

**The Securitization of Development and its Impact on Peacebuilding: A study
of Canadian Mission in Afghanistan**

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Abstract

After the attacks of 9/11, the policies related to national security, especially in Western nations, took a fundamental shift towards viewing weak and fragile states as security threats. The international community poured in an enormous amount of aid and resources to rebuild the fragile Afghanistan as part of the peacebuilding mission. This substantial investment was a recognition that peace and stability in Afghanistan were important to establishing and maintaining international security. Building on the existing literature on securitization, development and peacebuilding, this paper analyzes how securitization of development has impacted the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan using the post 9/11 Canadian mission as an example. The Copenhagen School's securitization theory is used as a framework to understand how Canada securitized development through the language of securitization. The analyses of official policy documents show that Canada's position remained that by helping failed or fragile states like Afghanistan, it is also securing its national security interests. The securitization resulted in framing the focus of peacebuilding in Afghanistan through a lens of security for Canada. This was demonstrated through the prioritization of the military component of the mission over development priorities, signifying the importance given to conventional security over a more inclusive concept of security such as human security. Furthermore, securitization of development ended up undermining the peacebuilding process by pushing aside essential tenets of development. The failure to establish local agency, aid ineffectiveness, local-capacity building and budget imbalances were some of the challenges arising as a consequence. Eventually, increased donor fatigue, particularly due to the volatile security situation, resulted in withdrawal from the complex mission. One of the main lessons learned from the post 9/11 Canadian peacebuilding mission in Afghanistan is that securitization policies designed to bring peace and stability in a post-conflict Afghanistan were ineffective.

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Section 1: Introduction

In 1966, Robert McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense, remarked that “without development, security would forever remain an elusive goal” (McNamara, 1966). He identified a direct and positive correlation between development, political stability, and peace. This is of particular relevance to the contemporary policy discourse about development and peacebuilding. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s brought about new rebuilding efforts for countries overcoming the aftermath of war and conflict that shifted the focus from traditional military-based security towards policies of development, economic growth and stability. In 1992, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote *An Agenda for Peace*, a report that introduced the concept of peacebuilding which he defined as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, par. 21). The definition recognizes development activities by external actors as a critical element of the peacebuilding process because it creates the foundational structures for lasting peace in post conflict countries. It also recognizes the importance of collaboration of development actors at international, national, regional and local levels. Inherent in this notion of development in post-conflict countries is the need to not only ensure military security, but to also ensure development that is able to achieve other forms of security such as human security, economic security, and food security, to name a few. Boutros-Ghali states that “cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation” (par. 57). This sustained peace can only be attained through an understanding of local conditions and by addressing the root causes of the conflict in war-shattered fragile states. However, the provision of military security is essential to provide space for the

development processes. The relation between security and development is widely acknowledged in policy discourse, as highlighted by former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who stated that ‘no development without security, and no security without development’ signifies that relation (2018).

The events of September 11, 2001 changed the global dynamics of international affairs. Prior to this, the peacebuilding agenda of the 1990s had been motivated by the need to address deep-rooted development problems in conflict-affected countries. Post 9/11 policies related to national security, especially in the Western states, took a fundamental shift where the risk of security spillovers and safe havens for terrorists raised a spectre against the fragile and failed states as breeders of terrorism (Brown & Grävingholt, 2016). The implication of fragile countries in propagation of terrorism attached a priority of heightened emergency to help fragile countries develop.

This paper explores the question if the securitization of development in a post-conflict country has any impact on the peacebuilding process. Using the post 9/11 Canadian mission in Afghanistan as an example, this paper will analyze the Canadian approach to securitization in the post 9/11 Afghan mission. Analyses will be conducted by applying the Copenhagen School of Securitization as a framework to establish how a threat environment is created through the language of securitization. In an overview of the challenges and impact of securitization of development and aid assistance given to Afghanistan, this paper will argue that the securitization of development made it difficult to achieve desired positive results in achieving security and development in Afghanistan, leaving a negative impact on peacebuilding. The paper is divided in five sections, the first section being the introduction and establishing the question.

The second section of this paper will explore the theories of securitization and explains the main characteristics of the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School's theory of securitization posits that the threats are not just threats by nature but are constructed as threats through language. The framing of fragile countries in propagation of terrorism helped securitize the public discourse on the threats posed by the fragile states.

The third section introduces the case of Afghanistan as a fragile state and the Canadian mission in Afghanistan and looks at the securitization policy of Canada by examining the official policy documents like the International Policy Statement (IPS), Manley Report and the overall Whole of Government approach. This case study is used to demonstrate how the securitization took place as a result of security grammar used in the official policy documents and the end results of that.

The fourth section will look into the challenges that the concept of peacebuilding faces when the development is securitized and impact of the securitization on shaping the peacebuilding discourse in the future. The fifth section will conclude with reflection on these challenges and broadly speaking on the impact of securitization on the peacebuilding in the future.

Section 2: Securitization of Development

2.1 An Overview of Theory and Concepts

Security and development are two broad concepts. There is a wide variety of literature explaining the connection between security and development. Collier and colleagues describe the correlation between security and development by identifying that where development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from violent conflict, and where development fails, the countries become high risk to be caught in a conflict trap (Collier, et al., 2003). The end of the Cold War brought about a new understanding of security that no longer conceived it solely in military and state-centric terms but expanded it to the need for development in fragile countries. Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace (1992)* recognizes the importance of development activities by external actors as an important element of peacebuilding. The report mentions that peacebuilding may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development, but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace (par. 56). The events of 9/11 brought about further changes in the discourse around security and development. With this change the use of the concept of securitization became prevalent as Western states tied international security to the peace and stability in weak and fragile states. As a result, securitization of development became an important component of post-conflict peacebuilding in fragile countries.

Different approaches to securitization have been taken by various academics. For example, Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt argue for the provision of aid as the means to ensure national and international security. In their book, *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*, they explore how failing states and the War on Terror prompted donor countries motives to securitize foreign aid programs. They view aid outcomes through the lens of security and argue that the securitization of

aid takes different forms and can be observed through “changes in discourse, aid flows and institutional structures” (Brown & Grävingholt, 2016, p.3). In contrast, according to Waever, Buzan, and de Wilde, who make up the core of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, securitization occurs when fields unrelated to security (such as development), become securitized by actors who attach security value to them. While Brown and Grävingholt focus on the increased justification of countries to provide aid where it is deemed important for national and international security, the Copenhagen School relies on the discursive construction of an existential threat that needs to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures. After the events of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the policies related to the national security relied heavily on the discourse focusing on the existential threat of terrorism rising from weak and fragile states. Despite the fact that the US-led war in Afghanistan was explicitly not a humanitarian intervention, the U.S. policy makers and its allies would come to embrace the language and rhetoric of a humanitarian cause (Ayub & Kouvo, 2008, p.647). The Canadian policies on Afghanistan reflected on similar focus on threats rising from failed/fragile countries and if not helped they pose a security threat to Canada. The increased justification of the mission in Afghanistan relied on identifying the weak and fragile states as threats in the official policy documents and speeches. For the purpose of this paper, because of its much reliance on the discursive construction of existential threats, the securitization theory by the Copenhagen School of securitization will be used as a model to establish how development has been securitized using the language of security in national policies in the wake of the events after the 9/11. The impact was unprecedented as it engaged wide array of actors and involved large amount of aid for development. The extraordinary measures that began with the War on Terrorism continued with the international agenda to securitize development in fragile countries especially the ones on forefront of War on Terrorism.

2.2 The Copenhagen School of Securitization

The Copenhagen School's framework of securitization focuses on the processes through which security threats are created. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde sought to expand the focus of security studies from one that narrowly focused on security threats in the form of a military conflict to include other non-conventional threats such as economic, environmental, and human security. They established the predominant definition of securitization that is used today: 'when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics," we have a case of securitization' (Buzan, et al., 1998, p.24-5 & 2003, p.491).

These processes include the presentation of a particular issue, using sufficient rationale and justification, as an existential threat by an actor who proposes exceptional measures to address that threat. Securitization is a process-oriented approach that "combines the politics of threat design with that of threat management" (Balzacq, 2016, p.495). The threat design and its management is conceptualized around three units of analysis: 1. the securitizing actors who initiate the securitizing move by vocalizing that a referent object is existentially threatened, 2. the referent object which is the community or concept facing a threat that requires special measures for its survival, and 3. the audience which is the target recipient of the securitization narrative (Buzan, et al., 1998, p.37-38). The success of that securitization is measured when it is well received by an audience. Therefore, the key idea underlying securitization is that an issue is given sufficient importance to win the approval of the audience, which enables the securitizing actor to handle the issue using whatever means they deem most appropriate to counter the threat.

One of the distinguishing aspects of the Copenhagen School's definition of securitization is the use of "security grammar"; first framing an issue as a threat and then convincing the audience to lift the issue above ordinary politics through the "speech-act": "by saying the words something is done" (p.26). The Copenhagen School of Securitization gives a lot of importance to the concept of a speech act. Security is established through the speech-act which signifies the presence (according to the speaker) of an existential threat to its security. This existential threat is then used as an attempt to legitimize extraordinary measures and their successful acceptance by the target audience (Wilkinson, 2015, p.33). The stronger the target audience's perception that something is threatening, the more likely the securitization will be successful (Wilkinson, 2015, p.36). According to Buzan and colleagues, the speech act is successful under "facilitating conditions," that has two important elements: 1. construction of a plot that includes the grammar of security and 2. the position of authority for the securitizing actor, that is the relationship between the speaker and the audience and thereby "the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in securitizing attempt (Buzan et al., 1998, p.33)."

To elaborate further, security issues are the result of a leader's (securitizing actor) efforts to understand and shape the world, which depends on the ability of a community (audience) to realign its understanding with it. State leadership has a privileged position for addressing security issues and, thereby, influencing the audience. For example, the U.S. President George W. Bush's (securitizing actor) success in convincing (speech-act) a majority of Americans (audience) to accept the view that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (existential threat) and therefore setting the foundations for an invasion of Iraq (securitization measure). In the case of the Iraq example, the facilitating conditions, i.e., Saddam Hussain's history of aggression and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 provided the necessary support for the Bush Administration to present

Iraq's non-existing weapons of mass destruction as an existential threat to U.S national security. Buzan argues that 'securitization is not a reaction to something actually being a security threat. It is not necessary for a real threat to exist for an issue to be securitized – only for the issue to be presented as a real threat' (Buzan, et al., 1998, p.24). This example also highlights that the existential threat does not need to be a real threat, given the fact that not only did the U.S. forces not find any weapons of mass destruction (existential threat), officials discovered that Iraq had basically ended its nuclear weapons program in 1991 (Kessler, 2019).

2.3 Securitization of Development Post 9/11

The War on Terror became priority-setting of the Western security agenda as did the focus on developing weak and fragile states where the securitization was applied (Buzan, 2006). The framing of underdevelopment as posing an existential threat followed by the acceptance from the audience legitimizes the threat. As a result, the security and development became imperative for the maintenance of international and national security.

The use of security grammar highlights the purpose of development using the speech act. Howell and Lind argue that the securitization of development is evident in political leaders' discourse and through the language used in official policy documents where poverty, deprivation and terrorism are presented as related (Howell & Lind, 2009, p.1281). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002) clearly asserts that "the events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states" and that providing development is important "so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists" (Bush, 2002, p.7). Almost overnight the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that, beyond a doubt, conflict and fragility in

poverty-stricken and politically unstable parts of the world could breed terrorism, which can then spill over and become a security threat around the globe. Similarly, (as will be discussed in detail in *Section 3*) the *Canadian International Policy Statement* (2005) highlights that the “security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad [...] this is especially the case in failed and failing states” (Government of Canada, 2005, p.2). Howell and Lind also argue that when planning and implementing development programs and projects, relief and aid efforts now address underlying security issues and often include more extensive use of military personnel (Howell & Lind, 2009, p.1281). Once the fragile state narrative is built, the measures are put in place to make development crucial for the maintenance of international and national security.

Post 9/11, the close interaction between foreign aid provision and security agencies within developing countries can be seen through the generous aid flows towards the countries identified as being on the frontline of the global War on Terror, such as Afghanistan. Since 2002, the majority of development aid to the 48 nation states identified as ‘fragile’ by the *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD) has gone to just three countries: Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (OXFAM, 2011, p.2). To demonstrate the magnitude of this, Iraq received twelve times the money that Democratic Republic of Congo (a notoriously fragile state that remains on the top ten list of fragile countries) received (p.10). These statistics show an imbalance in the distribution of aid according to the donor country’s security priority. The provision of global aid to just two fragile states of obvious geopolitical importance – Iraq and Afghanistan – has risen steadily since 2001 (OECD-DAC, 2010, p.77). In fact, over two-fifths of the total \$178billion increase in OECD donors’ development aid during this time period has been to these two countries, with the remaining increase been shared by the other 150 developing countries (OXFAM, 2011, p.9).

These statistics highlight the concentration of foreign aid to the countries deemed fragile and display their importance to the security agendas of the donor countries.

According to the OXFAM report, “global aid spending is increasingly skewed towards countries where threats to donors’ national security are perceived to exist, or where donors are militarily engaged” (p.5) The report also suggests that by recruiting aid and aid institutions for their own national security objectives, donor states risk undermining the effectiveness of the aid and will fail to contribute to the long-term security for recipient communities and governments and to their own nation states (p.3).

Section 3: Securitization of development: Canada's post 9/11 mission in Afghanistan

As established in the previous section, the post 9/11 global policy shift from narrowly viewing weak states as needy of development supports to seeing them primarily as a security threat resulted in them receiving an increasing proportion of the international aid budget. The investment of these additional funds was recognition of the fact that these states now played a pivotal role in international security and stability.

This section will examine this policy shift towards securitization by deconstructing Canada's post 9/11 mission in Afghanistan. It will begin by setting the context for the post 9/11 situation in Afghanistan. Next, it will analyse the government documents showing the shift in Canadian policy towards securitization of development, focusing on the application of securitization language and the different modalities through which aid was securitized. It will present the impacts of the policy shift towards securitization by demonstrating its effect on both security and development outcomes. It will conclude by highlighting the impacts on Canada's peacebuilding mission in Afghanistan.

3.1 Afghanistan: Setting the Context

Over the last few decades, Afghanistan has been exposed to the impact of political and ideological forces, starting with when it first became a Cold War battleground between the Soviet Union and the United States. Then after the fall of Soviet Union, the country faced civil war and political disintegration over the years until the U.S. invasion in 2001.

3.1.1 Fragile State of Affairs

3.1.1.1 The Soviet Invasion, Afghan Civil War and the rise of Taliban

The Soviet war of resistance in the 1980s has defined Afghanistan as it is today. The invasion and war with the Soviet Union cost incalculable loss of life and property, disrupted economic activities, and spurred enormous refugee outflows. The infrastructure was severely damaged, and millions of people crossed into neighbouring countries such as Pakistan, Iran and Tajikistan to seek refuge (Zhang, 2019, p.6). Afghanistan's economy became much more dependent on the former Soviet Union. The Afghan Army, which fought alongside the Russians, had been well trained and well equipped. However, in 1989, when the former Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the Afghan army began to fall apart. By 1991, when the Soviets cut off the supplies of fuel, food, and equipment, neither the army nor the regime could function (Braithwaite, 2014).

After the Soviet left, the country soon plunged into a dreaded civil war following its failure to create a state, common national leadership, centralized army, and a sound economy. The warlords and criminal gangs rushed to fill the vacuum created by the failure of public institutions to provide security (Kaldor, n.d). Consequently, the country further sank into anarchy, with a complete breakdown of law and order. The defeat of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War translated into a near-total withdrawal of western interests from Afghanistan, at a time when the population needed it more than ever in order to rebuild and recover from a decade of violence. Astri Suhrke writes that after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989, the West no longer professed much of an interest in the country, and the mujahedin groups who were fighting the Soviets, aided by regional powers, turned on each other and a civil war began. Neither the US nor the UN intervened to stop the fighting, and the Taliban exploited the anarchic violence to seize power, eventually controlling some 90 percent of the territory and giving sanctuary to international terrorists (Suhrke, 2009, p.228). As a result, the country went into chaos.

Much of the destruction occurred during the Soviet occupation (Noorzoy, 2012). The post-Soviet civil war brought about additional large-scale population displacements, unprecedented human casualties, and irreparable damage to public and private property. Villages, towns and cities were destroyed, and their leftover socio-economic and political-administrative structures became indistinct. As a result of the Soviet invasion and the ensuing civil war, the majority of Afghan children, the country's future generation, grew up either as refugees or as internally displaced people, and suffered from a lack of laws and institutions to protect them.

3.1.1.2 The U.S. War on Terrorism

After the September 11th attacks on the United States, the U.S. and the allied forces responded by invading Afghanistan, destroying the al-Qaeda terrorist network, and toppling the Taliban regime that had sheltered the terrorists. At the time of the US invasion, Afghanistan was a poor, highly fragmented country that had just emerged from decades of war (Barnett, & Zürcher, 2009, p.41). The fragility of the state was such that many of its 20 million people faced starvation (Rashid, 2001). The contemporary population displacement of Afghans that followed the US invasion created the biggest refugee problem that the world had seen at the time. Afghanistan holds about 2.5 million registered refugees, the second largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2019). The war exacerbated the effects of poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation, lack of access to health care, and environmental degradation on the health of its population (Janzekovic, 2009).

More than two decades of war and unrest resulted in the fragile state of affairs that Afghanistan was in when the U.S and allied forces overthrew Taliban. The country needed sustainable development and peace. There was a need to build resilience among the Afghani people and give them the capacity to make their own decisions moving forward.

3.1.2 The starting point for Peacebuilding

The defeat of Taliban led to a broader debate about the promotion of a government that would join in the war against terrorism and to create structural underpinning for a stable peace. In December 2001, months after the attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, various representatives of Afghan groups under the auspices of the UN met in Bonn, Germany. On 5th of December 2001, the *Bonn Agreement* was formalized. It is a legal and political framework to commence postwar activities of rebuilding a war-torn country with the help of allied forces (Suhrke, et al., 2002, p.877). The UN Security Council authorized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to continue the campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Kabul and surrounding areas only. ISAF under the 2001 *Bonn agreement* was deployed as a NATO peacekeeping and reconstruction force. It was modelled on the pattern of 'a coalition of the willing', and the advantage was that it could be deployed quickly since it was not formed by the UN but consisted of national contingents that operated under a UN resolution (Suhrke, et al., 2002, p.883). The ISAF thus functioned with minimal institutionalisation in relation to the UN, and within a more uncertain timeframe than was customary for regular UN peacekeeping operations. As outlined in the *Bonn Agreement*, the expansion of the stability and reconstruction mission under ISAF to other parts of the country faced some obstacles initially. Because on the parallel the U.S. was fighting its war on terrorism under *Operation Enduring Freedom* with the allied forces. On that, Astri Suhrke and colleagues write that many traditional troop contributing countries (such as the UK, Canada and Norway) who may have otherwise contributed troops fully to the UN-authorized ISAF force, had already placed much of the military resources behind the US war in Afghanistan in order to demonstrate their support to the United States War on Terror and

“demonstrate their lineup that President Bush had defined as either with us, or against us” (Suhrke, et al., 2002, p.883).

The Bonn Agreement was a preliminary step towards post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan. It established the decisions regarding power sharing in the political and military arena, and established principles for developing the social and economic sectors to ensure the transition towards peacebuilding (Suhrke, et al., 2002, p.876). Barnett and Zürcher write that because of its perceived importance to the new security agenda and the war against terrorism, the international community immediately provided support for the political process and provided “muscular and generous” funding (Barnett, & Zürcher, 2009, p.43). The objective set by the international community, including Canada, was to “build a new Afghan nation through the promotion of reconstruction, reform, and development” (Banerjee, 2005, p.25). For the purpose of stabilizing the country and building governmental capacity, the world pledged around US\$286.4 billion, making Afghanistan a major recipient of a high concentration of international aid (Poole, 2011, p.2). In 2000, the year before the U.S. invasion, Afghanistan was the 69th largest recipient of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide, receiving 0.3% of total ODA and by 2008, it had become the world’s leading aid recipient, with the total share of ODA increasing from US\$ 1.3 billion in 2009 to US\$ 6.2 billion (Poole, 2011, p.6).

Canada was among the top five western donor countries to provide foreign aid and assistance to Afghanistan. The Government of Canada committed \$1.9 billion to development and reconstruction in Afghanistan for the period 2001 to 2011 (Government of Canada, 2015). It also contributed forty-thousand troops in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 (Veterans Affairs Canada, 2019). Canada fought alongside the U.S. in its war against terrorism as well as remained involved

with ISAF. It also had an increased military role in Afghanistan's Kandahar province, where it led the Provincial Reconstruction Team from 2005 to 2011 (Brown, 2016).

3.2 Analyzing Canada's policy shift towards securitization of development

Canadian engagement in Afghanistan evolved greatly over the decade following the invasion in 2001. Canada's mission began with disrupting al-Qaeda (the terrorist organization responsible for the attack on the U.S) and toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The initial success in the first phase of the mission was followed by peacebuilding tasks aimed towards maintaining peace and creating an environment suitable for lasting peace in the long-term. Canada's primary objective in Afghanistan was to lay the foundations for state stability and lasting peace by building and strengthening the Afghan state's machinery and institutions. Much of the Canadian aid to Afghanistan was securitized.

3.2.1 Canada's implementation of Securitization Language

The Copenhagen School's definition of securitization relies heavily on the analyses of speeches and language in policy documents. As mentioned, the securitization is complete when a political leader's speech act and the use of security language in the official policy documents convinces the audience of the threat and the measures taken to address those threats. As the Canadian mission in Afghanistan continued, the grammatical-linguistic rules of the securitization theory present in the Canadian official policy documents demonstrated the propagation of the concepts of 'failed and fragile states' and that of the 'whole of government (WoG) approach' to convince the audience of an existential security threat.

3.2.1.1 Failed or Fragile States

The ‘fragile state’ concept was introduced into policy discourses at the end of the Cold War. However, it did not gain traction until the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 (Keating, 2016, p.10). This post-9/11 view of the world refocused the concept of fragile states beyond the need for poverty alleviation and improvement of living conditions by emphasizing fragility in terms of their vulnerability to becoming targets as safe havens for terrorists; a threat with global consequences (Brown, 2016). Canada used the terminology of the *failed* and *failing* interchangeably to highlight that the existential threat to Canada’s national security is generating from these failed/fragile states. For example in 2004, the Immediate Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan tabled in the Parliament Canada’s National Security Policy and addressed the Parliament that, “The National Security policy is an integrated strategy that demonstrates the Government of Canada’s leadership and commitment to protecting Canadians” (Government of Canada, 2004).

Canada’s 2004 National Security Policy describes the growing number of failed or failing states as an important challenge for international security, stating that,

“these states contribute to spreading instability and can be a haven for both terrorists and organized crime groups that exploit weak or corrupt governing structures to pursue their nefarious activities. These activities have had consequences far beyond their borders, including for Canada” (Privy Council Office, 2004, p.7).

The document further argues that these failed and failing states pose a security threat to Canadian national security which justifies the extreme importance to help these countries.

“Failed and failing states can provide a haven for terrorists, which can pose risks to the security of Canadians. Canadian security will be increasingly dependent on our ability to

contribute to international security. This may require the deployment of military assets to protect against direct threats to international peace and security or the provision of development assistance to strengthen public institutions in weak or failing states” (Privy Council Office, 2004, p.6).

In 2005, Canada released its International Policy Statement (IPS), which highlights the threats to Canada generated from failed and failing states:

“At the dawn of the 21st century, Canada faces a complex array of security challenges [...] Failed and failing states dot the international landscape, creating despair and regional instability and providing a haven for those who would attack us directly” (Government of Canada, 2005, p.1).

The subtle message conveyed to the audience is that these failed or failing states are responsible for creating conditions that harbor terrorists and lead to global terrorism. In short, these states themselves become an inherent threat to national and international security. Furthermore, the IPS focuses on how these states create regional instability that pose a direct threat to Canadian national security by asserting that,

“Failed and failing states pose a dual challenge for Canada. In the first instance, the suffering that these situations create is an affront to Canadian values. Beyond this, they also plant the seeds of threats to regional and global security. They generate refugee flows that threaten the stability of their neighbours and create new political problems for their regions. More ominously, the impotence of their governing structures makes them potential breeding grounds or safe havens for terrorism and organized crime” (Government of Canada, 2005, p.5).

The term, *fragile states, failed or failing states* is used to justify the need to stay in Afghanistan. Stephen Brown suggests that the use of failed and fragile state terminology highlights the presence or imminence of chaos that requires military intervention to prevent or solve a crisis (Brown, 2016, p.116). The application of the integrated Whole of Government (WoG) approach to development shows the focus on the shift from normalcy to emergency situation as security concerns were being mainstreamed into development goals. Brown also suggests that the term failed or fragile states is deliberately used to justify a relatively ad hoc decision to intervene in a small number of specific ‘crisis countries’, where the government could practically use development assistance to contribute to stabilization and security (Brown, 2016, p.113).

3.2.1.2 Whole of Government Approach

In 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin introduced the concept of 3D’s in his address on his visit to Washington D.C.

“The three D’s means building public institutions that work and are accountable to the public for their actions, [...] It means working on many levels at the same time and doing so in ways that reinforce each other” (Martin, 2004).

This approach involved the close coordination of defence, diplomacy and development (3D model). The latter aims at incorporating civilian and military resources to achieve stability in failing and failed states. Following the Prime Minister, the then Foreign Minister Peter MacKay (2006) stated that:

“not just the Canadian forces, but Canadian diplomats, development workers and experts in human rights, good governance, the rule of law, and democracy building have all come together in common endeavour overseas to advance Canada’s security...a whole different approach is what is needed and is how we are proceeding” (Travers & Owen, 2008, p.688).

The 3D model evolved into an all-inclusive the “whole of government” (WoG) approach introduced in 2005 *International Policy Statement*:

“The government is committed to enhancing Canada’s ability to contribute to international peace and security and, in particular, restore stability in failed and failing states. Achieving this objective in today’s complex security environment will require, more than ever, a “whole of government” approach to international missions, bringing together military and civilian resources in a focused and coherent fashion” (Government of Canada, 2005, p.26).

The WoG approach subordinates these coherent resources to a particular security logic that posits that operations in a post-conflict situation are intertwined and cannot be approached separately; instead, they require an integrated approach. This is demonstrated through the IPS for the strategy in Afghanistan which was co-developed by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces with support from other government departments and agencies, including Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). This close collaboration between aid, foreign policy and security agencies at the national level manifested the exceptional changes to institutions from different fields to implement the WoG approach. Although the overall mandates for all these stakeholders are different, they came together under the unified goal of peacebuilding through reconstruction, development, and providing security.

Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is most often cited when demonstrating the importance of the speech act in identifying failed states as the protective havens for terrorists. There is irrefutable evidence that Afghanistan served as the base for al-Qaeda. The 9/11 attacks planned and generated by the terrorists based in Afghanistan provided the facilitating conditions, the world was

preoccupied with the threat of terrorism. The securitization process was complete when the public (audience) accepted the speech act by the government that called for Canada to continue its mission to deal with the existential security threat generating from a fragile country like Afghanistan. When Canadian troops were first deployed to Afghanistan, the public strongly endorsed the mission. Environics' Focus Canada tracking surveys show three quarters (75%) were supportive, 38% strongly so for the Canadian mission in Afghanistan (Adams, 2015). Similarly, according to an Ipsos-Reid/Globe and Mail/CTV poll conducted in 2002, two-thirds (66%) of Canadians supported the combat role for Canadian troops being deployed to Afghanistan given the circumstances and majority of Canadians (51%) indicated that the war in Afghanistan was a necessary response after the attacks on September 11th, 2001 because of the threat of terrorists being trained and harboured there (Ipsos-Reid, 2002).

3.2.2 Modality of Aid Delivery

3.2.2.1 Securitization and the Canadian Aid

Canadian aid to fragile states is highly concentrated. In 2010, among the forty-seven fragile states, the top five recipients of Canadian aid (Haiti, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sudan), received almost 55 percent of the funding allocated that year (Carment & Samy, 2014, p.229). Several vehicles exist for the delivery of foreign aid, including Official Development Assistance (ODA). The ODA, as defined by the *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD), is a gold standard of delivering foreign aid to developing countries that promotes and specifically targets their economic development and welfare (OECD, 2019, p.1). The OECD specifically clarifies that ODA cannot be used as military aid or for the promotion of donors' security interests (OECD, 2019, p.1). However, as observed through Canada's 2004 National

Security Policy and International Policy Statement of 2005, the Canadian government used the WoG approach as a mechanism to direct ODA funds to support national security objectives in Afghanistan. This resulted in the securitization of half of Canada's development aid to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was Canada's main ODA recipient as early as 2002. It was soon replaced, ranking second to Iraq in 2003 (Massie & Roussel, 2016, p.163). Following the deployment of Canadian troops to the country in 2001, ODA to Afghanistan doubled every year from 2001 to 2003, and again between 2005 and 2007. Between 2000 and 2007, ODA increased 50-fold from \$6.66 million to \$345.39 million (in constant USD). With the end of Canada's combat role in 2011, the aid levels began to drop and was recorded at \$84.19 million in 2014, the year Canadian troops left Afghanistan (QWIDS-OECD, 2020).

Initially, Canadian aid was closely aligned with the priorities of the Afghan government and was delivered in close cooperation with multilateral actors. The bulk of this aid was delivered in Kandahar where the majority of Canadian troops were deployed. According to Stephen Brown, after 2007, aid often responded to the priorities of the Canadian Forces, articulated by the Canadian government and imposed on the various components of Canadian foreign policy. This was justified by invoking a WoG approach, to achieve unified and collaborated efforts among the various official Canadian actors, such as the military, diplomats, and CIDA officials. Essentially, this approach aligned Canadian aid with Canadian security interests (Brown, 2016, p.19).

CIDA was instrumentalized through the tools of securitization implemented by the Canadian government (i.e. the WoG approach) to redirect the funds intended for development related programs, to security purposes allowing security actors, such as military, to deliver aid to

Afghanistan (Brown, 2016, p.114). A significant amount of aid was spent on projects aimed at winning local hearts and minds, in other words, to garner support for the presence of Canadian troops. For instance, aid was used to try to win villagers' support by building them a school or a clinic, theoretically making them less likely to support the Taliban (Brown, 2016, p.20). The 2007 report by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence suggested that the "CIDA should be funneling significant amounts of development money through our military" (The Senate of Canada, 2007, p.8). One of the recommendations of the report was also that "CIDA provide from its budget \$20 million directly to the Canadian Forces for their use in local development projects by Afghans" (The Senate of Canada, 2007, p.16).

3.2.2.2 Implementing the Whole of Government Approach

The integration of the defence, diplomacy, development (3D model) in the WoG approach meant enhanced collaboration between each department. Forming a development and security nexus so that each department contributes its expertise into a combined effort towards rebuilding peace and security. A good example of how the civil and military development nexus materialized are Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs were first implemented by the United States in 2002 following the invasion of Afghanistan. They are used to introduce post-conflict, reconstruction, security, and development activities in areas still too hostile for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) relief agencies (Abbaszadeh, et al., 2008, p.5). PRT's are the primary path through which aid and development is channelled in Afghanistan. PRT units in each province in Afghanistan house military, diplomatic, and development personnel and are in charged with reconstruction efforts in which they are situated. Canada's military led the PRT in Kandahar, Afghanistan's most volatile province from 2005 to 2011, where they had the enhanced role in peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction. Even though Canada is not the

originator of this concept, it became the key tool to implement the WoG approach. The objective of PRTs was to rebuild local infrastructure and provide services to local citizens. First a reconstruction or development need was identified, then a solution to meet the need was devised and implemented using Canadian development aid.

The Canadian government committed to allocate 60-70% of its total developmental fund for Afghanistan on PRTs (Banerjee, 2008, p.49). Canada's PRTs received funding and support from all three of the main agencies involved: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defense (DND), and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Although PRTs have become an integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have also been criticized for several reasons. These include their mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, and their failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with UN and NGO organizations (Abbaszadeh, et al., 2008, p.4). Furthermore, imbalances in their staffing and mission resulted in an overrepresentation of the military component relative to the civilian participation in the PRT projects. In 2006, the civilian component of the PRT consisted of one person from CIDA, three from DFAIT, and two RCMP officers (Leprince, 2013, p.364). These decisions demonstrate the triumph of a security logic focussing on conventional concerns of military capacity, over a more inclusive concept of security which should value the human security of a post-conflict fragile population. These imbalances highlight a key failure of the implementation of the WoG approach. According to Mark Duffield, it is important to be mindful of the fact that the newfound concern over failed states indicates that the War on Terror is not simply a military campaign, it is a multidimensional conflict that also engages with questions of poverty, development and internal conflict (Duffield, 2006, p.27).

3.2.2.3 Challenges in Implementation of the Whole of Government Approach

A major challenge in coordinating a WoG approach is that each organization operates within its own cultural understanding of a situation and has its own standard intervention practices. A good example of this is the different approaches to the development goals in Afghanistan adopted by CIDA and the Canadian Military. The development perspective that CIDA adopted integrated with local and national development strategies and emphasized the importance of working with locals, investing in long-term development, and building the institutions of the Afghan state (Leprince, 2013, p.365). This approach recognized that results would not be visible for years, if not decades. The enhanced military role in the whole of government approach rendered the development projects more security driven and short term and less sustainable. Stephen Brown argues that the whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan was dominated by a security viewpoint, to the detriment of development, and the strategy was relatively inefficient on both counts (Brown, 2016, p.20).

The Canadian Military, on the other hand, believed it was urgent to have a significant reconstruction program that would deliver immediate value to the Afghans in Kandahar in order to stem the insurgency. As a result, they approached development with a “win hearts and minds” strategy. A strategy requiring quick action since “the more the reconstruction the more likely people will support the international community rather than the Taliban and the more secure the country will become” (Brown, 2016, p.122). It had short term goals requiring local support for and assistance with their counter insurgency efforts. In order to obtain this support, they preferred to implement quick, freestanding projects that were mostly infrastructural. The *2008 Counter*

*Insurgency Manual*¹ elaborates on the military's role in providing development support. For example, it directs military personnel:

“Even before non-military agencies arrive in the area to begin long-term development projects, military forces may begin the process to alleviate suffering, spark development and gain campaign support. Measures will involve quick-impact projects such as repairs to wells and the conduct of local medical clinics, remuneration for collateral damages, low-level employment schemes such as war damage repairs and checkpoint construction and delivery of basic tools for work and agriculture” (The Department of National Defence, 2008, p.5-26).

3.2.3 Reinforcing Securitization

The public support for the mission that was high in the early years started to wane by the end of 2006. The increase in Canadian casualties, considerable economic cost, and an unknown outcome created public confusion and a lack of support for the mission. A 2006 Ipsos-Reid survey showed that the majority of Canadians now opposed the ongoing operation in Afghanistan (54%) and were of the opinion that "Canadian troops should not be deployed in Afghanistan and they should be brought home as soon as possible" (52%) (Ipsos-Reid, 2006a; Ipsos-Reid, 2006b). The opposition parties were all calling for Canada to end its combat mission in Afghanistan but continue with the humanitarian mission (Massie, 2008, p.19; Fletcher et al., 2010, p.913). According to a 2009 poll for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, a majority (53%) believed that Canada should end its military mission in 2011 and concentrate exclusively on humanitarian work and

¹ a doctrine that frames counterinsurgency within the context of the range of military operations and provides a framework for the different ways land forces could counter an insurgency

reconstruction, while only 15 percent wanted to see an ongoing role for the Canadian Forces past 2011 (Innovative Research Group, 2009 as cited in Chapin, 2010).

In response to the decreasing public and political support to continue the mission, a panel led by former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley was formed. The Panel was tasked with public review of its policy in Afghanistan, and to make recommendations going forward in preparation for the intended troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2009 (CBC News, 2007). The *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (popularly referred to as the Manley Report) was presented in the House of Commons in 2008.

John Manley spoke about the report to the Canadian media and explained that the security situation is not only deteriorating in Afghanistan but that the “the mission is in jeopardy [as there] simply are not enough troops to ensure that the job can be properly done in Kandahar province...” (CBC News, 2008, p.6). The report highlighted the primary objective of Canadian presence in Afghanistan as,

“countering the terrorist threat, by foreclosing the regression of Afghanistan as a haven again for terrorists, is plainly one objective. To achieve that imperative, and to protect regional and international stability, most people (Canadians and Afghans alike) can agree on a larger and overarching purpose – to help build a stable and developing country in which the rights of all citizens are respected and their security is protected by their own government [...] A primary Canadian objective, while helping Afghans, has been to help ensure that Afghanistan itself does not again revert to the status of sanctuary and head office for global terrorism” (Manley, 2008, p.20).

Similarly, the June 2008 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, cites the reasons why Canada should not shy away from development enabled by a military presence, and that “the Afghans are in desperate need of assistance precisely because they have endured more than three decades of conflict and if the military presence were to disappear, there would be no possibility of development”(The Senate of Canada, 2008).

The Senate report further restates the securitization narrative that the “world security is increasingly threatened by weak and failing states [...] These states will continue to erode unless wealthier nations focus on security and reconstruction in a serious and sustained way. Canada’s two areas of focus at the moment are Haiti and Afghanistan. Our contributions in these two states are essential to a broader effort to help stabilize failed or failing states” (The Senate of Canada, 2008).

The Manley report reiterated the need for Canada to continue its mission in Afghanistan with the purpose of helping Afghans achieve sustainable peace and security. It also reinforced the policy that by helping a fragile country like Afghanistan, Canada is in fact also securing itself from any security threats that may generate from there. The Senate Report (2008) reinforces the fragile state terminology, and like most policy documents, it highlights the inherent threats to global security generated from failing states if not helped otherwise. In the wake of the recommendations of the 2008 Manley report, the Prime Minister Harper sought a parliamentary extension of Canada's mission to Afghanistan until 2011.

3.3 Effect of Canada’s Securitization Mission on Security and Development Outcomes

The Canadian mission to Afghanistan was Canada’s largest military deployment since WWII. The estimated financial cost of the mission was around \$18 billion (Pugliese, 2019). The Canadian Forces ended their operations in Kandahar in 2014 without having established a secure

environment, while CIDA cut its overall aid to Afghanistan and redirected the Kandahar aid budget to more secure areas of the country (Clark, 2018; Brown, 2016). Kandahar remained a volatile province and the security threats continue to exist.

During their mission in Afghanistan, the Canadian government had initiated three “signature” development projects: 1) the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system, 2) the building or repair of 50 schools, and 3) the expanded support for polio immunization. These three projects provide good examples to demonstrate the effectiveness of the overall mission.

Up until its withdrawal in 2014, Canada spent an estimated \$50 million on repairs to some of the Dahla Dam’s infrastructure and on cleaning and rebuilding 500 kilometres of canals to move water to farmlands downstream (Pugliese, 2014). Based on its December 2013 visit, the Ottawa Citizen reported that the water did not reach 30 percent of the canals that Canada refurbished. That was because the dam itself was not fully functioning at that time and was not expected to be until at least 2017. That date has now been moved to 2023 with a final cost set at around \$500 million (Pugliese, 2019). Furthermore, according to Nipa Banerjee, a former head of CIDA operations in Afghanistan (2003-2006), on her visit to the dam in 2004, local farmers told her that if the dam cannot be replaced, its height should be increased to hold more water. Her proposal for a feasibility study was sent to the CIDA’s program desk for options to improve the dam but was never materialized (Watson, 2012).

Of the numerous schools that were built during the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, many are now closed because of a lack of funding and in part because instability has prevented people from making use of them (Pugliese, 2019; Khan, 2018). Likewise, the efforts to immunize Kandahar’s children against polio was also left incomplete at the time of departure. The spread of

the disease continues and has led to new cases in the province and elsewhere in Afghanistan. According to Nipa Banerjee, “Kandahar is still called the world’s capital of polio” (Watson, 2012).

3.4 Overall Impact on Canada’s Peacebuilding Mission in Afghanistan

Canada started its mission in Afghanistan under the banner of the Whole of Government approach. However, there was a lack of a unified objective and no clear division of functions between the 3Ds. This resulted in confusion such that the defence and development agencies ended up overlapping and sometimes duplicating the activities (Banerjee, 2009, p.68). Stephen Brown posits that in terms of development and security in Afghanistan, Canada’s WoG approach largely failed on both counts (Brown, 2016, p.127). The Manley report that came about to salvage the mission support and revise the much needed mission objectives also failed to provide directions on how to achieve a sustainable peace in Afghanistan (Siebert, 2008). As a consequence of these shortcomings, Canada failed to implement many of its signature development projects intended to lay the foundations for stability and to help secure Afghanistan, particularly Kandahar, from insurgent violence.

When Canada departed Afghanistan in 2014, the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgencies were destabilizing the government and threatening the population and the Taliban controlled more Afghan territory in 2017 than at any time since 2001 (Amnesty International, 2017). To summarize the mission as Roland Paris describe it, “in the end, the Canadian exertions and sacrifices in Kandahar did little to change the underlying conditions of this conflict” (Paris, 2014). It is justified to state that without achieving security and development, the peacebuilding process will remain an elusive goal.

Section 4: Impact of Canadian securitization policies on peacebuilding in Afghanistan

4.1 Challenges for Peacebuilding

The securitization of development with an increased focus on fragile states as the source of the existential threat has justified the robust response to achieve international peace and security. A diverse troupe of actors belonging to various fields such as the military, the civilian population and humanitarian groups, played an important role in post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan. The securitization made an enormous amount of international aid available for reconstruction and development. However, there were unintended consequences of the external actors' engagements in a conflict zone. Although the actors involved had a shared aim of bringing stability, reconstruction and peace in Afghanistan, they also each had their own values, interests and mandates that did not always align with the local needs or goals.

As described in *Section 2*, the securitization of development uses exceptional measures in order to eliminate security threats. This introduces a number of challenges to the peacebuilding process. Securitization brings the domain of peacebuilding under the umbrella of a national and international security agenda of powerful states (Paris, 2018, p.5). It also limits the peacebuilding process to the security agenda of the donor country rather than a development agenda for the affected country. Like most fragile countries, the development agenda in Afghanistan should aim to build human security, to give the locals the sense of agency and to empower them to make their own decisions, rebuild infrastructure, education, and include building the institutional capacity and political legitimacy that leave them susceptible to political instability and violent conflict. Naomi Weinberger maintains that the probability of success in peacebuilding reflects on three critical dimensions: addressing the local roots of hostility, building local capacities and the degree of international commitment (Weinberger, 2002, p.246). In the context of the Canadian mission in

Afghanistan, the following challenges that emerged as a result of its securitization policies and its impact on peacebuilding will be explored: 1) lack of clear objectives, 2) budget imbalances 3) failure to establish local agency 4) aid in-effectiveness, and 5) inability to implement successful capacity building.

4.1.1 Unclear objectives

Just like any complex endeavour, peacebuilding requires clear direction, strategic planning, thorough analysis, and effective coordination and implementation to achieve its objectives. The international community started with confused objectives in Afghanistan. After achieving the initial goal of eliminating the terrorists and the suppression of the Taliban in 2001, there were no clear objectives on how to achieve sustainable peace and stability in a fragile state of Afghanistan. According to Nipa Banerjee, it was never clear whether the objectives were aimed at ‘achieving security for the homeland and Afghanistan by eliminating safe havens for terrorists, or whether they were trying to establish democracy. Even if both of these were the objectives, neither has been achieved’ (Banerjee, 2009, p.67). The incorporation of the Whole of Government (WoG) Approach based on civil-military collaboration also had its shortfalls. Banerjee criticizes the fact that no unitary objective was established and no division of functions between the defence, development and diplomacy (3Ds) to achieve the objective was envisaged (Banerjee, 2009, p.67). The program saw a miscoordination and organizational tension in the civil-military relationship.

4.1.1.1 Impact

As was highlighted in *section 3*, the development perspective of Canadian International Development Agency of having long-term projects differed from the military perspective of quick impact projects to gain local legitimacy quickly. This had an impact on the legitimacy of the WoG approach and the reconstruction and peacebuilding operations in a conflict zone. Development

actors were overshadowed by military actors, which brought the development goals to the political agenda (Petřík, 2016, p.165). This appeared to transform development aid into an instrument to fight war rather than helping with the development in the country. These organizational differences also led to misunderstandings which had a negative impact on the development and reconstruction initiatives. In a study conducted by Travers and Owen, they observed that NGOs saw civil/military coordination as a simple “means of accomplishing military objectives” which sometimes resulted in a fractious relationship between humanitarian workers and soldiers (Travers & Owen, 2008, p 692).

4.1.2 Budget imbalances

Furthermore, the imbalance in the division of budgets for each of the 3Ds has been noted. According to Chuck Theissen, non-military and non-governmental actors within the international intervention process in Afghanistan have accused countries of redirecting development aid from humanitarian organizations to military channels. The imbalance between development and military funding on both international and domestic levels shows that the funding has been heavily weighted towards military expenditures. Total international military spending by US and NATO forces in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2006 out-spaced total development funding by 900% with US\$ 82.5 billion spent on the military and just \$7.3 billion on development (Travers & Owen, 2008, p.699). The ratio is similar within Canada. Averaged over the 10-year commitment of \$1 billion dollars, Canada spent approximately \$100 million to one billion per year on development as compared with an estimated \$600 million to one billion per year in military expenditures (Travers & Owen, 2008, p.699).

4.1.2.1 Impact

Travers and Owen assert that given the military dominance in the mission budget and particularly in the Kandahar PRT, the political justifications referring to reconstruction and development assistance begin to look less plausible (Travers & Owen, 2008, p.699). The military's undertaking of the humanitarian assistance work as part of their 'win the hearts and minds' of the local population also concerned the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The main objective behind this strategy was the military force's protection and information gathering as a result of gaining local trust and legitimacy. However, this approach brought confusion in the role of humanitarian agencies and the military forces on ground (Franke, 2006, p.12). Fiona Terry writes that when the provision of aid and development are tied with a military or a political strategy, it is treated as such, and "the policy backfires when villages are punished for having received it or aid agencies are attacked as agents of the enemy's agenda" (Terry, 2011 & MacAskill, 2004). In addition, Jaroslav Petrik asserts that such negative experiences underscore that politicization of aid resulting from a close partnership between aid agencies and the military not only harms other civilian aid actors, but ultimately undermines the entire development effort (Petřík, 2016, p.178).

4.1.3 Failure to establish local agency

The premise on which peacebuilding measures are initiated means tackling the 'root causes' of instability violence in order to 'build a lasting peace' (Paris, 2018, p.7). This requires a multilateral approach with sustainable development goals and local ownership. The latter is especially important in post-conflict scenarios, so that locals can have ownership of decision making that impacts them. Gaining legitimacy for international projects, funders and even governmental organizations, stems from the ability of international collaborations to harness the power and agency of the communities they are working in to successfully implement peacebuilding projects (Hancock, 2018, p.38). Landon Hancock posits that local ownership is the

heart of peacebuilding and that it contributes to the legitimacy of any peacebuilding effort. According to Hancock, a need for agency of the local population through deliberative governance is important for a successful peacebuilding process. ‘Agency’ is defined as having power to act and set goals that is partially independent of constraining factors such as foreign funders’ wishes, while ‘deliberative governance’ is “the art of governing communities in participatory, deliberative and collaborative ways” (Hancock, 2018, p.25). When a peacebuilding project satisfies the need for agency, then it will be legitimate in the eyes of locals and potentially in the eyes of outsiders such as national governments, funders, or other peacebuilding agencies (Hancock, 2018).

For instance, in Afghanistan the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) failed to consult the government ministries regarding their plans (Thiessen, 2012). Chuck Thiessen argues that is one of the reasons why the PRTs, under the WoG approach, were sometimes accused of being a “copy of government” in the provinces, which clearly undermines their stated goal of supporting local government (Thiessen, 2012, p.325). Another example of failure to incorporate local input comes from the case of the Dahla Dam project, the local demands to raise the height of the dam to increase the capacity of the reservoir in order to meet their needs were overlooked. Instead, the Canadian government invested their resources in fixing the canals because they deemed it a more urgent and achievable goal (Watson, 2012).

Similarly, the Canadian mission failed to establish local agency amongst Afghans in the school building project. This is mostly due to the fact that the project was implemented without adequate community input and understanding of the local culture. OXFAM reports that locals believe that to sustain the school project “you have to have community support and the local mullahs [religious clerics] must be supportive [...] If they [the mullahs] are involved in the schools

and know the teachers, we have seen that they will not be able to oppose it” (OXFAM, 2011, p.5).

An important caveat in the process of enabling local agency is the need to ensure it is not being granted to those actors who promote a terrorist agenda, reinforce structures and mechanisms of corruption, and create instability. In the name of fostering local agency, peacebuilders could very well empower the wrong actors. In the case of post 9/11 Afghanistan, the abuse of power increasingly became an organizing principle of the political order, whereby elites derive power both from external actors and their ability to manipulate divisions within a fragmented society through ethnic and factional mobilization (Theros & Kaldor, 2018, p.14). Following the 2001 expulsion of the Taliban, the international community and Afghan power-elites justified the placement of former warlords into positions of power to address the threat posed by armed militias and to quickly stabilise the country (Thiessen, 2012, p.265). Despite their ugly histories of human rights abuses, these Warlords were granted top positions in central government, appointed as provincial governors, and were mostly allowed to accumulate incredible wealth and power (Mac Ginty, 2010, p.586). These dynamics of insecurity also generated opportunities for the Taliban, who were known to provide safe haven to Al-Qaeda terrorists.

4.1.3.1 Impact

Evidently, local legitimacy given to inappropriate local partners can adversely impact the success of development causes and lead to overall negative consequences on peacebuilding activities. Dilemma related to choosing local partners from within warring groups risks both empowering potential spoilers and alienating local populations that suffer at the hands of these groups. It effects the legitimacy of both the government and the peacebuilders, as the general population feels excluded from political processes such as leadership selection (Thiessen, 2012,

p.265; Narten, 2009, p.260). Similarly, the presence of warlords hinders efforts to legitimize central governance in Afghanistan. According to a study, the warlords were identified as destructive for peacebuilding efforts as the risk of a resumption of civil war was heightened by the presence of a warlords; by accepting them as leaders serves to entrench a culture of corruption and injustice within the state (Thiessen, 2012, p. 228). The destructive influence of Warlords also creates problems for grassroots Afghans, by prolonging under-development and worsening poverty (p. 228). The empowerment of influential warlords is also a reflection of the urgency to implement quick solutions to the donor's priorities rather than the local needs. This was also reflected in the provision of aid and its ineffectiveness to build local capacity and to establish local agency.

4.1.4 Aid in-effectiveness

The challenge for international donors in war-ravaged countries like Afghanistan is to redesign aid packages to focus primarily on the provision of reconstruction aid that promotes investment, local employment, and entrepreneurship (del Castillo, 2011). However, the securitization of development agenda complicated the goals of aid effectiveness by focusing the provision of aid on the donor's priorities instead of the recipient's need. A good example is the short-term aid projects which utilized the quick impact 'win the hearts and the minds' strategies in Afghanistan, e.g., building infrastructure such as repairing a road or a school. These projects under the WoG aimed to get quick buy-in from the recipient country, however, they did not include any provisions for the transfer of the infrastructure to local ownership and capacity building for its long-term maintenance. In his study, Chuck Thiessen writes that many Afghan participants claimed that small scale development projects while serving a purpose were noticeably falling short in the battle against poverty and unemployment and both factors identified as triggers for

recruitment into the insurgency (Thiessen, 2012, p.155). Stephen Brown points out that the presence of a basic incompatibility between the WoG approach and the principles of aid effectiveness will remain unless the goal of the recipient country's long-term development trumps a donor's short-term, self-interested contributions to concerted efforts in fragile states (Brown, 2016, p.121).

4.1.4.1 Impact

The policies under the Paris declaration were designed to make aid distribution more efficient by effective transfer of ownership of the development process from donor countries to the recipient countries (den Heyer, 2016). However, the provision of aid to conflict-affected countries has often proved to be more of a problem than a solution, in part by contributing to the creation of economies that would soon collapse if the international community and aid flows withdraw (del Castillo, 2011). This is evident in the trajectory of the Canadian aid budget, particularly in comparing budgets during the mission in Afghanistan, to pre- and post-mission budgets. In conjunction with the increased military role in Afghanistan, Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) rose from USD 13 million in 2000 to USD 407 million in 2007. After another slight increase, it declined to USD 101 million in 2012, after the troops' departure (Brown, 2016, p.122). The reduction in the amount of aid as the troops disengaged from the mission poses questions about the donor's intentions and commitments and points towards weaknesses in the development agendas. The Afghan economy showed significant improvement following the 2001 invasion. But this economic improvement cannot be taken as independent effort; it is clear that this growth was largely driven by foreign aid. The IMF report on *Afghanistan National Development Strategy* released in 2008 stated that the foreign aid over the previous 5 years made up approximately 60% of Afghan GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2008, p.19). As

a result, Afghanistan grew vitally dependent on foreign aid to support its precarious economy. The donor dependency creates a sense of fragility because any reductions in funding make them vulnerable to widespread struggle and jeopardizes the success of the peacebuilding process (Thiessen, 2012).

4.1.5 Inability to implement capacity building

According to the political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, “the strengthening of the capacity of a post-war government is vital to allow it to perform basic functions of public administration, such that the government can eventually wean itself from outside assistance should be treated as a crucial goal of peacebuilding” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.8). Peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan calls for the urgent need to build capacity and give a sense of agency to local decision makers, without which it will be very difficult to build a self-sustaining peace.

Building the capacity of the Afghan armed forces and police was also a vital element in the effective transition and smooth handover of projects and programs once the foreign troops left. In 2009, NATO states decided to establish the NATO Training Mission with the objective of increasing the capacity of the Afghan security forces as a means of realizing full Afghan responsibility for security. Canada was an initial contributor providing training assistance for the Afghan military. The Canadian contribution was to train the Afghan National Army (ANA), Air Force (AAF), and Police (ANP) schools and training establishments. However, the process had its limitations. First, there was a lack of professional trainers who were well acquainted in local languages and very few translators available, which made training difficult (Aman & Aman, 2015). Second, there was not an adequate amount of time to carry out comprehensive training programs that are required to achieve lasting results. While basic skills can be imparted relatively quickly,

the knowledge and skills required to establish and run an army effectively is not a quick process (Jeffery, 2013).

4.1.5.1 Impact

Low capacity was a significant factor in the struggle to achieve local ownership over peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Where the capacity building activities required longer time frames to be effective, it also is meant to consider their prowess accordingly to be successful. The participants of study conducted by Thiessen (2012) believed that many Afghan government officials were struggling to meet the requirements of modern structures as envisioned by international interveners and funders, and there is a possibility that locally developed and appropriate skills are being suppressed and ignored (p.263). Furthermore, the over reliance on training did not result in achieving desired results. Effective capacity building not only requires training but also on-the-job capacity building through working alongside technical advisors in developing policy, responding to daily issues, and managing operations together (Thiessen, 2012, p.148).

When Canada pulled out of Afghanistan in 2014, the Taliban insurgency was gaining strength, the reconstruction and development benchmarks were largely unmet, and the Afghan government's position was still precarious (Potter, 2020). This instability was felt by locals, as reported in a 2012 study of Afghans working in a range of fields, where a significant number of participants feared resumption of civil war and significant developmental and political loss of ground upon foreign withdrawal (Thiessen, 2012, p.135). One study participant, a senior donor official, believed that current efforts were unsustainable and post-withdrawal insecurities would render "a lot of money and effort wasted" (Thiessen, 2012, p.135). The security situation is seen

to have been deteriorating especially since the troop withdrawal began (Chughtai & Qazi, 2020). Today, there is an increased level of insecurity in Afghanistan.

4.2 Securitization and Peacebuilding: An Analysis

There is broad agreement that peacebuilding resides at the nexus of development and security. However, the interpretation of whose security is at stake and how security and development should intersect varies greatly (Tschirgi, 2013, p.208). In countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, peacebuilding has been instrumentalized to serve a larger security agenda of powerful western states. As Necla Tschirgi highlights, the concept of peacebuilding that emerged in the 1990s prioritized longer-term development based on a country's unique circumstances, while the resurgence of the state-centric security agenda that emerged after 9/11 has appropriated peacebuilding as part of an external security agenda where multilateral humanitarian concerns confront national security priorities (p.208). The securitization of development is not a new phenomenon. Roland Paris writes that studies of the record of international military operations since the end of the cold war failed to find a single case that was wholly altruistic (Paris, 2014, p.573). Even operations described as humanitarian were 'blurred with self-interested power pursuits' and shaped by 'geo-strategic interests' (p.573). Even today, the reconstruction and development agendas in Afghanistan are based on similar agendas. As Barnett Rubin states, the US intervention in Afghanistan is not necessarily accurately framed through a focus of peace- or state-building in the country, but rather through a lens of security for the US themselves (Rubin, 2006). If peacebuilding actors allow their own security goals to supersede human security for those on the ground in conflict-affected and fragile states, peacebuilding will lose much of its rationale (King & Matthews, 2012, p.289). Furthermore, this imbalance in aid allocation impacted the availability of aid globally. Necla Tschirgi critiques the substantive donor funding to Afghanistan

and says that ‘the large amount of the international resources allocated to Afghanistan are at the expense of the unmet needs and emergencies in other parts of the world especially in Africa’ (Tschirgi, 2003, p.11). Tschirgi’s argument has weight, as linking development and aid to international security may also result in selectivity as the assistance becomes concentrated in areas of strategic interest, to the detriment of other needy but less important regions.

4.2.1 Impact of Securitization on Peacebuilding in the Future

The overall impact of this strategic shift in peacebuilding policies with securitization of development and foreign aid at the forefront will have an impact on the way peacebuilding may be viewed in the future and can have a negative impact on the peacebuilding process. As the war prolongs, the peacebuilding in Afghanistan becomes more prone to failure. The reasons for failure in Afghanistan today can be reflected in the peacebuilding ventures of the future. As a result of securitization policies, Afghanistan saw an enormous international input in the form of aid and resources. However, the socio-economic indicators in Afghanistan failed to show significant progress despite the amount of aid committed to them (Pahlman, 2015, p.53). Furthermore, where there was increased donor fatigue in terms of military and developmental agenda and the volatile security situation, on the other hand, resulted in countries withdrawing from the mission that was not only complex and dangerous, but involved plenty of risk and considerable cost without greater success (Thiessen, 2012, p. 136). Roland Paris argues that “the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have cast a shadow on peacebuilding.” Paris elaborates that because of the outcome of these wars, the US and some of its allies have shown reluctance to become engaged in post-conflict peace missions elsewhere (Paris, 2018, p.6). Timothy Donais posits that if international actors come to view the dilemmas of peacebuilding as largely intractable, we may see a terminal decline in both political and financial support for peacebuilding initiatives (Donais, 2012)

Section 5: Conclusion

There has been no peacebuilding mission as challenging as that in Afghanistan, which has been mired by counter-insurgency, decades of conflict, and deep tribal differences. The post 9/11 peacebuilding mission was initiated with the 2001 *Bonn Agreement* in which the international community, including Canada, had pledged support to rebuild the fragile state of Afghanistan. Canada joined the mission cognizant of the fact that besides taking on the role as a peacebuilder, it was also a supporting player to a larger War on Terror led by the United States. The Canadian mission, aimed at ensuring peace and stability in fragile Afghanistan, failed to achieve its objectives as a result of its securitization of development and foreign aid. Consequently, it has had a negative impact on the peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan.

The National Security Policy (2004), International Policy Statement (2005) and Manley Report (2008) are all testimony that the official priority of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan was to secure Canada's own national security interests from the threats of terrorism generating from fragile states, like Afghanistan. The role of the Canadian mission in this international project of peacebuilding in Afghanistan shows that attaching a level of priority and urgency to issues where failure to respond quickly is presented as a substantive security threat creates a different, yet equally harmful risk of placing public values and freedoms under threat. In addition, attaching a level of priority to security over the stabilization and reconstruction mission in a post-conflict fragile country results in peacebuilding objectives being demoted to a by-product of security instead of the ultimate goal.

The Canadian securitization policies focused on stabilization and development in Afghanistan to ensure its long-term security goals. These policies shaped peacebuilding priorities, programs, and targets and defined the type of responses accordingly. The implication of securitizing these policies was that the Whole of Government approach failed to become a unified

and coherent policy in the Afghanistan mission. Instead, it increased competition between all 3Ds (defence, development and diplomacy) for policy ownership, access to resources, and program implementation. Consequently, it resulted in prioritizing security objectives above development priorities.

In addition, the use of the terms *failed* and *fragile* states interchangeably demonstrated a lack of cohesion and agreement on what constitutes a fragile state. The failed and fragile state terminology highlighted the imminence of chaos that required military intervention to help a fragile country like Afghanistan. Furthermore, security was embraced with a narrow definition in official Canadian documents. The incorporation of development into a militarized agenda emphasized the importance of integrating military security into development, while disregarding a comprehensive definition of security, which places equal priority on other facets of security, especially human security.

Successful peacebuilding requires an earnest recognition of the importance of development along with a commitment to invest the necessary tools and resources to address development problems before they become imminent security threats. Conversely, the lessons observed from past Western securitization development agendas, and as demonstrated by the Canadian mission, is that providing security and development to populations in need with a simplistic ‘win the local hearts and minds’ approach in order to achieve quick results is not conducive to sustainable peace. Rather, sustainable peace is only achievable if peacebuilders engage with the local community and include them in the development process. By empowering the locals and giving them agency in the development process, peacebuilders can understand and address the realities on the ground, instead of imposing their own Western securitized development agendas, as demonstrated by the failed signature projects in Kandahar. Furthermore, the purpose of international aid is not to make

countries dependent on it, rather to help locals build their capacity so that they are able to wean themselves off of foreign aid. Lastly, attaching aid to military presence in a recipient state reduces the legitimacy of the overall peacebuilding mission because as troops are withdrawn so too is the aid that was attached to them.

Moving forward, it would be wise for Western democracies, in particular Canada, to reflect on how securitization of development can undermine the overall peacebuilding process and the need to minimize its negative impacts. The Government of Canada needs to ensure effective planning and support for the integrated Whole of Government approach. This requires a recognition of the need to correct the imbalance in the power dynamics between the 3Ds and the need to make peacebuilding the unifying objective. Lastly, a successful mission requires clear objectives, well-defined responsibilities, cooperation, and accountability.

The final measure of successful peacebuilding in Afghanistan will be its ability to withstand relapse into instability and conflict; a true indicator that it is no longer a weak and fragile state. The analysis of the present situation in Afghanistan shows that although the political landscape has changed, the impact of securitized development remains precarious for peacebuilding. The Taliban, who were the main insurgent throughout the Canadian mission, have now emerged as the major legitimized player on ground. In February 2020, the world witnessed the signing of an agreement between the United States officials and Taliban representatives in Doha, Qatar, widely referred to as a “peace deal.” This deal marked the end of the War on Terror, led by the United States. It set a timeline for the complete withdrawal of American troops, called for the cessation of hostilities by requiring the Taliban breaks ties with terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, and promoted stability by establishing an intra-Afghan peace dialogue.

Given that hostilities continue, whether peacebuilding will be successful at ending the conflict in Afghanistan remains to be seen. On the political front, the two Afghan political rivals who recently signed a power-sharing deal had been a cause of political instability and uncertainty. As both rivals had claimed victory in recent presidential elections and had declared themselves as president in separate inauguration ceremonies. While the peace deal acknowledges the Taliban as a legitimate player, it raises concerns around local agency and ownership in Afghanistan. Given the political instability in the capital, Kabul, there are concerns that Afghanistan will relapse into conflict, putting the overall success of the international peacebuilding mission into question.

Despite intense efforts on the part of the international community, including Canada, most of Afghanistan has presently failed to realize sustainable development and peace. The security situation in the country remains volatile. Although the challenges of the Afghan mission are significant, there is more at stake. The world is looking at what has been done in Afghanistan as a road map for new ways to respond to the complexity of weak and fragile states and what has been done, will play a role in shaping the course of future peacebuilding efforts.

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