

ASSESSING SUCCESS IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS
No Evaluative Framework Without A Political Framework

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Abstract

The international community has long relied on United Nations (UN) peace operations as the means of creating and maintaining international peace and security, however the realities of what a “successful” mission looks like remains obscured, as the experiences and definitions of success may differ between the various players involved. While a shared definition of success and operational structure remains elusive, it is clear that the assessment of UN missions must be conducted in a holistic manner, from mandate crafting, to mission transition and exit. Among these realities is that the assessment of UN peace operation success is all too often hindered by political partiality with the determination of mission success frequently held hostage by faulty political processes. It is essential that evaluative frameworks encompass the various stages of a peace operation, in order to illustrate the political challenges that often obstruct the planning and assessment of a UN mission. Highlighting the political obstacles associated with holistic mission planning and assessment, against the backdrop of ongoing, ad hoc UN peace operation deployments to Haiti, breaks down existing normative positions and exposes the realities and voids in current methodology.

Keywords: United Nations, Peace Operations, Peacekeeping, Peace-building, Evaluative Frameworks, Political Frameworks, Assessment Templates, Peacekeeping Success, Measures of Performance, Benchmarks and Indicators, Haiti peace-building

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Table of Contents	iii
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Background.....	3
Thesis Outline.....	5
 CHAPTER 2: HAITI BACKGROUND.....	6
Breaking Binds	6
Dictatorships and Growing Unrest	8
A Glimpse of Democracy	10
The First Intervention	11
The Second Intervention.....	16
 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW.....	21
Methodology.....	21
Literature Review	24
What is Success?	27
Success and Key Evaluative Frameworks.....	35
Success, Security Council Politics and Mandate Crafting	55
Success, Transitions and Exit Strategy Development.....	62
 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS	68
UN Mission Mandates in Haiti.....	70
Existing Frameworks: Strengths and Weaknesses	74
 CHAPTER 5: PROPOSAL, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	82
Embedded Assessment in Support of Evaluation.....	83
EASE Applied to Haiti	90
Discussion.....	96
Conclusion.....	103
 References Cited.....	106

Chapter 1: Introduction

United Nations (UN) peace operations represent the global community's collective commitment to international peace and security. Modern UN peacekeeping missions seek to accomplish a wide-array of tasks, from military intervention in protection of civilians, to democracy building and rule of law establishment. The new, far-reaching goals of United Nations peace operations require ever more complex mechanisms for assessing their success. Though there is a growing wealth of assessment tools and templates, they have largely been designed within 'silos,' independently assessing each phase of a UN peace operation. As UN mission mandates form the building blocks of peace operations, it is here that continued emphasis should be placed on evaluating the success of a mission. Moreover, there is a need to continue to develop evaluative frameworks that assess UN missions on an ongoing basis, rather than simply evaluating past missions within a lessons learned context. Though evaluative frameworks play an important role in successfully guiding a UN mission, the challenges created by political realities in the Security Council have largely been absent from framework design and implementation, therefore weakening the usefulness of their application.

Within this thesis, I will examine existing evaluative frameworks, identify the policy and literature gaps associated with the frameworks, and finish by examining my proposed evaluative framework, Embedded Assessment in Support of Evaluation (EASE). My proposed framework will serve two purposes: (1) it will demonstrate the need for holistic mission planning and assessment; and (2) the framework will function as a vehicle to illustrate the political challenges associated with developing and applying evaluative frameworks to UN peace operations. I seek to advance these concerns against the backdrop of ongoing UN peace efforts in Haiti, where the

broad issue that is to be addressed is the degree to which the UN's efforts in the country have been successful, and whether or not we can identify these successes (or failures) within an organized evaluative framework. Within this thesis, my central research question will be: What led to the deployment of ten independently mandated UN and international interventions in Haiti over a span of 25 years? And, more broadly, what does that tell us about the planning and assessment process associated with UN missions? My hypothesis, and what provides the overall direction for this thesis, is that political challenges within the Security Council hinder the mission planning and assessment of UN peace operations. The need for ten ad hoc UN and international deployments to Haiti was a direct result of politics in the Security Council and a lack of planning and ongoing evaluation throughout the life span of the various missions in the country.

My proposed remedy to the policy and literature gap is an evaluative framework that combines the necessity of holistic mission planning with the need for ongoing, embedded assessment. As well, the evaluative framework developed in this thesis will illustrate the added complexity associated with politics in the Security Council found throughout the life span of a mission, the challenges political realities create for assessment, as well as providing a detailed analysis of why evaluative frameworks and assessment in general are hindered by disparities between Security Council members and external political forces within the host country and among troop contributing nations. In short, Embedded Assessment in Support of Evaluation is a mission planning and assessment framework that bridges the existing gaps in evaluative frameworks for UN peace operations (taking into consideration the various steps of a mission) while acknowledging the challenges presented by often hostile political landscapes in the lead up to and during UN mission deployments.

BACKGROUND

Examining existing evaluative frameworks against the backdrop of the UN's efforts in Haiti provides unique insight into the development of UN peace operation strategies, highlights the need for holistic mission planning and assessment in order to avoid ad hoc mission deployment, and demonstrates the political challenges associated with mission planning and assessment. Haiti is well suited as a case study for examining the effectiveness of evaluative frameworks in part due to the longevity and occurrences of UN missions in the country, the political complexity of achieving and maintaining cooperation among decision-makers, as well as the type of missions that were deployed. Enduringly, the UN has been in Haiti for over 25 years, while deploying 11 independently mandated missions to the country, including one complete withdrawal and re-entry. The political complexity is a result of Haiti's unique history, namely Spanish, French and the American intervention, as well as the political animosity among the local population toward UN peacekeepers in the country. Finally, the UN has conducted the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping in Haiti, from election monitoring in 1990 to peace and state building operations in 1993 and 2004, respectively. Broadly, there is a remarkable question that has not been sufficiently answered with regard to UN efforts in Haiti- what brought about the ad hoc deployment of ten independently mandated missions in the country over the course of 25 years?

The theoretical grounding, guiding my approach to this thesis is based on academic research conducted on evaluative frameworks for UN peace operations, such as the proposed frameworks developed by Paul F. Diehl & Daniel Druckman (2010), and Martin-Brûlé (2016), as well as those developed by Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and official United Nations

assessment frameworks. In short, the proposed methodology and research plan of this thesis is based on UN publications, as well as relevant academic literature. Based on this research, I anticipated that the findings will point towards evaluative frameworks as beneficial for identifying success in UN peace operations, but that mandate crafting and exit strategies must necessarily be incorporated into a larger evaluative framework in order to be effective. Moreover, those political challenges have often adversely effected the implementation of evaluative frameworks.

In addition to simultaneously assessing existing evaluative frameworks and the mission in Haiti, I seek to address three additional issues. First, I will examine how evaluative frameworks have so far avoided the important questions of mandate creation and exit strategies when examining the success of peace operations. Additionally, I will consider several assessment templates (i.e., Diehl & Druckman, 2010) that were initially intended to be ongoing, in order to provide timely policy decisions, however, in practice these frameworks have only been identified as useful for assessing peace operations within a lessons learned context. And finally, I will look to illustrate the need for holistic mission planning and assessment as necessary to more thoroughly evaluate UN peace operation success. Throughout the discussion of these issues, I will address the political challenges associated with all aspects of planning and measuring peace operation performance.

Broadly speaking, my research objective is to determine the strengths and weaknesses of existing evaluative frameworks against a backdrop of UN efforts in Haiti in order to determine a better path forward. I will explore the limitations of existing assessment tools, looking to examine whether they are effective at evaluating ongoing missions rather than retroactive peace operation evaluation. Finally, the objectives of the research will look to investigate how mandate

crafting, exit strategy development and political realities in general can be more ably incorporated (or acknowledged) within an evaluative framework. I will address these policy challenges by incorporating them into my proposed assessment framework, Embedded Assessment in Support of Evaluation. An accompanying recommendation for further research and analysis will be made based on the need to consider evaluative frameworks across multiple organizations, as well as the challenges associated with mandate crafting within the context of the highly politicized Security Council.

THESIS OUTLINE

The body of this thesis is divided into five chapters including the **Introduction**. Chapter 2 is the **Historical Background**, where I briefly summarize the events that precipitated the two periods of UN and international intervention in Haiti. Chapter 3 is the **Methodology and Literature Review** section, where I review the existing evaluative frameworks for assessing UN intervention from which I developed my own research. Chapter 4 is the **Results and Analysis** chapter of the thesis where I discuss the data that I collected through the methods that I applied to the existing evaluative frameworks and include my interpretations of the results; it includes a discussion of how my interpretations relate to the literature on evaluative frameworks. Chapter 5 presents a summary of my **Proposal, Discussion and Conclusions**, advancing a new evaluative framework, Embedded Assessment in Support of Evaluation, as well as recommendations for future research on the topic of mandate evaluation and exit strategies.

Chapter 2: Haiti Background

An understanding of Haiti's turbulent history is critical to the identification of political realities, which shaped the UN's peace-building efforts in the country. This is an important starting point in the effective assessment of peace operation performance in the country and development of evaluative frameworks that takes into account the political undertones found throughout mission planning and assessment in general. The lessons drawn from the past indicate that the design of evaluative frameworks must incorporate the political and historical circumstances in which the conflict (and decision makers) operates. To date, this holistic approach to assessing success has not been implemented, largely a result of prevailing political attitudes standing in the way.

BREAKING BINDS

Modern Haiti makes up the western portion of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with its neighbor, the Dominican Republic. A product of colonial expansionism in the Caribbean, the small island changed colonial hands, from Spanish (1492-1697) to French (1697-1804) rule through pitted military battles (Leininger, 2006, p. 490). During this brutal process of colonization, thousands of African slaves were brought to the island in order to augment the loss of the local indigenous population. Near-continuous cycles of slave resistance led the French colonial administrations to govern through acts of "atrocities" (Podour, 2012, p. 10). The slave revolt was eventually successful (in fact, the only slave revolt in history to be successful), with

independence finally coming to the island in 1804 (Leininger, 2006, p. 490; Podour, 2012, p. 11; Malone, 2006, p. 54).

As the war of independence came to an end in 1804, the political landscape of Haiti was divided between two prominent revolutionary generals, Alexandre Petion, acting as President in the south and Henri Christophe as self-proclaimed King in the north (Podour, 2012, p. 11). The newly independent Haiti would not be re-united until the death of Henri Christophe in 1820 (Podour, 2012, p. 11). Moreover, the politically unsettled period following independence was made all the more challenging with forced war reparation payments placed on the country by France. In fact, it took a full 122 years, or until 1947, for Haiti to fulfill the payments for its revolt and independence (Podour, 2012). Imposed war reparations by France unnecessarily burdened the still fragile country, and ultimately “prevented Haiti from establishing itself economically” (Podour, 2012, p. 12).

From the period immediately following independence to just before the U.S. occupation (1915-34), all but one President of Haiti had either been “nominally a general or actually serving in the army” (Mendelson, 2012, p. 120). In fact, Haiti’s political culture since independence in 1804 can be characterized as a continual struggle for absolute power, with officials governing through fear (Malone, 1998, p. 54). This political turmoil is evident in the development of the country’s legal framework, where, prior to the 1990s, the country had 41 heads of state, 29 of which were assassinated or overthrown (Kinzer & Woodstock, p. 150). Ongoing military control of the country and constitutional uncertainty would prove to be a destabilizing element during the course of UN peace-building efforts in the country.

In addition to the political turmoil that followed the first hundred years of independence, Haiti’s underdeveloped relationship with the wider international community was a direct result

of it being a black republic at a time of widespread slavery, particularly in the United States (Malone, 1998, p. 56). Following the 19 years of US occupation, Haiti promptly returned to military rule and erratic regime changes (Leininger, 2006, p. 490). Since 1915, no other country was as committed to influencing Haiti's internal affairs than the United States (Malone 1998, p. 56). The historic tendency of the US to intervene in the country is evident in the lead role it assumed in drafting Security Council resolutions.

Dictatorships and Growing Unrest

The period of political and economic uncertainty following the US occupation came to an abrupt end when Francois Duvalier assumed power of the island nation in 1957. Duvalier established an authoritarian system of government based on “personalized, centralized power,” and, with the assistance of his personal presidential guard, enabled the systematic repression of the Haitian population (Leininger, 2006, p. 490). Though the US continued to maintain its influence in the country, Haitians have lived under the Duvalier dictatorships for much of their recent history (Podour, 2012, p. 1). Francois Duvalier ensured his authoritarian brand would continue after his departure through a constitutional amendment, which enabled his son, Jean Claude Duvalier, to assume the presidency and control of the military (Leininger, 2006, p. 490). In January 1972, a referendum was held in which 2.4 million people voted in favor of Jean Claude Duvalier's succession, with (characteristically of a dictatorship) only one dissenting vote registered.

Haiti's two longest serving dictators, known locally as ‘Papa Doc’ and ‘Baby Doc’, governed without any common rule of law, while terror was used as a weapon of control against

the population (Podour, 2012, p. 1). It wasn't until 1985 that political unrest began to grow in the country. Haiti's political elite, seeing the social tides changing, sided with a popular movement, known as the Lavalas, which saw the overthrow of Jean Claude Duvalier's regime in 1986 (Leininger, 2006, p. 490). Among the leaders of the popular movement was future President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Podour, 2012, p. 1).

Following the popular uprising that saw the removal of the Duvalier regime, a military junta was to oversee the transition period and eventual democratic elections, scheduled for November 1987 (Leininger, 2006, p. 491). There were great expectations in the lead up to general elections, however, the goodwill and hope of the Haitian population quickly evaporated when the elections in 1987 were brutally ruptured by the military (Leininger, 2006, p. 491). The absence of any coherent and embedded form of civil society in the country undermined efforts to establish democratic procedures (Malone, 1998, p. 55). For instance, Haiti's legislature and judiciary, after decades of authoritarian rule and systematic degradation, had been reduced to the lowest level required to ensure the survival of the Duvalier regime (Malone, 1998, p. 55). Establishing a lasting democratic system in Haiti has proven difficult as a result of ongoing political and economic instability, a history of authoritarian leadership, and a culture of resorting to violence in order to overcome political obstacles (Leininger, 2006, p. 489). Moreover, the historical struggle against colonial rule effectively cast Haiti as a dependent nation by the international community, which would continue to color perceptions of the country in the lead up to, and following UN peacekeeping deployments to the country.

A GLIMPSE OF DEMOCRACY

It wasn't until 1990 that the military junta, led by Prosper Avril, would come under sufficient popular and international pressure to resign, allowing for the first free and fair elections in Haitian history (Leininger, 2006, p. 491). General elections took place in November 1990, under close observation of the international community, particularly the United Nations (Leininger, 2006, p. 491). The uprising against the transitional military rule allowed for a young priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide to rise to political dominance and become the first democratically elected leader of Haiti (Mendelson, 2012, p. 120). However, the election failed to reduce the strength and control of Haiti's military and police structure, where the army continued to exert political influence behind the scenes (Mendelson, 2012, p. 121).

Though ultimately short lived, the 1990 election of Aristide "represented a major change in Haiti's historic pattern. For the first time, the population had at least partial control of some of the mechanisms of the state" (Podour, 2012, p. 17). However, Haiti's ongoing socioeconomic issues represented a constant obstacle to the young presidency. The open hostility of Haiti's political elite, "the loyalty of the Armed Forces uncertain, and the tradition of confrontation and violence in Haitian politics represented a sobering backdrop" (Malone 1998, p. 58). Just eight months after taking office, on September 30, 1991, a military coup forcefully removed Aristide, and the hope of a new democratic future for a long troubled nation (Mendelson, 2012, p. 121). The security forces killed more than four thousand civilians over the course of the military coup (Mendelson, 2012, p. 121).

President Aristide's short-lived period in office was disrupted by challenges to the implementation of democratic reform in a country with a centuries-old deficiency in state

institutions (Malone, 1998, p. 75). Without the necessary institutional capacity of the State and a functioning civil society underpinning it, “the deck was strongly stacked against him” (Malone, 1998, p. 76). In the period immediately following the military coup, the human rights situation in the country continued to concern the international community. In fact, at the time the human rights organization known as La Plateforme, “reported 500 documented cases of extra-judicial executions from October 1991 to February 1992” (Malone, 1998, p. 72). While in exile in the United States, Aristide attempted to maintain a level of control over the movement that brought him to power. At the same time, the US government was busy using behind the scene diplomatic channels in an effort to reinstate him. The US negotiated a deal that presented Aristide with a chance to return to Haiti and assume his role as president (Podour, 2012, p. 19).

The political and diplomatic efforts of the international community at the request of the exiled president would eventually create the conditions necessary for UN and international intervention, with the stage being set for near-constant peace-building efforts in the country. However, the hurried timeline for deployment, including back channel negotiations, effectively removed the ability for policymakers to develop a long-term strategy in Haiti. In addition to this, decision makers within the Security Council were largely unaware of the political and social realities facing the country (Malone, 1998). The UN’s inability to understand and overcome the political obstacles both within the Security Council and in Haiti effectively removed the capacity to plan and assess the peacekeeping mission that was to be deployed.

THE FIRST INTERVENTION (1990-2000)

Following the military coup, and subsequent reinstatement of Aristide by the US, the UN took center stage in a broad range of peace building activities in Haiti. Specifically, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized an election-monitoring mission, economic sanctions, two peacekeeping operations (PKOs), a naval blockade, and a UNSC authorized use of force against the military regime in Haiti during the 1990s (Malone, 1998, p. 1). Almost immediately following the military coup on 29 September 1991, and exile of President Aristide, the UN and the United States began considering options for reestablishing democracy in the country. However, the ad hoc nature of UN deployments to Haiti in the years immediately following the coup were a direct result of the political challenges of coming to a common decision within the Security Council.

As of 1 March 1993, UN mission planning experts had visited Haiti, returning to the UNSC with recommendations for the UN component of the peace operation, Mission Civile Internationale en Haiti (MICIVIH; Malone 1998, p. 80). Aristide had for the most part been opposed to a military intervention in order to retake the country, but by January 1994, signaled his support for a “surgical” intervention to overthrow the coup leaders in Haiti (Malone, 1998, p. 101). On 9 September 1994, two US aircraft conducted a pro-Aristide leaflet drop over Port-au-Prince, while two US warships sailed into the waters off Port-au Prince (Malone, 1998, p. 111). In preparation for the operation, the US government recruited nineteen countries to participate in the Multinational Force (MNF) totaling about 2,000 troops in addition to the American contingent (Malone, 1998, p. 111).

On 19 September, American forces entered the Port-au-Prince area, and quickly moved into the countryside, while the troop contributions from other nations took some days more to fully deploy. The deployment of the MNF unfolded in such a smooth manner that the force began drawing down the number of troops stationed in Haiti from its peak of 21,000 within just three weeks of its arrival (Malone, 1998, p. 113). The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) began its transition from phase 1 (MNF deployment) to phase 2 (the redeployment and rebadging from the multinational force) with twelve military observers on 23 September 1994 (Malone, 1998, p. 113). UNMIH was authorized by the UNSC Resolution 940 as a follow up to the deployment of the MNF. Initially, UNMIH was to assist Haiti with sustaining a secure and stable environment conducive to holding elections, protecting key institutions, and the creation of the Haitian National Police (Kinzer & Woodstock, p. 151). Aristide returned to Haiti, along with other American dignitaries, aboard a US Government aircraft on 15 October 1994 (Malone, 1998, p. 114).

The UN returned to Haiti in 1994 in order to restore a democratically elected government and provide security and stability for the state. However, determining how to exit the country was left to US military planners. The UN mission in Haiti was considered to be a short-term effort to stabilize Haiti and restore the President (Mendelson, 2012, p. 123). However, the planning rationale was far too limited in scope, and ultimately shortsighted. The UN had initially proposed an overall objective of democratization, with a definitive timeline for exit. The UNMIH mission objective was to stabilize the security situation in the country, “create a new police force, and eventually demobilize the army” (Mendelson, 2012, p. 123). However, the demobilization of the army would eventually come back to haunt the UN efforts in Haiti in the form of gang activity.

The UNMIH mandate emphasized enabling an environment conducive for elections, which also served as a clear benchmark for success, and therefore, an exit strategy. Specifically, UNMIH's benchmark for success would be "a secure and stable environment that allowed for social and economic development, free elections, and a peaceful transfer of responsibility to the government of Haiti" (Mendelson, 2012, p. 126). However, while providing a clear direction for the mission, it also represented a vague definition of success, and therefore, a tough task to operationalize. The use of this benchmark meant there was ultimately a premature push, particularly from the US, for general elections to be held in Haiti (Mendelson, 2012, p. 127). It is clear that Haiti's economic and social issues could not be effectively addressed in such a short time (Mendelson, 2012, p. 127).

The official military handover, from the MNF to UNMIH took place on 31 March 1995 (Malone, 1998, p. 123), however, following Aristide's return to Haiti, and the establishment of UNMIH, the UN faced a new set of unique challenges. These included the development of democracy in the country, notably, the institution-building necessary to sustain a nascent democracy (Malone, 1998, p. 119). By February 1996, the short timeline given for the UNMIH mission was made evident by the lack of confidence in Haiti's ability to maintain political stability (Malone, 1998, p. 128). Following general elections in Haiti, President-elect Préval indicated that he would seek an extension of UNMIH, while the UN itself had been planning for a scaled-down mission involving 2,100 military personnel accompanied by 300 civilian police with the main objective being the support for the continued development of the Haitian National Police (HNP; Malone, 1998, p. 132).

However, through 1996 the security situation in Haiti continued to deteriorate. In May 1996, a 100 percent increase in the murder rate and a 250 percent increase in political

demonstrations over the previous month were observed by UN observers (Malone, 1998, p. 138). Moreover, the security, political and economic environment of Haiti continued to degrade through 1997, at the same time as international determination to see the crisis through was waning (Malone, 1998, p. 140). With Haiti's security situation deteriorating and the UN emphasizing police reform and training, the transition from a formal peacekeeping mission to one focused on public safety development began to show. The United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was established through UNSC Resolution 1141 on 28 November 1997 in order to address the growing insecurity in the country (Malone, 1998, p. 147).

By mid-1999, the US decided to withdraw its remaining 500 soldiers from the country, citing the inability to create long-term stability in Haiti (Mendelson, 2012, p. 128). With the second election of Aristide, in 2000, the US and UN withdrew their final troop commitments from Haiti, even though there was a continued deterioration of human rights in the country (Mendelson, 2012, p. 128). By January 2000, nearly all US soldiers and UN military personnel had vacated the country, thus ending an almost six-year military presence in Haiti (Malone, 2006, p. 159). Moreover, with the withdrawal of MIPONUH in March 2000, nearly a decade of United Nations involvement in Haiti came to an end, albeit temporarily (Malone, 2006, p. 160). Failing to take stock of the unique political and social history of the island resulted in inadequate planning for the UN mission's and ultimately ensured continued ad hoc responses to challenges as they arrived.

THE SECOND INTERVENTION (2004-)

The premature withdrawal of the international mission from Haiti in early 2000 resulted in widespread political upheaval, violence and socio-economic challenges, with the security sector being the primary problem (Mobekk, 2008, p. 113). However, in May 2000, general elections finally took place after the initial polling date had been postponed on four different occasions due to political and security instability. The democratic process, however, was widely rejected by the local population as a result of the flawed method of calculating the election results (Malone, 2006, p. 160). The contested election of May 2000 resulted in three-time president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide's eventual removal from power by violent rebellion on February 28 2004 (Malone, 2006, p. 153; Podour, 2012).

In the lead up to Aristide's removal from office, paramilitaries perpetrated massacres in the streets with near impunity (Podour, 2012, p. 53). As protests and armed rebellion spread from Port-au-Prince to the countryside, the Haitian government was unable to prevent further violence. And, since the disbanding of the Haitian armed forces, the government of Aristide was ill equipped to deal with the advance of armed paramilitaries. Meanwhile, the internationally trained Haitian National Police nearly collapsed as a result of being overwhelmed by the ensuing violence (Malone, 2006, p. 163). The multitude of armed groups operating in Port-au-Prince and throughout the country included Aristide Loyalists, unofficial pro-Aristide gangs, gangs who participated in the 1991 coup, former military officers and their committed troops, former police officers, as well as non-political armed groups taking advantage of the growing insecurity (Mobekk, 2008, p. 116). The disbanding of the Haitian army during the 1990s, in part, played a role in the growing instability at the beginning of the 2000s as many of the armed gangs were

former soldiers (Malone, 2006, p. 156). Moreover, Haiti's newly formed and trained police forces were inadequately prepared to deal with the rising violence. In fact, the small force of 5,000 prior to the crisis of 2004 and 2,500 shortly after, was more often outnumbered and outgunned by well-armed militias and gangs, estimated to be around 25,000 strong at the peak of the rebellion (Malone, 2006, p. 165).

As a consequence of the growing insecurity, President Aristide resigned on 29 February, once again fleeing the country (Mobekk, 2008, p. 116; Mendelson, 2012, p. 128). Remarkably, ten years after the US brought Aristide back to power during the first multinational intervention in the country, it was Washington that played an important role in removing him due to his inability to maintain political stability (Malone, 2006, p. 163). As political violence continued to increase following Aristide's departure, John Reginald Dumas, the UN Secretary-General's special advisor for Haiti at the time, called for a 20-year peacekeeping presence in Haiti, which would be necessary in order to (re-) establish the rule of law in the country (Malone, 2006, p. 165). Moreover, there was concern among independent observers on the ground in Haiti at the time that armed gangs were developing into "coherent insurgencies" as had occurred in Colombia and Somalia (Malone, 2006, p. 166).

Once again, the US spearheaded the effort to restore order in the country by leading a multinational force of some 3,000 troops that deployed to Haiti in 2004. After quickly securing the countryside, the MNF was replaced by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Under Security Council Resolution 1542 of April 30 2004, MINUSTAH was authorized to deploy up to 1,600 police and over 6,700 troops. The main objective of the new UN mission in Haiti was to oversee general elections by providing a secure and stable environment (Mobekk, 2008, p. 118; Mendelson, 2012, p. 128). In addition, MINUSTAH sought further police reform,

DDR measures, and the protection of civilians deemed to be under imminent threat of physical harm. While the peacekeeping operation was rolling out, a transitional authority was set up in Haiti until elections could be conducted. However, ongoing violence perpetrated by armed gangs continued to hamper UN efforts to stabilize the country ahead of the general elections.

Though elections were postponed several times due to political and security issues in the country, they were eventually held on 7 February 2006, with Rene Préval winning the election (Mobekk, 2008, p. 118). Préval took office on May 14, 2006, inheriting a fragile democratic system supported by the international community, with a “police force that had been systematically corrupted, subverted, and remade in the image of the coupsters” (Podour, 2012, p. 121). Moreover, because the state apparatus was dependent on donors for finances and the UN and the Haitian National Police for security, the newly formed government had very little latitude to negotiate the fragile political environment it inherited. In addition to this, the government of Préval was forced to deal with the economic crisis of 2008 and the catastrophic earthquake of 2010 (Podour, 2012, p. 127).

While Préval attempted to steer the political course of Haiti, MINUSTAH undertook anti-gang operations in some of the slums surrounding Port-au-Prince in order to restore the rule of law and assist the government. Kidnappings and general street violence in and around Port-au-Prince declined notably from 2006 to 2007 as a result of the efforts to combat local gangs (Mendelson, 2012, p. 129). MINUSTAH continued operations after the earthquake in 2010; unfortunately the mission was largely caught in an ongoing cycle of disaster response and political unrest. The UN’s cycle of intervention in Haiti can be expressed as a failure to “establish benchmarks that would allow the mission to base its departure on sound considerations” (Mendelson, 2012, p. 129).

The UN initially identified the end of the Préval administration, in 2011, as a possible departure date for MINUSTAH, coinciding with the planned goal of fully deploying the Haitian National Police to replace MINUSTAH troops as the main form of security in the country (Mendelson, 2012, p. 130). However, with the earthquake and economic crisis, the mission was extended further, though the mission's underlying goal remained the "development of a capable state." (Mendelson, 2012, p. 130) The difference between the UN's presence in Haiti today and that of its past missions is that the strengthening of the Haitian state is viewed as a long-term project. Moreover, the mission mandate has changed since 2004, rather than the primary goal of restoring security the main objective is now advancing a "real development agenda." (Mendelson, 2012, p. 131) The UN's efforts in Haiti over the past two decades suggest that there is no one template for dealing with weak or fragile states. Socioeconomic, political and security issues vary from conflict to conflict, however, clear benchmarks can, when used properly, chart the course for a mission.

Understanding the unique political contexts in which peace operations are conducted is critical to assessing UN peace operation success. Haiti's politically and socially turbulent history has directly affected the UN's efforts to restore peace in the country. Haiti's political and social unrest, its systematically weakened institutions and reliance on the military for day-to-day security of the country directly influenced the UN's efforts in the country from the Security Council mission planning phase of the operations through to mission deployment and exit(s). Moreover, the highly politicized decision-making process within the Security Council further hindered the effective and timely response to the conflict in Haiti. The ad hoc UN deployments to Haiti were a result of a lack of basic knowledge of Haiti within the Security Council, as well as its initial inability to come to a common decision on what the response should be. It is clear

from the history of UN efforts in Haiti that political realities negatively shaped the initial mission planning and assessment process while continuing to hamper transition and exit planning to this day. Moreover, determining what constitutes peace operation success within an ad hoc, and politically volatile situation is extremely challenging. Finally, as will be demonstrated in the following Chapters, the political challenges within the Security Council continue to hamper the effective application of evaluative frameworks across the peace operation spectrum.

Chapter 3: Methodology and Literature Review

METHODOLOGY

In this Chapter I will explore the methodology behind the literature on existing evaluative frameworks, as well as primary source material on the topic of United Nations (UN) peace operations, evaluative strategies and peacekeeping success in Haiti. In order to effectively assess existing evaluative tools, I have organized the literature into relevant groupings, from official UN policy to academic development. The research methods I employed throughout the course of this thesis project enabled me to explore existing knowledge on the topics of evaluative frameworks and exit strategies, while simultaneously bridging the literature gap between evaluative frameworks, mandate creation and achievement, and politics in the Security Council. In short, the chosen research methodology will address the significant literature gap between mandate creation and mission assessment and political realities that exists within policy and academic circles. I have included mandate assessment and achievement in order to connect the existing literature gaps between larger UN peacekeeping assessment and exit strategy development. In addition, the methods employed within this section will support the development of an evaluative framework that acknowledges and examines the political realities at the mandate crafting stage, as well as during mission assessment and mission transition and exit.

As there is a wealth of scholarly research, as well as official publications that have focused on lessons learned from past peacekeeping missions, the availability of information on UN peace operations is quite robust. Based on the breadth of information available on these

practices, I decided to focus on three broad groups of literature: (1) official UN policy; (2) Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) research; and (3) academic research. In order to investigate these three key bodies of knowledge, I consulted primary and secondary source documents. The primary source material came from United Nations and non-governmental official publications. The secondary source material was comprised of existing relevant academic literature. Limitations of using official publications from NGOs or institutional bodies, such as the United Nations or US military after-action reports, are that there are often hidden normative positions in reporting on success and failure. For instance, the UN could optimistically report on its own performance, ‘cherry picking’ the information so the mission is presented in the best light.

I define a normative position as a collection of particular experiences that effectively shape the way an author or practitioner will view or tackle a certain problem. Thus, the particular experiences of individual practitioners will necessarily shape the type of evaluative framework that they produce, including the goals and indicators associated with the framework. Institutional viewpoints and operational requirements on the part of the UN can lead to selectively reporting on the progress of mission tasks. The use of complementary primary source publications and academic literature will result in a balanced illustration of the performance of UN peace operations. In short, academic literature balances the viewpoint of institutional reporting by allowing for third party assessments on the performance of institutions themselves.

Throughout the research process, I aimed to simply and efficiently organize and assess available data on evaluation in UN peace operations in general and in particular, in Haiti, in order to both test the best methods for assessing success and develop a proposed new evaluative

framework better able to encompass all phases of a UN mission. I have separated this process into four phases.

Phase 1: I will select data from UN publications and secondary source material on existing evaluative frameworks for UN peace operation.

Phase 2: I will then sort the data so as to reflect and respond to the assessment questions developed by each individual evaluative framework.

Phase 3: I will then assess the existing evaluative frameworks, with an eye to determining the efficacy of each of the evaluative frameworks for assessing the case study of Haiti.

Phase 4: I will then conduct an independent analysis of the assessment frameworks with a view to proposing increased holistic mission planning and assessment within a new evaluative framework, EASE.

The chosen methodology will present a clear picture of existing evaluative frameworks, both official and scholarly, in addition to highlighting the policy and literature gap between mandate creation, mission deployment, and mission transition and exit. At the same time, the methods employed in this thesis will unpack some of the often-overlooked dilemmas of assessing UN peace operations, namely the politics surround mission planning and assessment, the necessity for ongoing assessment rather than lessons learned, and exit strategy development. The research methodology will assist in framing the need for an evaluative framework that takes into account the various stages of a peace operation, rather than existing frameworks, which focus on individual assessment of each phase of a UN mission.

The strength of my chosen research methodology is an efficient examination of assessment processes for UN peace operations, illustrating the clear policy gap between mission

conception, mission deployment and mission withdrawal that exists today. The chosen research framework will further assist the development of an evaluative framework by demonstrating existing policy gaps within UN peace operation assessment. What my chosen research methodology reveals, and what others before have not, is that there is a continued need for holistic mission planning and assessment in UN peace operations. Additionally, the holistic conception of UN peace operations must take into consideration the evaluation of mission mandates, their creation and eventual execution, including the political realities in which they are born, which have largely been excluded from existing research on evaluative frameworks and exit strategies.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Existing literature on evaluative frameworks for UN peace operations largely falls short of providing the assessment framework that I envision is necessary for holistic mission planning and assessment and ultimately determining success. In addition to mandate crafting and assessment, the existing literature is for the most part designed to assess the performance of past missions, in other words, lessons learned evaluation. Given the literature reviewed in this Chapter, it is evident that assessments are conducted in silos, independently assessing each phase of a mission rather than in a cumulative manner. Moreover, the important political realities (found at various points in a mission from the Security Council to domestic and international contexts) are largely absent from evaluative framework design and implementation. In light of this literature review, what is needed is an embedded framework allowing for ongoing

assessment. An embedded framework is only possible if effective planning is conducted at mission conception, when a mission mandate is crafted.

In order for holistic mission planning and assessment to be achieved, it is important to take into consideration the process of crafting and wording a mission mandate, as well as the political realities in which the mandate is born, and the types of baselines, benchmarks and indicators embedded in the mission objectives. Holistic mission planning and assessment will allow for the peace operation to proceed through its first stages (conception to deployment to evaluation) with careful direction and ultimately on to its final transition phase and eventual exit as it clears those benchmarks. Without mandate clarity (a mandate with established baselines, benchmarks and indicators of success) there can be no comprehensive evaluation of the mission's progress, and as such, there can be no effective transition and exit strategy. Existing literature takes the central elements of mission mandate, mission success and mission withdrawal to be separate. However, I believe that they are in fact all connected, and must be examined accordingly in order to best prepare and guide a mission for eventual success.

Before examining in detail the literature on evaluative frameworks, it is first important to make note of the differences between 'primary' and 'secondary' sources consulted for this literature review. Primary sources are considered to be those published directly from the United Nations, while secondary refers to all academic research in support of UN peace operations. It is imperative that both official UN policy as well as academic discourse on the topic of evaluative frameworks be combined and examined in conjunction with one another. Policy and academic research on UN peacekeeping success can, and should, be addressed at the same time in order to better present a more complete picture of where the existing debate rests, and how policy issues should be addressed. Both policy and academic work offer valuable insight into the debate

around success in UN peace operations. However, they should not be viewed as separate entities to be addressed on their own. The challenge of assessing complex UN peace building missions requires a complete picture, and the input of as wide a swath of the debate as possible only serves to better this cause. If the goal is truly holistic mission planning and assessment, from conception to implementation to withdrawal, holistic research should be the desired answer to the challenge of assessing and executing complex UN peace operations.

As will be illustrated, there are unique challenges, such as political and operational considerations, involved in the establishment of baselines, benchmarks and indicators that are capable of effectively shaping the progress of a UN peace operation. For example, political realities within the Security Council at the mandate crafting stage pose a problem to the establishment of effective benchmarks and indicators of mission success. As well, when crafting the initial mission mandate, policymakers often oversimplify mission objectives or aim for unattainable goals. Moreover, the crafting of benchmarks and indicators of assessment necessary to guide long-term stabilization goals continue to pose a challenge for policymakers. Finally, when crafting benchmarks and indicators, policymakers must also assess or be aware of what other international organizations will be doing in the country. For instance, incorporating NGO timelines as well as unique mandates into a mission-wide evaluative framework.

This literature review will unpack some of these issues by examining what the United Nations has done to self-assess its peace operations, in addition to examining key contributions of evaluating peace operation success from the larger academic community. The organization of the literature review will be separated into four parts, beginning with: (1) broad definitions of success in UN peace operations; (2) a closer examination of success for key evaluative frameworks; (3) success and the political realities found within the Security Council; and finally

(4) an illustration of success and transition and exit strategies. The structure of this literature review will demonstrate the need for holistic mission planning and assessment, while serving as the foundation for the development of an evaluative framework, Embedded Assessment in Support of Evaluation (EASE). In addition to providing a holistic approach to mission assessment, this framework will act as a vehicle highlighting the political complexities associated with UN mission planning and assessment in the Security Council.

WHAT IS SUCCESS?

A common definition of what constitutes success in UN peace operations is critical to planning and measuring the performance of UN peace missions. However, to date no single definition of success has been established, which is largely a result of success being a product of unique political realities within each mission. Nonetheless, it is important to survey existing definitions of success in order to assist in developing an evaluative framework that encompasses all stages of a peace operation while demonstrating the inherent political challenges associated with the assessment of UN peace operations. The following section will examine existing criteria and definitions of success in UN peace operations.

Duane Bratt (1996) looked to bridge the literature gap between the ability to evaluate UN peacekeeping operations and identifying and defining success within peacekeeping missions. Although his research represented an important contribution to defining success, issues remain with the process for determining that success, such as assessment of mission mandates and conflict resolution. According to Bratt, there are four ways in which operational success can be measured: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment and

limitation of casualties (Bratt, 1996, p. 64). In developing a set of criteria that can be used to assess the success of UN peace operations, Bratt noted that it is impossible to classify peace operations as successful or unsuccessful without an objective standard with which to assess all peace operations (1996, p. 65). In order to provide further clarity on mission outcomes, Bratt suggested that for each indicator of success, a peace operation could be judged as a complete success, a moderate success, or a failure.

Bratt's first indicator of success, whether the mission mandate has been achieved, can be evaluated by examining the stated mandate in Security Council resolutions by determining if the language of the text was translated into 'on the ground' accomplishments (1996, p. 67). He noted, however, that mission mandates are often vague, and most likely reflect political realities. The second indicator of success, the resolution of conflict, requires a formal peace agreement between two formerly warring parties, such as a peace treaty, or for internal conflict, a type of power-sharing arrangement (Bratt, 1996, p.68). Bratt believed that peace operations should, in part, be judged on the resolution of conflict because it is something that is within the mission's direct control, and is often a cornerstone of a peace operation (1996, p. 68). Bratt's third indicator of success, conflict containment, is important because it is often the sole reason peace operations are deployed (1996, p. 69). Bratt's final indicator of success, the limitation of casualties, is evaluated by comparing the number of casualties in the conflict (both military and civilian) prior to, and after, the deployment of the peace operation (1996, p. 69). Limiting casualties is a useful indicator of success because even if the conflict goes unresolved, the limitation of casualties marks a "significant" contribution (Bratt, 1996, p. 70). Though the mandate might in fact be a relevant place to assess success, the problem remains of how best to acknowledge the political conditions in which the mandate was crafted when making an

assessment. The unaddressed concern is that basing an assessment off of a faulty mandate hinders the assessment of all other factors associated with success throughout the life cycle of a mission.

Jair Van der Lijn (2009) looked to build upon existing indicators of success in UN peace operations established in the 1990s. The findings of the article indicate that there are key, intersecting factors that effectively predict success in UN peace operations. However, notable issues remain with his research, such as the requirement of peace agreements and the inability to factor criminal activity within the assessment framework. According to Van der Lijn, the key requirement for success is a durable peace, which is the “achievement of negative peace” whereby violence in a conflict is sufficiently addressed and stopped (2009, p.46). Positive peace, conversely, entails more than just violence abatement, but rather the accomplishment of larger peace-building goals such as democratization and socio-economic growth, or the root causes of the conflict (Van der Lijn, 2009, p. 46).

Key to peace operation success is determining whether the contribution of the mission helped to “establish ten years of negative peace [violence abatement] and a positive development in remedying the causes of conflict.”(Van der Lijn, 2009, p.46) The problem with this basis of assessment is, first, the assessment is occurring long after a peace operation has left the conflict zone, which means ongoing assessment does not occur. Second, the stated “positive development” in solving the root causes of the conflict is far too vague to meaningfully assist in the evaluation of a peace operation. Exactly which root causes, and more broadly, over what time period should these developments take place?

According to Van der Lijn, chief among the factors for success is “Co-operation from Important Outside Actors” which is identified as a crucial part of the success of peace operations,

where the international community's involvement in a mission is viewed as having a largely positive effect on the mission. Crucial to the development of evaluative frameworks is the indicator of success, "Clear, Appropriate and Achievable Mandate", which refers to the likelihood of the missions objectives producing success or failure (Van der Lijn, 2009, p. 48). Vagueness of the mandate, as well as political and diplomatic compromises, is identified as a key obstacle to this factor of success. Further, the more extensive the mandate, the more likely it will produce a successful outcome on the ground. However, more research should be focused on the mechanisms (and politics) associated with crafting a mandate, as well as the baselines, benchmarks and indicators embedded in it.

Maja Garb (2014) advanced the conceptualization of success in UN peacekeeping missions by noting that there must be a common definition of success to be used across all peacekeeping missions. However, her analysis of success largely leaves out the key question of who (success for whom?) has developed the definition, and what political implications the definitions have, for instance, politicians seeking re-election (thus wanting a mission to be viewed as effective to their constituents). Garb notes that success has largely been composed of three indicators: the fulfillment of the mandate or goals, the political and security situation, and assistance to the local population (2014, p. 46). She suggested that success groupings often differentiate between success on a strategic level (such as democratization, long-term stability) and success on an operational or even tactical level (such as crime reduction, health and economic development) (2014, p. 46). With this in mind, Robert C. Johansen (1994) believes that policymakers should be less concerned with a peace operations ability to return a country to an ideal state of peace, but rather assessing the effects of peacekeeping forces on the local

population. This perspective focuses the attention to tangible, short-term goals, rather than long-term implications of a country returned to normalcy.

What constitutes success may also depend on which organization or actor you consult. For instance, Donna Winslow (2002) has noted that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may not declare a project or larger mission to be a success until all human suffering has ended within a conflict environment. Public opinion and the media may have a narrower definition of success, such as the cessation of large-scale hostilities. Moreover, national politicians whose responsibility it is to see the conflict through while managing domestic concerns such as casualties and financial burdens might also identify yet another definition, such as ‘good publicity for the government.’ Therefore, the challenge within the mandate crafting stage is to identify a common definition of success prior to developing benchmarks of success. A process made all the more difficult as a result of the political realities within the UN Security Council.

Unsal Sigri and Ufuk Basar (2014) proposed a “comprehensive and detailed” model for assessing peacekeeping operations by primarily focusing on the military component of peace operations, and specifically, looking at the tactical level, rather than strategic (such as democratization, rule of law, long-term stability). The proposed framework for success is based on a “generic tool” which can be applied to any peace operation. Further to this, they expand on the terminology used widely by the military, namely: Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). The proposed assessment tool acts as a bridge between UN peacekeeping operations and standard (NATO) military intervention. The frameworks “universality” may make it more challenging to apply to widely divergent circumstances UN peace operations routinely face, such as peacekeeping and peace building activities.

Sigri and Basar (2014), in building their own framework of assessment, look first to define success in UN peace operations. Assessment is viewed as a “process that measures the level of progress of an operation toward the mission end-state” (2014, p. 393). However, given the abundance of actors with their own independent assessment frameworks, Sigri and Basar look to propose an adaptable tool, which can be applied across the UN spectrum of operations. Their model of assessment would focus on the tactical (peacekeepers) level. Within the model, a special Assessment Team would be integrated within a peacekeeping headquarters prior to the deployment of a peace operation. The strength of having an embedded team formed at the beginning of an operation is that it would be able to collect information on the ground, as it occurs, allowing for ongoing assessment of peace operations. The challenge, however, is translating the local achievements to strategic objectives, which are often political.

Within their assessment framework, Sigri and Basar use the often-used MOP and MOE system of assessment for military interventions as a basis for ongoing internal assessment. The proposed special Assessment Team would use MOPs in their assessment model in order to answer questions like “Was the action taken?” and “Were the tasks completed to standard?” (Sigri & Basar, 2014, p. 399) The tactical level assessment model offers a unique perspective on the assessment of UN peace operations and provides ongoing assessment, while at the same time providing policymakers with a clear model to implement. However, the challenge with focusing primarily on the tactical level is translating that into strategic outcomes while updating the mandate as conditions on the ground change.

Darya Pushkina (2006) advanced 12 hypotheses associated with determining success in UN peace operations in order to see why the UN was more successful at managing some internal conflict than others. She noted that the UN was successful when there was a strong commitment

by the UN, an absence of external support for belligerents, clear and lasting diplomatic efforts, and little mutual antagonisms among the parties involved in the conflict. However, Pushkina did not distinguish between short-term success and long-term success, particularly when she addresses UN efforts in Haiti. Moreover, she gave little attention to determining success when criminal groups are one of the parties to the conflict, such as in Haiti.

Pushkina noted that the simplest way to assess success in UN peace operations is to evaluate the mission mandate (2006, p. 138). However, there are problems in doing so, such as determining the political aspects of a mandate, and whether it was crafted properly, something that my framework would directly assess. Within the evaluation of the mission mandate, she highlighted broad criteria for success, namely: (1) limiting violent conflict; (2) reduction of human suffering; (3) preventing the spread of conflict; and (4) promoting conflict resolution (Pushkina, 2006, p. 138). The use of these criteria addresses peacekeepers' performance in fulfilling the mission mandate, as well as the mission's contribution to the goals of international peace and security (Pushkina, 2006, p. 138).

A key takeaway from her analysis of success is that great power involvement in a UN peace operation does not necessarily produce the successful outcomes one might think. Though she pointed to the UN's efforts in Haiti in the 1990s (UNMIH) as a success, the long term effects were largely negative, even with great power involvement from the United States. Moreover, intervention by a regional organization in a conflict does not necessarily produce successful outcomes, as was the case in Haiti with the involvement of other Latin American countries, under the Organization of American States (OAS). Of critical importance, Pushkina, failed to take into account warring parties whom are left out of peace agreements, negotiations and

diplomatic maneuvering, such as criminal activity and gangs or former soldiers as was the case in Haiti.

Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2007) looked to analyze the success of UN peace operations against the backdrop of “sustainable peace.” Moreover, efforts to achieve that success are influenced by three key factors; the degree of hostility of the factions, the extent of local capacities remaining after the war, and the amount of international assistance provided (Doyle & Sambanis, 2007, p. 496). However, their preferred standard of measuring success is the achievement of “participatory peace”, which includes the absence of organized violence as well as restoration of effective state sovereignty over its territory and a level of political openness (Doyle & Sambanis, 2007, p. 496). Their approach to assessing success in UN peace operations is long-term. However, they largely fail to outline the indicators and benchmarks necessary to fully conceptualize the steps involved in assessing the progress of a mission.

The literature consulted thus far indicates that as of yet, no common definition of success has been agreed upon. For some, success is about creating a lasting peace, while for others it is about short term, tangible benefits. Arriving at a common definition of success is critical to mission planning, assessment and transition and exit. Understanding the political complexities associated with arriving at a common definition of success is equally important to understanding the process of evaluation. For the most part, the political realities surrounding the process of determining success has largely been absent from most critical assessments of UN performance measuring. Politics within the Security Council have and will continue to, hamper the development of a common indicator of success, as well as the development of evaluative frameworks in general. In order to further highlight the ad hoc and politicized process for defining and implementing a common definition of success, the following section will take a

closer examination of key evaluative frameworks. Finally, the framework I propose will acknowledge and address the political realities associated with measuring performance, while at the same time, developing an evaluative framework that is embedded and holistic in manner.

SUCCESS AND KEY EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORKS

United Nations: What is success?

In many respects the current discourse surrounding the integration, transition and assessment of peace operations rests on the pivotal United Nations *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (The Brahimi Report, United Nations, 2000). The *Brahimi Report*, among other things, looked to advance the integration, planning and execution of United Nations peace operations. Since its release in 2000, the UN has steadily moved toward a common strategic and operational framework for its many peace operations. However, to date United Nations evaluative frameworks have been developed in an ad hoc manner, providing oversight and assessment for mission performance as issues arise rather than in an ongoing manner. Moreover, a common definition of mission success remains obscured by the multitude of UN bodies involved in the assessment process. What is missing is an examination of the political considerations at the start of mission planning, which ultimately reduce the UN's ability to define and properly plan for, success in its peace operations. The best planning and assessment intentions of the UN will ultimately be held hostage to the political circumstances in which the missions are born.

Building on key recommendations within the *Brahimi Report* to better coordinate among the many UN agencies, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Peacebuilding

Commission (PBC) and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The PBC was established with a mandate to bring together relevant peace-building actors, such as governmental, non-governmental and UN agencies, in order to develop integrated strategies for future peace operations (United Nations, 2010). By focusing on reconstruction and institution-building, the PBC would serve as a mechanism to accomplish the primary purpose of UN peace operations; laying the foundations for durable and lasting peace in post-conflict settings (United Nations, 2010). The PBC has been a crucial step toward greater integration of the UN's many peace operations, as well as strategy development and holistic planning of its new peace operations. However, the PBC is still attempting to find its "place" in the greater peace-building process, where it is frequently seen as duplicating services provided by other UN agencies.

The United Nations looked to further strengthen the PBC and PBSO as well as mission planning services in general, by embedding an integrated planning process into all forthcoming peace operations. To this end, the *Integrated Missions Planning Process* (IMPP) represents one of the UNs recent policy-improvement initiatives for coordinated planning of UN peace operations. First drafted in 2006, IMPP was viewed as a catalyst for broader, integrated UN peace-building strategies, which would ensure an inclusive approach to the planning of integrated peace support operations (United Nations, 2006). By establishing a mandatory integrated planning process, IMPP effectively laid the groundwork for a future standardized, pan-United Nations evaluative process for assessing benchmarks in a peace operation.

An integrated peace operation, according to the United Nations, is "one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of a UN mission at the country level" (United Nations, 2006). The Integrated Mission Planning Process is designed to facilitate the achievement of a common understanding by establishing a planning process that involves all

necessary actors and stakeholders (United Nations, 2006). For example, once the United Nations Security Council has requested the establishment of an integrated peace operation, IMPP would commence detailed planning, following three specific stages: (1) Advance Planning, (2) Operational Planning, and (3) Review and Transition Planning (United Nations, 2006). The stages of detailed planning represent an important first step in the development of a holistic and embedded evaluative framework for UN peace operations.

The primary goal of the third stage of IMPP is to ensure that lessons learned throughout the life-span of an operation are “fed back into subsequent planning” and that “constant monitoring against identified benchmarks is being undertaken”(United Nations, 2006). Moreover, IMPP states that reviews should be conducted in close consultation with national governments involved in the mission, with the Integrated Mission Planning Team operating as a liaison between the UN and those national governments invested in the mission (United Nations, 2006). As well, during the review and transition planning process, the PBSO should be kept up-to-date on the progress achieved thus far by the mission.

Mission performance reviews can be conducted at three levels: (1) continuous review, (2) periodic review, and (3) strategic review (United Nations, 2006). The continuous review process is to be coordinated and executed by the Integrated Mission Planning Team, with the results of each review fed back into ongoing mission planning as part of a peace operation’s normal routine. The periodic review is broader in scope than the continuous review, and is usually initiated as part of a renewal or change of a mission mandate in order to aid in charting a new course for the mission. The strategic review, however, is focused on the performance of departments and agencies. For instance, a DPKO-led inter-agency team will assess ongoing requirements for the mission to meet its mandate, recommending changes to either the scope or

size of the peace operation (United Nations, 2006). Critically, IMPP does not take into account the political realities associated with a mission mandate, something that I will directly address. As well, the policy document does not address whether short-term or long-term evaluations are to be conducted, and at what intervals assessments should be conducted.

The *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (2008) is designed to be the definitive UN policy document outlining peace operation planning and execution (United Nations, 2008). The policy framework notes that when the Security Council decides to plan for, and deploy a peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat must help ensure that the mission's mandate is clear and achievable (United Nations, 2008). The mandate must reflect the resources (financial and human capital) that contributing nations are willing to provide (United Nations, 2008). As the document highlights, successful completion of the mandate ultimately rests on the ability for all actors to engage in a holistic manner. Determining whether a peace operation has achieved its mandate remains an ongoing policy challenge, as there are many variables that indicate mission success or failure. However, the document largely fails to examine the strategy beyond the mandate, that is, whether the security and political situation in the country has improved while failing to meet the objectives of the mandate. More can be done to establish a mandate evaluation process prior to mission deployment as well as assessing the political process by which the mission mandate is formed.

Building upon the integrated approach to planning and executing peace operations, the UN released the *Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook* as another source of guidance toward planning and measuring progress during the course of UN peace operations (United Nations, 2013). Among other things, the Handbook outlines strategic assessments and technical assessments as measures enabling the application of appropriate UN responses to evolving

political and military situations at the country level. The purpose of a strategic assessment is to bring the various UN agencies, such as security and human rights development together in order to share best practices in post-conflict contexts (United Nations, 2013). An integrated technical assessment is defined by the UN as a “Headquarters and field-based analytical exercise” which focuses on “United Nations programmes and operations (staffing, budgets, funding, systems, etc.) for one entity and/or sector.”(United Nations, 2013) Integrated technical assessments can be conducted at any point in the life cycle of a UN peace operation, unlike strategic assessments that occur at certain key points of a mission.

Within the United Nations system there are other formal mechanisms for assessing the performance of UN peacekeeping missions. For instance, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) all have certain provisions for the evaluation and inspection of field missions in order to better inform key stakeholders of operational performance. However, the ad hoc nature of their combined evaluations leaves much to be desired. The processes for evaluation within the UN are not integrated well enough, as they simply evaluate problems as they arise rather than offering advice on how to create benchmarks embedded in a mandate from the outset.

The OIOS’s mandate is broadly defined as the overarching internal oversight body of the United Nations. Within the OIOS’s operations is the Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED), which seeks to assess the “relevance, efficiency and effectiveness (including impact)” of the UN’s programmes, such as peacekeeping, in order to evaluate the accomplishment of objectives and mandates. There are three main aims of evaluation of UN programmes: to assist programmes in delivering better results, to enable the UN to learn from its past experiences, and to provide

public accountability (United Nations, 2014, p. 5). The key issue with this mandate is that the evaluations undertaken by the department can be viewed as a form of lessons learned, rather than ongoing assessment.

In addition to inspection and evaluation services provided by the OIOS, the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) provides an interagency professional network that brings together evaluation units operating within the wider UN system, in order to ensure a common approach and standard of assessing peace operation success. As well, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) operates its own internal evaluations division in order to assist with the management and operation of both Headquarters and field missions. The DPKO evaluation team looks to evaluate the ability of a peacekeeping operation to effectively implement Security Council mandates. As with the OIOS, a key issue with this mandate is that it presents a picture of evaluation leading to lessons learned, rather than ongoing assessment driving policy-making. Moreover, it is unclear whether the evaluations conducted by the internal assessment division at DPKO are intended as short-term or long-term evaluations.

The United Nations handbook, *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (2010) represents a necessary first step in the creation of common benchmarks and indicators working toward the measurement of success in peace operations. The primary aim of the handbook is to provide United Nations field presences with a template, or guideline, on how best to assess progress in peace consolidation. The handbook, however, does not look at the initial mandate crafting as a starting point; rather, it proposes mission assessment once a peace operation is underway. This is problematic, as it requires the operation to construct benchmarks following the start of a mission and does not benefit from baselines on which to base those assessments.

The Handbook is not intended to act as a universal template of preferred benchmarks and indicators which can be applied to assess peace consolidation under all situations, rather, the aim of the Handbook is to provide a clear picture of the steps involved in assessing peace operations (United Nations, 2010). Benchmarking is defined as a “type of monitoring that uses a benchmark as a point of reference against which change and progress can be measured.”(United Nations, 2010) Specifically, a benchmark is said to be a “concrete point of reference”, such as a value, state or characteristic, which has been verified by practice to lead to the fulfillment of overall mission objectives (United Nations, 2010). Moreover, benchmarks are viewed as a process, for example, identifying whether the level of corruption in a given area is being reduced over time. As such, the United Nations identifies two basic elements for monitoring progress toward peace consolidation: “(1) a robust yet uncomplicated measuring system with appropriate benchmarks and indicators; and (2) an effective monitoring mechanism capable of gathering inputs from multiple sources and having the necessary credibility and authority within the government and international community to propose course corrections.”(United Nations, 2010)

The purpose of assessing peace operations is to ensure that long-term peace consolidation occurs. The UN Handbook defines a consolidated peace as a “process leading towards a self-sustaining peace.”(United Nations, 2010) However, a peace consolidation benchmark, whether broad or specific, should always be phrased as a point of reference that can then be defined and subsequently measured by a set of relevant indicators (United Nations, 2010). Establishing benchmarks is most commonly done at the sector level, for example: security, governance and rule of law. However, it is also possible to define a benchmark by key components of a mission mandate or alternatively, by signed peace agreements (United Nations, 2010).

Within the Handbook, the United Nations has outlined three types of evaluative frameworks in which to guide the development of benchmarks: (1) strategy-based; (2) sector-based; and (3) process-based frameworks (United Nations, 2010). A strategy-based benchmark, or evaluative framework, is one that is based upon the mission mandate, or other “well-defined strategic goals” of the peace operations (United Nations, 2010). Strategic-based goals have the important advantage of being easy to establish as they make use of clearly defined mandates or peace agreements, which act as a type of natural benchmark. However, strategic-level benchmarks also present drawbacks, in that strategic goals such as a mission’s mandate are a result of political processes, which therefore might lead to the adoption of unrealistic objectives for a mission (United Nations, 2010). Moreover, benchmarks based on strategic or mandated goals are also susceptible to measuring achievements directly related to the mandate, while overlooking any negative developments in the country context (United Nations, 2010).

Sector and process based frameworks are far more specific than strategic-based benchmarks. Sector-based benchmarks use a set of priority areas (such as governance or rule of law) as a basis for formulating benchmarks (United Nations, 2010). The United Nations Handbook notes that “sectors help organize overall system-wide objectives and may be divided into sub-sectors to further increase the level of resolution and the possibility of specifying benchmarks clearly.”(United Nations, 2010) Process-based benchmarks, on the other hand, refer to processes deemed vital to overall peace consolidation. However, sectors and processes are ultimately viewed as interconnected, interacting and complementing one another (United Nations, 2010). The Handbook represents an important step toward a more holistic framework for the evaluation of UN peace operations. However, despite the advancement, the UN has yet to

establish a common framework and definition of success, nor utilize such a framework in a uniform manner, across all peace missions.

A clear challenge to the development of a common definition of success and process for planning and assessment lay in the fact that the UN is a multi-body organization, where acting in unison is often overlooked or simply impossible. A common approach to peace operations, and therefore what constitutes success, is stymied by the political complexities found within the Security Council. The political realities of the Security Council represent the elephant in the room. That is, UN peace operations are born with political limits and therefore a shared understanding of success and assessment process remains out of reach. In addition to this, broader issues can be raised about the sheer volume of assessment tools and evaluative frameworks developed by the UN, such as there being too many agencies covering the same topic, which can lead to a duplication of services or competition for finite resources. This thesis will seek to build on the UN's development of frameworks by introducing the need to examine the initial mission mandate (and the political realities in which they are born) prior to the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Without a careful examination of the political complexities associated with mission planning and assessment, there can be no common framework for judging the life-span of a UN mission, and thus, little can be done to plot the direction of a mission toward transition and exit.

United States Institute of Peace: What is Success?

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has proposed an alternative to UN performance measures with its evaluative framework for assessing success in UN peace

operations. In 2010, USIP released the handbook, *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework* (pronounced M-PEACE), as a tool to further assist the evaluation and assessment of ongoing UN missions. The MPICE evaluative framework is a metrics collection system, composed of outcome-based goals, indicators, and measures, which once collected, can be measured to “provide indicators of trends toward the achievement of stabilization goals over time.”(USIP, 2010) Mission success, according to MPICE, is intrinsically linked to the capacity development (success) of indigenous institutions.

The evaluative framework’s use of assessing the capacity of indigenous institutions to carry out the task of peace building is unique within the literature examined on existing evaluation frameworks. Indigenous organizations and institutions form the backbone of long-term stability in a host country and thus the ability of these institutions to carry out the functions of the state are of paramount concern to any peace operation. However, the issue with assessing indigenous institutions and organizations is that most of these agencies and objectives, such as police and judicial reform, take some time to come into their own. Thus, measuring the progress of domestic capacity in an ongoing peace operation environment would remain a challenge, and likely fall outside the scope of this evaluative framework. Moreover, the inability to properly assess the beginning of a mission represents a critical issue with the framework. Without knowing if the foundation of the mission is built on solid footing, assessing the remainder of the mission, and the direction it is taking, is largely irrelevant.

The primary goal of MPICE is to assist policymakers in formulating long-term stabilizing strategic and operational plans in UN peace operations. MPICE would thus allow practitioners to track progress from the outset of an operation, through the stabilization phase and ultimately onto self-sustaining peace (USIP, 2010). The strength of this evaluative framework is that it

proposes indicators which can point toward the long-term strategic aims of the mission while the mission is unfolding. However, where the weakness of the framework rests is with a lack of first assessment of the mission mandate necessary in building the frameworks for the rest of the mission and the political realities in which the missions are born, namely within the Security Council.

MPICE enables practitioners to determine a baseline goal before intervention takes place and thereafter track the mission's progress toward stability and self-sustaining peace (USIP, 2010). MPICE defines a country to be on a trajectory to self-sustaining peace by using three Objective States: (1) State 0 – Imposed Stability, (2) State I – Assisted Stability, and (3) State II – Self-Sustaining Peace (USIP, 2010). According to the handbook, MPICE is designed to be used during States 0 (Imposed Stability) and I (Assisted Stability) of a peace operation (USIP, 2010). MPICE is primarily concerned with measuring the drivers of conflict against the ability of indigenous institutions to resolve the conflict peacefully. The institutional performance of the host country includes both government agencies and informal societal practices (USIP, 2010).

The capability of indigenous organizations and institutions to resolve conflict are assessed according to five sectors or end states: Safe and Secure Environment, Political Moderation and Stable Governance, Rule of Law, Sustainable Economy, and Social Well-Being (USIP, 2010). Each of these five end states are divided into two subsectors: Conflict Drivers and Institutional Performance, which are then further subdivided into: Goal, Indicator, and Measure (USIP, 2010). Within the evaluative process, the indicator states the concept that is to be assessed, and the measures describe the empirical data to be collected (USIP, 2010).

Once the initial evaluation has been completed, it is up to the individual policymaker to tailor the assessment and recommendation to the mission. The handbook notes that since the

goals, indicators and measures included in the MPICE Metrics Framework are “generic in nature, they must be adapted to the specific policy goals, conflict dynamics, and cultural peculiarities relevant to each conflict setting.”(USIP, 2010) It is, therefore, up to the decision-makers planning and executing a peace operation to determine how the assessments will be conducted, and how the mission will respond to the recommendations. The “tailoring process” of the MPICE Metrics Framework allows for country specific issues to be resolved with greater adaptability. However, like the various United Nations handbooks and guidelines on evaluating peace operations, the MPICE framework fails to pay close attention to the development of a mission mandate, which is necessary in framing a sound trajectory for the mission. What is needed is a careful assessment of the political realities found within each phase of a UN peace operation, and how that affects the broader assessment process.

Paul F. Diehl & Daniel Druckman: What is Success?

The evaluative frameworks developed by the UN and USIP, while representing important contributions to assessing success in UN peace operations, largely fail to examine the political realities associated with mission planning and assessment. Paul F. Diehl & Daniel Druckman (2010) attempt to address the policy-deficiency of assessing UN missions by developing their own evaluative framework for UN peace operations. Diehl & Druckman’s advancement of an evaluative template aimed to provide a systematic, comparative framework for examining and evaluating complex UN peace operations. Though the framework was initially designed to assess ongoing UN peace operations, as yet there has been no ongoing assessment of a UN mission. Moreover, the framework does not take into account the assessment of a mission mandate and

the political realities in which a mandate is crafted, as well as the ability to point a direction toward the transition and exit of a mission.

Diehl & Druckman develop their indicators of success by advancing goals that are common to all peace operations. The three core goals of all peace operations are: violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). Violence abatement represents the first and most common evaluation question, which simply put, asks: is violence still present? Here an evaluation can follow time analysis, such as how long peace has been observed, or conversely, whether there are fewer casualties over a given time period. The common goal of conflict containment reflects the shared peace operation goal of limiting or halting the spread of violence into new geographic areas, or into neighboring states. Finally, conflict settlement speaks to the resolution of disputed issues and positions between the former participants of the conflict.

Diehl & Druckman build on the core goals by outlining the so-called, new goals of peace operations, which principally came about from the increased development of complex peace missions since the end of the Cold War. The new generation of peacekeeping missions looked to accomplish tasks that were fundamentally different from the original intention of peacekeeping, for instance, the separation of formerly warring parties within a single state. Diehl & Druckman focus on five of the most important new mission goals that peace operations look to undertake: democratization; humanitarian assistance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and human rights protection (2010, p. 63). In addition to the benchmarks developed for the goals of new peace operations, Diehl & Druckman identified broad peace building goals, which include, but are not limited to, local security; rule of law; local governance; and restoration, reconciliation, and transformation (2010, p. 94). Diehl & Druckman finish outlining

their assessment template by applying the evaluative framework, and indicators of success, to the Bosnian civil war. Through their findings, they argue that the framework is largely capable of effectively evaluating a peace operation, however, that the framework would ultimately require further testing to prove its usefulness as a comparative assessment tool.

In order to further test the proposed evaluative framework for UN peace operations, Diehl & Druckman organized a follow-up panel, which conducted closer examinations of several case studies including UN missions in Cambodia, East Timor, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. The comparative studies on UN peace operation success were organized into another book, *Peace Operation Success: A Comparative Analysis*, and published in 2013. The assembled authors noted the evaluative framework was largely useful in evaluating peace operation success, however, there were a few key limitations and recommendations for continued refinement. For example, Jeni Whalen's (2013), contribution to the evaluation of the UN peace operation in Cambodia, noted that the question of timing when assessing a peace operation requires further consideration. She questioned whether peace operations should be assessed on a rolling basis, or simply in a retroactive manner. Moreover, Whalen noted that the economic, environmental and political conditions created by UN troops should also be taken into account when assessing the success of peace operations.

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (2013) echoed Jeni Whalen's comments and recommendations on the timing of peace operation assessments. They noted, "With ongoing missions... it is important that evaluation frameworks are able to deal with a moving picture not simply a snapshot." (Bellamy & Williams, 2013) Moreover, issue was raised with regard to the core goal of violence abatement, which, they note, is usually not relevant, since most UN peace operations are deployed following the conclusion of violence. Further, John Braithwaite (2013)

noted an inherent dilemma within the framework, notably that most peace operations do not occur in a strictly linear fashion, and that as others had noted, most “prevention-peacemaking-peacekeeping-peacebuilding is not done by ‘peace operations.’” There are a multitude of other actors involved in each peace operation, and as such, the question is raised as to how best evaluate their activities in conjunction with the peacekeeping mission itself.

The evaluative framework developed by Diehl & Druckman contributes to the advancement of a common assessment mechanism for UN peace operations. The framework has been noted as an effective tool to assess UN mission performance. As well, success for Diehl & Druckman is fundamentally about the ability of the peace operation to contain the spread of violence, and ultimately to settle the underlying causes of the conflict. However, the evaluative framework was never truly tested against ongoing peace operations (which the authors had originally intended). Moreover, the evaluative framework developed by Diehl & Druckman did not consider the importance of assessment leading to the development of exit strategies. For example, how does an evaluative framework effect the crafting of an exit? As well, the framework’s strength (clear goals, benchmarks and indicators) is undermined by its inability to assess, or at least consider, the importance of the initial process of mission mandate crafting and the political realities in which the mandate is born. In short, the evaluative framework would have benefited from an acknowledgement of the political complexities associated with UN peace operation planning and assessment.

Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé's (2016) research on evaluating success in UN peace operations further builds upon the growing literature on the topic of evaluative frameworks for UN missions. Martin-Brûlé examined how certain factors in UN peace operations, such as the effect of great power intervention on success in UN missions, provide assessment mechanisms that as of yet have not been explored. According to Martin-Brûlé, great power commitment to a UN mission is a crucial component of success more broadly. She defines a great power as regional or international state actors with significantly more robust military means than the state within which the peace operation is taking place. UN peace operation success, according to Martin-Brûlé is fundamentally about the (re)establishment of order and the accomplishment of the mission mandate.

In examining success in UN peace operations, Martin-Brûlé focuses on the particular conditions under which peace operations are most likely to succeed (2016). The often-discussed issue with evaluating peace operation success is that the accomplishment of the mission mandate is not necessarily directly linked to achieving order in the country (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). The nuances found within a mission mandate lead Martin-Brûlé to develop a new typology for assessing and classifying peace operation success: failure, partial failure, partial success and success (2016). By introducing two additional variations of outcomes for peace operations (partial failures and partial successes), Martin-Brûlé looks to highlight how reestablishing order in a war-torn state is more complex than simply achieving the missions mandate, as well as much more nuanced than a traditional binary assessment of success and failure can manage (2016).

The factors contributing to the success of a peace operation, according to Martin-Brûlé, are the type of strategy adopted by the mission and the type of interveners involved in the operation. Peace operations may, however, employ different strategies, often within the same mission. Commonly, peacekeeping strategies adopted by the UN and international community are reflected in economic sanctions or military interventions (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). Success, therefore, is determined by a binary use of coercive or non-coercive force. However, it appears as though a combination of the two strategies, coercive and non-coercive force, contribute the most to the success of peace operations (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). The employment of both coercive and non-coercive force is known as a deterrence strategy, and Martin-Brûlé argues that it is the best overall strategy for peace operation success (2016).

Martin-Brûlé notes that both sufficient troop numbers and financial backing by a great power are necessary for a deterrence strategy to succeed (2016). As such, the type of intervener, as well as the mandate of the mission, represents a key component of determining success in a peace operation. An intervention in a failed-state or intra-state war setting can be conducted from either an international/regional collective force or international great powers. According to Martin-Brûlé, collective interveners refer to international or regional organizations, such as the United Nations or African Union, while international great powers primarily refer to permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), though lesser great powers such as Nigeria, can form a great power within its own region (2016).

While collective interveners such as the UN allow for burden-sharing of the financial and human capital related to a peace operation, great powers are able to commit the resources necessary to achieve order in the country, particularly if they have a vested interest in the outcome (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). Moreover, when a great power is the primary intervener, they are

more likely to ensure their troops have the necessary equipment to minimize casualties, and ultimately increase the deterrence effects among the belligerents. However, the development of an effective mission mandate is critical to success regardless of which actors are in the lead.

Mission mandates form an integral component and indicator of UN peace operation success. However, mandates are largely a result of political compromise “between the interests of the different interveners...” which can therefore be susceptible to ambiguous or vague mission goals and can lead to periodic altering throughout the life cycle of a peace operation (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). As such, judging success in a peace operation by examining the mission mandate remains a challenge, as they are often purposely unclear or very broad (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). Martin-Brûlé indicates that it is therefore unwise to attempt to assess a peace operation by its mandate, as that would be evaluating the wording of the mandate, rather than the indicators on the ground (2016). The most important factor for Martin-Brûlé when examining the mission mandate is its ability to help foster the (re-)establishment of order in the country. Order, according to Martin-Brûlé, can be achieved through a combination of two means: by state/local authority or by the presence of an international force capable of enforcing the rules. Martin-Brûlé notes that it is, in fact, more important that a peace operation (re-)establish order than accomplish the mission’s mandate (2016).

In assessing what constitutes success in UN peace operations, Martin-Brûlé notes that interveners cannot assume to “win on the cheap.” The UN or a great power must commit the resources, communication and knowledge and ultimately show the resolve necessary to (re-)establish order (2016). Martin-Brûlé’s assertion that great power involvement in a peace operation is critical to achieving success is based on multiple case study examinations. As she indicated, operations from “Somalia to Haiti and Afghanistan...” have increasingly called upon

the involvement of great powers to collaborate with other states and international actors to bring stability and order to war-torn countries (Martin-Brûlé, 2016). However, great power involvement has not led to significant success in Somalia, and intervention in Haiti continues despite twice being lead by the involvement of a great power.

Martin-Brûlé indicates that the success of international interventions in fragile states is largely based upon the involvement of a great power. However, this indicator of success raises some important questions. First, is the involvement of a great power a reliable indicator of success? Second, how often are great powers (such as the United States) in the lead of a UN peace operation? Though the odds of success undoubtedly increase when a great power intervenes (increased financial contributions, increased troop numbers and increased capacity to see the conflict through to the end), has there always been success? For instance, there are many notable circumstances when great power intervention has failed to tip the balance in favor of a lasting peace. The United States took a leadership role in the UN's efforts to stabilize Somalia during the 1990s, but ultimately failed to create the conditions of lasting peace. As well, the two U.S. led interventions (1990s and 2000s) in Haiti have thus far failed to produce clear results toward a lasting peace. Perhaps, the only time when great power intervention *does* produce effective results is in circumstances of total war (such as the U.S.' involvement in World War Two). Clearly, the use of great power intervention as a key indicator of success in an international peacekeeping mission is flawed. However, there are other factors that contribute to issues with the application of this framework.

Putting aside the issue that great power interventions have not always been the catalyst for the long-term stability Martin-Brûlé envisions, there are other problems that arise with this typology of assessment. A key issue with measuring the re-establishment of order is knowing

when and how the re-establishment of order has occurred, and whether a true lasting order has been established. Moreover, what if the re-establishment of order comes at a cost, such as the degradation of rule of law and democratic systems? Does the re-establishment of order outweigh long-term peace building goals? Returning to the concept raised earlier on measuring success in total war circumstances; the idea of measuring success by the re-establishment of order might work under the condition of all-out war. However, the goals of modern UN peace operations are far more nuanced than simply returning the country to a condition of non-conflict. In fact, UN missions routinely have goals ranging from democracy-establishment and rule of law to human rights, equality, and economic and social progress. Examining and assessing great power intervention and the re-establishment of order does not account for new peace building goals, which are not always explicitly designated, or are added in an ad hoc manner.

Though Martin-Brûlé does state that mandates often reflect political realities, the accomplishment of the mandate is nevertheless viewed as a component of mission success. However, the issue of relying on the accomplishment of the mandate is that, as she pointed out, mandates can be a result of political negotiation. Moreover, if policymakers are to assess the accomplishment of a mission mandate, they must also look to assess the mission mandate prior to its employment. For instance, was the mission mandate crafted with long-term stability in mind, or is it intended as a band aide fix? The political realities associated with mandate crafting will necessarily alter the articulation of the mandate. Moreover, if achievement of a mission mandate is key (and the necessary evaluation of that achievement is conducted) then it is also important to evaluate the process of mandate creation prior to mission deployment. If the mandate is unclear, measuring its performance and achievement has little effect on determining a successful peace operation in general.

SUCCESS, SECURITY COUNCIL POLITICS AND MANDATE CRAFTING

Political issues routinely, however, stand in the way of defining and evaluating success in UN peace operations. Though this is widely accepted, the political realities in which evaluations of success occur are all too often absent from research on assessment of UN peace operation performance. The decision-making process within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) plays a crucial role in determining whether a given peace operation will be a success, and how that success can be measured. As such, closer examination of the political undertones of UNSC mandate crafting is critical to effectively assessing UN peace operation performance. What follows is an examination of decision-making processes at the Security Council in general, and specifically, as it relates to the UN missions in Haiti. An examination of the political realities found within the decision making process at the Security Council helps to highlight some of the challenges associated with assessing UN peace operation performance.

Following the end of the Cold War, the UNSC endeavored to increasingly approve and implement complex mission mandates (Malone, 1998, p. 19). With this, came an increasing use of elections as a method for fostering peace and its “disposition to authorize the use of force.”(Malone, 1998, p. 22; Leininger, 2006, p. 487) For instance, the UNSC decision-making process during the first years of the intervention in Haiti (1993 and 1994) were occurring against a “backdrop of serious UN-over stretch...”(Malone, 1998, p. 34) as well as the mandate being highly influenced by regional policies (Leininger, 2006, p. 488) including those of the United States. In addition to this, the policies and subsequent resolution and mandate in the lead up to UN deployment in Haiti, were made with little knowledge of Haiti itself, with the end result being strategies that were “naïve and ill conceived...”(Hagman, 2002, p. 1)

In addition to improper planning and regional policies winning the day, there is a post-colonial view of decision-making in the Security Council, particularly with its involvement in Haiti. For instance, ongoing political and social instability coupled with a high level of violence in the country, was interpreted by the United States as proof of Haiti's inability to govern itself, and invoked US paternalistic tendencies (Morengo, 2012, p. 381). This, it is suggested, created the necessary ground for intervention and occupation during the early 20th century, as well as during the more recent UN interventions in the country. Moreover, Haiti's geographic position on the periphery of the United States further exacerbates US influence in the country, with many Haitians living in the United States and contributing to the Haitian national budget through transfers and remittances (Morengo, 2012, p. 382). The proximity of Haiti to the US serves to further the American interest in the country and is ultimately reflected in the Security Council decision-making process.

The United Nations Security Council assumed an ad hoc approach to its decision-making process in response to the Haiti crisis as a result of member states' differences of interpretation of the Charter and wording of the resolution. Ongoing apprehension from China, Brazil and other South American states on the use of military force in Haiti weakened the chances of an effective mandate being crafted. At the outset of the crisis in Haiti (1991), both China and India were staunchly against direct military involvement in the country, arguing that Article 2(7) of the UN Charter barred outside interference in members' domestic affairs (Morris, 1995, p. 394). When consensus had finally been achieved, it was US domestic pressure, international concern, and the media writ large that moved the Security Council to act on Haiti. As an example of the crisis affecting domestic public opinion and the media, refugee flows from Haiti to the US increased pressure on the United States to seek a solution to the crisis (Morris, 1995, p. 395). In fact, the

refugee flows from Haiti were cited in the Security Council as a key factor in constituting the crisis as a “threat to international peace and security.”(Morris, 1995, p. 395) Refugees fleeing the crisis in Haiti effectively altered the information landscape within the United States sufficiently to move the Security Council to act on Haiti.

In addition, the Security Council was eventually moved to consensus by political and diplomatic efforts on the part of the Haitian President in exile calling on the United Nations to intervene militarily (Morris, 1995, p. 396). Even though some states (read China and Brazil) continued to oppose military intervention in Haiti, the use of political and diplomatic channels by President Aristide while in exile, played a crucial role in pushing the Security Council to accept a military intervention in the country. However, the issue of the sanctity of state sovereignty at the Security Council remained a clear bone of contention among members. As an example, Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela argued against the use of force in order to bring about the restoration of President Aristide citing the issue of state sovereignty as a key reason for their dissent (Morris, 1995, p. 404).

In addition to the issue of state sovereignty, many Security Council permanent and non-permanent members voiced concern over American interest in the region and US-Russia quid pro quo agreements (Morris, 1995, p. 405). As an example, initial statements by US diplomats indicating military intervention was about protecting vital interests and nationals living in Haiti only served to strengthen many arguments in Latin American against sanctioned military intervention (Morris, 1995, p. 405). As well, within the Security Council there were reports of American and Russian deal-making on reciprocal support for proposals on military intervention within their own spheres of influence (Morris, 1995, p. 406).

Though the Security Council mandate for military intervention was ultimately attained, the decision-making process exposed underlying cleavages among permanent and non-permanent members over the use of military force in the domestic affairs of UN member states as well as the issue of state sovereignty. The fact that the Security Council was “pushed to the breaking point”(Morris, 1995, p. 409) over the use of force in Haiti would prove detrimental to the long-term planning process for the subsequent peacekeeping and peace building missions in the country. Though the political and diplomatic channels were ultimately successful in sanctioning a military intervention, the process was fraught with back-channel negotiations and members pitted against other members. Within this climate of political cleavages and lowest common denominator compromise, it is easy to see how the critical task of mandate crafting would take a backstage to political crafting. Moreover, defining and evaluating success within a highly politicized Security Council represents an obvious, ongoing challenge.

Even after the Security Council has come to a consensus on implementing a peace operation, the challenge of crafting an effective mission mandate becomes a central issue. In light of the complexities of mandate crafting, this section will focus on illustrating the process of developing a mission mandate, as well as the political undertones found within the mandate itself as a product of compromise. The intention is to demonstrate the challenges of crafting a mandate for a UN peace operation, as well as the need for closer attention to its development through assessment or incorporation into broader assessment frameworks for UN peace operations. Finally, this section will underpin discussion on the need (and challenge) for the placement of baselines, benchmarks and indicators within the mandate in order to guide ongoing assessment as the mission unfolds.

The process of mandate crafting at the Security Council involves the balancing of political compromise and legal boundaries, where the Council acts as both an executive and a legislature (Roland, 2004, p. 3). The terminology found within United Nations mission mandates reflects both political and “quasi-legal” considerations (Roland, 2004, p. 1). Within a legal context, accompanying statements within a UN resolution are used as a method of further treaty interpretation and clarification (Roland, 2004, p. 5). As an example of the political-legal foundations of mandates is the use of “legal sounding terms that have weighty political impact”(Roland, 2004, p. 5) yet largely remain unaddressed.

The initial crafting of a mission mandate is generally written into the Security Council resolution, where upon adoption by the permanent members, provides the “direction, guidelines and limits...” of the mission (Roland, 2004, p. 6). As the terms within the mandate determine the legality of subsequent action, the question of who drafts UN resolutions is critical in determining the objectives of the mission as well as the underlying political intentions and motives behind the mission (Roland, 2004, p. 6). The Security Council usually appoints a single member state to undertake initial drafting of a mission mandate, in a political context, this is usually reflected in a particular country with a close connection to the issue taking the lead (Roland, 2004, p. 6). The Security Council may appoint a member state to take the lead as a result of geographic proximity to the subject country, as well, a past or present relationship or alliance may also play a factor in determining which country takes the lead in drafting the initial mandate (Roland, 2004, p. 6). Moreover, there are permanent members of the Security Council that almost always take the lead on mandate crafting, such as the United States. The political process of mandate crafting leaves room for faults to be found. For instance, mission mandates can be viewed as a product of

political pragmatism rather than the implementation of universal principles found within the UN Charter (Roland, 2004, p. 12).

The political undertones of the mandate make the articulation of the political results being sought incredibly difficult, which can often be influenced by forces outside of the United Nations Security Council. Mandates are often constructed on certain premises (such as negotiated peace agreements or cease fires) that can be thwarted by outside actors, such as political forces not associated with the UN or not party to any agreements (Roland, 2004, p. 15). Though it is well understood that mandates are required to be clear and practical, the political process of their drafting often result in “inconsistent obligations.”(Roland, 2004, p. 16) At the operational level, ambiguity and inconsistency written into the mandate can often be overcome. However, under resourced mission mandates are far tougher to manage at the operational level (Roland, 2004, p. 16). Under funded or “half-hearted actions” stemming from a vague mission mandate serve to undermine the legitimacy of UN peacekeepers, as well as effectively setting a mission up for failure before it even starts (Roland, 2004, p. 17).

Assessing a mission mandate is made all the more challenging given the political dimensions at play in its initial drafting. One indication of a successful mission mandate, however, is the “satisfaction” of principle parties to a UN peace operation (Roland, 2004, p. 17). Moreover, the satisfaction of the permanent members of the UNSC, the troop and civilian contributors and neighboring countries play a role in determining the success of a mission mandate. Though this assessment formula reflects what many have indicated about the broader success of UN peace operations, it does little to reflect the content of the mandate, and the process by which it was crafted.

However, Roland indicates that in the end, mandates must be assessed on their clarity and practicality. Here Roland notes that a “workable mandate will comprise mainly of action tasks that are simply described for the benefit of both the implementers and the subjects...” and that furthermore, many “of these tasks will be measurable in terms of performance, cost and timeliness.”(2004, p. 18) In addition to this, Roland makes clear that the mandate should point the direction for the mission, and a point of transition or exit should be developed so policymakers can decide when peacekeepers are needed and when development assistance takes over (2004, P. 18). The central issue with this is that more can be done to ensure or articulate the steps of the mission within the mandate itself. For instance, placing baselines, benchmarks and indicators within the text of the resolution and mandate in order to better instruct the mission implementers.

A well-planned mission mandate is crucial to the overall success of a UN peace operation. However, there is also debate around the impartiality and partiality of a mission mandate as advanced by Jane Boulden (2005). Boulden asks, can a mission mandate be impartial, and if so, is it even desirable? Moreover, can the UNSC craft an impartial mandate, and is that conducive to success within a peace operation? Mandate crafting reflects partiality through the political decision-makers (the Security Council) determining the required action, and establishing a set of objectives for a potential operation (the mission mandate), the objectives identified by the SC are then operationalized by the military deploying on the peace operation (Boulden, 2005, p. 150). The partiality of the mission mandate is then reflected throughout the course of the operation itself. However, the UN is at its core a political actor (a political forum of sorts) with, in the end, political goals, namely the “protection and maintenance of international peace and security” (Boulden, 2005, p. 158). With this in mind, can a mission mandate

developed within the UN framework be impartial or removed from political circumstances? Though it might at first be desirable to be impartial, it is likely impossible to remove the politics from the mandate. What is needed, then, is an assessment framework that acknowledges this, and works around it.

The Security Council and the mission mandates it produces are a direct result of political maneuvering and negotiating, and as such, the missions deployed following those decision-making processes reflect the unique circumstances of each member state party to the negotiations. Making sense of the political dimensions underlying peace operations is crucial in determining the success of a mission. Beyond assessing success through the lens of Security Council decision-making, it is crucial to understand the political issues at the outset of the mission, as it is here where the groundwork and direction of a mission comes about. To date, a cursory evaluation of the mandate crafting stage of UN peace operations has occurred, however, more detail is required. I will incorporate this knowledge into my proposed evaluative framework so as to demonstrate the political challenges associated with mandate creation, and evaluation of success in general.

SUCCESS, TRANSITIONS AND EXIT STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

The final section of this literature review will examine the key considerations of successful transitions and exit strategies from UN peace operations. Transition and exit strategies must be developed in part on the results gained through the assessments made during the life of a mission. Richard Caplan (2012) builds upon the growing discussion on the topic of withdrawal from UN peace operations and international interventions. The book's contributors present an

extensive discussion on exit strategy development by examining peace operations and military interventions from Haiti and Sierra Leone to Iraq and Afghanistan, and identify key obstacles and challenges to the implementation of exit strategies. However, Richard Caplan's book ultimately fails to raise the issue of evaluative frameworks leading to an exit strategy and the role of mandate crafting in determining an effective exit strategy. Moreover, the political decisions made at the outset of a mission are scarcely examined, however, do effectively indicate mission success and therefore, the process of transition and exit form a peace operation.

The findings of the book, and indeed the overarching argument of the contributing authors, are that the best exit strategy is that of a fluid, phased transition-based exit. Clear deadlines for exit, and limited scope strategies such as the implementation of elections, are presented as being less effective at producing a successful exit. A phased withdrawal is an exit based on a transition from, say peacekeeping to peace building, or from military intervention to humanitarian assistance. Richard Caplan argues that transition-oriented exits have not always been the most common forms of exit. However, when implemented, they have ultimately been the most successful. Exit strategies, as Caplan argues, are dependent upon clear, and effective mission mandates, which lay the groundwork for an exit. A common theme throughout the book is that context matters. Exit strategies are, according to Richard Caplan, often the result of certain international and domestic circumstances (read political realities), which help to shape the types of exits, as well as their overall success.

William J. Durch (2012) highlights the factors that most contribute to a good or bad exit strategy. However, he fails to outline how an evaluation of the mission points the direction toward a transition. Durch notes that, broadly speaking, "an exit strategy is a plan for assembling the means to reach goals whose attainment is necessary to leave..." country X (2012, p. 87).

Moreover, a good exit strategy will require “political and operational measures” on which to base assessment of the mission, and for leadership to judge when a withdrawal is most likely to be successful (Durch, 2012, p. 90). Thus, for Durch an exit or withdrawal from a conflict zone is really about making an evidence-based projection on what will happen once troops have departed a country. Elections are seen as indicators of success for a UN peace operation, and therefore act as triggers for troop withdrawals, however, the qualifier is that elections should not be conducted prematurely out of concern for destabilizing the country (Durch, 2012). Transition-based exits are therefore best as a means of overcoming the sudden shock of a quick post-election withdrawal.

Speaking specifically on Haiti, Johanna Mendelson Forman (2012) notes the past use of both end states and end dates in the country as a method for judging when an exit would be most successful. However, the combination of end state and end date exit strategies in Haiti has produced mixed results. Mendelson explores whether UN forces in Haiti conducted a genuine exit (twice?) or whether there was a transition from one type of intervention to another (2012, p.119). Mendelson notes that the challenge of planning and executing any exit strategy is that it must on the one hand balance the political realities on the ground with the mission mandates that guide the direction of international operations (2012). Mendelson notes that the first instance of exit from Haiti was a combination of both an end state and end date, as elections (end state) were set to take place by 1995 (end date) (2012). However, it became apparent to policymakers that end date strategy for troop withdrawal would not ensure long-term goals were achieved. Therefore, the subsequent Security Council resolutions and mission mandates set benchmarks as indicators of success, which would trigger automatic withdrawal from the country (Mendelson, 2012).

Dominik Zaum (2012) looked to further highlight the role of transition-based exits as most likely to lead to long-term stability in the country. Zaum examined the case studies of Cambodia, Bosnia and East Timor as instances where UN international administrations were established to oversee much of the governing of the country, with most requiring follow-up missions to secure the peace. Zaum indicates that an exit strategy “should best be understood as a process rather than the event of withdrawal” (2012, p. 138). Under international administrations, an exit is defined as a transition of governmental authority exercised by international administrations to local institutions (Zaum, 2012). Exits under international administrations are best seen as a process of transition because there are normally several agencies overseeing operations within the host country, and each might have its own mandate and therefore timeline, requiring some to depart before others (Zaum, 2012). However, the achievement of mission mandates is still viewed as the key driver of exits from international administrations.

The common theme is that an exit from an international intervention should be seen as a process rather than a single event. Transitions rather than end dates or end states are advanced as most likely to lead to successful peace operation exits. Richard Caplan concludes by examining the policy implications of developing exit strategies. Caplan indicates that in order to develop an effective exit strategy, policymakers must necessarily have a well-planned entry into the country in the first place (2012, p. 311). Planning for an exit should, therefore, begin before a UN peace operation has been deployed. Though, as on-the-ground circumstances are likely to change over the course of a mission, a clear roadmap is unlikely to be effective, rather, periodic exit strategy updating should be undertaken through out the life of the peace operation (Caplan, 2012). Policymakers must have long-term vision and patience, where the time horizon on an operation is linked to long-term end state goals.

Richard Caplan brings together notable scholarly resources in order to highlight contemporary debate on the role of exit strategies in UN and international interventions. Though mission mandates are identified as being key to producing a successful exit strategy, little is done to indicate how one might assess progress in order to develop the particular exit strategy. Caplan notes that “specific criteria for measuring a consolidated peace will vary from one situation to another: there can be no standard checklist applicable to all situations” (2012, p. 314). Moreover, exits must be based on benchmarks that are concrete and measureable, and use meaningful indicators to point the direction toward an exit (Caplan, 2012). The brief overview of assessment of UN operations is the closest the book comes to acknowledging that evaluating success (and an effective mandate) in peace operations is crucial to advance an exit strategy. The issue of examining the mission mandate (and the political realities in which they are born) and addressing a framework to advance an exit strategy is largely left to the reader to puzzle over.

The literature review conducted within this Chapter has demonstrated that although there is robust discussion on what constitutes success in UN peace operations, there remains a gap connecting the assessment of various phases of UN missions. For instance, existing evaluative frameworks are often designed and implemented in silos, operating independent of other phases of missions as well as other actors involved in peace building itself. Moreover, existing evaluative frameworks largely neglect the political realities in which peace operations are born, and how those political realities shape the manner in which evaluations are conducted and ultimately mission success. In response to the gap identified in the literature, I will propose an evaluative framework that further illustrates the political challenges associated with assessing success in UN peace operations. The next Chapter will present the analysis of the literature review conducted in this Chapter, with an aim of highlighting and expanding upon the identified

assessment gaps that exist in the reviewed material as well as the issue of political realities shaping mission planning and performance.

Chapter 4: Results and Analysis

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) plays a crucial role in determining the wording (objectives) and direction of UN peace operations through the development of a mission mandate. As a result of the political challenges outlined within the literature review, the results and analysis portion of this thesis will begin by examining the mandates of the missions in Haiti in order to illustrate the political realities of crafting a peace operation mandate within the context of a highly politicized environment in the Security Council. This Chapter will then examine the strengths and weaknesses of key evaluative frameworks in order to demonstrate the need for greater understanding of the role politics plays in holistic mission planning and assessment. In light of the political complexity of the UNSC, this section will demonstrate the need for careful consideration of the first mandate when appraising the overall performance of a UN peace operation as well as reaffirm the need for holistic mission planning and assessment.

After careful examination it became apparent that assessments of UN peacekeeping success are conducted in ‘silos,’ independently evaluating each phase of a mission. For instance, Robert Johansen (1994), Doyle and Sambanis (2007), Jair van der Lijn (2009), and Diehl & Druckman (2010; 2013) overlooked the importance of examining the political issues associated with mandate crafting, as well as laying the foundation for baselines, benchmarks and indicators of success. They left out of their assessments the importance of mission planning necessary to move the peace operation from one phase to the next, or simply put, from peacekeeping to peace sustaining. On the other hand, Duane Bratt (1996), Maja Garb (2014), and Martin-Brûlé (2016), incorporated to one degree or another, the successful completion of the mission mandate as a key indicator of success. However, what they collectively missed was an emphasis on the need to

develop baselines and benchmarks within the wording of the mandate. As well, in their assessment of mandate accomplishment, they largely left out or strategically avoided, an appraisal of mission mandates and an account of the political realities in which they are crafted. What is largely absent from the evaluative frameworks consulted for this thesis is a detailed discussion of the politics within the Security Council and mandate crafting stages of a UN peace operation.

The literature reviewed demonstrates issues within existing assessment practices at the UN itself. For instance, the UN conducts its own mission assessments, however, it does so in an ad hoc manner, often within (and not between) different departments and agencies, such as UNDP and PKO. Yet, since the *Brahimi Report* in 2000, the UN has developed its ability to not only measure the performance (and success) of its missions, but also to conduct holistic mission planning. The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and the Capstone document, Principles and Guidelines, provide an overview of the steps in the planning and assessment of UN peace operations. In addition to the development of planning and assessment mechanisms at the UN, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), United Nations Evaluations Group (UNEG) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) operate their own inspection and evaluations of UN peace operations. Though the evaluations conducted by these agencies offer important services to measuring the performance of peace operations, they do so in largely an ad hoc manner.

Periodic assessments are not guaranteed or the norm, and inter-agency operability is limited. The politics within the Security Council and the mission mandate-crafting process make incorporating these assessment services from the outset of a mission a necessary challenge to overcome. Moreover, as the Security Council and mandate crafting section of the literature

review made evident, the political cleavages found within the decision-making process (between UNSC permanent and non-permanent members) often impede the development of a common framework of peace operation success. As well, the political realities, more often than not, create a situation in which an effective (holistic) mission mandate simply cannot be articulated and therefore operationalized. Political realities ultimately hinder the design and implementation of evaluative frameworks.

UNITED NATIONS MANDATES IN HAITI

Prior to conducting an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of existing evaluative frameworks against a backdrop of political realities within the Security Council, it is important to first note the particular details of the UN's mission mandates in Haiti. For ease of analysis the UN's efforts in Haiti have been separated into two broad groups: the 1990s United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the 2000s United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This grouping allows for ease of assessment, as well as providing a simple yet clear view of the missions and how best to evaluate them. A key question to be addressed within this section is how political cleavages within the Security Council adversely affected the creation of UN mission mandates in Haiti and ultimately ensured ad hoc UN deployments to the country.

The UN's first foray into Haiti began in the early 1990s, with its flagship mission being UNMIH. UNMIH's mission mandate can be broken down into three broad groupings: (1) to help implement certain provisions of the Governors Island Agreement; (2) to assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force; and (3) to assist the Government of Haiti in establishing a secure and stable environment to hold elections, to provide security to

international personnel and key installations, and the professionalization of the police force. The three core elements identified from the mission mandate have been selected in order to simplify the assessment and analysis process.

Examining the UNMIH mandate in greater detail, the United Nations Security Council, under Resolution 867 (1993), established UNMIH in order to help implement certain provisions of the Governors Island Agreement signed by the Haitian parties on 3 July 1993 (Malone, 1998). Initially, UNMIH's mandate was to assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and creating the conditions for a new police force. However, due to the non-compliance of the existing military authorities in Haiti, and the inability for UNMIH to deploy in a timely manner, the reform of the military did not go ahead as planned, resulting in an immediate political and military set back for the mission (Malone, 1998).

Following the restoration of the government in Haiti, which was spearheaded by the American forces, UNMIH's mandate was revised under Resolutions 940 (1994) and 975 (1995). UNMIH's mission mandate was altered in order to assist the democratic Government of Haiti in "fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: sustaining a secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; and the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force" (Malone, 1998). In addition to this, UNMIH's mandate was updated in order to better assist the authorities in Haiti in "establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair elections to be called by those authorities" (Malone, 1998).

UNMIH fully deployed by 31 March 1995, and legislative elections were held by the summer of that same year. Moreover, the Presidential elections were held successfully on 17 December 1995, with the transfer of power to the new President taking place on 7 February

1996. Resolution 1048 (1996), which extended the life of UNMIH's mandate, was made at the request of the President of Haiti (Malone, 1998). Ad hoc follow-up missions were deployed to Haiti from 1996 to 2000, involving police reform and training. The unique political dimensions of the Security Council, United Nations member nations as well as local political considerations affected the planning, deployment and assessment of the UN's intervention in Haiti through the 1990s. The unwillingness of the international community to support military intervention directly led to the ad hoc deployment of troops, while the decision-making process of the Security Council undermined a committed and common approach to the UN efforts in the country. The lengthy negotiations (political challenges) over deployment length and mission objectives, meant the UN's first efforts to restore order in Haiti lacked a sound transition and exit strategy and ultimately set the stage for yet another intervention in the country.

The deployment of MINUSTAH was a direct consequence of a lack of planning because of the political squabbling within the Security Council at the start of the 1990s. The UN's new mission was a response to Haiti's increasing political instability (and coup) in the early 2000s. Like UNMIH, the mission mandate can be separated into three broad groups: (1) support for the transitional government in Haiti; (2) the establishment of a secure and stable environment conducive to holding periodic elections, assisting in monitoring and reform of the Haitian National Police, assisting in DDR measures and rule of law and public security; and (3) support for human rights and human rights NGOs operating in the country (United Nations, 2004).

Specifically, the Security Council, under Resolution 1542, established MINUSTAH on 30 April 2004 in order to support the Transitional Government in Haiti. The mission mandate included providing "a secure and stable environment," assisting in restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police as well as with Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

(DDR) programmes, assisting with the establishment of the rule of law and public safety in Haiti, supporting the ongoing development of constitutional and political processes, providing support to the Transitional Government and Haitian human rights organizations and groups operating within the country, and finally to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country (United Nations, 2010). However, in the period following MINUSTAH's initial deployment, the mission altered its concept of operations and its authorized strength on several occasions due to changing circumstances on the ground such as the continual erosion or instability of the political, security and socio-economic situation in the country. The periodic reassessment (and mandate updating) of the mission can be viewed by examining the near-constant updating of United Nations Resolutions from 1608 (2005), 1702 (2006), 1743 (2007), 1780 (2007), and 1840 (2008) (United Nations, 2010).

The UN Security Council extended MINUSTAH's mandate on 13 October 2009 with the passing of Resolution 1892. The revised mission mandate tasked MINUSTAH with supporting the nascent Haitian democratic process, including promoting political dialogue and national reconciliation as well as providing the necessary logistical support and security assistance (United Nations, 2010). However, following the devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, the UN Security Council, under Resolutions 1908 and 1927, increased the authorized troop limits in the country in order to support the "immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts" (United Nations, 2010).

The political cleavages within the Security Council had adverse effects on the planning, deployment and exit of UN peacekeeping forces in Haiti. The prolonged negotiations over the goals of the military intervention in Haiti meant that the planning and assessment of the mission took a back seat to political compromise. A close examination of the UN mandates in Haiti

illustrates the ad hoc nature of UN deployment in Haiti, and the need for further assessment and analysis at the mandate crafting stage as well as embedded evaluative frameworks within the mandate itself. In the following section I will examine the strengths and weaknesses of existing evaluative frameworks in order to demonstrate the need for more holistic mission planning and assessment as well as consideration for the unique political realities found within each UN mission and the evaluations conducted in support of success.

EXISTING FRAMEWORKS: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

This section will demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of key existing frameworks against the backdrop of political challenges associated with the UN's efforts in Haiti. The United Nations handbook, *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (2010), represents an important starting point for an assessment of UN peace operations. Within the handbook, the UN identifies two basic elements for monitoring progress toward peace consolidation: (1) a simplified measuring system with appropriate benchmarks and indicators; and (2) a monitoring mechanism capable of gathering data from multiple sources, while having the necessary credibility within the government and international community to propose necessary course corrections (United Nations, 2010).

United Nations benchmarking is most commonly done at the sector level, for example: security, governance and rule of law. However, it is also possible to develop benchmarks against key components of a mission mandate or alternatively, by signed peace agreements (United Nations, 2010). Within the handbook, the United Nations has outlined three types of evaluative frameworks in which to guide the development of benchmarks: (1) strategy-based; (2) sector-

based; and (3) process-based frameworks (United Nations, 2010). Essentially, the UN has outlined a process whereby the assessment of a peace operation begins with the evaluation of the core goals of the mandate.

Applying the UN evaluative framework to the peace operation mandates in Haiti demonstrates the use of the three types of strategies. For instance, if we assume the first type of evaluative framework outlined by the UN, that of strategy-based evaluation, we can determine that the first mission period (UNMIH) was a partial success. UNMIH, according to this evaluative type, achieved its mandate in that elections were held and police reform was conducted. However, the strategy fails to examine the long-term trends associated with elections and judicial reform. According to the UN's second evaluative type, that of a sector-based approach, UNMIH can also be seen as achieving partial success. Finally, the process-based framework effectively assesses both UNMIH and MINUSTAH against the objectives outlined in the mission mandate. Though the framework indicates the need to assess the mission based on the goals outlined in the mandate, the framework leaves out the baselines necessary to judge the resulting performance of the mission.

The UN evaluative framework is sufficiently capable of examining many of the objectives outlined in the mandates, however, it fails to both consider long-term trends as well as the political issues surrounding the initial crafting of the mandates. The political undertones found throughout the planning, deployment and assessment stages of the missions in Haiti are simply overlooked by the UN framework. In short, the underlying political and security challenges within Haiti are far more nuanced than the framework is able to capture. As well, the several evaluative frameworks developed by the UN often operate in 'silos', independent of one another as well as independently assessing each phase of a mission.

Assessing USIP's *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments* (MPICE) framework against the backdrop of ad hoc UN deployments to Haiti allows for a closer look at both the development of evaluative frameworks as well as an assessment of the UN's efforts in the country. MPICE assesses the capability of indigenous organizations and institutions to resolve conflict according to five sectors or end states: Safe and Secure Environment, Political Moderation and Stable Governance, Rule of Law, Sustainable Economy, and Social Well-Being (USIP, 2010). In short, success according to the MPICE evaluative framework is about establishing an environment conducive to peace consolidation. MPICE defines peace consolidation as a situation in which peace has been established and external support is no longer needed to sustain that peace. In order to determine peace consolidation, the framework uses "normal rates" of criminality, mortality and participation in elections, for example, as key indicators of success and consolidated peace. As such, a self-sustaining peace is advanced as being crucial to assessing the success of a peace operation.

The MPICE evaluative framework's central aim of determining a self-sustaining peace within a host country is a simple way of assessing success in UN peace operations. As assessed against a backdrop of ad hoc UN intervention in Haiti, the MPICE framework points to success in Haiti under most identified benchmarks and indicators. However, UN efforts in Haiti have been focused on either imposed stability or assisted stability, with little movement toward a self-sustaining (long-term) peace. Moreover, a quick examination of the framework against the backdrop of Haiti would have you believe the UN's 25 years of intervention were a success, however, the local complexities point to a more nuanced outcome.

Paul F. Diehl & Daniel Druckman (2010; 2013) developed their evaluative framework for UN peace operations in order to provide a systematic and comparative analysis of assessment

within an ongoing mission context. The core indicators of success are advanced as common to all peace operations, namely: violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. In addition to these core goals, the new goals of peace operations include: democratization; humanitarian assistance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and human rights protection. Finally, the peace building goals outlined in the framework include: local security; the rule of law; local governance; and restoration, reconciliation and transformation.

Success for Diehl & Druckman is fundamentally a nuanced term measured by key indicators and benchmarks. Defining success for UN peace operations remains a challenge, for instance: success for whom, or as compared to what? In an attempt to outline possible avenues for success, Diehl & Druckman outline three different baselines of assessment, namely: (1) comparing peace operations against no action being taken; (2) a before and after assessment; and (3) comparative assessment between different peace operations. Comparing peace operations against the idea of no action being taken is commonly referred to as the “better than nothing” yardstick. This baseline of assessment relies on a simple question: is peacekeeping better than *this* list of alternatives? However, counter-factual analysis is inherently problematic. For instance, determining what could have happened is near impossible. Thus, it is important for the wording of the mandate to indicate what the baselines are, and when the periodic assessments are to be conducted off those baselines.

The “before and after” assessment seeks to examine and compare the conditions prior to deployment and following deployment or withdrawal. The assessment of the conflict will thus reflect the state of the conflict at the start of the deployment. As such, an advantage of this baseline is it allows for comparisons across the life-span of a mission. However, its usefulness is hindered by the fact that obvious improvements would be seen if a mission is deployed during

fighting rather than following it. Finally, a comparative assessment baseline looks to compare what has been deemed successful in other peace operations to the one being assessed. For example, a peace operation with few casualties, either among civilians or peacekeepers, would be seen as comparatively more successful than another peace operation, which saw many more casualties. However, attempting to compare peace operations in order to determine success is like comparing apples and oranges. Thus, this baseline of success requires near-identical missions in order to be evaluated, something that is simply not possible.

Peace operation mandates are viewed as being the surest indicator of success, however, they too have their problems, namely the political circumstances under which they are crafted. Diehl & Druckman thus advance a decision-making template highlighting several key questions in order to circumvent the issues identified with the three broad baselines of success definitions. At one point or another, the UN's efforts in Haiti over the past 25 years have made use of all these indicators and goals, often at varying times. However, UN efforts in Haiti faced a more nuanced conflict than what is laid out in the evaluative framework developed by Diehl & Druckman. Beginning with the core goal of violence abatement, UN efforts in Haiti were largely deployed following open conflict, thus, reducing the need to examine the missions' ability to reduce violence. Moreover, the conflict in Haiti was largely characterized by criminal activity through former soldiers and gangs, and though there was a peace agreement prior to the deployment of UNMIH, the mission cannot be said to be a violence-preventing mission. In fact, MINUSTAH's deployment in 2004 had no peace agreement on which to base its goals and objectives.

The core goal of conflict containment was also evident within the UNMIH mandate and to a lesser extent covered under MINUSTAH's mandate. Though, like violence abatement, there

was little concern of open hostilities spilling beyond Haiti both as a result of geography and because the actors in the conflict were largely criminal organizations and gangs. If the definition of conflict containment is stretched, then the idea of preventing refugees flows outside of the country can be seen, as this was a major concern in the lead up to the deployment of UNMIH. As well, with further examination, the issues of criminal activity crossing the boarder to the Dominican Republic or elsewhere in the region could fall under this indicator. However, the framework largely overlooks the illegal activities that peace operations often focus their attention on.

Finally, the core goal of conflict settlement can be seen predominately in the 1990s during the deployment of UNMIH. The Governor's Island Peace agreement facilitated the transfer of political power, and the deployment of peacekeepers under UNMIH. Power-sharing arrangements were advanced in Haiti over the course of UNMIH's deployment, however, given the type of conflict (criminal gangs) the scope of conflict settlement activities is inherently limited. This can be seen in particular during the 2000s, where no peace agreement was signed. The peace operations deployed to Haiti have been centered on political and security stability as a result of gang activity rather than against a single party seeking political action. Thus, the core goals advanced by Diehl & Druckman might, in fact, be a bit too focused on military combat to effectively assess peace operation success in Haiti. Moreover, without a political framework, the assessment tool developed by Diehl & Druckman is largely unusable.

Where the UN focused its efforts, both during UNMIH and MINUSTAH, has been in what Diehl & Druckman term new goals and peacebuilding goals. The new goals of democratization, humanitarian assistance, DDR, and human rights protection have all been employed in UN operations in Haiti, and all to varying degrees of success. In addition to these,

the peace building goals of local security; rule of law; local governance; and restoration, reconciliation, and transformation were supported over the course of UN efforts in Haiti. When applying the evaluative framework to the UN's efforts in Haiti one can see the overall usefulness of the evaluative framework. Both the new goals and peace building goals developed by Diehl & Druckman were primary goals in Haiti, and thus are useful to examine in determining UN success in the country. However, the framework falls short in assessing Haiti when the consideration of the politics of the Security Council are examined, as well as the development of a transition and exit strategy. The framework, in short, does not assist the assessment of Haiti in a trajectory toward long-term transition and exit strategies.

Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé's (2016) work on evaluating success and failure in UN peace operations introduces the component of mandate achievement to the analysis of UN efforts in Haiti. There are two key indicators of success in UN peace operations: the (re-)establishment of order and the accomplishment of the mandate. Moreover, among the most important factors in determining the success of a UN peace operation, according to Martin-Brûlé, is the involvement of a great power within the broader military intervention. In defining success, Martin-Brûlé organizes outcomes into four broad definitions: failure, partial failure, partial success, and success. As an application of the evaluative framework, it is easy to use, with straightforward, simplified definitions, indicators and outcomes. However, the evaluative framework's simplicity ultimately overlooks the complexities associated with political cleavages within the Security Council as well as mandate crafting, as can be seen in its application to the UN's efforts in Haiti.

When assessed against the backdrop of UN efforts in Haiti, it becomes clear that the framework's reliance on great power intervention in predicting a positive outcome largely goes against the outcomes of the UN in Haiti. Both great (USA) and regional (Brazil) powers were

deeply involved in the UN intervention in Haiti, yet the long-term outcome was largely unsuccessful. Though the peace operation largely accomplished the various UN mandates over the course of the 1990s; the long-term stability of the country remained unclear (as was demonstrated by the return of the UN in 2004). The strength of the framework developed by Martin-Brûlé is that it is clear and simple. Yet, its application to UN efforts in Haiti exposes some weaknesses, namely its inability to measure long-term outcomes and the issue of great power intervention failing to produce a positive outcome. Moreover, the political realities of mandate crafting as an obstacle to further assessment are largely absent from the framework.

This Chapter suggests that there continues to be an assessment gap between mission conception, mission deployment and mission transition and exit. Evaluative frameworks, developed by the UN or within policy and academic circles, are all too often designed and implemented independent of either all aspects of a mission or of other organizations operating within the peace operation. Moreover, mission planning largely leaves out the importance of embedding assessment frameworks into the text of the mandate and the larger planning cycles of a mission. As well, the analysis indicates that the political aspect of mandate crafting, mission deployment and transition and exit are largely absent from existing evaluative frameworks. In the following Chapter I will discuss the need for more holistic mission planning and assessment of UN peace operations while taking into account the political challenges associated with the deployment of assessment mechanisms. Finally, I will propose and discuss an embedded evaluative framework, one that both highlights the steps of a mission which must be assessed, while serving as a vehicle for explaining how political issues within the Security Council often impede the design and implementation of evaluative frameworks.

Chapter 5: Proposal, Discussion and Conclusion

The literature reviewed and the analysis conducted thereafter, has highlighted the continued need for holistic mission planning and assessment within UN peace operations. As noted in the literature review, substantial research has been conducted with the purpose of determining success in UN peace operations. However the design and implementation of evaluative frameworks have largely been in response to specific moments within a mission, rather than a mission as a whole. Moreover, political challenges associated with assessing success are largely absent from the majority of evaluative frameworks. As a result of this, I will develop an evaluative framework that brings together the various stages of a mission under a single assessment template. As a case study, I will set this proposed evaluative framework against the backdrop of the UN's efforts in Haiti, in order to demonstrate how political fissures and lack of consensus within the Security Council hinder the implementation of assessment frameworks. Within this chapter, I will also raise key points for discussion and future research, before concluding with a brief summary of the aims, accomplishments and findings of this thesis.

Evaluative frameworks are tools employed for the success of UN peace operations by pointing the way forward, or outlining a direction which the mission can follow. Like a mission mandate, evaluative frameworks help to guide the evolution of a UN mission, leading to a definable outcome, and ultimately, mission success. As a brief analogy, an evaluative framework, when implemented from the outset of a UN intervention, will effectively act as a road map, indicating the number of kilometers to the objective, waypoints and landmarks notifying the policymaker of goals completed, and signposts acting as indicators providing important notices of the performance of a mission. As well, like a GPS road map, evaluative

frameworks facilitate the implementation of necessary course corrections if the mission takes the wrong ‘expressway’ or ‘off ramp’ and needs to plot a new direction. The importance of an evaluative framework is that it points toward mission success: crucial landmarks (benchmarks) are clearly defined and indicated, and the ultimate direction outlined from the outset. However, in order to function as intended, a GPS road map requires that all members that set out on the road trip agree on a final destination, and the best route to reach that end goal. Just as a road map requires that all parties agree on a route, an evaluative framework requires a peace agreement (political consensus) on which to base the direction to proceed. Effective evaluative frameworks, therefore, are inseparably linked to an agreed upon political framework.

EMBEDDED ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF EVALUATION

As a result of the existing literature gap between mandate crafting, mission deployment, and mission exit, I propose an evaluative framework that demonstrates the need for various stages of a UN peace operation to be bridged while serving as a vehicle to illustrate the political gaps that all too often hinder the assessment of success. In order to highlight the need for holistic mission planning and assessment, the evaluative framework I am proposing will, when employed, ‘embed’ itself into the entire structure of a UN peace operation, from beginning to end. I have named my proposed evaluative framework- Embedded Assessment in Support of Evaluation (EASE). The proposed evaluative framework breaks the phases of a UN peace operation into four key groups, namely: (1) Initial Crisis Response; (2) Mission Mandate Crafting; (3) Mission Deployment; and (4) Mission Transition and Exit. Moreover, within each phase of the framework are key processes and procedures that require research and analysis in

order to answer the key questions and indicators necessary to plot the course of a successful UN peace operation. Within each phase of the framework, political challenges, both within and outside of the Security Council, are identified in order to demonstrate the obstacles in determining what constitutes success. The following table (Table 1.) highlights the key components of the framework.

Table 1. EASE Framework

Phase of Mission	Process and Procedure	Key Questions to be Answered
Initial Crisis Response	Conduct Detailed Country-level Analysis	What are the specifics (history) of the country?
	Conduct Crisis Assessment	What are the particulars of the conflict (who are the actors involved in the conflict)?
	Identify Baselines of Assessment and Feed Back to UN	What did the country look like before the crisis, and at the start (just prior to UN deployment)?
Mandate Crafting	Develop Political Solution	Was a peace agreement signed? What is the end state desired by the Security Council? Short term and long term objectives identified
	Develop Operationalized Solution	What are the goals/objectives that can be deduced from the political solution?
	Develop Baselines, Benchmarks and Indicators tailored to specific mission	What are the necessary achievements for success, and what are the indicators of that success? What is accomplishable/manageable?
	Periodic Assessment dates identified	When (according to the sanctioned duration of the mission) should the scheduled assessments occur?
	Final draft of Resolution and Mandate and Articulation of Initial Exit Strategy	Under what conditions is the exit strategy to be executed?
Mission Deployment	Periodic evaluation based on a pre-determined timeline outlined within the mandate	Is the mission passing the benchmarks toward the accomplishment of its goals? Has the mission mandate been accomplished? Is there an identifiable 'trajectory' toward self-sustaining peace?
Mission Transition/Exit	Triggered following conclusion of periodic evaluations	What are the new goal/objectives of the mission?
	If evaluations are positive, transitions are triggered	Does the mission mandate need updating? What are the follow-up priorities?
	If not, return to mission deployment phase and start over	Transition to development-centred tasks?

The first phase of EASE is Initial Crisis Response, this stage focuses on the fact gathering and research necessary to design and tailor the framework to the specifics of the conflict zone under consideration. This phase is a crucial component of the framework, one largely left out of existing assessment tools, as it effectively sets the stage for the rest of the mission. Within this phase of the framework, there are three key components: detailed country-level analysis, conflict assessment, and baseline development. These three objectives work toward the communication and proposal of baselines necessary to develop specific goals and indicators during the course of a mission, as well as the articulation of a peace agreement.

I have chosen to adopt the assessment tool designed by Sigri and Basar (2014), as a guide for peace builders to follow in order to report on-the-ground developments to relevant policymakers. Their model of evaluation includes a Special Assessment Team dedicated to reporting key developments on the road to reaching the benchmarks and objectives of the mission. While conducting assessments during the deployment of the mission is important, as will be noted in later stages of this framework, it is equally important to conduct this research and assessment activity prior to deployment, in order to facilitate the designing of baselines, benchmarks, and indicators to be included in the mission mandate. In order to accomplish this, the baseline identified by Diehl & Druckman (2010; 2012), that of the before and after assessment, would be applied, making it possible to compare the status of the conflict prior to and after deployment.

It is the task of the ‘initial crisis response’ team to identify key considerations needed to determine the correct course of action by the Security Council. The Special Assessment Team employed in this capacity would follow the UN’s Integrated Mission Planning Process, namely the three stages of mission planning: (1) advance planning; (2) operational planning; and (3)

review and transition planning. As members of the Security Council are often ill equipped or uninformed (Malone, 1998) about the specifics of the host country, it is the task of the initial crisis response assessment team to clearly research and report on the conflict zone. In order to facilitate this task, key questions are included within the proposed framework, namely: What is the history of the country? Who are the key actors involved in the conflict? And important for establishing baselines on which to judge success, what did the country look like before (and if necessary) after the crisis? However, there are challenges that a discovery team must confront, namely: the political conditions (lack of international consensus on the best course of action) in which assessments are made, the actors involved in the assessment (and their normative positions), as well as the lack of local input into the process.

The second phase of the evaluative framework, the mandate crafting cycle, builds on the findings of the first phase so as to assist in the production of an effective mission mandate accompanied with an embedded evaluative framework by which to guide the mission. Within this section of the framework, the political solution to the conflict would be advanced by members of the Security Council, followed by the development and articulation of baselines, benchmarks and indicators, and then operationalized by military planners. The specific tailoring of the evaluative framework would then be outlined against an agreed upon schedule for periodic assessments to occur throughout the life-span of the mission. The final draft of the Resolution and mission mandate would then help to articulate the political framework under which the evaluative framework would function. This would allow for maximum flexibility for each unique conflict situation. The emphasis here is on the political framework necessary to guide the design and implementation of the evaluative framework. Success under this framework is therefore centered on the strength of the peace agreement. However, the mandate crafting stage is

historically where political realities have hindered the development of an effective political framework.

As has already been outlined in some detail, the mandate-crafting phase of a UN peace operation is fraught with political complexities. Gaining political consensus through a peace agreement is crucial to the development of an effective and clear mission mandate and therefore, the implementation of an evaluative framework. As well, evaluative frameworks must seek to disentangle politics from the mandate in order to ensure the necessary resources are provided to the mission. As such, following the initial drafting, the mission mandate should be assessed against other similar mandates, as well as key stakeholders in the conflict, including the affected local population, involved UN agencies, as well as troop contributing countries. This would ensure greater buy-in from all relevant stakeholders in seeing the mission through to completion. The final task of the mandate-crafting phase is to identify a possible transition and exit strategy, one that would be periodically updated as the mission unfolds. As will be noted in greater detail, there are competing political realities throughout this phase seeking to undermine the development of a common mission strategy.

Following the crafting of the mission mandate, the evaluative framework outlines the key processes of assessing the performance of the peace operation itself. As identified, the periodic assessment of the performance of a peace operation is critical to ensuring accurate results, but also to pointing the direction of the mission and eventually the transition and exit. Here, the identified dates for periodic assessments as outlined in the mission mandate are implemented throughout the deployment of the peace operation. The Special Assessment Team, outlined by Sigri and Basar (2014), would assist in the military component of the mission by examining the fulfillment of the goals and benchmarks indicated within the mission mandate. This can either be

done in a continuous fashion, or at the identified dates for the assessment found within the mission mandate.

Within this section of the evaluative framework, goals and objectives similar to those outlined by Diehl & Druckman (2010; 2012) will continue to play a key role, for instance, the goals of violence abatement, conflict containment, and conflict settlement. The reason for including these goals within the framework is that they apply to most peace operations, while offering flexibility to policymakers. In addition to the mission goals, the evaluative framework would assist in the guidance of the mission deployment phase by answering broad questions, including: Is the mission passing (successfully) the identified benchmarks toward the accomplishment of its goals? Has the mission mandate been accomplished? And, is there an identifiable ‘trajectory’ toward a self-sustaining peace? An historical limitation of evaluative frameworks at this juncture is for policymakers removed from the conflict and subject to political forces within the Security Council, as well as domestic pressures, to report success even when the on-the-ground picture indicates otherwise. Policymakers often point to results that showcase the greatest political success while conversely hiding the realities on the ground. This is problematic as it negates the effectiveness of evaluative frameworks.

The Mission Transition and Exit portion of the evaluative framework would guide the UN peace operation through the final phase of a mission, setting the stage for a regular development path. This phase of the framework is triggered following the successful completion of periodic assessments during the mission deployment phase. Some key questions to be considered when determining the process for a transition within a UN peace operation are: what are the follow-up priorities and does the mission mandate need updating so as to reflect the new on the ground realities? If there is little consistency (defined over x amount of periodic

assessments) with the trajectory toward self-sustaining peace, the information should be fed back to the Security Council in order to prevent a hasty transition and exit from occurring.

Discussing the best practice for exiting a military intervention, Richard Caplan (2012) noted that the surest peace operation exit strategy is that of a fluid, transition-based exit. Moreover, Caplan (2012) argued that effective exits are dependent upon clear, and effective mission mandates. In addition, effective exit strategies require the accomplishment of clear benchmarks in order to demonstrate a peace operation is reaching its goals and can be withdrawn (Durch, 2012). The evaluative framework advances mechanisms necessary to resolve some of these challenges, including: crisis response, mission crafting, and periodic assessment. However, it is important to note the limitations of this phase. Planning for a transition and exit must balance the needs of the local population with the political realities found within the Security Council. Evaluative frameworks have often faltered under the considerable pressure of Security Council members, troop contributing nations and host country policymakers pushing for a rapid exit based off of faulty or incomplete evidence of success, such as the holding of one election as a determinant of broader success. Evaluative frameworks, and specifically the process of determining exits based on success, are only as good as the political frameworks and the policymakers' decisions on which they rest.

The assessment tool proposed in this thesis endeavors to bridge the gap between mission conception, mission deployment, and mission transition and exit. In doing so, the assessment framework offers a unique platform with which to judge a mission in a holistic, ongoing and embedded fashion. At the same time, the framework takes into account the critical first response to a crisis and the crafting of the mission mandate as a starting point for laying the foundation of the rest of the mission. An embedded assessment framework is crucial to plotting the course of

the mission (goals and objectives), and the route it will take (benchmarks and indicators). In addition to this, the framework demonstrates the challenges posed by a highly politicized Security Council to the development and implementation of assessment frameworks and, broadly, to definitions of success. The following section of this Chapter will apply EASE against the backdrop of UN efforts in Haiti so as to more closely examine the political complexities that have effectively undermined the use of evaluative frameworks both in the country and elsewhere. In addition, this section will demonstrate the importance of an agreed upon political framework as a prerequisite to the successful design and implementation of an evaluative framework that will be discussed later.

EASE APPLIED TO HAITI

Applying the proposed framework against the backdrop of UN efforts in Haiti demonstrates the need for holistic and embedded, mission planning and assessment. Conversely, the evaluative framework demonstrates the political challenges found throughout the UN mission, which have more often than not, stood in the way of assessing success. United Nations peace operations in Haiti suffered from political hesitation and ignorance at the start, which led to inadequate mission planning, as well as an inability to chart the necessary course to fulfilling the desired political end state. In order to demonstrate the challenges with implementing an evaluative framework, I will separate the discussion of the proposed framework into its four main groups: (1) initial crisis response; (2) mandate crafting; (3) mission deployment; and (4) mission transition and exit. This method will simultaneously illustrate the steps involved with

implementing this framework in a practical sense while illustrating some of the limitations of evaluative frameworks in general.

My findings are that an embedded evaluative framework developed within the mission mandate for Haiti would have been better suited to negotiating the political challenges at the Security Council. Moreover, an embedded framework would have been more likely to lessen the need for multiple, ad hoc deployments to the country and would have allowed policymakers to assess the situation on the ground prior to the transition and exit of each individual mission. However, the political challenges within the Security Council undermined long-term peace building efforts in Haiti by slowing the process of gaining political consensus at the mission planning, evaluation, transition and exit stages of the various UN missions. Moreover, as political issues went unresolved (both at the Security Council and within Haiti) the necessary political framework on which to base an evaluative framework was never fully developed. Further preventing the use of an evaluative framework, MINUSTAH was deployed with no comprehensive political framework. Nevertheless, the use of an embedded framework would have better assisted policymakers and peace operation implementers with navigating Security Council politics prior to and during the mission's life span.

Had EASE been used during the UN's efforts in Haiti, the initial crisis response could have commenced immediately following the military coup in 1991. As there were UN observers in Haiti monitoring the 1990 elections, their findings would have been incorporated into the Special Assessment Teams research and recommendations to the Security Council. The detailed country-level analysis conducted in this phase would have then informed general recommendations for possible baselines, benchmarks, and indicators. Policymakers' understanding of the unique political and security situation on the ground in Haiti was largely

absent at the time of mission planning and as such, the process of informing Security Council members of the situation on the ground would have better assisted in the development of a comprehensive strategy and political framework (Malone, 1998). As well, the challenge of gaining political consensus and compromise among Security Council members would be assisted by this process of initial assessment. However, this process would also be fighting the tendency for local Haitian actors to be left out of the decision making process. Further to this, the deployment of assessment teams to Haiti, as outlined in the framework, would have undoubtedly meant that their own assumptions and normative positions would have circumvented the real needs of Haitians. So long as outside decision makers lead assessments of host country issues, ineffective decisions will inevitably persist.

Having completed the initial assessment, the mandate-crafting phase of the framework would interpret the reports conducted by the Special Assessment Teams in order to craft the political objectives of the mission. It is within this process that the political framework would be articulated, and (ideally) consensus gained. In this case, the UNSC's identified mission objectives were, broadly, the creation of an environment conducive to elections and training the Haitian National Police. Given these objectives, policymakers and peace operation implementers would then translate this into the necessary benchmarks so as to monitor its progress. The dates for periodic assessment would be articulated within the final draft of the resolution. Within this final phase, policymakers would identify an initial transition and exit strategy, which would be updated through periodic assessment over the course of the mission. Though a political framework was developed (UNMIH, not MINUSTAH), the process of developing a long-term solution was compromised by political realities within the Security Council. The process of long-

term planning and political consensus is the greatest challenge to be overcome when implementing an evaluative framework, as it forms the foundation of all future assessment.

Given the priority objectives outlined in the UNMIH mandate, the mission deployment phase of the framework would focus on assessing the accomplishment of the benchmarks in predetermined intervals. Had UN efforts in Haiti adopted a regime of periodic assessment, policymakers could have been better able to gauge the progress toward peace sustainment in the country. This form of embedded assessment could have better assisted policymakers in maintaining the identified goals of the mandate, or if the situation changed, to methodically re-orient the mission direction. Secondary to ensuring that progress is maintained and documented, the framework could better assist policymakers looking to move toward transition and exit when the mission was truly ready, rather than when they simply assumed it to be. This systematic process of embedded assessment could have been better able to remove the likelihood of ad hoc, multiple mission deployments to Haiti. However, there are important limitations to this process, namely the political decision-making that often cuts a mission short (as was the case in Haiti) and the ability to properly gauge the level of support and social improvement among the local population. The greatest threat at this stage of an assessment is the desire, mostly from troop contributing nations, though host countries are not immune, to cut and run from a mission as occurred in Haiti.

The use of the final phase of the framework, mission transition and exit, could allow UN policymakers and troop contributing countries to effectively plan for the long-term development goals of Haiti. Rather than simply looking at elections, reform of the judiciary, and Haitian National Police as indicators of success, policymakers could be concerned with ensuring the sustainability of long-term political and social conditions of the country. The development of

benchmarks and indicators within the mission mandate, as well as the use of periodic assessment throughout the life span of the mission could provide policymakers with a clearer picture of the state of the country, and therefore, when to trigger a transition (from peacekeeping to peace building) and eventually an exit from the country. This method of continual assessment could have lessened the need to re-deploy UN peacekeepers to Haiti in an ad hoc manner. However, the lack of a political agreement on what constituted success in Haiti ultimately could have negated the evaluative frameworks ability to plot the course. All relevant stakeholders must agree to a political framework in order for an evaluative framework to function as designed.

Finally, there are key moments in the UN's efforts in Haiti in which it becomes clear that an embedded assessment framework could have more aptly navigated the challenges of ensuring a lasting peace. In Haiti, key game-changing moments in the UN's efforts in the country include: the 1990 election monitoring mission and the coup, the 1996 departure of UNMIH and smaller UN presence, and the 2001 complete withdrawal of UN forces in the country. Further to these key moments in time where UN missions failed to plot long-term strategies, the UN pursued ongoing objectives that stymied long-term peace building efforts, including the disbanding of the Haitian army. These key failings represent missed opportunities for the UN to cement peace building improvements in Haiti, and had the conditions been right, an embedded evaluative framework could have assisted in identifying them.

The 1991 coup and ousting of the democratically elected President Aristide is the first major failure of the UN's peace building efforts in Haiti. The 1990 UN election-monitoring mission, The United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), successfully assisted in the administering of free and fair elections in Haiti. However, its departure from the country was premature. For instance, effective assessment of the

long-term trends of the country could have better enabled policymakers to identify systemic issues that had the potential to ignite future conflict. As a clear indication of future political turmoil, by 1991 76 percent of Haitians were living in poverty, only 39 percent had access to safe drinking water, and less than half of the adult population could read and write (Malone & Chavdam, 2013). Moreover, following the military coup, the U.S. Coast Guard was routinely intercepting 2,000 Haitian refugees a day, while at the height of the refugee crisis in 1994, the U.S. was housing more than 16,800 refugees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (Malone & Chavdam, 2013). Greater commitment, and an assessment framework able to plot ongoing trends, could assist policymakers in identifying such long-term peace building failings and could have helped ensure that the UN would not exit the country having only observed successful elections, and not long-term stability.

The 1996 drawdown of UNMIH, coupled with the complete withdrawal of UN troops, police officers and civilian support staff in 2001, represents another clear failing of UN long-term commitment in Haiti. After just 15 months, UNMIH left Haiti in June 1996, with its core peace-building mandate only “partly fulfilled” (Leininger, 2006, p. 510). Though the UN undertook Haitian National Police training and judicial reform following the departure of UNMIH, the core UN mission left the country far too early. The presidential election in 2000 was the final milestone with which the UN based its full (and premature) withdrawal from Haiti in 2001 (Hagman, 2002). The UN pulled out even though voter turnout in the 2000 elections was just 10 percent, and even though the official opposition was contesting the results of the election (Malone & Chavdam, 2013). For example, by 2002, widespread corruption and human rights abuses became the norm among police officers in Haiti, with drug trafficking and summary executions routinely committed (Hagman, 2002). Moreover, at the time, there were less than

3,000 trained police officers in a country of over 7.5 million people (Hagman, 2002). These facts, immediately following the withdrawal of UN field presence in the country, should have been anticipated by implementers prior to the departure of the peacekeepers.

An embedded evaluative framework could have assisted in measuring success in Haiti, and ultimately led to a more strategic transition and exit strategy development. However, an evaluative framework, as can be seen with the UN's ad hoc efforts in Haiti, is no replacement for an effective, and agreed upon, political framework. Haiti ultimately lacked political consensus (both within the Security Council and troop contributing nations as well as among local policymakers in Haiti itself) as to what the best route to peace and stability would look like. Of concern, without an environment of a degree of political unity, an embedded evaluative framework could not have been any more effective at providing policymakers a path toward mission success in the country than the ad hoc approach that had actually taken place. Nonetheless, evaluative frameworks are important as they force policymakers to think critically about the steps necessary for mission success.

DISCUSSION

As compared to existing evaluative frameworks, the framework I have developed incorporates the various stages of a UN peace operation into planning and assessment cycles, while simultaneously allowing for maximum adaptability within each unique mission context. In addition to allowing for greater flexibility, the framework incorporates and builds upon some of the strengths of existing frameworks, included in this is the accomplishment of the mission mandate (Martin-Brûlé, 2016), key goals, benchmarks and indicators (Diehl & Druckman, 2010;

2012), and the crucial long-term consideration identified within MPICE of peace consolidation (USIP, 2010). Furthering this, the framework encompasses the transition and exit strategy planning outlined by Richard Caplan (2012). However, EASE is not just a technical exercise, the evaluative framework demonstrates the political challenges associated with implementing, managing and assessing success in UN peace operations. Political cleavages within the Security Council weaken (and often completely remove) the ability to effectively assess the success of UN peace operations.

An evaluative framework for UN peace operations, regardless of how well crafted and implemented it is, does not supplant a carefully worded and agreed upon, political framework. Without a sound peace agreement, and the necessary political consensus by all relevant parties, evaluative frameworks cannot function as they are intended. Political frameworks, in effect, support the evaluative framework, which in turn, lends support to the political framework. Peace agreements and evaluative frameworks thus can be viewed as mutually reinforcing. Therefore, it is important to consider how effective and inclusive the political framework addressing the root causes of the conflict is, as assessments of UN peace operations must be based off a viable peace agreement. I define politics in the context of UN peace operations as a process of decision-making between policymakers, practitioners and academics. It is simply a process of give-and-take between different institutional power structures on the planning, operationalization and deployment of UN peacekeeping missions.

Effective political frameworks are a necessary first-step in formulating a viable evaluative framework with which to measure the performance of UN peace operations. I define a political framework for UN peace operations as: (1) political consultation and consensus; (2) an agreed upon peace agreement; (3) a viable peace process; and (4) peace consolidation and

sustainment. The reason for a four-stage conception of a political framework is that it is possible to have a signed and agreed upon peace agreement without having long-term commitment by all parties to the implementation of a peace process. Having an agreed upon political framework guiding the implementation of a UN peace operation ensures the greatest chance of measuring success. The mutually reinforcing conception of evaluative frameworks and political frameworks and the corresponding challenges associated with implementing them, is expressed in the following table (table 2.).

Table 2. EASE and Political Frameworks

EASE Framework	Political Framework	Challenges
1) Initial Crisis Response	1) Political Consultation & Consensus	Achieving a level of political cooperation
2) Mandate Crafting	2) Peace Agreement	Complete buy-in, clear baselines and objectives
3) Mission Deployment	3) Peace Process	Measuring performance, updating mandate
4) Mission Transition & Exit	4) Peace Consolidation	Long-term commitment, maintain political consensus

A political framework's ability to achieve political consensus is an important first step toward accomplishing the mission mandate. Political consultation and consensus is fundamentally about ensuring that the relevant stakeholders to the conflict are at the table and working in cooperation with one another. Obtaining political consensus among all concerned parties in intrastate conflict settings is a complex challenge, as there are often competing internal political dilemmas at play. However, there is a minimal political consensus that peace operations must obtain, namely, the participation of the "primary" warring parties (Hogbladh, 2005). Should consensus prove illusive, the principal actors to the conflict would serve as the next best option. Consensus among relevant stakeholders is the desired goal for the smoothest implementation of a

peace operation. However, if consensus cannot be achieved the mission would commence, while behind the scenes cooperation building is undertaken to achieve a minimum level of consensus. Further to this, it is important to note that political consensus must be carefully maintained throughout the life span of the mission, which can be an ongoing challenge as the UN presence itself changes the balance of power within the host country.

The second component of a political framework, the signing of peace agreements, forms an integral part of UN peace operations, bringing together the relevant parties to the conflict, including former warring factions. A peace agreement in a UN peace operation context is a “binding mutual deal signed or publically agreed to” (Hogbladh, 2005). Peace agreements are usually designed and signed by two or more primary warring parties in a conflict in order to resolve an identified dispute or incompatibility (Hogbladh, 2005). When peace agreements have not been used, increased uncertainty of the mission’s direction and performance occurs. Moreover, peace agreements between two or more warring parties serve as a political basis and mission outline for the UN Security Council as well as troop contributing nations. As such, peace agreements represent a key component of a UN peace operations overarching political framework.

The third element of a political framework, a United Nations supported peace process, results from and supports the establishment of a shared political vision and a signed and agreed upon peace agreement by relevant stakeholders to the conflict. I define a peace process as a path resulting from an effective political consensus and a signed and agreed upon peace agreement forming the foundation of a political framework. The peace process is both a formal and informal course where the parties to the conflict can be seen as moving through the various stages of a peace operation. Critically, a clear and agreed upon peace process can better support and be

supported by, an effective evaluative framework. The peace process ultimately influences the ability of stakeholders to move the UN mission toward the final component of a political framework, an achievable and viable predetermined level of peace consolidation.

Most existing evaluative frameworks stress the importance of a peace agreement to the success of a UN mission. While that is indeed an important component of success, there is another element of evaluation that is largely absent from existing frameworks; the requirement of a clear and agreed upon political framework. Political frameworks represent the ability to achieve a shared conceptualization of success by all concerned stakeholders of the mission. Moreover, political frameworks, as I have developed, assist in the design and implementation of evaluative frameworks. As Table 2 presented above illustrates, the EASE assessment framework and the political framework are mutually reinforcing, with corresponding indicators and processes that are concurrently accomplished over the course of a UN peace operation. Evaluative frameworks are only as good as the peace process on which they are built, and therefore, the peace process is critical to assessing success. Success is ultimately based on the strength of the political framework and whether relevant stakeholders support it. United Nations peace operations sink or swim depending on the adoption of an effective and inclusive political framework.

Political consensus is a key component to the implementation of an evaluative framework, and is crucial to policymakers and peacekeepers seeing a mission through to success. Therefore, a key indicator of UN peace operation success is political agreement by all parties. If political cleavages remain, effective evaluative frameworks, and successful outcomes will be less likely. However, as was mentioned earlier, there is a minimum level of consensus necessary to undertake a UN peace operation. A shared agenda toward peace building is nonetheless key, as

there must be near-total buy in by all stakeholders. Without a political framework, there can be no effective evaluative framework, and without an embedded evaluative framework assessing ongoing mission performance, there can be no long term, sustainable political framework (peace agreement). This concept is illustrated in the following diagram (Table 3.).

Table 3. Political Frameworks, Evaluative Frameworks and Success



Though assessment mechanisms are important for understanding UN peace operation success, political complexities (including the absence of peace agreements) often prevent the effective use of evaluative frameworks. As such, we must be willing to understand the limitations of evaluative frameworks, including: political challenges at the Security Council, political disparities between UN member states and troop contributing nations; as well as the important question of success for whom? Evaluative frameworks are all too often a product of policymakers removed from the actual conflict, thus diminishing their credibility. Additionally, political changes in administration and military handovers, or a change in the nation in command

of the mission, hamper the process of long-term assessment. The design and implementation of an evaluative framework is hindered by ongoing challenges such as these, which are found throughout the lifespan of a mission.

Moreover, there is a need to understand the sociological, economic, and political issues related to peace building efforts that are so often overlooked in purely technical exercises of determining success for UN peace operations. When examining the performance of UN peace building operations, it is important to acknowledge what implementers inevitably compromise in order to achieve success. For instance, do UN policymakers give up certain human rights within the host country when pursuing peace-building goals? When the international community decides to use a primarily military tool (with a secondary civilian component) to fix a socioeconomic and political problem we will undoubtedly be faced with the need to undertake certain compromises. Some of these compromises include: a post-colonial/foreign occupation critique of UN operations; human rights violations including accusations of UN sexual abuse, as well as cholera; and the forcing of non-compliant parties to the conflict to accept UN intervention. When UN peace building operations are pursued, the risk that negative compromises are required is a reality that must be acknowledged.

As the literature review indicated, it is tremendously difficult to define success, let alone determining the surest path to that success. Moreover, the multitude of indicators of success suggests that the political realities within the Security Council and between contributing and host nations effectively impede the forming of a common definition. So, is it impossible to know definitively what success is? In its simplest terms, then, success is the overcoming of political obstacles necessary to plan and evaluate United Nations peace operations. Success is an effective political framework that supports the design and implementation of an evaluative framework. It

is clear that without an agreed upon political framework there can be no evaluative framework and thus no success. The proposed evaluative framework and the discussion of political frameworks are meant as a conversation-starting piece intended to highlight some of the challenges to assessing success in UN peace operations. The primary aim of EASE is to engage and bridge the literature gap in order to highlight the need for more holistic mission planning and assessment as well as illustrating the political complexities associated with the design, implementation, and execution of UN missions. Moreover, disentangling mission mandates from the political environment in which they are crafted is key to determining the larger success of a UN peace operation. However, the political and evaluative frameworks advanced in this thesis require additional research in order to more thoroughly understand and articulate the necessity of agreed upon political frameworks within the context of assessment mechanisms. This can be achieved through an examination of the relationship between peace agreements and success in other UN peace operations, such as in Bosnia.

CONCLUSION

United Nations peace operations remain an important tool for establishing and maintaining peace after conflict. Without United Nations peace efforts the space for dialogue between states, a negotiation table for former belligerents to reconcile differences, and combined international effort in support of peace and security would simply not exist. The use of peacekeepers and development experts as a component of peace and state building efforts following internal conflicts will remain an essential part of the process of ensuring international peace and security. However, the need to assess the performance and effects of these missions is

of crucial importance as it not only assists in guiding a mission, but also assists the international community in assessing the resources necessary to allow for a successful outcome. In addition, the international community will be more likely to intervene in a conflict zone if there is a genuine chance the mission will succeed (with minimal resources expended). Evaluative frameworks assist in this by providing increased credibility (and guarantees) to the UN's peace building efforts, at a time when the UN needs it the most. However, that is not to say that evaluative frameworks offer a cure-all solution to the complexities of modern peace building missions. Evaluative frameworks are only as good as the political framework on which they rest and should be seen as supporting an agreed upon peace process rather than supplanting one.

In this thesis I have undertaken three key tasks in support of assessing success in UN peace operations. First, I have presented a comprehensive picture of existing policy and literature on the topic of evaluating success in UN peace operations. Though there is a substantial amount of research conducted on lessons learned for UN peace operations, the focus within this thesis has been on sampling a wide range of policy and academic research, in order to gain as complete a picture as possible of all aspects of a UN mission. Second, I have indicated and examined the existing policy and literature gap, where evaluative frameworks and exit strategies have been designed, tested, and applied within specific phases of a UN peace operation, rather than accounting for the entirety of a mission. This, I have demonstrated, is problematic as it focuses the attention of evaluation on one aspect of a mission, rather than seeing it as a combined effort. For instance, an effective exit strategy cannot be implemented without the requisite assessments conducted prior to its development. Finally, I have proposed an embedded evaluative framework (EASE) as both a method of demonstrating the need for increased holistic mission planning and assessment as well as an illustration of the political challenges associated with assessing success.

The framework makes it clear that political realities must first be resolved before an effective assessment of mission performance and success can be conducted.

Having examined in detail existing literature on peace operation evaluation, and addressed the need for careful consideration of the political frameworks on which assessments rest, I have made three core findings: (1) that assessing success must be done in a holistic manner, evaluating all phases of a mission as one; (2) that politics (between the Security Council and troop contributing and host nations) all too often stand in the way of effective mission planning and assessment; and, (3) that evaluative frameworks are only as effective as the political frameworks guiding the peace operation. However, these key findings indicate that there continues to be further room to examine the performance of UN peace operations.

Understanding how political challenges within the United Nations Security Council affect the assessment of UN missions is not an easy task. Political realities permeate and impede every step of UN peace operation planning, implementation and assessment. To date, political issues have made assessing UN peace operations a near insurmountable challenge. Having acknowledged the serious obstacles to defining and assessing success in UN missions, the task at hand is to conduct UN peace operation assessments in a holistic and ongoing manner in order to provide up to date progress reports and to guide the overall direction and performance of a mission. As the United Nations continues to engage in peace-building operations around the world, critically and thoughtfully examining how best to assess the success of UN peace operations is of ongoing importance to the peace and security of the international community.

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