

**Birds Without Wings: An Exploration into the Relationship Between Orientalism, Liberal
Peacebuilding, Resistance, and Masculinities in the West Bank**

Emma Swan

Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Doctorate in Philosophy degree in International Development

School of International Development and Global Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Ottawa

ABSTRACT

The image of a kufiyah-clad Palestinian teenage boy brandishing a stone laden slingshot, facing-off against an Israeli tank, has long pervaded images of Palestinian resistance around the globe. Notwithstanding the disparity in might, and the legitimate discussion around whether wielding a slingshot when faced by a tank should indeed be considered armed resistance in the first place, this dissertation explores the Orientalist shaping of Palestinian resistance and its repercussions for Palestinian men engaged in resistance. In the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, at an unprecedented rate, international aid flowed into Palestine under the pretexts of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Deeply embedded within the liberal peace paradigm, some of this funding went towards interventions targeting Palestinian civil society and the promotion of ‘nonviolence’. We know from other examples around the world, donor interventions targeting the political, economic, and social spheres of recipient countries have profound impacts outside of their stated goals. And while this has been noted by scholars in Palestine and beyond, what remains underexplored is the way that these interventions, and the embedded frameworks, discourses, and ideologies, have shaped both the unarmed resistance movement within Palestine, and more specifically, the individual social and cultural lives of those engaged in resistance. There is no way to explore, debate, or even talk about armed and unarmed resistance without first asking how the terms are defined and positioned within a particular framework. Here I find Orientalism, critical feminist theory, and critical peacebuilding literature useful perspectives from which to survey the shifting terrain of Palestinian unarmed resistance in the post-Oslo era and the subsequent shaping of male identity within the resistance movement. This dissertation answers the calls of post-colonial academics for the need to engage in resistance research that aims to understand resistance from the perspective of those who are resisting. At the same time, this dissertation challenges straightjacketed links

between representation and domination by expanding our understanding of the role of Orientalist narratives in the Palestinian resistance movement. It argues that Palestinian men engaged in resistance are not just screens on which donors and CSOs/NGOs project their narratives of violent Arabs in need of civilizing (through the adoption of nonviolence). Rather, Palestinians too represent themselves in different ways, conceiving a gendered sense of self in social, public and political spaces. Such contested practices of representation produce cracks and dislocations in understandings of identity, agency, structure, and power in conflict contexts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As many know, pursuing a PhD is far more than an academic journey; it is a journey that unfolds alongside one's life. Through grief, divorce, moving across the country- then across the world, giving birth to my daughter, and buying a home, this dissertation—along with my partner Kevin—were the only constants. This dissertation then, is the outcome of a long process of years of personal, emotional, political, and intellectual growth, and its completion – alongside the research that went into it – would never have been possible without the guidance, mentorship, and support of the community of people I am fortunate to have around me. Attempting to put into words the gratitude I hold towards this diverse group of people, is somewhat of an intimidating task.

I would first like to thank my family: my partner Kevin, my daughter Avery, my father Mike, my stepmother Kathy, my brother Alec and sister-in-law Ana, and my sister Josie. It is a true testament of love to stick by someone's side as they navigate the tumultuous PhD journey. My family persevered through years of my rambles, rants, thinking out loud, and celebrated every small victory. Dad, you have never questioned my direction, but rather have supported me in everything I do with a gentle hand on my back. I am forever grateful for your steadfast belief in me. And Kevin, where to start. We met in the very early days of my PhD journey, and you quite literally have been there every step of the way. Thank you for picking up your life and leaving your job to move across the world and set up a life with me in Palestine. I cannot count the number of pep talks you have given me, believing in me when I certainly did not believe in myself. You have read almost every word of this dissertation and I am deeply grateful for your feedback and reflections. During fieldwork, you kept me focused and helped me to fine-tune and articulate what I was experiencing, seeing, hearing, and thinking. Your brilliant mind kept me on my toes and your keen eye kept my grammar in check. I love you, and thank you.

I have the deepest gratitude for my fantastic supervisor, Rebecca Tiessen. Her relentless patience, lightning-speed feedback, and unwavering confidence throughout my field work and writing were the grounding force I so greatly needed. Rebecca's words kept me going when I lost steam, reminded me that I did in fact have something to say, and pushed me to take my thoughts and findings further. As a friend, a mentor, and a colleague, it is difficult to find the words to express my gratitude for Rebecca's overwhelming generosity. She always had time for a chat, responded with sincere feedback to my emails that arrived at all hours of the night, and extended countless opportunities my way, from which I benefited greatly, and am forever indebted. Thank you, Rebecca, your lessons and mentorship will stay with me as I move into this next chapter in my life, and always.

I was fortunate to make incredible friendships with an inspiring group of women during my PhD studies. These friendships were integral to my success and will stick with me for the rest of my life. The love, solidarity, and support that I received from Laura Beckwith, Jessica Cadesky, Katelyn Cassin, and Midori Kaga kept me going through the dark days of comprehensive exams,

fieldwork, the early sleepless months of motherhood while attempting to write this dissertation, and finally through to its completion. I would never have been able to complete what I had started if it was not for these friendships.

Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without all of the Palestinians who opened their hearts and lives to me. I was deeply touched by Palestinian hospitality, warmth, and generosity on a daily basis. In addition to the countless resilient and thoughtful individuals who agreed to participate in this research, many more shared their thoughts over a cup of coffee, while sitting next to each other on a *servis*, while choosing vegetables in the market, or standing in line at Qalandia checkpoint. This dissertation is as much a result of your patience and openness, then anything. Together, you taught me more than I could have imagined about the strength of the human spirit and its ability to remain hopeful and warm in the face of unrelenting struggle.

My journey to Palestine began back in 2011 when Karama Women's and Children's Centre invited me to travel to Dheisheh Camp where I stayed for a number of months opening a small library in the camp. Without this experience, I would not be where I am today. This experience, and the people who opened their homes to me and shared parts of their lives with me, ignited a passion for the land of Palestine. I therefore am deeply grateful to them. I owe endlessly to Sulaiman Khatib and Ali Abu Awwad who, during my first research experience in the West Bank years ago, took me into their homes and into their worlds. The people I met and the relationships I built through them were the foundations of this dissertation and are where it all began. I am indebted to the insights and authentic reflections of my five interpreters. Equal parts friends and colleagues, each in their own way, my interpreters deepened my understanding of life in the West Bank.

This dissertation is dedicated to the two most important women in my life: my mother Rebecca and my daughter Avery. While you two were tragically never able to meet, collectively, that tenacious spirit and curiosity for the unknown you both share kept me focused, kept me smiling, and ultimately kept me writing. In another universe, Mom, I hope that you can read this and be proud.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
LIST OF ACRONYMS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xii
LIST OF IMAGES.....	xiii
CHAPTER 1- Introduction	1
Research Questions, Methods, and conceptual Framework	3
Findings and Contributions of Research	6
Structure of Dissertation.....	9
Theoretical and Empirical Contributions	14
CHAPTER 2- Methodology	16
Field Location	17
Ethnography.....	22
Critical Ethnography- Critical Theory in Practice.....	28
Feminist Methodology.....	32
Locating the Researcher in the Research: Reflexive Practice and Positionality	34
Reflexivity.....	36
Evolution of Field Work.....	37
Positionality: Who am I and Why Does it Matter?	43
(Re)thinking Reflexivity and Positionality: Too much of a good thing?.....	51
Data Collection	53
Sampling and Recruitment	53
Key Informants	57
Interpretation and Transcription	59
Limitations	60
‘Performance’, pre-patterned responses, and inconsistencies.....	60
Language	61
Trust	62
Interpretation.....	63
Ethical Considerations	64
Anonymity and Data Protection.....	67
Potential Benefits to Participants	69
Methods.....	70
Participant Observation	70
Semi-Structured Interviews.....	76
Group Interviews.....	82
Data Analysis	83
Coding	83
Presentation of Findings.....	85

Conclusion	87
CHAPTER 3- Research Paradigm: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework	88
Poststructuralism Meets Critical Feminist Theory	88
Discourse and Power	94
Discourse	94
Power	95
Power and Resistance	98
Orientalism- The Politics of Representation	99
Masculinities: Hegemonic, Alternative, and Beyond	103
Hegemonic Masculinities	105
Shifting Hegemonic Masculinities Towards Alternatives?	107
Structure-and-Agency Perspective	112
Conclusion	122
CHAPTER 4- Review of Relevant Literature	123
Resistance	124
Palestinian Resistance	128
Sumud and Everyday Acts of Resistance	131
Unarmed Resistance and Peacebuilding	133
Resistance and Gender	137
Masculinities and Palestine	145
Peacebuilding	148
Liberal Peacebuilding	149
Local Ownership	153
Critiques of the local turn literature/practice	155
The Everyday	158
Resistance and Hybridity	162
NGO-ization	165
NGO-ization in Palestine	169
Gender, Peace, and Security	171
Enter in the 'other' side of gender	172
Masculinities and Nonviolent Action in Conflict and Peace.....	176
CHAPTER 5- Overview and Evolution of Palestinian Resistance	181
A Land Without a People for a People Without a Land?	181
The Naksa, or Six Day War 1967.....	185
October War, or Yom Kippur War 1973.....	191
First Intifada 1987.....	192
Fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf Crisis	198
Oslo 1993-1995.....	200
Post-Oslo Era	204
Second Intifada 2000	205
From the Fall of the Intifada, to the Rise of BDS.....	211
Fatah-Hamas Schism.....	212
Third Intifada or the Death of Resistance? 2015.....	214

Oslo and its Discontents	216
The TRUMPeted Cries of Oslo's Swan Song	219
Great March of Return.....	220
2022 and Beyond	222
Conclusion	222
CHAPTER 6- To Exist is to Resist: Motivating factors leading Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance today	224
Why Engage in Resistance	225
We are born into a context that creates resistance: resistance is a reaction, not an action	226
In Search of Dignity: Resistance as Empowerment, Resistance as Resilience	231
Live like Other Human Beings in the World	233
Why Engage in <i>Unarmed</i> Resistance?	235
Shifting perspectives, humanizing Palestinians.....	235
Gaining the international community's support	238
Emasculation or Alternative Masculinities	245
I don't want to die for my country, I want to live for my country.....	247
The Motivations of 'Others'	253
It's all about the money- 'You pay for nonviolence, you get nonviolence'	256
Meeting 'Internationals'	258
Travel.....	260
Conclusion	264
CHAPTER 7- Occupied by Nonviolence: Liberal Peace over Liberation	265
What is the Liberal Peace Architecture?.....	266
Oslo, the Liberal Peacebuilding Architecture and CSOs/NGOs.....	272
NGO-ization.....	275
The 'Local Turn'	276
Liberal Peacebuilding and Unarmed Resistance: Co-Constitutive or Diametrically Opposed?	278
NGO-ization: The Declawing of a Movement	285
From a National Agenda to the Globalized Liberal Peace Agenda	285
From Collectivism Under Popular Resistance to the Globalized Elite	292
From Politics to the Anti-Politics of Specific Sites/Projects/Days.....	293
From Indigenous Knowledge Towards Neo-Colonial Knowledge of Orientalism.....	296
Conclusion	300
CHAPTER 8- Two Wings of a Bird: Armed and Unarmed Resistance	301
The Role of Ideology and Framing in Shaping Unarmed Resistance: Orientalism	302
From Said's Orientalism to the Orientalism Embedded in LPA Today	304
Israel versus the Palestinian 'Other'	304
Orientalism in Action.....	305
Removing the Broader Context of Settler Colonialism.....	306
The Case of Pinkwashing	310
The Language of Violence	312
Mobius Strip of Violent/Nonviolent Resistance and the Inevitability of Palestinian 'Violence'	317
Who's Violence?	319

Orientalism and the LPA: Erosion of Self-Representation and Indigenous Knowledge	322
Armed and Unarmed Resistance: A Binary or 'Two Wings of a Bird'?	326
Throwing Stones.....	330
Shifting Frameworks of Stone Throwing	335
Conclusion	337
CHAPTER 9- Birds Without Wings: Material and Structural Effects of the LPA on Unarmed Resistance	339
Forsaking a Broader Strategy of National Liberation, Self-Determination, and Decolonization for a Framework Palatable to the LPA.....	339
Narrowing Resistance to Specific Projects/Days/Sites.....	343
Projects.....	343
From National Liberation to Specific Sites	348
"Only on Fridays"	349
Money and Salaries Shape Resistance: "I think you have touched our wound in this question"	353
Killed Volunteerism	356
Elitism, Lack of Trust, Jealousy, and Skepticism	358
Conclusion	364
CHAPTER 10- Masculinity and Unarmed Resistance Post-Oslo: Structure and Agency	366
The Construction of Masculinity Under Occupation: The Role of Resistance	369
Violence, Suffering, and Sacrifice- Pillars of Hegemonic Masculinity?	377
Social Perception of Resistance Tactics	380
The Currency of Nonviolence	384
Shifting Resistance Frameworks: On Script, Off Script.....	386
Collecting Passport Stamps and Pay Cheques.....	396
Making Friends with Foreigners	401
CHAPTER 11- New Spaces for Alternative Masculinities, Evolving Notion of Hegemonic Masculinity, or Neither?	411
'Nonviolent' Resistance: A New Space for Alternative Masculinity?	412
Unarmed Resistance: The New Hegemonic Norm?	424
Conclusion	432
CONCLUSION	436
Research Questions and Summary of Key Findings	438
Implications and Contributions of Findings	440
The interpellation of Orientalist narratives into liberal peacebuilding	441
Nuancing 'the local': from local agendas to local actors	444
Structure-orientated versus agency-orientated approach to peacebuilding	450
Resistance Studies	453
Masculinities	455
Limitations of Research and Future Empirical Studies	456
Conclusion	460
REFERENCES	463

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AHC	Arab Higher Committee
BDS	Boycott Divestment Sanction
BSO	Palestinian Black September Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
EUPOL COPPS	European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMR	Great March of Return
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
ISM	International Solidarity Movement
LGBTQ2+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Two-Spirited
LPA	Liberal Peace Architecture
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCR	Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement

PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PRC	Popular Resistance Committees
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works for Palestinian Refugees
UNSCR 1325	United Nations Security Council Resolution Women, Peace and Security

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Number of Interviews per Participant.....	78

LIST OF IMAGES

Image 1: Open Shuhada Street campaign. Photo by Author, Feb 2018.	73
Image 2: Group interview, Youth of Sumud, cave rehabilitation project, Susya. Photo by Interpreter, January 2019.	83
Image 3: A banner in Hebrew, English and Arabic hangs at the entrance of a protest at the Bedouin community of Khan al Ahmar which the Israeli Supreme Court had recently given approval to the Israeli state to forcibly transfer and demolish. Photo by Author, July 2018.	242
Image 4: Activist making placards for the protest the following morning. Photo taken shortly after the interaction described above. Photo by Author, Feb 2018	289
Image 5: Standwithus Flyer. www.standwithus.com/campus/pdfs/flyers/treatmentgay.pdf and Poster from Blue Star http://www.bluestarpr.com/poster-galleries/page/2/	311
Image 6: Activists gather at Khan al-Ahmar to protest Israeli demolition orders. Photo by Author. October 2018	353
Image 7: Mural depicting men throwing stones and being arrested on the Separation Wall outside of Aida Refugee Camp in Bethlehem. Photo by Author, February 2018.....	371
Image 8: Framed photos of male family members killed or imprisoned, and Yasser Arafat on a participant's living room wall. Photo by Author, November 2018.....	372
Image 9: Poster on Refugee Camp Wall. Photo by Author, October, 2018.	411

CHAPTER 1- Introduction

In the years following the 1993 Oslo Accords, billions of dollars in multilateral foreign aid flowed into what was intended to be the future state of Palestine. The majority of this aid was directed towards supporting peacebuilding and statebuilding initiatives with the hopes of creating a ‘just, lasting and comprehensive peace’, and ultimately serve as a roadmap to a viable and sovereign Palestinian state. Despite the large sums of money spent over the course of the past 29 years, few material steps towards either initiative have been achieved and an independent Palestinian state seems less probable than at any other point in recent memory. Palestinians for their part are arguably in a far worse economic and political situation than ever before. As such, the prospect of peace is ever more remote.

With the chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasser Arafat denouncing armed resistance, the PLO leadership returning from exile and trading in their guns for positions in the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA)— thus transforming Fatah from a national liberation movement to a political party—the Oslo years precipitated the demilitarization (and largely demobilization) of the cohesive resistance movement Palestinians once rallied behind. Despite this demilitarization and demobilization, piecemeal resistance to Israeli settler colonial practices remains to this day, albeit almost unrecognizable from the national liberation movement that existed prior. While the changing political dynamics certainly contributed to the unrecognizable nature of resistance today, other important factors related to the introduction of Western peacebuilding efforts in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords also contributed to the shifting nature of resistance, and yet remain underexplored.

While these dynamics unfolded in Palestine from the early 1990s onward, on the international stage and in academic and policy circles, conversations related to the ineffectiveness and perceived shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding proliferated at a rapid speed. Questions of local ownership, the everyday, resistance, and hybridity began to destabilize liberal peacebuilding orthodoxy. During this same period of time, feminists were increasingly questioning the gender dynamics of conflict and peace, with novel questions around the role of masculinities in these domains gaining prominence. This period of time also coincided with the establishment of the field of resistance studies. Concerned with questions of oppression, power, and agency, this area of inquiry drew widespread attention and turned its analytical focus towards the experiences of individuals and groups resisting oppression. While the evolution of these conversations may have occurred simultaneously as major political and social shifts were underway in Palestine, there has been insufficient research bringing these strands of thought together. There has been even less attention turned towards how these shifts play out on the micro level, in the everyday lives of those engaged in unarmed resistance as they navigate the complex and precarious realities of post-Oslo Palestine.

One of the first things that becomes apparent when looking at the contemporary conditions and circumstances surrounding unarmed resistance in Palestine, is that resistance is both a globally and locally influenced practice. It is impossible to understand the evolution of the Palestinian resistance movement today without looking at the role of the international community. Through their efforts to graft grassroots peacebuilding onto preexisting unarmed resistance activism, over the course of my research, it became increasingly clear that the international community has played a crucial role in shaping the discourse, mobilization, and praxis of unarmed resistance. These global influences include the role of donors, the process and rhetoric of liberal peacebuilding, the presence of international peace activists, and the influences of all these on CSOs/NGOs in the region (a

process I refer to as NGO-ization). While international and foreign ideological influences and financial support is by no means a new phenomenon in Palestinian, it nevertheless remains an underexplored and ill-understood dynamic today. Therefore, it is from this place, that this dissertation launches its inquiry.

Notwithstanding fifty-five years of Israeli military occupation, and in the face of rampant media coverage of the ‘violent Palestinian Other’, there exists a substantial, yet underappreciated, majority of Palestinian men who refuse the use of arms as a means of creating a future free from colonial oppression. The majority of Palestinian men reject expressions of masculinity that rely on armed resistance – even though permitted by international law – and instead opt for unarmed tools for building peaceful and inclusive communities. How do research participants understand this choice and how are these choices impacted by external factors? How does this choice impact their gender identity, and vice versa? Does this represent a context specific example of the unraveling of hegemonic masculine expectations in conflict settings? Or are there other ways of understanding the decision making of research participants? In addressing questions such as these, this dissertation answers the appeals of feminist academics and practitioners who urge that there is great need to explore the variety of masculinities that emerge in times of conflict (Connell, 2009; Duncanson, 2015; Higate, 2007, 2012; Parpart, 2015; Wedgwood, 2009; Groes-Greene, 2009), and “to understand more about men who do not resort to violence, even when they have all the life experiences that would lead us to expect them to do so” (Pankhurst, 2008, p. 312).

Research Questions, Methods, and conceptual Framework

This research explores, through firsthand narratives and the backdrop of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the interactions and relationships that emerge when liberal peace interventions are grafted

onto a longstanding national liberation movement. It provides granular analysis into the subsequent nuanced social relations and invisible workings of power in the lives of male Palestinians engaged in unarmed resistance. Moreover, it addresses motivations related to why and how certain men reject armed engagement in resistance/conflict. Understanding the decision-making of research participants can only be undertaken if we: a) think about how gender is experienced differently by men and women in the region; b) understand the extent to which masculinity is conceptualized in terms of engagement in resistance, and; c) explore what kind of a space exists for alternative masculinities, for men who choose unarmed resistance.

Specifically, this dissertation is exploratory in nature and relied on qualitative data to consider the following research questions:

1. What are some contributing factors that lead men to engage in unarmed resistance today?
2. How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?
3. How have men engaged in unarmed resistance, responded to and navigated the contemporary unarmed resistance space?

I addressed these three research questions across six empirical chapters. An overview of these chapters will be provided below.

Peacebuilding literature confirms the importance of peacebuilding policies being built around indigenous frameworks, agendas, and involvement, thus promoting local ownership as a key facet of sustainable peace. What the literature often overlooks however, are fundamental questions related to epistemological, ideological, and discursive alignment (or lack thereof) between a specific local context, and the intersection with the agendas of donors and the normative frameworks that influence them. With these questions remaining overlooked, there is subsequently

minimal investigation into the impacts on, and the first-hand experiences and perspectives of those who find themselves in the spaces where these two meet. This dissertation therefore, aims to fill that gap by engaging a theoretical and conceptual framework that teases out and highlights the diverse ways that liberal peace has shaped the Palestinian unarmed resistance movement, and how men have, through a combination of cooption, resistance, and strategic adoption, navigated this nexus.

In order to highlight the various implications of the meeting of liberal peace and unarmed resistance in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, this dissertation draws on Edward Said's concept of Orientalism to interrogate the embedded logic of the liberal peace paradigm which frames Palestinians as the violent Other. Orientalism is used to draw readers' attention to the politics of representation and unearth the subterranean operations of Western power in producing a distorted image of Others/the Orient/Arabs/Palestinians. I then use the concept of *NGO-ization* to illustrate some of the consequences of the increase in Western donor involvement on the unarmed resistance movement. The primary contribution of this dissertation relates to the utilization of hegemonic and alternative masculinities to explore the relationship between liberal peacebuilding, power, gender identity, and unarmed resistance. The theoretical focus on masculinities helps to bring to light the elusive nature of patriarchy and the way that various aspects of power manifest in the lives of research participants.

Lastly, I embark on my analysis through a structure and agency approach. This approach ensures that the context of settler colonialism, as well as externally imposed liberal peacebuilding, remain central throughout my analysis and presentation of findings. While ensuring that the structures remain visible, this approach has also made it possible to simultaneously focus on the specific and

individual ways that my research participants navigate the complex social and political context they find themselves in.

Data was collected from a combination of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and group interviews over the course of 20 months of field work in the West Bank. While hundreds of individuals informed my understanding of my research topic, I officially engaged 56 research participants (8 women and 48 men). During field work, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 38 participants (6 women and 32 men), many of whom took part in multiple interviews, for a total of 63 interviews and more than 126 hours of verbatim transcribed material. Data were also collected during three group interviews (one with 7 participants, one with 6 participants, and one with 5 participants) for a total of 18 participants (2 women and 16 men).

Findings and Contributions of Research

The main findings of this dissertation are best broken down per research question.

1. *What are some contributing factors that lead men to engage in unarmed resistance today?*

Research participants point to a number of contributing factors leading them to engage in unarmed resistance today. The most commonly reported are: a desire for justice, dignity, and equality for Palestinians; 2) a desire to gain the support of the international community in Palestinians' struggle; and 3) a desire to gain access to privileges, offerings, and other benefits provided by the liberal peace architecture (LPA) such as salaries, opportunities to travel, and exposure to foreigners.

2. *How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?*

Western peacebuilding efforts have perpetuated problematic, partisan, and colonial narratives/representations related to the conflict in general, and Palestinian resistance to settler colonial oppression and dispossession specifically. This has undermined the ability of Western peacebuilding efforts to contribute to building peace in the region, and in many ways, has functioned to further entrench an unequal and oppressive status quo. Western peacebuilding has largely been constructed from within a liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Amongst a number of other areas of intervention, the LPA directly engages with Palestinian and international CSOs/NGOs in promoting ‘nonviolence’ as a tool of peacebuilding. As a result of the embedded assumptions and framing of Palestinians within the LPA, peacebuilding efforts have merged with unarmed (nonviolent) resistance to configure a form of politics in which representations of Palestinians are constructed through Orientalist narratives. In turn, the resulting patronage between Western donors (the LPA) and Palestinian CSOs/NGOs has led many of these organizations, and the individuals working within them, to privilege the LPA’s framing, agendas, goals, and tactics in their resistance activism, at the expense of indigenous frameworks. By tying peacebuilding and ‘nonviolence’ to unarmed resistance, the LPA has contributed to shifting unarmed resistance away from being part of a larger national liberation movement, towards gradual focalization of specific sites of resistance, specific projects, and activism pursued ‘only on Fridays’. Moreover, by introducing salaries and funding, opportunities to travel abroad, and a platform to meet ‘internationals’ into the incentive structure for engagement in unarmed (nonviolent) resistance, the spirit of volunteerism and national service which once propelled the resistance movement, has been undermined. This has contributed to further fragmentation, distrust, and elitism associated with unarmed resistance throughout the West Bank.

3. How have men engaged in unarmed resistance, responded to and navigated this space?

In navigating the new incentive structures for unarmed resistance introduced by the LPA, their discursive frameworks, as well as other funding requirements (to do with tactics and activism), Palestinian men engaged in a combination of adoption, cooption, and resistance to these exogenous structures. According to research participants, their decision making should not be viewed as a capitulation to donor and Israeli-driven demands, but rather navigating these realities demonstrates critical agency with three over-arching goals. First, as a means of gaining a tactical advantage over Israel by leveraging the support of the international community in order to increase pressure on Israel to end the occupation. Second, to avoid giving Israel ‘gifts’ in the form of behavior that can be used to reinforce flawed Orientalist stereotypes that paint a civilized and democratic Israeli state defending itself against violent and freedom-hating terrorists. And third, as a means of accessing the material benefits that often accompany engagement with the LPA. Engaging with the LPA, then, has in and of itself become a means of social navigation.

In most cases, research participants’ navigations have led to adaptations to their gender performance in certain spaces. They have dislocated hegemonic masculinity from armed resistance, which continues to be foundational for respect and power at the community level. However, while research participants have dislocated notions of hegemonic masculinities from the use of armed resistance, they have done so in order to access opportunities which bestow upon them new forms of power and privilege. So, while some aspects of the performativity of hegemonic masculinity may have changed, its interest in the distribution, management and access to power has remained. Through this process, hegemonic masculinity is reformulated to maintain the pre-established gendered hierarchies of an earlier time, before the introduction of the LPA, Oslo, and the popularization of so-called ‘nonviolence’. Ultimately, in answering my third research question, this dissertation found that men engaged in unarmed resistance forged a parallel/alternative model

of hegemonic masculinity which brings together some of the pre-existing hegemonic expectations/norms/qualities such as resisting the occupation (and the subsequent suffering and sacrifice that comes along with this commitment), while also incorporating new norms/qualities such as a commitment to ‘nonviolence’, international travel, and connections/friendships with international (and Israeli) activists. These findings illustrate how nonviolent performances of masculinity can also be hegemonic, even in conflict settings.

Structure of Dissertation

Chapter 2 opens with a discussion related to the two major methodological approaches taken: critical ethnography and feminist methodology. I then move into a discussion around reflexivity and positionality with the intention of locating myself within this research, while also engaging in a critical discussion around the limitations of both. In laying the groundwork for data collection, I detail my sampling and recruitment techniques, as well as outline ethical considerations and explore issues such as anonymity and data protection. The chapter then presents the methods utilized during data collection: participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and group interviews. Lastly, I conclude with an overview of the strategy and process of data analysis.

Chapter 3 brings together the theoretical and conceptual streams of thought that form my research paradigm. In painting my research landscape, this chapter looks at the ways in which post-structuralism, critical feminist theory, Orientalism, masculinities literature, and a structure and agency perspective have come together to each inform various aspects of this dissertation.

Chapter 4 reviews the relevant bodies of literature that have informed this dissertation. It opens with an overview of resistance literature and the field of resistance studies, before providing more detail into research that offers specific insights around resistance in Palestine. The chapter then

reviews relevant works on masculinities in Palestine before diving into the corpus of work addressing peacebuilding, paying specific attention to the critiques and cleavages that have emerged over the decades. I briefly present NGO-ization and provide some examples of where and how this conceptual lens has been applied, before ending with an overview of the canon of gender, peace, and security literature. This last section also provides a focus on how masculinities literature emerged and fits within the field of gender, peace, and security.

In Chapter 5 I lay out a brief historical and political overview of the key moments shaping Palestine in general, and impacting the nature of resistance specifically. Beginning in WWI, this chapter paints a picture of the formation of the British Mandate of Palestine and the emergence of Palestinian resistance to British colonial rule. From here, I map the evolution of resistance organizing and tactics through various wars, the Oslo years, two intifadas, and up to today. This chapter demonstrates the ways that over the decades, Palestinian resistance has ranged from amorphous reactions to dispossession, to an organized, hierarchical, and structured resistance movement; always in flux, yet always present.

In Chapter 6 I addressed my first research question, ‘*What are some motivating factors leading Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance today?*’. In doing so, I provide extensive quotes and first-hand narratives of research participants around three interconnected themes: 1) a desire for justice, dignity, and equality for Palestinians; 2) a desire to gain the support of the international community in Palestinians’ struggle; and 3) a desire to gain access to privileges, offerings, and other benefits accessed through engaging with Western peacebuilding efforts.

Chapter 7 is the first of three chapters addressing my second research question, ‘*How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed*

resistance?'. It introduces the term liberal peace architecture (LPA) before elucidating the relationship between the LPA and unarmed resistance. After establishing what the LPA is, its relationship with CSOs/NGOs, and how it is conceived of in relation to unarmed resistance, Chapter 7 concludes with presenting the concept of NGO-ization as a way of understanding some of the impacts that the LPA has on the unarmed resistance movement. In doing so, it lays out four tangible domains of NGO-ization and the declawing of unarmed resistance by precipitating a shift: from a national agenda to the globalized liberal peace agenda; from collectivism under popular resistance to the globalized elite; from politics to the anti-politics of specific sites/projects/days; and from indigenous knowledge towards neocolonial knowledge of Orientalism.

Chapter 8 is the second of three chapters to address my second research question and limits its analysis to the role of ideology and framing inherent in liberal peacebuilding. Here, I rely on the concept of Orientalism to illustrate how liberal peacebuilding has uncritically adopted discourses and framings of Palestinians (and their resistance to Israeli settler colonialism) that are problematic insofar as they construct Palestinians as the antagonistic 'Other', thus erasing the context of settler colonial violence to which peacebuilding is reacting. This then spurs a foray into the language of 'violence' as it relates to resistance, as well as a critique of the binary of violent/nonviolent resistance. I conclude with the example of labeling throwing stones as 'violent resistance' to illustrate the arguments presented in this chapter. Ultimately, Chapter 8 provides evidence of the reinforcing nexus of power and representation. It does so by highlighting the ways that the power/knowledge nexus functions as a trap which limits critical thinking, self-representation, and the propagation of historically grounded, context specific knowledge (and policy) related to the conflict.

Chapter 9 is the last chapter directed towards my second research question. It moves the focus from the ideological and discursive relationship between the LPA and unarmed resistance, towards a discussion of the tactical and material ramifications of the LPA's involvement in unarmed resistance. This chapter considers two concrete arguments illustrating how the LPA tactically and materially altered unarmed resistance in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. First, I suggest that the LPA introduced money into the incentive structure for engaging in resistance which in turn, impacted the spirit of volunteerism in the West Bank and contributed to igniting further fragmentation between individuals, organizations, and groups. Secondly, this chapter presents findings illustrating how the LPA turned unarmed resistance into a set of projects, localized acts of resistance and activism which occurred only on specific days of the week, and therefore narrowed the scope and emancipatory goals of national liberation and self-determination once analogous with resistance activism. Ultimately, Chapter 9 picks up on the concept of NGO-ization from Chapter 7 and offers a more granular look at the manifestations of the NGO-ization of unarmed resistance in the West Bank in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords.

Chapter 10 addresses my third research question '*How have men, engaged in unarmed resistance, responded to and navigated this space?*'. As the previous empirical chapters addressed various structural processes resulting from the implications of the LPA involvement in unarmed resistance, Chapter 10 introduces a focus on research participants' agency as they navigate the new terrain of unarmed resistance brought about by the increased involvement of the LPA. This chapter opens with a discussion around the construction of masculinities in the West Bank. This discussion highlights the role of resistance activism in constructions of masculinity and argues that narratives of masculinity remain tied – at least in part – to the heroic image of an armed resistance fighter. This chapter highlights the ways in which patriarchal privilege tied to hegemonic masculinities

continues to influence the way research participants behave, as well as how they are received from both the local Palestinian community, as well as in various international fora accessed through the LPA. The chapter then teases out examples of nuanced expressions of critical agency in the ways research participants navigate their social and structural realities, through capitalizing on, coopting, and resisting aspects of the LPA to meet their personal and national liberation needs.

Moving from questions related to why and how research participants navigate the new terrain of unarmed resistance, the last of the empirical chapters, Chapter 11, explores what this means for the utility and appropriateness of categories of masculinities such as hegemonic, alternative, and hybrid. I first present a characterization of unarmed resistance by drawing on narratives and scholarship related to alternative masculinities. The chapter then challenges this characterization by unpacking some of the language and experiences of research participants to show the complexity and lack of clear distinction between hegemonic and alternative masculinities predicated on men's relationship to armed resistance. This chapter argues that rather than an expression of alternative masculinity, my research participants demonstrate an altered expression of hegemonic masculinity, one that maintains the gendered relations of power and status, yet rejects engagement in armed resistance. This new expression challenges straight-jacketed understandings of hegemonic masculinity in conflict contexts that tether it to the use of arms. This chapter ends with stating that while the concepts of hegemonic and alternative masculinities remain useful signposts, in complex social and political contexts such as my case study, they provide limited analytical utility in plotting shifts and changes to widespread norms and expectations of hegemonic masculinities. Instead, in aiming to understand these shifts, it is perhaps more useful to see the adoption of certain gendered traits and performances as a means of temporal

social navigation, a process that is neither static, nor linear, and rather based in the ever-changing structures in a given context.

I conclude this dissertation with a brief reflection on my main findings, provide a discussion around the theoretical and empirical contributions of this research, and suggest a few areas of future research.

Theoretical and Empirical Contributions

My research contributes empirical research grounded in first-hand narratives and the lived experiences of Palestinian men engaged in resistance. Therefore, in addition to advancing our understanding of the region in general, methodologically, this research is unique in its depth of ethnographic data achieved through reoccurring interviews and participant observation over the course of 20 months. As a result of this data, my research has contributed to challenging depictions of Palestinians which often frame them as being either repressed or resisting oppression (Furani & Rabinowits, 2011). While my findings certainly offer insight to the process of repression, oppression, and resistance, they also offer insight into the ways that Palestinians exercise their critical agency in navigating these processes. The contributions of this research are multi-fold: first for critical peacebuilding literature, Chapter 7 adds nuance and critical reflection around the romanticization and homogenization of ‘the local’; secondly, by bringing the concept of Orientalism in direct conversation with liberal peacebuilding, Chapter 8 unearths embedded—yet unexamined—assumptions, ideologies, and narratives taken as truth within liberal peacebuilding policy and practice in Palestine; thirdly, Chapter 8 to 11 advance our understanding of power dynamics resulting from global/local encounters between Western peacebuilding efforts and men engaged in unarmed resistance; fourthly, Chapters 10 and 11 broadens our understanding of the

ways that hegemonic masculinities shift and evolve in conflict and peacebuilding settings in response to opportunities and resources; lastly, while I did not engage specifically in postcolonial analysis, the overall findings of this research unsettle the assumptions of postcolonial thinkers vis-à-vis the totalizing effects of settler colonialism and the subsequent erasure of individual agency of the colonized.

In short, the detailed insights and thick description contained within this dissertation provides new knowledge about the sense making, motivations, and critical agency of actors as they navigate global and local structures of oppression, empowerment, and opportunity in conflict and peacebuilding settings. This new knowledge builds on a long tradition of critical feminist theory which asks questions related to power; who has it, who doesn't, and why? In doing so, it contributes feminist insights to the bodies of knowledge that make up the corpus of critical peacebuilding, masculinities, and resistance studies.

CHAPTER 2- Methodology

The following chapter will summarize the methodologies used in this research paying specific attention to how these methods evolved throughout the life of the research, and how they lend themselves to addressing the stated research questions and objectives. While this chapter outlines the methodological approach I employed in this dissertation, it also draws on my personal fieldwork experiences, and at times it does so at lengths, because these experiences had significant bearing on the methodological, analytical, and theoretical approaches taken throughout the data collection, analysis, and writing.

This research is exploratory in nature and used a qualitative research design. I believe this design was the most appropriate method for this study as qualitative research provides “a means of understanding the complexity of a situation by exploring the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social problem” (Creswell, 2009, p.4). This design, which has long been associated with critical feminist sensitivity, is unparalleled for the present purposes as qualitative research best allows the individual’s voice to be heard. This research was not guided by the desire to test a hypothesis. Rather, it is grounded in the belief that there is no right answer, no objective truth to uncover. Instead, I have attempted to “work back and forth between the part-whole relationship of the data and its setting and the context in which it is interpreted” (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 109).

Born out of the desire to better understand the interactions between Western peacebuilding efforts, unarmed resistance, and identity in Palestine, and recognizing the dearth of research that offers critical reflections in this regard, this research aims to explore how narratives of unarmed resistance are first constructed and perceived by Palestinian men involved in unarmed resistance,

and then secondly, uncover the material consequences of the involvement of liberal peacebuilding in these process. Key questions guiding this research include:

1. What are some contributing factors that lead men to engage in unarmed resistance today?
2. Post-Oslo, how have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?
3. How have men, engaged in unarmed resistance, responded to and navigated the contemporary unarmed resistance space?

Field Location

For the duration of 20 months in the field I lived in the West Bank city of Ramallah, and conducted interviews and participant observation throughout the West Bank. My choice to reside in Ramallah was a conscious choice. While it would be dishonest not to acknowledge the role that lifestyle played in making this decision, the type of research I was interested in conducting required my base to be immersed in the daily activities and happenings of my participants to the extent possible. I will touch briefly on lifestyle considerations before addressing the methodological considerations driving this choice.

Ramallah is a city in the central West Bank approximately 12 km from Jerusalem. Due to the annexation of East Jerusalem by the State of Israel, Ramallah has become the de facto capital of the West Bank. There are approximately 328,861 people living in the Ramallah and the surrounding Al-Bireh areas. While not the largest city in the West Bank, it is often referred to as a ‘bubble’ in the sense that it is distinct from the rest of the West Bank. While there are a handful of Israeli settlements flagging the city on all sides, the city itself is in Area A, and is therefore exclusively administered by the Palestinian Authority.

Cafes and bars, bakeries and restaurants, gyms, and shops selling everything from electronics to wedding dresses line the busy streets. Sitting outside of Garage, a popular bar, you feel like you could be in a thriving metropolis like anywhere else. Palestinians sip beer or tea, smoke cigarettes, snack on turmus beans (ترمس) soaked in lemon juice, play chess and talk about politics, fashion, or local gossip. While this lifestyle was not one enjoyed by most of my research participants, it was one that I benefited from having access to both for personal reasons, as well the fact that it provided valuable opportunities to speak with and get to know a large number of Palestinians who represented the diversity of perspectives and experiences of Palestinians; many of which were vastly different from my research participants. Given that I was also asking my partner to relocate to Palestine for two years, Ramallah felt like the best place for us to make a home. We had easy access to most amenities, and were able to rent an apartment that provided us with privacy, security, and comfort. Therefore, while Ramallah could not be considered to be in the heart of resistance actives like towns and communities such as Nabi Saleh, Tel Rumeida, or Balata Camp, it provided an opportunity to live in my field location, while maintaining a certain level of personal freedom that would not have be possible elsewhere. Furthermore, Ramallah provided space and opportunity to decompress while remaining in the field, continuing to learn Arabic, and be imbued in the local context. While Ramallah may have provided some much-needed respite, I do not mean to create the impression that life in Ramallah was easy. Firstly, I have to make explicit that my experience living in Ramallah, or anywhere in Palestine for that matter, was infinitely easier than the experiences of my Palestinian friends, key-informants, and research participants. I had a passport that awarded me the luxury of choosing to leave if the security situation changed, if I personally no longer felt safe, if my family was under threat, or if I felt that I was no longer able

to cope with the realities of living under a military occupation. I could leave, while many Palestinians cannot.

Due to the nature of the Israeli occupation and subsequent division of the West Bank into Area A, B, and C, Israeli checkpoints, roadblocks, settlements, and soldiers are found throughout the West Bank. While many of these checkpoints and roadblocks are permanent, many others are not and can be erected without notice. Travel is therefore extremely difficult, stressful, and time consuming. The 42km journey from Ramallah to Hebron, a journey that I made at least 30 times during my field work, could take anywhere from 2 hours to 8 hours depending on the checkpoints. This made planning interviews very unreliable. In addition to lengthy delays, road and checkpoint closures could occur at any time, without warning. Additionally, violent clashes between soldiers and Palestinians are a daily occurrence. Although we lived in Ramallah, sound bombs and live gun fire could be heard on a nearly daily basis, with our apartment being filled with teargas and the stench of skunk water on a number of occasions.

While ‘quality of life’ considerations certainly entered into my decision making, first and foremost my decision to live in Ramallah was a political, ethical, and methodological one. Ramallah is centrally located in the West Bank and serves as a hub when traveling by *servis* (small yellow public transportation vans that connect West Bank towns). This made it a logical place to live as it was relatively easy to navigate public transportation in and out of the city to get to the different villages and towns where I met my research participants. That said, I made the decision to travel by *servis* instead of private taxi, or by the Jerusalem bus system, a decision that made many of my participants and friends confused. Due to my Canadian passport, I was able to travel in and out of Jerusalem; an option that depending on the time of day, can make the journey East or South to

cities such as Bethlehem, Jericho, or Hebron significantly shorter. However, because of the oppressive ID card system in Palestine, many Palestinians are not able to cross checkpoints, even to travel to East Jerusalem and therefore are not able to travel by the Jerusalem bus system. Therefore, given that I often traveled with one of my interpreters, or with Palestinian friends going in a similar direction, rather than deciding on my mode of travel based on expediency, I would travel by the most widely accessible means. There were, however, exceptions to this.

One instance is particularly poignant and is illustrative of the disparity between me as an outsider, my subsequent privilege, and the Palestinians I was working with. My interpreter and I were traveling by *servis* on our way back from Dheisheh Refugee Camp. As we rounded the corner towards the checkpoint, the *servis* came to a sudden stop. Ahead was a mess of traffic and an Israeli tank, skunk water truck, and a dozen soldiers posted up on the roof tops of the stores that lined the street, and crouched behind sniper shields, peering down the scopes of their guns. These were aimed at smoking dumpsters that had been dragged out into the middle of the road to provide cover for the shabāb¹. Tear gas was thick in the air and the distinct sound of live ammunition made everyone in the *servis* jump and then duck. We were faced with two options: stay in the *servis* and wait for the road to reopen, something that could take anywhere from a couple of hours to a day, or hop in one of the taxis that lined the street going the other direction and try to make it into Jerusalem and then take another checkpoint to Ramallah. Because my interpreter did not have a Jerusalem ID, she was not able to take another route. Her only option was to wait it out. I was therefore adamant on staying with her and making our way back to Ramallah together. She however, was adamant that I jump in the first taxi and get out of the dangerous situation. She

¹ Shabāb is a term that refers to male Palestinian youth, but it is often used in the same way as the English term ‘guys’ is used.

pleaded with me to go. I initially assumed she was being polite in insisting that I take the fastest and safest option. After I refused to heed her advice and insisted on staying, she began to speak more forcefully. It was then that she explained that she felt that keeping me safe, was part of her job. Not part of her job as my interpreter, but as a Palestinian, as my friend. Therefore, by refusing to allow her to do so, I was denying her what little agency she had as well as the ability to fulfil what she felt was part of her job. Further, it was a disempowering reminder of the utter lack of control that she, like many Palestinians, have over their security, and the ability to keep those around them safe. After much discussion, I agreed to leave and take a taxi into Jerusalem. I felt like I had betrayed her, abandoned my ethics, and deceived my research participants. It felt deeply disturbing to leave a friend in a dangerous situation, to have the ability to leave a dangerous situation, when she did not. This was one of many situations that laid bare, my privilege and the degree of freedom I had compared to those I was living and working alongside.

My decision to live in Ramallah was also driven by methodological considerations. Spending time in Ramallah provided me with important insight into the larger social and political dynamics of my research location. When I wasn't conducting interviews, the ability to spend my days grocery shopping, hiking in the local wadis, and working from cafes all provided an opportunity to strike up casual conversations with West Bankers. By offering additional insights, perspectives, and experiences to my research participants, these conversations were particularly informative around the dynamics between urban and rural Palestinians, as well as highlighting the class divisions that run deep in Palestinian society. Many of the people I would meet in Ramallah spoke some level of English, many had travelled abroad, and the majority had completed high school with some obtaining university degrees. Many of them did not identify as ever being involved in resistance and instead were more interested in pop culture, fashion, or economics than regional politics. Many

of my participants, the majority of whom were faced with the violent and omnipresent effects of the occupation on a daily basis, would scoff at Ramallans and exclaim that they ‘live in a bubble’. They would go on to explain that they have the privilege of ignoring the occupation as they sip their lattes and drive their fancy cars around Area A.² Be that as it may, I found the contrast invaluable in building my understanding of the internal dynamics of Palestinian society. Spending all of my time in villages and with families that make up the public and international face of unarmed resistance such as the Tamimi’s in Nabi Salah, would have risked creating the impression that all Palestinians support resistance efforts; which clearly is not the case. As such, some of the people I met and spent time with on a daily basis in Ramallah served as a foil to my research participants and while not cited or ‘counted’ as research participants, were integral to my research.

Ethnography

Ethnography is primarily concerned with the detailed study of the actions and accounts of people in their everyday settings. In conflict settings, ethnographic fieldwork is important for getting the perspectives, sense making, and experiences of those most affected by conflict out into the world. Tourism is relatively limited in the West Bank, particularly in those areas most affected by the occupation (Area C). Add to this, the fact that mainstream media privileges certain narratives and silence others, means that detailed and firsthand accounts of Palestinians are scarce. If firsthand accounts of Palestinians are scarce, ethnographic accounts of Palestinians *engaged in resistance* are highly uncommon. To say that they are uncommon, is not to say that they do not exist. The longevity of the occupation and subsequent horrors have led a number of researchers to, “question

² A lot of this animosity was also driven by the fact that many of the inhabitants of Ramallah work for, or have family members who work for the PA. Given participants’ distrust and general frustration with the political situation in Palestine due to a number of reasons such as the PA’s corruption, they saw Ramallah as the epicentre of the literal—as well as moral—corruption plaguing their country.

Israel's effort to repress Palestinian nationalism and to normalize its own colonial and racial character. This facilitated the emergence of a Palestinian subject whose national identity and colonial predicament are probed rather than silenced” (Furani & Rabinowits, 2011, p. 481). These efforts however, “tended to produce depictions of Palestinians as locked in a bind between repression and resistance, ubiquitously struggling for national sovereignty” (ibid p. 484). The binary of repression or resistance mimics the discursive binary around Palestinian men being either a peacebuilder or a martyr. These simplistic labels are steeped in Western colonial bias. To this end, in 1978, in his well-known book *Orientalism*, Edward Said pointed out that Western colonial bias underpinned the entire field of anthropology (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998), not only in Palestine, but in the whole of the region. This research hopes to diverge from this binary way of thinking and starts from an assumption that people are complicated, and often present inconsistent messaging as they navigate, adapt, juggle, and make sense of their ever-changing present.

We look to Strine (1991) who reminds us that all human reality is,

a social construction given shape and meaning by the various cultural discourses/texts that circulate within it. Those texts that carry the weight of cultural authority as “reliable knowledge” or “objective information” (e.g., expert opinions or news reports) exerts powerful influences on how common perceptions are formed and common sense is made (as cited in Madison, 2005, p. 17).

When ones understanding of a conflict, and the actions of those most impacted by its violence, are based solely on accounts and narratives of the most powerful, we not only fail to truly understand a conflict, but we also risk perpetuating and further entrenching harmful, racist, and/or deeply subjective narratives, all the while being oblivious to the fact that we are doing so. Therefore, I believe that ethnographic fieldwork in this regard is extremely valuable as it provides an opportunity to disrupt the production of knowledge that has historically relied on the voices,

theories, and perspectives of those in power by engaging my “whole self physically and in every other way into the space of the world the researcher seeks to understand” (Ortner, 1995, p. 173). In so doing, I believe the ethnographic approach I took can contribute to, “uncover[ing] the untold realities of individuals, groups, and organizations—whether victim, perpetrator, or peacebuilder—in conflict environments” (Campbell, 2017, p. 90). In the case of this research, unearthing and turning our analytical gaze on Orientalist narratives related to resistance and masculinity is crucial to understanding how participants understand the, “grounds of their own actions in the historically and socially situated context of their lives” (Simon & Dippo, 1986, p. 199). This is not to say that the ‘untold realities’ I hope to draw attention to come to us as fully formed stories, experiences, narratives, or knowledge. Instead, the ‘untold realities’ I hope to uncover come to light in partial stories, partial experiences, partial narratives, and partial knowledge. They take shape by collating these parts, by fitting together observations made during ethnographic data collection, through theoretical perspectives gained by reading, through interviews, group interviews, etc. Throughout my research process, I saw my job as an active observer, researcher, and theorist, to knit all of these parts together to create a more multidimensional and holistic understanding of my research spaces. No matter how successful I may be at this however, the end result will never be a complete, perfect, or true representation. Rather, it is my attempt, to the best of my abilities, to make sense of the spaces I seek to understand.

While aiming to ‘disrupt the production of knowledge’ around Palestinian resistance by including the voices, perspectives, and sense making of those involved in resistance, I do not claim to be contributing to “true’, “real”, or “more authentic” narratives of resistance. All narratives, and “all modes of knowing” for that matter are “ideological, hence the issue is not whether one is ‘biased’; but rather, whose interests are served by one's work” (Simon & Dippo, 1986, p. 196). In this sense,

rather than an ‘objective’ or ‘true’ account, I hope to offer a different point of departure than the majority of work borne out of dominant narratives, one that is messy and imperfect, yet grounded in the experiences of those I lived and worked with.

While a great deal of rich and thoughtful research looking at ‘resistance’ in its many forms, functions, and iterations has been conducted (see Chapter 4 Review of Relevant Literature for discussion of such literature), the vast majority of these studies do not take an ethnographic approach, and opt for a different methodological approach. While they certainly contribute a great deal to knowledge, they are nevertheless what Ortner (1995) calls “ethnographically thin” (p. 190). Therefore, much of the literature on resistance in Palestine is not able to capture the depth of description and understanding that ethnography facilitates. In contrast to the ‘thick description’ of ethnographies (Geertz, 1973), this thinness relates to the fact that without ethnographic engagement on the part of the researcher, research findings are most often not rooted in in-depth contextual knowledge, because this knowledge is very difficult to obtain without spending considerable time with research participants in their environment. Moreover, it is “thin on the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on the cultural richness of those groups, thin on the subjectivity—the intentions, desires, fears, projects—of the actors engaged in these dramas” (Ortner, 1995, p. 190).

This research aimed to tease apart ideology, identity, and resistance tactics, and explore the power laden processes which shape these in the hopes of uncovering new insights into the way in which participants view, interpret, and respond to their world. One of the primary aims of this research was to understand how one’s involvement in unarmed resistance is influenced by Orientalist narratives and how these shape, and are shaped by, male gender identity. The methodological

process therefore, required a primary focus on power structures, context, and internal dynamics because narratives “operate within society as much as they are about society” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2009, cited in Saldana, 2009, p. 111). It also relied on building a degree of trust and familiarity with participants in order to delve into conversations about sensitive, personal, and politically charged topics. The need to have extended time in the field and knowledge related to the research context is a crucial part of building trust, and “[i]t is axiomatic among ethnographers that trust is a necessary foundation of successful data collection in the field” (Chakravarty, 2012, p. 253). The concept of trust is central to ethnographic research. That is not to say that there has to be whole-hearted trust between researcher and participant and vice versa, this is rarely if ever the case. In fact, Chakravarty (2012) explains that rather than full trust, what is perhaps more interesting and empirically rich, are relationships where only a partial degree of trust has been obtained, “reciprocal, delicate yet stable, partially trusting relationships open up opportunities for accessing hidden worlds of thought and behaviours” (p. 251). These relationships however, take a significant amount of time to cultivate and require patient and reflexive practice (ibid).

The process of building trust often consists of participants testing, labeling, talking and gossiping about, and observing during initial meetings (De Lame, 2005, cited in Chakravarty, 2012, p. 257). This process was evident in numerous occasions during my field work. For example, in the middle of interviewing a young university student and organizer of a resistance group on Birzeit campus, I began to direct the interview towards more sensitive topics. When I did this, she suddenly adopted a more aggressive tone and began asking me personal and political questions. I gladly answered them honestly, reflecting on my personal opinions and understanding of the context. After about 10 minutes of back and forth, she turned to my interpreter and said, “ah, I see, she gets it” after which, she gave me the nod to go ahead and ask more questions. While I didn’t know at the time,

this change of tact and tone was part of a ‘test’. In another example, a participant I had known and worked with for many years (and had even lived with years prior when I was in Palestine for another research project) was having friends over one evening and subsequently I was invited to join them at his house. When I arrived, there were other activists there who I had also interviewed yet I did not know they all knew one another. We spent the first half an hour I was there talking about the conversation they had had about me prior to my arrival. While I will never know what they concluded, they no doubt also talked about what they thought of me, my work, and whether I could be trusted or not. As a result, after spending the evening with the group, I was contacted to conduct further interviews with 3 of the men that were there that night. These interviews differed in depth from the first ones I had conducted with them prior to our evening together. I believe the difference was due to the fact that at the time of the second interview, we had established a level of trust and therefore, they were willing to speak more openly.

Connected to the process of building relationships with a certain degree of trust, is the process of discerning different types, depths, or degrees of openness in responses. While it is true of all qualitative research, I believe researchers of unarmed resistance in Palestine face a substantial risk of unknowingly collecting pre-patterned answers, rehearsed lines, or ‘NGO speak’, in their interviews and failing to identify these responses as such. This is due in large part to the high numbers of international organizations operating in the area and the value-laden nature of resistance. My experience highlighted for me the challenge of distinguishing between what people think you want to hear, versus what they feel and think themselves, personally, outside of official lines of political parties, NGOs, donors, local organizations, or groups. I found the only way to get to these deeper and more personal accounts was through time, repetitive exposure, establishing my presence as a researcher in the area, and being able to engage in conversations related to the

historical and contemporary political milieu in the region. For me, this was possible only through spending an extended period of time in my field location which gave me the opportunity to speak with hundreds of people, on a semi-regular basis, for two years.

Furthermore, in addition to building trust and learning to discern between pre-patterned responses and more individual responses, investing an extended period of time in my field location was necessary to ensure that I was accessing a sample outside of prominent and outspoken people who are repetitively interviewed and subsequently tend to hold the microphone and thus control the message portrayed to journalists, researchers, and international NGO workers. Concurring with Thomas (1993), I believe the best way around the above-mentioned challenges was to adopt an ethnographic approach. I found it to be best suited for my research as I aimed to explore “topics for which conventional native accounts may not always be sufficient when the answers are pre-patterned rhetoric that reflects learned accounts rather than actual reasons” (p. 38).

Critical Ethnography- Critical Theory in Practice

Reflecting on the above discussion regarding the importance I place on immersion and trust for the research process, as well as for identifying the operations of power in narratives and discourse around resistance, this research relied on a critical ethnographic approach to inform my research questions, shape my engagement with research participants, and direct my thinking throughout the analysis and discussion of findings. Critical ethnography was drawn on as the primary methodological approach in this research, but it also functioned as an integral aspect of my theoretical and analytical framework. While I recognize that theory and methods are not interchangeable, they do overlap. As Ortner (1995) explains, “the ethnographic stance... is as much an intellectual (and moral) positionality, a constructive and interpretive mode, as it is a

bodily process in space and time” (p. 173). In this sense, as a theory, critical ethnography functioned in defining the purpose of the research, and as a method, it functioned in outlining how the research would be conducted. Of the relationship between the theory and method of critical ethnography, Madison (2005) posits, “though theory may guide and inspire us in composing a lay summary, designing interview questions, or coding data, it is not theory but a methodological process that directs the completion of the task” (Madison, 2005, p. 14).

In many regards, this research presents the type of classic ethnography commonly found in academia since the post-modern turn in the 1980s, in so far as it strives for ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973); it relies on qualitative data which was collected over an extended period of time where I was immersed in the field; it strives to cognize participants’ own understandings, interpretations and ‘sense making’ vis-à-vis the research questions; and it is sensitive to questions of representation and reflexivity. Where critical ethnography— and thus this research— diverges from a more classical approach to ethnography however, is in its inclusion of historical, cultural, social and structural perspectives or frameworks in the hopes of producing findings which “support an emancipatory as well as a hermeneutic concern” (Simon & Dippo, 1986, p. 201). I hope this approach has led my research to being a resource for my participants to question “the constraints on the authorship of their lives and the lives of those with whom they live and work” (ibid p. 199).

It has been said that critical ethnography is critical theory in practice, the “doing” of critical theory (Madison, 2005), or that it is “conventional ethnography with a political purpose” (Thomas, 1993, p. 4). To this end, Simon & Dippo (1986) outline three conditions for ethnography to be labeled ‘critical’.

1. The research should “employ an organizing problematic that defines one’s data and analytical procedures in a way consistent with its project”;
2. The research should be “situated, in part, within a public sphere that allows it to become the starting point for the critique and transformation of the conditions of oppressive and inequitable moral and social regulation”; and
3. The research must “address the limits of its own claims by a consideration of how, as a form of social practice, it too is constituted and regulated through historical relations of power and existing material conditions” (p. 197).

This research addresses these three requisites of critical ethnography in the following ways:

1. Striving to find the “link between a concern with experience and subjectivity and the structurally sedimented relations of power” (Simon & Dippo, 1986, p. 197), this research aimed to highlight how “power operates not just on people, but through them” (ibid). Specifically, Orientalist narratives of resistance exert power over Palestinian men engaged in unarmed resistance. This power shapes their actions both consciously and unconsciously and has material consequences. The operations of power, however, does not end here. In having to navigate this terrain, these men themselves adopt, exploit, and enact various aspects of these colonial narratives in order to attain and maintain power in social, public, and political spaces, and thus in part, perpetuate and bolster colonial narratives of the violent Arab/Muslim/Palestinian man. Understanding these two processes, and the resulting contested practice of representation, produces cracks and dislocations in understandings of agency, identity, and representation.
2. It is here, in the cracks and dislocations, that serves as a “starting point for the critique and transformation” (ibid) of the Orientalist narratives shaping Palestinian resistance. As a clearer image of the larger forces shaping narratives of resistance in Palestine emerges through my analysis and findings, opportunities to propose alternative framings emerges,

framings that, rather than the power-laden narratives imposed by the outside, instead reflect those who are resisting (Thomas, 1993, p. 61).

3. My research findings, and the subsequent discussion, are organized around my own reflexive process. By repetitively drawing the readers' attention to the disconnects that appeared between participants actions and interview answers and to the dynamics between me—the researcher—and participants as well as providing analysis around these dynamics, I hope to problematize the notion of knowledge, findings, and data. I do this by attempting to illuminate the subjective nature of these and offer insights into how relations of power embedded within the research process itself functions to limit, or at the very least, form the scaffolding around my research and define the parameters of my research findings.

My desire to illuminate the way in which narratives of Palestinian resistance are imbued with Orientalist and colonial overtones, motivated me to adopt a critical ethnographic approach. The type of research I aimed to conduct required going “beneath surface appearances” and “unsettling both neutrality and taken-for-granted assumptions by bringing to light underlying and obscure operations of power and control” (Madison, 2005, p. 5) in order to “take us beneath the surface world of accepted appearances and reveal the darker, oppressive side of social life” (Thomas, 1993, p. 34). One only has to lift up the rock of discussions around resistance in Palestine and peer underneath to see the hegemonic, and I argue deeply ideological, discursive frameworks that shape these discussions. By challenging well-established, yet repressive, framing and understanding of unarmed resistance, I extend an invitation to rethink, contextualize, and politicize these understandings. Specifically, this research uses critical ethnography to lift up the rock of Palestinian unarmed resistance in order to decipher and expose the material effects of what I am calling Orientalist narratives of resistance.

Feminist Methodology

With critical ethnography's focus on going beneath surface appearances to uncover hidden workings of power, it provided one side of my dual methodological approach to this dissertation. The other side of this approach adopts a similar focus on uncovering relations of power, yet focuses specifically on the gender dimensions of these relations. The other side to my dual approach is a feminist methodological approach. Much has been written about what exactly a 'feminist methodology' is. Just as there is no singular feminism, there is no singular defined 'feminist methodology'. While it does not prescribe specific methods or data collection tools per se, feminist methodology is interested in the relationship between the creation of knowledge and the exercise of power and therefore aims to ensure space is held for participants to represent themselves and for their voices to be heard. It is interested in the relationships between the researcher and participants, and pays attention to the context in which research is conducted. By calling into question the lenses through which knowledge is created and that data is collected and interpreted, feminist methodology takes "into account the location(s) and political contexts which inform the writing and the political implications of particular interventions" and in so doing, those employing feminist methodology help "to re-articulate the relationship between the researcher and researched" (Sharoni, 1993, p. 24-25). In rejecting the notion that a researcher can ever be objective, neutral, or that ethical research that is apolitical is possible, feminist methodology demands that research be undertaken for a purpose beyond the 'creation of knowledge', it must have an emancipatory aim, or attempt to counter oppression (Allan, 2017).

The rejection of depoliticized data is but one location where critical ethnography and feminist methodology find companionship. Furthermore, feminist methodology and critical ethnography share an interest in assessing, "how social, historical, and cultural factors shape the research site

as well as participants' goals, values, and experiences" (Kirsch 1999, p. 3). Much like critical ethnography, a predominant feature of feminist methodology is its rejection of positivist thinking. Both these methodological and theoretical approaches urge researchers to abandon the mantle of objectivity and embrace social, political, and historical contexts in their efforts to understand their research space.

Feminist methodology actively works against universalizing the experiences of participants and aims to highlight how knowledge and power are intrinsically linked. It does so through exploring the role of discourse in shaping our world. Whitehead (2002) explains that using a feminist lens holds tremendous potential and is crucial when endeavoring to expose the veiled exercise of power in our world because power is never far from discourse around gender (p. 83). I understand gender, and for the purpose of this research, masculinities, to be constructed by individuals who in turn are influenced by social contexts. This dissertation therefore is based on the ontology of relativism. I do not aim to provide a linear explanation of my research topic, and reject the notion of a knowable and fixed subject. My purpose for engaging in this research therefore, is not to uncover some objective truth which is 'out there' waiting to be set free, instead, the purpose is to capture the meeting between my participants and myself, the researcher, vis-à-vis my research questions. This requires a continuous commitment to the role of agency and reflexivity in knowledge creation (vis-à-vis my research). Given my desire to understand the relationship between masculinities, unarmed resistance and Orientalist discourses, I believe such an approach is necessary to interrogate the diverse workings of power related to my research questions.

Locating the Researcher in the Research: Reflexive Practice and Positionality

Given the epistemological and ontological underpinning of this research, which are rooted in critical ethnography and feminist methodology, I believe it is important to spend some time unpacking reflexivity and positionality vis-à-vis my research process in order to recognize the “intimate relationship between research process and product” (Chakravarty, 2012, p. 254). Flowing from my ontological commitment to relativism and my epistemological commitment to constructivism, I believe that the data used to construct this dissertation, as well as this dissertation itself, are a result of the subjective meeting of researcher and researched. While this dissertation spends the majority of its time discussing the subjective construction of research participants’ lived experiences, below, I will turn the lens on myself, the researcher. By ‘reflexivity’, I am referring to the ongoing process of self-awareness throughout the research process where the desired outcome is to illuminate the “practice and construction of knowledge within research” (Pillow, 2003, p. 178). Other authors have defined reflexivity as, ‘turning back on oneself’ (Davies, 1999) or, “self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher” (England, 1994, p. 82). In any case, situating oneself within the research context, history, and participants has become an established tradition, a best practice, and a necessary ethical inclusion in ethnographic research (Britzman, 1995), particularly feminist ethnographic research (Nencel, 2014; Pillow, 2003). Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance and inclusion of such practices, research such as this dissertation, remains ethically precarious due to the covert and insidious workings of power and knowledge. Sharoni (1993) poses the difficult question, “can feminists theorize and locate the links between the histories, multiple identities and experiences of women without perpetuating global power relations which have been reinforced through the institutionalization of dichotomies such as self/other, researcher/researched, insider/outsider and

theory/practice?” (p. 22-23). While never feeling completely convinced of my effectiveness, nevertheless, I have attempted to wrestle with this tension within my own practice as a researcher, and the work I produce. A large part of unsettling these hierarchies is through intentionally making myself present throughout this dissertation. This begins with trying to understand the way my research participants understand me, rather than solely trying to understand my research participants. For me, this research very much unfolded as a dialogue between my participants and I, my field location and my positionality, my otherness and their otherness. This dialogue is the lynchpin to exploring my research questions, and understanding the findings.

In my attempts to see myself in the eyes of my research participants, the ways my positionality awarded me an unequal position vis-à-vis my research participants came into focus. I was seen as a link to the outside world, a world that many Palestinians feel holds the key to their liberation. Therefore, in this sense, “the ethnographic encounter was an encounter in international politics” (Peteet, 1991, p. 16-17). This realization meant that my reflexive practice required a broad lens, one that could adequately appreciate the historical, cultural, political, and personal dynamics at play. As mentioned previously, critical ethnography relies on an understanding and appreciation of the history and broader context in which we work. This history and broader context however, is itself “shaped by our own point of departure in the preset” (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 105). As such, “observer and observed are both embedded in historical contexts through which any interpretations must be conducted” (ibid, p. 108). And therefore, an examination of one’s positionality is “not a one-time act independent of the context of the knower”. Instead, it is an iterative process requiring continuous reinterpretation of the past and the present. Highlighting the importance of the ‘critical’ part of ethnography, Thomas (1993) argues that a researcher’s unexamined preconceived assumptions about the world form a fence around their research and

function to limit the possibilities of analysis and findings. In an attempt to identify and expose the parameters and limitations of this intellectual ‘fence’, critical ethnography challenges the researcher to expand their ontological assumptions through engaging in an iterative reflexive practice.

Anyone who has conducted qualitative research is familiar with the high degree of social interaction between researcher and research participant. As a result of the near constant interaction between researcher and researched during ethnographic field work, the collection of data is not a neutral process. As England (1994) suggests, “we do not parachute into the field with empty heads and a few pencils or a tape-recorder in our pockets ready to record the ‘facts’” (p. 84). In recognizing this, we recognize “our own implication in the production of data and thus must begin to include ourselves (our own practices and their social and historical basis) in our analyses of the situations we study” (Simon & Dippo, 1986, p. 200). In the spirit of the above quote, what follows is an attempt to include ‘ourselves in our analysis’, a theme that is carried through this dissertation.

Reflexivity

Reflexivity is premised on the idea that reality is socially constructed and knowledge is context-based and historically situated (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003 as cited in D’Silva, Smith, Della, Potter, Talley & Best, 2016, p. 96). If we start from this assumption, then by extension, we need to problematize how knowledge is situated and constructed in the research process. This is done firstly, through interrogating the relationship and power dynamics between researcher, participants, data, and knowledge production.

England (1994) believes such self-reflection “induces self-discovery and can lead to insights and new hypotheses about the research questions” (p. 82). For myself, this couldn’t be truer. In the

spirit of reflexivity, it is of methodological and theoretical importance to provide a bit of background on the evolution of my fieldwork and thus, my research questions themselves. I believe this explanation is necessary as it is an integral aspect of the final iteration of the research, as well as lending itself to a deeper, more personal, if not vulnerable and illustrative reading of how the critiques embedded herein materialize.

Evolution of Field Work

Reflexivity is not something that occurs after the fact, post-field work, when the researcher has left the field and is writing up their findings. For myself, it has been an ongoing process that took a great deal of inspiration and direction from encounters in the field. These encounters not only presented important opportunities to (re)assess my role as a researcher, but also to (re)assess my research questions and theoretical framework. As a result of these encounters and subsequent (re)assessments, the direction of my fieldwork underwent a substantial reworking while in the field. At the time, I felt that this ‘reworking’ and the need for my research to ‘evolve’ during fieldwork was an indication of my failure as a researcher in so far as I had failed to identify the problematic framing of my research questions prior to field work. I embarked on my fieldwork with the impression that I was supposed to know exactly what I was looking for. In the quote below, Thomas (1993) walks us through why this assumption is flawed,

Contrary to what we read in methods texts, topic selection usually begins with only a vague idea of some broad question or issue. It may not be narrowed down until well into data gathering... Critical ethnography is even more difficult, because the focus of attention often lies in areas at first glance unnoticeable and within data sources possessing mechanisms to conceal, rather than reveal, their secrets. Critical ethnography is especially susceptible to the need for flexibility, because the questions that are most interesting may not be revealed until considerable background data emerges” (p. 34).

As my field work unfolded, so too did the process of (re)defining my research much in the fashion outlined by Thomas (1993). While it was the process of fieldwork in general that inspired the evolution of fieldwork and research, one interaction in particular was the catalyst.

It was just before noon on January 30th, 2018, the morning sun was beating down on the muted dust covered olive trees that lined the potholed street leading up to the university. Crammed in the back of a small yellow *servis* van, the sounds of Salat al-Dhuhr blasted on the radio as misbaha prayer beads danced from the rear-view mirror. I was excited, a little nervous to be sure, but mostly excited. After 3 months of getting my bearings, immersion Arabic lessons, countless emails, and diligently going over my research proposal, I was on my way to meet the Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at Birzeit University (an academic I had long looked up to and had relied heavily on her work while shaping my own understanding and research). I had been back in Palestine for a little over 3 months at this time and I was finally ready to dive into my data collection. Before I did so however, I wanted to solicit the feedback from a Palestinian academic I had long admired, the very woman I was on my way to meet. After sending her my research proposal and bio, we emailed back and forth for a month or so before agreeing on a time to meet.

I was prepared for a difficult conversation: questions about positionality, my language capabilities, my theoretical framework, my methodology, or my historical knowledge of this tumultuous and complicated region. What I wasn't prepared for however, was a total 'undoing' of the very fabric making up my academic clothing, my educational background, my whole entire PhD. I wasn't prepared to come face-to-face with a call so forthright, so penetrating; it was nothing short of a call for decolonization.

I must have looked lost. I definitely looked out of place. It took all of 2 minutes for a group of students to ask where I was trying to go and steer me in the right direction. I arrived for my meeting without a minute to spare and after a brief knock, I was welcomed inside by a muffled voice on the other side of the office door. As I walked in, my lungs instantly tightened with the pungent smell of stale cigarette smoke mixed with the aroma of cardamom and coffee. Squinting through the haze, I quickly introduced myself and began a long oration of thanks and genuine flattery. She invited me to sit, and as I did, asked me why I was in Palestine and what I was planning on researching. I started from the beginning, from the first time I had come to Palestine nearly 10 years prior. Leaning back in her chair, she lit a cigarette and rested her feet up on the desk. I continued. “I came to Palestine for the first time in 2011.... Then again for my Masters research in 2013....” After 10 minutes or so, she stopped me. Where did I get the idea for this research she asked me? I explained it was borne out of my Masters research and the stories that research participants had shared with me. Had I consulted any Arab scholars? Any Palestinian scholars? She probed. ‘Yes’, I told her of Edward Said, Mazin Qumsiyeh, Islah Jad, Laleh Khalili, Raja Shehadeh, Nahla Abdo, Nadia Abu-Zahra, Fatima Kassem, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Lena Meari, Amalia Sa’ar, Marwan Darweish, Taghreed Yahia-Younis, all of whom had been integral in shaping my understanding of Palestine in general, and my research specifically. What came next is a lesson I will never forget.

I sat there listening to her speak, only barely grasping what she was saying, as if I could almost make out the letters on the optometrist’s poster but needed them to click the lens a few more times in order to read the chart clearly. I have spent my academic life identifying with critical literature. Finding comfort in its unorthodox reading of the world, agreeance with the assessments of the pervasive nature of Western power and hegemonic order, and comforted by the ‘stick it to the man’

conclusions that are never afraid to speak truth to power. How ironic it was then, to find myself confronted by the uncomfortable realization that I may be perpetuating the very mindset that I had spent years critiquing. I recalled what Simon & Dippo (1986) reminds us, “we should turn to a consideration of how the discourse we use to talk with others and through which we write and think, silences as well as articulates” (p. 201).

Not quite grasping the depth of her critique, nor the way my discourse may be silencing, I patiently and confidently engaged in discussions of different theorists, of the various schools of thought and ways of framing resistance. I nodded energetically at her fascinating points and felt satisfied and intellectually nourished when she nodded at mine, only to realize that I was missing the whole point. While I was exploring a canon of literature, exposing gaps I perceived in the literature, pointing out contradictions, and nuance, she was *exploding*, rather than exploring, this canon. It was not my methodology that she was critiquing, not the interviews I was going to conduct, not the authors I cited, the literature I cover, nor my read of the political context. She was critiquing my worldview, my biography. She was shining a light on my positionality. While I was calling for a critique of Western Liberal peace and the way gender interacts and relates to these processes, she was calling for a critique of the critique. A critique of the whole discipline of peace studies, of development, of gender studies; so not to reproduce the colonized knowledge that has for so many years plagued these disciplines. Colonized knowledge that I, an eager and naïve young scholar was unwittingly contributing to through some sort of “academic neo-imperialism” (England, 1994, p. 84).

Rather than recount the whole conversation, I will share one quote that I believe summarizes quite well the essence of the interaction,

[Professor] *The most valuable thing you can contribute to literature on Palestinian resistance is your unique insight as an insider.*

[Emma] *What do you mean an insider?*

[Professor] *As part of the colonial project.*

The crux of her critique rested on my lack of insight into the ‘politics of the gaze’; the fact that as long as my research was focused on the violence/nonviolence of Palestinians, I was focusing on the actions of the colonized, as if these actions were somehow inherent to them, divorced from the context and history of place and thus missing the critical point; resistance is the reaction to colonization. As such, this ‘gaze’ cannot be divorced from, and is not that different from, classic colonial narratives that go something along the lines of, *‘they’ the southern, backward, primitive, subjects are the objects of ‘our’ theorizing, our teachings, our judgment.* In the case of my research, this is manifest in the idea of ‘alternative’, ‘progressive’, ‘softer’ masculinities involved in nonviolent resistance. The point of departure is inherently Western-centric and therefore anything deduced from the data collected within this framework will too be inherently Western-centric. This framing will inevitably lead to prescriptions, measurements, and value judgments because as long as the focus is on the violence/nonviolence of the colonized, the context is missed, power glossed over, and the power/knowledge nexus reproduced. I find comfort in Thomas’s (1993) reminder that, “one’s prior assumptions can be wrong and still be illuminating” (p. 34). My initial plan and proposal for my fieldwork may have been flawed, but it was illuminating.

For a few weeks following the meeting I grappled with her questions and comments and preceded to spiral into an overwhelming rut. I struggled to find my intellectual footing, my place in the field, my purpose. I, as a researcher, and my proposed research project, all felt like a farce. I kept repeating, *“All you have to contribute to the literature on Palestine is your unique insight as an*

insider”. After thinking through and around this for some time, I can now say that I do not agree with this critique entirely. However, nor do I disagree with it. The truth embedded in her critique was that “the research relationship is inherently hierarchical; this is simply part and parcel of the (conflictual) role of the researcher” (England, 1994, p. 84). It didn’t mean I should abandon my research. Rather, it highlighted a reality that I had to recognize and work within. That being said, I have done my best to acknowledge this and account for it in my research. For a start, I would like to explicitly take responsibility for the inevitable imperfections I bring to this research by nature of my own limitations. Furthermore, I recognize that this research does not present fully the voices of my participants, as I believe this is an impossible feat for any researcher, much less for an outsider. I would like to own, as Wasserfall (1993) puts it, the “intrusions both in their [my] informants’ lives and the representation of those lives” (p. 28, as cited in England 1994, p. 84). I do believe however that as a researcher, I have a valuable role to play. My specific biography, positionality, and personality have come together to create a unique understanding and interpretation of data collected and therefore the research questions at hand. England (1994) reminds us that, “researchers are part of the world that they study... we do not conduct fieldwork on the unmediated world of the researched” we conduct research in “a world that is already interpreted by people who are living their lives in it”, a “world *between* ourselves and the researched” (p. 86 *emphasis added*). My research therefore, hopes to contribute to the (re)interpretation of these two worlds by exploring the space, or ‘betweenness’ as England (1994) calls it, binding their world and mine (ibid, p. 87). In this sense, I am reminded of what Thomas (1993) says about how we as researchers are changed by the process of conducting research,

The researcher is part and parcel of the research process, and we must always be aware not only of how we might influence and shape the slice of culture we study, but must also of how we ourselves are changed by the research process.

Reflexive understanding is a form of self-dialogue by which we demythologize (i.e., strip away comfortable meanings from) what we have done (p. 67).

Throughout the findings and discussion sections of my dissertation, I intersperse my own narratives with those of my participants. By applying England's notion of 'betweenness', I explored the thorny and messy spaces between researcher and participant, perception and self-perception, interpretation and (re)interpretation etc. I have teased out nuances related to Western—and thus my own—narratives and indigenous narratives of resistance, all the while being sensitive to the subject/agency dichotomy which recognized that participants are both 'projected upon' through Orientalist narratives, but they too contribute to, and capitalize on, these narratives.

In sum, I want to be clear that the purpose of this research is not to speak for Palestinians, thus remaining trapped in the very web I aim to critique, but to bring forth narratives, experiences, and insights of Palestinians engaged in unarmed resistance as *I* understand them. This is therefore as much about my own journey as it is about exposing normative judgements rooted in Orientalist narratives of peace, conflict, and resistance prevailing in the region. As such, the finding and discussion henceforth presents my personal analysis and process of discovery based on the data collected.

Positionality: Who am I and Why Does it Matter?

This research is reflexive through self-critical introspection and self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self. Assessing one's positionality is an important aspect of this. I am sensitive to the fact that I am a white, educated, middle class woman with a passport that grants me the right to move and travel throughout the West Bank and across the border to Israel, other neighboring countries, and the majority of countries around the world. I am conducting research with Palestinian men and women, many of whom have little to no freedom of movement, and limited economic, and

educational opportunities. Although my research participants were born in the region and their families have existed there for generations, many of them do not possess the necessary ‘papers’ to be granted the same right to movement as I have been granted by nature of where I was born. While one’s positionality affects one’s access to power to be sure, disparities in this regard can also create the impression that the researcher has power and influence beyond what is actually the case. This perceived power can result in expectations or hopes on the part of research participants that the researcher will be able to help them, benefit them, or support them in a variety of ways.

Because I fit the demographic of many of the Western female activists who travel to Palestine to take part in various organizations and movements associated with unarmed resistance, I was exposed to data that would have been difficult to access otherwise. I experienced first-hand the pride and ownership that my male research participants garnered from my presence at events and in social settings. Moreover, my identity opened up conversations about participants’ wives and family life. While I never had the opportunity to interview the wives and partners of my research participants in private, I nevertheless spoke to them informally and asked my participants about their wives’ and partners’ engagement in resistance, as well as their feelings about their husbands or partners engagement in unarmed resistance. The resounding impression that I was left with — built off my conversations with the wives and partners of my participants as well as the insights my participants shared with me — was that they disapproved of their husbands meeting with international female ‘activists’. In this example, it is possible to see how my identity as a white, Canadian researcher in her early 30’s presented the opportunity to observe dynamics that may have remained obfuscated to a researcher from a different demographic.

In much the same way that as researchers, we can never escape our own subjective reality, the same too is true of research participants. “Observer and observed are both embedded in historical contexts through which any interpretations must be conducted” (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 108). Who I am, what I represent, and how this impacts the decision making of participants vis-à-vis my research, is highly personal and subjective. With that being said, there are commonalities in terms of assumptions, perceptions, and beliefs held by participants that shape the research process and thus, are important to acknowledge and address to the degree possible. I am an outsider to my field location in every conceivable way. I do not have familial, linguistic, cultural, or religious connections to the region. This outsider status cuts both ways. That is to say, it not only shapes my research by way of my own subconsciously held beliefs and assumptions, but also those of my participants. From the perspective of the researcher, my status of ‘outsider’ shapes the research process by affording both privileges that participants may not enjoy (such as freedom of movement, access to education, a passport, access to justice etc.); as well as disadvantages (such as an inability to perceive cultural, linguistic, and religious nuances). Calling on insights from intersectionality, while in the field, I occupy multiple imbricated identity markers. Not only am I a white, middle class, educated Canadian, I am also a woman, and younger than the majority of my research participants and yet childless at the time of data collection. While *all* of the facets of my positionality are too plentiful to address, I will address three particularly important aspects which ended up playing a crucial role in the direction of my research and my data collection and analysis:

- 1) Being viewed as a conduit to the outside world,
- 2) My assumed connection to an NGO, donor funding, or opportunity to obtain a Canadian visa; and
- 3) My gender and family status.

Conduit to the Outside World

Some participants saw me as a conduit for conveying their story, their experiences, even them as people with a history, to the outside world. This was evident throughout the interviews where participants often made a plea for their humanity. To me, ensuring that I convey their stories, narratives, and experiences to the best of my ability remains the basis of my responsibilities towards my research participants. Many Palestinians feel they have “lost the propaganda war”, or as Edward Said famously said, they have been denied permission to narrate. In a conflict where narratives, history, victimhood, and legitimacy run to the core, having the opportunity to speak and be heard can be an opportunity and a tool. In the West, and most definitely in the country where I am from- Canada, much has been written about Canada and Israel sharing common values and shared interests. This is often cited as a justification or an explanation as to why Canada maintains such strong ties with Israel, despite the latter’s flagrant disregard for international law and human rights; both principles for which Canada professes a strong commitment to upholding internationally. The relationship between Israel and Canada (and other Western countries) results in these countries advocating for Israeli interests in international arenas such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, as well as maintaining Israeli free trade agreements. These factors bolster what Wildeman (2021) asserts is a result of Canada and fellow Western democracies to favour Israel due to “racist perceptions towards the ‘Other’ people in MENA, where Arabs have all-too-often been characterized as less civilized, irrational by nature and extremist in their religious fanaticism” (p. 4). While this may sound like a far reach, these factors come together to create a much more sympathetic ear to the Israeli narrative vis-à-vis the conflict.

When I asked prospective participants if they would be willing to be interviewed, I was also unintentionally offering them the chance to paint a different picture of their struggle for national liberation than the one they felt is unjustly portrayed to the West. I mention this because this very possibly weighed in on their decision to participate in my research as well as their interview responses. While I cannot determine the degree to which this was the case, I did take a number of steps to ensure transparency on my end. Firstly, again and again I reminded participants that I was a PhD researcher, not a journalist. I did not write for newspapers, TV, or radio or any other platform/medium with high public visibility. I was upfront about the type of exposure PhD dissertations receive (very little), while also making a commitment to publishing aspects of the data I collected in other forums such as journals and book chapters which would have only marginally higher visibility than a dissertation, even if published in open access journals. Lastly, if I was going to be responsible for sharing their perspectives and experiences to a broader audience, then ensuring that I was accurately encapsulating their responses was vital. I therefore made sure that participants were comfortable with the content of interviews by offering them the chance to review the interview transcript prior to my analysis. While this was presented as an option to all research participants, only 2 respondents requested to view their transcripts.

NGO, Donor Funding, and Visas

In a region where economic opportunities are scarce and working for internationally funded NGOs or other donor related industries is one of the better paying jobs available, the fact that I was perceived to represent a connection to this world had an impact on my research. It no doubt weighed into people's decision to speak with me, to invite me into their home, and to maintain a relationship with me over the course of my fieldwork. This is not to say that this was the sole

motivation of participants, or even a significant one, but it cannot be overlooked as playing a role. Despite my efforts to explicitly state that I did not work with an NGO, that I had no connections to any hiring processes, and that there was no financial advantage to speaking with me, I cannot be certain that this didn't weigh into people's decision to engage with me. While it was essential on my part to be clear from the outset that I had no connection to donor funding, opportunities, or positions it was impossible to escape, and therefore I therefore decided to view it as an important part of my data. Because I had the opportunity to spend time with many of my participants outside of the initial interview over the 20 months I was in Palestine, most of which were in informal settings, I got to see 'behind the interview curtain', or outside of the '*NGO speak*'. This metaphorical curtain, or NGO speak, consists of a professionally curated set of answers, value signals, and catchy one-liners about peace and nonviolence directed towards a Western audience. *Was there a difference between this NGO speak on record and what I saw and heard off the record, in more informal non-interview settings? What did my participants think I wanted to hear? Why?* The presence of this doublespeak became an unintended, yet integral, piece of my research and questions such as those mentioned above offered guidance during my analysis. I will elaborate on this in subsequent Chapters.

Further complicating the association between me, a Canadian researcher interested in resistance/peace, and the perception that speaking to me may open up opportunities for connections or jobs with internationally funded NGOs, was the fact that my partner was working at a Canadian government office for the duration of my fieldwork. Because I believe in transparent relationship building with my participants, when they would ask me about my partner, I was forthcoming about where he worked. While this did not always come up, there were a number of research participants that I did speak with about this. This added an additional dynamic: the

perception that I may be able to help them access visas; opportunities for Canadian funded scholarships or other opportunities to travel to Canada; and the ability to organize official visits by Canadian delegations to a particular site of resistance or local Palestinian NGO with which my participants were associated. While neither myself nor my partner had the means to circumvent these conflicts of interest, it was a common misconception that we might be able to do so. In order to mitigate this to the extent that was possible, I made a list publicly available information and contacts about visas, immigration, and scholarship opportunities which I would share with anyone interested, but would neither personally refer anyone, nor offer any material support in these endeavors.

Gender and Family Status

I am a Canadian woman and at the time of data collection, I was in my early thirties and did not have children. While I was a woman, I was not a Palestinian woman and this meant that although some cultural norms related to appropriate behaviour between the genders applied, others did not. This not only posed an interesting dynamic between male participants and I, but also between female participants and I, as well as the families of my male participants and myself. My gender and family status played a significant, but perhaps surprising, role in my research. Much like Schwedler (2006) experienced, one of the first things that comes to mind when hearing of a Canadian woman studying men and masculinity in Palestine is the question of access. *Would these men be willing to talk to you?* The answer is yes, at least some men. *Do you need to wear a hijab?* No, I am not Muslim and therefore it would be perceived as odd if I wore a hijab (p. 425). Instead, rather than limiting my ability to move freely throughout my research space, in some ways, the differences between my participants and I (gender, nationality, culture etc.) were in fact what

facilitated my access and ability to see aspects of my research space that may otherwise have been invisible, inaccessible, or illegible. Had I been a Palestinian woman, different rules would have applied to my interactions with participants such as meeting alone in a cafe, spending the night at a local community organization preparing for a demonstration etc. While I will elaborate on this in my findings chapters, my identity as a female Westerner provided insight into a particular aspect related to international involvement in unarmed resistance; involvement in unarmed resistance provided men with otherwise unlikely access to exposure to Western women which resulted in status and jealousy from their community (as well as their family).

This dynamic presented challenges and opportunities throughout field work. How to maintain close working relationships with male participants that are built on trust and respect, while establishing and maintaining clear boundaries, and not giving the wrong impression, was a constant, and at times uncomfortable process. Moreover, I found something morally unsettling about knowing that I was being invited into spaces that other (Palestinian) women were being excluded from due to cultural norms. For example, when I was sitting around and socializing in a participant's living room with fellow activists, all of which male, I found myself feeling uncomfortable that there were no Palestinian women there as well. *What would they say, think, feel if they had been there? What am I missing by their voices being absent?* While I will never be able to answer these questions, their absence carried weight throughout my data analysis.

Lastly, the status that the broader community awarded to Palestinian men who engaged with foreign women is a slippery topic. It is slippery in the sense that it is difficult to fully grasp. There were times where I noticed that research participants clearly took pride in being associated with foreign women such as myself. However, when interviewing Palestinian women, this dynamic was

not only absent, but they also hinted towards a disdain for Palestinian men who fraternized with foreign women. The status that these men may have received for befriending or being associated with foreigners was granted by men themselves, rather than women within their community. Therefore, regardless of who awarded this status to my research participants, it nevertheless may have had an impact on my ability to access certain research spaces.

In sum, while my research participants may have been appraised of my lack of power in regard to how much exposure my research will have, my connections—or lack thereof—with NGOs and other work opportunities, and my inability to provide visas/travel connections, the larger community was not. The broader community may have still given my research participants status by virtue of the power they perceived me as having. Therefore, despite my efforts to ensure my participants were not under false impressions related to the benefit of participating in my research, they may have been well aware of the potential benefits outside of what *I* could offer, and instead were interested in the potential benefits from what *their community* could offer in terms of status and power resulting from the community's perceptions of me.

(Re)thinking Reflexivity and Positionality: Too much of a good thing?

As this chapter has thus far illustrated, I support and am deeply committed to a continuous engagement in reflexive analysis, or self-reflexivity. With that being said, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of such practice, as well as its detrimental potential. Writing nearly a decade apart, authors such as Pillow (2003) and Patai (1994) have passionately drawn our attention to the ways reflexivity has been hollowly applied in qualitative research. Pillow (2003) summarizes the critiques of some scholars who see reflexivity as, “at best self-indulgent, narcissistic, and tiresome and at worst, undermining the conditions necessary for emancipatory

research” (p. 176). Paraphrasing Patai (1994), she suggests that scholars who are deeply concerned about the questions surrounding representation are, “privileged academics engaged in the erotics of their own language games” (p. 176). These critiques rest on the authors frustration with what they perceive as reflexivity resulting in little more than ‘confessional tales’ that, while making the researcher feel more at ease with the challenges of representation in qualitative research, in fact, do very little to address the uncomfortable and sticky problem of speaking for others. For the researcher, reflexivity “can perform a modernist seduction – promising release from your tension, voyeurism, ethnocentrism – a release from your discomfort with representation through a transcendent clarity” (Pillow, 2003, p. 186). However, Spivak (1988) cautions, “making positions transparent does not make them unproblematic” (p. xxxx). In this critique, she charges that the act of ‘doing reflexivity’ does not automatically integrate insights from postmodern, feminist ontology and epistemology, rather ‘doing reflexivity’ in this manner “constructs the research participant as a modernist [knowable] subject” and thus perpetuates colonial relations between the knower and the known (Nencel, 2014, p. 76). Pillow (2003) speaks to this tension when she warns that reflexivity “always occurs out of an unequal power relationship and, in fact, the act of reflexivity may perpetuate a colonial relationship while at the same time attempting to mask this power over the subject” (p. 185).

While the temptation is there to get overwhelmed and paralyzed by the futility of attempting to conduct ethical, aware, and non-exploitative research given the criticisms, pitfalls, and inherent limitations briefly discussed above, my way forward has been to be cognizant of these pitfalls while accepting the imperfect nature of my research, despite however reflexive I intend to be. I have given considerable thought and space to self-reflexivity throughout this dissertation. I do not however, take feminist reflection on reflexivity and positionality as a confessional tale to share.

Rather, I have directed what I feel is the necessary attention to reflexivity and positionality as a step to disentangle and make visible the multi-layered power relations vis-à-vis myself, my research participants, my research process and product. I agree with Simon & Dipplo (1986) in their assertion that, “this is not a narcissistic turn, but rather a fundamental questioning of how the structured relations within which we live are implicated in the constitution of knowledge we put forward” (p. 200). In short, this is about recognizing that regardless of the precautions we take, the attentions we give to reflexive practice, and our ethical commitments, representation in research has consequences and it, along with interpretation, holds a great deal of power (Madison, 2005). Acknowledging this, along with the fact that we cannot entirely overcome this, is where my intentions lay.

Data Collection

Sampling and Recruitment

The seemingly simple act of determining one’s target population, delineating the conditions of participation, and defining who qualifies as a participant and who does not, is surprisingly fraught. This relates primarily to the difficulty in defining what is meant by *resistance*, and what constitutes as an act of resistance. While many Palestinians may identify as being ‘actively engaged’ in resistance, many more feel they are resisting simply by *sumud* (steadfastness, persistence, endurance) staying in Palestine, living their lives as normally as possible given the nearly impossible context that they find themselves in. If the act of living itself can be defined as a resistance tactic, it should it be categorized as unarmed resistance? Following this understanding of *sumud*, simply living becomes unarmed resistance. If done consciously, how does this differ from attending a march/rally/protest, planting olive trees after they are repetitively destroyed by

settlers, leading groups of Palestinian and Israeli youth in dialogue, rebuilding your home after it has been demolished by soldiers for the fourth time, or refusing a Jerusalem ID card as a form of resistance? Given the difficulty in answering these types of questions, a ‘mapping exercise’ of unarmed resistance activities, organizations, and activists in the West Bank was not possible. How then do I as a researcher interested in unarmed resistance, begin to narrow my focus and target the population down to an articulable group? Whose voices am I privileging, and whose am I silencing through this process of deciding ‘what counts’ as resistance?

As a result of the imperfect nature of categorization, combined with my aversion to the validity and utility of such categorization, this research has not endeavored to engage with a representative sample of participants which can be said to represent the spectrum of ‘Palestinian resistance’, or ‘Palestinian unarmed resistance’ for that matter. Instead, I let potential participants decide whether they are ‘actively engaged’ in unarmed resistance and once they have decided that, I then moved forward with inviting them to participate in my research or not. I chose to work with individuals who engaged in unarmed resistance in varying degrees of formality and as long as they themselves saw their actions as doing so. Some participants were members of well-known organizations which receive direct international funding, such as Combatants for Peace, Youth Against Settlements, Sumud Freedom Camp. Others were members of political parties, local committees, networks, and community groups such as village popular resistance committees and student groups. Still others preferred to remain ‘unattached’ and instead identify as individual actors, not tied to any specific group or organization.

It is also important to note that participants’ involvement with various groups, organizations or networks is fluid. That is to say, they may be involved in multiple forms of resistance at any given

time, they may change their level of involvement and engagement over time, depending on innumerable factors such as their family situation, the political climate, their exposure to violence, and personal experiences while engaging in these various levels of resistance, to name a few. Speaking further to the notion of fluidity in engagement, participants may also have simultaneously been members of a number of different organizations, received a stipend from a specific political party, while also engaged in small and informal modes of resistance. Therefore, defining exactly what a representative sample may or may not be in regards to those engaged in unarmed resistance proves to be very difficult. As such, I did not endeavor to do so. While the form of sampling I chose does not claim to be ‘representative’ it does provide a holistic picture of the unarmed resistance landscape in the West Bank and aims to collect data in varying degrees from across the unarmed resistance movement. I was sure to recruit participants from across the West Bank. Participants hailed from all major urban centres (Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Hebron, Jericho, Bethlehem, Tulkarm), a number of small villages (Nabi Salah, Bil’in, Budros, Hares, Beit Jala, Tawani, and Birzeit); as well as the main refugee camps in the West Bank (Jenin Camp, Dheisheh Camp, Aida Camp, Qalandia Camp, Balata Camp, and Tulkarm Camp). In short, while the sample reflects the geographical, socio-economic, political and religious diversity across the West Bank, as well as the opinions of NGOs, political parties, university groups, village committees etc., the resulting data and subsequent analysis and findings cannot be generalized, nor should they be, as this was never the intent of the research.

It is important to note, the unit of analysis in this research was the individual, rather than any organization or network. Unlike other studies on resistance which highlight singular organizations or networks and their role in Palestinian resistance (for example see Carpenter, 2018 for discussion of popular resistance committees in the West Bank; or Johansson & Wallin, (2018) for a deep dive

into the Freedom Theatre's role in cultural resistance), this dissertation looks at a specific aspect of resistance, that is, unarmed resistance, despite however difficult it may be to define. Participants were chosen from a combination of four methods:

- 1) Re-establishing connections with *individual* activists whom I was already familiar with, had previously interviewed, or had known through various connections over the years I had visited and worked in Palestine. Having worked and lived in Dheshieh Refugee camp in 2011, and then lived in Ramallah while conducting research for my Master's thesis in 2013, I had a number of existing contacts and friends in the West Bank with whom I had maintained contact;
- 2) Asking participants, my interpreters, and key informants to suggest other activists I should speak to (snowball sampling);
- 3) Identifying prominent local unarmed resistance/peacebuilding *organizations* and *groups* through the media and news;
- 4) Identifying individual resistance activists through participant observation and while attending demonstrations, marches, protests, clashes and peace activities and events.

Once potential participants were identified, I would either approach them directly and introduce myself, provide a very brief summary of my research, and ask if they would be willing to speak with me further, or I would ask to be introduced to them by a research participant, interpreter, or key informant. Once they agreed to speak with me, I would share more information about my research and offer to answer any questions that arose. I would then ask them how they understood their engagement in resistance and if it fit with the loosely defined parameters I set out for 'unarmed resistance', then I would gain their informed consent and ensure they understood the steps should they wish to withdraw from my study.

The first few interviews I conducted, I presented a printed copy of my research outline and informed consent form. I quickly received feedback that the act of signing their name made participants uncomfortable. I found this surprising at first given the fact that these same participants declined the offer to be assigned a code name or for their interviews to be anonymized. In any case, I altered my approach by delivering a pre-defined script which I would start each

interview with and gained their verbal consent, and reiterated their right to withdraw from my study at any time. A copy of this script has been included in the Appendix.

If I have not made abundantly clear thus far, I would like to clarify that my participants' identities do not conform to a fixed profile of traits. With that being said, certain parameters were required in choosing participants for this research. In order to qualify to participate in the research, participants were required to meet the following criteria:

1. Reside within the West Bank;
2. Over the age of 18;
3. Identify as being *actively* involved in 'unarmed resistance'; and
4. Provide informed consent.

Key Informants

Throughout the 20 months I spent collecting data in Palestine, in addition to participant observation and semi-structured interviews, I relied on the insights of a number of key informants. While I am uncomfortable with the term 'key informant' due to the inherent sensitivities associated with the term *informant* in my research location,³ I define a key informant as someone with whom I engaged with on a semi-regular basis and while I also conducted interviews with two of them, more

³ A broad perception and awareness exists throughout Palestine that Israel and the PA are actively recruiting informants for their own intelligence purposes, which changes the nomenclature from a research perspective. While outside the scope of this research, this has had a devastating impact on social cohesion and trust throughout Palestine. As such, the term 'key informant' does not sit right with me as it suggests that these individuals are acting as spies for me, telling the secrets of their community and culture to an outsider. Despite my discomfort with the term, alternatives such as: 'friend', 'collaborator', 'gatekeeper', 'assistant', 'interlocutor', 'fixer' also did not feel right for various reasons. I have subsequently been unable to find an appropriate alternative and therefore have stuck with *key informant*.

importantly, I had personal ongoing conversations outside of an interview setting. Key informants included

- Two local academics;
- Three of my interpreters; and
- Three friends I had made during previous visits to my field location.

These eight individuals provided particularly poignant reflections, analysis, and insights into my research, the internal dynamics going on behind the scene, and more covert aspects related to resistance activities, as well as about Palestinian daily life in general. They also helped connect me with research participants outside of my established networks. In short, they were a segue into ‘insider’s knowledge” of my research domain (Thomas, 1993) and I have no doubt that they helped add a degree of depth and nuance that I would never have been able to achieve without them. They were also integral to constructing my understanding of the role of gossip, jealousy, and other social phenomenon vis-à-vis my research. Key informants included three of my interpreters. One was in her early 20’s, she has worked for a number of other PhD researchers in the past and was closely connected to student organizing and activism around Ramallah and at Birzeit University. The other was in her late 50’s, worked as an interpreter for the UN and other international NGOs and had connections with various community groups, women’s organizations, and political organizations around Ramallah. The last of my interpreters, who also became a key informant, was a young man I met 15 years ago in Vancouver at a conference. We had kept in loose touch over the years and while he was not involved in resistance, he grew up in Hebron and was familiar with the surrounding areas. Of the five interpreters I worked with, he was the only male and I gained a great deal of insights by working with him. These insights were derived both from debriefings held after a particular group interview, as well as my own observations related to the dynamics between research participants and I in the presence of a male interpreter versus a female one.

Interpretation and Transcription

Interviews were conducted in Arabic or English at the request of the participant. During initial conversations either over the phone, or in person, I would ask their language preference. While I took two immersion Arabic courses for the first three months I was living in Ramallah, and continued to learn throughout the duration of my field work, my Arabic was not at a level sufficient to conduct interviews. Therefore, I relied on the help of five different interpreters (please see the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of working with 5 different interpreters below in the Limitations section) over the course of my fieldwork. These individuals were very diverse: their English ranged from impeccable to mediocre; their level of education ranged from a high school diploma to a Master's degree; and they were from different locations across the West Bank and Gaza.

When conducting interviews in English, I would travel and conduct my interviews solo. If a participant indicated that they would like to conduct the interview in Arabic, my interpreter and I would travel to the interview location (usually by *servis*), and begin with a brief introductory back and forth with me attempting my best Arabic. After the customary cup of coffee, I would begin the interview with an outline of my research, opening the floor to any questions, obtaining informed consent, and then moving into my questions. Depending on the flow of the interview, I would make a decision on the fly, as to when to stop the participant to interpret/translate. Sometimes my interpreters attempted simultaneous interpretation, sometimes they would interpret/translate every few sentences, and other times, if the participant was impassioned, they would summarize after a natural break in the conversation. Due to the unorthodox nature of the topics we were discussing, there were times where my interpreter would explain to me that they didn't think the participant understood the question and asked for alternative wording and/or ways

of explaining what I meant. This proved to be helpful in ensuring that I was able to clarify anything that was not understood and also enabled me to ask more poignant follow up questions.

Limitations

‘Performance’, pre-patterned responses, and inconsistencies

Inherent in all qualitative research, participants may have performed or told me what they thought I wanted to hear, or regurgitated pre-patterned responses they had heard elsewhere. While this is a risk in all qualitative research, I found it very difficult to navigate, particularly in the early days of my field work. While I had spent a considerable amount of time thinking around and about my positionality prior to commencing field work, it is another thing all together to be in the field and having to identify the ways in which your presence is shaping your respondents’ answers, in real time. While this is a limitation, it also became a site of rich data collection. After two years of conducting, transcribing, and coding/analyzing interviews, I became better at discerning when this was happening. In an attempt to account for and overcome this to the extent possible, I triangulated interview data with other interviews, material, and sources. This included analyzing interview responses from participants from similar, as well as different, backgrounds next to one another in order to identify similar patterns of behaviour, speech, and accounts of events. While this process aided me in identifying inconsistencies in accounts, as well as when participants would slip into pre-patterned response and the use of popular slogans and sayings adopted by NGOs, I did not do so in order to discredit these responses. I did so in order to better understand why, when, and how participants engaged this type of pre-patterned response. While I tried to remain cognizant of the above-mentioned challenge of ‘performance’, pre-patterned responses, and inconsistencies, I no doubt failed to pick up on it in every case and that will, and does, have an impact on my research.

Language

The fact that I am not a native Arabic speaker, no doubt, presented a limitation to my research. Despite the fact that I had the fortune of working with wonderful interpreters, their presence altered the research space in unique ways; their individual understanding of my research and participants' responses shapes the data; and their language proficiency dictated how detailed and nuanced the communication between the three of us—research participant, researcher, and interpreter—would be.

The fact that I worked with 5 different interpreters also presents a challenge worth mentioning. There would have been a benefit to working with one interpreter for the duration of field work. It would have led to a larger repertoire of interviews conducted with one person which would conceivably have led to a deeper familiarity of my research topic with my interpreter. It also would have provided consistency in interpretation/translation and meant that all of my transcripts would share the same quality of verbatim transcription based on the language skills of one, rather than five different, individuals. Despite these advantages, I chose to work with 5 different interpreters for a number of reasons which are worth outlining here. Firstly, I worked with different interpreters out of financial necessity. Interpreters charge different rates per hour, per day, or per interview and these rates had an impact on my ability to hire them. While their rates did not necessarily reflect quality, they did have an impact on who I was able to hire when I was to travel to far corners of the West Bank.

Secondly, interpreter's availability was another contributing factor. It was difficult to coordinate with some participants and I often needed an interpreter on a certain date and had little flexibility

if they were not available. Therefore, having a few different people to work with helped ensure that I had someone on a given date.

Thirdly, and most importantly for me, was my desire to tap into different scenes, age groups, crowds, and stratospheres of Palestinian society. Because interpreters often also provided insights and valuable debriefings after interviews, it was beneficial to have the opportunity to engage in these conversations with interpreters who had different life experiences, who had different topical expertise, who had different family/political/geographical connections etc. Moreover, as my interpreters also doubled as ‘fixers’ at times, connecting me to potential participants, it was beneficial to work with interpreters who had diverse networks. This helped me to diversify my sample and to ensure that I was not solely interviewing participants from a small subset of my possible research population.

The above three points are outlined in order to justify my use of multiple interpreters, yet they do not address the limitations of my inadequate Arabic language skills. Not only did this mean that I relied on interpreters to conduct some of my interviews, it was also a limiting factor to the language of literature I consulted in developing this research. I did not have access to the rich Arabic literature related to my research topic which is a significant limitation of this research. I was not able to gain insights, theoretical, methodological, or otherwise, and given the fact that this research is written in English, I am not able to contribute to a body of literature more easily accessible to my research participants.

Trust

While every effort was made to build a certain level of trust with my participants, to varying degrees, a level of distrust persisted. It was not uncommon for participants to make jokes about

me working for the Israelis, and I was often asked if I was Israeli, or Jewish, or if I worked *with* Israelis, if not for them. The perception that I may be sharing my data with their occupiers, no doubt had an impact on respondents' comfort and openness during interviews. While I could answer their queries, and assure them that I was not collaborating or sharing their information or data with anyone else, there was not much I could do outside of this, besides living in Ramallah and ensuring that I was known in the area for an extended period of time.

This lack of trust also complicated gaining access, and keeping these lines of communication open. There were times when participants would simply stop returning my phone calls, would fail to show up for a meeting/interview, or would show up and would only provide one word answers to my questions or would refuse to speak about themselves, and instead would only reiterate their organizations official lines. There were also examples of fantastic interviews being followed up with an unsuccessful interview a few months later with the same participant. The feeling had clearly changed and while they had still agreed to meet with me again, they were making it clear that they no longer wished to engage meaningfully in a conversation with me. At which time, I would offer them to withdraw from my research and also have their previous interview not included in my research. No one took me up on this offer. Nevertheless, the change in feeling was palpable and I will never know why the level of trust changed. In a context where threats, intimidation, bribery, and fear are pervasive, the possibilities are endless.

Interpretation

The question of interpretation is the proverbial challenge inherent in qualitative research methods. Despite my attempts to listen, learn, and constantly be checking in with participants and my interpreters to ensure I understood, inevitably, my understanding of participants' responses will

always be limited by my frame of reference, and the fact that I am an outsider to the spaces I seek to understand.

Ethical Considerations

As Allan (2017) opines, “if there is scant research on the ethics of fieldwork in conflict and post-conflict settings (Campbell 2010, 1), there is less still on the ethical issues facing researchers who focus on the lives of resistance activists in such settings” (p. 90). In preparing and conducting research for this dissertation, I found very little literature addressing the ethical considerations I was faced with during my PhD research. Notwithstanding this dearth of literature to provide guidance and recommendations, ethical considerations were addressed both formally and informally throughout the course of the research project. Given that the ethnographic method requires spending extended periods of time in one’s field location, as well as building and maintaining relationships with varying degrees of trust with participants, ethical considerations became part of my everyday praxis. Nevertheless, the 20 months of fieldwork I conducted, as well as the analysis and writing of this dissertation, has been fraught with ethical challenges. These range from how to obtain a visa which would allow me to stay in Palestine long enough to conduct this research; considerations related to participant’s safety and obtaining informed consent; to how far to probe in interviews when inconsistencies become evident; and ultimately what to include in the empirical section of this dissertation.

Palestine sits in the unique position of existing under military occupation and pseudo-statehood, while also being denied any autonomous land, sea, or air borders. This means that you cannot enter the West Bank, Jerusalem, or Gaza without obtaining Israeli permission, in most cases in the form of an Israeli visa. What’s more, as Banko (2012) recounts,

an individual wishing to enter Israel in order to travel to the West Bank must have a solid story about their reason for entering Israel. The basic tenets of such a story include an address in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and a job in the city claimed to be your residence while visiting Israel, an Israeli contact or two, a convincing tourist trip planned through Israel, a desire to visit the Holy Land — the list can go on (p. 444).

Not to mention the horrors this presents for Palestinians, this presents significant ethical and logistical challenges for those wishing to spend more time than the 90-day tourist visa one is given by the Israeli authorities upon entry. While not an official policy, it is common knowledge amongst any foreigner who has spent time in the West Bank, that telling an Israeli border guard that you intend to live or spend time in the West Bank in general, or especially if you were to say you were going to live in Ramallah and study resistance, will almost inevitably result in the denial of entrance into Israel, and subsequently Palestine as well (Banko, 2012). There are no guidelines around how to navigate situations like this. Reflecting on the dearth of scholarship addressing the ethically fraught situations feminist researchers find themselves in when trying to navigate “approval and clearance from various state levels”, Wolf (1996) opines that these problematic relationships are not usually discussed in the literature, “particularly in settings where those responsible for perpetuating systems of injustice and inequality must be appeased in order for the research to be conducted” (p. 23). This very much was the case in my field setting. If a researcher wants to conduct research in Palestine, no such visa exists. Therefore, researchers who would like to spend more than 90 days in the region are faced with two options: forge a relationship with an Israeli university and obtain a student visa that way, or leave the country after 90 days and hope to be issued another 90-day tourist visa upon reentry a few days later (a trip to the pyramids in Egypt or Petra in Jordan are common trips made for this purpose). Being faced with the ethical and methodological dilemma inherent in the first option is rivaled only by the precariousness of the second. Being associated with an Israeli university presented significant barriers to building trust

and rapport with Palestinian research participants. What is more, there is something philosophically questionable about lending one's name and institutional affiliation to the state that is illegally occupying the people you call friends, colleagues, and research participants. For many Palestinians, and those supporting their struggle for human rights and independence, forging institutional affiliations with Israel is tantamount to normalization. While the concept of normalization has different interpretations, it generally refers to the process of building normal relations with Israel in various fields including political, cultural, and academic, while failing to address the illegal actions of Israel vis-à-vis Palestine and Palestinians. This, some argue, normalizes Israel's behaviour and lends legitimacy to their actions by 'glossing over' or ignoring their inhumane treatment of Palestinians including the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, blockade of Gaza, and apartheid-like policies towards Palestinians. From this perspective, forging relations with an Israeli university could be viewed as profoundly undermining Palestinians' struggle for freedom by normalizing an abnormal political situation and thus perpetuating the status quo. If choosing the latter option, a 90-day tourist visa, there is no guarantee that you will be issued another visa upon reentry into Israel, particularly if you have been issued a number of tourist visas in the past. This precariousness makes the prospect of being able to conduct the extended fieldwork necessary for ethnography, bleak. Ultimately, when conducting extended field research in Palestine, each researcher needs to get creative in order to remain in the field. For myself, it was something that gnawed at me throughout fieldwork, and at times, "challenged the *raison d'être*" of my entire project" (Wolf, 1996, p. 1).

In order to guarantee that participants were providing informed consent, upon meeting potential participants, I clearly outlined the purpose and objectives of my research and made sure that participants understood that information they shared with me, would be used in constructing and

writing my dissertation. I also made it clear that there would be no potential benefit to participating in this research outside of a contribution to a better understanding of unarmed resistance in Palestine. Lastly, I ensured that participants understood how to withdraw their consent and have their interviews removed from my field notes and interview data, should they desire.

On a more formal level, prior to embarking on fieldwork, I underwent an ethics review and met all of the requirements in order to obtain ethics approval by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board at the University of Ottawa. The board is mandated to assess the ethical acceptability of student's research projects by considering the foreseeable risks, potential benefits, and ethical implications of the project. In obtaining ethics approval from the board, I provided a detailed project proposal outlining the purpose of my research project, my research questions, rationale for study, methodology, recruitment script, sample informed consent script, and interview topic guide. In addition to receiving ethics approval from my university, I also went over my interview guide and tested sample interview questions with key informants to ensure cross-cultural sensitivity.

Anonymity and Data Protection

In academia, maintaining the anonymity of research participants is considered an integral part, or best practice, in conducting ethical research. However, this is predicated on the assumption that anonymity is desirable from the perspective of participants. What if this is not the case? Sharing his experience conducting research with resistance activists in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Allan (2017) asserts, "there is little consideration of the ethics of maintaining anonymity when participants have expressly requested that their real names appear in research publications" (p. 110). Similar to Allan's (2017) experience, all but two of my male research participants

requested that rather than a pseudonym, their names be used in my research. While all 5 female participants requested pseudonyms.⁴ They rejected my offer to use a pseudonym for their interviews and instead, using their own words, they explained how removing their names from their stories would be disempowering. As mentioned in a previous section, participants made it clear that they felt that being interviewed was an opportunity to have their voices, stories, and perspectives taken out into the world. I therefore felt compelled, and even obliged, to use participants' names in this dissertation. Despite landing on the decision to use participants' names, I nevertheless worried constantly about protecting my data when crossing checkpoints. In addition to putting my electronics through scanners multiple times a day as I traveled across checkpoints, on many occasions, Israeli soldiers would take my electronics (laptop, iPad, phone, voice recorder, etc.) away for 'security checks'. I was never sure what happened to them while they were in their possession and certainly could not guarantee that information held on these devices had not been compromised. On a related note, it became apparent early on in my field work that my phone (as well as my partners) had been tapped, and while a common experience of journalists and researchers working in Palestine, it nevertheless remained a constant concern. As a result, I felt a sense of responsibility to tell my participants that while I had made all reasonable efforts to protect my research data, I could not guarantee the protection of my data from the Israeli authorities. Having this conversation with participants became a stark reminder of how different our worlds were. On many occasions, participants would laugh when I shared my concerns with them around anonymity and data protection. They would adopt a tone similar to the one someone would use with their younger sibling and would say things such as, "ya habibti, of course!" or, "the Israelis know what I had for breakfast this morning, what do I care?". For them, the constant surveillance

⁴ This is further discussed in Chapter 10

and lack of privacy resulting from living under military occupation was a part of everyday life and therefore my password and encryption protection came across as naive, or ‘cute’ even, but definitely not effective. In the end, I continued to employ various data protection methods such as password protecting all documents and multimedia material related to my research, encrypting files that were sent between devices, and deleting audio files as soon as I had transcribed them, as well as switching SIM cards, but like my research participants, I accepted that these measures were imperfect and inadequate. Furthermore, despite my reservations, I honored my participants wishes to have their interviews identified by name, lest not to rob them of “ownership of their own stories, experiences and insights” (Allan, 2017, p. 111).

Potential Benefits to Participants

After much deliberation, I opted to not offer participants a stipend for participating in my research. My decision was motivated by my desire to break from any associations or assumptions that prospective research participants may have related to my ability to provide material benefits such as salaries or other paid opportunities. Similarly, I endeavored to disassociate myself from any one NGO or organization, as well as the development and humanitarian work of the Canadian government. With that said, I would offer to pay any associated travel costs or gas money, an offer that was only taken up once by a participant who drove 45 minutes to pick me up from the bus station in Hebron and drove me back later that afternoon. I would also often bring snacks and small things to eat if I met participants at their home, or would attempt to pay for their coffee or drink if we met at a café. This often proved to be difficult, with many participants insisting on not only paying for their own coffee, but mine as well.

Material benefits aside, when speaking about benefits to participants for engaging in my research, important aspects related to reciprocity and intellectual exchange that takes place during interviews are worth mentioning. While I do not wish to overstate the degree to which this exists, I do nevertheless feel it is important to note here. On a number of occasions, participants thanked me for the conversations that we had shared. They explained that many of the questions had prompted them to think about their lives, their situation, and their decisions in ways they had never before. This was most common during second or third interviews with the same participant. Additionally, as mentioned before, many participants viewed me as a conduit to the outside world and therefore thanked me for traveling to Palestine, for taking the time to try and understand their world, and for attempting to tell their story to ‘my world’. Many of these same participants showed great interest in the finding of my research and expressed the desire to have a copy of my dissertation upon completion.

Methods

The data collection process for this dissertation was guided by the aforementioned critical ethnographic approach and feminist methodological epistemology. Data was collected during 20 months of fieldwork in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from October 2017 to June 2019. During this time, I relied on participant observation on a daily basis, semi-structured interviews, and group interviews to collect data.

Participant Observation

Participant observation was the bedrock of my fieldwork. Given its prominent position, it is difficult to define where it begins and ends, who is a participant and who is not, who am I observing and who am I not, when am I observing and when am I not. Methodologically speaking, participant

observation is most closely associated with ethnographic approaches. While one can find a broad range of definitions of what exactly participant observation entails, for the purpose of this research, my application of it best fits the following definition shared by Sharoni (1993), “a conscious and systematic sharing, in so far as the circumstances permit, in the life-activities and, on occasion, in the interests and affects of a group of persons” (as cited in Shroni, 1993, p. 43-44). In my observing, I engaged in varying levels of *active* and *passive* participant observation.

While the omnipresence of participant observation may be difficult to quantify, nevertheless, the information and understanding I gained through spending time and observing my participants in their homes, communities, gatherings, pastimes, and celebrations provided insight into the experiences and dynamics shaping their daily lives. As location and context is pivotal to understanding behaviours and beliefs, participant observation allowed me to integrate observed behaviours into the physical Palestinian context, thus leading to a greater understanding of how the local setting and behaviour interact. This helped to construct a backdrop to the more focused data I collected through semi-structured interviews and group interviews. In a place where even a simple task of going to the grocery store requires navigating a certain level of contextual, cultural, and political fluency, the contextual knowledge I gained through spending 20 months in my field location and countless hours with my research participants was invaluable. Participant observation opened up possibilities for me to “observe events that informants may be unable or unwilling to share when doing so would be impolite, or insensitive, and observe situations informants have described in interviews” (Kawulich, 2005, p. 4).

Highlighting the value of the insights I gained into the everyday lived experience of my research participants through passive participant observation, is saying nothing about the vivid and rich data

collected while engaging in more active participant observation when accompanying participants to protests, clashes, demonstrations, sites of ongoing resistance, activist meetings and get-togethers, forums, trainings, events, conferences, and rallies. Here, I was able to observe many of the phenomena related to unarmed resistance that participants had spoken about in interviews, in the flesh. As such, being an observer, and at times directly participating in these activities, helped interview data ‘come to life’. While these experiences helped semi-structures interview and group interviews data come to life, they also helped me to gain a more 360-degree view of sensitive topics, or topics on which “candid answers were not easily forthcoming” (Chakravarty, 2012, p. 265). By physically being part of the spaces I sought to understand, I was able to detect “many overt and covert actions that speak volumes” (ibid).

Participant observation is a funny thing. Whether I actively participated in events and daily life occurrences, or not, I was never solely ‘observing’. Instead, I was forever and always shaping the research space. Through participant observation I am shaping the research space both consciously and subconsciously, in the flesh and in the interpretation and analysis of events. Thus, the label ‘participant *observation*’ is imperfect in so far as I do not believe one is ever solely observing. I was never fully there as an insider, and never fully absent, as a fly on the wall. In any case, the impossibility of erasing oneself from the research environment became an important cite of data and point of analysis. Participant observation allowed me to observe, to the extent that I could, dynamics that emerged as a result of my presence. I would never have been apprised of these dynamics had I only conducted semi-structured interviews and group interviews. While I will go into a more detailed discussion of some of these dynamics that became visible to me as a result of participant observation in subsequent chapters, I believe the following example is illustrative.

Participant observation highlighted to me the artificial separation between violent/armed and nonviolent/unarmed resistance. For participants, a strong rhetorical commitment to unarmed resistance does not necessarily coincide with a rejection of violent resistance. While variations of this point were mentioned in the majority of interviews I conducted, it wasn't until I spent the night at a Palestinian organization in Hebron on the eve of their annual demonstration—Open Shahuda Street Campaign—that I witnessed it and thus, began to understand the delicate dance many men engaged in resistance find themselves doing.



Image 1: Open Shuhada Street campaign. Photo by Author, Feb 2018.

I arrived the night before a group of about 75 young protesters were preparing to march down the main street in Hebron towards Ibrahimi Mosque where they planned to pray and commemorate

the anniversary of the Ibrahimi massacre⁵, and to protest the subsequent closing of Shahuda Street in 1994. I had conducted multiple interviews and spent many afternoons drinking tea and sharing meals in the courtyard of the organization, and a significant amount of time with various members of this specific group prior to this overnight stay. I had met and interviewed the founder of the organization 5 years prior and remained in contact over the years. All this is to say, the relationships I had with this organization and its members, were some of the closest I had with research participants. The night before the demonstration, I made placards with 7 male youth and talked about the upcoming demonstration. As we colored in the block letters:

F R E E!
F R E E!
P A L E S T I N E!

on the placards, YouTube videos played on the TV in the corner of the room. The videos were set to dramatic, emotional, and inspiring music accompanied by videos and graphics showing Palestinian armed resistance; the aftermath of armed attacks inside Green-Line Israel; those involved in armed resistance driving around in cars, shooting automatic guns out of the sunroof; mass funeral processions carrying a bier draped in a political flag; scenes from people making hajj in Mecca; and pictures of shahīd (martyrs). These videos felt out of place in the lead up to an entirely unarmed and nonviolent demonstration. A demonstration organized and attended by youth who are ardent supporters of nonviolent resistance. These videos therefore, felt counter—or

⁵ In 1994, an Israeli-American settler and right-wing extremist orthodox Jew, Baruch Goldstein, killed 29 Palestinian worshipers who were praying inside Ibrahimi Mosque. As a result of the heightened tensions following the massacre, Israeli forces divided the Ibrahimi mosque into two parts; half remained a mosque, and the other half a synagogue with exclusive use for Israeli settlers. Additionally, the main commercial street in the market in Hebron, Shuhada Street, was closed to Palestinians, their shops forced to close and doors welded shut. It remains this way today.

antithetical—to the ethos of the upcoming protest. Speaking to the disjuncture between what Thomas (1993) calls ‘onstage rhetoric and backstage action’, and the learning opportunities that this disjuncture present, Thomas explains,

Sometimes the gap between accounts and what the accounts describe is sufficiently interesting that the accounts themselves can become the focus of analysis...The gap between onstage rhetoric and backstage action becomes a way of teasing out the contradictions that subjects must resolve when faced with competing demands of their daily existence (p. 38).

I was perplexed by the YouTube videos that had played on repeat on the evening leading up to the protest, until a chance interaction the following morning. On the morning of the protest, one of the youth sat down next to me and began to talk about how he hadn’t slept the night before. When I asked him why, he said he was up all-night worrying about what was going to happen at the demonstration. He knew that the Israeli soldiers would shoot, even if the protesters had nothing in their hands but placards and he therefore spent the night wondering who out of their group would be injured, go to prison, or worse. Even though he was participating in a strictly nonviolent and unarmed protest, the worry on his face and his agitated jumpy mannerisms mimicked someone going to war. The other young men who had gathered that morning before heading down to the demonstration were also noticeably quiet, standing silently around the courtyard smoking cigarettes and staring at the ground, lost in thought as they sunk their faces deeper into the kufiyahs wrapped around their necks. This experience highlighted to me the artificial separation between violent and nonviolent resistance. How can one make a distinction between armed and unarmed or violent and nonviolent resistance if the consequences of any and all resistance is met with the possibility of death? These young men live in a reality that defies our cliché— yes, violence begets violence, but nonviolence does not beget nonviolence.

The apparent disjuncture between a commitment to nonviolent resistance and a simultaneous valorization of violent resistance (as seen in the YouTube videos playing on repeat the night before) that I had initially been perplexed by, led to important insights around the difference between tactics and ethics; à la Gene Sharpe versus Gandhi. While the rhetoric related to the adoption of such tactics may have connected nonviolent resistance with values related to social transformation and justice during interviews, in practice, the adoption of unarmed resistance seems to have more to do with its power as a tool, its strategic advantage, than moral philosophy. If this is the case, then why the adoption of the moral philosophical rhetoric? The experiences I gained through participant observation, as in the example illustrated above as well as numerous other occasions, led me to believe that the adoption of such rhetoric was more for a Western audience. Once this became clear, the question then turned to why.

Semi-Structured Interviews

While I was constantly conducting *informal* interviews throughout the duration of my field work, many of these interviews were used to build an informed foundation and contribute to my general understanding of the spaces and the context I sought to understand. These informal interviews were not recorded, and I rarely took notes. Many such informal interviews took place while I was attending protests/marches/demonstrations/clashes. Others took place at cafes, on *servis*'s while traveling throughout the West Bank, and a large number of them occurred at the homes of my participants with their family members and friends. Still others took place while I was working in Gaza with individuals involved in resistance as part of the Great March of Return (GMR). While the insights gained through these conversations no doubt made their way into my field notes, I have not included them (i.e. counted them in my interviews) as formal data collection as it would be impossible to quantify these over the two years I was in the field.

In contrast to the above mentioned informal interviews, but building upon them, semi-structured interviews were important forms of data collection and were subsequently conducted with 37 participants (5 women and 32 men). These semi-structured interviews helped me to have the flexibility of open-ended questions, while also having the direction and focused thematic inquiry often found in a questionnaire. This format allowed for my open-ended questions to evolve over the interview process and across multiple interviews as my own thinking shifted with “evolving ground-level contingencies” (Chakravart, 2012, p. 265). This design also facilitated an ethnographic approach by according the leeway to probe at emerging themes throughout the interviews. It also helped to discover information that participants did not initially think to articulate or share, and/or that I did not think to ask. As Miller & Salkind (2002) confirm, “[o]pen-ended questions are appropriate and powerful under conditions that require probing of attitude and reaction formations and ascertaining information that is interlocked in a social system or personality structure” (p. 3). Constructing questions ‘on the fly’ was not only beneficial in terms of coming up with probing questions to better understand participants’ responses, I also found it to be valuable when I was attempting to elicit more personal or intimate responses from my participants. It was not uncommon for interviews to start off quite formal, with respondents providing “answers that parrot an official party line or reflect cultural rhetoric” (Thomas, 1993, p. 40).

In early interviews, I made the mistake of opening the interview with a blanket question along the lines of, “can you tell me a bit about the work you do related to resistance” this would, without fail, slip into a very long-winded description of groups, organizations, committees, or NGOs they were affiliated with, almost as if they were giving their fundraising pitch to a donor. Repeating buzzwords, platitudes, and cliché about nonviolence and telling me nothing about their actual

experiences with the messy, challenging and at times contradictory nature of resistance while living under occupation. In these cases, shifting my tone, framing, direction, or line of questioning helped to direct the interview in a less formal and more personal direction. Thomas (1993) explains that “critical ethnography may be more prone to this problem than conventional ethnography, because of the problem of digging below surface appearances” (ibid). Therefore, given my interest in accessing respondents’ personal beliefs rather than those of the groups, organizations, committees, or NGOs they work for, having the space to shift my line of questioning, improvising, and “ad-libbing subtle follow-up questions” during interviews was crucial in ‘getting behind the curtain’ of what Thomas (1993) calls “impression-management performances...designed for a public audience” (ibid).

As I am interested in understanding the lived experiences of participants and getting at their subjective understanding, this required a considerable investment of time in order to build rapport with participants. I therefore favored depth rather than breadth in my sample. While some participants were interviewed only once, for the most part, I opted to conduct multiple interviews with the same participant over the course of my time in the field rather than widen my sample. The majority of participants were interviewed 1 to 4 times over the 20 months I was in the field.

Table 1: Number of Semi-Structured Interviews per Participant

Sex	1 Time	2 Times	3 Times	4 Times	TOTAL
Male	20 Participants	4 Participants	4 Participants	4 Participants	56 Interviews
Female	3 Participants	2 Participants			7 Interviews
Total	23 Interviews	12 Interviews	12 Interviews	16 Interviews	63 Interviews

I found that repetitive interviews were particularly fruitful, and often unearthed a deeper layer of reflections on behalf of the participants as well as a deeper level of trust between the interviewee and me. In addition to repetitive interviews leading to more trust, I also found that giving participants time to reflect on the types of questions I had asked in the first interview, often prompted them to elaborate on what had been said previously. Much like Chakravarty (2012) describes,

In a one-shot interview, the researcher can probe gently but this is not likely in itself to be an effective strategy. Conducting repeat interviews is more effective because it gives the researcher the confidence to ask more pointed questions as trust levels may grow over time (p. 265).

In addition to interviewees having the chance to think about the responses they had provided during the first interview, I too was able to review our conversation prior to subsequent interviews and identify areas to probe further, or decide on a different direction to take the interview. I was also able to feedback to the participant what I had gathered from the preceding interview in order to ensure that I was not misinterpreting what they were saying. In this sense, interview settings became a “collaborative moment of making knowledge” (DeVault & Gross 2006, p. 181) rather than a mechanistic question-answer session. My past experience conducting interviews in the region emphasized the importance for the interview process being iterative and participatory. As such, participants were given a lot of space and encouragement to direct me, the researcher, to areas they deemed relevant and integral to my understandings of masculinities and unarmed resistance. All interviews were concluded by asking, “is there anything else that you think is important for me to understand? Anything that you think I am missing?” On numerous occasions, this open-ended question prompted really interesting conversations that opened up avenues of inquiry I had not previously been apprised of.

Interviews were voice recorded with the permission of participants. If participants opted to not be recorded, I took handwritten notes during the conversation if appropriate and when possible, I substantiated them during debriefing conversations with my interpreter (if present). I conducted 3 interviews where the participant did not want me to record and did not feel comfortable with me taking notes as he spoke. In these occasions, I would ask as many clarifying questions as I could to ensure I was fully comprehending their responses. Whether voice recorded or not, after conducting an interview, at my earliest convenience, I would write notes to myself about my reflections, memories, and things that had jumped out at me. These post-interview debrief notes were then included in each participants' file, along with their interview transcripts if the interviews had been voice recorded for my later analysis. For the three interviews where I was not permitted to voice record or take notes, I followed a similar process to the one outlined above; after the interview was finished and I found a place I could write, I would 'download' the contents of our interview by memory into my notes. This document then served as the sole document I analyzed for that participant.

Interviews lasted anywhere from 30 mins to 2.5 hours. Interviews took place at a location chosen by the participant. The majority of interviews were conducted in the homes of participants while others were conducted at a participant's' office, or at a local cafe or restaurant. Outside of the interviews themselves, our meetings could last all day. It was not uncommon to meet up with a respondent at their home; meet their family; be offered breakfast, lunch, or dinner depending on the time of day; followed by a tour of their neighbourhood, all before the interview began. On occasion, meetings were known to last for up to 10 hours. When meeting a participant for the first time, I never knew if the interview was going to take place that day or if we were going to spend the day together and then part ways having not turned to my research questions. This happened on

most occasions during our first meeting when I met participants in their homes. Being sensitive not to rush, hurry, or push my agenda on participants, and being grateful for their hospitality, I would leave it up to them to decide when the time was right to turn to the interview.

The days I spend with respondents and their family and friends but did not conduct an interview, were extremely rewarding experiences, both personally as well as in terms of data collection. For example, I spent an afternoon with a family whose son had just returned an hour before from Amman, Jordan where he had spent 2 months in hospital recovering after being run over by a settler in an ATV from the nearby illegal Israeli outpost of Havat Ma'on. He had been planting olive trees as part of a project to rehabilitate a nearby cave that was once been the home of a Bedouin family but had been destroyed by Israeli settlers years before. To welcome him home, 18 of his family members were gathered on mats and cushions around the perimeter of the living room, including his 101-year-old grandmother. While I was not able to understand all of the conversation because I was there by myself without the support of an interpreter, I did have a number of conversations with his extended family about what their life was like living between a number of notoriously violent Israeli settlements and outposts, their views on resistance, *sumud*, resilience, how they understood their nephew's actions to be an example of resistance, and the importance of Palestinians connection to the land. We also spoke about their views on the presence of the Italian NGO Operation Dove in their village. These conversations were fascinating in so far as they gave me a glimpse into the thoughts and feelings of the family members of those who are involved in unarmed resistance, rather than those involved themselves, including how these thoughts differed across generations in the same family. And while I did not conduct the intended interview that day, I spent 8 hours with the family, eating, drinking coffee and tea, and moving

between being a fly on the wall, and engaging in casual conversations related to the spaces I sought to understand.

Group Interviews

Having conducted research in Palestine 5 years prior to my PhD field work which had aimed to use focus group discussions as a data collection tool, I was aware of the challenges, and ultimately the futility, associated with trying to organize focus groups in a context where freedom of movement is a luxury most people do not enjoy, unreliable checkpoint wait times and closures as well as the necessity of identity papers and travel permits to move within the West Bank, make even a short commute almost impossible. Add to this extremely high levels of distrust due to fear of people working as Israeli informants as well as competition for limited resources between different unarmed resistance groups, committees, and organizations, all made holding focus group discussions highly unlikely. I therefore did not intend on using focus groups as a data collection tool. I was, however, pleasantly surprised when several group interviews materialized, almost accidentally, on three occasions. One of these group interviews was held with 7 male members of Youth of Sumud in a cave dwelling that was being rehabilitated by the group; one with 5 participants (4 males and 1 female) in an orchard outside the home of a prominent unarmed resistance activist in Bil'in; and the other group interview was held with 6 participants in the courtyard of a home in Dheisheh Refugee Camp with 5 young men and 1 young woman from the camp who were involved in resistance from a very young age. Group interviews were all conducted in Arabic and, due to their ad-hoc nature, were not based on a set of questions. Rather I would kick them off with an open-ended question similar to one I asked in semi-structured interviews. From here, I would let the discussion evolve naturally and only intervene with follow up questions when

I wanted to probe further, or when I felt the conversation was deviating too far in a certain direction.



Image 2: Group interview, Youth of Sumud, cave rehabilitation project, Susya. Photo by Interpreter, January 2019.

Data Analysis

Coding

I found coding my data to be an intimate, engaging, and entirely overwhelming process which subsequently required a degree of ‘light-heartedness’. I say light-heartedness because the process of reading through emotional and personal narratives and accounts while simultaneously looking for codes, repeated ideas, metaphors, and analogies—at times—felt cold and detached, while simultaneously feeling monotonous. I found it easy to get bogged down trying to find the perfect code, splitting hairs, and spending considerable time deciding whether a certain passage belonged here, or there, or whether it was worthy of a new code entirely. This depersonalization of data that occurred during coding, remains a haunting reminder of the problematic relationship between researcher and researched.

In any case, to begin, I read through my interview transcripts, field/interview notes, and post-interview debrief notes multiple times. From here, using NVivo software, I identified an initial set of codes. Using Saldana's (2009) coding categorization, I employed various types of codes. Most commonly employed were: descriptive codes (summative words or phrases of the topic of a given passage), NVivo codes (direct language of participants), attribute coding (essential information about the data and demographic characteristics of participant), emotion codes (labels the emotions experiences or inferred), versus coding (points out contradictory or conflictual data), and narrative codes (participants subject positioning and presentation of Self). After an initial round of coding, I went through a second and third cycle of coding in order to distill my initial list of codes into a more focused list. From here, I looked for patterns and emerging relationships between my codes and associated text in order to identify categories. In many cases, idiosyncrasies emerged during this process and these idiosyncrasies themselves formed patterns and thus categories and then themes. The process of moving from codes, to categories, to themes and eventually to theory was both logical and linear, while simultaneously being messy, imperfect, and profoundly subjective. It consisted of repetitively 'checking in' with my original transcripts to ensure I was not deviating from the initial intent, context, and framing of my participants. I often felt as though I was trying to weave a story that did justice to my participants, while making sense of their experiences with theory, and then presenting this for an audience who knew neither my participants' stories, nor the context. Thomas (1993) calls this a 'dual translation process',

"all ethnography is a dual translation process. We are translating the cultural codes of our subjects into a symbolic form that we can understand. We then translate our understandings into a form that the audience can understand. We must therefore be fluent in three languages: that of the subjects, that of our own science, and that of the audience" (p. 66).

Saldana (2009) cites Charmaz's (2006) metaphor when he explains that codes are the bones that form the skeleton of our analysis. Core categories identified through coding therefore are the spine of the skeleton (p. 163). Furthermore, the spine is also the meeting place of the 'three languages' mentioned in Thomas's quote above. Once I identified the 'spine of my research skeleton', I was then able to further distill these into a set of themes which I felt encapsulated the crux of my findings. These themes then formed the main pillars which I examined in depth in the following empirical chapters.

Presentation of Findings

I have aimed to weave my presence throughout the dissertation, in the hopes of making visible, and highlighting as a source of data, the varying ways I, along with what I represent, influenced the spaces I seek to understand in this dissertation. Without such situating, and in the absence of reflexive analytical commentary, there were times where I believed that their responses could be taken out of context and risk either being used in debates outside of the scope of this research, and/or perpetuating and bolstering the very Orientalist narratives I aim to tease apart and challenge. Therefore, I believe there is an ethical obligation to my research participants to ensure to the extent possible, that their comments and responses are not taken out of context and used to harm them. In writing myself into the text, I hope to not only make my presence in the interpretive process visible, but to also situate and make sense of participants' responses vis-à-vis context, culture, history, and of course, theory.

There are also risks involved in the approach I took. In acknowledging these risks, I am reminded of England's (1994) question, "can we incorporate the voices of 'others' without colonizing them in a manner that reinforces patterns of domination?" (p. 81). By aiming to go beneath surface

appearances, and applying a critical eye to the spaces between participants' words and actions, by weaving historical and contextual analysis (inherent aspects of critical ethnography) as well as the researcher's own reflexive analysis into participants accounts, this approach can dance a delicate line between critically engaging in holistic analysis, and overpowering the voices of research participants with the researcher's own voice. While I acknowledge this risk, and after giving it much thought, I have come to terms with and accepted that there is a certain level of authority I have taken in producing this dissertation.

In aiming to account for this to the degree possible, while in the field, I triangulated my findings and preliminary analysis with my key informants and a few of my research participants who were keen to actively regularly participate in the research. During these conversations, in order to make sure I was not off the mark, I would present themes and broader patterns I was seeing emerge in the data and get their reactions and feedback to them. Patton (2002) posits, "researchers and evaluators can learn a great deal about the accuracy, fairness, and validity of their data analysis by having the people described in that data analysis react to what is described" (p. 560). For me, this was definitively the case and I gained meaningful insight and confirmation. While I was never told that I was 'missing the mark', I was told on a few occasions that while what I was saying may be true, it was either not of importance to resistance, or people don't like to talk about it. This was comforting in two ways: it was relieving to hear that in my attempt to listen, interpret, historicize, contextualize and analyze that I had successfully distilled and synthesized aspects of the spaces I had sought to understand; and secondly, the fact that some of the themes and patterns that I had identified by 'reading between the lines', were uncomfortable for people to talk about, pointing to the fact that they were important, and hold a certain level of significance.

When thinking about how best to present the findings of this dissertation along thematic lines, I found myself continuously being drawn to a select number of research participants whose narratives, experiences, or insights seemed to reliably provide a summative overview of common themes. These individuals are therefore featured to a greater extent than others. While the voices of my participants are central to this research discussion and are front and centre by means of frequent quotes and passages, I have structured my findings as well as my discussion of these findings in Chapters 6-11 in such a way that the reader is presented with both the words of the participants', as well as my analysis. This approach shares epistemological affinity with feminist methodologies and critical ethnography, which both support the use of grounded theory and analysis and reject the notion that the researcher should strive for detached objectivity. Instead arguing that this is not only undesirable, but is also impossible and therefore calls for incorporating reflexive inquiry in an attempt to interrogate, navigate, and explore the implications of a researchers own inherent biases throughout the research process.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the methodological approaches and tools utilized throughout this dissertation. It presented critical ethnography and feminist methodology as foundational, while also highlighting the role of reflexivity and positionality in the formation of this research project, and resulting dissertation. It outlined my data collection process and tools, including participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and group interviews, as well as a justification for why and how I chose the tools and process I did. This chapter concluded with touching on the process of data analysis, coding, and presentation of findings.

CHAPTER 3- Research Paradigm: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The purpose of this chapter is to outline and connect the theories and concepts that I have drawn on for the conceptualization and analysis of this dissertation. These include: critical feminist theory, post-structuralism, Orientalism, hegemonic and alternative masculinities, and structure/agency. Rather than addressing my theoretical and conceptual framework in separate chapters, I have opted to knit these together in the following chapter. In so doing, it also serves as an introductory survey of the various streams of literature related to my research questions, which will then be expanded upon in the following literature review. Understanding how these concepts come together to form the webbing, foundation, or the paradigm I have conceived of for this research, is important because together, they form the lens through which I read my data, and therefore have practical implications on the findings. This chapter therefore offers an overview of the research landscape, insofar as it captures the specific paradigm from which I conducted this research and through which I analyzed/made sense of my data. These analytical frames guide my “general philosophical assumptions about the nature of the world”—or the ontology—and my way of understanding it—the epistemology—both of which underpin this research (Maxwell, 2005, p. 36).

Poststructuralism Meets Critical Feminist Theory

The main goal of feminist theory, Ferguson (2017) reminds us, “is to trouble power relations, imagine better worlds, and work to achieve them” (p. 283). While remaining committed to these principles, *critical* feminist theory aims to go further by radicalizing the process of ‘troubling power relations’ by actively focusing on forms and sites of resistance. In doing so, it brings to light narratives and stories of the oppressed which can help to move towards (re)centering individuals

themselves as the primary actors/narrators in their quest for ‘representation, equality, and emancipation’ (de Saxe, 2012, p. 196). In short, critical feminist theory aims to transform and unsettle dominant knowledge production by ‘disrupting canonical knowledge’ as a means of decentring dominant voices and ‘questioning hegemonic understandings of oppression’ (ibid). This research utilizes the insights of a critical feminist perspective by actively engaging with the narratives and life experiences of research participants, and specifically, through seeing these as possible sites of resistance. I have utilized this approach to then gain a better understanding of the less visible workings of power vis-à-vis gender performances of men engaged in unarmed resistance in the West Bank, as well as global North/ South and donor/recipient relationships shaping research participants’ lives. Feminist theory has long been used to examine the many forms of patriarchy within societies and has evolved to examine other issues of power, oppression, and exploitation from a gendered perspective. Using a critical feminist lens therefore, holds tremendous potential to expose the veiled exercise of power in our world; as power is never far from discourse around gender (Whitehead, 2002, p. 83).

Critical feminist theory recognizes gender and gender relations to be socially and culturally constructed. Aligning with poststructuralism, this way of viewing gender understands it to be a way of structuring power, which is constructed through discourse. In this sense, gender is a “set of discourses that represent, construct, change, and enforce social meaning” (Connell cited in Sjoberg, 2009, p. 187). For the purpose of this research, critical feminist analysis has been used as a tool for understanding how *gendered performances* related to what it means to be a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’, as well as gendered performances related to peace and conflict, and resistance and violence, are conceptualized, actualized, and institutionalized in the West Bank. It has also helped to gain insight into the mechanisms by which these gender scripts are challenged and resisted.

Based on the early feminist writing of Beauvoir (1949) who argued against any universal essence of women, today, feminist theory is predicated on the assertion that there is *no* biological essence of masculinity and femininity, and instead sees these categories as being something that a person *does* or *becomes*, rather than what a person *is*. Put simply, we have to learn how to do gender, and we learn this through a process of socialization. The process and result of gender socialization is a hierarchical gender order, created and policed through invisible operations of power. Supporting this idea, Scott (1986) explains that gender “is a primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated” (p. 1069). Understanding gender as constructed through socialization and therefore specific to social locations and contexts, this dissertation is based on the understanding that there is nothing inherently male, nor Palestinian for that matter, about violent or nonviolent, armed or unarmed resistance. Rather, it reflects a process of socialization in reaction to a set of structures within a given context; a process that is shaped not only by local customs, politics, and culture, but is also deeply tied to global narratives, frameworks, politics, and power. And while individuals may experience similar socialization and may exist within the same global power hierarchies, they do not come out the other side as uniform agents. To acknowledge that gender scripts, performances, and expectations shape individuals, is not to suggest that individuals lack agency. However, “feminist theorizing needs to be able to risk totalizing discourses in order to say something about social power” (London Feminist Salon Collective, 2004, p. 27). Therefore, critical feminist theory helps us to understand how individuals are shaped by—as well as reject, resist, critique, and challenge—power relations. In this way, the gendered individual is at once produced through power relations which may constrain the capacity for agency, but they do not euthanize it (ibid).

This dissertation has relied heavily on the theorizing of critical feminist scholar and poststructuralist, Judith Butler. Much like the theorizing of Foucault who, in 1978, argued that sexualities are discursively constructed over time, Butler (1988) maintains that “gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time -an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (p. 519), or what Foucault calls ‘regulative discourse’. The ‘stylized repetition of acts’ Butler argues, is best understood as a performance. This *performance* responds to the expectations and norms of a society rather than anything biological or static. In other words, she argues that gender is constructed through a set of normative frameworks that ascribe meaning, as well as imposing limits, to behaviour. The regulative discourses that produce gendered patterns of behaviour are not necessarily articulated by those who purportedly occupy them. Rather, they are articulated and imagined through the use of language and subsequently, power plays an integral role in forming the subject through these frameworks. In essence, the subject comes into being, it “emerges through a primary submission to the categories, terms, and names established by the concatenations of power relations that precede and extend beyond the subject they hail into being” (Mills, 2003, p. p. 259). Butler (1988, 1990, 1994) therefore uses the notion of performativity to explain how discourse produces the subject. Her conceptualization of gender performance has been utilized in this dissertation as an entry point to a broader discussion around scripts and performances of masculinity as they relate and interact with modes of engagement in resistance in Palestine.

Butler’s work and theorizing defies philosophical and theoretical containment and therefore, while I mentioned her as an important contribution to my understanding of critical feminist theory, much of her poststructuralist theoretical thinking has also informed core aspect of this dissertation. Butler

(1990) identifies poststructuralism as the rejection of, “the claims of totality and universality and the presumption of binary structural oppositions that implicitly operate to quell the insistent ambiguity and openness of linguistic and cultural signification” (p. 40). In this way, this dissertation owes much to poststructuralist thinking. Inherent in the framing of my research questions, is a rejection of universal, hegemonic, and essentializing metanarratives. Instead, the dissertation draws out and uncovers localized and context specific framings of gender identity, peace, resistance, etc.

Critical feminist theory’s call to “reconsider our existing understandings of knowledge, power, and spaces of empowerment” (de Saxe, 2012, p. 198), echoes poststructuralists such as Foucault and Said, in their attention to the relationship between knowledge, power, discourse, resistance, and emancipation. Similarly, I have found Butler’s theoretical insights useful in exploring the ways discourse, narratives, and competing frameworks operate within my field location. Scheman (1993) explains that epistemologically, feminists have long recognized that however knowledge is framed, it is “always in part about the relationships between the knower and the known” (quoted in Sjoberg, 2009, p. 192). This insight has been helpful in deciphering the ways that Western narratives, or what I have labeled Orientalist narratives, have shaped the lived experiences of Palestinian men engaged in unarmed resistance. Therefore, I have taken from poststructuralism and critical feminist theory, the notion of gendered individuals are discursively constructed. I also use these frameworks to explore how individuals acquiesce, coopt, and resist this discursive construction. This thinking has helped to shine a light on the way that representations of Palestinians and their resistance to Israeli settler colonial practices and violence has functioned to delegitimize Palestinian’s rights to statehood, independence, and human rights. With that being said, the flip side of this is that this approach has also simultaneously provided a way of viewing

the power that narratives and discourse hold as a sites or methods for resistance, fighting oppression, and emancipation. In other words, I have used critical feminist theory and poststructural analysis to gain insight into the way that narratives and discourse can function to both oppress—and empower—individuals and groups.

This research is interested in a certain type of discourse as it relates to my field location and research participants, and that is Orientalism. I will return to Orientalism, and outline how it is understood and utilized in this dissertation after a discussion of power. So, while I employ a number of different theoretical and conceptual frameworks in this dissertation, for me as a researcher, it is critical feminist theory that ties them all together. In conceiving of the strength of bringing together various approaches to this dissertation, I am inspired by Ferguson's (2017) vision of feminist theory which she argues "flourishes best through scholarly practices that cast a capacious net across fields, think interrelationally about power and resistance, and seek alliances with others who are both critical of prevailing conditions and imaginative about collective possibilities for freedom, justice, and joy" (p. 27).

Lastly, I want to add on a more personal front, critical feminist theory can also be thought of as a methodological approach taken in this dissertation insofar as it has shaped the 'doing' of research, rather than merely the analysis of it. In Chapter 2 Methodology, I outline an experience—a particular conversation with a Palestinian post-colonial feminist theorist—I had during data collection which led to a fundamental reorientation of my research plan, framing, and questions. The fact that this interaction had such a profound influence so as to redirect my entire dissertation, is a consequence of critical feminist approach to conducting research, or a critical feminist methodology. This methodology requires a commitment to positionality, self-reflection, and an

openness to constantly be listening to diverse voices and engaging in critical conversations. As a result, throughout data collection, analysis and writing, I remained committed to reconsidering and questioning my understandings of knowledge, power, and frameworks—the very nature of my thought process (de Saxe, 2012, p. 198). The final dissertation as you now find it, is a result of this commitment.

Discourse and Power

Discourse

Michael Foucault popularized the notion of a ‘discourse’ in his works *Discipline and Punishment*, as well as *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Given the concept’s close ties to poststructuralist thinking, discourse should be understood as a process through which reality is constructed, brought into being, and then understood. According to Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin (2013) discourse can be understood as a “strongly bounded area of social knowledge”, which weaves the boundaries of “a system of statements within which the world can be known” (p. 83). I use the concept of discourse to argue that the dominant discourses of the West vis-à-vis Palestinians and the conflict obscures the lived reality of millions of Palestinians, it is deeply rooted in Western perceptions, and silences Palestinians right to self-representation. This has material consequences as it forms the foundation of Western policy and practice when engaging with Palestinians. Therefore, throughout my data analysis, I have returned to the functioning of various discourses on the lives of my research participants. This has been applied to discourse related to violence and nonviolence, resistance, and masculinities.

Power

No discussion of discourse would be complete without touching on the concept of power. Critically, poststructuralists argue that dominant discourse is constructed by power. Furthermore, they also argue that dominant discourse shapes our experience and understanding of ‘reality’. Following this line of thinking therefore, power shapes our social reality. In *Bodies that Matter*, Butler (1993) describes how the subject emerges through submission to categories or names that have been created through power relations, for example ‘woman’ etc. and how subjects must reiterate those categories or names in order to maintain existence. However, when we say that discourse is shaped by power, it is important to provide context around how this power is conceived. In this dissertation, power is conceived of in a poststructural sense, influenced by the thinking of Foucault (1980), Said (1978; 1993), and Butler (1993). That is to say, it is *not* necessarily a repressive force, an overt expression or use of force that one uses ‘over’ another, or institutionalized in and through law. It does *not* necessarily rely on coercion, or overt violence, to achieve a desired outcome. Instead, for the purpose of this dissertation, power is conceived of as productive, creative, and often invisible.

To say that power is productive, is to highlight the way that power produces a subject through the “production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of discourse” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93). It is power that dictates what a specific discourse is comprised of. In other words, the claims, ideas, and images produced *about* a certain group come together to create a specific discourse related to this group. Because the origin of this dominant discourse is the site of power, the discourse is subconsciously adopted by all that come into contact with it, including the subjects themselves. Through the adoption and repetition of the discourse, it begins to appear normal and natural and is then taken as truth. This conceptualization of power has been crucial in my understanding of

research participants' experiences reacting to the twin processes of settler colonialism and liberal peacebuilding.

While alternative discourses (or what Foucault calls popular, native, or subjugated knowledges) exist to be sure, due to their subjugated position in society, these alternative discourses are rendered ineligible. Authors such as Said (1987), Fanon (1963), and Spivak (1988) pay particular attention to the way that the Oriental, the colonized, and the subaltern have been denied access, have been excluded from the construction of dominant discourse. Building off of this line of thinking, Gayatri Spivak (1988) famously asked, "Can the Subaltern Speak?". Illustrating that discursive control of knowledge and meaning is key to maintaining and exercising power, Spivak (1992) argues that intellectuals in Europe and western countries control the kind of knowledge they assume to be the 'truth' through the creation of colonialist discourses of the 'Other'. In this way, hegemonic power defines and frames reality and perpetuates it by justifying the building of institutions, both formal and informal, which support and legitimize the hegemonic discourse. The result of this conceptual tautology is the silencing of anything that falls outside of the framing. One of the reasons this is perpetuated, Spivak (1988) would argue, is that the subaltern has no means with which to influence dominant or hegemonic discourse about themselves, and therefore no way for their voices to be heard. While I find this line of critique compelling, and indeed find countless examples of it in my data, I take from the insights of these scholars, their thinking around the barriers and structural forces shaping and impeding my research participants' self-representation and emancipation. Where I deviate from these perspectives, is in their totalizing and inescapable view of structural oppression. This distinction ties into the structure/agency debate which will be presented at the end of this chapter.

Furthermore, the more recent work of Butler (2021) has helped to bring to light a discussion of the way power functions to create discursive frameworks related specifically to violence and nonviolence. I have applied her theorizing in the regard to my own thinking related to how the discourse of violence has shaped Western knowledge and understanding around Palestinian resistance. Butler (2016) highlights the ways that concepts of violence and nonviolence are not neutral. Instead, they come to us within a certain discursive framework, and this framework automatically interprets and ‘works over’ these concepts, applying a set of assumptions and perspectives. A crucial aspect here is the way that power functions to shape discursive frameworks and thus knowledge; it does so without our knowing. More to the point, discursive frameworks are invisible and therefore, rather than seeing the framework for what it is—just one of many possible frameworks—the framework is taken as truth. This occurs without acknowledgment, analysis, or critical thought given to the very process of interpreting the framework that has occurred. It ends up operating as a kind of “common sense, implicit, often unconscious shorthand process of explanatory and normative judgment” (Hutchins, 2008, p. 23). Hutchins (2008) highlights the way that this normative judgement shapes and limits ‘our social scientific imagination’ (ibid). Speaking specifically to the way discursive frameworks shape gender, Dowd (2010) explains that the power of frameworks is an “acceptance of the pattern as usual, normal, and taken-for-granted” (p. 316). Therefore, a process of ‘uncovering’ or ‘making visible’ first, the discursive frameworks/narratives themselves, and then secondly, the ways that these frameworks/narratives function to shape, and define a subject has been of great importance in this dissertation as I aim to gain a holistic picture of my research context.

This way of understanding the nexus of discourse, frameworks, and power was utilized to draw the reader’s attention to the ways Orientalist narratives both construct, as well as place value on,

the male Palestinian subject and their engagement in violent/nonviolent or armed/unarmed resistance. Moral philosophy, Butler (2016) reminds us, begins with the question of whether violence is ever justified. What this line of inquiry fails to do, however she argues, is to question what counts as violence, and what counts as a justification. I have found that questioning what violence is and how it is framed, justified, and understood in a given context, as well as asking questions around what violence is *not*, are important tools necessary to situation my analysis and to think critically beyond dominant narratives.

Power and Resistance

Foucault (1978) famously said, “where there is power, there is resistance” (p. 95). In this statement, Foucault emphasizes that it is not possible to struggle against (or resist) power in order to achieve some form of pure justice. Rather, he argues that one struggles (or resists) to take power. In this statement, he not only draws our attention to the omnipresence of resistance, but also cautions against romanticizing resistance, as it itself, is not immune to perpetuating relationships of power. Expanding on this, Said (1982) argued that,

if power oppresses and controls and manipulates, then everything that resists it is not morally equal to power, is not neutrally and simply a weapon against that power. Resistance cannot equally be an adversarial alternative to power and a dependent function of it (as cited in Bayoumi & Rubin, 2000, p. 215-216).

This insight has been crucial in building a framework through which to view and analyze men’s engaged in unarmed resistance, for their resistance to violent colonial occupation, in turn, is also used as a means of obtaining power. This is to say, resistance is not merely a benign, democratic, and altruistic act aimed as redressing a power imbalance in a given context, sphere, or domain. Resistance can function on multiple levels at once. Simultaneously resisting domination in one area, while perpetuating it in another. This conceptualization of power and resistance has helped

to make sense of the way that men who engage in unarmed resistance to resist Israeli domination, can also do so to obtain money, travel permits, and exposure to foreign women.

To conclude, in this dissertation, critical feminist theory dovetails with poststructuralism to critically and holistically engage with the multiple and overlapping dynamics of oppression, power, and resistance that exist within gendered categories (masculinities and femininities) and beyond. This approach recognizes that oppression operates through a multifaceted matrix of power relations. This means that people are never wholly oppressed or empowered, submitting or resisting, benefiting or losing. Instead, these processes are simultaneously occurring and require a historically grounded, gender sensitive, and structure/agency informed approach to data analysis in order to bring them to light.

Orientalism- The Politics of Representation

Through questioning the power and politics of representation; who has it, why, and what effect it has on the ‘represented’ (Dabashi, 2015, p. ix), this dissertation has relied heavily on the theorizing of Edward Said. At its core, Said’s theorizing exposes the way that Western ideas about the Orient are inextricably tied to, dependent on, and linked with the West’s domination over it. Said calls the process of constructing institutionalized Western knowledge of the Orient, *Orientalism*. While orientalism, outside of Said’s use of the term, refers simply to Europe’s representations of the East, Said critically engaged with the term thus giving it a new meaning, one rooted in critical analysis of the way that Western knowledge and power, constructs an image of the Orient—a distorted inferior image—that is then projected onto them. In this sense, Orientalism is not so much a theory, as it is a critique or an analytical tool to reverse the taken-for-granted nature of Western understandings of Palestinians. If Orientalism is not a theory, but instead a critique or a tool, I

believe it is fair to say that it is a tool Said created in order to draw our attention to the subterranean operations of power in producing a distorted image of Others/the Orient/Arabs/Palestinians. Deriving from Said's ontological and epistemological roots in poststructuralism and the work of Foucault, his theorizing highlights how *repetition* of dominant discourse, establishes dominant narratives and discourse as truth. Specifically, he illuminates how this process plays out vis-à-vis Palestinians and argues that the collection of Western (mostly European) post-enlightenment writings, media representations, and works involving representations of the Orient, formed a discourse which in turn, constructed and then managed the Orient. For Said (1978), Orientalism,

is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do) (p. 20).

In this sense, we can understand Said's concept of Orientalism as a critique of representation and of Western supremacy, as well as a tool for uncovering some of the ways that this representation occurs, the ways it evolves to silence Palestinians through ‘power political, power intellectual, power cultural, and power moral’. It also helps us to better understand the ‘considerable material investment’ (Said, 1978, p. 14) that has been made by the West in maintaining their dominance over the Orient. One of the ways I will use Said's notion of Orientalism is to demonstrate how ‘material investments’ towards the silencing of indigenous Palestinian representation and the continuation of Western domination continue today, through the agendas, frameworks, policy, and practices of the liberal peace architecture.

Said's infamous work on Orientalism was born out his personal frustrations and observations as a Palestinian around how representation of Palestine and Palestinians were most often shaped by others, by non-Palestinians. Said's conception of Orientalism and its theorizing around how the Palestinian people have been denied the opportunity for self-representation, or as he said, 'have been denied right to narrate' (1984), mirrors Marx's adage that 'they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented'. Orientalism continues to provide us with an account of the pervasive and continuing power of representation that the West (and its allies such as Israel) possess in the domination of the Middle East. In his canon of publications, Said argued that representations of the Orient, or the East, or Palestine in particular, classified this region and its Arab inhabitants as different, irrational, and inferior to the West and thus, functioned to legitimize Western superiority and control. "Orientalism is a style of thought" he explains, one that is 'based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'' (Said, 1978, p. 10). He coined the term Orientalism to highlight the process of 'dominating, restricting and having authority over the Orient'. A process that he argues produces the Oriental subject as 'voiceless and with no authority over its own representation' (ibid).

One of my aims throughout this dissertation has been to uncover and provide a reworking of the discourses we subconsciously rely on in constructing our understanding of Palestinians and their engagement in resistance. Further, I have done this in order to spur a discussion and deeper consideration of how the subject (Palestinian men) and identity of those subsumed within these discourses have become imbricated with dehumanizing, ideological, and exogenous representations. Said's work has helped to inform my analysis around how Palestinian identity, international perception, and space for alternative narratives are constructed and maintained and how this plays out in the lives of my research participants. His work, most notably the trilogy

Orientalism (1978), *The Question of Palestine* (1992), and *Covering Islam* (1981) have been instructive for exploring “the representation of Arabs/Muslims/Palestinians, categories often conflated together to produce a monolithic image of the Other as backwards, terrorist and despicable” (Abdo, 2014, p. 45). By labeling Palestinians as terrorists, Bayoumi & Rubin (2000) argue that Israel and the West systematically suppressed the reality of the Palestinian experience of dispossession (p. xxvii). Of particular relevance is the way that Palestinians are often framed as the aggressors, as the violent party in need of pacifying, as terrorists. Part of this process, I believe, is shaped through Orientalist narratives embedded within the liberal peace architecture.

When I say Orientalist narratives, what I am referring to is a narrative constructed by the West (and Israel) *about* Palestinians, which frames them as a backwards or a somehow lesser ‘other’ when compared to a ‘civilized’ Israel. While written in 1996 and therefore prior to 9/11, Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (1996) is an example of this hostile Orientalist discourse. Commenting on this, Ashcroft (2004) highlights how the representation of Islam since September 11, 2001, has become even more brutally simplistic. Both in popular Western imagination and in media representation, terrorism virtually is Islam and vice versa; “the representation of Islam has always been an important part of the Palestinian question because it has been used to silence the Palestinians, the majority of whom are Islamic” (Ashcroft, 2004, p. 118). I illustrate in greater detail how Orientalist narratives embedded within liberal peacebuilding are constructed and then used to silence (or deny the right to narrate) indigenous Palestinian perspectives and self-representation in Chapter 8.

One way that Palestinians have been ‘denied right to narrate’, is through the space, language, and framing of Palestinian resistance, both abroad as well as within Palestine. Ultimately, to the extent

that Western media, scholars, popular culture, and politics imagines, emphasizes, and distorts the framing and thus our understanding of Palestinian resistance, Said's notion of Orientalism offers a tool to begin to explore the relationship between Western influence in shaping the resistance movement, the operations of power, and how Palestinian men involved in resistance navigate these forces.

Masculinities: Hegemonic, Alternative, and Beyond

In the same way that traditional social theories making it difficult to understand women's experiences in social life, so too do they neglect to see men's activities as gendered (Harding, 1987). Therefore, masculinities research and scholarship is a complementary endeavor which has become an essential piece of critical feminist analysis (Dowd, 2010, p. 415; Ghousseub & Sinclair-Webb, 2000, p. 8). And while the study of men and masculinities emerged in the 1980s with the pioneering work of RW Connell and colleagues, it builds off of insights brought forth by African American feminists such as bell hooks and Angela Davis (Hancock, 2016). These women argued that all women were not oppressed equally and that women of color experienced oppression, discrimination, violence, and subjugation differently than white women. In addition to being the foundation of the concept of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989; Collins, 1990), by opening up discussions around inequalities within and amongst women and drawing attention to how different facets of one's social and political identities (outside of solely gender) impact one's experience, these feminists opened the door to authors such as Connell to begin to question different experiences of power and privilege between men. Connell not only brought theorizing around men and masculinities squarely into feminist thought, but also established the notion that multiple masculinities are always in existence at any given time and place (Carrigan, Connell & Lee, 1985). This novel way of understanding gender not only illuminated the power disparity between men

and women, but also between men themselves, and thus, argued that a hierarchy emerges within the social category of ‘men’.

As this hierarchy is socially constructed, it is neither stable nor sedimented, and must therefore constantly be maintained. Peterson (2010) asserts that, “the edifice of masculinity is a mythic construction” and this results in pressure to “prove one’s manhood” (p. 27). Therefore, rather than taking masculinity as a given natural state, this way of understanding male gender identity posits that the types of characteristics men occupy, impacts their position in the masculinity hierarchy, and thus dictates their access to power. ‘Characteristics’ here, refer to both innate characteristics such as height, race, etc., as well as characteristics they prescribe to, such as assertiveness, dominance, bravery, etc. Therefore, in order to prove one’s manhood, men exhibit characteristics that are socially and culturally labeled as honored ‘*male* characteristics’. Peterson (2010), reminds us that the privileging of masculinity does not mean that all men are privileged, but rather that gender devalues all feminized statuses, regardless of who they are exhibited by.

Peterson’s point offers an important nuance that is often overlooked; the denigration of the feminine does not only create a power hierarchy between men and women, but it is the leading cause of the hierarchy between men and other men. It is well established that historically, characteristics associated with men such as reason, agency, objectivity, and control have been valorized at the expense of that which is characterized as feminine: emotional, passivity, uncertainty, subjectivity (Peterson, 2010). In this sense, gender functions as a relational and essentializing force where ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ become part of a dependent and self-perpetuating machine, a Mobius strip of sorts where, as Enloe (1989) explains, “the meaning of masculinity is essentially invested in the denigration and exclusion of the feminine” (cited in

Hutchins, 2008, p. 26). This hierarchy creates a dualism of man/women, where woman is what man is not. Among the many negative ramifications of this dualism, feminist scholars exploring its material effects concur that the leading consequence, is that it essentializes masculinity and femininity and locks them into a rigid binary (Alwis, Mertus & Sajjad, 2013; Dolan, 2014; Hudson, 2009; Mazurana & Cole, 2013; Parapart, 2014; Puechguirbal, 2010; Willett, 2010). In fact, Ferguson (2017) identifies an opposition to this dualistic thinking as one of the core fundamental principles of feminist theory (p. 270).

Feminist theorists and others concerned with gender relations, and the gendered nature of our world, have actively worked to dismantle gendered binary thinking. In dismantling the binary, feminists begin to dismantle gender essentialism. Fighting essentialism remains a crucial part of feminist theory because if left unproblematicized, essentialism “tends to naturalize familiar power arrangements by attributing them to timeless essence rather than historical processes” (ibid, p. 271). One way in which feminist theorists have done so, is through employing the concept of hegemonic and alternative masculinities in order to deconstruct the monolithic and essentializing category of masculinity, and tease out the hierarchies that exist between men and masculinities as well as between men and women.

Hegemonic Masculinities

If we look at the hierarchy that exists between men and masculinities, sitting on top of this gender hierarchy is the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’. Perhaps the most popular and widely cited concept in masculinities studies, ‘hegemonic masculinity’ was popularized in Connell’s (1987) *Gender and Power*. Often misunderstood to mean the most common form of masculinity, or traditional male norms, instead, hegemonic masculinity should be understood as a dominant

discourse since most often only a minority of men actually espouse the suite of hegemonic ideals (Groes-Green, 2012, p. 105). In this sense, Connell (1995) explains that hegemonic masculinity is a cultural ideal, not a description of the personalities of the majority—or the most powerful—of men. The majority of men do not directly fit the descriptions of hegemonic masculinity, instead, this model commands power and respect and is recognizable as an ideal (Carrigan et al., 1985, p. 592-600). Therefore, rather than being assumed as the norm, hegemonic masculinity is normative in so far as it embodies the current most honored way of being a ‘man’ in a given context and requires “all other men to position themselves in relation to it” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832). Put another way, Hooper (2001) explains that particular masculinities are valorized, not necessarily consciously or deliberately, creating a norm to which men aspire even if they often do not achieve this, and to Hooper, this is hegemonic masculinity (as cited in Hamber, 2016, p. 27).

Connell’s notion of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ will be used to understand regional and context specific discourses of masculinity, and to explore how these discourses operate within a web of power relations in my research setting. More specifically, I will engage with the concept of hegemonic masculinity as a means to better understanding the ways that men’s engagement in resistance informs hegemonic masculine gender scripts, as well as to understand how engagement with liberal peacebuilding initiatives contribute to—or challenge—local conceptions of masculinity.

Men who embrace hegemonic masculinities benefit from what Connell calls ‘the patriarchal dividend’ (Carrigan et al., 1985, p. 594). Conversely, other (alternative) masculinities do not have access to the same power and symbolic/material privileges (Groes-Green, 2012, p. 94). Therefore, hegemonic masculinity exercises power over rival, ‘marginalized’ masculinities, often leading to

a discrediting of alternatives (Lusher & Robins, 2009). But what are the alternatives? Theorists often rely on the concept of alternative masculinities when aiming to understand non-dominant, non-hegemonic masculinities.

Shifting Hegemonic Masculinities Towards Alternatives?

Theorizing around masculinity in general, and hegemonic masculinity specifically, has not been unequivocally welcomed by all feminist scholars. The majority of critiques can be distilled into two main concerns: the fear of masculinity scholarship hijacking the hard-won and long-awaited attention that feminist concerns have starting to receive in the mainstream (Dowd, 2010), and the concern that the term functions to essentialize masculinities and thus erase differences and power hierarchies between men. Responding to the second concern related to essentializing masculinities, it is important to bring to the forefront of our discussions around masculinities, the multiple, imbricated, and evolving nature of masculinities. Connell's concept of hegemonic masculinity must be acknowledged for emphasizing differences, inequalities and hierarchies between men, a point that is often overlooked by scholars (Wedgwood, 2009). In line with a poststructuralist critique outlined above, Whitehead (2002) puts forth an understanding of men and masculinity as discursively informed subjectivities rather than as biological individuals. It is helpful to see men and masculinities as discursively informed insofar as it reminds us that they are not static, they are often contradictory and inconsistent, and they manifest themselves in myriads of practices, performances, and discourses that vary between social contexts (Whitehead, 2002). It is from this understanding of gender identity in general, and masculine identity specifically, that this dissertation rests.

Responding to what some perceive as the essentializing claims of hegemonic masculinities, and carrying on the feminist tradition of fighting essentialism, cutting edge feminist research by authors such as Duncanson, 2015; Groes-Green, 2009; Haque, 2013; and Parpart, 2015 provide innovative contributions to the scholarship forging more nuanced and anti-essentialist accounts of masculinities. These authors answer the calls of Christensen & Jensen (2014) who stress that,

In order to understand the complexity in gendered power relations there is a need for re-articulating Connell's notion of hegemonic masculinity focusing less on deterministic and stable power relations and more on contradictions, antagonisms, ambivalences, ruptures and on-going struggles to create hegemonic formations (p. 67).

From highlighting the relationship between philogynous masculinities and hegemonic masculinities in Mozambique (Groes-Green, 2012) to constructions of alternative masculinities in post-war Cambodia (Haque, 2013), these analyses highlight the complexities of differences and hierarchic power relations between men and provide examples of theorizing around how and why, and where hegemonic masculinities are deconstructed, and alternative masculinities are constructed.

A growing body of literature has illustrated how masculinities are not simply diverse and hierarchical, they are also malleable and evolve as a result of changing social and material circumstance. If we accept the work of Connell (1987, 1995) and others arguing that masculinities are actively constructed, this means that they are *processes*, not character types. The social processes that shape masculinities centre around what/how a given social context defines a man's role and expectations of behaviour. This, however, changes and evolves based on the shifting contexts men find themselves in. Therefore, there has been an emergence of literature highlighting diverse social contexts in which shifts occur in hegemonic masculinity toward versions that centre

less on things such as: violence, dominance, breadwinning, promiscuity, and/or emotional repression. Some examples of this literature can be found in the work of Skinner (2021) who documents the popularization of rap music in Palestinian refugee camps and traces its use by Palestinian male youth as a channel through which patriarchal gendered binaries and hegemonic masculine ideals of emotional suppression are overcome. She argues that through the lyrics of this music, emotionality is masculinizing and therefore subsumed into patriarchal gender binaries and hegemonic norms, while simultaneously challenging these very binaries and norms.

Another example is the work of Cuklanz & Erol (2021) who document the shifting image of masculinities vis-à-vis how men relate to their families in American television. They argue that while remaining squarely rooted in hegemonic masculine norms related to violence, there is evidence of a shift towards the inclusion of fatherhood and paternal nurturance within traditionally hypermasculine genres of westerns and prison dramas. Thus, expanding constructions of hegemonic masculinity to include fatherhood and nurturing paternal behaviours.

Szabo (2014) situates her research within the blurring of alternative and hegemonic masculinity as it relates to men's involvement in the kitchen. She argues that, despite men's increasing engagement in cooking, an act that could be seen as adhering to alternative masculine norms given its social ascription to femininity, these men frame their cooking through the prism of hegemonic elements revolving around notions of individuality and romantic or sexual allure, tropes of hegemonic masculinity.

As a last example, Duncanson (2009) assembles evidence of the emergence of an alternative discourse of 'peacekeeper masculinity' amongst British soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Bosnia. Peacekeeper masculinity, she argues, is distinct but fails to challenge the hegemony of the

warrior model of hegemonic masculinity in these forces. While the military is traditionally thought of as the epicentre of hegemonic masculinity, Duncanson argues although the emerging peacekeeper masculinity does not dislodge the hegemony of the warrior model, it nevertheless is important in so far as it challenges the gendered dichotomies associating masculinity to incorporate values traditionally positioned as feminine.

What these four examples have in common, is the attention they give to the ways hegemonic masculinities shift, evolve, and are challenged through the performative adoption of values, behaviours, or actions traditionally conceived of as feminine. In line with the examples provided above, Groes-Green (2012) insists that alternatives can appear as a subtle, ‘softening’ of hegemonic masculinities, and subsequently argues for the need to “disentangle existing entanglements” of diverse masculinities in the same cultural context in order to provide the opportunity to identify “the ways in which their meaning and context shift” (p. 95). While these authors identify emerging alternatives as important sites of analysis and potential entry points towards the creation of alternative, more gender-equitable notions of masculinity, they simultaneously warn of the dangers of being ‘fooled’ by shifts in hegemonic norms which may not necessarily indicate the emergence of alternative masculinities. In fact, Duncanson (2015) reminds us that, “softer, more feminized form of hybrid masculinity (in the sense that it has incorporated traits and practices associated with women and femininity) can become hegemonic... masking new oppressions by seeming to be progressive—or more positive” (p. 243).

What I borrow from these examples, is a desire to move beyond essentialized and crystalized notions of masculinities and instead, strive towards an understanding of the ways that masculinities shift and change as they interact and react to specific contexts. As I explore the experiences of my

research participants engagement with unarmed resistance, as well as the various opportunities that this engagement brought with it, I remain attuned to slippages and evidence of the operations of power flowing through such engagement. In doing so, I homed in on the operations of power related to the construction of hegemonic and alternative masculinities within and between my research participants.

While there is a growing body of literature on masculinities in conflict settings, war, and in the military, there is limited attention given to how either non-combatant men, male civilians, or men engaged in nonviolence are impacted by situations of conflict, violence, war, or occupation (MacKenzie & Foster, 2017; Myrtilinen, Khattari & Naujoks, 2016). This has led to a conceptual blindness towards actions and strategies of men not engaged in violent activity in conflict settings which is confirmed through a review of the current literature related to masculinities in such settings (Giligan, 2001, p. 2). Looking specifically at male gender identity in conflict settings, authors have argued that globally, society privilege hegemonic masculinities which exhibit ‘tough’ responses to conflict, and—due to the relational nature of gender identities touched on earlier—thus feminizing nonviolent alternatives (Cohn & Ruddick, 2003; Enloe, 2007). Speaking specifically to this point, McDonald (2010) posit that men’s desire to assert their gender identity and achieve dignity may compel men and young boys to “pursue violent identification processes rather than risk assuming an abject emasculated subject position” (p. 210). This dissertation however, challenges this assumed link between emasculation and nonviolent responses to conflict, by responding to the calls of feminist scholars such as Pankhurst (2008), Wright (2014), and Connell (2009), who emphasize that rather than exploring why men pursue militarized or armed/violent resistance, exploring why more Palestinian men do not (Leech, 2009, p. 77).

This dissertation integrates the concepts of hegemonic, shifting, and alternative masculinities to draw out a context specific example of the elastic and unstable nature of masculinities. I believe, along with other critical scholars, that analysis into men and masculinities must avoid homogenizing and essentializing masculinities into ‘hegemonic’ or ‘militarized’ etc., this theoretical lens therefore will be utilized to explore space for ambiguity and change in dominant hegemonic discourses around masculinities. It uses these frameworks to tease out how specific social, political, cultural, and economic milieu, converge to create a context in which masculinities evolve. In this analysis, this dissertation has used these concepts to show how, in fact, hegemonic masculinities can evolve to encompass nonviolent responses to conflict, resistance, and war. Applying the concepts of alternative and hegemonic masculinities therefore illuminate the multiplicity and contradictory nature of masculinities yet help to retain feminist insights into the connection between masculinity and power. Furthermore, this dissertation builds on the above-mentioned conceptual framework (and the literature which supports it) to problematize assumptions related to the assertion that hegemonic masculinities are always willing to resort to violence. This approach adds credence to the idea that men’s gender identity can be simultaneously hegemonic and non-hegemonic and therefore contributes to this literature through exploring what happens when hegemonic masculinity incorporated traits and practices culturally associated with femininity in conflict settings.

Structure-and-Agency Perspective

The so-called structure/agency debate has been central to the social sciences for decades. At its core, it is really a debate—or a dance—between where one places emphasis between individuals’ freewill, intention, and action, and wider structures of power and social relations in deciphering human behaviour. Are individuals free agents, or are they confined and defined by social structure,

or is a combination of both, and if so, what combination? How we understand human behaviour and social existence depends on how we understand structure and agency within a given context.

We can trace the structure/agency debate in social sciences back to early philosophical distinctions between structuralism on the one hand, which sees structures (material and cultural) as constructing society and human behaviour, and, on the other hand, schools of thought which understand individual agents as ‘masters of their universe’, as central to the shaping of their realities, and who understand individual agency as enacting greater influence onto individuals’ world and the larger social structure. For structuralists such as Durkheim, society determines human action and behaviour. From this standpoint, agency is external to individuals, in the sense that society provides people with agency. Post-structuralism on the other hand, add a perspective on power and thus combines structure with agency. These two perspectives create separate poles, where on one side lies an understanding of humans as ‘fully atomized actors’ with ‘unfettered individual choice’, and on the other lies an understanding of humans as ‘deeply socialized’ actors who ‘unwittingly act to reproduce the social structure’ (Coburn, 2016, p. 467).

Contemporary scholars tend to find themselves somewhere in the middle of these two approaches, offering a third way of understanding human behaviour which places analytical emphasis on individual agency with a simultaneous appreciation of wider social structures. We can call this third way a *structure-and-agency perspective*. These three approaches—structure, agency, structure-and-agency perspective —therefore create a spectrum which, “put forth quite different accounts of the nature of human agency, traversing the terrain from unfettered individual choice through different formulations of conditioned agency to heavily socialized views where action is dictated by the social structure” (ibid, p. 466). For authors advocating for a balance between agency

and structure, they see this approach as vital to gaining a deeper understanding of persistence and emergence, stability and change, on both the individual and collective levels (Meltzer & Manis, 1992). By adopting a structure-and-agency perspective, scholars are freed from “the false dichotomy of structure versus agency” (Musolf, 2017, p. 6).

Coburn (2016) warns that despite the central role that underlying assumptions about human agency and social structures play in informing how researchers conduct research, that is, what they ‘pay attention to’ in the way they design and conceive of their research and the “inferences he or she draws from data”, nevertheless, “these assumptions are rarely acknowledged by implementation scholars” (p. 466). Therefore, I wish to make explicit, to the extent possible, my embedded assumptions around structure and agency in order to provide analytical transparency vis-à-vis this dissertation. Before I outline how a structure-and-agency perspective has informed this dissertation, I will first outline how I understand agency, and how I understand structure.

Agency is essentially an agents’ ability and capacity to act. It has been defined as “an actor’s ability to have some effect on the social world—altering the rules, relational ties, or distribution of resources” (Scott, 2008, p. 77). Agency is therefore present when an actor defines a situation, and then acts. This occurs despite the fact that they are surrounded by structure. Authors stress the importance of agency in understanding human behaviour because without such a focus on agency, “disembodied and anthropomorphized social forces appear to animate behaviour” (Musolf, 2017, p. 5). Therefore, rather than ‘disembodied and anthropomorphized social forces’ driving human behaviour, I believe it is the process of individuals deciphering and then ‘choosing from available choices’ in order to ‘make their own history’, despite being embedded within a plethora of social and material structures (ibid p. 6). This deciphering and then acting is, I believe, a result of critical

consciousness. My conceptualization of agency rests on an assumption that from critical consciousness, arises agency. In the eloquent words of Meltzer & Manis (1992), “critical consciousness and collective action pump, like ventricles, the body politic with transformation” (p. 15). The meeting of critical consciousness and agency lies in “the ability to define the situation so as to unmask ideology, especially the ideologies of inferiority that afflict the disadvantaged” (ibid, p. 12). While stressing the role of critical consciousness and agency, I do not mean to erase “irrationality and the unconscious within conceptualizations of agency” (The London Feminist Salon Collective, 2004, p. 30). Critical consciousness raising agency is not meant to indicate a rational actor. Rather, agency refers to the behaviour of imperfect, socialized, and structure-informed, actors. And therefore, what agency and critical consciousness is meant to indicate, is “hope and possibility for challenging structural, determined inequalities” (ibid).

In terms of informing this dissertation, I have looked out for examples of critical consciousness and assume a degree of agency is present in my research participants as they navigate liberal peacebuilding interventions, as well as life under occupation, and the embodiment of gender scripts. This conceptualization therefore, has been applied to my understanding of research participant’s activism in the West Bank.

Structure on the other hand refers to “patterned social relations, rules, and resources... the innumerable social facts external to the individual and over which the individual does not have much control” (Musolf, 2017, p. 3), as well as material structure such as institutions, laws, and systems. When we look at the role of structure from a feminist lens, we need to add gender, patriarchy, and sexuality as sites of analysis insofar as they shape social structures on the individual level, as well as larger collective systems. Moreover, adding an intersectional lens to our

understanding of structure, allows us to become cognizant of existing relations of power and the resulting material and social-cultural structures influencing human behaviour such as class, (dis)ability, ageism, etc. It should be noted however, that these categories are neither stable nor distinct, instead, they are “always permeated by other categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of creating and being created by dynamics of power” (Cho, Crenshaw & McCall., 2013, p. 795). Understanding structure from a feminist and intersectional lens helps to understand that agency is not experienced the same way for everyone, agency is ‘not evenly distributed’ (Coburn, 2016, p. 470), it is managed through different structures. In other words, it helps us to understand how individual agency is “constrained and enabled in different ways and to different degrees among individuals in different locations in the social structure” (ibid). Or put differently, structures are, “centrifugal forces that decentre agency” (Meltzer & Manis, 1992, p. 4). We see here how structure functions to ‘organize social positions hierarchically’, thus ensuring that ‘power emanates from those who control the means of administration and violence to make and enforce policy” (Musolf, 2017, p. 3).

On the most rudimentary level, the focus on individuals’ resistance to settler colonial practices and occupation central to this dissertation, is evidence of an embedded appreciation for the competing forces of agency and structure. Focusing on agential resistance to structural oppression, combined with a focus on agential resistance of certain narratives and discourse (what I have called Orientalist discourses), demonstrates a commitment to a structure-and-agency perspective to multiple simultaneously levels.

Furthermore, my application of structure and agency centres on a conceptualization of power. By virtue of my focus on agency, this dissertation highlights research participants’ power to ‘make

strategic choices and to disrupt, mediate, combine, and interpret' their structural environment. I have done this at the same time however, as 'foregrounding how social structure constrains and enables these actions', therefore highlighting the way that power is 'institutionalized in the social structures' they live within (Coburn, 2016, p. 470). Therefore, while I have argued in this dissertation for the importance of bringing in analysis of agency into our understanding of men's engagement in unarmed resistance—their choices related to tactics, language, and their use of voice—I have aimed to do so without disregarding structural constraints on their actions. I do not believe that individuals in the West Bank, or elsewhere for that matter, are 'free agents' insofar as they remain captive to various structures imbued with power hierarchies. These are diverse and range from the Israeli settler colonial project, patriarchal gender norms, patronage resulting from donor and CSO/NGO (patron-client relations), neoliberal economics, and liberal peacebuilding interventions, to name but a few. In other words, while I argue that my research participants make informed choices, they do so from a limited set of options dictated by a myriad of structural factors, some of which are universal such as ones inherent in a capitalist society, and others are context specific. In this way, my analytical engagement with structure-and-agency breaks with post-colonial theorizing which tends towards a deterministic and structural view of power, erasing individual agency (Kapoor, 2002). Meltzer & Manis (1992) sum up the balance I have intended to strike in this dissertation when they conclude, "structural constraints, whether individuals are aware or unaware of them, do not shelter individuals from their consequences... Yet the power of social forces does not determine individuals. As long as humans are alive and in possession of their consciousness, agency exists" (p. 5).

When conceptualizing the relationship between structure and agency employed in this dissertation, the work of Ortner (1995; 2006) has been foundational. Her conceptualization of structure and

agency begins with an understanding that subjects are always embedded in multiple webs of seemingly opposing power relations. This is similar to the work of Gordon (2002) who explains, that humans cannot exit powers web, they can only act differently within power. Therefore, in terms of my research participants, “whatever ‘agency’ they seem to ‘have’ as individuals is in reality something that is always in fact interactively negotiated...as truly and inescapably social beings, they can only work within the many webs of relations that make up their social worlds” (Ortner 2006, p. 151-152). This conceptualization does not suggest that agency trumps structures, but rather individuals inevitably and always navigate these structures through agency, albeit the structures individuals are faced with, differ from person to person based on intersectional identity factors. I have applied this thinking to the way I approached my research participants experiences and actions.

Understanding research participants behaviour as part of them navigating social structures in the West Bank, I also borrow from the work of Vigh (2007). His work provides a framework which highlights actions as navigations of social terrain, or structure. The idea of navigations then becomes the tool which bridges agency and structure (p. 14). Reading the actions of my research participants as social navigations, builds an understanding of the constant efforts of my research participants to innovate, alter, and empower themselves in a social condition of settler colonialism (Hoffman & Lubkemann 2005, p. 318).

Beyond my direct application of a structure-and-agency perspective into the analysis of my research data, questions of structure/agency have also shaped this dissertation in less direct ways. Chiefly, this has occurred through secondary resources found in the literature informing my research area. I have relied on these canons of literature in forming the foundation of this research

and thus, have inherited knowledge which has been constructed by way of a structure-and-agency perspective. Most apparent of the interaction between structure/agency debates on the fields informing this dissertation can be found in various strands of peacebuilding literature, as well as in literature around resistance studies.

Structure/agency debates have highlighted various examples of agency which have arisen in response to structural impositions associated with liberal peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2008). The structure/agency debate therefore has spurred critique within the liberal peacebuilding literature, resulting first in the ‘local turn’ literature, and more specifically, in hybrid peace literature⁶. Outside of critical peacebuilding literature, there has been a tendency to overlook *structure* in peacebuilding theorizing, policy, and practice. The critical strands of peacebuilding literature have aimed to provide a framework to better appreciate and interrogate the relationship between agency and structure. The liberal peace paradigm is unapologetically agency-centred at the expense of consideration for local contextual structures. This is tied of course to the neoliberal and free-market roots of liberal peacebuilding which frames individuals as free and ‘rational actors’ possessing the power to determine their own ‘successes and failures in social mobility’ (Musolf, 2017) and are therefore capable of overcoming conflict if given the right tools. The emphasis that liberal peacebuilding puts on reconciliation and people-to-people dialogue and peacemaking further prioritizes agency over structure in the ways that it frames conflicts as being resolvable by “interpersonal contacts, and achieving a desired end-state of shared values, narratives and identity” (Hughes, 2017, p. 1). While people-to-people peacebuilding and reconciliation may be important

⁶ ‘Local turn’ and ‘hybrid peace’ literature in peacebuilding will be defined and reviewed in greater detail in the following chapter.

and beneficial in healing individual grievances, it assumes a certain degree of equality between both sides, which is often misguided.

Without dealing with the structural and institutionalized power disparities between conflictual groups, these structures of inequality—which often function to create and fuel the conflict in the first place—remain intact. Hughes (2017) goes on to explain that liberal peacebuilding emphasizes agency at the expense of structure by way of “problematizing conflictual identities and social relations as agential and inter-personal”, this then results in conflicts being “decontextualized from their structural environment” (ibid) and made about individual agents. Therefore, scholars have argued that “structure-centric policy must take precedence” because “equality is not attainable solely by agency-centric social change” (Musolf, 2017, p. 15). An agency-centric approach to peacebuilding often focuses on ‘transforming values, attitudes, motivation, and morale at the individual level’. This Musolf (2017) argues, “is precarious, far less effective, systemic, and radical than dismantling social arrangements” (p. 16) which form the root causes of conflict and war.

With its emphasis on, “human freedom, the potential of agency over structure, the power of reason, and the faith in the reconcilability of interests” (MacMillan, 1998, p. 13), liberal peace can be said to lack an appreciation of the limiting and oppressive functioning of structure in the contexts in which they aim to ‘build’ peace. In recognizing this limitation, this dissertation highlights the multiple, often critical forms of agency exhibited by my research participants, while reminding readers how these actions, and avenues of possibility, are conditioned by the social location in the contexts they find themselves in. Richmond & Mitchell (2011) identify multiple forms of agency that emerge as a result of the imposition of liberal peacebuilding in six different peacebuilding

contexts. These forms of critical agency they argue, range from participation and co-optation or subterfuge, to resistance and autonomous counter-organization (p. 329). These forms of agency, interact with liberal peacebuilding (which consists of material and social structures), to create unique forms of hybridity. This conceptualization of multiple forms of agency, which in turn, result in the altering of peacebuilding interventions, has informed the way I approach my research findings and specifically the way I have highlighted some of the everyday forms of agency that the structures of Orientalist narratives combined with Liberal peacebuilding narratives have inspired. From this conceptualization of structure/agency, I have borrowed the idea that agency takes many forms, and it is these diverse forms that create hybrid outcomes in peacebuilding contexts.

Outside of the structure and agency debate in peacebuilding literature, there is another key canon of literature informing this dissertation that is informed by this debate. In many ways, the whole field of resistance studies is a product of a structure-and-agency perspective. Resistance literature was borne out of an academic desire to better understand the existence and experiences of agents pushing back against oppressive structures, and to better understand the possibility of material and social structural change. Structures do change, we have seen this throughout history. Despite the infamous quote by Martin Luther King Jr, the arc of history does *not* inherently bend towards justice. If it has arced towards justice, it is because of people exercising their agency, that shape social forces towards justice. As Hayes (2018) notes, ‘nothing bends towards justice without us bending it’. Understanding how and why structures ‘bend’ (or change) therefore, requires a structure-and-agency analytical approach. Integrating a deeper emphasis on agency into our understanding of human behaviour and our social world is an integral part of explorations into social change, oppression, and hierarchies of power. Agency, and thus resistance, provides an

analytical tool to make sense of how the oppressed “transform from being obedient to capitalist culture to resisting cultural hegemony; that is to say, how they become motivated to change the meaning, context, and trajectory of their lives” (Musolf, 2017, p. xi).

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined and connected the primary theories and concepts that I have drawn on in order to construct this dissertation: critical feminist theory, post-structuralism, Orientalism, hegemonic and alternative masculinities, and structure/agency. As the reader will no doubt see, there is overlap and synergy between many of these concepts and theories. A common theme traversing the theoretical and conceptual bodies of thought relate—both directly and indirectly—to a desire to unveil power and individuals’ resistance to it. Moreover, my research paradigm as I have called it, tends towards a critique of hegemony and oppression. It therefore endeavors to knit together a way of understanding various diverse forms of oppression, as well as uncovering ways that individuals have, and can continue to be supported, to reshape these relationships.

CHAPTER 4- Review of Relevant Literature

This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature I have relied on in constructing and understanding my research questions, field location, and global/local context. I therefore have chosen a selection of authors to highlight the main arguments in the given body of literature, as well as providing readers with an appreciation of some of the nuance, critiques, and reactions within each field of study. While I survey literature with a global focus, as you will no doubt notice, emphasis has been placed on literature related to Palestine. Being that this dissertation is rooted in the lived experiences of individuals living in the West Bank, this focus is to be expected. While this chapter is intended to review the relevant literature, it is far from exhaustive. Reference to relevant literature has been included throughout this dissertation, and therefore is not limited to this chapter. This chapter is furthermore intended to be read alongside the Theoretical and Conceptual Framework Chapter. This chapter is divided into four broad sections. The first section surveys the literature on resistance before narrowing its focus to the resistance movement in Palestine. In this section I further break down resistance in Palestine into three sub-categories: *sumud* and everyday resistance; unarmed resistance and its connection to peacebuilding; and literature addressing the gender dimensions of resistance. In the second section, I return to the concept of masculinities and provide an overview of the corpus of work on Palestinian masculinities. In the third—and longest—section, I turn to the literature on peacebuilding. I address the literature around peacebuilding at length due to the significance of peacebuilding to the themes examined throughout this dissertation, including the LPA. What's more, various other concepts integral to this dissertation such as resistance, gender, and NGO-ization interact with peacebuilding literature, policy, and practice in ways that have direct relevance to this dissertation

and therefore warrant inclusion. Lastly, this chapter turns to a review of gender, peace, and conflict literature, with a focus on literature addressing men and masculinities as an analytical focus.

Throughout this chapter, I highlight the contributions of feminist literature to my understanding of the diverse strands of literature drawn on for this dissertation. What feminist insights contribute to understandings often revolves around a common theme; the need to critically unpack, deconstruct, and rethink many of our embedded assumptions. What feminist insights encourage us to do, is to see that the world as we know it is shaped by and through gendered power relations from the macro to the micro. While often rendered invisible by mainstream analytical frameworks, feminist literature pulls the veil back on these exercises of power and therefore helps to reveal a more holistic and gendered picture of our world.

Resistance

The study of resistance is not a new phenomenon. Scholars and theorists have aimed to better understand tactics and struggles against practices of domination, exploitation and oppression for decades by paying particular attention to practices of power, and peoples responses to it. It has therefore been studied by diverse approaches and schools of thought spanning topics as diverse as gender identity (Cerezo, Cummings, Homes & Williams, 2020), organizational studies (Mumby, Thomas, Martí & Seidle, 2017), revolutions and social movements (Certo, Leigh & Rogstad, 2019), and peacebuilding (Richmond, 2011). As a result of the wide application of resistance as an analytical and conceptual framework to understand power and oppression, some have called the study of resistance ‘chaotic’ (Baaz, Lilja, Schulz & Vinthagen, 2016, p. 137). The desire to provide an analytical home to these diverse studies, led a number of scholars to come together in the early 2000s to create the field of Resistance Studies. Vinthagen was one of those scholars, he

described Resistance Studies as being borne from a frustration that Peace Studies had been trapped in the liberal paradigm which decentred questions of power and oppression, while assuming that people in conflict are equal. This, he suggests, misses the crucial point that peace, justice, and equality cannot be achieved without addressing power (Vinhagen, as quoted in Freeman-Woolpert, 2019).

Despite the proliferation of scholarship on resistance, what exactly resistance *is*, remains imprecise (Hallander & Einwohner, 2004), indiscriminant in its application (Brown, 1996) and loosely-defined (Weitz, 2001). In response to the lack of a widely agreed upon definition of resistance, Weitz (2001) laments that this has led “some scholars to see it almost everywhere and others almost nowhere” (p. 669). Similarly, McDonald (2013) warns, resistance has, “often been carelessly wielded as a blunt instrument, imposing itself on various modes of contestation regardless of context and local meaning” (p. 27). Building on this critique, and drawing on her work with Bedouin women in Palestine, Abu-Lughod (1990) scorned theorists for being preoccupied with ‘finding resisters and explaining resistance’ at the expense of exploring larger workings of power and the ‘complexities of the nature of forms of domination’ (p. 41). She concludes with warning against ascribing the label of resistance to acts of which the resisters themselves do not ascribe the same label. In other words, she warns against seeing everything as resistance. Instead, she insists on the importance of intention, and argues for labeling resistance as resistance, only insofar as there is conscious intention and the actors themselves define their behaviour as resistance.

With that being said, Vinhagen, defines resistance broadly as “a hindering of subordination” (Vinhagen, 2006, p. 14). Building off an understanding of power put forth by Foucault and outlined in the previous chapter, Gilgan (2001) argues that “resistance is inherent in power

relations and therefore where there is domination, violent or otherwise, some form of resistance must also be present” (p. 5). Despite the propensity of some to see resistance everywhere, and thus watering down its analytical utility, resistance nevertheless remains an important lens through which to understand the relationship between agency, power, and oppression.

Resistance has been conceptualized from the overt to the almost undetectable. On one side of the spectrum, resistance has been used to understand social movements’ use of arms and violent tactics such as certain wings of the resistance movement in Palestine (Sen, 2019), the Naxal movement in India (Archana, 2019), or Kurdish Workers Party in Kurdistan (Yegen, 2016). On the other side of the spectrum, silence has been understood as a form of resistance (Parpart, 2019). Viewing silence as a form of resistance, the theorizing of Pickering (2001) offers an interesting example of women’s use of silence as a strategy to disrupt police interrogation in Northern Ireland. Similarly conceiving of a connection between resistance and silence, as well as other less visible forms of resistance, Scott (1990) put forth the idea that subordinates adopt different scripts—public and hidden transcripts—depending on their audience. While public transcripts refer to the public performances required of subjects, that is “the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate” (p. 2), hidden transcripts, refers to the ways subordinate groups communicate within and between themselves, “those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript” (p. 4-5). He argues that the decision to adopt one transcript in the face of power, therefore withholding personal feelings and beliefs (staying silent about them in certain settings), should be conceived of as a form of resistance. In addition to the distinctions between the degree to which resistance is visible, the literature around resistance further distinguishes between—and often disagrees on—the scale and level of coordination of resistance. Resistance can be conceptualized as ‘individual or collective,

widespread or locally confined’ as well as falling along a spectrum from coordinated collective action on one side, to lone-wolf singular acts on the other (Hallander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 536).

There is also diversity in terms of the way scholars understand and categorize goals of resistance. While resistance is generally understood to be engaged with as a tool to enact change, at times, resistance is engaged with in order to stop change from happening. For some such as the Hawaiian women highlighted in the work of Silva (1997), speaking their traditional language, publishing traditional stories, and practicing traditional dance was a means of resisting Hawaiian annexation. Similarly, for Palestinians, performing the dabke⁷ becomes a means of resisting cultural genocide, dispossession, and the erasure of their space, time, and presence on the land of Palestine, ‘to preserve the dabke is to preserve the nation’ (McDonald, 2013, p. 22). In these examples, people engage in resistance to stop cultural loss, while in other examples, resistance has been conceived of as a tool of the oppressed to enact change.

Resistance has also been understood as a tool in defining ones’ identity. Examples of the role of resistance to societal expectations in forming ones’ identity are diverse, as seen in the following two examples. Kuumba & Ajanaku (1998) argue that dreadlocks have become a “symbolic accompaniment to oppositional collective identities” associated with African liberation and other counterhegemonic social resistance movements (p. 227). In this sense, they represent not only resistance to Western white hegemony, but also forge a collective oppositional identity. Helman (1999) provides another interesting example with the case of Israeli conscientious objectors. Given

⁷ Traditional Palestinian line dance

the primacy of military participation in Israeli national identity, Helman argues that refusal to engage in the military, can therefore be conceived of as resistance *against* that identity.

What the broad literature on resistance shows us, is that the way that resistance is conceptualized and actualized in a specific context is largely dependent on what options are available. Therefore, understanding resistance requires an approach that bridges discursive and material relations of power in a given context. The impact of this thinking is evident in the way that my dissertation findings have been analyzed. In addressing my research questions, I have attempted to explore the discursive *and* material relations of power vis-à-vis unarmed resistance, liberal peacebuilding, and research participants.

Palestinian Resistance

Palestinian resistance did not emerge with the creation of the State of Israeli in 1948. With the long history of colonialism and imperialism dating back hundreds of years, resistance has grown and matured alongside these ever-changing geopolitical realities. Theorizing around Palestinian resistance (muqa'wam) however, first appeared in the writing of Palestinian writer, activist and political leader Ghassan Kanafani. While Kanafani wrote about Palestinian resistance from the perspective of a nationalist liberation movement, he also framed it as part of the larger pan-Arab revolutionary socialist movement against imperialism. His work marked an important merging of anti-imperialism, anti-colonial theory, and resistance in Palestine. By urging Palestinians to take up the 'weapon of literature' as a form of resistance (Holt, 2021, p. 3), Kanafani's revolutionary resistance writing remain poignant today for their historical insights into indigenous Palestinian understandings of resistance.

Given the totalizing effect of the Israeli Settler colonial project which, from the perspectives of many Palestinians, aims to eliminate any semblance of Palestinian history, culture and identity, resistance today is characterized by a wide variety of tactics, ideologies, and motivations. For Massad (2006), resistance “is the only remaining obstacle to a complete Zionist victory, one that seeks to be sealed by Zionism’s rewriting of both Palestinian and Jewish histories” (p. 142). From this perspective, the popular Palestinian adage arises, ‘to exist is to resist’. If resistance is conceptualized as a means of survival, it therefore spans social and cultural forms (literature, dance, poetry, and prose) in addition to more commonly explored direct and physical forms of resistance (Abdo, 2014, p. 84).

Summarizing the breadth of resistance, Richter-Devroe (2008) posits, “every single day Palestinians engage in everyday forms of resistance, such as resisting closures, roadblocks, curfews, invasions, land-grabs. . . [as well as through] formally organized nonviolent direct action, resisting the occupation through demonstrations, sit-ins, or protests” (p. 45). As a result of the broad brush with which resistance is understood in Palestine, it has come to encapsulate almost any act that disrupts the social, political, or legal order imposed by the colonial occupying power. Therefore, in addition to simply remaining on one’s land—which is perceived as an act of resistance in and of itself in the face of systematic efforts to remove them, resistance has come to encompass acts of civil disobedience such as strikes, impeding home/village/olive grove demolitions; economic boycott, divestment and sanctions; symbolic performances of resistance such as theatre and learning and practicing dabka; to organized and financed armed insurgencies, and random ‘lone-wolf’ armed attacks. These are all used to disrupt the Israeli settler colonial project and therefore, from the perspective of Palestinians, fall under the umbrella of ‘resistance’. Speaking to the breadth, depth, and multi-faceted nature of the Israeli settler colonial project,

accordingly, Svirsky (2017) argues for a conceptualization of resistance in Palestine which accounts for the corresponding breadth, depth, and multi-faceted nature of Palestinian reaction to settler colonial practices, or what Tripp (2013) calls the ‘capillary forms of resistance’ (p. 5-6). Svirsky (2017) therefore suggests that resistance ought to be conceptualized as “part of a structure, not an event” (p. 30). This mirrors the theorizing of Deleuze & Guattari (1988) who argued that resistance is ‘rhizomatic’, it is comprised of multiplicities of interactions and relations, moving through different dimensions, and thus possessing no beginning and no end.

When speaking of Palestinian resistance, it is helpful to distinguish between a) *sumud*, individual, and everyday resistance; b) organized unarmed resistance (often tied to peacebuilding and international donors); c) eruptions of resistance in the form of intifadas; and lastly d) armed resistance. Although this categorization simplifies a review of the literature, it should be noted that these categories are imperfect, remain fluid, and are deeply interrelated.

Armed resistance is outside the scope of this dissertation. Armed resistance is dealt with in detail by a number of other authors however, for example: Sen (2014), Kear (2019), and Dunning (2016) provide in depth analysis around Hamas and armed resistance; Levitt (2021), explores the connection between Palestinian NGOs and armed resistance; Yaregal (2011) and Naaman (2007) look specifically at female suicide bombers; Bartal (2017) theorizes the recent knife attacks; and Brym & Araj (2006) address armed resistance during the Second Intifada. Given the focus of this dissertation, I will not be addressing literature on armed resistance, nor will I spend much time on the two intifadas, as this was done in Chapter 5- Contextual Briefing. As such, the following sections will aim to scan literature around everyday resistance, unarmed resistance, and gender

and resistance in Palestine in order to situate the arguments and findings contained within this dissertation within the larger literature on Palestinian resistance.

Sumud and Everyday Acts of Resistance

Directly translated from Arabic, *sumud* means ‘steadfastness’. *Sumud* has been defined in different ways by different authors. For Ryan (2015), *sumud* is “resilient resistance—a tactic of resistance that relies on qualities of resilience such as getting by and adapting to shock” (p. 299). Said (1999) on the other hand, described *sumud* as “a form of ‘elementary resistance’ that turns presence into small-scale obduracy” (p. 100). When striving to define *sumud* some authors such as Meari (2014) describe *sumud* as “an indefinable force representing the possibility of political praxis outside the space of normalized forms of politics” (p.549). Other authors define *sumud* as “resisting-by-existing” (Rangitsch, 2007, p. 15), and “steadfast perseverance” (Nassar & Heacock, 1990, p. 28). From a more analytical perspective, Lax (2021) describes the concept of *sumud* as “an indigenous lens to view the infrapolitical resistance of the West Bank” (p. 153). Despite differences regarding the exact interpretation of *sumud*, there is general consensus that it is “central to Palestinian self-definition” (Peteet, 2000, pp. 183-184).

Sumud was introduced into general discourse at the end of the 1970s when *sumud* funds, or formally *The Steadfastness Aid Fund of the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee*, were established in Jordan in order to facilitate the continued presence of Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem (Malik, 2013, p. 12; Nakhleh, 2004, pp. 31-34; Shearer & Myer, 2005, p. 167; Teeffelen, 2011, p. 21; Turner, 2012, p. 497). Literature and analysis pertaining to *sumud* during the 1970s and early 1980s, often framed it as a way of keeping the Palestinian community intact through grassroots community building when, at the time, “there was not yet a sustained and

broad movement of struggle against the Israeli occupation” (Teeffelen, 2011, p. 136). In the 1980s Raja Shehadeh (1982) described the birth of *sumud* as a conscious path taken in the face of Israeli occupation. He proclaims, “when faced with two alternatives, choose the third”; in the face of Israeli occupation, Shehadeh’s two alternatives are "mute submission" and "blind hate" while the third way was *sumud* (Shehadeh, 1982). Shehadeh’s view of *sumud* represents a refusal to submit to the occupation coupled with a refusal to take up arms.

While *sumud* is certainly the most theorized of ‘everyday resistance’ in Palestine, various other actions have been approached by authors in this field through the mantle of everyday resistance. Examples range from the use of humor and laughter (Bhungalia, 2020), theater (Santos, 2016), creative expression (Lax, 2021), remembering (Hawari, 2018), and even hiking (Clarno, 2016). Still other acts of resistance fall outside of the category of *sumud*, yet are not part of organized larger scale resistance such as Palestinians retaining ID cards that give refugee status (thus proving their illegal expulsion from their land), to Palestinians holding on to the key to their family house located inside present day Israel (Abu-Zahra, Leech & MacNeil, 2016, p. 9). These examples illustrate the way that in Palestine, resistance has been conceptualized through a multiplicity of approaches covering actions from the micro to the macro, from articulated acts, to simply the continuation of life despite difficult circumstance. From *sumud* to the diverse readings of everyday resistance outlined in this section, most of these authors draw on the work of Scott (1985; 1989; 1990), in his theorizing around everyday resistance, which sees it as ‘small scale... relatively safe... requiring little or no formal coordination (1989, p. 35). Despite the seemingly ad hoc nature of everyday resistance, these authors convincingly illustrate how these small acts are nevertheless highly political, and combine to subvert the macro-politics of the Israeli settler colonial project. Tying everyday resistance to politics, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) reminds us that paying attention

to the ‘small-scale’ and everyday acts of Palestinian resistance exemplifies the second wave feminist notion that the “personal is political” and brings to light the fact that ‘the everyday is a space for oppression and domination, but also subversion and creativity’ (p. 2). Echoing her evocation of the second wave slogan, Barbosa (2022) explains, “the ordinary is itself an inherently political category” and Palestinian’s everyday actions and choices to resist and subvert oppression in their own perhaps seemingly mundane way, demonstrates the way that “the social and political are inextricably linked” (p. 50).

Connecting the notion of everyday resistance specifically to this dissertation, the work of Santos (2016) highlights how a Palestinian theatre located in Jenin, has become a site of everyday resistance aimed at countering Western and Israeli narratives of Palestine and Palestinians. She argues that the theatre has become a “tool of collective memory for marginalized and dominant groups” (p. 2). Her insights have helped shape this dissertation insofar as she argues that this form of unarmed resistance can—and should—be understood as a “method for opposing hegemonic power” as well as a tool “to challenge and transform dominant power structures” (p. 2). In this way, her thinking combined with my research data inform my own thinking around the role that unarmed resistance plays in countering dehumanizing narratives of Palestinians. As this section has outlined, the everyday has become a site of resistance, and thus politics, in diverse and nuanced ways for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Unarmed Resistance and Peacebuilding

There is substantial literature exploring unarmed resistance in the West Bank, providing detailed accounts of the evolution of unarmed resistance, often era by era, from the British mandate, through the First Intifada, the Oslo Peace Process, and the Second Intifada (Bröning, 2011;

Darweish & Rigby, 2015; Pearlman, 2011; Rigby, 2010; Schock, 2015; Qumsiyeh, 2011). This literature is often framed as a ‘counter-narrative’ to the mainstream media portrayal of armed/violent resistance, terrorism, and rocket fire (Hammami & Tamari 2006; Shinar 2003). It also dissolves the oft-touted claim that Israel has no partner for peace, by revealing decades of unarmed and peaceful dedication to resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict. These rich accounts help to debunk the above-mentioned mainstream portrayal that contributes to the sentiment in academia, the media, and public discourse in North America, that if only Palestinians would resort to nonviolence, they would succeed in achieving peace (Dana, 2018; White, 2007). It also highlights the lack of accountability and responsibility that is placed on Israel to cease its armed and violent behaviour.

In highlighting a long and robust history of nonviolence in Palestine, the literature mentioned above suggests the problem is in media reporting and coverage, rather than a lack of nonviolent resistance and peacebuilding. As Qumsiyeh (2011) explains, “the only constant through the ups and downs of the political structures, and through the ebbs and flows of the armed resistance, was popular [unarmed] resistance” (p. 238). Academic scholarship, as well as some journalism alike, note the complacency of Western—particularly American—journalism and media for this one-sided coverage which has tended to ignore this history (Abdo, 2014).

Much like the work of Qumsiyeh (2011), other authors such as Hallward & Norman (2011) have detailed the persistence of unarmed resistance throughout the decades. Offering a welcomed alternative to the majority of literature (and nearly all media reporting) during the Second Intifada which tended to highlight armed resistance during this time (Brym & Araj, 2006; Grinberg, 2012; Matta & Rojas, 2016), Hallward & Norman (2011) argues that unarmed resistance remained a

widespread practice. Her major contribution relates to her assertion that, what “may be considered ‘nonviolent resistance’ by some activists, may not be considered ‘nonviolent’ and/or ‘resistance’ by others” (p. 2). In so arguing, she brings nuance to our understanding of the diversity within and between resistance activists: a core area of focus in this dissertation.

Many scholars have offered important observations around the rise in joint Palestinian/Israeli activism and unarmed resistance. While many of these scholars highlight the strength of such resistance (Hallward, 2009; Fleischmann, 2019; 2021), some, such as Abu-Nimer (1999) draw our attention to the inherent asymmetric power relations between Israeli and Palestinian activists and the challenges this presents in joint resistance activism. The power disparity between the two, he argues, can be detrimental to Palestinians and their struggle for national liberation and ending the occupation. This line of critique is picked up by other authors such as Dajan & Baskin (2006) who highlight how the power disparity between Palestinians and Israelis is perpetuated by unequal access to funding as well as substantial differences in motivating factors to engage. Because Israelis are not struggling for statehood, freedom, and independence (they already have these things), their engagement is predicated on the act of meeting the other side and ‘dialoguing’ as an end in and of itself. Palestinians on the other hand, are engaging in order to work toward ending the occupation and creating a Palestinian state. This distinction has important implications on the internal dynamics of these joint spaces, as well as on their overall effectiveness. Hassassian (2006) for example, highlights that Palestinians’ engagement in joint Palestinian/Israeli resistance and peacebuilding more commonly reflects a “pre-established commitment to the national struggle before they have any commitment to what is commonly seen as the peace process” (p. 72).

Highlighting the difference in motivating factors between Israeli and Palestinian activists, brings up an important point in regard to other exogenous influences on Palestinian unarmed resistance. Within the literature addressing Palestinian resistance, there is a smaller but important body of research specifically addressing the impact of donors and the international community on unarmed resistance. Schock (2003) has highlighted how western donors have played a role in popularizing an understanding of unarmed resistance as synonymous with dialogue or peacebuilding. This, he argues, has led to fragmentation and increased perceptions among Palestinians that engagement in unarmed resistance alongside Israelis, contributes to normalization. He goes on to suggest that this perception functions to delegitimize this form of activism in the eyes of Palestinians.

Another way that scholars have theorized the relationship between donors/the international community and unarmed resistance, ties into the way that this relationship thwarts, depoliticizes, and demobilizes resistance activism. An insightful example is found in the work of Tartir (2017) who focuses on Security Sector Reform (SSR). Rolled out as part of the institutional reform process and statebuilding project in the aftermath of the Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2006, he argues that SSR ultimately functioned to criminalize Palestinian resistance. To this point, he posits, “the overarching goal of the SSR, in general, and the security campaigns, in particular, was to criminalize resistance against the Israeli occupation and to silence opposition to Israel’s colonial dominance” (p. 8). His work convincingly illustrates how donor agendas flowing through SSR interventions, culminated in thwarting resistance efforts within the West Bank by turning the Palestinian security forces against their own people and in effect, criminalizing resistance.

Resistance and Gender

Women and Resistance

While the gendered subject in much of the literature on Palestinian resistance is assumed to be male, when gender is an explicit focus of analysis, literature has tended to focus on the roles and experiences of women in resistance. The First Intifada really marked the emergence of a gendered analysis of Palestinian resistance. Due to the nature of the First Intifada which was predominantly a non-militarized, civil disobedience movement, resistance most often played out in the community; its streets, neighborhoods and homes (Johnson & Kuttub, 2001, p. 6). Lacking a clear distinction between what one could call ‘the battle front’ and the ‘home front’, the First Intifada blurred the lines between the public and private. With this blurring also came a blurring between those engaging in resistance and those going about their daily lives. Authors have drawn attention to the way that this resulted in acts such as the route one takes to the grocery store, the types of food one buys, or the colors they wear in public becoming sites of resistance. As such, traditional gender divisions of engagement were challenged (Yuval-Davis, 1997) resulting in relative parity between the number of men and women engaged in resistance during the First Intifada. A great deal of literature around the First Intifada therefore, focuses on women’s overwhelming participation in the uprising (Abdo, 1991; Fleischmann, 2003; Hammami, 1990; Holt, 1996; Jad, 2010; McDonald, 1991).

Not all scholars shared the framing of women’s involvement in the First Intifada as something novel and noteworthy. In response to this trend, Sharoni (2016) reflects on the uptick in literature and media coverage highlighting women’s involvement in the First Intifada. She concludes that it is a symptom of scholars and journalists’ *naivety* around Palestinian women’s long history of

resistance to political violence, their involvement in political activism, and organizing at the community level as part of the Palestinian national liberation movement (p. 381), rather than something novel. She therefore argues that the First Intifada was not exceptional in terms of women's involvement, it was merely an opportunity to put their skills and knowledge to use. And specifically, the First Intifada "provided Palestinian women with the opportunity to make public an earlier realization: that their national liberation struggle is intertwined with their struggle for gender equality" (p. 382). The tying of women's involvement in resistance during the First Intifada to their struggle for gender equality has been picked up on by a number of other feminist scholars (see: Glavanis-Grantham, 1996; Jad, 2010; Peteet, 1991).

As tactics and politics shifted from the First to the Second Intifada, so too did the gendered nature of engagement. Many Palestinian authors have identified a number of different processes which have led to a noticeable decline in women's engagement in resistance in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords (Allabadi, 2008; Johnson & Kuttub, 2001; Kuttub, 2008). Some authors have explained this shift as a result of the fact that during the Second Intifada, sites of resistance shifted from the streets of cities, towns, and villages, to outside the community at checkpoints, settlements, and border crossings (Hammami & Tamari, 2006; Johnson & Kuttub, 2001). As the location of resistance shifted, these authors argue, so too did the tactics of the Israeli military in dealing with Palestinian resisters. According to Hammami & Tamari (2006), that fact that sites of resistance were removed from community centres meant that confrontations between resisters and Israeli army quickly escalated into military confrontations (p. 226). As these confrontations became ever more violent, participation became more gendered, with less women participating than the previous intifada (Sharoni, 2016). While acknowledging that 'fewer Palestinian women assumed leadership positions during the Al-Aqsa Intifada' (p. 391), the work of Sharoni (2016) argues that

during the Second Intifada, women nevertheless ‘made considerable gains’ and maintained ‘active resistance to the occupation and the violence unleashed by the Israeli military’ (p. 396). She draws attention to less visible roles women played during this period of time such as: documenting abuses and effects of political violence on Palestinians and the impact of the resulting economic crisis on family structures; accounted for the unprecedented mobilization of feminist and queer activists for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, and participated in women-to-women (Israeli and Palestinian) activism and joint resistance.

Focusing her analysis on unarmed resistance in the aftermath of the Second Intifada, Ritcher-Devroe (2012) argues that while so far unsuccessful in sustaining concrete material changes, women’s resistance activism possesses the possibility of affecting substantial political change by radically challenging conventional androcentric and male-dominated political discourse. She also illustrates how women’s involvement in resistance activism challenges “reductionist gender binaries of men/protector vs. women/protected that undergird traditionally male-dominated conceptions and practices of formal politics” (p. 181). These insights are poignant when read alongside the findings of this dissertation, in particular, the spaces and opportunities that exist—or don’t—for Palestinian women to engage in unarmed resistance in the aftermath of Oslo Accords, and the ensuing NGO-ization of unarmed resistance. While sharing Ritcher-Devroe’s (2012) assertions around the powerful possibilities set in motion by women’s engagement in unarmed resistance, in her recent book, Kayali (2021) draws out some of the consequences of the NGO-ization of resistance post-Oslo. By examining how Palestinian women perceive, negotiate, and enact resistance in the aftermath of Oslo Accords, her research ultimately found that women feel estranged from resistance due to the lack of legitimacy resistance now has in the West Bank-

due in part to the way that much unarmed resistance has come to be defined through and by a donor driven agenda.

Men, Masculinities, and Resistance

As I mentioned in the opening of the section on gender and resistance, when gender is an explicit focus of analysis, literature has tended to draw attention to the roles and experiences of women in resistance. This is surprising given the visibility of men vis-à-vis resistance, combined with the uncritical assumption some authors reiterate when writing about resistance, void of a gender analysis, which paints all Palestinian men with a brush that assumes they are engaged in resistance. In differentiating the role resistance plays in the lives of Palestinian women and men, and offering an answer to why more men are represented in protests, Kayali (2021) argues that “for men, involvement in resistance presents as an outlet, while for women, given the different set of constraints they face... it constitutes an additional burden” (p. 161). Because men “(a) do not risk the kind of stigma faced by females who threw stones alongside males, and (b) they are not held back by the kinds of responsibilities that are borne by Palestinian women” (ibid), male Palestinians do not experience the same barriers to participation that Palestinian women do. The argument that men do not face the same barriers as women do engaging in resistance is straightforward enough. However, once engaged, what the relationship between resistance and masculinity is, is far less straight forward with authors offering important diversity in opinions and analysis.

An important body of literature that aims to understand the relationship between resistance and masculinity in Palestine considers male identity formation and how this is shaped by the occupation itself, as well as resistance to the occupation. While some of these works focus specifically on masculinity and resistance (Kelly, 2008; Peteet, 1994), due to the central role that

resistance plays in conceptions and constructions of masculinities in Palestine, other works address men and masculine identity writ large, and by doing so, also address resistance as part of their analysis (Barbosa, 2022; IMAGES, 2017; Kuttab, Abu Awwad, Meari & Hammami, 2020; Leech, 2009).

Perhaps the most well-known piece of work related to masculinities and resistance is that of Peteet (1994) who documented in great detail how violence, beatings, and incarceration became ‘rites of passage’ that “galvanizes political consciousness and agency” as “a creative and dynamic act of resistance” (p. 31). This rite of passage she argues, thus became a crucial dimension for identity formation of Palestinian men and boys during the Second Intifada. By drawing the reader’s attention to the way that Palestinian men themselves, interpret practices of violence and power, she highlights the “terrain of cultural resistance to domination” (p. 31) that emerged during this time. This analysis is mirrored by scholars such as McDonald (2010) and Nashif (2004/05) whose findings suggest a shared critical reading of practices of masculinity serving to transform humiliation into empowerment; suffering into pride, sacrifice into resistance; and Israeli attempts to terrorize into a rite of passage towards manhood, power, and prestige (McDonald, 2010, p. 192; Peteet, 1994; Nashif, 2004/05). Similarly, speaking to men’s rite of passage, Kayali (2021) found that, “protest, and its association with defense of the nation and the community, appears to present one of the few realms in which the transition into manhood can be overtly displayed” (p. 162).

Offering a slightly different take on the relationship between engagement in overt resistance and constructions of masculinity, others such as Kelly (2008) maintain that, “rather than being produced through participation or experiences of violence, for many West Bank Palestinians, masculinity is steeped in the more practical responsibilities of kinship, and the sacrifices of

paternity and brotherhood” (p. 361). For Kelly, the non-engagement of Palestinian men — and their insistence on maintaining the mundane and *unexceptional* routines of their everyday life despite the violence of the Second Intifada — is analysis worthy. Kelly’s (2008) unique contribution problematizes and provides nuance around the goals and means of resisting. Unlike the majority of authors who focus on the way that men shift their actions, expectations, and means of engaging as a result of the conflict, for Kelly (2008), it is precisely the opposite that he understands as an important site of resistance. It is men’s refusal to alter their actions, expectations and instead, as one of his research participants demonstrated, continue their studies to become an accountant.

It is interesting to note the date of two of the above two mentioned publications by Peteet (1994) and Kelly (2008). Both publications came out shortly after the First and then Second Intifada respectively. Noting dates of publication and the context-specific political and security dynamics at the time, Leech’s (2009) insights come to light. He argues that a normative shift in male identity formation occurred between the first and second intifada which leads him to posit, “requirements of ‘being a man’ shifted from the role of fighter against Israel to provider and protector for their family”. He went on to suggest, therefore, that resistance had “been re-conceptualized to focus primarily on steadfastness, or *sumud*, against the occupation” during the Second Intifada (p. 76).

Building on the importance of time periods in contextualizing divergent notions of masculinity in Palestine vis-à-vis resistance, some scholars argue that the differing expectations of men relates to the distinct political milieu of the time of analysis. During the era of the Second Intifada, Nashif (2004/2005) argues that Palestinian men tended to exaggerate their gender identity, as a result, he explains that ‘overmanning’ is a ritualistic response to the crisis of male productivity (cited in

Sa'ar & Yahia-Younis, 2008, p. 307). The 'overmanning' is manifest in forms of resistance. McDonald (2010) explains this this is a result of "limited spaces for articulating masculinity (honor, protection, self-sacrifice and generosity) and so few opportunities to fulfill the progression into manhood through conventional means, resistance to the occupation has become a primary process for asserting or claiming one's manhood" (p. 210). He goes on to later explain, "the engendering of resistance and violence as acts of manhood has been greatly facilitated by the performative transference of wedding songs and dances into politico-nationalist frames" (ibid). He therefore adds important insights to the literature forming a picture of the process through which resistance is inscribed into culture as a touchstone of masculinity.

Furthering this line of inquiry related to the nexus of gender identity, resistance, and culture, writing shortly after the First Intifada, Yuval-Davis (1995) reflects on the way that while men are framed as the liberator or protector of their nations, Palestinian women are idolized as the cultural bearers and reproducers of the nation. Exploring how this process takes place, McDonald (2010) details how interpretations and rituals of violence and masculinity become cemented into daily practice, made to feel natural, real, and common-sensical, through music, dance, theatre, cinema, and graphic media in Palestine.

While the literature covered thus far paints resistance as an avenue towards agential empowerment, not all scholars see it this way. Rather than adapting to the shifting political realities in the aftermath of Oslo Accords, during the Second Intifada, Johnson & Kuttub (2001) noted the shrinking of dignified narratives of resistance available to young men, "young male roles as heroes and agents of national resistance" became "destabilized by the humiliating conditions of Oslo" (p. 34). The resulting 'crisis in masculinity' (ibid; also see Holt, 2003) they suggest, was felt by many

young Palestinian men who were, at the time, unable to resolve this crisis through popular resistance, and increased militarism became the only available 'solution' (ibid, p. 36). As the Second Intifada progressed, they noted that “popular confrontations [were] overshadowed by military activities undertaken by a small group of young men, the crisis [became] more militarized and even more restricted in its participation” (ibid).

While the ‘crisis in masculinity’ discourse remains common among scholars, some, such as Barbosa (2022) take issue with the way that this discourse functions to crystalize notions of Palestinian manhood into an outdated historical ideal of an armed resistance fighter (*fidā’iyyīn*). This, he argues, is antithetical to what we know about gender identity and cultural norms: they shift, they adapt to changing realities, they evolve. However, he argues that if we view any circumstance in which a man is not able to live up to the hegemonic ideal as a ‘crisis in masculinity’ we are denying, inhibiting, or blinding ourselves to the possibility of change; we are participating in the “epistemic freezing of the [hegemonic] ideal” (p. 172). In short, when Palestinian men are not able to live up to their gendered expectations, this discourse automatically assumes their masculinity must be in crisis, rather than it being in the process of shifting. Ultimately, Barbosa argues that the masculinity in crisis discourse has blinded theorists from “tuning their analysis to changes in the practices of manhood in varying times and spaces” (p. 172). In applying this analysis to his work with Palestinian *shabāb* living in Shatila Refugee Camp in Lebanon, he concludes that despite not fitting into the hegemonic ideal of a *fidā’iyyīn* (armed resistance fighter),

the *shabāb* do not experience any crisis in masculinity. Rather, it is a certain narrow definition of gender as characteristic of differential access to power among men and women that by heuristic fiat has forced into supposed crisis those men unable or unwilling to conform to the requirements of an ideal-typical hegemonic masculinity (p. 126).

I found Barbosa's (2022) analysis to be a unique and poignant reminder of the limitations that some of the most utilized frameworks in men and masculinities research depend on—such as hegemonic masculinities—in theorizing shifts and change.

Masculinities and Palestine

The study of gender in Arab or Islamic societies disproportionately focuses on the study of women, with Orientalist questions around oppression and a lack of agency, the role of the Hijab in constraining women's freedom, and the practice of female genital cutting receiving most scrutiny (Abdo, 2014; Ouzgane, 2003). Moreover, Aslam (2012) explains, when men are considered in literature related to gender in Arab or Islamic societies they are, “usually introduced as offenders” (p. 115). Ghoussoub & Sinclair-Webb's (2000) edited volume, is widely considered to be the first ‘serious work’ on men and masculinities in the Middle East that treats men as gendered subjects. Through a diversity in authors and approaches this collection provides important insight around context specific manifestations of masculinities and documents various processes through which masculinities shift and evolve. A significant theme addressed in this volume is that of violence (both the experience and perpetration of violence). As such, the book points to the importance of violence in understanding the formation of masculinities in the region. If it is true that there is a dearth of literature on masculinities in Arab, Islamic, and Middle Eastern societies as a whole, this is particularly true in the case of Palestine (MacKenzie & Foster, 2017, p. 209; Sa'ar & Yahia-Younis, 2008, p. 305).

During the First Intifada, Peteet (1994) posited, “Arab masculinity is acquired, verified, and played out in the brave deed, in risk-taking, and in expressions of fearlessness and assertiveness” (p. 34). This, she argues, is due in part to the fact that the crushing conditions of economic and physical

insecurity resulting from the occupation has limited the ways in which masculinity can be demonstrated outside of these extreme acts. Providing a similar analysis which centres economic conditions as pivotal to shaping masculinities in Palestine, in 2016, the INGO Promundo joined forces with UN Women and Birzeit University to conduct the first ever large-scale research project aiming to understand, '*what does it mean to be a man in the Middle East and North Africa*'. The study found that for young Palestinian men, social pressure to realize the role of 'provider', remains one of the greatest source of tension for them. Perhaps one of the most surprising findings from the study relates to generational changes in understandings of masculinity (and gender equality) in Palestine. The study found that rather than relaxing their patriarchal attitudes and moving towards more equitable attitudes (a trend that was observed in all other 30 countries the study was conducted in), young Palestinian men are becoming *more* patriarchal and *less* equitable in their attitudes and beliefs than older generations (p. 32). The authors suggest that these findings may be explained in part by the fact that high rates of youth unemployment and a 'lesser likelihood – compared with older generations – of pursuing higher education' may be crystalizing unequitable attitudes and producing regressive ideas around masculinity and a backlash against ideas of gender equality. For example, the study found that in Palestine, 80% of men reported that they should have final word around decisions in the home (p. 30), 88% of men reported needing to know where their wife was at all times (p. 60), and 85% of husbands said that they control when their wives can leave the house (p. 60). This study offers a contemporary take on hegemonic masculinities in Palestine clearly illustrating a persistent connection with breadwinning and providing, as well as decision making and control. These finding mirror the work of Kuttat et al. (2020) who explain that despite cooperation and solidarity between men and women as elements of survival and

resistance, this cooperation “has not generally resulted in radical transformations of gender relations due to the family’s inequitable gender power relations” (p. 17).

Foster (2011) distills three leading meta-narratives of challenges pertaining to men’s ability to assert their masculinity in Palestine: 1) the struggle of Palestinian fathers to sustain their respect and authority under the forces of the occupation; 2) the impact of land dispossession on men; and 3) the increasing difficulties for men to maintain their breadwinner statuses within the family (p. 73). Building off of the data collected in Foster’s (2011) research, and offering contemporary analysis of masculinities in Palestine, MacKenzie & Foster (2017) argued that for men in the West Bank, the experience of living under a violent occupation and perpetual insecurity creates the conditions for what they call ‘masculinity nostalgia’, or a “yearning for a set of gender norms and relations linked to fantasies of a secure, ‘traditional’ and ordered past” (p. 206). This emerging ‘masculinity nostalgia’ is predicated on a dream to return to peacetime where a man’s ‘rightful place’ is as a father, breadwinner, and landowner. Although these three categories may sum up the challenges many men face in relation to their gender identity vis-à-vis the occupation, how men deal, cope, and navigate these challenges and how those coping mechanisms interact with other changing social, political, and economic shifts in the region, has been left un-problematized.

This section opened with introducing the work of Ghoussoub & Sinclair-Webb’s (2000) and pointed to the way that their work situated violence (both the experience and perpetration of violence) as intimately tied to formations of masculinities in the region. While this function of violence may be true, it has left out, and thus silenced, explicitly unarmed and nonviolent men and masculinities in the region. Therefore, while there have been efforts to fill the lacuna in empirical

studies related to masculinities in Palestine, to date, there has been no known studies looking at the interplay between masculinities and engagement in *unarmed* resistance in Palestine.

Peacebuilding

With the cessation of the Cold War, the face of conflict and war was changed (Kaldor, 1999; Mair & Steiner, 2011; Paris, 2002; United Nations Population Fund, 2001; Yilmaz, 2007). Instead of embarking on an era of peace as was initially hoped, conflicts continued unabated in new and insidious forms. In contrast with the interstate wars of the Cold War era, there was a dramatic rise in intrastate conflicts. As a result of this transition, the casualties of war also shifted dramatically. The gradual shift in conflict style that occurred through the 20th century led to the largest number of victims and fatalities being civilians and noncombatants. Ultimately, this necessitated a new way of thinking about conflict resolution, rebuilding, and healing. That new way of thinking became liberal peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding as an appellation is relatively new in the “development lexicon” (Munro, 2000, p. 1). Robert Miller maintains that the term peacebuilding is in its “etymological adolescence” it is “gangly and undefined” (as quoted in Schirch, 2008, p. 2). Originally coined in 1975 by Johan Galtung with the publication of *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding*, the term peacebuilding aimed to broaden the range of activities that earlier notions of peacemaking and peacekeeping embodied. Galtung’s definition of peacebuilding aimed to do this by going beyond the cessation of armed conflict, or what he calls ‘negative peace’, towards building what he calls ‘positive peace’ or ‘the process of life enhancement’, ‘the presence of symbiosis and equity in human relations, or ‘the absence of structural and cultural violence’ (Galtung, 1996). Galtung’s conception of peacebuilding was unique at the time due its recognition

of the importance of identifying and building structures which might militate against war, thereby addressing the root causes of conflict (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, & Sitea, 2007, p. 37). Galtung's theorizing around peacebuilding served as the foundation of this field of study and practice. Building off of his work, peacebuilding was further theorized in two distinct directions; communitarian peacebuilding epitomized in the work of Boutros Boutros Ghali in his seminal work *An Agenda for Peace*, and liberal peacebuilding epitomized in the work of John Paul Lederach in his twin publications *Preparing for Peace* and *Building Peace* (Hancock, 2017, p. 255; Donias, 2012). Of these two, liberal peace has come to dominate global practices of peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War (Richmond, 2011).

Liberal Peacebuilding

Evidence of its omnipresent force, liberal peacebuilding has been called a 'paradigm,' (Paris, 1997), an 'enterprise' (Tanabe, 2021), a 'model' (Richmond, 2011); a 'discourse, framework and structure' (Richmond, 2006, p. 295), and a 'project' (Jabri, 2010). In its inception, liberal peacebuilding predominantly focused on the political character of peacebuilding; "liberal peacebuilding is the idea and practice of building peace through liberalization" (Lederach, 1997, p. 4). Liberal peacebuilding therefore, came to revolve around democratization, the rule of law, free and globalized markets, human rights, and neoliberal development. Writing in the late 1990s, Paris (1997) posited that peacebuilding "is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization" (p. 56). Writing nearly 15 years later, but very much continuing on this framing, Richmond (2011) defined liberal peacebuilding as, "a model through which Western-led agency, epistemology, and institutions, have attempted to unite the world under

a hegemonic system that replicates liberal institution's norms, and political, social and economic systems" (p. 1). Taking this line of critique even further, Turner (2012) argues that, liberal peacebuilding pursues a modern version of the *mission civilisatrice* insofar as they attempt to implant idealized Western sociopolitical and economic systems in countries experiencing conflict, while ensuring security and control. Paris (2004) spells out the set of policy prescriptions, or what he calls, 'the typical formula' for liberal peacebuilding as follows,

promoting civil and political rights; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; promoting the development of independent 'civil society' organizations and the transformation of formerly warring groups into democratic political parties; encouraging the development of free-market economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a country's borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while reducing the state's role in the economy (p.19).

Evidence of liberal peace's emphasis on the importance of local economies being brought into the global economy and the creation of strong institutions can be found in the case of Palestine. A key belief embedded within the liberal peacebuilding paradigm constructed in Palestine was that Palestine's problems could be explained and solved, at least in part, by their (lack of) integration into the global economy. The objective of liberal peacebuilding in the region became to support the peace process which was set in motion with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. In order to support the peace process, the liberal peacebuilding logic followed loosely along the lines of: if we develop the Palestinian economy and state institutions, when the occupation 'inevitably' ends, Palestine will be well-positioned for further negotiations and peace talks which will then lead to a two-state solution (Turner, 2012, p. 497).

While liberal peacebuilding literature (and actors) concede that peacebuilding requires interventions, the degree to which these interventions balance coercion, conditionality, and consent

is a matter of debate (Richmond, 2006). The emphasis placed on these manners of motivation — coercion, conditionality, and consent — depend on where along the spectrum of liberal peace thinking one falls. The graduations of liberal peacebuilding thinking falls along a spectrum ranging from hyper-conservative and conservative, to orthodox, and then emancipatory (ibid). Interventions falling on the hyper-conservative and conservative side of the spectrum tend to rely on coercion and conditionality much more than those on the orthodox and emancipatory side. Pugh (2012) has coined this ‘aggressive peace’. This graduation is not stable and over the lifetime of a peacebuilding intervention, a combination of peacebuilding thinking is to be expected.

Liberal peacebuilding literature may lead one to believe that liberal peacebuilding is “unproblematic in its internal structure, and in its acceptance in post-conflict zones” (Richmond, 2006). However, it’s the standardized prescriptions (or ‘internal structure’ as Richmond suggests) that have come to be the focus of much critique. Often applied in blanket, top-down one-size-fits-all interventions, liberal peacebuilding has been described by Mac Ginty (2008) as similar to flat-pack IKEA framework of peacebuilding (p. 145). By likening liberal peacebuilding to the assembly of IKEA furniture, Mac Ginty highlights an important stream of critical thought. The critique rests on an objection of liberal peacebuilding’s reliance on democratization, the rule of law, free and globalized markets, human rights, and neoliberal development as a set of standardized ‘treatments’, often applied in such a manner as to be tone-deaf to the context. In other words, as outlined by Taghdisi-Rad, (2011), most of the policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of international assistance in conflict-affected contexts are “of little relevance to the recipient country’s socio-economic structures” (p. 194). These critiques have paved the way for debates in the literature related to this narrow interpretation of peacebuilding and its *templated* application (Gawerc, 2006; Paris, 2002).

Although peacebuilding was initially envisioned as a process to help rebuild societies recovering from war and violence, as time went on, scholars began to argue for the need for peacebuilding to address the risk of *further/future* conflict (Mair & Steiner, 2011). This aspect of mitigating the risks of future conflict, relates specifically to looking at drivers and root causes of conflict. In stark contrast to the original theorizing of Galtung which advocated for addressing the root causes of conflict and war, liberal peacebuilding paradoxically evolved to focus on ‘tangible measures’ of peacebuilding at the expense of actually addressing the underlying structural causes of the conflict (Duffield, 2001; Mac Ginty, Muldoon & Ferguson, 2007). The Palestinian context is a case in point. In Palestine, there is a body of work exposing the way that, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, international assistance (the majority of which has been delivered in support of peacebuilding and statebuilding initiatives), has accommodated, or accepted the Israeli occupation as something that needs to be worked around, rather than eliminated (Hanafi & Tabar, 2005; Brynen, 2000; Le More, 2005, 2008; LeMore, Keating & Lowe, 2005; Taghdisi-Rad, 2011; Turner, 2014). These authors highlight the fact that liberal peacebuilding has gone full steam ahead with the usual suite of recommendations and interventions, all the while the realities on the ground in Palestine remain suffocating, with “the intensification of settlement expansion, the apparatus of occupation, continuing violence / war (as in the war on Gaza), and deepening polarization at many level” (Brand-Jacobsen, n.d, p. 18). As such, these authors argue that donors work ‘around’ the conflict, rather than taking it into account as the problem that needs to be solved (Taghdisi-Rad, 2011, p. 5). Ultimately, literature on liberal peacebuilding in Palestine highlights that liberal peace’s reliance on neoliberal and market-based peacebuilding tools have failed, and inevitably will continue to fail to build peace as long as interventions work around the occupation, and the Palestinian economy subsequently remains at the mercy of the Israeli occupation, settlement

enterprise, and blockade (ibid). In effect, ignoring “the root causes and underlying contradictions which have given rise to the conflict” (Brand-Jacobsen, n.d, p. 18).

As a result of the shortcoming mentioned above, liberal peacebuilding has had a poor track record in fostering long-term and sustainable peace. Examples, though extreme, such as Afghanistan (Dodge, 2021), Iraq (Yousif, 2006), Timor-Leste (Richmond & Franks, 2008) epitomize this critique. As a result of these failures and dismal successes, liberal peacebuilding has sustained its fair share of criticism.

Debates and critiques related to liberal peacebuilding revolve around two primary points of contention: the *efficacy* of liberal peacebuilding and the *legitimacy* of liberal peacebuilding. Literature in the efficacy camp aims to identify ways to improve the application of liberal peacebuilding and thus leaving its epistemic and ontological grounding intact (Bellamy & Williams, 2004, p.6). Authors such as Paris (2010) fall within this camp, arguing, “there is no realistic alternative” (p. 340). Literature in the legitimacy camp, on the other hand, lay bare what they believe to be pathologies within liberal peacebuilding, therefore question the liberal peacebuilding project in its entirety (Tadjbakhsh, 2011). Authors such as Chandler (2017), Donias (2012); Jabri (2010); Mac Ginty (2008, 2011, 2014), and Richmond (2009; 2012) embrace this camp.

Local Ownership

Failures and unsatisfactory results of peacebuilding are often explained along a number of well-articulated critiques. Of these, perhaps the most well-developed critique relates to the lack of ownership communities, civil society, the grassroots, and even local elites have over the peacebuilding process in general, and programs and projects specifically (Autesserre, 2014;

Donias, 2012; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). Some authors have gone as far as to frame, local ownership as “being at the heart of the problems facing peacebuilding today” (Hancock, 2017, p. 257). The shift towards addressing issues of local ownership is commonly called, ‘the local turn’. Critiques such as these, resulted in the emergence of a body of literature addressing local ownership in peacebuilding beginning in the 1990s, and finding its stride in the 2000s as a dynamic critique of liberal peace. This has led to the field accepting as a truism, that for peacebuilding to be effective, it needs to be locally owned (Tartir and Ejodus, 2017).

The ‘local’ in local ownership refers not only to national governments but also to civil society; local and regional governments; and a country’s population. Mac Ginty & Richmond (2013) define the local as,

the range of locally based agencies present within a conflict and post-conflict environment, some of which are aimed at identifying and creating the necessary processes for peace, perhaps with or without international help, and framed in a way in which legitimacy in local and international terms converges (p. 769).

Local ownership literature rallies around a central claim that peacebuilding should be “built on internal, domestic and local traditions as well as cultural practices” where international actors are seen as playing a supportive role, and “bystanders in decisions on what type of peace is to be built” (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p. 827). However, as we will see below, the ‘local turn’ and local ownership has become somewhat contested.

Widely recognized as fundamental to the success of peacebuilding, has been an international commitment to ‘put national actors at the helm’ of such endeavors in order to facilitate the much-needed move towards local communities defining their own pathways to peace, identifying the root causes of conflict, and designing the future of their state (McCandless, 2013, p. 227). A

number of key policy documents have reacted to the call for greater emphasis on local ownership such as *The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (2011), the *World Bank World Development Report* (2011), and *OECD States of Fragility* (2015). These normative policy documents explicitly acknowledge local context as paramount and locate local ownership as not only a best practice, but also a precondition for effective reforms and sustainable peace. And while the critique leveled at liberal peacebuilding related to a lack of local ownership has been received and integrated into many of peacebuilding normative policy prescriptions such as the ones noted above, authors have called into question the degree to which this has occurred in a meaningful and transformative manner (Chandler, 2010; Randazzo, 2017).

Critiques of the local turn literature/practice

Mac Ginty (2011) offers a particularly pointed critique in his assertion that in many instances, the idea of local ownership is given rhetorical support, while in practice, it is integrated as little more than lip service, with power remaining squarely situated within the international community (p. 60, 79). Local ownership, or the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding, while itself being a critique of liberal peacebuilding, therefore, has therefore not been immune to analytical scrutiny.

Critiques within the local turn literature draw attention to the way that much of this theorizing has romanticized and homogenized the local portraying it as static (Kappler 2015). This has led scholars such as Schierenbeck (2015) to question, “what/who is ‘the local’ and who is included or excluded from ‘the local’?” (p. 1023). Romanticizing and crystalizing the local, authors argue, is ill advisable. Just because an actor, a practice, an institution, or a solution is ‘local’, does not mean that they are egalitarian, legitimate, just, fair (Donias, 2012; Paris, 2010). Nor does it mean that actors that are local, are *always* ‘local’. For example, Kappler (2017) has argued, “actors constantly

reposition themselves vis-à-vis the ‘local’ and ‘the global’. Depending on time and context, they delocalise or (re-)localise their identities and are therefore in constant movement” (p. 876). Her research therefore not only brings to light the limitations of the commonly stated binary of ‘local versus international’, but also the complexity of agency, identity, and identity politics in peacebuilding. These insights point to the way that the labeling of who is ‘the local’ can and does, “change over time, depending on the social, political and economic context” (p. 877). Put bluntly, Kappler’s (2015) work raises the important point that labeling ‘the local’ is in and of itself, “a political decision in terms of which biases and authorities to ascribe to those actors, and how to read them academically” (p. 877).

Moreover, there is a lack of consensus of when and how the local should be brought in to the planning and implementation of peacebuilding interventions. Some such as Paris (2010) argue for a transfer of responsibility and gradual buy-in of local elites, while others such as De Carvalho, De Coning, & Connolly (2014) and Nathan (2007) argue for more broad-based and longitudinal participation of local actors. In between these two approaches, some such as Donias (2012) argues for resources, responsibilities, and consensus building between both local actors and internationals. While outside the corpus of peacebuilding literature, the following quote by Paulo Freire (1970) captures what I believe to be the sentiment behind claims by authors who point to the failure of liberal peacebuilding to successfully integrate local ownership and local knowledge into peacebuilding interventions. Freire (1970) states, “they cannot enter the struggle as objects in order later to become human beings” (p. 68). I use this quote to illustrate the futility of trying, in retrospect, to integrate the perspectives of local populations and communities into liberal peace interventions. This integration authors such as De Carvalho, De Coning, & Connolly (2014) and

Nathan (2007) would argue—if it hopes to be meaningful and sustainable—local engagement must be integrated into the very fabric of peacebuilding efforts, not something that is added on later.

The diversity in agendas, goals, and interests of ‘the local’, has also become a layer of critique pointed towards the ‘local turn’ literature. Sending (2011) posits that peacebuilding “is caught in a web of constituencies that have different and partly competing interests and concerns” (p. 66). Offering a tangible example of how this plays out on the ground, Tartir and Ejodus’s (2017) study in Palestine is instructive. In their critique of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), Tartir and Ejodus (2017) highlight the diversity of goals, agendas, and opinions of the diverse actors all falling under the category of ‘local’. Their research reveals ‘realities of insecurity that have been rendered invisible’ by the dominant discourse of local ownership that ‘privileges narrow technocratic dimensions’ of peacebuilding at the expense of local lived experiences (p. 145). The EUPOL COPPS mission was part of the roadmap for peace proposed by the Quartet on the Middle East. Its goals were “to support the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state through the establishment of a sustainable and effective policing under Palestinian ownership” (p. 142). The EU labeled the mission a ‘good success story’, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) felt the mission had succeeded insofar as it improved their ability to police the West Bank. On the other hand, the authors found that Palestinian civil society and ‘everyday Palestinians’ had a far more pessimistic view of the mission claiming it was “neither effective nor locally owned” (p. 145), and did nothing but hamper their ability to break free from occupation and oppression. The challenge lies in the fact that the PA, Palestinian grassroots, and civil society all fall in under the category of ‘the local’, yet hold profoundly different views related to the goals and success of the mission. Ultimately, their research highlights challenges with local ownership related to the narrow conceptualizations of

ownership, as well as homogenizing understandings of what and who the local is. They offer an important line of questioning for peacebuilding interventions aiming to adhere to the principles of local ownership: Firstly, who are the locals? And secondly, whose ownership is privileged and who is marginalized in the process? (p. 145)

Looking at the rich and well-developed critiques of liberal peacebuilding related to its failure to apply crucial lessons around local ownership in a satisfying and meaningful way (de Haan, 2009, p. 148), one thing becomes apparent; in order to move beyond a rhetorical nod towards local ownership, an epistemological shift is needed, a radical departure from the well-worn paths that are currently being trodden (Farr, 2011, p. 551-552). Without which, little hope can be found in the literature to overcome the current struggle between the liberal peace system and localized processes of politics, resistance, and peace (Richmond, 2014, p. 4).

The Everyday

Growing out of the local turn literature in the mid 2000s, came an analytical focus on the ‘everyday’ in conflict settings (Autesserre, 2014; Chandler, 2015; Mitchell, 2011; Richmond, 2009; Millar, 2020). Focusing on the everyday in this sense, meant that attention was shifted from formal institutionalized politics, towards *informal*, mundane ‘world building’ (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1625), everyday ‘routine practice’ (Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 549), and ‘automatic responses to the world’ (Autesserre, 2014, p. 6). The intention behind introducing the concept of ‘everyday-ness’ into the study and practice of peacebuilding, was to introduce an ‘alternative dimension of lived reality’ (Millar, 2020, p. 216) in order to better understand the agents, the grassroots actors behind ‘bottom up’ peacebuilding efforts. It offered a new perspective from which to view ‘peace and politics’ (Richmond, 2009, p. 331). By bringing into the analytical frame, “the fluid, organic and

creative tactics individuals deploy to get along within complex socio-cultural milieu” (Millar, 2020, p. 311), ‘local-turn’ literature, emphasizes the everyday lived experiences, sense-making, choices, and actions of individuals as they navigate, on a daily basis, the complicated—often dangerous—and contentious politics of peacebuilding. This literature rests on the view that in contexts of conflict and peacebuilding, the everyday is “seldom divorced from the wider social and political context” (Hamber, 2016, p. 29), and instead, is a site of less-visible politics. The literature on ‘the everyday’ in peacebuilding mirrors the ontological and epistemological standpoint of much of the literature on ‘the everyday’ in resistance studies, as well as feminist scholarship on the everyday. The peacebuilding and resistance literature employing the concept of ‘the everyday’ aims to bring to light the agency of actors, as well as emphasizing the everyday as a site of politics (Millar, 2020, p. 310).

Much like we saw with literature on the everyday in resistance studies, the application of the everyday in peacebuilding literature has not gone unproblematized (Millar, 2020; Mitchell, 2011; Randazzo, 2016). Scholars have taken issue with the extent to which everyday literature actually analyzes actions of the everyday due to an analytical reliance on an ‘overly political lens’ (Millar, 2020). By this, I mean that scholars such as Millar (2020) have suggested that a catch 22 has emerged in this literature. He argues that by seeing every act through a political lens, and as an expression of emancipatory agency, “inadvertently strips away the very everyday-ness that gives the concept so much of its value for the study of peace and peacebuilding” (p. 311). He illustrates how authors employing the ‘everyday’ often do so “as a scalar referent for politics at the micro or local level’, rather than as an understanding of the everyday as *pre-political* responses to conflict and peacebuilding settings. By this he means that everyday phenomena are at once both political and a-political, they are,

explicitly those actions motivated, stimulated or provoked by concerns parallel to or outside politics – by social, cultural, economic, religious, psychological or other dimensions of life – and everyday peacebuilding is composed of exactly such actions inspired by precisely such motivations (p. 319).

While the tensions within the ‘everyday peacebuilding’ literature have not been resolved, the analytical focus on the everyday remains an important contribution for better understanding the ‘complex socio-political milieu’ of conflict settings by bringing to light the nuances, ‘located in the mundane responses to the challenges to life and wellbeing’ (Millar, 2020, p. 321-322).

Another area of critique directed towards the everyday peace literature is the relative silence around feminist insights related to the gendered nature of the everyday (Elias & Roberts, 2016). Feminist scholars have long argued that paying attention to the everyday is an integral part of understanding peace (and conflict) from a gendered perspective. If the everyday is a site of less-visible politics, for feminist scholars and theorists, it is a site rife with gendered power relations. In drawing attention to the gendered nature of everyday politics in peacebuilding, feminists simultaneously draw attention to the ways that conflict and insecurity shape the everyday lived experiences of people, and this occurs along deeply gendered lines (Wibben, 2020; Sylvester, 1993; Ni Aoláin et al. 2018). Gender power, Cockburn (2004) reminds us, shapes “the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international (p. 28), and therefore, if peacebuilding must be conceived of in terms of everyday politics, one must also conceive of these everyday politics of peace from the household to the international. The ‘battlefield’ is not something that is ‘out there’, it crosses into the home and all other private domains. Therefore, understanding ‘the everyday’ in peacebuilding from a feminist standpoint necessitates taking our analysis into the home and other traditionally private domains to understand how violence and peacebuilding interventions and processes impact power relations and thus interact with other axes

of oppression. A feminist analysis of the everyday in peacebuilding highlights that in order for any just and lasting peace to be established, peacebuilding efforts must address and eliminate the everyday acts of violence and oppression that may have been present prior to conflict, but also ones that became normalized during conflict. Authors such as Moser (2000) and Cockburn (2004) argue for understanding conflict and peace as constituting a gendered ‘continuum of violence’. The concept of a gendered continuum of violence rests on there being no abrupt distinction or cut-off between public to private spaces and between conflict and post-conflict. We therefore need to see distinction such as public and private, or conflict and post-conflict as a continuum that plays out in everyday engagements and interactions, as well as in political and institutional settings. For women and other groups made vulnerable by unequal power relations, contexts that may appear to be peaceful on the outside, may in fact be sites of violent, oppressive, and unequal gendered power relations. Feminist everyday peace literature helps us to become aware of the violence in nonviolence.

Feminist theorizing on the everyday in peacebuilding highlights the need for intersectional analysis to be integrated into peacebuilding efforts. Paying attention to identity markers such as class into understandings of everyday (in)securities, can help peacebuilding interventions be more attuned to the differences between individuals, thus ensuring interventions meet the needs of a wider portion of a population (Wibben, 2020, p. 117). Ultimately, feminist research that theorizes peacebuilding through the lens of the everyday, provides a more comprehensive understanding of peacebuilding that “addresses the complex and contradictory nature of social relations involved in everyday peacebuilding” (Vaittinen, et al., 2019, p. 194)

Building on literature on the everyday, feminist theorizing also helps to bring to light the unique ways that women build peace, interpersonally, in their homes, and in their communities. As this agency and resilience is often rendered invisible by state and institution focused understandings of peacebuilding, bringing the everyday into our understanding of peacebuilding helps to illuminate the work and efforts of women as they survive, thrive, and navigate post-conflict and the precarious nature of peace.

Resistance and Hybridity

In relation to peacebuilding, studies of resistance to peacebuilding have largely been conducted through a critical lens (Ejdus & Junco, 2017). These studies look at resistance by organized and collective campaigns (Newman & Richmond, 2006; Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2006), as well as indirect everyday acts of resistance to peacebuilding (Richmond 2010; Pouligny 2006). Authors such as Hancock (2017) argue that while an improvement to classic top-down liberal peacebuilding, the notion of local ownership nevertheless remains ineffectual for accurately accounting for agency. Critiques such as this have led to explorations aimed at bringing agency back into our understanding of peacebuilding. In doing so, authors such as Mac Ginty (2011) and Richmond (2014) have introduced the concept of ‘hybrid peacebuilding’. Hybrid peacebuilding refers to what happens when local actors assert their agency through resisting—both directly and indirectly—international peacebuilding interventions. Resistance in this instance, is conceptualized in terms of the way that local actors co-op, appropriate, alter, and shift peacebuilding interventions to meet their own objectives and agendas. In resisting therefore, local actors express agency in altering internationally imposed liberal peacebuilding projects and programs for their own purposes (Belloni, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011; Millar, 2014). While always different than originally anticipated by external actors, the resulting ‘hybrid’ outcomes of interventions are not always antithetical to

the goals of the liberal peacebuilding actors. The fruit of the interactions between external liberal peace-driven interventions and the agency of local actors can sometimes result in meeting the needs of both interveners as well as local actors (Verkoren & Van Leeuwen, 2013, p. 159). Conversely, this interaction can also result in the failure or ‘spoiling’ of international peace interventions. There have been a number of studies highlighting resistance to peacebuilding interventions and the resulting hybrid peace that has emerged in contexts such as Palestine (Brynen, 2000); Cambodia (Lee, 2021), Bosnia (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2006), Kosovo (Mahr, 2017). In his in-depth exploration of the interaction between the economic dimensions of international peacebuilding and the agency of local actors in Palestine, Brynen (2000), provides an example of how this analytical lens is applied,

Recipients of peacebuilding assistance are not passive, but rather active agents in their own right, pursuing their own political and other agendas. In this, external assistance represents a potentially potent resource. Understanding the dynamics of peacebuilding assistance thus requires attention to how donor programs actually impact on local societies and politics –and how local political actors seek to shape assistance to serve their own purposes (p. 26).

Hybridity therefore has been used as an ontological framework in the literature which broadens the binary conceptualization of ‘international versus local’ (Lee, 2021, p. 602), instead focusing on interactions and exchange between the two. Summarizing the work of Mac Ginty (2010) and Lee & Özerdem (2015), Lee (2021) explains,

the formation of hybrid peace is determined by the combined impact of the compliance powers of liberal peace; the incentive powers of the liberal peace; the ability of local actors to resist, ignore, or subvert the liberal peace; and the ability of local actors to formulate and maintain alternatives to the liberal peace (p. 603).

What this quote also highlights is the role that power plays in understanding the hybrid peace approach. For example, the detailed work of Lee (2021) has shown that different local groups in

Cambodia were motivated to resist peacebuilding programs for different and distinct reasons. Her findings problematize the homogenizing views of ‘the local’, as well as add nuance to understandings of local grievances, resistance, and the resulting hybridization of peace.

While I have included examples of authors addressing peacebuilding in various sections covered thus far, by means of a segue to the next section on NGO-ization, I will provide one more example of a critical review of liberal peacebuilding in Palestine. In Palestine, liberal peacebuilding has often been criticized first for its failure to produce a Palestinian state (Turner, 2015, p. 73), but also more specifically due to its insistence on promoting and building up Palestinian ‘state’ institutions and economic development, while failing to address the Israeli occupation and settler colonial expansion into territory established as the future Palestinian state (Le More, 2008; Roy, 2007; Turner, 2012). The fact that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was first formed, then propped up, and endlessly funded to ‘govern’ an area that it “has neither sovereignty nor control over its resources, and it has no defined borders” (Turner, 2015, p. 90), and remained under colonial occupation, offers a glaring example of the way that ‘IKEA flat packed’ peacebuilding interventions are pursued under the rubric of peacebuilding—at the expense of—or devoid of contextual relevance and nuance.

In her thought-provoking piece, Turner (2015) provides a scathing well-articulated evaluation of liberal peacebuilding in Palestine. She suggests that, given the devastating impacts of the Oslo Accords and peacebuilding interventions have had on Palestinians, we need to re-conceptualize peacebuilding practices in the region. This re-conceptualizing, she argues, rests on relabeling peacebuilding as counterinsurgency. She believes peacebuilding has functioned more as a tool of counterinsurgency rather than a tool to build peace because the goals of peacebuilding have centred

around ‘secure[ing] a population’, rather than building sustainable peace and a Palestinian state (p. 74). If viewed this way, then in fact, peacebuilding has been rather successful in Palestine in so far as it has demobilized a national liberation movement, successfully, “securing the population and ensuring acquiescence in the face of violent dispossession” (p. 81). Flowing from this analysis, many authors have argued that peacebuilding and donor involvement in Palestine has in fact, subsidized the occupation, further entrenching Israeli control, Palestinian dependence, and masked Israel’s continued colonization (Gordon, 2008; Le More, 2008, 2005; Turner, 2015).

Another way that critical theorists have made sense of the interactions between the increase in donor involvement, Palestinian dependency, and continued colonization, is the process of NGO-ization of Palestinian civil society. Before continuing with a review of pertinent literature related to peacebuilding, I will provide a momentary detour in order to tease out and examine NGO-zation before returning to peacebuilding literature, and specifically, the relevant literature addressing gender and masculinities vis-à-vis peacebuilding.

NGO-ization

The call for greater local ownership in peacebuilding has had consequences outside of simply increasing local ownership for the betterment of long-term and sustainable peace. Calls for greater local ownership has increasingly led to ‘the local’ being reduced to CSOs/NGOs. Here, Leonardsson & Rudd (2015) argue, “civil society is seen as the local that legitimises elite-level national ownership” which then leads to “questions about the role of civil society, presumably operating through the grassroots in ‘locally’ owned, bottom-up peacebuilding processes, but in practice sometimes consisting of professionalised NGOs” (p. 830). In some cases therefore, emphasis on bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding have contributed to the formalization and

professionalization of CSOs/NGOs (Randazzo, 2017; Verkoren & Van Leeuwen, 2013). The process through which NGOs become professionalized, institutionalized, and depoliticized has been coined NGO-ization (Alvarez, 2009; Chahim & Prakash, 2014; Choudhry and Kapoor, 2013; Lang, 2013; Smith, 2007; Ungsuchaval, 2016). Different authors have put forth a number of frameworks for understanding NGO-ization. Choudhry and Kapoor (2013) posit that the most crucial factors are professionalization, institutionalization, depoliticization and demobilization, while Lang (2013) adds bureaucratization to the list. Despite the slight differences between authors, NGO-ization has been widely adopted as a conceptual framework for understanding some of the unintended consequences of power relations and influence of the international, on local CSOs/NGOs.

While this term has been applied to CSOs/NGOs in general, there is also a specific body of literature that applies NGO-ization in relation to social movements and activism (INCITE, 2017). For example, Chakraborty (2021) understands NGO-ization as, “the cooption and erasure of critical social movements” (p.1). Feminist scholars such as Paternotte (2016) and Abu-Assab et al., (2020) have looked at the NGO-ization of LGBTQ2+ activism, Roy (2014a) applied NGO-ization to critique the cooption of resistance in India, Jad (2004) to the Arab Women’s Movement, Alvarez (2009) used it to explore Latin American pro-feminist movements, and Keysan (2019) used NGO-ization to understand shifts in Turkish feminist activism. A commonly noted consequence of NGO-ization (particularly as it relates to social movements and activism) is the charge of elitism (Dana, 2013) and the resulting disconnect between NGOs and social movements from the ‘real lives of people’ (Ungsuchaval, 2016). Building on this, Meyers (2016) argued that “NGO-ization turns local organizations into satellites or franchises of international organizations, thus ‘de-localizing’ them and pulling their leadership away from their members” (Meyers, 2016,

p. 4). The process of pulling the leadership of local organizations away from the grassroots is highlighted in the way that NGO-ization shifts CSOs/NGOs from activism to advocacy (Paternotte, 2016). The diverse case studies represented in this literature point to two key consequences of NGO-ization: first, a dependency on international funding and agendas; and secondly, a lack of legitimacy (Gianna, Muciele & Lozza, 2021).

The work of feminist scholars has shone a light on the process of NGO-ization in relation to the women's movement and demonstrated how the feminist movement has been weakened by this (Jad, 2004; Batiwala, 2008). These feminist critiques of NGO-ization mirror those highlighted in the above sections including professionalization, de-politicization, de-mobilization, and de-localization of activists, movements, and organizations. However, feminist theorists help to illuminate the gendered dynamics and consequences of this process. Authors such as Eisenstein (2005) critiqued liberal feminist organizing for possessing a 'dangerous liaison' with capitalism. The works of authors such as Fraser (2009) took this line of critique further and argued that second-wave feminism had been coopted and turned into a 'unwitting' accomplice to neoliberal capitalism by shifting away from the radical (and socialist) feminist goals that were originally present in second-wave feminist thinking related to calls for systematic transformation of economic and political systems. These authors point to the way that the NGO-ization of liberal feminist activism results from its relationship with neoliberal capitalism, a relationship that "serves to dull the potential of a critical feminist theory" (Schild, 2015, p. 60). This acceptance required second-wave feminists to '(re)signify' their goals away from any anti-capitalist organizing, towards goals that did not challenge the orthodoxy of capitalism.

Applying this critique to Latin America, Alvarez (1999) highlights how the NGO boom in Latin America led to the NGO-ization of the feminist movement. This resulted in the professionalization of feminist organizing and functioned to stratify the feminist movements by creating a class of elitist bureaucratic ‘gender experts’, and a class of low-income ‘politically silenced’ beneficiaries of feminist social programs. It also drew feminist organizing away from ‘earlier, more movement-orientated activities’, towards ‘gender policy assessments, project execution, and social service delivery’ (p. 182). Offering another feminist take on NGO-ization in the context of feminist movement in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Zia (2009) argues that by welcoming Islamic and religion-based feminist visions into feminist theorizing and organizing in Pakistan, second wave feminism has become diluted in its effectiveness and support in Pakistan due to its integration of discriminatory religious laws. While this may make these organizations unthreatening to the authority of religious, state, and political parties, it also thwarts their emancipatory potential. NGO-ization in this case refers to the way that ‘a new generation of Islamic revivalist feminists’ have coopted secular radical feminist thinking in Pakistan and functioned to ‘rationalize all women’s rights within the religious framework and render secular feminism irrelevant while framing the debate on women’s rights exclusively around Islamic history, culture, and tradition’ (p. 29). In doing so, this has marginalized secular political feminism in Pakistan and framed it as a Western ‘outside voice’, “rather than a legal, economic, sociological, political and personal alternative challenge to all forms of patriarchal expression, including religion” (p. 44).

These examples provide tangible and empirical evidence of Chakraborty’s (2021) charge that NGO-ization results in, “the cooption and erasure of critical social movements” (p.1). However, feminist theorizing around NGO-ization also makes an important contribution to our understanding of the process by drawing attention to women’s agency in navigating NGO-ization,

an analytical angle I borrow from this literature in this dissertation. For example, Nazneen & Sultan (2009) show how in Bangladesh, small women's organizations chose to strategically engage and adopt NGO models of activism in order to access resources for their constituency as well as for organizational sustainability and survival (p. 195). This analysis therefore highlights the structures of power that depoliticizes activism, but does not frame women and the women's movement as agentless, disempowered subjects.

NGO-ization in Palestine

Connected to the NGO-ization literature, is a robust body of scholarship which addresses the impact of donor funding and involvement on CSOs/NGOs in Palestine following the Oslo Accords (Dana, 2013; Darwish & Rigby, 2015; Kuttab, 2008; Smith, 2007). Jad (2007), applied the term NGO-ization to highlight the way that these funds came to dominate the agendas and directions of CSOs/NGOs in Palestine. Kuttab (2008) used the NGO-ization framework to analyze the women's rights movement in Palestine and Kayali (2021) used it to look at Palestinian civil society in general. Turner's (2014) work details how, after signing the Oslo Accords, Palestine's CSO/NGO sector mushroomed due in part, to the influx of foreign donors directing funds to NGOs under the rubric of supporting local civil society, ensuring local ownership, and democracy promotion. Dating back to the early years of the Oslo Accords, this literature offers a robust critique detailing how NGO-ization has led to the professionalization, de-politicization, and a reduction in legitimacy of these organizations (Atia & Herold, 2018; Awashra & Awashreh, 2012; Hammami, 1995; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005; Jad, 2007). Building on this critique, Dana (2015) has highlighted how this process turned Palestinian NGOs into tools and vehicles through which neoliberal values are transmitted into the larger Palestinian society (p. 194). He suggests that the framework for building peace in the region put forth by the liberal peace framework led Palestinian CSOs/NGOs

to forfeit their “critical characters and tasks associated with its historical anti-colonial struggle” and become “foreign-dictated and financed professional NGOs” (p. 208).

Tracing the effects of foreign funding to CSOs/NGOs in Palestine, Allen (2013) charts the creation and mushrooming of what she calls the ‘human rights industry’ resulting from the influx of international funding and aid for ‘human rights’ in the years following the Oslo Accords. She demonstrates how the influx of funding has led to the demise of the nationalist ethos as CSOs/NGOs adopt the language, narratives, and goals of their funders and subsequently their work is reduced to “donor-driven projects taken on mainly to garner international funds rather than to serve the Palestinian people according to a locally relevant agenda of priorities” (p. 67). Building on this critique, Darweish & Rigby (2015) warn that NGO-ization of civil society post-Oslo transformed activism, community organizing, and CSOs/NGOs into “professional deliverers of foreign development aid, with a number of significant consequences” (p. 106). Of the significant consequences Darwish & Rigby speak about, I think the impact on activism and mobilization are particularly poignant for this dissertation. Supporting Darwish & Rigby’s analysis, Dana (2013), argues that since the Oslo Accords, NGOs have proliferated and have “become dominant organizations at the expense of other indigenous forms of civil society, in particular the mass-based movements” (n.p). The mass-based movements that Dana mentions relate to the national liberation movement and resistance movement. Narrowing her line of critique to this area in particular, Norman (2015) provides unique analysis related specifically to NGO-ization and unarmed resistance in Palestine (p. 41). She concludes that, the rise in people-to-people initiatives (joint Palestinian/Israeli activism and unarmed resistance) in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, led to the professionalization and “the institutionalization of nonviolence through NGOs and the redefinition of nonviolence by Western agendas” (p. 41). Collectively, this literature paints a

detailed, if not bleak, picture of the landscape in Palestine vis-à-vis peacebuilding (as well as resistance) and the influence of international donors funding, agendas, and frameworks.

Gender, Peace, and Security

Current literature on peacebuilding confirms that women and men experience conflict and peace differently, and that women are fundamentally underrepresented in peacebuilding processes (de Alwis, Mertus, & Sajjad, 2013; De La Ray & McKay, 2006; Hudson, 2009; Krause, 2019; Villellas, Urrutia, Villellas & Fisas, 2016). Asking the gender question in relation to peacebuilding has, “become institutionalized through policymaking, legal practice, and the development of practitioner models and has been enhanced through academic research” (Theidon, Phenicie, & Murray, 2011, p. 3). This has led to an extensive exploration of the gendered nature of conflict and peacebuilding. It is well documented that women often face the worst consequences during times of conflict and they are highly underrepresented in peacebuilding processes (Giles & Hyndman, 2004; Mazurana & McKay, 2001; Onyejekwe, 2005). As a result, there has been a dramatic increase in attention on the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes. However, a large portion of literature and existing frameworks related to gender and peacebuilding often use the terms gender and women as if they were synonymous (Myrntinen, Naujoks, & El-Bushra, 2014; Sudhakar & Kuehnast, 2011; Theidon, Phenicie, & Murray, 2011; Vries, 2010). The treatment of gender as woman has led to a focus on the experiences, importance, and value of including women in all levels of peacebuilding. This has occurred alongside recognition of the importance of not sidelining women as victims but instead highlighting their resilience. This recognition culminated in the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) in 2000. Building off of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, early literature

around UNSCR 1325 stressed the Resolutions transformative potential (Cohn, Kinsella & Gibbings, 2004; Tryggestad, 2009), and the possibility it held as a ‘watershed’ for women’s rights in conflict settings (Anderlini, 2007, p. 7). However, twenty-two years after its passing, scholars have exposed major challenges in the Resolution itself (Hill, 2002; Cohn 2008; Whitworth, 2004; Cockburn, 2007) as well as in its implementation and progress in achieve meaningful improvements in the area of gender and peacebuilding (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2015; Cohn, Kinsells & Gibbings, 2004; Hudson, 2012; Santos, 2021; Willett, 2010). Amongst the plethora of critiques, Pratt & Richter-Devroe (2011) edited a special issue in the International Feminist Journal of Politics dedicated to critically examining UNSCR 1325. As part of this Special Issue, Farr (2011) offered analysis around UNSCR 1325 in Palestine. In this analysis, she points to the difficulties that Palestinian women have faced in their ability to use UNSCR 1325 to bolster and further their activities and ideas on peacebuilding (p. 540). While the challenges around implementation of UNSCR 1325 are diverse and fall outside the scope of this dissertation and thus this literature review, one area is of particular importance to this dissertation and that relates to the relative silence around men and masculinities in UNSCR 1325 (Santos, Roque & Moura, 2013) and the broader literature on gender and peacebuilding.

Enter in the ‘other’ side of gender

Literature on the topic of masculinities and peace represents a belated recognition that men are gendered beings (Bannon & Correia, 2006; Sudhakar & Kuehnast, 2011; Watson, 2015). This has led to a new impetus for understanding the relational aspects of gender as they correspond to peace and conflict and the concept of masculinity(ies) in peacebuilding (Bannon & Correia, 2006, p. xviii). While the silences and expulsion of men and masculinities in literature addressing peacebuilding has *not* gone unnoticed (Cahn & Ni Aoláin, 2010; Hamber, 2007; Myrtilinen,

Khattab & Naujoks, 2016; Theidon, 2009), this nevertheless remains a much less well-developed area of inquiry compared alongside literature addressing women and peacebuilding.

The motivations for authors to bring masculinities analysis into our understanding of peacebuilding are diverse. Some advocate for integrating an understanding of masculinities into peacebuilding from more of a radical epistemology seeing this inclusion as “an antidote to militarism” (Wright, 2020). Others suggest that understanding gender relations and masculinities is key to building sustainable peace (Krause, 2019). Most common in the literature however, is framing the inclusion and integration of men and masculinities into peacebuilding as strategically beneficial in promoting the inclusion, human rights, and security of women and girls (USIP, 2013), or through what Hamber (2016) calls, “a violation-centric lens” (p. 25). Borne out of this latter category, is a line of critique addressing masculinities—or lack thereof—in UNSCR 1325+. UNSCR 1325+ helped to popularize the idea that the marginalization of women in peacebuilding is a threat not only to women’s rights, it is also a risk for the general failure of peacebuilding.

What it neglected to communicate, however, was that the same can be said for the marginalization of men and masculinities. Ignoring the relational character of gender gives an inaccurate understanding of the workings of power in a given conflict or post-conflict context and is therefore detrimental to processes and activities working towards building positive peace (Hudson, 2009). Leading feminist peace organizations such as the Women’s Peacemakers Program and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, peacebuilding NGOs such as Saferworld and International Alert, as well as authors such as Cockburn (2011), Cohn, Kinsella & Gibbings (2004), Dolan (2014), Duriesmith (2020), Myrntinen (2019), Shepherd (2008), Whitworth (2004), and Wright (2020) have all specifically called out UNSCR 1325+ for a near silence around men,

boys, and masculinities. As a result, rather than seeing men as ungendered, natural, or naturalized, there has been a recent attempt in critical feminist literature to examine how men and masculinities are gendered and uncover how this process influences conflict, post-conflict, and peacebuilding environments. This has begun to shift the focus of ‘gender analysis’ away from solely women, towards a more diverse and multifaceted understanding of gender.

The broadening of gender analysis to include men and masculinities is an important step because, as Parpart & Zalewski (2008) remind us, by focusing solely on women we frame them as the problem that needs to be fixed (also see Watson, 2015), thus rendering the pernicious effects of patriarchy and the relational aspect of gender inequality unproblematic. Other authors such as Sudhakar & Kuehna (2011) have echoed the concern related to equating gender with women stating, “focusing on one side of the gender equation... provides an incomplete understanding of gender issues in the context of conflict and peacebuilding efforts” (p. 2).

Authors in this field therefore, generally agree that theorizing both masculinity and femininity, women and men, is paramount to understanding the working of gender, conflict and peacebuilding (Dowd, 2010; Connell, 2002; Duncanson, 2013; Duriesmith, 2017; Myrtilinen, Naujoks, and El-Bushra, 2014; Myrtilinen, Khattab & Naujoks, 2017; Zalewski & Parpart, 1998). For Watson (2015), he argues that in order for a gender-just peace to emerge, social change is necessary. An inherent part of this social change, must be a change in the social position of women. This, he explains, “will redefine their relationship with men, and the acceptance of this change will need to involve a shift in male gender norms, otherwise referred to as masculinities” (p. 50). In other words, gender equitable peace it is not only about shifting women’s opportunities, protecting rights, and including women’s voices in conflict and peacebuilding contexts, it is also about

addressing men and masculinities in these same domains. But this requires a framing and understanding of ‘men as men’, not as ‘default humans’ (ibid, 59). In other words, we must see men as gendered beings, and therefore as an integral part of a ‘gender-sensitive’ approach to peace and conflict.

This literature emphasizes the fact that including men in gender analysis and recognizing the implications and importance of masculinities vis-à-vis peacebuilding, does not diminish the importance of acknowledging and highlighting women’s important roles and struggles. Rather by including men, it is argued that programs, theories, and models are more meaningful and therefore effective (Bannon & Correia, 2006; Vries, 2010). In a like manner Sudhakar & Kuehnast (2011) posit that expanding the gender lens to encompass men does not come at the expense of women, rather “as the evidence base grows, strategies can be better tailored to reflect the reality of shifting norms and roles for men and women in conflict [and post-conflict] zones” (p. 3). What critical feminists ultimately point to, is the impossibility of challenging gender order without problematizing the underlying gendered power hierarchy embedded in conflict and peacebuilding contexts. With a consensus that incorporating analysis around men and masculinities into feminist theory related to peace and conflict (as well as security studies) is essential, the question then turns to how. Some authors have opined that in order to truly and holistically make gender visible in peacebuilding, we must move beyond exclusively asking the “woman question” to also ask what Kathy Ferguson termed ‘the man question’ (Ferguson, 1993). Asking the ‘man question’ in relation to peace and security relates to understanding how constructions of certain masculinities perpetuate and sustain unequal power between men and women, militarism, and conflict (Enloe, 1983, 1993; Cohn & Ruddick, 2003; Theidon, 2009), how they are sustained, and how they can be dismantled.

Masculinities and Nonviolent Action in Conflict and Peace

In much the same way that the corpus of peacebuilding literature often fails to account for masculinity and men's experience in peacebuilding, literature exploring nonviolent action often fails to do the same (Garcia, 2010, p. 7). For authors advocating for the need to address the 'man question', they see this as an opportunity to recognize that, in the same way that it is pivotal not to marginalize women as victims, it is also crucial not to marginalize men as violent perpetrators. Despite this evolution, often times, when men and masculinities are problematized in the literature, they are confined to roles related to perpetrators, combatants, and soldiers (Cock, 2001; Goldstein, 2003; Myrttinen, Khattab & Naujoks, 2016). Authors such as Hamber (2016) warn against this as he argues it "can become the focus of attention at the expense of understanding the more insidious and wider role of masculinity in war and peace" (p. 19). This narrow analytical focus on militarized, violent, or combatant masculinities in conflict and peacebuilding results in a simultaneous disregard for non-militarized, non-combatant, non-spoiler men in conflict, post-conflict, and peacebuilding (Kunz, Myrttinen & Udasromo, 2018; Myrttinen, Khattab & Naujoks, 2016). This depiction misleads one to believe that the only gender disposition and alignment for men in conflict, post-conflict, and peacebuilding contexts is the stereotypical war enticing combatant, which is clearly inaccurate. Myrttinen, Khattab & Naujoks (2016) therefore highlight how this focus, "has meant that men as peacebuilders and non-violent men, who by and large are the majority of men even in conflict-affected situations, have seldom been researched or theorized, especially from a critical gender perspective" (p. 2). To this point, Pankhurst (2008) calls for the need in conflict and post-conflict settings, "to understand more about men who do not resort to violence, even when they have all the life experiences that would lead us to expect them to do so" (p. 312).

Perhaps the most prominent contemporary scholar exploring nonviolence, Gene Sharp, posits that in order for individuals to engage in nonviolence, they must transcend the “fear of acting independently and fear of the sufferings which may follow” (cited in Garcia, 2010, p. 456). Given ‘feminized’ assumptions around nonviolence and peacebuilding, part of the ‘suffering’ individuals may face is therefore connected to potential consequences of acting outside of one’s gendered script. However, this remains largely under-theorized in the literature on nonviolence. Therefore, what is missing in the literature is a *gendered* understanding of the social navigation and sense making that underpins men’s unarmed or nonviolent engagement. There are of course, a few notable exceptions. For example, offering a historical analysis of the First World War, Bibbings (2003) explores the experiences of male conscientious objectors. She found that, “objectors came from a range of social, economic, and educational backgrounds and based their objections on varied grounds... moral, political, or humanitarian grounds, sometimes alongside religious beliefs” (p. 128). In spite of the diverse grounds leading men to reject participating in the war, she goes on to explain that they nevertheless,

Embodied a dominant conception of deviant, marginal masculinity; he was seen as the antithesis of the volunteer [soldier], as a complete anathema... If the military man was brave, loyal, patriotic, self-sacrificing, and true, the conscientious objector had to be cowardly, disloyal, unpatriotic, selfish, and traitorous (Bibbings, 2003, p. 130).

Bibbings’ work therefore offers insight into the consequences of the ingrained assumption/socialization between masculinity and violence, and conversely the feminization of nonviolence. By outlining the experience of men who refuse to engage in the use of arms/violence, the ‘suffering’ that Gene Sharpe identifies as an inevitable hurdle to a commitment to nonviolence, comes to life.

Offering a contemporary example of research which explores nonviolent masculinities in conflict and peacebuilding, the work of Kunz, Myrntinen & Udasromo (2018) in Indonesia is illuminating.

They argue that,

the conflation of hegemonic forms of masculinity with militarization and violence overlooks the many ways in which civilian men use political mechanisms of hegemonic masculinity to create consent while remaining explicitly non-violent and thus contribute to non-violent ways of managing conflict (p. 299).

While novel in their interrogation of the assumption between hegemonic masculinities, power, and violence/militarism in conflict and peacebuilding settings, the deeper contribution of this work is found in their analysis of the ways in which men participating in peacebuilding initiatives have successfully contributed to reducing violence, yet do not necessarily challenge hegemonic masculinities. Their nonviolence and peace work has become their source of power. These findings support patterns identified in this dissertation and therefore, have helped to inform my analysis. The general lack of analytical attention placed on men and masculinities not engaged in violence in conflict and peacebuilding settings presents both a substantial gap in the emerging literature on men and masculinities in peace and conflict, as well as an immense opportunity. This dissertation therefore, will pick up on this line of inquiry and in doing so, will contribute to filling this gap.

Feminist scholars have highlighted how societal perceptions of men's natural proclivity to violence has led to a deep-rooted acceptance that violence and men go hand in hand, particularly in conflict settings (Hutchings, 2008). Feminist contributions have unpacked this essentialist framing to demonstrate how boys and men are often socialized into a gender code, or identity, that intimately links male identity with violence; a link that has the potential of predisposing men to be perpetrators and victims of violence (Hong, 2007). Based on a study of young men in Northern

Ireland during the conflict, Harland (2011) notes, “despite their different backgrounds, violence was perceived by all young men as an accepted and normal part of their everyday lives” (p. 419). In conflict settings, violence is often part of the way in which men prove or establish their identity.

Notwithstanding the fact that certain patterns of masculinity legitimize violence, some violent patterns of masculinity also develop in response to violence. There is a tendency in the literature to treat men’s aggression as solely the cause, rather than as a symptom of violence and war (Sharoni, 2008). When exploring the idea that violence begets violence, literature on the Palestinian case study becomes particularly interesting. In their study of the relationship between structural violence (checkpoints and impediments to movement) on Palestinians likelihood of supporting peacebuilding or violence against Israel, Longo, Canetti and Hite-Rubin (2014) found a correlation between experiences of humiliation at checkpoints and support for violence against Israelis. Conversely, they also found that “easement [to restrictions of movement] makes subject populations less likely to support violence” (p. 1006). Similarly, Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport & Hobfoll’s (2016) research showed that individual-level exposure to terrorism and political violence can make individuals and groups less likely to support peace efforts (p. 845). Despite the above mentioned contemporary research around the effects of exposure to violence on peace and nonviolence, the question of how and why then, the majority of Palestinian men reject the use of arms and violent engagement in conflict, and instead engage in unarmed means to resist the occupation and build peace remains uncharted literary territory.

This chapter has surveyed five interrelated bodies of literature associated with this dissertation: resistance; masculinities in Palestine; peacebuilding; NGO-ization; and gender, peace, and

conflict. Together, the review of literature presented here provides the contemporary landscape from which this dissertation took form.

CHAPTER 5- Overview and Evolution of Palestinian Resistance

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief historical and political overview of the key moments in recent time shaping my case study location of the West Bank, in general, and impacting the nature of resistance, specifically. The diverse people living in this region have a rich and ancient history of coexistence. To say there is a rich and ancient history of coexistence is not to suggest that it has always been peaceful. There are, to be sure, ample examples of conflict and revolts during the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to the end of World War I. And while this rich history has important bearing on the region as we know it today, for the purpose of this overview, we will begin at the now infamous date of 1917 with Britain's Balfour Declaration and quickly move through key dates and moments up until present time. Included in this historical overview is a sketch of the emergence and involvement of the international solidarity activists, including Israeli activism, in relations to Palestinian resistance. The purpose of this section is not to provide a detailed account of the tumultuous history of the region, nor a detailed account of the evolution of resistance, but rather to provide a contextual snapshot of key historical moments in the making of the present. The key dates highlighted here were chosen based on participants' own accounts of Palestinian history and their own personal reflections during interviews related to the relationship between the past and the present vis-à-vis the evolution of resistance, with a focus on the West Bank. It is hoped that this timeline will help to provide a contextual backing to the ensuing empirical chapters.

A Land Without a People for a People Without a Land?

Colonial narratives have been used to understand and shape the land of Palestine for centuries. By the end of the nineteenth, and the beginning of the twentieth century, the popular Zionist slogan 'a land without a people for a people without a land', entrenched the denial not only of the land of

Palestine but of the very existence of Palestinians (Ashcroft, 2004, p. 117). Be that as it may, during this period of time Palestinians did exist, as did their land of Palestine. In the midst of WWI in 1917, by way of the Balfour Declaration, the British Government announced their support for the establishment of a 'Jewish National Home' in Palestine. At that time, the region was under Ottoman control but would soon come under British colonial rule with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the end of the war. Like the rest of the region, at the end of WWI, Britain drew up lines which were to become the borders and placed the land of Palestine under colonial trusteeship; the 'Mandate for Palestine'. By the 1920s, the League of Nations approved the British Mandate for Palestine and its purpose of helping establish a Jewish Homeland. The early signs of organized Palestinian resistance to the first movements of Zionism and an articulated Palestinian national movement began almost instantaneously and have persisted throughout the decades as a reaction to the conditions of oppression and dispossession they have endured until today (Dajani, 2015). Protests against the Balfour Declaration have been documented as early as 1918, and signaled a disappointment at the non-fulfilment of the promise of independence and self-determination for Palestinians after WWI (Pearlman, 2011; Qumsiyeh, 2011; Rigby, 2010). Throughout the 1920's as Jewish migration increased, so too did tensions between the new immigrants, and the indigenous Palestinian population. At this time, Palestinian armed and unarmed resistance took root. While the 1929 Al-Buraq uprisings were the first mass protests against increased Jewish immigration to Palestine, the beginning of organized and largescale Palestinian resistance is often identified as the 1936 - 1939 Great Revolt (Arab Revolt) and general strike against the British administration of the Palestine Mandate. When it first emerged, the Great Revolt was predominantly nonviolent and unarmed. It was characterized by the use of diverse tactics and means of civil disobedience such as strikes, political entreaties, diplomatic petitions,

and protests (Mason & Falk, 2016, p. 168; Pearlman, 2011, p. 1; Rigby, 2010). Despite the nonviolent and unarmed nature of the resistance, the British colonial response to their efforts was brutal (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 229). So, while beginning as an unarmed “campaign of civil disobedience”, the Great Revolt adapted its tactics and introduced the principle of “‘armed struggle’ into the practice and lore” of Palestinian resistance (Atran, 1990, p. 482) and devolved into “a far more violent and peasant-led resistance movement” (Norris, 2008, p. 25). Organized by the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), the uprising and strike rallied around the demand for Palestinian independence and the end of the policy of open-ended Jewish immigration and land purchases with the stated goal of establishing a ‘Jewish National Home’ in Palestine. A sense of Palestinian unity through resistance was fostered by the AHC who included representatives from all major parties, religions, and elite families; “rival elites thus pledged to put aside, at least temporarily, their differences and forge a united front” (Pearlman, 2011, p. 43). As the Great Revolt rumbled on, so too did violent responses by the British Military Forces and armed Zionist militias.

Throughout the 1930s -1940s, armed Zionist militias and paramilitary groups such as Hagana, Irgun and Stern Gang launched a number of attacks against Palestinian and British targets. These resulted in mass displacement of Palestinians, and marked the beginning of a period of ethnic cleansing (Pappe, 2006). In May of 1948, the State of Israel is declared. This continues to be commemorated in Palestine today as the ‘*Nakba*’, or the ‘catastrophe’. Upon gaining independence, Israel immediately passed the Law of Return, stating that any Jewish person had the right to immigrate to Israel. Palestinians often notes that the Israeli ‘Law of Return’ is ironically named given the fact that nearly half of the Arab population, approximately 750,000 Palestinians, were forcibly displaced in the drawing up of the State of Israel and were not—and continue to be

denied—the right of return (Said, 1992, p. 14). During the process of state formation, between 400-500 Palestinian villages in the area that was to become the State of Israel were demolished or renamed and re-appropriated as Israeli villages. What remained of historic Palestine, became known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For many Palestinians, this period of time marks the most painful in their collective memory. Based on data collected through narrative histories of Palestinian women who lived through the 1948 Nakba, Kassem (2011) recounts, “the year 1948 is the most crucial in the lives of Palestinians, at both the personal and the collective level” (p. 1) and it continues to exert a powerful influence on their present-day lives (ibid). Due to the crippling impact of the Nakba such as the overwhelming number of new refugees and IDPs, economic collapse, and collective trauma, there was very little in the way of Palestinian resistance for the next 15 years.

In the years following the creation of the State of Israel, Palestinians living in the West Bank lived under Jordanian rule, while those living in the Gaza Strip lived under Egyptian rule. It was during this time that the articulation of *sumud*, or steadfastness, as a conscious tactic of popular resistance gained prominence (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 100). A clear divide emerged between *sumud*, and more organized endeavors to resist dispossession, displacement, and oppression with the ultimate goal being to ‘liberate’ Palestine. While the establishment of a Palestinian national liberation movement began with a loose network of nationalist student organizations (most notably at Cairo University headed by Yasser Arafat and American University in Beirut by George Habash) around the region in the 1950s, it wasn’t until the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially came into being in 1964 that the Palestinian resistance movement had an organized and cohesive front. As an umbrella organization, the PLO unified a range of different political ideologies and popular organizations involved in resistance in order to be named, the ‘sole legitimate representative of the

Palestinian people'. In fact, for the ensuing three decades, the PLO was often referred to simply as *the Resistance*. Based on the notion that 'what has been taken by force can only be returned by force', armed resistance became the PLO's key tenet of resistance. Rigby (2010) notes, the rise of the PLO not only provided a unified face of Palestinian resistance to the world, it also gave rise to the iconic figure of the Palestinian *fidā'iyyīn*, a *kiffiyeh* clad man with his weapon in hand (p. 33). Inspired by other anti-imperial struggles such as the Cuban revolution under Che Guvera and Fidel Castro, and the efforts of the Bolivian Sandanista movement, the PLO's commitment to armed struggle took its cues from the writing and theorizing of Frantz Fanon and the likes. And while the tactics and ideology behind much of Palestinian resistance today have greatly deviated from the PLO's 'leftist' anti-imperial and third world nationalist beginnings, this image nevertheless, persists today.

In the years following the establishment of the PLO, tensions were high between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries and these tensions peaked in 1967 with what Palestinians known as *the Naksa*, but more commonly referred to as the Six Day War. Israel's victory resulted in the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights in Syria.

The Naksa, or Six Day War 1967

In June of 1967, war broke out between Israel and the neighbouring states of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Lasting only a week, the war was a decisive loss for the Arab states and resulted in Israel seizing the Sinai and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. While Egypt later regained the Sinai in 1979, Israel unofficially

annexed Golan Heights in 1981 and continue to occupy the region today. Likewise, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, remain under Israeli occupation and blockade.

For the PLO, the Naksa was a turning point. The events that took place during the war and the resulting occupation, served to crystalize and re-articulate the goals of their resistance. Prior to 1967, while not necessarily articulated as such, resistance generally rallied around liberating all of historic Palestine. After 1967 however, the PLO and other Palestinian national resistance activities narrowed their focus from fighting Zionism in general, to colonial occupation specifically. As such, putting an end to Israel's rule over the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem became paramount in order to achieve their goal of building a future Palestinian state on what was left of historic Palestine; the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (Dajani, 1995, p. 32). Dajani (1995) explains that in redefining the goals of resistance from Zionism to colonial occupation, the PLO experienced the rise of various factions and splinter groups, as well as the emergence of radical Islamic groups. These groups were unhappy with either the secular nature of PLO resistance, and/or the PLO's narrowed focus on ending the occupation, and thus from their perspective, giving up on liberating *all* of historic Palestine. Furthermore, tension arose within the PLO between leftist parties such as PFLP, and Fatah who both held competing visions and opinions around the scope and strategy that Palestinian national liberation should follow. The Lebanese historian Fawwaz Trabulsi (1969) sees the division between the leftists and Fatah to be, "two relatively autonomous, yet dialectically interrelated struggles: the anti-imperialist class struggle and the anti-Zionist struggle" (as cited in Quenzer, 2019, p. 702). Yet, while political ideologies, tactics, strategies, values, and scope of resistance differed between the various PLO factions, it nevertheless remained the overarching organization of Palestinian resistance during this time. The diverse voices within the PLO were seen by some to be a strength. While others argued

that the plurality of thought within the PLO, “came at the price of the loss of a substantive, singular plan to achieve liberation as well as to clearly visualize what a liberated Palestine would look like for its inhabitants” (Quenzer, 2019, p. 696) and thus “continued to divide and strain resistance efforts” (p. 697).

Despite the differing opinions within the PLO, one thing was for certain, the Arab’s defeat in the Six Day War of 1967, considerably deflated Palestinian’s dream of pan-Arabism and presented them with the chance to “create their own, distinctly Palestinian resistance movement” (Quenzer, 2019, p. 700). As such, much of those committed to resistance turned their hopes for liberation inwards. No longer looking to their Arab neighbors for their liberation, and despite internal struggles between various factions, support for the PLO mushroomed. Rosemary Sayigh (1979) speaks to this mushrooming of the PLO’s support shortly after the Six Day War claiming that it arose, “like a phoenix out of ashes, galvanizing a whole nation humiliated by the collapse of the Arab armies. In this first glamorous début, the Resistance reaped a harvest of hero-worship from a wide spectrum of Arab public opinion” (Sayigh, 1979, p. 148).

The PLO’s strength and ability to organize and carry out armed operations was bolstered by the fact that they were located outside of Palestine, their headquarters jumping from one neighboring country to the next, and thus relatively outside of the severe repression Palestinians were experiencing inside Palestine. They were initially based in Jordan until their expulsion in 1971, Lebanon until the 1980s, Tunis from 1982-1991, and back to Palestine in 1994. Palestinian resistance organized from inside Palestine was “severely circumscribed” through Israel’s use of tactics such as collective punishment and deportation of any suspected resistance leaders (Rigby, 2010, p. 35). As such, resistance organizing inside Palestine remained grassroots and was led by

youth and student associations, labor unions, cooperatives, as well as the women's movement (Dana, 2015, p. 192; King, 2007). In addition to *sumud*, resistance inside the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem predominantly consisted of the establishment of various voluntary committees, civic organizations, and associations such as: trade unions, voluntary work committees, medical relief committees, agricultural relief committees, student/youth groups and women's groups which focused on providing community services. These associations and committees provided for Palestinian's needs in order for them to become less dependent on Israeli institutions, and thus less vulnerable to their oppression, repression, and abuse. In a sense, they were developing a new tactic, 'institutional resistance'. That is, resistance through developing grassroots alternatives to Israeli structures, services, and institutions. While this organizing initially appeared to be ad-hoc and apolitical, in the coming years, it evolved into being the foundation of the First Intifada.

In addition to *sumud* and grassroots organizing in Palestine, another unarmed and nonviolent tactic of resistance emerged during this time; what Bargu (2015) calls 'necroresistance' (transforming the body into a site of resistance). First recorded in 1968, and giving material expression to Michel Foucault's (1978) assertion the "where there is power, there is resistance" (p. 95), following Israel's occupation, the number of Palestinians in Israeli jails greatly increased. As a result, hunger striking began to be used by Palestinians held in Israeli prisons to resist the Israeli matrix of power and control, in order to achieve political objectives not limited simply to the release of the prisoners themselves.

Despite the growing presence and strength of grassroots organizing and other forms of unarmed resistance mentioned above, armed resistance "would remain a defining element of this period of Palestinian resistance" (Quenzer, 2019, p. 699). During the 1960s and early 1970s, Palestinian

armed resistance garnered a great deal of international media attention as the actions/missions/operations were no longer confined to the region. In 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four aircrafts and attempted to hijack a fifth. While all hostages were eventually released, these hijackings further tarnished the reputation of the PLO and failed to garner the international sympathy intended. Inside Palestine however, these hijackings gave rise to one of the most iconic and honored figures in Palestinian resistance, Leila Khaled; the face of who is stenciled onto walls in countless refugee camps across the West Bank. While famous for her role in two airline hijackings, Leila's active participation in resistance has since shifted and remains prominent in politics as a member of the Palestinian National Council and leader in the General Union of Palestinian Women (Irving, 2012). Palestinian feminists such as Eileen Kuttab, claim that Leila's actions were instrumental in establishing women's prominent position in resistance during the First Intifada.

In addition to garnering negative media attention around the world, the hijackings were to have another detrimental impact on Palestinian resistance and the PLO. The hijacked aircrafts were taken to Dawson's Field in Jordan, nicknamed the PFLP's 'revolutionary airport', much to the displeasure of King Hussein. These hijackings, and the negative media attention they received, were the final stroke for the Jordanian King who had been growing increasingly unhappy with the PLO's presence in Jordan. With continual acceleration, King Hussein's troops were in conflict and clashes with Palestinian *fidā'iyyīn* whose presence had become a destabilizing force to the Jordanian king's authority. Moreover, as Palestinian resistance *fidā'iyyīn* frequently launched raids against Israel out of Jordan, the King found himself in the challenging position of needing to appear to support Palestinian resistance to the rest of the Arab world, while also protecting his country against violent Israeli reprisals in response to the Palestinian attacks being launched out of Jordan.

Ultimately, the hijackings proved to be the straw that broke that camel's back and the PLO was forced out of Jordan in 1971 in what became known as Black September. The PLO then set up their base in Beirut, Lebanon.

Following the hijackings, in what is probably the most high-profile Palestinian operation, the Palestinian Black September Organization (BSO), a disenfranchised and hardline offshoot of Fatah, attacked the Israeli Olympic team at the 1972 Munich Summer Olympic Games. BSO emerged in the wake of the PLO's expulsion from Jordan and were opposed to what they saw as Fatah's growing opposition to armed struggle and their conciliatory stance, or what some have suggested, "Arafat's desire to extract the benefits of violence [armed resistance] without the cost of openly advocating it" (Pearlman, 2011, p. 77). At the end of the Munich Summer Olympic Games attack, eleven Israelis and a German police officer had been killed, as well as 5 members of BSO. Not only did this invite fierce criticism from around the world and lead to a clandestine assassination mission by Israeli special forces inside Lebanon, it was also a contributing factor to the growing antagonism between the Lebanese government, the PLO, and the Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. In response to the events at the Munich Olympics, Israel launched Operation Spring of Youth in 1973 which assassinated two BSO commanders as well as Arafat's second-in-command, all of whom were living in Beirut. BSO acted outside of the PLO and Fatah (as seen when they seized the Saudi embassy in Khartoum), but was not entirely separate. Pearlman (2011) explains, "BSO was a safety valve for Fatah radicals who might otherwise have directed their ire at their own leadership" and "prevented these cadres from abandoning Fatah" (ibid). While the group was small in numbers and short-lived (it was dissolved by 1973 after a little more than a year), its legacy has had an immense impact on global perspectives of Palestinian resistance.

October War, or Yom Kippur War 1973

While both the Israelis and the Arabs (Syria and Egypt) claimed victory in the October War, one thing remained certain: accounts of Palestinians' (by way of the PLO) contributions to the Egyptian and Syrian war effort have largely been neglected. Moreover, regardless of who emerged the victor, save for a slight moral boost, Palestinians dire situation inside the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem remained unchanged. While the Yom Kippur War failed to improve the lives of Palestinians on the ground, the following year was a monumental one for Palestine. In 1974, the PLO was granted non-state observer status in the United Nations and received international recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by way of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236. Resolution 3236 also established Palestinians' right to self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty over a state of Palestine.

Despite the political advancements made by the PLO on the international stage during 1970s, they remained on unstable ground. While using Southern Lebanon to launch attacks into Israel, their internal politics were in turmoil, as was their relationship with their host, Lebanon. During the 1980s, factional rivalry within the PLO and elsewhere in the Palestinian resistance movement grew and there was a resurgence and emergence of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood- as well as their offshoot Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. These Islamist groups gained support in part, due to Palestinian's frustrations with corruption and the failure of the PLO in improving their situation inside the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the intention of rooting out the PLO, in what has been called by some, the Israel-PLO War. After PLO fidā'iyyīn were guaranteed the protection of Palestinian refugees and civilians, they withdrew from Beirut. However, despite the guarantee of protection,

horrific massacres of Palestinian refugees took place by Lebanese Christian militants working with Israel's IDF who were barricading off the camps so no one could escape. These massacres poured fuel on the fire of contempt between the multiple parties involved. Khalidi (2014) suggests that the death of so many Palestinian civilians in Lebanon during the war led many Palestinians inside the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem to feel a sense of futility towards armed resistance which, years later, may have led to the favourable outlook towards negotiations. As such, it could be argued that the 1982 war may have led to greater acceptance and positive public opinion for the Oslo Accords a decade later.

In addition to forcing the PLO out of Lebanon, the horrors of the Israel/Lebanon War of 1982 played an additional and lesser known role in shaping resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; it led to the establishment of Yesh Gvul, an Israeli organization founded on selective refusal to serve in the IDF. While Yesh Gvul did not engage in joint resistance with Palestinians, the organization nevertheless was the first in a succession of Israeli 'refusenik' groups, the more radical of which began to participate in joint nonviolent resistance alongside Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

First Intifada 1987

As conditions in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem gradually worsened, sometime in the mid 1980s, the PLO began to explore the strategy of unarmed resistance. While unbeknownst to the PLO at the time, this new⁸ avenue for Palestinian resistance was to become the hallmark of the

⁸ I do not mean to suggest that unarmed resistance was "new" to Palestinians, for as long as Palestinians have been resisting colonial oppression and dispossession, it has been an aspect of their resistance. What I mean here is that the scale and coordination of such resistance was unparalleled.

First Intifada. Despite the PLO's new interest in popular resistance, they were nevertheless, caught off guard when, in December of 1987, thousands of Palestinians mobilized drawing on various forms of popular resistance and thus began the First Intifada. Events that could be classified as popular resistance (demonstrations, strikes, petitions, flying flags, etc.) jumped from 933 in 1985 to 1,358 in 1986 to 2,882 during the first year of the Intifada in 1987 (as cited in Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 135). There is great debate around whether the First Intifada can be considered 'nonviolent'. The answer lies in the way one defines nonviolent. Stone throwing was a widespread and common practice which received almost unanimous support amongst Palestinians. So much so that the First Intifada is often called the Stone Intifada or Stone Revolution (Usher, 1990). Without delving into a detailed discussion regarding the violent/nonviolent nature of the First Intifada, suffice it to say, it was predominantly unarmed and grassroots. The unique, grassroots, and seemingly spontaneous nature of the First Intifada has fascinated researchers and is the most studied of all Palestinian uprisings and resistance (King, 2007; Robinson, 1997; Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 134).

While it is difficult to pinpoint with certainty the exact trigger of the First Intifada, many cite the running over of four Palestinians by an Israeli army truck in Jabalya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip as the catalyst for the mobilization of thousands of unarmed Palestinians (Mall Dibiasi, 2015, p. 670). Targeting the social sources of Israeli power, the frustrated Palestinian population committed en-masse to boycotts, strikes, and other direct civil acts of resistance. They did so while leaning on the services and support provided by the fabric of grassroots alternative structures and institutions that had been woven throughout Palestinian society during the previous decades (from late 1970s to late 1980s). This social fabric bolstered community self-reliance and thus lay the groundwork for resistance during the First Intifada. Recounting this era today, Palestinians will tell you that all sectors of society participated, regardless of gender, class, religion, or age.

Grandmothers would throw stones, children would wave flags, whole villages would participate in tax strikes (the most famous of which was in Beit Sahour in 1989). The First Intifada was inspired by, and remembered for, ideals central to the Palestinian national struggle such as “solidarity and the principles of kinship, cohesion, and self-sacrifice” (Allen 2013, p. 69). Resistance during the First Intifada consisted not only of disobedience, demonstrations, boycotting Israeli goods, and strikes, but further entrenched Palestinian’s reliance on alternative grassroots institutions and services. Resistance, therefore, was two-fold: administering the provision of essential and basic services and coordinated resistance activities; “by working on the former, Palestinians would also be struggling for the latter” (Dajani, 1995, p. 46). The goal of such an approach was to “create a counter-authority to that of the Israeli occupiers, thereby undermining the Israeli capacity to command obedience” (Rigby, 2010, p. 39).

The mass mobilization, network of informal institutions, and community support infamous of the First Intifada were possible only as a result of decades of women’s activism and community organizing in Palestine. As such, women’s involvement in the First Intifada has been the subject of a rich collection of literature (Abdo, 1991; Peteet, 1991; Sharoni, 1995). Some such as Usher (1992) have argued that overall, women’s involvement has been “an experience of empowerment” (p. 39). On the other hand, while women’s robust involvement in the First Intifada may, at first blush, appear “to be an inspiring model of female inclusion in and positive contribution to an anti-colonial movement” (Holt, 2003, p. 224), in fact, as Holt’s research demonstrates, “If one delves below the surface... a number of inconsistencies begin to emerge” (ibid). For example, a central figure coming out of the First Intifada was that of a ‘Um al-Shaheed’ (Mother of the Martyr); the resilient middle-aged Palestinian women, bravely protecting her family, as well as the wider Palestinian community. Despite this heroic and powerful image, it is nevertheless couched in an

essentialized view of women's contribution and role of a mother and does little to challenge the underlying patriarchal structure of society (Holt, 2003, p. 231). In this sense, motherhood was understood to be essential for the 'survival of culture and national identity' (Abdo, 1991, p. 27). During this period of time, Palestinian women's struggle for emancipation was inseparable from their struggle for national liberation. Authors such as Abdo (1991) however, offer important insight around the lasting impact of mass participation of Palestinian women in the First Intifada and their congruent social-cultural struggle against the traditional Palestinian patriarchal structure (p. 22). Despite women's active involvement and contributions to various facets of resistance during the First Intifada Abdo argues, the patriarchal leadership structures had a tendency to reduce this involvement to 'motherhood equals nationhood' and as a result, women's struggle for emancipation was, in part, subsumed by their national struggle, and their national struggle, subsumed by their gender roles. This androcentric discourse and subsequent essentialist framing of women, despite rhetorically praising their strength and participation, in fact, relegated women's activism and involvement in resistance to symbolic auxiliary status (Holt, 2003; Jamal, 2001).

What began as a spontaneous grassroots uprising, shifted—at least in part—to a more centralized structure consisting of local neighborhood 'popular committees', the newly formed United National Leadership of the Intifada, and the PLO. Resistance activities at this time were steered through leaflets and directives which were issued through a command network between these three bodies. These leaflets informed communities of strikes days, organized resistance activities, boycotting instructions, and general information pertaining to the uprising. In 1988, a leaflet was distributed calling specifically on Palestinian women to "continue confronting soldiers and settlers" (Peteet, 1994, p. 42). Authors such as Pearlman (2011), have argued that the high level of cohesion between women and men, different community, parties, social classes, religions, and

groups members, and importantly within the PLO, was the leading factor that unarmed and nonviolent resistance presided over the First Intifada.

While resistance during this era was predominantly unarmed, the Israeli response was not. In his now infamous policy, then-defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin implemented the ‘broken bones’ policy, ordering security forces to break the limbs of Palestinians resisting; even if they were resisting by drawing graffiti on the side of a building, waving the Palestinian national flag (which was punishable by up to 5 years in prison), or throwing a stone. While experiences of violence by the hands of their occupiers was by no means a new phenomenon for Palestinians, in fact, “beatings have been a part of the apparatus of domination since the beginning of the occupation” (Peteet, 1994, p. 36), it was the frequency and severity during this period which is of note. Palestinian experiences of violence were so widespread that, in her study of ritualized inscriptions of bodily violence experiences by Palestinian male youth during the First Intifada, Peteet (1994) argues, beatings and detention came to be framed as critical rites of passages into adulthood for young men.

While the First Intifada did not succeed in convincing the Israeli Government to lift the occupation, it did succeed in convincing an increasing number of Israeli citizens of the legitimacy of the Palestinians struggle to end the occupation. In 1988 for example, the Israeli group Peace Now mobilized 50,000 to 80,000 Israelis to protest the government’s response to the First Intifada. Initially led by Israeli women’s groups, the First Intifada saw the emergence of joint Israeli/Palestinian unarmed/nonviolent resistance (also called nonviolent direct action), a trend that continued into the 2000s. A large part of this joint resistance was predicated on the assumption that Palestinians were less likely to face violence at the hands of Israeli soldiers when they were

engaging in unarmed resistance if there were Israelis (or international activists) there to bear witness. Therefore, Israelis would travel to the West Bank to demonstrate and protest the building of the wall (this came later after Israel began building the wall in 2002), observe checkpoints, dismantle roadblocks, and assist Palestinians in their olives harvest, “to guarantee the safety of the Palestinians against attacks from the settlers and the army while they harvest their olive crop” (as cited in Fleischmann, 2019, p. 54). Along the spectrum of joint Israeli/Palestinian resistance activism during this area, was the proliferation of ‘people-to-people’, Israeli-Palestinian civil-society cooperation efforts, or joint spaces. Based on the logic of mutual recognition, Israelis and Palestinians would jointly participate in ‘peacebuilding’ through dialogue, various support groups, and joint activism. Herzon & Hai (2005) estimated that between September 1993 and October 2000 there were about 500 people-to-people projects involving over 100 organisations and a total budget of \$20-30 million (p. 13).

It was also during the First Intifada that the international solidarity movement became an active player in Palestinian unarmed resistance. Established in 1988, the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement between People (PCR) was one of the earliest organizations specifically articulating the desire for international activists to partake in resistance activities. With the goal of “bridge[ing] the gap between Palestinians and peoples from all around the world, informing the public about the reality in Palestine, and empowering the community through nonviolent direct action” (PCR, n.d), PCR organized countless events over the ensuing decade. PCR then led to the establishment of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) during the early years of the Second Intifada in 2001. ISM is “a Palestinian-led movement committed to resisting the long-entrenched and systematic oppression and dispossession of the Palestinian population, using non-violent, direct-action methods and principles” (ISM, n.d) and remains active in nonviolent resistance today.

In response to the violent policies of the Israeli Government during the First Intifada, the Israeli human rights groups B'tselem (the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories) was established in 1989 to document and publicize Israeli abuses and oppression. The organization remains active today and provides important data which is used in human rights reports in the region such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. According to B'tselem's website, during the First Intifada, 1,204 Palestinians and 179 Israelis were killed (this number includes soldiers). While the First Intifada was predominantly unarmed, it has been argued that the use of force by Israel against Palestinian civilians and resisters led a generation of Palestinians to believe that unarmed and/or nonviolent tactics of popular resistance do not lead to the desired response which was freedom from colonial occupation. Instead, the First Intifada demonstrated that unarmed and nonviolent resistance leads to 'broken bones', violence, and further oppression. As a result, some Palestinians came to the conclusion that armed resistance was unavoidable. This proved to be a dangerous lesson for both Israelis and Palestinians as seen during the Second Intifada.

Fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf Crisis

As part of their Cold War strategy, the Soviets saw the Palestinian resistance movement as a proxy to fight the expansion of US diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East (by way of its ally Israel) and to thwart the establishment and expansion of US and Western spheres of influence in the region. Up until the 1967 Six Day War, Soviet support to the Palestinian resistance movements was primarily limited to minimal political support in the international arena (Ginat & Bar-Noi, 2007, p. 265). However, following the Six-Day War, their support for Palestine's national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle intensified. During its height in the 1970s-80s, Soviet policymakers provided the PLO with arms and training. While the Soviets did not officially

recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people until 1978, the PLO opened an office in Moscow in 1976 in order to process military aid and organize military training (ibid, p. 269). While support for Palestinian resistance from the Soviet Union's persisted, at least in part, until its fall, following the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Union in 1985, the nature of this support began to wane. Striking a different tone than his predecessor related to Palestinians means of resistance, Gorbachev urged Arafat, and thus the PLO, to normalize relations with Israel. The strained relationship between Gorbachev and the PLO reached a low following the Gulf Crisis in 1990. Arafat's endorsement of Saddam Hussein in the 1990 Gulf Crisis not only led Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to cut their financial and diplomatic support for the PLO, but also distanced the PLO from the Soviets response to the conflict. This served to further drive the wedge that had been developing since 1985 between the two former allies. The reverberations of this weakening relationship could be felt inside Palestine through the reduction of funding to the PLO, as well as internationally where, in the words of Brynen (2019),

While still declaring that Palestinian national rights must be addressed [the Soviet Union] had in practice abandoned its commitment to an international peace conference under U.N. auspices, muted its past insistence on Palestinian statehood to the point of inaudibility, and was prepared to acquiesce in the marginalization of the representative role of the PLO (p. 172).

The growing rift between the PLO and Soviet Union following the Gulf crisis in 1990 lessened the blow when, a year later, the Soviet Union fell in 1991 and any support that remained up to that point, evaporated. In Palestine, the fall of the Soviet Union left left-leaning political groups in the Palestinian resistance movement, "stranded without material support, ideological base, or political focus" (Browsers, 2004 as cited in Allen, 2013, p. 91). The PLO's ensuing economic crisis, a consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union, combined with the reduction of financial and political support from the Saudis and Kuwaitis in response to Arafat's stance vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein,

contributed to a weakening of Arafat's influence amongst Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem as well as capabilities of the resistance movement. It was from this weakened position that the PLO entered into secret political negotiations with Israel.

This loss of revenue, a local leadership vacuum resulting from mass incarceration of leaders from both armed and unarmed resistance, competition and division amongst different groups, and general fatigue led to the decline of the First Intifada. While the resistance was internally exhausted and fragmented, it had succeeded in ushering in a new era, that of political negotiations. In 1991, the US-Soviet Madrid Conference brought Israel and the PLO together for the first time since 1949. While the outcome of the conference in terms of political and practical accomplishments was dismal, it did lay the groundwork for secret talks in Norway which led to the successful signing of the Oslo I Accord (or the joint Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements) in 1993. This also marked the official end of the First Intifada. With the Intifada brought to a close, hopes turned to the political process. As Qumsiyeh (2011) notes, “many hoped that the political process would be able to harvest more than token fruits from the rich tree fertilized by the extraordinary sacrifices and struggles of 1987–91” (p. 162).

Oslo 1993-1995

1993-1995 are often referred to as the ‘Oslo years’. Beginning with the historic handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin on the lawn of the White House, the Oslo years ushered in a new era for Palestinians with drastic changes to the ideology of the PLO, their function, behaviours, and notably, their resistance tactics. Oslo outlined the plan to implement a two-state solution to the protracted conflict in which a Palestinian state would eventually exist in the West Bank and Gaza, alongside an Israeli state. Although the Oslo Accords never *explicitly* articulate a

commitment to building a Palestinian state, “forms of statehood were the goal implicit in the negotiations” (Turner, 2012, p. 497). With both sides of the conflict recognizing each other’s right to exist, Israel promising to withdraw from territory it had occupied since 1967, and Arafat’s renouncement of armed resistance and return to Palestine to establish the Palestinian Authority (PA), for many Palestinians, the Oslo years presented hope, something that had been hard to come by over the previous 45 years since the creation of the State of Israel. The hope and optimism felt by many Palestinians was also shared by many in the international community where substantial increases of official development assistance (ODA) and aid flowed to the newly formed PA. In fact, levels of aid disbursed “were the highest anywhere in the world in the 1990s, far outstripping the response to humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Rwanda” (Wake, 2008, p. 109-110).

After the signing of Oslo I in 1993, the PLO moved their headquarters from Tunis to Gaza and set up the PA in 1994. While the PA was given limited authority over civil administration in the West Bank, they were not given authority over the land. This same year, PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres are jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their part in the signing of the Oslo Accord. Oslo I was followed by the Oslo II Agreement in 1995 which led to a territorial transformation of the West Bank into “a patchwork of different zones of governance” (Mall Dibiasi, 2015, p. 676) by splitting it into Area A, B, and C all with varying degrees of Israeli and Palestinian control. Oslo II laid out Palestinian self-rule over Area A of the West Bank (about 18% of the West Bank), shared control over Area B (about 22% of the West Bank), and Israeli control over Area C (about 62% of the West Bank). Five years later, the resulting territorial transformation of the West Bank into these different zones was to play a detrimental role in shaping the tactics and nature of resistance during the Second Intifada; yielding a much more violent and militarized uprising.

A particularly damaging policy coming out of the Oslo Accords which has had a devastating impact on Palestinian resistance was that of security cooperation between the PA forces and the Israeli military. Tartir (2015) explains, security cooperation targeted resistance, “first to tame it, and then to criminalize it” (p. 486). As a result, many inside Palestine began to perceive security cooperation as a form of national betrayal by their own leaders and subsequently accused the PA of operating as another arm of Israeli military and intelligence forces. While this sentiment was held by some more critical of Oslo Accords at the time, over the years, it has become the overwhelming feeling amongst Palestinians today. In short, security cooperation has, and continues to, consolidate Israel’s military advantage (Abrahams, 2020); it has led to the delegitimization of Palestinian security forces in the eyes of Palestinians thus contributing to the further fragmentation of the population and the death of national unity; which has ultimately extinguished any widely supported and meaningful resistance movement or national liberation struggle.

Of importance for the resistance movement, the Oslo Accords formalized a strategy in which Palestinian and Israeli citizens were encouraged to come together in various people-to-people dialogue programs and projects in the hopes of “creating the necessary conditions for a sustainable peace” (Hirschfeld & Roling, 2000, p. 23). As NGOs, donors, and the international community became more active in promoting and funding these dialogue and people-to-people programs and projects, they began to adopt the language of ‘nonviolence’. In so doing, nonviolence took on a new meaning no longer tethered to the legacy of the mass mobilization of Palestinians resisting during the First Intifada and instead, began to be associated with joint Israel/International/Palestinian projects, international activists holding ‘trainings’ and conferences, and elite English speaking events. While it took place over the course of years, “the

resultant reframing of nonviolence [as joint Israeli/Palestinian programs] caused many Palestinians to view nonviolence as a form of accommodation rather than activism... the Oslo effect redefined nonviolence in such a way as to disassociate it from resistance” (Norman, 2015, p. 38). The consequences of this process become increasingly apparent in the years the come.

While the Oslo years may have initially provided a glimmer of hope for many Palestinians, the victorious energy and optimism was not shared by all. The month following the signing of Oslo II, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish Israeli extremist. In hindsight, Rabin’s assassination may have sounded the death knell for the Oslo Accords. While Oslo I (the Interim Agreement) had set out a path for the transfer of power and land from Israel to the PA, progress had been dismal and the breakdown of talks between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in early 2000s further disheartening for the many who had put faith in the political process. While many had indeed put faith in the political process, demonstrating impressive precognition, other more critical voices at the time warned of Oslo’s inherent shortcomings and argued that the Accords would not lead to Palestinian independence and instead would intensify Palestinian dispossession and oppression (de Jong & Aaronson, 2001; Roy, 2007).

One thing was for certain; Oslo sharpened divisions between Palestinians. In the lead up to Oslo, Hamas became an important political player and began to challenge the PLOs position as the ‘sole representative of the Palestinian people’. Inside Palestine, Hamas, along with Islamic Jihad, were the main opposition to Oslo and maintained popular support from those who felt Oslo was a capitulation and deviation from their struggle for national liberation. As Kristianasen (1999) puts it, “at the time of the signing of the Oslo accords, Hamas set itself up as the champion of resistance to Arafat’s ‘sell-out of Palestine’ through jihad” (p. 22). With Hamas positioning itself against

Arafat's Oslo peace process, it wasn't until the peace talks in the early 1990s that "the representational authority of the PLO" came into dispute (Dajani, 1995, p. 41). Tension between the PA and Hamas continue unabated into the post-Oslo years.

Post-Oslo Era

The tension between Hamas and the PA became particularly apparent in their use of resistance tactics. In signing the Oslo Accords, Arafat had committed the PA to quelling resistance and even acts of nonviolent, popular, or civil resistance in the post-Oslo era were responded to swiftly by both the PA and the Israeli authorities (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 166-167). During the post-Oslo years, the "PA emerged as the institutional embodiment of the Oslo process" (Dana, 2019, p. 69). With the PA committed to security cooperation, state-building, and the principles outlined in Oslo, Hamas turned to armed resistance. Positioning itself as the "political-militant challenger" to both Fatah and the peace process, it became "the 'radical flank' of the Palestinian national movement" (Abrahams, 2020, p. 895). Summing up the PA's approach at the time, Meari (2018) explains that the post-Oslo era was "characterized by the transformation of the Palestinian struggle from a revolutionary anti-colonial liberation struggle into a state-building project bound by legal and administrative liberal logic and neoliberal economic and political rationality" (p. 50). And while public opinion was in favor of the peace process and subsequent state-building project in the early days of the Oslo era, as tangible improvements in the lives of Palestinians were hard to come by in the post-Oslo era, public opinion turned from optimism to skepticism (Abrahams, 2020).

With this shift, came an ideological shift via-a-vis resistance tactics. Evidence of this became clear in the years to come as first Hamas, and then Fatah turned to armed resistance. The ideological rift between the PA and Hamas however, came close to civil war in 1994 and then again in 1995.

While never erupting in civil war, the divisions between Hamas and the PA were made worse by allegations of corruption, a bloated bureaucracy, and the PA's police treatment of fellow Palestinian prisoners. Moreover, this rift was fueled for years to come by external actors such as the US and the EU who actively worked to disempower Hamas by further arming and funding Fatah (ibid). In her detailed historical account of armed and unarmed resistance in Palestine as well as South Africa and Northern Ireland, Pearlman (2011) argues that fragmentation within a movement increases the likelihood that the movement will employ violent protest because, "various forms of competition along the movement's vertical and horizontal cleavages feed escalation" and thus play an "irreducible role in encouraging violence" (p. 219). The events that followed, certainly support this theory. With national unity at an all-time low, deep resentment building towards the fruitless political process, and a generally worsening situation in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, the milieu was ripe for another shake up.

Second Intifada 2000

The Second Intifada, or Al-Aqsa Intifada as many in Palestine know it as, began in late September 2000 and raged on for four years before coming to an end sometime in 2005 (the exact end date is disputed). General frustrations over the failures of Camp David and Taba Peace Summits, continued Israeli settlements expansion in the West Bank, economic decline, severe leadership crisis, combined with the everyday struggle of living under an ever-crushing military occupation with no end in sight (Pearlman, 2011; Mason & Falk, 2016), were ignited with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's inflammatory visit to the third holiest site in Islam, Al-Haram Al-Sharif, or the Temple Mount. It became apparent early on that this intifada would not be like the last. What is now a commonly recited fact by Palestinians, it was reported by Haaretz that one million bullets had been fired by the IDF during the first few days of the Second Intifada (Pedatzur, 2004).

During the Second Intifada, Israel's policies of collective punishment left no family untouched. The violence however, was not one sided and the nature of the violent confrontations during the Second Intifada was deeply gendered (Johnson & Kuttub, 2001, p. 33). Far more violent than any other period of Palestinian resistance, the images of Palestinian political violence, suicide bombings inside Green Line Israel in particular, coming out of the region during the Second Intifada shocked the world. While the Second Intifada was not planned by any political force (Jamal, 2005, p. 155), unlike the First Intifada which was a spontaneous popular uprising, the Second Intifada evolved into, at least in part, "an organized militant 'uprising' led by the younger [male] and more militant elements in Palestinian organizations" (Mall Dibiasi, 2015, p. 680). As the Second Intifada began to take on more militarized and armed forms of resistance, Hamas's military wing Izzad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, along with other Palestinian armed factions such as Islamic Jihad and Fatah militants became the central actors in armed resistance.

The rise in the prominence of armed resistance during this period has many contributing factors including: the violence Palestinians had incurred while using *unarmed* resistance during the First Intifada; frustrations with the PA's "unreciprocated compromises during political negotiations... [and] failure of the PA to hold the Israeli state to its Oslo promises" (Khalili, 2007, p. 201); the ever-increasing numbers of violent Israeli settlers (Hammami & Tamari, 2001); the disillusionment arising from the failed political peace process which "increasingly resembling a façade for perpetual occupation and dispossession" (Carpenter, 2018, p. 25); and the inspiring success of Hezbollah which was attributed with the victory of forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000. As one respondent explained, "we had tried unarmed resistance in the First Intifada, we had tried political negotiations over Oslo, but nothing worked. We lost hope, all we got was more settlements, more checkpoints" (Interview by Author). Another important but often

overlooked factor contributing to the use of armed resistance highlighted by Rigby (2010) is linked to the territorial division of the West Bank into Area A, B, and C and the subsequent concomitant power configurations outlined in Oslo II. The majority of Palestinian urban centres were in Area A, and were thus under the control of the PA and outside of military incursions, were not under the control of the Israelis. Therefore, tactics used in the First Intifada such as civil disobedience and mass demonstrations were no longer effective unless they took place at checkpoints (Rigby, 2010); checkpoints which were heavily armed by soldiers. Acts of unarmed and nonviolent resistance at checkpoints were often be met with disproportional force and thus, everyday resisters would retreat, and armed groups began to take their place (*ibid*, p. 682). As acts of unarmed resistance moved to the background, armed attacks and political violence took to the foreground. Hammami & Tamari (2001) explain, “save for massive candlelight marches and funeral processions within the cities, the population at large has been left with virtually no active role in the uprising” (p. 17). Pearlman (2011) puts forth another contributing factor to this shift in tactics. She posits that it was the high degree of fragmentation and overall lack of cohesion within the PLO that was the leading cause of the Second Intifada turning to armed and violent means of resistance. This, she argues, was motivated by the PLO’s inability to establish centralized authority and institutionalized command and control which invited the formation of militant splinter groups, and competition along the PLO’s vertical and horizontal cleavages further exasperated a turn towards militancy in an attempt to seize power.

While armed resistance remained the prominent form of organized resistance during the Second Intifada, public opinion remained deeply divided and subject to the ebb and flow of support, particularly when it came to suicide bombings which were often argued by those opposed to their use, to be tantamount to political suicide. According to the Jerusalem Media and Communications

Centre, in 2001, 70% of women and 74% of men supported Palestinian military operations as a mode of resistance, and 48% of women and 52% of men approve of suicide operations (as cited in Johnson & Kuttab, 2001). One of the leading criticism of armed resistance during the Second Intifada was the resulting alienation and exclusion of women and grassroots civil society (however never entirely absent, for example, in Jan 2002 the first female suicide bomber carried out a mission in West Jerusalem), who had been deeply involved in the First Intifada (Johnson & Kuttab, 2001). During the height of the violence, public opinion polls found that 80% of respondents supported the idea of, “a large-scale Palestinian movement committed to nonviolent action against Israeli occupation” (as cited in Pearlman, 2011, p. 161). While this never materialized, what did emerge during the Second Intifada was localized unarmed resistance targeting the construction of the Israeli wall. Purportedly in response to the increase in Palestinian armed resistance inside the Green Line, Israel began the construction of the wall/Apartheid wall/barrier/security fence in 2002. Despite being deemed a violation of international law by the International Court of Justice, it spans over 700 kilometers and remains in place today. Rather than building the wall on the internationally recognized Green Line, or inside Israel, 85% the wall runs through Palestinian land, at times cutting 18 kilometres into the West bank. As a result, the wall cuts Palestinians off from their land, separating villages from one another, trapping some Palestinians either between the wall and the Green Line or on the inside of the Green Line, and at times, cutting cities such as East Jerusalem in two. Given the diverse and detrimental impact that the wall has had on Palestinians’ lives, it has been the object of a great deal of literature and research (Busbridge, 2013; Dana, 2017; Dolphin, 2006; Lagerquist, 2004; Larkin, 2014; Netti & Mansour, 2020; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2006; Tamimi, 2011). Due to illegal land confiscations and resulting territorial dislocation, as well as the social, economic, and environmental impacts of the

wall, not to mention the devastating impact on Palestinians human rights, in the midst of the Second Intifada, the building of the Israeli wall sparked a new wave of Palestinian resistance; site specific nonviolent resistance led by Popular Resistance Committees (PRCs).

Unlike the national cohesion and political mobilization during the First Intifada, rising out of the shadows of failing political negotiations, the Second Intifada was a particularly dark period for Palestinian political, social, and ideological fragmentation. In many ways, the construction of the wall contributed to the ongoing process of geographic fragmentation of Palestinian society. However, in other ways, it provided a unifying point of convergence. The Israeli wall, a beacon of separation, ironically became a “focal point for cohesive organised non-violent local protest” (Mall Dibiasi, 2015, p. 669) and resistance. Resistance against the wall became the key facet of nonviolent resistance during the Second Intifada (Rigby, 2010, p. 49). Named after the local neighbourhood ‘Popular Committees’ of the First Intifada, non-factional local resistance committees, known as PRCs, began to form in 2002 in villages affected by the construction of the wall such as Budrus, Bil’in, Ni’lin, Al-Ma’sara, and Beit Ummar, and later expanded to communities resisting the encroachment of settlement expansion and the construction of colonial infrastructure on their land such as Nabi Saleh. These committees consisted of local community members from various political groups and often times were led by men who had actively engaged in resistance during the First Intifada. Some of the PRCs were built upon pre-existing community councils or political structures in the community, while others were grassroots, lacking any formal political structure (Alazzeah, 2012, p. 21). The PRCs organized weekly Friday nonviolent protests for members of the community which were, and some continue to be, joined by Israeli groups such as Anarchists Against the Wall, as well as international solidarity activists. While the leadership of these PRCs is almost exclusively male, reminiscent of the First Intifada, the whole community

would take part in the weekly protests and the high numbers of women and children participating was often highlighted. A number of documentary films have been produced about PRCs resistance.⁹ Although PRCs have adopted the moniker ‘popular resistance’ in their name, many research participants highlighted that these committees, and the resistance they led, was not ‘popular resistance’ in the First Intifada sense. Instead, they saw this resistance as ‘village resistance’ or ‘symbolic resistance’ due to the localization of focus and goals. That is, for the most part, it was Palestinians directly and specifically impacted by the construction of the Wall or the appropriation of their land whom participated, as opposed to all Palestinians, for all of Palestine. The rise in PRCs precipitated a shift in the tactical considerations of nonviolent resistance. While the First Intifada was predominantly nonviolent and unarmed, its goals were much broader and were ideologically rooted in the ethos of Third World anti-colonial movements and revolutionary strategy; total emancipation from colonial oppression and national liberation. In short, nonviolent resistance during the First Intifada aimed to completely shift the social framework in which Palestinians were trapped. Conversely, nonviolent resistance during the Second Intifada, increasingly represented by the work of PRCs throughout the West Bank, shifted its tactical approach towards short to medium term objectives aimed at a particular goal (such as changing the route of the wall or retaining access to a spring) within the existing colonial social framework (Alazzeah, 2012, p. 17). Within these narrower goals, the PRCs have achieved demonstrable successes. For example, sustained nonviolent resistance in Budros resulted in diverting the proposed route of the wall and thus, saving the village’s agricultural land and olive trees that would have otherwise been annexed by Israel.

⁹ Examples of these documentary films are: Budrus: A Palestinian story of non-violent protest (2009); Bil’in Habibti (2006); and Five Broken Cameras (2011).

In addition to the involvement of international solidarity activists, joint Palestinian and Israeli activism and unarmed/nonviolent resistance saw a severe, yet short lived, decline during the Second Intifada (Maoz, 2004) as a result of the violence, distrust, and fear experienced on both sides. The dip in participation in joint resistance soon recovered and by the mid 2000s, more Israelis and international activists were traveling to the West Bank to resist alongside Palestinians than ever before, the majority of which participated in the weekly protests organized by PRCs. These Israelis and international activists saw themselves as, “co-resisters or solidarity activists, promoting and supporting the resistance efforts of the Palestinian activists” (Fleischmann, 2019). Further bolstering Palestinians’ struggle to end the occupation was the emergence of two important Israeli groups inspired by the horrors of the Second Intifada: Machsom Watch, an Israeli women’s organization established in 2002 that posted Israeli women at checkpoints in the West Bank in order to campaign against the occupation and to shine a light and report on human rights abuses by Israeli soldiers against Palestinians at checkpoints; and Breaking the Silence, a group established in 2004 to collect testimonies from soldiers who served in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) in order to raise awareness within Israel and the International community about the abuses of the IDF against Palestinians. Moreover, the rise of such organizations and activism dovetailed with an increase of Israeli youth refusing to serve in the OPT (Fleischmann, 2019).

From the Fall of the Intifada, to the Rise of BDS

As the Second Intifada came to a close, a new arm of resistance emerged from the collective desire of 170 Palestinian civil society actors in 2005; the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Inspired by the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, the BDS movement represented a novel form of unarmed resistance primarily using economics as well as the arts and academia as its tools to pressure Israel to: end its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands

and dismantle the wall; to recognize the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and to respect and support the right of refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194 (BDS, 2021 March 8). Building off of the increase in international solidarity activism and support which had been strengthened through resistance to the wall during the Second Intifada, the BDS movement was unique not only in its use of economic, cultural, and academic boycotts as tools of resistance, but also in the fact that its targeted area of action were predominantly outside of Palestine in the grocery stores of Europe, on music festival lineups in Tel Aviv, in the classrooms of universities in the US, and on the board of directors of major international companies. Given its nonviolent and unarmed nature, the current response of Israel and its allies such as Canada and the US to the BDS movement is surprising. While BDS's brand of resistance may be nonviolent and unarmed, it nevertheless strikes to the core of the conflict, and thus to the core of the Israeli state. BDS "revived old questions about the legitimacy of Zionism, how to justify the privileging of Jewish over non-Jewish rights, and why refugees can return to their homes in other conflicts but not in this one" (Thrall, 2015). As such, Israel has dedicated whole Government departments towards working to portray the movement as an existential threat to Israel and equated it with antisemitism. The Israeli government even passed a law that bars entry to foreigners who have publicly supported the BDS movement. The BDS movement remains an active form of resistance today with supporters inside Palestine, Israel, and around the world.

Fatah-Hamas Schism

The Second Intifada did not end on a high note for Palestinians. Following the death of Arafat in 2004, Mahmoud Abbas became the second president of Palestine in 2005. In an attempt to signal a shift in tone, shortly after coming to power, Abbas ordered that all posters of slain resistance

fighters and martyrs be removed from the streets of Ramallah (Khalili, 2007, p. 194). While the PA was brought into being with Arafat at the helm byway of the Oslo Accords, it was Abbas in fact, that was “more compatible with both the US and Israeli interests” (Dana, 2019, p. 73). This became immediately evident upon the commencement of his presidency as the rift between Fatah and Hamas was once again cleaved open with the help of the US and Israel. In 2006, Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislative elections and was called to form a government. Threatened by the prospect of Hamas forming a government, a semi-civil war that broke out between Fatah (backed by Israel and the US) and Hamas in 2007 and any hopes of a successful Fatah-Hamas unity government quickly dissolved. The semi-civil war resulted in Fatah being forced out of the Gaza Strip and Hamas taking over as the sole governing party of the Gaza Strip. Of this time, Dana (2019) writes, “with two de facto divided governments in Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian political field reached its worst level of fragmentation since the emergence of the Palestinian national movement” (p. 81). As a result of Hamas’s electoral win and takeover of Gaza, Israel imposed a land, sea, and air blockage of the enclave. The impacts of which, have been crippling for the 2 million inhabitants. The political bifurcation established in this era, as well as Israel’s land, sea, and air blockade continue today.

As the post-intifada years roll on, two deadly operations, albeit on much different scales, put Palestine, and particularly Gaza, back in the media light, shifting attention once again to the plight of Palestinians: Operation Cast Lead 2008/2009 which lead to the death of 1,398 Palestinians—the majority of which were civilians (B’tselem, 2021 March 8) and the Israeli assault on the ‘freedom flotilla’ in 2010 which led to the death of 11 Turkish activists attempting to reach Gaza with humanitarian goods.

Third Intifada or the Death of Resistance? 2015

In the fall of 2015¹⁰, there was a dramatic increase in the number of violent attacks in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Israel. Some called this upsurge in violence ‘the third intifada’, or ‘knife intifada’ after the large number of stabbings that took place in Jerusalem and elsewhere. Car attacks and shootings were also recurrent during this time. Unlike the previous two intifadas, it was clear that these attacks were carried out on an individual basis, that is, they were uncoordinated ‘lone wolf attacks’. They were also unique in the sense that, on the Palestinian side, they were carried out predominantly by young Palestinians, many of whom were minors, and many of whom had been born in the post-Oslo years. It is believed that an increase in visits by Jewish groups—particularly settlers—to Al-Aqsa Mosque, combined with despair and a lack of hope; as well as the lack of progress towards peace and independence and the absence of a way forward—be it via a peace process or a resistance movement; anger over Israel’s killing of thousands of Gazans during Operation Protective Edge in 2014; and increasing settler violence, settlement expansion and land confiscation in the West Bank, all culminated in slow burning incitement for Palestinian attackers. On the other side, during this time, some Israeli settlers carried out armed attacks, while Amnesty International reported the IDF’s use of extrajudicial killings, ‘shoot-to-kill’ policies, home demolitions and forced evictions, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture, and withholding the bodies of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces—thus obstructing autopsies to ascertain cause of death (Amnesty International, 2016).

¹⁰ While I use the fall of 2015 as the start date, many believe that this uptick in violent attacks—the potential ‘third intifada’—in fact, began in 2014 with the kidnapping and murder of 3 teenage Israeli settlers, followed by the kidnapping and burning alive of a teenage Palestinian boy in Jerusalem. These events led Israel to launch Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, which ultimately led to the death of 2,202 Palestinians, 526 of them children, and 72 Israelis, 1 of them a child (B’Tselem, 2021 March 23).

In hindsight, the unrest in 2015 did not have the endurance and organization of past uprisings and subsequently did not materialize into a third intifada. However, given the failure of any Palestinian group to harness the unrest, as well as to organize and mobilize those with energy to give towards resisting, what it did lay bare, was the lack of leadership in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. While the cause of this has its roots lie in the Oslo Era, this is lack of leadership has had a direct impact on contemporary resistance.

One area of Palestinian resistance that has not been curtailed by the crisis in Palestinian leadership has been the ongoing prevalence of resistance inside Israeli prisons in the form of hunger striking. This tactic is increasingly employed by those held under administrative detention (incarcerated without charge or trial), those protesting solitary confinement, medical neglect, access to education, and the withholding of family visits etc. Shwaikh (2020) asserts, the act of refusing food in order to achieve political objectives “invert[s] the concept of sovereignty, bringing it from the level of the nation-state to a human and personal one by reclaiming agency of the body against a power that seeks to administer it” (p. 2). While focused on specific objectives related to fighting for their basic human rights, Palestinian hunger strikers have achieved some notable successes such as improvements in their conditions as well as in some cases, their release from prison. Imprisonment, and thus hunger striking, is a deeply gendered form of resistance. Today, it is estimated that 40% of males living in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem have been imprisoned by Israel at least once in their lifetime (Bailey, 2014). Moreover, according to Addameer – Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, there are currently 4450 Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons, 32 of which are female (Addameer, April 2022). Given the overwhelming majority of prisoners are male, the image of a gaunt man, hands bound by cuffs and reduced to a wheelchair, has come to symbolize this form of resistance. Be that as it may, there

have been a number of high-profile and successful hunger strikes by female prisoners dating back to the 1970s. Shwaikh (2020) goes as far as to claim, related specifically to women's use of hunger strikes as a tool of resistance, "due to their collective coordination and organizing, women have been more effective than their male counterparts in achieving their political goals" (p. 2).

Oslo and its Discontents

If we look outside of the 'knife intifada', there has been a near eradication of armed resistance from inside the West Bank as well as any organized larger scale unarmed, nonviolent resistance. What little organized resistance that does take place, is unarmed, as well as being localized around specific sites such as Nabi Salah, Bab el Shams, Khan al-Ahmar, Tel Rumeida, etc. Resistance activities in these localized sites often have location specific goals, rather than being part of a larger coordinated and organized struggle for national liberation. This is partially due to the lack of unified leadership and the absence of a unified direction or ultimate goal of resistance. It is not however, solely a challenge of a lack of unified leadership. Darwish & Rigby (2015) suggest that the high levels of distrust and cynicism of community members towards local leadership has become a core weakness of popular resistance and has resulted in low rates of participation (p. 97-98). Gone are the days when the Palestinian people had a 'legitimate representative' in the PLO; so too are the days of any organized and coordinated resistance movement, national liberation struggle, or peace process. While nearly three decades have passed since the Oslo Accords of 1993, the social, political, and economic conditions under Israeli occupation are worse than ever (Procter, 2019, p. 20). Many have argued that despite the continuation, and worsening, of conditions in Palestine since the Oslo Accords, the policies enshrined in the Accords over the ensuing decades, led to the death of the revolutionary spirit in Palestine (Allen, 2013, p. 8), a "widespread sense of

resignation” (Darweish & Rigby, 2015, p. 98), and subsequently to the death of resistance and the national liberation struggle (Farah, 2006; Khalili, 2007; Norman, 2015). Dana (2019) posits,

The Oslo process has successfully paved the way for the current situation where the numbers of settlers in the occupied West Bank have more than doubled and Israel’s colonial control over land, resources and borders has been institutionalized without effective resistance (p. 64).

The so-called death of Palestinian resistance has many contributing factors such as: exhaustion on behalf of the population and a desire to ‘live a normal life’; an utter lack of legitimacy and trust in Palestinian politicians; desires of youth to put their energy in globalized capitalist desires rather than give their energy towards resistance; the “growing trends towards the primacy of the individual over society” (Allen, 2013, p. 87); and the NGO-ization of civil society (Darweish & Rigby, 2015) as well as the NGO-ization of resistance (more on this in Chapter 7). While dynamics such as the ones just listed came up time and again in interviews, the most common responses to questions related to why the current state of resistance is at a record low, revolved around the consequences of policies enshrined in the Oslo Accords. Top of this list was the PA’s security cooperation with Israel. Research participants explained that they felt betrayed by their own government and felt that in the absence of Palestinian political leadership, resistance was futile as there would be no one to lead their future state should their resistance be successful and the occupation ceases to exist, and they actually achieved independence and statehood. The PA’s continued security cooperation has led to tyrannical suppression of Palestinian resistance. This repression extends beyond dissent towards Israel, to dissents towards the PA as well. The PA became notorious for violently suppressing unarmed protesters protesting against PA/Israeli security cooperation, as well as protesters angry about overall PA ineffectiveness and corruption. These unarmed protesters were often beat with batons by PA security forces and are fired at with

rubber-coated bullets and teargas. Other contemporary means of resistance such as online activism has also been quelled by the PA. For example, in 2017, a new internet censorship law was passed by the PA, forbidding dissent against the PA on social media. In short, the PA itself is often cited as a contributing factor to the reduction of resistance in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The Oslo Accords contributed to the reduction of resistance in other ways as well. For many, the signing of the Accords signaled to the world the promise and inevitability of the formation of a future Palestinian state. As such, donor's priorities lay "largely in the realm of 'development' and 'democracy'" (Allen, 2013, p. 75) and were subsequently keen to be involved and contribute "millions of dollars to build states, civil society, and political 'capacity'" (Brynen, 2002, as cited in Khalili, 2007, p. 190). However, the Oslo Accords gave Israel the right to veto, intervene, supervise, and control the content, budgets, design and delivery of all development and peacebuilding activity in the region (Ibrahim & Beaudet, 2012, p. 484-485). This brings us to where we are today, where all donor funding and internationally funded civil society organizations, groups, movements, and associations are required to adopt, at least rhetorically, agendas that do not threaten the State of Israel, lest they be denied permits to operate by Israel (INGOs) or denied funding by international donors (local Palestinian NGO/CSOs).

Although the Oslo Accords never explicitly articulate a commitment to building a Palestinian state, "forms of statehood were the goal implicit in the negotiations" (Turner, 2012, p. 497). Subsequently, following the Accords, donor aid, and international assistance rose exponentially from US\$178.74 million in 1993, to US\$2.52 billion by 2010 (ibid). International aid, donor funding, financial support, as well as many international solidarity organizations operating in Palestine, enforced—both implicitly and explicitly—the Oslo Accords terms as a conditional

political framework towards the goal of statehood (Dana, 2019). Local NGOs and civil society receiving international funding therefore became conduits for this framework and discourse. Some critics argue that the infusion of international funds into civil society (as well as the PA) was a way of ‘buying consensus to Oslo’” (Allen, 2013, p. 79). And while, civil society had always been a robust and integral aspect of Palestinian society (as seen in the First Intifada), and in the 1970s and 80s, was deeply rooted in the national liberation movement (Dana, 2015, p. 192), by adopting the Oslo political framework, civil society became increasingly professionalized and depoliticized. To a certain extent, this pivoted the focus of some CSOs/NGOs away from the desires and needs of the grassroots and national liberation movement, towards the agendas of donors, and thus Israel. This has been coined, the ‘NGO-ization’ of resistance.

The TRUMPeted Cries of Oslo’s Swan Song

The 2017 American election and ensuing four-year presidency of Donald Trump has left a lasting mark on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. In addition to moving the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (an act which is illegal under international law), recognizing Israel’s illegal annexation of the Golan Heights, and ceasing funding for the United Nations Relief and Works for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), the Trump administration released its attempt at a peace plan, *Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People* in January 2020. Arguably the most “one-sided proposal for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since proposals began to be made under British colonial rule nearly a hundred years ago” (Wildeman & Swan, 2021, p. 3), *Peace to Prosperity* represented a radical departure from past US policy. By denying Palestinians the right to an independent state, awarding Israel sovereignty over the entirety of Jerusalem, denying the rights of millions of Palestinian refugees, and allowing Israel to unilaterally annex substantial parts of the West Bank, *Peace to Prosperity* undid any surviving

remanence of the Oslo framework and peace process. Partially in response to changes in US policy under Trump, (such as the US embassy move and defunding UNRWA), the largest Palestinian sustained uprising since the First Intifada emerged in March 2018 in the Gaza Strip.

Great March of Return

Trump's announcement, and eventual move, of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was met with surprisingly limited resistance in the West Bank. Living in Ramallah at the time, I was surprised by the responses of Palestinian friends, research participants, and the overall sentiment expressed by the general public across the West Bank. While angry to be sure, people across the West Bank repeatedly expressed various iterations of, "we always knew the US was not an honest broker for peace, now at least the world can see it too". In other words, they felt that Trump's official change in policy did not really alter the status quo, instead, it simply laid bare what their *de facto* policy of pro-Israel bias had been for years. In Gaza, the response was much different. Trump's egregious foreign policy shifts vis-à-vis Palestinians and the 'peace process', dovetailed with decades of mounting anger over the continued denial of Palestinian refugees' right of return, along with utter exasperation and hopelessness resulting from the ongoing suffocating blockade of Gaza. This culminated in a mass popular resistance movement in the Gaza Strip that lasted for two years, known as the Great March of Return (GMR).

Initially organized by a group of Gazan activists over social media, the GMR kicked off with an almost "festival-like" (Wispelwey & Abu Jamel, 2020, p. 180) air on Palestinian Land Day, March 30th, 2018. At specific locations along the Gazan boarder, tens of thousands of Gazans across political, age, and gender divides gathered to share food, perform dabke dance, and fly Palestinian flags, all in a collective resistance effort. Tactics such as the use of banners, stone throwing, tire

burning, attempts to breach the fence, and incendiary kites were used, as well as more symbolic forms of resistance such as tent encampments and dance performances. In a similar fashion to the First Intifada, the GMR mass mobilization rose from the grassroots, largely outside of the purview of the governing party, Hamas. However, as the movement progressed, some say “Palestinian factions rushed to endorse the march and claim some if the credit for themselves” (Abusalim, 2018, p. 98), others claim that Hamas attempted to co-opt it in order to boost its leverage over rival political party, Fatah in the West Bank (Obaid, 2018).

Over the nearly two-year course of the GMR, 214 Palestinians, including 46 children, were killed, and over 36,100, including nearly 8,800 children were injured. Over 8,000 of those injured were shot by live ammunition, including 1,500 minors and 150 women (B’Tselem 2020; OCHA, 2020). Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) and Amnesty International reported the use of ‘expanding’ ammunition used for hunting, also called butterfly bullets or Dum Dum bullets, “which expand and mushroom inside the body” (Amnesty International, 2018) with the aim of inflicting maximum carnage. UNHCR Independent Commission of Inquiry found reasonable grounds to believe that Israeli snipers intentionally shot civilians, health workers, journalists, children, and people with disabilities despite their identity clearly being visible and posing no direct harm or threat (p. 13-15). The report concluded that Israel violated international law and may have committed war crimes in their lethal response to the GMR in Gaza.

While the GMR succeeded in gaining international recognition, it did not lead to improvements in the lives of Gazans. In fact, given the initial sense of agency, hope, and optimism felt in Gaza at the beginning of the GMR, the ‘heavy burden of death, disability, and trauma suffered by protesters and family members’ (Wispelwey & Abu Jamel, 2020, p. 179), and the increasing sense of

helplessness and hopelessness resulting from the failure of the uprising to produce any meaningful victories, has further exasperated the may crises in Gaza.

2022 and Beyond

At the time of writing, one would be hard pressed to find someone who did not agree with the notion that ‘Oslo is dead’. Despite this recognition, it remains the official framework of international donors and peacebuilding efforts. In response to the Israeli government’s declared intention to annex large parts of Palestinian territory, a step laid out in *Peace to Prosperity*, in May of 2020, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declared an end to all commitments, obligations, and understandings between the PLO and PA with Israel and the US. If followed through with, this would indicate an official reneging on all Oslo related agreements, including security cooperation, thus placing all responsibilities of the provision of Palestinians needs on Israel, as an occupying power. While this is by no means the first time such threats have been made by the PA, and it is too early to tell whether any meaningful action will result from this declaration, it does offer insight into the desperate state of affairs. By reneging on the Oslo framework, Abbas would essentially be dissolving the PA, since its existence is based on agreements laid out in the Oslo Accords. What this would mean for Palestinian national liberation and resistance, could be significant. Given the current state of affairs, with fragmented leadership, geographic and territorial bifurcation, various competing interests, and a lack of grassroots mobilization, it is unlikely that the West Bank will see a renewed popular resistance movement anytime soon.

Conclusion

As the above chapter aimed to outline, Palestinian resistance has never been a monolithic movement. It has had to react to and evolve as a result of shifting political and economic ties in

the region and the world; it has waxed and waned in popular involvement and support; shifted its goals as well as its tactics and strategies depending on the political milieu, financial support, and/or ideological influence of external actors; yet, it has never ceased to exist. In the face of mounting oppression, what has remained constant, is the unwavering desire of Palestinians to live free of colonial occupation and oppression. Despite this steadfast yearning, the last 74 years of resistance has little in the way of demonstrable successes, some going as far as to say it has failed (Holt, 2003, p. 229). What does this mean for those with a deep desire to ‘do something about’ the oppression and dispossession faced by Palestinians? What does it mean for those committed to living a ‘normal life’, a life with dignity and freedom? Despite the long history of women’s involvement in resistance and the Palestinian liberation movement, men remain the public face of resistance (more on this in Chapter 10). Gendered expectations of protection and defence of one’s community, family, and nation persist despite gains in gender equality in the region. The failed resistance movement is seen in part, as a gendered failure. Men’s inability to protect and defend, and “their apparent powerlessness in the face of a militarily superior enemy has caused a crisis of masculinity” (ibid). The remainder of this dissertation will sharpen its focus to explore the unique experiences of men currently engaged in unarmed resistance in the West Bank.

CHAPTER 6- To Exist is to Resist: Motivating factors leading Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance today

Given the high price that many have paid—and continue to pay—for their involvement in resistance, understanding what motivates Palestinians to sustain their resistance efforts warrants exploration. In addressing my first research question, *What are some motivating factors leading Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance today?*, this chapter will present the first-person accounts of research participants related to their motivations for engaging in unarmed resistance in the contemporary context. As such, this chapter represents the initial stage of analysis in so far as I have summarized key themes coming out of interviews, yet little theoretical analysis is provided¹¹. Instead, I let participants' words elucidate for the reader in the form of interview excerpts and extensive quotes. With that being said, in some cases, I provide a bit of background around certain participants as well as other supporting commentary in order to contextualize participants' responses. While the degree to which participants own words are relied on in answering the research question may appear inordinate, I believe that incorporating the voices of participants to the extent possible, is invaluable for the purpose of humanizing this research and the following empirical chapters, as well as helping to introduce the readers to a bit of background on some of the research participants. In reading their own words, one is hard pressed to overlook the turbulent, fettered, variegated, and ultimately deeply human experiences of the group of Palestinians' whose stories form the foundation of this dissertation as they navigate the current social, political, and economic milieu vis-à-vis unarmed resistance.

¹¹ While my intention in this chapter has been to limit the theoretical analysis, I recognize and agree with Ferguson's (2017) assertion that by the very act of writing this chapter, my interventions are "themselves theoretical acts: I am not simply describing an activity... I am participating in that activity by engaging it" (p. 270).

As will become evident throughout this chapter, there is great diversity in motivations and drivers for engaging in unarmed resistance. Far from homogenous, these motivations are neither straightforward, nor unchanging and represent a complex interplay between social structures in the West Bank and the individual agency of my research participants. Contradictions and competing personal, national, and structural factors come together in an intricate and unique dance between structure and agency for each participant. What I have aimed to do in this chapter, is to tease out some of the imbricating themes that emerged throughout the analytical process. The material presented in the following chapter will then be picked back up and expanded upon in subsequent chapters and will form the foundation upon which the main arguments put forth in this dissertation are based.

In addressing my first research question, ‘*What are some motivating factors leading Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance today?*’, this chapter will focus on three interconnected themes: 1) a desire for justice, dignity, and equality for Palestinians; 2) a desire to gain the support of the international community in the struggle for Palestine; and 3) a desire to gain access to the notoriety, privileges, offerings, and other benefits provided by the liberal peace architecture (LPA). Each theme tells a particular part of the context needed for deeper analysis of research findings and will be elaborated on in subsequent chapters.

To begin, when exploring the motivating factors for men to engage in *unarmed* resistance, we first need to look at why they engage in resistance at all. This is where I will begin.

Why Engage in Resistance

Any conversation around why Palestinian’s resist, as well as conversations about what tactics they use and why they use them, needs to be contextualized within a milieu of a violent military

occupation and settler colonialism. While the ensuing empirical chapters are based on participant's own accounts, these accounts are obviously subjective in nature. This means that while they provide crucial insights into how participants understand their life experiences and choices, as well as how they want me to understand them, they are also situated within a context that may be normalized by the participant. The metaphor of a fish attempting to describe various experiences and choices in their life to a human, while neglecting to mention the fact that they live underwater and breath through gills comes to mind. In this case, while for Palestinians it is painfully obvious why they resist, for readers and those of us from the outside, an emphasis on the context from within which resistance arises is crucial. Therefore, to begin, Palestinian resistance is firstly made possible, and remains only possible, through the prism of the legitimization of Israeli settler colonialism and all of its subsequent forms of violence. Put simply, participants "behaviour emerges from the experience of structure" (Musolf, 2017, p. 5). There is no Palestinian resistance, whatever the form, without Israeli settler colonialism, occupation, and blockade. At the risk of overstating the obvious, to begin this conversation in any other way would be to perpetuate some of the very phenomenon related to framing and discourse that this dissertation aims to explore and hopefully illuminate. That being said, as we will see in the following chapter, the omnipresent power of structure, social forces, colonial practices etc., "does not determine individuals" (ibid). That is to say, they are not powerless pawns simply existing within a powerful super-structure. Individuals "possess consciousness, intentionality, and meaning, in short, agency" (ibid, p. 6). It is here, in the messy space between structure and agency that we begin.

We are born into a context that creates resistance: resistance is a reaction, not an action

The question, 'why engage in resistance?' elicits responses highlighting the reactionary nature of resistance given the context of oppression, "our situation is the source of our resistance... The

amount of pain people are going through, this motivates them to fight for the land” (Abu Mohammed, Bil’in) explained. Their situation is that of an omnipresent occupation, a reality that is perceived by participants from a young age.

From the day we first opened our eyes they [Israelis] were in front of our faces. They are there, so it forces you to do something. I was born in 1992, when I became aware in 2000, I was about 8. I became aware of the problems and things happening, like the occupation invading the camp I live in. The first things I was aware of were these things. So immediately, I indulged in this thing [resistance]. The other kids used to go play, but we used to go play to see the soldiers, gather their leftover bullets, gather the tear gas bombs and things like that, take part in funerals of martyrs that died, all of these things implemented the soul of resistance in us and we started taking part in things like that (Male Interview, Dheisheh Camp).

To say that the contemporary context in the West Bank is one of ‘occupation’, does little to accurately portray the deeply entrenched matrix of Israeli control over the lives of Palestinians and the institutionalized and systematic human rights abuses occurring on a daily basis. This is important to account for because of the direct correlation participants draw between their interface with the occupation as a child, and their involvement in resistance today. In other words, it is not so much that they grew up under ‘an occupation’ that drives them to resistance. Rather, it is the type of occupation, the unique nature of the Israeli occupation that they grew up under that did. During their lifetime, many of my research participants witnessed a number of significant and monumental events—many of which were outlined in Chapter 5: Contextual Briefing—such as: the occupation of their historic homeland and the dividing up of the West Bank into Area A, B, and C; the establishment and expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the subsequent transfer of half a million Israelis settlers into the West Bank; the building of the separation wall; the destruction and elimination of numerous Palestinian villages; the confiscation of thousands of dunams of land; two intifadas which resulted in the death of thousands of civilians;

economic collapse; innumerable home demolitions; and the erosion of freedom of movement. Exposure to these structural and material consequences of the occupation play a significant role in children growing up with their identities deeply intertwined with the occupation and subsequent oppression. A participant from Jenin Refugee Camp eloquently laid out his thoughts,

For me and many like me, young people do not choose their life and do not have the luxury to think about what they want to become. When I look back at my life, there is a stark reality and understanding that it has not been my choice. After being in prison, I was unable to work, study or move easily and all because of my situation; where I was born and who I am – a Palestinian refugee in occupied land. My story is not unlike thousands of others. Old and young, Muslims, Arabs, our only fault is to be born here. If you are born during the intifada, you carry a stone, wear the kuffiyeh, protest and do what everyone else does. If you don't, you are not really a Palestinian. To be a British person, you will go to school, go to college and then go to university and if you don't, you are not really British. In Brazil, you will learn the samba and speak Portuguese. If you don't, your Brazilian identity is questioned. We become who we are, from where we are born. If I am born here, what am I expected to become? Am I given a different chance or told that another life exists? No! If I am thrown in the sea, am I expected not to get wet? No! My Palestinian identity is forever intertwined with the occupation, with oppression and with my refugee status (Male Interview, Jenin Camp).

Drawing on the theme of being born into a context that necessitates resistance, Amjad's reflections are insightful. Amjad spent 15 years in prison after being arrested for this participation in armed resistance during the First Intifada. He was the only surviving member of a group of three Palestinian prisoners who escaped from the infamous Israeli Ofer Prison by digging a 13-meter-long tunnel with a spoon. After his escape, he lived as a fugitive in the hills surrounding Ramallah for 7 months before being captured and sentenced to an additional 16 years in prison. During our conversation, a month after his release, Amjad recounted that as a young boy growing up in Kafr Ni'ma, his motivation for getting involved in resistance was tied to the location of the community he was born in,

When I was young, I was not bothering anyone. I did not do anything bad to anyone. I did not steal anything or kill anyone. I did not hate people. My land was taken, my friends were killed and I am just human. The Israeli soldiers entered our home, we have no privacy in our home. All of these things make me want to resist. In front of my family's house, there is a settler's house surrounded by gates and fences and a big sign. I used to ask my mother when I was a kid, 'what is that?' She would say, 'it is the Jewish'. I would ask her, 'are they soldiers?' She told me, 'no'. I didn't understand why they were there. So, for me, the first motivation for resistance was the fact that I grew up in front of a settlement and had many questions about it... It is natural for humans to react to this pressure, even as a child I wanted to do something about everything I was seeing (Amjad, Kafr Ni'ma).

Likewise, a participant from the South Hebron Hills reflected,

We were born with the settlements in our faces. We were born going out with the sheep every day and getting chased by the settlers and getting attacked by them; our parents, our grandmothers and our grandfathers. This has been our life as long as we have known it. The occupation is not just about what it does to us as an individual, this is from our grandfather's era (Youth of Sumud, Group Interview, South Hebron Hills).

While contemporary hardships of living under occupation are plentiful, historical moments and events prior to participants' lifetime or prior to their political consciousness remain core to their sense of identity today, as seen in the above quote. The memorialization of these moments and events hold an important position in family narratives and subsequently remain tied to participant's understanding of their present. When speaking about the connection between living under occupation and their engagement in resistance, participants do not distinguish between present-day hardships and the legacy of historical moments such as the Nakba (1948) and the Naksa (1967). While the loss of homeland may form the backdrop, the loss and subsequent oppression is ever-evolving and remains ongoing and alive today. Therefore, it is not merely growing up under occupation that leads to their commitment to resistance, but a combination of the contemporary *and* historical ramifications of the Israeli settler colonial project.

I was born in 1973, I grew up in the occupation. When I was 10 years old, I was thinking about protests and resistance. I was thinking about the conflict, the occupation. I wanted to protest... We were so young. But even though we were young, we had seen so much. By that time, I had seen the army come and arrest my Father countless times, sometimes for a day, a week, sometimes longer. So, I was born into a family that I had to see these problems. I grew up hearing my parents' and grandparents' stories about Beersheba, being forced to leave in 1948. They used to always talk to us about the war in '48 and '67. How they had to run away from Beersheba. How they had to run to Jordan and then come back and settle in Jericho. They told stories about how they had to cross the Jordan river. These stories, I grew with them. It really became part of me and my life, my daily life, and my history (Ahmad, Jericho).

In this sense, we see how research participants history, and the history of their family, is embedded in their present. Or, as Das (2007) suggest, "violent memory is buried in everyday life" (p. 11). In so far as their present is marked by the stories of their past, recounting these stories functions not only as the foundation to their identity, but as pillars upon which they reaffirm and evolve this identity. Further connecting contemporary hardships with historical events, a participant currently living in Dheisheh Refugee Camp explained, "We are born and raised on these things and we've seen so many things, this pushed us to always be in the front row in clashes with the occupation and to resist them wherever they are." This statement was prefaced with an explanation that he was born into a "history of our ancestors that were displaced in 1948". He went on to explain this history,

I'm from a village called Ajoor around Hebron, my ancestors were kicked out of it. What I know, I have been told by my grandparents and these things were my main motivation, it is the main thing in everything we do. Also, I am living in a camp, we have many hardships in the camp. What I saw: people dying, kids dying, women dying, Gaza being bombed, Jenin massacre. I read about these things as I grew up. (Male Interview, Dheisheh Refugee Camp).

As the above quotes have illustrated, participants understand their choice to engage in resistance as somewhat of a compulsion, a reaction or a product of their contemporary and historical environment. As such, the popular adage, 'resistance is a *reaction*, not an *action*' was woven

throughout interviews, “Resistance is a reaction. The action of the Israelis leads to the reaction of the Palestinians” (Yacoub, Hebron).

As participants highlight, growing up under occupation, seeing settlements, soldiers, checkpoints, violence, and protests everywhere they turn, combined with knowledge of the historical suffering of their families and communities, compound to motivate them to resist. They describe it as a reaction to their surroundings. As a necessary part of their identity. As they have never experienced ‘pre-conflict’, their choice to engage in resistance is not framed as engaging in the conflict. Rather, it is framed as an inevitable reaction to their surroundings, their identity as Palestinians, their history, and their survival. For my research participants, there is no other history, there is no other option. The occupation is omnipresent both in terms of the current reality, as well as in relation to the formation of their worldview and identity. While the occupation may create the context and the structure, participants desire for dignity and human rights underpin much of their motivation.

In Search of Dignity: Resistance as Empowerment, Resistance as Resilience

Deeply rooted in the human desire to live with dignity and free of oppression, for some participants, continuing to resist is integral to continuing to live. Resistance offers an avenue for empowerment and resilience,

I believe that as long as you resist, you don't fail. The enemy doesn't succeed in breaking you. I still resist and therefore I still exist. As long as you are resisting, you have not been crushed. We may not have won, but we are on the road to success (Yousif, Beit Jala).

Rani, a participant from Bil'in, engages in resistance as a means of remaining free, as a tool of empowerment. Rani is a quadriplegic. He was shot in the neck by an Israeli soldier while participating in a nonviolent protest in the centre of Ramallah at age 19. He has use of his left

arm/hand only. While stressing the danger involved in resistance, in the below quote, Rani lays out how the act of resistance in and of itself is empowering, it highlights Palestinian's agency, it is a means of reclaiming one's power and retaining one's dignity. It is a channel to freedom, while living in a profoundly 'unfree' environment.

Emma, freedom has a price. This is the price I paid for freedom [using his eyes and facial expression to gesture to his wheelchair and motionless body]. When we are fighting, we feel free. I made the choice, I am fighting for our freedom, so I feel free. While others are sitting in their houses doing whatever, I am fighting for our freedom. You feel free when you resist. You take your power back. This is our choice. We have to ask ourselves every day, are we ready to pay the price for our freedom? We know what the price is. It is being shot, being in a wheelchair, in jail, dead. These are the choices if we want to be free (Rani, Bil'in).

Another participant disclosed that he engages in resistance as a means of countering the humiliating tactics of the occupation such as restricting Palestinians' movement, demolishing their homes, dispossessing them of their natural and material resources, etc.

The Israelis use our goods [land and resources]. We need to take this back. We need respect and dignity. The Israelis are so happy if they stop us in the checkpoint for hours. This is our dignity they are hurting, but I refuse it. I want to pass freely. I want to see my friends in Ramla, Lod, Jaffa, Jerusalem without checkpoints, without blockades! I want to pray in Jerusalem and not ask permission, freely! I want to build my home and know it will stay there. So many people they pour all of their life savings into building a home and in one minute the Israelis destroy it (Abdullah, Bil'in).

In reaction to what he felt was an assault to his dignity, Abdulfattah explained that he is motivated to engage in resistance in order to fight dehumanization, injustice, and hatred.

People here, we resist to keep ourselves human. People are resisting against oppression because they are resisting against dehumanization. I believe if you have even a bit of hatred in your heart, you are losing part of your humanity. I don't know what hatred is, I have a lot of anger, but again, you shouldn't confuse anger with hatred. A lot of people have anger because they cannot tolerate injustice and oppression. Again, it's about what we make with this anger. I call

our resistance ‘beautiful resistance’. It was criticized because of the name, beautiful resistance. They say, ‘how dare you call the resistance beautiful, are you calling the other resistance ugly?’ No! There is no ugly resistance for me, because when you resist you defend something just, and right. So, this is a beautiful act, and whether it is armed or unarmed, whether I agree or don’t agree with it, it is a beautiful act of humanity (Abdulfattah, Aida Camp).

In this quote, Abdulfattah speaks about the anger that results from living with injustice and oppression. The fact that his anger motivates him to engage in resistance, he posits, is a ‘beautiful act of humanity’. In the opening of this quote, Abdulfattah proclaims, ‘we resist to keep ourselves human’. The notion of ‘remaining human’ can be understood as a means of countering the dehumanizing effects of living under Occupation. As part of countering dehumanization, participants commonly asserted the fact that they were ‘just human’, that they wanted to ‘live like other human beings’. That is to say, there is nothing remarkable about them, or their goals.

Live like Other Human Beings in the World

Connected to their feelings of dehumanization, when speaking about their motivation for engaging in resistance, participants expressed a desire to ‘live a life like everyone else’ as a leading motivator. “Resistance is the journey of searching for life, freedom, we want to live just like the other human beings” (Abu Mohammed, Bil’in). Through similar statements, participants explain that their motivations to resist are driven by a sense of injustice. They stress the fact that there is nothing extraordinary about them, they are human beings, wanting to live like other human beings. Being robbed of basic human experiences, rights, and opportunities since childhood, feeds these feelings. Osama explained,

I’m fighting for myself, I want to be able to go visit my grandmother in Jerusalem and stay in her house, just like anyone in this world would want. She’s living here, 24km away from me, and I was forbidden to go there for 14 years, forbidden to visit my grandmother, to see her! I was forbidden to go where I used to play as a kid, I was forbidden to live as a child. They kidnapped my

childhood from me, they took it away from me and sometimes today I'm trying to relive it... So I am a freedom *fidā'yyīn* and my freedom does not come easy. It is not found in a state, a flag, it is to be free. Me and my people. To be free to go wherever we want. To live like a human being, like other people everywhere in this world; to raise my children in a normal place, a normal community, a normal city where they don't grow up with so much fear (Osama, Jericho).

Highlighting again, the feeling that resistance is a human reaction, and is tied to the human desire to live with freedom and human rights, a participant from Tulkarm shared,

Resistance means, I am a person born under the occupation and have been denied my rights. I ask myself and ask my family 'why am I living in this situation?' 'Why am I different than other people in the world and our Israeli neighbors?' 'Why don't I get my rights like they do?' I know the occupation is to blame for this. This leads me to search in my head for ways to stop the occupation and I find that resistance is the best way to end the occupation and bring freedom. Resistance for me is human reaction. It is connected to my humanity. I am not in resistance because I want to kill people, it is not my goal, not my aim. My aim is to bring freedom, my aim is to live like the other people in the world. Not to kill. Resistance for me, is humanity, it's freedom (Nour, Tulkarm).

Ayed, the founder of the Palestinian Popular Committees Against the Wall and Settlements, feels that in Palestinians' struggle to be granted, 'normal rights like everyone else in the world', the international community can play an integral role in convincing Israel to respect Palestinians rights.

We need the power of small children in France to find a way to help us. For example, if he boycotts Israeli goods, he has found his way to help us. Not because we want to punish the Israeli people, but because we want to force them to believe that we are people, normal people, we need normal rights like everyone else in the world (Ayed, Budros).

Building on Ayed's suggestion to engage 'small children in France' to pressure Israel to respect Palestinians rights, many participants made the connection between their yearning to be seen as human beings, the international communities' perceptions of Palestinians, and their desire to engage in resistance, and specifically to engage in *unarmed* resistance.

Why Engage in *Unarmed* Resistance?

As this chapter has so far outlined, Participants' motivation for engaging in resistance transcend discussions of tactics and ideological convictions associated with different modalities of resistance, and instead, are deeply rooted in their experiences and sense of identity, first as, and as human beings, and secondly as Palestinians. However, this research narrows its focus to *unarmed* resistance. Here, discussions around tactics, philosophy, ethics, personal gains, and structural forces all play a role in shaping this space.

Shifting perspectives, humanizing Palestinians

Returning to Edward Said and the dehumanizing effect of denying a narrative, research participants felt like they and other Palestinians have never been given the right to a legitimate voice. It was commonly noted by participants that while Palestinians have the right under international law, byway of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and UNGA resolution 37/43 in 1982¹², to resist their occupation through the use of arms, they choose not to out of consideration for the repercussions of such tactics. Chiefly, the way that armed resistance bolsters the Israeli narrative which paints Palestinians as terrorists and further functions to deny Palestinians the opportunity to share their narratives and experiences. Therefore, for many participants, a leading motivator for engaging in unarmed resistance is to undo this process of dehumanization and to utilize unarmed resistance in order to humanize Palestinians and shift the perspectives of Israelis and the international community.

¹² UNGA Resolution 37/43 reaffirmed “the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle”,

For example, Issa is from the small Palestinian town of Hares in Area C which is on the outskirts of the Israeli settlement of Ariel. He has lived as a paraplegic since 2001, when he was shot in the back by an Israeli soldier as he walked out of his front door to call his children in from playing. Issa was shot with a dum-dum bullet which punctured his lung and severed his spine. In our conversation, he spoke about the way that his commitment to unarmed resistance is tied to his refusal to let hate takeover his life despite the suffering he has been subjected to. He goes on to share his thoughts regarding the humanity of Israelis, of the very soldier that shot him in the back and paralyzed him. Therefore, for him, his commitment to unarmed resistance is tied to his belief that living with hate drives one to violence, and it also destroys one's humanity. At the same time however, the occupation creates an unlivable situation and as a result, something must be done to stop it. Issa therefore continues to engage in unarmed resistance as a means to protect himself and to fight for his rights, while still retaining a connection to his humanity, as well as that of Israelis.

I have every reason in the world to hate, or to pick up a gun, or to do whatever I want. They took half of my body from me! They tried to treat me like garbage, they tried to end my life. But I will not hate and I will not pick up a gun because I believe that even the soldier that shot me is a victim. He is a victim of hate. Before he came to be a soldier, they washed his brain in the school, in the Kibbutz and then finally, in the army. Everywhere he goes in life he is told, 'if you don't kill Palestinians first, they will kill you'... We don't hate the Jewish because they are Jewish. We hate the Israeli Government policies against us. I must protect myself, not because I hate them, but because I want to protect myself as a human being (Issa, Hares).

I was struck by the sentiment in Issa's quote related to the humanization of the Israeli soldier who shot him, that bears a resemblance to the post-colonial author Paulo Freire (1970) who argued,

Liberation is thus a childbirth, and a painful one. The man or woman who emerges is a new person, viable only as the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is superseded by the humanization of all people. Or to put it another way, the solution of this contradiction is born in the labor which brings into the world this

new being: no longer oppressor nor longer oppressed, but human in the process of achieving freedom (p. 49)

In both Issa's quote, as well as the quote by Freire (1970), the need to humanize the other side is highlighted as necessary for freedom.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, feelings of dehumanization come from growing up and living under occupation, as well as the way that Israeli soldiers and settlers treat Palestinians on a daily basis. While being denied their human rights and living as subjects in a settler colonial project aimed at erasing their existence may be the underlying driver of the feelings of dehumanization, so too is the way that they have been characterized as violent, aggressive, dangerous, etc. both by Israel, as well as the international community. As such, for some participants, engaging in unarmed resistance presents an opportunity to show the world another face of Palestinians. Moreover, as illustrated by the following quote, it also presents an opportunity to challenge the image of Palestinians held by many soldiers, and to make them confront, on a personal level, the human beings they are oppressing.

We don't want to hurt other people in the way that others hurt us. We just want our rights, we want them back, and we will get them back by showing our oppressors that they are the ones acting inhumanly (Youth of Sumud, Group Interview, South Hebron Hills).

Similarly, a participant from Bil'in noted,

One of the goals is to change the beliefs of the soldiers, to make them learn something about who we are. The Israelis teach their soldier something and they come with these ideas. What we do in popular resistance makes them confused about what they had learnt because we are acting differently than they expected (Basel, Bil'in).

Unarmed resistance, many participants explain, humanizes Palestinians by making them relatable, 'not scary', and therefore seen as deserving of human rights in the eyes of the international

community. What this also does is to highlight the violence of the Occupation. Salah, a member of the coordination committee of Stop the Wall Campaign and the Boycott National Committee, described,

The Israelis inside '48 [a term used to refer to the Israeli borders established in 1948 in the wake of the Nakba as per UNGA Resolution 181] call themselves the most democratic country in the Middle East. This is how they tried to win the hearts and minds of the world. And this is why popular resistance shows the world that we are like any other nation, we want freedom and independence. We want to have the freedom to move within the West Bank and Gaza and Jerusalem, we want to go pray in Al Aqsa, we want to visit family inside '48. With popular resistance, we show that Israel is the murderer country that is killing us (Salah, Ni'lin).

One of the many motivations to engage in unarmed resistance therefore, relates to the power that it holds to shift the perspectives of Israelis and the international community in order to humanize Palestinians. Once 'humanized' through the adoption of unarmed resistance, participants then are granted a place within the doctrine of human rights. This perception is connected to the most universal theme that emerged in the data; the use of unarmed resistance as a means to gain the support of the international community.

Gaining the international community's support

There is a general sentiment held throughout the West Bank in which people feel that they are treated as sub-human. That is, they feel as if they exist outside of international normative frameworks related to human rights, outside of international law, and outside of basic human dignity. These feelings, participants explain, are initiated by the humiliating repercussions of the Israeli occupation as well as the impunity with which Israel denies them their basic human rights. Less obvious however, participants report that this dehumanization is, rather than being limited to Israeli actions, also perpetuated by the international community by way of their historical adoption

of a narrative and lens favourable to Israel related to issues pertaining to the conflict. What is interesting here, is that while participants feel that Israeli actions are responsible for their dehumanization, it is the international community they posit, that offers the key to counter this. When they talk about being ‘seen as human beings’, they are not speaking about being seen as such *only* by Israelis. Rather, they also tie this directly to the international community. “We want to show the world of the humanity of Palestinians, that we are not all terrorists and we are not born with this hate and we don't want to kill anyone” (Osama, Jericho). Here, at the nexus of dehumanization, dignity, and the international community, resistance *tactics* enter into the fold.

Inevitably, when speaking about their motivations for engaging in unarmed resistance, in nearly every interview conducted for this research, participants spoke about the importance they placed on gaining the support of non-Palestinians in their struggle. This support they explained, comes in the form of international and Israeli solidarity activists protesting for Palestinian freedoms and rights in their respective countries or traveling to Palestine to resist alongside them, or supporting the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement abroad. It also comes in the form of political and diplomatic support such as voting patterns at the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, diplomatic pressure on Israel to adhere to international law, donor funding and support for civil society and NGOs, etc. Lastly, it comes in the form of ideological support through the adoption of what they consider to be a more balanced narrative vis-à-vis the conflict. They felt that this support not only humanized them, but also lent legitimacy to their struggle, lessened the violence of Israeli soldiers at checkpoints and demonstrations, brought in much needed financial support, increased the number of external witnesses who could vouch for and publicize the violence and discrimination they face, and ultimately brought their plight and subsequent struggle into the global consciousness.

In 2000 Yasser Arafat started calling for international activists to join us. This started the increase in international observers and activists here. But at first, the international community was scared and did not want to come. We had to find creative ways to make internationals feel like they want to come, feel safe. It is very important for us to have internationals here to witness and stand with us (Issa, Hares).

Despite the overwhelming consensus related to the desire to gain the support of the international community in the Palestinian struggle, participants emphasized a distinction around how this support was gained. Similar to Issa in the quote above, the ‘creative ways to make internationals feel like they want to come, feel safe’ that Palestinians have adopted, rely on unarmed resistance tactics. Here, research participants emphasized the international community’s divergent reactions to Palestinians’ tactics of resistance. The unifying theme in this regard related to the international community’s approval of Palestinian resistance, *only* so far as it is nonviolent and unarmed.

[Interviewer] When you started working with this organization doing cultural resistance, did you stop the other resistance you were doing before, like throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at clashes?

Honestly, no, because me going to do the dabke [traditional Palestinian folk dance which since 1948, has become a symbol of Palestinian identity and cultural resistance] doesn’t cancel the fact that I should also throw rocks. I make time for both, I have time for dabke and make another time for throwing rocks.

[Interviewer] Do you feel that these two different types of resistance have the same goal?

This has goals and that has goals, but they both meet at the end. The dabke symbolized that our ancestors lived, and through me, I can relive it and pass it on to other generations and take care of its existence. Throwing rocks is the ongoing resistance because I can’t stand in front of a soldier and do the dabke. I can face soldiers with a rock, but the dabke is a way to send our struggle as a message with taking care of our ancestors history and traditions. How can I get the message to a foreigner abroad? Will I go throw rocks in front of him? No, it won’t work, but when I show him [through dabke dance] the prisoners struggle in an artistic way and the foreigner is happy, he will understand better. I don’t talk, I just dance in an artistic way and I act how the prisoner is in his cell and that way I am sending our message to the foreigners (Male Interview, Dheisheh Camp).

In this interview, the participant distinguished between his resistance aimed at soldiers and the immediate occupation, and his resistance aimed at ‘the foreigner’. Stones were for soldiers, dabke was for his community, his culture, and for the international community. Stones challenge his immediate reality of being faced with an Israeli soldier in his camp, while his unarmed resistance—dabke—challenged a narrative that denied Palestinians a history in the region, their ancestral roots in Palestine. In this sense, his motivation to engage in unarmed resistance related to asserting his ancestral roots in Palestine while communicating to the international community the suffering of Palestinians in the hopes of gaining their support.

Below, Nour explains how Palestinians’ use of unarmed resistance in Khan al Khmar has helped protect the village from demolition by gaining the support of the international community.

Now in Khan al-Ahmar, they [Israelis] want to destroy all of the houses. If I used a gun on these soldiers, the Israelis would destroy us all in a few minutes. Up until now, they haven't been able to destroy Khan al Khmar because the whole world is watching and we now have their sympathy because we are not using violence. Now, many people in EU and USA they stand with the Palestinian people against Israel, this is the difference between armed and unarmed resistance (Nour, Tulkram).

As Nour posits, Palestinians use of nonviolent resistance at Khan al Ahmar won them the support of the international community. In turn, this support has protected Khan al Ahmar, the Bedouin village located in the E1 corridor slated to be demolished by the Israeli government, from being destroyed.



Image 3: A banner in Hebrew, English and Arabic hangs at the entrance of a protest at the Bedouin community of Khan al Ahmar which the Israeli Supreme Court had recently given approval to the Israeli state to forcibly transfer and demolish. Photo by Author, July 2018.

Taking Nour's logic one step further, it is then, through the international community's approval of Palestinians tactics of resistance that Palestinian's struggle is reframed as a legitimate struggle of an oppressed people resisting dispossession. As a result of this reframing, their human rights are protected, at least rhetorically. This ties into what many participants suggest, through the international community's approval, Palestinians are granted passageway from the category of Arab terrorist (and therefore 'sub-human'), to 'deserving human'.

The Palestinian community accepted the nonviolent resistance and respects this kind of resistance for many reasons. First, with this style of resistance I can send a message to the international community that there are Palestinian people here and that they deserve to live like other humans, they deserve to live free, the children deserve to live like international children, same with the women (Hasan, Al Masara).

Building on the idea that nonviolent resistance humanizes Palestinians in the eyes of the international community, in an interview conducted in English, a participant from Jericho explained,

In the past, we used to think that all of the Europeans supported the Israelis, and they didn't care about us. But after seeing them come to work here [through various NGOs and solidarity organizations/groups], we realized that this is not true. There are a lot of people who are working with us, they support Palestinian rights. This gives us more energy and more power. It inspired us. It also inspired us not to make more violence. Because we need to take care of them, our international friends, because they help us. Why did they support us, why did they start to help us? Because we started to use humanity ways [sic], to work against the occupation. They respected this. When we were using suicide bombings, all of the international people were against us. But when we changed, stopped using these methods and started nonviolent struggles, many European started supporting us. We started to hear a lot of voices in support of us. This was steering us to continue and to leave the violence and use the nonviolence (Ahmed, Jericho).

Echoing the above sentiment related to nonviolent resistance eliciting the support of the international community, another participant shared,

Palestinians, by peaceful resistance, have reached the whole world and people are here to support us because they started to see us as human beings resisting for our rights. Before, when we were armed, we were scary. We showed the people that we were dangerous, now we are telling the world, we are just human beings and we want to live (Osama, Jericho).

Connected to the idea of using nonviolent resistance as a tool to gain support, a participant from Beit Jala explained that Palestinian people are “with the popular resistance because currently it is what is available” to them. He went on to share,

People don't respect the PA at all. And we have doubts about the donations of the West for the popular resistance. Who supports the popular resistance? The Europeans currently support the Palestinian Authority and, in the past, they were our colonizers. We can't deny that we are with the popular resistance because currently it is what is available to us, but we are with it with a clear strategy. I can't deny that these donations or finances came with terms and conditions. The

population does not respect the leaders and the PA. The people are concerned about the financing from the West for popular resistance. But resistance is supposed to be funded by political leaders, PLO, why is it funded by the West? These countries are the same countries who used to be our occupiers! But, this is what we have in our hands now. This is the only option, we have to use what we have, nonviolence is what we have and have to use it (Yousif, Beit Jala).

While many participants spoke about the various motivators contributing to their decision to engage (or not engage) in certain tactics of resistance in order to garner the support of the international community, some participants also felt a competing sense of defiance towards this pressure. Despite the importance all participants put on having the international community view them—and their resistance/struggle—in a positive light, some individuals felt frustrated by what they saw as being ‘told by outsiders’ how to resist. While some participants were happy to let the international community’s preferences and needs (i.e., feeling safe and welcomed at protests) shape their resistance activities, others navigated the desire to have their support, while vehemently rejecting some of the ideological convictions held by the international community vis-à-vis resistance tactics.

Continuing the thread of international support being tied to the adoption of certain resistance tactics, in the below snippet from an interview conducted in English with a participant in Bethlehem, they detailed the ways that the desire for donor funding shapes people’s willingness to engage and accept certain agendas,

The political situation created a lot of economic restrictions and the NGOs came to substitute that. But it did it with an agenda. Every proposal, every project, all the money that comes here, has an agenda. And I don’t trust so much the agenda. Every Palestinian person will tell you the same thing, ‘I don’t trust the agenda but I’ll have the money’. So, you are cornered all the time to get your money.

[Interviewer] And what is that agenda that the NGOs come with? How are you cornered?

To kill the resistance! This was the plan since Oslo. All of this peacebuilding and NGO work that is linked together is diluting and compromising what the Palestinians want to say about what our needs are, how we want to resist and what challenges need to be addressed. First, we use the language of the donor. We use goals and objectives that are not meeting our community needs. It is like being torn between being chained to NGOs; they are giving you money to do resistance' within their limit, if you go beyond, even if it meets your needs and the community needs, no, you can't (Female Interview, Bethlehem).

As elucidated by this female participant, research participants are aware of the disorientating effect donor funding and agendas has on resistance tactics and Palestinian agendas. Nevertheless, given the importance research participants place on gaining their support, they tolerate this influence.

This section has outlined how many participants are motivated to engage in unarmed resistance, at least in part, as a means of attracting international sympathy and support in their struggle. This, they believe, is possible only when Palestinians engage in unarmed resistance rather than armed resistance, or any sort of resistance deemed 'violent' by the international community. By gaining the sympathy and support of the international community, participants postulate that their resistance becomes more successful in eliciting the desired outcome. In this regard, the choice can be thought of as strategic or a tactical decision. Going back to the previous discussion around dignity, in addition to strategic/tactical motivations, participants are also motivated as a means of countering the emasculating impacts of the occupation.

Emasculation or Alternative Masculinities

While an assault to one's dignity and honor, and feelings of disrespect cut across genders to be sure, what is unique to my research participants is that some men experience the occupation and subsequent oppression as an affront to their masculinity. As such, they see resisting the occupation (and related policies) as empowering, as masculine, and as part of the gendered expectations of what it means to be a Palestinian man. A participant from Budrus shared,

As a Palestinian man suffering from the occupation, our first rule must be to resist the oppression and our occupation. Nobody respects us, nobody understands us if we keep silent against the occupation (Ayed, Budrus).

In an interview conducted in Jenin Refugee Camp, a participant described how, as a teenage boy, the act of resisting required courage, and the payoff was empowering,

[Interviewer] You said that in the camp, everyone was involved, but did you know anybody that you went to school with that didn't engage in resistance during the intifada?

A lot, a lot!

*[Interviewer] What do you think was the difference between the people that....
[participant cuts interviewer off]*

They were cowards, haha!

[Interviewer] Do you mean that they didn't participate because they were scared?

Yeah, of course it was everywhere [fear and danger]! Some people accept the danger and the risk of doing something, some people don't, they are too scared. A lot of people were in jail. A lot of the violence back then was pushing me to do something in order to show, especially when I was a teenager, like to show that I'm here, I'm a man, I can protect, I can do, I can act! (Male Interview, Jenin Refugee Camp).

While much has been written about the androcentric nature of nationalism in general, what is less understood is the gendered nature of narratives of occupation, and of the violent oppression Palestinians are resisting. When asked about the motivation for engaging in unarmed resistance, participants commonly feminized the land of Palestine, speaking about the occupation as a rape, pillage, or domination, an injustice that needed to be righted.

While many participants noted the emasculating effects of the occupation as a motivating factor for engaging in resistance, some participants also pointed to specific forms of grassroots peacebuilding initiatives associated with unarmed resistance that mirrored and perpetuated

emasculating power inequalities between the occupation forces and Palestinians. For example, speaking specifically about joint Palestinian/Israeli workshops and peacebuilding projects, Abdulfattah likens the Israeli occupation to rape, and highlights the absurdity or futility, in his opinion, of joint initiatives bringing together Palestinians and Israelis to ‘make peace’ while failing to challenge, on a structural level, the occupation. Here, he situates Palestinians as dominated and powerless, and suggests that their position will remain as such unless direct action is taken to address and end the violation. In such a framing, any act outside of committed resistance, is viewed as submission.

There has been so many of those supposed to be ‘peacebuilding projects’ and Israelis and Palestinians come together and dance and hug and whatever they do and say, ‘hallelujah, we made peace!’ Children go to summer camps, Seeds of Peace, Hands of Peace, whatever stupid peace there is, and to make pieces of peace, bla bla bla, but the issue is, they think the problem is between people. The problem is not between people, people can meet, make love, get married whatever, and, it is not a problem between individuals. Israelis and Palestinians often do meet and share and work together and so on, as human beings. The issue is that if we are talking about bringing people together during the act of rape, if someone holds the hand of the victim while she is being raped and says ‘be patient, get used to it, can I bring you a glass of water?’ or whatever, and doesn’t stop the rape, then there is a huge problem with this mentality! (Abdulfattah, Aida Camp).

In framing the occupation as a gendered act of domination, the act of ending the occupation and/or liberating Palestine, thus becomes understood as a masculinized act.

I don’t want to die for my country, I want to live for my country

The perception that different resistance tactics elicit different outcomes in terms of the safety of those resisting was often highlighted in interviews. Participants spoke about how they promoted and engage in unarmed resistance in part, as a way to continue to resist, yet reduce the likelihood they be killed or arrested. While it is widely documented and understood that activists are killed

and imprisoned without charge on a daily basis for engaging in unarmed resistance, as highlighted in the experience of research participants such as Rani and Issa, the likelihood of this happening is less than if they were engaged in armed resistance. Therefore, for many participants, unarmed resistance is framed as a smart choice, in so far as the activist is more likely to live longer, and be able to continue to resist.

Zamn, the organization that I work for—I am sorry, I am going to switch into my NGO talk for a minute—Zamn is the third largest NGO on Facebook in Palestine. We have over 200,000 followers and we use this media as a platform to access the mainstream here in Palestine. We are trying to send these types of messages that we have been talking about earlier. Two years ago, there was an increase in youth going to checkpoints and trying to stab Israeli soldiers. They all died! We at Zamn, decided we wanted to do something about this so we started a campaign with a series of videos with the slogan, 'I don't want to die for my country, I want to live for my country' (Wisam, Ramallah).

When speaking about motivations for engaging in unarmed resistance, the desire to not 'give the occupation what it wants' was a common theme. By this, participants explain that they feel the occupation wants them either dead or imprisoned. By engaging in armed resistance, participants felt that they were therefore making it easier for soldiers to arrest and/or kill them, thus giving them what they wanted.

If I'm using violent resistance, I have 3 options: 1) to go to jail, 2) to be wounded, or 3) to be killed. And it will not take a very long time for one of these to happen. So, when you are using violence, one of these things will happen and then you can't protect your family. You can't protect anyone who is close to you. You can't protect your land. That's why we are looking to make more people involved in nonviolence (Izzat, Hebron).

In the excerpt below from an interview with an activist from Bil'in, the participant speaks about his personal journey and transition from a time when, as a young boy, he dreamed of spending his life in prison as a *fidā'iyyīn*, to later in life, wanting to find a way to resist the occupation without going to prison.

Basel describes growing up looking up to two men: Yassar Arafat and his uncle who was in prison for killing an Israeli soldier. Basel described growing up and hearing people in his community talk about his Uncle as if he were a hero. This, he explained, led to him dreaming about growing up to be like his uncle.

When I was a child I thought that I was related to a hero. I was so proud of him. I used to dream about being like him when I grew up. It was my dream to be in prison like him. I wanted to be in prison with a high-profile case for many years, or even my whole life.

[Interviewer] When did the desire to spend your life in prison change? And why do you think it changed?

The first time I was in prison this changed. I was 14 or 15 years old. I have been to prison about 30 times, mostly only days and weeks. Through these experiences, I realized that our enemy wants to put us in prison, so we can't let our self be put in prison. The best type of resistance is to do resistance but don't end up in prison because that is what they want. It is a challenge, resist but don't end up in jail. At that time, I started to understand a methodology: 1) you have occupation, 2) you are Palestinian, and 3) you need to resist. These are facts. The other fact is that the occupation wants to put you in prison and therefore you have to be ready to go to prison. But, the trick is learning how to avoid it. This is a big challenge. When I was in prison, I realized that I need to resist but this enemy wants to kill me or put me in prison and I don't want to die and I don't want to give them what they want (Basel, Bil'in).

Hafez is a member of the South Hebron Hills Popular Committee, and leader of the unarmed resistance movement in the village of At-Tuwani. With around 300 inhabitants, this small Palestinian community is overshadowed by the ever-expanding illegal Israeli settlement outpost of Havat Ma'on and is subjected to extreme violence from settlers on a daily basis. While the community is in the West Bank, it is in Area C, and is therefore under Israeli military and civilian control; meaning it has no support or protection from the Palestinian Authority. As a result, they rely on Israeli soldiers to protect them from the violence of Israeli settlers. This is a profoundly illogical configuration which has led to ongoing human rights violations, violent attacks, and

impunity for the Israeli settler who attack them, kill their livestock, and continue to illegally dispose them of their land. After witnessing his mother being beaten by a settler while tending to the family's sheep—an attack which left her deaf in one ear—Hafez recounts the events leading up to a life changing conversation he had with his mother after the attack regarding the use of armed resistance.

We heard the neighbors screaming, so we ran towards the fields. I saw the settlers and my mother was on the ground, they were hitting her on her head, it was a horrible thing. Honestly, I went crazy. I started running towards my mother and the settlers were still there around her so the armed settler started talking in Hebrew and told me to stop and he said, 'if you don't stop I will kill you'. I didn't listen to him and I kept on going, so he started shooting at me. Honestly when I think back on that situation, I am supposed to be dead! You know what? He was firing, the bullets were passing from between my legs, next to my head, he meant to kill me! But I was just running, I couldn't stop, and he kept shooting. But you know what happened? He ran out of bullets, he saw me running faster and he thought I was coming after him, so he ran away and all the other settlers ran away. When I got to her, my mother was bleeding. I went crazy, honestly. We called an ambulance and took her to the hospital, she stayed in the hospital for 2 weeks, when she left the hospital I truly had a plan to take revenge! So one day I was sitting; I was planning for something big, then my mother came. I was 23 years old at the time. This is exactly what she said word by word, 'I know what you are thinking about, your mother was harassed and beaten in front of you, and your dignity is hurt, and stuff like that, but what you are thinking about is going to destroy you and everyone around you. You have to think of something else. Another way, other than what you are thinking about'. She didn't know what my way was, or what I was thinking about exactly, but she said you have to think about what you are about to do. Her words were really affective. On one hand, she was right. If I got revenge, it would have meant that I would for sure die, 100%! They may also arrest all my family and demolish my family's home. So I started thinking about alternative ways.

The formation of this committee [Popular Resistance Committee] came from the idea that we studied our reality and what is going on and the reality is that they are attacking our human rights which then leads to people reacting with violence. Legally, under international law, we can go that way, but we have to ask whether it is serving us or not, this is the question. The occupation pressures us to go that way so that they have an excuse for all their policies, violence, and killing. So, if violence gives the occupation what they want and serves their excuses, we must then think of other ways to resist. I came to this idea from what my mother

had said to me. Because of this, we realized that we must not give the occupation gifts (Hafez, At-Tuwani).

Hafez's story highlights the predicament that many Palestinians find themselves in. At once wanting to resist their oppression, but afraid of the consequences of doing so. Hafez's mother knew of these dangers when she warned him, 'what you are thinking about is going to destroy you and everyone around you'. In this quote, she is reminding her son Hafez that any thought about engaging in armed resistance and retaliation for what they had done to his mother, would inevitably result in death and further suffering for his family. Moreover, when Hafez speaks about giving the occupation gifts, he is referring to giving Israelis an example of violence to legitimize their violent oppression based on a narrative that they are fighting 'terrorists'. Therefore, he was motivated to engage in unarmed resistance as a way to seek revenge for the abuse his mother was subjected to, while avoiding tactics that may be used by Israel to legitimize soldiers and/or settlers' violence against him and his family.

Linking armed resistance with revenge, a participant from Jenin Camp explains that many people, including himself when he was younger, felt similar to Hafez: engaging in armed resistance was empowering, it was vengeful, it was proud. However, in hindsight, it took more from them and their life, than it did from Israel and/or the occupation. As a previous member of the armed group Islamic Jihad, he shares his reflections around the futility of his engagement in armed resistance during the Second Intifada when the Israelis invaded the refugee camp he lived in. He felt that he achieved nothing by engaging in armed resistance, and instead, he lost 4 years of his life in an Israeli prison. Once released, he was labeled as a terrorist by the international community and had missed out on important rites of passage for men his age such as marriage, getting a job etc. Later in the interview, he went on to explain that the personal sacrifice inherent in armed resistance was

not worth it and that this realization was, in part, what motivated him to become involved in, and eventually run, a small NGO in Jenin Camp which aims to provide a platform for unarmed cultural resistance.

You hurt Palestinians pride if you say, 'beautiful resistance' or 'nonviolent resistance' or 'cultural resistance' or 'theatre resistance'. They are afraid because they are too proud, their pride is hurt by this because they feel that they should have the guns and kill Israelis. I was one of them. But I began to realize, what is the point in killing somebody? You are not making change, you are just ending his life. You succeed when you make your enemy get to the point that they actually change their mind themselves due to their beliefs, they change their position themselves. This is success! It is very easy to kill people. But it is not easy to make people change and make them understand things and make them stand beside you and beside your case. This is my problem. I come from a place where I lost my own friends in the invasion and I went to prison for almost four years, I was 17 years old. I was thinking in jail, what did we actually get from what we did? Nothing!!! Yes, you can scream 'yeah, yeah, Allah Akbar, bla bla bla' But we achieve nothing! I look around me and there are no friends from the resistance left. Smart, brave, intelligent kids and young people... gone! They [the West and Israelis] are not calling them heroes, they call them terrorists. For Palestinians though, they are heroes. But I want everybody to see brave leaders, intelligent people who defend their homeland. No, they call them terrorists. I am thirty-two now, what do I have? I have just this [points to theatre]. But if you look at all of my cousins and my friends, they are married, they have children, a house, they run after the money. My father was in prison in the First Intifada and when I joined the Second Intifada, he grabbed me by the ear and said, 'Son, it happened to me. You will lose your work. You will achieve nothing. You will not liberate an inch of Palestine. The other guys [who don't join resistance] will finish university, get good positions, be rich, and you will still be looking for work.' I was like, 'Aaah, my country needs me, bla, bla, bla'. But exactly like he said, I got out of prison after the Second Intifada, all of my old friends were in university, and I couldn't be part of it. I can't work too because I was in prison and everybody is scared to have someone who was with Islamic Jihad, in resistance and then out of prison working for them (Male Interview, Jenin Camp).

This section has outlined both strategic and personal motivations for engaging in unarmed resistance. Gaining the international communities support was the leading strategic/tactical 'pull factor' motivating participants. While dehumanization, emasculation, being denied dignity etc. were some of the self-reported 'push factors' motivating participants to engage in unarmed

resistance. This however, brings us to a third category: participants' perceptions of the motivations of others.

The Motivations of 'Others'

Up until this point, I have summarized the leading 'self-reported' findings related to the general research question of, '*What are some motivating factors leading Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance today?*' Through personal life stories and rich narratives, research participants outlined a myriad of contributing factors, motivations, as well as life circumstances which led them to their current engagement in unarmed resistance. While these have been outlined above, what is missing is a discussion around what participants understand to be the contributing factors or motivations leading *other people* or *other communities* to engage in unarmed resistance. What is interesting is that, due to the relatively small size of the West Bank—approximately 5,640 km² (smaller than the Greater Toronto Area) and a population just shy of 3 million people—many people engaged in unarmed resistance know each other, or at least know of each other.

You could say that the activists in Palestine are like one family who all know each other. This is so, even though there is some conflict and some people don't like one another, and there is some conflict from time to time. In the demonstrations and resistance actions, you see the same people, it's one group (Basel, Bil'in).

The geographic and demographic realities in the West Bank combine with a number of other factors, increase the likelihood that those engaged in unarmed resistance know one another. One such factor is the absence of a mass popular resistance movement. This leads to organized unarmed resistance being limited to specific sites which are planned, coordinated, attended, and publicized by an oligopoly of a relatively small number of well-funded and well-known CSOs/NGOs and local resistance committees that dominate the nonviolent resistance space. This means that many

activists attend the same marches, demonstrations, protests, and events; they maintain a presence at the same sites of resistance such as Sumud Freedom Camp, Khan al-Ahmar, Bab el Shams, Nabi Saleh, Bil'in etc.; they are featured in the same documentary films and are interviewed by the same media outlets; they are competing for the same funding from donors to support their organizing and resistance efforts; they befriend the same international activists; and they speak at the same events/conferences. The pool of those who identify as engaging in organized unarmed resistance, in other words, is relatively small. Countless times during interviews, participants would speak about other activists, using their full names, or organizations without knowing that I had interviewed these men as well. And while I never asked participants about what they thought other activists were motivated by, nevertheless, they would often speak about things that 'other activists' did, felt, said, believed in, etc. However, because of the relatively confined area, and the length of time I spent in the West Bank meeting with activists, I had (or would end up) interviewing many of the 'other people' that research participants spoke about. During the interviews I conducted with the activists that had been referred to however, they did not disclose these same motivations about themselves. Instead, what would often occur, would be that the same pattern would emerge when these 'other' participants spoke about other individual activists, communities, or groups. It was as if everyone was pointing their fingers at each other, or other communities involved in unarmed resistance, accusing them of being motivated by things such as: salaries, positions, fame/notoriety, travel opportunities, exposure to foreign women etc. The participants being accused of what could be called 'less noble' motivations, were themselves, accusing others. This occurred so often that, during analysis, these became codes in and of themselves and thus, I believe hold important insight in relation to the spaces I seek to understand. In short, many of my research participants were accusing other communities, or specifically other men involved in unarmed resistance (some of

whom happen to also be my research participants) of being motivated to engage in unarmed resistance as a means of accessing power in various forms. While it is not important who exactly is motivated by what, what this game of finger pointing does illuminate, is the highly sensitive and contentious repercussions of the complex web of individual, global and local power relations resulting in the proliferation of international donor money/involvement towards unarmed resistance, as well as the involvement of international and Israeli activists vis-à-vis the Palestinian resistance movement. In short, it uncovers an almost entirely ignored aspect of the NGO-ization of resistance in the post-Oslo era.

Grassroots nonviolence and peacebuilding as practices/forces aimed at overcoming oppression, have received increasing international attention and interest across the world in recent decades. In the lead up to, and early years after, the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, the international community invested huge amounts of money into Palestinian civic engagement and civil society. This money was given under the pretense of fostering economic and social development in order to create the environment for peacebuilding and state-building. Many participants however, feel that the money was an effort to buy Palestinians acceptance of the Oslo agreements;

In the First Intifada, there were international organizations who were supporting and helping our resistance. Then these same people started to suggest to Palestinians to go to Oslo. Because they were giving us money, people were open to their suggestions (Amjad, Kafr Ni'ma).

The international community's interest in Palestinian unarmed resistance continues today, as does the funding and opportunities that this interest brings with it. This has shaped and influenced the movement in innumerable ways—an area that the following chapters will address in great detail. In summary, most apparent of these in interviews however are: the introduction of salaries and

remuneration for participation in unarmed resistance, meeting international activists, and the opportunity to travel abroad.

Everyone is going after their own interests. Some people could be interested to join because of women, some people because they believe in what they are doing, some people want some money, some people want permits, some people want to be famous, and for some people it is business. Some of them are using our resistance to achieve this I think you have touched our wound in this question (Osama, Jericho).

Similarly, a participant from Bil'in noted the shift from a time where there was popular resistance, and when people were 'real fighters',

Yes, the first intifada was the stones intifada, it was real popular resistance, all kinds of people joined the intifada. Palestinians were real fighters, when they went to fight, or entered this situation they were going to liberate Palestine and they never cared about being killed or jailed. Now it's different. This resistance today, it is not the same. Many people think about other things when they join, like they are looking for positions, this is many of them, not just a few people! Of course, we still have real fighters. Just some groups of people join this resistance and yes, as I said, some of them are joining to be famous, or to get positions, or salaries or to travel around or to go abroad, and this actually makes a big problem for us (Kefah, Bil'in).

Both of these quotes point to a commonly held frustration related to what one participant called the 'corrupting of unarmed resistance' by the introduction of new motivating factors for engagement. Research participants felt that these new motivating factors were introduced in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords when there was a drastic increase in Western donor peacebuilding efforts which included support for Palestinian CSOs/NGOs.

It's all about the money- 'You pay for nonviolence, you get nonviolence'

It was common for participants to suggest that 'other' Palestinians were motivated to engage in unarmed resistance because of the available funds and financial remuneration. Building on the role of the international community in shaping motivations for engaging in unarmed resistance, being

paid for one's activism and involvement in unarmed resistance therefore emerged as a common theme.

With the introduction of financial remuneration, a new motivating factor for engagement in unarmed resistance was introduced. This came, however, at a cost. It led to the decline of volunteerism, which participants explained, had historically been an integral motivator driving participation in resistance organizing and activities. Participants explained that prior to Oslo, people used to volunteer in various ways to support and take part in unarmed resistance, they felt that it was part of their civic duty.

Participants felt that in addition to motivating people to engage in nonviolent activism and resistance, the financial remuneration offered by NGOs and donors also functioned to corrupt community organizations and resistance organizations at the village level.

Gradually more and more people supported resistance on Fridays to get a salary. Gradually, all of the Popular Committees who were working against the wall, were with this financial agenda (Ayed, Budros)

When I would ask participants about what changed from the First Intifada, which all participants agree was a *mass* unarmed popular resistance movement, to the unarmed resistance that could be found today, an overwhelming majority of participants explained that 'money' entered into the picture. This, they argue, was profoundly damaging to the resistance movement.

At one time, when a person asked me what I mean by popular resistance, I could tell them this story that I just told you [The story of the village of Budros holding weekly protests against the route of the Israeli Wall which cut the village off from hundreds of acres of their land, after years of protesting, they successfully rerouted the wall off of their land, back to the Israeli border]. But now, if you ask me the same question, I will tell you, 'not like Nabi Saleh, not like Bil'in' [other villages who adopted the model of weekly unarmed protests against dispossession], I mean daily struggle like what I was part of back in 2003-2005.

I used to identify it as, 'like this' now I identify it as 'not this' because today it [popular resistance] doesn't exist. You can see all of this money, official commissioners, famous activists, but you cannot see real action on the ground. There is lots of talk about organizing resistance, but not a lot of resistance actually happening.

While only one participant spoke about personally being motivated to engage in unarmed resistance by the prospect of a salary, unprompted by the researcher, the majority of participants made the point to say that they were *not* motivated by money or a salary, and only that the ever-elusive 'others' may be. However, feeling that international money negatively affects the motivations (and thus the trust and cohesion of resistance efforts) of those engaged unarmed resistance, was a common undercurrent with research participants.

Meeting 'Internationals'

The next of the themes presented as 'motivations of others' related to the desire to meet 'internationals'. The term 'internationals' is used by participants to refer to any foreign national visiting, working, or volunteering in Palestine. These individuals are most often international solidarity activists, volunteers or employees of INGOs, faith-based groups, international observers and civil society groups, journalists, researchers, backpackers/travelers, and students. As outlined in Chapter 5, since the early 1990s, there has been an influx of internationals traveling to the West Bank to participate in nonviolent resistance and activism alongside Palestinians. This remains true today where it is common to see dozens of international activists attending protests, marches, demonstrations, and other nonviolent events. Activists stay for days, weeks, months, and sometimes years. They bring with them diverse languages, cultures, and world views and provide a link to the world outside of the West Bank which for many Palestinians, is something they only get via TV, the internet, and social media.

In 2010, after I was released from being wanted as part of a deal between the PA and Israel, I was invited by a friend to go with him to a meeting of peace activists. I didn't know what he meant by peace activist. He told me that there were people from all over the world talking about peace. So I said, 'yallah, ok let's go'. I wanted to practice my English and maybe hang out with European people. It had been a longtime for me being stuck in Jericho, I was not allowed to leave Jericho for 7 years and I wanted to go to Bethlehem. So, I went with him (Osama, Jericho).

Although internationals are both male and female, participants highlighted the role that their gender played in motivating Palestinian males to engage in unarmed resistance.

We are all human and foreigners are very beautiful. For sure, some young men, they come because this is something attractive for them, the fact that there are girls there. Of course, everyone comes for different reasons.

[Interviewer] Does this effect the resistance?

This is a very sensitive subject. There are actions that we do to ensure that we protect the integrity of our resistance activities. For example, we make rules around cloths so foreign women cannot wear just anything they want. We care a lot about this sensitive subject because it can come in many forms. For example, there may be women who come to our protests from Israel and she has a job from the Israelis, her purpose here in our resistance movement is to delegitimize it by trying to make things happen between her and Palestinian men. Because of this, we have very strict rules. We start our protest march in one place, and then always end in the same place so we can see where everyone is. Also, women wear proper clothing. This issue is the baby for our management group. We care deeply about this and are very careful about anything that can damage our resistance. We pay specific attention to this and are always watching the shabāb [male youth]. Also, the shabāb know we are watching them. In any action, we have members of the management committee on all sides. Also, we are in a small village, we know everything about each other, we know their family (Basel, Bil'in).

With very little opportunity to meet people from outside Palestine, the involvement of foreign nationals in nonviolent resistance becomes a draw to participate in and of itself. Add to this the differing cultural norms that foreigners bring with them, including around friendship with the opposite sex, and the allure grows.

Sometimes it causes problems and a lot of them, because I think the international activist women show empathy and emotion with holding hands. But for Palestinian men, they view it as sometimes she is doing it because she is interested in them. We give lectures to internationals about this and lectures for our members. We tell our members, those who come from Europe and America and Canada are this and this. Certain things are normal for them in their society, that are not for us. So it's not their fault. No one is right, no one is wrong. So internationals may be happy with that in their society, and we are happy with our traditions, but it's good to be aware and know other people's cultures (Riyad, Bethlehem).

Continuing the vein of exposure to different cultures, participants spoke about the appeal of travel opportunities that are opened up by participating in nonviolent resistance and engaging in certain NGOs.

Travel

In addition to introducing internationally funded salaries and payments for participating in certain unarmed resistance activities, and increasing the number of international activists participating in unarmed resistance, the growing interest in unarmed resistance on behalf of the West, has also increased the demands for Palestinians to travel abroad to share their personal stories and experiences related to unarmed resistance on university campuses; at conferences; on book tours; at workshops and trainings; as well as at synagogues, churches and mosques around the world. Due to a combination of economic constraints and Israel's punitive restrictions on Palestinian's freedom of movement, for many living in the West Bank, the opportunity to travel at all—to and from Jerusalem, into Israel, or overseas—is a rare privilege most often reserved for the elite. However, with their financial means, connection to government, and political influence to obtain travel permits, INGOs and other groups based in the global North, commonly sponsor and facilitate individuals to travel from the West Bank to another country abroad. Given the near impossibility for many West Bankers to travel, the prospect of being able to do so through an NGO or

international group, is a motivating factor for some to engage in unarmed resistance connected with internationally funded/supported CSOs/NGOs

The international people being with us, is very important, but the money has negative effects and makes troubles and problems between the people. Now we have people who come just to travel, just to have girlfriends and to see the international girls. Some people come just to make an interview with the media. Everybody has their reason and agenda now.

[Interviewer] What about for you personally?

For sure, travel! It was a door that was forbidden for us to go through. Before, it was forbidden for a freedom fighter to go abroad to talk about his life and his resistance. But now, through the door of nonviolent resistance, me as a Palestinian can have the chance to talk about the problems and the issues we face here to people abroad. I was in Huston and I taught many people about the occupation. We learn many things from these trips and travels. It is a necessity to explain to the American people about the suffering of Palestinians. People are curious and we must tell them. The people in the USA are friendly but have no idea about what is happening. Here is Palestine we hate the American people because we see them in Hollywood movies and they are killing people in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine etc. (Hasan, Al Masara).

For my research participants, some of the appeals about traveling abroad are the opportunities it presents to educate the world about Palestine, to learn about other cultures, and to learn to speak English.

I was very excited the first time I was invited to travel with YAS. I will be an educated person I thought! In other countries, I will meet new people and I will discuss so many different things, I would learn from different people. And also, when I travel outside of Palestine, I get to know more people and new cultures. I have been to Italy, I have been to Sweden, Denmark. Every day you are learning new things in these places. Working for YAS, it is a very good chance for anyone who wants to change their opinion on anything. In the beginning, as I said before, I was nothing. I didn't have anything, but now I have a lot of information. Also, I can speak English. I feel more good about myself when I am like this. My father is proud when he saw me speak English in front of people. Usually he tells our neighbors, 'my son, he speaks English' or something like this. So, all my family feels happy about that. All the ones who are around me feel happy about these opportunities (Izzat, Hebron).

Wisam, a participant who works at a Palestinian NGO which promotes nonviolence and programs/activities aimed at countering extremism, explains that a large number of Palestinian youth engaged in programs offered through his NGO are motivated to do so by the possibility to travel abroad. Similar to Izzat speaking about his father's pride in the previous quote, traveling abroad Wisam explains, increases participants social status within their communities.

People getting paid for their activism also means that this activism gives them access to things they usually wouldn't have access to, like being able to travel. There is a lot of influence behind this subject. In my work at the NGO, I see that one of the main attractions to this program is the possibility to travel, this is why people want to participate in our nonviolence activism. Even if it means that they have to travel with an Israeli counterpart, people are willing to do this. I started thinking, on the average day, how many Palestinian kids can actually travel? This is a huge privilege here; coming back from seeing Berlin and talking about it to their peers and their parents, and communities. And the more people see and hear about this, they are like, 'I want to be part of this'. But ya, this experience makes them become part of an elite group of people in their communities. They learn to speak English, dress well, they know how to speak to people from other countries (Wisam, Ramallah).

In this section, I have outlined three leading motivations put forth by research participants as incentives for attracting some Palestinian men to engage in nonviolent resistance. While participants touched on these—financial remuneration, meeting internationals, and travel—in relation to other people's motivations, they rarely acknowledged them directly when speaking about what drew them personally to engage. In this sense, there was a palpable degree of incrimination around these topics. One possible explanation for this is that there is a degree of stigma attached to motivations outside of what could be labeled altruistic or based on ones' service to the national liberation project and subsequent fight against oppression. However, motivation is neither singular nor monolithic, not in the case of engaging in resistance, or any other psychosocial force for that matter. And while it may be tempting to romanticize a past where decision making was less convoluted, simpler, more honest, or pure, in all likelihood the same level of

complexity would have existed if examined in depth at that time. While this romanticized perception may exist in relation to the resistance movement in Palestine, as many participants attest to, one can be certain that individuals' decision making in relation to when, how, and if to engage in resistance was never straightforward. It was never simply, "I am a Palestinian man, therefore I resist", even if participants recount it as such. This is to say, today, as in the past, people engage in the various modalities of resistance due to a complex confluence of material and symbolic rewards, as well as individuals' interpretations and calculations related to their situation. At the same time, their engagement is also shaped by pre-established social structures external to the individual, of which, they had no part in creating (such as political and economic structures).

Highlighting the breadth of these motivations of Palestinian men engaged in unarmed resistance is a crucial part of understanding their experiences living under, yet resisting against, the Israeli settler colonial project. However, while highlighting the colonial continuities ever present in my participants' lives is crucial to contextualizing their narratives, it goes without saying that the inherent agency possessed by participants' means that they are not merely powerless victims of colonial practices and oppression. Rather, they too act, strategize, and navigate the complex global/local power nexus as agents, confronting the reality of a "life besieged by an institutional, systemic, and socially reproduced unattainability of power" (Musolf, 2017, p. 2). By teasing out and illustrating the complexity in motivations, the following empirical chapters embark on an investigation into the dance between the impact of colonial practices (structure), and the critical agency of those living and resisting within this space, altering the meaning, context, and trajectory of their lives.

Conclusion

In addressing my first research question, '*What are some motivating factors leading Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance today?*' this chapter has relied on extensive quotes from research participants to draw our attention to three interconnected themes: 1) a desire for justice, dignity, and equality for Palestinians; 2) a desire to gain the support of the international community in Palestinians' struggle; and 3) a desire to gain access to privileges, offerings, and other benefits provided by the liberal peace architecture (LPA). These themes will serve as the basis, background, and context to the ensuing empirical/discussion chapters. I will now move on to address my second research question, '*Post-Oslo, how have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?*'.

CHAPTER 7- Occupied by Nonviolence: Liberal Peace over Liberation

In this chapter I will build on the findings of Chapter 6 in approaching my second research question, ‘*Post-Oslo, how have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?*’ In addressing this question, the role of liberal peacebuilding emerged as a uniting theme throughout research respondents’ responses. I therefore argue that Western peacebuilding efforts in the West Bank exist *within* the liberal peace paradigm and have explicit impacts on power relationships. This chapter is devoted to defining, unpacking, and situating what I call ‘the liberal peace architecture’ (LPA) in the context of the spaces I seek to understand. I begin by defining the LPA, looking specifically at how/why engagement with civil society organizations and non-government organizations (CSOs/NGOs) takes place. Then, I explore the relationship between the LPA and unarmed resistance. The main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the way that the LPA has intertwined with CSOs/NGOs and argues that this has fundamentally altered the space, motivations, incentives, and practice of unarmed resistance in the West Bank.

As a result of the type of patronage relationship that exists between those who hold the purse strings (the LPA) and those who receive funding (CSOs/NGOs), the LPA has come to hold a substantial amount of power when it comes to the way unarmed resistance is understood and practiced at the grassroots. I illustrate how the LPA’s agendas and goals are privileged at the expense of the agendas and goals of local actors. Despite the LPA’s sphere of influence, this chapter problematizes the assumption that two Western frameworks—nonviolence resistance and liberal peacebuilding—are compatible with indigenous frameworks used to understand these processes. Lastly, this chapter concludes by tracing how the involvement of the LPA has led to the NGO-ization of unarmed resistance in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. It does this by teasing

out 4 key tangible shifts in unarmed resistance activism: 1) from an agenda of nationalism to one defined by the globalized liberal peace agenda; 2) from a sense of collectivism under popular resistance to one of globalized elite; 3) from widespread politicization to an emphasis on anti-politics of specific sites/projects/days; and 4) from indigenous forms of knowledge towards a neo-colonial knowledge of Orientalism.

What is the Liberal Peace Architecture?

Understanding the way that '*Western peacebuilding efforts have shaped unarmed resistance*' first requires us to articulate what 'Western peacebuilding efforts' are, and decipher who/what actors are painted with the broad brush when we use such a term. No one clear definition of who is incorporated under the epithet of 'Western peacebuilding' exist, and diverse understandings can be found through the articulations of research participants, as well as various actors including: 'internationals', 'donors', 'the West', 'foreigners', 'the international community', 'America', 'the EU', 'international organizations', think tanks, and granting agencies. In this dissertation, I understand Western peacebuilding efforts to be the efforts of countries and actors such as the UN towards creating a two-state solution as the main policy prescription. The most common articulation of this vision strives for the creation of a territorially contiguous Palestinian state on the borders laid out in the 1967 'land for peace formula' adopted in the UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). This is also called the Green line or pre-1967 borders. Western peacebuilding efforts therefore, can also be understood as peacebuilding efforts of the 'international community'. In this sense, the international community is understood to encompass the main donors supporting peacebuilding and statebuilding in Palestine, as well as countries maintaining strong diplomatic ties with Israel and include: US, Canada, Japan, the Nordic states

Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland, and European Union member states such as France, Germany, the UK, Spain, and The Netherlands, (Atallah, 2021, p. 83).

Despite decades of criticism and cosmetic changes, the dominant framework of peacebuilding employed around the world employs the doctrine of ‘liberal peace’ (Chandler, 2017; Paris, 2010; Paffenholz, 2021; Richmond, Björkdahl, & Kappler, 2011; Xu, 2019). Richmond & Mitchell (2011) outline the key pillars of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm; “the presence of democratic processes, the rule of law, guaranteed human rights, a social contract guaranteed by a robust civil society, and integration into the global economy” (p. 326). The liberal peace framework rests on the assumption that not only can peace be obtained through development, but a very specific form of development: neoliberal economic development which stresses the importance of liberal democratic institutions, market-based political economy, and effective state apparatus (Regilme, 2020). These “neoliberal doctrines have been embraced to such an extent that they can be found in nearly every aspect of the Palestinian economy, such as real estate development, financial and banking services, the public sector, tax collection, security, education and telecommunications” (Tayeb, 2019, p. 26).

The Oslo Accords were the watershed moment for liberal peacebuilding in Palestine. By stressing that the ‘market’s’ invisible hand would guide Israelis and Palestinians to peace’ (Haddad, 2016, p. 3), the peace process was underpinned by an ideological commitment to neoliberalism. In other words, it was understood that conflict, war and – in Palestine’s case – occupation could be overcome by “encouraging the liberalization of the political and economic structures” (ibid, p. 25) and private-sector growth/development. In the lead up to and aftermath of the Oslo Accords, these prescriptions were implemented by scores of actors committed in one way or other to liberal peace

orthodoxy. I am therefore using a generic term to capture the many actors, ideologies, assumptions and driving forces behind the widespread emphasis on ‘building peace in the region’ adopted by the international community since the Oslo Peace Accords: the Liberal Peace Architecture or LPA.¹³

Of primordial importance to the policy prescriptions coming out of Oslo, was the emphasis on business as a peacemaker. In their quest to build peace, Keen (2009) points to how the Oslo Accords epitomise liberal peace’s “faith in business-as-peacemaker” and highlights the propensity of this approach to ignore “historical rights and wrongs” (p. 6). In his earlier work (2009) he dug into this critique in detail highlighting the absurdity of such an approach, “the single most important constraint on the Palestinian economy has been the behaviour of successive Israeli governments” and while this may receive rhetorical nods from the LPA, nevertheless, policy and ‘the weight of the recommendations’ coming out of the LPA consistently fall ‘squarely on the Palestinians’ (Keen, 2009, p. 7). This critique is as old as the Oslo Accords themselves. Le More (2005) reflects in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords and the proliferation of the LPA, “frustration grew at Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Palestinian economy but international actors remained compromising and displayed surprisingly ‘little practical, sustained action intended to influence Israel measures’ whether through diplomatic or economic means” (p. 996-997 as cited in Keen, 2009, p. 7). The Oslo Accords and LPA’s shared emphasis on prioritizing economic development for peace is problematic because in doing so, they shift the onus of securing peace onto the relative

¹³It is important to recognize that in terms of exogenous forces, it is not only Western donors, agencies, and actors that have contributed to peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development in the West Bank. While Arab donors, predominantly Gulf States, are also active in this space, they tend to have a different perspective and influence and should therefore be addressed as a separate category. As such, they are not included in the working definition of liberal peace architecture for the purpose of this research and Arab donors realm of influence on Palestinian resistance is not addresses in this dissertation

success of Palestinian economic structures, as opposed to addressing the real elephant in the room: the entrenched military occupation that precludes any real peace progress and/or development – political, economic or otherwise. Notwithstanding the robust critiques of the ideology, frameworks, policy, and practice of the application and implementation of liberal peace in Palestine, up until today, Liberal peace remains the dominant paradigm through which the conflict is engaged with internationally.

While there is a diverse assemblage of actors involved in the LPA, this dissertation adopts a broad frame of analysis from intergovernmental actors, to governmental, and transnational civil society including internationally funded Palestinian grassroots networks, CSOs and NGOs, as well as other forms of “symbolic, financial, or technical forms of support, both direct and indirect, by state, interstate and non-state actors” outside of Palestine (Dubouet, 2015, p. 169). While adopting a broad frame of analysis in relation to actors within the LPA, this dissertation focuses on the interaction between research participants and a certain sector of the LPA: internationally funded civil society organizations (CSOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals. While both of these terms (CSOs and NGOs) are “notoriously slippery” (Bebbington & Riddell, 1995, p. 880), I employ civil society in the following way: civil society is one of the three main segments of society, alongside government and business. I understand a civil society organization (CSO) to be what is formed when members of society organize (outside of the family) towards a common goal, purpose, or interest. As such, while civil society interacts with the state and business in the sense that it, in conjunction with these sectors make up society writ large, it is distinct from the state. As the name indicates, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also independent from the government/state despite the fact that they may receive funding from government bodies. I find DeMars’s (2005) definition of NGOs to be particularly helpful,

If business firms are private actors pursuing private profit, and governments are public actors pursuing public purposes, then NGOs have one foot in each camp. As private actors, NGOs do not seek to control the levers of public power. Therefore, they neither organize for elections like political parties, nor use violence to seize power like terrorists and insurgents. In contrast to firms, NGOs do not pursue the private profit of their owners or shareholders. Instead, they articulate and claim to serve a broad, public purpose based on universal human (or species) rights and needs. (p. 41).

NGOs and CSOs are both non-profit organizations which can be organized at a local, regional or international level. I use both of these terms in this dissertation.

The LPA has a direct line to the grassroots and Palestinian civil society through funding and supporting ‘projects’ and activities of CSOs/NGOs. I use the term ‘activities’ to refer to things such as planting trees, demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, presentations/conferences, etc., and I use the term ‘project’ to refer to anything from education and awareness initiatives, ‘training of trainers’, dialogue groups, people-to-people workshops, peace camps, observers and accompaniment, art installations and productions, etc.

A second important conceptual distinction to be explained is ‘peacebuilding’ versus ‘liberal peace architecture’. Peacebuilding as a practice has evolved in scope and focus since it was first coined in 1975 by Johan Galtung with the publication of *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding* and was officially introduced into mainstream discourse in the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report *Agenda for Peace* in 1992. The term ‘peacebuilding’ aimed to broaden the range of activities that previous notions of conflict resolution, peacemaking, and peacekeeping embodied. Galtung’s definition of peacebuilding aimed to do this by acknowledging the importance of identifying and building structures which might militate against war, thereby addressing the *root causes* of conflict (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, & Sitea, 2007, p. 37). Lederach (1997) built on this and describes peacebuilding as a,

comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct (p. 84–85).

Today, the term peacebuilding provides an umbrella which recognizes efforts geared towards social change at all levels of society and at all stages of conflict aimed at addressing underlying causes and consequences of conflict. Moreover, it expands our understanding of interventions associated with conflict resolution to include a “broader political agenda comprising civilian as well as military issues needed for peace to be sustained” (Lederach, 1997, p. 4). Despite the capricious nature of the term peacebuilding, with comprehensive critiques found throughout the field¹⁴, at the highest level, we can assume that the ultimate objective of peacebuilding is to reduce and mitigate the impact, frequency, and severity of violent conflict; reduce the “level of human violence in a given political territory” (Reglime, 2020, p. 513); and strive to create a ‘pathway to a peaceful and just society’ (Paffenholz, 2021, p. 378).

My use of the term *liberal peace architecture* on the other hand, could also be termed the ‘liberal peace regime, matrix, or industry’. It refers to the ideological ‘material and financial infrastructure that buttresses’ peacebuilding work; the subsuming activities and institutions; the individuals who work within them; and the ‘formulas they have learned in order to write reports and grant applications, and funding streams that this industry generates and depends on’ (Allen, 2013, p. 4). It is this amorphous ‘architecture’ that follows along like a shadow cast everywhere ‘peacebuilding’ travels, that is being referred to by the term LPA. In this sense, the LPA becomes, “hegemonic in how it governs the terrain of articulations and relationships” (Badarin, 2017, p.

¹⁴ for a discussion around some of these critiques, see Chapter 4- Literature Review.

231) between the international community and – in this case – Palestinians. Moreover, the LPA dictates, “political and financial support, includes or excludes actors, authorizes certain practices and delimits others; it writes narratives of conflicts, and defines acceptable and deviant behaviour” (ibid). Badarin (2017) likens the power and operation of the LPA to that of a “corporate enterprise specializing in knowledge production on conflicts” (ibid).

Oslo, the Liberal Peacebuilding Architecture and CSOs/NGOs

In terms of iconic moments in the Western consciousness related to peace, conflict, and the Middle East, the handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzak Rabin on the lawn of the White House in 1993 has to be one of the more memorable. The handshake marked the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Governing Arrangements (DOP), or the Oslo Accords. While the Oslo Accords were the basis of the official peace process, it was Western peacebuilding efforts and the subsequent introduction of the LPA that underpinned the Accords with interventions prioritizing and developing Palestinian political capacity, state institutions, economic stability, and civil society. In this sense, liberal peacebuilding interventions were rolled out as a “parallel track to negotiations” to the peace process (Hadaad, 2016, p. 4). After the signing of the Accords, the initial investment of billions of dollars in international development aid and peacebuilding funding to the West Bank was framed as a ‘peace dividend’ and was intended to “help bolster support for the Accords by providing tangible social and economic benefits for Palestinians” (Leone, 2011, p. 13). It has been argued that in practice however, this peacebuilding in Palestine prescribes to a neoliberal orthodoxy (Haddad, 2016; Turner, 2012), is a colonial practice (Turner, 2012), contributes to “a ruse of ‘peace’” (Browne, 2021), and resulted in “increased dependency on foreign aid” (Leone, 2011, p. 13). In making sense of these critiques, we need to look to the liberal peace underpinnings of both the Oslo Accords, as well as subsequent peacebuilding efforts.

According to critical scholars such as Badarin (2017), these efforts have led us to where we are today, where the security and market-imbued discourse that dominated the Oslo Accords and the policies carried out by the LPA, have come, “at the expense of other essential issues such as justice, legitimacy, international law, and human rights” (p. 241). In other words, rather than addressing the root causes, colonial legacies/realities, and actual grievances of the parties involved, the Oslo Accords codified a one-sided peace process which prioritized a ‘peace dividend’ of economic security (Leone, 2010, p. 59). One reason for the one-sided nature of the Oslo Accords was that it treated the outcomes of the negotiations as a set of agreements between two equal parties, which it was not; “one country was advanced, sovereign, and historically assisted in its development (Israel); the other was not sovereign or developed, and only recently financially assisted (the occupied Palestinian territories)” (Morrison, 2020, p. 2468). The result was a set of agreements, and international support, which, “clearly favor an industrialized, sovereign state over stateless indigenous people” (ibid). It should come as no surprise then, that the LPA has seen such little progress towards a meaningful, just, and lasting peace in the region. It is important to carry this understanding forward as we move to look at how the LPA has engaged with civil society and the subsequent impact it has had on unarmed resistance in the West Bank.

Due to the international community’s central role in shaping the agreements, from the outset, the Oslo agenda was an omnipresent force, shaping all donor engagement and activity in the region (Jamal, 2007, p. 69). This funding was funneled through a number of different channels such as

bilateral aid to the newly established PA, multilateral assistance and aid via various UN agencies, as well as CSOs and NGOs.¹⁵

Shortly after signing the Oslo Accords, 43 countries present at the first Washington donors conference collectively pledged billions of dollars (initially 2 billion and later increased to 4 billion) in aid to support what at that time was thought to be a five-year interim period (Brynen, 2000, p. 3). While this money, along the more than \$40 billion dollars of funds spent thereafter (Wildeman & Tartir, 2021, p. 223), had the goal of promoting peace through neoliberal development assistance, it also had unseemly manifestations. Among those less desirable outcomes was the professionalization of CSOs/NGOs¹⁶ in all sectors; this has been coined, the

¹⁵ This feature tracked closely with other peacebuilding interventions that have often placed an emphasis on engaging NGOs and CSOs in delivering and allocating assistance. The reliance is based on the normative assumption that CSOs/NGOs are sites of participatory and collective empowerment, effective service providers, more cost-effective and flexible, a core tenant of a vibrant civil society, and are therefore uniquely placed to support change at the grassroots and contribute to the development of a robust civil society in fragile and conflict affected environments (Atia & Herrold, 2018, p. 1044; Dana, 2015, p. 194). Adding to this normative logic built into peacebuilding interventions, was (and continues to be today) the unique political situation in Palestine; it is under military occupation and thus lacks a sovereign government. As a result, in the lead up to and during the early Oslo years, the majority of donor assistance flowed through various CSO/NGO channels (Bryden, 2000).

¹⁶ Pre-Oslo, there was a robust civil society sector recently bolstered by their pivotal role as the glue and engine of the First Intifada. As the peace process took form, gained momentum, and waned in the LPA, these CSOs/NGOs which had been an integral part of the domestic mass-based resistance movement in the First Intifada, were either transformed into foreign-funded NGOs (Dana, 2015, p. 191), or left to wither away (Farsakh, 2016; Jamal, 2007). To this point, Dana (2015) distinguishes between “the pre-Oslo mass-based civil society, and the post-Oslo NGO-led civil society” (p. 196). In the years following Oslo, donor assistance shifted away from solely being dispersed through CSO/NGO channels and moved towards nascent Palestinian official institutions (particularly in areas such as health, education and social services). Towards the end of the Oslo years of 1993- 2000, 15% of all aid to Palestine was to the ‘civil society sector’ (Haddad, 2016, p. 86). Farsakh (2016) pointed out, “the focus on civil society has permeated every area of donor work ever since aid flows to the WBGS [West Bank and Gaza Strip] began in the 1990s, but it became even more significant after 2001” (p. 50).

‘NGO-ization’ of civil society. In this context, the term NGO-ization refers to the process in which CSOs were funded, professionalized, de-politicized, turned into nine-to-five jobs, and thus integrated into a capitalist economic system through the LPA in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords (Choudry & Kapoor, 2013). Sami shares his perspective on this process,

You know what they call NGOs here, ‘Dukkakiin’ [the word for ‘shops’ in Arabic]- just money-making organizations that are upper middle class and are just interested in making money. We do these little workshops here and there so we can benefit. This came from Oslo. For me, I blame Oslo for everything! Oslo created this systems and structures within the PA where billions of dollars were poured into the NGO community, billions of dollars poured into the PA to market and to sell Oslo. The work of civil society NGOs, compared to other countries, it is the upper middle class, if not the upper-upper class. It is a good paying, high end job. It destroyed the volunteerism that we had before. Money started pouring in and the corruption started happening (Sami, Bethelhem).

Sami’s insights mirror arguments put forth by Leone (2010) who identified a similar critique of NGOs operating as ‘dukkakiin’ in her research. Leone (2010) found that NGOs had were called dukkakiin in conversations she had, as well as by local media. Despite this disparaging label which equates them with shops that are set up to service donor demands, they nevertheless retain ‘substantial powers of persuasion in society’ and attract ‘some of the most committed activists’ (p. 62). They do so she argues, because they offer ‘an important vehicle for social mobility’ (ibid). Therefore, the primary reason for resistance activists continued engagement with CSOs/NGOs Leone believes, is the lucrative nature of this work, which I argue has led to the professionalization of activist engagement, the depoliticization of their struggle and activism, and ultimately, their diminished efficacy.

NGO-ization

If NGO-ization refers to the process through which social movements are professionalized, depoliticized, demobilized, and turned from collective endeavors to the endeavor of individuals or

individual CSOs/NGOs, then research participants have painted a clear picture of the NGO-ization of unarmed resistance in the West Bank. According to Lang (2013) NGO-ization should be viewed as “a culturally and politically mutable tendency rather than a narrowly confined path” which comes into being through “different iterations and is fueled by different processes in different global or local constellations” (p. 65). NGO-ization therefore unfolds and manifests differently in different contexts and struggles (Choudry & Kapoor, 2013, p. 10). I therefore think it is important to look at how specifically it plays out in the unarmed resistance movement in the West Bank. Therefore, after discussing the relationship between peacebuilding and unarmed resistance, this chapter will turn to exploring how NGO-ization has had an impact on the unarmed resistance movement.

The ‘Local Turn’

As the world witnessed negotiations and the formal peace process between Israel and Palestine stall, then crumble, and eventually die, to be replaced by a bloody intifada in the early 2000s, international efforts to understand the perspectives of the Palestinian grassroots, and those engaged in unarmed resistance were further bolstered. The failing peace process also dovetailed with a shift in thinking within the LPA which emphasized engagement of the grassroots in peacebuilding actions prior to, and outside of, formal negotiations and political solutions to conflicts. At a policy level, during this time, there was increasing recognition that in order for sustainable peace to be achieved, a people-centred approach which engaged local actors at the grassroots was crucial. The importance of local actors in peacebuilding efforts has been most apparent in the concept of ‘local ownership’ (Reich, 2006, p. 5-6). The *local* in local ownership refers not only to national governments but also to civil society and a country’s civilian population. Local ownership was officially established as a key principle of aid effectiveness as part of the Paris Declaration on Aid

Effectiveness (2005). It was later expanded upon in key policy documents such as *The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (2011), the *World Bank World Development Report* (2011), and *OECD States of Fragility* (2015). These policy documents not only framed the engagement of grassroots actors as a best practice, but also a precondition for effective reforms and sustainable peace. As a result of these normative policy directives, an increasing amount of attention has been cast towards grassroots actors in Palestine, as seen in the widespread funding and support of CSOs/NGOs. This funding fundamentally and irrevocably “transformed the civil society sector financially, programmatically, and structurally” (Norman, 2015, p. 41). Despite the shift from close to 100% of aid being directed through CSOs/NGOs to around 15% by 2000, a turgid NGO/CSO sector remained intact. This sector carried with it not only salaries, but also directives and ideologies flowing from donors, through these organizations, to the grassroots. Therefore, fundamentally shaping the lives of Palestinians.

The signing of the Oslo Accords and the subsequent introduction of the LPA fundamentally altered CSOs/NGOs engagement and activism in the West Bank, particularly with respect to organized Palestinian anti-colonial resistance and its struggle for national liberation and self-determination (Merz, 2012). This was due almost entirely to the official adoption of the two-state solution and statebuilding frameworks outlined under Oslo. As summarized by Dana (2015), “the shift from the phase of the national liberation struggle to the phase of a Western-guided peacebuilding process invariably implicated multi-layered processes of political, economic, social and institutional reconfigurations” (p. 195). In other words, this not only facilitated a shift in political leadership from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to Palestinian Authority (PA), it also led to a shift in civil society to “carry out predefined tasks in service of the ‘peace process’” (ibid). This shift Dana posited, was “one of the most salient political implications of the Oslo

process” (ibid). In short, the Oslo Accords laid the groundwork for Western peacebuilding, and thus the LPA, to have a direct line into resistance activism and organizing in the West Bank by introducing new paradigms, frameworks, and patterns of external influence and intervention into internal Palestinian affairs. This has led to a context where CSOs/NGOs have had to, “readapt to the perquisites of the Oslo political equation by replacing major political assignments previously associated with the dynamics of anti-colonial struggle with ostensibly apolitical approaches based on the politics of peacebuilding” (ibid, p. 195). An integral aspect of exploring how the LPA has engaged with and shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance, is questioning their underlying assumptions and goals.

Liberal Peacebuilding and Unarmed Resistance: Co-Constitutive or Diametrically Opposed?

Many authors have called attention to the fact that in the West Bank, the distinction between the concepts of peacebuilding and unarmed resistance is subtle (Hassassian, 2006; Musleh, 2012, p. 98; Richter-Devroe, 2008). For example, Foster (2011) posits, “peacebuilding activities in the West Bank reside in a complex nexus of resistance to occupation, societal development, and nation building with many local organizations involved in all three types of activities” (p. 20). In the following Chapters 10 and 11, I chart how men engaged in unarmed resistance have learned to play their part in this logic.

Despite the complementarity that some have argued exists between unarmed resistance and peacebuilding, the conflation, adoption, and proliferation of this logic on behalf of the LPA should not be left unproblematized. There are both practical and theoretical ramifications of this conflation. At the most rudimentary level, both unarmed resistance and peacebuilding seek to address social, structural, and cultural violence through methods which do not rely on the use of

arms (Lederach, 1995). However, it should be acknowledged that there are ontological differences between Palestinian resisters and the LPA when it comes to their framing, goals, and methods of both resistance, as well as peace and peacebuilding.

During data collection, it became apparent that articulating a culturally appropriate, context sensitive, and informed working definition of unarmed resistance, peace, and peacebuilding was crucial. The term peacebuilding is highly contentious in Palestine and often evokes a visceral reaction when not clearly defined. The sensitivity surrounding the definition of peacebuilding is due to a number of reasons. These included: multiple years of unsuccessful political negotiation coined as peacebuilding; the assumption that ‘peacebuilding’ implies that the conflict is over and one is now working to build or rebuild a society; the lack of understanding regarding what peace means to Palestinians as opposed to Israelis; and the fear of normalizing an abnormal and unequal situation between Palestinians and Israelis. The following quotes highlight some of the sensitivities around peacebuilding in participants’ own words. One participant articulated the rejection of the word peacebuilding in the following way:

If I am hungry and you keep waving a piece of bread before my eyes at first, I will try my best to get it. I will talk to you, ask you, beg you, but then if you refuse to give it to me, even a piece of it, I will become angry and hate you for teasing me.... This is peace and peacebuilding in Palestine. People keep hearing about peace and peacebuilding but they don’t live it, they don’t taste it, they don’t feel it. They are still hungry (Ali, Beit Ummar).

Moreover, Leila, a director of a peace and nonviolence NGO in Ramallah explained:

For many the terms peace and peacebuilding are pessimistic words because they represent political peacebuilding [from which nothing has yet to be achieved]... peace is the unattainable word that we now connect with the ideas of compromise, surrendering, political loss, humiliation, and normalization (Leila, Ramallah).

The above quotations highlight how terms such as peacebuilding are imbued with political and cultural nuance, a fact that is often lost on policy makers and ‘peacebuilding experts’. This points to a crucial detail related to unarmed resistance and peacebuilding; for Palestinians, the crux and objective of unarmed resistance and/or peacebuilding is nothing short of internationally recognized Palestinian statehood. Amid donor talk, policy documents, and philosophical academic debates, this point must never be forgotten.

Prior to the peace process, participants explained that Palestinians would not have thought to categorize resistance (regardless of its form) and peacebuilding together. This assertion is supported by Hassassian’s (2006) research which found that people engaged in unarmed resistance prior to the Oslo years, possessed a “pre-established commitment to the national struggle before they have any commitment to what is commonly seen as the peace process” (p. 72 as cited in Norman, 2015, p. 41). Taking into consideration these different standpoints, at first blush, resistance and peacebuilding efforts do not instinctually share the same space. However, despite the perceived daylight between the two concepts, they have become increasingly intertwined in the West Bank over the last 30 years since Oslo. This intertwining of the two began with the Oslo Accords which officially relabeled Palestinians’ struggle from that of an occupied people struggling for liberation and independence, to a struggle of people in a ‘conflict’ or ‘post-conflict’ zone (Hanafi & Tabar, 2005, p. 222).

Richmond & Mitchell (2011) suggest that Liberal peace interventions are inevitably “shaped by local, contextual elements and forms of agency” (p. 17); a process that was highlighted throughout this research in the West Bank. From the outset, rather than a context of post-conflict, Liberal peacebuilding interventions and activities in the West Bank have existed within the context of a

military occupation and ongoing settler colonial displacement and dispossession. As a result, Liberal peacebuilding activities in the West Bank have *also* existed within the context of an ongoing indigenous resistance movement, fighting against both the immediate threats of displacement and dispossession, as well as fighting for self-determination and national liberation. This diverse resistance movement has employed a spectrum of resistance tactics over the decades. However, an ever-present modality has been unarmed resistance.

During the First Intifada, mass popular unarmed resistance was practiced throughout Palestine. It is generally accepted that it was disruptive, raised the cost and inconvenience of the occupation, and threatened political isolation for Israel to such a degree that it eventually pressured Israel to the negotiation table (first Madrid and then Oslo). This history supports Dubouet's (2008) claim that unarmed resistance can support the goals of peacebuilding by "transforming unbalanced power relations in preparation for conflict negotiations" (p. 3). During the First Intifada, Palestinian's use of unarmed resistance gained them recognition both internationally and from Israel, and served to bolster their demands of self-determination. This ultimately led to the recognition of the PLO and the commencement of the Peace Process. This early success of unarmed resistance, however, was short lived. Despite helping to encourage negotiations with the Israelis at the outset, in the years since Oslo, unarmed resistance hasn't facilitated any further meaningful traction and has borne neither tangible *political* successes nor notable improvements in the lives of Palestinians.

In the years following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Palestinian political leadership (the PLO and PA) became increasingly dysfunctional and ineffective; a reality that on the one hand, certainly contributed to the wane and extinction of an organized resistance movement. While on the other

hand, brought the concept of unarmed resistance and peacebuilding closer together as Palestinians were essentially rudderless, and no longer had national leadership to issue resistance directives. Corruption, fragmentation, and a lack of legitimacy extinguished Palestinians' sense of national unity and led to what many participants describe as utter political and nationalist apathy.

Hope is what kept people going, trust was huge, trust in the leaders themselves. But now everyone has lost hope. We have lost hope in our leadership, we have lost hope in ourselves, we have lost hope in violence and we have lost hope in nonviolence. After 70 years we have tried everything and we have just had more and more losses. There is no fruit, no matter the tactic (Yacoub, Hebron).

While the shambles of Palestinian political leadership certainly contributed to the nearly defunct resistance movement, this dissertation focuses on another area, the introduction of billions of dollars of development aid and assistance under the mantle of 'peacebuilding' into CSOs/ NGOs in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords.

As suggested in the previous paragraph, resistance may not intuitively fall under the banner of peacebuilding. However, the LPA has subsumed forms of unarmed resistance under the umbrella of 'nonviolent resistance' into the purview of peacebuilding activities. They do so in part by framing unarmed resistance as a means of reducing overt violence and thus suffering in the region; by popularizing the notion that peace will never be achieved through (Palestinian) violence and that peace will only be achieved through 'peaceful' means; by situating individuals' lack of understanding, connection, and empathy for 'the other side' as a significant barrier to creating peace; and by suggesting that if Palestinian and Israeli citizens can meet and make peace at a personal level, then their respective governments can be pressured into following suit— thus paving the way for more dialogue, negotiation, and mediation. In short, "a discourse emerged under Oslo that linked nonviolence with notions of peace, coexistence, dialogue, toleration,

forgiveness, and reconciliation” (Norman, 2015, p. 41). By tying nonviolent resistance to peacebuilding, the LPA forged and legitimized their involvement in the shaping of an indigenous act of rebellion and resistance. In this sense, the LPA coopted something that was originally a tool of national liberation, to be used as a tool to build Liberal peace. Moreover, they did so despite that fact that many facets of the conflict enshrined in Oslo (which is the foundation of the Liberal peace in region) are at odds with the historic goals of Palestinians’ national liberation movement.¹⁷

Not surprisingly therefore, the involvement of the LPA, has not come without substantially altering how resistance is practiced and engaged with. It is well documented that rather than taking their cues from their beneficiaries/recipients/constituents who are resisting oppression and settler colonialism, donors making up the international community refuse “to accept Palestinian society’s own critique of the Oslo process and its definition of resistance against the occupation” (Farsakh, 2016, p. 60).

It should be emphasized that the LPA’s inroad to influencing unarmed resistance was—and continues in part to be—through exerting the power and promise of financial support for CSOs/NGOs (Dana, 2015, p. 195). This financial support, influences the agendas of CSOs/NGOs (and therefore unarmed resistance) less through direct donor conditionality, and more commonly through the effects of “competition over funding and the kinds of organizational restructuring” that obtaining funding and support implicitly requires (ibid, p. 196). This includes CSOs/NGOs

¹⁷ One could also add that by shifting efforts away from national liberation and towards peacebuilding, the LPA brought Palestinians down a path which ultimately continues to buy more time for the ‘status quo’, which is ultimately the incessant settlement movement that daily takes acreage away from a future Palestinian state. Therefore, the longer the LPA contributes to distracting Palestinians (and the world) away from meaningful resistance, the more time the Israelis have to make sure a Palestine will never exist by creating new ‘facts on the ground’.

organizing and support for certain resistance tactics as well as the rhetoric and language used to speak about the occupation and broader context.¹⁸

This chapter has so far argued that in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, agendas tied to liberal peacebuilding were established in the West Bank. These agendas then became an omnipresent force, shaping all donor funding in the region. A great deal of this funding was funneled through CSOs/NGOs. This resulted in Western peacebuilding, and as a result the LPA, having a direct line into grassroots unarmed resistance activism and organizing in the West Bank. However, this involvement was not neutral. Ontological differences emerged between Palestinian resisters/civil society and the LPA. These related to framing, goals, and methods of resistance, as well as peace. As such, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, the ontological differences have led to a number of shifts in unarmed resistance in the West Bank which require further analysis. A helpful conceptual framework to plot these shifts is that of NGO-ization.

NGO-ization refers to the process in which CSOs/NGOs are funded, professionalized, depoliticized, and integrated into a capitalist economic system squarely located in the liberal peacebuilding agenda. I will now trace how the involvement of the LPA has led to the NGO-ization of unarmed resistance in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords along 4 key tangible shifts: from a national agenda to the globalized liberal peace agenda; from collectivism under popular resistance to the globalized elite; from politics to the anti-politics of specific sites/projects/days; and from indigenous knowledge towards neo-colonial knowledge of Orientalism.

¹⁸ This point will be flushed out in Chapters 6 and 7

NGO-ization: The Declawing of a Movement

Dana (2013) identifies four dimensions of NGO-ization, and what he refers to as, “what went wrong” with civil society after Oslo. These are: national agenda versus globalized agenda; collectivism versus elitism; politics versus anti-politics; and indigenous knowledge versus neocolonial knowledge. In order to explore how the process of NGO-ization has had an impact on unarmed resistance, I employ a slightly altered version of Dana’s (2013) four domains as a basis of the following section:

- 1) From a National Agenda to the Globalized Liberal Peace Agenda;
- 2) From Collectivism Under Popular Resistance to the Globalized Elite;
- 3) From Politics to the Anti-Politics of Specific Sites/Projects/Days; and
- 4) From Indigenous knowledge towards Neo-Colonial Knowledge of Orientalism

Using these four domains, I will trace the effects of NGO-ization on the unarmed resistance movement.

From a National Agenda to the Globalized Liberal Peace Agenda

In their research on liberal peacebuilding processes in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Bosnia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Liberia, Richmond & Mitchell (2011) found that the liberal peace paradigm “tends to privilege the goals of international actors, often excluding the needs, goals, and norms of local actors” (p. 326). In light of the data collected during research, this charge is befitting in the West Bank.

It is fair to say that the national liberation movement has been undermined as a result of the Oslo Accords (Brown, 2003; Ghanem, 2010; Jad, 2020; Shweiki, 2014). While multifaceted, this is due in part to the proliferation of CSOs/NGOs in service to the LPA. In the aftermath of Oslo Accords Leone (2011) explains, “Many NGOs progressively became part of an imagined global community

that shared their professionalism and globalized outlook but, as a result, they became less involved in the Palestinian national project” (p. 14-15). The process of directing unarmed resistance away from a nationalist agenda towards a liberal peace agenda has subsequently blunted the edges of this activism. This goes beyond the classic ‘NGO falling victim to the curse of foreign aid-dependency’ critique. It points to an entire movement for national liberation being thwarted, contorted, and coopted by the LPA. Jad (2007) recognized this when she commented, “the NGO-ization of the national agenda in Palestine, transformed it from a struggle to realize self-determination and sovereign statehood into projects for donor funding” (p. 628). By requiring that CSOs/NGOs receiving funding from the LPA conform to the Oslo Framework, the LPA set in motion a major restructuring of CSOs/NGOs towards servicing the ‘peace process’ (Dana, 2013). “This deeply altered the organizations’ self-perception and the way in which they related to the national liberation movement and their previously active social constituencies” (ibid). In the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, no longer was there an agreed upon national liberation goal for those engaged in unarmed resistance. Instead, goals were diversified towards those embedded within the Oslo Accords and the liberal peace paradigm. Jamal’s (2007) research supports this assertion. She notes, “most donor projects aimed to secure one objective—the success of the peace process with Israel” (p. 70). The lack of a common national liberation goal dovetailed with the introduction of new incentive structures which also contributed to the disintegration of a national agenda. The LPA rejigged the incentives to participate in unarmed resistance away from national service to independence and freedom, towards material benefits and personal gains.

The LPA’s conditional financial and ideological support meant that they held a great deal of power to direct the agenda of CSOs/NGOs. We see evidence of this in the responses of research

participants who highlight the loss of freedom they experience in pursuing unarmed resistance rooted in anti-occupation activity.¹⁹

Critics of NGO-ization have often argued that the process turns CSOs/NGOs into ‘satellites’ of international agendas and therefore is “‘de-localizing’ them and pulling their leadership away from their members” (Meyers, 2016, p. 4). The patronage between the LPA and Palestinian CSOs/NGOs has pulled activism away from a nationalist agenda and the types of organizing/activism which historically mobilized Palestinians.²⁰ Meyer (2016) suggests that there is an “inverse relationship between the types of things local groups need to say and do to get international support” and the things that the broader civil society want to see out of CSOs/NGOs operating in their communities (p. 5). Further to this point, Bob (2005) warns of the loss of domestic legitimacy which results from this inverse relationship when he states, “what plays best overseas seldom corresponds to what matters most domestically” (p. 193).

An illustration of Palestinian concerns for loss of domestic legitimacy and nationalist agenda can be found in the language of protest songs, placards, and chants. Examples of this were found while attending a protest in Hebron. During the protest, I witnessed a conversation between three people: the organizer of the event (the Founder and Director of a well-known NGO and much-interviewed Palestinian activists), one of the shabāb that worked at the NGO and helped to mobilize youth in

¹⁹ The case of the SIDA funded theatre production on page 344, is one such example. By revoking funding for distributing a poster which made an illustrative reference to the history of resistance in Jenin Camp, the LPA attempted to silence and redirect unarmed resistance away from the historical national agenda, and shape it to fit its version of unarmed resistance. Here we see the LPA eager to support CSOs/NGOs, but only ones promoting narratives that fit neatly into the Oslo framework.

²⁰ Specific illustrative examples of the ways that these agendas differ will be given in subsequent chapters.

the area, and an international solidarity activist. The conversation illustrated the way that external opinions and perceptions come to play a substantial role in shaping unarmed resistance, even down to the language used. To me, the concerns expressed between the three individuals at the protest centred on the way that external influences and narratives result in significant changes to the language of dissent – changes that align with the liberal peace paradigm and minimize or erase the domestic impetus, discourse and legitimacy of unarmed resistance.

The conversation between the three individuals unfolded around a debate they were having related to what should be written on a placard that was to be held at the front of the demonstration the next morning. The shabāb wanted to write—in English— “*From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free!*”. The organizer of the event told the shabāb that this had the potential to upset some of the international and Israeli activists present at the protest because it could be interpreted as calling for the destruction of Israel. He also explained that they got a large portion of their funding from an American Jewish organization who would most likely revoke their funding if they saw the slogan on a placard. The international solidarity activist agreed, explaining that in America, that would be understood as a call which denied Israel’s right to exist and suggested a few different slogans. The shabāb however, explained that to him, the slogan was a call for the establishment of a democratic state for all people living in historic Palestine, a place where Palestinians have equal rights, freedom of movement, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. His family was from the Latroun area he explained, and they had been forcibly displaced and their village destroyed during the 1967 war. To him, the slogan was about his right to return there, to harvest his grandfather’s olive trees which still stood, despite his house being destroyed. It had nothing to do with the erasure of Israel, but rather as part of a one state solution where everyone lived under one set of laws, rights, and freedoms. Drawing on notes I took during the event, the shabāb explained,

‘the Israelis aren’t going anywhere, we might as well fight for a future where we can all live together’ (Shabāb, Hebron). At the end, the Shabāb lost, and another slogan was chosen; “*Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine*”. At the time, I was struck by the unspoken hierarchy of agendas and differing perspectives. The Shabāb lost this battle I believe, because he was proposing a vision for the future of Palestine that broke with the Oslo framework, and thus the framework of the LPA. The organizer, while sympathizing with the Shabāb and agreeing with him when he explained himself, nevertheless, insisted that he chose another slogan as not to upset ‘the internationals’ or disrupt their funding and support. The international solidarity activist was adamant about the slogan being anti-Semitic and therefore inappropriate. The Shabāb felt it was a profound and humanizing vision of a future free from discrimination. Ultimately, he was denied the space for his vision, for a national agenda that broke with the global liberal peace paradigm and subsequently the Oslo Framework.



Image 4: Activist making placards for the protest the following morning. Photo taken shortly after the interaction described above. Photo by Author, Feb 2018

This example highlights the way that the relationship of patronage between donors and CSOs/NGOs results in unarmed resistance (as well as peace) frameworks, agendas, and even

language to shift to fit within the LPA. I believe this example provides anecdotal support to Regime's (2020) critique of peace being used as a political tool, "the success of a particular vision of peace primarily depends on the effectiveness of the powerful actors' mobilization efforts in support of such a peace vision, while also delegitimizing its *competitors*" (emphasis added, p. 512). While it may initially seem odd to call Palestinians engaged in unarmed resistance 'competitors' vis-à-vis the LPA, in a sense they are. Insofar as their vision for peace, peacebuilding, and unarmed resistance differs from those of the LPA, their alternatives must be discredited in order to ensure consensus to the Oslo paradigm.

The NGO-ization of resistance has created what Norman (2015) calls the "nonviolence market" (p. 43). Through establishing a 'competition over funds for nonviolence', donor engagement in this field turned it 'into a commodity of sorts' (ibid, p. 44). Evidence of this 'nonviolence market' can be found throughout interviews with research participants. Participants highlighted the ways that unarmed resistance became a job, a project, and/or a means of accessing perks such as international travel. Because of this, it also created fractures and tension between activists, as well as between activists and the general public. In addition to these manifestations, in aiming to address my second research question, '*post-Oslo, how have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?*', I want to highlight how the NGO-ization of resistance has 'declawed' much of this activism. I say declawed insofar as it required this activism to adhere to the agendas and narratives of the LPA rather than more radical anti-colonial and national liberation narratives. Adbulfattah laments,

Before Oslo, the Palestinian community was still led by civil society organizations and local NGOs within the camps, within all of Palestine—the youth centres, the cultural centres— they were the flames of revolt. Patriotism,

independence, and so on. Now, they just feed the PA or the international community's agenda (Addulfattah, Aida Camp).

Unarmed resistance is not the only field in Palestine which has seen a shift from domestic to globalized agendas. Kuttab's (2008) research over the past three decades has illustrated the systematic way that Palestinian women's rights NGOs have adopted a paradigm based on liberal feminism, which "conceives women as the sole agents of their destiny and considers gender as an individual rather than a relational concept" (p. 112). In terms of agendas and priorities of CSOs/NGOs, she argues that this results in an individualistic understanding of gender as something that individual and atomized women experience. This functions to dislocate their work, and ultimately depoliticize it, from the wider political, economic, and social context of occupation. Not surprisingly, the impacts of these interventions are limited, lack any *transformative* potential, and fail to meet their emancipatory and empowering goals. Taking the findings of Kuttab's work on Palestinian women's rights organizations and applying them to the work of Palestinian organizations promoting peacebuilding and nonviolence, is particularly insightful. What Kuttab (2008) describes in the case of Palestinian women's rights organizations is analogous to that of unarmed resistance in the West Bank. In the same way that she suggests these organizations '*conceive women as the sole agents of their destiny and considers gender as an individual rather than a relational concept*', so too has unarmed resistance adopted the view of the LPA which views the plight of Palestinians as a result of individual phenomenon such as the building of the separation wall rather than as part of systematic and institutionalized settler colonial dispossession. This atomized understanding is detached from the larger structural nature of oppression resulting from settler colonialism. This atomized and depoliticized reframing then leads resistance organizing to focusing on these, rather than the larger agenda for national liberation. This will be expanded upon in the sections below.

From Collectivism Under Popular Resistance to the Globalized Elite

Engaging in unarmed resistance supported by the LPA provides research participants with salaries and other forms of financial remuneration. It also provides opportunities to engage with foreigners inside the West Bank at protests and events, and outside of Palestine through invitations to participate in international events and conferences (Dana, 2013). These privileges have helped to create what Hanafi & Tabar (2005) call a Palestinian “globalized elite”. I would add to this, paid activist work also undermined the purpose of volunteerism and led to the death of popular resistance.

As outlined in the above section, this elite is fettered to the agendas of actors within the LPA, rather than being tied to their constituents and broader Palestinian civil society. This, combined with the salaries and international connections, has resulted in a crisis in their legitimacy. This crisis in legitimacy relates to the Palestinian public’s perception that these activists no longer possess a commitment to Palestinian liberation, and instead, are plagued by corruption and a quest for personal gain. This crisis has paved the way for accusations of elitism directed towards unarmed resistance activists. As a result, research participants detailed the challenges they face in regard to their ability to mobilize large numbers of individuals. In their view, the general population increasingly saw participating in unarmed resistance as something elitist and unrepresentative of their views and goals, and were therefore less willing to mobilize in the name of it. Research participants were aware of this. They made sense of it by explaining that the general public was jealous of activists’ travel and salaries and therefore did not want to join them in their resistance activities. Research participants further detailed the way that salaries and remuneration for activism greatly reduced volunteerism. Because collective action and mass mobilization requires a desire to engage based on ideology, philosophy, and a shared common goal—and on a

voluntary basis—this means that the death of volunteerism, meant a death to collective action, or what Palestinians call popular resistance. Ultimately, it also diminished research participants’ ability to speak for Palestinian civil society as they arguably no longer represent the grassroots. The charge of elitism, has gone hand in hand with the professionalization of unarmed resistance work and activism and has led to its divorce from the grassroots, therefore resulting in an erosion of trust, and crisis in legitimacy as unarmed resistance activists are increasingly seen as conduits of the West, and Israel.

From Politics to the Anti-Politics of Specific Sites/Projects/Days

For my research participants, another angle of NGO-ization has meant a general de-radicalization²¹ of their agendas (ie. making life better under occupation but not talking about how to rid the occupation). In saying this, I am suggesting their agendas became less politically driven and quieted activists calls for the structural overthrow of their systematic dispossession and occupation. As Jamal (2007) notes, in the aftermath of Oslo, “none of the donor programs were aimed at addressing the occupation or the political difficulties caused by that occupation” (p. 73). This mirrors findings of Verkoren & Van Meeuwen (2013) who argue that the work of NGOs in post-conflict contexts is often depoliticized and therefore “becomes uncritical of structural issues and power imbalances, whether domestically or internationally” (p. 161). Instead of addressing the occupation and political dimensions of the conflict, unarmed resistance began to focus on specific

²¹ I do not use the term radicalized in any theological or psychological sense. I say de-radicalize in the sense of vision, goals, and level of politicization, rather than referring to any violent repertoire of action. I use the term radical in a similar fashion as it is used in describing different branches of feminism. I liken it to the difference between radical feminism and liberal feminism. Where the former aims to overthrow the patriarchal system, where the latter calls for reducing barriers to women’s participation in the system, rather than overthrowing the whole system as seen with radical feminism.

sites and days of the week (most often Fridays), and specific projects/activities,²² none of which were coordinated or framed as part of a larger political struggle to end the occupation and achieve independence and statehood. To this point, Jawad (2011) explains that with the gradual focalization of resistance, each new site of resistance “narrows the discourse, understanding, and reach of the Palestinian struggle, as it physically reduces the map of Palestine” (p. 140).

Specific sites of resistance include activities such as targeting the route of the Israeli separation wall²³, 85% of which is built inside the West Bank, thus usurping large portions of Palestinian land. Targeting the route of the wall was the primary motivation for unarmed resistance in villages such as Budros and Bil’in. Examples of specific sites of resistance also include the expansion of a settlement cutting a village off from their water supply such as in Nabi Saleh; or settlers attempts to take over the land and cave dwellings of Bedouin families in the South Hebron Hills. Site specific activities also included replanting olive trees after they have been cut down by settlers, or protesting for the removal of metal detectors at Al Aqsa Mosque. I am not suggesting that these acts of unarmed resistance have been introduced by the LPA, I believe they would be part of the repertoire of unarmed resistance with or without the LPA. What I am suggesting is that the lack of coordination between these acts, the narrowing of goals in such a way as the activities become the goal in and of itself—rather than a small victory contributing to the larger goal of decolonization—are a result of the de-politicization of resistance efforts as they became projects, and sites of

²² Detailed examples and context around the focalization of resistance activities to specific sites, dates, and project will be provided in Chapter 7

²³ In 2004, the International Court of Justice ruled that the wall was “contrary to international law” as it involves the destruction and illegal confiscation of Palestinian land and imposes severe restrictions on Palestinian movement.

activism supported by the LPA. We see evidence of this on when Basel lamented, “once they stopped building the wall in Bil’in, we stopped our actions” (Basel, Bil’in).

Connecting this to the death of the national agenda, Jawad (2011) explains, the “Palestinian anticolonial liberation struggle has been largely reconfigured into a humanitarian struggle of a people distributed over numerous enclaves, inside and outside the land of Palestine” (p. 140). By reducing the map of Palestine, Jawad refers to the way that focusing on sites of resistance (rather than an over-all strategy), de-politicizes this activism. It makes unarmed resistance activism about 150 dunams of land in Nabi Saleh for example, as opposed to the systematic and institutionalized policies of apartheid and settler colonialism. It does so by inadvertently accepting the status quo of occupation; the division of the West Bank into Area A, B, and C which inevitably leads to a clampdown on freedom of movement, human rights, and security; and the ever-expanding settlement enterprise. This is succinctly outlined in Farsakh’s (2016) analysis of donor funding to Palestinian CSOs/NGOs targeting good governance,

While helpful in providing needed training, education, and management techniques, good governance projects nevertheless remain problematic. They ... seek to depoliticize the community rather than to empower it to resist Israeli settler colonialism... they allow people to vent but not necessarily to suggest an alternative to the ongoing political reality. Although citizens are able to express discontent and report on corrupt bureaucrats under such schemes, they are not encouraged or enabled to challenge authority or engage it critically, especially as they became increasingly dependent on it (p. 56)

By allowing people to vent but not change their political reality, Farsakh’s analysis is helpful in understanding the depoliticizing effects of supporting unarmed resistance activities such as protesting the route of the Israeli separation wall. Using the same language as Farsakh, we see how these specific sites of activism allow people to vent, but this support does not encourage or empower them to suggest alternatives to the ongoing political reality of occupation and settlement

expansion . Ultimately, I believe that by erasing the politics of settler colonialism and occupation, as well as erasing the politics of resisting such practices, the LPA renders this sort of resistance ineffectual if measured against the national liberation goals articulated by research participants.²⁴

This brings us to the last category laid out by Dana (2013) which focuses on the way that NGO-ization functions to shift the production and transfer of indigenous knowledge towards what he calls, ‘neo-colonial knowledge’.

From Indigenous Knowledge Towards Neo-Colonial Knowledge of Orientalism

From the broader NGO-ization literature, we know that donor funding imposes both material, as well as ideological constraints on NGOs (Liinason, 2021). What I think is important to reflect on is how the last three decades of liberal peacebuilding have influenced and shaped our knowledge and understanding in the West of what peace, peacebuilding, and unarmed resistance means/represent in Palestine. How has knowledge about the region been constructed, communicated and transmitted, and by who?

Dana (2013) argues that prior to the Oslo Accords, CSOs/NGOs were central to the creation of knowledge which sustained a Palestinian political consciousness predicated on “principles of resistance and self-determination” (n.p). This knowledge, he argues, “emphasized local culture as a cornerstone to the construction of collective identity and the promotion of the culture of resistance” (n.p). This knowledge was further bolstered by a number of Arab and Palestinian authors and academics researching and publishing on issues related to the settler colonial conflict and Palestinian resistance to it (Aruri, 1981; Elmessiri, 1981; Hadawi, 1981, 1972, 1977; Hadawi,

²⁴ I should note however, that it remains *effectual* in so far as it can produce measurable outcomes suited for funding cycles and RBM frameworks of the LPA.

& Kubursi, 1988; Khalidi, 1984). This began to change when the Oslo Accords shifted the framework through which the West (and particularly donors) engaged with the region, and established a statebuilding and peacebuilding agenda in the early 1990s. As liberal peacebuilding became the dominant paradigm through which the conflict was framed and understood, funding, frameworks, and ideological underpinnings began to shift. This fundamentally shifted the centre of knowledge creation. As liberal peacebuilding research began to take the place of other pre-existing research agendas in the region, this inadvertently contributed to shifting knowledge formation because, as Xu (2019) cites, “mainstream peacebuilding research agendas end up reinforcing Western biases and reproducing Western power and hegemony” (p. 582). The fact that the majority of these publications were in English and therefore available to Western audiences, only exacerbated this process. Examples of this can be seen in the thousands of United Nations reports, as well as NGO, donor, World Bank, IMF, and OECD reports published since the Oslo Accords. As accessible English language literature on Palestine, these reports, and the embedded frameworks from which they were conceptualized, became a well-tapped source of ‘knowledge’ about the region. One of the many results of the burgeoning liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding literature was a gradual move away from an emphasis on creating a local culture of resistance and steadfastness (*sumud*), towards a ‘standardized body of knowledge’ of the LPA. Ultimately, Dana (2013) concludes that this process has been so thorough that today, “Palestinian NGOs are instrumental in transmitting, consuming and marketing this knowledge” (ibid).

As an example, as CSOs/NGOs have become increasingly intertwined with the LPA, research participants have learned to operate in their linguistic repertoire in order to gain access to funds and status. In the West Bank, during interviews that I conducted – as well as interviews with other researchers and journalists I either overheard or was present for – certain English buzzwords and

phrases were commonly used to talk about unarmed resistance. This lexicon included phrases such as *'peaceful resistance'*, *'joint struggle'*, *'a shared, common humanity'*, *'action not reaction'*, *'feel the pain of my enemy'*, *'sometimes you have to be right, and sometimes you have to be smart'*, and so on.²⁵ These phrases were used by research participants during interviews conducted in English and Arabic to communicate their personal experiences, opinions, and thoughts. They served as the framework for which research participants relied on to present their story with the world. Two things are of note: first is the frequency of which these phrases were used. They would often be peppered throughout interviews and repeated verbatim by diverse participants. The verbatim repetition is unusual given the specific and detailed wording such as *'shared common humanity'*. There are countless ways of expressing this same sentiment, and the fact that multiple participants used this exact verbiage suggests that they had heard it somewhere and felt compelled to borrow the exact phrase.

Secondly, and offering us a clue as to the source of such phrases, during interviews conducted in Arabic, participants would switch to English to say things such as, *'joint struggle'*, *'action not reaction'*, or *'peaceful resistance'* etc. When I would ask my translator why they said it in English, they explained that the interviewee most likely, 'didn't know how to say it in Arabic'. Given that *all* of my research participants spoke Arabic as their native tongue, the fact that they said these phrases in English when the rest of the 1-2-hour interview was conducted in Arabic, points to the foreign nature of such phrases.

²⁵ During participant observation, I also overheard research participants use these same phrases countless times at events, workshops, and activities carried out by CSOs/NGO's engaged in nonviolent resistance. Moreover, you can hear them in the media and in documentaries interviewing unarmed resistance activists.

I believe that research participants were introduced to such phrases through their work and engagement with various branches of the LPA: workshops, trainings, project proposals, donor reports; as well as through their interactions with international activists, donors, and various other LPA stakeholders. Through this subtle shift in language and phraseology, indigenous knowledge and ways of speaking about their experiences and thoughts in their native tongue begin to be transformed by their exposure and engagement with the LPA. This is evident in the adoption of a specific lexicon and verbiage as illustrated above, as well as in the adoption of broader narratives of resistance (this will be expanded upon in the next chapter).

In 2012, Awashra and Awashreh conducted a study on Palestinian NGO governance in the West Bank, with a focus on accountability. The findings of their study point to the fact that Palestinian NGOs are more accountable to donors than to their constituents, or the civil society they purportedly represent. This, they argue, is related to two interrelated issues: “NGOs function with a donor-driven agenda, and that their accountabilities are directed upwards towards their financiers” (Awashra & Awashreh, 2012, p. 70). If CSOs/NGOs are directed by a donor-driven agenda, and their accountability is tied to their financiers, then we can begin to understand why and how they have moved away from producing and disseminating indigenous knowledge which represents indigenous understandings of peace, peacebuilding, and resistance. Further, we can begin to plot how and why Orientalist renditions of both the oppression, as well as Palestinians response to it, have subsumed the anti-colonial body of knowledge from which CSOs/NGOs activism was historically grounded pre-Oslo.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have turned a critical lens on liberal peacebuilding in the West Bank. I have argued that as the name of this chapter suggests — ‘Occupied by Nonviolence’ — the omnipresent effects of the LPA has created an occupation of sorts in the West Bank. In so far as development assistance, aid, and other forms of support are tethered to the agenda of the LPA, unarmed resistance organizing and activism has trimmed its sails so closely to the LPA winds as to cause it to deviate from its national liberation course. I have laid out an argument suggesting that the LPA has led to the NGO-ization of the unarmed resistance movement. That is, it has led to its professionalization, de-politicization, and demobilization. In making this argument, I have unsettled assumptions and the romanticization of the *local* under liberal peacebuilding by raising “important questions regarding the way grassroots associations can be co-opted by other actors, including representatives of global civil society such as foreign donors, international NGOs, and transnational networks” (Mayers, 2016, p. 12). I highlighted 4 key tangible shifts through which the LPA contributed to the NGO-ization of unarmed resistance in the West Bank. It shifted: from a national agenda to the globalized liberal peace agenda; from collectivism under popular resistance to the globalized elite; from politics to the anti-politics of specific sites/projects/days; and from indigenous knowledge towards neo-colonial knowledge of Orientalism.

If we conceive of the LPA as being comprised of both philosophical/ideological *and* material elements, then interaction between the LPA and Palestinian resistance too can be understood as operating on these different levels. The following two chapters will build on the discussion presented here, and address the role that ideology and framing associated with the LPA plays in shaping unarmed resistance (Chapter 8), as well as the material and structural effects of the LPA on unarmed resistance (Chapter 9).

CHAPTER 8- Two Wings of a Bird: Armed and Unarmed Resistance

In Chapter 7 I fleshed out what I mean by *liberal peace architecture* (LPA). I painted a picture of its relationship to civil society organizations/nongovernmental organizations (CSOs/NGOs), and its subsequent involvement in unarmed resistance. The chapter argued that through its involvement with CSOs/NGOs, the LPA has fundamentally altered the space, motivations, incentives, and practice of unarmed resistance in the West Bank. One way of understanding this, Chapter 7 argued, is through the conceptual framework of NGO-ization. If, as Chapter 7 suggested, the LPA can be conceived of as operating on both the philosophical/ideological *and* material level, then our exploration of the interactions and influences of the LPA on Palestinian unarmed resistance should be considered on these different levels. This chapter will consider the role that ideology and framing of the LPA plays in shaping unarmed resistance in the West Bank. This chapter therefore, will shift the analytical lens from more of a conceptual lens of NGO-ization presented in Chapter 7, towards a theoretical and philosophic lens of Orientalism.

In exploring the question of, ‘*How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?*’, an important point of departure needs be the very language we use to speak about resistance. Armed and unarmed, violent and nonviolent; far from a pedantic distinction, the use and application of these terms reveals a great deal more than merely tactical distinctions. The language we use to speak about Palestinian resistance has material consequences in the lives of Palestinians and therefore warrants a critical discussion. In order to unpack this, I will use the framework of Edward Said’s *Orientalism* to illuminate the ideological underpinnings of the LPA and the subsequent impact these have on the language and frameworks of the LPA.

Next, this chapter will embark on a critical discussion around the language and binary of violent/nonviolent resistance. It will consist of two parts: first, I will unpack the term *violent* as it relates to resistance. Next, I will explore the *binary* that has emerged in the discourse of the LPA which frames Palestinian resistance as either violent or nonviolent. I ultimately argue that by crystalizing the term ‘violence’ as an integral part of Palestinian resistance (either in its presence, ‘violent resistance’ or in its absences, ‘nonviolent resistance’) the LPA has established a problematic binary imbued with judgement and assumptions. In labelling an act like throwing stones as ‘violence’ – for example – I argue that this exogenous framing does not reflect indigenous frameworks, and instead functions to normalize settler colonial violence, as well as sew distrust and fragmentation amongst Palestinian communities and those engaged in resistance.

The Role of Ideology and Framing in Shaping Unarmed Resistance: Orientalism

I leverage the term ‘Orientalism’ not as a generic study of the Orient, but in a direct reference to Edward Said’s conceptual framework which should be understood as a mode of thought, a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having ultimate authority over the Orient” predicated on the fundamental distinction between the “Occident” (West/us) and the “Orient” (East/them) (Said, 1978, p. 2-3).

I use Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism to draw out some of the embedded frameworks shaping Western peacebuilding efforts and the subsequent manifestations of this framework on unarmed resistance in the West Bank. It goes without saying that peacebuilding always consists of “highly charged political undertakings that do not derive from a platonic template” (Haddad, 2016, p. 5). And while we may acknowledge that these processes are politically and ideologically charged, relatively little attention has been given to the exact nature of the embedded and underlying

assumptions that shape the larger LPA and subsequent engagement with the various stakeholders in the West Bank. That is to say, how these assumptions may lack neutrality and perpetuate the conflict, is often ignored. Moreover, what this means to the individuals living their lives under occupation is also largely sidelined. I am concerned with challenging the historically inscribed inequalities and patterns of representation and subsequent discrimination that are today, embedded in the LPA and played out in the field of unarmed resistance. I do not however, claim to provide a ‘non-Orientalist’ account or representation. For, as Said (1978) noted,

the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambiance of the representer (p. 272).

In this sense, I am implicated in the “struggles through which representations of the local are negotiated” (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015, p. 434). Therefore, this chapter contains my attempt to uncover, illustrate, and problematize the spaces I seek to understand, without narrating an alternative truth. In doing so, I bring to the surface some of the effects and consequences that Orientalist narratives (representations) have on the lives of Palestinian men engaged in unarmed resistance. In the pages that follow, I argue that Palestine in general, and Palestinian men engaged in resistance more specifically, are subject to a set of discourses that produce a focus on the colonized, detached from the context of colonization. This focus is as blind to its own ahistorical subjectivity as it is damaging in its effects. In short, Orientalist depictions embedded in the LPA have material (and political) consequences, and understanding these are integral to understanding the status quo. The presence of Orientalist narrative is problematic not only because they mischaracterize the conflict and those who are resisting colonization, but because these narratives also conceal this mischaracterization. In so far as they conceal the mischaracterizations, they

simultaneously obfuscate more appropriate, balanced, and historical understandings of the context, and thus further entrench the West's control over the East.

From Said's Orientalism to the Orientalism Embedded in LPA Today

Orientalism remains a system of hegemony that continues to shape the outlook and framework of the LPA towards the Palestinians generally, and Palestinian resistance in particular. Edward Said has long argued that Islam, the Middle East, and Palestine specifically has been subjected to a number of Orientalist narratives in the West's framing and understanding of them. These representations are based on western-centric and often-times racist assumptions of who 'they' are: the Arab, Muslim, Other. This has embedded an invisibility of Palestinians, while simultaneously propagating exogenous representations of them. This process Said (1987) believed, can be traced back to the discourse of Orientalism, that has an "entrenched cultural attitude toward Palestinians deriving from age-old Western prejudices about Islam, the Arabs, and the Orient" (p. xiv). Said saw Orientalism as "a whole episteme developed over multiple centuries," which dictated how the West would think about the East (Desmond, 2013, p. 37). Orientalist narratives are therefore predicated on a dual process of represented/silenced and civilized/uncivilized (us/them or victim/perpetrator)—with the examples presented within this dissertation, being a unique mixture of these two. Ultimately, this process creates a hierarchy of differentiated subjects.

Israel versus the Palestinian 'Other'

Abu-Laban & Bakan (2008) have argued, despite its geographic location and the historical anti-Semitic labeling of Jews as 'Other', Israel has always been considered a member of the West. This was achieved, they argue, in part, by early Zionist's adoption of European colonial discourse (p. 646). In making sense of this categorization, they posit that an international 'racial contract' was

constructed which assigns common interests between Israel and political/cultural allies. Security features of the West-Israel relationship further strengthen these so called ‘common interests’. While framing Israel as part of the West, Orientalist narratives begin to normalize their actions and behaviours, framing them as normal, as the status quo, and as the baseline from which we judge and compare ‘others’. This assumed neutrality or normalness associated with their actions simultaneously reinforces the otherness of Palestinians and their actions.

The grouping of Israel as part of the West was bolstered during the post-9/11 War on Terror with Israel positioning its siege and blockade of Gaza and military occupation of the West Bank within the same framework as those liberal democracies united in their fight against a globalized terrorist threat represented by Al-Qaeda. This helped perpetuate a clash of civilizations type framing, with Israel in the ‘us’ (Western liberal democracies) and Palestinians in the ‘them’ category alongside a stateless, global jihadist movement.

Orientalism in Action

While writing in the 1970s as a means of critiquing problematic portrayals of the ‘East’ put forth by authors and academics in the ‘West’, Said argued, “Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens or even people, but *as problems to be solved or confined* or—as colonial powers openly coveted their territory—taken over” (emphasis added, Said, 1978, p. 207). It is this aspect of Orientalism, the way that certain subjects are taken to be “*problems to be solved or confined*” that I find particularly poignant for this research. This specific strand of Orientalism I believe, encapsulates the “asymmetric conflict and asymmetric peace” between Israel and Palestine (Turner, 2011, p. 1-2). Throughout the life of the conflict, framings of the Palestinian as Other have often rested on Orientalist “stereotypes, biases and images of the

Other as less knowledgeable, less moral and less worthy” (Bahdi & Kassis, 2016, p. 2012). Contemporary Orientalism in action, continues to frame the Palestinians as backwards, regressive, and barbaric. As a result of the omnipresent reach of Orientalist understandings of Palestine, much of the support and involvement of the LPA in Palestine echoes these “Orientalist modalities and remain uncritically affixed to liberal (colonial) modernity” (Chishti, 2020, p. 583). I argue that while this operates at the political level with the constant assertion that Israel is ready to make peace but needs a ‘partner for peace’, I am more interested in the way that the LPA has engaged Palestinian civil society and specifically men engaged in unarmed resistance through this same framework.

Removing the Broader Context of Settler Colonialism

Although the LPA’s role post-Oslo has been to support the peace process and build peace in the region, the fact that it is couched within a set of assumptions (as well as policies) shaped through Orientalist narratives means that it fails to accurately diagnose drivers of the conflict. This is evident in the ways that the Oslo Accords and the subsequent LPA has erased the context of violent settler colonization, dispossession, and military occupation, while simultaneously framing Palestinians as the ones who needed to be made into a ‘partner for peace’ (See Turner, 2011 for a detailed discussion on the creation of the ‘partner for peace’ paradigm), and ‘taught about nonviolence’. By removing the broader context of settler colonialism in their prescriptions and interventions, Palestinians and Israelis are framed as two parties on equal footing in a conflict, which is quickly debunked if one were to compare indicators between Israel and Palestine such as GDP, civilian death toll, functioning institutions, various health outcomes etc. (see: Rosenthal, 2021).

On an individual level (as we will see played out in interviews in the following chapters), there is an implicit assumption that Palestinians involved in resistance are violent, and nothing short of terrorists, yet the same assumption is not made for Israelis serving in the military in the West Bank, despite the fact that both have been involved in violence against civilians for political/ideological ends. This framing constructs a façade which pits Palestinians against the ‘civilized, willing, and ready’ Israeli partner. This discourse thereby frames Palestinians as inferior to – or ‘other’ than – Israelis and the international community. Israel is lumped together with the West in a way that Palestine can never feel such affiliations. This stems in part, from their lack of statehood, but it is also entrenched by perceptions stemming from racism, judgments around modernity, Western values, etc. The erasure of the context and mutual responsibility for violence also means that rather than bringing the two sides closer to peace, the LPA has acted decisively on behalf of Israel’s settler colonial project.

This brings us to where we are today, where Orientalist narratives form the foundation of mainstream public opinion, as well as official policy and practice. Orientalist discourses however, are not only problematic because they fail to capture reality, they also succeed in concealing and distorting it (Alghamdi, 2020, pp. 3-4). Specifically, the LPA has played an important role in shifting the narratives and framing of the conflict in such a way as they perpetuate the impunity through which Israel carries out their colonial endeavors in the region. This shaping of rhetoric employs a discourse that is shaped by—as well as reinforced through—Western impressions of the conflict. The resulting dichotomy of a democratic and reasonable Israel and the backward terrorist Palestinians pervades policy and practice of the LPA and, as we will see in the following chapters, is articulated throughout interviews with research participants.

In *Orientalism*, Said (1978) claims that knowledge about the Orient is generated not through historical facts and writings of those from the region, but through the imagined constructs of the West/Europe. Since these imagined constructs have always been developed outside of the Orient itself, the Orient is not a free subject of thought. In this sense, what is often called ‘knowledge about the Orient’ is neither objective nor neutral. This knowledge rests on assumptions and portrayals that not only essentializes certain peoples and cultures from the region, but also erases history, inhibits self-representation, and reinforces the superiority of Western knowledge and narratives. In short, it reinforces Western power. For Palestinians, the Oslo Accords, the ensuing peace process, and the LPA did just this. The erasure of the Palestinian narrative from the peace process (and by extension its erasure from the LPA) mirrored that which was enshrined in Zionism. By controlling the narrative, the LPA approaches the continued expansion of the Israeli state through a framework which uncritically takes Palestinian non-existence as a starting point. In this way, the ensuing prescriptions and policies related to Palestinian resistance construct an almost perfect caricature of Orientalist stereotypes—violent, undemocratic, antagonistic, needing to be governed, etc. By providing both support and an audience for Zionism (Said, 1978, p. 4), the LPA has facilitated the further entrenchment of inequality, oppression, and ‘facts on the ground’, all of which make the prospects for peace fewer and fewer.

The Oslo Accords were a turning point in the application of Orientalist narratives in Palestine. In failing to properly contextualize the conflict, as well as ignoring the most pressing issues for Palestinians while expecting them to capitulate to Israeli demands, the LPA provided ideological cover for Israel to continue its colonization of historic Palestine. Israel has done so through settlement building, annexation, dispossession, and subsuming control of natural resources crucial for sustaining life, etc. By weaving Orientalist tropes into the very fabric of the LPA, peacebuilding

in the West Bank becomes about pacifying Palestinians, ‘training them’ on nonviolence and democracy, and teaching them how to live in peace with the other side instead of supporting and using soft power to demand an end to the occupation and settlement building as a prerequisite to peace. By failing to support a peace articulated in part by Palestinians, the Orientalist undercurrent of the LPA perpetually justifies the political domination of the East by the West (remembering previous discussion around Israel’s admission into the category of ‘the West’). This has resulted in a dominant perception among international donors, NGOs, policy makers, etc. of a dichotomy between democratic Israel and terrorist Palestinians (Said, 1978, p. 10-11). While often subconscious, this dichotomy tends to overemphasize Palestinian violence, while failing to discuss its roots, and failing to similarly emphasize Israeli violence; because to do so, would be to challenge (in any meaningful way) the notion of democratic Israel and its settler colonial project.

In highlighting this embedded dichotomous perception, I am not suggesting that the LPA is wholly silent on Israeli transgressions. Comments regarding the killing of civilians in Gaza, or plans to demolish and dispossess Palestinians of their land/houses, or settlement expansion certainly grace the lips of actors within the LPA. However, these comments are often made from within a framework which views these as negligible details which are ‘unhelpful’, yet not the crux of the conflict. They may also be framed as a response to Palestinian actions. Illustrative of the racial contract between Israel and the West, is the fact that support from the LPA towards Israel is never made vulnerable by these transgressions. This is in stark contrast to Palestinian transgressions which risk scuttling not only financial support, but also ideological and public opinion-based support for their human rights, including their right to self-determination. In fact, research participants highlighted this as one of the key drivers of engagement with the LPA. Through their accounts, we can arrive at a position that sees Orientalism, far from a phenomenon reserved for

academia and the media, as a system of hegemony that continues to shape the LPA's outlook towards the Palestinians. And subsequently, how these tropes play out in the current LPA's peacebuilding efforts. With a discussion on the Orientalist undercurrent of the LPA behind us, this chapter will now turn to a contemporary example of 'Orientalism in action' using the case of Brand Israel and pinkwashing.

The Case of Pinkwashing

The Orientalist distinction between us (Israel and the West) and them (Palestinians) has been carefully constructed and capitalized on through a number of public relations campaigns by the Israeli Government. The well-known Brand Israel campaign is instructive for illustrating this point. Political 'washing' functions to shift the discourse and frameworks used to understand an issue, obfuscating holistic analysis and context. In the early 2000s, by way of Brand Israel, the Israeli government set out on a 'branding' campaign aimed at improving its image abroad through actively aligning itself with Western democratic and liberal values. This multimillion dollar campaign focused its attention on portraying Israel as a 'safe-haven' for LGBTQ2+ individuals. This was then contrasted by portraying Palestine as a 'regressive, violent and homophobic place' (Ellison, 2013). Using LGBTQ+ rights to obscure Israeli human rights violations has been called 'pinkwashing'. The process of political 'washing' in Israel, whether it is pinkwashing (Puar, 2011; Schulman, 2020), greenwashing (Sass, 2017), or veganwashing (Alloun, 2020) etc., is a "highly sophisticated form of propaganda-marketing-PR spin-Revisionist history/thinking/mythology" (Haeder, 2021). While Brand Israel was launched in the early 2000s, Puar (2011) draws our attention to the fact that the 'Israeli gay tolerance/Palestinian homophobia' binary continues to be a recognized discursive tactic of the conflict today (p. 137). To this, I would add, it is a form of what I am calling 'Orientalism in action', which functions to justify and perpetuate the domination

of the Israel West/us over the Palestinian Other, while also leading to the normalization of settler colonialism. Promoting LGBTQ2+ rights in Israel normalizes settler colonialism in the sense that it aims to distract the international community from the areas in Israeli policy/actions which contravenes the rights of other groups (such as Palestinians), not to mention international human rights. Furthermore, it frames Israel as a liberal, democratic state, obfuscating that fact that it is an oxymoron for liberal democratic states to be repetitively charged with committing the crime against humanity of apartheid (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Amnesty International, 2022; B'Tselem, 2021).

The Orientalism in action evident within the Brand Israel campaign is on stark display in flyers such as the ones below, produced by StandWithUs and BlueStar, both pro-Israel advocacy organizations. Through the rubric of LGBTQ2+ rights, these flyers cast Israel as civilized, progressive, and liberal (and thus relatable to the West) as opposed to the barbaric, backward, and violent Palestinian.



Image 5: Standwithus Flyer. www.standwithus.com/campus/pdfs/flyers/treatmentgay.pdf and Poster from Blue Star <http://www.bluestarpr.com/poster-galleries/page/2/>

Campaigns such as Brand Israel, along with supporting organizations such as Standwithus and BlueStar are examples of Orientalism in action, they illustrate how Israel establishes and reaffirms its likeness with the West by relying on Orientalist narratives of Palestinians. While pinkwashing may appear to be unrelated to the LPA and its narratives of Palestinian resistance, as a contemporary building block of public opinion and media coverage in the West, it is an example of the way that Orientalism frames Israel as morally distinct from Palestine. In doing so, Orientalism (and campaigns employing Orientalist framing such as Brand Israel) plays an active and problematic role in shaping donor policy, practice, and agendas. I draw attention to this because it is an important facet in understanding how the pervasive influence of Orientalism continues to shape the region.

The Language of Violence

It is well established that language is not neutral (Freire, 1970). Language is a critical avenue through which power operates, and thus, a site where power relations in society are shaped and played out. Spears (1997) reminds us that the language individuals use and are exposed to, constitutes the framework of their thinking, the categories and concepts that shape the meanings of reality. Moreover, language carries with it sociopolitical and ideological implications which shape and are shaped through relationships of power. In the case of resistance, where individuals are operating in contexts with a high degree of inequality and disparity, this is particularly poignant. Therefore, examining the language of the LPA in relation to resistance can be helpful in gaining insight into embedded power relations, and therefore some of the more hidden avenues through which the LPA impacts unarmed resistance. I turn now to the term *violence* as it relates to resistance.

In the West, resistance is most often categorized as violent or nonviolent; with every act of resistance being categorized as either constituting *violent* resistance or *nonviolent* resistance. This distinction is inaccurate for a number of reasons: it fails to reflect indigenous knowledge related to the language of resistance; it creates an artificial binary and ignores the fact that resistance is a fluid, ever-changing spectrum²⁶; and it is problematic due to the political, ideological, and loaded language of violence (as opposed to the more neutral language of ‘use of arms’ or armed resistance).

Reminding us that language and the words we use ought to be a subject of analysis, Kassem (2011) explains, “the use of language is an ideological act that belongs to and conditions an entire system of values in order to reinforce certain attitudes, views and socio-policies realities” (p. 11). In the case of violent/nonviolent resistance, the system of values that this language reinforces and upholds is one which erases the violence of the Israeli settler-colonial project by maintaining their monopoly on legitimate violence (where it is not called violence any longer, and instead it is called some variation of *Israeli actions*), and Palestinians response to this colonial violence is what is labeled as either *violent* or *nonviolent*. We see how built into the very language, is an assumed neutrality that places Israel as the norm, and Palestinians always as counterpoised as the aberration.

Alazzeh (2012) takes issue with representations of violence which, he argues “served to delegitimize Palestinians’ right to national liberation” as well as shaping realities on the ground “through the use of discursive tools as an essential part of the subjugation of the colonized” (p.

²⁶ For example, the General Strike in 1936 started out as a nonviolent strike, but the British colonial refusal to head to the demands, combined with violent reprisals, transformed the strike into riots.

19). This line of thinking is reminiscent of Butlers (2021) questioning, “is ‘violence’ here the name given to those efforts to undermine and destroy prevailing institutions of legal violence? If so, it serves not so much to describe a set of actions as to enforce a valuation upon them” (p. 137). This chapter’s point of departure rests on Butler’s assertion that the term ‘violence’ serves more than a description of an act, it is a ‘valuation’ of acts and actors.

There are numerous terms to describe the various modalities of resistance. When addressing Palestinian resistance, the LPA, like the West in general, has adopted the terms violent and nonviolent resistance. However, in Arabic, what the West knows as ‘nonviolence’ has no translation and instead is most often called unarmed or popular resistance (Al moqawama al sha’biyeh). Research participant’s use of the term nonviolence reflects a choice (not always conscious) to align themselves with the LPA rather than historically grounded resistance terminology. The absence of the word for nonviolence in Arabic is a consequence of the different ways that different groups of people frame and understand resistance, and what they, and *how* they, understand violence. As the LPA has become increasingly involved in unarmed resistance, the lexicon of the West, of violent and nonviolence, has made its ways into everyday parlance. Not however, without a certain level of hostility or subversion by some. While not all participants were critical of the labels of violent/nonviolent, it was common for research participants to provide an aside at one point during the interview in order to let me know that there is actually no word for nonviolence in Arabic.

Demonstrating an awareness of the origination of this way of speaking of violence and non-violence, participants were obviously appropriating this as a way to be seen and heard by the LPA and as a means of gaining legitimacy in their struggle for national liberation internationally

(Allazeh, 2012, p. 19).²⁷ Some of my research participants explained that even though they use the language of nonviolence, they find it problematic. This mirrors the findings of Jawad (2011) who argues that we can understand the “use of a discourse of nonviolence as an appropriation” of the language and framing of the LPA “because such terminology was not historically used at either the level of leadership or more popular level in Palestine” (p. 132). A respondent from the village of Nabi Saleh spoke about his frustration with the term violent and nonviolent resistance. He felt that by calling Palestinian resistance violent (or not violent) it reflected a framing of resistance that was detached from those who practice it, and at odds with the framework of those who it purportedly described. In an interview conducted in English, the participant explained,

We don't like using anything with violence in the name because we don't agree with the Western definition. They want to put everything through their lens, their language, their standards. They feel that they have the reality, the right answer, right way and that we should have to follow them. From their point of superiority, they come to push everything through their idea. They want to educate us on nonviolence (Bassem, Nabi Saleh).

By using the term *violence* in relation to resistance, research participants felt that it erased the violence of the occupation and placed their resistance to oppression as the starting point, as the original sin, rather than the violent oppression itself. Deeming resistance as violent or nonviolent, does nothing to address the violence that resistance activities are reacting to. Highlighting this point, a participant from Birzeit explains,

In my opinion, all types of resistance that we are doing are peaceful. I don't know something called violent resistance, what I know is that you are occupying my land, you are taking something that is mine. So, in the first place, you are taking something that is not yours and it is my right to defend it the way I want (Female, Birzeit Interview).

²⁷ See Chapter 8 and 9 for an in-depth discussion related to the appropriation of this language.

A research participant from Aida Camp expressed similar disapproval towards the labeling of resistance as ‘violent’, and a frustration with the way that it erases the context of oppression,

Resistance can have different shapes, we can qualify it as armed or not armed but not in terms of violent and non-violent. Violence is a wanton action against weak people. On the other hand, resistance against an oppressor, against an injustice, against an occupation, is a legitimate right, whether it is armed or not armed. This is why I cannot qualify armed resistance as violence (Abdulfattah, Aida Camp).

Prior to engaging in field research, with my academic background in peace and conflict studies, political science, and international development, I uncritically accepted the terms ‘violent and nonviolent resistance’ with very little thought paid to what was being implied through this language and framing. Research participants however, raised a number of points during fieldwork that spurred me to examine the way the term ‘violent’ is applied, understood, and framed vis-à-vis the conflict more generally, and Palestinian resistance more specifically. It is fair to say, spending any amount of time in the region, speaking to individuals living under—and resisting against—oppressive and violent policies of occupation, it becomes immediately apparent that commonly held notions of violence are not based on concrete, objective truths.

When speaking about violent or nonviolent resistance we are speaking about frameworks and these frameworks are vacillating; they are not unproblematic, or neutral (Butler, 2021). Different people not only have different *experiences* of violence based on diverse identity markers, they also have different *definitions* and understandings of violence. Therefore, the labeling and categorization of resistance as either violent or nonviolent is highly subjective and rests on a foundation of ideology and assumptions of what constitutes violence, and by who. In my conversations with research participants and interactions with various arms of the LPA, it became clear that when the language of violent/nonviolent resistance was adopted as the primary descriptor of resistance, it inscribed

onto those resisting, a limiting, regulating, and othering framework. This, I am arguing, is an example of Orientalism.

Mobius Strip of Violent/Nonviolent Resistance and the Inevitability of Palestinian 'Violence'

Said (1978) argued that Orientalism functions as a set of parameters around possible thought and verbal expression concerning Arabs. By understanding Orientalism as a system that defines the possibility of discourse, it can help us to better understand the way that the LPA has framed Palestinian resistance as either *violent* or *nonviolent*, rather than part of a wider struggle for national liberation and self-determination against a *violent* settler colonial project. More to the point, by using the concept of Orientalism, we see that it is the response of Palestinians to their surroundings that attracts the label of violent or *not-violent*, rather than the oppression they are facing being subjected to the same labels. By being either violent or *not-violent*, Palestinians engaged in resistance can never escape the label of 'violent'. The label itself therefore, functions as Said describes, as 'a set of parameters around possible thought and verbal expression' (and I would also add physical expression) concerning Palestinians. It is still the violence that they, or their brethren, practice that defines them. Through this framework therefore, their actions, or non-actions in the case of *nonviolence*, are inevitably tied to notions of violence. In this sense, for men engaged in nonviolent resistance, their resistance is the negative of someone else's positive. In other words, their resistance is *not-violent*, as if the baseline for resistance is violent. If violence is the referential point, then Palestinian actions can only be violent or non-violent, depriving them of the opportunity to situate their resistance to settler-colonial dispossession in something else altogether. This traps Palestinian men engaged in resistance in a discursive regime from which they cannot escape. Instead of engaging in resistance that is not-violent, if they engage in resistance

without the use of arms, what are they? Can Palestinians identify as *not* ‘not-violent’? If they are *not* ‘not violent’, then what are they? The negative cancels out the negative and thus they remain, violent. In this framing, one cannot resist without their very resistance being defined against a baseline of violence.

This chapter has so far argued that research participants’ experiences navigating the LPA highlight the fact that the LPA’s frameworks are affected by an ideological discourse disjointed from their own. This framework functions to limit Palestinian self-representation, as illustrated in the section above. I call the framework an ‘Orientalizing discourse’ or ‘Orientalist narratives’ of resistance because they are predicated on an ideology which promotes the ‘West-and-Islam/Arab’ dualism. A dualism which results in defining the actions of one side of the conflict (the Palestinians) as violent; albeit either violent or nonviolent, and failing to define the actions of the other side of the conflict (the Israelis) in a similar fashion. From this framework, there is no emphasis on Israeli violence or nonviolence, particularly as a prerequisite for entry into international platforms, institutions, aid and funding, etc. These Orientalist narratives adopted by the LPA²⁸ vis-à-vis Palestinian resistance, frame Palestinians as possessing a leaning towards violent conflict

²⁸ While I am suggesting that this problematic framing of Palestinians and their resistance to Israeli settler colonialism is a consequence of Orientalism, Keen (2012) highlights the discrediting of legitimate grievances and dismissive framing of armed non-state indigenous movements as ubiquitous within the liberal peacebuilding framework. Keen (2012) outlines two competing understandings related to the motivations of armed actors in civil war: greed and grievances. He goes on to suggest that liberal peacebuilding (epitomized in the work of Paul Collier) tends to view armed movements as greedy and quasi-criminal rebels rather than popular movements with legitimate grievances. The tendency to disregard grievances of non-state actors not only delegitimizes local knowledge, where the solutions to conflicts, “lie not in the wisdom of Darfur, for example, but in the wisdom of Oxford and the sophistication of Washington” (p. 766), but it also skirts uncomfortably close to “delegitimizing protest in general” (p. 768). This analysis should be viewed as a buttress to my argument related to the workings of Orientalism within the LPA.

resolution and in need of being pacified, coerced, and taught nonviolence. In this framing, the larger context and embedded violence of settler colonialism is erased; the gross power disparity between the two sides is almost entirely ignored; and the litany of structural and material violences afflicting Palestinians are disregarded.

Who's Violence?

Reflecting on the above section, I need to clarify that I am *not* arguing that if we also understand Israeli actions as violent then it balances the ledger, or legitimizes Palestinians use of armed resistance. There is no place for moral justifications here. Rather, what I am taking issue with is the application of the term ‘violent’ and the way that in violence reduction strategies, policies, and peacebuilding interventions, the LPA does not view political Zionism and Israel’s overall settler colonial project as a form of violence. Instead, the gaze remains locked on the actions and reactions of the colonized. Policy and praxis embedded in the LPA is thus directed towards fixing the *violence* of the colonized while ignoring the violence of colonization. A recipe that I believe will never lead to an equal—and thus just and sustainable—peace. Instead, it serves to further privilege Israeli power through material, geographic, narrative, and discursive control and dominance over the context. Touching on the application of the label of violence in the context of resisting oppression, the late Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire wrote in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970),

Any situation in which “A” objectively exploits “B” or hinders his self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes with the individual’s ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human. With the establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has already begun. Never in history has violence been initiated by the oppressed. How could they be the initiators, if they themselves are the result of violence? How could they be the sponsors of something objective whose objective inauguration called forth their existence as oppressed? There would be no oppressed had there been no prior of violence to establish their subjugation.

Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognise others as persons - not by those who are oppressed, exploited and unrecognised (p. 55).

If, as Freire (1970) argues, violence originates in oppression not the reaction to oppression, why then does the LPA focus at length on the actions of Palestinian rather than the actions of the Israeli occupation, annexation, dispossession, siege, and blockade? The answer relates to the specific framework being adopted by the LPA. A framework which takes for granted, the legality of Israeli violence (to a certain degree). I feel that the difference between the frameworks of violence adopted by Palestinians versus those adopted by Israelis and the LPA comes down to the embedded Orientalist narratives shaping the LPA's framework.

Moral philosophy, Judith Butler (2021) reminds us, begins with the question of whether violence is ever justified. What this line of inquiry fails to do however she argues, is to question what counts as violence, and what counts as a justification (p. 136). Questioning what violence is and how it is framed, justified, and understood in a given context, as well as asking questions around what violence is *not*, are important tools necessary to think critically beyond the narratives adopted by the LPA. Butler's call to problematize discourses of violence opens up opportunities to ask questions such as 'Why does the LPA not urge the Israeli military to use *nonviolence*?', or 'Why does the LPA not promote programs targeting Israeli youth urging them to refuse military service and instead practice nonviolence in order to resolve the conflict?'. These questions allow us to understand how Orientalism has embedded specific framings of what constitutes violence. In this sense, Israeli actions are taken as 'legal' and legitimate violence. Conversely, it is only actions opposing this legal violence that are labeled violent.

In the early 1990s Walter Benjamin argued that “legal violence regularly renames its own violent character as justifiable coercion or legitimate force, thereby sanitizing the violence at stake” (as quoted in Butler, 2021, p. 132). Further paraphrasing the work of Walter Benjamin, Butler (2021) outlines the way the term ‘violence’ is most often used to describe and label activities, actions, tactics etc. used to contest the legal monopoly on violence (p. 129). In the case of Palestinian resistance, by resisting against Israeli policies and actions, indeed, the very ethos of political Zionism which necessitates the dispossession of Palestinians, Palestinian resistance challenges the legitimacy of Israeli rule, occupation, annexation, and blockade. In short, it challenges Israeli state sanctioned violence. In doing so, Palestinian resistance renders itself vulnerable to the label of ‘violent’ because it strives to challenge and change the status quo. This labeling occurs even when Palestinian efforts are unarmed. Speaking to the process through which unarmed forms of resistance such as boycotting, demonstrations, strikes, or throwing stones are labeled as violent, Butler (2021) emphasizes that it then, “becomes all the more important to situate that naming practice critically within political frameworks and their self-justificatory schemes” (p. 14). I have therefore suggested that revisiting Said’s concept of Orientalism is useful in order to ‘situate that naming practice’ and understand the historical shaping of the framework employed by the LPA which allows for this disjointed rendering of resistance.

The overarching goal of this section has been to introduce the reader to some of the problematic, and ideologically-driven and invisible politics embedded in the way the LPA speaks about resistance. It argues that the framing of resistance as violent and nonviolent perpetuates an understanding of resistance that is rooted in the perspective of the oppressor/colonizer. And while many Palestinians use this language, particularly when speaking English, they do so with mixed feelings due to their perceptions around what constitutes violence versus what constitutes a

reaction to violence. Rather than using violent and nonviolent as categories of resistance, participants preferred the terms armed and unarmed. Or, in the case of unarmed resistance, they also use the term ‘popular resistance’. By doing so, they keep the focus on the goals of resistance, rather than a judgment tied to the tactics. That is to say, while arms may be used in their resistance, this does not mean that their resistance is violent, it is merely armed. This distinction may sound diminutive and incidental, but the goals of armed and unarmed resistance remain the same, freedom from oppression.

Orientalism and the LPA: Erosion of Self-Representation and Indigenous Knowledge

To date, the majority of discussions around Palestinian violent or nonviolent resistance are constructed on an incomplete premise that is rooted in Orientalist narratives of Palestinians. The premise, I have argued is incomplete because the very notion of violence is defined within a certain framework and, as Butler (2021) explains, the concepts of violence and nonviolence comes to us already interpreted and worked over by this framework (p. 136). Adding to Butler’s insight, I would also argue, not only do the frameworks of violence and nonviolence carry their own interpretive weight, in the case of Palestine, they are mapped on top of a pre-existing Orientalist framework. Subsequently, the “historicity of that working over is congealed in the discursive framework within which violence appears” (ibid) and in that framework, Israeli colonial violence is generally exempt. As I have argued in the section above, Palestinians resisting occupation, colonization, dispossession, blockade etc. is called violent merely because it seeks to ‘undermine and destroy prevailing institutions of legal violence’ and therefore render itself eligible to be called violent, from within this particular colonial framework (ibid, p. 137). And while I have already discussed the theoretical implications of such a regulating discourse, what I haven’t touched on is how this plays out in the lives of Palestinians engaged in unarmed resistance, post-Oslo. Therefore,

the next step is to understand how the LPA's embedded Orientalist narratives related to resistance have had a tangible impact on the lives of research participants. As an illustrative manifestation of such impact, we will now turn our attention to the way that these narratives shape the space and discursive field of self-representation for research participants.

In the following lengthy quote, a female respondent from Hebron eloquently discusses the process and consequence of how the LPA's lexicon of violence impacts the sense of self and the parameters of self-representation for those involved in resistance. The interview began with the participant speaking about her experience joining an NGO involved in unarmed resistance during the Second Intifada. She then moved to highlight the changing terrain in terms of the language that was used to talk about resistance towards the end of the Second Intifada and how that shapes her fellow resisters sense of self,

People started to reconsider saying if they are with or against armed resistance. I think there is still something inside this question that is not understood though. I think this is partly because the language has changed, because we have to represent ourselves as not terrorists, which is a huge burden. Israel and the media are always saying we are terrorists. NGOs tell us we have to use nonviolence. Even some *fidā'iyyīn* who were with armed resistance and have not transformed their paths to go to unarmed resistance, the way they talk about their involvement in armed resistance, while there is still pride in it, there is also this shame and guilt, this misunderstanding about why, when he was 14 years old, he went and did something [armed]. There is also a lack of forgiveness for ourselves, a lack of understanding for why we did what we did, why we resist, how we resist. Armed resistance has a reason. It doesn't need to be right or wrong, it doesn't need to be labeled violent or nonviolent. We were resisting however we could. Armed resistance is not even conscious responding, it is the reaction of people from a place of protection and defending. And for this, people are now shy and embarrassed to talk about it. We are now putting the lens of the NGOs, or the internationals that tell us 'violence' is bad [she uses air quotes when saying violence]. So for me, the language of resistance has changed, but it was an imposed change. It didn't happen by a real understanding of what happened and continues to happen to Palestine, our colonization. This means that now there is shame. There is shame about a whole era, labeled as violent without any understanding of why, what, how. We are ashamed of ourselves. This is not just

a lack of understanding from the outside, but also from within our communities. Amongst ourselves, maybe we are still ashamed of it collectively we have to justify it over and over. We are obsessed with reminding people that we are still humans. In every joint space²⁹ I have been part of, there is always that Palestinian who stands up and says, ‘we are here to send a message of peace, not violence’ this justification is trying to explain that they are not terrorists before anything even starts. They are apologizing for their resistance to the Israelis’ just to be allowed at the table. They don’t understand that you don’t need to justify yourself. Can you imagine, the colonized apologizing to the colonizer for not accepting their own colonization!? (Female Interview, Hebron).

Sharing her experience, the respondent provides a personal account of the way that language and framing interact with power to literally shape memory, history, identity, and self-representation. Butler (1993) describes how the subject emerges through submission to categories or names that have been created through power relations, for example ‘terrorist’, ‘violence’ etc. and how subjects must reiterate those categories or names in order to maintain existence. In the above quote, the respondent provides a firsthand account of how Palestinians themselves must reiterate the categories created for them, in order to be seen, heard, and included at the table. This quote also demonstrates how some Palestinians have internalized a certain degree of shame and embarrassment in regard to their involvement in armed resistance, but also the need to apologize for it, and separate themselves from it, regardless of their personally held convictions related to it. The research participant also hints at a dissonance, which later in the interview she reemphasizes, between personally held opinions and frameworks related to resistance, and ones which Palestinians adopt in certain spaces. This theme will be picked up on in Chapter 10.

Writing about the same era as the above participant, Kelly (2008) found that during the Second Intifada, “support for violence, and its refusal, were not ethical absolutes. Instead they were rooted

²⁹ The term ‘joint space’ refers to different workshops, ‘peacebuilding’ gatherings, nonviolent resistance meetings that are held by NGOs to encourage Israelis, Palestinians and Internationals to meet and work together to build peace

in a mixture of pragmatism and a felt need for a reluctant, but ultimately just, reaction to Israeli violence” (Kelly, 2008, p. 367). This perception, which was held by the majority of my research participants, is lost in the adoption of labels of violent and nonviolent resistance and the necessity to claim allegiance to one or the other. Rather than rejecting frameworks that do not comfortably nestle alongside indigenous frameworks of resistance, participants detail the way they have adopted, to varying degrees, those of the LPA as a necessity, and as a tool.³⁰

Returning to the quote from the female respondent from Hebron, Palestinians in general, and Palestinians involved in resistance specifically, have become, “obsessed with reminding people that we are still humans... and trying to explain that we are not terrorists”. Continuing with Butler’s analysis, we see how Palestinians become vulnerable to the authority of Western Orientalist narratives because we, as social beings and as humans, are constructed through language. Therefore, the ‘success’ of these Orientalist narratives is that they ‘accumulate the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices’ (Butler 1993, p. 227). On a theoretical level, postmodernists like Butler argue that there is no fundamental essence, and therefore our experiences are defined through language. Because of this, we can never find ourselves outside of discourse. What then, does this mean for the subjects of this discourse? The reinforcing nexus of power and representation function as a trap which limits critical thinking, self-representation, and the propagation of historically grounded, context-specific indigenous knowledge. Instead, it renders both Palestinians engaged in unarmed resistance, as well as the LPA, stifled and defined by exogenous and Orientalist frameworks.

³⁰ This will also be expanded upon in Chapter 7 and 8.

Bringing the theoretical down to the tangible, a Catch-22 emerges when we consider the fact that the colonial subject comes into existence through language, and this language is constructed by relations of power. The Catch-22 rests on the fact that they are dependent on the language of the West as a means of being heard, yet at the same time are dehumanized and constructed as Other through this very language. Given that language and discourse shapes reality, any substantial rejection of the labels applied to the colonized therefore, threatens their very existence. Echoing back to my assertion on page 334, if Palestinians refuse the Orientalist narrative and do not identify as ‘*not* violent’ in their resistance (and instead choose to identify in their own language, framework, etc.), what are they? This was highlighted by research participants who recounted how, prior to engaging in peacebuilding activities, particularly joint spaces, they—or others in their group—made a point to assert their commitment to peace, to nonviolence, and their rejection of armed resistance (essentially stating that they are *not* a terrorist), as a starting point. In order to be seen, accepted, and allowed in that space, they had to adopt the language and framing of the LPA. Going back to Said’s claim that Palestinians have been denied the right to narrate, Ashcroft (2004) illustrates how “obtaining permission to narrate is a matter not simply of speaking but of speaking in a way that may be heard” (p. 120). Much like Spivak’s provocative questions, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, we see the limitations imposed on Subjects or the Other which restrain the degree to which they are able to define themselves outside of the hegemonic discourse.

Armed and Unarmed Resistance: A Binary or ‘Two Wings of a Bird’?

Resistance for our people is 180 degrees starting from shooting a bullet to praising people. There are 83 ways of resisting, and a strong society respects them all. Resistance is like two wings of a bird. The bird needs both wings to work together to fly; left and right; armed and unarmed resistance. Each wing supports the other and carries the bird (Yousif, Beit Jala).

Up to this point, this chapter has established a critique of the use of the term *violence* in relation to resistance. It has argued that this label is incongruent with Palestinians understanding of their resistance which does not rest on a binary of violent/nonviolent—or even armed and unarmed or popular resistance for that matter—and instead on an ever-vacillating *spectrum* of tactics to resist colonial dispossession. It has illustrated how the use of the term serves more than a description of an act, it is a ‘valuation’ of acts and actors. Part of this valuation, functions to further the *othering* of Palestinians and perpetuate Western/Israeli dominance over them. Building on this foundation, research findings point to yet another situation in which resistance frameworks of the LPA are at odds with Palestinian indigenous knowledge and frameworks. This disjunction relates to the spectrum of resistance tactics and the creation of binary understanding of violent/nonviolent resistance.

The prominence put on tactics of resistance by the LPA, combined with the resulting emphasis on the need to claim allegiance to one or the other, results in a binary framing of resistance. In this binary, the fluid and unstable spectrum of resistance is forced into a ridged categorization of violent or nonviolent. Western philosophy has a long history of binary thinking. This has served to, “construct discourses that have served to build an asymmetric hierarchy of values and marginalize and devalue diversity or multiplicity of thoughts” (Tanabe, 2017, p. 453). The introduction of binary thinking around resistance tactics has resulted in exactly as Tanabe (2017) suggests, to create an asymmetric hierarchy which devalues diversity, and I would argue fluidity. It was often mentioned that the LPA was more concerned with tactics of resistance than the goal and resistance. Mazin, a participant from Bethlehem, highlights how the emphasis on tactics as opposed to a broader strategy and national liberation goal is at odds with his prioritization as a colonized person when he laments, “for the colonized, it is the outcome that matters, not the methods. For the West,

it appears to be the other way around!” (Mazin, Bethlehem). Jawad’s research (2011) mirrors this argument, “while the emphasis from the international community is placed on the “nonviolent” tactics and not necessarily on the signification of the larger struggle itself (to free Palestine from colonial rule), the villagers’ eyes are intently focused on the larger goal” (p. 132). By focusing on tactics and methods over outcomes and goals, the binary of violent/nonviolent resistance is brought to the foreground. The fact that it is the outcomes and end goals that matter for Palestinians, means that less attention has historically been placed on the tactics used, and of what side of the binary their resistance activism falls. However, for the LPA, the preoccupation with tactics and methods forces activists to make claims *for* or *against* armed or unarmed resistance in order to benefit from the LPA—a distinction that nearly all research participants explain is incongruent with their understanding of the spectrum and history of Palestinian resistance.

While resistance is often portrayed as a binary, the reality is much less neat and stable. Highlighting the artificiality of this binary, participants spoke about the relationship between armed and unarmed resistance as ‘two wings of a bird’. If a combination of diverse resistance tactics is what propels a bird to flight, as Yousif suggests, a resistance movement draws strength from such diversity. From this perspective, when interrogating the binary thinking of armed/unarmed resistance (or violent/nonviolent resistance) as the answer for, or against, national liberation and self-determination, we recognize that both have a role to play. They do not form a binary. They are co-constitutive and fluid.

Research participants spoke about a previous era, one prior to the Oslo Accords and the LPA, when the distinction between tactics—and therefore the binary between armed and unarmed—was less

pronounced. This era, they argued, was the time when their resistance movement was at its strongest,

The era of al intifada [First Intifada] was the best era that has ever been for Palestine because at that moment, every person in Palestine was resisting in their own way. There was no armed or unarmed. It was just resistance. You resisted however you could. This made us [the national liberation movement] strong (Female participant, Birzeit).

This quote suggests that by erasing labels associated with resistance tactics, removing connotations associated with violence, and the binary way of thinking about resistance, people were free to resist, ‘however you could’. According to this participant, during the First Intifada, Palestinians were not preoccupied with appeasing the LPA and therefore identifying whether they were ‘with armed resistance’ or ‘with unarmed resistance’, they are awarded the space to simply resist. The inclusivity that this fostered, was crucial for the strength of the grassroots uprising. From this perspective then, by insisting on a binary of resistance tactics, the LPA has contributed to weakening the resistance. Mazin, expands on this suggesting that diversity is key to the healthy functioning of any system, be it ecological, social, or political,

It is natural to expect diversity in political opinion and among politicians, that’s why in many Western governments there are many parties with different ideas. This means there is a healthy democracy. This is the same with resistance, you have to have variations to be healthy. The variations themselves are not what is important. But it is that there is variation that is important. It is healthy to have diversity. It's not healthy to have just one idea or one monolithic form of resistance or one monolithic religion or one mono-whatever! I mean, just like in nature, diversity is strength (Mazin, Bethlehem).

The assertion that armed and unarmed are ‘two wings of a bird’ and are part of a coherent, ‘strong’ (Female participant, Birzeit), and ‘healthy’ (Mazin, Bethlehem) resistance movement sits awkwardly with the framework of nonviolent resistance used by the LPA. It fits awkwardly because it does not square with a framework which automatically categorize resistance tactics and

philosophies into a binary. A binary that according to participants, is inaccurate, as well as futile, and problematic. Speaking from personal experience, in the following quote, Rani highlights the perceived futility of categorizing resistance tactics into a binary of either armed or unarmed,

When I was 19 years old, I was shot in the neck at a peaceful demonstration in the middle of Ramallah against Sharon's visit to Al Aqsa on September 30th, 2000. I had no stone, no gun, no bomb, no knife. I have been a paraplegic ever since...The occupation kills people in their sleep, in their home. Therefore, it doesn't matter if it was a peaceful protest or not, it didn't matter if I was in the front, back, anywhere. They still use violence, they still kill. There are even people killed when they are in wheelchairs like me. We go to Khan al-Ahmar with nothing but peaceful resistance but still they come and spray pepper spray and sewage on us. This is the occupation (Rani, Bil'in).

If the response to armed and unarmed resistance from Israeli soldiers is the same, as posited by Rani, the emphasis placed on the distinction between the two appears to be related more to the way the LPA perceives and thus reacts, than to the way the occupation forces react.

Throwing Stones

Tying the previous two sections together—the use of the term *violent* resistance, and the artificial binary of violent/nonviolent resistance—this section will use the example of throwing stones to illustrate how the LPA's influence over defining unarmed resistance plays out in the lives of those who are engaged in resistance.

Israeli actions such as land confiscation are not considered to be violent, while if the Palestinians who are experiencing dispossession and are having their land confiscated react by throwing a stone, this is labeled as violent resistance. This bias is not merely of discursive consequence. It shapes Palestinians access to financial, material, and ideological support from the LPA. If Palestinians react with throwing stones, they are labeled as violent and their movement is no longer supported. A consequence that is not applied equally to Israelis. The Israeli government's military

aid for example is not threatened, their acceptance in international fora such as the UN is not put into question, their rights to live with dignity and human rights such as freedom of movement is not up for discussion if they engage in violent acts such as home demolitions or shooting of unarmed civilians.

Some respondents were particularly passionate in their response to my question of whether throwing stones is armed/violent resistance. These respondents strongly opposed the notion that stone throwing should be considered armed resistance, “How can a stone be a weapon when they have the most high-tech army in the world!?” (Abdullah, Bil’in). Abdullah went on to share he felt that the categorizing of throwing stones as violent resistance emerged during the Oslo years, the period of time where, under the rubric of peacebuilding, the LPA established its presence in the field of unarmed resistance.

It was symbolic at first. The name of the Intifada was Stone Intifada. I respect stone throwing. I think it is our right to use the stone, it got us to Oslo, but I think that if we don’t use them now, it will be better. We don’t want to loose their support (Abdullah, Bil’in).

While he does not explicitly say that it is the LPA that he is afraid of losing the support of, given the timeline he is speaking about, it is fair to assume he is referring to the support of the international community.

A respondent from Nabi Saleh shared his frustration with navigating pressures to label throwing stones as armed resistance. Reflecting on a workshop/conference he went to in Jerusalem which was sponsored by a number of INGOs, he explained,

I believe that stones are nonviolent, by my standard. I told them [hosts of a workshop on nonviolence] the main issue about stones is that it is in our culture. When we feel scared we go directly to the ground and pick up a stone. Our

ancestors are shepherds, they do this. We throw stones to control our flocks, we use stones to tell our dogs where to go. If we throw stones at the occupation it is an action of protecting yourself, not attack. I talked about this [to the workshop organizers]. He told me, 'the world doesn't accept that, doesn't accept the stone' I told him 'that's not my problem, it's the worlds. I don't do my resistance because you like or don't like it' (Bassem, Nabi Saleh).

In the above quote, expressing his frustration with throwing stones being framed as violent resistance, we see how historically rooted indigenous understandings of resistance butt up against the neat categories of violent and nonviolent as understood by the LPA. Speaking to this point and in reference to the Bedouin village of Khan al Ahmar that was facing Israeli demolition orders at the time of the interview, a respondent from Tulkarm scoffed at what he perceived to be a bias in the categorization of what is considered a 'violent act', "They act like land confiscation is not violent, but throwing stones is? What?! This is crazy, you know?" (Anan, Tulkarm).

Lending credibility to my argument that the LPA has fashioned a resistance framework in the West Bank in the image of its own exogenous framework, is the interesting comparison which emerged when I looked at interview responses from the West Bank, against those from Gaza in relation to the throwing of stones. There was a significant difference between respondents from the West Bank and respondents from Gaza. When asked about the relationship between throwing stones and resistance, responses in the West Bank were much more varied, offering multifarious answers to the question of, "Does stone throwing constitute armed resistance?" While most participants noted that they did not personally feel that throwing stones was armed or violent resistance, they reminded me that the international community nevertheless did. This provides an interesting counter point, and alternative interpretation, to the arguments put forth by Crossley (2005) who suggests that a foundational functioning of discourse is that individuals participating in it are *unconscious* of the system of conventions surrounding them, as well as unconscious of the specific

consequences that their use of the discourse has. This was not the case in interviews with research participants in the West Bank. It was common for respondents to state that while they personally do not believe that stone throwing falls under the category of armed resistance, they would ensure that the shabāb (youth) did not throw rocks during demonstrations. When asked why, they explained that they demanded that stones were not thrown at protests so that the international solidarity activists, and NGO representatives that were present, wouldn't label them as 'violent'. If, they argued, they were seen to use stones and thus be labeled as using violent resistance, they would lose financial and ideological support for their resistance activities.

The dissonance between what research respondents personally believed and what they said in public (and demanded of their fellow activists) often took multiple interviews to come to the surface. During the initial interview, participants would speak about how they are committed to nonviolent resistance, and not using stones. However, during later interviews, it would become clear that they felt conflicted by this framing. Many research participants appeared to be apologetic for the act of throwing stones. While they would preface their condemnation with saying they respect those who throw stones, they nevertheless generally denounced the use of stones in their resistance activities.

Responses in Gaza were much different. In Gaza, all individuals interviewed categorically felt that stone throwing did *not* fall into the category of armed resistance. Most often, questions around this topic were met with scornful disapproval, as if to suggest it was a stupid question, "peaceful resistance is when a person goes carrying a flag or a stone. Armed resistance is when he carries a weapon. We were carrying stones, not weapons" (Mahmoud, Rafah refugee camp, Gaza). I think this difference is noteworthy. While it is impossible to discern why certain individuals feel a

particular way, I do believe one way of analyzing the difference in responses between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the influence of, or lack thereof, the LPA on resistance organizing. In Gaza, there are no Western NGOs involved in resistance work. You won't find peacebuilding workshops or conferences on nonviolent action, there are no joint dialogue programs between Israelis and Palestinians, and no longer any Western/European activists involved in resistance (there are very few foreign nationals granted entry permits to Gaza by the Israelis). This is in direct contradiction to the West Bank where much of the unarmed resistance (such as local Popular Resistance Committees and most of the larger CSOs/ NGOs organizing unarmed resistance) are closely tied to, supported by, and funded by the LPA, either directly or indirectly through the PA. Moreover, international and Israeli activists, as well as journalists, are present in large numbers at the majority of resistance activities such as organized protests and demonstrations. I believe that the lack of involvement of the LPA in resistance in Gaza has had implications on their framework and agenda of resistance, in that it pays much less attention and energy towards deciphering whether or not throwing stones should be considered violent. If this is the case, it would explain Gazans' puzzlement at me posing the question in the first place, which again, is in stark contrast to interviews conducted in the West Bank where people were very well versed in the conversation and controversy around it. Moreover, many West Bank respondents had personal anecdotes and experiences with having to navigate this discussion in their own work as activists, such as the example of Bassem on page 349. And while the vast majority of Gazans engaged in resistance are engaged in unarmed resistance, findings from interviews conducted in Gaza suggest that they do so without emphasizing the role that stones do, or do not, play in their resistance. While anecdotal in nature, the difference in emphasis activists place on throwing stones between the West

Bank and Gaza remains noteworthy.³¹ I should add, this is not to say that Palestinian activists cannot renounce the use of stones in unarmed resistance on their own accord, only that generally speaking, research participants did not instinctually categorize the throwing of stones as armed resistance.

Shifting Frameworks of Stone Throwing

Because funding and support for unarmed resistance is only granted if resistance fits within a framework aligned with the LPA, those that wish to receive this support, must adopt this framework. This therefore creates a hierarchy between Palestinians sympathetic to the frameworks and agendas of the LPA, and those who are not. This hierarchy is not merely theoretical or tactical. It is also material in the sense that those aligned with the LPA, receive funding, and thus all the various form of power that follow. In this sense, we see certain Palestinians, those positioned to benefit from the LPA, determining the discursive and tactical framework of unarmed resistance. This hierarchy is evident in things such as: the permits certain activists are granted to move around the West Bank and internationally; their language skills and knowledge of a certain lexicon used in trainings and workshops; the media interviews they conduct, documentaries they star in, or books they have published; the international activists and delegations visiting or staying in their homes/communities and the WhatsApp threads they have with activists from around the world; the salaries they make and the cars they drive; as well as the number of followers they have or

³¹ In order to develop a greater understanding of the drivers of this disparity, further research is needed. The fact that Gaza is under blockade and siege—the very reason it is more or less isolated from the LPA—also means that it is very difficult for researchers, Palestinian or otherwise, to conduct research in Gaza. As such, I mention this merely as an interesting point of comparison, rather than a flushed-out argument.

fellow activists they can mobilize. In short, the hierarchy between those who adopt the framing and agenda of the LPA and those who do not, results in a certain level of power being granted to some activists over others. This will be expanded on in the following empirical chapters.

The fact that participants themselves do not see armed/unarmed resistance as two distinct concepts—and disagree with the categorization of certain acts such as stone throwing as ‘violent’ resistance—is illustrative of the way that resistance is shaped, defined, categorized, and regulated along an Orientalist discursive terrain. Given CSOs/NGOs reliance on external donor patronage, research participants too are compelled to exist within this discursive terrain. This is an example of how power, through discourse, shapes the subject and regulates their identities. The experiences of my participants illustrate how they are positioned within an Orientalist discourse as racialized Others and their access to alternative discursive spaces—such as colonized peoples struggling against settler colonial oppression—is severely constrained. As a result, they face the choice of adopting this discourse and framing, rejecting it and having to face the inevitable backlash and personal cost that comes with challenging this hegemonic discourse, or appropriating this discourse through a combination of the two.

While I am arguing that the LPA plays an active role in shaping unarmed resistance in the West Bank, in part, by supporting only those activities and activists who adopt their framework and agenda, this is not to suggest that research participants, even those who adopt the LPA framework, are without agency. In fact, interviews were riddles with examples of “hidden forms of agency” (Richmond & Mitchell, 2011, pp. 2-3). In his classical work from 1990, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, Scott argues that amongst subordinated groups, it is important to look at “what is said in the face of power and what is said behind its back” (p. 5). What is said

‘in the face of power’ in this case is that yes, throwing stones is violent and subsequently has no place in resistance today. However, ‘what is said behind its back’ is that stone throwing is a form of expression, or reaction to fear and intimidation. It is not armed or violent resistance and is a respectable and historically rooted form of resistance. We see here how Western narratives of what constitutes violence, what is a legitimate, justified, or moral form of resistance and what is not, has come to shape the space and perceptions of Palestinians themselves.

Conclusion

In exploring my second research question, *‘How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?’*, this chapter has focused on the role that ideological underpinnings and framings of resistance have shaped the LPA’s engagement in unarmed resistance, and how this has played out in the West Bank. This chapter applied the conceptual lens of Orientalism as a tool to illuminate and analyze these ideological underpinnings and framing of resistance. In setting the stage for this exploration, this chapter opened with a discussion around language, stating that the language we use to speak about Palestinian resistance has material consequences in the lives of Palestinians. It focused its critique on the term ‘violence’ and unpacked its application in relation to resistance activism and tactics. In so doing, it argued that the language of violence in relation to Palestinian resistance bolsters an understanding of the context that assumes the legality and thus legitimization of Israeli actions which erases the violence of the Israeli settler-colonial project by maintaining their monopoly on legitimate violence. This critique provided the backdrop to arguing that the LPA has framed Palestinian resistance as either *violent* or *nonviolent*, rather than part of a wider struggle for national liberation and self-determination against a *violent* settler colonial project.

The crux of this chapters' argument is that by crystalizing the term violence as an integral part of Palestinian resistance, either in its presence, 'violent resistance' or in its absences, '*nonviolent resistance*', the LPA has established a binary imbued with judgement and assumptions. This analysis then brought us to a discussion related to the LPA's framework of violent/nonviolent resistance arguing that the resulting binary is problematic insofar as it is detached from indigenous knowledge and practice. It concluded with the example of the categorization of throwing stones to illustrate this.

In sum, this chapter has shown how the reinforcing nexus of power and representation functions as a trap which limits critical thinking, self-representation, and the propagation of historically grounded, context specific knowledge related to the conflict. Instead, as this chapter has outlined, it renders both Palestinians engaged in unarmed resistance, as well as the LPA tied to exogenous and Orientalist frameworks. In the following chapter, Chapter 9, I will wrap up my discussion related to my second research question, '*How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?*', by looking specifically at the material and structural effects of the LPA on unarmed resistance.

CHAPTER 9- Birds Without Wings: Material and Structural Effects of the LPA on Unarmed Resistance

This chapter considers two concrete arguments related to how the LPA has tactically and materially shaped and altered unarmed resistance in the West Bank. Firstly, I argue that the LPA introduced money into the incentive structure for engaging in resistance which in turn, impacted the volunteerism spirit in the West Bank and contributed to igniting further fragmentation between individuals, organizations, and groups. Secondly, I argue that this turned resistance into a set of projects, localized acts of resistance on specific days thus narrowing the scope and emancipatory goals of national liberation and self-determination. Ultimately, this chapter offers a more granular look at the manifestations of the NGO-ization of unarmed resistance in the West Bank in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords.

Forsaking a Broader Strategy of National Liberation, Self-Determination, and Decolonization for a Framework Palatable to the LPA

It was universally put forth by participants that unarmed resistance has seen a substantial decline in vision, cohesiveness, mobilization and engagement since the Oslo Accords. This, participants explain, has simultaneously gone hand in hand with a shift in language, definitions, tactics, and framing related to unarmed resistance. While the factors are likely many, what did become apparent throughout interviews is that participants themselves assume a correlation between these permutations and the introduction and involvement of the LPA.

Following the Oslo Accords, donor aid, and international assistance rose exponentially from US\$178.74 million in 1993, to US\$2.52 billion by 2010 (Turner, 2012, p. 497). International aid, donor funding, financial support, as well as many international solidarity organizations operating in Palestine, enforced—both implicitly and explicitly—the Oslo Accords terms as a conditional

political framework towards the goal of statehood (Dana, 2019). Local CSOs/NGOs receiving international funding became conduits for this framework and discourse; a process that is well established in the literature on NGOs. For example, DeMars (2005) highlights that the private identities and public mandates of NGOs make them prime targets for “political actors seeking to give veiled expression to political projects” (p. 42). This is illustrated by similar criticism in Palestine which has argued that the infusion of international funds into civil society as well as the PA was a way of ‘buying consensus to Oslo’ (Allen, 2013, p. 79). And while, CSOs/NGOs had always been a robust and integral aspect of Palestinian society (as seen in the First Intifada), and in the 1970s and 80s, was deeply rooted in the national liberation movement (Dana, 2015, p. 192), by adopting the Oslo political framework, civil society became increasingly professionalized and depoliticized. Or in the words of Regulsks (1999), they went “from protest to proposal” (p. 65 as cited in Atia & Herold, 2018, p. 1050). This has had two interrelated consequences: firstly, it led many Palestinians to view CSOs/NGOs with a degree of skepticism, charging them with being elitist and tied to foreign interests thus reducing their grassroots support base and ability to mobilize. This also scrubbed the role of the grassroots in society as the bedrock of the Palestinian anti-colonial, national liberation struggle (Allen, 2013). Secondly, it shifted the attention and efforts of CSOs/NGOs away from addressing the politics of the occupation, resistance, community mobilization, grassroots organizing, and other anti-colonial activity towards apolitical approaches based on the politics of development, peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and relief, and “legalistic protection of human rights” (Khalili, 2007, p. 35; Dana, 2019, p. 66). Some have gone as far as to suggest that the result of influx of external funding to CSOs/NGOs after the Oslo Accords, has been to turn them into, “missionaries of the new era”, where their efforts of ‘conversion’ are to the neoliberal peace and development paradigm, thus weakening the collective national resistance

movement (Merz, 2012, p. 50). Due to the nature of funding relationships between CSOs/NGOs and donors, the most successful of these organizations came to be the ones who adopt the lexicon and reporting requirements of donors (Dareish & Rigby, 2015, p. 106). To a certain extent, this pivoted the focus of many CSOs/NGOs away from the desires and needs of the grassroots and the national liberation movement, towards the agendas of donors.

The Oslo Accords gave Israel the right to ‘supervise, control and veto’ the content, budgets, design and delivery of development and peacebuilding activity flowing through the LPA (Ibrahim & Beaudet, 2012, p. 484-485).³² As a result, funding and support provided to CSOs/NGOs, groups, movements, and associations by the LPA became inherently tied to the adoption of a framework and agenda that by design, aligned with the interests of the adversary and occupying power- the State of Israel. For if these organizations were to pursue goals outside of these frameworks and agendas, they would be denied permits to operate by Israel (INGOs), or denied funding by international donors (local Palestinian CSOs/NGOs). In Allen’s (2013) detailed exploration into the ‘human rights industry’ which has risen and taken shape since the Oslo Accords, she plots the way that funding for CSOs/NGOs became, “guided by donor government’s own foreign policy goals, such as “coexistence”, [and] combating incitement against Israel” (Allen, 2013, p. 75). Ultimately, the influence of the LPA on resistance is comparable; it hinges on a certain degree of patronage which exists between the LPA, CSOs/NGOs, and Palestinian grassroots activists. This relationship results in the LPA wielding a tremendous amount of power in terms of setting the

³² See *Chapter 1- Background and Context* for a brief overview of some of the manifestations of the Oslo Accords on the resistance movement.

agendas, tactics, frameworks, even the lexicon used by CSOs/NGOs, and those engaged in resistance. For example, a research participant from the West Bank town of Tulkarm argues,

I am disappointed by the fact that a lot of civil society's political engagement in Palestine is rested on false rhetoric. Not necessarily false rhetoric on behalf of the political parties, but the NGOs. They are more focused on having a high moral ground and saying the right things to the internationals rather than focusing on the issues in front of us, and rather than actually trying to build a resistance movement (Anan, Tulkarm).

In the above quote, Anan articulates a commonly held frustration amongst research participants related to the power that the LPA wields in dictating the priorities of CSOs/NGOs vis-à-vis resistance. This is a well-established pattern and has been noted in the literature as far back as the 1980s: donors wield their influence through their funding, which results in the professionalization and de-politicization of organizations, and a move away from an accountability to civil society, and instead towards an accountability to donors (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986). By focusing on the agendas and frameworks of donors, CSOs/NGOs work is increasingly depoliticized. The depoliticization, as laid out in the following quote by Dana (2015), is not accidental. It is, in fact, inherent in the LPA's adherence to the Oslo paradigm,

From donors' perspective, Palestinian NGOs should not be affiliated politically and nor are they expected to become involved in any form of anti-colonial politics. Instead, their desired function is to perform certain predefined roles related to service provision and social engineering directed to enhance a top-down social transformation as a means to a political end: To further stabilize the 'peace process.' Consequently, Palestinian civil society has broken radically with the conventional anti-colonial politics that were so prominent in the period prior to the Oslo process (p. 203).

Drawing on her experience in India, Roy (2014a) concludes that patronage between those that supply capital, NGOs, and activists shifts the agendas of resistance organizers, which ultimately

weakens indigenous resistance and voice. Her reflections are exceptionally poignant in the case of the West Bank and eloquently sum up the sentiment of many research participants,

Eventually—on a smaller scale, but more insidiously—the capital available to NGOs plays the same role in alternative politics as the speculative capital that flows in and out of the economies of poor countries. It begins to dictate the agenda. It turns confrontation into negotiation. It depoliticizes resistance. It interferes with local peoples’ movements that have traditionally been self-reliant (Roy, 2014, n.p).

We can understand the LPA as having an altering effect on the resistance movement for a number of interrelated and mutually constitutive reasons. Of these, we will touch on two in this chapter: narrowing of resistance to specific projects, days of the week, and sites; and the introduction of salaries into the incentive structure for engaging in resistance, thus greatly thwarting the spirit of volunteerism.

Narrowing Resistance to Specific Projects/Days/Sites

Projects

The LPA has proved to be generally unwilling to support and bolster individuals and/or CSOs/NGOs that are outspoken about addressing some of the more structural aspects of Israel’s settler colonial activity, or pose more radical social agendas. Remembering that the LPA is tied to the Oslo Agenda, this is not surprising. However, in favoring less radical projects to fund, the LPA is facilitating something inoffensive, and therefore fundamentally ineffective. This is problematic because changing the status quo will inevitably require some measure of uncomfortable resistance, and not the apolitical, banal projects promoted by the LPA. If the LPA is unwilling to ‘get its hands dirty’, then they’re perceived by research participants as failing to do anything meaningful in bringing about change.

On a number of occasions, participants asked me, tongue in cheek, questions highlighting the selective nature of what the LPA supports, drawing attention to the fact that the LPA supports activism, empowerment, development, etc. only insofar that it is apolitical and does not advocate for radical or structural change. For example, a participant from Jenin Camp shared a story of a recent play his small community theatre was producing. The play was titled '*The Siege*'. It was funded by Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) as part of a larger project aimed at youth empowerment, community development, and cultivating a 'culture of peace'. The play was about the siege that took place in Jenin Camp in 2002. For him, putting on similar plays was an integral part of his unarmed resistance as it taught people about their history. He felt that it also reminded the audience about the resilience of their community and the type of collective activism that they are capable of. After a year of preparation, they were ready to show the play. They created posters to advertise the play around the refugee camp where the theater was located. The poster he explained, had a picture of a *Shabāb* with a kufiyah around his face, a slingshot in the background, and the picture of a large old key which was a well-known symbol for the right of return for Palestinian refugees.³³ As soon as the donors caught wind of this, they "called us and said, 'you can't put our name on this poster and we don't want to be part of this production any more'" (Male Interview, Jenin Camp). Even though the donors had approved the content of the play, they hadn't approved the graphics (a slingshot and a key) used to advertise the play. By forcing his theatre to either use 'appropriate' imagery or operate without funding (which

³³ The key has come to symbolize the right of return for the thousands of Palestinians that were forced to flee their homes in 1948 and beyond. For many of these families, they thought they were going to be able to return to their homes a few weeks later. While that never happened, 70 years later, these keys still remain in the family. These keys are emblazoned in many Palestinian homes today. Aida Refugee camp for example, has a huge 20-foot-long key above the entrance to the camp. This symbolizes the right of return for the nearly 3,000 inhabitants of the camp.

was an impossibility given the cost of materials to make the sets, costumes, etc.), his unarmed resistance—and ability to tell the story of his community’s history and their dreams for the future—was profoundly curbed. For the donors, the slingshot represented armed/violent resistance and the key represented the right of return for the 14,000 refugees living in the camp. Both of these fall outside the Oslo paradigm and therefore outside what the donor was willing to support. In trying to tell a story of resistance, resilience, and hope, he found himself on the other side of the images of youth empowerment and community development that the LPA wanted to promote and in turn, funding and support was revoked. In telling his story, he concludes, “the projects we can get support for aren't what they were before Oslo. The freedom we had to decide on our resistance projects, to express ourselves, it is gone” (Male Interview, Jenin Camp).

Stories such as these were commonplace throughout interviews. Anecdotally, they highlight a particular dimension of influence the LPA has in shaping unarmed resistance in the West Bank whereby setting explicit or implicit discursive, practical, and even visual limits on how unarmed resistance can be portrayed. In doing so, the LPA shapes the material reality of unarmed resistance on the ground. The projects and activities that end up receiving funding and support are the ones with the ‘right’ agenda, use the right imagery, and are aligned with the framework of unarmed resistance and the future (no right of return for refugees) put forth by the LPA. This process means that not only do projects and activities outside this framework never get off of the ground due to a lack of financial support, but it has also led to the proliferation of actors who are amenable to and share the same worldview as the LPA and therefore the Israelis, by design. In the example, we see how limitations around donor funded programs shape the way that resistance is memorialized and taught within a community. In so doing, it serves to reshape history and the memory of the past towards an image that is more palatable and sanitized to the West and Israel. Even though the

production that had its funding revoked was not calling for armed resistance (evidenced by the fact that SIDA had approved the contents of the play), it was the sharing of imagery which conjured up memories of the camp's history – a history that inhabitants felt was an integral part of their identity – that was forbidden and grouped into the category of 'inappropriate. Instead of Palestinians deciding on the unarmed resistance activities and projects they wanted supported by the LPA (such as a play), less political activities such as teaching nonviolent conflict resolution, facilitating dialogue groups, picking olives, supporting weekly 'peaceful protest', delivering human rights trainings etc., tend to be favored. While these endeavors are certainly worthwhile and important endeavors, they must be understood within the limitations they present.

The first limitation is that the diversity of unarmed resistance activities and projects is homogenized to fit the LPA framework; and second, that if we are to understand resistance activities along a spectrum rather than a binary, funding and support goes towards only a small selection of unarmed resistance activities, and to those that fall on the 'less radical' side of the unarmed resistance spectrum. Another example of this can be seen with women's groups in the West Bank. Women's political activism, organizing, and resistance activities were at an all-time high coming out of the First Intifada, entering into the Oslo years. With a long history of mobilization and activism, many donors were, and continue to be, keen on funding women's organizations through various educational, legal, and economic empowerment projects. These projects aim to empower women to 'use their voice' and be 'active agents of change' in their communities. However worthwhile and important these empowerment projects are, there remain important questions about the ability of these initiatives to address women's empowerment and the multiple layers of oppression they face. Questions include: Are Palestinian women empowered to fight the occupation, to demand decolonization and self-determination? Research participants

indicate this is not the case. The explanations for the persistent challenges and limitations surrounding empowerment can be understood through the lenses of decolonization and self-determination. To address these ongoing challenges requires a radical agenda and political engagement aimed at disrupting the Oslo paradigm and thus undermining the very foundation of the LPA, as well as fighting against Israeli state sanctioned violence. Moreover, these goals do not fit neatly into the LPA which places women's empowerment squarely in the broader liberal camp that would rather have women as active members in the economy instead of as radical activists focused on political objectives.

On one occasion a participant from Hebron asked why 'my government' funds Palestinian NGOs involved in women's social and economic empowerment yet did not support Palestinian women's activism in the West Bank that focused on challenging the Palestinian Authority's cooperation with Israel on matters of security. They went on to highlight that there was no support for women's unarmed activism part of the *Great March of Return* in Gaza, even though these women were challenging not only the illegal blockade on Gaza, but also patriarchal norms within their communities. Both of which she believed, if successful, would drastically improve the lives of Palestinian women.

The point here, is to highlight the gap between the priorities and lived experiences of individuals, and donor's empowerment, equality, and peace agendas/priorities which erase and ignore the very systems of unequal power and politics perpetuating inequality, oppression, and insecurity for individuals. In this example, donor funding de-politicizes the plethora of insecurities and inequalities facing women in Palestine, and instead remains trapped in neoliberal development and peacebuilding orthodoxy that fails to address the political barriers to development, security, and

equality (Swan, 2021). This example offers a window into understanding the larger impacts of donor programming around nonviolent resistance and peacebuilding.

From National Liberation to Specific Sites

In addition to the LPA's reluctance to support more socially radical, political, or structural forms of unarmed resistance, participants also noted the congruent and gradual focalization of resistance in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. That is to say, unarmed resistance activities being gradually more focused on specific site, on specific days of the week, or as part of a specific project rather than an overall national liberation strategy/goal. By shifting the notion of resistance from something that was entrenched and unrelenting in the day-to-day of Palestinians, to something that could be effectuated through particular projects, at particular locations, and only on particular events or days of the week, the LPA undermined an established and foundational principle of resistance in Palestine (as well as globally) related to the functioning of resistance as a 'capillary' following power and running beneath the surface of everything (Tripp, 2013, p. 5-6). Or as Svirsky (2017) explains, resistance in Palestine is best conceptualized as "part of a structure, not an event" (p. 30). This piecemeal approach to resistance therefore undermines the collectivity of the struggle and focuses attention to narrow unconnected manifestations of the Israeli settler colonial project. As these narrow and unconnected manifestation of the occupation become the focus of resistance efforts, we are distracted from the fact that political realities become more dire and the occupation systematically encroaches on the lives of Palestinians.

You can't have nonviolence as a one-time activity and call it nonviolence because it lacks the strategy! Nonviolence is a daily engagement, a daily resistance, daily activism. Nowadays people when they think of nonviolence, they think it is a demonstration, or a protest. But the core of nonviolence is a lack of obedience to the system of oppression and no cooperation. No obedience and no cooperation (Sami, Bethlehem).

In this quote, Sami laments that ‘nowadays’ the philosophy behind, and the meaning of unarmed resistance has been lost. He relates this to the fundamental premise of unarmed resistance being neglected in the majority of activism being practiced in the West Bank today. Earlier in the interview, he compared this to a time in the past, during the First Intifada, where this was not the case, a time when resistance was understood as a way of life, not an event.³⁴

“Only on Fridays”

My research participants demonstrate that the resistance framework of the LPA shifted unarmed resistance from being the centrality of Palestinian identity, to being an afterthought once the work day was done, or some measurable singular act. While this way of understanding unarmed resistance (specific sites, etc.) has yielded small articulable victories, it could also be argued that they have harmed the resistance movement by perpetuating the perception that peace and freedom can be achieved through fighting against individual and specific aspects of the occupation, rather than the whole process and structure of settler colonization and occupation. Ayed offers insight into this perspective.

Ayed led the unarmed resistance struggle in the village of Budros in the early 2000s. Like many participants, he expressed a frustration with the way that donor funding shaped the resistance in his community. The money for organizing unarmed resistance in his community he explained, came from both direct and indirect routes. It came indirectly from donors by way of the PA and

³⁴ It should be stated that the drivers of the disintegration of a larger national liberation movement for self-determination since the Oslo Accords are diverse and interrelated. These drivers range from the lack of political leadership and various policies coming out of the Oslo Accords such as PA security cooperation with Israel, Israeli’s “deliberate efforts to root out, and thwart any attempts at a national or collective unity” (Hassassian, 2006, p. 59), economic deprivation, together with the longevity of the conflict and the resulting exhaustion of the Palestinian population.

directly through the EU. During the period of time Ayed was organizing resistance in Budros, Salam Fayyad entered into the Palestinian politics. An economist by trade, he served as Finance Minister in 2002, before becoming Prime Minister in 2007 (until 2013). Fayyad is notorious for ushering in a set of neoliberal institutional reforms (squarely within the Oslo paradigm) to the PA, which emphasized economic development and cooperation with Israel. His legacy, along with the specific set of reforms, is commonly referred to as 'Fayyadism'. These reforms were geared towards appeasing international donors and the US administration. Despite his lack of support within Palestine, Fayyad's popularity with the international community is well documented (Thrall, 2010) and some authors have suggested that he became, "the face that the donor community wanted to see in order to transfer their funds to the PA" (Tartir, 2015, p. 21). While an in-depth dive into the politics of Salam Fayyad and the subsequent impact on resistance is outside the scope of this dissertation, other authors have outlined the ways his policies 'outlawed resistance' (Tartir, 2015), and contributed to the narrowing of resistance to what Tartir calls, 'financially-sponsored peaceful resistance' (p. 42). He goes on to outline how the neoliberal paradigm of the LPA (which, given his popularity with donors, is the same paradigm flouted by Fayyad), "created an industry for peaceful resistance" (ibid). Therefore, in short, Fayyad's emphasis on economics/finance made him popular with the LPA, who overlooked the lack of democratic process in the PA and allowed for the tamping out of popular resistance. Ayed's interview offers anecdotal support to Tartir's analysis. In regard to organizing and participating in unarmed resistance in his village, Ayed reflected on Fayyad's policies saying, "on Friday he said you could do anything you wanted [any sort of nonviolent resistance], but on Sunday you must be back at work in the morning, or if you are a student, you must be at your desk" (Ayed, Budros). He further despaired, "if you are following his plan or strategy, you can get lots of money" (Ayed,

Budros). Ayed explained that if an activist committed to the weekly protests on Friday, they could be paid, “50,000 Shekel a month from the PA. But they must only struggle on Friday, and then get back to work on the week days” (Ayed, Budros). According to Ayed, this money came from LPA (either directly through EU donors or byway of the PA) as a way of ‘buying out’ the resistance movement. Not only did this dampen the revolutionary spirit of resistance in Ayad’s perspective, it was also ineffectual in regard to the goals of national liberation and self-determination. Mirroring this indigenous perspective of resistance, compared against the LPA, Ayed laments,

To work only of Fridays means that the bulldozers that are building the wall are working everyday except Friday (and Saturday because of Shabbat). So, what are you resisting? You can send a message to the world that you are resisting but you cannot put pressure on the bulldozers to stop them from working if you only do 'part time resistance' on Fridays (Ayed, Budros).

Drawing similar conclusions to Ayed, another popular resistance committee organizer from the village of Nabi Saleh further highlighted the distinction between the localization of resistance activities to specific sites, towns, specific days of the week and/or other material forms of oppression on the one hand, and a national liberation struggle for self-determination on the other. He goes as far as to say that he believes that these small victories of unarmed and nonviolent activism are in fact harming the resistance movement because they perpetuate the perception that peace can be achieved through fighting against individual and specific aspects of the occupation, rather than the whole process and structure of settler colonization and occupation.

They partially succeeded in changing the direction of the wall and to protect parts of their land. But in general, it harmed the whole resistance strategy of Palestine because it put the tactic before the strategy. The wall is not the problem, the problem is the colonization of Palestine. They focused on the wall, on settlements, but these things are just a shape of the occupation. The problem is the colonization of our land. Oslo agreement succeeded in changing the face of Israel so we distinguish between Israel and the occupation. Now people talk about the two as if they are different, but they are not. Israel is the occupation

and the occupation is Israel. We have to struggle against both (Bassem, Nabi Saleh).

It is necessary to contextualize the above quote as not to mischaracterize his conclusion. This participant and I spoke at lengths about the goals of resistance, and what he viewed as the necessary strategy. For him, the strategy and goals of resistance are an end to the occupation; the right of return for Palestinian refugees; a removal of Israeli settlements from the West Bank; freedom for Gaza' and full unfettered access to Jerusalem as Palestinians' capital, and ultimately statehood. In this sense, when he says, "Israel is the occupation, and the occupation is Israel. We have to struggle against both" I believe he is eluding to the need to couch resistance activities within the larger strategy and struggle of decolonization, rather than individual site-specific challenges/victories. Moreover, given his acceptance of a two-state solution as his goal of resistance outlined above, his quote should neither be interpreted as a call for a struggle against the concept of Israel, nor their right to exist. Instead, his frustration is with the idea of resistance being measured in the successes of things such as rerouting the Israeli separation wall, removing metal detectors at Al Aqsa mosque, or saving a village such as Khan al-Ahmar from demolition all the while remaining under military occupation. In the absence of a broader strategy he argued, these small victories become distractions. People, both within Palestine and internationally, succumb to the illusion that progress is being made, resistance is working. This ultimately dims the nationalist revolutionary spirit of resistance by narrowing its goals; as outlined by a participant from Bil'in, "once they stopped building the wall in Bil'in, we stopped our actions" (Basel, Bil'in).



Image 6: Activists gather at Khan al-Ahmar to protest Israeli demolition orders. Photo by Author. October 2018

From this perspective, the localization of unarmed resistance goals means that small successes end up distracting from the fact that political realities become more acute; settlements continue to expand; annexation in places such as Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem is formalized; and restrictions on Gaza worsen. These findings mirror that of Darwish and Rigby (2015). They argue that the localization of unarmed resistance to specific sites has rendered it ineffectual to any larger goal of ending the occupation and national liberation. They state, “there have been too few pockets of resistance and sites of confrontation to impose sufficient cost on Israel to cause any significant section of the Israeli public to conclude that the occupation was unsustainable and not worth the price” (pp. 96-97). As a result, they argue, these small pockets of resistance are left to churn on, while failing to result in any meaningful impact or change.

Money and Salaries Shape Resistance: “I think you have touched our wound in this question”

In all of the research on Palestinian resistance, little has been said of the internal politics of resistance and the role that Western³⁵ external funding has on the movement and its participants.

³⁵ I specify ‘Western’ funding because this differs greatly in terms of influence to that of other donors such as Iran.

Salaries, financial remuneration, and in-kind support have always been a feature of resistance work in Palestine. Examples of support include: direct monetary transfers from the PLO and external stakeholders or supporters (Iran, Egypt, Cuba, etc.); financial support from the PLO to resisters' families; food and other necessities provided to resisters by communities; or other material needs such as weapons or travel arrangements, those engaged in resistance have always received various forms of support. While this is perhaps obvious, I mention it to remind readers that the ensuing discussion is not meant to be viewed as a comparison to a romanticized past when those engaged in resistance did so as free agents, without strings attached, enjoying unwavering public support and legitimacy, and in the absence of external levers exerting influence. However, despite this legacy of historical support, current mobilization trends today are fundamentally different than previous eras, where "collective action primarily was driven by a voluntary spirit to serve the public good and interest, which was crucial to the overall collective action" (Dana, 2015, p. 200). Furthermore, the external funding and assistance that did exist prior to Oslo was found primarily in solidarity forms of support. Seen to be largely in line with Palestinian's own goals, frameworks, and interests.

I agree with Kelly's (2008) assertion that while "a list of the reasons why people take particular paths is a largely thankless and meaningless task", I think it is important and "possible to produce an account to the structural conditions which make certain choices possible" (p. 370). In this sense, I hope to draw attention to the introduction and ballooning of *Western* salaries, stipends, grants, project funding, and professional positions in the field of 'nonviolent resistance'. This money, which came by way of the LPA tied to the Oslo Framework, fundamentally altered the unarmed resistance space and led to a fundamental shift in the political economy of development assistance, aid, and support to Palestinian CSOs/NGOs.

Wisam, a research participant from Ramallah explained, “with their money, they can influence how an activity goes, how resistance goes. This means you can influence the direction it takes. You can buy activism. You pay for nonviolence, you get nonviolence” (Wasim, Ramallah). Not only do salaries and stipends have an impact in terms of mobilization, but also in terms of internal dynamics within unarmed resistance groups, organizations, committees, and communities, etc. In the above section, we saw how LPA funding and support for projects is tied to a specific framework of nonviolent resistance and peacebuilding. Meaning that support was only granted to projects and activities that fit within this framework. However, funding from the LPA not only goes towards projects and activities, it is also used to pay the salaries, compensation, and/or honorariums for nonviolent resistance leaders, activists, and participants. It should not come as a surprise then, that this in turn, shapes unarmed resistance.

Today, popular resistance doesn't exist. You can see all of this money- famous activists, but you cannot see real action on the ground. Lots of talk about organizing resistance, but not a lot of resistance actually happening. There is a saying, 'if you want to kill a movement, kill it by money'. If you spread money, any movement, even if it is a volunteer movement, you will kill it. There is a very big difference between a movement motivated by morals and a movement motivated by money. Our movement is a movement that needs belief in it, it needs morals. Because of this, the money effects it (Ayed, Budros).

In this quote, Ayed suggests that external money kills resistance by altering the incentive structure. Where he believes a successful resistance movement needs to be motivated by morals and a ‘belief in it’, the money and salaries funneled through the LPA kills resistance by contributing to a diminishing spirit of volunteerism and shifting unarmed resistance activism towards a more professionalized and elitist activity. This in turn, builds resentment and creates an environment ripe for jealousy and mistrust between groups/communities/individuals vying for the same limited resources.

Killed Volunteerism

It has been noted by research participants and academics alike, that volunteerism underpinned resistance efforts prior to Oslo, but have since been transformed by the LPA. “What was once a form of resistance imbued with clear social responsibilities and motivated by devotion to the nationalist cause has increasingly become a vehicle for upward mobilization (Leone, 2010, p. 68). With the introduction of financial remuneration for nonviolent activism, came the decline of volunteerism, which participants explained, had historically been an integral aspect of resistance organizing and activities. The decline of volunteerism shifts involvement in what is supposed to be part of a nationalist struggle, to something that is done occasionally, by specific people, for specific events rather than something that is integrated into the fabric of existence. If we understand resistance as a rhizome, or ‘a structure rather than an event’ (Svirsky, 2017), then we can appreciate the relentless and everyday sacrifice and energy needed to sustain such a structure. This level of commitment requires a spirit of volunteerism as it would be impossible to be remunerated for such a holistic level of engagement. Therefore, the dampening of the spirit of volunteerism historically associated with resistance, has meant that so too has the relentless commitment been dampened, reduced to acts/events, and itemized remunerated engagements.

Unfortunately, international aid has made a lot of damage within the Palestinian resistance community. It has destroyed a lot of values that we had such as the spirit of volunteerism which is necessary for resistance. Now everybody wants pocket money to participate (Abdulfattah, Aida Camp).

Abdulfattah’s impression that international aid has ‘destroyed a lot of values’ within his community, points to the gravity of donor involvement in resistance. Interviews suggest that the LPA not only shifted incentive structures for participation, they also shifted social values. In turn, this also shifted the movement itself.

Building on Adbulfattah's sentiment of resistance historically depending on volunteerism, Wasim comments, "the spirit of volunteerism here is almost gone. People expect you to pay them to show up, to pay for their transportation, a meal, pay for everything" (Wasim, Ramallah). When I asked him what specifically he thought led to this diminishment, he replied,

Maybe it is part of when the NGOs started working here in Palestine. They realized that you can get a group of people to come to their activities by paying for their transportation, their food, and then it becomes part of an expected thing. This doesn't exist in other places, some people pay NGOs to volunteer! We used to in the First Intifada, we used to donate food for participants, but not now, now it is the opposite... So ya, I see a shift, something that maybe during the First Intifada was thought of as resistance, you did it because it was part of your fight, now there is an expectation to be paid to participate. It is almost becoming an industry, a business, employment. You have people that get paid a lot more than the average Palestinian to work with these NGOs, to do *their* type of resistance and peacebuilding (Wasim, Ramallah).

By introducing financial remuneration for things that at one time were considered to be part of one's duty and fight for self-determination, the LPA transformed activism towards professionalized activity, rather than one centred on volunteerism. For example, mobilization becoming tied to financial remuneration was often highlighted by participants and is a well-known consequence of the influx of foreign funded NGOs post-Oslo. Ahmad, explained how this has led to individuals playing NGOs off of one another, picking and choosing where to go, what to participate in depending on who is providing a better 'perk'. In short, the various forms of remuneration provided by the LPA introduced competition and division into something that historically people had been doing collectively *precisely* because they were on an even – unpaid – playing field. Now – with compensation – fundamental issues of fairness and personal recognition come in to play and undermine the purpose of resistance.

I'm going to be honest here. We have in Palestine, a theory. We say, the Palestinian society became worse when the NGOs arrived because we lost the

voluntary spirit. If someone wants to do something, organize something, it's not possible, nobody will join, nobody will take part because they say, 'this other NGO paid us, or gave us this and that'. People won't join in without getting something from it. When the PLO came back, the people became poorer and there was not enough money or work. Everyone needed to look after themselves. People started thinking, why would I volunteer when another organization would pay me? And the ones that would pay are the ones that are Western, with their slightly different agendas. The NGOs pay people to do the things they used to volunteer to do (Ahmad, Jericho).

In the above quote, Ahmad connects the rise in stipends, salaries, and various types of compensation with people's willingness to adopt 'slightly different agendas'. From being paid to attend a protest, denouncing tactics such as throwing stones, adopting the language of *violence* or *nonviolence*, or dictating the imagery used to promote a play as seen on page 361, the exogenous frameworks and agendas of the LPA may be odds with those personally held by research participants. Nevertheless, remuneration makes them an attractive option. The high-level impact of this is yet another example of how a shift has occurred from a solidary based social movement for national liberation, to neoliberalism.

The result of activists, leaders, committees, and community organizing groups receiving remuneration for their resistance activities has repercussions beyond killing the spirit of volunteerism. According to participants, it also sews seeds of distrust and jealousy between individuals and communities which in turn, contributes to a crisis in the legitimacy of unarmed resistance.

Elitism, Lack of Trust, Jealousy, and Skepticism

Borne out of the perceived reduction of volunteerism, came a focus on unarmed resistance activists being 'elitist'. This perception resulted in further fragmentation and distrust between and within those engaged in unarmed resistance, as well as the general public. When I would ask participants

about what changed from the First Intifada, which all participants agree was a *mass* unarmed popular resistance movement, to the unarmed resistance that could be found today, an overwhelming majority of participants explained that ‘money’ entered into the picture. This, they argue, was profoundly damaging to the resistance movement. Probing and follow up questions around this were met with responses such as, “I think you have touched our [Palestinian] wound in this question” (Osama, Jericho). The money that participants spoke about not only killed volunteerism as highlighted in the above section, but participants also explained that it weakened the cohesion of unarmed resistance by sewing distrust and cynicism at all levels of society. Participants felt that financial remuneration provided through the LPA functioned to corrupt community/resistance organizations at the village and individual level. This perception was borne in part by the fact that the LPA is understood to be part and parcel with the Oslo paradigm/framework. Therefore, their support is also in line with Oslo’s goals, frameworks, and interests, which are perceived to be at odds with those of indigenous actors. This was perceived by both those outside the resistance movement, as well as within. Speaking to this, Hasan shared, “the international people being with us is very important but the money has negative effects and makes troubles and problems between the people” (Hasan, Al Masara). Ayed, elaborated on this suggesting that the types of problems it creates between the people relate to jealousy and corruption,

When the communities get money, the first question is, where did the money come from, what did you do with it, how much did you get, who were you before, why did you get more than someone else? These basic questions break people apart. This is what killed all of the Popular Committees across the West Bank (Ayed, Budros).

Feeling that international money negatively effects the trust, cohesion, and motivations of those engaged unarmed resistance, a participant from Bil’in who is involved in organizing and leading

the weekly protests against the building of the Israeli Wall that have taken place there since 2005 shared,

One of the biggest problems that can affect the resistance is the money which comes through the NGOs. Many people believe that in life, wherever money enters a relationship or anything it breaks it, it is ruined. This happens in the resistance movement, money breaks it. It changes the aims and it changes the people... Of course, resistance needs some money, but what is the source of this money? Where will the money go and who will control it? (Basel, Bil'in).

Basel went on to share the story of when USAID came to his community and offered to support their unarmed resistance organizing,

USAID came to Bil'in and asked if they could finance our resistance movement but we refused. We have the people. We need money without conditions. It is a very sensitive and complicated subject because when you have money as a leader, you have to show what you do with this money, but because it is resistance, you can't show what you do with this money because maybe it is illegal, because everything is illegal! How can I manage as a leader, I have to tell the people 'look, I have \$1,000 and I did this and this and this'. But then your enemies will know how much you have and know what you do and will do. And then if you don't let the people see where the money goes, they will accuse you of stealing it (Basel, Bil'in).

The disintegration of trust outlined by research participants can be understood, in part, to be connected to the fact that while remuneration for involvement in unarmed resistance was present prior to Oslo, it was most often provided by indigenous sources: the PLO, civil society, personal and individual finances, etc., or was solidarity-based support from the Arab world, "motivated by the desire to help Palestinians remain on the land and resist the occupation (promoted by the PLO and funded by Arab states), or assist in the development of Palestinian wellbeing and quality of life" (Turner, 2012, p. 497). This funding therefore supported Palestinians to resist how they deemed appropriate, whether it be remaining on one's land and practicing *sumud*, or building their communities in ways they felt appropriate—rather having to conform to the Oslo Accords and thus framework of the LPA. Hanafi & Tabar (2005) highlight this phenomena in suggesting that

the Oslo Accords precipitated a fundamental shift in the political economy of aid to Palestinian CSOs/NGOs. External funding and assistance prior to Oslo was found primarily in solidarity forms of support. This support was seen to be in line with Palestinian's own goals, frameworks, and interests and was also relevant/connected, at least in part, to the local economy. After Oslo, the mushrooming of international involvement in peacebuilding and statebuilding meant that much of the remuneration for unarmed resistance came by way of the LPA and was politically driven, aimed at bolstering the peace process and the building of liberal peace in the region (Hanafi & Tabar, 2005). Given the fact that the LPA is part and parcel with the Oslo paradigm/framework, this support therefore was in line with Oslo's goals, frameworks, and interests, rather than those of indigenous actors. Additionally, it was decoupled from the local economy. Oftentimes, this meant that salaries and project funding were not only potentially disconnected from indigenous goals, frameworks, and interests; but were also disproportionately high in comparison to the local economy. While this distinction is imperfect, of course there are exceptions, it does speak to a general shift in terms of the types of 'strings attached' to the available funding and support for unarmed resistance pre, and post-Oslo. It also speaks to the process through which unarmed resistance became associated with elitism.

The connection between elitism and the erosion of solidarity and legitimacy is well founded. Many scholars have identified the connection between the rise in international funding to CSOs/NGOs and subsequent challenges to their accountability and legitimacy in the eyes of the grassroots, civil society, and local politics in Palestine (Challand, 2009; Hammami, 1995; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005). For example, Hammami (2000) proposed that as international donor funding to CSOs/NGOs increased after the Oslo Accords, we saw an "retrenchment from popular constituency" (p. 16). One of the drivers of this retrenchment, is the elitism that came to plague much of the resistance

activism supported by the LPA. Speaking to the NGO elite in Palestine, Dana (2015) highlights, “this elite is supported and sustained by economic, political and social incentives of international donors. At the economic level, NGOs became an attractive source of income where high salary and other economic privileges are secured” (p. 200). This was mirrored in interviews where participants such as Wisam recognize that the general public views nonviolent resistance as ‘elite activism’ (Wisam, Ramallah). The primary driver for the perception of this elite activism Hanafi & Tabar (2005) suggest, is borne out of the increased entry of Palestinian CSOs/NGOs into what they call the aid industry, or what I am calling the LPA.

The perception of nonviolent resistance being ‘elite activism’ was palpable throughout the West Bank. When speaking to people *outside* of the resistance movement and *not* involved with a CSOs/NGOs, I was often surprised by the skepticism and disparaging ways that Palestinians spoke about those engaged in nonviolent resistance today. There was a stark contrast between the caricature of those involved in *unarmed* resistance in the past—a romanticized, altruistic, and steadfast force—and the caricature of those involved in *nonviolent* resistance today—an elitist, opportunist, vehicle of acculturation. While these are of course extremes, I give them as caricature examples to highlight the rupture between the two perceptions. They reflect the growing divide between Palestinians who hold very different values (one group rooted in the national liberation movement and the other group seen as ‘sell-outs’ to the international community who are after individual gain over societal gain). There are, of course, many Palestinians in the middle or closer to one of these extremes than the other. However, this division is used in discourse/rhetoric to convey frustrations with the perceived impact of international interventions.

While the charge of elite activism that Wisam mentioned comes from the general public and is directed towards research participants, jealousy, lack of trust, and skepticism was also apparent within and between research participants. These personal reactions and feelings from the general public towards men engaged in unarmed resistance supported by the LPA reflect a view of them as pursuing their *self-interest* instead of the collective interest. The accusation is that they would rather get paid and travel than do the ‘real resistance work’ and get shot or imprisoned, yet, are presenting themselves (and benefitting from doing so) as peacebuilders and as representatives of the Palestinian grassroots and unarmed resistance to the world. Some people see this as shallow, sanctimonious, and ultimately ineffectual at addressing the occupation. Ortner (1995) suggest that,

If we are to recognize that resisters are doing more than simply opposing domination, more than simply producing a virtually mechanical re-action, then we must go the whole way. They have their own politics—not just between chiefs and commoners or landlords and peasants but within all the local categories of friction and tension (pp. 176-177).

In my case study, these categories go beyond those of men and women; seniors and juniors; struggles between religious sects etc. While the relationship may be complicated between those involved in armed versus unarmed, research participants highlight that the greater tension and friction is within categories of those involved in unarmed resistance. Specifically, those who are affiliated with CSOs/NGOs and receive a salary, who are leaders of local Popular Resistance Committees and have connections with INGOs, and who travel abroad to talk about peacebuilding and nonviolence. Speaking to the tension between activists, Anan suggests that the jealousy and gossip between individuals and organizations working in nonviolent resistance should be expected. They are after all, he comments, “competitors in a market” (Anan, Tulkarm).

The concept of NGO-ization presented in Chapter 7 is a useful conceptual framework coming out of critical development studies which can help us unpack some of the themes covered in this chapter. I believe that many of the phenomena brought up by research participants in regard to the way that the LPA has shaped unarmed resistance, are tied, in part, to what I am calling ‘the NGO-ization of resistance’. According to authors such as Hammami, the tangible ramifications of NGO-ization became glaringly evident during the Second Intifada where, unlike the First Intifada, CSOs/NGOs remained largely disengaged, “immobilized by the cognitive dissonance of their obligations to their donor base and to the national struggle” (Leone, 2010, p. 28). This framework therefore, helps us to see how unarmed resistance activism has become a site within itself of power hierarchies, and struggles over access to the resources of the LPA. Ultimately, weakening the resistance movement which depends on public legitimacy, mass based mobilization, and wide-spread buy in to a shared agenda.

To conclude, I want to return to Yousif’s quote used in the previous chapter which elucidates how armed and unarmed resistance are ‘two wings of a bird’, and both integral to a bird’s ability to fly (i.e. the integrity and strength of a resistance movement). What happens when both armed and unarmed resistance are thwarted? What is left if resistance becomes a project, a task one engages in in order to get paid? What happens when resistance becomes something that is defined and dictated by exogenous actors? Drawing on the title of Mahmoud Darwish’s first collection of resistance poetry in 1960, what is left is ‘asafir bila ajniha’, *birds without wings*.

Conclusion

In answering my second research question of, ‘*How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, Western peacebuilding efforts have shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?*’, I broke the findings up into

three distinct chapters: Chapter 7- *Occupied by Nonviolence: The LPA, CSOs/NGOs, and NGO-ization*; Chapter 8- *Two Wings of a Bird: Armed and Unarmed Resistance*; and Chapter 9- *Birds Without Wings: Material and Structural Effects of the LPA on Unarmed Resistance*. This chapter has surveyed how the LPA has tactically and materially shaped and altered unarmed resistance in the West Bank. It argued that the LPA narrowed the scope of unarmed resistance, focusing it on specific sites of resistance and specific days. This segued into a discussion into the influence of money and salaries flowing from the LPA to unarmed resistance activism. This chapter touched on two interrelated consequences of the introduction of the LPA's money and salaries: killing the volunteerism spirit once associated with resistance activism, and fueling a lack of trust, jealousy, and accusations of elitism.

CHAPTER 10- Masculinity and Unarmed Resistance Post-Oslo: Structure and Agency

The focus of the previous three empirical chapters has primarily been on the structural processes and realities resulting from the implications of the LPA on unarmed resistance in the West Bank. I have shown how peacebuilding efforts have merged with unarmed (nonviolent) resistance to configure a form of politics in which representations of Palestinians are neither neutral, nor immune from Orientalist narratives. Therefore, I have so far aimed to illustrate how the LPA has been afflicted by the curse of Orientalism, an omnipresent force which reaches to the very core of its theoretical foundation. The far-reaching tentacles of Orientalism reach deep within Palestinian civil society, intimate social and family structures, and into global perceptions of Palestinians and their struggle for national liberation and self-determination. While the power-knowledge nexus resulting from the Orientalist narratives embedded in the LPA has woven a constellation of social control with respect to resistance, Palestinian men engaged in this field are nevertheless not silenced victims of an inequitable structural process. And while colonial and Orientalist narratives have rhetorically “played an active role in constructing violence as part of manhood in the Middle East” (Malmstrom, 2015, p. 309), if we scratch the surface of the emerging web of influence the LPA exercises, various forms of Palestinian agency emerge. It is here, in the meeting of structure and agency, that the following chapter turns to my third and final research question, *‘How have men, engaged in unarmed resistance, responded to and navigated the contemporary unarmed resistance space?’*

Agency is inherently tied to power: the power to act, the power to represent, and the power to decide. Power, and agency, then interact not only with the larger structures of society, but also between individuals. One’s ability to exercise their agency is filtered through the prism of identity.

And while identity is constructed by a myriad of factors, this analysis will centre around one of the most universal markers of identity: gender.

One's gender serves many functions. It acts as a scripted performance defining what behaviours and interactions are seen as appropriate. It also establishes a power structure and hierarchy. By shaping access to power, gender shapes opportunities, expectations, and experiences. And while gender is often broken into the binary of masculinity and femininity, feminist theorists have further broken these categories down into more descriptive and nuanced categories reflecting the spectrum of human experiences. Butler (2004) would argue that gender identities are the result of discursive practices which construct the gendered subject. Conversely, Connell (2002) draws attention to the role of agency³⁶ vis-à-vis gender identity, in her assertion that, "bodies are both objects of social practice and agents in social practice" (p. 47). Together, what Connell and Butler highlight, is that despite the omnipresent power of discourse in shaping and creating the world as we know it³⁷, "subjects do sometimes possess power and exercise it" (Duncanson, 2015, p. 233). It is here, in the space between discursive construction and the agential expression of my research participants that my analysis finds its home. In the following chapter, I engage in an analysis of the way that male research participants "seek to draw and actualize their life trajectories in order to increase their social possibilities and life chances" (Vigh, 2007, p. 11) in the volatile, shifting, and unstable social/political landscape of the West Bank. And, along the way, rely on the concepts of hegemonic masculinities to do so.

³⁶ Not all authors agree with this point. For examples, Whitehead (2002) argues that Connell's theorizing and conceptualization of hegemonic masculinities is structurally reductive (p. 94).

³⁷ Also see Foucault, 1972 for a discussion around the power of discourse in shaping our reality.

In introducing the concept of agency into my analysis on men and masculinities vis-à-vis unarmed resistance I contend with current literature which has become preoccupied with the “categorization of men’s experiences to a plethora of fixed and fluid ‘types’ of masculinities” (Waling, 2019, p. 90; also see Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p. 337). While helpful frameworks to begin an analysis, the multiple types of masculinities, from hegemonic, militarized, protest and toxic, to alternative complicit, and marginalized, these categorizations offer little in terms of understanding and theorizing the shifts, slippages, and mobility between and within these categories among individual men. Moreover, they do not provide a framework to understand cultural, or movement-based evolution of male gender identity across society. The critical role that agency plays in the way that men navigate their surroundings is well established in feminist literature (Connell, 2009), and feminist literature regards gender identity, and thus masculinities, as an interaction of both structural forces and the conscious choices of individuals (, p. 105). As such, while using the concept of hegemonic masculinity and alternative masculinity in this chapter, I also apply the concept of agency to help illuminate the experiences of individual men within these larger categories, as well as within larger social structures, as a means of understanding seemingly contradictory identities such as ‘nonviolent hegemonic masculinity’. We will now take a closer look at how men have navigated the unarmed resistance space as it relates to the LPA, attempting to neither frame men as victims of gendered (and Orientalist) stereotypes nor, responsible for these stereotypes.

In using the term ‘navigate’ in relation to the way my research participants interact with the LPA vis-à-vis their resistance work, I am borrowing from Henrik Vigh (2007; 2010) who argues that the concept of navigation is helpful in understanding, “how people act in difficult or uncertain circumstances and in describing how they disentangle themselves from confining structures, plot

their escape and move towards better positions” (2010, p. 419). Through his work with youth in Guinea-Bissau, Vigh (2007) uses the analytical lens of navigation as a tool to explore the interface and gap between agency and ‘social forces’ (p.14). Vigh suggests that using the term social navigation can be helpful as, “an analytical optic able to illuminate the way agents guide their lives through troublesome social and political circumstances” (p. 13). In this sense, social navigation denotes the inseparability of action and environment combined with knowledge and praxis (ibid). Adopting this interpretation of navigation I believe, helps to better contextualize and understand the opportunistic and/or tactical ways in which my research participants expand their horizons of possibility in a context of occupation, conflict, and constrained opportunities.

The Construction of Masculinity Under Occupation: The Role of Resistance

The displacement, dispossession, and ethnic cleansing resulting from the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the ongoing occupation of what remained of historic Palestine after 1967, has touched the lives of every Palestinian. It has shaped their collective consciousness and continues to play a fundamental role in how individuals construct their identity. At the beginning of any interview for example, I would ask the interviewee to introduce themselves. After stating their name, what followed was always a historical account of where they were from, where they live now (if different from where they are from), and what year they – or their families – left their ancestral homes. While there are of course differences between refugees, urban Hebronites and Jerusalemites, or individuals from Beit Jala for example, what remained constant was the importance of place, as well as the denial of such connections, in the formation of Palestinian identity.

In the same way that recounting geographic violence and the personal accounts of displacement formed a backdrop to one's identity, so too does one's involvement, or one's family's involvement in resistance to these processes of displacement and oppression. During the First and Second Intifadas the various forms of resistance, popular struggle, nonviolent direct action, stone throwing, strikes, armed attacks and ambushes etc., were all (in varying degrees) part of the collective 'resistance movement'—unified across political parties, religious differences, and ideological leanings by the PLO and the Chairman Yasser Arafat. Across the spectrum of tactics, the degree to which society idolized those who have suffered and made great sacrifices for the resistance movement falls along deeply gendered lines.

In Palestine, the man is responsible for protecting the family. When I was young and first got involved in resistance, I got involved to protect my sisters and to protect my family because I felt the responsibility to protecting my family. Here, it is mostly men that are responsible for doing the resistance (Osama, Jericho).

It is posters and photographs of the faces of men and boys who gave their lives, either through death or imprisonment, to resistance that plaster the walls of refugee camps, and make appearances in every city, town, and neighborhood throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Yacoub explains that despite women's long-standing involvement in resistance, it is men that face social pressure to resist. This resistance comes in many forms,

It is related to the culture. Our culture blames men. We want our freedom and our rights and they expect this to be achieved by men. Although women are sharing in *sumud*, there is still an expectation for me to be the one who brings us freedom... In the Palestinian culture, men are power and men need to be strong. Israeli policy is to make the men look weak and make them think and look like they are nothing. They make them wait for hours in a check point just to humiliate them. These efforts of the Israeli plan make men react. The men therefore try to say, 'no, I am a man and I have power'. Each man shows his power in different ways. In our community, the more pressure you put on men, they react in crazy, crazy ways. They may never have even thought about doing such a crazy thing, they didn't plan it. But because of all of the pressure on their

dignity and against their manhood and against their appearance in front of their community as a man losing power, sometimes men use violence, they use unexpected actions (Yacoub, Hebron).



Image 7: Mural depicting men throwing stones and being arrested on the Separation Wall outside of Aida Refugee Camp in Bethlehem. Photo by Author, February 2018.

Indicative of the central role that resistance plays in the lives of Palestinian men and subsequently the construction of hegemonic masculinity is the very public and visible memorialization of prisoners and martyrs. The stories of how and when loved ones lost their lives are seared into a family's collective memory. Almost every single Palestinian home I entered displayed similar photographs adorning the living room walls, young men posing with a gun (sometimes superimposed, sometimes unedited) in a *keffiyeh* against a backdrop of Al Aqsa mosque. Much like the process of interviewees being keen to share where in Palestine their family originally hailed from, upon entering a home, as little as a glance at one of these photos would inevitably result in your host recounting, with a mixture of pride and sorrow, who the man in the photo was,

how and when he died, or how long he had been in prison for. These men are idolized by their family and peers for their suffering and sacrifice. Families spoke with pride about the various involvements of family members in resistance, and families of martyrs, *fidā'iyyīn*, and prisoners derive deep respect and admiration from their community for the actions, commitment, and sacrifices their family member made for resistance.



Image 8: Framed photos of male family members killed or imprisoned, and Yasser Arafat on a participant's living room wall. Photo by Author, November 2018.

Riyad, a participant from Bethlehem spoke about the Intifada era where, “it was like a competition between families, who had the most family members in resistance, and who dedicated their life and time for Palestine” (Riyad, Bethlehem). During interviews, when male and female participants were asked who they looked up to as children, it was common for them to cite an imprisoned or martyred family member alongside more well-known Palestinian male national resistance figures such as Abu Amar (Yasser Arafat), Abu Jihad, George Habash, or Ahmad Yassin. Images of international political revolutionaries such as Che Guvera, were also very common.

There were two role models who I looked up to when I was young: Yasser Arafat and my Uncle. My uncle, he was in Israeli prison for a very long time for killing an Israeli soldier, he was a hero in our community. Growing up, I wanted to be a hero like him (Basel, Bil'in).

Basel described that his adoration for these two men centred on their bravery, sacrifice, and strength, "When I was born, my uncle was in prison and I grew up hearing stories about him. From the stories my family told me, I knew he was a big, strong and very brave man" (ibid). Family members either martyred or imprisoned were framed as heroes. Their legacies crystalized through family stories and passed on to the next generations. Another interviewee shared this story:

My uncle was my hero when I was a kid, he was killed in the 1970s. Although he died a month before I was born, I grew up listening to stories about him, being a martyr and Palestinian prisoner. In 2010 my sister's husband was also killed, he was 42 years old. I come from a resistance family in Hebron. I grew up with the idea that a martyr is a hero, the biggest hero in our community. We feel that he really makes an impact on the occupation, he hurts the occupation and therefore he is a hero. How a martyr puts his life for the sake of his country and dies defending as a *fidā'īyyīn* means that his name and his picture will never disappear. We never forget our martyrs (Yacoub, Hebron).

As illustrated through these quotes, a great deal of social respect is bestowed upon those who resist the occupation and fight for Palestinians' right to self-determination and national liberation. Historically, those held up as Palestinian heroes and role models were those engaging in various forms of armed resistance as this not only demonstrated a willingness to engage in violence for the sake of the homeland, but also bravery, sacrifice, and inevitably, suffering. And while today, organized armed resistance in the West Bank is almost nonexistent –with political leaders in the PA strongly condemning it and participants having shifted their tactics – those who had previously engaged in armed resistance nevertheless continue to receive respect, power, and admiration. Participants explain that although tactics of resistance have shifted, these men remain the most idealized version of Palestinian men, with the image of the Palestinian *fidā'īyyīn* full of sacrifice,

suffering, and the will to protect, forming the core hegemonic ideals of what it means to be a Palestinian man.

It is something very old that is in our culture. We are still singing the songs for a man who fought and was hung by the British. In our culture, it is the heroes who fight against the occupation and lose their lives, sacrifice their lives, to fight against the occupation, nobody else can reach this level of respect in our culture (Osama, Jericho).

In an interview with the wife of a PFLP Commander imprisoned for 16 years for his role in planning and carrying out the 2001 assassination of Israel's Minister of Tourism Rehavam Ze'evi, she sat on her living room couch under a life size poster of her husband, a framed sweater of his, and various news clippings of his involvement in the assassination. She spoke about the level of admiration her husband continues to receive today, even though he is in prison and cannot see or communicate with anyone, even her.

Sometimes I post something on Facebook about Ahid. When people read it, they see that I am his wife. The days when I post something about him, I get tens of friend requests just because I am Ahid's wife. Thousands of people have sent friend request since he went to prison, I don't know any of them personally. If this means anything, it means how much people love prisoners. The harder they hit the occupation, his respect grows higher in the eyes of people (Female interview, Ramallah).

Although resistance has been practiced, consciously and unconsciously by Palestinian men and women throughout history and into today, the above quotes paint a picture depicting resistance playing a particularly prominent role in the construction of Palestinian masculinity. From the perspective of men themselves, their engagement in resistance is seen as an avenue to regain dignity despite the humiliation of living under occupation. As mentioned in Chapter 6, when asked why they resist, male interviewees explained their involvement was connected to their dignity and humanity. Men's powerful stories related to how and why they engage in resistance, make explicit

their feeling of emasculation and dehumanization resulting from living under occupation and how resistance efforts offer an avenue to counter some of these feelings.

Masculinity, like gender in general, is neither natural nor given, and is constructed through social processes dictating roles, responsibilities, and expectations. While these change over time and place, core aspects of patriarchal gender order remain fixed in place. Despite changes in social structures, economic opportunities, security considerations, and rights and freedoms in Palestine, narratives of masculinity appear to have remained tied to notions of being a provider and a protector. Interview data suggest that it is the universal role of the protector that tethers masculinity to resistance and the fight for national liberation and self-determination. Further illustrating the connection between notions of hegemonic masculinity and resistance, Malstrom (2015) found that for his research participants, “to resist is to be political, which (I was often told) is a must for a proper Palestinian man” (p. 310). He found that from the perspectives of his research with men engaged in resistance, men who were perceived to be non-political (and thus not engaged in resistance) were “total failures, frail creatures” and their masculinity was called into question (p. 311).

The ongoing Israeli occupation, crippling economic situation, and profound daily insecurity make providing and protecting, or fulfilling other related narratives of masculinity difficult, if not impossible. One way in which men confront this, and attempt to assert their masculinity, is through engaging in resistance. The connection between resistance and masculinity has been recounted in the work of authors such as Johnson and Kuttub (2001), Taraki (2006), Malmstrom 2015; and Peteet (1993) who all argue that throughout contemporary Palestinian history, gender relations have been the outcome of actions and interactions taken by men and women in response to the

structural realities of settler colonialism and occupation; their immediate needs; and the discourse of resistance. In the previous chapters I outlined a number of ways that the LPA has had an impact on the unarmed resistance movement. This, I argue, has occurred on two levels. First, the LPA has had an impact on unarmed resistance on a theoretical/discursive level, whereby resistance has become delineated along two dichotomous categories of violent or nonviolent, resulting in a framing of resistance as either one that works towards peace and is 'legitimate' (ie. nonviolent); or one that works against peace and is 'illegitimate' (ie. violent). This understanding, I argue, is constructed by way of Orientalist narratives of Palestinian resistance that erase the context of settler colonial violence, crystalizes resistance into a binary of violent and nonviolent resistance, and therefore defines Palestinians' resistance to colonial oppression through the prism of their inevitable use of violence. Moreover, the LPA's use of Orientalist narratives to construct Palestinian resistance has dramatically altered the space in which male Palestinians now find themselves. While the pressure to participate in resistance remains, the space, support, consequences, and opportunities to do so have significantly shifted since the Oslo Accords of the mid-1990's when the LPA began to take hold in Palestine.

Secondly, the LPA has had an impact on unarmed resistance on a more grassroots level through the introduction of money and support for *unarmed* resistance understood through a specific framework which has shifted the organization of resistance away from an inclusive struggle for national liberation and self-determination, and instead towards development projects, specific sites of resistance, and on specific events and days of the week (as discussed in Chapter 9). On this level, the LPA has also had an impact on unarmed resistance through introducing salaries, opportunities to travel and speak to international audiences, and increased the presence of international solidarity activists in resistance activities in the West Bank. As a result of these shifts

at both the theoretical/discursive level, as well as the material and grassroots level, research participants have adapted to and navigated these spaces through an intricate dance of appropriation, capitulation, resistance, and disengagement.

Violence, Suffering, and Sacrifice- Pillars of Hegemonic Masculinity?

Fanon (1963) famously argued that violence was a necessary tool for decolonization due to the fact that colonialism is, metaphysically, established and maintained through violence and therefore, can only be dismantled by the same tools. In short, he argued, violence is the only language the colonizers understand/respect. More importantly, he believed that a consequence of colonized people living under the violent structure of colonialism is that they have suffered such a degree of disempowerment as to create an inferior self-perception against that of the colonizer. This, he argues, has the consequence of producing a tendency for apathy in the colonized. Rather than resist colonization from within this mindset—which will inevitably be unsuccessful he argued—Fanon believed that colonial systems, architecture, and mentality could only be, and will only be, dislodged when the colonized subjects regain their sense of agency. And while Fanon suggests that colonial subjects can only regain their sense of agency through the adoption of violence, *a position I do not adopt in this dissertation*, what I do borrow from Fanon and believe shines through in the findings of this research, is the important role that agency plays in struggles against oppression. Challenging Fanon’s assertion that for the oppressed, violence is the sole avenue for regaining agency, if we look closely, we see hidden examples of the agency of those fighting oppression without the use of arms. The following chapter will draw our attention to the ways that my research participants navigate the shifting terrain of resistance, through the adoption of different resistance frameworks.

Literature and general consensus has come a long way from Mussolini's hypothesis that 'war is to man what maternity is to women'. Accordingly, biological essentialism arguing that violence is innately male, or part of the so-called 'male hormone' has been discredited in the literature (Connell, 2009). That said, although to a lesser degree, this mentality is still evident in scholarship, media, policy, and in the public discourse. Contributing to this is the fact that although most men are not violent, even in conflict settings, most violence is perpetrated by men (Connell, 2001). Moreover, across the world, most acts of violence are carried out by men and men are most often on the front lines of civil unrest, riots and gang warfare, and account for the overwhelming majority of firearm-related injuries and deaths (Widmer et al., 2006). As such, it can be said that there is a "material actuality to masculinities", frequently underpinned by violence or its threat (Whitehead, 2002, p. 35).

Around the globe it has been extensively noted that there is a deep-rooted acceptance that violence and men go hand in hand, particularly in conflict settings (Hutchings, 2008). Boys and men are often socialized into a gender code, or identity, that intimately links male identity with violence; a link that has the potential of predisposing men to be perpetrators and victims of violence (Hong, 2007). Based on a study of young men in Northern Ireland, Harland (2011) notes that, "despite their different backgrounds, violence was perceived by all young men as an accepted and normal part of their everyday lives" (p. 419). In conflict settings, violence is often part of the way in which men prove or establish their identity. Sociologist Michael Kimmel (2013) explains, "violence has long been understood as the best way to ensure that others publicly recognize one's manhood" (p. 253). Conflict, occupation, and war make traditional rites of passage such as getting your first job, first car, meeting a partner etc. more challenging. As a result, Hong (2007) explains that when men are denied access through traditional means to establishing their masculinity, these men instead

“‘prove’ their manhood by exhibiting it in extreme forms, ie. violence” (Hong, 2007, p. 271). Similarly, Kimberly Theidon’s (2007) research with former combatants in Colombia found that participating in paramilitary groups allowed men “to ‘feel like a big man in the streets of their barrios,’ and to ‘dress well,’ privileges they insist would not have been possible if they weren’t carrying a gun” (cited in Cahn & Ni Aolain, 2010, p. 105). The association of violence, or the threat of it, being linked to hegemonic masculinity, was evident throughout data collection and interviews. This mirrors the findings of Malmstrom (2015) who argues,

Daily life in the West Bank is infused with references to violence/resistance through which its meaning is communicated and it is confirmed as unavoidable. The meaning of violence should therefore be analysed as an integral part of the daily making of masculinity, where the subject is molded and gendered through the lived experience of violence, both as victims and as actors (p. 312).

As previously mentioned, it is the images of male *fidā’iyyīn* with their weapons in hand that fill the living rooms of participants, posters of *fidā’iyyīn* that plaster the walls of towns and camps, and national songs of resistance and liberation sung about male protagonists who fought for Palestine. However, hegemonic masculinity is much more nuanced than simply past or present engagement with violence or armed resistance. It is fair to say that hegemonic masculinity in the West Bank, is tied—at least in part—to engagement in resistance. What does this mean in a post-Oslo West Bank, where organized armed resistance is nearly nonexistent, security cooperation between the PA and Israel make this sort of activity futile, and the LPA ties international support for the Palestinian cause to their use of ‘nonviolence’? As material incentives such as salaries and opportunities to travel shift towards those who engage in nonviolent resistance, does social perception follow? Are the ‘new resistance fighters’, those engaged in nonviolent resistance, valorized in the same way as the *fidā’iyyīn* of the past? Is resistance as a rite of passage, an avenue

to male power and privilege, still available to men engaged in unarmed resistance in the West Bank today? We will now move on to consider these questions.

Social Perception of Resistance Tactics

Research participants highlighted the respect that they, and their communities, have for those engaged in armed resistance. When asked whether they felt that men engaged in unarmed resistance, even those who have achieved a high profile internationally, receive the same level of respect as the men who engage in armed resistance, there was a general consensus that while people respect all forms of resistance, these men could not achieve the same level of notoriety and respect in Palestinian society as those who engaged, or previously engaged, in armed resistance. Participants explained that this is tied to the way that the media covers resistance (Ahmad, Jericho), as well as the perception that using violence against a violent occupation is the only way to “hurt the occupation and take revenge” (Abu Mohammad, Bil’in). Another participant suggested that Palestinian society respects armed resistance more than unarmed resistance because,

With armed resistance, people don't feel guilty when they see them resisting, sacrificing, dying. They don't see themselves in the *fidā'iyyīn*, they don't blame themselves for not being involved.

[Interviewer] Can you explain that to me a bit more?

Armed resistance, not everyone can do it. Only 1% or 2% can do it. Therefore, no one feels guilty for not making armed resistance. But unarmed resistance, everyone can do it. So when they see it, they feel guilty and blame themselves (Bassem, Nabi Saleh).

Regardless of the many reasons for this sentiment, what is clear is that as Palestinians increasingly experienced dispossession and colonization, armed resistance became, and remains to a certain extent, tied to time-honored notions of the ideal Palestinian man, with men engaged in armed resistance (currently or previously) subsequently receive more notoriety and respect in society.

The media always follows the violence. They don't follow the nonviolence. In general, give me the most famous man working in nonviolence. You won't know who he is. But if he is a guy involved in violent resistance, the media would make many interviews with him. So in general, the world gives more attention and respect to those who work in violence, this is the same in our communities (Ahmad, Jericho).

Days after being released from 15 years in an Israeli prison, Amjad explained to me that the hierarchy between men engaged in armed resistance exists not only on the streets and homes of Palestine, it is also carried into prison, “in prison, there is more respect for those who did something big in resistance and have many years in prison. The more they made them [Israelis] suffer, the more respect they have” (Amjad, Kafr Ni'ma).

If men engaged in armed resistance receive more respect and status at the community level, as well as in prison, it is not surprising that this hierarchy was also apparent in the field of nonviolent resistance. Participants posited that their ability to work in nonviolent resistance and continue to receive respect from their community was closely tied to their past engagements.

My Background, killing an Israeli Soldier, protects me from anything. I made something big and everyone trusts me! Because I have a big history, I can say anything now. I am like a father for them (Abu Mohammad, Bil'in).

While the respect and status achieved through armed resistance, suffering, and sacrifice cuts across gendered lines, the manifestation of this sentiment as expressed by male participants offers a particularly interesting point of analysis. Research participants, who were previously engaged in armed resistance and in most cases subsequently endured imprisonment, mentioned that their history provided legitimacy, strength, and persuasive influence in their current work in unarmed resistance.

Gutmann (1997) argued that ethnographic investigations of men and masculinity must include research on women's reflections and insights about their experiences and observations regarding men and masculinities. In keeping with this suggestion, interviews with female activists provided nuanced insight and valuable perspective in relation to the spaces I sought to understand. While exploring the role that previous engagement in armed resistance plays in constructing masculinities in the unarmed resistance movement, a female activist from Hebron reflected,

It gives this badge of 'I've served my manhood role/national duty' ... I think this can be a good thing or it could not. Some people take it and say 'look, I have endured all of this and now I am taking different path'. Or it can also become 'I have power over you' because of what I have been through. It is often a way of showing 'I have endured this, and now I can say something else, or give my understanding or perspective'. It can be talked as 'don't talk to me, I have done this and I can do whatever I want now, either in nonviolent or in whatever space I want' (Female Interview, Hebron).

What this female participant suggests, is that having a history of involvement in armed resistance, lends legitimacy and credibility, and perhaps even authority, to men in unarmed resistance spaces. This, she notes, is not inherently a negative thing. It can be used to engage more people in unarmed resistance, but it can also be used to dominate and silence divergent perspectives and inputs.

Ali is a former leader of a Fatah armed resistance group. He recently founded a mass joint Palestinian-Israeli nonviolent movement headquartered near the contentious Gush Etzion junction outside of Bethlehem in the West Bank where the large Jewish settlements of Alon Shvut and Etzion Bloc form a highly militarized and notoriously violent junction. When asked about how his community reacts to his joint activism work with Israelis, he suggests that, given his history, "no one can question my dedication to the cause, they know I am a fighter for Palestine. I have just switched tactics now" (Ali, Qubeiba). Participants who previously engaged in armed resistance (most of whom also subsequently spent time in Israeli prison) hypothesized that they themselves

would *not* receive the level of support and acceptance in their community for their nonviolence and peace work *had they not* previously been engaged in armed resistance; had been willing to sacrifice years of their life for the cause; and subsequently suffered greatly. One participant who spent a decade in prison beginning at the age of 14 explains, “my past as an ex-fidā’iyyīn and spending 10 years in prison has given me legitimacy in my community and within Palestine. Here information is much more about the messenger rather than the message” (Souli, Hizma). His reflections suggest that his work as a self-identified ‘peacebuilder’ is more accepted in Palestinian society due to the fact he was willing to fight for his country and to endure violence at the hands of Israelis, and to sacrifice his teenage-hood and early adulthood for resistance, rather than about his message of nonviolence, coexistence, and peace. He goes on to explain,

For peacebuilding to be effective within Palestine, people must trust the peacebuilder, the person teaching and talking about peace. Trust is based on who they are, their past, their name etc. My background is full of suffering from the occupation. Suffering builds trust... I would never be where I am now, like as an influential peacebuilder, if it wasn’t for my past. No one would listen to me. This is true around the world; Mandela wouldn’t be famous if he was sitting on a hill in a villa somewhere (Souli, Hizma).

Their history of armed resistance, and subsequent suffering, means they have achieved the pinnacle of hegemonic masculine characteristic. This therefore serves as a passport to now operate in realms outside of hegemonic masculine norms, as they have already ‘earned their badge’. Moreover, the general public appears more inclined to respect and accept their message and actions due to the fact that they have already asserted their masculinity through narratives of hegemonic masculinity such as heroic sacrifice, bravery, armed resistance, suffering and prison time. Furthermore, these men utilize the respect and power they gained through their engagement in traditional male-centric forms of armed resistance to gain popularity as individuals, as peacebuilders and activists, while also using this respect as a tool to publically reject the use of armed resistance. This illustrates how

the hierarchy established during violent periods of men's lives, transcends into peaceful times, and carves out new spaces for these men to maintain hegemonic masculine authority. This leads to their current messages and opinions being privileged and carrying immense weight given their past. Ironically, their history of violence opened opportunities to openly speak out and call for an end to the use of armed resistance while promoting collaboration and joint peace efforts. This emphasis on joint Palestinian-Israeli activism is important to emphasize. Many of these men had been engaged in resistance at a time where men were expected to resist and reject all efforts and actions of their oppressors (Israel) in defense of their personal dignity, their community, and their homeland. Joint resistance efforts therefore run counter to these expectations and thus, are at odds with dominant narratives of hegemonic masculinity in the region. This was highlighted by Osama who described public perception of him when he began to engage with Israelis in his nonviolent resistance work as a "pussy" (Osama, Jericho). It is worth addressing the offensive term Osama describes his peers calling him. To evoke such a slanderous term that is used to describe women's genitalia is illustrative. It highlights two things: first, the denigration of females. It is used in such a way as to suggest it is the ultimate offence for a man to be feminized. Secondly, the fact that working alongside Israelis in nonviolent activism elicits such an insult, highlights the gendered expectations associated with resistance- in not engaging in resistance in the ways expected of him, he is emasculated and equated with a woman's genitalia.

The Currency of Nonviolence

Illustrated by the anecdotal perspectives shared by these research participants is a dichotomy; respect and notoriety are tied to armed resistance, yet armed resistance has, for the most part, been abandoned in the West Bank. This has occurred in tandem with the rise of influence and involvement of the LPA in resistance organizing which builds off this age-old hierarchy, yet adds

a new requisite; advocating against the very acts and methodology which bestowed these men with the community respect and honor in the first place. This is to say, if men previously engaged in armed resistance are willing to reject and/or speak to the futility of armed resistance (or such acts deemed to be violent by the LPA such as throwing stones), they are presented with the opportunity to tap into an entirely different means of accessing status/respect/notoriety (and thus power) through the LPA. This occurs through accessing salaries, travel and speaking opportunities, and connections with international NGOs and activists. The admiration in Palestine that participants spoke about in regard to the use of armed/violent resistance is not limited to Palestine. Like Ahmad suggested in the quote shared on page 398, the media has always been drawn to violence. It is not surprising therefore, that globally, notions of hegemonic masculinity are tied to the use of, or wiliness to resort to, violence (Connell, 2000; Whitehead, 2002). Similarly, Parpart (2015) notes that militarized masculinity is often portrayed as the quintessential form of hegemonic masculinity, associated with conflict, bravery and military leadership. This dovetails with what I have called ‘Orientalist narratives of Palestinian resistance’ which frames Palestinians as the violent ‘other’, possessing a propensity to conflict. As a result, the West is fascinated by stories of ‘peaceful’ Palestinians. They are eager to hear their life stories, their accounts of working alongside Israelis, and uplifting perspectives of reconciliation, peacebuilding, and the power of nonviolence to bring about change. These men engaged in unarmed resistance are often framed as if they are some sort of rare anomaly (as opposed to the overwhelming vast majority of men in Palestine writ large, let alone Palestinians engaged in resistance). This framing is constructed by both the LPA, as well as by Palestinians themselves. This will be discussed in the next section.

Shifting Resistance Frameworks: On Script, Off Script

At one point over the two years of conducting reoccurring interviews with participants, all participants eventually made a point of speaking about their level of admiration and respect for those who remain committed to armed struggle. There was a sense of urgency in their claims, almost as if they were worried I would mischaracterize their commitment to unarmed resistance and nonviolence as a denunciation of armed resistance writ large, its supporters, and the legacy of those who dedicated and lost their lives to it. Given my previous work in the region and the length of time I spent in my research location, I was able to get to know a number of respondents on a personal level. Reoccurring interviews often became more of a back and forth discussion, where participants were able to get a sense of the depth of my knowledge and understanding of the region. This relationship evolved over time through spending time with their families on a semi-regular basis for years, observing and participating alongside them at demonstrations, clashes, and resistance activities, and frequenting cafes and restaurants with them and their friends outside of a ‘work’ environment. Izzat was one such respondent. He spent countless hours sharing the ins and outs of his life living in H2 in Hebron, as well as the dramas of his family and personal life. After a few months of spending time together, I began to notice a pattern. Izzat shifted between frameworks and ways of speaking about resistance when we would speak in an ‘official’ capacity, meaning an interview with a voice recorder on, versus when we were sitting in a café, or drinking tea under an olive tree overlooking Shahuda Street. During interviews, he would speak about how hard it was to ‘teach Palestinians about nonviolence’. He framed nonviolent resistance as something new to Palestinians.

During the First Intifada and Second Intifada, most of the people they were using violence. We didn’t have any group, any organization, who were talking about

nonviolence, so most of the Palestinians are using violence. Now we have the idea of nonviolence starting to grow. This is the work I do (Izzat, Hebron).

In this quote, Izzat recites a well-rehearsed narrative which suggests that Palestinians have historically only utilized violence to achieve their goals of ending the occupation and statehood. The narrative then concludes with the assumption that the reason they have been unsuccessful in achieving these goals is because they use violence.

I believe that respondents such as Izzat frame nonviolent resistance as a novelty or as something new to Palestinians for the sake of Western audiences. Respondents do so, sometimes unconsciously, in part as a result of the disconnect between indigenous understandings of resistance and resistance frameworks of the LPA. Throughout interviews, Izzat would continuously speak about his ‘conversion’ to nonviolent resistance, juxtaposed against an Orientalist image of a violent Arab seeking revenge through the only means he knows – violence. In the above quote, Izzat reflects on the absence of groups or organizations talking about nonviolent resistance during the First and Second Intifada. Over this time, however, the vast majority of Palestinians were resisting using unarmed resistance tactics - even during the Second Intifada which was one of the bloodiest periods of time in terms of Palestinian resistance. So rather than there being an absence of nonviolent resistance, what there was instead, was a completely different lexicon and framework for understanding nonviolent resistance. It was not called nonviolence, it was called popular resistance, striking, boycotting, noncooperation and noncompliance, civil disobedience etc. Yacoub explained,

During the First Intifada, everyone was participating but not nobody knows the name. Those who are educated, maybe they would call it nonviolent resistance, but the rest of the population would participate without having to name it. They would participate and they didn’t think of what it was called. It was just a

reaction. It had no definition, it was more of an activity, something Palestinians had passion for (Yacoub, Hebron).

Returning to Izzat, in aiming to understand his framing of nonviolent resistance, it is crucial to consider his engagement with the NGO he works with. This NGO receives financial, material and in-kind support from a wide range of donors around the world—a fact that the organization is very proud of. They are, in short, deeply embedded with the LPA. Through his work and training with this NGO, he had been ‘taught’ that what was happening ‘before’ was not nonviolent resistance, it was something else. And that something else, as it falls outside of the resistance framework of the LPA, is therefore labeled as violent. Learning to speak about the history of Palestinian resistance is such a way as to conform to this Orientalist binary of violent/nonviolent may lack historical grounding and function to rewrite history through a certain exogenous framework, but it is also the price of admission into the LPA. Therefore, consciously or not, it is a price that Izzat, and many others like him, are willing to pay. When I brought this up with him over coffee, without a notepad or voice recorder, he laughed, shrugged and intimated that this disparity was not lost on him. He spoke about the infamous Palestinian strikes of 1936 and the collective boycotting of Israeli goods during the First Intifada. What he said next surprised me, “we need to teach them [Palestinians] this new type of nonviolence if we want their [the West or LPA] support. Wallah³⁸ habibti, this is life for us” (Izzat, Hebron). What this comment highlights, is that when sitting together with a voice recorder and notepad in front of me, I represented the LPA. By interviewing this man engaged in nonviolent resistance, asking him questions about armed/unarmed resistance, community support/rejection for it, etc., I was positioning his commitment/engagement in unarmed resistance as something unique and noteworthy. I was interested in talking to him

³⁸ a word in Arabic meaning ‘I swear by god’. It is peppered through speech, even when participants are speaking English such as the case in this interview with Izzat.

precisely because he did not currently engage in armed resistance, and identified as being *actively engaged in unarmed resistance*, as per my participant selection criteria. This was the space my research sought to understand. However, in doing so, I was in a sense, enticing the very Orientalist tropes I am arguing are embedded in the LPA. And so while I was playing my part in perpetuating Orientalist narratives, so was he. He was delivering the well-rehearsed narrative expected of him. As I began to understand that participants either consciously or subconsciously relied in part on scripts, I began to pay attention to and try to identify when this was happening.

Scott (1990) describes a similar experience while conducting research which became the foundation of his well-known work on hidden transcripts. He notes, “I found myself using this social logic to seek out or create settings in which I could check one discourse against another and, so to speak, triangulate my way into unexplored territory” (Scott, 1990, p. ix). This ‘triangulation’ was helpful in illuminating the way that participants juggle different frameworks of resistance depending on their audience, or depending on their use of hidden and public transcripts. Using Scott’s (1990) work helps us to see the less dramatic and more incremental ways that Palestinians resist both their immediate oppression as well as the dehumanizing Orientalist narratives of the LPA, in addition to accessing the opportunities presented by the LPA through vacillating frameworks of resistance. Scott (1990) perceives these different transcripts as ways of behaving or speaking that are curated and choreographed by agents to respond to particular social settings. While public transcripts refer to the public performances required of subjects, that is “the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate” (p. 2), hidden transcripts, refers to the ways subordinate groups communicate within and between themselves, “those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript” (p. 4-5). As data analysis unfolded, I began to recognize that the hidden transcripts embedded in the

daily lives of my research participants as they navigated the LPA, were in fact a method of resistance that occurred in tandem with outright resistance. Adopting certain public transcripts offers a way for research participants to (re)narrate the Palestinian story to the world.

The on-script/off-script interactions (or public and private transcripts) such as the one with Izzat, were increasingly commonplace the further into my research I went. I would often find myself in conversation with participants where I would realize they had switched frameworks. At one point they would be speaking about how the resistance activities that they organized were purely nonviolent and peaceful, “I am *not throwing stones*, I am not killing Israelis, I am not carrying guns, I am only using peaceful activities” (Nour, Tulkarm Camp). With this specific participant, in an interview at a later date, he spoke about the First Intifada as a “peaceful intifada, no guns, *only stones*, Palestinian flags, and economic resistance [boycott and strike]” (Nour, Tulkarm Camp). We see how his framework for understanding violent resistance shifted when he spoke about resistance today, where stone throwing is considered violent, versus when he spoke about resistance during the First Intifada, when stones were considered *nonviolent*. I believe this shift coincided with his release from prison and his subsequent involvement with an NGO promoting nonviolence. Nour still works for this NGO, the office of which we met for the first time, is lined with inspiring quotes by Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. He explained that when he was released from prison, there were no opportunities for him. He had a young family, he lived in a refugee camp, and he had no work. And while he possessed a great deal of respect in his community resulting from his years as a Fatah commander, “I was seen as a hero of resistance” (Nour, Tulkarm), he nevertheless was released during the Oslo years, a very different time from when he entered into prison. In this new political reality, he felt stuck and confused with what to do with his life, and since his wife had given birth to their first child while he was in prison, his new

responsibilities as a father. He didn't want to go back to jail, his "soul needed to resist", and he was faced with the financial realities of providing for a family. He was also faced with a new revelation,

When I got out of a jail I began to understand that the Israelis want Palestinians to use violence, they want to eliminate us through killing or forcing us to leave, and when we use violence, this gives them a reason. They use these small acts of violence to show the world, 'see Palestinians are violent, they want to kill the Jewish people and we are just protecting ourselves!' The people outside don't understand the conflict here, they don't understand the history and what is really happening here so they believe this. If they see a man throwing a stone with a Keffiyeh around his face, they see a terrorist, because this is what Israel tells them and then Israel's response is seen as protection, not violence. This image is very bad for us (Nour, Tulkarm).

What's notable from Nour's quote – beyond his suggestion that Israel has long used its portrayal of Palestinian men to rationalize violence against them – is the way in which he identifies and incorporates approval from the West as essential for Palestinian legitimacy. In his diagnosis that the West is the gatekeeper of funding, support, and success in the Palestinian struggle against occupation, he's describing a need for the West to view him as human, as deserving of human rights and freedom, and not as a terrorist. An exogenous view now incorporated in his own understanding of what it means to be a legitimate player in a long struggle for independence and self-reliance. As many research participants explained, it was Oslo that changed the realities of resistance, of politics, and of life for Palestinians. The onset of the Middle East Peace Process (Oslo Accords), meant that support for Palestinians would be granted through the LPA prism of peacebuilding, statebuilding, and nonviolence. Furthermore, if as research participants suggest, the key to Palestinians' independence and freedom rests in the perception and support of the international community, of which the LPA is the key gatekeeper, at times, research participants adopted, conformed to, and appropriated whatever narratives and/or frameworks that they needed

to in order to succeed, or at the very least, survive in this reality. For Nour, this meant he turned to working with an NGO and engaging in nonviolent resistance and peacebuilding work to ensure his relevance and survival.

Similar to the shift in Nour's resistance frameworks highlighted above, Norman (2015) found that in the aftermath of Oslo, nonviolent resistance became increasingly geared towards appeasing the international community rather than directly challenging the occupation (p. 37-38). She uses the term 'Oslo effect' to refer to the way that the LPA effectually reframed and redefined unarmed resistance during this time to reflect their framework and ideological standpoint. I believe that Nour's shifting framework of resistance speaks to Norman's notion of the Oslo effect, and confirms Norman's (2015) assertion of shifting frameworks related to unarmed resistance prior to Oslo and then post-Oslo.

Another anecdotal example which is illustrative of this dynamic is Osama. A former Hamas operative who had been in jail numerous times for his involvement in armed resistance, Osama now works with a number of internationally funded joint Palestinian-Israeli peacebuilding, dialogue, and nonviolent resistance organizations. For our first interview, I interviewed him in his home in Jericho, where he had an Israeli activist 'secretly' staying with him in the back room of his house. He noted that not everyone in his community would support him working with Israeli and Jewish American activists,

It is not easy. Especially for someone who has previously been in a high position in armed resistance, where everyone is calling you a hero and a champion of Palestine. It is hard for people to hear that you have become such a pussy (Osama, Jericho).

Despite the fall from hero status which he suggests came from engaging in unarmed resistance alongside Israelis, he nevertheless felt that working with them, along with joint Palestinian-Israeli NGOs, was a crucial, yet delicate balancing act that was necessary to shift global perceptions and support for Palestine in favor of their fight against occupation and in pursuit of freedom and independence.

The hate is our enemy, the fear is our enemy, the victimhood is our enemy, and the image of us as terrorists is our enemy. I am trying my best to keep my hope and to fight these enemies. Hope for me is like being in a dark desert and having a small candle when it is windy. I am trying my best to put my hands up to protect it, keep it from going out, even though if I try to protect it, it could burn my hand. But I have to do this because it is the only light, without it, there is only darkness. I protect this light even if it is burning my hands sometimes. The burn is worth not living in a dark desert (Osama, Jericho).

In this revealing extended metaphor, Osama is describing the compromise he had made in order to keep the light - a flame of hope - alive. In fighting the numerous enemies he identifies, 'hate, fear, victimhood, and Palestinians terrorist image', Osama describes his engagement in nonviolent resistance alongside Israelis as his tool. His decision to engage with the LPA, in part, as a means of (re)narrating the Palestinian story to the world, illustrates the way that representation can be a form of resistance in itself. In such a way, Meltzer & Manis (1992) remind us "narratives can be a social weapon. The first act of resistance is to tell one's own story" (p. 12). In a similar vein, Scott (1990) argues that in power-laden contexts and situations, "one of the key survival skills of subordinate groups has been impression management" (p. 3). Taking into consideration the perspective of Maltzer & Manis (1992) alongside that of Scott (1990), we can view Osama's insistence on fighting the enemies of 'hate, fear, victimhood, and Palestinians terrorist image' by taking back the power of narration, combined with impression management as motivational fuel for his commitment to engage with the LPA. Later in the interview Osama highlighted the

importance of gaining the support of the LPA in Palestinians' struggle. The 'hope' he speaks about, in this sense, is connected to believing that positive change can, and eventually will, occur. The lynchpin to this occurring, according to Osama, is inherently tied to the perception and support of the LPA. Therefore, he is willing to adopt a resistance framework which may not necessarily align with his personal beliefs and understanding of his right of resistance under international law in order to maintain their support. In so doing, Osama personifies the wisdom of post-colonial theorists who argue that as colonized people in order to be successful in self-representation, one must "represent yourself on the Other's territory with the Other's tools" (Ashcroft, 2004, p. 120, also see Spivak, 1988). Similarly, Myrntinen, Khattab & Naujoks (2016) have argued that, "Local- and national-level actors often feel compelled to use the language as well as the theoretical frameworks of the Global North in order to be heard, forcing them to drop local complexity and nuance" (p. 2-3). During the last interview I conducted with Osama, two years after our first meeting, he addressed this head on, and spoke to the pattern I had noticed related to the difference between participants speaking 'on script and off script'. In speaking about this, he made it clear that it was not only a conscious choice and a tactical choice, but it was the smart choice, the choice that got him closer to his goal of ending the occupation, achieving freedom, and independence.

Sometimes you have to be right, and sometimes you have to be smart. I am trying to be smart, more than right. If I can bring you from your home in Canada to stand with me at Khan al Ahmar by telling you I am accepting 'your way', I am smart. I am bringing you to my side. But if I want to be 'right' and tell you that I believe in my right to carry a weapon or to throw a stone because we are resisting illegal occupation and then I lose your support, I am losing you—the international community, the Israelis, everyone. This isn't smart (Osama, Jericho).

If, as Ashcroft (2004) argues, the success of Palestinian's struggle for national liberation and self-determination will only come "from the control of representation and the communication of the

Palestinian situation to a dominant audience” (p. 113), then adopting the LPA’s frameworks, despite its dehumanizing and Orientalist undertones, can be reinterpreted as, rather than a capitulation, a brilliant act of agency where the adoption of a dehumanizing narrative is turned on its head to further the agenda and goal of resistance. If this is the case, it then confirms Said’s (1978) claim that because the Orient is not a representing subject in its own right, but rather a subject represented by the West (p. 21), then representation should be understood as both a tool of colonial control, but also importantly, a tool for indigenous resistance to Western discourses, narratives, and representations. Osama’s actions can be seen as resistance within resistance. He is resisting Orientalist narratives, while also resisting the occupation.

Therefore, despite Osama’s personal feelings that throwing stones is a legitimate form of resistance, his insistence on *not* throwing stones, “turns resistance from a simple opposition to a control of the means of representation” (Ashcroft, 2004, p. 113). He appropriates the language and framework of the LPA in order to gain their support. This functions to bolster his interests both on a personal front (through gaining access to perks associated with the LPA such as salaries, opportunities to travel, and exposure to international activists), as well as on a national liberation front insofar as it garners the support and sympathies of the West.

In sum, participants described their decision to align the framework of their resistance and activism to that of the LPA not as a capitulation to donor and Israeli driven demands, but rather as an expression of agency with three over-arching goals. First, this is seen as a means of gaining a tactical advantage over Israel by leveraging the support of the international community in order to increase pressure on Israel to adhere to international law. Second, it seeks to avoid giving Israel ‘gifts’ in the form of behaviour that can be used to reinforce Orientalist narratives that paint a

civilized and democratic Israeli state defending itself against barbaric and freedom-hating terrorists. And third, it is a means of accessing the material benefits that often accompany engagement with the LPA. While the distinctions may seem trivial, the fact that participants felt obliged to make a distinction between adhering to the resistance framework prescribed by the international community less out of a commitment to ‘peacebuilding’—the rubric under which the vast majority of international solidarity and donor support falls under—and more as a means to continue their fights against the occupation and dehumanization, is noteworthy. In this example, while some may argue that the goals are similar—the cessation of the occupation and the creation of a state for Palestinians, regardless of the configuration—the two paths (Palestinian resistance fighters’ commitment to resistance and the LPA’s commitment to peacebuilding) commonly accepted in the West Bank are drastically different in their meaning for research participants. Here the disconnect between LPA and local goals and priorities becomes starkly obvious. From the outset of the peace process, in terms of its engagement with civil society and the grassroots, the LPA has aimed to demobilize Palestinian resistance efforts by what Turner (1995) calls ‘peacebuilding as counterinsurgency (Turner, 2015); advancing a ‘culture of peace’ (Plonski, 2005); and promoting democracy, human rights, and economic development (Farsakh, 2016). During this same period of time the goals and priorities identified by research participants were the cessation of the occupation and the creation of a state for Palestinians- including the right of return for refugees and unfettered access to Jerusalem.

Collecting Passport Stamps and Pay Cheques

The ‘on script-off script’, or ‘hidden and public’ transcript phenomenon is one way that male respondents have learnt to navigate the shifting space for unarmed resistance as a result of the introduction of the LPA, post-Oslo. One way in which men receive status and power from

engaging in unarmed resistance within the LPA framework is by accessing the opportunity to travel, receive salaries, and/or form relationships with international activists. Research participants engaged in nonviolence funded by the LPA often receive generous funding for their projects, and are presented with the opportunity to receive salaries and to speak around the world at events, conferences, and various other engagements. International travel is in comparison an enormous privilege to the opportunities available to the majority of Palestinians and one that is important to emphasize. Forced to live under and navigate a bureaucratic and discriminatory identification and permitting system, which “by most accounts... is one of the most pressing current problems in the West Bank” (Abu-Zahra & Kay, 2013, p. 3), the majority of Palestinians are subject to repressive movement restrictions which inhibit many Palestinians from traveling domestically to nearby villages, let alone internationally. Add to this the fact that around 40% of Palestinian males have been in prison at one point in their life (Addameer, 2013), and ones’ chances of being granted the necessary documentation by the Israeli Authorities to travel is even slimmer. It is worth noting, even if the Israeli authorities were to grant the necessary permits to travel, their history of incarceration, in some cases on terrorism charges, renders them inadmissible to most countries around the world.

Moreover, the salaries and financial support that these men receive from international donors, NGOs, and other branches of the LPA stands in stark contrast to the high unemployment rates and economic instability faced by the majority of Palestinians. As Wisam, along with many other participants noted, nonviolent resistance and peacebuilding has become “an elite business where you have people that get paid a lot more than the average Palestinian to work with these NGOs”

(Wisam, Ramallah).³⁹ These salaries are coveted, particularly when we consider the unemployment rate in the West Bank is 15.7% (ILO, 2020), with many of those employed, being underemployed or earning below a livable wage. Furthermore, if we look at it through a gendered lens, we see how working with an NGO provides a means for men to fulfil gendered expectations such as breadwinning. When I asked Wisam what impact he thought this has on the perception amongst the general public of men engaged in unarmed resistance he explained,

It has shaped how people look at resistance, and has sort of delegitimized this type of resistance to say the least.

[Interviewer] Delegitimized in the eyes of who?

In the eyes of the local people here for two reasons: one, because you work with Israelis and two, you are being offered things that normal Palestinians can't have access to. This leads to lots of jealousy (Wisam, Ramallah).

Wisam went on to explain that while in the past, when people would say, 'I am involved in resistance', it was something that people were proud of being involved in. Nowadays, if someone was to say this, "they are often perceived as being elitist" (Wisam, Ramallah). Abu Mohammad, who after killing an Israeli soldier spent 22 years in exile and was granted reentry in 1996 as part of Oslo negotiations, explained that over the last two decades, he has noticed a substantial shift in the perception of Palestinian communities related to those engaged in unarmed resistance. He explained that the opportunities to travel, the salaries offered by NGOs, and the sharp rise in

³⁹ This same phenomenon has been identified in a number of post-conflict settings. For example, in former Yugoslavia, the LPA facilitated the growth of NGO/CSOs to the point in which peace became "a business, a platform on which jobs can be created" (Lemay-He'bert and Kappler cited in Obradovic-Wochnik, 2020, p. 122).

internationally funded joint programs has meant that, “people are not trustful, and people don’t like the peaceful resistance leaders, the ‘stars’ of resistance” (Abu Mohammed, Bil’in).

The hardships faced by the average Palestinian creates a context where the ‘perks’ offered by the LPA are at odds with the reality of the majority of Palestinians. This disparity between those who can access these perks and those who cannot, has led to deep cleavages at the community and interpersonal level. While with unarmed resistance, “everyone can do it” as Bassem (Nabi Saleh) reminded me, not everyone is willing to pay the price of admission, that is, adopting a nonviolent resistance framework in line with the LPA. This means that the pool of those who identify as being engaged in nonviolent resistance is relatively small compared to other periods of time. Obradovic-Wochnik (2020) highlighted how, in the former Yugoslavia, certain ‘locals’ were empowered through their engagement in peacebuilding efforts. This created a self-perpetuating cycle where these locals then became the default ‘local’ voice, and “this reinforces a cycle through which some actors are empowered (they gain project funding, for instance), gain public visibility and as such are approached by donors and academics, ensuring future visibility and ‘legitimacy’” (p. 125). In the West Bank, a similar cycle has emerged where certain activists engage with the LPA (which, as I previously argued, requires them to adopt a specific resistance framework), these activists are invited to speak at their events, and they compete for the same pool of funding. Because of this,

You will see the same faces everywhere you go. Every time I go to meetings or workshops, it is always the same people, I know everybody. We all work in the same donor funding circle. Even sometimes we are invited to speak at the same events across the world and we all have to go at the same time. Then it becomes like a competition where everyone is putting on the table who they are, what they have done, how much time they spent in prison, stuff like that. These events are like job interviews and donors decide who to fund (Wisam, Ramallah).

Wisam highlights the hierarchy between men that is established through engaging in armed resistance, and how this hierarchy translates into times of nonviolent engagement. We see this in the way that more extreme acts of armed resistance (what participants often called ‘big actions’) or longer prison terms act as a currency in the world of nonviolent resistance and the LPA. According to Wisam in the above quote, the more prominent in armed resistance men were, the more sought after they are now by the LPA to advocate for and be spokespeople of nonviolence. This was echoed by many other research participants. In other words, engaging in armed resistance not only establishes men’s position within the resistance movement at the time, it translates into men’s positions in prison (as expressed in the previous quote by Amjad on page 388), it also impacts men’s positions and opportunities available through nonviolent resistance.

Authors such as Duncanson (2015) remind us that hegemonic masculinities are not fixed identities. Rather, they can shift and adapt to changing power dynamics to subsume and co-opt contradictory or antagonistic narratives in order to evolve and reaffirm an updated version of male power and privilege. As the conflict and resulting oppression increasingly limit access to resources necessary to fulfil gendered “ritual and social obligations” (Vigh, 2007, p. 97), as well as the resources necessary to ensure a future for themselves, research participants have been confronted with new structural realities from which they must find new avenues for social mobility. Specific to Palestinian men, the research of Foster & MacKenzie (2017), Johnson & Kuttub (2001), and Peteet (1994) has illuminated the ways in which living under occupation (and the myriad of subsequent forms of violence) impedes normative masculinized practices and rites of passage. According to these authors, this has resulted in “masculinity nostalgia” (Foster & MacKenzie, 2017), a “crisis in masculinity” (Holt, 2004), or what others have called thwarted masculinities, and a general sense of gendered inadequacy among men. In a context such as the West Bank, where a general

sense of gender inadequacy among men is widespread, the LPA opens up a navigational space as it provides men, particularly those previously engaged in armed resistance, with material and social resources. What if, as a means of countering feelings of gendered inadequacies, men turned to nonviolent resistance, and engagement in the LPA. If this were the case, we could expect to observe men seeking out alternative avenues offered by the LPA for (re)establishing gendered hierarchies; for example, avenues such as salaries offered by NGOs, speaking tours in Europe, or connections with international activists, for example. I believe this is what I found in the data. In some ways, notions of hegemonic masculinity are challenged in and through the engagement in nonviolent resistance. However, at the same time, traditional assumptions related to masculinity and the connection to resistance is reconfigured so that men's rejection of armed resistance can be subsumed within them. These findings offer a counter to the work of Duriesmith (2014; 2018) who found that in our era of new wars, "few avenues are available for young men to assert their position as would-be patriarchs, resulting in social understandings of manhood that emphasize collective violence as a path towards status and wealth" (2018, p. 2). In fact, the lack of avenues for men to assert their positions as 'would-be patriarchs' has led to an emphasis on unarmed resistance as a path towards the status and wealth of patriarchs.

Making Friends with Foreigners

In Chapter 5- Contextual Briefing, I outlined the growth and evolution of international (Israeli and otherwise) activists traveling to Palestine to struggle alongside Palestinians in unarmed resistance. While the impact of this on the resistance movement itself is an interesting point of analysis, another line of inquiry however, relates to the way that their presence interacts with and plays a role in the "maintenance of existing gendered scripts which establish the 'masculine' as power"

(Skinner, 2021, p. 12). Through this analytical focus, the entanglements of hegemonic and alternative masculinities come into focus.

In reflecting the local constellations of power, research participants – as men engaged in resistance – find themselves at once in a place of privilege and power, while simultaneously under a system of oppression and violence. In their homes and in their communities, they have the social freedom to make decisions about whether they should engage in resistance or not. They also have the freedom to choose whether they work with an NGO, attend a protest in other parts of the West Bank, or apply to and accept an invitation from an NGO to travel to Germany to speak about nonviolence, as examples. These are privileges and freedoms that at times, look much different for the women in their lives, whether their wives, sisters, or female counterparts. An aspect worth noting in relation to Palestinian women's experiences navigating these spaces compared to that of Palestinian men, was inadvertently hinted at during data collection. When interviewing male participants, all but two requested that I use their real names throughout my research. Conversely, all 5 female participants requested a pseudonym be used. While I did not ask further questions in this regard, out of fear for making them feel uncomfortable, it nevertheless points to the fact that female participants did not feel comfortable with (or that it was advantageous to), have their thoughts and experiences linked with their names.⁴⁰ On the other hand, the opposite was true for male respondents.

⁴⁰ The one exception was Ahid's wife whom I call, *Female Interview, Ramallah*. While she opted to conceal her name, she asked that I use her husband's name in my note taking and subsequent writing. When I explained that this would make it easy for someone to trace her comments back to her, she said she was aware of that and nevertheless, wanted her husband's name to be used.

In addition to the disparity in decision making and autonomy that my research participants enjoyed compared to women, their engagement with international activists was further managed through this gendered prism. Male research participants would often spend their evenings hosting international activists in their home, going for coffee with them in town, conducting interviews with them in private, etc. This occurred despite, what was at times, the disapproval, reservations, feelings of jealousy, and opposition on behalf of the women in their lives.

The divergent perspectives on resistance between activists and their family members was a shared theme throughout interviews. Some participants would either directly, or indirectly, allude to the fact that they felt their wives and fiancés were uncomfortable with their engagement in nonviolent resistance, particularly alongside Western women. Ahmed explained that his wife did not support his work in nonviolent resistance. For one, he posits that she may not believe in unarmed resistance in general,

Maybe she doesn't believe in what I am doing, in nonviolence and in working with internationals and Israelis. Maybe she believes in armed resistance. Her family is in Gaza and they are suffering a lot. She doesn't want me to be meeting with Israelis and the same people who are making her family suffer. She doesn't want me to host them in my home, but I insist. It has happened that we fight about this. We have uncomfortable conversations about this. I know and I feel that it is very important for me to stay in my nonviolent struggle to help my family, to help my people, but she doesn't see this. I cannot convince her. She asks me a lot to stop, but I refuse (Ahmed, Jericho).

He went on to explain that he often asks his wife to join him, but she is afraid to and instead tells him, “no, it is a man's job” (Ahmad, Jericho). Speaking to the gender dynamics at play, Ahmad explained that his wife’s reservations related more specifically to his involvement and interactions with international women.

I don't know about others, but in my relationship, my wife is always asking me to stop. She asks me a lot to not meet people, to not go to these events, and not to work in nonviolence! She does this even though she knows it's very safe.

Interviewer: If it is not related to your safety, why do you think she wants you to stop?

She is jealous. She doesn't want me to meet international women. In our culture, men and women cannot meet like this [*he gestures to him and I sitting across a table from one another at a café*] (Ahmed, Jericho).

In his unquestioned commitment and insistence on engaging in nonviolent resistance, as well as meeting and befriending international women, despite his wife's desires, Ahmed asserts his patriarchal authority and looks to enforce existing structures of hierarchy and power in the family. The intra-household conflict resulting from hosting international female activists is not unique to my field location. For example, Tiessen, Roa & Lough (2021) noted similar dynamics emerging in communities in Malawi, Kenya, and Uganda hosting international volunteers. Despite the benefits of hosting international volunteers, female respondents raised concerns around "the additional work burden and housework that often fell on women when international volunteers came to stay in their homes" as well as concerns related to female volunteers having access to male-dominated spaces that local women do not such as, "watching television and politicking" (p. 47). When I asked male research participants such as Ahmed about how they resolved the intra-household conflict resulting from the presence of female international and Israeli activists, he replied, "Here, men are always right. They have the right to do anything in the home. He is always in control, he controls his sisters, his wife, he controls everything" (Ahmed, Jericho). While on one hand, during interviews, Ahmad expressed his desire for his wife to join him in his resistance efforts, he spoke about how he believed that women should be free to engage in resistance, travel, work, and meet with their friends unaccompanied (he framed this in opposition to what he perceived to be the norm in the city he lived in), he simultaneously perpetuates male dominance

and privilege by refusing to consider his wife's request for him to not meet with female international activists, and to not be forced to host (not to mention cook and wait on) Israeli activists in her own home.

Considering the dynamics between research participants and their female family members is integral to understanding the nexus of resistance, power, and masculinity. Myrntinen, Khattab & Naujoks (2016) warn of the importance of considering both women's as well as men's experiences of hegemonic masculinity when they caution, "in engaging with men on gender issues, one also needs to be careful of not focusing only on men and leaving out women, as doing so only serves to cement a different, perhaps less violent, form of male dominance and privilege without fundamentally transforming gendered power dynamics" (p. 8). While this research did not interview the wives of male research participants – and I therefore cannot represent their views in this discussion – I do not mean to suggest that they fall into an orientalist characterization of deferential, disempowered and victimized Arab women. In Ahmed and his wife's example, it is very likely that she would have a different story to tell than the one Ahmed recounted. She too has agency, and the workings of her power may have occurred outside my line of sight and inquiry. I mention this as a reminder that the realities of gender relations are much stickier and more nuanced than any one person can account for. In failing to provide Ahmed's wife's perspective on this, I recognize the risk I run of feeding into the dichotomization of Palestinian women as either "women-of-the-harem victimization" or "behind-the-scenes-but-truly-powerful agency" (MacLeod, 1992, p. 535) and in this, reducing, "the subtleties of women's subjectivity under power" (ibid).

While befriending female international activists may cause marital disagreements and intra-household conflict and friction, amongst peers, an entirely different dynamic emerged, one in which I experienced personally working as a female researcher/activist amongst my research participants. Befriending western women appeared to be viewed as somewhat of a status symbol amongst my research participants. Participants often spoke with pride about the number of WhatsApp conversations they have with female activists from around the world. When they would mention these conversations to their male activist friends while sitting around as a group having coffee for example, they would also always mention what country the women they were chatting with were from. Having a global network of female friendships to flaunt appeared to act as a currency some research participants were able to draw on to improve their ranking amongst their fellow male activists. I should note, it was never intimated that there were romantic relations between research participants and their foreign friends. While pre-marital and/or extra-marital relationships surely occur in the West Bank, it remains a relatively taboo subject, and was not bragged about or flaunted, at least not in my presence. From what I was told, these women were friends, and given the social norms around mixed-sex friendships, this was a rarity. It is interesting to note, as more foreign women become involved in nonviolent resistance, this appears to have the potential to impact Palestinian women's engagement in these same spaces. In Nour's experience, he has found it difficult to address the fear in his community related to the potential for cultural exchange of gender norms and values between international activists and Palestinian women. He explained that not only are Palestinian families concerned that if their daughters participate in resistance activities with foreign activists that they would be exposed to Western men, but perhaps more importantly, they were concerned that they would be exposed to Western women, and therefore a different set of gendered scripts.

They are afraid. The culture of Palestinians and Arabs are different than those of Canadians. Some people are afraid here. They are radical. They don't want women to be in the same place as men. They are always afraid that maybe their daughter will see and learn experiences by these women [foreign women] and by being exposed to internationals so they don't want their daughters to be around international women (Nour, Tulkarm).

So, while foreign female activists provided an opportunity for male participants to explore friendships with women, perhaps developing a deeper understanding of women's experiences, thoughts, and feelings, this same space does not exist for Palestinian women. Additionally, the presence of foreign women facilitated the making of these novel friendships and contributed to men's social clout, while at the same time potentially limiting Palestinian women's opportunities to engage. It is interesting to note how on one hand, the potential for female friendships create alternative male spaces, yet this alternative space simultaneously remains commodified and protected by "enduring patriarchal gender structures" which brings into question whether they challenge hegemonic masculine norms, and an "overall male dominance" (Grose-Green, 2012, p. 94).

At times, the desire to befriend female international activists resulted in jealousy and competition between male activists, where an uncomfortable sense of ownership and guardianship sometimes emerged. On a number of occasions, I was on the receiving end of this. In addition to witnessing bitter exchanges between research participants and their fellow male activists about who would 'escort' the foreigner, on one occasion, a research participant with whom I had established a collegial working relationship with told another activist that he was not allowed to text me to invite me to a protest; I was 'his international'. After a bit of back and forth in order to ensure I understood the interaction I had just witnessed, I reminded him that I was in Palestine to conduct research on resistance and therefore would like to receive invitations from all of my research participants to

attend events. Through this public exchange, I got the impression I had insulted him. Perhaps he took my request to suggest that I was questioning his friendship, that he was not able to provide me with sufficient connections and exposure to resistance activities; maybe he felt I was questioning/challenging how ‘connected’ or ‘in the know’ he was; or perhaps he had a longstanding personal conflict with the other activist and therefore did not trust him etc. Regardless, I had inadvertently touched on a territorial hornets’ nest which exposed underlying dynamics governing male Palestinian activists’ sense of self when it came to international activists. And while this anecdotal experience is noteworthy – specifically because of how extreme of an example it was – speaking with fellow female activists and researchers in the field, I discerned anecdotally that it was not an isolated incident and pointed to a shared underlying dynamic related to authority, guardianship, and gender relations.

Building on the role of guardianship and gender relations in unarmed resistance work, Sami, the Founder and Director of a large Palestinian organization dedicated to nonviolent activism as well as personal and spiritual transformation in the West Bank town of Bethlehem, offered interesting insight. Reflecting on the gender dynamics he witnesses within his organization, he explained that while male activists were open to Palestinian women resisting alongside them, and determined to increase the number of international solidarity activists in general, the barriers for Palestinian women’s engagement remain tied to deep rooted patriarchal gender norms.

There might not be a rejection of Palestinian women participating in these things, but there are so many layers and barriers that are put on their participation – although most of them are unconscious. In nonviolent activism we say, ‘yes of course women can join, women are free to, we want women to participate!’ But how many women are actually in the inner circle deciding on the type of actions we are going to do? And are they presenting their strong feminine voice in these actions or are they just agreeing, or speaking the male language. Trying to fit in to our voice, to fit into our type of nonviolent resistance. For example,

if we were sitting in a session and are talking about a protest, if we put the spotlight on a woman, she may suggest a different thing to do, or a different location for the protest. Quickly, I always see this undermining of her voice happen, kind of like, “you don’t get it”. You hear stuff like this a lot. Unless she participates and is agreeing with the men, she is put on the side in terms of her role and her voice in it [resistance]... Palestinian women are afraid when they come into these spaces for the most part. They do not feel the full space of security to speak and to be who they want to be (Sami, Bethlehem).

Sami’s assessment of the lack of space for meaningful participation for Palestinian women in the planning and executing of unarmed resistance activities points to the patriarchal undercurrent present in unarmed resistance where men remain the voice of authority and decision making. When I asked Kefah about this, he simply said,

In resistance, we have a problem with women actually. We have some women here, some places they join, but we are a manly society, so it’s mostly men. If we really want to get women to come, sometimes we organize demonstrations only for women (Kefah, Bil’in).

While I could speak from experience about some of the dynamics present for a Western woman participating in a protest alongside Palestinian male activists, I could only observe what it was like for a Palestinian woman. Was there a difference between how Palestinian male activists treated and felt about them? Research participants suggested there was. In addition to speaking about this with a Palestinian female activist, I also brought this up with Sami. When I asked him what the dynamic between Palestinian men and women was like during a protest he responded,

We immediately go into this protection mode in these actions [protests and resistance activities]. You know, like, when things get dangerous with the soldiers or settler, the men are all ‘women and children first, get them out of here!’ So this is again part of what happens in these situations and why you won’t see many women on the front lines because if things happen, immediately they are pulled out. We can’t have them there, it is an insult for us to have our women arrested [*he says this with a mocking tone*]. Yes, we may glorify them after, like Ahed Tamimi and others, but we will do everything to protect them. Again, this is our tribal system, where it is about protecting the women first. So

even if they come, we are always watching them, ‘where are the women, are they fine, are they protected, are they taken care of?’

[Interviewer] Is this the same with foreign women?

Well, if it was, they [Palestinian males] learnt quickly through going up to a beautiful American or French woman who is in a demonstration and getting slapped in the face by them, or committing violent acts against a foreign woman and getting confronted. I think that over the years, being around foreign women more and more in these movements, some of these women are strong and they are standing up for their rights, they have traveled here alone from their country. They don’t want baby sitters. This begins to change the way the guys interact with them (Sami, Bethlehem).

Sami is outlining a noteworthy process of cultural and social exchange of norms between international activists and the Palestinians with whom they are showing solidarity as they engage in unarmed resistance. While gender norms and assumptions of international activists may at times butt up against those of Palestinians, after time, Palestinian men have adapted to them, incorporating a different set of rules for engaging with these activists of the opposite sex. As Sami describes, along with a large number of other respondents, this has not translated into different rules for engaging with Palestinian women in these same contexts. Respondents explain that interactions with Palestinian women remain confined to historical patriarchal gendered scripts which rely on a set of norms dictating the extent to which women can participate and engage in decision making in public spaces. Here we see how even when Palestinian men and women resist side-by-side, these shared spaces “can also be a site of exclusion, governmentality and hidden power relations” (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2020, p. 118). Borrowing from a Foucauldian reading of power, Obradovic-Wochnik (2020) note that “locations of power and elitism are not always obvious” (p. 119), despite advocating for the importance and involvement of women in resistance, resistance activities themselves “can also be agents of oppression and exclusion” (ibid).

CHAPTER 11- New Spaces for Alternative Masculinities, Evolving Notion of Hegemonic Masculinity, or Neither?



Image 9: Poster on Refugee Camp Wall. Photo by Author, October, 2018.

The last chapter, Chapter 10, opened with a discussion of the relationship between resistance and the construction of masculinity in Palestine arguing that narratives of masculinity remain tied – at least in part – to the heroic image of *fidā'iyyīn*. I have shown how, through a nuanced expression of critical agency, some research participants have adopted the LPAs framework for understanding resistance which has led to adaptations to their gender performance in certain spaces. Despite the fact that research participants remain embedded within fields of power, their lived experiences are shaped through expressions of agency and conventions which fundamentally shape their efforts to be and to belong (McDonald 2013). The subsequent adaptations to their gender performances are motivated by a number of factors expressed throughout interviews. These include:

- Engaging with CSOs/NGOs funded by the West as a reliable way to make a living;
- The LPA is seen as the gatekeeper for international support towards the Palestinian right to self-determination;
- Engaging in nonviolent resistance presents an opportunity to make connections with and/or gain exposure to international activists;
- Working within the LPA provides the opportunity to travel internationally which in some local circles, is regarded with prestige.

Moving from questions related to why and how research participants navigate the new terrain of unarmed resistance brought about through the increased involvement of the LPA in these domains, this chapter will explore what this means for the utility and appropriateness of labels/categories of masculinities. More specifically, I will turn to a discussion of a recurring question I was puzzled by throughout my research process: are my research participants performing alternative gendered scripts, which challenge notions of hegemonic masculinities in the West Bank, or are they redefining to their benefit, new notions of hegemonic masculinity in the maintenance of ‘masculine as power’? Ultimately, this chapter argues that while labels such as *alternative* and *hybrid* masculinities remain useful as signposts, in complex social and political contexts, they provide limited analytical utility in plotting shifts and changes to widespread norms and expectations of hegemonic masculinities.

‘Nonviolent’ Resistance: A New Space for Alternative Masculinity?

A key characteristic of male Palestinian ‘racial positioning’ has been a specific form of hegemonic gendered labelling shaped by discourses of Orientalism (Barber, 2015). The assumption that all Palestinians are violent, leads to a valorization for those who are not. As inaccurate and offensive as this may be, we can see aspects of this thinking being internalized by some of my research participants themselves who spoke about the difficulty in ‘teaching’ their fellow community members about nonviolence (see previous discussion about Izzat on page 405-406) and how they

themselves have had to find deep courage and bravery to continue their work in nonviolent resistance. To a certain extent, participants spoke in such a way as to construct a violent caricature of other Palestinian men. They did so I believe in part, to set themselves apart as better or more advanced, in other words, to make themselves a rare commodity. In this way, violence is re-defined as having value only in the past. This harks back to previous nonviolent social movements where some argued that there needed to be a Malcom X to contrast and strengthen the messages of Martin Luther King more compelling (Joseph, 2020), and that the violent peasant revolt which took place in India was vital to the strength of Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent movement that coincided (Reddy, 2010). Similarly, research participants would often construct an image of 'other Palestinians' as valorizing violence, ready to become martyrs, being corrupt or untrustworthy, and therefore, in stark contrast to themselves. By muting the nuance and instead painting a picture of a society that valorizes armed resistance, while at the same time benefiting from these images in their personal lives, research participants found a way to capitalize on Orientalist images of Palestinian men. By positioning themselves in opposition to this 'violent norm', they became safe and therefore acceptable and fundable for the LPA. In doing so, they leveraged a new form of power that was acquired through their status from their previous engagement in armed resistance. This status is carried forward through new connections and relationships that provide economic power and/or rhetorical power in the eyes of donors. Mac Ginty (2013) made a similar observation a decade ago, when he suggested that in development and post-conflict settings, local "communities may purposively shape their publically-accessible transcripts in order to maximize the rewards from outsiders" (p. 425).

As all-encompassing as both the Israeli occupation and the Orientalizing narratives of the LPA may be on the lives of my research participants, they nevertheless acted with agency and purpose,

making calculations as to when, where, and how to engage with the LPA. And while they may be denied the right to narrate on the international stage as Edward Said suggested, or to be heard and represented in ways that feel authentic and fair, these choices and calculations have had material impact both in terms of their personal lives and on the resistance movement writ large.

On a personal level, their gender identity has been profoundly impacted by the structures at play. Conflict and occupation strike at the core of what it means to be a man, and for many living in a post-Oslo Palestine, is profoundly disempowering and emasculating. On the other hand however, the very fact that masculinity is shaped and impacted in unique ways by conflict, awards men power and privilege to speak about the conflict, and unarmed resistance, in ways that differ from that of women. It also allows research participants to differentiate themselves from other men who currently engage in armed resistance, or who have never engaged in resistance. In this way, we see how hegemonic masculinity, even when conceived and constructed in new and nonviolent ways, nevertheless remains about creating a hierarchy that differentiates between men's and women's roles, as well as between men's and other men's roles.

The West is fascinated by Arab men—Palestinian men—who reject violence, and the use of arms, who advocate for coexistence and joint struggle alongside Israeli. This is, in part, due to embedded assumptions that in conflict settings, men are 'supposed' to be soldiers, are supposed to engage in violence. They are supposed to be defending their land, honor, and dignity through the use of arms. Violence is always on the table, or at least so the hegemonic masculinity discourse goes. So what happens when men, who have every life circumstance which would presumably lead them to violence, refuse this. They are held up as heroes, even the 'true heroes' of the conflict by the LPA simply because they are men in a conflict zone, not using violence. This glorification of the male Palestinian peacebuilder is a consequence of the confluence of hegemonic masculinities and

Orientalist narratives which assume that Palestinian men should be carrying a gun, bomb, or knife. Therefore, we see the ways that shifting expectations of hegemonic masculinities comes both from outside (the LPA), but also inside Palestine, through research participants strategically navigating Orientalist expectations of them.

The nuance that I am trying to highlight is the way that men, who previously epitomized hegemonic masculinity in Palestine, have evolved in their understanding of their role in the national liberation movement. Rather than facing off against the occupation forces via clandestine armed operations, subsequent prison terms, and perhaps martyrdom, their role is now centred on gaining the support of the international community (LPA). This requires engaging in a type of nonviolent resistance that highlights joint activism with Israelis, dialogue, and the absence of certain unarmed tools of resistance such as the throwing of stones and calls for global boycotting of Israeli goods. Again, these findings mirror Norman's (2015) concept of the Oslo effect mentioned earlier, where nonviolent resistance shifted towards appeasing the international community rather than directly challenging the occupation in the aftermath of Oslo Accords. Through this evolution, I argue, we have seen the transformation of hegemonic masculinities into nonviolent ones, while still drawing on hegemonic notions of masculinity such as resisting the occupation, suffering, and sacrifice. Research participants have been at the forefront of this evolution in notions of hegemonic masculinity, and they have been there not as agentless victims of Orientalist frameworks or neocolonial structures inherent in the LPA, but as critical agents. This results in a process which, much like the findings of a study by Kunz, Myrtilinen & Udasmoro (2018) in Indonesia, "men participate in peace-building contribute[s] to reducing violence, yet do not necessarily challenge hegemonic masculinities" (p. 299).

This phenomenon has also been documented in masculinities literature where we see men who reject hegemonic masculine norms rely instead on alternative masculine norms and get held up as heroes. In his work on alternative masculinities and men who engage in antiviolence work, Flood (2014) observed that, ‘public reception of men’s antiviolence work’ was filtered through the lens of ‘patriarchal privilege, with men’s efforts receiving greater media attention and interest than women’s, and men receiving praise and credit’ simply for being men involved in antiviolence against women advocacy work (p. 47). Rather than leading to a redistribution of power, this instead reinstates and grants power and privilege to these men. In this way, we see the patriarchal inevitability of male power and privilege. Either men use violence and sexism to attain power, or they don’t, but either way, the men that reject these hegemonic norms are praised, valorized and further empowered for their decision. The risk of rewarding nonviolent behaviour as something unique or special, is that it feeds patriarchal power in that regardless of what men do, they receive power and status from doing it.

Hegemonic masculinity scholars have also noted the potential for the emergence of alternative forms of masculinity (Carrigan, et al., 1985; Duncanson, 2009, 2013, 2015; Messerschmidt, 2012; Wedgwood, 2009; Whitehead, 2002), or even for the possibility of dismantling of hegemonic masculinity all together (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Stressing that masculinities are always multiple and ever-changing, these scholars have helped to broaden our understanding of the complexity and fluidity of male gender identity. If we give credence to the fact that hegemonic masculinities can ‘soften’ (Duncanson, 2015), or be ‘dismantled’ (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) in order to make way for alternative masculinities, understanding masculinity in the West Bank requires beyond the caricatures of violent masculinities that characterize Orientalist discourse (Hasso, 2018). That said, we also cannot simultaneously ignore the role that engaging in

armed tactics of resistance against the violent occupation and settler colonial project, plays in the making of Palestinian masculinity. Feminists have drawn our attention to the ways that the hierarchy between men and women is maintained by valuing characteristics traditionally associated with masculinity, and devaluing feminized statuses/traits, regardless of who they are exhibited by (Peterson, 2010). In this way, as Enloe (1989) explains, “the meaning of masculinity is essentially invested in the denigration and exclusion of the feminine” (cited in Hutchins, 2008, p. 26). This hierarchy creates a dualism of man/women, where woman is what man is not, and vice versa. Among the many ramifications of this dualism, feminist scholars concur that the leading consequence, from which many other flow, is that it essentializes masculinity and femininity and locks them into a rigid unequal binary (de Alwis, Mertus & Sajjad, 2013; Dolan, 2014; Hudson, 2009; Mazurana & Cole, 2013; Parpart, 2013; Puechguirbal, 2010; Willett, 2010). Therefore, as Duncanson (2015) concludes, in order for alternative masculinities to emerge, or for hegemonic masculinities to be dismantled, the first step is for what have traditionally been seen as feminized traits to be incorporated into hegemonic masculine scripts (p. 244). If we accept that hegemonic masculinities in the West Bank are tied to narratives of being a breadwinner (MacKenzie & Foster, 2017); a protector of family, land, and nation; as well as possessing braveness and a willingness to suffer (Nour, Tulkarm), sacrifice, and fight for Palestine (McDonald, 2010); or being a “strong man with a big history [in armed resistance]” (Kefah, Bil’in), then alternative masculinities can be understood to challenge one or all of these narratives by incorporating the feminized antithesis. In the case of my research participants, they declined to engage in the use of arms as a means of resisting the occupation, with the majority of them working alongside Israelis in their endeavors. This, in and of itself, could be understood as ‘alternative’ for as Duncanson (2015) posits,

For the unraveling of hegemonic masculinity, men must be encouraged not so much to change their ways as to change the way in which they negotiate their identities in relation to others. Rather than forge their identities through relations of opposition or domination, men and subjects in general need to construct their identities through recognition of similarity, respect, interdependence, empathy, and equality with others (p. 233).

Certainly, engaging in nonviolent resistance alongside Israeli activists demonstrates a shift towards the recognition of 'similarity, respect, and interdependence'. Moreover, research participants highlighted the difficulty they had in gaining the acceptance of the wider community for their work and relationships with Israelis. This, they explained, came down to the fact that in the West Bank, one's only exposure to Israelis is as soldiers and as the face of the occupation, and correspondingly a symbol of their dispossession and oppression. In fact, the majority of participants recounted how they too used to share this opinion. In the following lengthy quote, Nour shares his first experience meeting an Israeli at an NGO, and the process of him becoming an ally and friend in his resistance work,

I kept thinking he was a soldier undercover or intelligence that was there to trick us and arrest us. I thought it was a trap. Day by day, we built trust between us. Everyday I saw more and more how he was like me, a human. I saw him, and he saw me as a human too. I am not a terrorist, I am like an Israeli. We decided to work together against the occupation. Our personal stories helped us build trust between Palestinians and Israelis. I now have good friends from Israel. Last week, Itamar was at my home all night. We are friends with his whole family. He brings his wife, his daughter and his sons to visit me in my home in the camp. I cannot visit him in his home because I need a permit and cannot enter Israel, but he comes here (Nour, Tulkarm).

Later in the interview he recounts a recent example of how Nour's relationship with his Israeli friend Itamar had led to a shift in the thinking of his own son.

Last week my son got stuck in Israel because he ran out of money and couldn't get a bus home. So I called Itamar and he picked my son up in Haifa and drove him to Tulkarm. He drove him home in the middle of the night! It is not easy for Israelis to go into Palestinian cities in the middle of the night. I asked my son,

could you kill this man? He said, ‘no, it would be impossible. If I saw anyone wanting to hurt him, I would have to stop him’. My son understands. He is 20 years old and he understands that he is a human (Nour, Tulkarm).

As Nour’s experience highlights, in some ways, for research participants, working alongside Israeli women and men could be seen as a step towards the ‘unraveling of hegemonic masculinity’ in that it fosters ‘respect, interdependence, empathy, and equality with others’.

Going back to Butler (1988) for a moment in her theorizing around gender performances, she argues,

if the ground of gender identity is the stylized repetition of acts through time, and not a seemingly seamless identity, then the possibilities of gender transformation are to be found in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a different sort of repeating, in the breaking or subversive repetition of that style (p. 520).

Drawing on this insight for analysis, research participants highlight how masculinities are not inevitably violent in conflict settings. They are diverse and multiple, and undergo *shifts* based on context and time. This is to say, the performance itself of masculinity has not been stable for research participants, it has evolved. In her work on militarized masculinities in Zimbabwe, Parpart (2015) notes that in fragile and conflict affected settings, militarized masculinity is often portrayed as the quintessential form of hegemonic masculinity. It is associated with conflict, bravery, and military leadership. Yet, she argues, there are exceptions to the militarized narratives that challenge the simplified image of militarized masculinities. Parpart (2015) explains “militarized masculinities... have been seen as the litmus test of political credibility and leadership potential in the region” (p. 312). She goes on, however, to point out a flaw in some feminist theorizing: militarized masculinities are not *inevitably* hegemonic or hyper-masculine (ibid, p. 314). These findings complicate the picture of a clear distinction between hegemonic and alternative

masculinities. A distinction that is all too often reduced to the nature of men's relationship and engagement with hegemonic masculine norms, expectations, and performances vis-à-vis the use of arms and violence.

It is important to note here that while hegemonic masculinity is often defined as an ideal type of man, this should not imply that the majority of men exhibit these qualities. Duncanson's (2015) work reminds us that hegemonic masculinity should be considered as a dominant discourse not as a universal norm, "the argument is not that all soldiers fit this model or even that the majority do - rather, that this model acts as a cultural ideal, in more or less overt ways, and all [soldiers] negotiate their masculinity in relation to it" (p. 234). This is important to highlight because by suggesting that hegemonic masculinity may be tied in part to armed engagement in resistance, this is not to say that the majority of Palestinian men are engaged in armed resistance. In fact, regardless of the period of time, only a very small minority of men in Palestine ever engage in armed resistance.

Myrntinen et al. (2016) argue, the focus on men and violence in conflict setting is,

on the one hand understandable: conflict-affected situations are defined precisely by these violences, and men and boys are by and large the main perpetrators of these violences globally. On the other hand, the focus leaves out the masculinities which are not violent and the men and boys embodying these masculinities (p. 2).

In working with men who are actively engaged in *unarmed* resistance, this dissertation aims to understand their experiences and how they constructed their identity in relation to hegemonic norms. This relationship however, is far from straightforward. Are hegemonic masculinities 'softening' as Groes-Green (2012) suggests and shifting towards alternative masculine narratives if—in conflict settings—they reject the use of violence and engagement in armed resistance? If

the buildings lining the streets of West Bank towns remain plastered with the posters of men engaged in armed resistance and not of the images of Palestinian men leading unarmed protests, have hegemonic masculine norms shifted?

In distinguishing gendered performances as a form of alternative or hegemonic masculinities, Buschmeyer (2013) notes that alternative masculinities are less respected by the wider society; are often not accepted as ‘real masculinities’; and are rarely held up to be role models. Nour speaks to this in our conversation about role models in Palestine. He laments, “All of us, especially the shabāb [male youth], are looking to men using violence as a hero” (Nour, Tulkarm). Similarly, Yousif suggests that this is due to the violent nature of the oppression they are fighting,

the arrogance and violence of Israel has made Palestinian citizens look up to those who resist Israel with a weapon more than any other type of resistance... Meeting violence with violence is respected more than meeting violence with nonviolence (Yousif, Beit Jala).

Illustrated by the above two anecdotal perspectives, is a larger theme presented in the data: unarmed resistance is generally not awarded the same level of respect, those engaged in it are not elevated to the status of role models, and, to Palestinians outside of resistance work, these men are framed as sellouts, as ‘weak’ (Yacoub, Hebron), ‘silly’ (Kefah, Bil’in), as contributing to ‘normalization’ (Nour, Tulkarm), or as ‘pussys’ (Osama, Jericho).

Taking this all into consideration, it is apparent that distinctions between hegemonic and alternatives masculinities are not clear-cut. Moreover, it becomes evident that it is not so much about the categorization of different masculinities into these two distinct categories that is insightful, rather, what remains an important analytical practice is teasing out the process by which men seek access to hegemonic masculinities, the way they redefine the borders around it to fit their

situation, and how this is navigated through power and privilege. Leaning into the messy distinction between the two, authors such as Groes-Green (2012) place an emphasis on context and place when striving to tease out alternative practices, “contextualizing alternative masculinities involves paying attention to where and when specific notions and practices are enacted and *by whom*” (emphasis added, p. 93). ‘By whom’ I believe is one of the key clues in deciphering alternative practices in my research setting. The vast majority of my research participants have a history of engagement in armed resistance. And while this may be a result of poor sampling methodology, at the risk of sounding hubristic, I have reason to suspect that it is not. Rather, I think what this points to is an integral phenomenon in unarmed resistance related to the dance between structure and agency in post-Oslo West Bank. For example, notwithstanding the argument that all Palestinians are engaged in resistance simply by remaining in Palestine (a concept known as *sumud*), actively resisting the dispossession and occupation of their lands is something that only a select portion of Palestinian society identify as engaging in. Research participants and I spent many hours speaking about what differentiates those who engage in resistance and those who do not. While there was no consensus to report, a metaphor was used on a number of occasions by research participants highlighting the fact that humans are animals; we all possess slightly different levels of tolerance and react in different ways to stimuli. Research participants used this metaphor as a way to explain why some people in Palestine engage in resistance, while others do not. The metaphor is eloquently summarized by Mazin,

Some people react, some people don’t. It’s very understandable, actually. It’s nature. If you put a pack of dogs in the corner of a room and poke them with a stick repeatedly, the behaviour of the dogs will vary depending on the dog. Depending on what kind of dog it is, what breed of dog, whether it’s a bulldog or a Chihuahua or whatever, you know. Some will bite, some will look scary and growl but not bite, some will whimper and hide (Mazin, Bethlehem).

The point here is that the demographic of men I interviewed and worked with for this research are not representative of Palestinian men writ large. Those who I worked with are – as a necessary condition for my researching them – those motivated to resist. And it remains likely that those who were motivated to resist in previous eras, would similarly be those who are motivated to resist today. While this is certainly not an absolute, as there are many reasons why significantly fewer Palestinians are engaged in resistance today than in previous decades (none of which relate to an improvement in the situation), it does mean that, to a certain extent, my research participants are ‘resisters’. They always have been and always will be. Their shifting in tactics therefore should be read in part as representative of the shifting in norms, opportunities, and available discourses related to resistance, rather than an issue of sampling. Going back to Groes-Green’s (2012) assertion that it is important to look at ‘what practices are enacted and *by whom*’, the ‘whom’ we are looking at in this research are a specific subsection of Palestinian men in the West Bank. They are the resisters. She further suggests that alternative masculine practices should be contextualized, an analytical lens should be turned towards ‘where and when specific notions and practices’ emerge. This is where the LPA comes into play. The LPA introduced new incentive structures into the field of resistance. My research participants then reacted to, or ‘navigated’ these new incentive structures in such a way that led them to where we meet them today. The LPA provided a suite of material and tactical resources, but at a cost. The cost was the adoption of the resistance framework of the LPA. As a result, men who had previously prescribed to narratives of masculinity that supported, valorized, and engaged in armed resistance, shifted (at least in part) their behaviour away from this narrative of hegemonic masculinity, towards one more favorable to the LPA. In doing so, they shifted the parameters of what constitutes hegemonic masculinities using the power

they had and the additional power they leverage by engaging with the LPA. But whether this mean they have forged a new alternative masculine performance, is another question.

Unarmed Resistance: The New Hegemonic Norm?

In some ways, my research participants have redefined a key tenet of hegemonic masculinity by dislocating notions of their masculinity from armed resistance. They have done so in order to maintain their power and status, and in ways that suit their current agendas, and the current political context that emerged out of the Oslo Accords. In so doing, they have opened up alternative avenues for gendered performances related to men and resistance to emerge. If we look at this from another angle, research participants use their pasts of armed resistance and prison time to access these new spaces. They do so however, while also using the respect, power, and trust they gained through previous engagement in armed resistance as a sort of passport to speak about nonviolent resistance within their communities. Therefore, paradoxically they may be using their engagement in nonviolent resistance as a means to “bolster subjectivities that draw on hegemonic ideals” (Szabo, 2014, p. 232). Another finding which suggests that engagement in unarmed resistance and the LPA tracks gendered scripts has to do with their interactions with international female activists. The fact that some research participants capitalize on their engagement in nonviolent resistance and the LPA in order to meet female international activists, and develop friendships with these women, despite their wives objections and the resulting inter-household conflict, further perpetuates patriarchal norms around decision making, being in control, and freedom to act; all tropes of hegemonic masculinity. Furthermore, the possessiveness related to who can have contact with which female activists observed during data collection (and outlined in Chapter 10), mirrors this process.

To the above point, Lusher & Robins (2009) argue that,

hegemonic masculinity might reproduce itself by evolving into what might be seen as a ‘new’ masculinity but still maintain a dominant position over other masculinities (Demetriou 2001). In such a way the specific qualities attributed to masculinity and femininity at a particular point in time may change without necessarily a change occurring in the gendered relations of power (p. 391).

This argument however, is in tension with Duncanson’s (2015) assertion which suggests that the first step in unraveling hegemonic masculinities, or creating space for the emergence of alternative masculinities is ‘for feminized traits to be incorporated into hegemonic masculine scripts’ (p. 244). If, as Lusher & Robins (2009) argue, ‘qualities attributed to masculinity and femininity at a particular point in time may change without necessarily a change occurring in the gendered relations of power’, then what good is incorporating what have traditionally been seen as feminized traits, if these traits may have been masculinized and granted status and respect precisely because of their adoption into male gendered scripts. Does this not create a Catch 22 where feminized traits or performances (such as a commitment to dialogue, nonviolence, and cooperation, for example) are only feminized insofar as they remain in the domain of femininities, but become safe (not a challenge to their dignity, authority, power; i.e. their masculinity) for men to exhibit through the very act of being adopted by hegemonic masculinity?

In their pioneering work on hegemonic masculinities, Carrigan et al. (1985) theorize that men who embrace hegemonic masculinities benefit from ‘the patriarchal dividend’ (Carrigan et al., 1985, p. 594) in the form of authority, respect, power, and control over one’s life. As the theory goes, conversely, other alternative masculinities do not have access to the same power and symbolic/material privileges (Groes-Green, 2012, p. 94), arguably because as Duncanson (2015) suggests, they have incorporated what have traditionally been seen as feminized traits. If this is

the case, if research participants are to be considered trailblazers of an emerging alternative masculinity, we could expect them to lack access to power and symbolic/material privileges. As highlighted in interviews, my research participants do not appear to be lacking in power and symbolic/material privileges as a result of their engagement in nonviolent resistance. They have therefore, incorporated ‘feminized traits’ without losing out on the ‘patriarchal dividend’. This therefore further destabilizes the argument that these men have forged a new alternative discourse of masculinity.

An additional interesting counter to the alternative masculinities hypothesis is presented in an interview conducted in English with Sami, a lifelong peace activist who comes from a well-known family with ties to unarmed resistance predating the Oslo accords and the introduction of the LPA. When asked about his perceptions of the gendered dynamics of unarmed resistance in the West Bank, he eloquently reflects,

When we look at nonviolence today, it is mostly men, and mostly men still using the macho mindset and the masculine consciousness to resist without arms because it is strategically and pragmatically a better option for them at this time. It is still about destroying, winning, undermining, delegitimizing, whatever things we want to do to the other side, that if we had the support and arms to do it, we would do it, but because we don’t, we chose nonviolence (Sami, Bethlehem).

Sami posits that for many men he works with, the turn to nonviolent resistance reflects a pragmatic decision based on the shifting structural realities faced by these men. These structural realities dovetail with forces such as ever-evolving colonial continuities and political shifts. These include the disintegration of organized armed resistance movements in the West Bank as a result of political commitments under Oslo which preclude support for all armed resistance at the political level. It also includes other factors related to policies coming out of Oslo such as the security

cooperation between the PA and Israel, and myriad other agreements which have essentially led to the demobilization and disarmament of armed groups in the West Bank. Therefore, from his perspective, as gendered expectations related to armed resistance became unattainable, men sought nonviolent resistance as an alternative avenue to express well-rehearsed gendered scripts. Here we see Vigh's (2007) claims around social navigation coming to life; "social navigation may thus involve detours, unwilling displacement, losing our way and, not least, redrawing trajectories and tactics" (p. 14). As summarized by Vigh (2007), social navigation for my research participants "is the tactical movement of agents within a moving element. It is motion within motion" (ibid).

As highlighted in Chapter 6, it was common for participants to suggest that 'other activists' were drawn to engaging in nonviolent resistance for the exposure they would gain to international activists, particularly women. The same pattern was evident for motivating factors such as salaries and travel opportunities. While only a few participants acknowledged these as a motivating factor for them personally, the fact that most participants reported 'other activists' as being motivated by these factors, rather than themselves, indicates a level of shame associated with them. By acknowledging these alternative motivations, whether it is salaries, travel, or exposure to international activists, etc., it was as if their engagement in resistance would be viewed as less heroic, less authentic, or less valued. This not only highlights the fragility of masculinity, but also points to an interesting dichotomy where on one hand, the occupation continues to put pressure on Palestinian men to engage in resistance, alongside the cultural and social expectations for men to do so. And on the other, the structural realities and space for resistance post-Oslo remain mediated through the LPA, which itself has fundamentally altered the realities and space for unarmed resistance. Notwithstanding the impact of these changes, social expectations of men engaged in resistance remain tied to rigid pre-established gender roles and expectations. A disconnect has

therefore emerged. Findings of this research have pointed to ways in which men have navigated this disconnect through various techniques which have created an almost parallel, subculture, or hybrid notion of hegemonic masculinity.

All of my male research participants were currently engaged in unarmed/nonviolent resistance, and all but three were associated with, to varying degrees, CSOs/NGOs which received, at least in part, their funding from Western donors/agencies/foundations. All but five of these men had previously been engaged in armed resistance and all but one had spent time in prison (note: these are not necessarily connected, as Palestinians are often imprisoned without ever engaging in armed resistance). What their stories illustrate, is the possibilities opened up by the LPA for men to retain positions of power and privilege (salaries, travel permits, international connections/relationships etc.) by drawing on certain dimensions of hegemonic forms of masculinity, while also drawing on alternative narratives of masculinities (to redefine the hegemonic masculine norms) which remain explicitly nonviolent in the field of resistance. These permutations, however, do not appear to have translated into new hegemonic norms which privilege nonviolence, gender equality, and power sharing writ large. So while some aspects of the performativity of hegemonic masculinity may have changed, its interest in the distribution, management and access to power has remained. We therefore could understand my research participants as representing a new expression of hegemonic masculinity, rather than an expression of alternative masculinity, which challenges straight-jacketed understandings of hegemonic masculinity vis-à-vis resistance that tether it to armed resistance. While establishing their social status through traditional hegemonic models of masculinity, research participants exemplify how nonviolent performances of masculinity can also be hegemonic. Through this process, hegemonic masculinity is reformulated to maintain the pre-

established gendered hierarchies of an earlier time, before the introduction of the LPA, Oslo, and the popularization of so called ‘nonviolence’.

This parallel/alternative model of hegemonic masculinities brings together some of the preexisting hegemonic expectations/norms/qualities such as resisting the occupation (and the subsequent suffering and sacrifice that comes along with this commitment) and breadwinning/providing (Kelly, 2008), while also incorporating new norms/qualities such as a commitment to ‘nonviolence’, international travel, and connections/friendships with international (and Israeli) activists. So, while these men have dislocated notions of hegemonic masculinities from the use of armed resistance, what remains is a reliance on these historical legacies. Combined with their experiences of suffering and sacrifice, they ensure their place along the higher rungs of a gendered hierarchy, as well as ensure that they continue to benefit from the ‘the patriarchal dividend’ (Carrigan et al., 1985, p. 594). To this point, Hooper (2001) explains, “hegemonic masculinity gets transformed, through constant challenges and struggles, to resemble whatever traits happen to be most strategically useful for the getting and keeping of power” (p. 61). Mirroring this analysis and my research findings, Hamber (2016) notes a similar pattern in South Africa and Northern Ireland where, ‘choosing the political party over revolutionary armed insurrection... is not merely about political pragmatism, but also involves a realization (conscious or not) that (masculine) power can also be exercised in different ways” (p. 27).

When combined with ‘perks’ such as impressive salaries and opportunities, chances to travel, and exposure to international activists, does a new hegemonic masculinity emerge? Have these ‘perks’ precipitated the construction and adoption of new hegemonic masculine norms that reject the use of arms, that are no longer on the front lines of operations and instead, possess this history, but

also stories of their travels in Dublin, New York, or Hamburg? Has this precipitated a new hegemonic unarmed resistance fighter who attends protests and nonviolent resistance activities with not only their Palestinian followers, but also a cadre of international activists, with whom they have collegial relationships, and one that exhibits behaviour with the opposite sex that would not be considered inappropriate if they both were Palestinian? Does this new form of unarmed resistance constructed in part by the LPA represent a new dimension of hegemonic masculinities—the ‘armed-turned-unarmed worldly resistance fighter’? In thinking around these questions, we should not lose sight of the fact that while these men may hold hands with female activists at protests and events, present alongside female counterparts at conferences, and speak about the importance of everyone—man and woman—joining together to resist the occupation, at home and behind the scenes at NGO meetings, patriarchal performances related to authority, decision making, and autonomy, as well as ideas related to ‘destroying, winning, undermining, delegitimizing’ (Sami, Bethlehem) their opposition, appear to remain intact.

If hegemonic masculinity is a combination of both a “cultural ideal and patterns of practice of real men” (Duncanson, 2015, p. 236), then we could say there has been a shift in the patterns of practice vis-à-vis resistance for my research participants. However, there does not appear to have been a shift in cultural ideals around these same practices. Moreover, if hegemonic masculinity is a cultural ideal (Connell, 1995), the current most honored way of being a ‘man’ in a given context which requires “all other men to position themselves in relation to it” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832), are my research participants really exhibiting a new, hybrid hegemonic masculinity? If we recall the discussion in the previous section, it does not sound like the general public in the West Bank view my research participants as the new ‘cultural ideal’, nor does it sound like ‘other men position themselves in relation to’ them. By this count, these men do not seem to have forged

a new hegemonic masculine discourse. On the other hand, however, these men have dislocated masculinity from armed resistance, which, as discussed by participants, continues to be foundational for respect and power at the community level.

Messerschmidt (2012) argues that in order to properly grasp and conceptualize hegemonic masculinities, we have to unravel hegemonic masculinities from alternative and non-hegemonic masculinities in a given context (p. 73). As the findings of this research have illustrated, however, Messerschmidt's proposal can be extremely challenging. Unravelling hegemonic masculinities from alternative and/or non-hegemonic masculinities becomes frustratingly complicated, if not futile, with some behaviours simultaneously exploiting attributes that are associated with both hegemonic and non-hegemonic masculinities. The process of – and subsequent frustration with the futility of – teasing out the ensnarled terrain between hegemonic and alternative masculinities has been noted by scholars such as Buschmeyer (2013), Groes-Green (2012), Szabo (2014); and Wetherell & Edley (1999). What these authors findings, alongside findings of this dissertation, point to is the limited functionality/advantage of the “categorization of men's experiences to a plethora of fixed and fluid ‘types’ of masculinities” (Waling, 2019, p. 90), regardless of how flexible and iterative those categories may be. Bridges & Pascoe (2014) suggest that men who distance themselves from hegemonic masculinity, while enforcing inequality and power over women, enact a form of hybrid masculinity. However, if men's “self-presentations can be simultaneously hegemonic and non-hegemonic” (Szabo, 2014, p. 234), what analytical function do these categories serve? Hybridity, in terms of categories of masculinities, I believe, treads the line of forcing a ‘square peg into a round hole’ insofar as it represents an attempt to further categorize a concept which has proved to be ‘un-categorizeable’. While I agree that these labels remain useful as signposts, in complex social and political contexts, they provide limited analytical

utility in plotting shifts and changes to widespread norms and expectations of hegemonic masculinities. As such, I conclude with arguing that there is no satisfying conceptual framework for theorizing men who reject certain key facets of hegemonic masculinities, yet who simultaneously draw on the power and social capital gained by previously prescribing to hegemonic gendered scripts. Or, in the most simplistic terms, men whose attitudes and behaviours simultaneously reinforce and challenge hegemonic masculinities inevitably raise questions about the possibilities of various understandings of hegemonic masculinity/ies.

Conclusion

Duncanson (2015) proposes that, “hegemonic masculinities which have adopted ‘softer’ traits in order to retain power will contain contradictions, this creates opportunities for feminists to push at those contradictions, make them explicit, in the hope of forcing consideration of the underlying problems” (p. 243). This is what I have done in this chapter. I have not done so in order to discredit the work of research participants, or their commitment to unarmed resistance. I have approached my analysis in such a way so as to bring to light the slippery nature of patriarchy and the way that various aspects of power manifest in the lives of my research participants. It also does so by drawing our attention to the ways that external interventions (be it by donors, international activists, IFIs, INGOs, or the entire LPA), have consequences on the lives of those subjected to them, not only in a material sense, but also on a social, communal, interpersonal, and individual level. This chapter has centred its analysis on how Palestinian men engaged in the field of unarmed resistance have navigated their social and structural realities vis-à-vis resistance in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. In doing so, it has aimed to show how research participants have, through exercising their agency, capitalized on, coopted, and resisted aspects of the LPA in order to meet their personal and national liberation needs. As highlighted by participants, while they may not be

able to exit the web of the LPA's power, they can act differently within it (Gordon 2002). In this way, engaging with the LPA has in and of itself become a means of social navigation. For research participants, the LPA provides material and social resources here and now. Additionally, it serves as a tool to meet longer-term aspirations like an end to the occupation, and greater independence or even statehood. In this way, we see how research participants use their engagement in the LPA as a means to "concurrently plot trajectories, plan strategy and actually move towards telos [an ultimate object or aim] a distant goal in or beyond the horizon" (Vigh, 2007, p. 13). In other words, for my research participants, engaging with the LPA is a way to "simultaneously address both the immediacy of finding their bearings in a turbulent situation and the drawing of possible lines of flight into the future" (ibid, p. 131). The process of navigating the LPA not only has an impact on the gender identity of research participants, but also shapes it. A number of lessons have emerged as a result of this analysis. First, in conflict settings, hegemonic masculinities should not be assumed to be tied to engaging in the use of arms in conflict. Secondly, in challenging post-colonial structural determinism, the appropriation of the framework and lexicon of the LPA should not be viewed merely as a capitulation, but as an essential strategy of self-representation, self-preservation, and an expression of agential power (Ashcroft, 2004, p. 120).

This chapter has highlighted the ways in which patriarchal privilege tied to hegemonic masculinities continues to influence the way research participants behave, as well as how they are received from both the local Palestinian community, as well as in the various international fora opened up through the LPA (Flood, 2014, p. 48). Although research participants have not transcended aspects of hegemonic masculinities which perpetuate the gender inequitable nature of patriarchy, their engagement in unarmed resistance could be seen as a positive 'step in the right direction'. Authors such as Claire Duncanson have argued for a need to overcome some of the

pessimism found in many feminist scholars work around alternative masculinities and instead, see examples such as the unarmed/nonviolent Palestinian resistance fighter as ‘entry points’ which can be built on to encourage more meaningful and structural change towards more gender equitable and egalitarian male identities.

Unarmed resistance is not always a coherent space, and contradictory philosophies, motivations, opportunities and messages are presented by research participants. There is no ‘one right way’ to understand and categorize my research participants diverse experiences and choices. Moreover, no one research participant ‘only, always and completely’ (Buschmeyer, 2013, p. 306), embodies/exemplifies this analysis. Be that as it may, when viewed together, the narratives, stories, and experiences of research participants paint a nuanced, yet relatively cohesive tapestry, complete with distinct themes and patterns which together, offer a novel rendition of structure, agency and gender identity vis-à-vis unarmed resistance. These findings do not speak to all men engaged in unarmed or nonviolent resistance in the West Bank across space and time. This chapter has aimed to simply capture a contemporary and unique aspect of unarmed resistance expressed by my research participants as it relates to the LPA and masculinities.

While it is well founded in the literature that we cannot ignore gender as a site of power in peacebuilding (Duncanson, 2016; Pankhurst & Blackman, 2006; Pankhurst, 2012; Hudson, 2009; Shepherd, 2014), what this chapter has illustrated is that the same is true for unarmed resistance and nonviolence initiatives. Gendered power relations are reinforced, challenged, and reconfigured between men themselves, as well as between men and women as they navigate new spaces and opportunities opened up by the involvement of the LPA. As men navigate these turbulent and unstable social-political environments, they too are “being moved by currents, shifts and tides”

requiring them to adapt their actions “to the movement of the entombment we move through” (Vigh, 2007, p. 14). It is here, at the confluence of liberal peacebuilding, resistance, and gender identity that my research participants have found what Vigh (2007) calls, ‘motion within motion’. Their experiences, sense making, and actions should be understood as navigations in the face of precarity thus highlighting the inseparability of action and environment combined with knowledge and praxis (ibid, p. 13).

CONCLUSION

Nearly ten years ago, McCandless (2013) noted an, “open recognition that policies and practices that frame action in countries emerging from war have been dominated by Northern actors, and that this needs to change” (p. 227). However, a decade later, this critique remains appropriate. In 2021, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) Ban Ki-moon states, “it is time to acknowledge that the longstanding approach taken to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the international community has failed and a new one is required” (n.p). With a consensus that the current approach isn’t working, the question then turns to what a new approach should look like. Who, what, and how should it be conceived of? While the precise answers to these questions certainly lie outside of the theoretical scope of this research, what is certain is that in order to addresses and build off the failures and lessons learned emerging from critiques of the current approach, Western peacebuilding actors need to decentre themselves from knowledge production, agenda setting, and history writing in the region. A radical reconceptualization of the field of liberal peacebuilding will be required in order to centre the knowledge, priorities, and agendas of Palestinians if any new approach hopes to have better success.

As this dissertation has uncovered, despite the LPA’s efforts to engage with Palestinian civil society by integrating aspects of unarmed resistance with nonviolence and grassroots peacebuilding interventions, liberal peacebuilding has yet to address the privileging of Western knowledge, agendas, and biases in policy and practice aiming to build peace in Israel/Palestine. By drawing out and exploring some of the consequences of leaving unchecked, the ideological frameworks embedded within the discursive regimes and practices of liberal peacebuilding, this dissertation has brought to light new understandings around the encounters between liberal peacebuilding and local actors. It has done so by centering the voices and experiences of

Palestinians themselves throughout the conceptualization, data collection, and analysis of this research. By viewing peacebuilding and resistance from the perspectives of those living in oppressive and conflict-ridden contexts, I have drawn on feminist scholarship and methodology which argues for the need to critically unpack hegemonic assumptions and values through recognizing diverse voices and points of view. This approach also adheres to the principle that, ‘we are our own experts’. This dissertation has highlighted how in Palestine, encounters between liberal peacebuilding and the local are shaped through imbricating layers of unequal and problematic power relations between: Israelis and Palestinian; Western peacebuilding actors (donors) and local activists, peacebuilders and civil society; and Palestinian men and women navigating these systems. Feminist insights help me to unpack these multifarious power relations, the findings of which has shed light on the importance of understanding these dynamics from the perspectives of those affected, in order to chart a way forward towards meaningful and critical engagement with liberal peacebuilding. In short, centering the voices and perspectives of Palestinians has helped to uncover why peacebuilding efforts have not brought the region closer to a just peace.

In addition to the absence of a peaceful resolution to the conflict, this dissertation uncovered other demonstrable implications and consequences of liberal peacebuilding efforts on the social, cultural, and political lives of my research participants. If one thing is certain, it is that liberal peacebuilding interventions have a profound impact on social relations outside the purview of their intended goals. Reflecting back on the findings of this dissertation, we see how some of these social relations have been shaped through new power struggles brought about by the opportunities offered through engagement with the liberal peace architecture (LPA). By teasing out and making visible these opportunities, as well as their subsequent social, cultural, and gendered impacts, this

dissertation has provided insight into the implications liberal peacebuilding has had on Palestinians' fight against oppression, and their struggle for national liberation and peace. Moreover, it has introduced a degree of nuance to our understanding of the shifting notions of gender identity in conflict and post-conflict settings.

In concluding this dissertation, this chapter will briefly reiterate my research questions and findings. I will then reflect on the larger implications of these findings to the field of peacebuilding in general, as well as offer thoughts around NGO-ization and the field of masculinities studies. Lastly, I will outline three areas of future research I identified while writing this dissertation.

Research Questions and Summary of Key Findings

This dissertation was guided by three research questions:

1. What are some contributing factors that lead men to engage in unarmed resistance today?
2. How, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, have Western peacebuilding efforts shaped Palestinian unarmed resistance?
3. How have men, engaged in unarmed resistance, responded to and navigated the contemporary unarmed resistance space?

In answering these questions, this research found that despite decades of dispossession and oppression—as well as failed Western peacebuilding efforts—the continued motivation of Palestinian men to engage in unarmed resistance centres on their desire for justice, dignity, and equality. This dissertation also exposed untold and un-theorized motivating factors. These are outside of those often cited in the literature on Palestinian resistance and relate specifically to the role and impact of Western peacebuilding efforts in the region. These motivating factors are: a desire to gain the support of the international community in Palestinians' struggle for national liberation; and a desire to gain access to privileges, offerings, and other benefits provided by the

LPA such as salaries, opportunities to travel, and exposure to foreigners. These findings provide a fuller sense of the range of factors that motivate individuals to engage in unarmed resistance and offer a novel way of understanding some of the more invisible social and political impacts of Western intervention and donor engagement in the region, by narrowing the unit of analysis down to individuals' sense-making.

In addition to the ways that the LPA has shaped the incentive structure and motivations for men to engage in unarmed resistance, this dissertation also painted a granular picture of some of the impacts and consequences of the involvement of the LPA on unarmed resistance itself, as well as in the personal lives of my research participants. This dissertation found there to be two distinct spheres in which the LPA has shaped unarmed resistance. These two spheres are: in the realm of discourse through the frameworks and ideologies employed in Western peacebuilding efforts in forming the foundation of policy and practice; and secondly, in the domain of material and structural elements from which my research participants interacted, gained access to, and navigated their resistance activism.

This dissertation offered a broader perspective on the NGO-ization of resistance in Palestine than has been provided by other studies. It found that the NGO-ization of unarmed resistance ultimately contributed to: an abandonment of a national liberation agenda and a shift towards the agenda of the LPA; a shift from collective action, towards individualized and elite activism; the de-politicization of activism; and a shift in knowledge from indigenous Palestinian frameworks and discourse, towards neo-colonial knowledge. By focusing specifically on the implications of NGO-ization on the resistance movement, combined with attention to the gendered implications of such

a process, a fuller sense of the range of impacts and consequences emerging from peacebuilding encounters between international and local actors is realized.

Lastly, this research uncovered a more complicated picture of representation, agency, and gender identity vis-à-vis unarmed resistance than existed in the literature prior. It found that in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, a new political and social landscape emerged as a result of the LPA grafting grassroots peacebuilding efforts onto the preexisting unarmed resistance movement. Research participants responded to this new landscape through a combination of adoption, cooption, and resistance. Findings related to the unique ways that research participants navigate the current spatial and temporal terrain illustrate the degree to which their identity as Palestinian men, is tied to engagement in resistance. My research findings elucidate instances of shifting hegemonic gender expectations, all the while leaving other hegemonic gender expectations intact. In answering my third research question, it ultimately found that in navigating the contemporary unarmed resistance space some men in Palestine have dislocated notions of hegemonic masculinities from the use of arms in conflict and resistance. However, it also found that they have done so in order to access new avenues of power and privilege, thus perpetuating a longstanding requirement of hegemonic masculinities.

Implications and Contributions of Findings

In this section I consider the macro-level implications of this study in relation to the bodies of knowledge comprising the field of peacebuilding in general, and peacebuilding in Palestine specifically, as well as gender and masculinities in conflict settings. In reflecting on the implications of my research findings, I will also discuss where and how these findings advance or deviate from current approaches and understandings.

I will turn first to the implications and contributions of my research findings towards advancing knowledge in the field of peacebuilding. Given the significance of peacebuilding to the themes examined throughout the dissertation, I break this discussion into three subsections reflecting the diverse contributions to knowledge related to peacebuilding.

The interpellation of Orientalist narratives into liberal peacebuilding

Since the popularization of the Zionist adage, ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’, Palestinians have come to epitomize the silenced ‘Other’ in Western political and cultural thought. Starting from a place where their very existence is called into question, while morally problematic, it is not surprising then that Western understandings of Palestinians’ contemporary struggle remain trapped within the discursive regimes of the West (and its allies such as Israel). As highlighted in Chapter 8, this manifests in the language and frameworks used to speak about and understand the conflict—Palestinians engagement and role in it—as well as the peacebuilding and statebuilding policies and praxis of Western actors in the region. While Edward Said helped to problematize historical and contemporary representations of Palestinians in the academy and in the media, it is a detriment to the field of peacebuilding that his untimely death prohibited him from extending this line of critique to the lasting effects of the peacebuilding policies and practices coming out of the Oslo Accords. Said’s work has been instrumental in my research, particularly the significance of representation in conflict and peace. Questions such as: ‘who has the authority to represent?’, ‘why does it matter?’, and ‘what are the consequences of being denied this right?’, have guided this research and analysis. In seeking answers to these questions, I have contributed to contemporary literature and current knowledge around the relationship between unarmed resistance and peacebuilding in Palestine and have offered a novel way of understanding the lack of progress in peacebuilding. By engaging with the concept of Orientalism, this dissertation has

offered a way of interpreting the lack of progress as a consequence of the flawed paradigms through which the international community and LPA understand and have engaged with the conflict. Seen from this perspective, the limited progress is therefore not an accident, not a result of an absent Palestinian ‘partner for peace’, and not evidence of the need for more of the same aid and peacebuilding spending.

Furthermore, this research has also drawn attention to the way that the LPA understands and frames violence in the region. In doing so, it has illuminated the need to “expand our political vocabulary for thinking about violence and the resistance to violence” (Butler, 2021, p. 23). These findings have led me to argue for the need to adopt a more unbiased understanding of violence. This critique does not stop here. As Israeli historian Pappé (2017) reminds us, only an “unbiased understanding of the past offers the possibility of peace. The distortion or manipulation of history, in contrast, will only sow disaster” (p. i). Therefore, without an unbiased understanding of violence, as well as the historical roots of the conflict, the LPA risks continuing to protect ‘a regime of colonization and occupation’ (ibid).

In teasing out the Orientalist narratives and frameworks embedded within the LPA in Palestine, this dissertation has provided tangible fodder to the argument that Western liberal peace discourses often do not fit well with local contexts. Yet, as Verkoren & Van Leeuwen (2013) have argued, “intervening actors nonetheless have largely been unable to let go of these discourses and their accompanying intervention models” (p. 160). In addition to providing an illustrative example supporting the claim that Western ‘intervening actors have largely been unable to let go of these discourses’, findings of this research have also lent insight into why this may be the case.

While liberal peacebuilding actors are implicated in constructing and perpetuating biased and problematic discourses and narratives related to Palestinians and the conflict, they remain largely unaware of the way that Orientalism has operated in shaping their understanding of the context, as well as the subsequent policies and practice emerging from these assumptions. We speak about the impact and importance of interrogating our worldviews and positionality through a self-reflective practice in social science research, but rarely do these practices make their ways into policy making circles in donor countries and multilateral organizations. As this research has demonstrated, this lack of reflexivity is detrimental to the effectiveness of liberal peacebuilding writ large.

Certainly, peacebuilding policy and practice has evolved away from top-down formulaic prescriptions to see ‘the local’ as something integral to successful peacebuilding. As such, there is almost universal rhetorical support for ‘country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility’ in international normative policy documents, as seen in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011). However, this dissertation highlights how the shift in thinking has not translated into ‘country-led and country-owned’ peace. The findings presented in this dissertation reinforce the limitations of peacebuilding and the need for a more responsive strategy to support local initiatives and to more fully tackle the broader systemic barriers to peace. As illustrated through my research, shifts in mainstream liberal peacebuilding thinking have not led to the interrogation of the worldviews, ideology, and epistemological and ontological core of Western donors and peacebuilding actors operating in Palestine. The very knowledge that liberal peacebuilding operates on, a critical and unbiased understanding history, and the unique contemporary social and political power dynamics of the conflict have not been fully interrogated.

While elaborating on some of the internal dynamics of peacebuilding actors is outside of the scope of findings of this dissertation, this research opens up new spaces for considering the core aspects of peacebuilding practice such as a ‘results agenda’ that continue to be shaped by the needs, demands, and vision of donors. Against the backdrop of ‘lessons-learned’ from problematic neoliberal Structural Adjustment Lending and the rise in global goal setting such as the MDGs and SDGs, donors are increasingly focusing on ‘*managing for results*’ (Furubo, 2013; Menon, 2013). This ‘managing for results’ framework forms the basis and is crystalized in the push for results-based management. This focus on measurable results, however, may have adverse effects on international normative commitments such as those committed to ‘context specificity’, ‘addressing root causes of conflict’, and ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are ‘country-led and country-owned’ because the type of epistemic and ontological self-reflection that is required to uncover Orientalist assumptions, destabilizes the very nature of Western interventionism and certainly does not lend itself to a measurable and results-based approach to peacebuilding.

In sum, this research has added a degree of nuance to our understanding of the importance of representation, discourse, and ideology in peacebuilding policy and practice. It has demonstrated the Western centric foundations of peacebuilding efforts in Palestine and provided first-hand accounts of how this functions as an impediment to the creation of just peace.

Nuancing ‘the local’: from local agendas to local actors

While I have just outlined how findings of this research point to the importance of liberal peacebuilding reflecting on, and working to overcome, embedded biases in their discourse, frameworks, and knowledge, this research provides further insights useful in broadening our understandings of peacebuilding praxis. Moving from a discussion of the epistemological and

ontological underpinnings of liberal peacebuilding, to interrogating the concept of ‘the local’ in peacebuilding, my research findings highlighted in Chapter 9 complicate the one-dimensional way that ‘the local’ has been conceived of and raise questions related to the way that engaging the local has been held up as a panacea in peacebuilding. The very exclusion of the perspectives, priorities, and involvement of local actors in liberal peacebuilding led to the ‘the local turn’ in peacebuilding⁴¹, this reorientation drew peacebuilding actors attention to the importance of integrating local agendas, priorities, and actors into peacebuilding interventions. However, this dissertation has shown that despite the local turn, the perspectives, frameworks, and priorities of local actors remain largely sidelined. Instead, *certain* locals are empowered to act within the agendas and frameworks of liberal peacebuilding and Western donors. This results in a distortion of the priorities, knowledge, and values expressed across broader Palestinian society. By illustrating how this has occurred in Palestine, this dissertation functions not only as a cautionary tale of the consequences of this prioritization, it also provides insights useful in redirecting the local turn towards meaningful engagement with local context and local actors. If these lessons are applied in practice, they can help to steer liberal peacebuilding and Western donors away from perpetuating and recreating the very practices that led liberal peacebuilding into crisis and precipitated the local turn in the first place.

Local Actors

Local turn literature has pointed to the need for liberal peacebuilding efforts to more meaningfully engage with the local while ensuring that local actors are at the helm of peacebuilding interventions (this is referred to as local ownership). It is argued that ensuring greater local involvement and

⁴¹ See Chapter 4 Literature Review for a more detailed overview of the local turn.

ownership will lead to more effective peacebuilding outcomes. While certainly an important critique, findings of this research provide empirical nuance to conceptions and assumptions of ‘the local’ that builds on local turn literature. Where my research deviates from mainstream local turn literature is in the way it problematizes the local and rejects the way local actors and engagement tends to be romanticized and homogenized in liberal peacebuilding. I have shown how, at the grassroots and individual level, local actors exercise their critical agency in navigating multiple coexisting structures of oppression. Humanizing local actors as critical agents with their own agendas and sense-making helps to provide color to the often ‘faceless’ local in this literature. Engaging with the local and ensuring that interventions are locally owned is certainly important, but as this research has revealed, asking questions related to unequal power relations that may exist between and within the local (particularly along gendered lines), the degree to which local actors have local legitimacy, and the motivations and interests of individuals need to be considered when striving for local ownership and engaging with local actors.

Further rooting this nuancing of the local to include gender identity, Chapter 10 and 11 has offered a more complicated perspective of the decision making of local actors. By illustrating the importance of power dynamics in driving local actors’ behaviour and decision making around engagement in resistance, my research findings elucidate Foucault’s (1978) contention that, “resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (p. 95). Those resisting oppression and fighting for political justice and equality, may also be the site of oppression themselves. This insight is important to both resistance studies, but also to peacebuilding.

While local actors may be engaging in peacebuilding at the community level, they may simultaneously also be perpetuating inequality and oppression in their personal lives. This is a

useful reminder to scholars, policy makers, and practitioners guilty of painting ‘the local’ in one broad, often romanticized brush. The local is made up of agents making choices based on their own unique circumstances and sense making. This means that while my research participants may very well be deeply committed to Palestinian national liberation and building a peaceful future for themselves and their families, they are also looking out for their own self-interest. To assume otherwise, would be an act of dehumanization.

In addition to considerations of local gendered power dynamics, this dissertation has also brought up important insights related to the nexus of local actors, legitimacy, and liberal peacebuilding. In doing so, it brings new empirical evidence to literature on NGO-ization which cautions that as CSOs/NGOs become increasingly tied to donors’ agendas and funding, they lose local legitimacy. My research extends current insights around NGO-ization which tend to have a narrow focus on professional NGOs, to understand the process of NGO-ization for individual activists (Dana, 2013). It highlights the contradiction between what breeds legitimacy at the local level (engagement in resistance and the sacrifice and suffering that goes along with it), and the international community’s discourses related to civil society and local actors (representative, egalitarian, and nonviolent). While civil society may be romanticized as being inclusive, nonpartisan, and nonviolent by the LPA—with CSOs/NGOs being selected and supported based on these criteria—there is a contradiction in so far as the LPA also wants CSOs/NGOs to be locally ‘rooted’ in, and genuinely representative of, the society in which they are operating (Verkoren & Van Leeuwen, 2013, p. 163). However, my research findings draw attention to research participants’ perceived loss of legitimacy in their communities resulting from their engagement with the LPA (jealousy, lack of trust, accusations of corruption, being framed as ‘sellouts’ etc.). This is further exacerbated by the pressure to renounce the very acts that gained them legitimacy in their communities

(engagement in armed resistance), in order to benefit from the support of the LPA. My findings therefore add empirical support to Verkoren & Van Leeuwen's (2013) assertion that,

these two criteria – upholding ‘global’ values, and local rootedness – in reality are often at odds with each other... groups that are most deeply rooted, completely trusted, and experienced as legitimate on the ground, are often not the same as those most in step with Western norms (p. 163, 164).

Local Context

I have outlined contributions of this research to the broader peacebuilding literature related to the local turn, I will now draw attention to the ways in which this research provides a tangible case study illuminating the short coming of liberal peacebuilding related to the integration of local context into peacebuilding praxis. Importantly, this section also foregrounds potential consequences and dangers of failing to integrate an unbiased understanding of context into peacebuilding efforts.

Spray painted onto the separation wall running through Bethlehem is the 1962 John F. Kennedy quote, *‘those who make peaceful revolution impossible, will make violent revolution inevitable’*. I often reflected on this throughout my time in Palestine. What is peaceful revolution, and how does one support it? Moreover, how does one make it ‘impossible’ as the quotes suggests? We know from resistance studies as well as the work of post-structuralists such as Foucault (1978), that ‘where there is power, there is resistance’. In other words, where there is oppression, there will inevitably be resistance to this oppression. We can extrapolate from this that in the absence of meaningful change in Palestine resulting in the guarantee of equality, freedom, and independence, resistance will remain an inevitable social force in the region. While at the moment this resistance activism is predominantly unarmed, going back to the words of Abu Mohammed from Bil’in,

‘resistance is like seasons’, it is always changing. His assertion was not a threat, but rather it highlights the inevitability that Palestinian resistance ebbs and flows, takes on shapes, forms, and tactics depending on the material and ideological support available at a given time. The existence of Palestinian resistance is intimately tied to the context of occupation and settler colonialism. One cannot understand the peacebuilding milieu in Palestine without understanding resistance: its tactics, its goals, its discourse, and ultimately its role in shaping civil society, politics and even the economy. So long as Palestinians remain under occupation and blockade, as Chapter 6 illustrated, they will resist. This resistance is woven into the very fabric of Palestinian society. It is unique, context-specific, and is inseparable from building peace.

If Western peacebuilding efforts endeavor to contribute to alleviating suffering, oppression, inequality, and violence in the region, supporting ‘peaceful revolution’ is a must. Whether we use the lexicon of peaceful revolution, unarmed resistance, or peacebuilding, the lesson remains unchanged; while Palestinians may have different visions of the exact steps towards peace, at the most fundamental level, an end to the occupation and ongoing Israeli settler colonial dispossession is at the core of Palestinians agendas. Therefore, until this is achieved, Palestinians will continue to engage in resistance against this oppression. Achieving an end to the occupation and dispossession however, requires structural upheaval, not *apolitical* Band-Aid solutions that work within the current framework of ongoing settler-colonialism. It is here, I believe, that my research findings contribute important insights for peacebuilding praxis. In order for peacebuilding to contribute to peace, it must align itself with the context. Once this is done, it will become painfully evident that eliminating the structural forms of oppression, in addition to empowering individuals to be agents of peace in their lives and in their larger communities, is key to building peace.

In short, the international community⁴² has a choice to make. Peace in the region will not be achieved without structural change. If the international community hopes to have a say in how this structural change comes about, there needs to be support for activism (and donor policy) that targets structural change in order to make meaningful shifts to the status quo. If the LPA continue to overlook this, they open up space for alternative support to gain traction and influence.

It is worth pausing to think, by failing to address the context of settler-colonialism, declawing unarmed resistance, and thwarting the agendas of those aiming to build a future state without the use of arms, is the liberal peace paradigm making peaceful revolution impossible? As the events in March/April 2022 have illustrated, when Western actors cannot, or will not provide an avenue for fighting oppression and dispossession, frustrations do not wane. Moreover, as the hopes of a two-state solution leading to freedom for Palestinians evaporate, individuals desire to fight inequality in the hopes of achieving freedom from oppression do not. Therefore, the inability of liberal peacebuilding to build peace and instead remain ‘stalled between war and peace’ (Stokke et al., 2022), is dangerous: it undermines all parties’ long-term interests, and it therefore should not be ignored.

Structure-orientated versus agency-orientated approach to peacebuilding

Of particular importance to the field of peacebuilding, and the corpus of knowledge comprising the field of critical peacebuilding literature, this dissertation has brought a structure and agency analysis to our understanding of the perspectives of Palestinian men as they navigate the meeting

⁴² In Chapter 7 I defined the ‘international community’ in relation to Western peacebuilding efforts as the group of states and multilateral organizations working towards a two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders. This includes countries and actors such as: US, Canada, Japan, the Nordic states Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland, and European Union member states such as France, Germany, the UK, Spain, and The Netherlands, (Atallah, 2021, p. 83), but also INGOs, the UN, IFIs, etc.

of unarmed resistance and peacebuilding. The unique insights that this analysis has brought to light draw attention to the need for peacebuilding interventions to address the structural drivers of conflict and insecurity in peacebuilding settings. These accounts demonstrate the need to shift peacebuilding policy and praxis from almost exclusively being focused on agential change, towards an approach that targets structural change in conflict and post-conflict settings.

This dissertation has argued that liberal peacebuilding is unapologetically agency-centred at the expense of consideration for local structures of power. By this I mean that current approaches to liberal peacebuilding tend to *support* and *empower* local actors to actualize the agendas of the LPA as seen in Chapter 9, rather than their own agendas which in their own diverse ways, centre on structural change towards the goal of Palestinian national liberation and self-determination. In this way, local actors adopt and practice nonviolence as defined by the LPA; they meet with Israelis and build connections; they are taught about democracy, rule of law, and the importance of education; and they are encouraged to develop their entrepreneurial ideas, and to gain the skills necessary to join the work force. In short, the burden of building a thriving, secure, and peaceful society is placed on their shoulders, without simultaneous targeted interventions being directed towards eliminating the larger structural forces and barriers that render agency-centred interventions ineffectual in isolation. Local actors' ability to build a thriving, secure, and peaceful society however, is further thwarted through the process of the NGO-ization of CSOs/NGOs (and activists) historically involved in resistance. As outlined in Chapter 7 and 9, as this activism is increasingly co-opted into the agendas of the LPA, the resistance movement is divided and depoliticized, thus rendering it weaker.

As Musolf (2018) reminds us, “working on transforming values, attitudes, motivation, and morale at the individual level, while achievable, is precarious, far less effective, systemic, and radical than dismantling social arrangements that cause maladaptive cultures to arise and socially reproduce” (p. 15-16). What this research therefore contributes to is a critique of peacebuilding in Palestine. In its wider application however, it also demonstrates that in order for peacebuilding interventions to contribute to building peace, there is a need for a balanced approach which includes addressing the macro context-specific structures alongside micro interpersonal agency-orientated interventions.

In sum, if actors within the LPA were to react to and integrate the critiques articulated throughout this dissertation, it would first require donors and policymakers to interrogate epistemological and ontological assumptions embedded within their understanding of a specific context. This includes unpacking and critically engaging with renditions of the history of a region; the root causes of oppression, violence, fragility, and conflict; and the agendas, priorities, and knowledge of local actors and parties to a conflict. In the case of Palestine, this would inevitably lead to a more balanced and locally grounded understanding of the conflict which would first and foremost point to the occupation, blockade, annexation, dispossession, settlement expansion, and siege as primary drivers of the conflict, insecurity, and oppression in the region. It would also highlight the inefficient, corrupt, undemocratic, and damaging effects of the Palestinian Authority. From this more balanced reading of the conflict, its history, and the structural impediments to peace, it would be apparent that peacebuilding efforts need to go beyond technocratic and agency-centred approaches, to address the complex political contexts in which conflict takes place.

Finding a balance between structure and agency in conceiving of peacebuilding interventions can help to transform Western peacebuilding efforts towards being more meaningfully grounded in the local context, local knowledge, and local frameworks. Doing so would better equip international peacebuilding actors with the tools and knowledge necessary to identify and address root causes and drivers of conflict, insecurity, and violence in a given region. This would therefore lead to better policy and praxis that can begin to dismantle power imbalances on a structural level, as well as on an interpersonal level.

Resistance Studies

This research contributes to the field of resistance studies by drawing attention to the way that multiple concurrent practices of resistance evolve and interact. The field of resistance studies is predicated on the knowledge that resistance is an inherent reaction to relations of unequal power. In the literature on resistance this has resulted in a great number of diverse studies highlighting resistance to a broad range of power relations, operating on many different levels from interpersonal, cultural, institutional, and global. If resistance is inherent in relations of power, then we can assume that resistance is not a one-dimensional act as power relations are multiple and imbricating in any given context. Despite this, there are very few examples of empirical research that bring to light multiple exercises of power and thus of resistance happening concurrently.

This dissertation contributes to advancing our understanding of resistance by weaving a detailed narrative of research participants' experiences resisting the multiple operations of power they face including—but not limited to—the omnipresent occupation and settler colonial dispossession. As this dissertation unfolded, what came to light through this narration, was the presence of multiple layers of resistance that overlapped, yet responded to different power relations. Outside of the first

layer of resisting the occupation and settler colonial practices, my research uncovered a second layer of resistance where research participants engage with the LPA not solely as a means of resisting the occupation, but as a way of resisting global Orientalist narratives about Palestine and Palestinians. They used the LPA to (re)narrate their story, to show the world another face as illustrated in Chapter 10. While all research participants certainly articulated an understanding and intentionality related to the power of engaging with the LPA in order to change global images of Palestinians and to humanize them (thus winning ‘hearts and minds’), a subset of my research participants simultaneously engaged in a third layer of resistance by resisting aspects of the patronage between Western donors and recipients by rejecting certain frameworks and discourses related to their resistance (labeling throwing stones as ‘violent resistance’ for example). Some research participants such as Bassem (introduced in Chapter 8) engaged with the LPA, yet refused to denounce stone throwing, instead insisting that it was integral to his culture and cannot be labeled as violent resistance. While others such as Izzat (in Chapter 10) as well as many others, switched back and forth between hidden transcripts and public transcripts when it came to the topic of stone throwing. Lastly, a fourth layer of resistance was uncovered through the research process and this relates to gender identity. By highlighting the experiences of men who have shifted from armed to unarmed resistance, my research brought to light the way that by engaging in unarmed resistance, research participants resisted certain cultural expectations of Palestinian men related to the nature and tactics of resistance. This is highlighted by a male research participant from Jenin Camp when he reflected on his friend who remains in armed resistance, saying “he is just a victim of how the culture and the people want him to be”.

In short, this dissertation introduces an empirical investigation into what I am calling, ‘resistance within resistance’. Seeking out resistance within resistance in contexts outside of Palestine, could

help other studies of resistance to uncover the multiple and overlapping power dynamics of their area of study. This would inevitably add a deeper understanding to operations of power in complex and sensitive contexts.

Masculinities

The final contribution to existing knowledge that I will outline relates to the field of men and masculinities studies, particularly where this field engages with conflict and peacebuilding. Firstly, while scholarly explorations around men and masculinities in post-conflict, transitional justice, and peacebuilding has grown in recent decades, the majority of this empirical exploration remains Western centric (Hamber, 2016). Therefore, while my research benefits from the insights of previous studies, and borrows extensively from this knowledge, it nevertheless contributes a rare ethnographic account of non-Western masculinities in a peacebuilding setting. More specifically, this research contributes to understandings around masculinities in the Middle East in general, and Palestine in particular. When notions of masculinity are considered in literature on the Middle East, it is most often in relation to violence, misogyny, or terrorism. This has led Khalili (2013) to lament that the study of violence in the Middle East is part of a, “hysterical mainstream narrative [which] locates the source of violence in or emanating from the region in Islam(ism) or attributes it to some half-baked but remarkably persistent cultural explanation... which uncomfortably echo the racism of an earlier scholarly era” (p. 791). Given the preoccupation with explorations around masculinities and violence in the Middle East, by offering an in-depth exploration into non-Western men and masculinities that does *not* centre on violence, misogyny, or terrorism this research is in and of itself, a contribution that expands the literature to explore the ways that men and masculinities resist oppression and engage in resistance without the use of arms.

In his 2016 article, Hamber (2016) concluded by highlighting the need for future explorations of masculinities in transitional justice and peacebuilding contexts to explore ruptures between hegemonic and new masculinities (p. 25). This call has been echoed by other scholars who identify the need to understand how masculinities change, shift, and evolve, particularly in conflict and post-conflict (Cahn & Ní Aoláin, 2010). In Chapter 10 and 11, this research adds to the field of masculinities studies by examining the shifting gendered expectations, narratives, and avenues of power as understood by Palestinian men in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. It also adds empirical insights around masculinities in everyday peacebuilding settings as opposed to focusing on formal institutionalized masculinities in armies, as soldiers, or as peacekeepers.

While building on the field of men and masculinities, this research does so from within a critical feminist theoretical standpoint, thus bringing feminist insights (and commitments and sensitivities related to seeking out unequal power relations) to the field of men and masculinities studies. In engaging with women in regard to their insights and perspectives around men and masculinities, this research grounds its analysis not only on men in relations to other men, but also broadens this to conceive of masculinities in relation to broader shifts (or lack therefore) in gender relations between men and women. In doing so, it adds contextual examples of the process of “the remaking of gender and sexual inequality in new and ever more insidious forms” (O’Neill, 2015, p. 115). It is these feminist insights that have made this research’s contributions to the field, evermore poignant.

Limitations of Research and Future Empirical Studies

Despite months of full-time immersion Arabic lessons upon arrival in Ramallah, previous field work in the region, including living with a Palestinian family for 2 months, my Arabic was not at

a level of fluency that granted access to the nuanced and rich conversations that were going on around me on a daily basis, as well as in interview settings. While I would often catch parts of conversations and be able to ask follow-up questions, there is no doubt that a great deal was lost due both to the speed (or lack thereof) of my comprehension, and in any translation that occurred. While my interpreters were wonderful, through their summaries and even verbatim translations, they too presented another layer of analysis to research participants responses. This therefore presents a limitation to this research and its findings. I tried to mitigate this challenge through the ongoing data collection process by interviewing diverse actors in both English and Arabic; through checking in with knowledge experts such as key informants; sharing my evolving understanding and thinking with Palestinian historians and academics; through discussions with interpreters between interviews, and during interviews and participants observation, I would repetitively (re)articulate my understanding of conversations with those involved to double check that I understood correctly.

Another limitation relates to my sample. I did not include the perspectives of international ‘peacebuilders’, those international actors engaged in the implementation of peacebuilding projects in the region, or representatives of foreign donors in my sample. While I did this by choice, as I wanted to highlight the perspectives of Palestinians related to their engagement in unarmed resistance and the way it connected to the peace that was being built—or not—in their communities, it nevertheless meant that my analysis often rested on the ‘boogieman’ of liberal peacebuilding actors, without including their perspectives. So, while I may have decided that the perspectives of international peacebuilding actors were not integral to addressing my research questions during the design stage of this research, I recognize that their perspectives may have provided a broader set of insights. However, limiting the focus allowed me to understand a

particular vantage point, a certain set of ideas, and a rich analysis of the experiences of the local by/from the local. Similarly, the research focused specifically on men involved in unarmed resistance as that was the focus of this empirical research with a small sample of women. Additional research that focuses explicitly on the experiences of women is also a valuable angle for subsequent research. Therefore, future research could use the insights gained of the Palestinian-specific and male-specific resistance experiences and compare that to findings with/from international actors and/or women involved in resistance to further broaden and advance the scholarship.

Notwithstanding the important contributions this dissertation has made towards broadening our understandings of encounters between Western peacebuilding efforts and local actors, as well as the constructions and adaptations of masculinities in these contexts, the adage still holds; ‘the more you know, the less you know’. Therefore, in answering my research questions, further areas requiring exploration were uncovered and gaps in analysis and data emerged which require further research in order to build on this knowledge.

The focus on the local in this study is limited by the sample chosen for this empirical study. There are other ways that the local is constituted and reconstituted depending on the actors engaged in the data collection process. As outlined in the literature review, peacebuilding literature has begun to problematize the concept of ‘the local’. This dissertation contributes to this critical line of inquiry by raising questions around whose interests ‘the local’ are serving in Palestine. It has destabilized simplistic and dehumanizing assumptions related to men’s engagement in unarmed resistance by bringing to light the diverse and very human motivations and dynamics that emerge in the meeting of my research participants and the liberal peace architecture. What became evident,

but I did not directly address in this dissertation, is the way that age, religion, and/or class etc. may play into men's critical agency and thus their engagement in unarmed resistance. By bringing to light other variables and structures governing individuals' lives, we could engage in a much deeper structure and agency analysis of men's behaviour vis-à-vis the local in peacebuilding. Therefore, applying a more *intersectional* analysis to the question of 'why Palestinian men engage in unarmed resistance' and how various identity markers shape men's engagement both in terms of resistance, but also in relation to their engagement with the LPA, would be a valuable area of future research.

Secondly, due to the scope of this research, I limited my focus to masculinities in Palestine. However, in doing so, I believe this resulted in an analytical blind spot in relation to the *macro*-contextual forces at play in the making—and unmaking—of hegemonic masculinities amongst research participants. The elephant in the room in regard to understanding hierarchy, gender identity, power, etc., is that inquiries into these areas should also address the role that Israeli masculinities in the Israeli Defense Forces play in shaping masculinities in Palestine. As soldiers that serve in the West Bank, interact with Palestinian civilians on a daily basis in their homes, streets, and communities, Israeli hegemonic and militarized masculinities come face to face with Palestinian civilians and inevitably, these interactions which are governed by immense power disparities, have an impact on masculinities in Palestine. Turning an analytical line of questioning towards the relationship between Israeli masculinities in the making and shaping of Palestinian masculinities has the potential to provide poignant insights into the effects of settler colonialism, occupation, oppression, and conflict on gender identity.

Furthermore, building off of the fascinating work of Sharon Sharoni, who explores the connection between militarized masculinities in Israel and gender based violence (GBV), I believe extending

a similar research focus to understanding the nexus of shifting notions of masculinity in Palestine (by way of the adoptions of unarmed/nonviolent resistance) and the subsequent impact on GBV in Palestine would help to provide a more holistic understanding of the meaning/interpretation/manifestation of ‘nonviolence’ in the broader context of men’s lives. Asking questions such as, is there a connection between a commitment to nonviolence as part of resistance and/or peacebuilding efforts and nonviolence in the home, could offer insight around the degree to which a public commitment to unarmed resistance bleeds into private life, and thus nuanced conversations related to the relationship between hegemonic masculinities, power, and violence.

Conclusion

In laying out my understanding and use of Orientalism in Chapter 8, I argued that Israel has been subsumed into the category of ‘the West’. Put simply, I outline how Israel is largely seen to belong to ‘us’ (Western liberal democracies), while Palestinians find themselves in the category of ‘them’ (backwards/Arab/Other). As I wrap up this dissertation, I want to make a clarification in regard to this categorization. In putting forward this explanation and way of understanding the ideological alignment between Israel and the West, I do not mean to suggest that the LPA is working on behalf of Israel, nor that it is in alliance with Israeli policy makers as part of some plan to undermine Palestinian right to self-determination (an all too common anti-Semitic conspiracy theory). The fact that the LPA has aligned itself with colonial narratives and frameworks, some of which also shared by Israel, is a function of these narratives being deeply rooted in the foundation, establishment, and history of countries making up ‘the West’. And while Israel certainly capitalizes on this, as seen in the example of pinkwashing and Brand Israel in Chapter 8, the West is just as much—if not more—to blame from this alignment.

With that said, the LPA's failure to 'build peace' in the 29 years since the Oslo Accords and the outset of the Middle East Peace Process, has important and detrimental implications for all actors. On the one hand, the status quo is buying time for Israel to establish 'facts on the ground' in the form of expanded settlements and population transfer to occupied and annexed Palestinian land; arguably making peace ever more unlikely. It has been argued that the longer the illusion of a two-state solution and subsequent investments in ineffectual peacebuilding efforts continue, the more it serves Israel's short term territorial interests. For example, the former Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon (2021), recently argued that through perpetuating the status quo, Israel demonstrates an "intent to maintain its structural domination and oppression of the Palestinian people through indefinite occupation" (n.p).

On the other hand, however, I would argue that perpetuating the status quo undermines *all parties'* best interests, including Israel's. Israel's security will forever be compromised in the absence of a just peace. According to Palestinians, a just peace requires an independent state for Palestinians. Building on this argument, Atallah (2021) explains, for Israelis, a Palestinian state is a "key factor in safeguarding Israel from impending demographic and security burdens while preserving its 'democratic and Jewish' character" (p. 89). Therefore, by perpetuating a context in which Israel further entrenches its settlement expansion and population transfer to Palestinian land—thus making the prospect of a future Palestinian state less likely by the day—liberal peacebuilding's maintenance of the status quo is thwarting the objectives of *everyone* involved. Firstly, the LPA is serving to undermine its own objectives of establishing a 'just, lasting and comprehensive peace'; secondly, it is thwarting Palestinians right to self-determination; and thirdly, it is compromising Israel's security concerns and threatening their international standing.

For reasons outside of moral and philosophical importance, international actors should take note of these findings and ask themselves important questions about what sort of peace is being built and according to whom. There is a tangible danger if the LPA continues to disregard Palestinian frameworks of unarmed resistance and peacebuilding. The ‘peace’ that the LPA is currently aiming to build is “an unsatisfactory peace that contains the seeds for future armed conflict” (Keen, 2009, pp. 23-24).

While I and others such as Pappé (2017) have argued, “the policies of disinformation and distortion continue to the present and play an important part in perpetuating the conflict” (p. i), this is not to suggest that there is a clear aggressor/victim dichotomy present. Corruption, spoilers, self-interest, and violent ideologies certainly exist on both sides. But as this dissertation has made clear, in the absence of an ever-expanding settler colonial project, the so-called conflict would look very different. This needs to be made explicit. Peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development interventions which circumnavigate—rather than work to eliminate—the structures and political realities of ongoing dispossession, occupation, blockade, and annexation do not help to build a just peace. At best, they support marginal gains that can benefit a few, dividing and weakening the resistance and ultimately, they have contributed to the evasion of a just and lasting peace.

REFERENCES

- Abdo, N. (1991). Women in the Intifada: gender, class and national liberation, *Race and Class*, 32, 19-34.
- Abdo, N. (2014). *Captive Revolution Palestinian women's anti colonial struggle within the Israeli prison system*. London: Pluto Press
- Abu-Assab, N., Nasser-Eddin, N. & Seghaier, R. (2020). Activism and the economy of victimhood: a close look into NGOization in Arabic-speaking countries, *interventions*, 22(4), 481-497.
- Abrahams, A. (2020). Monopolization of violence in the Palestinian struggle, *Defense and Peace Economics*, 31(8), 892-903.
- Abu-Laban, Y. & Bakan, A. (2008). The racial contract: Israel/Palestine and Canada, *Social Identities*, 14(5), 637–660.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (1990). The romance of resistance: tracing transformations of power through Bedouin women, *American Ethnographer*, 17(1), 41-55.
- Abu-Nimer, M. (1999). *Dialogue, conflict resolution, and change: Arab-Jewish encounters in Israel*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Abu-Zahra, N. & Kay, (2013). *Unfree in Palestine: registration, documentation and movement restriction*. London: Pluto Press.
- Abu-Zahra, N., Leech, P., & MacNeil, L. (2016). Emancipation versus desecuritization: resistance and the Israeli wall in Palestine, *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 31(3), 381–394.
- Abusalim, J. (2018). The great march of return: an organizer's perspective, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 47(4), 90-100.
- ADDAMEER. (2013). General briefing: Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons. Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association.
https://www.addameer.org/advocacy/brbobiefings_papers/general-briefing-palestinian-political-prisoners-israeli-prisons-0
- Addameer- Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association. (April 2022). *Statistics*,
<https://www.addameer.org/statistics>
- Alghamdi, S. (2020) Orientalism and its challenges: feminist critiques of Orientalist knowledge production, PhD Dissertation, York University.

- Allabadi, F. (2008). Controversy: Secular and Islamist women in Palestinian society, *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 15(3), 181-201.
- Allan, J. (2017). Activist ethics: the need for a nuanced approach to resistance studies field research, *Journal of Resistance Studies*, 11(2), 89-121.
- Alloun, E. (2020). Veganwashing Israel's dirty laundry? animal politics and nationalism in Palestine-Israel, *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 41(1), 24-41.
- Alazzeah, A. (2012). Non-violent popular resistance in the West Bank: the case of the popular struggle committees, *International Institute for Nonviolent Action*, Birzeit University.
- Allen, L. (2013). *The rise and fall of human rights: cynicism and politics in occupied Palestine*. Stanford University Press
- Alvarez, S. (1999). Advocating feminism: the Latin American NGO boom, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 1(2), 181-209
- Alvarez, S. (2009). Beyond NGO-ization?: reflections from Latin America, *Development*, 52, 175-184.
- Amnesty International. (2016). *Amnesty International Report 2015/16 - Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories*. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/56d05b486.html>
- Amnesty International. (2018). Israel: Arms embargo needed as military unlawfully kills and maims Gaza protesters. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/04/israel-arms-embargo-needed-as-military-unlawfully-kills-and-maims-gaza-protesters/>
- Amnesty International. (2022). Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: A Cruel System of Domination and a Crime Against Humanity. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/>
- Anderlini, S. N. (2007). *Women building peace: what they do, why it matters*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Archana, Y. (2019). Oppression and resistance: an analysis of conflict and violence through the shift in Naxal movement of Bihar, India, *Contemporary Voice of Dalit*, 11(2), 172-181.
- Aruri, N. (1981). The earlier palestinian resistance: Arab politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The frustration of a nationalist movement. Ann Mosely Lesch, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 10(4), 113-117.
- Ashcroft, B. (2004). Representation and its discontents: Orientalism, Islam and Palestinian crisis, *Religion*, 34, 113-121

- Aslam, M. (2012). *Gender-based explosions: The nexus between Muslim masculinities, jihadist Islamism and terrorism*. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Ashcraft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (2013). *Post-colonial studies: The key concepts*. London: Routledge.
- Atallah, M. (2021). The international community's role and impact on the Middle East Peace Process, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 27(1), 81-97.
- Atia, M. & Herold, C. (2018). Governing through patronage: the rise of NGOs and the fall of civil society in Palestine and Morocco, *Voluntas*, 29, 1044-1054.
- Atran, S. (1990). Stones against the Iron Fist, terror within the nation: alternating structures of violence and cultural identity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, *Politics & Society*, 18(4), 481-526.
- Autesserre, S. (2014). *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Awashra, R., & Awashreh, M. (2012). Accountability: a lingering dilemma for Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), *International NGO Journal*, 7(4), 64-72.
- Baaz, Lilja, Schulz & Vinthagen, (2016). Defining and analyzing "resistance": Possible entrances to the study and subversive practices, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 4(16) 137-153.
- Badarin, E. (2017). Palestine: A protracted peacebuilding process, *Conflict and Security: Advances in Research*, 3, 227-245.
- Bahdi, R. & Kassis, M. (2016). Decolonisation, dignity and development aid: a judicial education experience in Palestine, *Third World Quarterly*, 37(11), 2010-2027.
- Bailey, P. (2014) Hunger strike: still an effective mode of resistance for Palestinian prisoners? *Washington Report on Middles East Affairs*, 33(3).
- Banko, L. (2012). Occupational hazards, revisited: Palestinian historiography, *The Middle East Journal*, 66(3), 440-452.
- Bannon, I., & Correia, M. (2006). *The other half of gender: Men's issues in development*. Washington: World Bank.
- Barber, T. (2015). Performing 'Oriental' masculinities: embodied identities among Vietnamese men in London, *Gender, Place and Culture*, 22(3), 440-455.
- Barbosa, G. (2022). *The best of hard times: Palestinian refugee masculinities in Lebanon*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

- Bargu, B. (2015). *Starve and immolate: The politics of human weapons*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., & Sitea, L. (2007). Peacebuilding: What is in a name?, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 13(1), 35-58.
- Bartal, S. (2017). Lone-wolf or terror organization members acting alone: new look at the last Israeli-Palestine incidents, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 53(2), 211-228.
- Batliwala, S. (2008). *The Power of movement: Clarifying our concepts, in changing their world: Concepts and practices of women's movement*, Toronto, CapeTown, Mexico: AWID.
- Bayoumi, M. & Rubin, A. (2000). *The Edward Said reader*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Boycott Divestment Sanctions Movement (2021, March 8). What is BDS? BDS. <https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds>
- Beauvoir, S. (1949). *The second sex*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Bebbington, A. & Riddell, R. (1995) The direct funding of Southern NGOs by Northern donors: new agendas and old problems, *Journal for International Development*, 7(6), 879-893.
- Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. (2004). Introduction: thinking anew about peace operations, *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), 1-15.
- Belloni R (2012) Hybrid peace governance: Its emergence and significance, *Global Governance* 18(1), 21-38
- Bentz, V. & Shapiro, J. (1998). *Mindful inquiry in social research*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Bhungalia, L. (2020). Laughing at power: Humor, transgression, and the politics of refusal in Palestine, *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 38(3), 387-404.
- Bibbings, L. (2003). Conscientious objectors in the Great War: the consequences of rejecting military masculinities, In P. Higate (Ed.) *Military masculinities: Identity and the state*. Westport: Praeger.
- Björkdahl, A. & Selimovic, J. (2015). Translating UNSCR 1325 from the global to the national: protection, representation and participation in the National Action Plans of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 15(4), 311-335.
- Bob, C. (2005). *The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V. (2006) Peace on whose terms? War veterans' associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In E. Newman & O. Richmond (Eds.), *Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing spoilers during conflict resolution*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Brand-Jacobsen, K. (n.d). *Palestine and Israel: Improving civil society peacebuilding strategies, design, and impact*, Departamento de Operaciones de Paz (DPO) – PATRIR.
- Bridges, T., & Pascoe, C. (2014). Hybrid masculinities: new directions in the sociology of men and masculinities, *Sociology Compass*, 8(3), 246-258.
- Britzman, D. (1995). "The question of belief": writing poststructural ethnography, *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 8(3), 229–238.
- Bröning, M. (2011). *The politics of change in Palestine: state-building and non-violent resistance*. London: Pluto Press.
- Brown, N. (2003). *Palestinian politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine*. Berkeley: University of California Press
- Browne, B. (2021). Disrupting settler-colonialism or enforcing the liberal 'peace'? transitional (in)justice in Palestine-Israel, *Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies*, 20(1), 1–27.
- Brym, & Araj, B. (2006). Suicide bombing as strategy and interaction: the case of the Second Intifada, *Social Forces*, 84(4), 1969–1986.
- Brynen, R. (2000). *A very political economy: peacebuilding and foreign aid in the West Bank and Gaza*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- B'Tselem. (2020). Shoot and abandon: 155 amputees and 27 paralyzed in two years: how Israel punished those who dare protest the siege on the Gaza Strip. *B'Tselem- The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories*.
https://www.btselem.org/firearms/20200130_shoot_and_abandon_in_gaza_155_amputees_and_27_paralyzed_in_two_years_of_protests
- B'Tselem. (2021). A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This is Apartheid.
https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publications/202101_this_is_apartheid_eng.pdf
- B'Tselem. (2021, March 8). Fatalities during Operation Cast Lead. B'Tselem.
<https://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/during-cast-lead/by-date-of-event>
- Busbridge, R. (2013). Performing colonial sovereignty and the Israeli "separation" wall, *Social Identities*, 19(5), 653–669.

- Buschmeyer, A. (2013). The construction of 'alternative masculinity' among men in the childcare profession, *International Review of Sociology*, 23(2), 290-309.
- Butler, J. (1988). Performative acts and gender constitution: an essay in phenomenology and feminist theory, *Theatre Journal*, 40(4), 519-531.
- Butler, J. (1990). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Butler, J. (1993). *Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of 'sex'*. New York: Routledge
- Butler, J. (1994). *Gender as performance: an interview with Judith Butler*, conducted by Peter Osborne and Lynne Segal, *Radical Philosophy*, 67, 32-9.
- Butler, J. (1997). *The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Butler, J. (2004). *Undoing gender*, New York: Routledge.
- Butler, J. (2016). Rethinking vulnerability and resistance. In J. Butler, Z. Gambetti, & L. Sabsay, (Eds.), *Vulnerability in Resistance*. Duke University Press.
- Butler, J. (2021). *The force of nonviolence: an ethico-political bind*. London: Verso.
- Cahn, N., & Ni Aoláin, F. (2010). Gender, masculinities and transition in conflicted societies, *New England Law Review*, 44, 101-123.
- Campbell, S. (2017). Ethics of Research in Conflict Environments, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 2(1), 89–101.
- Carpenter, M. (2018). *Palestinian popular struggle: unarmed and participatory*. London: Routledge.
- Carrigan, Connell & Lee, (1985). Towards a new sociology of masculinity, *Theory and Society*, 14, 551-604.
- Cerezo, Cummings, M., Holmes, M., & Williams, C. (2020). Identity as resistance: identity formation at the intersection of race, gender identity, and sexual orientation, *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 44(1), 67–83.
- Certo, Leigh, J., & Rogstad, A. (2019). Revolution and resistance in world politics, *Millennium*, 47(3), 323–325.
- Chahim, D. & Prakash, A. (2014). NGOization, foreign funding, and the Nicaraguan civil society, *Voluntas*, 25, 487-513.

- Chakraborty, P. (2021). Rethinking NGOization as postfeminist practice: interstitial intimacies and negotiations of neoliberal subjectivity in violence prevention, *Frontiers in Sociology*, 6, 1-14.
- Chakravarty, A. (2012). "Partially trusting" field relationships opportunities and constraints of fieldwork in Rwanda's postconflict setting, *Field Methods*, 24(3), 251-271.
- Challand, B. (2009). *Palestinian Civil society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude*. New York: Routledge.
- Chandler, D. (2015). Resilience and the 'everyday': Beyond the paradox of 'liberal peace', *Review of International Studies* 41(1), 27-48.
- Chandler, D. (2017). *Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1997-2017*. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan
- Chandler, D. (2010). The uncritical critique of "liberal peace." *Review of International Studies*, 36, 137-155.
- Chishti, M. (2020). The pull to the liberal public: gender, orientalism, and peace building in Afghanistan, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 45(3), 581-603.
- Cho, S., Crenshaw, KW. & McCall, L. (2013). Toward a field of intersectional studies: theory, applications, and praxis, *Signs*, 38(4), 785-810.
- Choudry, A. & Kapoor, D. (2013). *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*. London: Zed Books.
- Christensen, A., & Jensen, G. (2014). Combining hegemonic masculinity and intersectionality, *NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity Studies*, 9(1), 60-74.
- Clarno, A. (2016). Hiking in the West Bank, *Contexts*, 14(2), 64-66.
- Coburn, C. (2016). What's policy got to do with it? how the structure-agency debate can illuminate policy implementation, *American Journal of Education*, 122, 465-475.
- Cock, J. (2001). Gun Violence and Masculinity in Contemporary South Africa. In R. Morrell (Ed.), *Changing men in Southern Africa* (pp. 43-55). London: Zed Books.
- Cockburn, C. (2004). The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace. In W. Giles & J. Hyndman (Eds.) *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Cockburn, C. (2007). *From where we stand: war, women's activism and feminist analysis*. London: Zed Books.

- Cockburn, C. (2011). Snagged on the Contradiction: NATO, UNSC Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses. *Contribution to the Working Group on "Feminist Critiques of Militarization"*, No to War – No to NATO Annual Meeting.
http://wloe.org/fileadmin/Files-EN/PDF/no_to_nato/women_nato_2011/NATO1325.pdf
- Cohn, C. & Ruddick, S. (2004). A feminist ethical perspective on weapons of mass destruction. In S. Hashmi, & S. Lee, *Ethics and weapons of mass destruction* (pp. 405–435). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohn, C. (2008). Mainstreaming Gender in UN security policy: a path to political transformation?. In S. Rai, & G. Waylan (Eds.), *Global governance: Feminist perspectives* (pp. 185–206). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cohn, C., & Ruddick, S. (2003). A feminist ethical perspective on weapons of mass destruction, *Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights*.
- Cohn, C., Kinsella, H. & Gibbings, S. (2004). Women, Peace and Security Resolution 1325, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 6(1), 130–140.
- Collins, PH. (1990). *Black feminist thought: knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment*. New York: Routledge
- Connell, R. W & Messerschmidt, J. (2005). Hegemonic masculinity: rethinking the concept, *Gender and Society*, 19, 829–59.
- Connell, R. W. (1987). *Gender and power: society, the person and sexual politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Connell, R. W. (1995). *Masculinities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Connell, R. W. (2000). Arms and the man: Using the new research on masculinity to understand violence and promote peace in the contemporary world. In I. Breines, R. Connell, & I. Eide (Eds.), *Male roles, masculinities and violence: A culture of peace perspective* (pp. 21-33). Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
- Connell, R.W. (2001). Introduction and overview, *Feminism & Psychology*, 11(1), 5-9.
- Connell, R. W. (2002). Masculinities, the reduction of violence, and the pursuit of peace.” In C. Cockburn & D. Zarkov (Eds.), *The post war moment: Militaries, masculinities and international peacekeeping* (pp. 33-40). London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Connell, R.W. (2009). *Gender: In world perspective*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of race and sex: a black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, *Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics*, *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 1(8), 139-167.

- Creswell, (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. New York: Sage Publications.
- Cuklanz, L., & Erol, A. (2021). The shifting image of hegemonic masculinity in contemporary U.S. television series, *International Journal of Communication*, 15, 545–562
- D'Silva, M., Smith, S., Della, L., Potter, D., Rajack-Talley, T. & Best, L. (2016). Reflexivity and positionality in researching African-American communities: lessons from the field, *International Communications Studies*, XXV(1), 95-109.
- Dabashi, H. (2015). *Post-Orientalism: knowledge & power in a time of terror*. London: Routledge.
- Dajani, M. & Baskin, G. (2006). Israeli-Palestinian joint activities: problematic endeavor, but necessary challenge. In E. Kaufman, W. Salem, & J. Verhoeven, *Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (pp. 87–110). Boudler: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Dajani, S. (1995). *Eyes without country: searching for a Palestinian strategy of liberation*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Dana, K. (2017). The West Bank Apartheid/separation wall: space, punishment and the disruption of social continuity, *Geopolitics*, 22(4), 887–910.
- Dana, T. (2013). Palestinian civil society: what went wrong?, *Alshabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network*.
- Dana, T. (2015). The structural transformation of Palestinian civil society: key paradigm shifts, *Middle East Critique*, 24(2), 191-210.
- Dana, K. (2018). Confronting injustice beyond borders: Palestinian identity and nonviolent resistance, *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 6(4), 529-552.
- Dana, T. (2019). Lost in translation: the Palestinian national movement after Oslo. In M. Turner, L. Achilli, & D. Buttu (Eds.), *From the river to the sea: Palestine and Israel in the shadows of peace* (pp 63-94). Washington: Lexington Books.
- Darwīsh, M., & Rigby, A. (2015). *Popular protest in Palestine: the uncertain future of unarmed resistance*. London: Pluto Press.
- Das, V. (2007). *Life and words: violence and the descent into the ordinary*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Davies, C. (1999). *Reflexive Ethnography: A guide to researching selves and other*. Hove: Psychology Press.

- de Alwis, M., Mertus, J. & Sajjad, T. (2013). Women and peace processes. Chapter 8 in C. Cohn *Women and Wars*. London: Routledge.
- De Carvalho, G., De Coning, C., & Connolly, C. (2014). *Creating an enabling peacebuilding environment: how can external actors contribute to resilience?*, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, PBS 028.
- De Haan, A. (2009). *How the aid industry works: an introduction to international development*. Boulder: Kumarian Press.
- de Jong, J. & Aronson, G. (2001). 'The final status maps – a territorial analysis', Report on Israeli Settlement. Washington DC: Foundation for Middle East Peace.
- De La Ray, C., & McKay, S. (2006). Peacebuilding as a gendered process, *Journal of Social Issues*, 62(1), 141-153.
- De Saxe, J. (2012). Conceptualizing critical feminist theory and emancipatory education, *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, 10(2), 182-201.
- DeVault, M., & Gross, G. (2006). Feminist Interviewing: Experience, talk and knowledge. In S. N. Hesse-Biber (Ed.), *Handbook of Feminist Research* (pp. 173-197), Los Angeles: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1988). *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- DeMars, W. E. (2005). *NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics*. Pluto Press.
- Desmond, J. (2013). 'And never the twain shall meet?' considering the legacies of Orientalism and Occidentalism for the transnational study of the US, *Review of International American Studies*, 6(1-2), 31-47.
- Dodge, T. (2021). Afghanistan and the failure of liberal peacebuilding, *Survival*, 63(5), 47–58
- Dolan, C. (2014). Has patriarchy been stealing the feminists' cloths? Conflict-related sexual violence and UN Security Council Resolutions, *IDS Bulletin*, 45(1), 80-84.
- Dolphin, R. (2006). *The West Bank Wall: Unmaking Palestine*. London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
- Donais, T. (2012). *Peacebuilding and local ownership: Post-conflict and consensus-building*. New York: Routledge.
- Dowd, N. E. (2010). *The man question: Male subordination and privilege*. New York: New York University Press

- Dudouet, V. (2008). Nonviolent resistance and conflict transformation in power asymmetries, *Berghof Research Center*.
- Dudouet, V. (2015). Sources, functions and dilemmas of external assistance to civil resistance movements. In K. Schock (Ed.) *Civil Resistance* (pp. 168-199). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Duffield, M. (2001). Governing the borderlands: decoding the power of aid, *Disasters*, 25(4), 308-320.
- Duncanson, C. (2009). Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peacekeeping Operations, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 11, 63–80.
- Duncanson, C. (2013). *Forces for Good? Military Masculinities and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Duncanson, C. (2015). Hegemonic masculinity and the possibility of change in gender relations, *Men and Masculinities*, 18(2), 231-248.
- Dunning, T. (2016). *Hamas, jihad and popular legitimacy: reinterpreting resistance in Palestine*. London: Routledge.
- Duriesmith, D. (2014). Is manhood a causal factor in the shifting nature of war? the case of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 16(2), 236-254.
- Duriesmith, D. (2017). *Masculinity and new war: The gendered dynamics of armed conflict*. London: Routledge.
- Duriesmith, D. (2018). Hybrid warriors and the formation of new war masculinities: a case study of Indonesian foreign fighters, *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 7(1), 1–16,
- Duriesmith, D. (2020). Engaging or changing men? Understandings of masculinity and change in the new 'men, peace and security' agenda, *Peacebuilding*, 8(4), 418-431
- Eisenstein, H. (2005). A dangerous liaison? feminism and corporate globalization, *Science and Society*, 69(3), 487-518.
- Ejdus, F., & Junco, A. (2017). Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding: effectiveness, ownership, and resistance, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 39(1), 4-27.
- Elias, J. & Roberts, A. (2016). Feminist global political economies of the everyday: from bananas to bingo, *Globalizations*, 13(6), 787–800.

- Ellison, J. (2013). Recycled rhetoric: brand Israel "pinkwashing" in historical context, DePaul University, *College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations*.
- Elmessiri, A. (1981). The Palestinian wedding: major themes of contemporary Palestinian resistance poetry, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 10(3), 77–99.
- Enloe, C. (1983). *Does khaki become you? The militarisation of women's lives*. London: Pluto Press.
- England, K. (1994). Getting personal: reflexivity, positionality, and feminist research, *Women in the Field*, 46(1), 80-89.
- Enloe, C. (1993). *The morning after: sexual politics at the end of the Cold War*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Enloe, C. (2007). *Globalization and militarism: feminists make the link*. Washington: Rowan & Littlefield.
- Farah, R. (2006). Palestinian refugees, *Interventions*, 8(2), 228-252.
- Farr, V. (2011). UNSCR 1325 and women's peace activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13(4), 539-556.
- Farsakh, L. (2016) Undermining democracy in Palestine: the politics of international aid since Oslo, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 45(4), 48-63
- Ferguson, K. (1993). *The man question: visions of subjectivity in feminist theory*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Ferguson, K. (2017). Feminist theory today, *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 20, 269-286.
- Fleischmann, E. (2003). *The nation and its 'new' women: the Palestinian women's movement, 1920–1948*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fleischmann, L. (2019). *The Israeli peace movement: Anti-occupation activism and human rights since the Al-Aqsa Intifada*. London: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited.
- Fleischmann, L. (2021). The role of internal third-party interveners in civil resistance campaigns: the case of Israeli-Jewish anti-occupation activists, *Government and Opposition*, 56(1), 184–200.
- Flood, M. (2014). Men's Antiviolence Activism and the Construction of Gender-Equitable Masculinities, In Angels Carabi & Josep Armengol (Eds.), *Alternative Masculinities for a Changing World* (pp. 35-50). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- MacKenzie, M., & Foster, A. (2017). Masculinity nostalgia: How war and occupation inspire a yearning for gender order, *Security Dialogue*, 48(3), 206-223.
- Foster, A. (2011). "*Pulling the tail of the cat*": an exploration of Palestinian peacebuilders' conceptualisations of men and masculinities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Masters Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington.
- Foucault, M. (1982). *The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The archeology of knowledge and the discourse on language*. New York: Pantheon Books
- Foucault, M. (1978). *The history of sexuality. Vol. 1: An introduction*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1979). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. London: Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972–1977*. C. Gordon, Ed., C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, & K. Soper, Trans. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Fraser, N. (2009). Feminism, capitalism and the cunning of history, *New Left Review*, 56, 97-117.
- Freeman-Woolpert, S. (2019). How a radical activist-scholar is shaking up academia. *Waging Nonviolence*. <https://wagingnonviolence.org/rs/2019/08/radical-activist-scholar-resistance-studies/>
- Freire, P. (1970). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York: Continuum.
- Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization*, International Peace Research Institute Oslo; SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Garcia, A. (2010). *Burnout in nonviolent action and its effects on nonviolent movements*, Masters Thesis, University for Peace.
- Gawerc, M. (2006). Peace-building: Theoretical and concrete perspectives, *Peace & Change*, 31(4), 435-478.
- Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ghanem, A. (2010). *Palestinian politics after Arafat: A failed National Movement*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Ghoussoub, M. & Sinclair-Webb, E (Ed.). (2000). *Imagined masculinities: Male identity and culture in the Middle East*. London: Saqi Books.
- Gianni, N., Michele, F. & Lozza, C. (2021). From “liberal” to “liberating” empowerment: The community protection approach as best practice to address NGO-ization, *Civil Society Knowledge Centre, Lebanon Support*, <https://civilsociety-centre.org/pdf-generate/73161>
- Giles, W., & Hyndman, J. (2004). *Sites of violence: Gender and conflict zones*. Los Angeles: University of California.
- Gilgan, M. (2001). The rationality of resistance: Alternatives for engagement in complex emergencies, *Disasters*, 25(1), 1-18.
- Ginat, R. & Bar-Noi. (2007). Tacit support for terrorism: The rapprochement between the USSR and Palestinian guerrilla organizations following the 1967 war, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30(2), 255-284.
- Glavanis-Grantham, K. (1996). The Women's movement, feminism and the national struggle in Palestine: Unresolved contradictions. In H. Afshar (Ed.), *Women and Politics in the Third World* (pp. 171–185). London: Routledge.
- Goldstein, J. (2003). *War and gender: How gender shapes the war system and vice versa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gordon, N. (2002). On visibility and power: an Arendtian corrective of Foucault, *Human Studies*, 25(2), 125–145.
- Gordon, N. (2008). *Israel's occupation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Grinberg, L. (2012). Resistance, politics and violence: The catch of the Palestinian struggle, *Current Sociology*, 61(2), 206-225.
- Groes-Green, C. (2012). Philogynous Masculinities: contextualizing alternative manhood in Mozambique, *Men and Masculinities*, 15(2), 91-111.
- Gutmann MC. (1997). The ethnographic (g)ambit: women and the negotiation of masculinity in Mexico City, *American Ethnologist*, 24(4), 833-855
- Hadawi, S., & Kubursi, A. (1988). *Palestinian rights and losses in 194 : a comprehensive study*. London: Saqi Books.
- Hadawi, S. (1972). *Crime and no punishment: Zionist Israeli terrorism, 1939-1972*. Beirut: Near East Ecumenical Bureau of Information and Interpretation.
- Hadawi, S. (1977). *Arab boycott of Israel: peaceful, defensive and constructive*. Ottawa: Arab League Information Center.

- Hadawi, S. (1981). *The Palestinian: victim of conspiracy (a collection of articles)*. Toronto: The Arab Palestine Association.
- Haddad, T. (2016). *Palestine Ltd. neoliberalism and nationalism in the Occupied Territories*, London: I.B Tauris.
- Haeder, P. (2021). Washing away one trail of tears after another. Weblog post. *Dissident Voice* [BLOG], Santa Rosa: Newstex.
- Hallander, J., & Einwohner, R. (2004). Conceptualizing resistance, *Social Forum*, 19, 533-554.
- Hallward, M. C. (2009). Creative responses to separation: Israeli and Palestinian joint activism in Bil'in, *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(4), 541-558.
- Hallward., & Norman, J. (2011). *Nonviolent resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and advocacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hamber, B. (2007). Masculinity and Transitional Justice: An Exploratory Essay, *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 1(3), 375-390.
- Hamber, B. (2016). There is a crack in everything: problematizing masculinities, peacebuilding and transitional justice, *Human Rights Review*, 17, 9-34.
- Hammami, R., & Tamari, S. (2001). The second uprising: end or new beginning? *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 30(2), 5-25.
- Hammami, R. & Tamari, S. (2006). Anatomy of another rebellion: from intifada to interregnum. In J.& R. Stein (Eds.), *The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993-2005*, (pp. 263-281). 1st ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hammami, R. (1990). Women, the hijab and the Intifada, *Middle East Report*, 20, 24-28.
- Hammami, R. (1995). NGOs: The professionalisation of politics, *Race and Class*, 37, 51-63.
- Hammami, R. (2000). Palestinian NGOs since Oslo: from NGO politics to social movements?, *Middle East Report*, 214, 16-19+27+48.
- Hanafi, S., & Tabar, L. (2003). The Intifada and the aid industry: the impacts of the new liberal agenda on the Palestinian NGOs, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, 23(1&2), 205-214.
- Hanafi, S., & Tabar, L. (2005). The new Palestinian globalized elite, *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 24, 13-32.
- Hancock, A.M. (2016). *Intersectionality: An intellectual history*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

- Hancock, L. (2017). Agency & peacebuilding: the promise of local zones of peace, *Peacebuilding*, 5(3), 255-269.
- Haque, M. (2013). Hope for gender equality? A pattern of post-conflict transition in masculinity, *Gender, Technology and Development*, 17(1), 55-77.
- Harding, S. (1987). The method question, *Hypatia*, 2(3), 19-35.
- Harland, K. (2011). Violent culture in Northern Ireland: Young men, violence, and the challenges of peacebuilding, *Youth & Society*, 43(2), 414-432.
- Hassassian, M. (2006). Civil society and NGOs building peace in Palestine. In E. Kaufman, W. Salem, and J. Verhoeven, *Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (pp. 59–86). Boudler: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Hasso, F. (2018). Decolonizing Middle East Men and Masculinities Scholarship: An Axiomatic Approach, <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/38079>
- Hawari, Y. (2018). Palestine sine tempore?, *Rethinking History*, 22(2), 165-183.
- Hayes, C. (2018). The idea that the moral universe inherently bends towards justice is inspiring. It's also wrong. *NBC News*, <https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/idea-moral-universe-inherently-bends-towards-justice-inspiring-it-s-ncna859661>
- Helman, S. (1999). From soldering and motherhood to citizenship: A study of four Israeli peace protest movements, *Social Politics*, 6(3), 292-313.
- Herzon, S. & Hai, A. (2005). What do people mean when they say 'people-to-people'? Origins, definitions, goals and methods, *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture*, 12/13(4), 8-15.
- Hill, F. (2002). NGO Perspectives: NGOs and the Security Council, *Disarmament Forum*, 1, 27–30.
- Hirblinger, A., & Simons, C. (2015). The good, the bad, and the powerful, *Security Dialogue*, 46(5), 422-439.
- Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Canetti, D., Rapaport, C., & Hobfoll, S. (2016). Conflict will harden your heart: Exposure to violence, psychological distress, and peace barriers in Israel and Palestine, *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(4), 845-859.
- Hirschfeld, Y., & Roling, S. (2000). The Oslo process and the people-to-people strategy, *Development*, 43, 23–28.

- Hoffman, D., & Lubkemann, S. (2005). Introduction: West-African warsapes: warscape ethnography in West Africa and the anthropology of "events", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 78(2), 315-327.
- Hollander, J. A., & Einwohner, R. L. (2004). Conceptualizing resistance, *Sociological Forum*, 19, 533-554.
- Holt, M. (1996). Palestinian women and the Intifada: An exploration of images and realities, In Haleh Afshar (Ed.) *Women and Politics in the Third World* (pp. 189-207). London: Routledge.
- Holt, M. (2003). Palestinian women, violence, and the peace process, *Development in Practice*, 13(2/3), 223-238.
- Holt, E. (2021). Resistance literature and Occupied Palestine in Cold War Beirut, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 1-16.
- Hong, L. (2007). Toward a transformed approach to prevention: Breaking the link between masculinity and violence, *College Health*, 48, 269-279.
- Hooper, C. (2001). *Manly states: masculinities, international relations, and gender politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hudson, H. (2009). Peacebuilding through a gender lens and the challenges of implementation in Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire, *Security Studies*, 18(2), 287-318.
- Hudson, H. (2012). A double-edged sword of peace? reflections on the tension between representation and protection in gendering liberal peacebuilding, *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), 443-460.
- Hughes, J. (2017). Agency versus structure in reconciliation, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 41(4), 624-642.
- Human Rights Watch. (2021). A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution>
- Huntington, S. (1996). *Clash of civilization*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Hutchings, K. (2008). Making sense of masculinity and war, *Men and Masculinities*, 10(4), 389-404.
- Ibrahim, N. & Pierre, B. (2012). Effective aid to the Occupied Palestinian Territories?, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 12(5), 481-500.

- IMAGES. (2017). *Understanding masculinities, results from the International men and gender equality study in the Middle East and North Africa*. United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women); Promundo, <https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/5/understanding-masculinities-results-from-the-images-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa>
- INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence. (2017). *The revolution will not be funded: Beyond the non-profit industrial complex*. Durham: Duke University Press
- International Labour Organization (2020). The situation of workers of the occupied Arab territories, Report of the Director-General - Appendix 2021 International Labour Conference 109th Session. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_793285.pdf
- The International Solidarity Movement. (n.d). *About ISM*. <https://palsolidarity.org/about/>
- Irving, S. (2012). *Leila Khaled: icon of Palestinian liberation*. London: Pluto Press.
- Jabri, V. (2010). War, government, politics: a critical response to the hegemony of the liberal peace. In O. Richmond (Ed.), *Peacebuilding: critical developments and approaches* (pp. 41-57). New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Jad, I. (2007). NGOs: between buzzwords and social movements, *Development in Practice*, 17(4-5), 622–629.
- Jad, I. (2004) The NGO-isation of Arab women's movement, *IDS Bulletin*, 35(4), 34-42.
- Jamal, A. (2001). Engendering State-Building: The Women's Movement and Gender-Regime in Palestine, *Middle East Journal*, 55(2), 256-276.
- Jamal, A. (2005). *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005*. Indiana University Press.
- Jamal, A. (2007). *Barriers to democracy: the other side of the social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Jawad, R. (2011). Staging resistance in Bil'in: The performance of violence in a Palestinian village, *The Drama Review*, 55(4), 128-143.
- Jenkins, J. C., & Eckert, C. M. (1986). Channeling black insurgency: Elite patronage and professional social movement organizations in the development of the black movement, *American Sociological Review*, 51, 812–829.
- Johansson, O., & Wallin, J. (2018). *The freedom theatre: Performing cultural resistance in Palestine*. New Delhi: LeftWord Books.

- Johnson, P. & Kuttaf, E. (2001). Where have all the women (and men) gone?: reflections on gender and the Second Palestinian Intifada, *Feminist Review*, 69(1), 21-43.
- Joseph, P. (2020). *The Sword and the Shield: The Revolutionary Lives of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr.* New York: Basic Books.
- Kaldor, M. (1999). *New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era.* 1st edition. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kapoor, I. (2002). Capitalism, culture, agency: dependency versus postcolonial theory, *Third World Quarterly*, 23(4), 647-664.
- Kappler, S. (2015) The dynamic local: delocalisation and (re-)localization in the search for peacebuilding identity, *Third World Quarterly*, 36(5), 875-889
- Kappler, S. & Richmond, O. (2011). Peacebuilding and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina: resistance or emancipation?, *Security Dialogue*, 42(3), 261–278.
- Kassem, F. (2011). *Palestinian women: Narrative histories and gendered memories.* London: Zed Books.
- Kawulich, B. (2005). Participant observation as a data collection method, *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 6(2).
- Kayali, L. (2021). *Palestinian women and popular resistance: Perceptions, attitudes, and strategies.* London: Routledge.
- Kazziha, W. (1979). *Palestine in the Arab dilemma.* London: Croom Helm
- Kear M. (2019). *Hamas and Palestine: The contested road to statehood.* London: Routledge.
- Keen, D. (2012). Greed and grievance in civil war, *International Affairs*, 88(4), 757–777.
- Keen, D. (2009). Economic initiatives to tackle conflict: bringing politics back in, *Crisis States Research Centre Occasional Paper 9.*
- Kelly, T. (2008). The attractions of accountancy: Living an ordinary life during the Second Intifada, *Ethnography*, 9(3), 351-376.
- Keysan, A. (2019). *Activism and women's NGOs in Turkey: civil society, feminism and politics.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Khalidi, R. (2014). Call off the sainthood of Ariel Sharon, *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/14/call-off-the-sainthood-of-ariel-sharon/>

- Khalidi, R. (1984). The Asad Regime and the Palestinian Resistance, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 6(4), 259–266.
- Khalili, L. (2007). Heroic and tragic pasts: Mnemonic narratives in the Palestinian refugee camps, *Critical Sociology*, 33(4), 731–759.
- Khalili, L. (2013). Thinking about violence, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 45(4), 791–794.
- Ki-moon, B. (2021). US should back a new approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Op Ed, *Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/c1210a21-0209-4c4b-8cb3-cfa31c3fdee0>.
- King, M. (2007). *A quiet revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and nonviolent resistance*. New York: Nation Books.
- Kirsch. (1999). *Ethical dilemmas in feminist research the politics of location, interpretation, and publication*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Krause, J. (2019). Gender Dimensions of (non)violence in communal conflict: the case of Jos, Nigeria, *Comparative Politics Studies*, 52(10), 1466–1499.
- Kristianasen, W. (1999). Challenge and counterchallenge: Hamas's response to Oslo, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28(3), 19–36.
- Kunz, Myrntinen & Udasmoro, (2018). Preachers, pirates and peace-building: examining non-violent hegemonic masculinities in Aceh, *Asian Journal of Women's Studies*, 24(3), 299–320.
- Kuttab, E. (2008). Palestinian women's organizations: Global cooption and local contradiction, *Cultural Dynamics*, 20(2), 99–117.
- Kuttab, E., Abu Awwad, N., Hammami R., & Meari, L. (2020). Formations of masculinities and gender dynamics in the Palestinian colonial context. *Birzeit: Institute of Women's Studies- Birzeit University*.
- Kuumba, M. & Ajanaku, F. (1998). Dreadlocks: The hair aesthetics of cultural resistance and collective identity formation, *Mobilization*, 3, 227–243.
- Lagerquist, P. (2004). Fencing the last sky: excavating Palestine after Israel's 'separation wall', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 33(2), 5–35.
- Lang, S. (2013). *NGOs, civil society, and the public sphere*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Larkin, C. (2014). Jerusalem's separation wall and global message board: graffiti, murals, and the art of sumud, *The Arab Studies Journal*, 22(1), 134–169.

- Lax, A. (2021). The be creative is to exist': rejecting resilience, enacting sumud in the cultural resistance of ASHTAR theatre, *Research in Drama Education: The Journal of Applied Theatre and Performance*, 26(1), 153-170
- Le More, A. (2005). Killing with kindness: funding the demise of a Palestinian state, *International Affairs*, 81(5), 981-999.
- Le More, A. (2008). *International assistance to the Palestinian after Oslo: Political guilt, wasted money*. London: Routledge.
- LeMore, A., Keating, M., & Lowe, R. (2005). *Aid, diplomacy, and facts on the ground*. London: Chatham House.
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable development in divided societies*. Washinton: United States Institute of Peace.
- Lederach, J.P. (1995). *Preparing for peace: conflict transformation across cultures*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Lederach, J.P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Lee, S., & Özerdem, A. (2015). *Local ownership in international peacebuilding: key theoretical and practical issues*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, S. (2021). Local Resistance and Hybrid Peace, In O. Richmond & G. Visoka (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Leech, P. (2009). Masculinities and the occupation of the West Bank. *International Sociological Association*. E-Bulletin 12.
- Leonardsson, H. & Rudd, G. (2015). The 'local turn' in peacebuilding: A literature review of effective and emancipatory local peacebuilding, *Third World Quarterly*, 36(5), 825-839.
- Leone, A. (2011). Civic education in post-Oslo Palestine: Discursive domestication. In M.C. Hallward & J. Norman (Eds.), *Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada: Activism and Advocacy* (pp. 13-32). New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Leone, A. (2011). Civic education in post-Oslo Palestine: discursive domestication, in M.C. Hallward and J. Norman (Eds.), *Second Intifada: Activism and advocacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Leone, A. (2010). *International development assistance and the effects on Palestinian community mobilization*, Masters Thesis, Georgetown University,

<https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/552820/LeoneAva.pdf?sequence=1>

- Levitt, M. (2021). A Blurred line between civil society and terrorism: examining charges of NGOs funding the PFLP, *Policy File*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Liinason, M. (2021). “Drawing the line” and other small-scale resistances: exploring agency and ambiguity in transnational feminist and queer NGOs, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 23(1), 102-124.
- The London Feminist Salon Collective. (2004) The problematization of agency in postmodern theory: as feminist educational researchers, where do we go from here?, *Gender and Education*, 16(1), 25-33.
- Longo, M., Canetti, D., & Hite-Rubin, N. (2014). A checkpoint effect? evidence from a natural experiment on travel restrictions in the West Bank, *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4), 1006–1023.
- Lusher, D., & Robins, G. (2009). Hegemonic and other masculinities in local social contexts, *Men and Masculinities*, 11(4), 387-423.
- Mac Ginty, R. (2008). Indigenous peace-making versus the liberal peace, *Cooperation and Conflict* (43)2, 139–163
- Mac Ginty, R. (2011). *International peacebuilding and local resistance: Hybrid forms of peace*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Mac Ginty R (2010) Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace. *Security Dialogue*, 41(4), 391–412.
- Mac Ginty R (2014) Everyday peace: Bottom-up and local agency in conflict affected societies, *Security Dialogue*, 45(6), 548–564.
- Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. (2013). The local turn in peace building: a critical agenda for peace, *Third World Quarterly*, 34(5), 763-783
- Mac Ginty, R. (2013). Introduction: the transcripts of peace: public, hidden or non-obvious?, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 7(4), 423-430.
- Mac Ginty, R., Muldoon, O, & Ferguson, N. (2007). No war, no peace: Northern Ireland after the agreement, *Political Psychology*, 28(1), 1-11.
- MacKenzie, M., & Foster, A. (2017). Masculinity nostalgia: How war and occupation inspire a yearning for gender order, *Security Dialogue*, 48(3) 206–223

- MacLeod, A. (1992). Hegemonic relations and gender resistance: the new veiling as accommodating protest in Cairo, *Signs*, 17(3), 533-557.
- MacMillan, J. (1998). *The liberal peace*. London: Tauris Academic Studies, I.B Tauris Publishers.
- Madison, S. (2005). *Critical ethnography: Methods, ethics, and performance*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Inc.
- Mahr, E. (2017). Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 39(1), 72-94.
- Mair, D., & Steiner, K. (2011). *Peacebuilding and conflict prevention*. Policy Document, Vienna: Austrian Development Agency.
- Mall Dibiasi, C. (2015). Changing trends in Palestinian political activism: the Second Intifada, the wall protests, and the human rights turn, *Geopolitics*, 20(3), 669-695
- Malmstrom, M. (2015). Porous masculinities: agential political bodies among male Hamas youth, *Etnográfica*, 19(2), 301-322.
- Maoz, I., (2004). Peace building in violent conflict: Israeli-Palestinian post-Oslo people-to-people activities, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 17(3), 563-574.
- Mason, V. & Falk. R. (2016). Assessing nonviolence in the Palestinian rights struggle, *State Crime*, 5(1), 163–186.
- Massad, K. (2006). *The persistence of the Palestinian Question: Essays on Zionism and the Palestinians*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Matta, & Rojas, R. (2016). The Second Intifada, *Archives Européennes de Sociologie. European Journal of Sociology*, 57(1), 65–113.
- Maxwell, J. A. (2005). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach* (2nd Ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Mayers, S. (2016). NGO-ization and human rights law: the CRPD's civil society mandate. *Laws*, 5(2), 21.
- Mazurana, D., & McKay, S. (2001). Child soldiers; what about the girls?, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 57(5), 30-35.
- Mazurana, D., & Cole, L. (2013). Women, girls and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Chapter 9 in C. Cohn, *Women and War*. London: Routledge.

- McCandless, E. (2013). Wicked problems in peacebuilding and statebuilding: making progress in measuring progress through the New Deal, *Global Governance*, 19, 227-248.
- MacDonald, E. (1991). *Shoot the women first*. Random House (UK).
- McDonald, D. (2010). Geographies of the body: Music, violence and manhood in Palestine, *Ethnomusicology Forum*, 19(2), 191-214.
- McDonald, D. (2013). *My voice is my weapon: music, nationalism, and the poetics of Palestinian resistance*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Meari, L. (2014). Sumud: A Palestinian philosophy of confrontation in colonial prisons, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 113(3), 547-578.
- Meari, L. (2018). Reading Che in colonized Palestine., *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 50(1), 49-55.
- Meltzer, B. N., & Manis, J. G. (1992). Emergence and human conduct, *The Journal of Psychology*, 126, 333-342.
- Merz, S. (2012). 'Missionaries of the new era': neoliberalism and NGOs in Palestine, *Race & Class*, 54(1), 50-66.
- Messerschmidt, J. (2012). Engendering gendered knowledge: assessing the academic appropriation of hegemonic masculinity, *Men and Masculinities*, 15(1), 56-76.
- Meyers, S. (2016). NGO-ization and human rights law: The CRPD's civil society, *Laws*, 5(21).
- Millar G (2014) Disaggregated hybridity: why hybrid institutions do not produce predictable experiences of peace, *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(4), 501-514.
- Millar, G. (2020). Preserving the everyday: Pre-political agency in peacebuilding theory, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 55(3), 310-325.
- Miller, D., & Salkind, N. (2002). *Handbook of research design & social measurement*, Sixth Edition. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Research Methods.
- Mills, C. (2003). Contesting the political: Butler and Foucault on power and resistance, *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11(3), 253-272.
- Mitchell, A. (2011) Quality/control: International peace interventions and 'the everyday', *Review of International Studies* 37(4), 1623-1645.
- Morrison, S. (2020). Wither the state: the Oslo Peace Process and neoliberal configurations of Palestine, *Social Science Quarterly*, 101(7), 2465-2484.

- Moser C. (2001). The gendered continuum of violence and conflict: An operational framework. In C. Moser, F. Clark (Eds.), *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and political violence*. London: Zed Books.
- Mumby, D., Thomas, R., Martí, I. & Seidle, D. (2017). Resistance redux, *Organizational Studies*, 38(8), 1157-1183.
- Musleh, A. (2012). Acting together: Resistance and reconciliation in regions of violence. In C. E. Cohen, R. G. Varea, & P. O. Walke. (Eds.), *Building Just and Inclusive Communities* (pp. 582-585). Oakland: New Village Press.
- Musolf, G. R. (2017). Oppression and resistance: A structure-and-agency perspective. In G. Musolf (Eds.) *Oppression and Resistance: Structure, Agency Transformation* (pp. 2-18). Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited
- Myrttinen, H. (2019). Locating masculinities in WPS. In S. Davies and J. True (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Myrttinen, H., Khattab, L. & Naujoks, J. (2016). Re-thinking hegemonic masculinities in conflict-affected contexts, *Critical Military Studies* 3(2), 103–119.
- Myrttinen, H., Naujoks, J. & El-Bushra, J. (2014). Rethinking gender in peacebuilding. *International Alert*. http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Gender_RethinkingGenderPeacebuilding_EN_2014.pdf.
- Naaman, D. (2007). Brides of Palestine/angels of death: media, gender, and performance in the case of the Palestinian female suicide bombers, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 32(4), 933–955,
- Nakhleh, K. (2004). *The myth of Palestinian development: Political aid and sustainable deceit*. Jerusalem: PASSIA.
- Nashif, E. (2004/05). Attempts at liberations: materializing the body and building community among Palestinian political captives, *Arab Studies Journal*, 12/13(2/1), 46-79.
- Nassar, J. R., & Heacock, R. (1990). *Intifada: Palestine at the crossroads*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Nathan, L. (2007). No ownership, no commitment: a guide to local ownership of security sector reform, Paper commissioned by the Security Sector Reform Strategy of the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, University of Birmingham, UK
- Nazneen, S., & Sultan, M. (2009). Struggling for survival and autonomy: impact of NGO-ization on women's organizations in Bangladesh, *Development*, 52(2), 193-199.

- Nencel, L. (2014). Situating reflexivity: Voices, positionalities and representations in feminist ethnographic texts, *Women's Studies International Forum*, 43, 75-83.
- Netti, R. & Mansour, O. (2020). The Israeli West Bank wall: iconographic storytelling, *Disegnare Con*, 13(24), 1-19.
- Newman, E. & Richmond, O. (2006) *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Ní Aoláin, F., Cahn, N., Haynes, D. & Valji, N. (2018). *The Oxford handbook on gender and conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Norman, J. (2015). "We do not work for peace": Reframing nonviolence in post-Oslo Palestine. IN K. Schock (ed.), *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*. (pp. 35-58). University of Minnesota Press.
- Norris, J. (2008). Repression and rebellion: Britain's response to the Arab Revolt in Palestine of 1936-1939, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 36(1), 25-45
- O'Neill, R. (2015). Whither critical masculinity studies? notes on inclusive masculinity theory, postfeminism, and sexual politics, *Men and Masculinities*, 18(1), 100-120.
- Obaid, H. (2018). Protests and the return of Hama's political fortunes, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76792>
- Obradovic-Wochnik, J. (2020). Hidden politics of power and governmentality in transitional justice and peacebuilding: The problem of 'bringing the local back in', *Journal of International Relations*, 23, 117-138.
- OCHA. (2020). Two years on: people injured and traumatized during the "Great March of Return" are still struggling. The Humanitarian Bulletin, March-May 2020. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/two-years-people-injured-and-traumatized-during-great-march-return-are-still-struggling#ftn3>
- OECD. (2015). States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/FINAL%20States%20of%20Fragility%20Highlights%20document.pdf>
- Onyejekwe, C., (2005). Women, war, peace-building and reconstruction, *International Social Science Journal*, 57(2), 277-283.
- Ortner, S. (1995). Resistance and the problem of ethnographic refusal, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 37(1), 173-193.
- Ortner, S. (2006). *Anthropology and social theory*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Ouzgane, L. (2003). Islamic masculinities: an introduction, *Men and Masculinities*, 5(3), 231-235.
- Paffenholz, T. (2021). Perpetual peacebuilding: a new paradigm to move beyond the linearity of liberal peacebuilding, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 15(3), 367–385
- Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between People. (n.d). *About the Rapprochement Center: Mission*. <https://pcr.ps/about-our-work/>
- Pankhurst, D., & Blackman, J. (2006). Mainstreaming gender in peacebuilding: a framework for action, *Journal of Gender Studies*, 15(2), 191-193.
- Pankhurst, D. (2008). ‘Post-War Backlash Violence against Women: What Can Masculinity Explain?’, in Pankhurst, D., (ed.), *Gendered Peace: Women’s Struggles for Post-War Justice and Reconciliation*, (London, UK: Routledge)
- Pankhurst, D. (Ed.). (2012). *Gendered peace: Women's struggles for post-war justice and reconciliation*. Routledge,
- Pappé, I. (2006). *The ethnic cleaning of Palestine*. London: Oneworld Publications
- Pappé, I. (2017). *Ten myths about Israel*. London: Verso Books
- Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism, *International Security*, 22(2), 54-89.
- Paris, R. (2002). International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’, *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 637–656.
- Paris, R. (2004). *At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press
- Paris, R. (2010). Saving liberal peacebuilding, *Review of International Studies*, 36(2), 337-365
- Parpart, J. (2010). Masculinity, poverty and the ‘new wars’, *Nordic Journal of Africa Studies*, 5(2), 85-99.
- Parpart, J. (2013). Gender, violence and human security: Critical feminist perspectives, *Gender & Development*, 22(3), 589–92.
- Parpart, J. (2015). Militarized masculinities, heroes and gender inequality during and after the nationalist struggle in Zimbabwe, *NORMA*, 10(3-4)
- Parpart, J. (2019). Rethinking silence, gender, and power in insecure sites: Implications for feminist security studies in a postcolonial world, *Review of International Studies*, 46(3), 1-10.

- Parpart, J., & Zalewski, M. (2008). *Rethinking the man question: Sex, gender and violence in international relations*, London and New York: Zed Books.
- Patai, D. (1994). When method becomes power. In A. Gitlen (Ed.), *Power and method* (pp. 61–73). New York: Routledge.
- Paternotte, D. (2016). The NGOization of LGBT activism: ILGA-Europe and the Treaty of Amsterdam, *Social Movement Studies*, 15(4), 388-402.
- Patton, M. (2002). Two decades of developments in qualitative inquiry: a personal, experiential perspective, *Qualitative Social Work*, 1(3), 261-283.
- Pearlman, W. (2011). *Violence, nonviolence, and the Palestinian national movement*. Cambridge University Press
- Pedatzur, R. (2004). *More than a million bullets*. Haaretz. <https://www.haaretz.com/1.4744778>
- Peteet, J. (1991). *Gender in crisis: women and the Palestinian resistance movement*. Columbia University Press.
- Peteet, J. (1994). Male gender and rituals of resistance in the Palestinian "intifada": A cultural politics of violence, *American Ethnologist*, 21(1), 31-49.
- Peteet, J. (2000). Refugees, resistance, and identity. In J. Guidry, M. Kennedy, & M. Zald (Eds.), *Globalizations and social movements: Culture, power, and the transnational public sphere* (pp. 183-209). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Peterson, S. (2010). Gendered identities, ideologies, and practices in the context of war and militarism, In *Gender, War and Militarism*, Sjoberg and Via (eds), Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Pickering, S. (2001). Engendering resistance: Women and policing in Northern Ireland. *Policing and Society*, 11(3–4), 337–358
- Pillow, W. (2003). Confession, catharsis, or cure? Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as methodological power in qualitative research, *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 16(2), 175-196.
- Plonski, S. (2005). Developing agency through peacebuilding in the midst of intractable conflict: The case of Israel and Palestine. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education*, 35, 393-409.
- Pouligny, B. (2006). *Peace Operations seen from below: un missions and local people*. Boulder: Kumarian Press.

- Pratt, N. & Richter-Devroe, S. (2011). Special Issue Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13(4).
- Puar, J. (2011). Citation and Censorship: the politics of talking about the sexual politics of Israel. *Feminist Legal Studies*, 19(2), 133–142
- Puechguirbal, N. (2010). Discourses on gender, patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A textual analysis of UN documents. *International Peacekeeping*, 17(2), 172–187.
- Pugh, M. (2012). Reflections on Aggressive Peace, *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), 410–425.
- Quenzer, K. (2019). Beyond Arab nationalism? The PLO and its intellectuals, 1967–1974. *Interventions*, 21(5), 690–707.
- Qumsiyeh, M. (2011). *Popular resistance in Palestine: A history of hope and empowerment*. London: Pluto Press.
- Randazzo, E. (2017). *Beyond Liberal Peacebuilding: A Critical Exploration of the Local Turn*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Rangitsch, S. (2007). *Tracing symbolic discourse of steadfastness and resistance: Collective memory, social practice and Palestinian (trans)nationalism*. Budapest: Central European University.
- Reddy, V. (2010). Working class in ‘quit India’ movement: Madras presidency, *Indian Historical Review*, 37(2), 275–289.
- Regilme, S. (2020) Competing visions of peace amidst declining democratization, *Peace Review*, 32(4).
- Reich, H. (2006). "Local ownership" in conflict transformation projects: partnership, participation or patronage? *Berghof Occasional Paper No. 27*, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Richmond, O. (2006). The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’, *Conflict Security and Development Security & Development*, 3, 291–314.
- Richmond, O. (2009). Becoming liberal, unbecoming liberalism: Liberal-local hybridity via the everyday as a response to the paradoxes of liberal peacebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3(3), 324–344.
- Richmond, O. (2010). Resistance and the post-liberal peace, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 38(3), 665–692.
- Richmond, O. P. (2011). Local Conflict Resolution in the Shadows of Liberal International Peacebuilding. In M. Brigg & R. Bleiker (Eds.), *Mediating across difference: Oceanic*

- and Asian approaches to conflict resolution* (pp. 57-72). Mānoa Valley: University of Hawaii Press.
- Richmond, O. (2012). Beyond Local ownership in the architecture of international peacebuilding, *Ethnopolitics*, 11(4), 354-375.
- Richmond, O. (2014). *Peace: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Richmond, O., Björkdahl, A., & Kappler, S. (2011) The emerging EU peacebuilding framework: confirming or transcending liberal peacebuilding?, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 24(3), 449-469.
- Richmond, O. & Franks, J. (2008) Liberal peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The emperor's new clothes?, *International Peacekeeping*, 15(2), 185-200
- Richmond, O. & Mitchell, A. (2011). Introduction. In, O. Richmond & A. Mitchell (Eds.), *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Richter-Devroe, S. (2008). Culture, and conflict resolution in Palestine, *Journal of Middle East Women Studies*, 4(2), 30-59.
- Richter-Devroe, S. (2012). Defending their land, protecting their men, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 14(2), 181-201.
- Rigby, A. (2010). *Palestinian resistance and nonviolence*. East Jerusalem: PASSIA
- Robinson, G. (1997). *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.
- Rosenthal, R. (2021). A comparison of health indicators and social determinants of health between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, *Global Public Health*, 16(3), 431-447.
- Roy, A. (2014a). *The NGO-ization of resistance*, Pambazuka New, <https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/ngo-ization-resistance>
- Roy, S. (2007). *Failing peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict*. London: Pluto Press.
- Roy, S. (2014b). De-development revisited: Palestinian economy and society since Oslo, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28(3), 64-82.
- Ruddick, S. (1995). *Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Ryan, C. (2015). Everyday resilience as resistance: Palestinian women practicing sumud, *International Political Sociology*, 9(4), 299–315.

- Sa'ar, A., & Yahia-Younis, T. (2008). Masculinity in crisis: the case of Palestinians in Israel, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(3), 305-323.
- Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
- Said, E. W. (1992). *The question of Palestine* (2nd ed.). New York: Vintage Books.
- Said, E. (1981). *Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Said, W. E. (1999). *After the last sky: Palestinian lives* (2nd ed.). New York: Colombia University Press.
- Said, E. (1993). *Culture and imperialism*. New York: Knopf.
- Saldaña, J. (2009). *Coding manual for qualitative researchers*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Santos, M. (2016). Palestinian narratives of resistance: The Freedom Theatre's challenge to Israeli settler colonization, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 8(1), 96-113.
- Santos, A. (2021). Towards gender-equal peace: From 'counting women' to meaningful participation, *Oslo Forum Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Towards_gender-equal_peace_WEB.pdf
- Santos, R., Roque, S. & Moura, T. (2013). Missed connections: representations of gender, (armed) violence and security in Resolution 1325, *Revisita Critica de Ciências Sociais*, 5, 3-31.
- Sasa, G. (2017). *Israel: Greenwashing Colonialism and Apartheid*. MES Major Papers, Master of Environmental Studies, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University
- Sayigh, R. (1979). *Palestinians: from peasants to revolutionaries*. London: Zed Books
- Schierenbeck, I. (2015). Beyond the local turn divide: lessons learnt, relearnt and unlearnt, *Third World Quarterly*, 36(5), 1023-1032.
- Schild, V. (2015). Feminism and Neoliberalism in Latin America, *New Left Review*, 96(96), 59–74.
- Schirch, L. (2008). Strategic peacebuilding: state of the field, *South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 1(1), 1-17.
- Schock, K. (2003). Nonviolent action and its misconceptions: insights for social scientists, *Political Science and Politics*, 36, 705–712.

- Schock, K. (2015). *Civil resistance: Comparative perspectives on nonviolent struggle*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Schulman. (2020). Appendix: Brand Israel and Pinkwashing: A Documentary Guide. In *Israel/Palestine and the Queer International* (pp. 179–186). Duke University Press.
- Schwedler, J. (2006). The third gender: Western female researchers in the Middle East, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 39(3), 425–428.
- Scott, J. (1986). Gender: A useful category of historical analysis, *American Historical Review*, 91, 1053–1075.
- Scott, J. (1985). *Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. (1989). Everyday forms of resistance, *Copenhagen Papers in East and Southeast Asian Studies*, 4, 33–62.
- Scott, J. (1990). *Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, R. (2008). *Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Sen, S. (2019). *Decolonizing Palestine: Hamas between the anticolonial and the postcolonial*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Sen, S. (2017). To fight is to exist: Hamas, armed resistance and the making of Palestine, *Interventions*, 19(2), 201–217.
- Sending, O. (2011). The effects of peacebuilding: Sovereignty, Patronage and Power. In S. Campbell, D. Chandler & M. Sabaratnam (Eds.), *A Liberal peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding* (pp. 57–68), London: Zed Books.
- Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2015). *Security theology, surveillance and the politics of fear*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2006). Negotiating the present, historicizing the future: Palestinian children speak about the Israeli separation wall, *The American Behavioral Scientist (Beverly Hills)*, 49(8), 1101–1124.
- Sharoni, S. (1995). *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The politics of women's resistance*. Syracuse University Press.
- Sharoni, S. (2008). De-militarizing masculinities in the age of empire, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 37(2), 147–164.

- Sharoni, S. (2016). Gender and resistance to political violence in Palestine and Israel. In S. Sharoni, J. Welland, L. Steiner, & J. Pedersen (Eds.), *Handbook on gender and war* (pp. 380–399). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Shearer, D., & Myer, A. (2005). The dilemma of aid under occupation. In A. L. Michael Keating, *Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground: The case of Palestine*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Shehadeh, R. (1982). *The third way: A journal of life in the West Bank*. Salem: Salem House Publishers
- Shepherd, L. (2008). *Gender, violence and security*. London: Zed Books.
- Shepherd, L. (2014). *Gender matters in global politics*. London: Routledge.
- Shinar, D. (2003). Peace process in cultural conflict: the role of the media, *Conflict & Communication Online*, 2(1), 1-10.
- Shwaikh, M. (2020). Engendering hunger strikes: Palestinian women in Israeli prisons, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1–19
- Shweiki, O. (2014). Before and beyond neoliberalism: the political economy of national Liberation, the PLO and 'amal ijtima'i'. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Silva, N. (1997). Ku'e! Hawaiian women's resistance to the annexation, *Social Process in Hawaii*, 38, 2–15.
- Simon, R., & Dipbo, D. (1986). On critical ethnographic work, *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, 17(4), 195-202.
- Sjoberg, L. (2009). Introduction to security studies: Feminist contributions, *Security Studies*, 18, 183–213.
- Skinner, C. (2021). "There was something inside of me I needed to let out": occupied masculinities, emotional expression and rap music in a Palestinian refugee camp, *Men and Masculinities*, 1-18.
- Smith, C.D. (2007). *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict: a history with documents*. 6th ed. Boston: Bedford/St Martin's.
- Spears, R. (1997). Introduction. In T. Ibanez, & L. Iniguez (Eds.), *Critical Social Psychology* (pp. 1-26). London: SAGE.
- Spivak, G.C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, (Eds.) *Marxism and the interpretation of culture* (pp. 271-313). Urbana, IL: Univ. of Illinois Press.

- Stokke, K., Kham, K., Nge, N. & Hvilsom, S. (2022). Illiberal peacebuilding in a hybrid regime. Authoritarian strategies for conflict containment in Myanmar, *Political Geography*, 93, 1-14.
- Sudhakar, N., & Kuehnast, K. (2011). The other side of gender: including masculinity concerns in conflict and peacebuilding, *United States Institute of Peace Peacebrief*, 75.
- Sumpter, K. (2015). Masculinity and meat consumption: an analysis through the theoretical lens of hegemonic masculinity and alternative masculinity theories, *Sociology Compass*, 9(2), 104-114.
- Svirsky, M. (2017). Resistance is a structure not an event, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 7(1), 19-39.
- Swan, E. (2021). “The personal is political!”: exploring the limits of Canada’s feminist international assistance policy under occupation and blockade, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 27(1), 117–135.
- Sylvester, C. (1993). Riding the hyphens of feminism, peace, and place in 4 – (or more) part cacophony, *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, 18(1), 109–18.
- Szabo, M. (2014). “I’m a real catch”: The blurring of alternative and hegemonic masculinities in men’s talk about home cooking, *Women’s Studies International Forum*, 44, 228-235.
- Tadjbakhsh, S. (2011). *Rethinking the liberal peace: External models and local alternatives*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Taghdisi-Rad, S. (2011). The political economy of aid in Palestine: Relief from conflict or development delayed? Abingdon: Routledge.
- Tamimi, A. (2011). Socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the Israeli Separation Wall, *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 68(4), 557–564.
- Tanabe, J. (2017). Beyond liberal peacebuilding: a critique of liberal peacebuilding and exploring a postmodern post-liberal hybrid model of peacebuilding, *International Relations and Diplomacy*, 5(8), 447-459.
- Tanabe, J. (2021). Post-liberal peacebuilding as intercultural philosophy: a Buddhist critical appraisal of liberal peace for holistic peace model, *Social Ethics Society Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 7, 58-94.
- Taraki, L. (2006). *Living Palestine: Family survival, resistance, and mobility under occupation*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Tartir, A. (2015). Securitised development and Palestinian authoritarianism under Fayyadism, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 15(5), 479–502.

- Tartir, A. (2017). Criminalizing resistance: The cases of Balata and Jenin Refugee Camps, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XLVI(2), 7-22.
- Tartir, A., & Ejodus, F. (2017). Effective? Locally owned? Beyond the technocratic perspective on the European Union police mission for the Palestinian Territories. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 39(1), 142-165.
- Tayeb, S. (2019). The Palestinian McCity in the Neoliberal era, *Middle East Report*, 290, 24-28.
- Teeffelen, T. (2011). *Sumud: Soul of the Palestinian people*. Bethlehem: Arab Education Institute.
- Theidon, K. (2009). Reconstructing masculinities: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in Colombia, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 31(1), 1-34.
- Theidon, K., Phenicie, K., & Murray, E. (2011). *Gender, conflict, and peacebuilding state of the field and lessons learned from USIP grantmaking*, Washington: United States Institute for Peace Peaceworks.
- Thomas, J. (1993). *Doing critical ethnography*, New York: SAGE Publication.
- Thrall, N. (2010). *Our man in Palestine*, The New York Review, nybooks.com/articles/2010/10/14/our-man-palestine/
- Thrall, N. (2015). *BDS: How a controversial non-violent movement has transformed the Israeli-Palestinian debate*. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/14/bds-boycott-divestment-sanctions-movement-transformed-israeli-palestinian-debate>
- Tiessen, R., Rao, S., & Lough, B. (2021). International development volunteering as transformational feminist practice for gender equality, *Journal of Developing Societies*, 37(1), 30-56.
- Tripp, C. (2013). *The power and the people: Paths of resistance in the Middle East*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tryggstad, T. (2009). Trick or treat? The UN and implementation of security council resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, *Global Governance*, 15, 539-557.
- Turner, M. (2011). Creating 'partner for peace': The Palestinian Authority and the international statebuilding agenda, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 5(1), 1-21.
- Turner, M. (2012) Completing the circle: peacebuilding as colonial practice in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), 492-507
- Turner, M. (2015). Peacebuilding as counterinsurgency in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, *Review of International Studies*, 41(1), 73-98.

- Ungsuchaval, T. (2016). NGOization of civil society as unintended consequence. *Premises on the Thai Health Promotion Foundation and its pressures toward NGOs in Thailand*. ISTR conference, Stockholm.
- United States Institute of Peace. (2013). *Men, peace and security symposium: Agents of change*. <https://www.usip.org/events/men-peaceand-security-symposium-agents-change>.
- Usher, G. (1990) Children of Palestine, *Race & Class*, 32(4), 1-18.
- Usher, G. (1992) Palestinian women, the intifada and the state of independence: An interview with Rita Giacaman, *Race & Class*, 34(3), 31–44.
- Vaittinen, T., Donahoe, A., Kunz, R., Omarsdottir, S. & Roohi, S. (2019). Care as everyday peacebuilding, *Peacebuilding*, 7(2), 194-209
- Väyrynen, T. (2019). *Corporeal peacebuilding: Mundane bodies and temporal transitions*, Springer International Publishing.
- Verkoren, W., & Van Leeuwen, M. (2013). Civil society in peacebuilding: global discourse, local reality, *International Peacekeeping*, 20(2), 159-172.
- Vigh, H. (2007). *Navigating terrains of war*. Oxford: Berghan Books.
- Vigh, H. (2010). Motion squared: A second look at the concept of social navigation, *Anthropological Theory*, 9(4), 419-438.
- Ariño, M., Arestizábal, P., Villellas, A. & Fisas, V. (2016). Gender in EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy and practice, *WOSCAP- Enhancing EU Peacebuilding Capabilities*, <https://gppac.net/files/2018-11/Scoping%20Study%20-%20Gender.pdf>
- Vinthagen, S. (2006). Power as subordination and resistance as disobedience: Non-violent movements and the management of power, *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 34(1), 1-21.
- Vries, J. (2010). Women and man as allies in peacebuilding, *Together for Transformation*, 7-10.
- Wake, (2008). An unaided peace? The (unintended) consequences of international aid on the Oslo Peace Process: Analysis, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 8(1), 109–31
- Waling, A. (2019). Rethinking masculinity studies: Feminism, masculinity, and poststructural accounts of agency and emotional reflexivity, *Journal of Men's Studies*, 27(1), 89-107.
- Watson, C. (2015). Begging the man question: What would a men, peace, and security agenda look like?, *Connections*, 14(3), 45-60.
- Wedgwood, N. (2009). Connell's theory of masculinity – its origins and influences on the study of gender, *Journal of Gender Studies*, 18(4), 329-339.

- Weitz, R. (2001). Women and their hair: Seeking power through resistance and accommodation, *Gender & Society* 15, 667–686.
- Wetherell, M., & Edley, N. (1999). Negotiating hegemonic masculinity: Imaginary positions and psychodiscursive practices, *Feminism & Psychology*, 9(3), 335-56.
- White, B. (2007). Nonviolent resistance a means, not the end. *Electronic Intifada*, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/nonviolent-resistance-means-not-end/7171>
- Whitehead, S. (2002). *Men and Masculinities: Key themes and new directions*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Whitworth, S. (2004). *Men, militarism and UN. Peacekeeping*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Wibben, A. (2020). Everyday security, feminism, and the continuum of violence, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 5(1), 115-121.
- Widmer, M., Barker, G., & Buchanan, C. (2006). Hitting the target: Men and guns, *Revcon Policy Brief*, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Wildeman, J. (2021). Assessing Canada's foreign policy approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding 1979-2019, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 27(1), 62-80.
- Wildeman, J. & Swan, E. (2021). What lies ahead? Canada's engagement with the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinians: an introduction, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 27(1), 1-20.
- Wildeman, J. & Tartir, A. (2021). Political economy of foreign aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A conceptual framing in Tartir, Alaa; Tariq Dana; & Timothy Seidel, eds, *Political Economy of Palestine: Critical, Interdisciplinary, and Decolonial Perspectives*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan (223–247).
- Willett, S. (2010). Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the impact on women, peace and security, *International Peacekeeping*, 17(2), 142-158.
- Wispelway, B. & Abu Jamel, Y. (2020). The great march of return: lessons from Gaza on mass resistance and mental health, *Health and Human Rights Journal*, 22(1), 179-186.
- Wolf, D. (1996). *Feminist dilemmas in fieldwork*, Colorado: Westview Press.
- World Bank World Development Report (2011). World development report: Conflict, security and development. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389>
- Wright, H. (2014). Masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding: Perspectives on men through a gender lens. *Saferworld*. UK Department for International Development.

- Wright, H. (2020). "Masculinities perspective" advancing a radical women, peace and security agenda?, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 22(5), 652-674.
- Xu, C. (2019). The critical impasse of peacebuilding: Toward an analytically eclectic critique of liberal peacebuilding, *International Journal*, 74(4), 581–599.
- Yaregal, W. (2011). Female suicide bombers: Desperation or weapon of choice? The case of Palestine. Georgetown University, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.
- Yegen, M. (2016). Armed struggle to peace negotiations: Independent Kurdistan to democratic autonomy, or the PKK in context, *Middle East Critique*, 25(4), 365–383.
- Yilmaz, M. E. (2007). Intra-state conflicts in the post-conflict war era, *Internal Journal on World Peace*, 24(4), 11-33.
- Yousif, B. (2006). Coalition economic policies in Iraq: Motivations and outcomes, *Third World Quarterly*, 27(3), 491–505.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (1995). *Gender and nation*. London: Sage Publications.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). Women, citizenship and difference, *Feminist Review*, 57(1), 4-27.
- Zalewski, M., & Parpart, J. (1998). *The "man" question in international relation*. London: Routledge.
- Zia, A. (2009). The reinvention of feminism in Pakistan, *Feminist Review*, 91, 29-46.