

Golden Dawn and Front National: A Comparison of Ideological Discourse

By: George (Georgios) Triantafillou

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Master's degree in Political Science

Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Ottawa

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: SCHOLARSHIP ON THE RADICAL RIGHT	7
CHAPTER 3: FAR AND RADICAL RIGHT IDEOLOGIES	15
CHAPTER 4: FRONT NATIONAL – THE PROTOTYPICAL RADICAL RIGHT PARTY.....	29
CHAPTER 5: FRONT NATIONAL – DISCOURSE DÉDIABOLISÉ UNDER MARINE LE PEN.	42
CHAPTER 6: GOLDEN DAWN – THE DAWN OF GREEK NEO-NAZISM.....	55
CHAPTER 7: GOLDEN DAWN – EXTREME NEO-NAZI IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE	69
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION – THE COMPARISON OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSES	90
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	101

Abstract

The literature has lacked a comparative analysis into Greece's Far Right party, Golden Dawn's, (GD) ideological discourse. The Far Right party is the most extreme in the Greek Parliament, promoting an ultra-nationalist agenda and being accused of operating as a terrorist organisation by the state.

Looking at characteristics such as nationalism, euroscepticism and authoritarianism, this thesis compares GD to the prototypical radical right party, Front National (FN), and predicts that they will be more radical in every aspect of their discourse. In addition, it seeks to fit them within a party classification.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The rise of the far right in Greece is not a new phenomenon. The Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) spearheaded the Greek radical right movement prior to the 2012 elections. Although they seemed to be in a position to profit from the Greek economic meltdown, the coalition government vote in favour of the first bailout package was the nail in the coffin for the party, disbanding and disappearing from the Greek Parliament completely in the following 2012 general elections. In their wake, the Golden Dawn (GD), an even more radical party, took their place winning 7% of the vote and 21 seats in parliament. The June 2012 elections saw their seats drop to 18 while holding the same percentage of the vote, then dropped again in January 2015 to 17 while maintaining virtually the same percentage of the vote. In the most recent 2015 elections, Golden Dawn managed to gain another member of parliament, bringing the total elected members of parliament back up to 18 while obtaining 7% of the vote again. Golden Dawn was an openly neo-Nazi party previously (some argue it still is), and its violent rise has not only shocked the Greek people, but many in Europe.

Golden Dawn's ideological discourse differs from that of LAOS, as it does from other radical right parties in Europe. The party has two main ideological documents: *Golden Dawn: An Ideological Movement* and *Political Stances: On the Golden Dawn of Hellenism*. Both documents that are readily available on their website (in Greek), describe Golden Dawn's ideology along with its political, economic and social stances. Using these two core documents, along with scholarly articles and documents written by the party and available on their website, I

compare Golden Dawn's ideology with a staple radical right party, for which I use the French Front National (FN). As radical right parties such as these can have varying ideological discourses, this paper seeks to answer the question: to what degree is Golden Dawn similar or different from a typical radical right wing party such as the Front National?

I have chosen the FN because it can be considered the prototypical radical right wing party. The party has been in existence since the 1970s and has experienced a sizeable degree of success in the French political arena for quite some time. In addition, as opposed to most radical right parties that exist for a short period of time, only to dissolve or merge with other fringe parties, the FN has been around the longest with surprising longevity and with no evidence that the party will soon fall off the map like so many others have. For this reason, the FN remains an idol for new radical right parties, and serves as a strong example for which the GD could be compared to.

Using the comparative analysis approach to compare the two parties, I address far right elements such as nationalism (and all its different forms therein), anti-establishment stances, euroscepticism (scepticism of European integration), immigration positions, crime and punishment, constitutionalism versus anti-constitutionalism, militarism, decadence and palingenesis (national rebirth) found in the two parties. I conduct an in-depth analysis of the Golden Dawn's published manifestos with other official documents as well as available articles on their website that could supplement the information in their manifestos or portray the party's ideology in a practical 'news article' fashion, revealing their ideological

positions. I expect to find Front National's ideological discourse to be primarily focused on anti-immigration, security and economy, yet that their ideas keep in line with the French constitution. As a result of Front National's recent change of leadership, I am confident that there has been a taming of their ideological positions. Golden Dawn, on the other hand, I predict will be more radical in all such aspects, proposing measures that would go against the Greek constitution and human rights.

Understanding and contrasting the ideological documents of both parties will allow for a breakdown of what makes Golden Dawn a far right party and if its ideological discourse is similar to that of the Front National. The discovery of differences in ideologies could potentially allow us to understand how these parties evolve over time, considering the birth of the parties differ significantly in origin, period and political and social environments surrounding them. The rise of the right in Europe currently gives a reason for political scientists to study their ideologies, electoral successes and actions, especially during this time of unprecedented migration flow into the continent. Nationalism in far right party ideological discourse has been expressed at the national level, potentially influencing the immigration debate and adversely affecting immigrants who have become scapegoats. The Hungarian guard is a prime example of how the radical right can use their rising popularity and extremist ideology to discriminate against and attack migrants and gypsies and further politicise the ethnocentric anti-immigration debate (Varga, 2014; Williams, 2006).

Defining ideology is a contentious subject within the social sciences, with a variety of definitions having been created in an attempt to best define it. The debate

has left some scholars labelling the concept as “elusive”, thus pointing to the complexities surrounding the term itself (McLellan, 1986). In the most basic terms, the Oxford dictionary defines ideology as “a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy”. I have chosen to bypass the debate by focusing on the ideological discourse of the parties.

This paper will therefore hope to demystify Golden Dawn’s ideological discourse, exposing their ideological positions, policy objectives and social stances, while finally comparing it to their prototypical counterpart. A party can only be considered radical if compared to one that is not, and seeing as the Front National is considered radical, it is suspected that Golden Dawn may fall farther into the far right category than their counterpart.

Methodology

By using an in-depth analysis and comparative analysis approach, this paper is uncovering whether or not Golden Dawn is similar or different from Front National. The in-depth analysis is used to analyse Golden Dawn’s ideology, in order to thoroughly dissect the party’s literature to understand the political, social and economic stances the party takes. This analysis is conducted on the discourse of the Front National, examining the same criteria as Golden Dawn.

Analysing the structure, wording and principles put forth in the various manifestos and ideological documents of the two parties serve as the foundation for the comparative analysis that follows it. Recognising Fascist, neo-Fascist, neo-Conservative and/or nationalist ideals in the documents allows for the

understanding of the basis of the party, while decoding the structure and presentation of their arguments. I clarify the image that the parties portray to their electorates, which could either be representative or a masking of the party's true nature. Ultimately the analyses conclude with the classification of the parties' levels of radicalism using known scholarly criteria, which is outlined in chapter three.

In combination with the categories of the far right that have been defined in chapter 3, this method allows for comparison of the parties' discourses through their policy proposals such as positions on national economic policies, immigration, nationalisation, education and positions on law and order. In addition to this, the comparisons of nationalist rhetoric and the vilification or glorification of sometimes-questionable national or foreign figures by the parties is made. The criteria incorporated for the radical right parties, as examined in chapter three, is based off work by scholars such as Ignazi and Akkerman (Ignazi, 2005; Akkerman, 2012), who focus on classifying parties within the radical right spectrum.

I have chosen to use the manifestos and policy documents of both parties due to the richness of their ideological content. The two GD manifestos: *Golden Dawn: An Ideological Movement* and *Political Stances: On the Golden Dawn of Hellenism* and the FN manifesto: *Notre Projet: Programme Politique Du Front National* are the core of the parties themselves, expressing their beliefs and views regarding both internal and external socio-political issues. Alongside these, supplementary documents are analysed for ideological statements, such as Golden Dawn's online news articles, their ongoing criminal case, eight news articles from the party website and international news outlets on the GD as well speeches by the party leader and MPs.

These GD speeches include Michaloliakos' "Victory Speech", "Caucus Meeting Speech", "Anti-U.S., Turkish and Immigrant Speech" and a speech regarding the Imia crisis, along with Athenian MP, Kassidiaris' "Athens Speech" and "Anti-memorandum Speech". For the FN, speeches by Marine Le Pen, including her "Speech on the Refugee Crisis", "2011 Electoral Speech", "Jeanne d'Arc Speech" of 2015, and "Speech on Islamic Fundamentalism", public statements by her members of parliament, two interviews (with the Reuters news network and RFI) as well as three news publications are used. The use of known scholarship on these parties' ideologies and discourses is used to uncover information that may not be found in the party's policy documents. Other scholars have formulated opinions on the ideologies of these parties, which is used to supplement my analysis. By comparing the manifestos with the speeches, news and secondary scholarly sources, I am able to note extra ideological information missing from their manifesto, while noting whether or not continuity exists in their ideologies between the different sources. The information is then extrapolated and contrasted with each other as well as with that of the Front National. These sources, however, offer snippets of their ideological positions on more specific issues and within certain contexts that could add to their discourse.

In the following chapter, I introduce radical right parties by examining available scholarship, explaining who the voters of these parties are, their electoral success, influence on mainstream politics and other important aspects. Following that, I explain the radical right ideology, the ideologies of the far right and extreme right as well as distinguish the various far right families from each other. In addition

to this, I show how parties stand ideologically. The fourth chapter is the first on the Front National, introducing the party. In the fifth chapter I examine the Front National's ideological discourse in-depth. Chapter 6 introduces the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, with the eighth chapter, following it, explaining their extreme ideology. I conclude with a comparison of both party's ideological discourses, identifying differences and similarities between the two and classifying Golden Dawn within the far right through the comparison.

Chapter 2: Scholarship on the Radical Right

Scholarship on the European radical right has brought a plethora of information to the forefront regarding these parties. This chapter seeks to present this scholarship and explain its relevance. These studies uncover information for what is an important party family within the political spectrum of European nations, making it an important subject of study for various reasons. The radical right has influenced national policies such as immigration and nationalisation, has challenged mainstream parties, joined coalition governments and in some cases formed paramilitary groups to protect its enforcement of a created "sub-state" (Skenderovic, 2007; De Lange, 2012; Kallis, 2013). As a result, scholars have studied the party family from a variety of angles, such as through electoral studies to understand voter patterns and variables influencing those voters, to ideological analyses, to comparative studies and more. These studies become deeper when scholars analyse specific aspects of a party's ideology, such as euroscepticism, paramilitarism or nationalism, which will be discussed in the later chapters.

The influence on the mainstream can be introduced through the impact of radical right electoral success (Aicholzer, Kritzinger, Wagner & Zeglovitz, 2014; Kallis, 2013; Manatschal, 2012; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2011). Research has shown that radical right parties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria and the SVP have been successful in attracting enough votes to cause the mainstream to realign themselves on some social and economic issues (Aicholzer, Kritzinger, Wagner & Zeglovitz, 2014; Kallis, 2013, Manatschal, 2012; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2011). Examples of radical right electoral success is seen in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden, where the FPÖ won 20.5% of the vote and 38 seats in parliament in the 2013 election, the SVP winning 26.6% of the vote and 54 (the most seats in parliament) in 2011 and the Sweden Democrats (SD) securing 48 seats with 12.9% of the vote in the 2014 elections (Federal Elections, 2011; Valmyndigheten, 2014). The translation of these votes into influence has been seen with the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), the DF, FPÖ and the SVP's impacts on tightening legislation on immigrants' rights (Van der Brug, Fennema, van Heeden & De Lange, 2014). Front National has had a similar effect on the political environment in France, increasing ethnocentrist policies, as did the German radical right (Minkenberg, 2010). The result of this can be the implementation of more xenophobic, ethnically based policies, which may exclude people outside the ethnic circle from participating in the political process or perhaps from ever naturalising within these countries. The reason for such behaviour on the part of the mainstream is to attempt to recover lost votes from the radical right, a phenomenon referred to as the 'contagion of the right' by some scholars (Norris, 2005; De Lange, 2012).

The counter argument, however, is that there is no correlation between the radical right and the direct radicalisation of the mainstream and policy (Akkerman, 2012; Mudde, 2013). Organisational weakness and the limited options for coalitions, as a result of their level of radicalism, can cause them to either be inefficient or unable to have direct effects on policies, although exceptions such as the SVP exist (Akkerman, 2012). Akkerman (Akkerman, 2012) does recognise, however, that even if these parties cannot influence policy directly, they can still influence a 'shift to the right' in the mainstream, thus still making them a polarising actor.

Indirect influence through electoral success is not the only method for these parties to influence mainstream politics. This could come through their election into a coalition government or as an opposition party, although scholars such as Akkerman and Mudde recognise the importance of the indirect effects the radical right can have on the mainstream and policy (Akkerman, 2012; Mudde, 2013). There are a variety of examples of radical right parties joining coalition governments with the mainstream. One of the most memorable examples comes from the Italian parliament in 1994 and 2001, where Silvio Berlusconi invited Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and Lega Nord (ND) to govern with Forza Italia (FI). Other examples are seen in Austria in 2000 when Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) formed a coalition government with the FPÖ (De Lange, 2012). There are certain examples where the radical right has been effective, such as in Denmark, where the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) influenced the coalition enough to form a programme in which immigration was a central topic, creating a Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants

and Integration, which was one of the DF's desires (Bille, 2002; Bjorklund & Andersen, 2002).

Other methods radical right parties use to maximise their effectiveness in influencing the mainstream parties include creating polemic arguments around immigration and nationalisation and securitising the issue. Skenderovic notes how the SVP was successful in pushing for stricter immigration policies for fear of *Überfremdung* (over-foreignisation) (Skenderovic, 2007). They were successful in halting proposals to introduce *jus soli* immigration policies and have continued to be influential in the sphere of immigration (Skenderovic, 2007). The successful initiative by the SVP in 2009 to ban the construction of minarets is an example of how radical political thoughts have resonated amongst the people of Switzerland, winning the referendum to ban the construction with 57.7% of the Swiss vote (Stockemer, 2012). The SVP during the 1993 referendum on entry to the EU was successful in campaigning against Switzerland's membership to the union as a member of the governing coalition (Stockemer, 2012). They did so by campaigning for Swiss sovereignty and tight restrictions on immigration, which greatly popularised their national rhetoric amongst the population (Stockemer, 2012). Parties in a variety of European countries attempt to create polemic arguments in line with their political and social stances. An example of such includes anti-globalisation arguments, which radical right parties argue destroys the fabric of the domestic economy, or multiculturalism which they argue as destroying national or European identity (Zaslove, 2004). The Swiss radical right has been successful in creating the anti-Islam and anti-immigration debate, influencing the mainstream

and polarising society on the issue (Dolezal, Helbing & Hutter, 2010). The result is that radical right parties adopt programmes to the general crisis of national identity, along with other topics, to strengthen their electoral market position (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012).

Studies show that radical right parties tend to gather votes from mostly young (under 25), male, blue-collar workers, older voters, medium-education cohorts in large cities, liberal voters who lost political trust for the mainstream and ethnocentrics, even if there is a lack of ideological proximity (Arzheimer & Carter, 2003; Goodwin, 2011; Stefanova, 2009). It is also found that farmers, singles (divorced) and non-religious individuals are more likely to vote for the radical right than others. (Wers, Sheepers & Lubbers, 2012). Parties that have been the most successful have been able to assemble a cross-class voter base. These parties, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), are able to secure votes from the lower-middle classes, who are economically insecure, in tangent with blue-collar and non-manual workers agonised by outsourcing, economic instability, social spending cutbacks and more (Goodwin, 2011). This in turn brings them to channel their dissatisfaction through the simplistic arguments of the radical right (Stockemer, 2012). There are some exceptions, however, where extreme parties that are rooted in Fascist and neo-Nazi traditions, such as the BNP, fail to secure the lower-middle class vote due to their extremism. These extreme parties attract mostly working-class men who are pessimistic of their economic opportunities and who have low levels of education and qualifications (Goodwin, 2011). Following with atomisation theories (Arendt, 1951), it is also known through studies that

radical right supporters are typically of low-income and low-education levels, who are "losers" of globalisation. Electoral research has found that a citizen's classification on the left-right scale, as well as their attitudes towards immigration, are two major factors to predicting the likelihood for the voter to support the radical right (Goodwin, 2011; Stockemer, 2012).

Social class, age and gender do not fully explain why people vote for the radical right. Structural factors, such as immigration (especially of non-European ethnicity), unemployment, the current European economic crisis, the refugee crisis and crime all play a role in influencing the voters (Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002; Van der Brug, Fennema, 2007; Goodwin, 2011). This is explained by the ethnic competition theory, which proposes that ethnic groups that share similar economic interests compete for scarce resources, bringing about a perceived ethnic threat and interethnic antagonistic attitudes (Coser, 1959; Werts et al., 2012). With an ailing economy and less jobs available on the market, individuals who are economically insecure are more likely to vote for the radical right (Kitschelt, 1995; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007; Goodwin, 2011). Therefore, parties on the radical right have a large pool of voters that they could influence to vote for them, especially during times of economic and political uncertainty. These individuals include skilled labour workers, blue collar workers and lower-middle income individuals who also see immigrants as competition in the fight for scarce resources, such as jobs, and thus are more likely to vote for the radical right to try to further their economic interests (Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer & Carter, 2003; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007; Goodwin, 2011).

However, some studies have found that not all immigration is correlated with an increased likelihood for a radical right vote, however. Instead, these studies find that certain minority groups, such as Muslims and other non-Europeans, are the immigrants that the locals find to be 'threatening' (Lubbers et al., 2002; Goodwin 2011). The reason for this lies not only in the perceived economic threat, but that these voters believe that immigrants and minority groups are threatening national culture and their traditional way of life (Goodwin, 2011). The ongoing migrant crisis in Europe is an example of explosive immigrant levels that will drastically change national demographics. Only the upcoming national elections in affected countries will be able to tell us if the radical right will gain from it or not.

Citizens who perceived their living environment to be threatened or deteriorating in terms of economic prosperity and criminality, feel as though they are relatively unsafe in their own neighbourhoods as a result of factors such as youth hooliganism or a lack of police presence. These individuals may also feel threatened by immigrants and ethnic minorities, who are often overrepresented in published statistic on criminality (Dagevos & Gijsberts, 2010; Werts et al., 2012). Radical right parties often play on these sentiments to attract votes by proposing a cap on immigration, stricter sentencing and more police funding (Werts et al., 2012).

Electoral support and voting patterns are important for the future of a radical right party as electoral support for the radical right could correlate with support for the party's ideology, whereas a decrease could mean the opposite. Radical right literature greatly discusses the various aspects of a party's ideology

that influenced the increase (or decrease) within the vote share and to target the cleavage of society that is likely to vote for them (Ford & Goodwin 2014; Luccassen, & Lubbers 2012; Stefanova, 2009; Stockemer, 2014; Werts et al., 2012). These authors cover ideological aspects of the parties they research as well as the ideological forces that specifically drive those parties to electoral success, such as promising voters less immigration (especially when it is high), promising to tackle corruption and protect blue-collar interests (Rydgren & Ruth, 2013; Stefanova, 2009). These are relevant factors when analysing the evolution of a party's ideology, because a change in a party's ideology could correlate with a change in electoral support. There is a plethora of examples of parties reforming, evolving and tweaking ideologies and images to better their results in the polls (Goodwin, 2010; Ignazi, 2005). The transformations of the radical right to maintain vote shares seem to have paid off. Records show that radical right parties may not just become popular for a short time and then fall back to the shadows. They have improved in mobilising their core constituencies repeatedly in contrast to other parties, so that once voters vote for the radical right, they most often continue to do so in the future (Art, 2013).

European integration and the EU is a polarising subject that influences the vote for the radical right. Studies have shown that euroscepticism is a strong determinant to explain radical right voting (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; Werts et al., 2012; Goodliffe, 2014). Recent crisis moments in Europe, which include events such as the almost-Grexit, the possible looming Brexit, the refugee crisis and the economic crisis could potentially be interpreted as the failures of European integration by voters. With euroscepticism being a common trait of radical right

wing parties, Eurosceptic voters are more likely to vote for them (Caiani & Conti, 2014; Goodliffe, 2014).

Based on the aforementioned information, it is evident that electoral studies and the study on radical right influence are important. We must, however, understand what the far right is. To do so, an understanding of their ideologies is needed. In the following chapter I will introduce the ideologies of far right parties, specifically those of the radical and extreme right.

Chapter 3: Far Right and Radical Right Ideologies

The soul of any political party is their ideology. It influences nearly all aspects of their existence, from policy propositions, to their operations, electoral success, membership and more. Understanding and differentiating the various types of far right parties is essential to be able to understand where a party stands within the broad spectrum that lies beyond the mainstream right. In this chapter, I will define the far right, radical right and extreme right, in addition with smaller, more specific parties such as regional nationalist parties. I will also define a different categorisation of parties placed within the 'old' and 'new' right families. It is vital to distinguish the difference between the radical and extreme right seeing as they are considerably different in their levels of radicalism. In short, extreme parties take more radical positions than radical right parties in terms of their nationalism, and embrace historically extreme movements and ideologies such as Nazism or Fascism (Minkenber, 2013).

Defining Radical and Other Far Right Parties

Far Right

An all-encompassing classification is the term 'far right', which includes both radical right and extreme right parties, with nationalism, anti-systemness and anti-immigration components of their ideologies holding enough basic similarities for a very wide umbrella definition (Ellinas, 2007). The categorisation of parties within this blanket term allows for us to establish exactly 'how radical' a particular party truly is. Far right parties that are considered neo-Fascist, or not, in their ideologies can be classified through their use of old and neo-Fascist doctrines. According to Pietro Gattinara, Caterina Froio and Matteo Albanese, neo-Fascist parties push for a stronger state to protect the citizens from the international financial system (taken from the Fascist doctrine *Daestra sociale*) while espousing Fascist ideologies such as adopting an identarian vision, communitarianism, anti-imperialism, Europeanism while also being anti-EU and anti-American (Gattinara, Froio & Albanese, 2013). Neo-Fascist classifications within the radical right family allow for the specification of the most ideologically extreme parties as 'extreme right parties'. These parties that espouse neo-Fascist or neo-Nazi ideological values are based on Fascist ideologies or openly praise Nazism or Fascism, such as Jobbik and CasaPound, which can then be analysed in a comparative manner with their less-radical counterparts, such as UKIP.

Radical Right

One of the categories within the far right is the radical right, which scholars believe could be considered a party family of its own (Zaslove, 2004). These parties have certain distinguishing characteristics, common within the literature, that help define the party family, such as: xenophobia, anti-system attitudes, anti-elitism, in some cases levels of authoritarianism, nativist nationalism and acceptance of existing constitutional order (Mudde, 2002; Zaslove, 2004; Minkenberg, 2013). The differentiation of the various right-wing parties is made by Eatwell (Eatwell, 1989), who splits the right into the reactionary right, moderate right, radical right, extreme right and the new right. These parties were lumped into categories based on their corresponding major ideological factors, such as traditionalism, liberalism and neo-Fascist authoritarianism (Ignazi, 1996).

What defines a radical right party currently is something of a debate between scholars, who have differing opinions on naming such parties as: 'populist' versus 'radical', and what ideological positions a party should hold to be classified within the radical right. Some scholars (such as Albertazzi and McDonnell) argue that what makes a party considered part of the 'populist' right are their populist ideologies. In this definition, populism is emphasised and not nationalism and authoritarianism, which to scholars such as McDonnell, allows for a broader scope of analysis because it removes the straightjacket of deterministic classifications (Zaslove, 2009). Other definitions oppose this, arguing that there are common radical right ideologies that can be specified. This is seen in Mudde's definition that requires core characteristics of the populist radical right to have populism, nativist nationalism, and authoritarianism in their ideologies (Zaslove, 2009). Certain scholars, such as

Zaslove, are against having minimal or maximum classifications for fear of having too restrictive of an analysis or that radical right parties will be held to higher methodological standards than mainstream parties. However, he does not provide guidelines of his own (Zaslove, 2009). An example of a radical right ideology is French *orléanisme*, which has its roots in conservatism and liberalism and a renewal of French constitutional monarchy (similar to the UK); this encompasses the views of the radical right as non-Fascist authoritarian (Ignazi, 1996; de Broglie, 2003).

Aligning this paper closer to Mudde's definition, which notes that there are shared core principles within radical right ideologies, I will attempt to gauge the Golden Dawn's ideological compatibility with the radical right, however, there are many factors other than nativist nationalism and authoritarianism that will be taken into account. As for economic stances of the parties, some radical right parties differ from neo-liberals to chauvinistic leftists, to national socialists. Therefore, economic preference will be seen in a broad perspective while recognising some parties lean further to the right than others.

Regional Nationalist Parties

Some radical parties are regional nationalist parties, differing from most other radical parties who are not. The ideologies of these parties are similar to most radical parties, with their basis in nationalism. Xenophobia is not a necessary trait for these parties, with there being varying positions on immigration between these types of parties (Karapin, 1998). The most popular example of this kind of party is the Lega Nord, which is against the central state because of themes that are

recurring in radical right discourse, such as mismanagement, corruption and inefficiency while the individuals being represented (in this case northern Italians) are the burdened 'honest and laborious' Italians, who are different from the southerners (Ignazi, 2005). This party has flirted with the idea of creating an independent state in northern Italy, named *Padania*, whereas most other radical right parties are against fragmentation of the state and represent it as a whole (Ignazi, 2005). Other parties are opposite of Lega Nord, and are radical parties of independent states or regional governments that want *enosis* with another nation. This is seen with ELAM in Cyprus, which calls for the reunification of Cyprus and Greece while maintaining a radical anti-immigration, anti-Turkish and anti-capitalist agenda (Katsourides, 2013).

Extreme Right

Extreme-right groups according to Ignazi (Ignazi, 1996) can be split into two groups: traditional extreme right parties and post-industrial extreme right parties. The traditional extreme right parties are the protectors of nostalgia, reminiscent of the Fascist parties that came as a result of the industrial revolution (Ignazi, 1996). The extreme right parties that were birthed after 1980 have different ideologies. These parties are considered post-industrial extreme right parties, which no longer keep material interests as their central focus, nor the bourgeoisie. Instead, non-material issues such as ones of identity and self-realisation take precedence (Ignazi, 1996). Post-war nations such as France saw far right parties return with very minimal success with the memory of the Second World War still fresh in the minds

of the citizenry. Unlike radical right parties who have mild levels of authoritarianism, wishing to modify the existing democratic system through basic centralisation of government and stronger leadership, extreme right parties aim for large-scale constitutional change and in some cases parts of the constitution (Karapin, 1998). Extreme parties such as *Jeune Nation* in France were formed in the 1950s, espousing anti-communist, anti-modernist, xenophobic and pro-empire views (Stockemer, 2015). Front National in its beginnings in 1970 also had some Neo-Fascist and Neo-Nazi ideologies and was not focused on as many economic issues and on national rebirth, with immigration not even a part of its manifesto (Shields, 2011).

Fascist and Neo-Fascist Parties

Fascist parties are one of the oldest types of far right parties. It could be argued that a fringe of the traditional extreme right are Fascist parties, who oppose parliamentary democracy, were antidemocratic, ultranationalist and paramilitaristic (Art, 2013). This branch of far right parties has a long history dating back to the interwar period, where Fascist parties such as those of Hitler and Mussolini gained power as a result of economic and political instability, partnered with a growing resentment of the mainstream who was unable to swiftly reverse a decline in economic output. These Fascist parties subscribed to an ideology that was antidemocratic, ultranationalist and paramilitaristic (Art, 2013). The Fascist parties were sworn enemies of parliamentary democracy, and looked to defend that nation from threats (both internal and external), as well as to organize coercion outside

state law to achieve specified objectives (Art, 2013). The Italian Fascist movement gained popularity under Mussolini as a party that was focused on the economy and opposed discrimination on a social class basis and class war. In addition to this, Mussolini and his party sought the rebirth of a great Italy, equalling the great Roman empire of the past: *romanità* (Nelis, 2007). The Mussolini radical right (Fascist) ideas also employed the idea of 'vital space', which included territory that was viewed as historically Italian, such as the entire Mediterranean (Newman, 1944). Mussolini also created an armed militia called the *squadristi* (Blackshirts) to promote order in the streets by using violence. The use of the Blackshirts on the March on Rome brought the start of Italian Fascism.

Ideologically, German Nazism (a form of Fascism) is very similar to Mussolini's Italian Fascism where it was primarily economic based with territorial claims, but different in some ways. It is exclusivist, where those that are considered community outsiders were excluded from German society through the justification of scientific racism and the promotion of a homogeneous society. The edicts of Nazism opposed Communism and rejected class equality, making it anti-Communist. In Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, anti-Communism and anti-Semitism are outlined quite clearly, along with expressing a right to German territorial expansion (Hitler, 1925). A significant difference between Mussolini's Fascism and Hitler's Nazi-Fascism was the strong anti-Semitism.

Greek Fascism under the 4th of August regime led by Ioannis Metaxas lasted from 1936-1941 when Greece fell to the Axis forces. This regime held similar themes to Mussolini's Fascism and Hitler's Nazism in being heavily militaristic, in

favour of significant territorial expansion and the rebirth of Hellenic civilisation (Kallis, 2007). The *Megali Idea* (Great Idea) of recreating a Hellenic Empire through the conquest of neighbouring Balkan states, campaigns in Turkey and other Mediterranean countries is similar to the other two Fascist dictator's visions. Metaxas portrayed himself and his regime as the outsiders following populist rhetoric to portray himself as the one to bring the *Neon Kratos* (New State). This meant denouncing Marxism and traditional Capitalism, following the Fascist path to a new conception of politics, society and economics (Kallis, 2007). He gained popularity during his regime by introducing minimum wage, unemployment insurance, maternity leave and 40-hour work weeks.

The end of the Second World War saw a great decline in the popularity of Fascism due to the atrocities perpetrated by the Fascist regimes of the Axis forces. However, the far right evolved multiple times in the years leading to the present day. In some cases, there are traces of some continuity whereas in others there are little traces of the old Fascist doctrine. What has remained, however, are the overarching themes of the far right that are being addressed in a plethora of ways within the party family, which allow for certain parties to be affiliated with quasi-old to new guard of the far right, with some parties being labelled as openly neo-Fascist or neo-Nazi, such as the German National party.

In Italy, the neo-Fascist party, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement – MSI) was created right after the war in 1945 as a pro-Mussolini neo-Fascist party by Fascist veterans of the Mussolini regime. The party was formed to revive Fascism and fight Communism (Ignazi, 2003). The party continued its fight

against Communism, openly espousing Fascism until its transformation into the National Alliance, where it rejected Fascism, totalitarianism and racism (Tripodi, 1998). These parties had ideologies more similar to interwar Fascist parties.

Neo-Fascist parties wish to evoke the politics of the interwar period, with agendas that are similar to their predecessors. These parties have significant fascist-style goals and methods of organisation, which seek national unity against internal enemies (usually communists, leftists and foreigners), and external enemies (nations to which they believe to have Cassius Belli), focus on national expansion and the creation of an empire, an authoritarian state and a regulated economy (Karapin, 1998). The economic style can range from liberal to a more socialist system (Karapin, 1998).

Old Right, New Right

There is another form of categorising far right parties, moving away from terms such as 'radical' and 'extreme', focusing on a classification of 'old' versus 'new', with their classifications stemming from the historical evolution of the far right. The concept of a far right party has evolved over time, with there being a largely accepted distinction between the 'old right' and a 'new right'. Parties of the old right are described as parties whose ideological documents were dominated by economic issues, such as the dismissing of Capitalism and Communism and finding a new way to deal with the economic and class issues. The new right is less focused on economic issues in their ideological documents and more focused on non-economic issues such as nationalism and traditional values that are constantly threatened

(Cole, 2005). Parties such as Hungary's Jobbik and Italy's CasaPound can be labelled as part of the old guard of the right, or 'old right'. These two parties are heavily anti-capitalist, critique the political establishment including parliamentary representation, and use some Fascist and neo-Fascist ideological documents to build on their ideologies (Gattinara, Froio & Albanese 2013; Varga, 2014). Parties such as the SVP, Lega Nord and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) would fall under the 'new right', focusing primarily on ethno-nationalism, immigration and sovereignty issues, and less so on older class conflicts and economic revolution (Ford, Goodwin & Cutts, Halikiopoulou, Mock & Vasilopoulou, 2013; Harrison & Bruter, 2011; Skenderovic, 2007).

There are similarities between the old right and new right parties however, with overlaps in ideologies. Both parties, old and new, have ideological focuses in national decay and palingenesis, patriotism, as well as in strict law-and-order policies (Cole, 2005). The current Front National, for example, uses decay as a reason for a nationalist solution to France's problems, as did the party in their 'old right' days (Shields, 2011; Stockemer, 2015). The comparison can also be made between Metaxas', Mussolini's or Hitler's Fascist regimes push for national rebirth, which are concepts found in various radical right discourses such as that of Front National, the MSI, Lega Nord and many other parties (Almeida, 2013, Ignazi, 2005). The 'old right - new right' classification is mixed with the other sub sections of the far right such as the radical and extreme parties, allowing for a double classification to further specify a party's position based on its ideology.

There are some general similarities between the various party classifications, such as the promotion of nationalism, law and order and anti-system attitudes. A clear distinction between radical, extreme and regional parties is evident based on their fundamental stances. The adherence to the constitution on the part of radical parties and not of extreme parties is one of these examples. Even this one difference will set the precedent for policies that will diverge substantially from their counterparts. The difference in the style of definitions from the Far-Radical-Extreme-Fascist right in comparison to the Old-New definitions is that the latter allows for a broader definition, placing parties in one of two baskets. Basing itself on economic and cultural issues, which all far right parties tackle, the definition also opens itself to criticism for being too broad. Parties that fall into the same 'Old' or 'New' category could be significantly different ideologically, yet both would be labelled the same. A combination of both types of definitions could lead to a more specific classification.

Ideologies of the European Far Right

The ideologies of the far right cover issues from economics to citizenship, with different degrees of radicalism between radical and extreme parties. Radical right wing parties in particular are a rather heterogeneous party family. These parties, such as Lega Nord, the SVP, True Finns and the FPÖ are characterised as nationalistic, xenophobic, eurosceptic, and are in favour of majoritarian democracy with less checks and balances. European parties typically embody these

characteristics, although parties are not uniform in which of these characteristics are most important to them, and parties can differ in their level of radicalism within each category. Party manifestos shine light on what each party view as their primary focus, and what other characteristics will be shaping their policy recommendations. If these parties have party-funded newspapers or news outlets, these are other sources that can confirm the party's ideological focus.

Decadence, palingenesis and ridding the state of foreign influence, are all important ideological factors that drive radical right agendas. The dominance of these elements to scholars is important in understanding radical right parties, seeing as they are recurring. Scholars find that parties that incorporate these ideological elements into their programmes, will bring in anti-immigration and more nativist *jus sanguinis* nationalisation stances into their programmes. This is confirmed through various parties by a plethora of scholars, where palingenesis comes from the imposition of ethno-nationalist policies and the ridding of the current corrupt elite. This is seen in the Golden Dawn who discourage voters from voting for the mainstream and advocate national rebirth (Koronaïou, Lagos, Sakellariou, Kymionis, & Chiotaki-Poulou, 2015). These sentiments are also shared by parties such as the True Finns (Arter, 2010) and Front National (Almeida, 2010).

The concept goes further into viewing immigrants as one of the primary reasons for this decadence, seeing as they will either stain the bloodline of the ethnic nationals of the perceived homogeneous nation, (stated by more extreme parties), or that they cannot assimilate into the host country's culture, and thus dilute or destroy it. This negative identity dimension of the far right excludes all

foreigners, immigrants, asylum seekers, politicians and other officials based on political or foreign exclusion. The reason for this is that it will lead to a degenerative social and political culture. The xenophobic idea of this stems from the party's beliefs that foreigners will bring with them foreign influence, norms, culture and values, and that these are parasitic, causing the eventual change and, therefore, decline in national culture of the host nation (Harrison, & Bruter, 2011). Parties such as the extreme right Jobbik highlight in their manifesto that current foreign-influenced leadership and politico-economic environments are destructive to Hungarian society. This is doubled when considering the immigration and Gypsy populations who add to a degrading Hungarian society (Jobbik, 2015). Certain radical right parties also portray secularism, Semitism, immigration and homosexuality as reasons for national decadence, with some calling for the reestablishment of the church within the state (Jobbik, 2015; Sum, 2010; Tomic, 2013). Girard's four types of scapegoating to explain the logic of this type of ideology in radical right parties: (i) cultural disintegration induced by the abolition of fundamental differences; (ii) accusations that relate the crisis to transgressions whose distinguishing essence pertains to the suppression of fundamental differences; (iii) physical elimination of displacement through race, religion, social and behavioural markers; (iv) physical elimination of the scapegoat will restore status quo (Almeida, 2014).

Moving from decadence to palingenesis, it is found that parties justify the need for national reform to strive for national greatness, often going back to the "glory days" of the past. By emancipating the state from the corrupt elite and other

elements of decadence, the far right is then able to use the optimistic reincarnation of a greater state, or in some cases even empire, to draw in votes (Caiani, & Conti, 2014; Shields, 2011; Varga, 2014). Examples of this are seen with the radical right party, Italian Lega Nord (Northern League) who wants to bring Italy back to the glory of the Roman Empire and Hungary's Jobbik, which advocates for the restoration of a pre-Trianon Hungarian border (Caiani & Conti 2014; Szele, 2012). Tomic notes similar cases in ex-Yugoslavia with the Serbian Radical Party referring to a Greater Serbia within their rhetoric on palingenesis, features recognised by Fort and Goodwin in their research on less radical UKIP (Ford & Goodwin 2014; Tomic, 2013).

Euroscepticism is one of the pillars of radical right ideology, with many parties taking positions against the Union. To understand where they stand, studies have been conducted on party ideologies to assess levels of euroscepticism amongst radical right parties. Vasilopoulou (Vasilopoulou, 2011) separates parties as rejecting eurosceptics, conditional eurosceptics and compromising eurosceptics. Rejecting implies that parties are against the principle of cooperation, policy practice and future EU policy. Conditional, however, implies that the party is in favour of cooperation and not the latter two, whereas compromising is only against future EU policy. The focus on nationalism and thus the surrender of sovereignty to the EU, ranks parties within these categories and, therefore, analyses if they are more or less radical. The Front National (FR), Tricolour Flame (ITA), League of Polish Families (POL) and the BNP (UK) fall under rejecting. The FPÖ (AUS), Flemish Interest Attack (BEL), Danish People's Party (DEN), Popular Orthodox Rally (GRE)

and Northern League (ITA) all fall under 'conditional eurosceptic'. Lastly, National Alliance (ITA) and For Fatherland and Freedom (LAT) are compromising (Vasilopoulou, 2011). As the literature shows, there is no unified position on European integration, or how to unravel it, within the radical right, as is true of the mainstream.

The extensive literature on the subject of radical right ideological discourse, however, does not cover where Golden Dawn stands comparatively and lacks a truly in-depth analysis of its ideological documents. With the plethora of definitions and structures separating the far-right into the radical and extreme right, as well as defining their specific stances within those subcategories, Golden Dawn can be given an appropriate classification in comparison to the Front National. Using the methods and information gathered from the literature, this paper will seek to add to the study of the European radical right by delving deeper into the Golden Dawn's discourse and comparing their positions to those of Front National who is arguably one of the most successful radical right parties in Europe. The study will help fill a void in the literature on Golden Dawn, which has been analysed in stand-alone analyses, however, lacks the comparative aspect outside the Greek political spectrum.

Chapter 4: Front National – The Prototypical Radical Right Party

The French radical right party, Front National, is considered to be an example of a prototypical European radical right party that has come to serve as an example for other parties. Certain aspects and characteristics such as its evolution over time,

membership, voters, the context in which it operates and its ideological discourse allow it to be labelled as such. Its history has seen the party evolve significantly from its humble, yet extreme beginnings into one of the most followed radical right parties in Europe. The party is a rising force within the French political arena and is significant in its success within one of Europe's strongest political and economic powers, which brought about the renaissance and the shift away from absolutism to democracy in modern history.

The Front National's official history started with its creation as a political party in 1972 with the beginnings of the *Nouvelle Droite* (New Right) when it was created by François Brigneau and François Duprat with Jean-Marie Le Pen leading the party. The earlier years of the party, headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen was the beginning of what was then a new twist of the European neo-Fascist movement, using slogans of the 1930s French Fascists, appealing to Algerian war veterans and followers of the Poujadisme movement. This new party had the vision of uniting the various radical and extreme right movements in France, such as the Poujadists, antigauillists, neo-Fascists and right-wing intellectuals into one party, thus forming a true alternative for the masses. The model of the party was based on the Italian Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI*) (Stockemer, 2015). Their ideology focused primarily on the "defaite necessaire du Marxisme", with little mention of immigration or nationalism found in their early 1970s manifestos (Camus, 1998; Shields, 2011). The party displayed significant levels of revolutionist tendencies, using wording that presented the party (and the people) as being at war, with the party aiming the people towards a "new revolution" as well as a "new

defence” of the French people (Stockemer, 2015). Historians such as Pierre Milza considered this party to not be an extreme party, but a neo-Fascist party, using an ideology that went contrary to its purpose of trying to move themselves away from the political margins (Dézé, 2012).

The newly founded Front National created its image based on populism through xenophobic movements that transcended the political cleavages of the left and right. Economically, the party promoted primarily liberal policies, seeking to make cuts in the public sector and was in favour of the minimisation of state intervention in the market. They thus found themselves ideologically between being in favour of pro-national revolution and conservatism, as seen in their 1972 *National* (Camus, 1998). The party did not see much electoral success in their beginnings (Ray, 2015). As a result, the party attempted to improve voter support by making amendments to their party ideology such as: the halting of their denouncing of outside influence as a reason for national decay along with some of their other most radical positions; however, their electoral success remained dismal at 0.62% in the 1974 presidential elections. Just a few years later, the party brought two parties into their ranks, which shaped their ideology into one that embraced new concepts such as militarism, racism, anti-democracy and fierce anti-communism (Stockemer, 2015).

With the 1980s came a new chapter for the Front National and France, with the Socialist Party coming to power in 1981, suspending all deportations of migrants and changing the procedure for expulsion from an administrative issue to a judicial issue. This saw a shift from repatriation to integration, with immigrant

populations receiving some new rights and opportunities. The Front National saw this as the “défrancisation de la France”, pushing the party to take stronger stances against immigration (Shields, 2011). The widespread concern and dissatisfaction with the change in policy brought about a new age for the Front National, creating a new ideological image with the primary focuses on immigration and security. The party was able to capitalise on the socioeconomic crisis taking place in France, promoting authoritarian elements that had solidified within the party’s ideology and advancing xenophobic elements as well. The party connected immigrants with unemployment and criminality as well as politicised anti-establishment attitudes using a populist discourse in place of its previous extremist one. This new populist message included Gramscian language that was introduced by the think tank GRECE, which did not portray extremism, using concepts such as ‘identity’, ‘exclusion’ and ‘difference’ while campaigning on the security of French citizens (Mayer & Perrineau, 1989; Crépon, 2012; Stockemer, 2015). The party pushed against multiculturalism and integration using this new populist rhetoric and pushed for policies to transfer economic and social benefits from migrants to French nationals. This is seen in their 1986 manifesto that focused primarily on demographic shifts as well as moving resources from migrants to French nationals (Shields, 2011). The party saw some electoral success in the 1986 elections with their radicalised programme, receiving 9.8% of the vote, giving them 35 seats in the National Assembly (Shields, 2011).

As popularity plateaued in the late 1980s, the influential party member, Bruno Mégret, brought about a new revolution in the party’s expressions by

changing the party program to express xenophobic and exclusionary elements in a normalised manner. Mégret acted as the driving mechanism of the party, influencing Le Pen considerably, while simultaneously sowing some discontent as a result of differences in style and ideologies (Dély, 1999). This new strategy strengthened the Front National's ability to attract voters from outside its traditional core constituencies and politicise the debate about the party's ideology (Stockemer, 2015).

The party gained some legitimacy in the 1990s with centre-right politicians such as Claude Gaudin and Gérard Longuet, who called for a political alliance between the mainstream and the Front National, even though the party's ideology was even more radical throughout that decade than the last (Shields, 2011). Front National adopted popular Capitalism, where the economic policies would be based on economic nationalism, which focused on the poorer French nationals and that the economy must serve the nation, for which they campaigned for "un nouveau protectionnisme" (Mayer & Perrineau, 1996). This economic policy was anti-neoliberal while also anti-state, advocating that their position was "Ni Gauche, Ni Droite" (Neither Left nor Right). This economic policy was used to further their nationalist, anti-immigration and security-focused vision. In addition to this, the party branded elites, such as the European Union and other international political institutions as 'enemies' of France, bringing forth national-populist discourses on immigration, authoritarianism, strict law and order policies and xenophobia (Stockemer, 2015). The emphasis on security was evident, with Jean-Marie Le Pen using election campaign mottos such as "security is the first liberty" in some of the

party's regional campaigns (Farand, 2015). They altered the important issues, which changed from a Capitalist versus Communist conflict to one where nationalists protected national sovereignty against the "europeanists" and the "cosmopolitans" (Crépon, 2012). The transformation in their approach was to drastically improve their results in the elections, with the new objective being "not just electing a few ministers, but to take charge of which direction the nation and its policies" (Albertini & Doucet, 2013). The party saw good numbers during the elections from 1990 to 1995, increasing their vote share, compared to their results in the previous decade. There was a setback, however, as a result of their new manifesto which contained policies, such as quotas for immigrant children in schools, that were unconstitutional in 1996, and caused fears of similar politics as those seen under the Vichy regime (Shields, 2011). As a result, their popularity dropped and they changed their focus from immigration to unemployment. This was still linked to immigration (according to the party); however, it allowed for them to not be seen as an extreme party (Shields, 2011).

Currently the party has remained as the typical radical right wing party, having rid itself of extremist shell, rebranding itself as a populist republican party although its ideology has remained radical, falling within the 'new right' category following Cole's criteria of focusing heavily on decadence of the state, nationalism and traditionalism (Cole, 2005). This is as a result of focusing less on economic upheaval as they did during their neo-Fascist beginnings and moving towards the preservation of national French culture and traditions. The party has become a strong opposition force to the mainstream, leading campaigns against immigration,

focusing on a strong national culture and strict conceptions of citizenship and stringent rules regarding nationalisation. Economically the party has remained chauvinistically left under Marine Le Pen (Stockemer, 2015). The party's main ideological statements reflect xenophobia, anti-immigration statements, ethnocentrism, anti-elitism and anti-Europeanisation/anti-EU (Shields, 2011; Stockemer, 2015).

The Front National believes that one of the most important aspects of national deterioration is the breakdown of differences between French and foreign cultures, which is fundamental for the preservation of French culture and national order (Almeida, 2014). In addition to this, homosexuality also plays a role for the Front National in the decadence of the state and culture (Almeida, 2014). Their position on national decay has been relatively constant over time, however, their policies to combat it have evolved into what seems to be a new phase for the party under Marine Le Pen, who is a symbol of modernisation in contrast to her father, *Le Diable de la République*. This modernisation has come through the evolution in the presentation of their ideology that modernises the approach the party takes towards certain issues through the process of *dédiabolisation*. This process, however, has only cemented the party in the 'new right' category, seeing as the main ideological beliefs remain untouched if not further radicalised (Stockemer, 2015).

The Front National's abortion stance changed from outlawing abortion during the time Simone Veil was Health Minister in France to holding a referendum on "human dignity and on the sacred character of life" as of 2007 (Almeida, 2013). This push for secularism comes as a part of their push for *laïcité* in an attempt to

solidify their republican image. This has, however, been used as a front to make attacks on other groups.

A poster put up during the 2007 election campaign depicted a woman from a postcolonial ethnic minority with a quote that communicated that nationality is purged of racial premises and that the new focus was on *laïcité* (Almeida, 2013). *Laïcité*, however, means a ban on any public showing of belonging to a community other than the nation-state (Almeida, 2013). This allows for an attack on Islam, which is perceived as a threat to the nation while remaining republican in principle (Almeida, 2013; Stockemer, 2015). Le Pen's speech in 2006 noted that one does not have to be of French blood to become French, but nationality meant unmitigated adoration for all things national and total assimilation. Classifications of who could assimilate, however, were made when comparisons between southern Europeans and Poles (who can assimilate), versus North and Sub-Saharan Africans (who cannot assimilate), distinguishing the white, Christian undertones of their nationalisation positions (Almeida, 2013). The party's manifesto portrays opposition to central European treaties and that the party fundamentally rejects the EU. What is missing from its updated manifesto, however, is the mention of withdrawal from the Union (Almeida, 2013). These characteristics are typical of the radical right-wing group, where the preservation of culture and traditions are of utmost importance, whereas economic issues have been relegated to a second-class issue in comparison.

Front National, as the example of a typical radical right party, is missing a paramilitary wing that extreme right parties, such as Jobbik, in the form of the Hungarian Guard, hold as an important arm of the party. This exemplifies the Front

National's adherence to the rule of law and the national constitution, choosing to fight the 'corrupt elite' and 'lax immigration policies' through first and foremost political influence and then social influence as opposed to using force. The party's history and modernisation of its policies from those influenced by neo-Fascism to a strongly democratic (albeit populist), nationalist multiparty issue show that the Front National is the prototypical radical right party by which other parties, such as the Golden Dawn can be compared with.

The Front National has seen an increase in their vote share under Marine Le Pen, which has been attributed to some as a result of the European economic crisis, the inability of the mainstream to respond to the needs of the people efficiently and the process of *dédiabolisation*. As stated previously, the Front National started with dismal results in their elections, winning approximately 0.6% of the vote in the presidential elections of 1974. Since then they have experienced various levels of success and failures, with the latest trend being some of the greatest successes in the party's history, beside Jean-Marie Le Pen's reaching the final round in the presidential elections.

Many deemed that the drop in the Front National's popularity in 2001 would be long lasting. The 2011 cantonal elections confirmed that the drop in popularity for the Front National in 2001 was not to be long lasting, seeing as they rebounded in the 2010 regional elections and hit party record numbers in the 2011 cantonal elections (Gougou & Labouret, 2011). Since then, the party has been experiencing strong numbers at the polls and the ballot box. In the 2014 European elections, the Front National came in first with 24.86% of the total vote, besting the UMP by 4%

and the PS by 11%, granting them 24 seats in parliament, giving them the highest score ever achieved by a radical right party in a national election under the Fifth Republic (Goodliffe, 2015). Front National came first regarding votes amongst low-income voters (30%), industrial workers (43%) and service sector workers (38%), therefore capitalising on the groups hardest hit by the economic crisis (Goodliffe, 2015). In addition to this, Marine Le Pen has won votes from Catholic women, who have become more ethnocentrist over time, as well as attracting working class women (Mayer, 2013). The rise of euroscepticism translates into more votes for anti-mainstream parties, which opens up new electoral opportunities at the European and national levels (Goodliffe, 2015). As a result, Front National captured 68 percent of the eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European elections (Goodliffe, 2015).

Marine Le Pen was able to register 2.7 million more votes than her father's best result after the Sarkozy presidency in 2012, showing that the Front National was able to break the "glass ceiling" (Mondon, 2014). Le Pen has tried to do away with the idea of her party being a protest vote through the expression of the party's normalisation, stating that a vote for the Front National was "un vote réfléchi. construit, un vote d'espérance, de soutien, en somme un véritable vote d'adhésion au nouveau chemin que je propose à la France" (Mondon, 2014). Here she attempts to state that voters are consciously voting for better leadership for France. A softened tone from the FN under Marine Le Pen has also brought a new, younger generation of supporters (Williams, 2011). Support has risen from all categories of the political and social spectrum, with the BVA/Les Echos poll indicating that the FN is becoming a party similar to the mainstream in its perceived ability to be a credible

and legitimate contender (Williams, 2011).

Certain events in France and Europe have had polarising effects on French citizens, ultimately influencing political parties, such as the Front National, to campaign in order to gain these votes. An example was the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty, which were seen as unacceptable surrenders of French economic and political sovereignty by the Front National. The majority of 'non' voters were from the right, including the radical right, who were staunchly against both treaties (Goodliffe, 2015). The economic and social crises in France have been in part, a reason for the rise of Euroscepticism. The rise of unemployment rates and the need for social assistance correlated with this rise, and thus greater support for the Front National from voters across the political spectrum (Goodliffe, 2015). Front National voters cited immigration, unemployment, the cost of living and security as their main issues they supported the party for, which they connected to European policies (Goodliffe, 2015).

The Members

The demographics of the Front National's membership have evolved together with the party, seen in the historical overlay above. More recently, the party has been attracting a large (and broader) membership base, expanding from their original base of neo-Nazis and pro-Vichyist supporters (Stockemer, 2015).

Membership in the 1970s was a mix of supporters of the battle for French Algeria, the traditional extreme right and the poujadistes. The 1980s saw some new wings of classical right members and at the end of the 1980s and onwards a larger amount of

younger members, (who now make up the majority of new recruits) (Lafont, 2001).

Membership to the party is very open, with members being able to join at local officers or online, while providing a relatively quick method for advancement for those who are hard-working (Stockemer, 2014). Membership within the party, however, is not for those without thick skin, seeing as commitment to the Front National comes with some high costs, such as stigmatisation, rejection and thus disintegration from society.

According to Stockemer (Stockemer, 2014), who used Art's (Art, 2011) terminology of extremist, moderate and opportunist members and activists, members of the FN fall mostly within the categorization of 'moderates'. This is because there are few opportunistic tendencies, due to the low prospects of the FN ever gaining enough national representation to gain power, which eliminates the opportunistic option from the list of classifications. With the exception of the most extreme neo-Nazi members, the vast majority of FN members are not extremists either, seeing as they do not use revisionist or neo-Nazi discourse, instead opting for a peaceful transformation of French society and politics through (mostly) legitimate democratic routes. Generally, members of the Front National adhere to ethnocentrism: glorifying France, which they view as being historically formed by a set of beliefs, customs and values, whilst blaming the corrupt 'established elite' for its decay. Additionally, acceptance of the laws and ideals of the Fifth Republic are also respected by most members, although there are some divergences through their espousal of some level of authoritarianisation of government (Stockemer, 2014).

Members of the Front National find themselves developing around the party, further cementing themselves into the radical right family. The party creates a counter-culture to members and is able to retain members for extended periods of time. This could be in part because once one critiques the modern society from a radical right perspective, one cannot take it back and re-join it (Lafont, 2001). As part of this Front National family and their self-categorisation as 'des révoltés', an 'us' versus 'them' attitude is taken by members to non-Front National supporters, with some referring to them as "l'ennemi" (Lafont, 2001). This marginalisation also brings cohesion amongst party members, who find themselves to be ideologically similar enough, transforming into a unit that is seen as easy to integrate into.

When it comes to numbers of members, the current Front National is in no way suffering from a shortage. As of November 29th 2015, the FN under Marine le Pen boasts an army of 83,000 full members (party dues paid and all) (Huffington Post, 2016). This number is the highest in the party's history, with their numbers growing by over 100% since 2012. This allows them to establish a strong local presence, permitting the party to garner good results in both municipal and European elections.

Research shows that in addition to the traditional ethnocentric personas of the members of the Front National, two other general traits are visible: (i) authoritarian personalities, as well as (ii) the glorification of France's past (Stockemer, 2014). Not all members start off as staunch nationalists, however. Some members become more right wing over time, whereas others become disgruntled with the UMP and the PS, therefore choosing to join the FN in hopes that Le Pen would bring about

change that would eliminate clientelism, corruption and political apathy (Stockemer, 2014).

Not an Atypical Radical Right Party

The information provided regarding the party's beginnings and the evolution of their discourse over time is not atypical for a radical right party. The party has shown that over time, they have de-radicalised their ideologies from proto neo-Nazism, to Poujadisme to their current discourse, which will be discussed shortly. Party membership has evolved in tangent with their discourse, with both a change in discourse enticing new groups of members to join the party, as well as new waves of groups and members joining the party affecting their discourse, as mentioned previously throughout their history of party mergers. Voters for the Front National have also followed a general trend, also discussed previously, where their voter base consists of blue-collar workers with minimal education, although recently a larger group of younger voters has bolstered the FN's results in the polls. Current trends in the polls and membership, however, need credit from the party's ideological discourse, which has further evolved under the leadership of Marine Le Pen.

Chapter 5: Front National – Discourse Dédiabolisé under Marine Le Pen

Front National's ideology and discourse have seen many stages of evolution since its creation, having left behind its slogans from the French Fascists of the 1930's, the Poujadiste ideologies and the hard line (and often crude) position of Jean-Marie Le Pen (Stockemer, 2015). Instead, under the leadership of Marine Le

Pen, the party has undergone a process of *dédiabolisation*, moving away from the legacy of *Le Diable de la République* to a more modern and softened Front National. Front National's current discourse is in essence, a continuation of the old themes the party held pre-Marine, such as immigration, anti-Islamification, anti-Brussels and anti-Euro-globalisation. The key difference is the de-radicalised party outlook, stepping away from terms such as "radical" and "extreme" that Jean-Marie did not shy away from, and promoting the party as a republican party (Stockemer, 2015). The party's move to branding themselves as a patriotic republican party, that is "ni gauche, ni droite" brings a new age for the Front National, opening potential new doors to electoral opportunities in the future.

Euroscepticism and Democracy

Euroscepticism is a topic that many radical right parties in Europe hold dear, blaming the European Union for domestic issues as well as mainstream politicians for ceding sovereignty to Brussels. Front National has traditionally been against the deepening of the EU, with anti-EU discourse being prominent and continuous under Marine Le Pen. Euroscepticism ties in with other important ideological positions and discourse, such as economics, politics, immigration and culture. Although mainstream parties had some issues with EU treaties and legislation, Front National has been able to claim ownership over the Euroscepticism issue, being the only party that is unconditionally opposed to the European project (Goodliffe, 2015).

Various issues revolving around membership to the European Union are evident in their discourse. The Front National was in favour of European integration

pre-1989, seeing it as a tool to fight against Communism, however after the collapse of the Soviet Union, their position changed to unrepentant anti-Europeanism (Goodliffe, 2015). Front National's Euromanifestos have steadily increased their focus on European issues since 1989. With the economic crisis hitting Europe full force in 2010, the party has taken this discourse further, promoting an exit from the Euro, according to their manifesto, in order to recover their monetary sovereignty. This was escalated in 2013 and onwards by calls for a referendum by Marine Le Pen and prominent leaders of the party (Reungoat, 2015). The nationalist issue of ceding the printing press to the European Union, and, therefore, full economic sovereignty is therefore linked to their anti-European stance, which is typical of radical right discourse.

The party programme labels the European Union as “L’Europe contre les peuples”, and discusses issues regarding the EU under their foreign policy section. The label indicates their disdain for Union, along with their categorisation of the EU as ‘external’, as symbolization that France should be outside of the elitist, liberal organisation (Front National, 2015). The party charges French membership into the EU with exacerbating and causing: the opening of borders causing delocalisation, unemployment, the dictatorship of the free market, destruction of public services, lack of job security, poverty and mass immigration. Although not a symbol of the radical right, the party also takes a stance against Turkish entry to the EU, stating that the EU’s view of Turkey being a European country is wrong (Front National, 2015).

A lack of democracy is yet another critique of the EU, viewing European

elections as weak, and not an answer to the ‘problem’. The reason for this lack of efficacy is that the European Commission (EC) is too powerful next to the European Parliament (EP). The result of this is the overwhelming power of the supranational organisation in their view, beginning with policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and more, which marginalises European agriculture and other industries. They view this as destroying jobs, especially those in France (Front National, 2015). Their manifesto compares the states of the EU as victims of the Minotaur, and thus the EU elites as King Minos, feeding national industries and member states to the Minotaur. They use the example of the Greek economic crisis for the lack of democracy as well as a lack of sound economic policy, arguing that millions of other Europeans are suffering to help extinguish the flames of the Greek crisis in the name of the EU. The evidence of the displeasure from the French people regarding this is the 55% of French voters who voted against the European Constitution (Front National, 2015). Le Pen continues the rhetoric in an interview, blaming the EU for the “disparition de la France...et effacement économique” which she cannot see as a surprise with elites who are two faced, and view the people of France as “vulgaire”, a “syndrome” she claims is common of the French political elite (RFI, 2012).

What is missing from this new programme, however, is a clear note to exit the EU completely, although they do note that if elected, they would remove all EU flags from public buildings. Instead, what is seen is the promotion of a new EU, one where France would control its borders once again, preferring an “association of free European states” who hold similar visions and interests on topics such as

immigration and promoting trade with each other. The stance on Schengen was emphasised by Le Pen in the European Parliament following criticisms of European border polices saying that “It is absolutely vital to bring an end to the Schengen system to allow each country to control their borders.” followed by blaming Europe for the inter-state conflict on the continent (Le Pen, 2015). In addition to border controls, FN would also promote national laws over European ones, as well as returning the national printing press, thus leaving the Euro currency (Front National, 2015).

The Front National has been able to use the EP as a tool to further their normalised image. The alliances forged in European Parliament allow for a domestic de-demonisation strategy, by choosing alliance members that would boost credibility (Reungoat, 2015). Golden Dawn was excluded from this most recent alliance for being considered too radical, painting an image of a non-radical Front National for home-supporters. Being elected into European Parliament also benefits Front National by providing them with financial resources, allowing them to invest in domestic political activity. This can be in cash flow and in the ability to employ staff to devote themselves to the party's cause at the national and European levels (Reungoat, 2015).

The anti-EU discourse is aimed primarily at the economic failures of the EU, along with the lack of national immigration policy. Seeing as the party is firmly against immigration, both the EU and immigration are attributed to the high unemployment and economic crisis. A call for revolution by Le Pen was her attempt to persuade the French people to vote for what she sees as positive change against

the failures of the EU and the current French regime, stating:

“I think the desire for a revolution like those on the other side of the Mediterranean exists here. Of course, I’m appealing for a democratic revolution – and that’s also perhaps the role of the Front National – for a peaceful revolution by the ballot box, a patriotic revolution.” (Chrisafis, 2011).

A return to a ‘sovereign France’ by the FN would thus lead to the reestablishment of a stronger France, and thus the palingenesis of the nation.

Immigration and Economic Policies

Economics and immigration are linked subjects to the FN, similarly to economics and membership to the EU. The dissolution of national borders within the EU, especially in the Schengen area, prevents national governments to implement their own migration policies. The result has been very strong national debates regarding the policy, with radical right parties such as Front National opting to return to national borders. The link between immigration and economics is due to the mass influx of immigrants into France, with the recent economic crisis along with the refugee crisis heating the topic of immigration, liberalism and employment.

The party's discourse presents its opposition to Third World immigration due to economic, cultural and republican protectionism, critiquing neoliberal globalisation, which allows for the party to avoid their discourse being seen as racist (Goodliffe, 2015). Front National is in favour of running the economy by the principles of *Étatisme* (Statism), where the state plays a strategic role in the country's economic development, social stability and social and economic protectionism, where French companies would be supported against multinational firms. This protectionism also encompasses national preference, where French

workers are preferred for employment, benefits and housing over foreign nationals (Goodliffe, 2015).

The party has furthered their anti-EU discourse by amending their economic policies from a predominantly free market position to a more leftist, egalitarian and nationalist economic position. The financial crisis fuelled their ability to blame the EU for much of France's economic problems, such as the outsourcing of manual labour jobs, deindustrialisation, deprivation of national sovereignty and a lack of a regulated system to block immigration from non-EU countries. This discourse goes on to bash neoliberal policies that enshrine the EU and see it as one of the causes of France's decay (Stockemer, 2015). This is seen especially in their distaste for austerity economics, which has been rampant in Europe in recent years. Le Pen in her "Jeanne d'Arc Speech" stated the need to do away with this economic plan to a roaring crowd stating:

"...Brussels asks for new cuts to the budget, and the government obliges. This routine restarts every year. And every year, the taxes, in the private sector just as the public sector, just as they do for our retired, continue to rise, small business continues to go bankrupted. The heritage of the state, generations upon generations of French, continues to be dilapidated. And every year, the objective of austerity policies is never met: every year, the debt increases more. Austerity is not only inefficient, but dangerous." (Le Pen, 2015).

The nationalisation of economic policy comes hand in hand with the increase in immigration as a result of free market policies. The party believes that if they are able to control the economy, they should also control immigration to be able to properly guide the economy in the direction they desire, which would benefit French nationals and select immigrants who are able to properly assimilate.

The internationalization of the economy through free trade and liberal economics is seen as a threat to the French economy. As a result, the party pushes for a greater nationalist economic outlook, shifting their economic positions to the left from their traditional neo-liberal outlooks. In their programme, they support “buying French”, the reindustrialization of France and heavy protectionism to support French companies from foreign competitors. Industries that are considered vital to the French economy that would enjoy extra protection would be their industrial sector (such as the automobile industry) as well as their agricultural sector (Front National, 2015). To support French reindustrialisation, the party proposes to invest in research and development and other French industries, which the mainstream has supposedly left aside in favour of personal gains. Other elements in their programme point at clientelism and the lack of accountability from the ruling elite as to blame for the economic situation of France, in which the party claims they would take a stance on ending clientelism and thus resolving one of the issues that plague the French economy.

Xenophobic policies such as “ultra-selective” immigration policies are linked to race along with economic capabilities. The party claims that the majority of immigrants coming to France are not economically beneficial to the country, and thus are more of a burden than a gain. They propose decreasing the level of immigration from 200,000 immigrants allowed to enter per year to 10,000, based on strict guidelines that will give preference to educated individuals who can be economic assets, as well as individuals from European countries (Almeida, 2013; Front National, 2015). The ability to assimilate to the culture is equally important as

the ability to add to the French economy, using economics as a tool to legitimise xenophobic policies while maintaining a republican, mainstreamed vocabulary and approach to doing so.

Immigration that is deemed as uncontrolled by the FN is blamed for the hard-pressed social welfare system in France (Front National, 2015). The idea of immigration being the cause of the failure of social welfare programs is reminiscent of Jean-Marie Le Pen's support for the social programmes to be available only to French nationals, although Marine Le Pen does not go as far as to say that. Instead the promotion of a more restrictive immigration and nationalisation policy is preferred to curb social spending.

Security

Like most radical right parties, the Front National places strong emphasis on law and order policies and national security. Issues of securitisation are also linked to other aspects of their discourse, such as immigration and religion. The Front National's discourse is pro-securitisation, anti-Islamisation and in favour of increased funding for governmental, legislative and military sectors that would strengthen national security (Almeida, 2013; Front National, 2015; Mondon, 2015; Stockemer, 2015). Protection of the French state ranges from protection at a national level, involving changes to military spending and structures down to making changes to the judiciary and prison terms. Front National therefore, believes that it is the defender of France and its citizens, by being the only party willing to

protect its national sovereignty, its streets and French culture.

The 'new' FN under Marine Le Pen sought ideas from the think tank Idées Nation, advising insecurity concerns (security and economic) be a top issue for the party, and to turn away from identity issues. This is supported by the promotion of harsh penalties, immediate reaction and sanctions for delinquency, along with the promise of ridding neighbourhoods of "thugs who terrorise". This is paired with the position that the judiciary should be funded by another 25 percent to properly deal with the increase in the policy-emphasis of insecurity, and swiftly prosecute offenders (Williams, 2011). Ultimately, these changes would strive to end the ghettoisation of French cities according to the party.

The lack of funding to the Department of Justice (which is in a "lamentable" state) is a grave issue to the party, who claims that 40,000 more jail spots need to be made available, with more investments being made to the police force as well (Front National, 2015). Increasing the number of police officers, in concert with increasing jail sizes allows the party to paint an image of a more secure France, although there is no mention of why more prison spots are needed, nor why there is a need for more police officers. In terms of the military, the party is also in favour of increasing investment to the armed forces, and increasing the head count of service members seeing as "you cannot have a grand nation without a grand army" (Front National, 2015). Le Pen argues in favour of re-arming and increasing these numbers in European Parliament, stating that the European plan to lesser numbers of service men and women in the names of austerity must stop, and thus requires more investment (Le Pen, 2015). The increased investment to the military is meant to

ensure France is protected, as well as being able to play a larger role internationally to ensure the protection of the French state.

Aside from criminals and supposed 'international threats' to French sovereignty, a more salient security issue to the FN is the issue of Islamisation, and radical Islamists. The party has stepped away from traditional radical right positions condemning Jews and taking anti-Semitic positions, (as Jean-Marie was known to take), to focusing on anti-Islamisation as a security issue in light of France's recent terrorist attacks and the rising number of Muslim residents. Marine Le Pen condemns anti-Semitism and presents herself as the 'defender of French secular republicanism', which is considered to be under threat by Muslims (Mayer, 2013). Marine's push against Islam, calling for the end to street prayers and the government's assistance in building mosques, brought a polemic issue to the forefront of French society, declaring war against the integrists. Here she proclaims that there will finally be change (Mondon, 2014). In an attempt to stigmatise the Muslim population, Le Pen has proposed constant surveillance in mosques and to ban the wearing of religious symbols on public transport (Mondon, 2014). She also, after the Paris bombings in November, called for the closing of all mosques that were found to spread radical Islam (Le Pen, 2015). The party's ideology, however, has not truly been deradicalised. Although the image of the party through the process of dédiabolisation has allowed for a deradicalised image. This is seen with the continuation of some of the older themes, such as continuing the ultra-Catholic tradition, and defending France against the "other", specifically the Muslim population (Mondon, 2014).

Front National championed the anti-system position, with Le Pen at its head fighting the “corrupt politicians” and the “biased media” (Mondon, 2015). This fight is one that the other radical right parties engage in, seeing themselves as the only viable option from all the other “corrupt parties” that have been in power. This allowed the FN to be the defender of *one people*, therefore the defender of France itself and portray itself as *neither left nor right*, which is similar to past Fascist movements. (Mondon, 2015). This aim of to portray themselves as the defender of the *one people* creates the *us* in a fight against the *other*, which are typically immigrants and the media. Marine Le Pen also takes a strong stance on Islam by using attacks by Islamists as her basis for her “war on politico-religious fundamentalists who kill our Christian men, our young Muslim men and Jewish children” (Mondon, 2015). In a speech to the European parliament states the security issue she deems as the root cause of Islamist terrorism: “Mass immigration breeds terrorism, because it brings communitarianism, which is the terrain on which Islamist fundamentalism recruits.” (Le Pen, 2015). This is paired with the need for the reintroduction of the death penalty (Mondon, 2015). The party’s discourse makes no mention of the use of force and extreme methods to ensure any form of “security”, choosing instead to follow the rule of law and achieve their goals through the democratic process.

Homosexuality

In light of the law allowing *la mariage pour tous* in France, Front National has shifted their anti-homosexuality discourse to the left, taking a step back from their

historically staunch anti-homosexual positions. Although their party manifesto states that the party supports a traditional family structure, and that are not in favour of same-sex marriage or same-sex adoption (Front National, 2015). The true importance of the topic however is minimal, with the topic only taking up a couple lines in their 106-page programme. In addition to this, Marine Le Pen has personally expressed more homosexual-friendly positions (Mayer, 2013). Other members of the party have voiced similar positions, with a candidate expressing his “indignation” over the homophobic comments of a UMP deputy, Christian Vanneste. This was coupled with Marine’s campaign director, Louis Aliot, stating that Vanneste has to “reread his history books”, reversing the traditional criticism from the mainstream to the Front National (Mondon, 2014).

A Normalisation of Radical Right Discourse

When looking back to past ideological discourses of the FN, there has been a successful deradicalisation of the party’s portrayal of their ideology today in comparison to their past ideological statements. Although this accompanies a true “dummying down” of some of their radical positions, their discourse has for the most part only been rebranded. As the party evolved, it adopted the Gramscian concept of hegemony from the left, seeing the success the left had commanding it. The racist vocabulary of the party soon after, transformed into the vocabulary of difference, culture and people, thus ‘cultural differentialism’ as it was called by Pierre-Andre Taguieff (Mondon, 2015). This change in vocabulary allowed the FN to portray itself as the true tolerant party that would fight against the intolerant

internationalists (Mondon, 2015). As the party uses this change in vocabulary and continues to emphasise its *dédiabolisation*, the recurring themes of the corrupt elite, euroscepticism, decadence and palingenesis continue to dominate their discourse. This process has been highly controversial seeing as their overall programme's message is a continuation of their traditional themes (Stockemer, 2015). As a result, the party is still the prototypical radical right wing party.

Chapter 6: Golden Dawn – The Dawn of Greek neo-Nazism

The Greek neo-Nazi, far right political party, Golden Dawn, has taken Greek politics by storm, surprising the established political parties by establishing themselves as the third largest political party in the past couple of elections. Golden Dawn does not fit well within the “typical” definition of a radical right wing party. Although the base components of their ideology seem quite similar with other parties, such as their fight against the corrupt elite, national decadence and the promotion of strict immigration policies, their proposed methods to deal with these issues differ with other radical right parties. The party they are today stems from a series of reforms to their brand and significant changes in ideology over the years (Ellinas, 2013). Although there is information available on the party, some of their internal dynamics are quite mysterious, as are their members, with very little information leaking from their tight fisted organisation.

Nikos Michaloliakos, the current leader of the party, drew up the foundation for the party together with the imprisoned Greek junta colonels in the 1970s, to whom he was the leader of the youth wing. The organisation started as a small,

unrecognised party with a newspaper under the name “Golden Dawn”, which was strongly national-socialist and neo-Nazi. Michaloliakos was the publisher-editor himself and titled articles, which had obvious neo-Nazi slogans, such as one titled “Hitler for 1,000 Years” (Bistis, 2013). The first congress of Golden Dawn in February 1990 was decorated with swastika flags, with photo evidence, highlighting the adherence to Nazism in the early years of the party. Michaloliakos had embraced far right ideological positions at a young age when he joined the 4th of August Party at sixteen years old. This party was a movement that sought to create the “Third Hellenic Civilisation” based on the government style of ex-dictator, Ioannis Metaxas, who favoured authoritarianism and nationalism. Following his membership with the 4th of August Party, he joined the group which was in favour of uniting Cyprus with Greece, called Epitropi Syntonismou Enotikou Agona (ESEA), which kept close ties with Greek-Cypriot paramilitary forces and their affiliated organisation EOKA B. The party leader also served time in prison for offenses relating to his far-right activism, which included charges for illegal possession of explosives (Bitsis, 2013).

In 1993, the party became officialised under the name “The Popular National Movement – Golden Dawn”, winning only 0.01% of the vote in its first European election (Nedos, 2005). In the 1980s the organisation embraced Olympianism (Greek-paganism), where the worshipping of the twelve Olympian gods was promoted however, Greek Orthodoxy replaced the ancient gods soon afterwards (Golden Dawn, 1990). The organisation during this time was involved in the Yugoslav Civil War, sending volunteers under the name of the Greek Volunteer Guard to fight with the Serbs, where they fought and were present in Srebrenica,

raising a Greek flag over a church after the town's submission (Michas, 2002). The reason for siding with the Serbs goes back to Greek history and culture, where Serbs have been considered close military allies in the Balkan wars, as well as considered "brothers" by many, due to the link of the Orthodox faith. Throughout the period of the 90s, the party was fiercely anti-immigrant, with the leader of their paramilitary wing openly calling for the use of force to "rid Greece of the infestation of immigrants", which was at that time much lower than it is now. Michaloliakos and his party went and ceased activity for a short time in the 2000s until Michaloliakos' announcement of full resumption of ideological and political activism in 2007. Far-right groups were afraid of coming out of the shadows for the first thirty years after the fall of the Greek Junta due to Greek society's largely anti-dictatorship sentiments, however LAOS' entry into Greek Parliament in 2007 was seen by some as the opportunity for a radical right comeback (Bistis, 2013). It is no wonder why Golden Dawn reappeared from the darkness of underground operations at that time.

Currently the party holds similar ties with Greek-Cypriots as ESEA with EOKA. The National Popular Front (ELAM), a nationalist Greek-Cypriot party that is reminiscent of the old EOKA paramilitary Group, is the sister party of Golden Dawn. The party first started as the "Golden Dawn Cyprus Branch" before becoming ELAM (Katsourides, 2013). Along with ties to other Greek people, such as the Greek-Cypriots, Golden Dawn along with their sister party in Cyprus have the Greek Orthodox Church as a significant ally, considering both Greece and Cyprus are some of the most theocratic democracies in Europe (Katsourides, 2013).

Golden Dawn's party structure is unique in terms of its structure in the European context. The party structure is heavily centred on the individual with the most authority, which is the party leader. There is a party congress, which consists of 300 party members recruited from local cells who meet once every three years to set the general ideological and political principles of the party. The general secretary also has enormous power seeing as all decisions made by him/her are binding. The position is automatically renewed every three years unless an absolute majority of the council votes for elections, which shows that the organization of the party is not even democratic. Michaloliakos as the leader of the party must also be called "chief" (αρχηγός), which includes his wife, so as to emphasize his power as leader (Ellinas, 2013). The party adheres to *Führerprinzip* (the leadership concept), which was the fundamental basis of political authority in the structure of the Third Reich government (Ellinas, 2014). This concept helps describe the authoritarian internal structure of the party.

Political and ethnic based violence has brought the party and some of its members in opposition with the law, which includes some of the upper echelons of the organisation. In the 1990s some of the party's members were accused of "hate crimes against political opponents and ethnic minorities", these hate crimes including vandalism of Jewish cemeteries in Greece's two largest cities: Athens and Thessaloniki. Of the members, one was proven guilty while the party denied that it or its members were involved with the vandalism. The second in-command and a prominent member of the party at the time, Antonis Androutsopoulos, was also on the run for seven years, living in hiding in Venezuela for some time after attempting

to murder three leftist students, one who was critically injured. He was eventually arrested in 1997 and found guilty and serving a reduced sentence of twelve years, as opposed to twenty-one (Bistis, 2014). Another prominent member of the party, Pantelis Kazakos, confessed to murder after going on a shooting spree in October 1999 in a district of Athens that held a sizeable immigrant population, killing two men and injuring several others. All the victims were not of Greek origin, targeting immigrants in his racially motivated attack. More recently in 2012, GD MP and spokesperson, Ilias Kasidiaris, slapped the Communist (KKE) MP Liana Kanelli (on air) three times in the face. Kasidiaris was not charged due to the immunity Greek law gives to MPs. In 2013, the most prominent case, being the murder of left-wing rapper Pavlos Fyssas, brought light on the Golden Dawn's dealings, which subsequently involved Greek anti-terrorist forces investigating and arresting a dozen senior party members, including Ilias Kasidiaris, three other lawmakers and Michaloliakos himself, who currently awaits trial at Greece's Korydallos maximum security prison. Kasidiaris has been freed along with some other party members, although Michaloliakos remains in prison as trials continue. They are being tried for operating a terrorist organisation as a political party, the murder of Pavlos Fyssas and an immigrant murdered earlier that year (Maltezou & Georgiopoulos, 2013). Ironically, Michaloliakos is now held at the same prison he would meet former Junta members, such as Georgios Papadopoulos.

The current Golden Dawn party has remained unique in terms of its party hierarchy, ideology, activism and paramilitarism. Although no longer openly neo-Nazi (meaning they no longer drape their meetings with Nazi party flags) and

adopted Christianity as their party religion, like most other radical right parties in Europe, the ideological positions of the party are atypical as are their vast array of public services for radical supporters. Using Cole's party classification, the Golden Dawn would fall between the "old" and the "new" right (Cole, 2005). Scholars label the Golden Dawn as neo-Nazi and as Fascist in its ideology, hierarchy and actions (Dalakoglou, 2013; Ellinas, 2013; Ellinas, 2014; Koronaiou et al., 2015; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015). Party principles such as statism, paramilitarism, transcendence and cleansing allow for such categorisation, with those principles either more extreme or absent in other radical party ideologies.

Members

Although there is a great deal of mystery regarding membership to the Golden Dawn, member socialisation and the process to join and progress within the party, there is still some very basic information available to us that is either through their website or that has been leaked. In addition to this basic information regarding members, there is some information specifically pertaining to youth membership and support, extracurricular groups and organisations created by party members and the militarisation of these members. These members differ greatly from typical radical right activists, falling more along the lines of extreme right actors, which falls in line with Caiani and Borri's (Caiani & Borri, 2013) that members of parties with less openness (closed groups) are usually more violent due to the selection of more radical members in groups that are selective, such as Golden Dawn.

From what we know regarding membership to the Golden Dawn, it is very selective and not advertised on their website, with the exception of heavy advertisement for new members to their Youth Wing and nationalist school. It is easier to become a supporter, however, with donations open to all Greeks in Greece and abroad, accepting donations at their chapters in New York, Montreal and elsewhere, as well as online. There are some prerequisites to becoming a member of the Golden Dawn though. A Greek citizen, or individual of Greek blood may join the party if he is recommended by two existing members, followed by being approved by a party committee. The new members must be active for a full year before being allowed to vote or be elected in intraparty elections (Ellinas, 2013).

After the election of Golden Dawn to parliament, the party was quick to expand its activity, which included the expansion of local cells and the establishment of local networks. The party was then able to amass new members in a variety of different regions (Ellinas, 2014). The members of the party are quite diverse, ranging from young members who have been brought in from their Youth Wing to senior citizens who were either involved with previous radical right wing cells or are disenfranchised with the current socioeconomic crisis in Greece. The party has been successful in recruiting many young members, funnelling many of their newer recruits into their paramilitary wing or running their online operations (Ellinas, 2014; Koronaiou et al., 2015). These expansions of the local cells allowed for the party to make strong connections with some of the other citizen groups involved in vigilante activities against non-Greeks (Ellinas, 2014). The connections made with these groups were also ways to increase membership of individuals that had similar

ideologies to the party.

Golden Dawn has been successful in reaching out to the youth and the working class for membership, following the traditional Fascist tradition. The main bulk of its members are young people, scholars, students, artists, farmers, employed and unemployed individuals. These young members are often recruited at youth festivals organised by the party in autumn, accompanied by White Power music (Sakellariou, 2015). Secondary school children have been becoming members of their Youth Front at an especially rapid pace, as Golden Dawn continues to influence the education system. These students openly express their support for GD, attack non-Greek students and teachers as well as recruit other classmates to the cause. Further evidence of the influences of Golden Dawn on the education system is the formation of the Anti-Fascist Education Front, as well as the Nationalist Front of School Teachers. The latter group is composed of teachers that are members of GD (Sakellariou, 2015).

It is no secret that the Golden Dawn has strong ties with the military and the police in Greece. The establishment of relationships with both the police and the military has allowed for the Golden Dawn to utilise both of the organisations to train its members into what they call “political soldiers” under the command of Michaloliakos, in the paramilitary wing of the party (Ellinas, 2014; Halikiopoulou, Vasilopoulou, 2012). In addition, all members of the Golden Dawn undergo military training to go with the military structure of the party (Ellinas, 2014). Photo and video evidence numbered in the thousands that were seized by the police during the undergoing investigation of the party depicts Golden Dawn members during

military and execution exercises. Many of the photos show members using military assault rifles, practicing executions in their training camps (Smith, 2014). The military training provided to the members of the party has been instructed by senior police officers, leaders of the Greek Special Forces, firearms and explosives divisions, rapid response motorcycle divisions and other military officers including the reservist officers. Party members boast of their army of at least 3,000 military trained individuals “ready for anything” (Smith, 2013). Prosecutors in the trial against the Golden Dawn claim that members slaughtered sheep to practice knife techniques, carried around bazookas and were training to “break into parliament with tanks”, which would have been supplied by the Hellenic Military (Baboulias, 2014). The fears that the military would stage a coup also brought Papandreou to reshuffle the top army brass, showing that the fear of military intervening either as a lone actor or through the Golden Dawn is evident.

Although it is not confirmed if members of the Greek ultranationalist punk band “Pogrom” are also members of the Golden Dawn, their presence at party rallies is of importance to understanding members and the party. Pogrom would play songs such as “Rock for the Fatherland”, “Auschwitz”, “Mila Ellinika I Psosa” (Speak Greek or Die) and more at rallies as members gave a hero’s welcome to their leader. Not all individuals that attended these rallies, however, were the typical extremist neo-Nazis, but many at these rallies were mainstream Greeks, who were part of the group that were once supporters of the mainstream parties that have gone from middle-class comfort to poverty during the crisis (Bistis, 2014).

There have and continue to be many anti-Fascist and anti-Golden Dawn

protests that have some thinking twice about becoming a member for fear of ostracism and their safety. There are gaps in the information available, such as member socialization and the overall number of members within the party, however member militancy and activism, as seen above, is quite high. The diverse membership of the Golden Dawn is also imitated in the polls, where many who have not joined for various reasons are able to show their support for the party discreetly.

Voters and Supporters

Golden Dawn's sharp rise in popularity from 0.01% of the vote to approximately 7% over a short period of time during the crisis means that there has been a substantial shift from who their original core supporters were in their beginnings to Golden Dawn now. Moving away from solely Greek neo-Nazis and ultranationalists, Golden Dawn has a much more diversified voter and supporter base, thanks to the collapse of the mainstream pre-crisis PASOK and Nea Demokratia two-party system. The revitalised Golden Dawn during the crisis has been effective in increasing and maintaining their vote share at 7%, with the current migrant crisis and anti-memorandum strikes only increasing their popularity.

Voters for the Golden Dawn come from different age, economic and political backgrounds. Their voter demographics, however, are fairly unique in comparison to some other European radical right parties. The party voters are mostly younger to middle aged individuals (ages 18-44). Contrary to popular belief that less educated individuals would join radical parties, the majority of voters have middle

to high education levels (Ellinas, 2013). As shocking as it might be that the classical “older, working class, unemployed” individual is not the staple voter for the Golden Dawn, support for the radical right by youth has been proven in previous elections, such as those in 2002 where a significant portion of younger voters supported LAOS. The difference with Golden Dawn, however, is that the youth vote for them is extremely high and towers over the LAOS’ results in the past (Sakellariou, 2015). Golden Dawn in their latest slew of elections attracted the second highest number of young voters of all the parties. This has been attributed not only to the crisis, but to their use of the internet to reach the youth while simultaneously discouraging these voters from watching the “corrupt” television channels. These young voters also do not regard their vote as a reactionary protest vote, but that they made conscious and rational decisions when dropping their vote into the ballot box (Koronaïou et al., 2015). During the double elections of 2012, Golden Dawn won 10-14 percent of the vote from young people between the ages of 18-14 and 13-16 percent for those in the age group of 25-34. (Sakellariou, 2015).

Following the accusations against members of Golden Dawn, support for the party from youth remained very high, with the party receiving 9.4 percent of the votes in 2014, winning two seats in European Parliament. This increase in their popularity is seen to be in part because of an increase in youth support for the party after they became accused of being a ‘terrorist organisation’, capturing 21.2 percent of the youth vote (ages 18-24) (Sakellariou, 2015). Possible explanations for the positive effect from prosecutions could be to do the high levels of public distrust, dissatisfaction and alienation of the Greek political institutions (Ellinas, 2014).

Overall, the party has been able to capture more of the youth vote from those aged 18-34 than their national percentages. The party only falls to SYRIZA in terms of youth support. Sakellariou (Sakellariou, 2015) attributes ideological closeness with the party and high unemployment (above 60%) for youth support. His work shines light on what youth believe is needed to be Greek, showing that 78.9 percent of youth believe that having at least one Greek parent is important and 84.2 percent that speaking Greek is important. In addition, the youth show high levels of intolerance to minorities such as Albanians, Gypsy populations, Muslims and Jews due to their unwillingness to be fully incorporated into Greek society. Lastly, he finds that 22.6 percent of youth justify violence to support the Greek race and 48 percent believe migrants should not have equal welfare rights as Greeks. These nationalist sentiments shared by youth groups are significant factors for why voters for the GD are predominantly young.

Youth voters are not the only ones who show their support to GD at the ballot box. Electoral studies have data showing that in many regions, more than half of police officers vote for the party. It was found that in Athenian sectors with high immigrant populations there were higher levels of police support for GD (Lambropoulos, 2012). Aside from the overrepresentation of younger voters, there is also a general overrepresentation of male voters. Females, perhaps due to the extremist, militant style of the party, are underrepresented, similarly to older voters, although they have been steadily increasing their popularity amongst older voters as well. GD is also overrepresented amongst voters who hold lower education up to the secondary level. There is also a strong show of voters who are

unemployed, susceptible to market pressures, such as the self-employed and employers (Ellinas, 2014). Their party has been struggling to gain the housewife vote as well as the pensioner vote, however there are possibilities for the GD to seize the pensioner vote amongst the slew of pension reforms, which saw thousands of pensioners protesting in 2015, whom Golden Dawn showed strong support for. The same applies to voters who see large influxes of illegal migrants, such as the residents of Kos who elected a Golden Dawn member in the 2015 elections and who have Golden Dawn members supporting their protest against a migration holding camp on the island. The party is not necessarily dependant lower income voters and youth however, with 14.8 individuals considering themselves to be part of the upper or urban class voted for Golden Dawn. This is coupled with 10.7 percent of the middle class and only 9.2 percent of the lower-middle class voters, as well as 9.9 percent of lower income voters (Ellinas, 2014). It is a possibility that those who are suffering in the higher social classes feel a disproportionate decrease in quality of life seeing as the tax burden of the memorandums are taking aim at those with wealth.

The party has made inroads in municipalities in the northern border regions of Greece, such as: Pella Kilkis and Kastoria, along with municipalities in central Macedonia such as: Pieria and Imathia. Golden Dawn also did especially well in the traditionally conservative Peloponnese, more specifically in Laconia. In large cities such as Athens, Pireaus and Thessaloniki, the party outperformed, especially in former LAOS constituencies. More rural and non-urban areas in Attica in which LAOS did not perform well, Golden Dawn saw increased vote shares (Ellinas, 2014).

Ellinas (Ellinas, 2014) notes that Golden Dawn has now established a loyal voter base, with three quarters of the voters who voted for them in the European elections reporting that they voted for them in the 2012 elections as well.

With political and economic instability ruling in Greece throughout this crisis, political violence has skyrocketed in forms of hooliganism, violent protests, riots and targeted attacks. The violence in cities such as Athens, Thessaloniki and Corinth have included uncontrolled and unpunished looting of property, both public and private, which has arguably given precedence for a normalisation of violence in public protest. Violence against parliamentarians has also drastically increased, with alarming approval rates of 49.6 percent amongst those asked in a survey (Ellinas, 2014). Factors such as these could explain an increase of support for Golden Dawn who uses violence as a means to get political messages across. The party was to supply the violence demanded by the Greek people during a time of socioeconomic crisis in their frustration against clientelism, corruption and distrust of the system.

A Young Far Right Party

Golden Dawn's beginnings and evolution, both ideologically and as an organisation does not fit the typical framework. The party's evolution started, as mentioned above, as a staunchly Nazi paramilitary organisation that involved themselves in armed conflicts in foreign countries, like Yugoslavia, and in violence in Greece. The party seems to have tried to modernise their image recently, losing the Nazi symbolism in place of ancient Greek symbols, such as the meandros, that can be seen as a swastika at a quick glance. Party members, unlike other far right

parties, receive military training, and are comprised of many young members who are more keen on revolution. The Youth Front and the paramilitary wing of the party are eerily similar to aspects of Fascist tradition, specifically the tradition in Hitler's Nazism, with the party also securing a strong youth vote (Sakellariou, 2015). Strong military and police support, partnered with support from the unemployed, working and upper classes strays from the norm when it comes to far right support.

As unique as the party may be, there are some similarities in terms of their evolution. There is a trend that far right parties tone down their ideological radicalism (or perceived radicalism) in order to obtain votes (Ford, Goodwin & Cutts, 2014). If this is true, there is possibility that Golden Dawn may de-radicalise their image further, as attempted during the European elections by putting forth better-known and more "responsible" looking EMPs (Sakellariou, 2015). Until the future plays out the party's later evolutionary stages however, they remain to be atypical, with a largely unusual voter base in comparison to the average far right party, a much more radical membership and a very authoritarian party structure.

Chapter 7: Golden Dawn – Extreme neo-Nazi Ideological Discourse

Using primarily Golden Dawn's manifestos and news publications, along with some scholarly work, this chapter will analyse the party's ideological discourse. As discussed earlier, European radical right parties share many common themes in their discourse, such as euroscepticism, decadence, palingenesis, xenophobia, law and order, traditionalism and of course, nationalism. Golden Dawn is no different in the sense that they use these themes constantly in their discourse, which can be

found in their party manifesto, their news articles, their programme highlights, speeches and acts. They in fact add to the list, using significant amounts of militarism in their discourse, which cannot be said for the prototypical radical right party. In addition to militarism, Golden Dawn's discourse arguably is largely paleo-Nazi in nature, with elements of neo-extremist discourse through their support of biological purity, expulsion of non-Greeks, significant overhaul of the Greek political system, militarisation of the state, aims for national expansion, paramilitarism and economic reform (Golden Dawn, 2012). Their updated manifesto tackles the economy and national decay especially, catering to the Greek economic crisis, which lays the foundation for the justification of their radical discourse.

Economy

With the Greek economy in shambles, Golden Dawn emerged from the darkness to use the climate of economic depression and social anxiety to their advantage. The party, like classical Fascist parties, used and continues to use fighting words in their discourse, taking the economic crisis and the conditions placed upon Greece through the memorandums and playing with the themes as though they were battles of war. The very first lines of their manifesto describe their position on the global capitalist economic system and the effect on Greece:

“The economic crisis is just the tip of the iceberg... the freedom fighters of the Popular Nationalist Movement take up the struggle against decline, for the rebirth of our Nation, for a new Golden Dawn of Hellenism. The rise of our Movement has wreaked panic in the ranks of the regime of sin.”

(Golden Dawn, 2012).

To GD, the economic crisis in Greece is the end result that comes with submission to the capitalist “regime of sin”. “Bankrupted” Capitalism, in both national and global forms, as well as “historically failed” Marxism are seen as two economic systems that are destroyers of states, but to which Golden Dawn will triumph over for the better of Hellas (Greece). In their place, the party wishes to establish a national, directed economy that will bring economic growth to Greece (Golden Dawn, 2012). The party’s nationalist approach staunchly rejects “profit over patriotism”, liberalism, “inhuman Marxism” and Globalisation. To the Golden Dawn, economics must not be in opposition to the state’s fundamental ideas, such as immigration policies, and therefore are opposed to increasing the population through foreign workers, who will eventually threaten national identity (Golden Dawn, 2012). The party shows preference for a directed economy over what they deem to be an unaccountable laissez-faire liberal economy that is currently in place. Although they believe in direction, which is more reminiscent of Socialism and Communism, the party believes in property, private initiative but not in “immoral and unchecked profiteering that burdens the Popular Community with its illicit treasure-seeking” (Golden Dawn, 2012).

Although strict conditions placed on the Greek economy have had some unprecedented economic effects, Golden Dawn places the majority of the burden of Greece’s crisis on the European memorandums, which they view as catastrophic. Golden Dawn links the memorandum with both economic and social destruction, a drop in GDP and skyrocketing unemployment. Michaloliakos describes the

sentiment of the party against the memorandums in his “Victory Speech”, where he stated that:

“The junta of the bailout continues. The National resistance of Golden Dawn against the bailout’s junta will continue too, both inside and outside of parliament. We will continue the struggle for a Greece liberated from global speculators.” (Michaloliakos, 2012).

The proposed response to the referendums is to use Greece to essentially play the role of an economic terrorist, by purposely leaving the EU as a “huge weapon” to start a domino of dismantling the EU, supposedly destroying the EU economy and reducing the global GDP by 17 trillion euros by 2020, causing global economic depression (Golden Dawn, 2012). The use of this weapon is one that only a “truly national government” would utilise, using Cold War political rhetoric to present their version of what could be seen as economic “Mutually Assured Destruction”. Furthermore, GD would demand the inspection and deletion of what they perceive to be “illegal debt”, meaning much of the debt owed to the Troika and European states would not be repaid. GD MP Kassidiaris expressed this in parliament when furiously tearing up the memorandum yelling “They will get nothing from Greece!” and refusing to sell natural resources such as “the natural gas the Germans want...” (Kassidiaris, 2015). In addition to the refusal to pay debt, Golden Dawn claims that as the “only true national leadership”, they would claim the rights of Greece and settle Germany’s debt towards Greece. The party quotes that the occupying German Army debt to Greece amounted to 100 billion euros, which (with interest) amounts to 510 billion Euros to 575 billion Euros that the party would force Germany to repay (Golden Dawn, 2012).

Emphasising the nationalisation of the Greek economy, Golden Dawn emphasises the importance of self-sufficiency in all “basic survival goods the People need” by strengthening these basic industries such as: Agriculture, Medicine, Weapons and Fuel. The decrease in Greek production, such as the destruction of Greek industry, agriculture and animal husbandry are all to be reversed, for they are considered important national objectives to the party. Greek national resources, which the party deems to be the wealth of the national state, and its wealth, that is to be invested in by the state. National resources such as oil and natural gas, gold and other precious metals are to be exploited by Greeks, criticising the mainstream elites of selling Greek resources to the “Zionists” (Golden Dawn, 2012). In addition, Golden Dawn, similarly to their radical left enemies, SYRIZA, wants to bring about the nationalisation of Greek banks. The party does not make promises, however, for a prosperous populace, shying away from what they see as a return to the “sad materialist days of 2004” and thus away from decadence and to the palingenesis of the Greek state and economy (Golden Dawn, 2012). Instead they emphasise productive jobs for all Greeks, implying that the state is to accumulate the wealth over the populace, following nationalist economic ideologies.

Golden Dawn firmly states that the economy of the national state should never be in opposition to its fundamental ideas, such as its anti-immigration stance, which will later be touched upon. Foreign workers for cheap labour will not be allowed so as to threaten the national identity of the state and to take jobs from ethnic Greeks. Their manifesto also makes it clear that economics is not to impede on the principles of ‘social justice’ and thus not determine the politics of the state

(Golden Dawn, 2012). GD's 'National Plan' document outlines the new economic partnerships Greece would make under their leadership. To ensure that their political and economic objectives are met, without American and German influences, Greece would form free trade agreements with Iran, China and Greece's historical ally, Russia (Golden Dawn, 2015). This proposed plan would see the creation of an economic bloc that is perceived to be more beneficial for its national objectives than one with Europe or the USA.

Their discourse is clearly in favour of a national economy that is meant only for Greeks, demonising laissez-faire liberalism and Marxism. Their economic policy excludes Europe and the United States, blaming them, the "Zionists" (Israel), and Greek elites for the demise of the Greek economy. Their discourse that Greece is meant for the Greeks plays on a strong sense of national identity, but really, who are Greeks to the GD? What classifications does the party put on identity?

National Identity and Immigration

Golden Dawn's manifesto starts by addressing "every Greek man and woman", however, who is considered Greek? Like Hitler's Nazi party, Golden Dawn uses a biological conception of the nation-race as part of their espousal of National Socialism, with a focus on strict preservation of a pure Greek bloodline (Ellinas, 2014; Golden Dawn, 2012). Golden Dawn refutes scholars who argue against the continuity of pure Greek blood since antiquity. The party instead refers to Greeks as "True and Pure Hellenes", who are the current inhabitants of the nation and who

constitute the authentic continuity of the authentic Greeks, disputing internationalist “Marxist” claims (Golden Dawn, 2012).

The continuity of the Greek race is therefore the continuity of the nation itself, who are described as descendants of the great nation that created Civilisation and protected Europe from the Orient until it was betrayed by the West when it fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 (Golden Dawn, 2012). This description highlights Hellenic racial superiority as the creators of civilisation, as the protectors of true Europeanism and as the nation that was betrayed, which is to paint the image of today’s Greece having been betrayed by the European Union and mainstream elites. The party’s definition of a Greek goes farther than just pure-blooded Aryan Greeks, but is tied in with love for the nation. Corruption, for example, is a trait that cannot be held by a “real Greek”, because these are two mutually exclusive concepts (Halikiopoulou, & Vasilopoulou, 2012). Greek politicians who are considered traitors to the Golden Dawn cannot therefore be considered as pure blooded Hellenes, such as former Prime Minister George Papandreou, who is considered to be only 25 percent Greek, which is seen as a partial reason for his involvement in the Greek economic crisis (Hlikiopoulou, & Vasilopoulou, 2012). Further to this concept, the party states that those who have a national conscience are the only individuals with Greek blood who can be considered true Greeks, therefore not only foreigners excluded from being Greek, but those that the party labels as ‘Hellenophones’. These individuals who may have naturalised legally, becoming “Greek” by law are labelled as Hellenophones to emphasise their position outside of the true Greek definition created by the party (Golden Dawn, 2012). The party has

established clear boundaries between what a 'true Greek' and an 'other' is, and sees the cracking down on the latter category of people as necessary for the purification of the nation.

Greece's wish to maintain the purity of the Greek race lays the foundation for their xenophobic discourse. Anti-immigrant discourse is very strong for the Golden Dawn, taking extreme positions that resemble wartime Fascist party discourse. Immigrants are seen as one of the main reasons for national decay because they are seen as incapable of loving Greece as they are not, and will never be of pure Greek blood. Golden Dawn proclaims that they are therefore the renaissance of the nation, whose fighters will struggle against Greeks becoming "just a vote" in their own country (Golden Dawn, 2012; Golden Dawn, 2015).

Immigration is seen as an objective set by the 'system' to ensure the destruction of every ethnic and racial identity and thus political and public life (Golden Dawn, 2012). The conspiracy of a global plan to destroy individual races comes directly from party leader Michaloliakos' book *Enemies of the Regime* written in 2000, as noted in their manifesto. Michaloliakos himself also noted in his speech that they will not let Greece become a "social jungle" as a result of the "millions of illegal immigrants they (the elite) brought into our homeland, without asking us" (Michaloliakos, 2012). This threat of immigration is also linked, similarly with other radical right parties, to crime and the growing burden on the health care and other welfare programs provided by the state. Golden Dawn provides a solution, the expulsion of all illegal immigrants and immigrants whose temporary residency expires to stop the decadence of the state. Immigration is to be halted, lumping legal

and illegal immigrants together because their discourse emphasises that there is no such thing as legal immigration (Golden Dawn, 2012).

The securitisation of the immigration debate was spearheaded by Golden Dawn. GD recently, and the previous governments before its rise in popularity, saw immigration to be a main cause of disease, securitizing the issue as a public health issue (Dalakoglou, 2013). These immigrants are also linked to criminality, as expressed by GD MP Kassidiaris in a speech in Athens proclaiming that Pakistanis, Afghans and other immigrants go to Greece to commit crimes (Kassidiaris, 2014). The party's National Plan seeks to protect the Greek people by expulsing all "immigrant invaders" from the country, for they are an "invading informal army". Prior to doing so, as they figure out a process, the party proposes that migrants be placed in detention camps that would be far from where Greeks reside, where conditions would be far less 'luxurious' than they are now (Golden Dawn, 2012). The claim of luxuriousness contrasts the violations against human rights against Greece regarding the current detention camps that migrants are held in, which included issues such as: serious overcrowding, lack of healthcare, poor sanitary conditions, lack of heating and water, access to open air, toilets as well as a lack of access to both natural and artificial light (Crépeau, 2013). Regardless, Golden Dawn's discourse is aimed at disgruntled Greeks who have seen a significant decline in their quality of life by vowing to take away free meals for migrants at camps, refuse to provide heating or air conditioning and other luxuries, which, if food is a luxury, then one can only imagine the proposed conditions. Golden Dawn takes the issue one step further, proposing that foreigners who commit crimes not be imprisoned

together with Greeks, but be transferred to these camps, where they will spend their lives working for the benefit of the public. These proposals are eerily similar to the Nazi *Konzentrationslager* (concentration camps), which were meant for those who held “racially undesirable elements” and who would work for the German public (Evans, 2005). To further alienate the created “other”, Golden Dawn proposes the segregation of the school system to separate Greeks from non-Greeks, so that the education of nationals is not hampered “because of the weaknesses of the aliens” (Golden Dawn, 2012). One of the party slogans, “To rid the filth from the Earth” (in reference to foreigners), aligns with their policy proposals.

Golden Dawn’s anti-immigrant discourse has been influential on policy, managing to shift debates and extending their views onto mainstream policy proposals. Examples of these are the Xenios Dias (Hospitable Zeus) anti-immigration program put in place by Antonios Samaras’ New Democracy government and the request by the Minister of Interior to request (as a result of GD pressure), that all Greek municipalities provide the government with a census of all non-Greek children, a practice used by the Nazis in 1940 (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2012; Kallis, 2013). To the GD the mainstream has failed Greeks in favour of aiding immigrants, causing the party to brand themselves as the true Greek state, providing the same state services that the government would provide to all people in Greece, but instead provide them only to pure Greeks who can identify themselves with their Greek identity cards (Golden Dawn, 2012; Koronaïou & Sakellariou, 2013).

Golden Dawn' array of social services is vast, using it as a tool to gain votes by playing on the scapegoat of the Greek state being unable to provide jobs or social programs to true Greeks because immigrants are taking those away from them. The list of social programs provided by the party include medical services such as blood donation services and *Medecines avec Frontiers* (playing of *Mecedines sans Frontiers*), jobs and food services such as 'Group for the Unemployed Hard-Hit Greeks' (OAED) and their 'free food for Greeks' program. Other less major services are also available, such as security against criminal migrants (claimed by some citizens), clothing drives, legal aid and more (Golden Dawn, 2012; Koronaiou & Sakellariou, 2013). The 'Greek-only' social programs are attempts to show that the Golden Dawn can operate as a sub-state, laying the foundations for what they hope to be the creation of their New Greece.

Some of the most popular programs throughout this crisis are the food drives and the OAED, along with medical services. With the Greek state being less able to provide these basic services, as a result of the economic meltdown, some Greeks have been seeking them from Golden Dawn. Much needed jobs for example in a country with unemployment at over 25 percent have been especially focused on by citizens and the party. The slogan "every foreign worker is a Greek unemployed" is used to call upon Greeks to hire only Greeks. The OAED, whose acronym is the same as the official state acronym for the "Manpower Employment Organisation", advertises jobs, for example, in newspapers. The party also organises groups to visit local factories and other businesses that employ immigrants and inform them that they are being irresponsible to local Greeks and that they should hire only Greeks.

The party, at times, photographs these establishments and advertises them to defame the businesses, and in some cases have sent groups to threaten the owners, although the party denies the claims (Koronaïou & Sakellariou, 2012).

The social services the party provides stand as the party's clear opposition to immigration and the support for non-Greeks. Their disdain for non-Greeks comes from their definition of a Greek, which uses the biological conception of racial purity. Conceptions of what a Greek is, racial purity and anti-immigration stances dominate much of the party's discourse. The blame for immigration is placed upon the 'traitors', which are the Greek elite, who are supposedly part of the conspiracy of 'international Zionism' and slaves to the European Union, thus supposedly bringing decay to Greece (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015). The party's ideological discourse therefore takes a stance against the European Union and against the elites, who are seen as not taking a strong enough stance against immigration and bringing about the de-securitisation of Greece.

Euroscepticism and the Elite

Greece's membership in the EU is a heated topic in Greece, with the national referendum in the summer of 2015 showing a clear "OXI" (NO) to the EU in regards to the memorandum. However, the vote was not just regarding the bailouts, but it held symbolic value to the depressed voters. With Greece receiving the brunt of illegal migrants during a time of record unemployment and high levels of street violence, the atmosphere has been primed for euroscepticism. Golden Dawn's discourse is strongly against the EU and the mainstream elites who they view as

selling the country to Germany and the Zionists just to remain part of the elitist club (Golden Dawn, 2012).

The European Union is portrayed in their National Plan as synonymous to easy money and consumption, and thus a tool used by the elite for personal gain at the expense of the Greek state and people. Membership to the EU is considered submission to the policies of powerful interests, and thus ruling Greece from afar in what they call 'xenocracy' (Golden Dawn, 2012). The nationalist discourse rules out any kind of infringement upon sovereignty, in which they view the elites, such as the mainstream politicians as selling to others. They paint the image of a Greece enslaved by Brussels (the 'foreign master'), and goes back in history to Greece's independence from the Ottoman Empire only to have a foreign king bestowed upon them with the EU. This serves to try to create Europe as the "other", counter to the purpose of the European project which seeks to create unity in Europe. The only true moments of Greek liberation to the party was under the authoritarian rule of Metaxas and the Greek military regime (Golden Dawn, 2012).

The established dynastic political families in Greek Parliament, which many Greeks link to the hindrance of political efficacy and accountability, are another target for the GD. These elites are seen as ruling against the people instead of for them. The party seeks to cleanse this class from the political scene, citing the Greek line 120 of the Greek constitution that says "respect of the Constitution lies in the hands of patriots of Greece", which they believe is justly in their hands being the only "true" patriots (Michaloliakos, 2013). Michaloliakos goes further in his stance against the established political class in his "Caucus Speech":

“No. We will not favour to some people who are third and fourth generation politicians, with white collars. We will remove them from political life, those who are sly and speak of expressing the needs of the people and our race. We will not bring them back. Let them take their views and stop these sly thoughts of theirs because they are opening the gates of hell!” (Michaloliakos, 2013).

The symbolism of the elite and hell is to portray the elite as those who have opened the gates of hell through bad governance and are thus dragging Greece to the depths of Hades as a result.

The colours of the party’s flag, which like the Nazi party flag, is red, black and white, is symbolic to the party in the European context. They reject the notion that the flag and its colours were meant to imitate the Nazi party flag, stating that the colours have strong Hellenic nationalist meanings:

“White betokens the innocence of our just enterprise against the tyrants, black symbolises our death for country and freedom, and the red signifies the self determination of the Greek people and the joy they experience on account of the war they wage for the resurrection of the Motherland” (Golden Dawn, 2012).

The explanations for the colours come from the Philike Hetaireia, a secret society of nationalists whose purpose was to overthrow Ottoman rule of Greece, with the colours symbolising the independence struggle from their oppressive regime. The significance that the Golden Dawn attributes to it today is the oppressive regime of the European Union and the corrupt elite, who the party aims to wage war against in their dream for palingenesis. For these reasons, the party is in favour of exiting the European Union if they are to come to power.

National Security, Law & Order and Violence

As most radical right parties, Golden Dawn's discourse emphasises the need to protect the nation and ensure national security in the name of Greek sovereignty, as well as the need to restore order through strict laws and increased funding to the police. The mainstream, the left and the European Union are charged by the GD for bringing about insecurity in Greece by gutting the Greek military and police through spending cuts, not being self-sufficient in the production of arms and involving too much politics in military matters (Golden Dawn, 2012). Due to a distrust of the European Union, the party sees that it is their responsibility as nationalists to ensure Greece establishes itself defensively in the Mediterranean to ensure proper balances, aiming at the traditional military rivalry that has become heated again in recent years with Turkey, which is seen as a non-European country. Until then, the party believes in establishing order unilaterally until they are able to gain power, through the use of their paramilitary group by fighting, seeing as they believe that the use of violence is justified if used to protect 'authentic democracy' that protects Greek sovereignty (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015).

The "Neo-Hellenic state" which the Golden Dawn wishes to create will grant more resources and power to the military. The current length of mandatory conscription for adult males in Greece is 9 months, reduced from 12 months in 2009. As a citizen, one is able to pay a hefty fine to avoid conscription. Both the short time along with the option to opt-out of conscription is deemed unacceptable for security purposes by the Golden Dawn. The party's discourse uses the Turkish threat along with migration as the prime reasons for the need to change the operation of the military. These changes include the expansion of conscription to

make it mandatory for all men and women at age 18 to serve for 14 months, with women covering non-combat positions (unless requesting combat positions), and men serving their time on Border Patrol (Golden Dawn, 2012). The increase in servicemen and women will mean an increase in the military expenditures, however this is a non-issue to the party, who believes that the military is one of the most important institutions of that nation, similar to the views of Fascist parties.

The party also seeks to nationalise Greek defence industries and increase the production of arms. Their plan is to make all trade agreements have a prerequisite for co-production so that they can produce their own weapon systems (Golden Dawn, 2012). To ensure that the oversight runs smoothly, they suggest that the position of Minister of Defence be reserved for military personnel only. Although one portion of their National Plan points to the increase in military presence as a purely defensive mechanism, their ideological statement, words of their members and leader as well as nationalist party music, paints a very different picture. The revival of the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea) policy that drove Greece to war with the Ottoman Empire after the First World War is the objective of the party that is made evident through most of their discourse. Michaloliakos made this clear in a speech to his supporters:

“For two thousand years, the Jews would say a wish during their festivals, "next year in Jerusalem", and ultimately after many centuries they managed to make it a reality. So I too conclude with a wish:

Next year in Constantinople, in Smyrna, in Trebizond!” (Stohos, 2013).

The dream of annexing these former Greek territories that have Greek minorities, along with other areas such as Northern Epirus (Southern Albania) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of ‘Macedonia’ (FYRO’M’) show that the party sees national

security as synonymous with national expansion. This is seen in their nationalist music as well, such as the “Golden Dawn Anthem” which sings of a time for revolution and expansion as well as their Greek translation of the Nazi Horst Wessel song, which is dominated by words of future military victories and annexation of former Greek lands.

In terms of internal security, such as policing, the party’s ideological discourse points at the creation of a quasi-police state, with police funding and powers increasing drastically. In the party’s National Plan, Golden Dawn proposes the re-establishment of the Greek Constabulary, which would act as a special unit of the police that would wield heavy offensive weapons to tackle youth crime and foreign robbers. They deem youth hooliganism as a threat that today’s police are fighting “unarmed”, and thus justify heavy weaponry for police officers (Golden Dawn, 2012). This comes off as hypocritical considering Golden Dawn’s own history with street violence, all the while claiming they operate within the law and the constitution.

To pair with the heavy offensive weapons, Golden Dawn’s discourse promotes aggressive spirit and liberation from guilt due to the use of personal weapons for the police forces (Golden Dawn, 2012). This culture could perhaps seek to promote a strong and violent police force to subdue those who will go against their laws, or seek to interfere with their power. The re-establishment of the Ministry of Public Order, with the minister being a police officer, is portrayed to ensure efficient and effective use of the police service. The increased depth and scope of policing operations and increased funding will be paired with harsher penalties, with

especially heavy statutory offenses for any offense that seeks to “dissolve social cohesion and destroy the national body” (Golden Dawn, 2012). This discourse holds a heavy authoritarian tone, portraying a strong dislike for political protest and civil uprisings, also very similar to Fascist discourse and operations.

Seeing as the party is not in power, Golden Dawn has taken it upon themselves to establish order unilaterally in the meantime, having been caught beating immigrants and anti-racist protesters who they view as disturbing the peace. One of the most famous examples of Golden Dawn’s policing was their tours of Athens’ shop stands owned by visible minorities, where GD members and MPs requested documents proving the stands were set up legally. If the owner could not provide documents, or could not provide them quickly enough, the party members would destroy the stands completely. Other examples include stabbings of migrant workers, leftists and other individuals who the party sees as unwanted or a threat to order (Baboulias, 2012; Dalakoglou, 2013). The discourse and actions of the party regarding national security and law and order come with some authoritarian undertones that go against democratic principles.

Authoritarianism and links to Fascism/Nazism

“Believe, Obey, Fight”. This quote, used extensively by Mussolini during his rule of Italy, stood as a staple slogan, one that Golden Dawn has reinvented as “I Believe, and I Believe in turn, means I Struggle” (Golden Dawn, 2012). The struggle against parliamentary democracy is evident, with the current system being viewed as a system of decay that was established by the left after the Junta in the 70s.

Although the party claims to not be a Fascist or neo-Nazi party, their discourse leaves many questions open, with the downright disdain of what is considered a political system based on material criteria. Similarly to the Nazi party, prior to their successful election and seizure of power, Golden Dawn claims to be a true democratic party, however, their discourse is satiated with authoritarianism.

Golden Dawn seeks the “political cleansing” of the nation’s governance system as part of their fight for national independence and sovereignty of the people (Golden Dawn, 2012; Golden Dawn, 2015). The party expresses their wish for the nationalist Greeks to vote them in as an absolute majority so that they can bring about considerable constitutional reforms in their attempt to bring Greece back to greatness and follow through with their cleansing. The immediate changes evident in their discourse include many more powers for the government. The first proposed change is the abolition of parliamentary immunity so that the party may judge the ‘corrupt traitors’ in a ‘special court’, and pass a law that will allow the state to confiscate all property of these individuals (Golden Dawn, 2012). This was emphasised by the party leader in his “Victory Speech” stating:

“The new golden dawn of Hellenism is rising. To those who betray this homeland, the time has come to fear! We are coming!” (Michaloliakos, 2012).

The second immediate change will be to have referendums on all important national issues. The third is introducing a constitutional change that will make the president of the Democracy elected directly, instead of being appointed by the Prime Minister. They will also reduce the numbers of MPs to 180 and stop publicly funding other parties (Golden Dawn, 2012). These changes lie parallel to statements

in the party's discourse found in their other party document, *An Ideological Movement*, that rejects all political thought, which they claim to be extinguishing as we speak (Golden Dawn, 2012).

The re-establishment of Church-State relations and thus the abolition of its separation is a major priority to the party. This comes hand in hand with their policy of banning all other religions that threaten or offend Greek traditions and history, or that damage the strength of the nation (Golden Dawn, 2012). The reestablishment of the church and the removal of all "decadent and internationalist" clergy is reminiscent of Greek authoritarianism prior to Ottoman occupation, where the head of the empire was also the patriarch of the church. However, the degree to which GD would re-establish the Greek Orthodox church's power is not defined.

Fear politics acts as one of the arms of the party's authoritarian tone, with examples of harsh words, violent slogans and forced respect for the party leader, emphasising their love for power. During the 2012 elections, as reporters were waiting to hear the speeches of the individual party leaders after the votes were counted, Golden Dawn members who acted as security for their leader shouted at reporters to stand in a sign of respect, and ousted those who did not comply (Weisenthal, 2012). This stands as a message to the other parties, the media and the citizens of Greece as a message of significant change if they come to power, one where the authority will not be shy to show their dominance. In addition, the party instils fear through military marches in front of key points, such as embassies and immigrant neighbourhoods. An example of this was seen in front of the United States embassy in Athens, where Michaloliakos spoke of Greek nationalism, acts of

patriotic bravery (in Greece and Cyprus), portraying anti-American sentiments, anti-Turkish sentiments and anti-immigration stances (Michaloliakos, 2015). This speech was then followed by a march past the embassy by black-clad supporters with military music and cadence.

Golden Dawn sees the current political system as one that favours the oligarchs and plutocrats. In contrast to their conception of Greek politics, they believe that those who rule the country should be the *Aristoi* (the best – from aristocrats). In support of this dream, their discourse bases this new political order as meritocracy, where those who deserve it will rule (Golden Dawn, 2012). Of course, Golden Dawn sees themselves as nationalists, as the *Aristoi*, along with other Greek nationalists who join their cause.

Extreme Right Discourse

The discourse as presented by the party is all but typical. Unlike most radical right parties, they do not take a new-right approach in their views, nor does it seek to establish change without violent undertones. The exit of the EU, financial terrorism, economic nationalism, the creation of Nazi-style concentration camps and the biological conception of the nation-race are all concepts that are either radicalised further than the average party, or missing from typical radical right discourse. The perceived national decay, which the party labels themselves as the only salvation, is blamed on the elite, the EU, migration and all those they label as “traitors”. The recreation of a Greater Greece, with former Greek lands in Albania, FYRO’M, Turkey and Cyprus being annexed, adds to their violent discourse. In all

aspects of their ideological discourse, the party can be classified as an extreme radical right and Fascist party, as fitting in David Art's (Art, 2013) definition of an extreme Fascist party.

Chapter 8: Conclusion - The Comparison of Ideological Discourses

Front National and Golden Dawn are both far right wing parties. What is interesting to see, however, is whether these siblings (within this family) are similar or different from each other. The research has found that when looked at individually, both parties appear to tackle similar themes such as: euroscepticism, immigration, security (both domestic and international), the economy and national decay. The parties' discourses however are not fully compatible, with some significant differences in their levels of radicalism, as expressed in Front National's denouncement of Golden Dawn. I will proceed by highlighting the similarities as well as the differences between the discourses of both parties by comparing their ideological discourses.

Euroscepticism

Both parties take an anti-EU position in their discourses, blaming it for the economic, migration and political problems at the domestic level. Front National and Golden Dawn do not see the EU as a democratic entity, with Front National's emphasis being placed on the power of the EC, whereas Golden Dawn sees it as an oppressive regime from Brussels that has brought "xenocracy" to Greece. In addition, both parties blame membership to the EU for their lack of competitiveness,

growing unemployment rates and for the entrance of large corporations, which are considered detrimental to the economy compared to local business (Front National, 2015; Golden Dawn, 2012). The suite of similarities end here however, with Golden Dawn's stance becoming more radical than their French counterpart's. While Front National's toned-down discourse no longer mentions an exit from the EU, Golden Dawn is in favour of a full exit. France is in support of significant change to the functioning of the EU which would give more power to the member-states, whereas Golden Dawn rejects even the basic principles of the EU's founding, such as a common European history and sees it as a tool for the corrupt elite to bring decay to Greece. As a result of the dissatisfaction with the EU and their respective nations' membership to it, both parties call on their people to bring about a national revolution, one where patriots will bring the nationalist parties to power so that they can return to putting national policies before the policies of the bloc. The ways in which the parties call for change, however, are not the same.

Golden Dawn's discourse is explicit in their preference to turn to Russia, China and Iran for new trade partners to distance themselves from Western Europe. In terms of their Euroscepticism, Golden Dawn goes further in their discourse to defame the EU and to label it as a threat to Greek sovereignty, economy, the nation-race and security, while pushing for a full exit as opposed to Front National. Both parties call upon their voters and supporters to bring about a revolution, which holds different meanings to the two parties. Seeing as France is not in favour of a full exit, this revolution through the ballot box would involve pushing for foundational changes to the European Constitution, shifting more sovereignty back to national

governments (Front National, 2015). In Greece, Golden Dawn also calls upon the people to rise up in revolution against the 'slavery to the EU', however, they are in favour of taking extreme measures to bring about the start of their nationalist regime (Golden Dawn, 2012). This revolution would bring about a full exit from the EU so as to be able to establish their own state-centred economy, social policies and extreme immigration and nationalisation policies. The plan and proposed revolution of the Golden Dawn far exceeds Front National's in levels of extremism.

Economics

The economic front is where the most similarities can be seen between the two parties. Both parties are in favour of a more chauvinistically left approach of running the economy, using principles of statism and nationalism in their economic plan. Both Front National and Golden Dawn are in favour of protectionism against foreign firms, as well as the principles of national preference, where French people would be preferred for employment and other benefits over foreign nationals (Front National 2015; Golden Dawn, 2012). The internationalisation of the economy and liberal economics is considered a threat to the two radical parties, who prefer nationalist economies. This goes hand-in-hand with the strong discourse in favour of the reindustrialisation of their economies, with strong focuses in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The two parties also share the opinion that clientelism is to end if the economy is to thrive, seeing themselves as the answer to the issue. Both parties also both blame foreign workers for high unemployment rates and for the hard-pressed social welfare system.

The EU is heavily blamed for the economic downturn in both parties' respective nations. As discussed, Front National criticises economic austerity imposed upon France and other European states from Brussels while Golden Dawn sees the bailouts and conditions tied to them as strangling the economy. The proposed solutions by the two parties differ in how they would execute their proposed changes. Golden Dawn would like to see the state accumulate wealth over the populace to promote their nationalist ideology, seeing it as a tool to reinvest in the national economy (Golden Dawn, 2012). This approach of rejecting "profit over patriotism" is similar to that of Front National's ideological position, seeing as they also promote French companies over foreign firms. Golden Dawn, however, seeks to establish Greece as a nation that can be complete self-sufficient by establishing agriculture, medicine, weapons and fuel industries, whereas Front National does not plan to take such a strong step towards state-centred economic policy.

Golden Dawn, however, does make some strong statements regarding how they plan to revitalise their economy and solve their debt crisis. Their discourse sees the debt Greece owes to Europe as "illegal" and thus will not repay it. They go further, to demand roughly a half trillion euros in war reparations from Germany, threatening economic Armageddon if their demands are not met. Their combative approach to solving their economic problems is unique to their party and not found in Front National's discourse.

National Identity and Immigration

Although both parties take strong anti-immigration stances and are in favour

of preserving national identity, Golden Dawn's discourse is significantly more radical than FN's in this context. While FN's discourse is anti-immigrant, it is open to allowing select immigrants from entering and becoming citizens. The proposed number of allowed immigration, however, would be vastly reduced from 200,000 to 10,000. Their rationale for this is that mass immigration is economically unsustainable, but also that a lower amount of immigration makes it easier for the fewer (select) coming in to assimilate to French culture (Front National, 2012). GD on the other hand deems all immigration to be illegal and sees immigrants as a threat to the purity of the Greek race, a notion that goes farther than the inability to assimilate into the Greek culture. In addition, Golden Dawn's discourse favours Nazi-style concentration camps, with frightening conditions where migrants will be placed to do hard labour for the "better of the Greek people". GD's discourse also compared migrants to filth, which must be cleansed from Greece if they are to protect the country from the destruction of national identity (Golden Dawn, 2012). FN opposes immigration for a largely economic reason, while GD takes both an economic position against them, (seeing them as stealing jobs from Greeks), as well as using the nation-race as a form of exclusion for all non-Greeks. GD also uses the biological conception of race, similar to Nazi Germany, which differs from FN's approach, which is not as strict in its definition of race (Front National, 2015; Golden Dawn, 2012). Immigrants are seen as incapable of ever loving Greece as a full-blooded Greek would, adding to the list of reasons to exclude immigrants (Golden Dawn, 2012). Front National, however, comparatively has a certain degree of faith in the ability for immigrants to assimilate into French society as opposed to

Golden Dawn by not proposing an outright halt to immigration. The French party also does not base their disdain for immigration on conspiracy theories, such as Golden Dawn. Golden Dawn's seeing immigration as an objective set by the 'system' to ensure the destruction of ethnic and racial identity is an extreme position not shared by their French counterpart (Front National, 2012). In this category, GD's discourse is much more radical than their French counterpart.

Security

Security is a topic covered extensively by both parties, encompassing national security as well as law & order policies. FN and GD believe that to ensure national security, they need to protect the sovereignty of the nation. Illegal migration, Islam and the EU for example are two threats to national sovereignty. In their discourses, both parties express that an increase in military spending is necessary, with an enlargement of existing military capacities. The increase of personnel is a concept shared by the two parties, although Golden Dawn is the only party in favour of the conscription of both men and women for 14 months to ensure the protection of the nation (Front National, 2015; Golden Dawn, 2012). Golden Dawn furthers their security discourse by taking an offensive instead of defensive stance, seeking to reconquer formerly Greek lands such as Constantinople, Smyrna and Cyprus (Golden Dawn, 2012). Expansion as a form of national defence is not seen in FN's discourse, which focuses primarily on policing.

Law and Order is taken seriously by both parties, who look to increase funding to the judiciaries, the police, and to implement harsher punishments for criminals.

In this category, GD takes a more radical position in their discourse than FN. FN seeks to end what they call the ghettoisation of French cities through the strengthening of the police force, however GD seeks to do the same through what is seen as the militarisation of the police in comparison to the FN (Front National, 2012; Golden Dawn, 2012). Golden Dawn emphasises their promotion for the use of violence by police as a deterrent to crime, yet there is no mention of this in FN's discourse. In addition, GD takes the law into their own hands, violently attacking and sometimes murdering immigrants and leftists who do not obey with laws that they wish to enforce, something that is not seen by the FN.

Authoritarianism and Paramilitarism

The concepts of paramilitarism and authoritarianism are strongly dominated by Golden Dawn and scarcely mentioned, if not absent from Front National's discourse. Front National's deradicalised discourse tries to distance itself from the authoritarianism that was associated with the party discourse under Jean-Marie Le Pen and have successfully done so by rebranding themselves as a republican party. Golden Dawn's discourse briefly mentions democracy, and only when proposing referendums for important national decisions and the election of the nation's president. Aside from these points, their discourse is highly authoritarian in nature, emphasising the power of their leader as well as their discourse on increasing the power of government when they come to power, allowing for the imprisonment of those they brand as traitors.

Between the two parties, GD is the only one with a full-fledged paramilitary

wing, armed and trained for battle. The support for this wing of the party is synonymous for their discourse on national revolution and cleansing, along with their overall militarism. Unlike GD, FN does not condone the use of violence, whereas GD sees it as a normal tool to use, to protect the nation from “authentic democracy” (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015). The paramilitaristic and authoritarianism of GD’s discourse is strongly linked to Fascism and Nazism, linking the party to violent, authoritarian, ideological positions, which have been removed from FN’s discourse.

Concluding Remarks

Through the analysis and comparison of Golden Dawn and Front National’s ideological discourses, I conclude that that Golden Dawn is significantly more radical than their prototypical counterpart. Golden Dawn and Front National share similar themes in their discourses, such as the nationalisation of their economies, increasing national security, euroscepticism and immigration, however Golden Dawn takes a more extreme position on all of them. The ideological documents published by the party, their speeches and news articles express the differences themselves.

Front National’s *dédiabolisation* has, to a certain extent, normalised their discourse in comparison to their older examples. The party seeks systemic change and the return of France to its former glory from its decadent state through the democratic route, adhering to the constitution of the republic. Their popularity has risen in tandem with their deradicalisation, showing that they have been effective in

altering their discourse. Golden Dawn, however, strays far from the path of Front National, using violence as a means to promote their discourse, one that promotes National Socialism, racism, militarism and ultranationalism. Their expansionary dreams and Nazi discourse eclipses the radicalism of the FN, which by comparison is much more moderate.

In accordance with the literature, Front National falls squarely within the radical right camp. Using Mudde's (Mudde, 2009) definition of a radical party, requiring core characteristics of populism, nativist nationalism and authoritarianism, Front National's social and economic policies are both nationalist and populist in nature, with minor authoritarian undertones fulfilling the requirements of the definition. The party is non-Fascist authoritarian, distinguishing it from the more radical definitions of far right parties, such as extreme right parties (Ignazi, 1996). Furthermore, the party is considered a 'new right' party, seeing as its ideological documents, (although heavily based on economic reform), do not dismiss Capitalism as an economic system. In addition, Front National is heavily focused on the preservation of traditional values that are at threat from foreigners, which is in line with 'new right' ideological positions (Cole, 2005).

Golden Dawn is a more complicated case. It is clear from their ideological discourse that they are not a radical right party. The levels of neo-Fascism, neo-Nazism and extremist positions put them to the right of radical right. Golden Dawn falls closer to the definition of an extreme right party, although their positions make it difficult to firmly label them as such. Using Ignazi's (Ignazi, 1996) definition of extreme parties, GD holds elements of the "traditional extreme right", using

interwar Fascist party discourse revolving around industrial revolution (through the reindustrialisation of Greece) and being the protectors of nostalgia. Some aspects of their discourse, however, also fall within the definition of the “post-industrial extreme-right”, by heavily focusing on identity issues (Ignazi, 1996). This, in tangent with the party’s preference for Paleo-Nazi-style definition of the nation-race through the biological conception of race, paramilitarism, expansionism, authoritarianism and their segregation of the ‘lesser’ foreigners from Greeks, also allows them to be classified as a Fascist party (Art, 2013). Additionally, GD does not fall comfortably within the ‘old right’ and ‘new right’ categories. By demonising both Capitalism and Communism in favour of National Socialism, the party takes very traditional ‘old right’ positions, however, they also focus on ‘new right’ issues that are non-economic, such as nationalism, traditional values and the threat against them by foreigners (Cole, 2005).

As a result of Golden Dawn’s inability to comfortably fit the new-right and old-right families, in tangent with their fusion of old traditional and post-industrial extremist ideologies, including Fascism and Nazism, I propose a new category of parties that accommodate these anomalies. The category, which will be named *Pseudopaleo right* parties,¹ will require that a party uses a fusion of traditional interwar extremist ideological discourse revolving around economic issues such as national expansion, paramilitarism, ultranationalism, Fascist authoritarianism, economic issues, (that are in conflict with Capitalism and Communism), as well as espousing elements of new right politics such as identity issues, traditional values

¹ *Pseudo*, from Greek: False and *Paleo*, from Greek: Old. The combination is used for parties that hold many aspects of old right, yet embody aspects of the new as well.

and anti-immigrant positions.

Now that Golden Dawn has been compared to a prototypical radical right party and classified within the far right political party family, it is easier to understand where they stand amongst the other European radical right parties. There are, however, many topics still to cover regarding the party, with future research topics of importance lying in party members. To better understand the party, we must understand who the members of the Golden Dawn are and how they compare with other contemporary radical right party members in other European countries. Other possible research areas of importance could be researching the pending charges on the party members and how it pertains to a possible hidden ideology of the party. Until then, Golden Dawn operates as the third largest party in Greece, making inroads during Greece's greatest socio-economic crisis in its modern history, with much mystery revolving around the inner workings of the party and its members.

Bibliography

- Aichholzer, J., Kritzing, S., Wagner, M., & Zeglovits, E. (2014). How has Radical Right Support Transformed Established Political Conflicts? The Case of Austria. *West European Politics*, 37(1), 113-137.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.814956>
- Akkerman, T. (2012). Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immigration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010). *West European Politics*, 35(3), 511-29. doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.665738
- Albertini, D., Doucet, D. (2013). *Histoire du Front National*. Paris: Tallandier.
- Alidières, B. (2012). Les Temps du Vote Front National et de ses Représentations. *Hérodote*, 144, 18-37. Doi: 10.3917/éher.144.0018.
- Almeida, D. (2013). Towards a Post-Radical Front National? Patterns of Ideological Change and Dediabolisation on the French Radical Right. *Nottinghamman French Studies*, 167-176. DOI: 10.3366/nfs.2013.0049
- Almeida, D. (2014). Decadence and Indifferentiation in the Ideology of the Front National. *French Cultural Studies*, 25(2), 221-32.
doi:10.1177/0957155814520906
- Arendt, H. (1951). *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Art, D. (2013). Rise of the Radical Right: Implications for European Politics. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 6(2), 127-137.
- Arter, D. (2010). The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of the True Finns. *Government and Opposition*, 45(4), 484-504. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01321.x
- Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2003). Explaining Variation in the Extreme Right Vote: The Individual and the Political Environment. *School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment (SPIRE)*, 1-46. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
- Baboulias, Y. (2012, December 4). Greece's Golden Dawn isn't a political party – it's more like a criminal gang. *The Guardian*. Retrieved January 12, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/04/greece-golden-dawn-not-political-party>
- Baboulias, Y. (2014, November 13). Greece's Neo-Nazis Were Scarier Than Anyone Imagined. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved February 03, 2016, from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/13/greeces-neo-nazis-were-scarier-than-anyone-imagined/>

- Billie, L. (2002). Denmark. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41(7-8), 941-946. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
- Bistis, G. (2013). Golden Dawn or Democratic Sunset: The Rise of the Far Right in Greece. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 24(3), 35-55. DOI 10.1215/10474552-2339453
- Bjorklund, T., & Andersen, J. (2002). *Anti-immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Parties and the Danish People's Party*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.
- Bustikova, L. (2014). Revenge of the Radical Right. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(12), 1738-65. doi:10.1177/0010414013516069
- Caiani, M., & Borri, R. (2013). The Extreme Right, Violence and Other Action Repertoires: An Empirical Study on Two European Countries. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 14(4), 562-81. doi:10.1080/15705854.2013.793532
- Caiani, M., & Conti, N. (2014). In the Name of the People: The Euroscepticism of the Italian Radical Right. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 15(2), 183-197. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2014.885766>
- Camus, J. (1998). *Le Front national*. Toulouse: Milan.
- Chrisafis, A. (2011, March 21). Marine Le Pen Emerges from Father's Shadow. *The Guardian*. Retrieved March 31, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/21/marine-lepen-defends-republic>
- Coffé, H. (2005). Do Individual Factors Explain the Different Success of the Two Belgian Extreme Right Parties. *Acta Polit Acta Politica*, 40(1), 74-93. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
- Cole, A. (2005). Old right or new right? The ideological positioning of parties of the far right. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, 203-230. Retrieved April 17, 2015, from [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1475-6765](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1475-6765)
- Coser, L. A. (1956). *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Crépeau, F. (2013). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Addendum : Mission to Greece (Rep. No. A/HRC/23/46/Add.4).

- Retrieved December 12, 2015, from
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/51b983ab4.html>
- Crépon, S. (2012). *Enquête au Coeur du Nouveau Front National*. Paris: Nouveau Monde.
- Dagevos, J., & Gijssberts, M. (2010). Integration in Ten Trends. *The Netherlands Institute for Social Research*, special, 1-17. Retrieved March 1, 2016.
- Dalakoglou, D. (2013). 'From the Bottom of the Aegean Sea'1 to Golden Dawn: Security, Xenophobia, and the Politics of Hate in Greece. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 13(3), 514-22. Retrieved March 16, 2015, from
[http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1754-9469](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1754-9469)
- Davies, P. (1999). *The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse, and Power*. London: Routledge.
- De Broglie, G. (2003). *L'Orléanisme: La Ressource Libérale de la France*. Perrin.
- De Lange, S. L. (2012). New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties. *Political Studies*, 60, 899-918.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00947.x
- Dély, R. (1999). *Histoire Secrète du Front National*. S.I: Grasset
- Dézé, A. (2012). *Le Front National: à la conquête du pouvoir?* Paris: Armand Colin
- Dolezal, M., Helbling, M., & Hutter, S. (2010). Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland: Ethnic Citizenship, Church-State Relations and Right-Wing Populism. *West European Politics*, 33(2), 171-90.
doi:10.1080/01402380903538773
- Ellinas, A. A. (2007). Far-Right Parties in Europe. *Comparative Politics*, 39(3), 353-371. doi:10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0165
- Ellinas, A. A. (2013). The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4), 543-65.
doi:10.1080/13608746.2013.782838
- Ellinas, A. A. (2014). Neo-Nazism in an Established Democracy: The Persistence of Golden Dawn in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 20(1), 1-20.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.981379>
- Evans, R. J. (2005). *The Third Reich in Power*. New York: Penguin Group.

- Evans, R. J. (2012, June 27). Europe on the verge of a nervous breakdown. *New Statesman*. Retrieved March 26, 2015, from <http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/world-affairs/2012/06/europe-verge-nervous-breakdown>
- Farand, C. (2015, December 07). Marion Maréchal-Le Pen: The rising star of France's far-right Front National party. *Independent*. Retrieved January 15, 2016, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marion-mar-chal-le-pen-the-successful-face-of-france-far-right-front-national-party-a6762436.html>
- Federal Elections in Switzerland Totals. (2011). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from <http://www.electionresources.org/ch/nationalrat.php?election=2011>
- Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind. *The Political Quarterly*, 85(3), 277-284. Retrieved March 25, 2015, from <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-923X/issues>
- Front National. (2015). Notre Projet: Programme Politique Du Front National (In French). Front National.
- Gattinara, P. C., Froio, C., & Albanese, M. (2013). The appeal of neo-Fascism in times of crisis. The experience of CasaPound Italia. *Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, 2, 234-58. Retrieved May 19, 2015, from <http://www.brill.com/Fascism>
- Golden Dawn. (1999, October). Our Ideology: God Religion (In Greek). Golden Dawn.
- Golden Dawn. (2012). An Ideological Movement (In Greek). Golden Dawn.
- Golden Dawn. (2012). Political Positions: For the Golden Dawn of Hellenism (In Greek). Golden Dawn.
- Golden Dawn. (2015). ΕΘΝΙΚΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ - ΓΙΑ ΜΙΑ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΗ ΚΑΙ ΙΣΗΧΡΗ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ. ΣΤΟΧΟΣ Η ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ (In Greek), 1-2. Retrieved October 2, 2015, from http://www.xryshaygh.com/assets/files/xa_ethniko_sxedio.pdf
- Goodliffe, G. Europe's salience and "owning" Euroscepticism: Explaining the Front National's victory in the 2014 European elections in France. *French Politics*, 13(4), 324-345. Doi:10.1057/fp.2015.19.
- Goodwin, M. J. (2010). Activism in Contemporary Extreme Right Parties: The Case of the British National Party (BNP). *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 20(1), 31-54. doi:10.1080/17457280903450690

- Goodwin, M. J. (2011). Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe. *The Royal Institute of International Affairs- Chatham House*, 1-30. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
- Gougou, F., & Labouret, S. (2011). The 2011 French cantonal elections: The last voter sanction before the 2012 presidential poll. *French Politics*, 9(4), 381-403
- Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism. *European Journal of Political Research*, 51, 504-39. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02050.x
- Halikiopoulou, D., Vasilopoulou, S. (2012, October 15). Greece's Response to Austerity has been to say "no to the Fourth Reich" but yes to the neo-Nazism of the Golden Dawn. *London School of Economics*. Retrieved from <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2012/10/15/greece-golden-dawn/>
- Halikiopoulou, D., Mock, S., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2013). The civic zeitgeist: Nationalism and liberal values in the European radical right. *Nations and Nationalism*, 19(1), 107-27. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2012.00550.x
- Harrison, S., & Bruter, M. (2011). *Mapping Extreme Right Ideology: An Empirical Geography of the European Extreme Right*. doi:10.1057/9780230336834
- Hitler, A. (1999). *Mein Kampf* (R. Mannheim, Trans.). Boston, NY: Mariner Books.
- Huffington Post (Trans.). (2014, November 01). France's National Front Reaches Highest Membership Number Since Party Was Founded. *The World Post*. Retrieved January, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/01/national-front_n_6087082.html
- Ideology. (1989). In *Oxford English dictionary online* (2nd ed.), Retrieved from <http://www.oup.com>
- Ignazi, P. (1996). The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties. *Party Politics*, 549-566. doi:10.1177/1354068896002004007
- Ignazi, P. (2003). *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ignazi, P. (2005). The Extreme Right: Legitimation and Evolution on the Italian Right Wing: Social and Ideological Repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the

- Lega Nord. *South European Society and Politics*, 10(2), 333-49.
doi:10.1080/13608740500135058
- Jobbik. (2015, January 26). Manifesto. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from
http://www.jobbik.com/manifesto_0
- Kallis, A. (2013). Far-Right “Contagion” or a Failing “Mainstream”? How Dangerous Ideas Cross Borders and Blur Boundaries. *Democracy and Security*, 9, 221-246. doi:10.1080/17419166.2013.792251
- Karapin, R. (1998). Radical-Right and Neo-Fascist Political Parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), 213-234. doi:10.2307/422288
- Kassidiaris, I. (2014, February). *Athens Speech*. Speech presented in Athenian constituency, Athens, Greece. (In Greek)
- Kassidiaris, I. (2015, July). *Anti-Memorandum Speech*. Speech presented in Greek Parliament, Athens, Greece. (In Greek)
- Katsourides, Y. (2013). Determinants of Extreme Right Reappearance in Cyprus: The National Popular Front (ELAM), Golden Dawn's Sister Party. *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4), 567-89.
doi:10.1080/13608746.2013.798893
- Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). *The radical right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Reprint, Revised ed.). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Koronaïou, A., & Sakellariou, A. (2013). Reflections on ‘Golden Dawn’, community organizing and nationalist solidarity: Helping (only) Greeks. *Community Development Journal*, 48(2), 332-8. Retrieved February 17, 2015, from
<http://cdj.oxfordjournals.org/>
- Koronaïou, A., Lagos, E., Sakellariou, A., Kymionis, S., & Chiotaki-Poulou, I. (2015). Golden Dawn, austerity and young people: The rise of Fascist extremism among young people in contemporary Greek society. *The Sociological Review*, 63, 2nd ser., 231-49. doi:10.1111/1467-954X.12270
- Kriesi, H., (2014). The Populist Challenge. *West European Politics*, 37(2), 361-378.
doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.887879
- Lafont, V., (2001). Les Jeunes Militants Du Front National: Trois Modèles d’Engagement et de Cheminement. *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 51(1-2), 165-198.

- Lambropoulos, V. (2012). Ένας στους δύο αστυνομικούς ψήφισαν «Χρυσή Αυγή». TO BHMA. Retrieved December 19th 2015 from <http://www.tovima.gr/afieromata/elections2012/article/?aid=457088>
- Lamontagne, B., Stockemer, D. (2010). The French National Front: A Comparison between Elected Officials' Assessments of Popular Support for the French National Front and Public Opinion Polls. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(1), 39-59.
- Le Pen, M. (2015, May). *Jeanne d'Arc Speech*. Speech at Place des Pyramides, Paris, France. (In French)
- Le Pen, M. (2015, September). *Speech on the Refugee Crisis*. Speech at the European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium. (In French)
- Le Pen, M. (2015, November). *Post-Paris Bombings Speech*. Paris, France.
- Le Pen, M. (2015, December). *Speech on Islamic Fundamentalism*. Speech at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, France. (In French)
- Lubbers, M., Gijssels, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme Right-wing Voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41(3), 345-378. Retrieved March 1, 2016.
- Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2007). Euro-Scepticism and Extreme Voting Patterns in Europe: Social Cleavages and Socio-political Attitudes Determining Voting for the Far left, the Far right, and Non-voting. *Measuring Meaningful Data in Social Research*, 71-92. Retrieved March 3, 2016, from <http://repository.uibn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/54924/54924.pdf?sequence=1>
- Lucassen, G., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(5), 547-574. doi:10.1177/0010414011427851
- Maltezos, R., & Georgiopoulos, G. (2013, September 28). Greek police arrest leader, lawmakers of far-right Golden Dawn. Reuters. Retrieved February 10, 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-goldendawn-idUSBRE98R02Q20130928>
- Manatschal, A. (2012). Path-dependent or dynamic? Cantonal integration policies between regional citizenship traditions and right populist party politics. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 35(2), 281-297. Retrieved March 23, 2015, from

- <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2011.573221#.VeB9rb6przI>
- Mayer, N., Perrineau, P. (1989). *Le Front National à Découvert*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
- Mayer, Nonna. (2013). From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 66, 160-178.
- McLellan, D. (1986). *Ideology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Michaloliakos, N. (2012, May). *Election Victory Speech*. Presented outside of Greek Parliament, Athens, Greece. (In Greek)
- Michaloliakos, N. (2013, April). *Caucus Meeting Speech*. Presented in the Greek Parliament, Athens, Greece. (In Greek)
- Michaloliakos, N. (2015, July). *Anti-U.S., Turkish and Immigrant Speech*. In front of the United States embassy, Athens, Greece. (In Greek)
- Michas, T. (2002). *Unholy alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia*. Texas A & M University Press.
- Minkenberg, M. (2001). The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy Effects. *West European Politics*, 24(4), 1-21. Retrieved March 12, 2015, from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380108425462#.Vd_cVb6przI
- Minkenberg, M. (2010). *Context and Consequence: The impact of the New Radical Right on the Political Process in France and Germany*. Retrieved April 17, 2015, from <http://www.proquest.com>
- Minkenberg, M. (2013). From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21(1), 5-24. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2013.766473>
- Mondon, A. (2013). Nicolas Sarkozy's legitimization of the Front National: background and perspectives. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 47(1), 22-40.
- Mondon, A. (2015). The French secular hypocrisy: the extreme right, the Republic and the battle for hegemony. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 49(4), 392-413. DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2015.1069063
- Mondon, A. (2014). The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender? *Modern & Contemporary France*, 23(3),

301-320.

- Mudde, C. (2002). *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2011). Who's Afraid of the European Radical Right? *Dissent*, 58(4), 7-11. doi:10.1353/dss.2011.0090
- Mudde, C. (2013). Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? *European Journal of Political Research*, 52, 1-19. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02065.x
- Mudde, C. (2015, May 16). 'Weimar Greece' and the Future of Europe. Retrieved October 27, 2015, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cas-mudde/weimar-greece-and-the-future-of-europe_b_6876944.html
- Nedos, V. (2005, September 11). Το κλούβιο: αβγό του φιδιού. TO BHMA. Retrieved from <http://www.tovima.gr/relatedarticles/article/?aid=168197&dt=11/09/2005>
- Nelis, J. (2007). Constructing Fascist Identity: Benito Mussolini And The Myth Of Romanità. *Classical World*, 391-415. Retrieved September 22, 2015, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25434050>
- Newman, B. (1944). The New Europe. *The American Journal of International Law*, 38(3). doi:10.2307/2192402
- Norris, P. (2005). *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Prowe, D. (1994). 'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts. *Contemporary European History*, 3(3), 289-314. doi:10.1017/S0960777300000904
- Ray, M. (2015, August 31). National Front; Political Party, France. Retrieved October 5, 2015, from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Front-political-party-France>
- Rensmann, L. (2011). Resentment Reloaded: How the European Radical Right Mobilizes Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism. *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, 3, 543-73. Retrieved April 19, 2015, from http://jsantisemitism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=444&lang=en

- Reunsgoat, E. (2013). Mobilizing Europe in national competition: The case of the French Front National. *International Political Science Review*, 36(3), 296-310. doi: 10.1177/0192512114568816.
- RFI (Director). (2012). *France-Paris - Marine Le Pen - Candidate a l'élection présidentielle 2012, présidente du Front National (FN)* [Video file]. Retrieved April 2, 2016, from <http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20160322-marine-canada-france-humour>
- Rydgren, J., & Ruth, P. (2013). Contextual explanations of radical right-wing support in Sweden: Socioeconomic marginalization, group threat, and the halo effect. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(4), 711-28. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.623786>
- Sakellariou, A. (2015). Golden Dawn and its Appeal to Greek Youth. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung - Perspectives*, 1-19.
- Samuel, H. (2015, December 06). Far-Right Front National on course to make history in French regional elections. The Telegraph. Retrieved January 8, 2016, from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/12036230/Far-Right-Front-National-on-course-to-make-history-in-French-regional-elections.html>
- Sandelind, C. (2014). *European Populism and Winning the Immigration Debate* (1st ed.). Falun: Fores.
- Shields, J. (2011). Radical or not so radical? Tactical Variation in Core Policy Formation by the Front National, *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 29(3), 1-25. doi:10.3167/fpcs.2011.290306
- Skenderovic, D. (2007). Immigration and the radical right in Switzerland: Ideology, discourse and opportunities. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 41(2), 155-76. doi:10.1080/00313220701265528
- Smith, H. (2013, September 24). Greece launches inquiry into claims Golden Dawn trained by armed forces. The Guardian. Retrieved February 05, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/greece-inquiry-golden-dawn-armed-forces>
- Smith, H. (2014, January 17). Golden Dawn photos shock Greece. The Guardian. Retrieved February 05, 2016, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/greece-golden-dawn-mock-execution-nazi-salute-claims>

- Stefanova, B. (2009). Ethnic nationalism, social structure, and Political Agency: Explaining electoral support for the Radical Right in Bulgaria. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(9), 1534-56. doi:10.1080/01419870802541754
- Stockemer, D. (2015). Introduction to the special issue: Explaining the spike in electoral support for the Front National in France. *French Politics*, 13(4), 319-323.
- Stockemer, D. (2012). THE SWISS RADICAL RIGHT: WHO ARE THE (NEW) VOTERS OF THE SWISS PEOPLES' PARTY?. *Representation*, 48(2), 197-201, DOI:10.1080/00344893.2012.683490
- Stockemer, D. (2014). Who are the members of the French National Front? Evidence from interview research. *French Politics*, 12(1), 36-58. Retrieved February 25, 2015, from <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/fp/journal/v12/n1/full/fp20141a.html>
- Stockemer, D. (2015). *FN Draft Book Manuscript*.
- Stohos. (2013). ΜΙΧΑΛΟΛΙΑΚΟΣ: ΤΟΥ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ ΣΤΗΝ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΥΠΟΛΗ, ΣΤΗΝ ΣΜΥΡΝΗ, ΣΤΗΝ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΟΥΝΤΑ...!!! ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΗ Η ΣΥΝΕΝΤΕΥΞΗ ΤΟΥ ΑΡΧΗΓΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΧΡΥΣΗΣ ΑΥΓΗΣ...(In Greek) στοχος. Retrieved January 17, 2016, from http://www.stoxos.gr/2012/12/blog-post_7247.html
- Sum, P. E. (2010). The radical right in Romania: Political party evolution and the distancing of Romania from Europe. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 43, 19-29. Retrieved April 23, 2015, from www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud.
- Syllas, C. (2014). It's all Greek... *Index on Censorship*, 43(1), 28-33. doi:10.1177/0306422014522185
- Szele, A. (2012). Extraordinary Situations, Extraordinary Means: The Regenerative Projects of the Hungarian Radical Right. *CEU Political Science Journal*, 7(02), 123-144. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from www.cceol.com.
- Tomic, D. (2013). On the 'right' side? The Radical Right in the Post-Yugoslav Area and the Serbian Case. *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, 2, 94-114. Retrieved April 25, 2015, from <http://www.brill.com/Fascism>
- Tripodi, P. (1998). The National Alliance and the Evolution of the Italian Right. *Contemporary Review*, 272(1589). Retrieved October 26, 2015, from <http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/ps/i.do?&id=GALE%7CA20980022&v=2.1&u=otta77973&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w>
- Valmyndigheten. (2014, September 20). Val Till Riksdagen - Röster. Retrieved March 1, 2016, from

- <http://www.val.se/val/val2014/slutresultat/R/rike/index.html>
- Van Der Brug, W., & Fennema, M. (2003). Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-immigrant Parties Developed into two Separate Groups by 1999. *European Journal of Political Research Eur J Political Res*, 42(1), 55-76. Retrieved March 1, 2016.
- Van Der Brug, W., & Fennema, M. (2007). Forum: Causes of Voting for the Radical Right. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 19(4), 474-487. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
- Varga, M. (2014). Hungary's "anti-capitalist" far-right: Jobbik and the Hungarian Guard. *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 42(5), 791-807. doi:10.1080/00905992.2014.926316
- Vasilopoulou, S. (2011). European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition. *Government and Opposition*, 46(2), 223-44. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01337.x
- Vasilopoulou, S., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2015). The Golden Dawn's 'Nationalist Solution': Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece. *Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean*, 1-110. doi:10.1057/9781137535917
- Werts, H., Scheepers, P., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right. *European Union Politics*, 14(2), 183-205. doi:10.1177/1465116512469287
- Williams, M. (2011). A new era for French far right politics? Comparing the FN under two Le Pens. *Analise Social*, 46(201), 679-695.
- Williams, M. (2006). *The impact of radical right-wing parties in West European democracies* (1st ed., Vol. 1). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wiesenthal, J. (2012, May 6). Check Out This Video Of Greek Nazis Behaving Exactly Like You'd Expect Nazis To Behave. Business Insider. Retrieved January 17, 2016, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/golden-dawn-party-makes-journalists-rise-for-entrance-of-leader-2012-5>
- Zaslove, A. (2004). The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right. *European Integration*, 26(1), 61-81. doi:10.1080/0703633042000197799
- Zaslove, A. (2009). The Populist Radical Right: Ideology, Party Families and Core Principles. *Political Studies Review*, 309-318. doi:10.1111/j.1478-9302.2009.00191.x

Ziller, C., & Schubel, T. (2015). "The Pure People" versus "the Corrupt Elite"? Political Corruption, Political Trust and the Success of Radical Right Parties in Europe. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 1-19.
doi:10.1080/17457289.2014.1002792s