the expansion of trade on the basis of the trade and payments agreement of January 5, 1955, Belgrade, July 30, 1955.

- Protocol on trade negotiations, Moscow, September 1, 1955.

- Protocol on negotiations on technical matters concerning construction of industrial plants in Yugoslavia, Belgrade, November 28, 1955.

- Protocol on commodity exchange for 1956, Belgrade, January 6, 1956.

- Agreement on the construction of industrial plants in Yugoslavia (against a 110-million dollar credit), Belgrade, January 12, 1956.

- Agreement on the extension of a loan (30 million dollars in convertible currency) to Yugoslavia by the U.S.S.R., Moscow, February 2, 1956.

- Agreement on a 54-million-dollar commodity credit, Moscow, February 2, 1956.

- Protocol on the fulfilment of mutual deliveries of goods for 1955, Belgrade, May 19, 1956.

- Protocol on supplementary deliveries of goods in 1956, Belgrade, June 6, 1956.

- Agreement between Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic regarding cooperation in the construction of aluminium plants in Yugoslavia (including a 175-million-dollar credit,) Moscow, August 1, 1956.

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1 Yugoslav Survey, (Belgrade), XI, No. 3, (August, 1970), pp. 153-156.

- Protocol to the agreement on cooperation in the construction of industrial plants, Moscow, August 2, 1956.

- Protocol on commodity exchange for 1957, Moscow, February 26, 1957.

- Protocol on the amendment of Article 2, section 2 of the payments agreement, Moscow, February 26, 1957.

- Protocol on imports into Yugoslavia of machinery and equipment, Moscow, February 26, 1957.

- Agreement on mutual deliveries of basis goods in the period 1958-1960, Moscow, April 10, 1957.

- Protocol on deliveries of machines and equipment from the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia on the basis of the protocol of August 2, 1956, Belgrade, September 1, 1957.

- Trade protocol for 1958, Belgrade, November 1, 1957.

- Trade protocol for 1959, Moscow, January 1, 1959.

- Trade protocol for 1960, Belgrade, January 30, 1960.

- Agreement on mutual deliveries of goods for the period 1961-1965, Belgrade, March 30, 1961.

- Trade protocol for 1961, Belgrade, March 30, 1961.

- Trade protocol for 1962, Moscow, February 15, 1962.

- Protocol on trade negotiations conducted by Yugoslav and U.S.S.R. government delegations, Moscow, July 6, 1962.

- Protocol to the agreement of mutual deliveries of goods for the period 1961-1965 (from March 30, 1961), Moscow, July 6, 1962.

- Trade protocol for 1963, Belgrade, October 4, 1962.

- Protocol to the agreement on mutual deliveries for the period 1961-1965, Moscow, July 20, 1963.

- Agreement on the donation of a prefabricated units factory for the reconstruction of the earthquake-stricken city of Skopje (with a protocol), Moscow, August 19, 1963.

- Trade protocol for 1964, Belgrade, September 26, 1963.

- Trade protocol for 1965, Moscow, November 11, 1964.

- Agreement on deliveries of ships and other kinds of watercraft by Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union, Moscow, November 11, 1964.

- Protocol to the Yugoslav-Soviet agreement of March 30, 1961, regarding mutual deliveries of goods for the period 1961-1965, with annex, Moscow, November 26, 1964.

- Agreement on the provision of technical assistance to Yugoslavia in the construction of steam power plants, Moscow, November 26, 1964.

Scientific-Technical, Technical and Industrial Cooperation

- Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, Belgrade, December 19, 1955.

- Agreement on specialization, cooperation and scientific and technical cooperation, June 26, 1963.

- Agreement on conditions for technical training of Yugoslav and Soviet experts and workers, Belgrade, April 29, 1964.

- Agreement on terms for sending Yugoslav experts to the U.S.S.R. and Soviet experts to Yugoslavia for the purpose of provision of technical assistance and other services, Belgrade, April 29, 1964.

Cooperation in Culture, Science and Information Media

- Agreement on mutual purchases and sales, without transfer of foreign exchange, of scientific, technical, socio-economic, artistic, school and other kinds of literature, and gramophone records, Belgrade, November 12 and 13, 1955.

- Agreement on cooperation in the development of research in the sphere of nuclear sciences and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Belgrade, January 28, 1956.

- Agreement on mutual deliveries of documentary films, Belgrade, March 28, 1956.

- Convention on cultural cooperation, Moscow, May 17, 1956.

- Agreement (exchange of notes) on the information service, Belgrade, June 14, 1956.

- Agreement on the regulation of operation of the Soviet Cultural Centre in Belgrade, Belgrade, June 9, 1961.

- Agreement on further cooperation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Belgrade, January 10, 1963.

- Agreement on scientific cooperation between the Yugoslav Federal Council for the Coordination of Scientific Research and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow, February 24, 1964.

Consular Relations

- Convention on the regulation of questions concerning citizenship of persons with a dual citizenship, Moscow, May 22, 1956.

- Consular convention, Belgrade, July 21, 1960.

- Treaty on judicial assistance in civil and criminal cases, and family-law matters, Moscow, February 24, 1962.

- Agreement (exchange of notes) on the abolition of fees for all kinds of visas, Belgrade, December 30, 1963, and January 14, 1964.

Cooperation in Transport and Communications

- Agreement on the flying of Soviet civil aircraft over Yugoslav territory and Agreement on the flying of Yugoslav civil aircraft over the territory of the Soviet occupation zone in Austria, Belgrade, January 10, 1955.

- Agreement on air traffic, Moscow, September 3, 1955.

- Agreement on the postal, telegraph and telephone services and agreement on the exchange of postal parcels, Moscow, September 27, 1955.

- Agreement on cooperation in the field of communications, Belgrade, December 23, 1964.

- Agreement on amendments to the agreement on air traffic of September 3, 1955, Belgrade, June 27, 1964.