

The Transformation of National Identity in Germany: The Role of Political Parties

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Abstract

This thesis examines how national identities change and evolve through time. In that sense, it joins other studies that have studied the mechanisms for changes in national identities. While some authors have tended to focus on state structure, institutional changes (i.e. the creation of federal institutions that encourage regional identities) or belief systems, this study argues that political parties play an important role on national identity formulation. Essentially, this study will establish the argument that political parties have an impact on the direction of national identity. Using HI it will illustrate that the institutional framework in which political parties operate affects the direction that they will push national identity towards. Indeed, political actors have a vision for national identity and they will articulate and redefine how national identity is conceptualized but not freely. Rather, how institutions guide actors, preferences and ideas is central to understanding why national identity takes the form and direction that it does. Using the case study of Germany (1949-1969), it will demonstrate that the CDU sought to define German national identity as one based on Christian *weltanschauung*, integration with the west (*westbindung*) and social market economy (*sozialen Marktwirtschaft*) and that with each notion the influence of the Basic Law and previous political institutions could be felt as emphasis would be put on how each concept was related to “freedom”, “individual rights” and “democracy”.

Key words: national identity, political parties, West Germany, CDU, NSDAP, Historical Institutionalism

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1. National Identity: the Impact of Political Parties

How and why does national identity evolve? This is a simple enough and rather straightforward question, but the answer is far more complex. This thesis will look into the role that political parties play in transforming and directing the course of national identity. It therefore implies that national identity is not static and that changes can be made over during its articulation. Looking at the case study of Germany, it will analyse how the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP) and the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Unions – CDU*) have influenced the direction of national identity in the German nation. During Nazi-era Germany, it was considered that Germany was being polluted by non-Volks, or non-Germans “resulting in the violent exclusion of any non-Germanic ethno-cultural group within the Nazi realm” (Allen, 2010: 2). The NSDAP sought to direct national identity towards an ethnic conception that was essentially based on its vision of a biologically and racially “pure” state. However, after the military defeat of the Third Reich in World War II (WWII), the birth of the FRG under the government of the CDU provided a different direction for how national identity was imagined. Not only did the German national identity seek to incorporate many elements of a nationalism based more on civic and cultural reading of nationalism (Allen, 2010), but also, as it was positioned by the CDU as Christian, Western and legitimized by the successes of the social market economy.

The “why” component to the question about changes in the direction of national identities is therefore linked to the role that political parties play in conceptualizations of national identity. Next, “how” do national identities change? Indeed, beyond the drastic transformation of German national identities, it is how political actors reconfigure a national identity that is of interest. Political actors operate within a given political system and this structure influences their vision of the nation. While pre-WWII Germany was a totalitarian state with political actors operating with very little structure and restraint and therefore quite “free” to articulate their vision, post-WWII Germany was a democracy. This has entailed a totally different set of constraints and structures. Therefore, while, German national identity has undergone transformations, but so did its political system. Following the end of the war, Germany was economically and politically destroyed and subsequently rebuilt by the Allies. A new political system was put into place with a new constitution, new institutions and the rearrangement of the political elite.

Indeed, when the Allied forces pushed through German defense lines in Italy, “East” met “West” on April 24, 1945 when Soviet and American troops met near Torgau, Germany on the Elbe River. The Soviets then took Berlin, where Hitler committed suicide on April 30, and the unconditional surrender of Germany followed on May 8, 1945 bringing an end to Hitler’s 12-year “Thousand Year Reich”. Germany’s occupation lasted until 1955 for Western Germany whereas Eastern Germany remained under Soviet rule until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

The Bonn Republic¹ was born in 1949 and faced considerable challenges as it sought to redefine itself in Europe. It has been argued that the legacy of WWII and its National Socialist past determined much of the nature of the Bonn Republic (Wittlinger, 2010). Therefore, the political institutions adopted sought to divide and diffuse power in order to avoid the rise of another Reich. Blending federalism and an electoral system based on proportional representation sought to make the establishment of a majority central government difficult and to encourage coalition governments. In addition, constitutional change was made difficult and put the emphasis on cooperation and consensus, as it required the approval of a two-thirds majority of both chambers. The new German Constitution – the Basic Law – ensured an independent judiciary system, a clear division of powers, and the rule of law. It emphasized human rights and freedoms and sought to render the government truly accountable to its citizens. Moreover, Germany's new political institutions have proven impermeable to change. Katzenstein (1988) argued that what is remarkable with West Germany's "longest experience with democracy" (Katzenstein, 1988: 325) is the persisting continuity of its political institutions despite significant international and national changes.

All these post-war induced political and institutional changes coincided with the transformation of national identity in Germany. With post-war democracy came a changed idea of national identity. Germany sought to re-define and project itself as a peace-loving liberal democracy. The Bonn Republic sought not only to keep a low international profile (*Machtvergessenheit*) but also to avoid identification with the nation (Ashkensis, 1976). Rather, Germans sought to encourage a national identity based on its "commitment to the democratic principles, values and institutions that had developed after, and, to some extent, because of Auschwitz" (Wittlinger, 2010: 4).

Hence, to reiterate, the puzzle is to understand the process of "why" and "how" German national identity changed in direction. In addition, this analysis seeks to better comprehend that while changes in directions of national identity occur they are not as necessarily as radical as they may seem on the surface. This is because national identity is a large and complex concept and can be defined on many different issues. As the literature review will demonstrate, political leaders have at their disposal a vast array of resources upon which to found national consciousness and therefore influence the direction of national identity: language, culture, history, religion, foreign policies, social policies, and founding documents. Hence, the very concept of national identity is dependant on many different understandings of the nation. This means that it is also not something that changes over night. National identity, because of its complexity and its embodiment of a vast array of ideas cannot undergo radical change. Rather, change will be gradual. Hence conceptualizing national identity as a painting, the artist continuously adds different shades that are applied one after another. Each layer of color adds a new element to the painting

¹ Since my timeframe concentrates on the thirty years following the war, the analysis will focus on the Bonn Republic for two main reasons. First, it is essentially the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into which the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was integrated in 1990. Hence, this reunification can be qualified with the GDR having to adopt the FRG's vision of national identity. Secondly, an idea linked to the first, is that the political institutions and political elites of the FRG remained the foundation of unified Germany due to the dismantling of socialist institutions in the GDR.

but it does not entirely erase what proceeded, rather it builds off it in order to create a different tone. This is what makes national identity such a rich and interesting concept to analyse. Political actors may seek to influence its direction and put the emphasis somewhere new as a painter may wish to add a new hue to his or her painting but it nonetheless is guided by what preceded it.

This leads us to our research question: How has German national identity evolved through the interactions of political institutions and political actors? It will be argued that the way political institutions are “structured” affects how national identity is “imagined”. In that sense, we must change our traditional focus (which tends to look at nationalism either as a socioeconomic or cultural phenomenon) and understand that nationalism is a political phenomenon (Lecours, 2000). Indeed, national identity is something that can be created, transformed and is inherently politicized. Hence, it can undeniably be only apprehended through a political approach. Therefore, in addition to viewing nationalism as a form of politics, we must also grasp that national identity and its subsequent direction depends on opportunity structures and collective action frameworks (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). Political actors do not operate in a vacuum. They are structured and shaped by their political environment (i.e., political institutions). Hence, such an analysis would concentrate on *how* political elites articulate national identity (and transform it) and *what* shapes their actions is possible (due to the constraints of political institutions but also due to past conceptualisations of the nation). Accordingly, my first argument is that national identity in Germany has undergone several shifts. My second argument is that political actors were the main actors influencing the direction of national identity. And my third argument is that how national identity was imagined was influenced by institutional design and by what preceded it. I therefore essentially claim that the interactions between political actors and political institutions are what give rise to the changes in direction of German national identity. In other words, this analysis focuses on a politicized account of identities.

This lead us towards the significant influence that political actors and political institutions have on influencing a state’s national identity. This analysis will start by conceptualizing our dependant variable – national identity. It will then define and conceptualize our independent variable – political parties. The main political actors in Germany driving change will be identified as the NSDAP during the Third Reich and the CDU in the first decade of the FRG. Therefore, the main focus of this analysis will be on the domestic drivers of change in national identity.

This does not mean that the CDU was not influenced by international considerations. Indeed, the role of the Allies in the early days of German political life was very important. And in particular, when the Cold War set in. The Berlin Blockade (June 24, 1948–May 12, 1949) heavily affected not only how the CDU viewed the future of the German nation but also the Allies’ perception of Germany. Indeed, the blockade and the ensuing wall that divided Berlin until 1989 cemented the CDU’s idea that the future of Germany lay with a strong alignment with the West, even if that meant compromising Eastern Germany in the process. Furthermore, while the economic integration of British and American zones (Bizonia) and introduction of the Deutschmark in Western-occupied zones had been the detonator for the Berlin Blockade, the blockade ultimately served to

speed up political integration, as previously reluctant France joined Bizonia to form Trizonia which set the basis for the future FRG. Finally, while there had been tensions between Germans, French, Americans and British in how to rebuild Germany, the blockade served as a reminder that all had common interests and values in the face of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Allies played another role in influencing the domestic structure of political parties and political life in Germany: de-nazification² and the presence of the Allied Control Council, which, in the immediate aftermath of the war, had complete control of all political activities in Germany. These structures and processes had considerable influence on the German political leadership of the occupation years and the early phases of the FRG. Hence, many plausible political leaders were refused access to political careers due to past associations, whether close or remote, with the Nazis during the Third Reich. In addition, the Allies tended to encourage political actors who had refused to cooperate with the Nazis to return to political life (see Merritt, 2016 for more information).

Literature Review

National Identity

Identity is all about answering the question of: “who am I?” or “who are we?” In other words, according to Guibernau, “Identity is a definition, an interpretation of the self that establishes what and where the person is in both social and psychological terms” (Guibernau, 2007: 10). It forms the basis of one’s relationship with the other. National identity is a type of collective identity. Collective identities are built on citizens’ feelings of belonging together as a group with a common political structure and a common political fate (Easton, 1965). This shared sense of community creates a sense of loyalty and obligation towards the group and its members, eventually leading them to subordinate their individual goals to the larger group (Herrmann and Brewer 2004). Therefore, as trust and solidarity is promoted among group members, collective identities in turn encourage political cooperation and strengthen the group acceptance of common institutions and

² It was noted however that while initially in Germany there was a strong will to de-Nazify Germany, recent information concerning the full extent of the de-nazification process in Germany tends to leave a more nuanced picture of success (see Taylor, 2011 and Messenger, Paehler, 2015). There was a strong will on the behalf of the Americans to punish the leadership of the Nazis and remove them from public life. For example, in Germany, 3,623,112 people in the American zone were screened, representing 21.7% of the German population in their zone. All in all, in Western Germany, Germans were screened and then classified as either major offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, and followers. In the American zone, 2.5% were convicted as major offenders, 11.2% as lesser offenders, 51.1% as followers while 33.3% of cases were suspended. In the British zone, none were convicted as major offenders, 1.3% as lesser offenders, 10.9% as followers while 29.4% of cases were suspended. In the French zone, 1% were convicted as major offenders, 2.5% as lesser offenders, 44.7% as followers while 52.2% of cases were suspended (Fürstenau, 1969: 227). This testifies to the differences between Allied zones regarding the de-nazification. However, it also demonstrates that the actual de-nazification process remained incomplete, with the great majority of people screened being classified as “followers” and hence not truly responsible for their actions. These individuals were reinstated through Article 131 of the Basic Law that either reintroduced them into public life or gave them full pensions. Finally, it should be noted that in both cases, once power was shifted to Germany, the purges slowly ceased. Indeed, in Germany, as early as in 1949, West German chancellor Adenauer stated the “need to punish the guilty, (extend) forgiveness and (make possible) reintegration for the misled or the fellow travellers” (Messenger and Paehler, 2015: 7).

collectively binding decisions (Kielmansegg, 2003). Generally speaking, collective identity is based on the idea that one group is somehow distinct from another. The ways in which, the criteria for differentiating groups and defining an individual's membership in a group, as well as the group's common interests, will vary. But eventually, these representations of what constitutes a group become embedded in institutions, symbols and cultural understandings that in turn become internalized in a socialization process, making them resistant to change (Brewer 2001, Risse 2000 and Marcussen et al 1999). However, while they may be resistant to change, they can be changed. This is apparent with the aforementioned case study of Germany's national identity before and after WWII.

National identity is not nationalism. The question is therefore not whether nations are an ancient and natural phenomena (Hastings 1997, Roshwald 2006, Grosby, 2005) or whether the creation of a nation coincided with modernity and the modern state (Kedourie 1960, Anderson 1993, Gellner 1989, Breuilly 1985, Hobsbawm and Rangers 1983, and Tilly 1994). Rather, national identity presupposes that a nation-state exists and that it is endowed with its own political institutions. Moreover, while nationalism can be used to challenge territorial or political arrangements, national identity is not used in this way but rather to create a sense of national unity for a given polity. Hence, national identity is used to mobilize solidarity among members of the nation and to formulate their identities and interests as members of that larger nation and not some other group; in other words, there is a "deep horizontal comradeship" that links members of a nation together (Anderson, 1991: 7).

The means that a state uses to provide and create a single national identity include: the construction and dissemination of a certain image of the nation, the creation and spread of symbols and rituals that are to reinforce a sense of community, the advancement of citizenship with well-defined civil, legal and political rights and duties, the creation of common enemies and the progressive consolidation of national education and media systems (Guibernau, 1996: 669-670). Therefore, national identities are not bounded or fixed. The dominant stories (the stories told from above) about identity can change through encounters, inscriptions, erasures or impositions. In that sense, they are social constructions and as such demand the reorganization of social and cultural boundaries, because "when people put political boundaries in place, they also organize social relations on each side of the boundary, relations across the boundary and stories about the whole ensemble" (Tilly, 2005: 182).

Essentially, this analysis will adopt the following definition of national identity: (1) national identity, like nations, is a mental construct and is therefore "imagined" (Anderson, 1993). People believe that they belong to a certain nation and as such adopt a given identity, but this is done without face-to-face contact with the majority of other members of this nation. (2) National identity is a collective and social identity, and as such, can be created and can be transformed through time. National identities are formed through the conscious efforts of political actors. (3) National identity is "based upon the sentiment of belonging to a specific nation, endowed with its own symbols, traditions, sacred places, ceremonies, heroes, history, culture and territory" (Guibernau, 1996: 658).

Furthermore, this analysis will focus on an understanding of national identity as emanating from “above”. I will argue that national identity is initiated, articulated and formulated at the state level. Hence, in this analysis, national identity emanates from the official discourse of the party in power through multiple political institutions. This is because nation and state are intertwined. While this does not mean that there may be varying understandings of what identity means within a state, the overarching state nonetheless seeks to represent what identity means or does not mean within its territory. Moreover, when differences in identity do exist, they tend to be in regions or territories that are dotted with their own political institutions. For example, while the federal government of Canada contends that it represents the Canadian nation at large, the province of Quebec often contends that it forms its own nation. However, the existence of a “sub-nation” beyond the fact that the territory speaks another language and historically practiced another religion, has been forged by the creation of distinct political institutions through which regional political actors can articulate, channel and define what this alternative identity may be. Hence, the fact that Canada is a federation has facilitated the continuation of a distinctive different identity within the Canadian nation.

Indeed, federalism is institutionally designed to provide greater regional autonomy as regional parliaments with independent competencies develop. This provides the “opportunity” for regional or national political parties to contest and possibly win elections and therefore continue to develop their own regional visions of identity (Jesse and Williams, 2005). Similar institutional designs and the existence of alternative identities exist in Spain (e.g., Catalunya), Belgium (e.g., Flanders), Great Britain (e.g., Ireland or Scotland), Germany (e.g., Bavaria) or even the creation of the supra-national identity of the European Union (EU). In that sense, the importance of institutions in promoting identity cannot be ignored. While, the forms of identity may differ (inclusive or exclusive identities), the underlying issue is that this identity ultimately is channelled through institutions, and this analysis has chosen to concentrate on state-level institutions in order to find the largest common denominator of identity.

In addition, there are distinctions that can be made with regards to on what sort of collective identity national identity is defined. In other words, how national identity is conceived and “imagined” can differ. Indeed, Kohn argues in a highly normative analysis that the world of nations be divided into Western states (civic) and non-Western states (ethnic), based on the claim that ethnic nations are culturally oriented with an emphasis on education, propaganda and cultivation of native values whereas civic nations are politically oriented with an emphasis on policy-making and government (Kohn, 1944). Basically, civic national identities are democratic, with an emphasis on civil society and liberalism whereas ethnic national identities are authoritarian and exclusionary.

To demonstrate, on the one hand, civic nations are based on the idea of a social contract, open membership based on free choice, sovereignty located in the individuals who enjoy civic rights, rationality, because the national mentality looked towards the future, political and economic advancement, and universalism. Ethnic nations, on the other hand, are based on the idea of an organic and natural community, objective and ascribed factors determined membership to the nation and acquired through birth, sovereignty

understood in collectivist terms and above the individual, and irrationality as the national mentality looked to the past in search of roots for regeneration. In other words, rather than cultural baggage, it is the political rights and attachments to civic and political institutions (the rule of law, the constitution, etc.) that legitimize state rulers in civic nations.

Despite the obvious normative values behind Kohn's distinction, scholars have been influenced by the dichotomy between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism (Gellner 1983, Ignatieff 1994, Hobsbawm 1992, Smith 1986, Renan 1995). While it is too normative to argue that there are geographical explanations for such differences, the distinction between different forms of national identities is important. However, just as much as we cannot seriously argue that ethnic national identities are reserved for non-Western states, national identities cannot be neatly categorized into one distinct category either. Muller (2008) or Spencer (2014) have demonstrated that when states are faced with external threats, they tend to refocus their national identities on a more ethnic reading.

It has already been mentioned that national identity is not nationalism and that there are different sides to national identity. It is now very important to also make the distinction between state ideology and national identity. Indeed, as Gerring (1997) states, "ideology is a highly flexible conceptual tool" (Gerring, 1997: 957). Furthermore, because political parties have ideologies, the distinction between the ideology of the political party and the vision for national identity of the political party becomes quite blurry. Let's start by stating the obvious: ideology is essentially how we view the world. Through what lenses do we make sense of it all? The main political ideologies that have dominated the past century are liberalism, conservatism, socialism and communism. In party politics, ideology and individual and collective views on the world have been shaped by the divide between left and right, between conservative and progressive (Noel and Thérien, 2008). This idea is reinforced by studies on party stances on European integration. It has been noted that the fundamental differences has been over "regulated capitalism" and "neo-liberalism" (Hooghe and Marks, 1999) and in that sense, contestation has been "understood to be over a two-dimensional space, delimited by a left/right dimension from social democracy (and state socialism) to market liberalism" (Hellstrom, 2008: 192).

The confusion stems from the fact that nationalism has often been considered an ideology. Smith's definition implicitly calls nationalism a form of ideology: "nationalism is an ideological movement to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an accrual or potential "nation" It is an active movement inspired by an ideology and symbolism of the nation" (SOURCE). Other scholars on nationalism agree that ideology is paramount to the creation and reproduction of nationalism. Hence, Kedourie sees nationalism as a full-fledged ideology that is spread through imitation. Whereas Orridge (1981) claims that the ideological role overlaps with the functions of national identity. It obviously serves the cohesive need of the state if it can appeal to a sense of common identity. And Larsen (1995) also claims that, "ideology again overlaps with identity because a fundamental belief of nationalism is that people can only be self-realized and can only obtain full freedom in the nation-state". There is a link between nationalism and ideology, with many claiming that nationalism is a form of ideology or at the very least has ideological content. On the other

hand, ideology is “a system of the ideas and representations (images, ideas, or concepts) which dominate the mind of a man or a social group”. In other words, ideologies are systems of political thought, flexible or rigid, deliberate or not, through which the individuals and the groups construct a given understanding of the political world that they live in and then act. Basically: ideologies are frames or lenses through which we make sense of the world

Some studies have sought to analyse how state policies have not only impacted how the nation’s identity is defined but also how state ideology has influenced its direction by influencing the choice of policies available to political actors. This means that while state ideology is not national identity, it does nonetheless guide its direction. Lamp and Mazower (2004) demonstrated how political ideology and religious identity influenced the direction of national identity in South-eastern Europe. The authors therefore contest the commonly held assumption that the two great wars and the ensuing Cold War were the sole reason why national identity in the region took the forms that they did. Rather, they argue that there is a strong connection between ideology and national identity, or in the authors’ words, “our focus is on another connection, between ideology and the national identity it sought to provide as the ‘cement’ in the social formation of the modern state” (Lamp and Mazower, 2004: 4). Hence, leaders with given political or religious ideologies advanced or contested national identities which consequently transformed these identities.

Bloomaert (1999) also took for granted in his study on the construction of the Tanzanian nation that it was built around the common Swahili language and a common state ideology, conceptualized as Ujamaa (Bloomaert, 1999: 88). Hence, Ujamaa and the underlying humanist idea that “man (was) the objective of all development” (Bloomaert, 1999: 36) was the foundation upon which intellectuals and political leaders in Tanzania built “National Culture”. The obvious interaction and thereby link between ideology and national identity is clear. Fawn (2003) also demonstrates the link between the two in his study of nation and state building of post-communist states. He argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the replacement of the Communist ideology by Western neo-liberal leaders who then influenced the process of state and nation building. Essentially, the direction of “who we are” or in other words, national identity, was provided through foreign policy. In the author’s words, “the extent to which the construction of a national identity governs foreign policy and the extent to which foreign policy is used to express within and outside the country this new or renewed national identity becomes the central issue pursued” (Fawn, 2003: 1). Therefore, Fawn recognizes that national identity, ideology and foreign policy are conjoined and influence each other.

Shifting from foreign policy to social policy, Béland and Lecours (2004) argued that there is a link between this and national identity. Indeed, they claim that, in Canada, the federal government had recognized the relationship between social policy expansion and the construction of a Canadian national identity in the “ideal of Canada as a ‘just society’ [which] was also part of this nation-building project. In this context, federal social programmes gathered Canadians from all backgrounds and walks of life under the umbrella of a universal “we”—a single national community of fate” (Lecours and Beland, 2004: 57). Hence, they explain that in multinational states like Belgium and Canada, the fact that

regional governments pursue different social policies can help to contribute to the development of distinct regional national identities that are different from the center in addition to becoming the focal point of nationalist action. It is argued that while most nationalist scholars focus on ethnicity, culture, or on language. There is an important role that social policy can play in the development of national consciousness and therefore the rise in a different national identity. Indeed, the authors claim that social policy is very effective for identity building and territorial mobilization. In their study, Beland and Lecours put the emphasis on how sub-state political parties will put the emphasis on the social policy preferences because social policy can be treated and articulated by nationalist leaders as symbols of a wider set of values, societal priorities and political culture. They argue that healthcare coverage, social services and income support programs are as much as culture present in the everyday life of individuals and constitute a source of social cohesion. Indeed, social policy is at the heart of community and can be connected to a set of collective values. Therefore, “national solidarity is a political and ideological construct that owes much to nationalism as a political force” and therefore, social policy “is both the vehicle whereby common values can be expressed and the means whereby a society consciously reproduces its own identity” (Miller, 1995)

So while, social policy will help define the values upon which a nation’s identity should be founded upon, ideological values can affect the direction of nationalist movements. Hence strong religious values may lead to more conservative social and family policies or in contrast, for example, in Quebec, at the ideological level, the shift of Quebec nationalism geared towards a more progressive vision of social policy coincided with the decline of the Catholic Church.

The reasons why policies as vectors for national identity formation can be important is because, policy (which is influenced by ideology) is the vehicle through which common values are expressed and in turn becomes the means through which a society reproduces its own identity. Hence it is not all about ethnicity, or religion or language that defines a nation’s identity. It is also upon what policy and values a nation can be defined upon. This idea reiterates what was mentioned earlier: national identity as understood in this thesis is not solely about culture, language or religion but rather it is about how political actors will define the contours of the nation. This is a politicised account of national identity formation. To further develop the distinctions between state ideology and national identity. It can be argued that both are systems of ideas and representations and that both emanate from the state. However, where they differ is that ideology is influenced by who is in power. In other words, who is in power will define state ideology whereas, national identity is more complicated and is influenced by more elements that include: values, policies, language, culture, and territory. Hence, state ideology will influence national identity in that it is an ideational frame. Hence it is not and has never been whether communism, fascism, or liberalism is the national identity of the state but rather that these ideational frameworks will guide and influence how national identity is defined. To conclude, the essence or content of national identity is “fed” an influx of information that influences its direction. This influx comes from a superposition of foreign policy, social policy, economic policy and ideology. Finally, and very importantly, it can also be argued that while state ideology will change rather suddenly depending on who is in power, national identity changes more slowly. This is due to the inherent fact that it depends on more input than state ideology

on its own but also because whereas national identity is always defined on the idea of core values that are to define the nation, the influx of information it will receive through foreign policies, economic policies, social policies and values will be gradually added onto this core which will eventually direct identity formation in a different direction.

Changes, Transformations and the Evolution of National Identity...through the State, Belief Systems, or Institutional Changes?

This study joins others who have sought to better grasp the mechanisms behind national identity change. Some authors have sought to explain the origin and transformation of national identities by looking at structural constraints like state structure. Stidel (2012) demonstrates the importance of this and looks at the newly decolonized states in Southeast Asia and how each conceptualized national identity. He demonstrates that there were diverging patterns towards statehood and that each pattern produced a different conceptualization of national identity. Inland agrarian states of mainland Southeast Asia developed coherent and centralized military, fiscal and administrative structures in order to defend themselves against their neighbours, which not only encourages monetization, land settlements and reclamations but also the homogenization of language, culture and religion. In such cases, ethnic cores were configured and state national identity revolved around “being” Burmese, Cambodian or Vietnamese.

On the other hand, island Southeast Asian countries unburdened from the war-making cycle experienced a form of fragmented colonial rule: indirect rule led to a decentralization upon decolonization and proto-federal state structures. This led to more state ambiguity with regards to what national identity should entail. Indeed, efforts revolved around “becoming” Malaysian or Filipino. Kaplan and Herb (2011) claim that “geography shapes national identities” in that landscape images help embody national character; for example, the nascent Irish state developed the imagery of thatched cottages and working peasants that directly opposed the urban and industrial image of Great Britain. Klesner (2006) argues that the US has played a critical role in the development of Mexican national identity. Indeed among groups who are most exposed to direct contact with the US (i.e., close to the US-Mexican border) have developed different conceptions of national identity.

Sometimes, the structural constraint has less to do with the state as an institution, and more to do with previously existing cultural identities. Arguing that introducing a new identity requires changing the way people think and act, those initiating change must often “enrol assorted participants and allies who often resist or assert their own agendas. Promoters often introduce material or cultural devices in the course of cajoling or co-opting these actors; they also frequently have to revise the idea or practice in questions” (Fukase-Indergaard and Indergaard, 2008: 350). Hence, in modernizing Japan, Meiji-state builders were forced to adapt and build on pre-existing identities, which essentially entailed the adoption of Shinto as a state religion, transforming it from its previous indigenous status, all under the watchful and benevolent eye of the Japanese Emperor. Such an explanation tempers the idea that political actors are entirely free in formulating their visions of identity, but also demonstrates that they can definitely direct it. Moreover, it testifies to the

importance that lessons of the past or identities of the past can be incorporated into the understandings of the new nation.

Others have looked at belief systems and the documents or monuments that enshrine them to explain the emergence of national identity. For example, Lipset (1963) argued that with the birth of the American Constitution of 1787, the US became “the first nation”. He argues that it is the role of values and the specific social conditions in the US that allowed the US to successfully break away from the British Empire and install a civic democracy, something that other decolonizing Latin American States were unable to create. Jurgen Habermas and Dolf Sternberger talk about *Verfassungspatriotismus* or constitutional patriotism to explain how the Basic Law of 1949 has played a central role in defining national identity in post-WWII Germany. This is essentially because national symbols and history had largely been discredited with the Nazis. Hence, the Parliamentary leader of the CDU Friedrich Merz claimed, in 2001, that, “the Basic Law is the foremost expression of our value-system and therefore part of German cultural identity which facilitates the internal cohesion of our society” (Manz, 2009: 488). There is a symbolism attributed to the founding document that guarantees the survival of the nation and also embodies it.

Martinsen (2010) claims that national identity and national interests are linked. This is because when the Federal Agency for Civic Education published *The Quest for German Identity*, peace was equated with German identity. Martinsen sees a shift in this identity. Arguing that German security white books can help grasp how German’s define national identity, he claims that throughout the Cold War, national interests were defined in vague terms through the defence of democratic values and support for international law but that now the books argue for stronger military engagement abroad and have blurred the distinction between peace and war.

The role that public memory plays in promoting one vision of identity over another is another important element. This is because,

“there are private and public memories....they often stand in opposition to what is being said in public discourse. In the other hand, we have to realise that memories always have a function in the public sphere....what is remembered in the present always stands in relation to this present, one could say: it is always instrumentalized. What is remembered always serves to legitimate or to delegitimise the present” (Aledia, Assman as quoted in, Lewis, 2003: 117).

Indeed, in the post-WWII era, the Holocaust has largely constituted the “otherness” for Germans. How Germany remembers the Holocaust as it seeks to become a “normal” nation has been an important element of German nation building. For example the *Leitkultur* debate in Germany, initiated in 2000–2001 when parliamentary CDU leader, Friedrich Merz claimed that foreigners in Germany should adapt to German values and norms of ‘*Leitkultur*’. The debate struck a chord in Germany as,

“it combine(d) two pre-established discursive patterns that lie at the very heart of German identity construction. Whilst its first lexeme *Leit-* hints at a hierarchical relationship between cultures with the German one taking the lead, the second lexeme *-kultur* denotes the social glue that is traditionally meant to bind Germans together” (Manz, 2004: 483).

The political Walser–Bubis debate³ that focused on ‘Auschwitz’ and on how Germany should remember the crimes of its Nazi past is particularly interesting. Indeed, it forced politicians to weigh in on the debate and also coincided with a time when a new generation of Germans were coming into power that had not participated in the war first-hand. What ensued was a debate centered on what continued role the Holocaust should take in Germany as political leaders debated the design of the Berlin Holocaust memorial.

Changes in national identity can also be symbolized in official documents. Indeed, Igartua (2006) claims that after WWII, representations of national identity in English Canada underwent a deep transformation – moving from an ethnic definition towards a right-based concept of citizenship as embodied through the 1946 Citizenship Act, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963–70) and the adoption of the federal multiculturalism policy in 1971. Hence, just as the constitutionalization of political parties has changed how political parties operate, there is also a link between constitutional democracy and the creation of a civic nation (Breton, 1986 and Ipperciel, 2007). In other words, if civic national identity is based on political rights and freedoms, they must be protected by an official document that in turn provides legitimacy that is independent of ethnicity, language or religion. The Basic Law of 1949 exemplifies this change. The new document sought to replace previous national symbols as bearers of identity by a document that sought to symbolize the nation’s values.

Looking at institutional changes, Bechhofer and McCrone argue that there is an emergence or at least a re-assertion of sub-state nationalisms that question and provide alternatives to the dominant state national identity. In particular, they question the emergence of a Scottish national identity and argue that it was constitutional change (i.e., the creation of the Scottish Parliament) that made people feel more Scottish rather than the change itself being driven by the increase of Scottish nationalism. In other words, devolution provided the institutional context that allowed Scots to imagine themselves through different lenses. Furthermore, they argue that while “constitutional change afforded the key critical context in which the nature of claims to identities, and the way they are negotiated, were likely to change” (Bechhofer and McCrone, 2009: X), they were nonetheless based on a previously existing difference in what it meant to be Scottish. Indeed, people in Scotland had been “brought up and educated by Scottish institutions, governed and judged by a distinct legal system, and in the case of Presbyterians, worshipped in a Scottish way through a Scottish national church” (Bechhofer and McCrone, 2009: 13). Hence, what this constitutional institutional change concretely allowed Scots to do for the first time was to actually have a political institution that could serve as a legitimizing alternative to British national identity.

³ When Walser was awarded the Peace Prize at the Frankfurt Book Fair in 1998, his acceptance speech concentrated on the problems of Germany constantly taking its guilt as a “moral stick” which it used to hit the German nation over and over again. He condemned the instrumentalization of the Holocaust as a “permanent exhibit of our shame” and pleaded that it was time for the German nation to move on and become a normal nation. He raised the ire of Ignatz Bubis, President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany.

Hence, Argelaguet (2006) claimed that it was a consensus between Catalanian leaders that prompted them to define the Catalan language as central to Catalan identity. He argues that regional leaders, by focusing on education and the teaching of the Catalan language, reinforced Catalan identity. Hence, while throughout the 1980s and 1990s Catalan nationalist parties governed Catalonia, when the Socialists came into power in 2003, the consensus that there was a distinct Catalan identity continued and, as such, its language continued to be taught and protected throughout the education system. According to Argelaguet, this consensus is due to the practical realization that, “political parties have to design their strategies and activities while bearing in mind that the Catalan population is divided on many sensitive issues, such as the national question” (Argelaguet, 2006: 450). Here it is the “national question” and “structure of society” that is structuring the rules of the game for Catalan political parties, but in addition, Catalonia is placed in the greater Spanish context, as Catalan leaders have also used Catalan to propose an identity in opposition to the Spanish one (which has also only been possible because of the institutional structure of Spain, which is a decentralized federation).

In all these studies on national identity transformations and changes, the state, belief systems and institutions are the parameters that are structuring possibility and opportunity for change. This thesis seeks to build on this premise in order to analyse the actual process and driver of change. It will argue for the importance of political parties and the recognition that they can be the main drivers renegotiating national identity. In addition, while recognizing the importance of the state, the aforementioned studies also concur that changes in national identity are most likely to occur when there have been major changes in state institutions. This thesis will also seek to support that premise. The case study of the drastic transformation of national identity in post-war Germany attests to this. Indeed, there was a new window of opportunity to transform German national identity following the war with the restructuration of the German state and its political institutions.

Changes, Transformations and the Evolution of National Identity...through Political Parties?

Political parties as political actors have become, in democracies, significantly important institutions. While, in the past, the mobilization of partisan interests was seen as a threat to the supposed neutral public and common good, because political parties and factions were often thought of as equivalent (Maisel and Brewer, 2008: 29), the idea that parties could have a positive and constructive impact on the politics slowly emerged (Burke, 1976: 425). This change occurred when the idea that diversity was no longer considered incompatible with political order started emerging. While parties had been

“inconceivable in the Hobbesian or in the Spinozan view of politics; they were not admitted into the city of Rousseau. They are only conceivable, and have actually been conceived, when the ‘horror of disunity’ is replaced by the belief that a monochromatic world is not the only possible foundation of the polity” (Sartori, 1976: 13).

From their initial reluctant acceptance, political parties today have become thought of as vital political institutions. Indeed, the idea that “political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the political parties” (Schattschneider

1942: 1), has been embraced by many scholars (Dahl, 1982, Schumpeter, 1943, Schmitter and Karl, 1991). Indeed, a direct consequence of the constitutionalization of political parties has been the transformation of “political parties from socio-political organizations into institutions that form part of the official fabric of the democratic state” (Van Biezen, 2011: 209). Furthermore, this means that the roles that political parties may play in addition to “the rules of the game” have been codified by the constitution, a significant political institution. A direct consequence of the constitutionalization of parties, whether intended or unintended, has been a new definition of “the rules of the game” which has influenced, determined and constrained what political parties may do in addition to shaping their identities and opportunity structures.

Hence, political parties have gone from being incompatible with democracy to being its very foundation. Beyond being transformed into the gatekeepers of democracy, political parties have also played a fundamental role in developing visions of national identity and have often had a profound effect on how national identity is conceived. Indeed, it is of no coincidence that this analysis chooses to focus on the influence of the CDU on German national identity. The new democracy of Germany was provided, by the occupying Western powers, with a new constitutional framework that “constitutionalized” political parties on the premise that political parties are important political institutions for democracy. Furthermore, political parties have, over time, played an important role on how identity is viewed and understood which has consequently altered its definition. Indeed, the post-war Germany of the CDU of the 1950s–1960s linked its national identity with the principle of “free democratic basic order” which translated into the integration of West Germany with Western civilisation, social market economy and Christian socialism.

There have been studies that have analysed the connection between national identity and political parties. Indeed, Kleuters (2009) demonstrates that political struggles between political parties can help explain why certain visions of national identity are promoted over others. Hence, he argues that while the CDU under Adenauer claimed that West Germany represented the entire German nation, including Eastern Germany, this was essentially because of the CDU–SPD political struggle that brought the CDU to “link peace and reconciliation with the West to anti-communism and the impossibility of German reunification” (Kleuters, 2009: 525), while the SPD claimed that ‘Change through Rapprochement’, (which essentially became the backbone of *Ostpolitik*) should replace the old CDU paradigm. These two competing political parties offered two competing visions for the future of the German nations, as they sought to adapt to a changing international structure.

There seems to be a recurrent theme that changes in how national identity is conceived occur during political crises or political change. Hence as the USSR crumbled, Russia was faced with a dire task: how to forge a new nation, one that would “reconcile civic identities based on inclusive citizenship and exclusive ethnic identities based on such common characteristics as culture, religion, language and a common ancestor of a dominant nationality, on the one hand, and of ethnic minorities, on the other” (Tolz, 1998: 993). Tolz demonstrates that each political party had their own vision of Russian identity. While President Yeltsin, through declarations and new laws, struggled to change previous

Russian concepts that identity had to be based on an ethno-national doctrine, his leadership and political party put forward the idea of a Russian identity based on co-citizenship and adopted, in 1993, the definition that Russians were “a community of citizens” (Tolz, 1998: 1009). His motions and ideas were constantly challenged by other visions of Russian identity, such as those of the Communist Party of the Russian Republic, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and the Congress of People’s Deputies. These opposition political leaders have “devoted much more space in their writings and public speeches to the question of what is the Russian nation than [did] the president and his supporters in the executive branch of government” (Tolz, 1998: 1012) and have also successfully redirected identity definitions. For example, President Yeltsin in 1996 increased his efforts to achieve CIS and Slavic integration as a direct consequence of the communist sponsored resolution that revoked the Belovezhe Accords. Hence, political parties have a keen idea and definition of identity, and use their political power to influence state positions on how that identity is defined. Finally, while this may be influenced by ideology, it is the vision put forward by political parties that corresponds to the way national identity is envisioned.

In Taiwan, national identity has become a strong focal point for political parties. While there seems to be a contention between the different visions of national identity that the “pan-blue” and “pan-green” parties advocate, the fact remains that both political parties agree that a Taiwanese “nation” exists. This nation considers itself part of mainland China but refuses to be “dictated” to by the government of Beijing. Rather, they claim that they form a distinct nation within China and that their differences must be respected. However, beyond this basic agreement, Taiwanese political parties differentiate with regards to what it means to be Taiwanese. The Kuomintang, under Lien Chan’s leadership sought to “make the party of the ‘New Taiwanese’, a people of citizens who would identify with Taiwan’s history, its economic and political achievements, and its liberal constitutional state” (Schubert, 2004: 540). In essence, it was positioning a Taiwanese identity in opposition to mainland China. The People’s First Party (PEP) has also actively sought to promote a Taiwanese national identity in opposition to mainland China by affirming that throughout the island’s 400-year recorded history “a portion of the Taiwan people have built a separate political and cultural identity (*renting*)” and that its specific “history and cultural rootedness make it very difficult for the majority of the people to accept a policy that aims at realizing unification as soon as possible” (Schubert, 2004: 543-44). These two political parties mainly represent the “pan-blue” movement that acknowledges differences between Taiwan and mainland China but does believe in a reunification eventually as long as the reunification allows for Taiwanese particularities to survive. However, other Taiwanese political parties take a much more uncompromising stance. They are the “pan-green” parties. They advocate Taiwanese independence from mainland China on the basis that Taiwan can no longer identify itself with mainland China (Schubert, 2004). This is not about ideology but about what it means for each political party to be Taiwanese and as such, what constitutes the Taiwanese nation.

Other studies that have sought to analyse the role that political parties play in how national identity can be imagined. Heywood (2002) claims that all major political parties operating in Scotland must project and reflect a sense of national identity that sections of the electorate can recognize and associate themselves with, as these political parties provide the link between civil society, institutions and the wider public. Today, in Scotland,

the idea of being Scottish is now linked to a sense of place or civic form of belonging rather than a sense of history, tribe or birth. The change was gradual but occurred through political parties. Indeed, Leith and Soule (2011) demonstrate how political parties built this new image of Scottish national identity by employing “a sense of national identity within their core documents” (Leith and Soule, 2011: 41) which demonstrated how political party members and leaders directed all their arguments and ideas towards the sense of Scotland as a place rather than a tribe. Hence, Scottish political parties through parliamentary debates and party manifestos have consistently influenced the direction of how national identity in Scotland is perceived and understood.

The same thing can be found in the German Federation. The Bavaria region has often promoted a different vision of identity than that of the rest of Germany and political parties have played an important role in this. In Bavaria, the Christian Social Union’s (CSU) political project is intimately linked to promoting a distinct Bavarian identity different from the center. This has forced other political parties to reinforce their positions on identity and territory (Hepburn, 2008). Bavaria has a long tradition of disassociating itself with the rest of Germany. The strong identity of Bavarian parties was apparent in their unanimous rejection of the Basic Law in 1949, as it was perceived as not federalist enough. Indeed, one of the issues that Bavarian political parties have promoted as essential in safeguarding the distinct identity of Bavaria has been a decentralized federalism. Moreover, in 1946, the Bavarian Assembly voted upon a Bavarian constitution, and the first line had read ‘Bavaria is a Free State’, and was littered with references to Bavaria’s traditions of statehood and sense of identity (Hepburn, 2008: 6). The CSU has been successful in establishing itself as the prime defender of Bavarian interests in Germany with only a three-year break from power (1954–57). According to Hepburn, this has been done by advancing a vision of a single Bavarian culture that bridges the Catholic South and Protestant North and then successfully ties it to party identity by campaigning on slogans such as “Bavaria, the CSU and Strauss” in 1986 or “Vote for Bavaria” more recently and by adopting the Bavarian traditional national symbols of the lion and blue diamond as party symbols. Here, a regional political party has sought to embody a representation of a regional national identity. But this literature is more about how political parties are trying to defend a vision of a distinct national identity as different from the center. This thesis will seek to explain the role that central political parties play in articulating national identity and thereby transform it, rather than on simple definition, redefinition and protection.

The literature on the building of the European Union (EU) has also demonstrated the important roles that political parties have played on promoting national identities in certain cases and collective supra-national identities in others. Because the EU has become a true political entity and as such, “an object of identification besides and above the national community” (Bergbauer, 2010: 2), Bergbauer asserts that national political parties have, in general, been giving more and more importance to issues pertaining to the collective European identity. Since the 1980s, political parties have been contributing more and more of their party statements to promoting identity. Indeed, with the exception of Greece and the UK, political parties have put the emphasis of collective identities on the EU rather than on national states. Bergbauer demonstrates that on average, between 1994 and 2004, 16% of party statements relate to identity matters. While, his analysis seeks to demonstrate

the tendency of political parties to emphasize a European identity, the fact remains that political parties have been politicising identity more and more, and as such, have been influencing its direction. Indeed as of 2004, of the 16.3% of identity issues in party statements, 38% make reference to national identity whereas 62% refer to European identity. This has been accompanied by a clear tendency by the state to seek further integration with the European community.

While Topaloff (2012) does not agree with the overall tendency of political parties putting a stronger emphasis on collective European identities like Bergbauer, he does demonstrate the important impact that political parties may have on state identity policies. He argues that although once marginalized by the state and by the electorate, anti-EU political parties such as the French Front National (FN), the Italian Lega Nord, and the Finish Perussuomalaiset (True Finns) have been able to rise in prominence by voicing their strong anti-EU positions and positing themselves as the guardians of national identity (Topaloff, 2012: 3). Indeed, until the mid-1980s, no mainstream political party, with the exception of in the UK, publically and proudly took a position against the EU during domestic elections. Today, this is commonplace. Political parties have increasingly and successfully sought to redefine national identity in opposition to the EU project. For example, in France, the FN campaigned against the Masstricht Treaty (1992) by claiming that “it was the end of France, the French people, its language and culture” (Le Pen, in Front National 1993, 366–367 quoted in Hainsworth, O’Brien and Mitchell, 2004: 46).

Furthermore, demonstrating the importance of political parties in how identity is defined, 26 EU member states out of 27 have decided to ratify the Constitution Treaty through their national assemblies rather than holding a national referendum. This has served to politicise identity, as political parties have appropriated identity in the fight over further European centralization or decentralization. Hence, Hainsworth, O’Brien and Mitchell demonstrate how the *Rassemblement Pour la République* (RPR)⁴ claimed that the European Union Treaty (2007) would undermine France’s national identity that brought many RPR deputies to campaign against its ratification. Indeed, the RPR has historically been the Gaullist party and the party associated with the founding of the Fifth Republic. It has also tried to portray itself not as a political party but as a “national movement” by claiming the ability to speak for all French people (Hainsworth, O’Brien and Mitchell, 2004: 38). The de Villier’s political party, *Union pour la France* (UPF), has also been adamant in its defence of the sovereignty of French national identity in the face of not only an expanding EU but also in opposition to other political parties. He claims that by cohabitating with the socialists, the RPR–UDF destroyed “the values of imitative, and responsibility, patriotic and national values, moral and civic values, values of mutual aide, aesthetic and ethical values (de Villiers, 1991 as quoted in Hainsworth, O’Brien and Mitchell, 2004: 51), all important French values.

The surprising defeat of the 2005 Constitutional Treaty in France was also highly linked to how political parties appropriated ideas of identity faced with further integration. Indeed, the refusal of the treaty by 54.7% of the electorate despite then-President Chirac’s

⁴ The RPR was replaced by the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) in 2002 by Jacques Chirac which was itself renamed Les Républicains in 2015.

personal interventions on three occasions for a “Yes” vote was a political success for the French left. The fringe French political parties had campaigned against the Treaty, stating that it would undermine France’s national identity (Ivaldi, 2006). Moreover, what is truly interesting here is how, despite being an issue of direct democracy, in that a referendum is an opportunity for the people to speak and not their representatives (i.e., political parties), this case illustrates that political parties were so keen in promoting their vision the future of France’s identity within the EU that they monopolized and appropriated the referendum. And they were successful in bringing their voters to vote following party conviction. Of the extreme left and communist supporters, 94% and 98% voted against the European constitution respectively; similarly, 75% of the *Mouvement Pour la France* (MPF) voters and 93% of the FN supporters rejected the Treaty, as did 79% those who had cast their vote in favour of *Chasse Pêche Nature et Traditions* (CPNT) leader Jean Saint-Josse in the first round of the 2002 presidential election (Ivaldi, 2006: 8).

In France, as extremist parties gain in popularity, new definitions of national identity have taken hold. This in itself is not novel. Political parties and their leaders have often used “the nation” to gain public support for government. Indeed, General de Gaulle called upon memories of the “French grandeur” to unite the French behind the Fifth Republic, while socialist Presidential hopeful Francois Mitterrand used images of a quiet village with its church steeple (images of a time-honoured French village) as a backdrop for his election campaign posters in order to rally the support of rural France and demonstrate his commitment to traditional French values and identity. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2009, opened a debate on national identity after the theme had already dominated the 2007 presidential election. Indeed, during the campaign he promised to create a Ministry for National Identity claiming that,

“I say, what is France? What does it mean to be French? I say, there is a national identity that is not reduced to an ethnic group, is that shocking? I say, that those immigrants that seek to join us must adhere to this national identity, is that shocking? And Mrs. Royal, who is someone I believe to be reasonable but with whom I do not share the same ideas, claims that this is ‘awful’? But you must understand that this is insulting, not for me, but for the thousands of people who share my opinion when they question whether France means something today?” (Sarzoky, 2007).

How to redefine national identity was clearly becoming an election issue for the UMP. Once elected, Sarkozy successfully inaugurated the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development, whose mandate is to better select immigrants, help their integration, define and protect national identity and foster co-development. A couple years later, in 2009, the UMP sought to open up a national dialogue on national identity, with Sarkozy speaking at length of a “crisis”, of “traditions” being challenged and of “national identity” being under threat, with examples either linked to the left or immigration. Hence, he sought to demonstrate that the UMP “owned” the issue of national identity and that solutions proposed by the left were harming and destroying

France's national identity. This debate eventually led to the banning of the niqab, or the Islamic full covered veil, as it was judged as being incompatible with French national values.

The debate also paved the way for the political revival of the extreme-right Front National (FN) who essentially campaigns as the only party willing to defend France's national identity. All in all, when the UMP attempted to direct the debate on national identity, the FN, as a political party with its own vision of the French nation, fed off this "opening" and started proposing its own definition of French national identity that has largely been contributed to its revival (Martigny, 2009). The FN has been adamant in claiming that the French are "victims of financial and economic globalization and jihadist globalization and that both forces are destroying the France that we know and love" (Marine Le Pen, February 5, 2017, Lyon). Furthermore, the 20–30% of the French public themselves feel like French national identity must be protected and that the FN is doing a good job and a majority believe that French society is losing its national identity (Lamontagne, Stockemer, 2010: 50). So far, the FN has been the most vocal political party in asserting that French national identity was under threat and that, as such, it needed to be protected and through the process, they are redefining it. It paid off. After historically beating the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin and coming in second place in the 2002 Presidential Elections, the FN was decimated in the 2002 legislative elections with only 11.3% of the vote. They won 11% in the 2007 presidential election but no seats in the 2007 legislative elections, with only 4.3% of the vote. Only one candidate⁵ reached the run-off, only to be defeated by the PS.

However, after the redefining of national identity by the UMP, the FN re-emerged with 12% in the 2010 regional elections, 15% in the 2011 cantonal elections, 24.86% in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, and 33.9% in the 2017 Presidential elections, making it an increasingly important political force. Hence, while many French politicians have historically given little importance to the factor of national identity, and sought to define it more on the abstract idea of the "République", the FN has opened the debate and forced political parties to acknowledge several ethnic compositions of this national identity. Hence, the political debates about national identity within political parties were apparent in the 2017 presidential primaries, when the Republican hopeful and ex-President, Sarkozy, was determined to play on the field of the FN, going even further than Le Pen to redefine the threats and solutions to French national identity (Sarkozy, 2016). The FN has politically capitalized on actively promoting its definition of national identity. This has been the case for other political parties too. Whether in the framework of national politics or EU politics, national identity has been a defining issue for the agendas and manifestos

⁵ Marine Le Pen made it to the second round in the circumscription of Pas de Calais, but then was defeated by the Socialist candidate.

of political parties. These studies demonstrate that political parties have an opinion on national identity. The next question is how do they influence it?

The literature has also demonstrated that in multinational states, political parties have played an important role in negotiating national identity. Indeed, the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) and *Bloc Québécois* (BQ) in Canada are two political parties that have sought to promote a distinct Québécois national identity in contrast to the rest of Canada. Indeed, the national identity promoted by the *Union Nationale* under Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec from 1936–1939 and 1944–1959 was a traditional and rural vision of Quebec. The party and its leader claimed that the survival of French Canadians was only possible through a fierce attachment to their only real “capital”, which was namely language and religion (Dion 1978). In that sense, “nation” was defined in religious and linguistic terms and not limited to the Quebec territory: all social institutions that supported these “sacred” traditions (the family, the parish and the Church) were considered indispensable to the maintenance of French-Canadian culture.

This vision of national identity was challenged by the Liberals under Jean Lesage, who claimed that the Quebec state was the only institutional framework able to promote the well-being of French Canadians. No longer was the French-Canadian identity found only in the province of Quebec, but also in the political climate that enabled them to promote their interests. Indeed, Rocher (2002) claims that the Quiet Revolution in Quebec enabled the development of a nationalist ideology with different political parties articulating the necessity for Quebec society to use state tools in order to promote their interests, rather than the social institutions promoted under Duplessis. Hence, the state became linked to definitions of national identity. Indeed,

“it is in this context that the constitutional debate and the necessity for Quebec to obtain new areas of intervention to respond more effectively to its social, economic and cultural specificity must be understood. Even if the principal political parties presented divergent strategies to Ottawa, the Liberal Party and the Union Nationale favouring a recasting of federalism while the Parti Québécois, by bringing together the more nationalist elements of society, recommending instead the route to Quebec's accession via sovereignty, the end result was a growth in the interventionist capacity of the State and a larger control of more sectors” (Rocher, 2002: 7).

The PQ further instrumentalized identity throughout the late 1970s as it introduced Bill 101, which made the state the protector of the French language and proposed a referendum in 1980 that sought to make Quebec a sovereign state. The referendum was a consequence of two different visions of identity: on the one hand, Canada and on the other, Quebec. Indeed, the PQ argued that Canada and Quebec were evolving in two different directions and that Quebec could no longer find representation in how the rest of Canada was being “imagined”. While the referendum failed to pass, with 60% voting against, the PQ continued to claim that it represented the Quebec nation and following constitutional negotiation failures a new referendum was introduced in 1995 that almost passed. With an unprecedented high turnout level of 93.5%, 50.6% voted “no” whereas 49.4% voted yes.

The PQ has proven to be an important player in renegotiating Québécois identity and promoting it on the federal scale. Indeed, as Rocher (2002) claims, during the 1980s

and 1990s there were two different visions of national identity developed between the two “nations”: English Canada, which is now attached to its new symbol of pan-Canadian unity enshrined by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Quebec, which is becoming more desirous than ever to reaffirm its collective rights, notably the right to a French environment. Today, the idea of linking Quebec’s distinct national identity to Quebecois independence has diminished as the Liberals have taken over government. Indeed, unlike the PQ during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, they have tended to portray Quebec’s national identity as being compatible within a federal framework.

Going back to the issue on how political parties promote visions of national identity, the Liberal Party in 2013 published a document entitled, “the Quebecois Identity” which defined the Liberal Party’s vision. In a thirteen page document the Liberal Party claims that Quebec’s national identity essentially lies in inter-culturalism (which is opposed to Canada’s broader definition of multiculturalism), the religious neutrality of crown institutions, and the promotion of legal frameworks for accommodations (Liberal Party, 2013). Again, what is interesting for the upcoming analysis is how political parties seek to define and influence what constitutes national identity. Finally, with the election of Liberal Justin Trudeau in October 2015, the new Prime Minister declared, “Canada is Back”. While Canada has never physically disappeared, this was a firm declaration that while the Conservatives under Stephen Harper had sought to disengage Canada from international institutions and multilateral negotiations. The Liberals believed firmly that Canada’s national identity was firmly entrenched with multilateralism (for more on the dichotomy between the “warrior nation” under the Conservatives and the “internationalist nation” under the Liberals see Morin, 2013). As such, the Conservatives had, according to the Liberals, destroyed an essential fabric of Canadian identity. In addition, Trudeau has been very insistent on making the link between Canadian national identity and the Liberals’ identity as being coexistent: “Liberals have long been champions of our Canadian rights and freedoms, and we will forever remain loyal defenders of the values on which our country was founded: acceptance, liberty, and mutual respect” (Trudeau, 2015).

Studies on multinational states and states operating within a supranational structure like the EU have demonstrated that political parties have visions for national identity and that they seek to influence its direction. Therefore, political parties do seemingly embody visions of national identity but what role do they play in actually spreading this identity? What is the process under which transformations in national identity as articulated by political parties occur? This thesis will seek to answer this question by further developing the link between political parties as a main driver in changes of national identity. It will do so by bringing two literatures of national identity change together. Indeed, it will argue that there are interactions between political parties and the state that together influence the direction of national identity. Hence, it builds on those authors who argued for the importance of belief systems, institutions and the state as the main drivers behind how national identity is defined or imagined but it will also concur with those authors who emphasize the role that political parties play in putting forward visions for national identity.

Theoretical Framework

Concretely this thesis grounds itself in a Historical Institutional (HI) framework, as it strives to acknowledge that there is an interaction between political actors and political institutions in that political institutions structure the “space” of political actors. In other words, change is possible, but the overarching institutional environment in which political actors operate heavily influences its direction. This thesis seeks to contribute, through an in-depth case study on the role that political parties play on the definition of national identity, to the burgeoning literature in the school of HI. It therefore strongly advocates for the recognition that institutions play an important and understudied role in structuring actors’ preferences. In other words, as the literature review has already demonstrated, there are two continuous issues that remain under-analysed which this thesis will seek to address: (1) that national identity is inherently political, and as such, is transformable and (2) that political parties play an important role in reformulating and redefining national identities. Hence, while actors’ ideas are important for explaining changes in national identity, this should be the starting point and not the conclusion (Pierson, 2004). Rather, HI will question how these ideas or preferences were structured. In other words, HI claims that the political world is institutionalized, and that these institutions shape the way that actors perceive problems and challenges through the lens of national identity.

There are three main reasons why an HI framework is appropriate with regards to the relationship between structure and agency. First, HI starts with the assumption that the state is not a neutral arena in which different groups compete. Indeed, these institutions structure and constrain political actors’ behaviour (Skopcol, 1992). The state and its institutions are potentially autonomous, and as such, can affect the direction of competition between groups. Moreover, the position of each political actor within a given institutional design will influence how interests are defined and how interactions with other political actors occur. In other words, institutions structure what is possible for political actors in a given context. Indeed, HI’s emphasis is on how institutions affect behaviour by “providing information relevant to the behaviour of others, enforcement mechanisms for agreement, penalties for defection, and the like” (Hall, Taylor: 1996: 7). Political institutions structure political action by not only reducing political uncertainty but also by providing information about guidelines of political action (what is possible and what is not) and what to expect from other political actors (rules).

What is central is how political actors turn to patterns of behaviour (through institutions) to attain their goal. A strong defender of HI in comparative politics, Skopcol (1992) analysed the development of the welfare state in the US and precisely looked at institutional explanations to explain why welfare states have their own particularities and why there can be no predetermined path. The major differences between the United States and Europe were institutional in that while European industrial states often had central unified governments, the US had strong state governments and the strongest American political institutions were the courts and political parties. This necessarily implied two different paths towards welfare policies. Indeed, the institutional arrangements “affect[ed] the capabilities of various groups to achieve self-consciousness, organize and make alliances” (Skopcol, 1992: 47).

Pierson's (1996) study demonstrates how institutions affected the creation of interest groups. Hence, in the US, the fragmented state and the organization of party competition along patronage lines worked against the creation of a unified working class that could apply political pressure for a national welfare policy. At the same time, through the creation of Civil War benefits to veterans and their families, a new strong interest group emerged that competed with other groups seeking welfare protection from the state. The HI framework forces scholars not to take group interests as given but rather question how such groups are even created in the first place. Pierson (1996) argues that women groups were able to use largely symbolic social provisions adopted by EU member states in order to pressure the EU to adopt more concrete social provisions on the EU level. Immergut (1992) sought to understand the reasons why some countries adopted national healthcare systems while others adopted decentralized and fragmented ones. She came to the conclusion that the structure of each country's political institutions affected interest groups. In other words, the "rules of the game" were different depending on the political institutions in place and ultimately affected political strategies and the choices of political actors that then impacted health care policy.

Hence, such a framework will help to take into account why the CDU sought to articulate German national identity in the way that it did. It allows the study of the role of political parties on national identity while recognizing that there is an overarching structure that impacts the end result. Moreover, for this case study, a HI framework also enables us to take into account the consequences of the constitutionalization of parties (Van Biezen, 2011). Indeed, whether intended or unintended, the rules of the game for political parties have become increasingly defined. This has influenced, determined or can constrain what political parties may do and has also shaped their identities and opportunity structures.

There was a marked shift in how political parties were institutionalized after WWII. While most established liberal democracies before the war did not make mention of political parties or their roles in their constitutions, after WWII, there was an important process of "party constitutionalization" (Van Biezen, 2011: 188). This means that democratizing post-WWII countries explicitly associated a positive goal to political parties in their constitutions as political participation, representation, pluralism, and competition became increasingly defined in terms of party, with parties being given the pivotal role of being the channels of participation (Van Biezen, 2011: 188). Van Biezen explains that "as parties in the post-war era underwent an ideational transformation by which they gradually came to be seen as procedurally necessary as well as democratically legitimate for democracy, the notion of parties changed also in terms of their constitutional codification" (Van Biezen, 2011: 195). While political parties are a main focus of this study they do not operate in an institutional vacuum. Indeed, while there is much agency behind political parties in that they have discourse and strategy, they nonetheless operate within an institutional framework. Particularly, in this case study, the over-riding institutional structure, in which the NSDAP operated, was relatively free because it constructed a totalitarian state. Hence, the national identity that the NSDAP envisioned for Germany was not hampered by the same structural constraints of the CDU. Hence, the CDU, operating in a democracy, needed to face regular and free elections and had a constitution that guided possibilities and opportunities.

Second, since HI contends that identities are politically constructed, it allows analyses on how such identities will be framed. In other words, “institutions do not only play a crucial role in the organization and mobilization of interests and identities, they are also prominent in their definition” (Lecours, 2000: 513). Moreover, Immergut (1998) explains that institutions “act as filters that selectively favour particular interpretations either of the goals towards which political actors strive or of the best means to achieve these ends” (Immergut, 1998: 20). Institutions are closely linked to beliefs and ideas and as such can be extremely helpful in explaining the development of national identities. Indeed, Weir (1989) explained that structural differences between British and American political systems explain the differences in the timing of when Keynesians ideas became influential. Hence, it was not the idea per se that mattered, but how the overall political system was able to “receive” the idea. Esping-Anderson (1990) also emphasizes how “our personal life is structured by the welfare state and so is the entire political economy” (Esping-Anderson: 1990: 141). Indeed, all our expectations and much of our beliefs of what to expect from the state are structured by the fact that, today, we live in welfare states that provide unemployment insurance, pension and health insurance. This demonstrates the importance of institutions in providing the framework of our identities, beliefs and ideas.

The same case can and should be made for national identities. Such a study would look at how political institutions, like constitutions, have shaped how political actors view the world. Going back to the Basic Law, much of the political identity in the FRG was reorganized and redefined through this founding document. Most importantly and in a dramatic shift from the Third Reich, individual rights were now protected. This reformulation of rights and freedoms would in turn affect what visions political actors (i.e., political parties) could put forward. In other words, this thesis will argue that the CDU largely took its vision for German national identity from these concepts, that were themselves enshrined in the Basic Law.

Third, HI reinforces the idea of interactions between structure and agency. Indeed, this thesis argues that it is important to understand identity as the *connection* between structural constraints and individual action. It seeks to avoid arguing that identities are created by social, cultural or political structures and emphasizes that political actors have freedom in articulating their version of identity, but only within the institutions that not only predate them but also structure their possibilities. Hence, it seeks to give back agency to overly structural analyses that often dominate the field of political science but only to certain degree. Indeed, such a framework also guards us from claiming that individuals may choose freely whatever identity they want. The picture is more complicated. Hence, just as political actors do not operate freely, political institutions do not dictate all the rules. There is interaction. It is this interaction and the effects that it has on national identity formulation that HI can help decipher. Hence, such a framework permits us to look at political parties operating in an institutionalized environment.

Therefore, (1) HI gives us the necessary tools to study how political parties are organized and institutionalized. (2) HI also helps us grasp that identities are politically constructed and as such their construction and possibilities will be heavily influenced by the

institutional structure of the state. And finally, (3) HI promotes the idea of interaction between institutions and agency. Political actors (political parties) do not “invent” national identity freely. Rather, they operate within certain institutions, and as such, structural constraints that guide their visions.

Yet, HI is not only about the relationship between agency and structure. It is also about critical junctions and how institutions evolve through time. Whereas in the past, HI has often focused on the continuity of institutions or focused on the appearance of a “critical junction” which is understood as a period during which the usual constraints of action are eased or lifted (see discussion on the that matter by Mahoney 2000 or Thelen 2004), more recent studies in the field have sought to understand and analyse a more general model of change. Indeed, the idea is that since institutions have inherent tensions related to resource allocation, “institutional outcomes need not reflect the goals of any particular group; they may be the result of ambiguous compromises” among actors who can coordinate on institutional means even if they differ on substantive goals” and it is “for these reasons there is nothing automatic, self-perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements” (Thelen, 2010: 8). This idea of gradual change can be understood if we link it to our earlier discussion concerning state ideology and national identity. Indeed, it was stated that national identity changes gradually through time as it receives guidance under the form of different policies, values and ideas. As explained, national identity is not something that is radically re-written, rather it receives, under the influence of political parties, new guidance that leads it onto a different path. This is why adopting a HI framework is well adapted to grasp the complexities of this gradual change. Indeed, HI can help us to recognize new policies, institutional arrangements or ideological paradigms do not replace the old but are layered atop prior patterns creating a “layered text” (Tulis, 1987). This means that institutional arrangements or ideational arrangements are often products of a past event and will outlive the particular condition that led to their creations. The result is not that old orders are erased but rather that elements of them are recombined and reconfigured into a new set of political patterns that is recognizably new and yet retains some continuity with the old ones. Orren and Skowronek (2004) argue in their study on American political development that politics are indeed determined by: those that seek to change it (political parties in my study) and by all the arrangements that carried over from the past and are newly situated in an alternative setting. They claim that there are always contradictions and conflicts within each institutional setting as there is never a perfectly overlapped ideological and institutional order. They define this concept of internal friction as intercurrency. It is the presence of intercurrency that also can explain why change occurs. Indeed, intercurrency can be further defined as the realisation that internal frictions or contradictions exist between institutional layers and that change occurs or is dependant on how institutional arrangements create an arena conducive to entrepreneurial politics. Hence, the actors (political parties) drive change (national identity) but the range and scope is determined by historically constructed and pre-existing institutional arrangements. Essentially, political parties are the agents of change but they do so because there are institutional opportunities and change is never complete in that ideational and institutional vestiges get “carried over”. Finally, how do we know when it’s the right time for a new idea? HI argues that it is not about whether it is a compelling idea rather it is about whether there are good political circumstances that favour it. In this

analysis, the critical junctions occurred with the Great Depression and end of WWII. In each situation, new political actors were given more institutional room to manoeuvre and push forward their visions for the German nation. It will be demonstrated that each political party, the NSDAP and the CDU, would a German national identity that while definitely linked to past conceptualisations of German identity nonetheless did have something new. It is in other words, the recognition of “something new built upon something old”. Hence to reiterate, as the literature review has demonstrated, our modern idea of a nation dates to the 19th century. This means that the imagine community has existed long before today’s political actors. While this does not mean that political actors will not seek to influence its direction, they are nonetheless dealing with a concept that can not be erased and rewritten overnight rather they are adding new layers to the whole.

Methodology

Germany as an important Case Study

This analysis will be based on a historical single case study. Case studies have been an inherent part of qualitative research and while their definitions have generated much debate, most scholars seem to agree “one of the main tasks of case study analysis is to generate as many testable implications of one’s hypotheses as possible in a given case” (Levy, 2008: 3). Furthermore, a case study is “explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others” (Levy, 2008: 4). Indeed, this analysis will focus on redirections in national identity through the mechanisms of political parties. While many question the theoretical and scientific relevance of single case studies, there is much to be gained from adopting such a method, and some detractors, notably Campbell, have retracted earlier pessimistic views on the matter.⁶ Indeed, a single case study has been defined as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2004 : 14). In other words, rather than trying to achieve generalizations that often can lead to a superficial analysis, it is an in-depth almost anthropological and historical dive into the issue at hand. It is a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973). The largest advantage of a case study research approach is that it offers a holistic picture of a phenomenon and therefore explains the relationship between parts of a whole rather than giving pieces of information about the components of a relationship (Stake, 2005). Also, a case study is perfectly capable of explaining “how” and “why” of relationships (Yin, 2014). A single case study is essentially looking to develop an in-depth knowledge of the case in addition to understanding a complex unity. This “complex unity” (della Porta, 2008: 206) will be the transformation of German national identity. The complexity lies in the fact that rather than aiming for a generalization, we shall be aiming for “dense knowledge” (della Porta, 2008: 207) that can take into account the interaction between national identity, political parties and political institutions. Authors have increasingly recognized that single case studies on their own can and do contribute to

⁶ See the excellent analysis of the most common misunderstandings of case study research by Flyvbjerg, 2006.

providing generalizable data and also are important pieces to a puzzle (Flyvbjerg, 2006 and Ragin and Becker, 1992).

Why Germany? There are three main reasons. First, Germany underwent a significant change in national identity following the end of WWII. Indeed, it went from a highly militaristic and exclusive vision of national identity towards a pacifist and inclusive vision that has endured for over fifty years, despite a significant domestic upheaval (reunification in 1992). Hence, if such a transformation of national identity was possible in Germany, then it should be possible elsewhere. This is the most important reason guiding the choice of Germany for this thesis. Indeed, as Paton explained, “if [national identity transformation] can happen there, it can happen anywhere” (Paton, 1990: 174).

Second, Germany was equipped with a new constitution that constitutionalized political parties. Indeed, new political institutions were created which helped create the window of opportunity to transform national identity. This is a major rerouting of the institutional structure that is not easily replicated. Hence, choosing Germany allows for the analysis of how new political institutions seemingly affect changes in national identity. Indeed, this transformation is apparent with the constitution writing in newly (re)established democracies. For example, while in Weimar Germany, political parties required the political neutrality of public officials stating that “civil servants are servants of the public as a whole, not of a party” (Art. 130), Article 21 of the 1949 Basic Law regulated “issues such as the freedom of political parties, their role in the formation of the political will, intra-party democracy, and the duty of parties to account for their assets” (Van Biezen, 2011:195).

The Basic Law laid out the framework through which democracy was to be exercised. The Basic Law in two ways structured the political parties in the FRG. First, in Article 21, their very goals and internal structure were defined. Hence, they were to represent the political will of the people, they were to be freely formed, their internal structure was to be democratic and they were to account for the sources of their funds. Second, and central to this analysis, they were to respect the “free and democratic basic order” and not seek to destroy or weaken the existence of the FRG. Hence, political parties in the FRG were constitutionally required to adhere to notions of freedom and democracy. These notions of freedom and democracy were defined and embodied in Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19 and 20 (see document 1 for these articles in the Annex).

Therefore, political parties in the FRG operated in a double structure. Not only were they constitutionally required to respect the free and democratic basic order, but this order was itself constitutionally developed throughout the Basic Law. To reiterate, the CDU was responsible for the development and direction of national identity when in government, but it did so in the overarching framework of the Basic Law. In addition, the new German constitution outright banned political parties that did not recognize the new constitutional order, which had the effect of making the Nazi and Communist parties illegal. The German Basic Law transformed political parties into institutions by investing them with the power of forming the political will of the people. Furthermore, the German constitution not only provided the institutional framework for the roles that parties might play during electoral

competition but also regulates political parties on democratic principles,⁷ rights and duties,⁸ the extra-parliamentary organization⁹ and judicial oversight.¹⁰ In addition, as already mentioned, there seems to be consensus among authors that changes in national identity are more likely to occur at moments of change in state or social structure.

Third, following WWII, Germany experienced the domination of one party in government for a relatively long period of time (1949–1969) that will help us gauge the transformation of German national identity as promoted by the CDU. This helps evaluate the role of the CDU in an unencumbered way. Again, in order to isolate the role of political parties in the transformation of national identity, we must be able to actually evaluate the political party over a period of time. Having one political party in power for twenty years allows us to examine the impact of their vision.

This thesis therefore seeks to analyse how political parties influence the direction of national identity in Germany. In particular it will compare the Third Reich to the FRG. This is because it seeks to analyse change and continuity through time and through space. Politics are shaped by time. This thesis contends that national identity is political. Hence, a comparison of the same region at different times in history seems best adapted to grasp what is new and also what is continuity with regards to identity formation. Including and analysing Nazi Germany is interesting because the presence and tenure in power of the NSDAP not only affected the course of history of Germany as a nation but the National Socialists were themselves affected by past conceptualisations of Germany as a nation. The great depression was a critical junction for a new political actor who pursued a vision for national identity. This testifies to the importance of how new political actors can impact the direction of national identity. Furthermore, it's an extreme case in that it was a totalitarian regime. But extreme cases should not be ignored. And, the third and probably most important and interesting reason behind the including of the Third Reich is that it testifies to how national identity is built over time. Indeed, Nazi Germany demonstrates that *even* the Nazis who were operating in a totalitarian structure used historical continuities with the Weimar Republic and German Empire to “frame” national identity. Hence despite being a totalitarian regime, they still were influenced by past conceptions of nationalism and national identity. In addition, all later attempts to define the German nation in the FRG were influenced by the National Socialist past. Indeed, it was often about “how to explain” why Nazism occurred and how “we” are better because of “X, Y and Z”. Political parties would legitimize themselves as protectors of the German nation by identifying what ills had caused Nazism and how they are completely different. Analysing

⁷ Democratic constitutions will start by enumerating the principles and values upon which the polity shall be based. These often include: the rule of law, human dignity and democracy.

⁸ “Rights and duties” refers to how the individual is given central importance through which the constitution guarantees liberal rights and freedoms to the individual. Although now very common and taken as given, this was a novelty the after war years.

⁹ The German Basic Law required that the internal structure and organization of political parties be democratic. The idea is that if political parties are to protect state-level democracy, they must adhere to the same democratic principles internally too.

¹⁰ Constitutional courts were established in the wake of the war. Their goal was to assure that legislation respect the constitution. Therefore, rather than having the legislative or executive branches of power guarantee the protection of the constitution, the courts were given this power in Germany.

how national identity evolved in the FGR under the CDU leadership is interesting because the end of WWII provided the critical juncture for the CDU to bring forth ideas of national identity. We are again at the intersection between: new institutions and new political actors that lead to a change in direction of national identity. The emphasis of who the German nation is has shifted. Unlike in Nazi Germany, we can see the influence of political parties in a true democracy. There will be new ideas concerning German national identity but these new ideas will nonetheless be guided by past conceptualisations. Hence, in each case analysed (the Third Reich and the FGR) there has been an active nation-building project that has taken place and it is this thesis' hypothesis that the political party in power largely influenced it. However, at the same time, this nation building process is influenced by political institutions but also by past ideas of national identity. Hence, changes in national identity are not as radical as they may seem but rather slow and incremental and build off what proceeded from it.

Process Tracing and Historical Narratives

This analysis will use some process tracing, and in particular, use an “explaining outcome process tracing” method (Beach and Pederson, 2013). Such a technique is used when we know the final outcome, B (a shift of direction in national identity), but we do not know what caused B. Such a methodology essentially seeks to “fully explain” why B happened. Therefore, as in other process tracing methods, we are identifying as many steps/factors that contributed to making B happen. In other words, the mechanisms used for explanation are “non-systematic, case-specific mechanisms to craft a sufficient explanation of a particular historical outcome” (Beach and Pederson, 2013: 309). Process-tracing has come under fire for being too much like a detailed narrative. This is unfair as it differs in three main ways: it is focused, structured and a narrative explanation of a casual path that leads to a specific outcome (Vennessson, 2008: 235). Hence, while it may seem at times as if this thesis is merely “telling a story”, it will actually be *focused* in that it looks only at national identity in Germany and political parties. In that sense it tells one story in particular. It also will be *structured* in that it will look at how HI can help explain the manoeuvres of political parties. And finally, it will be *a narrative explanation* of how German political parties impacted German national identity and in that sense this study will fall into the category of a historical narrative.

Finally, while many studies use primary sources for process tracing, there is no mention made in the literature that process tracing cannot be done through a more exclusive use of secondary than primary sources. This is because, the whole point of process tracing is essentially to explain an outcome by looking at the steps which means that whatever evidence (whether it be secondary or primary) works. Furthermore, some have argued that

secondary sources are even better equipped to reproduce information as they have the distance to analyse the situation in hindsight that some primary sources cannot do alone (Falleti, 2006, Punton, 2015 and Bennett and Checkel, 2012).

The general factors that explain changes in direction of national identity are identified as:

Pre-WWII Germany: The Great Depression set off a global economic crisis. The structure of Germany's economy made it vulnerable to external crises, leading the German economy into extreme crisis. A weak Weimar Republic was unable to deal with the economic crisis, which then led to a political crisis. This political crisis enabled/facilitated the arrival of the Nazi party into power. The Nazi party then overrode democratic institutions to establish a totalitarian regime with the Enabling Law. The Nazi party then proceeded to redefine German national identity. This German identity was based on *volksgemeinschaft* or "people's community" and on the conception of a racially pure state.

Post-WWII Germany: With the end of WWII, the Allies restructured domestic and international politics in Germany by implementing the Basic Law. The Basic Law constitutionalized political parties, which gave them new mandates and also structured their behaviour. Hence while the CDU linked German national identity to the Christian *weltanschauung*, integration with the West (*westbindung*) and social market economy (*sozialen Marktwirtschaft*), they would also justify this national identity through the Basic Law. Finally, its main political rival, the SPD, in 1957, embraced all three elements of German national identity put forward by the CDU.

Finally, this thesis is seeking to better understand the mechanisms of national identity as advocated by the state and not as advocated by society. This is because, this thesis considers national identity as something that is politically defined and not only culturally. Indeed, while some studies will focus on the commemoration of historical events, the role of civic education, tradition, language or religion, I am taking a top down approach to national identity and as such the prism is focused on "national" issues pushed forward at a state level and not by regular Germans themselves. This is why I have chosen to analyse policies that emanated from political parties. Hence, I concentrate on how the NSDAP sought to define the German nation on the values of a racially pure state and on the creation of a *Volksgemeinschaft* and how the CDU sought to define the German nation on the values of Christianity, social market economy and west-integration. These three "pillars" do not represent all of German national identity, but I will argue that they do represent how a political party (the CDU) sought to reorient German national identity. Hence, the focus is on values and on policies that the CDU pushed forward in manifestos, speeches and debates, as these were the visible moments when a political party (the CDU) sought to define the contours of a nation and it allows us to see what values they found important and in which institutions they were bounded. Hence, *Volksgemeinschaft*, a racially pure nation, social market economy, west-integration and Christian values are all values and policies which also allow us to look at issues that Political Parties found important and sought to include in their portrayal of the German nation (in that sense, it is a contrast to national identity as may be understood by regular Germans).

Sources

Concretely, the thesis will start by looking at the rich secondary literature on how the NSDAP came into power in addition to its actions once in power. Then it will shift to the vision of the NSDAP in relation to national identity. To do so, it will rely heavily on Hitler's autobiography, *Mein Kampf* as it provides a window into the thoughts of the NSDAP leader. Indeed, this book will be used to put forward the main ideas behind the NSDAP's vision for the German nation that it was seeking to establish, and in particular, the racial state. However, other primary sources such as speeches and documents by NSDAP officials will also be used to identify how the NSDAP sought to redefine German national identity. To finish this section, we shall dwell on how different sectors such as education, youth programs, entertainment programs, radio propaganda, public rallies and the use of fear were specifically employed by the NSDAP to diffuse its vision of national identity. This will be done through a combination of secondary literature and primary literature such as original movies and audio of the different NSDAP rallies, in addition to school textbooks and curriculums, which all will be used to demonstrate how the NSDAP sought to permeate German society with its definition of national identity.

Next, the focus will be on the changes of national identity undertaken by the CDU. It will start by focusing on the rich secondary literature that describes how the CDU came into power and its main ideas. Then, it will look at the CDU founding declarations and declarations by early leaders in order to define how the CDU viewed the future of German national identity. With regards to how the CDU sought to define and transform German national identity, this paper will then analyse and compare CDU and SPD party manifestos and CDU election posters for the German federal elections of 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961 and 1969. Election manifestos are interesting tools to gauge identity as they put political parties and goals "on paper" by providing information on policy issues. Moreover, since they are written in the context of an election campaign, they can help separate what party leaders consider relevant and particularly salient during electoral competition as parties can be expected to emphasize issues that will help them gain electoral advantage over their party rivals (McDonald and Mendes 2001).

The CDU tried very hard to tie their vision of German national identity in their election manifestos and the literature has demonstrated that there is a link between election manifestos and party identity. Indeed, an election manifesto is a document that allows analysts to study the trends of party identities. It is a specified document "locked" in time formulated by a political party in order to present their vision of society, nation and politics (Leith and Soule, 2011 and Kiratli, 2015 and Janda, Harmel, Edens and Goff, 1995). Furthermore, it is a long-lasting framework of the parties' politics and their subsequent identities. In addition, it is a document that has a direct impact on the electorate and can be viewed as a good reflection of the society when ratified by electoral results (Kiratli, 2015). Indeed, the political party election manifesto can be considered as the most significant and effective method of communication of the party because it contains the plans, strategies and tactics for the political thoughts and beliefs on how to best govern the country (Inan and Sancar, 2009).

In addition, we shall compare and analyse CDU and SPD leaders' speeches and declarations throughout these different elections in order to better grasp how the CDU sought to influence German national identity but always in relation to the Basic Law. The main themes of these documents will be analysed in relation to the three main drivers of the CDU's vision for German national identity: the social market economy, the Christian *weltanschauung* and the integration with the West. Understanding that the CDU had to "convince" not only Germans, but its political rival, the SPD, that its vision for German national identity was better than other visions, is a central element of the thesis. This is why much attention will be given to election manifestos, speeches and election posters. These were key moments when the CDU had to justify its vision and convince voters. In addition, these were key moments when there was more competition with regards to the message. Indeed, during election moments, a new "space" is made for other political actors as they compete for power.

Finally, with regards to reception, we shall be constantly referring back to the *Institute für Demoskopie* at Allensbach (Allensbach Institute), which was a very influential opinion research institute in the FRG and which published the annual *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung* ("state of the German soul") in addition to the *Horkheimer Institute für Sozialforschung* (Frankfurt School) that published the *Gruppenexperiment: Ein Studienbericht* in 1955.¹¹ Indeed, these two institutions were the pioneers of public opinion in the FRG. Moreover, they were run by Germans and not by the Allies. This is important because it has been found that the Allies' political goals would often transpire their surveys, studies and opinion polls and therefore affect the neutrality of their findings (Ostrow, 2012).

The different polls and findings of these two institutions will be our gauge throughout the upcoming analysis with regards to how the German public "received" the vision put forward by the CDU of the German nation. Indeed, in the words of the founders of the annual German public opinion polls proclaimed, "this is not a portrayal of the Germans based on second or third hand reports; it is the nation's own description of itself" and,

"the editors feel ... that the most fruitful attribute of this publication is the fact that it disproves, or at least casts doubt on, stereotype judgments of a nation by its neighbours. The Germans, on account of their role in world politics over the past century, have at times been exposed to collective repudiation, more than any other nation, with the inevitable consequence that the entire population was identified with small ruling groups ... only the self-portrayal of groups in the form of poll results can project a picture that is comparatively objective" (Neumann and Neumann, 1981: ix).

Hence, these different documents gauging how the German nation perceived itself will be the indicator throughout this study of how well the message of the CDU was received.

¹¹ This innovative study was the result of a study of 137 focus groups conducted throughout West Germany during the winter of 1950–51 to understand the nature of the German public in the FRG.

This analysis will therefore argue that political parties affect the direction of national identity. Not only are political parties representative of a collective identity but they also can actively promote a vision of national identity. This shall be the mantelpiece of this analysis. This feels like a good time to reiterate a previous point made earlier on in this section before proceeding towards the empirical analysis on how German national identity was transformed through interactions with political parties. Recognizing the blurry line between national identity and state ideology, in no way does this thesis claim that national identity and ideology are significantly separate. Rather it defends the view that ideology *guides and informs* national identity. It seeks to contribute in that sense to the literature that recognizes that national identity is influenced by ideology, foreign policy and social policy. Recognizing that there are interactions is essential to fully grasp the complexity of the notion.

Concretely, though a case study of Germany we shall examine how the CDU articulated a vision of national identity that was influenced by the new institutional reality of the FRG. First, we need to examine the institutional and political framework of Germany before WWII. Hence, Chapter Two will focus on how the Nazi party was created and transformed into a national political party. It will also develop its vision of national identity. Next, Chapter Three will focus on how the Nazi party sought to redefine and transform German national identity. Following the end of the war and subsequent military occupation of Germany, its national identity drastically changed. Therefore, Chapter Four will start by describing the social, economical and political context of post-WWII Germany before describing the birth of a new political system and emergence of a new political party: the CDU. It will also develop the three main pillars of the CDU vision for German national identity: Christian *weltanschauung*, integration with the West (*westbindung*) and the social market economy (*sozialen Marktwirtschaft*). Chapter Five will analyse how the CDU sought to diffuse its vision of German national identity onto and throughout the German state. Throughout this final chapter, we will also check with how German society perceived the three main elements that the CDU sought to articulate its vision of German national identity and how this vision was received. We shall then conclude with a brief summary but also with a discussion on why the understandings of national identity transformations are so important.

2. The Establishment and Creation of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) and Birth of the Third Reich

The Nazi Party did not rise to power through a putsch. Rather, the German people gradually handed them the power to govern. While their rise to power can be partially explained by the economic and political instabilities afflicting Germany and the Nazis' use of political intimidation, it also involved their participation in elections, in Parliament and in the everyday procedures of the doomed Weimar Republic. However, Adolf Hitler never made it a secret that he held the parliamentary democracy of the Weimar Republic in great contempt and sought to get rid of it, that he was determined to crush communism, that he blamed the Jews for all of Germany's economic woes and that he sought to remove them from the German society, and that he wanted to rearm Germany in order to rebuild the great German nation after its devastating defeat in WWI. However, such a program was not possible in a democracy, it required a one-party dictatorship which Hitler would successfully start to establish when the German president Paul von Hindenburg (1925–1934) would appoint him Chancellor on January 30, 1933. Indeed, after years of political and economic instability, Germans had thought to find refuge in the Nazi Party. The Nazis would then endeavour to transform national identity based on its understanding of the nation.

While this thesis seeks to first and foremost address the issue of how political parties transform national identities, this chapter will start by addressing how the Nazi Party rose to power. This is because political institutions matter. Essentially the rise to power of the Nazi Party can be explained as the failure of Weimar Republic political institutions to address the domestic political and economic problems and the restructuring of the Nazi Party which made it a viable political alternative. Hence, this chapter will start by asking: How did the Weimar Republic's political structure allow the Nazi Party to gain power and how did the Nazi Party successfully restructure itself in the aim of taking this power? Finally, this chapter will focus on the vision for the nation of the Nazi Party. It will demonstrate the principle tenets of national identity as understood and advocated by the Nazi Party and analyse its evolution over the course of its existence (1919–1945).

A Republic in Crisis

When the note issued by the Army High Command reached the Germans that a German military defeat was inevitable, in September 1918, the news fell like a pile of bricks. The German public had, until then, been totally unaware of the military failures of their nation as they had been blinded by the official propaganda. Prince Max of Baden formed a new government in October under consultation with the political parties of the Reichstag majority, and its first mandate was to negotiate the difficult task of an armistice. However, once news settled that an immediate and complete defeat had occurred, revolutionary groups and peace movements emerged and quickly dominated the German political scene. As the political parties of the majority at the Reichstag sought to amend the constitution and deal with the internal political crisis, it became evident that the military and the monarchy had little intention in bowing to the authority of the Reichstag. Indeed, despite growing calls for the abdication of the Kaiser, he fled himself out to the GHQ at Spa in order to escape the pressure for abdication. Admirals of the German Navy, unwilling

to surrender, sought to launch one last attack but were faced with thousands of mutineers. The military and police apparatuses of the German state surrendered to the civil rebellion as it grew in strength.

In the midst of this, a German delegation was sent to begin the armistice negotiations. The terms that ended the brutal four-year war were severe for the Germans. They were to evacuate all occupied territory in the West and the whole left bank of the Rhine, surrender war materials, the submarine fleet, the High Seas fleet, and its military vehicles. Allied prisoners were to be returned immediately without reciprocal obligations, peace treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest were abrogated and they were to withdraw from the East once the Allies gave the order (Kolb, 2005). With the monarchical system abolished in November 1918, domestic political parties and groups had found themselves taken by surprise and there was little consensus on what the next step should look like: what form would the post-imperial system take? The proclamation of a new German order had been full of promises and hope:

Workers and soldiers! The four war years were horrible, gruesome the sacrifices the people had to make in property and blood; the unfortunate war is over. The killing is over. The consequences of the war, need and suffering, will burden us for many years. The defeat we strove so hard to avoid, under all circumstances, has come upon us. Our suggestions regarding an understanding were sabotaged, we personally were mocked and ignored. The enemies of the working class, the real, inner enemies who are responsible for German's collapse, they have turned silent and invisible. They were the home warriors, which upheld their conquest demands until yesterday, as obstinate as they fought the struggle against any reform of the constitution and especially of the deplorable Prussian election system. These enemies of the people are finished forever. The Kaiser has abdicated. He and his friends have disappeared; the people have won over all of them, in every field. Prince Max von Baden has handed over the office of Reich chancellor to representative Ebert. Our friend will form a new government consisting of workers of all socialist parties. This new government may not be interrupted, in their work to preserve peace and to care for work and bread. Workers and soldiers, be aware of the historic importance of this day: exorbitant things have happened. Great and incalculable tasks are waiting for us. Everything for the people. Everything by the people. Nothing may happen to the dishonor of the Labor Movement. Be united, faithful and conscientious. The old and rotten, the monarchy has collapsed. The new may live. Long live the German Republic! (Philipp Scheidemann, Proclamation of the Republic, November 9, 1918, German Radio Archive, Frankfurt, translated by A. Ganse)

However, the actual situation was quite dire. Indeed, the young Republic was under tremendous political pressure as the Communists incited revolutions in Berlin and other major cities like Hamburg and Munich in 1919, establishing Council Soviet Republics. Indeed, the Communist Party of Germany founded by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht attempted to take over on January 6, 1919. This became known as the Spartacus Rebellion. Workers throughout the state were leaving factories and heading for government buildings and the army was in no state to oppose the uprising and maintain order (Feuchtwanger, 2001: 196).

Hence, the Free Corps (*freikorps*) were asked by President Friedrich Ebert to fight the communists and protect the government. The Free Corps were composed of ex-soldiers, unemployed youth and led by ex-officers. These private paramilitary groups were composed of conservative and ultranationalist men and started proliferating throughout

Germany in late 1918. By mid-1919, there were 65 different corps throughout Germany (Mitchell, 2008: 65). What was dangerous for the nascent democracy was that the Weimar Republic did not command their loyalty or respect. Most even had contempt for the Republic. Nonetheless, they fought for it in the face of the communist uprising, as their loathing of communism outweighed their contempt for the Republic (Crimm, 2007). Indeed, the war was not over; the enemy was now “within” (Stackelberg, 1999: 67), as these were men who had returned from the German front against Russia and were consequently extremely wary of communism. They executed Luxemburg and Liebknecht in captivity in Berlin and violently crushed the movement, unleashing a campaign of “white terror” (Stackelberg, 1999: 67).

In March, the Communist Party reorganized their remaining forces and attempted another take over. Ebert called in the Free Corps again and within a few days, 1,000 people had been killed (Mitchell, 2008:67). Ebert then turned his attention to the Soviet Republic of Bavaria, where the authority of the Republic was being seriously compromised by the presence of this parallel government. The Free Corps and the Germany army were called to intervene and Munich was put under siege. On May 1, 1919, six hundred people were killed (Kuhn, 2012: xxviii). The left was not the only political group hoping to take down the German state. On the right, the German National People’s Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei*) was established as the party that claimed loyalty to the monarchical constitutions, the social basis and values of Kaiser’s Germany and was nationalist and anti-parliamentary. With no strong and united centre political party, there was little counterbalance to the two extremes on the left and right and what remained was a fragmented domestic political scene.

It was in the midst of this domestic turmoil that the Weimar Republic was founded in 1919, with the adoption of the ‘Weimar Constitution’ by the National Assembly on July 31. This new constitution established the Reich as a parliamentary republic. However, in addition to its shaky domestic foundations, the fledgling democracy was also founded in the direct aftermath of the German defeat in World War I, a defeat that was not only sudden but also humiliating. Germans were caught by surprise by their defeat and, in addition, horrified by the conditions of the armistice.¹² Indeed, German resources had been exhausted by the war, and therefore it had come to the negotiating table with little power in its hands, as it was in no position to continue the fight and the Allies were very much aware of this (Kolb, 2005). The conditions upon which Germany surrendered saw Germany lose 1/8th of its territory, 1/10th of its population, 15% of its agricultural production, and 20% of its steel, coal and iron industry) (Kolb, 2005: 29). In addition, Germany was held financially responsible for the war under Article 231 and eventually, following the Reparation Commission’s recommendations, ordered to repay 132 billion gold marks (about 31.5\$ billion) (McElligot, 2014). Germany faced near total disarmament, as its army was capped at 100,000 men and its navy at 15,000 men. The humiliating conditions of defeat would later help set the stage for the rise of the NSDAP, as it instrumentalized the

¹² No information leaked during the negotiations of the Armistice. Hence, the Germans had no idea what their conditions of surrender would look like. Indeed, when the conditions of surrender were released on May 7, 1919, all political parties agreed to reject the treaty, but by June the SPD and the Centre Party had accepted the Treaty.

idea of a weak German nation associated with the Republic and those who signed the armistice¹³ versus the strong and proud nation they would embody when in power.

As the young Weimar Republic struggled to regain control political control over its territory by disbanding the Free Corps and restructuring the *Reichswehr*, many army officers started to resist. One of them was General Walther von Luttwitz, who decided to take action against the Republic. After successfully leading the Free Corps against the Spartacus Rebellion and ultimately protecting the Republic, in March 1920, General Luttwitz seized Berlin with the help of group of army officers. The 6,000-strong Berlin-based *Marinebrigade Ehrhardt* Free Corps and right wing nationalists forced Ebert to flee and proclaimed Wolfgang Kapp the new chancellor. However, his putsch struggled to find the necessary support. Not only was the *Reichswehr* so internally divided that they remain motionless throughout the Putsch,¹⁴ but the President also struggled to get the necessary public support, despite issuing a statement with ideas of restabilising an honourable German nation:

Militant Bolshevism threatens us with devastation and violation from the east. Is this government capable of fending it off? How will we avoid external and internal collapse? Only by re-establishing the authority of a strong state. What concept should lead us in this endeavor? Nothing reactionary, instead a further free development of the German state, restoration of order, and the sanctity of law. Duty and conscience are to reign again in German lands. German honor and honesty are to be restored. (Reich Chancellor: Wolfgang Kapp)

Indeed, while the President had understood “strong state” as one synonymous with unity and the rule of law, and the rebirth of “German honour” capable through “duty and conscience”, the Nazis would later make “strong state” synonymous with an authoritarian regime and “German honour” with a racially pure and expansionist state. The Putsch ultimately failed, but only because the Weimar government successfully called on the German people to implement a general strike to fight the revolution. The move received broad support from trade unions, the *Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* or Independent Social Democrat Party of Germany, and other left wing political parties who were wary of the military and the right wing establishment. Within two days, Berlin had no trains, no water, no gas and no electricity which led to the paralysis of the city and the aspiring Kapp government, forcing them to flee five days later.

Yet, despite this very rocky start, the Weimar Republic was able to establish itself as the governing authority of the German nation and even garner public support. It established a parliamentary democracy that guaranteed basic civil rights and abolished the privileges of the aristocracy. The new Reichstag was elected through universal suffrage, the chancellor and cabinet were responsible to parliament, there was a strong president who was directly elected every seven years and therefore independent from a parliamentary majority, controlled the armed forces, directed foreign policy, appointed the chancellor and could dissolve parliament and call new elections. The centre of power was the Reichstag, which was responsible for enacting legislation and controlling the executive. However, the

¹³ They would later be labelled as the November Criminals

¹⁴ The German army did nothing throughout the Putsch. It defied the Republic's orders to crush the movement and it ignored von Luttwitz's call for arms

president was given extensive powers in order to bypass the Reichstag, or what the political right named 'parliamentary absolutism' (Kolb, 2005). In particular, Article 48 gave the president the power to temporarily suspend parts of the constitution, institute emergency measures and intervene with the armed forces to re-establish order and security in the case of a state of emergency. Hence, by giving the President these extraordinary powers, the Weimar Republic's forefathers had given him a blank check to override the Reichstag and therefore political debate and concessions.

There was no true counterweight to the president and therefore no true parliamentary sovereignty. Emerging as a parliamentary democracy with political parties, the Weimar Republic was able to count on the support of the Social Democrats¹⁵ (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*), the Centre Party¹⁶ (*Zentrum*), the German Democratic Party¹⁷ (*Deutsche Demokratische Partei*) and the German People's Party¹⁸ (*Deutsche Volkspartei*). Despite the institutions that were set up in the aftermath of WWI to found a democracy in Germany, there was a lack of political and social consensus among Germans. This truly became apparent with the economic turmoil following the Great Depression. Indeed, from 1924–1929, the economic stability of the Weimar Republic improved and even began to prosper, with the French withdrawing from the Ruhr,¹⁹ the German acceptance of the Dawes settlement of reparations issue²⁰ and the Young Plan.²¹ This helped remove the economic stress plaguing the Republic and political parties were able to focus on improving the life of Germans and simply participating in the new democracy.

However, when American loans stopped flowing into Germany due to the world economic crisis, Germany plunged back into economic instability. Indeed, then foreign minister (1924–1929) Gustav Stresemann had warned Germans in 1928 that, "I must ask

¹⁵ They formed the largest of political parties throughout the Weimar Republic. It was strongly committed to upholding the Republic.

¹⁶ While a defender of Catholic interests, the Centre Party professed loyalty to the Weimar Republic and was present in every Weimar coalition government until 1932. It provided five German chancellors.

¹⁷ The German Democratic Party was the result of a merger between the Progressive People's Party and the left-wing National Liberals. They participated in almost every single government until 1932 and sought to represent the middle class. It made many unpopular compromises and experienced falling voter support throughout the years. Indeed, while receiving 19% of the vote in 1919, this had fallen to 1% by 1932.

¹⁸ The German People's Party was initially hostile to the Weimar Republic, but it changed its position under Stresemann and started participating and upholding the Republic. However, following Stresemann's death, many anti-parliamentary elements that had been previously contained under his leadership arose again, and it converged with the right-wing nationalist opposition, which contributed to its fall. The party received 10% of the vote in 1920 but only 1% in 1932.

¹⁹ The French had occupied the Ruhr when the Germans defaulted from their 1923 reparations payment.

²⁰ Under the Dawes Plan, Germany's annual reparation payments would be reduced, increasing over time as its economy improved; the full amount to be paid, however, was left undetermined. Economic policy making in Berlin would be reorganized under foreign supervision and a new currency, the Reichsmark, adopted. France and Belgium would evacuate the Ruhr and foreign banks would loan the German government \$200 million to help encourage economic stabilization.

²¹ The plan reduced the total amount of reparations demanded of Germany to 121 billion gold marks, almost \$29 billion, payable over 58 years. Another loan would be floated in foreign markets, this one totaling \$300 million. Foreign supervision of German finances would cease and the last of the occupying troops would leave German soil. The Young Plan also called for the establishment of a Bank for International Settlements, designed to facilitate the payment of reparations.

you always to remember that during the past year we have been living on borrowed money. If a crisis were to arise and the Americans were to call in their short-term loans, we should be faced with bankruptcy” (Stresemann in 1928, Peikoff, 1982: 56). The Great Depression hit Germany hard. Not only were no new American loans being issued as of late 1929, but American financiers began to call in existing loans. Unfortunately, the German economy did not have the necessary capital and banks struggled to provide money and credit. With the US imposing tariff barriers to protect their companies, Germany lost access to US markets, which had the direct consequence of closing much of the sector. By 1932, German industrial production had shrunk to 58% of its 1928 levels (Petzina, 1969). Unemployment was rampant. Indeed, by the end of 1929, 1.5 million Germans had lost their jobs and by 1933, unemployment had reached 6 million (Petzina, 1969).

The immediate political consequence of this economic instability was the breakup of any German political unity that had seemingly existed. It had looked like Germany’s humiliating WWI defeat and the detested Versailles Treaty was water under the bridge under the strong leadership of Stresemann, as Germany renegotiated the terms of its wartime reparations and regained international trust through membership to the League of Nations in September 1926 with a permanent seat on the council. These were seen as huge international successes and important steps to reinserting Germany to its rightful place in the international relations. In addition, election results from this period also seemed to indicate that the Weimar Republic was stabilizing, as notable declines in support for extreme right and left political parties occurred and parties sympathetic to the Republic increased their number of seats in the Reichstag. However, despite a certain normalization of domestic politics and acceptance of the new parliamentary system, there remained much disaccord between political parties. This was apparent over “strong political disagreements over trivialities such as the issue of the national flag or the creation of denominational schools which demonstrated that there was no effective consolidation nor any significant sign of political maturation in particular the main democratic parties had still not recognized the vital necessity of working together in a spirit of compromise” (Layton, 2005: 49).

Adding to Germany’s political woes was the government’s response to the Great Depression. Indeed, rather than increasing government spending to stimulate the economy, then-Centre Party leader Heinrich Brüning increased taxes to reduce the budget deficit and implemented wage cuts and spending reductions. While, the Reichstag opposed these measures (but were incapable of providing alternative solutions), Hindenburg issued the policies through emergency Presidential decrees, which only served to reinforce the belief by the fringe parties that participation in the Reichstag was useless and also increased political divisions. This testifies to the fact that while cooperation had been possible during the “better” years, when economic problems started plaguing Germany once again, the responses of the different political parties in Germany were too different and many refused to cooperate with each other. It became extremely difficult to form coalition governments with antagonistic parties. Furthermore, opposition to the Weimar Republic had never been entirely silenced, with a few political parties still actively seeking its demise. The

Communist Party of Germany²² (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*) on the left and the German National People's Party²³ (*Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei*), Bavarian People's Party²⁴ (*Bayerische Volkspartei*), and Nationalist Socialist German Workers Party²⁵ (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*) on the right remained strongly opposed to the Weimar Republic and with the radicalization of the political landscape following the Great Depression, were able to garner more and more public support. This brought more and more coalition governments that were structurally weak as they put together groups that fundamentally refused the parliamentary democracy that the Weimar Republic represented.

This was reinforced by another factor. German political parties were not open associations with broad platforms designed to attract a range of voters; rather, they were exclusive institutions that represented distinct segments of society and therefore were unable to develop programs that could appeal to voters outside their particular social, economic or ideological group (Bendersky, 2014). Moreover, with private newspapers, bureaucracy, social clubs and, in some cases, paramilitary groups, all German political and social life tended to be organized around the party rather than the state. This tended to further isolate people from the greater German nation as social interactions were restricted to people coming from the same limited socio-economic backgrounds (see Putnam 1993 for further information pertaining to the positive effects on the development and consolidation of democracy through vertical social interactions).

The Weimar Republic had one additional obstacle to the development and consolidation of democracy: the staff behind its public institutions had remained unchanged since the monarchy. The problem was that the majority of these bureaucrats were anti-republicans, with little loyalty to the new Republic that they had sworn to serve and often favoured the ultranationalists and opposed government policies (Bendersky, 2014). Further complicating the situation was that these bureaucrats could not be removed from their jobs as their rights of tenure were protected by law (Ziblatt, 2017). The army also had serious reservations about the Weimar Republic. Indeed, when the terms of the Versailles Treaty were known, there had been serious discussion among army officers about replacing the Republic with a military dictatorship (Ziblatt, 2017). Hence, the Republic could not be assured that the army would come to its defence in the case of a putsch or an attack from the extreme right or left.

²² This party had incorporated the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD, the party responsible for initiating the successful general strike of Berlin during the Kapp Putsch) who had become embroiled with internal strife. The Communist Party rejected the parliamentary system and only started participating in elections when the USPD merged with them in 1920. However, they remained political outsiders in that they launched many propaganda campaigns that argued for the removal of democracy and the 'tyranny of finance capital'. Throughout the elections of the 1930s, they placed third place.

²³ The German People's Party represented a conservative monarchist group who were fundamentally opposed to the Treaty of Versailles and the new democratic order. They quickly became supporters of the NSDAP.

²⁴ Initially part of the Centre Party, the Bavarian People's Party split when they disagreed with regards to participation in the parliamentary system. They remained a dominant political force in Bavaria, and started supporting the NSDAP in the 1930s.

²⁵ The Nazi Party that would evolve under Hitler's leadership and eventually lead to the collapse of the Weimar Republic.

Hence, while the Weimar Republic set the stage for democracy to take hold in Germany, it was faced with great socio-political and economic challenges. While it would deal with these challenges and therefore prolong its survival until 1933, the Republic had been dealt a difficult set of cards right from its inception. It is in this complicated and chaotic context that the Nazi Party was able to instrumentalize identity issues and political insecurities and rise to power in Germany.

The National Socialist Party's Rise to Power

While the Great Depression, the consequences of which will be explored in the next section, and Adolf Hitler's charismatic leadership are often linked to the decisive rise of the Nazi Party in German federal politics, one fundamental element is too often ignored: How did the Nazi Party position itself in such a way that made it a credible alternative to other German political parties? Indeed, despite the failures of the Weimar Republic, there was nothing inevitable about the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany. Throughout the 1920s it remained a fringe political movement that drew its support essentially from the Bavarian regions. Little in its program or initial structure could have foreseen its development into a German political movement. This next section will concentrate on the *institutional* changes that arose within the NSDAP, as Hitler sought to transform the informal gathering into a powerful political movement ready to initiate the much sought after change. It will be followed by a section that concentrates only on the *identity* changes of the party.

The Nationalist Socialist German Worker's Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* or NSDAP and also commonly known as the Nazi Party in Western literature) was born from the ashes of the German Worker's Party (*Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* or DAP), a political party with no clear organizational structure or financial resources (Orlow, 1969: 11). Indeed, the first question that must be analysed is how did the NSDAP grow from the DAP and become the massive political organization that allowed it to become a credible contender to power on the German political scene? Indeed, just as the constitutionalization of political parties influenced how national identity would be understood (as the post-WWI analysis will later demonstrate), the inner structure of the NSDAP was fundamental in explaining how the party first rose to prominence.

On January 5th, 1919 the German Worker's Party (*Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*) or DAP was jointly created by Anton Drexler and Karl Harrer in Munich. Little attention was given to this new political party as the political scene in Munich was already quite crowded and confused. New political parties came and went often enough, that little left to doubt that the DAP would follow the same trend. Politics were extremely radicalized between the left and the right and much political debate occurred through violence as many political groups had their own paramilitary groups.²⁶ However, the DAP flourished. Within four years of its founding it had become a remarkable political force in the Bavarian republic. This had much to do with Hitler's increasing presence in the nascent party, but also much to do with

²⁶ These paramilitary groups included the *Freikorps* which would be essential in crushing the Marxist Revolutions throughout Germany.

how the organizational structure of the party changed over the years as Hitler aimed to make the party more disciplined (Hanson, 2010).

The Building of the NSDAP

Hitler had been sent to investigate the party as part of his job as a political indoctrination official for the Reichswehr. He quickly adhered to the core message of the party that was anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, pro-nationalist and anti-Jewish (Hitler, 2011). He joined the DAP in September 1919 and quickly became chief of propaganda and a member of the executive committee. Hitler quickly critically pointed out that the party was very inefficient and un-bureaucratic because it lacked accounting books and membership rolls (Orlow, 1969: 15), but also that the intraparty democracy that characterized the internal administration of the DAP made it look like a “tea club” rather than a political party (Hitler, 2011). Indeed, while the DAP was opposed to the parliamentary democracy of the Weimar Republic, its internal decision making process was subject to strict democratic rules. The party’s entire membership elected the executive committee and decisions within the committee were free, unrestrained and based on simple majority principles. Furthermore, all party members could bring initiatives to the board as the executive committee was required to address any item that 1/10th of the members wanted to bring before the committee (Orlow, 1969: 15).

Hitler sought to tighten the organizational structure and constantly advocated for the dissolution of the bonds between the DAP and its older “brother” the Zirkel²⁷ and independent decision-making authority for the executive committee. However, the leadership of the DAP refused Hitler’s proposals, prompting Hitler to proceed to change it in another manner. Hitler concluded that if he was to change the organizational structure of the DAP he would need to inspire a massive influx of new members into the DAP in such a way that these new members would not be necessarily loyal to the party but loyal to Hitler, and therefore follow his leadership and not the executive committee’s and, if necessary, could be used to overthrow the old leadership. This course of action ended up being extremely successful for Hitler and for the DAP. Indeed, Hitler started increasingly appropriating the movement in his different public addresses, claiming that while the German Worker’s Party was founded on January 5th, 1919, its true birth occurred when it made its first public appearance with a mass meeting with Hitler as the main speaker. He also spoke often of its “lack of leaders”, something that Hitler was trying to change by “generating constant activity” (General Membership Meeting and Party Conference of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party on 29 and 31 January 1922 in Munich, *VB*, No. 7 January 25, 1922, translated in Muhlberger, 2004: 62) Therefore, the DAP started targeting lower and urban worker classes, differentiating themselves from the other political parties who sought middle class support.

²⁷ The DAP was actually born from the branches of the Zirkel (Circle). The Zirkel was a group founded by Drexler and Harrer who would meet frequently to discuss political and current issues. Membership was limited to seven members and attendance was limited to these members and at times their invited guests. The meetings would involve a speech by Harrer with members discussing different points afterwards. Drexler sought to increase its membership and publicize its political views. It was then decided that a political party (the DAP) would be created to fulfill these two new roles while the Zirkel would continue to exist under its old mandate.

Furthermore, the DAP managed to attract the attention of the Bavarian government, which had little sympathy for the German Republic. In particular, the commandant of the Reichswehr, Franz von Epp, his chief of staff, Ernst Rohm and the Munich chief of police, Ernst Pohner who were all eager to overthrow the Republic and openly encouraged ultranationalist movements started supporting the DAP.²⁸ With the financial support of the Reichswehr, the NSDAP was able to purchase the *Volkischer Beobachter* (*VB*), which would become the official party newspaper and “an indispensable ideological and organizational link between the party’s central leadership and its local and, later, provincial membership” (Orlow, 1969: 21). Indeed, control was important for Hitler. That had already been apparent with his multiple attempts to control the organizational structure of the DAP, but control of the message was equally important. Hence, the *VB* became not only a vehicle for expanding his message to a larger group of sympathisers but also a means for giving ideological clarifications and “vehicle for transmission of orders and directives relating to the party’s organizational structure” (Orlow, 1969: 21).

Hitler was successful in diluting the older membership guard. He had charisma, he had the flexibility that came from not having a day job and he was an excellent public speaker. Using the famous beer halls of Munich, Hitler quickly promised a good show for all attendees to the political meetings. Indeed, food and beer were provided in addition to a compelling speech that was addressed to the defeated and disillusioned Bavarians and was usually followed by a political brawl and flying beer mugs (Gabb, 2011: 37). Not unlike the communists before him, Hitler used the large beer halls of Munich to create a large social movement.²⁹ Indeed, he used these occasions to demonstrate the vision of his movement and the content of many of his speeches was then published in the *VB* in order to generate further publicity for the nascent movement. For example, on February 24, 1921, Hitler organized a large Beer Hall meeting at *Hofbrauhaus* to not only commemorate the one year anniversary of the first public meeting of the DAP but also to introduce the German people to its new political program. This program, albeit rather vague, became known as the “25 Point German Workers’ Party Program” and essentially laid out the basis of the Racial State that the NSDAP would later institute (see in particular points: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10).³⁰ Hitler would tirelessly use the beer hall meetings to promote his visions for the future of the German nation, claiming that Germany could not be rescued by Parliamentarians and needed the imminent upheaval of Parliamentary democracy because “Democracy is veiled Jewish dominance” which ultimately meant that “Democracy was the breach which the Jewry had made in the German heart, which poisoned the blood through the belief in Mammonism, which has plunged our people into mortal danger” (Meeting in Rosenheim on October 28, 1922, translated by Muhlberger, 2004: 73). Also hoping to bridge the social divides between Germans and further unite Germans based on the existence of a German nation which the NSDAP ideal of *Volksgemeinschaft* would further demonstrate later, Hitler would claim that “victory will finally come due to the great

²⁸ In 1920, the DAP changed its name to NSDAP.

²⁹ Bavaria’s socialist revolutionaries had used the beer halls to organize the November 1918 Revolution. Fishman notes that the “revolutionary leadership hustled all returning soldiers and sailors to the nearest beer hall to be proselytized” (Fishman 1964: 247)

³⁰ See document 2 in the Annex.

love which will fuse together all national comrades on the day of the *volkisch* resurrection” (*Christmas Party* at the Hofbrauhaus Beer Hall, translated by Muhlberger, 2004: 85). Furthermore, despite the high inflation³¹ that was beginning to plague Germany, people were still producing the charged 50 cents to hear Hitler speak, and this even at the peak of inflation (Kershaw 1998: 202). In addition, Hitler had recognized the publicity component of the beer halls. Indeed, Hitler had argued that, “it makes no difference whatever whether they laugh at us or revile us, whether they represent us as clowns or criminals; the main thing is that they mention us, that they concern themselves with us again and again” (Kershaw 1998: 147).

All this helped turn the spotlight of the party more and more onto Hitler. Indeed, at the first mass meeting held in Munich on February 24 1920 at the Hofbrauhaus Beer Hall, the party spotlight was uniquely on Hitler as he proclaimed the birth of the Nationalist Socialist German Worker’s Party (NSDAP or Nazi) and a new political program. Furthermore, using his extraordinary oratory skills and position as propaganda chief, he was successful in creating a new “group of unofficial leaders, a sort of shadow leadership corps, (that) collected around him” (Orlow, 1969: 22). This new group included Dietrich Eckart, Alfred Rosenberg, Hermann Esser and Emil Gansser who, like Hitler, did not have day jobs, which gave them the leisure of travelling and giving speeches throughout the region, giving them more visibility and having the effect of becoming the representatives of the NSDAP in the minds of the population.

Moreover, Hitler was successful in expanding party membership. Indeed, after one year of Hitler’s presence in the political party, party membership had increased to over three thousand (Bendersky, 2014). The NSDAP started expanding the number of locals it had throughout the region. Four locals were created for Munich alone and by 1921, there were ten other locals throughout Bavaria and one even outside Bavaria, in Mannheim. Each local was relatively autonomous. Indeed, other than sending 20% of money collected through dues and 50% of all voluntary contributions to party headquarters, they could elect their own leaders and accept or expel any members. However, their creation continued to dilute the older leadership, as local groups would invite a speaker from party headquarters, but, as this speaker was systematically from Hitler’s group it helped cement the image that the NSDAP was Hitler’s party (Orlow, 1969: 24). Indeed, when the party gathered in Munich for its first national congress on January 2nd, 1921, it was no longer the small discussion group that Hitler had joined a year before: it was now an organized and recognized political movement with 3,000 members.

The older leadership had been eclipsed by Hitler, but would not go out without a fight. The executive committee sought to reduce Hitler’s influence in the party by signing an agreement with the German Socialist Party (*Deutsch-Sozialistische Partei*) another political party strongly attached to identity in addition to being anti-Jewish. The new party headquarters were to be transferred to Berlin. The aim here was to wrestle control away

³¹ Indeed, the harsh reparation payments imposed on Germany led the mark to depreciate against foreign currencies, but the government continued printing currency, which led the consumer price index to increase at an alarming rate from 100 in 1914 to 310 in 1918 to 100,000,000,000 by 1923 (figures from Widdig, 2001).

from Hitler by isolating him. This was because the heart of his support came from Bavaria, by moving the party away from Munich and up north where Hitler had little support networks, any attempt on his behalf of taking control of the NSDAP would be more difficult. However, Hitler did not fall into the trap. Rather than accept his subordinate role, he simply resigned from the party on July 12th, 1921. This quick, decisive and rather unexpected move took the executive committee by surprise and when Hitler set down his conditions for returning to the NSDAP two days later, all were accepted. These conditions included: a three-man action committee would now be in charge for formulating the party's policies (these policies were then to be assigned to the following subcommittees: propaganda, finance, youth organization, sports and athletics, investigation and mediation) and all members would be nominated by Hitler, members who refused would be expelled from the party. A special party congress held on July 29 cemented the change in organizational structure of the NSDAP. Hitler had been given "dictatorial powers" over the NSDAP and represented the "first step on transforming the NSDAP into a new-style party, a 'Führer' party" (Kenshaw, 1998: 164-65). Indeed, once these structural changes had occurred, the political organization was ready to expand. With Hitler's leadership firmly consolidated and structured in Munich party headquarters, attention was turned to local offices and to competing political parties.

Competing political parties were dealt with through the use of the Storm Troopers. The NSDAP created the "Gymnastics and Sport Section" which was used to train individuals to protect Hitler during his speeches in the Beer Halls and restore order when needed (*To Our German Youth! VB*, No. 64, August 14, 1921, translated in Muhlberger, 2003: 4). Ernst Rohm then made a deal that merged the Erhardt *Freikorps* Brigade with the Gymnastics and Sport Section of the NSDAP, successfully forming a paramilitary group that was tied to the party. By October 1921, the paramilitary organization had renamed itself the Storm Troopers (*Sturmabteilung*) or SA.³² The NSDAP used the SA to break up meetings of rival political groups (Gaab, 2011: 38). The SA and the component of violence and fear would later become an important instrument for the NSDAP as it developed its vision of identity.

Seeking to centralize control, local offices were dealt with in mid-September when Hitler issued his first circular letter (*Rundschreiben*) to them, instructing them to acquire party flags, to submit to Munich the copies of all resolutions passed at local meetings and names of members serving on local committees (*Rundschreiben* Nr. 4, 1921). Not all locals complied immediately, as their organizational structure still resembled the pre-Hitler NSDAP of largely autonomous discussion groups. However, by early 1922, they started to send, albeit erratically, the required information. The absence of a direct line of authority linking the locals to Munich was a structural obstacle to Hitler's end goal of transforming the party into a national one. Hence, taking advantage of the 1922 National Party Congress,

³² While Hitler maintained the SA separate from the NSDAP's political organization, the SA was never allowed to become an independent organization but remained the armed part of the party. The SA was organized into regiments that corresponded to party locals and centuries that corresponded to sections in Munich. All SA members trained with the regiments and centuries but they were also required to attend party session meetings with regular party members, hence they never lost contact with the day-to-day political activities of the party. Indeed, their identity was intertwined with the party. However, being militarily trained, they did quickly become the party's centre of power.

Hitler spoke at length about the need for “a tightly organized leadership” (Orlow, 1969: 36), arguing that locals could remain financially independent as long as they were politically subordinate to Munich. This speech led to the congress amending the party’s bylaws to allow the first chairman to expel entire locals (and no longer individual members) in addition to local leaders giving their vote of confidence to Hitler’s new vision of local-Munich relations. This translated into less decision-making power on the behalf of locals and more power to Munich. This centralizing tendency was further strengthened with the decisions that removed the power of locals to negotiate agreements with other political movements, to propaganda material necessarily being obtained directly from Munich and the creation of any new locals being dependent on Munich’s approval (Orlow, 1969: 36). In addition, the office of delegate (*Delegierte*) was established which created a system through which delegates were appointed by Hitler and responsible for overseeing the activities of locals and reporting directly back to him. Therefore, the National Congress of 1922 marked an important milestone for the NSDAP. It was increasingly becoming a centralized political movement revolving around Hitler’s complete control. This would later prove to be decisive when it came to how the NSDAP would seek to articulate its vision for national identity in that there would only be space for one vision.

The Putsch and its Consequences on the NSDAP

However, the organizational structure NSDAP would fall apart following the Putsch of 1923³³. The failed Putsch reinforced three fundamental issues for Hitler and highly influenced the next sequence of his actions as further developed the NSDAP. First, his time in prison served as a moment of reflection for the future of the NSDAP. Indeed, it is during his time in prison that Hitler wrote *Main Kampf*, the summary of his ideological convictions and essentially the foundation of the future NSDAP ideology that would essentially serve as the cornerstone for its vision of the new German nation that the NSDAP would seek to influence once in power. Furthermore, Hitler became convinced that a military option for overthrowing the Weimar Republic would not succeed and that a more promising option would be the NSDAP’s political participation in the Weimar system.

³³ Throughout the early history of the NSDAP, Hitler had shared the belief that the Weimar Republic would be overthrown through an armed insurrection. While he had considered participating in Bavarian elections (see Orlow 1969, Hoffmann, 1924), he quickly changed his mind and decided to join the other Bavarian extreme right political movements which in 1923 formed a union in order to coordinate their efforts against the Weimar Republic. Hitler was named the political leader of the Militant Association (*Kampfbund*) while Colonial Kriebel was both military commander and political leader. By August of 1923, the plan to overthrow the Republic was set in motion. *Kampfbund*, Bavarian units of the Reichswehr and other extreme right groups would await the signal from the Bavarian government and then move up north. There was an explicit understanding that the Bavarian government would somehow lead the rebellion. However, no signal was ever given. Indeed, upon the return of the head of the Bavarian police, Hans von Seisser, from Berlin the head of the Bavarian Republic, Ritter von Kahr, informed the *Kampfbund* that the Putsch would not take place. Hitler, as political leader of the *Kampfbund*, disagreed and decided to send the signal for the rebellion nonetheless. Hence on November 8, 1923 Hitler, flanked by the SA disrupted a beer hall speech by Gustav Ritter von Kahr, the Bavarian state commissioner, who alongside Bavarian State police head, Colonel Hans Ritter von Seisser and Reichswehr, General Otto von Lossow formed the triumvirate, and proclaimed the start of the revolution. The three Bavarian leaders were met at gunpoint and “convinced” to join the revolution. However, the three, upon escaping the custody of von Ludendorff, quickly denounced the revolution and ordered the police and the army to suppress it. Hitler was imprisoned and 14 Nazi members were shot in addition to four police officers. The Putsch had failed.

Change would have to emanate from within. And finally, a fundamental organizational lesson was learned: never lose control of one's decisions. Hitler had allowed his actions to become dependent on the decisions of others. Indeed, by becoming the political leader of the militant *Kampfbund*, Hitler had aligned himself to a military solution and empowered the SA branch of the NSDAP. Hence, the 55,000-strong political branch of the NSDAP could not be used. The success of the coup hence relied entirely on the SA and on non-NSDAP allies. Hitler had lost his signature control. He had done this by integrating the NSDAP into a broader movement over which neither Hitler nor the NSDAP had any direct control.

Since the political section of the NSDAP had been thoroughly ignored during the preparations of the 1923 Putsch and no preparations had been made were the Putsch to fail, the NSDAP quickly fell apart. The few remaining militants quickly split into two main rival groups: the Nationalist Socialist Freedom Party (*Nationalsozialistische Freiheitspartei*) or NSFP³⁴ and the Greater German People's Community (*Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft*) or GDVG. They had nothing in common except for their veneration of Hitler. After his release from prison, Hitler quickly used their disorganization to his advantage and worked to rebuild the movement. He started with Munich first. The GDVG not only had maintained what remained of the NSDAP membership in Munich and control over the party newspaper. Starting with his signature move of proclaiming speeches and attempting to connect with the maximum number of members in Munich, Hitler, helped by Esser and Steicher, succeeded in convincing the GDVG that the future of the NSDAP depended on Hitler's personal control and dissolved itself in March 1925 and urged members to join either the NSDAP or DVFP (Orlow, 1969). The task of consolidating the organizational structure of the party was given to Executive Secretary Philip Bouhler and Treasurer Franz Xaver Schwarz. Under these two men, a true centralized and impersonal bureaucratic administrative structure was established, which was essential for the NSDAP to aspire to future growth, as Hitler was now free to concentrate on the political future rather than on the day-to-day operations of the movement.³⁵

Hence, Hitler started working on the arduous task of isolating the NSDAP from other *volkisch* movements (for more information on the background see: Muhlberger, 2004: 108–111). This was done through the 1925 presidential elections. While the agreement of the other German *volkisch* movements had been to support the candidature of Karl Jarres, Hitler declared that the NSDAP would be backing Ludendorff. Hence, this put members of the NSDAP at a dilemma. Supporting Jarres meant that they were disloyal to Hitler, while supporting Ludendorff meant full commitment to Hitler's personal leadership (Muhlberger, 2004). Ludendorff, lost but Hitler had managed to isolate the NSDAP and the DVFP from the other *volkisch* movements by forcing them to break rank, and now they had only Hitler to turn to for leadership (Orlow, 1969: 62). Hitler organized a meeting of top Nazi leaders from the North and the South in Bamberg on February 4th,

³⁴ The NSFP was essentially the result of the merger between the NSDAP and the German *Volkisch* Freedom Party (*Deutschvolkische Freiheitspartei*) or DVFP. The DVFP was quite influential and well organized in Northern Germany, having had political successes in Thuringia and Mecklenburg (Hertzman, 1963).

³⁵ An Organizational Committee was created that had the goal of settling disputes in the name of Hitler without actually requiring Hitler's personal approval.

1926 and forced them to either chose between the rejection of his leadership or accept that the Nazi movement would be *one* under Hitler's strict personal control. They had little choice. Isolated from the other *volkisch* movements, the Northern leaders, who had until then reserves about Hitler's dictatorial leadership, knew that their political future depended on a strict alliance with Hitler: they sided with NSDAP.

Hitler quickly worked to re-centralize the party and remove any regional and local autonomy that had developed since the Putsch. Indeed, locals needed prior approval from party headquarters in order to establish any organizational changes and propaganda committees directly linked to Munich were established in locals. In addition, Hitler was made hierarchically superior to the executive committee and he could now expel individual and local organizations from the party (Orlow, 1969: 73, and for a detailed account of the changes in regulation check the *Fundamental Regulations for the Reformulation of the National Socialist German Worker's Party*, VB, No, 1, February 26, 1925, translated in Muhlberger, 2004: 124). At the Weimar Congress held in July 1926, the NSDAP presented itself to Germany as a unified and disciplined political organization with all final authority resting on Hitler (Muhlberger, 2004: 167). This was enough to convince many political rival groups to merge with the NSDAP but also was the proof that once again, Hitler had successfully managed to create a movement that was the centre of the German extreme right (Muhlberger, 2004 and Hanson, 2010). Furthermore, Hitler continued to centralize and tighten control over the NSDAP through his network of *Gau* (particular district administrations) and *Gauleiter* (responsible for the operations of the *Gau* and personally nominated by Hitler) by the establishment of financial control in the offices of the Reichsleitung. Hence, how different *Gau* managed their finances became a means for evaluating the performances of the *Gau* and rewards to successful *Gauleiters*,³⁶ included being nominated to represent the NSDAP on electoral lists for either state legislatures or the Reichstag (Orlow, 1969: 83). Increasingly, their very identity became intertwined with Hitler and the Munich headquarters.

Rebuilding the NSDAP and Momentum

Now, Hitler needed mass support in order to propel his party to national prominence. Indeed, Hitler's NSDAP, at the time of the Weimar Congress, only had 35,000 members. Much more was required if the party wished to aspire to political power. The question was which segments of the German population to target. Between 1926 and 1928, the NSDAP had concentrated on an "urban plan", that is, on drawing support from the proletariat in German cities. The NSDAP therefore became a direct competitor with the SPD and the KPD but it lacked any militant street fighting organization or union organization that could help further convince the masses. Hence, Hitler decided to revive the SA. Under the strict authority of the SA-leader or *Osf*, Franz von Pfeffer, the new SA became a non-military body that would consist of "one hundred thousand fanatic fighters. Its activities will be tremendous mass demonstrations, not secret cabals" (Orlow, 1969: 101) and all SA members would have to be members of the NSDAP and swear an oath of personal loyalty to Hitler. This tightening of control over the coercive element of the NSDAP institution would not only help the NSDAP gain power as SA soldiers would be

³⁶ Goebbels was Gauleiter of Berlin.

critical in crushing and dissuading communist supporters in future elections but also in instilling the fear that the NSDAP would rely on in order to put forward its definition of national identity.

Furthermore, while not officially endorsing the creation of unions, the NSDAP allowed its members to join different non-NSDAP unions. However, following the realization that the urban plan was failing as their electoral support fell, Hitler decided to concentrate efforts on the middle class and on university students. The NSDAP abandoned the proletariat and any socialism references and started addressing the concerns of rural and small towns which, at the time in Germany, were largely inhabited by lower-middle class and mid-middle class people. These people were largely concerned with maintaining their societal status and values. This echoed with the NSDAP and they projected themselves as the only party capable of protecting traditional values. Indeed, the NSDAP set out to address all the fears and prejudices of the lower-middle classes inhabiting rural and small town Germany.³⁷ They would do so by claiming that these people, inhabiting rural Germany represented the heart of the German nation (Brustein, 1996). However, the vast majority of these people were, while extremely patriotic, largely apolitical.

Through the creation of a vast network of horizontal organizations, the NSDAP sought to dig their tentacles in their society and culture in order to engage them. This was done through the Hitler Youth (*Hitler-Jugend*), whose main goal was to encourage parents to send their children to this group that proposed itself as an alternative to the “moral decay” of youth under the Weimar Republic. The Nationalist Socialist Women’s Order (*NS Frauenbund*) included occupation-oriented associations that were party-affiliated. The Nationalist Socialist Press Correspondence was established at the end of 1929 in order to provide, free of charge, newspaper copies about the NSDAP and its goals in addition to the “save our culture” organization which sought to demonstrate the NSDAP’s support for middle class values. Furthermore, in 1928, Fritz Reinhardt had set up a school for the training of local speakers; this school became known as the School of Orators of the NSDAP (*Rednerschule der NSDAP*). The point was simple: to teach a student how to memorize a speech, write one by himself and then learn how to answer questions about the speech. Essentially, the NSDAP was creating a generation of orators to better “spread” the message. By November 1928, the NSDAP had integrated a Nationalist Socialist Film Service in order to distribute videos through the distribution of film projectors to all locals. Videos were a successful way of reaching the rural population, as the spectacle of a movie in itself was often enough to draw an audience (Orlow, 1969: 160). By 1929, the rural-nationalist plan had come into full effect and it was undeniably successful. NSDAP membership was up throughout Germany, meeting halls were filled to capacity, and the press had started taking notice of the party again.

The Nazi Party was now an institution ready for power. Indeed, it was a centralized bureaucratic machine with vertical and horizontal institutions that could deal with a major influx of members without any major changes. It just needed an opportunity to demonstrate

³⁷ These fears and prejudices included : the future of agriculture and farmers, civil servants, disabled veterans, banks, money and the economy and Bolshevism.

it. The critical domestic context of Germany following the Great Depression would provide the much-needed window for the NSDAP to demonstrate its political readiness.

The NSDAP's Critical Junction: The Great Depression

In 1930, Germany was in the midst of the Great Depression. When the stock market crashed on Wall Street, the German economy was very vulnerable as its economy was dependent on foreign capital, mostly in the form of American loans and foreign trade. With a failing economy, the US demanded that the loans be repaid but the Germans had no more money as the world export market was no longer viable. Hence, production levels fell, which led to massive lay-offs of German workers, wiped out savings accounts and was coupled with high inflation. Hence, almost overnight, the standard of living of the German nation dropped. However, the overall shared general opinion was that Germany was suffering because they never had any control over their economy in the first place after signing the Treaty of Versailles. The Weimar Republic was struggling to provide the basic services for its citizens. There were 4.5 million unemployed and millions were going hungry. However, the only item on the political agenda was austerity. Indeed, all the German government did was “cut, cut, cut” spending (Documentary Rise of the Nazi Party, 2014).

In the midst of this economic crisis, a political crisis was brewing. The German democratic government was starting to unravel as it faced political deadlock. Indeed, the economic crisis caused disunity to the political parties as they fought over the best solutions. Rather than forging an alliance in order to provide legislation, they squabbled. Indeed, no longer in the few remaining years of the Weimar Republic would a government rule with the support of a parliamentary majority. In March 1930, Heinrich Brüning became Chancellor, but without a Reichstag majority, his appeals to provide financial programs to the nation were often firmly opposed by other political parties. In addition, many of his actions actually exacerbated the economic situation of Germany which made him to be known as the “Hungry Chancellor” and inspiring a new nursery rhyme: “Wait a while and just you’ll see, and Brüning will come up to you with the ninth emergency decree and make mincemeat out of you” (Evans, 2003: 254). While, Brüning never actually used nine emergency decrees, he did make use of them four times. This tendency to rule by emergency decree coupled with gruelling economic conditions quickly made him the most unpopular chancellor of the Weimar Republic (*Ibid*: 255). When the deflationary budget was refused as Social Democrats joined the Nationalists and the Communists in their refusal to approve, the Reichstag was dissolved and a new election was called for on September 14th, 1930.

The Nazi Party sprang into action. As aforementioned, after the failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, Hitler had been convinced that the road to success for implanting his vision for Germany was through democratic elections. The 1930 elections were viewed as a window of opportunity for the Nazi Party. This is because the great fear that followed the crash was successfully appropriated by the NSDAP. While the production line workers and the already unemployed turned essentially to the KPD, those who feared the future, who feared economic woes, who feared the loss of social status, turned to the NSDAP, which

was capable of presenting familiar appeals of tradition with promises of remedying the situation. Having already convinced the middle class of rural Germany, the NSDAP was starting to turn their attention to the middle classes of urban Germany.

Using massive rallies that were based on the ideas of “order, unity and discipline” and that used almost religious imagery and massive propaganda, the Nazi Party campaigned hard using direct slogans such as “Bread, freedom, work” or images of Germans looking into the face of the Depression with the slogan, “Germany’s last hope: Hitler”. The Nazi Party organization prepared speech after speech, in which Hitler “offered a vague but powerful rhetorical vision of a Germany united and strong, a movement that transcended social boundaries and overcame social conflict, a racial community of Germans working together, a new Reich that would rebuild Germany’s economic strength and restore the nation to its rightful place in the world” (Evans, 2004: 257). These themes were essentially the foundation of the vision of the NSDAP and would influence its conceptualization of German identity. Such a vision, compounded with the internal divisions of the Weimar Republic and economic woes, successfully convinced millions of German voters. The Nazi Party won 6.5 million votes (17%), which represented 107 seats in the Reichstag, just 36 seats fewer than the biggest party in the ruling coalition, the Social Democrats. The Nazi Party was now the second most popular party in Germany.

Through the campaigning of the idea that the NSDAP represented the face of the “awakened nation” (Goebbels, 1935: 94, Calvin College) and as such represented the re-birth of the German nation, the NSDAP was gaining resonance. Indeed, when compared to the last general election in 1928, in which the Nazi Party only received 810,000 votes (2%), which had translated into only 12 seats, the impact of the Great Depression, the inertia of the rulers in the Weimar Republic and the strengthening the NSDAP’s own institutions in addition to the newfound resonance of its vision was apparent. Through these elections, the NSDAP had become the “catch-all” political party of social protest. On the eve of this tremendous 1930 election victory, Goebbels proclaimed,

Overnight we have changed from a small and despised group to a leading mass party, and our victory on 14 September is unprecedented in political history... In the last two years our party has grown by a factor of ten. It has conquered bastion after bastion and fortress after fortress throughout the nation, regardless of lies, slanders, and bans. It has built a strong organization, begun fifty newspapers and developed a battalion of the best political speakers. It had produced a flood of plans and ideas and many organizers and thinkers. This cannot be explained by ordinary means. It is a political mystery, something of a miracle. Our duty is to transform the miracle of this political mystery into reality. The broad masses who have expressed themselves in our movement have given a clear and unmistakable statement against the Germany of today and for the Germany of tomorrow. They want a radical break with the domestic, foreign, economic and cultural policies of the past government. No more threatening assault on the System can be imagined. It is clear that the will to rid Germany of the old parties and their ideas is no longer that of a small party, but of an entire awakened nation. (Goebbels, 1935: 94, translated by the Calvin College German Propaganda Archive)

The economic crisis and the solutions that Hitler proposed seemed to be translating into political success. These solutions revolved around returning the unemployed to work, removing the Jewish from the German society, as they were pinpointed by the NSDAP as key players in all of Germany’s economic woes, stopping the German WWI repayment

and rearming Germany. With the ban on the SA being promised to be lifted by President Hindenberg as long as Hitler supported a new government, a new election was called for July 1932, in which the Nazi Party doubled their numbers. They doubled their vote to 13.1 million (37.4%) and received 230 seats. In an unprecedented move, Hitler rented an airplane and flew across Germany giving speeches throughout German towns in his famous 'flight over Germany'. In addition, election flyers were massively distributed that attacked their largest political rival, the communists,³⁸ in which, the Nazis claimed,

Communists! We are hungry and on the dole, we lack food and jobs. We have bitter wives at home, and children whose every wish we must deny, or discontented parents, brothers and sisters. It has been this way for months, years; how long can it go on this way! One week follows another. Everything stays the same, conditions get worse, never better. Things are the same for us as they are for you. Does it have to stay that way? No! It really is not necessary. A condition that people have caused can be changed by them too. You trust Russia. You have been fighting for your idea for years. What has happened? You have 3/4 of a million fewer votes than in September 1930. Despite the need, despite the misery! Do you really believe that your cause can lead us to better times, that your wavering, aimless leadership that has been wrong so often in the past can actually win? Do you believe that Russia will help? Would it not be better to help ourselves!? For the German proletariat to help itself? We Nazis help each other. He who has something to eat shares it with him who has nothing. He who has a spare bed gives it to him who has none. That is why we have become so strong. The election shows what we can do. Everyone helps! Everyone sacrifices! The unemployed give up their wedding rings. Everyone gives, even if it is but a penny. Many small gifts become a large one. Ten million 10-pfennig coins are a million Marks. We don't need any capitalists, the lie that you are always told. We do it ourselves, and are proud of it. We all help and sacrifice, because we believe in our idea and our Führer. Without our party program, we would not have become so large and strong. We believe in our program because it says that our leaders have pledged to carry it out, even if it requires the sacrifice of their own lives. Translation, side 2: Adolf Hitler wrote the program, and we know that he will hold to it. Help build the people's state! It doesn't matter where you came from, we are interested only in what you can do, and in your character. We want to fight. We oppose current conditions! We want to escape this misery! That is why we fight today's system! That is why we want to rule Prussia! Help us! We can do it! Enough! Things have to change! Vote National Socialist. (1932 Election Flyer, Calvin College Archive)

The emphasis on the German nation was clear. The flyer claimed that only the NSDAP recognized the strong social fabric that tied the Germans together. Indeed, the NSDAP claimed that only Germans could help each other and that change would only emanate and be successful if all Germans united as one nation without outside influence. Their electoral platform paid off: they were now the largest party but still faced an opposition that served again to paralyse the government. 100 Communists now faced 196 Nazis in the Reichstag. Indeed, these two extreme and enemy parties together now formed the absolute majority of parliament, which made Reichstag sessions more and more rowdy and any attempt to discuss became impossible through incessant interrupting, chanting and shouting. Hence, while the Reichstag had sat on average for 100 days a year throughout 1920–1930, by 1932 it sat for three days in six months (Evans, 2004: 276).

³⁸ Throughout the existence of the Weimar Republic, the two political rivals had clashed. However, in the early 1930s, their rivalry increased. There were often armed clashes between the SA and the Alliance of Red Front-Fighters, which resulted in multiple casualties. Indeed, the Nazis claimed there were 17 deaths in 1930, 42 in 1931 and 84 in 1932. Moreover, they claimed that 10,000 had been injured in 1932. The Communists claimed there were 44 deaths in 1930, 52 in 1931, and 75 in the first six months of 1932 (Evans, 2004 : 270).

In an attempt to renegotiate a truce, Hitler asked von Hindenburg to be named Reich chancellor; he argued that his party's participation in government would be dependent on this position. Indeed, Hindenburg was the only person with the authority left to sign decrees and appoint governments. However, Hindenburg did not trust him and refused, proposing instead the position of vice-chancellor that Hitler refused. Rather, Papen decided that he would dissolve the Reichstag and declare the end of elections with backing of Hindenburg and simply rule by decree. Yet, when the Reichstag entered its session, the demands for dissolution were ignored and instead a new election was called for November, 1932. This election marked a new turning point for the NSDAP. Their votes fell from 13.7 million to 11.7 million: while they still were the largest party in the Reichstag with 196 seats, other political parties, and in particular the Communists, had improved their numbers. It nonetheless remained impossible to govern, as no coalition government could be formed without Nazi participation and Hitler refused to enter into a coalition government.

The strategy of participating in elections until victory seemed to be showing its limits. Hitler decided that power would have to be attained differently. Chancellor Papen was convinced that a state of emergency need to be declared in order to limit the appeal and power of political parties and put the governing power into the hands of the most able. However, Schleicher was wary that this could create a state of civil war and questioned the German ability to crush the SA, were they to revolt. Hence, he offered that he become the new Chancellor and negotiate a "national front" of Social Democrats, trade unions, Catholics and even the more left-wing elements of the NSDAP (Bendersky, 2014: 80). Hindenburg reluctantly accepted the proposition. However, Schleicher was unsuccessful in his political manoeuvrings. Moreover, Papen, who continued to have the confidence and ear of Hindenburg, remained politically active and was able to negotiate with Hitler. Indeed, Hitler, fearing that an electoral victory was impossible, was reluctantly accepting to enter a coalition government with the right. Power would be attained through the "back door". The now infamous Papen plan involved that Hitler be named Chancellor but that a conservative cabinet be nominated in order to keep Hitler in check³⁹ in addition to the holding of new elections. Indeed, Papen claimed that, "we will have pushed Hitler so far into a corner that he'll squeak" (Evans, 2004: 308). Finally, after much reservation and hesitation, Hindenburg succumbed to the increasing pressure to get government functional again. Hence, amidst jubilant Nazi celebrations, on January 30th, 1933, Hitler was appointed Chancellor. During the last elections that the Weimar Republic would have, Hitler set out his vision for the rebirth of Germany,

For fourteen years the parties of disintegration, of the November Revolution have seduced and abused the German people. For fourteen years they wreaked destruction, infiltration, and dissolution. Considering this, it is not presumptuous for me to stand before the nation today, and plead to it: German people give us four years' time and then pass judgement upon us. German people give us four years, and I swear to you, just as we, just as I have taken office, so shall I leave it. I have done it neither for salary or wages; I have done it for your sake!...For I cannot divest myself of my faith in my people, cannot disassociate myself from the conviction

³⁹ While Papen and the conservatives did maintain control of Cabinet, the Nazis held the position of Chacellorship and German and Prussian Ministries of the Interior. These were key cabinet positions from which control over law and order was total.

that this nation will one day rise again, cannot divorce myself from my love for this, my people, and I cherish the firm conviction that the hour will come at last in which the millions who despise us today will stand by us and with us will hail the new, hard-won and painfully acquired German Reich we have created together, the new German kingdom of greatness and power and glory and justice. Amen. (Evans, 2004: 324)

With each election, the NSDAP insisted that they were the political party with the German nation's best interests. The NSDAP was adamant in declaring all other political parties as responsible for the failings of the German nation and claimed that they alone could redefine Germany and thereby restore Germany to its glory days. However, a Nazi triumph was far from inevitable; indeed, the Communists were also extremely popular. The KPD had the support of the working class of Germany and had seen their seats in the Reichstag increase steadily going from 54 seats (10.6% of the vote) in 1918 to 100 seats (16.9% of the vote) in November 1932.

However, when a fire occurred at the Reichstag and the culprit was found to be Marinus van der Lubbe, a young Dutch communist who was found at the scene,⁴⁰ the winds changed. The Nazis successfully exploited this fire. After the declaration of a state of emergency by Hindenburg, Hitler convinced him to use this time to suppress the Communists once and for all. Alongside the police, the SS and SA were sent in to destroy the Communists, with the final tally being 4000 murdered, imprisoned and beat-up (Bendersky, 2004). The German people overwhelmingly supported the brutal crackdown. Indeed rather than seeing the crackdown as one against the Communist political party, the Nazis argued to the German people that they were fighting criminals who wanted an "imminent Bolshevik revolution" that would uproot and destroy the German nation. This resulted in big business and industrialists throwing their heavy weight and finances behind the NSDAP. Furthermore, in efforts to openly intimidate the opposition, the SA, SS and Hitler Youth patrolled the streets as they raided opposition leader's houses and organized transport the day of the vote. The result was that the Nazi Party managed to secure 44% of the vote, a hairsbreadth from an absolute majority. This represented 17 million Germans. But, the numbers also demonstrated that despite an almost dictatorial control over the message and the streets, 5 million people had voted Communist, (reducing their pre-election seat count from 100 to 81), 7 million Social Democrats and 5.5 million for the Centre Party.

Hitler then decided that elections simply would not work; the popularity of the NSDAP seemed to have reached its limits.⁴¹ He therefore sought to pass the Enabling Act, which would give allow him to temporarily suspend the constitution and the parliament and take control for four renewable years. The vote had to take place in the Reichstag but required a 2/3 majority. While he was able to reduce the quorum to 378 from 432 by eliminating the democratically elected Communists from the vote, he needed more support despite the support of the Conservative and Nationalist parties. In particular, he needed the support of the Centre, as he knew that he could not count on the Social Democrats. He successfully managed to convince the Catholic parties, the party that had been one of the pillars of support for the Weimar Republic, that he would protect them in exchange for

⁴⁰ There remains much doubt surrounding his involvement in the fire.

⁴¹ This limit had already started becoming apparent in the November 1932 elections.

their support.⁴² Indeed, the Centre Party, in the midst of all the political violence during the last year, was increasingly worried about the survival and protection of the Catholic Church in Germany. Hitler promised that the rights of the Church would not be harmed and that the judiciary would remain independent (Evans, 2004: 352). He then went in front of the Reichstag and he declared that the Enabling Act was necessary were his government to successfully fight unemployment, and promised not to endanger the peace with France, Britain and Russia, to restore public order, and to provide a stable political system. The Reichstag proceeded to vote. When 441 members voted “yes” and 94 “no”, the Enabling Act was successfully passed on March 24th, 1933, and in doing so the Weimar Republic had democratically signed its demise. Indeed, this Act marked the start of the Third Reich, under a one-party system: the Nazi Party. The Enabling Act put Hitler in a position from which he could transform the German state⁴³ and society. From within the confines of a totalitarian state, the NSDAP would articulate a vision of national identity and impact and influence the German nation.

The Evolution of NSDAP Identity

This thesis contends that national identity can be changed and that it evolves under the actions of those in power, namely, political parties. Identity is not static and is in constant redefinition. Moreover, the identity of the NSDAP evolved over time as Hitler took a more prominent role in the political party. Indeed, it did not only evolve from an informal political gathering to a large political party but its position on identity also evolved. Indeed, the DAP, before Hitler’s involvement was a melting pot of volkisch ideas, anti-communism, social revolutionary ideas and anti-Semitism with none holding an apparent predominance over another (Hermand, 1992: 84). Hitler, on the other hand, would develop and coordinate the two basic tenets of the Nazi conceptualization of national identity: *Volksgemeinschaft* and the superiority of the Aryan race. Indeed, the Third Reich under the NSDAP would seek to project a German nation based upon the *Volksgemeinschaft* and ethnocentric view that only Aryans deserved and could be part of the German nation.

The NSDAP did not create these ideas from scratch. Rather the German Romanticism movement that started in the late 18th century influenced them. It placed the emphasis on the individual. While this may seem contradictory when we think how the NSDAP attempted to destroy the individual to the profit of the society, Wells (2018) explains that if we understand the *volk* as forming one community, it makes more sense as

⁴² The Centre Catholic Party feared that were they not to support the NSDAP, that they would suffer the same fate of the Communist Party.

⁴³ As this thesis’ goal is to demonstrate the role of political parties in the transformation of national identity, it shall not dwell on how the Nazi Party transformed the German state through its removal of key political institutions. Indeed, through the powers granted by the Enabling Act, the Nazi Party sought to revolutionize the state through the idea of coordination or “*gleichschaltung*”. Hence, the Nazi Party dissolved and reorganized state governments, purged the bureaucracy, crushed trade unions, and introduced a one-party system. He waited until the death of the German President, Hindenburg, on August 2, 1934 to announce that the functions of President and Chancellor would be merged (until this, the President technically could have removed Hitler from power, but Hindenburg had been too ill to serve) and made all members of the military swear an oath of total obedience to Hitler.

the individual as a single human being gets replaced by the idea of a homogenous community that becomes almost like one individual, acting as one and thinking as one. The Romantic Movement also sought to put the emphasis on nature. This gave way to the exploration of ideas of nation and identity. Indeed in the Romantic thought nature was not cold and mechanical rather it was alive and spontaneous. It was filled with a life force that corresponded to the emotions of man. Hence the human soul could be in rapport with nature since it too had a soul. Hence every individual could be linked to nature that he in turn shared with every other individual that helped create the idea of one *volk* united in one shared emotional experience through nature, or in other words one nation. In addition, landscape gave members of a community their characteristics and also defined who was foreign. This would be apparent with NSDAP sponsored ideas that the Jewish people originating from the desert were “dry”, “shallow” and “arid” whereas the Germans were “pure”, “strong” and “determinate” as they historically came from the Nordic. Finally, the anti-Semitism of the NSDAP was not new in German history. Most Jewish living in Germany had come from Russia had ever since their arrival in Germany in the 19th century faced discrimination from German society and from German state. Indeed, while Napoleon had emancipated Jews across Europe, with his fall in 1815, Jews suffered discrimination on the behalf of German states. During the Hep-Hep riots Jewish property was destroyed, Jewish were dismissed from public office and many work, marriage and settlement rights were greatly restricted. While their conditions improved with the unification of Germany During and continued to under the Weimar Republic, anti-Semitic activities on the behalf of political parties and social movements persisted.

This next section will address the concepts upon which the NSDAP established its vision for national identity. To do so, it will analyse and take into account the contents of articles and information published in the *VB* (the NSDAP’s magazine) that essentially served as an early voice for Hitler before his seizure of power. It will also take into consideration the contents of *Mein Kampf* as the book serves to demonstrate the “inner mind” of Hitler and other documents published by the NSDAP or NSDAP members.

Volksgemeinschaft or People’s Community

The core tenet of the Nazi Party’s national project was to create a *Volksgemeinschaft* or “people’s community” under the slogan of “*Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer*” or “one people, one empire, and one leader”. The general idea was that despite the fact that Germans belonged to different social classes and had different incomes, they were all to be considered *Volksgenossen* (racial comrades) who would be united by blood and a common national destiny. Hence, despite the undeniable fact that society tended to be organized around wealth or social status, all Germans, under *Volksgemeinschaft*, could aspire to an equal social status simply because they were part of the German race. In this sense, *Volksgemeinschaft* was also linked to the second general tenet of the Nazi identity: the installation of a racially pure state. Indeed, while a national state would unite different people from different religions and cultures, a volkisch state would unite people on the basis of a racial interpretation of racial purity. Hence, to form a new German nation under this understanding, it was essential to remove all foreign elements from the nation. Furthermore, *Volksgemeinschaft* also aspired to the idea of destroying the individual for the benefit of the society. Indeed, rather than protecting the equal rights of all individuals

to the law, “civil rights and guarantees were now replaced by the total incorporation and integration of the individual, in thought, action, and feeling, into the *Volksgemeinschaft*” (Majer, 2003: 47). Hence, the individual could only attain his/her full capacity through his/her full integration into the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The basic guiding idea here was that, “an individual can prosper only as a member of a people’s community and the group can survive and prosper only if the individual subordinates his own interests to those of the *Volksgemeinschaft*” (Knauerhase, 1972: 47).

1. *Volksgemeinschaft* as an Idea of “Belonging” and Saving the German Nation

The emphasis on the creation of a *Volksgemeinschaft* can be found as early as 1921 in the *VB*. There was an inherent idea that the German nation should not be based on socio-economics but on German “belonging”. This is especially apparent when looking at Hitler’s speeches to the working class. Hitler sought to counter the Bolsheviks with his idea of the classless nation based on *Volksgemeinschaft*. Hence, admission to the German nation would be based on race rather than class. Indeed, it was proclaimed through the pages of the *VB* that,

the concept of ‘national community’ (*Volksgemeinschaft*) must, if it is not to become a slogan like so many others, be based on national, social and idealistic views. Its worst enemy is Marxism on the one hand, and capitalism on the other hand. Both of these represent the complete opposite of the triple division of the view on which the national community rests” and that, “the idea of national community, and with it liberation from foreign political constraint, will in terms of thought be a prerequisite for, in terms of realization the consequence of, an economic transformation of current power and property relationships. (*VB*, No. 117, June 16, 1923. National Community)

Furthermore, the NSDAP sought to establish itself as the essential link between the *Volk* and state. Indeed, it considered the *Volk* to be the natural unit of social organization and therefore believed that the state was responsible to protect it, regulate the relationship of the members to each other, assure the purity of its bloodlines and culture and create the basis for its continued growth (Knauerhase, 1972: 47). Hence, the Weimar Republic was serving the individual interests of the Jewish and the capitalist. Indeed, “what sort of system is it, that takes away from its citizens their meagre nest eggs and eats up the capital of their businesses with which they are supposed to work?” (The November Men, July 1932 Reichstag Election Pamphlet, *VB*, No 204, July 22, 1932). The Communists were only exacerbating class distinctions and actually harming the German worker and consequently, the German nation:

the current parties of the left are the mercenary forces of the Jewry. Its purpose is not the emancipation of the working people from the hordes of international, finance-capitalist exploiters, but the removal of the last remnants of national economic independence through the destruction of political independence and freedom of nations-----the parties of the right either prepare this development, and therefore form little more than the right wing of the Marxist groups, or they are – through the ‘decent’ or ‘noble form of conflict’, which the Jews have inculcated into them, which means in plain German cowardly stupidity – the eliminators of the national elements within their ranks. (*Völkisch Thought and the Party*, by Hitler, *VB* no. 1, January 1, 1921)

The NSDAP on the other hand would be capable of serving the nation. Therefore, the NSDAP sought to present itself as the only political party out to protect the *Volk* and uninterested in personal gain but concentrated on the larger picture: the survival of the German nation. For example, the NSDAP promised that they intended to “unite the people regardless of class, estate, occupation or confession. We want to use the combined energy of the whole of the people to bring back work, bread and freedom” (*Freedom, Beauty and Dignity!* July 1932 Reichstag Election Poster, in *VB* No. 197, July 15, 1932). Furthermore, Hitler noted that,

there is no such thing as nationalist feelings based on profit. Likewise, there is no such thing as nationalism built on classes....you can only be proud of your Volk when you no longer have any reason to be ashamed of your social standing. A Volk, however, half of whose people are destitute or languishing or ruined, presents such a wretched picture that no one could take pride in it. Only when all the limbs of the *volkisch* body are healthy, both spiritually and physical, can the joy that comes from belonging to that body justifiably rise up to the high emotional level that we can term national pride. This highest pride, however, will be felt only by people who recognize the greatness of their Volk's national characteristics. This inner marriage of nationalism and a sense of social justice is ready to be planted in the hearts of the young. At some future time, then, a Volk made up of citizens of the new state will rise up, bound together and forged by a common love and a common pride, and will be forever unshakable and unconquerable. (Hitler, 2011, 280)

This quickly led to the principle of *Volksgemeinschaft* being quickly established as the ideal form of nation. Rather than taking the individual as the base point, the NSDAP sought to put the emphasis on the community as the essential link between nation and society. Hitler claimed on January 27th, 1934 that

people's community: that means a community of all productive labour, that becomes the oneness of all vital interests, that means overcoming bourgeois privatism and the unionized, mechanically organized masses, that means unconditionally equating the individual fate and the nation, the individual and the people....the bourgeois must become a citizen of the state, the red comrade must become a racial comrade. Both must, with their good intentions, ennoble the sociological concept of the worker and raise the status of an honorary title for labour. This patent of nobility alone puts the soldier and the peasant, the merchant and the academician, the worker and the capitalist under oath to take the only possible direction in which all purposeful German striving must be headed: towards the nation. (Hitler in an interview with Hanns Johst on January 27, 1934 in Evans, 2006: 497)

The idea was inherently based on the idea that a people's community be organic. Hence, collectivity, “rather than being put together like a thoughtless machine, is united like a conscious living organism. Above all the organic promise, so to speak, is a promise of meaningful connectedness” (Gonen, 2000: 140). Therefore the goal was to create feeling of connectivity amongst individuals. Hence, the feeling of alienation that accompanied modernity would be balanced by an emphasis on the people's historical past, the isolation of urban life would be balanced by an emphasis on comrades united by *Volk*, and feelings of individuality would be balanced by an emphasis that all formed the same fabric of an organic community that was linked by common blood and history.

2. *Volksgemeinschaft* as the Exclusion of Foreign Elements

However, the creation of the *Volksgemeinschaft* also put much emphasis on the idea of belonging to a German nation. This German nation was essentially a blood nation. In other words, belonging to the nation required that one carry German blood. Therefore, quickly, *Volksgemeinschaft* became synonymous not only with the erasing of social class distinctions but also with the exclusion of foreign elements from the people's community. There was in the conceptualization of what constituted the German nation a strong emphasis on ethnicity. One did not become German, rather the question was to ensure that all "natural" Germans be guaranteed access to the German nation. Indeed, Hitler claimed that the German was greatest because "of his willingness to put all his abilities in the service of the community. In him, the instinct for self-preservation has reached the noblest form, since he willingly subordinates his own ego to the life of the community and, if the hour demands, even sacrifices it (Hitler, 2011: 89). This was something not possible for the Jewish for example, as they were uniquely self-interested individuals who "never possessed this idealistic impulse. His whole history is a witness to that: he has never had his own state, never had his own culture. His prophesy only states, 'You shall gobble up all the people the God Jehovah will provide you with'" (*VB*, No 53, June 5 1920, From the Movement). Hence, the creation of a *Volksgemeinschaft* is also part of the larger NSDAP national aspiration of the building of a racial state. This shall be further developed in the next section.

The Racial State

While the idea of German citizenship based on a community of descent was not new in Nazi Germany,⁴⁴ what was new was the *institutionalized* idea that access to the German nation could only be based on race. Indeed, historically in Germany, "belonging" to the nation had everything to do with an ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood and therefore was independent of the state. The idea of citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* was first introduced by Bavaria in 1818, and then adopted by the Prussian citizenship law of 1842, which, in turn, led to its adoption by the unified German Reich in 1871. This citizenship law was firmly institutionalized in 1919 under the German Nationality Law⁴⁵ and placed German citizenship in the category of "community of descent, with little regard for birthplace and residence" (Howard, 2008: 42). However, the Nazis used this exclusive conceptualization of citizenship and nationhood in order to develop a racial state. This political conceptualization of race would be developed by Ernst Krieck, who, in 1934 would define, that

race manifests itself in the will, the outlook, and the worldview in accordance with the racial hierarchy of values. Then German racial hierarchy of racial values conforms to the heroic, soldierly, and political ideal, and places top priority on the values of honour, loyalty,

⁴⁴ See Rogers Brubaker (1998). Furthermore, Brubaker makes the convincing case that in the world of nation-states, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish citizenship from the nation. This thesis agrees. Just as modernizing states sought to define who belonged to a nation and upon what criteria, today, modern and established nation-states continue to define "insiders" and "outsiders" on the grounds of citizenship.

⁴⁵ Furthermore, despite the failure of the Weimar Republic, and the atrocities committed under the Third Reich, the principle of *jus sanguinis* would not be altered until 1990, and would not take effect until 2000. Furthermore, the changes enacted, while making it easier for immigrants to become German, still has many conditions.

camaraderie, tenacity of body and spirit, veracity, commitment to the commonwealth of the *volkish* totality, and of social justice. It is upon these values that the state, the organization of the *Volk*, culture and upbringing are built (Krieck, 1934: 36)

Hitler clearly manifested his thoughts of the superiority of the Aryan race that he considered the Germans to be part as the “founders of culture” but that their superiority could be threatened when “races” mixed. Indeed, he wrote,

Aryan races – often absurdly small numerically – subject foreign peoples, and then, stimulated by the living conditions of the new territory (fertility, climatic conditions, etc.) and assisted by the multitude of lower-beings standing at their disposal as helps, develop the intellectual and organizational capacities dormant within them. Often in a few millennia, or even centuries, they create cultures that originally bear all the inner characteristics of their nature, adapted to the above-indicated special qualities of the soil and subjected beings. In the end, however, the conquerors transgress against the principle of blood purity to which they had first adhered, they begin to mix with the subjugated inhabitants and thus end their own existence; for the fall of man from paradise has always been his expulsion. (Hitler, 2011: 30)

Hence, Hitler aspired to the goal of “purifying” the German nation and sought to use the state in order to prevent its fall at the hands of what he perceived to be foreign and “subjected” people. This was reflected in point four of the Nazi Party program, which stated that, “only *Volk*-comrades can be citizens. And only persons of German blood, irrespective of confession, can be *Volk*-comrades. No Jew can be a *Volk*-comrade”.⁴⁶ Indeed, the NSDAP aspired to create a German state that reflected a “true German culture” and this meant a culture coming from the blood, traditions and spirit of the *Volk*. (Bendersky, 2014: 115). Hitler proclaimed in front of the Reichstag on January 30th, 1937 “I speak prophetically. Just as the discovery that the earth moved around the sun led to the complete transformation of the way people looked at the world, so too the blood and racial teachings of National Socialism will change our understanding of mankind’s past and its future” (Hitler, 1937). This new national conceptualization of what it “meant” to be German would be a huge part of the NSDAP’s political program in power.

While the means through which the NSDAP would seek to ultimately separate the Jews, infirm, homosexuals, Roma and other “undesirables” from the Aryan Race was new and horrifying, in Germany, there was already a historical anti-Semitism, which the NSDAP successfully exploited. The Jews in Germany historically had many restrictions placed on them, barring them from certain professions such as public administration, the army or teaching positions, limiting the number of marriages, and limiting property rights. While Napoleon emancipated the Jews of the German territories following the Congress of Vienna, many German states reversed Jewish emancipation. Full emancipation would only occur with Bismarck upon unification in 1869 for Northern Germany and 1871 in the new German Republic. However, anti-Semitism prevailed throughout German society and anti-Semitic movements and organizations flourished throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

From the start the NSDAP was anti-Semitic. Hitler’s focus on the Jews was unrelenting right from the 1920s, and elements of anti-Semitism were always present in all

⁴⁶ Quoted by Brubaker, Rogers. 1998. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Boston: Harvard University Press. p. 167.

his speeches before the Putsch of 1923. Hence throughout the early 1920s, Hitler concentrated on blaming the Jews for all the things he despised, such as capitalism, socialism, liberalism, democracy and finances. Since his main issue was the humiliating defeat of Germany and the failures of the Weimar Republic led by the “November Criminals”,⁴⁷ the NSDAP essentially concentrated first on linking the Jews to the despised Weimar Republic and its parliament. Furthermore, the fact that new strongly anti-Semite contributors such as Alfred Rosenberg⁴⁸ (1896–1946), Dietrich Eckart⁴⁹ (1868–1923), Gottfried Feder⁵⁰ (1883–1941) and Hansjorg Maurer⁵¹ (1891–1959) joined the NSDAP helped develop the party line against the Jews. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was frequently used and published in the early years of the NSDAP to justify its position against the Jews. However, it must be stated that in its early stages, the NSDAP was preaching largely to an already anti-Semite audience and therefore needed little to “convince” them of the inherent “evils” of the Jews (Jones, 2014). These views were “refined” during the writing of *Mein Kampf* and it is when the NSDAP resurfaced in 1925 following Hitler’s release from prison and its positioning as a party ready for power that its position on Jews had to be refined and developed in order to gain greater German support.

Two main changes in these views occurred in the late 1920s and early 1930s. First, the NSDAP started making more and more mention of the “scientific” evidence by linking the “Jewish problem” to anthropological and biological evidence that sought its legitimacy from eugenics. Indeed, the NSDAP gave more and more public space to scientists and university professors who would give “scientific proof” that the Jewish were inferior. Second, Hitler had integrated his anti-Semitic views into a larger and more “national” problem: the purity of the Aryan race. Not only pinpointing the Jewish (who still shared the bulk of the blame), the NSDAP added the mentally ill, the homosexuals, the infirm and the gypsies to the long list of elements that were responsible for the decline of the German nation. The Jewish question became a biologically and racially constructed argument: the inherent Aryan racial purity had been compromised because of the foreign and corrupt influences of inferior races. This in turn had undermined the German nation as a whole. Hence, the NSDAP started to concentrate more fully on “racial hygiene” and “population policies” rather than solely on the Jewish question. All this became part of their larger nation-building intent to create a racially defined nation. In the next few paragraphs, this analysis will demonstrate these shifts of position within the NSDAP as the party developed its vision for national identity.

⁴⁷ The often NSDAP cited “November Criminals” included members of the Centre Party and the Social Democrats, and were the men who had signed Germany’s demise through their acceptance of the Versailles Treaty.

⁴⁸ Rosenberg published several important anti-Semite works such as *The Track of the Jews throughout the Ages*, and *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*. He participated in the Beer Hall Putsch and was later awarded with the position of the head of the NSDAP’s Foreign Affairs (1933–1945) and Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories (1941–1945). He was tried and found guilty at the Nuremberg Trials and executed in 1946.

⁴⁹ Eckart was the chief editor of the *VB* from 1921 to 1923.

⁵⁰ Feder joined the NSDAP and became a Reichstag deputy until 1933, upon which he was appointed the Secretary in Ministry of Economic Affairs and later the State Commissar for Settlement Policy.

⁵¹ Maurer was editor of the *VB* from 1920–1923 and 1925–1926. He left the *VB* and the NSDAP following a dispute with Max Amann.

1. 1920–1925: *Anti-Semitism as a Principle*

Before the writing of *Mein Kampf*, the position of the NSDAP on the Jewish question was largely based on exploiting pre-existing feelings of anti-Semitism. Hence, the *VB* claimed in 1920 that the Jewish sought to attain domination of the world through the denationalization of the peoples; the expropriation of land; the destruction of the independent middle class – communalization; the extermination of the national intelligentsia (Russia!); permanent security through the complete dulling of the minds of the people through the press, art, literature, cinema etc., confusion of public opinion, destruction of the rule of law, struggle against religious convictions, furtherance of sectarianism etc., undermining of morals and customs) the Jews as white-slave traffickers in all ages! Communalism of women!), money is his love and character!; class conflict serves him as his last means. The worker is a means to an end in the service of the Jew to protect the international stock market and loan capital and of the peace treaty...the battle-cry is: ‘Anti-Semites of all countries unite’! (*From the Movement, VB*. No 53, June 5, 1920)

Hence the already established stereotypes of the money-loving Jews and their supposed domination over the press and the arts were reinforced by the NSDAP. However they added certain new links between the Jews and the perceived problems plaguing contemporary Germany: the fears of communism and the WWI peace treaty. With regards to communism, Hitler claimed that, “the current parties of the Left are the mercenary forces of Jewry...final objective is the construction of the Jewish world state as prophesised by Jahweh” (Hitler, *VB, Volkisch Thought and the Party*, No 1, January 1, 1921).

Furthermore, throughout the early 1920s, the NSDAP essentially sought the violent overthrow of the Weimar Republic and was essentially targeting Germans who were anti-parliamentarians. Indeed, in the early 1920s, the NSDAP was still a nascent political movement and specifically targeting the already disenchanted right-wing Germans. The goal was to incite enough Germans in order to inspire a revolution against the Weimar Republic. As another *volkisch* political party vying for political support among other *volkisch* political parties, the NSDAP was extremely anti-Semitic (like the other *volkisch* political parties at the time) but linked its anti-Semitism not only to the economy, like many other political parties but also to the Weimar Republic. Hence, the Weimar Republic, democracy and the parliamentary system suddenly became synonymous with the Jews. Indeed, the NSDAP increasingly started describing the Weimar Republic as the “Jewish Riff-Raff and Crooks Republic”, the “Jewish democracy”, “swindle and betrayal” and that under democracy, the voter had no power as it was a ploy for “Jewish domination” (see different publications from the *VB*).

Furthermore, the NSDAP exploited the “Barmat Scandal” which involved a financial scandal by two Jewish entrepreneurs, Julius Barmat and Ivan Kutisker who had secured large loans from several banks only to default on them. Barmat was sentenced to eleven months of jail and Kutisker five years amidst accusations of bribery and corruption against SPD politicians, including some bearing the presidential seal. The NSDAP exploited the scandal as proof that that the Jews “controlled” the new politicians of the Weimar Republic, even naming the Republic the “Jew Barmat” (Canning, Barndt and McGuire, 2010).

The NSDAP viewed reality through racist lenses. Indeed, the pages of the *VB* are full of racist references to the “Jewish problem”. The claim was essentially that, the Jews were “poisoning the people”, and that since they had never had a state or a culture, that they sought to “gobble up all the people the God Jehovah will provide [them] with” (Positive Anti-Semitism, *VB*, No 88, November 4, 1922). As the 1920s progressed however, the line of thinking did too. Indeed, themes of racial purity started to emerge and the possibility that the Jews were contaminating the inherent purity of the German race. Indeed by 1923, the *VB* started claiming that, “the physical and intellectual ability of the racial comrade is not the goal, but the means, of retaining German character” (Racist Thought and *Volkisch* Thought, *VB*, No 199 September 27, 1923) and that, “we believe with the advocates of racism that blood ties are of great significance, but we also believe additionally that the intellect, history, language and education for a higher form of community – which we can call a *volkisch* community of the blood, a *volkisch* or ethnic state – are all of great significance” (*Ibid*). This line of thinking would continue to evolve as the NSDAP sought to provide more and more “scientific” evidence of the inferiority of the Jewish race and of its polluting of the German national community after the Hitler’s release from prison.

2. 1925–1933: Anti-Semitism as a Science

Upon his release from prison in December 1924, Hitler started to rebuild the NSDAP, and with this came clarifications and the development of a refined position on anti-Semitism. Indeed, while in prison, Hitler had had the time to reflect and write *Mein Kampf*, which essentially set the foundation for the future NSDAP identity: the inferiority of the “Jewish Race” and the need to separate the “pure races” from “impure races”. His book is therefore full of references to the “Jewish problem”. Indeed, stipulating that the Aryan represents the most superior race and that the Jews represent the most inferior one, he claims that, “the mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew” (Hitler, 2011: 12). Hitler questions upon seeing a Jewish man, “is this a German?” (Hitler, 2011: 44) and thunders,

“with satanic joy in his face, the black-haired Jewish youth lurks in wait for the unsuspecting girl whom he defiles with his blood, thus stealing her from her people. With every means he tries to destroy the racial foundations of the people he has set out to subjugate. Just as he himself systematically ruins women and girls, he does not shrink back from pulling down the blood barriers for others, even on a large scale. It was and it is Jews who bring the Negroes into the Rhineland, always with the same secret thought and clear aim of ruining the hated white race by the necessarily resulting bastardization, throwing it down from its cultural and political height, and himself rising to be its master” (Hitler, 2011: 46).

Essentially, the change in tone with regards to anti-Semitism that occurred as Hitler started rebuilding the NSDAP can be summed up as seeking to root anti-Semitism in science and also linking it to the greater issue of race. Hence, claims that, “anti-Semitism in the NSDAP is ultimately founded on racial and biological *facts about race and biology* (italics in the original), and on its practical implementation is in line with political, cultural, and economic considerations” (Engelbert, 1933: 90) and that essentially, “the NSDAP has always recognized the Jews and Judaism as the greatest enemy of the German *Volk* and the greatest obstacle to the nation’s betterment” (*Ibid*). Hence, there is here a break with anti-

Semitism as a principle and a new emphasis on how anti-Semitism is actually a means to an end. Anti-Semitism is now viewed as the way forward to racial purity and national revival.

Furthermore, more and more attention was given to eugenics and racial hygiene. How “cross-breeding” was destroying superior races was more frequently established. Mentions on how the “Semitic race really does represent an inferior type of humanity in comparison with the Indo-European” (Negros and Negroids, *VB*, No 54, March 6, 1926) and “in the bastards who result from the unnatural cross-breeding, the albumins of one race are constantly fighting from those of others, and what is good and valuable in one race can never develop given that the albumins of the individuals will divert them from their natural path of evolution” (*Ibid*). Demonstrating that somehow the Aryan race was superior and better at certain sports and occupations, it was put forward that “it is really not surprising that among the flying aces one finds such a high percentage of pronounced Nordic types” (Race and Flying, *VB*, No. 287, October 14, 1931) or that “only people who are racially of high standing are also physically, spiritually and morally of high standing” (Christianity and Race, *VB*, No. 106, April 16, 1931) and that “fertility represents political power....we possess a more exact knowledge of the conformity to natural laws relating to our biological being and therefore also have the means to avert the disaster threatening our future” (Population Policy based on Racial Hygiene, *VB*, No 119, April 28, 1932).

There was also a will to ensure that this burgeoning racial theory be set within the confines of science. Indeed, there was the inherent idea that it,

“was scientific fact that the Jew is different from the German. This is neither arrogant nor boastful. It is simply the way things are. For us, the Jewish question is a question between two peoples. Its characteristics are determined by the racially determined differences between the two and by the unusual sociological and numerical development of Jewry in the course of its history, developments that have become particularly evident in the past decades through a constantly growing process of foreign infiltration that has reached an intolerable level for the German people” (Schulz and Frercks, 1934).

Hence, the NSDAP invited more and more professors and specialists to analyse “Jewry” and the “race question”. The NSDAP through the pages of *VB* published statements and claims such as those of Professor Dr. Gunther, that “the goal of Nordic racial thought is concerned less with the regeneration of the individual than with the enrichment of the German people through a racial type that is sound enough both mentally and physically to bring about a *volkisch* rejuvenation” (Nordic Racial Thought, *VB*, No 166, July 15, 1930). In addition, Professor Schemann (1852–1938)⁵² claimed that co-existence between the Jews and the Germans was impossible because the Jews sought to “exploit the Christian pan-race for itself, its ultimate victory would therefore mean the end of the Indo-Germanic race, the supreme power in the cultural world” (Jewry and the Race Question, *VB*, No 296, October 23, 1931). To this we can add, Dr. Gercke⁵³ who claimed that the “study of race

⁵² Ludwig Schemann was a race ideologist who founded the Gobineau League in order to further the Aryan myth and was a huge advocate of the Aryan racial theory.

⁵³ Achim Gercke was a Nazi Party activist who founded the Reich association for Family Research and was appointed an expert on racial research to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in 1933.

is the deepest source leading to the rebirth of the German people. The highest demand of the NSDAP is clarity in racial awareness, thought, intention and action” (The NSDAP and the Jewish Question: The Study of Race is the Profoundest Source for German Rebirth, *VB*, No 366, December 31, 1932).

Finally, this period also marks an increased will on the behalf of the NSDAP to broaden its definition of racial impurity. Indeed, the Jews were not the only “impure” elements “plaguing” the German race. The handicapped, the homosexuals, the gypsies too were “tainting” the “purity” of German blood. Hence, the *Lex Zwickau* was drafted in 1927 claiming that the blind, deaf, mentally handicapped and epileptic should be subjected to sterilization, and that women who were unable to prove their ancestry be monitored for signs of mental illnesses and prohibited to bear children until their mental and physical health be proven.

3. 1933–1939: *Anti-Semitism as the Building of a New German Nation through Segregation*

Once in power, the NSDAP now had the political means to start implementing their vision for the new Reich. This essentially resulted in the beginning of the separation of the German race from the foreign races, essentially the Jews. More and more emphasis was put on how the Jews were harming the greater German nation and that only if they were physically separated could the German nation reclaim its former glory. Hence, the idea of “who” belonged in the nation was being developed and the Jewish were clear “outsiders” and not welcome in the new conceptualization of the German nation as developed by the NSDAP. Indeed, Hitler emphasized that, “the highest aim of human existence is not the maintenance of a State of Government but rather the conservation of the race” (Hitler, 2011: 69). Therefore, the first decade of the Third Reich essentially was marked by new means to “conserve” the “superior race” in addition to the establishment of what we may call the racial state. Indeed, the NSDAP criticised states that were based on “basic rights” and sought to be based on the *Volk* and on blood rights. Hence it sought to “place the *Volk* directly at the centre of thought, of faith and will, of creation and of life” (Stuckart and Globke, 1936: 20). Indeed, Hitler proclaimed in his closing address at a 1935 Party rally that,

The point of departure of National Socialist doctrine does not rest with the state but with the *Volk*. That is to say, in order to be able to test, judge, and correct the suitability and efficacy of external *volkisch* forms, we must grasp them as more than mere ends to an end. Therefore, the focal point of all National Socialist thought lies in the living substance which we, according to its historical development, call the German *Volk*. (Hitler, 1935)

Hence, the NSDAP state would actively seek to redefine citizenship and nationhood according to its perception of the racial state. It started by separating the Jewish from being able to participate in the German public life. Hence, the *Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums* (Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service) was passed on April 7th, 1933 and prohibited Jews and political opponents from occupying any civil service job. Members of the civil service were required to provide proof of Aryan ancestry in order to maintain their occupations. Jewish students were also quickly legislated by quotas (1.5%) in order to attend German public schools and universities under the “Law

Against the Crowding of German Schools and Institutions for Higher Learning” (passed on April 25th, 1933). Jewish tax consultants’ licenses were revoked, Jewish civilians were fired from the army, Jewish lawyers were disbarred (Law Regarding Admission to the Bar) and by 1934, and Jewish actors were prohibited from performing. Indeed, within the first few years of NSDAP rule, the Jews were effectively being removed from the public space.

Once separated from the public sphere, the NSDAP concentrated on establishing segregation based on biology in order to ensure “the survival of the German nation”. Therefore, the *Reichsbürgergesetz* was passed on September 15th, 1935, which clarified citizenship to the Reich based on German blood ancestry. Indeed, “A citizen of the Reich is only that subject who is of German or kindred blood” (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1935). This removed all citizenship rights from the Jews. No longer German citizens, they became German subjects (*Reichsangehöriger*). In addition, the “Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour” prohibited marriage and extramarital relations between Jews and Germans and redefined relations between Jews and the state by prohibiting the flying of the German flag by Jews. These laws were all based on the understanding that “compelled by knowledge of the fact that the purity of German blood is the prerequisite for the continued existence of the German *Volk*, and inspired by the unbending will to secure the future of the German nation in perpetuity” (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1935).

Furthermore, with the annexation of Austria in March 1938 and the entry of 192,000 Austrian Jews into the Reich, the situation worsened. Jewish businesses were sold for pennies to Germans, Jewish institutions were stripped of any official status (March 28th, 1938) and Jews were required to carry special identification cards (July, 23th, 1938). In order to legitimize the anti-Jewish laws, “Jewish specialists” such as Seraphim and Arlt published memos and dissertations that sought to reinforce the idea that the Jews were not German, that they formed a biologically distinct race and therefore, their segregation could be scientifically sanctioned. Indeed, taking an anthropological viewpoint, Seraphim demonstrated that because of years of inter-racial breeding between Jews and non-Jews there now existed different “traits” of Jewish which included the Oriental, Near-Eastern, Alien, Cross and half-breed Jewish types. Each had their own distinctions, but they remained nonetheless Jewish (Seraphim, 1938). The crackdowns on the Jews only increased following the assassination of the secretary of the German Embassy in Paris, Ernst Eduard vom Rath, by a Jewish national.⁵⁴ The German state violently cracked down on the Jews: this became known as *Kristallnacht* or Night of the Broken Glass. Indeed, the *VB* clamoured,

It is clear what conclusion the German people will draw from this latest event. We shall no longer tolerate a situation where hundreds of thousands of Jews within our territory control entire streets of shops, throng places of public entertainment, and pocket the wealth of German leaseholders as “foreign” landlords while their racial brothers incite war against Germany and shoot down German officials. The shots fired in the German Embassy in Paris will not only mark the beginning of a new German attitude in the Jewish Question but will hopefully also provide the signal for those foreigners who up to now have not grasped that ultimately there is

⁵⁴ Herschel Grynszpan, a seventeen-year old Jew shot Rath after learning of his family’s deportation to Poland.

only one thing standing in the way of international understanding between nations – International Jewry. (*VB*, November 8, 1938 in Benz, 1991: 3)

On that fateful night, Jewish synagogues and businesses were burned and Jews thrown into prison, beaten and an estimated 400 killed (Rabinbach and Gilman, 2013: 721). The Jews were now banned from parks, gardens, beaches, cinemas, theatres, concerts, and certain neighbourhoods. Indeed, a new tone had been set by the NSDAP, “complete elimination, absolute segregation...this land is all we have, and we must free it from the Jews” (*Das Schwarze Korps*, 1938: 1).

However, for this “elimination” and “total segregation” to successfully occur, the German state required knowledge: where were the Jews? Indeed, registries needed to be established. Hence, a new law that sought to complement the already existing law requiring Jews to carry special identification cards was passed under the name of the “Second Decree Concerning Implementation of the Law on Changes to Family Names and First Names”. This sought to render the identification of Jews even easier. Indeed, if the Jews were to be isolated from the German nation, they needed to be easily recognized by the state. This was part of the institutionalization process that followed the sought after changes of national identity by the Nazis. Hence, all Jews were to either carry “Jewish names” or add “Israel” in the case of men or “Sara” in the case of women to the end of their names. Indeed, Arlt⁵⁵ argued that,

“Adolf Hitler’s blood revolution, which takes blood as the basic foundation for the individual and *volkisch* existence and regards blood as the foundation for all expressions of men and the human community, represents the final struggle against the Jew...as long as his parents were Jews, he remains a Jew, and his thought, his belief, his character, and his comportment are and remain those of alien species. There is no bridge he can cross to join the community of non-Jews” (Arlt, 1938: 126).

Identification became absolutely necessary for the NSDAP controlled state. Indeed, if they were to successfully separate the Jewish from the rest of Germans, they needed to know who the Jews were and where they lived. It was therefore not only an ideological combat that sought to illustrate how the Jews, through their “perverse” bloodline, were corrupting the great German nation, but also an institutional combat that required extensive state-run registries. Indeed, within the instructions issued by Heydrich for Kristallnacht for the ensuing destruction of synagogues and Jewish businesses, great pains were taken to ensure that “all archives found in all synagogues and offices of the Jewish communities, so as to prevent their destruction during the demonstrations” (Heydrich, 1938, Article 3), be seized by the police prior to destruction. This would help the NSDAP later on and compliment the information within the Reich Registry for Jews and mixed-breed Jews. This registry, often called the Cultural Registry, was created mid-1939 in order to, “create a registry of Reich members who have non-Germanic cultural affiliations (the Cultural registry). Each individual lists the name (also maiden name), surname, home address (also

⁵⁵ Fritz Arlt (1912–2012) joined the NSDAP in 1930 and quickly rose to prominence due to his writings on Judaism. He became control manager of the Race-Political Office of Silesia in 1936, and sought to perfect the Jewish registry of the Third Reich. He later became the Director of the office for Population Policy and Welfare set up in Poland.

the country and community), sex, date of birth, and the information provided by the individual regarding religion, native language, cultural affiliation, occupation, the number of children under 14 years of age per household, and a declaration (yes or no) of whether the land is used for agricultural purposes” (Gotz and Roth, 2004: 79). This meant that by the end of 1939, all Jewish (full or part-Jewish) people living in Germany, in addition to German nationals married to Jews, were registered several times with their age, occupation, income, residence, family members, fertility, photographs, fingerprints and signatures (*Ibid*). Such registries and censuses were also conducted throughout all occupied Eastern territories and would serve as the foundation for the creation of ghettos and, later, concentration camps.

4. 1939–1945: Anti-Semitism as the Final Solution

On January 30th, 1939, Hitler proclaimed to the Reichstag that “if international finance Jewry in and outside Europe succeeds in plunging nations into another world war, then the end result will not be the Bolshevization of the planet and thus the victory of the Jews – it will be the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe” (Hitler, 1939 in front of the Great German Reichstag). Nine months later, that war started with the German invasion of Poland. According to Goebbels, the Jews were guilty of starting the war and in that sense

Every Jew is our enemy in this historic conflict, regardless of whether he sits vegetating in a Polish ghetto, or carries on his parasitic existence in Berlin or Hamburg, or blows the trumpets of war in New York or Washington. All Jews, by virtue of their birth and their race, are part of an international conspiracy against the National Socialist Germany...The Jews are out undoing. They are the ones who instigated and brought on this war with the intent of annihilating the German Reich and our people. This plan must be foiled...the Jews are to blame for each German soldier who falls in this war. They must have him in their conscience and must also pay for it...the Jews are at fault for this war. The treatment they receive from us is hardly unjust. They have deserved it all. (Goebbels, 1942)

From this moment on, the Jewish would be subjected to violence, deportation and eventually mass-murder as the vision of a Jew-free German nation developed within the NSDAP. Indeed, the war had provided the NSDAP with the perfect opportunity to frame the Jews as *the* enemy seeking the destruction of Germany.

While Rosenberg had prophesied as early as 1930 in *Myth of the Twentieth Century* that only through the elimination of the Jews could the German nation become “healthy” again, the NSDAP did not immediately adhere to this vision. Indeed, as it has been demonstrated in the previous sections, the NSDAP slowly developed its vision concerning the Jewish question, the German nation and the racial state. It went through different phases. However, these different phases did eventually lead to the adoption of the final solution: the elimination of the Jews.

While the end goal was increasingly becoming clearer, there were many technical details that needed to be worked out first. However, segregation could already start. This was an attainable intermediate goal that sought to cleanse certain spaces of Jews and concentrate them in designated places under the policy of *Judenreservat* (Jewish reservations). Hence, the first ghetto was established in Piotskow Trybunalski, Poland in

October 1939 and was quickly followed by many more. The majority of ghettos were established in Poland, as with 1.7 million Jews as the time, it had the largest Jewish population in the world. Although the first concentration camp had been established in 1933 in Dachau, Germany, followed by five others, Sachsenhausen (1936), Buchenwald (1937), Flossenbug (1938), Mauthausen (1938) and Ravensbruck (1939), these camps had mainly served the purpose of “political reorientation” or criminal punishment⁵⁶ and were not originally intended for the actual segregation of Jews from the rest of the German nation. Ghettos were, in that sense, different. Forced labour, identification, the establishment of Jewish councils within the ghettos and restrictions on mobility accompanied the creation of these Jewish ghettos. Furthermore, it had been firmly established by Heydrich that they formed a temporarily solution to the “Jewish problem”. The NSDAP started illustrating how the ghettos were a perfect occasion to demonstrate the “true nature” of the Jewish. Indeed, they invited doctors and researchers to conduct “field studies” and then published their findings which claimed, “corruption, demoralization and thievery in the ghettos are terrible...evil traits and basic instincts are now revealed in all their nakedness” (Zeitlin, 1941).

The rhetoric of the NSDAP was getting more and more precise with regards to how they viewed the future of the German nation and even greater European order. Jews would no longer be tolerated to be physically present in the same living spaces. The same recurrent themes of how the Jews were a biologically different from Germans, sought to control the world’s finance and were undermining the German nation continued to be advocated by the NSDAP, but now the NSDAP now had a plan on how to stop this and save the German nation at the same time. Indeed, Goering charged Heydrich on July 31st, 1941 to “send me before long, an overall plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired final solution of the Jewish question” (Goering, 1941). But the general idea was already there. Rosenberg had stated that

Since it was Germany, with its blood and its *Volkstum*, that finally put a definitive end to this Jewish dictatorship for Europe and is now charged with keeping Europe as a while free from the Jewish parasites, I believe we can also speak for all Europeans and say: the Jewish question will not be solved until the last Jew has left Europe altogether And it doesn’t matter whether this program takes five, ten, or twenty years to complete. The transportation facilities of our times are such that a large-scale resettlement could be easily organized and executed if all nations work together. (Rosenberg in a speech delivered from Berlin at the “The Jewish Question as World Problem” conference on March 28, 1941)

The 1942 Wannsee Conference called for “the expulsion of the Jews from every sphere of life of the German people, the expulsion of the Jews from the living space of the German people...approximately 11 million Jews will be involved in the final solution of the European Jewish question” (Minutes taken from on January 20, 1942 from the “Wannsee Protocol” U.S government translation prepared for evidence in the Nuremberg Trials).

⁵⁶ Criminal punishment was also reserved for the “race traitors” who included people who did not respect the newly established marriage and extramarital laws between Jewish and non-Jewish.

Hence, while by 1942, already about a million Jews had already been exterminated by the SS largely in Poland, the Baltic countries and the Soviet Union following the German invasion in June 1941, the idea of a more systematic and organized extermination started to make ground (Rabinbach and Gilman, 2013: 745). Gas vans were already being used for the killing of the mentally ill and the disabled under the “Action T4” plan in several extermination sites that developed throughout Germany and Austria often associated with a psychiatric hospital. There are no documents that clearly pinpoint the start of the extermination camps, but starting in 1941, the systematic gassing of Jews started first in Chelmno, and quickly expanded to include Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz-Birkenau (the largest extermination camp complex, with four gas chambers).

It seems as if there was a will to keep these mass extermination sites somewhat a secret from the German people and even lower NSDAP officials, which can explain the relative documental silence around the question. Indeed, there are no speeches or publications that publicized the existence of these camps. Nonetheless, the rhetoric that continued to spew from the NSDAP calling for the removal of the Jew from the German living space nonetheless hinted at the fact that this was what was going on behind the scenes. Indeed, it was claimed that, “the Jewish race is equally alien to all European races in the same degree. Its historical and intellectual/spiritual danger cannot, therefore, be averted by any form of assimilation. The only way to eliminate from Europe the threat that it poses by virtue of its very existence is to completely remove it from the territory” (Gross, 1943). Furthermore, Himmler, in a speech to the SS on October 4th, 1943 mentioned when explaining the strength of the SS man, “most of you must know what it means to see a hundred corpses lie side by side, or five hundred, or a thousand. To have stuck this out – excepting in cases of human weakness – to have kept our integrity, that is what has made us hard” (Himmler, October 4, 1943).

This marked the end of the evolution of NSDAP vision regarding the Jewish question. It had started as a relatively unstructured political movement that had originally sought to garner political strength in an anti-Semitism that linked the new and unpopular Weimar political system to the Jews. It then evolved from a simple anti-Semitic movement among others to one that sought to ground its anti-Semitism in science and biology as it developed the ideological platform for a racial state. Once it had been established that the Jews formed a different biological entity from the Germans, the NSDAP could start focusing on the segregation of the Jews from the non-Jews, while still using the claims that they formed a different race, and by that biological fact, were harming the German nation. When the war broke out, the NSDAP was able to frame the Jews as war enemies out to destroy Germany and therefore was able to escalate their violent attacks on the Jews and implement the Final Solution.

Hence, during the course of twenty years the NSDAP idea of the nation evolved. The next chapter will address how the NSDAP sought to diffuse their vision for national identity through different political and social institutions during their tenure in power.

3. The Diffusion of NSDAP's vision of National Identity onto the Third Reich

The previous chapter established the NSDAP as a political actor with a vision for the German nation that was based on the idea of *Volksgemeinschaft* and the creation of a racial state. This next chapter will focus on how the NSDAP sought to articulate and develop its vision on German national identity based on the two aforementioned ideals.

Propagating NSDAP's vision of Identity through Public Displays

Culture is fundamentally linked with the production and reproduction of nations and identity. Indeed, Anderson (1983) claimed that it was only once books could be massively distributed throughout the world with the development of "print capitalism" that the idea of "belonging" to a given community or nation could start to grow in people's hearts and minds. Indeed, he claimed that a newspaper reader in one part of the world could "imagine" a national community of people who had never been in face-to-face contact simultaneously reading the same newspaper. Hence, there is an idea that receiving similar information contributes to creation of national identity. Postill (2006) claimed that the tiny community of the Iban of Sarawak on the island of Bornea was able to become efficiently "Malaysianised" through the explicit state-led use of media efforts.

Sub-national movements have also recognized the utility of the press or radio in advocating for their distinct identity. Connell (2003) demonstrated how Scottish newspapers have sought to construct their papers as Scottish "nationals" rather than local papers and represent any local Scottish events as national ones. Bilig (1995) demonstrated that the maintenance of a public national culture and identity requires "banal practices" such as the everyday reading of the same billboards, signs or unnoticed flags hanging in public buildings throughout the nation by millions of nationals. This is because the state must constantly remind its society what constitutes nationhood. In addition, political speeches and mass media often serve to reproduce the same visions of the nation. Hence, the nation and national identity are sustained through the use of everyday symbols that cease to become conflictual as they become "banal". Similar theories illustrating how national identity and nations are sustained through everyday cultural practices have grown in the past few years (Brubaker and al 2008, Foster 2002, Edensor 2002, Bratsis, 2006).

This next segment will explain how the NSDAP used the media (essentially the radio) and massive public rallies to fortify and transfer its vision of national identity, one essentially based on the creation of the mythical *Volksgemeinschaft* and a racial state, onto the German nation.

The Arrival of the Political Radio

We, on the other hand, intend a principled transformation in the worldview of our entire society, a revolution of the greatest possible scope that will leave nothing out, changing the life of our nation in every regard. This process, which had been visible to the layman in the past six months, was naturally not random. It was systematically prepared and organized. We have

used our power in the past six months to carry out this transformation.....one *Volk*, one Reich, one will, and a glorious German future! (Goebbels, 1933)

The Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was founded under the direction of Josef Goebbels on March 13th, 1933. This Ministry was established in order to promote the Nazi ideal of *Volksgemeinschaft* and used the radio, television and massive public rallies to attain its goal. Indeed, the Nazis seized control of the radio, believing that not only would “radio do what newspapers had done for the 19th century” (Rhodes, 1976: 26) but also illustrated the belief that, “for the first time in history we have in radio a medium which enables us to mould nations of many millions by daily and hourly influence...radio can have the same impact as newspapers, but...is more up-to-date, more versatile, more profound, and more uplifting but virtue of its inherent artistic element” (Hadamovsky⁵⁷, in Sterling, 1972: vii).

Goebbels explicitly declared his intention to transform the German nation through the radio. Indeed he declared, after the elections of 1933, “with this instrument you are making public opinion. If you do it well, we shall win over the people. If you do it badly, the people will in the end run away from us...Once we have won them, radio must hold the 100% of our supporters, must defend them, must indoctrinate them so thoroughly that no one can break away anymore” (Goebbels, quoted in Bramsted, 1965: 65–66). Interesting enough, Goebbels also regularly gauged public opinion in order to measure what people were thinking about plays, radio emissions, and policy measures being sponsored by the Ministry. Hence, propaganda was a two-way street. Not only was the message important, but equally important was how well the message was being received by the intended audience (Bramsted, 1965). Indeed, Goebbels told the managerial staff of German radio “I am placing a major responsibility in your hands, for you have in your hands the most modern instrument in existence for influencing the masses. By means of this instrument you are the creators of public opinion. If you perform this well, we shall win over the people” (Goebbels, during an address to Haus des Rundfunks on March 25, 1933, quoted in Welch, 1993: 39).

This transformation required the removal of competing national and regional radio stations and the need to reach out to the German nation on a whole. The explicit goal was to create a greater means of uniformity thoroughly in line with the creation of *Volksgemeinschaft*, in that all Germans, from the west, east, north or south, whether Catholics or Protestants, whether proletariats, bourgeois or peasants, could be united and moulded to form one community of Germans (Bramsted, 1965). To do so required that radio stations aspire to the NSDAP message. Hence, not only were semi-public radio

⁵⁷ Eugen Hadamovsky was Goebbel’s second-in-command throughout the war. Before, he had been *Reichssendeleiter* or the director for national programming of German radio. He wrote *Propaganda and National Power* in 1933, which served to explain and development how propaganda could be used for the Nazis. Indeed, the main goal of this book, as stated in Chapter One, was to answer the questions: “In which ways will public opinion properly express the instinctive spirit and will of the nation? How will radio, the press, news services, and propaganda and cultural institutions give expression to the powerful life currents of the nation? How can they be intellectually controlled without falling into the traps and pitfalls of liberalism?” (Hadamovsky, 1933)

companies dissolved with the creation of the centralized Reich Broadcasting Corporation but also German manufacturers started massively producing cheap and heavily state subsidized *Volsempfänger* (people's receivers) which was done with the goal of bringing a radio into every German house (Rhodes, 1976: 26).⁵⁸ Furthermore, these radios were specifically designed to be only able to receive the long-wave national network stations and regional stations controlled by the Ministry of Propaganda. The goal here was to only encourage the listening of only domestic broadcasts sanctioned by the NSDAP and discourage the listening of any foreign broadcasts (Rabinbach and Gilman, eds, 2013: 604).

Moreover, in order to further increase radio listening, communal listening sessions were encouraged with the creation of over 3,000 listening rooms. Not only were these communal gatherings an occasion for the radio to further indoctrinate German society, they also served the purpose of bringing German society together and therefore further diminishing the importance of the individual (Sommerville, 2012: 114). All restaurants and cafés were required to provide public addresses and loudspeakers lined the streets. In all, this made Hitler and the party omnipresent and unavoidable, as people could only with difficulty escape the daily messages of what constituted the German nation. Indeed, as soon as an important message would be made by a Nazi leader, “sirens would howl and professional life throughout the nation would stop for the duration of the ‘community reception’ in an effort to persuade the individual citizens to identify with the nation” (Welch, 1993: 40). The goal was clear: radio was to become politics through another means. Indeed, Franz Hartung claimed that

“every form of activity in the state must be examined in terms of its utility and benefit to the political needs of the state, this utterly obliterates any notion of apolitical because the only measure of value is in terms of political relevance. This is why politics is the determining factor in radio: it resembles the center axis of a wheel whose spokes are the driving force behind everything else” (Rabinbach and Gilman, eds, 2013: 616).

The central concern of the Nazi party was to connect all Germans with their national community. In order to do so, they had to ensure that regional *Volk* cultures were represented. Hence, *Stunde Der Nation* (The Hour of the Nation) that was broadcasted every working day between 7 and 8pm sought to incorporate information about different regions in order to create a common understanding between Germans (Crosby, 2014: 5). This radio show quickly became one of the most popular listening slots, with Berlin children stating “*Hour of the Nation* is always very interesting. I particularly enjoy listening to the old village music when the program is broadcast from Bavaria. There should be more programs like this. I like to hear the shepherds from the Alm speak” or “I especially like the *Hour of the Nation* because it connects us to people from all walks of life; it offers information about the manners and customs of the ancient Germans” (Rabinbach and Gilman, eds, 2013: 622). The radio was a vehicle through which time and space became

⁵⁸ The policy was actually quite successful with the number of private radios quadrupling between 1933 and 1939. (Rhodes, 1976: 27).

compressed and a new national community could be imagined. The NSDAP successfully established a space through which all Germans were listening to the same speeches, stories and songs about their past, present and future.

Public Rallies, the Art of Persuasion

In addition to the use of the radio as a means of convincing the German population that they formed a strong community of *Volksgemeinschaft*, the NSDAP quickly recognized the importance of massive public rallies. Indeed, Hadamovsky wrote that

“all the power one has, indeed even more than one actually has, should be displayed and demonstrated. A hundred speeches, five hundred newspaper articles, radio talks, films and plays are unable to produce the same effect as a procession of gigantic masses of people taking place with discipline and active participation, or a demonstration in which the means of power and weapons of the state are expressed through its military, police, and political forces” (Hadamovsky, 1933) and “the military parade, for example, owes its existence, its popularity among the crowds, and its necessity to soldiers in whom it creates self-confidence. The clearer the strength is to the masses, the more impressive and forceful is the effect on each individual. When uniformed troops in strict discipline appear before a gathering of the civil populace, the rallies have a powerful character and a boundless jubilation is released” (Hadamovsky, 1933).

Furthermore, these public rallies also were an occasion to create and cement tradition. Hobsbawm coined the term “invented tradition” to indicate

“a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviours by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past” (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1).⁵⁹

Indeed, the *Reichsparteitag* or Reich Party Rallies more commonly known as the Nuremberg Rallies quickly became the most popular and anticipated public rallies of the Nazi Party. Testifying to the strength of symbolism and need of continuity between past and present in order to link the past grandeur of Germany to the one that the NSDAP was actively creating today, the city of Nuremberg was strategically chosen for these party rallies. First, it is situated in Bavaria, which was the traditional bastion of NSDAP support. Second, it happened to be closely geographically situated to the center of Germany. Third, it had a rich history. Indeed, Nuremberg Castle had served as the imperial residence for the great Holy Emperors, it had been a free imperial city until the Napoleonic Era, was the stage for the Peace of Nuremberg which established important religious rights to the Protestants, the birthplace of the first German railroad and an important element of

⁵⁹ In addition to the new roles that the Party rallies were given, new customs under the form of holidays were established in order to remind the German nation of the political achievements of the NSDAP. Indeed, in the words of Hannes Kremer, head of the Cultural Office of the Ministry of Propaganda, “in our efforts to deepen National Socialist forms of behaviours in the area of rituals and ceremonies, we have two main tasks. On the one hand, we must create new customs to accommodate new ideas, and on the other, it is necessary to adjust those customs that have grown out of the people to the ‘new community of Germans’, which means giving these inherited customs a new content consistent with the people’s community” (Kremer, 1937, translated by Randall Bytwerk. Calvin College, German Propaganda Archive).

Germany's industrial economy. Finally, it had been defined as the "most German of German cities".

Hitler used the architectural talents of Albert Speer⁶⁰ to transform and build the stage for the rallies. Every detail in the rallies was carefully planned. The Nazi Rally grounds were impressive in size. They covered 11 square kilometers and were dotted by different monuments and buildings. The Luitpold Arena served as the prime location for the SA and SS to honour the dead of the war. The Congress Hall was designed to be the congress center of the NSDAP. The central Zeppelin Field, where the majority of the festivities of the rallies took place, was an impressive structure. When commissioned to build the stage for the annual Nuremberg rallies, Speer used the Pergamum Altar of ancient Greece as inspiration and designed a massive stone structure some 400 meters long and 24 meters high, and the stadium was to hold 340,000 people. Dramatic effects during the rallies were due to Speer's "cathedral of light", which was the use of 130 anti-aircraft searchlights which cast massive beams of light into the sky, creating a magical and mystical effect. The massive structure served to make the individual disappear within the masses. Again, the individual was to form part of the group, which in turn was to form the nation. Indeed, with the gigantic dimensions, the grounds and architecture encouraged people to believe that they were participating in something significant but that they, as individuals, were quite insignificant. The municipal stadium was also incorporated into the rally complex in order to be used for parades and roll calls of the Hitler Youth. There was the Great Road which was 2km long and 60 meters wide and served as the central axis of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds and led south from the Congress hall to the March Field but also was aligned with the Castle and the Old Town, hence operating as a symbolic link between the past grandeur of old Nuremberg and the new one being set into motion by the NSDAP. The SS barracks were also erected on the part grounds, illustrating their importance to the NSDAP. The KdF-Town was a recreational area that had the purpose of entertaining visitors to the public rallies. The camp zone served to house participants to the rallies. Two buildings: the German stadium⁶¹ and March field,⁶² both part of the original design, were never completed due to the outbreak of war.⁶³

The first NSDAP rally took place in 1923 but was only followed, three years later, by one in 1926. While at first, the rallies were relatively modest and could essentially be summed up as a long rallying speech by Hitler that lasted a day. However, following the NSDAP's ascension to power in 1933, the rallies started being held annually⁶⁴ and growing

⁶⁰ Speer joined the NSDAP in 1931 and quickly drew the attention of Hitler as an efficient organizer. He started his architectural work by redesigning the party headquarters in Berlin, renovating the Chancellery building in Berlin and constructing the stadium of the Nuremberg rallies. During the war he was tasked with designing and building structures for the war effort and in 1942, was nominated Minister of Armaments. Found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, he was not hung but sentenced to 20 years of jail in Spandau Prison during the Nuremberg Trials.

⁶¹ The stadium was supposed to accommodate over 400,000 people making it the largest in the country.

⁶² The March Field was to serve as the training exercise of the Wehrmacht.

⁶³ For a showcase of pictures, postcards and descriptions detailing the different monuments, people and organization of the rallies, see Wilson, 2012

⁶⁴ Each rally had a specific theme. In 1934 (5–10 September) it was the "Rally of the Will", in 1935 (10–16 September), it was the "Rally of Freedom", in 1936 (8–14 September) it was the "Rally of Honour", in 1937 (6–13 September), it was the "Rally of Work", in 1938, it was the "Rally of Greater Germany". The

in size. By 1934, the rallies spanned over seven days with different themes and messages each day and finishing with fireworks. Important NSDAP institutions, such as the Hitler Youth, SS and Armed Forces each got their own day of honour. Hitler would often make several fiery speeches throughout the course of the rallies and they were often an occasion for the party to develop its party platform.⁶⁵ A description of the 1927 “Day of Awakening” Nuremberg Rally demonstrates the aura and almost mesmerizing effect that the rallies inspired. Suddenly, the individual through his participation formed one with the crowd, the party, the nation.

In the distance, march music and unceasing shouts of ‘Heil’ announced the approach of the possession. Soon its head appeared at the corner. Within a few minutes, the Frauentor moat resembled a sea of fire. In astonishing order, the Brown Shirts marched past their Fuhrer and greeted him with their eyes shining, the hand with the burning torch raised as in an oath. The enthusiasm of both the onlookers and the marchers hardly knew any limits. (Rosenberg and Weib, 1927: 47)

The description of the 1933 “Victory Rally” by Wilfred Bade also testifies to the electrifying atmosphere behind the rallies,

for several minutes, the Fuhrer is so overwhelmed by the effervescent salvos of ovation that he cannot take the floor. Every time he raises his hand to quell the crowd, he is inundated by another springtide of “Heils!” and he had no option but to let his hand fall and humbly concede to letting these absolutely stunning outpourings of joy gush over him. (in Rabinbach and Gilman, 2013: 92)

Going back to Hobsbawm, there was a clear will to “inculcate certain values and norms of behaviours by repetition” through the participation of these rallies. And in that sense, they were planned, repeated, organized and full of symbolism. Furthermore, as Nietzsche describes, there is a state of ecstatic overcoming of the everyday life experience through an aesthetic experience that he calls the “Dionysian” experience. Hence, when in a Dionysian state, participants no longer feel their individuality or their own personal identities, rather, they become part of something bigger and greater than themselves. It is a pleasurable experience in that “each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbour, but as one with him” (Nietzsche, 1968: 37) and in this state, one is spellbound. This was the desired effect of the Nuremberg Party Rallies, and they were extremely successful. The Nuremberg Party Rallies were extremely real. There were large sums of money involved, and they required extensive organization that started a year before the next rally, as well as space, food and shelter for the participants. They involved the active participation of hundreds of thousands of people who loved Hitler (Brockmann, 2006). Indeed,

To find eating facilities and sleeping quarters for the many thousands of party members was a colossal job. Metal bed frames and mattresses were bought for the mass quarters in factories and schools. They can be stored and used every year. Only a small percentage of the men were able to stay in private homes. The people of Nuremberg were asked to fill out a questionnaire stating any extra beds available. There are only a few hotels in the city of Nuremberg, and they

planned 1939 (2–11 September) “Peace Rally” was cancelled because of the invasion of Poland, and Germany’s entry into war.

⁶⁵

have the combined total of only 2,000 beds; naturally the hotels are reserved for special guests. How to feed many thousands of people at the same time poses the biggest problem. Each military or political group has its own field kitchen. The food was bought as far in advance as possible. One central committee did all the buying...during the rally, all restaurants were to stay open around the clock, but no alcoholic beverages were to be served after midnight (quoted in Burden, 1967: 117)

The order, the masses, the planning and the heightened adoration of Hitler is apparent in the documentary *Triumph of the Will*, directed by Leni Riefenstahl, which documented the 1934 rally and served to introduce the Nazis to the world and to any German who did not make the trip up to Nuremberg, as the documentary was showcased in every German movie theater. The goal of this film, commissioned by Hitler, was to prove to the world and to Germany that Hitler and the NSDAP would restore Germany to grandeur. It sought to “showcase” the Third Reich to the German nation (Rawson, 2012). This is apparent in the many shots of Hitler photographed against the sun or the sky, in the mists, clouds and smoke, and in the awe and wonder of the crowds. He was the saviour (Rawson, 2012). Furthermore, in an attempt to demonstrate how the rallies represented the German nation on a whole, many groups were represented. They included German peasants, who represented not only rural Germany but also older German traditions, the youth who were the future, the SS, the labour services but also women were included in the movie, something that had rarely occurred on film (Barsam, 1975).

Even outsiders could appreciate the power behind Hitler’s rallies. William Shirer, an American journalist, noted about the 1934 rally

I am beginning to comprehend, some of the reasons for Hitler's astounding success. Borrowing a chapter from the Roman [Catholic] church, he is restoring pageantry and color and mysticism to the drab lives of 20th Century Germans. This morning's opening meeting...was more than a gorgeous show; it also had something of the mysticism and religious fervor of an Easter or Christmas Mass in a great Gothic cathedral. The hall was a sea of brightly colored flags. Even Hitler's arrival was made dramatic. The band stopped playing. There was a hush over the thirty thousand people packed in the hall. Then the band struck up the *Badenweiler March*...Hitler appeared in the back of the auditorium and followed by his aides, Göring, Goebbels, Hess, Himmler and the others, he slowly strode down the long center aisle while thirty thousand hands were raised in salute. (Shirer, quoted in Fridell, 2007: 49-50)

The rally programs essentially ran over the course of about a week and essentially sought to create an experience through which individuals would become transformed into NSDAP supporters. It was essentially a festival with speeches, military displays, fireworks and torch light parades, through which individuals were to become “intoxicated” with excitement and awe over the greatness that the NSDAP was bringing to the German nation.

Propagating NSDAP’s vision of Identity through Education

Germany Awake! Storm, storm, storm! Let the bells ring from tower to tower, Ring till the sparks begin to shower, Judas appears to win the Reich's power. Ring till the bell ropes redden with blood. Ring for the burning, the martyred, and the dead. Ring out the storm, and let the whole earth shake, Revenge to the rescue, and thunder overhead! Woe unto those who dream today! Germany, awake! (Eckart, Germany Awake)

Just as this poem was widely used by the NSDAP in order to awaken and nurture German nationalism, Gellner (1989) demonstrated that education was widely used as a standardization tool for the modernizing state throughout the 19th century. Indeed, through the use of a standardized state education, high cultures (often the state) were able to impose its vision of culture, nation and identity onto all sub-cultures. Indeed,

the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the population. It means the general diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of a reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous impersonal society, with mutually sustainable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of the previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves. (Gellner, 1989: 57)

Much has been written on how states have used education as a means to unite and form a national community in line with new values (see for example, Kazamias, 2009 on Greek nation-building following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire; Gal, 2002 on the notion of ethnicity in Israel; Chia, 2012 on the case of how history education was used to build the nation of Singapore; or Zajda, Daun and Saha (eds), 2009 for a broader discussion of the link between nation-building and education). In modernizing Japan, one of the Meiji delegates argued that

When it comes to things like schools and factories, it is impossible to tell you everything, for it defies description. From now on, unless we pay a great deal of attention to the children, the preservation of order in our country in the future will be impossible ... Maintaining a stable state will be difficult unless we consider social conditions and pay attention to social evils. Nothing is more important than schools for improving social conditions and uprooting social evils. The civilization we have in our country today is not a true civilization, and our enlightenment is not true enlightenment. To prevent trouble ten years from now, there is only one thing to do, and that is to establish schools worthy of the name. A long-range program for the stability of our country will never be carried out if we have only a small number of able people; we have to have universal adherence to the moral principles of loyalty, justice, humanity, and decorum ... Our people are not different from Americans or Europeans of today: it is all a matter of education or the lack of education. (Kido Takayoshi, quoted in Daikichi, 1985: 54.)

The idea that education is inherently part of nation building was not new in Germany either. Indeed, the idea of *Volksbildung* (national education) of the entire nation as a foundation for national culture was actively promoted by German educationalists such as Adolf Diesterweg as early as the mid-1800s, when the Stiehl Ordinance standardized the curriculum and training of teachers, and effectively brought education firmly under the control of the state (Pine, 2010: 7). Moreover, depending on the historical context, the German education system underwent several changes. The liberal trend of Humboldt (1767–1835), which sought to develop liberal and democratic values, was replaced with conservative nationalism under Bismarck with the establishment of the *Kaisereich*, which established an education system that was more nationalist, militarist and with a strong emphasis on authority. This trend continued under the Weimar Republic and was strongly reinforced by the NSDAP. Indeed, Hitler held the education system under great contempt, arguing that they should, “put young men in the army, whence they will return refreshed

and cleansed of eight years of scholastic decline” (Norman and Stevens, 2000: 548). He believed that a new curriculum had to be put into place, one that would result with, “a young man leaving school (so that) he is not a half-pacifist, democrat or something else but a whole German” (Hitler, 2011: 244).

Furthermore, the NSDAP believed that the liberal Humboldtian concept of education had to be erased from Germany, as its emphasis on the individual and intellectual aspirations were incompatible with *Volksgemeinschaft*. The Nazis sought to transform education to put the emphasis on the collective rather than on the individual. This is because the survival of the “community” required that individual action be replaced with mass action or “the individual’s unqualified embrace of the general will as embodies in the person of the Fuehrer” (Blackburn, 1985: 116). It was claimed in the widely distributed booklet of the Hitler Youth that importance of having a shared view of the German nation was based on the National Socialist viewpoint. It claimed that

“this shared National Socialist worldview makes it possible for German citizens to participate actively in the formation of our national life. Regardless of his position, each German can through thought and deed participate in political, cultural, and economic renewal. This common worldview is the unbreakable bond that holds together the leadership and the followers of our people in their common labor” (Bennecke, 1937: 1).

Hence, Hitler used the National Socialist Teacher's League not only to produce a new curriculum but also a new generation of teachers. These teachers would become the NSDAP’s education “army” in order to instill new values and reorder German identity with NSDAP thinking. Indeed, the task of these new teachers was to “temper people for membership in that fraternity (*Volksgemeinschaft*) by plucking out the impurities accumulated during the centuries of alien influence” (Blackburn, 1985: 117).

Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund or National Socialist Teachers’ League (NSTB)

The NSTB was created in 1929 under the leadership of the conservative Hans Schemm and sought to provide reports of the political reliability of teachers and ensure the ideological indoctrination of teachers (Pine, 2010: 15) and transform them into National Socialist *Volkserzieher* (people’s educators) (Pine, 2010: 18). Indeed, since the Nazis could not fire all existing teachers, they sought to incorporate them into a new institution that would help them transform the teaching profession. It soon became impossible to teach without being a member of the NSTB (Noakes and Pridham, 1998: 431). Furthermore, any objections by the teachers to conform would be met with them being fired or worse, interned in concentration camps as political enemies (*Ibid*). Teachers also joined because of fears of unemployment, job security and there was an extremely popular idea emanating from rural school teachers who enjoyed the idea of being part of the idea of a new German nation and “catching” up to the social levels of the urban teachers (Koonz, 2003: 39). Hence while from late 1932 to 1933, the league had grown from 5,000 to 11,000, by the time the NSDAP came into power, membership soared to 220,000, with only 80,000 not joining (*Ibid*: 133). This number continued to soar and by 1936, 95% of the teachers in Germany were members of the NSTB (Rabinbach and Gilman, 2013: 241). Furthermore, the 1937

Civil Service Act made it mandatory for teachers to not only defend Germany at all costs but also fulfill the vision of the NSDAP for the German nation (Shirer, 2011: 249). This new generation of teachers was responsible for the creation of a new national community that would be not only in line with the racial state that the NSDAP was producing but also with the establishment of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Hence, class, educational and regional differences were to be erased, and this had to start with the removal of any social or regional differences that existed within the teacher community.

This was done through the creation of special teacher training camps. A report on one of these NSLB training camps in 1936 openly stated that training sought to “adjust all the teacher to the common foundation of the National Socialist world view” (Pine, 2010: 16). The creation of a new generation of Germans, all linked and inherently part of the aspired *Volksgemeinschaft*, required the training and creation of a new generation of teachers that would not only adhere to the worldview of National Socialism but also be able to promote and transfer it to the next new generation through standardized education. These camps taught eugenics, the superiority of the “Nordic race”, and its “pollution” of its purity by ‘racial miscegenation’, studied and improved their understandings of *Mein Kampf* in addition to the development of knowledge on German history and geography. The idea that German education be inspired by racial education was strongly emphasized by Ernst Krieck (1882–1947) and Herman Nohls (1897–1960) who argued that “the notion of society as an organic whole [required that] each individual was to be educated for his or her “natural” place in society, following the model of breeding animals for their appropriate functions” (Rabinbach and Gilman, 2013: 241). Furthermore, teachers were given a handbook, published in 1937 by German educator Fritz Fink, that claimed

the Jewish racial question is the central issue of the National Socialist world view. Finding a solution to this problem guarantees the survival of National Socialism and with it the survival of our people for eternity” and that, “we German educators want to drill into the minds and hearts of German youth from early childhood on the knowledge of the true nature of the Jews. No one among our people must be permitted to grow up without being fully aware of the devastating danger, which the Jews pose for Germany. As a prerequisite for this, the German educator must himself be totally familiar with racial issues and the Jewish Question. In the education camps and teacher training seminars of the National Socialist Teacher’s union many worthwhile activities have been undertaken in this direction. Experience has taught us, however, that many educators have not been able to apply their acquired knowledge on racial matters in such a way that our youth can profit from their teaching for their entire lives. He who dedicates one hour a week in his school teaching racial science and the Jewish Question in an independent, separate subject area has chosen an unnatural path. The insight into racial issues must be a theme central to the instruction of all age groups. There isn’t any subject taught at school which would not lend itself to the presentation of valuable knowledge in unexpected, meaningful ways regarding the Jewish Question. The following text, The Jewish Question in Education has evolved from a desire to demonstrate some of these possibilities . . . The book. . . in a straightforward fashion wants to show the German educator how the Jewish Question may be naturally integrated into the classroom. He who knows his way along the main road will discover for himself thousands of side streets, and will soon gain new insights. (Fink, 1937: 5-6)

In this sense, teachers were taught that they played an important role in the future of the German nation and instilling the new National Socialist worldview. By 1939, 2/3rds of German teachers had attended NSTB camps (Pine, 2010: 16).

There was also another goal of these camps: the creation of a “teacher’s community”. Indeed, through the communal life that was encouraged through these camps, the NSDAP sought to remove social barriers related to class or regionalism. Pine notes that the purpose of these camps was to “turn educators of different occupational classes and different age groups into one combat community – a community in which all dividing walls are torn down by collective existence and experience” (Pine, 2010: 17). Hence, transferring the feeling of being part of a community was a key goal. Again, in line with Nazi thinking, the goal was to remove the importance of the individual and replace it with the collective. It seems that they were largely successful in transforming individual teachers into a community of teachers. Participants claimed that, “a comradely feeling of belonging together prevailed, since we knew that all of us were bearers of one great idea and wanted to help our Fuhrer to realize the great idea of the national community” (Lansing, 2010: 30).

The Curriculum

The new German curriculum for education was not to

“impart a multiplicity of knowledge for the personal use of the individual. It has to develop and harness all physical and mental powers of youth for the service of the people and the state. Therefore, the only subject that has any place in the school curriculum is that which is necessary to achieve this aim. All other subjects, springing from obsolete educational ideas, must be discarded” (Hinton and Samuel, 1949: 83).

Hence, great emphasis was put on biology, physical education, physics, geography, history, racial studies, German and mathematics.

1. Biology:

German students learned about the importance of maintaining “racial purity” in order to safeguard the German nation. Essentially, they were taught about the “psychological qualities of the Jewish soul” which explained their “repulsiveness”, hence a German fifth grader learned that

the history of Jews demonstrates that they serve no purpose in the building of a nation, for they are incapable of voluntarily subordinating themselves as individuals to the interests of the whole. Their most potent weapon is their cold, soberly calculating intellect. This is what turns them into clever traders and merchants who have mastered the fine art of availing themselves of every auspicious opportunity with absolutely no regard or consideration for their fellow humans or human decency; because according to their laws, any means necessary must be employed in dealings with non-Jews. (extract from a fifth grade biology textbook, Stech, Stengel and Wagner: 1942: 32)

Indeed, the NSDAP’s goal was to mold a German nation of “masses”. All individual action was abhorred and discouraged and national emphasis was placed on how to better serve the nation as “all” (with the exception of the Jews and other undesirables) formed the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Hence, even in such a text that seemingly only evokes the inferiority of the Jews, what is interesting is the reasons *why* the Jews were identified as problematic: they were individualist. Furthermore, much of the biology textbooks put emphasis on how

the human race could be categorized similarly to the animal world. Indeed, a popular middle class textbook explained,

“the animal world can be classified into Nordic men and lower animals. We are thus able to establish the following principle: there exist no physical or psychological characteristics which would justify a differentiation of mankind from the animal world. The only differences that exist are those between Nordic men, on the one hand, and animals... including non-Nordic men” (Hermann Gauch, 1933: 77).

Indeed, the curriculum for biology put forward by the NSTB encouraged that evolution be stressed in all biology curriculums because, “the individual organism is temporary, the life of the species to which it belongs, is lasting” (Linder and Lotze, 1936-37).

2. Physical Education

The importance that the NSDAP placed on physical education was linked to its inherent belief that a strong nation required a physically fit society. However, the importance that Germans had placed on physical education was not new. The importance of gymnastics had been established in the 19th century and the glorification of militarism in physical training had been part of the Weimar Republic (Pine, 2010: 61). Hitler claimed that physical education was required for the “breeding of absolutely healthy bodies” (Hitler, 2011: 371) and that, “a man of little scientific education but physically healthy, with a good, firm character, imbued with the joy of determination and will power, is more valuable for the national community than a clever weakling” (Hitler, 2011: 300). Hence, not only was physical education fundamental for the creation of a strong and physically fit new generation of Germans but it was also inherently the strength of the new nation. The NSDAP consequently increased the time students spent doing physical education from the previous two hours a week to two hours a day (Pine, 2010). In addition, attesting to the idea that Germans must increasingly form a new community, physical education was a time when sports could be collectively practiced hence, the NSDAP realized that, “we have the opportunity to guide the youth away from the “I” sports of past times to the “We” sports of the National Socialist state” (quoted in Pine, 2010: 63).

3. Physics

Physics revolved around the need for peace-time and war-time engineers or in the words of Erich Gunther⁶⁶ the need to awaken “not only the ability to bear arms but also the will to do so, and beyond that, to show the ways and technical means to carry out the decision to bear arms” (Pine, 2010: 45). Indeed, Gunther in his *Military Physics Handbook for Teachers* claimed that “a solid instruction in physics still remains the best preparation also for military purposes” (Gunther, 1938: 43). Furthermore, emphasis was placed on how

⁶⁶ Erich Gunther (1904–1998) was the author of the new handbook for Military Physics published in 1938.

important engineers, chemists and physics were to the German nation. Indeed, Carl Krauch⁶⁷ explained that “presentations should be made before high school seniors by suitable gentlemen from universities and industry which include slides (and perhaps tours) in which the importance of technology and chemistry to the German national economy is demonstrated along with the chemist's vital role and mission” (Krauch, 1937, quoted in Hentschel, 1996: 165). Hence, an example taken from a German physics textbook issued by Gunther asked students

a little cigar case filled with sand is hung on four strings like a parallelogram pendulum. You now shoot horizontally along the pendulum's oscillation level at the front side of the little case. The bullet gets lodged in the sand in the case and the extent of its movement is transferred onto the pendulum, which swings in a certain manner. According to the law of momentum, you obtain $mv = (m + m_1) \times v_1$, whereby m is the bullet's mass, v the bullet's velocity and v_1 is the velocity of the oscillating object when the bullet has come to a halt in it. (Gunther, 1933: 233).

4. History and Geography

History classes followed the goal of Hitler's thinking: “we learn history in order to find an instructor for the future and for the continued existence of our nationality” (Hitler, 1992: 383). Hence, the idea was to bring students to understand that the present glorious future of the German nation was linked to past grandeur and that, therefore, what the NSDAP was seeking to do was simply to continue and develop the almost natural greatness of the German nation. The geography curriculum sought to compliment history classes in that it sought to further develop a love of the German homeland and justify the expansionist policy through the idea that Germans needed more living space under the banner of ‘*Volk ohne Raum*’ (people without space). Indeed, an excerpt from a geography textbook claims that

Despite the great decrease in birth rate, the German people, with a population density of 133.5 per square kilometer, remains a crowded people. Other peoples with a much smaller population density still have large colonial holdings that can accept their surplus population. Although it is true that the Four Year Plan has guaranteed our food supply and raw material needs, we lack the abundance that other nations have because of their colonies. Since we do not want to be a dying people, our goal is to increase our birth rate. But for a growing population we need space if we do not again want to see large amounts of German blood immigrating to other nations, as was the case before the World War. Each year, a large number of German emigrants left for foreign lands. (part of a chapter taken from a middle-school Geography textbook. Muller. 1943: 116)

5. Racial Studies

Racial studies was a mandatory class and essentially served to teach all Germans that “the strength of the nation was conditional upon ‘pure’ blood” (Pine, 2010: 57). In that sense, there was a huge emphasis on the role the Jewish people had played on “destroying” the German nation and on the importance of knowing one's family trees. German studies built on racial studies in order to promote the idea that the NSDAP was revitalizing a nation that had been decaying under previous leadership and foster a greater notion of

⁶⁷ Carl Krauch (1887–1968) was a German chemist and responsible for implementing Hitler's Four Year Plan for economic national sufficiency.

“Germanness” and national pride (Pine, 2010: 53). In a NSDAP curriculum put forward by Graf, emphasis was put on how to present

an overview of the mental characteristics of the individual races, collect from stories, essays and poems examples of ethnological illustrations. Underline those terms that describe the type and mode of the expression of soul. Also ascertain which physical characteristics go hand in hand with psychologically determined traits for the individual figures. Try to discover inner attitudes in stories and poems, which describe the forms of actual intrinsic nature of racial soul. Also transfer this way of observation to persons in your neighborhood. What are the expressions, gestures and movements, which allows us to make conclusions as to the attitude of racial soul? Collect propaganda posters and caricatures for your race book and arrange them according to a racial scheme. What image of beauty is emphasized by the artist in posters about sports and travel? Publicity for cosmetics? When viewing monuments, not the race of the person portrayed with respect to figure, bearing and physical characteristics. Try to harmonize these determinations with the features of the racial soul. Observe the people whose special racial characteristics especially stand out to you also their posture the way they walk, speak, and further, their demeanor and gestures. Observe the Jew: his way of walking, his bearing, gestures and movements when walking. What strikes you about the way a Jew talks and sings? What are the occupations engaged in by the Jews of your acquaintance? In what occupations are Jews not found? Explain this phenomenon on the basis of the character of the Jew's racial soul. In what stories, descriptions and poems do you find the psychological character of the Jews accurately portrayed? (Graf, 1939 found in Wegner, 2002: 90)

6 Mathematics

In mathematics, the NSDAP sought to link the subject to the broader war effort and to the “cleansing of the nation”. Indeed, students learned basic arithmetic through the use of problem solving questions that asked, for example, “a bombing plane can be loaded with one explosive bomb of 35 kilograms, three bombs of 100 kilograms, four gas bombs of 150 kilograms, and 200 incendiary bombs of one kilogram, what is the load capacity?” (Mann, 1939: 62) or

“every day the state spends RM. 6 on one cripple; RM. $4\frac{1}{4}$ on one mentally ill person; RM. $5\frac{1}{12}$ on one deaf and dumb person; RM. $5\frac{3}{5}$ on one feeble-minded person; RM. $3\frac{1}{2}$ on one alcoholic; RM. $4\frac{4}{5}$ on one pupil in care; RM. $2\frac{1}{20}$ on one pupil in a special needs school, what is the total cost of one cripple and one feeble-minded person on the state if their life-span is 45 years?” (Mann, 1939: 63).

Hitlerjugend or Hitler Youth (HJ)

Yet, while the Nazi Party sought to reformat identity through the public education system, it complimented standardized state education with the creation of the *Hitlerjugend*, which actively sought to further erase individuality by integrating the German youth into an army-like structure in which the youth were organized into a rigid structure and subordinated to authority.

This youth learns nothing but to think German and to act German. When these boys enter our organization at the age of ten, it is often the first time in their lives that they get to breathe and feel fresh air; then four years later they come from the *Jungvolk* into the Hitler Youth, and we keep them there for another four years, and then we definitely don't put them back into the hands of the originators of our old classes and status barriers; rather we take them

straight into the Party or into the Labor Front, the SA, or the SS, the NSKK [motorized corps] and so on. And if they are there for another two years or a year and a half and still haven't become complete National Socialists, then they go into the Labor Service and are polished for another six or seven months, all with a symbol, the German spade. And any class consciousness or pride of status that may be left here and there is taken over by the Wehrmacht for further treatment for two years, and when they come back after two, three, or four years, we take them straight into the SA, SS, and so on again, so that they shall in no case suffer a relapse, and they will never be free again as long as they live. (Hitler, 1938 in speech to Hitler Youth at Reichenberg found in Hermand, 1997 : 17)

This statement by Hitler summarized the goal of the Hitler Youth. Just as modernizing states used education as a standardization tool, Hitler sought to cultivate social cohesion, national identity and the training of future civil bureaucrats for the party and state apparatus. The Nazi Party would reorganize the German youth with the goal to ensure that future generations of Germans would be unquestionably part of the fabric of the German nation that they were seeking to build. Indeed,

Whoever marches in the Hitler Youth is not a number among millions but the soldier of an idea. The individual member's value to the whole is determined by the degree to which he is permeated by the idea. The best Hitler Youth, irrespective of rank and office, is he who completely surrenders himself to the National Socialist world view. (Schirach, 1934: 135)

Due to the NSDAP's strong emphasis on the reeducation of the German youth, the Hitler Youth quickly imposed itself in Germany as a key political institution, complimenting education. Created in 1926, by 1933, the organization had supplanted all rival institutions as the majority of conservative youth organizations voluntarily dissolved themselves, Jewish and Communist organizations were disbanded and various Protestant groups were successfully pressured to join. They absorbed 20 German youth leagues and totaled 3.5 million members (Zapotoczny, 2005)⁶⁸. The only organization that successfully resisted in the early years was the Catholic Youth Organization.⁶⁹ However, by 1936, all sports facilities and activities were under the monopoly of the HJ with non-members barred access. This increased the pressure on the remaining competing youth groups. Indeed, by 1939, 8.7 million children were part of the HJ. When taking into account the fact that the total population of German youth was 8.87 million and that the HJ denied membership to Jews, the HJ can successfully claim that it had incorporated all eligible youth into its organization. This is partially due to the fact that on March 25th, 1939, a youth's participation in the HJ became mandatory with fines and sometimes prison time for parents preventing their children from participating.

The HJ was under the supreme control of Baldur von Schirach, or *Jugendführer des Deutschen Reiches* (Youth Leader of Germany). A strong believer in structure, he was responsible for introducing a structure that had boys as early as 6–10 years of age informally participating, with 10–14 year olds belonging to the *Jungvolk* and those between 14 and 18 formally participating in the HJ. While there was a female version organization,

⁶⁸ This was a drastic increase from 1932 when HJ members had added up to 107,956.

⁶⁹ The Catholic Youth Organization was protected by the concordat signed between the Vatican and Germany protecting German Catholic institutions.

the *Jungmadel*,⁷⁰ the HJ was primarily male-oriented with days full of war games, and essentially sought to prepare for the “unavoidable war” with pre-military training through overnight camps, roll calls during ceremonies, rifle practice, the study of maps and the spotting of imaginary and designated enemies and strenuous marches throughout Germany (Kater, 2004). Indeed, what differentiated the HJ from the normal public education system that German youth attended, was that the HJ was structured in a military style. It taught obedience, organization, structure, endurance and national pride. It stripped youth of their individuality and firmly placed them within the collectivity of staunch NSDAP supporters committed to the new vision of the German nation. In the words of Hitler, “Look at these young men and boys! What material! With them I can make a new world!” (Hitler, quoted in Rempel, 1989: 2).

The HJ was quickly faced with the logistical difficulties of its popularity: there were simply not enough local youth leaders. *Reichsfuhrer* schools (leadership schools) were established to solve this problem. They offered three-week courses on Nazi principles and German history with practical leadership training. Within a year, 12,000 new HJ leaders and 24,000 *Jungvolk* leaders had completed these courses. Furthermore, vocational training was encouraged with the initiation of a National Vocational Competition for HJ with winners in each category being rewarded by a meeting with Hitler. In addition, all HJ members were required to participate in the Reich’s Land Service that offered city dwellers the opportunity to experience life on a German farm in order to instill the German values of hard labor and the simple traditional life. These short and intensive training sessions quickly developed into a network of schools throughout Germany to which promising youth (10–18 years old) were sent to rather than attending the public schools. They became known as the Nazi Elite Schools or Napolas. Their sole goal was to reproduce a new generation of Nazi leaders. Requirements for entry were exclusive, but in line with the *Volksgemeinschaft*, had nothing to do with wealth or social status. Rather, entrance was exclusively based on Aryan parentage, character, accomplishment and capacity for leadership (Childs, 1972: xxi). Indeed, the Hitler Youth Official Handbook written by Fritz Brennecke in 1937 clearly sought to reinforce the idea of German superiority that was already being taught at schools. Chapter Two of this Official Handbook starts with the assertion that “possession of German blood is therefore essential for admission into the community of German people” (Brennecke, translated in Childs, 1938: 13) and the argument that the Nazis were capable of bringing back this natural superiority: “the Nationalist Socialist movement has quickly gained the victory in this sphere (economic) too because its structure, internally and externally, corresponds to the heroic conception of life and the racial character of the German people” (*Ibid*: 83).

During the war, the Hitler Youth participated in the “re-training” of ethnic Germans who had “lost their way” through years of assimilation in conquered territories such as Poland. Indeed, while at the start a voluntary mission, it became mandatory in 1942 as thousands of HJ flocked to the Polish countryside to give German lessons to Volga-Germans. Again, the creation of a new German community, one free of the constraints of locality but solely based on race, was the goal of these “lessons”. Furthermore, the youth

⁷⁰ The Jungmodel essentially taught German girls domestic chores and taught them the importance of becoming good wives and mothers in order to nurture the next generation of Germans.

sent to Poland had another mission: guarding the youth in conquered nations. Hence, they were specifically taught how to subjugate others deemed as “inferior”. This training would eventually prove useful for the SS, as they started recruiting from the HJ ranks for concentration camp guards. Essentially, the HJ was a massive organization of young men who had been trained to blindly follow and trust Hitler and Nazi leadership. While there were many struggles within the HJ (sexual assaults and thefts committed by HJ members), the major goal of the NSDAP was to indoctrinate a new generation of Germans with the feeling that they represented a new Germany. This Germany was strong, proud, and Aryan. Furthermore, one’s first and uttermost important duty was to unquestionably serve it.

Propagating NSDAP’s Vision of Identity through Entertainment

Strength through Joy – Kraft durch Freude (KdF)

There are no more private citizens. The time when anybody could do or not do what they pleased is past. (Ley, 1938: 71)

The KdF was a Nazi created socio-political institution under the supervision of Robert Ley that sought to monitor and control the leisure time of workers. It was an extension of the German Labour Front, the “union” that had replaced and centralized all other worker unions once the NSDAP had, fearing communism and socialism, made them illegal in 1933. The KdF supervised after-work activities, holidays and leisure time with the main goals of ensuring that workers did not have too much free time on their hands to get involved in political movements against the state and provide the worker with enough leisure so that the worker would be grateful to the Nazi Party for providing the structure that enabled it. Indeed, the scope of the organization was vast and it was an extremely popular and successful Nazi institution. It arranged theater trips (those living in the country-side had trains put to their disposal for travel means), summer holidays (often to the Italian Riviera, with the support of Mussolini), ski trips (often to the Italian Alps, with the support of Mussolini), summer and winter hikes, cruises, adult education classes, and exhibits in factories (Bendersky, 2014). One year after its creation, in 1934, 2.1 million people participated in a KdF event. By 1938, over 9 million people had participated in KdF activities. In addition to leisure, the KdF sought to ensure that German workers were physically healthy. Indeed, the KdF slogan that “your health does not belong to you” (Lea, 2002: 48) was part of the larger Nazi idea that personal fitness should not be an individual concern but transformed into a national concern. Being fit was part of one’s duty to the nation.

But the goal of the KdF was not only to control the leisure time of German workers, it was also part of the broader Nazi identity project of creating the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The idea was to bring to the masses the pleasures and benefits of the elite in an effort to erase or at least blur social classes under the idea that all formed the fabric of the German nation. Indeed, in the words of Ley, “the worker sees that we are serious about raising his social position. He sees that it is not the so-called ‘educated classes’ whom we send out as representatives of the new German, but himself, the German worker, whom we show to the world”. (Ley quoted in Lea, 2002: 49). indeed, in addition to the fact that now all Germans had access to paid vacation leave and with the fact that worker salaries had been

frozen, the KdF also sought to propel workers towards full self-esteem. The KdF owned a fleet of twelve cruise ships with standard cabins, large halls and banquet rooms that all KdF members shared with no distinction of class and cruised German workers to Portugal, the Canary Islands, Greece or Tripoli for holidays. On the Baltic island of Rugen, the Prora resort testified to the importance that the NSDAP put in creating a uniformed community with no distinctions. Sleeping accommodations resembled barracks and were identical in size and there was a large multipurpose room that was designed to hold 20,000 vacationers. Indeed, “family vacations for workers were not to be occasions for intimacy and privacy...Rather the resort would become a venue for creating loyal Germans, who would eagerly abjure their class identities and follow their fuhrer without reservations” (Baranowski, 2007: 159). Ley adds that “the bourgeois must no longer feel himself a kind of pensioner of either tradition or capital, separated from the worker by the Marxist idea of property” (Toland, 1992: 7).

Workers were even provided with the possibility to own their own car when an inexpensive “people’s car” was massively produced by the first Volkswagen factory set up near Fallersleben. This new car was to be known as the “KdF Wagen”, but never saw its massive distribution to the workers, as when war broke out, production was diverted towards the production of an all-purpose military vehicle (Lea, 2002: 49). Of course, there was much incentive to participate in KdF-sponsored activities. Unlike participation in the other NSDAP political and social institutions like the Hitler Youth or the Teacher’s League, here participation was not based on coercion or fear but rather on the inciting promise that participants would have a great time. Indeed, the brochures put forward by the KdF truly put the emphasis on the possibility of having an inexpensive vacation that would not only provide reflection time but also true relaxation.⁷¹

In a further attempt to pave the way for a truly *national* identity, one that not only overcame class distinctions but also localism, the KdF sponsored travel excursions within Germany. Hence, farmers were brought to the city and city-dwellers brought to the countryside and encouraged to regain their “strength” by relaxing with their compatriots (Lea 2002: 49). Furthermore, in an attempt to remove all social barriers to cultural activities, the KdF organized concerts, plays, operas and art exhibits. Indeed, if all Germans were to form the *Volksgemeinschaft*, then all Germans must be able given equal access to German culture. Hence, it was necessary to “arouse and mobilize the intellectual and ethical capabilities inherent in the German workman by enabling him to realize the beauty and grandeur of life in nature, art and the company of those of his fellows who share his own views. In doing so, we have broken the social convention that has been valid for decades and have removed the antagonism between work and culture” (Ley, in Lea, 2002: 49-50).

Finally, much of the KdF activities revolved around its adult education courses. Here the attempt was to indoctrinate workers with the Nazi vision regarding its racial state and purity of the German nation. Hence, while many courses were solely oriented to further traditional education and careers, others were geared towards the promotion of Nazi ideas. Such courses included, “The Nation’s Health”, “Racial Biology”, “Race and Heredity”,

⁷¹ See the brochures in the Appendix for some examples.

“National Socialism and the Race Problem” and “The Jews and the History of the Peoples of the World” (Lea, 2002: 50). Furthermore, in KdF-sponsored advertisements of its cruises or beach vacations to the German nation, its choice of models in its brochures continued to propagate what racially pure should look like (Baranowski, 2007: 149). Indeed, the brochures put forward images of white, Aryan families or couples enjoying themselves on the beach.⁷²

Propagating NSDAP’s vision of Identity through Violence and Fear

While the previous sections put the emphasis on how the NSDAP sought to transform national identity through the targeted use of education, entertainment and propaganda, it is impossible to talk about the Nazi Party and German identity under its influence without addressing the role that the SA and the SS played in fostering the fear and compliance necessary to create such an authoritarian state.

Sturmabteilung (SA)

Created in 1921, the SA or commonly known as the “Storm Troopers” or “Brown Shirts” were led by Ernst Rohm, who believed that the overthrow of the Weimar Republic would require an armed uprising. The SA was to accomplish this task. Not dictated by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the group quickly grew to include many members of the German army and vast paramilitary organizations that had flourished in the aftermath of WWI. They were charged with protecting party rallies, beer hall speeches and disrupting opponent’s political meetings. As the NSDAP started participating more and more in national elections throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, the SA also became increasingly visible as they distributed party pamphlets, election manifestos and continued to break up political meetings, especially, those of the Communists.

However, their rival association, the SS, as well as Hitler, felt threatened by their unchecked power. Indeed, between 1929 and 1933, membership to the SA grew from 30,000 to 425,000 (McDonough, 2012: 44). Furthermore, if the failed coup had taught Hitler an organizational lesson, it had been to ensure that control always be in the hands of the leader. This was clearly not the case with the SA. In addition, when looking at the composition of the SA, members were mainly men between the ages of 18–35 and the SA tended to serve as an outlet for delinquent men to channel their violence and discontent towards political opponents. During the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, the SA had been described as an organization, “composed in large part of ruffians and bullies” (Kritz, 1995: 472). In that sense, they greatly differed from the SS, who largely recruited their members from the HJ and the party.

This had a double consequence. First, the SS was more closely linked to the NSDAP as one of its institutions and second, personal identities had been redefined in line with the

⁷² For example, one brochure dated from 1939 shows a young blond couple lying in the sand obviously relaxed and content. (“Morgen in den Urlaub”, NSG Kraft durch Freude, Gau Oberdonau. Berlin: B=Verlag der Deutschen Arbeitsfront.)

NSDAP's broader national vision. On the other hand, the SA had always remained somewhat independent from the NSDAP. Indeed, the SA had never been under the central control of the NSDAP and operated more like a parallel paramilitary group while still recognizing the authority of Hitler. This is largely because Rohm had always been unwilling to submit the SA to party control and had never relinquished the idea of a violent uprising against the Republic, something Hitler had done following his failed putsch. Hitler himself seemed to shelve the question of the SA and allow it to continue its existence as a parallel group, as he never gave it true direction (Muhlberger, 2004: 117). This is probably due to two main reasons. First, following the failed Beer Hall Putsch, the rebuilding of the NSDAP required a "military-like" apparatus that was loyal to its cause in order to further its propaganda and protect its events. Second, since membership to the SA was linked to many other paramilitary groups and veterans of the then still diverse extreme right political scene, severing the group could have had the potential of severing the links to other political groups that Hitler was intended to assimilate into his movement.

However, while Hitler allowed the SA to continue its independent existence for the time being, he was simultaneously developing the SS and its close collaboration with the NSDAP. Indeed, the goal here was to create a strong and centralised Nazi elite institution that would serve the NSDAP. The group was set up in 1925 by Julius Schreck and its mandate made clear: "their activities are to protect meetings in their area, to secure subscribers and advertisements for the VB, to introduce new members to the party, and to prepare counter-measures against the eventualities noted above" (VB, What are the Protections Squads of the NSDAP and What do They Want? No 23, January 29, 1926). While this mandates made it sound quite similar to the SA, what was different was the notion that the SS, "represents the fusion of the best and most trustworthy male party members committed to protect, and work selflessly and untiringly for, the Movement. Only those who want to be in the frontline of the great battle that our Movement has to carry out should join the Protection Squad" (*Ibid*). Once it became clear to Hitler that the SA would not submit itself to the NSDAP and that his power had been sufficiently consolidated after being named Chancellor, Hitler made the decision with the help of the German army to purge the SA. Therefore, on June 30, 1934 on the night known as the "Night of Long Knives", lists of SA leaders⁷³ to be executed were distributed to the SS, including Rohm himself who was executed on July 1, 1934 after failing to commit suicide with the revolver that had been provided to him in his jail cell. This marked the demise of the SA and the flourishing of the SS.

Schutzstaffel (SS)

⁷³ The SA leadership was not the only focus of the purge; Hitler took advantage of the purge to remove several key leaders from the army, conservative movement in general and enact revenge for his failed Beer Hall Putsch. Indeed, Papen's secretary, Herbert von Bose was shot, previous Chancellor General von Schleicher and his wife were shot, Major-General Kurt von Bredow was shot in addition to Gregor Strasser who had been linked to negotiations with Schleicher's government, and leader of "Catholic Action", Erich Kalusener was shot as a warning to the Catholic Church, former Minister-President Gustav Ritter von Kahr was also executed for his role in the calming the Hitler putsch, Otto Ballerstedt, a former political leader who had successfully persecuted Hitler for breaking up a political meeting resulting in Hitler spending one month in jail, was also shot. Former Chancellor Heinrich Brüning was able to escape as well as Captain Ehrhardt, the Free Corps leader in the Kapp Putsch.

The true expansion of the SS was possible under the direction of Heinrich Himmler who was appointed *Reichsfuhrer-SS* in January of 1929. Indeed, when Himmler took on the reins of power, the SS only consisted of 280 men (Wilcox, 2015: 35), however it quickly evolved into the central institution responsible for handling party and state intelligence in addition to staffing the concentration camps. Soon, the SS would become synonymous with terror for the millions classified as “enemies of the state”. Once Hitler in power, the SS set its sight on centralizing the German police forces under its centralized control. They gained control over the Gestapo in 1934, and by April 1934 the SS consisted of 210,000 members flowing through its different organizations: the *Schupo* or Civil Security Police, the *Orpo* or Uniformed Municipal Police, the *Sipo* or Political Security Police and the *Sicherheitsdienst* or SD (Nazi Party intelligence). Furthermore, the SS by 1940 had been reorganized into the *Waffen-SS* and constituted the largest force of armed men in Germany after the *Wehrmacht* with 100,000 men and one million by 1944 (Bendersky, 2014: 133). This brought the SS to serve as a counterweight to the German army, as these men were loyal only to Hitler and Himmler.

In addition to perpetuating terror and violence in the German state, the SS was itself an institution that sought to diffuse identity. Indeed, Himmler himself was a strong anti-Semite and infatuated with Hitler. This would help him transform the SS into not only an institution responsible for maintaining order but also for diffusing the NSDAP vision of the state among Nazi elites. Indeed, he claimed in a conversation that, “for him I could do anything. Believe me, if Hitler were to say I should shoot my mother, I would do it and be proud of his confidence” (Himmler, in a conversation with Otto Strasser in 1930). The SS developed into an elitist institution with Himmler’s insistence that only the “best quality” of men be recruited (Wilcox, 2015: 37). Indeed, by 1934, the first *SS-Junkerschulen* was established in Bad Tolz and followed, in 1935, by another in Braunschweig. Once the war started, three more were founded in Posen-Treskau (1943), Klagfurt (1943) and Prague (1944). These were academies which sought to “create a professional SS officer corps by means of the establishment of a standardised military training system and the creation of the political soldier” and Himmler sought to ensure that the SS be “a highly disciplined and well-trained racial *Fuhrerkorps*” (Pine, 2010: 89). Furthermore, they were inculcated with the idea that they represented not only the “superior” race but also were the top tiers of the German nation itself. Indeed, Himmler told SS members, that loyalty, obedience, bravery, and truthfulness were the virtues of the SS man, claiming that

we have not had a single case in our ranks of a prominent SS man becoming disloyal. Let this be your guideline: If within your purview anyone should ever become disloyal to the Fuhrer or the Reich, even if only in thought, it is up to you to see to it that this man departs from the brotherhood, and we shall see to it that he departs this life” that “when generals obey, armies obey automatically. This sacredness of orders applies the more, the larger our territory grows” that “our men are brave” and finally, that truthfulness “which is very rare in Germany” was something that the SS did have because, “we SS men must get to the point where we no longer conclude written agreements; where among us, as was customary in former days, a man’s word and handshake constitute a contract, and where the handshake or the word of an SS man is proverbially more reliable than a mortgage on someone else’s most valuable property. That’s how it must be. (Himmler, speech at Posen)

In addition, while all leaders and members were submitted to racial selection and therefore the “aristocracy of blood” (Pine, 2010: 89), cadets were also trained to view themselves as “future leaders and the academies were constructed to create an air of privilege befitting a new elite, with the symbolism of German historic grandeur” (*Ibid*).

Finally, to conclude, it is telling that certain notions of national identity as advocated by the Nazis during the Third Reich continued to persist in the nascent years of the Federal Republic of Germany. Hence, in December of 1952, 37% of Germans believed that it was better for Germany to not have any Jews in the country, 20% answered no that it was not better and a huge 43% had no opinion! While the yes/no answers evolved, with 19% believing it was better not to have Jews in the country by March 1965 and 34% rejecting this, the undecided changed little and even increased to 47%. In another question in a public opinion poll, Germans were shown a list of opinions on Jews and asked to determine which ones contained the most truth for them. The answers clearly demonstrated that certain “facts” that the Nazis had sought to diffuse onto the nation still had considerable sway. Hence in 1965, 20% considered Jews to be stingy, 28% did not and a whopping 52% had no opinion; 30% believed that Jews only did good to serve their self-interest, 22% did not and 48% had no opinion; 42% believed that when Jews dominate a trade, no one else could get a foot it, 18% did not and 37% had no opinion; 25% believed that Jews were exploiters and lived from the work of others, 27% did not and 48% had no opinion.

As the previous section explained, racial hygiene had been a huge element of the identity of the Third Reich. In 1949, 70% of Germans answered that they would not marry a person of Jewish descent and only 8% answered yes, with 22% saying that it depended on circumstances. By 1961, 54% would still not marry a person of Jewish descent, 14% would and 32% were on the fence. In an interesting breakdown of the answers of 1961, it was found that of those who had answered that they would not, 43% were 16–29 years old, 54% 30–44 years old, 58% 45–59 years old and 63% were 60 and over. Hence, the re-education of the Germans after the Nazis was working: those who had been born and educated in the FRG were the age group in which the least amount of people answered that they would not marry a Jew. When asked whether a court should punish Germans who carry out anti-Semitic activities in Germany, the answer, in 1949, was 41% yes and 43% no. By 1960, the numbers had significantly changed with only 7% answering no and 78% answering yes. Furthermore, Hitler, as the leader of the NSDAP, had held a very important place in the hearts and minds of Germans with 40% of Germans answering in 1952 that “Hitler did much good, but it was greatly outweighed by his disastrous actions and characteristics” and 48% believing, in 1965, that without the war, Hitler would have gone down as Germany’s greatest statesman.⁷⁴

The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the different measures that the Nazi party took to influence German national identity. All played a role in driving the Nazi-imposed vision of what the German nation should look like under their reign. It was not necessarily a pretty sight. In Nazi Germany, huge segments of the population were excluded from nationhood and were actively persecuted. Culture, leisure and education

⁷⁴ That number of Germans believing that Hitler would have been the most important German statesman fell to 29% by 1964.

were severely controlled and there was little space for the individual. Indeed, in their attempt to create a *Volksgemeinschaft*, a people's community, the notion of "people" and "community" as social fabric was destroyed to create a totalitarian state. Indeed, the state and its vision on national identity sought to permeate all factors of social life. In that sense, it is difficult to truly assess how successful the NSDAP was in changing how Germans felt about being German. Nonetheless, it is possible to ascertain that there was a strong will on the behalf of the state to change that definition. The goal of this analysis is to examine *how* political parties and institutions transform national identity, and from the above discussion it can be concluded that the Nazi Party did radically seek the transformation of German national identity through the creation of a *Volksgemeinschaft* and a racial state. However, following the end of the war, they were removed from power and the entire political and institutional framework was transformed, as was the direction of national identity. This thesis argues that this evolution was due to how the CDU reoriented national identity in Germany based on its vision. The next chapter will dwell on the origins of the CDU in addition to their vision that influenced how they viewed German national identity.

4. The Establishment of the CDU and the Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

In the previous chapter, we discussed the impact and role of the NSDAP on how Germany's national identity was conceptualised. However, at the end of the war, German national identity shifted in direction. In the previous chapter, we discussed the impact and role of the NSDAP on how Germany's national identity was conceptualised. However, at the end of the war, German national identity shifted in direction. No longer was it based entirely on an ethnic conception but it would seek to embrace a more civic vision of national identity. Indeed, while Germany would seek to be more civic, Germany, until very recently, has maintained components of ethnic citizenship that have characterized Germany since the beginning. Indeed, the 1871 constitution defined citizenship towards Germany on the basis of the Prussia citizenship law of 1842. This meant that you were born German that translated into descent from a citizen being the guiding force for citizenship. Naturalisation was linked to two main criteria: minimum socioeconomic criteria and proof of respectability (which was also quite vague). The FRG continued to massively import foreign workers throughout its existence under the CDU and the SPD, and these workers and their offspring remain outsiders. Yet post-war and post-cold war migrating "ethnic Germans" returning from occupied territories were granted automatic German citizenship under the provision of article 116 of the German Basic Law. Since, 1950 about 4.5 million (including family members) have immigrated to Germany under this provision, whereas foreign workers (mainly of Turkish origin) or asylum seekers have been barred citizenship despite living on German territory for years. The original idea was that foreign workers would return to their homelands relatively quickly, but many chose to build their families in Germany that has led to tensions and internal contradictions to the FRG and today reunited Germany's civic democracy. Finally, birthplace-based citizenship was introduced into German nationality law in the Migration Act of 2000 (in force from 2005) and for the first time, children who were born in Germany to parents of foreign nationality acquired German citizenship if one of the parents: had legally resided in Germany for eight years, or had the right to unlimited residence or to an unlimited residence permit. However, it initially remained prohibitive with dual citizens having to choose between foreign citizenship and German citizenship by the age of 24. This was finally amended in 2014. In addition, no longer was it totalitarian, but now embraced democracy. No longer was it about "only" Germany but it was about integrating Germany into a broader international community. The newly established FRG would be democratic, free, Christian and an integral part of the West. This national identity would also be strongly influenced by the new institutional framework of the FRG (i.e., the Basic Law). It will be argued that the CDU would be the main driver for this evolution. Finally, as I explained in my theoretical section, CDU inspired conceptualisations of German national identity would often continue to be linked to past conceptualisations

The next two chapters will focus on the link between national identity of the FRG and the CDU at the end of the war. After the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, the Allies reinstated a new Germany. Indeed, Germany was militarily occupied and divided, and it was under these circumstances that its political system, economy and identity was transformed. While the influence that the Allies and the Cold War had in shaping Germany's future should not be underestimated, it can be defended that once political parties were reinstated in the FRG, they became bearers of identity independent from the Allies. Furthermore, while the Allies were an omnipresent guiding force in the immediate aftermath of WWII, competences were quickly transferred to the Germans. Indeed, by 1949, the FRG was proclaimed, free elections were held and a new constitution, the Basic Law, was adopted. By 1954, Germany had joined NATO and on May 5, 1955, the military occupation of West Germany came to an end. A page had been turned, and the FRG was a fully sovereign state once again. It will be argued throughout the next two chapters that the CDU, in interaction with the Basic Law, impacted the FRG's national identity.

This chapter will start by describing the political, economic and social state of Germany at the end of the war. It will then focus on the birth and establishment of the CDU as a FRG national political party. Finally, it will address the main issues upon which the CDU sought to define German national identity.

The End of WWII

On May 8th, 1945 the Wehrmacht unconditionally surrendered to the Allies. The end of the Third Reich would be confirmed with the arrest of Admiral Donitz on May 23, who had been appointed by Hitler before his suicide on April 30th. The Third Reich had fallen. Germany at the end of the war was in a state of ruins. Determined not to repeat the mistakes made with the 1918 Armistice, the Allies sought to ensure that the Germans understood that they had lost and that the Allied victory could not be put into question. Indeed, Hitler had capitalized heavily on the feeling of resentment from the German population that the loss of WWI could have been avoided or had been a mistake. Hence, while the domestic German population had not witnessed the war directly in WWI, this time they had suffered heavy aerial bombardments and watched as the Allies marched into Germany. Furthermore, all of Germany was occupied. This time, the Allies would not simply occupy the Rhineland, but all of Germany and take over all its political institutions. They declared in the Berlin Declaration on June 5th, 1945 that

there is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers....the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. (Berlin Declaration, June 5th, 1945 from Military Government Gazette, Germany, British Zone of Control, 1945)

It is impossible to understand how the German Republic was born without detailing the influence of the Allies in the reconstruction of Germany. They were omnipresent in the early days and remained omnipresent. The Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945) confirmed the decisions made during the Yalta Conference (in February 1945) concerning the future of Germany. With the main political goals revolving around the “4Ds”: denazification, demilitarization, decartelization and democratization. The military occupation of Germany by the victorious Allies would be total. Germany’s economy, politics and territory would be completely in their control. Germany would be divided into four zones of occupation and Berlin into four sectors. The Allied Control Council would be the centralized occupation authority and would be made up of the military occupation authorities from the US, the UK, the Soviet Union and France. The Americans, French, Soviets and British were each responsible for administering the occupation in their zone and developing policies for them.

The plan was to coordinate policies in Germany through the Allied Control Council, but with the Western currency reform and the Soviet blockade of Berlin, all cooperation stopped. In 1948, the Western allies decided to merge. First the Americans and the British combined their zones (Bizonia) and soon the French joined (Trizonia). All three finally fully merged with the establishment of the FRG in May 1949 and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October 1949. Germany’s geographical borders too would be affected. The Allies decided that Poland would lose its pre-WWII territories east of the Curzon Line to the Soviet Union, but would be compensated with southern parts of East Prussia in addition to receiving “administrative control” of German territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. In addition, the Potsdam Conference also marked the beginning of the emerging confrontation between East and West that would reign over the next few decades. Through the administration of their respective zones and though their disagreements, the Allies greatly shaped the rebuilding and resulting direction of devastated post-war Germany.

Population Transfers

It was agreed upon during the Potsdam conference that ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe would be transferred back into Germany. Indeed, the Allies sought to remove any new grounds for a new German expansion based on its vision of ethnic citizens. It was therefore decided to transfer ethnic Germans out of eastern and south-eastern Europe. This became known as the “population transfer” and details were hammered out in November 1945. Hence, ethnic Germans were forcibly removed from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Austria and resettled into the occupied zones of Germany. In a very meticulous and detailed way, the Allies planned to reallocate the population. Hence, “into the Soviet zone from Poland, 2 million persons into the Soviet zone from Czechoslovakia, 3/4 million persons. Into the British zone from Poland, 1 1/2 million persons. Into the American zone from Czechoslovakia, 1 3/4 million persons. Into the American zone from Hungary, 1/2 million persons. Into the French zone from Austria, 150,000 persons.” (“Expulsion plan for ethnic Germans” in Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54).

In addition to these forced population transfers, hundreds of thousands of Germans were fleeing westward from the advancing Red Army. These transfers caused a huge refugee crisis in the Western occupied zones and in particular in the British and American zones, as the French did not feel obliged to take in refugees in their zone, having been absent at the Potsdam Conference when this population transfer agreement had been made. Indeed, most of the cities had been reduced to rubble by Allied bombing during the war, and the country's shattered infrastructure simply could not cope with such an influx of people. Even after their arrival, refugees continued to die in the thousands because they were unable to find the shelter, medical aid or the food to sustain themselves.

Furthermore, the transfer was far from being orderly. In the British zone, between February 1946 and October 1947, eight trains with a capacity of 2000 people made their way back and forth between Szczecin and Lübeck. Other trains took refugees from Kaławska to Mariental, Alversdorf and Friedland and from April 1946, refugees were also transported to Lübeck by sea (Lowe, 2012). It has been estimated that some 6,000 'eastern' Germans were transported into the British zone almost every single day for a full year and a half (Lowe, 2012). These population transfers in the British zone were code-named Operation Swallow and a couple detailed reports remain, such as one detailing the arrival of the first Swallow train's arrival in Detmold:

"of the 1,507 expellees on board, 516 were children, many of whom were barefoot. The passengers had been awakened from their beds during the night of February 20, 1946, and told to be ready in ten minutes' notice, which proved insufficient for many of the parents to find their children's shoes. The Germans were brought to a camp, where the men were taken away; nothing more was known of them. The women and children were marched to a railroad station, their baggage taken from them and some beaten along the way. They were placed on a train, which did not arrive in Detmold until March 3. Passing through the Soviet zone, the Reds had given them some coffee, about a pound of bread and some sugar, which was all the food they have been given for the ten days of their journey" (Douglas, 2012: 169).

The men were often retained in the eastern zone as productive labor (Douglas, 2012 and Lowe 2012) while the old, young and women were sent on towards the western zones. The Americans also continued to receive refugees from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia – more than 3.5 million of them in total (Lowe, 2012). The authorities struggled to cope, and hundreds of thousands were still in refugee camps at the start of the 1950s.

Moreover, other Germans often regarded these German refugees as foreigners, and tensions often rose up between them. As General Clay wrote in 1950,

"separated from Germany through many generations, the expellee even spoke in a different tongue. He no longer shared common customs and traditions nor did he think of Germany as home. He could not persuade himself that he was forever exiled; his eyes and thoughts and hopes turned homeward" (Lowe, 2012).

The millions of refugees who, while being considered German, had not lived in Germany for years, therefore posed not only an influx intake problem but also had to be "transformed" into Germans. Hence, the German nation being built would need to also take into account this population.

Hunger

In addition to the refugee crisis, there was not enough food in Germany. Germany had lost its agricultural surplus regions when the Allies decided to give territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers to Poland in addition to its other Third Reich eastern breadbaskets. Moreover, since occupied Germany was never treated as an economic unit, bringing in food from the Soviet Union's mainly agricultural zones through intra-German trade was impossible. Furthermore, Germany's transport infrastructure was destroyed, which made the transport of food in the country difficult. The influx of refugees, almost 8–10 million people in the British and American zones, only exacerbated the low resources. (Grunbacher, 2010: 15). Hence, from 1945, Germans experienced daily hunger and starvation. Indeed, the average calorie intake in the British zone was 1,040, in the American zone it was 1,275 and in the French zone it was 927 for juveniles and normal consumers and 1,144 for heavy workers (Grunbacher, 2010: 16). The British were even forced to ration bread and potatoes in Britain in order to sustain food rations in Germany (Grunbacher, 2010, 34). Newly released Konrad Adenauer expressed concern about the low calorie intake to Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson the then Governor of Cologne by pointing out that it was similar to the calorie intake he had been receiving in the Gestapo concentration camp. When Patterson replied that the Germans had only allowed a 900 calorie intake to the Dutch during the war, Adenauer counterattacked by asking him: "Are you a Nazi?" (Schwarz, 1995: 300).

This would echo the reality of the precarious balance between the German people and the Allies for the next few years. Indeed, while not all Germans had been Nazis, it was difficult for many army members to disassociate civilians from the horrors of the Nazi regime and not seek some type of revenge on the Germans (Muller, 2010: 31). It was a dire situation and not helped by the fact that some Allies were adamant in their rejection of an economic revival of Germany. This did not help the German economy, which, in turn, did not help the food situation or the living standards of the Germans.

Prison Camps

At the end of the war, the British and Americans found themselves responsible for millions of German prisoners. Indeed, about 5 million German soldiers were taken prisoner by the Western Allies and the immediate solution was to intern them (Bessel, 2009). Some 400,000 were sent to prisoner camps in the United States as labour, but the vast majority were sent to the infamous Prisoner of War Temporary Enclosures (PWTE). The conditions of these camps were dire. They were open fields surrounded by barbed wire. Nothing more. There was no shelter, no latrines, and little or no food. Adenauer was very worried about the future of Germany under the occupation. While he had been initially happy about welcoming the American troops into Cologne, the mood had changed as the actions of American soldiers caused indignation on the behalf of the Germans. Indeed, there had been much looting and stealing (Schwarz, 1995:300). Furthermore, the conditions of the prison camps of Sinzig, Remagen and Kripp were also appalling. The 300,000 prisoners were

often being held outdoors with no shelter and according to Consul-General von Weiss, sixty to a hundred were dying every day (Schwarz, 1995:300).

Denazification

The denazification process was also quite chaotic. Not only was it uncoordinated throughout the British, American, French and Soviet zones but it was also quite unpredictable and its process was also thought to hinder West Germany's revival (Herz, 1948). Adenauer complained in a letter that,

"here in Cologne we experience on a daily basis the grotesque situation whereby the city's military commander allows a person back to work only to be removed again weeks later by the Field Security Service (FSS). It appears that here in Cologne the Military Government 622 and the FSS do not act on the same principles....we are faced with the grotesque situation that the lower administrative bodies (town and district councils) sometimes act very stringently, sometimes very leniently; while in the higher administrative bodies (Chamber of Agriculture in Bonn, State Food Office, government,) party members remain in the highest and most responsible posts" (Grunbacher, 2010:18-19).

This situation was tentatively rectified by the Allies with the introduction of the *Fragebogen* or questionnaire which required every German over the age of 18 to answer 131 questions in order to classify them as either an exonerated person (*Entlastete*), fellow traveller (*Mitlaufer*), accused of minor crimes (*Minderbelaste*), accused of crimes (*Belastete*), or accused of major crimes (*Hauptschuldige*). However, in reality the vigour with which the questionnaire was applied differed depending on the zones. Hence the British vetting process was quite lenient, whereas the Americans vehemently pursued minor Nazis, leaving the more important Nazis untouched as they tried to collect evidence. Insufficient resources and personnel hence often meant that the more important Nazis were able to escape severe punishment in the US zones (Taylor, 2013).

Start of the Cold War

Interestingly enough, the beginning of the Cold War actually helped accelerate Germany's path to overall recovery (at least Western Germany). Until the disintegration of relations between the West and East, the fate of Germany had been unclear due to disputes between the occupying powers. There was no agreement on the future of Germany. There was no concise and coordinated plan. All general objectives (i.e., denazification, demilitarization, democratization) were being pursued in a very independent manner in each zone. The British sought to revive the German economy as soon as possible in order to ensure that their occupation costs ceased to be covered by the British taxpayer, while the French refused any large-scale economic revival or centralization of the German state. The Americans were themselves divided between the State Department, Pentagon and Treasury Department. (Grunbacher, 2010: 25). However, when the Soviet Union decided to move away from the West and pursue its own vision independently, it generated a response. This concerted response would help Germany rebuild itself.

By 1946, the food situation in Germany was still quite dire but it started receiving more political attention, as it became known that the Soviets were providing 1,500 calories.

Indeed, General Clay stated in a memo that, “there is no choice between becoming a Communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories. It is my sincere belief that our proposed ration allowance in Germany will not only defeat our objectives in middle Europe but will pave the way to a communist Germany” (The Papers of General Luscious D. Clay). Indeed, Russia held the eastern half of Germany, Poland, the Balkans, Hungary and a part of Austria. The economic and political principals in these Russian occupied zones were very different from those applied in the Western zones. Things were pulling apart. The divisions were becoming more and more apparent. And now it was for German influence that the new battle lines were being drawn.

The Allies were now fighting for the hearts and minds of the Germans. This became clear with Molotov’s Paris statement in 1946 in which he declared,

“it has of late become fashionable to talk about the dismemberment of Germany into several ‘autonomous’ states, about the federalization of Germany and about the separation of the Ruhr from Germany. All such proposals originate in the same policy of destruction and agrarianization of Germany, for it is easy to understand that without the Ruhr Germany cannot exist as an independent and viable state. But I have already said that if the interests of peace and tranquility are dear to us the destruction of Germany should not be our objective....in order that the development of German peaceful industries may be of benefit to other peoples who need German coal, metal and manufactured products, Germany should be granted the right of export and import and if this right of foreign trade is effectuated we should not put obstacles in the way of the increase in the output of steel, coal and manufactured products of a peaceful nature in Germany, naturally within certain bounds and provided that an inter-Allied control shall inevitably be established over German industry and over the Ruhr industries in particular...it goes without saying that we raise no objection to the setting up of a German central administration as a transitional step towards the establishment of a future German government” (Molotov Paris Speech, FRUS 1946, vol II).

This would provoke a new response on behalf of the Western powers. The new vision that would be applied to Germany would be laid out in a speech given by US Secretary of State James ,Byrnes in which he declared that “it is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West” (Given on September 6th, 1946: Frus 1946). Byrnes based his vision for the future of Germany on the principles of the Postdam Agreement. Hence, Germany’s economy was to be revived and centralized and a provisional German government was to be established with its leaders being democratically chosen by the Germans themselves. On January 1st, 1947 the British and the Americans combined the economies of their respective zones. Furthermore, as relations between the West and the East continued to deteriorate, the vision that a full European recovery would be impossible without a strong Germany started to take hold more broadly. Furthermore, the American, British and French zones would be firmly integrated into the “West” when they were included in the American program of economic aide for Europe: the Marshall Plan.

This section described the harsh situation of Germany at the end of WWII. It is on these shaky grounds that the FRG was established. And yet, despite the mass destruction, the hunger, the refugees, the competing Allied visions for German recovery, the removal of much of the political leadership and the destroyed economy, the FRG was successful and flourishing. A new democracy was established and thrived. The main governing

political party in the Republic's first twenty years, the CDU marked it as a nation by setting the framework and guidelines of its national identity.

The Birth of the Federal German Republic (FRG)

As this thesis reflects on the interactions between national identity, political institutions and political parties, it is important to discuss the structure provided by the political institutions of the FRG.

A New Federalism

One of the main goals of the Allies was to avoid the reestablishment of a strong unified central state in Germany. Therefore, building on the rich history of federalism in Germany,⁷⁵ the Allies encouraged a new vision of federalism for West Germany. It has been largely successful. Indeed, today federalism in Germany has “acquired the status of an authentic expression of German identity” (Umbach, 2002: 5). The reason why federalism has been so successfully integrated into German identity is largely due to the important historical place that federalism had in German national memory (Umbach, 2002 and Von Beyme, 1984). Hence, even if the vision of federalism being encouraged by the Allies was new, the fact that federalism had old roots in Germany helped with the new architects’ “bricolage” of national identity (Indergaard and Indergaard, 2008).

At the end of the war, the Allies redrew the internal borders of Germany so that no more than 30% of either population or territory was included in any one Lander. The creation of new Landers had three main goals. First, it sought to prevent any dominance of one Lander over another as Prussia had in the last. Second, a clear “break” with the Third Reich was to be made. Third, and perhaps most importantly, by drawing “artificial” lines, new identities would be created, identities that would not have continuity with traditional historical regions (Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt, 1981). Hence, the Allies therefore established eleven new Landers in West Germany (Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wurttemberg-Baden, Wurttemberg-Hohenzollern,⁷⁶ and the Free State of Oldenburg⁷⁷). Therefore, beyond the redrawing the physical boundaries, the Allies sought to strengthen the Landers from within with the creation of new institutions, new identities, and new powers. Quickly, by January 1946 political elections were being held in American Landers for the election of representative bodies in communities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. By June, these elections were ubiquitous in the American zone. The British and the French pursued the establishment of political parties at the Lander level more cautiously, but by the end of 1946, elections were being held in both zones too.

⁷⁵ The German Confederation 1815-1866, the second German Empire 1871-1918 and the Weimar Republic 1919-1933.

⁷⁶ Following a referendum in 1952, Baden, Wurttemberg-Baden and Wurttemberg-Hohenzollern merged into Baden-Wurttemberg.

⁷⁷ The Free State of Oldenburg was merged into Lower Saxony in 1946.

The Bundesrat embodied the new vision of federalism for West Germany. The Bundesrat was the creation of a new institutional device that would restrain central and national politics by giving Lander governments a direct voice and even veto power. Furthermore, since members of the Bundesrat were drawn up from the Landers themselves and responsible to Land cabinets, there was also a goal to institutionalize political diversity (Heidenheimer, 1958). German federalism was based on the idea of a vertical division of powers, with Landers being conceived as state units (Gunlicks, 2003). Indeed, much authority was granted to them. Article 30 states that “state powers and the implementation of state tasks are the responsibility of the Lander unless the Basic Law provides otherwise” (Basic Law, 1949). This gave the Landers legislative powers over local governments, culture, schools, visual and performing arts, public safety (police), and some aspects of civil service and health care. Despite the intertwining of the central government and the Landers, the authority to legislate on foreign affairs, defense, national citizenship, and, of particular concern to this analysis, the regulation of political parties remained firmly in the hands of the federal assembly: the Bundestag.

The Basic Law

The birth of the FRG required a founding document. This document would be the Basic Law and was adopted on May 8, 1949 by the newly established and strengthened Landers but not by popular vote. Indeed, on July 1st, 1948, the Western Allies (France, USA and the UK) gave the eleven Prime Ministers of the Lander the “Frankfurt Documents” that instructed them to set up an assembly to draft a democratic and federal constitution. While the Prime Ministers at first refused to draft such a constitution, fearing that such a document would only serve to further divide Western and Eastern Germany, a compromise was eventually reached. The new document would not be a constitution but rather a “basic law” that would be provisional and first step towards the establishment of an independent and sovereign Germany. Hence, on September 1, 1948 the Parliamentary Council⁷⁸ met in Herrenchiemsee, Bavaria and started drafting the “Basic Law”, which was approved on May 8, 1949 by the council and ratified by all Landers except Bavaria on May 23, 1949.

The Basic Law not only defined freedoms, rights and federalism⁷⁹ but also enshrined the role political parties were to play in West Germany. Not only were political parties required to protect the democratic nature of West Germany but their structure also was to be democratic (Heberle, 1962). Indeed, Article 21 states

the political parties participate in the forming of the political will of the people. They may be freely formed. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publically account for the sources of their funds. Parties which, by reason of their aims or behaviour of their adherents seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court decides on the question of unconstitutionality. (Basic Law, 1949)

⁷⁸ Konrad Adenauer was President of the Council. Each Lander had one representative.

⁷⁹ Almost half of the articles of the Basic Law refer to federalism.

Yet, in addition, the Basic Law required all members of the Bundestag to be “representatives of the entire nation, not bound by mandates or directives and subject only to their conscience” (Article 38). Hence, party members are required to go beyond the political will of a given community and represent the entire nation. This is an important element for this analysis, as it goes beyond regional or local identities and seeks to enclose the whole nation.

The adoption of the Basic Law paved the way for the first federal elections since Hitler’s ascension to power. These historic elections were held on August 14th, 1949 with the CDU taking 31% (139 seats) and the SPD taking 25% (115 seats). This started the reign of the CDU over West German politics, as they governed uninterrupted from 1949 to 1969. In the next section we shall discuss the establishment of the CDU as a national political party.

The Birth of the Christian Democrat Union (CDU)

An old world has sunk and we want to build a new one...by returning to the cultivation of those moral principles and spiritual values that constituted...the honourable tradition of our land (Andrea Hermes, CDU, July 1945).

The CDU’s Beginnings and Consequent Expansion as a National Political Party

As the Allies took over the economy and international affairs of defeated Germany, there were little areas in which Germans could directly influence their future. However, when the occupying powers allowed the reestablishment of political parties in their different zones, a political space was made for the Germans to act. And act they did. The revival of a political party system was strenuous: as the Nazis had ravaged German political institutions and following the war, there was no nation-wide communications network. Only the Socialists and the Communists had some organizational structure following the war, but they the extensive institutional structure that had once linked them to specific regions and cultures throughout Germany had been severed through *gleichgeschaltet* (coordination) that had seen the Nazis take over every single aspect of social and political life. The Catholic Church had cut itself off from any political activities under the Nazis. The result was “a breakdown in the rigid system of regional, denominational, ideological and class cleavages that had characterized German society and the old party system” (Cary, 1996: 148). Hence, while some political parties (the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the German Communist Party (KPD) sought to rebuild from pre-existing social and cultural fabrics, others (such the CDU) simply were created from scratch.

The actual idea of a Christian Democratic Union was born from the initial discussions in Königswinter between Leo Schwering⁸⁰ and Wilhelm Warsch⁸¹ as they came to the realization that the old Centre Party had no future in the new Germany.⁸² A new party needed to be formed. How would this party be a unifying force? It needed to overcome the socialists. It needed to overcome the differences between Protestants and Catholics⁸³ and therefore be non-denominational (Dowell, 1972). Furthermore, with massive migration and immigration into the German borders following the end of the war, Germany's congressional map was being re-drawn. The persistent patterns of "closed villages" that had existed since the mid-17th century was being radically transformed as newcomers resettled throughout Germany. While many traditional strongholds (Trier, Cologne and Munster) of the predominantly Catholic Center Party of the Weimar Republic remained 2/3 Catholic and predominantly Protestant areas of Northern Germany (Holstein, Hamburg, Berlin and Lower Saxony) remained 2/3 Protestant, the percentages were falling. Indeed, by 1946, only 1 of the original 57 German districts (upper Palatinate) remained 95% Catholic and none of the 13 German districts had 85% Protestant populations anymore (Mitchell, 2012). In Bavaria, the historic stronghold for Catholicism, only nine of the 1,424 purely Catholic municipalities continued to be mono-confessional and only one of the 140 previously Protestant municipalities continued to be mono-confessional (Mitchell, 2012). Finally, in large areas of West Germany (Franconia, Palatinate, Hess and North Rhine) neither Protestants nor Catholics had a 2/3 majority (Mitchell, 2012). Hence, a new coalition needed to be founded in this new post-war reality. This new coalition needed to be able to take into account both religious groups if they wanted a chance to be represented in tomorrow's Germany. Furthermore, there was a will to simplify the party system (Pridham, 1977). Indeed, a party system that had been defined by multiple small parties vying for political competition had helped pave the way for the NSDAP to Parliament under the Weimar Republic. Hence, the "trauma" of small political parties was still evident when the CDU claimed that it needed a "few large parties" because "the Weimar democracy was wrecked by the splintering of parties. We wanted parties, which could really support the state. From this came the notion of concentrating democratic circles from the Christian camp, across confessions, in one large party of the progressive centre" (Pridham, 28: 1977).

The most important rival political force for the CDU was the Centre Party that had been re-established in North-Rhine at the end of the war as was also vying for the support

⁸⁰ Born in 1883, he was a doctor of philology and a secondary school teacher by profession. He had been a devoted member of the Centre Party and Catholic organizations. He had been dismissed from his post as Centre Party delegate to the Prussian Landtag in 1934 by the NSDAP and sent to a concentration camp during the war.

⁸¹ A lawyer who had been dismissed by the NSDAP in 1933. Like many early members and advocates for the CDU, many had suffered at the hands of the Nazis due to their participation in Catholic movements during the war (i.e., the Catholic worker's movement)

⁸² This was because the Centre Party had lost its political credibility because it had voted for the Enabling Act

⁸³ Many thought that the inability for the Protestants and the Catholics to work together had contributed to the rise of Hitler. Indeed, while the Catholics had stood behind the Centre Party, the Protestants had backed various nationalist or liberal parties, thereby transcending the potential for a strong unified group.

of the Catholics. However, important pre-war Centrist figures (Konrad Adenauer⁸⁴, Adam Stegerwald⁸⁵, Andreas Hermes⁸⁶, Jacob Kaiser, and Leo Schwering⁸⁷) did not support a Centrist revival and instead pitted their weight behind the building of a new political party: this new political party would be based on the central tenant of inter-dominational cooperation and democracy.

Once the seeds for the creation of such a party had been spread out throughout Germany, the actual founding meeting of the Rhenish *Christlich-Demokratische Partei* (CDP)⁸⁸ took place in September 1945 and the founding manifesto declared, “the Party of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany, out of its fervent love for the German nation, calls on all Christian, democratic and social forces to work together to build a new homeland” (Appeal by the Christian Democratic Union, 1945).

Adenauer quickly ascended to become leader of the CDU in North Rhine Westphalia. Indeed, in January 1946, following the lifting of the political ban on his person, Adenauer was elected provisional chairman of the CDU. Two weeks later he replaced Schwering as the Rhinish Chairman⁸⁹ and on March 1st he became permanent zonal

⁸⁴ It is impossible to talk about the CDU without evoking Adenauer’s role in the party. A devout Catholic, Adenauer was born on January 5th, 1876 in Cologne. He served as mayor of Cologne from 1917 to 1933, during the tumultuous years of the aftermath of WWI and the Weimar Republic. At the end of WWI, Cologne was heavily hit by the armistice conditions: the occupied territories and left bank of the Rhine was to be evacuated within three weeks before the British occupying troops entered. This represented two armies, the 6th and 7th divisions with 500,000 men and 300,000 horses (Schwarz, 1995 v1; 126). Adenauer had the city ring its church bells as the first units arrived in Cologne. The city council were instructed to “give a hearty welcome to the hundreds of thousands of courageous warriors” Schwarz, 1995 v1; 126) and when the last soldiers of the Imperial Order had passed through, “fear of occupation, and of temporary separation from unoccupied Germany” (Schwarz, 1995 v1; 127) were all that was left. But, Adenauer served Cologne well and was able to establish a good working relationship with the British. However, as the NSADP increased its influence in Germany, he came increasingly under attack for being a Jewish sympathiser and for being anti-German due to his sympathy for pro-European ideas (Schwarz, 1995 v1; 219). By 1933, he was removed from his position of Mayor and his financial resources were confiscated. He laid low during the war years, afraid to return to his home in Cologne for fear that the SA would attack, but nonetheless found himself arrested in 1944 and put into the Brauweiler prison alongside his wife. At the end of the war, the Americans reinstated Adenauer as Mayor of Cologne, but when Cologne was transferred into the British zone, he found himself often in political conflict with the British and was soon dismissed as Mayor and temporarily banned from political activity. The ban on political activity infuriated Adenauer, who found himself unable to continue working with the nascent CDU. He said “apart from me personally, this ban affects the entire Christian Democratic Party whose spokesman I am...!” (Schwarz, 1995 v1; 324). Once the ban was lifted, Adenauer plunged himself into the development of the nascent political party and rose to become its Chairman in the British zone and eventually, West Germany’s first Chancellor. In all, Adenauer served four terms as Chancellor, as the CDU won the 1949, 1953, 1957 and 1961 Bundestag elections. However, Adenauer resigned as Chancellor in 1963 following the Spiegel Affair but remained party leader until 1966. He died near Bonn, on April 20, 1967.

⁸⁵ As district governor of Franconia he helped establish the idea of an interdenominational party in the South.

⁸⁶ In the East, Hermes was a central figure in the first founding initiative of the CDU, he was quickly replaced by the Soviets by Jacob Kaiser.

⁸⁷ In the West, Schwering pioneered the initiative to found an interdominational party, and called the nascent party: Christian Democratic Party (CDP). Adenauer quickly joined.

⁸⁸ Later renamed the *Christlich-Demokratische Union* (CDU) in November 1945.

⁸⁹ Adenauer had been approached by Arnold Dusseldorf supporters as early as August 1945 to be the Rhinish Chairman of the party, but Schwering supporters had refused.

chairman. Indeed, the first official meeting between CDU delegates of each British zone Landers (Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Westphalia and the Rhineland) was held in Herford in January 1946, and Adenauer was named CDU party leader of the British zone. This quick ascension was due to his intact political prestige but also aided when the British tried to negotiate a grand coalition government in North Rhine-Westphalia after the local elections of 1946. Negotiations between the CDU and the Social Democrats broke down over who would receive the ministry of the interior, as this ministry controlled schools and therefore religious schools. Though a coalition was eventually reached with the Social Democrats, the conflict that had arisen helped cement the British CDU ranks behind Adenauer (Van Hook, 2004).

Now that the British-zone CDU was united behind Adenauer, it was time to unite the CDU in the American and French zones, which remained relatively autonomous. However, here there was much friction between Adenauer and Kaiser, who was then leader of the CDU in Berlin (Kleuters, 2012: 28-29). The two needed the different Landers' approval of their leadership before a true national union could be made, and there was much contention about where the party's headquarters would lie: in Berlin or in the West. Despite Kaiser benefitting from the support of the British Military personnel, Adenauer was successful in his endeavours in uniting the different British and American Landers in a meeting on April 3rd, 1946 in Stuttgart and informed the British and the Americans in a note that "all those present agreed that everything should also be done to facilitate the amalgamation of the CDU of Berlin and the Russian Zone with the parties of the other Zones, but the site of the future party leadership should not be Berlin or a place in the Russian Zone" (Schwartz, 1995: 365) but somewhere near the Main.

Adenauer won the battle against Kaiser and firmly implanted himself as a leading CDU figure capable of navigating between the Landers (Williams, 2000). Furthermore, his subsequent election as chairman of the West German Parliamentary Council (*Parlamentarischer Rat*) on September 1st, 1948 that was responsible for drafting the Basic Law. To secure the nomination, Adenauer created a conservative alliance with the Deutsche Partei (DP) and the liberal FDP (Schwarz, 1995: 589) which meant that he no longer needed the support of the left-wing Christian Democrats such as Arnold, Lenz and Kaiser and Krone (Kleuters, 2012: 32). Once nominated, he consolidated his position as a national political leader that led local Lander Christian Democrats to unite behind the the CDU of Adenauer. The only exception was the *Christlich Soziale Unions* (CSU) of Bavaria, who faced strong historical and political pressure from the separatist *Bayernpartei* to not merge with the CDU. However, the mutual understanding that rose was that while the CSU would remain an autonomous political party with its own chairman, members, headquarters and organizations, there would be a mutual alliance on the federal level that would be based on the agreement to never compete with each other's membership, form a common *Fraktion* in the Bundestag, not to run against each other in elections and propose a common candidate for chancellors before Bundestag election (Streiff, 2006: 13).

However, it would be some time before the CDU developed into a truly national political party. Indeed, despite winning 31.1% of the national vote in the 1949 Bundestag elections, the CDU was more a "loosely-coordinated alliance of Christian Democratic

Lander parties as late as 1949” (Pridham, 2015: 58). Indeed, following the first federal elections in August 1949, Adenauer became the first FRG Chancellor. However, since the CDU had not been established as a national political party, there had been little national organizational structure at the time of the first elections. Therefore Adenauer, in his capacity of chairman of the CDU of the British zone (the largest regrouping of CDU zonal groups) simply convened in an informal gathering in his home in Rhondorf one week after the election with carefully selected party leaders to discuss his appointment as Chancellor, the form of future government and coalition strategies (Pridham, 2015). It would take the Goslar Conference held between October 20-22, 1950 for the CDU to take the first essential step towards the creation of a national political party and “powerful instrument for the exercise of national power” (Pridham, 2015: 58). Indeed whereas the mid to late 1940s marked the consolidation of Christian democracy as a viable political concept in West Germany, the 1950s marked the consolidation of the CDU as a national vibrant political party.

The Goslar Congress served to confirm Adenauer’s position as party leader. The federal Chancellor was elected party chairman by 302 votes out of 335, with 22 abstentions and four “no” votes; the remaining votes were divided equally between other names. Indeed, the congress was a form of showing the approval of the Adenauer Government (Pridham, 1977). In front of 1,000 delegates,⁹⁰ Chancellor Adenauer walked on stage to the music of Beethoven’s “Egmont” overture and declared that “the Christian outlook, its chosen basis for domestic and foreign policy, is essential for the struggle against Bolshevism” (Pridham, 2015: 65).

However, the Goslar Conference also transformed the CDU into a full-fledged national political party with branches in all western Landers and Berlin, the creation of national headquarters (*Bundesgeschäftsstelle*) that would be responsible to the Party Executive but financed through the regional organizations (*Landesverbände*), and directives for Party Committee composition. The role of the Party Federal Committee (*Parteiausschuss*) was emphasized and its delegates were to be chosen from the *Landesverbände*, the *Land* party chairmen, the chairmen of the Bundestag *Fraktion*, the chairmen of the *Fraktionen* in the Land parliaments, the Federal Executive and five representatives from the Refugees’ Committee. All these institutional decisions confirmed and reinforced a federal party structure for the CDU. Indeed, many resources and much power of the CDU was to be found at the Lander level.

As the CDU grew into an institutionalized political party, so did its influence over the Chancellor. This is an important point as the main argument of this thesis is that political parties influence and direct the course of national identities, not one political leader per se. Hence, the first part concentrated on the influence of the NSDAP over the conceptualization of the German nation and now we are focusing on the role the CDU played in developing a new German nation at the end of WWII. The major difference with this section is that the CDU operated in a federal democracy whereas the NSDAP had operated in a totalitarian regime. The influences and constraints that each political party

⁹⁰ Of these delegates, 386 had voting rights while the rest were invited as guests (Pridham, 2015: 65),

was subjected to in that sense is very different. Hence, whereas the NSDAP was essentially Hitler's party, the CDU was not Adenauer's party. While we should not underestimate the important role that Adenauer played in the development of the CDU and in its early days in power, as the CDU developed its internal national organs and expanded throughout West Germany, it also developed its own identity and consequent visions.

Hence, Adenauer would throughout his tenure as Chancellor face party pressures emanating essentially from the Bundestag *Fraktion*. Indeed, a high proportion of Bundestag deputies were members of the party executives organs. Hence, "members of the *Fraktion* depended on their national political careers to a large extent on Adenauer's electoral appeal, so that ultimately the success of his policies and his public authority as Chancellor determined the strength of his party position, yet paradoxically the greater the size of the *Fraktion* – it increased from 139 in 1949 to 243 in 1953 and 270 in 1957, as a result of Adenauer's victories in the latter two years – the more unwieldy it became to manage" (Pridham, 1977: 69-70). Essentially, the *Fraktion* served to "make sense" of the different interests incorporated within the CDU. Indeed, each Lander had its own vision or interests that was projected towards the federal level, but if the national CDU was to keep its vast appeal and continue to transcend different classes and interests, it had to ensure that these "vested" interests did not take up too much space while still ensuring that the Landers felt individually represented. While it has been noted that the *Fraktion* almost always stood by the government in foreign affairs (Pridham, 1977), this was less the case for domestic, social and economic issues.

The development of the CDU into a truly national political party took a few years. Indeed, on the eve of the first federal elections of the FRG in 1949, it was only in the British zone that a united CDU front existed. While the CDU was present in the French and American zones, there was no subnational union as in the British zone under Adenauer's leadership. Nonetheless, the CDU won the most seats and became the first democratically elected governing party of the FRG. It slowly evolved, as the aforementioned section describes and by the next Bundestag elections, held in 1953, the CDU was a national political party with locals and institutions throughout West Germany. The CDU also embodied a vision for the German nation. Its foremost founding identity was its personification as a Christian political party. As such, and especially in the early years, it was adamant in seeking to establish the FRG as a Christian nation and advocating the Christian component of German national identity. While over the years it would spend less and less time seeking to establish the FRG as a Christian nation, it nonetheless remained an important backdrop of its vision for the German nation and it would often link the two other main issues of the CDU's vision of German national identity, integration with the West (*westbindung*) and the social market economy (*sozialen Marktwirtschaft*) to it.

The CDU and its Vision for German National Identity

Contemporary Christian democratic parties evolved from Catholic confessional parties that were created in the 19th and 20th centuries. Originally, these parties opposed liberal democracy. Indeed they challenged "the ascendancy of liberalism in Europe from a "fundamentalist" and theocratic perspective" (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2010: 185).

Furthermore, they were originally anti-democratic until the realization that the consolidation and further expansion of parliamentary and electoral democracy would provide them with institutions of social and political power (Kalyvas, 1996). Indeed, the post-war Christian Democratic parties were adopted in a context of establishing democracies. In that sense, they were religiously inspired but secular in that they fully accept parliamentary democracy (Warner, 2000). Indeed, there is a strong belief that only within a free and constitutional democracy could the fundamental values of Christian Democracy be realised (KAS).

Christian Democracy has historically essentially been based on ideas of compromise, accommodation, pluralism, human rights and integration (van Kersbergen, 1994 and Irving, 1979). Essentially, Christian Democrats believe that every individual is unique and must be treated with dignity. Christian Democracy in that sense reflects the Christian idea that individuals must be accepted with all their weaknesses and strengths and that their rights be protected but that not only is man an individual, he is also a social being and therefore an individual must participate in society. The fundamental values of Christian Democracy are freedom and equality and solidarity. With regards to freedom, it is believed that it can be achieved through constitutionally protected fundamental rights such as the freedom of religion, opinion, and right to property for example. With regards to equality, the Christian Democrats conclude that equality must guarantee equal justice for all and that no one be treated unfairly because of religious belief or origin. With regards to solidarity, it is believed that all members of society must work together to insure that equality prevails.

The CDU was founded in the aftermath of the horrors committed in the name of National Socialism. There were open wounds that needed to be addressed and the CDU sought to not only address them but also make sense of the horrors committed. Indeed, there was an inherent need to understand why such a vision had existed and what measures needed to be taken in order to prevent a repeat. Indeed, the underlying question was: on what should Germany's national identity be based? Political parties were operating in a new political landscape. The new political institutions of the German Republic offered a renewal of options. The fact that the Third Reich and its vision of the nation had been completely discredited also offered a window of opportunity for political parties to truly elaborate their own visions and truly offer something new. Hence, the CDU claimed that the FRG's national identity should include: Christian values, the social market economy and integration with the West.

Christian Values

Social justice and social love should protect a new people's community, which knows how to combine the God-given freedom of the individuals and the claims of the community with the demands of the common good. Therefore we are advocating a real Christian socialism, which has nothing in common with false collectivist aims, which fundamentally contradict the essence of man. It is however our firm will to set up a social order which accords just as much with the democratic tradition of the Germans past as well as the breadth and spirit of Christian natural law. (Cologne Principles, June 1945)

In the Cologne Principles, there was an emphasis on the need for a new “people’s community” one that would replace the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The CDU would seek to create this new community based on Christian *Weltanschauung*. Indeed, Adenauer claimed “we call ourselves Christian Democrats, because we have the deep conviction that only a democracy rooted in the Christian-Western worldview, in Christian natural rights, and the basic principles of Christian ethics can fulfill the great responsibility to educate the German people and lead to its re-emergence” (Adenauer, quoted in Jackson, 2006: 129). Basing German identity on a Christian one was sought to correct the failures of the past German nation, namely National Socialism. Hence, equating the German nation with a Christian *Weltanschauung* developed the idea that the new German community would not be based on solely the “community” to the detriment of the “individual” as National Socialism had. Rather, it would uphold the individual while reinforcing the “common good”. While the Third Reich had prioritized the society over the individual and had sought to destroy family units in order to subordinate individuals to the needs and requirement of the society and the totalitarian state, the CDU believed that the family unit, an important Christian ideal, needed to be established as the center of society.

Furthermore, as the NSDAP had murdered and detained individuals with no justice or compassion, the CDU sought to emphasize the need for social justice. Hence, the “people’s community” of the CDU was one based on compassion, justice and individual rights and freedoms, which were nonetheless the same ideals of Christianity. Finally, a very important element of Christian Democracy was freedom, namely the freedom of an individual in relation to the state. However, as the Cold War progressed and the divisions between East and West grew more entrenched, freedom for the CDU increasingly became synonymous with freedom for communism. Indeed, Adenauer wrote in the early discussions of the creation of a Christian political party that “I beg you and the other gentlemen to bear in mind continually in your deliberations that only this planned concentration of all forces with a Christian and democratic basis can protect us from the dangers emanating from the East” (Adenauer, August 21, 1945 in a letter to Karl Scharnagle, mayor of Munich). Indeed, there was a strong normative tendency to emphasise inalienable individual rights and freedom because it was thought to be the best way to protect Germany from authoritarian tendencies to put the state and nation first to the detriment of individual rights (i.e., the Nazis and their treatment of Germans were not considered to be part of the *Volksgemeinschaft*). Therefore, the CDU would place the individual at the center of political life.

The catastrophic aftermath of National Socialism and the need for the old German nation to burn and come again from its ashes like a new phoenix was especially evident in the founding years of the CDU. The past needed to be addressed. However, it needed to be addressed in a way that demonstrated that the CDU not only held a new vision but that it could also be linked to a historical continuity in the past. As Hastings and Ranger (1983) demonstrated the importance of tradition or at least the illusion of tradition in the founding of nations and identity, the ideal of a common historic and more ancient tradition of Christian identity would be advocated by the CDU in order to found the new German nation. Furthermore, with the memories of the horrors of the Third Reich still afresh in the hearts and minds of the Germans, the values as associated by the CDU to Christianity

would be positioned as weapons that could be used to explain why National Socialism had taken hold of the German nation as it had.

Hence, Nazism became the result of a broader battle: materialism versus Christianity. Indeed, in the early postwar years, the CDU often declared Nazism to have been the result of materialism. National Socialism had been akin to the battle “between Christian and materialistic convictions, between fear of God and idolization of man” (Mitchell, 2012: 77). The CDU initially built on this simple Manichean good versus evil model their message for the future of Germany. The CDU reinforced the idea of Germans as *victims* of National Socialism by clearly emphasizing its toll on the Church and broader Christian community. It was important to position Germans as victims as it delegitimized the Allied ideas that not only were all Germans guilty of the horrors of National Socialism but that they had collaborated with it. Rather, the CDU, by actively reinforcing the idea that National Socialism was the summit of materialism, helped alleviate German guilt that Hitler had been German. Indeed, Karl Arnold, founder of the Dusseldorf local CDU, claimed that “Hitler was no typical and exclusively German phenomenon; he was rather the personification of the destructive spirits in Europe and in the world, and Germany was in this sense only the local place on which the European boil burst” (Mitchell, 2012: 78).

The CDU also portrayed Christians as resisters. Indeed, Kaiser claimed that the Nazis had tried to eliminate Christianity as it “was the strongest counterweight against all aberrations and exaggerations of political extremes” (Tichenor, 2016: 110). In Lower Saxony, the Christians had been attacked because National Socialism had “very early on, recognized its most powerful internal enemy in the faith of both confessions, and called its most powerful internal enemy in the faithful of both confessions, and called in its elites organization, the SS, against this enemy” (Mitchell, 2012: 82). Such discourse helped provide credibility for the CDU to present itself as a moral authority but also allowed Germans associated with the CDU to find comfort in the idea that they were not responsible for National Socialism and that as Christians they had participated in the struggle between the Christian Church and the Nazis (*Kirchenkampf*). Indeed, a 1945 local party program declared, “National Socialism combatted both confessions, we are bound more tightly to each other; we have learned together from this ordeal” (CDU 1945 Party Program in Mitchell, 2012: 83). This helped create the larger ‘imagined community’ that brought together Protestants and Catholics in postwar Germany and cement the inter-confessional bridge.

Karl Arnold in the founding of the local Dusseldorf CDU in November 1945, had declared that the party would be “a torch bearer to Christian Socialism” (Heidenheimer, 1960: 118). The Neheim-Husten Programme of March 1946 concluded that “the Christian outlook on life must again replace the materialistic outlook, and instead of the principles resulting from materialism must come the principles of Christian ethics. They must be the determining factor in the rebuilding of the state and in fixing the limits of its power in the rights and duties of individuals, for economic and social life, for our culture and for the relationship between peoples” (Neheim-Husten, 1946). Adenauer also clearly emphasised his Christian ideology in the Christian Democratic program of 1945 that stated “the principles of Christian ethics and culture, of true democracy must carry and pervade the

life of the state. The power of the state is limited by the dignity and inalienable rights of the individual” (Schwarz, 1995: 342).

The inherent Christian idea that state and society could only be judged from the perspective of an individual who was bound to family, people and the state. Furthermore, family, people, and the state must be clearly under Christian moral law. Indeed, Adenauer claimed that “union in such a party alone could make it the representative of the Christian principle against a-Christian parties, and I believe that our people can only recover if they are ruled by the Christian principle once more” (Adenauer, 1966: 45). As the CDU expanded throughout the British zone, the *Was Nun* an influential Christian socialist pamphlet reiterated the importance “to reorganize public affairs in German lands according to the principle of a ‘Christian community-oriented order’” (Van Hook, 2004: 144). Again, the point here was the creation of a “imagined community” based on Christianity and Christian values. Essentially, the founding principle was based on the idea that

“social justice and social love should protect a new People’s community, which know how to combine the God-given freedom of the individual and the claims of the community with the demands of the common good. Therefore we are advocating a real Christian socialism, which had nothing in common with false collectivist aims, which fundamentally contradict the essence of man. It is however our firm will to set up a social order which accords just as much with the democratic tradition of the German past as with the breadth and spirit of Christian natural law” (Leo Schwering, in Pridham, 1977).

While the emphasis on the mistakes of National Socialism was quite apparent and important in the immediate post-war years, as the CDU grew, it relied less and less on an image constructed mainly in opposition to Germany’s Nazi past. Furthermore, while the CDU capitalized on the political appeal of religion that was able to transcend class in order to promote a “community” of Christians, it must be noted that emphasis on the Christian identity has tended to decrease as the idea of secularism took hold in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, the CDU has increasingly positioned themselves as a “catch-all” political party, de-emphasizing their Christian religion for “a nebulous humanitarian and moral concept that allowed them to be simultaneously Christian and secular” (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2010: 188). However, the Christian component of the German nation would continue to be advocated by the CDU as main driver for the third element of national identity: integration with the West. Indeed, the CDU advocated that due to its Christian heritage and links to the iconic *Abendland*⁹¹ there should be no question that its place be with the West, despite the iron curtain running through Germany. Hence, while as the FRG formed, the original emphasis on purely Christian values was evident, this slowly changed towards a wider vision of advocating for a shared Christian past between the FRG and the rest of Western Europe. In addition the articulation of the FRG as a Christian nation would also guide the CDU’s reasoning on the social market economy through to the idea of social justice.

Finally, while today the Christian roots of unified Germany are less apparent, the FRG under the CDU during the timeframe analysed (1949–1969) was largely defined as a

⁹¹ For more information on the *Abendland* and its implications for German Christian identity, see Granieri 2003 pp. 14–16

Christian nation. In addition, the Christian component of the German national identity was also integrated by the SPD in their definition of the FRG nation. Indeed, in their 1957 election manifesto, they declared

“on September 15th, 1957, the electors determine the policy of free Germany for the next four years. it is about the responsible decision about the life and daily questions of our whole people. it is not about ideologies or about confessional problems. the Christian foundation of our people is as self-evident as its confession to democracy” (1957 SPD election manifesto, election manifesto project).

The Social Market Economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft)

Since the FRG was largely the creation of outside influences, namely an Allied creation, it lacked a founding myth. Indeed, while the French have the French Revolution, the Americans the Revolutionary War and the Canadians the repatriement of the Constitution, the FRG did not have truly have a founding myth that Germans could rally to. However, the lack of a political founding myth was replaced by a creation of an economic myth (Pearce, 2008). Indeed, the social market economy became directly associated to a founding myth in that it has been “connected directly to Germany’s recovery and legitimated it as a fundamental bedrock of West Germany’s postwar democracy” (Van Hook, 2004: 3). However, as all other founding myths, there are many misconceptualizations of the social market economy. The social market economy was not a social economy in that there was true reticence to develop a welfare state. It was not a true market economy in that the state intervened regularly. While the thesis will develop the main tenants of what the social market economy entailed, in addition to what vision it was based on, the fact that the term has taken a life of its own and does not truly reflect its reality is a testimony to the success of the myth. Indeed, the fact that the term social market economy has been correlated (even erroneously) as directly responsible for West Germany’s economic success reflects the power of the term and its success as a founding myth by the CDU.⁹²

The economy of Germany was devastated at the end of the war. A strong commitment quickly emerged on the behalf of the CDU to rebuild Germany’s economic order but to ensure that it would be committed to Christian social responsibility. Indeed a new economic and social model would need to emerge, one that would be able to be focused on the common welfare that would serve society. Indeed, the starting point was that a framework that encouraged individuals to pursue their own interests while also pursuing the common good needed to be established. We already have established that this new socio-political and economic order was to be democratic, free and humane based on Christian values. But in addition, according to Glossner, the new German state was to be based on Kant’s postulate for solidarity, on Hegel’s idea of reconciliation in addition to a third element, a notion of subsidiarity. This was largely because of the realization that the individual needed protection from collectivism, something that the Third Reich had failed to do. Indeed, “the sovereignty of the solidary citizen became the fundamental normative

⁹² Indeed, the importance of the Marshall Plan should not be forgotten.

principle and public acceptance became the relevant legitimising criterion for any political action” (Glossner, 2010: 5). Hence, according to Erhard, for any economic policy to work, it needed first and foremost to be accepted by the public which consequently entailed that it give priority to this very same public (Erhard, 1963: 13). Hence, the trinity of the notions of solidarity, subsidiarity and sovereignty led to the “Third Way”: a mix between *laissez faire* capitalism and a planned economy. This would become known in its early days as the mixed economy and eventually became baptized as the social market economy.

Adenauer first called for a mixed economy (*Gemischtwirtschaft*) that would allocate economic power to both the private and public sector in the Ahlen declaration issued in February, 1947 which stated that

the *capitalist* economic system has served neither the state’s nor the German people’s vital interests. After the terrible political, economic, and social collapse that resulted from criminal power politics, a new order is required, and it must be built from the ground up. The content and goal of this new social and economic order can no longer be the capitalistic pursuit of power and profit; it must lie in the welfare of our people. A socialist economic order must provide the German people with an economic and social framework that accords with the rights and dignity of the individual, serves the intellectual and material development of our nation, and secures peace both at home and abroad. (Ahlen Program of the CDU, February, 1947)

The CDU clearly supported economic planning and guidance, the decartelization and nationalization of large-scale industry and the extensive codetermination rights for workers. Moreover, while private ownership is protected, such ownership entails social responsibility (Basic Law, Art. 14). In other words, “property must constitute a public good rather than merely serving the needs of the individual owner” (KAS). The CDU initially, throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, remained committed to the Ahlen Program and the entailing *Gemischtwirtschaft*. This vaguely defined economic concept set clear limits to collectivization and government control over the economy by allowing private entrepreneurship. This was in direct opposition to the economic model proposed by the SPD, who argued that the economy should be state-run rather than market-led. Hence, the economy promoted by the CDU was based on the presumption that private property and the optimal supply of goods were not possible through a free and unregulated economy, but rather a legal framework initiated by the state to guide market economies. Hence the economic model promoted by the CDU was one that was part liberal and part interventionist. Essentially it sought to reward individual achievement while enabling the state to protect economically weak individuals.

However, the economic concept of *Gemischtwirtschaft* was still quite vaguely defined. Essentially, it was part interventionist and it was part liberal, which was a good starting point but too vague to base an economic policy on. Indeed, in the nascent days of the CDU, the idea of a new economic system was first and foremost based on the social aspect. It needed more economic growth. Ludwig Erhard, the Economic Minister (1949–1963) and Second Chancellor of West Germany (1963–1966) would be the instigator of what is today called the social market economy in Germany. It would take Erhard’s vision of a liberal and social economic model to give life to the social market economy that would eventually become the backdrop of German economic policies in the future. Indeed, the Dusseldorfer Leitsätze, which would be adopted as CDU party manifesto and platform for

the upcoming 1949 federal elections would be the first clear step of the outlining of a social market economy. It claimed

the “Social Market Economy” was taken as basis for the German economic policy....it is the socially limited constitution of the commercial economy in which the effort of free and proficient people is accommodated by an order generating a maximum of economic benefit and commitment expressed by real competition in performance...the social market economy is in sharp contrast to the system of the command economy ...but also in opposition to the so-called “free market economy” of liberal coinage. (Dusseldorfer Leitsätze as quoted in Glossner, 2010: 96).

However, there would be much debate to how “free” the economy should be; Erhard⁹³ argued that “the freer an economy is, the more social it is” (Erhard, in Glossner and Gregosz, 2011). Hence the emphasis was put on the market economic system. Indeed, Erhard would move the CDU economic policy from an ideological and Christian anti-materialism viewpoint to a “pragmatic materialism” (Glossner, Gregosz, 2011: 14). Concretely, the vision was that social market economy would,

[replace] the collapsing system of total economic planning with a social market economy. The situation of our economy forces us to realise that in future we have to decide between two basically different economic systems, namely the system of market economy – which is based on free prices, real competition and social justice. The desired market economy will be distinctly social in orientation and commitment. Its social character lies in the fact that it is able to offer a larger and more diverse variety of goods at prices which are decisively determined by consumer demand. As a result lower prices raise real wages and thus allows for a better and broader satisfaction of human desires. If there is already a strong social moment inherent in the productivity of the market economy, it will be necessary nevertheless to carry out, with all determination, a number of measures which guarantee social security and which can be realised within the framework of the market economy. (Translated from source reprinted in: R. Lowenthal, H.P. Schwarz (eds), *Die Zweite Republik. 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland*)

Essentially the new German economic order sought by the CDU was that the Social Market Economy should be used as a regulatory policy idea that would combine free enterprise with a social programme supported by market economic performance. Hence, the social market economy was in a nutshell, the pursuit of a market economy but only within an institutional framework established by the state. This framework was essentially the setting of the rules by the state based on *marktinterventionen* or “market intervention” rather than “market control” (*marktregulierungen*) by the state (Hallett, 1973: 19). Hence, while control meant that the state was actively preventing the normal functioning of the market through the establishment of rationing or quotas, the CDU embraced state intervention that continued to allow the economic process to work but changed the outcome in order to level the playing field (e.g., by the use of tariffs). The social market economy was considered “a turn away from collectivism to the valuation of the individual and the person” (Statement by Adenauer at a presentation of the CDU on July 21st, 1948 in

⁹³ Erhard became known as the *Wirtschaftsdiktator* (economic dictator) because of the seemingly failing social market economy. Indeed, following the currency reform (First Law for Monetary Reform in June 1948, Second Law for Monetary Reform in June 1948, Third Law for Monetary Reform in June 1948, Fixed Account Law in October 1948, Guiding Principle Law) prices and unemployment were on a significant rise after its implementation. Indeed, living expenses were increased by about 200%, there was a pay freeze and confrontations between employers and employees were growing (see Glossner 2010).

Glossner, 2010: 12). This echoed the fears and concerns of German decision makers of the dangers of centralization and control. Indeed, while the Nazis had based the economy of the Third Reich on a heavily centralised and planned system, the new leaders of the FRG sought to “free” the individual from the constraints of operating in a closed economic system. The idea was that a new economy, one that enabled individuals to make decisions for themselves and by themselves within the framework of a market economy.

However, this market economy would not be solely individualist either: it needed to be based on Christian-humanistic values of solidarity and equality in a mutually supportive society (Glossner, Gregosz, 2011: 24). Furthermore, it required that all tiers of the society participate fully because “only if Social Market Economy was borne by the political will of the entire citizenry would it be possible to construct an economy that was both free and simultaneously social” (*ibid.*). Indeed, this new economic order was not only economic but also social. Muller-Armack, who coined the now iconic phrase of “social market economy” claimed that individuals were not to be seen as isolated consumers in a market system, rather they were members of social, economic and political groups, and as such, their group interests also warranted representation. The emphasis on the acknowledgement of the importance of subgroups was not new in German history. Indeed, in Germany, the strong tradition of,

“modern Catholic social teaching...has stressed that the worker is not simply a hand, who is entitled to his wages, but that, through his labour, he contributes just as much to the enterprise as does the employer through his capital and management, and is therefore entitled to security and some measure of participation in running the business” (Hallett, 1973: 22).

Therefore it is not surprising that the CDU ran many campaigns insisting that the entire German nation be a part of this new economic order. Indeed, the CDU sought to project the idea of a new German nation based on social market economy that condemned anti-materialism and promoted the creation of a new social and humanistic West German nation.

Finally, this idea of the Social Market Economy has become an inherent part of Germany. Indeed, even today, some sixty years after its establishment as the new economic order, it has been accepted in principle by all political parties in parliament, as the main opposition, the SPD, officially accepted the notion in 1956, only ten years into the FRG, in the *Godesberg Programme* (see Document 3 in the Annex). The Social Market Economy, initiated and formulated by the CDU has become a founding element of Germany’s national identity that has persisted over time and survived German reunification to become a founding myth of Germany.

West-integration (Westbindung)

Thou shalt consider yourself not only a German, but also a European. Avoid a narrow-minded and fruitless nationalism, which separates us from the rest of the world and is the father of war. (CDU, election flyer, 1949)

Right from its inception, the CDU argued that the FRG needed to anchor its identity with the West. There was a recurrent idea that Germany had always historically been part of the West, but that it had strayed under Prussian leadership towards materialism, which culminated under the leadership of the NSDAP. Indeed, Adenauer claimed that “we want our culture to find its basis again in Western Christian culture, the core of which is the noble concept of the dignity of the person and the worth of each individual” (Adenauer, in Jackson, 2006: 129). We see how Adenauer used the term “again” in order to reinforce the idea of continuity. Hence the true identity of Germany had always been with the West and its straying had had dangerous consequences. The CDU therefore advocated for a full return towards the West in order to rebuild the German nation. In addition, the FRG as a Western nation was to be actively pursued even if it meant further distancing itself with Eastern Germany. And while the SPD in particular did not want to antagonize Russia by claiming that the FRG was a Western nation, the CDU would consistently claim that German national identity was Western due to its institutional and political linkages to the west. Indeed, Adenauer claimed

Russia is moving every further away from cooperation with the other Great Powers and is doing whatever it wants in the territories it controls. Already these territories are governed by completely different economic and political realities from the rest of Europe. The division in Eastern Europe, between the Russia territories and Western Europe, is a fact. (Adenauer, October 1945 in Kleuters, 2012: 27)

This testifies to the importance of acknowledging the links between institutional and political realities and its consequences on identity. Hence, according to Adenauer because the Russians were in full political and economic control of Eastern Europe they had started affecting the very basis of identity of these regions. In the same fashion, because the USA, the UK and France had influenced the political and economic system of West Germany through the creation of political and economic institutions, somehow West Germany evolved differently from the East and is now closer to the West.

Yet, what is the West? What distinguished Western civilization and identity from the East? Furthermore, despite being a sworn enemy of the majority of the nations that later formed the West, how did Germany successfully reposition itself as an inherent part of the West? These are fundamental questions and their answers would help explain not only how the CDU played an important role in anchoring the FRG within the larger western “civilization” but also sought to reposition its national identity as “Western”. In an excellent study on rhetoric and legitimization, Jackson (2006) explains how German leaders and their US counterparts sought through public rhetoric to define the economic and military place of post-war Germany in the Marshall Plan and NATO. As early as 1945, Adenauer was seeing the growing divisions between East and West and trying to make sense of West Germany’s place in it. Obviously, there were the geopolitical forces of the Cold War that were shaping the CDU’s outlook towards divided Germany, but nonetheless, the CDU incarnated the political party that firmly believed that the FRG’s national future lay with the West, even if this meant cementing the divisions between the two Germans. Indeed, the CDU was ready to accept the “break”, albeit temporarily, with the German

nation as a whole in order to reorganize the FRG's national identity as a free, democratic and fundamentally Western nation.

There was a strong will on the behalf of the CDU to preserve and advocate for a civilizational community that included the FRG with the West. The strong will of the CDU to root the FRG firmly with the West was due to the idea that for West Germany to truly evolve into a strong democracy, it needed to turn its back on the East, even if this meant closing the door to East Germany (Weber and Kowert, 2007: 43-44). Hence, while the CDU never stopped hoping for German reunification, it was largely believed that integration with the West was essential in order to safeguard the fledgling nation, even if that meant postponing German reunification. This thought was never abandoned, as even years later, whenever Adenauer was asked what his biggest success as Chancellor was, he would reply that it was the alliance of the FRG with the "free West" (Granieri, 2003: 3). There were three main goals driving Adenauer's reasoning: (1) to support and strengthen Germany's nascent democracy through close ties with Western democracies, (2) to overcome historical strains between Germany and its Western neighbours by close political and economic integration with Western Europe and (3) to ensure the FRG's protection against military aggression or political subversion through a durable alliance with the US (Pulzer, 1995). Furthermore, the FRG, as an occupied state until 1955 and its dependence on the West for security "reinforced the connection between foreign and domestic policy" (Granieri, 2003: 9). Both leaders of the two main political parties in the FRG, Adenauer (CDU) and Schumacher (SPD), made the link explicitly. Indeed, Schumacher claimed that "the contest over foreign policy is at the same time the contest over internal policy and the social content of the political order" and Adenauer declared "everything depends on foreign policy" (Granieri, 2003: 9). And as was explained earlier by Fawn (2003), foreign policy influences the direction of national identity as success stories in foreign policy became founding myths upon which national identity is based.

However, the two main political parties of the FRG, the SPD and the CDU would clash over integration with the West. Indeed, this would be a significant battleground between the CDU and the SPD as the two held two totally competing visions for the future of the German nation and its subsequent identity. On the one hand, the CDU⁹⁴ believed that West Germany needed to firmly root itself in the Western camp even if that meant temporarily further entrenching the divisions between the two Germanys, and on the other hand, the SPD claimed that West Germany needed to remain in contact with East Germany and not push too far West in order to serve as a bridge between East and West. A key debate where this tension was apparent was the rearmament debate of the early 1950s and the nuclear weapons debate in 1957–1958. This political debate with regards to the future of the FRG nation pitted two different visions for the nation. On the one hand, the CDU claimed that West Germany needed to reassert its sovereignty and understand that it, by itself, formed the new German nation. On the other hand, the SPD claimed that rearmament would only serve to jeopardise any hopes for the reunification of Germany, and would

⁹⁴ It should be noted that this was not always the case. As Adenauer sought to consolidate its position within the CDU in the formative years, he often clashed with the left-wing CDU (Kaiser, Arnold and Lenz) who believed that post-war Germany should build ideological bridges between the East and West and maintain a neutral position in order not to compromise a united Germany.

therefore only divide the German nation. In addition, the German public was also unsure. There was significant political debate between the CDU and other political parties in addition to the need to “convince” the German public that the FRG was now a nation whose identity was indeed with the West. Indeed in February 1958, the deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany was opposed by 81% of the German people. Hence, this was a significant political moment for the CDU, but also testifies to its underlying vision for German identity and how it sought to articulate and transform it.

Until 1955, the FRG had no regular armed forces, and therefore the security of the Republic was guaranteed by the Western Alliance. However, the growing demarcation between East and West was aided by the creation of the Cominform, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, a tightened and cohesive control of the Soviets over the Eastern satellite countries, the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, the establishment of NATO and the Berlin Blockade. With Germany at the frontier between West and East, there was a growing realization on the behalf of the Allies that the FRG would need to contribute to the security alliance of the West. Furthermore, with the Korean War and the country’s subsequent division in two, the parallels between divided Germany were increasingly apparent and fears of Soviet aggression into the West via Germany grew in addition to the growing realization that deterring Soviet aggressions on the sole reliance of American air and naval power was insufficient (Hanrieder, 1967: 37). Hence, the Allies started to encourage the development of a domestic German security force.

In the beginning, this was done through the encouragement of the establishment of German mobile police units at the Lander level and only made available to the Federal level for emergencies. The idea was how to allow Germany to participate in its own defense without establishing a national army. By 1950, in order to protect the federal border, a 10,000-strong police force was established. 10,000 additional men were put on reserve. Furthermore, by 1953, there were 20,000 men in the border security police force (Hubatsche, Heidelmeyer, Werner, Klaus-Eberhard, Schomerus, 1967: 115). A major step towards the FRG’s ensuing sovereignty, security, but above all its entrenchment into the West was reached in 1952, when the German Treaty was signed. The treaty, signed in Bonn, brought the occupation governments to an end and gave the FRG “full authority in domestic and foreign affairs, except as provided in the present Convention”. The Allies were still allowed to station troops in West Germany and take any necessary security measures for them. The next day, another important step for the reestablishment of German units for the defence of Germany and the West was made with the signing of the European Defence Treaty (EDC) by foreign ministers of France, the FRG, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. While the EDC failed, due to French resistance in the National Assembly in August 1954, the idea that the FRG should participate in the Western security alliance did not. Everything started to take form with the Paris Agreements that were signed in October 1954 and came into force on May 5th, 1955 that had the FRG formally enter the West European Union (WEU) and in NATO. While, the FRG had limited military capacities⁹⁵ imposed, the FRG now was an equal member in the Western military alliance,

⁹⁵ The statue of limitation was as follows: 12 divisions for the army, 1,350 airplanes with a personnel of about 85,000 men and a Navy limitation that would be fixed annually. Furthermore, there were armament

and as such, was now formally protected but also, because of mutual defence issues, now had to provide security benefits. Hence, on November 12th, 1955, the *Bundeswehr* was reborn and the first 101 troop volunteers received their letter of appointment by the new Minister of Defence, Theodor Blank.

Through its adhesion to NATO, West Germany became an integral part of the West. It also served to increase the divisions within the German nation as West and East were now based on opposing visions of the future. And while there was initially great political debate about whether the FRG needed to be so firmly entrenched with the West, the CDU was largely successful in redefining the FRG as a Western nation. This became apparent when the SPD, despite winning the 1969 Bundestag elections and socialist Chancellor Willy Brandt seeking a form of rapprochement with Eastern Germany through the adoption of *ostpolitik*, and subsequently questioning the confrontational attitude taken by the CDU with regards to its Eastern German counterparts, never questioned the fact that Western Germany was a separate national entity whose national identity was first and foremost of a Western nature (Fink and Schaefer, 2009: 5). Indeed, as early as 1959, the SPD had declared its support for NATO and admitted that Western Germany was closer to the West than to the East in the Godesberg Programme, which stated that “the German Social Democratic Party declare their support for the defence of the liberal-democratic basic order and approve national defence” (Godesberg Programme, 1959) .

To conclude, this chapter has dwelt on the creation and consolidation of a new national political party: the CDU. It has also illustrated the three main issues upon which the CDU would seek to imagine the German nation: Christian *weltanschauung*, social market economy and integration with the West. The next chapter will discuss and analyse how the CDU diffused and drove these three main drivers of national identity onto the emerging German nation.

5. The Diffusion and Development of the Three Pillars of the CDU’s Vision of the FRG’s National Identity

The CDU is determined to build a new, different Germany. (CDU, 1946)

The previous chapter focused on the CDU’s establishment as a national political party in addition to what has been identified as the three main drivers of its vision of national identity: Christian *weltanschauung*, integration with the West (*westbindung*) and the Social Market Economy (*sozialen Marktwirtschaft*). This next and final chapter will analyse how the CDU articulated these issues and sought to diffuse them throughout the German nation and how the public received this definition of German national identity.

Before doing this, the thesis will quickly dress a portrait of the results of the Bundestag elections between 1949 and 1969. This is important for two main reasons. First,

restrictions in addition to the foregoing of the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (Hubatsch, 1967 : 118).

since we are looking at how political parties shape national identity, it is instructive to see how the political party doing the “shaping” is faring in elections. Second, it gives a historical context of the issues behind the elections and the results.

The April 14th, 1949 elections were the first Bundestag elections held in the FRG and the first free elections for Germans since the Weimar Republic. They were elections of historic proportions in that sense. Ten different political parties received representation in the Bundestag. The CDU/CSU received 139 seats (31%), the SPD received 131 seats (29.2%), the Free Democrat Party (FDP) received 52 seats (11.9%), the Communist Party (KPD) received 15 seats (5.7%), the German Party (DP) and Bavaria Party (BP) both respectively received 17 seats (4.2% and 4.0%), the Centre Party (Zentrum) got 10 seats (3.1%), the Economic Reconstruction Union only present in Bavaria (WAV) got 12 seats (2.9%), the German Right Party (DRP) got 5 seats (1.8%), and the South Schleswig Voters' Association (SSW), only present in Schleswig-Holstein, got 1 seat with (0.3%). While the numbers would have suggested a coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, there were great ideological differences between them and despite the fact that North Rhine-Westphalia CDU Land leader Arnold called for a ‘grand coalition’ between the two, the SPD, under the leadership of Schumacher, refused, fearing that the SPD’s program would be compromised under an alliance with the CDU (Culver, 2012:36). Hence, the first national elections of the FRG pulled it to the right as the CDU/CSU created a coalition with the FDP and the DP.

The September 6th, 1953 Bundestag elections were a triumph for the CDU/CSU in that they were given a wide mandate with 45.2% of the national vote, which translated into 244 seats. The SPD received 150 seats (28.8%), the FDP got 48 seats (9.5%), the Refugee Party, competing for the first time in national elections, got 27 seats (5.9%). With the cut-off set at 5% in order to receive representation in government, the other political parties did not receive seats in Bonn. Although, the DP (3.3%) and the Zentrum (0.8%) through strategic alliances with the CDU/CSU, managed to secure 15 and 3 seats, respectively despite their low percentage scores. All in all, it was a triumph of moderate political parties over the extreme right and left. Indeed, the Communists were reduced to 2.2% and the DRP to only 1.1%. The triumph of the CDU/CSU was largely due to its taking over the FDP and the DP electorate (Culver, 2012: 76). Finally, the CDU’s success in these elections was a personal victory for Adenauer in addition to an important endorsement of his policies. It seems as if the Germans were accepting the vision of the nation that the CDU was promoting.

The September 15th, 1957 Bundestag elections further demonstrated the successes of the CDU/CSU. Indeed, the FRG was going through an economic miracle, largely attributed to the Social Market Economy and its foreign policy of close rapprochement with the West and NATO. This strategy was proving to be extremely successful with the German electorate (Culver, 2012: 87). These elections gave an absolute majority, 50.2%, to the CDU/CSU, which translated into 270 seats. The SPD received 169 seats (31.8%), the FDP received 41 seats (7.7%) and the DP, through strategic alliances with the CDU/CSU that gave it the capacity to meet the direct seat requirement, received 17 seats despite a 3.4% national vote.

The 1961 Bundestag elections resulted in a drop for the CDU. No longer an absolute majority, the vote for the CDU/CSU fell from 50.2% to 45.4%. It was Adenauer's fourth Bundestag election and his popularity was waning throughout the German electorate, and even within the CDU/CSU. The CDU/CSU received 242 seats and the SPD got 190 seats (36.3%). The big surprise came from the FDP, which saw its share of the national vote rise from 7.7% to 12.8% in these elections, giving it 67 seats. The FDP however was causing difficulties as it had pledged that although it favoured an alliance with the CDU/CSU over the SPD it would only support the CDU/CSU without Adenauer as leader. Indeed, the successes of the FDP was apparently due to the loud role that leader Erich Mende played in the lead-up to the election, declaring that while they supported the CDU they no longer supported Adenauer (Culver, 2012: 108). Hence, the CDU was drifting away from its leader and taking on its own institutional path. Adenauer no longer benefitted from the strong popularity that he had had previously, and as such, there was more space for debate within the CDU and also between political parties. Moreover, this new space helped to distance the CDU as an institutionalised political party from the image of a new political party of a "man with a vision". Finally, the FDP did join the CDU/CSU in government on the vague promise that Adenauer would resign before the end of his term and that Schröder would replace von Brecht as Foreign Minister (Culver, 2012:108). Furthermore, with regards to the institutionalization of a party system, the 1961 elections were the first elections in which only three political parties received representation in government. While the tendency had already started to show in previous elections, other political parties (in particular the DP) had been given representation.

The September 19th, 1965 Bundestag election still gave the CDU/CSU coalition a win over the SPD. Indeed, the CDU/CSU received 245 seats (47.6%) and the SPD 202 seats (39.3%). The FDP chose to join the CDU/CSU government despite the SPD and the CDU expressing the possibility for a grand coalition during the election campaign. The 1965 elections, held almost two decades after the first national elections in the FRG, demonstrated the strength of the enduring democratic institutions and the traditions taking hold within West Germany. Indeed, now three national political parties were strongly established with a broad national appeal that in no way threatened the democratic nature of the state.

The September 28th, 1969 elections confronted the CDU under Kiesinger and the SPD under the popular leader Willy Brandt. While the SPD increased its national vote to 42.7% (224 seats), it still trailed the CDU/CSU, which got 46.1% (242 seats). However the margins were closing between the two and because of the FDP's 30 seats (5.8%) and their choice to support the SPD, the 1969 elections produced the first government of the FRG to be headed by a socialist Chancellor.

Now, we shall focus on how the CDU sought to define and articulate its vision for the FRG's national identity in addition to how German society accepted this vision of national identity.

Christian Weltanschauung (identity)

All conflicts are between Christianity and materialism. That is what the struggle is about, and this conflict also exists within the democracies. The modern technical world in which we live, with its movies, radio, and television, favours the development towards a mass society, and this “man of the masses” will always incline towards materialism. To counterbalance this we need, in all countries, Christian parties which not only permeate political, social and economic life with a Christian spirit, but over and above that aim at creating the essential conditions for a Christian existence of the individual. (Adenauer, 1966: 39–40).

Christian parties, like the CDU, were considered necessary in order to protect the individual. But the CDU would not stop at the redefinition of the individual, rather they sought to reposition the German nation as a Christian nation. The CDU would endeavour to create an imagined community based on the Christian values of social justice, family, order and human dignity. In the CDU founding document, it was claimed that,

“only the Christian ideology guarantees law, order and moderation, the dignity and freedom of the individual and, hence, a true and genuine democracy, which must not be confined to the State but also should form the basis for every aspect of the life of the individual, of our people and of all nations. We regard Christianity’s noble perception of human dignity and the value of every single human beings as the foundation and guiding principle of our work in the political, economic and cultural life of our nation” (Manifesto of the CDU, March 1946).

In this document, the German nation, “our nation”, was assumed to be Christian. But this was not all: by claiming that only a Christian ideology could guarantee a “true and genuine democracy” the CDU was not only positioning itself as the protector of democracy but also claiming that only through the establishment of a Christian nation could democracy be saved. The democratic institutional structure of the FRG was affecting how the CDU framed its message. Indeed, the fact that the CDU used language adopted from the Basic Law in order to push forward a Christian conception of German national identity is what is central here.

The way that the CDU defined a Christian nation was entirely compatible with the Basic Law. This law, for example, contained the principles that “the dignity of man shall be inviolable” (Article 1.1, Basic Law, 1949) and that “the German people therefore acknowledges inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every human community, of peace and of justice in the world” (Article 1.2, Basic Law, 1949). Indeed, there was the idea in the Basic Law that the German nation needed to be based on a community of individuals, which the CDU made clear was only possible through a Christian outlook. Adenauer declared, “if the German people are ever to rise again from their present state of abject misery, if they will ever, work their way to prosperity again, they will owe this rise solely to the initiative of the individual and never again to the bureaucracy of the state” (Adenauer, 1966: 41).

There are two things that are interesting in Adenauer’s statement and in the founding document of the CDU. First, Adenauer used the term “again” to emphasize that Germany had lost its identity under previous leaders, and that the CDU, through its emphasis on the individual and hard work, would help Germany find its way. Indeed, as will be explained shortly, the CDU claimed that the idea that the German nation was a

Christian one was not novel. Rather, the German nation had always been a Christian one, but it had strayed under the Third Reich with disastrous consequences, which the CDU would often remind the public of. This link continuity between past and present is extremely important for the building of nations. Indeed, Smith (2003) explains that nations may take on different forms but that their legitimacy often comes from much more ancient practices. Hastings and Ranger (1983) also testify to the importance of a perceived link through “tradition” between past and present. Second, just as a Christian outlook empowers the individual, the CDU was placing the future of the German nation in the hands of the individual. But also, there is a link with Article 1 of the Basic Law that puts great emphasis on human rights and justice and dignity. All terms are present in the founding document of the CDU. These mutually reinforcing views and interactions between state documents and political parties helped give legitimacy to the national identity that the CDU was pushing forward.

The CDU would also put great emphasis on “democracy” and “Christianity”. Adenauer claimed, “we call ourselves Christian Democrats, because we have the deep conviction that only a democracy rooted in the Christian-Western worldview, in Christian natural rights, and the basic principles of Christian ethics can fulfill the great responsibility to educate the German people and lead to its re-emergence” (Adenauer in Jackson, 2006: 129). Beyond the fact that the CDU sought to instil the idea that the German nation needed to be re-embrace its Christian roots by using the term “re-emergence”, there was also a clear message that Christianity would protect democracy. Hence, not only was the embracing of Christianity a necessary condition for the German nation to regain some of its former glory, but only a Christian German nation would be strong enough to ward off any future attacks on democracy. In 1965, the CDU opened its election manifesto with the reminder that the Christian citizens of the German nation are essentially the bulwarks against National Socialism, claiming that the rise of Hitler and the NSDAP was the result of the failure of the Christians to unite. This idea of “Christians as resisters” was important for how the CDU conceptualised the German nation. Indeed this gave moral authority to the CDU to “claim” the German nation. In other words, because Christians had been one of the only groups to resist National Socialism, they represented the moral compass of the nation. In that sense, the CDU were the only ones “fit” to govern in the name of the nation. Indeed, the CDU would employ the imagery of the Christian community resisting the Nazis often, claiming that “National Socialism found its strongest opponents in those Catholic and Protestant-Evangelical parts of Germany” (Adenauer in Jackson, 2006: 129).

However, more importantly, the CDU would focus on how Christianity guaranteed “freedom” and the protection of the “individual”. This was done in the same way as the Basic Law defined the rights and freedoms of individuals as essential components of democracy. The overarching idea here was that for a democracy to succeed, it required free individuals, which could only be provided through Christianity. Hence the CDU positioned the success of the future of the West German nation on its capacity to embrace its Christian national identity. Indeed, the 1949 CDU election manifesto explained that Christian identity was based on “social order”, “social justice”, “freedom of movement” and “human dignity” (1949 CDU election manifesto, Election Manifesto Project). Not only are these terms universal and easy to grasp, they echoed the Basic Law and reinforced the

commitment to the new institutional framework of post-WWII. Yet the CDU went further by emphasizing the importance of a “Christian responsibility” (1949 CDU election manifesto, Election Manifesto Project). Hence it was not only about being compatible with democracy, it was also about taking responsibility for the future of Germany as a nation. In that sense, since Christians strongly defend freedom and social justice, embracing the German nation as a Christian nation would almost automatically entail that freedom and social justice would come hand in hand. In addition, the CDU claimed that it adhered to a “Christian work order” (1949 election CDU manifesto, Election Manifesto Project). This meant that not only CDU would be prepared to protect the most vulnerable and maintain “human” dignity through good working conditions but that individuals would have the right to work, free to change work, free in their choice of work and just compensation. All these elements in the 1949 election manifesto of the CDU portrayed a picture of very free individuals which echoed the Basic Law.

In addition, emphasis was put on the family as a fundamental unit of the German society by both the Basic Law and the CDU. Indeed, the 1949 CDU election manifesto proclaimed that the family was the best way to preserve society and state. This again was a direct reference to the disastrous years of the NSDAP. While the totalitarian state had sought to destroy the family unit as a source of authority, the CDU wanted to re-establish the family as a source of legitimacy. Hence, the state here is not all-powerful as it was in the Third Reich. Society, and in particular the family, is established as a central player and balance to the state. This idea is also echoed in Article 6 of the Basic Law, which repositioned the family as a central unit of the German nation. The 1953 election manifesto also reinforces the importance that family plays as a societal unit and a balance to state power. The family and the individual are the safeguards of society. This idea is very much in tune with Christian values, which maintain that the individual forms a part of the whole, and as such, is responsible for the whole.

In addition to claiming that democracy and Christianity are linked, the CDU also sought to ensure that Germany was seen as always having been a Christian nation. The CDU would endeavour to establish this connection through the resurrection of the term of *Abendland*. *Abendland* was a mythical term associated with the German Catholics. The term has gone through different phases, meaning different things at different times, but essentially it has been consistently linked to the idea that the German nation is part of a larger Christian community.⁹⁶ Indeed, while the term was first used in the 16th century during the Renaissance as a counterpoint to Martin Luther’s translation of the East-Orient as *Morgenland*, it took a decisively German turn during the period of romanticism at the end of the 18th century when it became linked to the struggle between the Catholics and the centralizing Bismarck over control of the Roman Catholic Church (*Kulturrekampf*) (Forlenza, 2017:264). Following the end of WWI, the German Catholics claimed that the collapse of Prussian society was the perfect opportunity to create a political, social and cultural renewal of the German nation based on *Abendland*. During the Weimar years, interest in the term waned and almost entirely disappeared under the Third Reich, as the Catholic Church was forced underground. The term regained popularity at the end of the war when ideas of a nation based on the *Reich* or *Mitteleuropa* lost all legitimacy. Indeed,

⁹⁶ For more information on the history of the term see: Forlenza, 2017.

Abendland became a viable alternative because of the fact that the Church did not cooperate with the NSDAP. Now, the focus was on the “*abendlandische Kultureinheit*” (*Abendland* as a single cultural entity), the renewal of a Christian, supranational community, and the revival of, and reorientation towards, the basic Christian values.

The CDU appropriated the discussion of the creation of an *Abendland*. In other words, the German nation would be the establishment of the *Abendland*: it needed to go past narrow-minded nationalism and imagine the establishment of a community that would be based on the shared values of Christianity. In addition, there was great resonance for such a concept for several reasons. First, there was the enthusiasm of a German revival. Second there was the hope for a better future, thanks to a better spiritual connection. Third there was the idea of rebuilding the German nation, which had been destroyed by materialism and atheism. In other words, because Germany had fallen into an atheist vacuum, it had been plunged into a totalitarian dictatorship. Two themes are important here. First, Christianity is poised to be better compatible with democracy than atheism. Second, there is a return to a better past with notions of previous grandeur of the German nation of before it had become atheist.

The CDU would appropriate the term with great enthusiasm and seek to channel it onto the German nation. In addition, there was a great deal of effort made to ensure that the term and Germany’s natural place in the community be understood as a continuity in history and not something novel. Hence, according to von Bretano, the West German foreign minister (1955–1961), protecting the *Abendland* was grounded in history and part of the same larger battle in which Charlemagne had fought against the Magyars, the Spanish had liberated Granada in 1492, and the Polish king Johann III Sobieski had broken the Siege of Vienna by the troops of the Ottoman Empire (Kaiser, 2007: 228). It was about protecting and establishing the natural Christian community. Indeed, Adenauer claimed that

“our people can only be made healthy again when Christian principles rule within them again. Furthermore, I believe that this is the only way to secure strong resistance to the form of state and the ideological world of the east – Russia – and to provide a connection with Western Europe in thought and culture, and also in foreign policy” (Adenauer, 1983: 78).

In 1945, Adenauer declared, “we want our culture to find its basis again in the *Abendland* culture” (Adenauer in Mitchell, 2012: 92). Note how both CDU leaders make use of the term “again”. The CDU is trying to position their conception of national identity as the continuation of an older and more ancient national identity that had been part of the German nation.

The CDU sought to put forward a Christian *Weltanschauung* in the German nation that was the FRG. Indeed, the CDU would often portray the “fight” between West and East as essentially a confessional one, between Christianity and atheistic communism, with the FRG as the embodiment of the *Abendland* (Mitchell, 2012: 183). Adenauer had been promoting and defending this idea since the mid to late 1940s. Indeed, he had proclaimed, “the danger is great. Asia is on the Elbe. Only an economically and spiritually healthy Western Europe including, as a western component, the part of German not occupied by Russia – can halt the further spiritual and powerful advance of Asia” (Adenauer, 1946 in

Mitchell, 2012: 183) and also that there were two major fronts: “the Christian-*adendlandische* front, whose strongest support here in Germany is the CDU and the CSU, and the Asian front” (Adenauer, in Mitchell, 2012: 184). “Asia” was perceived as dangerous and somewhat incompatible with the true German national identity, which was essentially Christian. In other words, Germany needed to be spiritually healthy or “Christian” in order to protect its identity and nation from the Eastern “invaders” coming from Asia. The dichotomy of “good” versus “evil” that is so prominent in the Christian vocabulary was being adapted to the realities of the Cold War but also moulded in a way that saw the Cold War being less about communism versus freedom but through spiritual lenses: Christianity versus atheism.

The imagery of *Abendland* to enhance the nation’s identity would also be used by the CDU to remind Germans what a Christian nation entailed and what its values were. In the 1953 election manifesto, the CDU claimed that it sought to create an organic German society based on Christianity. What is interesting here is how the CDU claimed that it did not want to return to a “confessional nature” of German politics. The 1961 election manifesto makes the same claim again. It “opposes the resurrection of the battle, and every attempt to rekindle the confessional struggles” (1961 CDU election manifesto, Election Manifesto Project). Hence, this is not about “Christians” versus “the rest”. It is about recognizing the fact that Christian values are already present in the German nation and therefore there is nothing incompatible with advocating a Christian national identity. In other words, Christianity was being portrayed as the *natural* national identity of West Germany by 1953. In 1961, the CDU was calling for, “the freedom of the citizen...the commitment of all groups and alliances to the general well-being”. This was a direct reference to the Christian ideal of individual freedoms in addition to how all needed to work in union towards the building of a new society. The CDU was seeking to put forward a feeling of shared responsibility with which all in the nation could identify.

Finally, because *Abendland* could mean so many things, it was an extremely malleable concept. Hence, it was used to root the German identity in a Christian one; it was used to root the German nation in the greater Western tradition; it was used to root the German nation in democracy; it was used to root the German nation in the values of justice, dignity, humanity and freedom. Indeed the importance of establishing the imagery of *Abendland* in order to better propose a community and identity upon which to found the FRG, which was the positioning of the German nation as based on Christian identity, had other implications for the identity of the nation. Indeed, as the next sections will develop, Christianity would also be framed as the link between Germany and the West and would often be the guiding identity hand behind the legitimization of integration with the West. Indeed,

“the original outline of a united Europe was that of a Christian, medieval Europe under a twin authority – a spiritual one personified by the papacy, [and] a temporal one embodied by the Emperor, the head of the Holy Roman Empire. This unity withered after more than six centuries of existence, when the Renaissance weakened religious ties; the Reformation likewise disrupted religious unity and the Empire lost its prestige to newly sovereign nations. Europe split into a large number of states whose interests and aims conflicted to such a degree that fierce battles ensued” (Schuman “Concept of a United Europe’, 1957).

The CDU strongly believed that the building of a Western community based on a community of Christians was not only a healthy return to an older concept of *Abendland* but also important for world peace. And, while the CDU started to stray from the use of the German Catholic imagery of *Abendland* in the 1950s, the collective space that it represented was gradually replaced with a German association to the West. It also proclaimed that, thanks to Christian Democrat leaders (e.g., Adenauer), West Germany had become an inherent part of Europe because “Western policy without the contribution of free Germany is unthinkable today” (CDU election manifesto, 1965, Election Manifesto Project).

How the CDU sought to explain German national identity was intertwined with the West and the German nation as belonging with the Western world. The Western civilization will therefore be the focus of the upcoming section.

West-bindung (West-integration)

The CDU also built on the idea that the German nation needed to be based on a Christian identity when they advocated for integration with the West. Indeed, the CDU would stress that Germany, as a Christian nation, belonged with its Christian counterparts in the West. In other words Germany’s natural and primordial place was with the West and Western civilization. Furthermore, there were historical continuities. This would lead to the policy of *westbindung* or West-integration. Essentially the CDU would seek to define the German nation as part of a larger political and cultural group – the West – through this policy. Of course, the CDU was not the only political actor pushing for this definition of the German nation. Indeed, the Allies also played pivotal roles both in Germany and in the United States to legitimize the idea of a Western civilization and the place that Germany should occupy within it.⁹⁷ However, as this thesis seeks to focus on the role that political parties play in national identity, we shall concentrate on the actions of the CDU and how its vision was diffused throughout Germany and challenged by the SPD. In addition, while the Christian component to national identity that the CDU sought to advocate was more rhetorical, the idea that German national identity be “Westernized” had concrete consequences and policies. Indeed, the reasoning that the FRG should be defined as a Western nation brought the CDU to not only emphasize a Western national identity for the FRG but also set up political institutions that would link the FRG to the Western space that would eventually become the European Union (EU). Hence, the Schuman Plan (1950) led to the first timid steps of international European cooperation, which then led to the Treaty of Paris (1951) and the ensuing Coal and Steel Treaty (CST in 1951). This, in turn, led to the Treaty of Rome (1957) which created the European Economic Community (EEC). In addition, there was the failed attempt to create a European Defence community which ultimately led to the FRG’s ascension to NATO in 1955. These were all part of a holistic picture in which the CDU painted the national identity of the FRG as Western and in dire need of a form of supranational Western protection.

⁹⁷ For more on their role and how US public discourse evolved to include ideas such as Western civilization, see Jackson, 2006)

The CDU and the SPD would clash over the conceptualizations of the basis of identity. While the SPD claimed that the German nation was socialist and independent, the CDU claimed that the German nation was Christian, Western and dependent on the West. Hence, while the SPD did not counterattack the belief that Germany belonged culturally in the West, the SPD strongly believed that Germany could hold out on her own as a “middle power” between East and West. The CDU, on the other hand, did not. They sought the creation and German adherence to institutions that would root the FRG in the West: NATO, the CST and the EEC. Indeed, the CDU would also ground the greater fight against communism in the East as a battle that the West could not successfully fight unless German regained her natural position in the West.

While the SPD sought to distance itself from nationalism, claiming that “no one who wants to be a good German can be a nationalist” (Schumacher, in Jackson, 2006: 126), Adenauer would claim that the SPD was nationalist. Indeed he proclaimed,

the leaders of the Social Democrats strike a very strong national tone in their speeches, and they proclaim socialism as the cure for all evils of mankind. If you permit me a slight digression, I repeat: the military men, in very high military positions recognized the utility of the words “national” and “socialism” for propaganda. They combined them in one word and created a new form of socialism, National Socialism. They said to themselves: if we want to reach the broad masses, we need to put some nameless soldier on top of this movement. So they came up with Hitler. (Adenauer, in Jackson, 2006: 128).

Therefore, the CDU positioned itself as a proponent willing to change worldviews. Rather than look at the world through materialistic lenses (i.e., seeing the state as a means to change material conditions), the CDU would transform the state as a vector of civilization (i.e., the state would adopt a civilizational identity). Indeed, linking the German nation to a larger political and cultural community was a clear goal of the CDU. Adenauer argued that if the Third Reich happened,

it was because of the exaggeration and excessiveness of the Prussian conception of the state, its militarism and its nationalism. Let me repeat: the exaggeration and the excessiveness. In the second place, I will mention Marxism of all shades and colors, and in the third place, National Socialism (KAS, 5 May, 1946: 4).

This reinforced the idea that a conceptualization of the German state based on a cultural community larger than the pure nation state was being advocated. Furthermore, the CDU would seek to stress the idea that Germany had historically been part of the Western civilization but had strayed away under the bad leadership of Bismarck and Hitler. Again, like due to its Christian roots, a German nation being defined as a Western nation was a not novel idea. Rather, the CDU was claiming that it had always been part of the German DNA.

The SPD would strive to advocate for a third way, believing that Germany could play a special role in Europe through socialism and become a bridge between East and West. But the CDU rejected the idea of a bridge. Rather it sought to merge with the West, but not some ambiguous, broadly-defined West. Instead, the CDU would argue that a

Western-Christian German integrated in a Western-Christian Europe was the future. Adenauer claimed that

the destiny of Germany is also the destiny of Europe...the CDU and CSU in Germany, above all, because we see ourselves also as the guardians of the Christian western spirit. (Adenauer, Rally August 1947)

Further positioning the idea that the FRG belonged in a larger community of believers than its geographical borders provided, Adenauer stated,

the West, the Christian West, is no geographical concept, it is a spiritual and historical concept that also encompasses America. It is this Christian West that we want to try to save. We will do everything in our power, in the hope and with the conviction that god will not abandon the German people. (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1976: 351)

In a similar vein, the CDU claimed that it was the “German destiny” to be part of the West and that “we stand before a choice between slavery and freedom. We choose freedom” (Adenauer in front of the Bundestag, 1949 in Thompson, 2014: 223).

Furthermore, with a strong presence of international political leaders on German soil throughout 1945–1949 and the looming tensions between the Soviet-controlled zones and the Western-controlled zones, early German political leaders had to navigate between different political leaders who all operated under constraints and could only take limited political action. Hence, the SPD was often conflicted and as such its message tended to be convoluted. Since it had chosen to adopt a third way that stressed the unity of all Germany, it was often forced to address issues that the CDU was not. Hence, since the CDU had so openly and firmly chosen to side with the West, moving all players into a Christian and Western conceptualization of identity, they never had to worry about their Eastern counterparts. The SPD, on the other hand, did, and their strategy for addressing the Marshall Plan or common defence alliances was complicated by this fact.

Finally, a decisive move was made by the CDU in 1953 following the death of Stalin and the adoption of a more conciliatory attitude on the behalf of the Soviets towards the West. Indeed, pressure was growing on Adenauer to participate in the “détente” in order to help with any potential reunification of the two Germanys. When the SPD announced a Bundestag resolution in favour of a four power conference, the CDU quickly put forward another resolution that agreed on reunification on the following five conditions: “the holding of free elections”, “the establishment of a free government across the whole of Germany”, “the signing of a peace treaty that is freely negotiated”, “the settlement of a peace treaty of all pending territorial issues” and “the securing of action for all German parliament and all German Government within the framework of the United Nations basic principles and aims” (Adenauer in Doc 138, in Grunbacher, 2010: 276)”. Essentially, the CDU was saying that the reunification of Germany was a possibility only if the basic components of the FRG –free elections and *westbindung* – be maintained. The only political party that refused the resolution was the Communist Party. The CDU had on official record all major political parties including the SPD as supporting reunification only if free elections and the permission of *westbindung* could continue. The June 17th uprising and the ensuing Soviet military intervention against its East German population further

cemented the idea that West Germany was the only legitimate government to represent all of Germany.

Beyond the popular idea that the CDU was preventing communism from taking hold in Germany, the CDU also sought to ground itself as the protector of the German nation. The CDU, in a 1953 election poster, showed a red devilish unsmiling face with a huge red hand reaching for West Germany, which along with Western Europe, was not yet in the shadow of the red figure but was still in the light thanks to the CDU (*nein darum CDU*). Indeed, the CDU attributed itself as the reason for the survival of the German nation. Another 1953 election poster showed a young mother and her infant being reached for by a huge red hand with the words “protect us!” (*schützt uns!*) written underneath. Again, the idea was reinforced that only the CDU could protect the child and the mother who were symbolic of the nascent German nation. The CDU also issued a poster in 1953 that portrayed a shadowed face, with only the eyes, ears and head visible. The man is wearing a Soviet Army hat and is looking menacingly towards the audience and states “all Marxist roads leads to Moscow” (*alle wege des marxismus führen nach moskauds*). This reflects the idea that any other political party, namely the SPD that the CDU, who were accused of being Marxist, would threaten the German nation as Germans knew it. A 1957 election poster showed a big red key with a huge white x-mark over it, promising “no red key” with the CDU (*keinen roten rathaus schlüssel*). Again, the CDU positioned itself with this image as the sole guarantee for West Germany to remain independent from the East. This was also apparent in the 1957 elections, when CDU posters (see document 6 in the Annex) showed Adenauer under the political slogan “no experiments”. In addition, the CDU called out to the democratic and freedom that the West represented, which, the CDU claimed, only the fatherly figure of Adenauer could guarantee using the political slogan of “freedom, peace and unity” (*für den frieden die freiheit und die einheit*). Indeed, the CDU would seek to present the following argument: Germany as a nation could not adhere to communism because Germany belonged with the West. This actual reasoning would be considerably developed through the CDU election manifestos that would seek to link “nation”, “identity” and the “West” with the idea that German identity be part of the larger Western identity. Concretely, this would explain the CDU push for the European alliance project and German membership in NATO.

By 1953, the CDU was using its election manifestos to put forward the idea of rearmament in link with West-integration. It argued that a European political community needed to be created in the face of the threat of the Soviet Union. In the 1957 election, Adenauer claimed over and over again that the election would be decisive as it would decide whether “Germany remained Christian or became communist” (Adenauer, in Williams, 2000: 444). Indeed, SPD leader Ollenhauer had been campaigning on the idea of leaving NATO, which prompted the CDU to compare him to Little Red Riding Hood going to the Big Bad Soviet Wolf, asking the Wolf to “live and let live” and remain neutral. Indeed, the CDU sought to position itself as the protector of the German nation, but also as the protector of Germany *as a Western nation* first and foremost. Indeed, their campaign speeches were always about demonstrating the very linear position that the CDU has taken towards the West from the Petersburg Agreement of 1949, the member of the Council of Europe in 1951 to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, in addition the numerous high-level

meetings between Adenauer and international Western leaders (Pridham, 1977). The CDU argued that there was no space for neutrality. This would endanger the nation as it would leave the door open for Eastern values and norms and essentially the FRG would be “swallowed” up whole by the Eastern bloc, which did not represent the identity of Germany.

In 1961, the terms become clearer. The CDU now wanted, at the same level of importance of the freedom of all Germans, world peace, the unity of the motherland, the unification of Europe under the Atlantic community. Hence, the association of Germany with the West was now as important as “freedom”, “peace” and “unity”. West-intergration had become a fundamental character of the nation. This can be associated with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that led to the creation of a new institution, the EEC, which also structured how the CDU viewed national identity. Hence, while the Schuman Plan had opened a door for viewing the cooperation of nations in a different light by stating, “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it” (Schmann Declaration, 1950), the Treaty of Rome, with the creation of a new political institution, structured a new way of thinking of nations by claiming that ensured “the economic and social progress of their countries by (a) common action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe and directing their efforts to the essential purpose of constantly improving the living and working conditions of their peoples” (Treaty of Rome, 1957). There was now, with the creation of a new supranational institution, a common notion that such institutions binding the West would create greater stability, prosperity and maintain peace. Indeed, these institutions would greatly influence how the CDU positioned the FRG in the West.

The idea that *westbindung* had become a national reality and a source of national pride was also confirmed in 1960, when Herbert Wehner of the SPD endorsed NATO, the European community and homeland defense (Granieri, 2003: 132). No longer was it to be a question whether the West German nation should be Western or pursue another strategy, rather now both of the main German political parties operating in the FRG had to come to an agreement about the nature of the German nation. The SPD “declared their support for the defence of the liberal-democratic basic order and approve national defence” because “national defence has to be in accordance with Germany’s political and geographic situation and thus has to keep limits which are necessary for the creation of requirements for international détente, for an effective controllable disarmament and for Germany’s reunification” (Godesberg Programme, 1959 in Grunbacher, 2010: 151-52). Hence, while there would still be considerable disagreements with regards to how West Germany should pursue foreign policy, no longer would the disagreements be about whether West Germany *as a nation* belonged in the Western bloc.

With regards to German rearmament, the Korean War convinced the Allies that this was necessary. Suddenly, the fact that the communists could go to war over their ideology had dawned on Western political leaders, which led them to the dire realization that not only did Germany need to be able to participate in its own defence but that a broader collective defence policy needed to be adopted. Yet beyond the recognition that a collective defence community needed to be established to provide security guarantees, there was a

will to tap into a deeper ideological need: the natural belonging of the FRG to the community of Western nations. In 1953 Adenauer proclaimed in front of the Bundestag that

the Western world finds itself in a truly great danger. West Germany is a part of the Western world and due to its geographic situation, it is more exposed to that danger than other lands. At the present time, negotiations with the Soviets for the purpose of normalizing relations can only promise success if the Soviets know that their negotiating partner is strong enough to make aggression risky. This strength can only be maintained if the Western world organizes its defense together. The Western powers are agreed that this strength will only suffice if Germany also contributes. The German people cannot refuse, not only because it guards us against a lethal danger but also because we have duties to fulfill to Europe and the people of Western civilization. (Adenauer, Bundestag 1953 extraordinary session)

West Germany was therefore unquestionably positioned as part of the Western world and Western civilization. The Germans felt themselves entrusted with the mission of protecting not only the German nation but also Western civilization. This echoed what Cardinal Frings had proclaimed in a sermon in Bonn, when he had sought to explain that it was Christian responsibility for people to ensure a peaceful order. Hence, turning a blind eye on injustice just because the potential of war was too scary was actually immoral and incompatible with Christian thinking (Bark and Gress, 1989: 280). Adenauer claimed again in another speech of the same year,

we must free ourselves from thinking in terms of national statehood... West European countries are no longer in a position to protect themselves individually; none of them is any longer in a position to salvage European culture. These objectives can only be attained if the West European nations form a political, economic and cultural union and, above all, if they render impossible any military conflicts among themselves. (Adenauer, quoted in Craig, 1958: 138-9)

Again, the emphasis on the German nation being responsible for protecting Europe and almost as a bearer of European culture is present. The CDU is defining the German nation as a European one. The CDU also sought to tie the idea of an eventual future German reunification to embracing the West. Hence Adenauer also claimed that

any refusal by the Federal Republic to make common cause with Europe would have been German isolationism, a dangerous escape into inactivity....Nobody could explain how German unity in freedom was to be achieved without a strong and united Europe. When I say 'in freedom' I mean freedom before, during and above all after all-German elections. No policy is made with wishes alone and even less from weakness. Only when the West was strong might there be genuine point of departure for peace negotiations to free not only the soviet zone but all of the enslaved Europe east of the Iron Curtain, and free it peacefully. To take the road that led into the European Community appeared to me the best service we could render the Germans in the Soviet Zone. (Adenauer, 1966: 415)

The German nation was to be free and to do so it needed the West.

In addition, the CDU poised *westbindung* as a means to "save" German democracy. Adenauer argued that

there was only one way for us to save our political liberty, our personal freedom, our security, the way of life we had formed in many centuries and which was based on Christian and humanistic ideology; we must form firm links with the peoples and countries that, shared our views concerning the state, the individual, liberty and property. We must resolutely and firmly resist any further pressure from the East. (Adenauer, 1946 in Barnstone, 2005: 78)

Indeed, the CDU was using imagery from the Basic Law about “personal freedom” and “individual” and imagery associated to liberal democracies with “political liberty”.

Germany’s identity as a nation was to become intermeshed with the West. No longer was Germany to be a uniquely independent nation, rather it was to be part of a larger whole. This translated into a general feeling that no longer was Germany more unique or stronger than other nations. This was felt in public opinion polls, as the Allensbach Institute polls demonstrate. When Germans were asked whether they believed that Germany could become “one of the most powerful” countries in the world, by 1954, 41% answered no, and, by 1965, that number was at 52% (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 195). In addition, while 38% answered that Germany was not more efficient or capable than other nation and 39% answered yes on the whole, the numbers had increased to 50% by 1965 on the “no” side and had dropped to 28% on the “yes” side (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 171). Furthermore, whereas not having a national consciousness was considered a bad quality by 11% of Germans in 1952, that number had dropped to 4% by 1973 and to 2% by 1980 (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 169).

In addition, public opinion polls were demonstrating that Western Germans were increasingly convinced that the future of their nation was tied to the Western community of Europe. In 1958, when asked what was the most essential policy that needed to be pursued by the FRG, 54% answered that, “efforts should be made to achieve the economic integration of the European countries and to create a United States of Europe” and only 32% believed that acting as a bridge between East and West was the most important policy (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 512). When asked in 1950 which side Germans were on, 64% sided with the West, 2% with the East and 26% were neutral (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 523). Germans were therefore learning to associate themselves with the West as the CDU advocated. Furthermore, they were increasingly willing to link their national consciousness to the West in the form of a “United States of Europe”. Indeed, when asked, in 1955, which way they would vote in such a case, 68% were for, 7% against and 25% undecided. By 1961, 81% were for, only 4% against and 15% undecided (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 525). In addition, in the same year, the Allensbach Institute found that 44% believed that the integration of the Western nations was desirable, while 24% thought that a more national course should be taken.

However, when asked what they did not like about the CDU’s policy in 1955, only 5% answered “dependence on Western powers” (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 245). It seems as if Germans remained slightly wary of the military alliance. But support of NATO was also high, with 52% for, 18% against and 30% undecided in 1955 and 67% for, 9% against, and 24% undecided by 1963 (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 519), the numbers of undecided were high in the early years. When asked in 1961 whether to choose between a military alliance with the USA and neutrality, 40% chose the USA, whereas 42% chose neutrality.

Four years later, in 1965, there was little change in the numbers: 46% chose USA and 37% chose neutrality (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 523). However, the idea of NATO and the military alliance that it represented did grow in strength slowly and by 1971, 51% believed that it was responsible for bringing the Western countries closer together (Noelle and Neumann, 1981: 434) and 51% had no problem with the German army being under the command of NATO rather than West German supreme command (Noelle and Neumann, 1981: 435).

Furthermore, if we take into account the public opinion polls with regard to German reunification, it demonstrates that while reunification remained important in the minds of Germans, other issues such as the economy, the creation of a united Europe or disarmament were equally significant. In an opinion poll asking West Germans if they could have three wishes with regards to policies what would they prioritize, reunification consistently hovered around 65% between 1957 and 1965, concerns over price increases from 1962 also hovered around the 65% and nuclear weapon concerns stayed consistently at 50% (Noelle and Neumann, 1967: 215). However, when asked in other opinion polls what the most pressing matter was for West Germany, support for reunification was reduced. In addition, reunification as the most pressing matter for West Germany has gone through different phases. Hence, in 1951, at the start of the Korean War only 18% found it the most pressing matter, whereas by 1959 following the second Berlin crisis, the number had jumped to 45%, only to fall back to 19% in 1961 and return to 47% in 1965 following the Vietnam War (Noelle and Neumann, 1967: 214).

Yet this testifies to the idea that while the desire for a united Germany never ceased, the conceptualization of what a united Germany meant did. When asked if reunification were to take place if Germans would be willing to forgo certain liberties and freedoms such as freedom of assembly, free elections, freedom for all democratic parties, etc., 51% answered that they would be unwilling to yield in 1958 (Noelle and Neumann, 1967: 469). 45% in 1954 and 43% in 1955 answered that reunification would not be worth it were Germany barred from Western alliances (Noelle and Neumann, 1967: 471). West Germans, while viewing their counterparts in East Germany as part of Germany as a whole on a territorial basis, also recognized that their identity was no longer the same. The Western German nation was free, democratic, and Western and reunification would only be possible on the basis of West Germany reabsorbing Eastern Germany. The German nation of the FRG was Western. This idea of Western German values as being the “better” or more representative identity for the whole German nation was made apparent when the Allensbach Institute polled West Germans on how they viewed the immediate government of the hypothetically reunited Germany. Hence when West Germans were asked in 1953 and 1954 whether free elections should be held first or whether an immediate consultative assembly with both Western and Eastern representatives should be formed, 67% called for free elections first in both years. In 1953, 58% of West Germans responded that any present member of government in the Soviet zone was considered as unfit for the governing the newly reunited Germany, while 13% believed that they should be represented (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 470). This testifies to the shared Western German sentiment that leaders of Eastern Germany could not successfully represent the German nation.

Social Market Economy

At the end of the war, the German economy was completely devastated and needed to be rebuilt. The CDU would capitalise on two major issues in order to develop and diffuse their new economic vision for the German nation: the political institutions of the FRG and the failure of the SPD to develop a coherent vision. The CDU would be largely successful in positioning the German nation as a nation with a socially responsible economy, but it would be a rocky road. The CDU would need to convince the Germans that a social market economy could solve their problems. The party also needed to link it to national identity. Through the use of election manifestos, posters, numerous speeches and interviews to radio and newspapers, especially on the behalf of Erhard, the Minister of Economic Affairs (1949–1963), the CDU would portray the social market economy as an inherent part of the German nation.

With regards to the first element that ultimately helped the CDU in diffusing their identity: political structure, an important correlation would occur between economic freedom and political freedom. Indeed, the institutional framework that the Basic Law established aided the CDU in their development of the social market economy. Hence, Article 2 made the individual the centre of attention by stating, “everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality, insofar as he does not infringe the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code. Everyone shall have the right to life and physical inviolability. The freedom of the individual shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only on the basis of a law” (Basic Law, 1949). Ensuring that the rights of the individual were strongly anchored in the political system paved the way for an economic system that would allow the individual to freely attain his/her rights. The social market economy would prove to be just the right system. Hence, the CDU would stipulate that within the social market economy, the individual had agency, possibilities and ultimately freedom whereas any planned economy would remove that freedom of the individual. Indeed, Erhard wrote

in every citizen’s individual conscience, the freedom of consumption and the freedom of performing an economic activity should be perceived as fundamental, uncontested rights the freedom of every citizen to consume, build his life with the financial means he has at his disposal, according to his personal desires and expectations. This fundamental democratic right of freedom of consumption has to find its logical complementarity in the freedom of the entrepreneur to produce or sell that what he believes to be necessary according and successful out of the expression of the needs of all individuals. (Erhard, 1957: 14)

In that sense, the post-war political system of the FRG that was geared towards the preferences of the individual was ultimately more open to adopt an economic system that would allow those preferences to be expressed. The second element that helped the CDU diffuse their identity was the failure of the political opposition to implement a vision. The CDU would recognize early on the importance of the political institutions put into place by the Allies as mechanisms of diffusion. Hence, the CDU would use the Economic Council to communicate to the German people the benefits of the social market economy. Although initially only preoccupied with administrative details and largely under the control of the

occupying powers, several changes were passed⁹⁸ that gave the Director of Administration for Economics authority and freedom in the application and interpretation of economic planning and rationing (Glossner, 2010: 100). Hence, Erhard as the new Director of Administration for Economics, found himself in a position of power, which led him to initiate economic liberalization after currency reform. This control over the main body in charge of economic policy in the immediate after years of the war by the CDU helped squeeze political opposition out of the economic decision-making process of the FRG. Furthermore, the CDU benefitted from having the political support of the FDP and the DP with regard to their economic liberalization, while on the left, the SPD struggled to define and differentiate its planned economy from its communist counterpart, the KPD.

Yet, despite these advantages, the foundation of social market economy as a basis of German identity was not a given. It took time for the CDU to develop their vision of the social market economy and it took even longer for them to diffuse it through the nation. The CDU would have to convince the Germans that the social market economy was an inherent part of the German nation. Despite developing their vision and definition of the social market economy in the 1949 election manifesto, the CDU spent more time on how to understand the dualism between “freedom” vs. “state control” or the “market” vs. a “planned” economy. Indeed “freedom” was contrasted to “control” with the implicit goal of reminding Germans of the lack of freedom that they had been given under the NSDAP. It was also a clever way to link NSDAP state control to the SPD’s economic vision. Indeed, the CDU sought to portray the SPD’s vision of the economy as on par with that of the National Socialists, arguing that, “National Socialists and Marxists are closely related in their basic outlooks [and] completely consistent in their methodology” (Mitchell, 2012: 182).

Indeed, in 1950 when it was found that 56% did not know what “social market economy” meant, 27% were able to give either vague or incorrect answers, and only 12% were able to name its basic tenets such as “free market, the economic policy of the government and liberal economy”. In 1952 the numbers were not better when 48% had no idea, 37% were either vague or wrong and 8% right (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 275). After this, a significant publicity effort was launched by the CDU. In addition to the realization that the general public knew little about social market economy, the Korean War (1950–53) hit the German economy, hard causing prices to fluctuate. This caused Germans to question free markets and to show an increased preference for planned economies (Spicka, 2007: 95). The CDU decided to react to better define social market economy which was also found to have great-untapped political power. Indeed, when asked “what type of program must a party have, so that it works well for Germany?”, 87% mentioned social, 73% democratic, 58% Christian, and 25% authoritarian. Hence, Germans wanted a social, democratic and Christian form of economy. The CDU would seek to funnel its social market economy model onto that conception. In addition, those responding poorly to the CDU’s economic policy claimed that it was not “social” (Spicka, 2007: 103). The CDU

only needed to better link *its*⁹⁹ economic policy to being “social”, “democratic” and “Christian” to win the hearts and minds of the Germans. That is exactly what it set out to do.

The social market economy would be essentially tied to the German economic miracle, and as such, geared to take on proportions of a founding myth for the FRG. This started happening as soon as the elections of 1953 and 1957. Indeed, a clear connection would be made between the economic miracle of the FRG and the political legitimacy of the FRG. Indeed, the CDU claimed that while in 1948, the country lay in economic chaos, the arrival of Erhard and his conceptualization of free competition versus a planned economy brought about the economic miracle of the FRG. In a 1949 CDU election poster, a plentiful table of food is portrayed with the slogan “this is what our economy brings you”. The idea was to convey the idea that economic successes are attributed to the economy of the CDU. By 1953,

“the grey spectre of unemployment has been banished. Nearly three million new jobs have been created. Housing for more than five million people have been built. Erhard watches relentlessly over the value of the currency...we create work, not through inflation but through reconstruction. Only if social convictions and personal effort to achieve high performance combine can we look towards lasting prosperity” (translated from Rhein Neckar Zeitung, September 1953, in Grunbacher, 2010).

Essentially, the CDU would seek to introduce advertising techniques that would “produce political meaning [for] the economic miracle” (Spicka, 2007: 95). The 1953 election CDU poster portrayed a strong man whose face we do not see walking in the German countryside carrying a bag full of golden seeds and sprinkling them into the fields. The CDU logo is just above his opened hand and in the middle of the sun. Two main ideas underpin this poster. First, the CDU is the sun that allows the seeds to grow through its social market economy and second, only the CDU can provide the fertile grounds that are needed for the seeds (i.e., the German economy) to grow. In another 1953 election poster, the CDU also represents itself as “peace” [*fur den frieden*] against the background a green and plentiful German countryside with men and women working and walking in the fields and gardens. Showing a smiling Erhard, another 1953 election poster claims that prosperity for all is possible under the social market economy (*erhard halt was er verspricht: wohlstand fur alle durch die soziale marktwirtschaft*). In this poster, the CDU emphasized and personalised its economic policies. Hence, Erhard is the personification of social market economy.

What’s more, in this poster, the term “social market economy” appears. The CDU needed to get people familiar with the term. In addition they needed people to associate the term with not only the CDU but also with economic prosperity. Hence, the 1957 CDU election poster shows people working, factories blooming, children drinking milk, and going to Church under the slogan “stepping stones of our economic policy since 1947”

⁹⁹ The public opinion polls of the Allensbach Institute also found that Germans were having trouble correcting associating economic policy with its correct political party. Hence, in March 1953, 12% thought that the social market economy was the economic policy of the SPD and only 5% were able to associate it with the CDU (Neumann and Noelle, 1967).

(*marksteine auf dem wege unserer wirtschaftspolitik seit 1947*) and another sign with two red question marks pointing towards ragged and crying children and what looks like a food line under the slogan of “follow the dictatorship and command economy” (*folgen der diktatur und kommando wirtschaft*). This poster clearly sought to have the CDU appropriate Germany’s economic prosperity.

The election manifestos of the CDU also demonstrated the increase need to not only define the social market economy but also position it in such a way that the German public perceived it as part of the German nation. Hence, the 1953 election manifesto spent time explaining how the CDU under the social market economy had improved the living conditions of Germans but also linked it to social policy. In addition to explaining the economic benefits of a social market economy it was also about “economic democracy”, “genuine freedom”, and “the basis of social justice, freedom of movement and genuine human dignity” (CDU election manifesto, 1953, Election Manifesto Project). By 1957, the election manifesto of the CDU again sought to ensure that the social market economy and its economic benefits would be linked to the CDU, but it was not as adamant in defining the approach. Gone was the technical jargon behind social market economy. Now, it had moved towards the easy-to-grasp idea of how it wanted prosperity for all. Now that the economic miracle of West Germany was in full motion, and the CDU could now simply take credit. Hence, continuing down the path of social market economy was all that was needed to the “unity of Germany and guarantee peace and freedom, security and prosperity of the fatherland” (CDU election manifesto 1957, Election Manifesto Project).

This was also the first time that the term “fatherland” was used in a CDU election manifesto. This was important in establishing the link between economic policy and national identity upon which a nation or fatherland can be founded. In addition, in a very linear way, the 1957 election manifesto starts off by reminding Germans that in 1945, their economy lay in ruins; that by 1949, under the leadership of the CDU, the economy was turning around thanks to the social market economy; that by 1953, the economy was flourishing; and that by 1957, a new social order and booming economy had been reached. Again, what is interesting is how the economy and its success were correlated with social order. The CDU was seeking national legitimacy through its successful economic policies. In other words, national identity was being linked to economic structure and policies. Indeed, in these elections, the CDU used almost mythical language of “gates opening” thanks to a new social order and a blooming economy. The CDU was claiming that the social market economy had allowed the return to the “real” Germany and the “rise of the defeated German nation” (CDU election manifesto 1957, Election Manifesto Project).

By the next elections, the CDU no longer needed to advocate for the social market economy nor define it anymore, because the SPD had officially accepted the social market economy as the premise of the German economy. Indeed, the 1959 Godesberg Programme had the SPD declare their support for, “steady economic growth”, “free choice of consumption”, “free choice of workplace”, “free competition and free entrepreneurial initiative” and declared that, “totalitarian economic planning destroys freedom. For the reason the Social Democratic Party approves of the free market whenever there is free competition” (Godesberg Program, Grunbacher, 2010: 151–2). Hence, while there would

be debate as to what course of action would be better for the German economy in general, the fact that the German economy was a market economy was no longer up for discussion. Therefore, in future elections, comments about German economic policy would often simply be about ensuring that the link between “nation” and “economy” be made so that national identity could be tied to economic success. In 1961, the CDU promised to protect the German fatherland and claimed that to do so, its first priority would need to be the continuation of the social market economy (CDU election manifesto, 1961, Election Manifesto Project). By the 1965 election, the CDU had moved onto associating “nation” with itself and the social market economy. Indeed, Germany and France were not just two nations, rather they were two “economic nations”. Election manifestos would only be part of the larger propaganda at the hands of the CDU to inform the Germans of the social market economy and more importantly link it to the identity of the nascent nation, industrial organizations and charismatic Erhard would also be of great use in helping to define social market economy and reinforcing the idea of the economic miracle as the West German founding myth.

Indeed it was found in a new public opinion poll conducted by the Allensbach Institute that there was still great mistrust towards the industrialists. Hence, in 1950, 59% of Germans believed that manufacturers needed to be “forced” to meet the wishes of their workers (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 353). This resulted in a very strong show of solidarity of businesses and industries uniting behind the CDU and helping it to bolster support for the social market economy. Hence, different organizations were established to promote the idea. While their power would ultimately depend on their finances, all agreed that free market and free democracy went hand in hand. A more modest group called the Action Group for the Social Market Economy (*Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft*) was founded on January 23, 1953 in Heidelberg by neoliberal academics, journalists and industrialists would organize conferences and public forums in defence of the social market economy. Other organizations would concentrate on rehabilitating the image of German industry in the face of German society after the Great Depression and its collaboration with Hitler, such as the Federation of German Employers, the Federation of German Industry and the German Institute of Industry. They would all conduct public relations campaigns on the behalf of the FRG’s industry (Spicka, 2007: 110).

One of the most important organizations would be the Society for the Promotion of Social Compromise (*Gemeinschaft zur Forderung des sozialens Ausgleichs*) or more commonly known as the Weigh Scales (*Die Waage*). It was set up in 1952 and claimed that its goal was “convincing the entire population of the enduring validity of our economic system” and launching a national public relations campaign. It would advertise with newspapers such as *Der Spiegel* and produce movies screened in theaters across the FRG with the feature called “keep seeing things clearly” (*Behalte Deinen klaren Blick*). *Die Waage* would spend 1.1 million in 1954, 1.6 million in 1955 and 900,000 in 1956 on advertising and publicity (Spicka, 2007: 229). *Die Waage* would be a very important political force backing the CDU and diffuse the idea that social market economy was an essential part of West German national identity. In one video (1957), the German economy is shown flourishing with happy, working, rich people to the tune of happy music in contrast to the unhappy, poor, and largely unemployed people to the tune of dark music.

On the one side are those benefitting from a free and market-based economy and on the other side are those living under a planned economy (*Werbespot der "Die Waage e.V. für sozialen Ausgleich" aus dem Jahr 1957*). Again, the idea put forward to West Germans was that happiness as a nation is related to its economic policies.

Die Waage would also produce documentaries that would promote the social market economy and its economic benefits in comparison to those living under planned economies (see *Die Waage "Operation Wunderland"*). In particular, during the election years of 1953 and 1965, two popular cartoon characters Fritz and Otto, representing two working class men, appeared in hundreds of daily newspapers and would promote the social market economy, and indirectly, the CDU. Indeed, the two would debate about free market versus planned economies in an easy to grasp way. The message was geared towards the everyday working German. Hence, one cartoon read:

Otto: "if we have the money to buy something"

Fritz: "That's is the case in every sort of economy, only those who have the money can buy – only those who earn can spend."

Otto: "But in the socialistic planned economy, the state dictates the prices, then you can buy..."

Fritz: "What's been allotted to you from above – and that's is little and worthless. And what you can buy without restrictions is sinfully expensive. We have already experienced this. Think about the time before 1948. "

Otto: "Yes, yes, my wife had to strip our home of many fine things in order to satisfy the children's hunger" (Betts and Eghigian, 2003: 168)

In this cartoon, it is depicted that any formed of planned pricing becomes economic planning, which then in turn creates undesirable shortages of unwanted things and creates an unequal market for desired goods (i.e., the black market). In addition, the authors of the cartoon quickly seek to reinforce the idea that all economic progress that has been made is related to the economic policy of the CDU (i.e., the idea that before 1948, things were bad) and hence a market economy was synonymous with national progress.

Die Waage would also embrace the slogan of, "everyone has a part of it" which essentially sought to reinforce the idea of the attainable economic miracle. Hence, Fritz now had a brand new refrigerator that cost less today than before because of Erhard's economic policies that were spreading the wealth. In another advertisement campaign, *Die Waage* presented a woman who had fled Upper Silesia "with nothing", children in tow, as a refugee but who had "obtained a new life" thanks to the social market economy (Abt 16, Nr 1, Fasz 2, RWWA). An important slogan of *Die Waage* would be that the "social market economy benefits everyone" (*Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft nutzt allen*). The idea was to include all Germans in one big prosperous society. The nation's identity here was based on the idea that *all* were participating in a successful economic policy. These different industrial organizations would work hard throughout the 1950s to portray the new West German prosperity as the rebirth of the true German nation through their numerous polls and marketing campaigns. They would be essential in spreading the idea of an "economic miracle" (*wirtschaftswunder*) linked to the social market economy

However, the political and extremely charismatic figure of Erhard would also be essential in promoting a national identity based upon the social market economy. The

figure of Erhard would be often polished by the CDU. Indeed, although many Germans knew of and had a positive opinion Erhard,¹⁰⁰ the CDU sought to ensure that Erhard be remembered as a CDU asset as well as the “face” of social market economy which was helping the German nation. Hence, following the 1957 CDU party conference, the CDU pictured Erhard in an open street market in its series, “Men beside Adenauer”.¹⁰¹ The text that accompanied the picture ties social market economy to freedom and ultimately democracy by claiming that “his sources of power” (e.g. his mandate as Minister of Economy) come from that “scientific” understanding (see document 4 in the Annexe). Hence, the social market economy is not about the individual but about “all Germans” and the economic successes of such an economy has given legitimacy to the West German state within the German nation. Erhard would play a very important role in the branding of the social market economy as the foundation of the West German nation.

Indeed, Erhard, the father of social market economy, would become one of its loudest advertisers. The benefits and ideals of the social market economy became like a brand, one upon which the German nation should be founded. Indeed, Erhard would deliver speeches, talk on the radio and to the newspapers and continuously “sell” the idea of social market economy as an essential part of the German post-war recovery and national consciousness. It must not be forgotten that Erhard had been deputy director of a marketing research institute, the Economic Observation of the German Finished Goods Industry (*Institute für Wirtschaftsbeobachtung der deutschen Fertigwaren*), before entering politics. He had a great understanding on how to tailor a message to a public. Erhard’s speeches would seek to promote a better understanding of the principles of the social market economy and drive home the idea that the liberalization of the markets under state supervision would and could provide economic success. He also pointed out the dangers of adopting a planned economy by linking it to Germany’s inglorious NSDAP past.

Therefore, in 1954, following the failure of the establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) because of the refusal of the French to National Assembly to ratify it, Erhard questioned the persistence of “sensitivity” around nationhood. He argued that freedom could only be attained when the free people of the democratic West stood together. Similarly, he claimed that the social market economy was freedom. It provided freedom through liberal principles (Erhard. 63: 156). Always wary of the “collective” and feeding into the fears of Soviet influences and the Nazi past, Erhard would proclaim that, “nothing is more likely to lead to abuse of power than concentration of power in the hands of a collective” (Article in *Via Aperta*, No 12, December 1959–January 1960 in Erhard, 1963: 274).

Erhard would also firmly tie his economic policy to the idea of the nation. In 1957, Erhard proclaimed in a speech at the 7th Parliamentary Party Progress of the CDU that

¹⁰⁰ The public opinions polls had 14% liking him in 1951, 26% in 1952, 37% in 1953, 45% in 1954, 46% in 1955 and 50% in 1956.

¹⁰¹ This series sought to portray key members of Adenauer’s team in order to increase public knowledge of other CDU leaders.

we regard it as our duty and responsibility, however, not merely to improve over-all living standards but also to awaken a social consciousness which will produce a more mature and more intelligent awareness in the individual and at the same time lead us as a nation to a new way of life. This presupposes that we should cease to think in terms of classes or even groups, and that we look beyond our immediate group-interests, acquire a real sense of community life and feel responsible, as a community, for the future destiny of our country and our people. (Erhard, 1963: 199)

The social market economy was supposed to become the vector through which a German community was to be established. Indeed, it was to become one of the foundations of the German nation. Throughout this speech, Erhard referenced back to this idea that the social market economy would lead to a new awareness, a new community, a different conceptualization of the nation. He stated “we are moving, so to speak, into a new phase of the social market economy, in which prosperity should bring to each individual something more than just freedom from material want and social security but should awaken a new awareness of life” (Erhard, 1963: 194-94) and that “a nation that is strong enough to sweat the evil poison of collectivism out of its system has opened up the way not only to spiritual freedom and independence but also to prosperity and security” (*ibid*, 202). In 1960, Erhard proclaimed in a speech to the CDU Federal Congress that

the guiding principles of economic policy not only leave their mark on society but also are shaped and altered by it. The echo that economic policy finds in the minds of a nation will resound all the more if that policy succeeds not merely in fulfilling its more immediate aims but also in giving a convincing answer to contemporary spiritual problems. (Erhard, Speech to the CDU Federal Congress in Karlsruhe, April 28, 1960 in Erhard, 1963: 275)

Beyond the clear recognition that society and economy were interrelated, there was an emphasis that a sound economic policy could also give rise to a new identity upon which to found the nation. He states later in the same speech: “a social policy which aims to be more than just an ideology and to be realistic and progressive must have as its basis the actual conditions of our economic environment” (Erhard, Speech to the CDU Federal Congress in Karlsruhe, April 28th, 1960 in Erhard, 1963: 282). Therefore, this was not simply CDU ideology: it was more. It was about redefining or rather finding the intrinsic true nature of the basis of identity of the German nation that ultimately needed to take into account the social market economy.

In addition, Erhard would insist that the notion that “freedom” and “market economy” were two sides of the same coin. This was essential for the West German nation’s identity. Since, the FRG had been defined as a free and democratic nation in the Basic Law, it was only normal that its economy be free and democratic too. Hence, Erhard would claim that the,

“basic principle of freedom for the consumer must logically be counter-balanced by freedom for the producer to make or sell what he believes to be marketable....freedom for the consumer and freedom to work must be explicitly recognized as inviolable basic rights by every citizen. To offend against them should be as an outrage against society. Democracy and free economy are as logically linked as are dictatorship and State controls” (Erhard, 1958: 6).

Indeed, he would often link the survival of the West German state as a democracy to its choice of economic model. This portrays the interaction between a vision for national identity and the institutional framework in which political actors are operating.

The idea of the “economic miracle” that the social market economy had created was an essential component of building the German nation through an identification with a certain economic model. Hence, according to the CDU, the free and prosperous West German nation was indebted to the social market economy. In other words, the social market economy had transformed the nascent FRG into a free and prosperous nation. In addition, everyone could be part of this nation. The CDU tried very hard to include everyone in this vision. Selling the economic miracle was therefore essential in order to define the nation’s identity. Hence, the CDU put out numerous advertisements claiming that things were getting better for all Germans. The message was that Germans as a collective national group were happy, free and prosperous thanks to the social market economy. Hence, the slogans “it’s getting better for us” and “prosperity for all”¹⁰² became the focal point of the 1957 elections, with a variety of posters reading: “the clothing closet attests”, “the pay check attests” and “the shopping bag attests” (see document 5 for an example in the Annex). The grocery bags of the West Germans were overflowing; dads were bringing home gifts to their kids and women were well dressed. All finished the same way,

prosperity for all is no longer a slogan, and prosperity for all is and will become reality, for many already today, surely for all tomorrow. It will continue upwards as it has up until now, step by step, if we avoid experiments. (see Document 5)

Hence, there was again the dire warning of “no experiments” aimed at the SPD but also the linear vision of the CDU. What looks at first like a uniquely individualist campaign for consumerism was actually more complicated. In order for the West German nation to be prosperous as a whole, individuals had to consume. In other words, what each individual did left a larger imprint on the German nation as a whole. It was about bringing German society together regardless of class or economic conditions. Indeed “prosperity for all” through social market economy was essentially the creation of a new “people’s community”.

Erhard and the CDU would be successful in bringing the Germans to embrace the social market economy. Indeed, while only 54% of Germans preferred a free economy over a planned economy (31%) in 1953, by 1971 that number was up to 70%, with only 21% wanting a planned economy. Another poll, held in 1955, demonstrates that 66% of Germans believed that industry should decide which products are manufactured, and that only 20% believed that government should decide (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 352). The market economy had indeed won the fight over the hearts and minds of the Germans. In turn, the social market economy would become the economic principle that would legitimize the German nation. The social market economy and the idea that it was

¹⁰² Choosing the term “prosperity for all” was good for the CDU: the term was already closely associated with Erhard as he had just published a book with the same title the year before.

responsible for the economic miracle was fully embraced by West Germans and there are numerous studies that testify to how this economic miracle has become a founding myth for West Germany (see Van Hook, 2004; Grunbacher, 2017 and Pearce, 2008). Building a national identity on an economic myth helped build West German identity. After WWII and the horrors of pure ethnic nationalism, West Germany needed an identity that could bind it despite its aversion to nationalism, and economic policy provided exactly just that. All in all, the CDU would be successful in portraying, redefining and presenting a German nation based on a vision of a successful, prosperous society all participating in the nation. Hence, while in 1951 only 2% considered the FRG to represent the most prosperous times of Germany history, that number would jump to 62% in 1963 (Noelle, Neumann, 1967: 150). The economic miracle and its place as a founding myth seemed to be gaining resonance.

This section has sought to explain how the CDU shaped the West German national identity based on Christian *weltanschauung*, which emphasized social justice, the rights of the individual, democracy and the revival of the myth of the *Abendland*. The CDU claimed that West Germany's national identity had always been linked to a Christian one and that in order for the young democracy to survive and not succumb to materialistic temptations, it needed to re-embrace this national identity. Another important component for the CDU's understanding of the FRG's national identity was the social market economy (*Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*). Indeed, the CDU's economic social market policies were tied to the economic miracle of West Germany, and as such, it became a founding myth for the young Republic. Finally, the last element of the CDU's understanding of West German national identity, integration with the West (*westbindung*), framed the political landscape of the FRG and of Europe throughout the Cold War. In a sense, it continues to today as the EU is essentially the continuation of the policies that emanated from the attempt to define the FRG as a Western nation. Furthermore, as a testimony to the strength, resonance and endurance of the national identity put forward by the CDU, not only did public opinions polls continuously approve them but by the late 1960s, its main political rival, the SPD had also embraced them as essential components of the West German nation.

6. Conclusion

This thesis has studied how national identities change in direction and evolve through time. In this sense, it joins other studies that have studied the mechanisms for change in national identities. While some authors have tended to focus on state structure, institutional changes (such as the creation of federal institutions that encourage regional identities) or belief systems, this study argues that political parties play an important role in national identity formulation. Throughout this analysis, identity is understood as a political concept which helps shift the focus from cultural and societal factors onto political explanations. This is partially because it focuses on an understanding of national identity as emanating from “above”, in that national identity is initiated, articulated and formulated at the state level. The existence of national identity presupposes that a nation-state exists and that it is endowed with its own political institutions. National identity is used to mobilize solidarity among members of the nation and to formulate their identities and interests as members of that larger nation and not as some other sub-state group.

It has been argued that the means that a state uses to provide and create a single national identity include: the construction and dissemination of a certain image of the nation, the creation and spread of symbols and rituals that reinforce a sense of community, the advancement of citizenship with well-defined civil, legal and political rights and duties, the creation of common enemies and the progressive consolidation of national education and media systems (Guibernau, 1996: 669-670). Hence, in this analysis, national identity emanates from the official discourse of political parties through multiple political institutions. Essentially, this study has sought to establish the argument that political parties have an impact on the direction of national identity. Using a HI framework has helped to further develop this picture. Hence, it has also sought to illustrate that the institutional framework in which political parties operate affects the direction in which they push national identity. Indeed, political actors have a vision for national identity and they will articulate and redefine how national identity is conceptualized, but not freely. Therefore, as Piersons so correctly stated, actors, preferences and ideas are the starting point rather than the end point of analysis (2004). Rather, how institutions guide actors, preferences and ideas is central to understanding why national identity takes the form and direction that it does.

This thesis sought to compare through time and space Nazi Germany and the early years of the FGR. It chose to do a comparison through time rather than analysing two regions at the same time. This is because it sought to better understand how and when change occurs but also how past conceptualisations of the nation continue to influence future conceptualisations of the nation. Hence, the presence and tenure in power of the NSDAP not only affected the course of history of Germany as a nation but also were

themselves affected by past conceptualisations of Germany as a nation and as such including an analysis of national identity under the Third Reich should included in a research that attempts to disentangle how political parties affect national identity. It demonstrates that *even* the Nazi's used historical continuities with the Weimar Republic and German Empire to "frame" national identity with regards to ethnic citizenship and "greater solution" to German unity. Hence despite being a totalitarian regime, they still were influenced by past conceptions of nationalism and national identity. This comes and reinforces HI and how its not all about radical change but that there are continuities between past and present and that the political party (actor) must navigate between them. Furthermore, all later attempts to define the German nation in the FGR were influenced by Nazism. Indeed, political parties would seek to position themselves in such a way in order to answer or explain why Nazism occurred and how they are better suited to represent the German nation because of "X, Y and Z". Political parties would legitimize themselves as protectors of the German nation by identifying what ills had caused Nazism and how they are completely different. This was apparent in the CDU's insistence on how National Socialism was about materialism and that embracing God (a Christian one) would help preserve the German nation from such excess again. It was also demonstrated that presence of the CDU in power during the nascent years of the FGR affected the national direction of the FGR as a young state and also as a newly divided state. This coincided with new institutions and new political actors which brought a change in the direction of national identity. In this case study, unlike in Nazi Germany, we can see the influence of political parties in a true democracy. But we also see the layering of national identity. There are continuities with the German Empire, Weimar Republic, and Third Reich on how nationhood is conceived. Hence, the CDU's portrayal of *Kirchenkampf* which was used in order to proclaim themselves the "true" protector of the German nation but also by proclaiming the Protestants and the Catholics as the historic protector of the German nation but also as the main victims of National Socialism they also excluded other Germans, such as the Jews, from the nation. The CDU sought to link its Christian values as pillar of the German nation to the older and historical concept of the *Abendland* which enhances the continuities with past conceptualisations of the German nation but also with West-integration, the CDU was essentially tying the FGR to an older conception of German national identity that dates from the Holy Roman Empire that considered what came from the East was barbarous and that Germany was the last frontier of civilisation (Taylor, 1968).

Review

Using the case study of Germany, it was demonstrated that the NSDAP sought to create a *Volksgemeinschaft* and a racial state. The creation of a 'national community' (*Volksgemeinschaft*) was based on the idea that a classless community of Germans should be created on the basis of racial belonging. In other words, all Germans could aspire to equal social status simply because they were biologically part of the German race. In addition, *Volksgemeinschaft* also aspired to the idea of destroying the individual for the benefit of the society. Hence, the individual could only attain his/her full capacity through his/her full integration into the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The NSDAP also sought to create a

racial state in which only “racially pure” Germans would be part of the German nation. This German nation was essentially a blood nation. In other words, belonging to the nation required that one carry German blood. Therefore, *Volksgemeinschaft* also became synonymous not only with the erasing of social class distinctions but also with the exclusion of foreign elements from the people’s community. Hence, the NSDAP started to concentrate on “racial hygiene” and “population policies”, which all became part of their intention to create a racially defined nation. The NSDAP would then seek to permeate all parts of society through the use of radio communication, national rallies, culture, education and tools of repression (i.e., the S.A and S.S) to enforce its vision for the German nation.

Operating in an authoritarian regime, the NSDAP was inhibited by political institutions and were relatively ‘free’ in how they chose to conceptualise German national identity. This changed after the war. With the end of WWII, new political institutions were put into place, namely the Basic Law. This document would codify practices for political parties and essentially constitutionalize them but it would also protect democracy, basic freedoms and individual rights.

This would impact how the CDU would frame their vision for German national identity. The CDU would seek to define German national identity as one based on Christian *weltanschauung*, integration with the West (*westbindung*) and the social market economy (*Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*), but with each notion the influence of the Basic Law and previous political institutions could be felt. Hence, the CDU would claim that German national identity needed to include a Christian identity as means to protect democracy, protect individuals and their rights and freedoms. The CDU would seek legitimacy from the creation of the myth that Protestants and Catholics had participated in the *Kirchenkampf* against National Socialism. It would also be claimed by the CDU that if Germany had fallen victim to National Socialism it was precisely because Christian faith had been replaced with materialism, hence shifting the blame of National Socialism from the Germans as a society and towards a much larger debate about atheism and religion.

The CDU would also position integration with the West as an essential component of German national identity. Indeed, the CDU would stress the historical similarities between Germany and the West. In addition, the CDU would claim that in order to maintain freedom and democracy, Germany needed to firmly link itself with the West through the creation of new supranational institutions. These new political institutions, namely the ESC and EEC would also further influence how the CDU positioned its national identity in relation to the West. Indeed, the German nation would be claimed to be inherently part of Western civilization. Finally, the social market economy would be positioned as a foundation of German national identity because it was the only economic model that protected the freedoms of individuals and therefore was entirely compatible and coherent

with democracy, in addition to the shared economic successes it generated for the German nation. All three elements would also be adopted by the CDU's main political rival, the SPD in the Godesberg Declaration by 1959, further testifying to the success that the CDU had in defining these three elements as part of German national identity.

Although this thesis sought to focus on political parties and their influence on national identity, the Cold War and burgeoning European Union played a role in the positioning of Germany as a Western, Democratic Nation by the CDU. Also, this thesis did not focus much on how opposition political parties might have influenced the direction of the nation. The interactions between the CDU and the SPD about the future direction of German identity did influence its subsequent direction, but I would also argue that the SPD also helped cement the vision of the CDU in its 1959 Godesberg Program by accepting West-integration, Social Market Economy and by claiming that Democratic Socialism was essentially born from a common Christian Ethics (past) and humanism and which not only reiterated that the German nation was Christian but also claimed that it was a party that was compatible with those "ancient or traditional" ideals by claiming that Socialism was part of an older Christian and European tradition. Hence, we saw the SPD trying to "position" itself as ready to govern over the FGR and embracing the idea of the FGR nation that had seemingly been embraced by the Germans. This strategy seemingly paid off too. Following the Godesberg Program, the CDU started declining in support to the benefit of the SPD in the elections of 1961, 1965 and by 1969 Willy Brandt becoming the first SPD Chancellor of the FGR.

With the election of the SPD, a new era began which was essentially marked by the adoption of a new governmental policy, Ostpolitik, and this also served to redirect German national identity. Ostpolitik was the opening the way for diplomatic relations and confirming the peacetime territorial status quo. It ruled out any use of force between the two states and stipulated respect for territorial integrity and the existing borders. Through this policy, the SPD sought to recreate bridges between East and West but this also effectively pushed the question about German unity to the sidelines. Indeed, it was almost the confirmation that two Germany's existed which meant that for a while the ideas of pan-German national questions were forgotten. The adoption of Ostpolitik definitely redirected German national identity. This was a new instance of a political party influencing the direction of national identity. It must be noted that the critical juncture here was that at the time of the election of the SPD (1969), the political institutions of the burgeoning European union were no longer being questioned and that NATO and the EEC were cohesive enough but still a loosely knit organisation at the time. This gave space for the FGR to negotiate with the East without going into NATO or EEC mandates.

However, we see again how older conceptualisations of national identity continue nonetheless as while the FGR signed an agreement with the USSR to recognize the Oder-Niese line on the Polish Western borders, the FGR also signed its own agreement with

Poland that allowed Polish nationals of German origin to resettle in the FRG. Furthermore, Ostpolitik did take its course but it nonetheless grew off the idea that the FRG was now a Western nation hoping simply to build a bridge with its Eastern neighbours and in that sense, it did not question the layers of national identity that the CDU had pushed forward onto the FRG.

Contributions

1. Interactions between Political Parties and Political Institutions

This analysis helps to contribute to our understanding of the multiple impacts that political parties have on identity politics. Indeed, rather than focusing on the roles that political parties play in maintaining or consolidating democracy or how they represent different segments of society, this analysis sought to explore their role in national identity. Hence, through their visions on the nation, political parties impact how the nation is conceived and impact its direction. National identity is not static and undergoes transformations, understanding the mechanism behind the transformations is what is central in this analysis. Indeed Germany is an interesting case, as national identity in Germany was drastically transformed following the end of WWII. The change in national identity coincided with the creation of new political institutions that empowered new political actors. This is why political parties and their interactions with political institutions have been identified as the mantelpiece of the study.

This study also helps contribute to our understanding of how national identities evolve through time and what impacts their direction. National identities are a fascinating concept in that what it means to be part of a nation is changing more and more today. With the rise of new populist governments throughout the globe, understanding their potential impact on how the nation is conceived of is of great importance. However, crediting political parties with too much power is also not recommended. Indeed, this analysis has sought to develop is that there is an interaction between political parties and the political institutions that guide their environment. Hence, even populist political parties cannot freely redefine national identity in democracies. The presence of institutions structure their visions and possibilities. This goes back to our HI framework, which contends that identities are politically constructed. This allows analysis on how such identities will be framed. In other words, “institutions do not only play a crucial role in the organization and mobilization of interests and identities, they are also prominent in their definition” (Lecours, 2000: 513) and institutions “act as filters that selectively favour particular interpretations either of the goals towards which political actors strive or of the best means to achieve these ends” (Immergut, 1998: 20).

Thus, in any study on national identity it is important to take into account the consequences, which may be unintended, of such institutions. While the CDU sought to push forward a vision of a German nation based on Christianity, part of Western civilization and that was based on a unique economic model, this vision was itself influenced by the democratic nature of the Federal German Republic (FRG) and the Basic Law. As the Basic Law placed emphasis on the rights and freedoms of individuals, the CDU would find itself also putting an emphasis on rights and freedoms. Hence, the CDU would claim that Christian values protected “freedom” the “individual”, and that recognizing Germany as a Western civilization protected “democracy” and “freedoms”, and that the social market economy was the only economic model compatible with “democracy”, as not only was it based on “free choice”, but it also protected the most vulnerable. Indeed, understanding the interactions and influence of political institutions on how national identity is conceptualized and imagined was the primary goal of this analysis.

2. National Identity as a Slow and Gradual Process

Throughout this thesis there have been echoes of past conceptualizations of the way the German nation was projected testifying to how vestiges from the past get carried over to the present and future. Indeed, the Third Reich’s vision for a “greater” Germany was not wholly new as the idea of a greater Germany had existed throughout the Holy Roman Empire and had been up for debate in the early years of the German confederation project. This idea of a German nation that went beyond actual physical state borders was carried over in the FGR by the CDU also when they sought to position the FGR as a Christian nation by resurrecting the idea of the Abendland or their insistence that the natural and normal integration of the FGR to the West was a return to a larger imagined community that Germany has always historically belonged to.

Just as symbols from the German nation’s past would be resurrected¹⁰³, ideas of past conceptualizations and understandings of national identity would continue to guide

¹⁰³ For example : Symbols of Prussia would appear throughout the Third Reich too and Goebbels, in 1932, would claim that, “National Socialism may justly claim that it is Prussianism” The idea, which we carry, is Prussian. The hallmarks, for which we fight are suffused with the Prussian spirit, and the aims which we are trying to achieve are rejuvenated from the ideals for which Frederick William I, Frederick the Great and Bismarck strived” (Goebbels, 1932). In addition, the ceremonies to mark the opening of the new session of the Reichstag after the elections of March 1933 became known as the “Day of Potsdam”. The opening of the Reichstag had originally been scheduled for the first week in April, but the date was moved up to March 21, the first day of spring and the anniversary of the opening of the first Reichstag in the German Empire (March 21, 1871). Additionally, the main festivities were moved from Berlin to the Potsdam Garrison Church, where Frederick II ("the Great") and his father, Frederick William I, were buried. Former crown prince William was present as a guest of honor and representative of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and his brothers Eitel Friedrich and Oskar (both members of the Steel Helmet [*Stahlhelm*] veterans’ organization) also took

present and future understandings and definitions of German national identity. Hence, we return to the idea that while political parties did act at the critical junctions that made space for new ideas possible, they were guided themselves by institutions but also ideas of the past. This is apparent for example in how citizenship was defined throughout German history. Indeed as Brubaker (1992) has analysed, citizenship laws provide an excellent opportunity to understand how a nation defines access to the nation. Despite transitioning from federal monarchy (1871-1918), democracy (Weimar Republic 1918-1933), totalitarian regime (1933-1945) and democracy (from 1945), Germany has continuously maintained a relatively strong ethnic component of citizenship. This has deep historical roots. Indeed, the quest for national unity in Germany was a long path in the making and a political union only was born under the leadership of Bismark in 1871. This long struggle for any form of political unity had the lasting effect to create a will on the behalf of Germans to seek cultural cohesion that has influenced how Germans saw each other. Indeed, very early on there was the idea that while Germany as a unified state did not exist, a German nation did. This meant that there were Germans living beyond the borders of established frontiers and this has shaped conceptualisations of German citizenship for all political actors in Germany. The NSDAP and the CDU were no different in this sense and they both continued to view Germans having descended from other Germans which meant that there were many “non-Germans” living in the physical territory of the FGR but also many “real Germans” living outside of the physical territory of the FGR. Linked to this continuous ethnic conceptualisation of nationhood, Germany has since unification maintained and carried over anti-Semitism which results from its understanding of ethnic citizenship. Indeed, the majority of Jewish immigrated into Germany from Russia, and non-German parts of Austria-Hungary in the later decades of the 19th Century following the economic boom of the German Empire. This led to very racist naturalization policies in the German Empire.

Levy and Weiss (2002) talk about a “blocked naturalisation” on the behalf of the Jews because, for example, in Prussia where more than 2/3 of the Jews lived (representing 10% of the foreign population), there was only a 1% naturalisation at the end of the German Empire. (Levy and Weiss, 2002: 64). While the Weimar Republic did not pass any anti-Semitic measures, the position of German Jews grew more difficult. There was localised anti-Semitism already present in Germany coming from small, local organisations and political movements and parties which translated concretely into localised violence, vandalism, racism (not accepting Jewish members into clubs). Furthermore, throughout the timeframe analysed, some of the opinion polls that I mentioned also testify to the enduring legacy of anti-Semitism and racism. Many Germans in the FGR maintained that while they

part in the “Day of Potsdam” celebrations together with a third brother, August William (an *Oberführer* in the SA).

did not have a problem with Jews they did not believe in “inter-racial” marriage for example or they continued to stereotype them with “inherent” traits that Germans considered as “Jewish”.

In addition, the FGR by pushing forward the conceptualisation of the German nation as essentially Christian not only had a negative effect on the surviving Jewish population in Germany by excluding them from the nation but by legitimising the important role that Christians played in the “protection” of Germany with the *Kirchenkampf* and the portrayal of Christians as being a main victim of National Socialism, the systemic persecution of Jewish during the Third Reich was partially ignored. In addition, the CDU’s insistence that National Socialism was explained by the loss of God to the profit of materialism had the effect of relaying inherent anti-Semitism present in Germany as a minor explanation.

Essentially, all these continuities have demonstrated that past conceptualisations of national identity continue to resurface. Using the terms of HI, “once created, institutions changes in subtle and gradual ways over time. Although less dramatic than abrupt and wholesale transformations these slow and piecemeal changes can be equally consequential for patterning human behaviour and for shaping substantive political outcomes” (Thelen, 2010: I). The same holds true for national identity. Hence, new policies, institutional arrangements or ideological paradigms do not replace the old but are layered atop prior patterns creating a “layered text” (Tulis, 1987). Basically HI allows scholars to recognize that political ideas and interests that had prevailed in the past may no longer find outlets in the same institutional settings or institutions. This means that political actors will often be induced to find new ways to define and advance their aims whether by finding a new institutional forum that is more receptive to their ideas or by adapting idea to take advantage of new institutional opportunities. The result is not that old orders are erased but rather that elements of them are recombined and reconfigured into a new set of political patterns that is recognizably new and yet retains some continuity with the old ones. How do we know when it’s the right time for a new idea? It is not about whether it is compelling rather it is about whether there are good political circumstances that favour it. With regards to the Third Reich, my analysis contended that the great depression proved to be a decisive critical juncture for the NSDAP to bring forwards new ideas of nationhood based on *Volksgemeinschaft* and the creation of a racially pure state that were nonetheless guided by past ideas of one *volk* dating to German romanticism, ethnic citizenship and anti-Semitism. With regards to the FGR, my analysis contended that at the end of WWII, Allied inspired creation of democratic institutions and Basic Law proved to be the necessary political circumstances for the CDU to push forward Christian values, west-integration, and social market economy as the main foundations of the ensuing German nation. Indeed, national political structures not only shape policy outcomes but also act as gatekeepers for political

ideas and cultural dispositions. Two main things should be emphasised here: the ideas of political actors matter (ideology) and the society's cultural repertoire is old, older than the actors and older than the institutions. In that sense, there will be ideational and institutional influences of the past onto the present. Hence, there are therefore contradictions and conflicts within each institutional setting as there is never a perfectly overlapped ideological and institutional order. This has been defined as intercurrency (Orren and Skowronek, 2004) which refers to the idea that internal frictions or contradictions between institutional layers, that change occurs or is dependant on how institutional arrangements create an arena conducive to entrepreneurial politics. In other words, the actors (in this analysis: political parties) drive change (in this analysis: national identity) but the range and scope is determined by historically constructed and pre-existing institutional arrangements. To reiterate and conclude, political parties are the agents of change but they do so because there are institutional opportunities and change is never complete in that ideational and institutional vestiges get "carried over".

3. Nationalism is a Political Concept

As the literature review brought up, what is often missing from studies on nationalism is the recognition that nationalism is a political concept. Indeed, rather than focusing on the cultural components that distinguish certain nations and national groups from others, it is essential to recognize why nations and national groups put the emphasis on culture or materialism in the first place. Understanding nationalism through the lens of politics can help explain this. Essentially, the main objective of national groups is the control of the state. This control is understood as being essential for the protection of its culture, identity, and resources. Hence, culture is used as a political tool in order to attain a broader goal, namely, control over the state. Hence, putting the focus on how national identity is "all about politics", we were able to pay attention to "who" is doing the diffusing and "what" is influencing its direction, rather than only testifying to what is being diffused. In other words, this thesis sought to look at how political parties are the main political actors doing the diffusing and how state institutions were influencing the direction of national identity. Indeed, this thesis found that the Basic Law provided an institutional framework that served as a filter through which the CDU based its vision for national identity.

4. State Nationalism

In addition, this thesis has essentially focused on nationalism as advocated by the state. In other words it sought to redirect our attention towards state nationalism. Often,

studies on nationalism have tended to conflate nationalism with minority nationalism. This means that the focus has been on minority groups who are seeking statehood or more autonomy. Unfortunately, what has often been ignored is how the majority group shapes its national identity. Indeed, as Gagnon and Lecours (2011) noted in both cases of minority and majority nationalism, there are no differences with regards to how culture is used as a “political resource” (Lecours, Gagnon, 2011: 9). In both cases, culture is merely a tool that is instrumentalized by a national group to increase power.

The state is an important tool in the case of majority nationalism in protecting the national aspirations of the majority group. Majority nationalism can be defined as “manifested in the maintenance of already-achieved state sovereignty, the protection of ethnic kin across the border, the safeguarding of majority-group national culture, and increasingly, the protection of majority-ethnicity civilian populations from terrorism” (Loizides, 2015: 2). Kaufmann (2011) also demonstrated that ethnic majorities are powerful actors in the shaping of national identity. He claims that majorities tend to see the nation as ‘theirs’. Hence, this thesis has sought to further develop the renewed interest in nationalism as advocated by the state or majority nationalism. The CDU as a political party of the dominant national group of Germans, used the state to advance their definition of German national identity. This is nationalism. This is also the strong recognition that understandings of culture were used in order to advance that vision. Hence, the emphasis on the Western traditions of German national identity and Germany’s Christian history were part of the strategy of a national group that was using culture as a political tool.

As addressed in the above paragraph, this thesis focused on state nationalism or majority nationalism. One of the problems in scholarship on nationalism is its ignorance of the nationalism “projected by the central, consolidated state” (Gagnon and Lecours, 2011: 4). This thesis sought to fill that gap by addressing how political parties diffuse national identity on a state level. But in doing so, it may be claimed by critics that the thesis is no longer analysing national identity but addressing state ideology. I would rather claim that it has touched down, in a broader sense, on the *interaction* between ideology and national identity. Indeed, it sought to contribute to the work already done that understands that national identity is related but not reduced to what may be perceived as state ideology. Hence it builds on the idea that ideology, foreign policy and social policy influence national identity, and while are both part of state identity, they are not the same thing (Beland and Lecours, 2004, Fawn, 2002, Bloomaert, 1999 and Lamp and Mazower, 2004). Indeed, as defined throughout this thesis, it has been demonstrated that political parties are powerful political actors in defining and redefining national identity, but that change itself is felt more gradually.

Limits and Future Research

One limit of this thesis was that it did not focus on German literature by German authors. Indeed, although it did try as much as possible to integrate German scholarship, due to language issues, the thesis' literature was limited to literature that had either been translated or originally written in English or in French. However, its principle limit is that only one case study was addressed. While, single case studies are increasingly being recognized as having analytical interest in social sciences because of the in-depth insight that they can provide about the broad phenomenon (Levy, 2011 and Yin, 2004), its comparative strength is weak. For this thesis, time and financial constraints ended up limiting this analysis to Germany, but it would be interesting to analyse other cases in order to further illustrate the influence that political parties play in the development of national identities. One strong potential study is Japan. Indeed, Japan has several of the same characteristics (such as a significant shift in national identity before and after WWII, a change in national identity coinciding with the creation of new political institutions and new political actors) and could be used as a good case study to compare to this one about Germany.

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Annexe

Document 1. “Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Bonn May 23, 1949” Archives Nationales du Luxembourg, Luxembourg. Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Question allemande. Loi fondamentale de l'Allemagne 1949, AE 4191.

Basic Rights

Article 1

[Human dignity – Human rights – Legally binding force of basic rights]

- (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.
- (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
- (3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.

Article 2

[Personal freedoms]

- (1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.
- (2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.

Article 3

[Equality before the law]

- (1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
- (2) Men and women shall have equal rights. The state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.
- (3) No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavoured because of disability.

Article 4

[Freedom of faith and conscience]

- (1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be inviolable.
- (2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
- (3) No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render military service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.

Article 5

[Freedom of expression, arts and sciences]

- (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.

(2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour.

(3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.

Article 19

[Restriction of basic rights – Legal remedies]

(1) Insofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law must apply generally and not merely to a single case. In addition, the law must specify the basic right affected and the Article in which it appears.

(2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected.

(3) The basic rights shall also apply to domestic artificial persons to the extent that the nature of such rights permits.

(4) Should any person's rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts. If no other jurisdiction has been established, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. The second sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 10 shall not be affected by this paragraph.

II. The Federation and the *Länder*

Article 20

[Constitutional principles – Right of resistance]

(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.

(2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies.

(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.

(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available

Document 2. “From the Movement. National Socialist German Workers’ Party.” VB, No. 16, March 3, 1921 translated in Muhlberger, 2004: 43-44).

1. We demand the union of all Germans in a Great Germany on the basis of the principle of self-determination of all peoples.
- 2.
2. We demand that the German people have rights equal to those of other nations; and that the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain shall be abrogated.
3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the maintenance of our people and the settlement of our surplus population.
4. Only those who are our fellow countrymen can become citizens. Only those who have German blood, regardless of creed, can be our countrymen. Hence no Jew can be a countryman.
5. Those who are not citizens must live in Germany as foreigners and must be subject to the law of aliens.
6. The right to choose the government and determine the laws of the State shall belong only to citizens. We therefore demand that no public office, of whatever nature, whether in the central government, the province, or the municipality, shall be held by anyone who is not a citizen.
We wage war against the corrupt parliamentary administration whereby men are appointed to posts by favor of the party without regard to character and fitness.
7. We demand that the State shall above all undertake to ensure that every citizen shall have the possibility of living decently and earning a livelihood. If it should not be possible to feed the whole population, then aliens (non-citizens) must be expelled from the Reich.
8. Any further immigration of non-Germans must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who have entered Germany since August 2, 1914, shall be compelled to leave the Reich immediately.
9. All citizens must possess equal rights and duties.
10. The first duty of every citizen must be to work mentally or physically. No individual shall do any work that offends against the interest of the community to the benefit of all.

Therefore we demand:

11. That all unearned income, and all income that does not arise from work, be

abolished.

12. Since every war imposes on the people fearful sacrifices in blood and treasure, all personal profit arising from the war must be regarded as treason to the people. We therefore demand the total confiscation of all war profits.

13. We demand the nationalization of all trusts.

14. We demand profit-sharing in large industries.

15. We demand a generous increase in old-age pensions.

16. We demand the creation and maintenance of a sound middle-class, the immediate communalization of large stores which will be rented cheaply to small tradespeople, and the strongest consideration must be given to ensure that small traders shall deliver the supplies needed by the State, the provinces and municipalities.

17. We demand an agrarian reform in accordance with our national requirements, and the enactment of a law to expropriate the owners without compensation of any land needed for the common purpose. The abolition of ground rents, and the prohibition of all speculation in land.

18. We demand that ruthless war be waged against those who work to the injury of the common welfare. Traitors, usurers, profiteers, etc., are to be punished with death, regardless of creed or race.

19. We demand that Roman law, which serves a materialist ordering of the world, be replaced by German common law.

20. In order to make it possible for every capable and industrious German to obtain higher education, and thus the opportunity to reach into positions of leadership, the State must assume the responsibility of organizing thoroughly the entire cultural system of the people. The curricula of all educational establishments shall be adapted to practical life. The conception of the State Idea (science of citizenship) must be taught in the schools from the very beginning. We demand that specially talented children of poor parents, whatever their station or occupation, be educated at the expense of the State.

21. The State has the duty to help raise the standard of national health by providing maternity welfare centers, by prohibiting juvenile labor, by increasing physical fitness through the introduction of compulsory games and gymnastics, and by the greatest possible encouragement of associations concerned with the physical education of the young.

22. We demand the abolition of the regular army and the creation of a national (folk) army.

23. We demand that there be a legal campaign against those who propagate deliberate political lies and disseminate them through the press. In order to make possible

the creation of a German press, we demand:

(a) All editors and their assistants on newspapers published in the German language shall be German citizens.

(b) Non-German newspapers shall only be published with the express permission of the State. They must not be published in the German language.

(c) All financial interests in or in any way affecting German newspapers shall be forbidden to non-Germans by law, and we demand that the punishment for transgressing this law be the immediate suppression of the newspaper and the expulsion of the non-Germans from the Reich.

Newspapers transgressing against the common welfare shall be suppressed. We demand legal action against those tendencies in art and literature that have a disruptive influence upon the life of our folk, and that any organizations that offend against the foregoing demands shall be dissolved.

24. We demand freedom for all religious faiths in the state, insofar as they do not endanger its existence or offend the moral and ethical sense of the Germanic race.

The party as such represents the point of view of a positive Christianity without binding itself to any one particular confession. It fights against the Jewish materialist spirit within and without, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our folk can only come about from within on the principle:

COMMON GOOD BEFORE INDIVIDUAL GOOD

25. In order to carry out this program we demand: the creation of a strong central authority in the State, the unconditional authority by the political central parliament of the whole State and all its organizations.

The formation of professional committees and of committees representing the several estates of the realm, to ensure that the laws promulgated by the central authority shall be carried out by the federal states.

The leaders of the party undertake to promote the execution of the foregoing points at all costs, if necessary at the sacrifice of their own lives.

Document 3. “Godesberg Program of the SPD”. Volume 8. Occupation and the Emergence of Two States, 1945-1961 Godesberg Program of the SPD (November 1959)

Freedom and justice are interdependent, since the dignity of man rests on his claim to individual responsibility just as much as on his acknowledgement of the right of others to develop their personality and, as equal partners, help shape society.

Freedom, justice and solidarity, which are everyone’s obligation towards his neighbours and spring from our common humanity, are the fundamental values of Socialism.

Democratic Socialism, which in Europe is rooted in Christian ethics, humanism and classical philosophy, does not proclaim ultimate truths – not because of any lack of understanding for or indifference to philosophical or religious truths, but out of respect for the individual’s choice in these matters of conscience in which neither the state nor any political party should be allowed to interfere.

The Social Democratic Party is the party of freedom of thought. It is a community of men holding different beliefs and ideas. Their agreement is based on the moral principles and political aims they have in common. The Social Democratic Party strives for a way of life in accordance with these principles. Socialism is a constant task – to fight for freedom and justice, to preserve them and to live up to them.

Basic Demands for a Society Worthy of Man

From the acceptance of Democratic Socialism follow certain basic demands which must be fulfilled in a society worthy of man.

All peoples must submit to the rule of international law backed by adequate executive power. War must be ruled out as a means of policy.

All peoples must have equal opportunities to share in the world’s wealth. Developing countries have a claim to the help of other peoples.

We are fighting for democracy. Democracy must become the universal form of state organisation and way of life because it is founded on respect for the dignity of man and his individual responsibility.

We resist every dictatorship, every form of totalitarian or authoritarian rule because they violate human dignity, destroy man’s freedom and the rule of law. Socialism can be realised only through democracy and democracy can only be fulfilled through Socialism.

Communists have no right to invoke Socialist traditions. In fact, they have falsified Socialist ideas. Socialists are struggling for the realisation of freedom and justice while Communists exploit the conflicts in society to establish the dictatorship of their party. In

the democratic state, every form of power must be subject to public control. The interest of the individual must be subordinated to the interest of the community. Democracy, social security and individual freedom are endangered by an economic and social system in which striving for profit and power are the distinguishing features. Democratic Socialism therefore aspires after a new economic and social order.

All privileged access to educational institutions must be abolished. Talent and achievement should be the sole criteria of advancement.

Freedom and justice cannot be guaranteed by institutions alone. Technology and organisation are exerting a growing influence on all areas of life. This creates new dependencies which threaten freedom. Only diversity in economic, social and cultural life can stimulate the creative powers of the individual without which man's mind is paralysed.

Freedom and democracy are only thinkable in an industrial society if a constantly growing number of people develop a social consciousness and are ready to help shoulder responsibility. A decisive means to this end is political education in its widest sense. It is an essential objective of all educational efforts in our time.

The Order of the State

The Social Democratic Party of Germany lives and works in the whole of Germany. It stands by the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic. In accordance with the Basic Law it strives for German unity in freedom.

The division of Germany is a threat to peace. To end this division is a vital interest of the German people.

Not until Germany is reunited, will the whole people be able freely to determine the content and form of the state and society.

Man's life, his dignity and his conscience take precedence over the state. Every citizen must respect the convictions of his fellow men. It is the duty of the state to protect freedom of faith and freedom of conscience.

The state should create the conditions in which the individual may freely develop his personality, responsible to himself but conscious of his obligations to society. Established fundamental rights do not only protect the freedom of the individual in relation to the state; they should also be regarded as social rights which constitute the basis of the state.

The social function of the state is to provide social security for its citizens to enable everyone to be responsible for shaping his own life freely and to further the development of a free society.

The state becomes a truly civilised state (Kulturstaat) through the fusion of the democratic idea with the ideas of social security and the rule of law. It depends for its content on the forces prevalent in society, and its task is to serve the creative spirit of man.

The Social Democratic Party affirms its adherence to democracy. In a democracy the power of the state is derived from the people and the government is always responsible to Parliament whose confidence it must possess. In a democracy the rights of the minority as well as the rights of the majority must be respected; government and opposition have different tasks of equal importance; both share in the responsibility for the state.

The Social Democratic Party aims to win the support of the majority of the people by competing under equal conditions with other democratic parties in order to build a society and a state that accord with the essential demands of democratic Socialism.

Legislature, executive and judiciary should operate separately and it is the duty of each to serve the public interest. The existence of three levels of authority—Federal, State, and Local – ensures the distribution of power, strengthens freedom and through co-determination and co-responsibility gives the citizen manifold access to democratic institutions. Free local communities are vital to a living democracy. The Social Democratic Party therefore supports the principles of local self-government which must be extended and given adequate financial support.

Associations in which people of different groups and sections of the population unite for common ends are necessary institutions of modern society. They must be democratically organised. The more powerful they are, the greater is the responsibility they carry, but the greater also is the danger of their abusing their power. Parliaments, administration and courts must not be allowed to come under the one-sided influence of vested interests.

Press, radio, television and cinema fulfill public tasks. They must be independent and free to gather information wherever they wish, to comment on it and to distribute it, and to form and express their own opinions. Radio and television should remain under the control of public corporations, and be directed by free and democratic boards. They must be safeguarded against pressure from interest groups.

Judges must have outer and inner independence if they are to serve justice in the name of the people. Lay judges should play an equally important part in jurisdiction. Only independent judges can pass judgment on criminal offences. Neither wealth nor poverty should have an influence on people's access to courts or on jurisdiction. Legislation must keep pace with the development of society if justice is to be done and if the people's sense of justice is not to be violated.

National Defence

The Social Democratic Party affirms the need to defend the free democratic society. It is in favour of national defence.

National defence must be adapted to the political and geographical position of Germany and therefore stay within the limits imposed by the necessity of creating the conditions for an easing of international tensions, for effectively controlled disarmament and for the reunification of Germany. Protection of the civilian population is an essential part of a country's defence.

The Social Democratic Party demands that the means of mass destruction be banned by international law in the whole world.

The Economy

The goal of Social Democratic economic policy is the constant growth of prosperity and a just share for all in the national product, a life in freedom without undignified dependence and without exploitation.

The Second Industrial Revolution makes possible a rise in the general standard of living greater than ever before and the elimination of poverty and misery still suffered by large numbers of people.

Economic policy must secure full employment whilst maintaining a stable currency, increase productivity and raise general prosperity.

To enable all people to take part in the country's growing prosperity there must be planning to adjust the economy to the constant structural changes in order to achieve a balanced economic development.

Such a policy demands national accounting and a national budget. The national budget must be approved by Parliament. It is binding on government policy, provides an important basis for the policies of the autonomous central bank, and establishes guiding lines for the economy which keeps its right to make independent decisions.

The modern state exerts a constant influence on the economy through its policies on taxation, finance, currency and credits, customs, trade, social services, prices and public contracts as well as agriculture and housing. More than a third of the national income passes through the hands of the government. The question is therefore not whether measures of economic planning and control serve a purpose, but rather who should apply these measures and for whose benefit. The state cannot shirk its responsibility for the course the economy takes. It is responsible for securing a forward-looking policy with regard to business cycles and should restrict itself to influencing the economy mainly by indirect means.

Free choice of consumer goods and services, free choice of working place, freedom for employers to exercise their initiative as well as free competition are essential conditions of a Social Democratic economic policy. The autonomy of trade unions and employers' associations in collective bargaining is an important feature of a free society. Totalitarian control of the economy destroys freedom. The Social Democratic Party therefore favours a free market wherever free competition really exists. Where a market is dominated by

individuals or groups, however, all manner of steps must be taken to protect freedom in the economic sphere. As much competition as possible – as much planning as necessary.

Ownership and Power

A significant feature of the modern economy is the constantly increasing tendency toward concentration. Large-scale enterprises exert a decisive influence not only on the development of the economy and the standard of living but also on the structure of the economy and of society. Those who control large industrial concerns, huge financial resources and tens of thousands of employees do not merely perform an economic function but wield decisive power over men; wage and salary earners are kept in a position of dependence, and not only in purely economic and material matters.

Wherever large-scale enterprises predominate, free competition is eliminated. Those who have less power have fewer opportunities for development, and remain more or less fettered. The consumer occupies the most vulnerable position of all in the economy.

Increased power through cartels and associations gives the leaders of big business an influence on politics and the state which is irreconcilable with democratic principles. They usurp the authority of the state. Economic power becomes political power.

This development is a challenge to all who consider freedom, justice, human dignity and social security the foundations of human society.

The key task of an economic policy concerned with freedom is therefore to contain the power of big business. State and society must not be allowed to become the prey of powerful sectional groups.

Private ownership of the means of production can claim protection by society as long as it does not hinder the establishment of social justice. Efficient small and medium sized enterprises are to be strengthened to enable them to prevail in competition with large-scale enterprises.

Competition by public enterprise is an important means of preventing private enterprise from dominating the market. Public enterprise should safeguard the interests of the community as a whole. It becomes a necessity where, for natural or technical reasons, economic functions vital to the community cannot be carried out in a rational way except by excluding competition.

Enterprises which are built up on a voluntary collective basis and whose purpose it is to satisfy demand rather than earn private profits help to regulate prices and serve the interests of the consumer. They perform a valuable function in a democratic society and should be supported.

Large-scale publicity should give the people an insight into the power structure of the economy and into business practices in order that public opinion may be mobilised against abuses of power.

Effective public control must prevent the abuse of economic power. The most important means to this end are investment control and control over the forces dominating the market.

Public ownership is a legitimate form of public control which no modern state can do without. It serves to protect freedom against domination by large economic concerns. In these concerns power is held today by managers who are themselves the servants of anonymous forces. Private ownership of the means of production is therefore no longer identical with the control of power. Economic power, rather than ownership, is the central problem today. Where sound economic power relations cannot be guaranteed by other means, public ownership is appropriate and necessary.

Every concentration of economic power, even in the hands of the state, harbours dangers. This is why the principles of self-government and decentralisation must be applied to the public sector. The interests of wage and salary earners as well as the public interest and the interests of the consumer must be represented on the management boards of public enterprises. Not centralised bureaucracy but responsible co-operation between all concerned serves the interests of the community best.

Distribution of Income and Wealth

The competition economy does not guarantee by itself just distribution of income and wealth. This can only be achieved through measures of economic policy. Income and wealth are distributed unjustly. This is not only the result of mass destruction of property through crises, war and inflation but is largely due to an economic and fiscal policy which has favoured large incomes and the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few, and which has made it difficult for those without capital to acquire it. The Social Democratic Party aims to create conditions in which everybody is able to save part of his rising income and acquire property. This presupposes a constant increase in production and a fair distribution of the national income. Wage and salary policies are adequate and necessary means of distributing incomes and wealth more justly.

Appropriate measures must ensure that an adequate part of the steadily growing capital of big business is widely distributed or made to serve public purposes. It is a deplorable symptom of our times that privileged groups in society indulge in luxury while important public tasks, especially in the fields of science, research and education, are neglected in a way unworthy of a civilised nation.

Agriculture

The principles of Social Democratic economic policy apply also to agriculture. The structure of agriculture, however, and its dependence on uncontrollable forces of nature call for special measures.

The farmer is entitled to own his land. Efficient family holdings should be protected by modern laws on land tenure and leases.

Support of the existing system of co-operatives is the best way of increasing the efficiency of small and medium sized holdings whilst maintaining their independence. Agriculture must adjust itself to the changing economic structure in order to make its proper contribution to economic development and to assure an adequate standard of living to the people working in it. These changes are determined not only by technical and scientific progress, but also by the changes in the location of the market within the framework of European co-operation and by the fact that the German economy is increasingly linked with that of the rest of the world. The modernisation of agriculture and its efficiency are a public responsibility. The interests of the farming population are best served by the integration of agriculture into an economy with high productivity and an ever more widely distributed mass purchasing power. Price and market policies necessary to protect agricultural incomes should take into account the interests of the consumers and of the economy as a whole.

The cultural, economic, and social condition of the entire farming population must be improved. The lag in social legislation must be overcome.

Trade Unions in the Economy

All wage and salary earners and civil servants have the right to free association in trade unions. They would be helplessly exposed to those in positions of command in enterprises and concerns unless they were able to confront the latter with the united force of their free and democratically organised trade unions and freely to agree on working conditions.

Trade unions fight to secure wage and salary earners a fair share of the country's wealth and the right to a voice in decisions affecting economic and social life. They fight for greater freedom and act as representatives of all working people. This makes them an important element in the constant process of democratisation. It is the unions' great task to enable every employee to shoulder responsibility and to see to it that he can make use of his abilities.

Wage and salary earners whose contribution to production is decisive have so far been deprived of an effective say in economic life. Democracy, however, demands that workers should be given a voice and that codetermination be extended to all branches of the economy. From being a servant the worker must become a citizen of the economy. Co-determination in the iron and steel industry and in coal mining marks the beginning of a new economic structure. The next step should be the establishment of a democratic organisational structure in all large enterprises. Co-determination by employees in the independent administrative bodies set up in the economy must be secured.

Social Responsibility

Social policy must create the essential conditions which allow the individual to unfold himself freely in society and which determine his life according to his own responsibility. Social conditions that lead to individual and social hardship cannot be accepted as inevitable and unchangeable. The system of social security must correspond to the dignity of responsible individuals.

Every citizen has the right to a minimum state pension in case of old age or inability to earn a living, or at the death of the family's provider. This pension is supplemented by other personally acquired pension claims. In this way the individual standard of living will be sustained. Social allowances of all kinds, including pensions for war-disabled and their dependents, must be regularly adjusted to the rise in earned incomes.

Technology and modern civilisation expose people to many dangers to their health. They threaten not only the living generation but future generations as well. The individual is unable to protect himself against these hazards. The Social Democratic Party therefore demands comprehensive health protection. Health policy must be perfected, and the conditions and ways of living must be shaped in a way conducive to making life in sound health possible. Public health protection, especially protection at work and effective methods of preventing damage to health in individuals, must be developed. A sense of personal responsibility in respect of one's health must be aroused and the doctor of one's choice must be given full facilities for the preservation of health and prevention of illness. The professional freedom of decision of doctors must be ensured. The provision of adequately equipped hospitals is a public task.

Since all people should have an equal chance to live, all must have access to the treatment made available through modern technical research when they are in need of it, regardless of their financial position. Such medical treatment must be supplemented by adequate economic assistance in the case of illness.

Working hours should be progressively shortened without prejudice to income levels and in step with the development of the economy. In order to cope with particularly difficult situations in life and in special cases of need, the general social allowances must be supplemented by individual care and social aid. Social aid should be given in co-operation with independent voluntary welfare organisations and institutions for mutual aid and self-help. The independence of free welfare organisations must be protected.

All labour and social legislation should be ordered and compiled in a surveyable code on labour legislation and a code on social legislation. Everyone has a right to a decent place in which to live. It is the home of the family. It must therefore continue to receive social protection and must not be the mere object of private gain.

The housing shortage must speedily be eliminated through effective building programmes. Public housing must be encouraged and social considerations must be taken

into account when determining rents. Speculation in real estate should be prohibited and excessive gains from the sale of real estate taxed away.

Woman–Family–Youth

Equality of rights for women should be realised in the legal, economic and social spheres. Women must be given equal opportunities in education and occupational training, in the choice and practice of professions and in earnings. The special psychological and biological characteristics of women should not be disregarded because they have equal rights. The work of the housewife should be recognised as an occupation. The housewife and mother is in need of social assistance. Mothers of children of pre-school age and school-age should not be compelled by economic need to seek gainful employment.

State and society must protect, support and strengthen the family. By supporting the material security of the family, society recognises its moral value. Effective help should be given to the family by generous tax allowances for parents, and by maternity benefits and family allowances.

Young people must be enabled to manage their own lives and grow up ready to assume their responsibilities towards society. It is therefore the task of state and society to strengthen the educational function of the family, to supplement it where it does not suffice, and, if need be, to provide an alternative. A system of grants and scholarships must ensure that special abilities and aptitudes of young people are fully developed in their vocational and professional training.

The protection of the young workers must be adjusted to present-day social conditions and educational experience. If the young people are entrusted at an early stage with a share in the work and responsibilities of adults, they will become well-informed and determined democrats. Progressive youth legislation should guarantee the young people's right to education and development of their personality. In all areas of life which concern education or the encouragement and protection of youth, the welfare of youth must have priority over all other considerations.

Cultural Life

The creative powers of the individual must be given a chance to unfold freely in a full and diverse cultural life. The state should encourage and support all forces willing to make a contribution to cultural progress. The state must protect the citizen against all attempts by power groups or sectional interests at making the people's spiritual and cultural life subservient to their own purposes.

Religion and Church

Only mutual tolerance which respects the dignity of all men regardless of differences in belief and conviction, offers a sound basis for political and human co-operation in society.

Socialism is no substitute for religion. The Social Democratic Party respects churches and religious societies. It affirms their public and legal status, their special mission and their autonomy.

It is always ready to co-operate with the churches on the basis of a free partnership. It welcomes the fact that men are moved by their religious faith to acknowledge their social obligation and their responsibilities towards society. Freedom of thought, of religion and of conscience, and freedom to preach the gospel must be protected. Any abuse of this freedom for partisan or anti-democratic ends cannot be tolerated.

Education

Education must give an opportunity to all freely to develop their abilities and capacities. It must strengthen the will to resist the conformist tendencies of our time. Knowledge and the acquisition of traditional cultural values, and a thorough understanding of the formative forces in society, are essential to the development of independent thinking and free judgment.

School and university should bring up youth in a spirit of mutual respect. Youth should be taught to appreciate the values of freedom, independence and social responsibility as well as the ideals of democracy and international understanding. The aim should be to encourage tolerance, mutual understanding and solidarity in our society in which so many philosophical viewpoints and systems of value exist side by side. The curricula of schools should therefore pay proper attention to education for citizenship.
[...]

Our Way

The Socialist movement has an historic task. It began as a spontaneous moral protest of wage earners against the capitalist system. The tremendous development of the productive forces with the help of science and technology brought wealth and power to a small group of people, but only destitution and misery to the workers. To abolish the privileges of the ruling classes and to secure freedom, justice and prosperity for all was and remains the essence of the Socialist aim.

The working class had to rely on its own resources in its struggle. It acquired self-confidence by becoming conscious of its own position and by its determination to change this position by united action and the experience of success in its struggle. Despite heavy setbacks and some errors the Labour movement succeeded in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in winning recognition for many of its demands. The proletarian who was once without protection and rights, who had to work sixteen hours a day for a starvation wage, achieved the eight-hour day, protection at work, insurance against unemployment, sickness, disability and destitution in old age. He achieved the prohibition of child labour and night work for women, the legal protection of youth and mothers, and holidays with pay. He successfully fought for the right to assemble and to form trade

unions, the right to collective bargaining and to strike. He is about to obtain the right to co-determination. Once a mere object of exploitation, the worker now occupies the position of a citizen in the state with equal rights and obligations.

In several countries of Europe the foundations of a new society have been laid under Social Democratic governments. Social security and the democratisation of the economy are being realised to an increasing extent.

These successes represent milestones on the march forward of the Labour movement which has demanded so many sacrifices. The emancipation of the workers helped to enlarge the freedom of all men. From a party of the working class the Social Democratic Party has become a party of the people. It is determined to put the forces unleashed by the industrial revolution and the advance of technology in all spheres of life to the service of freedom and justice for all. The social forces which built the capitalist world cannot tackle this task. Their historical record is one of impressive technical and economic advance, but also of destructive wars, mass unemployment, inflation which robbed people of their savings, and economic insecurity. The old forces are unable to oppose the brutal Communist challenge with a better programme for a new society, in which individual and political freedom is enhanced, and economic security and social justice guaranteed. This is why they cannot satisfy the claims for assistance and solidarity from the young states which are about to throw off the yoke of colonial exploitation, to shape their destinies in freedom and to insist on participation in the world's wealth. These states are resisting the lure of Communism which is trying to draw them into its sphere of influence.

Communists are radical suppressors of freedom and violators of human rights and of the self-determination of individuals and peoples. The people in the countries under Communist domination are increasingly opposing the Communist regime. Even in those countries changes are taking place. Even there, the longing for freedom is growing which no system can wholly suppress in the long run. But the Communist rulers are fighting for their own survival. They are building up military and economic power for which their peoples have to pay the price and which represents an increasing threat to freedom.

Only the prospect of a society based on the fundamental values of democratic Socialism can offer the world new hope, a society resting on respect for human dignity, on freedom from want and fear, from war and oppression, which is built in co-operation with all men of good will.

This message is addressed to all men and women in this country as well as in other parts of the world.

In Germany Socialists are united in the Social Democratic Party which welcomes to its ranks all who accept the fundamental values and demands of Democratic Socialism.

Document 4: CDU/CSU - MÄNNER NEBEN ADENAUER: Professor Ludwig Erhard WOHLSTAND FÜR ALLE · EINHEIT FÜR DEUTSCHLAND · FRIEDEN IN DER WELT

Russell", erklärte Beckhoff, "sie hat ihn in der Klinik konserviert. Wenn er wieder erwacht, lasse ihn ruhig mit ihm sein."

Erhard aber ging nicht nach Hause zur Via Agrippa, sondern in ein Warenhaus. So ist die Vergangenheit der letzten Stunden bei einem schweren Virus raus zu versetzen. Er hat es nicht in der Nacht kann er beim. Er hat noch sehr lange weite, spitz und versucht in Zorn und Töner zu versetzen, was er auch nicht begreifen hatte. Er war ihm jedoch klar. Maria, was immer überdies, der seine auch nicht. Das war für ihn eine Enttäuschung, die in ihre Unfähigkeit der gleichen, die ihn Heide damals herbei hatte, als sie ihn schied, das sie einen anderen heiraten würde.

Erst gegen Morgen fand er in die Haltung eines Mannes zurück, der auch mit einem solchen Scheitern leben wollte. In war ja schließlich nicht das schlimmste Heide.

Maria -- der Unterschied war gering. Vorwiegend bestand er nur in der Dürftigkeit ihrer notwendigen Lügen. Er versagte, dass er Heide nicht verachtet. Sie war ihm von Herzen ergeben gewesen. Maria erregte -- das fühlte er gut -- wie ein Mädchen eine Frau.

Er stand auf, ging ins Badezimmer und schaute die kalte Brause auf. Sie sollten ihn nicht unterkriegen, nicht Heide, und auch nicht Maria.

Nun gerade nicht?

Er hatte ein paar Erfahrungen mehr gemacht. Die Frauen, mit denen er in nächster Zeit umgehen würde, sollten das so spüren bekommen.

Am nächsten Tag brachte ihn, genau wie damals, der Arbeitstag nach Berlin.

Der Plüsch am Eingang der Autobahn war noch denselbe von damals. Er erinnerte ihn jungen frischen Deutschen sofort wieder.

"Man sieht, Sie sind wieder gut auf den Beinen", sagte er lachend. "Es war damals nach dem Unfall eine Autounfall, getrennt von einem Unfall. Sie mal", dabei zeigte er auf seinen linken Arm. "Ich habe da ein Kreuz bei Berlin auch. Wunderbar!"

Dann ließ er Erhard einsteigen.

Unabhängig von der Frage zum ersten Stock empor für konnte die Bewegung mit Drucker. Besser, kann erwarten und die Bestätigung, dass er hier wieder Arbeit finden würde.

Aber der junge Mann im Vorgesetzten-Büro, natürlich, dass der Comandante nicht mehr die Arbeitsfähigkeit verlor sei.

"Ich habe ihn aber doch geschickt", sagte Erhard, schlicht entsetzt, "ich war die letzte Hoffnung, er könnte etwas für mich tun. Wann wird er denn wieder zurück sein?"

Der Sekretär zuckte vorzeitig mit den Schultern. Er zeigte Erhard eine Zigarette herüber, die Erhard nervös entzündete.

"Wissen Sie", sagte Erhard, "die können mich nicht. Als ich noch hier im Werk eingesetzt war, soll es Ihre Stelle eine junge Dame -- ich bin gewissermaßen Menschenschein und im Kaufmannsstand, nicht unwahrscheinlich. Ich würde Herrn Bismarck mit sagen, dass ich zu jeder Arbeit bereit bin, habe Sie zu jeder! Wenn Sie ein gutes Wort für mich einlegen würden, wäre ich Ihnen sehr dankbar. Nur als Beauftragter kann ich ja wohl nicht mehr verwendet werden. Das ist natürlich für mich ein böser Schicksal, denn ich war immer ein guter Herr. Ich bin, was ich immer den besten Menschen, was ich immer den besten Menschen war."

Erhard trat plötzlich eine halbkreisförmige Seite ein. Schenken in Bernau Zimmer. Keine neue Schritte. Eine Tür wurde leise ins Schließ gelockt. Erhard sah den Mann, hinter seinem Schreibtisch in Verlegenheit windenden jungen Mann an.

Lied Herr Direktor Bismarck sich etwas verlegen?"

Erhard nickte.

MÄNNER NEBEN ADENAUER:

Professor Ludwig Erhard

Als die Menschen im Juni 1948 an die Schalter der Banken und Sparkassen drängten, um das schlechte Geld in neue Scheine umzutauschen, ertönte über die Rundfunksender der „Frei Westposten“ die Stimme eines Mannes, die der Bevölkerung bis auf den heutigen Tag im Ohr geblieben ist. Es war die Stimme Ludwig Erhards. Er tat, was er seither immer wieder getan hat: er machte mit sicheren, überzeugenden Worten zur Vernunft. Als Leiter der obersten Wirtschaftsbehörde jener Zeit unternahm er zugleich ein Werk von geschichtlicher Bedeutung.



Entgegen den Weissagen und Ratschlägen der Anhänger einer staatlichen Kommandowirtschaft schaffte er die Lebensmittelkarten und Bezugsheine ab. Damit verließ er der D-Mark echte Kaufkraft.

Adenauer hatte den mutigen Professor 1949 als Wirtschaftsminister in die erste, frei gewählte Regierung der Bundesrepublik. Erhard ist seiner Linie, Anwalt der Verbraucher zu sein, bis auf den heutigen Tag treu geblieben. Er gilt als unverwundlicher Optimist. Aber seine Kraftquellen liegen tiefer. Er glaubt an wissenschaftlich begründeter Erkenntnis an die Idee der Freiheit. Mit der Überlegenheit seiner Persönlichkeit sagt der geborene Franke den Unternehmern und den Gewerkschaften oft unbesorgte Wahrheiten. Er will, daß freie Arbeit und freie Nachfrage den Markt regeln. Die gute und ausreichende Versorgung des Verbrauchers ist seiner Meinung nach die Grundlage einer gesunden Volkswirtschaft. - 80 Prozent der Löhne und Gehälter gehen durch die Hand der Hausfrauen. Deshalb spricht der Wirtschaftsminister mit Vorliebe zu ihnen, deshalb kümmert er sich persönlich um die Preise. Die Hausfrauen sind seine wichtigsten Partner. Ludwig Erhard gehört zur CDU/CSU, der Partei, die unheilt ihre Ziele verfolgt:

WOHLSTAND FÜR ALLE · EINHEIT FÜR DEUTSCHLAND · FRIEDEN IN DER WELT

Document 5: Wohlstand für alle – Einheit für Deutschland – Frieden in der Welt

[illegible]

Document 6: CDU Election Posters (source Plakatarchiv, ACDP)



ERHARD hält, was er verspricht:
Wohlstand für alle durch die
SOZIALE MARKTWIRTSCHAFT

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