Fairest of Them All? Examining Canada's Changing Foreign Policy Identity and Discourse

Catherine Dos Santos

Submitted to the University of Ottawa
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts
In the Program of
Public and International Affairs

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract

The debate on identity continues to underscore an unsettling insecurity within the annals of Canadian foreign policy. The ascendancy of the Harper government is viewed by many scholars and practitioners as a radical realignment and challenge to the liberal international orthodoxy governing Canada's foreign policy identity, and concomitantly, its discourse and practice. Utilising David's Campbell's exposition on performativity and identity, this paper seeks to examine and explore the foundational tenets of Canada's foreign policy identity, seeking to understand the shifts, contradictions, and ambiguities inherent within the perceived changing precepts of Canadian's external/internal identity.

Keywords: (neo)continentalism, Canadian foreign policy, liberal internationalism, identity, performativity, foreign policy

Quebeckers no longer recognize themselves in Canada's foreign policy, which has turned its back on a tradition of openness, mediation, and multilateralism[1]

In the life of a nation, we are called upon to define who we are and what we believe.[2]

Introduction

For students, practitioners, and the Canadian public writ large the liberal internationalist perspective is often lauded and accepted as Canada's "natural" governing strategy, and concomitantly, a cornerstone of its identity. Indeed, like the above quote by Quebec's own sovereigntist Premier demonstrates, Canada's liberal internationalist principles participate in performatively constituting the key elements in defining and mirroring a pan-Canadian set of values at home and abroad. Even for those who do not accept the Canadian state as legitimate such as Quebec's sovereignty movement, there is an acknowledged sense of a particular set of values embedded within the discourse. Yet, the purposeful pursuit of the liberal internationalist perspective as Canada's chosen statecraft was deliberate in its intent to uniquely fashion a Canadian response to international developments at the time. Its lineage as such can be traced to Canada's assertion of functional representation which sought to maximize and leverage Canada's expertise and by extension, its importance, by gaining a place at key decision-making bodies. Acting as the precursor to the philosophical underpinnings of the middle power paradigm, functionalism ascribes that certain states that are not great powers still hold influence more than smaller states and thus should be accorded stature; thereby reinforcing and perpetuating the continued hierarchical and unequal nature of power in the international system.

[1] Sophie Cousineau, "Canadian foreign policy doesn't align with Quebeckers values: Premier Marois," Globe and Mail. (October 16, 2012) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-foreign-policy-doesnt-align-with-quebeckers-values-premier-marois/article4615437/

[2] Quote by President George Bush Senior. Quoted in David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) p.3

Thus, officials held that the Canadian self was more important, and *ergo* superior, to that of the Dominican Republic or El Salvador by virtue of Canada's sacrifices in terms of monies, armed forces, and loss of life.[3]

Upon the commencement of the cold war, functionalist principles were subsumed and interwoven within the wider normative understanding of the liberal internationalist perspective. At its genesis, the application of the political and linguistic practices associated with liberal internationalism would be rooted in problem solving methods. Less a sophisticated theoretical undertaking and more an accepted set of assumptions, norms, beliefs, strategies, and associated policies accepted and promoted by Canada's elites, liberal internationalism sought to navigate and buttress the new confines and realities of an American dominated liberal internationalist geopolitical order. Given the new configuration of the international system which produced and accelerated bipolar rivalry between the West and the Soviet Union and its allies, Canadian officials proclaimed Canada's rank and status as that of a 'middle power' whose utility would be derived from acting as a system stabilizer, mediator, conflict resolver, and when necessary, enforcer. Mackenzie King himself asserted in the House of Commons in 1944 that in spite of the great powers, other smaller powers possessed power and could use it in the capacity for peace.[4] In the mindset of Canadian officials, the perceived sense of danger was not singular and immediate in that there was not a perception of an imminent and random attack on Canada's continental soil per se. Still, it was understood that a new reality was now shaping world affairs and the trajectory of peril was international.

---

[3] Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. 3rd edition (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc, 1997) p.54 While race is not explicitly mentioned in the quote, Srdjan Vucetic explores the idea of the racialized Anglo-American identity that unites countries such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand within an "Anglosphere." Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Geneology of a Racialized Identity in International Relations. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)

[4] King stated, "The great powers are called by that name simply because they possess great power. The other states in the world possess power and therefore, the capacity to use if for the maintenance of peace."Ibid. p.55

Undeniably, the immediate sense of threat was more global in nature in that there was an overarching fear that the great powers would not be able to control their expansionist and power hungry methods thus plunging the world once again into a third world war; perhaps this time with annihilating nuclear consequences. Given this sense of threat perception coupled with a desire for recognition in the international arena, the quasi- philosophical underpinnings of Canada's liberal internationalism were rooted in the political practices of multilateralism, mediation, institution building, and ultimately peacekeeping; aligning Canada with the geopolitical atmosphere in the West at the time. These political practices were seen as effective methods to enhance and project Canada's stature and identity in the international realm while constructing a unifying narrative of a conscionable Good Samaritan otherwise known as the 'nice Canadian', or in more cynical eyes, the 'stern daughter of the voice of God.'[5] More importantly, these practices differentiated Canada from the colossus to the South, the United States. The latter's ascendency to global superpower in almost all spheres of influence only further deepened the profound sense of insecurity and hastened the need for an(inter)national and pan-Canadian cultural identity; particularly amid continuing nationalist tensions in Quebec and the weakening of English Canada's traditional ties to Great Britain. Further, liberal internationalism discourse provided and projected a measure of independence as Canada's policymakers sought to differentiate and produce a nuanced and sophisticated foreign policy befitting a sovereign polity. While controversial at the time, Pearson's American-derived proposal of a peacekeeping force ultimately transcended its policy relevance but is still considered to be an enshrining, positive, and self-disciplinary piece of a pan-Canadian history and identity.

[5] Quote attributed to Dean Acheson, quoted in Lynda Hurst, "On world stage, best supporting actor," Toronto Star. (Sept 29, 2007), http://www.thestar.com/opinion/columnists/2007/09/29/on_world_stage_a_best_supporting_actor.html

Thus, a by-product of the adoption and ascendency of liberal internationalism was the enshrinement and promotion of a particular mythology and narrative of a peaceful kingdom whose innate sense of humble virtue and altruism triumphed over any predatory self-interested instinct. Sean Mahoney goes a step further by defining these attributes as "Canadian exceptionalism" arguing that Canada's national discourse revolves around the perception that Canada's fundamental character is "different and morally superior to that of its southern neighbour, and that Canadians are nice and altruistic."[6] Canada's self-styled reputation was further bolstered by such self-referential labels as "honest broker" and "helpful fixer" which materialized after Canada's achievements as mediators by active participating in every U.N peacekeeping mission during the cold war era including in the Suez, and the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza among others. As J.L. Grantastein states, "Canadians were middlemen, honest brokers, helpful fixers in a world where these qualities are rare. Peacekeeping made us different and better."[7] Therefore, these activities further legitimized and in effect stabilized a particular type of image and identity so as to augment Canada's stature abroad. According to Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin Senior in 1964, "peacekeeping has been pre-eminently the province of middle and small power....a role in which peacekeeping forces have been essentially impartial."[8] That sense of impartiality and neutrality remains an abiding thread despite the in congruency of the statement. Canada was by no means neutral. Canada acted in the interest of the liberal international economic order and held firm its place within the constellation of participating nations. Nevertheless, these acts

[6] Quoted by Eric Wagner, "Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War," (2008-07-14), http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/wagner-eng.asp
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.

also disproportionately elevated Canada's status and prestige within the annals of positional power politics that characterised the cold war dynamic.

Moreover, liberal internationalism also had the purposeful effect of acting as a unifying and stabilizing agent of national self identity; providing a chimera[9] of equanimity, élan and *gravitas* on the world stage. However, deeper integration with the United States through institutionalized trade agreements coupled with the US-dominated financial and geopolitical order as well as the events of 9/11, accelerated a deepening malaise within foreign policy circles which questioned the efficacy, direction, and future of Canada's foreign policy ambitions and initiatives. It is well worth noting, however that during the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s, a brief respite occurred. Then foreign affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy championed the adoption of the principles and associated policies related to human security, soft power, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which galvanized the attention of practitioners, the policy community, and the public.

Still, the discursive narrative associated with the then foreign affairs minister and the management and application of the practices of human security, soft power, and R2P leant itself to widespread criticism. Critics of the realist persuasion such as Kim Richard Nossal charged the government of the day of participating in "pinch-penny diplomacy" and offering foreign policy on the cheap in the hopes of bolstering its self-image.[10] For those on the left, these practices were characterised as merely another hypocritical guise in which to subordinate, exploit, and subject the Global South to unfair and unequal human rights practices; and uneven,

[9] The employment of term chimera is used to denote that of an illusion. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines chimera as an "illusion or fabrication of the mind." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chimera

[10] For further discussion see Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world. (Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 2004), and Kim Richard Nossal, "Pinchpenny Diplomacy," International Journal. (Winter, 1998-9) pp.88-105

restrictive and punitive institutional trade agreements based on neoliberal precepts. Todd Gordon dismisses the notion of any sense of compassionate humanitarian impulse or widening of a humanistic agenda. Instead, Gordon characterises the ascension and adoption of R2P as the West's attempts to legitimize its imperialist ambitions by justifying undertaking military incursions into sovereign states under the umbrella of humanitarianism in order to subordinate non followers that are deemed a 'political risk' to the neoliberal regime by claiming that they are a danger to themselves.[11] Interestingly perhaps, after the events of 9/11 Canada quietly began to shelve its human security agenda, along with its support of R2P while incrementally aligning its policies in support of the American-led war on terror which hastened the gnawing sense of an existentialist crisis within the 'foreign' aspects of the Canadian self.

Within this growing ideological identity crisis emerged a movement towards what some term continentalism.[12] Continentalism advocates deeper economic and societal integration with the United States. Continentalism argues for the total alignment (and collapse) of Canada's foreign, security and defence policies into the latter's sphere. As a consequence, the tone and manner of Canada's image becomes more closely aligned with principled warrior than that of virtuous peacekeeper. If internationalism embraces or at least projects a discourse or "mirage" of the collective spirit—such as through the use and promotion of multilateralist principles and acting as an "honest broker," continentalism advocates a discourse of exclusivity--including

[11] Todd Gordon. Imperialist Canada. (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010) p.303

[12] Greg Albo disagrees arguing this radical orientation towards US style foreign policy is actually not continentalism, but can be best understood as "cooperative specialization" following from Canada's position as ally and active supporter in the US-led "Empire of Capital", the specific features of which are imperialism and militarism as well as the continued maintenance of Canada's formal political sovereignty as well as the institutional autonomy of the foreign policy apparatus. However, Albo fails to take into account the rise of ideological aspects of neo-conservativism that are now being interwoven/integrated and contesting traditional continentalist discourse, what Massie and Roussel term neo-continentalism. Greg Albo, "Fewer Illusions: Canadian Foreign Policy Since 2001,"Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan. Edited by Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) p.243

bilateralism and ad hoc arrangements that are typically solely in Canada's self interest; specifically, its corporate interest. The advent of the Harper government as majority ruling party of Canada is often viewed as a clear manifestation and arrival of a particular shift in the norms, values and identity inherent in the Canadian discourse. Specifically, the acceptance and projection of a continentalist agenda and discourse by the Canadian state resulting in a radical and unilateral realignment and contestation of previously accepted foreign policy goals and identity towards those more common to the United States.

This realignment continues to produce deep internal tensions as the policies and practices enacted by the key actors exacerbates growing regional and societal cleavages on the one hand, while legitimizing corporate actors and privileging a complex combination of neoliberal narratives and neoconservative precepts, on the other within the fragile Canadian polity. At the same time, the government also evokes and co-opts the linguistic and moral tenor associated with liberal internationalism to legitimize endeavors such as Canada's mission in Afghanistan and Libya.[13] This paper will examine the so-called radical reorientation of Canada's foreign policy identity and seeks to reflect on the political practices and discourse undertaken by the Harper government and the realignment of foreign policy and questions whether these practices are simply mirroring and/or consolidating the neoliberal narrative onto the foreign policy platform.

Mirror, Mirror: Identity and Foreign Policy

[13] Specifically that of good international citizen, protector of the weak and the international community's moral compass. For further discussion, see Claire Turenne Sjolander and Kathryn Trevenen, "Constructing Canadian Foreign Policy: Myths of Good International Citizens, Protectors, and the War in Afghanistan," Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective. Edited by J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2010) p.45

Identity is the fabric of one's being and is vital in rendering meaning and stability to an individual's life. It informs who and what we are, and similarly what we are not. It informs what groups and people we seek to belong to, and those we reject (or are rejected from). Identity is often defined by but not always limited to the self in relation to and opposite of difference to something or someone else. However, the identity/difference nexus need not be constituted as merely of negative value. Identity can also be derived by sameness: that is, identifying characteristics or traits that are similar to the self. It can instill a positive essence of being when construing the motives of the other. It is when the other is pronounced as different, and different is interpreted as inferior and/or evil, that the other is pejoratively cast. In psychology and sociology, identity is often conceptualized and filtered through the parameters and interactions of the individual and society through the experiential and personal. In international relations theory, the dualistic and competitive nature of the self and other often underscores and informs the traditional theoretical undertones of the anarchy/sovereignty dilemma. It is often through the difference of the self in reference to the other, that the discourse of the foreign is produced and understood. Specifically, that the insecure Self is in constant fear of threat due to the anarchical nature of the international realm, and thus reduces objects and events to material causes while employing ahistorical problem solving methods to manage the issue(s) at hand.

On the other hand, post-structuralists conceptualize identity by seeking to create a wider normative and meta-theoretical understanding of the practices and relations studied in international relations by "re-inscribing world politics as a multinational," and multifaceted

space.[14] Indeed, poststructuralists seek to regain and reclaim the intellectual terrain dominated by those of the realist persuasion by reframing and broadening the discourse by rendering the subjectivity of the state problematic. Discourse is thus conceived as a "specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities, constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible."[15] Perhaps it is not surprising that then post-structuralists therefore claim greater sensitivity to "the contingency, heterogeneity, and radical "difference" that characterizes world politics: it is the most exciting and least dangerous way of understanding and participating in a changing world."[16] Indeed, as Samantha Arnold cogently notes "a post-structuralist perspective entails taking seriously the idea that there is 'nothing outside of discourse" and that so called objective reality is always subject to interpretation and filtered by perception.[17] Meaning is thus filtered through perception and by a core belief system and it is through discourse that it is processed and expressed. Put another way, "discourse is constitutive of our world."[18] Yet, discourse is not meant to be treated as something "that subjects use in order to simply describe objects, it is that which constitutes both subjects and objects."[19] It would be erroneous to assume then that discourse is neutral. Instead "discourse is always an interpretation, a narrative of multiple realities inscribed in a specific social or symbolic order."[20] Still, the poststructuralist perceptive does not seek to provide any concrete truths. Instead, it seeks to construct a portal

[14] Mark Laffey, "Locating identity: performativity, foreign policy and state action," Review of International Studies. Vol. 26 (2000) p.430.
[15] Luisa Bialasiewicz, David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey, Alison J. Williams, "Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US Strategy," Political Geography. (2007) p.406
[16]Mark Laffey, op.cit., p.429
[17] Arnold goes further by stating that interpretation occurs within a framework of meaning that defines things and the relationship between things. See Samantha L. Arnold, "Home and Away: Public Diplomacy and the Canadian Self," *op.cit.*,p.17-18
[18] Ibid., p.18
[19] Luisa Bialasiewicz et al., *op. cit.,* p.406
[20] David Grodin, "Rewriting the National Security State: How and Why the Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War," Paper presented at the Annual International Studies Association, March 17-20, 2004, in Montreal Quebec., p. 4

that allows for an exploration of unchartered theoretical territory through the employment of discursive and dialectic devices.

Moreover, from a post-structuralist standpoint, there is greater sensitivity and attention paid to the performative nature of the state—casting a wider net of plausible explanatory and observatory factors for decisions rendered in world politics. According to David Mutimer, "performativity in particular draws our attention to the multiple ways in which the self can be constituted."[21] Similarly, the performativity of the state itself rests on its ability to present a multiplicity of facets (of self) that project its presence and identity within the community of states. The state can put on many contradictory facades—friend/enemy; protector/bully, provider/predator depending on the warranted situation. Perhaps this is not so surprising, as Mutimer suggest, "in foreign policy analysis, this aspect of our lives has been elevated to an analytical insight: where we stand is where we sit."[22] So whereas the Soviets and their allies were constructed as "enemies of freedom" during the cold war; in the post cold war period, the Russians now became perceived as reluctant and wary allies.

Rather than accepting realism's ontological assumption of treating the state as a unitary 'black box', post-structuralists instead question the universalizing structure that underpins traditional understandings of the state system while examining the underlying competing narratives and identities that make up the state. Weber spotlights the link between performativity and the subject of sovereign states stating that "sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but subjects in process and all subjects in process (be it individual or

[21] David Mutimer, "No CANDU: The Multiple-Nuclear Canadian Self," *op.cit*., p.99
[22] Ibid. p.102 By contrast, David G. Haglund argues that where you stand, depends on where you fit. See David G. Haglund, "And the Beat Goes On: Identity and Canadian Foreign Policy," 50 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy: Canadian Among Nations 2008. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008) p.347

collective) are the ontological effects of practices performatively enacted."[23] Put differently, "performativity is the vehicle through which ontological effects (such as the effect of a doer behind the deed) are established.[24] Thus, the state is continually striving to perpetuate a particular identity through a series of moves and practices in which it (re)affirms its presence of being; both for its domestic and international audiences. Although Weber cogently observes that the state is continually subjected to process and therefore by extension, is subjected to changes in patterns of behaviour, it is the memory of the previous behaviour that can also act as a constraint to a radical shift in identity and performance. A case in point is Prime Minister Trudeau who entered office purposely seeking to dismantle certain percepts associated within the already dominant discourse of Canada as a middle power, and instead left office espousing much of the previous rhetoric he once so vigorously sought to rebuke.

David Campbell's seminal work *Writing Security*, also examines the notion of identity and its link to performativity. Borrowing from Judith Butler's exposition on feminist accounts on perfomativity and gender, Campbell deliberately draws on Butler's work to inform his analysis on political identity and foreign policy. Butler's work seeks to recognize that while the subject is socially constructed, this does not equate to a loss of agency.[25] Moreover, Butler seeks to deconstruct prevailing narratives involving the ontological composite of the body and its appropriated (mis)use in denoting and defining the body, sex, and specifically, gender as binary. Butler problematizes the so-called metaphysical naturalness often ascribed to sex and gender while spotlighting the value laden normative understandings interwoven in identifications of gender. Deducing that "gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-

[23] Cynthia Weber, "Performative States," Millennium. 27 (1998) p.2
[24] Judith Butler, quoted in Osbourne, quote used by Mark Laffey, *op. cit.*, p.431
[25] Ibid., p.431

floating attributes," Butler states that "the substitutive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled by the regulatory practices of gender coherence."[26] In this manner, it is society's normalizing codes that ascribes and disciplines the discursive practices that ultimately may inform an individual's choice in creating/perpetuating a so-called settled identity. Thus, "the performative dimension of construction is precisely the forced reiteration of norms"[27] as it relates to gender. Butler seeks to re-inscribe agency by arguing that "reiteration of norms is compulsory, but agency lies in the possibility of resignification, meaning the reworking of the discourse through which subject effects are reproduced."[28] Therefore, while the subject remains vulnerable to the overwhelming nature of the forced norms hidden within the discursive practices that re-inscribes gender/ sexual mores, the ability to co-opt such mores through the displacement/modification of the discourse remains.

Transposing Butler's thesis, Campbell utilises an "identity politics narrative,"[29] to elucidate and expound on the relationship between the self and other. He argues that the constitution of identity is derived through an intricate system of boundaries that continually classifies and imposes self regulated limits in order to affirm, contain and differentiate the self from the other, or the outside from the inside; depending upon the circumstance. For Campbell, states and bodies are each "performatively constituted."[30] States, therefore, engaged in "boundary producing political performances" in order to secure their identities while projecting the foreign realm as dangerous and different, inferior, and threatening.[31] These boundary producing practices also produce an institutionalized form of competition and

[26] Quoted in David Mutimer, *op. cit.*, p.101
[27] Mark Laffey, *op. cit.*, p.432
[28] Ibid.,p.432
[29] Ibid., p.430
[30] David Campbell, *op cit*., p.10
[31] Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation," Review of International Studies. (2004) p.35

confrontation amongst states. As Campbell notes, "a notion of what we are is intrinsic to an understanding of what we fear...in other words, the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of figurations of higher/lower."[32] That form of competition manifests in the representation and possible dissimulation of the other in guises and forms that manifest as a potential threat to the self identity. Indeed, in the United States, there continues to be an acceleration in the hysteria over what constitutes a citizen vs. alien (foreigner.) More and more, exclusionary practices and privileging discourses are mainstream fodder as pundits disputes what constitutes a proper citizen.

As Rumelili notes "externalisation also serves as a disciplinary function inside the state, by defining and representing dissident elements as 'foreign and alien,' and linking them to external threats."[33] The state thus casts suspicion on the allegiance of the 'foreign-born' citizen and those potentially sympathetic to the wider narrative involved. Early on, after 9/11 the mass media shamed those of the progressive liberal persuasion by thus portraying them as unpatriotic and enablers of terrorism by undermining a unifying consensus over the war on terror.[34] Naturalized citizens from a particular race, ethnicity and religion become cast within the wider discourse as potential internalized threats. Previously uncontested areas of the domestic domain became problematized and securitized and therefore, under greater scrutiny by the state apparatus. Immigration, work visas, and the entry of international students to institutions of higher learning are no longer understood as having positive valence through economic and societal currency and exchange. Instead, these policies are being subjected to the wider

[32] David Campbell, *op. cit*., p.73
[33] Bahar Rumelili, *op.cit*., p. 9
[34] Anthony R. DiMaggio, Mass Media: Mass Propaganda: Examining American News on the War on Terror. (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008) p.87

(negative) narrative of suspicion, danger, and fear. This is due to a perception that "insecurity comes not from a specifically threatening other but from all those unwilling to integrate; all those refusing their prescribed place" in society and, by extension in the capitalist system.[35] The inside of the state is now perceived to be under as great, if not greater threat, than the outside.

Focusing exclusively on the foreign policy practices and discourse of the United States, Campbell spotlights how understandings of the external realm are necessarily (at least according to epistemic realism) predicated upon discourses of fear and danger. As a consequence, the Other is continually dehumanised and purposely (re)imagined as threatening, inferior, uncivilized, and barbaric and a threat to the very foundation and superior precepts that make up the United States and its democratic ideals. Most recently, when examining the current discourses that are interwoven in legitimizing the ubiquitous war on terror, the imagery and language used is one that denotes the terrorists as backward barbarians seeking to destroy the very essence of modern civilization, while conversely, equipping the United States as heroic for saving itself, and paradoxically, Islam as well. Commentaries regarding a perception that the war was being fought on Crusade-like religious grounds against the evil perils of Islam were immediately denounced by U.S. supporters that argued that the "U.S functions as World's strongest defender of Islam."[36] This argument is reminiscent of nascent narratives depicting the Soviets and communism as the evil empire determined to destroy the West with its false ideology.

[35] Luisa Bialasiewicz et al., *op. cit.*, p.414
[36] Amy Zalman, Jonathon Clarke, "The Global War on Terror: A narrative in need of a re-write." Ethics and International Affairs. (Summer 2009) http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/23_2/essays/002

In contract, America is portrayed as the leader of the "free world" whose destiny it was to "liberate" those countries already or soon to be shackled by the false prophet of communism. Thus, the ascendency of the war of terror segued nicely into already established discourses of fear and danger. Indeed, this follows Tuathail & Dalby's assertion that "discourses of foreign policy practices produce certain political, social, and physical geographies (which enflame and incite certain conceptual, moral and/or aesthetic understandings of self and other), security and danger, proximity and distance, indifference and responsibility."[37] It is interesting to note that Canadians interpreted and internalized the war on terror and the threat of danger discourse not as a global threat against the Self per se; but as a localized threat to the economic prosperity of the country especially in light of the border closings immediately after the 9/11 attacks. This is not to diminish Canadians (and global) reaction to the horror experienced by Americans on that fateful day. However, it is stated to act as a differentiation in how political identity (re)produces a particular type of foreign policy predicated upon previous understandings and interpretations of threat and danger which then creates or negates particular narratives or reinforces particular discourses depending on the circumstance at hand.

Perhaps of even greater import, is the continuing pattern that interprets that the "mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of the threat."[38] Thus, by denying that there can possibly be an alternative mode of being, this allows for the construct of a potential Self/Other identity conflict that may produce and legitimize violence against that

[37] Quoted in Umut Ozguc, "Remaking Canadian identity: A critical analysis of Canada's Human security discourse," Journal of Human Security. Vol. 7 (2011) p.39
[38] David Campbell, *op cit.*, p.3

which is deemed the other. By silencing and/or diminishing the self's ability to construct the other as an alternative mode of being, the opportunity to produce narratives based on variant responses is thus closed. According to Campbell "the constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence: it is a condition of possibility....that while the objects of concern change through time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as dangers persists."[39] By singularly projecting and constituting difference as both a negative variable and threatening attribute in conflict with the identity of the Self, it privileges certain dispositions, techniques, and beliefs while delegitimizing and oppressing others. Moreover, foreign policy provides the impetus for the continual renewal of state identity simply by reconstituting the danger.

Campbell also takes aim at epistemic realism's uncontested view of the state as sole actor in the international realm and foreign policy as the embodiment of its participatory and reactive efforts in navigating the external realm. Campbell rejects the overly simplistic assumptions undertaken by traditional scholars and instead demonstrates that "foreign policy is not simply the response of a pre-given subject, whether singular or plural, to its environment but the means through which a particular mode of subjectivity is reproduced."[40] Distinguishing between Foreign Policy vs. foreign policy, Campbell asserts that Foreign Policy "shifts from a concern of relations between states that take place across ahistorical, frozen and pre-given boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the "state and the international system."[41] Hence, Foreign Policy distinguishes itself by enacting state practices of representation that are representative of the sovereign state. On

[39] Ibid., p.11
[40] Mark Laffey, *op.cit*., p.430-431
[41] David Campbell, *op cit*., p.61

the other hand, foreign policy is understood to be the "the political practice that makes "foreign" certain events and actors."[42] Therefore, foreign policy is conceived as an extension of statecraft that legitimizes and produces specific outcomes predicated upon the spatial reality and construct of the other. As Bialasiewicz et al., note "states are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration policies, military deployment and strategies etc."[43] Moreover, foreign policy makes explicit the sovereign integrity and separation of the external realm from the domestic one while each informs and self-enforces a particular set of performative practices and discourses undertaken by the state. Foreign policy thus provides the means and manner in which the self confronts the other in the international realm. Moreover, it is Foreign Policy that allows and legitimizes that state to perform itself in the international arena. Laffey cogently notes, "Foreign Policy is a specific kind of boundary producing political performance that draws upon available modes of representation in order to reproduce a particular mode of subjectivity."[44] Hence, Foreign Policy "is thus re-theorised as one of the boundary-producing practices" through which the state is "performatively reproduced as a subject of global political life."[45]

Campbell argues that the state can be understood as having "no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality," and that the identity of any particular state should be understood as "tenuously constituted in time....through a stylized repetition of acts and achieved "not through a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition."[46] Indeed, it is through the process of repetition that identity is produced and stabilized. According to Mutimer, "identity is therefore performed, and the performance is guided

[42] Ibid., p.61
[43] Luisa Bialasiewicz et al., *op. cit*., p.406
[44] Mark Laffey, *op cit*., p.431
[45] Ibid.
[46] David Campbell, *op.cit* p.9

(regulated), not by any external authority, but rather by the memory and interpretation of what has gone before."[47] It is memory and interpretation that also allows for and yet constraints possible alternative practices to be performed. For example, in Canada, when Prime Minister Harper attempts to invoke masculine imagery to depict Canada as a "robust middle power" and "energy superpower" on the world stage, the tenor of such a performance evokes harsh criticism at home. Regarding acting as an energy superpower, one *Globe and Mail* columnist scathingly wrote, "Prime Minister Harper touts Canada as an "emerging energy superpower" as if it were the next OPEC. It's a misleading, extravagant, and potentially dangerous claim. Canada will not save the world from oil shortages."[48] The performance evokes criticism as Canadian identity is understood through a particular prism and mythology: Canada is a humble "peaceable kingdom" that utilises its military for peacekeeping missions and its resources in order to benefit international society. Any attempt to debunk such a narrative is met with hostile resistance. Fulton writes, "The Harper government. . .continues to erase from its memory Canada's storied history as a force of moral good and peacemaker within the international community."[49] It is widely known and accepted in foreign policy circles that while the peacekeeper myth can no longer stand up to the veracity of reality, it endures within the Canadian consciousness and discourse. Yet, it is telling that the Canadian public writ large has not yet responded negatively to the government's desire to annihilate practices and narratives that produce and reinforce positive understandings and imageries of a Canadian (inter)national identity.

---

[47] David Mutimer, *op. cit.*, p.100

[48] Quoted in Laura Way, "An energy superpower or a super sales pitch? Building the case through an examination of Canadian newspaper coverage of oil sands," Canadian Political Science Review. (January 2011) p. 82

[49] Quoted in Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Conversations with Consensus—Internationalism under the Harper Government," Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy. Edited by Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013) p.xiii

Interestingly, if American discourse and thus identity is premised around danger and fear, Canadian foreign policy discourse is still tenably fashioned around the performative practices of multilateralism and acting as an "honest broker" although that too is evolving. That is not to say that danger and fear are not inherently part of and understood within Canadian political practices. But it is continually being retooled and understood within a discourse that still understands fear and danger as "something out there" rather than "something over/in here." Increasingly, a subtle change is occurring and permeating and contesting the myth of "peaceable kingdom" as Canadians have woken up to news of a plot to bomb a VIA Rail train and home grown terrorism being exported to Algeria. Yet, the contrasting responses by Justin Trudeau and Stephen Harper to the bombings in Boston each spotlight the increasing tension between competing discourses on danger directed at/within the Canadian polity. Justin Trudeau's "musings on the root causes"[50] behind the Boston attacks is actually indicative of Canada's previous liberal internationalist stance.

Similar to Jean Chretien's musings on 9/11 being the aftermath of America's intrusive foreign policy in the Middle East, Trudeau's statements are reflective and grounded in a liberal discourse based on inclusiveness, self reflection and a desire to step away from a reductive and simplistic discourse of "us vs. them"-the West vs. the Rest. Indeed, the search for root causes lies at the very heart of Canadian and international policy. David Carment and Steward Prest argue that, "those who dismiss the "root causes" argument misunderstand both the scope of Canadian policy and the underlying causes of terrorism. The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally altered Western states' approach to terrorism by reinforcing the point that

[50] Justin Trudeau stated, "We have to look at the root causes … But there is no question that this happened because there is someone who feels completely excluded … And our approach has to be, where do these tensions come from?" Barbara Kay, "Trudeau reveals his inner sophomore with search for 'root causes,' National Post. (April 13, 2013) http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/04/18/barbara-kay-2/

securing failed states would lead to improved security for all. After the Boston attacks, disengagement from this agenda is not an option because the motivations for these bombings link back to Chechnya and even Kyrgyzstan, places ravaged by war and underdevelopment."[51] Moreover, such an approach is grounded not in fear and a parochial sense of danger. Instead, it projects a secure sense of self and identity that is open to confronting weaknesses within the outside/inside (domestic/foreign) governing system. Indeed, Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocated for a "root causes" strategy "recognizing that military force was insufficient in fixing the complex problems fundamental to states that served as safe havens for terrorist activity."[52] David Carment and Steward Prest caution that "the Canadian government must tread carefully and not turn its back on the need to understand root causes, especially when those involved are our own citizens and the consequences of neglect are severe. Studies on those Canadians involved in international terrorism show that a sense of exclusion, marginalization and political grievance are often key facets of "home grown" terrorist behaviour."[53] Hence the performative practices that would naturally evolve from such an approach would likely be more proactive and inclusive in mark contrast to reactive practices based on fear.

By contrast, Prime Minister Harper's response was to immediate condemned the attacks and direct government action to combat terrorist activities occurring on Canadian soil. Once again, the performative practices associated with that government action specifically address utilising the power of the state to increase surveillance and security based practices within the territorial entity. Prime Minister lambasted Trudeau for his attempt at "sociology" and a "weak

[51] David Carment and Stewart Prest, "Finding 'root causes' of terrorism is the core of Canadian policy," National Post. (April 23, 2013) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/finding-root-causes-of-terrorism-is-the-core-of-canadian-policy/article11494674/
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

response to terrorism, arguing "academic pondering," saying that those who would seek to hurt Canada are starkly opposed to Western values."[54] By adopting such an approach, the Prime Minister attempts to marginalize and silence an alternative mode of being and identity by diminishing the capabilities of the speaker of the dissenting view. Indeed, his response drew fire with critics such as David Carment and Stewart Prest arguing that, "Prime Minister Harper's comments, with his calls for harsh punishment without any hope of more general understanding are unhelpful. They tap into and assuage that feeling of helpless rage, but offer nothing beyond vengeance as a solution." [55] While Harper's immediate response was politically expedient in assuaging Canadians' fear and outrage, while gaining public support for the passage of Bill S-7, it hinders and handicaps serious discussion of a broader societal approach.[56] Such an approach could have included restoring resource allocations in the form of border security guards or community service funding in dealing with the events at hand, instead of opting for a strict law and order solution.

Perhaps of even greater significance is Vucetic's observation regarding structures of meaning and political actors. He states that "arguing is as important as discourse: while the

[54] Steven Chase, "PM Stephen Harper steps up attack on Justin Trudeau over terrorism," National Post. (April 25, 2013) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/pm-stephen-harper-steps-up-attack-on-justin-trudeau-over-terrorism/article11548558/

[55] David Carment and Stewart Prest, "Finding 'root causes' of terrorism is the core of Canadian policy," National Post. (April 23, 2013) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/finding-root-causes-of-terrorism-is-the-core-of-canadian-policy/article11494674/

[56] Bill S-7 is an Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act," but it is known more generally as the "Combating Terrorism Act". The bill is meant to bring back to two clauses that were first passed after the Sept. 11, 2001 terror, but which were allowed to lapse in March 2007. One clause deals with investigative hearings – which allow the police, with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to force a person to appear at a hearing to answer questions related to past or future terrorist offences. Another clause is about "recognizance with conditions" – essentially preventive arrest to stop terrorist activities before they occur. However, NDP public safety critic Randall Garrison argued that "this is a government that has cut back spending in critical areas like the border services.. So if we're really going to attack terrorism, let's have that proper balance between the resources we need and the existing laws." Tobi Cohen, "Controversial anti-terror bill passes, allowing preventative arrests, secret hearings," National Post. (April 13 2005) http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/25/controversial-anti-terror-bill-passes-allowing-preventative-arrests-secret-hearings/

dominant discourse shapes foreign policy by ruling out the proverbial "impossibles," it is arguing that makes some policy directions more likely than others."[57] Moreover, by constructing a particular discourse as impossible, it also constructs it as inferior and thus it is more likely to be rejected as a plausible explanatory alternative in shaping/viewing 'reality' and *ergo*, identity. Thus, the process of identity is never fixed, self-perpetuating or deterministic but continually fluid, ever-changing and vulnerable to a shift in parochial societal norms.

Given that the state is understood as being "tenuously constituted in time,"[58] Campbell argues that "national states are unavoidably paradoxical entities that do not possess pre-discursive, stable identities...."[59] Hence the practices of representation are central to Foreign Policy given that "states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never fully revealed:....for a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; *statis* would be death."[60] Hence the state is in a continual process of reproduction. Without the ability or desire to functionally continue its practice of representation through state practices, the state would likely cease to function. As Laffey writes "state action then is accounted for by reference to representational practices that must be deployed in order to reproduce and secure a particular mode of subjectivity."[61] It is through these representational practices that the state derives its legitimacy and hence its identity.

From Mandarins...: Liberal internationalism as Canadian practice and orthodoxy

[57] Srdjan Vucetic, *op cit.*, p.11
[58] Campbell, *op cit*., p.10
[59] Ibid., p. 12
[60] Ibid.,
[61] Mark Laffey, *op.cit*., p. 433

We have a . . . lasting and visceral commitment to multilateralism which is ingrained, and endemic to the Canadian character.[62]

It is often taken for granted amongst foreign policy aficionados and the Canadian public writ large that liberal internationalism is Canada's *defacto* foreign policy discourse. Yet, the so called golden era of Canadian diplomacy did not manifest through its own volition. Instead, it was purposely crafted in order to perform a particular style of foreign policy as well as justify Canada's place within the community of nations. Moreover, as Mutimer cogently notes, "we assume, a particular identity for 'Canada': generally, that identity is one of a coherent international actor, which adopts and executes 'policy' in international relations."[63] Indeed, Canada's once preferred foreign policy style revolved around the associated practices and discourse of a middle power acting as "an honest broker' and a "helpful fixer" as well as a "good international citizen" amongst the cavalry of international agents. These political practices purposely emerged out of a particular internal/external imagery and discourse within the Canadian polity which saw Canada's placement in the community of nations as a staunch middle power that sought to punch above its weight especially after the Second World War. Indeed, as Lionel Gelber wrote in 1944, "under the impact of war, Canada has moved up from her old status to a new stature. With her smaller population and lack of colonial possession . . . Canada must figure as a Middle Power."[64] By constructing Canada as a middle power, Canadian politicians were signalling that to the world and Canadians that Canada was not a trifling, unimportant player on the world stage. It also signalled that Canada would no longer support an isolationalist stance in conducting foreign affairs. Through the currency of blood and loss, both literal and metaphoric, Canadian politicians were re-envisioning and recalibrating

[62] Quoted by Stephen Lewis, quoted in Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. 3rd edition. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013) p.1
[63] David Mutimer, *op cit*., p. 100
[64] Kim Richard Nossal, *op cit*., p.54

Canada's (inter)national stature. Nationalism, as much as a quest for internationalism, was predominately in the minds of Canadian officials at the time. Participation in the war translated into a powerful symbol of Canada's determination to transcend its status as a dominion in the British Empire and establish its independence as a sovereign nation. As noted by Jack Granatstein, "in the course of fighting to secure a place commensurate with Canada's new power. . .nationalism now marched hand in with internationalism."[65] Indeed, the Canadian state played a central role in crafting and managing Canada's (inter)national identities.

In the realm of foreign policy, Canada's internal and external identities were purposely considered to be mutually reinforcing and pivotal in the weaving and understanding of Canadian nationhood. The ascendency of liberal internationalism as Canada's foreign policy orthodoxy emerged not as a result of public opinion but instead from a carefully calculated response by public officials, whom convinced Prime Minister Laurent that adopting such a perceptive would be in Canada's national interest.[66] More importantly, unlike the isolationist and imperialist stances of the earlier decades that divided the fledging dominion, liberal internationalism acted as a unifying and powerful narrative bridging the divide that separated loyalists English Canadians and isolationist French Canadians. As Cohen writes, "they (mandarins) gave shape to a restless nation shedding its colonial past and pursuing an independent role in the world. They gave it a sense of self."[67] Indeed, Canadian internationalism "acted as a symbol of a distinct Canadian population that was independent of British roots...and throughout the Cold War, Canadian internationalism constituted a political

[65] Quoted in Tom Keating, *op cit.,* p.24
[66] Kim Richard Nossal, *op cit.,* p.157
[67] Andrew Cohen, *op cit.*, p.7

platform which enabled discursive construction of a Canadian identity."[68] The promotion of internationalism as Canada's accepted foreign policy discourse was widely accepted by elites through the Canada, including Quebec. Nossal notes that "only five Quebec MPs voted against the United Nations Charter in 1945."[69] Mc Roberts argues that post war internationalism acted as a signal to the whole world—especially those in Quebec that "Ottawa was the only national government in Canada."[70] Indeed, liberal internationalism was a fundamental part of a wider nation building exercise.

Louis St. Laurent during the Grey Lecture at the University of Toronto in 1947 declared that the enshrining five principles of Canada's new internationalist foreign policy platform were "national unity, political liberty, the rule of law in international affairs, the values of Christian civilization, and the acceptance of international responsibility."[71] In the ever-present desire for nation building, Laurent was implicitly declaring that Canada's external identity was white and Christian. According to Brodie, the onset of a particular set of political institutions and practices including The Family Allowance Act, Canada Pension Plan, Medicare Act, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canada Council and the 1953 Immigration Act, "not only provided the raison d'etre for the Canadian government to use disciplinary techniques of Canadianisation policies on Canadian subjects, but also promoted a state-sponsored single Canadian identity that imagined the Canadian self as Anglo-Saxon, white and Christian."[72] The absence of any mention of Aboriginal effects is telling. Indeed, St. Laurent explicitly outlined that Canada was a "nation constructed on the foundations of two cultures and two languages," and Trudeau once again reaffirmed this particular construction of Canada as he noted that "the

[68] Umut Ozguc, *op.cit.,* p.41
[69] Kim Richard Nossal, *op cit*., p.157
[70] Quoted in Umut Ozguc, *op cit*., p. 41
[71] Kim Richard Nossal, *op. cit.,* p.156
[72] Umut Ozguc, *op cit.,* p.42

paramount interest is to ensure the political survival of Canada as a federal and bilingual sovereign state."[73] Indeed, the promotion of a Christian civilisation would be most apparent with Canada's approach to foreign aid. Many of the funding dollars from The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) often went to evangelical church groups whom targeted underdeveloped countries in Africa and Latin America for their programs. Gottlieb has stated that Canadian foreign policy has a "missionary impulse which drives us to export our values to the less fortunate peoples of the world."[74] Indeed, according to Sjolander, in examining the case of Afghanistan, "the discourse of internationalism has served as a prism reinforcing the construction of a laudable identity for Canada, all the while leaving Afghanistan and all the actors within largely silent and without agency—the vessel for the "other" into which Canadian virtuousness has been poured."[75] Nevertheless, the principles espoused by St. Laurent laid the foundation for the promotion of what some would later call "a naive and moralistic mythology about the purposes of Canada's foreign policy, one that lead us to conceive ourselves as holier than others in the world."[76] Yet this very mythology serves the very purposes of performatively constituting the Canadian self in relation to the foreign other.

That said, liberal internationalism offered Canadians a new unique narrative and practices in navigating the still unstable new global order being constructed after the demise of the old powers. Liberal internationalism thus provided a guiding framework and salvo in interpreting and dealing with the ascendancy of the United States as not only continental partner but global leader of the 'free world' in the new bipolar international system. Canadian

---

[73] Ibid.
[74] Quoted in Adam Chapnick, "Caught in-between Traditions: A Minority Conservative Government and Canadian Foreign Policy." Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities. Edited by Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), p.63
[75] Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Canada and the Afghan "Other": Identity, Difference, and Foreign Policy, *op cit*., p.239
[76] Quoted by Denis Stairs, Quoted in Adam Chapnick, *op cit.,* p.63

internationalism provided enough of a distinct and unique national discourse that it offered a viable and positive alternative by presenting itself as distinct and unique as compared to the overwhelming Other that lay just south of the border. It did so without it impeding or contesting the new found geopolitical and socioeconomic realities that were shaping the bilateral relationship.

Indeed, the careful scribing of the Canadian Self as committed system stabiliser whose commitment to the practice of multilateralism ensured its place in the makeup of Cold War international institutions. Canada's adoption of multilateralism as political practice underscored and legitimized the narrative of "national goodness"[77] within the confines of Canada's national identity. The normative underpinnings of multilateralism also aided in the construction and legitimization of particular practices and discourse embedded in the Canadian psyche and public discourse. As Charbonneau states, "as an ideological construction, multilateralism is more than a process for good governance: it also entails notions and visions of peace, liberty, human rights, security and democracy and...the discursive use of the concept convey normative assumptions about the nature of multilateral practices, about the characteristics of the global order it implicitly promotes, and about the boundaries and limits of political possibilities."[78] The adoption of multilateralism as practice within the discourse of internationalism cannot be understated for it not only reinforced the narrative of "national goodness, " it was also a contributing factor for building and legitimizing a particular type of Canadian (inter)national identity that corresponded with an activist agenda and participation on the world stage by the Canadian state. In fact, the practices of Canadian multilateralism were often described as demonstrative of the "benign and selfless nature of Canadian policies,

[77]Umut Ozguc, *op. cit*., p.41
[78] Quoted by Tom Keating, *op. cit.*, p. 6

procedures, processes, and mechanisms."[79] These mechanisms and practices only further reinforces a particular positive self image of Canada's internal and external identity which often was used to delineate and distinguish Canada from the hegemonic presence of the United States while also constructively engaging the United States in a variety of bilateral and multilateral forums.

One of the first steps in chartering and crafting a sense of independence while pursuing the practice of multilateralism was Canada's desire to join a variety of international organizations. It did so for a variety of reasons. The first reason was Canada's desire to distinguish itself as an independent player on the world stage. Second, by actively participating in the creation and founding of several international institutions, Canada was purposely casting itself as an "aligned member of the international community."[80] Therefore, Canada's position within the community of nation-states was that of a firm supporter of the liberal capitalist system forcibly defended, if necessary, by the United States and its allies and managed through the intricate system of political, military and security institutions. Multilateralism was seen as "forming the basis of a widely applicable set of convictions about the forms of international behaviour and organization which best served not only the Canadian, but the general interest."[81] Thus, beginning with the signing of the United Nations Charter in 1945, Canada was an active participant and contributor to the designing of several key political and economic institutions that continue to effect and wield enormous political, economic and military power. Canada was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) whose main contribution to the organization can be found in Article 2 which sought to broaden the

[79] Ibid., p.7
[80] Kim Richard Nossal, *op cit.*, p.155
[81] David Black and Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Multilateralism Reconstituted and the Discourse of Canadian Foreign Policy," Studies in Political Studies. (Spring 1996) p.12

organization's military purpose to include a socio-economic one. Moreover, Canada was a founding member of the Commonwealth, the *Francophonie,* and the Bretton Woods system of institutions including the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization amongst others. By joining and actively participating in these organizations, Canada's identity was being mutually reinforced both at home and abroad.

During the cold war, the principles and values of liberal internationalism were very much in keeping with the domestic economic and political practices of embedded liberalism Canada's policymakers actively pursued and promoted an external liberal international discourse while pursuing a policy of multiculturalism and openness domestically. In exercising these dual discourses, Canadian leaders purposely constructed a self image that delineated and distanced itself from the hegemonic power of the U.S while at the same time reinforcing the latter's primacy as leader of the international community. Canada was by no means neutral during the Cold War. Canadian officials stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States and its allies in the fight against communism. Where Canadians officials sought to imprint their own stamp was in their desire to avoid and be embroiled in another systemic conflict that could have nuclear repercussions. Furthermore, Canada's participation and pursuit of multilateralist practices must still be understood as "serving the interests of a hegemonic and unequal world order that reinforces and legitimates the interests of dominant capitalist powers such as the United States."[82] Yet, Canada was still able to distinguish itself on a number of files including Cuba and China, which further instilled a sense of independence within the construct of Canadian identity. Canada was able to successfully sidestep a negative construction of its

[82] Quote by Mark Neufeld, quoted in Tom Keating, *op cit.,* p.8

motives by instead projecting itself as a self-effacing, altruistic middle power and a carrier for peace.

This particular image of Canada was enshrined within the Canadian and international consciousness due to Canada's role in the Suez crisis that occurred in 1956. It is often treated as the pinnacle moment of establishing Canada's (inter)national identity of a peace broker and peacekeeper. The culmination of the crisis would inevitably see Canada's external affairs minister, Lester B. Pearson awarded the noble peace prize for securing the ceasefire and for the proposal of a peacekeeping force. Canada would also be praised for its mediation efforts within various coalitions including mostly unsuccessful attempts to restrained aggressive initiatives by the United States including the Korean War-which Canada did participate in, Vietnam, which it did not, and the periodic divisions with the Commonwealth over South Africa.[83] Indeed, the Suez crisis along with its attempts to mediate other conflicts solidified Canada's stature as an "honest broker" and "helpful fixer" as particular "truths" in Canadian identity. Often silenced or negated is the dissenting discourse that emerged at the time over Canada's perceived abandonment of the British Empire during its time of need. According to Vucetic, Canadian officials were able to reconcile dissenting discourse by packaging the proposal of the ceasefire and peacekeeping force as a policy aimed at offering a face-saving proposal in order to maintain Commonwealth unity.[84] Yet, as a result of Canada's willingness to broker the ceasefire and propose a peacekeeping force, it is now considered to be a positive self-disciplinary practice that is deeply embedded as a cherished piece of Canadian identity and national unity. During the Cold War years, Canada participated in every peacekeeping

[83] Kim Richard Nossal, *op cit.*, p.58. For a detailed account of the Suez crisis, see Robert W. Reford, "Peacekeeping at Suez, 1956," Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases. Edited by Don Muncton and John Kirton. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1992) p.58-77 For an alternative reading of Suez, see Srdjan Vucetic, *op cit*., particularly chapter 4, pp-74-100

[84] Srdjan Vucetic, *op cit.*, p.81

mission when asked further solidifying its image as a nation committed to peace and one that chartered its own course that differed from its other allies. Peacekeeping made Canada both a unique player on the continent and a desirable one by allowing it a unique niche in which Canada could perform duties that the United States and other great powers could not. It also defined and constrained Canada's defence policy discourse so that Canada's military was understood not simply as warriors performing war but as symbols of peace offering protection.

In fact, in pivoting the tenets of internationalism within the context of the Self and Other, particularly the normative aspects of moral superiority and altruism, the discourse of internationalism exposes that the Canadian self is superior to foreign others. As Sjolander states, "the great truth of Canada is notable because it is not a truth shared by others, at least not by others in the same way...used this way internationalism is an inherently relational idea, it defines Canada's difference with respect to the rest of the world, and as such, its theoretical edifice depends upon an unspoken and often unseen 'other'."[85] In unpacking the 'great truths' inherent within the discourse of internationalism, it allows for the exegesis of the disciplinary narratives involved in the construction of the self and other in Canadian foreign policy. Hence, the "use of internationalism embeds within it forms of "othering" that manipulate, marginalize, and silence the objects of our foreign policy."[86] It also silences any form of inquiry about the exportation of Canadian values as it takes as given that the Canadian (foreign) self is performs in a manner superior to others. Thus, Anita Singh in detailing Canada's relationship with India, argues that the guiding principles behind liberal internationalist statecraft as performed

[85] Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Canada and the Afghan "Other": Identity, Difference, and Foreign Policy, *op cit*., p.239
[86] Ibid.

by the Canadian state was qualified as having a "paternalistic" attitude.[87] This paternalistic attitude was exemplified by Canada's "father's knows best" approach, which Singh feels "was particularly evident in the imposition of sanctions by Canada against India after the latter's nuclear weapons test."[88] As Mutimer states, "performative identity is, not just tenuous and stylized, but also multiple and contextually contingent."[89] Within the inside (of the state), liberal internationalist principles were positively understood as promoting an altruistic, moral, and enlightened approach to policies and practices delivered outside of the state. Yet, on the "outside", for the "other", in this case India, the guiding discourse behind liberal internationalism statecraft and discourse as performed by the Canadian state were interpreted and understood as being morally superior and paternalistic, mirroring Canada's approach to its own indigenous population.

Indeed, within the inside of the state, Canada's identity was also contextually context. Canada's choice to embrace multiculturalism in the 1960s was purposely undertaken in order to secure and maintain national unity in light of the growing separatist movement in Quebec and the rise in immigration from Asia. It chose to embrace multiculturalism as a means to further extend the mythology of Canada as an altruistic middle power whose identity was predicated upon the principles of peace, inclusion and tolerance. While at home, Canadian officials were declaring that Canada's national interests were "less selfish" and Canada was "the first international country", it did so to silence and/delegitimize growing dissension amongst the Quebecois as well as Native Canadian movements.[90] Therefore, one can see how Canada's demonstrates multiple selves depending on the context. For the Canadian public, Canadian

[87] Claire Tureen Sjolander and Heather Smith, "Canada, the World and the Inside/Outside of Internationalism," *op cit.*, p.258
[88] Ibid.,
[89] David Mutimer, *op cit.*, p.102
[90] Quotes by Joe Clark, quoted in Umut Ozguc, *op.cit*., p.43

officials constructed Canada's image as one of inclusiveness, tolerance and openness which reinforced Canada's domestic efforts to reposition and reimagine Canadian identity as multicultural so as to negate growing dissension from Quebec and its Aboriginal communities. The promotion of multiculturalism coincided with the rise in Quebec nationalism. Canada would find itself in the midst of political turmoil during the FLQ crisis with only minimal resolution after the first referendum in 1980. Multiculturalism was also a response to the "1971 conflict between the federal government and Aboriginal peoples, a conflict which had assumed new life in the wake of the 1970 attempt by the Trudeau government to unilaterally assimilate First Nations peoples by depriving them of treaty rights, reserves, and their own national affiliations by rendering them "Canadians." Aboriginals rejected the notion that they were "ethnicities" like other Canadians."[91] As Ozguc states, "when national unity and stability becomes a source of anxiety, states are deeply involved in the discursive (re)construction of national identity through symbols, myths and rituals that mould a 'collective memory' the subjective recollection of past and present events into narratives of national unity."[92] Thus, multiculturalism became the political bulwark or panacea that assisted in cooling off national anxieties over unity and stability and recalibrated the discourse of inclusion and exclusion vis a vis Canadian identity.

At the same time, in the international arena, Canada's economic performance in the third world demonstrates that Canada's practices were not based on tolerance and fairness but instead on exploitation. Todd Gordon explicitly states that beginning "roughly in the late 1970s and early 1980s (its adoption and the aggressiveness of the adoption having differed from country to country), has been witness to a major offensive by Canadian capital and state against

[91] George Elliot Clarke, Multiculturalism and its (Usual) Discontents, Canada Watch. (Fall 2009) p.24
[92] Umut Ozguc, *op cit.*, p.40

indigenous and working people at home and abroad. There is no bright side to Canadian investment in the South. It is accomplished by displacing indigenous people and poor peasants from their land (to get at mineral and oil deposits, for example), destroying ecosystems and ruthlessly exploiting the sweat labour of typically poor women in the region's export processing zones, where workers' rights are minimal if they exist at all."[93] Yet, the Canadian state had been successful in being able to unite Canadians[94] (both French and English) in supporting an internationalist foreign policy precisely because "there is a collective desire to be seen as international promoters of peace and prosperity."[95]

Indeed, with the ending of the Cold War, Canada once again struggled to fit its principles within the confines of the new world order. The anticipation of the peace dividend did not last long and soon, the currency of acting as a middle power began to wane as the United States remained the sole hegemon on the international stage. Moreover, prior to the ending of the cold war, Canada signed the Free Trade Agreement and then shortly thereafter the North American Free Trade Agreement ushering in a particularly painful restructuring of its economy, particularly in Central Canada. At the same time, there was a renewed sense of optimism and vigour in revamping international institutions such as in the United Nations. There was a deepening desire to broader the strict discourse of security to encompass human security concerns. No longer was security to be defined in purely militaristic terms nor would security be defined solely by the state. In 1994 The UNDP Report was released and proposed that "individuals and sub-state groups are rendered vulnerable through repressive state

[93] Todd Gordon, *op cit.*, p.11
[94] Umut Ozguc, *op cit*., p.43
[95] Adam Chapnick, "Caught In-between traditions: A Minority Conservative Government and Canadian Foreign Policy, *op cit.*, p.62

structures or unequal global practices that perpetuate a zero sum understanding of security".[96] While deeply contested, human security became popular amongst particular set of countries including Canada.

Concomitantly, in 1996, Lloyd Axworthy became Canada's foreign affairs minister. Under his tenure, he sought to recalibrate Canada's liberal internationalist principles to suit the new reality of the times. Canada was emerging out of a deep and prolonged recession and just emerged from a deeply bitter referendum battle which saw Quebecers just barely deciding to stay in Canada. Canada's internationalist principles were in flux and Canada was no longer acting as a robust player on the world stage, as the state was preoccupied with its domestic socio-economic and political struggles. Axworthy sought to realign Canada's liberal international principles and advocated for a soft power and human security agenda in light of the Department of Foreign Affairs ever increasingly shrinking budget. Indeed, it would be under Axworthy that the second wave or extension of the liberal internationalist platform emerged. No longer constrained by the confines of state security reasoning, human security galvanized the attention of Canada's foreign affairs minister and shaped the portfolio of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Under Axworthy's five year tenure, Canada articulated a series of positions that were consistent and modelled after Canada's internationalist discourse of an altruistic power that favoured humane approaches to security and state relations. For some like Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, Axworthy's tenure represented "intrusive internationalism", seen as "revolutionary" from the prefects of the past.[97] On closer examination, Axworthy's time as foreign affairs minister re-established and reiterated many of

[96] Ibid.,
[97] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, "the Axworthy Revolution," Canadian Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy. Edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, Maureen Appel Molot, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.67

the founding precepts of Canadian internationalism. Indeed, within the discourse of internationalism, Axworthy reaffirmed the Canadian self as a good international citizen and noble international actor that sought to protect the weak. Indeed, as Sjolander states, "Liberal internationalism became, in a significant sense, a Canadian brand which reflects the best of Canadians to themselves at home, at least as much as it promotes and image abroad."[98] With Aworthy's activist agenda, the public attention was galvanised by the renewed internationalist vigour as performed by Axworthy.

Axworthy's Canadian interpretation of human security discourse was strongly predicated upon an "ontological claim that represents Canada as a model citizen."[99] This idea was not new in Canadian discourse as it neatly follows earlier claims of Canada having a national interest that is less selfish as Canada's character is one that is predicated upon fairness and tolerance. Axworthy promoted national building practices and once again reinvigorated Canadian's imagination and appetite for the practice of multilateralism and acting as a helpful fixer. Axworthy argued that "human security directly expresses the international usefulness of the Canadian experience of using talents of accommodation, negotiation and good will to overcome differences—leading to a unified, tolerant Canada.[100] By recalibrating human security within a Canadian values discourse, Axworthy neatly mutually reinforced Canada's fledging (inter)national identities. For those longing for the days of Pearsonian internationalism, Axworthy was certainly attempting to act as his worthy successor.

In fact, Axworthy would receive a Nobel Peace prize for his efforts in regarding the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, signed by 122 countries in Ottawa in December 1997.

[98] Quote by Claire Turenne Sjolander, quoted in Jean-Chrisophe Boucher, "The Responsibility to Think Clearly about Interests: Stephen Harper's Realist Internationalist, 2006-2011, *op cit.,* p.54
[99] Umut Ozguc, *op. cit*., p.46
[100] Ibid., p.46

Axworthy's human security agenda would also encompass aiding in the establishment of the International Criminal Court, supported the creation of a joint committee on war affected children working with NGOs, leading to a conference in 2000. It was Canada, under Axworthy's helm who took the lead with Norway in "developing a draft declaration on the right and responsibilities of individuals, groups and institutions to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and freedoms.[101] Axworthy argued for the use of soft power in order to punch above Canada's weight. Soft power[102] meant the use of specific political practices that were embedded within a particular liberalist thought that encompassed the human security paradigm including but not limited to democracy promotion, peace-building, enhancing civil society and rebuilding failed and failing states amongst other issues.

Axworthy was especially adept in taking previous practices of statecraft such as multilateralism and acting as an 'honest broker' and providing a fresh spin in order to advance his human security agenda. It once again reasserted a foreign policy discourse that revolved around Canada's independence especially in regards to the U.S. other. Axworthy's human security agenda once again spotlighted the differences between the Canadian self and the American other especially when the American government did not sign on to the International Criminal Court. However, critics abounded regarding the practices associated with Axworthy's agenda. Although Axworthy sought to bring attention to the plight of Africa's poor, instead,

[101] Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, "The return to Continentalism in Canadian foreign policy," *op.cit.*, p.3

[102]The origination of the term soft power is attributed to American scholar Joseph Nye, who wrote *Bound to Lead* as a counterargument against those of the declinist school who believed that America's power was irrevocable in its sunset years. He defined soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion." He went on to note that this power "could be cultivated through relations with allies, economic assistance, and cultural exchanges." He argued that this would result in "a more favorable public opinion and credibility abroad." See Joseph Nye Jr. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1991)

the charges of hypocrisy was leveled at the Minister especially in light of revelations of Axworthy's failure to stop Talisman's Energy's investment in the Sudan. Although a government sponsored report cast doubt on Talisman's Energy's association with the Sudanese state especially in light of its assistance in aiding the military in the civil war. It became evident that the practices involved in undertaking a human security agenda were only relevant and useful when no Canadian corporate interests were involved.[103] Indeed, the performative effects and practices of the human security agenda demonstrated that the repetition of a particular subjectivity and representative practices stylised by the Canadian state were still powerful tools in capturing and (re)imagining the Canadian self and state. By promoting the particular practices inherent within the human security paradigm, officials were once again securing in the minds of Canadians and the world that Canada's identity was of one of tolerance, inclusiveness, fairness and non-American.

Similar to the human security agenda, the rise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) agenda that also emerged out of the United Nations and was championed by Canada as well. For proponents of Canada's internationalism, R2P was a natural extension of Canadian's already established human security practices. It argued that when faced with human crises that the international community of nations had a right to military intervene in those areas, thus suspending the once sacrosanct issue of sovereignty. R2P attempted to update international law in order to allow existing countries to come to the assistance of those populations that were

[103]Brown writes that "despite Foreign Affairs Minister proclamation that should Talisman be exacerbating the conflict in Sudan...the government of Canada may consider, if required, economic and trade sanctions. Despite a report in early January 2000 that found no direct link to Talisman, it did conclude that oil development was fueling the war. Axworthy announced that the government would impose no sanctions on Talisman." See Chris Brown, "Africa in Canadian Foreign Policy 2000: The Human Security Agenda, *op cit*., p.209

being affected by a humanitarian crisis.[104] For realists, Canada's desire to champion such an effort once again smacked off hypocrisy as Canada did not have the military capability to perform such a duty. However, R2P fit nicely within the rubric of Canadian identity discourse. If understood from the performative practices of internationalism and multilateralism as constructs of Canada's internationalist identity, R2P is demonstrative of Canada's desire to be socially responsible and demonstrates its progressiveness by willing to forgo the principles of sovereignty in order to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. According to Boucher, "liberal internationalism expressed itself through the R2P agenda by proposing Canadian support for cosmopolitan ideals, promoting good citizenship, and favouring the betterment of the global public good."[105] Moreover, R2P reinforces the particular discourses which views Canadian interpretation of humanitarian intervention through the guise of liberal notions and prejudices regarding modernity and the supremacy of liberal democratic values. For idealists like Axworthy in the internationalist tradition, the desire to improve the lives of the most vulnerable superseded any potential moral conflict in the manner in which that goal was achieved.[106] Therefore, R2P is constructed and understood within the internationalist worldview that Canada should assist those suffering from a humanitarian crisis by utilising multilateralism to coordinate a U.N sanctioned mission in line with Canada's altruistic and selfless principles inherent within its past (inter)national identity.

---

[104] According to David M. Malone, "Axworthy, understanding the saliency of the precedent created by NATO's Kosovo intervention, convened the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Commission concluded on two important notions: 'sovereignty as responsibility' and the related concept of the Responsibility to Protect, the latter to be exercise in the first instance by states in support of their own populations, and by others internationally where states do not act to protect their populations (or act to oppress them seriously or to deny their basic rights.) David M. Malone, "U.N. Reform," *op cit*.,p.87

[105] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "The Responsibility to Think Clearly about Interests: Stephen Harper's Realist Internationalism, 2006-2011, *op cit.,* p.65

[106] It should be noted that the Conservative government views R2P as "conceptually suspect and lends itself to the propensity to impose a social order that many perceive as imperialistic or Western-centric, which is why upon its arrival it tasked DFAIT to remove all instances where R2P was mentioned." Ibid. While it may have abandoned the principle, Keating argues that the Harper government adopted the practice in Libya. See Keating, *op cit*., p.253

to Sycophants: ascendency of Continentalism as competing discourse and practice

Respect for you will not last long unless in your proposals you indicate concern for world order, the delicate balance of power, and precedents rather than for your country's narrow's interests or your own glorification.[107]

For many, the arrival of Stephen Harper is demonstrative of the legitimization of a particular form of the continentalist discourse within Canadian foreign policy. Yet, continentalism was always present as an alternative discourse in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy identity. According to the late John Holmes, liberal internationalism and continentalism were merely "two sides of the dumbbell" in Canadian foreign policy.[108] Yet, the rise of continentalism as discourse accelerated during the 1990s. Indeed, just as Axworthy's contribution towards advancing and recalibrating the second wave of Canadian internationalism was at its crescendo, the continentialist discourse was already gathering steam as part of a wider criticism of Axworthy's internationalist agenda. For those of the continentalist persuasion, Canada is understood not to be a self cast distinct of the U.S other, but is viewed as being both similar, and desirable. According to Vucetic, the continentialist discourse "places Canada firmly in the liberal democratic West, but it challenges the claim to uniqueness," by no longer identifying the U.S as a threat to its identity.[109] Indeed, if liberal internationalism were preoccupied with constructing a Self that could sustain the pressures of having the United States as its continental other, continentalists believe and advocate for greater socio-economic integration between the two countries, and with the advent of the Harper government, the liberal establishment and its principles are now disdainfully cast as the unwelcomed other.

[107] Quote by John W. Holmes, quoted in Denis Stairs, "John W. Holmes and the diplomacy of lesser powers," International Journal. (Spring 2010) p.290

[108] Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, "The return to Continentalism in Canadian foreign policy," *op.cit.,* p.5 For a succinct overview of the history of continentalism, see Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, "The Twilight of Internationalism: Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy," *op cit.,*

[109] Srdjan Vucetic, "Why did Canada Sit out the Iraq War?" Canadian Foreign Policy, (2006) p.139

Continentalists work within the rubric of neo-liberalist economic policy advocating for the interpenetration of trade and capital between states arguing that trade and security are necessarily linked and that especially given the events of 9/11, one cannot exist without the other. Indeed, the genesis of the continentalist discourse remains as of an offshoot of trade policy. According to Roussel and Massie, "traditional continentalism essentially refers to the vast and multifaceted network of exchanges (goods, people, ideas etc.,) between Canadian and American societies and its positive consequence for both societies and government. It can be seen as an unintentional societal and economic phenomenon rather than as a deliberate political project or governmental strategy designed to meet explicit political ends."[110] Indeed, the early antecedents of the continentalist project were the promotion of trade between Canada and the United States while purposely creating/maintaining a heterogeneous and distinct Canadian (inter)national identity.

However, the events of 9/11 crystallised the continentalist discourse as a legitimate alternative narrative and challenger to Canadian (inter)national policies. Whereas prior to 9/11, the continentalist discourse was limited to the economic sphere; after, it was broadened to include security, defence and ideational dimensions. Indeed, it is the ideological dimensions that for some like Roussel and Massie distinguishes and delineates neo-continentalism from traditional continentalism while others view the tenure of the Harper government as a "realist" approach to international affairs.[111] If liberal internationalism finds its roots in the political

[110] Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, "The Twilight of Internationalism: Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy," *op cit*., p.41

[111] For example, Albo calls many of the changing political practices undertaken by the Harper government "a new realism" to Canadian statecraft, while Jean-Christophe Boucher distinguishes Harper's tenure as "realist internationalism." See Greg Albo, "Fewer Illusions: Canadian Foreign Policy since 2001," Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan. Edited by Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) p.241 and Jean-Christophe Boucher, "The Responsibility to Think Clearly about Interests: Stephen Harper's Realist Internationalism, 2006-2011, *op cit.*

corridors of Ottawa, then the architects and lineage of neo-continentalism are seen to be directly traced back to the Calgary School, of which Prime Minister Harper is often seen as one of its pragmatic disciples.[112] Indeed, the tenets of neo-continentalism are composed of several principles that seek to challenge the primacy of the liberal internationalist narrative and indeed reshape the foundational tenets of Canadians sense of its (inter)national identity. Indeed, neocontinentalism is seen as the external expression of a growing contestation by the West against the precepts of the liberal/Liberal regime of the past decades. That said, according to Roussel and Massie, neocontinentalism has not been accepted as yet as a dominant narrative. Instead, it is seen as an emerging rival narrative that seeks to reshape Canada's discourses and practices so that the Conservative approach, and with it, neocontinentalism, are seen as the natural governing discourse, and by extension, the new political (inter)national identity for Canada.

The first core principle consists of a Canadian flavour of neoconservatism, as it accepts adopting a law and order approach, free market principles, and social conservative values (binary narratives on marriage, family and the placement of women within the social hierarchy). It purports to put forward a particular vision of the state and its responsibilities: it challenges the tenets of the expansionist Welfare state, which is negatively associated with previous Liberal party governance, particularly in the areas of the economy and society, and advocates for the principles of tax reductions. While embedded liberalism was an essential

[112] It should be noted that the origination of the 'Calgary school' derives from the an article presented by American scholar David Rovinsky, "The Ascendency of Western Canada in Canadian Policymaking," Policy Papers on the Americas. (Washington: CSIS, 1998) and later editorialized by Marci MacDonald in "The Man Behind Steven Harper," The Walrus.ca . (October 2004) http://thewalrus.ca/the-man-behind-stephen-harper/. However, Barry Cooper argues that no such intellectual cabal exists, and indeed, Cooper goes so far as to distinguish the differing nuances between the academics and policy makers linked together arguing that the Calgary School 'is an intellectual construct or rather a construct of intellectuals, a category that includes bright minds in the Toronto media.' Barry Cooper, "the myth of the Calgary school," The Calgary Herald. (June 24, 2004) p.A19

component for the liberal internationalist identity conceived of Canada as a social-democratic country, neoliberal precepts underpin the neocontinentalist paradigm. The second principle consists of the political practices and policies that shape Canada's statecraft. Neocontinentalists believe that Canada's statecraft should not flow from soft power principles but instead should be focussed on staunch diplomatic principles and hard power capabilities. Hence, there are calls for an increase in the defence budget so that Canada's military can properly serve its missions abroad. Steven Harper made it equivocally clear, that his understanding of foreign policy is predicated on "re-equipping the military is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to making Canada a meaningful contributor in the world."[113] Indeed, Harper goes further in an interview and stated, "I know we've received some criticism for re-investing in our military, but when you're in a dangerous world and countries are from time to time called upon to do things to deal with those dangers, if you don't have the capacity to act you are not taken seriously. Nobody takes your views seriously unless you can contribute to solutions, and it's very difficult to contribute to solutions unless you can contribute across the range of capabilities, up to and including military capabilities."[114] As Roussel and Massie argue, fundamentally, neo-continentalists believe in the positing that Canada is not a merely a middle power, but a "foremost power", depicting "Canada as a state with a huge potential of influence on the international stage if it plays its cards well and accepts the responsibilities that comes with such rank."[115] Canadian identity is thus not predicated upon acting as a peaceable kingdom that acts as an honest broker and helpful fixer in order to advance its standings in the international

[113] Quoted in Jean-Christophe Boucher, *op cit.,* p.60
[114] Kenneth Whyte, "In conversation: Steven Harper: The P.M on how he sees Canada's role in the world and where he wants to take the country," http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/07/05/how-he-sees-canada%E2%80%99s-role-in-the-world-and-where-he-wants-to-take-the-country-2/ It should be noted that Boucher feels that Harper's stance on the military is more in lined with realist internationalist stance given that Harper is seeking to align with Canada's national interest, which is to remain a relevant player on the world stage, and hard power is cast as necessary evil in order to remain relevant. See Jean Christophe Boucher, *op cit.*,p.61
[115] Ibid.

community. Quite the contrary, as seen by John Baird's speech at the United Nations in which he clearly stated that Canada "would no longer go along in order get along with everyone else's agenda....we now take strong, principled positions in our dealings with other nations---whether popular or not."[116] Interestingly, it runs counter to Sjolander's assertion that "internationalism is an "influence multiplier"[117] for the middle power that chooses to act as a team player in multilateral fora in order to secure perceived global public goods within the international commons. Instead, neocontinentalism seeks to brag that Canada is an "energy superpower" that manages its financial affairs including its banking system better than its international colleagues. For neocontinentalists, Canada's identity was now being reshaped to act as a confident nation no longer confined to a neurosis of being nice, altruistic and benign when in reality it is principled agent capable of standing up for its own interests.

The third principle consists with adopting a Manichean conception of the world: it views the world in simplistic good vs. evil terms. According to Nossal, a "Manichean worldview coupled with an instrumental view of world affairs guides the Harper government, where foreign policy is at once a struggle between good and evil and an instrument that can be used to advance a domestic partisan agenda."[118] Indeed, neocontinentalism does not seek to advance a search for root causes and instead advocates a limited and binary world view that casts normative western ideals such as democracy promotion, the rule of law, and free market capitalism as the natural and progressive way of life. As Roussel and Massie point out, "Prime Minister Harper praised Columbia for its path towards democracy, but demonised Iran and

[116] John Baird, "Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations General Assembly," New York City, September 26 2011. http://www.international.gc.c.a/media/aff/speeches-discours/2011/2011-030.aspx?lang=eng&view=d
[117] Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Canada and the Afghan "Other", Identity, Difference, and Foreign policy, *op cit.,* p. 240
[118]Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Canada, the World and the Inside/Outside of Internationalism, *op cit.,* p.257

chastised Russia for their aggressive behaviour."[119] Indeed, Steven Harper himself states, "We think it's pretty important that our long-run interests are tied somewhat to our trade, but that they're more fundamentally tied to the kind of values we have in the world: freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. We see over time—it's not an ironclad rule—but those societies that promote those values tend to share our interests, and those that do not tend to, on occasion, if not frequently, become threats to us."[120] Indeed, the political practices that emerge from this particular view point are one of confrontation and withdrawal. Canada's self is thus (re)cast as being in fear and in danger of the foreign other, while evoking commonalities with a particular type of self: democratic societies.

This can be seen through the discourse and practices employed by the current foreign affairs minister, John Baird, who in denouncing Iran's nuclear ambitions vowed to impose trade sanctions between the two nations. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, Canada "said it would enforce a total trade ban on Iranian goods, going further than any other major Western nation in imposing trade-related penalties amid a broad effort by Washington and its allies to persuade Tehran to give up its nuclear program."[121] Unlike the political practices embedded within the internationalist stance that would have addressed these issues at the United Nations, and its various committees, neocontinentalists employ a discourse of principle in which to address marginalize and subdue the other. Indeed, neocontinentalism explicitly cast the (in)secure Canadian self as morally superior to that of the uncivilized and unrepentant other. While this is reminiscent of the liberal internationalist narrative, the tone and language

[119] Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, "The Twilight of Internationalism," *op cit.*, p.47
[120] Kenneth Whyte, "In conversation: Steven Harper: The P.M on how he sees Canada's role in the world and where he wants to take the country," http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/07/05/how-he-sees-canada%E2%80%99s-role-in-the-world-and-where-he-wants-to-take-the-country-2/
[121] Paul Vieira, "Canada Imposes a Total Ban on Trade with Iran," Wall Street Journal, (May 29, 2013) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324866904578513442435665794.html

employed is not. John Baird, in explaining Canada's unprecedented actions against Iran stated, "the move was necessary due to a failure by Iranian leaders to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. . .we are compelled to take further actions against this reckless and irresponsible regime."[122] By framing Iran as "irresponsible and reckless," Canada is cast as Mother Superior admonishing one of the faithful for their wayward behaviour and now must be punished for their 'bad' deed.

Indeed, Sjolander and Trevenen quote Razack, who in speaking of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, state that "deeply embedded within the conceptual foundations of the Bush administration's notion of a life and death struggle against the 'axis of evil' is a thoroughly racial logic. Disciplining, instructing and keeping in line Third World people who irrationally hate and wish to destroy their saviours derives from the idea that Northern people inhabit civilized lands while the South 'is a meta-physical battlefield devoid of all recognizable humanity into which the wandering European enters at his peril."[123] Neocontinentialism situates itself very clearly in this particular framing of North and South relations and indeed, Baird comments on Iran demonstrates that the government follows the same racial logic by pitting Iran as an "irrational and thus uncivilized other' in contrast to the civilized and rational Canadian self.

Another tenet of (neo)continentalism is Canada's willingness to embrace the United States as its closest partner and ally. It is understood that Canada's prosperity is dependent upon immediate access to the United States market. This was clearly understood the day after 9/11, when Canadians woke up to the fact that trucks were lined up for hours waiting to cross in

[122] Ibid.,
[123] Quoted in Claire Turenne Sjolander and Kathryn Trevenen, *op cit.*, p.49

the United States. Yet, for neocontinentalists, the relationship with the United States underscores the very essence of all actions undertaken by the Canadian state. Canada's relationship with the United States is seen as "an indispensable foundation of Canadian foreign policy in all dimensions."[124] Indeed, Harper makes clear that Canada must be seen as a "strong, reliable partner" to the United States, both in North America and abroad.[125] The recasting of the American self as a desirable compliment to the Canadian self also sheds light in the shift of values and identities from liberal internationalism to neocontinentalism. By casting the American other as desirable, neocontinentalism seeks to find a place of belonging within the North American community. Instead, the Harper government casts Liberal/liberal ideals as the prejorative other needing to be erased from Canadians collective memories. Whereas liberal internationalist favours the creations of the symbols and myths that are absence of any former imperialist or continentalist overtones (the Maple Leaf, peacekeeping and the adoption of multiculturalism are all examples), neocontinentalists strive for connections with both its British past and its perceived continentalist future. Indeed, this particular mindset has always been present. Vucetic writes that "a strong British connection buttressed Anglo-Canadian hegemony over the Quebecois, and provided an antidote to creeping Americanization."[126] Hence, there is a greater emphasis on Canada's participation in the War of 1812, renaming the navy to be the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force and the replacement of Quebec paintings with the portrait of the Queen in the hallway of DFAIT.[127] More recently, the Prime Minister's airplane was repainted so that the colours were now red, white and blue: a powerful symbol

[124] Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel, *op cit.,* p.47
[125] Ibid.
[126] Srdjan Vucetic, *op cit*., p. 77
[127] Jennifer Ditchburn, "Baird orders Quebec paintings replaced by Queen's portrait," Globe and Mail. (July 26, 2011) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/baird-orders-quebec-paintings-replaced-by-queens-portrait/article588398/

that evokes imagery of both the union jack and the stars and stripes. This desire for reimagining and reclaiming aspects of the Canadian identity can be seen as a means and manner in which to dilute and counter the liberalist conditioning of the past decades.

Yet, even Massie and Roussel acknowledge that the advent of the Harper government has not translated as yet as a dominant discourse in Canadian foreign policy. However, Frederic Merand and Antoine Vandemoortele, for example, "contend that Harper's actions are demonstrative of a radical continentalist, systemically aligning himself with Washington."[128] But on closer examination, it becomes clear that when necessary, the Conservative government utilises liberal internationalist language in which to clarify and reinforce prevailing narratives of Canadian (inter)national identity for the audiences at home and abroad. So, while Harper made an unexpected trip to Kandahar to demonstrate a more muscular foreign policy, he employed liberal internationalist language in order to affirm Canada's commitment there. Harper stated, "Canada has a noble tradition of helping the world's needy. There are few countries more needy than Afghanistan.....Canadian forces are also playing humanitarian roles, delivering aid supplies, medical treatment and other services."[129] Indeed, while Albo is correct in recognizing that "peacekeeping and development programs have been through devaloured or instrumentalized in Canadian foreign policy,"[130] with Canada all but abandoning peacekeeping in both the letter if not in spirit of its inception, the associated narratives of liberal internationalism are still employed.

In fact, Turenne Sjolander and Trevenen argue that when it became apparent in 2006 that the Canadian public was increasingly becoming more critical of Canada's participation in

[128] Jean Christophe Boucher, *op cit.*, p.53
[129] Claire Turenne Sjolander and Kathryn Trevenen, *op cit.*, p. 44
[130] Greg Albo, "Fewer Illusions: Canadian Foreign Policy since 2001," Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan. Edited by Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) p.259

Afghanistan, Harper and the Canadian government's discourse surrounding the war began to shift. Where as in 2006, Peter Mac Kay stated that "Canada's mission to Afghanistan is in our national interest. On September 11 2001, terrorists attacked North America and Canadians were killed... That's why we are in Afghanistan.," the language was softened when confronted with an increasingly skeptical public."[131] Indeed, a 2007 Strategic Council report obtained by the Globe and Mail "recommended that the Canadian government place the emphasis on what was previously understood as human security and concomitantly, internationalist terminology: "rebuilding", "enhancing the lives of women and children, and peacekeeping" in communicating with the Canadian public in order to change negative perceptions of the Afghan mission."[132] The example of Afghanistan is employed to illustrate that even when the Harper government seeks to radically assert its neocontinentalist agenda, previous memories and interpretations by the Canadian public can and have tempered the exercise and implementation of that agenda. Moreover, as Campbell asserts previous acts within the foreign policy sphere along with accompanying discourse can and in some cases does act as a deterrent or constraint to the pursuit of a particular type of statecraft of political practice.

That said, Harper has been most successful in challenging Canada's presence and participation at the U.N, eschewing attending Barack Obama's address to the United Nations, preferring to make an appearance at the Tim Horton's Innovation Centre.[133] More recently, Canada has decided to pull out of the U.N anti-droughts convention, making Canada the only country in the world to do so. Moreover, Canada most recent refusal to participate in the U.N

[131] Claire Turenne Sjolander and Kathryn Trevenen, *op cit.,* p.47
[132] Claire Turenne Sjolander, "John H Holmes and the reconciliation of immoderate views," International Journal. (Spring 2010) p.329
[133] Josh Visser, "In Case you forgot he's Canadian: Stephen Harper takes in junior hockey game, "Rolls up the Rim, and wins," National Post. February 21, 2013, http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/02/21/in-case-you-forgot-hes-canadian-stephen-harper-takes-in-junior-hockey-game-rolls-up-the-rim-wins/

disarmament forum due to the fact that Iran was in charge. All of these examples do illustrate the Conservative government's willingness to move away from the practices of multilateralism and inclusion and has caused some such as Albo to conclude that the Harper government's approach is a radical departure in terms of discourse and practice. Yet, unlike the "national interest discourse" that was first introduced to signal a more robust response to the war in Afghanistan but was immediately softened and couched in internationalist terms in order to appease the Canadian public, little negative reaction has been offered by the Canadian public writ large to Harper's actions. If and when such a reaction should emerge, it is likely that Harper's government will likely seek the 'middle ground' offered by the prescripts of liberal internationalism. However, the lack of reaction by the public remains key to understanding the so called radical reorientation undertaken by the Harper government, which upon further inspection proves that it may not actually be quite so radical after all.

Conclusion

> Basically, we are living in a world that is more competitive than any other era, where change is faster and less predictable, and where long established orders-whether they are economic, political, or industrial-are being challenged and supplanted. In this world, the difference between success and failure is greatly magnified. This applies to . . . industries, and entire countries.[134]

In conclusion, this paper has sought to examine the shifts from Canada's liberal international discourse and associated political practices and (inter)international identity towards a more (neo)continentalist viewpoint, most recently articulated by the Harper government. Illustrating how the liberal internationalist discourse and practices play a key role in reimagining and legitimizing a particular type of positive Canadian identity, this paper also acknowledges the gaps that are also apparent between the discourse and narratives interwoven in the precepts of internationalism and the reality of Canada's state actions. As Turenne

[134] Quoted in Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else. (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012) pp.168-169

Sjolander and Smith conclude, "liberal internationalism is something that a state "does" or practices."[135]

Concomitantly, the ascension of (neo)continentalism as state practice exemplified by the Harper government continues to contest essential practices and discourses once considered endemic to understandings of the Canadian state. Yet at the same time, the Conservative government also utilises the political practices and discourses of liberal internationalism when it is deemed advantageous. Such is the case with Afghanistan, where Harper's words invoke Canada's great "mythical truth" of Canada acting as an honest and impartial broker interested only in the betterment of the global good. Indeed, in examining different places and space where liberal internationalism practices meets (neo)continentalist discourse, it becomes evident that it may be too soon to declare the Conservative government's foreign policy stance as a radical reorientation of the discourse. Without question, (neo)continentalism is indeed contesting key aspects and understanding of Canadian (inter)national identity. Yet, it must also be understood that (neo)continentalism is also a fear based response to a rapidly changing environment, in which globalized threats are ambiguous and ever present. Moreover, as certain nations successfully navigate the new global geostrategic terrain, others are bound to fall behind. Indeed, as the United States finds itself weighted down by domestic turmoil, a large fiscal debt and an overextended military, the myopic wisdom of the neocontinentalist fervor in placing U.S interests above all others will likely be contested. Moreover, as power becomes diffused amongst a wide variety of nations, the desirability for the pursuit of multilateralism and international institutions is likely to increase. Already, traditional understandings of places and spaces occupied by the state are being contested as new borders and boundaries are created

[135] Claire Turenne Sjolander and Heather A. Smith, *op cit.*, p.258

that test and contest state dominance. In thinking about perspective recommendations, it would be facile to suggest that Canada return to a liberal internationalist stance in order to guide its foreign policy. While it may be desirous by those of the liberal internationalist persuasion to dismiss the Harper government's tenure as an outlier in terms of governance; to do so would be disingenuous and reductive. However, it may be imperative that Canadians begins to understand and perhaps reconcile the different and competing visions of Canadian identity and the practices and discourses that underscore and define the Canadian self to its self as well as in relation to the foreign other.

Bibliography

Albo, Greg. "Fewer Illusions: Canadian Foreign Policy Since 2001,"Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan. Edited by Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) p.241-269

Arnold, Samantha L. "Home and Away: Public Diplomacy and the Canadian Self," Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective. Edited by J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.15-28

Baird, John. "Address by the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations General Assembly," New York City, September 26 2011. http://www.international.gc.c.a/media/aff/speeches-discours/2011/2011-030.aspx?lang=eng&view=d

Bialasiewicz, Luisa; Campbell, David; Elden, Stuart; Graham, Stephen; Jeffrey, Alex; Williams, Alison J. "Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US Strategy," Political Geography. (2007) pp.405-422

Boucher, Jean-Christophe. "The Responsibility to Think Clearly about Interests: Stephen Harper's Realist Internationalism, 2006-2011, pp.79-108

Brown, Chris. "Africa in Canadian Foreign Policy 2000: The Human Security Agenda, Canadian Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy. Edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.192-212

Black, David; Turenne Sjolander, Claire. "Multilateralism Reconstituted and the Discourse of Canadian Foreign Policy," Studies in Political Studies. (Spring 1996) pp.7-35

Campbell, David. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

Carment, David; Prest, Stewart. "Finding root causes of terrorism is the core of Canadian policy, National Post. (April 23, 2013) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/finding-root-causes-of-terrorism-is-the-core-of-canadian-policy/article11494674/

Chapnick, Adam. "Caught in Between Traditions: A Minority Conservative Government and Canadian Foreign Policy. Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities. Edited by Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), pp.58-75

Chase, Steven. "PM Stephen Harper steps up attack on Justin Trudeau over terrorism," National Post. (April 25, 2013) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/pm-stephen-harper-steps-up-attack-on-justin-trudeau-over-terrorism/article11548558/

Clarke, George Elliot. Multiculturalism and its (Usual) Discontents, Canada Watch. (Fall 2009)

Cohen, Andrew. While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world. Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 2004.

Cohen, Tobi. "Controversial anti-terror bill passes, allowing preventative arrests, secret hearings," National Post. (April 13 2005) http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/25/controversial-anti-terror-bill-passes-allowing-preventative-arrests-secret-hearings/

Cooper, Barry. "the myth of the Calgary school," The Calgary Herald. (June 24, 2004) p.A19

Cousineau, Sophie. "Canadian foreign policy doesn't align with Quebeckers values: Premier Marois," Globe and Mail. (October 16, 2012) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-foreign-policy-doesnt-align-with-quebeckers-values-premier-marois/article4615437/

Ditchburn, Jennifer. "Baird orders Quebec paintings replaced by Queen's portrait," Globe and Mail. (July 26, 2011) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/baird-orders-quebec-paintings-replaced-by-queens-portrait/article588398/

DiMaggio, Anthony R. Mass Media: Mass Propaganda: Examining American News on the War on Terror. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008.

Fournier, Tim. "Liberal wrongly denies Canadian troops in Iraq War, (January 12, 2008) retrieved on May 24, 2013 http://archive.martlet.ca/martlet/article/Liberal-wrongly-denies-Canadian-troops-in-Iraq-war/

Freeland, Chrystia. Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012.

Gordon, Todd. Imperialist Canada. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010.

Grodin, David. "Rewriting the National Security State: How and Why the Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War," Paper presented at the Annual International Studies Association, March 17-20, 2004, in Montreal Quebec. pp.1-31

Hampson, Fen Osler; Hillmer, Norman and Appel Molot, Maureen. "The return to Continentalism in Canadian foreign policy," Canadian Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy. Edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.1-18

Haglund David G. "And the Beat Goes On: Identity and Canadian Foreign Policy," 50 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy: Canadian Among Nations 2008. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008) pp.343-367

Hillmer Norman; Chapnick, Adam. "The Axworthy Revolution," Canadian Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy. Edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001)pp.67-88

Hurst, Lynda . "On world stage, best supporting actor," Toronto Star. (Sept 29, 2007),, http://www.thestar.com/opinion/columnists/2007/09/29/on_world_stage_a_best_supporting_actor.html

Kay, Barbara. "Trudeau reveals his inner sophomore with search for 'root causes,' National Post. (April 13, 2013) http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/04/18/barbara-kay-2/

Keating, Tom. Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. 3rd edition. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013

Laffey, Mark. "Locating identity: performativity, foreign policy and state action," Review of International Studies. Vol. 26 (2000) pp.429-444

MacDonald, Marci. "The Man Behind Steven Harper," The Walrus.ca . (October 2004) http://thewalrus.ca/the-man-behind-stephen-harper/.

Malone, David M. "U.N. Reform," Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities. Edited by Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), pp.79-108

Massie, Justin; Roussel, Stephane. "The Twilight of Internationalism? Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy," Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy. Edited by Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.36-49

Mutimer, David. "No CANDU: The Multiple-Nuclear Canadian Self," Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective. Edited by J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Nossal, Kim Richard. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. 3rd edition (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc, 1997.

Nossal, Kim Richard. "Pinchpenny Diplomacy," International Journal. (Winter, 1998-9) p.88-105

Nye Jr. Joseph, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1991.

Ozguc, Umut. "Remaking Canadian identity: A critical analysis of Canada's Human security discourse," Journal of Human Security. Vol. 7 (2011) pp.37-58

Paikin, Zach. "Canada's foreign policy needs a dose of realism," May 8, 2013, (retrieved on May 25, 2013) http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/05/08/canadas-foreign-policy-needs-a-dose-of-realism/

Rovinsky, David."The Ascendency of Western Canada in Canadian Policymaking," Policy Papers on the Americas. (Washington: CSIS, 1998) pp. 1-28

Rumelili, Bahar "Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation," Review of International Studies. (2004) pp.1-22

Reford, Robert W. "Peacekeeping at Suez, 1956," Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases. Edited by Don Muncton and John Kirton. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1992) p.58-77

Smith, Heather A; Sjolander, Claire Turenne. "Conversations with Consensus—Internationalism under the Harper Government," Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy. Edited by Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.xiii-p.xxvii

Sjolander, Claire Turenne. "Canada and the Afghan "Other": Identity, Difference, and Foreign Policy, Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy. Edited by Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.238-p.253

Sjolander, Claire Tureene. "John H. Holmes and the reconciliation of immoderate views," International Journal. (Spring 2010) pp.321-329

Sjolander Claire Turenne; Trevenen, Kathryn. "Constructing Canadian Foreign Policy: Myths of Good International Citizens, Protectors, and the War in Afghanistan," Canadian Foreign Policy in Critical Perspective. Edited by J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp.96-109

Stairs, Denis. "John H. Holmes and the diplomacy of lesser powers," International Journal. (Spring 2010) pp.289-pp.302

The Dominion Institute, "Visions on Canada's Foreign Policy," Prepared by Innovation Research Group, Inc, November 4, 2004, pp.1-31

Vieira, Paul ."Canada Imposes a Total Ban on Trade with Iran," Wall Street Journal, (May 29, 2013) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324866904578513442435665794.html

Visser, Josh . "In Case you forgot he's Canadian: Stephen Harper takes in junior hockey game, "Rolls up the Rim, and wins," National Post. February 21, 2013, http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/02/21/in-case-you-forgot-hes-canadian-stephen-harper-takes-in-junior-hockey-game-rolls-up-the-rim-wins/

Vucetic, Srdjan .The Anglosphere: A Geneology of a Racialized Identity in International Relations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Vucetic, Srdjan. "Why did Canada Sit out the Iraq War?" Canadian Foreign Policy, (2006) pp.133-153

Wagner, Eric . "Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War," (2008-07-14),retrieved on March 2, 2013, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/wagner-eng.asp

Way, Laura. "An energy superpower or a super sales pitch? Building the case through an examination of Canadian newspaper coverage of oil sands." Canadian Political Science Review. (January 2011) pp.74-98

Weber, Cyntha. "Performative States," Millennium. 27 (March, 1998) pp.77-85

Westhead, Rick. "Canada's international reputation rising: survey," Toronto Star. (Thursday May 23, 2013) http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/05/23/canadas_international_reputation_rising_survey.html

Wythe, Kenneth. "In conversation: Stephen Harper. Macleans.ca (Tuesday July 5, 2011) retrieved on May 24 2013 http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/07/05/how-he-sees-canada%E2%80%99s-role-in-the-world-and-where-he-wants-to-take-the-country-2/

Zalman, Amy; Clarke, Jonathon . "The Global War on Terror: A narrative in need of a re-write." Ethics and International Affairs. (Summer 2009) http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/23_2/essays/002