



THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN FRANCE

The shifting threat of migration: From a threat to culture to a source of
terrorism

Evan Sweet , MA Candidate
Supervised by Professor Costanza Musu
Submitted as the final requirement for the Graduate School of Public
and International Affairs
July 19, 2017

Abstract

This paper seeks to assess how migration has become a matter of security in France. It will use securitization as a theoretical framework to explore how migration has become securitized in France over the past 25 years, and argue that migration has shifted from a perceived threat to societal and cultural security to a more traditional threat to security, specifically in the form of terrorism. It argues that the Syrian refugee crisis and recent terrorist attacks in France have shifted the securitization of migration from being presented as a threat to domestic culture to a traditional national security threat. Broadly, this paper will look at the refugee crisis, terrorist attacks in France and the integration of minorities and how these issues contribute to the securitization of migration. By analyzing current events surrounding the refugee crisis in France and the securitizing power of French Laws and EU treaties, it is possible to see how pervasive the securitization of migration has become in contemporary France. This paper argues that migration has become securitized through political discourse, discourse in the media, and the practices of security and policing officials. Securitization of migration in France has resulted from failed integration of the large Muslim-majority immigrant population, riots in the *banlieue* and the communities' unproven links to terrorism, recent terrorist attacks, and the Syrian refugee crisis. This paper finds that securitization in France is largely directed at the significant Muslim population living in the poor *banlieue* outside of major cities, and more recently the refugees arriving in Europe. Linking refugees and minority populations to a terrorist threat has negative implications for these communities, and this paper finds that often these linkages are based more on perception than reality. The paper concludes that societal issues in France need to be addressed beyond the scope of security.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction	4
Migrants, Immigrants and Refugees	9
Chapter 2 - Literature Review	13
Securitization Theory	13
Securitization of Migration	17
Securitization of Refugees and Asylum Seekers	21
Securitization of Migration in France	24
Chapter 3 - Immigration and Integration in France	24
Embedded Social Issues	32
Chapter 4 - How Migration Becomes Securitized	34
Securitizing Migration in France	37
Political Discourse	39
Discourse in the Media	41
Chapter 5 - Laws, Treaties and Migration	43
French Laws	43
EU Treaties	44
Foreign Fighters and the EU	47
Chapter 6 - Current Situation	48
Refugee Crisis	48
Terror Connections	50
Convergence of the Refugee Crisis and Terrorism in France	52
Chapter 7 - Implications of Securitization	55
Chapter 8 - Conclusions	59
Appendix	63
Figure 1: Main immigrant groups in France	63
Figure 2: Immigration to France, 1994 to 2003	64
Map 1: Radical individuals in France.	65
Bibliography	66

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Since the globalization of security threats the movement of people has been brought under intense scrutiny. As developments in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have led to the creation of technologies that facilitate communication on a global scale as well as more open borders, migration has moved from the purview of a country's department of immigration to, in many cases, a matter of state security and policing. Security, as a fluid concept, can be applied to any object that a state, group, the media or the public sees as a threat to them and/or their way of life. (Walters, 2010; Buzan, 1998). In this sense, migration has come to be framed as a security issue by many groups around Europe, whether it be the government, political parties or the media. Migration is not a security threat in itself, but it can become one through the discourse and practices applied to it: a theoretical framework known as securitization. This framework is the most useful to describe the transformation of migration into an issue of security.

This paper will explore the securitization of migration in France and how recent discourse linking terrorism with migrants and refugees is part of a wider social issue regarding integration and immigrants in France. The central questions which guided this research are as follows: to what extent and how has migration become securitized in the past 25 years? Has it become more of a security issue since the Syrian refugee crisis began in 2011? This paper will use securitization as a theoretical framework to explore how migration has become securitized in France over the past 25 years, and argue that since the beginning of the refugee crisis and following recent attacks, migration has shifted from a perceived threat to societal and cultural security to a more traditional threat to security, specifically in the form of terrorism. I have chosen to focus on France for a variety of reasons. Firstly, since 2011, France has suffered numerous terrorist attacks, and as such provides an interesting ground on which to study the

nexus of migration and security. Recently, these attacks seem to have become more frequent, with notable attacks taking place on a Toulouse Jewish school in 2012, the Charlie Hebdo offices in January 2015, the November 2015 shootings and bombings in Paris, and the truck attack in Nice in 2016. While these attacks in particular gained the most media attention because of the high number of casualties, there have also been smaller attacks and attempted attacks. The recent spate of attacks coupled with the refugee crisis has created a tense environment in France surrounding migration and the perceived threats that come with it. These attacks have resulted in an official state of emergency in France, bringing a large police and military presence and increased border controls. (Pop & Turner, 2016; Holehouse, 2016). This increase of attacks and the European-wide refugee crisis, has created a situation in which security and migration are very important issues for the public, politicians, and intelligence and policing agencies.

Secondly, France is an interesting case because of societal and historical issues, such as racism towards North African minorities, tensions with immigrants of Algerian descent and socio-economic disparities between France's majority and minority populations. (Hussey, 2014). Migration as a security issue is not new within France, though lately the focus of this security threat may have shifted from societal security to national security and/or public safety. The issues of societal security and integration will be further discussed and explored later in this paper. The foremost societal issue, as it relates to security and migration, is that of France's Muslim population, which is one of the largest in Western Europe. (Pew Global, 2016). Long before the refugee crisis began and prior to the latest wave of attacks, this segment of the French population had come under scrutiny for a perceived lack of integration into society and had been linked to various security threats. (Bourbeau, 2011; Hussey, 2014). Examples of these tensions are the controversy of Muslim girls wearing headscarves in French schools in 1989, Algerian

Nationalist violence in the 1990s, and riots in predominantly Muslim Parisian *banlieue* in the 2000s, the most notable riot being in 2005. (Laurence, 2006; Hussey, 2014). All of these events were linked to the security of the French state in some way. As such the securitization of migration in France has significant historical roots and is in no sense a recent phenomenon.

The recent refugee crisis and the attacks throughout France has brought immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, and Islamist extremism, to the forefront of the public debate. France has experienced these terrorist attacks at a time when a record number of refugees are coming from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, and therefore many linkages have been made between the “wave of migrants” and an increase in extremism. (Bourbeau, 2015; Luedtke, 2015). The links between refugees, violence and insecurity are not new, but it is possible that it has re-emerged or become more prominent since the refugee crisis began and this mass movement of people became visible in the daily lives of Europeans. This paper will comprise of eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant literature as it relates to securitization theory, the securitization of migration and the securitization of migration in France. The classic securitization works of Thierry Balzacq, Barry Buzan, and Didier Bigo will provide a foundation of securitization theory on which much of this paper is built. Chapter 3 will look at Islam in France and the integration of the Muslim community. The position of the Muslim and immigrant communities within France is closely related to the securitization of migration, even though in many cases Muslim and immigrant families have been settled for two or three generations. As well, these communities are sometimes perceived as a threat to cultural homogeneity and as a source radical Islamist terrorism against the state and the public, which contributes to securitization. Such thinking stems from the idea that Islam is incompatible with French society and the linkage of these communities with extreme violence, such as the Algerian

terrorism in the 1990s and the riots in, and the perceived danger of, the *banlieue* surrounding Paris, Lyon and Marseille. It will be argued that many of these issues have roots in integration problems, rather than inherent incompatibility and violent tendencies on the side of the Muslim community. France provides an interesting case because it is home to one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe. Studying France with regards to the integration of its Muslim population may provide insight into other Western European countries that are also home to large Muslim communities, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Britain.

Chapter 4 demonstrates how issues, migration in particular, can become a matter of security. Migration is not inherently an issue of domestic and/or international security, yet it can be made into one through the framework of securitization. Migration can become a threat to security through discourse in politics and the media and practices of security professionals, provided that the audience, usually a state's citizens, accept it as such. Chapter 4 goes on to explore the discourse in the media and in politics behind the securitization of migration in France. For the purposes of this paper, I will look at the post-1989 period. 1989 provided a turning point in the securitization of migration and immigration, particularly in the Muslim community, because of the *Affaire du Foulard* in Creteil when two French girls were sent home from school for wearing headscarves. This event provided a catalyst for migration and immigrants of Muslim-origin to be viewed as a threat to French cultural homogeneity (Freedman, 2004), a worry which is being repeated today in face of the refugee crisis, though also with an element of threatening national security. 1989 was the year that the Berlin wall fell and conflicts in Eastern Europe produced many refugees fleeing to Western Europe, events which changed migration and security within Europe and from which the UN acknowledged the destabilizing effect migration may have. (Lohrmann, 2000).

Chapter 5 will provide a brief overview of the French laws and EU treaties that affect migration and the treatment of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants alike. The main French laws affecting immigration are the Pasqua law, the Sarkozy law and the Dubre law. Each of these laws are related to the movement of people, and in some cases it can be argued that they contributed to the securitization of migration by framing it as a threat. At the EU level, there are specific treaties related to asylum seekers and migrants, including the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009). Like the French laws, these treaties present certain aspects of migration as a threat that needs to be controlled.

Chapter 6 focuses on the current situation of the refugee crisis in the EU. I will look at some of the causes of the refugee crisis, including the conflict in Syria and Iraq (where the majority of refugees are arriving from), as well as conflicts in Northern and Central Africa, and generally how conflict, poverty and state fragility has caused a spillover of migrants and refugees to Europe. That most of these people are from Muslim countries has led to a fear of them exporting secular and extremist violence to Europe, and the fear of ISIS terrorists coming in with the migrants and refugees. Attacks in Brussels, Nice, Paris and Berlin worked to highlight these fears of terrorists arriving amongst the migrants and refugees. I will analyze the trend of these fears.

Chapter 7 analyzes the implications of securitizing migration and making it an issue of state security, rather than the purview of an immigration department. In recent times, it seems that the migration of specifically Muslim people has become a security issue because of the fear of cultural dilution and/or terrorism, a view often perpetrated by populist and right-wing politicians and media. If migration is related to international security and the survival of the state, it will cause states to be reluctant to accept asylum seekers, especially those from the

Middle East or Africa. Once in the state's territory, the state can use securitization to justify more intense screening and surveillance methods at their borders and throughout their territory.

Intelligence agencies would be able to normalize intrusive surveillance on the grounds of protecting national security. This leads to the unfair targeting of minority groups, such as Muslim youth in the *banlieue*. It is important to understand the transition of migration to a security concern and the implications this will have. Chapter 8 will provide conclusions and look at the refugee crisis through the lens of securitization and how this process has been present since the crisis began, and if the associated fears are justified. I will revisit the terrorist attacks in France and the effect they had on securitization, and if the links to the refugee crisis are warranted.

Migrants, Immigrants and Refugees

The refugee crisis in Europe has caused many states and citizens to question the mass movement of people and the mobility that these people enjoy. One of the main issues surrounding this crisis is how the people entering Europe, or attempting to enter Europe, are classified. Migrant, refugee and immigrant each have a different meaning, yet these terms have become used interchangeably by the media, by politicians, and by citizens, causing much confusion on what to call the migrant/refugee crisis. (Saunders, 2016; Baxter, 2015). This section will seek to differentiate between these concepts. Terms have emerged in media and political discourse, and have overlapped, with the shifting discourse allowing the terms to be used interchangeably and have a securitizing effect on many of these groups.

The crisis in Europe is referred to both as the migrant crisis and as the refugee crisis. The people that have come to Europe from various conflict and poverty stricken zones are a mixture of refugees, fleeing for their safety and survival, and economic migrants, trying to get to Europe

in search of a better life and to escape poverty. The wide use of terms has confused the narrative that surrounds this crisis. “Migrant” and “refugee” have been used interchangeably by the media and policy makers alike to refer to the recent arrivals from the global south. (Georgiou, 2017). The result of this confusion surrounding the terms have led much of the media to refer to the crisis as the migrant/refugee crisis. This is not a new phenomenon, and confusion surrounding the terms applied to people on the move is often present when studying security and migration. Political actors one year may state that asylum seekers are placing a burden on security, and then the next year they may say that economic migrants are a source of insecurity. (Guild, 2009). While these are two different groups of people, both can be deemed a source of insecurity. Certainly in Europe, the terms “immigrant” and “migrant” have negative connotations, and is applied to entire groups of people, even if they are not themselves an immigrant but the child of an immigrant. (ibid, pp. 14). For the purpose of this paper it is important to understand the difference in these terms, even though they have often been used interchangeably.

The Council of Europe broadly defines a migrant as “any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country”. (COE, 2014). This is a very difficult definition to apply to the vast majority of the people currently in camps in Europe or attempting to get there, as most of them have not acquired “significant social ties” to the countries they are currently in. Such a definition narrows down the focus of people to migrant workers, a term which does not apply to the asylum seekers and refugees fleeing to Europe. A UN report on migrant workers more broadly defined migrant as “covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of 'personal convenience' and without intervention of an external compelling factor”. (ibid). While this term is broader, it could be applied to some of some of the people coming to

Europe who are not strictly refugees. In the case of refugees, the decision to migrate is not a free one and is often a matter of life or death. Those migrants fleeing poverty and seeking economic benefits in Europe could fall under this definition. Economic migrants are not in the same category as refugees, and it has been argued that many of the people trying to reach Europe are doing so for economic reasons. The “migrant” part of the crisis refers to these people, while the rest of the people are refugees fleeing conflicts. Even though refugees are in greater need of assistance, the hardships and extreme poverty that many of the migrants classified as “economic migrants” cannot be underestimated. The distinction between the two categories is not an easy one to make.

The difficulty in distinguishing between economic migrants and refugees is a cause of concern for many European citizens and politicians. While states have a moral and legal obligation to protect refugees and some asylum seekers, no such obligation exists for economic migrants. Even though the term “migrant” and “refugee” are being increasingly used as though they mean the same thing, the UN stresses that they are different terms. Refugees are persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution, and as of the end of 2015 there were 21.5 million refugees worldwide. (UNHCR, 2016). Refugees are in need of protection because it is too dangerous to return to their home state. Currently, most of the refugees coming to Europe are fleeing conflicts and persecution in Syria (360,000 people), Afghanistan (175,000) and Iraq (125,000). (BBC, 2016). People from fleeing war zones are due protection and the assurance that they will not be returned to their home state. Migrants are not under direct threat, and choose to move to improve their lives, reunite with family, or a variety of other reasons. (UNHCR, 2016). They can safely return home without being under direct threat from their government and/or ongoing conflict. Migrants are due respect and human rights the same as refugees, yet it is important to distinguish

between the two categories because of the particular predicament that refugees are in. It can be damaging and undermining to refugees when politicians, the media and the public combine the two terms and associate each with security issues and economic burden. The thousands of people reaching Europe are a combination of refugees and migrants, and it is important from a legal point of view to determine which are which so that the refugees are given the protection they are due.

The term, or concept, of “immigrant” will also be central to this paper. An immigrant refers to a person who comes to a country to take up permanent residence. (Merriam-Webster). This may involve taking on the citizenship of a new country, or being a dual citizen if that is permitted. Immigration has been at the forefront of political and public debate for some time in Europe, particularly in France where this paper will focus. With the current migrant/refugee crisis, immigrants and second generation immigrants are coming under fire from politicians and the public as an additional part of the problem that needs to be controlled as well. Immigrant, in many countries, has come to have a negative connotation that is loaded with security-related content. (Guild, 2009). Guild provided the example of Moroccans and Malians, who are called “immigrants” in many countries regardless of their status in the eyes of the state. In some cases, the migrant/refugee crisis is viewed as an extension of this immigrant problem and migrants, refugees and immigrants, be they first or second generation, are all viewed under the same category.

For the purpose of this paper, the current crisis will be referred to as the refugee crisis. While, as mentioned, the people arriving to Europe are a combination of refugees and economic migrants, this paper will simply use “refugee crisis”, even though it is difficult to draw a distinction between migrants and refugees without official numbers. The media has mostly used

the terms migrant or asylum-seeker to refer to the people residing in the Calais “jungle” and, after its destruction, the northern arrondissements of Paris near Gare du Nord and Stalingrad. (McGuinness, 2016; Gagnon, 2016; France24, 2016; Frej, 2017). As reported by the media, these asylum-seekers come from a variety of states including Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria. Some will be eligible for asylum, thus they are technically refugees, but some will not be able to claim asylum successfully. The diverse nature of the background of the people arriving in France makes it difficult to use one term or category to encompass the whole group. Refugee and refugee crisis will be applied in the remainder of this paper. This must be taken lightly as some will be granted official refugee status and some will not, however they are seeking some sort of refuge from their states of origin.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

Securitization Theory

Securitization theory emerged from the Copenhagen School, led by Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Waever. A study of securitization should begin with this school of thought. Buzan, de Wilde and Waever argue that security is about survival and if there is an existential threat to a referent object, such as the state, territory, environment, and/or society, a security matter exists and extraordinary steps must be taken to deal with this security issue. (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 21). Buzan, de Wilde and Waever present securitization as a process through which an actor, be it the state, media or any number of actors, seek to depict an object as an existential threat, with the goal of legitimizing extraordinary means against this threat. It is important to note that security is not thought of in a traditional, realist way in which

the state approaches its survival through an approach focused solely on military power. Instead, securitization takes the approach that follows Buzan's idea of a broadening and deepening of security issues, in which security issues are constructed and can cover much more than a state's military power. This paper will use securitization theory, informed by a variety of both classic and contemporary sources, to present the securitization of migration in France.

Rita Abrahamson used securitization theory to present how Africa has become securitized through speeches of Western leaders, with a particular focus on Tony Blair. Abrahamson says that for the Copenhagen school, security is not a pre-existing or objective condition but the outcome of a process, such as a specific speech act framing an issue as a threat to a referent object. (Abrahamson, 2005). As opposed to security being something that is a hard concept, in terms of military power, securitization theory argues that anything can become a matter of security through a process. Security does not refer only to military interactions between states and the threats that can arise from these interactions. Security may refer to any object that is presented as a threat to a referent object.

Thierry Balzacq is another important scholar of securitization. In line with the Copenhagen School, he too sees securitization as a process rather than something that is objective and pre-existing. Balzacq defines securitization, quite complexly, as "an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor. who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations. thoughts and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be immediately

undertaken to block it.” (Balzacq, 2011, p.3). While this is a very complicated definition, in sum he is saying that securitization is the use of tools, such as policies or speech acts, by an actor to convince an audience of the threatening nature of some referent object in order to justify extraordinary measures. Legitimization of extraordinary measures against some identified security threat is a recurring theme in most theories of securitization.

This idea of securitization as a process is shared between Balzacq and the Copenhagen School. Whereas neo-realism and realism define security very narrowly as the threat, use and control of military force, securitization, as mentioned, takes a much broader and deeper view. In securitization theory a referent object’s security threat does not depend on its features, it comes from the interactions between a securitizing actor and its audience. (Balzacq, 2016). In this sense an issue can only become securitized if the intended audience, such as the public or parliament, accepts it as some kind of existential threat. When assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory, Cote defines it as “individual(s) or group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice.” (Cote, 2016, pp. 548). The audience is an essential aspect of securitization theory and vital to the process of securitizing an issue. As soon as an audience accepts the link being made between a referent object and a threat to their security, this issue has been successfully securitized. (Balzacq, 2005). One can see the danger of securitization since anything can go through this process, even if it does not pose a real or tangible threat. Once an issue is securitized, a state may seem justified in taking extraordinary measures in the name of national security as the audience will not oppose such measures.

According to Philippe Bourbeau, securitization has two main logics: the logic of exception and the logic of routine. The logic of exception is closely related to Balzacq and the

Copenhagen School and assumes that security is a process designed to combat existential threats with extraordinary measures. (Bourbeau, 2014). On the other hand, “the logic of routine views securitization as a collection of routinized and patterned practices, typically carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals, in which technology comes to hold a prominent place”. (Bourbeau, 2014, pp. 188). While oftentimes in securitization literature these two logics are distinct and separate, Bourbeau argues that they are not exclusive and often work together. In this sense, I agree with Bourbeau and this paper will use both logics together. This will be demonstrated and argued later in this paper. Didier Bigo is one of the main proponents of the logic of routine. He has argued that issues become a matter of security through administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation and proactive preparation. (Bigo, 2002). Bigo theorizes that the practices of security officials play a part in determining what issues become a matter of security. This differs from the theory of the Copenhagen School, in which actors such as the media and government officials may securitize an issue through speech acts provided the audience accepts such action. These different theories of how issues become securitized do not need to be conflicting, and may work together to securitize existential threats which are perceived or real.

An important part of securitization theory is threat framing. Since securitization exists as a process that allows for anything to be used as a referent object for security, provided the threat is accepted by the audience, framing issues as a threat is a key part of the securitization process. Rychnovska discussed the power of threat framing and used the UN, as a powerful international institution, as an example of how issues can be framed as threats. It is argued that the UN has the power to securitize issues through framing these issues as a threat. The UN can be a securitizing actor of global issues by authorizing the use of force, or other exceptional measures, against a

global security threat, thereby embodying the “exceptional measures” seen so often in securitization theory. (Rychnovska, 2014). Rychnovska uses the example of the 9/11 attacks and how this led to a global securitization of terrorism, as well as many issues surrounding it, and the adoption of many new and extraordinary measures. Through threat framing the UN can securitized issues because of its institutional power, with the example of global terrorism being used to illustrate this. Framing an issue as a security threat, either through a speech act or security practices, is an important part of the securitization process as developed by Buzan, Waever and Balzacq.

Securitization of Migration

Securitization can be applied to many objects, ideas, groups and individuals as long as they are framed as posing an existential threat and as long as an audience accepts this threat as legitimate. For the purpose of this paper it is important to look at the literature surrounding the securitization of migration in particular. The securitization of migration is an issue that has been extensively studied, and some argue that it is the issue to which securitization theory has been applied most frequently. (see Huysmans, 2006; Guild, 2009). This is especially true in the European Union, where migration and the movement of people, especially across the EU’s external borders, has been a security issue for some time.

Myron Weiner wrote on the relation of migration and security issues before they were commonly linked in the public mind and official discourse. Writing after the end of the Cold War and during the breakup of Yugoslavia, Weiner wrote that the conflicts had created insecure minorities that often wanted to emigrate, yet few countries would accept them. (Weiner, 1993). He argued that constraints on Western European countries accepting these people, at the time

often from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, were fears that an influx of another ethnic group could give rise to xenophobic sentiments, conflicts between natives and migrants, and the growth of anti-immigrant right-wing parties. (ibid). Weiner's arguments and insights prove to still be relevant today as refugees and immigration is a political issue in Europe and there has been the rise of many right-wing parties. At the time of writing, Weiner highlighted the fact that an influx of refugees was portrayed as a potential threat to security because of terrorist attacks they may carry out and also a threat to the ethnic homogeneity of a state (ibid), which has been called societal security by Didier Bigo. (Bigo, 2002). Weiner's work is a valuable starting block for a review of securitization of migration, as he outlines the various security threats refugees *may* pose, though he recognizes that these fears are often overblown by governments and media. The securitization of migration in the EU, and the perceived threat of mass movement of people, remains a very sensitive and important issues for governments and Europeans.

Jef Huysmans has often written on the securitization of migration in the EU. Since the 1980s, debates surrounding migration have tended to focus on migration as a danger to the public order and domestic society. (Huysmans, 2000). Huysmans goes on to argue that "The process of securitization of migration does not include just a few far right groups. It has included national governments, grass root organizations, police networks, the media, etc." (Huysmans, 2000, pp. 758). It can be seen that the securitization of migration is a far reaching topic, with many different groups concerned about the impacts and consequences of an influx of people into their society. The idea of migration posing a threat to domestic society and culture is what Ole Waever and Huysmans have referred to as societal insecurity. Societal insecurity is seen when immigrants and refugees are portrayed as disturbing normal life and endangering a collective way of life practiced by an entire community. (Huysmans, 2006). In this sense, the security

threat is not directed at the state in a traditional military sense, but at the domestic culture and traditional ethnic group. State survival is a question of sovereignty, whereas societal security focuses on the survival of the identity of a group of people. (Waeber, 1993). The notion of an existential threat to domestic culture can arise from how immigration and immigrant communities are framed. Huysmans finds that “Extensive media coverage of immigrant involvement in riots in urban ghettos, the political rendering of these riots as incivility, and the presenting of the notion of a dangerous class create an idea of cultural danger.” (Huysmans, 2000, pp. 763). When immigration is framed as a source of riots and instability, it becomes securitized in the public eye. Often, metaphors of “floods” and “invasions” of immigrants are used to create a negative image of immigration and securitize it. (Huysmans, 2006). Rhetoric of this nature has played an important role of the securitization of migration throughout Europe.

The issue of migration as a security threat is especially relevant in Europe, even more so recently, as the continent is faced with large numbers of migrants and refugees from the global south who are often fleeing conflict zones. However, the securitization of migration is not a new phenomenon. Huysmans provides an excellent overview of the securitization of migration in Europe. As well, there are many other scholars who have much to offer in this area. Didier Bigo has argued that migration has increasingly been interpreted as a security problem, and that the securitization of migration has come from speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create against certain groups of people and the specific actions of security professionals. (Bigo, 2002). The security-migration issue became increasingly visible in Europe, and as such gained more academic attention since the 1990s. It has been argued that 9/11 contributed greatly to the securitization of migration in Europe and around the world (Boswell, 2007) and that these events allowed migration to be increasingly framed and constructed as a security issue, placing borders

and controlling entry at the top of many governments' agendas. (Humphrey, 2013). When studying the securitization of migration in Europe post-9/11, Boswell found that the attack had far reaching consequences for the securitization of migration in Europe and allowed law enforcement agencies to try and draw a link between counter-terrorism and migration control. (Boswell, 2007). While 9/11 did perhaps provide a catalyst for the securitization of migration, an attempt to causally link immigration and terrorism proved difficult to sustain, according to Boswell. Boswell provides a contrast to Bigo's view that security officials strongly securitize migration and argues that security professionals do not exercise complete control over migration policies. (ibid). However, in a later publication Boswell argues that states have been able to realize their migration control policies and justify "draconian" control measures through highlighting the security threats associated with migration, allowing seemingly illegitimate practices to become normalized. (Boswell, 2011). In this sense, Boswell supports securitization's logic of exception rather than the logic of routine. 9/11 did move the securitization of migration more into the public eye and give governments license to implement stricter mobility controls, yet it has been an issue in Europe since the late 1980s (see Weiner, 1993; Buzan et al, 1998; Huysmans, 2000).

Over the past few decades, migration has become more visible across Europe and pressure has been applied to governments to better control their borders. (Broeders, 2013). Doty wrote on immigration and the politics of security at the turn of the 21st century, prior to when migration came to the forefront as a security issue. In line with the Copenhagen School, she argued that issues are not inherently a security issue, but become security issues through a process, and these issues can threaten state or society. Doty and Kaya discuss the increasing focus on societal security over state security. (Doty, 2000; Kaya, 2007). Societal security is the

ability of society to keep essential aspects under perceived or real threats, an idea linked with national identity. (Doty, 2000). The concept of societal security will be central to this paper as immigration is presented as a societal threat. The process of securitizing issues goes hand in hand with what has been a shift in the focus of security studies to society as the referent for what needs to be secured and protected. Behind this societal threat is categorizing migrants and/or refugees as 'others' and linking them to unemployment, drug trafficking, human trafficking, criminality and terrorism. (Kaya, 2007). It is this discourse that creates a fear of refugees among the public, who come to view them as a very real threat to their safety, jobs, and way of life.

Securitization of Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Refugees in particular are becoming objects of securitization, as they are often fleeing conflict zones and there is a fear they will bring conflict or upheaval with them. With many refugees coming to Europe from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a fear among European states that terrorists or ISIS sympathizers may be among the refugees. This is the latest development of the transition of refugees into a security issue. Globalization is one of the factors that has contributed to this transition. As international travel is now more accessible than ever, globalization has led to changes in the composition and scale of international migration, with refugees and asylum seekers being labelled as unwanted international travelers by many Western policymakers. (Richmond, 2005). This attitude towards refugees, viewed as a destabilizing threat, has been illustrated by European states reluctance to accept many of these people. This is not only a contemporary issue, as it has been present throughout recent history. Lohrmann wrote on refugees as a source of insecurity at the turn of the century, before 9/11 brought the issue to the forefront of the public mind. Regarding conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Congo, the

UN explicitly admitted that forced population movements are a destabilizing factor for regional and international security. (Lohrmann, 2000). Mass movement of refugees fleeing conflict present security issues for receiving states on how to accommodate these people, while at the same time balancing security concerns. Terrorist attacks, such as the 1995 GIA bombing in Paris and the 1993 World Trade Centre attack, have illustrated the possible spillover of domestic conflicts to receiving countries. (ibid). Terrorist attacks, or similar events, create a fear of refugees from conflict zones, even if refugees did not perpetrate the attack. As such, the globalization of conflict and terrorism has caused many states, both at the public level and in politics, to link terrorism with refugees and migration. This fear is being played out in the rhetoric of populist European politicians, including Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders.

Fiona Adamson wrote on the transition of migrations and refugees onto the security agenda because of the effects of globalization. She argues that policymakers in the United States, Europe and much of the Western world are increasingly making links between migration policy and national security, as refugee flows are seen as a conduit for terrorism. (Adamson, 2006). Refugees have transitioned from a humanitarian issue to one that also includes security and public safety. Scholars and policymakers alike are “finding it increasingly difficult to ignore the relationship between migration and security in a highly interconnected world defined by globalization processes. Globalization is changing the overall environment in which states operate, including how they formulate their security policies.” (Adamson, 2006, pp. 167). Globalization has offered many benefits to Western states, yet it has also been a cause for concern in terms of increased ease of movement for all people.

Feller wrote on the intersection of refugees and globalization, and the threats that come with it. He argues that since 9/11, the globalization of the movement of people carries with it

“the spectre of terror exported, transnational crime proliferating, national borders abused with impunity and host community ways of life under serious threat.” (Feller, 2006, pp. 511). Whether or not these fears are justified is another matter that will be explored later on in this paper. Feller argues that refugees and asylum-seekers have been mischaracterized, either intentionally or unintentionally, as bringing with them a host of problems, resulting in responses to refugees that undermine their protection rather than facilitate it. (Feller, 2006). In the public mind, links are often made between international terrorism and asylum-seekers, even though none of the 9/11 hijackers or the Bali, Madrid or London bombers was a refugee or asylum seeker. (ibid). This demonstrates the securitization of the refugee and how the refugee has become a referent object for security, even if this is a concept that is relatively unfounded. Some politicians’ rhetoric draws on these fears of refugees, and this fear is often accepted by at least some of the state’s citizens, who are the audience for this securitization. In closing, Feller argues that “the tendency to criminalize and vilify asylum seekers and refugees seems to be increasing, not only in the wake of contemporary terrorist attacks but also, more generally, because of racism, xenophobia and social exclusion.” (Feller, 2006, pp.522). The role of terrorist attacks in the securitization of refugees will be explored in this paper, as will the social exclusion of the Muslim and immigrant populations in France.

While refugees can benefit from globalization and the ease of travel that comes with it, they also suffer as they become objects of security concerns. Fears of refugees as vehicles of terrorism has caused policymakers to link security and refugees in both discourse and security practices. How this affects refugees will be analyzed in this paper. This is an issue of ongoing importance, as conflicts around the world cause refugee flows, states must balance their duty to provide safety to asylum-seekers with public safety.

Securitization of Migration in France

France provides a particularly interesting case as migration has been securitized for some time. Benson, Bourbeau, and Caviedes have looked at the issue of the securitization of migration in France, and how it is framed as a threat to cultural stability. Benson has mentioned the rise in France of migration as a security issue instead of an economic one (Benson, 2013) and that during the 1990s immigrants were increasingly linked with crime (Benson, 2002). What needs to be studied further is if the attacks in 2014 and 2015 further shifted migration towards a central security issue. France has had a long history of anti-immigrant right-wing parties, a prime example being the National Front, who suggests migration is a problem. (Caviedes, 2015). Philippe Bourbeau's *Study of Movement and Order* provides an excellent point of departure for gaining a basis for the securitization of migration in France. He defines securitization as the "process of integrating migrants discursively and institutionally into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defence" (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 43), which he argues has taken place in France through various speech acts and laws that have been passed. While studying the securitization of migration in France, Bourbeau found that the French believe there are too many immigrants and that they pose a threat to French culture. (Bourbeau, 2011). This suggests strong securitization of migration in the country. Whether or not migration has shifted further onto the security agenda and become linked to terrorism, and the factors contributing to this, will be studied in this paper.

Chapter 3 - Immigration and Integration in France

France is home to 4 – 6 million Muslims, its largest and fastest growing minority group,

and one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe. (Pauly, 2004). Most of France's immigrants originate from Algeria and Morocco, with particularly strong ties to Algeria as it is a former French colony that was involved in a violent war of decolonization with France. Algerians, and people of Algerian descent, make up a large portion of France's Muslim minority, though exact figures are difficult to determine as France does not collect census data on religion or ethnicity. The majority of France's Muslim population is concentrated in urban areas surrounding Paris, Marseille, Lyon and Lille. (Laurence, 2006). It has been estimated that the largest concentration of this population is surrounding Paris, where 40% of France's Muslim are believed to live. (Cornish, 2015). Many of these areas, termed *banlieue*, are associated with poverty, violence and crime and serve as a reminder of how marginalized segments of the immigrant population are in France. (Obi, 2010). This marginalization may serve as a catalyst for radicalization and turning against the state, manifesting itself in terror attacks or emigration to join conflicts abroad. This section will provide insight into the Muslim community in France, and the integration and social issues that they face. It will be argued that many of France's security concerns may come from inside of the state from its marginalized communities, rather than the migrants and refugees arriving at Europe's borders.

France's largest immigrant groups come from the Maghreb countries of Algeria and Morocco, as well as a smaller number from Tunisia. (see appendix 1). It is from these countries, as well as former French colonies in West Africa, where a large number of France's Muslim population, both first and second generation, have their origins. This group of immigrants and immigrant families has faced the largest amount of integration issues and scrutiny, perhaps because of their Muslim faith and the fact that many immigrants live in poor *banlieue* outside of major cities. The *banlieue* of Paris, Lyon and Marseille, are often associated with violence, crime

and poverty. (Balzacq, 2016; Obi, 2010) Integration issues between France and its Muslim community of immigrant origins are illustrated by the *banlieue*. Since the mid-1980s, there has been debate about the integration of immigrants, in particular as regards those from the Maghreb states, as well as about the limits of the French integration model. (Luhman, 2015). Time and again there has been violent conflicts in the *banlieue* involving predominantly young people with an immigrant background. (Hussey, 2014). Often, the riots in the suburbs are linked to Muslim youth and radicalization, yet they are often about lack of socio-economic opportunities rather than religion or rebelling against the state. (d'Appollonia, 2015). In fact, the riots of 2005 were caused by a failure of government to address long-standing issues in France's Muslim and immigrant communities: socio-economic inequalities exacerbated by entrenched discrimination against immigrant minorities from colonial origins, particularly Algeria. (Hargreaves, 2007, pp. 1). This section will look into the integration of France's Muslim population, and how securitizing moves have been made toward this group in particular.

Though this paper has a primary focus on migration as a security issue, when discussing the securitization of migration in France it is also important to discuss Islam, integration and immigrants. Following the *Affaire du Foulard* in 1989 in Creteil, the integration of Muslims and the compatibility of Islam with French society has been brought under question by some members of the media and some politicians. (Bourbeau, 2011). There are global debates surrounding the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy and the integration of European Muslims, with a trend pointing towards diasporic Muslims being linked to the global Muslim community through the *Ummah*, or the community of the faithful, causing concern for some in Europe. (Ajala, 2014). This trend often manifests itself in the questioning of Muslim's loyalty towards their European states and linking these communities with terrorism. Post-9/11,

there was an increasing securitization of Muslim communities in the Western World, both through anti-terrorist legislation and policies, that liberated a rhetoric constructing Muslims in Europe as enemies of European societies. (Ajala, 2014). France was certainly not immune to this trend, especially since they are home to one of the largest Muslim population in Europe and have had a history of integration problems with their Muslim community. (Freedman, 2004). The securitization of an entire community has a negative effect on integration, as a host society will be reluctant to accept these people, and suspicious of them if they suspect a link to terrorism.

France has a particularly difficult relationship with its community of immigrants from an Algerian background. This tense relationship is often attributed to the Algerian war of independence, the Algerian Civil War, and the terrorism carried out in France during the 1950s and 1990s as a result of these wars. (Hussey, 2014). Suburbs of major French cities, called *banlieue*, have become closely related to security concerns that stem from migration and immigrants. These *banlieue* are home to many immigrants and people of immigrant descent, who are often of a Muslim background and face poverty, ghettoization, unemployment, scapegoating and massive discrimination. (Diallo & Boulin). This discrimination has manifested itself in, among other ways, increased attention from security officials. French people of Arab and African descent are six to eight times higher to be the subject of a police check, are often targeted by police harassment and are referred to as “immigrants” even though they are often French citizens born in France. (Diallo & Boulin; Ware, 2015). This type of discriminatory behaviour damages these communities and creates mistrust between the members of these communities and the security authorities of the state. The *banlieue* is framed in French political discourse to migrant-linked security threats, it is seen as a space of “social fragmentation, racial conflict, urban decay, criminality, delinquency, civil disorder, Islamic fundamentalism and

terrorism”. (Obi, 2010, pp. 142). The securitization of these poor suburbs is directly related to the securitization of migration in terms of similar fears of terrorism and social upheaval. These suburbs are home to many disaffected youth, who are often second generation immigrants that do not feel accepted by French society.

Due to a lack of socio-economic opportunities, youth in the *banlieue* become susceptible to radicalization by extremist groups offering acceptance and direction and building discontent with the state. (Cesari, 2010). Since the 1990s, global terrorist networks have sought to recruit followers from France, where there are integration problems and close immigrant links with Algeria. (Laurence, 2006). The *banlieue* could, and have, serve as incubators for terrorism where youths have little sense of identity, a disconnection from the state and bleak prospects for the future are attracted to the direction offered by radical Islam recruiters. (Yap, 2016). Once radicalized they pose a threat to public safety from within France, rather than an external threat facing France. France’s complicated relationship with its Muslim community and the fear of radicalization of youths in the suburbs make the current migrant crisis all the more concerning as there is a worry that some migrants may be fighters from Syria seeking to radicalize European citizens. France has been the largest European source of foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq, estimated at 1,700, with 250 having returned to France. (The Soufan Group, 2015). Fhrad Khosrokhavar identified 4 steps in the French radicalization process: “alienation from the dominant culture, thanks partly to joblessness and discrimination in blighted neighborhoods; a turn to petty crime, which leads to prison, and then more crime and more prison; religious awakening and radicalization; and an initiatory journey to a Muslim country like Syria, Afghanistan or Yemen to train for jihad.” (Khosrokhavar, 2015a). He goes on to note that Muslim make up about half of the prison population in France but only account for 7-10% of

France's total population, which points to social injustice and ingrained problems. Youths in the *banlieue* and the *cités* (social housing) embrace radical Islam because of the hatred they feel towards a society which treats them unjustly and from which they are physically disconnected in the *banlieue*. (Khosrokhavar, 2015b). Worryingly, there seems to be radicalization problems in the *banlieue* and a high rate of radicalization within France. A leaked report published by *Le Figaro* stated that there were 8,250 people who had been reported for suspicions of being a radical Islamist, with a concentration in the Paris area. (Cornevin, 2015). This trend compliments the large number of foreign fighters that have gone from France to Syria and Iraq. A lack of social justice for immigrants and their children has resulted in a disaffected community, some of which are turning to radical Islam. France must address the contributors of radicalization in the *banlieue* and within marginalized communities if further attacks are to be avoided and would-be foreign fighters discouraged.

Following the Charlie Hebdo attacks there was a widespread feeling in France that they were related to the *banlieue* and the minority communities that live there. (Packer, 2015). Though the *banlieue* are linked to problems with immigrants and radicalization, most of the issues stem from France's integration policy and the social exclusion these areas face because of it. A study found that France and Belgium have a high rate of radicalism among their Muslim populations because of the state's strong approach to secularism, like the banning of the niqab, and high youth unemployment rates in immigrant-dominated urban areas, such as Molenbeek and the *banlieue*. (McCants & Meserole, 2016). Secular policies are perceived by Muslims as taking measures against Islam, which adds to discontent among this population as many are discriminated in education, employment and housing opportunities. (Henley, 2015).. Since many of the people living in these areas are poor and do not enjoy the socio-economic opportunities

equal to other French citizens, these areas could be a source of radical violence as resentment and discontent directed towards the French state festers.

Riots in the *banlieue* are often followed by securitizing moves by the media and politicians. Even if the cause of the riots is unrelated to Islam and terrorism, links tend to be drawn between immigrants, their children and radical violence in the suburbs. The 2005 riots in suburbs of Paris had the effect of causing a negative public view of Islam and Muslims, even though the riots had nothing to do with Islamist thought and were not religious in nature. (Laurence, 2006, pp. 68). This creates a fear of immigrants who are already settled in France because of the association with violence and crime, as well as those coming as a result of the refugee crisis. Negative views of Muslims in France and the association with terrorism is not a recent phenomenon resulting from the most recent attacks. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rise of political Islam in Iran and violence in many Middle Eastern countries (Algeria's GIA, Al-Qaeda), led to a view that Arab equates to Muslim, which in turn equates to religious zealot and terrorist. (Laurence, 2006, pp. 51). These unfortunate views are pervasive in some of the public's imagination and are present in the discourse of some media and politicians. This ongoing fear has been fueled by the current migrant crisis and the spate of attacks seen across Europe. These events work to question the feasibility of accepting any migrants amid security concerns.

Islam and integration in France are not only viewed as a source of terrorism, but also as a threat to traditional French culture. This is a type of security matter that Bigo terms an "existential threat". (Bigo, 2002). An existential threat exists when the culture or way of life of a group of people comes under threat from a different, foreign group. Terrorism is one fear that comes from the lack of integration of the Muslim community in France, yet there is also the fear of an incompatibility with French culture. *Banlieue* have come to be associated with, and

sometimes are a physical reminder of, the lack of integration of some pockets of Muslim and immigrant communities. In some areas the lack of integration has manifested itself in a “ghetto phenomenon”, with certain *cités* having high rate of drug dealing and other crime. (Lawrence, 2006, pp. 40). Areas that are infamous for these activities are Saint-Denis, Aubervilliers, and Bobigny, all of which are in the northern suburbs of Paris. These areas are noted for their lack of integration and are often associated with “Muslim” and “immigrant”. As a result of the problems associated with Muslim and immigrant communities, worries about damaging social cohesion with French society at large has become a cause of concern for some politicians, most often on the right.

While the lack of integration and the desperate situation in the *banlieue* are often blamed on people of immigrant origins unwillingness to adopt French culture, the role of the state and their policies must also be questioned. France, like many Western nations, discriminates against Muslim origin families at business and economic levels. (Kaya, 2012, pp. 403). Principle barriers to integration do not come from unwillingness, rather they stem from social disadvantages and racial and ethnic discrimination. (Hargreaves, 2007). In the face of a lack of socio-economic opportunities and discrimination by the state, it is not surprising that many people of immigrant origin do not feel a part of France, even if they were born there and speak the language. It is this social unrest and the real and perceived injustices that fueled many of the riots in the *banlieue*, not radical youths attacking the state. Without socio-economic opportunities, it is very difficult for groups and individuals to fully integrate into society.

The acceptance and integration of Islam and immigrants in France remains a challenging, yet vitally important, step in addressing security concerns as they relate to societal security and public safety. The issues of integration and the security concerns that surround this community

need to be addressed and resolved, otherwise unhappy young men and women may turn to radical groups as an outlet for acceptance. If not addressed, isolated and impoverished *banlieue* will become grounds for creating further discontent and potential terrorists. Franco-Islamic communities are focused almost exclusively in *banlieue* of Paris, Marseille, Lille and Lyon. (Pauly, 2004, pp. 38). These areas lack opportunity and are associated with crime, terrorism, and poverty, resulting in a negative perception shared by the wider public of France, and the security forces. In some cases, marginalization has alienated these communities, allowing terrorist cells or suspicious activity to go undetected or unreported. (Pauly, 2004, pp. 53). Many of the perpetrators of the recent attacks in France grew up or lived in poor *banlieue*, where they were exposed to crime, radicalism and racism on part of the state. (Chrisafis, 2015; BBC News, 2016 Apr 27). Following the attacks in 2015, the Muslim communities in *banlieue* have faced further scrutiny because the attackers had connections to these poor urban areas. (Cornish, 2015). Evidently, there are ingrained social issues within France that need to be addressed.

Embedded Social Issues

The securitization of migration goes much deeper than speech acts, discourse and negative representations in the media. Though immigration has been linked with terrorism and the arrival of terrorists from the Middle East, much of the securitization of immigration comes from internal, social issues. France has a complicated with its immigrant Muslim population, even though many have been in the country for generations. (Kille, 2015). Immigrants, even second or third generation, have an 80% higher unemployment rate than non-immigrant French. (ibid). This points to a much more embedded and socially structured issue than the current migrant crisis can explain. This type of securitization can be called securitization by routine, as

opposed to speech acts. By linking terrorism to people arriving from outside of France, such as the Middle East and Africa, the issue of internal problems is deemphasized. Even though, in the wake of the attacks in Paris, we have seen a connection created between the migrant crisis and terrorism, historically it has been found that this link is difficult to sustain. (Boswell, 2007). In the case of each of the attacks in 2015, at Charlie Hebdo and the various attacks in November, the majority of the perpetrators were actually European citizens of Muslim immigrant origin. (Chrisafis, 2015; BBC, 2016 Apr 27). While recently there has been a trend towards securitizing migration in terms of the migrant crisis and terrorism coming in from abroad, the more pertinent issue may be how immigration and immigrants have been securitized within the state. This could be a vicious cycle, as immigrants are viewed as a security threat they become securitized, and through this process of securitization they are viewed as a threat by wider society and thus have difficulty integrating.

Immigration and immigrants in France have been viewed as a security problem, in a number of ways, since the 1990s. (Huysmans, 2000; Huysmans, 2006). It can be seen that migration as a security issue goes back much further than recent rhetoric by the National Front, covered later in this paper, and in the media about immigration being a terrorist threat. Though this shift has occurred, it is merely part of an overarching theme of migration as a security issue within France. Immigrants have come to be regarded as a security threat in France largely as a result of perceptions linking them and their communities with crime, unemployment, violence and an unwillingness to integrate into French society. As a result of the perception of threat and instability that surround these communities, unfair prejudices of predominantly Muslim immigrants exist and work to alienate these people. One main issue facing Muslim communities is the widespread belief that they do not want to participate in, or assimilate to, wider society.

(Simmons et al, 2016; Nardelli, 2015). It is because of this belief that French people see immigrants as a threat to their domestic culture and way of life. In other words, there is an existential threat to domestic society and culture. The perceived terrorist exists within this wider threat to French culture and way of life that has been constructed through the process of securitization.

A large, disaffected Muslim community within France is bound to be a source of conflict when they are perceived as not being part of “French” society because of their differences and supposed unwillingness to integrate. France has moved to protect its culture, and this can be seen as alienating those that do not “fit” into traditional French culture, which is primarily Caucasian and Christian. This leaves much of the Muslim population, many of whom live in poor *banlieue*, feeling isolated. Islamist recruiters have taken advantage of this sense of not belonging and unsuccessful assimilation to convert disaffected immigrants to ways of violence, with the Charlie Hebdo attackers being a prime example. (Newton-Small, 2015). Clearly, securitizing immigrants only works to feed negative perceptions and isolate those being securitized. It seems that a terrorist threat is more likely to come from within France, rather than through the migrant crisis.

Chapter 4 - How Migration Becomes Securitized

Traditionally migration is not, in itself, a threat to security or a classic focus of security studies, which have tended to focus on military power and war. (Walt, 1991). Migration has become securitized over time, through various processes, discourses and structures as discussed in the literature review. Migration has transitioned into an issue of international security and, in the case of the refugee crisis, an issue that draws international attention and divides opinion across and within states. Globalization and public discourse have played a role in how migration

has come to be perceived as a security threat. Migration and the movement of people is not a self-evident security problem but globalization has created a world in which the movement of people and security threats are much easier than previously, and the creations of an “us/them” rhetoric creates a perception of danger around the movement of people. (Walters. 2010). This section will explore how this perception can come to pass.

Globalization has contributed to an increase in international migration, as well as an increase in the securitization of migration. Globalization has brought the world much closer together, increasing the likelihood of zones of disorder spilling into other parts of the world. (Walters, 2010). These zones of disorder create flows of refugees fleeing their homes and searching for safety. Naturally, these refugees are then linked to the disorder they are fleeing and it is feared they will bring violence with them. Security has been globalized to manage threats of international crime and terrorism (Humphrey, 2013) and in this way migration now has a much higher visibility because of the threat it may carry. These threats are most often linked to migrants and refugees from the Middle-East or Africa, rather than skilled labour from other parts of Europe or North America. (Dearden, 2016). People moving from the developing world, either forced as refugees or by their own choice as economic migrants, are often classified as security threats by receiving states. Globalization has increased the number of people moving around the world, putting international migration on the security agenda for many states.

Ease of movement would not be seen as a threat to international security were it not for the discourse behind migration. Through the securitization process, migration has been come to be seen as a threat to security. It is this discourse, rather than globalization and migration itself, that turn the movement of people into a security issue. Political debates, speeches and media can all represent migration so that it comes to be seen through the lens of security, framing an issue

in such a way that it receives the utmost attention. (Walters, 2010). How migration, immigrants, refugees, etc. are presented in the media and how politicians talk about such issues affects how the wider public perceives these issues. These speech acts are important to the process of securitization because as soon as an issue is declared a threat it becomes a security issue. (Yuksel, 2014). It does not matter if an issue poses a real, tangible threat to a state's security, if an issue is presented as threatening, it has been securitized as long as the audience accepts the object in question as a threat. (Unver Noi, 2015). Since the 1980s, debates around migration have been shifting to how migration poses a danger to public order and domestic society. (Huysmans, 2000). Like Walters, Huysmans stresses that this discourse can come from national governments, grass root organizations, police networks, the media, and a variety of organizations. (ibid). Presenting migration and immigrants as a threat does not just come from far-right political parties and groups, though they certainly have a role to play.

The current migration crisis has coincided with the rise of right-wing parties as well as populist and nationalist sentiments. As right-wing populism is surging in Europe, such as the Front National, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom, and the Freedom Party of Austria, the imperative of these groups is to keep immigrant numbers small. (Ashkenas & Aisch, 2016; Joppke, 2007). Several members of the Europeans Union support restrictive immigration policies because of their desire to maintain national unity, as well as traditional language and religion. (Ivarsflaten, 2005). Populist and far-right movements often link an increased number of immigrants with societal insecurity, increased terrorism, less jobs for the domestic population, and the draining of social benefits to these immigrant groups. When groups create these linkages, a certain perception of migration is constructed as well as an "us versus them" or "citizen versus illegal" framework. (Walters, 2010). When political leaders, such as The National Front's

Marine Le Pen, make these connections, immigration becomes securitized. Buzan defines securitization as the process by which an actor seeks to depict an issue as an existential threat, with the intention of legitimizing extraordinary means to address the perceived threat posed by that object. (Buzan et al, 1998). The groups want to frame migration and incoming migrants and refugees as a threat so that the government does not accept them, thus protecting their domestic culture from culturally different people. The state is the central player in the securitization process and framing an issue as an existential threat, which calls for extraordinary measures beyond routine politics. (Williams, 2003, pp. 514). While the state may be the central player, it will be seen that those outside of the government can also contribute to the securitization of an issue.

Securitizing Migration in France

As discussed in the literature review, without the presence of a threat, perceived or real, and acceptance by an audience, an issue cannot become securitized or move onto the security agenda. The existential threat can be against a variety of referent objects, such as the state, territory, culture, etc. (Yuksel, 2014). Often, migration is presented as a threat to cultural homogeneity (Huysmans, 2000), the fear being that an influx of immigrants from a different culture will pose a threat to the existence of the domestic culture. This particular fear has been played out in France where, as demonstrated by several opinion polls (see figure 1), people believe that too many immigrants will pose a threat to their culture and traditional ways of life. (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 120).

Figure 1:

French attitudes toward national identity and safety

If something isn't done to limit the number of immigrants, France risks losing its national identity. (%)

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
1985	68	27	5
1989	74	24	2
1993	67	32	1

Similar findings were made by the UNHCR and the IOM, who found that public opinion towards immigration was largely negative in Europe and that immigration was associated with insecurity. (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2015; Espiova et al. 2015). This type of threat is not necessarily a threat to the state, rather it poses a security threat to society. Instead of a threat to state sovereignty, immigration can be seen to pose a threat to societal identity. (Waever, 1993). Certainly, this has been the case in France and in the discourse of some French politicians and media as they present the large Muslim population, mostly of North- and Sub-Saharan African descent, as a threat to the French culture. (Laurence, 2006). Some of this fear is based on the perception that the Maghrebi community of France is culturally distant and resists assimilation. (Rudolph, 2003). This has previously been an issue in France and now, with the potential of a further influx of predominantly Muslim migrants, the issue has flared again. As mentioned, immigrant communities in the *banlieue* are often associated with high crime rates, violence and the rejection of state authority. (Cesari, 2010; Hussey, 2014). Already these areas and communities are deemed to be sources of insecurity and the attacks in 2015 could have heightened these beliefs and tensions. Following the attacks in France in 2015, which were perpetrated largely by French citizens of North-African immigrant backgrounds (BBC News, 2016; Chrisafis, 2015), there may have been a stronger emphasis from a societal and criminal

threat to a terrorist threat coming from migrants. However, much of this political discourse already existed and had been emerging before the attacks in 2015.

Political Discourse

Much of the discourse surrounding migration and framing it as a threat comes from the far-right of the political spectrum. The National Front in particular plays a role in the securitization of migration and immigrants. These speech acts regarding migration as a threat are often exaggerated in order to elicit maximum effect. Migration has often been a matter of security in France, and is often described as being a threat towards French culture and way of life. (Unver Noi, 2015). Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, has often played on the idea of French culture being threatened by immigrants, and the migrant crisis has presented the opportunity to do so further. Le Pen has spoken of a “large wave of migrants” coming towards France (The Economist, 2015a) and in the face of this she wants to keep France “authentically French”. (The Economist, 2015b). In the view of the National Front, migrants are a threat to the French way of life. In this way, they securitize migration by presenting it as an existential threat to society because the incoming people are from a different culture. However, it has not solely been the National Front securitizing migration. Nicolas Sarkozy, while Minister of the Interior and a member of a mainstream political party, used the terms “criminal”, “vagabond”, and “scum” to describe Muslim youth in the *banlieue*, as well as linking them to Islamic terrorism. (Kaya, 2009). Following riots in Clichy-sous-Bois, Sarkozy repeated an embrace of anti-immigrant and Islamophobic themes, which left the minorities in these communities marginalized and created a disregard for Sarkozy and the leadership in France. (Crumley, 2012). As was discussed in chapter 3, creating an environment of resentment and marginalization can

have dire effects for these communities and the state as a whole. These speech acts from mainstream politicians have a direct effect on securitizing immigration.

Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, the National Front has drawn links between immigration and an increase in terrorism. Even before the attacks in Paris, the National Front repeatedly drew connections between immigration and Islamic Fundamentalist. The National Front's platform draws direct, controversial links from immigration and immigrants to a variety of societal and security problems:

Uncontrolled immigration is a source of tension in a Republic which is no longer able to assimilate the new French. Ghettos, inter-ethnic conflicts, community demands and politico-religious provocations are the direct consequences of mass immigration which is undermining our national identity and brings with it increasingly visible Islamization. (Front National).

Language such as “ghettos” and “inter-ethnic conflict”, and the connection to radical Islam make immigration a matter of security, as does the threat to national identity that this passage suggests. For the French far-right party, and many of its supporters, immigration was a security issue before the attacks. It is these groups that created the fear and promoted the idea that the migrants stemming from conflicts would bring terrorism to Europe.

The Charlie Hebdo attack and the attacks in November 2015 allowed for the further securitization of migration, in particular with respect to migrants coming from Africa and the Middle East. Le Pen drew connections between North African immigration to France and Islamic terrorism after the Charlie Hebdo attack and also linked the war on terrorism to mass migration. (Mestre, 2015; Nossiter, 2015). Following the Paris attacks, Le Pen's stance on immigration was mirrored by many around France and public opinion was against accepting more refugees. (Vinocur, 2016; Wright, 2015). Le Pen called for a halt to refugees entering France as she played on fears that there were a large number of murderers and/or terrorists among them. (Newman,

2015). After the attacks, fears of immigration had shifted from a cultural threat to a tangible threat to the lives of French citizens. Linking the terrorist attacks to immigrants and the refugee crisis further securitized migration through various speech acts. However, this link is based much more on fear than on reality. The refugee is seen as a potential terrorist, and the terrorist as a potential refugee. Even though the attacks in Paris were perpetrated by European citizens, border security and the flood of migrants are blamed for the attacks. (Nail, 2016). The issue of terrorism may not be a problem of migrant security, but of long-standing societal issues and the ongoing securitization of immigrants within France.

Discourse in the Media

Media also plays a role in the securitization of migration and how the issue is viewed by the general public. Many times in the media frightening headlines about immigrants and the idea of an unstoppable wave of migrants has been used (Luedtke, 2015), and so migration was constructed as a security issue by creating a desire among French citizens to preserve the cultural identity and society of France. Migration and the integration of immigrants into society is an important issue in France that gains a lot of attention in the media. Therefore, how these issues are portrayed affects how the public views migration. An OECD report has said that the growing commercialization of mass media has led to a more sensationalist approach to issues, which can reinforce negative perceptions of migration. (OECD, 2010). Negative media coverage of immigration legitimizes a general viewpoint that links immigration with crime and urban violence. (Tsoukala, 2002). This negative portrayal and perception of immigrants, both new and old, is not a new issue in France. In fact, a shift in media coverage of immigrants took place in the 1990s, when there was a focus on security problems in suburbs with large North African

populations, a fear of right-wing extremism as a response, and a fear that French culture was threatened because of poor integration of immigrants. (Benson, 2002). This shift in media coverage linking immigrants with security issues, threatening culture and involving increased crime, has continued today and immigration remains a security issue for many people in France. The refugee crisis has given rise to these fears and public figures, such as Le Pen, have generated hysteria and created visions of France being overrun by Muslims. (Kamdar, 2015). The media and public figures securitized migration through speech acts, presenting the movement of people as a threat to security.

The refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks have brought immigration, integration and terrorism into sharp focus. Previously, much of the security discussion around immigration in France was centred on the threat it posed to French culture, as well as crime in the *banlieue* of major cities. While these aspects are still part of the conversation surrounding migration and security, there may be another shift, or addition, to the securitization of migration in France and throughout Europe. Recently there have been links created between the refugee crisis and an increase in terrorism. Many of these arguments suggest that foreign fighters will return from conflicts in Syria and carry out terrorist act in their home countries. Migration and terrorism have become linked in contemporary times, especially since 9/11, even though they are not the same thing. (Nail, 2016). The connection between terrorism and migration is very strong in many people's' minds, which is why this current migrant crisis, coupled with on-going conflict in Syria, is a fearful prospect for many around Europe. In France, the National Front has jumped on this connection and linked Islamic fundamentalism with the influx of refugees coming to Europe. (Mayor, 2015; Chappellet-Lanier, 2015). Following the attacks in Paris in January and November of 2015, security and migration were heavily linked, though not for the first time.

Chapter 5 - Laws, Treaties and Migration

This section will look at French Laws and EU treaties that have affected and encouraged the securitization of migration. The implementation of these laws offers insight into how politicians and lawmakers view migration, and demonstrates how security and the movement of people is becoming increasingly intertwined. Laws pertaining to the movement of people are an important part of the securitization process as they will show how migrants and refugees are perceived in the eyes of the state and the power that the state can exert over these people.

French Laws

In France, three laws in particular have come into effect in the past 25 years that have a direct effect on the movement of people. These laws have been implemented in recent times and illustrate the increasing securitization of migration at the state level. The first law to be discussed is the Pasqua Law of 1993, put forward by the then Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua. The goal of this law was to severely limit and reduce immigration to France, and it also enhanced the powers of police to deport foreigners and eliminated opportunities to appeal asylum rejections. (Hamilton et al., 2004). The Pasqua law viewed some aspects of immigration and access to French territory as a matter of policing, the first step in securitizing migration. As soon as security forces can act in the realm of immigration, it can become securitized through the practice of these security officials. (Bigo, 2002). One can see the transition that immigration began to make to a matter of security. Philippe Bourbeau cites the Pasqua Law in his book on the securitization of migration in France, and argues that the Pasqua Law reinforces repressive measure to impede access to France, views immigrants as a police matter and rolls back the

rights of foreigners. (Bourbeau, 2011). These are all securitizing moves by the French state, and came at a time when the integration of Muslim immigrants was being questioned throughout France. Limiting immigration from traditional sources, such as Algeria, was seen as a way to combat the problem of integration.

In the following ten years, two more laws were passed that made securitizing moves in towards immigration and the movement of foreigners: the Dubre Law in 1997 and the Sarkozy Law in 2003. Much like the Pasqua Law, these laws came at a time when there was frequent public debate on the issue of integration of immigrants and there had been violent events linked to immigrant communities, including riots in the *banlieue* and GIA bombings in Paris and other parts of France in 1995. The Dubre Law hardened detention processes and again expanded police powers, while the Sarkozy Law five years later reinforced measures against illegal immigrants. (Bourbeau, 2011). The increase of police powers in the area of immigration and relating to foreigners entering, or already in, France are examples of the securitization of migration. As migrants are integrated institutionally into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defence, they are furthered securitized. (Bourbeau, 2011, pp. 43). Each of these laws progressively securitized migration at a time when France was experiencing problems with its immigrant and Muslim communities, two communities that are often linked even though they are not one in the same.

EU Treaties

Securitizing moves have been made at the EU level in the forms of various treaties that have been put forward and implemented. Similarly to the French laws, the focus will be on three treaties that have been enacted within the last three decades. Each of these three treaties link

security, migration and movement within the EU. The three treaties I will focus on are the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and the Lisbon Treaty (2007).

The Maastricht treaty is significant because it is when extra-EU migration by third country nationals came onto the EU policy making agenda, though much of the control on migration still rested with member states. (Boswell, 2011). This treaty is relevant to the securitization of migration because it came into effect when there were fears around Europe about the possible dangers of immigration and integration. (ibid). Concerns about immigration and the mobility of people was manifesting itself at both the national level, in laws like the Pasqua Law, and the supranational level, such as parts of the Maastricht treaty. It was with the Amsterdam treaty in 1999 when migration and asylum were included in the EU's main political and legal framework. (ibid). Much like the progression of the laws in France, one can see how a similar trend took place at the EU level as migration and asylum became more important issues and important areas of policymaking to ensure control over movement of people coming from outside of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty in 2007, ratified in 2009, marked "the full integration of migration and asylum into the EU treaty framework, setting out provisions on borders, asylum and migration". (Boswell, 2011, pp. 10). These provisions included common visa and short-term residence policies, checks at external borders, absence of internal borders and an integrated approach to border management. Since 1993, there has been a clear evolution in migration and asylum in the EU, with a move towards common policies across states and a larger role for the EU to play in this domain. This points to the increasing importance of migration, especially migration coming from outside of the EU's external borders.

Access to the EU and the control of its external borders has become ever more important as the refugee crisis progresses and terrorist attacks take place in European countries, though the

link between these two events is weak at best. Calls for stronger border controls have intensified since the refugee crisis began in 2011, with some EU members questioning the viability of the Schengen Agreement. (Traynor, 2016). While it remains difficult to enter the EU at an external border, once in the EU travelling between member states is open because of the Schengen agreement. Because of the sheer amount of migrants and refugees arriving at the EU's borders since 2011, it is impossible (and illegal in the case of refugees) to deny them entry. Once they have entered the EU, the Dublin Convention states that they must apply for asylum in the first country of entry, which is usually Greece or Italy. However, the numbers have overwhelmed these country's capacities, and often those arriving do not want to stay in either of these countries and would rather move on to Germany, Sweden or France, usually trying to reach the UK. Some states and politicians, such as Hungary, have called for the reinstatement of internal borders to limit the movement of people because of security concerns associated with the migrants and refugees. (Traynor, 2016). These concerns were illustrated in November 2016, as the attacker at a Berlin Christmas market was able to travel through the Netherlands, Belgium, and France before finally being arrested in Milan, Italy. The ease of movement is certainly a security concern with many people arriving who are undocumented and unknown to EU security officials. However, it is not only migrants and refugees that pose security concerns because of the Schengen agreement. EU citizens, such as the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks, can benefit from the open internal borders and travel between countries with the intent to attack.

Foreign Fighters and the EU

It is important that domestic laws keep pace with contemporary issues and are able to respond to them in the best way possible. This section briefly demonstrated how laws react to changing a changing landscape of migration issues and foreign fighters. As migration became to be perceived as a security issue, this was reflected in legislation at the state level and treaties at the EU level. Lately, many countries are implementing laws that address returning foreign fighters, some of whom may pose a threat upon their return home. France has recently stepped up anti-terrorism measures as it is concerned about homegrown terrorism and returning French fighters from Syria and Iraq. (Chrisafis, 2015). Both France and other European countries are dealing with new issues of foreign fighters returning. France has had the largest number of fighters from Western Europe leave to fight in Syria, estimated at 1,700. (Kirk, 2016; The Soufan Group, 2015). It is likely that many of these fighters will wish to return to France, some with intentions to bring terrorism to Europe. This will place a strain on security and intelligence agencies, and it will be important that effective laws are in place so that officials have the power to detect and detain these returnees. Since 2012, France has had laws in place that allow the state to charge citizens for joining Islamist fighting groups abroad. Once foreign fighters return to France, they are questioned by intelligence services, after which they are almost always detained and charged with conspiracy with a terrorist organization. (Library of Congress, 2015). In addition, since November 2014 French law has allowed or the confiscation of passports of potential foreign fighters and an entry ban on foreigners linked to terrorist activities. (van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016). French intelligence and law enforcement agencies will need to ensure they are aware of who leaves France with the intention to fight abroad, and monitor them closely to detain them on their return. The awareness surrounding terrorism in France, both homegrown

terrorism and fighters returning, will have made the state sensitive to ensuring they have the powers to legally take all the precautions necessary to ensure public safety.

Chapter 6 - Current Situation

This section will explore the current situation in France and abroad as it relates to the refugee crisis and the concerns around terrorism. The refugee crisis, together with terrorism attacks and a fear of further attacks, has garnered a lot of media attention since the crisis began in 2011. In this section, the origins of some of the refugees and migrants will be discussed, as well as the factors pushing them to leave their states for Europe. Conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan has caused many of these people to flee, as well as state fragility throughout Africa causing a spillover effect to the external borders of Europe. (UNHCR, 2015). Concurrent trends, including the rise of ISIS, terrorism attacks in Europe, and the rise of populist parties who create a fear of immigrants and refugees, has led to a tense atmosphere in Europe. This tension has been felt particularly in France, which has been the victim of a number of terrorist attacks and has been in an official state of emergency since November 2015. (Raimbourg, 2017). As discussed later in this chapter, these attacks were associated with the many refugees and migrants in Europe by some media and political parties, which contributed to a securitization of these groups.

Refugee Crisis

Europe is currently experiencing one the largest refugee crises in its history. Since 2011, thousands of refugees and migrants have entered, or attempted to enter, Europe through a number of sea and land routes. This crisis is unique when compared to others, such as the influx

of Balkan refugees following the breakup of Yugoslavia, because of the volume of people and the fact that most of these refugees and migrants are coming from Middle Eastern and African countries. (BBC News, 2017). While Europe is not a stranger to immigration from Africa or the Middle-East, the vast numbers arriving in a relatively small timeframe is a cause for concern. These concerns include terrorism being exported from war zones and integrating a large number of Muslim refugees into Western European countries that are already facing issues surrounding integration. (Dragostinova, 2016). Countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium are already home to a large, disaffected Muslim minority, where an increased number of Muslim refugees could add to the current integration problems (See Figure 2).

Country	Muslim Population	Proportion of Population
Germany	4,760,000	5.8%
France	4,710, 000	7.5%
Netherlands	1,000,000	6.0%
Belgium	630,000	5.9%

Source: Pew Global, 2016

State fragility and conflict are major contributors to the refugee and migrant crisis, with certain international trends and events providing a catalyst for the refugee crisis and the on-going fears of terrorism in Europe. The principle cause of the current crisis is the ongoing civil war in Syria during the past four years, as well as the breakdown of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Eritrea, causing desperate people to flee these countries. (Dragostinova, 2016). These conflicts have been the push factors that have caused a surge of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe. The fragility of some states in Africa and the Middle-East has resulted in a spillover effect to Europe’s borders. There are some worries that these conflicts will not only result in a spillover of people, but also a spillover of conflict from these regions to Europe. Concerns about migration

from Africa arise because of the possible links between human mobility in a globalizing world and the flow of terrorism, criminality and health risks. (Obi, 2010). The fear that radicalized members of ISIS or other terrorist groups will be among the refugees and migrants is not unwarranted or unfounded, as ISIS has stated that it wants to carry out attacks in Western Europe. However, the most notable ISIS-claimed attacks in Paris and Brussels were largely carried out by EU citizens, rather than people coming from Syria or Iraq. A main security concern for countries like France and Belgium is radicalized members of their own populations and fighters that travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight, who may try and return home. Current international events are certainly a cause for concern and are a key factor in the refugee crisis and the climate of worry in Western Europe. An increase in terrorism has coincided with the arrival of refugees and migrants, however the refugees and migrants have not been the predominant source of these attacks. Migrants and refugees have been portrayed as threatening the security of societies and states since the crisis began and since the Charlie Hebdo attacks, and a notable shift to defensive measures instead of humanitarian measures took place after the November 2015 attacks. (Georgiou, 2015). However, some of these fears, especially in France, may be misplaced.

Terror Connections

The refugee crisis has become associated with immigrants, particularly immigrants of a Muslim background, and terrorism, even though a UN report found these connections unjustified. (Dearden, 2016; Emmerson, 2016). As most of the migrants are Muslim, or at least from Muslim countries, fears associated with this demographic in Western Europe are being magnified through the refugee crisis. Recently, “the issue of the so-called ‘illegal migrants’ has

been picked up by western political elite and state administrations as the very source of some endemic problems such as unemployment, violence, terror and some other social and cultural problems.” (Kaya, 2012, pp. 405). Often, illegal migrant also implies Muslim to many people in Europe, resulting in the fears associated with illegal migrants also being pinned to Muslims. This is because most Muslims were originally of immigrant origin in the EU, and so “the categories of immigrant and Muslim tend to overlap” in many Europe countries. (Cesari, 2010, pp. 10). This is an unfortunate sentiment, and it is one that has contributed to the securitization of migration, especially since the migrant crisis and the sudden growth in perceived illegal migrants arriving to Europe. Many parts of Western Europe already had negative perceptions of immigration from the Muslim world, which fuels much of the anger and security concerns towards the refugee crisis. Islamophobia has intensified in Europe because of al-Qaeda style violence and the radicalization of some segments of Muslim origin immigrant communities, which has reinforced the societal unrest resulting from immigration. (Kaya, 2012, pp 407). Recent attacks in France, Belgium and Europe will have built on this Islamophobia and calls for less immigration from certain segments of the European population. The radicalization present in some communities was brought into sharp focus following the Brussels and Paris attacks, as Molenbeek, Belgium became known globally as a hotbed of terrorism. (Williams et al, 2016; Kroet, 2017). It is likely that similar radicalization exists in *banlieue* surrounding major French cities, such as the areas where the Charlie Hebdo shooters lived. As previously mentioned, the *banlieue* of major French cities are already associated with poverty, lawlessness and terror. These links are not always unfounded, and many of the November 2015 attackers did have connections to Parisian *banlieue*. (BBC News, 2016 Apr 27). One must be careful not to needlessly make inferences that these deprived urban areas are full of potential terrorists. This creates a climate of distrust and

emphasizes security when in fact a more social approach may be necessary. Radicalization, or the potential for it, is often viewed as a matter for policing and law enforcement, but radicalization must also be understood in the context of societal factors, and may be encouraged by social exclusion. (Khosrokhavar, 2017). This will be discussed further in the following section.

Convergence of the Refugee Crisis and Terrorism in France

The current situation surrounding the refugee crisis and terrorism in France provides an excellent case study to analyze links between terrorism and the crisis. France has been in a state of emergency since 2015 because of the series of attacks they suffered in November 2015, granting the police additional powers to search and arrest. (HRW, 2016). Human Rights Watch reported that this has put a strain on France's relationship with its Muslim population because of police abuse of powers (ibid) and has highlighted integration issues, as well as created tension within its population, many of whom do not want to accept more refugees because of terrorism fears and cultural differences. The National Front, and 2017 presidential candidate Marine Le Pen in particular, have tried to use these fears of terrorism and cultural differences to win votes during the 2017 Presidential Campaign. Before the 2015 attacks in Paris, Le Pen linked immigration and Islamist extremism, while following the attacks she proposed to "expel foreigners who preach hatred on our soil" and to strip dual-nationality Muslims with extremist views of their French citizenship. (Branford & Nowak, 2017). In her election manifesto, Le Pen wanted to halt immigration, close mosques with any links to radical Islam and deport foreigners who had been monitored by security services for connections to extremism. (FN Election Manifesto, 2017; Reuters, 2017). These types of measures and links are damaging to the Muslim

community as well as the refugees and migrants because connection is drawn between them and the attacks or possible attacks. Considering that a significant proportion of French people accept and believe this link, around 46% according to a Pew Report, it can be argued that the audience has accepted the securitization of migration. (Simmons, Stokes, & Wike, 2016). Audience acceptance is a vital step in the securitization of an issue (Balzacq, 2016; Cote, 2016), and it can be seen in France that this was the case following the attacks in 2015.

Given the on-going state of emergency in France, the 2017 Presidential Election was always likely to have a strong focus on immigration and security. In the wake of Islamist terrorist attacks in France, Marine Le Pen's security and immigration rhetoric resonated with French citizens and propelled her to be an actual contender for the Presidency of France. (Sandford, 2017). Le Pen has played on fears of migrants, refugees and terrorism to create associations in the mind of her audience and supporters so that the lines between national security and immigration become blurred. At a rally in Lyon, Le Pen linked globalization with weakened sovereign defences and weak borders, thus creating an environment that allows Islamic Fundamentalism to grow. (Sandford, 2017). Blaming the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in France on globalization and weak borders is a securitizing move by Le Pen, and goes hand in hand with her election platform of greatly reducing immigration and making the process to become a French citizen more difficult, as well as expelling foreigners and closing Mosques with links to radical Islam. (Reuters, 2017; FN Election Manifesto, 2017). These provide examples of how Le Pen, throughout her campaign, created a link between terrorism and foreigners, a rhetoric which was more easily accepted by French citizens following the deadly attacks.

Immigration, terror and security played important roles in Le Pen's campaign but they were also central topics of discussion for the other candidates, who all promised to spend more

on security and terrorism prevention and battled in the area of immigration. (Murphy & Romei, 2017). Immigration and terror became key election issues in the wake of the terror attacks and the refugee crisis, ensuring it was at the forefront of voters and candidates minds. Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron, the final two candidates for the Presidency, each had differing views on French immigration policy. Macron opposed immigration quotas and supported a common EU immigration policy, while Le Pen wanted to limit immigration to 10,000 people per year. (Serhan, 2017). How each of these candidates view immigration is likely influenced by how they view immigrants and minorities within France. Throughout the campaign Macron took a liberal approach to minorities and did not comment on Muslim dress codes as many of the other candidates did. (Al Jazeera, 2017). Alternatively, Le Pen took a much harsher stance towards immigration and minority communities. Speaking on France's Muslim minority, she said "We do not want to live under the rule or threat of Islamic fundamentalism," and condemned the hijab, prayer rooms in workplaces, the construction of mosques and pork-free options in school lunches. (ibid). The contrasting views and discourse of these two politicians is very important to understand in contemporary France given the current political climate. While Macron did not make judgements or securitizing statements, Le Pen linked Islamic fundamentalism with minorities and immigration. The terror attacks by citizens of immigrant and Muslim background played into Le Pen's anti-immigration platform and made it easy for her populist discourse linking terror, refugees and immigrants to gain traction among some of the population. This is securitization in action.

The current situation in France is fraught with more issues than the refugee crisis and the discourse and rhetoric surrounding it. The recent attacks, and the resulting state of emergency, have brought immigrants and integration into focus. Coupled with the presidential campaign,

these issues have gained high visibility, but these current events may be masking deeper problems within France. The next section will demonstrate how the issues of integration are related to the current events and fears of immigration.

Chapter 7 - Implications of Securitization

Throughout this paper we have seen how issues become securitized and why they may become securitized. This section will analyze the implications of securitization and the far-reaching effects it can have on a community as a whole. This is a specifically pertinent problem for many Muslim communities in Europe. Due to the persistent linking of terrorism with Muslim communities, it can be argued that Islam in particular has suffered from securitization. (Balzacq, 2016). Security professionals have a strong capacity to define threats and create an “us and them” attitude: their practices can define a security continuum, domestically and globally. (Huysmans, 2002, pg. 16). France, being home to one of Western Europe’s largest Muslim communities and the victim of many recent radical attacks, will have felt short term and possibly long term effects of a further securitization of migration. It will be argued in this section that while discourse plays a role in the securitization of migration, most of the implications of securitization originate in the intelligence and policing sectors.

The intelligence community has a large role to play in the securitization of migration and the resulting implications of this. The practices of security professionals and who they choose to target contributes to securitization by what Didier Bigo terms the “logic of routine”. (Bigo, 2002). In France, these practices have included surveillance of Mosques and Muslim communities, as well as immigrants entering from Muslim countries or who are of North African background. (Laurence, 2006, pp. 260). These types of practices work to securitize an entire

community as they become a cause for concern for the state, whether this is justified or not. Such specific targeting of a certain community can cast every member of this community as a threat to the wider population, even if this is not the case. While security officials do need to start somewhere in order to prevent attacks, this routinized securitization of the Muslim community in France may have long lasting effects. Already, this community faces social disadvantages and discrimination (Laurence, 2006; d'Apollonia, 2015), and further securitization of the community as a whole could prove detrimental to integration into French society. In itself, this presents a concern for French security officials because a lack of integration has been demonstrated as a catalyst for home-grown radicalization and violence. (Khosrokhavar, 2017). Intelligence agencies need to strike a balance between necessary policing and surveillance and ensuring they do not create an environment of securitization through their practices.

Aside from government, including politicians and political parties, and the bureaucracy of a country, there is a growing influence of police, security and intelligence services in the process of securitization. (Zemni, 2006, pp. 4). The constant gathering, analysis and interpretation of information by these security apparatuses seem to target some social sectors over others, such as the Muslim community. (ibid). Wide intelligence gathering of this nature has a securitizing effect on the community because they become security threats in the eyes of these agencies. Embedded securitization in the Muslim community in France, and doubtless in many European countries, occurs because of such practices regardless of intent or guilt of the community as a whole. In France, the embeddedness of the securitization is demonstrated by the high level of police attention and disproportionate prison sentences that young immigrants, mostly Muslims, face. (Cesari, 2010, pp. 237; Collyer, 2006). This clearly shows that this community in particular is viewed as a threat by security officials, in addition to the negative

discourse, such as being called “scum” by Sarkozy (Kaya, 2009) and the negative perceptions of the 2005 riots, that has continued. Following the attacks, tensions and surveillance will only be intensified with regards to this community. Because they were already securitized, French immigrants and Muslims will face further implications following the attacks.

Securitization can have significant implications for the object being secured against, which in this case is largely Muslim and immigrant communities within France. As demonstrated, securitization can lead to unfair attention directed at these communities from policing and intelligence agencies. International migration has served as a focus point for unspecified fears, and given rise to securitization policies such as “stepped up border controls and stricter internal surveillance of immigrants produces unintended effects” (Faist, 2004, pp.1). These unintended effects include a lack of social opportunities and discrimination by law enforcement. The securitization of migration in France has also led to tougher border controls intended to slow illegal migration and lower the number of asylum applicants. (d’Appollonia, 2015). The linkage of increased flows of people and insecurity has led to the practice of security officials to tighten border controls and surveillance capabilities. (Anderson, 2015). With each border crisis that Europe has suffered, from the arrival of Sub-Saharan migrants in Italy in the early 21st century, the 2006 boat crisis off the Canary islands, Europe as responded with increased border security, surveillance and patrols. (ibid). These increased border security measures force migrants and refugees to take riskier routes, which reinforces the security response. The implications of intensive border security and the securitization of movement has been covered widely in the media and is illustrated by the drownings in the Mediterranean, numbered at 3,200 for 2016, and deaths along the land routes resulting from precarious smuggling activities, as seen in Austria where migrants were found asphyxiated in a truck.

(Townsend & McVeigh, 2016; Dearden, 2017; UNHCR, 2016; BBC, 2015). Strict border controls in the name of security and keeping unwanted migrants and refugees out, who some in Europe and France see as potential terrorists (Nail, 2016; Front National), force migrants and refugees to trust smugglers and risk their lives on dangerous routes. Yet, these measures and securitization of migration and the resulting impacts are rarely grounded in reality or fact. An increase in migration is not linked with an increase in terrorism, (Boswell, 2007) and as such intelligence gathering and border controls have to be balanced with potential benefits of immigration. (Bove, 2016). Unfortunately, the securitization has tended to affect certain communities more than others and has resulted in more comprehensive and targeted security practices and tighter borders, especially for asylum seekers.

The implications of securitization can be seen specifically in France through the state of emergency in place since November 2015. Following the attacks, France implemented a state of emergency that has been extended multiple times and gives police extended powers to search and arrest. (Agence France-Presse, 2016). This action demonstrates the extreme measures that a state can go to if national security is deemed to be at risk. While this state of emergency is not directed specifically at migrants and/or refugees it does give police significant powers within France. Once an issue is successfully securitized and accepted by the audience, it enables authorities to use whatever means they deem appropriate to handle the issue. (Balzacq, 2016). France is using the high threat of terrorism, coming from either the domestic population or externally, to justify extreme measures in continuing the state of emergency and granting security agencies far-reaching abilities. However, this state of emergency may not be a justified response to the terror threat in France. An inquiry into the state of emergency in July 2016 and a report by a parliamentary commission, *Communication d'étape sur le contrôle de l'état d'urgence*, said that

the state of emergency had limited impact over time on improving security, and any effect it may have had was now over. (Raimbourg, 2017; Fenech, 2016; Houry, 2017). Fears around terror and insecurity have allowed this state of emergency to be extended with little opposition, even though it may no longer be necessary, and in fact may damage those unfairly targeted. Human Rights Watch reported that French police have carried out abusive and discriminatory raids and house arrests against Muslims under the ongoing state of emergency. (HRW. 2016). It seems that the state of emergency has allowed French security agencies to unfairly target Muslims and people of North African descent, painting them as a security risk. This is a major implication of securitization and it is being played out in France because of the state-justified state of emergency. The Human Rights Watch report states that Muslims and people of North African descent had been widely targeted, alienating these communities from law enforcement even though they could help in identifying local terrorism threats. (HRW, 2016). Already a socially isolated and disadvantaged community, this state of emergency and the actions of police forces will only further contribute to the problem and could create further resentment within these communities. As has been demonstrated in this paper, it is this resentment, social exclusion and discrimination by the state that can lead to homegrown terrorism. The implications of securitization and the state of emergency may actually be counterproductive to what they aim to achieve.

Chapter 8 - Conclusions

This paper used securitization as a theoretical framework to determine how and why migration has become a matter of security over the past 25 years in France and how this has changed since the Syrian refugee crisis began. The securitization of migration is particularly

interesting to apply to France because of the number of events that have occurred which are deemed to be security issues. In 2005 and 2007 significant riots occurred in the suburbs of Paris and other major French cities between the police and Muslim-majority immigrant communities. Due to the security-oriented outlook of political parties towards immigrant communities, the interpretation of the riots did not go beyond the violence and radicalism of the Muslim youth (Kaya, 2009), even though it is likely the riots were the result of tension “deeply rooted in the social, cultural, political and economic processes that govern daily life in these areas”. (Moran, 2011, pp. 300). It is through structure and routine that these immigrants became securitized within French society. Contrary to what the media and political parties may say, the refugee crisis is not a certain source of terrorism. Instead of terrorism coming into Europe from conflict zones abroad, it is likely to come from within the state, as demonstrated by attacks in France, Belgium and the UK. Terrorist threats are just as likely to come from the domestic population as they are from the refugee crisis, if not more-so. One can see that securitizing migration and immigration does not solve a problem, and can in fact create further problems. Securitization can overstate an issue and create links that are unfounded while, in the case of France, ignoring deep social issues and routine securitization of entire groups. Immigration has long been framed as a security issue in France, much to the detriment of these communities and the people within them. Myron Weiner argued that an influx of culturally different people can generate xenophobic sentiments, cause conflicts between natives and migrants, and promote the growth of anti-immigrant right-wing parties. (Weiner, 1993). Unfortunately, this has come to pass in France and in order for it to be solved migration must be de-securitized and disembedded from perceptions and practices.

This paper explored the question of how migration in France has become securitized within the past 25 years, and focuses particularly on the current refugee crisis in Europe, issues surrounding integration and immigrants, and recent terrorist attacks in France. Each of these factors have, in some way or another, contributed to the increased securitization of migration and how it is perceived as a security issue. This is an important question to ask because of its relevancy to many states in Europe as they too face the refugee crisis, threats of terrorism, and the challenge of integrating diverse minorities into their societies. Securitization theory was used as a framework to study how migration became a security issue and analyze the type of security threat migration is said to present. Securitization has been demonstrated to occur through discourse in the media, political discourse and through the practice of security and policing officials. During the past 25 years, migration to France has often been portrayed as a threat to French identity and to French culture. This paper found that recently, since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis and an increase of terrorist attacks in France, the focus has shifted to a more traditional threat to the state, in terms of terrorist attacks originating from immigration to France, widely seen in the presentation of refugees from Africa and the Middle East as potential terrorist threats. This type of securitization links refugees, immigrants and immigrant communities to threats against the state, which is damaging to these people. It creates a sense of fear surrounding these communities, and results in misconceptions that have dire implications.


Failed integration and societal inequality can have dire consequences, as demonstrated by the attacks in France, as well as other European States, by citizens from minority and/or disadvantaged communities. The Charlie Hebdo attackers, Amedy Coulibaly, most of the November 2015 attackers, the Nice attacker, and recently the Manchester and London attackers all belonged to minority communities, were born, raised or had significant ties to Western

Europe and had varying degrees of Muslim faith or devotion. (BBC News, 2016 Apr 27; Chrisafis, 2015; BBC News, 2016 Aug 19; Goffin, 2017; CBC News, 2017; Sparrow, 2017). Outbursts of violence and radical ideology may become common among a minority population that feels abandoned or marginalized, and is manipulated by radicalism. Of course, many more factors outside the scope of this paper are at play in the radicalization of these people beyond state and societal structures. This paper merely analyzed the role that social exclusion may play with a focus in France and the damaging effects of securitization, with a wider application possible for other European states. Some of the discourse in France has been demonstrated in this paper link the refugee crisis, immigration and terrorism (Mayor, 2015; Front National; Nossiter, 2015), even when these links have been difficult to sustain. These dangerous linkages, which intensified following attacks in France (Mestre, 2015; Newman, 2015), further securitize issues and have negative implications for the targeted communities.

This paper tentatively concludes that links between the refugee crisis and an increase in terrorist activity and violence are, at best, premature. In the discourse cited in the paper and seen in the media, some people and political parties in France are keen to draw associations between refugees and terrorists (i.e. Le Pen following the attacks). Discourse linking the two merely stoke public fears and anti-immigrant, and often anti-Muslim, sentiment. Following riots in the suburbs and attacks like the ones witnessed recently, the French state has tended to respond in a strictly security-focused manner. (Laurence, 2006; Hussey, 2014). While this type of response is often justified and necessary, action may need to go further into social and integration related issues to address the problem at its root. Failed integration and social exclusion can breed radicalism, so instead of focusing on the refugee crisis as a matter of security, the focus should be on addressing domestic minority populations.


Appendix

Figure 1: Main immigrant groups in France




Source: INED, <http://www.sens-public.org/article772.html?lang=fr>


Figure 2: Immigration to France, 1994 to 2003



Source: Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, INED (2005)



Plus de 8 000 signalements pour « radicalisation » depuis la mise en place de la plateforme antidiyahad



Map 1: Radical individuals in France.

Source: *Le Figaro*, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/02/02/01016-20160202ARTFIG00368-islamisme-8250-individus-radicalises-en-france.php>

Bibliography

- Abrahamsen, R. (2005). Blair's Africa: The politics of securitization and fear. *Alternatives*, 30(1), 55-80.
- Adamson, F. (2006). Crossing borders: International migration and national security. *International Security*, 31(1), 165-199. Retrieved from http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/01622889/v31i0001/165_cbimans
- Agence France-Presse. (2016, December 14). French parliament votes to extend state of emergency until after 2017 elections. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/french-parliament-votes-to-extend-state-of-emergency-until-after-2017-elections>
- Ajala, I. (2014). Muslims in France and Great Britain: Issues of Securitization, Identities and Loyalties Post 9/11. *Journal Of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 34(2), 123-133. doi:10.1080/13602004.2014.911583
- Al Jazeera. (2017, May 6). France: Who are Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen?. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/france-emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-170505213010624.html>
- Andersson, R. (2015) *The Illegality Industry: Notes on Europe's Dangerous Border Experiment*. Retrieved from <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2015/10/illegality>
- Ashkenas, J. & Aisch, G. (2016, December 5). European Populism in the Age of Donald Trump. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/05/world/europe/populism-in-age-of-trump.html>
- Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). 'Securitization' revisited: Theory and cases. *International Relations*, 30(4), 494-531.
- Balzacq, T. (2005). The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2), 171-201.
- Balzacq, T. (2011). *Securitization theory how security problems emerge and dissolve* (PRIO new security studies). London: Routledge.
- Baxter, H. (2015, September 2). Why we've decided to call it Europe's refugee crisis. *Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-weve-decided-to-call-it-europes-refugee-crisis-10483507.html>
- BBC News. (2015, August 28). Austria lorry migrant deaths: What we know so far. Retrieved

from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34084597>

- BBC News. (2016, April 27). Paris Attack: Who Were the Attackers?. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512>
- BBC News. (2016, August 19). Attack on Nice: Who was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel?. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801763>
- BBC News. (2016, March 4). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>
- Benson, R. (2002). The Political/Literary Model of French Journalism: Change and Continuity in Immigration News Coverage, 1973–1991. *Journal of European Area Studies*, 10 (1): 49–70. doi:10.1080/14608460220148437.
- Benson, R. (2013). *Shaping Immigration News: A French-American Comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Berry, M., Garcia-Blanco, I., & Moore, K. (2015). *Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries*. Geneva: UNHCR. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/56bb369c9/press-coverage-refugee-migrant-crisis-eu-content-analysis-five-european.html>
- Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease.” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(1), 63–92.
- Boswell, C., & Geddes, Andrew. (2011). *Migration and mobility in the European Union*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Boswell, C. (2007). Migration control in Europe after 9/11: explaining the absence of securitisation. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(3): 589-610.
- Bourbeau, P. (2011). *The securitization of migration: A study of movement and order* (Security and governance series). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England]; New York: Routledge.
- Bourbeau, P. (2014). Moving forward together: Logics of the securitisation process. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 43(1), 187-206. doi:10.1177/0305829814541504.
- Bove, V., & Böhmelt, T. (2016). Does immigration induce terrorism? *Journal of Politics*, 78(2), 572-588.
- Branford, B. & Nowak M. (2017, February 10). France elections: What makes Marine Le Pen far right?. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38321401>
- Broeders, D., & Hampshire, J. (2013). Dreaming of Seamless Borders: ICTs and the Pre-Emptive Governance of Mobility in Europe. *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, 39(8), 1201-1218. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2013.787512.
- Buzan, B., Waeber, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

- Caviedes, A. (2015). An Emerging 'European' News Portrayal of Immigration?. *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, 41(6), 897-917. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2014.1002199.
- CBC News. (2017, June 5). What we know about the London attack: 2 assailants ID'd, police release dozen arrested. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/london-attack-factbox-what-we-know-1.4145623>
- Cesari, J. (2010). *Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, politics, and law* (Routledge studies in liberty and security). London ; New York: Routledge.
- Chappellet-Lanier, T. (2015, November 14). What's Next for Migrants After Paris?. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/migrant-crisis-paris-attacks/416067/>
- Chrisafis, A. (2015, January 12). Charlie Hebdo attackers: born, raised and radicalised in Paris. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/-sp-charlie-hebdo-attackers-kids-france-radicalised-paris>
- COE. (2014). Migration and Human Rights. *Council of Europe*. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/default_en.asp
- Collyer, M. (2006). Migrants, migration and the security paradigm: Constraints and opportunities. *Mediterranean Politics*, 11(2), 255-270. doi:10.1080/13629390600682974
- Cornevin, C. (2016, February 2). Islamisme : 8250 individus radicalisés en France. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/02/02/01016-20160202ARTFIG00368-islamisme-8250-individus-radicalises-en-france.php>
- Cornish, A. (2015, March 3). In France, Young Muslims Often Straddle Two Worlds. *NPR*. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/03/03/390449785/in-france-young-muslims-often-straddle-two-worlds>
- Côté, A. (2016). Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory. *Security Dialogue*, 47(6), 541-558. doi:10.1177/0967010616672150
- Crumley, B. (2012, December 7). The Problem of Clichy: After 2005 Riots, France's Suburbs Are Still Miserable. *Time*. Retrieved from http://world.time.com/2012/12/07/the-problem-of-clichy-after-2005-riots-frances-suburbs-are-still-miserable/?utm_source=huffingtonpost.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=publishexchange_article
- Dearden, L. (2016, October 24). UN report finds no evidence migration causes terror attacks and warns anti-refugee laws could worsen risk. *Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-terrorism-link-migration-un-expert-report-no-evidence-isis-uses-route-human-rights-a7377961.html>

- Dearden, L. (2017, January 17). Refugee crisis: More than 200 migrants drown and freeze to death as first fortnight of 2017 sets new record. *Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-latest-drowning-freezing-snow-mediterranean-hypothermia-greece-bulgaria-deaths-toll-a7532091.html>
- Diallo, R., & Boulin, J. (n.d). A Tale of Two Frances: French Society Must Embrace its Muslims. *The Huffington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rokhaya-diallo/two-frances-france-muslim_b_8582704.html
- Doty, R. L. (2000). Immigration and the Politics of Security, *Security Studies*, 8(2- 3), 71- 93.
- d'Appollonia, A. (2015, December 2). Security, Identity, Adversity: The “French Touch” on the Securitization of Immigration. *Council for European Studies*. Retrieved from <http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/security-identity-adversity-the-french-touch-on-the-securitization-of-immigration/>
- Emmerson, B. (2016). *Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism*. New York: The United Nations.
- Esipova, N et al. (2015). *How the World Views Migration*. Geneva: IOM.
- Faist, T. (2004). The Migration-Security Nexus. International Migration and Security Before and After 9/11, *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations*, 4 (3).
- Feller, E. (2006). Asylum, migration and refugee protection: Realities, myths and the promise of things to come. *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 18(3-4), 509-536.
doi:10.1093/ijrl/eel016
- Fenech, G. (2016, July 5). Relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015. *Assemblée Nationale*. Retrieved from http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922-t1.asp#P2776_721915
- France24. (2016. November 10). First official refugee and migrant shelter opens in French capital. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20161110-france-first-migrant-refugee-transit-shelter-opens-paris>
- Freedman, J. (2004). *Immigration and Insecurity in France*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Frej, W. (2017, February 16). Hundreds Of Migrants And Refugees Are Sleeping Outdoors In Paris. *The Huffington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/refugees-migrants-sleep-outdoors-paris_us_58988296e4b040613137c640
- Front National. (n.d). Immigration: Stopper l'immigration, renforcer l'identité française. Retrieved from <http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/immigration/>

- Gagnon, M. (2016, September 27). 'Back to the street': France's unimagined and unimaginable migrant crisis. *CBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/paris-migrant-crisis-1.3779541>
- Georgiou, M., & Zaborowski, R. (2017). Media coverage of the “refugee crisis”: A cross-European perspective. *Department of Media and Communications: London School of Economics and Political Science*. Retrieved from <https://edoc.coe.int/en/refugees/7367-media-coverage-of-the-refugee-crisis-a-cross-european-perspective.html>
- Goffin, P. (2017, May 23). What we know about the Manchester attacker. *The Toronto Star*. Retrieved from <https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/05/23/what-we-know-about-the-manchester-attacker.html>
- Goodwin, M. (2011). New Report: The Rise of Populist Extremism in Europe. *Chatham House*. Retrieved from <https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/news/view/178303#>
- Guild, E. (2009). *Security and migration in the 21st century*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hamilton, Kimberly, Patrick Simon and Clara Veniard. (2004). *The Challenge of French Diversity*. Washington, D.C.: The Migration Policy Institute.
- Hargreaves, A. (2007). *Multi-ethnic France : Immigration, politics, culture and society* (2nd ed.). New York ; London: Routledge.
- Henley, J. et al. (2015, November 14). France: the secular seat of Europe that has lost so many to radical Islam. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/14/france-the-secular-seat-of-europe-to-lose-so-many-to-radical-islam>
- Holehouse, M. (2015, November 20). Schengen at risk as France imposes indefinite border controls. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/12008561/Schengen-at-risk-as-France-imposes-indefinite-border-controls.html>
- Houry, N. (2017, March 13). Breaking France’s Addiction to its State of Emergency. *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/13/breaking-frances-addiction-its-state-emergency>
- HRW. (2016, February 3). France: Abuses Under State of Emergency. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-state-emergency>
- Humphrey, M. (2013). Migration, Security and Insecurity. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 34(2), 178-195. doi:10.1080/07256868.2013.781982.
- Hussey, A. (2014). *The French intifada : The long war between France and its Arabs*. London,

UK: Granta Books.

Huysmans, J. (2002). Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(1), 41.

Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the securitisation of migration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(5), 751-77.

Huysmans, J. (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. New York: Routledge.

immigrant. (2017). In *Merriam-Webster.com*. Retrieved from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/immigrant>

Ivarsflaten, E. (2005). Threatened by diversity: Why restrictive asylum and immigration policies appeal to western Europeans. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 15(1), 21-45.

Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination Policies in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. *World Politics*, 59(2), 243–273. doi:10.1353/wp.2007.0022.

Kamdar, M. (2015, August 27). An Immigrant in France. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/opinion/an-immigrant-in-france.html>

Kaya, A. (2007). Securitization of Migration in the West and Integration of Migrants. *Istanbul Kultur University Conference on Migration, Turkey and the EU, 23 March 2007*. Istanbul.

Kaya, A. (2012). Backlash of multiculturalist and republicanist policies of integration in the age of securitization. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 38(4/5), 399-411. doi:10.1177/0191453711435653

Kaya, A. (2009). *Islam, migration and integration the age of securitization*. Houndmills, England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Khosrokhavar, F. (2015a). The Mill of Muslim Radicalism in France. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/opinion/the-mill-of-muslim-radicalism-in-france.html?mcubz=1>

Khosrokhavar, F. (2015b). Les trajectoires des jeunes jihadistes français. *Études*, (6), 33-44. Retrieved from <http://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2015-6-page-33.htm>.

Khosrokhavar, F. (2017). *Radicalization: Why some people choose the path of violence*. New York, NY: New Press.

Kille, Leighton W.; Wihbey, John. (2015, November 16). France, Islam, terrorism and the challenges of integration: Research roundup. *Journalist's Resource*. Retrieved from <http://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/conflicts/france-muslims-terrorism-integration-research-roundup>

Kirk, A. (2016, March 24). Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for Isil?. *The*

Telegraph. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil/>

Kroet, C. (2017, March 20). Belgium's Molenbeek home to 51 groups with terror links: report. *Politico*. Retrieved from <http://www.politico.eu/article/belgiums-molenbeek-home-to-51-groups-with-terror-links-report/>

Laurence, J., & Vaïsse, J. (2006). *Integrating Islam : Political and religious challenges in contemporary France*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Library of Congress. (2015). *Treatment of Foreign Fighters in Selected Jurisdictions: Country Surveys*. Retrieved from <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php#France>

Lohrmann, R. (2000). Migrants, refugees and insecurity. current threats to peace? *International Migration*, 38(4), 3-22. doi:10.1111/1468-2435.00118

Luedtke, A. (2015). "Crisis" and reality in European immigration policy. *Current History*, 114(770), 89-96.

Luhman, M. (2015, December 2). Framing Migration: Rhetoric and Reality in Europe - An Introduction. *Council for European Studies*. Retrieved from <http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/framing-migration-rhetoric-and-reality-in-europe-an-introduction/>

Marine 2017. (2017). *144 Engagements Presidentiels*. Retrieved from <https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf>

Mayor, L. (2015, November 27). France's National Front leader calls Canada's refugee plan 'madness'. *CBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/france-le-pen-canada-refugees-1.3340209>

McCants, W. & Meserole, C. (2016, March 24). The French Connection: Explaining Sunni Militancy Around the World. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-24/french-connection>

McGuinness, R. (2016, November 7). Stalingrad to become migrant magnet, furious Paris mayors claim after forced to home 3,000. *Express*. Retrieved from <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/729754/Stalingrad-migrant-magnet-Paris-mayors-france-refugee-crisis>

Mestre, A. (2015, January 8). Pour le FN, la guerre est ouverte contre l'islam radical. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/01/08/pour-le-fn-la-guerre-est-ouverte-contre-l-islam-radical_4551642_823448.html

- Moran, M. (2011). Opposing Exclusion: The Political Significance of the Riots in French Suburbs. *Modern & Contemporary France* 19(3), 297–312. doi:10.1080/09639489.2011.588793.
- Nail, T. (2016). A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks. *Studies In Ethnicity & Nationalism*, 16(1), 158-167. doi:10.1111/sena.12168.
- Nardelli, A. (2015, January 8). From margins to mainstream: the rapid shift in French public opinion. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2015/jan/08/french-public-opinion-charlie-hebdo-attacks>
- Newman, C. (2015, November 17). Paris attacks: Marine Le Pen is no longer a political pariah. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/12000659/Paris-attacks-Marine-Le-Pen-is-no-longer-a-political-pariah.html>
- Newton-Small, J. (2015, November 17). France's Real Crisis Is About More Than Just Refugees. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://time.com/4117401/france-refugees-cultural-tradition-crisis/>
- Nossiter, A. (2016, November 3). Paris is the new Calais, With scores of migrants daily. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/world/europe/paris-migrants-refugees.html>
- Nossiter, A. (2015, November 17). Marine Le Pen's Anti-Islam Message Gains Influence in France. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/europe/marine-le-pens-anti-islam-message-gains-influence-in-france.html?_r=0
- Obi, C. I. (2010). African Migration as the Search for a Wonderful World: An Emerging Trans-global Security Threat?. *African & Asian Studies*, 9(1/2), 128-148. doi:10.1163/156921010X491290
- OECD. (2010). "Public Opinions and Immigration: Individual Attitudes, Interest Groups and the Media", in *International Migration Outlook 2010*. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2010-6-en
- Pauly, R. (2004). *Islam in Europe : Integration or marginalization?* Aldershot ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Pop, V., & Turner, Z. (2016, July 15). After Nice Attack, Countries Tighten Security on French Border; Authorities said at least 84 people died in the truck attack in the French Riviera city. *Wall Street Journal*
- Raimbourg, D. (2017). Communication d'étape sur le contrôle de l'état d'urgence. *Assemblée Nationale*. Retrieved from <http://www2.assemblee->

nationale.fr/static/14/lois/communication_2017_02_22.pdf

- Reuters. (2017, February 4). France's Le Pen sets out presidential election manifesto. Retrieved from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-election-fn-manifesto-factbox-idUKKBN15J00B?il=0>
- Richmond, A. (2005). *Globalization and the refugee crisis* (CRS working paper series ; no. 1). Toronto, Ont.: York University.
- Rudolph, C. (2003). Security and the political economy of international migration. *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 603-620. doi:10.1017.S000305540300090X.
- Rychnovska, D. (2014). Securitization and the Power of Threat Framing. *Perspectives: Central European Review Of International Affairs*, 22(2), 9-31
- Sandford, A. (2017, February 9). What are Marine Le Pen's Policies?. *Euronews*. Retrieved from <http://www.euronews.com/2017/02/09/what-do-we-know-about-marine-le-pen-s-policies>
- Saunders, D. (2016, August 26). The Migrant Crisis: Here's why it's not what you think. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/europes-migrant-crisis-eight-reasons-its-not-what-youthink/article26194675/>
- Serhan, Y. (2017, April 22). French Election 2017: A Guide to the Candidates. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/french-election-candidates/523545/>
- Simmons, K., Stokes, B., & Wike, R. (2016). *Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs*. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center. Retrieved from <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/>
- Simmons, K., Stokes, B., Wike, R. (2016, July 11). Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs. *Pew Research Centre*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/>
- Sparrow, A. (2017, March 24). Westminster attack. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2017/mar/23/westminster-attack-parliament-resumes-tributes-keith-palmer-live>
- The Economist. (2015a, December 6). A spectacular result for Marine Le Pen and France's far right. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21679606-first-round-migrant-crisis-helps-national-front-its-best-results-history?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e>
- The Economist. (2015b, November 14). Phantom menace. Retrieved from

<http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678272-marine-le-pen-may-win-elections-fear-non-existent-migrant-wave-phantom-menace?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e>

- The Soufan Group. (2015). *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*. New York, NY: The Soufan Group. Retrieved from http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf
- Townsend, M., & McVeigh, T. (2016, September 17). Migrant death toll expected to exceed 10,000 in 2016. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/17/migrant-death-toll-2016-syria-united-nations>
- Traynor, I. (2016, January 5). Is the Schengen dream of Europe without borders becoming a thing of the past?. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/is-the-schengen-dream-of-europe-without-borders-becoming-a-thing-of-the-past>
- Tsoukala, A. (2002). Le traitement médiatique de la criminalité étrangère en Europe. *Déviance et Société*, 26, 61-82.
- UNHC. (2016). Mediterranean death toll soars, 2016 is deadliest year yet. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684/mediterranean-death-toll-soars-2016-deadliest-year.html>
- UNHCR. (2015). *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Ünver Noi, A. (2015). Islamic State Recruitment and its Impacts on the Re-securitization of Migration in Europe. *Marmara Journal Of European Studies*, 23(1), 89-107.
- van Ginkel, B., & Entenmann, E. (2016). *The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union*. The Hague: ICCT. Retrieved from https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf
- Vinocur, N. (2016, January 27). Poll: Paris attacks eroded French support for refugees. *Politico*. Retrieved from <http://www.politico.eu/article/poll-paris-attacks-isis-isil-eroded-french-support-for-refugees-migration-asylum-bataclan/>
- Waever, O. (1993). "Societal Security: The Concept," in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, ed. Ole Waever et al. Copenhagen: Pinter Publishers.
- Walt, S. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2), p. 212.
- Walters, W. (2010). Migration and Security. In: *The Routledge Handbook of New Security*

Studies, ed. J.P. Burgess, 229-239. London: Routledge.

Ware, L. (2015, January 16). Muslim Immigrants and the “Other France”. *The Huffington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leland-ware/muslim-immigrants-and-the_b_6482936.html

Weiner, M. (1993). Security, Stability, and International Migration. *International Security* 17(3), 91-126.

Williams, A et al. (2016, August 1). How two Brussels neighborhoods became ‘a breeding ground’ for terror. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/brussels-molenbeek-demographics/>

Williams, M. C. (2003). Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), 511. doi:10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x

Wright, K. (2015, November 16). Paris Attacks: Refugees Again at Mercy of Shifting Public Opinion. *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kristin-wright/paris-attacks-refugees-at-mercy-of-public-opinion_b_8564890.html

Yap, I. (2016, January 13). France’s Attitude Toward Minorities Is Increasingly Unstable. *Stanford Politics*. Retrieved from <https://stanfordpolitics.com/frances-attitude-toward-minorities-is-increasingly-unstable-99e05a08af87>

Yuksel, S. (2014). Securitization of Migration: The Case of Turkey-EU Relations. *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 22(1), 169-187.

Zemni, S. (2006). Islam between Jihadi Threats and Islamist Insecurities? Evidence from Belgium and Morocco. *Mediterranean Politics*, 11(2), 231-253.
doi:10.1080/13629390600682842