

Rio de Janeiro Pacification Programs:

The militarization of the police in the perpetuation of structural violence

by

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Abstract

Rio de Janeiro has gone through four attempts to decrease the levels of violence in the city, nonetheless the city continues to be portrayed in the news as a city of violence and war. The projects attempted to decrease violence rates as well as combat police corruption and brutality. Moreover, the four projects aimed at reinstating the State control over the *favelas*, areas considered to be under the command of criminal groups. Known for its violent practices and corruption, the police of Rio was the main object of reform in all of the four projects as an attempt to decrease police brutality, corruption and the tensions between police forces and the *favela* residents.

Exposing the deep-rooted causes of Rio's violence, the present paper analyses the four peace projects implemented in Rio through the lenses of structural violence. Between racism, classism and the culturally constructed militarized image of the police, Rio does not seem to be able to reach peace. Departing from the principle that the State is not absent from the *favelas* but rather gives its power to the gangs through corruption and exclusion, the present paper analyses the social impediments for peace.

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List of abbreviations:

BOPE: *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (Special Police Operations Battalion).

CIPOC: *Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário* (Integrated Centre of Community Policing). The first attempt at implementing community policing in Rio de Janeiro.

CV: *Commando Vermelho* (Red Command). The largest drug cartel of Rio.

DOI-CODI: Destacamento de Operações e Informações¹ (DOI) e Centro de Operação de Defesa Interna (CODI).

FIFA: Fédération Internationale of Football Association

GAPE: *Grupamento de Aplicação Prática Escolar* (Group for School's Practical Application). The second attempt at implementing community policing in Rio. It was based on the application of the training and formal learning of community policing practices.

GEPB: *Grupamento Especializado no Policiamento de Bairro* (Specialized Battalion in Neighbourhood Policing). Part of the CIPOC plan, the GEPB was implemented in neighbourhoods that were considered to have a lower risk and which presented lower rates of violence.

GPAE *Grupamento Policial em Areas Especiais* (Special Areas Police Unit). The third attempt of implementing community policing in Rio.

PMERJ *Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro* (Military Police of Rio de Janeiro)

ROTA *Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar* (Extensive Rounds Tobias de Aguiar) São Paulo's special police battallion,

UPP *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (Pacifying Police Unit). The fourth and last attempt to implement community policing in Rio.

¹ Detachment of Operations and Information

Introduction:

Rio de Janeiro's current situation presents increasing homicide and criminality rates, classifying the city as one of one of violence and insecurity. This reality is a very different one from the time when the city was hosting two major international events: The World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 (Leahy, 2017). During that time, the government of Rio as well as its citizens were taking pride after their latest pacification² program, the *Unidades de Polícia de Pacificadora* - UPP (Musumeci, 2017, pp. 76-77; Martins, 2017).

Nearly ten years after the UPP implementation the program appears to be failed, despite authorities' reluctance in admitting it (Alves, L., 2017; Magalhães, 2018; Musumeci, 2017, p. 43). In the midst of a financial crisis, the state of Rio de Janeiro is unable to keep up with the salaries of public servants. In February this year, Brazil's Federal government took over the security department of Rio and sent army troops to ensure the safety of the city (Biller, 2018; Londono & Darlington, 2018).

The UPP appeared to be a suitable solution. Based on the community policing model, it sought to decrease criminal activities by introducing more approachable police and maintaining a constant police presence in *favela* areas (Gomes & Burlamarqui, 2016, pp. 37-38). Nonetheless, given the rise in violence levels and the introduction of a Federal intervention in the city of Rio, although not officially dismantled the UPP is no longer effective (Biller, 2018; Watson, 2017). Moreover, the fact that the Federal government and the army are now the ones managing the policies of public security in Rio de Janeiro, it becomes impossible to think of the UPP as a successful project in its objective to pacify the city ("Rio de Janeiro Violence", 2018; Londono & Darlington, 2018).

² Pacification: term used by Larkins to refer to the process of *pacificação* of the *favelas*, which in Portuguese means to make it peaceful.

In order to deeply understand the dynamics that contribute to the continuous violence in the *favelas*³ of Rio one must account for the *favelas*' formation. Moreover, to understand how community policing could contribute to the reduction of violence we must consider the historical formation of the social dynamics of the city. Self-constructed, the *favelas* have been stigmatized as hubs of criminality and drugs, which contributes to the justification of police brutality in these areas (Musumeci, 2017, p. 53). Historically the role played by the police in the maintenance of order within and outside the *favelas* has been one of containment of the lower classes. Denoting a prejudice derived from the elites' perception of the lower classes at the beginning of the twentieth century, police violence is deeply rooted in the racism and negative image built at that time (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 305-306; Santana, Costa, & Castro, 2016, p. 66;).

It was due to the history of oppression, mistrust and miscommunication between the lower classes and the police forces that the community policing model was proposed. That is because the model envisions the establishment of a neighbourhood police force that focuses on the development of preventive measures as well as reactive ones (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 305-307). Implemented for the first time in the 1980s, the community policing model is not something exclusive to the UPP strategy. As seen in Ribeiro and Montandon (2014) one should not make the mistake of thinking about each of the pacification strategies introduced in Rio as separate from each other. Working almost as a progression of concepts, the different programs are part of one process that still has much to learn and many changes to be undertaken (pp. 252-253). Thus, I propose to study each of the projects outlining how and why they failed in addressing the violence in Rio.

³ *Favela*: noun, a Brazilian shack or shanty town; a slum. Found at: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/favela>

I will start with a brief history of the development of the *favelas* and the social stigmas constructed around and forced upon its residents. To better comprehend why these programs failed, we need to first understand the formation of the criminalized perception of the *favelas*. Through this, one can understand why community policing is a good approach and the reasons that led to its non-implementation causing the failure of the projects.

Today, Rio's government faces challenges like corruption, poverty, police brutality and lethality rates. Acknowledging the shortfalls of the present thesis, my focus is in the relationship between *favela* residents and the police forces.

Working within the militarization of the police⁴ and the criminalization of the *favelas*, I will study how these two processes contribute to the perpetuation of violent conflict in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, I propose that these two processes are the main reasons for the failure of the peace processes that have been carried out by the government of Rio de Janeiro.

Divided into six chapters, the thesis starts with a brief history on the formation of Rio's social relationships. Next, it includes one chapter for each peace project. Dedicating four chapters to these projects the sixth chapter brings the conclusion which addresses how community policing model could work in Brazil and my analysis on how to tackle structural violence in the country.

Chapter one: "Contextualization of Rio's violence" will present elements such as racism, corruption, the role of the media and the social role played by organized crime. By presenting all these elements, I intend to demonstrate how their existence perpetuates and justifies violence in the *favelas* (Rocha, A. P., 2013). Departing from the declaration of Republic to current days I do not mention the colonization, nor do I present details from the

⁴ By militarization of the police, I mean the process through which the police forces in Rio became more violent and the construction of a war mindset that makes police officers see themselves as soldiers battling in the war against crime, rather than officers fighting to maintain the security of all members of society.

older forms of government in Brazil. The reason for that is because the type of racism present in colonization times is different from the type of racism existing in the *favelas*. First nations were seen as lazy by the colonizers whereas black people were seen as criminals and dangerous (Fausto, 2014, p. 16). Although corruption, police repression and status classification are deeply embedded in Brazil's colonization period; there is not enough time or pages to address five hundred years of history in the present thesis. Presenting Rio's history from the late 1880s until the 1988, I seek to expose the construction of the criminalized image of the *favelas*, the militarization of the police forces and their repressive role.

Thus, the historical analysis is important to comprehend the establishment of corruption as a "reciprocal exchange" under the aegis of the "*jeitinho brasileiro*"⁵ (Brazilian way; Misse, 2010, p. 36). Affecting not only Rio but the country, the *jeitinhos* create a type of prejudice that criminalizes the lower classes (Misse, 2010; Rocha, A. P., 2013).

Chapter two: "Analytical tools" bring the two analytical tools used to interpret the social dynamics of Rio and the model used to pacify the city. Through structural violence I intend to present more in depth understanding of the structural causes of the current conflict. Likewise, by presenting the community policing model and I intend to present a deeper analysis of the social structures while demonstrating how the model could contribute to a changing the social dynamics.

Chapter three: "The introduction of Community Policing to Rio", brings the first two pacification programs implemented in Rio. Without any mention to the pacification of the *favelas*, the two programs sought to change the relationship between the police forces and *favela* residents in an attempt to decrease violence levels in the city.

⁵ *Jeitinho Brasileiro*: means a corrupt or wrongful way of getting things done. Dubious way of circumventing the rule <https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/130995/how-can-i-translate-jeitinho-brasileiro-into-english>

Chapter four: “The *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais (GPAE)*”, presents the third pacification program through which the government sought to change the relationship between the police forces and the *favela* residents. While also aiming to bring the missing social services and assistance to these areas, the program tried to implement preventive measures and a stronger training on community policing to the officers of GPAE.

Chapter five: “The *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP)*”, brings the last pacification program. This is the only program that brought the idea of the community policing model as a way to pacify the *favelas*. While all other programs aimed at re-establishing the State presence in the *favelas* and change the relationship between police forces and *favela* residents, this is the first program that openly addresses the need to bring peace to these areas. Still ongoing, the project seems to have failed given the armed forces presence in the *favelas* and the fact that the Federal government is now in charge of security polices for the state and city of Rio de Janeiro (Alves, L. , 2017; Biller, 2018).

In order to understand the perpetuation of violence and police brutality in Rio, we must understand the social dynamics that justify the use of force by the police against the *favelas* and its residents. By comprehending the historical stigmatization of the lower classes, we can understand their criminalization and consequently, the justifications behind the use of force towards them. Thus, it is possible to point to the main causes of the failure of the peace projects. Having in its core mandate the introduction of a proximity police, the pacification programs fail because of police’s inability to change their militarized behaviour. Additionally, the continuous mistrust between police officers and *favela* residents also contribute to the failure of these projects.

Chapter 1: Contextualization of Rio's Violence

1.1 The history of the *favelas*

There is no one single explanation for the origin of the word *favela* to name the housing structures on the mountains of Rio de Janeiro (Cath, 2012). From the several existent hypotheses what can be said with certainty is that the term *favela* to name this type of housing structures in Rio was first used in the news of the beginning of the twentieth century. The media when broadcasting these regions of the city referred to them as *favelas* in a generalization of the first *favela* in Rio: the *Morro da Favela* (Silva, M. N., 2010, p. 63). In a short time, all the neighbourhoods formed on the hills were referred to as *favelas* (Ferreira, A., 2009, para. 8; Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 133-134).

This generalization led to the standardization of the negative image linked to that community, which had its roots in the negative image associated with its residents. Formerly residents of the *cortiços*,⁶ they were perceived as non-hygienic and dangerous types. They were seen by the elites as a type of people who formed a group of uneducated and vagabond-like individuals (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, p. 27; Santana et al., 2016, p. 63). A perception that followed them to the *favelas*, and one that was seen as a way of life that needed to be eliminated. This perception perpetuates until now and is used to justify the use of extreme force by the police forces (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, pp. 27-30; Santana et al., 2016, pp. 64-68; Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 62-63). This brief analysis of the *favelas*, and how they came to be known as such, is important to demonstrate how these areas have been historically stigmatized and marginalized.

⁶ *Cortiço*: Portuguese term used to designate highly concentrated areas of urban housing. Usually formed by a big mansion or house that is divided into small rooms for rental purposes, also traditionally considered a housing area of poor hygiene and sanitation.

1.2 Formation of *favelas*

In Rio de Janeiro, the *favelas* are predominantly formed on the hills and mountains that surround the city. They date back to 1865 when these first poorly structured houses started to be seen in the hills of the capital (Vaz, 1994, p. 590). Nonetheless, it was only with the occupation of the *Morro da Providência*, later named *Morro da Favella* that these houses started to get the attention of the press and State authorities (Valladares, 2000, p. 7).

With no defined history, the *favelas* have no set date to mark their beginning or expansion. They are the result of years of relocations, evictions, and demolitions for the modernization of the city (Vaz, 1994, p. 591). Amongst the many factors contributing to the rapid expansion and the formation of the *favelas*, I will focus on four main factors that led to the development of Rio as we know it today: racism, political and police corruption, the influence of the elites and the lack of infrastructure in the city of Rio. All four concepts are very intertwined and thus appear concomitantly.

1.2.1 Racism.

Racism has been present in Brazilian society since the country's inception. From the prejudice against the Indigenous peoples, seen as the uncivilized and lazy, to the establishment of slavery non-whites have always been seen as a second-class type of individuals who were more prone to criminality (Valladares, 2000, p. 22; Conniff & McCann, 1989, p. 195).

The criminalization of the non-white culture also contributed to the criminalization of these classes and the increasing repression by the police towards them. Consequently, creating a group of people that were not only excluded from society but also repudiated by it (Cath, 2012; Conniff & McCann, 1989, p. 201; Valladares, 2000, p. 25).

The elites' perception towards the lower classes, the non-whites, and the common people was transferred to the police forces. Consequently, their actions towards these social

groups became more violent confirming the police as a biased institution (Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011; Valladares, 2000, pp. 6-7). They started overseeing, controlling and repressing people with socially unacceptable behaviours such as prostitutes, drunks, *capoeiras*,⁷ and the unemployed (Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011; Valladares, 2000, pp. 18-23).

Additionally, former slaves were still seen as beneath the white population and the stereotype built by the elites towards them contributed to their historical marginalization. The fact that the elites considered them to be more prone to commit crimes due to their poverty, lack of opportunity, and education contributed to reinforce their criminalized image. Being predominantly composed of non-whites, the *favelas* residents suffered ever-growing police violence in the big centres (Conniff & McCann, 1989, p. 200-204).

In a society where the mechanisms for political representation and social action were not yet present, violent clashes were seen by the lower classes as their only recourse. With their growing discontent towards the modernization policies and their consequences, the lower classes started to protest and clash with the State authorities responsible for their removal. The police being responsible for those removals and the maintenance of order gained a civilizing function. They became the regulator of social behaviours and the intermediate between the State and the population (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, pp. 22-23).

1.2.2 Political and police corruption.

Directly related to the end of slavery and Brazil's new political regime the *favelas* are a result of the urban modernization promoted by the Old Republic (1889-1930). Moreover, the unplanned urban expansion caused by the massive influx⁸ of people from the former

⁷ Capoeiras: name given to the people that practices capoeira (Brazilian mixture of dance and martial arts, introduced by the slaves into Brazilian culture).

⁸ The influx represented a 95.8 percent growth between 1872-1890 (Suppia & Scarabello, 2014, para. 1)

coffee farms and Europe to Rio contributed to their development (Furtado, 1998; Suppia & Scarabello, 2014; Skidmore, 2010).

The Old Republic (1889-1930) was marked by social dynamics that were based on the *voto de cabresto*⁹ and the formation of *panelinhas*¹⁰ (Conniff & McCann, 1989, p. 36; Silva, M. N., 2010, 155). Characterized by favouritism and the maintenance of a power balance between oligarchies¹¹ this period can be considered the beginning of corruption in the country (Conniff & McCann, 1989, p. 271; Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 17). Thus, *favelas* can be understood as the result of such politics and their lack of concern for policies that attended the needs of the lower classes (Misse, 2010, pp. 26-27).

Moreover, when we analyze the role of the police and their function in society, there is a clear differentiation in how the police treated and continue to treat the lower classes and how they treat the elites (Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011, para. 10; Rocha, A. P., 2013, p. 86). Consequently, the lower classes were stigmatized as a group that needed to be controlled and repressed. At the same time, the *política de compadres*¹² (companion's policy) contributed to the construction of a government that attended to the demands of their own upper social group (Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011; Rocha, A. P., 2013; Valladares, 2000).

⁹ *Voto de cabresto*: practice through which powerful land owners would threaten people into voting for them, the voting system was open at the time and people were coerced into voting for the landowner they either worked for or that was influential in the region where they lived.

¹⁰ *Panelinhas*: used to refer to networks built within higher social class in Brazil to keep the political, judicial and media system interconnected

¹¹ Oligarchies: A government made by a minority of most wealthy classes, who influence politics, culture and economy to promote their own interests. In Brazil, they were wealthy landowners in the coffee industry who governed according to their interests. This period was marked by corruption, exchange of favours and many other questionable conducts that sought only the concerns of this very limited class of big coffee producers

¹² *Política de compadres*: an exchange of favours using public money to help or favour politicians' friends and family. The *política de compadres* allows for corruption and for political measures and public services that favour a specific person or group of people.

1.2.3 The lack of infrastructure of Rio at the end of the nineteenth century.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Rio de Janeiro was known for its weak infrastructure, the absence of sanitation, and urban planning (Suppia & Scarabello, 2014). Following the big influx of people from the coffee farms and Europe to Rio, *cortiços* and other community housing¹³ started developing in the downtown area as an alternative means of more affordable housing. (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, pp. 22-24; Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 64-73).

Nonetheless, the capital of Brazil between 1763 to 1960, Rio was not a model city for the entry of foreign visitors at the beginning of the Old Republic. Thus, looking to modernize the city and bring better sanitation and living conditions, Rio went through a series of urban reforms during the period from 1900-1930 (Ferreira, 2009, para. 20-12; Valladares, 2000, pp. 1-4).

The *cortiços* and other community housing were marked by the lack of ventilation, collective living, and low sanitation. Moreover, their structure facilitated the development and spread of various diseases such as yellow fever, smallpox, tuberculosis and even bubonic plague (Ferreira, 2009, para. 4). Consequently, both *cortiços* and community housing started to be seen as the representation of a decadent way of living which was in stark contrast with the envisioned image the elites had for Rio de Janeiro. Perceived as a focus of depraved behaviours, the *cortiços* became a standard to be eliminated (Machado, 2011, pp. 12-13; Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 2002, pp. 6-11). That perception contributed not only to the dismantlement of these housing structures, leaving a big part of the population homeless, but also marked the beginning of the stigmatization of *cortiço* residents. Seen as

¹³ Community housings were collective living spaces, marked by a high density of people in small spaces. Known in Portuguese as *cortiços*, *estalagens* and *casas de comodo*, these were considered as alternative living for those financially disabled. Usually built within a mansion, each room served as a “house” for a family, bathrooms were shared and there was not a lot of sanitation or privacy.

dangerous places where *vadios* (low-lives), prostitutes, and criminals lived, the community housing began to be defined as a disease and an area where police repression was necessary (Valladares, 2000, pp. 7-8).

1.2.4 The political and social influence of the elites.

Brazil has a history of slave-owner relationships, authoritarianism, and a government shaped by the interests of the elites. It is a country where a person's surname can give them differentiated treatment and where authority and power are derived from money (Barros, F.R., 2015, p. 26; Rocha, A. P., 2013, p. 94).

As seen above, the political control at the beginning of the twentieth century was in the hands of the elites who were interested in the aesthetic appearance of Rio. More focused on the modernization of downtown than in attending the needs of the lower classes they ignored this parcel of the population (Ferreira, 2009; Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015; Suppia & Scarabello, 2014). Influenced by Europe these elites started a series of reforms and innovations in the city, pushing the lower classes to the hills, where they would not be seen. This way, the elites the elites made sure the lower classes could not damage the image being built for Rio de Janeiro (Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 40-42; Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 12-13; Valladares, 2000, p. 7).

These reforms without proper planning and without considering local alternatives contributed to the formation of the *favelas* while the city's reforms towards modernization began (Silva, M. N., 2010, p. 65; Suppia & Scarabello, 2014, para. 3). Nonetheless, alongside the expulsion of the lower classes from downtown some level of tolerance towards the illegality of *cortiços* in more remote areas of the city was developed. By ignoring the formation of houses in the *favelas* and dismissing the needs of the lower classes, politicians and elites created the conditions for the development of the *favelas*. Re-established away from the downtown area of the city these housing structures were ignored until they were too

many and social problems started to arise in these areas (Valladares, 2000, pp. 7-8; Vaz, 1994, p. 586; Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 40).

Contributing to this negative image of the *favela* residents and the lower classes, in 1890, the Penal Code was reformed. Through this reform the government implemented a shift in the conceptualization of crime (Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011, para. 22). Switching the emphasis given to the criminal act and centering it on the individual considered or perceived as a criminal, this change directly contributed to the criminalization of a stereotype constructed by the elites. Moreover, it produced a police force more repressive towards a group of people perceived by the upper classes as vagabonds and more prone to criminality (Canuto de Souza & de Moraes, 2011, para. 22; Rocha, A. P., 2013, p. 85). This change to the penal code in 1890 can be considered to be the first steps towards the development of a biased police force. One which targets a certain group of people in society and acts upon socially unacceptable behaviours (Rocha, A. P., 2013).

1.3 The development of the *favelas*

Beyond the social factors that led to the dynamics of Rio, a few central events also contributed to the formation of the "us *versus* them" dichotomy between the social classes. The lack of infrastructure of the city at the end of the nineteenth century was one of the main causes for the series of reforms the city went through. Moreover, the Europeanization of the elites in the way they interpreted civility and modernity shaped the social relations in the city (Valladares, 2000, p. 15; Vaz, 1994, p. 585). The extreme focus on building an aristocratic image of Rio triggered the historical development of a political culture that does not focus on the lower classes (Machado, 2011, pp. 3-5). Instead, it pushes them to the extremes of the urban settings where their struggles are not witnessed (Suppia & Scarabello, 2014, para. 3; Misse, 2010, pp. 24-25; Vaz, 1994, pp. 586-590).

1.3.1 The hygienist policies.

With the need to eliminate the damaging and repugnant way of life in the *cortiços*, Cândido Barata Ribeiro¹⁴ implemented a series of modernizing reforms to promote sanitation. However, at that time, half of Rio's population was living in community housing making his task a difficult one to implement (Machado, 2011, pp. 16-17; Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 2002, pp. 5-9). During his reforms and demolitions Barata Ribeiro's most controversial removal was the *cortiço* known as *Cabeça de Porco*¹⁵ (Pig's head). Housing almost two thousand people, the *Cabeça de Porco* was destroyed in one day leading to the requirement of further government measures to deal with the evicted residents (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 2002, p. 7; Vaz, 1994, pp. 584-591).

It is with the demolition of the *Cabeça de Porco* that the first officially recognized *favela* emerged (Valladares, 2000, p. 7). Without resources or alternatives, the recently evicted residents of this community housing moved to the neighboring *Morro da Providência*, using the material from the demolition of the downtown tenements to build their new houses. (Silva, L. S., 2016, pp. 63-64; Valladares, 2000, p. 7).

A significant contributor to the formation of the *favelas* was the State focus on the improvement of the aesthetic of the city to the detriment of policies of social inclusion. This lack of involvement in the development of programs that served the needs of the lower classes is directly linked to the unplanned expansion of *favelas*. The sum of unplanned development and lack of investment contributed to reinforcing the perpetuation of a criminalized and uneducated image imposed on *favela* residents (Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 63-65; Valladars, 2000, p.15; Vaz, 1994, pp. 594-595).

¹⁴ Mayor of Rio between 1892-93

¹⁵ The *cortiço Cabeça de Porco* was named after the pig's head sculpture at the main gate of the old mansion

Furthermore, this focus on the European aesthetic and in presenting the downtown area as a model of civility, modernization, and cleanliness, started a process of public service selection (Suppia & Scarabello, 2014, para. 3; Vaz, 1994, p. 589). A higher focus on the central areas of the city allowed for certain behaviours and activities in more suburban areas (Valladares, 2000, pp. 15-16). Therefore, the relationship between the police forces and *cortiço* residents started to be one of tension due to the existing prejudice towards the lower classes (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, p. 23; Canuto de Souza & de Moraes, 2011).

1.3.2 The lack of State policies on affordable housing.

With the development of the *favelas*, the hygiene and modernization measures reinforced the expansion and proliferation of a “habitat marked by informality” (Silva, M. N. 2010, p. 65). The lack of State presence, and infrastructure in the neighbouring areas of Rio transferred the housing issues to the city borders (Silva, M. N., 2010, p. 29; Vaz, 1994, p. 587). Furthermore, their location allowed for a tolerance that only contributed to their perpetuation and marginalization (Vaz, 1994, p. 587).

By modifying its *ethos* from being a poor small conglomerate of constructions to becoming an area of the city, *favelas* turned into the new version of community housing. Nonetheless, they count on less infrastructure than the old *cortiços* in centre town (Vaz, 1994, pp. 591-592; Suppia & Scarabello, 2014, para. 3). Without a sewage system, electricity or garbage collection, these areas started to be perceived in the same negative way as the *cortiços*. As the media and politicians framed these areas as places of vagabondage and criminality, they started to be known for sheltering lower and dangerous classes. Poverty and lack of sanitation were seen by the elites as facilitators of criminality. Moreover, being poor started to signify a lifestyle that was linked to criminal behaviours, prostitution, drinking and disorder, and other unacceptable behaviours for social life with the elites. Consequently,

poverty started to be criminalized and the lower classes started to be seen as a group to be excluded and separated from the “good and civilized people” (Mattos, 2009, pp. 150-164).

Although no official measures were taken against the *favelas* in the mid-1900s, this negative perception of poverty led to the destruction of the initial shacks in the mountains of Rio. Police forces would go up to the hills only to destroy shacks, dismantle houses and demonstrate their power. Although these housings were not the primary concern of the government of the time, this demonstrates how poverty has been historically repressed. Moreover, it shows how the lack of policies for the lower classes led to their continuous stigmatization, expulsion and attempted elimination (Ferreira, A., 2009, para. 21; Mattos, 2009, pp. 159-161; Valladares, 2000, p. 19).

The unplanned and disordered development of the *favelas* led to their main characteristic today: the lack of defined roads and streets, as well as the messy, narrow pathways formed from the construction of shacks and huts, huddled together. This disordered gathering of houses makes present police incursions very difficult. Paths can lead to unexpected places and the narrowness of the streets may not allow for the passage of cars and/or other vehicles (Machado, 2011, p. 10; Valladares, 2000, p. 12).

1.3.3 The recognition of the *favelas* by the State and its prohibition.

The *favelas* started to be perceived in the mid 1930s and were legally recognized in 1937 through the *Código de Obras* (Code of Works) (Valladares, 2000, p. 18). However, it was not until the 1940s that the *favelas* were recognized as an urban phenomenon to be stopped (Vaz, 2000, p. 590). Legally recognized in 1937 through the creation of the Code of Works, the *favelas* were introduced in Chapter XV, section II (Valladares, 2000, p. 23; Vaz, 1994, p. 594). In this section, the *favelas* are defined as conglomerates of two or more hovels regularly arranged, or in disorder, constructed with improvised materials and in disagreement with the provision of the present decree (Valladares, 2000, p. 19)

Prohibiting their existence, the Code also forbade the additional construction of shacks and huts on the hills. Likewise, it stated that the government would use any means necessary to prevent their advance and any new developments in those areas would be demolished (Valladares, 2000, p. 23). The prohibition of the *favelas* without an alternative for the housing problem faced by Rio only contributed to further their negative image associated. This resulted in the criminalization of both its existence and, consequently, its residents.

Excluded from the rest of society as the uncivil, uneducated periphery, the *favelas* became a space for the development of demagogic politics. Its residents started to be associated with an image of “lost souls with the need to be civilized and saved” (Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 73-74). In reference to the peace projects in Rio, it is possible to see how this image is used to justify repressive measures performed by the police (Ribeiro, L., 2014).

1.4 The police forces and the *favelas*

When discussing the history of the police institution in Brazil, it is difficult to trace back to when it was officially founded. Some authors talk about a law enforcement authority from the time of the colonization (Silveira, 2014; Tierney, 2012). Others say that this first command cannot be linked to police history due to their *modus operandi* and activities (Souza, 2015). Nonetheless, what is important to notice is their role in the containment and repression of the lower classes. Moreover, it is important to notice their role in carrying out policies implemented by the government in the service of the elites. Their function in the expulsion and demolition of *cortiços* in order to modernize the city within European standards or even their role in invading residences to carry out forced vaccinations without further explanations. Police has always worked to serve the upper and political classes, embracing their prejudice and negative perception of the lower classes (Canuto de Souza & de Moraes, 2011; Ferreira, 2009; Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015; Mattos, 2009)

In a brief retrospect of the police forces in Brazil and their purpose in society, it is noticeable that they always carried out the task of containing the lower classes. Amongst their function of maintaining order and the safety of the population, they were also responsible for taming the uneducated and uncivilized population (Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011; Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, pp. 22-25).

1.4.1 The role of the police in the formation of the *favelas*.

From the inception of the *favelas*, the relationship between residents and the police forces has been one of tension and violence. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the police forces had a central role in containing the so-called dangerous classes. They took on repressive actions and contributed to the development of the criminalized perception of these groups (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, p. 27; Rocha, A. P., 2013, p. 86)

Between the ends of the nineteenth century until 1910 police officers were additionally tasked with the responsibility of imposing health measures on the lower classes. As a result, violent actions were taken by police authorities in the expulsion of the lower classes from the community living structures in downtown Rio (Mattos, 2009, pp. 164-169; Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 62-66). Under the banner of this new task, the police forces carried out several roles, going beyond their central mandate. Representing the State as an authority, they carried out expulsions of the population from the *cortiços* and ensured the implementation of sanitary measures. In carrying out measures to eradicate the diseases that ravaged the city, more and more authoritarian measures were implemented (Melo Goes Jr, 2015; Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015).

Being the ones that performed such tasks, the police forces became more repressive each time in carrying out their role to contain the so-called dangerous classes (Souza, 2015, p. 219). In guaranteeing the imposition of government sanctions, their relationship with the

lower classes became each time more conflicting and violent (de Macedo Santana & Rosa Soares, 2005).

The idea of serving the purposes of the State justified violent actions from the part of the police forces against the lower classes. Officers would be responsible for their evictions, forced vaccinations, and the repression of their “uncivilized” behaviour, contradicting the serve and protect discourse. These actions contributed to the development of a criminalized perception around these groups who were first installed in the *cortiço* and later moved to the *favelas* (Silva, M. N., 2010, p. 133).

1.5 The dictatorship (1964-1985)

The dictatorship in Brazil was an authoritarian regime, governed by the military, and marked by suppression and violence. During this time, several civil and socio-economic rights were suppressed. Torture and forced disappearances were standard practices of the police forces, and repression was actively imposed against any sign of discontent with the government (Alvin, 2015; Barros, F. R., 2010; Pedretti, L., 2016; Oliveira, 2011).

Taking place between 1964 and 1985, the dictatorship was comprised of five presidents, and its repressive measures were consistently implemented during the twenty-one years of its duration. The most controversial and discussed actions of the dictatorship were the first five *Atos Institucionais* (Institutional Acts). They were implemented in the first four years of the military government and excluded several rights from Constitution (Barros, F. R., 2010; Comissão Nacional da Verdade, 2014; Fausto, 2014; Joffily, n.d.).

1.5.1 The AI-5 and the creation of DOI-CODI.

The Institutional Act 5 (AI-5 in Portuguese) is considered the most controversial one as well as a symbol of the repression of the dictatorship period. It prohibited any political manifestation, vetoed *habeas corpus* and made police arrest free from the judicial mandate or

formal accusation. The AI-5 gave the president full powers including supremacy to close the Congress (Ceccatto, 2006; Portal da Legislação, n.d.).

Another controversial implementation and symbol of the authoritarianism of the military government was the creation, in 1970 of the *Destacamento de Operações e Informações*¹⁶ (DOI) e o *Centro de Operação de Defesa Interna*¹⁷ (CODI). Both departments were responsible for the investigation of revolutionary groups. The DOI-CODI created a police force that not only investigated and targeted the internal enemy but also monitored and focused its actions on the containment of the *favelas*. Under the command of General Humberto Sousa de Melo, they carried out execution missions leading to several missing person cases at the time (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, 2014; Joffily, n.d.).

1.5.2 Militarization of the police forces during the dictatorship.

Analyzing the dictatorship and its influence in the development of a militarized culture within the police forces, the amalgamation between the police and the army was a landmark in this change. It changed the police officers' perception towards concepts such as the maintenance of the social order and security as well as how they carried out their duties (Souza, 2015, pp. 214-217; Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 49). Order and security became linked to the preservation of the government. Thus, the enemy became any socialist or communist group that could threaten the continuation of the authoritarian regime (Alvin, 2015; Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011; Souza, 2015, p. 214).

1.5.3 Repression over the *favelas*.

With the paradigm shift in the police priorities and role, the *favelas* started to be seen as the home of the enemy, areas where socialist and/or communist ideas could develop. Their social demands (infrastructure, sanitation and the end of the relocation of *favelas*) were

¹⁶ Detachment of Operations and Information

¹⁷ Center of Operation of Internal Defense

considered “subversive actions” and possible communist attempts to topple the government (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, p. 17). They were perceived as a threat to the then political polarization between communist and capitalist models. This conceptualization of the *favelas* as areas inclined to the development of communism led to the criminalization of these areas (Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, pp. 14-17; Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 48-52). Marked by the removal and the intense repression of the poor population, the period of the dictatorship increased the control and violence in the *favelas*. These areas were then considered a risk not only to society but to the country and the government, creating a need to subdue and combat these areas and its residents (Alvin, 2015; Brum, 2013, pp. 181-190; Rodrigues & Oakim, 2015, pp. 11-16).

As demonstrated above, the militarized culture of the police derives from a military training and a violent and criminalized approach developed during the authoritarian regime. Its analysis helps one to understand how the criminalization of the *favelas* is deeply linked to the militarization of the police forces (Rocha, A. P., 2013, p. 87). Their new training and role, sought to end the internal enemy, personified by the *favela* residents (Barros, F. R., 2010; Mattos, 2009; Souza, 2015; Silveira, 2014).

1.5.4 BOPE, ROTA and the justification of extreme violence.

This period also created two elite squads: the *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais*¹⁸ (BOPE), which operates in Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo’s *Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar*¹⁹ (ROTA). Still operative, they are both known for their extreme violence and pride in not being corrupt (Larkins, 2015, p. 68; Soares, 2017, p. n/a). BOPE was founded in 1978 in Rio, with the central task of what was called a cleansing of the city. With the responsibility to fight the enemies of the State, the military fought internal and external

¹⁸ Special Operations Police Battalion

¹⁹ Tobias de Aguiar Ostensive Rounds

enemies. With the conceptualization of the *favelas* as places where the communist threat could develop, the military took on violent actions against the residents of these areas. Their repression and brutality were then justified through their mandate to cleanse the city from threats and harm (Larkins, 2015, p. 69). Today BOPE continues its repressive and violent tactics in order to fight drug dealers and criminals. However, its approach to this fight leads to a generalization of the *favela* residents' as disposable criminals, or casualties of war (Larkins, 2015, pp. 70-73; Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 57-60).

Framed almost like an army seal, BOPE's techniques of torture and violence are portrayed as a necessary evil and carried out for the greater good. With the task of ending the rule of drug lords in the *favelas* they invade these areas with little or no caution and care for the residents. In the face of the pronounced violence and criminality that took over Rio, the squad is seen as an elite troop required to deal with the usual war-like scenario of the *favelas* (Larkins, 2015; Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 59-61).

With training songs that make an apology to tortures and killings and an armoured car known as the "*Caveirão*" (big skull), BOPE is seen as an elite squad that fights criminals. However, due to their abuse of force in the *favelas*, the BOPE is feared not only by drug lords but also by residents (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 61). BOPE's militarized training, and references made about their officers being war dogs, and the "death to death itself", creates a violent culture within the battalion. With a discourse of war and lack of State presence in the *favelas*, BOPE is spared the public scrutiny over their incursions in the *favelas*. Police brutality is then justified through BOPE's discourse of spreading violence and terror, leaving bodies on the ground and war on drugs (Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 60-61; Larkins, 2015, pp. 68-70).

1.5.5 The inheritances of the dictatorship.

The effects of this period and its influence over the lower classes can be perceived in today's society and police forces. Continuing to target the *favelas* and its residents as enemies

of the State, they perpetuate the criminalized image given to these areas. With the end of the dictatorship, this war-like setting changed its focus, transferring it to the fight against the newly installed organized crime (da Nobrega Jr, 2010, pp. 127-128). The development of the *Comando Vermelho*²⁰ (CV) and the need to combat the enemy in the *favelas* continued through the democratization period. The war against criminality and trafficking became the new directive, exacerbating violence and consequently the conflict (Oliveira, 2011, p. 1; Silva, L. A., 2010, p. 291; Silveira, 2014, 12; Souza, 2015, pp. 208-209; da Nobrega Jr, 2010, pp. 127-128).

Although not much is said about the violence perpetrated particularly towards the *favelas* or police brutality during the dictatorship, the military government can be accountable for:

- The militarized culture of the police and the strengthening of the criminalization of the *favelas* and its residents. By framing these areas as conducive to socialist and/or communist movements, which were opposed to the authoritarian government, it portrayed the *favelas* as enemies of the State.
- Strengthening of the non-belonging perception toward the lower classes and the *favelas* especially in elite neighbourhoods, due to their relocation programs.
- Creating a new actor in Brazilian society, introducing the organized crime structure to the *favelas* through the creation of CV. The decision to imprison political activists with ordinary criminals backfired on the government. Imprisoned together in the same block area, they joined forces with other inmates to fight for their rights and better living conditions in the prison system. This alliance gave birth to the *Comando Vermelho*.

²⁰ Red Command, one of the biggest and the oldest criminal organization in Brazil. This will be further explained on the next pages (i.e. 28-31)

1.6 The birth of organized crime in Brazil

It was also during the dictatorship that one of Brazil's most significant and oldest criminal groups, the *Comando Vermelho* (CV) was born. In the 1970s, combining socialist ideals with illegal activities and skills, they were the first criminal organization to appear in the country (Faria, 2010, p. 34; Amorim, 1993, pp. 34-36). Seeking to fund escapes from prison and continue their manifestations and actions against the regime, the group started to perform robberies and other unlawful activities (Amorin, 1993, pp. 37-38; Ceccatto, 2006, pp. 10-13). As they grew bigger and needed more money to maintain their bribery of prison guards, they started applying the “expropriation”²¹ tactics used by the leftist movements of the time (Ceccatto, 2006; Rocha, A. P., 2013, pp. 35-36).

The CV started venturing into unlawful activities such as drug trafficking. Already involved to some extent in criminal activities the group continued and even increased their unlawful actions. As politics moved towards democracy, these activities became their sole purpose, decreasing their social and political engagement (Penglase, 2008, p. 128).

Inside the prison system CV established a code of conduct which sought to maintain peace and secrecy between prisoners. Requiring CV members to leave feuds outside of the prison, respect and protect each other, and maintain secrecy towards inmates' activities, the code strengthened the coalitions of the prisoners (Penglase, 2008, 126-127; Amorim, 1993, pp. 50-51). Moreover, it enabled CV to maintain order inside the prison system and decrease disputes between detainees. Valid to this day, the code empowers CV and allows their leaders to recruit and command traffic from inside the prison (Câmara dos Deputados, 2009; Penglase, 2008, p. 136).

²¹ Expropriation was a method used by movements that worked against the authoritarian regime, through which robberies were justified by the philosophy of modern Robin Hood, taking from the government and banks, to provide for the ones targeted and restrained by the State

1.6.1 The CV in the *favelas*.

As they started to be released or escaped, CV members returned to the *favelas* and initiated the establishment of a network of drug trafficking. In a few years, Rio de Janeiro became the main route for the cocaine coming from Colombia towards Europe (Amorim, 1993, pp. 89-93; Penglase, 2008, p. 130).

With their return to the *favelas*, they brought an adapted version of the same code they had in prison to these areas of the city. In this new version, the CV vowed to protect their community from ordinary crime and police harassment in exchange for their silence (Penglase, 2008, pp. 131-132). Additionally, they also vowed to provide support to the residents of the *comunidade* (community) providing for any economic or social struggle the residents might have been in (Amorim, 1993, pp. 81-83; Faria, 2010, pp. 33-34).

However, while they protected the residents from police abuse and violence as well as from petty crimes, the CV itself was very violent and strict (Penglase, 2008, p. 123). The non-compliance with the CV code resulted in severe punishment, such as torture or microwave death (Larkins, 2015, p. 46).²² As seen in Larkins (2015), the CV was not only violent but brought fear through spectacles of violence, making them public to maintain their ruling over the *favela* (p. 45). Amongst their many controversial actions, the group used to impose curfews and the closing of schools and commerce in mourning for the loss of their members (Amorim, 1993, pp. 11-12; Penglase, 2008, p. 131). Very aggressive in the application of their law, the CV retaliated against anyone that disobeyed an order (Martins, 2017; Penglase, 2008; Larkins, 2015). These actions contributed to not only strengthen the negative perception of the *favelas* as dangerous and violent places but also created the image that criminals controlled them (Ceccatto, 2006). The idea that the *favelas* were under the

²² Microwave death is a technique used by CV where they surround a person with car tires and set them on fire. A technique used by CV to avoid leaving any vestiges or proofs that may incriminate the authors of the crime (Larkins, 2015, p. 46).

control of criminal gangs was thus used as a justification for police brutality and the extreme use of force as well as the incursion of the armed forces in massive task forces (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 111).

Moreover, the amicable relationship between the CV and *favela* residents contributed to the generalization of these areas as hubs of delinquency. Nonetheless, what was not acknowledged was the provision of social and economic support that these groups provided (Ceccatto, 2006). The CV provided school supplies, electricity for the *comunidade* (community), help with food, gas and other provisions that families of the *favelas* could not afford. Likewise, they provided entertainment through cable television, organizing *bailes funk* (funk dances), barbecues, and other leisure activities. Providing not only basic needs but enjoyment as well, they even did some improvements in the urbanization of the *favelas* by asphaltting some areas (Amorim, 1993, pp. 81-83; Penglase, 2008, p. 131).

With an almost total absence of the government in these areas, the residents ended up going to the CV for social support. Facing police brutality and corruption, they preferred the ruling of the criminal group, which although ruthless, had a protocol for the use of violence (Larkins, 2015, pp. 44-46). The laws applied by the CV were within the social reality of the *favela* residents once the group members were also residents. The rules they implemented brought solutions to the problems faced by the *comunidade* that were in accordance with the residents' idea of justice (Penglase, 2008, pp. 131-133). Under the ruling of CV rapes, domestic violence, robberies of the *favela* residents and other transgressions were strictly prohibited and punished with extreme brutality (Penglase, 2008, p. 132; Larkins, 2015, p. 43). However, this preference and obedience to the code of criminality contributed to the development of a negative image of the *favela* residents. They were seen as accomplices of the criminal groups instead of victims of the system of corruption, abuse, and lack of government presence (Barros, F. R., 2015).

Nonetheless, although their method of operation was very aggressive, the group was and is aware of the need to respect and supply for the needs of the residents to maintain control over the *favelas*. Violence on its own does not guarantee loyalty making the ruling of the CV one that is also mindful and aware of the needs of these peoples (Penglase, 2008, pp. 137-138). To gain control of these areas, CV's strategy involved the assassination of local leaders followed by the election of new leaders who were members of the group. They also used force to implement their mandate where they could not reach the population with a political approach implementing violence and brutal actions (Ceccatto, 2006). With this, they created a dominant system, where they would influence even political choices of the *favela* residents once they controlled these areas. Political figures would need CV's permission to go into the *favelas*, making them a highly influential actor with significant bargaining power (Faria, 2010, p. 29) Consequently, it was under these conditions of apparent control of *favelas* by criminal groups and its set of rules that the division between the *morro*²³ (mountain) and *asfalto*²⁴ (asphalt) began (Santana et al., 2016, p. 68). The perception of the *favelas* by Rio's society as hubs of criminality led to the development of a discourse of violence and repression towards the *favelas* in order to regain control over these areas (Barros, F. R., 2015; Maciel, 2015; Riccio, Ross, Skogan, & Ruediger, 2013). The fact that these areas did not count on permanent police presence and the State was completely absent in the support of the *favelas* social needs allowed for groups like CV become the local authority (Ceccatto, 2006; Larkins, 2015).

²³ *Morro* makes reference to the mountains of Rio and the *favelas*, the lower classes, the areas considered hubs of criminality.

²⁴ *Asfalto* makes reference to the formal city of Rio de Janeiro, the one in the asphalt, where the upper classes live.

1.7 Criminalization of the *favelas*

As previously discussed, the *cortiços* were considered a centre of ill-repute, crime, and epidemics constituting a threat to moral and social orders. Although the *favelas* only started to be noticed as a phenomenon and studied in the mid-1940s, they began to be showcased at the beginning of the century. During the government of Pereira Passos (1902-1906), the mainstream press started to illustrate them as symbols of anti-progress and anti-civilization (Brum, 2013; Conniff & McCann, 1989; Ferreira, 2009; Mattos, 2009).

1.7.1 The press.

The newspapers at the time started painting a picture of poverty, addiction, and uncivilized behaviour with a touch of romantic novel to describe the violent occurrences in the *favelas*. Through their news report, the press started framing an image of the residents as uneducated, violent, and dishonourable (Mattos, 2009).

Moreover, the local press incited a fear throughout Rio de Janeiro that influenced in a growing demand for police repression to discipline what the elites considered to be uncivilized behaviours of the unoccupied class of delinquents (Mattos, 2009, p. 155). They also helped create the perception that law enforcement had too much tolerance towards the *favelas* and their residents (Mattos, 2009, p. 161).

In the description given by the press, the *favelas* were a place where vagabonds and delinquents lived and a place where uncivilized fights and overexposure of the private life took place (Mattos, 2009, p. 164). According to Mattos, the press leveled the popular culture, the everyday man, the factory worker to the deviating behaviour of the anonymous crowd of *Zé Ninguém*²⁵ (p. 162).

²⁵ *Zé Ninguém*: A John Doe, a nobody. Used in Portuguese to frame how insignificant someone is, someone whose surname is not known in society, also used to define poor people

1.7.2 Illegality.

The illegality of the *favelas* and the cultural expressions of their residents also contributed to the development of their criminalized image. Their cultural demonstrations such as *capoeira*²⁶, *escolas de samba*²⁷, *Umbanda*²⁸, and *Candomblé*²⁹, were considered low-life behaviours and some were even prohibited for a while, as was the case of *Capoeira*. With a focus on non-whites' culture, these activities were seen as activities of the lower class and vagabonds. However, their prohibition led to the exacerbation of the intergroup conflict between lower and higher classes in Brazil's society and reinforced the negative image linked to the lower classes (Barros, C. M., 2010, pp. 51-52).

1.7.3 Dictatorship.

Through the development of the notion of the internal enemy, the police forces were once again centralized in the army becoming a local body of the military. During the dictatorship, these areas were believed to be the hub of criminals and enemies of the State. The growing number of worker demands and syndicates in the *favelas* led the government to believe they were a possible communist threat that should be fought (Canuto de Sousa & de Moraes, 2011; Silveira, 2014; da Nobrega Jr, 2010; Alvin, 2015; Brum, 2013; Pedretti, L., 2016).

1.8 The structure of Rio de Janeiro today and its contribution to the continuing violence

Although several attempts to improve the life conditions and infrastructure of the *favelas* were made, the approach used by the dictatorship was no better than the ones used in

²⁶ *Capoeira* is an Afro-Brazilian martial art which combines dance, acrobatics, and music and was considered as an activity that was practiced by vagabonds and criminals, and it was prohibited by the Decree 847 from 1890, being legalized again in 1935

²⁷ *Escolas de samba*: Brazilian organizations that plan and stage samba parades during Carnival. Retrieved from: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/samba-schools>

²⁸ *Umbanda*: Afro-Brazilian religion that mixes Catholicism, and indigenous practices

²⁹ *Candomblé*: Afro- Brazilian religion that mixes, African beliefs with Catholicism and indigenous practices

former regimes. The idea of non-belonging created by the relocation of the *favela* residents to far neighbourhoods only added to the intergroup conflict between social classes in Rio. Moreover, it increased the mistrust between *favela* residents and State authorities (Brum, 2013; Alvin, 2015).

On that note, the mistrust between State agents and the lower classes is something that developed over time due to the extreme brutality with which police forces dealt with the *favelas*. A behaviour that started with the creation of the Real guard and continues to this day in their “civilizing” role (Barros, C. M., 2010; Ferreira, 2009; Silva, M. N., 2010). With this mindset, a repressive attitude was developed towards the *favelas* contributing to the development of the power of CV in these areas. Consequently, by attending to their social needs, CV created a relationship with the residents based on welfare and the establishment of rules to organize life in the *favelas* (Amorim, 1993; Penglase, 2008)

Given the neglect and aggressive way that the police treated *favela* residents, summed with the support received by residents from CV, the State and its agents became their common enemy. The code of conduct established by CV created a mutual respect between *favela* residents and criminals, which was in stark contrast with the relationship between the police and *favela* residents (Amorim, 1993; Barros, C. M., 2010; Mattos, 2009; Penglase, 2008). The police were seen as an inert force that did not attend to the *favelas*’ needs or matters. By interpreting the *favelas* as areas inhabited by criminals and threatening vicious types of people the police forces developed the habit of using violent tactics in these areas. Looking for socialists’ threats and targeting local associations, the police forces saw these areas as enemy territory (Alvin, 2015; Barros, C. M., 2010; Ferreira, 2009). Ignoring the *favelas*’ needs for patrolling, crime repression, and solutions to daily life concerns, they did not attend to them as citizens but as a problem to be solved.

Corruption is another contributor to the eroding relationship between *favela* residents and the police. Additionally, to the action of brutal forces such as BOPE, the corruption amongst the police contributes to the neglect and ill-treatment of the *favelas* (Amorim, 1993; Barros, F. R., 2015; Ribeiro, L., 2014). It allowed yet, for the creation of militias, which use violence and extortion as a means of enforcing their power (Cardoso, 2016; Morabito, 2010).

This historical perspective is important to give the reader the full picture of how rooted and in depth the problems in Rio really are. Derived from racism, the criminalization of the *favelas* developed throughout the years adding layers of prejudice (Barros, F. R., 2015; Brum, 2013). Formed mostly by non-whites the lower classes were always seen by the upper classes and political elites as dangerous, prone to criminality, and characters of unacceptable behaviours (Lima L. C., 2000; Misse, 2010; Suppia & Scarabello, 2014).

Furthermore, police repression has been in place since the beginning of the twentieth century. By serving the desire of the elites, they carried out the task of controlling, expelling and containing the lower classes (Conniff & McCann, 1989; Fausto, 2014; Furtado, 1998; Gay, 2014).

With an authoritarian government the militarization of the police forces became even more prominent. By framing the *favelas* as areas inhabited by enemies of the State, the already existent criminalized idea of these areas was exacerbated. In the next chapters, I will analyse the links between this historically built criminalization to explain the continuing disregard for the *favelas* and its residents (Barros, C. M., 2010; Barros, F. R., 2015; Canuto de Souza & de Moraes, 2011; Fischer, 2011). Moreover, with the presentation of the process of militarization of the police forces I intend to expose the causes that led to their failure in community policing model.

The history of abuse and containment combined with the perception of the *favelas* as criminal hubs is used to justify the brutal approach of the police in these areas. Furthermore,

it also frames the role of the police officer as a soldier fighting against crime. On that note what is more curious is how even *favela* residents do not condemn police brutality or any other type of extreme violence as long as it is against the criminals and not *pessoas de bem*³⁰ (Cardoso, 2010). As seen previously in this thesis, *favela* residents have always been supportive of strict and violent measures against those who broke the laws. Even within CV's violent command, residents felt the need to be protected against arbitrary actions from both the police and the criminal gangs as CV started to divide. This perception of the police as a combative force leads to the non-acceptance and later failure of the programs implemented in Rio. Without the acceptance of the model by police officers, they cannot fully implement the mandates of community policing (Barros, F. R., 2015; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro, L., 2014). Consequently, there is no space for the dismantlement of the tensions between *favela* residents and the police forces.

³⁰ Used to describe the good people, the workers, the ones that make their money honestly and are not involved with traffic or criminality. Cardoso (2016) show us through a series of interviews that the *favela* residents only see as negative the violence applied towards workers, and people not involved in illegal activities, supporting police violence against the ones that are acting outside the law.

Chapter 2: Analytical tools

2.1 Contextualization

Given the historical formation of the current conflicting social dynamics of Rio de Janeiro, I choose to explore the topic through the framework of structural violence. Through this lens, I intend to expose how the racism, class prejudice, and police violence are embedded in the local culture (Riccio et al., 2013; Silva, B. M., 2013). Unable to separate the current situation from its historical formation, the concept of structural violence allows me to identify the deep roots that cause the peace attempts implemented in Rio to fail. By understanding how the social tensions between upper and lower classes arise one can better understand the reasons behind its perpetuation. Moreover, it is possible to understand why despite the many attempts to improve the dichotomy *favela x asfalto* the projects fail in their implementation.

The apparent power of the criminal groups over the *favelas* feeds the discourse of war against drug trafficking. Moreover, it strengthens the idea of a need to regain State control over these areas (Barros, F. R., 2015; Cardoso, 2010; Maciel, 2015). Consequently, the police forces build their actions with a militarized view of their role ultimately justifying the extreme use of force in their incursions into the *favelas* (Silveira, 2014; Souza, 2015; Tierney, 2012). Thus, framed by the socio-political opposition between lower classes, police forces, and upper classes the present violence is comprised by three main factors: (i)The lack of trust and high tension that marks the relationship between the police forces and *favela* residents; (ii)The overly violent approach of the police forces in *favela* areas; and (iii)The presence of multiple criminal groups in the *favelas*.

All of these three factors are directly influenced by the class division that exists in Brazil's society and especially in Rio de Janeiro. The social dynamics played out between upper and lower classes contribute to the perpetuation of violence, mistrust, and

stigmatization. Historically built, these dynamics reflect years of police brutality, corruption, criminalization, exclusion, relocations, paternalism, and so on (Barros, F. R., 2015; Brum, 2013; Mattos, 2009; Vaz, 1994). Additionally, the historical perception of the lower classes as uneducated, unsanitary, classified as dangerous classes plays a big part in society's support towards police brutality contributing yet to the criminalization of the *favelas* (Machado, 2011; Oliveira, 2011; Tierney, 2012; Valladares, 2000). While analyzing the war against drug trafficking rhetoric, one should also analyze how this rhetoric is framed based on the lack of State control over the *favelas*. This way, structural violence is more easily perceived and thus work is developed to change it.

Studying the four peace attempts executed in Rio, I seek to demonstrate how the culture of prejudice and the normalization of violence in the *favelas* developed within Rio's society directly contributing to the failure of these projects. Using the community policing model, the four projects attempted to create a proximity between the *favela* residents and the police to create preventive measures and inhibit crime (Ribeiro, L., 2014; Souza, 2015; Tierney, 2012). The model's directives include a proximity between the police and *favela* residents which works towards improving the conflictual dynamic. However, when studying the implementation of the model and its proposals the peace projects falls short in fully implementing them. The militarized culture within the police forces impedes the execution of the directives laid by the community policing model (Cardoso, 2010; Misse, 2010; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Riccio et al., 2013; Silveira, 2014). Unable to implement a real proximity police, the peace projects applied a mix of repressive and community policing, giving continuity to the conflictual relationship. Additionally, the mistrust of the residents towards the police impedes the development of a full cooperation and interaction between them (Barros, F. R., 2015; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro, L., 2014).

Moreover, the continuous presence of the criminal gangs and its members in the *favelas* also contributes to the lack of cooperation of the residents. Threatened by the gang members and without much certainty that the peace projects will succeed, the residents fear the gang's backlash if they cooperate with the police (Cardoso, 2010; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro, L., 2014). On that note, many police officers used the peace attempts and their proximity with *favela* residents to gather information on the criminal groups (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 21). This strategy shows a continuity to their military strategy of combatting crime opposed to implementing a true proximity with the residents as community policing proposes (Ribeiro, L., 2014; Riccio et al., 2013).

Another common characteristic of the peace attempts is that they all led back to violent and repressive policing model. As tensions start to rise again and the criminal gangs start to regain space in the *favelas*, repression was the solution for the containment of violence. Moreover, police violence was often exacerbated shortly after a community policing project showing extremely high rates of homicide and criminality (Cardoso, 2010; Ribeiro, L., 2014; Silva, B. M., 2013; Silveira, 2014). Considering this, if real and sustainable change is to be achieved, the social structures that contribute to the social divide in Rio need to be altered.

2.2 Structural violence

2.2.1 What is structural violence?

Introduced by Johan Galtung in his “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” the concept of structural violence seeks to study and expose the root causes of avoidable harms such as diseases and death. In his definition structural violence is the invisible violence that leads to unequal opportunities to fulfill human needs. According to the author, these avoidable harms are represented by the impairment of fundamental human needs (Galtung, 1969; Galtung, 1985, p. 145; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 5).

Structural violence is then the imposition of limitations that prevent certain groups from achieving a quality of life that would have been possible without such limitations. They can be of religious, economic, political, legal, or cultural context and they impede a given group from fulfilling their full potential (Lee, 2016, p. 110; Graf, Kramer, & Nicolescou, 2017, p. 131). “Structural violence directly illustrates a power system wherein social structures or institutions cause harm to people in a way that results in maldevelopment or deprivation” (Lee, 2016, p. 110).

To reach this definition Galtung studied violence and its root causes, while creating a theory of the three components of violence. Galtung defined the concepts of direct and structural violence as well as positive and negative peace (Galtung, 1969, pp. 167-186). He defines positive peace as the absence of both structural and direct violence, while negative peace would be defined by the absence of direct violence. Direct violence is defined by physical harm to a person (Galtung, 1969, p. 190).

The role of negative peace is to expose the harms caused by social impairments and which, according to Galtung, cannot be seen as acceptable social orders (Lee, 2016, p. 111). Structural violence is caused by social impairment derived from human action and which purposefully or not exclude given groups (Galtung, 1985, p. 155; Galtung, 1969, pp. 145). It is linked to types of violence that are caused by social structures and which could be avoided. Moreover, it is linked to the harms derived from the failure in social structures, which lead one not to fulfill their potential (Galtung, 1985, pp. 146-147). We say it is violent because it can cause physical harm by inciting direct violence between social groups. Poverty for instance, in its depriving characteristic, is seen as a form of violence once it may decrease one's realization potential. This exclusion leads to a marginalization that ignites a process of physical harm that may ultimately lead to death. Because it is easily hidden within the social structures, structural violence can easily be confused with social injustice and normalized by

social patterns and behaviours which are not identified as the cause of harm towards someone else (Galtung, 1969, p. 188). Nonetheless, Galtung and other researches such as Paul Farmer and James Gillian have been able to develop ways of evaluating the impacts of social violence and have developed studies on how to build more egalitarian societies (Lee, 2016, pp. 112-113).

The most astounding element of structural violence is that it occurs independently of will or direct action because it is embedded in already set structures and institutional practices. Representing the result of historical processes, structural violence is a continuous process that determine the allocation and quality of resources depending on one's group affiliation (Lee, 2016, p. 111; Galtung, 1969, p. 179-180).

2.2.2 How does it relate to direct violence?

Structural violence is interdependent with direct violence in the sense that physical harm can derive from elements of structural violence such as racism, ageism and sexism (Galtung, 1985, pp. 146-147). Racism for instance can lead to violent manifestations from one ethnical group against another, classifying structural violence as the root cause for such physical harm. Structural violence is linked to direct violence because it creates the conditions for the development of physical harm and normalizes behavioural violence in the form of police violence, gender violence, race violence, terrorism, and war (Lee, 2016; Vorobej, 2008; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016).

Although not easily perceived as direct violence, social impairments are a result of how the social structures are established and when by leading to physical harm those impairments are causing direct violence. The fact that a person may die because of their lack of access to healthcare is the work of structural violence creating direct violence (Lee, 2016, p. 110; Vorobej, 2008, 86; Galtung, 1969, p. 145). That said, the death of a person by

starvation can reflect on one's inability to access the resources and social structures that would give them access to food (Lee, 2016, p. 110; Galtung, 1969, p. 155).

Another way to think of structural violence and the development of physical violence is linked to the economic and political status of each person. By studying those one can better understand how each group and social class relates with violence (Galtung, 1969, p. 152; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, pp. 8-9). How and why is violence used? For the maintenance of status quo? Or for the promotion of social change in given society? The fact that structural violence impedes a select group of people from achieving their full potential can create an intergroup tension. Moreover, the fact that a select group has more access to certain resources can generate tensions which can escalate to direct violence. Seen as a threat to one's human needs, this unbalanced inter-group interaction may lead to physical harm creating negative peace (Galtung, 1985, p. 146; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 18).

For instance, in India, the caste system contributes to a division in level of education, patriarchy and expectations from the men as well as the representation of what being a man means. In the study conducted in Karnataka State, it was noted a bigger number of reported violence in lower castes than upper ones (Krishnan, 2005a, p. 760). Lower caste men had more alcohol dependency and experienced a bigger level of stress due to their economic vulnerability. Additionally, lower caste men had a different view on masculinity, linking it to marital violence, leaving lower caste women vulnerable for all types of violence, including sexual abuse (Krishnan, 2005a, p. 772). This is an example of how political and social impairment, which is embedded in a given culture can lead to direct violence and not be seen by its members as something abnormal. In a study in rural Gujarat, the same situation was reported. Lower caste women suffered from marital abuse which was linked to economic stress by their male partners (Krishnan, 2005b, pp. 88-89). Although in this second study the results showed marital violence is more linked to gender differences and sexism rather than

social and economic status, this still translates as structural violence that leads and supports a physical harm against women (Krishnan, 2005b, p. 98).

Thus, structural violence is linked to direct violence either by the externalization of prejudice and tensions, or by means of ingroup culture. The marginalization and exclusion of certain groups can cause physical harm by means of deprivation. At the same time, violence can derive from the normalizing characteristic of structural violence which cast certain groups as open for abuse (Lee, 2016; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016).

2.2.3 How can we identify structural violence and which factors should be examined to find it?

Caused by culturally embedded behaviours, this impairment is not so easily identifiable or perceived by the membership of given groups or culture (Galtung, 1969, p. 173). On the contrary, they are part of how societies construct their social relations, and thus seen as normal consequences of life. Caused by injustice, it is a violence that derives from unbalanced social relations and which are normalized by experience (Galtung, 1969, pp. 169-171; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 7).

The fact that the majority of victims of homicide in the *favelas* of Rio are comprised by young black men, shows that there is a group that is more in danger or targeted than others (Fernandes, 2013). Nonetheless this is not noticed in the daily life and moreover it is normalized by the fact that majority of *favela* residents are black, and the majority of gang members are young male. This normalisation or justification of the facts, is what Galtung called structural violence.

Structural violence can thus be identified through already existent indexes such as life expectancy, death rates, mal-nutrition, and so on. Those indexes indicate what are the missed opportunities or access that a group may face, and which prevents them from fulfilling their

maximum capacity (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 12; Galtung, 1969, pp. 175-176; Vorobej, 2008, p. 86).

2.2.4 What makes it difficult to identify structural violence?

As explored by Dr. Paul Farmer and his study of structural violence in Haiti, this type of violence is culturally embedded and almost invisible. His research on avoidable diseases such as HIV, cholera, and Tuberculosis is a good example of how structural violence manifests itself (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 6). Dr. Farmer noticed that these diseases targeted more people living in poverty and particularly minorities. Demonstrating a correlation between their lack of access to education, healthcare, and information and the occurrences of the diseases, Dr. Farmer uncovered the structures that exposed the poorest to such conditions (Ivers, Farmer, & Pape, 2012, p. 2027). Classified as neglect diseases, the facts that these illnesses had treatment but still killed people in rural and poor areas, led Farmer classify this lack of access or interest as structural violence (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 6).

Structural violence is then classified as the death by diseases that already have vaccines and medications available, but not accessible to everyone. On that note the contraction of such diseases would also be considered a result of structural violence once there are preventive means available. The fact that one could live a healthier life and longer life if equal access to healthcare and prevention was given to them is the result of structural violence (Galtung, 1985, p. 145; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, pp. 5-6). Measurements of life quality and of avoidable harms are also measurements of the effects of structural violence. Thus, structural violence categorizes the avoidable death of a child due to malnutrition as a violent act due to the lack of action to prevent it from happening. Likewise, the absence of action through the lens of structural violence is a violation of a person's right

to equal rights and access to resources, representing thus a violence against this individual (Galtung, 1969; Galtung, 2010; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016; Vorobej, 2008).

Different from direct violence, structural violence is difficult to be identified due to its normalizing feature expressed by interactions that are internalized by the individuals in a given group (Galtung, 1985, p. 148; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 7). These interactions usually involve the power imbalance between groups and in the decision making of the division of resources. Thus, the group with less access suffers from structural violence. Lived in group, structural violence usually affects one category or class of people. That differentiation can be made through sex, race, nationality, social class, religion, and so on. This collective grief is caused by the institutionalisation of social norms or way of living that favours some to the detriment of others. Likewise, it can be the result of a non-intentional lack of support or opportunity to a given group (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 2; Galtung, 2010, p. 22).

2.2.5 Why structural violence?

I chose structural violence because the concept reveals patterns of oppression present in Brazilian society and specially in Rio's dichotomy of *morro versus asfalto* (Santana et al., 2016, p. 68). Historically built and culturally embedded, the conflict in Rio can be better understood through the concept of structural violence (Santana et al., 2016, pp. 62-64).

Structural violence allows me to identify the invisible contributors to today's reality. Rio's history of racism, prejudice, and the political elitism formed with the introduction of democracy in Brazil gave rise to several of the social issues faced by the city today. The political elitism led to the social exclusion of the *morros*, racism led to the construction of a criminalized image on non-whites and the prejudice towards *cortiço* residents developed a negative image of what would become the *favelas*. Moreover, the role of the police in the containment of the lower classes and non-whites allowed for the development of a

justification for their violence against those peoples. The need to relocate and contain them normalized police brutality while the negative and criminalized image attached to them created the need for these violent measures. *Favela* residents became invisible to the eyes of Rio society because these negative perceptions allowed for the justification of police brutality (Silva, B. M., 2013; Brum, 2013; Fausto, 2014; Fischer, 2011).

Linked to symbolic violence, when talking about Rio we can also see police violence being part of the social structure that requires them to show “spectacles of power and hegemony” (Larkins, 2015; Barros, F. R., 2015). The invisibility of the soldier image that police officers have of themselves, leads them to these symbolic demonstrations of power through violence. Its silent characteristics allow for the continuation of police brutality and the non-acceptance of a new paradigm within the police forces. Embedded in the police culture, the militarized view that officers have of themselves aligned with the discourse of war against drug trafficking allow for these structures to develop unnoticed. Nonetheless, because it is unnoticed and embedded in culture structural violence has the power to ignite direct violence (Santana et al., 2016; Ribeiro, L., 2014; Valladares, 2000; Tierney, 2012).

Structural violence also manifests itself through the mechanism of blame. In Rio, the criminalization of the *favelas* is reinforced as victims are blamed. Victims of stray bullets are told they were at the wrong place at the wrong time. *Favela* residents are often blamed for living in areas of high criminality. Furthermore, they are often accused as being linked to crime in the justification of the brutality faced by them (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 10).

The social perception of the need to contain criminality through violence is linked to the historical containment of the lower classes and their “uncivil” behaviours (Santana et al., 2016, p. 69). The imposition of curfews, the illegalization of *bailes funk* and the perception of “lost souls” attached to *favela* residents is also part of the historical construction of these classes as uneducated, impolite, uncivil, and so on (Fernandes, 2013; Maciel, 2015; Silva, L.

S., 2016). These historical constructs are the mechanisms that help normalize the experiences and justify the stigmatization of *favelas*.

The perception of an absence of State control over these areas is another example of structural violence, which does not look at police corruption. On the contrary, it is part of the historical prejudice against the type of structures that the *favelas* represent (Barros, F. R., 2015; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Riccio et al., 2013). Disorganized, unplanned, and overcrowded the structure of the *favelas* is in opposition to society's idea of what a governed city should look like. Nonetheless, no attention is paid to the State's marginalization of the lower classes in its exacerbated focus in policy making for the elites. This dismissal of the lower classes is embedded in the Brazilian culture of paternalist politics. Consequently, contributing to the normalization of exclusion of the lower classes (Barros, F. R., 2015; Brum, 2013; Mattos, 2009; Silva, B. M., 2013).

Structural violence in Rio allows the present thesis to expose the root causes that create a criminalized perception of the *favelas* while exploring other invisible injustices that contribute to the continuous oppression and de-humanization of *favela* residents. In exposing these injustices, I do not seek to empower situations of victimizations, on the contrary, I seek to demonstrate how some aspects of the conflict are culturally embedded.

The historical repression of the *favelas* by the police forces developed a relationship of suspicion between the residents and police officers (Brum, 2013; Fischer, 2011). The construction of a negative, uncivilized, non-hygienic type of people, justifies the need for a top down approach even within the implementation of a community policing model (Machado, 2011; Valladares, 2000). Moreover, this negative image leads to prejudice from the police itself, who classify all *favela* residents as a second-class type of citizens.

The normalization of violence, justified through a discourse of war, is also linked to a structurally built image of the internal enemy (Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 42-66; Tierney, 2012,

p. 27). Looking back at the role of the police in Brazilian society, they were often in charge of the containment of the dangerous classes. Consequently, when this discourse is developed, the *favelas* are automatically thought as enemy territory and war zone. The combat against drug trafficking is nothing more than a modified discourse from the combat of the dangerous classes, or the socialist threat, historically present in Rio's society (Cardoso, 2010; Fischer, 2011; Larkins, 2015; Misse, 2010; Tierney, 2012).

Thus, the use of structural violence to analyze the present situation in Rio is due to the need to shed a light on the historical formation of such condition. Only by understanding these deep-rooted tensions is that we can truly understand the reasons behind the failure of the peace implementation projects. Furthermore, it is only by understanding those historical relationships that we can work to change the culture of racism, prejudice and brutality (Galtung, 1985, p. 146; Galtung, 1969, pp. 179-180).

2.3 Community Policing

2.3.1 The Peelian Principles.

The Peelian Principles are a reference point to understand the structure of the modern Anglo-American police units and how their processes are guided. They define training, mission statements, and the understanding of the role of the police by officers and citizens (Loader, 2016, pp. 427-428). Through nine principles, Robert Peel described the tasks and approaches of the model. According to him, these should be carried out by the police to build a good relationship with society and count on their voluntarily help in the prevention and denunciation of crimes (Loader, 2016, pp. 429-430).

Within the principles, it is specified that the police organization should:

- 1- Prevent crime and disorder,
- 2- Recognize that their power derives from society's approval of their actions and behaviour,

- 3- Remember that society's cooperation and obedience to the law also derives from their approval of the police work,
- 4- Recognize that society's cooperation decreases the number of criminal activities, once they will be more prone to abide by the laws and regulations,
- 5- To be impartial, friendly, helpful and unbiased,
- 6- Use force only as a last resort and after all other attempts have failed,
- 7- To maintain a good relationship with society and remember they are also members of it,
- 8- To refrain from acting beyond their scope as police officers, not judging, condemning or punishing and finally,
- 9- To remember that the police efficiency is measured by the criminality rate and not by police exhibit of power and/or maintenance of order.

Being at the core of the community policing model the Peelian principles request police officers to refrain from using force and to engage with society members. Carrying out their role of public servants in the maintenance of order and the safeguard of the law, police officers should develop a closer and respectful relationship with the public. This is because the model proposes that a bigger proximity could create a voluntariness in society members leading them to contribute to the maintenance of order. Consequently, decreasing the need for the use of force in cases of disorder and illegality (Williams, 2003, pp. 108-109; Loader, 2016, p. 434).

2.3.2 What is Community Policing?

Community policing is a model which proposes to change the way policing is carried out. Departing from the principle of crime prevention, the model sought to fill in the gap left by distancing the police from the citizens (Skogan, 2008, pp. 44-45; Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 280-283). The community policing model was developed after a study of societies and their

relationship with the police forces. Studies showed that as crime rates went down, the police took on a more distant position because their main role of maintaining order was no longer imperative. Noticing that the lack of presence of the police led to a feeling of insecurity, Robert Peel proposed a new approach with the objective of promoting a police force that was more supportive. With this new model, he sought to decrease police's repressive measures while also inhibiting criminal behaviours (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 280-283; Skogan, 2008, pp. 47-49).

Although different schools and authors present distinct definitions of community policing, the central proposition of the model is to create a more friendly and approachable police force. The model seeks to (i) give more autonomy to police officers in their ground operations; (ii) build a relationship with the community for combined decision making, and (iii) create preventive measures as a means of eradicating crime (Morabito, 2010, pp. 265-267).

Community policing establishes a new methodology to the policing model. Bringing innovative ways of caring out existing responsibilities, by implementing a preventive approach instead of the corrective one (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994, p. 319). It is a model that intends to educate a new class of police officers who are knowledgeable in problem-solving, mediating and have a better and deeper engagement with the community (Loader, 2016; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994; Skogan, 2008; Williams, 2003).

2.3.3 The fallout of community policing.

Several studies of the impacts and challenges of community policing show that the program faces resistance from the officers who receive community policing training, due to its paradigm change characteristic. Studies made in majority black communities, Chicago and in an overview of Anglo-American police, show that this model is usually introduced in police forces that need to review their relationship with the community. Because the model

proposes an approach that contradicts the existent mindset in such police forces, community policing tends to face resistance once it proposes a change to the core of the repressive policing model (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994, pp. 324-328; Loader, 2016, pp. 437-438; Williams, 2003, p. 106). Studies and interviews with police officers in Chicago and in Rio de Janeiro show police officers tend to feel these changes are part of a top-down imposition of new values. They believe the model does not take into consideration their own experience in carrying out their duties and that the directives proposed by the model diminishes their work. Another reaction to the community policing was that the model does not account for the difficulties and stress of their daily routines (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994, pp. 328-329; Ribeiro, L., 2014).

Faced with such resistance, the model requires a strong accountability mechanism to be enforced amongst police officers. If the police force does not have a strong sense of accountability based on the law, the community policing model will not be seen as a new approach. On the contrary, the proposed change may be seen as a way to challenge police officer's role. Thus, a second challenge faced by the model refers to the strength of the institutions that should be responsible for enforcing its application (Morabito, 2010).

Another contributor to the fall out of the model is the lack of a strong unified police and/or community. Without a strong coalition in the decision-making process of the police forces and the community, it becomes very difficult to reach consensus. Consequently, when the time for interaction between police and residents come the implementation of changes becomes a challenge. Without a strong sense of direction from both sides of this new relationship, the modifications proposed by community policing do not take place. Unless there is a collective willingness to implement a new relationship, the directives of community policing fall short in its application (Morabito, 2010, pp. 581-583).

In the case of Rio, levels of violence are a possible disruptor for the application of community policing. This is because of the tensions created between citizens and police forces in their historical relations of repression and imposition of law (Barros, F. R., 2015; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro, L., 2014). Police forces have a history of approaching violent situations with repression and use of force to regain order. Thus, when the new approach calls for proximity and joint decision-making, the existing tensions tend to surface, becoming a challenge for the development of a new relationship. The challenge lays not only in the change of police culture but also in the development of a new trust. When faced with violent situations, police's first action is repression. On the other hand, the history of repression may not allow for a proximity between officers and citizens, becoming a disruption to the implementation of the model (Barros, F. R., 2015; Fischer, 2011; Misse, 2010; Morabito, 2010; Ribeiro, L., 2014).

Although theoretically there is a consensus about what community policing is, the application of its doctrine is not standard. There are various significant differences in how the theory is carried out by police forces around the world and which changes they implement in their culture, activities, and approaches. Consequently, it becomes very hard to say what can or cannot be considered community policing, making it hard to classify success and failure within its application (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014).

2.3.4 Why community policing in Rio?

In Brazil, the police forces attempted to apply the Peelian principals in an effort to implement a different type of policing model and approach. During the first government of Leonel Brizola, in 1983, he developed a new policing division that was trained under the community policing principle. Given the tensions between *favela* residents and the police forces, community policing represents an attempt to rebuild these relations and structure a combined effort to tackle criminality (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 279-281).

As seen above, community policing aims at decreasing the feeling of insecurity while also creating a close and more friendly relationship between police and citizens. Given Rio's current situation and historical tensions between *favela* residents and the police, community policing embodies the paradigm shift necessary to change the violent reality. Moreover, by developing a relationship of trust between *favela* residents and police officers the model could lead to a partnership to fight drug trafficking and criminality (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Riccio et al., 2013).

2.3.5 A study of community policing in Rio.

Through the empowerment of the *favela* residents, the community policing model sought to decrease the social gap by raising their concerns and cooperatively finding solutions for their problems. This approach intended to create a community based anti-crime program by introducing preventive measures and decreasing the criminalized image linked to the *favelas*. Considering the *favelas*' reality, this proximity could bring a stronger presence of the State to those areas improving their infrastructure and access to government services. Moreover, this joint effort would also signify a bigger collective pressure for better services, recreational activities, and a co-operative effort to patrol and supervise the neighbourhoods (Skogan, 2008, p. 48). Thus, the cooperation between *favelas*' residents and police forces could challenge the criminal activities carried out by the gangs, decreasing violence and criminality (Loader, 2016; Skogan, 2008; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016).

While studying the failure of repressive police measures in tackling criminality, three things are noticed: (i) violence levels go up as well as criminality and homicide rates, (ii) police mortality and deaths caused by police officers also increase, (iii) increase of intra-gang conflict which leads to an increasing risk of living in the *favelas* (Barros, F. R., 2015; Larkins, 2015; Ribeiro, L., 2014; Santana et al., 2016).

Community policing, on the other hand, could lead to a decrease in criminality and homicide rates, creates a better perception of the *favelas* and brings a feeling of safety to its residents (Skogan, 2008, p. 48). Given the influence of organized crime in the *favelas*, this proximity and new relationship with the police may cause a decrease in their power. Moreover, with a new policing model and relationship with the residents, the occurrence of police corruption and militia activity may decrease. Overall, community policing in Rio could insert the State in these areas without spectacles of violence, while also restraining the activity of criminal groups and the development of militias (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 303-304; Larkins, 2015).

When talking about community policing in Rio, we must also account for the benefits it brings to the community itself. Through the inclusion and training of the community on police tasks and knowledge they develop the power of leadership in the residents. This empowerment can inhibit criminal activity and preventing youth from joining the gangs (Fernandes, 2013, p. 214).

By understanding and bringing solutions to the community's issues, policemen gain a more humanized image regaining their legitimacy especially amongst the minority classes. Moreover, by taking these issues more seriously and analysing them in an unbiased manner, police authorities may decrease the adverse image they have over the *favelas*. This decrease can thus break the criminalized image attached to these regions of the city and contributing to the decrease of violence, deaths, and fear (Skogan, 2008; Silva, B. M., 2013; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016).

However, the result took unexpected routes, creating a police force that carries the same terminology but not the same practices. Named community policing, the projects that sought to introduce such model, did not execute its directives (Machado, 2016; Riccio et al., 2013; Rocha, A. P., 2013; Serrano-Berthet, Carbonari, Cavalcanti, & Willman, 2013)

2.4 Next chapters

In the next chapters I will analyse the four pacification attempts implemented in Rio and through the above-mentioned tools I will show how and why they failed. In a chronological manner the next pages are designed to show the following patterns:

- An increase in violence, criminality and homicide rates after the end of each pacification project.
- The implementation of a repressive police force each time these projects are deemed failed and how these repressive measures contribute to the increase of insecurity and deaths
- A lack of change in the police militarized culture, framing the proximity policing projects as a type of “fake police”
- The continuity of a centralized police
- The presence of a war against drug trafficking discourse and rhetoric of blaming and shaming towards *favela* residents that become victims of police brutality
- The criminalization of the *favelas* and its contribution for a top down approach that sees *favela* residents as lost souls that need to be educated, saved, and controlled
- The application of the projects in *favelas* close to affluent and prime areas of the city

The first project was implemented by Governor Leonel Brizola in 1983 around the 18th Police battalion and lasted until 1987. This first approach was named *Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário* (CIPOC) and was based on studies made on models being applied in Canada, US and Japan (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 19; Ribeiro, L., 2014; p. 288). It englobed the neighbourhoods of *Jacarepaguá, Freguesia, Tanque, Vila Valqueire, Taquara, Curicica, Cidade de Deus, Anil e Gardênia Azul* (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 290).

The second project was divided into two types of policing according to the area of the city it was applied. Introduced by Brizola in his second mandate he implemented a program that counted on repressive and community policing. The *Grupamento de Aplicação Prática Escolar* (GAPE) implemented in 1992 in the neighbourhoods of *Pavão-Pavãozinho* and *Providência* was later expanded to other *favelas* after presenting initial positive results (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 295-296). Nonetheless, at the end of Brizola's government in 1995, reports of police abuse and the increase of violence in the city led to the end of the program (Tierney, 2012, p. 36).

The third project was implemented by governor Anthony Garotinho in mid 2000. Named *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (GPAE), it was aimed at fighting urban violence in special areas.³¹ With a positive first impact, the program was expanded to other areas of city in the subsequent two governments³², but was discontinued in 2007 (Albernaz, Caruso, & Patricio, 2007, p. 5). However, the lack of decentralization of power led each *grupamento* (Police battalion) to follow the instructions and order of their leadership. Consequently, the community policing application was done according to each commander's interpretation instead of the model's directives. With the rapid expansion of the program and the poor training received by the new recruits the repressive model became routine again, and the program was discontinued (Cardoso, 2010).

The last and still ongoing project was the *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP), implemented in 2008 in *Morro Santa Marta*, by governor Sergio Cabral (2007-2014) (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 2). Presenting great results initially, the project counts on thirty-eight (38) units in two hundred and sixty-four (264) neighbourhoods (Governo do Rio de

³¹ Special Areas were *favela* areas with high density and high criminality and violence rates, where the crime had more power than the State.

³² Benedita da Silva was governor of Rio between 2002 and 2003 and Rosinha Garotinho governed between 2003-2007.

Janeiro, n.d.). However, the latest financial and political crisis faced by Rio leads researchers and analysts to classify it as a failure.

Chapter 3: The introduction of community policing in Rio

3.1 Post dictatorship period

Re-democratization brought an end to the policy of removal and demolition of *favelas* (Brum, 2013, p. 179). Implementing a new approach, the democratic government focused on urbanizing these areas (Maciel, 2015, p. 12). The urbanization project was a challenge in itself once it required reforming, bringing sanitation, light, and other urban services to the existing *favelas*. The continuous development of new structures within the *favelas* compounded the challenge that now had to absorb the constant growth of new and unplanned structures. This rapid expansion alongside the government's difficulties in keeping up with the urban reforms gave space to the colourful kaleidoscope of the poor constructions we see today (Brum, 2013, pp. 191-194).

With the end of dictatorship and consequently the end of the persecution period against socially oriented organizations a new space was formed for the development of such organizations. Thus, it is possible to notice the emergence and formalization of NGOs, residents' associations, and pastoral services in the *favelas* which allowed for civil society to collectively work for its own development (Brum, 2013, p. 191; Silva, M. N., 2010, p. 56). Organizing around the demands and needs of the *favela* residents these organizations promoted work on areas such as healthcare, housing, drug abuse treatment, crime prevention, and development of youth to prevent them from getting involved with the criminal gangs (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 69; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 38; Brum, 2013, p. 191; Fernandes, 2013, p. 213).

Although the policy of removals was no longer part of the government's agenda, the repressive measures taken by the police, especially in *favela* areas, remained a practice. Moreover, the establishment of the CV (Red Command) in these areas contributed to

fostering the negative image associated with the *favelas* (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 305; Santana et al., 2016, p. 62; Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 42).

Leonel Brizola³³ was elected in time where violence and crime rates were on the rise. Notorious for his opposition towards the authoritarian government, Brizola sought to implement a new policing model in Rio which focused on developing a new relationship between the police forces and *favela* residents known as the community policing model (Ribeiro, L., 2014; Riccio et al., 2013; Salem, 2016a; Valladares, 2000).

3.2 The police forces in the post- military government

With the end of the authoritarian government police forces were once again separated from the army and divided into military and civil police battalions (Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 45-46). Although parted from the army, the military training was kept as part of the police forces own training. Moreover, an authoritarian culture and highly hierarchized organizational structure remained at the core of the police forces mentality; police forces still embraced the philosophy and behavioural patterns of the army (Rocha, A. P., 2013, p. 97; Souza, 2015, p. 212). The military tactics, training, structure, and behaviour thus became part of their own culture and behaviours (Silveira, 2014, p. 5). Applying illegal and violent measures police forces now worked as vigilantes justifying this authoritarian approach through the need of combating crime (Silva, L. A., 2010, pp. 289-292; Silveira, 2014, p. 14; Rocha, A. P., 2013, pp. 87-88; Tierney, 2012, p. 28).

BOPE (*Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais*) and ROTA (*Rondas Extensivas Tobias de Aguiar*), the special squads created for the defense of the country against the communist threat, continued to be known for their “cleansing task” (Maciel, 2015, p. 85; Silveira, 2014, p. 14). Perceived by society today as the elite squad of the police, these troops are widely accepted within Rio. Although less open and severe, the squads continue to carry

³³ Governor of Rio de Janeiro between 1983-1987

out torture techniques and executions in order to gain information on gang members and leaders (Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 58-60). This maintenance of violent practices perpetuates the tension between police forces and *favela* residents. Moreover, it gives continuity to the militarized culture within the police and strengthens the negative perception that the police have towards new policing models (Gay, 2014; Larkins, 2015; Silva, B. M., 2013; Silveira, 2014).

3.3 The introduction of Community policing in Rio – *Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário* (CIPOC)³⁴

3.3.1 Political background.

Opposed to the military government, Brizola wanted to implement a policing model that was less violent and repressive; however, given the military conduct during the dictatorial period, the armed forces were unlikely to accept such advance (Riccio et al., 2013; Salem, 2016b; Valladares, 2000). Thus, in order to achieve his goal Brizola eliminated the Secretariat of Security, known for its authoritarian and abusive conduct and for its direct link with the military (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 287). In its place he created the Secretariat of Public Security and Human Rights to implement new measures and policies that would guide his public security plan. Composed of members of civil society and government entities, the aim was to create a debate forum for decision making (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 68; Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 2). Nominating Colonel Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira as the chief of the Military Police of Rio, the government wanted to introduce a policing tactic that was more approachable and friendly. Researching for a new model, Colonel Cerqueira sought a paradigm that shifted the police forces' authoritarian behaviour to a partnership between State authorities and the *favela* residents (Barros, F. R., 2015; Gomes & Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro, L. C., 2011; Riccio et al., 2013; Medeiros, 2007).

³⁴ Integrated Centre of Community Policing

After visiting the US, Canada, and Japan, he grounded his new paradigm on the community policing models that were used by the New York, Ontario and Koban Police.³⁵ The primary goal of this attempt was to change the actions of the police (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 288; Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 6). The new model sought to modify the police from a force with military-imposed violence and repressive methods to one where police activities would be directed to collectively developing order instead of imposing it. Additionally, the model had the objective of ending the criminal stereotype of the *favela* residents and developing police assistance in the community by reaching combined decisions (Barros, F. R., 2015; Ribeiro, L. C., 2011; Silva, B. M., 2013).

3.3.2 The implementation of CIPOC.

3.3.2.1 The introduction of community policing.

Very aware of the problem of corruption amongst the police forces, Colonel Cerqueira tried to change those behaviours through a reform across the whole police force. He wanted a change that would modify both the mindset as well as the conduct of the officers, creating a police force that would fight criminality within the law (Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 4). Moreover, Colonel Cerqueira aimed at developing a police force that was approachable and which created preventive measures to eradicate criminality in its entirety (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 67). It is through this lens that he introduced the model of community policing in Rio. Introducing a reform of the policing model, Colonel Cerqueira proposed the creation of the *Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário*³⁶ (Barros, F. R., 2015; Silva, B. M., 2013).

³⁵ Koban police: The Koban police is a police model developed in Japan through which they attempted to increase the feeling of security by creating several police stations around the cities.

³⁶ Integrated Centre of Community Policing

During his analysis of the increase of criminality in Rio, the Colonel noticed a pattern in the occurrence of *crimes de ocasião*.³⁷ He noticed that poverty and lack of opportunity increased the chances of youth getting involved in petty crimes (Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 10). Thus, Cerqueira believed that to have a more peaceful society there was a need for social reform as well. Consequently, community policing was introduced in Rio with an extra layer of responsibility engaging police officers in social support to poor neighbourhoods (Silva, B. M., 2013, pp. 10-11).

3.3.2.2 The strategy implemented in Rio.

Two distinct police units: *The Policiamento Comunitário de Bairro* (Community Neighbourhood Police) and the CIPOC were created to implement this new approach. The first one was implemented in neighbourhoods with low criminality and minor public security issues. The CIPOC focused on areas with security problems considered more serious by the police due to a lack of social services and a stronger presence of criminal elements. This division of approach already shows a different treatment between the type of community policing applied to neighbourhoods with some level of stigmatization and the ones perceived with less bias (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, pp. 19-20). Consequently, by framing some neighbourhoods as areas with “more serious security problems” the project furthered the stigmatization of these areas. By dividing the approach between less dangerous and more dangerous areas, the project implemented repressive measures in areas considered more dangerous, increasing the separation between formal neighbourhoods and *favela* ones (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 241).

³⁷ Crimes de ocasião: Refers to robberies of opportunity. The fact that there are no policemen around, or the distraction of the victim can lead to these types of crime. They are crimes that are not planned, they are opportunity crimes

- ***The Policiamento Comunitário de Bairro.***

The *Policiamento Comunitário de Bairro* (Neighbourhood Community Policing), was executed by a special group created for this specific approach: the *Grupamento Especializado no Policiamento de Bairro*³⁸ – GEPB. With the objective of promoting a greater integration between residents and the battalion, this approach was applied to all neighbourhoods of the city. Although it did not formally differentiate between *favelas* and non-*favela* neighbourhoods, the model focused on areas of the city that had more infrastructure and lower criminality rates (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, pp. 19-20). To define which neighbourhood would receive each approach type, the government used several indexes which reflected a clear differentiation between the formal city and the *favelas*. Very successful, the GEPB had the objective of applying combined decision making in the development of solutions to the problems faced by each neighbourhood (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, pp. 20-21; Silva, B. M., 2013, pp. 7-8; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 243).

- ***The Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário.***

The CIPOC was introduced to *favela* complexes that were considered to be greater risk and presented higher rates of violence. The first complex in which this style was initiated was in the *favela* complex of *Cidade de Deus* (City of God; Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 7). Although framed as a community policing model, the project applied repressive measures as a first tactic to gain control of the territory (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 241).

The main purpose of the CIPOC was to change the perception of the police forces both from the *favela* residents' perspective as well as the police organization itself. Envisioning a change in the behaviour and culture of the organization, CIPOC introduced human rights education programs, newly graduated police officers, and a community focused

³⁸ Specialized Battalion in Neighbourhood Policing

training (Silva, B. M., 2013, pp. 4-6; Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 288-289). Services such as community support, children's patrol³⁹, and social and labour support were also introduced. With this, the government sought to create a body that would partner with the community to promote preventive measures to tackle the problems faced by the poor neighbourhoods (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 20; Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 6). Moreover, police officers provided the communities with tutoring, emergency service, ambulance, leisure activities and patrolling (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Costa, 2014; Lopes & Figueira, 2013).

Aligned with the CIPOC, the government also implemented an anti-drug abuse program through educational speeches in public schools (Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 6). Their goal was to decrease the number of users and consequently decrease drug trafficking and criminality by building preventive policy around the issue of drugs. Its aim was to not only educate the youth on the risk and consequences of drug use, but also to encourage them to pursue a new path away from the narcotics market and drug trafficking (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 257). Named *Programa Educacional de Resistência às Drogas*⁴⁰ (PROERD), the objective was to create a greater proximity between the *favelas'* youth and police officers (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 242; Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 6).

3.3.2.3 The successes.

Without a determined name, the first implementations of community policing in less violent neighbourhoods were quite successful and some of them, like the initiative at the Urca⁴¹ neighbourhood, continue to this day. Its success is attributed to the close relationship established between the residents and the police as well as the strong coalition and presence

³⁹ Children's Patrol, or *patrulhamento mirim* worked as a boy's scout introducing children to the work of the police forces.

⁴⁰ Educational Program for Drug Resistance

⁴¹ Urca is an upper class neighbourhood located just below the Sugar loaf mountain.

of the residents' association. These factors contributed to balance the tensions between residents and police interests avoiding the perpetuation of a top down imposition of values and determinations (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, pp. 143-145).

Through the lens of structural violence, the project promoted a space for dialogue. This dialogue exposed the structural problems that led to criminality in the *favelas*. Through the implementation of the community policing model and a partnership between the police forces and the residents, the prejudices and stereotypes were exposed. By attending to the neighbourhood's needs, the GEPB promoted a greater inclusion of these peoples into Rio's society and allowed them to have access to services they did not before.

By contrast, in the areas where police brutality was the primary response, the implementation of community policing did not yield the same positive results. This repressive approach based on imposition of values and use of violence gave continuity to the existent structural violence and the promotion of racism, and classism (Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 6; Rocha, A. P., 2013, p. 88; Correa, Cecchetto, Farias & Fernandes, 2016, p. 103).

Moreover, the history of violence between police officers and *favela* residents built a relationship of mistrust and tension. The historical roots of racism and the use of the police forces to contain the lower classes and repress former slaves as well as their cultural manifestations was transferred to the *favelas*, which were originally formed by former slaves and *cortiço* residents (Tierney, 2012, pp. 25-29). Thus, when CIPOC used repressive measures as a first approach to implement a community policing model in the *favelas*, these tensions and mistrust were exacerbated. The use of force by the police while implementing the community policing model only contributed to the re-affirmation of the need to use force in order to be able to establish State presence in the *favelas*. Moreover, police's discourse on the *favelas* and the fact they were under the control of criminal gangs contributed to deepening the already criminalized image of these areas in the eyes of Rio's society

(Tierney, 2012, pp. 28-29). Furthermore, although police presence restrained the actions of organized crime, criminals themselves were still present in the *favelas*. Thus, any resident that collaborated too much with the police risked being targeted by these groups when the police forces were gone, and criminal gangs had free access again (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 292). The feeling that these measures were not going to constitute a long-term solution caused *favela* residents to fear the return of past times when criminal gang members walked armed and freely through the *favelas* (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 292; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 21).

3.3.2.4 The fall out of CIPOC.

The mix between repressive and community policing at the implementation of the program created more tensions between police forces and *favela* residents. Thus, when finally implemented, the model of community policing was received with mistrust and suspicion. The problem with this strategy was that it supported repressive measures and strengthened the militarized culture of the police forces (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, pp. 243-245). The use of an aggressive incursion tactic to regain control of the territory itself made the residents identify this new force as violent and oppressive (Silva, B. M., 2013, pp. 16-17). Moreover, it fostered new tensions and hatred as it created victims through the use of violence in police's initial incursions (Costa, 2004; Silva, B. M., 2013).

As seen in the first chapter, the relationship between police forces and *favela* residents was one marked by repression, violence, and regular incursions (Riccio et al., 2013, pp. 308-311). These incursions were heavily influenced by the perception of a need to educate and civilize that population, thus marked by the imposition of values, laws, and government measures (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 291). Additionally, the persecution suffered by these residents during the authoritarian government only added to this tense and conflictual relationship. The initial aggressive approach of CIPOC officers prior to the implementation of community

policing reinforced the mistrust residents had towards the police and increased tensions between these two parties. Moreover, the fact that these victims were seen as casualties of war and were and are still often times criminalized by the media and the police themselves, only reinforces the repressive social structures present in Brazilian society. The criminalization of innocents and the lack of reporting or reaction from the media and society towards those victims clearly indicates how stigmatized these regions of the city are. The lack of reaction additionally demonstrates the racial profiling police and general society display towards *favela* residents (Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 6; Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 52; Santana et al., 2016, p. 69).

On that note, many authors argue that the policing model (CIPOC) applied in the *Cidade de Deus*⁴² *favela* failed to implement the program's pillars of an approachable and community focused police (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 69). The impositions made by the police in these areas was a strategy that negated the pillars of community policing. Additionally, it furthered the gap between police officers and the community strengthening the existing lack of acceptance and high degree of mistrust on the part of the *favela* residents (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 21). The use of force only bolstered the history of tension and violence between them. Moreover, the fact that police officers used their closer relationship to the residents as a means to identify and restrict criminals, led to the maintenance of the negative and repressive perception that *favela* residents had towards the police (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 21).

Although many social services were introduced in the *favelas*, the suspicion and tensions between its residents and police officers continued to exist. The perpetuation of military tactics in *favelas* considered more dangerous, impeded the development of any real cooperation between them, giving the program fewer chances for success (Ribeiro &

⁴² City of God *favela* complex

Montandon, 2014, pp. 256-258). Additionally, although many officers saw the new approach and their social role in the *favelas* as a need in order to fight criminality, many did not agree with the extra tasks (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 69). The program's methodology of having the police force as a support for the community led many officers to see it as a work for "fake" police. Although positive for some, for others these attributions became too much. This lack of support from the police itself resulted a lack of capacity from the program to attend all demands (Rocha, A. P., 2013, pp. 91-92; Silva, L. A., 2010, pp. 291-293).

Although the preventive techniques and the idea of combined problem solving were broadly accepted in the force, the social activities and engagement were seen as too much of a burden (Musumeci, Muniz, Larvie, & Freire, 1996, p. 120). With such varied demands and needs, the *favela* residents felt there was still a lack of social support and access to government services. At the same time, the police were also seen as the only State authority present in the *favelas* and to whom residents could voice their needs and demands. This overwhelmed not only the officers but the program's overall capacity as well. In the end, criminality rates did not decrease, nor did police brutality. Moreover, there was no significant improvement of the social conditions of these areas, leading to the re-establishment of a repressive police force (Gomes & Oliveira, 2016, p. 21; Tierney, 2012, p. 33).

As seen in the previous pages, in areas where the community policing directives were implemented without any repressive measures the CIPOC initiative presented positive results. Nonetheless, with the end of Brizola's mandate the project was cancelled. The discontinuing of CIPOC led to the reinstatement of oppression, violence, and authoritarianism in the *favelas* (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, pp. 19-21; Tierney, 2012, p. 33; Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 292).

Overall, the failure of CIPOC was due to its flaws in following the model. In its first measures, CIPOC promoted a division in the methodology used, dividing its application

according to the type of neighbourhood; community policing was not employed in accordance with its principles in areas considered violent hubs of criminality (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 244).

3.4 The following years after CIPOC

3.4.1 The re-implementation of a repressive police.

With the end of Brizola's project there was an increase in drug trafficking and homicide rates throughout the state of Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, there was a generalized discontent of society towards Brizola's security program. The increase of criminality fostered a feeling that the government was not doing its due diligence in the maintenance of order and security in Rio (Mamede, 2010, p. 2; Costa, 2004, p. 135).

With that scenario in mind Moreira Franco's⁴³ electoral promises involved bringing the repressive methods back. Following his discourse⁴⁴ of ending violence in one hundred days Franco was elected and police brutality was once again normalized (Mamede, 2010, p. 4-9; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 21). Fighting against drug trafficking, Moreira Franco personified the rhetoric of "*colocar a polícia na rua*"⁴⁵ and aimed at regaining State control over the *favelas* (Mamede, 2010, pp. 3-5). He promoted brutal incursions in these areas intending to eradicate the drug and crime lords operating there (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 292-293).

Moreira Franco's government presented a big duality between speeches and actions. The governor believed in strengthening the police and empowering them to avoid corruption and combating the occurrence of the militias. At the same time, Franco was against the death

⁴³ Moreira Franco was governor of Rio from 1987 to 1991

⁴⁴ Moreira Franco's electoral campaign used Rio's violence saying he would end violence through repressive measures in one hundred days (Mamede, 2010, p. 4)

⁴⁵ *Colocar a Polícia na rua*- to put the police on the streets. In Brazil this is an expression that refers to the increase of number of policemen on streets to fight criminality. However, the type of policing in this scenario is a repressive violent police that would fulfill the role of containing the lower classes while arresting criminals and using excessive force (Mamede, 2010).

squads and believed in a policing model that was effective, yet attentive and respectful. Thus, in his speeches it is possible to notice mentions to the empowerment of the police, the strong repression of criminality, at the same time that it is possible to notice recommendations of respect for human rights (Mamede, 2010, pp. 5-9).

However, his government was marked by the increase of actions by death squads and police brutality, facing yet high degree of resistance and police insubordination. His “one hundred days” plan, included an increase in the number of officers on the streets, changes in the administration of the police forces, and the purchase of new equipment. Measures which were implemented by Franco in an attempt to increase the feeling of security and combat police corruption (Mamede, 2010, p. 8). Nonetheless, his government became known for increased corruption, police brutality, death squads and an open endorsement of police using an ‘ends justify the means’ approach. (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 21; Mamede, 2010, p. 1-12).

3.5 Brizola’s second government

In 1991, Brizola was re-elected and his second government was even more mired by double standards than his first. Brizola restructured the GEPB⁴⁶ and created the *Batalhão de Choque*⁴⁷. The creation of the *Batalhão* and its introduction to *favela* areas in repressive and violent incursions furthered the stigmatization of *favela* areas (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 22).

Facing increasing violence, due to police corruption, the development of *milícias*⁴⁸, and the mounting conflict between gangs, the government received heavy criticism from

⁴⁶ *Grupamento Especializado no Policiamento de Bairro* introduced by Brizola in his first mandate. See page 63.

⁴⁷ *Batalhão de Choque* is a police force dedicated to the dispersion and control of mobs and manifestations. Using non-lethal weaponry, they use force to disperse mobs or expel groups in reintegration actions

⁴⁸ *Milícias*- a group by policemen and firefighters who work as vigilantes, forming death and torture squads against criminals. Illegal, they are seen as an alternative source for justice and control of criminality. However, they exploit the lower classes, extorting money in exchange for protection, access to cable TV, gas and

society (Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 9). At the same time, organized crime was perceived to rule over some *favela* areas and in order to maintain their power, they become an oppressive and violent force. The division of CV was one of the main causes for this change once they now fought over territory. Consequently, the friendly perception that *favela* residents had of crime as a support to them changed and their relationship became marked by fear. (Silva, M. N., 2010, pp. 134-135; Penglase, 2008, pp. 122-124).

As noted by Colonel Cerqueira, police corruption was increasing and their complicity with crime allowed residents to become victims of the vicious and arbitrary actions of gangs (Silva, B. M., 2013, p. 9). This only furthered the existing mistrust and distance between *favela* residents and the police. *Favela* residents saw themselves caught between police brutality and the gangs' violence, having no one to resort to for protection (Gay, 2014; Misse, 2010; Riccio et al., 2013; Silveira, 2014).

Facing social pressures and the widespread perception that human rights defenders and measures were conniving with criminals, Brizola decided to institute even tougher measures (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 22; Mamede, 2010, p. 7). He implemented a more repressive and *linha dura*⁴⁹ type of policing in areas believed to be more dangerous and controlled by crime (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, pp. 295-296; Silveira, 2014, p. 8). Whereas, in regions believed to be more civilized, less dangerous, and unlawful Brizola implemented a community policing approach (Mamede, 2010; Medeiros, 2007; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014). In opposition to the community policing strategy, this imposition of power through violence contributed to deepening the polarity between lower and upper classes (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 294-296).

sanitation systems as well as transportation. Today the militia are also involved with traffic and impose rules as strict and arbitrary as the one imposed by organized crime.

⁴⁹ Translated as hardline, used to designate radical measures, authoritarian, strict measures. When relating to a type of policing refers to a police force that uses excessive force to ensure the maintenance of order and security.

3.5.1 The *Grupamento de Aplicação Prático Escolar* (GAPE).

In 1992 the *Grupamento de Aplicação Prático Escolar*-GAPE was created with the objective of implementing a community policing model throughout Rio de Janeiro. GAPE was a police force trained within the community policing framework and created to absorb recently graduate officers (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 248).

Initially implemented in the *Morro da Providência*⁵⁰, the plan was for GAPE to function as a training lab for the study of community policing practices and how those contributed to the decrease of violence (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 69; Oliveira, 2013, p. 77). GAPE was an internship for recently graduated officers. It was an effort to change the culture of the police by introducing a new training and perception of the police forces to its officers based on a community policing paradigm (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 248).

GAPE's main objective was to regain State control over these areas and stabilize the situation through a community policing model. Focused in poor neighbourhoods who suffered from high levels of violence caused by drug trafficking, the goal was to establish a dialogue with the residents while patrolling these areas. Avoiding intra-gang conflicts and decreasing violence, GAPE substituted the oppressive incursions of previous police forces into the *favelas* with a constant police presence (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 295).

With proposals that sought to identify and eliminate the causes of criminality and insecurity in areas like *Pavão-Pavãozinho* and *Providência*, GAPE's strategy combined two processes: (1) The incursion in the *favelas* to decrease criminality and assume control over these areas, (2) employing the permanent presence of officers (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 295). GAPE also applied theories of human rights and brought a new approach to the formation of

⁵⁰ *Morro da Providência*: *favela* located close to the downtown core of Rio de Janeiro and the portuary zone

these new officials. Trying to develop a new culture within the police forces this approach sought to break with the over-militarized existing philosophy. The officers were taught and trained in community policing and applied such knowledge across GAPE units (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 296).

3.5.1.1 GAPE's fall outs.

The program was initially installed in the *Morro da Providência* and later expanded to the *favelas* of *Borel*, *Mangueira* and *Andaraí*. The constant presence of police forces in the *favelas* brought positive initial results. However, the different standards set by Brizola's government, differentiating between dangerous and non-dangerous areas with different strategies, furthered the polarization of *morro x asfalto*.

In Copacabana⁵¹ for instance, Brizola implemented a more friendly and thorough approach (Ribeiro, 2014, pp. 294-295). Prior to introducing security policies, the government sought to understand the social dynamics by way of organized studies of the area. Executing the model according to the issues and demands of the area, this approach was successful and counted on a great support from the local population (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 244).

The lack of coordination between the programs and the ambiguous messages sent by the opposite policing models led to an escalation of violence, criminality, and homicide rates (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 23). The duality in the approach developed a repressive force alongside a community policing division. The areas that received repressive police faced an increase in violence and homicide rates due to the clashes between the police and criminal gangs. The areas where community policing was installed faced a relocation of criminal gangs to other areas of the city because of the constant presence of the police. This also contributed to an increase in clashes between gangs for territory control, which also

⁵¹ Copacabana is very high-class neighbourhood, famously known for its expensive condominiums and the Copacabana Palace, one of the most expensive hotels in Rio.

contributed to an increase in violence and homicide rates. Additionally, police divisions that did not receive community policing training continued to be brutal and corrupt, which also contributed to the increase of violence and criminality rates. As a result, when Rio started preparing for the UN's Environment Summit - Rio 92, a massive operation⁵² was implemented to guarantee the safety of foreign visitors (Costa, 2004, p. 135).

The presence of the army on the streets not only weakened the idea of the program, but also added to the already militarized culture of the police forces. On that note, GAPE's human rights lens applied to the new expected conduct of the police was perceived as colluding with criminality. The perception of Brazilian society was that human rights was a concept that only existed to defend criminals (Mamede, 2010; Medeiros, 2007; Costa, 2004).

Once the mistrust between the police and *favela* residents continued to be a reality and society at large deemed the approach a failure, at the end of Brizola's mandate, the program was discontinued. The resistance within the police forces and the lack of collaboration between public departments and programs led to the continuation of police violence and prejudice. Additionally, despite the efforts of GAPE a trust-based relationship with the residents could not be established. In spite of the governor's work on pushing the project and its first successful results, GAPE faced too much resistance from all the involved actors (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 25).

3.5.1.2 Nilo Batista and Operação Rio.

Renouncing the government of Rio to run for president in 1994, Brizola left the post for his vice governor Nilo Batista (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 24). His one-year government was considered weak and he was accused of not being able to impose State

⁵² The operation counted on fifteen thousand soldiers from the army (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 23)

presence in the *favelas* (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 25). Moreover, he was said to be incapable of fighting criminality and controlling the conduct of its policemen.

The police forces during that time were heavily accused of corruption and association with the drug trafficking, seen as a command of dirty cops in need of a reform to “clean” the battalion. Facing strong pressure from society and the federal government for not being able to control the growing violence in Rio, Batista accepted the presidential intervention (Costa, 2004, p. 136).

Operação Rio took place between October and December of that same year. Using repressive measures and military tactics, the operation sought to apprehend guns, drugs, and traffickers. Although very aggressive and extensive, the operation was unsuccessful in ending drug trafficking (Costa, 2004, p. 136; Caldeira & Holston, 1999, pp. 295-296). As soon as the troops were withdrawn from the *favelas* crime rates rose back to previous levels (“*Operação Rio*”, 1994; Souza, 2015; Costa, 2004; Magalhães, 2018).

3.7 Analysis

Historically constructed, the police conduct towards the lower classes has always been one of disdain and imposition. From the expulsion of these people from the *cortiços* to police’s violent incursions in the *favelas*, their history is marked by mistrust and tension. Additionally, when analyzing the formation of the *favelas* it is possible to notice a complete absence from the government, void which was filled by the social role played by criminal organizations (Tierney, 2012; Valladares, 2000; Silva, M. N., 2010; Penglase, 2008).

Thus, when the State decided to change its approach to these areas it should have initiated this new relationship with the employment of social programs. Nevertheless, they came in with a stabilization period comprised of violent incursions and the effective combat of criminality (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014). Moreover, the authoritarian and abusive conduct of the dictatorship period continued to be part of the behaviour portrayed by the

police forces leading the reforms to fail. In order to have a true community policing model established there was a need for a full reform of the police forces culture, training, and response protocol (Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Costa, 2004; Musumeci et al., 1996; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014).

Once the structural problems are not addressed, the sole presence of the police is not enough for the maintenance of decreased criminal activity (Silva, B. M., 2013; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Tierney, 2012). Although the police presence restrains the activity of criminal organizations, the existing tensions between officers and *favela* residents contribute to the discouragement of these officers in carrying out the new model. Moreover, seen as a fake type of police by the rest of the force, these officers tend to quickly revert to old habits of brutality and prejudice. On the one side we see a police officer trained to fight criminality and to suspect *favela* residents due to their proximity and relationship with criminal gangs. On the other there is a population that has always been mistreated and repressed by the police who now presents itself as a partner (Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Correa et al., 2016; Mamede, 2010; Silva, B. M., 2013).

The fact that CIPOC proposed a first violent and repressive approach to the *favelas* to later implement a friendly type of police rendered the interactions between the police and residents very difficult. In the development of a different approach to higher class neighbourhoods from lower class ones, Brizola's initiatives contributed to deepening the divisions between social class in Brazilian society (Santana et al., 2016, p. 68). Furthermore, his division of roles amongst the police forces and the different programs contributed to the lack of commitment from police officers (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, pp. 256-257). By including only newly graduated officers in the CIPOC and GEPB without introducing their methods to rest of the force led to further defensive behaviour towards these branches of the police force. The newcomers became a joke to the force which judged the police officers

involved in community policing as not conducting real police work (Mamede, 2010; Barros, F. R., 2015; Tierney, 2012).

That said, it is possible to perceive the structural issues existent within the police forces as well. Their military training and mindset towards criminals framing their role as protectors of order in the war against crime, contributed to their violent and abusive conduct. Additionally, the historical relationship between police officers and the *favelas* in their role to control and relocate its residents creates a criminalized image of these residents. Consequently, the use of force is seen as necessary to both society and police authorities which gives continuity to violence, corruption, and mistrust (Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Lopes & Figueira, 2013; Riccio et al., 2013; Silva, B. M., 2013).

As for GAPE, although their fulltime presence in the *favelas* appeared to have given the residents more security and restrained criminal activities, the resistance within the police forces led to its failure (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 296). Additionally, the growing number of corrupt policemen and the entrenched image of the police as a combatting force led to an increase of violence and police brutality (Caldeira & Holston, 1999, p. 699).

As seen in Galtung's conceptualization of peacebuilding, while working to promote negative peace and end personal violence one must pay attention to avoid encouraging the development of structural violence. The work towards the end of direct violence may jeopardize the development of positive peace (Johansen, 2007, p. 188).

While combatting personal violence in the *favelas* the government contributed to generalized criminalization of these areas. It increased structural violence making the path towards positive peace longer. Likewise, it contributed to the formation of a negative view on human rights and a widespread pressure for more aggressive and rigid measures. Moreover, their repressive approach gave strength to the authoritarian and violent policing model developed during the military government. Consequently, supporting the police culture of

adopting any means necessary to fight criminality (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro, L., 2014).

The discourse of “*bandido bom é bandido morto*”⁵³ (Misse, 2010, p. 13) used during the dictatorship was transferred to the police forces strengthening their aggressive approach towards crime. Additionally, the new discourse of war against drug trafficking established to justify their violent actions supported the implementation of repressive measures from the police towards the *favelas*. These aggressive discourses against crime fuel the perception of criminality in the *favelas* (Silva, B. M., 2013; Mamede, 2010).

In both peace processes it is possible to identify the structural constructions embedded in some of the discourses and actions carried out by the police, the media as well as some governments. The idea that repressive measures are necessary in order to regain control over the *favelas* is part of a historically constructed perception that these are separated areas of the city, which should be treated differently (Santana et al., 2016, p. 69). Nonetheless, one must acknowledge the role played by the lack of social services and government support which contributes to the increased power of traffickers. Moreover, it must also be taken into account that police corruption only exacerbates the absence of the State in those areas.

⁵³ In English *good bandits are dead bandits*

4. The Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais

4.1 The government of Marcelo de Alencar and the return of repressive policing

Despite GAPE's (*Grupamento de Aplicação Prático Escolar*) attempt to establish a community policing model across the police forces, the rhetoric of war against crime was never fully abolished from police rhetoric (Cardoso, 2016; Misse, 2010; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014). The culture of repression and use of force was still part of the police ethos and the new policing paradigm was never truly embraced by the officers who saw GAPE as a joke-like model (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 25).

After *Operação Rio*, the perception within Brazilian society was that *favelas* were controlled by drug trafficking gangs. That is because only a few criminal leaders were apprehended and even with the presence of the army criminal activity and homicide rates increased. In fact, the presence of the armed forces in the *favelas* only reinforced the image of these areas as the enemy territory. In this operation, army soldiers felt displaced in applying military training in national territory and having Brazilian citizens as their target and framed as the enemy (Costa, 2004, pp. 136-137). This displacement led the military to be insecure in their actions once the use of force against Brazilian civilian population is not part of their imaginary. Moreover, the framing of criminal leaders as enemies led to extreme use of force by the army. The lack of palpable results in the aftermath of *Operação Rio* gave support to the return of the repressive policing model.

As seen in Hinton, Marcello de Alencar⁵⁴ reinstated the militarized culture of the force and restored police interventions in the *favelas* (as cited in Tierney, 2012, p. 34). By stressing the zero-tolerance policy in the police against criminality and gangs, his measures intensified confrontations and increased levels of police lethality (Costa, 2004, p. 136; Human Rights Watch, 1998, Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 298).

⁵⁴Governor of Rio between 1995-1999

With violence increasing and the relationship between police and the *favela* residents deteriorating, corruption also increased (Zaluar, 2007, p. 8). The number of militia and executions increased when Alencar established a reward for good services, best known as *Gratificação Faroeste*⁵⁵ (Wild West Gratifications). These gratifications developed a police organization that used violence and military techniques in the hunt for criminals, consequently building a culture of warfare. The *gratificação faroeste* rewards were quickly linked to the use of violence and indiscriminate killings, especially the execution of criminals and gang leaders (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 297; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, pp. 26-28; Salem, 2016b, p. 27). During the time these gratifications were in place, Rio reached a homicide rate of 8.218 homicides per one hundred thousand inhabitants (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 27). The policy of reward for repressing criminality by all means necessary showcased palpable consequences; creating a closer relationship between the police and the army. This closeness between army and police forces caused the continuity and strengthened the culture of authoritarianism and criminalization of the *favelas*. The results were a huge increase in homicide rates as well as on-duty deaths amongst policemen (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, pp. 27-28). Even though society was faced with higher rates of criminality and violence, those abuses were interpreted as inevitable due to the conflict (Caldeira & Holston, 1999, pp. 695-696).

From a structural violence perspective, the justification of abuse through the need to fight criminality is in itself a cultural structure that normalizes violence, police abuse and executions (Silva, M. N., 2010, p. 144). Moreover, it strengthens the criminalized image of the *favelas* and gives continuity to the normalization of violent situations in the *favelas* (Santana et al., 2016, p. 62). This normalization of the violations happening in *favela* areas

⁵⁵ The gratifications were known as “wild west gratifications” because it became known for its extra judicial killings, once officers who killed criminals were usually the ones who received such prizes.

allows for them to continue to happen. Concurrently, it justifies the fact that lower classes live in violent areas of the city, because of their own lack of education or “civilization” (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 306).

Influenced by the rhetoric of war against crime, society came to perceive these deaths as casualties of war. The death of innocent people and the disrespect for human rights was consequently deemed as a necessary measure given the situation found in Rio (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 35-37). Police brutality became justified through the rhetoric of “shoot to kill” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999, p. 704); while the death of civilians was justified through the criminalization of the *favelas* (Cardoso, 2010, p. 38). These areas were perceived by police and society as hubs of criminality; transforming *favela* residents into suspects, having their innocence questioned until proven otherwise (Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Salem, 2016b; Cardoso, 2010;)

4.2 The renewal of the community policing model- *Mutirão pela Paz*

With the rise of violence, political pressure was formed, international agencies started denouncing human rights violations and the increase of police brutality in *favela* areas (Magaloni, Franco, & Melo, 2015, p. 11). Organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the UN started denouncing these abuses through their reports as well as recommendations in decreasing police abuse (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Zaluar, 2007; Amnesty International, 1998). This opened space for dialogue in the political arena about the need to promote a change in the policing model used in Rio. Close to new elections, one of the candidates, Antony Garotinho, took advantage of the political and social climate to make his electoral campaign over police reform (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 27). Thus, in 1999 Garotinho was elected as the governor of Rio and recovered the idea of community policing by introducing the “*Mutirão pela Paz*” (Peace Collective Efforts) (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 27). The initiative sought to implement constant

and permanent community policing in the *favelas*. Through a combined mobilization of State agencies, the *Mutirão pela Paz* aspired to tend to the social demands of communities (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 299). Moreover, it sought to decrease the lethality of police actions and the segregation and criminalization of the lower classes. By implementing reforms in all sectors, from security to education and healthcare systems, the goal was to answer to the demands from both the communities and international actors (Correa et al., 2015; Maciel, 2015; Ribeiro, L., 2014; Riccio et al., 2013; Rushel, 2011).

The *Mutirão pela Paz* was envisioned by, then, Deputy Secretary of Research and Citizenship, Sociologist Luiz Eduardo Soares. It focused on changing the way public security was understood (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 298-299). Soares proposed an approach that sought to tackle criminality without incurring in the same pattern of police violence seen in previous governments. Additionally, it envisioned a combined action between the police and the government to introduce social services such as education, healthcare, installation of sewage system and other sanitary measures (Ruschel, 2011). The biggest shift this program introduced, was the proposal of a police force that was guided by the principles of equality and diversity, helping *favela* residents solve their problems (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 27; Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 70). That way the focus was not only to guarantee State control over the *favelas*, but also develop these areas, reintegrating them into the formal city (Silva, L. A., 2010, p. 90; Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 49).

The government then reformed police stations, to make them less oppressive and to establish the community policing approach (Tierney, 2012, p. 35). It re-designed police training, and in an effort to encourage and empower the officers to embrace changes, it included the option for officers to enroll in university courses in areas such as politics, justice and human rights. Another important change was the creation of an Ombudsman office,

established to receive complaints about police brutality and misconduct (Caldeira & Holston, 1999, p. 707; Tierney, 2012, p. 35).

The *Mutirão pela Paz* was successful in getting acceptance from the *comunidades*. Brazilian media and society were very favourable of the results presented by the initiative, which contributed to the decrease of violent attacks from both police and criminal groups (Ruschel, 2011). The program, however, was not very well accepted amongst the police forces, which saw all the changes as diminishing to their roles and responsibilities. Facing opposition and resistance from the police, and complaints of police brutality and insubordination, the project was discontinued (Corrêa et al., 2015; Maciel, 2015; Riccio et al., 2013). Moreover, Soares' innovations and proposals to reform the paradigms of public security in Rio, raised a lot of hostility inside the police force, leading to his replacement in 2000 (Ribeiro, L., 2014, pp. 298-299).

4.3 The *Grupamento de Policiamento de Áreas Especiais*

Between 1999 and 2000 the levels of violence were spiking (Waiselfisz, 2012, pp. 185-187), and the work of militia was generating several protests in high-class neighbourhoods such as Copacabana (Cardoso, 2010, p. 58). In May of 2000, these protests grew larger after the execution of five youth in the *favela* complexes of *Pavão-pavãozinho* and *Cantagalo*, which were complexes known by their high levels of criminal activity (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 40; Cardoso, 2010, p. 58; Petry, 2000). Following this event, the new commander introduced a second program of community policing, the *Grupamento de Policiamento de Áreas Especiais*⁵⁶ (GPAE). The program was initially introduced in these two complexes, to decrease the number of armed individuals circulating through the *favelas* and to tend to the public demand of a change in police conduct. Much like the *Mutirão pela Paz*,

⁵⁶ Police Battalion for Special Areas

the GPAE introduced new police stations in an attempt to decrease the fear and uncertainty behind the police work (Cardoso, 2010; Lessing, 2018; Riccio et al., 2013; Vargas, 2013).

Working closely with NGOs, especially Viva Rio, the program also sought to connect civil society groups with the government to improve living conditions in the *favelas* (Cardoso, 2010, p. 59; Albernaz et al., 2007, pp. 40-41; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 29). The GPAE strategy was heavily influenced by the operation developed in Boston, named Operation Ceasefire (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 249; Lessing, 2018, p. 189). Applying the core directives of the Boston program, the GPAE mainly focused on ending inter-gang conflict. Given Rio's reality of police brutality, the difference of GPAE, was to also tackle the violence between gangs and the police. With that, the program aimed at restraining the open display of firearms from gang members as well as their arbitrary ruling over the *favela* residents (Lessing, 2018; Cardoso, 2010; Cardoso, 2016).

To guarantee the GPAE's thorough implementation and oversee the developments of the new program, the government of Garotinho created a community council. The council's main task was to promote dialogue and develop a partnership between the police forces and *favela* residents to reach combined decisions on crime prevention strategies. Prior to its implementation, they hosted two meetings with the local police forces, GPAE officers and local leaders to explain the goals and strategies of this new type of policing (Albernaz et al., 2007; Cardoso, 2016; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014).

Working almost as an extension of the *Mutirão pela Paz*, the GPAE had four main goals: (i) to decrease risky situations, specifically the ones that affected children, (ii) decrease the fear felt by *favela* residents, (iii) prevent and punish police misconduct and (iv) the repression of drug trafficking only in cases where the act was caught red-handed (Cardoso,

2016, p. 79).⁵⁷ In summation, the objective was to end the presence of fire arms in the *favelas*, impede the involvement of children with criminal groups and combat police corruption (Serrano-Berthet et al., 2013, p. 36). Seeking to diminish the action of the criminal gangs in the *favelas* the program implemented actions to inhibit the public display of guns and the circulation of armed individuals in these areas. Additionally, by impeding the involvement of youth with criminal groups the GPAE sought to not only offer a different path for *favela* youth, but also to weaken the criminal gangs, once they would not have so many new recruits. The GPAE also implemented a full-time police presence in the *favelas* as a means of decreasing violence and restrict criminal activity (Barros, C. M., 2010; Barros, F. R., 2015; Cardoso, 2016; Ribeiro, L., 2014). To achieve these goals, the program had a zero-tolerance policy with police misconduct and brutality inside the *favelas* (Barros, C. M., 2010, p. 71).

In its initial planning phase, the GPAE sought to create a recruiting process, based on volunteer officers, thus, guaranteeing their commitment to the new model. Those officers would then receive training, and the battalion would be comprised of members that identified with GPAE's policing directives. This however, did not happen (Cardoso, 2010, p. 62). The GPAE was comprised of the worst officers in each battalion, chosen by their commanders who saw this as an opportunity to get rid of their weak or bad officers (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, pp. 249-250). The program was initially formed by four main stations divided along both *favela* complexes. They were strategically positioned in places formerly used by the gangs as drug selling points (Cardoso, 2010, p. 64).

Although the GPAE did not predict any action directly fighting drug trafficking, the program did have a mandate to arrest individuals involved in criminal activity or illegal possession of weapons. Believing that police presence alone would inhibit criminal

⁵⁷ Catch red-handed: to discover someone doing something bad or illegal according to the Cambridge dictionary: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/catch-sb-red-handed>

behaviours, they focused on creating that presence with foot patrols over the *favelas* (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 42; Cardoso, 2016, p. 77; Lessing, 2018, p. 189).

The GPAE targeted the structural deficits as a means to prevent the return of crime to the *favelas*. Thus, the program introduced the installation of sanitary systems, electricity, and healthcare. Combining a different police approach with the introduction of social services in the *favelas*, GPAE sought to develop these areas and create the roots for the maintenance of peace. Having learned from previous programs, the new project wanted to promote access to social services that were available to the rest of the city (Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Rocha, A. P., 2013; Berkmann von der Wehl, 2016).

4.3.1 The favela's reality.

4.3.1.1 Organized crime.

At this point the *Comando Vermelho* had broken down into three main groups (Rocha, R. G., 2010, p. 36; Silva, L. A., 2010, p. 30; Misse, 2011, p. 19). The leadership of these criminal gangs was changing rapidly, presenting younger people as leaders, due to the violent clashes between them (Rocha, R. G., 2010, pp. 36-37; Cardoso, 2010, p. 188; Fernandes, 2013, p. 212). The augmented conflicts for control of territory and the promotion of the best leadership style endangered the *favela* population who were constantly under fire due to rival gang invasions (Cardoso, 2010, p. 121).

The relationship between *favela* residents and the gangs had deteriorated, the initial respect and code of silence imposed by CV no longer applied in many *favelas*. In interviews with the residents, the recurring topic raised was regarding the ruling of the gangs and the fear it created (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 188-189). Without any type of social rule or relationship dynamic, anyone could become a target of the gangs and its members. The lack of established rules and conducts allowed gang members to act indiscriminately. Anyone could be

considered a traitor, an enemy, an *x-9*⁵⁸, and anyone could become the target of a member's rage, or scorn. Residents were at risk of being accused of disrespect or of provoking a member's rage. Young girls who did not respond to their appeal could suffer intimidations and threats (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 164-167). Boys that would not get involved with the gang or who did not accept their recruitment, could also be perceived as snobs and targeted by the members. Moreover, if a gang member was accused of wrong doing and sentenced to execution, his whole family could also be in danger and suffer death threats, forcing them to abandon their house (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 167-170).

Nonetheless, the lack of support from the state and the violent actions being carried out by the police led the *favela* residents to see the criminal gangs as their only authority capable of bringing solutions to their problems⁵⁹. As seen in Cardoso (2010), the residents maintained some level of friendship and respect towards gang members and their leaders as a need to guarantee their protection and have access to the social support they provided (pp.162-164). Although the gangs were very subjective in their ruling, they were also the closest thing to an administrator of the *favelas* that residents had. They were the ones that solved disputes, made sure other gangs were kept away and provided for medical assistance, protection, electricity, cable television and so on (Alves & Evanson, 2011; Cardoso, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 1998; Lessing, 2018; Long, 1989; Valladares, 2000).

4.3.1.2 Police forces.

The police forces were perceived by *favela* residents as unscrupulous and callus with the lives of the lower classes (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 242-244). In the many clashes with criminal gangs, their use of force and gun power was indiscriminate, striking criminals and civilians in

⁵⁸ X-9 is an expression used to refer to an informant, a whistle blower, gossipmonger. Within criminal gangs a X-9 is a traitor, a person that tells on the gangs' activities.

⁵⁹ There is not enough research on the opinion of the residents of the *favelas*, especially on interview with groups such as church groups, NGOs and political groups.

the same proportion. Their violent incursions in the *favelas* in the search for weapons, drugs and to apprehend traffickers worsened the already violent reality of the *favelas* (Cardoso, 2010; Costa, 2004; Musumeci, 2017; Rocha, A. P., 2013; Silveira, 2014). They were perceived by the residents as a brutal force that had no respect for their lives (Larkins, 2015, p. 60). The police were seen as irresponsible and racist, and were accused of having a non-selective approach, targeting everyone and anyone that lived in the *favelas* (Santana et al., 2016, p. 69)

The situation of the *favelas* was historically classified as extremely hostile. The landscape of the *favelas*, the privileged geographic position of the criminal gangs and their superior fire power contributed to increased levels of stress (Tierney, 2012, p. 28). This stress and pressure can be seen as one of the many contributors to the violent approach of the police forces in the *favelas*. Under pressure, police officers end up having emotional reactions in their decision making. Moreover, under-armed and entering a chaotic urban space structured around narrow alleys and dead-end streets, the police faced great difficulty in navigating through the *favelas* (Tierney, 2012, p. 36). These difficulties and uncertainties contributed to the psychological distress of the officers, consequently leading to increasing the militarized culture of the police forces. Considered the same distress as having lived in a war zone, it becomes clearer how the violence in the *favelas* is the cause and the consequence of police brutality aligned with the inter-gang conflicts (Barros, C. M., 2010, p. 65). The military training and culture within the police forces to see *favelas* as enemy territory, summed with the violence caused by inter-gang conflict contributes to further the militarization of the police forces. (Riccio et al., 2013, p. 311; Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 66). In a brief analysis of the phenomenon, it is possible to perceive how intertwined the elements of this conflict are (Albernaz et al., 2007; Souza, Minayo, Guimaraes e Silva, & Pires, 2012; Souza, L. A., 2015).

4.3.2 GPAE success.

The initial implementations of GPAE presented a feeling of regained respect by *favelas* residents. The new, less repressive approach obtained positive feedback from the residents who were no longer victims of the gang's indiscriminate command (Cardoso, 2016, p. 79). The media presented a constant acclamation of the program as well as its approval by both *favela* and asphalt residents (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 250). The initial results brought a feeling of renewed security to Rio de Janeiro (Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Misse, 2010).

The GPAE brought changes to the communities by promoting a decrease in the police incursions, decreasing the number of casualties and fear amongst the residents of these areas, producing a perception of success of the GPAE throughout society (Albernaz et al., 2007; Cardoso, 2016; Lessing, 2018). Additionally, the augmented police presence in the *favelas* and the introduction of the new police stations in former drug dealing spots, restricted the actions of the gangs in these areas (Cardoso, 2010, p. 64).

The presence of police officers was initially welcomed by the *favela* residents as they brought an end to the shootings between gangs, and between police and criminal gangs in those areas (Tierney, 2012, p. 42; Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 300). The GPAE's focus on fighting police corruption was also widely celebrated amongst the *favela* residents, as that decreased the power of militias (Tierney, 2012, p. 28). The program applied disciplinary action towards officers that incurred in abuse of power or carried out arbitrary measures, decreasing the tension between the police and the residents. Moreover, the new stance presented by police commanders increased the trust and the feeling of security between the two groups. The *favela* population started to differentiate between the officers from GPAE and the other battalions through the unnecessary use of fire arms by officers that did not belong to the GPAE, classifying them as *callus*, and a type of police that was used to shoot to kill (Barros,

F. R., 2015; Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Rocha, A. P., 2013). What was celebrated by *favela* residents, however, was seen as negative reinforcement amongst the police forces. The introduction of disciplinary measures and the fact that GPAE was open to receiving complaints from the residents regarding police behaviour, created fear and suspicion within the police forces (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 43). The officers felt under suspicion, which interfered with the development of dialogue and partnerships with the community (Albernaz et al., 2007; Barros, F. R., 2015; Cardoso, 2016).

As seen in the Urca program, community policing models work best when combined decisions are reached and a joint study of the needs and difficulties of a community are implemented. Moreover, the combination of bottom up (through the combined decision making and discussion of issues) and top down (imposition of the law and maintenance of order) policies, with policies of development and access to basic needs, can lead to a long-term improvement on quality of life, as well as maintain low criminal and homicide rates (Cardoso, 2016; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014; Ribeiro, L., 2014; Riccio et al., 2013).

The initial response to the implementation of the GPAE was positive, evidenced by the decrease in homicide rates and a reduction in the number of armed individuals within the *favelas* where the program was implemented (Cano, Trindade, Borges, Ribeiro & Rocha, 2012; Maciel, 2015). The residents of the *favelas* that received GPAE saw the program as the cause for their new reality of peace, as well as their increased feeling of security (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 44). The perception of success attributed to the decrease in homicide rates led the initiative to continue through the government of Benedita da Silva⁶⁰, Garotinho's vice governor. Moreover, during the governance of Rosinha Garotinho, from 2003 to 2006, the program was not only continued, but expanded to other *favelas* (Riccio et al., 2013, p. 312).

⁶⁰ She assumed the administration when Garotinho renounced his position to run for president in 2002.

4.3.3 GPAE challenges.

As seen in Albernaz et al. (2007), the history of conflict and repression towards the lower classes led them to see their participation in the administration of their issues as a space for denunciation. Brazil's paternalist history also contributed to this view as it did not create the means for participatory and collaborative policy making (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 43). That said, one should take some distance from the bias of a community that was accustomed with the violent and rude manners of the police officers. Used to being contained and repressed by the officers who often times were also involved in corruption, the residents had a very skeptical image of the GPAE (Riccio et al., 2013, p. 311). In order to thoroughly access their complaints, it is necessary to consider how the interaction between GPAE officers and *favela* residents happened. Although some of them were based on bad policing practices due to old habits, it is necessary to analyse which of the complaints were the defensive attitude of the residents towards these changes and which part was based on truly abusive practices (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 44; Cardoso, 2010, p. 258).

Aside from their role in restricting criminal activity, the GPAE also carried out prevention work. Part of this prevention was to strategically build an image of the police officer into a role model to prevent youth from getting involved in crime. However, different from the drug lords, the police officers did not have an extravagant and luxurious life (Tierney, 2012, p. 48). Moreover, the officers were seen as a brutal and racist force that threatened the lives of the lower class just as much as the drug traffickers did (Albernaz et al., 2007; Cardoso, 2016; Riccio et al., 2013; Berkmann von der Wehl, 2016).

The rapid expansion of GPAE led the program to a multiplicity of different approaches and consequently, its failure in keeping peace. With police stations being implemented too fast, the program observed its methodology being applied differently at each of the stations (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 285-289). Opposed to the community policing model the

GPAE was never able to de-centralize power to give the officers more autonomy (Albernaz et al., 2007, pp. 45-47). Consequently, each GPAE station was heavily dependent on the conduct and attitude presented by their commander. With this highly hierarchic disposition, each time there was a change in command, there was a change in the conduct of the officers. Thus, dependent of the commander's interpretation and level of agreement with the pillars of the community policing model, the GPAE suffered a constant change in direction and relationship with the community (Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Lessing, 2018; Berkmann von der Wehl, 2016).

The GPAE changed its commander every two years, resulting in a rotating way of approaching the residents. Moreover, this change signified a change in the way the battalion saw the program, which led to many conflicts between commander and its troop. These changes also led to confusion amongst the residents, who did not know what to expect from the battalions and how each new force was going to act (Albernaz et al., 2007, pp. 45-50). Although none of the police stations fully implemented the mandate of the community policing model, some stations were more open and friendlier than others with the communities within the different *favelas*. This differentiation resulted in different types of relationships between police officers and *favela* residents, weakening the GPAE as a continuous program (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, pp. 249-251; Riccio et al., 2013, p. 312; Cardoso, 2010, pp. 297-300).

The negative perception of the program by police officers combined with the lack of faith in the GPAE's development led to the formation of a police force doomed to fail (Cardoso, 2016; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014). The differences in leadership and the negative perception of the GPAE as "weak" and "fake" type of police due to its approach, led to ever growing conflicts and an overall disorganization in how the program was carried out (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 45).

Considering the core of the model proposed by community policing, the idea was to prevent the development of criminality through the elaboration of social policies which identified the root causes of the issue. Additionally, it sought to promote a partnership between the community and the police, working to propose solutions to the difficulties faced by given community. The lack of combined efforts and a cohesive approach to the social demands of these areas was one of the reasons why the program failed (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014; Albernaz et al., 2007).

4.3.4 GPAE fall outs.

During this time, the term *favela* started being seen as a negative and depreciative term to refer to these neighbourhoods, being then called *comunidades* (communities), due to their community living style. What must be made clear is that the term community started being used to refer to lower class neighbourhoods, usually poorly and illegally constructed. With that, community policing started being seen not as a policing model focused on the community in general, but custom made for *favelas* (Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 274; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 256). Working with a top-down approach the GPAE battalions perceived themselves as the type of police that was there to educate and control the lower classes (Albernaz et al., 2007; Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Misse, 2010; Morabito, 2010). Differently from what the community policing proposed, the GPAE did not develop a decentralized police force (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 47). Moreover, it did not develop a strategy that allowed for the community's participation in the decision-making process (Salem, 2016a, pp. 50-53).

Additionally, seen by commanders as weakening the police force the GPAE faced strong institutional resistance and a lack of support from the forces. Sending their worst men, the commander of each battalion perceived the GPAE as a doomed plan due to its mandate and non-repressive directive (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, pp. 249-250). Consequently, the

GPAE suffered from a lack of interaction between the residents and the police officers. Given the history of conflicts between residents and the police, the officer's continuous imposition of values increased the tension and aggravated the mistrust between them (Albernaz et al., 2007; Cardoso, 2016; Cardoso, 2010; Barros, F. R., 2015).

Both the imposition of values and the lack of decentralization of each unit contributed to the failure of the program. In no time, the residents started complaining about the treatment received from the police officers. Arbitrary stops and inspections especially towards young black males, led to complaints of lack of respect for their human dignity (Tierney, 2012, p. 44). The *favela* residents believed that the police should know how to differentiate a criminal from a *pessoa de bem*⁶¹, and treat them with the respect and equality⁶² they deserved (Cardoso, 2010, p.133). Complaints about the differential treatment that the police forces gave the people that lived in the *favelas* versus the ones that lived in the *asfalto* started emerging. These complaints were not voiced before because of the lack of social space for this type of complaint from the lower classes, who were extremely repressed (Albernaz et al., 2007; Serrano-Berthet et al., 2013; Ribero & Montandon, 2014).

Additionally, contrary to the community policing model, the GPAE kept the PMERJ⁶³ highly militarized and heavily structured in the hierarchy of its battalions and stations. That meant that at each GPAE station, officers still answered and awaited instructions from their commander (Salem, 2016b, pp. 50-54). Consequently, each battalion embraced and fulfilled the guidelines of community policing according to their commander's view on the model. Where the commander followed through on the implementation of proximity police and carried out a friendly conduct with the residents, the officers tended to follow the community

⁶¹ A good person, expression used to denominate people that are not involved with crime, dignified workers, people of good conduct.

⁶² As seen in Cardoso (2010), in interviews carried out with *favela* residents, they claimed they wanted to be treated with the same respect, sympathy and care that was given to the upper classes and people who lived in the formal city (Cardoso, 2010, p.200).

⁶³ Military Police of Rio de Janeiro

policing principles (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 45). However, the quick expansion of the program and the lack of resources dedicated to training and formation contributed to the implementation of units in which the commander did not abide by such principles.

Consequently, there was an increase in the number of complaints of bad conduct, lack of interest for the community's issues, lack of support, disrespect and abuse of power (Riccio et al., 2013, p. 312)

After a few years the *favela* residents started protesting against the project, stating that police violence was still a reality (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 287-289). Moreover, allegations of corruption and the increased police brutality, increased number of missing people, and the continued presence of traffickers in the *favelas*, led to the discontinuation of the project. The complaints were so abundant that GPAE reached an officer-transfer rate of seventy percent from the original battalion introduced to the first complex (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 43; Tierney, 2012, pp. 37-38)

Since the program did not seek to directly repress the gangs they started slowly regaining power over the *favelas*. With threats made against residents or confrontations and attacks on GPAE stations, the gang leaders started to reclaim their space, triggering a repressive and violent response from the police forces (Cardoso, 2010, p. 301; Serrano-Berthet et al 2013, p. 43). Without further social support and no changes in the way police officers conducted their job, the GPAE started to slowly show signs of failure and dismantle. The lack of social policies to develop the areas that received the program, made it impossible to truly implement preventive measures (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014, p. 251).

4.4 Analysis

The historical formation of the police forces in Brazil produced a force that historically aimed at controlling and containing the lower classes (Salem, 2016b, p. 29). Often using violence to carry out their duties, it is also important to notice the difference in

conduct between social classes. The upper class has always encountered a police force that was friendly, resourceful and helpful, which is in stark contrast from the treatment given to *favela* residents. The perception by the *favela* residents that they were treated as a second-class type citizen by the police was a leading cause for the continuing tension between them, one of the strongest signs of structural violence (Cardoso, 2010, p. 36; Salem, 2016b, p. 45). Moreover, what is possible to learn from the implementation of the GPAE was the need for recognition that the *favela* residents still have in being acknowledged as fellow citizens and not criminals (Albernaz et al., 2007; Barros, F. R., 2015; Cardoso, 2016).

Analyzing the society of the twentieth century, the social hierarchy was comprised of oligarchs, government officials, simple workers and former slaves (Salem, 2016b, p. 39; Silva, L. A., 2010, p. 287). These recently freed slaves were also a constant target of the elite's scrutiny and police officers' commands. This negative perception of non-whites became linked to their way of living and allowed for a standardized prejudice against the lower classes, mainly composed by non-whites at that time (Conniff & McCann, 1989, p. 194). Likewise, the elite's negative image of the *cortiços* was transferred to the *favelas*, creating space for police brutality in these areas which was justified through the rhetoric of "the need to control the dangerous classes" (Cardoso, 2010, p. 18; Silva, L. A., 2010, p. 287). During the dictatorship, the fear of a communist threat created by the social demands of the lower classes, allowed for extremely violent measures in these areas of the city. The *favelas* became the hub for all things negative, with organized groups fighting for civil and political rights being seen as an enemy of the State and their social claims being framed as subversive (Conniff & McCann, 1989; Fausto, 2014; Misse, 2010; Silveira, 2014; Valladares, 2000).

This negative perception towards social claims are, through a structural violence lens, the proof of the normalization of a social divide that maintains the status quo. The fact that violence is used in the containment of these social claims characterizes the externalization of

the tensions between upper and lower classes (Silva, L. A., 2010, pp. 287-300). Through the imposition of repressive measures, the military government materialized physical harm towards the lower classes, in an attempt to keep them in their lower status in society. At the same time, this materialization of violence can also be analyzed as a measure believed to be in the defense of the government and society once the stigmatization of the lower classes becomes normalized by culture (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 35; Salem, 2016b, p. 64). The history of prejudice, racism and exclusion of those considered unfit for social life justify the use of force against the lower classes once they normalize social patterns of exclusion and marginalization (Barros, F. R., 2015; Cardoso, 2010; Larkins, 2015; Magaloni et al., 2015; Morabito, 2010).

The paternalistic politics of the country contributed to the development of a society that sees the State as an all-encompassing entity which is responsible for its citizens (Santana et al., 2016, p. 68). The police forces, being State agents themselves, were then perceived as the ones responsible for all the needed social changes in the *favela* areas (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 72). Consequently, their social needs in areas such as education, healthcare, sanitation, job placement and so on, became the responsibility of the officers of the GPAE (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 72; Riccio et al., 2013, p. 312; Tierney, 2012, p. 47). The program was ultimately seen as the salvation of the *favelas* and too many responsibilities were transferred to the police. They became in charge of providing first aid, organizing leisure activities for the community, helping with tutoring and so on. This accumulation of tasks and duties, contributed to not only provoking frustration in the forces, but also strengthened the prejudice they faced before their fellow officers (Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Morabito, 2010; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014).

The presence of the police hindered drug trafficking and other criminal activities, but the lack of support from the force as a group did not sustain these results. The extra layer of

social activities developed by GPAE officers contributed to an opposition towards the program by the rest of the police. Moreover, the friendly and open approach proposed by the program was seen as weakening the forces (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 45).⁶⁴ Militarized, the police forces saw themselves as soldiers fighting against crime, which went against the proposal of the GPAE that sought to approach citizens from a human rights perspective. Nonetheless, the stress and fear through which police officers undergo, must be acknowledged to understand their defensive position towards the change of paradigm (Souza, L. A., 2015; Souza et al., 2012; Rocha, A. P., 2013; Melo Goes Jr, 2015; Silveira, 2014).

Although community policing seemed like a fitting approach to the situation in Rio, the resistance within the police forces was too strong in order to fully implement the directives of the model (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 74). The militarization of the police is normalized not only by the structural violence presented by racism and classism but also by the stress they undergo in *favela* missions (Salem, 2016b, pp. 38-40). The history of tensions between the police and *favela* residents, and the role of the police in containing those peoples adds a new layer to the already conflictual relationship. The criminalization of the *favelas* is another normalizing element that justifies not only racism and classism, but also obscures those prejudices. The criminalization of poverty is then used to negate the elements of structural violence, using an invented stereotype of criminal to normalize prejudices. Brazilian society negates their prejudice through the discourse of defense against the criminal-type which matches the physical appearance of the lower classes (Cardoso, 2016, pp. 80-85).

In its initial stage, the GPAE presented an improvement in the life conditions of *favela* residents, yet, the lack of a deep reform within the police institution led to the

⁶⁴ GPAE was even known as Gmãe (Gmom), because of its heavy weight of social tasks and its friendly approach (Tierney, 2012, p. 33).

program's failure. The constant change in interaction between police officers and residents gave continuity to the lack of trust between residents and police forces. Moreover, the expectation from residents towards the GPAE officers to solve all of their problems led to a lack of collaborative work between them, creating a force that was each time further from their primary purpose and more engaged in social welfare (Albernaz et al., 2007; Morabito, 2010; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016).

Moreover, the officers' low salaries and their constant presence in these areas opened a space for police corruption. The practice was already very common within the force and was one that had been fought against since Colonel Cerqueira's studies on how to modify the culture of repressive policing. By corrupting themselves the police gave control of the *favelas* to organized crime (Barros, F. R., 2015). Moreover, once this corruption also involved extortion from *favela* residents to uphold their safety, the lack of trust and tensions between them and the police grew. Corruption in this case, not only symbolized exploitation but also a dismissal of the *favelas*. Likewise, it contributed to the development of the *favela versus asfalto* dichotomy, which reflects the social abyss developed during the twentieth century (Souza, L. A., 2015; Silveira, 2014; Misse, 2010; Melo Goes Jr, 2015; Rocha, A. P., 2013).

What is also important to notice, is the criminalized image that these officers had towards the *favela* residents. As seen in Cardoso (2016), the initial positive reaction to the GPAE derived from the residents' perception of a gained respect and a recognition for their moral value. With the decrease in conflict and shootings between criminals and police, the residents felt safer. Moreover, they felt that they were receiving the same treatment as upper classes, where police operations were carried out with due diligence and caution in having any casualties (p. 81). However, the rapid expansion of the program aligned with the constant changing of command, created confusion and disorganisation given the program was still

very hierarchically organized and each commander had a different approach to the proposal of GPAE (Albernaz et al., 2007, p. 45).

One thing that we must pay attention to is the differentiation made even by *favela* residents between criminals and *pessoas de bem* (good people). Although stigmatized, these residents also approved and supported repressive actions from the police as long as they were targeting criminals (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 182-184). This shows us how widespread the image of a war against crime is in Brazilian society, as well as the need for repressive measures. Even amongst those who suffer the most with police brutality and prejudice, there was support for such measures to apprehend and punish the outlaws. This perception contributed to the maintenance of police deviations and strengthens the justifications for violations of human rights (Cardoso, 2016; Cardoso, 2010; Larkins, 2015; Misse, 2010).

Additionally, the continued presence of criminals in the *favelas*, and their intimidation of the residents contributed to the lack of support and collaboration between the residents and the police. Afraid that the criminal groups would rule again and constantly threatened by the gangs, residents also suffered with anxiety and fear of being perceived as an *x-9*, paying the price when police would no longer be there (Cardoso, 2016; Larkins, 2015; Misse, 2010; Lessing, 2018; Berkman von der Wehl, 2016).

The failure of the GPAE initiative was accompanied by an increase of violence and homicide rates. The program received several complaints by *favela* residents regarding the conduct of policemen, on top of threats suffered by them from the criminal gangs (Cardoso, 2010, pp. 311-313). Additionally, police corruption was widespread in the military police forces, which facilitated the comeback of criminal gangs to the *favelas*. On that note, militias were also growing, and they became each time more rigid and violent with the *favela* residents. Much like the criminal gangs, the militias also established strict regulations and

used violence to maintain their power (Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Griffin, 2015; Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014).

It is in this context that Sergio Cabral Filho was elected in 2006, taking office with the promise to establish public order and win the war against crime (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 30). As the GPAE started to show signs of failure and the criminal gangs started to demonstrate their presence in the *favelas*, the need to regain State control over these areas was once again part of the government discourse. Criminal leaders were orchestrating attacks on police stations, inflating the discourse of a city of war and supporting the combative rhetoric of war against crime. Shortly after Cabral took office, he signed an agreement with the Federal government to have the army intervention (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 31).

After almost seven years the program failed due to multiple reasons, including its inability to combat police corruption, create a trusting relationship with the *favela* residents and effectively repress crime. Without any successful preventive measures, gangs continued to recruit within the *favelas*. Without an effective repression of their activities and the fear of the *favelas* residents, gang members still had economic power over these areas and their residents. (Cardoso, 2010; Cardoso, 2016; Fernandes, 2013; Lessing, 2018; Ribeiro, L., 2014).

5. The Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP)

5.1 Background

In 2007, Rio hosted the Pan-American games. Just like with the UN Conference Rio-92 the games demanded changes in the policing scheme to guarantee the international guests' safety. Following the Pan-American's success, Rio and Brazil put themselves on the map for hosts of the World Cup (2014) and the Olympic Games (2016). As seen in Vargas (2013), Brazil has a history of police brutality and racism that excludes and marginalizes the non-whites. Thus, when the time for these games came, the government presented a pre-game mega police operation in the *favelas* of Rio that sought to show the world that the State had control over all areas of the city (p. 276).

Sergio Cabral took action with strategic incursions of the *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (BOPE) and the military in the *favelas*. The incursions into the *favelas* as well as extensive operations around these areas had the objective of ending the control of criminal gangs. The main objective with this course of action was to present a peaceful city in the coming events (Barros, F. R., 2015; Moraes, Mariano & de Souza Franco, 2015; Vargas, 2013). With a war-like rhetoric from the governor, the *favelas* received a massive operation by the Brazilian military forces. Deploying military police troops (1,350 policemen) alongside BOPE and the National Armed Forces to arrest criminal groups and suppress the work of the militia (Barros, F. R., 2015, p.75).

The year of 2007 was then marked by the opposition of two initiatives to promote peace in Rio: the *Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania*⁶⁵- *Pronasci*, and the continuation of violent temporary and defined incursions in the *favelas*. The *Pronasci* constituted an opposition in relation to the repressive policing model focused on preventative measures to improve the relationship between the police and the *favelas*. It aimed to create a

⁶⁵ National Program of Public Security and Citizenship

public security policy that was country wide. Moreover, given Brazil's political division of public services, it proposed a multilevel dialogue and a deeper interaction between government departments. Considering the extremely poor infrastructure found in the *favelas*, there was need for a combined effort to integrate their residents into the formal city.

Nonetheless, the violent incursions in the *favelas* gave continuity not only to the militarized culture of the police forces but also to the overall violence that plagued Rio. The first raids were made in the *favela* complex of *Alemão*, which in turn led the gangs to migrate to other *favelas*, located in the south zone of the city (Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014, p. 8; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 33). This alarmed the upper classes, who were too close to the cross fire between gangs. Moving to *Santa Marta* and *Pavão-Pavãozinho*, these gangs started representing a risk to the upper classes due to the fights between gangs over territory (Barros, F. R., 2015; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Larkins, 2015; Rocha, A. P., 2013; Silva, M. N., 2010). The situation became a problem for the population as a whole; not only was there a need to decrease the violence levels in Rio but also to guarantee the safety of international visitors. The migration of gangs made the government realise that repressing them in one *favela* would not solve the problem. Moreover, the tactic of repression and war could not be carried out throughout the city of Rio. The number of casualties and the rise in homicide rates called the attention of international organizations and human rights defenders, alarming the organizers of the World Cup and the Olympic Games (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 67; Magaloni et al., 2015, p. 11). Organizations such as FIFA and the International Olympic Committee were attentive to the developments in Rio. At the same time organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were critics of the situation (Werling, 2014, p. 20; Salem, 2016a, p. 40). It is in this moment that the UPP was born (Brum, 2013; Cardoso, 2016; Moraes et al., 2015; Ribeiro, L., 2014; Berkmann von der Wehl, 2016).

5.2 What is the UPP?

Introduced by the then Secretary of Public Security, José Mariano Beltrame, the UPP was a strategy that sought to change the police approach and culture at the time. Moreover, it consisted of a strategy that sought to eradicate the power criminal groups held over the *favelas* (Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014; Oosterbaan & Van Wijk, 2014). Beltrame wanted to create a tactic that would allow for the continued decrease of violence rates in Rio while developing a long-term solution (Moraes et al., 2015, pp. 506-508). Introduced in *Santa Marta* in 2008, the project was an attempt to steer the criminal gangs away from the area (Moraes et al., 2015; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014; Serrano-Berthet et al., 2013).

The main goals of the UPP were to decrease drug trafficking and the number of armed individuals circulating in the *favelas*, as well as to contain the violent conflict that took place in these regions (Cano et al., 2012; Cardoso, 2016; Moraes et al., 2015; Salem, 2016). Aware of the previous attempts to bring peace to Rio, Beltrame focused in changing the image of the police by ensuring the police forces were on board and regaining State control over the *favelas* (Moraes et al., 2015, pp. 511-512).

5.2.1 Implementation.

The UPP was implemented alongside its guidelines and objectives. As seen in Beltrame's interview, the police forces saw an opportunity to introduce a constant police presence in *Morro Santa Marta* and they took the opportunity without any structured plan:

So began the UPP: the militia headed by Nick kidnapped a reporter there in Morro Santa Marta. We arrested Nick, the *favela* had no leader. Let's go there. The staff asked, "In what way?" I just said, "Let's go. Let's not waste time. " And our project here was coming out. Our plan was still coming out. We were still thinking how to put it on paper, but we saw that it was time to occupy Morro Santa Marta, it was the

moment, we could not miss that opportunity. Then we went in and took the Bangu Battalion. The Battalion stayed for about 30 days. We started working there without structure (Moraes et al., 2015, p. 508).

Based on a series of discussions, experiences and modifications the program took five years for its formal document to be finalized, coming to place only in 2013. Thus, without a clear mandate the first UPP units developed their own relationship with the *comunidade* the unit was inserted in. The police officers of each unit would serve the principles they believed to be right, making the UPP's initial results hard to measure. Without clear and formal objectives defined prior to the implementation of the UPPs, it is hard to analyse the effects, successes or failures of the program (Barros, F. R., 2015; Dias & Zacchi, 2012; Moraes et al., 2015; Vargas, 2013).

Morro Santa Marta was chosen as the first one to receive the UPP for two main reasons: (i) after studies were conducted, *Santa Marta* was found to be free from the ruling of criminal groups and (ii) the *favela* was big enough to try out Beltrame's plan, but not big enough to risk a major failure (Moraes et al., 2015, pp. 507-509). At first *Santa Marta* received what was called the *Companhia de Policiamento Comunitário do Santa Marta*⁶⁶ which was later designated *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora*. As seen in Beltrame's speeches, this first attempt was nothing more than a test, being implemented without training in community policing or a defined directive (Moraes et al., 2015, pp. 509-511). The main goal was to establish the permanent police presence before the criminal groups returned (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Moraes et al., 2015; Silva, M. N., 2010).

In 2009 a pilot project was being structured and it predicted four phases for the creation of new UPPs. (i) Intervention phase: This phase aimed at expelling criminals and drug lords regaining state control over these areas; (ii) Stabilization phase: Delimitation of

⁶⁶ Community Policing Company of Santa Marta

the area now controlled by the State. This was a period to start building trust between police officers and the population. It was a phase to enforce the police presence and maintain the decrease in drug dealing, guns and the presence of the criminal gangs; (iii) Implementation phase: Implementation of the UPP with the establishment of UPP battalions and stations. This phase is marked by a paradigm shift due to the introduction of community policing; (iv) Evaluation phase: Evaluation and monitoring of UPP activities and its impact on the *favela* residents' life (Barros, F. R., 2015, p.77; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, pp.35-36; Maciel, 2015, p.17; Salem, 2016a, pp.43-44).

The innovation and difference that the UPP brought in relation to the former pacification attempts was that it had the support not only from the Federal government but also from private corporations. Counting on financial aid from *Pronasci* and the EBX group⁶⁷, owned by Eike Batista, the program represented a bridge between many sectors of society (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 36). Linking civil society groups like *Viva Rio*, with entrepreneurship organizations such as *Sebrae*⁶⁸ and *Firjan*⁶⁹, the UPPs represented a blend of experience and opinions. Moreover, it represented a combined support between the government, the industry and civil society (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 36; Moraes et al., 2015, pp. 501-503).

⁶⁷ EBX group is a Brazilian conglomerate owned and chaired by businessman Eike Batista. Composed by five companies the conglomerate focuses on mining and energy production. In 2013 one of the companies of the group suffered a major fall in stocks due to its inability to deliver the promised petrol exploitation from the *Bacia de Campos*, the main area of exploitation of Brazilian oil company- Petrobras. In 2017, Eike was arrested accused of corruption and money laundry in an investigation that includes the former governor of Rio, Sergio Cabral, accused of corruption and involvement with the organized crime.

<http://www.latimes.com/world/brazil/la-fg-brazil-governor-20170613-story.html>

⁶⁸ Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service (Sebrae) is a private entity that promotes the competitiveness and sustainable development of micro and small enterprises. Sebrae is an agent for training and promoting development.

http://www.sebrae.com.br/sites/PortalSebrae/canaais_adicionais/sebrae_english

⁶⁹ Formed by five organizations, FIRJAN, CIRJ, SESI, SENAI and IEL, the FIRJAN System promotes business competitiveness, education and quality of life for workers and society as a whole.

<http://www.firjan.com.br/english/who-we-are/default.htm>

The UPP counted on a first repressive approach in an effort to achieve long-term containment of criminal activity in the *favelas*, which was followed by the implementation of permanent police presence through the (UPP) project (Cano et al., 2012; Dias & Zacchi, 2012; Moraes et al., 2015; Silva, L. S., 2016). With initial positive results and the increased feeling of security within the *favelas* and throughout the city of Rio de Janeiro, Cabral was re-elected in 2010 and the UPP program started expanding to other *favelas* (Gomes & de Oliveira Burlamaqui, 2016; Maciel, 2015). As the UPP gained shape, the officers were trained in human rights and sociology (Vargas, 2013, p. 284). The community approach included more police officers in the *favelas* and only new recruits were selected to be part of these battalions (Lessing, 2018; Loader, 2016; Musumeci, 2017; Werling, 2014).

5.3 The successes

The UPPs brought a decrease in homicide, robberies and armed violence rates, delivering great results in the first years. The number of violent deaths decreased from 53.8 per one hundred thousand inhabitants in 2007, to 21.3 per one hundred thousand in 2015 within the city of Rio de Janeiro (Instituto de Segurança Pública, 2016b, p. 7). According to the report on indexes of the UPPs between 2007 and 2015, the results showed a decrease of violent deaths by sixty percent in UPP areas (Instituto de Segurança Pública, 2016a, p. 3).

The initial overall social perception of the UPPs was very positive. *Favela* residents with UPP in place felt safer, and the ones from neighbourhoods awaiting the new program were very positive about having it implemented (Vargas, 2013, p. 285). The pacification brought an end to the hostility and gunfire between criminal groups and between those groups and the police (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Musumeci, 2017; Vargas, 2013). Announcing the arrival of social services and the end of the criminal gangs' rule over the *favelas*, the media contributed to the widespread positive perception of UPPs through Rio's society. Praising the initiative and its instant results, the

media supported the project as well as the repressive measures taken by the police forces. With the discourse of regaining State control over the *favelas* the media played an important part in justifying police brutality through the war against crime rhetoric (Barros, F. R., 2015; Ribeiro, L., 2014; Santana et al., 2016).

The decrease in drug trafficking and armed individuals in the *favelas* also contributed to the development of positive perception from *favela* residents. Moreover, the end of violent police incursions and the initial excitement with the arrival of new services created a positive reception of the UPP by the *favela* residents. The area no longer had sudden armed conflicts breaking out and the open threat of criminal groups' arbitrary command had ceased, developing a positive analysis of the UPPs (Barros, F. R., 2015; Dias & Zacchi, 2012; Musumeci, 2017; Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014).

However, since 2014 the areas previously considered pacified have been presenting increasing number of homicide and violent deaths. According to the report on UPP areas⁷⁰ from the *Instituto de Segurança Pública-ISP*⁷¹, there was a constant decrease in all indexes from 2007 through 2013, with 2013 having the lowest rates. In 2014 and 2015 it is possible to observe a constant rise, presenting rates still lower than the ones from 2007, but increasing nonetheless (Instituto de Segurança Pública, 2016b, p. 5).

5.4 The challenges

The State absence within the *favelas* environment allowed for the development of an area of the city that was not familiar with many laws, regulations and social behaviours that were common to the rest of society. Under the rule of the criminal gangs, the laws they followed were the ones imposed by those gangs. Thus, when the UPPs were installed in the *favelas* the regulations brought by these police officers were seen as imposition of values

⁷⁰ Rio de Janeiro Report: Balance of Indicators of the Pacification Policy (2007-2015)

⁷¹ Public Security Institute

(Cano et al., 2012, p. 151). By introducing values and regulations on the recently pacified *favelas*, the police forces created a top-down imposition of values. Regulations on noise, safety and working hours of public spaces were introduced but not so easily accepted. Accustomed to the law of the gangs, funk dances used to go until the morning with no restrictions on the volume of the music (Cano et al., 2012, pp. 151-152). Youth did not agree or liked the new regulations on noise and public disturbance, but the older people supported and saw those new rules as positive, once they no longer had to put up with the all-night dances. Moreover, no safety inspections or regulations were followed by the places where those dances took place, but with the implementation of the UPPs that changed (Cano et al., 2012, p. 154). The access to parks and other public spaces was constrained to business hours as it is common in the formal city (Correa et al., 2016, p. 108). New to the *favelas* and its residents, these regulations were seen by the elders as something needed and positive. Nonetheless, the youth saw them as an imposition of values and prejudice against their culture (Barros, F. R., 2015, p. 84). Differently from what was planned in the implementation of community policing, the top down imposition of values was seen as a “civilizing” approach, very close to ones seen at the beginning of the twentieth century (Santana et al., 2016, p. 69).

Surveys taken in 2009 and 2010 from *favela* residents that received UPP showed a seventy percent rate of fear for the return of the criminal gangs to the *favelas*⁷². The surveys also showed a spread-out impression of increased crime and fear amongst the residents from the gangs and their threats (Cardoso, 2016, pp. 83-84). The fear of the gangs contributed to the low rate of interaction developed between residents and policemen (Bianchi, 2017;

⁷² With the constant presence of the police in *favelas* that received pacification programs, the gangs although sometimes still present in the area and still powerful, were inhibited in their activities and mandate. Moreover, some *favelas* witnessed the withdrawal of gangs with the arrival of the community policing programs.

Werling, 2014, p.7).

The constant threats *favela* residents endured from criminal groups contributed to the lack of collaboration from the residents with UPP officers, for fear of retaliation (Cardoso, 2016, p. 84; Correa et al., 2016, p. 109). Additionally, the stereotype linked to *favela* residents also impeded the development of a better relationship between the police and residents. The criminalization of *favela* residents by UPP officers, as well as their conception of the residents as unpolite and uncivil, prevented them from interacting (Salem, 2016a, p. 71). This lack of dialogue led to the failure of one of the pillars of community policing model, which foresees combined decision making and preventive measures. The failure in establishing conflict resolution tools and a dialogue with local leaders deemed the UPP unable to establish a *de facto* community policing model (Barros, F. R., 2015; Cano et al., 2012; Dias & Zacchi, 2012; Santana et al., 2016).

Another of the main challenges faced by the UPP was the lack of commitment and support from policemen themselves. The friendly approach proposed by the program strengthened the already existent negative image that police officers had of the UPP. The fact that they had to interact with the residents and prevent crime instead of combatting it contributed to the officer's perception of the UPP as a weak type of policing (Salem, 2016a, pp. 69-72; Vargas, 2013, p. 297). In surveys, seventy percent of policemen answered that they preferred to be allocated in battalions that were not part of the UPP strategy (Werling, 2014, p. 7; Maciel, 2015, p. 23). Overall UPP officers felt more like mediators, attending mainly domestic disputes and petty crimes instead of police officers. Their militarized view of the police role and image as a combative force strengthened their feeling of being second-class type of officer (Vargas, 2013, p. 297; Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 293).

Although police officers received a two-week training on community policing, the overall methodology continued to be a militarized one. Thus, the introduction to community

policing and human rights as a means to change the combative culture of police forces was considered as a failed attempt (Salem, 2016a, p. 45). The militarized culture of the police forces in Brazil and specially Rio led to a growing dissatisfaction of these officers and their work at the UPP. As seen in Tierney (2012), the militarized training police received from the academy, built an inclination towards violence. Moreover, it contributed to the maintenance police brutality in *favela* areas. As quoted from her interview with Colonel Robson Rodrigues on June 29th, 2011, “the military police are trained not to recognize the humanity of the residents” (p. 61). Consequently, the change brought by the UPP and its training was not welcomed or embraced by the police officers.

Additionally, the fact that UPP officers had different uniforms and non-lethal arms presented itself as an impediment for their satisfaction with their new role. Their mandate inside the *favelas* as a preventive and friendly force went against everything they embraced as what it meant to be a police officer (Barros, F. R., 2015, pp. 121-122; Salem, 2016a, pp. 65-66). The poor infrastructure of the UPP stations, built in containers without bathrooms, led officers from the UPP units to rate the project negatively. Interviews with these officers show that they felt like they were being watched while not respected or appreciated, their efforts were not recognized, and they were constantly being judged and analyzed by the *favela* residents, whom did not trust them. On the spotlight for the *favela* residents and being mocked by their fellow officers from different divisions, UPP officers had an overall feeling of depreciation and humiliation (Vargas, 2013, pp. 286-287).

The negative image of the police from both *favela* and non-*favela* residents also contributed to the failure of the UPPs. Seen by society at large as unprepared, corrupt and badly trained, police officers in the *favelas* were seen as incompetent and imposing (Salem, 2016a, p. 72; Correa et al., 2016, p. 111). UPP officers continued with arbitrary stop and search operations, which prolonged the tension between the police and *favela* residents.

These operations exacerbated the feelings of disrespect and restraint already existent within *favela* residents due to other measures such as the imposition of regulations and curfew (Correa et al., 2016; Frühling, 2012; Rocha, A. P., 2013).

5.5 The fall outs

The imposition of acceptable social values and behaviours led to the introduction of disciplinary roles to be carried out by UPP stations (Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014, p. 188). This disciplinary role aggravated tensions between police and residents. The prohibition of *baiões funk* (funk parties) and selected funk music (the *proibidão*)⁷³ were seen by *favela* youth as oppressive and biased (Correa et al., 2016, pp. 108-109; Silva L. S., 2016, p.399-340). Nonetheless, these prohibitions were perceived as a necessary measure by the upper classes and police officers because the songs were apologetic to guns, traffickers and crimes. This opposition and lack of dialogue between social classes contributed to furthering the already existent dichotomy between *asfalto* and *morro* (Salem, 2016a, pp. 19-20; Ribeiro, L., 2014, p. 274-277). Moreover, the link between this imposition of values and its asserting value as the mark of State control over the *favelas* continued to increase tensions between *favela* residents and the police.

The UPPs were implemented in *favelas* located in high-class neighbourhoods and close to locations where upcoming sports events would take place, supporting the idea that the pacification was aimed at benefitting the upper classes. Focusing on these areas of Rio reinforced the discussion proposed by many authors on the matter, that the pacification was a modern version of the containment of the lower classes (Barros, F. R., 2015; Brum, 2013; Vargas, 2013; Berkmann von der Wehl, 2016). As seen in Brum (2013), history repeats itself in the management of poverty for the promotion of *Grandes eventos* (Big events; pp. 193-

⁷³ *Funk proibidão*: forbidden funk songs that made apology to criminal groups, firearms and defended the killing of police officers

195).

Another fall out was the lack of funding and focus on the UPP Social, which led the program to fail in tending to the structural changes needed to fulfill the program's objectives. If the UPP Social had been thoroughly established, it would have promoted social and economic development, tackling the elements of marginalization and exclusion of *favela* residents (Salem, 2016a, p. 77). By giving *favela* residents social support that empowered them, the process of inclusion would have happened automatically and smoothly.

However, the failure in introducing the UPP Social led to the *favela* residents' believing that the State did not make enough investments in the poorest regions of the city (Dias & Zacchi, 2012, pp. 203-204). The decrease in violence and criminal activity in the *favelas* could only last if the areas were developed, giving its residents a better chance at breaking the historical social exclusion. The stigmatization of the *favelas* is linked to their lack of education, access to sanitation systems and healthcare (Salem, 2016a, pp. 81-82; Correa et al., 2016, p. 102; Cardoso, 2016, p. 77). Thus, this lack of investment in the UPP stations only exacerbated the feeling of worthless that *favela* residents already had towards the State (Dias & Zacchi, 2012; Maciel, 2015; Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014; Vargas, 2013).

By empowering the *favelas* the main goal of developing preventive measures to tackle criminality and violence would have been achieved. Consequently, criminal gangs would have less power and opportunities to recruit in the *favelas* (Dias & Zacchi, 2012; Lessing, 2018; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014).

The poor training of the officers serving these battalions contributed to their conduct concerning the UPP. Misconduct of a police officer was usually punished by sending those who committed deviations to the training center as instructors (Moraes et al., 2015, p. 512). Consequently, the new recruits were trained by bad cops, corrupt, members of militia and so on (Cardoso, 2016; Costa, 2004; Griffin, 2015; Moraes et al., 2015; Werling, 2014). Also,

even though the UPP areas presented a decrease in homicide and criminal rates, as well as police lethality, the numbers of missing persons increased (Correa et al., 2016, p. 107; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016, p. 37; Musumeci, 2017, p. 17). Additionally, there was an increase in bodily injuries and police violence (Vargas, 2013; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016).

5.6 Today's reality

The UPP project came to be seen as another failure, due to the inefficiency of implementing the project to its fullest, and the imposition of values on *favela* residents. Envisioned as a community policing model, they failed to introduce proximity police, to develop infrastructure and to provide social services such as education and healthcare (Barros, F. R., 2015; Cano et al., 2012; Moraes et al., 2015). Having not completed their goal, violence spiked and the National Armed Forces were reintroduced in the *favelas* to guarantee the security of the city (Martins, 2017; Strobl, 2017; Watson, 2017; Lopes M. , 2018). Failure in applying a real community policing model, also gave continuity to the criminalization of *favelas* and its subsequent seclusion, justifying the militarized actions of police forces (Barros, F. R., 2015; Maciel, 2015; Musumeci, 2017; Werling, 2014).

5.8 Analysis

The UPP project seemed like a step towards promoting the end of the historical social divide and exclusion of the *favelas*. It was meant to represent a change in the police culture and conduct, presenting a police force that does not differentiate between classes and sees *favela* residents as citizens instead of a problem to be solved.

Although the project has not been cancelled, the armed forces are now present in Rio and sporadic raids are being carried out by the army, leading the project to be deemed as a failure (Musumeci, 2017; Gardiner, 2018). When thinking about the proposals and directives

to be followed by the UPP, and the actual actions taken, it is possible to notice that the full community policing was never implemented (Salem, 2016a).

Funk dances and songs were prohibited, defining the project as an imposition of social values and a continuation of the “civilizing” process that the State always implemented over the lower classes, rather than community policing. The State’s prohibition can be linked to the ban on *samba*, *capoeira* and the imposition of sanitary measures from the early 1900s (Brum, 2013; Valladares, 2000; Alves & Evanson, 2011). The continuous prohibition on cultural expressions of the lower classes indicates the perpetuation of top-down approaches linked to the criminalization of *favelas*, as both a consequence and a contributor to the *morro x asfalto* tension. Additionally, the imposition of State regulations gives continuity to the mistrust of *favela* residents towards the State and its agents. This imposition of values and rules jeopardized the development of dialogue and cooperation between police and *favela* residents, which challenged the main principle of community policing. The long history of impositions and marginalization requires an approach that is less invasive and challenging to the culture of the *favelas* (Correa et al., 2016; Salem, 2016b; Silva, L. S., 2016).

When we consider theories of urban security and policing, community policing seems to be a great option for cities like Rio de Janeiro. They bring closeness and a new level of respect between State authorities and citizens by working with and for them, instead of against them (Cano et al., 2012; Cardoso, 2016). This, however, is not what is observed with the UPP. The imposition of values and regulations contributed to furthering the tensions and mistrust between police officers and *favela* residents (Correa et al., 2016; Magaloni et al., 2015; Silva, L. S., 2016). The poor training and militarized culture of the police forces led to the ongoing police bias and prejudice (Barros, F. R., 2015; Griffin, 2015; Silveira, 2014). The continuation of stop and search operations created a feeling of unworthiness and criminalization in the residents, increasing the existing tensions (Correa et al., 2016;

Musumeci, 2017). Additionally, the lack of dialogue and openness towards the *favela* culture impeded the development of joint decision making proposed by the UPP project (Werling, 2014; Berkman von der Wehl, 2016)

Furthermore, the UPP was implemented without a clear objective, directive or methodology. Without a clear path to follow, it became very difficult to define when and how developmental strategies would take place. The bigger focus of expanding the program to other *favelas* side tracked the necessities, attempting to keep the results alive. With the constant presence of police officers in the *favelas* the sudden breakouts of violence and shootings between rival gangs and the gangs and the police stopped. Moreover, the open display of fire guns and violent acts by gang members was also contained. With this increased peace and safety, the program became stagnant and not many efforts or initiatives were carried out to supply the social needs of the *favelas*. Ending the violence and containing criminal activity in the *favelas* are not enough when residents have a deep need for education, healthcare and other social services. This failure in providing social development reflects on the UPP by not implementing preventive measures sought by community policing. Moreover, the lack of development and support contributes to the continuation of the social abyss between upper and lower classes. Without a better future to look for, youth got involved with drug trafficking and other illegal activities (Werling, 2014, p. 4). Likewise, the social stigmatization suffered by them leads to the maintenance of *favela* youth in this social and economic ostracism. Given the history of racism and prejudice, added to the lack of education and instruction, *favela* youth continue to have few opportunities for improving their life style (Barros, F. R., 2015; Correa et al., 2016; Ferreira, 2009; Vargas, 2013).

As previously mentioned, the UPPs presented a significant decrease in homicide rates, however, there was an increase in non-lethal crimes and disappearances. This increase can demonstrate the inefficiency of UPP officers in tackling smaller crimes in the *favelas* and

controlling these criminals (Barros, F. R., 2015; Gay, 2014; Werling, 2014). It also shows that although UPP seemed to have tackled the work of militia and police brutality, it may have only masked it. The decrease in homicide rates at the same time that non-lethal crimes and disappearances increased led to the continuation of a mistrust and awareness towards these officers (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Musumeci, 2017; Santana et al., 2016).

While criminal groups were the only authorities present in the *favelas* they did not allow crimes inside the *favelas* to go unpunished and in one way or another they protected the residents from police brutality. Nonetheless, their vicious actions and unstable conduct kept residents afraid and tense. Although armed conflicts no longer erupted in the *favelas*, the residents still suffered with threats from the gang members and the militias actions. Thus, the UPP could then be seen as a change in management but not in paradigm (Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014, p. 3; Werling, 2014, p.23).

The continuous imposition of public policies, without respecting the *favela* residents' opinion has repeated itself throughout history. First with the imposition of sanitation measures, followed by the creation of proletarian parks, the State always imposed a new order over the areas (Valladares, 2000, p. 19). The lack of consultation and the use of force disguised in the maintenance of order rhetoric contributes to the continuous distrust and tension between *favela* residents and the State (Barros, F. R., 2015; Cardoso, 2010). Today's brutality is justified through the need to fight criminality almost in the same way it was used during the dictatorship. During the military government the justification was through the creation of the internal enemy in the image of local leaders targeting them as reactionaries. Today, the devise is made through the opposition between criminals and *pessoas de bem* (Brum, 2013; Cano et al., 2012; Gay, 2014; Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014).

5.9 Today's complexity

The historical formation of the *favelas*, the racism and prejudice against *favela* residents, all contribute to the situation found in Rio today. As seen in the present thesis, former slaves and non-whites were perceived as non-educated, uncivilized and more prone to criminal activity by the elites in Brazil. The same prejudice which existed towards the *cortiços* at the beginning of the century was transferred to the *favelas* when the relocation policy took place. Additionally, the lack of state interest for the lower classes and its corrupt and patriarchal mechanisms, led the politicians to attend solely the demands and interests of the upper classes. Moreover, the spike in drug trafficking and violence in the *favelas* from the 1980s-1990s, with the division of CV and the consolidation of Rio as the main drug route to Europe, magnified the criminalization of these areas (Brum, 2013; Costa, 2004). As those ideas spread throughout society and CV began to expand its power, the relocation, destruction and repression of the *favelas* was once again the topic of newspapers, requesting action from the government, quoting Carlos Lacerda⁷⁴ as the last mayor of Rio to really work on fixing the issue the *favelas* represented (Brum, 2013, p. 193).

Corruption, a poor health system, a poor educational system and the lack of opportunities for the lower classes form the complexity of today's reality. In order to have a real change in Rio de Janeiro and decrease the violence there needs to be a combined reform of several sectors.

- Corruption must be fought at all levels, within the political, police and prison systems. There need to be a strong combat on corruption in order to decrease the power of the criminal gangs. Moreover, having the prison system as one of their main hubs of recruitment

⁷⁴ Carlos Lacerda was the mayor of Rio in the 1960s who developed a policy of removing the *favelas* from the hills by creating affordable housing in other neighbourhoods with the intent to regenerate the *favela*'s residents.

(Câmara dos Deputados, 2009, pp. 50-53), groups such as CV benefit from the corrupt and negligent system to recruit members, blackmail and keep control over their activities.

- The educational system must improve, in order to give people, especially lower classes a real chance to improve their life conditions and compete in the job market. Moreover, education should introduce courses aimed at combatting the structural violence in the country, encouraging students to re-think their family concepts. By exposing the structural elements that lead to the continuous racism, classism and corruption, there could be opportunity to change the situation in future generations.

- By reforming the healthcare system, part of the structural violence that causes deaths due to the lack of supplies and qualified professionals, many avoidable deaths could be prevented. Looking back a few years in Brazilian history, many of the diseases seen today, such as dengue, yellow fever and tuberculosis, were extinct and returned due to the lack of vaccinations (World Health Organization, 2018). Thus, a reform in the healthcare system to improve its quality and availability to the lower classes would improve their life conditions and allow them to develop.

Considering the latest events in Rio de Janeiro with the introduction of the army and the execution of Marielle Franco, a city councillor that was denouncing police brutality, it is hard to talk about pacification now (Barbara, 2018). Security policies have been transferred to the federal level and this leads to a conclusion that the UPP, although still ongoing have failed. Given the recent fake news that surged after Marielle's murder, this thesis becomes ever more important in the understanding and exposure of the criminalization of *favelas* and its residents (Barbara, 2018). The fact that her death is now being attributed to her involvement with drug traffickers and gangs, just come to prove how *favela* residents are criminalized and police brutality is justified through the war against traffic rhetoric.

6. Conclusion

In this thesis I analyzed the four peace attempt projects that were implemented in Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* between 1983 and 2008 and looked at the reasons behind their failures. This analysis considers structural violence to postulate that the government's attempts at pacification failed due to infrastructure pressures and structural oppression that were never properly addressed.

In the first chapter, I presented a historical background of the formation of the *favelas* and the social tensions that arose in Rio de Janeiro throughout the twentieth century. This history begins at the formation of the Republic and continues through to the end of the dictatorship. In this chapter I sought to analyze the social dynamics found in Brazilian society and, particularly, those in Rio de Janeiro. By undertaking this analysis, it's possible to perceive three main structural systems that contributed to the formation of today's violent reality in Rio:

1. As seen in chapter one, political paternalism is one of the main causes of corruption due to the development of the *política de compadres*. The combination of both led the government to cater to the demands of the elite classes to the detriment of the lower tiers of Brazilian society. The result was that government corruption was evident through violence and intimidation of lower classes in exchange for votes. These paternalistic measures are observable through the number of rigid policies intended to keep the lower classes restrained (Barros F. R., UPPs and the criminalization of the favelas: A Challenge to the Comprehension of the Notion of "Public Space" in Brazil, 2015; Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Conniff & McCann, Modern Brazil: Elites and masses in historical perspective., 1989);
2. The construct of a negative image of the non-whites which led to the development of a stigmatization of them as more prone to criminality is directly

linked to the criminalization of the *favelas*. During this era of removals and expulsions, the lower classes were perceived as dangerous, uneducated and uncivilized (Brum, 2013; Ferreira, 2009; Machado, 2011; Valladares, 2000). This contributed to negative public perceptions of the lower classes and particularly the *favelas*. Targeted as areas of criminality, the *favelas* and their residents were afforded fewer civic rights and significantly lower levels of civil supports (Barros, 2015; Conniff & McCann, 1989; Correa et al, 2016; Fischer B. , 2011; Mattos, 2009).

3. The militarization of the police, which was caused in part, by its unification with the national army during the era of dictatorship, was a means to contain the lower classes (Mamede, 20120; Oliveira, 2011; Salem, 2016). Acting as state agents in the expulsions and forced sanitation measures of the lower classes, the police forces resorted to violence and brutality in carrying out their duties (Ribeiro L., 2014; Rocha, 2013; Silveira, 2014). Moreover, policemen continue to this day to guarantee the safety and well-being of the elites at the expense of the lower classes (Costa, 2004; Griffin, 2015; Magalhães, M. , 2018).

Working in combination, these three structural systems have resulted in today's complex reality. Working as a self-feeding cycle, the criminalization of the *favelas* is used to justify the militarization of the police forces. Furthermore, the militarization of the police forces emerges from the criminalization of the *favelas* (Silveira, 2014). The government considers the *favelas* as occupied territory which justifies why police use extreme force and military tactics when entering these communities (Barros, 2015; Riccio et al, 2013). The growth and persistence of criminal groups in the *favelas* are a direct result of government's lack of investment in social structures and infrastructure in lower class communities (de Macedo Santana & Rosa Soares, Reforma Passos: Cem Anos de uma Intervencao Excludente, 2005; da Nobrega Jr, 2010).

This analysis has attempted to show that the historical beginnings and the continued growth of the *favelas* are the result of a lack of government policy and investment in lower class communities. Likewise, it is also a consequence of the government's catering to the demands of the elites.

The stigmatization of the *favelas* is connected to a negative public perception towards the *cortiços*, subsequently transferred to the *favelas*. It is important to note that the media played a key role in forming an image of *favela* residents as uncivilized and uneducated; and further, it had a role in inflating social pressure towards stricter and tougher measures in these areas. Completing the cycle, police forces have historically used brutal measures to meet societal demands to combat crime. These measures include very defined and violent incursions of the police in the *favelas*.

In Chapter two I presented the theories used to analyse the criminality in Brazil as well as the reasons for the failed peace attempts in Rio. Presenting both structural violence and community policing allows an understanding the root causes of violence in Rio, as well as the mechanism behind the peace agreements.

The concept of structural violence supports arguments that historical under investment along with a militarized approach to policing has contributed to today's criminalization of the *favelas*. Understanding how *favelas* were formed and the deep roots of the conflict, provides an explanation as to why peace attempts have failed to this point. Until some of the underlying structural causes are addressed, it will not be possible to close the gap between *morro x asfalto*, and subsequently not possible to promote lasting peace, order and good governance. It is necessary to address the structural oppression lived by the lower classes since the proclamation of the Republic, while also tending to the structural issues in Brazilian public services. Until there is a reform in Brazilian public services, known to be

corrupt, classist and excessively bureaucratic, there is no space to talk about tackling structural violence in the country.

Community policing, built jointly between citizens and government, is one approach to change the militarized culture of the police. Additionally, it contributes to an empowerment of the lower classes by using joint decision-making and preventive approach to reduce criminal behaviour (Loader, 2016; Skogan, 2008; Williams, 2003). Specifically in Rio, this would break the ongoing top-down approach towards “civilizing” the lower classes. As mentioned, the introduction of preventive measures rather than response measures will lead to a decrease in recruitment for criminal gangs. Better infrastructure and development in the *favelas* will translate into access to better education, healthcare and many other social services unavailable today. This will close the gap between classes and reduce the stigmatization of *favela* residents.

In chapter three I presented the first two peace attempts in Rio; describing each of them, the challenges they faced and the fall out from both attempts. A depiction emerges of incoherent and repressive policing approaches, which further demonstrates a lack of continuity in the government’s position. The resistance presented by the police forces in embracing and fully implementing the community policing model led to their failure. It is with the failure of CIPOC that human rights start to be negatively addressed by Brazilian society and the media. Likewise, the chapter presents the duality of public security policies and how these become political currency when used to inflate the discourse of war against crime. At the end of each government the security policy changes, interchanging between community policing and repressive measures.

In chapter four I presented the third peace attempt implemented in Rio, the *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (GPAE). The project lasted seven years and continued through three different governors while expanded to several *favela* complexes

in the city. In its initial year GPAE presented good feedback from *favela* residents and showed signs of improvement in the relationship between police officers and the residents. Nonetheless, the social structures that created the militarized culture of the police as well as the criminalized image of the *favelas* led to its failure. Moreover, corruption and the continuous presence of criminal gang members prevented *favelas* residents from interacting more and fully trust in the police (Albernaz et al, 2007; Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Ribeiro L. , 2014; Ribeiro & Montandon, 2014).

In chapter five I focused on the *Unidades de Policia Pacificadora* (UPP) project. Although this attempt is still ongoing, it is facing an uphill battle and lack of momentum as pacified *favelas* fall back into open conflict (Bianchi, 2017; Soares, 2017). Moreover, given the recent events in the city it is difficult to talk about a continuation or success of the UPP, even though the program has not been officially cancelled (Biller, 2018; “Rio de Janeiro violence”, 2018; Forte, 2017; Strobl, 2017). It is important to note that the transfer of the security administration from the state government to the army forces strongly suggests that the attempt to pacify the *favelas* of Rio through UPP has been a failure. The execution of city councillor, and activist on anti-police brutality Marielle Franco, is evidence that militia and police corruption are still rampant in Rio (Lessons from a murder in Rio de Janeiro, 2018; Barbara, 2018).

From the inception of the *favelas* as an alternative to the demolished *cortiços* and the lack of policies for popular housing, to today’s reality, the relationship dynamic between police forces and *favela* residents has been one of repression and mistrust. The role of the police forces has always been to contain the lower classes and implement force to carry out government policies (Silva M. d., 2010). Since these areas were far from downtown and did not foster much public sympathy, it provided the right conditions for the emergence of the *favelas* (Silva M. d., 2010).

Framing citizens of the *favelas* as unsanitary, uneducated and more prone to crime, Brazil formed a stigmatized image of the *favelas*, which was rooted in racist⁷⁵ views of the era (Canuto de Souza & de Moraes, 2011; Conniff & McCann, 1989). The criminalization of these neighbourhoods by various governments created an internal enemy to be combatted. In addition to being seen as criminal havens, *favelas* were also seen as more susceptible to develop socialist and communist groups. The brutal tactics used in these neighbourhoods was further justified by images of *favelas* as a place of subversive peoples and ideals (Alves & Evanson, 2011; Alvin, 2015; Brum, 2013).

The idea of *favelas* as criminal havens was, and is, deeply embedded in Brazilian society. It allows for continuous support for police repression and justification for police brutality, which in turn normalizes the death of *favela* residents. The criminalization of the *favelas* allows for crimes to go unpunished, for militias to be forgotten and for the continuation of the division between *morro* and *asfalto*. As seen in the case of Marielle, when a civilian is killed by militia or police, an automatic link is made between the victim and the criminal gangs (Barbara, 2018). The justification of homicides in the *favelas* through the criminalization of the victims allows for violence to continue. Moreover, it blindsides the media discourse and the political platform that uses such cases to either call for repressive measures or for pacification projects.

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that human rights have become a political platform and currency and are often seen as an excuse or a defence for criminal behaviour. The elites generally have had a negative reaction towards human rights arguments, which in turn also criminalizes or downgrades anyone that attempts to defend these rights. This negative view of human rights also contributes to shut down any mention of crimes committed by the police or their brutal actions in the *favelas*. The fact that most human rights

⁷⁵ Non-whites were considered to be more prone to criminality (Conniff & McCann, 1989, p. 201)

activists in Brazil talk about police brutality automatic makes any of their arguments null. This not only allows for the continuation of the action of militia and the extreme use of force by the police in the *favelas* but also normalizes it through the criminalization of these areas and its residents (da Nobrega Jr, 2010; Misse, 2011; Souza L. A., 2015).

With respect to police repression, violence against criminals is widely accepted in Brazilian society, including within the *favela* population. As Cardoso (2016) argues, the biggest challenge faced by police in gaining the trust of the *favela* population was the suspicion within their own ranks towards *favela* residents. These residents felt disrespected and sought to be recognized and treated as *pessoas de bem*, receiving the same respect as the upper classes. Nonetheless, they still approved and supported repressive measures and worse treatment for criminals (Cardoso, 2010, p. 182). This illustrates how the use of violence to fight crime was intrinsically supported within Brazilian society regardless social classes.

In the midst of these numerous complex relations and growing violence, another actor was added to the equation with the insurgence of the militias. Extorting the population of the *favelas* in exchange for protection, and the expulsion or control of criminal groups, militias served to play a similar role as the gangs, with the difference being that they were considered “official”. Their existence contributes to the lack of trust *favela* residents have in the police forces and why they resist working with them to denounce corrupt cops, gang members or militia members (Neto, A, 2013).

The stigmatization of the *favelas* gives residents a lower rank classification, which in turn justifies the violation of their rights. The classification of *favelado*⁷⁶ comes accompanied by the image of poor, dirty, uneducated, impolite, and unlawful. Consequently, the peace projects fail, not in their conception but their application. Additionally, the militarized culture of the police does not allow for officers to see themselves as a public servant but rather a

⁷⁶ The one who lives in the *favela*

soldier. Thus, it becomes difficult to apply a community policing model when the police officers cannot change their perception of their work and role in society. If the militarized culture of the police is not changed, community policing and the proximity element of it will never be implemented. Unless there is a break from the distrust and tension between police forces and *favela* residents, it is not possible to promote a combined management and solution to the local problems. Moreover, if a proximity police is not fully implemented it becomes hard to introduce preventive measures to avoid the reoccurrence of violent conflicts in the *favelas* (Gomes & de Oliveira Bulamarqui, 2016; Koonings, 2014). If there is not a combined effort to introduce the social demands of these areas, allowing for youth to have real chances at developing and evolving, the presence of police itself cannot avoid new associations to crime. The fact that UPP social did not receive enough funding and did not develop to its full potential, contributed to the maintenance of the divide between *asfalto* and *favela*. Without real opportunities, the division and stigmatization of the *favela* residents as a second-class type of people is perpetuated.

The pacification programs have suffered from the same approach of stigmatizing the *favelas*. Reinforcing the need to re-gain power and control over the *favelas* and the need to control and civilize these areas perpetuates existing social tensions. Without the recognition of the *favela* residents as people with rights, duties and citizenship, the attempts to bring peace to Rio will continue to fail. The root causes of the current conflict must be addressed in order to achieve a lasting peace. Moreover, without changes to the militarized police culture, programs like the GPAE and the UPP will likely also fail because abusive practices will continue. If police forces do not adopt a new approach, they will continue to contribute to the stigmatization of the *favelas* and the distrust between them and the residents (Koonings, 2014). The Ombudsperson established during the government of Garotinho, received seven thousand and eight hundred complaints in the first ten years. However, only four resulted in

convictions, demonstrating the need to change the culture of the police and the country. This dismissal of cases and the fact that executions are disguised in *autos de resistência* call attention to the need of attending to the structural causes of the conflict. By changing the stigmatization of the *favelas*, the introduction of a community policing model becomes possible (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

Overall, the models applied in Rio cannot be classified as community policing. Police officers have continued the violent and repressive approaches of the past and lacked the required change in police culture. Additionally, the tensions between the police and *favela* residents has impeded the participation of the community in the decision-making process. (Frühling, 2012).

As Rocha (2013) discusses, there is a social division in Brazil and especially in Rio which separates individuals between low and high moral status. The author presents *favela* residents, a significant proportion of whom are poor, black and young, as a group more likely to suffer from police violence. Much of the research into Rio's *favelas* demonstrates that these areas suffer from stigmatization of crime which in turn classifies its residents as a lower rank of citizen.

The present thesis attempted to expose these elements and present a deeper understanding of the social patterns that allow for the worsening of social relations and life conditions. By exposing the structural violence present in Brazil, and how the social structures present in the country contribute to the extreme social divide, I believe it is possible to start addressing them. All of the contributors to Rio's current reality were historically built and are deeply interconnected, feeding from one another. Thus, although a continuous attempt to change the policing model is a good alternative, there will not be any significant change if culture behind the image of the police and the *favela* is not changed.

While society continue to criminalize poverty, changes in the police model will continue to suffer social pressure and receive support in their militarized approaches.

My conclusion draws from a positive perception of the community policing model as an alternative to decrease the tensions between police forces and *favela* residents. In supporting this approach, there is a need to introduce the missing public services to *favela* areas, improving their life conditions and decreasing their dependency on either the police or the traffickers. Concomitantly, there is a need to break with other social structures that contribute to the criminalization of these areas exposing the elements that compose the structural violence existent in Brazil.

In order to have a lasting change and decrease in criminality and violence rates in Rio, a series of aspects must be addressed. There needs to be a strong combat against corruption at all levels of Brazilian society, including the government, police agents and civilians. Additionally, there needs to be a reform in the public services, increasing their quality and they need to be introduced in the *favelas*. However, the current situation of violence and gang rivalry is an impediment to progress.

Government investment into a robust education program offers the best opportunity to improve Rio's situation. This would be a long-term plan with long-term objectives. However, it is the most realistic option for ending the cycle of violence which has plagued the *favelas* for far too long.

Acknowledging the difficulties in proposing a resolution to Rio at this moment, I suggest a change in the educational system is the best approach to start the dialogue around the social injustices present in Brazilian society. Given the current polarization in Brazilian society between *mortadelas* and *coxinhas*⁷⁷, as well as the use of the violent occurrences in

⁷⁷ Coxinhas and mortadelas are a representation of the right and left political wings supporters, which is polarized by social classes as well. Coxinhas are the representation of the upper classes that support the right wing. Coxinha was a slang used to describe the preppy people. Mortadelas are the representation of the lower classes that support the leftist movement, especially PT. The nickname derives from the fact that

Rio as political platform for the upcoming elections prevent me from proposing any type of solution at this moment.

The Brazilian population is being stirred by the media and inflated political discourses that call the attention of the masses and leads to superficial debate and derails from the deep structural problems. These discussions cast a shadow on the paternalistic, corrupt and clientelist system that runs Brazilian society. The focus on race and social class blindsides the history of the *políticas de compadre*, police brutality, the criminalization of the *favelas* and the imbedded corruption that is present and spread-out in Brazilian society. Thus, at this moment no dialogue is possible and there is a need to wait for the tensions to decrease.

the demonstrators for PT always receive a mortadella sandwich to participate and also because mortadella is known to be a cheap type of meat in Brazil (Fagundez & Teixeira, 2015).

Annex 1: Serie Histórica Letalidade Violenta Rio de Janeiro

Historical series of violent deaths in Rio de Janeiro:

Ano	CAPITAL		
	Letalidade Violenta	População	Taxa por 100 mil hab.
1991	3.571	5.480.768	65,2
1992	3.701	5.492.909	67,4
1993	3.874	5.507.300	70,3
1994	4.192	5.521.492	75,9
1995	3.831	5.535.481	69,2
1996	3.156	5.551.538	56,8
1997	2.906	5.612.944	51,8
1998	2.185	5.687.440	38,4
1999	2.659	5.762.826	46,1
2000	3.147	5.857.904	53,7
2001	2.984	5.902.592	50,6
2002	3.465	5.947.622	58,3
2003	3.495	5.992.995	58,3
2004	3.456	6.038.714	57,2
2005	3.231	6.084.782	53,1
2006	3.286	6.131.201	53,6
2007	3.354	6.177.974	54,3
2008	2.877	6.225.104	46,2
2009	2.902	6.272.594	46,3
2010	2.205	6.320.446	34,9
2011	1.783	6.355.949	28,1
2012	1.557	6.390.290	24,4
2013	1.613	6.429.922	25,1
2014	1.552	6.453.682	24,0
2015	1.562	6.476.631	24,1
2016	1.909	6.498.837	29,4

Fontes:

Homicídio doloso: elaborado por ISP com base em informações da PCERJ

População: elaborado por ISP com base em informações do IBGE




Ano	CAPITAL		
	Homicídio Doloso	População	Taxa por 100 mil hab.
1991	3.466	5.480.768	63,2
1992	3.547	5.492.909	64,6
1993	3.733	5.507.300	67,8
1994	4.081	5.521.492	73,9
1995	3.744	5.535.481	67,6
1996	3.081	5.551.538	55,5
1997	2.852	5.612.944	50,8
1998	2.134	5.687.440	37,5
1999	2.361	5.762.826	41,0
2000	2.737	5.857.904	46,7
2001	2.437	5.902.592	41,3
2002	2.718	5.947.622	45,7
2003	2.574	5.992.995	43,0
2004	2.653	6.038.714	43,9
2005	2.406	6.084.782	39,5
2006	2.465	6.131.201	40,2
2007	2.336	6.177.974	37,8
2008	2.069	6.225.104	33,2
2009	2.155	6.272.594	34,4
2010	1.628	6.320.446	25,8
2011	1.417	6.355.949	22,3
2012	1.206	6.390.290	18,9
2013	1.311	6.429.922	20,4
2014	1.237	6.453.682	19,2
2015	1.200	6.476.631	18,5
2016	1.330	6.498.837	20,5

Fontes:

Homicídio doloso: elaborado por ISP com base em informações da PCERJ

População: elaborado por ISP com base em informações do IBGE



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