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Catherine Eda Melvin

AUTEUR DE LA THÈSE / AUTHOR OF THESIS

M.A. (Translation)

GRADE / DEGREE

School of Translation and Interpretation

FACULTÉ, ÉCOLE, DÉPARTEMENT / FACULTY, SCHOOL, DEPARTMENT

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Canadian, Québec and French Print Media

TITRE DE LA THÈSE / TITLE OF THESIS

Annie Brisset

DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS SUPERVISOR

CO-DIRECTEUR (CO-DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS CO-SUPERVISOR

EXAMINATEURS (EXAMINATRICES) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS EXAMINERS

Aline Francoeur

Timothy Stanley

Gary W. Slater

LE DOYEN DE LA FACULTÉ DES ÉTUDES SUPÉRIEURES ET POSTDOCTORALES /  
DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCORAL STUDIES

**CROSS-CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS: THE  
CONSTRUCTION OF “AMERICA” AFTER SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup> IN  
ENGLISH CANADIAN, QUEBEC AND FRENCH PRINT MEDIA**

by

Catherine Eda Melvin

School of Translation and Interpretation  
University of Ottawa

Supervised by

Annie Brisset, Ph.D.

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## ABSTRACT

The cultural turn in Translation Studies is the name given to the shift from an inter-lingual approach to the study of translation to an inter-cultural one. Since the cultural turn, meaning is no longer considered to be reducible to the level of word, sentence or even text within a specific situation of utterance. Instead, culture as a whole is considered to be the prime locus of meaning. Translators, then, are not expected to be simply bilingual, but to be *bi-cultural*. Translating between cultures and not simply between languages means that translators must understand the frameworks of social knowledge between which they are expected to operate.

This thesis is a comparative discourse analysis that explores how pre-existing discourses in English Canada, Quebec and France affect the representation of the United States in print media coverage following terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. More specifically, the impact of the discourse of *counter-Americanism* in English Canada is analyzed in a corpus of newspaper articles selected from five major Canadian dailies. Similarly, articles from *Le Devoir* and *La Presse* are analyzed in relation to the discourse of *américanité* in Quebec and articles from *Le Monde* are analyzed in relation to the discourse of *anti-Americanism* in France. In each case, the construction of an American identity can be traced to the specific geographical, historical, political and economic relationships of each country to the U.S. This means that representations of an American Other serve primarily to support representations of self, thus revealing the relative and constructed nature of national identity.

Drawing on scholars in both Cultural Studies and Communications, this study outlines how discourse constructs national identity. In addition, it illustrates how identity discourses affect the construction and interpretation of meaning, thus meriting attention in the field of Translation Studies.

## RÉSUMÉ

En traductologie, le « tournant culturel » marque le passage de l'approche interlinguistique à une approche interculturelle de la traduction. Le sens n'est plus circonscrit au lexique, à la syntaxe ni même au texte inscrit dans une situation de communication immédiate. C'est la culture tout entière, un espace-temps peuplé de représentations symboliques, qui informe et donne sens à l'interprétation de ces unités. Dès lors, on attend du traducteur qu'il soit non plus seulement bilingue mais *biculturel*. Faire passer un texte d'une culture à une autre oblige le traducteur à connaître le cadre de référence propre à chacune des sociétés que la traduction met en présence.

Dans cette perspective, on s'est proposé de voir comment les discours déjà établis au Canada anglais, au Québec et en France ont différemment orienté la représentation des Etats-Unis dans la presse écrite de ces sociétés après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 à New York et Washington. Plus précisément, on a étudié l'incidence du *contre-américanisme* qui caractérise l'espace anglo-canadien (« Nous ne sommes pas Américains »), dans un corpus de presse regroupant des articles extraits de cinq grands quotidiens anglophones du Canada. De même, des articles du *Devoir* et de *La Presse*, également publiés après les attentats, ont été mis en rapport avec le discours de l'*américanité* qui sous-tend les représentations identitaires au Québec. Enfin, des articles du *Monde*, publiés durant la même période, ont été analysés au regard du discours *anti-américain* répandu en France. Dans chacune de ces trois sociétés, les relations géographiques, historiques, économiques et politiques avec les Etats-Unis ont débouché sur une construction particulière de l'identité américaine.

En s'appuyant sur les acquis théoriques des études culturelles et des communications, l'étude cherche à montrer comment l'identité nationale se construit à travers le discours et comment cette construction influence l'interprétation du sens. D'où sa pertinence pour la traductologie.

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## INTRODUCTION

The cultural turn in Translation Studies is the name given to the shift from an inter-*lingual* approach to the study of translation to an inter-*cultural* one. As has been oft repeated, “[s]ince languages express cultures, translators should be bicultural, not bilingual” (Bassnett & Lefevere 11). Culture, then, and not word, sentence, or even text, is the operational unit of translation (Bassnett & Lefevere 8). But how are translation scholars to go about incorporating the concept of culture into their work? What is culture anyway and how does one go about knowing it?

In a broad sense, culture is considered to be all socially conditioned aspects of human life. In her book *Translation Studies, an integrated approach*, Mary Snell-Hornby relies on American ethnologist Ward H. Goodenough’s definition of culture:

As I see it, a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and do so in any role that they accept for any one of themselves. Culture, being distinct from their biological heritage, must consist of the end product of learning: knowledge, in a most general, if relative, sense of the word. By this definition, we should note that culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, behaviour, or emotions. It is rather an organization of these things. It is the forms of things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them. As such, the things people say and do, their social arrangements and events, are products or by-products of their culture as they apply it to

the task of perceiving and dealing with their circumstances. To one who knows their culture, these things and events are also signs signifying the cultural forms of models of which they are material representations (...).

(qtd. 40-41)<sup>1</sup>

Social knowledge, then, is at the heart of culture and is thus, central to contemporary translation studies. What is required when one translates is not simply knowledge of correct grammar and style of the languages in question, but instead, an understanding of what knowledge is shared by the communities in question, how that knowledge is organized and in what ways it is expressed. I say the languages and the communities in question because a translator must first interpret the source text and then formulate a target text appropriate to the target community. The double action of interpretation and reformulation that is translation requires this “bicultural” knowledge.

In an attempt to illustrate how social knowledge is 1) constructed and 2) culturally specific, this thesis will examine the discursive strategies used to represent (and construct) one object of discourse in three different cultural communities. The object of discourse examined is “America” or more specifically, the United States. The discourse strategies used to represent the U.S. by the print media in English Canada will be examined and compared to those used by both the print media in Quebec and in France.<sup>2</sup> By addressing one object of discourse within a limited timeframe, the thesis intends to

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the author is aware of the fact that there is no consensus, in Translation Studies or beyond, as to an exact definition of culture. For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of culture provided here will be the one used.

<sup>2</sup> Like “culture” itself, “cultural community” has no one definition. Although it is acknowledged that the communities in question (English Canada, Quebec and France) are large areas that incorporate many different communities, these broader, more general categorization are adequate for the purposes of the present study.

provide but one example of the specific frameworks of social knowledge between which translators are expected to operate.

Furthermore, various translation scholars correlate the concept of translation to that of representation. The constructionist approach to representation is highly influenced by semiotics and the work of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (Hall, *The Work* 15). It is also highly influenced by French philosopher Michel Foucault and his work on discourse, language and power (Hall, *The Work* 15). According to Hall (*The Work*), Saussure emphasized the fact that words have no *a priori* meaning. Instead, the meaning of words and concepts comes from social consensus. The *signifier* for tree is made up of the visual word “tree” and the acoustic image (or sound) of that word. The *signifier* refers to the *signified*: the mental concept of *tree* that the signifier evokes. The link between the signifier and the signified is *arbitrary*. This means that the word tree refers to the concept of tree only because of social habit. There is nothing innate about the object in nature that makes it a tree, in other words, a tree has no “treeness.” Further, this meaning only holds true for as long as the members of a community agree upon it and therefore, it can be different in different communities and can change over time. In England, for example, the word fag refers to a cigarette. In Canada, however, it refers to something quite different. Even within one community, a word can take on a different meaning over time. Currently, the primary definition given for word gay in the *Encarta Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language* is “attracted to the same sex” (771). Secondary definitions listed include “merry,” “bright in color” and “carefree”. All secondary definitions are marked “dated.” The same word we use today to describe a person who is homosexual was used, in the not so distant past to describe someone who

was happy or carefree. Clearly, words have no *a priori* meaning but depend on social consensus to affix their meaning.

In the same way that societies affix meaning to words, they also affix meaning to other entities. One such entity is a nation or national identity. With regards to the work at hand, we can say that different societies affix different meanings to the concept “America.” Like words, then, the meaning of America varies from one society to another and can change over time. This meaning is created by what we say about America. Just as there is no innate “treeness” to a tree, there is no innate “Americanness” to America. The way we talk about America paints a picture of what it is. In other words, America is represented by what we say about it. Furthermore, this representation is the meaning of America at a given point in time. “Signs communicate, not simply because they are social phenomena and are part of material reality, but because of the specific function which they have of *refracting* that reality of which they are a part” (Hall, *Culture* 328).

Similarly, a translation can be said to represent a source text. André Lefevere, for example, considers translation to be a *refraction* of an original work. *Refraction* is defined as “the adaptation of a work of literature to a different audience, with the intention of influencing the way in which that audience reads the work” (234-235). Other types of refraction include reader guides, book reviews, film adaptation and their reviews, *etc.*

Lefevere’s theory of refraction developed in the early 80s and has become even more relevant over time. Lefevere emphasizes the point that at one time, literature held a central position in Western culture. But as technology evolves, literature seems to hold a less important position than television, film and music videos (Bassnett & Lefevere 9).

Consequently, ideas about literature come more and more from refractions. In other words, our ideas about literature come more from what we say about literature than from literature itself (Bassnett & Lefevere 9). Lefevere's *refraction*, then, parallels the notion of *representation*. As the term refraction implies, a translation is a prism through which we view a source text. Similarly, discourse is the prism through which we perceive the world. Translation, then, *is* representation.<sup>3</sup>

The rationale for a thesis such as this in Translation Studies is two-fold. First, I am analyzing how "America" is represented at a particular point in time in three different cultural communities. We can ask ourselves, how is "America" represented to English Canadians, French Canadians and to the French? Or, in other words, how does "America" *translate* to Canadians? How does "America" *translate* to the French? Second, if the unit of translation is indeed culture, and not text, an understanding of social knowledge and how it is constructed and disseminated is essential to the field of Translation Studies. An understanding of discourse and how it operates, then, is central to both facets of this project.

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<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to note that in "The Work of Representation", Stuart Hall often relies on the notion of translation: "Signs are organized into languages and it is the existence of common languages which enable us to *translate* our thoughts (concepts) into words, sounds or images, and then to use these, operating as a language, to express meanings and communicate thought to other people" (18, my italics); "Codes fix the relationships between our conceptual system and our linguistic systems (remember, 'linguistic' in a broad sense), codes make it possible for us to speak and to hear intelligibly, and establish the *translatability* between our concepts and our languages which enables meaning to pass from speaker to hearer and be effectively communicated within a culture. This *translatability* is not given by nature or fixed by the gods. It is the result of a set of social conventions" (21-22, my italics); "To belong to a culture is to belong to roughly the same conceptual and linguistic universe, to know how concepts and ideas *translate* into different languages, and how language can be interpreted to refer to or reference the world" (22, my italics).

## Discourse Analysis and Translation Studies

Although Translation Studies was not defined as an independent discipline until the 1970s, countless thinkers throughout history have addressed the idea of translation. As Snell-Hornby points out, “For 2, 000 years translation theory (some call it ‘traditional’, others now dismiss it as ‘pre-scientific’) was primarily concerned with outstanding works of art” (*Linguistic Transcoding* 79). This changed, however, in the 1950s when, excited by the idea of machine translation, scholars began to focus on defining units of translation. The goal was to designate units in different languages that could be considered *equivalent*. In this way, computers could be programmed and translation could be done by machines (Bassnett & Lefevere 4). By distinguishing between *literary* and *non-literary* texts, theorists were able to ignore the culturally-bound elements (generally considered to be found only in literature) and concentrate on designating equivalence between words and phrases in different languages (Bassnett & Lefevere 4).

In the 1960s, however, the interpretive approach (also called the ‘theory of sense’) was developed and adopted by professors at the *École Supérieure d’Interprétation et de Traduction* (or ESIT) in Paris. As outlined by Myriam Salama-Carr in the *Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*, in the interpretive approach:

The translation process is seen not as a ‘direct conversion’ of the linguistic meaning of the source language but as a ‘conversion from the source language to sense and then an expression of sense in the target language.’ Translation is thus not seen as a linear transcoding operation but rather a dynamic process of comprehension and re-expression of ideas. (113)

Although the interpretive approach recognizes that the translator's *cognitive baggage* (or real-world knowledge) affects his or her interpretation of a text, it does not place texts and their translations in their situation of utterance.

In contrast, Skopos theory, developed in Germany in the 1970s, sees translation, like other forms of communication, as a form of human action and places texts in their situation of utterance. According to Skopos theory, translations have an intended purpose. It is this intended purpose that becomes the guiding principle for translation choices. This theory marks a “general shift from predominantly linguistic and rather formal translation theories to a more functionally and socioculturally oriented concept of translation” (Schaffner 235).

Because these approaches consider cultural (or context)-bound elements, deciphering meaning in a text expanded beyond the word, the phrase, the sentence or even the text. In order to decipher the meaning of a text, one must consider countless elements—textual and non-textual. During this same period, new approaches to literary studies developed. These new approaches were strongly influenced by the Russian Formalists of the 1920s and the Structuralists of the 1930s (Bassnett 125). They look at literary works as part of a literary system rather than as isolated works. Consequently, translation has been re-defined, taking into account the translation process, the complexity of textual meaning and the systems to which texts and their translations belong.

Once the search for meaning (or the definition of ‘unit of translation’) moved

beyond the level of text, discourse analysis took on new importance in the field of translation studies. Defining discourse, however, is no simple task.<sup>4</sup>

Basically, the study of discourse recognizes the relationship between form and meaning. Although linguists have attempted to separate language from discourse, *langue* vs. *parole* for Saussure, *competence* vs. *performance* for Chomsky (de Beaugrande 207), it has become generally accepted that language does not exist in a vacuum and that meaning cannot be separated from form. Any utterance is considered to be a form of human action where the participants in the communicative event and the circumstances (cultural, social, political, historical, interpersonal etc.) in which the communication takes place all play a role in creating the meaning of that utterance. The circumstances included in the analysis of the communicative event vary depending on the discipline and goal of the research. In the *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*, Robert de Beaugrande provides the following definition of discourse:

Besides being the standard designation for a recorded sequence of utterances (Longacre, Pike) or of “texts” (Beaugrande and Dressler), “discourse” may designate elaborate complexes all the way up to a definite order of concepts (Hindess and Hirst) or the entire practice and communication within a social institution (e.g. MICHEL FOUCAULT, *L’Archéologie du savoir [The Archeology of Knowledge]; Language, Counter-Memory, Practice.* (208)

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<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the French definition of *discours* in *Terminologie de la traduction* does not match the English version in that same work (Delisle *et al.* 30-31, 135).

Based on the work of Michel Foucault among others, many disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities analyze not only texts, but also the institutions that shape the circumstances surrounding the production of any given text at a specific point in time. Understood in this way, discourse is not simply what is said but how it is said, by whom and under what circumstances.

Consequently, as one may expect, the field of discourse analysis is a varied and dynamic one. Indeed discourse analysis has been used in several disciplines for various purposes. As Basil Hatim points out in the *Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*:

Since it was first used by Zellig Harris in 1952, the term **discourse analysis** has come to mean different things to different people. That what is involved is the study of language beyond the level of the sentence may in fact be just about the only thing that unites a broad array of disparate approaches, all of which would be vying for the label ‘discourse analysis’.” (67)

Generally, discourse analysis seeks to identify how the way in which information is presented in a text influences the meaning of that text. Further, it attempts to identify the ways in which social institutions (academia, the church, the media, *etc.*) control the production and dissemination of knowledge. As Stephen Riggins points out in his essay “The Rhetoric of Othering”, “Discourses do not faithfully reflect reality like mirrors (as journalists would have us believe). Instead, they are artifacts of language through which the very reality the purport to reflect is constructed” (2). Because we do not always have direct experience with other countries, other people, other cultures, *etc.*, much of how we view the world comes from what is said or written about it. Further, the representations

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created and perpetuated by discourse(s) are often strong enough to convince us that they are true even when we are confronted with evidence to the contrary.<sup>5</sup> The power that discourse has, then, is enormous and the ever-growing interest in discourse analysis merited.

### **Discourse, Knowledge and Power**

In an essay entitled, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Louis Althusser expands on the role played by ‘state apparatus’ in the Marxist theory of ideology. For Althusser, the ‘reproduction of the conditions of production’ means not only the reproduction of labour skills, but also the reproduction of the ideology of the ruling class.

The reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words.’ In other words, the school (but also other State institutions like Church, or other apparatuses like the Army) teaches ‘know-how’, but in forms which ensure *subjection to the ruling ideology* or the mastery of its ‘practice’.” (133)

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<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that some scholars question our ability to have direct experience at all, arguing that all experience is mediated by discourse. Derrida’s famous phrase, “Il n’y a pas hors texte” comes to mind.

One contribution that Althusser made to Marxist theory was to distinguish between 'Repressive State Apparatus' and 'Ideological State Apparatus' or ISA. The Repressive State Apparatus functions 'by violence', whereas the Ideological State Apparatus function 'by ideology' (145). In other words, the Ideological State Apparatuses maintain the existing power structures by perpetuating the ideology of those structures. Althusser identifies the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA (press, radio, television *etc.*) and the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, *etc.*) (143). All of these institutions serve to disseminate the ideology of the ruling class thereby reproducing the conditions of production ensuring their continued power/dominance.

As Stuart Hall points out, in his later work, Michel Foucault was concerned with the relationship between knowledge and power (*The Work*, 47). Like Althusser, Foucault was interested in how power operated within institutions (Hall, *The Work* 47). Foucault, however, criticizes Marxist theory because it "tended to contrast the 'distortions' of bourgeois knowledge, against its own claims to 'truth'" (Hall, *The Work* 48). By contrast, Foucault argues that the knowledge or ideas of the ruling class make claims of truth when there are, in fact, only 'regimes of truth' created by the discourse of that same ruling class (Hall, *The Work* 48). Herein lies the power of discourse. Not only does the ruling class have access to the major Ideological State Apparatuses and therefore, a great ability to disseminate its own ideology, this ideology is so predominant that it comes to be considered natural, i.e. to be considered true. Clearly, knowledge is always related to power and meaning often defined by it. This intimate relationship between discourse, knowledge and power underpins the field of critical discourse analysis. The role of

critical discourse analysis is to “describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimized by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions” (van Dijk 84).

It is important to note, however, that the process of constructing meaning and influencing thought through discourse cannot always be considered a conscious effort, i.e. as a conspiracy of the state or of the ruling class. “This does not mean that they are engaged in a conscious, coordinated conspiracy to produce a monolithic view, but that they subscribe to a general common purpose and a common field of meanings” (Karim, *Making* 104). Instead, it is fair to say that utterances tend to be made up of the meanings that are already available. This limited choice ensures that the dominant ideology (inherent in the available discourse(s)) is perpetuated.

### **Discourse and National Identity**

As outlined, meaning is not essential but socially agreed upon and changes over time. This is true, not only of words; but also of more complex concepts such as nation or national identity. National identity is concerned both with the identity of a nation (Canada, for example) and the people of that nation (Canadians). Ultimately, when we talk about the national identity of Canada or the national identity of the Canadian people, we are, in fact, referring to some sort of “Canadian-ness” that can be attributed to both the country and the people.

We often think of the characteristics of national identity as essential or *a priori*. “These identities are not literally imprinted on our genes. However, we do think of them as if they are part of our essential natures” (Hall, *The Question* 611- 612). Many

thinkers, however, have shown that the elements commonly thought of as defining national identity, are not essential after all. As early as 1882, Ernest Renan questioned our understanding of the concept of nation. In his famous essay “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation” he asserts that nations are not, in fact, defined by race, language, religion, common interests, or geography—factors commonly thought to be essential to national identity at that time:

Je me résume, Messieurs. L’homme n’est esclave ni de sa race, ni de sa langue, ni de sa religion, ni du cours des fleuves, ni de la direction des chaînes de montagnes. Une grande agrégation d’hommes, saine d’esprit et chaude de coeur crée une conscience morale qui s’appelle une nation (56).

Instead, he sees nation as a *social* arrangement, decided upon by the members of a community:

Une nation est donc une grande solidarité, constituée par le sentiment des sacrifices qu’on a fait et de ceux qu’on est disposé à faire encore. Elle suppose un passé; elle se résume pourtant dans le présent par un fait tangible; le consentement, le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune. (55)

Although Renan may overstate the level of choice each member of a national community has in living “la vie commune,” he does show that national communities are a socially agreed upon arrangement and not an essential, unchanging reality (Bilig 95).

If nations, and by extension national identities, have no essential meaning, how then, are they defined? Stuart Hall argues that:

[...] in fact, national identities are not things we are born with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to *representation*. We only know what it is to be “English” because of the way “Englishness” has come to be represented, as a set of meanings, by English national culture.

(Hall, *The Question* 612, original italics)

A national identity, then, is a discursive construct. What is said about Canada and Canadians does not simply reflect Canada but also constructs it.

The representation of national identity determines how we view ourselves and how we view others. It influences our conception of the world as well as our own place in that world. For this reason, national and/or cultural identities are often understood in contrast to each other.

“Some modern theorists of language have argued that *meaning* always depends on the relations that exist between the different terms or words in a meaning system” (Hall, *The West* 187, original italics). As Hall points out, Saussure argues that the words “night” and “day”, for example, do not mean anything on their own. Instead, it is by understanding the difference between “night” and “day” that these words have meaning for us (187). Similarly, cultural and/or national identities are often understood in contrast to each other. An understanding of what is Canadian requires an understanding of what is *not* Canadian. “By analogy, national cultures acquire their strong sense of identity by contrasting themselves with other cultures” (Hall, *The West* 189). What is said about the United States in Canada, then, plays an important role in the construction of our own national identity.

## Newspapers and the Nation

For Benedict Anderson, it is primarily the daily newspaper that allows for the imagining of national communities. Of reading the morning newspaper, Anderson writes:

The significance of this mass ceremony [of consuming the morning paper]—Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers—is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet whose identity he had not the slightest notion... What more vivid figure for the secular, historically-clocked, imagined community can be envisioned? At the same time, the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life [...] fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating the remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations. (39-40)

Furthermore, within the framework of what James Carey calls “the ritual model” of communication, newspapers can be considered a dialogical representation of the community they serve.<sup>6</sup> In this vein, Richard L. Kaplan argues that “journalism’s diverse

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<sup>6</sup> Carey’s ritual model of communication is outlined in Part 1 of his book Communication and Culture (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). Carey’s model directly opposes a transmission model of communication whereby information is seen as being passed from a powerful sender and received by isolated, individual

reports take as their most basic and most entrancing story the life and times of the nation—its challenges abroad and its decay or rejuvenation at home” (211). The daily newspaper, then, is an important site for the construction, dissemination and maintenance of national identity. Because what is said about the U.S. is a prominent discursive strategy for the construction of national identity in Canada, and because the newspaper is the primary site for the construction of national identity, the present study will restrict its analysis to the representation of the United States in the print media.

### **Representing “America”: a Case Study**

This thesis will evaluate the meaning that is assigned to the concept “America” by the print media in English Canada, Quebec and France. To this end, I will identify the dominant discursive strategies and attempt to show how these strategies work to form a representation of “America.” In addition, I hope to identify the ways in which the discursive strategies used by the print media in France and Quebec differ from those used by the print media in English Canada. My hypothesis is that these strategies will not be the same due to the differing relationship between each community and the U.S. The primary focus of this thesis is the representation of the U.S. in English Canada. The analysis of the modes of representation in Quebec and France are not exhaustive but instead serve simply as a comparison to the dominant modes of representation identified in the English Canadian print media. Further, because newspapers are considered to be a dialogical representation of the community they serve, the modes identified are the dominant modes but not the only ones.

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receivers. Carey’s model emphasizes the cultural aspects of communication and draws heavily on American Cultural Studies scholars.

For the English Canadian corpus, I have selected articles from the following five dailies: *The Globe & Mail*; *The National Post*; *The Gazette* (Montreal), *The Daily News* (Halifax); and *The Vancouver Sun*. I selected *The Globe & Mail* and *The National Post* as they are Canada's only national newspapers. Both papers are based in Toronto but are circulated across the country. However, as they are both based in Toronto, I thought it was important to include papers produced in other parts of the country as well. For this reason I selected one paper from the west coast, *The Vancouver Sun*, one paper from the east coast, *The Daily News* (Halifax) and one paper from Quebec, *The Gazette* (Montreal). Practical constraints also guided my choice of newspapers. As it was necessary to go through an overwhelming volume of material to select the corpus, it was imperative that I had databases cataloguing newspapers and articles at my disposal. At the University of Ottawa I had access to the *Canadian Periodical Index* and to *Canadian Newsstand*. Based on what papers were available, I selected a group that I felt would represent Canada as a whole.

Although it is difficult to provide statistical evidence of dominant modes of representation, throughout the selection process these dominant modes of representation were obvious. The modes of representation discussed in this thesis figure much more prominently in the print news coverage of September 11<sup>th</sup> than do other modes. Marcus Gee's column in the *Globe & Mail*, for example, appears more than double the amount of times as Rick Salutin's column in that same newspaper. Consequently, I have included an analysis of Gee's articles and not Salutin's. Similarly, I have included articles written by Margaret Wentz whose column was printed close to every second day during the month in question. Other columnists included in my corpus figure prominently in various

papers across the country. Andrew Coyne's articles, for example, appeared 35 times in various newspapers across the county. Similarly, David Warren appeared 29 times in various papers across the country. Christie Blatchford articles appeared 19 times and Robert Fulford's articles appeared 12 times.

The Quebec corpus is composed of articles selected from both *Le Devoir* and *La Presse*. Although the dominant discourse in Quebec is less homogenous than in English Canada, the same voices did continually re-occur. It is these voices that I analyze in my corpus: Jean-Robert Sansfaçon (articles appeared 15 times); Mario Roy (articles appeared 16 times); Christian Rioux (articles appeared 16 times); André Pratte (articles appeared 17 times); Michèle Ouimet (articles appeared 14 times).

Articles from *Le Monde* were selected for my analysis of print media representation of the U.S. in France. *Le Monde*'s September 13<sup>th</sup> headline, "Nous sommes tous américains" was the main impetus behind this choice. A notoriously anti-American newspaper, *Le Monde*'s headline seemed to suggest a very pro-American position. A comprehensive list of articles analyzed can be found on page 99 of this thesis ("Print Media Corpus").

Most articles selected in all three corpora come from newspapers printed during the first days following the attacks. During the selection process, however, I read all newspapers printed during the first month following the attacks. The articles selected can be considered representative of dominant modes of representation during this month.

I limited my corpus to articles covering the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001. At this point in time there was extensive media coverage of the events. For this reason, the coverage was

prominent in our newspapers and thus played a strong role in creating an image of “America” at that time. In addition, this period is an interesting one for analyzing representations of America. Because there are few terrorist attacks in North America, and certainly none of this magnitude, the public and the press at this time were concerned with the issue of how Americans, and America, are perceived abroad. In addition, headlines like “Nous sommes tous américains” from a newspaper that is notoriously anti-American, as well as a clear feeling and message of solidarity with the United States in Ottawa, suggested a moment of change, however temporary, of dominant attitudes toward Americans in English Canada and in France. Because I was interested in a comparison between different cultural communities and not simply different language communities, it seemed that adding a French-Canadian community would be of interest. Furthermore, I was interested in finding out if the strong tradition of *counter-Americanism* that dominates representations of Canadian national identity in English Canada also existed in Quebec.

Chapter 1, entitled “The Dynamics of Recognition”, outlines already existing discourses on the U.S. in English Canada, Quebec and France. Specifically, it outlines the discourse or *counter-Americanism* in English Canada, the discourse of *américanité* in Quebec and the discourse of *anti-Americanism* in France. The goal of this chapter is to establish the discourses through which the U.S. is traditionally represented in all three cultural communities. Chapter 2, “Constructing America: the American War Story” outlines the dominant narrative structure through which the U.S. traditionally represents itself, when in conflict with other peoples. In addition, it examines the presence of this narrative in the English Canadian print media and compares it with the representation in

Quebec and in France. Finally, Chapter 3, “America = the West: Freedom and Democracy Under Attack” explores what role the discourse that constructs the West plays in the media representations of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in English Canada. This chapter explores the representation of the West as well as the representation of a Muslim Other in English Canada and compares these representations to those in Quebec and France.

## CHAPTER 1 -- THE DYNAMICS OF RECOGNITION (OR WHAT “THEY” HAVE TO DO WITH “US”

In Canada, perceptions of and attitudes toward the United States are intimately linked to ideas about ourselves. Geographical proximity as well as shared history and close economic ties mean that Canadian realities are highly influenced by the U.S. In English Canada, this close relationship has led to a continual allegation of our difference from Americans as a means of asserting our own distinct Canadian identity. In Québec on the other hand, where the French language acts as a clear mark of difference, there is a discourse of *américanité* that acknowledges American influences on the Québécois identity. Even as far away as France, ideas about and attitudes toward the U.S. play a role in the construction of a French identity. This chapter will outline the tradition of *counter-Americanism* in English Canada, the discourse of *américanité* in Québec and explore the discourse of anti-Americanism in France. The goal of this chapter is to outline already existing discourses on the U.S. in English Canada, Quebec and France.

### **Canadian National Identity: Counter-Americanism**

Geographical proximity and shared history mean that the political, economic and cultural realities in Canada are highly influenced by the U.S. As Allan E. Gottleib, Canada's former Ambassador to Washington, has pointed out:

Relations with the United States, be they good or bad, are not for us a matter of choice—we have them whether we want them or not. The length of our common border, the nature of our economic systems, the openness and the pluralism of our political systems, all combine to create

an unequaled mass of contact and movement between our two societies

[...]. (23)

This close geographical, economic and political relationship means that we, here in Canada, are constantly coming in contact with and being affected by the United States. Indeed, Canada and the U.S. have the largest trading and investment relationship in the world (Gottleib 26). Canadian national identity, then, is often expressed as a *counter-Americanism*. Often, to be Canadian means to be not-American. In addition, these differences tend to be asserted on a national level. Here we see how discourse eliminates diversity. We do not say that *this* Canadian is different from *that* American. We say that Canadians are different from Americans in general. In this way, we negate the fact that often there are greater differences between two Canadians than between a Canadian and an American, depending on the individuals subjected to the comparison. William D.H. Johnson puts it this way:

To put it another way, a university professor from Canada is more like a university professor from the United States than a Canadian university professor is like a fisherman from Newfoundland or an Alberta rancher.

And, of course, the American professor is more like his Canadian counterpart than he is like a Hispanic share-cropper. (171)

Despite the obvious similarities between Canadians and Americans, and the wide range of difference between Canadians themselves and Americans themselves, attempts at describing and explaining the differences between these two countries persist.

## **Canadian/American Difference: the Theory of Formative Events**

The claim that Canadians and Americans, Canadian society and American society are different is advanced and studied by historians, sociologists and political scientists alike. According to James Curtis and Lorne Tepperman, various sociologists have attempted to explain the differences between Canadian and American society (43-50). Political scientist Kenneth McRae advanced the idea that there have been different formative events, with differing consequences for Canada and the United States in order to explain the differences that currently exist (Curtis and Tepperman 44). In the 1960s American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset pinpointed several differences in American and Canadian values and used the theory of formative events to explain them (Curtis and Tepperman 45). More recently, Canadian author Michael Adams uses the theory of formative events to explain perceived differences in Canadian and American values in his 2003 book *Fire and Ice: the United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values*. Most simply put, according to the theory of formative events, American society is a result of the successful American Revolution while Canadian society is built upon the Counter-Revolution.

In McRae's view, the American Revolution provides an important key to explaining Canadian-American differences. Neither French Canada nor English Canada supported the American Revolution. This non-support reinforced loyalties toward the establishment in both parts of Canada, and set the stage for Canada and the United States to go in separate directions. As a result of the Revolution, English Canada moved closer to British

society and culture, while the United States moved away from it. (Curtis & Tepperman 44)

For Lipset's part, he asserts the following:

The Loyalist émigrés from the American Revolution and Canada's subsequent repeatedly aroused fears of United States encroachment fostered the institutionalization of a counter-revolutionary or conservative ethos. By contrast the core values of The United States, linked to the idealistic ideology which emerged during the Revolution, were codified in the Declaration of Independence and elaborated in the principles successfully pressed by the Jeffersonian Democrats in the formative post-Revolutionary decades. (Lipset 39)

Although the revolutionary/counter-revolutionary narrative has long been part of Canadian and American mythology explaining the differences between the two nations, it has not gone un-criticized. In fact, McRae himself acknowledges the problem of representation and interpretation in historical scholarship. How we represent the Loyalists (as well as how we represent the American Revolution) affects the conclusions we can draw on their values and, consequently, the role they played in shaping Canadian and American society. In McRae's own words:

For in the American view the Loyalists were unregenerate Tories, placemen, servile monarchists, enemies of the notion of liberty upon which the new republic was founded. In the Canadian view they become heroes who endured exile and hardship to demonstrate their attachment to the Crown and the British connection and their abhorrence of mob violence and

democratic excesses. When the emotional content is allowed to boil away, the two traditions are not very far apart. (McRae 235)

Although other scholars have also questioned common interpretation and representation of both the American Revolution and the Loyalists<sup>7</sup>, it cannot be denied that contrast with the U.S. remains an important strategy in the construction of Canadian identity. “From its beginnings as the parts of British North America that rejected America’s revolution, Canada’s national identity always hinged on this contrast with the United States” (Thompson and Randall 309).

### **Canadian/American Difference: Canadian National Sovereignty**

There is no doubt that our status as a “small” country (certainly in terms of population and global power and not in terms of land mass) in comparison to the superpower status of the U.S. has exacerbated the counter-American tradition in Canada. Clearly, this inequality influences the way in which we perceive, react to and interact with the United States.

Canada is indeed a small country in terms of population, with all of the attendant fears about dominance by a large one, a point that needs to be understood in our relations with the United States. Canadian fears are further fueled by America’s dominant role in the world as a whole.

(Flaherty and McKercher 14)

As Flaherty and McKercher point out, on-going disputes between the two countries concerning unfair trading practices of steel, pork, beef, fish, lumber and wheat, are, in fact, disputes about Canadian national sovereignty (7). In other words, being so

geographically close and so economically dependent upon the American superpower leads to a Canadian desire to protect its national sovereignty. It is these perceived threats to our national sovereignty that have resulted in the intense counter-American tradition.

In the relatively recent past, this tendency has been most intense during Free Trade negotiations when economic integration was seen to be a threat to political and cultural sovereignty. Although the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and The United States never came into effect until January 1, 1989 (Granatstein 271), the public debate surrounding it began years earlier (Granatstein 251).<sup>8</sup> Many Canadians saw the FTA as a major step in the “Intellectual, cultural, and political destruction of Canada” (Granatstein 259). Ironically, in his 1983 leadership campaign, the then leader-to-be of the Progressive Conservative party, Brian Mulroney, seemed to see Free-Trade as a threat to Canadian sovereignty too, “It affects Canadian sovereignty, and we’ll have none of it, not during leadership campaigns, nor at any other times” (Granatstein 251). It was Brian Mulroney, along with then U.S. President Ronald Regan, who later ratified the deal (Granatstein 256).

Less than three years later, U.S President George Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Mexican President Carlos Salinas announced the conclusion of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—an agreement that expanded Free Trade to include Mexico (Thompson & Randall 293). In addition to perceptions that the FTA contributed to the loss of several hundred thousand jobs in Canadian industry during the Canadian recession that began in 1990 (Thompson & Randall 293-294), Canadian fears that economic integration would threaten political and cultural sovereignty were re-

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<sup>7</sup> See Bell & Tepperman 1990 and Granatstein 1996, 14-18

ignited. Despite Canadian concern, the deal was ratified and came into effect in December, 1992 (Granatstein 276). It is during these times when Canadian sovereignty is threatened that the counter-American tradition in Canada is most pronounced.

Despite this strong counter-American tradition in Canada, there are points in history when dominant discourse has eliminated (or at least downplayed) these differences. Notably, a strong continentalist argument emerged during the Cuban Missile Defense Crisis of 1962 and 1963 (Grant 26). Interestingly, the argument for national sovereignty seems to be silenced, or at least hushed, at times when there is a security threat. Similar to the political climate in Canada in the weeks and months following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, during the Cuban Missile Crisis any questioning of American motives or action raised accusations of anti-Americanism or of being a “bad ally” (Grant 30). It seems that the fear of continental integration becomes insignificant in the face of threats to homeland security. During these times, there is often a strong “continentalist” discourse where differences between Canadians and Americans are downplayed. This North American discourse is motivated by a threat to national (and continental) security, revealing the non-essential nature of national identities.

### **Constructing the Nation Post 9/11: Canadians *Are* Americans**

Immediately following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in New York and Washington, the print media plays an important role in assigning meaning to those events for their Canadian public. In the earliest papers, the 9/11 story is told in no uncertain terms. The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks are portrayed as an attack on America and Americans: an attack

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<sup>8</sup> For a more detailed description of the debate surrounding the FTA see Granatstein, Chapter 10, “Last Gasp Anti-Americanism: The Free Trade Agreement of 1988 and After.”

on American values and the American way of life. In the English Canadian context, the American is no longer the Other against whom we assert our national identity, but the American and the Canadian are one, North America has been attacked and *our* values must be defended.

The English Canadian print media adopts an American perspective and the distinction between Canadians and Americans is eliminated. Several articles printed in various papers across the country on September 12<sup>th</sup> are written by American journalists and come from American news agencies. These articles are written from an American point of view and have a strongly patriotic message. Several English Canadian newspapers ran these articles with no clear mark that they are originally American. Of most interest here is how the national deixis works. In his book *Banal Nationalism*, Michael Billig argues that far from post-modern assumptions about the disappearance of the nation state, nationalism is so engrained in our daily lives, that we may not even notice the countless ways in which the nation is marked everyday. “The crucial words of banal nationalism are often the smallest: ‘we’, ‘this’ and ‘here’, which are the words of linguistic ‘deixis’,” (94). These words point to (and create) the real-world context, outside of the text. Articles referring to ‘us’, ‘our nation’ or ‘our leaders’ (like that of Jay Ambrose printed in the Halifax *Daily News*) are inclusive and refer to the nation and leaders not only of the writer, but also of the reader. Canadian readers continually reading editorials written by American writers, then, are not only hearing the story from an American point of view, but are included in that story. According to Jay Ambrose, “*We* do not want to put so many checks and inspections on top of checks and inspections that *we* are robbed of the liberated spirit that marks *us* as a nation” (my italics).

According to Bill Tammeus, “[...] what *we* didn’t know –couldn’t at first—was whether somehow the whole world was unravelling, whether *we* were in the crosshairs of fanatics who were determined to bring *our* lives crashing down” (my italics). These small words, referring to Americans, read by Canadians, mean that the Canadian perspective melds with the American perspective. In the moment of reading, Canadian becomes American, there is no distinction.

It is not, however, only editorials from American writers and American news agencies that function in this way. English Canadian writers working for major Canadian newspapers use language similarly. Margaret Wenté’s editorial entitled “U.S. will never be the same” uses ‘we’ in such a way that Canadians and Americans are considered to be one and the same. It is not of little importance that this article appeared on the front page of the *Globe & Mail* on the morning after the attacks. At the end of her article Wenté argues:

*We* have ahead the test by fire of a presidency. *We* will have agonizing stories of human suffering, too many to bear. *We* will have the dead, the countless families shattered and grief and mourning beyond measure. But the wounds to *America*, though terrible, are very far from mortal. (my italics)

Wenté’s ‘we’ refers to both Canadians and Americans. ‘America’ is no longer simply the United States (as it is generally considered to mean in English Canada) but North America as a whole. Still more articles simply refer to the attacks on ‘North Americans’ and the countless ‘North American’ lives lost. In these articles there is no acknowledgement of difference between the U.S. and Canada, no admission that the

attacks took place in New York and Washington and not Toronto or Ottawa. The alignment of Canada with the U.S., Canadians with Americans is very likely to go unnoticed, slipping into the Canadian consciousness without question or reflection.

Still other articles align Canada with the U.S. in a more visible way, highlighting Canada's vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Several articles claim that "Major Canadian cities such as Montreal and Toronto are vulnerable to the same kind of devastating terrorist attacks that hit New York and Washington [...]" and refer to the fact that several Canadians died in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. "Given the number of Canadians who work in New York's world Trade Center, Thompson said, it is very likely that a number of them were also killed in the attack" (Thompson).

### **Strategic Use of Counter-Americanism**

Other articles are clearly aware of Canadian concerns over national sovereignty and the traditional counter-Americanism. An editorial entitled "A shared sense of purpose necessary for Canada: Common goals with U.S. needn't mean a loss of sovereignty", for example, argues for continental integration without ever explicitly stating so. Citing Canada's dependence on the U.S. for both trade and security the article claims that "Today, we want to be safe—nearly 60 percent of Canadians say they're prepared to give up some sovereignty in return for better security" and that "No matter what we do, terrorist will kill more North Americans. But if we don't act fully in concert with the U.S. there will be deaths we could have prevented. And our economy will be irreparably harmed. Canada's trade with the U.S. is our lifeblood. Whatever differences we hold dear that fact cannot be denied."

Similarly, Margaret Wente's column published on September 13<sup>th</sup> is aware of the tradition of counter-Americanism in Canada and uses it to align Canadians with Americans. She states:

We Canadians love to exaggerate our differences from Americans and brag about our moral and cultural superiority.

But now we can think only of what we have in common—our beliefs about human decency, and the rule of law. The differences don't matter any more, if they ever did.

Solidarity with the American people was in fact so strong that several journalists claimed that the September 11<sup>th</sup> meant continental integration. This solidarity, combined with accusations that terrorists enter the U.S. through Canada and American Ambassador Paul Celluci's suggestion that Canada harmonize its immigration policy with that of the U.S., led to a strong argument for North American integration that went mostly uncontested in the mainstream media during the first month following September 11<sup>th</sup>. One front page headline, for example, screams: "Sept.11: The end of Canadian nationalism: Aftermath pushes North America to inevitable union" (Bliss). The print media coverage in English Canada considered Canadians to be Americans and told the 9/11 from an American perspective.

### **Québécois Identity: the Discourse of *Américanité***

As is the case in English Canada, geographical proximity means that economic, political and cultural realities in Quebec are highly influenced by the United States. This American influence has been studied by scholars in various disciplines, including history,

sociology, cultural studies and literary studies (Bahia 26). With French language serving as a clear mark of difference between Americans and Quebecers, counter-Americanism is not central to the construction of a Québécois identity. In fact, since the 1970s scholars in Québec have been developing the concept of *américanité* which acknowledges, rather than denies, the American influence on the Québécois identity (Bahia 26).

In his book *Ni avec eux ni sans eux*, historian Yvan Lamonde outlines the concept of *américanité* and traces its historical roots. According to Lamonde, the theoretical concept of *américanité* was advanced by intellectuals in the 1970s and marks a rupture from the idea that France is the most dominant influence on Québécois identity. In an article entitled “Pourquoi penser l’américanité du Québec?” (published in a special edition of *Politiques et Sociétés* dedicated to the notion of *américanité*) Lamonde offers the following equation as a way of representing the Québécois identity:  $Q = - (F) + (GB) + USA^2 - (R)$  (93). As Marcio Bahia points out in his recent work on the topic, in this equation – (F) means that France has less influence on Quebec’s historical and cultural identity than commonly believed; + (GB) means that Great Britain’s influence is greater than the elite were willing to believe;  $USA^2$  means that the influence of the U.S. is so great that it is represented to the second power; - (R) shows the failure of the Roman Catholic Church to advocate spirituality in French America over the materialism of English-speaking America (27-28). For those who support the concept, *américanité* more accurately represents the economic, political and cultural reality of being part of the American continent.

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The concept, however, has not gone unchallenged. In his book *Critique de l'américanité*, sociologist Joseph Yvon Thériault strongly criticizes the concept, not only dismissing it as useless, but also accusing it of being dangerous:

L'américanité est un concept-poubelle. Poubelle dans le sens d'un ramassis hétéroclite d'énoncés dont on réussit difficilement à trouver la forme. Poubelle aussi dans le sens d'un concept qu'il faut rejeter, car inutile sinon dangereux, pour comprendre le parcours historique de la nation française d'Amérique. (23)

Thériault's book calls into question the distinction that Lamonde make between *américanité* and *américanisation*:

Empiriquement, au départ, il n'est pas vrai que les travaux portant sur l'américanité – à commencer par les propres études de Lamonde – tentent de définir une réalité politique, économique ou culturelle qui engloberait l'ensemble de l'Amérique et qui se distinguerait de l'américanisation – l'influence américaine sur le reste de l'Amérique. C'est l'Amérique étatsunienne qui fascine les personnages des romans dits de l'américanité. C'est parce que l'action se déroule indistinctement entre Montréal, New York, la Californie ou la Floride [...] que ces romans sont dits de l'américanité. Dans les travaux socioéconomiques, l'intégration économique continentale dont il est question est bel et bien l'intégration aux États-Unis [...]. (30-31)

In the foreword to *Ni avec eux ni sans eux*, Lamonde does distinguish between *américanité* and *américanisation*:

D'entrée en jeu, précisons que l'américanisation du Québec, concept de résistance ou de refus, est ce processus d'acculturation par lequel la culture étatsunienne influence et domine la culture autant canadienne que québécoise—et mondiale—tandis que l'américanité, qui englobe tout autant l'Amérique latine que l'Amérique saxonne, est un concept d'ouverture et de mouvance qui dit le consentement du Québec à son appartenance continentale. (11)

Although Lamonde attempts to make a clear distinction between *américanité* and *américanisation*, the ambiguity between these two concepts seems to be at the root of much criticism. Theoretically at least, *américanité* refers to the fact that Québec is part of the entire American continent and not simply to the relationship between Québec and the United States. Lamonde seems to invite criticism, however, as much of his book is dedicated solely to this “problematic” relationship:

Thus, as we read Lamonde's book we come to the conclusion that there is a disproportion between its intention and its actual accomplishment: there is an intention of creating a continental discourse of inclusiveness, which is impeached by the restriction and fixation of analysing the *américanité* in relation to the United States alone; as if the whole continent were reduced to the United States of America. (Bahia 32)

What is important for the present study is the fact that although *américanité* seeks to acknowledge the influence of the American continent on Québécois identity, it seems to limit its study to the influence of the United States. In addition, while there is an

acknowledgement and acceptance of American influence, there is also an awareness of the hegemony of American culture on a continental and global scale.

### **Québécois Identity Post 9/11: We Are All North Americans**

Like the print media in English Canada, the print media in Québec interpret the 9/11 attacks as an attack on North America and North Americans. The distinction between Québécois and American, however, is continually marked. Where the English Canadian print media often use ‘we’ to refer to both Canadians and Americans, the Québec print media tends to make a distinction between Americans and Quebecers. An article printed in *Le Devoir*, for example, states: “If faudra s’en imprégner car on ne peut admettre que cela se reproduise, que ce soit *chez nos voisins américains* ou *chez nous*” (Descôteaux). “[C]hez nos voisins américains” refers to the United States, while, “chez nous” refers to Québec. While there is an acknowledgement of threat to Quebec territory, the distinction between the U.S. and Québec remains. Another article printed in *Le Devoir* states:

[...] New York est une métropole civile. La métropole, y compris pour nous, Québécois, Canadiens. New York est un symbole, le nôtre, celui du Nouveau Monde. Une attaque contre New York, c’est une attaque contre nous tous Nord-Américains. Et malgré les différends qui peuvent nous opposer, malgré l’arrogance culturelle et la suffisance politique à l’image de l’ogre qui ne voit même pas ce qu’il écrase sous son pied, cette attaque terroriste meurtrière contre l’Amérique est une attaque contre nous tous,

Nord-Américains et Occidentaux. (Sansfaçon, “La guerre au cœur de l’Amérique”)

Again, Sansfaçon interprets the attacks as being aimed at North Americans and Westerners alike, the distinction between Québécois and American is clear. Here, the discourse of *américanité* is obvious. Quebec’s place in the New World explains why Quebec is implicated in an attack that took place in New York City. While there is a clear expression of solidarity with the American people, it is accompanied by a negative representation maintaining a critical distance in its analysis of the situation. Even when acknowledging the implications of the attacks for North American, The Québécois identity remains distinct.

As in English Canada, the Quebec print media also ran stories from American journalists and American newspapers following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. *La Presse*, for example, ran excerpts from several American papers under the headline “L’Amérique sous le choc.” Because the article consists of several different excerpts and not entire articles, the fact that they came from somewhere else is obvious. In addition, above each excerpt the name of the paper in which it appeared the previous day is clearly marked. And, as if to avoid any confusion, at the top of each article runs the following sentence: “Nous vous présentons ici des extraits d’éditoriaux parus dans différents journaux américains, hier.” These articles appeared on September 13<sup>th</sup>, two days after the attacks. Perhaps because there is no time needed for translation, American editorials appeared in English Canadian newspapers on September 12<sup>th</sup>. In addition, these articles ran under headlines with author names, and not under the name of American newspapers. They

were not clearly marked as being American. The English Canadian reader reads as if s/he is an American while the Québécois reader remains Québécois.

### **France and the U.S: Anti-Americanism in France**

Although the word *antiaméricanisme* didn't appear in *Le Petit Robert* until 1968, anti-American discourse in France has been traced back to the Enlightenment. In his book *L'Ennemi Américain*, Philippe Roger argues that before 1780, anti-Americanism (at that time, an as yet unnamed phenomenon) was found primarily in writing describing nature: plants, animals and the climate in America. According to Roger, Buffon, Voltaire and Raynal were among the major proponents of this *naturalist* anti-American discourse (23). For Buffon, for example, plants and animals in America were all smaller, degenerate versions of their European counterparts, or more specifically, their European *ancestors* (31-32). In this discourse, Europe was considered to be the *origin* and not simply another territory or another society. The degenerate state of the American wildlife was attributed to the climate, considered only in terms of extremes, hot and arid or cold and glacial. "Chez Buffon, le climat est un tyran plus direct et plus absolu. Il violente animaux et humains jusque dans leur morphologie" (Roger 37). The transforming effect of the climate, then, was not restricted to the wildlife, but also extended to man. Even transplanted Europeans were altered by this brutal climate, becoming degenerate versions of their European ancestors (37-38).

The earliest traces of anti-Americanism in France are found in this *naturalist* anti-American discourse. By the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, anti-American sentiment is directed primarily at American culture. In chapter four, entitled "Métropolis, Cosmopolis Défense

de la francité” Roger argues that because France experienced an American cultural invasion in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (439), anti-Americanism is, in fact, a strategy for preserving a specific French way of life that is directly opposed to a specific American way of life (442). Much like in English Canada and in Quebec, then, discussions about the U.S. in France are, in fact, discussions about French identity itself.

In the same vein, in an article entitled “French Pique and *Piques Françaises*,” Marie-France Toinet argues the following:

The French are not so much holding a debate about the United States but about themselves, about their society, their goals and their methods. It is, so to say, a Franco-French debate, where American arguments—often half-baked—are just an excuse or a pretence. The French hold the United States up as a mirror to look, in fact, at themselves. (137)

The usurping of Western Europe as the main political and economic power, as well as the rapid and continuing encroachment of American culture world wide has meant that France, along with other powerful European nations, have had to re-examine their own ideas about themselves. In France, interest in the U.S. is primarily found in the sectors of foreign policy and culture. It is precisely in these areas that France derives a strong sense of its own identity.

Anti-American sentiment in terms of culture is due mostly to the hegemonic nature of American culture in France, as in the rest of the world. Without resorting to clichés about French intellectualism and love of wine and cheese, Henri Astier explains the derision of American culture in terms of the French tradition of state supported culture. According to Astier’s argument, because the French have a strong belief in a

cultural role for the state (meaning that a great deal of state money goes to the creation and dissemination of art and culture) the fact that American culture is driven by private money “places it beneath consideration” (296). Astier also argues that American cultural icons like Woody Allen and Lou Reed, who are adored in France, are seen as exceptions rather than ambassadors of their culture (296).

French interest in and general derision for American foreign policy and action world wide is most commonly attributed to a fall in rank:

France’s attitude seems to be nothing more than pique over not being a world power any more and over seeing the United States, a country that had originally been its client, replace it on the world scene to become its benefactor—via the Marshall Plan—and protector. (Toinet 136)

For Toinet herself, however, this view is far from complete.

Another factor contributing to anti-American sentiment in France goes back to French involvement in the American Revolution, when France thought that their instrumental role in securing American independence would lead to a special relationship with the U.S. It was instead Britain that became special friend and ally to the U.S., “while France was left resentful in the cold” (Toinet 134).

Others, notably Jean-François Revel who has published extensively on the subject, see French anti-Americanism as a device used to avoid analyzing its own deplorable actions:

This stops us from looking at ourselves and facing the painful truth: pogroms, the holocaust, the Moscow trials, totalitarianism throughout a whole continent—in short some of the worst atrocities in the history of

mankind—happened in the past 80 years in Europe, not America. The presence of a monster across the Atlantic helps us forget our own demons.

( qtd, in Astier 299)

Anti-Americanism in France, then, is about French self-perception as culturally and intellectually superior to Americans; French embarrassment at its diminishing status on the world stage; French sour grapes over the American cold shoulder and French need to avoid horrible truths about its own actions abroad. It would seem that French attitudes toward the United States, then, have nothing to do with valid criticism of the U.S. and everything with their own need to “feel good” (Astier 299).

The distinction between valid criticism of American culture and foreign policy and anti-Americanism, however, is a fuzzy one. Both Toinet and Astier attempt to distinguish between valid criticism of the U.S. and anti-Americanism. Their attitudes toward the U.S. are clearly different and this plays a role in their analysis of anti-Americanism. Where Astier asserts that the “systemic and insistent blame” on America is the proof of a goal beyond analysis, indeed proof of anti-Americanism (299), Toinet argues that “systematic and permanent opposition to everything American” simply does not exist (135). Although Toinet and Astier agree on the definition of anti-Americanism, they disagree as to what extent anti-Americanism exists in France according to that definition. Where Astier claims that American cultural icons are seen as exceptions rather than ambassadors of their culture (296), Toinet claims that even those most critical of the U.S. are capable of loving its literature, movies and music (135).

Toinet does not intend to say that there is no anti-American sentiment in France. An analysis such as Toinet's attempts to point out the danger is labelling all criticism of the U.S. as anti-American.

In other words, a professional but critical view of American things, realities, policies, ideas and features is easily taken for the expression of anti-American feelings, even when it is interwoven into a basically favourable outlook. The particular becomes the whole, criticism becomes hostility, assessment is anti-American. (137)

This blanket label often discredits valid criticism or even worse, silences it. Because there is no consensus as to the definition of anti-Americanism, it is difficult to point out when a criticism of the U.S. is anti-American or not. As we will see in the upcoming chapters, it is clear that the print media in France is far more critical of the U.S. than the print media in either English Canada or Quebec. Despite the appearance of solidarity in *Le Monde's* famous headline "Nous sommes tous américains" the representation of the U.S. in the special September 13<sup>th</sup> edition is far from positive. Specific arguments advanced by *Le Monde* are dismissed as anti-American and considered akin to terrorism in the mainstream English Canadian newspapers.

## **Summary**

As we have seen, discussions about the U.S. in English Canada, Quebec and even in France are intimately connected to ideas of self. In other words, what we say about the U.S. is more about "us" than it is about "them." After the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in New York City, the discourse of counter-Americanism that is usually central to the

construction of Canadian identity disappears. Instead, the 'we' in Canadian newspapers refers to Canadians and Americans alike, asserting that commonly touted differences are of little importance and should be forgotten. This strategy is central to the continentalist discourse that emerged at this time. In Quebec, there is also an acknowledgement of solidarity with the American people. However, perpetuating the double discourse of *americanité*, this solidarity exists side by side with an awareness of negatively-perceived American attributes. In this way, the Quebec print media acknowledges the American part of the Québécois identity but does not eliminate the distinction between American and Québécois. Despite *Le Monde*'s famous headline, there is no real expression of solidarity with the American people. In fact, as we will see in the upcoming chapters, the United States is harshly criticized and even blamed for the attacks.

## CHAPTER 2 – CONSTRUCTING AMERICA

Because the print media in English Canada adopts an American perspective, the 9/11 attacks are interpreted through narratives that are typical to American self-representation throughout history. “The American War Story”, as outlined in Tom Engelhardt’s *The End of Victory Culture* serves as a narrative model through which Americans have long explained their own involvement in domestic and international conflict. This chapter will show how the print media in English Canada draws heavily on elements of the American War Story to interpret the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in New York and Washington, thus representing the U.S. and Americans as they traditionally represent themselves.

Following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, a comparison with the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941 is often made. This comparison is an apt one, not only because it is another of the very few attacks in which the U.S. was targeted directly, but also because the attacks on Pearl Harbor played a crucial role in re-molding The American War Story. Elements of this narrative are clearly present in the print media coverage of the 9/11 attacks in English Canada. The U.S. is portrayed as an injured but righteous nation, united by the strength of common beliefs and convinced of American ability to emerge victorious. Several articles printed in English Canadian newspapers emphasize the surprise nature of the attacks, American deaths and American vulnerability as well as the certainty of American victory. In addition, America is portrayed as inherently possessing the positive attributes of freedom, strength, courage and power. Slotted into the framework of The American War Story, these attributes guarantee future American

victory and serve to prove the righteousness of the American cause. Although the print media in Québec also contains elements of the War Story, key elements are missing. Notably, American victory is not portrayed as a certainty. Ultimately, the print media in Quebec questions elements of American self-perception rather than reinforcing them. Finally, in France's *Le Monde*, comparisons to Pearl Harbor serve to reveal the negative aspects of American retaliation at that time and also to criticize the U.S. in general.

### **The American War Story**

The American War Story can be traced back to the colonization of North America by the Europeans, specifically, to European encounters with native inhabitants when they first arrived and as they moved westward across the continent. Representations of these encounters depicted the white Europeans as facing a brutally violent and non-rational Indian enemy. Typically, the Europeans were vastly outnumbered and continually staving off attacks upon their otherwise peaceful and settled existence. This representation of the earliest days of European settlement in the New World begins with settled Europeans, ignoring the disruption of a native way of life already in progress, not to mention the massacre of native peoples that preceded established settlements. The land it seemed was the Garden of the World<sup>9</sup>: a virgin land uninhabited by Man and waiting to be cultivated.

Once the Europeans arrived and settled, an outside enemy sought to destroy their way of life. As Engelhardt outlines, defense against Indian attackers is consistently depicted as a brutally violent and absolute slaughter of Indians by Europeans. Because

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<sup>9</sup> The term is borrowed from Henry Nash Smith's 1950 study *Virgin Land The American West as Symbol and Myth*.

the settlers are consistently portrayed as being outnumbered by their Indian enemies, the brutal nature of European retaliation is considered to be justified. Moreover, Engelhardt argues that the absolute nature of the European victory over their Indian attackers is not only considered to be justified, but that it also serves as proof of the victor's inherent rightness. "[...] [T]he numbers seemed to confirm not just the success but the essential rightness and goodness of the country," (Engelhardt 39). In fact, depictions of Europeans in battle with Indians almost never included American deaths, implying that American victory was somehow meant to be. Innocent and outnumbered, Americans rose to victory due to their inherent rightness and goodness. This narrative became the model through which all American conflict was depicted.

In order to explain the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor to an American audience that was not used to seeing their own nationals killed, the War Story had to be modified to incorporate American deaths as well as increased American vulnerability. The War Story proved durable due precisely to its ability to adapt. The "new" reality of American deaths was explained by emphasizing the surprise nature of the attacks on Pearl Harbor. In addition, American deaths, unlike the complete slaughter of American enemies, were represented as isolated incidents. Dead Americans did not serve to prove the righteousness of the enemy, but instead became heroic martyrs for the American cause of justice and freedom, illustrating "the enemy's incomprehensible infamy and deceit" (Engelhardt 39). American vulnerability became a rallying cry to unite a nation that *would* be victorious. In Engelhardt's words: "[...] Americans were able from the first moments of the war to appropriate defeat as a stance for triumph, to portray Pearl Harbor

[...] as the mega- and mini-Alamos from which the largest victory in human history would flow” (52).

It is no surprise, then, that the media in the U.S. portrayed the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in exactly the same way. In an article entitled “Villains, Victims and Heroes: Melodrama, Media and September 11<sup>th</sup>” Elisabeth Anker outlines the dominant mode of representation through which the U.S. is portrayed in American T.V. coverage on September 11<sup>th</sup>. In other words, how America was represented to Americans immediately following the attacks. She asserts that the dominant mode of representation is one of melodrama where “[an innocent victim] is under attack from an evil ‘other’, a villain, and this condition necessitates a retaliatory act of heroism” (25). Anker further asserts that in this mode of representation, the retaliating act of heroism re-affirms the state of moral purity that existed before the victimization. Because the villain is the embodiment of pure evil, any retaliation on behalf of the victim/hero-to-be (in this case the U.S.) is justified and considered to be “a responsive moral heroic crusade that extends goodness in the world” (25). American national identity, in this mode of representation, is reduced to the most general ideals of freedom and democracy, the victimization resulting from attack and the heroic acts of redemption that follow (25). Although this narrative is nothing new in the U.S., more startling perhaps is the fact that the print media in English Canada also adopts this same mode of representation following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

### **America Defined: the English Canadian Print Media**

Key elements that allow us to identify the presence of The American War Story in news stories reporting on 9/11 in English Canada are as follows: comparison to Japanese

attacks on Pearl Harbor; emphasis on American vulnerability or American deaths; inherent rightness of American cause; certainty of American victory. It should be noted that although not every article that contributes to the perpetuation of The American War Story contains all of the aforementioned elements, the cumulative effect reconstructs the narrative all the same.

Predictably, an American editorial printed in the Montreal Gazette contains the most glaring example of the War Story narrative. The article, entitled, “Lady Liberty still stands” acknowledges American vulnerability revealed by the 9/11 attacks: “Suddenly, Americans in America are more vulnerable than we were ever willing to believe.” September 11<sup>th</sup> victims are compared to the victims of Pearl Harbor and are immediately immortalized as heroic martyrs for freedom: “They died for freedom, as surely as the victims of Pearl Harbor.” And finally, American vulnerability is a position from which America will emerge victorious: “But we are not defeated. We will not surrender to the cowardly forces of terrorism, who would bring America to her knees”; “Lady Liberty still stands tall. Shrouded in smoke. Covered in dust and blood. She is crying. She is afraid. She is angry. But she will not yield.”

Although a much longer and more detailed article, Marcus Gee’s “The sleeping giant wakes up angry” is another pertinent example of how the American War Story is used to interpret the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in the English Canadian print media. Gee compares the attacks to the attacks on Pearl Harbor: “Today as Americans absorb what is being called their second Pearl Harbor, the giant is stirring again”; “Yesterday’s attacks were indeed worse than Pearl Harbor.” He strongly emphasizes the American death toll:

No one knew yesterday how many were killed or injured, but given that 50,000 people work in the World Trade Center on any given day—not including visiting tourists—the toll should surpass Pearl Harbor’s 3, 500. At a worst case, it might even surpass the worst death toll in U.S. military history [...]

He also emphasizes American vulnerability: “Any lingering sense that the United States was safe from the world’s turmoil vanished in the fire and smoke of the crumbling World Trade Centre. It is doubtful that Americans have ever felt so vulnerable as they do today.” Gee quotes Lewis Eisenberg, chairman of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as saying: “as Americans, we will pull together and do what’s right,” a reference to the inherent justness of the American cause. Again, vulnerability is a position from which America will emerge victorious. Gee emphasizes the certainty of American victory: “Once Americans get over their shock over yesterday’s attacks on their homeland—the worst in 225 years—they are bound to be angry. Their wrath will shake the world.” Once Gee begins to talk about retaliation, American vulnerability has disappeared. Americans *will* retaliate and their wrath *will* shake the world.

Gee’s comparison to Pearl Harbor, extends to include predictions as to what American response may be. He emphasizes the enormity of the American response that is sure to come, “After Pearl Harbor, the United States mobilized its enormous energy and vast resources for an all-out campaign that included the invention, production and use of a fearsome new weapon, the atom bomb.” And later, “Something similar may happen now.” Although it is considered to be one of the most horrific events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Gee’s attitude toward the use of the atom bomb, ending World War II is a positive one.

His concluding remarks do not leave us with an impression of the horror unleashed by the use of the atom bomb, but instead his attitude toward American action reveals admiration: “However the United States reacts to yesterday’s horrors, few doubt that it will do so with the same determination and vigour it showed in 1941.”

Further, Gee’s article seems to be a pre-emptive justification for American action yet to come. He continually presents the nature of the attacks as justification for extreme retaliation: “Yesterday’s events could *force* the United States to be more muscular, intervening in troubled, chaotic places that it would prefer to avoid, it hopes of establishing a worldwide Pax Americana.” And later: “He says the United States might even be *forced* to take over and run troubled countries like Afghanistan to prevent them from being used as staging grounds for attacks on the United States” (my italics). Here, the choice to use the verb “force” implies that the United States has no choice but to become “more muscular” and to intervene in other places around the world. Subsequent American action in Afghanistan and Iraq is both predicted and justified. Further, responsibility for this action is shifted from America to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. If America has been forced to do something, they cannot be held responsible for it. The 9/11 attacks forced America to react; they did not choose to do it arbitrarily.

### **America Defined: Characteristics Attributed to America and Americans**

The U.S. portrayed by the print media in English Canada, then, is an injured but righteous nation. America inherently possesses the positive attributes of freedom, reason, civility, power, strength and courage. It is precisely because we represent national and cultural identities as essential that we have come to think they are. This tendency is

evident in the Canadian print media post 9/11. Indeed, on September 12<sup>th</sup>, the Montreal Gazette ran an American editorial referring to the “*true* heart of our people” (Tammeus, my italics). On the same day, *The National Post* ran an editorial claiming, “[...] beneath the heart of every hyphenated American, there rages the heart of an American period” (Blatchford). The idea here being that certain values are innately American and that no matter the national or cultural background of one who holds those values, they are American values all the same.

### **Freedom**

Freedom is one of the characteristics most often attributed to the United States by the English Canadian print media following 9/11. An American editorial that ran in *The Gazette* on September 12<sup>th</sup> describes Americans as “a good-hearted people who love liberty” (Tammeus). In the same article, the author declares America the global guardian of liberty and warns Americans to protect this role, “If we don’t protect and preserve our freedoms by being watchful, cautious, careful, we might give away our role as the guardian of liberty.” Another article printed on the same day in *The Daily News* claims that a “liberated spirit” is one of the things that marks America as a nation (Ambrose).

Often, the Statue of Liberty is used as a symbol for America. An editorial printed in *The Vancouver Sun* on September 12<sup>th</sup> uses the Statue of Liberty as a symbol for America:

The United States continues to be expressed by the Statue of Liberty, it retains the torch of freedom. The Americans have everything: freedom; a system of government under law; the might of magnificent military power. But all of it

founded upon the liberty that made a very great commercial nation; a nation of 'traders not raiders'." (Warren)

Here, the author not only states that Americans have freedom but also that the nation itself was founded upon it, making freedom an essential and unchanging part of the American nation.

## **Power**

Power, be it economic, military or political, is another characteristic attributed to America and Americans in the discourse immediately following 9/11. The United States is often referred to as a superpower or some variation thereof: "the world's superpower" ("We're all victims of terror"); "an American superpower" (Gee); "the world's only superpower" (Blatchford); or "the world's greatest superpower" (Patterson).

Frequently, reporters state that the sites of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks (the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and the World Trade Center in New York City) were chosen for their symbolic value. Like many others, an editorial printed in *The Gazette* on September 12<sup>th</sup> sees the Pentagon as a symbol of America's military power and the World Trade Center as a symbol of America's economic and political power. "That another hijacked jet could then descend over the streets of Washington D.C., and plunge into the Pentagon, the military headquarters for the world's superpower, seemed beyond belief" ("We're all victims of terror"), "[...] might have seen the World Trade Centre [sic] as a symbol of American economic might, and thus of that country's international political power" ("We're all victims of terror"). In her editorial published on September 12<sup>th</sup>, Margaret Wente, who describes America as "a nation at the height of power, peace

and prosperity”, also sees the Pentagon and the World Trade Center as “America’s most potent symbol of financial and military might”. References to America’s military power are not only contained to the Pentagon’s obvious symbolism. Margaret Wentz refers to America’s “military muscle” (“U.S. will never be the same”) and David Warren states that Americans have “everything” including “the might of magnificent military power.”

### **Strength**

Closely linked to power, discourse post 9/11 attributes strength to America and Americans. Sometimes the noun strength and its variants are used when referring to America: “[...] ours is a *strong* society that will not give way easily to any extreme” (Ambrose); “where the Free World—and those who long for freedom—look for *strength* and leadership” (“Lady Liberty still stands”). Other times, authors refer to “iron resolve and unfathomable will” or state that “Americans win...because they refuse to lose” (Blatchford).

### **Courage**

As demonstrated by the following examples, Americans are commonly described as being courageous: “Americans are good at such things: giving aid to survivors and the families of victims and resolving to maintain a rational perspective and keep their courage” (Ambrose); “[...] lots of people—not just trained emergency workers, but also many others—performed acts of bravery and courage” (Tammeus).

## America Defined: The Quebec Print Media

The print media in Québec also uses a comparison to Pearl Harbor to help interpret the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks but key elements of the American War Story are missing. Several articles printed in *Le Devoir* and *La Presse* emphasize American deaths and American vulnerability. This vulnerability, however, is not represented as a position from which America will rise to certain victory. There is no assertion of the inherent goodness or rightness of the American cause and finally, the possibility of a harsh response is not presented in a positive light.

Various articles compare the September 11th attacks in New York to the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor. One article printed in *La Presse*, for example, claims: “Tout au long de la journée, d’aucuns n’ont pas hésité à comparer la catastrophe d’hier à l’attaque de Pearl Harbor, le 7 décembre 1941, au cours de laquelle 2403 personnes ont perdu la vie.”<sup>10</sup> The article concludes by emphasizing America’s inability to protect itself, or in other words, by highlighting American vulnerability:

Tout cela pour conclure que même la nation la plus puissante de la planète, bénéficiant de la force armée et du service renseignements les mieux équipés”, n’est pas à l’abri des attaques terroristes. Plusieurs Américains entendus à la radio l’ont dit: ici, la vie ne sera plus jamais la même. (Duchesne)

This vulnerability, however, is not presented as a position from which the powerful America is able to rise triumphantly to victory.

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<sup>10</sup> Figures for the actual death toll resulting from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor vary from article to article. Interestingly, Marcus Gee’s figure of 3,500 is by far the highest I came across over the course of my research.

Another article printed on the same day makes the same comparison to Pearl Harbor. This article doesn't present a certain rise to victory either. Instead, it reflects the confusion and uncertainty about how the U.S. will or should respond:

Plusieurs spécialistes ont comparé l'attaque d'hier à Pearl Harbor. En 1941, dans un geste surprise, l'aviation japonaise avait attaqué la flotte américaine. Traumatisé, humilié, les États-Unis étaient sortis de leur isolement pour se jeter dans la guerre. *Mais* en 1941 l'ennemi était visible et incarné dans un État, le Japon. Les victimes étaient des militaires et non des civils. Et l'attaque avait eu lieu dans une baie du Pacifique et non au cœur de la plus grande ville américaine. (Ouimet "La nouvelle guerre")

Here, the word "mais" marks a distinction between the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Because the article does not draw on a specific narrative frame through which to interpret the event, it more accurately reflects the confusion and uncertainty that surely follows an attack such as the one perpetrated on September 11<sup>th</sup>:

Beaucoup de questions restent en suspens. Est-ce que les États-Unis peuvent se protéger contre de telles attaques qui soulignent l'extrême vulnérabilité des grandes villes comme New York? Comment des avions commerciaux, bourrés de passagers, ont pu être détournés et servir de bombes vivantes? Et comment expliquer l'impuissance des services secrets américains qui n'ont rien vu venir? Les Américains voudront se venger. Ils considèrent que cette attaque est une déclaration de guerre. Mais une déclaration qui vient de qui, et pourquoi? Pour l'instant, l'ennemi est invisible et personne ne sait comment le combattre.

Unlike the English Canadian corpus which tells the story through an already established narrative frame, the print media in Quebec makes a comparison with Pearl Harbor but does not assume that 9/11 is the same story. The French-Canadian reader is left with more questions than answers, revealing the real vulnerability in the U.S. (and perhaps around the globe) at that time.

An article printed in *Le Devoir* also reveals American vulnerability on September 11<sup>th</sup>:

Tous les mécanismes de sécurité, de prévention et de défense ont flanché. Ni le FBI ni la CIA, ni les services secrets militaires n'avaient même pu imaginer qu'une telle attaque pouvait survenir un jour. Comment prévoir le pire quand on se croit indestructible? Des milliers de citoyens ordinaire, du p.-d.g. d'une grande banque au simple employé d'entretien, ont été coincés aux étages de ces tours gigantesques, fierté de l'Amérique, qui se sont effondrés moins d'une heure après l'impact, comme une construction d'allumettes. (Sansfaçon "La guerre au Coeur de l'Amérique")

I say, "revealed" because this vulnerability is presented in contrast to American power and in contrast to an American self-perception of indestructibility. This awareness of American self-perception marks a difference from the representation in the English-Canadian print media. Because the English Canadian reads from an American perspective, the American self-perception is not marked but instead the American viewpoint is naturalized. In the Québec print media, on the other hand, the difference between Americans and French-Canadians is marked. American vulnerability is not

simply appropriated by the American War Story and used to re-enforce American ideas of self-perception but instead, American vulnerability as revealed on September 11<sup>th</sup> stands in almost challenging contrast to American ideas of self.

## **America Defined: the French Print Media**

### **Comparisons to Pearl Harbor**

References to Pearl Harbor are also ubiquitous in France's *Le Monde*. The comparison, however, does not serve to interpret the 9/11 attacks through The American War Story. Instead, references to Pearl Harbor are used to introduce criticism of the United States. American vulnerability is highlighted, not as a position from which to rise victorious, but rather to reveal America's false arrogance and feeling of superiority.

The famous September 13<sup>th</sup> headline "Nous sommes tous Américains" seemed a shocking statement for a newspaper that is considered to be riddled with anti-American sentiment. A closer analysis of the special September 13<sup>th</sup> issue of *Le Monde* devoted to coverage of 9/11 reveals strong criticism of the U.S., far from the complete solidarity suggested in the headline. Indeed, the article itself contains harsh criticism and negative representations of the United States. In it, references to Pearl Harbor serve as a springboard from which the author is able to criticize American action in the past:

Pearl Harbor avait marqué la fin d'un isolationnisme, ancré au point d'avoir résisté même à la barbarie de Hitler. Quand en 1941, Charles Lindbergh faisait une tournée de conférences en Europe pour plaider contre toute implication américaine, une large partie de l'opinion outre-Atlantique rêvait déjà d'un repli sur l'espace latino-américain, laissant

l'Europe à ses ruines et à ses crimes. Après Pearl Harbor tout a changé. Et l'Amérique a tout accepté, le plan Marshall comme l'envoi de GI's sur tous les points du globe. Vint ensuite la déchirure vietnamienne, qui a débouché sur une nouvelle doctrine, celle de l'emploi massif et rare de la force, accompagné du dogme du "zéro mort" américain comme cela fut illustré pendant la guerre du Golfe. Tout cela et désormais balayé : nul doute que tous les moyens seront utilisés contre des adversaires restés à ce jour insaisissables. (Colombani)

Far from Marcus Gee's praise for American "power and dynamism" the article criticizes both American isolationism before the attacks on Pearl Harbor as well as American involvement after Pearl Harbor. The author takes the opportunity to remind the reader of American reluctance to enter World War II despite the obvious atrocities carried out under Hitler's rule, implying that the U.S. was (and is?) only interested in its own well-being and willing to leave Europe to "ses ruines." The reader is also reminded of the tragic Vietnam War.

Criticism of the Gulf War in 1991 and the American "dogme du zéro mort" comes up in numerous articles in the September 13<sup>th</sup> edition of *Le Monde*. This "dogme du zéro mort" is a reference to the attempt by the U.S. to represent the Gulf War as a clean war — with little collateral damage and few Allied casualties. Criticism of this American policy in the 1991 Gulf War does not immediately appear in the English Canadian print media and is far from the dominant discourse. Awareness in France could well be attributed to the publication of Jean Baudrillard's provocative and controversial essays

“The Gulf War will not take place”, “The Gulf War: is it taking place?” and “The Gulf War did not take place.”<sup>11</sup>

In stark contrast to English Canadian print media, other articles also represent American action after Pearl Harbor in a negative light. Instead of focusing on the positive results from American action in World War II, one author refers only to the final act of dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima: “Une heure plus tard, les Etats-Unis déclarent au Japon une guerre qui ne s’achèvera, près de quatre ans plus tard, qu’avec Hiroshima” (Courtois). In addition, the author uses the negative formulation “ qui ne s’achèvera [...], qu’avec Hiroshima,” emphasizing not only the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima but also the length of the war and American inability to end it sooner and using less horrific means.

Quoting an American actor, another article refers to the unjust treatment of Japanese Americans in the U.S. during the Second World War:

“Les musulmans font partie de notre communauté. Il ne faut pas tirer des conclusions trop vite. J’espère que nous avons appris une leçon importante avec les camps d’internement pour Japonais...”, explique l’acteur, évoquant les injustes répercussions de Pearl Harbor sur les Américains d’origine japonaise pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale. (Mulard)

Here, the reader is again reminded of the most negative points in American history.

Reactions to the attacks on Pearl Harbor led not only to the dropping of the atom bomb in

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<sup>11</sup> Baudrillard’s essays appeared in *Libération* on 4 January, 1991, 6 February, 1991, and 29 March, 1991 respectively.

Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but also to the imprisonment of Japanese Americans in work camps — attributing racism to Americans in the past.

The comparison with Pearl Harbor in *Le Monde*, then, is not a favourable one. It does not perpetuate the idea of an innately good and right America justified to retaliate however it sees fit. Instead, it criticises American action and doubts the intentions motivating it.

### **Vulnerability and Power**

As is the case in English Canada and Quebec, several articles refer to America's vulnerability, revealed by the 9/11 attacks: “un colossal nuage de poussière, de débris, de fumé, noie New York et ses gratte-ciel, qui semblent soudain petits et fragiles” (Krauze); “C'est un nouveau monde qui s'annonce, dans lequel l'hyperpuissance vient d'afficher sa vulnérabilité à l'hyperterrorisme” (“La fin d'une rêve ”). In the French print media, however, this vulnerability is seen as a necessary antidote for American arrogance and the unequal distribution of power globally.

Power is a characteristic that is repeatedly attributed to the U.S. As is the case in English Canada and Quebec, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are seen as symbols of American financial and military superpower status: “[...] comme le montre la sophistication de l'opération de guerre qui a frappé tous les symboles de l'Amérique : ceux de la surpuissance économique au cœur de Manhattan, de la puissance militaire au Pentagone, et enfin de la puissance tutélaire du Proche-Orient tout près de Camp David,” (Colombani); “Deux symboles de l'hyperpuissance américaine, les tours du World Trade Center, à New York, et l'immeuble du Pentagone, à Washington, ont été attaqués mardi 11 septembre,” (“L'Amérique sous le choc d'un 'Pearl Harbor' terroriste”); “Le

détournement d'avions de ligne par des pirates de l'air qui les ont dirigés vers les symboles de la puissance économique américaine à New York—les tours jumelles du World Trade Center—puis vers le cœur de leur puissance militaire en Virginie, près de Washington—le Pentagone—a fait des milliers de morts” (“La fin d'un rêve”). This power, however, is not simply accepted as innate fact but evaluated in terms of the global context.

La réalité est plus sûrement celle, en effet, d'un monde sans contrepoids, physiquement déstabilisé donc dangereux, faute d'équilibre multipolaire.

Et l'Amérique dans la solitude de sa puissance, de son hyper-puissance, en l'absence désormais de tout contre-modèle soviétique, a cessé d'attirer les peuples à elle; ou plus précisément en certains points du globe, elle ne semble plus attirer que la haine. (Colombani)

Here, it is argued that America's position as world's sole superpower creates an unbalanced and dangerous world. Dangerous because this unchecked power can account for the hatred that many people feel for the U.S. and allows for the type of attack that happened on September 11<sup>th</sup>. The author goes on to say: “Dans le monde monopolistique d'aujourd'hui c'est une nouvelle barbarie, apparemment sans contrôle, qui paraît vouloir s'ériger en contre-pouvoir” (Colombani). America's power then, is the source of its vulnerability. Unlike the narrative of the American War Story where America, through its strength, power and the rightness of its cause, rises up from a position of vulnerability, here there is no inherent rightness of the American cause and it is its very power and questionable motivations that ultimately make for its vulnerability.

## Arrogance and American Self-Perception

As outlined, the unequal distribution of power on a global scale and American abuse of power is at the root of much criticism of the U.S. In addition, the U.S. is represented as an arrogant nation, deluded about the privileges their immense power affords them. In the French media, the proposed National Missile Defence Shield, and American isolationism in general, represents this American arrogance. In an article printed on the front page of the September 13<sup>th</sup> edition of *Le Monde*, Daniel Vernet asserts that the American National Missile Defence plan (or NMD) is the product of an American “illusion” to “rendre son territoire invulnérable à toute attaque venant d’un de ces roque states (États voyous) [...]” (“Erreur sur la menace”). Although briefly outlined, it is neither the political implications of such a plan nor the exorbitant cost that are important for the argument of this article but rather the idea upon which NMD is based: “Ce qui compte toutefois ici, c’est moins la faisabilité du programme, et son coût, que l’idée sur laquelle il est fondé: il ne doit pas être permis aux ennemis des États-Unis de porter la guerre sur le territoire américain.”

Vernet’s article at once describes elements of American self-perception and argues that the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks challenge those elements. First, the author suggests that the 9/11 attacks serve to show Americans that they cannot wield their power with impunity, suggesting that they think they can: “Si les Américains pensaient que la construction bipolaire avait cédé la place à un monde unipolaire dans lequel ils pourraient impunément imposer leur volonté et leur loi, ils se sont trompés.” *Le Monde* claims that the American worldview sees America fearlessly wielding its own power over the rest of the world. The author goes on to argue that the terrorist attacks serve to show the U.S.

that they are vulnerable to attack, just like other (less-powerful) nations despite their own feeling of superiority and exception:

Mais la seconde conclusion que des hommes politiques tentés moins par l'isolationnisme que par l'unilatéralisme devraient en tirer, c'est que ni leur situation géographique ni leur puissance ne mettent les États-Unis à l'abri des tourments du monde. Et que ce degré, sans doute irréductible, de vulnérabilité les place malgré toutes leurs prétentions contraires dans une situation analogue à celle des autres États moins puissants de la planète. Par conséquent, les États-Unis devraient accepter de revenir sur le "splendide isolement" qui semblait la caractéristique de la politique engagée par la nouvelle administration républicaine. Le terrorisme les fait en quelque sorte rentrer dans le rang.

Essentially, Vernet argues that the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks put the U.S. in its place and sees this as positive and necessary. Vernet's final remarks reinforce the idea that September 11<sup>th</sup> served primarily to destroy American illusions about its own invulnerability due to its immense global power:

La nouveauté radicale introduite dans le monde par les attentats de New York et Washington, c'est que, pour la première fois, des groupes aux contours mal définis déclarent la guerre à l'État le plus puissant de la planète. L'après-guerre ne ressemble décidément pas à ce que les vainqueurs de la guerre froide avaient envisagé.

The main sentiment underlying Vernet's article is that American arrogance about their own "superiority" and exclusion from global conflict as well as the right to wield their power as they see fit is challenged by the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

## **Summary**

In the most immediate coverage of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on New York and Washington, the Canadian print media expresses a complete solidarity with the American people. The association with the U.S. goes so far that the distinction between Canadian and American is blurred. Americans are represented to Canadians in the Canadian print media as they traditionally represent themselves. The American War Story is the predominant narrative used to construct the image of a vulnerable and wounded America. An America that will rise to victory due to her inherent righteousness. The print media in Quebec, on the other hand, maintains a distance from the American Other and the discourse represents a far more confused and questioning perspective. In addition, the print media in Quebec recognizes America's own perception of itself and acknowledges how that perception is endangered by 9/11.

France also makes a comparison between the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941. In France, the comparison serves to highlight negative points in American history including the dropping of the atom bomb in 1941, the imprisonment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War, and the Vietnam War. Other points in American history are also presented in a negative light. Specifically, American policies concerning the Persian Gulf War in 1991 serve to reveal American manipulation of public perception for its own purposes. In stark contrast to the

overwhelmingly positive representation of America in the Canadian print media, a strongly negative portrait of America emerges in the French press. Much like in Quebec's daily newspapers, France's *Le Monde* acknowledges American modes of self-perception. But, where the print media in Quebec sees how these ideas are challenged by 9/11, the print media in France goes a step further, arguing that the arrogant U.S. has been put in its place and that this American reality-check is much needed.

In the next chapter we will see how the American War Story extends to the representation of the Muslim Other. Much like the representation of the Japanese kamikaze pilots during World War II, the perpetrator's of the 9/11 attacks are considered to be non-rational, un-civilized fanatics. This representation often generalizes, extending to all Muslim and Middle Eastern peoples.

### **CHAPTER 3 – AMERICA = THE WEST: FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY UNDER ATTACK**

On September 11<sup>th</sup> President George Bush made an address to a shocked and horrified nation. In it he repeatedly characterized the attacks and those who perpetrated them as evil, declaring, “Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror [...] Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. [...] The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts.” Toward the end of his address, the President rallied the American people, claiming that: “[y]et, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.” Bush’s rallying cry set up a clear opposition between good and evil that permeated the on-going coverage of the events in both the U.S. and in Canada.

The attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington was interpreted by the print media as an attack on North America and North American values. Further, these North American values are considered to be Western values and the attacks in New York and Washington become an attack on all of Western civilization (according to some reporters, it seems that civilization itself is exclusively Western), pitting East against West, good against evil. The American identity, then, is understood in terms of its place in the world in relation to those who perpetrated the attacks. As we have seen, in the print media coverage of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in English Canada, the U.S. is portrayed as a wounded but righteousness nation, united in its goal to conquer an evil enemy and rise to victory. In this chapter, we will see how this America is seen as being synonymous with the West. The evil Other, then, is the direct antithesis of the West. American and Western values are considered in opposition to Muslims and

Muslim values. This chapter will show how the print media in English Canada frames the 9/11 story within long-established conceptual maps of the world. Specifically, it will show how explanations claiming that the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks were an attack on Western values contribute to the discourse that constructs the entity known as the West. In addition, it will show how the discourse following 9/11 perpetuates the notion that the West is superior to the Islamic world thus legitimizing Western power on a global scale.

### **America Is the West: an Attack on Core Values**

In an editorial printed in *The Gazette* on September 12<sup>th</sup>, it is clearly argued that the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks were not only an attack on the U.S. but also an attack on Canada and the entire Western world. The writer claims that:

For those huddled around television sets yesterday morning, watching in stunned silence, it was a day when terrorism hit *home*. This wasn't simply an attack against the United States: it was an attack against all of *us*.

Identifying with yesterday's victims was all too easy, because *they* were *us*. ("We're all victims of terror", my italics)

Later in the article, 'us' is qualified: "Canada and other Western nations all need to take a long, hard look at their intelligence and security systems." 'Us', then are those of us living in countries considered to be part of the Western world. The argument is that the attack was directed at everyone in the Western world. Consequently, everyone in the West can be considered to be a victim of the attacks. In this article, like many others, Canada equals the U.S. equals the West. The inclusive 'we' in this article, then, refers not only to North America but to the entire Western world: "And, now that *we* have seen

how vulnerable *we* all are to acts of terrorism, perhaps it is time for tougher security measures throughout *our* society” (my italics).

On October 3<sup>rd</sup>, Andrew Coyne argues more directly that America is the West: Those who do—the vast majority, I venture to say, in every Western nation, and most of the rest—were shocked into a sudden redefinition of themselves, or perhaps merely an acknowledgement of what had already occurred: that whatever our separate nationalities, the nations of blood and soil, our more fundamental attachment is to a nation of common values. Call that nation the West—or since the idea of a nation defined by its values is indigenous to the new World, call it America.

Here, Coyne argues that “the West” is made up of nations that are built on common core values. He makes no distinction between the countries that make up the West, instead arguing that the nations of the West all belong to one nation, “a nation of common values.” He goes on to name “freedom, equality, democracy” as fundamental Western (or American) values. Coyne’s argument, however, does not clearly outline which countries he considers to be part of the West. In addition, he ignores the fact that the very idea of “the West” is itself a product of discourse.

In an article entitled “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” Stuart Hall outlines the historical context in which the notion of the West emerged. He reminds us that although we often refer to “the West” or describe people and places as “Western,” they actually “represent very complex ideas and have no simple or single meaning” (Hall 185). Hall argues that when we talk about “the West” we are not referring to geographical location. Although the idea of the West did emerge out of western Europe,

Japan, a country that is located in the far East, is now considered to be Western (185). Hall claims that by “Western” we mean a “society that is developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular, and modern” (186). He also argues that because the idea of the West” is a product of discourse, its meaning is not fixed and can change over time.

The argument advanced by Coyne relies on the assumption that the West is made up of countries built on common values. It also relies on assumptions about what those values are. Further, it ignores the fact that the idea of the West and the American identity are products of discourse and sees these values as essentially Western. Ultimately, this argument serves to keep discussion away from any other possible explanations of the events. Telling the 9/11 story from the American point of view serves to garner support for any American action taken in response to the attacks. If all Western nations are attacked, then consequently, all Western nations should support retaliation. In addition, the use of the concept of the West serves to manipulate the response of countries not (or not yet?) considered to be western. When core values like freedom and democracy are said to be under attack, many countries rush to affirm their support of these values and consequently, of the United States.

Historically, the discourse of the West has relied on a non-Western Other against whom to assert a Western identity. In other words, defining what is Western also requires a definition of what is *not* Western. In his book *Orientalism*, Edward Saïd argues “that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (3). Saïd advances the argument that the West constructed its identity in opposition to a constructed Oriental identity. This opposition served mainly to construct a positive idea of the West by

constructing it as superior to the East. Like Saïd, Karim H. Karim argues that “the darker lines of the Orient Other began to emerge at the same time as the crystallization of the idea of the West” (*Historical Resilience* 160). Negative stereotypes about Muslims have been circulating in the West for centuries. These “resilient” stereotypes affect how we interpret events and how they are represented in the news. Interpretations of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, then, rely heavily on already accepted ideas about the West and about Muslims. “Dominant cultural and religious world views of society are critical in shaping these cognitive structures with which we make sense of ongoing events” (Karim, *Making Sense* 102). These accepted ideas only allow for certain interpretations of events. “Whereas mainstream journalists do not always subscribe overtly to official views on terrorism, the field of meanings in which they chose to operate inevitably leads them to produce only certain interpretations of political violence” (Karim, *Making Sense* 105). Ultimately, the problem is that the public ends up reading an oversimplified and stereotyped version of the events: us versus them; good versus evil; the West versus the rest. In addition, the homogenizing effect of discourse means that the negative stereotypes used to describe the perpetrators of the attacks end up being attributed to Muslims in general, perpetuating already rampant misconceptions. “One primary problem that underlies dominant constructions of Muslim societies is the failure to acknowledge their diversity” (Karim, *Making Sense* 108). Indeed, this is a fundamental problem when we apply any collective identity, be it national, cultural or religious to individuals.

The coverage of 9/11 in English Canada relies heavily on this opposition, perpetuating the notion that the West is superior to the East and perpetuating a negative

and stereotyped representation of Muslims. Margaret Wente, whose opinions are often printed on the front page of the *Globe & Mail*, and plastered all over its web site, is one of the worst offenders. On September 12<sup>th</sup>, she writes:

Who did these things? All indications point to a sacred *jihād* from the Middle East. Maybe it was Saddam Hussein, exacting his blood revenge at last. Or Osama bin Laden, the millionaire fanatic who hates America for sending troops to Saudi Arabia during the war in the Persian Gulf, and for supporting Israel. “*Blood, blood and destruction, destruction,*” he commanded in a videotape to his followers last fall. To kill Americans is holy.

Those who are responsible are most likely men from remote desert lands. Men from ancient tribal cultures built on blood and revenge. Men whose unshakable beliefs and implacable hatreds go back many centuries farther than the United States and its young ideas of democracy, pluralism and freedom.

Hard men, who hide out in desert bunkers and turn the instruments of Western technology—its computers and CD-ROMs and videotapes and airplanes—against the West. Men capable of flying Boeing 747s with pinpoint, deadly accuracy, and of giving up their lives for the greater glory of Allah, and of murder on a massive scale. Men who’ve mastered and the modern Western technocratic skills, and who deploy them with the implacable determination of fanatics. Men whom most Americans, in

their innocent and happy secularism, can scarcely comprehend and hardly ever gave a thought since that nearly bloodless cartoon war in the gulf.

Here, Wente uses a strongly negative, stereotyped representation of Muslims. She begins by pointing out specific people who may have instigated the attacks—Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. The problem arises however, when she turns to a description that could be applied to Islamic societies in general. By placing any hatred on behalf of the perpetrators of the attacks in ancient history, a common representation of any Muslim discontent (Karim, *Historical Resilience* 155), other explanations for the attacks are eliminated. In other words, the complex political, social, historical and cultural context within which the attacks took place is ignored. Although Wente herself claims that due to the attacks “[m]illions of people of Islamic faith [are] unfairly tarnished by the terrorism of a few,” she herself applies negative stereotypes to all Muslims. Presumably, the perpetrators of the attacks are not the only people from these “remote desert lands” or from “ancient tribal cultures.” If this shared history and these “implacable hatreds” are indeed what led to the attacks, it follows that all Muslims are capable of such acts.

The opposition set up between Islamic and Western cultures serves to support certain ideas about the West. Technological advancement is considered to be exclusively Western. In this case, fanatics have used it against the West in ways unthinkable to Westerners (to whom the technology rightfully belongs). Americans (who represent the West in this discourse) live in a secular society and not a society full of religious fanatics. This secularism makes them oblivious (innocent) to this kind of evil. Wente asserts that democracy, pluralism and freedom are American values, implying that other people, notably Muslims, do not (indeed cannot) hold these values. It is interesting that Wente

refers to the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf as a “bloodless cartoon war,” clearly revealing the success of American initiatives to represent it as a “clean” war.

Wente reinforced this negative, stereotyped representation on September 13<sup>th</sup> when she writes:

It doesn't matter where we were born, or what language we speak to say our prayers for the dead. Those killers hate us too, simply for the values that we hold. Their attack on America was an attack on our common civilization.

The only border that matters now is the one between our world and the killers' world, the one that separates the rule of law from the rule of blood revenge and sacred jihad. The one that separates a tolerant and peaceable society from one that advocates mass slaughter (Margaret Wente, “We're all Americans now,” *Globe and Mail*, September 13<sup>th</sup>).

Here, Wente asserts that the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks were an attack on *our* common civilization. She makes it clear that national boundaries and cultural and linguistic differences are of little importance. The only thing that does matter is our common values. Like Coyne, Wente relies on the assumption that Western nations are built on these common values. Now that the only border that matters lies between those who share *our* values and those who do not, the world has been neatly split up into two polarized opposites. On *our* side there is *us*, tolerant, peaceable and governed by the rule of law. On *their* side there are killers, advocating mass slaughter and governed by the rule of blood revenge and sacred jihad. In the Canadian context, Wente's reference to a

border is part of the strong continentalist discourse that emerged in English Canada following the attacks.

In countless other articles the hatred behind the 9/11 attacks is continually linked to fanaticism: “The world must come to grips with the increasing spread of suicide attacks and with the fanatical hatred that inspires them” (We’re all victims of terror); “The planet became a much smaller place when the hatred of fanatics half a world away was visited upon New York and Washington” (*Shared sense of purpose*).

In fact, fanatical hatred seems to be the only acceptable explanation for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Early attempts to explore possible reasons for the attacks were flatly refused by the media. Notably, in an article entitled “Stop making excuses for terrorism”, Marcus Gee dismisses any other explanations for the attacks. He argues that “[t]errorism is a deliberate form of political or ideological warfare waged by fanatics with a disposition for unlimited violence.” Examining any possible causes for the attacks, we are told, is not a worthwhile endeavour: “Serious students of terrorism rejected the ‘root causes’ theory long ago.” Here, Gee’s argumentative strategy is obvious. Clearly “serious students of terrorism” know more about terrorism than the average *Globe & Mail* reader. And although Gee never quotes or names these serious students, we are to trust their informed opinion. According to Gee, attempts at explaining the attacks are the same as justifying them. He argues that “by making excuses for terrorism, *even qualified excuses*, they give the perpetrators what they crave most, legitimacy. Worse, they acquit them of responsibility for their own actions” (my italics). Here, Gee makes sure to cover all bases. Excuses and qualified excuses alike are to be dismissed. Gee’s concluding remarks re-iterate the “real” cause of terrorism: “We now know we must confront

terrorism face to face. Before we do that, we must learn to see it as it is—not as the product of ‘root causes’ but as the result of a deliberate decision to kill in the name of hate.” Fanatical hatred motivates terrorism and we are not to even question whether this is indeed the case and if so, what may motivate this kind of hatred.

The opposition set up between the West and the Muslim Other is also clear in the discussion of power. Despite the positive attitude toward American power, desire for power from anyone else is considered negative and leads to terrorism: “But if the NATO stance holds, it might, just might, herald an era when the tolerance of the Western democracies and their like-minded allies for the ignorance, corruption, fanaticism, duplicity and power hunger that allows terrorism to flourish is finally broken” (Manthorpe). This statement is based on the assumption that Western governments and societies are not afflicted with any of the above-mentioned characteristics and that none of their aggressive and violent acts towards other countries can be considered terrorism. Instead, Western countries simply tolerate terrorism from non-western countries (or have tolerated it so far). In addition, when power is attributed to the Other, it is no longer a positive attribute but something to be feared and eliminated, “ [...] the object is the destruction of an enemy, who has become too powerful to be ignored” (Warren).

The representation of the West as freedom loving, reasonable, civilized, innocent and happy and the East as hate-filled, fanatical and maniacal is both a product of discourse and producer of discourse. The long-established tradition of pitting East against West highly influences the way in which the 9/11 attacks were interpreted in English Canada. By interpreting the event through this discourse, the notion of the West continues to be constructed and knowledge about the East and the West continues to be

produced and disseminated. As has historically been its function, this discourse serves to reinforce the existing global power structure. The negative stereotype of the Muslim Other functions in a similar way. It serves as a counter-point against which the superiority of the West can be asserted. Like the polarized framework of East vs. West, good vs. evil, stereotypes are another process by which dominant power structures are continually reinforced. As Michael Pickering points out, “The comfort of inflexibility which stereotypes provide reinforces the conviction that existing relations of power are necessary and fixed” (3). Although we are often confronted with evidence that contradict common stereotypes, they have proven to be extremely resilient.

Some researchers explain this resilience in terms of how language is used to construct stereotypes. It has been argued that “positive characteristics of liked groups [Americans and the West in this context] and negative characteristics of disliked groups [Muslims in this context] tend to be expressed by broad traits, whereas negative characteristics of liked groups and positive characteristics of disliked groups tend to be expressed by narrow trait descriptors” (Maas 208). In other words, we generalize about the positive characteristics of the liked group and at the same time, generalize about the negative characteristics of the disliked group, making these traits difficult to disprove. Like Pickering, Maas argues that the function of these stereotypes is to “protect existing beliefs against disconfirmation” (212). Because it was precisely those countries that are part of the West that constructed the discourse of the West, positive characteristics were assigned to the West while negative characteristics were assigned to the rest. The negative and stereotyped representation of the Muslim Other helps to perpetuate the idea that the West is superior to the rest thus legitimizing Western power. This tendency is so

strong in the media discourse immediately following 9/11 that some writers do not simply let the stereotypes speak for themselves.

In an article published on October 9<sup>th</sup>, one day after the initial attacks on Afghanistan, Robert Fulford boldly argues that 9/11 has eliminated cultural relativism and that the West is indeed superior to the East. He writes:

Islam is a culture that has soared high; a millennium ago it was in every way more sophisticated than Christian Europe. But today Islamic culture tolerates terrorists, and often uses them (as Pakistan does) for its own aggressive purposes. Is it, then, the equal of a culture that doesn't tolerate terrorism?

That kind of comparison has been ruled off limits. Ask Silvio Berlusconi, the Premier of Italy, he said on Sept. 27 that Western civilization is superior to that of the Islamic world. "We should be confident of the superiority of our civilization, which has given people widespread prosperity and guarantees respect for human rights and religion. This respect certainly does not exist in Islamic countries."

Scandalo! *Berlusconi had said what everybody believes*. Naturally he was condemned across Europe. Naturally Muslims demanded an apology (he refused). But something like the pride he expressed will be necessary for all of us if we are to pursue what is, as bin Laden says, a war between ways of life ("A war between civilizations", Oct. 9, the National Post, my emphasis).

This representation of a struggle between a good, Western civilization and an evil, Muslim one serves to garner support for any American retaliation as well as to maintain existing global power structures.

### **The West and the Muslim Other in the Quebec Print Media**

As outlined in Chapter 1, the print media in Quebec expressed solidarity with the American people following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Similar to the English Canadian print media, the attacks in New York and Washington are often seen as an attack on the entire Western world. On September 12<sup>th</sup>, Bernard Descôteaux of *Le Devoir* writes:

Les frontières ne sauront les arrêter. Qu'on le veuille ou non, nous serons tous leurs victimes. Ces gens-là ne font pas de nuances. Ils n'ont qu'un seul ennemi, l'Occident, et nous, Québécois et Canadiens, en sommes, peu importe les réserves que nous puissions entretenir en notre for intérieur à l'égard de la domination américaine sur cet Occident.<sup>12</sup>

Descôteaux goes on to argue that the attacks are an attack on core values, namely, an attack on freedom: “Lorsque George W. Bush affirmait hier matin que “c’est la liberté qui a été attaquée”, il a raison. Ceux qui ont commis ces attaques ne conçoivent toutefois pas la liberté de la même manière que nous la concevons.” Although he asserts that “they” don’t conceive of freedom as “we” do, he offers no further explanation as to what this might mean, or what “their” perception of freedom is. In this way, Descôteaux, much like the English print media, implies that freedom, or at least freedom as we understand it, is uniquely Western.

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<sup>12</sup> Here again, we see that when solidarity with the U.S. is expressed in the Quebec print media, it is coupled with an awareness of American traits considered to be undesirable.

Descôteaux, however, seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Although the attacks are often seen as being perpetrated against the West, the polarization of the so-called Western world and the Islamic world that persists in English Canada is not dominant in the Quebec print media. As we saw in Chapter 1, on September 12<sup>th</sup> Jean-Robert Sansfaçon claimed that the attacks were an attack on the entire Western world:

[...] New York est une métropole civile. *La* métropole, y compris pour nous, Québécois, Canadiens. New York est un symbole, le nôtre, celui du Nouveau Monde. Une attaque contre New York, c'est une attaque contre nous tous Nord-Américains. Et malgré les différends qui peuvent nous opposer, malgré l'arrogance culturelle et la suffisance politique à l'image de l'ogre qui ne voit même pas ce qu'il écrase sous son pied, cette attaque terroriste meurtrière contre l'Amérique est une attaque contre nous tous, Nord-Américains et Occidentaux. (Sansfaçon "La guerre au cœur de l'Amérique")

On the following day, Sansfaçon is careful not to generalize about those who perpetrated the attacks. In an article entitled "La difficile sécurité" he writes:

Car, si nous, Occidentaux, avons notre part de responsabilité, nous avons aussi le droit et le devoir de défendre les nôtres, nos frères, nos sœurs, nos amis, qui sont identifiés comme l'ennemi à abattre dans la guerre sainte que quelques factions intégristes de l'Islam ont déclarée à l'Occident.

Michèle Ouimet of *La Presse* also steers clear of associating the perpetrators of the attacks with Muslim or Middle Eastern peoples in general, she writes:

Les forces sont complètement disproportionnées. D'un côté, les Etats-Unis, vulnérables avec sa société ouverte où les gens peuvent circuler librement. De l'autre, des groupes terroristes incontrôlables, sans base géographique, prêts à faire sauter le cœur de New York pour défendre leur cause.

And later she states : "Au moment de mettre sous presse, personne n'avait encore revendiqué l'attentat, même si de nombreuses rumeurs visaient les groupes islamistes extrémistes. Mais il faut garder la tête froide. Tous les islamistes ne sont pas des terroristes" ("La nouvelle guerre"). For both reporters the description of those who perpetrated the attacks remains narrow and specific. Sansfaçon asserts that it is only a few "factions intégristes" that have declared war on the West. For her part, Ouimet specifically points out not only that the perpetrators of the attacks are as yet unknown, but also that not all Muslims, indeed not even all Islamic fundamentalists, are terrorists.

There is an enormous difference between these representations and those that dominate the print media in English Canada. Although the print media in Quebec does maintain the notion that the attacks were an attack on the West and not on the United States alone, it does not set this West up in contrast to a negative and stereotyped representation of Middle Eastern or Muslim people in general. Even the most pro-American, pro-Bush, pro-"War on Terror" journalist's (*La Presse*'s André Pratte immediately comes to mind) do not set up a polarized opposition between the West and Islam. It should be noted, however, that much like Marcus Gee's opposition to exploring any other reasons for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, several voices at *La Presse* argue that the attacks are fueled by pure hatred and that any role played by the U.S. is not worth exploring. On September

12<sup>th</sup>, Mario Roy, for example, argues, “Hier, lorsque les tours jumelles sont tombées, on a été confronté à une haine d’une pureté absolue.” And later : “S’il y a mille raisons, bonnes ou mauvaises, pouvant être invoquées pour critiquer les États-Unis, elles n’ont eu aucun rôle à jouer dans les événements d’hier” (Roy). Similarly, on September 13<sup>th</sup>, André Pratte argues:

Régnant sur une bonne partie du monde depuis des décennies, les Américains se sont fait beaucoup d’ennemis, notamment quand leur lutte contre les communistes a sauvagement dérapé. Sauf que les milliers d’innocents morts le 11 septembre 2001 n’ont pas été victimes d’une cause. Sinon, il y aurait eu plaidoyer, revendications, exigences. Or, ils ont été victimes d’une haine aveugle, qui ne pourra être calmée par aucun accommodement, aucun compromis.

Although articles that appear in *Le Devoir* are also very pro-American, oversimplification and placing blame for the events is generally avoided. As we saw in both excerpts from Descôteaux and Sansfaçon, even when declaring solidarity with the U.S. there is an awareness of unfavourable attitudes toward the U.S. Arguments blaming the U.S. for the attacks, however, are rare while articles dismissing the “blame the victim” argument appear regularly.

This moderation in modes of representation—neither completely in line with the U.S. nor blaming it for the attacks—can be attributed to Quebec’s geographical proximity to the U.S., as well as to English Canada, while at the same time having linguistic access to discourse that comes from France. Christian Rioux, *Le Devoir*’s Paris correspondent often advances arguments similar to those advanced by the media in France, but shies

away from placing blame on the U.S. Much like the argument advanced by Jean-Marie Colombani on the front page of *Le Monde* on September 13<sup>th</sup>, Rioux sees the unequal distribution of power as a cause of this new form of terrorism. He writes:

On ne le dira jamais assez, cette mouvance terroriste est le résultat direct de la désintégration d'un ordre planétaire autrefois régi par deux superpuissances. La dislocation de l'Union soviétique a créé dans une partie de l'humanité le sentiment de ne plus être écouté, d'être laissé pour compte et de ne plus pouvoir agir sur les rapports de force. (Rioux)

Unlike Colombani, however, Rioux is careful not to place blame on the U.S. but attempts to shed light on the situation while blaming neither "evil" Islam, nor "evil" America. This attempt to avoid oversimplification is explicitly stated in an editorial written by Jean-Robert Sansfaçon on September 13<sup>th</sup>. He writes:

On l'a beaucoup écrit, les événements survenus cette semaine aux États-Unis sont en partie le résultat de l'arrogance américaine dans le monde, mais aussi celui de la montée de l'intégrisme islamique dont il serait bête d'en attribuer la cause aux Américains. L'histoire est plus complexe qu'on aime à se la raconter. Ce n'est pas non plus l'absence de morale à l'échelle de la planète qui explique des actes comme celui de New York. Des jugements comme ceux-là ne trouvent leur origine que dans une analyse manichéenne du monde, avec le bien drapé de blanc d'un côté, celui des pays pauvres, et le mal coiffé de noir de l'autre, celui des pays développés.

Another explanation for the absence of the representation of a polarized struggle between good and evil, despite the support expressed for the U.S. is the pacifist message that permeates the Quebec print media. Where the print media in English Canada echoes the war rhetoric of the Bush administration, Jean-Robert Sansfaçon, among others, asserts his belief in a peaceable solution: “Les États-Unis et l’Occident tout entière à ses côtés doivent réapprendre à jouer un rôle actif et positif dans la recherche de la paix. Car si le terrorisme est l’arme des faibles, jamais les plus forts n’en viendront à bout en se contentant d’exercer leur puissance” (“La guerre au cœur de l’Amérique”). More specifically, Michèle Ouimet often argues against American retaliation. In an article outlining the devastation that a military attack on an already-devastated Afghanistan would cause, Ouimet concludes: “Les populations civiles n’ont rien à voir avec les groupes extrémistes et les ben Laden de ce monde qui forment des complots et rêvent de détruire le géant américain. Elles n’ont pas à payer le prix de la riposte” (“Le prix de la riposte”).

This can also help to explain the absence of the victory narrative that we find in the Canadian print media. Like American president George Bush, the print media in English Canada rallies the Canadian people to prepare for war. So, while a large number of journalists in English Canada are confirming, not only an American counter-attack, but also an American victory, many journalists in Quebec are arguing against any violent reaction at all.

An Ipsos-Reid survey carried out in September 2001 on support for the American “War on Terror” corroborates this thesis. When asked if they support active participation of Canada in the American “War on Terror”, 75% of all Canadians said yes. When asked

if they would still support Canadian participation if the “War on Terror” put Canada more directly in danger, rates were much lower. In Quebec, the rate dove to 31% -- more than 20% lower than the national rate.<sup>13</sup>

### **The West and the Muslim Other in the French Print Media**

As is the case in both English Canada and Quebec, the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in New York and Washington are often seen as an attack against core Western values like freedom and democracy. Several articles echo this sentiment. In an article printed on September 14<sup>th</sup> in *Le Monde*, for example, Laurent Zecchini reports on a meeting of the European Commission, the Parliament of Strasbourg and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 15 countries in the European Union. In it he reports the official government stance on the attacks: “Ces actes effroyables, soulignent-ils, constituent une attaque non seulement contre les États-Unis, mais contre l’humanité tout entière et les valeurs et libertés qui nous sont communes à tous” (“Les Quinze affirment leur détermination”). At the same time Zecchini, much like the European officials, is careful not to represent the attacks as a clash between Islam and the West. He writes: “Hubert Védrine a souligné devant ses homologues qu’il est important de ne pas faire apparaître les attaques contre l’Amérique comme une guerre de civilisations entre, d’une part les Occidentaux, d’autre part, le reste du monde.” Similarly, in another article entitled “Au Parlement européen: ‘Nous sommes tous des Américains’”, Rafaele Rivais reports on the same meeting. He writes: “Tous ont assuré que les attentats du 11 septembre visaient non seulement les Américains, mais aussi les valeurs de liberté et de démocratie défendues par l’Union

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<sup>13</sup> The survey carried out by Ipsos-Reid was reported on in *Le Devoir* on September 24 in an article entitled “La distance” by Chantal Hébert, p. A4.

européenne.” And later he writes: “Plusieurs présidents, et notamment M. Pöttering, ont mis en garde ‘contre un amalgame entre terrorisme fanatique et religion islamique.’”

Unlike the print media in English Canada, then, the French press is careful not to make assumptions about those who perpetrated the attacks and not to perpetuate a negative, stereotyped representation of a Muslim Other.

The attacks are interpreted as being an attack on core values, primarily freedom and democracy, but not necessarily as an attack on the entire Western world. In this way, an oversimplified version of the events — good vs. evil, the West vs. Islam — is avoided. In fact, where the West is seen as a uniform block of nations by the print media in English Canada, in France, national boundaries are emphasized and independent action is encouraged. Coverage of NATO’s invoking of Article 5 clearly illustrates this difference.

Article 5 “provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the *actions it deems necessary* to assist the Ally attacked” (<http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm>, my italics). Reference to Article 5 in *Le Monde* is almost always followed by a reminder that NATO allies are not obliged to participate in an American, military counter-attack. Several articles remind the reader that each country can decide for itself if it will provide support to the U.S or not. On September 14<sup>th</sup>, for example, Laurent Zecchini writes: “Cette décision est assortie d’une condition importante, et elle ne signifie pas que les membres de l’Alliance vont se joindre unanimement à toutes les représailles que pourraient engager les États-Unis.” Similarly, Claire Trean writes : “Cet engagement n’est certes à ce stade que de nature politique: il

n'implique aucune participation automatique des alliés à une intervention militaire, chacun gardant sur les opérations qui seront lancées sa liberté d'appréciation et le choix d'y participer ou pas" ("Un soutien a priori"). And on Sept. 19<sup>th</sup>, Daniel Vernet writes: "[L]'article 5 laisse à chaque pays membre de l'Alliance le soin d'apprécier la nature et les modalités de sa contribution. Comme le notait naguère un expert atlantique, celle-ci peut aller de l'envoi d'un télégramme de soutien à une participation militaire" ("Les Européens s'interrogent"). The print media in France is careful to show that NATO allies are not obliged to participate in an American counter-attack but can decide for themselves if and how they will participate. More specifically, France's option to choose is reiterated. Zechinni writes: "Autrement dit, la France [...] serait parfaitement libre de refuser de participer à des représailles militaires contre, par exemple, l'Afghanistan ou le Pakistan, si les Etats-Unis lui en faisaient la demande" ("L'Alliance atlantique"). And Vernet, for his part, asserts: "Les autorités françaises ont répété à plusieurs reprises qu'elles n'étaient pas disposées à accepter n'importe quel type de riposte et qu'elles jugeraient en fonction des choix des Américains et de l'appui qui leur sera éventuellement demandé" ("Les Européens s'interrogent").

Here we see that the print media in France continually emphasizes the fact that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not mean that France (or any member country for that matter) is obliged to take part in an American counter-attack. In this way, national boundaries do matter and the entity known as the West is not a homogeneous block but a block of separate nations able to act independently of each other. Furthermore, the United States is not considered to be synonymous with the West. By emphasizing the American point of view, as well as the possibility of an American over-

reaction, the print media in France separates the U.S. from its NATO allies and casts the U.S. in a negative light. Trean, for example, asserts:

On en percevait déjà les fissures 24 heures à peine après le drame: on devinait le malaise de beaucoup quand le président George Bush, avec des accents reaganien, évoquait le combat entre 'le bien et le mal'; on remarquait les précautions de certains dirigeants, comme le premier ministre français Lionel Jospin, qui, avant même que l'ennemi ait été désigné, mettaient en garde contre un affrontement général entre le monde islamique et l'Occident. ("Un soutien a priori")

This polarized view of a conflict between good and evil is an American view. Trean does not adopt this point of view but rather casts it in a suspicious light, thus marking the distinction between the American point of view and that of other Western nations.

Zecchini, for his part, emphasizes a possible American over-reaction. He states:

Du point de vue de certains pays inquiets des conséquences diplomatiques, notamment vis-à-vis des pays arabes, d'une possible surréaction des Etats-Unis envers leurs agresseurs, la référence à l'article 5 pourrait, paradoxalement, jouer dans le sens de la modération : quand elle décidera de répliquer, l'Amérique ne le fera pas seule : elle engagera les dix-neuf pays de l'Alliance atlantique. ("L'Alliance atlantique")

Marking a clear distinction between the U.S. and its NATO allies, Zecchini hopes that more moderate allies will temper a possible American over-reaction. Similarly, Daniel Vernet expresses concern as to what American reaction may be if allowed to act unilaterally. He writes:

S'agissant des représailles militaires, George Bush et ses conseillers peuvent décider que les Etats-Unis ont intérêt à agir seuls pour avoir une liberté d'action totale, plutôt que de passer par l'OTAN avec deux inconvénients : il n'existe pas de plans de lutte contre le terrorisme dans cette organisation et il est nécessaire d'obtenir sur les opérations envisagées un consensus à dix-neuf jugé paralysant par les généraux américains. Ou encore privilégier une coalition ad hoc, constituée de quelques pays prêts à s'engager à leurs côtés. La question qui se pose aux Européens, et notamment à la France, est de savoir s'il ne serait pas plus judicieux de prendre les devants, de ne pas attendre que Washington ait arrêté ses plans et formulé des demandes, mais de proposer des actions à mener en commun. ("Les Européens s'interrogent")

Like Zecchini, Vernet distinguishes between an American point of view in terms of appropriate response to the attacks and the European point of view. The West, then, is not portrayed as a uniform block of countries, standing together against a clear enemy. Like Trean, Vernet emphasizes the necessity to avoid representing a war on terror as a war against the Arab or Muslim world: "Il convient de tout mettre en oeuvre pour éviter l'amalgame entre les terroristes et le monde arabo-musulman, sous peine de tomber dans le piège tendu par les terroristes." The absence of a negative and stereotyped representation of a Muslim Other in the French print media can be at least partly explained due to the fact that much of the blame for the attacks is assigned to the U.S. itself.

As outlined in Chapter 2, the print media in France holds that the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks challenge American modes of self-perception. Namely, if America thought it could go around wielding its power as it sees fit, September 11<sup>th</sup> serves as a warning to let it know that it cannot, or so the argument goes. This argument does not only suggest that America's modes of self-perception are challenged by the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, but that this arrogant attitude itself is to blame for the attacks. American arrogance and tendency to act unilaterally is continually blamed for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Jan Krauze, for example, writes: "Et il est infiniment dangereux de croire que l'on peut, année après année, frapper où on veut et qui on veut, avec ou sans le couvert de l'ONU, sans être un jour, à son tour, touché, fût-ce "lâchement", comme l'a dit M. Bush" ("Pourquoi il faut aussi savoir garder raison"). This is only one argument among many advanced in the French print media that places blame on the U.S. for the attacks perpetrated against it. Ironically, Jean Marie Colombani's article "Nous sommes tous Américains" serves as a good example of this tendency. After he argues that an unequal distribution of power (or, in other words, the excess of power that the United States benefits from) may be the reason behind the attacks, he reminds us that it was the American CIA that funded Ben Laden to fight against a communist threat in Afghanistan. He writes:

Mais la réalité, c'est peut-être celle d'une Amérique rattrapée par son cynisme : si Ben Laden est bien, comme semblent le penser les autorités américaines, l'ordonnateur de la journée du 11 septembre, comment ne pas rappeler qu'il a lui-même été formé par la CIA, qu'il a été l'un des éléments d'une politique, tournée contre les Soviétiques, que les

Américains croyaient savante. Ne serait-ce pas alors l'Amérique qui aurait enfanté ce diable?

Again, despite the message of solidarity suggested in its title, Colombani clearly argues that much of the blame for the attacks belongs to the U.S. itself.

Although American power, arrogance and unilateralism are most often blamed for anti-American sentiment and thus for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, in an article entitled "Une guerre du IIIe millénaire", Nadia Khouri Dagher offers a range of other reasons why the U.S. brought the attacks upon itself. She argues that: 1) American neo-conservative ideology has ensured the kind of civil society that allows terrorist organizations to operate; 2) the Israel/Palestine situation, which is being touted as an alibi for the attacks, is nothing more than a catalyst for frustrations felt in the Arab/Muslim world since the Gulf War in 1991; 3) that anti-American sentiment extends far beyond the Arab world due to the fact that globalization is felt as an aggressive form of worldwide Americanization. For Khouri Dagher, then, acts of aggression against the U.S. are linked to anti-American sentiment that the U.S. itself has provoked. The hate motivating the attacks is not seen to be inherently Muslim or Arab, as it is represented in the English Canadian print media, but instead, inspired by American action and American policy on several fronts. It is precisely these kinds of arguments that are given little space in the print media in English Canada and that are either dismissed as anti-Americanism or condemned for aiding terrorism.

## CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the discursive strategies used to represent the United States in English Canada, differ from those used in both Quebec and France. English Canada and France present polar opposite views. While English Canada adopts an American identity, emphasizing positive characteristics and ignoring negative ones, the media in France criticizes American modes of self-perception and even blames perceived American arrogance for the attacks. Perhaps of most interest for this project, is the fact that, although both communities communicate using specific varieties of the same language, the representation in Quebec does not match that of France. Perhaps predictably, this reveals the fact that the meaning attributed to the U.S. in Quebec (or France) is not dependant upon or reducible to the French language alone but is influenced by extra-linguistic and extra-textual factors that are specific to each region.

The media in English Canada represents the U.S. in the most favourable light by far. Because the English Canadian print media represent Canadians and Americans as sharing a common identity, there is little criticism of the U.S. and positive characteristics (freedom, power, strength, courage, civility, reason) are emphasized. As we saw in chapter two, English Canadian newspapers relied on the “American War Story,” a narrative historically used by Americans to represent themselves, to interpret the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and to predict American reaction. In this narrative, the U.S. plays the part of both victim and hero. The victimization serves to justify any American retaliation. The heroism serves the same purpose. In fact, identification is strong enough that the print media in English Canada does not tolerate criticism of the U.S. at this time.

Any argument questioning American foreign policy or pointing out questionable American action in other parts of the world is dismissed as anti-American or accused of helping terrorists. Arguments like Marcus Gee's, that any explanation for the attacks in fact legitimizes them, silences all debate and simply allows for a simplistic qualification for the attacks and the perpetrators as "evil." This classification of the perpetrators as "evil" extends to all Islamic and all Middle Eastern peoples. Negative representation of the Muslim Other (them) reinforces positive representation of Americans and Westerners in general (us).

In France, on the other hand, there is a highly critical and negative representation of the United States. Although the special edition of *Le Monde* published on September 13<sup>th</sup> seemed to proclaim a message of solidarity with the American people, a closer reading of the articles in that issue and of articles printed on the following days reveals pointed criticism of the U.S. bolstered by an obvious dislike of America in general. America, understood most often in terms of its foreign policy, is considered to be arrogant and self-centered. Pointed criticism of America's foreign policy thus serves as a secondary means of perpetuating a general assessment of the American character. The American-proposed National Missile Defense, for example, becomes a signifier for American arrogance when used by the media in France. Thus the dominant explanation for the attacks given by the English Canadian print media, namely that "they" are evil, is not dominant in France. Instead, the perceived identity of the American people is blamed for attacks. Perhaps as a result, the negative and stereotyped representation of Islamic and Middle Eastern peoples is not dominant in the French print media. With Americans

to fill the position of primary Other, there is no use for a strongly negative representation of a Muslim Other at this time.

It is not surprising that the representation in Quebec lies somewhere between the opposite representations we see in English Canada and France. Because the discourse of *américanité* in Quebec acknowledges the influence of the American continent on the Québécois identity, there is a clear expression of solidarity with the American people immediately following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. At the same time, unlike the complete identification with the U.S. that we find in the English Canadian newspapers, the Québécois identity does not disappear into an overarching American identity but is continually marked as distinct. Further, the influence of France on the available discourses in Quebec is obvious in the media coverage of 9/11. Much like the arguments advanced by the print media in France, the media in Quebec questions American modes of self-representation. Unlike the media in France, however, Americans are not blamed outright for the attacks. Indeed, more like the English Canadian media, these arguments are barely tolerated. Quebec's geographical proximity to and thus relationship with the United States, as well as its linguistic and historical ties to France are marked in the media coverage of 9/11.

A comparative discourse analysis such as this illustrates the fact that social knowledge is culturally specific. An entity such as the United States does not have one essential meaning that can be expressed in many different languages. Instead, language is the raw material used to construct the knowledge that is so often perceived as natural or *a priori*. It is precisely for this reason that translation scholars and practitioners must expand their field of inquiry beyond the level of text and foray out into the vast and

varied context that we call culture. If this study is but one example of frameworks of social knowledge between which translators are expected to operate, it offers a space for further reflection within the discipline.

First, an awareness of how discourse constructs social knowledge is useful in theorizing 1) the role of translator and 2) the translator as subject. As outlined in chapter one, the existing discourses in English Canada, Quebec and France about the U.S. are intimately connected to issues of identity in all three communities. The impact of one's identity on the interpretation of events, as well as on the designation of meaning to concepts and entities, is clear. The discourse of *américanité* that contributes to the construction of a Québécois identity, for example, is influenced by both Quebec's geographic location on the American continent and by its historical and cultural ties to France. Similarly, the coverage of the 9/11 attacks in Quebec contains elements of the coverage in both English Canada and in France. One's own identity, be it national, racial, gender, socio-economic, *etc.*, then, is central to both the interpretation and the construction of meaning. Consequently, discourses that construct identity are central to the discipline of Translation Studies.

If the contextual factors that influence the translation process have been emphasized since the cultural turn in Translation Studies, so too has the role of the translating subject. The current trend in Translation Studies sees the translator not only as transferring information from one cultural community to another, but often sees her as mediating between two cultures. In an article entitled "On Cooperation," for example, Anthony Pym argues that "the goal of any translation project should be to promote long-term cooperation between cultures" (1). Despite its attempt to elevate the status of the

translator, this type of argument risks relegating the translator once again to invisibility. The translator-as-mediator model risks ignoring the fact that translators, like texts, are embedded in cultural narratives that construct who they are. Texts do not exist in a vacuum and nor do translations. The institutional factors that shape the production and dissemination of social knowledge (embodied in texts and their translations) also play an instrumental role in shaping the translators who translate those texts.

Second, although the cultural turn in Translation Studies has meant that translation theories have moved from primarily linguistic approaches to primarily cultural ones, translation pedagogy has failed to fully incorporate the notion of culture. Studies like the present one, which look more closely at how discourse constructs social knowledge, shed light on the complexity that must be acknowledged when incorporating the notion of culture into the study of translation. An adequately developed notion of culture and the effect it has on both text and subjectivity will provide areas for further reflection in the field of translation pedagogy.

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