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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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THE EFFICACY OF NEGOTIATION AND "ASSAULT" AS A
RESPONSE TO THE "TERRORIST" ACT OF HOSTAGE-
TAKING IN URBAN CANADA: AN EVALUATION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE DEPARTMENT EXPERIENCE.

SUBMITTED BY PETER A. SHONIKER

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
of the University of Ottawa, in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.



Peter Shoniker, Ottawa, Canada, 1981

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Peter A. Shoniker

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The act of seizing hostages is one for which there are innumerable motivations and manifestations, yet only one acceptable solution - the successful termination of the episode by ensuring the safety of those involved. This concern for safety not only embraces the hostages and members of the public but the perpetrator and "control force" members (i.e. police, militia, correctional staff and/or other law enforcement personnel who become involved in a response to a "hostage situation") as well. If one were to draw a stock market analogy to a "hostage situation", the hostage could be seen as the perpetrator's "preferred share" in an anticipated capitulation by the "control force". The value of this share is a function of the concomitant value which society attaches to human life. In Canada, the acceptable casualty rate among hostages is zero and thus the hostage is of great value to the perpetrator. It is in this connection that the transformation of a "hostage situation" to a consummate act of "terrorism" reveals itself.

The nature and quality of a "hostage situation" is such that a response measure must inherently appreciate the potential for human destruction. Such a measure must consider every possible eventuality and develop a system which is effective rather than adhering to a theoretical position which may not be effective regardless of its sound logic. Further, a response measure cannot commit itself to falacious axioms such as those which propose "fighting fire with fire". As a natural corollary to this orientation, a "control force" must adopt and maintain a procedure which is characterized by carefully calculated measures. It can be logically inferred that in most "hostage situations" the final disposition of the episode will be a function of the expertise employed by the "control force" in addressing the manifest threat to human life. The ultimate purpose of this study, therefore, will be to analyze, discuss and evaluate a "control force" response to the "terrorist" act of "hostage taking" in the extant Canadian context through a consideration of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department's experience.

The first and perhaps most essential stage of this evaluative process will be an analysis and discussion of the nature and quality of the "hostage situation" to which a "control force" must address itself. This initial attempt to illuminate the study's parametric structure must ultimately apply itself to Metropolitan Toronto. For it is only when one acquires an understanding of the hostage episode from an endemic viewpoint, that the feasibility of theoretical propositions can be considered. Therefore, this study must be appreciative of the type of "hostage situations" which the Metropolitan Toronto Police address

and how theorists have viewed this threat. Chapter Two will attempt to reconcile the issue of whether or not the act of seizing hostages in an urban setting amounts to an act of "terrorism". This will be augmented by an analysis of various "terrorist" typology theories. In this regard, it is essential that one reconcile opposing propositions which contend on one hand that within the definitive parameters of the term "terrorist" are comprised emotionally and criminally motivated perpetrators as well as those who are ideologically oriented and philosophically motivated, while an adversarial point of view holds that only the ideologically oriented and philosophically motivated perpetrators should be considered "terrorists".

The amount of existing literature on the nature of "control force" responses to the act of seizing hostages is appreciable. In particular, the efficacy of "control force" negotiation in an initial response to a "hostage situation" is a subject to which academics as well as practitioners have addressed themselves. Chapter Three will attempt to bring the theories embodied within conventional models of negotiation, relevant research and training programmes into concert, in order to reveal the evolution of "control force" responses and their present disposition as intervention techniques. Because the commencement and maintenance of interaction between the perpetrator and a "control force" negotiator must be a parameter of a "control force" response, an attempt will be made to delineate its components and discern its efficacy as an integral part of a response procedure, capable of remaining amenable to the perpetrator's threat and/or disposition.

An evaluation of a process can only proceed effectively when the procedure followed by an agency is analyzed and discussed. In Chapter Four, a brief history of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department and its Emergency Task Force (E.T.F.) will be presented. Further, an attempt will be made to determine the extent to which the E.T.F. is influenced by the theories considered in Chapters Two and Three, by analyzing the structure and operational procedure followed by the unit. In addition to this focal point of the chapter, this analysis will serve two ancillary functions: 1) it will provide an introduction to the primary concern of this research endeavour and, 2) it will compare and contrast the "official" procedure established by the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department's Rules, Regulations and Procedures with the procedure followed by the E.T.F.

Chapter Five will consider the feasibility of the research methodology to be employed in this study. An evaluation of the response procedure employed by the E.T.F. will be facilitated by the use of an analytic induction procedure. The purpose of this methodology will be to discern those qualitative as well as quantitative indicators which will provide the study with a research design having viable evaluative criteria.

In order to appreciate fully the present state of a "control force" response to "hostage situations", one must assess those conditions and circumstances which exist within the jurisdictional boundaries of the "control force" being evaluated. In Chapter Six, all of the "reported hostage situations" during the five year study period will be examined with regard to their status (i.e.

"founded" or "unfounded"), time of occurrence, day of occurrence, month of occurrence, and location). This analysis is intended to serve two basic functions. Firstly, it will clarify the nature and quality of the study's universe. Secondly, it may reveal certain trends which may have an effect on the attitudinal approach shown by a "control force" in responding to a "hostage situation". For example, a "control force" may react with increased vigour and intensity to a "reported hostage situation" which occurs in an area that has a high percentage of "founded hostage situations". Should such evidence present itself, it is possible that a causal association between the adopted "control force" procedure and the status of the episode's termination will reveal itself.

The principal figures in a "hostage situation" are the perpetrator(s), hostage(s) and "control force" members. Chapter Seven will analyze the relationships between the three, while deducing which characteristics in each elicit a certain response from the others. This will be achieved through the process of analytic induction. By analyzing the characteristics of the individual "reported hostage situations" in the study period, one can delineate those characteristics and behaviours which create a cause-effect nexus between themselves and a certain procedural termination of the episode, from those which create no such connection. The significance of this operation resides within the development of four hypotheses which will address themselves to the perpetrator(s), hostage(s), "control force" and, the weapon in the perpetrator's possession. Upon concluding the analytic induction procedure, these hypotheses

will be universally applicable to all of the "founded hostage situations" in the study period.

In Chapter Eight, a conclusion to this study will be rendered in the light of discoveries made by the preceding chapters. For this research to be of practical as well as academic value, it must serve as an instrument of instruction for the agency and process under consideration. Therefore, it will be essential to the success of this study to draw scientific conclusions with respect to the causal as well as procedural associations which pervade the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department's response to "hostage situations". Further, the significance of variables which affect the termination of the episode will be discussed at length.

CHAPTER TWO
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENON OF
"TERRORISM" AND A DELINEATION OF ITS MANIFESTATIONS.

"Terrorism" is not new. Indeed it manifested itself in the very rudiments of social development over 2,300 years ago.¹ Hassel observes that

This criminal device is probably one of the oldest known to man. It is found in ancient Greek and Roman mythologies and the Norse sagas. It has been used by every generation and almost every culture.²

What is new however, are the various and sordid dispositions which "terrorism" has assumed during its evolution. With the 1960's came a decade which would witness the progression of "terrorism" from practical obscurity to irrefutable prominence as a social problem. The incidence of aircraft "hijackings" began to increase with alarming regularity and then, in 1968, "terrorism" in the form of "urban guerilla" movements and "hostage takings" realized appreciable proliferation.³ No longer were acts of "terrorism" endemic with respect to either geography or ideology.⁴ Law enforcement authorities were being called upon to react to situations where the threat to human life was

manifest. It soon became apparent that the outcome of these situations was dependent upon the law enforcement authorities' reaction as a response unit, yet they possessed a minimal degree of practical or theoretical expertise in this regard. Unlike "terrorism" itself, responses to it were "... still embryonic in development".⁵ Whether the sudden popularity of this phenomenon was due to the vicissitudinous nature of human existence or some indeterminable factor residing within a quixotic, social fabric is practically irrelevant. What is important is the development of theoretical and practical innovations for its treatment.

As a consequence of the uncertainty and exigent need for assistance with respect to acts of "terrorism", law enforcement authorities tended to opt for one of two diametrically opposed responses. In some cases, partial acquiescence or absolute capitulation to the "terrorist's" demands was employed; in others, the "time honoured" practice of meeting aggression with aggression was seen as the most appropriate alternative. The efficacy of both these alternatives as ameliorating forces in the incidence and severity of "terrorist" acts can be justifiably questioned. Shortly after the attack on the Olympic Village (September 5, 1972) at Munich, West Germany, by eight members of the Black September Organization (a branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in which 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team were killed, an integrative process combining the theoretical and practical expertise of psychiatry, psychology, criminology, law enforcement and the militia was instituted on a universal scale.⁶ It became apparent that if there was to be an answer to "terrorism" and its manifestations, it resided within the

structure of this professional union. These efforts eventuated the conception of a third, alternative response in the rather concrete concept of "hostage negotiating". The importance of a multi-faceted response system soon became evident. Olin reinforces this orientation as he states that

A delicate balance must be maintained between negotiation, concession, and tactical action. ... A military response using infantry tactics would be analogous to using a machete, rather than a scalpel, to remove a tumour.⁷

Attempts at defining "terrorism" have been quantitatively numerous and qualitatively diverse. Szabo contends that

... terrorism is one of those words which seems easy to recognize but difficult to define.⁸

With each perpetrated incident of so-called "terror", scores of theoreticians, practitioners and academicians have been motivated to attempt to produce a uniformly applicable definition of "terrorism". Each bears its own merit and, in the vast majority of cases, accurately reflects the nature and quality of that type of "terrorism" to which the author attempts to address himself. Within the numerous definitions, however, there are two discernible ideological trends - some are analytical, while others are emotional. Those who view the phenomenon from the analytical perspective agree with Lejins and Flynn that

The concept of terrorism describes a wide variety of human behaviour, which ranges from irrational acts committed by mentally

deranged persons to such crimes as armed robbery perpetrated to obtain funds for financing of revolutionary causes.⁹

Those who view it from an emotional perspective, would perhaps find their orientation embodied within the contention advanced by Sloan, Kearney and Wise, which suggests that

... one person's terrorist can indeed be perceived to be another one's liberator.¹⁰

Some theoreticians, and indeed some practitioners, have refused to accept the feasibility of rendering a definition of "terrorism".¹¹ Some feel that it is an exercise of marginal utility¹², while others perceive it to be a process by which the imminent danger of some acts is ignored and denied by virtue of their exclusion from the narrow categorization of "terrorism".¹³ Still others contend that defining "terrorism" is simply useless.¹⁴ It seems quite apparent that the concept of "terrorism" is very elusive in a definitive perspective. However, the task of rendering a definition is basic to the formulation of an effective means of responding to acts of "terrorism". Such a formulation predicates a definition of the phenomenon by delineating its parameters. Before methods of controlling and reacting to a phenomenon can be approached, one must have knowledge of its nature and quality. In the case of "terrorism", there appears to be a unique connotation for each and every individual. The inherent subjectivity of such a disposition necessitates the adoption of definitive parameters which are sufficiently broad to accommodate the pluralistic nature of public opinion, yet basic enough to facilitate the delineation of acts according to specific

criteria. In this regard, Stratton renders a most appropriate analysis:

Terrorism is a method by which various people - the downtrodden, disadvantaged, disillusioned, "wronged", cornered, bored or politically motivated - attempt to gain power, control, influence or recognition. A persuasive way of gaining these goals is to take absolute control over one or more person's lives by using them as hostages. This is an act of terrorism to promote whatever cause or goal the hostage-taker feels is important. Therefore, one who takes hostages is a terrorist. They inflict fear, not only on the hostages, but the community at large. Their reign of terror may consist of physical and/or psychological violence. All hostage-takers are terrorists; however their causes, motives and rationally may be different.¹⁵

There is general¹⁶ as well as particular¹⁷ support for Stratton's orientation in the relevant literature. Although pronouncements of other authors are occasionally less emphatic than Stratton's, their contentions that "hostage taking" in the urban setting of North America is a form of "terrorism" are central to their ideological orientations. However, care must be taken to heed Stratton's qualification which states that although all hostage-takers are "terrorists", the similarities which exist between the two may proceed only as far as this categorical symbiosis. Having postulated this theory of "hostage-taking" as a function of "terrorism", perhaps it would be most appropriate to adopt a system of categorical analysis which will facilitate a further breakdown of the types of "terrorists" who employ hostage-taking as a means of operationalizing their respective goals.

There are three fundamental features of "terrorism". The first deals with the "terrorist". In general, he belongs to a group which resort to the perpetration of an act of "terrorism" in an effort to achieve a goal which they feel they are otherwise unable to achieve. Like these goals, the individual's orientation, motivation and reasons for believing that the goal is otherwise unattainable, may vary. The second feature deals with the instrument of "terrorization". This is characterized by the total control which a "terrorist" is able to exercise over the lives of people for a limited period of time. These people, the hostages, are often obtained randomly from the population at large to give "terrorism" its third feature. This deals with the community at large, which is "terrorized" through fear of physical or psychological violence by assimilation to and identification with the hostages. This analysis bears the connotation that each "terrorist" act of "hostage taking" is instrumental rather than expressive. The central issue is thus the means to the achievement of a goal rather than the goal itself. Therefore, the total control over the lives of the hostages as well as the inculcation of fear into the community at large, are either unintended consequences of the act or achievements which are secondary to the "terrorist's" primary goal.

These three features present themselves as possible points of departure from which a response programme could be formulated. However, in the context of contemporary society where the individual is presupposed to be a free and independent agent, the first feature, which deals with the terrorist, appears to be the most promising point of departure. In this regard, one is motivated by Leaute and McClintock to examine the various "terrorist"

typologies.¹⁸ Indeed, even the Greek philosopher Theophrastus found it beneficial to investigate the distinguishing characteristics of apparently homogeneous groups as early as the third century B.C.¹⁹ However, one must heed the advice of Souchon, who suggests that great care be taken so as not to infer from generalizations what the precise actions of a particular individual will be.²⁰ Stratton concurs with Souchon as he states that

In attempting to generalize, we examine individual hostage-takers, seeing if they can fit into certain categories; but we must not lose sight of the fact that they, too, are unique individuals. This point cannot be taken too lightly or we miss important clues given by the hostage-taker and fail to realize that the individual may be different from any prototype developed.²¹

In his analysis of "control force" responses to "hostage situations", Kobetz identifies two groups of "terrorists": 1) the "political ideologist" and 2) the "fleeing felon" or "prison inmate".²² He claims that because of a philosophical dedication to the "cause" which motivates the perpetration of the act, the politically motivated "terrorist" is the most dangerous perpetrator that a "control force" is likely to encounter in responding to a "hostage situation". With respect to the "fleeing felon" or "prison inmate" who resorts to "terrorism", Kobetz contends that although he presents less danger than the "political ideologist", he too, has the capacity to kill and must, therefore, be addressed with extreme care. Within the context of his article, the author's "terrorist" typology is secondary to his concern for the physical nature of the "control force" response to a "hostage situation". However, it fails to provide a

means for the identification of all "terrorists" for whom different response techniques must be adopted. In particular, it ignores the mentally disturbed perpetrator. Consequently, this typology is inadequate.

A more satisfactory classification has been presented by Hacker, who suggests that "terrorists" should be delineated according to the perpetrator's orientation. He identifies three types: 1) "crusaders"; 2) "criminals" and, 3) "crazies".²³ "Crusaders" are those whose orientation is political, ideological, philosophical, anarchistic and/or revolutionary. They are characterized by "good training",²⁴ "blind obedience"²⁵ and, a desire for identity. Their goal is to overcome an oppressive social concept. "Criminals" are characterized by selfishness and a "... willingness to resort to socially disapproved methods ..." ²⁶ to attain their goal. They desire to reap a financial benefit from the perpetration of an act of "terrorism". "Crazies" are characterized by an egocentric motivation discernible only to themselves.²⁷

Schlossberg's criteria for classification are similar to those employed by Hacker. He identifies three types of "terrorists": 1) "professional criminals"; 2) "psychos" and, 3) "group terrorists".²⁸ The "professional criminal" is an individual who usually earns a living through criminal activities, and becomes a "terrorist" when confronted by the police during the commission of a crime. In a state of panic, he claims hostages, hoping that he can negotiate immunity from prosecution. The "psycho" does not function in accordance with societal standards and rules. He exists in a world of his own and his actions rarely make sense to anyone but himself. The term "group terrorist" can apply to any group, ranging from a loosely organized mob to an extremely dedicated cadre of

political zealots. The most essential characteristic of this type of "terrorist" is the functioning of the group concept. Their use of "terrorism" is the result of a carefully calculated and well coordinated plan. Schlossberg's classification differs from Hacker's typology by virtue of its emphasis on the delineation of motivational factors upon which a "terrorist's" orientation is dependent. However, with respect to the formulation of a response system, Hacker's typology is superior because it identifies the psychological characteristics that are relevant to the response and resolution of the hostage drama.

A third, similar classification which is presented by Stratton, contends that man's behaviour is the product of "numerous variables", and thus the manifestations of his behaviour in acts of "terrorism" are similarly diverse. In accordance with this eclectic orientation, Stratton identifies three types of "terrorists": 1) "social, political, or religious crusader"; 2) "criminal" and, 3) "mentally ill"²⁹. Like Hacker's "crusader" and Schlossberg's "group terrorist", Stratton's "crusader" is extremely committed to his "cause", often to the point of death. It is this quality which makes his actions seem most "outrageous".³⁰ Stratton contends that the "crusader" is the most dangerous "terrorist" to deal with. The "criminal" is usually motivated by an "aversion" to imprisonment.³¹ For this reason, he will take hostages when arrest appears imminent. Most "criminals" think quite logically and realize that surrender is the most advantageous solution. The "mentally ill terrorist" desires to control other people. He lives in a world of his own and is unable to understand why people view his behaviour as abnormal. Stratton suggests that when negotiating with a "mentally ill" perpetrator, one must "... understand the hostage-taker's world."³²

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (I.A.C.P.) identifies four types of "terrorists": 1) "terrorists"; 2) "escaping felons"; 3) "prisoners" and, 4) "mentally deranged".³³ The I.A.C.P. concurs with Kobetz, Hacker, and Schlossberg in its characterization of the "terrorist". It advises that the dedication of these perpetrators makes them the "greatest of threats"³⁴ among "terrorists". The I.A.C.P. contends that in addition, these perpetrators are possessed with a desire to usurp a government. "Escaping felons" are those who claim hostages in an attempt to "... barter for their freedom".³⁵ The I.A.C.P. contends that they are the most rational type of "terrorist" and thus, is optimistic of a peaceful resolution in situations where the perpetrator has this type of orientation. The "prisoner" who resorts to "terrorism" is usually attempting to call attention to a perceived injustice within the institution. He presents a unique challenge to the "control force" because a decision must be made on whether to negotiate or immediately "assault" upon perpetration of the act of "terrorism". The perpetrators in a prison hostage situation are often unorganized and disoriented in the early stages of a siege and thus, the I.A.C.P. recommends consideration of an early "assault". The "mentally deranged" perpetrator is characterized by his inability to think rationally. The passage of time is recommended as the most appropriate ameliorating force with this type of "terrorist".

The I.A.C.P. employs the term "terrorist" to describe ideologically oriented or philosophically motivated "terrorists". The restrictive use of this term amounts to a misnomer. A "terrorist" refers to anyone who perpetrates an

act of "terrorism". As previously discussed, the concept of "terrorism" has proved to be elusive to those who have attempted to apply narrow definitions. For this reason, many authors have accepted the term "terrorism" as a general classification for an act of "hostage taking".³⁶

Hassel presents a typology which is similar to that of the I.A.C.P. He identifies four types of "terrorists": 1) the politically motivated zealot; 2) the escaping felon; 3) the prisoner and 4) "the mentally deranged".³⁷ Hassel contends that the politically motivated zealot is usually oriented to the Marxist ethic and, consequently, has a profound dedication to the "cause". Hassel advises that the "control force" must be able to ascertain the degree of "terrorist" dedication to the "cause" in order to address itself to a politically motivated act of "terrorism". The "escaping felon" is perceived as a rational individual who, faced with a "fight or flight" alternative, assumes a "terrorist" stance. In consequence, Hassel states that it is essential that the first few minutes of such a seige pass in an uneventful manner. He contends that if the "control force" stabilizes the setting in which the drama is occurring, there will be a concomitant placating effect on the "terrorist".³⁸ In his analysis of the inmate "terrorist", Hassel contributes to the position advanced by many students of prison disturbances (most notably Mattick³⁹, McCleery⁴⁰, Hartung and Floch⁴¹, Sykes⁴², Cloward⁴³, Flynn⁴⁴ and Brent⁴⁵) as he places the blame for prison "hostage situations" on a correctional philosophy which places society's "worst and most violent"⁴⁶ citizens together in a stagnant setting. He contends that such situations can be extremely dangerous and cannot be addressed as a homogeneous phenomenon. Finally, Hassel claims that the

"mentally deranged terrorist" is often motivated by a murder-suicide desire. He recommends that a "control force" take advantage of the passage of time while attempting to calm the perpetrator. Although Hassel attempts to associate the characteristics of the "terrorist" with the proposed "control force" response, an analysis of response techniques is absent in three of the four types.

Goldaber succeeds in associating the characteristics of the "terrorist" with the required "control force" response as he presents a typology which identifies three basic "terrorist" orientations: 1) "psychological"; 2) "criminal" and, 3) "political".⁴⁷ A further delineation which includes three sub-types per category makes the author's analysis rather unique. He includes "suicidal personalities", "vengeance seekers" and, "disturbed individuals" as sub-types of the "psychological terrorist". The "cornered perpetrator", "aggrieved inmate" and, "felonious extortionist" are sub-types of the "criminal terrorist". The "social protestor", "ideological zealot" and, "terrorist-extremist" are sub-types of the "political terrorist" (see Appendix "A"). In addition to this typology, Goldaber presents a general profile of each type of terrorist, elucidates upon their distinguishing characteristics and, identifies a variety of indicators which reveal the possible nature and quality of "terrorist" acts. He then suggests a practical orientation for "control force" response to each type of "terrorism".

Goldaber's typology represents the most thoroughly instructive model of "terrorist" delineations available in the literature. The only evident shortcoming is that his brevity precludes a much needed elaboration on the "control force" response to the individual types of "terrorists". His typology

appreciates the distinct possibility of a perpetrator assuming a disposition which cannot be explained by the application of a general label (i.e. "psychological", "criminal" or, "political terrorist"). A response system in general and a negotiation model in particular must be amenable to the various dimensions which a "terrorist's" character may possess. Goldaber's typology advances a basic framework which facilitates the "control force's" development of the necessary expertise and sagacious disposition to address most acts of "terrorism". Therefore, as an analysis of such acts proceeds, Goldaber's typology will be relied upon as a basic term of typological reference, while Stratton's definition of "terrorism"⁴⁸ will be employed for the more general purpose of delineating an act of "terrorism" from one which does not meet the parametric criteria for such an act.

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CHAPTER THREE
THE HUMAN RESPONSE

Upon consideration of the theoretical positions regarding the "terrorist" act of "hostage-taking", it becomes evident that there is a need for the formulation and implementation of "control force" response measures which serve a greater purpose than a simple post facto description. These responses can assume two basic orientations: 1) preventive measures of detection and deterrence, or 2) reactive measures of control. In the formulation and implementation of such measures it must be remembered that there is no response measure which can be viewed as a panacea for "hostage situations". Like methods employed for the delineation of "terrorist" types, one can analyze the facts, draw conclusions, test the conclusions and postulate a hypothesis however, he can only be as correct as statistical variance culled from a practical analysis will allow. Therefore,

While the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty. You can never foretell what any man will do, but you can

always predict with precision what an average number of men will be up to. Individuals vary but percentages remain constant.¹

The most uniformly applied measure of detection and deterrence is the concept of "target hardening". This is a procedure whereby society applies protective measures to the possible target of a "terrorist" attack in order to prevent or deter him from preying on that target. This concept has received some support² however, its detractors have posited equally viable arguments. Sundberg and Crelinsten contend that "target hardening" simply protects a target rather than treating the more serious problem of "terrorism"³, while Szabo claims that it simply forces the displacement of "terrorist" acts.⁴ Miller⁵ and Stratton⁶ contend that the most obvious targets are rarely victimized by "terrorists" and therefore, target prediction and "terrorism" prevention are equally impossible. Fattah⁷ and Schreiber⁸ suggest that "target hardening" be adopted as a short term adjunct to a more efficient reactive measure of control. In this latter context, society would not be deceived by the false sense of security which "target hardening" appears to provide.

There are four reactive measures of control which could be implemented in response to a "hostage situation": 1) capitulation to the "terrorists" demands; 2) a policy of no negotiation; 3) an immediate "assault" upon the area under siege or, 4) a policy of negotiation with "assault" as an available contingency. Kupperman is alone in his support of capitulation.⁹ The danger of this response is that it will engender further acts of a similar nature.¹⁰ A country, government, culture or group may become vulnerable by virtue of its

reputation as a "soft touch". For example, during a five year period (1968-1972), Argentina experienced 11 incidents of "terrorism".¹¹ Unlike other countries, it increasingly employed a policy of absolute capitulation to the "terrorist's" demands in an effort to save the lives of those immediately affected. During the next year (1973), Argentina was victimized by 33 acts of "terrorism".¹²

Kaplan supports the policy of no negotiation, however, he appreciates the inherent danger of such a response.¹³ Some contend that a refusal to negotiate is an aggravating "challenge" to the "terrorist"¹⁴, while others claim that its implementation has been met by a low level of social tolerance.¹⁵ Perhaps it is for these reasons that the policy of no negotiation has rarely been implemented and consequently, cannot be evaluated as a viable response measure.

There is little support for the adoption of immediate "assault" as a response measure in the relevant literature. Although some recommend that more emphasis be placed on "assault" than negotiation, they do not support it as a uniform response measure.¹⁶ The position advanced by those who subscribe to the policy of immediate "assault" is that there will be a reduction in the incidence of "terrorism" when "terrorists" realize that they will either have to surrender or die. Although Israel has experienced some success with this policy, its success as a response designed to save human lives is questionable. In considering the fate of hostages who were present in the area under siege during an "assault" operation, Jenkins, Johnson and Ronfeldt analyzed ninety "hostage situations" between 1968 and 1975 and found that 1) 35% of these hostages were killed during the "control force assault"¹⁷ and, 2) 79% of all hostages who were killed, met their death during the "assault".¹⁸

The policy of negotiation with "assault" as an available contingency has met with overwhelming support in the literature.¹⁹ The concept of negotiation is rooted in our social system. It is democratic for one to forfeit something in order to obtain something else. Similarly, "terrorism" is goal directed and conceptually oriented. A "terrorist" is motivated by a desire, and his action is a response to that desire. In formulating an effective response to the threatening nature of "terrorism", one must appreciate the psychological disposition of the "terrorist" as well as the role which law enforcement authorities must play in the protection of society. In this regard, Stratton suggests that

Getting a perspective of the perpetrators through how they experience themselves or portray themselves to others can be very important and can give officials some insights on the best manner to approach the person.²⁰

The concept of negotiation in the commercial perspective is largely different from, yet in some ways similar to, that form of negotiation which is most appropriate for a "control force" response to a "hostage situation". In basic terms

Negotiation may be defined as the voluntary process of distributing the proceeds from cooperation.²¹

This notion of "cooperation" which appears to pervade the concept of commercial negotiation, is further reinforced by Bartos who contends that

It is a process the objective of which is to find a compromise that is mutually acceptable. It

is by definition true that this compromise, although mutually acceptable, gives each side less than a total victory would; that is, less than the best possible outcome.²²

The characteristics which distinguish the theoretical model of negotiation from the practical formulation of a hostage negotiation model become evident when one considers the contingency of mutual advantage. In a "hostage situation", the "control force" desires to achieve three goals: 1) preserve the lives of all those involved; 2) deter the repetition of the act, and 3) terminate the "situation" in the shortest possible time. Neither the first nor the second objective can be compromised, thus an equitable pay-off accruing to the "terrorist" seems unachievable. However, the time element provides a source for "control force" acquiescence. A "control force" must be continually cognizant of the reality of its bargaining position. The structure of the hostage negotiation concept is basically one of "dyadic conflict"²³ where both sides have the capacity to exert force on the other.

Negotiations involve some type of equality where two equal or at least powerful parties work out a compromise. Negotiations by law enforcement officials, even with criminals, involve communication, understanding and compromise. It is not simply giving orders, ultimatums, or threats. Rather, it is a recognition of equality of power as the terrorist who has hostages has more control over their lives than do the law enforcement officials he may be negotiating with.²⁴

Although the "game theory" which presupposes a rational disposition on the part of both sides²⁵ and the "pareto-equal" model which envisages a

relatively equal pay-off for both sides²⁶ must be dismissed, one must not regard a hostage negotiation as a zero-sum game where a "control force" victory is synonymous with the absolute defeat of the "terrorist". By virtue of the negotiable nature of time, the "control force" is able to offer comfort, food, assurances of safety and face-saving to the "terrorist" as pay-offs. A "control force" would be well instructed to heed the advice of Miller, as he states that

To see hostage taking as a plus-zero game where only the authorities or the hostage takers can win is to reduce to a bloodbath a ritual that can otherwise work out in exchanging face and political symbols for human lives.²⁷

The need for negotiation in a "hostage situation" is a result of the "conflict of interest"²⁸ which exists between the "terrorist" and "control force" with respect to their purposes for coveting the hostages. In order for a "terrorist" to participate in a negotiation, he must believe that his disposition and/or fate will be enhanced.²⁹ The negotiation will not alter his desire to gain certain concessions rather it will involve him in a loosely structured bargaining system where contingencies are placed upon everything he receives.³⁰ This serves a dual purpose for the "control force". Firstly, it occupies the "terrorist" with demands such as comfort, food, assurances of safety and face-saving while more intimidating demands such as flight with the hostages are temporarily foresaken. Secondly, by making it incumbent on the "terrorist" to reveal his orientation through his demands, the "control force" can assess his ideological orientation, priorities, ultimate desire and, possibly, his psychological

disposition.³¹ Initially, the "terrorist" has control over the negotiation. Neither a negotiator nor a "control force" must allow their appreciation for this initial imbalance to dissipate. It must be remembered that when the difference between reaching an agreement and not reaching an agreement is more costly to the "control force" than to the "terrorist", the "control force" is at a distinct disadvantage.³² Therefore, it is the primary function of the negotiator to redress this imbalance by guiding the "terrorist" to a state of awareness where he will perceive failure to reach an agreement as a very costly alternative to the negotiation process. A negotiator must, therefore, transform the quality of the negotiation from a "zero-sum game" to a "non-zero sum game", where there is a common interest in peaceful resolution.³³ When the "terrorist" begins to appreciate the importance of the hostages' safety, he will increasingly accept contingencies which are placed on concessions in order to avoid the imposition of "control force" sanctions.

Indeed, it could be readily argued that much of what goes on between hostage taker and negotiator in any set of circumstances is ritualistic, and it is important that both sides maintain their proper roles in the course of the unfolding of the ritual.

... It is in the perception of the hostage scenario as a ritual with subsidiary benefits to the hostage takers resulting without complete capitulation by authorities that the strategy of negotiation begins to take on meaning and is comprehensive.³⁴

As previously mentioned, it is difficult to adopt a conventional model of negotiation in its entirety to a hostage negotiation model. The Shapley³⁵ and

Nash³⁶ models, for example, are inappropriate because they are designed to facilitate a pay-off assuring both parties of realizing benefits which are slightly above their minimum demands. The Richardson model³⁷ must also be rejected because it presupposes a negotiator's acquiescence to an opponent's demand if the demand requests less than a previous one. In such a case, the "control force" would have to reveal its priorities. There are however, some formal models from which applicable techniques and parameters can be extrapolated and adapted to the concept of hostage negotiation. The Bush-Mosteller model for example, is specifically designed to remain amenable to exploitation by the negotiator.³⁸ However, its inflexible nature presents the danger of withdrawal by the disadvantaged party. The Markov chains model is basically a model of reactive negotiation.³⁹ It enables the negotiator to elicit an initial statement or demand from the other party and, reactively, construct a "chain" of negotiation from that point.⁴⁰ This is relevant to a hostage negotiation because, through the "terrorist's" statements, the negotiator is able to reduce the level of anxiety and thus restore the "terrorist's" ability to approach the problem-solving task in a reasonable and logical manner. The Markov chains model contends that because the respondent (negotiator) in a negotiation is able to discern the other party's ("terrorist's") orientation and priorities, he is forced to make fewer assumptions. The negotiator who makes fewer assumptions, knows more about the other party's orientation than the other party knows about his. It follows that an advantage will accrue to the negotiator who knows more about the other party. Consequently, he can construct an unequal opportunity model within which he can exploit the "terrorist" by offering a low

priority concession (i.e. cigarettes) in return for a high priority demand (i.e. release of a hostage). This model's fallibility resides within its presupposition that the other party would not discern the priorities of the negotiator and reciprocate a high-priority demand with a request for a proportionally high-priority, "control force" concession.⁴¹

The Raiffa and Braithwaite models of negotiation are also adaptable to a hostage negotiation. They are both designed to ensure that one party benefits disproportionately from the bargaining process.⁴² The Braithwaite model has two distinct perspectives: 1) maximin, and 2) minimax.⁴³ The "maximin" strategy guarantees each party a minimum pay off and is thus both safe and predictable. The "minimax" strategy is designed to engender an unbalanced pay off table in favour of the negotiator. Therefore, the "minimax" structure is less safe and predictable and, the negotiator has a chance to lose heavily or gain heavily. However, measures can be taken to increase the predictable nature of a "minimax" structure in order to make it more safe.

The degree of aggressiveness or strength of conviction which a negotiator should employ while bargaining is an issue which is central to the negotiation concept in general and, hostage negotiation in particular. Hamner and Yukl contend that

... a soft approach to bargaining, where steady concession-making takes place, leads to more mutually satisfactory agreements in most situations. However, when the bargainer has a long time to reach agreement, is more interested in "winning" than in reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement, or is bargaining with an opponent with low aspirations, then it pays to be tough.⁴⁴

The degree of "toughness" that a negotiator adopts however, must be consistent with the "terrorist's" orientation, emotional disposition and most importantly, the degree of risk which can be taken in absolute safety. Although "toughness" tends to give the negotiator an advantage⁴⁵, it also results in fewer final agreements. Bartos found that "extremely tough" negotiators reached an agreement with the other party less frequently than "moderately tough", "moderately soft" or "extremely soft" negotiators.⁴⁶ However, the "tough" negotiators benefited from 75-86% in the final pay off when an agreement was reached.⁴⁷ It seems apparent that it is beneficial for a negotiator to assume a "moderately tough" disposition. This would theoretically increase the pay off and decrease the possibility of not reaching an agreement. Indeed, Bartos contends that most parties will succumb to a negotiator who exercises judicious toughness.⁴⁸

The adaptability of the negotiation process to the hostage scenario is made difficult by the unusually high emotional level which pervades every aspect of the negotiation. The inherent presence of the manifest threat to human life tends to force a negotiator to function at such a level rather than at the more advantageous, conceptual level. The success of a particular negotiation often resides within the negotiator's ability to address the "terrorist's" threat. Schelling advises that the "control force" should first evaluate the advantage which will be realized by the "terrorist" if he fulfills a threat.⁴⁹ Therefore, the physical and mental disposition of the "terrorist" must be known. In responding to a "terrorist's" threat, one should initially employ the reactive negotiation model advocated by Markov.⁵⁰ The "control force" reaction

in general and the negotiator's reaction in particular will substantially influence the "terrorist" decision to carry through with a threat. If he believes that by executing a threat, he will benefit, then he is likely to fulfill the threat. Conversely, if he believes that the execution of a threat will be detrimental to this efforts, he will probably not fulfill it. It is essential to remember that such assumptions are contingent upon the rationality of the "terrorist". If he is irrational, he may execute a threat which is clearly disadvantageous to him.⁵¹ In such a case, he may feel he will benefit psychologically from harming the negotiator. Therefore, a negotiator should establish two irreversible penchants in the "terrorist's" mind: 1) he will benefit from the hostages' safety and, 2) the negotiator is assisting him in his time of anxiety and is concerned for the safety of everyone involved. Ultimately, the negotiator must convince the "terrorist" to relent on some of his demands. This has a dual advantage for the "control force". Firstly, it confirms the "terrorist's" nature as one which is less threatening than appearance indicates.

Every deadline that passes is another victory for us and makes the perpetrator more indecisive.⁵²

Secondly, it reduces the stress which is exerted on the negotiation process. In this regard, Hopmann and Walcott state that

... stress and tensions generally tend to be dysfunctional for negotiations. They tend to create greater hostility among negotiators; they tend to produce harder bargaining strategies; and they tend to lead to successful outcomes less often than when such tensions are not so strong.⁵³

The disposition of the negotiator is very important during a hostage negotiation. He should be an individual with limited authority. This will reduce the antagonism which the "terrorist" may show for failure to acquiesce to a demand, and the negotiator's restricted "decision latitude"⁵⁴ will provide a useful means of delay by virtue of it being necessary for him to consult a senior officer.⁵⁵ The character of the negotiator will also have an efficacious influence on the final outcome of the negotiation. If the "terrorist" considers the negotiator to be a devious, arrogant, authoritative figure, it is likely that the negotiation will be characterized by conflict. Conversely, if the negotiator presents himself as an understanding, amiable assistant in a critical situation, the "terrorist" will place a modicum of trust in his judgement. Brehmer and Hammond contend that in a negotiation, the formal characteristics of the negotiator's cognitive system are more likely to create conflict than either his race, nationality or sex.⁵⁶ Hermann and Kogan isolate the following personality characteristics: 1) anxiety; 2) authoritarianism; 3) cognitive complexity; 4) tendency toward conciliation; 5) dogmatism; 6) risk avoidance; 7) self esteem and, 8) suspiciousness and, contend that 79% of the studies which have examined relationships between negotiating parties have found that all of these characteristics are significantly related to the outcome of the negotiation.⁵⁷ Empirical evidence seems to indicate that one who is dogmatic, avoids taking risks and has a complex cognitive system will make a good negotiator,⁵⁸ while one who is anxious, authoritarian, has an abundance of self esteem and/or a suspicious nature will make a poor negotiator.⁵⁹ A negotiator should be self

confident, have a good sense of identity, not be in need of affection⁶⁰ and not be a psychologist who has no police training.⁶¹ There are numerous characteristics which a hostage negotiator should and should not possess. Perhaps Miron and Goldstein render a meaningful criteria when they propose that

If you can think of 20 ways to use a brick for something other than building outhouses, you'll probably make a good negotiator.⁶²

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE EMERGENCY TASK FORCE:
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Department has a present strength of 5,352 police officers and 1,120 civilian employees. They are responsible for policing Metropolitan Toronto's 240 square mile area and its 2,135,000 citizens. This law enforcement agency has a present annual budget of \$180,000,000 and responds to approximately 2,500,000 calls for assistance each year. In 1979, the Metropolitan Toronto Police addressed themselves to 208,825 Criminal Code offences. Of this number, 112,028 (53.6%) were "cleared" (i.e. by means of criminal conviction or the laying of a criminal charge).


The Metropolitan Toronto Police Department traces its history to 1835, when the County of York appointed one "high" constable, five constables and 14 reserve officers to enforce the law and maintain public order in Toronto while functioning as its police department. With the passage of time, 13 different police departments established themselves within the boroughs in and surrounding the city. On January 1, 1957, all 13 departments were amalgamated into the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department.

Presently, one must meet the following requirements in order to become a Metropolitan Toronto Police Officer:


1. Be a Canadian citizen or British subject;
2. be between the ages of 21 and 35;
3. have successfully completed grade 11;
4. be 5'8" (male), 5'4" (female) in height;
5. weigh at least 160 lbs. (male), 110 lbs. (female);
6. have uncorrected vision of 20/30;
7. read and write English;
8. pass a physical examination;
9. pass an oral and written examination;
10. pass a psychological evaluation;
11. be of "good moral character and habits" and,
12. reside within the Metropolitan Toronto area.

Upon being accepted as a candidate for the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department, one must maintain an academic average of 90% in all criminally related courses and 75% in all other courses while completing a 38 week training programme (19 weeks at the Ontario Police College in Aylmer, Ontario and 19 weeks at the Metropolitan Toronto Police College). Subsequent to this, an officer remains on probation for a period of three years, at which time he obtains the rank of first class police constable.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Department comprises five police "Districts" within which there are 18 "Divisional" units (see Diagram "A"). There are 26 specialized "squads" within the department which perform functions ranging from homicide and hold-up investigations to mounted and marine patrol. Most of these operate from police headquarters (in the North/East region of 52 Division) but, due to geographical convenience and/or practical necessity, some have independent locations. One such unit is called



MET



- 49 -
 DIAGRAM "A"

- DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
- DIVISIONAL BOUNDARIES
- DIVISIONAL STATIONS
- HQ POLICE HEADQUARTERS
- ETF EMERGENCY TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE DISTRICT AND DIVISIONAL BOUNDARIES

20F2

the Emergency Task Force (E.T.F.) and, it is responsible for responding to calls involving firearms, explosives, potential disasters, barricaded criminals and "hostage situations". This unit maintains its own headquarters in North York (within 32 Division) and is capable of rendering a mobile response to all emergency situations.

The Emergency Task Force concept was conceived in 1965, when the present Chief of Police (then holding the rank of Superintendent) was delegated the task of developing a specialized response unit which could efficiently address itself to the increasing number of dangerous weapon calls, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, campus uprisings and other incidents involving the potential for mass disorder and/or violence. In April 1967, after two years of preparation, the Emergency Task Force began to function with no. 5 District Headquarters as its base. Its personnel strength at this time was one Staff-Sergeant (Commanding Officer), three Sergeants and 48 Constables. Until 1970, this unit functioned in a manner which was consistent with its envisaged orientation. However, an alarming increase in the incidence of bomb threats and actual bombings motivated the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department to incorporate a Bomb Squad with the Emergency Task Force during the latter part of 1970. Shortly after the September 5, 1972 siege on the Olympic Village in Munich, West Germany by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), police forces around the world were awakened to the reality of "terrorist" operations. In addition, calls involving firearms, barricaded criminals, ransom kidnappings and hostages became frequent occurrences in Toronto. The Chief of Police ordered the re-structuring of the Emergency Task Force personnel so

that it would be capable of discharging a "control force" function based on the team concept in such situations. In May 1975, a municipal government decision resulted in the phasing out of the Emergency Measures Organization (E.M.O.). This provincially funded agency had maintained responsibility for responding to all situations of potential disaster. On January 1, 1976, the Emergency Task Force assumed the responsibilities of the Emergency Measures Organization. Consequently, it now responds to all emergency calls (from firearm calls to train wrecks) in the Metropolitan Toronto area.

At present, the personnel strength of the Emergency Task Force is one Inspector (Commanding Officer), three Staff-Sergeants, seven Sergeants and 69 Constables. There are six "gun teams" within this unit which function as "assault teams" during "hostage" and barricaded criminal "situations". Their duties in these "situations" involve "containment" of the area under siege, inner perimeter security, aerial and ground level observation as well as "assault" and sniper operations. Each "assault team" includes six officers. In most cases, the team leader holds the rank of Sergeant however, in some cases, the team leader is a constable with appreciable experience in weaponry. The mobile ability of, and support services provided by the Task Force are quantitatively diverse and qualitatively refined. For reasons of practicality as well as security, it is sufficient to state that it is capable of responding to any siege or disaster short of a military offensive. The six "assault teams" cover a three shift, 24 hour day, with two "teams" working each shift. The shifts are 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.; 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.; and 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Due to days off and vacation leave, a team usually functions with 67-100% personnel strength.



The qualifications which an applicant to the Task Force must meet are more stringent than those for the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department in general. A successful candidate must have a minimum of three years experience as a police officer, be able to run 1 1/2 miles in less than 12 minutes and obtain a score of at least 65/100 in a rigorous physical examination. A physiotherapist conducts the examination and it is his prerogative to reject an applicant for physical reasons. The applicants are tested for cardiovascular conditioning and recovery ability (50 marks); strength (i.e. they must complete 30 push-ups in 40 seconds, 40 sit-ups in 60 seconds and 10 consecutive chin-ups) (30 marks); body flexibility (they must be able to extend their fingertips 4-7 inches beyond their toes when in a rigid sitting position with their knees locked (10 marks) and, body fat (no more than 15% is permitted) (10 marks). A body fat content in excess of 15% is in and of itself, reason for rejection. It should be particularly noted that one of the Task Force's two mottos is "Our attitude towards others determines their attitude towards us". An officer whose disposition is inconsistent with the implicit expectations of this pronouncement is unlikely to be considered for acceptance to the unit. The Task Force is an all male unit. With the total female personnel of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department being 91, it is unlikely that a random distribution of all personnel (5,352) would result in a female being assigned to the Emergency Task Force.

The "assault teams" occupy their eight hour tours of duty in the following manner: six hours of patrol, one hour for lunch/dinner and one hour of mandatory physical fitness training. The "team" members patrol in two equipped vans and two to four equipped police cars. They patrol the entire

Metropolitan Toronto area with an emphasis on the downtown area (nos. 1 and 5 Districts) (see Diagram "A"). In particular, a patrol emphasis is placed on nos. 11, 14, 51, 52 and 55 Divisions (see Diagram "A").

Both "assault team" vans are equipped with two Colt AR 15 gas operated, semi-automatic, .223 calibre rifles (projectiles have a range of 3,600 ft./sec. upon release); three Remington model 870, 12 gauge shotguns (all 12 projectiles within a one round release have a range of 1,400 ft./sec.); one Remington model 870, 12 gauge shotgun with a "shot diverter" (all 12 projectiles within a one round release have a range of 1,400 ft./sec. and a dispersion rate of one diametrical foot for every three feet the projectiles travel); one Remington 40 XB, .308 calibre sniper rifle with a floating aluminum barrel and telescopic lens (projectile has a range of 2,600 ft./sec. upon release and, an accuracy rating of three diametrical inches at a distance of 200 yards throughout the release of a five round magazine); a quantity of seven types of chloracetophenone gas (CN tear gas) cannisters and projectiles (see Appendix "A", Articles 33 and 34); three Rolls Royce bullet proof vests; three Rolls Royce bullet proof helmets; four single-frequency, portable, communication radios and, six M-17 gas masks, as well as various and sundry support instruments and a quantity of ammunition. It should be noted that the Task Force's second motto which appears beneath a picture of its entire arsenal reads: "Let's hope we don't have to use it".

Upon being notified of a possible "hostage situation", an "assault team" proceeds immediately to the location of the area under siege (see Appendix "A", Article 2.). Upon arrival, the "team" determines the presence or absence of hostages, the nature of the weapon which the perpetrator has in his possession,

the number and description of perpetrators, the number and description of hostages, the location of the perpetrator(s) within the area under siege and the external and internal structure of the area under siege (see Appendix "A", Articles 9, 10, 12, 13, and 26). They proceed to effect "containment" of the "situation" by establishing inner and outer perimeters (see Appendix "A", Articles 20, 23 (b), (c) and 27). The inner perimeter is an area within which officers should be present on a "need to be there" basis only (see Appendix "A", Article 24). For example members of the "assault", negotiation, observation, sniper and command post "teams" should be the only officers in this area (see Appendix "A", Articles 11 and 24). The outer perimeter is a "buffer zone" which is established primarily for public protection (see Appendix "A", Article 25). Officers involved in perimeter security and in some cases, members of the media, should be permitted within the outer perimeter (see Appendix "A", Article 39). The establishment of the perimeter size varies in accordance with the weapon which the perpetrator has in his possession and, the nature of the general area in which the scenario is taking place. In general, if the perpetrator is armed with a firearm, the inner perimeter should cover approximately 90,000 square feet (approximately two square city blocks), while the outer perimeter should be between 135,000 and 180,000 square feet (approximately 3 to 4 square, city blocks). If the perpetrator is armed with a knife or a weapon which has a similarly limited range, the inner perimeter should be established in accordance with the structural barriers of the room, apartment, office or area within which the perpetrator is located, while the outer perimeter should be sufficiently flexible to restrict public movement in the area surrounding the

area under siege. A "control force" must be aware of the possibility that a perpetrator may decide to move outside of the area under seige and/or the inner perimeter. In such a case, strategies must be available for all contingencies. Should a perpetrator maintain control over a hostage while attempting to move the scenario to another location, the Metropolitan Toronto Police implement a mobile control procedure referred to as "Phase II" (see Appendix "A", Articles 41-47. This procedure facilitates the containment of the scenario while in its mobile stage and the re-establishment of perimeter security upon arrival at the destination. In such a case, the need for evacuated territory and the importance of a sufficiently large outer perimeter at the initial scene become quite obvious.

Many factors can and do influence the amount of time expended in establishing "containment" and perimeter security. Some cases require as much as one hour, while others may require only 10 or 15 minutes. Depending on the number of "assault team" members on duty and/or the gravity of the "hostage situation" (i.e. number of hostages, number of perpetrators, injuries and/or, geographical area) between four and 10 "assault team" personnel will be involved in a response. They are numbered one through four with a four-man "team", one through five with a five-man "team" and so on. The number one man is usually armed with a Remington model 870, 12 gauge, shotgun, while numbers two to four or two to five are armed with Colt AR 15 gas operated, semi-automatic, .223 calibre rifles. The team leader will occupy the last number except in cases where a sniper is required. The "assault team" members strategically locate themselves while maintaining good cover (see Appendix "A",

Article 18). It is at this point that the roles of the command post (temporary headquarters), Commanding Officer and negotiator become essential. The command post will serve as the source of information dissemination and procedural co-ordination (see Appendix "A", Article 37 (a) and (b)). In some cases, the Commanding Officer will remain in the command post however, it is not usual for him to be located near the area under siege. There are two possible reasons for this: 1) he may find it beneficial to commute to and from the periphery of the area under siege in order to get a "feel" for the "situation" or, 2) the swift progression of the scenario may prevent the establishment of a formal command post. It should be noted that the Commanding Officer is usually the first senior officer (of the rank of Inspector or above) who arrives on the scene, however, he can transfer his responsibility to any other senior officer at anytime. It is the Commanding Officer who is responsible for consulting with and deploying all Emergency Task Force personnel (see Appendix "A", Articles 27 and 32). They are under his authority and must adhere to his orders.

An "assault" procedure is extremely complex. It must assume an orientation which is not only consistent with the perpetrator's disposition, weaponry and location but, with the physical structure of the area under siege as well. The Emergency Task Force "assault teams" maintain a training schedule which includes shooting practice twice a month and, simulated "assault" practice once a month. The simulated "hostage situation" response is conducted at a municipally owned farm. The "team" members rotate, role-playing as a perpetrator under a variety of circumstances. For reasons of security, the exact mechanics of an "assault" procedure cannot be dwelt

upon; however, a basic structure can be discussed. Upon mobilizing an "assault" where the use of firearms will be necessary, the following roles are assumed by the "team" members: number one man (armed with a Remington model 870, 12 gauge shotgun) will be the first officer to enter the area under siege and will thus have the task of confronting the perpetrator; numbers two and three men (armed with Colt AR 15 gas operated, semi-automatic, .223 calibre rifles) will provide back up and cover for number one man; number four man (armed with a Colt AR 15 gas operated, semi-automatic, .223 calibre rifle) will usually provide diversionary fire or "safety valve" security in the event of a fleeing perpetrator; number five man (armed with a Colt AR 15 gas operated, semi-automatic, .223 calibre rifle) is usually the "team" leader and will co-ordinate the "assault"; and number six man (if necessary/available) (armed with a Remington 40 XB .308 calibre sniper rifle with floating aluminum barrel and telescopic lens) will perform the sniper function.

Although a response to a "hostage situation" must be structurally flexible, there are certain procedures to which all Metropolitan Toronto Police Officers must theoretically adhere. These guidelines are manifested within "Operational Procedure Number 66" and contained within the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department's Rules, Regulations and Procedures (see Appendix "A"). Articles 1 through 15 serve as structural guidelines to which initial officers on the scene should adhere. The purpose of these Articles is to prepare the area under siege and its surrounding geographical area for the arrival of the Commanding Officer and the Emergency Task Force. Articles 16 through 20 outline the duties of support personnel who will ultimately be involved in outer perimeter security.

Once again, it is essential that the general area in which the hostage episode is taking place be under strict, police control and remain conducive to intervention by the Emergency Task Force. Articles 23 through 29 outline the procedure for establishing "containment" as well as the inner and outer perimeters. Article 30 compels the Commanding Officer to ensure that an attempt is made to commence negotiations with the perpetrator. Articles 31 through 40 serve as basic guidelines for the management and co-ordination of the "control force" response. More than any other group of Articles within "Operational Procedure Number 66", these are amenable to alteration, compromise and/or deletion. Articles 41 through 48 outline the response contingencies which must be adopted in the event that the perpetrator forces the episode to enter into a mobile stage. Article 49 ensures that evidence will be collected and reports and observations will be co-ordinated in a manner which will assist the efforts of subsequent de-briefing and prosecution. Contravention of one or more of the Articles contained within "Operational Procedure Number 66" could theoretically result in an officer being charged under the Departmental Rules, Regulations and Procedures. However, as was previously mentioned, the nature of a "hostage situation" is such that strict adherence to a set of rules which quantitatively exceed basic parametric guidelines is difficult as well as dangerous.

In all "hostage situation" responses, an attempt to commence negotiations with the perpetrator must be made (see Appendix "A", Articles 30 and 36). As it is essential that the Commanding Officer be able to structure a response which is amenable to all contingencies, he is afforded an appreciable amount of

latitude with respect to the operationalization of negotiations. Due to the potential unavailability of the two "trained" negotiators who are attached to the Emergency Task Force, it is often necessary to elicit the assistance of one of the Department's other 36 "trained" negotiators and/or one of its other 5,314 officers who are trained to intervene in various forms of crises.

The use of formalized negotiation techniques as a response to "hostage situations" in Metropolitan Toronto began in 1975. Reacting to an increasing number of calls involving the seizing of hostages, the Chief of Police instructed the Emergency Task Force on April 1, 1975 to adopt the term "hostage situation" as an official label to be applied to all incidents of this type. Previous to this date, all calls involving a threat to public and/or private security where the presence of a weapon had been established were collectively labelled as "gun calls". On Sunday, June 22, 1975, the Task Force responded to its first "founded hostage situation" and although it was disposed of in a swift, efficient manner, the Chief of Police became concerned about the potential complexity and seriousness of future "hostage situations". In accordance with this concern, he decided to expose the Task Force to formal training in the art of hostage negotiating; Two Staff-Sergeants from this unit were sent to the Canadian Police College in Ottawa in order to study under Captain Frank Bolz and Detective Harvey Schlossberg (Ph.D.) of the New York City Police Department who had become internationally recognized in this field. Upon returning from this programme, one of these officers developed an internal programme for training hostage negotiators. In the beginning, many line officers were reluctant to place faith in the efficacy of hostage negotiating

however, with time, effort and practical success, it became an accepted parameter of "hostage situation" responses. To this date, the officer who pioneered the hostage negotiation course maintains this programme while engaged as a Staff-Sergeant with the Emergency Task Force. Presently there are 38 trained hostage negotiators within the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department (.7% of the police personnel), of which two (2.5% of the Task Force personnel) are attached to the Task Force. As the incidence of "hostage situations" increased (1975 - 12 (10 unfounded, two founded); 1976 - 27 (22 unfounded, five founded) and, 1977 - 21 (11 unfounded, 10 founded) this officer began lecturing each graduating class from the Metropolitan Toronto Police College on the basic fundamentals of a "hostage situation" response.

Negotiations for the release of a hostage are guided by a number of essential parameters: 1) it must be a "give and take process" (i.e. everything that the perpetrator desires has a price tag attached to it); 2) although ultimate victory must reside with the "control force", acquiescence to certain demands which are made by the perpetrator can often facilitate a peaceful resolution to the "situation"; 3) outright capitulation should never be considered (the concern is not only for the lives of the hostages who are immediately endangered, but for the hundreds and possibly thousands of hostages whose lives will be endangered in future "hostage situations"; 4) the negotiator should not be a senior officer because his refusal to capitulate may bear a more antagonizing denouncement for the perpetrator than will the conveyance of a refusal by a lower ranking officer; 5) throughout the negotiation, the negotiator must allow the perpetrator to ventilate through him,

and he must monitor his anxiety and aggression while functioning as an amicable compositor during the perpetrator's time of crisis and, 6) the primary rule is nobody dies. If a hostage is seriously injured, killed or if the threat to his/her life becomes dramatically manifest, negotiations cease to become the primary "control force" consideration. Once the perpetrator has shown a blatant disregard for the value of human life in this manner, the "control force" owes it to the hostage to "assault" and attempt to save his/her life.

As there are certain essential parameters which guide the process of negotiations, so too are there parameters which are common to the procedural response to all "hostage situations" in Metropolitan Toronto. With the passage of time and benefit of practical experience, this response has been refined in order to adopt itself to the exigency of each "hostage situation". There are three particular parameters which appear to be constant factors in the response procedure and thus, merit analytical consideration. Firstly, the establishment and maintenance of perimeter security appears to be a major concern of the Emergency Task Force response to all "hostage situations". The amount of time expended in the establishment of the perimeter security may influence the duration of the siege. The second major factor in a "hostage situation" which constitutes a necessary parameter of the "control force" response is the commencement of negotiations. This decision is usually made by the Commanding Officer however, it is contingent upon the availability of a negotiator, verbal access to the Perpetrator and the nature of the siege. Notwithstanding these contingencies, the length of time which elapses between the arrival of the Emergency Task Force and the commencement of

negotiations may be yet another factor which influences the duration of the hostage episode. The third major factor which constitutes an essential parameter of the "control force" response to a "hostage situation" is the decision to alter the tactics at some point during the episode. Perhaps more importantly, the reasons for altering the tactics may indeed influence the final disposition of a "hostage situation".

In summary, the Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force wishes to achieve three goals through its "hostage situation" response. In order of priority, these goals are:

1. To terminate the "situation" peacefully, with neither injury nor death to the hostages, spectators, police or the perpetrator;
2. to effect the deterrence of further "hostage situations"; and
3. to terminate the "situation" as swiftly as possible.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE NO. 66

This procedure does not apply to a police radio broadcast "Code XN", an EXTORTION involving a bank or other business, in which a hostage is held and where negotiations may already be under way. Police officers in the vicinity of such an occurrence will remain in their patrol area, away from the scene, unless directed otherwise.

PHASE ONE

Radio
Dispatcher

1. Receiving a report of an armed person barricaded, dispatches a police unit to investigate and confirm.
2. Upon confirmation from the unit, dispatches:
 - a) Additional police units to assist;
 - b) Uniform Sergeant;
 - c) Investigative personnel;
 - d) Emergency Task Force personnel.
3. Notifies:
 - a) Officer in Charge of division concerned;
 - b) Headquarters Duty Officer;
 - c) Headquarters Identification Bureau.
4. Directs responding units to the location of the first officer(s), indicating safest approach route.

First
Police
Officer

5. Receiving a call of an armed person(s) barricaded:
 - a) Approaches the area with caution;
 - b) does not approach the suspect house or apartment;
 - c) positions vehicle a safe distance from the location;
 - d) ascertains whether an armed person(s) is barricaded.
6. Upon confirming call, requests:
 - a) Additional police personnel, advising safest approach route;
 - b) ambulance to attend and stand by.
7. Assists injured persons when it can be done in safety.

APPENDIX "A"
Page 2 of 6

8. Upon arrival of additional officers, interviews complainant and witnesses. If possible, detains them for interview by a supervisory officer.

9. Attempts to determine:

- a) The exact location of the suspect(s);
- b) their identity;
- c) all other pertinent information.

10. Attempts to determine if there are other persons involved:

- a) As suspects;
- b) as hostages;
- c) for other reasons.

Second
Police
Officer

11. a) Positions vehicle safely;
b) uses vehicle as a mobile command post;
c) notifies radio dispatcher of his exact location;
d) maintains radio communication.

12. Advises responding officers of:

- a) Location of suspect(s);
- b) exits to be covered;
- c) persons to be evacuated;
- d) traffic points to cover;
- e) all other pertinent information.

13. Advises radio dispatcher of all available information, including:

- a) Description of suspect(s) and weapon(s);
- b) description of hostage(s);
- c) exact location where suspect(s) is barricaded.

14. Records all events in chronological order.

15. Briefs supervisory officer on his arrival.

Assisting
Officers

16. Report to mobile command post.

17. Take up safe vantage points, sealing off all exits to contain the suspect(s).

18. Position themselves to avoid crossfire situations.

19. Evacuate all endangered persons from the vicinity when it can be done in safety.
20. Maintain control of designated areas to assure safety of citizens and to prevent escape of the suspect(s).
21. Ensure all persons having pertinent information are interviewed by a supervisory officer.
22. Report to command post when relieved.
- Supervisory Officer 23. Assumes command of all personnel and:
 - a) Obtains complete report from first officer on the scene;
 - b) ensures the suspect(s) is isolated and contained.
 - c) ensures containment personnel are positioned safely and will not be caught in crossfire.
24. Establishes an inner perimeter and clears all unnecessary personnel.
25. Establishes an outer perimeter and ensures that all endangered persons are evacuated from within it.
26. Obtains all available information concerning:
 - a) Suspect(s):
 - (i) exact location (floor, room, roof, basement),
 - (ii) identity,
 - (iii) reason(s) barricaded,
 - (iv) physical description,
 - (v) mental and physical condition,
 - (vi) previous history,
 - (vii) demands made.
 - b) Hostage(s), if any:
 - (i) identity,
 - (ii) physical description,
 - (iii) mental and physical condition,
 - (iv) relationship to suspect, if any.
 - c) Location:
 - (i) interior and exterior description (acquire a floor plan if possible),
 - (ii) ensures all possible escape routes are covered,
 - (iii) obtains number and location of telephone in premises,
 - (iv) locations of service connections to the building (hydro, water, gas).

27. Assigns Emergency Task Force personnel to relieve containment officers.
28. Ensures that radio communication is established between command post and Emergency Task Force containment teams by way of Emergency Task Force portable radios.
29. Requests the Officer in Charge of the Communications Bureau to have suspect's telephone number changed to one known only by police, as soon as possible.
30. Attempts to communicate with the suspect(s) by telephone, loud hailer or public address system.
31. Requests relatives or friends of the suspect(s), from a safe distance, to:
 - a) Provide background information;
 - b) assist with negotiations if other attempts fail.
32. Consults with Emergency Task Force personnel and discusses tactics.
33. Requests Fire Department stand by if tear gas to be used.
34. Ensures only trained personnel use tear gas and emergency weapons.
35. Apprehending the suspect(s), ensures:
 - a) A minimum number of personnel come in contact with the suspect(s);
 - b) a minimum number of personnel handle the weapon(s) used by the suspect(s);
 - c) suspect(s) receive medical treatment if required;
 - d) personnel are assigned to protect the crime scene;
 - e) the Duty Inspector is notified if tear gas has been used;
 - f) Emergency Task Force personnel begin the decontamination process immediately, if required.

Senior
Officer

36. Finding hostage(s) being held whose life may be in danger if tear gas is used, requests the assistance of:
 - a) Unit Commander, Emergency Task Force;
 - b) Divisional Unit Commander;
 - c) Officer in Charge, Intelligence Bureau (Mobile Support Services);
 - d) Trained negotiators.
37. Assumes overall command and:
 - a) Establishes a temporary headquarters, advising the Duty Section and radio dispatcher of the location and telephone number;
 - b) utilizes the full resources of the Force, establishing an advisory panel of Senior Officers at the temporary headquarters;
 - c) requests assistance from persons having specialized knowledge or equipment, e.g. building owner or caretaker, a member of a municipal service or the Canadian Armed Forces.
38. Ensures that a chronological history of events is maintained.
39. Establishes a press information centre within the outer perimeter and designates a press information officer to liaise with the news media.
40. Moves into phase two in the event negotiations fail and suspect(s) and hostage(s) are allowed to leave the scene.

PHASE TWO - MOBILE PHASE

Senior
Officer

41. Notifies radio dispatcher immediately:
 - a) Mobile phase is in effect;
 - b) to advise radio units of the route, if known, instructing them to remain in assigned patrol areas and not to interfere.
42. Accompanies the ~~convoy~~ and assumes command at new location unless relieved in another jurisdiction.
43. Prepares a critique of the incident and submits to Deputy Chief, Field Operations.

Officer
in Charge
Intelligence
Bureau
(Mobile
Support
Unit)

44. Commands personnel participating in the convoy and controls its size, considering:
 - a) Number of suspects;
 - b) their armament;
 - c) number of hostages;
 - d) destination, if known.
45. Details a minimum of four cars:
 - a) Escape vehicle to carry suspect(s) and hostage(s);
 - b) three chase vehicles:
 - (i) first vehicle - M.S.S. operator and two members of E.T.F. assault team,
 - (ii) second vehicle - M.S.S. operator and three members of E.T.F. assault team,
 - (iii) third vehicle - M.S.S. operator, Officer in Charge of operation, negotiating team co-ordinator, officer in charge of convoy and officer in charge of E.T.F.
46. Maintains communication with the Officer in Charge, Communications Bureau, as to progress, route and location of convoy.
47. Arriving at the destination:
 - a) Institutes containment procedure;
 - b) notifies radio dispatcher of mobile command post location for responding officers;
 - c) notifies appropriate Police Force, if outside Metropolitan Toronto jurisdiction.

PHASE THREE - RELOCATION PHASE

Investigative
Inspector

48. Follow applicable procedure in Phase One at the new location.
49. Upon completion of the occurrence, ensures the scene and all evidence are preserved and protected until the investigation is complete.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter will be to examine and discuss the research methodology which will facilitate an evaluation of the Metropolitan Toronto Police, Emergency Task Force's response to "hostage situations". The purpose of any research effort is to effect a

... systematic and objective inquiry into an area of experience to increase knowledge or to facilitate problem solving.¹

The area of experience which is of interest to this study is the operational procedure employed by the Emergency Task Force in responding to a "reported hostage situation". This operational procedure manifests itself within the duties, responsibilities and expectations of a "control force". The term "control force" refers to any law enforcement agency which functions as an integrative unit capable of responding to all aspects of a "hostage situation". Such a response requires expertise in negotiation techniques, perimeter and containment security, surveillance capacity and armed "assault" techniques.

In light of the interest that this study has with regard to the manner in which the Emergency Task Force performs its "control force" function, it would seem that the research methodology to be employed must assume the form of evaluative research.

Evaluative research could be defined as the application of scientific research methods and techniques to test the results of a process, technique or system against such criteria as (a) its purpose; (b) the efficiency of its operation; (c) its unintended effects; (d) its significance in its context.²

Evaluative research most commonly manifests itself in one of 10 methodological orientations: 1) Real vs. Ideal conditions; 2) Real conditions vs. Published or Official standards; 3) Before status vs. After status; 4) a time series analysis comparing Programme persons with non-Programme persons; 5) a time series analysis comparing Programme persons with "similar" non-Programme persons; 6) a time series analysis comparing Programme persons with "very similar" non-Programme persons; 7) Real outcomes vs. Expected outcomes; 8) Agency reactions vs. Participants and behaviour; 9) Participant costs vs. Control costs and, 10) Participants and Controls vs. Costs and Benefits.³ It is true that the choice of a methodology which is appropriate for a particular study is important to the success of an investigation; however, the ultimate success of the investigation is more likely to be determined by the validity of the criteria which a researcher selects to measure the data. When selecting indicators of performance, the objective nature of the indicators is of obvious import. However, such selections must be made in the light of the

agency's prospects for attaining goals. Further, the presence of "latent" as well as "manifest" goals must be taken into consideration. Goals of the "manifest" type are usually those dictated by policy, while goals of the "latent" type are usually of an unofficial or personal nature.⁴ In the present study, the indicators of performance which will be employed as evaluation criteria will be: 1) the avoidance of harm to hostages, spectators, police and perpetrators and, 2) the amount of time expended before the termination of the "hostage situation". It seems quite apparent that both of these goals are of the "manifest" type however, because the Emergency Task Force's function as a "control force" during "hostage situations" is not its only responsibility, it is possible that some "latent" goals will reveal themselves through the testing of hypotheses which will address those factors which contribute to the termination of a "hostage situation".

Many researchers have advanced opinions on what a good evaluation should do. Glaser contends that a good evaluation is one which is 1) based on objective or hard data; 2) relevant to attainable goals and, 3) able to involve continuous rather than discrete variables.⁵ Adams suggests that a "comprehensive" evaluation should contain

- Objectives of evaluative research
- Organization of evaluation
- Coordination of evaluation
- Staffing and funding of evaluation
- Theories of correctional improvement
- Planning of evaluation
- Methods and strategies
- Reporting and dissemination of evaluation
- Utilization of evaluation
- Assessment of the evaluative process
- Development and improvement of evaluation.⁶

Buikhuisen and d'Anjou state that a good evaluation must: 1) evaluate the practice that is actually in effect; 2) remain amenable to the measurement of independent variables; 3) be able to trace all results to a cause and, 4) contain groups which are representative of the population to which ascriptions are being made.⁷ Further, they contend that it is essential for an evaluative method to evaluate practice as well as policy.⁸ Brenner and Carrow suggest that a good evaluation must not ignore the "social costs" of the programme or practice being evaluated. "Social costs" may include the dangers and inconvenience created by a "hostage situation" and/or the "control force" response. In this regard, society's demand for a certain level of productivity will vary with the inherent "social costs" of a programme.⁹

The primary purpose of scientific evaluative research must be to reveal whether a measure which has been taken or is being considered is effective and whether it works on everyone, on a certain target group, or on certain persons in certain circumstances.¹⁰

Analyses of evaluative research reveal two major concerns: 1) the need for ethical research and, 2) the controversiality of the "hard data" vs. "soft data" debate.¹¹ During the last decade, evaluative research has realized a proliferation in status however, its progress has been impeded by a lack of administrative confidence and trust.¹² As in all fields of research, the honesty of the researcher and his analysis cannot be compromised.¹³ When engaging in evaluative research, this parameter becomes increasingly important. It must be remembered that an agency which permits an evaluative study to be conducted,

is exposing itself to criticism which could be damaging.¹⁴ In reference to the field of corrections, Adams contends that the reason for the difficulties which evaluative research has encountered is the irresponsible manner in which many evaluative studies have been conducted.¹⁵ Therefore, a researcher must maintain integrity and avoid being "polemic" throughout an evaluation.

Anyone wanting to do evaluative research is very much dependent on the co-operation of others ... Evaluative research therefore encroaches very much on everyday life.¹⁷

The controversy regarding the "hard" vs. "soft" data debate has endured due to the indefatigable determination of advocates on both sides. In its essence, the argument is one which juxtaposes the rigorous nature of a summative evaluation with the flexible nature of a formative evaluation. With the former, a comprehensive method links specified goals with a well defined programme. With the latter, a system of continuous feedback is developed whereby the inherent amenability of a system to its goals can be ensured.¹⁸ The summative approach would require operationalization through the systematic integration of a method such as Real vs. Ideal conditions¹⁹ with a statistical instrument such as configuration analysis,²⁰ while the formative approach would require operationalization through a procedure such as a comprehensive analysis of cases.

Some researchers contend that the determination of success or failure according to evaluative research is closely related to the rigour of the methodology which is employed. Adams claims that assessment by results and

objectives is more important than the "hardness" of a research design.²¹ Further, he suggests that by employing a "hard data" approach, the researcher is able to bring a pre-determined, negative influence to bear on the outcome.

If "weak" designs bring more relevant and more important consequences than "strong" designs, weak is to be preferred to strong, ...²²

Biles concurs in this regard, claiming that the criminal justice system functions under the erroneous belief that "hard" data is necessary for conclusive results. In fact, he contends that "soft" data is a viable alternative as a basis for rendering decisions.²³ Further, he fears the refusal of methodologists to accept the fact that little difference exists between these orientations may prove disastrous for evaluative research.

A commitment to a rigid evaluative model for all criminal justice decisions may turn out to be an impossible strait-jacket and one that impedes the development of increasingly rational and sensitive criminal justice policies.²⁴

Although not alone, Glaser appears to be foremost in the advocacy of "hard" data in evaluative research. In particular, he is critical of the case study as an evaluative method. His main criticism is that it is a "... spurious method of evaluating people-changing efforts"²⁵ however, he does not explain his reasons for such an assertion. Further, he rejects the case study evaluation regardless of the number of cases or the percentage of the universe which the population of cases constitutes.²⁶ He justifies this criticism by stating that the

success or failure of a case is irrelevant unless expressed in a statistical conclusion.²⁷ He states that an evaluation must, therefore, be statistical for it to have merit.

Individual cases illustrate how a method works or fails, and suggest explanations for its outcome, but only the statistical pattern can demonstrate how effective it is.²⁸

It seems apparent that Glaser neglects to consider four arguments which have been advanced in support of a formative or "soft" data approach to evaluation. Firstly, the inherent rigidity of "hard" data makes it less likely that an agency or programme will be viewed as successful by the evaluation. If insistence on "hard" data carries with it a threat to the integrity of a methodology, then its eventuation is detrimental to the research effort. Secondly, "hard" rather than "soft" data bears potential inapplicability to a people-changing of human process. For example, the need for a control group or for variables to be held constant would present ethical as well as practical problems in the present study. Thirdly, the employment of statistical data results in the process of data aggregation. Consequently, the relationship of one factor to another factor in a particular case may be obscured.²⁹ Glaser fails to take into consideration that this methodological frailty exists with statistical analyses but not with the case study method. Finally, an evaluation of a service provided by an agency which includes each case in which that service has been rendered throughout the agency's history, is surely not the same as a study which contains "... one or two dramatic cases"³⁰ as Glaser

contends in his categorization of all case studies. It appears evident that Glaser's criticism of the case study as an evaluating method is because it supposedly lacks the systematic integration necessary to render a conclusion on the actual effectiveness of a programme. If indeed, the case method adopted lacks systematic integration, a criticism would be justified. However, a case study could preclude such a concern by adapting itself to a research design which could facilitate the discernment of constant variables and the postulation of hypotheses. Such an adaptation exists in the method of analytic induction. In the present study, analytic induction would facilitate determination of the presence of a definable sequence of events when a "control force" response is successful and conversely, the absence of certain events when a "control force" response is unsuccessful. By permitting cases which tend to countervail parameters established by previous cases to be included in the study, the selectivity and exclusion which Glaser speaks of can be methodologically remedied. As Cressey suggests

Negative cases are the growing point of science, exceptional instances forcing us either to reject or revise the generalizations.³¹

In 1934, Florian Znaniecki introduced a methodological concept which he called "analytic induction". The purpose of this methodology was to render a "closed system" which would preclude: manipulation of variables by external stimuli. It was his desire to construct this methodology in a manner which would facilitate the postulation of universal statements rather than narrowly defined doctrines. He states that

Analytic induction abstracts from the given concrete cases characters that are essential to it and generalizes them, presuming that in so far as essential, they must be similar in many cases. This is why the method of analytic induction has been called the type method ... Thus, when a particularly concrete case is being analyzed as typical or eidetic, we assume that those traits which are essential to it, which determine what it is, are common to and distinctive of a class.³²

Subsequent to Znaniecki's presentation of this methodology, other researchers have adopted it. Cressey³³, Lindesmith³⁴ and, Lemert³⁵ are examples. There are seven essential steps to the process of analytic induction. The researcher must first postulate a general definition of the phenomenon to be considered. Secondly, the postulation of a hypothesis is required. Thirdly, one case is considered in light of the hypothesis and the consistency of the hypothesis with the facts of the case is assessed. If consistency is not achieved, a fourth step undertakes to render a more precise definition of the phenomenon or a re-formulation of the hypothesis. Fifth, although "practical certainty" of hypothetical viability may appear evident, the researcher must be prepared to accommodate any negative case through re-definition of the phenomenon or re-formulation of the hypothesis. The sixth step comprises the continuation of this procedure throughout the analysis of each case. Upon completion, a universal relationship appreciating all negative cases should be discerned. Finally, all cases outside of the definitive parameters of the phenomenon are examined in order to establish that the description of conditions included in the final hypothesis are always present when the phenomenon is present and always absent when the phenomenon is absent.³⁶

Some claim that there is little advantage to be gained in employing analytic induction as opposed to numeric induction. The basic difference between the two is that analytic induction involves all cases of the phenomenon in the final theoretical formulations, while numeric induction considers all cases regardless of their consistency with definitive parameters and stated hypotheses. The process of numeric induction comprises a comparison of the occurrence and non-occurrence of a phenomenon in the absence or presence of a condition. Consequently, it either accepts or rejects a hypothesis on a pure probability basis. Table 5.1 shows the essential difference between numeric and analytic induction in a graphic manner (see Table 5.1). With analytic induction, there is an insistence that all cases be represented in one diagonal set of squares (i.e. P , C , and $\bar{P}$, $\bar{C}$). By virtue of the analytic induction process of redefining the phenomenon and re-stating the hypotheses, no cases will present themselves in the other set of diagonal squares (i.e. P , C and $\bar{P}$, $\bar{C}$). With numeric induction, the desire is to determine in which square a "loading" effect occurs. Consequently, cases in which the conditions are not present, yet the phenomenon occurs, are left unexplained. When viewed in this fashion, analytic induction appears to be superior to numeric induction.

Some criticisms of analytic induction have been advanced and merit a response. Robinson claims that it is a restrictive methodology because it forces a hypothesis or eventual theory to assume a limited universe of reference when more encompassing references can be drawn from the available data.³⁸ Further, he contends that

TABLE 5.1: DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS OF
ANALYTIC VS. NUMERIC INDUCTION

	P	$\bar{P}$
C	X	?
$\bar{C}$	O	X^1

P - instances where the phenomenon occurs

$\bar{P}$ - instances where the phenomenon does not occur

C - instances where conditions are present

$\bar{C}$ - instances where conditions are not present³⁷

The success of analytic induction in producing complete evaluations is due to its procedure, to its systemization of the method of the working hypothesis, and not to its logical structure.³⁹

Turner is more critical of the manner in which analytic induction has been employed than he is of the methodology itself however, he does claim that it is vulnerable to many "intrusive factors" (i.e. external stimuli which may be neither determinable nor predictable) which activate apparent systems.⁴⁰ Ultimately, he advocates the use of numeric induction in conjunction with analytic induction in order to eventuate the most thorough methodology.

Analytic induction fails to carry us beyond identifying a number of closed systems, and enumerative induction fails to go beyond the measurement of associations.⁴¹

In response to Robinson's criticism, it should be pointed out that in the present study analytic induction will be used to discern the presence or absence of a definable sequence of events being present in a successful "control force" response or absent in an unsuccessful one. That a hypothesis will be restricted to this term of reference, in no way inhibits the desire of science in this instance. Further, this study will not concern itself with the reasons for analytic induction's thorough nature, rather it will avail itself of this property. In response to Turner, it must be conceded that the possibility exists that there is an advantage to employing a statistical analysis as a complementary methodology to analytic induction. However, the existence of the advantage

has yet to be demonstrated. An advantage can exist only if one methodology provides an addition to the other's revelations. The claim that one methodology does not "carry us beyond" a certain point and the other methodology "fails to go beyond" another point, does not reveal any additional advantages to be accrued from the use of both.

In this study, analytic induction will be used. Hypotheses will be formulated on the basis of the level of performance that is expected of the Emergency Task Force, and related to the outcome of "hostage situations" to which it has responded. Each case will be examined in order to produce four narrowly circumscribed hypotheses, indicating the best strategy which the Emergency Task Force could employ in eventuating the most successful termination to the episode. These hypotheses will address 1) the "control force" response; 2) the hostage(s); 3) the perpetrator and, 4) the weapon in the perpetrator's possession. It should be noted that this methodology bears some resemblance to "grounded theory", where data is systematically obtained from social research and theory is derived directly from it.⁴² This connection between data and theory facilitates the postulation of hypotheses which will only be altered by a change in the empirical universe.⁴³

The use of analytic induction refers to the analysis of "founded hostage situations" to which the Emergency Task Force has responded however, this unit responds to all "reported hostage situations" (i.e. "founded" or "unfounded"). It is only after the establishment of perimeter security that the status of a "reported situation" is determined. In consequence, it appears important to analyze all of the "hostage situations" to which the Emergency Task Force has

responded in order to determine whether the procedure that has been/is being followed produces the best results in terms of the deployment of police personnel.

The data on which this study is based has been collected from the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department. Normally, data on the rate and breakdown of crime in the Metropolitan Toronto area is available through computer; however, neither the incidence of, nor information on "hostage situations" is available from this source. Consequently, it was necessary to obtain data from the following sources: 1) line summaries of calls to which the Emergency Task Force has responded; 2) the personal memo books of officers who functioned as "control force" personnel during the 93 responses and, 3) in four cases which were considered major incidents and were consequently subjected to post-occurrence debriefing, from files which contain the debriefing procedures and general synopses. The line summaries usually comprise a 10 to 15 word synopsis of the incident, considered sufficient for administrative purposes for which they are prepared. The data they contained was frequently insufficient for the present research. Consequently, the researcher was forced to conduct interviews with police officers who were involved in responses to "hostage situations". In all, 108 officers were interviewed. The interview usually consisted of the officer recounting the "hostage situations" after refreshing his memory from his memo book. In six cases, the researcher went to the scene of the "hostage situation" subsequent to its occurrence, in order to appreciate the geographical nature of the "control force" response.

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CHAPTER SIX
ANALYSIS OF "HOSTAGE SITUATIONS"

Perhaps the most appropriate point of departure for this analysis would be a consideration of the "founded" and "unfounded hostage situations" to which the Metropolitan Toronto Police, Emergency Task Force has responded during the years which constitute this study (April 1, 1975 through February 1, 1980). A case has been classified as "founded" if, upon responding to a "reported hostage situation", the "control force" discovered that a hostage had been/was being held by a perpetrator who was presenting a threat to individual/public safety. A case has been classified as "unfounded" if, upon responding to a "reported hostage situation", and establishing perimeter security, the "control force" discovered that in fact, no hostages were being/had been held. During the years included in this study, the Emergency Task Force responded to 93 "reported hostage situations". Of these, 33 (35.5%) were of the "founded" type, while 60 (64.5%) were of the "unfounded" type. Table 6.1 shows an analysis of "founded", "unfounded" and total number of "reported hostage situations" according to the years included in this study (see Table 6.1).

TABLE 6.1: "REPORTED HOSTAGE SITUATIONS" PER YEAR
BY "FOUNDED"/"UNFOUNDED" STATUS

YEAR	"FOUNDED"	"UNFOUNDED"	TOTALS
1975	2 (16.7) *	10 (83.3)	12
1976	5 (18.5)	22 (81.5)	27
1977	10 (47.6)	11 (52.4)	21
1978	7 (43.8)	9 (56.2)	16
1979	8 (50.0)	8 (50.0)	16
1980	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	1
TOTALS	33 (35.5)	60 (64.5)	93


* The figures in parentheses represent percentages.

From Table 6.1, four significant observations can be made. Firstly, the number of "reported hostage situations" was largest in 1976. In this year there were 27 cases (29% of the total cases in this study). Secondly, the number of "founded hostage situations" was largest in 1977. In this year there were 10 cases (30.3% of all "founded" cases in the study). Thirdly, the number of "unfounded hostage situations" was largest in 1976. In this year there were 22 "unfounded" cases (36.7% of all "unfounded" cases in the study). Fourthly, the proportion of "founded" to "unfounded hostage situations" has steadily declined from 1:4.4 in 1976 to 1.1 in 1979. When the presence of steady declines in "reported" (33.3%) and "unfounded hostage situations" (63.6%) between 1976 and 1979 is considered in the light of the absence of any discernible trend in the incidence of "founded hostage situations", it would seem apparent that there exists an association between the two steady declines. There are three possible explanations for this combination. The first is the influence of police specialization in responses to "hostage situations". In 1976, the availability of officers, specially trained in the art of hostage negotiations and "assault" procedures was communicated to all Metropolitan Toronto Police personnel. Therefore, there is a possibility that every "reported hostage situation" was referred to the Emergency Task Force at this time. With the passage of time, it is possible that Divisional officers developed a sense in delineating "founded" from "unfounded" cases before requesting the assistance of the Emergency Task Force. The second possible explanation is that Emergency Task Force personnel who had become accustomed to responding to "reported hostage situations" although their assistance had not yet been requested, developed a certain

expertise in refraining from responding when a "reported hostage situation" call came over the radio but did not request their assistance. Thirdly, the influence of contagion, an artifact created by media coverage, merits some consideration. For example, on Sunday, January 11, 1976, the Emergency Task Force responded to a "founded hostage situation" ("founded" case number 4) which was of a nature unparalleled in its experience. This incident received wide media coverage as the first "major hostage situation" in Metropolitan Toronto. During the next two weeks, the Emergency Task Force responded to one "founded" and two "unfounded hostage situations". Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that such an influence could account for the dramatic increase in "reported hostage situations" evidenced in 1976, a contagion effect in the public sector cannot be discounted.

An analysis of the months in which the "hostage situations" occurred is presented in Figure 6.1 in order to discern the presence or absence of a definable cycle which pervades the years under consideration (see Figure 6.1). From the graph, it can be seen that there is very little evidence to indicate that a discernible cycle exists. In 1975, there were both high and low periods, with October being the most active month. In 1976, the trend was between one and two "reported situations" per month, with May and June being the exceptions. In 1977, there were both high and low periods, with the summer months (May, June, July and August) experiencing no "hostage situations" and October being the highest month in the study with seven "reported hostage situations". In 1978, the trend was two or less "reported hostage situations" per month, with February being the exception at four. In 1979, the trend was once again two or

FIGURE 6.1: "HOSTAGE SITUATIONS" BY MONTHS AND YEARS



less "reported hostage situations" per month, with August and October being the exceptions at three. A general decline in the number of "reported hostage situations" seems to be evident during the summer months of July and August however, generalizations cannot justifiably proceed any further.

The next stage of this analysis will consider the incidence of "reported hostage situations" according to the day of the week. Table 6.2 shows this analysis (see Table 6.2). From Table 6.2, it can be seen that Saturday, Sunday and Monday have the highest rates of "reported situations" while Wednesday has the lowest. There appears to be no relationship between the "founded" and "unfounded" cases. By performing a "chi-square" operation and determining $\chi^2 = 2.4339$, it becomes evident that the pattern of distribution in Table 6.2 is not statistically significant.

At this point, it would seem appropriate to consider the time of day in relation to "reported hostage situations" in Metropolitan Toronto. Because this study will address itself to the Emergency Task Force's response to such "situations", the hours of the day have been divided according to the shift system within which this unit functions. Table 6.3 shows the division of the 24 hour day according to the three shifts which constitute the Emergency Task Force tours of duty (see Table 6.3). There are three aspects of this analysis which are of import. Firstly, the highest incident of "founded hostage situations" occurs during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift (52.8%). Secondly, the lowest incidence of "founded hostage situations" occurs during the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift (20.0%). Finally, the highest incidence of "unfounded hostage situations" occurs during the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. By

TABLE 6.2: "REPORTED HOSTAGE SITUATIONS"
BY DAYS OF THE WEEK

DAY	"FOUNDED"	"UNFOUNDED"	TOTALS
SUNDAY	6 (40.0) *	9 (60.0)	15
MONDAY	4 (25.0)	12 (75.0)	16
TUESDAY	5 (45.5)	6 (54.5)	11
WEDNESDAY	3 (30.0)	7 (70.0)	10
THURSDAY	6 (46.2)	7 (53.8)	13
FRIDAY	4 (36.4)	7 (63.6)	11
SATURDAY	5 (29.4)	12 (70.6)	17
TOTALS	33	60	93

$$\chi^2 = 2.4339 \quad \text{d.f.} = 6 \quad p. = 0.90$$

* Figures in parentheses represent percentages.

TABLE 6.3: "REPORTED HOSTAGE SITUATIONS" BY
EMERGENCY TASK FORCE SHIFTS

SHIFT	"FOUNDED"	"UNFOUNDED"	TOTALS
7:00 a.m.- 3:00 p.m.	6 (35.3)*	11 (64.7)	17
3:00 p.m.-11:00 p.m.	19 (52.8)	17 (47.2)	36
11:00 p.m.- 7:00 a.m.	8 (20.0)	32 (80.0)	40
TOTALS	33	60	93

$$\chi^2 = 8.8951$$

$$\text{d.f.} = 3$$

$$p. = 0.05$$

*Figures in parentheses represent percentages.

performing a "chi-square" operation and determining $\chi^2 = 8.8951$, it becomes evident that the pattern of distribution shown in Table 6.3 is significant at the 0.05 level.


An analysis of the incidence of "reported hostage situations" is most relevant to the Metropolitan Toronto Police experience when one considers it in the light of the city's geography. Table 6.4 shows an analysis of all cases according to the five Districts which constitute the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department (see Table 6.4). Table 6.4 shows that number 5 District has the highest rate of "unfounded" cases while number 3 District has the highest rate of "founded". In order to discern the presence or absence of a relationship between "reported hostage situations" and number of reported criminal offences per District, the relevant data is presented in the form of a bar chart in Figure 6.2 (see Figure 6.2). This graphical analysis shows a strong relationship between the number of reported criminal offences, "reported hostage situations", "founded hostage situations" and, "unfounded hostage situations". In order to render a more specific analysis of the relationship, a rank order correlation(s) will be done. This operation (Spearman's rho) reveals very positive correlations in two instances. The rank order correlation coefficient between the number of reported criminal offences and number of "reported hostage situations" according to Police District is + .90, and between the number of reported criminal offences and "founded hostage situations", it is + .95. Though less positive, the rank order correlation coefficient between the number of reported criminal offences and number of "unfounded hostage situations" according to Police District is still quite significant at + .70.

TABLE 6.4: "REPORTED HOSTAGE SITUATIONS" AND
NUMBER OF REPORTED CRIMINAL
OFFENCES BY POLICE DISTRICT

DISTRICT	"FOUNDED"	"UNFOUNDED"	TOTALS	NUMBER OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES REPORTED (1979)	PERCENTAGE OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES (TORONTO) (1979)
1	9 (37.5) *	15 (62.5)	24	45,044	21.6
2	2 (40.0)	3 (60.0)	5	27,513	13.2
3	7 (87.5)	1 (12.5)	8	35,703	17.1
4	6 (54.5)	5 (45.5)	11	29,308	14.0
5	9 (20.0)	36 (80.0)	45	71,257	34.1
TOTALS	33	60	93	208,825	100.0

* Figures in parentheses represent percentages.

FIGURE 6.2: "HOSTAGE SITUATIONS" AND REPORTED CRIMINAL OFFENCES BY POLICE DISTRICTS"



Perhaps a more accurate breakdown of the demographic correlation between "hostage situations" and reported criminal offences in Metropolitan Toronto can be rendered in a breakdown of data according to the 18 Metropolitan Toronto Police Divisions. This analysis can be seen in Table 6.5 (see Table 6.5). It shows that the three Divisions with the highest number of reported criminal offences (52, 14 and 55) also rank in the top four Divisions according to number of "reported hostage situations". Further, the two Divisions with the lowest number of reported criminal offences (42 and 21) rank in the bottom 10 according to the number of "reported hostage situations". Perhaps a more specific relationship will be revealed when the data is presented in the form of a scatter diagram as seen in Figure 6.3 (see Figure 6.3). The graphical analysis indicates a correlation between the number of reported criminal offences and number of "reported hostage situations"; however, a rank order correlation will be needed to determine the nature of this correlation. The correlation coefficient between the number of reported criminal offences and number of "reported hostage situations" according to Police Division is + .53; between the number of reported criminal offences and number of "founded hostage situations", it is + .57 and, between the number of reported criminal offences and number of "unfounded hostage situations", it is + .34. None of these figures indicates the existence of a strong correlation.


In concluding, the most significant observations which this analysis can offer are: 1) the incidence of "reported" and "unfounded hostage situations" has steadily declined since 1976, while the incidence of "founded hostage situations"

TABLE 6.5: "REPORTED HOSTAGE SITUATIONS" AND
REPORTED CRIMINAL OFFENCES BY
POLICE DIVISIONS

DIVISION	"FOUNDED"	"UNFOUNDED"	TOTALS	NUMBER OF REPORTED CRIMINAL OFFENCES (1979)	PERCENTAGE OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES (TORONTO) (1979)
11	4 (50.0)*	4 (50.0)	8	8,877	4.3
12	2 (50.0)	2 (50.0)	4	6,681	3.2
13	1 (25.0)	3 (75.0)	4	9,360	4.5
14	2 (25.0)	6 (75.0)	8	20,126	9.6
21	1 (33.33)	2 (66.67)	3	6,246	3.0
22	-	-	-	9,765	4.7
23	1 (50.0)	1 (50.0)	2	11,502	5.5
31	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	3	13,545	6.5
32	3 (100.0)	- (0.0)	3	12,022	5.8
33	2 (100.0)	- (0.0)	2	10,136	4.8
41	5 (62.5)	3 (37.5)	8	14,314	6.8
42	- (0.0)	1 (100.0)	1	6,472	3.1
43	1 (50.0)	1 (50.0)	2	8,522	4.1
51	- (0.0)	9 (100.0)	9	10,229	4.9
52	4 (30.77)	9 (69.23)	13	25,753	12.3
53	1 (33.33)	2 (66.67)	3	9,773	4.7
54	- (0.0)	2 (100.0)	2	9,155	4.4
55	4 (22.22)	14 (77.78)	18	16,347	7.8
TOTALS	33	60	93	208,825	100.0

* Figures in parentheses represent percentages.

FIGURE 6.3: "REPORTED HOSTAGE SITUATIONS" AND REPORTED
CRIMINAL OFFENCES BY POLICE DIVISIONS



* Numbers in parentheses represent Police Divisions.

has declined since 1977; 2) the ratio of "founded" to "unfounded hostage situations" decreased from 1:4.4 in 1976 to 1:1 in 1979; 3) the day to day and month to month trends in the incidence of "hostage situations" are insignificant; 4) the influence of the time of day on the incidence of "hostage situations" is significant; 5) there is a very positive correlation between the number of reported criminal offences and the number of "reported" and "founded hostage situations" according to Police District and, 6) there is a positive correlation between the number of reported criminal offences and the number of "reported", "founded" and "unfounded hostage situations" according to Police Division.

29

CHAPTER SEVEN
CASE DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSIS

20

The following cases have been classified as "unfounded" because upon response by the Emergency Task Force to a reported "hostage situation", there was either no evidence of any disturbance at the address or the disturbance did not in fact, involve the taking of hostages.

		<u>1975</u>		
<u>"Unfounded" Case #</u>		<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Division</u>
<u>"Reported" Case # in ()</u>				
1 (1)		Tuesday, April 15	3:30 a.m.	11
2 (2)		Saturday, April 26	9:25 p.m.	54
3 (3)		Sunday, June 8	11:40 p.m.	11
4 (4)		Saturday, June 21	2:48 a.m.	54
5 (6)		Sunday, September 7	8:14 p.m.	41
6 (7)		Monday, September 29	1:15 a.m.	42
7 (8)		Sunday, October 5	6:25 a.m.	55
8 (9)		Saturday, October 11	1:50 a.m.	55
9 (10)		Friday, October 24	2:15 p.m.	55
10 (12)		Monday, December 15	3:35 a.m.	41

1976

<u>"Unfounded" Case #</u> <u>"Reported" Case # in ()</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Division</u>
11 (16)	Thursday, January 15	9:00 a.m.	51
12 (17)	Wednesday, January 21	12:14 a.m.	51
13 (19)	Saturday, February 14	5:10 p.m.	51
14 (20)	Saturday, February 28	1:40 a.m.	52
15 (21)	Wednesday, March 10	1:35 a.m.	14
16 (22)	Tuesday, March 16	2:48 a.m.	12
17 (23)	Saturday, April 17	3:54 p.m.	52
18 (24)	Saturday, April 24	3:05 a.m.	52
19 (25)	Wednesday, May 5	9:00 a.m.	14
20 (26)	Thursday, May 13	9:09 p.m.	55
21 (27)	Friday, May 21	9:00 a.m.	55
22 (28)	Sunday, May 30	11:10 a.m.	51
23 (29)	Sunday, June 6	8:42 p.m.	14
24 (30)	Monday, June 7	3:30 a.m.	14
25 (31)	Wednesday, June 23	11:00 p.m.	11
26 (32)	Saturday, July 10	9:30 p.m.	55
27 (33)	Friday, August 13	1:15 a.m.	51
28 (35)	Sunday, September 12	1:50 a.m.	14
29 (36)	Saturday, October 23	11:28 a.m.	14
30 (37)	Wednesday, November 3	2:30 p.m.	51
31 (38)	Tuesday, November 23	3:40 a.m.	55
32 (39)	Friday, December 31	1:02 a.m.	53

1977

33 (40)	Monday, January 10	2:05 a.m.	43
34 (41)	Tuesday, January 11	10:32 a.m.	52
35 (46)	Thursday, April 14	12:07 a.m.	12
36 (47)	Wednesday, September 28	3:25 p.m.	21
37 (49)	Tuesday, October 4	10:27 p.m.	52
38 (52)	Monday, October 10	7:26 a.m.	13
39 (53)	Monday, October 10	9:15 p.m.	55
40 (54)	Monday, October 10	11:30 p.m.	23
41 (56)	Thursday, November 10	7:40 p.m.	55
42 (57)	Friday, November 11	3:20 p.m.	51
43 (59)	Saturday, December 3	11:22 a.m.	55

1978

44 (64)	Monday, February 20	3:11 a.m.	55
45 (65)	Monday, February 20	4:10 a.m.	53
46 (66)	Saturday, February 25	5:14 a.m.	13

47 (67)	Wednesday, April 19	10:45 a.m.	55
48 (70)	Sunday, August 20	12:37 a.m.	52
49 (72)	Sunday, October 1	4:53 a.m.	55
50 (73)	Saturday, October 28	9:03 p.m.	51
51 (75)	Friday, November 17	6:35 p.m.	31
52 (76)	Tuesday, December 26	7:06 p.m.	11

1979

53 (78)	Friday, February 2	2:55 p.m.	21
54 (79)	Monday, March 5	11:05 p.m.	52
55 (80)	Thursday, March 29	12:26 a.m.	52
56 (81)	Sunday, April 8	3:08 a.m.	52
57 (82)	Thursday, May 3	1:15 a.m.	41
58 (87)	Monday, August 27	1:15 a.m.	13
59 (88)	Thursday, October 4	8:24 p.m.	51
60 (89)	Monday, October 22	1:35 a.m.	55

1980

- NO UNFOUNDED CASES AS OF FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 29.

The following cases have been classified as "founded because upon response by the Emergency Task Force (control force) to a reported "hostage situation", it was determined that people were being held as hostages or had been held as hostages by a perpetrator who was presenting a threat to individual/public safety.

"Founded" Case No. 1 ("Reported" Case No. 5)

On Sunday, June 22, 1975 at approximately 5:05 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" at a golf range which lies partly within (33 Division) and partly outside the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Toronto. Upon arrival, it was determined that the scenario had moved into the sole jurisdiction of the York Regional Police. A 22 year old male had taken his former girlfriend as a hostage and forced her to move away from the driving area and out into the open fields of the range. He was armed with a hunting knife and had no history of mental illness. The Task Force served an ancillary function in establishing containment with the driving area and fields as the inner perimeter and the

exterior border of the range property as the outer perimeter (see Diagram "B"). Negotiations commenced and, over an approximate twenty minute period, the negotiator was able to position himself within four feet of the perpetrator and his hostage. During this face-to-face negotiation, the perpetrator made no demands. Rather he complained about his unfaithful girlfriend and how he was going to teach her a lesson. The negotiator told him that nobody was worth the trouble that he was getting himself into. During the next 10 minutes, the perpetrator vented his frustrations to the negotiator and agreed to surrender without offering resistance. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 5:55 p.m.

- Hypothesis No. 1: When negotiations are established within twenty minutes and the perpetrator is involved in a face to face interaction with a "control force" negotiator and vents his grievance to the negotiator while making no demands, the episode will terminate successfully within one hour.
- Hypothesis No. 2: When the perpetrator is a young male and the hostage is the source of his grievance, the episode will terminate successfully.
- Hypothesis No. 3: When the perpetrator has no history of mental illness and is not intoxicated, the episode will terminate successfully.
- Hypothesis No. 4: When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a knife, the episode will terminate successfully.

"Founded" Case No. 2 ("Reported" Case No. 11)

On Tuesday, October 29, 1975 at approximately 5:19 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 52 Division. An intoxicated 42 year old male had taken a Toronto Transit Commission Inspector as a hostage in the underground subway at the Bay/Bloor station. He was unarmed and had a history of mental illness and acute alcoholism. He had refused to pay the price


DIAGRAM "B"

"Founded" Case # 1

("Reported" Case # 5)

Sunday June 22, 1975.

- (H) - Hostage
- (P) - Perpetrator
- (N) - Negotiator
- (MP) - Mobilization Points
- (AO) - Aerial Observation Points
- (PO) - Primary Observation Point
- (SL) - Sniper Location
- (GLO) - Ground Level Observation Points
- (TH) - Temporary Headquarters
- Outer Perimeter
- - - Inner Perimeter



Highway # 400

of admission at the subway entrance and, after leaping over a turnstile, he was confronted by the Inspector on the passenger platform. He seized the Inspector and threatened to throw him onto the subway tracks if the others (T.T.C. employees and police) in pursuit did not leave. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the platform as the inner perimeter and the subway station entrances as the outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and the perpetrator made no demands other than the police assuring his safety if he released the hostage. Within three minutes this assurance was given and the hostage was released.. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 5:46 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of new elements in the form of the perpetrator making demands which were acceded to in part and the fact that the amount of time expended in establishing negotiations cannot be determined, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the alteration of the phrase "... while making no demands ..." so that it will read "... while making either no demands or demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to ..." and 2) the deletion of the 20 minute time element from the hypothesis. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator is involved in a face to face interaction with a "control force" negotiator and vents his grievance to the negotiator while making either no demands or demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, the episode will terminate successfully.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves the addition of new elements in the form of the perpetrator being a 42 year old male and, the hostage being a stranger to him, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: 1) the qualification of the hypothesis by stating that the perpetrator's age has no determinable effect on the episode's disposition. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 2 will now read as follows:

When the hostage is the actual source of the perpetrator's grievance, the episode will terminate successfully regardless of the perpetrator's age.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves the addition of new elements in the form of the episode terminating successfully even though the perpetrator had a history of mental illness and alcoholism and was intoxicated, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the alteration of the entire hypothesis so that it will read "Neither the existence of a history of mental illness or alcoholism in the perpetrator's background nor his intoxicated state prevents a successful termination to the episode". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 3 will now read as follows:

Neither the existence of a history of mental illness or alcoholism in the perpetrator's background nor his intoxicated state, prevents a successful termination of the episode.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the perpetrator's weapon of potential destruction being an agent outside of his

control, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the hypothesis by adding the phrase "... or some agent outside of his control, ..." succeeding the phrase "When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a knife ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a knife or some agent outside of his control, the episode will terminate successfully.

"Founded" Case No. 3 ("Reported" Case No. 13)

On Saturday, January 10, 1976 at approximately 12:30 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 32 Division. A 27 year old male had taken his two year old daughter as a hostage. He was armed with an eight inch kitchen knife, had no history of mental illness and was known to be a regular methamphetamine user. The perpetrator's ex-common law wife had legal custody of the child and the perpetrator had taken the child from her earlier in the evening. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the one bedroom apartment under siege as the inner perimeter and the third floor of the apartment building as the outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and the perpetrator demanded that he be permitted to keep his daughter. The negotiator was able to gain admittance to the apartment unit with the perpetrator's permission and thus negotiated face-to-face. The perpetrator was in a state of anxiety and was holding his daughter tightly. During the negotiation he vented his frustrations to the negotiator and over a period of approximately 45 minutes he gave permission to four unarmed assault team members to enter the apartment unit. He requested a cigarette from the

negotiator and in return, the negotiator asked him to remove the knife from a threatening position near the girl's throat. He complied, and as he leaned forward to ignite the cigarette, the four assault team members seized him. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 2:42 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the implementation of an "assault" operation and, the fact that the perpetrator's demands were unconnected to a fear for personal safety and were not acceded to yet the episode terminated successfully, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the existing hypothesis will be qualified by the addition of a concluding sentence which will read as follows: "However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, successful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator is involved in a face to face interaction with a "control force" negotiator and vents his grievance to the negotiator while making either no demands or demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, the episode will terminate successfully. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, successful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of a "assault" operation.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the hostage not being the source of the perpetrator's grievance yet the episode being terminated successfully through the implementation of an "assault"

operation, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be made: 1) the deletion of the phrase "... regardless of the perpetrator's age" and, 2) the qualification of the hypothesis by adding the sentence "However, when the hostage is not the source of the perpetrator's grievance, successful termination is possible only through the implementation of an assault operation" to the concluding phrase "... the episode will terminate successfully". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 2 will now read as follows:

When the hostage is the actual source of the perpetrator's grievance, the episode will terminate successfully. When the hostage is not the source of the perpetrator's grievance, successful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the perpetrator having a history of drug abuse, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: the qualification of the hypothesis by: 1) deleting the word "or" preceding the phrase "... alcoholism in the perpetrator's background ..." and 2) adding the words "... or drug abuse ..." succeeding the phrase "Neither the existence of a history of mental illness, alcoholism ..." Therefore, Hypothesis No. 3 will now read as follows:

Neither the existence of a history of mental illness, alcoholism or drug abuse in the perpetrator's

background nor his intoxicated state prevents a successful termination of the episode.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no element which is both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, the hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 4 ("Reported" Case No. 14).


On Sunday, January 11, 1976 at approximately 7:18 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 41 Division. A 25 year old male had seized a 46 year old male as a hostage after gaining illegal entry to the latter's home. The perpetrator had a criminal record, including 12 convictions for violent and non-violent offences, and had consumed a 26 ounce bottle of rum and 24 bottles of beer with a friend between 7:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. on the previous night. At 5:30 a.m., he entered a taxi cab and instructed the driver to take him to the rear of a shopping plaza. Upon arrival at the destination, the perpetrator robbed the driver and shot him twice in the back of the head with a sawed-off, 12 gauge shotgun. The driver died almost instantly. At 7:05 a.m., the perpetrator entered another taxi cab and instructed the driver to take him to the rear parking lot of a nearby apartment building. Upon arrival at the destination, he robbed the driver and shot him once in the face with the same weapon. The shotgun pellets did extensive superficial damage, however, the driver was able to leap out of the car and flee. As he fled, the perpetrator shot him in the arm. A passing T.T.C. bus driver witnessed this and informed the police. The first responding divisional units pursued the perpetrator throughout an adjacent residential area. During the chase, the perpetrator declared "Shoot

me, I've got nothing to lose". After an exchange of gunfire, he forced his way into the hostage's residence. The hostage's wife and two sons managed to escape, leaving the perpetrator and hostage alone in the house (see Diagram "C 1").

Upon arrival at the scene, the Task Force established containment with a one square block inner perimeter and a three square block outer perimeter (see Diagram "C 2"). The perpetrator refused to negotiate; however, he made one demand - to speak to the friend with whom he had been drinking during the night. The situation remained rather dormant for approximately 2 1/2 hours and then, without warning, the perpetrator emerged from the house with the shotgun barrel against the hostage's head at approximately 10:00 a.m. Although a sniper had the opportunity to shoot the perpetrator at this time, an order for strict firearms discipline was observed. At this time, the commanding officer (E.T.F. Inspector) told the perpetrator that he could speak with his friend. The perpetrator replied: "I'm through talking". At this point the perpetrator and hostage entered the hostage's snow covered automobile which was parked in the driveway. The commanding officer gave an order to immobilize the perpetrator if this could be achieved without endangering the life of the hostage. With the hostage at the wheel of the car and the perpetrator seated directly behind him, the car slowly backed down the driveway. At this point, a police car was ordered into the path of the reversing automobile. Upon contact, the driver's door opened and the hostage emerged from the car. An "assault team" member

"Founded" Case # 4
 ("Reported" Case # 14)
 Sunday January 11,
 1976.

- 1 - Taxi Driver
 #1 Fatally
 Wounded (apprx.
 6:45 a.m.)
- 2 - Taxi Driver
 #2 Critically
 Wounded (apprx.
 7:15 a.m.)
- 3 - Scene of
 "Hostage
 Situation"
 (apprx. 7:35
 a.m.)



1/2 mile

Scale of Miles

- 116-

DIAGRAM "C 1"

Highway # 401

Birchmount Road

Kennedy Road

Midland Ave.

Brimley Road

Lawrence Ave.



Eglinton Ave.

St. Clair Ave.

DIAGRAM "C 2"

"Founded" Case # 4
 ("Reported" Case #14)
 Sunday January 11,
 1976.

- (AS) - Area Under Siege.
- (MP) - Mobilization Point
- (AO) - Aerial Observation Point
- (PO) - Primary Observation Point
- (SL) - Sniper Location
- (GLO) - Ground Level Observation Points
- (TH) - Temporary Headquarters
- Outer Perimeter
- - - Inner Perimeter



grabbed the hostage and pulled him away from the door. The perpetrator emerged and pointed his shotgun at the hostage. The commanding officer ordered him to "Give it up". The perpetrator turned and pointed his gun at this officer who shot twice, hitting the perpetrator in the head. The perpetrator was pronounced dead at 10:15 a.m., seven minutes after the situation was terminated.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of (a) the perpetrator's refusal to interact with a "control force" negotiator and (b) the implementation of an "assault" operation terminating the episode unsuccessfully, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the addition of the phrase "... or should he refuse to interact with the negotiator, ..." which will follow the existing phrase "... should his demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety ..." and, 2) the qualification of the second sentence by adding the words "... or unsuccessful ..." succeeding the word "successful". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator is involved in a face to face interaction with a "control force" negotiator and vents his grievance to the negotiator while making either no demands or demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, the episode will terminate successfully. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating unsuccessfully through the implementation of an "assault" operation even though the hostage was not the source of the perpetrator's grievance, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the second sentence by adding the words "... or unsuccessful..." succeeding the word "successful". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 2 will now read as follows:

When the hostage is the actual source of the perpetrator's grievance, the episode will terminate successfully. When the hostage is not the source of the perpetrator's grievance, successful or unsuccessful termination is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the perpetrator being intoxicated, having a history of criminal violence, displaying extreme violence prior to seizing the hostage and the episode terminating unsuccessfully, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the addition of the phrase "... though an unsuccessful termination is possible when the perpetrator is intoxicated" to the concluding phrase "...prevents a successful termination of the episode, ..." and, 2) the addition of the sentence "However, should the perpetrator have a history

of criminal violence and/or display extreme violence involving bodily harm and/or death prior to the seizure of the hostage(s), successful termination of the episode is not possible" to the concluding sentence specified above. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 3 will now read as follows:

Neither the existence of a history of mental illness, alcoholism or drug abuse in the perpetrator's background nor his intoxicated state prevents a successful termination of the episode, though an unsuccessful termination is possible when the perpetrator is intoxicated. However, should the perpetrator have a history of criminal violence and/or display extreme violence involving bodily harm and/or death prior to the seizure of the hostage(s), successful termination of the episode is not possible.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating unsuccessfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a "restricted" (s. 82(1) Criminal Code)¹ longarm, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the hypothesis by adding the phrase "... however, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible" to the concluding phrase "... the episode will terminate successfully ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a knife or some agent outside of his control, the episode will terminate successfully; however, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible.

"Founded" Case No. 5 ("Reported" Case No. 15)

On Tuesday, January 13, 1976 at approximately 7:09 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 41 Division. A 33 year old male had taken a seven year old girl as a hostage. She was the daughter of the perpetrator's ex-common law wife. The perpetrator was armed with a Crossman .22 calibre rifle (not a "restricted weapon" because its projectile does not exceed a speed of 500 feet per second upon release²), had a history of mental illness and was known to have suicidal inclinations. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the apartment building as the inner perimeter and an approximate, on square block area as the outer perimeter. The hostage's mother informed police that the perpetrator had fled to an adjacent apartment with the hostage. The negotiator contacted occupants of the apartment unit at approximately 7:55 a.m. and spoke with the perpetrator. The perpetrator seemed calm and made no demands. At 8:10 a.m., the tenant gave "assault team" members permission to enter the unit. The perpetrator was speaking on the telephone with the negotiator while two adults and the hostage sat nearby. Upon being asked to surrender, he forfeited his weapon and agreed. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 8:15 a.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because the perpetrator in this case neither engaged in a face to face interaction with a "control force" negotiator nor vented his grievance to the negotiator, yet the episode terminated successfully, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the alteration of the first sentence so that it will read as follows: "When the perpetrator interacts with a

"control force" negotiator and makes no demands or only demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes no demands or only demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating successfully through interaction between the perpetrator and a "control force" negotiator even though the hostage was not the source of the perpetrator's grievance, this hypothesis must be reworded.

The following changes will be necessary: the qualification of the second sentence by: 1) altering the phrase "... successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation so that it will read "... the implementation of an "assault" operation can terminate the episode either successfully or unsuccessfully ..." and, 2) adding the phrase "... and, the non-intervention of such an operation will result

only in a successful termination of the episode" to the alteration specified above. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 2 will now read as follows:

When the hostage is the actual source of the perpetrator's grievance, the episode will terminate successfully. When the hostage is not the source of the perpetrator's grievance, the implementation of an "assault" operation can terminate the episode either successfully or unsuccessfully and, the non-intervention of such an operation will result only in a successful termination of the episode.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating successfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was an "unrestricted" longarm, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the hypothesis by adding the words "... "unrestricted" longarm ..." succeeding the phrase "... in the perpetrator's possession is a knife, ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) a knife,
- (b) an "unrestricted" longarm, or
- (c) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully however, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible.

"Founded" Case No. 6 ("Reported" Case No. 18)

On Sunday, February 8, 1976 at approximately 12:57 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 14 Division. An intoxicated 38 year old male had taken his brother, sister-in-law and their three children as hostages. He was armed with an M-1 carbine rifle and had no history of mental illness. During the course of the Saturday evening and night the perpetrator consumed approximately 15 bottles of beer and a litre of wine. Much to his sister-in-law's objection, he insisted on showing his nieces and nephew his rifle. The sister-in-law notified the police. In a state of apparent panic, the perpetrator took the entire family as hostages. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with a one square block inner perimeter and a two square block outer perimeter. Attempts to contact the perpetrator were unsuccessful. Consequently, there was no interaction between the perpetrator and a "control force" negotiator. Without notice, the entire family emerged from the house with the son carrying the rifle. The "assault team" entered the house and arrested the perpetrator, who offered no resistance. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 1:31 a.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the perpetrator refusing to interact with a "control force" negotiator while failing to present an actual threat to the hostages and the episode terminating successfully, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the existing hypothesis will be qualified by the addition of the following phrase to the concluding sentence: "... unless the perpetrator does not

present an actual threat to the hostage(s)." Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes no demands or only demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present an actual threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of new elements in the form of the episode terminating successfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was a "restricted" longarm but he did not present a threat to the

hostages, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: the qualification of the second part of the hypothesis by 1) beginning a new sentence with "However, ..." and, 2) adding the phrase " ... unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s)" to the concluding phrase "... successful termination is not possible, ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) a knife,
- (b) an "unrestricted" longarm, or
- (c) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully. However, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

"Founded" Case No. 7 ("Reported" Case No. 34)

On Sunday, August 15, 1976 at approximately 2:25 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 33 Division. A 26 year old male had seized the 14 year old son of his common law wife as a hostage and was holding him in a 7th floor, one bedroom apartment. The perpetrator was armed with a .45 calibre Colt automatic pistol and had a history of mental illness, drug abuse and alcoholism. He had consumed eight bottles of beer and "four or five bennies" (benzedrine) during the early afternoon. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the apartment building as the inner perimeter and an approximate two square block area as the outer perimeter. Negotiations

commenced and, although the perpetrator made no demands, he threatened to shoot the hostage and throw him off the 7th floor balcony. He claimed that he had been hearing voices all morning which were instructing him to kill the boy. This was his motivation for taking him as a hostage. The perpetrator ordered the hostage to remain in a bedroom while he negotiated with the police on the telephone in the living-room. During the negotiations the perpetrator made no demands and his anxiety fluctuated appreciably. At times he went into fits of rage and threw beer bottles through the windows and destroyed furniture. The perpetrator was periodically visible to an "assault team" sniper on the adjacent roof however, strict firearms discipline had been ordered and was observed. After studying a floor plan of the apartment unit under siege, the commanding officer discovered that if a sufficiently swift entrance was obtained into the unit, the "assault team" could prevent the perpetrator from reaching the hostage. The members of the "assault team" and the sniper were instructed to immobilize the perpetrator if their lives or the life of the hostage was threatened. The "assault team" entered the unit and confronted the perpetrator. He ran to the balcony and threw the revolver away. All members of the "assault team" employed their own discretion in refraining from firing. The perpetrator surrendered and the situation was terminated without injury at approximately 3:55 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of

the perpetrator's fluctuating anxiety, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the deletion of the word "or" from the phrase "... no demands or only demands which are connected ..." in the first sentence and, 2) the phrase "... or, should the perpetrator display fluctuation in his anxiety level, ..." will succeed the phrase "... a fear for personal safety and are acceded to ..." in the first sentence. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes no demands or only demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to or, should the perpetrator display fluctuation in his anxiety level, the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present an actual threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating successfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was a "restricted" (s. 82(1) Criminal Code)³ handgun, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the first sentence by adding the words "... in the perpetrator's possession is a knife, "unrestricted longarm, ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) a knife,
- (b) an "unrestricted" longarm, or
- (c) some agent outside of his control, the episode will terminate successfully. However, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

"Founded" Case No. 8 ("Reported" Case No. 34)

On Monday, February 28, 1977 at approximately 12:50 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 31 Division. A 27 year old male with no history of mental illness had taken his wife and 10 month old son as hostages. He was armed with a hunting knife and it seemed apparent that the situation had been precipitated by the wife's attempt to leave the matrimonial home with the son. An occupant in a neighbouring apartment had seen the perpetrator enter the unit under siege while brandishing the hunting knife and had, consequently, notified the police. Upon arrival, the Task Force established

containment with the third floor of the apartment building as the inner perimeter and the apartment building as the outer perimeter. The negotiator was permitted to enter the unit and found that the perpetrator and hostages were in the washroom. The perpetrator made no demands; however, he was extremely anxious. With time, his level of anxiety decreased. When the commanding officer realized that the episode was limited to the washroom, he instructed four "assault team" members to conceal themselves outside of the washroom entrance. The negotiator suggested to the perpetrator that the close quarters of the washroom were making the situation uncomfortable for everyone and recommended they all move into the living-room. The perpetrator devised an elaborate plan for the exit from the washroom. The wife emerged first, holding the son with one arm and the perpetrator's hand with her free hand. The perpetrator had the knife against his wife's back. As they emerged, an "assault team" member pulled the wife and child forward, another pushed the perpetrator backward and a third struck the perpetrator on the forearm with a rubber baton forcing him to drop the knife. The situation was terminated at approximately 2:43 p.m. with the perpetrator receiving a bruised forearm.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode being terminated successfully through the implementation of an "assault" operation when one of the hostages was the source of the perpetrator's grievance, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change is necessary: the alteration of the first sentence so that it reads as follows. "When one or more of the hostages is the source of the perpetrator's grievance, the episode will be terminated successfully regardless of whether or not an "assault" operation is implemented". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 2 will now read as follows:

When one or more of the hostages is the actual source of the perpetrator's grievance the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not an "assault" operation is implemented. When the hostage is not the source of the perpetrator's grievance, the implementation of an "assault" operation can terminate the episode either successfully or unsuccessfully, and the non-intervention of such an operation will result only in a successful termination to the episode.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 9 ("Reported" Case No. 43)

On Friday, March 11, 1977 at 5:00 p.m., the Task Force responded to a

"hostage situation" in 11 Division. An intoxicated 38 year old male with a history of mental illness had taken six tenants in a rooming house as hostages. He was armed with a 12 gauge shotgun and a .303 calibre rifle and had embarked on what appeared to be an unprovoked rampage through the rooming house in which he lived. He went from room to room seizing hostages; however, one tenant managed to escape and notify the police. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment. Because of the location (Queen Street) and the time (5:00 p.m., Friday afternoon), the rooming house complex with an approximate 10 foot security zone stretching from the exterior walls was established as the inner perimeter and an unbalanced two square block area bordered by Queen Street on the north was established as the outer perimeter (see Diagram "D"). It was determined that the perpetrator was holding between six and eight hostages in a two room basement unit at the rear of the building. Negotiations commenced and it soon became evident that the perpetrator was less than coherent. He demanded \$100,000 and some whiskey. Throughout the negotiation he was extremely abrupt and became increasingly agitated. When he felt the "control force" was stalling, he slammed the receiver down on the telephone and fired one shotgun blast through the ceiling. From the a ground level observation point he was observed walking about the area under siege. In addition, it seemed apparent that the hostages were buried beneath some piled-up furniture on the west wall of the unit.

Subsequent to the perpetrator firing his gun, the commanding officer began to place an assault operation in motion. Two "assault team" members positioned themselves at the rear window of the unit (south side) and four

DIAGRAM "D"



"Founded" Case # 9

("Reported" Case #43)

Friday March 11,
1977.

- (AS) - Area Under Siege
- (H) - Hostages
- (P) - Perpetrator
- (N) - Negotiator
- (MP) - Mobilization Points
- (OP) - Observation Point
- (AT) - "Assault Team"

—— Outer Perimeter
- - - Inner Perimeter



"assault team" members positioned themselves at the door to the unit (north side). Orders were given to refrain from shooting unless the lives of the hostages or police officers were in danger. With the use of a periscope, the perpetrator could be seen standing by the door, facing northward and holding both weapons in his arms. The "assault team" members at the window distracted the perpetrator by tapping on the window. As the perpetrator turned toward the window, four "assault team" members crashed through the door. The perpetrator dropped the .303 rifle, spun around and pointed the 12 gauge shotgun at an advancing officer. Two officers fired one round simultaneously, hitting the perpetrator in the right shoulder and left arm. The situation was terminated 7:07 p.m. without injury to the five hostages. The perpetrator recovered from his wounds.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the perpetrator displaying fluctuation in his anxiety level while making demands which were unconnected to a fear for personal safety and, the episode terminated unsuccessfully through the implementation of an "assault" operation, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the addition of the word "or" immediately following the phrase "... makes no demands ..." in the first sentence and, 2) the deletion of the phrase "... or, should the perpetrator display fluctuation in his anxiety level ..." in the first sentence. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes no demands or only demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating unsuccessfully where the perpetrator has a history of mental illness, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the addition of the phrase "... has a history of mental illness and/or ..." to the phrase "... though an unsuccessful termination is possible when the perpetrator ..." in the first sentence. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 3 will now read as follows:

Neither the existence of a history of mental illness, alcoholism or drug abuse in the perpetrator's background nor his intoxicated state prevents a

successful termination of the episode, though an unsuccessful termination is possible when the perpetrator has a history of mental illness and/or is intoxicated. However, should the perpetrator have a history of criminal violence and/or display extreme violence involving bodily harm and/or death prior to the seizure of the hostage(s), successful termination is not possible.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 10 ("Reported" Case No. 44)

On Monday, March 21, 1977 at approximately 11:50 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in a bank on the south-east corner of King and Yonge Streets in 52 Division. A 38 year old male with a history of alcoholism but no history of mental illness had entered the bank with a sawed-off, 12 gauge shotgun concealed under a loosely fitting "lumber-jack" shirt. After successfully seeking out the manager, he declared "The bank will be closed for to-day; it is no joke, get the doors locked". He then fired one shotgun blast into the ceiling and said "That's just to show I mean business, I'm serious". He then took 18 bank employees as hostages and ushered them to a second floor office where some would remain for the next 12 hours. Upon realizing that many of the employees were French-Canadian he stated "I wouldn't mind blasting off some French Canadians". However, he seemed to be cognizant of the hostages' safety from the beginning of the situation. He never pointed his gun at a hostage and he permitted them to eat and go to the

washroom. Early in the siege he warned them: "Be calm, stay down, I don't want to hurt anybody". He had a criminal record which included six non-violent offences and had served as a merchant marine and mercenary in the Congolese Army but was presently unemployed.

Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the inner perimeter being bordered by Adelaide Street on the north, the west side of Victoria Street on the east, Wellington Street on the south and the east side of Bay Street on the west and, the outer perimeter being bordered by Queen Street on the north, the east side of Victoria on the east, Front Street on the south and the west side of Bay Street on the west (see Diagram "E"). The negotiation centre was located in the manager's office of a bank across the street from the area under siege. The mobile command post was established in a separately contained unit within the same structure as the area under siege. There were nine ground level observation points within the inner perimeter. There were five aerial observation points, all within the inner perimeter. There were four aerial sniper locations and three ground level sniper locations, all within the inner perimeter. There was one primary aerial observation point and one primary ground level observation point. There were approximately 60 officers involved in the inner perimeter security, "assault", sniper and observation operations. Most were armed with heavy weaponry (i.e. Remington 12 gauge pump action shotgun, Colt AR 15 gas operated, semi-automatic rifle and Remington 40 XB .308 calibre sniper rifle). There were approximately 15 officers involved in the mobile command and negotiation centre operations.

DIAGRAM "E"

"Founded" Case # 10



("Reported" Case #44)

Monday March 21, 1977

- (AS) - Area Under Siege
- (MP) - Mobilization Points
- (AO) - Aerial Observation Points
- (PO) - Primary Observation Points
- (SL) - Sniper Locations
- (GLO) - Ground Level Observation Points
- (TH) - Temporary Headquarters
- (NC) - Negotiation Centre

Outer Perimeter

Inner Perimeter



There were approximately 200 officers involved in outer perimeter security, crowd control and support services.

Negotiations commenced with some difficulty, due to the fact that members of the media had occupied the telephone lines to the bank. By approximately 12:15 p.m. these lines were cut and the "control force" occupied one line for the purpose of negotiation. The perpetrator demanded a C-130 Hercules aircraft to fly him to Uganda and a police van to transport him to the airport. He stated that he wanted to join the army of Idi Amin. He said "I'm a fan of his" and "I just want to get back to soldiering. I want to soldier for Ugandan President Idi Amin. I've always admired him. I killed people back there in the Congo. God, more than I can remember, and I wanna (sic) do it again." The perpetrator reinforced his ideological orientation by taking approximately \$3,000 in cash and throwing it in a waste basket. It is interesting to note that he would later contend that he hated Idi Amin and wanted to get to Uganda and assassinate him. During the negotiation, the perpetrator was encouraged to speak of his past. He seemed rather egotistical and the negotiator reinforced his ego by characterizing his tour of duty in the Congolese Army as a heroic effort. At approximately 1:23 p.m., the perpetrator heard "assault team" members assuming positions outside of the area under siege. He reacted by firing two shotgun blasts into the walls of a stairwell. He was extremely agitated by this but did not fault the negotiator. At this point a secondary negotiation made contact with the perpetrator. The primary negotiator remained on the telephone while the secondary negotiator spoke with the perpetrator face-to-face. The perpetrator developed a trusting relationship

with both of the negotiators. He contacted the primary negotiator by telephone on four occasions asking for advice and assistance. He was similarly reliant on the secondary negotiator. The perpetrator was engaged in telephone negotiations for approximately two hours and 18 minutes during the siege and in face-to-face negotiations continuously throughout. It is interesting to note that he was enraged by his brother's presence in the bank and was furious when the brother attempted to convince him to surrender.

The perpetrator released the hostages in four stages. First, a single female hostage was released at approximately 12:40 p.m. because she was ill. Second the 13 female hostages were released at approximately 3:45 p.m. in return for an interview with a member of the media. Third, the bank manager was released at approximately 4:30 p.m. because he was a diabetic who required medication. The remaining male hostages (3) were released at approximately 11:30 p.m. in return for the primary negotiator agreeing to visit alone with the perpetrator before the latter surrendered. With the exception of the final releases, the perpetrator had been convinced by the negotiator that he should release the hostages because their health, sex and/or disposition were becoming a liability to him. The primary negotiator had asked the perpetrator to surrender on three occasions, however, it was only after he told him that he had accomplished his goal and had a story to tell the public, that he capitulated. The "situation" was terminated without injury at approximately 11:34 p.m.

At a subsequent debriefing session, seven problems were marked for immediate attention. First, the irresponsible manner in which the media conducted itself had to be addressed. Two media personnel had in fact, engaged

police officers in altercations while attempting to penetrate the inner perimeter. Second, a more efficient system of disconnecting telephone lines had to be developed. Members of the media had occupied the lines for approximately 20 minutes before the Bell Telephone Company was able to co-ordinate the communications system. Third, there were too many support service personnel (police) who wanted to enter the inner perimeter. This was problematic because the Command Post must be able to identify every individual and his location within the inner perimeter. It was decided that in the future, the inner perimeter should be restricted to containment, assault, observation, command post and negotiation personnel. Fourth, it was felt that a better understanding of the psychological phenomenon known as the "Stockholm Syndrome" was needed. At one point in the siege, two female hostages emerged from the bank escorting an ill hostage and returned to the area under siege because they didn't want to leave the perpetrator. Fifth, some "control force" personnel felt that the system of information dissemination was less than adequate. It was resolved that in the future this would be corrected. Sixth, when the need for the C-130 Hercules aircraft became obvious, the police were unable to locate the three provincial ministers (Premier, Attorney-General and Solicitor-General) and the federal minister (Defence) through whom the request would have to be made. It was suggested that a procedure be established whereby such inaccessibility would not recur. Finally, the crowd control operations at the outer perimeter were carried out with little difficulty, excepting a few ambitious spectators who managed to position themselves directly across the street from the bank. This was understandable, because of

the numerous underground complexes in the area. Particular note was made of the efficient co-ordination of the facility engineering staff. The heat in the area under siege was set at 100° farenheit, causing the perpetrator to become fatigued. It was also noted that many citizens wished to become involved in the "control force" response. An offer by a man to supply guard and attack dogs was particularly significant in the light of "Founded" Case No. 15 ("Reported" Case No. 55).

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of two new elements in the form of 1) the perpetrator being ideologically oriented and, 2) the perpetrator making demands which were unconnected to a fear for personal safety and not acceded to, yet the episode terminating successfully, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the deletion of the word "or" succeeding the phrase "... makes no demands ..." in the first sentence; 2) the addition of the phrase "... or demands which are connected to an ideological orientation even though they are not acceded to, ..." succeeding the phrase "... personal safety and are acceded to ..." in the first sentence and 3) the addition of the phrase "... an ideological orientation or ..." succeeding the phrase "... to a fear for personel safety or ..." in the second sentence. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes

- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or

- (c) demands which are connected to an ideological orientation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety or an ideological orientation, or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating successfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was a "restricted" longarm and he did present a threat to the hostages but he was ideologically oriented, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the second sentence by adding the phrase "... or is ideologically oriented" to the concluding phrase "... does not present an actual threat to the hostage(s)...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) a knife,
- (b) an "unrestricted" longarm,
- (c) a "restricted" handgun, or
- (d) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully. However, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s), or is ideologically oriented.

"Founded" Case No. 11 ("Reported" Case No. 45)

On Tuesday, April 5, 1977 at approximately 9:57 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 32 Division. A 33 year old male with a history of mental illness had seized his eight year old daughter as a hostage. The perpetrator had been threatening other tenants with a handgun on the fourth floor of his apartment building. When one tenant informed him that the police had been notified, he fled to his apartment, taking his daughter as hostage. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the apartment building as the inner perimeter and an approximate one square block area as the outer perimeter. Attempts to contact the perpetrator were unsuccessful because the telephone line was in use. "Assault team" members and the negotiator positioned themselves in the hall outside the entrance to the perpetrator's apartment unit. It was apparent that he was speaking on the telephone with a friend and appeared to be reasonably calm. When the officers notified him of their presence, he became enraged and threatened to kill his daughter if they didn't leave. He had his daughter throw a .357 calibre magnum cartridge out into the hall to prove that he was armed. In addition, he stated

that he had wired his apartment with explosives and would detonate them if they (police) attempted to arrest him. While speaking with the negotiator, his mood and anxiety began to fluctuate. At one point, the commanding officer considered an "assault" procedure but this was dismissed because the proximity of the hostage to the perpetrator could not be established. At approximately 12:15 a.m., Wednesday, April 6, 1977, the perpetrator agreed to surrender if he was presented with a warrant for his arrest which the police had claimed they had. The warrant was slipped under the door. Moments later, the hostage emerged carrying a .357 calibre magnum revolver in one hand and five rounds of ammunition in the other. The situation was terminated at approximately 12:40 a.m., Wednesday, April 6, 1977 without injury as the perpetrator surrendered.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because the perpetrator's demands for police evacuation and legal proof of cause for police intervention were connected to a fear for personal safety, this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis. Therefore, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 12 ("Reported" Case No. 48)

On Wednesday, September 28, 1977, at approximately 4:40 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 13 Division. A 29 year old male with a history of mental illness had taken his wife and seven month old daughter as hostages while armed with two butcher's knives. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the third floor of the apartment building as the inner perimeter and the entire building as the outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and it became evident that the reason for the situation was the perpetrator's state of extreme depression resulting from his poor financial status. He demanded one million dollars and a helicopter in return for the safe release of the hostages. The negotiation endured for approximately two hours. The negotiator told the perpetrator that he was doing irrevocable damage to his daughter and that if he was to accomplish anything by his act, he would have to terminate the threat to his wife and daughter. The perpetrator became convinced that family security was more important than financial security and he released the hostages. However, the perpetrator did

not emerge from the apartment. When his wife informed the commanding officer that her husband had suicidal inclinations, a decision was made to implement an "assault" procedure. Upon entering the apartment, members of the "assault team" found the perpetrator bleeding profusely from 10 self-inflicted wounds. The situation was terminated at approximately 6:50 a.m. and the perpetrator recovered from his wounds.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because the perpetrator's wounds were self-inflicted before the mobilization of an "assault" operation, this episode is considered to have terminated successfully. Therefore, because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 13 ("Reported" Case No. 50)

On Friday, October 7, 1977 at approximately 7:12 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 23 Division. A 37 year old male with no history of mental illness had taken his estranged wife and five children as hostages. He was armed with a knife and, it was determined that he had been holding his family hostage for approximately 15 hours. He and his wife had separated two weeks prior to this incident and she had refused him entry to the home on Thursday, October 6, 1977. Upon arrival, the Task Force discovered that the perpetrator had fled through a rear entrance to the house. He was pursued and confronted by the "assault team". He surrendered without offering resistance. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 7:30 p.m. Because this case involves the termination of the episode prior to "control force" intervention, it will not be considered as a "founded hostage situation".

"Founded" Case No. 14 ("Reported" Case No. 51)

On Saturday, October 8, 1977 at approximately 8:31 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 55 Division. A 35 year old male with a history of mental illness and a criminal record involving violent offences had taken his wife and eight year old daughter as hostages. Two years earlier, this perpetrator was involved in a similar situation but did not take hostages. He had attempted to stab a police officer who had responded to a call for assistance in a domestic quarrel. When he lunged for the police officer, he was shot in the leg by another officer. After being found "not guilty by reason of

insanity"⁴ on an attempt murder charge, the perpetrator served 1 1/2 years at Oak Ridge - Maximum Security Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene, Ontario. Upon release, he returned to the matrimonial home. On Saturday, October 8, 1977 at approximately 8:05 p.m., he telephoned the police and declared that he was going to kill his wife, daughter and the first police officer who responded to the call.

Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with a one square block inner perimeter and a two square block outer perimeter. Attempts to contact the perpetrator were unsuccessful. After approximately 20 minutes, the wife and daughter emerged from the house and informed the "control force" that after the perpetrator telephoned the police, he instructed the hostages to remain in a second floor bedroom and then went down into the basement of the house. Thinking the perpetrator was barricaded in the basement, the negotiator attempted to contact him. After approximately 10 minutes, the commanding officer deployed the "assault team" to the basement of the house and instructed them to search the premises and to shoot only if their lives were in danger. Upon descending the basement stairs two members of the "assault team" were confronted by two boa constrictor snakes (eight feet and 11 feet in length) which the perpetrator kept as pets. Apparently the perpetrator had attempted to ambush the assault team and had fled through a basement window before the police arrived. The situation was terminated without injury at 9:45 p.m. and the perpetrator was arrested two days later after an extensive search operation. Because this case involves the termination of the episode prior to "control force" intervention, it will not be considered as a "founded hostage situation".

"Founded" Case No. 15 ("Reported" Case No. 55)

On Saturday, October 29, 1977 at approximately 3:25 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in a trust company in a plaza in 31 Division. A 23 year old male with a history of mental illness and drug abuse had taken 26 employees and customers of the trust company as hostages. He was armed with a M-1 carbine rifle containing a 20 round magazine and was dressed as a cowboy. In January 1977, while under psychiatric care, the perpetrator formed a security agency which specialized in the training, selling and leasing of guard and attack dogs (Doberman pinschers). During this period of time, he unsuccessfully attempted to register with the armed forces in Canada, the United States, Israel and Finland. It is interesting to note that on Monday, March 21, 1977, he offered the assistance of his expertise and dogs to the Metropolitan Toronto Police as they were responding to a "hostage situation" (see "Founded" Case No. 10 ("Reported" Case No. 44)).).

Approximately 25 minutes prior to his entering the trust company, the perpetrator and a male companion had robbed a pharmacy on Yonge Street just south of Steeles Avenue in the Metropolitan Toronto suburb of North York. The perpetrator was armed with an M-1 carbine rifle and his companion was armed with a sawed-off 12 gauge shotgun. As they entered the pharmacy, a female employee saw the weapons, escaped unnoticed and notified the police. After the thieves were given \$100.00, they chose different escape routes; the perpetrator left through the front door and successfully reached a stolen getaway car while his companion fled through a rear exit into the arms of police officers who had responded to the employee's alarm. The perpetrator waited

approximately two minutes and then fled from the scene (approximately 3:11 p.m.).

As he proceeded southbound on Yonge Street in the stolen vehicle, he remembered the death pact which he had made with his companion. He would later explain to a psychiatrist that he and his companion had agreed that if either were apprehended, the other would free him and they would have a shoot-out with the police. He turned into a plaza three blocks south of the intersection at Yonge Street and Finch Avenue (approximately one mile south of the pharmacy) and parked the car in front of the trust company on the east side of the plaza. At approximately 3:15 p.m., he entered the trust company, fired one shot into the ceiling and declared "Everybody up against the wall. Yah, that's right, it's a hold-up with a difference". The perpetrator showed very little concern over the three people who escaped through the front door. Rather, he focused his attention on the 26 people whom he had lined up against the wall and who would remain hostages for periods of between 10 hours and 35 minutes and 13 hours. He told the hostages that he wanted his companion brought to the trust company. He reinforced his mission as one of desperation rather than avarice by placing approximately \$50,000.00 on the floor and igniting it.

Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the inner perimeter being bounded by an imaginary east-west line drawn perpendicular to the east entrance to the plaza on the north, the structure containing the trust company on the east, the southern plaza structure to a point parallel with the east wall of the supermarket on the south and the east wall of the supermarket

on the west (see Diagram "F"). The outer perimeter was bounded by Byng Avenue on the north, Kenneth Avenue on the east, Church Avenue on the south and Yonge Street on the west (see Diagram "E"). The command post and negotiation centre were established in a furniture store next door to the trust company. There were six ground level observation points; all but one were within the inner perimeter. There were four aerial observation points, of which two were within the inner perimeter. The primary observation point was on the south-east corner of the supermarket roof and this location also served as the sniper location. Mobilization points were established near the south entrance off Church Avenue, the east entrance off Kenneth Avenue and the north-east corner of the supermarket. Rear exits and roof entrances in the complex containing the trust company made access and mobilization relatively simple; however, a fire department ladder was needed to position the snipers in the primary observation point. The length of time required to resolve the structural difficulties in the plaza (large parking lot, 52 other business establishments, Saturday afternoon shopping crowd and the uniform height of all surrounding buildings) resulted in a delay in contacting the perpetrator. Consequently, some members of the media took the liberty of speaking with the perpetrator by telephone. Their accusations of police lethargy exacerbated the perpetrator's violent disposition. In a fit of rage, he declared that he had killed a female hostage and others would die soon. The media interference prevented the negotiator from contacting the perpetrator once the decision was made to commence negotiation. By 4:45 p.m., the Bell Telephone Company had disconnected all lines in the trust company with the exception of the

DIAGRAM "F"

"Founded" Case # 15

("Reported" Case #55)



Saturday October 29,

1977.

- AS - Area Under Siege
- MP - Mobilization Points
- AO - Aerial Observation Points
- PO - Primary Observation Point
- SL - Sniper Location
- GLO - Ground Level Observation Points
- TH - Temporary Headquarters
- NC - Negotiation Centre

Outer Perimeter

Inner Perimeter



negotiator's line. As the drama continued into the night, the structural situation which had the negotiation centre and command post in the same room proved almost disastrous as the perpetrator was able to overhear the discussions involving police personnel and his own psychiatrist.

Orders for strict firearms discipline were issued. In order to discover whether or not a hostage had been wounded, members of the "assault team" attempted to get close to the front of the trust company. The difficulty which they experienced in concealing themselves became evident during the first hour of the siege when the perpetrator threatened to kill a hostage for each police officer he saw moving around in front of the trust company. After negotiations commenced, the perpetrator made his first demand - bring his companion to the trust company. Upon the psychiatrist's warning of the perpetrator's suicidal inclinations and their own desire to avoid a prolonged situation similar to the Stockholm Kreditbank in 1973,⁵ the police refused to acquiesce to this demand. However, they agreed to bring the companion to the command post where he could speak with the perpetrator by telephone. In order to ascertain the number and condition of the hostages as well as the general position which the perpetrator had adopted inside the trust company, the police agreed to bring food and refreshments to the front door and leave them for a hostage to retrieve. They discovered three important facts: 1) approximately 20 hostages were observed; 2) nobody appeared to be injured and 3) there appeared to be little if any shifting of furniture or barricading within the trust company.

The perpetrator's anxious mood seemed to be placated by the delivery of the food and refreshments, however, within 45 minutes his anger began to re-appear. He stated that "I know I'm not going anywhere". This was a point of much concern. It was at this point that one of the psychiatrists suggested that the Chief of Police speak with the perpetrator because he tended to respect figures of authority. At approximately 10:00 p.m., the Chief personally delivered more food to the front of the trust company enabling him to observe the situation in the area under siege. Less than five minutes later, the perpetrator fired three shots through the front window of the trust company. The psychiatrists interpreted this as an attempt to scare the Chief into thinking he had a close encounter with death.

As the episode endured, the situation seemed to become less threatening. With the exception of an irate hostage excoriating the Chief of Police for his reluctance to permit the perpetrator to speak with his companion, there was no fluctuation in the perpetrator's anxiety. It soon became apparent to the negotiator that the perpetrator wanted to be released from the death pact by his companion. However, it was felt unwise to permit them to speak at the time. Rather the negotiator and commanding officer decided to make the conversation with the companion conditional upon the perpetrator meeting a series of contingencies. This resulted in the release of all hostages in five stages. First, at approximately 1:50 a.m., an older female hostage was released after the negotiator convinced the perpetrator that she was a liability. Second, at approximately 2:15 a.m., fourteen hostages were released in return for the "opportunity to speak with your friend". However, after these hostages came out, the negotiator told the perpetrator he would be permitted to speak

with the companion when all of the hostages were safe. In apparent anger over police reluctance, the perpetrator fired seven shots from within the trust company. Third, an ill male hostage was released after the negotiator convinced the perpetrator that he was a liability. Fourth, during a ten minute interval (4:00 - 4:10 a.m.) four hostages were released after the police acquiesced to the perpetrator's demand for a newspaper photographer to enter the trust company and take numerous pictures of the perpetrator and his hostages. Finally, at approximately 4:20 a.m. the remaining hostages were released when the police acquiesced to the perpetrator's demands for another photography session and a bottle of whiskey. The only contingency which the police placed on providing the whiskey was that they receive the perpetrator's firearm first. The perpetrator gave his rifle to the last hostage who left the trust company. At approximately 4:27 a.m. the situation was terminated without injury as the perpetrator emerged from the trust company and was permitted to speak with his companion while in custody.

At a subsequent debriefing session, five problems were marked for immediate attention. Firstly, it was suggested that in order to avoid confusion, the negotiation centre should be located in a room which is isolated from all other "control force" functions. Secondly, in order to avoid antagonizing the perpetrator and jeopardizing the hostages' lives, it was resolved that a detailed plan for positioning "control force" members within the inner perimeter should be established upon arrival and there should be very little movement of officers after they have positioned themselves. Thirdly, it was resolved that the officers involved in the observation, "assault", security and sniper operations

would receive more diversified training regarding the practical problems which unique structural settings might present. Fourthly, it was suggested that all "control force" members be made aware of the manifestations and ramifications of the "Stockholm Syndrome", which many of the hostages suffered from in this case. Finally, the importance of media behaviour was strongly reinforced. It was suggested that they be made aware of the dangerous nature of their negligence regarding contacting the perpetrator.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the perpetrator's diverse demands (i.e. from a concern for personal safety to facilitation of a suicide pact), this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the deletion of the word "only" preceding the phrase "... demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety ..." in the first sentence and, 2) the qualification of the second sentence by adding the words "all of" preceding the phrase "... the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes

- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or
- (c) demands which are connected to an ideological orientation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator was face to face. However, should all of the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety or an ideological orientation, or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating successfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a "restricted longarm" and he does present a threat to the hostages, is not ideologically oriented but is emotionally motivated by the suicide pact, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the second sentence by adding the phrase "... or emotionally motivated" to the concluding phrase "... or, is ideologically oriented ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) a knife,
- (b) an "unrestricted" longarm,
- (c) a "restricted" handgun, or
- (d) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully. However, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or, is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated.

"Founded" Case No. 16 ("Reported" Case No. 58)

On Sunday, November 13, 1977 at approximately 9:52 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 55 Division. A 30 year old male with no history of mental illness had taken his two daughters (aged 3 and 5) as hostages. He was armed with an M-1 carbine rifle and wished to prevent his estranged wife from gaining legal custody of the children. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with a one square block inner perimeter and a three square block outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and the perpetrator demanded that his wife authorize him as the legal custodian of the children. After approximately 40 minutes of negotiations, the negotiator convinced the perpetrator that his actions were harming the children and his chances of having the law grant him custody of them. The relationship between the perpetrator and negotiator grew stronger and at approximately 11:00 p.m. the perpetrator acquiesced to the negotiator's request that he release the hostages. Within minutes, the perpetrator emerged from the house unarmed and surrendered. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 11:05 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating successfully where an emotionally motivated

perpetrator made no demands which were connected to a fear for personal safety, was not ideologically oriented and did present a threat to the hostage(s), this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the qualification of the phrase "... an ideological orientation ..." in the first sentence so that it will read "... either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation ..." and 2) the deletion of the word "or" preceding the phrase "... an ideological orientation ..." in the second sentence and, 3) the addition of the phrase "... emotional motivation or, ..." succeeding the phrase "... a fear for personal safety or ..." in the second sentence. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes

- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or
- (c) demands which are connected to either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, ideological orientation or emotional motivation, or should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this perpetrator was emotionally motivated by his wife's efforts to gain legal custody of their children, this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis and thus, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 17 ("Reported" Case No. 60).

On Monday, December 19, 1977 at approximately 6:00 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 21 Division. An intoxicated 38 year old male with no history of mental illness had taken the 14 year old son of a neighbour as a hostage. He was armed with a .22 calibre high standard, semi-automatic rifle. He had been showing the hostage his collection of guns (he belonged to a gun club) and, after a short time, the hostage announced he was bored and decided to leave. The perpetrator was insulted and ordered him to sit down and listen to more stories. Although the boy resisted, he was forced to remain in the second floor apartment. The perpetrator's wife who had been present throughout, became afraid, fled the apartment and notified the police. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with a one square block inner perimeter and a three square block outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and, upon realizing that the reason for the "hostage situation" was the perpetrator's being insulted by the hostage, the negotiator told the perpetrator that he too was a gun collector and could understand his feelings. They talked about guns for approximately 20 minutes and the perpetrator

became extremely calm. When the negotiator suggested that he release the hostage and surrender, the perpetrator agreed on the condition that they could continue their discussion on guns. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 7:10 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this perpetrator was emotionally motivated by the hostage's disinterest in his gun collection this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, and thus, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 18 ("Reported" Case No. 61)

On Saturday, January 7, 1978 at approximately 10:55 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 41 Division. An intoxicated 45 year old

male with no history of mental illness had taken his wife as a hostage in the bedroom of their one bedroom apartment. He was armed with a .22 calibre Cooley rifle and had been trying to force her to confess to being unfaithful to him. Neighbours had heard the noise and notified the police. From the apartment window, the perpetrator saw the police responding. He fled to an unoccupied adjacent apartment with his wife as hostage and forced his way into it. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the apartment building as the inner perimeter and a two square block area as the outer perimeter. When no answer was received from within the perpetrator's apartment unit, the "assault team" entered and found it unoccupied. A member of the "control force" had taken note of evidence of forced entry in the adjacent unit and upon calling into it, realized that the perpetrator and hostage were in there. Negotiations commenced and the perpetrator made no demands. After approximately 20 minutes the negotiator convinced him that he should capitulate. He released the hostage and surrendered without injury at approximately 12:20 a.m., Sunday, January 8, 1978.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 19 ("Reported" Case No. 62)

On Thursday, January 19, 1978 at approximately 11:05 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 52 Division. A 19 year old male with no history of mental illness had taken a restaurant waitress as a hostage. Armed with a butcher's knife, he had attempted to rob a restaurant but a police unit had responded before he could escape. He claimed a waitress as hostage and threatened to kill her with the same butcher's knife that he had used during the aborted robbery. Upon arrival, the Task Force established containment with the restaurant and a 10 foot zone outside of the premises as the inner perimeter and a one square block area as the outer perimeter. Attempts to contact the perpetrator were unsuccessful. Information obtained from a patron of the restaurant who had escaped indicated that the perpetrator and hostage were alone at the rear of the building. ~~The decision was~~ made for the negotiator to enter accompanied by a four-man "assault team". They encountered the perpetrator at the rear of the restaurant with the hostage on his lap and a knife

against her throat. The perpetrator was extremely agitated, repeating that "I'll kill her if you come any closer ". It should be noted that two members of the "assault team" had opportunities to fire a clear shot at the perpetrator, however, a decision had been made by the commanding officer to exercise strict firearms discipline.

Upon commencement of the negotiation, the perpetrator's anxiety began to abate. The negotiator dwelt on the innocence of the hostage and the dangerous nature of the situation in which the perpetrator had found himself. The perpetrator was so frightened by the situation that he was unable to communicate either demands or requests to the police. The negotiator told him that he would assist by relieving all of this pressure when he released the hostage. After assuring the perpetrator that he would not be harmed, the negotiator was able to gain the hostage's freedom. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 11:50 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 20 ("Reported" Case No. 63)

On Wednesday, February 8, 1978 at approximately 1:34 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 41 Division. A 31 year old male with a history of alcoholism but no history of mental illness seized his mother and sister as hostages while armed with a .38 calibre handgun. Earlier, on the evening of February 7, 1978, while intoxicated, the perpetrator had gone to the home of his in-laws in order to obtain his three year old son from the legal custody of his estranged wife. Due to the perpetrator's chronic alcoholism, his visitation rights had been restricted. Upon being refused entrance to his in-laws dwelling, he threw a number of rocks at the windows causing damage. His father-in-law threatened him with a rifle, so the perpetrator fled. He felt that if he seized hostages, the police would acquiesce to his demand to gain custody of his son. He went to his mother's house and effected his plan.

Upon arrival at the house under siege, the Task Force established containment with a one square block inner perimeter and a three square block outer perimeter (reduced to two square blocks at sunrise). At approximately 2:15 a.m. the negotiator established contact with the perpetrator. The perpetrator seemed extremely agitated during the initial stages of negotiations. He swore at the negotiator and blamed him for preventing his son from being brought to him. Sensing the deep affection which the perpetrator

had for his son, the negotiator began to focus on this relationship. Discussions involving the son had a placating effect on the perpetrator's disposition. At approximately 7:00 a.m., as the sun began to rise, the negotiator told the perpetrator that in less than one hour the street would be crowded with children who were on their way to school. Further, he stated that he did not want to risk the occurrence of an accidental shooting involving these children. Citing the affection which the perpetrator had for his own son, the negotiator requested that for the sake of the safety of other children, he should put an end to the siege. At this point, the perpetrator threw his firearm out the front door and surrendered to the negotiator. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 7:25 a.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves ~~no elements which are~~ both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 21 ("Reported" Case No. 68)

On Thursday, May 11, 1978 at approximately 8:43 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 12 Division. A 40 year old male with no history of mental illness had seized his wife as a hostage. Neighbours had heard some screaming from the house under siege and had notified the police. Apparently, the hostage (wife) had decided to leave the matrimonial home and the perpetrator (husband) was attempting to prevent her from doing this. Shortly before the police arrived, the perpetrator slashed the hostage's throat with a 10 inch bread knife and fled from the scene.

Upon arrival, containment was established with a one square block inner perimeter and a two square block outer perimeter. After three unsuccessful attempts to commence negotiations, the "assault team" entered the premises and found the hostage unconscious and bleeding profusely from the throat. A search of the area was conducted and at approximately 11:05 p.m. that night the perpetrator was apprehended. From a tactical perspective, the situation was terminated upon the discovery of the wounded hostage, however, from a procedural perspective it was not terminated until 11:05 p.m., when the perpetrator was arrested. The hostage recovered from her injuries. Because this case involves the termination of the episode prior to "control force" intervention, it will not be considered as a "founded hostage situation".

"Founded" Case No. 22 ("Reported" Case No. 69)

On Thursday, July 27, 1978 at approximately 5:07 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 52 Division. A 28 year old male armed with a starter's pistol had been confronted by a responding patrol unit during a hold up attempt. In a state of panic, the perpetrator seized a female clerk as a hostage. Although he seemed extremely agitated, the perpetrator had no history of mental illness. Upon arrival, containment was established with a one square block inner perimeter and an unbalanced two square block outer perimeter (due to the geography and time of day, the unbalanced outer perimeter was necessary in order to avoid wreaking havoc with automobile traffic). Before verbal contact was made with the perpetrator, members of the "assault team" had noted that the hostage was standing near a rear exit while the perpetrator was approximately 15 feet away and paying little attention to her. The commanding officer gave permission for an "assault" procedure to be carried out. Four armed members of the "assault team" confronted the perpetrator while yelling to the hostage to flee through the rear exit. In less than five seconds, the perpetrator was alone in the store facing four armed members of the "assault team". Upon being instructed to drop his weapon, he complied immediately. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 5:35 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the perpetrator not interacting with a "control force" negotiator yet, not

refusing to interact with a "control force" negotiator in an episode which was terminated successfully by the implementation of an "assault" operation, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the phrase "... should he refuse to interact with a "control force" negotiator, ..." in the second sentence so that it will read "... should he not interact with a "control force" negotiator, ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes

- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or
- (c) demands which are connected to either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, and ideological orientation or emotional motivation, should he not interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating successfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was an "unrestricted" handgun (s. 82(2)(d) Criminal Code)⁶, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the qualification of the first sentence by adding the words "... or handgun, ..." to the phrase "... is a knife, "unrestricted longarm ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) a knife,
- (b) an "unrestricted" longarm or handgun,
- (c) a "restricted" handgun, or
- (d) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully. However, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or, is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated.

"Founded" Case No. 23 ("Reported" Case No. 71)

On Tuesday, August 22, 1978 at approximately 10:30 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 11 Division. A 16 year old male escapee from a juvenile detention centre had seized a 15 year old female as a hostage in a two-story townhouse. The perpetrator had a history of violent crimes and was

armed with a hunting knife. At approximately 9:15 a.m. that morning the perpetrator was choosing a house to burglarize. He knocked on the door of the townhouse which was owned by the hostage's father. Through a glass panel in the front door the perpetrator could see the hostage descending a set of stairs while dressed in a nightgown. As she answered the door, the perpetrator asked her if she could supply him with some directions to an address which was fictitious. She was unable to assist him. The perpetrator then asked if there was someone in the house who might be capable of assisting him. The hostage responded by stating that she was alone in the house. The perpetrator thanked her and proceeded to a nearby hardware store where he purchased a hunting knife. He returned to the townhouse and gained illegal entry through a window. He attacked, bound and gagged the hostage. A neighbour had observed the perpetrator entering the house and had notified the police. Upon responding, the patrol unit found the perpetrator and hostage (still bound and gagged) in a second floor bedroom. It was quite obvious that a form of sexual assault had commenced. When confronted by police, the perpetrator placed the hostage across his lap and located himself in a chair in the corner of the bedroom (see Diagram "G").

Upon arrival, containment was established with the house as the inner perimeter and a one square block outer perimeter. A senior officer arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and assumed command. He issued orders for strict firearms discipline and at approximately 11:00 a.m. he contacted the perpetrator. At approximately ~~11:15~~⁶ a.m., the perpetrator gave this officer permission to come to the top of the stairway and commence negotiations.

"Founded" Case # 23

DIAGRAM "G"

("Reported" Case #71)

Tuesday August 22,

1978.

-  - Hostage's Initial Location
-  - Hostage's Second Location
-  - Perpetrator's Initial Location
-  - Perpetrator's Second Location
-  - Perpetrator's Location When Shot
-  - Negotiator
-  - Secondary Negotiator
-  - Aerial Observation Points
-  - Sniper Locations
-  - Telephone
-  - Bottle of Tequila

..... Trajectory of Shots Fired by Negotiator


----- Inner Perimeter

N

W

E

S



Upon scrutinizing the area under siege, the officer became aware of the infeasible nature of an "assault" operation. The perpetrator and hostage were approximately 22 feet from the top of the stairwell and out of view of both the windows and sliding glass doors in the bedroom. The tip of the hunting knife was placed against the hostage's throat, and the perpetrator had declared that the hostage was his "... ticket out of here". He appeared extremely agitated and admitted having consumed an appreciable quantity of mandrax that morning. His first demand was for a package of cigarettes. The negotiator (commanding officer) gave him an opened package containing nine cigarettes, in return he asked that the gag be removed from the hostage's mouth. The perpetrator complied. His second demand was for a firearm. The negotiator was able to dissuade him from persisting with this demand by convincing him that the situation was serious enough without a firearm being involved. The perpetrator's third demand was for a bottle of tequila which had been left on a nearby dresser. When the negotiator refused to acquiesce without the hostage's release, the perpetrator became enraged and suddenly made a slashing motion near the hostage's head. The fourth demand was for another package of cigarettes. The negotiator supplied an unopened package in return for the perpetrator's acquiescence to a request that the hostage be made more comfortable. The fifth demand proved to be the most important. The perpetrator demanded \$500,000.00, an airplane which would fly him to Scotland (his father lived there) and an unmarked police car for transportation to the airport. He imposed a 2:00 p.m. deadline and stated that upon boarding the airplane, the hostage would be released. Following this demand, the

perpetrator's anxiety fluctuated appreciably. He became furious with what he perceived to be police lethargy, however, his disposition was placated by explanations. The sixth demand which the perpetrator made was for a quantity of beer. The negotiator supplied some sandwiches and soft drinks with no contingencies attached.

At approximately 2:15 p.m., a social worker who had established a good relationship with the perpetrator was permitted to enter the area under siege and speak with him. It was felt that his guidance might facilitate a peaceful conclusion to the episode however, he assumed an authoritarian attitude similar to that which he had employed at the detention centre where the perpetrator was a ward (this was contrary to the instructions he had been given by police). His involvement exacerbated rather than ameliorated the situation. It became apparent to the negotiator and the secondary negotiator that the perpetrator was becoming increasingly unpredictable. As he became incensed by the social worker, the perpetrator suddenly plunged his hunting knife into a kleenex box beside the hostage's head, missing her by less than three inches. As the episode progressed, the perpetrator telephoned an airline official (who was arranging for the flight to Scotland) five times to inquire about the delay. The fluctuation in the perpetrator's mood seemed to become more profound with each telephone conversation. The negotiator decided that if given an opportunity to terminate the situation without injuring the hostage he would have to seize it because the threat to her life was now dramatically manifest. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., the perpetrator reached for the telephone once again. In doing so, he exposed the upper, left quadrant of his body while removing the hostage as

his human shield. The negotiator fired two shots, the first went approximately 10 inches over the perpetrator's left shoulder embedding itself in an interior wall and, the second hit the perpetrator in the upper left chest area. The situation was terminated at approximately 5:10 p.m. with the perpetrator dying as the result of the "control force assault" operation.

It should be noted that various negotiation techniques were employed throughout this episode. For example, the negotiator detected a decrease in the perpetrator's anxiety while he was boasting about his physical capabilities. Consequently, the negotiator encouraged such discussions. It is the opinion of the negotiator that the perpetrator's "drugged" state and youth (he couldn't conceive of capitulating and being imprisoned) prevented him from reasoning in a rational manner. During the course of the episode, the negotiator had countless opportunities to shoot the perpetrator, and the "assault team" which was positioned in an aerial location had two opportunities; however, at these times such a reaction was not seen to be necessary.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of new elements in the form of the perpetrator attempting to injure a hostage and the situation terminating unsuccessfully even though the perpetrator interacted with a "control force" negotiator and made demands which could be construed as being connected to a fear for personal safety, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the qualification of the first sentence by adding

the phrase "... unless the perpetrator attempts to injure a hostage" to the concluding phrase "... regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face"; 2) the deletion of the word "or" succeeding the phrase "... ideological orientation or emotional motivation ..." in the second sentence and, 3) the qualification of the second sentence by adding the phrase "... attempt to injure a hostage or, ..." succeeding the phrase "... ideological orientation or emotional motivation, should he ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes

- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or
- (c) demands which are connected to either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, an ideological orientation or emotional motivation, or should he not interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating unsuccessfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a knife and he has a history of criminal violence, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the deletion of the words "... a knife ..." from the first sentence and, 2) the addition of the sentence "When the weapon is a knife, the episode will terminate successfully, unless the perpetrator has a history of criminal violence" subsequent to the first sentence. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is
(a) an "unrestricted" longarm or handgun,
(b) a "restricted" handgun, or
(c) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully. When the weapon is a knife, the episode will terminate successfully, unless the perpetrator has a history of criminal violence. However, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or, is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated.

"Founded" Case No. 24 ("Reported" Case No. 74)

On Thursday, November 1, 1978 at approximately 7:33 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 53 Division. A 38 year old male

with no history of mental illness had seized his three children as hostages. He was armed with a rifle and had barricaded himself and the hostages in his one bedroom apartment. He and his wife were separated and this act was precipitated by the attendance of Sheriff's Officers who had produced custodial warrants for the three children. The perpetrator refused them entrance and seized the three children as hostages.

Upon arrival, containment was established with the apartment building as the inner perimeter and a one square block area as the outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and it soon became evident that the perpetrator seemed to be a victim and could not understand such intense law enforcement involvement in what he considered to be a family matter. After approximately two hours of negotiation with the negotiator emphasizing the hostages' safety, the perpetrator agreed to surrender if he could receive a receipt for the rifle and was provided with legal counsel. The commanding officer authorized acquiescence to these demands. At approximately 9:55 p.m., a six year old female emerged from the apartment carrying a .22 calibre rifle and some cartridges. Shortly thereafter, the other two hostages emerged from the apartment. The situation was terminated at approximately 10:12 p.m. without injury, when the perpetrator surrendered to his legal counsel.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this perpetrator was emotionally motivated by the prospects of losing custody of his children, this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, and thus this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 25 ("Reported" Case No. 77)

On Wednesday, January 31, 1979 at approximately 4:40 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 55 Division. A 35 year old male with a history of mental illness had taken his three year old daughter as a hostage. He was armed with a rifle and had taken the girl from the custody of his estranged wife on the preceding evening. The police had gone to his house acting upon a search request for a lost child. The perpetrator told the investigators that he was armed and had a hostage.

Upon arrival, containment was established with a one square block inner perimeter and a three square block outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced.

with the negotiator telling the perpetrator that he could show his love for his daughter by removing her from this dangerous situation. The perpetrator broke down emotionally, released his hostage and surrendered. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 5:25 a.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this perpetrator was emotionally motivated by his desire to gain custody of his child, this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, and thus this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 26 ("Reported" Case No. 83)

On Tuesday, May 22, 1979 at approximately 4:42 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 12 Division. A 22 year old male psychiatric patient had escaped from hospital and taken a 19 and a 21 year old female as hostages. He was armed with a butcher's knife and the area under siege was the 16th floor apartment of the perpetrator's brother. The perpetrator told the patrol unit that he would throw the hostage off the balcony if the police did not leave.

Upon arrival, containment was established with the 16th floor as the inner perimeter and the apartment building as the outer perimeter however, before containment was established, the perpetrator's brother entered the apartment and rescued the two hostages. The negotiator made verbal contact with the perpetrator who appeared to be in a state of hysteria. After calming him with assurances of safety, the "assault team" entered the apartment, confronted the perpetrator and disarmed him. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 5:12 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 27 ("Reported" Case No. 84)

On Monday, June 4, 1979 at approximately 6:30 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 43 Division. A 36 year old male with a history of mental illness had taken a 27 year old female nurse as a hostage in a hospital. He was extremely depressed because his father had just died of cancer in that hospital. He was armed with a hunting knife and was in a state of rage when the divisional personnel arrived.

Upon arrival of the Task Force, containment was established with the hospital room as the inner perimeter and the fourth floor of the hospital as the outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced, however, it seemed apparent that the perpetrator was less than coherent. After stating that the nurse had killed his father, the perpetrator stabbed her in the right shoulder. He was raising the knife in a repetitive motion when a member of the "assault team" fired one shot, hitting him in the right shoulder. The situation was terminated at 7:37 p.m., with both the hostage and perpetrator recovering from their wounds.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves the addition of new elements in the form of the perpetrator injuring a hostage and the episode terminating unsuccessfully even though the perpetrator interacted with a "control force" negotiator and made no demands, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the qualification of the first sentence by adding the words "... injures or ..." succeeding the phrase "... unless the perpetrator ..." and, 2) the qualification of the second sentence by adding the words "... injure or ..." preceding the phrase "... attempt to injure a hostage ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes

- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or
- (c) demands which are connected to either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face. However, should the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, ideological orientation or emotional motivation, or should he not interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating unsuccessfully when the perpetrator injured a hostage

even though the hostage was the actual source of the perpetrator's grievance and the "control force" had not implemented an "assault" operation, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following change will be necessary: the alteration of the entire hypothesis so that it will read "whether or not one or more of the hostages is the source of the perpetrator's grievance, the implementation or non-intervention of an "assault" operation can terminate the episode either successfully or unsuccessfully". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 2 will now read as follows:

Whether or not one or more of the hostages is the source of the perpetrator's grievance, the implementation or non-intervention of an "assault" operation can terminate the episode either successfully or unsuccessfully.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating unsuccessfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a knife and he injured the hostage, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: the addition of the phrase "... or injures a hostage" to the concluding phrase in the second sentence "... unless the perpetrator has a history of criminal violence ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) an "unrestricted" longarm or handgun,
- (b) a "restricted" handgun, or
- (c) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully. When the weapon is a knife, the episode will terminate successfully, unless the perpetrator has a history of criminal violence or injures a hostage. However, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated.

"Founded" Case No. 28 ("Reported" Case No. 85)

On Saturday, August 4, 1979 at approximately 4:00 a.m., the Task Force Responded to a "hostage situation" in 55 Division. A 24 year old male with a history of mental illness, alcoholism and narcotic abuse had taken his two year old daughter as a hostage. He was armed with a 12 inch butcher's knife and was attempting to prevent the hostage's mother (his estranged common-law wife) from assuming the custody to which she was legally entitled. The perpetrator was intoxicated and had consumed two tablets of valium that night.

Upon arrival, containment was established with the house under siege as the inner perimeter and a one square block area as the outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and it appeared that the perpetrator was determined to obtain legal custody of his daughter. Throughout the negotiations, the perpetrator seemed to offer less and less resistance to the negotiator's suggestion that the hostage be released. At approximately 6:40 a.m., the perpetrator fell asleep while the negotiator was talking. A member of the "assault team" in an aerial observation point spotted the perpetrator placing the

telephone receiver down and resting it on the floor. A decision had to be made regarding the viability of confrontation at this time. The commanding officer decided that the negotiator's relationship with the perpetrator was sufficiently strong to risk continuing negotiations. In addition, the safety of the hostage would not have been assured during an "assault" operation. The negotiator yelled to the perpetrator, who was awakened and suggested that he surrender. The perpetrator emerged with the hostage shortly thereafter. The situation was terminated without injury at 7:25 a.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 29 ("Reported" Case No. 86)

On Friday, August 10, 1979 at approximately 7:40 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 41 Division. A 38 year old male with a history of mental illness had taken his wife and two daughters as hostages. He was armed with a 12 gauge, pump-action shotgun, an M-1 carbine rifle and two Crossman pellet rifles. He was intoxicated at the time and in a state of severe depression regarding his financial status.

Upon arrival, containment was established with a one square block inner perimeter and a three square block outer perimeter. When first contacted, the perpetrator refused to speak with the police. However, after an approximate 20 minute period, negotiations did commence. It became quite evident that the perpetrator was suffering from a feeling of inadequacy as a husband, father and provider. He made no demands. The negotiator told him that if he would release the hostages, the negotiator would assure the perpetrator of psychiatric assistance. The perpetrator agreed, and his wife and daughters were released; however, they informed the police that the perpetrator had told them that he would not surrender. Shortly thereafter, the M-1 carbine rifle was thrown through an upper story window. When the negotiator asked him if this was indicative of his intention to surrender, the perpetrator answered in the affirmative, however, he was unwilling to throw the other weapons out the window. He promised the negotiator that he would surrender, but he asked that the police come up and get him because he was too distraught to move. This request was viewed with much pessimism and suspicion. The feeling among

"control force" personnel was that the perpetrator wished to commit suicide by confronting the "assault team" while armed thus forcing them to shoot. The commanding officer ordered the "assault team" to proceed with an "assault operation" while exercising extreme caution. Four members of the "team" entered the room in which the perpetrator was barricaded and found him holding a 12 gauge, pump-action shotgun. He was ordered to drop the gun but refused. He was again ordered to drop the gun and complied. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 8:55 p.m. It is interesting to note that the Task Force received a letter from the perpetrator two weeks later in which he thanked them for reacting to this siege in such a peaceful manner and for not shooting him.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this perpetrator was emotionally motivated by his feeling of inadequacy as a father, husband and provider, this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, and thus this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 30 ("Reported" Case No. 90)

On Friday, October 24, 1979 at approximately 9:20 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 14 Division. A 26 year old male had taken his friend's common-law wife as a hostage. He was armed with what appeared to be a .38 calibre handgun (in fact, it was a plastic replica). He had been drinking quite heavily with the hostage and the hostage's common-law husband throughout the evening and an argument had developed regarding the perpetrator's sex appeal. He produced the plastic gun and seized the hostage while the other individual fled in order to inform the police.

Upon arrival, containment was established with a one square block inner and a two square block outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and it became immediately evident that the perpetrator viewed the entire episode as a joke. The negotiator assured him that it was no joke and it would be best if he released the hostage and surrendered. The perpetrator complied with these requests. The situation was terminated without injury at 9:50 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 31 ("Reported" Case No. 91)

On Thursday, November 22, 1979 at approximately 6:15 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 11 Division. A 22 year old male with a history of mental illness had taken his girlfriend and another woman as hostages at the home of his girlfriend's parents. He was armed with a hatchet and was intoxicated at the time. Upon hearing excessive noise from the house, neighbours had notified the police.

Upon arrival, containment was established with an unbalanced 1/2 square block inner perimeter and a one square block outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced by telephone and the perpetrator was extremely agitated. As he

was speaking on the telephone, the perpetrator was chopping furniture and electrical appliances in the house. There was very little fluctuation in his mood. He seemed to be affected by some form of narcotic, yet he never admitted to this. All attempts by the negotiator to have the perpetrator ventilate his frustrations met with marginal success; however, a relationship did develop between the two. After approximately 7 1/2 hours of negotiations during which neither demands were made nor services rendered, the perpetrator agreed to leave the hostages inside the house and negotiate face-to-face with the negotiator. He emerged from the house brandishing a short handled hatchet and began to walk toward the negotiator when he spotted members of the "assault team" crouched behind a wall. He lunged in the direction of one of these officers with his hatchet raised above his shoulder. Another "assault team" member released a muzzle blast of chloroacetophenone gas (CN gas) in the perpetrator's direction. The situation was terminated when the perpetrator was immobilized at approximately 1:40 a.m., Friday, November 23, 1979. The perpetrator was treated for exposure to the gas and recovered.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because the perpetrator required treatment for exposure to CN gas, this episode is considered to have been terminated unsuccessfully. Because this case involves the addition of new elements in the form of the perpetrator attempting to injure a "control force" member and the episode terminating unsuccessfully even though the perpetrator interacted with a "control force" negotiator, made

no demands and did not injure or attempt to injure a hostage, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the qualification of the first sentence by adding the phrase "... or "control force" member" to the concluding phrase "... unless the perpetrator injures or attempts to injure a hostage" and, 2) the qualification of the second sentence by adding the phrase "... or "control force" member ..." succeeding the phrase "... should he injure or attempt to injure a hostage ...". Therefore, Hypothesis No. 1 will now read as follows:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes

- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or
- (c) demands which are connected to either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face, unless the perpetrator injures or attempts to injure a hostage or "control force" member. However, should all the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, an ideological orientation or emotional motivation, should he injure or attempt to injure a hostage or "control force" member or not interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves the addition of a new element in the form of the episode terminating unsuccessfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was a hatchet, this hypothesis must be reworded. The following changes will be necessary: 1) the addition of the words "... if the weapon is a hatchet, successful termination is not possible" subsequent to the word "However, ..." in the third sentence and, 2) the addition of the word "Further, ..." preceding the words "... if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, ..." in what will now become the fourth sentence. Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 will now read as follows:

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is

- (a) an "unrestricted" longarm or handgun,
 - (b) a "restricted" handgun, or
 - (c) some agent outside of his control,
- the episode will terminate successfully. When the weapon is a knife, the episode will terminate successfully, unless the perpetrator has a history of criminal violence or injures a hostage. However, if the weapon is a hatchet, successful termination is not possible. Further, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or, is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated.

"Founded" Case No. 32 ("Reported" Case No. 92)

On Sunday, December 2, 1979 at approximately 6:25 p.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 11 Division. A 26 year old male with a history of mental illness had taken his mother and two elderly male boarders in his mother's rooming house as hostages. He was armed with a bread carving knife (10-12 inch blade) and appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and/or narcotics.

Upon arrival, containment was established with the inner perimeter being the house and an approximate 10 foot safety zone around it with a one square block area as the outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and it seemed apparent that the perpetrator was enraged by something but wasn't able to verbalize it. Consequently, he remained at a level of high anxiety for approximately one hour. His mother escaped from the house and informed the police that the two other hostages were in a second floor room. Members of the control force placed a ladder against the window of this room and rescued the hostages while the perpetrator was on the telephone with the negotiator. One of the hostages had a large firearm collection, therefore two "assault team" members remained in the room to prevent the perpetrator from gaining access to them. A decision was made not to inform the perpetrator that the hostages had been rescued because it was feared that he would become hysterical. The perpetrator's psychiatrist was brought in as a secondary negotiator, but he exacerbated the situation appreciably. He told the perpetrator not to trust the police. Again, the perpetrator went into a fit of rage. The police negotiator was successful in calming him and the commanding officer decided to mobilize

an "assault" procedure. Four members of the "assault team" entered the house from two different directions while the two members on the second floor descended and confronted the perpetrator. He surrendered without resistance. The situation was terminated at approximately 8:55 p.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

"Founded" Case No. 33 ("Reported" Case No. 93)

On Thursday, January 10, 1980 at approximately 1:08 a.m., the Task Force responded to a "hostage situation" in 32 Division. An intoxicated 21 year old

male, armed with a 12 gauge shotgun had taken his parents and two sisters as hostages in the family home. Earlier in the evening there had been an argument between the perpetrator and his parents. When the perpetrator produced a shotgun, his mother notified the police.

Upon arrival, containment was established with a one square block inner perimeter and a three square block outer perimeter. Negotiations commenced and it became evident that the perpetrator was extremely intoxicated. His anger was directed toward his parents, who had reprimanded him for his excessive drinking. His level of anxiety fluctuated during the negotiation and when the negotiator emphathized with his position, he seemed to become calm. The negotiation endured for approximately one hour and 30 minutes. When the negotiator asked the perpetrator to surrender, he agreed. The father emerged from the house carrying the shotgun. The "assault team" entered the house and confronted the perpetrator who offered no resistance. The situation was terminated without injury at approximately 3:50 a.m.

Hypothesis No. 1:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 2:

Because this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 3:

Because this case involves ~~no~~ elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

Hypothesis No. 4:

Because this perpetrator was emotionally motivated by the reprimand he had received from his parents, this case involves no elements which are both peculiar to it and relevant to this hypothesis, and thus this hypothesis will hold in its entirety.

REFERENCES

1. Greenspan, Edward L. (annotations) (1979). Martin's Annual Criminal Code, 1979. (Agincourt: Canada Law Book Limited), s. 82(1)(d).
2. Ibid., s. 82(2)(d).
3. Ibid., s. 82(1).
4. Ibid., s. 16.
5. Lang, Daniel (1974). "A Reporter at Large: the Bank Drama". New Yorker. November 25, Volume 50, number 40, pp. 56-126.
6. Greenspan, Edward L. (annotations) (1979). op. cit., s. 82(2)(d).

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

The value of analytic induction is manifested in its ability to exclude the possibility of existing cases within the empirical universe countervailing the conclusions drawn by the hypotheses. Naturally, it is possible that future cases will present factual situations and methods of procedural termination which are diametrically opposed to the hypotheses derived from the present study; however, during the five year study period under consideration no case will be outside of the definitive parameters established by the hypotheses. Further, the application of the methodological principles embodied within analytic induction enables the researcher to appreciate the sequential development of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department and its Emergency Task Force's response to "founded hostage situations". As the process of analytic induction proceeds through the cases in this study, the discovery of new elements presenting themselves in the hypotheses becomes less frequent. Consequently, fewer amendments to the hypotheses are made in the latter half of the process. In the "Founded" Cases Nos. 1-16, there were two cases in which all of the

hypotheses held in their entirety. In the "Founded" Cases Nos. 18-33, there were 11 such cases. This development is due to the cumulatively inclusive nature of analytic induction and is to be expected. Perhaps at this juncture it would be most appropriate to consider the conclusions reached by this procedure.

The final postulation of Hypothesis No. 1 is stated as follows in "Founded" Case No. 31:

When the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes


- (a) no demands,
- (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or
- (c) demands which are connected to either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to,

the episode will terminate successfully regardless of whether or not the interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator is face to face, unless the perpetrator injures or attempts to injure a hostage or "control force" member. However, should all of the perpetrator's demands be unconnected to a fear for personal safety, an ideological orientation or emotional motivation, should he injure or attempt to injure a hostage or a "control force" member or not interact with a "control force" negotiator, successful or unsuccessful termination of the episode is possible only through the implementation of an "assault" operation, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s).

The graphic illustration of this hypothesis provided in Figure 8.1 may be of some assistance in discerning its conceptual relevance (see Figure 8.1).

A "control force" response to a "reported hostage situation" must be characterized by organization, discipline, communication and good presence of mind. This response commences upon the arrival of the first police officer on

FIGURE 8.1: "ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS #1's CONCLUSIONS



the scene. His function is crucially important because he must determine the status of the situation (i.e. "founded" or "unfounded") and discern as much information concerning the nature of the situation, the perpetrator and hostage(s). An officer who efficiently discharges these duties will facilitate a more effective "control force" response. In particular, if the case is a "founded hostage situation", the "control force" negotiator will be at an appreciable advantage having knowledge of the nature and quality of the situation. The natural evolution of a "control force" response dictates that it begin with an attempt to establish a verbal interaction between the perpetrator and the "control force" negotiator. In addition to providing a "control force" with an opportunity to gain an insight into the character of the perpetrator, the interaction process is intended to reduce his anxiety, thus enabling him to approach decision making tasks in a rational frame of mind. This process requires support from a well trained and adequately appointed tactical team. Although some "founded hostage situations" can be brought to a successful termination through negotiation, others require the implementation of an "assault" operation. To view one procedural option as being more essential than the other would be dangerous as well as erroneous according to Hypothesis No. 1 (i.e. 14 "founded hostage situations" (46.7%) in the study period were successfully terminated upon negotiation eventuating the perpetrator's capitulation ("Founded" Cases Nos. 1, 2, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28 and 30), while 16 of the "founded hostage situations" (53.7%) required the implementation of an "assault" operation to terminate the episode ("Founded" Cases Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32 and 33).

The first segment of Hypothesis No. 1 reveals that an episode will always be terminated successfully when the perpetrator interacts with a "control force" negotiator and makes (a) no demands; (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or (c) demands which are connected to an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to provided the perpetrator does not injure or attempt to injure a hostage or "control force" member. Further, it reveals that face to face interaction with the perpetrator is not relevant to the termination of the episode. During the study period, 11 "founded hostage situations" (36.7%) involved interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator with the former making no demands ("Founded" Cases Nos. 1, 5, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 26, 29, 30 and 32). A successful termination was eventuated through negotiation in six of these cases ("Founded" Cases Nos. 1, 5, 17, 18, 19 and 30) and the implementation of an "assault" procedure in the remaining five cases ("Founded" Cases Nos. 7, 8, 26, 29 and 32). There were two "founded hostage situations" (6.7%) during which the perpetrators interacted with negotiators and made no demands; however, because these perpetrators injured or attempted to injure a hostage or "control force" member, the episodes were terminated unsuccessfully and thus will be considered in the second segment of Hypothesis No. 2 ("Founded" Cases Nos. 27 and 31). During the study period, three "founded hostage situations" (10%) involved interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator with the former making demands which were connected to a fear for personal safety and were acceded to ("Founded" Cases Nos. 2, 11 and 15). There was one "founded hostage situation" (3.3%) during which the perpetrator

interacted with a negotiator and made demands which were connected to a fear for personal safety; however, because this perpetrator attempted to injure a hostage, the episode was terminated unsuccessfully and thus will be considered in the second segment of Hypothesis No. 1 ("Founded" Case No. 23). During the study period, eight "founded hostage situations" (26.7%) involved interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator with the former making demands which were connected to either an ideological orientation ("Founded" Case No. 10) or an emotional motivation ("Founded" Cases Nos. 3, 16, 20, 24, 25, 28 and 33). A successful termination was eventuated by negotiation in six of these cases (Nos. 10, 16, 20, 24, 25, and 28) however, the implementation of an "assault" operation was necessary in "Founded" Cases Nos. 3 and 33 in order to terminate the episode successfully.

The second segment of Hypothesis No. 1 reveals that an episode will always be terminated by an "assault" operation when the perpetrator (a) does not interact with a "control force" negotiator; (b) makes only demands which are unconnected to (i) a fear for personal safety, (ii) an ideological orientation, or (iii) an emotional motivation, or (c) injures or attempts to injure a hostage or "control force" member, unless he does not present a threat to the hostage(s). Further, it reveals that an "assault" operation under such circumstances can terminate the episode successfully or unsuccessfully. During the study period, three "founded hostage situations" (10%) involved the absence of interaction between the perpetrator and negotiator with the episode being terminated by an "assault" operation ("Founded" Cases Nos. 4, 6 and 22). In two of these cases (Nos. 6 and 22) the episode was terminated successfully, while the other (No. 4)

was terminated unsuccessfully. It should be noted that although "Founded" Case No. 6 involves the perpetrator not interacting with a "control force" negotiator, he did not present a threat to the hostages and thus such an episode need not necessarily be terminated by an "assault" operation in order to be successful. During the study period, one "founded hostage situation" (3.3%) involved the perpetrator making only demands which were unconnected to (i) a fear for personal safety; (ii) an ideological orientation, or (iii) an emotional motivation ("Founded" Case No. 12). It was successfully terminated by an "assault" procedure. During the study period, there were four "founded hostage situations" (13.3%) which involved the perpetrator injuring or attempting to injure a hostage (Nos. 23 and 27) or "control force" member (Nos. 9 and 31). These cases were terminated unsuccessfully through an "assault" operation.

In all "founded hostage situations", the result desired by a "control force" is a successful termination. Hypothesis No. 1 indicates that this result always presents itself through the intervention of interaction between the perpetrator and a "control force" negotiator when the perpetrator makes (a) no demands, (b) demands which are connected to a fear for personal safety and are acceded to, or (c) demands which are connected to either an ideological orientation or emotional motivation even though these are not acceded to, provided the perpetrator does not injure or attempt to injure a hostage or "control force" member (Intervention 1 (I (i))). However, if the perpetrator presents a threat to the hostage(s) while (a) not interacting with a negotiator, (b) making demands which are all unconnected to (i) a fear for personal safety, (ii) an ideological orientation, or (iii) an emotional motivation, or (c) injuring or attempting to

injure a hostage or "control force" member, intervention by the "control force" will always be in the form of an "assault" operation (Intervention 2 (I (ii))). In this case, the result can be either successful (desired) or unsuccessful (undesired). The graphic illustration of this concept provided in Figure 8.2 may be of some assistance in outlining the significant contribution and implementation of a "control force" response to a "founded hostage situation" (see Figure 8.2).

The final postulation of Hypothesis No. 2 is stated as follows in "Founded" Case No. 27:

Whether or not one or more of the hostages is the source of the perpetrator's grievance, the implementation or non-intervention of an "assault" operation can terminate the episode either successfully or unsuccessfully.

The graphic illustration of this hypothesis provided in Figure 8.3 may be of some assistance in discerning its conceptual irrelevance (see Figure 8.3).

The relationship between the hostage and perpetrator offers little to the body of knowledge regarding a "control force" response to a "hostage situation". Some may deem it logical to infer that a perpetrator will show more regard for a hostage who is a relative or acquaintance than for one who is a stranger. Others may contend that a perpetrator may be more moved by passion to injure a hostage who is a relative or acquaintance than one who is a stranger. This study is unable to draw conclusions in either regard. However, perhaps a profitable revelation resides within this shortcoming. A "control force" would be well advised to afford little if any consideration to the

FIGURE 8.2: "DESIRED VS. OBSERVED RESULT
UNDER "CONTROL FORCE"
INTERVENTION THROUGH
NEGOTIATION (I(i)) AND
"ASSAULT" (I(ii))





FIGURE 8.3: "ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS #2's CONCLUSIONS"



relationship existing between the perpetrator and hostage. Regardless of whether the hostage is a relative or acquaintance or a stranger to the perpetrator, an "assault" operation may or may not be necessary. Further, the intervention or non-intervention by an "assault" operation may terminate the episode either successfully or unsuccessfully. It should be noted that the "non-intervention of an assault operation" is not synonymous with intervention through negotiation. The former term evolves from the circumstances in "Founded" Case No. 27 where the "control force" withheld an "assault" operation and the perpetrator injured the hostage thus forcing termination of the episode to be classified as unsuccessful.


The final postulation of Hypothesis No. 3 is stated as follows in "Founded" Case No. 9:

Neither the existence of a history of mental illness, alcoholism or drug abuse in the perpetrator's background nor his intoxicated state prevents a successful termination of the episode, though an unsuccessful termination is possible when the perpetrator has a history of mental illness and/or is intoxicated. However, should the perpetrator have a history of criminal violence and/or display extreme violence involving bodily harm and/or death prior to the seizure of the hostage(s), successful termination is not possible.

The graphic illustration of this hypothesis provided in Figure 8.4 may be of some assistance in discerning its conceptual relevance (see Figure 8.4).

Through analytic induction, Hypothesis No. 3 reveals that where the perpetrator (i) has a history of alcoholism and/or drug abuse, the episode will always terminate successfully; (ii) has a history of criminal violence and/or displays extreme violence involving bodily harm and/or death prior to the

FIGURE 8.4: "ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS #3 & CONCLUSIONS"



seizure of the hostage(s), the episode will always be terminated unsuccessfully and, (iii) has a history of mental illness and/or is intoxicated at the time he seizes the hostage(s), the episode can terminate either successfully or unsuccessfully. Because the first and second delineations are absolute in nature and are instructive in and of themselves, only the latter delineation requires further elucidation.

During the study period, there were 14 "founded hostage situations" (46.7%) involving perpetrators with a history of mental illness ("Founded" Case Nos. 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 31 and 32). Of these, three (21.4%) were terminated unsuccessfully ("Founded" Cases Nos. 9, 27, and 31), while the remainder (78.6%) were terminated successfully. During the study period, there were 13 "founded hostage situations" (43.3%) involving perpetrators who were intoxicated ("Founded" Cases Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 17, 19, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33). Of these, three (23.1%) were terminated unsuccessfully ("Founded" cases Nos. 4, 9 and 31), while the remainder (76.9%) were terminated successfully. It is interesting to note that in the two "founded" cases (Nos. 7 and 28) where the perpetrator had a history of mental illness, alcoholism and drug abuse, and was intoxicated, the episodes were terminated successfully. Therefore, the following facts can be derived from this analysis: during the five year study period (1) all "founded hostage situations" involving perpetrators who had a history of alcoholism and/or drug abuse were terminated successfully, (2) all "founded hostage situations" involving perpetrators who had a history of criminal violence and/or had displayed extreme violence causing bodily harm and/or death prior to the seizure of the hostage(s) were terminated

unsuccessfully, (3) 21.4% of those "founded hostage situations" involving perpetrators who had a history of mental illness were terminated unsuccessfully, (4) three (60%) of those "founded hostage situations" which were terminated unsuccessfully ("Founded" Cases Nos. 9, 27 and 31), involved perpetrators who had a history of mental illness, (5) 23.1% of those "founded hostage situations" involving perpetrators who were intoxicated were terminated unsuccessfully, and (6) three (60%) of those "founded hostage situations" which were terminated unsuccessfully ("Founded" Cases Nos. 4, 9 and 31) involved perpetrators who were intoxicated.

From these findings, one can mollify an apparent myth which holds that when a perpetrator in a "hostage situation" has a history of alcoholism, drug abuse and/or mental illness and/or is intoxicated, the episode is likely to be terminated unsuccessfully. In point of fact, a "control force" has no reason to be anymore apprehensive when addressing a perpetrator who has a history of alcoholism and/or drug abuse than when addressing a perpetrator with no such background. When addressing a perpetrator who has a history of mental illness and/or is intoxicated, a "control force" should be aware that 21.4% of the former type and 23.1% of the latter were terminated unsuccessfully during the study period. Finally, when addressing a perpetrator who has a history of criminal violence and/or displays extreme violence involving bodily harm and/or death prior to the seizure of the hostage(s), a "control force" should be aware that no such case during the five year study period was terminated successfully and thus, the contingency of intervention by "assault" must be implementable.

The final postulation of Hypothesis No. 4 is stated as follows in "Founded"

Case (No. 31):

When the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is


- (a) an "unrestricted" longarm or handgun,
- (b) a "restricted" handgun, or
- (c) some agent outside of his control,

the episode will terminate successfully. When the weapon is a knife, the episode will terminate successfully, unless, the perpetrator has a history of criminal violence or, injures a hostage. However, if the weapon is a hatchet, successful termination is not possible. Further, if the weapon is a "restricted" longarm, successful termination is not possible, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or, is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated.

The graphic illustration of this hypothesis provided in Figure 8.5 may be of some assistance in discerning its conceptual relevance (see Figure 8.5).

The orientation of a "control force" response to a "hostage situation", can be appreciably guided by the nature of the weapon in the perpetrator's possession. For example, if a perpetrator is in possession of a longarm which is "restricted" according to s. 82(1)(d) of the Criminal Code of Canada¹ (i.e. a rifle or shotgun), a "control force" is likely to establish large outer (approximately 135,000 to 180,000 square feet) and inner perimeters (approximately 90,000 square feet). The type of weapon will also determine the "control force" mobility within the inner and outer perimeters. Should the perpetrator have a firearm in his possession, "control force" members may exercise care in not exposing themselves to his range. Conversely, should the perpetrator have a knife or hatchet in his possession, a "control force" may establish smaller perimeters, allowing itself substantial mobility within them. The potential of

FIGURE 8.5: "ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS #4's CONCLUSIONS"



the weapon in the perpetrator's possession as an agent of injury to a hostage is of primary importance to a "control force" and, it is in this regard that Hypothesis No. 4 realizes its potential as an instructive instrument.

The first segment of Hypothesis No. 4 contends that when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is (a) an "unrestricted" longarm or handgun²; (b) a "restricted" handgun³ or, (c) some agent outside of the perpetrator's control, the episode will terminate successfully. During the study period, there were (1) three "founded" cases (10%) where an "unrestricted" longarm ("Founded" Case No. 5) or handgun ("Founded" Cases Nos. 22 and 30) was the weapon in the perpetrator's possession; (2) three "founded" cases (10%) where a "restricted" handgun was the weapon in the perpetrator's possession ("Founded" Cases Nos. 7, 11 and 20) and, (3) one "founded" case (3.3%) where some agent outside of the perpetrator's control (an electrically charged subway rail) was the weapon in the perpetrator's possession ("Founded" Case No. 2). All of these episodes were terminated successfully.

The second segment of Hypothesis No. 4 holds that when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a knife, the episode will terminate successfully, unless the perpetrator has a history of criminal violence or injures a hostage. During the study period, there were 10 "founded" cases (33.3%) where the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was a knife ("Founded" Cases Nos. 1, 3, 8, 12, 19, 23, 26, 27, 28 and 32). Eight of these (80%) were terminated successfully, while two (20%) were terminated successfully ("Founded" Cases Nos. 23 and 27). In "founded" case no. 23, the perpetrator had a history of criminal violence and in "Founded" Case No. 27, the perpetrator injured the hostage.

The third segment of Hypothesis No. 4 contends that when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a hatchet, the episode will terminate unsuccessfully. During the study period, there was one "founded" case (3.3%) where the perpetrator's weapon was a hatchet and, it was terminated unsuccessfully ("Founded" Case No. 31). The fourth segment of Hypothesis No. 4 holds that when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is a "restricted" longarm, the episode will terminate unsuccessfully, unless the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated. During the study period, there were 12 "founded" cases (40%) where the weapon in the perpetrator's possession was a "restricted" longarm ("Founded" Cases Nos. 4, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 29 and 33). Of these, 10 (83.3%) involved perpetrator's who (1) did not present a threat to the hostage(s) ("Founded" Case No. 6), (2) were ideologically oriented ("founded" case no. 10), or (3) emotionally motivated ("Founded" Cases Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 29 and 33) and thus these episodes were terminated successfully. There were, however, two "founded" cases (16.7%) where the perpetrator's weapon was a "restricted" longarm and he (1) presented a threat to the hostage(s) and (2) was neither ideologically oriented nor emotionally motivated and thus these episodes were terminated unsuccessfully.

Therefore, Hypothesis No. 4 concludes that a "hostage situation" will be terminated successfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is (1) (a) an "unrestricted" longarm or handgun, (b) a "restricted" handgun, or (c) some agent outside of his control, (2) a knife and the perpetrator does not have a history of criminal violence nor does he injure a hostage and (3) a "restricted"

longarm and the perpetrator does not present a threat to the hostage(s) or is ideologically oriented or emotionally motivated. Conversely, it concludes that a "hostage situation" will terminate unsuccessfully when the weapon in the perpetrator's possession is (1) a hatchet, (2) a "restricted" longarm and the perpetrator presents a threat to the hostage(s) and is neither ideologically oriented nor emotionally motivated, and (3) a knife and the perpetrator has either a history of criminal violence and/or injures a hostage.

In summary, the process of analytic induction suggests that a "founded hostage situation" may be terminated through the implementation of an "assault" operation when the perpetrator 1) has a history of criminal violence, 2) displays extreme violence causing bodily harm and/or death prior to seizing the hostage(s), 3) injures or attempts to injure a hostage or "control force" member and/or, 4) is in possession of a hatchet. An "assault" operation must be considered when the perpetrator 1) has a history of mental illness, 2) is intoxicated, 3) does not interact with a "control force" negotiator, 4) makes only demands which are unconnected to a fear for personal safety, an ideological orientation or emotional motivation, 5) has a "restricted" longarm in his possession and/or 6) has a knife in his possession. In other "founded hostage situation", a successful termination to the episode may be eventuated through negotiation.

In concluding, it should be reiterated that the functional diversity of analytic induction can serve two purposes. Firstly, it can determine the component parts of an existing system and discern causal associations embodied within it. Secondly, it can determine the efficiency of an existing system with

respect to its attainment of a desired result. This research effort has been largely oriented to the first evaluative function however, it would be a less than responsible endeavour if the existing data was not used to produce at least a rudimentary evaluation of the efficiency displayed by the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department and its Emergency Task Force in responding to "founded hostage situations". After studying this phenomenon for over two years, completing New York City Police Department courses on hostage negotiating and tactical responses to "hostage situations" and observing the implementation of four "control force" responses to "founded hostage situations", the researcher feels disposed to comment on the performance of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department as revealed by this research and 18 months of practical observation. Because 25 of the "founded hostage situations" (83.3%) were terminated successfully, it would seem most appropriate to address the overall "control force" efficiency by examining those five "founded hostage situations" which were terminated unsuccessfully. In two of these cases (40.0%), the perpetrator was killed by the "control force" ("Founded" Cases Nos. 4 and 23). In two cases (40.0%), the perpetrator was immobilized after being shot in the arm and/or shoulder by the "control force" ("Founded" Cases Nos. 9 and 27). In one of these cases (20.0%), the perpetrator was immobilized after being sprayed with CN gas by a "control force" member ("Founded" Case No. 31).

In "Founded" Case No. 4, an intoxicated perpetrator with a history of criminal violence and armed with a "restricted" longarm (shotgun), seized an unsuspecting homeowner as hostage when the latter responded to a knock at his front door on a Sunday morning at approximately 7:30 a.m. Earlier that

morning, this perpetrator had used the weapon in his possession to kill one man and shoot another in the head. During the episode, the area under siege moved to the hostage's snow-covered automobile. When the perpetrator realized that the mobility of this vehicle was restricted by the "control force" he and the hostage emerged from it. When the hostage was pulled to safety by the "control force", the perpetrator pointed his weapon at the commanding officer who instructed him to drop it. The perpetrator refused and the commanding officer shot and killed him. Having displayed a disregard for human life by committing murder prior to seizing the hostage, the perpetrator presented a manifest threat to the hostage and members of the "control force". This was reinforced by his act of pointing a shotgun at a "control force" member. No amount of professional expertise could have terminated this episode in a successful manner.

In "Founded" Case No. 23, the perpetrator had a history of criminal violence and was armed with a knife. As the episode progressed, he became increasingly anxious and decreasingly coherent. When he thrust his weapon toward the hostage's head with sufficient force to tear a kleenex box placed less than three inches away, he displayed a disregard for the life of the hostage amounting to a manifest threat. It could have been professionally as well as logically inferred by the negotiator that the perpetrator would have to be immobilized. At that juncture there was no person more equipped to evaluate the threat to the hostage than he. If the negotiator had been a better marksman, it is possible that the perpetrator would have been only wounded; however, the fact that his first shot missed the perpetrator seems to reveal no intention on his part to kill the perpetrator. Rather, the negotiator seems to

have been trying to immobilize him. That the perpetrator's death ensued must be seen as the necessary risk that a "control force" member, exercising a good presence of mind, would have to have taken under the circumstances.

In "Founded" Case No. 9, the perpetrator was intoxicated, had a history of mental illness, was armed with two "restricted" longarms (a shotgun and rifle) and had shown a disregard for the lives of the hostages and "control force" members by firing a shot and pointing the shotgun at members of the "assault team". When the perpetrator pointed the shotgun at the members of the "assault team" and refused to drop it, the "assault team" had no choice but to immobilize him. Being marksmen, they were able to effect this purpose by incapacitating him without causing serious injuries. This response shows no room for suggested improvement.

In "Founded" Case No. 27, the perpetrator had a history of mental illness and slashed the hostage's throat with a knife before an "assault" operation was implemented. He was attempting to slash the hostage a second time when the "assault team" effected immobilization by shooting him in the right shoulder. Having blatantly displayed his intention to seriously injure or kill the hostage, the "assault team" had no choice but to respond to the perpetrator's actions by terminating the threat. Once again, it was the "assault team's" marksmanship which resulted in the perpetrator being incapacitated yet not seriously wounded.

In "Founded" Case No. 31, the perpetrator was intoxicated, had a history of mental illness and was armed with a hatchet. When he emerged from the area under siege and lunged toward a "control force" member while brandishing

the hatchet in a threatening manner, he was sprayed with chloroacetophenone gas (CN tear gas) and was immobilized. This measure was necessary in order to terminate the attempt to injure the "control force" member. The "control force" displayed excellent composure in appreciating the nature of the perpetrator's weapon and employing tear gas rather than bullets to immobilize him.

There are two common denominators which pervade the "control force" response to "hostage situations" which are terminated unsuccessfully. Firstly, it is evident that neither the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department nor its Emergency Task Force will risk injuring a perpetrator until he displays a manifest attempt to injure a hostage or "control force" member in a manner which amounts to a manifest threat to the life of the intended victim. Secondly, it is evident that much of the episode's status is determined by the response, negotiation and tactical decisions at which individual "control force" members arrive. From the arrival of the first officer on the scene to the moment of termination, "control force" members must employ personal discretion. During the five year study period, there exists no evidence which would indicate that while responding to "hostage situations" either the Metropolitan Toronto Police or its Emergency Task Force made a single decision which could be interpreted as erroneous. It should be noted that considerable expertise was displayed in the art of negotiation ("Founded" Cases Nos. 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 31 and 33) and tactical techniques ("Founded" Cases Nos. 7, 8, 9, 15, 19, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 31 and 33). In particular, the skill, technique and composure displayed by the "control force" negotiators in "Founded" Cases Nos. 10, 15, 19,

20 and 28 and the tactical and "assault teams" in "Founded" Cases Nos. 7, 15, 19, 22, 26, 28, 29, 31 and 33 were exceptional and unparalleled in the researcher's experience.

The findings which reveal themselves in Chapter Six provide an opportunity to consider the nature and quality of the empirical universe being examined. Through statistical analyses of the status (i.e. "founded" or "unfounded"), time of occurrence, day of occurrence, month of occurrence and location regarding all "reported hostage situations" during the study period, Chapter Six draws the following conclusions: 1) the incidence of "reported hostage situations" declines during the summer months, 2) there is an increase in the incidence of "reported hostage situations" during the week-end periods, 3) there is a significant correlation between the time of day and incidence of "reported hostage situations" and 4) there is a high correlation between the incidence of "reported" crime and the incidence of "reported", "founded" and "unfounded" hostage situations" within the geographical boundaries of the five Metropolitan Toronto Police District. These findings raise the possibility of "control force" members developing certain attitudinal approaches based on experience to certain "reported hostage situations". For example, one must consider whether "control force" members might respond with increased vigour to a "reported hostage situation" in an area which has proved through experience to have a high rate of "founded" cases. Neither the scientific analysis employed by this study nor the practical observations of the researcher reveal the slightest indication that such "conditioning" is present within the Emergency Task Force. Indeed, it seems apparent that it employs a uniform

approach to all "reported hostage situations" which is sufficiently disciplined to effect tactical control over an area under siege, while relying upon its inherent flexibility to allow for an uneventful termination to an "unfounded situation".

A "control force" initially relies on the judgement of the first officer on the scene in assessing the presence or absence of hostages. His decision may either result in the mobilization of a "control force" response or a routine, law enforcement address to a domestic quarrel. Chapter Six reveals that early in the development of the "control force" concept (i.e. 1975) and 1976), the Emergency Task Force responded to many "reported hostage situations" which were "unfounded". With time and experience, the incidence of "unfounded hostage situations" in Metropolitan Toronto has steadily declined. In this regard, one might logically infer that among other factors, the first police officer on the scene may be developing a greater skill for delineating "founded" from "unfounded hostage situations" while employing a more incisive investigative technique before summoning the Emergency Task Force.

There is very little empirical research which reveals the efficiency displayed by similar "control force" units. In fact the review of the literature contained within this research reveals only one such study. In a Rand Corporation analysis of "hostage situation" responses throughout the world, many interesting facts were examined.⁴ Upon deleting those episodes which were acts of international terrorism the following statistics present themselves: 1) 20% of the perpetrators were killed by the "control force" during the response⁵ and, 2) 11.3% of the hostages were killed during the episode.⁶ Although it would be fallacious to suggest that the episodes contained

within Rand Corporation study can be qualitatively juxtaposed to those discussed herein, the fact that during the five year study period the Metropolitan Toronto Police killed 6.6% of the perpetrators it addressed while allowing no hostages to die merits some consideration.

This research effort has shown that the act of seizing hostages in an urban setting such as Metropolitan Toronto can amount to a definitive act of "terrorism". A "control force" which responds to these acts of "terrorism" must possess expertise in tactical and negotiation techniques. It is in the fulfillment of these criteria that the efficiency of a "control force" will be determined. To consider one as being more important than the other is to add a destructive variable to a procedure that might otherwise function efficiently. The Emergency Task Force has performed this function in Metropolitan Toronto since 1976. For a "control force" with such a brief history, it has displayed an unusual ability to appreciate the advantageous nature of a multi-disciplinary approach to the "terrorist" act of "hostage taking". The performance of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department and its Emergency Task Force in responding to "hostage situations" warrants the favourable consideration revealed by this study as well as the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that their "control force" is inferior to none.

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