LOVE THINE ENEMY:
MORAL PREPARATION FOR KILLING IN WAR

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1. INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

The problem concerns the moral impact of killing in war. That is, the impact on the soldiers doing the killing. Recent research coming from the treatment of soldiers suffering from chronic psychological distress such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) because of combat experiences has identified 'Moral Injury' (MI) as a related but distinct condition. I will explore whether MI, as defined below, suggests any practical steps, and what those steps might look like. *Thesis Statement*. I propose that MI is caused by a transgression of a moral code, and that it is possible to mitigate the risk of MI by developing moral virtues. Moral virtues incline the individual to the appropriate end of human existence, which helps the virtuous both to follow their moral code, and to develop a moral code which is most suited to a right end. I will investigate the virtue of justice as the motivator for war and love of humanity as the internal motivator for peace and restraint in war.

One objection I wish to address up front is whether it is realistic to expect such a moral code of the average soldier. In fact, Jonathan Shay says in his seminal work on MI: "The justice of overall war aims… is not within the individual soldier's scope of moral choice, unless he or she is willing to face imprisonment or death by refusing to fight. I cannot hold soldiers to an ethical standard that *requires martyrdom in order simply to be blameless*" (*Achilles* 197). The purpose of this paper is not to comment on the value of such a standard as normative. But it is to say that the only sure defense against the conviction of one's own conscience is to refuse immoral actions. A virtuous soldier that discovers they are fighting for an unjust cause – say a Wehrmacht soldier that learns the truth of Nazi war aims – ought to refuse to fight, even if it

costs them their life. The psychologists who treat these wounded warriors know that 'going easy on them' fails to sooth the guilty conscience. Dr. Sonya Norman, based on her experience as a clinical psychologist working with veterans suffering from MI, writes, "If we were to say 'You did the best you could' or 'It wasn't your fault' our clients would not feel relief; rather they would feel like we did not understand the situation, like we did not understand them" (4). The question here is not what code soldiers can reasonably be held accountable to but whether it is possible to avoid MI.

Definition of Key Terms.

Moral Injury. Moral injury is an injury to the psyche, or soul of a person, which may be caused by transgression of a moral code by self or in association with others. (Litz *et al.* 700).

At its worst, MI can manifest in severe and chronic symptoms similar or related to PTSD. It is possible that MI, in a less severe degree, is present pervasively in the population of war veterans. Such less severe cases may not be debilitating but can cause long-term feelings of guilt and shame which can impact the quality of life and relationships and mental/spiritual health of the member. MI may by caused by the breach of any number of values or duties, but this paper will focus on the act of killing in war and its relation to murder. This will be developed in detail in chapter 2.

Moral Code. For this paper, I will refer to two kinds of relevant code: personal and transcendent. The personal code may consist of deeply held beliefs, values, and expectations that have been internalized by the individual. Ethical codes may be collective (societal norms) and even formalized (e.g. Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Forces (CF) Code of Values and Ethics, monastic rules, or knightly codes of conduct (Templars)). However, an

ethical code (or rather the breaking of it) can only cause MI to the degree that the individual has internalized it into a personal moral code.

By 'transcendent moral code', I mean a standard against which to assess personal moral codes. This might be natural law, or in the Christian view, the law of God. For example, the personal code of an WWII SS soldier may have justified the execution of Jews and others as 'subhuman', yet it remains clear by some outside and seemingly objective standard that such an act is murder. It is this code (or some approximation of it) that, "upon reflection", one would come to the realization of having broken: a transcendent moral code.

One may suffer MI because of a breach of *either code*. That is, one can experience guilt and shame for transgressing a personal code even if that code diverges greatly from the transcendent moral code, and one can experience the same for transgressing the transcendent code even if the act is in line with their personal code. One goal is to bring the personal into line with the transcendent and thereby avoid the added risk.

Pertinence of the Problem. This problem is pertinent to public ethics in two ways. The direct application of this is to individual soldiers, attempting to mitigate the impact of MI. My primary concern is the psychological or spiritual health of the soldier; nevertheless, there are obvious benefits for the state to have soldiers who are healthy and fit, and ready to defend the nation. The second way it is pertinent is that promoting ethical conduct in war cultivates internal restraints against war crimes and promotes more peaceful resolution of conflicts at the ground level.

Structure of the Argument. In chapter 2, I will offer a plausible working definition of MI from the existing research, especially in the work of Drs Shay, Litz, Nash, and Farnsworth and their colleagues. There is diversity in the literature on the exact nature of MI, but sufficient overlap to develop a roadmap to moral preparation. I identify two categories of MI: MI-1 resulting from

transgressions committed by self, and MI-2 resulting from transgressions of moral expectations by others or the world.

In chapter 3, I argue that a virtuous soldier may mitigate the risk of MI-1 by adhering to a personal moral code that conforms to a transcendent code. I will consider a military moral code from the virtue tradition, narrowing to a reformed Protestant perspective with Jonathan Edwards' vision of true virtue and justice. I consider just peace as an intermediate end, or *telos*, of war which works towards the ultimate end, or *eudaimonia*, which consists of harmony of all parts with the whole. Since virtue disposes the individual towards this end, the soldier who acts virtuously is best suited to mitigate the risk of MI-1. I use the Just War tradition (JWT) as a practical tool to guide virtuous participation and conduct in war, focusing on seven criteria grouped under the headings of *jus ad Bellum* and *jus in Bello*.

Following this, I link the reformed Protestant concept of justice to the guilt and shame that leads to MI-1. I argue that a personal moral code is the same as the reformed Protestant concept of conscience; when an individual commits an act of injustice that breaches their own conscience, it results in guilt and shame. Breaching a transcendent code that does not breach one's conscience can also lead to MI-1 if the soldier comes to a later conviction of this transcendent code. Therefore, the best defence against MI-1 is to strive to align their conscience with transcendent truth. Finally, I discuss the Christian virtue of love, or charity, which enables the soldier to fight with right intent and without malice.

In chapter 4, I argue that a virtuous soldier may mitigate the risk of MI-2 by developing resilient moral beliefs and expectations that can stand against reality. MI-2 is caused when moral expectations are disappointed, because an individual has trusted in an object (such as a person, an organization, a philosophy, humanity, the world) that was unable to meet these expectations. I

argue that the process of challenging and updating false expectations is a positive one that leads to greater truth. This process is analogous to the grief cycle that ends in acceptance. It is safer to work through the process of shedding naïve expectations gradually in a controlled environment than to suffer their loss all at once through traumatic experience.

In the final chapter, I consider ways in which moral virtues can be acquired and cultivated by soldiers, particularly recruits, prior to having to face the grim realities of war.

Statement of Moral Theories

Reformed Protestant Virtue Ethic. I will approach this problem within the virtue tradition, particularly from a reformed Protestant Christian perspective. I will focus on the work of Jonathan Edwards and Helmut Thielicke. Edwards was an 18th century American philosopher and theologian in the reformed Protestant tradition who engaged thoughtfully with the virtue tradition. Notre Dame professor Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, who has done extensive research into Protestant virtue ethics, names Edwards alongside Calvin and Luther as a defining figure in the tradition (vi). She notes that the early reformers distanced themselves from the historic idea of virtue, associated with Aristotle and Catholic scholastics, especially Aquinas. Luther, she says, "rejected the notion of virtue as implying a sort of works-righteousness" (vii) Nevertheless, both the early reformers and later theologians have held that Christians in particular, as well as humanity as a whole, are responsible to act morally, even if it does not earn us salvation. Cochran notes that the reformed Protestant concept of virtue more closely resembles that of the stoics than of Aristotle. She says that Calvin firmly rejected this accusation in his lifetime, but that Edwards accepted it saying that Stoic philosophers are "'the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers' who 'in their doctrine and practice came the nearest to

Christianity'" (1). Cochran argues that these reformed Protestant theologians articulate positions consistent with the received virtue tradition, albeit more in the Stoic than Aristotelian stream.

I appeal secondly to Helmut Thielicke as a more recent author, who's massive, three volume *Theologische Ethik*, is among the most comprehensive works on ethics in the Reformed Christian tradition. Thielicke was a contemporary of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth, serving as a pastor in the Confessing Church under the Nazi regime in Germany, which was nearly the sole voice against its unethical policies. He served as a theologian in post-war Germany and participated in reconciliation efforts. He writes his work in the tradition of the reformers, and in the context of the horrors of that recent war.

There are several reasons for this Protestant focus. Since I am an evangelical Protestant Christian and wish to write with an evangelical audience in mind, I wish to appeal to authorities within the tradition. Second, the tradition places particular emphasis on *sola scriptura*, the authority of the Bible alone as final in all matters of faith and practice. Cochran sums up the relevance to this topic clearly:

> Luther, Calvin, and Edwards are three central figures in Christian orthodoxy whose writings reflect a historical Protestant moral vision that preserves theological convictions that have remained essential to this tradition: a belief in a triune God who is distinct from and transcends the created order; a belief that Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, was a fully human and fully divine being who died and was raised from the dead; and a belief that human nature was corrupted by original sin but retains the possibility of salvation through the person and work of Jesus Christ. (5)

Helmut Thielicke preserved these theological convictions as well in opposition to the typically more liberal theology associated with German theologians. He identified himself with American

evangelicalism, although he did not hold strictly to biblical inerrancy in the way the reformers and Edwards did (Montgomery). His work is valuable here for its comprehensive practical application of reformed Protestant moral values.

A third reason is that the Protestant tradition provides a positive contribution to the discussion of itself. I will argue that this reformed Protestant ethic of virtue, with its views of the *telos* of human persons, of justice, and of love of enemies, provides a significant means to prepare for the moral demands of war and to mitigate the risk of moral injury. Its practical lessons may be applied by analogy within other frames of reference.

Aristotle and Eudaimonism. In this paper, I recognize Aristotle as the founder of the virtue tradition. I build on his basic concepts of *eudaimonia* and *virtue* in the abstract as the *telos*, or end of human effort and the means to that end respectively, like variables in an equation. MacIntyre argues that the output of this equation (virtue) varies with the input (*telos*) (163). I will argue that, if we input a reformed Protestant value into that equation – that the end of human effort is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever – then the output is a reformed Protestant ethic.

Just War Tradition. The Just War Tradition (JWT) has developed through many ethical traditions, not just virtue. However, it can be seen how the goal of JWT is to restrain the use of violence to the *telos* of restoring just peace. As this paper deals with the consequences of conduct in war on individual soldiers, I will consider mainly seven traditional criteria under the headings of *jus ad Bellum*: legitimate authority, just cause, right intent, last resort, reasonable chance of success; and *jus in Bello*: discrimination and proportionality.

2. MORAL INJURY

INTRODUCTION

I have based the description of MI in this paper on the work of US military psychologists Jonathan Shay, William Nash, Brett Litz, Jacob Farnsworth, and their colleagues who have advanced the study of MI over the last three decades. Their observations are drawn from the experience of veterans, initially from the Vietnam War and then later conflicts. Their findings are consistent with my experiences as a veteran and as a friend and counselor of other veterans. The veterans Shay *et al.* interviewed represent a sample at the extreme end of the bell curve for MI symptoms, since those with lesser symptoms rarely end up in Veterans' Affairs (VA) hospitals. However, there is sufficient consistency to suggest that the following is a practical working definition.

Defining Moral Injury. Moral injury is an injury to the psyche, or soul (Meagher xvii) of a person, caused by intense feelings of guilt, shame and/or rage which the affected person is unable to resolve. These feelings are produced by "Perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations. This may entail participating in or witnessing inhumane or cruel actions, failing to prevent the immoral acts of others, as well as engaging in subtle acts or experiencing reactions that, upon reflection, transgress a moral code" (Litz *et al.* 700).

This definition implies two kinds of moral code. The first is a personal code and the second is a transcendent code. These will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, but I will distinguish them here. The personal moral code consists of those currently held beliefs, values, and expectations that have been internalized by the moral actor. The second code is one which is discovered "upon reflection", and so 'transcends' the personal code. (I distinguish both

of these from collective ethical codes such as the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics, which can only cause guilt to the extent that they have been internalized into the individual's personal moral code). I will argue that this exercise of reflection serves to draw the moral actor towards a transcendent moral code which is *the* absolute, true moral code: natural law, or in the reformed Protestant framework, the law of God. Unfortunately, this experience reveals the transcendent moral code through the realization of having transgressed it. My purpose in this paper is to explore whether transgression of both moral codes can be avoided by discovering the transcendent code before transgressing it, and habituating oneself to the practice of it. That is, to cultivate true virtue.

Also from this definition, I distinguish two kinds of MI. The first, which I call 'MI-1', occurs as a result of feelings of intense guilt and shame for transgressions that the individual has personally committed. The second, 'MI-2', occurs as a result of anger towards others who have transgressed the injured person's moral code, often coupled with guilt and shame over the injured person's inability to prevent or rectify it, and which they have been unable to resolve.

Shay describes what extreme cases of MI look like with these symptoms:

> Loss of authority over mental function… Persistent mobilization of the body and the mind for lethal danger, with the potential for explosive violence; Persistence and activation of combat survival skills in civilian life; Chronic health problems stemming from chronic mobilization of the body for danger; Persistent expectation of betrayal and exploitation; destruction of the capacity for social trust; Persistent preoccupation with both the enemy and the veteran own military/governmental authorities; Alcohol and drug abuse; Suicidality, despair, isolation, and meaninglessness ("Moral Injury")

In this section, I will provide a working definition of the terms 'guilt' and 'shame'. At present, there is considerable agreement among researchers that guilt and shame over combat actions can lead to MI, but there is debate over the actual psychological mechanism or cause of these emotions, which I will discuss. Finally, I will look at proposed prevention strategies. I will start with a bit of background.

Background

US VA clinical psychiatrist Jonathan Shay is credited with having coined the phrase "Moral Injury" in the mental health world (Shay, "Moral Injury" 183). It first appears in an article entitled *Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad* in 1991 (563). This work resonated with veterans and earned him a hearing with veterans' organizations and the US military and government ("Trials" 286–87), and influenced the work of others in his field, such as Brett Litz and William Nash. Shay's work focuses on what I have called MI-2. His concern is MI caused by the moral failure of leadership, which is a betrayal of the personal moral code of the subordinate soldier. Litz and Nash brought MI-1 into the discussion, adding that MI is also caused by the actions of the individual soldier. Even responsibility for the actions of others can be internalized by the soldier as a personal inability to prevent those actions. More recently, there has been a dispute between Nash and Farnsworth over the exact nature and origins of guilt and shame in human beings as a species, which will be discussed below, however both groups of researchers agree that guilt and shame are the cause of MI. (Nash; Farnsworth, Borges, *et al.*). Taken together, these researchers provide considerable insight into the problem.

Although Shay recently coined the phrase 'moral injury', he argues that MI is as old as war itself. The premise of his ground-breaking book *Achilles in Vietnam* is that Homer writes the *Iliad* as a description of MI. The *Iliad* records a short episode in the siege of Troy by Greek

troops under their commander, Agamemnon. The story is most likely based on true events that took place around 12th to 11th century BC, and Homer writes approximately 400 years after the fact. For Shay, the value of the poem is not the history of the events, but the author's insight into the mind of a morally injured soldier. Homer's description of symptoms experienced by the poem's tragic hero Achilles closely match those of Vietnam veterans that Shay has treated.

At the opening of the poem, Achilles is outraged by Agamemnon's breach of the warrior's code by taking what was 'rightfully' Achilles': a woman captured in a previous action. Behind the scenes, Homer tells us that the gods judge this as a transgression, intimating that Achilles is right to feel betrayed. In response, Achilles isolates himself and abandons his duties to his comrades. After his closest friend is killed in his stead in a duel against the Trojan hero Hector, Achilles experiences profound grief, suicidal thoughts and survivor guilt. In retaliation, he enters into a 'berserker' rage and commits atrocities that transgress his own warrior code. Not only does he desecrate the body of Hector but also fantasizes about cannibalizing it. Shay identifies all of these elements in the stories of combat veterans he has treated (xx).

There are hints of MI in writers living between Homer and Shay as well. Older Just War thinkers tended to focus on the responsibility of government to limit warfare rather than the impact on individual soldiers, yet there is still recognition of the moral problem of war for individual soldiers throughout history. In the 16th century, Martin Luther's responded to the question of whether a soldier (or vassal) should fight if he knows his lord to be unjust in planning war: "If you know for sure that he is wrong, then you should fear God rather than men, Acts 4 [5:29], and you should neither fight nor serve, for you cannot have a good conscience before God" (Holmes 159). Even though the soldier may be branded a coward, and lose his fief or even his life, he should trust in the Heavenly Lord to "restore it to you a hundredfold" (159). In the

17th century, Puritan divine William Ames wrote, “Souldiers of the lower ranke, which are subjects to the Prince making Warre, although in a cause manifestly unjust, they ought not to assist him,” (bk.5, ch.33, para.17). Ames is concerned that a breach of conscience is an injury far greater than any temporal lord can inflict.

Guilt, Shame, Anger, and Other Combat Emotions

PTSD, Fear and Guilt. There is some debate over whether PTSD and MI are the same thing. PTSD has a long history, and while its symptoms have been consistent throughout history, the explanation of their causes has developed over time (Figley *et al.*, chap.3). The explanations have often depended on the prevailing philosophical/psychological paradigm of the day. In the Middle Ages, returning soldiers were assigned penance to deal with the moral defilement of their actions, showing that it was seen as a spiritual problem. Penance was required both for actions considered unjustified (killing innocents) *and* those considered justified (Verkamp 34).

In the post-Enlightenment era, physicians have looked for material psychological or biological explanations for the same problem. In their work on Combat Stress, Figley, Nash, *et al.* write that “The first recorded label for a combat stress reaction was ‘nostalgia,’” described in the 18th century as being caused by a loss of hope of ever returning home. It had symptoms such as becoming “sad, taciturn, listless, solitary, musing, full of sighs and moans. Finally, they cease to pay attention and become indifferent to everything which the maintenance of life requires of them” (36). Many veterans of the American Civil War were diagnosed with ‘Soldier’s Heart’ which described the racing heart associated with anxiety and panic attacks typical of affected veterans (36–37). It was speculated that this could be explained by exposure to physical damage caused by artillery bombardment (Bremner *et al.*). Similarly, veterans of the First World War were diagnosed with ‘Shell Shock’, attributing the soldiers’ psychological symptoms to physical

damage to the brain caused by massive artillery bombardment on a scale never before witnessed in the history of warfare (Bourne and Allerton xiv; Figley *et al.* 37). Veterans of the Second World War presenting similar symptoms were diagnosed with 'Combat Fatigue' or 'exhaustion'. Owing to advances in psychology, Combat fatigue brought a more nuanced materialist explanation, identifying the extreme stresses imposed upon body and mind by battle as the cause of the symptoms (Bourne and Allerton xvii–xix). The human brain simply is not designed to handle the weight and, being overburdened, ceases to function properly in some cases. This view being dominant during the post-war years, the military focused their preventative efforts on vetting applicants for psychological risk factors. They believed that those who succumb to combat fatigue smuggled inherent weaknesses in with them. (Vetting for risk factors persists to the present (Brockway; N. Defence, *DAOD 5023-1*), and no doubt prevents some moral casualties. However, the studies of MI research show that the actual incidence of MI is not strongly correlated with risk factors: psychologically and morally healthy people are also susceptible to MI (Figley *et al.* 68).)

Following the Vietnam War, Figley *et al.* write, "an explosion in research on persistent war-related stress disorders led to the official recognition in 1980 of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)" (38) as a specific diagnosis, or more broadly as 'combat stress injury'. These conditions are considered 'biopsychological', meaning that they are understood to be caused by both biological factors, like the physical impact of traumatic stress on brain cells, and psychological factors, such as conditioned response. In the Canadian military, operational stress injury (OSI) refers to a spectrum of problems within a range of severity, including "diagnosed medical conditions such as anxiety, depression, and PTSD" (266). PTSD is in no way limited to combat

trauma – it has been diagnosed in first responders of all sorts, victims of rape and childhood trauma, etc. – however, I will limit the discussion to PTSD caused by combat experiences.

The debate over PTSD and MI stems from the fact that the prevailing model of PTSD sees fear as the primary associated emotion whereas moral injury sees guilt and shame as the cause (Nash 465). In the fear model, It is believed that certain areas of the brain that are hardwired to aid survival become overstimulated through constant use in combat situations, triggering hyperarousal, fight/flight/freeze response, hypervigilance, light sleeping, etc., beyond the control of the victim (Bremner *et al.* 172). Results of this are 'flashbacks', and general disruption of relationships and ability to function in society. The problem with this theory is that it does not seem to square with the observations of psychologists and counselors on the front lines of treating veterans. Jonathan Shay notes that, "pure PTSD, as officially defined, with no complications, such as substance abuse or danger seeking, is rarely what wrecks veterans' lives, crushes them to suicide, or promotes domestic and/or criminal violence. Moral injury… does" ("Moral Injury" 184).

One of the major weaknesses with these modern theories is the failure to predict or account for who becomes injured and who does not. If PTSD-like symptoms are caused by physical damage from explosive shock waves, then why do some suffer more and others less under the exact same conditions? Why did some front-line infantry soldiers come away without Shell Shock while rear echelon medics suffered the same without exposure to shells? Bremner notes that shell shock was, "originally thought to be a physical disorder caused by exploding shells, but later it was realized that it could develop in locations far from the blast" (Bremner *et al.* 171). Why did WWII soldiers experiencing the same combat stress come away with different

levels of symptoms? Why do people experiencing the exact same trauma come away with very different symptoms?

Studies have failed to show a correlation between those who simply experienced traumatic combat events and those who suffer long-term PTSD. Yet, several studies have found significant PTSD symptoms in persons whose major stressors did not involve a close brush with death or serious injury. Studies of MI, on the other hand, have shown that "Combat-related guilt has been found to be a strong predictor of PTSD symptoms (Jordan *et al.* 628; see also Figley and Nash 54; Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 251).

Nash *et al.* summarizes the issue in an article titled "Psychometric Evaluation of the Moral Injury Events Scale". The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), is the authority for psychiatric diagnosis in the US and Canada. Prior to 2013, the 4th edition (DSM-IV-TR) stated that the diagnostic criteria for PTSD was "'an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of others' …to which the person must respond with "intense fear, hopelessness, or horror'" (646). This is in keeping with:

> current conceptions of PTSD as a disorder of Pavlovian fear conditioning or neural fear circuitry…. So-called non-A1 stressors that have been found to correlate with subsequent PTSD in civilian populations include the nonviolent death of loved ones, chronic illnesses, sexual harassment, marital divorce or separation, arrest or incarceration, relationship infidelity, bullying, and other distressing social events. Studies of military populations have found PTSD to correlate with a number of stressor types other than threats to personal safety, including atrocities, the loss of close personal friends, malevolent environments, and the act of killing. Furthermore, military personnel who

> develop PTSD following exposure to combat-related traumatic events may be as likely to experience peritraumatic anger as fear, helplessness, or horror. (646)

The most recent version, DSM-5, published in 2013, has in fact recognized these studies and altered its diagnostic criteria. It states "Emotional re-actions to the traumatic event (e.g., fear, helplessness, horror) are no longer a part of Criterion A [i.e., essential]" (274), and has added "Persistent negative emotional state (e.g., fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame)" (272). Farnsworth notes this update, saying:

> Although trauma has historically been conceptualized as a fear-provoking event, it is evident that many trauma survivors experience prominent trauma-related emotions other than fear… Additionally, PTSD has been removed from the anxiety disorders section in the newly published [DSM-5] and the revised criteria place greater emphasis on negative enduring changes in cognitions and mood that often occur following exposure to traumatic events (i.e., self-blame, persistent dysphoria). (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 256)

Shay argues that the changes did not go far enough, writing in 2014, "The DSM diagnosis, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), does not capture either form of moral injury" ("Moral Injury" 184), *i.e.* MI-1 or MI-2. Shay attributes this to a stubborn rejection of APA of "every diagnostic concept that even hints at the possibility that bad experience in adulthood can damage good character… [This] comes from American attachment to this old philosophic position with its brilliant pedigree, not from empirical facts, which abundantly show the opposite" (184)

Because feelings of guilt and shame are better predicters of long-term debilitating 'PTSD' than fear, let us consider what they are and how they are acquired.

Guilt and Shame. The data on the ground level – from veterans suffering from MI and professionals who treat them – is that they feel guilty for actions that they have done or that they feel somehow complicit in. They have taken a human life and their conscience condemns them, saying that they had no right to do so. Whether it was an innocent life – a civilian, a child, unarmed prisoners – or even an armed enemy combatant. Whether they killed an enemy in genuine self-defence or defence of a comrade, or whether they killed in a "berserker" rage (Shay, *Achilles* 98) out of revenge and hatred of the enemy. Whether they personally participated in an atrocity, such as intentionally killing civilians, or whether they only witnessed it or heard of others doing so.

In his book on MI entitled *Killing from the Inside Out*, Robert Meagher distinguishes guilt from shame in the following manner:

> Guilt is not contagious. Instead, it is most often suffered in private and healed, if at all, outside the public eye, through such means as memory, narrative, confession, and reparations. Shame is another matter, involving a global or comprehensive devaluation of the self and a consequent inner compulsion to withdraw from others, especially those others who are nearest and dearest. Guilt carries the weight of having done something evil, whereas shame's burden is that of having become evil, to the core. (45)

In Meagher's view, shame is the real killer. Guilt, he argues, can be constructive. It can be used to guide us to constructive ways of making amends and avoiding future actions that lead to guilt. It is a teacher on the path to virtue, like a goad to steer us away from vice. And guilt can evoke "understanding and compassion from others, and this initial bond can be the beginning of one's return to inner peace" (45). A person who feels guilt feels they are a good person who has erred, whereas a person who feels shame feels they are a wicked person who has only acted according

to their nature. Meagher says that such a person not only expects to be rejected but agrees that they should be. They withdraw and isolate. He concludes, "Indeed, many veterans, consumed with irrational and seemingly incurable shame, act plague-ridden, their souls sick unto death, convinced that their dark malaise is contagious and that they themselves, no longer worthy of care, are a danger to everyone they love and to everyone who loves them" (45).

Guilt, then, concerns what one has *done*, whereas shame concerns what one *is*, or is perceived to be (by self and/or others) because of having done it. In terms of killing, guilt is to feel responsible for unjustified killing, whereas shame is to perceive oneself as a murderer.

Farnsworth has worked on teasing out the different emotions that contribute to combat-related MI in a study called "The Role of Moral Emotions in Military Trauma", which largely affirms Meagher's impression. He writes, "The emotion of guilt centers on a negative evaluation of a specific behavior… primarily elicited by real or imagined violations that are perceived to threaten one's personal or communal relationship" (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 251). He says that, "Whereas guilt focuses outwardly on a specific behavior, shame involves a negative global evaluation of the core self that is accompanied by feelings of worthlessness, powerlessness, and feeling vulnerable and exposed" (251). His research corroborates Meagher's assertion that shame is more destructive than guilt. He says, "Shame has been robustly associated with substance abuse, anger, and aggression, whereas guilt often discourages these types of problematic behaviors" (251). He finds that guilt can be harnessed as a motivator to turn around the unworthy behaviour, whereas shame makes the person feel defeated, since they recognize themselves as a bad person, rather than a good person who has done a bad thing.

Guilt and Shame are the principal combat emotions leading to MI-1 specifically, since they are the result of actions or failures to act by the individual.

Other Combat Emotions. The research of Farnsworth *et al* also identified anger, disgust and contempt as emotions associated with combat experiences that indicate higher risk of MI. In the context of MI-1, these apply chiefly to two aspects of morally injurious events, namely the betrayal of having transgressed a code on one hand, and toward the object of the transgression. That is, veterans report feeling anger and disgust toward themselves for having perpetrated or been complicit in an immoral act. They report having felt rage and contempt towards the enemy when they killed them (252). In the first case, this anger and disgust may be considered as part of shame. The second case contributes more directly to the guilt of the act itself.

This anger or rage transforms the act of killing in war from a justified act of necessity to an act of personal vengeance. Farnsworth notes that "those service members who have reported killing noncombatants or killing in anger have been found to be particularly symptomatic" (252). Shay notes this kind of anger as a commonly reported experience of Vietnam veterans under his care, comparing it to Achilles' lust for revenge against Hector that drives him to inhuman treatment of his enemies. He refers to this as 'going berserk' and devotes a chapter of his *Achilles in Vietnam* to this phenomenon (ch.5). He concludes that a berserker soldier "cannot distinguish atrocities from military conduct… [and is] certain to be gravely disabled from participation in civilian society – probably for life" (201).

Contempt, in context of MI-1, means to dehumanize the enemy; psychologically, it is an attempt to justify killing the enemy by devaluing their lives. This can have a short-term advantage of lowering soldier's inhibition to kill, as Col. David Grossman discusses in his book *On Killing*, yet risks transforming a justified act of killing into murder, possibly even genocidal in its intent. Grossman shows that, as physical distance makes it easier for a soldier to kill (for example with artillery and air strikes as opposed to a knife), 'emotional distance' may be

achieved by dehumanizing the enemy as inferior, whether racially/culturally, or even 'morally', treating them as hated criminals who deserve to be killed (sec.4, ch.3). Grossman accepts that some amount of conditioning may be necessary, but states that this conditioning leads directly to PTSD and that society, "has an obligation to deal forthrightly, intelligently, and morally with the result and its repercussions upon the soldier" (287).

Farnsworth and Shay recognize such dehumanization as a complicating factor leading to MI (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 252; Shay, *Achilles* 202–03). Morally, devaluing the enemy's life skews our judgment of proportionality: if the enemy's life is worthless, then one can justify killing any number of them to achieve the most trivial military objective. This will be discussed later under the virtue of love of enemy, but here it is worth noting that contempt of enemy life contributes to MI-1.

Farnsworth identifies anger, disgust, and contempt as "other-condemning emotions" (252). Studies show that anger produces "a robust and large effect size… in predicting PTSD symptomatology," and "up to half of all returning service members experience problems with anger… anger increased significantly from pre- to postdeployment, suggesting the importance of war-zone stressors in rates of postdeployment anger and aggression" (252). Anger expresses an individual's visceral response to injustice committed against them, their moral code, deeply held beliefs, and expectations, as Shay tells us Achilles felt against Agamemnon for his transgression (*Achilles* 5–6)

Anger is the principal emotion leading to MI-2. I noted above that killing in anger complicates guilt and shame from the act; being ordered to kill can also constitute a transgression against an individual's moral code. Shay relates an interview with a Vietnam veteran whose anger over betrayed moral expectations burned bright years after the incident. In his first action

in theatre, his unit was ordered to intercept three fishing boats thought to be smuggling weapons to enemy fighters. The unit met the boats when they landed with overwhelming firepower, killing everyone aboard, only to find they were civilians with children and no weapons. That veteran felt shame for his part in the action, but also anger towards his leadership who ordered the (in his conscience) immoral act and then covered it up as a victory (3–4). Anger over such betrayals of 'what's right' is common among veterans whether for atrocities such as this, or even much lesser offenses.

Related to anger is loss and grief. As Shay points out, loss is not limited to the death of comrades, but includes loss of 'innocence', pre-war relationships, youth and health, and the 'waste' caused by war (*Achilles* 192; *Odysseus* 174). The loss experienced as loss of innocence is related to the loss of a functioning worldview – the failure of reality to conform to the expectations of the individual's moral code. These become "shattered assumptions", that "traumatic experiences, by their very nature, acutely damage: (1) the world is benevolent, (2) the world is meaningful, and (3) the self is worthy" (Figley and Nash 75). Such grief feeds anger at the world, humanity, or some scapegoat group for failing to act justly.

I discussed above how disgust and contempt toward the enemy complicate the feelings of guilt and shame leading to MI-1. In the context of MI-2, these emotions accompany anger directed toward those who have in whatever way transgressed the moral code. Disgust refers to a visceral aversion to persons or activities associated with moral contamination (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 252–53). This can lead to isolation from the others in the unit, and physical revulsion of otherwise innocent public displays or activities that bring to mind a past morally injurious event. In my role as military chaplain, it is not uncommon for a member to report becoming nauseous putting on their uniform or driving onto base because their perception of

soldiering has been morally contaminated. Contempt is directed at the offenders of the individual's moral code and expectations, judging them as "incompetent or morally lax" (253).

Etiology in Conflict. Recently, a debate between Nash and Farnsworth has highlighted a difference of opinion concerning the etiology – the medical cause – of MI, which is instructive to the problem at hand. The opening salvo was initiated by Nash and concerned differences between a 'stress injury' model that Nash espouses and a 'cognitive behavioural' model. According to the stress injury model, psychological stress causes physical damage to the cells: "Cells are living machines that require fuel, parts for repair, and sufficient down-time between exertions to reset their internal milieus to continue functioning as programmed in their DNA; all of these resources are in limited supply" (Nash 467). If these resources are depleted, the cell can suffer physical damage. He concludes "In the stress injury model, MI is a literal wound to the mind, brain, body, and spirit inflicted by a life event that violates deeply held moral expectations of oneself and the world" (468). He contrasts this to a cognitive-behavioural model that he (wrongly) attributes to Farnsworth which sees the damage of MI as caused by "a state of threat to well-being that could only result from an active appraisal of a challenge relative to available resources" (467). This means that the soldier's system is reprogrammed to 'appraise' the threat level as high and cannot adjust it back to an appropriate level once safe and back in country. If so, the solution would be to reframe the veteran's thinking to bring it into line with reality.

Farnsworth denies holding this view, pointing out that Nash is describing an out-dated version of the cognitive-behavioural approach (Farnsworth, Borges, *et al.* 634). Farnsworth's actual approach, called 'Functional Contextualism" does not deny that stress may cause physical damage to cells, but focuses more on the function of psychological responses to stimuli, based in evolutionary biology. He writes, "on both individual and group levels, the biological,

psychological, and social processes associated with morality were selected and passed on when they contributed to survival value" (635). Essentially, this is an attempt to give a material explanation for why our bodies and minds respond negatively to breaches of moral code: moral codes are what helped the species to survive, and these codes are policed biologically with built-in, internal punishment/reward systems.

Both authors are attempting to demonstrate that soldiers who suffer MI are not somehow weak or inferior, because it is a natural response to the kind of stressor they are experiencing. They agree that there are undeniable and persistent forces within the human psyche that prompt us towards moral acts and prick us – even severely wound us – when we we transgress them. These forces describe the individual's moral code – their deeply held beliefs, values, and expectations. In the next chapter, I will relate these forces to the reformed Protestant notions of conscience and affections.

Prevention

The bulk of the research on MI has naturally centred around treatment (after the injury) rather than prevention, at least in the sense of preventing the breach of moral code from happening. Dr. Nash notes that his combat stress model is aimed at preventing MI, but on scrutiny, he is talking about *after* the morally transgressive event has occurred. Because he understands MI to be a physiological injury to cells caused by enduring stress, he believes that injury can be prevented by getting control of the stress before it causes permanent damage (to material cells). Therefore, the focus of prevention is on identifying symptoms of combat stress (using a continuum model, which has become increasingly popular), and providing treatment early (Nash). Farnsworth, espousing a cognitive behavioural approach he calls 'social-functional', admits that " From the standpoint of resilience and recovery, it is as yet unclear what factors prevent moral injury"

(Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.*). Farnsworth, similarly, considers prevention only in the sense of early treatment. His framework looks to self-forgiveness. This does not mean dismissing moral emotions like guilt and shame, but encouraging patients to use these to guide them back to their values, for example, "enacting value consistent behaviors is likely to be an important element in recovering from moral injury" (Farnsworth 378). The question I am considering in this paper is whether soldiers can learn to practice virtuous behaviours *before* they have breached them. Can they be encouraged beforehand to explore key values – their own values, yes, but perhaps more importantly those values discovered by veterans by the act of having breached them? By extension, might it be possible that the values discovered through harsh experience are a closer approximation to a transcendent moral code than the untested codes of our private selves?

Dr. Shay, through his extensive interaction with injured veterans has become a 'missionary', commissioned by veterans to save inexperienced solders from the horrors they had to live through (Shay, "Moral Injury" 183). His recommendation for preventing MI is succinctly as follows: "Three things protect the mind and spirit of the people we send into a fight and those three things are cohesion, leadership, and training" ("Trials" 287). Meagher holds a bleaker outlook, contending that there is no avoiding MI, because killing in war is always morally wrong. His prevention strategy seems to be simply to stop fighting. He writes "Albert Camus… disallowed any distinction between killing and murder and argued that killing, even in self-defense, is never innocent, never without violation… [Meagher agrees:] Taking a life breaks the heart and darkens the soul… It is time for us as a nation to acknowledge it and to learn the rules of another road, the road to healing, and sooner than later the road to peace" (143). Unlike Meagher, Grossman believes that war is necessary and can be just, but he agrees with Meagher that MI is unavoidable, simply for biological reasons (287).

Shay's recommended preventative measures stem from his initial conviction that MI is primarily a betrayal of the soldier's code *by someone in authority over* the soldier, as Agamemnon over Achilles. Inasmuch as this conviction is true, his recommendation is of utmost importance: truly, if we could make all the superior officers ethically and morally trustworthy, the soldier could serve with confidence in their decisions. However, in this respect, I tend to defer to Meagher's bleak outlook: if my moral integrity depends on another, then there is no hope of avoiding implication in murder. For then, it would be outside of my control, and I hazard to predict that if there is war, there will always be leaders who make immoral choices. What I am interested in is whether a soldier can be prepared to maintain moral integrity *despite* immoral leadership.

I will attempt to demonstrate that soldiers can only protect themselves from MI by developing moral virtues which may guide them into the just and loving action, even if those in authority command otherwise.

Meagher must be taken seriously, however. If indeed all war is murder, then a moral person must refuse to participate in war. If one were a hitman for an organized crime gang, and asked what they should do to become moral and to begin to follow their conscience, surely one of the top items on the list would be to stop killing and cut ties with the gang. So, if war is always and irredeemably criminal, a person seeking to become moral must disavow it entirely. I do not believe that that is the nature of war, as will be discussed below under Just War. I hold to that rich tradition that honours the acts of those who defend innocent life from unjustified aggression. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the reality that countless veterans have fought for seemingly just causes and followed the rules of engagement (RoE), yet have suffered terrible MI – which Meagher and Shay and Nash and their colleagues have witnessed in their practices.

Therefore, even if Meagher is wrong, and there *is* sometimes a justification for war, we cannot prevent MI *simply by* ensuring Just War criteria are followed *at the level of government*. The Just War values must be internalized by the soldier, incorporated into their personal moral code, and they must also adhere to that code. In the end, we may find that Just War is nearly as impossible to attain in practice as Meagher would have us believe it is in theory.

3. MORAL CODE PART 1 – DOING WHAT IS RIGHT

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we have seen that killing in war leads to MI in some cases, and not in others. Clinical research has shown that, of all cases of PTSD, those most likely to lead to chronic debilitating symptoms are those associated with guilt and shame over personal transgression of a moral code (MI-1) or anger over others' transgression of a moral code (MI-2). While the exact physiological nature of the traumatic injury is debated, it is agreed that there is some structure in our psyche related to a personal moral code that resists transgression of that code, and becomes injured when transgression occurs. To avoid these MIs, soldiers need to avoid transgressing both their personal moral code, and a transcendent moral code they may discover upon reflection. In this chapter, I will explore a virtue ethic based on reformed Protestant tradition that can guide the soldier to cultivate virtues that help them avoid these transgressions. In the next chapter will look at how the soldier can develop realistic moral expectations congruent with reality.

I will start in the virtue tradition in the broadest sense by establishing that the *telos* of the activity of war must be *eudaimonistic*. It must have as its goal the flourishing of the human community (Russell 8), otherwise it degenerates into a barbaric raiding of goods for one group at the expense of the lives and flourishing of another. While no individual is omniscient, a soldier has virtuous intent if they fight to serve the common good of the whole. By cultivating and habituating that intent, they may work towards mitigating the risk of MI.

Jonathan Edwards' reformed Protestant concept of virtue provides such a view of virtue as benevolence for the whole at the expense of none of its parts. Justice, according to Edwards, is a beautiful picture of every part being in perfect harmony with the other parts and the whole. Yet

a part that opposes the harmony of justice must be opposed to the degree necessary to restore justice. A theory of Just War that is consistent with this reformed Protestant virtue ethic serves to maintain and restore this just peace.

The transcendent moral code points to this harmonious justice. The individual is discordant from this justice. They are diffracted or alienated within themselves, pulled by personal moral code (conscience), and 'affections' (or motivations), both of which diverge from the transcendent moral code and from each other. True virtue serves to bring all these conflicting drives together into harmony, which is possible in the person of Jesus Christ. Finally, love is the virtue that flows out of that: love of neighbour that motivates the soldier to fight for justice and love of enemy that motivates restraint and a desire for peace.

VIRTUE TRADITION

Can we really say that war could ever contribute to the greater good – whether that is Aristotle's *polis*, the common good, human flourishing, or even the whole world (including the environment)? Could we say that a particular war served the greater good, for example the war in Afghanistan between the US-led Coalition and the Taliban government? The objective was to dismantle al-Qaeda, in order to prosecute those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and to prevent them from being able to execute similar attacks in the future (Coppieters and Fotion 274–75). That is, the objective was to bring peace and security for all – since everyone is at risk of being targeted by terrorism at any time or place. Surely, peace and security serve the greater good and allow for human flourishing, hence are virtuous aims.

But was war the only way to achieve this desired aim? Could the Coalition have achieved peace and security through negotiation? In fact, they tried to negotiate with the Taliban government, giving them an ultimatum to hand over suspected al-Qaeda members, not to harbour

the organisation and to assist with the prosecution of criminals within their sovereign territory. The Taliban refused, forcing the US-led coalition to declare war in order to achieve its aims (267–68). But are such aims necessary for human flourishing? At any cost? What if the US simply practiced forgiveness and chose to live peaceably in hopes their enemies will respond in kind? There are several reasons to suspect that this action would not promote the greatest good for humanity. First, prosecution of injustice and violence seems necessary as a deterrent against future transgressions (272–73). If crimes had less consequences to the criminal, more people would be more tempted to commit them as a shortcut to get what they want or think they deserve. Second, it seems that the dignity of the victims of the crime demands a reckoning for there to be justice, as though, “The voice of your brother's blood is crying to me from the ground” (Gen 4:10). The preferred means of achieving such justice is through due legal process, but at such a scale, and when governments resist, war may be required in order to bring perpetrators to justice.

But what about the enemy’s cause? Justice is a virtue that requires a fair distribution of goods based on desert. Is it possible that al-Qaeda had a just cause to declare war on America and other Western nations? They believed they had (Scheuer, chap.4; bin Laden). Though they did not fight on behalf of a political government, they claimed to represent the *Ummah*, or the people of Islam everywhere in the world. They claimed that ‘the West’ (meaning, loosely, Western liberal democratic states and civilization as a whole), oppressed Islamic peoples through their economic and foreign policies, impoverishing, and in many cases killing them in wars that al-Qaeda deemed unjust (bin Laden; Scheuer, chap.4). Seen in this light, the targets of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon served as apt representations of the perpetrator of these respectively economic and military injustices against the *Ummah*. The people working in these

buildings were as much responsible for the injustices as munitions factory workers in Germany could be considered responsible for the death and destruction of the London Blitz of 1940-41.

This is an important consideration. If our goal is genuinely the common good for all humanity, then past and ongoing injustice that we commit against our enemy must be considered. If al-Qaeda were willing to make peace in exchange for fair treatment of Islamic citizens by the West (if it could be agreed upon what 'fair treatment' might look like), then this option ought to be tried before resorting to war.

This is not intended to be a detailed analysis of the justice of the war in Afghanistan, only to demonstrate that the war did have human flourishing as its goal, and that the determination of how to reach that goal is complex and unclear. This is the nature of virtue ethics in a fallen world – a world where human knowledge and reason are limited, and human inclination toward vice is great. Far from making virtue ethics ineffective, rather it emphasizes the importance of determining what the right object of human activity is – what is *eudaimonia* – as well as what virtues need to be developed to strive towards that end.

Eudaimonia and Virtue. I take to following definitions as axiomatic:

> *Eudaimonia* is the chief good, the end that is to be desired for its own sake, and for the sake of which all lesser ends are to be desired (Aristotle 1094a, 19-23).

Aristotle defines virtue as "the state that makes a human being good and perform his characteristic activity well" And, since doing an activity well is to aim at *eudaimonia*, or a lesser good which itself is aimed at *eudaimonia*, therefore:

> *Virtue* is that state that inclines the human to aim at *eudaimonia*. Similarly, individual virtues aim at *eudaimonia* within their specific activity or domain.

This logical definition of *eudaimonia* provides a common point of reference. Beyond this, the shape and application of virtue ethics can vary depending on what one understands *eudaimonia* to be. As MacIntyre says "any adequate teleological account must provide us with some clear and defensible account of the *telos* [end]; and an adequate generally Aristotelian account must supply a teleological account which can replace Aristotle's metaphysical biology" (163; Bielskis and Mardosas 188). I propose to do a similar project by replacing Aristotle's metaphysical biology with a reformed Protestant one.

In the reformed Protestant tradition, the chief good is God. He is the end to be desired for its own sake, and for the sake of which all lesser goods are desired. As stated in the Westminster Shorter Catechism: "The chief end of man is to glorify God (Ps. 86:9; Isa. 60:21; Rom. 11:36; 1 Cor. 6:20; 10:31; Rev. 4:11) and enjoy Him forever (Ps. 16:5-11; 144:15; Isa. 12:2; Luke 2:10; Phil. 4:4; Rev.21:3-4)." It may not be directly clear how 'God', simply stated, or God's glory fulfils human longing to flourish and be happy. However, accepting the biblical 'metaphysical biology', humans are created "in God's image"; hence our purpose, or *telos*, is to conform to God's image. As Augustine writes in his Confessions, "For you [God] have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it finds rest in you" (bk.1, ch.1). Something was lost to humanity through 'the Fall' or Adam and Eve's rebellion against God in eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. John Kilner argues that what was lost was not the image of God in the human person. Rather, he sees the image as a sort of blueprint – the comprehensive design for a person that, were they to conform to it perfectly, they would be what they were meant to be (131–32): fully human, fulfilled, satisfied, happy, flourishing. In this sense, image aligns closely with Aristotle's concept of virtue as that which inclines a thing to fulfil its *telos*, where the *telos* is God and His glory.

What is lost in the Fall is our ability to attain or maintain conformity to that design. Kilner says, “No image has been damaged, for God’s image is Christ – it is the standard of what God intends humanity to become. Nevertheless, sin has severely damaged people, who desperately need renewal according to the image of Christ” (132). The way in which this is lost, according to the Bible, is in accepting the serpent’s challenge to “be like God, knowing good and evil” (Gen 3:5b, ESV). The fruit was not, as is sometimes thought, for giving true knowledge of good and evil. On the contrary, the pair knew good before, which was to be in conformity to the image of God, to walk with Him in the garden in perfect submission. Evil was to stray from this. In taking the fruit, the pair certainly came to know evil in an experiential way, but more significantly, they lost access to the blueprint of God’s image, opting to put themselves in God’s place and determine good for themselves. The study of philosophy, and particularly ethics, is a fumbling in the dark to trace the blueprint for our lives that is right before our eyes. Jesus Christ is the light that shines on the blueprint so that we can see it, since he *is* the image of the invisible God. Jesus is the way to walk in that blueprint, by being in him. Christian virtue is to conform to the image of God found in Christ: “put off your old self… be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to put on the new self, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness.” (Eph 4:22-24) which is equivalent to saying, “put on the Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom 13:14) This is because Christ alone is completely virtuous and has attained *eudaimonia*. This logically follows where *eudaimonia* is God and His glory, since, “He is the image of the invisible God (Col 1:15a) and, “the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature” (Heb 1:3a).

To miss the perfect mean at all, to the side of one vice or the other, is to sin or “miss the mark”. The New Testament Greek word translated as sin is *hamartano,* which is the same stem that Aristotle uses in the statement “Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, in which

excess and deficiency constitute *misses of the mark*, while the mean is praised and on target" (1106b, 24-26). Biblically, however, sin cannot be brushed aside or corrected by learning from our mistakes and getting closer to the mark next time. It must be atoned for. "For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Rom 3:23). Since the glory of God is the *telos*, *eudaimonia* is lost by sin. Furthermore, "the wages of sin is death" (6:23), so that the nearly virtuous person cannot be considered to have been virtuous when they have met such an unhappy end (Aristotle 1100a, 10-11). Rather than building up a store of merit, say, all human persons accumulate only a deficit as every act falls short of the mean, on one side or the other. Only in Jesus Christ is virtue perfectly attained and maintained.

Biblically, then, for a person to attain *eudaimonia*, they must first have this deficit erased through an exchange with Jesus: "For our sake [God] made him [Jesus] to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God" (2 Cor 5:21). Those who remain 'in' him receive his virtuousness and he takes upon himself the deficit of viciousness the person has accumulated. This enables the person in Christ to potentially 'perform their characteristic activities well', as the image of God (the design for what a human is intended to be) is restored to light. This does not mean that the Christian is perfect (there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to prove that), just that they may only now move forward in the process of habituation to virtues that Aristotle envisioned, erring, and drawing closer to the mean that is now visible.

So far, this does not provide a clear objective to the activity of war, but it lays the foundation. To be virtuous, all human activity must (ultimately) serve God and His glory. This, however, does not objectively demonstrate what might be for God's glory and what might be opposed to it. One might argue, for example, that holy war, or Crusade, whose objective is ostensibly for God's glory, is always thereby justified. Nevertheless, we are inclined to evaluate

the virtue of a Crusade based on other factors, such as whether there was a just cause requiring military intervention (such as to protect Christian pilgrims on route to visit holy sites in territory held by Islamic empires), and how the wars were conducted (for example if the lives of innocents were treated with due respect). These kinds of factors, however, turn back to the same *telos* once we ask whether God's glory is promoted or tarnished by certain actions done in His name. If, for example, God identifies Himself as just and merciful, then any act that is unjust and/or unmerciful (as God defines justice and mercy in Himself), will serve not to bring glory to His name, rather dishonour. The Zeus of Homer's *Iliad* may be glorified by very different concepts of justice and mercy, where killing, raping, and enslaving the citizens of the losing force by the victor was considered acceptable and even fitting.

It would be impossible to go into a comprehensive discussion of what sort of actions glorify the biblical God, but some generalities will help. First, Jesus breaks these activities down into two main heads: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind," and "You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the Law and the Prophets." (Matt 22:36-40). This means that the requirements of biblical virtue are perfectly fulfilled by fulfilling these two requirements. If we imagine Aristotle's hierarchy of goods that work to an ultimate good, 'loving our neighbour' is the *penultimate* good. And who is my neighbour? My neighbour is humanity, both as a whole and each individual of every race, tribe and tongue. To love humanity is in effect to strive for human flourishing.

Here is one point of common ground between a biblical and a secular virtue ethic: both can accept human flourishing to be a worthy *telos* of human activity. The secular view sees human flourishing as an end in itself, whereas the biblical view sees human flourishing as a

subordinate good aiming at the higher good of glorifying God. (Since, in the biblical view, humanity is in God's image, therefore God is glorified when humanity is made to flourish, and for humanity to flourish means for it to be brought into conformity with the ideal design for human life. The ideal design for human life is God's image, which is perfected and united with humanity in Christ.) This will inevitably lead the Christian and humanist to different conclusions concerning what is best for humans to flourish, but in general the activities will aim for very similar ends, like a father's will for a son, and the son's will for himself, if the son is wise.

Jonathan Edwards develops this idea differently in his *Nature of True Virtue*, where he defines virtue as "*benevolence to being in general*" (3). He describes what he means by 'being in general' as follows, "Beauty does not consist in discord and dissent, but in consent and agreement. And if every intelligent being is some way related to 'being in general', and is part of the universal system of existence: and so stands in connection with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great whole?" (4) From this, we can say that Edwards' *eudaimonia* includes the flourishing and harmony not only of all humanity, but of the entire cosmos together, or at least all rational beings in it. Again, this can be equated with a secular view where it is assumed that humanity comprises all of the rational entities in the universe. Ultimately, Edwards shows that, where the biblical God is assumed, then benevolence to 'being in general' is essentially equivalent to benevolence to God, since, "God has infinitely the greatest share of existence. So that all other beings, even in the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the divine Being" (14). Yet here, as above, such benevolence for God necessarily includes benevolence for all other creatures, whereas benevolence for humanity does not require benevolence toward God.

To Edwards, benevolence towards anything less than ‘being in general’ is not true virtue. This is because benevolence to any part of the whole can pit one against the rest of the whole. He says for example that self-love “may make a man a common enemy to the general system,” but goes on to say, by analogy, that “this is as true of any other private affection, notwithstanding its extent may be to a system that contains millions of individuals” (89). He notes that it is often mistaken for virtue, especially the greater the number of individuals included in one’s benevolence. But no matter how great the number is, the part is always an infinitesimal portion of the whole. “Among the Romans,” says Edwards, “love to their country was the highest virtue; though this affection of theirs so much extolled, was employed as it were for the destruction of the rest of mankind” (88).

Benevolence to ‘being in general’ does not mean giving every individual what they selfishly want. Truly virtuous benevolence, says Edwards, “will seek the good of every individual being unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of being in general” (8) He says, “if there be any being statedly and irreclaimably opposite, and an enemy to being in general, then consent and adherence to being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forsake that enemy, and oppose it” (8–9).

This provides virtuous grounds for resisting enemies of ‘being in general’ or the common good. They may be resisted only for the sake of the whole, and not for the sake of any part of the whole, however big it might be. Therefore, it can not justify one nation aggressing against another nation for its own good, at the expense of the nation aggressed. It would not even justify one nation attacking another to acquire resources necessary for its own survival, unless it can be shown that its survival serves the common good of the whole, and the resources were being unjustly withheld by the attacked nation, making them an enemy of the common good.

Furthermore, it does not necessarily justify the use of armed, lethal force to oppose the enemy of the common good, unless it can be shown that this is necessary in order to effectively oppose them in the specific case at hand.

Peace: The End of War. This brings us to a place where we can give a name to the goal, or *telos*, of war: Peace (Augustine, *City of God*, bk.19, ch.12; Aquinas, pt.2.2, Qu.40, Art.1; Clausewitz 32; bk.1, ch.2). Peace refers to Edwards' ultimate *telos* of 'being in general' since it implies the harmony of all parts with the whole. To take this down a level, it is possible to think of peace in terms of the harmony of all humanity together (and possibly the harmony of humanity with its environment: the material world, solar system and universe), where peace envisions a state where human flourishing is possible and optimized.

Can we say, then that virtuous activities aim at human peace? To do so risks Edwards' charge that benevolence to a part can lead to opposition to the whole. One could uphold humanity as the ultimate end and be in opposition to God. However, it is not inconsistent to strive for a lesser good with a view to attain the greater good. Aristotle gives example of bridle making serving horsemanship, and horsemanship warfare, and so on (1094a, 9-16). The bridle maker can work for the sake of a good bridle, but he will see greater purpose in his work if he keeps in mind that his bridle contributes to a rider's success in battle, which in turn contributes to success in war, which in turn contributes to the peace and security of the city and (we hope) humanity as a whole. In the biblical view, to seek the peace of humanity is to love our neighbour which in turn brings glory to God, which is the ultimate end. In this, at least, Christian and secular can agree that human peace is a suitable goal for true virtue, provided it is subservient to the ultimate *telos* of 'being in general', which for the Christian includes God, but for the secularist stops either at humanity or the material universe.

The greater challenge is to determine what activities rightly contribute to human peace and flourishing. What I hope to do is provide a basis for soldiers to evaluate the orders given to them and their own intentions for doing them. The question a soldier needs to ask is, “Can I, in good conscience, participate in this war and in this action? Does it, to the best of my limited knowledge, genuinely contribute to the overall peace and common good of humanity as a whole (to the glory of God, for the Christian)?” Only if the soldier can answer “yes”, can they participate without risk of the guilt and shame that lead to MI, provided they are able to conduct themselves in a virtuous manner in the actual event. This raises the question: Is a soldier responsible to make themselves aware of the genuine issues at stake and to understand what makes for peace, and to what degree? I will have to return to this later, in chapter 4.

Just Peace. I have argued that peace is a proper *telos* of virtuous actions. But peace is more than the mere absence of violence: it is peace with justice (Holmes 6). Without justice, there is not peace, but an imbalance which nature demands be balanced; there is unresolved conflict that demands resolution. Edwards describes justice in this way:

> There is a beauty in the virtue called justice, which consists in the agreement of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner, and measure… There is a natural agreement and adaptedness of things that have relation one to another, and a harmonious corresponding of one thing with another. He who from his will does evil to others, should receive evil from the will of him or them whose business it is to take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf, in proportion to the evil of his doings (*Virtue* 36)

I acknowledge that there are diverse and contested concepts of peace and justice and their relationship to one another. Again, I will limit the discussion to a reformed Protestant concept, which itself would require more space to develop. It will have to suffice to say that neither

perfect peace nor perfect justice can be achieved in this fallen world, and only the promise of perfect peace and justice in a redeemed and restored new Heaven and Earth can provide hope to live in an unjust world. Nevertheless, within the paradigm in which I am working, peace with greater justice is a legitimate *telos* of human activity.

Our goal is to determine a way for the soldier to avoid moral injury. It is the virtuous soldier, who does all things for the sake of peace for the human community in the service of the highest good who can avoid the guilt of moral failure. And since peace requires justice, the virtuous soldier must have the virtue of justice, which we turn to now.

JUSTICE

Aristotle notes that justice is seen by many as the greatest virtue. He disagrees, holding that prudence is the greatest, but admits that justice holds a special place. He says that justice is, "complete virtue in the fullest sense, because… it is exercised in relation to others: it does what is beneficial for another" (1129b, 31; 1130a, 4-5). Justice finds its highest ideal where all parts of the whole of being function in perfect harmony with each other, as envisioned by Edwards above. It imagines something like the intricate interdependence of the cogs and wheels and springs of a mechanical watch. The apostle Paul gives a similar image, speaking of the ideal, spiritual human community of the Church being made of many different, but complementary members, each with unique needs and unique gifts to meet the needs of the whole and its parts (1 Cor 12:12-31). In reality, there are always issues that introduce injustice, and the virtuous person works to restore justice. A biblical example is the imbalance in distribution of food to Hellenistic converts recorded in Acts chapter 6; here, the solution was to establish members with the gifts needed to meet the need graciously, bringing the whole back into harmony.

In the political world, Aristotle envisions justice as the appropriate "distributions of honour or money or the other things that have to be shared among members of the political community" (1130b, 31-32). Thus, justice implies the appropriate distribution of both material and immaterial goods. Material goods would include things required for the body to survive and flourish, such as food and water, shelter, and clothing (or access to land that can provide them through labour), and whatever material goods may be needed or fitting to attain higher level needs. Immaterial goods include those things like honour, which he mentions, respect, rights, legal protection, community relations and many other things which cannot be held physically but which are needed for human flourishing. In the political arena, 'justice' is satisfied when these goods are distributed appropriately to all according to what is right and fitting. This does not necessarily mean that it is distributed equally – giving the same amount to each individual – rather that it is distributed according to what each individual deserves. Rawls calls this "an account of what properly belongs to a person and of what is due him" (10).

From the discussion above concerning *eudaimonia* and virtue, justice for any and every individual is for them to fully realize their humanity, to conform to their design. Each individual, while equal, is unique and different in role and function, so as to properly fit into the whole. In light of this, the just distribution of goods means that each individual gets what they need in order to be able to fulfill their specific role within the whole. And not every individual needs the same things as other individuals for this purpose. Bodies of different sizes need different amounts of food. Different trades need different resources in order to practice their skill and contribute to the common good. In an agrarian society, for example, the average family needs a certain amount of land to survive, and to have excess both for exchange and for contingency. A blacksmith, however, needs only enough land for a shop, but needs more raw metal to work with

than a farmer. A schoolteacher in the same town needs to be able to commit time to preparing and teaching lessons and does not have the time to cultivate crops to sustain themselves. Since the blacksmith's products and the teacher's lessons are of value to the whole community, they need to be compensated with the other goods they lack, especially food, and so on. The distribution of goods is based on need and desert.

In liberal societies, equal distribution of power is an important value, in order to hypothetically give the individual autonomy – the ability to develop their own identity or define their own place within the whole of being. Power is a vague concept encompassing whatever is required to afford the individual this ability. Politically, equal distribution of power is represented by giving everyone an equal vote in elections. Relationally, liberal ideals seek to empower the individual to make choices without undue influence from persons in authority. For example, parents ought not make unilateral decisions about the future career or partner of their children. However, this is not the only conceivable way to ensure justice for individuals, where justice is for a person to be able to fully meet their human potential and design.

Power, like any other good, is a tool or resource that needs to be distributed according to need and desert. For example, in a military setting, authority is delegated in a hierarchical structure, to ideally give everyone exactly how much authority they need to be able to fulfill their role toward the whole institution and its mission. Cooks supply food; logisticians supply resources; infantry provide protection and accomplish the mission while other arms supply fire support; and leaders provide direction and planning to keep things running properly. This allows every individual member to reach the potential of their own skills and training without everyone having to scrounge their own supplies, food, ammo, make all the decisions and deconflict them with every other member. They have the authority needed to do their own job.

Just distribution of power, then, like any other good, does not mean equal distribution of power, but only for each to have the power necessary to fulfill their role within the whole of being. Everyone will have greater powers in some areas of life – such as those that are more private and personal – and less over other, public areas of life. The latter must be negotiated with the rest of the individuals in society to live in harmony, and discover what contributions are needed and what are available in return.

Rectificatory Justice. In chapter 4 of book 5 of *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle notes another kind of justice that is rectificatory (1132b, 25): it seeks to rectify an injustice, bringing it back to a just balance. These two 'kinds' of justice are like two sides to the same coin. The first shows that justice is the fair distribution of goods; the second serves to *redistribute* goods that have become unjustly distributed in some way. One describes the balance, and the other describes how to bring about a balance when there is an imbalance. This type of justice is the province of the human activity of war: Just War serves to rectify injustice when other methods have failed.

In Edwards' picture, justice is all individual parts working in harmony with each other and with the whole. Injustice is disharmony and disunity of individual parts from the whole and with each other. Rectificatory justice means to bring these discordant elements back into harmony with the whole. This is because one disharmonious element harms all the others and the whole, especially those elements closest to it – like a broken gear will throw the adjacent gears out of their place and destroy the whole clockwork. Even if one gear were to grow out of proportion, it would crush those around it. In some situations, a gear might grow out of proportion by shrinking those next to it, and the clock may continue to function, but will not keep the proper time. Such may be the case in society where business owners and executives gradually assign disproportionate value and compensation to their own work compared to that of

the worker, such that the distribution is unfair based on what is needed for each to fully realize their design and purpose. The Old Testament ethic, for example, assigned a certain allotment of land to each family for subsistence (Num 26:55) that was not to be transferred permanently out of family (Lev 25:23-28), and "Woe to those who join house to house, who add field to field, until there is no more room" (Is 5:8). Justice demands redistribution of goods, in this case land needed to provide for the physical necessities of life in an agrarian society.

There are diverse and sometimes conflicting theories concerning what such a fair distribution looks like. It is beyond the scope of this paper and beyond the station of a soldier to consider just distribution in detail, but it is possible to get a sense of it. Rawls' criticism of utilitarian justice provides a starting point. He notes that, while utilitarian thinkers can and do affirm that upholding the good of all individuals is normally the best for overall utility, nevertheless in their philosophy, "there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others" (23). In extreme cases, a utilitarian could argue that some individuals need to be sacrificed so that the whole can survive and thrive, and that this would then be morally right. Since war *is* an extreme case, this argument is very tempting (and in fact is often invoked). But if, as I argue here, justice is the fair distribution of goods based on desert, then justice cannot be achieved by sacrificing some individual parts who do not deserve to be sacrificed. Therefore, the conscience cannot be appeased by such an argument, and moral injury remains a risk.

Like individuals, groups contend with each other for goods that are the currency of *eudaimonia*, justice and injustice. The state often sees itself as the defender of its own citizens, ensuring fair distribution of goods within the state and guarding a fair share of goods from other states. Cynically, the realist could say that the state has an obligation only to its own citizens and

none to those without, justifying hoarding of goods at the expense of other states and their citizens. Even a state that believes in the fair distribution of goods among all states can justify looking after only its own interests. For example, it may agree that it is unfair that other states do not have the power to defend their own citizens' rights, yet still feel no obligation to defend those rights for them. States are perhaps particularly prone to justify unfair distribution in their favour because the state is sovereign and there is no higher court to adjudicate between them. This leaves them prone to bias, as well as to protectionism due to lack of trust of others. The aim of true justice will be to attempt to see past these biases and to seek what is fair for all groups together, even at the expense of some extra they may be inclined to hold onto for security. The soldier cannot determine infallibly what distribution is truly fair for all states and individuals to live in harmony but must fight with the intent of restoring such an order.

While states have been the traditional focus of Just War principles, armed conflict between other types of groups should be included in this discussion, such as civil war, terrorism, counter-insurgency, and others, which constitute war "across cultures/civilization, between states and cultures, and internal war within states" (Heath 6). In this sense, the 'global war on terror' could be seen in two ways. Under traditional JWT, it is a conflict between sovereign states with legitimate authority on one side, and criminal organised terrorist groups on the other. But in a broader sense, it could be seen as an organized, large-scale conflict between two cultures, with Muslim extremists on one side, claiming to be an authentic representation of the Islamic Ummah, and the Western Liberal Democratic civilisation on the other, which is how it is popularly portrayed. Regardless of the belligerent parties involved in conflict, the view that the end of war is 'just peace', where goods are distributed fairly for the harmony of all, provides guidance to the just warrior.

Is Justice Attainable? A problem with having this kind of harmonious peace as a goal is that it may be unrealistic. And if it is completely out of reach, then it may actually be cause for increased justification of violence. If it were justifiable to fight until perfect redistribution of goods was achieved, for example, then there is virtually no limit to war (Bell 195).

Biblically, there is no expectation that such a harmonious peace will ever be attained by human effort before Christ himself returns to restore all things through his infallible judgment. All humans are plagued by vice and inclined to injustice individually and collectively. Even our most virtuous acts miss the mark, as the prophet Isaiah says, “We have all become like one who is unclean, and all our righteous deeds are like a polluted garment” (64:6), such that our accumulated deeds bring us farther and farther from the goal of justice rather than closer.

Some secular views are more optimistic concerning the ability of humanity to progress or evolve into a state of justice by our own striving. Others accept conflict as an integral part of nature. But even the optimistic view has to admit we have not achieved justice yet, and it is at best generations away. For example, McMahan believes that an evolving international court may suppress war by justly prosecuting unjust combatants, but admits, “At present, however, there is no impartial international court” that could conduct such trials (190). Therefore, this perfect harmonious peace cannot be a practical desired end state of war, in the sense of being a condition for the cessation of hostilities.

Nevertheless, ‘just peace’ is the *direction* we are heading in. It may be helpful to imagine the virtuous person as swimming upstream towards a waterfall against a strong current. They can not expect reasonably to reach the top of the waterfall by swimming, but neither can they give up, lest they be swept downstream into chaos and rank injustice. Yet, if they swim well enough and hard enough, they may at least pull society a little way upstream, if never to the final goal.

Therefore, a virtuous person is justified and obligated to do whatever contributes most aptly to just peace in the situation, in every area of life, and in every way possible. This is not the same as saying "at all costs", since some costs are opposed to justice and peace, hence are not the most apt way to contribute. It is always apt to resist the enemy of *eudaimonia*, as discussed above, but not always in the same manner. In general, the most apt manner to oppose injustice is with the least amount of force necessary to achieve the desired effect. Some force is required, since it is clear that it is against the enemy's will at this time to offer just compensation. However, the force required may be as minimal as calm rational persuasion. Failing that, one can appeal to societal pressure, grievance processes, litigation, criminal justice, and so on, to try to achieve justice in a personal matter, or for another, or for a group. In some cases, non-violent protesting, strikes, or civil disobedience have led to widespread improvement in the overall justice of the situation. If it is possible to achieve the desired effect without violence, then this is often preferable because taking human life even of an enemy of *eudaimonia* is such a drastic measure that it should not be resorted to except in defense of innocent life.

Unfortunately, it is often the case that innocent life is exactly what is endangered by the enemy. Such a situation urgently demands the use of force to protect life. If non-lethal force is unable to achieve this, lethal force may be required. But even when it is required, it is not required indefinitely; it may only be used until a lesser force may be aptly applied. The question of when and how lethal force may be used has a long history described as the Just War Tradition.

JUST WAR

JWT provides practical criteria that a virtuous soldier can use to help evaluate whether a war is just and what means may be justly employed. These criteria have been developed and critically evaluated over many centuries by pagan, Catholic, Protestant and secular critics and deserves

consideration. In order to defend this from a reformed Protestant perspective, I will begin by laying out a biblical foundation and boundaries for a biblical Just War ethic, from Romans 12-13. Then I will set out the traditional criteria and describe how they fulfil a reformed Protestant notion of justice, virtue and *eudaimonia*.

JWT foundations in Romans 12-13. Romans 12:14-13:7 provides a biblical principle for addressing injustice in an unjust world. The goal is to “live in harmony with one another” (12:16), described by Edward’s vision of true justice. While a greater harmony is possible and expected within the Church, in this passage in Romans, Paul is referring to harmony with those outside the church: “Bless those who persecute you” (12:15). Paul does not expect that harmony will always be possible, but only that the Christian do their best with what is in their control: “If possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all” (v.18). How is the Christian to deal with injustice? Paul answers, “Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave it to the wrath of God, for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord’” (v. 19).

Many Christians growing up in peaceful circumstances want to cut the verse off after the first clause “never avenge yourselves”, and substitute the rest with something like, “because vengeance is evil; God is a loving God who wants you to forgive and forget.” But that is not what Paul says. On the contrary, Paul affirms that the desire for vengeance is appropriate – in fact God not only approves but promises to execute vengeance Himself – but that it is only appropriate if executed by the appropriate authority. The term ‘vengeance’ is unpopular, but in fact what it means is to rectify an injustice. The Greek words used are *ekdikeō*, which is defined as “to procure justice for someone, *grant justice*; to inflict appropriate penalty for wrong done; to carry out one’s obligations in a worthy manner,” and *ekdikēsis*, which is defined as “meeting out of justice; retaliation for harm done” (Danker 300–01). It is related to “justice being done so as to

rectify wrong done to another" (301). The idea of vengeance in this passage is perfectly in line with the idea of justice as harmony of all members, with rectificatory justice serving the *telos* of bringing into harmony that which has fallen out of harmony.

In what manner does God carry out this just vengeance? Certainly, in part it has in view the final judgment (Matt 25:31-46; Rev 20:11-15; Ps 96:10-13), in which God will rectify every wrong that He appears to have overlooked from the perspective of human experience. At that time, all the dead will be "judged by what was written in the books, according to what they had done" (Rev 20:12). At that time, Christ the judge will "bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart. Then each one will receive his commendation from God" (1 Cor 4:5), but not before: "[the martyrs] cried out with a loud voice, 'O Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long before you will judge and avenge our blood on those who dwell on the earth?'" (Rev 6:10). Before that time, we will long for justice, and may strive for justice, but we do not expect it to be fully realized before the end. One reason given is that God is merciful to the unjust: "The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance" (2 Pet 3:9; *cf* Matt 13:24-30).

At the final judgment, then, and not before, God will achieve the justice envisioned by Edwards of perfect harmony of all individuals with the whole. However, God does bring about justice and restrain injustice in a limited sense in the meantime. One of the ways in which He accomplishes this, which is the one pertinent to this discussion, is through the sword in the hand of legitimate governing authority, which Paul discusses in the very next paragraph, which reads:

> Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore, whoever resists

> the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, for he is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God's wrath on the wrongdoer. (Rom 13:1-4)

Taken together, Christians may not take justice into their own hands for injustices committed against them but trust that God will bring about justice, and God uses secular governments to bring about justice in a limited sense in the temporal world. When the legitimate authority acts for justice, it acts as an agent of God's justice. Therefore, if an injustice has been committed against them, the Christian is morally permitted go to the government to seek justice. If attacked or threatened, they may call police to request protection; if a crime has been committed against them, they may go to the courts to seek compensation; if laws unjustly oppress them, they may seek representation to lobby for fairer legislation; and if their lives are threatened by foreign invasion, they may accept military defense. They are morally permitted, and morally obligated, to seek the same justice for others when they are aware of injustice. This is love of neighbour: to desire they live in harmony with the whole and fully realize their *telos* within it.

In his chapter on "the State and the Sword", Gordon Heath demonstrates admirably that, "Regardless of the system of government – empire, monarchy, dictatorship, republic, or other - …Christians have consistently developed the notion that the state has been established by God to carry out specific functions, functions that often included bearing and using the sword for justice" (50). He clarifies that Christians have not always agreed whether a Christian can participate in state's use of the sword, but "the thread of common agreement was that the God-

ordained role of the state was to promote justice and suppress sin" (50). Even those who held a pacifist view did not deny the validity of the government's use of the sword, only the permissibility of Christian participation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of the two positions; the question of MI in war is moot for Christians if the Christian pacifist position is the right one, so this paper assumes the JW position is a moral possibility.

Assuming that a Christian may participate in the use of the sword, as this paper does, it is clear from Romans 12:19 that they may not do so for the purpose of personal vengeance. It is perfectly conceivable, for example, for a person to enlist to fight in order to avenge a loved one killed when the twin towers fell, or for a soldier to kill out of revenge for a fallen comrade, or even for the attack against one's nation that one internalizes as a threat to their own security. This kind of motivation for fighting is not permitted to the Christian. But the use of the sword in Romans 13 implies a deliberate application of the sword for the *telos* of just peace. I propose, for the sake of this paper that a Christian fighting for the motivation of just peace is engaging in a virtuous activity whose end is *eudaimonia* as defined above, both in the secular sense and the reformed Protestant sense.

Just War Criteria. For the soldier deliberating about their motivation for fighting, the traditional criteria of Just War are indispensable. I will present seven criteria in the order given by G.S. Davis and Daniel Bell (Davis 53–54; Bell 102), broken down into two categories: *jus ad Bellum*, or justice in going to war, and *jus in Bello*, or just means in war. Two other categories have been introduced including *jus post Bellum*, or just resolution after war (Frowe, chap.12), and *jus ante Bellum*, or justice before war (O'Connell; Allman and Winright 177). Since I am concerned with a soldier's conduct during war, I will only look at the first two categories. Daniel Bell points out in his *Just War as Christian Discipleship* that, for the soldier, the criteria of 'right intent' covers

the intent for just resolution after war (167; also Heath 11). Similarly, the soldier's practice of justice before war concerns mainly an assessment of 'just cause', and moral preparation for the event of war.

Jus ad Bellum is the state's right to declare war in particular circumstances. Although accepting that war can be justified in some circumstances, the goal of JWT is actually to limit, rather than permit, violence (Heath 9; Cahill 1–2). It seeks to hold the state accountable to criteria such that it does not resort to violence unless it is necessary for the sake of justice.

Frequently in JWT, the individual soldier is exonerated from responsibility for concerns of *jus ad Bellum*, and need only concentrate on their own conduct in war: *jus in Bello* (Augustine, *City of God* 57 bk.1, ch.21; Walzer 39; Frowe 120; McMahan 84). This will be discussed below in more detail under the heading of 'combatant equality'. However, as the goal of the virtuous soldier is to fight only for just peace as an agent of God's justice (through the government), they will need to determine for themselves whether they can participate in a given conflict with a clear conscience.

<u>Legitimate Authority</u>. This is the logical starting place within the Christian framework based on Romans 12-13: without a legitimate authority acting on God's behalf, there is no justification for war at all. (It is the first listed by Aquinas (2.2, Qu.40), Bell and Davis. Frowe, from a secular perspective, lists it fourth, giving pride of place to 'just cause' (49)). The simplest and most obvious identification of legitimate authority is the recognized government of the state, in whatever form that may take. It may be an emperor – as it was when the apostle Paul wrote – monarch, oligarchy, tyrant, or democratically elected government. It is not required that the government be perfectly just in all its policies: Certainly, Paul did not portray Nero as being just, yet still recognized that he could bear the sword for the good of the empire and its citizens. Of

less certainty is the legitimacy of non-governmental bodies to declare and wage war, such as rival political factions or popular uprisings in civil war and rebellion, or of trans-national (often considered terrorist) groups. Al-Qaeda, for example, actually released a formal declaration of war against the US and its western allies (bin Laden). However, since it was not a recognized government, it was not clear whether they had a legitimate right to do so, which impacted the treatment of fighters fighting for their cause (for example, if captured, they were considered criminals and treated as 'detainees' rather than prisoners of war (POWs). Although this is an important discussion, and may affect our assessment of combatant equality, at this point I am talking to soldiers serving a legitimate government. As long as they do so, this aspect of the criteria is met without controversy.

The requirement of a legitimate authority implies an unbroken 'chain of command' from the government to the soldier-on-the-ground who applies 'the sword'. This is not to say that the soldier robotically follows the commands of their superior, but that they must act within the restraints and constraints given by their superiors. Only in this way can they ensure that their acts have been authorized, ultimately by the state who will accept responsibility and who alone has the authority to use the sword for justice.

Vigilantism, or taking justice into one's own hands, is ruled out. Self-defense is allowed, but this is because the law of the state grants this right to its citizens; if an individual defends themself in accordance with law, they act as an agent of, and under the authority of the state in that instance. This seems to clash with the tradition of Christian martyrdom in which we are called to choose death rather than resist evil. Martin Luther explains the difference; when asked if he would defend himself from robbers, he replies:

> Yes of course. I should then act the prince and wield the sword, since there would be no one else around who could protect me; I should strike out for all I was worth, and then go to Communion feeling I had done a good work. But if I were attacked as a preacher and on account of the gospel, with folded hands I should say: Well, my Lord Christ, here I am; it is you whom I have preached; if it is now time, I commit myself into thy hands; and then I would die. (Thielicke 462)

Just Cause. Secondly, the cause must be just. It is not sufficient for a Christian to 'simply follow orders'; even if the authority is legitimate, a virtuous soldier must decline any command that is manifestly unjust. This is true of any command or law given by government, but for the soldier it is a matter of life or death. As the apostles reply to the governing authorities (who commanded them not to teach about Jesus), "We must obey God rather than men" (Act 5:29). This principle is enshrined in Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in the Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&Os), which states "An officer or non-commissioned member is not justified in obeying a command or order that is manifestly unlawful" (N. Defence, *QR&O* 19.015.C). Participating in a massacre of a civilian population or torturing prisoners is manifestly unlawful according to the international laws of armed conflict (LAOC) and CAF RoE. It is conceivable, however that the laws of the governing authorities permit that which is manifestly unlawful for a reasonable person, for example the Nazi regime under which genocidal actions against Jews and others were 'lawful'. The Nuremburg trials rightly rejected this as a defense. The Christian, similarly, must consider not only what is lawful according to the state, but also what is reasonably required in order to obey God rather than human authorities. And this applies not only to their personal actions, but also to the justification for the war in the first place.

What makes for a just cause is implied in Romans 13, where Paul says that the purpose of wielding the sword is "for your good" (that is, for the common good of the citizens) and to avenge bad conduct. Under the reformed Protestant virtue ethic proposed above, this means that the purpose is to oppose the enemy of justice who is "statedly and irreclaimably opposite" (Edwards, *Virtue* 8) in order to bring them back into harmony by force or, if that is impossible, to restrain them. Early Just War thinkers associate just cause with avenging an offense (Aquinas pt.2.2, Qu.40, Art.1), with the *telos* being a 'just peace'. In modern times, just cause is seen to be almost exclusively 'defensive'. Signatories of the UN charter pledge to "refrain… from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" (art.2), yet "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs" (art.51). Hence, a state has a just cause to defend its sovereignty against 'aggression'. Aggression is the violation of sovereignty (Frowe 50) which includes invading sovereign territory or political independence. Walzer includes in this the integrity the 'common life', which includes lives and liberties of both individuals and the community (54).

One criticism of JWT is that it is difficult to objectively assess a claim for just cause. A government can, in bad faith, use propaganda effectively to give the impression of just cause where there is none. For example, the Gleiwitz incident of 31 August, 1939 (Debney 66–69) was a complete fabrication to give the impression that Germany had been attacked by an aggressive Poland. They invaded Poland the next day on the pretext of self-defence. Even the UN charter gives states latitude to claim a just cause for a threat to its political independence, which could be interpreted and spun in many ways. Are economic sanctions a threat to a state's independence such that it could be perceived as defensive to attack other states unjustly imposing them?

Citizens, including individual soldiers, do not have sufficient information to confirm whether all their government's claims are true. A person can only judge based on the information that they have available to them. Bonhoeffer believed that the German cause in 1939 was unjust and objected to participating in it, but supported those who believed otherwise (Metaxas 349–50). It is imperative for the soldier to develop the virtue of justice in order to best assess from the information available whether the cause is just, and the character of the government they serve. If their conscience does not allow them to participate, they should refuse. If it does, then they may participate solely with the intent of helping achieve the stated aims of the just cause. This leads to the next criteria, 'right intent'.

Right Intent. It is possible that a state has a just cause for war but its actual intentions are less than honorable. Aquinas lists this as the third criteria for Just War, and, quoting Augustine, says that wars are not just when they are fought "for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty" (pt.2.2, Qu.40). For example, Saddam Hussein justified the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait on the grounds that Kuwait threatened Iraq economically, while in truth "Hussein clearly coveted Kuwait's wealth" (Coppieters and Fotion 166), and his intentions seem more for territorial and economic aggrandizement than 'just peace'. As a result, the responding US and allied liberation of Kuwait in the same year had a just cause – restoring the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of Kuwait. However, it can be cynically argued that the US intention was motivated more by economic interest – a secure and affordable supply of oil from a friendly Kuwait – than by the desire for justice.

For the individual soldier, it is enough that there is a just cause, provided that the soldier checks their own motivation to fight only for that just cause. They may act on a moral equivalent to 'mission command'. Mission Command is a military doctrine that "relies on a clear

understanding of the commander's intent to… [allow] them maximum of freedom of action in how they accomplish their missions" (CFLI and Defence 131). By analogy, in the moral case, the intent the soldier has received from the highest authority is articulated in the just cause of the war, and any action or command which would be manifestly counter-productive to that aim must be suspected as a wrong intent. Systematically slaughtering civilians for the alleged aim of securing a peace for those same civilians, as in the case of the My Lai Massacre, is manifestly counter-productive to the credible claim of just cause.

On the other hand, there are many actions in war which are more ambiguous. If a soldier was ordered to secure an oil well during the Gulf War of 1990-91, it could be perceived as serving US interest, but it would also clearly serve the interests of the Kuwaiti people to protect the resource for their future use. The soldier can act virtuously defending the oil well for that purpose. The issue of 'collateral damage' where civilian lives or property is destroyed in order to achieve a legitimate military objective, is more difficult. Here, Aquinas' doctrine of double effect is helpful (pt.2.2, qu.64, art.7), which states that the use of necessary force to achieve a good effect renders the bad effect of the use of force only a by-product of the good effect. But this can be a slippery slope, used to justify great harm to achieve a trivial good. Thielicke, who is not naïve to this danger says that we need to ask, "Would I really be ready to wage this… war if it could in fact lead to the complete extinction of my nation and of civilization itself?" The answer is yes, "only when there is an elemental and radical threat, not only to my nation but also to our existence as a people, to our whole culture based as it is on freedom as a prized possession, indeed to the very possibility of meaningful human existence" (469). Under such conditions, it may be "better dead than a slave" (470). Apart from this, other means should be sought.

Thielicke uses an analogy here to Jesus' parable of the talents or minas, found in Luke 19:11-27. He says that the nation can become an idol (which he witnessed under the Nazi regime), but taken as a whole, the trappings of nationhood – culture, history, rights, freedom, etc. – are goods entrusted to us by God like the minas trusted to the servants in the parable. Therefore, "To surrender it is to transgress against the one who entrusted it to me" (470). We are not at liberty to sacrifice the liberty of others but must use it to the glory of the giver. A soldier who fights with this intent can fight with a clear conscience.

Last Resort. Before resorting to war, all other reasonable options need to be exhausted. This criterion is not identified by name in the ancient tradition, though it seems to be implied in the discussion of just cause. For example, Aquinas says that a just cause aims to impose justice upon a government that refuses "to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly" (pt. 2.2 qu.40). This implies that the aggressor has been given the opportunity to make amends and has refused. This often manifests itself as an ultimatum, such as UN Resolution 678 issued on 29 November, 1990, which "demanded that all Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991" (Coppieters and Fotion 163).

Ultimatums may make unjust demands which are not equal to the injustice that needs to be made right. The Austro-Hungarian Emperor, for example, had a right to demand justice for the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife in 1914 in Bosnia. But it seems they used 'righteous indignation' to justify ambitions for territorial expansion, demanding Serbian government submit to an Austrian inquiry, effectively undermining its political independence. The reality of state relations is messy and there is nearly always fault on both sides. Saddam Hussein's justification for invading Kuwait was weak, and certainly did not meet the criteria of last resort. Nevertheless, Iraq had grievances against Kuwait and its Western allies which may

have had some legitimacy. Kuwait was established by force in the fallout of WWI by the UK to serve British and, subsequently, US and Western interests. Hussein blamed Iraq's economic crisis on neighbouring Arab countries, including Kuwait, for not sticking to fair OPEC production limits, which was certainly encouraged by US and western economic policies, and for not cancelling war loans for its war against Iran which served the interests of all the Arab states. No doubt the Iraqi people suffered because of this economic crisis. Should the US and its allies defending Kuwait have offered to compensate for the consequences of unjust policies in exchange for the Iraqi withdrawal? Or was the economic crisis purely the responsibility of Hussein for unsound policies? In any case, the virtuous soldier who seeks a harmonious distribution of goods to all so that they may fully realize their part in the whole must consider what is in the interest of the citizens of the aggressing state as well as their own.

Reasonable Chance of success. The idea behind this is that the evils of war are so great that they cannot be justified unless the evils prevented are even greater. This may be seen as a utilitarian calculation rather than a virtuous one. However, part of virtue is to desire a good *telos* of 'just peace', and to learn how best to achieve this. It does not follow a utilitarian calculation slavishly, nor does it follow a categorical imperative slavishly. Nevertheless, both are tools for a virtuous soldier to consider the consequences of an act and of imposing certain rules and guidelines. As such, if there is no reasonable chance of achieving the aims of the just cause by military force, it may be more virtuous to resort to other means of resistance, such as we may learn from our pacifist friends.

One objection is that a virtuous person should oppose evil even if success seems hopeless. There were moments during WWII in which some argued that the chance of success against the Axis was so slim that they the UK should sue for peace. Churchill famously rejected

this and vowed to fight “on the beaches… on the landing grounds” even if the island were “subjugated and starving” the empire would keep up the fight (Churchill). That there was a reasonable chance is evidenced from the fact that they did, in fact, succeed. But it was not evident at the time. Furthermore, one could argue that by fighting, there was more loss of life and destruction than if Hitler had been allowed to carry out his plans unopposed. Few would argue that it would have been right to sacrifice millions of innocents to genocide to save millions of others who volunteered to fight or were killed inadvertently as collateral of the war to oppose it.

The principle here for the individual soldier is to submit to the decision of the government in this matter. If the cause is just, and the government chooses to fight, then let the soldier fight with all their might, even if it appears hopeless. But if the government chooses not to fight, the soldier cannot fight on their own without authority. On the battlefield, the soldier may be in a situation where the calculation of chance of success is relevant to decisions within their control. In this case, however, the matter falls under the *jus in Bello* criteria of proportionality.

Jus in Bello. Criteria of *jus in Bello* are those which the soldier is primarily concerned, and therefore most familiar. The earlier tradition concentrated more on the state’s obligation in war and made little comment about how soldiers should conduct themselves in war. The latter rules came out of a separate medieval tradition that includes the peace or truce of God movements and codes of chivalry. While *jus ad Bellum* criteria emerged out of a desire to limit the state’s use of the sword, *jus in Bello* criteria emerged out of calls from the clergy to limit the suffering caused by inevitable wars, and, from within the knightly profession, a desire for chivalrous conduct.

Discrimination. In its simplest sense, this criterion means to discriminate between combatants, who are legitimate targets, and non-combatants who must not be targeted. It has roots in the

peace and truce of God movements which attempted to minimize the destruction of war by protecting certain classes of people from being targeted in war, including clergy and 'workers' or peasants (Keen 27). In one sense, the medieval context made it easier to distinguish, since battles were fought in the field between two or more armies, whereas today's weaponry make unintended 'collateral damage' more likely. On the other hand, the siege of a city affected all the citizens inside, who may be subject to indiscriminate slaughter, rape and pillage once the walls were breached, and peasants may be plundered or murdered in their fields by undisciplined warriors. These actions were prohibited by the criterion of discrimination.

Some modern considerations include degrees of innocence and liability, and the doctrine of double effect. For example, is a civilian munition worker liable to attack for their directly assisting the war effort? Is it acceptable to drop a bomb on a high-value target if it is sure to cause the death of non-combatants in the vicinity? I will consider this in greater depth in the section on combatant equality. Here, the simple answer for the soldier is to follow the RoE, which in Western liberal countries clearly prohibit targeting of non-combatants. More importantly, for the soldier seeking to fight justly, "the criterion does not grant permission but rather names a responsibility, born out of love for neighbor, to actively strive to protect non-combatants from harm" (Bell 213). Our conduct towards non-combatants is driven by the *telos* of just peace wherein they be able to flourish.

Proportionality. This criterion seeks to limit violence against enemy soldiers. Again, this has roots in medieval clergy as well as codes of chivalry. One of the earliest examples of knightly chivalry is Gerald of Aurillac, who lived in the tenth century and was canonized as a saint for his virtuous behaviour. As a feudal lord, Gerald had a responsibility to defend those under his authority, and to bear the sword as a duty to his feudal lord. He is praised for his patience and

mercy and restraint towards his enemies. His biographer writes, “He was not incited by the desire for revenge, as is the case with many, or led on by love of praise from the multitude, but by love of the poor, who were not able to protect themselves” (Sitwell 100). In that lawless chaotic political situation, conventional wisdom says that it is important to be feared, but the biographer wants to show that Gerald’s gentleness and love for peace both earned the respect of his subjects and encouraged his enemies to make peace without fear of cruel punishment. The miracles associated with his sainthood come from battlefield victories won with minimal violence (101; 126–29). The relevant point is not whether the claims about Gerald are historically accurate, but that this version of Gerald was held up as an example of a virtuous and pious warrior, whom subsequent knights should emulate.

A code of honour limiting violence between opposing parties seems questionable. Indeed, it was rejected by Clausewitz, who argued that maximum application of force and violence would bring a swifter end to hostilities, thus limiting the harm caused by otherwise long, grueling conflict (13–15). The rise of total war in the last century has both cemented the principle while proving its fault: when one nation escalated force, the others were forced to follow in order to defend themselves, leading to longer and bloodier wars than previously imagined. However, the virtuous soldier will treat the enemy soldier with the same consideration they treat non-combatants: with the *telos* of ‘just peace’ guiding their conduct. The goal is not to kill as many enemies as possible, but to establish a peaceful future with and for them. It is necessary to kill to achieve Just War aims, but it is better to accept surrender with minimal casualties.

Combatant equality. The discussion so far assumes a moral distinction between soldiers fighting for a just cause and soldiers fighting without a just cause. I have considered this case from the

perspective of the soldier fighting: for the sake of their own moral integrity, the soldier must not fight in an unjust war. However, this poses two significant questions. First, does the unjust soldier, therefore, have a right to defend themselves or are they morally responsible for killing the just soldier? Second, does the unjust soldier deserve to be killed as just retribution for their actions?

The prevailing view is combatant equality (Frowe 124–27), which effectively excuses soldiers on both sides of a conflict from responsibility for acts committed in submission to a legitimate authority. Walzer says "By and large we don't blame a soldier, even a general, who fights for his own government. He is not… a willful wrongdoer, but a loyal obedient subject and citizen, acting sometimes at great personal risk in a way he thinks is right" (39). The laws of armed conflict (LOAC) affirm this view; for example, legal commentary on the Third Geneva Convention states, "The Detaining Power's authority to prosecute prisoners of war for acts committed prior to capture is also circumscribed by the so-called 'combatant's immunity'… Prisoners of war who are combatants may not be prosecuted for lawful acts of war committed in the course of an armed conflict" ("War Conventions" 3634). Combatant equality does not excuse soldiers from immoral or unlawful acts *in Bello* – if a soldier personally committed an atrocity, they can be held personally accountable by a tribunal after capture – but excuses the soldier from any responsibility to consider the justice of the war *ad Bellum*.

Jeff McMahan challenges this view. Conceptually, combatant equality sees opposing soldiers either like two boxers who step willingly into the ring and waive their right not to be assaulted (Hurka), or else like two gladiators forced into the ring who have the right to defend themselves and the guilt is on the masters who send them (58–59). McMahan rejects both conceptual models and argues that Just War requires a third model: that of policeman and

criminal in the act of perpetrating a violent crime. He writes, “the police officer who takes aim to shoot him does not thereby make herself morally liable to defensive action, and if the murderer kills her in self-defense, he adds one more murder to the list of his offenses” (13–14).

This analogy shows two things. First that the unjust soldier has no right to self-defence. The police officer only poses a threat to the criminal while the criminal is in the act of threatening an innocent victim; as soon as the criminal ceases hostilities and surrenders, the police officer ceases to threaten their life. For a defender to prevent aggression, they have to fight, but for an attacker to prevent aggression, they simply need to stop. The second thing this shows is that the just soldier only kills if it is necessary to stop an active threat.

This leads to an important distinction between being *liable* to defensive attack and *deserving* to be killed. McMahan puts it like this:

> If a person deserves to be harmed, there is a moral reason for harming him that is independent of the further consequences of harming him. Giving him what he deserves is an end in itself… By contrast, a person is liable to be harmed only if harming him will serve some further purpose—for example, if it will prevent him from unjustly harming someone, deter him (or perhaps others) from further wrongdoing, or compensate a victim of his prior wrongdoing. (8)

If we say that an unjust soldier deserves to die, that would mean that they ought to be executed even if they surrender or are wounded: if someone is sentenced to death, the executioner must complete the job. By contrast, an unjust soldier is only liable to be attacked while they continue to pose an imminent threat to innocent life or prevent achieving the just aims of the war.

This agrees with my proposed reformed Protestant concept of justice which seeks the harmony of all individuals and opposes individuals only who pose an imminent threat to this

harmony. The 'murderous criminal' who must be stopped by the police officer is synonymous with the government whose unjust aggression initiated a just response. Some of the soldiers fighting for the unjust side may be directly enacting the injustice. Many more are more like well-meaning relatives of a criminal who defend the criminal against the police because they are family. The well-meaning relatives need to be pushed aside to capture and prosecute the criminal at large. If they resist, the police officer may need to use force, but their guilt is the crime of abetting, rather than the criminal's murder itself. The WWII Wehrmacht soldier was not personally guilty of genocide, but they were guilty of abetting and protecting a genocidal dictator, even if they were ignorant of these crimes. Of such soldiers William Ames writes "Those that are guilty, are not to bee hurt any further then the compassing the just end of the Warre doth require" (bk.5, ch.33, para.17; 32). The objective of the just warrior is not the death of the enemy soldier, but a 'just peace' for and with them, or as many as can be saved.

Moral Guilt and Shame

Now that I have discussed justice, both in a general sense and specific to war, I can turn to the guilt and shame that can result from committing injustice. The reformed Protestant tradition provides a framework to understand the connection between psychological guilt that causes MI-1 and moral guilt of breaching a moral code.

Psychological guilt, as described in chapter 2, is the emotion experienced by breaching a moral code. Moral guilt is like a contamination on the psyche incurred by the act, or like a moral debt owed to rectify the injustice done. These are two sides of a coin: an internal, subjective side, and an external, objective side. The emotion of guilt is caused by the presence of moral guilt. The correlation is not perfect because of the disconnect between personal and transcendent moral codes. The discussion of MI in the previous chapter shows that some guilt is felt immediately –

that which results from breach of a currently held personal code – while other guilt is felt later – that which results from breach of a transcendent code which becomes evident 'upon reflection'. In both cases, however, psychological guilt is a direct result of moral guilt. Therefore, the surest way to avoid psychological guilt that leads to MI is to avoid the moral guilt of breaking the code.

I distinguished between guilt and shame above as that between what someone has done and what they are. Psychological guilt and shame are the feeling that one has done wrong and the feeling that one is a bad person, respectively. Moral guilt is the contamination or debt for the wrong done, and moral shame is the identification of a person as morally deficient. They are judged objectively as a 'bad' person.

With the reformed Protestant concept of virtue and justice established in this chapter, I can now explain the source of guilt and shame within this tradition. First, I will look at moral guilt as a breach of the transcendent moral code, and second as a breach of personal moral code, or conscience.

Transcendent Moral Guilt. According to Edwards, virtue is benevolence towards 'being in general', and justice is harmony of the whole and all individual parts. Injustice is any transgression against the harmony of the whole. Such a transgression causes objective consequences that disrupt this harmony, for which the transgressor is morally responsible. The transgressor is responsible to restore the harmony. This is objective, and it is even measurable to an omniscient observer. The subjective feeling stems from the harm and pain of disharmony. It causes harm to all individuals affected by the transgression to the degree that it takes away from their ability to fulfil their purpose within the whole. The transgressor is likewise harmed by the disharmony they caused but also by the burden of having to rectify all the harm caused. Psychological guilt, then, is only felt to the degree that the transgressor is aware of the harm

caused and their responsibility for it. In some cases, the felt psychological guilt can be greater than the actual harm caused, in the case where a conscience is over-scrupulous (which is discussed in the next section). In most cases, moral guilt far exceeds our acknowledgement of it.

Harm to the harmony of the whole goes beyond a utilitarian calculus of pleasure and pain. In the reformed Protestant tradition, it is not the outcome of the action that is judged but the intention, or motivation of the actor. This is demonstrated in the sermon on the mount. Here, Jesus is recorded as saying, "You have heard that it was said to those of old, 'You shall not murder; and whoever murders will be liable to judgment.' But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother will be liable to judgment" (Matt 5:21-22a). The point is that, even if we have not done anything outwardly that would be condemned in a court of law, internally we may be judged morally wrong. He goes on to tell us "Whoever insults his brother will be liable to the council; and whoever says, 'You fool!' will be liable to the hell of fire." (v. 22b). Here, he stipulates that the essence of murder is hatred – an internal motivation. This is evident in the Old Testament distinction between manslaughter and murder – a distinction that has persisted into modern jurisprudence – which hinges on intent: "If anyone kills his neighbor unintentionally without having hated him in the past… he may flee to one of these cities and live… The man did not deserve to die, since he had not hated his neighbor in the past" (Deut 19: 4-7). According to this moral code, it is possible to be judged a murderer – by God and, as a result, by conscience – without physically killing them. On the other hand, it may be possible (as I argue it is), to physically kill someone without hating them.

I will devote a later section to the idea of loving the enemy, even if killing is necessary for justice, but here I will discuss the guilt of killing. Killing always causes harm to the harmony of the whole, harm that is experienced by those close to the person or event, but it does not

always add the weight of moral guilt to the killer. If the killing was accidental, (*i.e.,* manslaughter), then the person who killed them is not responsible morally and has no obligation to rectify it (they may be guilty of negligence, but not intentional killing). Similarly, when a soldier kills an enemy in battle with the moral intention of bringing a 'just peace' for the harmony of the whole, then the death causes harm, but not guilt to the person who killed them. When, however, a person bears hatred towards someone but does not carry out the intention to kill them, there is less outward harm to those close to the victim, but the guilt of killing is born by the person that hates them. Hatred causes harm in the form of broken relationships between members of the whole that are meant to function in harmony with each other.

One goal of this paper is to help a soldier to be able to kill in war without experiencing crippling guilt. A criticism of this is that, for example, a sociopath would be able to kill without feeling guilt. I have argued here, however, that one's actions must be free from both psychological guilt and moral guilt. A sociopath may incur moral guilt without ever feeling it as guilt, but this is due to pathology: they are not morally excused, but morally broken. A soldier with a confused conscience *may* be able to commit injustice without feeling guilt, but the only way to *ensure* this is to avoid moral guilt. For an act of killing to be safe from MI, it both must *be* just and the soldier must *know* that it is just. This points us to the soldier's conscience.

Conscience

The Apostle Paul writes that when those, "who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them" (Rom 2:14-15). This highlights the tension between personal and transcendent moral codes and societal norms.

The exact nature of conscience is complex and contested in both philosophical and psychological spheres (Giubilini). Constraining my discussion to a reformed Protestant understanding, I define conscience as an internal 'voice', common to all (healthy) human persons, which guides us towards some approximation of a transcendent moral code. It judges our actions (or intended actions) as either right or wrong. Edwards writes that the 'natural conscience' consists of two things. First, a "disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others… in a consciousness of our being consistent or inconsistent with ourselves" (*Virtue* 65). Second, a "sense of desert", or justice, in which malevolence and injury are punished, love is returned, and kindness is rewarded (66). In other words, the conscience is synonymous with a personal moral code guiding the individual into how they ought to treat others. Edwards describes the 'natural conscience' as a sort of empathy that considers how one would want to be treated and extends it to others. Thus the conscience reacts to acts committed against others out of an "aversion to self-inconsistence and opposition" (67).

Conscience and Codes of Ethics. Conscience is distinguished from communal ethical codes (e.g., cultural norms). In fact, it is the conscience that challenges the individual to reject certain cultural norms on the basis that they are immoral, and more specifically on the basis that they do not 'feel right' to the actor in the situation. Such is the basis for social justice activism, such as the civil rights movement in the US which challenged accepted racist cultural norms based on the conviction of conscience that these norms were objectively wrong. These feelings prompted by conscience do not hold to the cultural norm, rather they condemn the actor with guilt if they decide to capitulate to the norm.

In war, there are often multiple and conflicting cultural ethical codes, such as that of the nation, one's family, the armed forces as a whole, and the unit with which one serves in theatre.

Earlier, I referred to an account of a unit in Vietnam that was ordered to fire at a group coming ashore in boats, only to discover that they were unarmed civilian fishermen. In the aftermath, they were encouraged that the action was justified and honorable. Yet the conscience of that veteran felt "deeply dishonoured" by the action, despite it being presented as an ethical norm (Shay, *Achilles* 4). It may be argued, of course, that the conscience is based on the higher cultural norms that oppose killing of innocents. I will return to this idea, but the important point is that the conscience is distinct from *merely professed* ethical codes. Any code that affects the conscience has been internalized.

What, then is the value of the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics and other professional codes of conduct? Such codes are our teacher, designed to inform our conscience. They are carefully and thoughtfully crafted based on the experiences of others who have gone before us. The apostle Paul describes the law as our "guardian", or "tutor" or "schoolmaster" (Gal 3:24), designed to guide us to a place where we walk by faith rather than by the letter of the law. Similarly, ethical codes guide the novice toward virtue and character that may be internalized and habituated, avoiding the need to learn through painful personal experience. My argument here is that ethical codes are only valuable to the degree that they have been internalized into one's conscience. And on the other hand, they are subject to judgment by both conscience and transcendent code.

William Ames argues that it is dangerous to submit conscience to any human law. He writes, "The Conscience is immediately subject to God, therefore it cannot submit it selfe unto Conscience any creature without Idolatry; God onely knowes the inward workings of the Conscience; he therefore onely can prescribe a law unto it, or bind it by one; God onely can punish the Conscience when it sinneth; he therefore onely can forbid any thing to it [sic]" (bk.1,

ch.2, para.12-14). Therefore, the conscience is separate from communal ethical codes, and should be adhered to when there is a conflict, at risk of MI.

Conscience and the Transcendent Moral Code. Conscience is also distinguished from the transcendent moral code. Ames states that "The Conscience of a man… is defiled… And so by it selfe cannot be a perfect, and pure rule, yea: if we simply follow it as a leader, we shall be brought oftentimes into vile wickednesse [sic]" (bk.3, ch.17, para.20). It is plagued by doubts and scruples caused, for example, by habituation to ethical norms that are inappropriate in certain (or any) circumstances. Such a conscience might excuse immoral behaviour, for example if one is raised in a racist environment and feels no guilt or shame perpetuating such attitudes. On the other hand, it may cause doubts when faced with the necessity to do what is morally right. An example of this is recorded by Corrie ten Boom in *The Hiding Place*, when her sister-in-law's conscience will not allow her to lie under any circumstances. A Nazi SD agent asked if she was harbouring any Jews; she answered honestly that she was, leading to their incarceration (ch. 8).

Examples of this may be seen in combat situations. Militaries expose soldiers to considerable conditioning in order to overcome the natural aversion to violence and killing, and to instill a military ethos with such values as responding obediently to orders without hesitation (Grossman, sec.7, chap.1). This makes it easier for the soldier to kill when it is necessary. But it also makes it easier to kill when it is not necessary, by gerrymandering the conscience into placing a higher value on obedience than human life. This may short-circuit the guilt/shame response in the moment but later, 'upon reflection', these breaches of the moral code may surface as guilt and shame.

The opposite problem often surfaces in combat in the form of an over-scrupulous aversion to killing even in justifiable necessity due, for example, to being immersed in religious

or humanist beliefs. The soldier may still feel guilty even if they have followed the RoE, and their cause is just. In this case, guilt and shame occur not because they have transgressed the transcendent code, but because their conscience is incompatible with it.

The conscience, then, is our natural, personal moral code. It does not guide us infallibly to an absolute moral code, nor is it identified with communal norms. And, while it can prod and prick with guilt and shame, we are still able to override it to act on other impulses that seem to hold greater appeal. This force that contends against the conscience Edwards calls affections.

Conscience and Affections. Conscience is distinguished from will, which determines how we will actually act. Conscience prompts and impresses upon the will, but the will can ignore it and act differently. Examples of this are myriad. Certainly, examples given above show that soldiers feeling guilt and shame because they acted in such a way that went against their conscience. Perhaps they killed an innocent civilian and were convicted by a healthy conscience, or even killed an armed enemy and were convicted by an errant one. In either case, they acted *against* their conscience. In fact, this is the crux of MI-1: that gulf between conscience and action.

Edwards attributes this to the 'affections.' Affections are the faculty "by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either is inclined to them, or is disinclined and averse from them" (Edwards, *Affections* 4). Affections are meant to be inclined to every good thing that leads to flourishing and be disinclined from every bad thing that leads away from flourishing. Affections that are rightly attuned, which Edwards calls 'religious affections', desire God first, from whom all good things flow. 'Natural affections', by contrast, are inclined to the good things themselves rather than God who gives them.

According to Edwards, the affections have mastery over the will. Our desires spring up as from the well of the heart's affections and motivate us to strive for the objects of our affection. It is this force that pulls against conscience. For example, a soldier's affections may be inclined toward honour and duty and loyalty as proper ends. In themselves, these affections may help the soldier to defend his country and comrades in combat with courage. But imagine this soldier in the situation where his platoon commander has ordered his unit to fire on innocent lives to achieve an important military objective. Now, his conscience is prompts him: "this is against your ethical code," but his affection for loyalty and duty drives him to obey. Affection for honour may conflict. But now affections for personal safety, and for acceptance within the team engage. The soldier chooses to breach his conscience to pursue the affections that motivate him more strongly than conscience.

Edwards explains the problem in *The Nature of True Virtue*. He says, "This natural conscience, if well-informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition to it; and yet without seeing the true beauty of it" (69). For Edwards, to 'see the true beauty' of something is to have affections for it. Quite simply, the reason we act against our conscience is because even though its justice is self-evident to us, it is not as beautiful or desirable to us as the objects of our affections. For example, conscience may tell us to pull over to help someone in need, but our affection for personal safety or punctuality or routine may be more beautiful, more demanding of our loyalty, than conscience.

To obtain religious affections is to set your affections on God first, and 'being in general'. When the heart is inclined toward God above all, then its desires for honour, duty, loyalty, security, acceptance and every other good thing are put in proper priority. Since its desires are satisfied by God, the will is free to follow conscience without fear. This is a

realignment of will and conscience. At the same time, it is a realignment of personal and transcendent moral codes. To put it another way, it is bringing our moral character into line with the golden mean that aims us at the proper end of human flourishing: *eudaimonia*.

The key, then, for a soldier to fight well and avoid MI, is to develop virtuous habits, which is nothing else but affections that are inclined to their proper end.

Love

The virtue of love was introduced into the JWT by Christian philosophers, notably Augustine and Aquinas. It seems odd to consider love as having anything to do with war; nevertheless, when Christianity began to be acceptable in the Roman Empire, and Christians found themselves in positions of power or in the military, they needed to reconcile the activity of war with the Christian call to radical love of neighbour, including enemies. Can a soldier love their enemy and still kill them? I argue that the soldier may kill the enemy despite loving them and must love them to achieve the proper *telos* of just peace.

Defining Love. Love is a virtue. Part of the problem with defining love stems from the loss of meaning of terms with the decline of virtue from ethical discourse, as discussed by Dorothea Frede in her chapter of the Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics (Russell 124–48). The virtue used to be called ‘charity’, directly from Aquinas’s Latin word *caritas*. Since virtues lost their status in ethical discourse, ‘charity’ is remembered as something more like almsgiving or pity, while love has become vague and tends to evoke the idea of an emotional attachment.

Love and *caritas* are translations of the biblical Greek word *agape*. The meaning of the word in this context is demonstrated by illustration, instruction, commands, and example. Love is exemplified by Jesus Christ who willingly gave his life to save humans from sin. Love is expressed in self-sacrificial acts for the benefit of others which are not, or not necessarily,

deserved. Cahill points to Jesus' Sermon on the Mount and sees love as "readiness to forgive," going "beyond self-gratifying relationships," and "mercy and forbearance." Love "urges the disciple to identify with the other, to perceive the other's concrete needs." Love is defined as "a way of acting, not as an emotion. However, inferable from the deeds done is an attitude toward others that might be characterized as empathy, kindness, generosity, or compassion" (31).

Love is a virtue in that inclines the virtue holder to these acts, out of a love for God and genuine love and respect for the dignity of all humans, who are created in God's image. Love desires for an individual to flourish by fulfilling their design and being in harmony with others and the whole. It is illustrated by Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37), in which a foreigner and traditional enemy acts to save and care for a man, while his own countrymen avoid getting involved. This is an appropriate picture for the situation the soldier finds themself in.

Love as a Military Virtue. A popular bumper sticker you might see around military base towns reads "I don't fight because I hate what is in front of me, but because I love what's behind me". The Christian virtue combines love of neighbour (what's behind me) with love of enemy (what's in front of me). The key challenge of war has been how to account for the requirement to love our enemy. After all, if love is an action (or is identified by its actions), then surely that action is not killing.

As noted above, love finds its way into the JWT through Augustine and is further enshrined by Thomas Aquinas. It is typical to note that Augustine justifies killing our enemy by appealing to the need to 'love what's behind' – the innocent victims of aggression (Regan 17). Aquinas applies the principle of double effect so that the intent of the action is not to kill, but rather the good of which the killing is a consequence (Vorster). Cahill criticizes both as dulling

down the actual actions required of love to a “readiness of mind” to do the actions if the opportunity arises. Of Augustine she says, “In presenting killing as an act of love for the killed, Augustine barely avoids an aura of disingenuousness” (232–33). According to Aquinas, “Love of enemies (Matt 5:44) does not, however, require us to feel a special attitude of love toward them, nor to show them ‘the signs and effects of love’ …to do so would constitute the ‘perfection of charity,’ which is neither possible nor obligatory now” (89). Bell gives a more nuanced view of these Fathers. Augustine, he notes, advocated that punishment, though necessary, must be done, “in a spirit of love, in the spirit of concern, in the spirit of reform” (159), and calls love, “a benevolent severity or harsh kindness, or in the sense that others have suggested an ‘alien act of charity’” (162). Although Aquinas posits a hierarchy of love based on opportunity and proximity, he says that in certain circumstances, the enemy neighbour before us may be the most proximate. “to love one’s enemies with the same affection and deeds bestowed on a friend is a more perfect form of love than to love only one’s friends” (162).

Bell gives three ways in which Just War is an ‘alien act of love’ towards the ‘enemy neighbour’:

> First, “Insofar as it restricts the violence that may be used against them;” Second, “insofar as the duration of violence is limited…stopping the fight when the enemy yields or redresses the injury and injustice inflicted;” and third, “To the extent that the goal of a just war is not the death and destruction of the enemy, but rather the restoration of the common good, of the order of peace and justice” (76–77)

Here again, the *telos* of the virtue of love in the activity of war is just peace, which requires redistribution of goods needed by both aggressor and victim to be in harmony.

Does Christian love demand Pacifism? The radical love of the enemy that Jesus commands tends to be placed in the pacifist camp. Cahill, for example, believes that the concessions of Augustine and Aquinas miss the mark of a truly ‘conversionist’ model of Christianity found at the heart of the Sermon on the Mount (232–33). I argue to the contrary that, as implied by the title of Bell’s book, a soldier’s love for their enemy is a discipline of a truly converted disciple (Bell).

From a Christian perspective, love is a fundamental virtue to complement justice. Jesus stated that the greatest commandment is “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the Law and the Prophets.” (Matt 22:37b-40). To love a person perfectly is to fulfil every obligation to them perfectly. Therefore, to have this virtue perfectly requires all virtues perfectly. However, without a clear definition of love, this rule can be interpreted to support diverse and contradictory principles and can become almost utilitarian: love can mean to let you do whatever pleases you.

An equivalent expression of this love for our neighbour is the ‘golden rule’: “do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets” (Matt 7:12) (since both expressions equal ‘all the Law and the Prophets). Cahill notes that Pacifists consider this passage to clearly demonstrate their view (31). A pacifist might apply it in this way: “I would not want to be shot; therefore, I should not shoot another.” But what if the question is phrased like this: “If I were about to murder my own child, would I want somebody to stop me from doing so, using whatever force necessary?” I believe that I can answer this question affirmatively. And in doing so, it places exactly the sort of caveats that are required of any Just War action. For example, I hope they would try to talk me out of it first and see if perhaps I had a

valid reason for threatening my child (perhaps the child is actually threatening another and I was protecting the other: unlikely, but worth checking). I hope they would attempt to knock me down before resorting to shooting a pistol at me, if it were possible without further endangering the child I am threatening or themself. That is, my love for my own life drives me to desire that taking it would be a last resort and proportional. If I love my enemy, therefore, I desire the same for them – that lethal force be truly a last resort. That being said, if it is not possible to stop me apart from taking the shot, I want to be shot rather than murder my own child, yes.

That is not, of course, to say that I would feel that way in the moment. If I am attempting to murder my child, there must be some reason, whether I am tricked into believing it is right, coerced into it out of fear of something worse, or have lost my rational capacity. In any of these cases, if I have no just cause, I need to be stopped. In the moment, I may irrationally object, but in standing back objectively, the answer is clear. In this way, love is reconciled with justice.

Applying love as a military virtue. As a virtue, soldiers need to develop a love for human beings that extends to fellow citizens, enemy nation non-combatants, and even enemy combatants. Love desires harmony of every individual with each other and the whole. If enemy soldiers can be seen as friends who have gone down the wrong path and must be prevented from doing harm, this can guide us to consistently apply the principles of right intent and necessity or last resort. Without the virtue of love, the soldier may be able to attain the external goods of 'just peace' through their actions, but not the internal peace from guilt. It may in fact be necessary to kill a certain person to achieve external peace, but if the internal motivation for killing was personal vengeance, or fear, or even just to get a paycheck, and there was no love for the person, then the conscience may condemn the killer as a murderer. The guilt and shame of this condemnation may cause MI-1. Therefore, loving our enemy is the only sure way to avoid MI-1.

4 MORAL CODE PART 2 – BELIEVING WHAT IS TRUE

Moral Expectations

MI-1 is caused when the individual commits an act against their own moral code. MI-2 is caused when the individual experiences something that breaches their moral expectations. This may include witnessing someone else breaching that individual's moral code, particularly if it is someone they trust, like a leader or battle buddy. However, it goes beyond this and includes when the world itself acts contrary to the individual's deeply held beliefs concerning what is right and fair. Such "Basic fundamental assumptions", include, "beliefs that the world is benevolent, the world is meaningful, and the self is worthy" (Litz *et al.* 698).

Such beliefs may stem from religious or ideological values, family and societal norms, or even an innate sense of justice (which naturally serves self-interest and grows to include empathy toward others). Farnsworth writes, "Given the role of religion/spirituality in shaping global meaning among a majority of the world's citizens, many service members' beliefs/values and future goals are likely permeated with moralities that are defined in part by the teachings and behavioral norms of their particular faith tradition or spiritual community" (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 257). LiVecche notes that "Many veterans are unable to reconcile such actions in war with the biblical commandment 'Thou shalt not kill.'" (31).

Where the religious person looks to God, MacIntyre notes that some writers looked to Nature, which is "conceived as and actively benevolent agent… a legislator for our good" (234). In both cases, the reality experienced in war can challenge everything from very high level beliefs including a just universe or "the ultimate goodness of humanity" (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 257), to lower level expectations towards self or trusted persons. Shay speaks of the broken trust of soldiers for their commanders and their nation, saying,

> They were deceived as part of their trauma… They were told about codes of conduct, but they then saw that the rules did not apply. They were told that the enemy was weak and ill-equipped, but then they saw how skillful the enemy's tactics and how well-suited their weapons were. They were told in many voices that it was noble to be a warrior and that they would come home as heroes, but then they learned they were not wanted… (*Odysseus* 176)

Similarly, the expectation that self is moral and trustworthy can be shattered. This belief may be derived from religious or secular sources. LiVecche quotes a religious soldier who, due to his participation in war, felt "I'm no longer the 'good' person I once thought I was" (31) though he had followed the RoE. Farnsworth notes that MI may invalidate such beliefs as "a perceived commitment to one's deepest moral standards" (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 257) from secular or religious sources. Meagher talks about "combat veterans who have followed all the rules and find themselves lost. Some speak of having lost their humanity, while others express the fear that they have lost their souls" (142).

This also points to an important link between MI-2 and MI-1. Farnsworth notes that, "a religiously devout service member who experiences PTSD symptoms and strong emotions of shame following a morally injurious stressor may interpret these difficulties to mean that he or she has been spiritually corrupted and therefore no longer "fits" within his or her religious community" (Farnsworth, Drescher, *et al.* 257). This implies that the soldier's 'losing faith' or breaking with deeply held beliefs as a result of MI-2 can be experienced as committing an act that breaches their personal moral code, causing guilt and shame that can lead to MI-1.

The purpose of this paper is to explore ways to prepare morally in order to prevent or mitigate MI-2. Figley and Nash discuss how an injured person must work through the trauma,

saying that, “Recovering from traumatic shame and guilt requires the construction of a new set of beliefs about oneself and one’s place in the world—beliefs that allow for very human weaknesses at sometimes crucial moments. Overcoming guilt and shame depends on forgiveness” (54). The only way to prevent the trauma that leads to MI-2, then, is to construct this set of beliefs *before* facing the trauma. That is, to challenge and replace naïve beliefs before reality forces us to. The process of losing cherished beliefs and constructing new ones can be compared to the grief cycle, such as proposed by Kübler-Ross in *On Death and Dying*. Another insight into the source of these beliefs comes from Edwards’ concept of Affections.

When Belief Meets Reality

Moral Grief Cycle. Kubler-Ross’s formative work *On Death and Dying* describes a cycle of grief. While its purpose is to describe the experience of patients diagnosed with terminal illness, it has proven to accurately describe loss of other things people value. For example, loss of a loved one, losing a job or retiring, losing one’s health or aging, and losing faith in deeply held beliefs. She identifies five stages of grief including denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance (ix). She is not suggesting that everyone moves mechanically through these stages, but they express a common pattern that may be experienced in different ways, durations, and even order. There are a few key take-aways relevant to the present discussion.

The first is that the goal is acceptance rather than reversal. If grief is reduced to simply a mood, then it might appear that reversal is a good goal: I was happy; this loss made me sad; the goal is to be happy again. But grief has more to do with one’s identity within reality. A loved one is so integral to one’s life that a large part of their identity is defined by their relationship to that person. The loss forces the griever to renegotiate their identity within this new reality in which that loved one no longer lives. When a loved one dies, they will not come back.

If a cherished belief is lost through contact with a traumatic event, it should be treated in a similar way. To try to hold on to such a belief in spite of the experience is to remain in a state of denial; it is neither healthy nor honest. On the other hand, it is not healthy to give up and stay in a place where the world has no sense or purpose; this is to remain in a state of depression. The loss of deeply held moral expectations is extremely disorienting. We orient our lives around them, working in certain ways in expectation of a just return. They make up an important part of our identity, which must be renegotiated in this new reality in which that belief we trusted in is no longer there to lean on. Acceptance does not mean to simply forget about it and learn to live without out it, but to allow the experience to inform and reshape the belief.

The second key take away is that acceptance is progress, not surrender. When you have a loss, it can feel like you had been on the top of the world and have now fallen off a cliff. When you are in the valley, it can feel like 'acceptance' means to you are being asked to trudge along the valley and accept that you can never get back up to the mountain top. In fact, acceptance is to walk through the valley to the other side where there is a gentle slope that rises higher than the cliff you fell from. Getting stuck in the valley is depression. Trying to claw back up the cliff is denial. The reality is that the cliff that felt like a mountain top was unstable – the belief was comforting, but untrue. Acceptance is to rebuild meaning and belief with nuance that makes room for the new reality revealed by the grief experience.

I say 'nuance' because it may be that the belief does not need to be rejected completely, but only nuanced. Wisdom passed down deserves consideration, and experience is fallible and open to misinterpretation. To use an example, Shay suggests that religious teaching that encourages self-sacrifice includes an "implicit" guarantee: that "God will see to it that the act of self-sacrifice, or even a sincere willingness to die, will *spare* the life of the comrade." This builds

an unrealistic expectation that, "In an ethical universe run by a just, loving, and all-powerful God, the 'person I was willing to die for' is not supposed to die" The expectation is disappointed: "The young man who took his religious instruction truly to heart found it unbearable when 'I was willing to die for him – but he's dead!' He was now guilty, and God was gone" (*Achilles* 74–75). I have argued above that the soldier should mourn that belief as lost and move forward to discover an alternative. However, what they need to do is analyse what exactly the expectation was, and what about the experience called this belief into question. The expectation is that a just, loving, all powerful God is obligated to save the person we risked our life for; the person dies, therefore their initial belief is untrue. I agree. This is a valid conclusion. Were they then to explore deeper into their faith, they would discover that the Bible claims both that God is just, loving, and all-powerful and also that He does not always answer our prayers as we think is just. The struggle to understand and accept this will lead the soldier into a deeper faith that is more resilient in the face of reality.

Beliefs and Affections. I introduced the topic of affections in the previous chapter. Affections shape our will, our emotional response, and our thinking. Affections amount to benevolence, or love, towards those things an individual perceives as excellent and worthy. The objects of our affections are those things which we trust in to provide justice – harmony, purpose and meaning. This is what motivates individuals to act in expectation of a fair return. Edwards argues that all humans necessarily have some object for their affections (*Affections* 46; 91–92); it is an integral design feature of the human psyche.

In light of this, the "deeply held moral beliefs and expectations" from my definition of MI can be defined as those objects of our affections that we trust in, and any facts about those objects that further define or constrain them. The previous example shows that it is not enough to

say simply that "God" is the object of one's affection: the God in question was 'good' and 'could not let the innocent suffer'. These constraints differentiate the God that is the object of the soldier's worship from the more nuanced God who is both good and allows the innocent to suffer temporarily but must make all things right eternally. Other objects of our affections may include security, family, duty, honour, military comradery, etc., each of which is laden with expectations of how they ought to function justly. All of them have the potential to fail when tested against the hardships of reality, leading to MI-2, except for those that are true, and in their proper place.

Beliefs That Don't Line up. History shows that it may be impossible to come to universal agreement over what best explains our experience, but contact with reality inevitably weeds out some beliefs. Whatever explanation we come up with must account for the 'problem of evil' for example: that bad things happen to good people. Belief in a God that always rewards good with good and punishes evil with justice in this world becomes untenable. Belief that the world is benevolent or fair – with or without God – is persistent, yet disappointing. On the other hand, nihilistic beliefs that the world is unfair, amoral, chaos are unsatisfying. They fail to explain the persistent human belief that the world *should be* fair.

More sophisticated atheistic beliefs explain this moral instinct as a survival mechanism that has evolved in this social animal called human simply because the instinct towards fairness increases the chance of survival of the herd, if not the individual. Morality is effectively an expedient deception that our brains have evolved to accept. (If this is the case, then the development of intellect to see through this deception is an evolutionary defect). On the other hand, more sophisticated religious beliefs account for the reality of both good and evil in various ways. The biblical explanation is that the world was created by God in perfect harmony. This explains the sense that the world should be fair. The world was thrown into disharmony by the

sins of the first human pair. This explains the reality of a “nature red in tooth and claw” (Ricks 399), while retaining much beauty and a longing for harmony. Further, the Bible satisfies the longing for justice through salvation and final judgment: all injustice will be made right; forgiveness is available through the substitutionary atonement of Jesus who accepted the punishment for our injustice to offer justification to those who accept it.

This is not simply an academic exercise. Simplistic moral expectations are anthropocentric, and ultimately egocentric: Justice boils down to what ‘feels’ right and fair to me personally (as though God exists to serve human interest, if at all). It is rooted, in other words, in our affections. And it cannot be uprooted simply with intellectual instruction. Often, it must be corrected through cycles of grief discussed above: one ego-centric belief must be tested against reality and found wanting, be lost, grieved, and then reoriented within the new reality. If done well, and we reach ‘acceptance’ stage of each grief cycle, we will be drawn toward truth, like a spiral. If we reject the truth, we may remain in a state of denial, becoming hardened in a position that is untenable, or we may go into a state of cynical despair, attempting to insulate ourselves against future disappointment by denying that there is any justice at all in the world.

The point is that deeply held beliefs cannot be influenced at the intellectual level through reason but must be negotiated at the level of the affections. It is easier and more compassionate to allow children to face small disappointments and grief cycles throughout their childhood than for them to face no challenge to their assumptions until they face tragedy, such as combat. By nature, we enter the world with both an expectation that we will be treated fairly, and an egocentric concept of fairness. In the reformed Protestant biblical worldview, the former is residual from the image of our just Creator, and the latter is inherited from ‘the fall’ – the sin of our first parents. The process of reality challenging beliefs is the process of turning us from our

egocentric justice to community centred justice and ultimately to justice as the harmony of 'Being as a whole'. "Folly is bound up in the heart of a child, but the rod of discipline drives it far from him" (Pr. 22:15). The discipline that God uses is to deprive us of what we think we deserve in order to show us what we actually deserve, and where justice comes from.

An important aspect of an individual's moral code and expectations include who is responsible to maintain justice and rectify injustice, and what those responsibilities are. If "the world is benevolent" and "meaningful", then "the world" has a responsibility to maintain this, whether it is God that oversees this, or universal 'karma', or the balance of nature. For some, 'humanity' is the integrating agent that brings harmony out of the chaos. For many, it is simply an expectation with no identified enforcer. The responsibility is hoisted upon parents, trusted authority figures, friends – especially the 'band of brothers (and sisters)' for combat soldiers – and other human agents. There can even be expectations of an enemy soldier, that they will follow a (chivalrous) code of conduct, and on civilians, for example that they will remain neutral and not threaten our flanks, in exchange for protection.

On the one hand, there is a remarkable amount of 'good' in human actors, who often live up to our expectations, at least in part. On the other hand, humans inevitably disappoint our expectations, sometimes tragically. If human individuals are the only source of justice, then the world is a very uncertain place. According to the reformed Protestant biblical view, fallen humans cannot ultimately meet this expectation both because they are inherently self-serving at least in part (that is, they are not perfect), and because they are not designed to fulfill this responsibility independently. Humanity has a similar problem: there is much beauty and goodness in humanity, but also much that is undeniably ugly, brutish, and 'red in tooth and claw'. Trust in humanity is disappointed and can lead to MI-2. Trust in self, or the expectation

that "self is worthy" as Litz *et al.* say, also disappoints, because self cannot guarantee justice to self or others either. And once we have been betrayed by self, there is nowhere else to turn.

The God of the Bible does not promise that good works will be rewarded, nor evil punished, immediately. In fact, Jesus promises his followers that if they act morally, they will be hated and treated unfairly. When the rescued battle-buddy dies, it is a result of the injustice of war, which results from "your passions are at war within you… You desire and do not have, so you murder" (Jam 4:1). God promises justice in the end but allows us to feel the consequences of injustice in the meantime. The Bible calls believers to love other humans, and humanity, but never to trust either to act justly or return that love. (So, believers can be pleasantly surprised when they do rather than disappointed when they fail to). The Bible affirms the suspicion that self is not worthy, and in fact cannot live up to the expectations of one's moral code, "for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Rom 3:23). Yet self is loved anyway: "In this is love, not that we have loved God but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins" (1 Jn 4:10). And self can be redeemed to be brought into line with its design: "you have put off the old self with its practices and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator… put on love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony" (Col 3:9, 10, 14). That is, the biblical worldview is neither optimistic nor hopeless about justice in the world, justice in human relationships, justice in humanity, or justice of self. The ultimate source and hope for justice lie in God and His redemption of the world and history, which alone brings 'being in general' together in harmony: justice.

The only sure way to prevent MI-2 is to have a worldview that anticipates everything that reality might throw at it. Since MI-2 results from a disappointment in a belief that has proven untenable, belief in such a worldview cannot be surprised or disappointed. The reformed

Protestant view is one such view because there is no human action so horrible that it is not anticipated in the Bible, no natural evil that defies biblical explanation, and no personal moral failure that should be surprising. Perhaps the only other option that anticipates these is a perfect nihilism that attributes no moral value to such events positive or negative. The difference is that the biblical worldview offers meaning and purpose in spite of injustice through a promise of ultimate justice.

The nihilistic worldview offers insulation against disappointment but ignores the human need for moral fulfilment, which may leave soldiers reaching for a quasi-mystical fatalism to provide some meaning. In *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Remarque describes the loss of the soldier's naïve worldview: "The idea of authority… was associated in our minds with a greater insight and a more humane wisdom. But the first death we saw shattered this belief… The first bombardment showed us our mistake, and under it the world as they had taught it to us broke in pieces" (12–13). Yet, he still needed some higher power to continue on: "In a bomb-proof dug-out I may be smashed to atoms and in the open may survive ten hours' bombardment unscathed… every soldier believes in Chance and trusts his luck" (101).

This does not mean, however, that a Christian or nihilist who simply profess such a truth has no danger of MI-2. They must truly believe them at the level of the affections. This is because our affections naturally turn to objects that glorify self over others and over God. Even if these truths are 'known', they need to be internalized, realized. They must become desirable to the heart. This begins to happen through the painful process of grief, which teaches the heart that any other object disappoints our expectations and wounds us, thus leaving God as the only viable alternative. According to reformed Protestant understanding, the heart itself must be regenerated – transformed by the power of the Holy Spirit so that its affections are set on God rather than

self. This is the first step in a life of Christian virtue. The regenerated Christian must still anticipate a constant struggle against affections turning back to their first loves (Rom 7), and must practice Christian virtues in order to develop the 'taste' for them. This process is analogous to the traditional process of character development in the virtue tradition.

5 MORAL PREPARATION

INTRODUCTION

Currently, the formal ethics training of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is administered through the Defense Ethics Programme (DEP). DEP is a virtue-based program which outlines a number of principles and values and a method of practicing these through case studies. In practice, DEP is administered through an annual lecture, which all CAF members are required to attend. If the Commanding Officer (CO) of the unit can give it a full, or even half day, participants might be able to work through some of the scenarios; more often ethics is given thirty minutes and the box is checked. Alternatively, members may be asked to complete an online multimedia slide presentation individually. Provided they can click the right boxes on a multiple-choice test, they are certified as an ethical soldier for another year. Thirty minutes per year dedicated to ethics cannot provide the kind of habituation envisioned in a virtue-based ethic. Yet, with the pressing demands and high operational tempo of the CAF, a CO only has one week per year to qualify all their unit members on individual battle task standards (IBTS) ranging from map and compass to marksmanship and weapons handling to laser safety and, yes, ethics.

The situation may not be so bleak, however, if we consider that much military training and deportment incorporates ethical formation inherently. Considering the four cardinal virtues, courage is highly valued in all military endeavours. Physical courage is instilled in basic training, as embodied by the recruit obstacle, or ‘confidence’ course, wherein recruits are challenged to test their courage and overcome fears to complete their training. Moral courage is encouraged and rewarded in training as well as in everyday activity within the unit, at least if morale is maintained. As a result, habituation in courage for unit members relies considerably on strong leadership. Where leadership is poor and where morale is low, cowardly, or apathetic conduct

may be rewarded in actual practice, and courageous conduct punished. Nevertheless, while this is a constant battle for military leadership, it is recognized as their responsibility to develop subordinates' physical and moral courage on an ongoing basis. What about other moral virtues?

Prudence. Military COs are perpetually developing the intellectual abilities in their subordinates, primarily in the areas of technical and tactical ability within the lowest ranks. With increasing rank, the expertise turns to operational and strategic level challenges, but still the focus is on efficient and effective application of resources and force to solve a military problem. The wisdom of the political objectives to be obtained through these military plans are left to political leaders. Many COs challenge their officers and even junior leaders to develop prudence through a reading program. I have personally participated in an 'officers' book club' in which two officers read the same book and debated it in front of the group. My partner and I debated the merits of Machiavelli's *The Prince*. However, the primary way in which soldiers are habituated to the virtue of prudence is in the areas of interpersonal relationships, group dynamics and motivation. Leaders learn through habit how to develop a team, prepare them for extreme situations and lead them through times of crisis. This tends to have the effect of making leaders sensitive to the ethical and moral problems within their unit, but less aware of the ethical and moral problems at the coal face between their unit and the realities of the operational environment – where troops meet local civilians and where they meet the enemy.

Temperance and Justice. The same limitations apply to the virtues of temperance and justice within the military context. Temperance is expected and rewarded with respect to other unit members, but not considered as much in relation to outside forces. Temperance is highly valued in the sense that a soldier is taught to maintain composure in high stress situations and to act on orders rather than out of passion. On the other hand, temperance towards the enemy may be seen

as a vice, and aggressiveness a virtue, once the green light is given to engage. Soldiers exercise restraint toward civilians, but even this is primarily in the context of following RoE.

Justice, similarly, is highly important within the unit. It is important for unit morale that members are treated fairly and injustice between members is rectified wisely, quickly, and decisively. As a result, this virtue is exercised within the unit, but again, not beyond the unit in a deliberate or formal way. Soldiers have a strong sense of justice but are not necessarily challenged to consider the fairness of their actions in war, or the fairness of the conditions leading to war.

Faith, Hope, and Love. The military has lately begun to acknowledge the importance of spiritual beliefs under its 'Canadian Army Integrated Performance Strategy' (CAIPS) initiated in 2015. CAIPS recognizes spiritual fitness as one of the six pillars (including emotional, social, familial, and intellectual). Spiritual fitness is defined as "a guiding sense of meaning, or value in life that has a positive effect on an individual's sense of morality and well-being" (Defence, *CAIPS* 3). It is "the ability to integrate core beliefs and values in a way that enables us to find greater meaning and purpose in life, positively affecting Army Team well-being, choices, actions, sense of belonging, and relationships" (annex. E, app.4) The document gives a number of positive outcomes of spiritual fitness, including, "enabling them to be strong, grounded, and connected… providing a moral and ethical foundation… providing [leaders] a moral compass which they can utilize with confidence in all aspects of leadership… to respect the dignity of others", etc. In fact, the entire ethical apparatus of the CAF falls under the heading of spiritual fitness according to this document, including the DEP. Individual beliefs and values, while not to be dictated by the CAF, nevertheless are important for the effectiveness of the overall team. What is communicated

is nearly that, it does not matter what you believe – within reason – as long as you believe in something. But you had better believe in that something strongly.

Soldiers need faith – in *something* – in order to serve well and remain motivated in the face of extremely challenging circumstances. They need some hope that their efforts mean something, that they can be redeemed from their failures, and that there is some reward even beyond death (whether the reward is for them personally, such as an afterlife, or for the good of those they leave behind). Finally, they need love, which we prefer to call 'respect for the dignity of others' in order to lead others and care for peers within the unit. The anticipated outcome of this for the team is:

> a. Readiness by inspiring an unwavering commitment to mission success which supports Army Team purpose and goals. This enables them to trust each other, to maintain *esprit de corps* and to be spiritually prepared for any of the challenges they face; and
>
> b. Resilience by fostering a high moral environment. This enables an openness to share challenges, and to accept critique and assistance from one another following potentially traumatic or difficult events, knowing that team members are grounded in a defined, practiced and hope-filled spirituality. (annex. E, ap.4)

Implementing Ethical Training. If we left it there, it would appear that the CAF has a good grasp of the issue and what needs to be done. It gets murky, however, when it comes to implementation. In the implementation order cited above, apart from the once per year DEP ethics lecture, nearly all of the strategies, programs, and training offered are programs of the CAF Chaplaincy, or Royal Canadian Chaplaincy Service (RCChS). This is due in part to the fact that this appendix was no doubt drafted by a chaplain working in the army commander's staff,

whose role it is to advise on all spiritual matters. The weakness of this is that most chaplain programs are optional, and many of them take place outside of working hours, on members' free time. One exception is the 'chaplain session' in which groups of soldiers may be tasked to sit through a half hour lecture or exercise led by a chaplain.

Another exception is the intent to implement Spiritual Resilience training into basic training courses for both recruits and officers. This is a welcome step. However, the same limitations apply as to the DEP mentioned above: there is already a lot of important training that a recruit needs to get a basic grounding in the profession, and there is pressure to shorten training time in order to get troops into vacant positions. Even if a reasonable amount of time is given to introduce the subject of spiritual resilience, including the importance of moral virtues, it is not the kind of habituation needed to ground one in virtue ethics.

Furthermore, the CAIPS project seems to have come to its culmination with the creation of a "Mission:Ready" website which offers some resources that members can click on if they want to get help or to develop one or another of these six pillars. Under the spiritual fitness page, called "My Beliefs", the resources point mainly to the RCChS, or to practical family or mental health resources. One interesting inclusion is a link to volunteer opportunities, which would give members an outlet to exercise certain virtues (*Mission:Ready - Canada.Ca*). Again, while the website is highlighted during briefings to troops at various times during the year, it remains completely voluntary.

Another prospect in this document is the intent to implement "performance mentoring and coaching" during phase 2 of the operation. This is difficult to enact in practice. The options are to pair mentors to protégés systematically, or to allow proteges to choose mentors based on natural affinity, or some combination of those two. Mentoring relationships that are assigned

rarely develop the kind of trust that can impact the protégé's character. Where they are not assigned, it becomes voluntary: many will not benefit from mentoring relationships, and the dangers of moral failure, such as moral injury to the individual and disgrace to the unit, are not averted. Informal mentoring relationships have always been a part of military life – it can be described as nepotistic in many respects. Mentoring programs have been tried and abandoned at various junctures in various units.

It may be that there is a failure on the part of the CAF to prioritize instilling virtue ethics into its members, or it may be that the nature of virtue ethics makes it a project that needs to go beyond the scope of regular work hours and beyond the purview of military leadership. The military can work to instill certain CAF specific values through formal training, by incorporating it into its annual training cycles, and by leadership modelling and rewarding virtuous conduct in their units. However, when it comes to larger questions of belief and meaning – which the CAF recognizes as fundamental requirements to motivate virtuous conduct – CAF members are encouraged to look to faith traditions or philosophies. Chaplains become subject matter experts (SME) in this area and are called upon to provide counsel to members on matters of faith and meaning, and to encourage them to practice their faith or beliefs, in order to habituate themselves. Such habituation might be realized through involvement in a faith community of the member's tradition, or service groups, talking circles, etc. on the member's free time. In such environments, members are challenged to think through their worldview holistically and put it into practice. They should also be challenged to consider how to apply these beliefs practically in the context of their role in the military.

WHAT WE BRING WITH US

Jonathan Shay notes, "We have been carefully taught to believe that good character cannot change in adulthood. This belief has a brilliant pedigree. It starts with Plato and runs through the Stoics, Kant, and Freud." He concludes, however, that "The trouble with this lovely idea is that it is bunk" ("Moral Injury" 184). Shay seems to be referring to a prevailing view of personality development expressed, for example, by researchers from the National Institute on Aging of the US National Institute of Health, who write "The mean levels of personality traits change with development, but reach final adult levels at about age 30" (McCrae and Costa 173). At the time of publication in 1994, they were able to say that "The general conclusion that personality traits are stable is now widely accepted" (174). Subsequent research shows more optimism for the ability of people to continue to develop positive personality traits such as insight, integrity, wisdom, and adjustment to society (*e.g.*, Josefsson *et al.*; McAdams and Olson).

When Shay says that the idea of character fixity is bunk, he is speaking negatively: his clinical experience and research has shown that character can be negatively affected by moral injury. Research in character development into maturity affirms that the opposite is also true: there is potential for soldiers to develop moral character right up to retirement. This does not deny, however, that the character is demonstrably more flexible and open to change at a greater rate before the age of about 30. Therefore, there is a greater return, and hence a greater urgency, to develop character in the lives of soldiers between the recruitment age of 17 or 18 to about 30. The CAF could have influence on the moral development of potential recruits through the cadet program while they are still adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18.

However we look at it, it is clear that the ethical foundation has been laid before soldiers enlist in the military. If they have developed the desired virtues, they will be able to build upon

them; if they have become habituated to contrary vices, these habits will be difficult, though not impossible, to change. Some vices may be screened out during recruiting, and some of those that slip through may be identified in basic training. But if most of the civilian population holds a certain value as a societal norm that is not compatible with military ethos, it is impractical to limit recruiting to only those who already hold all the desired virtues. For example, the majority of Canadians value human life and value justice in one form or another, but few can integrate these two values in the face of war, as shown above. It is not a virtue that should be expected of recruits, but one that they need to acquire specific to their profession. Some values that soldiers bring with them need to be challenged and unlearned, even while respecting where they came from.

Acquiring Military Virtues

As discussed above, the military is well-suited to train recruits in some virtues such as courage, loyalty, and duty, but less suited for others like hope and love. It is suited to train soldiers in some aspects of prudence, temperance, respect for humanity, and justice, but less suited to treat other aspects of them. A virtuous soldier will strive to practice virtues through the training opportunities and day-to-day unit activity, while striving also to learn and practice these other virtues. This could be done through personal development, participation in communities of faith, service groups, or other clubs that emphasize other areas. Of particular importance is to meet with like-minded military professionals to discuss and encourage each other in this endeavour, such as the Military Christian Fellowship (*MCF*) offers.

Habituation and Practice. According to Aristotle, moral virtue "is a result of habituation" (1103a, 17). He says that "nature gives us the capacity to acquire [moral virtues], and completion comes through habituation" (1103a, 25), for example, we "become just by doing just actions,

temperate by doing temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions" (1103b, 1-3). He compares it to practical skills that must be learned by doing; a novice builder can improve by instruction from an expert builder, but the instruction will involve building (1103a, 27 - 1103b, 2). MacIntyre reframes this in terms of practices done within a community that involve "standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as achievement of goods" (190). Virtues can be learned through a sort of trial and error, adjusting actions that fail to meet the standard of excellence. Aristotle seems to portray the standard as self-evident, in that a virtuous action is an action that a virtuous person would do (28, 1105b.5-7). With MacIntyre, learning can take place within the community from past and present practitioners (190). However, whatever action is practiced, whether virtue or vice, is what will be reinforced: if I act with courage, it will reinforce courageous behaviour in the future, but if I act cowardly now, I will be more likely to act that way in the future. "In a word, then, like states arise from like activities" (Aristotle 24, 1103b, 14-20).

In the Bible, virtues are cultivated both by divine grace and by human practice. For example, on the one hand, the Bible speaks of virtues as "fruits of the spirit" (Gal 5:22-23): fruits grow out of a branch by the nature of the branch, provided that it receives the proper nutrients, primarily on account of being grafted into the vine (Jn 15:1-11). The branches are pruned and maintained by the Holy Spirit in order to be made fruitful (v.2). The apostle Peter writes, "His divine power has granted to us all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of him who called us to his own glory and excellence… you may become partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet 1:3-4). On the other hand, the individual is challenged to make every effort to grow in Christian virtues by practicing them. Peter continues, "make every effort to supplement your faith with virtue, and virtue with knowledge, and knowledge with self-control,

and self-control with steadfastness, and steadfastness with godliness, and godliness with brotherly affection, and brotherly affection with love. For if these qualities are yours and are increasing, they keep you from being ineffective or unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. 1:5-8, *cf.* Rom 5:1-5).

Hence, the Bible agrees with Aristotle that virtue is cultivated by habituation. It is more complex when it comes to the idea of acquiring virtues by nature. In one sense, human nature is so marred by original sin that no true virtue can be acquired through it. The Bible says that "without faith it is impossible to please [God]" (Heb 11:6), and "our righteous deeds are like a polluted garment" (Is 64:6). Yet Aristotle's scheme works by analogy, since the Christian may acquire true virtue from the new nature – the nature of Christ bestowed upon the believer. Having acquired virtues, the Christian must cooperate with the Spirit to make them habit. They can claim supernatural help for this duty and may benefit from a divine goading when they neglect it, but they must still put in the effort.

In another sense, the reformed Protestant tradition recognizes that a certain kind of virtue can be acquired from the polluted human nature. Edwards refers to such virtues as "particular instincts of nature" (*Virtue* 75). They appear similar outwardly, but stem from a different motivation. True virtue, as discussed in chapter 2, stems from a benevolence toward 'being in general' whereas natural virtue stems from benevolence towards a part of being, typically self and the circle nearest to self. To use Aristotle's term, virtues incline the individual towards *eudaimonia*, and when one is inclined to something less than *eudaimonia*, that is vice. To use Edward's term, individual inclinations are 'affections' (75–77). Natural affections lead to vice, and virtuous affections lead to true virtue. If one considers *eudaimonia* to be personal happiness, they will exercise natural virtues to attain that; if flourishing for the human, to that end; if God

and His glory, then true virtue to that end. So, both natural virtue and true virtue exhibit a sort of courage, but the egoist's courage only inspires acts that preserve personal happiness, and the nationalist's courage only inspires acts that preserve one's nation but not to intervene in suffering in foreign lands. Humanist courage may inspire one to give their life for the freedom and equality of all people. The courage of true virtue alone inspires sacrificial acts for the harmony of all human persons with the whole while also providing the spiritual strength to act on them, the hope that it is not in vain and that even death cannot keep them from true *eudaimonia*. This goes for the other virtues as well.

Now, it is easily possible for one to act more courageously out of natural affections then another out of true virtue. It is possible for an individual to develop (I hesitate to say "complete") natural virtue to a high degree, through discipline and habituation, and equally possible for another to act cowardly due to failure to develop true virtue. For example, a humanist may be persecuted and killed opposing racial injustice, while a Christian may submit to Nazi antisemitic policies out of fear of injury to self or family. Hence, virtue habituation is important for all. Both natural and true virtue that are practiced lead to the common good. Both natural and true virtue that are neglected allow injustice to go unchecked. This points to the reformed Protestant doctrine of 'common grace', which theologian Louis Berkhof describes in this way: "It curbs the destructive power of sin, maintains in a measure the moral order of the universe, thus making an orderly life possible, distributes in varying degrees gifts and talents among men, promotes the development of science and art, and showers untold blessings upon the children of men" (pt.4 sect.3.a.4).

I have argued that all soldiers need to be disciplined to practice virtues to become habituated to them, for their own flourishing and for the common good. Some of these may be

practiced within the profession of arms. Other practices, especially justice and love of enemy, which are essential to avoiding MI, will need to be supplemented from outside. The best place to practice these are within a community where these virtues are ingrained in the culture. They can first be practiced within the family, but better a more diverse group, such as a church. Within a church community, the virtues will be positively taught and modeled and presented as expectations. They will also be tested: relationships will be strained by injustices, leaders will fail to live up to expectations, we will be tempted to resent fellow members we are supposed to love. These are the circumstances in which an individual can choose to respond in a virtuous manner with justice and love, in a controlled environment. Here, expectation and reality meet in manageable steps towards a faith in what is true.

Lessons learned within such a community must then be practiced in the military context and the wider world. In the community, a soldier can learn to love and respect those with different backgrounds and different views and still worship together and desire their welfare. This principle can be extended to those of greater difference in their unit, where the soldier can choose to respect those with whom they disagree and promote their welfare. By extension, the soldier can choose to respect the enemy they fight against, trying to understand their view even if the soldier has determined it to be unjust (which they must have if they determine their own cause to be just). The soldier that has learned to act justly within a community can choose to practice justice towards their comrades, commanders, and subordinates, working towards harmony within the team, and reluctantly but boldly rectifying injustice that threatens team unity. Again, this virtue of justice must be applied in war, where the virtuous soldier seeks only to bring about just peace that restores harmony with the enemy, its citizens and soldiers. The soldier

that takes every opportunity to practice these virtues in peace time will be most suited to practice them in war, and will bring credit to their unit, their nation, and their God.

Formal Training. For the individual soldier seeking to develop in virtue, every training event is an opportunity to practice even those virtues that are not part of the formal training aim. Whether formal training in these virtues can or should be imbedded into the training system is a different question. Ethical scenarios can be inserted into training events that challenge soldiers' application of RoE as well as moral virtues *in Bello*. Matters of 'just cause' can be inserted into the hypothetical training scenarios. Leaders at all levels who desire to provide opportunity for troops to practice virtues could use the existing DEP more regularly, focusing on scenarios that touch on matters of respecting human dignity. Commanders at the section and platoon level could break out the DEP during down-time between tasks. Though, if the leader facilitating the discussion does not take it seriously, the result will reflect that.

An encouraging development is the publication of *The Canadian Armed Forces: Trusted to Serve* and an effort to reinvigorate the DEP. It is virtue-based and focuses on character development, recognizing the time and discipline required to develop virtuous habits (Defence, *Trusted*). According to a recent professional development session, units will be required to dedicate 3 training days to DEP character development, spaced out over the year. It is recognized that 3 days is not habit forming, but leaders at all levels will be encouraged to make regular opportunities to speak to matters of virtue and character.

One option for training is to develop a series of 'chaplain sessions', thirty-minute presentations on ethics lead by unit chaplains within unit lines. This fits with the current framework where matters of 'spiritual resilience', which includes ethics, are primarily the responsibility of the chaplain (or rather, the responsibility of the commander on the chaplain's

advice). While a half-dozen lectures or conversations about military virtues is inadequate for perfecting virtues, it can at least alert soldiers to the urgency of the task and provide resources and direction for the soldier who takes it on, and can supplement the DEP.

Since faith communities, service and other clubs are places where ethical formation takes place, those with significant military populations should consider offering instruction and spiritual direction about military virtues. Local chaplains could help lead studies on JWT, loving my enemy in war, and other unique military challenges, in local faith communities, or clubs like the MCF.

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