

Multiculturalism and Low-Skill Temporary Foreign Work:
Bridging the Policy Gap? A Negative Influence on Canadian Society

Angela Tilk

Student Number: 7355480

Supervisor: Professor Christine Straehle

25 March 2015

Abstract:

Canada's Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) has been the focus of much public discourse in recent years. This discourse focuses heavily on labour market concerns and often does not encapsulate the program's effect on Canada's social society. This paper explores this social impact in greater detail, especially the significance of the program's expansion to include low-skill work. I find that the use of the program has negatively impacted Canadian perceptions of immigration because its use challenges the fundamental framework of Canada's successful immigration and multiculturalism policies. Further, it is indicative of an unofficial shift away from long-run immigration towards employer-driven immigration without public approval. These findings are evidenced in a number of specific policy analyses, such as Canada's Family Reunification policies and Foreign Credential Recognition (FCR).

Table of Contents

i. Abstract	p.2
1. Introduction	p.4
2. Canada's Model of Multiculturalism	p.6
2.1 Canadian Multiculturalism : Identifying Success	p.9
3. Temporary Foreign Labour in Canada	p.12
4. Exploring the Impacts of TFWs	p.16
4.1 Shifts in Labour Policy	p.16
4.2 What is Degradation?	p.17
4.3 Measurement Paramters	p.20
5. Labour Market Evidence	p.21
5.1 Language Programs	p.22
5.2 FCR	p.25
6. Evidence in Social Society	p.29
6.1 Social Trust	p.30
6.2 Family Reunification	p.33
6.3 Access to Citizenship	p.39
6.3.1 Evolution of Citizenship	p.42
6.3.2 Rates of Naturalization	p.44
7. Discussion of Findings	p.47
7.1 Economic Indicators	p.47
7.2 Social Indicators	p.48
8. Conclusion	p.51
9. Bibliography	p.53

1. INTRODUCTION

With over 232 million international migrants in the world today (OECD, 2013), dealing with immigration has become a necessary component of domestic policy. These large intakes of foreign nationals can provide positive economic benefits for host countries, such as filling labour market shortages. However, their impacts on society extend much further than economic contributions alone. Along with their human capital, migrants bring a host of cultural and social characteristics that may or may not integrate smoothly into a new society. Sometimes, policies of assimilation are adopted, where, upon entrance to a society, immigrants must commit to the cultural norms of their new place of residence. Other countries attempt to embrace these cultural differences alongside their own societal norms. It is within this niche that Canada has set a clear precedence. It made history as the first country in the world to adopt multiculturalism as official policy in 1971 and in doing so affixed a policy direction that both appreciated and welcomed ethnic diversity. These efforts helped encourage immigrants to integrate into society and take a permanent, active part in its social, cultural, economic, and political affairs. (CIC, 2015b) Canada's multicultural model has reaped positive results within the country and has become influential in discussions about immigration policy around the world. However, despite these achievements, current Canadian success does not guarantee such success in the future.

An emerging concern with regards to Canadian multiculturalism has been the growth and increased reliance on the country's Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) as a tool of Canada's immigration policy. Canada's model of multiculturalism was constructed around two fundamental principles: the idea of permanence and the

value of human capital. These principles were further emphasized by the ability of the points system to eliminate the racial discrimination that once characterized Canada's immigration policies. (Leonard & Straehle, 2012) After 1967, incoming migrants were admitted based on levels of higher education and work experience, rather than race, characteristics that helped facilitate them more efficiently and effectively into Canadian society. (Leonard & Straehle, 2012) The TFWP, being a temporary labour-importation program, diverges from these policy initiatives. Indeed, this divergence escalates to complete contradiction when considering the program's 2002 expansions to low-skill sectors. Subsequently, the Low-Skill Pilot Program saw an influx in workers of low human capital admitted into Canada on a temporary basis rather than the hitherto focus on high-skilled immigrants. Canadians have typically perceived immigrants as contributors to economic and cultural life because immigration policy has assured that new immigrants don't fall to the bottom rung of Canadian society. (Leonard & Straehle, 2012) Now, however, increasing numbers of low-skill workers challenge this traditionally accepted makeup. Jobs in low-skill work promote the ideology that immigrants tend to fill undesirable work positions within society, something Canadian immigration policy has actively tried to avoid. Moreover, increased number of TFW change Canadian's perception of Canadian immigration society, away from acceptance and integration to exclusion and mistrust. Therefore, I want to show that TFWPs pose a potential threat to Canadian's perception of immigrants and their inclusion into multicultural Canadian society.

To do so, this paper will first explore the origins of Canadian immigration and multiculturalism and identify major characteristics that contribute to its success. An

analysis of these findings juxtaposed with Canada's TFWP will attempt to determine the extent of the TFWP's influence on Canadian society. My hypothesis is twofold: first, that the presence of TFWs has contributed to a degradation of multiculturalism policy, either in the rewriting of the policy or in the implementation of it, and second, that the use of a TFWP shows an evident shift away from the traditional immigration policy Canada has employed towards employer-driven immigration. Finally, the paper will offer a summary of its analysis and recommendations moving forward.

2. CANADA'S MULTICULTURAL MODEL

I want to argue that there are a number of problems associated with temporary labour migration in Canada, including the threats posed to Canadian multicultural policies. In order to better understand these threats, we need to determine the successful characteristics of the Canadian multiculturalism experience. The original objective of Canadian immigration was a tool of nation building. Policy directives of the 20th century looked to dramatically increase inflows to Canada from source countries of a similar demographic. As such, racial discrimination and an inconsistent admission framework tinged immigration policy during this time. Immigration applications were accepted only from certain destination states and admission status was largely based on the discretion of immigration officers. The list of acceptable destination countries largely excluded nations of different ethnic makeup, such as South and East Asia, instead remaining focused on Western Europe. (Green, 1976) Indeed, Prime Minister Mackenzie King told the House in 1947 that 'large-scale immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population' and would 'certainly give rise to social and economic problems. (as cited in Green, 1976, p.21) But, in the late 50s, the absorptive

capacity of the Canadian economy for traditionally accepted European low-skill labourers began to slow and the Department of Labour advanced the idea that Canada instead needed *skilled* workers, regardless of origin, and needed them *soon*. (Green & Green, 2004) This shift was furthered in 1962, when Canada's Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Ellen Fairclough, said: "the key to our new immigration policy will be the consistent application of proper selection standards designed to bring the best possible settlers to Canada," an official proclamation calling for the best workers without mention of race. (as cited in Green & Green, 1999, p.37) Soon after saw the elimination of the 'acceptable' countries list and the implementation of Canada's renowned points system. The points system was key in enforcing the shift away from the race of a prospective immigrant and instead focusing on skills and human capital they actually possessed. (Green & Green, 2004) In 1971, this ideological shift culminated into actual law with the passing and enshrining of Canada's Multicultural Act. The Act promised to promote and recognize the diverse nature of Canada's identity and committed to full equality of all citizens. (Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1971) The following decades saw a continued importance in migrant human capital and enjoyed a more inclusive and diverse Canadian society.

Immigration policy in recent years seems similar to policies of the 1920s, where government focus was on long-term immigration – goals realized by consistent inflows of migrants, regardless of market conditions. (Green & Green, 2004) Hawkins calls this government position a 'victory for immigration' and a sign of a flexible national workforce. (Hawkins, 1974) Green and Green argue that this long-term immigration model actually is less efficient, benefiting not the labour market or incoming migrants, so

much as business owners and businesses themselves. The debate over short vs. long-term objectives in Canada is interesting in the context of this paper. Proponents of the short-term goals – that is, adjusting migration flows with labour market demand - question why, amidst high unemployment rates in the country, steady inflows of migration continue. Supporters of long-term immigration goals would argue that it is more important to maintain a flexible national workforce, since market demand fluctuations are often and varied. (Green & Green, 1999) It seems that, for either option, the fact that persistent inflows of permanent workers continued in Canada each year is uncontested. Indeed, Green and Green claim that under the long-term immigration model, business owners benefit because they can select employees from ‘a large inflow of labour that is picked specifically to flexible.’(Green & Green, 2004) Maintaining an immigration policy with long-term objectives in mind raises questions about the need for a temporary labour program. Each year, the Canadian government admits approximately 250, 000 permanent residents. (Statistics Canada, 2015) Discourse in favour of a TFWP commonly indicates that significant labour shortages exist, despite these maintained inflows. Indeed, this discourse circulates in regions where unemployment rates are 10% and higher. (Gross, 2014) Labour shortages could exist for a number of different reasons, such as reduced interprovincial mobility, for example, and temporary foreign workers should not be used as a blanket cure for all labour-related concerns. Canada has not looked to recruit low-skill work permanently since the implementation of the points system, so why would it look to do so temporarily? This next section presents problems associated with temporary labour migration in Canada and the threats it poses to our successful multiculturalism.

2.1 Canadian Multiculturalism: Identifying Our Success

Canada set global precedence by becoming the first country in the world to adopt multiculturalism as a national policy. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), an internationally renowned measure of integration, found that the Canadian government has the strongest commitment to anti-discrimination and equality of all 31 measured countries. (MIPEX, 2010) The Multicultural Policy Index, another international measure of multicultural policies, places Canada behind only Australia in terms of overall effectiveness in its multicultural policies. Canada's policies are recognized for their success within her borders as well. The response of the Canadian public in recent history has been overwhelmingly positive. In 1985, a study by Environics asked Canadians to describe what made them most proud of their country and found that multiculturalism ranked tenth on that list. The same question was asked over 20 years later in 2006 and multiculturalism had climbed to second place. (as cited in Reitz, 2011a, p.11)

Multiculturalism is, according to Adams, nothing short of "the Canadian dream." (Adams, 2007) Education is cited as the most important personal characteristic related to support for current levels of immigration. (Reitz, 2011a) This positivity for sustained immigration is fuelled by the human capital of incoming migrants, which enables them to enter the labour market faster and more effectively than if they did not possess these educational and vocational qualifications. In the same vein of thought, their economic contributions as a result of their labour market contributions fuel this positive perception of immigration and further its continuation over time.

Another key component of Canada's multicultural policies is their aim to further the ability of immigrants to integrate into society. This is done through skill development

and language programs, for example, which are based in the idea that immigration helps build society, rather than simply exist alongside it. In the United Kingdom, a strong colonial history meant a clearly established ideal of what it meant to be 'British.' Its multicultural progressions saw the pursuance of 'community cohesion,' by attempting to create cohesion between distinct neighbourhoods and calling for their coexistence. (Macdonald, 1989) Research has shown since that by targeting specific groups rather than overall exclusion has encouraged segregation rather than lessened it. (Reitz, 2011b) What resulted was the existence of parallel lives, something UK Prime Minister David Cameron colloquially defined as 'different cultures living separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream.' (as cited in Bloemraad, 2011) Phillips asserted more bluntly that these policies encouraged Britain to 'sleep walk into segregation.' (Phillips, 2005) The Dutch, too, have strayed from the inclusive principles of multiculturalism with their adoption of 'civic integration,' a collective of policy objectives that dictate more the need for immigrants to integrate themselves into society, rather than for society to work and integrate them. (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013) This rejection is especially troubling considering the scope of its divergence, as the Netherlands was once celebrated for its openness to and acceptance of immigrants. The Dutch case is worth exploring in further depth as it is now widely considered the prototypical example of the 'failure of multiculturalism,' in addition to being cited by many other European countries as grounds for retreating from their own multiculturalism. (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010)

Like Canada, the Dutch used immigration policy as a nation-building strategy in the postwar period and saw a steady rise in both immigrants and legislation at

accommodating these immigrants during this time. However, in the late 1990s, policy focus shifted to integration and assimilation after public outcry from the Dutch public claimed that immigrants had not been ‘meeting their responsibility to integrate.’ (Vasta, 2007) Public discourse identified Dutch migration policies as being too generous since newcomers were not required to know or expected to learn the Dutch language, culture, or history. (Bloemraad, 2011) Essentially, citizens felt the Dutch government had ‘ignored basic liberal democratic values’ in favour of the ‘acceptance of diverse cultural identities’ – a practice that ‘ultimately destroy(ed) social cohesion’ in the Netherlands. (Vasta, 2007) It was with this negative view of immigrants that ‘civic integration’ was embraced over multiculturalism. Joppke’s (2007) definition of this practice accentuates the importance of immigrants integrating more fully into the mainstream of society, and advances a number of core principles, such as employment and knowledge of language. The emphasis is placed on a migrant to integrate into society, rather than on the importance of maintaining their cultural habits.

Some of the aforementioned characteristics may sound familiar: Canadian policy also highlights the importance of the employability and language skills of an immigrant. It is important to note that Canada has not implemented the practices that are seen to have negative impacts on immigrants. The distinction here is that Canada also pursues multicultural objectives alongside integration policies. Kymlicka (2012) describes the Canadian model as ‘multicultural integration,’ promoting the aforementioned necessities of employment and language skills as a way to support cultural diversity. Acceptance of cultural differences is fueled by the ability of a migrant to become a full participant of society, a transition made possible by the ability to converse in the national language and

to contribute to the Canadian labour market. It seems an important lesson, then, is that integration policies are not only compatible with multicultural policies, but appear to be most effective when paired and pursued together. While the UK has visibly distanced itself from earlier commitments to multiculturalism by implementing civic integration policies without layering them with multicultural policies, the Netherlands appears to have abandoned multicultural policies completely in the late 20th and early 21st century. (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013) Both options have sparked backlash to immigration and offer important lessons to Canada moving forward. Banting and Kymlicka (2010) emphasize that there are varying degrees of ‘multicultural integration,’ that it is not a blanket solution for all countries struggling with multiculturalism-related concerns, but note that the Canadian model has thus far been effective for the country. With a successful multicultural framework in place, and important characteristics of this framework, such as permanence and human capital of incoming immigrants, identified, this paper will now look at Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program in more depth.

3. TEMPORARY LABOUR: THREATS TO CANADA

The aforementioned successful framework of multiculturalism in Canada is targeted towards a permanent class of immigrants, rather than temporary workers who leave the country when demand for their service drops. According to MIPEX, Canada holds the third best international ranking on integration policies for immigrants. (MIPEX, 2010) However, a recent study done by MIPEX in partnership with the Ryerson University Center of Immigration and Settlement predicts that future MIPEX results will find that Canada’s immigration effectiveness, compared to that of other countries, will drop far

down the list. They attribute this decline to a number of policy decisions in recent years, including those related to Canada's Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) and legislation changes to family reunification and citizenship acquisition. (Bauder, 2014)

Theoretically, temporary worker programs can be useful to offset labour shortages without negatively affecting wages or the economic climate. In practice, however, it often has many negative repercussions.

In the European cases, guest worker programs meant large inflows of low-skilled labourers and led to segregation in society that still hold some 40 years later. In the Canadian experience, previous regulation of the program has prevented large inflows of temporary workers from permanently remaining in Canada, but program dependence has reached such a level that Gross (2014) calls it 'a permanent fixture of Canadian society.'

This creates a two-tier system of workers: ones who are high-skill and permanent, and ones who are low-skill and are not. The implications of this are three-fold. Firstly, the program solidifies legislated inequality within society. By inviting workers into Canada but not allowing access to citizenship, the program diminishes Canadian commitment to equality and multiculturalism. Indeed, the preamble to Canada's Multiculturalism Act recognizes all Canadian citizens to be equal in status, before the law, and of opportunity. It seems curious that a country so committed to universal freedom and equality would use a program that continually denies these rights to an increasing number of workers within its borders each year. It is a wonder how does Canada determines a worker is good enough to help build her, but not worthy enough to call her home.

This leads to the second implication: societal perceptions of immigration. Large inflows of low-skill work meant that migrants had an increased propensity to be lower

income and thus had a more difficult time integrating into society while requiring a more significant contribution from the welfare state. (Castles, 1985) In Canada, decades of immigration policy highlighting the importance of education, language ability, and job skills means that Canadians hold their migrants in such high regards because they encapsulate these particular values. Low-wage workers are not required to be well educated, are not required to speak one of the national languages, and their job skills can be very limited. The connect between these two types of migrants is very weak. Reitz (2011a) found Canadians to be incredibly supportive of multiculturalism, ranking it higher than hockey and the RCMP as national symbols. How does this support waiver when the fundamental core of its beloved immigration system is completely reversed? Multiculturalism and integration in a society can only be fully realized when society supports it. Canadians supported an immigration system that brought in educated, employable immigrants. There has been no public discourse to support a labour program that brings in unskilled workers on a temporary basis. (Leonard & Straehle, 2012)

A compounding issue of this program is that it simultaneously exists alongside Canada's points-based immigration system. Each year, the two programs account for over 400, 000 migrants into the country, split almost evenly with temporary workers having a slight majority. This means over half of all incoming migrants for almost a decade have not held acceptable qualifications for entry, in terms of legal standards or of societal standards. As Canada attempts to maintain its commitment to multiculturalism, its values are constantly negated by the continued admittance of these low-skilled workers. Canadians respond positively to educated migrants. For each qualified permanent resident admitted to Canada, there exists the potential that he or she may be

labeled as a low-skilled worker admitted under the TFWP. These different streams of migration excessively complicate the conditions under which Canadian multiculturalism has previously succeeded. The existence of the TFWP significantly diminishes, and maybe even negates, the power of our Multiculturalism Act and the stability of our multicultural society.

The final implication of a heavily relied upon TFWP is the increased propensity for a growing underground black market of labour. As the infamous euphemism goes, there is nothing more permanent than a temporary worker and Canada is no exception. While not the focus of this paper, the number of vulnerable workers subjected to an underground slave labour market or extreme employer abuse is significant. (Fudge & MacPhail, 2006) In closing, this analysis highlights the concerns that reliance on temporary foreign workers can have for Canada. The legislated inequality it ensures within society, the difficulties it presents for temporary foreign workers and Canadian citizen alike in terms of integration issues are incredibly troubling. Comparing it with the European experiences and considering its contribution to an underground market for slave labour only furthers these concerns. Despite these theoretical indicators, the Canadian government still continues to rely on this program and has so for more than a decade. The remainder of this paper strives to find empirical evidence to support the claim that TFWs contribute to the degradation of multiculturalism in Canadian society and are indicative of an unofficial shift in Canadian migration policy.

4. EXPLORING CANADA AND THE IMPACT OF TFWs

In order to determine if: (a) a degradation of Canadian multicultural policies has occurred or (b) temporary labour patterns are indicative of a shift in immigration policy from the Canadian government, we must first define degradation as it pertains to this topic and illustrate the varying ways policy shifts would exist in society.

4.1 Shifts in Labour Policy

The first effect, a shift away from the long-run immigration policy currently pursued by the Canadian government, is evidenced clearly in a number of ways:

- (i) *a decrease in difficulty of employers to hire temporary foreign labour*

If restrictions ease on temporary labour, employers are more apt to use them, and, therefore, inflows of these temporary workers will increase. The more temporary workers that are admitted to Canada, the larger the contradiction between legislated policy and actual outcomes grows.

- (ii) *a decrease in the ease of access to citizenship (an increase in the number of requirements necessary for residency)*

Citizenship is the ultimate symbol of permanence. There are restrictions on being a permanent resident. Possession of Canadian citizenship means the holder is a Canadian citizen in any given place or at any given time.

- (iii) *an increase in government initiatives to recruit temporary foreign labour*

Government initiatives to import temporary labour fulfill objects the exact opposite of long run immigration goals. Low-skill workers further this contradiction since immigration framework aims to attract high-skill workers.

- (iv) *an increase in the rate of return of temporary workers*

This indicator is an extension of the one above. It highlights the same arguments: permanent vs. temporary and low vs. high skill. To return means that at one point, the temporary labour had already been admitted into Canada before, therefore confirming the prolonged existence of the program.

Increasing rates of return mean not only a temporary labour importation program *continuation* but also an *expansion* of said program. The increasing prevalence of temporary labour means that the Canadian government has further contradicted its commitment to long-term, high skilled migrants.

- (v) *an increase in temporary workers over permanent residency flows*

The strongest indicator of policy shift occurs when there are more temporary inflows entering Canada than permanent one. In absolute figures, regardless of skill level, more temporary workers are entering Canada than permanent ones.

How does this support a long-term immigration objective?

4.2 What is Degradation?

While labour shifts are easier to find, determining whether degradation of multicultural policies outcomes has occurred is more difficult. The way I construe it here, a degradation of these policies would be the decreased importance or effectiveness of the objective of multicultural policies. Since this analysis is looking to determine two separate effects – a shift in immigration policy trends and the degradation of multicultural policy outcomes - the same indicators will be used for both, but from a different perspective. It would occur in the following ways:

- (i) *a decrease in difficulty of employers to hire temporary foreign labour*

If employers can easily hire foreign workers, the supply of temporary labour will increase. With this increased labour comes an increasingly larger population of workers in Canada who are ineligible for integration programs since permanent residency is a requirement for these types of initiatives. Low-skill temporary workers, who often enter Canada workers without the cherished characteristics of typical Canadian immigrants, interact with Canadian citizens on an increasingly more frequent basis. This increase in frequency means that more often Canadians interact with: (a) visible minorities working in low-skill positions (contributing to the immigrant/low-skill work relationship referenced earlier) and (b) working migrants who demonstrate poor levels of human capital. These factors contribute to a degraded view of a Canadian citizens perception of immigration and, thus, degrades the outcome of multicultural policies aimed at encouraging equality and acceptance.

- (ii) *a decrease in the ease of access to citizenship (an increase in the number of requirements necessary for residency)*

An important step in the successful integration of immigrants is the transition from permanent resident to national citizen. A decrease in the ease of citizenship acquisition could translate to a lower naturalization rate and a growing number of permanent residents in Canada who do not fully integrate into Canadian society.

(iii) *an increase in government initiatives to recruit temporary foreign labour*

This disconnect between policy objective and actual outcomes is significant. It could lead to a fragmented relationship between Canadian citizens and their government. If Canadians are untrusting of government officials, a program involving immigration, such as the Temporary Foreign Worker Program could lead to public outcry against immigration as a whole. A rejection of immigration is a complete failure for multiculturalism.

(iv) *an increase in the rate of return of temporary workers*

If temporary workers continue to return each year to Canada, they become much more of a permanent component in society than their titles indicate. If policies are geared towards permanent, high-skill workers, this means consistently more and more members of Canadian society are not successfully captured in Canada's multicultural integration framework. If these integration policies do not capture these temporary workers, and these temporary workers continue to reenter the Canadian labour market consistently, there exists the risk for a polarization to occur within Canadian society (between the temporary and permanent workers) that have significant impacts on community and social cohesion.

(v) *an increase in temporary workers over permanent residency flows*

This occurrence negates the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, as it was drafted under the presumptions that immigrants would be treated as equals within society. Temporary workers do not hold the same equality levels as Canadian citizens and, therefore, are not treated the same way by the government. This

inequity could further compound to inequity within society, between Canadian citizens, migrant or not.

Keeping these parameters in mind, I will now introduce the framework for analysis.

4.3 Measurement Parameters

In order to evaluate Canadian multicultural policies and determine whether TFWs have contributed to their degradation, we will have to look at a variety of data over the past decades. Since we are primarily concerned with the effect of low-skill temporary workers on Canada multicultural policies, our pivotal base year is 2002, the year the TFWP expanded to include this type of work. To ensure completeness in our evaluation, we will include data from the five years prior to this important program change in order to capture any preemptive policies. Therefore, the bracket of analysis will cover data from 1998 until the most recent data available, likely 2014. For certain measures, data may be available for the year 2015 but likely will only cover until 2014. Additionally, while a comprehensive review of the TFW program would be ideal, data will be drawn only from the three most frequent users of the program: Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario. While any use of TFWs holds significance, Figure 1.1 demonstrates that these three provinces account for 80% of the program's inflows as well as over 60% of national population, thus holding the greatest influences on Canada's multicultural policies.

Temporary foreign worker positions on approved labour market opinions by province or territory, 2012

Alta.	84,465
Ont.	49,770
B.C.	28,060
Que.	15,415
Sask.	9,995
Man.	4,410
N.S.	3,300
Nfld.	3,025
N.B.	2,345
PEI	1,120
NWT	265
Yukon	250
Nunavut	90

Finally, the scope of our analysis will focus on two components of society: the labour market and Canada’s social fabric. While sociological indicators hold obvious linkages to the aim of the paper, economic signals bring a greater depth to the analysis and may help depict the scope of influence a temporary foreign worker program has in Canada.

5. LABOUR MARKET EVIDENCE

Analyzing employment-related programs that aim to further the qualifications of incoming migrants to Canada is a useful way of discovering any changes in multiculturalism policies in the labour market. An example of these programs is government-funded language training. Movement away from these types of programs could indicate that (a) a shift towards a more temporary type of work in the labour market is seemingly preferred and (b) possibly a degradation of multiculturalism within Canada. In this section, we analyze two programs or features of the Canadian labour market to determine if the existence of temporary workers has impacted their effectiveness or their use. The first is government funded language program (ESL and LINC) and the second is Canadian recognition of foreign credentials (FCR).

5.1 Language Programs (ESL, LINC)

The first indicator explored is the evolution of English as a Second Language (ESL) programs in the country. Low-skill temporary foreign workers are not eligible for language training upon entry to Canada (as they are not permanent residents) and often do not speak English or French at an adequate level for participation in public society. (Maytree, 2009) As language capacity is considered a priority for incoming migrants, a drop in funding of ESL programs would be indicative of a shift towards employer-driven immigration, catering specifically to current vacancies rather than ensuring qualified immigrants pre-exist in the Canadian labour market. Essentially, a drop in ESL programs could mean the increased incurrence of TFWs is correlated with a decreasing government emphasis on immigration. A reduction in programs available for language training are indicative of an emphasis change away from ensuring that permanent migrants in Canada become more marketable candidates for the labour market.

Canada's primary language program, funded by the Federal Government, is called the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC). It is offered across the country except for the following provinces: Quebec, Manitoba, and British Columbia. (Evaluation of LINC, 2010) Additionally, ESL programs are offered on a provincial basis, primarily in public schools for children but also cater to adult language training. Language training programs in British Columbia are still funded by Citizenship and Immigration, but responsibility of the program was transferred to the province in 1999. (Taviss & Simces, 2004) In 2010, a comprehensive review of this program was performed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada to ensure its relevance and design. Overall, the key findings show the program to be closely in line with CIC priorities and

reaffirmed the federal stance on the importance of language acquisition for successful integration into Canada. (Evaluation of LINC, 2010) The report has a generally positive undertone but shows a few key indicators of concern. It evaluates program effectiveness based on the quality of instructors, availability of the program, and overall enrollment, among others. It shows that for Alberta, the instructors are less qualified than in other provinces, that in Calgary, officials identified waitlists as a significant issue plaguing the program's effectiveness. It also identified that dropout rates are incredibly low. What is the significance of this? The simultaneous existence of these issues means that the migrant demand for these programs is very high while the provincial and federal commitment to ensuring availability of these programs is much lower. A separate study on the LINC programming done by the University of Calgary found that despite a 10% increase in the number of immigrants arriving between 2001 and 2006, federal funding to Alberta for language training has decreased. (Ricento, Cervatiuc, MacMillan, & Masoodi, 2008) Little rationale was given for the cuts in funding, simply that the funds allotted for language training in the budget was lower. (Evaluation of LINC, 2010) This means that Alberta's ESL program is both understaffed (in terms of quality) and undersized (in terms of capacity). At the same time, TFW legislation changed, admitting low-skill workers, and resulting in a large influx of unskilled labour into the province. This dual occurrence of increased temporary low-skill workers and decreases in language training (and the number of permanent residents who are unable to access it) exponentially threaten the overall perception of an immigrant in Alberta.

In Ontario, there does not appear to be any clear telltale indicators of degradation to LINC programs specifically but controversy over ESL funding in a number of school

boards have an interesting significance. Numerous reports emerged in 2007-2009 of Ontario school boards using government-allotted ESL funds to pay utility bills and staff salaries. An education report by the Ontario Government (2012) found that the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) spent over half of its ESL funds in 2007 and 2008 on utility bills, while the Peel District School Board spent only 70% of its ESL funding on actual language training. It also identified that despite increases in funding to Ontario school boards and increases in enrollment, there were significant drops in the number of ESL teachers available in Ontario schools. Indeed, 53% of Central Toronto schools in had 10 or more ESL students in their schools and *no* ESL teacher on staff. (People for Education, 2012) These issues were further compounded by the fact that, although the government identified these problems as offensive, it offered no accountability measures to ensure the money is spent appropriately in the future. While small amendments have been made since, Social Planning Toronto found that in 2013, over 25% of ESL funds, in general, were being used in Ontario schools for general expenditures and not towards specific language training ventures. (Social Planning Toronto, 2013) While Ontario's language training for adults may not show signs of deterioration, it is clear that the importance and efficiency for children's language training has taken a backseat to the province's other initiatives. This evidence may be indicative of a polarization between stated government initiatives on the importance of language acquisition and skills and the actual government action on ensuring language acquisition ensues.

In British Columbia, a report analyzing the framework of language training in the province found decreases in federal funding from 2000 to 2005, a time frame that once again overlaps with Canada's influx in temporary foreign workers. It also indicated that

language services in the province would soon require significant adjustments to accommodate these high inflows and raised insufficient funding as a critical issue to the effectiveness of the program. (Taviss & Simces, 2004)

Overall, language-training programs in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario exist and appear to be effective when accessed. However, there is consistent evidence to suggest that funding to these programs has been cut in recent years despite increasing inflows of migrants, especially in the 2001-2006 timeframe that saw such a sharp influx in temporary foreign workers in Canada. Using the framework, this paper cannot conclude that changes in ESL programs and funding are indicative of a shift in immigration policy. However, there seems correlation at least between less funding, increased numbers of TFWs and a growing negative perception of immigrants. This may jeopardize Canadian multicultural objectives. The government's seeming disinterest in the ability of its language programs to provide beneficial language services for all those who need access to them emphasizes a shift away from the importance of marketable skills – skills essential to entering the job market or interacting in a community. The Canadian philosophy that praises language skills and acquisition is transitioning to more of an ideal rather than an actual outcome and contributes to a degradation of multicultural policy outcomes.

5.2 Foreign Credentials Recognition (FCR)

The ability of an immigrant to work upon entrance to Canada is, as previously highlighted, a key factor in their effective integration into society. Often times, skilled work requires some type of varying credentials, educational, licensing, or the like. In

order for a migrant to successfully enter the labour market, their qualifications must be formally recognized through a process called Foreign Credential Recognition (FCR). FCR is comprised of two streams: regulated recognition and unregulated recognition. A professional association or government agency licenses regulated industries whereas unregulated industry has no such restrictions on practice. (McKenna, 2012) For regulated recognition, processing and administrative backlogs over the last 2 decades have plagued its effectiveness. Processing times have lengthened to such a point that migrants wait many years for recognition, sometimes to learn their credentials are not recognized at all. This credential disconnect, between a skilled migrant and their ability to find work in their field, is referred to as 'brain waste' and has a number of economic and social costs for society. (McKenna, 2012) A House of Commons (2009) report on the impacts of poor FCR estimated that it results in annual losses of \$2.4 - \$5.9 billion. Socially, the costs are just as high. The negative economic impact that labour market displacement, that is, a qualified permanent resident working outside their field, has on the affected individuals and their families is seen in lower incomes and standards of living. This social-capital inequality contributes to a two-tier system, thus encouraging the creation of a socioeconomic 'sub-class' in Canadian society. (McKenna, 2012) Indeed, the ideas of sub-tier systems and parallel lies are, as the previous analysis showed, contributing factors to failed multiculturalism in the UK and the Netherlands. With reference of unregulated industries, between 80-85% of incoming immigrants enter pursue work within these industries, meaning the actual employer carries out the recognition process, not official FCR bodies like with regulated industries. (McKenna, 2012) Initially, when immigration streams stemmed from Western European countries, FCR was easier for

employers and did not cause problems. Today and in recent years, however, there has been a significant change in the source countries of incoming immigrants and with it, a host of unfamiliar foreign institutions and regulating bodies. Without the resources to assess these new credentials, many employers discount the skills of migrant applicants and further compound the issue of ‘brain waste.’ There has been little to no funding assigned to improve the abilities of employers to assess these credentials and thus the problem continues.

What is the connection of poor FCR with temporary foreign workers and their impact on the way Canadians perceive immigration? Poor FCR means that skilled permanent migrants to Canada are forced into lower-skilled work than what they are qualified for. Zietsma (2010) found that from 2001 to 2006, only 20% of skilled immigrants who arrived in Canada within the last 5 years had found employment in their field of study. Over the same timeframe, the expansion of the TFW program to low skill work saw inflows to these lower positions dramatically jump, increasing the overall number of immigrants to positions of lower-skill. In the same way that increasing temporary workers into low-skill positions counteracts the vision of Canada’s immigration system to admit migrants with high levels of human capital, I propose that *not* addressing the need for effective FCR further aggravates the perception that immigrants will only fill low-skill work. It additionally discredits government discourse on the importance of human capital since they have not more effectively dealt with an issue that was first identified by the private sector in the early 1980s, over three decades ago. (Bauder, 2003)

The issues plaguing FCR practices are not new, unique to Canada, or even exclusive to permanent residents. Teaching certificates and fire-fighting credentials are just two of the examples restricted by provincial regulations – Canadian teachers accredited in Ontario are not able to teach in British Columbia, even if educated by a Canadian institution. (Ministry of Education, 2015) Similar problems in Australia were addressed by imposing a ‘principle of mutual recognition’ – meaning that once an immigrant or citizen is licensed in one state, they are recognized all over the country, improving the efficiency of the FCR process. (as cited in McKenna, 2012, p.19)

Specifically to address migrant-related FCR issues, the Australian government imposed a mandatory pre-immigration qualifications assessment for permanent immigrants. This Pre-Application Skills Assessment (PASA) framework ensures immigrants are eligible to enter the job market as soon as they are admitted to the country. This adoption is credited with increasing the employment rate of immigrants in Australia over Canada, raising the percentage growth in GDP per capita in Australia compared to Canada, and, most importantly with respect to individual immigrants, is credited with improving the average annual earnings to newcomers down under compared with those to the Canadian North. (Richardson & Lester, 2004)

In summation, the issues associated with FCR highlight a number of important points. First, the disconnect between current immigration policy and actual policy outcomes is again emphasized. The importance of human capital is especially compromised. It seems cruelly ironic that a country, which prides herself so strongly on her skilled workers, would lack so significantly in an effective mode by which to approve the credentials of immigrants. Since low-skill TFWs likely do not possess accreditation,

they are not impacted by or an impact on the FCR process. But their emergence alongside this lack in Canadian labour-market policy indicates a shift in immigration policy towards short-term labour-market needs and away from implementing long-term multicultural policies aimed at acceptance and integration. More workers working in low skill, whether doing so as a worker of the Temporary Worker Program or because a discounting of a permanent resident's skills left them with no other options, means increased opportunity for discrimination of these workers in Canadian society. The FCR framework shows an inconvenient truth: skills discounting and labour market displacement challenge the fundamental core of Canadian multiculturalism and immigration and act as a detriment to temporary foreign workers and Canadian citizens alike.

6. EVIDENCE IN SOCIAL SOCIETY

After exploring components of labour market, we now turn to the implications that TFWs hold for social capital in Canada. Exploring this topic and its trends within Canadian borders is especially significant considering its status as a migration-target country. There are many varying definitions of social capital, but generally it is described to consist of three major domains: trust (in individuals and institutions), interactions with others, and membership in organizations. (Pendakur & Mata, 2012; Putnam, 2007) These components hold a deep connection with the aim of multiculturalism policies.

Interactions with and trust in others are two strong indicators of the types of relationships that exist within a community; this fostering of a positive relationship is the ultimate goal of multicultural policies. In this section, we will first evaluate social capital on a general

level, analyzing social trust levels in Canada and in regions specifically impacted by the Temporary Foreign Worker Program. We will then look at two specific policies in Canada that contribute to positive social capital, family reunification policies and the ease of citizenship acquisition, to determine if TFWs have had degradation effects on Canada's social fabric via these two avenues.

6.1 Social Trust in Canada

Social trust has become a fast-growing area of interest for many countries in recent years. (Kazemipur, 2006) It is defined as the degree to which one can trust others whom one does not know personally and, as a component of social capital, enables more effective interactions between community members and increased community cohesion. (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2007) Studies on social capital have found many links between diversity and social trust, though not necessarily all positive. Some literature on the subject finds a negative relationship between the two variables – with higher levels of diversity come lower levels of social trust. These levels of social trust continue to drop when poverty and crime are added to the picture. It also finds an inverse relationship between population and trust (lower population numbers? means higher trust) and a positive one between income and trust (higher income means higher trust). (Putnam, 2007) These findings appear the opposite in Canada. Social trust research indicates that Canadian cities with more ethnically diverse populations tend to also demonstrate a higher level of trust. (Kazemipur, 2006) Additionally, Canadian researcher John Helliwell (2001) found a correlation between increasing trust levels and geographical

location – that is, it was observed that as one moved eastward or westward from Ontario and Quebec, social trust levels increased.

So what are the implications of these temporary foreign workers on Canadian social trust and community cohesion? On a national scale, the General Social Survey collects data on how Canadian perceives their community cohesiveness but collection methods have not adjusted to specifically address influxes in temporary foreign workers. What has occurred, however, is a growing bank of research within provinces that explore the impacts of these workers on provincial and community cohesion. Especially in the big three provinces of Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, a number of reports have emerged outlining the effects of TFWs on their community cohesion and social trust – these will be discussed now.

The divided nature of a temporary foreign worker – temporary transnationals who are members of a home community yet reside in another as noncitizens – make it almost impossible for them to realize the idea of community. Their inability to participate in social and economic relations limited their ability to actualize community with those around them. (Foster & Taylor, 2013) In Alberta, the rapid expansion of the oil sands saw an explosion of TFWs entering the province from 2001 to 2006 and alongside it the emergence of a ‘shadow’ population. Shadow populations are groups of individuals who are not officially recognized through enumeration as residents, and yet spend time in a region. (Hann, 2010) These shadow populations were found to produce a series of economic and social insecurities that together preempted them from participating in their receiving communities. As well, the workers possessed contradictory community identities, which ‘mediated status-based exclusion,’ and finally, their physical location in

work camps enhanced their separation from life. (Foster & Taylor, 2013) In both Alberta and British Columbia, the Temporary Foreign Worker Program was found to encourage low trust levels and resistance to it was vocalized by domestic workers because the program “promoted inequality and exclusion.” (Foster & Taylor, 2013) Media coverage on the TFW program, especially its expansion to low-skill work, has caused societal backlash in recent years and contributes to a negative perception of incoming immigrants, temporary or not. In most parts of Canada, including Alberta, temporary foreign workers possess limited residency rights, restricted labour mobility rights, and problematic access to basic employment rights. These restrictions constitute a form of ‘institutionalized uncertainty’ and lead to a position of differential exclusion. (Foster & Taylor, 2013)

These hindrances to social trust are further compounded by the fact that most TFWs do not wish to be excluded from their communities. Often arguments are made that TFWs do not wish to integrate in their host communities, preferring isolation until the expiration of their work permits, but recent research indicates the opposite. What is more often the case is that these workers *want* to stay in Canada and varying limitations on their ability to integrate, be it language or geographical location, result in these unwanted degradations of community. (Foster & Taylor, 2013) There exist two possible solutions to this problem: the first would be to offer settlement services to TFWs to help improve their linguistic and cultural knowledge, better improving their chances for successful integration. This solution is lacking, however, as full integration occurs best with access to citizenship. Low-skill TFWs have very limited access to citizenship streams. The second option is to eliminate the high flows of TFWs that enter the country all together until multicultural policies can advance to accommodate them. In doing so,

collateral damage within Canada's social atmosphere, such as the degradation of community cohesion, would subside.

Levels of social trust in Canada seem to strengthen in the long run with increased diversity, a positive observation considering Canada's heavily reliance on immigration. However, the emergence of temporary foreign workers appears to detract and even counteract this occurrence. Their transnational status and inability to fully integrate into society has had negative implications for social capital in the country. Especially in Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, where dependency on TFWs is highest, social capital levels have been threatened the most. Social trust is obviously a two-way street: if social trust levels are low within a portion of a community, social trust levels for the entire community drop. The issues within TFWs and their inability to integrate directly impact the perceptions that Canadian citizens have of them. As the inflows of TFWs continue, therefore indicating a shift in immigration policy, the question remains whether the economic benefits these work bring outweigh the negative effects they have on Canada's sociological atmosphere.

6.2 Family Reunification

The three broad objectives that guide immigration to Canada are to reunite families, fulfill the country's international obligations and humanitarian tradition, and to foster a strong viable economy. These objectives are reflected in the main classes of migrants under which people are admitted to Canada as permanent residents: family-class migrants, economic-class migrants, and humanitarian or Refugee status migrants. (Green & Green, 2004)

Family reunification has been a cornerstone of Canadian immigration policy since the Immigration Act was enshrined into legislation in 1976 and a vital contributor to the Canadian economy. This facet of Canadian policy allows immigrants to sponsor other family members to come join them in Canada. It is proven to have positive economic, sociological, and political significance for both the immigrant family members they join as well as for the Canadian economy. Sponsored parents and grandparents admitted under the program play critical roles as childcare providers so the sponsoring family member can contribute to labour market economy in addition to conducting household tasks, and by reducing pressure to return to the country of origin to be with family. Beyond this, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) considers the ability of a migrant in a host state to live with his or her family not only a human right but also an enabler of full participation in the host society. It claims the “right to family reunification is directly linked to every person’s human dignity and capacity to flourish and therefore also has a direct impact on social cohesion within the host society.” (International Organization for Migration, 2003) Clearly, the ability of a worker to reunite with his or her family has significant positive implications for Canadian society.

This opportunity, however, is not extended to low-skill temporary workers. Additionally, while there is no bar or cap on family reunification, the financial onus is on potential employees to demonstrate to an immigration officer that they are capable of supporting the dependents of the TFW while in Canada. (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010) These incoming spouses are not eligible for an open work permit, preventing them from finding work, and would need to secure work in already-approved LMIA position. This combined with the fact that workers with lower levels of formal training generally

earn less, presents, according to CIC, “very legitimate concerns regarding the applicant’s bona fides and ability to support their dependents while in Canada.” (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010) This is further compounded by the fact that applicants must demonstrate financial ability to meet expenses associated with relocation to Canada, such as the cost of travel, health coverage, etc. Low-skill workers are “less likely to be able to demonstrate this adequate financial support and therefore less likely to be accompanied by family members.” Despite accounting for over 55, 000 workers in 2013, low-skill workers are not eligible to be reunified with their families, further hindering their participation in society. (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010)

The significance of these restrictions has grown proportionally with the size of the TFW program. The greater the inflow of temporary workers means that more and more workers living in Canada are not granted the right to be reunited with their families, hindering their participation in society. And, since the inflows of low-skill TFWs increased enormously after the 2002 expansion, the temporariness of the program has become a very permanent part of society as new waves of TFWs arrive in large numbers each year. This means this restriction on family reunification has occurred for over a decade, slowly but surely diminishing the importance of family from the Canadian multicultural mosaic. So what is the significance of this for multiculturalism? The ability to bring families together is exceptional in its own right, but the importance of family reunification extends far beyond the micro level. Family reunification contributes to the ability of an immigrant to integrate into a society, meaning a direct link between this policy and social capital in a community. A diminishing importance of family reunification does not simply mean that families are unable to be together, it means that

immigrants struggle to become a part of their communities, and the cohesiveness of the population suffers. For example, if a worker were to be reunited with his family, the family would also integrate into Canadian society. The children would go to school, the wife would enter the workforce or at least regular community life, and the connections to Canadian society would exponentially grow for the original worker. Reciprocally, the relationships the worker has would extend the social interactions for his family members. Consider the scope of social connections for new workers if they lived within the same area and the impact family reunification would have. Instead, without reunification, these social connections are lost and the original worker continues to struggle to integrate. This is just one example of how family increases and deepens the ties that immigrants with families build with Canadian society over time.

Indeed, this diminishing importance appears to be reflected in new Canadian policy developments. In the mid- to late-1980s, family class immigration made up nearly half of annual migrant flows but in 2012, Table 2 shows it accounts for less than 22%.

Table 2
Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011

Year	Economic	Family	Protected persons	Others ¹	Total
			number		
1981	60,238	51,359	14,981	2,063	128,641
1986	35,840	42,477	19,204	1,835	99,356
1991	86,500	87,970	36,180	22,159	232,809
1992	95,790	101,113	37,167	20,722	254,792
1993	105,652	112,644	24,946	13,399	256,641
1994	102,308	94,190	19,773	8,114	224,385
1995	106,626	77,386	27,800	1,054	212,866
1996	125,369	68,359	28,356	3,987	226,071
1997	128,349	59,978	24,226	3,482	216,035
1998	97,909	50,896	22,797	2,593	174,195
1999	109,248	55,274	24,380	1,049	189,951
2000	136,284	60,619	30,081	471	227,455
2001	155,717	66,795	27,914	211	250,637
2002	137,863	62,292	25,101	3,792	229,048
2003	121,047	65,123	25,982	9,197	221,349
2004	133,746	62,275	32,686	7,116	235,823
2005	156,313	63,375	35,776	6,778	262,242
2006	138,249	70,518	32,499	10,375	251,641
2007	131,244	66,243	27,953	11,313	236,753
2008	149,069	65,583	21,859	10,736	247,247
2009	153,491	65,208	22,850	10,623	252,172
2010	186,918	60,230	24,697	8,846	280,691
2011	156,118	56,451	27,873	8,305	248,747

Over the last decade, there has been a gradual erosion of the family reunification program. Public discourse has come to see family-class immigration in Canada as uneconomic and costly and emphasis has shifted to the importance of economic migrants. This is strongly evidenced by the spike in TFWs along side a growing number of economic migrant inflows. The Family Reunification program was revamped in 2012, unveiling stringent new requirements for sponsorship applications. The minimum necessary income (MNI) increased by 30% as well as ensuring this MNI had been achieved for the last three consecutive tax years, up from the requirement of one tax year, and increasing the sponsorship undertaking period to 20 years from 10. (ECCC Calgary, 2014) Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the revised family reunification program only accepts 5,000 applications per year. On a federal level, the government has severely restricted the inflow of family migrants, even suspending the program completely in November 2011 for a period of time. (ECCC Calgary, 2014)

On a provincial level, the propensity to discourage family reunification has emerged in new policies as well. During this same federal suspension on applications, the Family Stream of the Alberta Immigrant Nominee Program was terminated. Thus, individuals in Alberta wanting to sponsor relatives (other than spouses or dependent children) were left without options between November 2011 and January 2014 (when the program was resumed). (ECCC Calgary, 2014) During this same period, low-skill temporary foreigner workers to Alberta accounted for 75% of all TFWs in the province, a value of 30,300 workers. It appears as though during its peak of temporary worker inflows, the availability for family reunification in the province was incredibly restricted or indeed suspended completely. Increasingly, more workers in the Canadian workforce

are unable to be supported by their families to integrate into society. The symbolic value of family is tarnished by these restrictive reunification policies. Similar findings are evidenced in British Columbia. Immigration trend reports published by the provincial government shows that while the Economic Class works increased by almost 20% between 2009 and 2010, its drop of 15% for Non-Economic Class immigrants is attributed to ‘its decline in Family class immigrants.’ (British Columbia Migration Trends, 2012) This total was also down 18% for the 2008 family intake numbers as well. During the same time period, low-skill TFWs account for 65% of all TFWs in the province. (Temporary Residents in British Columbia, 2012) The British Columbia low-skill TFW intakes seem to also correspond with a provincial directive shifting away from family reunification. Ontario’s family reunification follows a slightly different path from Alberta and British Columbia. The flows of economic and family migrants do not reverse over time as in the West, with family reunification inflows maintaining almost identical levels from 2001-2011 (26% and 28%, respectively) while economic class immigrants dropped from 64% to 52% over the same time frame. (Government of Ontario, 2012) The drop in economic migrants may be explained by significant backlogs to the Federal Skilled Worker Program, where over 70% of applicants were destined or Ontario, but since the family reunification numbers remained fairly consistent, there does not appear to be a degradation of these policies in the same way as it appears in Alberta and British Columbia.

Overall, the emergence of low-skill TFWs in Canada has occurred alongside the degradation of family reunification policies in Canada. Firstly, the TFW program itself essentially denies temporary workers the right to family reunification, despite their

extended commitment to Canada and the fact that temporary workers have become a permanent component of the Canadian economy. Secondly, this reliance on TFWs has negatively influenced the family reunification policies for permanent resident and those hoping to become citizens as well. On a federal level, a number of policy changes have made family reunification a privilege for the wealthy, increasing minimum income requirements and sponsorship times, and implementing inflow caps, preventing even those who can afford to sponsor families from doing so. While the importance of economic migrants cannot be denied, these policy shifts increase the perception that family class migrants are a drag on the Canadian economy when in fact the effectiveness of economic migrants are complemented by family reunification policies. As a defining trait of Canadian immigration, government initiatives demoting the importance family reunification not only have significant economic implications but are also detrimental to the full and active participation of workers in Canada, temporary or not. Our functionality as a multicultural nation depends on the participation of all members of society and decreasing family reunification diminishes our ability to do so.

6.3 Access to Citizenship

Perhaps the most important policy considered in this paper is the effect of temporary foreign workers on access to Canadian citizenship. Citizenship is the ultimate equalizer in society, awarding immigrants the same rights, responsibilities, and political voice that Canadians possess, and thus is an important step toward full integration into society. (Adams, Macklin, & Omidvar, 2014) Kymlicka (1995) calls it the ‘midpoint’ in the Canadian integration process - a stepping-stone that, if missed, hinders

multiculturalism and full inclusion in Canadian society. Additionally, citizenship acquisition not only welcomes the individual immigrant but encourages the public to recognize immigrants as their equals and develop together a new, shared sense of belonging. (Bauback, Honohan, Huddleston, Hutcheson, Shaw, & Wink, 2010)

With no pressure to assimilate or give up their culture, immigrants choose to naturalize because they want to be Canadian. It is with this logic in mind that I hypothesize high levels of naturalization to be strongly correlated with effective multicultural policies. I believe this to be true for two reasons: firstly, naturalized immigrants *want* to become Canadian. Economic rationales can fuel a decision to enter Canada as a permanent resident – the decision to naturalize means these immigrants are wish to escalate beyond simply being an economic member of society and fully integrate into Canadian life. Secondly, it is reflective of a widespread perception that it is good for immigrants to become citizens. Naturalization is seen as protecting the larger society’s investments in immigrants, making it more likely that money spent on recruiting, settling, and training immigrants will have greater payoffs for society as a whole. (Kymlicka, 2004) In this section we will be exploring more in-depth this hypothesis to see if the emersion of TFWs in Canada has negatively impacted naturalization rates and, thus, the full inclusion of immigrants in society.

6.3.1 The Evolution of Citizenship Legislation

For the “first time in a generation,” the Canadian government has implemented changes to Canada’s citizenship laws. The rules are a major change and make it tougher to achieve Canadian citizenship. They include: longer wait times to apply from citizenship

(increasing residency requirements to living 4 of 6 years in Canada from the only 3 years of 4 required before), tougher language requirements (increasing the ages necessary to pass the test in addition to increasing the difficulty of the test), and increased tax requirements (before, it was not required applicants to file taxes while the new rules mandate that 4 out of the 6 years of residency must be accompanied with filed taxes.) (CIC, 2015) Additionally, the changes make it possible for Canadian citizenship to be lost – new legislation will introduce the ability to revoke or deny citizenship to individuals who commit ‘act of terrorism or acts against Canadian interests.’ The Canadian government calls the changes ‘necessary to strengthen the value of Canadian citizenship.’ (CIC, 2015) Over the same time frame, legislation to the TFWP has too expanded, but not for the better. While paths to citizenship exist for high-skill worker (through express-entry programs,) options for low skill workers are slim. TFWs can be nominated by their host provinces for permanent residency, but are not eligible to apply directly to CIC through traditional means. Even the Live-In Caregiver Program (LICP), previously the only low-skill temporary work with guaranteed access to citizenship saw its legislation changed in November 2014. This will be explored in more detail below, but where the program nearly guaranteed permanent residency after 24 months, now this access is not guaranteed. Citizenship access for both permanent residents and low-skill TFWs alike has become more difficult to achieve.

6.3.2 Rates of Naturalization

Historically, Canada has been a world leader with respect to naturalization. The 2011 National Household Survey (HNS) showed that slightly over 15% of Canadian citizens

were naturalized and that 6.0% did not have Canadian citizenship. In 2011, over 85% of eligible immigrants acquired Canadian citizenship, over 10% higher than in Australia (74% of eligible immigrants naturalized) and almost double the American rate of 43.7% (National Household Survey, 2011) While clearly an impressive rate, a deeper look into the numbers presents a possibly troubling trend. Canada's 2011 census showed that the longer an immigrant resides in the country, the more likely they are to become Canadian. Among the foreign-born population who migrated prior to 1971, 93.3% reported they had acquired Canadian citizenship. (National Household Survey, 2011) However, in the time period between 2001 and 2005, only 77% of eligible immigrants had acquired citizenship and of those eligible for citizenship that arrived between 2006 and 2007, only 36.7% had acquired Canadian citizenship. (National Household Survey, 2011) It appears that as time progresses, Canadian migrants are choosing less often to acquire Canadian citizenship. A census report in 2006 states these drastic variances in naturalization rates are due to the fact that "those in Canada the longest...have had more time to make the decision to apply for (Canadian citizenship,)" implying that, in time, these Canadian migrants will opt for citizenship. (Chui, Tran, & Maheux, 2007) However, the sociological framework within Canadian society has changed considerably since the first wave of naturalized citizens arrived in 1971 and may account for the apparent hesitation in Canadian citizenship uptake. In addition to changing destination countries and economic troubles specific to new migrants, Canadian permanent residents have also been impacted by the emergence of Canada's TFWP. We will now explore the link between TFWs and citizenship acquisition and, using this analysis, determine if they have negatively impacted the naturalization rates within Canada.

The relationship between a temporary foreign worker and citizenship acquisition is a considerably fragmented one. The name itself stresses this division, implying that participants in this program will stay only temporarily in Canada and leave when their labour contribution is no longer needed. High-skill TFWs do have access to various streams of citizenship but the same opportunities are not extended to the low-skill TFWs. The most notable exemption is the inaccessibility of low-skill TFWs to apply directly to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) for permanent residency. There is opportunity to apply directly to provinces through the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP), but two notable low-skill work programs of: the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), and the Low-Skill Pilot Program do not offer citizenship. The Live-In Caregiver Program (LICP) allowed for workers to, after 24 months of full-time caregiving work, to apply for permanent residency. Indeed, before the changes, over 90% of LICP employees applied for PR and, of them, 98% received it. (Brickner & Straehle, 2010) Now, permanent residency is no longer guaranteed as an annual cap on the number of applicants allowed from this program was implemented. (CIC, 2014) The PNP is slowly growing in popularity, but in terms of absolute numbers, Table 3 shows that it admits very small amounts of temporary foreign workers as permanent residents.

Province/territory	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
British Columbia	3,000	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,800
Alberta	4,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,500
Saskatchewan	3,400	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,450
Manitoba	4,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Ontario	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,300
New Brunswick	550	625	625	625	625
Nova Scotia	350	500	500	500	600
Prince Edward Island	350	400	400	400	400
Newfoundland and Labrador	225	300	300	300	300
Yukon	190	190	190	190	190
Northwest Territories	-	150	150	150	150
Total	17,065	20,665	20,665	20,665	22,315

Source: Information provided by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
Note: Annual nomination limits apply only to principal applicants and are subject to adjustment by Citizenship and Immigration Canada in coordination with the provinces and territories.

In closing, there appears to be a link between growing numbers of temporary foreign workers and harder access to Canadian citizenship. In terms of their effect on naturalization rates in Canada, a clear link is not determined that TFWs have caused PRs in Canada from obtaining citizenship. However, temporary migrant workers' lack of full citizenship status within a host country has implications on community cohesion, as discussed, as therefore on the objectives of multiculturalism. There could be a connection between how PRs feel about their communities that prevents them from obtaining citizenship but more research is required to confirm. What is clear is that low-skill TFWs in particular appear to be all but exempt from accessing paths to citizenship, and while the Canadian government claims extreme labour shortages exist across the country, workers are welcomed on a temporary basis but are not encouraged to call Canada 'home.'

7. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

7.1 Economic Indicators

Two distinct policies were analyzed under the labour market umbrella. First was language training (such as ESL and LINC) and the second was Foreign Credential Recognition (FCR). There seems to be a correlation between dependency on TFWs and a degradation of language training availability. Funding to ESL programs in the Big Three provinces drops alongside an increase in temporary low-skill worker positions, as well as quality concerns over ESL instructors and availability. In terms of FCR, there is a strong disconnect between government discourse and actual policy outcomes on the matter. Where government policy emphasizes the importance of human capital and education, the ability of these immigrants to have their qualifications recognized hinders their ability to integrate effectively into the labour market and thus Canadian society. Poor FCR in Canada highlights the negative impact skills discounting and labour market displacement has on the ability of an immigrant to integrate effectively into society.

In terms of identified effects of TFWs in society, language program and FCR evaluations offer a number of useful observations. Firstly, this paper concludes that drops in language program funding are indicative of a decrease in effectiveness of multicultural policies. Language programs enhance the marketable skills of immigrants, and it is these skills that encourage their successful integration. The influx of TFWs in low-wage work, without language requirements or abilities, means that more visible minority workers are exhibiting poor language skills. Their inability to access these language programs – since permanent residency visas are a requirement for admission to the program – further slights their reputation in society. Labour market skills for immigrants have a two-fold

impact: first, they allow for immigrants to successfully enter the labour market and contribute to society. In doing so, they contribute to the dogma that immigration is good for the economy, and because of this, the Canadian perception of immigration continues to remain positive. This cycle only continues if immigrants in society are able to uphold their side of the bargain. Unfortunately, poor FCR disables many immigrants from doing so, and the addition of low-skill work to the TFWP mean that workers admitted under this programs aren't even eligible to contribute to this positive perception cycle because of their lack of skills.

7.2 Social Indicators

There were three social indicators evaluated within this study. First, how social capital and trust were influenced by TFWs, then two specific programs or facets of Canadian society: Family Reunification and Citizenship Acquisition. The conclusions of all three were similar, with temporary foreign workers contributing to the degradation of all three. In terms of social capital, temporary foreign workers appear to have negative impacts on community cohesion and social trust. Their inability to interact effectively within the community degrades them personally as well, since many TFWs wish to stay in Canada and integrate fully but are restricted by a variety of factors, such as language or geographical location. These findings are further compounded by the fact that, in general, Canada exhibits higher levels of social trust and appears to become more socially trusting with an increase in ethnic diversity as opposed to the United States.

In terms of family reunification, TFWs are often not able to bring family over with them on work terms due to financial restrictions and extra responsibilities placed on

the employer. The growing number of TFWs admitted into Canada on an annual basis means that more and more workers are without their families during life in Canada. This trend moving away from the importance of family has evidenced itself in recent Canadian legislation. Family reunification policies have become stricter, both nationally and provincially, and total admittance numbers are down significantly. Ontario seemed to be somewhat of an outlier in the context of this conclusion, with family reunification admittance numbers remaining the same when other provinces experienced large drops, but overall a lesser importance is evident in family reunification policies in Canada. But what does this mean for multiculturalism? The significance of family reunification extends far beyond the micro level. This program, this cornerstone of Canadian immigration, encourages an immigrant to integrate more fully into society. Since this is the ultimate goal of multicultural policies in Canada, to be denied this opportunity is to nullify the objectives of multicultural policies in the country. Family reunification contributes to social trust and, without it, negatively affects the immigrants themselves and also the perception Canadians have of immigrants. Low-skill TFWs are further disadvantaged as the inability to reunite with their family is just one in a long list of factors that discourage their integration into society.

In terms of citizenship acquisition, there appears to be a link between the growing numbers of temporary foreign workers and harder access to Canadian citizenship. Low-skill workers were not identified as an explicit threat to naturalization rates but their social impacts (their inability to integrate, the subsequent shift in societal perceptions of immigrants) have significant impact on social trust and community cohesion. These factors are what encourage a permanent resident to integrate fully by acquiring

citizenship. As this paper highlighted, the transition from permanent resident to Canadian citizen means the immigrant *wants* to become part of Canadian life. This desire for inclusion fuels efforts to integrate and contributes to higher levels of social trust and community cohesion. To not do so may be indicative of an environment where immigrants feel less welcomed or accepted. The number of pathways for TFWs, as well, is decreasing as the LICP recently changed its framework and removed permanent residency as a guaranteed program outcome. The social degradation as a result of the TFWs is sizeable and, as admittance numbers in the program increase, this will only continue to intensify.

In terms of the Degradation and Labour Shift framework established, all three indicators show evidence of a shift in immigration policy by the Canadian government. Social trust, as a general concept, highlights the negative impacts short-term workers have on communities. In doing so, the analysis highlights the growing number of low-skill TFWs and thus exemplifies this effect. The family reunification analysis shows that by moving away from the cornerstone of its immigration policy, the Canadian government is shifting policy objectives to the short term, a clear misstep from legislated discourse. Finally, for citizenship acquisition, what is more indicative of a shift towards short-run employment needs then restrictions to citizenship acquisition and a lessened ability to actually become Canadian, for PRs and TFWs workers alike? Full citizenship is the ultimate integrator into Canadian society, thus making restrictions on its access an indicator of a degradation of multicultural and integration policy outcomes as well.

This paper has found few benefits to low-skill TFWs in Canadian society, instead finding much evidence to suggest that workers of these skills levels on a non-permanent

basis actually have negative impacts in society. Their inability to integrate because of a lack of skills, including and especially language, means that they are discluded from community life. Their exclusion influences the perception of immigration by the entire Canadian public. It appears low-skill work at a component of the TFWP is a lose-lose situation when considered through a social society lens, degrading social capital and the outcomes of multicultural policies in many aspects of Canadian life.

8. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this paper has aimed to show both a shift in immigration policy towards short-term goals and a degradation of multicultural policy outcomes in Canadian society as a result of low-skill TFWs. In certain cases, such as family reunification and social trust, both effects are evidenced. In others, low-skill TFWs have specifically highlighted one or the other. In all cases, benefits of low-skill temporary work are difficult to determine. As a country built on the ideas of permanence and high levels of human capital, the TFWP expansion to low-skill work is an overwhelming contradiction to these national commitments. Moreover, Necessary modifications to specific policies, such as to FCR, have not occurred and continued to act as a detriment to Canadian society. As time continues, and the social fabric of Canada continues to be threatened by the TFWP program, the question of economic benefit over socioeconomic detriments persist. Are labour shortages so significant that employers really have no choice but import foreign labour from abroad? Does the demand to fill low-skill vacancies in fast-food surpass the importance of community integration and cohesion for all of Canada? The questions remain ever more relative to the Canadian economy and, if left unaddressed, could result

in a path towards community segregation and anti-immigration instead of our prized and cherished model of multiculturalism.

Works Cited

- Adams, M., Macklin, A., & Omidvar, R. (2014, May 1). Maytree: Citizenship Act. Retrieved March 24, 2015, from <http://maytree.com/policy-and-insights/speeches/citizenship-act-will-create-two-classes-canadians.html>
- Adams, M. 2007. *Unlikely Utopia: The Surprising Triumph of Canadian Pluralism*. Toronto: Viking Canada
- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2010). Canadian Multiculturalism: Global Anxieties And Local Debates. *British Journal of Canadian Studies*, 43-72.
- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2013). "Is There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index" (2013).
- Bauback, R., Honohan, I., Huddleston, T., Hutcheson, D., Shaw, J., & Vink, M. (2010). Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigration Integration. Retrieved January 7, 2015, from <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29828/AccessstoCitizenshipanditsImpactonImmigrantIntegration.pdf?sequence=1>
- Bauder, H. (2014). Ryerson Center for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS) - Annual Report 2013-2014.
- Bauder, H. (2003). "Brain Abuse", Or The Devaluation Of Immigrant Labour In Canada. *Antipode*, 699-717.
- Brickner, R., & Straehle, C. (2010). The Missing Link: Gender, Immigration Policy And The Live-in Caregiver Program In Canada. *Policy and Society*, 309-320.
- Bloemraad, I. (2011). The Debate Over Multiculturalism: Philosophy, Politics, and Policy. *Migration Policy Institute*.
- Canada - MIPEX. (2010, January 1). Retrieved December 17, 2014, from <http://www.mipex.eu/canada>
- Canadian Multiculturalism: An Inclusive Citizenship. (2012, October 19). Retrieved January 17, 2015, from <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/multiculturalism/citizenship.asp>**
- Castles, S. (1985). *Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe*,. London: Published for the Institute of Race Relations, London, by Oxford University Press.
- Chui, T., Tran, K., & Maheux, H. (2007). Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census. *Statistics Canada*. Retrieved from <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/pdf/97-557-XIE2006001.pdf>

- Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (2015) Changes to the Citizenship Act. Retrieved March 1, 2015.
- Ethno-Cultural Council of Calgary (2014) Families Together/Families Apart. Retrieved February 28, 2015.
- Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) Program. (2011, March 13). Retrieved February 10, 2015, from <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/evaluation/linc/2010/relevance.asp>
- Foster, J., & Taylor, A. (2013). In the Shadows: Exploring the Notion of “Community” for Temporary Foreign Workers in a Boomtown. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 38(2). Retrieved February 2, 2015, from <https://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/CJS/article/viewFile/19891/15415>
- Fudge, J., & MacPhail, F. (2009.) *The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada: Low-skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of Flexible Labour*. *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal*, 31, 1: 101-141.
- Government of Ontario (2012) *The Final Report By Ontario's Expert Roundtable On Immigration*. Retrieved February 4, 2015, from http://www.citizenship.gov.on.ca/english/keyinitiatives/imm_str/roundtable/why-an-immigration-strategy.shtml
- Green, A. (1976.) *Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy*, Toronto, Macmillan.
- Green, A., & Green, D. (2004). The Goals of Canada's Immigration Policy: A Historical Perspective. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research*, 13(1), 102-139.
- Green A., & Green, D. (1999) The Economic Goals of Canada's Immigration Policy, Past and Present, *Canadian Public Policy*, Vol.(15)
- Gross, D. (2012). Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada: Are They Really Filling Labour Shortages? *C.D. Howe Institute*.
- Haan, M. 2010. Measuring Alberta’s shadow population. Presented at the Unwrap Research Conference, October, Fort McMurray. [http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/crsc/pdfs/Unwrap - Measuring Alberta%27s Shadow Population.pdf](http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/crsc/pdfs/Unwrap_-_Measuring_Alberta%27s_Shadow_Population.pdf).
- Hawkins, F. (1972) *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press.
- Helliway, J. (2001). Social Capital, the Economy and Well-Being. *The Review of Economic Performance and Social Progress*. Retrieved January 28, 2014, from <http://www.csls.ca/repsp/1/03-helliwell.pdf>

- House of Commons (2009) Recognizing Success – A report on improving foreign credential recognition. Ottawa, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, pp.1-19.
- International Organization for Migration - Migration and Family. (2003, January 1). Retrieved January 30, 2015, from http://www.rcmvs.org/documentos/IOM_EMM/v2/V2S05_CM.pdf
- Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies For Immigrants In Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 1-22.
- Kazemipur, A. (2006). Social Trust, Ethnic Diversity, and Immigrants: The Case of Canada. Retrieved February 2, 2015, from <http://www.ualberta.ca/~pcerii/WorkingPapers/WP06-05.pdf>
- Kymlicka, W. (2004). Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links. *The Political Quarterly*, 195-208.
- Kymlicka, W. (2012). Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future. *Migration Policy Institute*.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Lenard, P., & Straehle, C. (Eds.). (2012). *Legislated inequality temporary labour migration in Canada*. Montreal [Que.: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Lenard, P., & Straehle, C. (2010). Temporary labour migration: Exploitation, tool of development, or both? *Policy and Society*, 283-294.
- Macdonald, I. (1989). *Murder in the playground: The Burnage report*. London: Longsight Press.
- Maytree: Policy In Focus. (2009, December 1). Retrieved February 7, 2014, from <http://maytree.com/policyPDF/MaytreePolicyInFocusIssue10.pdf>
- McKenna, M. (2012). Brain Gain, Waste, and Drain: Canadian Foreign Credential Recognition.
- Ministry of Education. (2015) *Frequently Asked Questions*. Retrieved March 17, 2015, from <https://www.bcteacherregulation.ca/faq.aspx>
- Nakache , D. and P. Kinoshita. (2010). The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Do Short-Term Economic Needs Prevail over Human Rights Concerns? IRPP Study, No. 5.

National Household Survey (NHS). (2011). Retrieved February 24, 2015, from http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011003_1-eng.pdf

OECD - World Migration in Figures. (2013, October 13). Retrieved January 19, 2015, from <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf>

People for Education (2012) *Annual Report on Ontario's Publicly Funded Schools*. People for Education. <http://www.peopleforeducation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Annual-Report-2012-web.pdf>

Pendakur, R., & Mata, F. (2012). Social Capital Formation and Diversity: Impacts of Individual and Place-Related Characteristics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1491-1511.

Phillips, T. (Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality) (2005, September 4). After 7/7: Sleepwalking into Segregation . Lecture conducted from Manchester.

Putnam, R. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity And Community In The Twenty-first Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 137-174.

Reitz, J. (2011a). Pro-Immigration Canada: Social and Economic Roots of Popular Views. *Institute for Research on Public Policy*. Retrieved February 1, 2015, from <http://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/research/diversity-immigration-and-integration/pro-immigration-canada/IRPP-Study-no20.pdf>

Reitz, J. (2011b). The distinctiveness of Canadian immigration experience. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 518-538.

Ricento, T., Cervatiuc, A., MacMillan, F., & Masoodi, S. (2008). Insights into Funded ESL Programs: Report on the LINC Program. Retrieved February 6, 2015, from <http://www.ucalgary.ca/tricento/files/tricento/lincreport.pdf>

Richardson, S., & Lester, L. (2004). A Comparison of Australian and Canadian Immigration Policies and Labour Market Outcomes. Retrieved from : http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/pdf/comparison_immigration_policies.pdf

Social Planning Toronto. (2013) *A Triple Threat to Equity Changing Priorities for Toronto Schools A Policy Brief on Learning Opportunities and ESL Funding in the Toronto District School Board*. Retrieved February 14, 2015, from <http://www.socialplanningtoronto.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Triple-Threat-to-Equity-Policy-Brief-May-6-2013.pdf>

Stolle, D., Soroka, S., & Johnston, R. (2007). When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust And The Mediating Effect Of Social Interactions. *Political Studies*, 57-75.

Taviss, R., & Simces, Z. (2004). Retrieved February 18, 2015, from <http://www.aved.gov.bc.ca/esl/docs/eslreview.pdf>

Vasta, Ellie, 2007, 'From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to Assimilationism in the Netherlands', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30.5, 713–40.

Zietsma, D. (2010). Immigrants working in regulated occupations. Retrieved March 4, 2014, from <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2010102/pdf/11121-eng.pdf>