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**Activism in the Shadows of Universalism:  
Where Is Human Rights, Then and Now?**

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## ACTIVISM IN THE SHADOWS OF UNIVERSALISM

### Where is Human Rights, Then and Now?

**Meredith Terretta, Talk prepared for the Human Rights Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa, 4 March 2016**

First I want to thank the Human Rights Research and Education Centre for inviting me up here to give this talk and to all of you for coming. I'm tremendously excited about the opportunity to strengthen my connections with this particular network.

Recently, Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights at the UN declared: "There is a struggle for the soul of the human rights movement, and it is being waged in large part through the proxy of genealogy."<sup>1</sup> What does he really mean by this? Why is history the battleground for the soul of human rights? In the first part of my talk today, before I get into my own research and argument, I want to talk in general terms about history's very recent engagement with human rights, relative to philosophy, political science, anthropology, and law. I'd like to explain why these dynamic historical arguments emerging over the last ten years are so critical to our present-day understanding of human rights. And then I will tell you how I am using historical inquiry to contribute to solving the problem of human rights today.

But first, what is the problem with human rights? In a general assembly a couple years ago, John Packer declared the Human Rights Research and Education Centre to be shamelessly for human rights. The problem is, it's getting harder to make a bold declaration like that, especially in the academy. Critical scholarship on human rights and humanitarianism has proliferated in recent years, seeming even to outpace positive, normative scholarship. A lot of folks seem unsure about what it means, or should mean, to be "shamelessly for" human rights.

Let's look at a sample from just the last two years. This year, Makau Mutua, consultant on governance and human rights for the World Bank and Professor of Law at SUNY-Buffalo published a piece asking "Is the Age of Human Rights Over?" in which he argued that "normative, philosophical, and cultural exclusivity has contributed to" the decline of human rights and, furthermore, that many in the Global South have come to see the UN, the International Criminal Court, and the human rights movement as "tools for the maintenance of an unjust global order."<sup>2</sup> Last year, Ayten Gündoğdu, a political scientist at Barnard College, Columbia published an Arendtian critique of human rights in which she asks, "to what extent do the ordering principles of the current international system, including human rights norms, contribute to the precarious condition of various categories of migrants?"<sup>3</sup> In 2014, Ben Golder,

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<sup>1</sup> Philip Alston, "Book Review: Does the Past Matter? The Origins of Human Rights," *Harvard Law Review* 126.7 (2013): 2043-81, 2077.

<sup>2</sup> Makau Mutua, "Is the Age of Human Rights Over?" in S. A. McClennen and A. S. Moore, eds, *The Routledge Companion to Literature and Human Rights*, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, 450-58.

<sup>3</sup> Ayten Gündoğdu, *Rightlessness in Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants*, Oxford University Press, 2015.

professor of law and scholar of international legal thought at the University of South Wales published an article in the *London Review of International Law*, “refusing human rights as a starting and critically redemptive endpoint” and suggesting that we “think instead of how to create new forms and new political vehicles and affiliations for the realization of ... universality, justice, or freedom, however conceived.”<sup>4</sup>

Historians are uniquely poised to speak to the problems the critical human rights scholarship lays bare. Because historians probe the very sites where abstraction alights in the everyday lived experience of the human agents claiming rights, defining rights, and figuring out how to implement them, from age to age. This makes historians ideally suited to reconciling contemporary and past notions of common humanity with cultural difference, be it of a temporal or geographical order.

Historical study of human rights began as a genealogical question, in other words with historians seeking their time of origin. Were human rights conceived as inalienable, natural rights in the Age of the Enlightenment only to achieve full expression in the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Lynn Hunt sought to demonstrate in her 2007 book *Inventing Human Rights: A History*?<sup>5</sup> Or—following high-profile American intellectual historian Samuel Moyn, who published his polemical *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*<sup>6</sup> in 2010—did the late 1970s mark the historical moment of human rights’ breakthrough into a moral, apolitical and normative movement capable of circumventing Cold War and First-Third World polarities that neutralized the UN’s Human Rights Commission? For the first few years, the lens of human rights history, regardless of chronological focus, usually trained north, but the critical method of doing human rights history—genealogizing—was established.

Critical genealogizing human rights foregrounds the agency of human actors within their historical contingencies. The late Kenneth Cmiel, the first historian to label human rights history a field in an essay appearing in the *American Historical Review* in 2004, pointed out that accounts of “logical, progressive development of human rights ideas tend to elide the political agency of unlikely rights claimants who made claims in and on the language of human rights.”<sup>7</sup> Genealogies of human rights drawing on historical data focus on those very actors within their specific historical contingencies and focus on deciphering their claims, as well as their choices and actions.

Historians of what is sweepingly termed the Global South have produced alternative human rights genealogies to those that I have mentioned above, showing how human rights have been

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<sup>4</sup> Ben Golder, “Beyond redemption? Problematising the critique of human rights in contemporary international thought,” *London Review of International Law* (2014): 1-38.

<sup>5</sup> Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010

<sup>7</sup> Kenneth Cmiel, “Review Essay: The Recent History of Human Rights,” *American Historical Review* (2004): 117-135.

successfully claimed and leveraged in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, and making a case for the emergence of a human rights practice in the Global South. A recent good example is Steven Jensen's diplomatic history, *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization and the Reconstruction of Global Values*. Other, more regionally specific genealogies, such as Keith Watenpaugh's *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism*, (slide) Luis van Isschot's *The Social Origins of Human Rights: Contesting Political Violence in Colombia's Oil Capital, 1919-2010* and Bonny Ibhawoh's *Imperialism and Human Rights: Colonial Discourses of Rights and Liberties in African History*, 2008 are equally important contributions. **Taken together what these alternative genealogies show us, I think, is that what broke through in the late 1970s was not human rights activism, but rather, the institutionalization of human rights NGOs and human rights as a matter of foreign policy in the global North.**

Alternative genealogies are most important for the way they probe the relationship between universal human rights and anticolonialism. The most polemical argument that Moyn advanced in *The Last Utopia* was his unequivocal declaration that "anticolonialism was not a human rights movement." One of the most useful rebuttals can be found in Lydia Liu's "Shadows of Universalism: The Untold Story of Human Rights around 1948," published in *Critical Inquiry* in 2014. Liu writes that the conviction that anticolonialism was not a human rights movement could only derive from Moyn's disavowal of universalism as a political problem in human rights in 1948. I want to say something about her very useful concept "shadows of universalism" as a way to segue into talking about my own current research.

For Liu, the "shadows of universalism" are what gave definition to the nascent concept of universal human rights as it gained traction in the UN. And the shadows included the following:

- Efforts to expand the universal beyond its specifically Western conceptual framework, undertaken by figures such as P. C. Chang, a Chinese representative to the UN who, with John Humphrey and Eleanor Roosevelt, composed a preliminary draft of an international bill of human rights in 1947
- The defeat, in the UN General Assembly on 2 November 1950, of the "colonial clause" through which Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands proposed to exclude colonial and non-self-governing territories from the application of the universal human rights covenants under preparation
- A draft resolution presented the following week and unanimously supported by Arab, African, and Asian states to include self-determination as a human right in the universal human rights covenants

In these shadows of universalism, Liu locates the struggles that exposed the contradiction, in 1948, between the enunciation of universal human rights, and the classical 19<sup>th</sup> century standard of civilization in international law upon which rested a widespread European assumption that the concept did not apply to colonized populations.

The thing is that many activists, advocates, claimants and petitioners advancing rights claims in 20<sup>th</sup> century Africa already understood this contradiction even before universal human rights' debut at the UN launched political discussions about it in the 1950s. And this is where my work parts ways with Liu's and others focused on the global elite at the UN. My research follows the activists and their advocates, who, decades before 1948, had formed strategic networks to claim rights for themselves and others. In other words, my research probes, not the discursive structure

of universal human rights, but the practice of human rights. I am interested in examining the ways in which practices of human rights preceded the discourse.

My focus on rights claimants and activists focuses on colonialism as a primary cause of rightlessness. Empire, from the time of its normative 19<sup>th</sup> century iteration, rendered subject populations mostly rightless and stateless. Long before the Second World War and the Universal Declaration, plenty of activists, intellectuals and lawyers recognized colonialism as a primary cause of rightlessness. The problem was that these folks tended to be on the fringe of discussions of internationalism as it emerged in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. They had to figure out how to break through. Their modes of breaking through figure, I contend, among the shadows of universalism that led up to Universal Declaration in 1948. The evidence I've found in petitions, colonial surveillance records, correspondence, league and associations' archives, lawyers' case files, and oral interviews demonstrates that from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, colonial subjects had found ways to make claims for basic rights in situations where they had few to none.

Since it's now been a while since I started my talk, I'll go ahead and signpost my argument here: **I conceive of rights activism issuing from Africa from about the 1920s and into the 1970s as a flexible formula of common elements, even though it varied from one colonial setting to another and evolved from one decade to the next. Transregional activist networks combined with the uses activists and their advocates made of various legal repertoires gave rise to the rights strategies the rightless and their advocates engaged at any given time and circumstance.** Because colonial settings are legally plural, activist lawyers had multiple systems of law to work with: colonial law, metropolitan law, customary law, which varied from one locale to another even within a given territory, international law, particularly in territories under the international oversight of the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations. The various jurisdictional statuses ranging from protectorate, to colony, to mandate or trusteeship territory, offered still more legal possibilities.

Activist lawyers led the way in transmitting the earliest rights claims from colonial Africa. Until the Second World War, most of these activist lawyers came, not from metropolitan Europe, but rather from the Caribbean, Oceania, Asia or Africa. They were lawyers from territories under European rule, schooled in metropolitan systems of law, who then set about reforming the law in Africa's colonial territories, mandates and protectorates. With the populations they represented, they articulated the first legal arguments against colonialism. Colonial administrators and missionaries referred to these lawyers as "hedge lawyers," or in French, *avocats marrons*, and worked hard to discredit and disparage them.

Rights claims became prevalent in the interwar period, and issued frequently from League of Nations Mandate territories with an international jurisdictional status, eight out of fourteen of which were in Africa.<sup>8</sup> Often, but not always working with activist lawyers, inhabitants of these territories filed petitions with the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission seated in Geneva. Denouncing racial discrimination and imposed legislation, the petitions expressed

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<sup>8</sup> On the contributions of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the emergence of internationalism in the interwar period see Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.□

grievances against corporal punishment of laborers, made claims including for the restoration of traditional titles, and protested unjust taxation or expropriation of land. Some advanced legal arguments for the “restoration of our national sovereignty” as did the Duala, a coastal population of French Cameroon who called into question the French right to administer them, given their history as first, a German protectorate, and then, a League of Nations Mandate territory.<sup>9</sup> The Guyanese Vincent Ganty’s organization, The Defense of Negro Cameroonian Citizens provided support to the Duala petitioners. Here, the founding documents show their legal counsel as Maitre P. Jean-Baptiste.<sup>10</sup>

Although few cases were settled in favor of the claimants, the claims represent an effort on the part of colonial subjects—whom colonialism mostly excluded from civil, political, and legal rights—to claim political subjectivity as they defined for themselves the rights delineated in the League of Nations mandate agreements.

Rights claims from colonial Africa did not issue only from mandate territories under international oversight. For example, in Madagascar, Malagasy war veterans collaborated with Antillean lawyers to launch a campaign claiming French citizenship. They did so after the first African deputy to sit in the French Parliament, Blaise Diagne of Senegal lobbied with Antillean deputy Gratien Candace for French African soldiers’ access to French citizenship. Their efforts paid off in a decree passed to that effect on 14 January 1918 and the Malagasy citizenship movement began as a veterans’ rights movement after the war, before reaching its crescendo in a petition and mass rally for collective citizenship for all Malagasies in 1929. The movement failed when its primary leaders were arrested and their publications censored by the French administration; but its leaders recast it as a call for independence from France as early as 1931.

Interestingly for the human rights historian, many of these petitioners and agitators, whether Malagasy, African or Antillean, had held memberships in various local sections of larger associations – Leagues and Defense Committees. These include the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH), the League of the Rights of Man founded in France in 1898. Africans founded local chapters of the LDH, as did, for example, Joseph Deemin of Gabon, who informed the LDH president that his sole goal was to “fight against injustice and the abuses of power that are frequent in our country.”<sup>11</sup> LDH support shows up in many of the petitions to the League of

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<sup>9</sup> See Ralph A. Austen and Jonathan Derrick, *Middlemen of the Cameroons Rivers: The Duala and their Hinterland c. 1600-c. 1960*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 144-159.

<sup>10</sup> Founding documents, Groupe-Ganty de Défense des Citoyens Nègres Camerounais et Ami des Nègres, Paris, 20 March 1931, 3 Slotfom 34, Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM), Aix-en-Provence, France.

<sup>11</sup> Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (BDIC), Archives Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, F Delta rés. 0798/90, President of the French League for the Defense of the Rights of Man and the Citizen to the Minister of the Colonies, 3 January 1920; Congo français-Gabon, Deemin Claim, 15 July 1918; Assistant Secretary-General LDH to President LDH, 21 Aug 1919; Joseph Deemin to President of the LDH, 1 June 1919; Councilor of State, Ministry of Colonies to President of the LDH, 17 April 1920; Claim filed with the Prosecutor of the Republic, Libreville, 3 October 1918.

Nations. From the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the LDH sometimes assisted those either claiming French citizenship, or protesting the abuses of the indigénat, the legal code of exception applied to colonial subjects.

Another important transregional rights association in this period was the League of the Defense of the Negro Race, founded by Tiemoko Kouyate who not only sought to mobilize local chapters throughout Africa, but was in correspondence with activists throughout Europe and the United States, including the American civil libertarian who I'll come back to later, Roger Baldwin, and W. E. B. Du Bois, the Pan-African anticolonialist who, in 1900, declared the color line to be *the* problem of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In 1929 Kouyate wrote to DuBois to connect with his organizations. A quote from that letter conveys the kinds of inter- and intra-racial rights ideas being exchanged across such long distances as different circuits intersected: "We are very attached to the very humane ideal of fraternal harmony and collaboration between the races. But we believe that this ideal is conditional on our national liberty and international equality."<sup>12</sup>

The components of early rights activism issuing from Africa from the early twentieth century to the interwar period were thus transregional advocacy; the presence of activist lawyers who instrumentalized the law to change the status quo; public opinion campaigns launched through the local press; and the use of petitions in lieu of political processes such voting, or political party membership. These modes of activism, I contend, make up the shadows of universalism. They continued after the Second World War when limited political rights began to be conferred to subjects of British and French rule.

Significant differences between the League's Mandate system and the UN's Trusteeship system further galvanized activism. The UN Charter specified that trust territories were to become self-governing. Petitions could now be sent directly to the Trusteeship Council in any language. Petitioners could now travel to New York to address the UN orally. UN Visiting Missions would periodically inspect conditions on-the-ground and distribute copies, in local languages, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the trusteeship agreements and the UN Charter. As a result of these changes, trust territory inhabitants became the first in the world accorded the right to petition the UN directly to denounce injustices and administrators' violations of the UN Charter and Trusteeship Agreements. Not until the mid-1960s would the UN institutionalize the reception of human rights complaints, through its Third Committee, for the rest of the world. Ralph Bunche, American statesman and largely the architect of the Trusteeship System and the one responsible for the changes to the petitioning and oversight systems. A PhD in Political Science from Harvard University, Bunche had written a doctoral dissertation comparing the administration of mandate territory of French Togo with that of the French colony of Dahomey. It is perhaps not coincidental that Sylvanus Olympio of French Togo, leader of the nationalist party Committee of Togolese Unity, and future first president of the independent Republic of Togo was the first oral petitioner to address the UN.

Hundreds wrote from Africa's seven UN trust territories, calling for self-determination and racial and economic equality; increased education and infrastructural development; Women petitioners took up the issues of women's access to education, landownership and commercial agriculture;

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<sup>12</sup> Kouyate to W. E. B. Du Bois, 29 April 1929, 3 Slotfom 111, ANOM.

Many petitioners requested greater protection of civil and political liberties essential to democratic political processes. **In the comparative analysis I am currently undertaking, I can chart the frequency of use of the phrase human rights, as it was variously translated and placed into local context.**

Given their volume, the petitions are incredibly varied, yet in their ensemble they clearly demonstrate that a majority of petitioners understood the UN as an international arena for claim-making; and that many understood their claims as important for the way they exposed administrators' disregard for the trusteeship agreements that bound them to govern trust territories in a particular way. Furthermore, petitions to the UN often consisted of an explanatory cover letter to a grievance expressed to the local French administration, indicating that petitioners shrewdly navigated the legally pluralistic trusteeship landscape, petitioning in duplicate or in triplicate—to local, regional, metropolitan and international jurisdictions. Two examples will suffice. The beginning paragraph of one prepared by leaders of Juvento, a youth party in French Togo sent in January 1953 shows the careful documentation of the administration's trusteeship agreement violations that coincided with the invocation of the UDHR: "It is with heartfelt regret that we, young Togolese, imbued with the principles listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Atlantic Charter, have the honor of submitting to your attention, in chronological order, the abuses and assaults carried out by police agents against the peaceful people of Lomé."<sup>13</sup> A petition from Mrs. Lydio Dopo, a cultivator and widow based in the Mungo region of Cameroon demonstrates the individual claims that exposed French administrators' transgression of trusteeship terms: "On 12 February 1954, a European Official of the Water and Forestry Service asked me to ... show him the boundaries of my plantation... He refused to accept the boundaries I showed him, and ... he cut off a large part of my plantation, which was under cultivation, for classification in the private domain. From time to time this European Official ... tells me that he will send me to prison ... if I persist in claiming my rights."<sup>14</sup> In the early 1950s as these petitions were sent, a French activist lawyer Maître Sylvestre Alcandre of Guadeloupe, who had been a founding lawyer of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA),<sup>15</sup> provided legal counsel and representation to JUVENTO.<sup>16</sup> Maître Yves Henry Louisia, a French activist lawyer from Martinique, maintained an office in Nkongsamba, the capital of the Mungo region in French Cameroon, from 1953 until his expulsion from the territory in October 1957.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Copy, President of the JUVENTO National Committee to the Governor of Overseas France, Commissioner of the Republic of Togo, 20 Jan 1953, UNTC, T/Pet.7/325.□

<sup>14</sup> Copy, Lydia Dopo to the High Commissioner of the French Republic in the Cameroons, 28 February 1954, UNTC, T/PET.5/400.□

<sup>15</sup> "Investigation into the African Independence Movement," Secret communiqué to the High-Commissioner of Côte-d'Ivoire, 21 October 1946, 1 Affpol 2263, ANOM.□

<sup>16</sup> Kaldor Papers, Box 27.□

<sup>17</sup> High-Commissioner of the French Republic of Cameroon to Minister of Overseas France, 25 October 1957, Affpol 3283/2, ANOM; Pierre Messmer to Maître Meignie, President of the National Association of Lawyers, Paris, 28 Jan 1958, 1 Affpol 3283/2, ANOM.□

In New York, Roger Baldwin, founder of the ACLU in the interwar period, and now Chairman of the International League of the Rights of Man founded in 1947 as the first human rights NGO to gain consultative status with the UN organized support for these petitioners. The ILRM organized support and used his associational and UN contacts to lobby the UN on behalf of the trusteeship petitioners. Baldwin viewed the trust territories as *the* legal and political opening through which to address the human rights abuses of colonial rule. Baldwin also learned immeasurably from petitioners, about in-territory conditions, local politics, administrators' violations of trusteeship agreements, and how human rights could best be defined to bring about colonialism's demise.<sup>18</sup> By the 1950s, petitioners came to deliberately voice rights claims in terms that should have required the UN's intervention, and in many cases did. Plebiscites and Referendums were held, under UN supervision, in British Togoland, Somaliland, and Ruanda-Urundi. The French had to produce inventories accounting for every political prisoner in French Cameroon before the Trusteeship could be lifted on 1 January 1960.

As in the interwar period, the role of activist lawyers was not confined to trust territories. British and Caribbean lawyers represented Kwame Nkrumah of Gold Coast, who would become the first president of Ghana, as well as many of those detained for involvement in the anti-British movement in Kenya known as Mau Mau. French and Antillean activist lawyers defended opponents of French rule in courtroom trials in Madagascar, Côte d'Ivoire, and, most famously, Algeria, as well as in French Togo and French Cameroon from the late 1940s through the 1950s.<sup>19</sup> Activist lawyers offered legal counsel to African activists, denounced judicial irregularities, torturous interrogations and summary executions in metropolitan presses, disputed electoral results, and argued in court to protect rights to freedom of speech and assembly.

The components of rights claims voiced in the era of Africa's decolonization, included, again, transregional advocacy, now on an international scale; activist lawyers leveraging the law as a mode of contestation; increased use of media to shape public opinion; the use of petitioning, particularly in UN trust territories where inhabitants experienced a severe curtailment of civil and political liberties such as the banning of political parties (a violation of trusteeship agreements); and an engagement with the UN, specifically the UN Charter, the trusteeship agreements and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Interestingly, activist networks and the use of the law as a mode of contestation formula carried through into the early postcolonial period. Relationships between activists changed as, in some cases, former activists became office holders in new states and perpetrated abuses, typically by legislating against political opposition through the passage of Preventive Detention Acts, Anti-Subversion Laws, and the creation of military tribunals which compromised the independence of

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<sup>18</sup> See Meredith Terretta, " 'We Had Been Fooled Into Thinking that the UN Watches over the Entire World': Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and Africa's Decolonization," *Human Rights Quarterly* 34.2 (2012): 329-60.

<sup>19</sup> Meredith Terretta, "Cause Lawyering et anticolonialisme: activisme politique et état de droit dans l'Afrique française, 1946-1960," *Politique africaine* 2015/2, No. 138: 25-48; Sylvie Thénault, "Défendre les nationalistes algériens en lutte pour l'indépendance. La "défense de rupture" en question," *Le Mouvement social* 2012/3, No. 240: 121-35.

the judiciary branch. In these cases, political oppositionists became the new activists. However, the transregional networks, activist lawyers, and public opinion campaigns continued. Paradoxically, it is as the human rights movement became institutionalized in the late 1970s that this formula changed in significant ways.<sup>20</sup> Although further study is needed to assess the impact of the shift from transregional activist networks to the institutional NGO model on African rights activism, the effects were undoubtedly paradigmatic. Perhaps most significantly, the institutionalization of human rights and humanitarian activism through NGOs based in the global north moved activism's points of origin from the continent to the West, and from symmetrical, counterbalanced collaboration to asymmetrical broadcasting from North to South.

### Conclusion

So what I've tried to do for you here today is first, to explain how human rights genealogies emphasize historically contingent human agency in ways crucial to our present-day understandings of human rights. I've shown how a focus on activists—rights claimants and their advocates—rather than theorists can reveal alternative genealogies, geographies, and chronologies for human rights. It also shows how activist strategies shift and evolve depending on their perceived cause of rightlessness, the reach of their networks, and the uses they make of the law. Ben Golder, the scholar of legal thought whom I cited at the beginning of my talk, might ask whether my work is critical, recuperative, or prescriptive. The answer is it is all three. Critical because it reminds us that the meaning of human rights anywhere and everywhere has been, is and will be contingent and ever-changing as humans grapple with particular experiences. Recuperative because it enables us to know what continuities, ruptures, struggles, and innovations those experiences contained. And prescriptive because it opens the many past understandings and practices of human rights to productive reinterpretations, making human rights history a potential source of innovation. Following the activists and their advocates into the shadows of today's concept of human rights can light the way to alternative futures.

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<sup>20</sup> A study of the metamorphosis from the networked era of human rights activism to the institutionalized form of human rights and humanitarian activism emerging in the mid to late 1970s may be found in Gregory Mann, *From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sabel*, Cambridge University Press, 2015. For a firsthand account of a human rights lawyer who experienced the shift from an “ad hoc” networked model to the institutionalized NGO model, see the thought-provoking memoir by David Kennedy, *The Rights of Spring: A Memoir of Innocence Abroad*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.