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FACULTÉ DES ÉTUDES SUPÉRIEURES
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FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND
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Canada and the United Nations in the Post-Cold War:
Failure or Neglect?

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MA THESIS

*“Canada and the United Nations In the Post-Cold War:
Failure or Neglect?”*

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For-Professor J Keshen

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Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 0-612-90118-1

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MA Abstract (History) – Abstract

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Canada and the United Nations in the Post-Cold War: Failure or Neglect?

Abstract:

Peacekeeping has come to be recognised as an essential multilateral activity by which to maintain world peace. Canada, a leading nation in peacekeeping, established an enviable record during the Cold War participating on virtually every mission deployed by the UN.

There is, however, a belief today that peacekeeping efforts in the post-Cold War era have failed. In turn, the Canadian government has been criticised for its continued willingness to participate in UN led operations as it seems to be occurring without a policy framework. As opposed to the Cold War where policy rationales could be made for Canadian peacekeeping efforts, modern efforts appear unproductive, dangerous, and contradicted by Canada's fiscal military expenditures.

This thesis explores this shift by examining the history of the Military Staff Committee, the differences between an interstate and intrastate conflict, force composition and finally Canada's policy and approaches towards peacekeeping. Collectively, they demonstrate that the UN and Canada have not failed in the post-Cold War era; rather, the approaches that made peacekeeping successful for forty years have hindered it for the last ten.

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Acknowledgments

The list of people I have to thank for making this thesis possible is extensive. They vary from personal friends and family to professionals and academic counsellors. Suffice to say that there is not enough space on this page to individually acknowledge them all. I apologise beforehand for any oversights that may occur.

I must recognise the support and assistance provided by the National Archives of Canada staff without whom, much of the background and insight into our Cold War peacekeeping missions would not have been possible. In addition, the After Action Reports provided by the Army Lessons Learned Centre helped to balance this paper by providing the primary source material from Canada's more recent peacekeeping operations. This is noteworthy, as these reports frequently consisted of material and publications that had not yet been made available to the public. Finally, in terms of research, I acknowledge the invaluable assistance provided by Elsie Lafontaine at the National Defence Headquarters' Library. Her willingness to provide government documents, some of which had not even been catalogued, as well as provide access to all the Defence White Papers since 1964, made Chapter IV possible.

My thanks must also go to Professor Jeff Keshen, my thesis advisor, who has supported the concept of this paper since the very beginning. Jeff, your patience with my overwriting, repetitiveness and partisan arguments was certainly appreciated. Moreover, your willingness to remain flexible and accommodate my busy work schedule was also invaluable. This paper reflects your clarity of thought as much as my own.

To Morgan Hladik, my good friend, fellow historian and comrade in arms, I cannot thank you enough for repeatedly enduring my rough drafts and horrible typing. Your criticisms and willingness to savage my arguments contributed in no small way to the finished product within. Thank you for keeping me between 'the arcs.'

Finally, and certainly not least, I must thank my wife Joanne. The truth is I would not have attempted an MA, much less this paper, without Joanne urging me to do so. Moreover, if convincing and encouraging me was not enough, Jo also assumed the duties of my 'live-in editor,' pointing out my inconsistencies and typographical errors with a high degree of accuracy and thoroughness. For the record, if Jo said it was wrong, it normally was. Joanne, my Jo, thank you for your patience, your support and your efforts. I love you very much.

In closing, I must say that any omissions, errors or misrepresentations within this paper are mine and mine alone. While the persons and organisations noted above certainly contributed to this paper, ultimately it was I who decided what stayed and what was removed through the research and writing process.

Glossary

Abbreviation

Mission

UNSCOB -	UN Special Committee on the Balkans (1947-1951)
UNTCOK -	UN Temporary Commission On Korea (1947-1948)
UNTSO -	UN Truce Supervision Organisation (1948-present)
UNMOGIP -	UN Military Observer Group In India and Pakistan (Kashmir) (1949-1996)
UNCMAC -	UN Command Military Armistice Commission (1953-present)
ICSC -	International Commission for Supervision and Control (1954-1974)
UNEF I -	United Nations Emergency Force (1956-1967)
UNOGIL -	UN Observer Group in Lebanon (1958)
ONUC -	UN Operation in the Congo (1960-1964)
UNSF -	UN Security Force in West New Guinea (1962-1963)
UNYOM -	Yemen Observation Mission (1963-1965)
UNFICYP -	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964-present)
DOMREP -	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General (1965-1966)
UNIPOM -	India-Pakistan Observation Mission (1965-1966)
OTN -	Observer Team to Nigeria (1968-1969)
UNEF II -	UN Emergency Force II (1973-1979)
UNDOF -	UN Disengagement Observer Force (1974-present)
UNIFIL -	UN Interim Force in Lebanon (1978-present)
UNGOMAP -	Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988-1990)
UNIIMOG -	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (1988-1991)
UNAVEM -	UN Angola Verification Mission (1989-1991)
ONUSCA -	UN Observer Group in Central America (1989-1992)
UNTAG -	UN Transition Assistance Group, Namibia (1989-1990)
ONUVEN -	UN Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (1989)
OSGAP -	Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1990-1993)
ONUVEH -	UN Observers for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (1990-1991)
UNAVEM II -	UN Angola Verification Mission (1991-1994)
UNAMIC -	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (1991-1992)
ONUSAL -	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (1991-1995)
UNIKOM -	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991-present)
UNSCOM -	UN Special Commission (1991-1998)
MINURSO -	UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (1991-present)
UNPF -	UN Peace Force (UN Protection Force, UN Confidence Restoration Operation) (1992-1996)
UNTAC -	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-1993)
CMAC -	Cambodian Mine Action Centre (1992-present)
ONUMOZ -	Operation in Mozambique (1992-1995)
UNITAF -	United Task Force (1992-1993)
UNOSOM -	UN Operation in Somalia (1992-1993)
UNOMSA -	UN Observer Mission in South Africa (1992)

Abbreviation**Mission**

UNOMIG -	UN Observer Mission in Georgia (1993-present)
UNMIH -	UN Mission in Haiti (1993-1996)
UNOMIL -	UN Observer Mission in Liberia (1993-present)
UNICTY -	UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993-present)
UNOMUR -	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (1993-1994)
UNAMIR -	UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (1993-1996)
UNOSOM II -	UN Operations in Somalia (1993-1995)
UNASOG -	Aouzou Strip Observer Group (1994)
MINUGUA -	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (1994-present)
UNMOT -	UN Mission in Tadjikistan (1994)
UNPREDEP -	UN Preventive Deployment Force (1995-present)
UNMOP -	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (1996-present)
UNMIBH -	UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-present)
UNMACBH -	UN Mine Action Centre, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-1997)
UNSMIH -	UN Support Mission in Haiti (1996-1997)
MINUGUA -	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (1997)
UNTMIH -	UN Transition Mission in Haiti (1997)
MIPONUH -	UN Police Operation in Haiti (1997-present)
UNMEE -	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-2002)

****Effective: 31-01-2002****

Introduction

Peacekeeping has been an activity associated with the United Nations (UN) for almost sixty years. From unarmed military observers along the India/Pakistan border in 1948 with the United Nations Military Observer Group in Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and in the Middle East along the Israeli border in 1949 with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, (UNTSO) the activity has evolved considerably. The Suez Crisis of 1957 saw peacekeeping change from unarmed single observers to formed units of armed soldiers such as those employed with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 and UNEF II in 1973.¹ It was this structure - lightly armed, formed bodies of troops - that would dominate UN peacekeeping throughout the Cold War with no fewer than 13 such missions being deployed between 1957 and 1989.²

Historian Jack Granatstein characterised the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping of this era, an activity by which Canada has garnered a worldwide reputation for excellence, as “responsible, useful, inexpensive and satisfying.”³ Donald Gordon, author of *Canada as a Peacekeeper*, saw peacekeeping as having overtones of “romance, adventure and intrigue...relatively cheap and simple of operations.”⁴ What these two scholars evidently shared was a common belief in peacekeeping as a positive activity that could be successfully conducted at relatively minimal cost in terms of military capability

¹ J.L. Granatstein and David Bercuson, *War and Peacekeeping: From South Africa to the Gulf – Canada's Limited Wars*, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991), p. 189.

² National Defence: Operational Research Division. *Canadian Forces Operations 1970-2000*, (Minister of Supply and Services, Feb 2002), p. 8..

³ J.L. Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Limited, 1986), p. 232.

⁴ Donald Gordon, “Peacekeeping: A Muted Voice,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*, ed. J.L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1969), p. 156.

and monetary outlay. In other words, it was an activity that appealed to a series of Canadian governments for it allowed them to contribute to global activities in a visible manner, create a positive Canadian image and at a cost commensurate to Canada's status as a middle power.

In terms of Canada's foreign policy, it is perhaps more important that peacekeeping throughout the Cold War catered to Canada's foremost security objective of the time: to preserve it from the effects of a global thermonuclear war through participation in multilateral alliances. This would include participation in such organisations as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and North American Air Defence (NORAD).

While participation in NATO and NORAD had obvious security benefits regarding potential conflicts in Western Europe and North America, participation on UN missions was also of significant benefit. Principally this was because a threat to Canada's security may well have emanated from Western Europe or North America, but could also have arisen from some other regional conflict that had spun out of control. This was particularly relevant in a region where either or both superpowers had a perceived strategic interest. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lester Pearson made this point while making his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in Oslo, Norway on December 11th, 1957. At the time, Pearson was commenting on the efforts of the Canadian-led UN mission to Egypt known as United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I).

I do not exaggerate the significance of what has been done. It would be futile in a quarrel between, or in opposition to, big powers. But, it may have prevented a

brush fire becoming an all-consuming blaze...and it could do so again in similar circumstances in the future.⁵

Through peacekeeping, therefore, Canada could intervene in such regions, help promote stability, prevent escalation, and by extension, preserve its own security. Collectively, these considerations--cost, influence accrued and security--motivated Canada to promote peacekeeping as a viable role for the country. As an extension of foreign policy, peacekeeping had inarguable credibility and worth, allowing Canada to garner a degree of international recognition and influence, a critical consideration in the bipolar Cold War era.

By contrast, there is a relatively common belief today that peacekeeping efforts in the post-Cold War era have largely failed. Missions like the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of 1991, the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) of 1992 and the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) 1992 have become reflective of an inability by the UN to secure peace. As Canada has continued to contribute to these missions, these perceived failings have had a negative impact upon Canada's efforts in terms of international prestige and influence. After all, it is difficult to convert the failure of a mission into political advantage on the world stage.

Domestically, in stark contrast to the golden years of peacekeeping, 1948-1988, the Canadian government has found itself increasingly criticised for its continued willingness to participate in UN-led operations because it seems to be occurring without a well-defined policy framework.⁶ As stated earlier, peacekeeping during the Cold War

⁵ Canada and Peacekeeping: DFAIT Policy Statement. [<http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/!back-e.asp>], 1999.

⁶ Louis A. Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search For Policy Rationales," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 13.

supported Canada's focus on multilateral organisations as a vehicle by which to prevent escalation of regional conflicts and ultimately the possibility of global thermonuclear war. Arguably, the possibility of a regional conflict escalating into global thermonuclear war is much reduced now with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is not to say that intervention on other grounds such as humanitarian or preservation of life, two commonly used phrases through the 1990s, is not valid. Rather, the rationale and criteria by which Canada chooses to participate on the many missions deployed since the end of the Cold War appears to be disjointed, and lacks the cohesive focus that defined participation throughout the Cold War.

A major problem throughout the 1990s, was Canada's willingness to rapidly increase the number of missions it was willing to undertake while simultaneously reducing the number of personnel available to assume these missions, not to mention defence expenditures. This has placed an enormous and well-publicised strain on the soldiers called upon to perform these duties. When the nebulous nature of the post-Cold War missions is factored in with the Canadian army taking numerous, public support for peacekeeping was bound to wane. Therefore, as opposed to the Cold War era where policy rationales could easily be made for Canadian peacekeeping efforts, modern efforts seem unproductive, unnecessarily dangerous, at odds with Canada's fiscal military expenditures and of questionable value to the country and its interests.

David Bercuson, Head of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, feels that the UN, and by extension Canada, is incapable of adapting and is therefore assuming unnecessary risks by persisting in undertaking new missions. In Bercuson's opinion, in the factional post-Cold War era "when [soldiers] are

sent on a UN peacekeeping operation, they can be meat on the table for hostile forces bent on causing them great harm.”⁷ Bercuson substantiates this comment by pointing out that soldiers under UN command must request permission before defending themselves, cannot undertake pre-emptive tactical operations nor count on heavy weapons, air support or tactical intelligence.⁸

Even Jack Granatstein, noted earlier as a strong proponent of peacekeeping during the Cold War, has tempered his view levelling scathing criticism at the Canadian government’s apparent lack of policy or goals when deploying peacekeepers on post-Cold War missions. In his opinion, peacekeeping has now become virtually a reflex activity undertaken with no underlying policy or thought.⁹

Granatstein and Bercuson express an opinion that is shared by many, and one that is rapidly gaining international momentum: that conventional peacekeeping as we have come to know it is ineffective and should be abandoned. In the post-Cold War era, peacekeeping is an activity to be pursued only when overwhelming military force can be brought to bear and in the absence of risk to the peacekeepers themselves. This is in direct contrast to the comparatively lightly-armed forces employed during the Cold War. Given Canada’s well-known opposition to large military expenditures and unwillingness to accept military casualties as a potential cost of operations, the future of Canadian participation on peacekeeping would appear bleak indeed.

With the UN’s peacekeeping efforts struggling, it has been argued by some scholars that peacekeeping should be left to combat capable organisations, perhaps

⁷ David Bercuson, “It’s Time for Canada To Hang up the Blue Helmet,” *The Financial Post*, 16 November 1996, p. 25.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.25.

⁹ Delvoie, “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search For Policy Rationales”, p. 15.

NATO or U.S. forces. This view seems to include Sir Brian Urquhart, one of the world's most respected authorities on peacekeeping, who states:

Peacekeeping is a very useful technique when the conditions are right. The trouble is that nowadays they mostly aren't right...The situations which characterise the post-Cold War world are really different from the situation peacekeeping was set up to deal with, and they really mostly are quite unsuitable for the peacekeeping technique.¹⁰

People who share Urquhart's position point to NATO's relatively successful intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo as evidence of this truth. Again, noting Canada's ambivalent attitude towards military expenditures, an attitude that largely transcends political party lines, the potential impact of calls for more robust forces on Canada's ability to participate should be obvious. Lacking credible forces, Canada simply will be unable to participate on the more hostile and uncertain missions of the 21st century.

The questions that arise from this willingness to abandon a tried and true international activity are numerous and diverse, both in terms of the UN itself and Canada as one of its strongest proponents for peacekeeping. First, is it fair to label the UN, and by association Canada, as failures when the organisation has been repeatedly curtailed by member states when conducting multinational activities, a point frequently overlooked by numerous academics? Second, are the geopolitical circumstances similar when comparing Cold War and post-Cold War missions and how does this contribute to the likelihood of 'success'? Do force composition and capabilities influence the potential outcome of a mission? Finally, in terms of Canada, is a policy rationalisation necessary for future operations or is it appropriate to continue to contribute to new missions simply

¹⁰ Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search For Policy Rationales", p. 19.

because there exists historical precedent? Can Canada keep up with the new, more aggressive form of peacekeeping?

This thesis will argue that the environment that allowed the UN and Canada to build their reputations as keepers of the peace during the Cold War catered to success. It will do so by examining UN command and control, the geopolitical differences between an interstate and intrastate conflict, force composition and finally Canada's policy and approaches towards peacekeeping. These four issues will be examined in a historical context, comparing and contrasting the realities of Cold War and post-Cold War missions. Collectively, they will show that the UN has not necessarily failed in the post-Cold War era; rather, the attitudes and approaches that made it so successful for forty years have hindered it for the last ten.

Chapter 1 will demonstrate that though limited by a moribund Military Staff Committee due to Cold War animosities, the comparatively stable environment created by the two superpowers allowed the UN and Canada to succeed despite UN command and control limitations. By contrast, the turmoil and chaos of more recent missions have underscored this deficiency in the UN's ability to prosecute effective military operations.

The tumultuous environment surrounding recent missions can be attributed largely to the geopolitical circumstances in the mission area. In broad terms, peacekeeping missions both during and after the Cold War can be characterised in one of two ways: intrastate or interstate. The differences are significant as the former is in effect civil war and the latter normally involves two sovereign countries, a critical difference in terms of the ability of the UN to mediate a given conflict successfully. Chapter 2 will examine these differences and point to the errors involved in a direct comparison of the

two, as the discrepancy between an interstate and intrastate conflict must be acknowledged prior to ascertaining whether a mission failed or succeeded. Of significance to this thesis is the fact that during the Cold War and the ‘golden age of peacekeeping’, the overwhelming number of missions were interstate, while missions in the post-Cold War were not.

Chapter 3 will examine force composition and capability as this also has a direct influence on the potential of a mission to succeed. Throughout the Cold War, well-trained, well-equipped armies from predominantly middle power countries such as Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and Canada, undertook peacekeeping. By contrast, due to the sheer number of missions in the post-cold war era, the UN has had to resort to accepting virtually any force made available regardless of their standard of training or combat capability. What are provided for latter-day missions are lightly-armed troops without armoured vehicles or offensive combat capability, perfect for a Cold War mission but woefully inadequate in such war-torn towns as Srebrenica, Kigali, Mogadishu, and Sarajevo. Exacerbating all of this is the reality that member states have proven unwilling to assume a proportionate share of the peacekeeping burden commensurate with their relative capability.

Finally, in Chapter 4, Canada’s efforts in peacekeeping both during and after the Cold War will be examined. By reviewing the historical record, it will become clear that Canada’s soldiers are struggling to maintain a legacy and reputation that was earned under markedly different circumstances. The army today is not the same one that realised success over the first forty years of peacekeeping. It is smaller, an increasing important consideration since missions are far more numerous and infinitely more hostile.

Despite this, it would appear that successive Canadian governments continue to try to use traditional peacekeeping as a means by which to maintain a presence on the world stage with apparently little realisation that the cost of participation has and will continue to increase. If success in the future is to be achieved, recent evidence makes clear that Canada will either have to give its peacekeepers the equipment, funding and direction necessary to meet these challenges or become far more selective on which missions it will join.

In the end, it will become clear that the UN and Canada have not failed in the post-Cold War era. Rather, the organisation and one of its foremost participants on peacekeeping operations have continued to operate in a post-Cold War environment with a Cold War model.

Chapter I

UN Command and Control: 'Potential Versus Reality'

In assessing whether or not the UN and Canada have failed or succeeded in peacekeeping during the post-Cold War era, it is essential to define the criteria by which this assessment is made. This is fundamental, as it would be manifestly unfair to both the UN and Canada, to pass judgement when there are substantial differences between the two eras. Moreover, it is equally important to establish what constituted success during the Cold War to determine if that has been realised in the post-Cold War.

For the purpose of this paper, a relatively immediate cessation of hostilities between the belligerent parties will be used as the benchmark for determining 'success' on a peacekeeping mission. Clearly, there will be variations and exceptions, but this does not impinge upon the validity of this criterion as a measuring stick of success. If stability was imposed following the arrival of UN troops, the level of violence diminished, and the circumstances created for a political resolution, the mission would have achieved its goal.

With this in mind, the focus will now shift to the command and control capabilities of the UN in regards to peacekeeping. This is of particular relevance to this paper as one of the most significant criticisms of the UN in the post-Cold War era has been its apparent inability to command and direct large, complex post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. This in itself is seen as a significant contributing factor to the failures of the 1990s. By extension, the conclusion that is commonly drawn from this observation is that the UN's command and control apparatus *was* capable of directing smaller Cold War missions.

This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts, as the UN's command and control capabilities were just as inefficient during the Cold War as they were in the post-Cold War. This should not be surprising because multinational peacekeeping operations were not a mandated activity in the UN Charter. Consequently, it is logical to surmise that there was no structure created specifically to direct peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping was in effect a Cold War compromise, an *ad hoc* creation that had no formal doctrine or structure. Likewise, the structure that was created to command peacekeeping operations was an adaptation of another organisation that had been created for an entirely different activity.

The command and control mechanism eventually employed was adapted from an organisation called the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which had been originally created to prosecute multinational combat operations. On the surface this would seem to be a positive development, as a command and control element structured for high intensity operations should logically be capable of conducting lower intensity activities. This, however, was not the case as the MSC, hampered by Cold War animosities, was unable to realise the degree of integration and development necessary to effect adequate command and control. Despite this limitation, the UN was able to achieve success on Cold War peacekeeping operations due to the relatively benign nature of these activities. Because of this, the UN gained a false reputation for competency and efficiency regarding peacekeeping. This reputation, however, would be quickly destroyed with the onset of a series of well-publicised failures in the post-Cold War era. Simply put, the UN's command and control mechanism did not fail in the post-Cold War; it never worked in the first place.

The UN Charter begins with the inspiring words: “We the peoples of the world, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...”¹¹ This phrase is a noble and compelling opening, reflecting the willingness of the organisation to sacrifice all in the pursuit of a high ideal. Moreover, the UN intended to achieve this goal, not through peacekeeping, but through the conduct of multinational war-like operations.

Sir Brian Urquart, a renowned authority on peacekeeping, was once quoted as saying: “[peacekeeping] was discovered, like penicillin. We came across it while looking for something else during an investigation of the guerrilla fighting in Northern Greece in 1947.”¹² While a humorous analogy, this observation is relevant as it underscores the fact that the UN was not created for peacekeeping, nor did its founders envision operations like it. On the contrary, the UN Charter envisioned robust collective security operations, not limited security operations like peacekeeping. Therefore, it would stand to reason that if a model for peacekeeping was absent, mechanisms to establish a command and control capability for such operations also did not exist.

Command and control capabilities for war-like collective security operations, however, were defined within the Charter. These provisions were listed under Chapter VII of Article 47 empowering the Security Council to solicit and direct armed forces in a collective security operation under the command of the MSC. Comprised of senior officers representing the five permanent members of the Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France - the MSC’s principal function, as envisioned

¹¹ Alex Morrison, “The Changing Face of Peacekeeping,” In *The Changing Face of Peacekeeping*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 6.

¹² Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., “The Security Council’s First Fifty Years,” *American Journal of International Law*, 89, no. 3 (July 1995), p. 532.

by the British at Dumbarton Oaks in 1946, was to “advise and assist the Security Council on military questions relating to peace and security.”¹³ Again, despite the inclusion of the word ‘peace’ within that function, it is important to remember that what the Charter envisioned for the MSC was the prosecution of war not peacekeeping. That being said, it is equally important to note that through the MSC, the UN had the authority to develop a multinational command and control organisation for the express purpose of directing collective security operations. Logic would dictate that if this had occurred, the inclusion of peacekeeping within multinational security operations would have been a relatively simple adjustment.

The reality is that it did not occur. The rigid bipolar nature of the Cold War worked against the establishment of an effective MSC as efforts throughout the late 1940s and 1950s simply failed due to the intransigence that characterised the superpowers.¹⁴ American objections to the MSC revolved around an unwillingness to place their soldiers under command of another power, or for that matter, the UN. Similarly, efforts to create standby forces for the UN or to establish an MSC, particularly with the Americans, were viewed as ‘thoroughly odious’ by the Soviets.¹⁵ The Soviets believed that any efforts to develop a standby force, under the MSC, was a threat that could be used by western powers to prevent the Soviet Union from realising its own plans of expansion. Former Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Andrei Gromyko, said as much when addressing the Assembly in 1958: “I need hardly point out how greatly support for

¹³ Kirgis, “The Security Council’s First Fifty Years,” p. 520.

¹⁴ Paul F. Diehl, “The UN and Peacekeeping,” In *Coping With Conflict After the Cold War*, eds. Edward A. Kolodziej and James Hopkins, (John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 150.

¹⁵ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the UN For Peacekeeping*, p.190.

such plans [collective security] would endanger the cause of peace and the UN itself.”¹⁶

The fact that the United States continued to pressure Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjold and later U Thant to enlarge the military staff without the Soviet’s approval did little to alleviate Gromyko’s concerns.¹⁷

In light of this environment of suspicion and distrust, the MSC was never able to develop the necessary cohesiveness for an efficient military headquarters. These would have included a capability to direct operations, communicate with tactical formations and establish a logistics plan by which to deploy and then sustain the forces in the field. Ineffective and curbed by Cold War tensions, the MSC was never able to fulfil its most important function: the strategic direction of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council.¹⁸

This, however, could almost be viewed as a positive development as neither superpower was willing to subsume its forces to UN command in an era where national interests superseded multinational efforts. Collective security initiatives sponsored by the UN and under the direction of the MSC would only be entertained if they catered to this agenda. In reality, the closest approximations to collective security operations as envisioned by the UN Charter were the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, which were far from being truly UN initiatives since they were both U.S.-led in structure and command.

However, even these two cases have to be placed in context. The United Nation’s Korean War effort occurred in the absence of the Soviet Union, which was boycotting the Security Council over the UN’s refusal to admit communist China. The Gulf War

¹⁶ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the UN For Peacekeeping*, p. 190.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

¹⁸ Kirgis, “The Security Council’s First Fifty Years,” p. 521.

intervention occurred *after* the Cold War had ended, which eliminated to a large degree the use of Security Council vetoes which had been used in the past to prevent multilateral intervention. This had been a perennial problem throughout the Cold War as either superpower simply used their veto to prevent the UN from interfering in issues deemed important to their own strategic interests. Consequently, as the evidence shows, UN-led multinational operations, under the direction of the MSC, were simply not conducted during the Cold War.

The potential ramifications of the UN's inability to fulfil the tenets of the Charter in terms of the MSC were recognised almost immediately. This can be seen in the comments of Louis St. Laurent in his opening speech to the UN General Assembly on 29 October 1946:

We [Canada] are particularly concerned that the Security Council and the MSC have so far failed to make substantial progress towards a conclusion of the special agreements with individual members required to implement Articles 43 and those following of the charter, and thus make armed forces and other facilities available to the Security Council.¹⁹

Without an effective MSC, it became clear to Canada and other member states that in the emerging Cold War era there was no chance of developing a capability for collective security within the UN organisation. As Larry Fabian concluded in *Soldiers Without Enemies*: "Any glimmerings of accommodation and progress as there [was] in the Military Staff Committee were the result of hard political bargaining and the willingness of the United States and the USSR to settle for less than what they regarded as optimal."²⁰

¹⁹ Canadian National Archives, *A.G.L. McNaughton Papers: Views of Canada on Matters Before the UN 1948*, MG30 E133 Series V Vol. 299.

²⁰ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies*, p. 192.

The inability of the UN to establish an MSC for the direction of collective security operations did not, however, prevent the organisation from attempting to fulfil its mandate through alternative activities. Lacking the command and control capabilities for robust security operations and faced with Cold War obstacles, these alternate activities had to be somewhat less in scope than that envisioned by the Charter. Eventually these operations, now collectively recognised under the aegis of ‘peacekeeping,’ would come to be the foremost activity by which the UN is known today.

Deployed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, peacekeeping initially consisted of unarmed military observers monitoring a cease-fire or truce such as the United Nation’s Truce Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO) established in 1948 for Israel and Syria. In effect, these observers acted as honest brokers for combatant forces, ensuring agreements were complied with while political negotiations progressed towards a final resolution. This activity evolved into the use of lightly-armed formed units such as in Suez in 1957 with the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) and with the UN Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. Marrack Goulding, the current UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs describes the lack of force doctrine employed by these types of operations:

More than half the organisation’s operations before 1988 had consisted only of unarmed military observers. But when operations were armed, it became an established principle that they should use force only to the minimum extent necessary and that normally fire should be opened only in self-defence.²¹

In Goulding’s words can be seen one of the reasons the UN was able to successfully conduct peacekeeping during the Cold War. Peacekeeping troops were not acting in an interventionist role, but merely as observers. It was this limited role, virtually eliminating the pressures and demands created by the turmoil of actual war, or

²¹ Adam Roberts, “The Crisis In UN Peacekeeping,” *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 94.

Chapter VII operations, which enabled the UN to conduct multinational operations. Furthermore, the limited role that these troops played placed a minimal strain on the UN's virtually non-existent command and control capabilities.

This is not meant to imply that problems related to this deficiency did not arise. For example, due to limited personnel, the operations centre in New York was only manned on a '9 to 5' basis while the deployed forces worked 24 hours a day. Evidently conflicts in a given mission area requiring the intervention of diplomats from UN Headquarters in New York were only to occur during daylight hours. The small size of the headquarters also impacted on the UN's ability to direct logistical resupply. Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, a Canadian Officer with several UN tours spanning UNEF I to UNPROFOR, commented on this issue in his book *Peacekeeper: Road to Sarajevo*. Here he described the UN of the Cold War as being "incapable of providing various supplies, ranging from food to construction materials."²² Further, "in the UN, unlike the military, operations do not reign supreme. If you need fifty vehicles to do the jobs, but the bean counters decide you can only have fifteen, you get fifteen."²³

Mackenzie's comments highlight deficiencies that would be intolerable in a modern army. That being said, the fact remained that the relatively calm nature of these Cold War missions enabled the UN to proceed with operations despite their limited ability to provide strategic direction and support. Furthermore, it was quickly becoming apparent that peacekeeping filled a need, namely to prevent regional conflicts from dangerously escalating existing Cold War tensions. This fact alone lent peacekeeping a degree of credibility and worth that ensured the activity would continue despite the

²² Lewis Mackenzie, *Peacekeeper: Road to Sarajevo*, (Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993), p. 58.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

limitations inherent to the UN structure. As Paul Martin Sr., Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, remarked in 1964:

In the thermonuclear war...and in the world of newly independent states and under developed countries in which conditions of instability and disorder are apt to rise, an international force to keep the peace or hold the ring while negotiations take place is vital if we are to avoid the dangers of escalation to nuclear war. Whether we like it or not, we live in a shrinking world. Local hostilities in Southeast Asia, Africa or the Mediterranean, if not contained quickly, can have as great an impact on our lives as an outbreak of hostilities in the more familiar trouble spots of direct concern to NATO.²⁴

It is important, however, to temper this perception of 'success' with a pragmatic observation. Through peacekeeping, the UN had definitely established a niche by which to work towards its mandate, but it was a niche that could be occupied only with the consent of both superpowers. As stated, these operations only occurred at the discretion of the two superpowers as either one could and did intervene to veto Security Council resolutions that were deemed to infringe on their respective spheres of influence. Peacekeeping did contribute to multinational security by easing tensions but for every 'successful intervention' there existed numerous omissions. For every Egypt and Cyprus, there was an Afghanistan or Vietnam where peacekeeping should have occurred, but never did due to this reality. The instances where the UN did intervene, however, created an artificial image of the organisation as a peacekeeper since academics and politicians focused on the successes while ignoring the omissions.

Dr. Joseph Jockel, the Director of the Canada Project for the Americas Program of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, touches on this development in his

²⁴ Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search For Policy Rationales", p. 15.

analysis of Canada's performance as a peacekeeper.²⁵ Jockel indicates that Canada's hard-won reputation as a "peacekeeper par excellence" was earned cheaply during the Cold War. Operations during the Cold War were infrequent and when they did occur it was normally because one or both superpowers had reigned in the belligerents due to strategic considerations. To emphasise this, Jockel points out that from 1945-1988 over 100 major conflicts occurred around the world resulting in twenty million dead.²⁶ The UN was powerless to intervene during this period due to the 279 vetoes cast by members of the Security Council.²⁷

Jockel's comments also serve to highlight another component of Cold War peacekeeping operations: namely that the majority were conducted by a relatively small number of countries, including Canada. Its participation and subsequent success in peacekeeping during the Cold War was not due to some natural predilection for Canadian soldiers to be benign and wholesome in nature. Nor was it due to Canadian moral superiority, as the public wished or often believed. On the contrary, the attraction of Canada as a peacekeeper was simply based on the stark realities of the era.

Canada and other countries who often participated on UN missions, like Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Ireland, had quickly realised the precarious position they were in due to Cold War tensions. These "middle powers" were all guided by four basic truths. Primarily, they did not seek to disturb the international balance of power and realised they were vulnerable to the impact of international conflicts. Second, when involved in multilateral activities they tended to focus on military niches they were

²⁵ Joseph Jockel, "Canada and International Peacekeeping: An American View." In *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), p.153.

²⁶ Ibid., p.153

²⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace 1995*, (New York: UN Press, 1995), p. 43.

capable of filling. In Canada's case, this included a capability to deploy tactical signal elements for peacekeeping missions. This piece-meal approach also demonstrates that militarily, middle powers were weaker and unable to confront either superpower directly. Third, middle powers, due to their relative vulnerability and weakness, gravitated towards a mediating role for conflict resolution, such as peacekeeping. Finally, nations of this stature naturally supported coalitions, like the UN, as a counterweight to the influence and power of the superpowers.²⁸ In return, the self-preservation strategy of these countries - embracing multilateral institutions to balance the bipolar Cold War environment - provided the UN with the forces it needed to pursue multilateral peace initiatives.

Peacekeeping, therefore, was seen to be a vehicle by which the UN would realise its mandate for collective security operations, while for middle power countries, like Canada, it was a means to exert the country's presence and expand its influence on the world stage. Essentially peacekeeping was a mutually beneficial arrangement. As stated earlier, however, peacekeeping was not a mandated activity according to the UN Charter. Mutually beneficial or not, peacekeeping was operating without established principles or structure. It was not until almost twenty years after the creation of the UN and following the deployment of several missions, that efforts were finally made to formalise the activity that had increasingly become known as "peacekeeping."

This occurred when Dag Hammarskjöld, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, gave "dramatic and forceful expression" to the new and less constricted

²⁸ S. Roussell and D. Philippe, "Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War", in Canadian News Disc. [<http://www.uottawa.ca/library/databases/cannews-e.html>], Summer 98.

approach to the international organisation. It was his influence that prompted attitudes to shift, albeit slightly. This was achieved when Hammarskjold asked how the UN could contribute directly to keeping the peace, when, in the current bipolar climate, it could not enforce the peace. Hammarskjold then proceeded to answer his own question by formulating the theory of “preventative diplomacy, now generally known as peacekeeping.”²⁹ The UN would no longer seek to create a proactive multinational, conventionally-equipped army, but would shift its focus to lightly-armed observation forces that would assist in creating the environment for a political solution, in effect mirroring the success of UNEF I.

To formalise this shift, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, known as the Council of 33, was created in February 1965. Balanced with political and geographical identities, it was empowered to explore “the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects.”³⁰ Without digressing into a step-by-step outline of the Committee and its trials, the single most important step taken was its adaptation of Article 43 of the Charter for the purpose of peacekeeping. Article 43 asks all member states to “undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”³¹ The activity, “peacekeeping,” was defined as “the interposition of an international will in the form of men drawn from the armed forces from various countries, frequently unarmed and always with their force under control,

²⁹ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the UN For Peacekeeping*, p. 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

acting as observers or patrollers *but not as combat troops* [italics added] to enforce peace.”³² As historian Jack Granatstein described it: “peacekeeping was to be a temporary expedient that met the needs of a certain period, not a long term reality upon which equipment and force structure could be based.”³³ Given the temporary nature of this activity, efforts to develop a command and control capability beyond the MSC languished.

As indicated earlier, peacekeeping troops were to be deployed under the conventions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This meant that the soldiers would be employed as observers and limited in their ability to take pre-emptive action against belligerent forces. Lethal force could only be used in self-defence. In other words, the troops would not be deployed to prosecute the level of operations initially envisioned to be under the control of the MSC. Acknowledging the Cold War realities, it is reasonable to surmise that this departure from the more aggressive Chapter VII operations was due in part to the command and control limitations imposed on the UN by the failure to create a viable MSC. Furthermore, it is also important to note that while peacekeeping had been formally recognised as an activity, no other military command and control structure was established to take the place of the MSC. In place of the cohesive and well-balanced military staff that would have been provided by the MSC, peacekeeping was to fall under the command of the Secretary-General and his Secretariat. The MSC was relegated to a largely advisory role.

³² Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the UN For Peacekeeping*, p. 58.

³³ J.L. Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Limited, 1986), p. 239.

While the adaptation of Article 43 of the Charter envisioned a moderately armed force coupled with a strong sense of co-operation and operating under the auspices of the UN, the fact remained that Cold War mentalities persisted. Member states continued to resist efforts to subvert their forces to the UN and the veto continued to be used to prevent collective action against “client states” of either superpower.³⁴ This reality, however, should not be allowed to detract from Hammarskjöld’s achievement in formalising peacekeeping as a UN initiative. The UN had to adopt peacekeeping or risk losing all credibility as a multinational security organisation. Larry Fabian, a research associate with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, believes that Hammarskjöld’s embracing of peacekeeping was a necessary step given that the UN was having a difficult time achieving its own goals in light of constraints imposed by the Cold War.³⁵ Peacekeeping, therefore, was a valid effort by the organisation to reclaim what the original authors of the Charter had envisioned.

The adoption of peacekeeping to replace robust war-like operations, however, was to refocus attention on the inability of the organisation to develop a comprehensive command and control capability for multinational operations. In reality, this had started to become apparent before Hammarskjöld began the process of defining peacekeeping and can be seen in the changing comments of the Secretary-General himself. In 1958, the Secretary-General stated “the UN Secretariat has by now extensive experience in establishing and maintaining UN operations involving military personnel and without improvising or augmenting unduly, can quickly provide operations of that nature.”³⁶

³⁴ Geoffrey Pearson, “Peacekeeping and Canadian Policy,” In *UN Reform: Looking Ahead After Fifty Years*, eds. Eric Fawcett and Hanna Newcombe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p. 112.

³⁵ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the UN For Peacekeeping*, p. 188

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

When Hammarskjold made this comment, he was reflecting on the ten years of success experienced by small observer missions like UNTSO. By 1960, he had revised his position saying, “it is a considerable weakness that the Secretariat has not in its ranks a highly qualified military expertise, which is able, on a current basis, to maintain a state of preparedness.”³⁷ This concession did not mean that the Secretary-General did not believe that peacekeeping missions should remain under UN control. Rather, it was an admission that the UN was becoming aware that the organisation lacked the structure to do it effectively.

Hammarskjold’s shift in opinion is not surprising considering the change in scope that the UN experienced as a result of the successes of the UNEF I deployment. As opposed to the UNTSO deployment, where a handful of independent military observers had been used, UNEF I had seen 6000 soldiers from ten contributing countries deployed along the Israeli-Egyptian border, in response to the Suez Crisis, clearly a far more complex undertaking.³⁸ With Lester Pearson, architect of UNEF I, lobbying for the UN to build on this success, it became evident to Hammarskjold that his organisation would be hard-pressed to accommodate operations of an increased tempo.

In April 1958, Pearson asked the UN to establish a more permanent basis for peacekeeping activities such as those undertaken with UNEF I:

Even if governments are unable to give the UN a fighting force ready and organised to serve it on the decision of the Security Council, they should be willing to earmark smaller forces for the more limited duty of securing a cease fire already agreed to by the belligerents. We might in this way be able to

³⁷ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the UN For Peacekeeping*, p. 198.

³⁸ Colonel J.A.R Gardam, “The UN Emergency Force 1956-1967,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 19, no.1 (Summer 1989), p. 20.

construct a half way house at the crossroads of war and utilise an intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions and actually fighting.³⁹

This was to become a common theme for Pearson as he continued to press for the creation of stand-by forces dedicated to peacekeeping. In 1963, Pearson addressed the UN General Assembly, urging member states to pool their resources and create a multinational force for the UN. Furthermore, it is worth noting Pearson's association of peacekeeping with middle power countries:

To [establish peacekeeping forces] would require a number of middle powers whose credentials and whose motives are above reproach to work out standby arrangements among themselves consistent with the UN Charter. What is needed, in fact, is an entirely new arrangement by which these nations would establish an international peace force, its contingents trained and equipped for the purpose, and operating under principles agreed in advance.⁴⁰

As before, despite the merit of Pearson's efforts to create peacekeeping forces, there was precious little done to address the growing realisation that there was a serious lack of command and control of operations. Ironically, it was also Pearson, then the Prime Minister of Canada, who alluded to this growing command deficiency within the UN in an address to the House of Commons on 13 March 1964. At the time Pearson was commenting on the forthcoming missions to Cyprus known as UNFICYP:

Once again the urgent requirements in Cyprus have illustrated the need to prepare in advance for prompt UN engagement in peacekeeping operations. This is a matter of contingent military planning in UN Headquarters by military and political staffs of earmarking, training and equipping units and personnel...we have been pressing for the establishment of a military planning staff which could assist the Secretary-General and his political advisors in establishing and

³⁹ David Cox, "Peacekeeping In Canadian Foreign Policy," In *An Independent Foreign Policy For Canada*, ed. Stephen Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 191.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

conducting peacekeeping operations....The obvious conclusion is that the UN cannot stand still in its preparations for such operations. It has accumulated experience but some of the lessons have been learned the hard way. The underlying risk of escalation to war demands effective preparedness.⁴¹

Once more, it becomes apparent that despite a significant degree of posturing and hand wringing over the growing realisation that UN command and control capabilities were floundering, little was being done to address the issue. UN missions continued to increase in number but this was not matched by a corresponding effort to augment its staff capabilities. U Thant, Hammarskjöld's successor, admitted as much in 1967 when he pointed out that efforts to address these shortcomings were not proceeding well:

The Secretariat at the present time has neither the authorisation nor the budget to engage in widespread planning, staff work, recruitment or training activities such as are common to national military establishments; nor indeed, in present circumstances would such activity have much practical utility. A plan for the training of officers for UN peacekeeping duties was elaborated in some detail some years ago, but has never been implemented for lack of authorisation and finance.⁴²

However, it must be kept in mind that given the criteria by which this paper is assessing success -a cessation of hostilities- the UN did achieve its aim. The UN's reputation and credibility as a multinational security organisation therefore, continued to grow. There were of course many reasons as to why this was happening, reasons that will be explored fully in subsequent chapters. Suffice to say that the relatively benign nature of Cold War peacekeeping operations made success achievable, *despite* the limitations in UN command and control.

The relatively docile nature of these Cold War operations can be seen in Major-General Mackenzie's comments regarding the 40-hour work week employed by the UN

⁴¹Canadian Government: *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, Second Session, Twenty-Sixth Parliament, Vol. I, 1964, p. 915.

⁴² Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the UN For Peacekeeping*, p. 209.

New York operations staff. “Communicating with [the UN’s] commanders in the field during office hours was good enough from the first observer missions in 1947 until 1992....there was ample time to react to a crisis during office hours.”⁴³ The assumption that this successful trend may have contributed in part to a false sense of confidence within the UN is not without reason. The lack of an effective command and control capability was recognised, but without a sense of urgency created by a failure, nothing was done to resolve it.

The inability of the UN to develop a command and control capability for multinational operations would only become more apparent with the end of the Cold War and the resulting rise in the number and complexity of missions. Calls to remedy the situation now began to arise from personnel outside the Secretariat. Alex Morrison, while employed as the Minister-Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, commented in 1989 on the need for the UN Secretariat to develop a cohesive and capable planning mechanism for deployed operations. The issue at the time was the deployment of the relatively benign mission, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), into Namibia. However, despite prior lessons learned and the requests of at least two Secretaries-General, nothing had changed as it “became apparent that the number of people in the UN Secretariat able to be devoted to operational and logistic planning was too low.”⁴⁴

⁴³ Mackenzie, *Peacekeeper: Road to Sarajevo*, p. 331.

⁴⁴ Alex Morrison, “The Renaissance of UN Peacekeeping: Some Observations From New York,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1989), p. 15.

In 1992, Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, Commander UNPROFOR in Bosnia, levelled harsh and very public criticism at the UN's inadequate command and control system:

Over the past few years, the number of UN peacekeepers deployed around the world has grown from fewer than 5,000 to well over 60,000, and yet...there is still no military-style command centre in UN New York; no one on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; no communication room with maps of the various operational areas on the wall, and mission-knowledgeable duty officers manning the radios and keeping a log of all the information and requests coming in from the field. No army in the world would deploy its troops with so little direct control over what they are doing. The UN shouldn't either.⁴⁵

By 1996, this situation had seen little improvement. General Maurice Baril, writing in his capacity as Canadian Military Liaison to UN New York, commented on the lamentable manner in which new and decidedly hostile peacekeeping operations were foisted upon the Secretariat despite the absence of a planning and command element:

It would appear that neither the Security Council, nor the member states were fully cognisant of the Secretariat's lack of resources to plan, deploy and control large and complicated operations in an unstable environment; for despite its limitations, the UN Secretariat was given the task. Traditional peacekeeping principles were applied during the negotiations of cease-fires, while the preparatory planning and mounting of operations were based on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that were outdated....Some believed that the symbolic value of the Blue Helmet would protect the lives of our peacekeepers.⁴⁶

These statements, however, were being made by senior officers who, with the exception of Mackenzie, were in reality well removed from problems in the field. Furthermore, it could be argued that a lack of strategic level direction had minimal impact at the tactical level in the field. After all, peacekeepers from 1948-1990 had managed to achieve success despite the limitations in UN headquarters. The reality is

⁴⁵ Mackenzie, *Peacekeeper: Road to Sarajevo*, p. 331.

⁴⁶ Maurice Baril, "Peacekeeping and Force", In *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 120.

that post-Cold War peacekeeping was occurring in a much more hostile and unstable environment. This created a corresponding demand on the UN in New York to take a more active role in the direction of operations. It was a task they proved unable to fulfil.

In order to provide a clear picture how a limited or inadequate command and control system affected the peacekeepers on the ground, it is worth examining a report filed by one Canadian battalion which served in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The 2nd Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment's (2RCR) After Action Report (AAR), filed with National Defence Headquarters in 1993, noted that clear lines of command and control were essential to successful operations. At the time, the battalion was commenting on their recent deployment to Bosnia with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR):

On a higher level, our perception is that an overall UN concept of operations was either lacking or not clearly defined. Little joint planning occurred between UNPROFOR and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) at a HQ level...and there did not appear to be a co-ordinated long term plan for developing and implementing the delivery of humanitarian relief through Bosnia. Equally, co-ordination of operations between UNPROFOR and UNHCR appeared to be minimal at formation level. Additionally, important and complex tasks were assigned to the Battle Group on very short notice without consideration to medical evacuation, freedom of movement, resupply, extraction of forces and the like. While much of this may have been in response to the political climate within Bosnia, it is our contention that the UN generally reacted to events rather than plan, implement and expand operations within a conceptual framework.⁴⁷

In light of this AAR, as well as the statements made by key UN personnel and senior military officers within the organisation, problems clearly existed regarding the organisation's inadequate command and control capabilities. The inability of the MSC to achieve fruition had resulted in an *ad hoc* arrangement being made with the Secretariat

⁴⁷ "After Action Report: 2RCR Op Cavalier Roto 2," In *Army Lessons Learned Center: Information Warehouse*, Ver. 10, 1999.

attempting to direct military operations. This system had worked in a limited sense when the missions were infrequent and relatively benign, but was faltering badly as the tempo increased. The nature of the problems varied, but in broad terms consisted of deficiencies in logistical planning, communications and operational direction. For soldiers on a mission, these inadequacies were proving unacceptable.

The perception, therefore, seems to be that the UN performed well during the Cold War but has been overwhelmed by the number of post-Cold War missions. The organisation, therefore, is incapable of conducting large complex post-Cold War missions and should leave this task to well-equipped, better-organised and well-led formations such as NATO. What this observation fails to take into account is that the UN's command and control capability did not suddenly fail. It was *always* inadequate. It succeeded in Cold War peacekeeping simply because the nature of these missions easily permitted success, not because success was earned. Furthermore, the UN's inefficient command and control capability is a by-product of the member states' own inability to co-operate during the Cold War. To a certain extent, the UN is culpable in that it was aware of its command and control limitations and did not act more forcefully upon them. What cannot and should not be overlooked is that the limitations placed upon the military staff of the UN were due to the member states' own intransigence.

This is not to say that the United Nations and its member states should not immediately take steps to address the command and control shortcomings. As Major-General Lewis Mackenzie wrote in his book *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo*:

The UN's role and responsibilities are expanding at a dramatic rate and peacekeeping is a growth industry. It wouldn't take a major effort for the world body to improve significantly the command, control, and logistical support of the

people doing the dirty work on behalf of us all. UN peacekeepers deserve nothing less.⁴⁸

Adam Roberts, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, seems to concur with Mackenzie's position and suggests that the UN must revisit how it plans and conducts operations in the post-Cold War era. Roberts also argues that peacekeeping should no longer be under the sole purview of the Secretary-General and his Secretariat, but should be commanded and guided by a properly trained staff:

In difficult and dangerous operations, officers naturally want the best system of intelligence, command, and control. Inevitably at present, officers tend to fall back on the resources of their own countries. Thus, a multinational peacekeeping force may have different contingents pulling in different directions....Among other actions needed is the appointment for each operation of a better equipped directing group with more resources at its disposal. There is a very strong case for setting up an integrated task force at UN Headquarters for each peacekeeping operation.⁴⁹

In 1995, Canada attempted to address the shortcomings in the UN's ability to direct and co-ordinate the larger multinational missions through the introduction of a study on a United Nation's Rapid Reaction Capability. Of the six key principles in the proposal, one was to "fill the current vacuum at the operational level of the UN by creating a UN operational-level headquarters for a rapid reaction group."⁵⁰ Of twenty-six recommendations in the report which was subsequently forwarded to the UN, six directly related to ways for the UN to improve its command and control capabilities. The relevant recommendations read:

1. The Secretary-General should continue the process of strengthening the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), including through loans and secondments from Member States, with the

⁴⁸ Mackenzie, *Peacekeeper: Road to Sarajevo*, p. 334.

⁴⁹ Roberts, "The Crisis In UN Peacekeeping," p. 113.

⁵⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canadian Study On a United Nations' Rapid Reaction Capability," [<http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/newltr/un/backgr.htm>], 1999.

objective of establishing an effective political and military central staff for peace operations; Member States should be encouraged to assist in these efforts. The Office of Military Advisor should be strengthened to enable it to execute fully the advisory functions assigned to this office. In order to provide better and more continuous military advice to members of the Security Council, the Military Advisor should institute a system of informal, regular meetings with the military advisors of all Members of the Security Council.

2. In conjunction with Member States, the Secretary-General should develop rosters of senior military commanders who might serve as force commanders in UN operations and bring these officers to UN Headquarters for periodic discussions about contingency planning, mandates, operational guidance, the integration of humanitarian and human rights concerns into peacekeeping operations, and lessons learned from past operations.
3. The Secretary-General, in conjunction with interested Member States, should establish a permanent UN operational headquarters, which would be a standing, fully deployable, integrated, multinational group of approximately 30 to 50 personnel, augmented in times of crisis, to conduct contingency planning and rapid deployment as authorised by the Security Council.
4. The operational headquarters should be tasked to undertake generic contingency planning when early warning mechanisms are triggered as well as liaison with regional organisations and agencies, with a wide variety of training objectives.
5. The United Nations should develop a vanguard concept which would link operational headquarters with tactical elements provided by Member States to the Secretary General through the Standby Arrangement System.
6. Consideration should be given, over the longer term, to the establishment of additional, regionally based operational-level headquarters, once a first operational-level headquarters has been established, and its performance and usefulness have been assessed.⁵¹

In addition to the Canadian proposals, there have been calls for some kind of revitalisation of the MSC or at the very least a review of how the UN is to adjust in the

⁵¹ National Defence, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability For the United Nations: Report of the Government of Canada*, (Minister of Supply and Services: Queen's Printer, 1995), p. 71.

post-Cold War era. Recently, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his report to the Security Council titled *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, reminded the UN that the MSC was not originally created for prosecuting peacekeeping operations. In that sense Boutros-Ghali believed that the MSC should be restricted to its original mandate of Chapter VII operations such as in the Korean or Gulf War. “In the end” he wrote, “the role of the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peacekeeping operations.”⁵² In his opinion, the function of the MSC would be replaced by a peacekeeping command and control organisation that would be customised for each separate mission. Instead of one command organisation there would be several with specific limitations and objectives, thereby limiting the ‘over stretch’ experienced by the MSC with the rapid increase in missions over the last fifteen years. Boutros-Ghali’s proposal may have merit, but a renewal of the MSC would take a significant investment in terms of personnel and training if it were to regain any sense of credibility. For example, as recently as May 2001, the *National Post* levelled scathing criticism at the MSC for “failing to take a stand on international issues such as when Somali warlords ran amok in Mogadishu” or when “Bosnian Serbs took hundreds of peacekeepers hostage.”⁵³

Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, former commander of the UN Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993-94, has also called for reformation of UN peacekeeping. The apathy and impotence of the world community and the UN were described by

⁵²Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace 1995*, p. 7.

⁵³ Steven Edwards, Canadian News Disc: National Post, “*UN Committee Fights Take-over*,” [<http://www.uottawa.ca/library/databases/cannews-e.html>], May 22, 2001.

Dallaire as “shocking and immoral.”⁵⁴ His hope was that the UN would emerge from its Cold War mindset where peacekeeping was hostage to the ideological sparring between the superpowers to adopt a more proactive approach. Dallaire’s comments cannot be simply dismissed as simply those of a disgruntled former commander, as the *UN Report on the Rwanda Massacre*, published in 1999, did direct a portion of the blame directly at the UN’s inadequate command and control capabilities. As reported in the *International Peacekeeping News*: “The report blamed...the Security Council’s lack of interest, inadequate communication and weak links between the field and UN headquarters for failing to prevent the genocide.”⁵⁵

The cost of failure on this mission was high. In Rwanda alone one million people were killed, half a million were injured, one million were displaced and two million refugees were expelled from the conflict area into neighbouring countries.⁵⁶ The UN’s *Rwanda Report* was followed by the *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations* or *Brahimi Report*, issued on 20 October 2000. The report clearly states that the UN must enhance its ability to command and control UN missions:

The Panel recommends that Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through the regular budget of the Organisation...It is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, nine civilian staff police to identify, vet and provide guidance for up to 8,600 police and 15 political desk officers for 14 current operations and two new ones, or to allocate just 1.25% of the total costs of peacekeeping to Headquarters administration and logistics support.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Romeo Dallaire, “The Rwandan Experience,” In *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), p. 14.

⁵⁵ International Peacekeeping News no. 2-01, “UN Failure Helped Rwanda Genocide,” [<http://www.un.org/News/>], Mar-April 1996.

⁵⁶ Dallaire, “The Rwandan Experience,” p.16.

⁵⁷ UN Publications and Reports, “Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on the UN Peace Operations,” [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/], 20 Oct 2000.

Marrack Goulding, in his article “The Evolution of Peacekeeping,” also echoes the demands for reform made by soldiers, politicians, and the UN:

The departments concerned at UN Headquarters New York need to be strengthened if they are to have the planning and command and control capability to support operations on the scale currently deployed. Financial and logistical procedures need to be streamlined. There needs to be a working capital fund for peacekeeping and a reserve stock of basic peacekeeping equipment to enable the Secretary-General to respond more quickly when the Security Council decides to establish a new peacekeeping operation.⁵⁸

The evidence demonstrates that the UN has recognised its limitations regarding command and control for a significant period. Calls for reform have come from a number of areas and have only increased in intensity over the last decade. If the UN’s recently released policy paper on the future of peacekeeping is to be taken at face value, these reforms should be taking place now. Whether or not they will reverse the decline of the UN’s effectiveness in peacekeeping will have to be determined over time. This of course, is entirely dependent on the member states’ willingness to cease discussing reform and actively participate in enacting it. As expressed by Major-General Mackenzie, “it is perhaps unfair and unwise to condemn the UN for failing to resolve the world’s problems, because, when we do that, we are condemning ourselves. The UN is merely the sum of its parts.”⁵⁹

The reality is that Bosnia, as well as the horrors of Rwanda, arguably the two best known UN “failures” in the post-Cold War era, occurred in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War. The UN simply did not have the resources or the support to overcome the command and control limitations imposed upon it during the Cold War. Lacking an effective MSC and lulled into a false sense of security by the very

⁵⁸ Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping,” *International Affairs*, 69, no. 1 (1993), p. 460.

⁵⁹ Mackenzie, *Peacekeeper: Road to Sarajevo*, p. xvii.

nature of Cold War peacekeeping, it proved tragically incapable of quickly adjusting to the more fluid and infinitely more violent nature of post-Cold War operations.

Chapter II

Interstate Versus Intrastate

‘Dissimilar Circumstances: Dissimilar Results’

It should now be apparent that though the UN’s command and control system was restricted by Cold War animosity, it was capable of prosecuting relatively simple Cold War peacekeeping missions when sides were clearly drawn. However, faced with the violence and fluidity of post-Cold War missions, it proved incapable of quickly adapting. Lacking effective command and control, UN missions simply struggled to achieve their mandates. On the surface, it could be concluded that the UN’s inability to cope was due to the number and size of more recent missions. This, however, would be a simplistic assessment. The size and number of missions during the post-Cold War were certainly factors that strained the stunted command and control capabilities of the UN, but they were not the reasons why peacekeeping faltered. This is because these new missions possessed a degree of violence and uncertainty unlike the majority of the Cold War missions.

This factor -the nature of the conflict- is of critical importance when attempting to determine why the UN has struggled in the post-Cold War era. Conversely, by understanding this shift, it becomes easier to see why the UN experienced such a high degree of ‘success’ during the Cold War. Therefore, what will now be examined is the difference between interstate and intrastate missions.

In general terms, interstate missions involve two or more sovereign nations in conflict while intrastate missions concern civil wars. As interstate conflicts dominated Cold War missions where success was prevalent, and intrastate conflicts prevailed on

post-Cold War missions, eclipsed by failure, it becomes readily apparent that the differences between the two are of great significance. It is these differences that will demonstrate that the UN, and by extension Canada, have not failed in the last fifteen years of peacekeeping so much as struggled to cope with an infinitely more hostile form of mission.

However, before examining the relative differences between interstate and intrastate conflicts, it is useful to review what the UN had established as the requirements for a peacekeeping operation to help define the 'baseline' by which UN peacekeeping was undertaken. By understanding this criteria, it will become clear why the UN struggled with intrastate missions and achieved relative success on interstate missions. While reviewing these requirements, it is important to remember that this list evolved from experience not doctrine. As established in Chapter 1, peacekeeping was not an activity specifically listed under the UN Charter and it was not until after a number of interstate missions that a policy was written to support the activity. Given this fact, peacekeeping policy was in effect a by-product of the trials and tribulations experienced by twenty years of missions as opposed to a formal theory. This experience resulted in the following conditions:

1. Consent by the belligerents for the deployment of the peacekeepers.
2. Belligerents consisting of two (or more) separate and sovereign states.
3. An agreed upon cease-fire prior to the imposition of UN troops.

4. The peacekeepers were military, acceptable to all belligerent parties, lightly-armed and restricted to a monitoring or observation task.

5. The use of deadly force by the peacekeepers would be in self-defence only.⁶⁰

In reviewing this list, it is obvious that these guidelines were meant to apply to a conflict between two sovereign nations, or an interstate conflict. This is not surprising as they were defined following UN missions such as UNTSO, UNEF 1 and UNFICYP, which were all interstate by nature. The overwhelming preponderance of interstate missions during the Cold War can be seen in a DFAIT table (Fig 2-1) showing Canada's participation in peacekeeping during the period 1956-1988.⁶¹ Of note is the list of protagonists on each mission:

Mission	Location	Dates	Protagonists	Maximum Cdn Troop Contribution
UN Emergency Force (UNEF-I)	Egypt	1956-67	Egypt, Great Britain, Israel, France	1007
UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-59	Israel, Syria, Lebanon	77
UN Emergency Force (UNEF II-Sinai)	Egypt	1973-79	Israel, Egypt	1145
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	Apr-Sept 1978	Syria, Israel Lebanon.	117
UN Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG)	Iran/Iraq	1988-91	Iran, Iraq	525

Fig. 2-1

The interstate character of these missions is confirmed by the involvement of separate nations. Missing from this list is the well-established UN mission to Cyprus, UNFICYP, as well as the UNOC, the UN mission to the Congo in 1960. UNOC is not

⁶⁰ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations For Peacekeeping*, p. 35.

⁶¹ Canadian Peacekeeping In the Middle East: Historical Record. [<http://dfait-maeci.ca/english/foreignp/terror/peacke-e.htm>] March 1996.

included, as it was clearly a civil war and therefore an intrastate operation. The reason UNFICYP is not included in DFAIT's table is that by definition it was also an intrastate conflict. This was recognised in a House of Commons debate held on 13 March 1964. At the time, the Leader of the Opposition, the Right Honourable J.G. Diefenbaker, was commenting on the growing conflict in Cyprus:

If forces are sent by the United Nations [to Cyprus] it will be the first time to my knowledge that the United Nations will be taking part in keeping the peace in a situation of civil war....It is one of those things that leads one to wonder whether this step, while necessary, will in fact weaken the purposes of the United Nations....Whatever the desirability and necessity of this action being taken, I am concerned with the effect upon the life and prestige and authority of the United Nations in the years ahead.⁶²

Diefenbaker was incorrect in identifying Cyprus as the UN's first intrastate conflict as that dubious honour fell to the Congo in 1960. He was correct, however, in saying that Cyprus was an intrastate mission as the conflict had started as a civil war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The eventual involvement of Greek and Turkish National forces, however, pushed the mission into the interstate arena. Further, the clear delineation of the forces, with the Turkish-Cypriots to the north of the island and the Greek-Cypriots to the south, is also more reflective of an interstate conflict. Diefenbaker's words, however, could be seen as prophetic given the trials that the UN would face when it became mired in a series of intrastate conflicts with the end of the Cold War.

Of the aforementioned characteristics of peacekeeping, perhaps the most important to note is the issue of 'consent.' Clearly, the success of a peacekeeping operation often depends on the willingness of the belligerents to accept a third party

⁶² Canadian Government: *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, Second Session, Twenty-Sixth Parliament, Vol. I, 1964, p. 892.

being placed between them. Furthermore, consent of the host nation(s) was an acknowledgement on the part of the UN that the nation's sovereignty would remain intact. On interstate missions, UN troops were present at the behest of the belligerents not in spite of them. This is not necessarily the case in intrastate missions where the state is being consumed by a civil war and the UN intervenes unilaterally to prevent human suffering.

The importance placed on consent during interstate mission can be seen in an exchange of correspondence between Major-General Burns, Chief of Staff (COS) UNTSO and Commander UNEF 1 (designate), and Dag Hammarskjold, UN Secretary-General on 13 November 1956:

When the Egyptian government gave its consent to the arrival of United Nations Forces in Egypt, it did so on the basis of the clear terms of its communication of the 11th instant, which, among other things, stipulated that it is agreed that consent of Egypt is indispensable for entry and presence of United Nations forces in any part of its territory, and that if such consent no longer persists, these forces shall withdraw.⁶³

In Canada, the importance of consent in peacekeeping was debated in the House of Commons on March 7th, 1957. Following a number of demands by opposition party members for clarification on Egypt's rights as a sovereign state as well as the legality of Canadian troops being on foreign soil, Lester Pearson provided the following:

I cannot, Mr. Speaker, give a legal opinion, but of course when the United Nations are in any country by agreement, the rights of sovereignty of that country have to be accepted and respected. In the case of Egypt, those sovereign rights which have been respected have to be considered within United Nations actions, within the United Nations assembly resolution which Egypt agreed for the introduction of that force to do certain tasks.⁶⁴

⁶³ Canadian National Archives, *Major-General E.L.M. Burns Papers: UNTSO/UNEF Pre-War 1956*, MG31 G6 Vol1.

⁶⁴ *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, Fifth Session, Twenty-Second Parliament, Vol. II, 1957, p. 1959.

Ramesh Thakur, Professor of International Relations at the University of Otago, New Zealand, contends that “peacekeeping based on consent was an innovative attempt to circumvent the world body’s failure to develop a collective security system.”⁶⁵ This position is a reasonable position to take as the UN lacked cohesive support due to Cold War intransigence for multinational interventionist activities. By having UN peacekeepers ‘invited’ to intercede, the requirement for multinational support was mitigated. Thakur goes on to point out that post-Cold War efforts have seen the issue of consent become less important. Consequently, attempts to convert such operations into international exercises for enforcing peace are “fraught with grave risks resulting from conceptual confusion thereby endangering the UN’s peacekeeping credentials.”⁶⁶

Again, Thakur’s assessment is accurate. Post-Cold War missions into countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia have been intrastate in nature involving civil wars and ethnic strife. In an intrastate conflict, it is possible to secure the consent of the majority of the parties involved before the commitment of UN troops, but almost certainly some factions will be either not represented or simply non-supportive. The result is UN troops lack the acceptance of all the belligerents and may be viewed as invading forces by some factions. In effect, to some factions these soldiers become targets rather than peacekeepers.

This situation is potentially what prompted a string of attacks on the soldiers of the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in 1993. Over a three-month period, a number of violent attacks were carried out that specifically targeted UN troops

⁶⁵ Ramesh Thakur, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia,” *The Journal of African Studies*, 32, no. 3 (1994), p. 387

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

who simply were in the wrong uniform at the wrong place and at the wrong time. On 4 June 1993, twenty-four Pakistani UN peacekeepers were killed and fifty-six wounded by Somali militias as they marched back to their unit lines following an inspection of a food facility. On 17 June, 5 Moroccan and 3 Italian peacekeepers were shot dead in a crowded marketplace. It was alleged that a Somali militia unit was behind this attack. Finally, on 8 August, four U.S. soldiers, under command of UNOSOM I, were killed when a remotely detonated mine exploded under their vehicle.⁶⁷

The application of host nation consent, however, is but one way in which intrastate missions do not fit the ‘peacekeeping’ criteria as defined by the UN. Another example is use of force. According to the UN, peacekeepers are to use force in self-defence only. This has been largely superseded in post-Cold War intrastate missions with the use of force in defence of the mission being permitted. Due to the volatile nature of the mission area, UN troops are more robustly armed and may possess more liberal Rules of Engagement (ROE), possibly under Chapter VII, that enables them to “use force to coerce or compel belligerents to act in a certain way.”⁶⁸ For example, the UNPROFOR ROE stated that UNPROFOR personnel were permitted to use their weapons:

- a. To defend themselves, other UN personnel, or persons and areas under their protection against direct attack, acting always under the order of the senior officer/soldier at the scene;
- b. To resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties, acting under the personal authority of the Force Commander only; and

⁶⁷ “The United Nations In Somalia 1992-1996”, *The United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol VIII*, (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 50.

⁶⁸ Thomas Geburt, “Military Operations In Modern Peacekeeping”, In *Facing The Future: Proceedings of the 1996 Canada-Japan Seminar on Modern Peacekeeping*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 39.

- c. To resist deliberate military or paramilitary incursions into the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA).⁶⁹

An expanded capability to use deadly force will undoubtedly be perceived as a threat by some parties who may target UN forces. The emphasis on these two characteristics, however - consent and use of lethal force in self-defence - does not negate the importance of having a cease-fire in place, impartial peacekeepers and a workable mandate by which to conduct activities. This can be seen in the wording of the UN Secretary-General's report of 12 November 1956 prior to the introduction of UNEF I. The force itself was only to deploy "when a cease-fire [had] been established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian government in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the other terms in the resolution of November 2nd."⁷⁰

Unlike consent and use of force, these three factors - a cease-fire in place, impartial peacekeepers and a workable mandate - have changed little in the transition from interstate to intrastate missions. They are as applicable today as they were during the Cold War. Rather, the emphasis on these two former issues was made to underscore the major differences between interstate and intrastate missions.

The impact these changes in the peacekeeping environment have had on the UN's ability to realise success in the post-Cold War is well documented. More importantly, the impact these changes have had on the UN's reputation as a multinational peacekeeping organisation has been significant. It is not an overstatement to say that Yugoslavia,

⁶⁹ "UNPROFOR Rules of Engagement," In *Army Lessons Learned Information Warehouse*, Ver. 10, 1999.

⁷⁰ *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, Fifth Session, Twenty-Second Parliament, Vol. III, 1957, p. 3491.

Rwanda and Somalia have become synonymous with failure in terms of UN peacekeeping.

In reality, the UN has borne virtually all of the blame for failure in post-Cold War peacekeeping, which should not be the case. This is because peacekeepers were never supposed to be deployed prior to a cease-fire between the belligerent parties. On the contrary, during the Cold War, peacekeepers helped facilitate the environment for political discussions by 'policing' an *existing* agreement. In the end, it was the responsibility of diplomats to achieve a political resolution; peacekeepers were present merely to monitor the situation thereby maintaining a suitable environment for discussions to continue. The linkage between diplomacy and peacekeeping can be seen in Mitchell Sharp's statement that peacekeeping operations in Cyprus had to be linked with a political settlement *prior* to Canadian participation.⁷¹

By contrast, on an intrastate mission, peacekeepers are trying to *impose* the environment for discussion by halting the ongoing violence. Political discussions, if they even occur, are not between sovereign heads of state but with splinter factions more attuned to securing their goals with force as opposed to dialogue. This undertaking is infinitely more difficult undertaking and fraught with grave consequences for the UN should the peacekeepers fail. Unlike an interstate mission where failure can be attributed to the inability of the belligerents to adhere to a cease-fire or to the actions of a sovereign government in continuing the violence, intrastate missions place the blame squarely on the UN. In this case it is the UN who 'fails' to maintain the peace, 'fails' to enforce the latest cease-fire or 'fails' to provide humanitarian aid.

⁷¹ Michael Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes*, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson limited, 1980), p. 112.

Having demonstrated that the UN is employing criteria scripted for principally one type of mission, interstate, it is clear that peacekeepers would struggle in an intrastate environment. Perhaps the clearest delineation between Cold War and post-Cold War missions or in broader terms, interstate and intrastate, can be found in Colonel James Allan's book, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer*. Here he points out that intrastate missions, "though still called peacekeeping are not the same. The concept of true peacekeeping or units interposed neatly between two dormant belligerents has evolved into an untidy and intrusive host of soldiers and civilians who are supposed to demobilise guerrilla armies, run or monitor elections, train police forces and rebuild shattered infrastructures."⁷²

Understanding the differences between interstate and intrastate missions is fundamental to comprehending why the UN struggled in the post-Cold War. This does not explain, however, why intrastate missions dominated the UN agenda in the post-Cold War. Simply put, interstate conflict was more prevalent during the Cold War because political ideology of the day viewed civil conflict as a "domestic concern."⁷³ The UN viewed intervention in a civil war impossible as it exceeded its mandate. Also, intervention by the UN in a civil war ran counter to Cold War doctrine informally imposed by both superpowers: namely to maintain the status quo and limit each other's global influence. Consequently, one or the other superpower acted in place of the UN to quell movements that stood to disturb that balance in an effort to retain their strategic position. American actions in Vietnam, Cuba and the Dominican Republic throughout

⁷² James Allan, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations By a Field Officer*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p. 1.

⁷³ Alastair Taylor, David Cox and J.L. Granatstein, *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response* (Lindsay: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p 23.

the 1950s and 1960s are reflective of this, while the Soviet Union's Prague Spring is one example of their actions. Multilateral activities directed towards an intrastate conflict during the Cold War were simply not permitted. Therefore, with the exception of the Congo, the only intrastate conflict in which the UN intervened during the Cold War, the remainder involved interstate missions.⁷⁴ However, that is not the case in the post-Cold War, as increasingly the UN is no longer working to separate two sovereign states in a border or territorial dispute. Rather, the UN is intervening in the affairs of one sovereign nation at an unprecedented rate. This is an important departure.

The figures provided by Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace* demonstrate a remarkable rise in the overall number of missions in the post-Cold War era. The fact that the majority of the increase during the 1990s involved "multifunctional" missions or "peacemaking" and "peace enforcement" only exacerbated an already difficult situation.⁷⁵ Of note, of the five UN missions that existed in 1988, only one involved an interstate conflict. This demonstrates a marked increase in the number of intrastate missions that the UN has been asked to undertake. Boutros-Ghali describes these intrastate conflicts as "fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty...a cohesion of states threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural, or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion, and on the other by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means."⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Alastair Taylor, David Cox and J.L. Granatstein, *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*, p 26.

⁷⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace 1995*, p. 7.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Boutros-Ghali's definition is accurate and only underscores the fact that peacekeeping in the post-Cold War environment is a hostile undertaking. By reflecting back on the peacekeeping criteria established earlier, it also becomes apparent through Boutros-Ghali's words that peacekeeping was not structured to intervene in civil war scenarios. Alex Morrison affirms this position. In his opinion, national sovereignty would normally preclude nations from intervening and stopping violence. However, in today's environment, "there is a greater duty in the world today, and citizens and individuals should not be held hostage to what are rapidly becoming to be viewed as outmoded concepts."⁷⁷ As Boutros-Ghali put it: "sovereignty is no longer absolute...sovereignty must be kept in its place...starvation and wanton killing are everybody's business and any absolute principle of non-intervention becomes a cruel abstraction indeed."⁷⁸

In contrast, the relatively benign nature of interstate missions can be seen in the papers of Major-General E.L.M. Burns, Commander UNEF 1. They are replete with the detailed accounting of the activities of a conventional interstate mission, containing everything from local arrangements for the prevention of incidents along a given demarcation line in Gaza, to locally co-ordinated agreements for the movement of the UN observers within a given Area of Responsibility (AOR). In some instances, such mundane activities as fishing rights between Syrian and Israeli settlers from Lake Tiberias and watering rights for cattle required the UN's intervention.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Alex Morrison, "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping," In *The Changing Face of Peacekeeping*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 8.

⁷⁸ Kisangani Emizet, "The Massacre of Refugees In Congo," *The Journal of African Studies*, " 38, no. 2 (2000), p. 196.

⁷⁹ Canadian National Archives, *Major General E.L.M. Burns Papers: UNTSO/UNEF Proposals in Regard to Lake Tiberias 1956*, MG31 G6 Vol. I

The novelty of the operation, not to mention Burns' skilful negotiations with both the Arabs and Israelis, drew a great deal of press attention and public support in Canada. The *Ottawa Citizen* in September 1955 declared that "peace hopes in Palestine rested with [Burns]."⁸⁰ A December 1955 edition of the *London Free Press* referred to him as "the umpire of the Middle East."⁸¹ The *Vancouver Daily Province* in January 1956 described him as a Canadian doing a "thankless job" as a "mediator between two impassioned enemies."⁸² Burns himself had occasion to aptly describe his task in an interview with an Israeli journalist, Yedioth Achranoth, in 1956. "I am feeling myself as an umpire in an American baseball match about to undergo a hail of soda bottles thrown by adherers [sic] of a group, if deciding in favor of the opposite group. I hope that here the opponents will not throw at me more dangerous tools."⁸³

Colonel Gardham, who served as a Reconnaissance Squadron Second in Command with the Fort Garry Horse in UNEF I, also offers insight into the interstate environment by writing that: "Ties with Canada and family were tenuous, the only regular link being ham radio... Sudden sickness such as 'sand fly fever' almost killed a Fort Garry Corporal, but the most prevalent complaint was the separation from family."⁸⁴ Also instructive in this respect are the words of Major-General MacInnis, Chief of Staff, and Canadian Contingent Commander with UNFICYP from 1986-1988. With respect to dealing with problems between these belligerents, he wrote: "Both sides [Greek and Turk] could be impressed by a bold display of scout cars, armoured trucks, blue flags and

⁸⁰ Major-General E.L.M. Burns Papers: UNTSO/UNEF Personal Clippings, MG31 G6 Vol. I

⁸¹ Major-General E.L.M. Burns Papers: UNTSO/UNEF Clips, Letters etc-1954-1956, MG31 G6 Vol. I

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Colonel J.A.R. Gardam, "The United Nations Emergency Force 1956-1967," In *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1989), p. 20.

talk of the ‘power and authority of the United Nations.’”⁸⁵ MacInnis went on to conclude: “peacekeeping operations are not particularly pleasant or rewarding from the soldier’s point of view. The work is boring and repetitive.”⁸⁶ Finally, Colonel James Allan who served as both a Battalion operations officer and Battalion Commander on two separate tours to Cyprus, also conceded that disciplinary problems arose amongst Canadian troops due to the ‘mind-numbing boredom of the peacekeeping duty...’⁸⁷

In contrast, the hostile nature of the intrastate environment can be seen in an excerpt of an After Action Report (AAR) filed by the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) following their tour in Croatia with UNPROFOR in 1993. In comparison to previous UN peacekeeping experience, the battalion was committed to an area “where war is still ongoing, artillery exchanges take place daily and UN troops often exchange small arms fire with either Serb or Croatian forces.”⁸⁸

One year later 1PPCLI was deployed into a similar area. This battalion noted the serious casualties suffered by the unit due to the proliferation of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, within their Area of Responsibility (AOR):

The Zone of Separation (ZOS) having been fought over for nearly three years was littered with minefields, individual mines and booby traps of every description. Mines had been laid by the JNA (Yugoslav Army), the HV (Croatian Army) the SVK (Serbo-Croatian Militia) and by uncontrolled defence units. Routes were often heavily mined, including the use of deep buried antitank mines that were extremely difficult or impossible to detect. In many cases, shrapnel was so prevalent that mine detectors were almost useless. Mines were the main cause of casualties during the unit’s tour, accounting for one death and seven injuries, several of which included massive trauma.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Major-General J.A. MacInnis, “Cyprus: Canada’s Perpetual Vigil,” In *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1989), p. 25.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁸⁷ Allan, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer*, p. 19.

⁸⁸ “After Action Report: 2PPCLI Op Harmony Roto 2,” 1999.

⁸⁹ “After Action Report: 1PPCLI Op Harmony Roto 4,” 1999.

The IPPCLI report also stated that due to the aggressiveness of the belligerent forces the unit had to remain capable of a “rapid transition from peacekeeping to mid-intensity operations.” Further, the unit had to be prepared “at any time to defend against an attack by heavily armed belligerents.”⁹⁰

Clearly, the violence and fluidity of an intrastate mission has a significant impact on the UN’s ability to achieve success. This has had a corresponding impact on the organisation’s credibility. By example, Dr. Miomir Zuzul, Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to the United States, claims that in 1995 when Croatia expelled the UN force [UNPROFOR] despite more than three years of ‘protection’, 39,000 people had been forced from their homes, 347 killed by occupying forces, and an additional 200,000 had been expelled from areas under UNPROFOR control.⁹¹ In clear terms, Dr. Zuzul was alleging that despite the presence of UN peacekeepers in what became known as United Nations Protective Areas (UNPA), belligerent forces were still capable of conducting genocide due to the UN’s inability to stop them.

Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali, Professor of the International Organisation at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, describes intrastate missions as beyond anything the UN has done in the past. Going beyond the simple interposition of a neutral third party between warring nations, these modern operations range from materialising the principle of self-determination (Namibia, Western Sahara), securing implementation of national reconciliation arrangements between an established government and guerrilla movements (Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique), to

⁹⁰ “After Action Report: IPPCLI Op Harmony Roto 4,” 1999.

⁹¹ Miomir Zuzul, “Peacekeeping Operations and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Failure of the Traditional Peacekeeping Doctrine and New Patterns of Peacekeeping,” In *Peacekeeping by Proxy*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999), p. 17.

protecting civilian populations and providing humanitarian assistance to those caught in the turmoil of merciless civil wars (Somalia, Yugoslavia).⁹² In 1995, both the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence acknowledged this shift in a report to the UN urging the organisation to increase its Rapid Reaction Capability in light of a string of failures in the immediate post-Cold War era. Within this report was an assessment on the changing nature of intrastate conflicts:

The new breed of intrastate conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peacekeepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operations of the early 1960s. They are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command. They are often guerrilla wars without clear front lines. Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets. Humanitarian emergencies are commonplace.⁹³

Clearly, when comparing interstate conflicts with intrastate conflicts, it becomes apparent that the intrastate environment is a decidedly different undertaking. Civil war along ethnic, political or religious lines dominates this venue as opposed to nation against nation. There is no clear-cut boundary by which the belligerents can be separated while a political solution is discussed, nor can consent be achieved as any number of splinter factions may wish to continue to prosecute their agenda regardless of the UN's presence. In the case of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, the situation was described as "fundamentally, a civil war... using terrorist methods. Artillery guns [were] shelling towns, tanks [were] standing very close to schools or hospitals. This practice was used

⁹² Victor-Yves Ghebali, "UNPROFOR In the Former Yugoslavia: The Misuse of Peacekeeping and Associated Conflict Management Techniques," In *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, ed. Daniel Warner (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 13.

⁹³ *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability For the United Nations: Report of the Government of Canada*, p. 3.

more...to terrorise the population...than to achieve any military objectives. The large number of warring parties (at least five in the Bihac pocket) included a significant banditry element.”⁹⁴

Ambassador Colin Granderson, who served on the UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti and most recently as a panel member on the Brahimi Commission on Peacekeeping Reform, also effectively describes the intrastate environment:

It is quite clear that over the past ten years since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping is taking place in a totally different environment. The wars are no longer between states but within states. Because of this, there are a number of consequences for peace operations, including in the way these operations need to be conceptualised and implemented. Among the elements that were underlined with regards to the nature of the conflict, it is the fact that we are not only dealing with intrastate war, but we are dealing also with irregular groups, lots of factions. We are also dealing with...neighbouring states that have their own interests at stake and are not necessarily happy with the way things are going...⁹⁵

Alan James, Professor of International Relations at the University of Keele in England, points out that UN involvement in intrastate conflicts during the Cold War was limited to the Congo, which itself saw limited success. He then goes on to comment that the post-Cold War era has seen the opposite with the UN beginning to throw “itself into civil wars, or their aftermath” in Angola, El Salvador and Mozambique.⁹⁶ These missions realised a degree of success; it was in Yugoslavia and Rwanda where failure became an issue. Simply put, interstate conflict produces invitations for UN intervention, while intrastate conflict normally have it imposed upon them.

⁹⁴ Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset, *UN Peacekeeping In Trouble: Lessons Learned From the Former Yugoslavia*, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998), p. 50.

⁹⁵ Ambassador Colin Granderson, “The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peacekeeping”, In *Future Peacekeeping: A Canadian Perspective*, eds. D. Rudd, J. Hanson and A. Stinson, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001), p. 7.

⁹⁶ Alan James, “Peacekeeping In the Post-Cold War Era, *International Journal*, 1 (Spring 1995), p. 261.

This distinction is relevant, as it was the latter type of conflict that predominated during the 1990s, or at the height of the UN's string of well publicised 'failures' in peacekeeping. During the Cold War, peacekeepers were deployed after the cessation of hostilities into an interstate environment, but the post-Cold War era is marked by deployment of peace forces between warring factions prior to the end of hostilities.⁹⁷ Based on this it should be readily apparent why the UN has struggled in the post-Cold War era. Charles Dobbie, author of the British Army Field Manual *Wider Peacekeeping*, points to the significant risk encountered by UN troops under these conditions:

To rush into a generalised advocacy of the use of force, on a misguided assumption that the UN can succeed where so many states and empires have failed, is to invite disaster. The risks in the expansion of the concept of peacekeeping, which we are currently witnessing, and of proposals for increased willingness to use force, are obvious. Major military activities in the name of peacekeeping may get mired in controversy and tainted by failure.⁹⁸

Colonel Thomas Geburt of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre concurs and makes the point that under these conditions the lines between peacekeeping and actual war fighting become blurred.⁹⁹ Lewis Mackenzie, speaking as Senior Research Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, emphasises the truism that "if you have to intervene with force, there is no peace to keep."¹⁰⁰ Mackenzie also believes that the future for the more robust form of peacekeeping has dimmed throughout the 1990s. This

⁹⁷ Michel Maisonneuve, "Practical Examples of the Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations", In *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 145.

⁹⁸ Charles Dobbie, "A Concept For Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 144.

⁹⁹ Thomas Geburt, "Military Operations In Modern Peacekeeping", In *Facing The Future: Proceedings of the 1996 Canada-Japan Seminar on Modern Peacekeeping*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 38.

¹⁰⁰ Mackenzie, "Peacekeeping With Muscle: An Oxymoron?", In *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 133.

is because the five members of the Permanent Security Council, in light of the lessons learned, will not permit the UN “to dash around the world intervening in missions where the U.S. or NATO will have to rescue them.”¹⁰¹ Given the NATO-led missions into Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan, Mackenzie’s comments seem justified. Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Principal Officer of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the United Nations, admits that this lack of confidence in the United Nations extends beyond the Security Council. During the rapid increase of missions in the latter 1990s, “one Member State or another used Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia as a justification for why they would not place their troops under UN command.”¹⁰²

These decisions, however, are reactionary, being motivated by perceived failure and neglect to consider basic causes such as intrastate peacekeeping based on an interstate model. Instead of asking why the UN has struggled in the post-Cold War era, they choose to use the results of recent missions as reason not to participate. If the UN needed assistance, as was certainly the case in Rwanda, it was because it found itself challenged by a hostile mission area necessitating a significant troop increase. This did not occur, but will not be addressed at this point. What is being overlooked is that the missions undertaken by the UN were not of the same sort that had been conducted during the Cold War. Intrastate missions with all their inherent risks and volatility had superseded interstate. Failure, defined simply as an inability to bring about a cessation of

¹⁰¹ Mackenzie, “Peacekeeping With Muscle: An Oxymoron?”, In *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in Conflict Resolution*, p. 136.

¹⁰² Elisabeth Lindenmayer, “The United Nations and the Collective Use of Force,” In *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 174.

hostilities, has replaced success. The problem therefore lies with the line separating peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Once this line has been crossed and force is used, the character of the mission is changed. Before force is used, it is critical that one decide in advance whether or not it is a line that they are prepared to cross.¹⁰³

That decision, however, does not rest with the UN but with the member states. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali conceded in the course of a press conference in October 1995: “Enforcement is beyond the powers of the UN because members contribute troops on the understanding that their role will be limited to peacekeeping. If peace enforcement is needed, it should be conducted by the countries with the will to do it.”¹⁰⁴ Ironically, this was precisely the role envisioned for the UN when the UN Charter was written.

Nevertheless, the ability of the UN to adapt to this more hostile form of peacekeeping must be improved. This issue was touched upon by the *Report of the Independent Inquiry into The Actions of the UN During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*.

Within the final observations, the commission stated:

While the presence of United Nations Peacekeepers in Rwanda may have begun as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of an existing agreement, the onslaught of the genocide should have led decision makers in the United Nations – from the Secretary-General and the Security Council to Secretariat officials and the leadership of UNAMIR – to realise that the original mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the United Nations, was no longer adequate and required a different, more assertive response, combined with the means necessary to take such action.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 175.

¹⁰⁴ Donald Daniel, “Wandering Out of the Void”, In *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide In Rwanda, [http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm], 15 Dec 1999.

In Canada, DFAIT has also acknowledged the changing situation in peacekeeping from an activity encompassing largely observation duties -interstate- to intervention on primarily humanitarian grounds -intrastate. This can be seen in DFAIT's policy statement titled *Canada and Peacekeeping*:

Traditionally, peacekeepers were placed between hostile parties to supervise cease-fires and, on occasion, the withdrawal of forces. In recent years, however, the nature of conflict has changed and the willingness of the international community to respond to new security challenges has increased. The nature of peacekeeping has had to be adapted. Peacekeeping resources are now employed in a variety of circumstances, ranging from cease-fire supervision to the delivery of humanitarian aid, the monitoring of elections and the clearing of mines. In Cambodia (1991-93), the United Nations was charged with disarming warring factions, repatriating refugees, ensuring respect for human rights, supervising important ministries of the national governments and organising provisional elections. In Somalia (1992-93) and Bosnia (1992-present), peacekeepers were deployed not to maintain a cease-fire, but rather to ensure the distribution of relief supplies and to stabilise the situation.¹⁰⁶

That having been said, intrastate peacekeeping continues to have its critics.

Professor David Bercuson, Director for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, wrote an article in the *National Post* in May 2001 claiming:

Peacekeeping began to die when the Cold War ended. When global bi-polarity melted away, so did the need for blue-helmet peacekeepers to fill whatever gaps the superpowers had avoided. Larger nations got into the peacekeeping game themselves, to serve their own interests. Large-scale peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the disintegrating Yugoslavia, proved too much for the UN's flimsy command and logistics. The vicious internal wars of the past decade proved the utter inadequacy of the UN composition, structure and rules of engagement. Peacekeeping has lost whatever lustre it once had.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Canada and Peacekeeping: DFAIT Policy Statement. [<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/back-e.asp>] 1999.

¹⁰⁷ David Bercuson, "Peacekeeping is On Its Last Legs" in National Post-Canadian News Disc, [<http://www.uottawa.ca/library/databases/cannews-e.html>], 24 May 2001.

Bercuson's harsh assessment aside, the UN has taken the position that the fundamentals of peacekeeping remain valid and are transferable to intrastate operations. As mentioned previously in the UN's *Rwanda Report*, the difference lies with a more assertive response and with the means to achieve the objective as opposed to a radical departure from traditional characteristics. Mediation, consent, impartiality and minimum force remain benchmarks of UN peacekeeping, whether they are interstate or intrastate.

This was the position taken by the UN Peacekeeping Operations Committee in 1996. In a Press Release issued by the Committee, the failings of the previous five years were attributed in part to the abandonment by the UN of traditional peacekeeping benchmarks. "Problems faced by peacekeeping operations stemmed from the non-observance of certain basic criteria. It was important to obtain and maintain the consent of the parties; to maintain neutrality; not to use force except in self-defence; to distinguish clearly between peacekeeping operations and humanitarian activities; and to provide proper security for the troops..."¹⁰⁸ It would be easy to dismiss this finding as irrelevant as it was made by a committee that, while engaged in peacekeeping operations, was not an active participant on the ground.

The Committee's position, however, is supported by the peacekeepers themselves. Following the end of UNPROFOR in 1996, a survey sponsored by the UN, was conducted of former serving officers, including Canadians, to determine whether or not the objectives of peacekeeping had changed in the intrastate environment. The questions varied from ones addressing the significance of the conflict in Yugoslavia to how the various UN requirements of peacekeeping factored into achieving the mission's

¹⁰⁸ "UNPROFOR Experience Raises Question of Need for Professional Advice to Security Council", in United Nations Press Releases, [<http://www.un.org/News/Press/full.htm>], 3 April 1996.

objectives. In contrast to Professor Bercuson's position, the results demonstrate that the peacekeepers themselves believed they had the formula correct.

The first series of questions concerned the composition of the conflict itself. In simple terms, did the peacekeepers realise they were involved an intrastate conflict, and how did this impact on their ability to comprehend and resolve the issues at hand?

Figures 2-2 and 2-3 show that 75% were aware Yugoslavia was an intrastate conflict and 61% felt this impacted on their ability to understand the nature of the conflict.^{109 110}




Fig. 2-2




Fig. 2-3

With respect to the issue of consent, the peacekeepers demonstrated a significant predilection for this requirement. As demonstrated by Figures 2-4 and 2-5, 88% felt it was an important component of liaison¹¹¹ and 74% felt consent by only the national leaders was insufficient.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Wolfgang Biermann and Ole Frederik Ugland, "Lessons Learned In the Field: A Survey of UNPROFOR Officers," In *UN Peacekeeping In Trouble: Lessons Learned From the Former Yugoslavia*, eds. W. Biermann and M. Vadset (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 85.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 85.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 87

¹¹² Ibid, p. 87




Fig. 2-4




Fig. 2-5

What Figures 2-4 and 2-5 imply is that consent must be far reaching and accepted to work. This assessment is borne out by Figure 2-6, which showed 78% of those surveyed believed consent of the local population was vital.¹¹³




Fig. 2-6

¹¹³Biermann and Ugland, "Lessons Learned In the Field: A Survey of UNPROFOR Officers," p. 87

The survey also addressed another pillar of traditional peacekeeping, impartiality.

Figure 2-7 shows that 97% felt a peacekeeper had to remain impartial¹¹⁴ and Figure 2-8 shows 82 % felt that impartiality was a realistic objective.¹¹⁵




Fig. 2-7




Fig. 2-8

Perhaps most telling of all was the issue of using force in self-defence. Keeping in mind that these soldiers had served in Yugoslavia in an exceedingly hostile environment, 78% felt this approach was especially necessary in an intrastate environment (Figure 2-9)¹¹⁶, and 64% felt an inability to adhere to this principle posed a grave risk to the mission itself (Figure 2-10).¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Biermann and Ugland, "Lessons Learned In the Field: A Survey of UNPROFOR Officers," p. 89.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 89.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 91.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 91.




Fig. 2-9




Fig. 2-10

Therefore, what was established as the crux of the problem with intrastate peacekeeping by the directing body, the Peacekeeping Operations Committee in 1996, was only confirmed by the participants on the ground, the peacekeepers, in 1998. The data provided by this survey suggests that the UN's failing in post-Cold War peacekeeping may be attributed to an abandonment of proven approaches and requirements. Once again, the all encompassing term 'UN' is used to apportion blame, but in reality, the contributing member states who are active on the ground are those who are faltering.

For every question on the aforementioned survey results where up to three-quarters of the respondents believed that the peacekeeping requirements as defined by the UN were correct, fully one quarter did not. This could imply that up to one quarter of the

peacekeepers deployed on the mission chose to ignore this criteria and potentially conducted themselves in an inappropriate and potentially dangerous manner. The problem with this is belligerent forces do not differentiate between contributing countries, they tend to view the UN forces as one entity. For example, if one UN battalion chose to give fuel to a belligerent force as a bribe to ensure their own freedom of movement, the impartiality of *all* UN troops would be compromised. This, of course, would relate directly to the issue of troop composition, which covers everything from national interest, training standards, conduct, capability, and numbers deployed. This issue will be explored more fully in the next chapter.

This being said, the UN cannot ignore the demands that an increased number of intrastate missions have placed on an already overburdened multilateral system. Nor does it mean that the UN should cease the review process that is necessary to determine why each post-Cold War mission presented such problems. A simple adherence to established principles in peacekeeping would not alleviate these issues.

The Brahimi Report on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, published in 2000, goes to great lengths to acknowledge the changing nature created by intrastate conflicts. In the executive summary, the report recognises that the recent failure of missions was not surprising as these missions “tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in a victory for any side...United Nations operations thus did not deploy into a post-conflict situation, but tried to create them.”¹¹⁸ This report, purportedly the blue-print by which the UN will resolve its peacekeeping problems, has already been recognised for its potential. While this is heartening, the fact remains that the UN still has its detractors

¹¹⁸ Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations. [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/] 20 Oct 2000.

and must produce results or face the possibility of being increasingly bypassed by the U.S. or NATO in a hostile post-Cold War environment. The fact remains however, as with anything the UN undertakes, the onus for success rests not so much with the organisation but with the member states themselves. They will determine whether the UN proves capable of adjusting to the intrastate environment.

Chapter III

Force Composition and Training

'Quality Or Quantity'

Based on the evidence provided in Chapters I and II, it should be evident that the UN did not fail in the post-Cold War era so much as it struggled to realise success in a decidedly different environment and without sufficient resources. Hampered by a limited command and control capability and faced with a staggering increase in missions, the majority of which were intrastate, the UN was simply unable to achieve the same degree of success that had been established during the Cold War. However, these two factors, inadequate command and control and the changing nature of peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War, were only two of the obstacles faced by the UN during the 1990s.

This is because each deficiency led to another seemingly insurmountable problem. A stunted command and control capability, although capable of directing a few smaller Cold War missions, was quickly revealed as incapable of adapting to the rapid increase in the size and number of peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era. This rapid rise in the number of missions since the end of the Cold War is demonstrated at Figure 3-1. Produced by National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, it shows that in a six-year period from 1988-1994, the UN experienced a 186 percent increase in peacekeeping operations with an average annual increase of twenty percent per year during the same time frame.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability For the United Nations: Report of the Government of Canada*, p. 2.




Fig. 3-1

****Total percentage Growth 1988-1994=186%**

****Average Annual Growth=20%**

This enormous increase in peacekeeping operations was in turn exacerbated by the reality that the majority of the new missions were intrastate in nature, a far more complex undertaking. The lethal combination of numerous missions coupled with the hostile and fluid nature of the intrastate environment was compounded by the UN's inability to identify and deploy well-trained peacekeepers in sufficient numbers to address the conflicts at hand.

Throughout the Cold War, the UN depended on a few select nations, described as 'middle powers,' to conduct the majority of peacekeeping operations. Each, by virtue of their relative economic and geopolitical position within the Cold War order, had a vested interest in co-operating with the UN; namely to prevent regional conflicts from

expanding into much larger affairs that could potentially involve the superpowers and their nuclear arsenals. In effect, peacekeeping was a multinational vehicle by which these middle powers could preserve their own security. Furthermore, in the rigid bipolar environment, peacekeeping permitted these countries to carve out a niche by which they could exert their influence on the global stage. Their ability to support peacekeeping was aided by the fact that the comparative economic prosperity of these nations enabled them to deploy well-trained and well-equipped conventional armies. These soldiers - disciplined and focused - proved capable of handling the demands of Cold War peacekeeping.

The rapid increase in UN peacekeeping missions following the end of the Cold War and its corresponding demand for additional peacekeeping troops was to prove beyond the abilities of the middle powers or at least beyond their willingness to commit. As such, and because the United States refused to subsume its forces under the UN, less capable forces from smaller countries were used to fill the gap. Lacking the training, equipment, and peacekeeping experience of the middle powers, the violence and uncertainty of post-Cold War intrastate missions only underscored their inability to cope. Force composition and training, therefore, must be identified as the third contributing factor in the UN's failures in the post-Cold War. Furthermore, the actions, or rather inaction, of individual member states, must also be brought to light since their selective participation on post-Cold War peacekeeping has also contributed to the UN's inability to realise success.

As noted in Chapter II, peacekeeping was an activity that was gradually developed and was eventually adopted by the UN over the course of the Cold War.

Similarly, the identification of the specific countries that would eventually conduct the majority of peacekeeping also evolved over time. From the beginning, it was clear that neither superpower could be called upon to assume this responsibility. Principally, this was because they were unwilling to subordinate their forces to the UN, as this would erode the hegemony and position of authority that they were trying to establish. This was most likely a positive development, as had either superpower participated on a UN peacekeeping operation it could have destabilised an already tenuous situation as the remaining superpower could have construed this action as a thinly disguised act of aggression.

On the other end of the spectrum were smaller countries, such as from Africa or Central America, that by virtue of their comparatively small armies or lower standards of training were simply unable to contribute effectively to peacekeeping. This is because a peacekeeping country, even in the relatively benign Cold War peacekeeping environment, had to possess sufficient military capability to provide a significant deterrence against continued aggression. What remained, therefore, were the middle powers, namely the Scandinavian countries -Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland- and Canada.¹²⁰ There were certainly other countries involved, such as Poland with UNEF I, but the majority of the Cold War interstate peacekeeping was conducted by the aforementioned countries.

On the surface, there is little linking these countries aside from similarities in their military forces and their subsequent efforts in peacekeeping. Geographically they were dispersed with the majority being Nordic countries, Ireland in Western Europe and

¹²⁰ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations For Peacekeeping*, p. 84.

Canada in North America. The common link among these countries, however, was their identification with the term ‘middle power.’ This phrase first appeared in the mid to late 1940s and was used to describe states that moved to assert a presence on the world stage as they had contributed significantly to the Allied War effort.

In effect, these countries believed that they had accrued a degree of international leverage due to their commitment to the Allied cause and now expected to be allocated a say in the world’s post-war affairs. Stephen Roussel, author of *Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War*, goes so far as to say that these countries were motivated in part by a “growing resentment of the great [super] power’s assumption of privilege within international institutions.”¹²¹ Significantly, at least in the context of this paper, such resentment would include the newly founded United Nations and more specifically the UN Security Council, which was quickly becoming hostage to superpower machinations. For example, Canada expressed concern that its hard-won reputation as a contributor to the efforts of the Second World War was quickly being forgotten in the UN forum. Consequently, whatever foreign policy leverage that had been accrued would be ignored. This can be seen in the statement made by Prime Minister King who feared that unless an alternative means was found to promote Canada’s visibility on the world stage, we [Canadians] would be “relegated to the same rank as the Dominican Republic and El Salvador.”¹²² The creation of peacekeeping, informally in 1948 with UNTSO, but formally in 1965 under UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, was to provide venue for middle power countries like

¹²¹ Stephen Roussel, “Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War,” In *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 28 (Spring/Summer 1998), p. 132.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

Canada to participate in global affairs and to exert a degree of influence commensurate with their perceived status.

The term ‘middle power’ continued to evolve as the 20th century progressed. Within the UN context, the term was initially used to describe those countries with comparatively medium-level resources, measured in terms of geography or wealth or military capabilities. In other words, it was a phrase used to describe countries with quantifiable measures of power such as “territory, population, military and economic capacity.”¹²³ The definition was expanded as the Cold War deepened to define these states not just by what they possessed but also by what they did. More succinctly, it described the member states that took the political middle on an issue and acted as mediator or performed a “third party function” in dispute-settlement efforts.¹²⁴

Peacekeeping clearly fell within this description.

Michael Tucker of the Department of Political Science at Mount Allison University saw peacekeeping as an ideal role for middle powers to fill. Peacekeeping was in effect an extension of diplomacy:

In the bipolar Cold War era, peacekeeping seemed like an apt function for ‘middle powers’ like Canada, given their non-great power status on military strategic matters and the sophistication of their para-military and logistical support capabilities. Indeed, peacekeeping efforts in this effort were viewed as the epitome of successful middle ‘powermanship’[sic].¹²⁵

Lester Pearson also saw the role played by the middle powers as irreplaceable, an unsurprising development given his association with peacekeeping. In his view, “[middle powers] are and will remain the backbone of the collective effort to keep the peace as

¹²³ Roussel, “Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War,” p. 134.

¹²⁴ Fabian, *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations For Peacekeeping*, p. 88.

¹²⁵ Michael Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes*, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1980), p. 112.

long as there is fear and suspicion between the great power blocs. They have special responsibilities in this regard which they should be proud to exercise.”¹²⁶ Donald Gordon, in his article *Canada as Peacekeeper*, portrayed a middle power as “the fireman who charges from the firehouse whenever an action is deemed tolerable by all the major [super] powers and is actually supported by a sufficiently strong coalition of major powers.”¹²⁷

It is evident in the words of these three men that peacekeeping was viewed as an appropriate role for middle power countries, one that garnered a significant degree of positive feedback. What should also be kept in mind is that the activity was mutually beneficial in every sense. Through peacekeeping, the middle powers had found a venue ideally suited to their military and economic status and one that lent them a voice on the world stage. In return, the middle powers provided the UN with a pool of well-trained and professional soldiers.

It is also worth noting that the peacekeeping role filled by the middle powers was *not* motivated solely by high ideals and a desire to further national interests. After all, given the bipolar realities of the Cold War, it is logical to conclude that it was in the middle powers’ best interests to take steps to defuse potentially dangerous conflicts in an effort to prevent all-out nuclear war. In the case of Canada and the Scandinavian countries, they would obviously be caught in the middle of any nuclear exchange between the Soviets and the U.S. As historian Jack Granatstein stated when describing Canada’s case: “Canada’s efforts [in peacekeeping] are imminently practical. Situated in

¹²⁶ David Cox, “Peacekeeping In Canadian Foreign Policy,” In *An Independent Foreign Policy For Canada*, ed. Stephen Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), p. 191.

¹²⁷ Donald Gordon, “Canada As A Peacekeeper” In *Canada’s Role As A Middle Power*, ed. J.King Gordon, (Lindsay: John Deyell Limited, 1966), p. 53.

the line of flight of Soviet and American ICBMs, Canada's only defence is peace."¹²⁸

Therefore, in addition to being inspired by a desire to exert their influence within the bipolar order, middle power countries were also motivated to embrace peacekeeping out of a sense of self-preservation.

Having explained why middle power countries were ideally suited to peacekeeping, it is worthwhile to establish why other select and equally capable countries were not. As indicated, neither superpower participated in peacekeeping, but the exclusion of other major powers also occurred. For example, throughout the Cold War, *none* of the permanent members of the Security Council -Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China or France- participated on UN peacekeeping missions. This was because these nations were too closely allied with one of the superpowers: -France and Great Britain with the U.S.- or China, loosely with the Soviets. Adam Roberts, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, commented on this fact in his article *Crisis in UN Peacekeeping*. However, in addition to excluding the members of the Security Council, Roberts also points out that the UN also avoided using contingents from countries bordering a conflict zone. This conscious decision helped ensure impartiality and limited the extent that "national interest" would influence a contributing country's actions.¹²⁹

These criteria, however, had inherent problems. For example, given their relative military weakness, a non-Security Council nation was unable to provide a significant deterrent effect due to their relative inability to project power on their own. The 1974

¹²⁸ J.L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: To Freeze a Crisis," *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?*, ed. J.L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1969), p. 161.

¹²⁹ Adam Roberts, "The Crisis In UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 95.

invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Army despite the presence of a large UN force is but one example. In addition, eliminating bordering countries as participants in a given conflict zone also eliminated vital local knowledge of customs or limited a contributing nation's willingness to stay the course, such as in the Congo in 1964. However, despite these limitations, or possibly even because of them, success was largely achieved through the first four decades of peacekeeping as the geopolitical circumstances simply catered to success in peacekeeping by middle power countries.

By contrast, the post-Cold War era has seen the UN struggle with setbacks and problems during its missions with the composition of peacekeeping forces being a significant contributing factor. This is because the rapid increase in UN missions has forced the UN to look beyond the traditional middle power countries in order to find sufficient troops. The UN, therefore, has largely abandoned its criteria of the Cold War and has started to depend more on third world countries and members of the Security Council as contributing nations. This shift in troop contributors carries with it a corresponding shift in the quality and impartiality of the peacekeepers themselves.

Illustrating the rapid expansion in the number of peacekeeping nations is the fact that in 1988, only twenty-three nations were considered as contributors to peacekeeping. By 1990 only two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this had swelled to forty-six of which China, a notorious human rights abuser, was one.¹³⁰

The doubling of the number of nations willing to commit to peacekeeping did not necessarily equate to a doubling of capability. After all, if a middle power had trouble

¹³⁰ Bernard Goetze, "The Future of Peacekeeping: A Military View" In *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War: International Security Enforcement*, ed. Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. 1991), p. 32.

during the Cold War projecting power in places like Cyprus, a third world army would fare much worse in the intrastate post-Cold War era. An example of this was the inability of the Nigerian, Nepalese and Kenyan battalions to impose any kind of presence in Croatia with UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia due to a lack of equipment and training. A 'Lessons Learned' document produced by the UN to address problems in its mission to the former Yugoslavia speaks of the problems created by simply deploying soldiers based on numbers as opposed to capabilities:

This approach towards peacekeeping, the enormous scale and size of the mission [UNPROFOR] created inherent problems of its own. More than 37 nations committed troops to an organisation that lacked the training, organisation, and command and control apparatus to direct it. Further, the mix of troops was established on the basis of a very specific requirement of a peacekeeping mission. The result was an overwhelming proportion of infantry, of varying standards, and too little support especially in terms of engineers, operational logistics, and helicopter assets.¹³¹

Limited troop contribution and poor training standards were also identified as contributing causes for failure of the UNAMIR missions to Rwanda in 1994. This can be seen in the UN's *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, published 15 December 1999:

The overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarised as a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide. UNAMIR, the main component of the UN's presence in Rwanda, was not planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble. The mission was smaller than the original recommendations from the field suggested, it was slow in being set up...it lacked well-trained troops.¹³²

¹³¹ Bertrand de Lapresle, "Principles to be Observed," In *UN Peacekeeping In Trouble: Lessons Learned From the Former Yugoslavia*, eds. W. Biermann and M. Vadset (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 139.

¹³² Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide In Rwanda. [http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm] 15 Dec 1999.

As these two cases demonstrate, the absence of a sufficient number of trained peacekeepers had a significant and negative impact on post-Cold War UN missions. The inability of the UN to secure an adequate number of trained troops also had the effect of asking its more capable forces to do more. In effect, a well-equipped and well-trained force, such as Canada, was asked to assume a proportion of responsibility in an Area of Responsibility (AOR) that was disproportionate to its capability. Quality was in effect diluted. This was the conclusion of the Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre when compiling the AAR from four separate Canadian Battalions that had served with UNPROFOR.

The size of the AOR is the largest contributor to (Bosnia) employment issues. The current AOR is approximately 10,000 square kilometres and is comparable to the ground normally occupied by a division (a formation normally 5-10 times larger than a battalion). The size of peacekeeping AORs has been steadily increasing for the last ten years. Since Cyprus (UNFICYP), battle groups are being spread thinner which has specific impacts on command, control, communications, force employment and service support.¹³³

Another problem that arises from deploying poorly trained troops is that it erodes the image of the UN as being impartial and professional. Once deployed, these soldiers can undermine the effectiveness of the UN by participating in less than scrupulous practices. Alan James, Professor of International Relations, University of Keele, England, alludes to this growing problem in his article *Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era*:

Peacekeeping post-Cold War tribulations could lie in the fact that the range of contributor states has shot up... In addition to the tried-and-tested peacekeepers from such states as Ireland, Canada, the Scandinavian countries and –earlier – India, numerous others have joined the roster. One 1994 list identifies no fewer than 66 contributors – and this is not the highest figure of recent times... Here it

¹³³ “Common Observations and Issues Op Palladium Rotations 0-4,” In *Army Lessons Learned Centre: Information Warehouse*, Ver. 10, 1999.

has to be said that disturbing tales have occasionally emanated from post-Cold War missions. In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, a number of contingents have reportedly practised free-market principles with excessive enthusiasm. In Cambodia, the libidinal proclivities of one contingent apparently led to a great deal of local embarrassment for the United Nations.¹³⁴

The dependence, however, of the UN on third world countries cannot simply be attributed to the number of missions. The reality is that exacerbating the rapid increase in the number of missions was the desire on the part of middle power countries to realise some kind of peace dividend following the end of the Cold War by reducing military expenditures. A case in point is the Canadian Forces (CF). While the number of post-Cold War conflicts requiring UN intervention have more than quadrupled, the CF has rapidly decreased in size. As pointed out by Colonel Bremner, former Director of International Policy at National Defence Headquarters, “in 1989 there were eighty-seven thousand military personnel, 1993 it was eighty-one thousand and 1995-96 it was seventy-five thousand. Currently the Forces struggles to maintain sixty thousand.”¹³⁵ This occurred at the same time as deployed personnel swelled from under 800 personnel in 1988 to a high of 4000 in 1992. Currently, Canada maintains *over* 4000 troops in missions around the world with a force that has been variously pegged at 54,000 to 59,000 personnel.¹³⁶ As Canada is just one of several countries which has chosen to reduce its armed forces, it becomes clear that with the rise in UN missions the UN had to look elsewhere for contributing forces.

¹³⁴ Alan James, “Peacekeeping In the Post-Cold War Era,” In *International Journal*, 1, (Spring 1995), p. 246.

¹³⁵ John Bremner, Canadian Preparations For Peacekeeping,” In *The Changing Face of Peacekeeping*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), p.101.

¹³⁶ Joseph Jockel, “Canada and International Peacekeeping: An American View.” In *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), p. 155.

The UN's manning problems, however, do not end here. Some of the problems finding adequate numbers of well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers have been internal to the organisation, in a sense, self-inflicted. This is because the UN now selects peacekeepers on an 'equitable geographic representation' principle, or the Standby Forces Agreement. This means that each of the five major geographic divisions within the UN - Western European and Others, Eastern European, African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean - must be represented on a given mission regardless of ability. One consequence of this policy is these nations now have a voice in how and when peacekeeping is conducted. This can be seen in a review of the list of nations that addressed the 1995 4th Special Committee Meeting on How to Improve Peacekeeping Operations. In place of Canada, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries, one finds attendees from Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait, Sudan, Jordan, Guatemala, Georgia, Kenya, Cuba and Mali.¹³⁷

While the Standby Forces Agreement is certainly an inclusive policy, it does not account for standards in proficiency and equipment. In effect, the selection of peacekeeping troops by geographic representation as opposed to force requirements leads to the selection of sub-standard forces. Reflective of this, for example, was the employment of the Kenyan and Nepalese infantry on UNPROFOR, despite their lack of armoured vehicles and modern weapons.

Exacerbating the obvious problems with this agreement is the informal understanding that forces from the former Warsaw Pact must balance the inclusion of a

¹³⁷ "Fourth Committee Continues Discussion On How to Improve Peacekeeping Operations," United Nations Press Releases. [<http://www.un.org/News/Press/full.htm>], 15 November 1995.

NATO country on a mission.¹³⁸ Therefore, if countries like Great Britain, Canada and Italy were deployed on a mission, there would have to be representation from countries like Poland, Bulgaria or Hungary. Therefore, the Cold War requirements for a well-trained, impartial and disciplined force has been replaced by a force based on equitable representation, differing standards of training and potentially conflicting allegiances.

This approach to manning missions has also raised the potential for nations to participate on a UN mission out of national interests as opposed to the desire to partake on a multinational peacekeeping mission. Miomir Zuzul, Croatian Ambassador to the United States, pointed to divergent national interests within the UN forces as a principal cause of the failure of UNPROFOR. According to Zuzul, these differences in opinion led to a marked inability by the UN to take decisive action on the ground. Simply put, “national troops can be put in blue berets and wear UN insignia, but they remain national forces-and this will inevitably colour their reaction to day-to-day challenges they may encounter.”¹³⁹ While Zuzul did not qualify his statements, it is possible that he was alluding to the presence of German peacekeepers, who historically supported the Croats or the French and Russian peacekeepers who have long allied themselves with the Serbs.

The employment of the Standby Forces Agreement by the UN has left the organisation open to criticism, in effect acting as a lightning rod as a cause for failure on post-Cold War missions. Marrack Goulding, before assuming the duties of Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs in the UN in 1991, touched on the policy of the

¹³⁸ Alex Morrison, “The Renaissance of United Nations Peacekeeping: Some Observations From New York,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1989), p.15.

¹³⁹ Miomir Zuzul, “Peacekeeping Operations and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Failure of the Traditional Peacekeeping Doctrine and New Patterns of Peacekeeping,” In *Peacekeeping by Proxy*, ed. Alex Morrison (Toronto: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999), p. 17.

Standby Forces Agreement. Because of the criticism the agreement had received, Goulding felt that the agreement needed to be "refined" and "extended to many more countries. Furthermore, the UN "needed to do more to help member states train their personnel for peacekeeping service and perhaps to undertake more training itself."¹⁴⁰

Alex Morrison in his article *The Renaissance of United Nations Peacekeeping* is less accommodating on the issue of geographic representation. In his opinion, the entire approach had to be placed in a different context, as many countries are unable to field large contingents and suffer from inexperience or a lack of equipment. Moreover, these smaller nations would want a commensurate share of the senior command and staff appointments within the UN mission headquarters, which could be out of line with their level of experience. For example, a small country like Lithuania has an armed force of twelve thousand personnel, or one division in strength. It would stand to reason that the military leadership of Lithuania would have little experience in directing forces several times larger such as a Corps, Army or Army Group.¹⁴¹ Morrison believes that this reality must be considered prior to appointing a contributing country's officers to the various command positions on a UN mission. The principle of geographic representation, therefore, should be kept as a guideline but "there may well be situations in which it could not be followed slavishly."¹⁴²

Clearly, the Standby Forces Agreement has not been seen as a prudent course of action for the UN to undertake. The truth, however, is the UN was forced to adopt and

¹⁴⁰ Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," In *International Affairs*, 69, no. 3 (1991), p. 460.

¹⁴¹ U.S. State Department: World Reports: Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, [http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/reports_ac.html], 1998.

¹⁴² Alex Morrison, "The Renaissance of United Nations Peacekeeping: Some Observations From New York," p. 15.

now expand the Standby Forces Agreement for two basic reasons: as a tool to ensure member state participation, and the sheer number of missions being undertaken. These two factors are related as if the number of missions increases dramatically then so too does the demand for peacekeepers. The demand for peacekeeping *has* increased because the post-Cold War era has seen a remarkable decline in the use of the veto as relations between the two superpowers thawed. From 1945-1990, 234 vetoes were used to prevent multinational intervention, while from 1990 to 1993, during the heady days of the new “peace enforcement,” none were recorded.¹⁴³ This has resulted in a phenomenal increase in the number of missions being undertaken by the UN and a commensurate demand for more peacekeepers.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his capacity as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, issued some startling statistics in 1995 (Fig. 3-2) demonstrating the rapid rise of peacekeeping operations in the immediate post-Cold War era.¹⁴⁴ Coupled with the statistics was an admission by the Secretary-General that even if the rise in activity had been restricted to the more “classical” peacekeeping missions involving interstate conflict, the resources of the United Nations would still have been hard pressed. The fact that the increase has been predominantly in intrastate missions has only exacerbated an already difficult situation.

¹⁴³ Roberts, “The Crisis In UN Peacekeeping,” p. 96.

¹⁴⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace 1995*, (New York: United Nations Press, 1995), p. 8.

Effective Date		31 Jan 88	31 Jan 92	16 Dec 94
Security Council resolutions adopted in the preceding 12 months		15	53	78
Disputes and Conflicts in which the UN was actively involved in preventative diplomacy or peacemaking in the preceding 12 months		11	13	28
Peacekeeping Operations deployed	Total	5	11	17
	Classical	5	7	9
	Multifunctional	0	4	8
Military Personnel deployed		9,570	11,495	73, 393

Fig. 3-2

Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, concurs that the post-Cold War era has seen an unprecedented degree of co-operation within the Security Council with a corresponding rise in the number of peacekeeping missions being conducted. Accompanying this increase, he argues, is a corresponding burden upon a system that was not empowered to sustain the load it currently carries. Furthermore, the UN is an organisation that is only as effective as the member states want it to be. As such Tharoor takes exception to criticism directed at the UN operations in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, such as a 1995 edition of the *New York Times* that wrote: “rethinking and retrenchment are in order...there should be a shift back toward more limited objectives like policing cease fires.”¹⁴⁵ In Tharoor’s opinion, it is patently unfair to blame the UN for perceived failings when member states refused to contribute adequate numbers of troops to Rwanda or never empowered the UN Secretariat to direct large multinational forces such as in Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1994, when the UN needed 5,500 soldiers for Rwanda it turned to nineteen governments, which at the time had collectively pledged 31,000 troops for

¹⁴⁵ Shashi Tharoor, “Should UN Peacekeeping go back to the Basics?” *Survival* 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995), p. 52.

future UN operations under the Standby Forces Agreement, but all declined. Currently the scheme has forty-seven countries participating but it is not clear whether or not this implies an increased viability for the arrangement.¹⁴⁶

The risk that selective participation by member states presents are twofold. On the one hand, when the UN intervenes into a conflict with inadequate forces, such as Rwanda or Somalia, and fails miserably in restoring stability, this erodes the UN's image as a viable multinational peacekeeping organisation. On the other hand, when the UN does not intervene because it has insufficient forces, it is labelled as being too selective. Louis Delvoie, Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, asks the question, "why did the UN intervene in Somalia and Rwanda when it chose to ignore similar problems in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka."¹⁴⁷ This lack of intervention casts doubt on the UN's policies and makes them appear decidedly like "selective intervention."¹⁴⁸ It would appear to be a hopeless situation and stems from an unwillingness by member states to contribute consistently and universally towards peacekeeping operations.

This should be of some concern as there has been a disturbing lack of participation by some member states that should assume a far greater share of the peacekeeping burden due to their relative capability. For example, American ambivalence regarding the unfolding horrors in Yugoslavia during the early 1990s can be seen in former-President Bush's "we are not the world's policeman" comment when asked if the U.S. would intercede against a hostile Serbia.¹⁴⁹ Further ambivalence can be

¹⁴⁶ Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping go back to the Basics?," p. 62.

¹⁴⁷ Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search For Policy Rationales," p. 21.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 21.

¹⁴⁹ S.P. Ramet, "War In the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992), p. 88.

seen in the response from then Defence Secretary Dick Cheney who, when asked about potential ground forces, said that “the situation doesn’t merit a Desert Storm-like military coalition involving substantial U.S. ground power.”¹⁵⁰ Given that the U.S. chose to deploy its forces into Afghanistan in 2002 under its command, not the UN’s, it would be reasonable to conclude that the U.S. has not modified its position when it comes to UN-directed peacekeeping.

Colonel James Allan, in his book, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer*, concurs with this assessment, pointing to the central dilemma of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War as it relates to peacekeeping. Allan believes the problem to be one of “how [the U.S. is] to articulate interests and maintain a moral foundation for policy in the absence of direct threats to U.S. strategic interests.”¹⁵¹ There is merit to Allan’s comments. Former President Clinton’s government articulated three criterion for peacekeeping operations that clearly demonstrated that U.S. national interests remained the principal consideration:

1. The objective of an operation must be clearly defined, in the U.S. ‘national interest’ and assured of continuing public and congressional support.
2. The commitment of U.S. troops cannot be open-ended. An exit strategy must consequently be in place before troops are deployed.
3. Operations involving U.S. forces must have effective command and control arrangements.¹⁵²

It is obvious, therefore, that despite the increased demands for well-trained troops to support peacekeeping, the U.S. will not participate with the UN, which is unfortunate,

¹⁵⁰ S.P. Ramet, “War In the Balkans,” *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992), p. 88.

¹⁵¹ Allan, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer*, p. 11.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

as it is likely that the demands on the UN will not decline. For example, Paul Diehl in his article *The United Nations and Peacekeeping* sees the UN playing a significant role in the post-Cold War era. This is due to the inherent instability created by the termination of “client-state” aide between the Soviet Union and its satellites as well as the U.S.’ unwillingness to intervene unilaterally unless national interests are at stake.¹⁵³ Diehl points to the high cost of unilateral intervention by the U.S. as demonstrated in Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia, as the cause for this ambivalence. The combination of Soviet/Russian inability and U.S. unwillingness to step up and assume a commensurate share of the burden for global security, therefore, has in effect made the UN an “inexpensive dumping ground for regional conflicts.”¹⁵⁴

Diehl may be correct, but it is possible that the new promptness and near unanimity of the Security Council does not necessarily herald a sudden viability for collective security operations under the UN. Third world countries, who are the majority stake holders on the UN General Assembly, are unlikely to relinquish their control of the UN agenda. Simply put, they now have the potential to prevent UN intervention due to their majority vote. The complete absence of UN action in Zimbabwe despite well-documented atrocities is in part due to the unwillingness of African states to act against one of their own. Regional blocs have also formed with other countries. There are already signs that China, India and others are coalescing into a developing “Asian bloc” to counter Western pressures on human rights.¹⁵⁵ This regional approach towards the

¹⁵³ Paul F. Diehl, “The United Nations and Peacekeeping,” In *Coping With Conflict After the Cold War*, eds. Edward A. Kolodziej and James Hopkins, (John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 148.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p 149.

¹⁵⁵ Ramesh Thakur, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia,” *The Journal of African Studies*, 32, no. 3 (1994), p. 391.

functioning of the UN may well be as effective a deterrent to UN intervention as the use of the veto was to the business of the Security Council during the Cold War.

While either one of the two aforementioned scenarios may well occur, the fact remains that the UN has been hampered by the sheer volume of operations as well as the composition and selective participation of member states on post-Cold War operations. These problems have been recognised by a number of countries as well as the UN itself. More importantly, it would appear that action is being taken to remedy the situation. For instance, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence have proposed a number of solutions to the UN to remedy this situation. These were included in National Defence's 1995 report titled *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*. Of the twenty-six recommendations in the report, six pertained to troop selection and force composition. The relevant recommendations read:

1. In order to build upon current practice and institutionalise a formal consultative process involving nations contributing to an operation, the UN Secretariat, and Security Council Members, Member States should establish a Troop Contributors Committee for each operation. Member States should also establish a Troop Contributors Forum, comprised of leading or major troop-contributing nations, which would meet periodically to review general peacekeeping issues of an operational nature and provide a formal voice to troop contributors.
2. In conjunction with Member States, the Secretary-General should develop rosters of senior military commanders who might serve as force commanders in UN operations and bring these officers to UN Headquarters for periodic discussions about contingency planning, mandates, operational guidance, the integration of humanitarian and human rights concerns into peacekeeping operations, and lessons learned from past operations.
3. The Secretary-General and Member States should continue to refine and strengthen the Standby Arrangements System, with special emphasis on the ability of Member States to meet specific readiness

targets for potential service in rapid-reaction operations.

4. The United Nations should develop a vanguard concept which would link the operational-level headquarters with tactical elements provided by Member States to the Secretary-General through the arrangements system.
5. The Secretary-General and Member States should consider organising standby units into multinational 'capability components', corresponding to function (observation force, humanitarian assistance force, cease-fire monitoring force, etc.) with appropriate training and exercising to enhance readiness. These capability components might include some of the newer tasks of multidimensional operations (natural disaster relief, humanitarian emergencies) working in close conjunction with other sectors of the UN and non-governmental organisations.
6. The Secretary-General, in co-operation with Member States, should develop a set of generic and mission-specific training standards and 'type' curricula applicable to all troop-contributing nations. Member States with standby arrangements with the Secretary-General should provide the UN with annual training summaries outlining the training activities undertaken and proposed for those units identified in the standby arrangements system.¹⁵⁶

Canada's proposals have received support. Colin Granderson, a former member of the Brahimi Panel on Peace Operations, urged Canada to take a leading role in the training of future UN troops. In his opinion, Canada should "use their experience and expertise to help developing nations obtain the capacity to train their troops and to have these sorts of units ready."¹⁵⁷ Granderson's suggestion is worth contemplating, especially considering Canada's own soldiers have identified the need for peacekeepers in the post-Cold War era to be trained to a war-like standard. This can be seen in 2PPCLI's AAR to NDHQ following their deployment on UNPROFOR in 1993:

¹⁵⁶ *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability For the United Nations: Report of the Government of Canada*, p. 70.

¹⁵⁷ Granderson, Collin. "The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peacekeeping." In *Future Peacekeeping: A Canadian Perspective*. eds. David Rudd, Jim Hanson and Adam Stinson, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001), p. 10.

Training for Op HARMONY must be intense and focused. Sections and platoons must arrive having endured sufficient hard training to be cohesive and confident in their ability to apply measured deadly force. Sections and platoons must have conducted live fire training in near-to-war conditions, to include all small arms, machine guns, anti-tank weapons and grenades. The importance of sections and platoons arriving in theatre confident in their ability to apply live fire cannot be over-emphasised. A platoon confident in its ability to apply the full range of force is more able to limit the amount actually applied under stressful incidents than a poorly prepared sub-unit which is more likely to lose control and over-react to a dangerous situation.¹⁵⁸

The UN has also produced two documents, *An Agenda For Peace* (1995) and *The Brahimi Report* (2000), that specifically address training standards for future peacekeeping operations. In fact, prior to these reports the UN had attempted to prompt member states as early as 1990 to adopt a more proactive and structured approach towards identifying and readying peacekeeping forces. This can be seen in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, where he reiterated his request for contributor nations to define precisely what they could contribute so that the UN could develop contingency plans for future operations. "Member States were requested in 1990 to state what military personnel they were in principle prepared to make available [for peacekeeping], few replied. I reiterate the request to all Member States to reply frankly and promptly."¹⁵⁹

The Brahimi Report, specifically written to address the well-publicised UN failures of the post-Cold War, dedicated one section to the issue of force generation and training. Within this section, known as the 9th recommendation, there are four sub-

¹⁵⁸ "After Action Report: 2PPCLI Op Harmony 2," In *Army Lessons Learned Centre: Information Warehouse*, Ver. 10, 1999

¹⁵⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace 1995*, 2nd ed., p. 15.

recommendations. In writing it the Committee asked the UN to overcome the ‘come as you are’ approach towards peacekeeping. In addition, the recommendation includes guidance towards the development of training standards for UN peacekeepers. The recommendations read:

1. Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) to form several coherent Brigade size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council Resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping mission [interstate] and within 90 days for a complex [intrastate] peacekeeping mission.
2. The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a cease-fire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be reached.
3. The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy.
4. The panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation.¹⁶⁰

As with the rest of the recommendations of *The Brahimi Report*, the degree of success they will realise is entirely dependent on the member states’ willingness to change. Romeo Dallaire, former commander of the ill-fated UNAMIR mission, emphasised this point when he said, “if the international community should do anything,

¹⁶⁰ Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations. [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/] 20 Oct 2000.

it must learn from...and take the necessary steps to mandate and equip the UN to become the crisis manager in a world where conflict and humanitarian disasters appear to be a growing trend.”¹⁶¹

Dallaire is correct. It has been argued that the UN tempo has fallen off from the over 75,000 personnel deployed at its peak in the mid-1990s. This is true but this statement must be placed in its context. In September 1994, the UN peaked at 76,000 personnel deployed, which fell to 29,286 as of March 2000, but this is still more than three times what was deployed in 1988 during the waning days of the ‘golden age of peacekeeping.’ Furthermore, if the UN’s increased involvement in Africa is any indicator, - namely 5,537 to the Congo in February 2000, and 11,110 to Sierra Leone, - such numbers too will only increase.¹⁶² The demand, therefore, on the UN to man these missions with whatever contributing nations it can, will not diminish and in all likelihood, will increase. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the member states of the UN to ensure that the UN is provided with sufficient numbers of well-trained troops for peacekeeping.

The UN, therefore, has not failed in the post-Cold War era. It has been let down by member states who either failed to fulfil standing agreements with the UN or simply refused to participate due to national interests. By doing this, these nations have absolved themselves of any right to criticise the courses of action undertaken by the UN. The creation of the Standby Forces Agreement was an attempt by the UN to address a burgeoning manpower shortage. While the regional approach to manning UN missions

¹⁶¹ Romeo Dallaire, International Peacekeeping News. [<http://www.un.org/News>] Mar-Jun 1996

¹⁶² Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Overload, Not Marginalisation Threatens UN Peacekeeping,” In *Security Dialogue*, 3, no. 2, (Summer 2000), p. 168.

has inherent flaws, the UN had little choice given the selective participation of UN member states. What remains now is for the UN to learn from the shortfalls of this system and adapt it to produce more viable peacekeeping forces. The member states could, through active participation in the plan, ensure that this is achieved.

Chapter IV

The Case of Canada: 'Peacekeeping by Historical Precedent'

What the preceding three chapters have shown is that the UN's failure in the post-Cold War is in fact the failure of the member states. In effect, forty years of Cold War animosity between member states has forced the UN to operate with inefficient procedures and a stunted organisation.

The increase in missions also placed a strain on the UN in terms of its ability to deploy a sufficient number of well-trained peacekeepers. This was because the traditional source of UN peacekeeping troops during the Cold War, the middle powers, either could not or would not assume responsibility for the increased demand. Consequently, the UN was forced to adopt different manning strategies, such as the Standby Forces Agreement, to meet the need. Initiatives such as this resulted in poorly trained and inadequately equipped peacekeepers being deployed on some of the most hostile missions ever undertaken by the UN.

In effect, the UN was conducting peacekeeping by rote. The organisation had developed procedures during the Cold War that were successful, but completely insufficient in the post-Cold War. What must be kept in mind is that such procedures were adopted due to the unwillingness or inability of the member states to co-operate when it came to multinational operations under the UN's control. This fact supports the premise that the UN did not consciously employ a flawed approach in post-Cold War peacekeeping. On the contrary, the UN was using proven methods that had been developed by working within the restrictions imposed by the member states. When the

UN tried to adapt to the more hostile post-Cold War environment by asking for additional troops and support for an enhanced command and control capability at the headquarters, it was rebuffed. The UN could not succeed since its member states failed the organisation.

This underscores that the UN is only as effective as the sum of its parts. Consequently, the willingness of more capable member states to contribute to peacekeeping, both during and after the Cold War, would have a direct impact on the UN's effectiveness as a whole. Moreover, if contributing member states had been lulled into the same sense of false confidence created by the Cold War environment, it stands to reason that their ability to adapt to post-Cold War peacekeeping would be impaired as well. This inability to adapt would in turn influence the UN's ability to achieve success.

To support this premise, an examination of one of the UN's principal supporters of peacekeeping, Canada, will be conducted. It is logical to conclude that if Canada, which has participated on virtually every peacekeeping mission, is struggling in the post-Cold War, then so would other countries. This in turn would lend further credibility to this paper's position that the UN as an organisation could not succeed, because it was let down by member states.

As indicated previously, the UN essentially stumbled into peacekeeping during the Cold War. This is borne out by the fact that guiding principles and doctrine for the activity were not formalised by the UN until seventeen years after the first mission in 1947. Nevertheless, despite peacekeeping's *ad hoc* beginning and evolving form, the activity quickly came to be the activity by which the UN was recognised. This occurred despite the UN's involvement in several other high profile, equally important,

multinational forums ranging from the preservation of world heritage sites, global literacy and the environment. Simply put, peacekeeping was viewed as an appropriate and important undertaking for the UN, one that reflected positively on the organisation and its mandate.

Similarly, Canadians for the last fifty years have been justifiably proud of Canada's impressive contribution to peacekeeping. It was an activity that appealed to Canadian society, as it seemed to reinforce the public's perception of the country as a benevolent, non-aggressive mediator. Professor Andrew Cooper of the University of Waterloo once described peacekeeping as "central to the definition of Canada's national identity, role and influence in the world."¹⁶³ In effect, it was "a symbol for Canada's world view, a staple tool for the application of constructive internationalism."¹⁶⁴

Peacekeeping also appealed to Canadians politically. Historian Jack Granatstein wrote that "peacekeeping...smacked of independence from the United States" and for political leaders "it was inherently useful, because it had good public relations value in Canada and abroad."¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the fact that peacekeeping afforded Canada this role in the midst of the Cold War, a bipolar era of strict alliances, only underscored its importance as a foreign policy tool. David Bercuson appears to support this position:

Since the creation of the UN, Canada has seen that body as a place where Canadian influence in world affairs could be maximised. It was a place where Canada could show a modicum of independence of NATO and the US and where Canada could impress the world with the good deeds it did in non-military spheres. Canada's diplomats loved the concept. If peacekeeping was a good way of enhancing the UN's role in world affairs, Canadian policy makers reasoned it would enhance Canada's role as well.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales," p. 14

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶⁶ Bercuson, "It's Time for Canada to Hang Up the Blue Helmets," p. 25.

By virtue of the importance placed upon it, Canada's commitment to the UN and peacekeeping has rapidly become a cornerstone of Canadian foreign and defence policy. In fact, Canada's commitment to the UN now spans almost sixty years and predates peacekeeping itself. This can be seen in the words of the Right Honourable Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs, who on January 13, 1947, clearly articulated Canada's position regarding the United Nations:

The growth in this country of a sense of political responsibility on an international scale has perhaps been less rapid than some of us would like. It has nevertheless been a perceptible growth; and again and again on the major questions of participation in international organisation, both in peace and war, we have taken the decision to be present. If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organisation. Canada's policy is thus one of full support for the United Nations.¹⁶⁷

Canada's first Special Representative to the UN, General Andrew McNaughton, expanded upon St. Laurent's statement during his speech to the United Nations on July 20, 1948. In the course of this speech, McNaughton clearly defined the role he saw for Canada as a middle power within the fledgling organisation:

A small power is, in a sense, by its very smallness relieved from much of the responsibility which participation in a decision involves, and which the implementation of such a decision requires. At the other extreme, the Great Powers can protect their positions with the veto. A 'middle power' such as Canada is, however, in a different position. Its economic strength and political influence are of importance, and the moral and material contribution, which it can make to collective action, is very significant.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Canadian National Archives, *A.G.L. McNaughton Papers: Views of Canada on Matters Before the United Nations 1948*, MG30 E133 Series V Vol. 299.

¹⁶⁸ *McNaughton Papers: Views of Canada on Matters Before the United Nations 1948*, Vol. 299.

McNaughton was eventually proven correct, as over the next fifty years, Canada would demonstrate an impressive commitment to the UN. From a Brigade Group dedicated to UN operations in Korea in 1951, to the first UN peacekeeping operation in the Suez in 1957, more than 100,000 Canadian soldiers would serve with the UN between 1947 and 2000. Moreover, as McNaughton predicted, the use of the Canadian Forces for peacekeeping did arguably garner Canada a significant degree of political influence on the world stage in excess of its status as a middle power.¹⁶⁹ Finally, as discussed previously, participation with the UN also fulfilled a valid foreign policy objective for Canada during the Cold War, namely self-preservation from global nuclear war through participation in multinational organisations. Participation on peacekeeping during the Cold War, therefore, was well suited to Canadian ideals and goals, providing the country with significant political clout in terms of visibility on the world stage, and was defensible as a foreign policy objective.

Canadian politicians, well aware of the political benefits of peacekeeping, were quick to point to the importance of continued participation in such operations. For example, a measure of the international prestige Canada earned by peacekeeping can be seen in an address by Lester B. Pearson to the House of Commons on March 15, 1957:

Let us see how our policy [peacekeeping during the Suez Crisis] is regarded in other countries. In the United Kingdom it has been warmly praised by...the *Manchester Guardian*, the *London Times*, the *Economist*, to name only a few. As recently as yesterday the *Daily Telegraph*, a newspaper which strongly supported the United Kingdom's intervention last October, had this to say editorially, and I quote: 'No country has grown in international stature so swiftly and so markedly as Canada has done during the Middle East crisis. Her role in the United Nations has been of dual importance. At the outset, she assumed there a commonwealth

¹⁶⁹ Geoffrey Pearson, "Peacekeeping and Canadian Policy," In *United Nations Reform: Looking Ahead After Fifty Years*, eds. Eric Fawcett and Hanna Newcombe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p. 113.

leadership that Britain as a 'party in the dock' was temporarily debarred from exercising. In the subsequent shaping of United Nations policy, Canada tried to temper realism with legalism into which the Assembly was forced by Afro-Asian rigidity and United States timidity. Her's has often been a lonely voice of reason crying in a wilderness of fantasy, 'expectations,' and 'assumptions.'¹⁷⁰

Another example of the positive image of peacekeeping would include an excerpt from a letter between UN Secretary General U Thant and Prime Minister Pearson following the withdrawal of UNEF I from Egypt in 1967:

Canada has thus given unstinting and vital support to UNEF both at the headquarters of the United Nations and in the field...Ten and a half years of successful service to peace is a historic achievement...Canada's large role in that achievement and your government's unfailing understanding of the requirements of UN peacekeeping operations are widely recognised and appreciated here.¹⁷¹

Building upon this legacy, Canada continued to provide troops to the UN throughout the Cold War in places like Cyprus with UNFICYP and the Golan Heights with UNDOF. Today, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) continues to emphasise the importance of peacekeeping to Canada's foreign policy. As it stated at the close of the millennium:

When Canadians think of their country's activities abroad, peacekeeping is one of the first to come to mind. Canada has participated in an overwhelming majority of peacekeeping operations mandated by the United Nation's Security Council. The government has clearly stated that peacekeeping is a very important component of Canada's contribution to the multilateral system.¹⁷²

However, while DFAIT reaffirmed the importance of peacekeeping to Canada's foreign policy, there has been a growing trend where peacekeeping is now seen by some

¹⁷⁰ Canadian Government: *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, Fifth Session, Twenty-Second Parliament, Vol. II, 1957, p. 2361.

¹⁷¹ *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, Second Session, Twenty-Seventh Parliament, Vol. II, 1967, p. 1294.

¹⁷² Canada and Peacekeeping: DFAIT Policy Statement. [<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/!back-e.asp>] 1999.

as an activity that should have ended with the Cold War. Whereas peacekeeping had been seen as valuable, important, and defensible in terms of foreign policy during the Cold War, now there are calls for the Canadian government to review its commitment. For example, Jack Granatstein once found peacekeeping to be a “satisfactory role” for Canada, but by the mid 1990s stated:

For too many Canadians peacekeeping has become a substitute for policy and thought. Some countries (but no longer our budget strapped nation) try to deal with problems by throwing money at them; our people, and to some extent, our governments try to deal with the world’s problems by sending peacekeepers. This is not an ignoble impulse but it is one that has to be checked with realism. Governments, like individuals, are supposed to be capable of rational decision making. And, automatic responses -whether, ‘my country right or wrong’ or ‘send in the Canadian peacekeepers’- are no substitute for thought.¹⁷³

Professor Bercuson, who saw much accomplished by peacekeeping during the Cold War, also issued strong criticism, contending that peacekeeping and defence budget cuts have largely usurped what should be the primary goal of Canada’s military:

It can be said that Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations was a good thing 30 or 40 years ago when such missions were only a small part of what the Canadian Forces did. But, now Canada's military has been so filleted that any other type of military operation has become virtually impossible to carry out. Now peacekeeping has become the central role, the *raison d'être* of the Canadian Forces.¹⁷⁴

Within these two assessments can be seen the perceived problems with Canada’s approach to peacekeeping. In effect, peacekeeping has become *too* important to Canada’s foreign policy, placing an inordinate strain on the Canadian Forces. This implies that Canada’s foreign policy is out of step with its defence policy as the government advocates a sustained, or on occasion, greater commitment to peacekeeping while failing to provide the Canadian Forces with the requisite funding to carry out their

¹⁷³ Delvoie, “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales,” p. 15.

¹⁷⁴ Bercuson, "It's Time For Canada to Hang Up the Blue Helmet," p. 25.

role. In November 2001, the *National Post*, concluded that, “Canada must increase its defence spending and reduce commitments to the United Nations” as “there is a deep divide between the rhetoric of a grandiose foreign and defence policy and a decline in resources that threatens to discredit Canada’s commitment to common security.”¹⁷⁵

This assessment, coupled with the allegations levelled by two former staunch supporters of peacekeeping, Granatstein and Bercuson, suggests that Canada’s current foreign policy is flawed. Moreover, the nature of the assessment is such that it must be examined to determine its accuracy. This is because the reliability of this conclusion is central to the issue of Canada’s effectiveness as a peacekeeper. Given Canada’s extensive support of peacekeeping over the last 50 years and reputation as a ‘lead nation’ in the activity, any erosion of effectiveness would arguably impact directly on the UN’s ability to achieve success in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, to determine if this is the case, an examination of Canada’s defence policy in terms of resource allocation and peacekeeping’s importance to the military, is necessary. Logically, if peacekeeping is deemed important by the government, then the military should be accorded the tools to conduct it successfully. Any misalignment between the two –military and defence policy- would certainly impinge on Canada’s ability to achieve success.

The first mention of peacekeeping in Canadian defence policy occurs in the 1964 Defence White Paper. Found under Section V and titled *Canada and UN Requirements*, peacekeeping is described as “pragmatic, depending largely on specific conditions and prevailing political circumstances.”¹⁷⁶ In addition, due to the relative novelty of the large

¹⁷⁵ Michael Friscolanti, “A Call to Arms for Canada,” Canadian News Disc. <http://www.uottawa.ca/library/databases/cannews-e.html>, 9 November 2001.

¹⁷⁶ Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence: 1964*, Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964, p. 24.

Cold War peacekeeping operations at the time of writing and lacking formal guidance from the UN, the Canadian Forces decided that:

While the training and equipment of such forces may be of a special nature, the best results would be accomplished through the establishment of regular military formations, which need not be earmarked exclusively for United Nations service and which can be used for other roles as required.¹⁷⁷

Significantly, the 1964 White Paper on Defence saw peacekeeping as the military's *last* priority. The four tasks assigned to the Forces read as follows:

1. Forces for the direct protection of Canada, which can be deployed as required.
2. Forces-in-being as part of the deterrent in the European theatre (NATO).
3. Maritime Force-in-being as a contribution to the deterrent (Standing Naval Force Atlantic - STANAVFORLANT).
4. Forces-in-being for UN peacekeeping operations, *which would be included also in (1) above* [italics added].¹⁷⁸

The prioritisation of tasks is important for a number of reasons. Principally, it is interesting to note that in 1964, although peacekeeping was in ascension as a cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy, the Forces saw it as the last priority. That being said, what is of particular significance is the caveat that commitments to UN peacekeeping operations were to be viewed as in support of the Forces' primary task to protect Canada. In other words, while UN operations were listed last, the foreign policy argument that a contribution to UN operations was in reality an act of self-preservation during the Cold War by preventing smaller conflicts from becoming larger had the effect of elevating its importance. Peacekeeping, while listed last, could, under the right circumstances, have been counted as the Force's *first* priority. While there is no evidence that this caveat was

¹⁷⁷ Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence: 1964*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964, p. 25.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

enacted during the seven-year life of the 1964 Defence White Paper, the importance of peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool is clearly reflected in this qualification to the Forces' assigned tasks. When this reality is coupled with the importance that Pearson placed upon peacekeeping in his earlier statement to the House of Commons, it would appear that in 1964, Canadian foreign and defence policy were in alignment.

The next Defence White Paper was produced in 1971 following a sweeping foreign policy review initiated by Prime Minister Trudeau. As opposed to 1964 where co-operation with the UN was central to Canada's foreign policy, the Trudeau Liberal government viewed the UN in a more jaundiced manner. Possibly this was due to the abrupt eviction of UNEF 1 in 1967 prior to the Egyptian attack on Israel, as well as the rapidly deteriorating situation in Vietnam, a situation in which the UN was powerless to intervene.¹⁷⁹ This assumption is in part substantiated by the 1971 White Paper itself which implied that the inability of the UN to launch any new missions since 1964 was in effect an indicator of the impotence of peacekeeping as a viable foreign and defence policy tool.¹⁸⁰ Instead of peacekeeping, Canada's overriding defence objective was to be "the prevention of nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation to ease the underlying cause of tension, by working for arms control and disarmament agreements, and by contributing to the system of stable mutual deterrence."¹⁸¹

While Trudeau did not cease working with the UN, it is obvious that his government's policy was focused on political dialogue rather than on contribution to multinational activities, a fact not warmly received by everyone. For example, in a letter

¹⁷⁹ Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence: 1971*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971, p. 3.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

between A.E. Richie, Canadian Ambassador to the United States and the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada, Ambassador Richie described Trudeau's *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, published by the Department of Foreign Affairs, as "lofty" and "high falutin' [sic]."¹⁸² Richie also conceded that the material contained in the publication would undoubtedly "stimulate a bit of talk [in Washington]."¹⁸³

Peacekeeping would continue under Trudeau, but there would be less emphasis on using it as a means of exerting influence on the world stage and as a foreign policy tool. For example, between 1970 and 1985, only six peacekeeping operations were undertaken by the military, and of those only one - UNEF II - was larger than a handful of observers. In contrast, between 1985 and 2000, no fewer than seventeen new missions were deployed, two-thirds of which were composed of a minimum of 300 personnel.¹⁸⁴ In other words, during the Trudeau era, the Forces undertook significantly fewer peacekeeping missions compared to the period immediately following Trudeau's departure. While other factors unquestionably influenced this development such as Security Council support and geopolitical circumstances, it can also be argued that the lower number of missions assumed by the Forces was reflective of the Trudeau government's stated importance of the activity in terms of foreign policy.

This development – dialogue in place of peacekeeping – was reflected in the 1971 Defence White Paper's priorities. Peacekeeping remained last, but no longer would the linkage be made between peacekeeping and Canada's primary role to defend sovereign territory, as the priorities listed were as follows:

¹⁸² Canadian National Archives, *Acheson Dean: Correspondence 1967-1970*, MG31-E44 Vol.9 File 7

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Department of National Defence: Operational Research Division, *Canadian Forces Operations 1970-2000*, p. 8.

1. The surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, i.e., the protection of our sovereignty.
2. The defence of North America in co-operation with U.S. Forces (NORAD).
3. The fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon.
4. The performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.¹⁸⁵

This is not meant to imply that peacekeeping was completely suppressed in the 1971 Defence White Paper. The document did define the criteria by which the Canadian Forces would be deployed on future peacekeeping operations. Known as the ‘Sharp Principles,’ they were named after Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and reflected the lessons learned on previous peacekeeping operations in the Congo, Egypt and Indochina. This position is supported by Professor Michael Tucker from Mount Allison University who argued that the adoption of the Sharp Principles was necessary given the “once bitten, twice shy” neurosis that took root following the rude ejection of the UNEF I forces, Canadians included, on the eve of the Six-Day War in 1967.¹⁸⁶ In summary, the principles stipulated that prior to the deployment of Canadian Forces on UN operations:

1. There should exist a threat to international peace and security.
2. The peacekeeping endeavour should be associated with an agreement for a political settlement, or at least a reasonable expectation for a negotiated settlement.
3. The peacekeeping organisation should be responsible to a political authority, preferably the UN.

¹⁸⁵ *White Paper on Defence: 1971*, p. 24.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes*, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), p. 112.

4. The peacekeeping mission should have a clear mandate adequate to permit it to carry out its assigned function.
5. The parties to the conflict accept the presence of the peacekeeping mission and agree to maintain a cease-fire.
6. Canadian participation on the mission is acceptable to all concerned.
7. There should be an agreed and equitable method of financing the operation.¹⁸⁷

Finally, despite Trudeau's focus on dialogue over peacekeeping he did reinvest in the Forces in terms of equipment renewal and acquisition. It is true that the Forces became smaller under Trudeau and did lose capabilities such as a Fleet Air Arm with the scrapping of the *HMCS Bonaventure*, but what remained did receive increased defence spending relative to their new size. For example in 1973, an NDHQ press conference announced that the Forces would benefit from a 7% per annum, 5-year renewal program commencing in fiscal year 1973-74. In real terms this would result in the acquisition of new maritime long range patrol aircraft, modernisation of communication equipment, a surface-to-air self-defence system, eight Chinook medium transport helicopters, upgrades to the Sea King maritime helicopter fleet, new trucks for the army and significant quantities of spare parts and ammunition. The government stated that these actions were necessary as "modern equipment is not only essential in itself, but is also important in maintaining the high morale of the Canadian Forces who use it."¹⁸⁸

Prime Minister Mulroney, however, viewed this investment as inadequate when he came to power in 1984. Consequently, Mulroney issued a new defence white paper in 1987 that was eventually titled, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for*

¹⁸⁷ Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales," p. 17.

¹⁸⁸ Canadian National Archives, *Access Section Interim: Press and Other Released Information 15 Jun 1973-12 October 1973*, RG 24, Accn 84-85/167, Vol. 14 File 1350-2/1, Part 2.

Canada. The perception of neglect under Trudeau's government can be seen in the four goals listed in Defence Minister Perrin Beatty's foreword to the document:

1. Honesty. A frank admission that the Forces had to deal with serious problems, which would take time to overcome.
2. A contemporary and manageable mandate. A clear statement of what their government expected them to do.
3. The resources necessary to do the job.
4. Perhaps most important of all, the clear moral support of Canadians for their work on behalf of Canada.¹⁸⁹

Challenge and Commitment, however, became irrelevant almost as soon as it was written. An arguably 'hawkish' document, it set out to re-equip and man the Canadian Forces on a much more aggressive posture than envisioned by the Liberals under Trudeau. This was because the defence paper reflected Mulroney's renewed commitment to NATO and increased willingness to work with Canada's allies. This can be seen in Mulroney's plans to increase the number of Canadian Forces in Germany and acquire nuclear submarines. Additional evidence of Mulroney's commitment to Canada's allies can be seen in Canada's subsequent participation in the Gulf War.¹⁹⁰ Ambitious and undoubtedly too costly for a country mired in a recession, *Challenge and Commitment* never realised its goals because the end of the Cold War in 1989 compromised its relevance and perceived need.

Nevertheless, the use of peacekeeping as a deterrent for escalating global violence was reaffirmed within the document. In addition, the guidelines for deployment

¹⁸⁹ Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy For Canada*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1987., p. i.

¹⁹⁰ *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy For Canada*, p. 17.

reinforced the Sharp Principles.¹⁹¹ What was different was the willingness of the Mulroney government to quantify how many troops it would be willing to commit to the UN. From a force of over 89,000, the white paper stipulated that “Canadian peacekeeping commitments flow from an established policy whereby 2,000 Canadian Forces members can be called upon for peacekeeping duties at any one time.”¹⁹² Defence priorities remained essentially the same with defence of Canada first, commitments to NORAD and NATO following next and peacekeeping finishing last. Given the intent of *Challenge and Commitment* - to focus the military’s efforts on NATO and NORAD objectives - it is logical to conclude that peacekeeping was allocated a proportionate share of the Forces in line with its perceived importance. This would in turn lend credibility to the conclusion that at least on paper, foreign and defence policy in terms of peacekeeping’s importance remained in agreement.

However, events in the post-Cold War era quickly outstripped the Forces allocated to peacekeeping by the 1987 Defence White Paper. This was because during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the U.S. ‘handled’ civil wars and political disturbances within their spheres of influence in order to limit the possibility of a small incident becoming larger. The Soviet intervention in Angola, Western Sahara and Liberia as well as the American actions in Nicaragua, Chile and Cuba (1959) are reflective of this trend. But their elimination as de facto guarantors of global security at the end of the Cold War saw civil wars rapidly consume the slender number of UN troops available. For example, Namibia and Nicaragua erupted into civil war in 1989, Western Sahara and

¹⁹¹ *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy For Canada*, p. 24.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Yugoslavia in 1991, and Cambodia, Somalia and El Salvador in 1992. Canada, despite the commitment of 2,000 peacekeepers in *Challenge and Commitment*, sent close to 4,000 peacekeepers to these areas.¹⁹³ To a force that was accustomed to deploying 650-800 soldiers at a time on well-established missions in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, the number and intensity of these new missions proved difficult to manage. The increased demand for peacekeepers was aggravated by the decision of the Mulroney government to reduce the federal deficit by trimming down the number of Forces personnel from 89,000 to 83,000.

As a result, by 1992 members of the Canadian Government began to question whether the Forces were capable of participating on the more numerous and hostile post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. This was suggested in a question posed by William Rompkey, Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) for Labrador, to the Minister of Defence:

We have to ask not only what the policy is going to be in future for our Canadian Forces but we have to ask also will the resources be available for our men and women overseas to do the job they have to do. Canada won't be able to participate in additional United Nations peacekeeping operations unless the Canadian Forces get more money and troops. Our ability to respond to future requests has pretty much reached its limit...our infantry is 1,200 members smaller than the metro Toronto police force and yet we are policing the world.¹⁹⁴

While certainly a valid observation, it must be kept in mind that Rompkey's question was posed during Question Period and did not constitute a formal request for a review of Canada's foreign and defence policy. Even if it had been, the Mulroney government never had the opportunity to review their defence policy, as in 1992 they lost a landslide election to the Liberal government of Jean Chretien. Chretien, faced with an

¹⁹³The Department of National Defence, "*Canadian Forces Operations 1970-2000*," Feb 2002.

¹⁹⁴*House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, Vol. XI, 1992, p. 14785.

outdated defence policy, an enormous deficit and spiralling debt, responded by launching a defence review. Initially it was unclear which way the new government would lean on defence policy, although in 1994 the Chretien government had adopted the slogan that the Canadian Forces would be able “to fight alongside the best against the best.”¹⁹⁵ The reality, however, was quite different. The Liberal government proceeded to cancel the EH-101 Anti-Submarine helicopter, to close military schools and colleges, slash training, and to cut the Canadian Forces personnel from 83,000 to 59,000. In addition, they contracted out the military supply and transport functions to civilians under the descriptor ‘alternate service delivery’ (ASD). In the end, aside from a small number of new armoured vehicles for a few of Canada’s remaining infantry battalions and four used submarines from the British, the Forces were reduced by one-third, their budget chopped by one-quarter, and remained equipped largely with 1960s and 1970s vintage equipment.¹⁹⁶

It was the reduction in military manpower, however, that had the largest impact of all. In the space of five years from 1989 to 1994, the Canadian Forces were reduced from almost 89,000 to 60,000 with no corresponding decrease in the number of UN missions that they were asked to undertake.¹⁹⁷ If anything, the operational tempo remained consistently high and on occasion increased.

¹⁹⁵ National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, (Minister of Supply and Services: Queen’s Printer, 1994), p. 4.

¹⁹⁶ Desmond Morton, “*What are We Asking Of Our Forces?*”, Canadian News Disc.<http://www.uottawa.ca/library/databases/cannews-e.html>], 15 November 2001.

¹⁹⁷ *1994 Defence White Paper*, (Minister of Supply and Services: Queen’s Printer, 1994), p. 46.

Canadian Defence Personnel				
Strength	Regular Force	Primary Reserve	Civilians	Total
1989	88,800	26,100	36,600	151,500
1994	74,900	29,400	32,500	136,800
1994 Budget: 1998 Target	66,700	29,400	25,200	121,300
1994 Budget: 1999 Target	60,000	23,000	20,000	103,000
Total Reduction 1994-1999	14,900	6,400	12,500	33,800
% Change	20%	22%	28%	25%
Total Reduction 1989-1999	28,800	3,100	16,600	48,500
% Change	32%	12%	45%	32%

Fig. 4-1

These opposing activities – a reduction in Forces personnel and an increase in the number of missions - had an enormous and almost immediate detrimental impact on the overall effectiveness of the Forces, so much so that in 1994, the situation facing the Forces had become significant enough for the Canadian government to open debate on the issue of new peacekeeping missions. At the time of the debate, Canada had 3,700 soldiers deployed in three critical mission areas, Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Rwanda, and according to the data provided at Fig 4-1, were rapidly reducing to 60,000 all ranks. At the same time, the government was considering the deployment of an *additional* 700 soldiers should the UN request them.¹⁹⁸

Andre Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, defended the government's plans to send more troops overseas despite the plan to systematically reduce the size of the Forces by one third and its budget by one quarter. Peacekeeping, it would appear, simply had to continue:

My view is that peacekeeping is fundamental to Canadian Foreign Policy. It is not simply a question of continuing a tradition for which Canadians have a deserved international reputation. It is a question of making a concrete and key contribution to international security at a time of instability in many parts of the world.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, First Session, Thirty-Fifth Parliament, Vol. 133, 1994, p. 5952.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5952.

Ouellet tempered his remarks by acknowledging that fiscal restraints could prevent Canada from realising all of these objectives. In reality, Ouellet was understating the enormity of the financial impact the numerous missions were imposing on the Canadian taxpayer. Up until the mid-1980s, Canada's annual share of peacekeeping costs was only \$8 million U.S.. By 1994 this had swelled to more than \$150 million.²⁰⁰

Jim Hart, Reform (MP) for Okanagan, was unwilling to accept that peacekeeping had to continue at all costs and pointed out that the objectives of the government's foreign policy were woefully out of step with the resource envelope allocated to the Forces:

The land element, as the army used to be called, has some 20,000 personnel, of those about 8,000 are combat ready. One third of these people are in the theatre of operations, one third have recently returned from operations and one third are in training. Simple arithmetic says either we do not have enough troops for foreign missions or we are putting too much pressure on those troops by rotating them far too often. We are all aware that the size of the regular Canadian Forces is being reduced to 60,000. This is of course because of cutbacks. Now that the budget has been reduced, the government is asking the Canadian Armed Forces to do much more in this unstable world with much less.²⁰¹

Chuck Strahl, Reform MP for Fraser Valley East, also joined the fray by pointing to the equipment deficiencies within the Forces:

Soldiers in the former Yugoslavia are using 31-year-old personnel carriers with telecommunications equipment that frequently breaks down. It can only be repaired in Canada. Better armour for the vehicles is now just arriving. We hear that the old engines of the carriers may not be able to move the personnel carriers with the added weight of the new armour. That is ironic. Unbelievably there are not enough binoculars to go around and soldiers must look through rifle sights to watch for dangerous activity. Our troops are forced to invite hostile fire just because they do not have binoculars.²⁰²

²⁰⁰ *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, First Session, Thirty-Fifth Parliament, Vol. 133, 1994, p. 5952.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5986.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 5991.

It was, however, Bob Ringma, Reform MP for Nanaimo-Cowichan, who came the closest to actually stating that peacekeeping had fundamentally changed and that Canada's foreign policy goals were out of step with that reality. Ringma also underscored the difference between 'peacekeeping,' or the activities associated with the Cold War, and 'peacemaking,' the activities more reflective of the post-Cold war. He differentiated the two by indicating that effective peacekeeping occurred when there was an agreement in place, such as with UNEF and UNFICYP, as opposed to peace enforcement operations such as UNPROFOR and UNAMIR.²⁰³ Clearly, the ability of peacekeepers to achieve success in the latter environment was severely curtailed, since there was no peace to keep:

In reviewing our foreign and defence policies, the public should decide if it supports both activities and under what circumstances. If we examine Canada's participation in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations over the years, we find that changes in operations and our commitments have taken place without our necessarily having changed policy. Through an apparent zeal to participate in all peacekeeping operations, we have gradually become immersed beyond the intent of our policy and almost beyond our resources.²⁰⁴

It must be noted, however, that these comments were made by MPs representing the opposition party who are bound to question the government's policies. Their criticism, in simple terms, will by its very nature accent the negative and tend to be partisan. Perhaps this is why the government, while acknowledging the opposition's comments in debate, opted instead to ultimately assign the Forces tasks in the 1994 Defence White Paper that do not appear to be in line with the planned force reductions.

²⁰³ *House of Commons Debates: Official Report*, First Session, Thirty-Fifth Parliament, Vol. 133, 1994, p. 2333.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2333

In summary, the 1994 Defence White Paper tasked the Forces to provide two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element and a headquarters element for multinational operations. These tasks were in effect ‘standing tasks’ to be filled by the Canadian Forces as required. Unlike the *Challenge and Commitment* Defence White Paper, precisely how many troops were to be earmarked specifically for peacekeeping operations was not clear. This was because peacekeeping was no longer a separate activity but was now captured under the banner ‘contributing to international security.’ Activities under this heading could arguably include contributions to NATO, NORAD, the UN or any other multinational security organisation.

In real terms, however, if all of the aforementioned tasks were filled simultaneously, it would equate to a commitment in excess of 4000 personnel, which the White Paper stipulated could be “sustained indefinitely” by the Forces.²⁰⁵ The document, however, did not say what the viability would be of filling these tasks if Canada already had 2,000-3,000 soldiers deployed on peacekeeping operations *at the same time*, which was exactly what eventually occurred in Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2002. In both instances the military had to withdraw after twelve months in Kosovo and six months in Afghanistan due to the enormous strain the additional deployments placed on Forces personnel.

Astonishingly, in light of the high operational tempo at the time, the 1994 Defence White Paper actually dismissed the possibility that the UN would have the ability to garner sufficient support for additional peacekeeping operations. This

²⁰⁵ 1994 *Defence White Paper*, p. 35.

statement was written at the same time that 3,700 Canadian soldiers were deployed on UN activities:

Historically, the UN has only rarely been able to achieve the level of consensus required to act militarily. As a consequence, it lacks the staff and the required experience in the planning or generation of multinational forces that would enable it to make use of the military potential of its member states in the most timely and effective manner. Indeed that the UN even has Canadian Forces at its disposal is subject to the willingness of individual member states to contribute such Canadian Forces at the time.²⁰⁶

The 1994 Defence White Paper also reaffirmed the criteria by which Canadian Forces personnel would be committed to future peacekeeping operations, which were, in effect, a reassertion of the Sharp Principles of twenty years earlier. They included:

1. There be a clear and enforceable mandate.
2. There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.
3. The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among mission partners.
4. In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognised focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures.
5. With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.
6. The size, training and equipment of the force be appropriate to the purpose at hand, and remain so over the life of the mission.
7. There be a defined concept of operations, and effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement.²⁰⁷

The missions in priority for the Forces, as defined by the 1994 Defence White Paper, and subsequently confirmed in the '1996 Departmental Outlook,' were reduced

²⁰⁶ 1994 *Defence White Paper*, p. 29.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

from four to three with the closure of Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) which occurred later that year. This eliminated the task of contributing standing ground forces to NATO, which in reality had been reduced to a token commitment at best. Curiously, peacekeeping, despite consuming the largest percentage of troops at the time the document was written, remained last. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the activity was no longer a separate line serial but had been subsumed under the aegis of ‘international security.’ The tasks read:

1. Defending Canada.
2. Defending North America.
3. Contributing to international security.²⁰⁸

It is clear, therefore, that a significant ‘commitment – capability’ gap existed between the 1994 Defence White Paper’s goals and Canada’s foreign policy, at least in terms of peacekeeping. Throughout the 1990s, more so during Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canada consistently placed a high degree of importance on peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool. As described previously, this commitment varied from 2,000 to in excess of 4,000 troops directly committed to peacekeeping throughout the 1990s. In contrast to previous defence white papers where troops committed to peacekeeping were in relative proportion to the emphasis being placed on the activity by DFAIT, by 1994 it was obviously out of alignment. The result was a significant decline in the ability of the Forces to train to higher levels as peacekeeping quite simply dominated the military’s agenda.

²⁰⁸ 1994 *Defence White Paper*, p. 18.

This fact was noted in the 1996 Auditor General's Report, which stated, "peacekeeping duty in the last few years has revealed serious problems in the Land Forces' ability to generate multipurpose forces...resulting in an inability to complete collective training plans...due to peacekeeping related tasks. Significant emergency buys were needed to provide minimum levels of equipment for troops deployed for peacekeeping."²⁰⁹

Perhaps it was this report that prompted the Liberal government to ask Dr. Bercuson, Director of Strategic Studies for the University of Calgary, to review the 1994 Defence White Paper and report on its validity. Bercuson had also taken issue with the rising number of peacekeeping missions. In his 1997 report to the Prime Minister, he described the tasks assigned to the Forces as "commendable but unrealistic objectives, too broad to allow the CF to focus on a realistic basic mission."²¹⁰ Perhaps even more telling was his final recommendation that "the government should cut back drastically on peacekeeping commitments."²¹¹

The calls for a review of the 1994 Defence White Paper did not stop here. The Council for Canadian Security In the 21st Century submitted a report to the Federal government in 2001 titled, *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper*. In this document, it was argued that the 1994 Defence White Paper reflected the global transformations, which were occurring during the early 1990s and was now out of date. The drafters, therefore, could not possibly have foreseen the proliferation of peacekeeping missions that occurred following its publication. These missions would

²⁰⁹ Auditor General's Report: 1996 [<http://oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9607me.html>], 1996.

²¹⁰ D.J. Bercuson, Report to the Prime Minister: A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence, (Minister of Supply and Services: Queen's Printer, 1997), p. 4.

²¹¹ Ibid, p. 10.

include Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1990-95), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (2000) and Macedonia (2001).²¹² Without exception, all of these operations were intrastate in nature and as such, “the risks to CF personnel including physical obstruction, armed attack, threats and kidnapping [were] greater...than ever before.”²¹³ Moreover, the report concluded:

There is a deep divide between the rhetoric of a grandiose foreign and defence policy and a decline in resources that threatens to discredit Canada’s commitment to common security. Neither those who favour a traditional approach to security nor those who promote the new concept of human security are happy with the situation, for obvious reasons.²¹⁴

Despite both of these reports, the government took no new steps to resolve the disparity between its foreign policy goals vis-à-vis peacekeeping and the direction provided in the 1994 Defence White Paper. It would appear that despite the importance of peacekeeping to Canada’s foreign policy objectives, the government had yet to realise the impact it was having on the soldiers themselves.

For example, Bill Porter of the *Canadian Peacekeeping Veteran’s Association* reported in 2001 that a decade ago “soldiers could expect a six-month peacekeeping tour every five years,” but now are rotated “into the most troubled places on earth every two years.”²¹⁵ The psychosocial impact of this is considerable. Suicide rates amongst Canada’s soldiers are almost five times the national average.²¹⁶ The Department of National Defence does not track divorce rates but it is reasonable to conclude that there is

²¹² Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper*, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2001), p. vii.

²¹³ Ibid, p. 10.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p. 18.

²¹⁵ Peter Mansbridge, “UN Told Canada Cannot Offer Any More Troops to Peacekeeping,” Canadian News Disc. <http://www.uottawa.ca/library/databases/cannews-e.html>, 23 February 2001

²¹⁶ Ibid., 23 February 2001

a significant difference here as well.²¹⁷ Obviously, the strain on the individual soldiers would in turn result in problems once deployed, in terms of discipline, effectiveness, and the ability to fulfil an assigned mandate. It is even quite possible that the well publicised disciplinary incidents in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti in the mid to late 1990s were at least in part caused by soldiers being asked to do too much too often.

Tom Keating, Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, takes a less humanistic approach in his criticism of the disparity between Canada's foreign and defence policies. Instead, Keating chose to examine the inconsistencies in monetary terms:

Operating under severe budgetary constraints, the Canadian Armed Forces have been stretched to the limit in meeting existing UN commitments. Despite its [Liberal Party] campaign promises, it is not at all clear what additional financial support a Liberal government will supply to maintain, let alone expand, these commitments. Any policy to save defence dollars may substantially impair the government's ability to respond to requests for additional peacekeeping contributions.²¹⁸

Lending credibility to Keating's assessment is the data provided by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS). While the data provided reflects military expenditures as a whole and not simply funding for peacekeeping, it is reasonable to conclude that given the significant percentage of the Forces committed to the activity, overall military expenditures *do* affect peacekeeping support. In any event, the CISS reported that Canada's defence budget for 2002-03 stood at \$12.3 billion dollars or 1.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This percentage actually represented a decline from 2001-02 when it stood at 1.2% of the GDP. This percentage ranks Canada 17th out

²¹⁷ Peter Mansbridge, "UN Told Canada Cannot Offer Any More Troops to Peacekeeping, 23 February 2001.

²¹⁸ Tom Keating, "The Future of Canadian Multilateralism," In *A Part of the Peace*, eds. M. Molot and H. Von Riekhoff (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), p. 63.

of 18 NATO countries and 53rd out of one hundred and sixty-two countries. When defence expenditures are expressed as a percentage of the population, however, Canada plummets to one hundred and fifty-fourth overall.²¹⁹

However, this data must be acknowledged as coming from a source that is bound to accentuate the negative aspects of government policy. In this light, it carries no more weight than questions from government opposition parties and reports from pundits or quasi-military bodies. This, however, has begun to change. In February, 2002, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, comprised of Liberal and Conservative members, reported “the level of funding for the Department of National Defence is insufficient to meet the many tasks assigned to our military. This limited funding has forced the Department of National Defence to focus on a cost-driven, resource limiting approach to operations...training has been curtailed, and personnel are being asked to perform at an unacceptably high level of operations tempo.”²²⁰ In contrast to the 1.12% of the GDP currently allocated to defence, the Committee recommended an increase to 1.69%. This would be equivalent to an increase of \$4 billion dollars to the baseline budget of the Department of National Defence.²²¹

An all-party House of Commons Committee echoed the Senate Report with its own publication in May, 2002. Of particular note is the fact that the House of Commons Committee is *dominated and chaired* by the governing Liberal Party. In contrast to the \$4 billion per annum recommended by the Senate Committee, the House of Commons

²¹⁹ The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, *Strategic Profile Canada: January 2002*, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies), January 2002.

²²⁰ Report on Canadian Security and Military Preparedness. [<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep05feb02part1-e.htm#What We Think>], Feb 2002.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, Feb 2002.

Committee recommended an increase of \$18 billion dollars over the next three years as well as an increase from 60,000 to 80,000 troops.²²² One member of the House of Commons Committee described the Forces as being “beyond the point of collapse,” a comment echoed by the Liberal Chair of the Committee, David Pratt, when he acknowledged that the Forces “were in dismal shape after a decade of government cuts.”²²³ The *Ottawa Citizen* described the Committee’s report as a “rare show of solidarity for a House Committee...to agree to a series of measures to beef up the military and increasing spending by 50% in only three years.”²²⁴ The final analysis, however, rests with Pratt who summarised the situation by stating, “our foreign policy is writing cheques our defence policy cannot cash.”²²⁵

Despite this report and others, the government still appears ambivalent about the dichotomy between foreign and defence policy. Martin Shadwick, a professor of Canadian Defence Policy at York University, believes that the hesitation of the government to review the 1994 Defence White Paper may stem from the conviction that a review would result in a complete jettisoning of Canada’s “multi-purpose, combat-capable” mantra for what is essentially a constabulary force.²²⁶ In effect, retaining the outdated and chronically under-funded defence statement of 1994 would be preferable to a review that may result in something less. This is inane logic. A plethora of reports

²²² Gordon Barthos, “*Invest in Canada’s Sovereignty*”, The Toronto Star, Department of National Defence ExecNet News Summaries. [<http://131.134.98.172/edgpa/clips.asp?Lang=E&option=national>], 13 June, 2002.

²²³ Allen MacArtney, “*Our National Shame*”, Calgary Herald, Department of National Defence ExecNet News Summaries. [<http://131.134.98.172/edgpa/clips.asp?Lang=E&option=national>], 10 June, 2002.

²²⁴ Editorial, “Neglecting Armed Forces Perilous to Maintenance of Independence”, Ottawa Citizen, Department of National Defence ExecNet News Summaries. [<http://131.134.98.172/edgpa/clips.asp?Lang=E&option=national>], 9 June, 2002.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Martin Shadwick, “White Paper Blues,” In *Canadian Military Journal*, 2, no. 4 (Winter 2002-2002), p. 65.

from various ‘think tanks’ and quasi-military lobby groups, and now two government committees, have repeatedly underscored that a review is not only necessary, but critical. For example, the Standing Committee on Finance urged a review to determine the 1994 Defence White Paper’s “continued relevance.”²²⁷ Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies prepared a report, *To Secure a Nation*, arguing that the global and domestic conditions on which the 1994 Defence Paper was based, have changed radically.²²⁸ The Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century described the White Paper as “increasingly irrelevant” and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs (SCONDVA) urged Ottawa to “immediately initiate a major review of foreign and defence policies.”²²⁹

However, this is not the case. The 1994 Defence White Paper remains in place and DFAIT continues to lay claim to peacekeeping as its very own. This can be seen in the foreword to the co-authored DND/DFAIT 1995 Report titled, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*:

In 1956, Lester Pearson helped to initiate the first real UN peacekeeping operation in response to the Suez Crisis. Ever since, support for and participation in UN peacekeeping operations has played a prominent role in Canadian foreign and defence policy. It is therefore appropriate that in this, the UN’s 50th anniversary year, the Canadian Government should place a special emphasis on ways of improving the use of blue berets to help resolve conflicts.²³⁰

DFAIT’s claim, while accurate in form, is lacking in substance. The reality, as demonstrated in this paper, is that peacekeeping has never been a very important military

²²⁷ Martin Shadwick, “White Paper Blues,” In *Canadian Military Journal*, 2, no. 4, p. 65.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²³⁰ National Defence, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability For the United Nations: Report of the Government of Canada*, (Minister of Supply and Services: Queen’s Printer, 1995), p. i.

role for the country. As noted earlier, throughout the Cold War no more than 2,200 military personnel were committed to the activity at any one time, which given the relative size of the Canadian Forces at the time, did not warrant the barrage of publicity or the weight of prestige attached to it. In real terms, during the same period Canada had more personnel committed to NORAD, 4CMBG in Europe and other such multinational endeavours. Peacekeeping, unlike today, was a comparatively minor role for the military.²³¹ Canada's ability to realise success during this period stems directly from the nature of the missions themselves - largely interstate – as well as the comparatively few number of them relative to the strength of the Forces at the time. Without question, the numerous and hostile nature of current efforts as well as the dwindling strength of the Forces have impacted on the military's ability to succeed on peacekeeping. In light of this truth, it is ironic that in 1999, DFAIT expanded upon the Sharp Principles by adding an eighth criterion for deploying soldiers on peacekeeping operations: that risk to Canadian soldiers be within reasonable limits.²³²

It should be clear, therefore, that despite continuing to participate on UN operations throughout the post-Cold War, Canada's reputation as a peacekeeper is in jeopardy. This is because the environment in which the majority of recent peacekeeping operations are occurring is markedly different than that of the Cold War. Consequently, the employment of lightly-armed and lightly-equipped troops is insufficient.

Peacekeeping is no longer inexpensive, it requires a significant investment in terms of training and equipment, neither of which is being given to the Canadian Forces under the

²³¹ J.L. Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986), p. 236.

²³² Canada and Peacekeeping: DFAIT Policy Statement. [<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/back-e.asp>] 1999.

1994 Defence White Paper. Moreover, it should now be obvious that the prioritisation of tasks within the Defence White Paper is not in line with the position taken by DFAIT.

The result, therefore, has been a reduction in Canada's ability to operate effectively in the post-Cold War environment in terms of inadequate equipment, an insufficient number of soldiers and dwindling defence expenditures.

One consequence of this reality has been the adoption of an 'early in-early out' policy by the Forces when conducting new peacekeeping missions. For example, in June 2001, the Canadian contingent in Ethiopia and Eritrea was withdrawn after only six months. Simply put, the Forces can no longer afford to assume the responsibility for long-term peacekeeping with declining assets. While the adoption of this method may be driven by fiscal and manpower restraints, the UN sees it differently. As reported in *Maclean's*, policies like Canada's 'early in-early out' demonstrate that there is a "diminished enthusiasm for peacekeeping among western countries, including Canada."²³³

In 1947, the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that "security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organisation."²³⁴ At the time, he was commenting on the development of the UN as a multinational coalition dedicated to world peace. In 1993, Prime Minister Chretien told the UN General Assembly: "The UN's central vocation - the defence and promotion of peace and security - is Canada's vocation as well."²³⁵ The difference lies in the ability of Canada to deliver

²³³ Corelli-Rae, "Early In, Early out: Canadian Peacekeeping is Changing as Ottawa Backs Away from Open-ended Missions", *Macleans*, Canadian News Disc. [<http://www.uottawa.ca/library/databases/cannews-e.html>], June 25, 2001.

²³⁴ Pearson, "Peacekeeping and Canadian Policy," p. 112

²³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 112.

in 1947 and its inability to do so in more recent times. For forty years, Canada was counted upon by the UN as a nation willing and able to provide forces to promote its goals. In the last ten to fifteen years that ability has been significantly eroded, but the political rhetoric of days gone by has not. While this certainly reduces Canada's political credibility in terms of peacekeeping, as noted by the recent British refusal to accept Canadian troops in the UN mission in Afghanistan, ultimately it impacts directly on the UN's ability to continue peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. While it is acknowledged that Canada is not the only capable member state that the UN can call upon, as the creator of the activity, and as one of the most prolific participants, Canada's current situation cannot help but hurt an already struggling organisation.

Conclusion

The UN's contribution to world peace during the Cold War is commendable and impressive. Hampered by the intractable attitudes often displayed by member states, the organisation found a way to fulfil its mandate and overcome obstacles in an extremely difficult era. On the other hand, as demonstrated in this paper, some have argued that the success the UN experienced during the Cold War was artificial in that the geopolitical circumstances and bipolar nature of the conflict all but ensured the organisation would prevail. In simple terms, the UN was only permitted to intervene, such as in the Middle East, when both superpowers agreed. In effect, this agreement helped tremendously in producing success, as no external influences would hinder the peace process.

The reputation the UN earned as a peacekeeper, therefore, was in some respects exaggerated. In more recent years, these detractors point to a string of failures – namely in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans - as evidence of this truth. The UN's future as a peacekeeper in the post-Cold War era, therefore, is limited at best. As Colonel James Allan wrote:

In such a world, the imperfect UN will be able to perform modest peacekeeping services of largely the classic type, with some minor additions in election monitoring and relief operations. Warlike peace enforcement operations should not be the task of the UN but of great power led coalitions or for regional defence and security groupings, with lip service being paid to the UN as in the American-led Gulf War.²³⁶

The plethora of articles and opinion pieces, some by previous supporters of peacekeeping, show that Allan is not alone in this observation. However, what commentary such as this fails to account for is the history surrounding the UN's efforts to

²³⁶ Allan, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer*, p. 156.

adopt and refine peacekeeping. It also neglects to recognise that the environment in which peacekeeping occurred during the Cold War, interstate conflict, is not the environment of current operations, which are predominately intrastate. Success in the former, as discussed in this paper, was far easier to achieve. Moreover, this criticism neglects to acknowledge that the problems within the UN are neither structural nor procedural, but is in fact the by-product of the interactions of the member states themselves. The Council for Canadian Security In the 21st Century alluded to this when it wrote: “the problem with the UN in peace support operations is not ‘institutional’ but ‘international’ – the UN’s capacity to manage international crises will, in the end, always depend on the political will of key members...”²³⁷

This statement is borne out by the limited support in terms of personnel and commitments the UN received when the organisation tried to take steps to bolster its peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s. As demonstrated in Rwanda, member states were quick to commit to the UN in principle, but proved hesitant to support the organisation when personnel and resources were required. Similarly, Canada took steps to improve perceived problems within the UN by sponsoring the joint National Defence/DFAIT proposal *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability For the United Nations*. Within this proposal were numerous recommendations that, if fulfilled, would have undoubtedly addressed the myriad manning and training problems revealed within the UN since the end of the Cold War.

The hypocrisy of these recommendations, however, can be seen in the growing ‘commitment-capability’ gap that plagues the Canadian Forces. Increasingly, Canadian foreign policy is placing demands on the Forces as peacekeepers at the same time that the

²³⁷ *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper*, p. 11. Conclusion- 124/133

Federal Government is slashing expenditures and reducing manning. The result has been a well-publicised erosion of the Forces' military capabilities as they struggle to perform in the hostile post-Cold War environment with antiquated equipment and with a frequency that threatens to burn out military personnel.

This has eroded the Forces' reputation as well-trained, well-equipped and professional peacekeepers. British General Sir Michael Rose, former commander UNPROFOR, said as much when he criticised the Canadian Forces' inadequacy as a modern, well-trained force. Moreover, the exclusion of the Canadians by the British from the current UN-led Afghanistan peacekeeping force could be interpreted as proof of his comments. Finally, the adoption of the 'first in – first out' approach to new UN missions by the Canadian government seems a tacit admission that the Canadian Forces are in fact incapable of modern peacekeeping operations for sustained periods.

What Canada has failed to recognise is that modern peacekeeping efforts require a much higher investment in terms of military expenditures and manpower to realise success. This is a critical oversight as it is successful peacekeeping that eventually translates into political credibility and leverage on the world stage. The inability or unwillingness of the government to come to grips with this issue has led to a declining effectiveness of the Canadian Forces. This in turn has meant that the UN can no longer count on Canada, at one time its staunchest supporter in peacekeeping, to provide well-trained, well-equipped troops for the numerous operations in the post-Cold War era. Given the UN's historic dependence on Canada in peacekeeping, this is a development that cannot help but hurt an organisation that is already struggling to adapt.

Major-General Mackenzie once said, “It is perhaps unfair and unwise to condemn the UN for failing to resolve the world’s problems, because, when we do that, we are condemning ourselves. The UN is merely the sum of its parts.”²³⁸ This phrase has been borne out by the evidence presented in this paper. The UN’s failure in the post-Cold War era has in fact been the failure of the member states. In condemning the UN, member states are doing no more than condemning themselves.

²³⁸ Mackenzie, *Peacekeeper: Road to Sarajevo*, p. xvii.

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