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**A Comparative Study of the Perceptions of Austria-Hungary and
Serbia in British Newspapers during the July Crisis of 1914.**

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Hungary and Serbia in British newspapers during the July
Crisis of 1914

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Introduction

In Sarajevo on June 28 1914, a member of a Serbian nationalist group, known as the Black Hand assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary and his wife Sofia Duchess of Chotek. The event provoked global media sympathy for the Dual Monarchy while the subsequent diplomatic manoeuvres known as the July Crisis made worldwide headlines. This study chronicles the "July Crisis" as it played out within a political spectrum of British newspapers. More precisely, this is a class-based examination of the popular portrayal of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and the lead up to the First World War within three distinctly different politically motivated British newspapers.

Great Britain was a society divided by and defined by class. As in most modern democracies, political parties capitalized upon these class distinctions. In 1914, the three main political parties were the Conservative Party, The Liberal Party, and the Labour Party. The Conservative Party represented the right wing of government. The party's ideals appealed to a wide cross-section of society, from the traditional aristocracy to the conservative members of the working class. Two notable newspapers catered to the extremes of conservative opinion. *The Times of London* represented the upper classes, those with land, and those involved in politics, while the *Daily Mail* represented the right

wing working class opinion. *The Times'* connection to high government¹ made it a unique paper to study. While the information was not classified, like the content represented in the documents from the Foreign Service, it nevertheless provided insight into the types of information that shaped the opinions of the average Member of Parliament.

The Liberal Party at this time especially, represented the middle ground.² In 1914, the Liberal Party in Great Britain was one of the main two parties. Its platform concentrated on moderate social change and social responsibility.³ The newspaper that most represented the Liberal opinion at the time was the *Manchester Guardian*.

Finally, the Labour Party represented the political left and the working classes. The unofficial newspaper of the Labour Party at the time was the *Daily Herald*. This paper had the most apparent bias and agenda of the three chosen papers. As of 1914, the Labour party had not yet held office; the first Labour government of Ramsey MacDonald was nearly ten years away. Consequently, the opinions expressed in the *Daily Herald* desperately tried to project the impression of legitimacy while at the same time promote the party's cause.⁴ Aside from the benefits of using a Labour newspaper as part of a comparative study, the *Daily Herald* also had the added advantage of being a little studied newspaper. While there have been several works that study British newspapers during the First World War, the *Daily Herald* has been largely ignored in the literature.

¹ Hargrove, Charles. "Le Times," *Revue des deux mondes*, 1985(4), pp. 73-83 and. Wilson, Keith M. *A Study in the history and politics of the Morning Post, 1905-1926*, Lampeter, Dyfed, Wales, pp. 57-72


² In 1914, the Liberal Party in Great Britain was still quite important. Throughout the twentieth century, the Liberal Party's influence in Great Britain dwindled in part due to the disastrous election of 1924 and in part due to the constant undermining of Liberal policy by other parties moving gradually left or gradually right.

³ Briggs, Asa "The Political Scene," in *Edwardian England, 1901-1914*, ed. Simon Nowell-Smith, London, 1965, pp. 93

⁴ As this event occurred well before the communist revolution in Russia, the *Herald* was better able to promote socialist ideology without fear of being labelled as communist sympathizers. Nevertheless, the paper still had to proceed with some caution as socialist notions had already caused a great deal of political upheaval in Europe.

These three papers were not the most popular papers at the time, but they did represent a large cross section of the population. Graph one: "1914 Circulation Figures" shows the average circulation numbers for each paper in 1914. The figures from series one represent the low-end readership estimate while the figures in series two represent the upper end of the circulation figures. The numbers vary depending on the source and on the current events of the time. For example during a strike, it was not uncommon for the *Daily Herald's* readership to more than double.⁵

Graph 1: 1914 Circulation Figures



This study uses information gathered from these newspapers to address two main issues. Firstly, it chronicles the changes in newspaper coverage from Austria-Hungary being portrayed as a friendly nation to being portrayed as an "enemy" nation. Unlike Germany, with whom a naval and arms race had caused a certain degree of public

⁵ Richards, Huw, *Bloody Crisis: The Daily Herald and the left*, London, 1997, pp.21 and Ayerst, David, *The Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper*, London, 1971, pp. 300

animosity to build up for a number of years; Austria-Hungary was considered a friendly nation. At the very least, the British public frequently ignored it. Popular serial novelist William LeQuex wrote several spy stories featuring Germans as the villains. However, there were no comparable portrayals of Austria-Hungary. Despite the fact that Austria-Hungary was allied with Germany and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in the Balkans had been the focus of many of the most disruptive international incidents in recent history. Austria-Hungary retained an image in the public eye, of being a backward and autocratic nation, steeped in history and culture. It did not possess the image of an “enemy” nation. However, just over a month after of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand Britain found itself at war with Austria-Hungary. This study asks how did the newspapers’ coverage change throughout that month? Did the newspapers continue to write about the Habsburg Empire as if it was a friendly, albeit troubled nation right up to the outbreak of the war, or was there a more gradual shift in the reported opinion, corresponding to the events of the July Crisis?

Secondly, this study will focus on the differences in newspaper coverage based on the intended audience. Using the three newspapers, all of which represent a different class and/or political viewpoint within society, allows this study to address the way coverage of an event is adapted to suit the needs of the audience. Historians such as Harry Hanak have argued that right wing media outlets are frequently portrayed as being more prone to promoting war, while left wing media outlets are portrayed as more pacifistic.⁶ Are these stereotypes applicable to the British newspapers of 1914? Was *The Times*, a conservative paper, pushing the idea of Austria-Hungary as the enemy and promoting the nation’s drive towards war? Conversely, stereotypes indicate that a well-

⁶ Hanak, Harry, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A. London, 1962

educated population is more reluctant to go to war than is one with less education, in which case, *The Times*; a paper known to represent the wealthy and well educated ought to be very pacific.⁷ Essentially this study examines how the class and political bias of a newspaper affected the reporting and hypothesizing about the outcome of the July Crisis.

Consequently, this discussion aims to deal with the larger question: how does the media spin a nation's drift toward war?

In order to address this larger question, the three newspapers will be examined in terms of a strict method. All articles will be analyzed by content, and in consideration of their headlines, wording, size, and placement within the newspaper. Special consideration will be given to editorials and letters, as they have highly biased natures and therefore more intentionally represent opinion than do regular articles, which often only passively represent opinion in their language choice. Articles from news services such as Reuters will be given the least weight. Because the paper purchases these articles, they are not tailored to convey the paper's opinion.

Using the following four steps, the main questions of this study will be analyzed and addressed. The first step in this study is to determine the newspaper's particular political and class bias. By researching the editors and columnists and by looking at readership information and the advertisements, the paper's ideal audience will become apparent. Knowing the paper's bias will open the door to identifying the paper's target audience, i.e. the "ideal reader."⁸ With an ideal reader in mind, it will be easier to

⁷ Wilson, pp. 57-72

⁸ Reah, Danuta, *The Language of Newspapers*, London: 2002, pp. 35 this work presents the idea that newspapers cater to an ideal reader. This ideal reader is a stereotype compiled using statistics on readership and demographics to determine whom the paper most appeals to. These statistics are then combined with the newspaper's projected image of itself and its ideals. The combination of these factors gives the newspaper a prototype of the ideal one person the whole paper is aimed at. It is of course accepted both in the media and in academia that there is no "ideal reader" as people's opinions change depending on the

determine whom the paper is appealing to and how the paper is trying to cater to while at the same time form the ideal reader's opinions.

The second step is to review and chronicle the paper's coverage of the July Crisis. The newspaper articles will be examined with attention to the following questions. What was the opinion of Austria-Hungary and the Archduke as revealed in the coverage of his assassination; was he a well-respected monarch or was he considered a stubborn autocrat? Did the opinion change by the time the ultimatum was presented to Serbia? How did the opinion change when the ultimatum's reply was rejected?

In the third step, this study will analyse the coverage for mention of war. The newspaper articles will be reviewed with attention to the following questions: throughout the crisis what was the paper's prediction of the likelihood of an upcoming war? How over the course of the crisis does the paper's opinion of an upcoming war change? Does the coverage/wording change accordingly?

Finally, in the fourth step this study will compare the three newspapers with each other. The comparison will be based upon: the differences between the coverage in the sample papers; how the paper's bias affects the coverage; how the paper's bias affects its enthusiasm for war; and, was the July crisis a convincing build up to the war, or did the public receive so little information that the arrival of war came as a shock to the nation?

This study divides The July Crisis into three distinct periods. The first and longest period is the assassination of the Archduke and his wife with its immediate

issue and sometimes even the presentation of the issue. However, when dealing with the study of newspapers it is sometimes more helpful to think in terms of the ideal stereotypical reader, as it allows for certain observations to be made which are otherwise impossible to make in a discussion of media and public opinion.

implications. The assassination initially attracted major headlines in all three papers. For the first week following the assassination, the newspapers were filled with stories about the Archduke. After the initial shock of the assassination, interest in the crisis waned. Articles about the Austria-Hungary were scarce throughout the early and middle parts of July. The second period begins when British interest was reignited by Austria-Hungary's presentation of an ultimatum to Serbia. This period is quite short. It leads directly into the third period: the rejection of the response to the ultimatum and the movement towards war. Consequently, this is the study of British newspaper articles from June 29th to August 4th, only. It will not deal with any articles produced during the war itself.

Chapter One: Historiography

In terms of historiography, few books deal with British / Austro-Hungarian relations in the years before the First World War. This is surprising considering the number of books that have been written about the origins of the First World War in general. The problem does not lie with a lack of literature on British foreign relations as there are hundreds of books written about Britain and Germany, and dozens about Anglo-Russian or Anglo-French relations. There is also an abundance of books on British public opinion concerning both Germany and Russia. It is therefore surprising to find so few books written on Anglo-Austrian relations and fewer still on popular British opinions of Austria-Hungary before the First World War. While this study focuses on the English language historiography, research indicates that there are just as few German language accounts chronicling Austro-Hungarian relations with Great Britain.⁹ While it is disappointing to find a lack of real historical debate, it is important to examine the accounts that do exist and use them as a platform to encourage further study of the topic.

Harry Hanak, in 1962 addressed the issue of Austria-Hungary in the British press. His book examined British public opinion of the Habsburg Empire through the writings of several prominent British journalists, namely Henry Wickham Steed and

⁹ Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise, 1908, bis zum Kriegsausbruch, 1914: diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Äussern, ausgewählt von Ludwig Bittner, Alfred Francis Pribram, Heinrich Srbik und Hans Uebersberger, bearbeitet von Ludwig Bittner und Hans Uebersberger. Wien, Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930. This is an eight-volume collection mostly made up of the correspondence and documents of the Austro-Hungarian foreign services. It contains several documents from Sir Maurice De Bunsen the British ambassador to the Habsburg Empire during the July crisis and some description of these documents.

Robert William Seton-Watson. Its scope, however, was larger than that of this study; the book's primary focus was on British support for the partition of Austria-Hungary after the First World War. To address this question it chronicled British opinion from the late 1800's until the end of the war. Unfortunately, for the purpose of this study, it contained only a limited section on the assassination of the Archduke and the ensuing diplomatic crisis; there was no discussion of social class or of the Labour Party. While Hanak provided some insight into the mood of the British press on the eve of the First World War, the portion devoted to the July crisis, was cursory. Sentiments on the assassination itself were missing, with no significant analysis of events, presented until after the ultimatum was rejected. In fact, most of Hanak's work on the outbreak of the war was focussed on the first few days of August; from there it quickly turned to a discussion of the attack on Belgium.

Despite only briefly mentioning the July crisis, Hanak divided the sentiments of the British press during the period into liberal and conservative camps. His division followed traditional lines, painting the conservative newspapers as the supporters of the war and the liberal newspapers as very vocal opponents to the war. On the conservative opinions he remarked

From the moment, that Austria sent her fatal ultimatum to Belgrade *The Times* was convinced that Britain was on the threshold of war and it endeavoured to explain to its readers why Britain had to intervene. It explained that Britain was faced with a crisis similar to that of the Napoleonic wars and that the establishment of one predominant power on the Continent did not coincide with British interests.¹⁰

He placed the conservative newspapers at the front of the argument for Britain's participation in a European conflict. According to Hanak, the Conservatives at the time

¹⁰ Harry Hanak, pp. 37

felt that the Liberals were short sighted, and did not understand the real dangers, or, at the very least, humiliations that laid ahead after a war in which Britain had played no part.

Hanak's work on the liberal media was far more extensive. He chronicled the adamant opposition to a war that the liberal press felt would be too costly and hold no benefit for the British population. His analysis of the *Manchester Guardian* painted a picture of a frenzied, extremely isolationist viewpoint which championed the cause of peace for Great Britain at any cost, of the paper, he wrote:

This useless fury was now visited upon Serbia and Russia, the two arch-villains of the conspiracy against peace, according to the Liberal press. The *Manchester Guardian*, always a champion of peace, announced that a war between Austria and Serbia, regrettable though it be, would not be calamitous. But when the danger arose, that Britain would be dragged into such a war it announced with an isolationism typical of the left wing that the affairs of the Balkans were of little interest to Englishmen. The *Manchester Guardian* expressed the pious hope that Serbia might be towed out into the middle of the ocean and sunk.¹¹

Hanak's analysis of the British Newspapers during the July Crisis while interesting, only scratched the surface of a plethora of available information. There was no in-depth analysis of any one source; it was a survey of media sources rather than an exhaustive discussion. Furthermore, while his comparison of conservative and liberal opinions towards war was insightful his work lacked detailed analysis of Austro-Hungarian and British relations in the war, and lacked any concrete reactions and opinions regarding the assassination and the character of the Archduke. With so many available angles to research and questions left unanswered, Hanak's is a useful work upon which to build.

Like the few other works on Austria and Great Britain, Hanak also devoted pagination to British opinion of Germany. He argued that the conservative press,

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 37-38

especially *The Times*, was more accommodating of French concerns than it was of German concerns. In many ways, according to Hanak the conservative press painted the Germans as the proverbial bogeymen. Lord Northcliffe, the chief proprietor of *The Times*, was convinced that German ambitions were an immediate threat to the British Empire.¹² This point of view is the one most often portrayed in popular historiography. Books such as *Don't Mention the War*, by Ramsden, *Dreadnought*, by Massie and *Rumours of war and infernal machines*, by Gannon support the theory that British society in the early summer of 1914 was wary of the Germans.¹³ Hanak did not accept the popular assumption that all of Britain was experiencing Germanophobia in the years prior to the First World War. He argued that political preference dictated who was considered the 'enemy'. A book written in the autumn of 1914 by Ramsay Muir, Professor of Modern History at the University of Manchester confirmed Hanak's theory. While his opinions echoed Conservative sentiments, Muir expressed an underlying sense of surprise, a lament that a society such as Germany's could be the author of such a war. There was a definite sense that the author once admired and quite possibly emulated Germany's culture and scholars and that the book was the reaction to the current state of war. Muir argued that the German civilization had been over-run and conquered by Prussian militarism when he wrote:

The series of events described and the extraordinary revelations they have brought as to the aims and methods of one of the great European powers have come upon

¹² Ibid, pp. 36 and Gannon, Charles E. *Rumours of war and infernal machines: Technomilitary agenda-setting in American and British Speculative fiction*. Liverpool, 2003

¹³ Ramsden, John, *Don't Mention the War: The British and the German since 1890*. London, 2006 and Massie, Robert K., *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the coming of the great war*, New York: 1991 and Gannon.

us so suddenly that many people have a dazed and bewildered feeling. They can scarcely grasp, and they cannot credit, the full horror of this revelation. Men who have known and loved Germany and the Germans, who have studied under the great masters of learning in the German universities, whose souls have been uplifted by the harmonies of Beethoven and of Wagner, who have recognised in Kant and Hegel the deepest minds of modern philosophy, who have revered the serene humanity of Goethe- such men, and they are many, and among the best, in all countries, find it incredible that such actions and such a policy as we have described should have come from Germany; and that the spirit which inspires these actions and that policy should have taken possession of the minds of the German people, or even of their rulers.¹⁴

Muir's sentiment can be explained in Hanak's discussion of the liberal press' attitude towards Germany. For Hanak there was a great gulf between the opinion of the conservative press regarding Germany and the opinion of the liberal press regarding Germany. Therefore, according to Hanak the sentiment expressed by Muir was one of a Liberal turned Conservative. Hanak reflected this opinion when he wrote:

By late July, the *Manchester Guardian* was thoroughly alarmed and till the outbreak of war, it published pages of correspondence from its readers deeply hostile to the war. These letters showed a Gladstonian desire for peace, a deep-seated isolationism, a hostility to Serbia and Russia, and an admiration of Germany as a bulwark of civilisation. They also stressed the commercial advantage accruing to England from neutrality. 'We have not seen a shred of reason for thinking' it wrote on 30 July, 'that the triumph of Germany in a European war in which we had been neutral would injure a single British interest, however small, whereas the triumph of Russia would create a situation for us really formidable.' Or, as a correspondent put it in a letter: 'We should find in destroying Germany that we had broken down one of the bulwarks of the world's civilisation and given Europe back to the beast. Letters in all the {Liberal} newspapers stressed that Britain should not fight, even if Germany invaded Belgium. If it had to fight anyone, it should fight that barbaric power Russia and her tyrannous ruler, 'the Cossack outrager of women.' Germany was Britain's friend though ties of kinship, civilisation, and trade.¹⁵

While Hanak presented a preliminary discussion of British opinion toward Austria-Hungary, his book transformed into a discussion of British opinion towards Germany.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 45

¹⁵ Hanak, pp. 38-39

The analysis of British attitudes towards Germany was insightful, but there was a lack of similar insight into opinions on Austria-Hungary. While not readily apparent like the position toward Germany, there is still too much material present to dismiss with a simple 'Britons were ignorant of the affairs of the Dual Monarchy'.¹⁶

There is indeed a void in the literature, which addresses the role of Austria-Hungary in the Great War and the opinions of the British public towards the Habsburg Empire. Three theories have been put forth as to why there are relatively few texts concerning public opinion of Austria-Hungary pre-World War One. German efficiency and the atrocities committed during the war overshadowed Austria-Hungary's role; the British Foreign Office at the time was not overly concerned with the affairs of Austria-Hungary; and finally the British government and indeed the British public were so preoccupied with Germany as a foe that there simply was no time to consider Austria-Hungary as well.

The discussion of war-guilt is a much-maligned subject. Essentially, while the Austrians may have allowed a diplomatic incident to develop into a war and may have even fired the first shots of that war, Germany's military might and war atrocities overshadowed the actions of the Dual Monarchy in the British consciousness and forevermore replaced the Habsburgs as the chief aggressors. It is therefore understandable that works such as Hanak's include large sections on Germany even though it was a book devoted to British public opinion of Austria-Hungary. Muir wrote in the fall of 1914, that the British government and by extension the British public has less cause to worry about the Habsburgs than about the Germans because it was German policy that pushed Europe

¹⁶ Schroeder, Paul, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A reply to Joachim Remak," Journal of Modern History 44(1972), pp.341

into a war.¹⁷ The assassination of the Archduke was just the pretext Germany needed to start the war she had planned for decades, possibly even centuries.¹⁸ While Muir's opinions were definitely coloured by the war, his insight is still a valuable primary source of the changed view of Austria-Hungary and Germany in the early months of the war. Muir chronicled several incidents where on the brink of war Austria-Hungary might have been amenable to negotiations, but Germany's desire for war pushed her allies to reject these opportunities.¹⁹ Therefore, referring back to Muir, historians were correct in essentially ignoring Austria as a perpetrator of the war as it was more a result of German policy and a German desire for war than of Austrian obstinacy.

Another theory for the lack of accounts of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain is that the British Foreign Office was not overly concerned with the affairs of Austria-Hungary. As Paul Schroeder argued in his response to Joachim Remak, the British Government "did not think of Austria as her enemy; they tried not to think of her at all."²⁰ Based on Schroeder's theory, the newspapers did not write about the affairs of Austria-

¹⁷ Muir, pp. 10-11

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid, Of those opportunities Muir Specifically wrote: "What of the Attitude of Austria? During the first few days, she maintained her stiff-necked attitude, and refused to discuss the Serbian question in any form. She was evidently still hoping that the bluff would succeed. But after a few days she realized that, the danger was serious, and that whatever the German officials might say. Russia would fight unless some settlement was reached. That conviction brought her to a more reasonable attitude. On July 31, Sir Edward Grey proposed that Austria should stop the advance of her troops in Serbia, that Russia on her side should take no military steps, and that the other powers should consider what satisfaction Serbia ought to give to Austria. To this Russia agreed at once; and on the following day Austria also accepted the proposal, thus for the first time permitting the powers to discuss the questions between herself and Serbia. On this basis, it seems safe to assume that a peaceful settlement would have been reached. The obstacle was no longer in the obstinacy of Austria. Where was it? Throughout the negotiations, the German government never tired of asserting that it was eagerly and assiduously working for peace, and using its influence with Austria in that direction. This is stated over and over again, but the only definite German step of which there is any proof was the forwarding of English suggestions to the Austrian government without comment. In the German White Book issued after the war began there is not a single document showing that Germany used any influence upon Austria in a peaceful direction. It is difficult to believe that if Germany had really been using pressure upon Austria she would not have included some evidence to this effect in the official statement of her case."

²⁰ Schroeder, pp.341

Hungary, as her interests did not intersect those of Great Britain. Alternatively, the papers did not concern themselves with the relationship between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, as there was no relationship. This also then explains the lack of histories written about British relations with the Habsburg Empire and British opinion of the Habsburg Empire.

F.R. Bridge came to a similar conclusion. He, however, argued that the Dual Monarchy was not content to be ignored by the British; rather they desperately tried to influence the British press in a positive manner at the beginning of the July Crisis. However, as Bridge's work is a diplomatic account of the lead up to the war, his mention of the press is unfortunately summed up in a single sentence, without even a footnote to follow.²¹ Given the apparent attempt of the Austrian Foreign Ministry to influence the British Press, it is pertinent that there be a study of the British press despite the fact that previous historians believe that the British unconsciously ignored the affairs of the Dual Monarchy.

While France and Russia both loomed large in the minds of the Edwardians Germany was the most feared and vilified foreign power at the time. Much has been written about the gradual deterioration of British and German relations at the turn of the century. John Ramsden's book, *Don't Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890* was a one of the more comprehensive works of this nature. Ramsden chronicled the gradual shift in British public opinion from one that viewed Germany as a friend and even a potential ally, to one that regarded it as a suspicious rival, to one that finally labelled it an enemy nation. With this gradual deterioration of British esteem for

²¹ Bridge, F.R., Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A diplomatic history, London, 1972, pp. 382

Germany also came the eventual negation of Germany's positive achievements. What was once considered a nation of great thinkers and scientists was suddenly cast aside as a nation of Huns whose great achievements were suddenly labelled outdated or were otherwise credited to another.²²

Most historians agree that the popular spy novels of William LeQueux did not initiate anti-German sentiment in Britain, although they held an undeniable appeal for Edwardians. Historian Gerard DeGroot reflected this opinion when he wrote:

Anti-German bigotry was not completely absent, but in most cases it was safely hidden beneath a veneer of British tolerance...once the war began, the veneer quickly cracked and hatred seeped through, especially on the home front, where it was encouraged by propaganda. But, before August 1914, there was considerable admiration for Germany and certainly a greater sense of harmony than was felt towards the "ally" France, a much more dependable object of hatred. It is therefore erroneous to assume that invasion literature books like *The Riddle of the Sands*, *The invasion of 1910*, and *the Battle of Dorking*, and plays like *An Englishman's Home* - was responsible for stirring anti-German feeling in the decades before the Great War. Granted, the books and plays were popular and the enemy was usually German. The literature was intended as a warning of an impending threat, but that does not really explain its appeal. This generation, like any other, has a healthy fascination for intrigue and espionage. Thrillers are always more credible if the bad guy is believable; linking the fictional enemy to a contemporary adversary provided the requisite verisimilitude.²³

Similarly, Gannon argued that while the writings of LeQueux were popular and no doubt exerted influence on the consciousness of both the public and their elected officials, it is impossible to determine how much effect his writing really had on the eventual decision to go to war. According to Gannon, the anti-German sentiments were already present when LeQueux began writing; he and Northcliffe simply took advantage of that fear.²⁴

²² Ramsden, pp. 1-91

²³ DeGroot, Gerard J, *Blighty: British Society in the era of the Great War*, London: 1996, pp. 12

²⁴ Gannon, pp. 35-38

LeQueux's books were gory, but fanciful fiction. The appeal of the books along with the wide distribution they received as a serial in the *London Daily Mail* meant that LeQueux's message was able to reach a large audience. LeQueux's message was not so much anti-German as it was anti-foreigner and pro-military expansion. LeQueux's writings indicate that he deeply distrusted anyone not of the British Empire and that he seriously questioned the loyalty of all immigrants to the British Empire. LeQueux's sentiments can be discerned from his writings where he at one point told his readers:

Most of these men were Germans who, having served in the army, had come over to England and obtained employment as waiters, clerks, bakers, hairdressers, and private servants, and being bound by their oath to their Fatherland, had served their country as spies. Each man, when obeying the Imperial command to join the German arms, had placed in the lapel of his coat a button of a peculiar shape with which he had long ago been provided and by which he was instantly recognized as a loyal subject of the Kaiser.²⁵

Despite the fact that LeQueux's writings were fictional, they appealed to many conservative Edwardians. In Martin Pugh's book, *State and Society: A social and Political History of Britain* he noted that despite Britain's clear naval superiority LeQueux's books nevertheless added to the climate of general paranoia.

Though the scares about spies, invasions, and the German navy were baseless propaganda, they were not without some political influence. Many of those in high places wanted to believe the rumours, as did the general public. In addition to becoming amateur spy-spotters, many Edwardians undertook first-aid training, especially under the Voluntary Aid Detachment organized by the Red Cross, so as to be useful when the invasion came.²⁶

More evidence to suggest that LeQueux's writings were propaganda was the fact that the serialized editions featured in the *Daily Mail* were actually placed there as

²⁵ William LeQueux, "The Invasion, 1910", reproduced in Robert K. Massie, pp. 636-637

²⁶ Pugh, Martin, *State and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain 1870-1997*, London, pp. 160

part of a plan orchestrated by LeQueux and Lord Northcliffe²⁷, the owner of the paper, to boost sales in certain communities. Pugh noted that:

LeQueux collaborated with Lord Roberts of the National Service League and Lord Northcliffe of the *Daily Mail* to focus attention upon the likely route chosen by an invading army; it followed towns which Northcliffe was anxious to boost sales of the *Daily Mail*, thereby enabling him to mix profit and patriotism in a rather satisfying way! It soon became difficult to separate fact from fiction. Reports of suspicious activities from members of the public found a welcome in the pages of the *Daily Mail* and other papers.²⁸

LeQueux was not the only Edwardian author of sensationalist anti-German invasion stories. Erskine Childers wrote a best selling novel *Riddle of the Sands* that discussed a secret German plot to invade England through the islands in the north Atlantic. While not as incendiary as LeQueux's work, Childers' book exhibited many classic anti-foreigner pro-British Empire sentiments. Like LeQueux, Childers work also expressed underpinnings of a pro-naval and pro-military build-up. At one point in the story, one of the main characters discussed sea power and Britain's need to increase her able-bodied naval reserve. He wrote:

There must be hundreds of chaps like me- I know a good many myself- who know our coasts like a book- shoals, creeks, tides, rocks; there's nothing in it, it's only practice. They ought to make some use of us as a naval reserve. They tried once, but it fizzled out, and nobody really cares. And what's the result? Using every man of what reserves we've got, there's about enough to man the fleet on a war footing, and no more. They've tinkered with fishermen, and merchant sailors,

²⁷ Lord Northcliffe was not only the owner of the *Daily Mail*, but also the *Times*. As the proprietor of several successful newspapers, Northcliffe was able to exert a considerable amount of political influence. Northcliffe, however, was not satisfied with expressing his political influence in his paper, he also strove to hold elected office. In 1895 in an attempt to win an election in Portsmouth, he purchased the town newspaper, *The Evening Mail*, and had the well-respected reporters fabricate a story about a Franco-Russian invasion of Portsmouth. The story was concocted in manner that emphasized the its authenticity of the atmosphere and its scientific authority rather than its plot. It was designed to play on local fears and local patriotism . He hoped that by highlighting the city's outdated defenses and the fact that the Liberal incumbent had not updated these defenses, would be enough to frighten the town into electing him into office. He even went so far as to include the city's prominent citizens within the narrative of the story, thereby adding a greater degree of realism. Gannon, described Northcliff's efforts as "the very best style of professional scaremongering," but in the end his efforts proved fruitless as he was not elected to power. Gannon, pp. 33

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 160

and yachting hands, but every one of them ought to be got hold of; and the colonies, too. Is there the ghost of a doubt that if war broke out there'd be wild appeals for volunteers, aimless cadging, hurry, confusion, waste? My own idea is that we ought to go much further, and train every able-bodied man for a couple of years as a sailor. Army? Oh, I suppose you'd have to give them the choice. Not that I know or care much about the Army, though to listen to people talk you'd think it really mattered as the Navy matters. We're a maritime nation- we've grown by the sea and live by it; if we lose command of it, we starve. We're unique in that way, just as our huge empire, only linked by the sea, is unique. And yet, read Brassey, Dilke, and those 'Naval Annuals', and see what mountains of apathy and conceit have had to be tackled. It's not the people's fault. We've been safe so long, and grown so rich, that we've forgotten what we owe it to. But there's no excuse for those blockheads of statesmen, as they call themselves, who are paid to see things as they are. They have to go to an American to learn their A B C, and it's only when kicked and punched by civilian agitators, a mere handful of men who get sneered at for their pains, that they wake up, do some work, point proudly to it, and go to sleep again, till they get another kick. By Jove! We want a man like this Kaiser, who doesn't wait to be kicked, but works like a nigger for his country, and sees ahead.²⁹

As Hanak noted not all of Great Britain lived in fear of a German invasion.³⁰

Ward's book, *Red Flag and the Union Jack*, examined the opinions of socialists in regards to the apparent German menace.³¹ He argued that the vast majority of the left opposed the increased armaments and Germanophobia presented in the conservative newspapers, asserting that those pushing for war were not true patriots as they were influenced either by selfish gain or by foreign interests.³² Unlike Hanak, Ward argued that the left neither supported nor feared Germany; rather the majority of the left in Britain only supported the British working classes. He explained that unlike socialists in other nations, who believed that workers had no country, British workers understood that

²⁹ Childers, Erskine, *Riddle of the Sands*, Oxford, 1903, pp. 89

³⁰ Hanak, pp. 37

³¹ Ward, Paul. *Red Flag and the Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left, 1881-1924*, Woodbridge United Kingdom, 1998

³² Ward, pp. 115. *An English Man's Home*, a popular play at the time, contained a line which expressed the popular socialist sentiments on war and patriotism of the time, it read: "The British workman is being deluded by this unholy alliance of Jew financiers, American and Irish journalists and peers, into the belief that Conscription is a worth ideal." This quote demonstrates a prevailing distrust of non-British people, that was not reserved solely for Germany.

they had national interests in common with the ruling class of their homeland. This translated to a realization that British socialists were afforded more political liberty than they would be in any other country and therefore the defence of Britain was worth the lives of a few British workers. This support, however, was only offered in a defensive war and the vast majority of the left did not support any increased armaments or money for the military.³³ For the most part, despite the fact the left in Britain was more supportive of its government than was the left in other countries, the British left believed that there was no threat of invasion by Germany, that Britain's defences were adequate, and that any increase in armaments would threaten peace and thus reduce the safety of the nation. Therefore, as Ward argued the attitude of the left to any future war was largely dependent on their belief in the existence of a threat dangerous to the continued survival of Britain as a nation marked out by its inherent freedom, rather than on socialist principles.³⁴

While it is still not a popular field of study, there are more accounts of British Austro-Hungarian diplomacy at the outbreak of the First World War than there are accounts of British public opinion towards Austria-Hungary. These works include monographs by Bridge, Fest, Schroeder, Remak, and Pribram.³⁵ Many historians will note that Britain was not entirely concerned with the affairs of Austria-Hungary. Schroeder likened Austria's behaviour towards Britain to that of an attention-seeking child. Austria lived in fear of Britain while at the same time desperately wishing to be

³³ Ward, pp. 115-118

³⁴ Ibid, pp. 102-118

³⁵ Fest, Wilfried, Peace or Partition: The Hapsburg Monarchy and British Policy 1914-1918, 1978 and Bridge, and Schroeder, and Pribram, Alfred Francis, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 1908-1914 translated by Ian F.D. Morrow (London, 1951), p. 216-217 The Original German version was published in 1923.

recognized by Britain.³⁶ In terms of diplomacy, both Schroeder and Pribram have argued that Britain was simply not thinking of Austria at all. Her concerns lay with Germany and Russia not with the former glory of the Habsburg monarchy.³⁷ Such an argument is short sighted. Turn of the century British foreign policy was above all else concerned with the maintenance of the balance of power. As Austria-Hungary held a strategic position nestled between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, the Habsburgs held a key role in maintaining the status quo in Europe. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the British heeded no attention towards the affairs of the Dual Monarchy. Wilfried Fest in *Peace or Partition* noted:

It was not before the evolution of the 'Balance of Power' in Europe as the maxim of British foreign policy that the Habsburg Monarchy became a country, which was taken into consideration by British statesmen who wanted to prevent any power from attaining continental supremacy. After the Napoleonic bid for hegemony the common interest of the two countries was realized by both Metternich and Castlereagh, and since the Congress of Vienna, the Hapsburg Empire was by and large appreciated by Britain as a useful factor to bar Russia from advancing to the Near East and the Balkans.³⁸

The strategic location of the Austro-Hungarian Empire made it tactically important to British public officials, while the erratic foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy made it difficult to ignore. Austro-Hungarian foreign policy at the time appeared intentionally to disrupt the balance of power. Due to these factors, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had to be in the sites of the British Foreign Office. The Habsburg Kingdom was a diverse land made up of a mosaic of cultures. Unfortunately, for peace

³⁶ Schroeder, and Pribram

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Fest, pp. 1. Fest was a student of A.J.P. Taylor. He argues that historically Britain and Austria-Hungary have maintained a friendship because the two countries have few common interests.

within Europe, many of these cultures wanted to govern themselves independently. The power of the Dual Monarchy had been steadily dwindling and by the turn of the century, the monarchy was having trouble placating all of the cultural groups and maintaining unity and order. Added to these factors was the continuing pressure building up between Austria-Hungary and her Russian supported neighbour Serbia. It is extremely difficult to assume that a nation like Britain, concerned with the balance of power on the continent, could have possibly ignored the actions of Austria-Hungary, as her actions were so likely to upset that delicate balance. Schroeder argued that as Britain had a self-prescribed duty to manage the European concert she should have better managed the Balkans to prevent Austrian decay and tension with Russia. He claimed that Britain was derelict in her duties by letting Germany both sustain and restrain the Dual Monarchy:

What makes Britain's responsibility for Austria's plight a heavy one, although less direct than Russia's or France's, is that Britain alone was in position to manage the European concert so as to control the Balkan situation.³⁹

In the existing historiography, Pribram discussed Great Britain and Austria-Hungary as if they existed in entirely separate spheres without any communication with one another. Pribram, in *Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 1908-1914*, remarked:

The interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, nevertheless, did not cross one another and therefore, did not form a barrier to friendly relations. Austro-Hungarian and British interests were widely separated in space. The British Government was primarily concerned with Far Eastern affairs, and the Irish independence movement, while the Austro-Hungarian Government was forced in an ever-increasing degree to devote its attention to the Balkans.⁴⁰

Further investigation into British Foreign Office papers led notable historian Luigi Albertini to conclude that the Hapsburg's dangerous policy in the early twentieth

³⁹ Schroeder, p. 342-343

⁴⁰ Pribram, p. 216-217

century made it impossible for the British government at least, to ignore Austria-Hungary. In *The Origins of the War of 1914*, Albertini wrote:

In the first place it was foolish and dangerous, if not also politically immoral, to regard the Austro-Serbian dispute of no concern of Britain and to think it could be kept separate from an Austro-Russian dispute. All that had happened from 1908 onwards served to prove that Austro-Serbian relations were one of the fundamental European problems.⁴¹

There is a lack of literature concerning British and Austro-Hungarian relations at the outbreak of the First World War. While it is apparent in the newspapers and political speeches of the time that Austria was not the chief concern of the British government or the British public, a study of Austria Hungary, Serbia and the July Crisis in the British press is still warranted. While it may not have been the chief focus of the British media at the time, it was not, as this study will demonstrate, completely ignored either. Furthermore, the fact that it was not the chief focus of the media at the time adds justification to this study as it is equally educational to examine an event that the media did not concentrate on as it is to examine an event which was heavily emphasized.

⁴¹ Albertini, Luigi, *The Origins of the War of 1914*. Translated By Isabella M. Massey London: 2005 originally published in 1952, pp. 331

Chapter Two: Historical Background

In order to gain a better understanding of the Edwardian media's stance on the July Crisis it is first essential to examine Edwardian culture and politics. In a study that focuses on a class-based approach to newspaper analysis it is important to examine the historiographical debate on class distinctions in the late Victorian and Edwardian eras. Furthermore, as part of this debate it is also essential to consider works on Edwardian opinions regarding literature and Edwardian class distinctions in as it pertained to literacy. Finally, to place the decisions of the papers on what stories to focus on or print, it is essential to put the events of the July crisis within the context of the newsworthy issues

The traditional analysis of social class and the political parties in Edwardian Britain portrays the two main political parties the Conservative and the Liberals representing two very different constituencies of class. The Conservatives represented the aristocracies sometimes called the 'classes' and the Liberals represented the working people sometimes referred to as the 'masses.' In traditional historiography these party and class distinction were set in stone, monolithic and antagonistic to one another. The two main political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals' rhetoric served to further polarize society creating a greater class divide between the aristocracy and the masses. The Conservative party was seen to champion the cause of the wealthy elite while the Liberals prided themselves on representing the poor. The Labour party was a late comer

to the political scene, but it rose out of the idea of class allegiance and sought to give workers an increased sense of class-consciousness and class identity.

According to Cannadine, however, the post Marxist analysis of class and party in Great Britain is more fluid. He argued that party politics during the Edwardian era were as much about manipulating social identities as they were about creating or defining those identities.⁴²

Both the Conservative party and the Liberal party appealed to different facets of society. In the Edwardian period, the Conservatives drew a great deal of support from the aristocracy, the middle classes, and the working class. Property owners, businessmen, and fully 1/3-1/2 of the working class population in some industrial cities were staunch supports of Conservative candidates.⁴³ Voters for the Liberal party were equally diverse as the party could count on support from many businessmen, professionals, and even some millionaires.⁴⁴ Of all the parties, the Labour Party was the most homogenous in its support, drawing nearly all of its votes from the working class. However, as historians like Ward, Cannadine, and Benson argued aside from presenting a unified rhetoric, politically the Labour party was just as divided if not more so than the other parties.⁴⁵

The debate over the role of party politics and class divisions reveals one important thing, that is, the ambiguity of the middle class. In many instances, historians like Cannadine argue that the middle class was not well defined; rather it was composed of the people who did not fit the definition of the aristocracy or the definition of the

⁴² Cannadine, David. *The rise and fall of class in Britain*. New York, 1999, pp. 110

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 117 and Benson, John. *The Working Class in Britain, 1850-1939*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2003

⁴⁴ Ibid, pp. 117

⁴⁵ Ward, pp. 118; Cannadine, pp. 118; and Benson, pp. 186-187

working class.⁴⁶ In the end, the middle class could not be defined by economic means as it was composed of a variety of people from the wealthiest factory owners to shopkeepers, and professionals. It too could not necessarily be defined by politics as its support was often fundamentally divided between the Liberal and Conservative parties.⁴⁷ In many ways, the most unifying element of the middle class was the stereotypes held by the other classes. The middle class was frequently portrayed as guilt-ridden, greedy, rootless, unpatriotic, self indulgent, hypocritical, feeble and complacent, and corrupt.⁴⁸

In many ways, it is almost as difficult to quantify the working class as poverty can be a fluid state and is often not a life long conditions as it can be affected by age and circumstance.⁴⁹ As McKibbin argued in *The Ideologies of Class*, sociologists at the time struggled to qualify poverty and it causes often relying on anecdotal evidence provided by aristocratic social critiques.⁵⁰ To add to this Joanna Burke argued that traditional definitions of class meant that the working class were meant to be less wealthy than the middle class, which in turn was less affluent than the upper class. She, however, found that the traditional economic definitions of the classes did not necessarily hold true for the Edwardian period. In fact, despite impressive improvements in their financial status, the self- defined working class retained their class identity and the label of working class.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Cannadine, pp. 121

⁴⁷ Gunn, Simon. *The Public Culture of the Victorian Middle Class: ritual and authority and the English industrial city 1840-1914*. Manchester, 2000, pp. 1-36

⁴⁸ Cannadine, pp. 123-124

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 119-120

⁵⁰ McKibbin, Ross. *The Ideologies of Class: Social relations in Britain 1880-1950*. Oxford, 1990, pp. 168

⁵¹ Bourke, Joanna. *Working-class cultures in Britain 1890-1960: Gender, class and Ethnicity*. London, 1994, pp. 5-8

The working-class in the Edwardian period enjoyed more access to printed materials than either their predecessors or their counterparts in other areas of the industrialized world. According to Sumpter, this increased access to printed material was directly the product of a change in the newspaper industry. Cheaper paper-making processes and improved printing technologies drove down the cost of mass producing a newspaper and therefore allowed for new readership. These technological developments were accompanied by significant changes in the structure of the British press. These changes included a structural movement away from small editor journals towards extensive capitalization, a formal shift from unbroken type towards illustrations and photography, and a changed in focus from Parliamentary news towards 'human interest' content.⁵² These changes allowed for the publication of more newspapers in Great Britain and increased the choice of newspapers available to the working-class.

Payne noted that, while the British working class in the early twentieth century were generally not required by their employers to be fully literate, most in fact were, taking great pleasure in reading anything from tabloid style newspapers to the eighteenth-century classics. He argued that by engaging in literacy the working-class were essentially staking a claim to an 'autonomous intellectual life' and throwing down a direct challenge to an English class system which insisted that intellectual endeavors were the preserve of their social superiors.⁵³ Rose made similar argument in his book *The Intellectual life of the British working classes*,⁵⁴ explaining that not only did changes in

⁵² Sumpter, Caroline. "The cheap press and the 'reading crowd': Visualizing mass culture and modernity, 1838-1910." *Media History*, 12(3), 2006, pp. 240

⁵³ Payne, Jonathan. "Literacy and the Working Class." *Labour History Review*, 67(3), 2002, pp. 368-371

⁵⁴ Rose, Jonathan. *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes*. New Haven: Yale, 2001

printing technology allow for greater literacy among the working classes, but also the rise in popular fiction and the secondhand bookstore.⁵⁵

Rose also examined the working classes' understanding of literature. He argued that working class readers often had difficulty distinguishing between factual and fictional sources. While the working-class was believed to enjoy reading and in the Edwardian period, they enjoyed an increase in access to reading material, there were still a limited number of sources available for their consumption. Rose argued without enough material to make adequate comparisons many working-class readers believed works of fanciful fiction to be true.⁵⁶ This tendency is especially revealing in terms of the working-class attitude to the anti German spy novels of LeQueux and Childers as well as the newspaper accounts of the July crisis.

Troubles in the Balkans were not new to Edwardian society. In 1908, a crisis erupted in the Balkans over Austria's attempt to annex Bosnia. In fact, the area had been a hot spot for political trouble for many years.⁵⁷ It is therefore understandable that the British public ignored Balkan affairs. On the one hand, trouble between Austria-Hungary and her Slav population or her Balkan neighbours was not news. There had been trouble for centuries and for Britons the troubles seemed interminable and without solution.⁵⁸ On the other hand, it is difficult to say that the British were not concerned with the occurrences in the Balkans because these troubles had serious implications on the British

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 120

⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 95

⁵⁷ As shocking as the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was, his death came at a time of frequent political assassinations. The political instability of the early twentieth century led to a great many political upheavals. Vladimir Dedijer in *The Road to Sarajevo*, chronicles all of the major political assassinations from 1792-1914. In the short period from 1870 until 1913 there are almost seventy names, all political figures, mostly from central and eastern Europe, the victims of political assassination. Dedijer, Vladimir, *The Road to Sarajevo*, New York, 1966, pp. 449-451

⁵⁸ Times of London. July 1, 1914, pp. 7B

Empire as much of the unrest stemmed from a clash between the two sick men of Europe Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. British diplomats knew that if either empire was to break up the ensuing chaos could have disastrous implications for the British Empire, especially in India and Africa. The idea of the Empire was so much a source of pride in Edwardian England that anything that could jeopardize the Empire was a news worthy item. On the other hand, supporters of the extreme political left were decidedly anti Empire. As articles in the Labour/ radical papers reveal, extremists believed that the Empire was a source of shame and led to the moral degradation of society along with too many foreign entanglements that could potentially embroil British soldiers and more specifically British workers.

In the 1906 general election, the Conservative Party was dealt a crushing blow. While the elections itself was won by the Liberal Party, the real result of the election was the emergence of a substantial Labour Party. The developments of the 1906 election mirrored the situation throughout much of the rest of Europe, where revolutionary parties were beginning to gain overwhelming strength. The primary difference was that in Great Britain, the Labour Party, unlike some of their more radical European counterparts, were staunch supporters of the parliamentary system. The election of 1906 revealed the state of the political scene in the pre-war period. The Liberals dominated the government in a series of minority governments, while the Conservatives were consistently shut out of office.⁵⁹ The Edwardian period was a political break from the Victorian period before it. Social sentiments of the day led many voters to shun the traditional aristocracy in favour

⁵⁹ Pugh, pp. 140

of a more socially responsible government.⁶⁰ The Edwardian period was the heyday of the Liberal Party in Great Britain. At the same time, however, a different form of socially motivated government was also gaining strength. While still not receiving the election numbers to form a government, the Labour Party was becoming a force to be reckoned with in the Edwardian period. The Labour Party presented more of a challenge to the Liberal Party than it did to the Conservative Party. In the end, the Liberal Party too was challenged more by the Labour Party than it was by the Conservative Party. At the time, Churchill, who sincerely believed that the differences between Liberalism and Socialism was the difference between rich and poor remarked:

Liberalism has its own history and its own traditions. Socialism has its own formulas and its own aims. Socialism seeks to pull down wealth: Liberalism seeks to raise up poverty. Socialism would destroy private interests: Liberalism would preserve private interests in the only way in which they can be safely and justly preserved, namely by reconciling them with public right. Socialism would kill enterprise; Liberalism would rescue enterprise from trammels of privilege and preference.⁶¹

The Edwardian period dominated by the Liberals was therefore a period of great social reform. The roots of modern ideas like old age pensions and school lunches, which allowed those in receipt of the services to maintain their franchise, replaced older poor laws, which provided state support at the expense of citizen rights.⁶² Edwardian society was a changing society with an increasing sense of social responsibility. With all of these changes in Edwardian Great Britain, it is of no surprise that the British who did discuss the Habsburg Empire characterized it as old fashioned and socially, politically, and democratically backwards.

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 40-45 and Briggs, pp. 90-97

⁶¹ Reproduced in Asa Briggs, pp. 93

⁶² Briggs and Pugh

The Liberal Government and Edwardian Britain in general, despite the naval race with Germany, were not renowned for their military planning skills.⁶³ The government and the society in general distrusted large standing armies and were wary of detailed military strategy.⁶⁴ For Edwardians prior to the First World War the army was used mainly for dealing with colonial issues while the Royal Navy protected the British Isles. Because Great Britain was an island nation, Edwardians felt that the Royal British Navy offered the best protection and a large army was unnecessary in all but the worst crises. Historically, the British had no need to maintain a large standing army as the Royal Navy was able to provide defence in most situations and were otherwise able to buy time to raise an army in more serious situations. According to DeGroot:

The prejudice against a large standing army went hand in hand with an aversion to strategic plans formed in advance of a crisis. Both, it was felt, smacked of militarism. Historians who contend that Britain was a militaristic society before 1914 have failed to explain this abhorrence of military planning. Britain preferred instead a pragmatic army, capable of reacting to crises when they occurred. Stated differently, the British saw virtue in muddling through.⁶⁵

Consequently, when the British were faced with the predicament as to whether or not to partake in the continental war brewing in the summer of 1914, they were also faced with a woefully inadequate military force, ill equipped, and untrained to deal with the reality of modern warfare.

⁶³ DeGroot, pp. 16

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Ibid

Aside from the larger political issues,⁶⁶ the newspapers were also pre-occupied with the day-to-day eccentricities of life. As is the case with any period, the press in Edwardian times often focused on minor social issues. This was especially true of the 'letters' section. The Edwardians were, on average, keener to write on local issues, with more immediate affect on daily life. One of the chief concerns throughout the letters section in *The Times* was whether to allow dogs on railway carriages.⁶⁷ While not the great political debate that was feminism and certainly not on par with the international concerns generated by the assassination of the Archduke, the dogs on railway cars debate raged, sometimes without civility, throughout the July Crisis. The debate in fact began the day after the papers began reporting the assassination of the Archduke. The letter that sparked a full month's worth of controversy read as follows:

Sir While you are dealing with the question of dogs in hotels and restaurants, I wish you would also turn your attention to dogs in railway carriages. I travel a good deal on the Great Western Railway and even if I ensconce myself in a smoking carriage, I frequently have to journey in the company of clipped French poodles or yappy Pekingese. The printed regulations of the Great Western Railway apparently do not sanction the presence of dogs in carriages. When I asked an official about the matter I was told that the "custom" was to allow dogs in carriages unless any passenger objected, in which case the dog could be turned out. I object to dogs in railway carriages, but I object still more to have to travel with an infuriated female who has been temporarily deprived of her yelping plaything. The company ought to deal with this matter themselves and not trust the burden of interference upon their customers.⁶⁸

⁶⁶It is little wonder that some historians have concluded that the events of June 28 1914 were of limited initial importance to the average Edwardian; never before in the history of the British Isles had there been so much social unrest on such a variety of issues. Strikes, Irish home rule, and feminism all grappled for newspaper headlines. It can be argued that the British government let alone the British public could not have possibly leant their full attention to troubles in the far off and always turbulent Balkans in the summer of 1914 because Britain itself was on the brink of civil war over the "Irish Question Manchester Guardian, *The Manchester Guardian History of the War 1914-1920*, volume one, Manchester, 1914, pp. 10 and Times, *The Times documentary history of the war*, volume one, London, 1917, pp. 5-26

⁶⁷ The dogs on railway carriages debate received significant pagination in *The Times* during the summer of 1914. In all total, there were thirteen letters on the subject in a time span of two weeks, nearly a letter a day.

⁶⁸ *The Times Of London*, June 30, 1914, pp. 9

The subject of dogs on trains became one of the more prolific and heated debates of the summer of 1914. Rebuttals to this letter and responses to the rebuttals took up significant pagination and was a major source of name-calling and sour feelings in the pages of *The Times*. Concerned citizens wrote in and defended both sides of the issue.

Another chief concern in the letters section was the danger caterpillars posed to children playing in parks. On July 24th 1914 in the heat of the crisis in the Balkans, one of the more prominent letters in *The Times* read as follows:

Your article on the vapourer moth caterpillars in the parks does not lay sufficient emphasis on the fact that "hairs of these caterpillars are irritating to sensitive skins." People and parents especially, should be more explicitly warned. The fact is that if a child handles one of these caterpillars the hairs adhere to the fingers and are certain sooner or later to be transferred to the sensitive skin of the eyelids. It {is} advisable that everybody should be warned not to handle either the caterpillars or the cocoons with their fingers or, if they do have to touch either, to be very careful to wipe their hands well (not on their handkerchiefs) before there is any chance of bringing them in contact with their eyes.⁶⁹

Aside from these topics, other major issues included the unseasonable warmth that summer, the public nuisance of car horns, compensation for poultry farmers due to nuisance foxes, and whose duty it was to clear the Thames River of unsightly and dangerous weeds.⁷⁰

While the letters in *The Times* often discussed trivial aspects of city life this was not the case for the *Manchester Guardian*. The *Guardian* rarely printed as many letters as *The Times*. When it did print letters, they were sporadically placed throughout the paper and always focused on major domestic and foreign policy issues. As will be demonstrated during the discussion of Britain's entry into the war, *The Times* not only published trivial letters, it also published letters expressing dissenting opinion. The *Manchester Guardian*,

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, July 24, 1914 pg. 9

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, June 29 1914 to August 4, 1914

however, exercised considerably more restraint. Throughout the month of July 1914 there were no letters about dogs in railway carriages or the danger caterpillars posed to children; instead, the few letters that there were concerned Irish home rule, various aspects of Manchester city politics, and Britain's potential role in a European war. The only exceptions were the letters praising the *Manchester Guardian* for taking a stance on a particular issue; even these letters, in the end, were concerned with serious political matters. A letter printed on July 9th concerning Irish home rule was typical for the paper:

Why should we not adopt the same principle and method in dealing with Ireland, the principle and method that have proved so successful in Australia? Let us pass the Home Rule Bill for Ireland in a form that shall exclude Ulster altogether and let us at the same time offer Ulster a Home Rule Bill for herself. It may appear at first sight to be a fantastic suggestion to make Ulster, with its million and a half population, into a self-governing state, but it would be better to do this by the process of legislation than to leave Ulster to do it for herself by the process of rebellion, and that seems to be the alternative.⁷¹

Compared to the often trivial and occasionally dissident letters printed in *The Times* the letters printed in the *Guardian* appear more carefully selected for content and opinion. Letters discussing the Irish Question were clustered together whenever there was a collection of articles on the Irish Question. At the same time, as will later be demonstrated in the section of Britain's entry into the war, not one of the letters expressed an opinion that disagreed with the editorial opinion of the *Manchester Guardian*.

The *Daily Herald* did not so much print letters as it did encourage its readers to contribute articles. Given the radical mandate of the paper, the *Daily Herald*, like the *Guardian*, did not dwell on trivial issues. It instead dealt with worker solidarity, working

⁷¹ *Manchester Guardian*, July 9, 1914, pp. 10

class rights, and anti-imperialism. On August 3, 1914, an article ran which was typical of the paper's sentiments:

We in England have also some lessons to learn. We are at the end, or people imagine we are, of a long period of agitation in connection with Home Rule, an agitation which has been carried on through bloodshed, persecution, and assassination, and all the horrors of internecine warfare of brother against brother creed against creed.⁷²

While there most certainly were more pressing issues in the summer of 1914 both domestic and foreign, the Edwardians like any other people were often preoccupied with the more trivial and daily aspects of modern life. While the letters in *The Times* did not express concern with the foreign affairs events of July 1914, the letters about dogs in railway carriages do hint at the tension caused by the feminist movement at the time. On the other hand, while the readers of the *Guardian* and the *Herald* wrote about far more significant issues the presentation of the letters in the *Guardian* and the mandate of the *Herald* suggest that the submissions have been edited for relevant content and discerning opinions.

⁷² *Daily Herald*, June 30, 1914, pp. 5

Chapter Three: Theory and Method

It is important to note that the newspapers do not necessarily represent public opinion. Newspapers have editors, and both editors and columnists have their own personal views, which are reflected in the language used in the articles, in the treatment of the subject, in the headlines, and even in what news is reported. Furthermore, it must be noted that a newspaper is a business and as such prints stories that will sell papers and generate money for the newspaper. A simple solution to avoid these problems would be to just use the letters section of the newspaper in order to gauge public opinion. However, that too is fraught with problems. As was demonstrated in the discussion of the letters section of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Daily Herald*, editors also choose what letters to print. For these reasons, this study focuses on political parties and class divisions as rather general entities. There are no public opinion polls dating from 1914 asking the average citizen his or her opinion on their personal changing view of Austria-Hungary over the course of the month of July. When discussing newspaper readers, it is really the discussion the 'ideal' newspaper reader as defined by Danuta Reah. This stereotypical reader is an archetype and does not actually exist. This study does recognize the fact that some readers choose newspapers whose beliefs oppose their own either in order to gain an understanding of another point of view, or perhaps in order to galvanize themselves more towards their own opinion.

For this analysis the three newspapers were categorized according to their respective political and class biases: *The Times* being aristocratic and Conservative; the *Manchester Guardian* being middle class and Liberal, and the *Daily Herald* being working class and Labour. In 1914, there were no studies that specifically concerned newspaper readership. While there were circulation figures prior to this period, no study

of the make up of a paper's readers was performed in Great Britain until 1932.⁷³ In 1932, however, in order to better target newspaper advertising, the first of three early studies randomly sampled and then surveyed the readers of the major British newspapers. The first challenge encountered by researchers conducting the survey was a lack of definition of the terms "reader". There is a marked difference between those who skim the paper casually and those who read it in-depth cover to cover. Therefore, for the purpose of the survey to be defined as a reader of a particular paper the respondent had to have read at least one article from start to finish in the previous day's edition.⁷⁴ The questionnaire asked respondents about their sex, age, and most importantly for this study, their family income. Respondents were then divided into three categories: "well to do", "upper and lower middle classes," and "working class and poor". The survey revealed that in 1932, 28.2% of *Times* readers were well to do, 40% were upper and lower middle classes, and 31.8% were working class or poor. The same survey reveals that 0.7% of *Daily Herald* readers were well to do, 16.6% were part of the upper and lower middle classes, and 82.7% were working class or poor.⁷⁵ While only 28.2% of *the Times*' readership was comprised of the elite this number was significantly higher than any of the other papers surveyed.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, the survey did not include the *Manchester Guardian*. While the readership survey was conducted considerably after the events of the July Crisis, it can be argued based on the work of other historians like Hanak and Richards⁷⁷ that the papers' readership figures do not vary greatly from the 1914 to the 1930's.

⁷³ Shankleman, Eric, "Measuring the readership of newspapers and magazines." *Applied Statistics*, 4(3), 1955, pp. 184

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 184- 186

⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 191

⁷⁶ *The Daily Mirror* reported 1.4% of readers were well to do, the *Daily Express* 3.5%, *Daily Mail* 6.3%, *News Chronicle* 2.4%, *Daily Sketch* 3.8%, and the *Daily Telegraph* 18.4%. Ibid, pp. 191

⁷⁷ Hanak, and Huw Richards

Once the readership was determined, the papers were surveyed for any mention of Austria-Hungary or Serbia in the period spanning from June 29 1914 to August 4 1914. For this study, a mention of Austria-Hungary constituted one of two scenarios. The first scenario was an article, editorial, or letter directly related to the Habsburg monarchy and the crisis at hand. This could include articles on a variety of subjects for example it could include among other things articles pertaining to the assassination of the Archduke, the funeral arrangements for the Archduke, the presentation of the note to Serbia, or Austro-Hungarian military movements.

For this study, an article, editorial, or letter that principally discussed the other major belligerent powers, but also referred to Austria-Hungary, also constituted a mention of Austria-Hungary. For the most part, these articles discussed German or Russian policies or movements.


If an article, editorial, or letter discussed Austria-Hungary, but did not relate to the political crisis at hand, it was not counted as a mention and therefore was not part of this study. For the most part, very few articles discussed Austria-Hungary in this period without pertaining to the July crisis itself.

Of the three subject papers, *The Times* is the only one that is indexed. It is also the only one available in a searchable electronic format. Initially *The Times'* electronic interface made it the easiest paper to search. The ability to keyword search made the initial collection and compilation of quantitative data easier than in the other two papers. However, once the collection of qualitative data began, the limited functionality of the electronic interface meant that there was little if any advantage to the searchable electronic format. In many cases, the keyword search function retrieved articles that

discussed Austria-Hungary or Serbia, but did not discuss the July Crisis. There were also many cases where alternate spellings or alternate terminology excluded relevant articles from the search results. In the end, had the interface exercised a greater degree of bibliographic control and used consistent subject headings the interface would have been more effective in retrieving relevant results. As it was, despite the fact that *The Times* was electronically searchable for the actual collection of qualitative data it was more effective to electronically browse the foreign news, editorial, and letters sections than it was to specifically search for relevant terms. As the interface itself does not offer a browse function, the most effective way to electronically view and then browse the entire contents of the paper was to do an open search limiting the retrieval by date and nothing else. While this produced a high recall, the results discovered through browsing had greater precision. At the same time after it was discovered that the search was not retrieving the most relevant articles, it then became necessary to backtrack and re-count the previously collected quantitative data through browsing to ensure that it was accurately representing the true composition of the data.

As the other two papers were not available electronically and were not indexed the only way to search through these papers was to manually browse the foreign news, editorial, and letters sections on microfilm for each day from June 29, 1914 to August 4, 1914. To generate the article division statistics the number relevant of news articles, editorials, and letters were tallied and compared. Similarly, to collect the qualitative data each paper was reviewed day by day and the relevant articles were read and added to the analysis. As with *The Times*, browsing although time consuming, ensured that all relevant articles were reviewed.

The Times featured the most coverage of Austria-Hungary. The following is a chart that breaks down the types of articles printed in this paper.




From the chart, it is clear that full-length news articles accounted for most of the information available on Austria-Hungary. In *The Times*, special correspondents located in field produced these articles. Unlike the other two sample papers, *The Times'* foreign news stories were not purchased from a news service such as Reuters therefore they were more reflective of the paper's viewpoint. Nevertheless, the articles still maintained a degree of professional detachment and were not as revealing as actual editorial pieces. Editorials made up the next largest group of articles that mentioned Austria-Hungary. Editorials and letters to the editor can be considered the most representative of public opinion. The opinions expressed within editorials and letters to the editor are furthermore quintessential in understanding the paper's position and the

opinion it disseminated to its readership. Therefore, for the purposes of this study editorials and letters to the editor were used to quantify public response, whereas news pieces were considered for their numbers rather than for their content. Out of one hundred and thirty seven references to Austria-Hungary during the study period, there were only three letters to the editor concerning Austria-Hungary. This however should not be taken to mean that there was no interest in the war. In the same period, there were one hundred seventy two mentions of Germany; eleven were letters to the editor and one hundred eighty one mentions of Russia of which six were letters to the editor.


In comparison to *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian* included a similar number of news stories, less editorials, and far more letters to the editor. The *Guardian* maintained a fluid format that adapted to suit the changing needs of the crisis. In the beginning like *The Times*, the *Guardian* printed more stories and little or no letters regarding the subject. By the end of the crisis, however, the *Guardian* printed literally dozens of letters each day concerning Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Britain's possible role in the crisis. The following chart breaks down the division articles throughout the crisis in the *Manchester Guardian*

Manchester Guardian division of types of articles



In terms of the chronological breakdown of the articles in the *Manchester Guardian*, the assassination was covered within the news section daily from June 29th 1914 until July 6th. Coverage of the ensuing crisis resumed daily from July 22nd until August 4th and the start of the war. There were two editorials on the assassination, one on the presentation of the note, and five on Britain's potential entry into the war. There were no letters regarding the assassination or the presentation of the note. All of letters printed in the *Guardian* regarded Britain's possible entry into the war. For the last days of July and the first days of August, the paper literally filled pages with letters protesting the war. These letters and editorials, however, did not solely concern Austria-Hungary or Serbia. The editorials for the most part outlined broad European diplomatic issues, of which the affairs of Austria-Hungary and the current crisis were of chief concern. The letters to the editor on the other hand were not primarily concerned with Austria-Hungary or Serbia. They were for the most part concerned with Germany and Russia.

The *Daily Herald* printed the most editorials on the crisis of the three subject papers. It is important to note, however, that much of the paper's news stories were so editorialized, it was difficult to categorize them as news stories and not as opinion pieces. As the paper's mandate was to disseminate politics first and news second every article was taken as an opportunity to express the paper's political views. The paper welcomed submissions from all dissenters and radicals. The interpretation of letters to the editor is necessarily broader when examining a paper that welcomes all submissions, especially when the paper's readers were so loyal that they have been referred to by historian Huw Richards, as 'followers' or 'supporters' rather than simply readers.⁷⁸ The following chart breaks down the coverage of the crisis.




As was the case with the *Manchester Guardian*, the coverage in the *Daily Herald* was more concentrated in the last week before the outbreak of the war. The paper covered the assassination in earnest for a full week including both editorials and news reports, but after the first week of July, the story disappeared from the headlines entirely. Coverage of

⁷⁸ Richards, "The Daily Herald 1912-1964," *History Today*, 2000, pp.12-13

the crisis in the Balkans did not resume until the eve of the presentation of the ultimatum. After the rejection of the ultimatum, the chief focus of the paper was on the crisis and more specifically protesting the impending war.

Articles, letters, and editorials that mentioned the July Crisis were then divided into the three periods: the assassination of the Archduke and the immediate aftermath; the presentations of the ultimatum to Serbia; and the rejection of Serbia's reply and the road towards war. At this point, the articles were divided into three categories: editorials and letters, article written by reporters working for the paper, and article purchased from new services. The editorials and letters were given the most consideration, as they were the direct reflection of the opinion of the editor or the newspapers' readers. The following chart compares the percentage of editorials written about the crisis in each individual paper.

Percentage of the total coverage made up by editorials and letters to the editor in each paper



Articles written specifically for the paper at hand were given the next most importance. As these articles were intended to convey the facts, their word choices and

even their existence were used as a demonstration of the paper's bias. Finally, the articles purchased from a news service were given the least amount of importance. While they did still convey the bias of the reporter, they did not really convey the bias of the paper, as they were purchased instead of written for the paper. The bias of a reporter is always present in the article. However, as this is a study of newspapers, the political parties, and economic classes they represent, the reporter's individual bias is less important than the newspaper's overall bias.

Once the articles were divided, they were then categorized in terms of their placement within the paper. Newspapers are the literature for people who are in a rush. While a newspaper contains a great deal of information, prominent articles and catchy headlines are more likely to be read by the masses than smaller articles. Not everyone has the time to sit and read every article in the paper, many instead choose to read the 'important' i.e. prominently featured news. On the same account, article with picture, maps, and bold headlines were given more consideration than text articles, as the graphics were more eye catching.⁷⁹

From there, the articles were analyzed in terms of their wording. Some articles that outwardly appear to offer no bias demonstrate their bias using language. Words like 'unfortunately,' 'autocracy,' 'terrorist' and even 'national' all give away the author or the newspaper's bias on the situation.

⁷⁹ Reah

Chapter Four: Analysis and evaluation

Without exception, the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife made major headlines in all three papers used for this study. Comparing the newspapers therefore was not a case of which paper had coverage and which did not. Furthermore, no comparison could be made concerning the placement of the articles as without exception for the first week in July it made major headlines in all three papers. Rather it was a case of comparing how much coverage, the content of that coverage, and the conclusions drawn from it. As this is a study of class and politics in the British media it is in reality a comparison on the way different political persuasions report foreign news and potential diplomatic fall out.

The Times and the assassination

In terms of British newspapers in 1914, *The Times* of London was the most focused on foreign news. Unlike many of its major competitors, *The Times* had correspondents abroad. Therefore, the paper had a significant advantage over the other papers in this study regarding coverage of a major event like the assassination of the Archduke and his wife. It is important to note, however, that as much as this focus on foreign affairs has proven to be extremely useful for historians, it did not make *The Times* the most popular paper of the period.⁸⁰ While it is the most accessible paper to historians, it was not the most accessible paper in Edwardian times. For the public, *The Times* was a paper intended for the political elite. Its special interest in foreign affairs came out of necessity as like all papers it catered to its ideal reader. In this case, the ideal reader was a

⁸⁰ Please see chart on page 3

politician, who by the very nature of his job, had to keep abreast on what was going on in the world at large.⁸¹ It is important not to assume that this special interest in foreign affairs particularly excited the average British citizen with little political influence.

As *The Times* was the only newspaper with a correspondent in the field in both Vienna and Sarajevo, the coverage of the assassination was understandably the most complete. Like all of the other papers, *The Times* began its coverage with a plethora of information about the assassination and the character of the late archduke. While not exactly giving him a positive character sketch, *The Times* described the Archduke as a 'vigorous' personality. It was the only paper in the study that expressed concern regarding his staunch Catholicism.⁸² Consistent with much of the British media immediately after the assassination, *The Times* expressed deep felt sympathy for the Emperor of the Hapsburg Empire. In an editorial on June 29th 1914, the paper reported:

The first thoughts of all men will turn to the venerable Emperor whose lot it has been to endure manifold and terrible sorrows such as mortal man had rarely known. All the suffering and woe which life can produce seem to have been poured upon his aged and lonely figure.⁸³

There was at the same time a deep connection and a sorrow felt by many people for the citizens of Austria-Hungary too. This is evident in some of the letters to the editor. On July 2, 1914 one such letter in *The Times* read:

Sir I hope I may be forgiven if I dare humbly to suggest to my brother ministers in all the churches that next Sunday the noble hymn tune "Austria" should be used: they might thus enable their congregations to show national sympathy with a bereaved Royal House, a stricken King, and a sorrowing people.... I believe it would be some comfort to Austria to know that we in Great Britain thus simply, unofficially, and naturally showed our condolence with them at this tragic time.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Wilson, pp.57-72

⁸² *The Times*, June 29, 1914, pp. 7F

⁸³ *Ibid*, June 29, 1914, pp. 9B

⁸⁴ *The Times*, July 2, 1914, pp. 9F

Of the Archduke himself, however, the paper was slightly less sympathetic it described him in an editorial that read:

The late Archduke Franz Ferdinand was to some extent an unknown quantity in European politics. Men speculated upon the possible results of his accession to the throne, but none could foresee with certainty the line his policy would have taken....In more recent years he was chiefly conspicuous for his pronounced Clerical sympathies, which sometime led him into pronouncements and acts which did not strengthen the alliance with Italy. He was always hostile to the Magyars, and there was no secret about his association with the so-called policy of Trialism, which aims ostensibly at adding to the Dual Monarchy a third great Slav state.⁸⁵

This editorial may not have portrayed the Archduke in the most positive light, but in comparison to some of its left-leaning counterparts, *The Times* was very conservative and polite in its description of the late Archduke's potential as a sovereign. It described him as having an 'unknown quality' rather than implying he would rule tyrannically as the *Manchester Guardian* had. As well, in comparison to the other papers in this study there was much less focus in *The Times* on the Archduke's legendary stubbornness.⁸⁶ It is equally interesting to note the special focus on succession in *The Times*. This angle was largely absent in the other papers. The *Manchester Guardian* made some mention of a

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, June 29, 1914, pp. 9B

⁸⁶ According to historian Holger Herwig's book *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918*, the Archduke was not a popular figure in Austria-Hungary either. About the assassination Herwig wrote: "Few in Vienna mourned the passing of Franz Ferdinand. The Archduke was staunchly Catholic, disliked the Czechs and Poles within the Empire, distrusted Vienna's ally, Italy, and hated the co-ruling Magyars at Budapest to the point that he drew the blinds of his personal train whenever he travelled through Hungary. Franz Ferdinand yearned for the day when, as ruler of the Dual Monarchy, he could curb the powers of the Magyars and re-establish the centralized monarchy as it had existed under Felix Prince zu Schwarzenberg after 1848. For the first few days immediately after the murder, Viennese pundits spent their time less on the fate that had befallen the Archduke and his family and more on the host of possible conspiracies to commit murder on the part of German intelligence, Freemasons, the son of the late Crown Prince Rudolph, and even Count István Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister. Nor did Kaiser Franz Joseph particularly mourn the loss of the heir presumptive. The Emperor had disliked Franz Ferdinand's marriage to Sophie Chotek and had cut the Duchess of Hohenberg off from all royal and court functions. After Sarajevo, Franz Joseph dispatched the body of the murdered archduke in the dead of night to the memorial chapel at Artstetten in the Danubian Nibelungengau with such alacrity and lack of decorum that he later had to explain his actions." Herwig, Holger, *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918*, London, 1997, pp. 8-9

possible successor, but in comparison to the number of stories that *The Times* ran discussing the succession, it was not a major thread within the paper. *The Times* spent a full week discussing the succession to the Hapsburg throne while the *Manchester Guardian* only contained one article.

Another issue that *The Times* focused a major article on early in the crisis was the ineptitude of the Sarajevo officials, not only for letting the assassination take place, but moreover for not being able to quell the tide of anti-Serbian sentiments before it devolved into a full-scale riot. On July 1, 1914, the paper reported on the town's decision to implement martial law:

The disorders which led to the necessity for these severe measures appear to have assumed almost incredible proportions. Eyewitnesses report that a number of Serb houses and shops were regularly sacked. The damage is estimated at millions of kronen. From the various accounts it seems clear that the lowest elements, especially is the Moslem quarter, took the opportunity of the patriotic student demonstrations to give free rein to their disorderly instincts. The police appear to have been helpless, and among the Serbs it is suggested that their helplessness was not entirely involuntary. Quiet was not restored until the troops made their appearance. The inability of the police to cope with the demonstrators has provided material for further criticism of the authorities at Sarajevo.

The article went on to describe the changes made to the Archduke's itinerary. It noted the fact that the drivers of the royal couple's convoy were unfamiliar with the city, and not informed of the danger or even of the changes of plan made to ensure the Archduke's safety. It then concluded:

The result was that exactly at the spot where Prinzip was standing the Archducal car had slowed down, and as it was near the pavement, the occupants offered a far less difficult mark than the assassin could have hoped for. I understand on the best authority that there is no foundation for the reports that information of the existence of a plot against the Archduke was given to the Austro-Hungarian Government by the Serbian Minister in Vienna.⁸⁷

⁸⁷*The Times*. July 1, 1914, pp. 7B

Aside from condemning the Sarajevo officials, the article showed no real sympathy for the peoples of the region, including the Serbs. It suggested that the Serbs were using the political unrest caused by the assassination to try to generate sympathy for themselves and then use that sympathy to further their own political aims. As well, it also showed a hint of preference towards the Austrians, as it found no indication that the Austrian government had any prior knowledge of a Serbian plot.

On July 2, 1914 in an editorial concerning the Archduke's funeral arrangements, the paper expressed more pro-Hapsburg sentiments:

We note with special satisfaction the self-restraint which the more responsible organs of opinion in Vienna are displaying under the circumstances that might easily have led them into violent and unjust denunciations.... The crime, it is acknowledged, must intensify the mistrust of the Serb race which is widely felt in the Dual Monarchy, but it is rightly declared that to make this tragedy the starting point for a fresh period of friction with Serbia would be a deplorable mistake.... For the present, it contrasts very favourably with the attitude both of some of the friends and of some of the critics of Austria-Hungary.... There cannot be any doubt that the murders were the result of a political conspiracy or that this was a Serb conspiracy.... Unsupported accusations against the Government of Belgrade and against the subjects of King Peter, can but lessen the impression produced by the assassinations and divert the European sympathies they have aroused.... The crime which has been perpetrated, like almost all political crimes of the kind, directly and powerfully tends to defeat the object of its authors. It cools the sympathies of civilized peoples for all who show a disposition to condone it, or to speculate of the supposed advantages it may bring their policy. It affords Austria-Hungary an opportunity for showing that she can treat the Serb question with justice and with magnanimity; despite the outrage done her dearest sentiments. To use that opportunity wisely and well, disregarding the clamours of the hour, would be a real proof of provident and sagacious statesmanship.⁸⁸

The excerpt from *The Times* addressed the question of support for Austria-Hungary versus support for Serbia. Many passages above displayed blatantly pro-Austrian sentiments, while at the same time contained several anti-Serb remarks. On the surface, this appears to confirm that *The Times* was deeply sympathetic to the Dual Monarchy and

⁸⁸ *The Times* of London, July 2, 1914, pp. 9C

far less sympathetic to the plight of the Serbs. *The Times*, however, took the issue to another level by explaining why there was resentment towards Serbia. Perhaps more importantly, it cautioned the Dual Monarchy not to misstep and squander the political sympathy that she had garnered. The paper openly acknowledged that the violent act took sympathy away from the southern Slavs and that there was a very real possibility Austria-Hungary would end up acting rashly. *The Times* therefore saw the assassination of the Archduke as an opportunity for Austria-Hungary to display leadership and to further diplomatic negotiations with Serbia. It argued that the proper handling of this diplomatic crisis would prove that the Dual Monarchy had moved beyond its previous mistakes in dealing with the southern Slav problem and would open up a new chapter in Austro-Hungarian diplomacy both with her neighbour Serbia and on the European diplomatic stage as a whole. Therefore, at this stage in the crisis *The Times* was more supportive of Austria-Hungary than it was of Serbia, but this support was not given without reservations.

One of the great strengths of *The Times* throughout this crisis was its ability to offer predictions. In the first editorial published by *The Times* on the assassination already the paper began to forecast the future, it wrote:

We cannot yet estimate the full consequences of yesterday's tragedy at Sarajevo upon the future of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So far as the succession is concerned, they will be less than will perhaps at first be supposed.... We should say that the events of yesterday will probably tend to strengthen the Dual system, at any rate for a time, but the more the Southern Slavs see their hopes recede the greater will be the danger of an ultimate explosion. Already they grow restive under repression, and if their dreams are thwarted in one direction, they may turn in another. For the moment the horror of the assassination engrosses thought, but the must assuredly add fresh clouds to the political outlook in Austria-Hungary.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Ibid, June 29, 1914, pp. 9B

Despite the early predictions on what implications, the assassinations might have on the internal politics of the Hapsburg Empire, it is important to note that at this early stage *The Times* made no mention and certainly, no predictions about what effect the events might have on international politics. It did not acknowledge the possibility that the assassination could lead to a war. In one editorial, there was discrete mention of the friends and the critics of Austria-Hungary perhaps making some negative comments and pushing the issue towards an international crisis.⁹⁰ At this point, however, those comments appeared more as expressions of anti-German and anti-Russian sentiments than as predictions of an upcoming crisis. The general attitude of *The Times* during this early period was one of caution. The paper most consistently warned Austro-Hungarian officials not to squander world sympathy and blow the crisis out of proportion. In comparison to other British newspapers, *The Times* during this period had a very conservative wait and see approach. As reports from Vienna and Sarajevo began to fizzle out, eight days after the assassination, there was one report that may have given *The Times'* readers an indication of things to come. The article, from July 6 1914, was a reprinted excerpt from a Serbian newspaper:

Austria-Hungary does not desire a war with Serbia, but is justified in expecting that Serbia should in every respect fulfill the duties of an honourable neighbour. The tone which the semi-official *samon-vrava* adopts in discussing relations with our monarchy is unfortunately a sad proof that the Serbia government is unacquainted with the most elementary principals of international courtesy. We can only advise Belgrade to make an immediate change in this respect and to take care to fulfill honourably all those obligations which are incumbent upon the Serbia Government in connection with the crime which was undoubtedly promoted in Belgrade. Those responsible for the destiny of the Monarchy cannot possibly neglect the duty of discussing the question quite quietly, but seriously sad resolutely, with the Serbian Government.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ibid, July 2, 1914, pp. 9C

⁹¹ Ibid, July 6, 1914, pp. 7A

Of all the papers examined for this study *The Times* featured the story of the assassination for the longest period. Where all of the other papers stopped reporting news from Vienna by the end of the first week of July,⁹² *The Times* continued to have sporadic reports concerning the Dual Monarchy well into the middle of July. In terms of this study's main questions, *The Times*, more than any other paper was in this period slightly pro-Austrian and anti-Serbian. While the Archduke himself may not have been the most popular figure in Great Britain at the time, *The Times'* reporters and editors and indeed its readers appear heartfelt and genuine in their expression of grief and deep sympathy for the Austro-Hungarian Emperor and for his subjects. In terms of Serbia, *The Times'* coverage was neither overtly positive nor negative. On the one hand, the paper reported that the "there cannot be any doubt that the murders were the result of a political conspiracy or that this was a Serb conspiracy".⁹³ On the other hand, the paper included five major articles on affects of anti-Serbian riots within the Habsburg Empire. One report read:

In all circles of Belgrade society the murder is condemned. Everybody know that such acts can be of no political benefit, as political assassinations only change persons, but not systems, and it is feared that one of the consequences will be severe measures against the Serbs in Austria.⁹⁴

In comparison to the other papers used in this study, *The Times*, at this stage, did not include any information regarding the implications for Great Britain. This on the one hand can be taken to mean that the paper assumed a natural detachment from the affairs of other nations and the affairs of Great Britain or on the other hand, it could be an attempt on the part of the paper to allow its readers to formulate their own opinions. The

⁹² The death of Chamberlain on July 2 1914 became the chief focus of al three papers overtaking the crisis in the Balkans as the major headline on July 4th 1914.

⁹³ Times of London, July 1, 1914, pp.7

⁹⁴ Ibid, 1914, pp. 7B

first option assumes a general apathy for foreign news on the part of the ideal reader despite the number of special correspondents *The Times* employed. The second option assumes that the ideal reader already had prior knowledge of the area as well as the education to make connections between foreign politics and domestic politics without the aid of the reporters and editor. Given *The Times* intended audience,⁹⁵ the second option is the most probable.

The Times connection to government meant that the paper paid special attention to world affairs. The assumption that the ideal reader was well educated meant that the paper was able to report news without necessarily spelling-out how the news was important to Great Britain, as it was assumed that the reader was capable of making that connection for his or her self. The language used in *The Times* was much less straight forward than it was in the other papers, giving the impression of cool detachment from the subject matter, rather than hot-headed judgment. The special interest in the aristocracy and in government also meant that *The Times* focused on some different issue, than a Labour paper like the *Daily Herald*. *The Times*' in-depth coverage of the succession to the Austro-Hungarian throne is a prime example of this. While the other papers may have paid it brief mention, it was one of the chief issues in *The Times*. In the end, however at this stage, before the presentation of the ultimatum, *The Times* did not; more than any other paper predict that the crisis would turn into an international war. However, unlike the *Manchester Guardian* that dismissed the crisis as being overblown, *The Times* urged the governments involved to exercise discretion. Therefore, while the paper did not predict a war on the pretext of the assassinations it fully acknowledged the danger the assassinations posed.

⁹⁵. Wilson, pp. 57-72

The Manchester Guardian and the assassination

Like all of the other newspapers used as samples in this study, the *Manchester Guardian* featured the assassination prominently in the headlines for several days following the event. In terms of the amount of coverage after that point, the *Manchester Guardian* contained 80% as much news coverage as *The Times* did, and more than 50% more news coverage than was in the *Daily Herald*.⁹⁶ One reason for the lack of coverage was that unlike *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian* did not have a field correspondent in the Balkans. Consequently, the paper received most of its reports from the Reuters news agency.

The paper's initial coverage leads to three very important conclusions. Firstly, the British public in 1914 had an interest in the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, as the paper would not have contained so much coverage of the assassination if there were no interest. Secondly, the sentiments expressed in the coverage suggest that the Archduke was not a popular figure amongst the Liberal press in Britain. Finally, the coverage indicates that the paper made no predictions that the crisis would escalate into a global conflict.

Like *The Times*, the *Guardian* featured extensive coverage of the assassinations on June 29th 1914 in the leading part of the foreign news section. The initial coverage included articles, photographs, and maps of the Habsburg Empire and neighbouring countries. Immediately, the inclusion of maps of the region, not just the city streets where event occurred, denotes the assumed general lack of knowledge of the reader, towards the

⁹⁶ Please see charts on pages 31, 33, and 34

area. However, the inclusion of so much, in-depth coverage indicates that there was an interest in the region and its affairs. As the assassination itself was worldwide news, the initial reports that were printed on June 29 were produced by the *Manchester Guardian* itself and therefore contained more editorializing than did the later reports, which were from the Reuters news service.

The initial reports were contrasting in their sentiments as they reveal both a deep sympathy for the Habsburg family and the people of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time criticizing the Archduke's lack of democratic policies and the general 'backwardness' of the Dual Monarchy. The paper's clear sympathy is revealed in headlines such as, "Habsburg Disasters: Emperor's lifetime of misfortune, defeats and deaths,"⁹⁷ and "World's Sympathy with aged Emperor: The Austrian Crime, Kaiser and British Prince to Attend funeral: Anti-Servian anger."⁹⁸ On June 30 the paper reported

The news of the Austrian murders has been heard with horror throughout the world. Messages of sympathy have poured into Vienna, whither the aged Emperor Francis Joseph returned yesterday. Comments on the crime, all expressing friendly feelings for the Emperor, are made by all the European papers, most of them, as is natural while the shock is still fresh, attaching an over-importance to the political consequences. In Germany, the journalistic view is coloured by the belief that the Emperor has lost a good friend; in Russia, the dead Archduke's hostility is remembered. The comments from other countries are of less interest, save those from Serbia, which swell the chorus of sympathetic regrets.⁹⁹

The paper was clear and heartfelt in its sympathy for the Austrian Emperor, but unlike *The Times* or the *Herald*, it made no comment of sympathy for the Austrian people and passed less judgement on the perpetrators. The statements made in the previously cited article are interesting as they address two of the main questions of this study. Firstly, they

⁹⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, June 29, 1914, pp. 9

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, June 30, 1914, pp. 11

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, June 30, 1914, pp. 11

provide a frame for the initial feelings towards the assassination not only in Great Britain, but also in Europe in general. Discussing how the assassination has caused the outpouring of sympathy from all over Europe, helps to establish the general mood of Britain in contrast to the continent. It also creates a launching point for the question, how did Austria-Hungary manage to squander the world's sympathy and end up at war with much of Europe?

Secondly, it raises the question about how much the newspapers and the casual reader knew about or suspected the upcoming war. There is a persistent thread within the origins of the war historiography that the implications of the assassinations were immediately understood and that there was a gradual building of tension from the time of the assassinations to the outbreak of the war. While British documents on foreign affairs prove that there was a gradual building of tension from the assassination right up to the ultimatum in diplomatic circles, there is no evidence to suggest that a war in the Balkans was a major concern on the minds of the everyday citizen. The fact a major national newspaper asserted the only reason so much importance was being attached to the Archduke's violent death was that the shock was still fresh makes it difficult to establish a general feeling of worry amongst the populace. In reality, the statement suggests a belief that within a few weeks, everything would blow over and the assassination would be nothing more than a footnote in history. This article was the first that dealt with the question of how well the newspaper predicted the likelihood of an upcoming war. In the initial days of the crisis, it is clear that the *Manchester Guardian* was neither aware of nor promoted any movement towards a global or even a regionalized war. If anything, the *Manchester Guardian's* prediction was that while the assassination would cause some

rumblings in the Balkans, it had not disturbed the balance of power in Europe. There was only one quote that implied the assassination could turn into a full-blown war. While there was no indication that Britain would be involved in the war, the paper did express concern that Germany might become embroiled in the conflict:

We regard Germany as a nation leading in the Arts and Sciences, and we have all learnt and are learning from German scholars. War upon her in the interests of Serbia and Russia would be a sin against civilisation¹⁰⁰

This quote supports Hanak's theory that the British Liberal media was overwhelmingly pro-German and anti-Russian at the time of the assassination.

While the *Guardian* expressed its sympathy over the tragedy, the paper was clearly not a supporter of the Habsburg monarchy or even of the late Archduke. While other papers attempted to describe the Archduke's character and his family in the utmost of polite manner, the *Guardian* made no such attempt. In one article, the paper remarked, "The Hapsburgs have produced many lunatics and one great statesman, the Emperor Charles V, but their modest capacities have not prevented their holding a high place, often the highest, in Europe for 800 years".¹⁰¹ Another article, entitled "Franz Ferdinand, his life views, an autocrat with popular sympathies",¹⁰² described the late Archduke as "one of the most reactionary figures in the none too liberal Habsburg Family." Later on in the same article, a correspondent gave a character summary of the Archduke. He was described as follows:

The Archduke was a simple and amiable man, but very passionate, and, in anger, incalculable. That, however, he had great strength of purpose is shown by the obstinate persistency with which he opposed his family's' resistance to his

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, July 1 1914, pp.9

¹⁰¹ Ibid, June 29, 1914, pp. 9

¹⁰² Ibid, June 29, 1914, pp.9

marrying the Countess Chotek. He was more than strong-willed; he was extremely obstinate and resolved to have his way at any cost. Consequently, it was feared that as a monarch he would be inclined to govern autocratically, and that, therefore, his Ministers would find it difficult to make him understand the position of the Sovereign in a constitutional country.¹⁰³

It is evident, then, that the Archduke was not popular in liberal circles in Great Britain. His autocratic tendencies made the liberal British media question his ability to rule constitutionally. With such prevailing worries, much of the sympathetic press was directed towards the Emperor's loss, rather than the loss of a great individual. In fact, when compared to *The Times* the *Manchester Guardian* was, remarkably pro-Serbian. Concerns that the Archduke was too obstinate to rule, dominated many articles concerning the circumstances of his premature death. In the second edition of the special morning express of the *Manchester Guardian*, an article reported:

There can be no doubt that the murders were the result of a Serb plot, and that the Archduke was really a victim of his own determination. Lately many arrests have been made, and it is said the plot has been traced to Belgrade. The Servian Ambassador in Vienna is said to have warned the Austrian Government of the existence of a plot and to have expressed a hope that the heir to the throne would postpone his visit to the southern provinces. But this the Archduke refused to do.¹⁰⁴

The coverage of the assassination of the Archduke in the *Manchester Guardian* indicates three important conclusions. Firstly, there was interest in the affairs of the Dual Monarchy and the events in the Balkans. The featured articles were not tucked away at the back of the paper in a little seen column; rather they were featured prominently in the main foreign news section. Often they occupied the leading column and included maps and pictures. The maps themselves may indicate a lack of knowledge about the region,

¹⁰³ Ibid, June 29, 1914, pp.9

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, June 29, 1914, pp. 16

but the fact that the story made such major headlines indicates a definite interest in the affair.

The second intimation that the *Manchester Guardian's* coverage of the assassination indicates is that sympathy for the Emperor were widespread, but the feeling of loss over the death of the Archduke were not. More specifically, the loss of the Archduke was felt more in Conservative camps than it was in Liberal circles. The day immediately following his death, the *Manchester Guardian* openly questioned the suitability of the Archduke to govern a constitutional state. The paper's scathing criticism even while other papers eulogized suggests that there was no love loss on the part of the British liberal media towards the late Archduke. While there was no direct indication of relief towards his death, there was no real expression of loss either. It could be that the loss was felt more keenly in more monarchist circles, namely the upper classes, for whom regicide was always abhorrent.

The final implication that the *Manchester Guardian's* coverage of the assassination reveals is that the paper did not predict the coming of the war at this early junction. The paper, in fact, blatantly criticized other media for blowing the political consequences of the assassination out of proportion simply due to the shock of the event. Unlike *The Times* where there appears to have been some trepidation over what Austria-Hungary would do in response, *the Guardian's* coverage was more focused on the person of the Archduke. As the paper clearly did not feel that the loss of the Archduke equated the loss of a great statesman, the possible political implications of the assassination were down played in the early parts of the crisis. As such, the idea of the assassinations of a source of building tension and causing of sense of foreboding in Britain from the beginning is not a viable theory, at least in terms of the British liberal media.

The Daily Herald and the assassination

In 1914, the *Daily Herald* was still a relatively new paper. Started in 1912, by the time of the July Crisis the paper faced daily financial troubles, as it was not a popular paper among advertisers. In 1913, Labour MP George Lansbury became the editor and proprietor of the newspaper. The mandate of the paper meant that the editor and the contributing journalists were politicians first and journalists second. The paper labelled itself as the voice of all rebels attacking the status quo and welcomed contributions from all radical groups; not just socialists.¹⁰⁵ For this study, then, the *Daily Herald* can be treated as a Labour paper, something that became official in 1922, when financial troubles forced Lansbury to turn to more official party channels.¹⁰⁶ Official party association would take some of the aggressiveness out of the *Daily Herald's* cutting edge reporting, but at time of the July Crisis, the *Herald* remained as radical as when it had first began. The paper inspired devotion among its followers. As Huw Richards wrote in his article on the *Daily Herald*, "Their secret was that while ordinary newspapers have readers, Lansbury's *Herald* had supporters - deeply committed to their paper and the philosophy that it stood for."¹⁰⁷

The coverage of the crisis in the *Daily Herald* was the least complete of the newspapers under consideration. Comparatively only a small paper, there was not much space devoted to foreign affairs, the little which there was, was frequently reserved for news on foreign workers' movements. This is not to say that the assassination did not make headlines. Rather it stirred up the news for several days, and then disappeared long before it disappeared from the headlines of the other, larger papers.

¹⁰⁵ Richards, 2000, pp.12-13

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, pp. 13

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

Despite that fact that the paper only devoted a small amount of pagination to the assassination, its coverage was quite comprehensive including both news articles and editorials. Like the other papers much of the initial coverage was sympathetic towards Austria-Hungary and less so towards the cause of the assassin. On June 30th, the paper described the deaths as 'tragic' and noted that the world sympathy lay with Austria. Of the Serbians, it reported:

A special message from Serajevo, says the Exchange Telegraph Company states that Servian students, when they heard the news exclaimed: 'Thank God we need not do it ourselves.' They have been arrested as accomplices of the murder.¹⁰⁸

After the initial sympathies with Austria, however, the paper's stance changed remarkably. In terms of its editorials and even some of its articles, *The Herald* was the most noticeably pro Serbian of the three papers studied. The articles, even at this early stage, were markedly anti-Austrian:

Throughout Austrian dominions, supporters of the present dynasty are waging war upon the Servians. Past Tuesday- from Vienna, it is announced that martial law will be extended throughout Bosnia. Sanguinary conflicts have taken place at many points between Servians and Croatians, and it is reported that a massacre of Servians has taken place of Dobojo. Servians everywhere are in flight.¹⁰⁹

While this passage appears to be stating the facts, words and phrases such as 'waging war and massacre' do not paint the Austro-Hungarian efforts in a favourable light. At the same time, *The Herald* was certainly not a great supporter of the Archduke. While some of the initial reports displayed sympathy even if simply in terms of the drama with which his death was reported, for example on June 30, the paper reported the

¹⁰⁸ *Daily Herald*, June 30, 1914, pp. 1

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, July 1, 1914, pp. 1

Archduke's last words were to his wife, "Sophie live for our children,"¹¹⁰ The overall sentiment towards the Archduke presented in the *Daily Herald* was not a favourable one.

On June 29th, the paper reported:

From the diplomatic standpoint, the unexpected departure of Franz Ferdinand will be received with mixed feelings in the Embassies of Europe. For the past few years, owing to the growing infirmity of that arch-intriguer, the King-Emperor Francis Joseph, Ferdinand is believed to have dominated the foreign policy of Austria. A reputed Chauvinist and a Pan-German, his ultimate accession to the throne was anticipated with no little anxiety by the diplomatists of France, Russia, and Britain. Even Austria's allies in the Triplice (Germany and Italy) were by no means enamoured of the prospect, owing to the fire-eating proclivities of the departed Archduke.¹¹¹

At every opportunity, the *Daily Herald* made a point to speak up against colonialism. National self-determination was one of the points that the paper championed itself upon. In that way, the anti-Austrian opinions are simply a product of the anti-imperialist views of the paper. Proof of this comes from an editorial written on June 30 1914, the paper wrote:

Battle, murder, and sudden death are three of the evils from which Christendom prays to be delivered everyday. No one can read of the murders of the Archduke of Austria and his wife without feeling sympathy and regret that in the 20th century it should be possible for such crimes to take place. We are often told that force is no remedy for the evils of society. Kings and emperors, princes and presidents, however, have taught the "common" people that government and law rests on force.... The peoples of the world are responsible in the main for their rulers. We must never forget that the working classes, the people of the world, man the armies and the navies by which despotism and governments are kept up. The lesson for all of us to learn from these assassinations is surely that if a new order is to be brought into existence it can only be by the development of a better spirit. After all, when we talk of the sacredness of human life, we must mean all human life. If we declare against its desecration in one place, we must declare against it on all occasions. At present in money making the grabbing of land, in

¹¹⁰ Ibid, June 30, 1914, pp. 1

¹¹¹ Ibid, June 29, 1914, pp. 1

the exploitation of subject races, all the "great" nations of the world use force and military as it suits them.¹¹²

Aside from demonstrating the paper's clear aversion to imperialism, this passage also answers questions about the prospect of war. The pacifist tone is a clear indication that the *Daily Herald* at this early stage in the crisis did not advocate war even a localized war between the two countries; certainly, it did not advocate any form of British participation if there were to be any kind of conflict. The anti-war attitude expressed in this passage is consistent with Paul Ward's argument on the British left's attitude toward a future conflict. He argued that only a threat to the very survival of the British nation would cause the left to support even a defensive war. As the *Daily Herald*, at this stage did not see the conflict in the Balkans as a direct threat to British liberty, the paper did not advocate any war effort on the part of Great Britain or any other nation.¹¹³

This is not to say that the *Daily Herald* did not predict a war. Unlike the *Manchester Guardian*, which assured its readers that the crisis would end before it began, the *Daily Herald* as early as July 3rd 1914, printed the headline, "Armed Conflict is not impossible."¹¹⁴ At this early stage, the paper even reported rumours that the Austro-Hungarian government presented the Serbian government with a "note", and that in the case of an unsatisfactory reply an armed conflict between the two nations would not be impossible.¹¹⁵

The coverage of the assassination of the Archduke by the *Daily Herald* answers two very important questions. Firstly, it confirms traditional assumptions made by

¹¹² Ibid, June 30 1914, pp. 2

¹¹³ Ward, pp. 118

¹¹⁴ *Daily Herald*, July 3 1914, pp. 1

¹¹⁵ Ibid, July 3 1914, pp. 1

historians such as Hanak, who assert that the Left-wing papers in Great Britain were generally pacifistic during the July Crisis. As Hanak himself did not study the *Daily Herald*, this examination of this paper adds credence to his theory. One must be careful not to include the *Daily Herald's* opinions in with those of the Liberal newspapers such as the *Manchester Guardian*. While the *Manchester Guardian* presented an insular opinion, which seemed not to care if the Balkans exploded in a contained war provided it would have no impact on Great Britain; any war to the *Daily Herald* would have been calamitous. The *Daily Herald* was overwhelmingly against any kind of armed conflict. In the end, the main difference comes down to the papers' individual views and idealism. The *Manchester Guardian's* mandate was to represent the Liberal opinion in Great Britain. While foreign affairs were of interest to Liberal Britons, the paper responded to all foreign matters with a certain amount of detachment. The *Daily Herald*, however, given its socialist ideals took a very different approach. The *Daily Herald's* mandate was to act as the voice of the workers. While this was indeed meant to be the voice of British workers, early twentieth century socialism emphasized the bond of all workers throughout the world. Therefore, the *Daily Herald's* ideology led the paper to report foreign news in a different way. The paper took the approach that the people in Austria-Hungary and Serbia were workers like the average *Daily Herald* reader; because they were 'brothers,' what happened on the continent was almost as important as what was happening to workers within the reader's own backyard.

The Times and the ultimatum

Given *The Times*' emphasis on foreign affairs, here, like in the previous section, *The Times*' coverage was the most complete. Unlike in the other papers, where the coverage of the situation in the Balkans completely disappeared from the headlines about one week after the assassinations, *The Times* regularly featured articles concerning the developing crisis. These articles were not leading stories; they were frequently quite small and were often tucked in the bottom corner of the international news page. Nevertheless the coverage of the situation meant that the presentation of the ultimatum and the escalation of the crisis came as less of a shock to *Times* readers than it did to the readers of the other papers, which did not report any news on the developing crisis after the first week of July. On July 23, 1914, *The Times* published an article discussing what various press outlets in Vienna and in Belgrade expected the contents of the 'note' to be. From there, as with the other papers, interest in the developing crisis began to increase steadily.

The following day a leading article presented the contents of the ultimatum to *The Times*' readers. The language of the note was described as: "severe, not to say violent, its tone is that of an indictment."¹¹⁶ It is clear by this point in time that *The Times* recognized the threat to world peace posed by the appearance of the ultimatum. It is equally clear that *The Times* held Austria-Hungary ultimately responsible for this threat. In an editorial published on Jul 24, 1914 *The Times* expressed its sentiments towards Austria-Hungary while at the same time predicting the effect that the assassination and the presentation of the ultimatum would have on world affairs:

¹¹⁶ Times of London, July 24 1914, pp. 8C

All who have the general peace at heart must earnestly hope that Austria-Hungary has not spoken her last word in the Note to Serbia to which she requires a reply tonight. If she has, we stand upon the edge of war, and of a war fraught with dangers that are incalculable to all the Great Powers. We do not hesitate to say that the crisis seems to us even more pronounced than those between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia in 1908-09 and 1912-13. As concerns the immediate quarrels of these states, that also is the opinion of Berlin and St. Petersburg. In both capitals it is assumed that Austria-Hungary has gone too far to retreat. By the issue of what is in substance an ultimatum, she has, it is supposed, burnt her boats.... We cannot share the confidence which is felt, or affected, in Berlin and Rome that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia will be 'localized' and that complications are improbable. The *Wilhelmstrasse*, it is said, holds that Serbia is 'morally isolated.' The news from St. Petersburg is an ominous comment on such an assumption.¹¹⁷

The Times fully expected the intensifying crisis to develop into a war, and became increasingly less supportive of Austria-Hungary. Earlier, *The Times*, while not overwhelmingly pro-Hapsburg, showed some inclination towards favouring the position of the Dual Monarchy over the position of Serbia. An editorial discussing the assassination left off with an ominous warning to Austria-Hungary not to squander the world's sympathy by acting rashly against her Serbian neighbours. In the opinion of *The Times*, Austria-Hungary's note to Serbia did just that. Despite the fact that *The Times'* attitude to Austria-Hungary became noticeably more negative, this can be explained by the previous warning. In the same editorial, the changing world opinion towards Austria-Hungary and Serbia was addressed as follows:

{I}t can hardly be doubted that a movement does exist in Serbia which aims at the ultimate creation of a "Greater Serbia" mainly at Austria-Hungary's expense, or that this movement is promoted and carried on by societies like the *Narodna Obrana*, or that Serbian officers and officials are engaged in it, or that Serbian newspapers foster it and incite their readers to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary and of her institutions. It is true too, speaking broadly, that the Serbia Government have not taken effectual actions to suppress this movement against a neighbouring power or to keep its activities free from the taint of crime. It may be acknowledged that from the strict standpoint of international right any power

¹¹⁷ Ibid, July 25, 1914, pp. 9C

which suffers such treatment from a neighbour is entitled to end it by the threat of war, or even by war itself. But the power which determines to exercise this right cannot expect others to own the justice of her action until she establishes it by something more than bare assertion. That is all that Austria-Hungary has given us hitherto.... The omission is more serious because she seeks to deprive Serbia of all opportunity of explanation or defence, by fixing a limit of forty-eight hours for the reply. The result of this procedure is that Austria-Hungary leaves a small and excitable Balkan kingdom to decide at a few hours notice whether there is, or there is not to be a third Balkan war and a Balkan war, this time, in which one of the great Powers will be involved as a principal from the first. That hardly seems statesmanlike, whatever may be her grievances against her neighbour.¹¹⁸

This excerpt shows the changing nature of *The Times*' attitude towards Austria-Hungary. While the paper felt that the Dual Monarchy was justified in her complaints against Serbia, as she had not offered any proof it made it difficult for the paper to offer total support for her cause. It is interesting to recognize that Austria-Hungary's note to Serbia did not generate any sympathy for Serbia from *The Times* newspaper.

Perhaps because the story never entirely disappeared from the pages of *The Times*, the paper had a firmer grasp of the situation and was therefore in a better situation to offer predictions than the other papers in this study. In comparison to papers such as the *Manchester Guardian*, *The Times* made an early prediction that the conflict would develop into a global conflict. This can be attributed to one of two things. Firstly as *The Times* was focused more on international issues, it had a stronger understanding of the alliance system and of the moods of the other European capitals. Therefore, it was better able to make an accurate prediction. Secondly, *The Times* did not stop reporting the crisis; so it was more acquainted with how the situation had been escalating and the potential dangers that lay with this further escalation. *The Times*, more than any other paper at this point was able to predict a violent solution to the crisis unfolding in the Balkans. There was however, still no mention of what role if any Great Britain would play in the almost inevitable war.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, July 25, 1914, pp. 9C

The Manchester Guardian and the Ultimatum

After a fourteen day absence from the paper, reports on the July Crisis in the Balkans resumed in the *Manchester Guardian* on July 23rd 1914. Despite the fact that the conflict had escalated since the last report on July 7, the essential message behind the *Manchester Guardian's* coverage had not. On July 23rd, the paper reported: "Vienna is notoriously the most jumpy capital in Europe, and the talk about war between Austria and Serbia is surely not to be taken very seriously".¹¹⁹ As with its earlier coverage, the paper was confident that there would be no war and that the readers had no cause for worry. To put the situation in perspective the paper used an example from British history comparing the current troubles in the Balkans with the quarrel between Britain and France in 1868 over Orsini's attempt to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon.¹²⁰ The paper wrote:

In the same way, Austria is now complaining that the real headquarters of the conspiracy which did the Archduke to death last month was not Sarajevo Bosnia, where the murder took place, but Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. The evidence of this belief has not been produced, but it is not intrinsically improbable. The population of Bosnia is Servian, and there is a Greater Servian movement, which hopes for the union of Bosnia with Serbia. If there are not some Servian officers intriguing in support of this movement we should be very much surprised. There were, we think, too British army officers among Jameson Raiders. What, under these circumstances, has Austria a right to ask of Serbia?¹²¹

This passage not only reveals that the *Manchester Guardian* still felt the need to compare the current situation with something more familiar to readers, but it also reveals that the sympathies of the paper do not at this point appear to lie with either side. The paper, assumed Serbia was probably guilty, but concluded that Austria-Hungary was unable to

¹¹⁹ *Manchester Guardian*, July 23 1914, pg 8

¹²⁰ Orsini's headquarters had been in London and France complained very bitterly that Britain allowed her capital to house the centre of a conspiracy against the life of France's sovereign.

¹²¹ *Manchester Guardian*, July 23, 1914, pp. 8

provide real proof. Much of the article on July 23rd involved the likelihood of Austria-Hungary obtaining proof against Serbia. The Article concluded:

The whole question is what the value of the evidence against Servian subjects may be, and until there is some means of judging that the vague charges against the Servian Government and Servian officers of sympathy with the anti-Austrian agitation in Bosnia seem to be a mere darkening of counsel. Of course, if Austria thinks her evidence is very strong and has reason to suspect that the Servian Government is so prejudiced politically that she will not judge it fairly, she can intimate that she will regard refusal to prosecute as an unfriendly act. But matters have not got so far as that. Austria still has to collect her evidence and still to formulate her charges; until that is done Servia cannot do or fail to do anything which would supply even a colourable excuse for diplomatic rupture.¹²²

It is evident that the *Manchester Guardian* was at this point not worried about the threat of a war, even a localized one. The tone of the paper began to change slowly over the course of the next few days. The next day the paper described the text of the Ultimatum as "severer in tone than well-informed persons thought probable" and that "its delivery may be followed by a grave international crisis."¹²³ From that point onward, the paper descended into what can only be described as panic. On July 24th, the *Guardian* printed the text of the ultimatum out in full. The next day pandemonium spread across the leading stories. Bold headlines and maps occupied a near, full-page spread on July 25th. One article entitled "Grave fears in London" remarked:

Reuter's Agency learns that in diplomatic quarters in London a very grave view is taken of the Austro-Servian crisis. It is considered that the brief time-limit stated in the Austrian Note shows that the Vienna Government is determined there shall be no negotiations on its demands, which must be accepted or rejected as they stand. No Servian Cabinet, it is thought, will be found to comply with them; and, failing such compliance hostilities appear inevitable.¹²⁴

¹²² Ibid, July 23, 1914, pp. 8

¹²³ Ibid, July 24, 1914, pp. 9

¹²⁴ Ibid, July 25, pp.9

While this was the paper's first assertion that the war was inevitable, there was still no consideration that the war could potentially involve Great Britain. The same article discussed that every attempt was being made to localize the war. At this point, it then appears that the *Manchester Guardian* while finally acknowledging that there would be a war between Austria and Serbia still held out hope that the war would not involve any other European power. The paper wrote:

Meanwhile the Powers will exert themselves to the utmost to ensure Serbia's submission on all point necessary to pacify Austrian feeling, and will equally endeavour to induce Austria in the interests of European peace not to press those demands, which will humiliate Serbia beyond endurance.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, it is apparent that the paper's hopes of a localized and foreign war were becoming quite dim. While still no mention of Great Britain, more coverage from July 25th indicates there was a growing sense of doom in the *Manchester Guardian* offices. The paper wrote:

Austria-Hungary's Note to Serbia, requiring her to suppress the Pan-Serb propaganda which led to the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife has brought the continent to the verge of a great war. Neither delay nor compromise will be allowed by the Vienna Government. By this evening Serbia must acknowledge her faults and promise, the reform demanded. Russia has come into the field in answer. Yesterday M. Sazonoff, the Foreign Minister in St. Petersburg said: "It is a challenge to Russia. To that there can be only one answer." What the answer from Belgrade will be no one knows, but there is reason to fear that national feelings will not allow the Ministers to yield. The latest telegrams say there is grave danger of an armed conflict. Austria has ordered her Ministers and the whole Legislation staff to leave Belgrade unless Serbia has given complete satisfaction by this evening. On the other hand, the Russian Cabinet decided to intervene immediately and ask Austria to permit delay and European mediation. A St. Petersburg announcement which bears the marks of a semi-official utterance threatens extreme measures if Austria will not consent to wait. Both Austria and Germany, who whole-heartedly supports her ally, are

¹²⁵ Ibid, July 25, pp. 9

already taking steps to localize the war. In well-informed quarters of London, a very grave view is taken of the danger.¹²⁶

This passage demonstrates that the *Manchester Guardian* was concerned about an impending global war. It also demonstrates the anti-Russian sentiment that Hanak discussed.

This article also shows that by this point in time the *Manchester Guardian's* coverage was markedly pro-Serbian and anti-Austria. This is a change from the coverage just a few days before where it was difficult to discern. With words like 'humiliation', being used to describe the consequences if Serbia did comply with the ultimatum it is evident that the *Manchester Guardian* in many ways sympathized with the plight of Serbia.

The Daily Herald and the Ultimatum

The *Daily Herald's* coverage of the presentation of the ultimatum was almost absent only one article on the ultimatum was printed within the paper. This is surprising given the fact that the paper had already begun discussing the implications of a note from Austria-Hungary to Serbia as early as July 3rd. Nevertheless, while the initial coverage of the note only received one article that article was at least given a fair amount of prominence on the front page. While the discussion of the note at this stage was quite brief, one major question can still be addressed. At this point, the *Daily Herald* seemed quite assured that there would be a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. On July 25th, under the headline "War imminent Again in Servia, Austrian Government trying to

¹²⁶ Ibid, July 25, 1914, pp. 9

force the pace”, the paper wrote: “The presentation of the ultimatum by Austria to Serbia may lead to serious trouble in the Balkans and this unhappy district may be plunged again into the horrors of war”.¹²⁷

At this stage however, the newspaper was reasonably assured that the conflict would be localized in the Balkans. While for the *Daily Herald*, any conflict was disastrous the paper expressed a calmer view when it was reasonably assured that not all of Europe would be dragged into the fray. On this note, the paper wrote:

The German Government is using its influence to localize the conflict, and although it was not consulted before the issue of the Note, it will oppose any attempt at European intervention. France is making representation at St. Petersburg and Belgrade, and possibly Russia may intervene.¹²⁸

From this passage, it is possible to address Hanak's theory that the left-wing papers leaned more towards Germany. While not explicitly expressed, the idea is certainly conveyed that Germany was doing everything within her power to contain and localize the conflict; Russia was on the other hand ready and willing to step in.

The *Daily Herald's* coverage of the presentation of the ultimatum was laden with editorializing. The paper reduced the reason for the ultimatum down to economics, it wrote, "The financial interests seem determined to form the pace, and the price of stocks on the Bourse remain steady, the banks lending their aid to the market."¹²⁹

In the end, the *Daily Herald's* coverage of the presentation of the ultimatum is consistent with the paper's other coverage. While it is unfortunate that there was not more pagination devoted to the presentation of the ultimatum, from the coverage there is one

¹²⁷ *Daily Herald*, July 25 1914, pg 1

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ Ibid

can determine that the paper was still pacifist and that there was no notion that Great Britain could be involved in any conflict that did arise. It is also possible to determine that the paper was at this stage more on the side of Serbia than on the side of Austria. Unlike some of the other papers, this was not a new development as for the most part the *Daily Herald* had leaned more towards Serbia's cause from the beginning that it did towards the plight of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The Times the Rejection of the Ultimatum and the coming of the war

The rejection of the ultimatum was followed with great interest in *The Times*. On July 27, 1914, the paper ran a full-page spread about Serbia's reply to Austria-Hungary. The story was accompanied by maps and supporting articles about how the news was taken in other European capitals. Headlines in that day's paper describe Vienna as having "War fever". The main editorial of the day also focused on Serbia's reply. The editorial read as follows:

In view of its moderation, the way to a peaceful settlement ought to stand open. Serbia has accepted in substance almost all of the very rigorous demands which have been made upon her. She asserts in principal to all of them with but one exception. Even in regard to this exception she has not given a categorical refusal....The case for delay in the opening of hostilities, which was already strong, thus becomes imperative. Surely the Emperor Francis Joseph , who has given the world so many proofs of his devotion to peace, is not going to jeopardize the safety of his Empire and the tranquility of Europe because Serbia has not at once acceded to the whole of the very humiliating requirements of the Note?... These are unheard of concessions for a sovereign State, however small, to offer to even the mightiest Powers. We think that Serbia has been well advised in tendering them. But are they not enough? What will the world think if Austria-Hungary rejects them? The points on which Serbia protests and asks for explanations undoubtedly involve an infraction of the most elementary of the rights inseparable from sovereignty. Even on those she does not bang the door to an arrangement.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ *The Times*, July 27 1914, pp. 9B

This quote reveals the paper's sympathy for Serbia and its realization that Austria-Hungary could not be placated, even by her own demands. The editorial's hopes that Serbia's concessions would be met with reasonable compromise in Vienna were lost. At this late stage in the conflict while the thought of war was horrifying, it became increasingly difficult for the paper to expect a peaceful solution to the conflict. In an editorial the following day, all hopes of peace were overshadowed by the realization that the crisis would turn into a European war.

The declaration of war against Serbia which was issued at Vienna yesterday, and which appears to have been followed by some insignificant acts of belligerency, brings us nearer to the catastrophe that all the world apprehends. The peace of Europe would at first sight seem to hang by a thread; yet everywhere there appear to be hopes that the thread will not be severed.... The statement which is said to emanate from the Ballplatz that not even a complete surrender by Serbia would now influence the action of the Dual Monarchy appears to us particularly reprehensible. It goes far to confirm the view, so strenuously denied, that Austria-Hungary has been bent on war from the first. But the rise of the war fever in various quarters is but a reason the more why the Great Powers which are not as yet directly interested in the dispute should labour without ceasing to save themselves from calamities unapproached in their wide flung ravages since the close of the Napoleonic wars.... It is with no such frivolous feelings that the Government and the people of England look abroad. They well know what a European war would mean to the whole world. But they know too, that the surest way to preserve the peace for which they long, and perhaps the only way, is to make clear to all that if their friends are forced into such a war England for her part will support them to the full. We have no selfish interests to serve. We have no direct interests at all, except those of seeing elementary fair play in the quarrel between Vienna and Belgrade. But we had little direct interest also in the controversy resolved at Algeciras, and none at all in the controversy that arose at Agadir. Nevertheless we were ready, and we showed that we were ready, on both those occasions to give our friends all the support at our command in the vindication of their rightful claims. We did so because it is our settled interest and traditional policy to uphold the balance of power in Europe.... We shall spare no pains and refrain from no exertions to avert a calamity so dire to all the Governments and all the people of Europe. But should our efforts in this behave prove vain, England will be found as ready to stand by her friends today as she ever was to stand by them when she was aiding Europe to fling off the despotism of Napoleon.¹³¹

¹³¹ Ibid, July 28, 1914, pp. 9C

This quote supports Hanak's thesis that the right-wing media, albeit reluctantly supported Britain's potential entry into a European war. While the quote is in no way in favour of a general European war, it is largely resigned to the fact that the July Crisis will turn into a general European war. On this front *The Times* was quite similar to the other papers in this study. All three papers acknowledged that the present diplomatic situation would almost certainly lead to a war. They also agreed that it was unlikely given the alliance system and the organization of the Great Powers that this war would be a localized war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. After this point, however, the papers diverge and have less in common with each other. *The Times* seems to hope that by conveying Britain's willingness to intervene on the part of her friends, the belligerents will think better of their actions and the war will be averted. This attitude is in stark contrast to that of the other papers within this study whom both, to varying degrees support British isolationism and protest any British involvement beyond mediation, within the conflict.

Even at this juncture, most of the letters to the editor in *The Times* concerned Irish home rule. There were four letters discussing the possibility of a continental war and the role Britain would play in such a war. Hanak wrote that conservative papers like *The Times* published articles and letters supporting Britain's entry into the war. While this is true in two cases there were also two letters published in the *Times* that presented an isolationist argument. One letter read:

A nation's first duty is to its own people. We are asked to intervene in the continental war because unless we do we shall be 'isolated'. The isolation which will result for us if we keep out of this war is that, while other nations are torn and weakened by war, we shall not be, and by that fact might conceivably for a long

time be the strongest Power in Europe, and by virtue of our strength and isolation, its arbiter, perhaps, to useful ends.... We can best serve civilization, Europe including France and ourselves by remaining the one power in Europe that has not yielded to the war madness. Thus, I believe, will be found to be the firm conviction of the overwhelming majority of the English people.¹³²

The following day *The Times* printed another letter that objected to Great Britain's potential role in a European conflict. The letter read:

I venture to ask you to record my protest, as one of the public, against the inference which you draw that England should involved herself in war on the hypothesis that other Powers have designs for her. The quarrel is not ours, and our efforts for the preservation of peace are bound to fail if we assume hostility on the part of Germany or any other power.¹³³

Both of the letters supporting Britain's role in the European conflict were published on August 5, 1914. One argued that while Britain had a duty to support the neutrality of Belgium she had an equally important duty to support Italy's neutrality, even though Italy was officially allied to Germany and Austria-Hungary.¹³⁴ The other letter supported Britain's duty to France. It read:

Where or by whom the great conflagration has been kindled is no longer of the least consequence. The only fact that matters is that France is about to be or perhaps is while I write, invaded by an overwhelming mass of Germans. If

¹³² Ibid, August 1, 1914, pp. 6C Included in this letter was a long section on the actual German threat to Great Britain and a section on Britain's commitments to France. This section is not only important due to the opinion it expressed, but it is also important as it demonstrates the international political knowledge of *Times*' readers. The omitted section read: "We are told that of we allow Germany to become victorious she would be so powerful as to threaten our existence by the occupation of Belgium, Holland, and possibly the North of France. But as your article of today's date so well points out, it was the difficulty which Germany found in Alsace-Lorraine which prevented her from acting against us during the South African war. If one province, so largely German in its origins are history, could create this embarrassment, what trouble will not Germany pile up for herself if she should attempt the absorption of Belgium, Holland, and Normandy... The object and effect of our entering into this war would be to ensure the victory of Russia and her Slavonic allies. Will a dormant Slavonic federation of say, 200,000,000 autocratically governed people, with a very rudimentary civilization, but heavily equipped for military aggression, be a less dangerous factor in Europe than a dormant Germany of 65,000,000 highly civilized and mainly given to the art of trade and commerce? The last war we fought on the continent was for the purpose of preventing the growth of Russia. We are now asked to fight one for the purpose of promoting it... On several occasions Sir Edward Grey has solemnly declared that we are not bound by any agreement to support France, and there is certainly no moral obligation on the part of the English people to do so."

¹³³ Ibid, August 2, 1914, pp. 2B

¹³⁴ Ibid, August 5, 1914, 9B

England were to repeat the blunder of 1870, with less excuse and tenfold the shame, she would not long remain unpunished.¹³⁵

While there were not many letters published about Britain's potential role in a European war, the percentage of dissenting letters does not support Hanak's theory. These letters also provide several discussion points. The letters that there were illustrate that *Times* readers were well aware of the impending war and were seriously discussing what, if any, role Britain would play in the conflict. As *The Times* catered to those well versed in foreign affairs it is not surprising that the readers responded to the paper with opinions based on international political facts and historic international relations.

These letters are also important to this study, as they do not mention either Austria-Hungary or Serbia. As this is a study of the British portrayal of Austria-Hungary and Serbia in the British press during the July crisis, it is noteworthy that at this late stage the principal catalysts of the crisis have been long forgotten, overshadowed by their larger, more powerful, and more menacing counterparts.

Austria-Hungary, while not a significant presence in the views of *The Times* readers, did receive mention from some correspondents. At this stage in the crisis, there was little if any sympathy for the cause of Austria Hungary. One correspondent wrote, "The entire policy of Austria-Hungary since the crisis began has been to prevent the prevention of war, and to cut off, both for herself and others, all possibility of escape from war."¹³⁶ Immediately after Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia, the paper printed a number of articles providing basic information on Austria-Hungary, her leaders, and her objectives in the war. These articles did not present the Dual Monarchy in the most favourable light. On correspondent wrote:

¹³⁵ Ibid, August 5, 1914, 9C

¹³⁶ Ibid., Jul 29, 1914; pg. 7 A

For weeks past efforts have been made to hide and confuse the cause at stake. On the eve of the war between Germany and France in 1870, Bismarck falsified a dispatch from his King and published the falsification in order to make it appear that Germany was fighting to defend her honour while she was really attacking France to secure the mastery of Europe. Just so today Germany and Austria-Hungary have falsified the issues by pretending that the war has arisen out of a just desire to punish the crime committed at Sarajevo. In reality the crime at Sarajevo was the merest pretext. Serbia whose complicity in the crime has been alleged but not proved, offered every satisfaction to Austria-Hungary. The satisfaction was rejected and war declared with the consent of Germany. Why? Because Serbia is the chief obstacle to the Austro-German advance towards the Mediterranean and to the establishment of complete German control of the Balkans, the Dardanelles, Asia Minor, and of the land and sea routes to Egypt and India.¹³⁷

There is the distinct attitude that Austria-Hungary had, as *The Times* predicted shortly after the assassination, squandered world sympathy, and shown herself to be a warmonger. On Austria and Great Britain one article read:

...diplomacy is working under grave artificial disadvantages. Austria had practically presented Europe with a series of *faits accomplis*. Europe is precluded from dealing with the whole matter on its merits. Some very good judges are beginning to believe that the only remedy and time is pressing will be found in a hardening of the British attitude, or rather in a more definite statement of the attitude which Great Britain would adopt if the European alliances found there military expression.¹³⁸

While the paper was essentially calling Austria-Hungary a war enthused country, there is the implication that entire affair was in reality a German construction. The quote above almost casually slips in the idea that Austria-Hungary's actions during the crisis were part of an Austro-German plan. In an article published on August 2, 1914 *The Times* argued that the real Austro-German plan was more concerned with the domination of Great Britain than it was with occupying the Balkans.

It is not a question of Serbia nor of Russia. It is a question of isolating England in order that when isolated she may be compelled to submit to German dictation. It is a question of destroying the security of the Mediterranean, through which

¹³⁷ Ibid, August 2, 1914, pp. 5B.

¹³⁸ Ibid, Jul 30, 1914; pg. 8A

England's route to Egypt and India and the bulk of her food supplies pass. It is a question of circumventing the independence of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg which England is pledged to maintain, an independence, moreover, which guards her most vital interests at home, the control of the Channel, through which German shipping and German warships must pass before they can prey on British merchantmen, on the high seas, cut off British food supplies, and detach our overseas dominions from the mother country.¹³⁹

The Times at this stage in the crisis was the most conflicted paper within this study. On the one hand, the editors and correspondents present a picture of certain calamity if Britain does not enter the war. This is the classic conservative media that Hanak described in his book. However, on the other hand the readers of the *Times* indicate through fully half of the letters to the editor an absolute rejection of war and an unyielding desire for Britain to remain in splendid isolation. On July 31st 1914, the paper published an article on the interests and duty of Great Britain. The article contained a number of reasons why Britain had no other option than to join the war and support France the main one being that France posed little threat to Britain where as Germany was Britain's direct rival. The article used recent historic evidence such as the increased costs on military equipment Britain was forced to pay since the victory of Germany in 1870 to keep up with the Anglo-German arms race. The article theorized about the possibility of Germany taking over Belgium, Holland, and Northern France and using these areas as the launch point of a naval attack on Great Britain. The article argued that this was a "contingency which no Englishman can look upon with indifference". It concluded by stating:

But if it be merely a contingency, why should England not wait until it is realized before acting or preparing to act? Because in these days of swift decisions and even swifter action, it would be too late for England to act with any chance of success after France had been defeated in the north. This is why the shots fired by the Austro-Hungarian guns at Belgrade reverberate across the English Channel.

¹³⁹ Ibid, August 2, 1914, pp. 5B

The safety of the narrow seas is a vital, the most vital, British national and imperial interest. It is an axiom of British self-preservation. France does not threaten our security. A German victory over France would threaten it irredeemably. Even should the German Navy remain inactive, the occupation of Belgium and Northern France by German troops would strike a crushing blow a British security. We should then be obliged, alone without allies, to bear the burden of keeping up a Fleet superior of that of Germany and of an Army proportionately strong. This burden would be ruinous. The interest of self-preservation, which is the strongest factor in national life, therefore compels us if the efforts of our Government to keep the peace should fail, to be ready to strike with all our force for our own safety and for that of our friends.¹⁴⁰

At this stage in the crisis, it can be argued that *the Times* was promoting Great Britain's entry into the war to a sceptical audience. The paper's articles and editorials all drive towards one conclusion that is the idea that Britain could not afford to remain neutral in a general European war. The paper argued based on economics, military power, national security, and the safety of the Empire with the goal of convincing readers that Britain could not justify non-intervention. Despite the inundation of articles and editorials, only half of the general readership appears to have been convinced. Rather than being an echo of the paper's opinions half of the letters to the editor on the subject of the war are in stark contrast to the paper's opinion often employing the paper's own arguments and evidence as reasons not to join the war effort.

The Manchester Guardian the Rejection of the Ultimatum and the coming of the war

The *Manchester Guardian*, while calmer than its counterparts when the ultimatum was issued, was far less calm when Serbia's response was rejected in Austria-Hungary. The morning headline on July 27, 1914 read "on the brink of a Great War, Armies preparing , Austrian minister leaves Belgrade, martial law in Russia, last attempts

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, Friday, Jul 31, 1914; pg. 9F

to preserve European peace.”¹⁴¹ The paper’s early optimism that the whole event would quickly fade was all, but gone. The leading story read:

Austria and Serbia hesitate on the brink of war. Hope that they will compose their differences without an appeal to arms is vanishing, and if war comes Russia is only too likely soon to be involved. Both Germany and Italy, whose treaties with Austria expose them to immediate dangers, look to Great Britain to procure a peaceful settlement.¹⁴²

This quote examines the alliance system. Britain in this case, is presented as being outside of the alliance system and therefore a viable party to act as mediator. There is not even the slightest prediction that Britain would play any sort of military role in the conflict. This is not to say, however, that the *Manchester Guardian* was presenting the conflict as an event in a far off land only concerning strange and distant peoples. On the contrary, it shows that at this point the *Manchester Guardian* expected Britain to act in her historic role as the maintainer of the Balance of Power in Europe. This initial degree of responsibility to world affairs was not well represented in Hanak’s work. For Hanak the British liberal media was an isolationist establishment who would rather see “Serbia towed out to the ocean and sunk” than it would have Britain play any role in the conflict, even the role of a mediator.¹⁴³ This quote from early in the third section, however, contradicts Hanak’s findings as the article even continued, saying:

The last chance of an escape from a great war lies in the efforts now being made by other Powers to arrange a settlement between Servia and Austria. England, Italy, France, Germany, and Russia are all known to have attempted to find a solution or to have watched will goodwill such attempts. If they fail their failure will bring with it a terrible calamity.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ *Manchester Guardian*, Monday July 27, 1914 pg 9

¹⁴² *Ibid*, Monday July 27, 1914, pg 9

¹⁴³ Harry Hanak, pp. 37

¹⁴⁴ *Manchester Guardian*, July 27, 1914, pp. 9

It is important to note that there is a hint of isolationist sentiment within the paper. While there was mention of Britain's historical mediation attempts, there was no mention of Britain's own commitments, such as the entente with France and Russia.

As the crisis wore on, the paper became more anxious at the idea of a war. On July 31st 1914, the paper entered into the great debate as to what role Great Britain should play in the war. Unlike the *Times*, the *Manchester Guardian* at this point advocated a strictly isolationist stance. Under the headline "The danger of a European war, should Great Britain be involved, public opinion and the catastrophe," it wrote:

It is time that the public should consider whether there is any valid reason why this country should permit herself to be involved in a great Europe war, if one should break out; and, if there is not, then to take good care to avoid any steps which might land us into it. Part of the press have been urging for some days that, if the war spreads, Great Britain must plunge in. They do not say what interest she would have in such a war, and of the general public none desires that she should be involved, though many fear it as well they may fear a catastrophe so gigantic.¹⁴⁵

To support the assertion that the Britain should remain neutral in the conflict several correspondents contributed articles. One article read:

Surely the insistence reiterated in the leading articles of many papers that fidelity to the Entente renders necessary out taking part in the war, should it become a "group" war, is quite uncalled for. Mr. Asquith reassured the House of Commons last year by saying that the Entente did not commit us to any such undertaking. Had not this statement been made I am confident that many protests would have been made against the suggestion that we were bound to support France in a war where we had no vital interests immediately at stake. The "maintenance of the balance of power in Europe" is advanced as the principal that must still guide our policy. But it is antiquated and ignores the fact that our interests are primarily world-wide and not merely European. The safety of India and our overseas dominions are of far greater importance to us than a possible defeat of France. But allowing that the preservation of the balance of power in Europe is a sound principal to act on, may it not, then, be questioned whether support ought not to be given to the Triple Alliance rather than to France and Russia, so as to maintain the balance? One point is clear, which is that by the press declaring that it is our

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, July 31, 1914, pp. 9

duty to support France and Russia, Russia is thereby encouraged to make war on Austria, and a general war will necessarily follow.¹⁴⁶

This demonstrates that the paper did not support Britain's possible entry to the war, and that it appeared to have little preference for either side at this stage in the crisis. While there was no sympathy expressed for Austria-Hungary or Germany, there was a distinct expression of distaste, even fear when discussing Russia.

Unlike *The Times*, in which half of the letters did not support the view of the paper, the *Manchester Guardian* was filled with letters to the editor encouraging British neutrality. On August 3, 1914, the paper devoted an entire page to letters objecting to Britain's potential entry into the war. One such letter read:

Who speaks for England! Those who are perpetrating the iniquity of driving Great Britain into a war represent in their portentously produced "statements" and editorials only themselves and a few hundred well-to-do people in London. No man living can say that they represent what England, the England of the countryside, the England of the crowded towns, would choose if she were given her choice. But she is not to be given her choice. She is to be shouted at, mesmerized, blindfolded, led to the brink of the pit and then pushed in.¹⁴⁷

Another letter read:

If we must fight, let us at least choose our most dangerous enemy. This, it seems to me, is either (1) The overflowing and politically repulsive Russian, who has menaced our trade and Imperial interests for some years past; or (2) The frightened reactionary at home who thinks to stifle discontent and arrest the regeneration of England by seeking the terror of a great common disaster. I submit this without losing sight of the menace of German militarism and expansive Imperialism.¹⁴⁸

In this instance, the letters support Hanak's thesis on the British liberal media on the eve of the First World War. There was no overriding fear of Germany and certainly

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, July 31, 1914, pp. 9

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, August 3, 1914, pp. 9

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, August 3, 1914, pp. 9 The previous two letters are samples from a collection of 24 letters to the editor, all of similar tone, printed in the *Manchester Guardian* on August 3, 1914.

not of Austria-Hungary presented within these letters. As Hanak argued, instead, there was great support for a nation and a culture believed to be among the most civilized in Europe. At this same time, there was a great distaste and fear of Russia. Letter writers worried about the implications of a Russian dominated Europe. The letter writers of the *Manchester Guardian* very much represented an isolationist viewpoint; they saw no reason for Britain to enter the war.

The Daily Herald the Rejection of the Ultimatum and the coming of the war

To say that the *Daily Herald* was in a panic about the possibility of a war is an underestimate. Once the reply to the ultimatum was rejected, the paper flooded with anti-war statements and planned anti-war protests. Unlike the mainstream media, the anti-war sentiment in the *Daily Herald* did not stop once the war began. Throughout the First World War, the paper remained the anti-war voice. While the paper's radical mandate never attracted many advertisers, its anti-war stance drove away the few advertisers it did have. Eventually its radical anti-war politics resulted in the publication's paper rations being revoked, forcing the paper to publish as a weekly rather than a daily for the duration of the conflict.¹⁴⁹ Unlike the *Manchester Guardian*, which was more pro-German and anti-Russian, the *Daily Herald* showed no visible support for either side. For the *Herald*, the fast approaching war was a battle of capitalists, from which only capitalists stood to gain. The problem for the *Herald* was that the burden of fighting fell on the working classes. Therefore, without real regard for the diplomatic issues behind

¹⁴⁹ Richards, pp. 13 According to Ward, the *Daily Herald's* continued antiwar stance once the war had actually begun put it in the minority of leftist British newspapers. Most leftist British newspapers opposed the coming of war, but once Britain was committed to fighting they whole heartedly supported the effort. According to Ward, most leftists joined their papers in supporting the war. George Lansbury, editor of the *Daily Herald*, was one of the few socialists who continued to oppose the war, he did so primarily on moral grounds. Ward, pp. 119-141

the upcoming war, *the Herald* took upon itself to unite workers and convince them not to partake in the war. This quote can be offered as evidence of *the Herald's* lack of support for either side:

The situation in East Europe seems to depend entirely upon the attitude of Russia, and it is significant that Russia says little, but is apparently, if the various telegrams can be believed, making steady preparations to assist Serbia if Austria persists in forcing war.¹⁵⁰

This quote demonstrates that *the Herald* believed that both sides were ultimately responsible for a potential European war.

The *Daily Herald* was the voice of pacifists. The paper strove to persuade the working classes that they stood nothing to gain from war and everything to gain from peace. The paper, however, faced an uphill struggle to convince readers that class solidarity held precedence over patriotism. Much of the mainstream media and most certainly government recruitment campaigns, focused on convincing the working class that their duty was to the king and the empire and that despite not sharing in much of the wealth of the empire they had more than a full share of pride in the empire. Radical media, like the *Daily Herald*, strove to disrupt this pride and replace it with international class solidarity. The position of the *Daily Herald* was perhaps best laid out in an editorial that appeared in the paper on July 29th, 1914:

The present European crisis throws a grave responsibility on the Trade Unions. At any moment the working classes of Europe may be called upon to defend interests which they are not concerned, for a cause that tends in no way to uplift them. Theirs will be the loss and the burden whatever side may be victorious. As the guardians of their welfare, it is the duty of the Trade Unions to declare that this thing shall not be. It is possible to ensure its prevention if the workers show the right spirit. In the first place let them understand that the nasal jingoism, which

¹⁵⁰ *Daily Herald*, July 28, 1914, pp. 1

cries out in the marketplace for war, is the antithesis of patriotism. In the second place let them remember that it is their brothers who will be shot down. The capitalists for whose benefit the war will be waged lose nothing save in the sphere of finance. The Labour leaders must act at once. We have heard enough resolutions. It is time for action. There has been given to the worker the opportunity to strike a blow at the very heart of the capitalist system. If he declares the he has no concern with any other conflict save the industrial conflict; if he thus makes clear the solidarity of working-class interest throughout Europe, he can ensure the commencement of a new era in history. He will make plain that henceforward the Army is not a tool in the hands of the aristocracies. He will make it plain that the workers will decide the problems for the decision of which they must bear the cost.¹⁵¹

This was, in essence, the quintessential position of the *Daily Herald*: the idea that the politics behind the capitalist's reasons for going to war were of no consequence. Historian Paul Ward, however, argued that unlike the left in other parts of Europe, the majority of the British left felt that they shared concerns with the ruling British elite. According to Ward, in the decades leading up to 1914 the British left had constructed a radical version of patriotism which accepted the idea of the national defence of Britain, since they saw it as the natural home of democracy, liberty and free institutions.¹⁵² Therefore, the real battle for the *Daily Herald* was the struggle to convince the working classes of Great Britain and if they could, around the world, not to fight in a war that offered them no benefit, simply due to a sense of patriotic duty. To illustrate this point further the paper published a poem on August 1, 1914. It read:

Hurrah for War!

Hurrah for the blood and entrails, for lungs shot through and
eyes gouged out, for faces torn off and limbs blown sky-high, for weeping
mothers and father-less children, for disease and death abroad, for
starvation and destitution at home.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, July 29, 1914, pp.5

¹⁵² Ward, pp. 122

Hurrah for War!

Hurrah for Blood and Bankruptcy!

Hurrah for Hell!

Into the streets, ye patriots! Wave your little flags and shout like mad.
War! War! War! Hurrah for War!

Here's a sailor. Gather round and shoulder him high! "Jack is ready for anything." You read that at your breakfast tables yesterday morning. Ready for anything, Ready to do his "duty," you know. Ready to slaughter and be slaughtered.

Up with him. Cheer ye patriots! To-morrow this sailor lad may be a mangled corpse; to-morrow his mother may be sobbing for the loss of her fair son.

But you're all right. You will be alive- and cheering. Carry him shoulder high-the Sacrifice!

There's a soldier. Up with him, shoulder high! Good old Tommy Atkins! He's the boy. Cheer, ye patriots! Pat him on the back. You will not see him again. He is off to do his share of the fighting: hi share and yours.

This lad in khaki may be lying at the bottom of a trench a few days hence, dead, with a dozen comrades on top of him, dead. Dead and mangled beyond recognition. God's image, after Mars and Mammon have done with it.

But you will be alright. You will be bending over you little ledgers when this boy is shrieking in agony. Hoist him on your shoulders, ye patriots! Carry him shoulder high- the Sacrifice!

Glorious, isn't it? War, war, glorious war! Three cheers for the red, white, and blue- particularly the red.

Here come the troops. Cheer, ye patriots! Wave your little flags. Sing your little music-hall ditties. These men are marching to Death, and you will march bravely with them - to the railway station.

Hurrah for War! Cheer, ye stay-at home heroes! Hurrah for the flag! Hurrah for the Empire! Hurrah for Insanity! Hurrah for Hell!¹⁵³

The poem served to illustrate the *Daily Herald's* anti-war stance, in a more touching way than perhaps a regular editorial would have. The poem not only expressed

¹⁵³ C. Langdon Everard, "Hurrah for War!" *Daily Herald*, August 1, 1914, pp. 3

an anti-war opinion, but also illuminated the hypocrisy of enthusiastically sending men to fight, claiming to be patriotic, while all the while staying at home in relative comfort and safety. It was in many ways a demonstration of the paper's lack of connection with the conflict at hand.

Along with publishing anti-war poems and editorials, the *Daily Herald* also tried to organize anti-war rallies. Almost immediately after the rejection of the reply to the ultimatum, the *Daily Herald* began to call upon its readers to rally together and protest the upcoming conflict. This protest was not even necessarily meant to keep Britain out of the war; it was in fact, meant to keep the peace in Europe. The *Daily Herald* sought to unite workers in a bond of class solidarity so that they would not take up arms against each other and then, therefore there would be no one to fight the wars for the capitalists. On August 1, the paper wrote:

We feel at the present time of the grave crisis it is necessary for us to speak with plainness ere it be too late. We shall not use the phraseology of diplomacy, for unfortunately, in that profession language is used to conceal thought. The working classes of Great Britain and Ireland must insist in no uncertain voice that this country shall not be dragged into a war. No amount of special pleading can in any way justify the firing of a single shot by a British soldier, or the exposition of a solitary torpedo by a naval ship. For this country to become involved would be the crime of the century. We have on more than one occasion protested against secret diplomacy and the theory of the continuity of foreign policy. We are all in the dark. We do not know what treaties have been signed, what engagements have been entered into in the name of England. All we do know is that in pursuit of a mirage known as the Balance of Power money has been spent like water in constructing awful engines of destruction.¹⁵⁴

Once it became apparent that the war was unavoidable in Europe, it then became the paper's mandate to prevent Great Britain from fighting in the war. While other newspapers spoke of British pride and the safety of the empire, the *Daily Herald*

¹⁵⁴ *Daily Herald*, August 1, 1914, pp. 5

spoke of the shame and humiliation that Britain should feel if she were to partake in warfare without a direct cause. As the passage above demonstrates, secret diplomacy was a particular thorn to the *Daily Herald*. As a paper devoted to voicing the opinions of radicals, it frequently criticized the government. One of its chief criticisms throughout the conflict was the secret alliances made by the foreign office with other nations. The *Daily Herald* felt that since the public did not vote on these Ententes with France and with Russia or for that matter the Belgium neutrality agreement, the British public should bear no responsibility in maintaining those agreements. This deep distrust of the Foreign Office added to the paper's general lack of support for the empire meant that the paper had some strong arguments against other media outlet's push towards war. The *Daily Herald* never strayed far from its radical anti-establishment or anti-capitalist message. In an editorial published on August 3, 1914, the paper wrote:

If the war between Austria and Servia embroils the rest of Europe, the British people will have the mournful consolation of knowing that the blundering diplomacy of our rulers during the last generation has been largely responsible.... Ambassadors and Diplomats, with all their fine uniforms and lace, their education and culture, their aristocratic lineage, are simply the marionettes manipulated by the interest mongers even as a dirty , course voiced man manipulates Punch and Judy at the street corner. A sight to amuse the Gods maybe, but fruitful of ruin to the Sons of Men. And England and modern English Liberalism is responsible for the War clouds in Europe to day. It abandoned its old ideals, and making friends with those who desired the fleshpots of Egypt, became Imperialist and entangled this country in the meshes of the doctrine of the Balance of Power, which is now hurling the whole of Europe into a horrible devastating war.¹⁵⁵

While Hanak's study did not encompass the *Daily Herald*, this passage supports his thesis that left leaning media outlets were typically pacifists and isolationists. The paper offered no support for the idea of war. The doctrine of maintaining the balance of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, August 3, 1914, pp. 8

power was in the eyes of the *Daily Herald* criminal and much of the reason the Balkans and Europe in general were in such turmoil.

Therefore, to return to the main questions of this study in terms of the final days of the crisis as reported in the *Daily Herald*, it can be said that the paper was not a supporter of either Serbia or Austria-Hungary. At the same time, neither Germany nor Russia was the enemy to the *Daily Herald* either. For the *Herald*, capitalism and interventionist foreign policies were the chief enemy and one that the paper did its utmost to fight. The paper sought not to rally troops to arms, but rather to rally the proletariat to peacefully protest against an unjust war; a war the paper felt would rob the working class (its supporters) of their very lives while making the capitalist wagers of war a tidy profit. For the *Herald* it was not time to show one's patriotic colours, as the paper firmly believed that war in this instance was decidedly unpatriotic and that the working classes of the world had more in common with each other than they did with their aristocratic compatriots.

At this point in the crisis, no newspaper in this study was ignorant of the potential dangers to world peace brewing in the Balkans. Furthermore, by the end of this period, no paper was ignorant of the fact that this war would, like it or not, involve Great Britain. While other papers, namely the *Manchester Guardian*, were most certainly opposed to the war and Britain's entry to it, its opposition was not as vehement as that of the *Daily Herald*. No paper took up the anti-war cause as strongly or as loudly as did the *Daily Herald*. Not simply content to complain about the upcoming war, the newspaper organized protests and published anti-war poems. It was in fact, one of the only papers to continue its anti-war stance throughout the First World War.

It is important to note, however, that the *Daily Herald* was a radical paper; its views were not mainstream and did not even necessarily represent the opinion of most of the British left. While there may not have been very many readers of the *Daily Herald*, those who supported the paper did so passionately.¹⁵⁶ Therefore, on the one hand the paper's views while intrinsically interesting are not necessarily the views of the majority of the British population in 1914. On the other hand, due to the near fanatical loyalty of *Daily Herald* readers, it can be argued that the paper, more than any other paper used in this study, represented the opinions and feelings of its ideal readers. It can therefore more than any other paper in this study legitimately be taken as the public opinion of that small segment of society.

¹⁵⁶ The readership figures for the *Daily Herald* varied greatly depending on the activities of radical and labour movements. Most figures place the paper's circulation between 40,000 climbing to 180,000 during strikes. Richards, 1997, pp. 21

Conclusions

This study set out to analyse and compare three British newspapers representing different classes and different political persuasions with essentially one major question: how do newspapers report a nation's drift towards war? This question was then broken down into two smaller questions: How do newspapers portray the belligerents of a future war and how do newspapers react when a reluctant nation is pushed toward war. To address these questions *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Daily Herald* were studied from June 28th 1914 to August 4th 1914 for stories with content relating to Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and the July crisis unfolding in the Balkans. Unlike Germany or Russia, Austria-Hungary was not among the average British citizen's primary concerns. This study examined how a nation that was previously ignored was turned into an enemy state in a period of little over a month. This study also examined how a nation which abhorred militarism was drawn, albeit reluctantly, into a world war and what role the different newspapers played in putting a spin on this development.

One of the major components of this study was to compare the coverage of three different newspapers for articles on Austria-Hungary from the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to the outbreak of the First World War. How did the paper initially portray Austria-Hungary and Serbia? Was there a significant change in the paper's perceptions as the crisis blossomed into a continental war, or did the opinions of Austria-Hungary and Serbia only change after Britain's entry into the war? How did the

paper's individual class bias and political bias change what was reported and how it was reported?

Perceptions of another nation are subjective and are want to change depending on the correspondent and the situation. Only one of three papers in this study maintained a constant stance or clearly traceable progression in its attitude toward either Austria-Hungary or Serbia. While there are some great inconsistencies, it is possible to draw several conclusions. *The Times* began the crisis with a considerable amount of sympathy for Austria-Hungary and ended the crisis promoting war against a nation that it openly referred to as a warmonger. Initially, of all the paper's *The Times* was the most tactful in its eulogy for the late Archduke and the most apparently genuine in its expressed grief for the Emperor Franz Joseph and the Austro-Hungarian nation as a whole. Early in the crisis; however, *The Times* prophesized that Austria-Hungary would over-react to the crisis, alienate friendly nations, and squander the world's sympathy. As far as the editor and correspondents of *The Times* were concerned by the presentation of the ultimatum to Serbia and by the subsequent rejection of Serbia's conciliatory response, Austria-Hungary did just that. So while *The Times* started out being the most sympathetic paper concerning the assassination by the end of the crisis the paper was openly critical of the Dual Monarchy and strongly advocated British involvement in a war that would effectively make the two countries enemies. As in all of the papers studied, however, it is important to note that while Austria-Hungary had certainly lost a great deal of esteem in the eyes of many *Times* correspondents after the first stage of the crisis, Austria-Hungary's complicity was thoroughly overshadowed by the paper's coverage of

Germany. In actuality, *The Times* thought of Germany as the enemy, Austria-Hungary was merely Berlin's puppet and a pretext for the Germans to make war.

The *Manchester Guardian* on the other hand began the crisis with a complete lack of sympathy for Austria-Hungary, going so far as to refer to the Archduke as a tyrant before he had even been laid to rest. The paper, however, ended the crisis with more feelings of sympathy and friendship towards Austria-Hungary, or more specifically her ally Germany, than did any other paper. A distinct fear of Russia coupled with an intense desire for Great Britain to remain in isolation, meant that the paper seldom reported ill of Germany or Austria-Hungary. For the *Manchester Guardian* Austria-Hungary was part of the troubled continent of Europe, and with her global empire, Great Britain could no longer prioritize continental affairs and continental relationships. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary was seen as a far lesser threat on a global scale than was Russia. The internal problems of the Dual Monarchy prevented Austria-Hungary from presenting as much of a challenge to British colonial possessions in Asia as Russia presented. In addition, while not considered the absolute ideal political system, British respect for the Hungarian constitution meant that newspapers like the *Manchester Guardian* felt Austria-Hungary was far more politically liberal than the oppressive regime in Russia. Therefore, while the paper's own correspondent referred to the Archduke as a tyrant, the Austro-Hungarian leaders and political system were still regarded as superior to that of Russia.

The *Daily Herald* was the one paper that remained consistent throughout the crisis. Representing an overwhelmingly socialist perspective, the *Daily Herald*, without fail, sided with the workers. National boundaries had little meaning to the *Daily Herald*; instead, it was all about class and economics. Consequently, there was no sympathy at

anytime during the crisis for Austria-Hungary itself, but there was always empathy for her working class. For the *Daily Herald*, the government of Austria-Hungary was no more tyrannical than the government of Great Britain. The paper firmly believed that capitalist wealth and greed ruled the Great Powers. Industrialists and capitalists were the same in either Great Britain or Austria-Hungary. Similarly, workers were subject to the same disadvantages and the same forms of abuse. Therefore, as far as the *Daily Herald* was concerned its readers had more in common with the average worker in the Dual Monarchy than they did with a British factory owner or even someone from the British middle classes. Consequently, the paper never presented Austria-Hungary itself as a potential enemy as that would be encouraging workers, (turned enlisted men) from one nation to fight against the workers from another nation. One of the main goals of the *Daily Herald* was to promote class solidarity, a principle that strongly discouraged worker fighting worker. Instead, the paper painted the capitalists of Austria-Hungary as the enemy, but not nearly as consistently as they painted British capitalists as the enemy.

This study also sought to answer how the political and class bias of a newspaper coloured the way the impending war was reported. Unlike the reports of Austria-Hungary and Serbia in which it was difficult to generalize, the analysis of the different paper's coverage of the impending war was more straightforward. For the most part the newspapers followed the lines traced by Hanak in his work on British newspapers and Austria-Hungary. *The Times*, like the other conservative newspapers, supported British entry into the war for reasons of national pride, diplomatic duty, and the need to maintain the balance of power in Europe. As a matter of patriotism, the paper had a stake in the war as a means of maintaining British prestige in Europe and throughout the world.

Worried by increased military spending due to the Anglo-German Naval race *The Times'* editor and correspondents saw the war as an opportunity to support France and ensure that a "friendly" nation occupied the land across the channel.

As Hanak wrote, the *Manchester Guardian* like the other liberal papers, vehemently protested Britain's entry into the war. The paper promoted the historical precedent as well as the economic benefits of remaining neutral. As far as the *Manchester Guardian* was concerned, the war could go on in Europe, but Britain had no place in it. Great Britain had enough to worry about on a global scale, maintaining the British Empire that she could no longer afford to be concerned with the balance of power in Europe alone. At the same time, the *Manchester Guardian* appeared neutral as to whether France or Germany should dominate Europe. The opinion expressed in the *Manchester Guardian* appears to have been a common one made possible largely by the Royal Navy. As DeGroot argued, the power and prestige of the British navy allowed for a certain degree of complacency and isolationist sentiments regarding European affairs:

Complacency towards the army was affordable because of the sense of security which the Royal Navy provided. That Britain ruled the waves may have been a cliché but it was not a myth. Since Britain was an island nation, and since an airborne attack was still some way off, the security the navy provided *was* real. True, the idea of Pax Britannica, which held that Britain could remain aloof from European affairs, was a fallacy, given her growing dependency upon continental markets. Nevertheless, the strategic fact remains: Britain did not feel *physically* threatened by the German or French armies.¹⁵⁷

Unfortunately, Hanak did not study the *Daily Herald*. In this study, the *Herald* represented the radical media. While the liberal media protested Britain's possible entry into the war, the socialist radical media/ labour media for the most part protested any country's movement towards war. While the British left was thoroughly divided

¹⁵⁷ DeGroot, pp. 15

concerning support for the war the issue was clear for one of its largest papers. For the *Daily Herald*, war was a capitalist quarrel that the everyday worker had to bare the brunt of. Consequently, while the nations of Europe were mobilizing to go to war, the *Daily Herald* was waging a campaign of its own mobilizing its readers to protest the war. The paper appealed to its reader's class-consciousness with the hope that if no worker turned up to fight the capitalist's war than there could be no war.

In conclusion, British media outlets presented the July Crisis in a manner which consistently represented their own political and economic backgrounds. As Hanak argued the conservative press reluctantly promoted the war, the liberal press vehemently opposed British involvement in the war, and the socialist /radical press vehemently opposed any war at all. These attitudes towards the war also played a significant role in the end portrayal of Austria-Hungary. In the case of the conservative media, Austria-Hungary by necessity became the enemy because she was Germany's ally and Germany was seen as the proprietor of the war. In the case of the liberal media, opinions towards Austria-Hungary were more positive. As Hanak argued, the British liberal media considered Russia to the greatest menace to European civilization. Austria-Hungary in contrast was seen as a cultural and historic center. Furthermore, as Vienna posed no threat to British colonial possession in Asia, Austria-Hungary was seen as far less of a threat to European security than Russia. The socialist radical media did not focus on any of the belligerents. Austria-Hungary as a nation was never portrayed as an enemy or a friend. For the socialist radical papers, the capitalists, no matter what country they hailed from, were the greatest threat to European culture and security.

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