

A Sociocultural Analysis of Korean Sport for International Development Initiatives

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Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa
in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Human Kinetics

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Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the following questions: 1) What is the structure of the Korean sport for international development discourse? 2) How are the historical transformations of particular rules of formation manifested in the discourse of Korean sport for international development? 3) What knowledge, ideas, and strategies make up Korean sport for international development? And 4) what are the ways in which these components interact with the institutional aspirations of the Korean government, directed by the official development assistance goals, the foreign policy and diplomatic agenda, and domestic politics? To address these research questions, I focus my analysis on the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and its 30 years of expertise in designing and implementing sport and physical activity–related programs and aid projects.

For this research project, I collected eight different sets of KOICA documents published from 1991 to 2017 as primary sources and two different sets of supplementary documents including government policy documents and newspaper articles. By using Foucault's archaeology and genealogy as methodological frameworks, the analysis highlights how KOICA sport has functioned for three decades as 1) an international development tool, 2) a diplomacy tool, and 3) a domestic policy tool of the Korean state. The conclusion focuses on 1) the relevance of findings to the larger context of SFD, sport diplomacy, and domestic policy and political literature; 2) additional cases demonstrating the ways other nations might employ sport for political purposes, in comparison with KOICA sport; 3) KOICA sport's potential future as an alternative to Korean SFD and future direction of my research journey toward a big picture of East Asian SFD.

Acknowledgements

This research journey would not have been possible without the enormous support and guidance I received from some very important people during my doctoral program. First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my esteemed supervisor Dr. Christine Dallaire for her support, guidance, and patience. Without her understanding and unwavering belief in me, I could not have realized this research project. As my supervisor over the past six years, she emulated the type of role model that I hope to one day become for my future students.

I would like to thank my thesis committee for their insightful comments and suggestions. To Dr. Alexandra Arellano, you gave me friendship and the opportunity to participate in your project trip to Kitcisakik. This chance allowed me to more deeply consider how my research project could be situated differently in SFD research. I appreciate Dr. Michael Robidoux for offering his critical thoughts about state-driven Korean SFD and its symbolic value to the Korean state in the larger context of the Cold War, distinctive from the mainstream SFD of the West. I also thank Dr. Alex Dumas for providing rich insight into the importance of elucidating the details of the methodological process, allowing me to revisit how I came up with key themes and concepts. I had the privilege of being evaluated by Dr. David Black as my external examiner, thank you for offering significant insight for understanding the Korean state as related to the Asian developmental state. Furthermore, I have learnt a lot from your research which extends the state's use of sport in Korean ODA to the realm of sport diplomacy and international politics.

My sincere thanks also go to Dr. Settar Koçak and Dr. Irmak Hürmeriç Altunsöz for providing me an opportunity to teach and practically apply what I learnt from teaching certificate programs to the lecture setting at the Department of Physical Education and Sports of the Middle East Technical University (METU). I would particularly like to thank Dr. Settar Koçak for

sharing wonderful humor and knowledge on how to adjust to teaching in the undergraduate university setting in Turkey. I also appreciate Dr. Irmak Hürmeriç Altunsöz, who is one of the friendliest professors I had the pleasure of meeting during the past several years. Thank you for your infinite support during my time teaching at METU. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to METU colleagues Nehir Kavi-Şimşek, Betül Coşkun, Serap Sarıkaya, Seda Taşci, Hakan Taş, and Tuba Yazıcı, for their warm welcome and friendship. I am grateful for the many lunches and social outings we shared together at Devrim. Thank you Nehir especially for your unwavering support, you always made me feel at home in Turkey even during the pandemic. I am grateful to your family for welcoming me with an amazing Turkish brunch and dinner. To Betül, it was a pleasure to share graduate studies and discussions with you on research life in both Canada (Korea) and Turkey. Your wholehearted support during my time at METU cannot go unacknowledged.

It was a pleasure to share doctoral studies at the School of Human Kinetics of the University of Ottawa with my colleagues (as members of Team Christine!) Humphrey Nartey, Phillip Chipman, and Joseph Friis. Humphrey Nartey, thank you for your wise advice and never-ending encouragement. To Phillip Chipman, I was very impressed by your routine – it made me more dedicated to my research. Thank you for joining the Olympic Talks that I first hosted with Humphrey. To Joseph Friis, thank you for your friendship and offering many opportunities to be involved in your research trip and hosting me at your home in Switzerland.

I would also like to thank Dr. Doeob Yang, you were someone I deeply relied on during my time in Ottawa. Thank you for being always on my side. To Dr. Yongeun Kim, I am much indebted to you for all that you have done for me. Your support allowed me to quickly adapt to a new environment, sport studies, at the School of Sport Science at Sungkyunkwan University.

I gratefully acknowledge the support of my friends outside academia during my years of graduate study. To Seonghyeon Joo, who was willing to share his place in Seoul while I completed my English courses: you helped me take my first steps toward doctoral studies abroad. Thank you. To Hyunjun Kim, giving me your time for our chats helped me overcome many difficulties in Ottawa. To Hwanjun Kim, your friendship over the last 25 years and presence in our hometown allowed me to recharge when doctoral life got exhausting. To Junhong Lee, for always welcoming me at our hometown: thank you. To Hojun Kwon, thank you for your words of encouragement. They always cheer me up. To Seungyeon Hong, I am thankful for your thoughtful ideas on relationships, which helped me mature and ease better into my new environment. Sunghwan Yeo, thank you for helping me successfully lead many social activities. They also instilled confidence in me towards my research. I thank Kainan Wang for her knowledge and skills that helped me, a non-native speaker, elevate my English abilities.

I wish to extend my special thanks to Young-gyu Jo, who has been an indispensable life mentor and role model for building my teaching philosophy since the sixth grade of elementary school. I thank Ela, who has always made me special and believe that I can do anything.

Finally, I am forever grateful to my family. The entirety of my graduate life would not have been possible without the unfailing love and support of my parents, Jongtaek Na and Jeongsoon Kim. To my father, thank you for your constant dedication and sacrifice for family. To my mother, who has taught me everything about how to live well: thank you for always believing in me and being there for me. Lastly, I thank my brother, Dong-uk Na, for his financial support and for taking on my role in the family while I was away during my doctoral studies.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In September 1991, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA¹) was formally established to manage and execute South Korea's official development assistance (ODA) portfolio. For nearly three decades since, KOICA has consistently funded and implemented sport and physical activity-related technical cooperation programs and aid projects in developing countries in the Global South. Although Korea took its first humble steps into sport aid in 1972 through the dispatch of Taekwondo instructors to non-aligned and socialist countries during the Cold War, its full-fledged participation in sport-related international development is thought to have truly begun after KOICA's establishment and subsequent integration of sport into its overseas development projects. Korean sport aid is typically characterized by a dominance of state-run programs, in contrast to the sport-for-development (SFD) movement and other development approaches around the world that mainly focus on the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society (Kidd, 2008; Darnell, 2012).

The start of the twenty-first century marked a significant shift in international development approaches. The United Nations (UN) introduced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to represent the new global development agenda, and SFD approaches dominated in the classic donor nations of the West, including Australia, Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Korea also seemed to respond to the rise of the SFD movement, with the government inviting sport administrators and coaches from developing countries to Korea (e.g. the Dream Together Program, 2013–present), provision of sports equipment and coaching services to developing countries (e.g. the Sport Partnership Program, 2004–present), as well as funding of overseas sport volunteer programs (e.g. Taekwondo Peace Corps, 2008–present).

¹ Korea International Cooperation Agency has adopted “KOICA” as its official acronym.

The popularity of the SFD movement in the twenty-first century is not a new phenomenon; boasting a long history that can be traced back to colonial practices of the nineteenth century (Kidd, 2008; Darnell, Field, & Kidd, 2019; Giulianotti, 2011a; Millington & Kidd, 2019). Importantly, the popularization and institutionalization of the movement has drawn much scholarly attention in the West, with research focusing not only on current SFD programs in the context of twenty-first century development, but also significantly on the prior use of sport in international development before SFD, shedding new light on previous approaches. This growing body of literature has allowed sport scholars in and from Western donor countries to study and reflect on previous sport-related approaches to the so-called “project of international development” (Williams, 2012, p. 1) adopted during the post-WWII era (Darnell & Black, 2011). Interestingly, despite the popularity of SFD research in the West, this does not seem to be the case in Korea. In fact, accompanying research on the Korean context is scarce.

As noted above, the use of sport in Korean international development has a long history dating back to the 1970s Cold War context. With the establishment of KOICA in 1991, Korea has accumulated extensive experience in using sport to tackle international development issues, implementing a diversity of sport programs and sport aid projects in developing countries in the Global South. Furthermore, since the late 2000s, ministries and governmental agencies related to sport and physical activity in South Korea have made practical attempts to apply current SFD approaches to their sport programs (Kim, Park, Kang, Lee, & Kang, 2013). Importantly, Korean sport for international development is observed to still maintain features also shared by Korean international development programs, mostly resulting from strong government involvement. In recent years, development scholars have shown growing interest in the study of government-led Korean international development, focusing on a number of features particular to Korea. These

include 1) Korea's identity as a leading, non-Western donor nation and member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (e.g. Atkinson, 2017; Kim, 2019; Mark & Soares, 2013; Mo, 2016; Watson, 2014); 2) its rapid economic development driven by the authoritarian military regime of the time, underlined in its description as a leading "Asian developmental state" in the political economy literature (e.g. Cherry, 2005; Gemici, 2013; Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013; Pirie, 2007; Sonn & Gimm, 2013; You, 2017); 3) its transformation from aid-receiving country to developed nation and major aid donor, allowing it to become a representative case of successful development (e.g. Chung, 2013; Lee, Park, & Park, 2018; Mark & Soares, 2013); 4) various efforts to apply Korean development knowledge and experiences from the 1970s to current international development programs (e.g. Aboubacar, 2014; Doucette & Müller, 2016; Howe, 2017; Jeong, 2017; Park, 2011); and 5) the politicization of state-led Korean development assistance (e.g. Kim, 2016; Kim, 2018; Kim & Garland, 2019; Kim & Gray, 2016; You, 2017; Watson, 2011, 2012, 2014). While scholarly interest in these issues does not reach the specific area of Korean SFD studies, the aforementioned characteristics of Korean international development provided sufficient justification for the pursuit of this research project concerning state-run SFD programs in the Korean international development context, which were found to be imbued with the Korean state's political aspirations. Through my research, I was able to uncover features that distinctively characterize Korean sport for international development and set it apart from mainstream international SFD programs of the West, which are generally non-state-oriented and minimally involve domestic political considerations (Coalter, 2010b; Darnell, 2012; Darnell & Millington, 2020; Hasselgård, 2015; Hayhurst, 2009; Giulianotti, 2011; Giulianotti, Coalter, Collison, & Darnell, 2019; Millington & Kidd, 2019). These features of Korean sport for

international development will be made more apparent in Chapters Two (Contextualizing KOICA Sport) and Three (Literature Review), as these two parts focus on: 1) analysis of the forthrightness of the Korean government toward international development and foreign aid to achieve its political aspirations and pursue national interests; as well as 2) situating Korean SFD within the politics of Korean international development as official development assistance policy, a diplomatic tool, and the state's domestic policy and political goals.

Topic and Research Question of the Dissertation

There are three pivotal SFD research publications that enabled me to critically analyze the importance of my research topic, methodological approaches, and the relevance of my dissertation: *Sport for Development: An Integrated Literature Review* (Schulenkorf, Sherry, & Rowe, 2016), *The State of Play: Critical sociological insights into recent 'Sport for Development and Peace' research* (Darnell, Chawansky, Marchesseault, Holmes, and Hayhurst, 2018), and *Norwegian Sports Aid: Exploring the Norwegian 'Sport for Development and Peace' Discourse* (Hasselgård, 2015). First, in an integrated review of SFD literature published in English academic journals, Schulenkorf et al. (2016) note that 92% of SFD studies were conducted by researchers from Western countries and that fewer than 2% of current SFD studies were published by researchers from Asia. It is worth considering Schulenkorf et al.'s (2016) statement that "there are literally hundreds of SFD projects – particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America – that do not benefit from any kind of research engagement or academic support" (p. 34). Considering Korea's role and status internationally as a leading, non-Western donor and member of the OECD-DAC, as well as its three decades of experience in using sport for international development, the present gaps in non-Western SFD research pointed out by Schulenkorf et al. (2016) allowed me to positively conclude the need and importance of my

research in mapping out Korean SFD in the international development context. This fact also obliges me to continue my important research task as a non-Western sport scholar from Korea, as few researchers with my background are contributing to English language SFD studies.

Second, in response to Schulenkorf et al.'s (2016) concerns regarding the lack of non-Western SFD research, Darnell et al. (2018) suggest several critical points, which can be summarized into the following three questions relevant to my research topic: 1) Is SFD a topic that needs the participation of researchers in and from underrepresented regions? Especially, the non-Western countries stated in Schulenkorf et al.'s (2016) review? 2) Is there a possibility that non-Western countries researchers have already studied the integration of sport and international development? If so, have they reproduced the same stance as leading SFD (e.g. Darnell et al., 2019; Darnell & Black, 2011; Kidd, 2008; Giulianotti, 2011a; Millington, 2015; Millington & Kidd, 2019) approaches to understand sport for international development, which allude to nineteenth century colonization, or focus on twenty century international development projects that commenced with U.S. President Harry Truman's inauguration speech in 1949? 3) In line with Darnell et al.'s (2018) questioning, is the research intended for academic publication or government policy reports? Adding onto these critical points, I ask a question relevant to my research project on Korean SFD: Is the researcher allowed to access the research field, resources, and critical informants (e.g. current and former volunteers, practitioners, staff, and government officers)? This question particularly pertains to SFD programs run by governmental aid agencies like KOICA, which are highly influenced by Korean domestic politics and the national interest (Kim, 2016). Let us start by answering these questions in reverse order, to make the argument more compelling.

In fact, the third question stood out to me more once I had fully engaged in the data collection and analysis of my work and reached an understanding of SFD in the Korean context as a complicated amalgam of Korean development, Korean sport development, and political schemes of the Korean state based on the authoritarian strategies and practices of previous military dictatorships. This point was made clear when I examined the nature of the sport programs run by KOICA as an agency with the support and supervision of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Independent researchers are not given full access to ongoing programs nor to current participants of its programs. Initially, I asked KOICA for permission several times to engage in participatory research, but there was no precedent for the external involvement of non-KOICA researchers. Following these setbacks, I had no choice but to opt to conduct document analysis for my research, looking at official documents published by KOICA between 1991 to 2017. Ironically, this set back allowed me to continue my work and conclude that this approach was most appropriate for the task of mapping out the structure of Korean sport for international development. In response to the first two questions, my research shows that Korean SFD maintains and reproduces a Korean sport culture greatly rooted in the strategies and practices of the Park Chung-hee (1961–1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988) authoritarian regimes. This study thus sets the foundation for future ethnographic and participatory research to be conducted. In other words, this dissertation identifies and analyzes typical characteristics of Korean SFD in the international development context, along with touching uniquely upon particular theoretical and methodological approaches ignored in existing SFD studies. In doing so, follow-up research building upon my work can not only contribute to the quality of Korean sport for international development literature, but additionally apply the approaches utilized in this dissertation to similar SFD contexts in non-Western countries. I anticipate future studies on Japan and China in

particular, as leading Asian donors² that share many cultural and political similarities with Korean sport and development.

Last, inspired by Hasselgård's (2015) emphasis on the need to examine the interplay of sport for development and peace (SDP), the politics of domestic development stakeholders, and the foreign aid system, I was able to move beyond my initially narrow perspective of Korean sport for international development as a sport-specific practice to consider it holistically as a political amalgam of the Korean sport system and culture, domestic and foreign policy objectives, and the national interest. It is important to be reminded of Hasselgård's (2015) urging for scholars to take a holistic approach to the identification of a particular SFD structure, which cannot be freed from a state's policy objectives, foreign aid system, and development stakeholders' domestic political considerations. Unfortunately, the number of studies following this guidance is low.

In light of these issues, my dissertation analyzes Korean sport for international development by applying Ziai's (2016) understanding of development as "the construction, complexity, and historicity of social reality" (p. 12). I set out to analyze the discourse of development as produced within a structure that can be recognized in texts. According to Ziai (2016), discourse in a poststructuralist perspective is defined as a system of meaning in which relations between the signifiers and signifieds are not all fixed. In his work, he also focuses on poststructuralist effects to show the emergence of events, historical singularities, and rules of exclusion, which can be seen as a political perspective of the workings of power relations (Ziai, 2016). Ziai (2016) explains that his research on the discourse of development is based on Michel Foucault's central concepts of discourse and power, in addition to his archaeology and genealogy

² Leading Asian donors in this dissertation refer to China, Japan, and South Korea.

methodological frameworks (Ziai, 2016). In keeping with Ziai's (2016) approaches, the following four main research question guide this dissertation: 1) What is the structure of the Korean sport for international development discourse circulating in texts? 2) How are the historical transformations of particular rules of formation manifested in the discourse of Korean sport for international development? 3) What knowledge, ideas, and strategies make up Korean sport for international development? And 4) what are the ways in which these components interact with the institutional aspirations of the Korean government, directed by the ODA goals, the foreign policy and diplomatic agenda, and domestic politics?

To address these research questions, I focus my analysis on KOICA and its 30 years of expertise in designing and implementing sport and physical activity-related programs and aid projects. Although Korea dispatched its first Taekwondo instructors overseas in 1972 as part of a new aid program, this move served diplomatic objectives related to the Cold War context. KOICA's establishment in 1991 was the beginning of Korea's full engagement in international development work. Through KOICA, a considerable number of Korean sport volunteers and instructors started being sent to sports federations and sports-related ministries in developing countries in the Global South, and this has continued to the present day. Notably, the majority of Korean sport programs and initiatives targeting international social development goals are greatly dependant on government funds, from KOICA in particular. Importantly, there have been few SFD programs throughout the entire history of Korean international development, and thus the aforementioned KOICA-run sport programs are the perfect case study to effectively delineate the architecture of Korean sport for international development, interacting with the political schemes of the Korean state. Generally, KOICA technical cooperation and aid projects can be categorized into three types: sport volunteering, Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors (DTI), and

sport aid. In this dissertation, these three types of programs are hereafter collectively termed as *KOICA sport*, with the names of particular programs specified as needed.

By using Foucault's archaeology and genealogy as methodological frameworks, I have narrowed down the scope of this dissertation to two main research concerns: 1) the analysis of the content (knowledge, ideas, strategies) and structure (rules of formation and their historical transformation) of Korean sport for international development discourse throughout the 30-year history of KOICA sport; and 2) the political role played by KOICA sport in spreading Korean (sport) development knowledge and experiences, fulfilling diplomatic goals, and managing domestic policy and political issues. Specifically, archaeology aims to identify discursive formations and uncover certain rules that give birth to certain objects, dominant ideas, and common themes in discourse (Foucault, 1972). Genealogy is in turn directed to trace the historical transformations of these discourses (Ziai, 2016), and this approach enabled me to discover the contradictions exposed within the explicit and implicit aims of KOICA sport discourses, referred to by Foucault (1980) as the "strategic functions" (p. 195) and political effects responding to urgent needs at a given historical and social context. These methodological aims were successfully achieved in the three articles of my dissertation.

SFD and the Sociopolitical Approach

According to Schulenkorf et al. (2016), SFD research in the domestic context has received much attention, but in contrast, there are relatively few studies on SFD at the international level. This research project aims to bridge some of this gap by focusing specifically on the use of sport in international development and critically examining KOICA sport as a leading governmental aid agency. Many different terms and descriptors for sport for international social development are used interchangeably by sport scholars, such as Darnell's (2012) sport for

development and peace (SDP), Levermore's (2009) sport-in-development (SID), and Schlenker and Adair's (2014) (global) sport-for-development (S4D). In this dissertation, I use sport-for-development (SFD), as related to the international social development context. At the same time, my review of other studies pertaining to international sport-for-development maintains their original terminologies. It is important to separate SFD and similar terms regarding the use of sport for social development from sport development, which is more focused on the achievement of sport-specific goals such as the enhancement of sport facilities, infrastructure, and athletic excellence (Kidd, 2008). Furthermore, Korean sport-for-development (Korean SFD) refers here to all approaches to the use of sport for fulfilling Korea's international development objectives, including SFD, sport development, and so on. However, different approaches are clearly distinguished when there is a need to illustrate the aims and strategies of specific sport programs for Korean international development.

My dissertation does not seek to provide a simple overview of the history of Korean SFD, nor does it touch upon the area of monitoring and evaluation as related to policy strategy or goal achievement in the Korean ODA context. Rather, I deliver a sociopolitical perspective by raising critical questions about the social factors and political schemes underlying Korean SFD. Additionally, I offer a critical perspective on the English-language SFD research articles produced by Western sport scholars in and from leading SFD donor countries such as Australia, Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom, by raising questions regarding specific results, the leading theoretical and methodological approaches to SFD, and the dominant narratives and representations of donor-recipient relations in SFD that have been uncovered and reproduced in existing English-language SFD literature.

Dissertation Chapters

This dissertation is largely composed of two parts. The first part focuses on the research component of the dissertation and consists of four chapters. Following the introductory Chapter One, Chapter Two provides an overview of each of KOICA sport's three programs, with a contextualization of KOICA sport within the historical context of Korean ODA. Chapter Three summarizes the body of literature on SFD into four themes: 1) SFD in the international development context, 2) Korean SFD, 3) the blending of SFD with sport diplomacy, and 4) SFD as a domestic policy and political tool. The neglect of these four topics by the SFD research community thus confirms my dissertation's contribution to the area of SFD literature. Chapter Four explains the methodological foundation for the three articles of my dissertation, describing Foucault's archaeology and genealogy and their application to the analysis of KOICA sport discourse to reveal the interplay of discursive formations and non-discursive practices. The second part of this dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapters Five, Six, Seven are three articles prepared for publication that highlight the findings and outline how KOICA sport has functioned for three decades as 1) an international development tool, 2) a diplomacy tool, and 3) a domestic policy tool of the Korean state. In the conclusion, Chapter 8, I discuss my research project and its analytic results as "alternatives to SFD" by describing 1) that the findings of the three dissertation articles can be relevant to the larger context of SFD, sport diplomacy, and domestic policy and political literature; 2) additional cases demonstrating the ways other nations might employ sport for political purposes, in comparison with KOICA sport; 3) the potential future of KOICA sport as an alternative to Korean SFD; and 4) my future post-doctoral research building on this dissertation, resulting in a contribution to both the current body of SFD literature and its on-the-ground practice.

Chapter 2: Contextualizing KOICA Sport

KOICA Sport in Korean ODA

KOICA sport aims to fulfill Korea's official development assistance (ODA) goals by sending qualified coaches and sport volunteers overseas to sports federations and governmental agencies responsible for sport and physical education in recipient countries, as well as funding various sport aid projects to construct sport centres, provide equipment, and support the operation of local sport programs. Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) claim that Korea's approach to international development lays down substantially the national and political interests of the Korean government, from past to present. A case in point occurred when Korea launched its first ODA program in 1963, inviting engineers and government officials from developing countries in the Third World to visit Korea. This move was made in response to a need for diplomatic posturing during the Cold War, as well the new military regime's intentions to prove its political legitimacy to the world (Watson, 2014). Significantly, many of the ODA programs implemented by the Korean government over the years have been based on Korean development knowledge and experiences, which are made up of the discursive practices and strategies of the Korean developmental state under the authoritarian Park Chung-hee regime of the 1970s. A growing body of literature on Korean international development has presented the argument that the dominant discourses and strategies of Park's development programs are still maintained and reproduced in current Korean ODA (e.g. Doucette & Müller, 2016; Gemici, 2013; Jeong, 2017; Kim et al., 2013; Kim, 2018; Kim, 2016; Kim, 2019; Kim & Garland, 2019; Kim & Gray, 2016; Watson, 2011, 2014). Viewing KOICA sport as an amalgam of Korean ODA, the policy and political objectives of the Korean government, and the maintenance of an authoritarian dictatorship legacy, it can be argued that KOICA sport is entrenched in Korean ODA practices. We can gain a critical understanding of KOICA sport and the politics of Korean international

development by asking the following questions: 1) Why has sport been consistently utilized as a development tool throughout the history of Korean international development? 2) Do Korean SFD programs actually pursue the goal of “international social development,” which both Korean ODA and KOICA claim to aspire to; and 3) In light of the manner in which the symbolic aspects of sport have been especially emphasized during the development period of Asian developmental states (Black & Peacock, 2013), is it possible that the symbolic meaning of these sport programs is more significant to Korean international development than its real development effects? I approach these questions from historical and sociopolitical perspectives and focus on identifying the dominant development discourses and politicized actors and terms in Korean international development, which are represented by Korean ODA and KOICA.

Korean ODA

As the leading governmental aid agency of Korea, KOICA is responsible for administering nearly all of Korea’s grant aid, with the gradual transfer of some responsibilities to other state agencies over time. The establishment of KOICA in 1991 is considered a milestone for Korean ODA, although the true start to Korean foreign aid actually goes back to the early 1960s (KOICA, 2011a).

Korea was an aid-receiving country from the end of the World War II in 1945 until 1996 when it became a member of the OECD (KOICA, 2011a). In the immediate post-war period between 1945 to 1948, Korea was governed by the American military under the United States Army Military Government in Korea. Like the European countries under the Marshall Plan, development aid primarily focused on the reconstruction of the Korean economy. However, the devastation of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 resulted in unprecedented national upheaval, and the majority of Korean civilians suffered from extreme poverty and starvation. During this

time, the development aid that was originally provided to help reconstruct the Korean economy was redirected into emergency food aid. Under the supervision of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), aid to Korea was later refocused in 1961 to once again support national economic development (KOICA ODA Institution, 2016). In the post-War era, development aid effectively operated to provide the model of “most developed” countries and their political ideas and systems to the “less developed” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 10). The United States and the Soviet Union competed to offer foreign aid and development assistance to the rest of the world in the Cold War context, in an exercise of hegemonic power (Wallerstein, 2004). American assistance thus must be understood in its broader historical and political context, as the government aimed to (and succeeded in) transplanting its democratic, capitalist model of development in South Korea, to establish an American proxy that defended against the communist development model of the Soviets.

In 1962, Park Chung-hee seized power through a military coup and quickly introduced a national development project the same year called the Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962–1966). This plan was designed to expand electric energy, coal energy, and other fundamental industries, as well as build infrastructure to stabilize the economy. Park’s large-scale development plan relied heavily on foreign capital from grant aid and concessional loans, and this foreign ODA allowed his regime to successfully carry out the project and implement three successors: a second (1967–1971), third (1972–1976), and even fourth plan (1977–1981). Taking the lessons learned from these development projects and funds provided by USAID, the Korean government invited government officials and engineers from developing countries to Korea in 1963 to participate in its first technical training programs. The Korean government funded the dispatch of experts to partner developing countries in 1965, and the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs dispatched medical doctors to the Republic of Gambia in 1968 and Taekwondo instructors to Lesotho in 1972 (KOICA, 2001). The Korean economy was improving at this time, but as one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1960s, it was still greatly dependent on foreign aid (Kim et al., 2013). Furthermore, Korean ODA was considerably influenced by the state's Cold War-era diplomatic objectives, as its program was initiated against the backdrop of the ongoing ideological battle between North and South Korea (Kim, 2016; Kim, 2018). Thus, the dispatch of the medical teams in 1968 and Taekwondo instructors in 1972 was overseen by the Korean foreign ministry and not by governmental departments or agencies responsible for public health or sports (Kim, 2016; KOICA ODA Institution, 2016). The Korean economy eventually experienced explosive economic growth during the 1980s, and this contributed to the success of South Korea's bids over North Korea to host high-profile international sports events such as the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics (Cha, 2008). These wins also held symbolic value, confirming South Korea's ideological and systematic superiority over North Korea in the Cold War context (Lee, 2017). In this respect, there was no longer the need to maintain the initial trajectory of Korean ODA, which was geared towards a diplomacy-centred approach, particularly against North Korea. Instead, Korean ODA policy evolved into a model focusing on economic cooperation with developing countries, while still making use of Korean ODA's symbolic value in helping pursue the government's objective to reintroduce itself as a leading developed nation to the rest of the world (Kim, 2018).

Historical and Political Considerations Leading to the Establishment of KOICA

In the early 1980s, the Korean government began making plans to integrate the administration and supervision of the various foreign aid programs run by different governmental agencies under a single organization exclusively responsible for Korean grant aid and technical

cooperation programs. In May 1990, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) introduced plans for the creation of an institution called the Korea Development Cooperation Agency, which later became KOICA. The International Cooperation Committee made the decision to name the institution Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in September 1990, officially designating it as a governmental agency specifically affiliated with and supervised by MOFA. The Korean government officially announced the establishment of Korea's leading governmental aid agency, KOICA, on April 1st, 1991, with an initial staff roster of 158 employees brought in from three different departments: the Korean Overseas Development Cooperation, the Korean Science and Engineering Foundation, and the Korean National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Since then, KOICA has been responsible for the great majority of Korea's grant aid and technical cooperation programs.

As previously argued, Korean ODA has been strongly driven by incumbent governments' political and diplomatic aims (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007). Although foreign aid is inherently subject to the national interest (Williams, 2012), Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) argue that the origins of Korean ODA, and KOICA's motivation to continue creating and implementing aid programs overseas, are quite different from those of European countries that openly promote humanitarian approaches for assisting underdeveloped countries and people in need within the Global South. European countries that successfully rebuilt themselves in the post-war period through American aid seem to provide ODA due to the so-called notion of "sharing the aid burden" (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007, p. 225). Their programs seem to reflect a strong focus on improving the well-being of people living in least developed countries, rather than a desire to strengthen their own international status. The development assistance programs of European countries in the Global North are, of course, not exclusively driven by humanitarian reasons.

However, it is important to note that they at least, on the surface, highlight principles of humanity and philanthropy, especially in the initial stages of their international aid programs. In comparison, a deciding factor leading to KOICA's establishment was the anticipated value of ODA as a political and diplomatic tool for the government.

The UN did not admit Korea as an independent member until 1991, although it continuously requested membership following the end of the American trusteeship in 1949. While engaging in intense ideological competition with North Korea during the Cold War, Korea needed to send a powerful message to the global community to acquire entry into the UN (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007). Thus, the creation of KOICA as the new face of Korean ODA would act as a signal indicating Korea's new identity as a member of the global community, dedicated to pursuing normative values and international norms like other responsible nations. Indeed, Korea was eventually approved as a UN member following its first dispatch of volunteers in September 1990 and KOICA's establishment in April 1991. Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) regard Korean foreign aid as a strategic move aimed to gain entry into the OECD, which represents a privileged club of "democratic and advanced countries" (p. 225). In fact, Korea had long harboured a desire to improve its international status and rebrand itself as a developed and modernized nation, wanting to break away from its previous image of poverty, colonization, and war (Collins, 2011). This led to the development of the elite sport system, cultivated an intense obsession with the achievement of excellence at international sporting competitions, and even caused the government to relentlessly bid for the right to host top-tier global sports events (Hong, 2011). In this respect, it can be argued that the government's desire to use Korean ODA as a means to enter the OECD was the primary motivating factor for KOICA's creation, described in the *KOICA Annual Report 1996* (KOICA, 1997, p. 44) as "a crucial moment" to "advance

Korea's globalization" and "rebrand Korea's passive and weak international image to the leading actor in the global community." Korea was able to eventually pay off its structural adjustment loans from the World Bank in 1995 and entered the OECD the following year, thereby shedding its status as an aid recipient country.

Furthermore, Korean aid initially functioned as a diplomatic strategy that utilized development grants and cooperation projects to enhance relationships with developing countries in Asia, especially socialist or non-aligned countries in Southeast Asia³. Korea's interest in developing countries in Southeast Asia was a consequence of its ongoing ideological competition with North Korea during the Cold War (Watson, 2014), and it hoped to gain a diplomatic advantage and enter the UN through the expansion of diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian nations (Kim, 2016). Entering the latter part of the Cold War, the Chun Doo-hwan regime (1980–1988) placed special emphasis on the establishment and normalization of relations with socialist and non-aligned countries in Asia, especially Vietnam and China, by adopting the policy of diplomatic pragmatism while simultaneously discarding the former administration's anti-communist approach (Kim, 2016). Official KOICA documents (KOICA, 2001) clearly indicate this policy direction change, stating KOICA's foundational purpose to be the fulfillment of the government's new foreign policy, which aimed to advance economic cooperation with developing countries in the Global South. To these ends, more than half of all KOICA aid grants and technical cooperation programs targeted Southeast Asian recipients, and furthermore, with the exception of Fiji and Papua New Guinea, KOICA volunteers were dispatched only to Southeast Asian countries from 1990 to 1995 (KOICA, 2001). As noted in the initial KOICA

³ In this dissertation, Southeast Asia geographically refers to the southern region of Asia, consisting of 11 countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Annual Report, these Southeast Asia-specific grants and programs conformed to Korean ODA policy at the time. Korea was already a fledgling donor nation in the early 1990s but was still seen by the global community as a developing country. Unhappy with this status, the Korean government placed priority on ODA for the Third World region and determined Southeast Asia to be an important geopolitical and diplomatic partner. Kim (2016) points out that the Korean ODA policy initially followed a similar trajectory to Japanese foreign aid from the 1950s and 1960s. Sato (2013) conceptualizes this as the aid strategy of a “semi-developed country” (p. 11), as Japanese aid was primarily driven by domestic conditions and the state’s aspirations to recover its status in Asia. Similarly, early Korean ODA tended to act as a strategic and diplomatic tool for introducing Korea’s new identity as a developed nation and aid donor, raise its regional status in Asia, and elevate its international status.

The Korean Developmental State in the 1970s

Korean ODA is based on Korean development knowledge and experiences that trace back to the authoritarian developmental state of Park Chung-hee (1962–1979). Johnson (1982) coined the term “developmental state” to refer to Japanese economic development in the post-WWII period, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, but the concept has also been used as a theoretical framework to explain the developmental trajectory of countries in South and Central America, East⁴ and Southeast Asia, Africa, and even Europe (Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Generally, the developmental state refers to a state that exercises strong authority over trade and the industrial sectors, benefits from an elite bureaucracy with expertise, and a state-friendly business sector that follows state-driven development policies and initiatives (Johnson, 1982; Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013). Evans (1995) additionally argues that the developmental state

⁴ East Asia geographically refers to the eastern region of Asia, and in particular this dissertation focuses on three leading East Asian donor countries: China, Japan, and South Korea.

employs a variety of statecraft strategies to pursue a set of collective missions and objectives. Under the operation of the developmental state, government intervention in the market is commonly justified by the argument that it always seeks the common good and works toward the national interest, as the government holds (and has the capacity to acquire) more expertise, information, and professional skills compared to the private sector (Jeong, 2017).

East Asian nations are routinely classified as developmental states due to their achievement of great economic development within a short period. The Four Tigers of Asia – Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea (Kim et al., 2013) – are famous for these reasons. In fact, many scholars (e.g. Douglass, 1994; White, 1998; Woo-Cumings, 1999) argue that developmental state theory emerged in response to the unique trajectory of East Asian development, which diverges from the Western European model. The East Asian model maintains characteristics exclusive to developmental states, including state tendency to exercise overwhelming authority to implement national development projects and the existence of a strong bureaucracy that suppresses civil society, private interest, and individual goals (Kim et al., 2013). Under special geopolitical and Cold War conditions, East Asian developmental states were governed to ensure national prosperity through constrained individual interest (Jeong, 2017). Likewise, the 1970s-era developmental state of Park Chung-hee followed the lead of the USA to compete with the Soviet-led Socialist Bloc at the international level (Pirie, 2008) and North Korea at the domestic level (You, 2017). In this context, Park's developmental state easily transformed into a system of nationalistic leadership, allowing his regime to utilize a variety of authoritarian technologies (Doucette & Müller, 2016). Lee (2006, p. 11) refers to the developmental state under Park as a “developmental dictatorship regime,” which is “a regime of passive revolution oriented toward modernization” that placed policy priority on economic

development over all other domestic issues. Park's developmental state and dictatorship in effect functioned as a hegemonic strategy for modernization (Lee, 2006) and was justified by the North-South ideological conflict, complex geopolitical conditions (being surrounded by various Socialist Bloc countries like China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea), and a shared national desire to develop and prosper economically after experiencing a so-called "national humiliation" at the hands of imperial Japan (Ha & Mangan, 2002; Mangan, Kwon, & Park, 2013; Tosa, 2013). This combination of geopolitical and sociocultural factors caused the state and the Korean public to feel a sense of duty to strive for the nation's prosperity, thus leading Koreans to comply with top-down policies and initiatives of the Park regime which were intended to increase development (Pirie, 2008). This also created the strategies and technologies of the developmental dictatorship that justified Park's *coup d'état* and the hegemonic power he wielded after he came into power, which was crucial as his government severely repressed democratic and labour movements and the development of civil society (Cho, 2013). More importantly, Park's developmental dictatorship propagated a narrative of guaranteed economic development, prosperity, and modernization, allowing for the surreptitiously depoliticization of his authoritarian strategies and technologies (Jeong, 2017; Sonn & Gimm, 2013). The *Saemaul Undong* (the "New Village Movement") of the 1970s can be considered an overall product of Park's developmental dictatorship.

***Saemaul Undong* in the 1970s**

Entering the 1970s, Park Chung-hee launched the *Saemaul Undong*. A large-scale rural modernization project that aimed to build foundational infrastructure, advance rural capacities, and increase rural income (Doucette & Müller, 2016), *Saemaul Undong* was the very essence of Park's developmental state and a key product of his developmental dictatorship (Jeong, 2017).

While *Saemaul Undong* is largely treated as the biggest contributor to Korea's successful economic development, it cannot be considered merely as a development project. Rather, it was also a modern-day dictatorial scheme that triggered a nationwide propaganda campaign of indoctrination, as it successfully turned the Korean public into willing volunteers and participants in Park's development projects (Jeong, 2017). Through the spread of the three critical values of diligence, self-help, and cooperation, coined by Park as the *Saemaul* "spirit," the public embraced this movement to address Korean modernization and economic growth (Kim, 2019). *Saemaul Undong* as a nationwide cultural movement discouraged traditional, ritualistic values considered to be incompatible with the ethos of modernized capitalist society, based on the Western model of development (Sonn & Gimm, 2013). In fact, the movement viewed Korean citizens that did not wholeheartedly embrace "capitalist working-class ethics" (Sonn & Gimm, 2013, p. 33) as lagging far behind the cultural norms adopted for purpose of national modernization. Thus, Jeong (2017) categorizes *Saemaul Undong* as a modern dictatorship that led the Korean people to voluntarily become involved in national development projects through the positive governing technology called the "*Saemaul* spirit", without exercising sovereign repressive power. Park's dictatorship mobilized the whole of society for the "modern rebirth of Korea," successfully compelling the people to internalize the nation's collective goals over individual interest.

Notably, the Park regime designated individual village representatives as so-called "*Saemaul* leaders" and trained them to lead other community members in *Saemaul Undong* projects. These leaders played a key role in leading a "mental revolution" to spread the idea of the *Saemaul* spirit, which helped encourage their communities to actively engage in the government's development initiatives (Sonn & Gimm, 2013). Volunteers were intentionally

referred to as “true Korean citizens” dedicated to the modernization of the fatherland (Doucette & Müller, 2016). *Saemaul Undong* unconsciously allowed for the depoliticization of the developmental state in this manner, obscuring the regime’s developmental dictatorship and its embedded political aspirations and governing technologies (Doucette & Müller, 2016). Thus, *Saemaul Undong*’s pursuit of economic development for national prosperity and prestige effectively whitewashed Park’s developmental dictatorship.

***Saemaul Undong* and Korean ODA Today**

Korean ODA has attempted to integrate humanitarian approaches into international social development through KOICA, moving away from past political and diplomatic trajectories (KOICA, 2011a). Entering the twenty-first century and witnessing changes prompted by the introduction of the new international development agenda, Korean ODA has attempted to follow the international development agenda and its norms by focusing more on humanitarianism, social development, and democratic development. However, the authoritarian legacy of Park’s developmental dictatorship still appears to be maintained and reproduced in Korean ODA through the successful camouflage of its political nature (Kim & Oh, 2012). Evidence to prove this idea is easily found in current Korean ODA practice, which has repackaged the *Saemaul Undong* of the 1970s as a new international development program (Kim, 2016).

The Lee Myung-bak government (2008–2009) attempted to restore *Saemaul Undong* as a standard model for Korean ODA (Watson, 2012). This project was again taken up by Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) during her presidency. It is important to note that she is Park Chung-hee’s daughter and ran on a platform that invoked her father’s historical slogans like “Let us live well like others” (Kang, 2000, p. 443) and promised to recreate the economic growth experienced under her father’s rule. State aid agencies doubled their foreign aid budget for *Saemaul Undong*

under Park's administration, helping to transform the historical rural development project into a new international development program under Korean ODA (Kim, 2019). In fact, Park's administration introduced a host of KOICA programs with the prefix "*Saemaul*" in the name, such as "Global *Saemaul* Youth Professional Volunteers," "Millennium *Saemaul* Village Project," "*Saemaul* Zero Hunger Community Project," and "SMART *Saemaul* Undong." While there is little direct reference to any *Saemaul* program in KOICA's sports sector, KOICA documents often mentioned *Saemaul* programs that operated Taekwondo and physical activity programs. This connection is also evident in the Taekwondo programs of "Young-*Saemaul* Undong Forum Overseas Volunteers," which were coordinated and operated in partnership with KOICA (Korea *Saemaul* Undong Center, 2014). These factors all point to the use of KOICA's overseas programs and aid projects as political tools for the Korean state.

Dominant Discourses Promoted and Circulated in Korean ODA

Dominant discourses circulating in Korean official aid also address the motivations for providing ODA. That is, they ask why Korea should engage in development cooperation work to help other countries. This discourse involves Korea's role as an emerging donor distinct from the classic donor nations of the West and the country's shifting position in the global community as a result of its provision of Korean-style ODA to developing countries around the world (Watson, 2014). First, one dominant discourse stresses that Korea's economic development and modernization would have undoubtedly been impossible without international aid received from other countries. Immediately following the end of World War II in 1945, Korea enthusiastically began preparations to rebuild and create an independent nation free from Japanese influence. However, three and a half decades of exploitation and colonization made it virtually impossible to raise funds for reconstruction purely from domestic sources. Foreign aid became critical.

Additionally, the Korean War broke out in 1950 and this 3-year civil war devastated the Korean peninsula and its key industries, laying waste to the economy. At the end of the war, 85% of gross national product (GNP) and 43% of Korean industry were demolished (Chang, 2007). By 1961, the Korean GNP amounted to only US\$89, making Korea a least developed country and the 101st poorest among 125 countries in the world (KOICA, 2011a). The international community helped Korea once again by providing the government with a large number of aid grants and concessional loans. Between 1961 and 1975, 63.6% of the total ODA received came from the USA alone, to a total of US\$3.9 billion. By the time Korea entered the OECD in 1996, it had received a grand total of over US\$12 billion from the international community (Kim et al., 2013; Kim, 2019). Through this aid, Korea successfully implemented a grand development plan, called the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, and the economy increased by 43.5% from 1962 to 1966, then by 33.8% from 1967 to 1971, and by 50% from 1972 to 1976 (KOICA ODA Institution, 2016). This was a result that simply could not have been imagined decades earlier, as Korea's post-war prospects had looked so bleak that US General Douglas MacArthur even stated that "[u]nless there is a miracle, it will take 100 years for South Korea to recover from the Korean War" (KOICA, 2011b, p. 34). Korea's incredible growth inspired the expression "Miracle on the Han River" (KOICA, 2011b, p. 34). It achieved explosive economic growth in just half a century, joining the OECD a mere four decades after the Korean War. It even entered the DAC in 2010, an acceptance holding strong symbolic meaning as it represented Korea's entry into the developed "country club." Thus, the prevalent narrative in Korean ODA discourse is that these achievements would not have been possible without the aid received from the international community (Watson, 2014; You, 2017).

The second dominant discourse in Korean ODA discusses how far Korea should go to reciprocate the help given by the international community. While foreign aid enabled Korea's remarkable economic transformation, many underdeveloped countries with conditions similar to those experienced by Korea prior to its development still struggle. As a responsible member of the international community, returning the favour seems like the right thing to do. As a country, Korea "has long emphasized the founding principle of *Hongig ingan* (humanitarianism) and the value of *Sangbu sangjo* (mutual help)" (KOICA, 1994a, pp. 9–10) and should engage in development work in the Global South. Classic European donors have not experienced conditions of underdevelopment and thus cannot be compared with the developing countries of the Global South, (Kim et al., 2013), but Korea shares many commonalities with these nations and can offer the development knowledge and experiences that other donors cannot. When the Korean War ended in 1953, Korea was considered "one of the world's Least Developed Countries" (KOICA, 2011b, p. 36). Now, it is one of the world's richest countries and has enjoyed multilateral development not only economically, but also in democracy, society, and culture. This development experience can be shared with developing countries in the Global South. Furthermore, in the post-Cold War context, international status is not only determined by hard power such as economic and military power, but also by the ways that the nation follows and respects international agreements and norms. Since the start of the twenty-first century, Korea has been required to join the fight against global poverty, in accordance with the international development agenda. Korea's contribution in this area enables it to promote its international status and power through Korean-style ODA.

The two narratives discussed above have dominated Korean ODA discourses to urge Korea and its citizens to fully engage with international development efforts to reduce global

poverty and to contribute to international social development. They also work to enhance the legitimacy of Korean ODA, which often faces criticism at home for “imitating” the humanitarianism of the West but failing to help “poor Koreans” in need or improve domestic social well-being (Kim, 2016; Mo, 2016; Chung, 2013). That is, Korea, as a newly developed nation that has just joined the ranks of the Global North, can hardly garner domestic support for Korean foreign aid and development assistance for developing countries merely by promoting the humanitarian and philanthropical reasons for doing so (Kim, 2019; Mo, 2016). It also needs to invoke the national interest (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007; Watson, 2014). Following these two dominant discourses, Korean ODA also promotes the narrative of Korea’s rebranding as a developed country of the Global North and middle-power in the politics of the global community (Howe, 2017; Kalinowski & Cho, 2012; Kim, 2016; Mo, 2016; Roehrig, 2013; Watson, 2012). In light of the politics of development aid during the Cold War, which involved competing models of development from the United States and the Soviet Union (Wallerstein, 2004; Williams, 2012), Korea’s efforts to establish a model of Korean ODA, manifested by the globalized version of *Saemaul Undong* today, should be understood as a strategic decision of the Korean state within the politics of Korean international development. Similarly, the use of sport during the initial stage of Korean ODA, namely the creation of traditional Korean sport programs (Taewkondo) in recipient countries, can be understood as the Korean state’s decision to pursue a symbolic strategy to achieve the national interest.

Tenets and Actors in ODA

The OECD (n.d.) defines official development assistance (ODA) as government aid that aims to achieve economic and social development according to international development goals. ODA has three critical characteristics: 1) it is provided by the governmental sector, from both

national and local agencies, 2) it targets economic and social development in recipient countries, and 3) it comes in the form of either grants or loans provided at below-market interest rates (OECD, 2012). While grants are funds that recipient countries do not need to pay back, loans (concessional loans) are repaid at below-market interest rates.

While most foreign aid takes the form of ODA and is provided by members of the OECD, the governments of non-OECD countries are also important actors in development – such as China, Brazil, Russia, and India (OECD, 2012). Multilateral development organizations are another key actor, particularly development banks such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Assistance under the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme of the UN, the European Union (EU), and direct-financing development agencies like the Global Fund (OECD, 2012). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also high-profile development actors, although they rely heavily on government funds and their monetary contributions are much lower (Watson, 2014). Nevertheless, the role of NGOs in international development in recent decades has become increasingly significant, particularly since the adoption of the UN's MDGs and post-MDGs (Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs) (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). Additionally, transnational corporations and wealthy philanthropists like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett regularly provide substantial grants for international development (OECD, 2012).

Types of Korean ODA and its Actors

Korean ODA is generally divided into two categories: bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA. While bilateral ODA pertains to the direct giving of aid through grants and concessional loans to people and institutions in recipient countries, multilateral ODA is provided by the Korean government to multilateral organizations conducting international development

cooperation, including the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and so on (OECD, n.d.). In 2018, Korean ODA amounted to US\$2.35 billion (74.27% of this amount was allotted to bilateral ODA, and 25.8% to multilateral ODA). Nearly half (46.7%) of all Korean ODA was directed to the Asian region (Southeast Asian countries in particular), followed by 27% for Africa, and 11.5% for Latin America and the Caribbean (KOICA, n.d.).

Multilateral ODA is largely administered by two ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). In particular, multilateral ODA to the UN and other international development organizations is provided by MOFA, and MOSF supervises multilateral contributions and subscriptions to development banks such as the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank. As a unified development aid agency since 1991, KOICA has administered most Korean ODA grants⁵ (KOICA, n.d.). For example, KOICA assistance to recipient countries provided 73.9% of all Korean ODA grants (US\$272.4 million of a total US\$368.67 million) in 2008 and 54.8% (US\$617.46 million of US\$1.12599 billion) of total ODA grants in 2018 (KOICA, 2019) (Table 1). For an idea of how bilateral ODA is allocated, in 2018 grants accounted for 65% of total bilateral ODA and concessional loans made up 35% (KOICA, 2019). Korean grants are largely provided through aid projects or technical cooperation programs. Grant aid projects are designed to promote national economic development and prosperity in recipient countries through the construction of facilities, provision of equipment, and dispatch of Korean experts in education, public administration, agriculture, industry, and environment to local settings. The aims and expected outputs of these grant aid projects often overlap with other technical cooperation programs. Korea's technical cooperation portfolio additionally involves

⁵ In this thesis, Korean ODA grants are referred to as funds (including KOICA assistance that recipient countries do not have to pay back).

overseeing the invitation of study visit participants from developing countries to Korea, dispatch of Korean experts and overseas volunteers, and humanitarian aid, along with the Development Experience Exchange program (DEEP), Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), and other technical programs. In terms of concessional loans, funds are provided to recipient countries by the Economic Development Cooperation Fund, which is administered by the Export-Import Bank of Korea (Korea EXIM Bank) under MOSF's supervision. Most technical cooperation programs are run by KOICA.

Currently, six leading technical cooperation programs are active. First, DEEP is a long-term program operated in recipient countries for up to 5 years, mainly designed to develop the holistic capacities of developing countries through the provision of Korean development knowledge and experiences. The program boasts a strict preliminary and post-project evaluation process. Second, the Korean government, mostly through KOICA, invites engineers, civil servants, and university students in development-related programs from developing countries to Korea to learn Korean development knowledge and experiences. Three different study programs are run for these visitors and vary by term length and objective: 3-month short-term programs, certificate programs that can be completed in under a year, and graduate programs over a year long. Graduate students from developing countries are fully funded to study development programs in Korean universities partnered with the Korean government and to learn development knowledge mostly based on the Korean context. Not only do these programs intend to cultivate development experts in developing countries, but students are also expected to transfer their newly learned Korean development knowledge, experiences, and culture to their home countries. All individuals invited by the Korean government are expected to serve as a bridge to enhance friendly relations between Korea and the recipient countries (KOICA ODA Institution, 2016).

Third, Korean experts in many different fields are dispatched to recipient countries and placed in national and local governments, state-run development agencies, research institutions, and universities. The first Korean expert team under this program was sent to work in the civil engineering industry in Ethiopia in 1967. KOICA has held authority over the dispatch of nearly all Korean experts overseas since the 1990s. Experts are required to hold relevant degrees and more than five (5) years of work experience in their specialty fields. Fourth, Korean volunteers have been dispatched to developing countries around the world through Korean ODA programs since 1990 to 1) contribute to the achievement of international development goals, 2) promote friendly relations between Korea and recipient countries, and 3) enhance Korean youth's global leadership skills. Notably, in 2009, the Korean government consolidated seven different overseas volunteer programs run by five different ministries (the former KOICA Volunteers and Mid-To-Long-Term Advisors programs of MOFA), IT Volunteers from the Ministry of Security and Public Administration (now the Ministry of Science, Information and Communications Technology and Future Planning), University Volunteers and the Science and Techno Peace Corps for Developing Countries from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (now the Ministry of Education), Senior Experts from the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (now the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy), and Taekwondo Peace Corps from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism under the name of "World Friends Korea" (WFK) (World Friends Korea, n.d.). While each of these seven volunteer programs are still under the individual supervision of their affiliated ministries, all volunteer programs under WFK are practically managed by KOICA. In addition to aid provided to multilateral aid organizations, the Korean government also provides direct aid to developing countries experiencing natural disaster, regional conflict, or chronic catastrophe, referred to as humanitarian aid. While humanitarian aid

habitually receives the most attention from both domestic and international media, it in fact comprises the smallest portion of Korean ODA (ODA Institution, 2016). Last, the KSP is a platform for sharing Korean development knowledge and experiences with developing country partners (Knowledge Sharing Program, n.d.). Launched by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (now MOSF) in 2004, it has since expanded to operate in over 76 countries. According to Kim and Tcha (2012), KSP is primarily designed for the “modularization” (p. 6) of Korean development knowledge and experiences to local contexts, to allow for greater accessibility and applicability in recipient countries. Thus, many different programs and initiatives led by NGOs and universities in Korea are supported by or partnered with Korean development agencies, in line with the technical cooperation programs funded through Korean ODA grants.

Table 1*Korean ODA Grants and KOICA Assistance from 1991-2018 (\$ million)*

Year	Korean ODA Grants	KOICA	Percentage of KOICA (%)
1991	25	22.1	88.4
1992	30.9	28.7	92.8
1993	32.6	29.7	91.1
1994	38.4	37.3	97.1
1995	50.1	47.4	94.6
1996	53.4	52.1	97.5
1997	54.7	53.4	97.6
1998	37.2	36.8	98.9
1999	38.9	36.9	94.8
2000	47.7	44.4	93.08
2001	52.9	47	88.8
2002	66.7	58.5	87.7
2003	145.4	121.7	83.7
2004	212	174.5	82.3
2005	318	201.8	63.4
2006	258.9	193.1	74.5
2007	361.2	270	74.7
2008	368.6	272.4	73.9
2009	366.9	272.8	74.5
2010	573.7	448.9	78.2
2011	575.02	404.8	70.3
2012	714.8	444.5	62.1
2013	809	477.4	59.01
2014	883.6	551.1	62.3
2015	906.4	563.2	62.1
2016	985	551.8	56.02
2017	1032.8	561.7	54.3
2018	1125.9	617.4	54.8

Note: KOICA is the main agency endowing Korean ODA grants.

Source: Data from 1991 to 2010 from the publication entitled *20 Years of KOICA* (KOICA, 2011); data from 2011 to 2018 from the *2018 KOICA daeomusang-wonjosiljeok tonggye* [Statistics on 2018 KOICA foreign grant aid] publication (KOICA, 2019); statistics on Korean ODA from

<https://www.oda.go.kr/opo/>.

The Development Dichotomy

There is some criticism for using the term “development dichotomy,” which seems to force hundreds of individual countries into a simple dichotomy (Streeten, 1983). The UN and many multilateral development organizations argue against the division of “developed” versus “developing” countries (United Nations, n.d.). They assert that this categorization does not properly reflect the specific development levels of each individual country, as how a country is classified may vary depending on which indicator is used, namely gross domestic product, gross national product, or the UN’s Human Development Index (The World Bank, 2015). In addition, this classification inherently makes the particular linear development model of European modernization a universal standard (Ziai, 2007), which represents asymmetrical and unequal relations to begin with (Crush, 1995). Criticisms towards the use of the developed versus developing categorization emerged in the 1980s (Streeten, 1983). In the past two decades, many multilateral development organizations have suggested alternative classifications. For example, the World Bank groups countries into four groups: low-income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high-income countries. By looking at and referring to all countries individually, international governing bodies avoid pushing countries into an incongruent dichotomy.

Nevertheless, I maintain the use of the developed-developing divide in my study. As argued by Nederveen Pieterse (2010), such a dichotomy tends to simplify complicated and dynamic relations between donors and recipients in international development while simultaneously uncovering hegemonic structures dominated by classic Western donors. The use of this categorization in my research can help demonstrate how dominant structures and asymmetrical power relations in international development cooperation have been maintained

and reproduced by Korea for decades, through various KOICA programs that focus on sport and physical education within the Korean ODA context. In the same manner, this dissertation also uses other development dichotomies, such as the Global North and South, West and the non-West, and classic and non-classic donors (also known as emerging donors) in development policy documents and studies. In fact, there is an attempt to replace the classification of the Global North and South with something called the “First-Third divide” (Thérien, 1999; Williams, 2012). Thérien (2012) argues that the North-South divide intrinsically designates an intentional gap between “the haves and the have-nots” (p. 727), that is, the rich and the poor. Similarly, the dichotomy of the West and the non-West is formed by the linear path of Eurocentric development, constructing the West as a standard of development and modernization that the non-West should follow (Escobar, 1995). Furthermore, the classification of classic and non-classic donors (or emerging donors) seems to be employed often in policy documents and literature on development history. While “classic donors” refers to the founding members of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (the predecessor of the OECD), new donors like Japan and Korea, who were former aid recipients and are now current members of OECD’s DAC⁶, are described as non-classic or emerging donors (Watson, 2014). As such, the intentional use of the above dichotomies can represent the dominant formations of discourses circulating in international development and ODA, which have been maintained and reproduced in KOICA sport programs and aid projects funded by Korean ODA.

The Triad of KOICA Sport

Responsible for most Korean grants provided by bilateral ODA, KOICA has specifically focused on two forms of grants: aid project and technical cooperation program. Sport aid projects

⁶ The DAC is a forum where major donors in the world review, analyze, and evaluate OECD’s policy aid.

pertaining to KOICA sport involve the construction of sport centres and provision of sport equipment, as well as small-scale sport initiatives in partnership with technical programs in recipient countries. Technical cooperation programs under KOICA sport can be divided into two types: sport volunteers and the Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors (DTI). Thus, KOICA sport offers three basic programs: sport volunteering, DTI, and sport aid. While the history of KOICA sport is older than KOICA officially, KOICA sport comprises of a smaller portion of KOICA assistance to recipient countries (See Table 2 and 3).

Table 2*KOICA Volunteers (1990-2017) and KOICA Sport Volunteers (1990-2016) Numbers*

	KOICA Volunteers (including sport)	Sport Volunteers	Percentage of Sport (%)
1990	44	8	18.8
1991	37	4	10.8
1992	52	1	1.9
1993	51	2	3.9
1994	59	4	6.7
1995	106	3	2.8
1996	131	6	4.5
1997	138	4	2.8
1998	108	6	5.5
1999	103	0	0
2000	126	2	1.5
2001	181	3	1.6
2002	207	2	0.9
2003	208	1	0.4
2004	696	5	0.7
2005	681	11	1.6
2006	772	12	1.5
2007	772	21	2.7
2008	822	15	1.8
2009	851	23	2.7
2010	797	35	4.3
2011	783	22	2.8
2012	813	29	3.5
2013	842	33	3.9
2014	985	28	2.8
2015	922	33	3.5
2016	911	31	3.4
2017	867	0	
Total	13,065	344	2.82 (from 1990 to 2016)

Note: KOICA sport volunteers were under the education sector of KOICA volunteers; due to the lack of statistics on sport volunteers from 2017, the above percentage on sport for the entirety of KOICA volunteers involve only data from 1990 to 2016.

Source: Statistics on the number of KOICA volunteers from 1990 to 2017 from *Hannune ilgeun 2017nyeon World Friends Korea juyo tonggye* [Key Statistics on World Friends Korea 2017 at a Glance] (KOICA, 2018); statistics on the number of KOICA sport volunteers collected through the information disclosure system of the government website *Jeongbo Gonggae* [Disclosure],

<https://www.open.go.kr/com/main/mainView.do>.

Table 3*Dispatch of Experts and Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors Numbers*

	Experts (including Taekwondo)	Taekwondo Instructors	Percentage of Taekwondo (%)
1991	72	20	27.7
1992	82	20	24.3
1993	89	17	19.1
1994	102	13	12.7
1995	112	12	10.7
1996	115	13	11.3
1997	95	15	15.7
1998	73	15	20.5
1999	77	13	16.8
2000	77	13	16.8
2001	82	14	17.07
2002	73	14	19.1
2003	78	18	23.07
2004	86	19	22.09
2005	93	19	20.4
2006	92	18	19.5
2007	60	17	28.3
2008	50	13	26.0
Total	1508	283	18.7

Note: Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors (DTI) was part of KOICA's Dispatch of Experts program.

Source: Statistics on the number of the Dispatch of Experts from <https://www.oda.go.kr/opo/>; statistics on the number of the Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors collected through the information disclosure system of the government website *Jeongbo Gonggae* [Disclosure],

<https://www.open.go.kr/com/main/mainView.do>.

KOICA Sport Volunteers

In 1989, the Korean government launched a program that placed overseas volunteers at the forefront of Korean ODA, named “Korea Youth Volunteers” (later renamed “Korea Overseas Volunteers;” also known as “KOICA Volunteers” and “World Friends KOICA Volunteers”).

This program was supervised by the Korean National Commission for UNESCO. Following the

project in April 1990 to establish KOICA, Korea Youth Volunteers was transferred to the auspices of KOICA. KOICA dispatched 44 volunteers abroad on September 1st, 1990, and eight of the total 44 volunteers were responsible for the fields of physical education (3), football (2), and Taekwondo (3) (KOICA, 2001, 112). Thus, KOICA's sport volunteer programming actually started a few months prior to its official establishment in September 1991. Following the structure of general KOICA volunteer programs, sport volunteers are dispatched to low- and middle-income countries in the Global South, with the bulk of them serving in sport federations, sport and community centres, and local schools. Notably, there is no official name designating these sport volunteer programs, which fall under the educational sector. These volunteers are commonly referred to as "KOICA *chaeyuk gyoyuk* [physical education] volunteers." However, contrary to what the phrase "physical education volunteers" suggests, volunteers are not only placed in the fields of physical education and school sport, but also posted to sports federations, community (sport) centres, the police force, army, and athletic departments of local and national governments in recipient countries. In this regard, volunteers are not strictly only involved in physical education. Accordingly, this dissertation collectively refers to KOICA volunteers of sport and physical education programs as *sport volunteers* hereafter. KOICA sport volunteers hold high qualifications that generally include elite athletic skills, expert knowledge, practical experience, and related certifications in applicants' specialty fields. To provide an example, applicants for Taekwondo-related volunteer programs are required to possess a fourth-degree black belt at minimum, or a Taekwondo instructor certificate issued by the Korean government. Korean men and women over the age of 19 are eligible to apply, but male applicants must have already completed the mandatory military service or be exempt.

Potential participants from all fields, including sport, who have already passed through a preliminary selection process (such as the document screening stage, interviews, physical exams, and so on) are required to undergo a 6-8 week domestic training (which varies depending on the type of volunteers) at the KOICA Global *Injae* [Talent] Training Institute (also known as World Friends Village), in either Yeongwol (located in Gangwon-do province, <https://wfv.koica.go.kr/>) or Seoul (<https://blog.naver.com/worldfriendsyw>). At the domestic training camp, trainees are educated about the knowledge and skills required for their specific overseas placement. Additionally, they learn about Korean language, cultural traditions, and the history and common values of Korean society, as well as how to adjust to leading a group life that values collective goals, experiences (e.g. wearing the standard uniform), and a shared identity as “citizen diplomats” (World Friends Korea, 2018). Sport volunteers are matched to meet the specific demands of the host organizations in recipient countries, with most of them sent to sports federations and sports-related governmental agencies. In fact, these receiving agencies often submit requests for current or former athletes that are highly qualified in their specific specialty sport. Thus, most sport volunteers are university students in athletic programs with excellent athletic skills, extensive experience, and government-issued certifications.

It is pertinent to focus on the establishment of “World Friends Korea (WFK).” As previously mentioned in the Actors and Terms in Korean ODA section above, the Korean government integrated seven overseas volunteer programs of five different ministries under the name of World Friends Korea in 2009. Since then, KOICA Volunteers have officially been called “World Friends KOICA Volunteers,” or “WFK-KOV” for short. Taekwondo programs under KOICA sport volunteers share many notable commonalities with the WFK Taekwondo Peace Corp program affiliated with the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST).

Nevertheless, Taekwondo has been a crucial and distinct element of KOICA volunteer programs (See Table 4). Another program of interest is the KOICA cooperation technical program “International Cooperation Personnel (ICP),” which ran from 1995 to 2014. ICP was created as a solution for the difficulties KOICA experienced in recruiting qualified Korean youth as volunteers. Operated as an alternative to military service, this program targeted young Korean men on the government’s military conscription lists. Volunteers were divided into two categories: International Cooperation Medical Doctors and International Cooperation Volunteers (ICV). ICV was fully administered and supervised by KOICA Volunteers, and subsequently, the recruitment of volunteers involved the same standards as KOICA Volunteers. For example, applicants for ICV’s sport sector were required to demonstrate athletic excellence and expertise and hold relevant government-issued certifications in their specialty (sport) fields. Thus, similar to the selection of Taekwondo sport volunteers, all ICV Taekwondo volunteers possessed at least a fourth-degree black belt or Taekwondo instructor certificate. As ICV volunteers were not distinctly separated from KOICA Volunteers in KOICA documents, this dissertation also places ICV sport in the same category as KOICA sport volunteers, without distinction.

Table 4*KOICA Sport Volunteers and Taekwondo Volunteers Numbers*

	Sport Volunteers (including Taekwondo)	Taekwondo Volunteers	Percentage of Taekwondo (%)
1990	8	3	37.5
1991	4	0	0
1992	1	0	0
1993	2	0	0
1994	4	2	50
1995	3	2	66.6
1996	6	2	33.3
1997	4	4	100
1998	6	4	66.6
1999	0	0	0
2000	2	2	100
2001	3	2	66.6
2002	2	2	100
2003	1	0	0
2004	5	3	60
2005	11	6	54.5
2006	12	7	58.3
2007	21	11	52.3
2008	15	12	80
2009	23	16	69.5
2010	35	17	48.5
2011	22	12	54.5
2012	29	12	41.3
2013	33	21	63.6
2014	28	19	67.8
2015	33	18	54.5
2016	31	23	74.1
Total	344	200	58.1

Note: Taekwondo volunteers referred to here are the KOICA sport volunteers in charge of Taekwondo programs in recipient countries.

Source: Statistics on the number of KOICA sport volunteers collected through the information

disclosure system of the government website *Jeongbo Gong-gae* [Disclosure],

<https://www.open.go.kr/com/main/mainView.do>.

Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors (DTI)

Looking at the dispatch of Korean experts to developing countries more generally, Taekwondo instructors were first dispatched by the Korean government to Lesotho in 1972. This program was then transferred to KOICA in 1991, continuing under the name of “Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors” (DTI) until 2008 in affiliation with the KOICA Dispatch of Experts programs. Applicants for the DTI program had to be below 35 years of age, discharged from compulsory military service, and holders of at least a fourth-degree black belt in Taekwondo. These requirements seem identical to the requirements for recruiting Taekwondo sport volunteers under non-DTI programs. However, there are two critical differences. First, unlike the selection of sport volunteers for Taekwondo, DTI participants are selected from a pool of Taekwondo instructors nominated by the Korean MCST, relevant organizations such as World Taekwondo (previously called the World Taekwondo Federation), *Kukkiwon* (the World Taekwondo Headquarters), the Korea Taekwondo Association, and from registered Taekwondo instructors (KOICA, 2001). Second, regulations explicitly stated that DTI instructors were to 1) be matched to Taekwondo federations and governmental agencies responsible for national Taekwondo in recipient countries; 2) play a significant role in promoting Taekwondo development of recipient countries by serving as “coaches for the recipient countries’ national teams” (KOICA, 1994b, p. 66) in the pursuit of “winning prizes in international Taekwondo competitions” (p. 66); 3) be responsible for “spread[ing] the popularity of Taekwondo” (p. 66) in recipient countries; and 4) be preferentially selected from applicants with an athletic career in, and experience of, “international tournaments to better help developing countries properly prepare for international competitions” (KOICA, 2002, p 34). Since 2008, the DTI program has been overseen by the Korean MCST and placed under the domain of World Friends Taekwondo

Peace Corps. While the DTI program did not account for a significant number and percentage of the entire Dispatch of Experts programs from 1991 to 2008 (See Table 3), its symbolic value was greater than its quantitative weight. Indeed, most introductions in the early years of KOICA's annual reports as well as the highlighted successful stories commonly focused on how DTI programs and their instructors successfully enabled Korean (KOICA) ODA by delivering Korean knowledge and skills, ultimately allowing for elite Taekwondo development. The years from 1991 to 2008, when the DTI program was under KOICA's supervision, will be the target of examination in this dissertation. This study does not cover DTI after it was transferred to MCST's jurisdiction.

Sport Aid

Sport aid is the last pillar of the KOICA sport triad. KOICA has implemented a host of sport aid projects in recipient countries over three decades, and notably, the majority of sport aid projects have involved the construction of Taekwondo sport centres and facilities, aiming to enhance the high-performance skills of national Taekwondo athletes and promote the popularity of Korean Taekwondo – a World Taekwondo distinct from North Korea's International Taekwondo – in recipient countries. This study looks at three significant projects in sport aid: *The Construction of a Taekwondo Hall in Tunisia (1997–1999)*, *The Project for Improving Taekwondo Training Center of Khanh Hoa Police Department in Vietnam (1999)*, and *The Project for Construction of Korea-Indonesia Friendship Sports Center in Indonesia (2003–2005)*. The names of the first two projects indicate a straightforward intention to enhance the athletic performance of local Taekwondo athletes within recipient countries, contrasting with the Indonesian sport centre project, which explicitly promoted greater public participation in sport and physical activity programs to improve public health and social development outcomes.

Nevertheless, as the project report (KOICA, 2006) listed one of the beneficiaries to be “Indonesian national Taekwondo” (p. 5), all three projects are more or less linked to the development of organized Taekwondo sport overseas. Furthermore, sport aid seems to be the most politicized practice of KOICA sport, to draw quid pro quo from recipient countries. These issues are discussed in detail in Article II of this dissertation.

Situating KOICA Sport in International Development

KOICA sport’s chief objective is to assist the development of institutionalized sport and to provide sports equipment, facilities, and training practices in recipient countries. KOICA sport volunteers are matched to meet the specific demands of each local placement site, with most volunteers being placed in sports federations and sports-related ministries to serve as coaches for local and national teams. KOICA is often asked to send former or current highly qualified Korean athletes. From 1991 to 2008, the priority of DTI was to enhance the Taekwondo skills of recipient athletes, with the aim to foster top-tier Taekwondo athletes and promote Taekwondo growth in recipient countries. As such, experienced, highly qualified Taekwondo coaches were placed overseas to ensure the success of the program. KOICA sport aid also intends to enhance institutionalized sport in recipient countries, mainly by providing advanced training facilities and equipment. In this respect, KOICA sport’s approach is closely related to sport development, which promotes sport culture in general. Kidd (2008) describes sport development as “a project of sporting organizations” (p. 373). In other words, sport development seeks to advance the sport system as a whole, by focusing not only on strengthening sport structures and institutions but also cultivating high-performance skills to perform better at sports competitions. Along with this sport development approach, KOICA sport also represents the current SFD movement, which treats sport as a tool for tackling social development issues targeted by the international

development agenda. Since 1991, KOICA has consistently stated its aim to pursue “economic and social development in developing countries” in official documents and on its websites (KOICA, n.d.). In this respect, KOICA sport also intends to promote education, public health, social welfare, and community development in recipient countries. Interestingly, SFD seems to have gained popularity with KOICA sport since the mid-2000s. This reflects the tendency of Korean sport to follow international development trends and involve itself with the social development issues laid out in the MDGs (Ha, Lee, & Ok, 2015; Kim et al, 2013).

The growing amount of foreign aid provided by Asian donors like China, Japan, and South Korea is not so much triggered by a determination to pursue development-related goals as it is by political considerations, such as a desire to join the ranks of the advanced countries of the Global North – a membership which traditionally has been granted only to Western (European) nations. This is important as it signifies a symbolic superiority in economy and technology, as well as in cultural and political aspects (Sato, 2013; Watson, 2014). Similarly, Korea’s attempt to join the OECD in 1996 – which represented a transformation from “the 24th poorest country” in the world (KOICA, 2011, p. 36) to a “more advanced developing countr[y]” (KOICA, 2011, p. 40), DAC member in 2009, and one of the “global leaders and the wealthiest countries in the world” (KOICA, 2011, p. 37) – does not particularly concern the international development agenda. Rather, it is Korea’s response to power struggles taking place over the reorganization of international relations, which involves newly emerging political actors such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Kim, 2016; Kim & Gray, 2016). In other words, Korean foreign aid and development interventions represent a strategic political move to occupy more space in the international sphere, as a middle power contributing to world peace and security (Roehrig, 2013). This is made clear by the fact that the majority of Korean ODA has focused on

developing countries in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia (KOICA, 2019). This is a means for Korea to strengthen and reposition itself as “a dominant regional power” (Mo, 2016, p. 589) and a middle power on the global stage (Howe, 2017; Kim & Garland, 2019). In this respect, Korea’s fervent pursuit to become the host of international sporting games in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (e.g. the 1978 World Shooting Championship, the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, and 1988 Seoul Olympic Games) can be connected to the state’s objective to show off the “Miracle on the Han River” (KOICA, 2011, p. 34), or “Korean ‘Miracle’” (Pirie, 2008, p. 2), to the world. Following the success of the 1988 Olympics, which was monopolized by the modern Western (European) countries of the Global North, Korea successfully obtained the symbolic status of modernity – a common motivation for Asian developmental states to continue hosting global sporting events (Black & Peacock, 2011). Taking a step further, Darnell (2007) illustrates that the international SFD approaches of the West serve to construct and reproduce a privileged position of superiority, or a particular form of authority, called “Whiteness” (p. 560). Korea’s strategy to follow the current development agenda, including involving itself with SDP initiatives and the MDGs, provide it with another avenue to achieve the subject position of authority and superiority typically dominated by the West.

Situating KOICA Sport in Diplomacy

Korea’s initial ODA programming involved sending Korean Taekwondo instructors to Lesotho in 1972, playing a role in giving South Korea a diplomatic advantage over North Korea during the Cold War. In the early 1960s, Korean Taekwondo instructors had already been posted as drillmasters in the South Vietnamese army to help promote Korea’s international image and strengthen its diplomatic relationship with South Vietnam, another anti-Communist nation (Johnson, 2018). As explained earlier, Korea has long regarded international sport as a tool for

achieving diplomatic objectives. In other words, sport has been employed as a tool to implement strategies and achieve various diplomacy goals (Merkel, 2008). Emphasizing elite sport development helps to showcase Korea's sporting prowess and promote its image on the global stage, which explains the effort put in by Korea to win the right to host top-tier global sporting events. The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were seen as an opportunity to introduce the global community to Korea's new modern image (Collins, 2011), and Lee (2016) even asserts that the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Games were meant to reflect Korea's strong desire to conform to Western cultural hegemony and privilege.

Korea's approach to the use of sport for international development has been carefully selected to fulfill the government's ODA goals (Na & Dallaire, 2015). In a literature review of research on Korean SFD, Na and Dallaire (2015) state that most studies regarding the integration of sport and Korean international development (mostly ODA) focus on its diplomatic use and their accompanying benefits. Details on how Korean SFD is likely to integrate with sport diplomacy approaches are discussed in the Literature Review chapter. Furthermore, an argument that KOICA sport aid projects tend to come with diplomatic conditions are made in Article II of this dissertation.

Situating KOICA Sport within the Domestic Policy and Political Context

In 2008, the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013) established WFK, combining several state-run overseas volunteer programs. Its establishment was greatly tied to Lee's Global Young Leader Training policy, which aimed to cultivate internationally competitive Korean youth by encouraging them to go abroad through government-sponsored programs. Lee's administration aimed to send 100,000 Korean youth volunteers overseas between 2009 and 2013. As shown in Table 2, the number of KOICA sport volunteers started to rise rapidly from 2009 onwards. In

addition, in 2015 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between KOICA and the PyeongChang Organizing Committee. Under this contract, KOICA Volunteers were mobilized to promote Korea's first-ever Winter Olympics to recipient countries (Wang, 2015). This supports the idea that KOICA sport, as a state-run program, is linked to the politics informing Korean international development and makes use of sport as a tool to address the state's domestic policy goals and political objectives. Furthermore, this argument can be extended to touch upon the neoliberal politics of South Korea, which were fully accelerated by the Lee Myung-bak government. For example, the Global Young Leader policy and its accompanying strategies were a response to a particularly pressing domestic issue at the time, youth unemployment, and the problems faced during the process of neoliberal reformation (Kim, 2018). This argument is supported by research showing that the decisions of young Koreans to volunteer abroad is actually influenced by the neoliberal policy goals and schemes of the Korean government (e.g. Cho & Mosselson, 2018; Kim, 2018; Park, 2010; Yoon, 2014, 2015).

Specifically, one of the dominant discourses promoted by the Lee government focused on the necessity of enhancing Korean youth's global competitiveness and personal development and framed his Global Young Leader Policy, which mainly targeted Korean youth. Importantly, the central themes of global competitiveness and personal development were certainly designed to enhance one's profitability and employability, to increase the rates of employment (Yoon, 2014). That is, the creation of a generation of young Koreans who pursue self-development through international experience and a global mind-set (the recipe for creating "profitable citizens") was a crucial policy target of the Lee government (Kim, 2018). Individuals that did not fit into this box were categorized as irresponsible members of society – unprofitable "wasted youth" (Yoon, 2015, p. 85). Lee's preferred neoliberal subjects were more likely to accept Korean nationalism.

That is, Korean youth who develop themselves as competitive, employable global leaders – the ideal subjects of the neoliberal Korean government – are seen as true Korean citizens and responsible members of society (Kim, 2018). This view is reminiscent of the linkage made between sport and nationalism by the military regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, both wielded national development like a weapon to squash criticisms of regime legitimacy and override public calls for democracy and individual freedom. The Park regime encouraged Korean citizens to help increase national prosperity by promoting sport to cultivate healthy minds and strong bodies, thereby leading to the creation of a “sound” Korean people (Ha & Mangan, 2002). National development, which involved the mixing of sport and nationalism, pushed the Korean public to pursue collective goals and share in a group identity whilst simultaneously restraining individual desires and preventing civil movements for democracy and political freedom. The 1988 Seoul Olympics are another telling example of the sport-nationalism nexus created under the Chun regime. The regime’s widespread propaganda about the success of the Seoul Olympics, which worked to paint a narrative of Korea’s triumph as a modern nation on the world stage (Mangan, Ok, & Park, 2011), effectively drew public attention away from democracy movements and the dubious legitimacy of the new regime.

Concluding Remarks

It is clear that the Korean government relied heavily on sport aid as a political instrument to win its ideological battle against North Korea in the larger context of the Cold War. Qualified coaches in the Western bloc (or Eastern bloc) were sent to the Third World in the same bloc with explicit goals, the enhancement of athletic performances and the achievement of athletic excellence at the top-tier global sporting events such as the Olympic Games (Levermore, 2009). This approach changed when the notion of sport-for-all aiming to improve people’s well-being

became prioritized in the policy agendas of Western European governments in the 1960s (Straume & Steen-Johnsen, 2010). In addition, critiques of classic development approaches obsessed with economic growth emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while the concepts of human development and social development began to simultaneously exert influence in the field of development (Nerderveen Pieterse, 2010). In this respect, it should be no surprise that sport-oriented development goals in foreign aid and international cooperation also shifted to focus on non-sport development goals that concerned human and social issues such as human rights, gender, race, and sustainability (Straume & Steen-Johnsen, 2010). In line with the structural reformation of the international development agenda (i.e. the MDGs), SDP has ended up dominating twenty-first century SFD initiatives in international development. That being so, SFD in this century is concerned with the methods used for achieving social development goals rather than the achievement of athletic excellence, and conducted by NGOs instead of ministries or governmental agencies responsible for foreign aid. The changes found in twenty-first century SFD approaches clearly demonstrate the singularity of KOICA sport, which maintained the particularities of government-run Korean SFD programs, and thus upholds the legacy of political objectives strongly influencing the use of sport for international development.

Nevertheless, it is worth taking a closer look at how Korea has also shown interest in SDP and the government's efforts to apply SDP and twenty-first century SFD approaches to Korean sport initiatives at both domestic and international levels. Following Woo-Cumings's (1999) understanding of the East Asian developmental state, Black and Peacock (2011) claim that state-led sport initiatives in Asian developmental states, like campaigns to host mega-sporting events especially (e.g. the 1988 Seoul Olympics in Korea), are largely determined by national desires (nationalism) for “‘catching up’ (i.e. following Western scripts) and ‘getting

even' (i.e. outperforming the originators at their own game[s])" (p. 2278). Thus, I believe this research project on Korean SFD can help to showcase this dualism that characterizes the Asian developmental state, which is regulated not only by a Western model of development and mainstream SFD in the twenty-first century, but also by typical Korean practices and knowledge centred on the nationalistic approaches, goals, and subjects of the Korean state.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

Overview

This chapter presents a review of sport-for-development (SFD) literature, focusing on the ways in which SFD and relevant approaches to the integration of sport into international development have been analyzed and sometimes challenged. It is broadly categorized into five sections: international SFD, Korean SFD, SFD in sport diplomacy, Korean SFD in the sport diplomacy context, and SFD as related to domestic policy and politics.

SFD at the International Level

The history of the use of sport as a tool for international social development, represented by the popular twenty-first century SFD initiative, is quite long (Darnell et al., 2019; Kidd, 2008; Giulianotti, 2011a; Millington & Kidd, 2019). Kidd (2008) traces the origins of SFD back to nineteenth-century Western European colonization. Giulianotti (2011a) situates the current form of SFD, defined as the sport for development and peace (SDP) sector, as having been preceded by two different stages in history. From the late eighteenth- to mid-twentieth century, sport was seen as essential for fulfilling European “colonial projects” (Giulianotti, 2011a, p. 209), and from the 1940s to 1990s, sport played a role in the struggle and resistance of former and currently colonized nations in the colonial and post-colonial context. SFD has been institutionally adopted in the mid 1990s into the international development agenda as a result of the emergence of the SDP sector. Darnell et al. (2019) argue that SFD can be framed within the narrative history of sport-for-good. They write that the value of sport-for-good for delivering social and moral benefits was initially promoted by English public school masters and the founders of the Olympic Games, and this narrative was disseminated globally through the worldwide popularity of the English public schooling system and Olympic Games (Darnell et al., 2019).

Nevertheless, the current approach for sport in international social development is different, particularly in terms of 1) the institutionalization of SFD; 2) the multitude of development organizations involved, at both the governmental and non-governmental levels; 3) the hundreds of SFD projects that have been implemented in developing countries in the Global South; and 4) sport and international development projects that are run not only by classic SFD actors like governmental agencies, but also NGOs, sports federations, transnational corporations, and other private parties (Coalter, 2010b; Kidd, 2008; Levermore, 2009). At the same time, scholarly interest in the topic has also climbed sharply in the last two decades, seemingly sparking a new trend in twenty-first century sport studies and the sociology of sport and sport management areas in particular. For example, this includes scholarly interest in conceptual understandings of SFD (Coalter, 2010a; Kidd, 2008; Levermore & Beacom, 2009), corporate social responsibility (Hayhurst, 2011; Khan, Westwood, Boje, 2010; Levermore, 2010), global sporting events (Black & Northam, 2017; Black & Peacock, 2011; de-San-Eugenio et al., 2017; Reis, Vieira, & de Sousa-Mast, 2016; Schulenkorf, 2016; Sherry, 2010), sport policy (Giulianotti, 2011b; Hayhurst, 2009), sport diplomacy (Black & Peacock, 2013; de-San-Eugenio et al., 2017; Murray, 2018; Murray & Pigman, 2014), social capital (Burnett, 2006; Coalter, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Peachey, Bruening, Lyras, Cohen, & Cunningham, 2015; Peachey, Cohen, Borland, & Lyras, 2011), gender and female empowerment (Foster, 2014; Hayhurst, 2014; Pizzolati & Sterchele, 2016), race (Darnell, 2007, 2010b), sport volunteering (Darnell, 2011; Clarke & Salisbury, 2017; Fletcher & Cullinane, 2017; Lucas & Jeanes, 2019; Smith, Cohen, & Pickett, 2014), and foreign aid and domestic politics (Beacom, 2009; Hasselgård, 2015).

Four Critiques of Existing SFD Research

An integrative review conducted by Schulenkorf et al. (2016) of English-language SFD research publications from 2000 to 2014 presents a comprehensive picture of SFD at both the academic and practical levels. Among the issues covered in their study's findings and discussion, four critical points framed how my research project would contribute to SFD research literature. First, according to Schulenkorf et al. (2016), only 10% of existing research (39/437) is focused on the examination of SFD at the international level, whereas the majority of SFD research (256/437, 58%) is directed towards development effects seen at the community level. Schulenkorf et al. (2016) argue that "given the popular rhetoric around sport for peace and reconciliation" (p. 34) reiterated in SFD discourse, this is rather unexpected. It is because SFD studies in the global setting should examine a variety of issues regarding cost, security, time, health, and so on (Schulenkorf et al., 2016). The analysis of international SFD also requires the integration of sport with a range of critical themes in the fields of international development and global politics, such as political economy, globalization, neoliberalism, and social development (Darnell et al., 2018). Understanding individual foreign aid systems and the politics of domestic stakeholders is important to the study of SFD in international development (Hasselgård, 2015). Predictably, the understanding of such extensive subjects across sport, government policy and politics, and development in domestic and international contexts may result in a more time-consuming analytical process, potentially presenting a barrier to the study of international SFD. Throughout the 20-year history of SFD studies, there has been little attention given to the analysis of SFD on the global scale. This indicates the need for research on international SFD to consider a comprehensive understanding of programs, to cover sport-specific issues in addition to a critical range of emerging issues in sociocultural and political studies.

Second, Schulenkorf et al. (2016) write that 92% of SFD researchers come from the West, mostly from North America, Europe, and Australia in particular, whereas the vast majority of SFD programs and initiatives are designed for and implemented in developing countries of non-Western regions such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Similarly, Burnett (2014) argues that SFD research is mostly based on Western intellectual modalities and practices in which sport researchers have been educated. Thus, she calls for a radical transformation in order to deconstruct the hegemony of Western-dominated intellectualism in SFD, which perpetuates neocolonial and neoliberal philosophies that frame the non-West as Others by those deemed to be the subjects in SFD (Burnett, 2014). This is reminiscent of Lindsey and Grattan's (2012) call for the incorporation of new and alternative methodologies in future SFD research and their criticism of the instrumental and hegemonic perspectives of Western SFD researchers that view local SFD practitioners and participants in the Global South as subjugated "others" (Lindsey & Grattan, 2012). Their findings show that the combination of the decentred and actor-oriented approaches allows a consideration of autonomy and local agency in the Sub-Saharan African context, which, as Cornelissen (2004) argues, counters the "prevailing Western portrayals of the African continent" (p. 1302). This is also supported by indigenous SFD scholars like Mwaanga and Mwansa (2013), who advocate that indigenous discourse enables researchers to consider alternative trajectories in SFD to unsettle its deep-rooted Western centrism. It is important to critically reflect on the implications of SFD studies that are conducted by Western or Western-educated researchers, including Darnell et al.'s (2018) questioning of whether researchers in the non-West are actually interested in SFD research, or whether SFD or SFD-related research already exists with different objectives and articles written in their languages. These concerns underline the chronicity of Western-led research tradition and intellectual strategy that steer

toward Western knowledge traditions, or direct non-Western sport researchers to Western-dominated SFD. Considering Schulenkorf et al.'s (2016) work, one more question can be asked: Does SFD research originating from Asia account for only 2%? As Schulenkorf et al. (2016) note, this data arises from English-language SFD articles, which implies that a greater number of SFD-relevant articles may exist and continue to be studied in other languages. In either case, the need for alternative perspectives to SFD research, particularly from non-West scholars, is clear.

Third, football is the most common type of SFD sports program (Schulenkorf et al., 2016), followed by other internationally popular institutionalized sports. This reminds us of the relevancy of Darnell's (2007) argument that northern-led development in the Global South "is not an apolitical project, but is representative of a particular political philosophy" (p. 565), as well as Darnell et al.'s (2018) concerns regarding "whether the popularity of football in SDP is neutral or whether in fact it constitutes a form of hegemony" (p. 136). Levermore and Beacom (2009) also argue that most sport activities in SFD are based on Western-oriented sport culture. It is then necessary to point out the fact that modern institutionalized sport originates from the West, and furthermore, that social and cultural elements of the West are inherently entrenched in these sports (Levermore & Beacom, 2009; Maguire, 1999). Considering Kidd's (2008) view of European colonial projects in the larger context of SFD history, sport was used as a method for constructing Western-centric civilization and modernization, as well as for inculcating Western knowledge and modalities within the non-West, although the nature of sport is superficially represented as apolitical. It is also important to remember, as urged by Darnell et al. (2018) and Sterchele (2015), that institutionalized sports might not be appropriate for SFD programs and organizations that seek social inclusivity and non-competitive ethos. In other words, considering that SFD involves the common good and social justice as "a new social movement" (Kidd, 2008,

p. 370), institutionalized modern sports rooted in the features of competition, hierarchy, and separation should be reformulated (Sterchele, 2015). In this respect, Taekwondo, as a signature KOICA sport program and Korean cultural product, could provide an alternative approach to SFD. It can be considered a response to recent calls for investigation into the impact of alternative sports and activities for twenty-first century SFD.

The last point pertains to the dispositional underpinning of SFD programs recently run by NGOs. In fact, this concern is largely unrelated to Schulenkorf et al.'s (2016) research findings, but I am compelled to highlight the quantity of SFD research focusing on programs run by NGOs. Initially, SFD emerged to represent a global transitioning away from governmental intervention and politically influenced decision-making, and a greater involvement of (global) civil society in international development (Coalter, 2010a; Giulianotti, 2011b). In fact, SFD programs guided by the MDGs and SDGs are the result of partnerships between NGOs and other international development organizations (Giulianotti, 2011b; Kidd, 2008). Research efforts have mostly focused on SFD NGOs and their programs. This focus needs to be critically reconsidered to improve the diversity and breadth of SFD research and to meet Schulenkorf et al.'s (2016) demands for more unique SFD research in the global context. In reality, most SFD NGOs rely heavily on governmental development agencies and international development organizations (Coalter, 2010b; Hasselgård, 2015), and leading SFD donor countries including Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom have exerted policy influence over the direction and aim of SFD NGOs (Giulianotti, 2011b). Millington's (2015) reference to the current twenty-first century SFD paradigm as an "ahistorical rendering of SDP" (p. 24) comes to mind when considering this context. The imbalanced research emphasis on SFD NGOs and their programs might therefore represent a new hegemonic strategy to forge and lead new trends in sport studies

already embedded in Western research practice. It is vital to raise the question of whether there are any SFD programs run without the influence of government agencies. For example, leading Asian donors such as Korea, China, and Japan conventionally empower the state and government agencies when collaborating with international development community agencies (Sato & Shimomura, 2013; Watson, 2014). Indeed, KOICA sport is state-run and has been an irreplaceable asset of Korean ODA for three decades. This dissertation, which focuses on KOICA sport as a state-run SFD program affiliated with the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can be considered as a contribution to a relatively untouched domain in SFD research.

Mainstream SFD Discourses

Based on existing SFD literature, I divided mainstream discourses on international SFD into two categories that relate specifically to donor-recipient relations: “Northern donor hegemony” and the “alternative Southern (recipient) perspectives.”

Northern Donor Hegemony.

For two decades, there has been a leading strand of SFD literature that views the Global North’s use of sport in international development as a hegemonic project to sustain and reproduce Northern authority and power in the Global South (the non-West). Darnell is a representative scholar of this perspective (e.g. Darnell, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013) and builds on Gramscian hegemony theory that focuses on the ways in which the hegemonic positions of relatively dominant groups are procured through social and cultural negotiations with subordinate classes in societal and cultural hierarchies. He examines how sport as an international development tool serves and sustains the hegemony of Whiteness as a position of racialized privilege (2007), Northern-led neoliberal development (2010), and Northern ideals and meanings (2012) ascribed in sport to be maintained and reproduced in international development

practices. In response to Lindsey and Grattan's (2012) criticism of hegemonic perspectives that simplify the complexity of SFD practices and exaggerate the Global North's domination of the Global South, Darnell and Hayhurst (2012) re-emphasize the importance of hegemony as a conceptual approach in SFD research. Emphasizing power and dominance in hegemony theory as non-static methods for mobilizing others through the social negotiation of authority and consent, they advocate that hegemony can be used to identify local challenges and negotiations in and through developmental interventions within power relations (Darnell & Hayhurst, 2012).

While hegemony theory is not treated as a specific theoretical framework, hegemonic perspectives are often employed by critical sport sociologists in leading Western SFD countries to understand the asymmetrical and unequal power relations that exist between Northern donors and Southern recipients (e.g. Hayhurst, 2009; Levermore, 2009; Nicholls et al., 2010). For example, Hayhurst (2009) confirms that the hegemony of neoliberal policy decision-making is recognized in SDP policy discourse. By identifying key elements of Western neoliberal policy such as privatization, individualism, productivity, and self-responsibility, she illustrates that neoliberal hegemony, like the MDGs driven by the leading donor countries of the Global North, is entrenched in SDP policy (Hayhurst, 2009). Levermore (2009) raises concerns that sport may be a tool to solidify the hegemony of privileged groups in higher-income Northern nations and Northern sports organizations, enabled through the promotion of particular norms and guidelines that regulate the actions of populations in the Global South. Saavedra (2009) cautions that the deployment of sport to achieve gender equality and female empowerment simultaneously triggers the transfer of particular norms and ideologies entrenched in the hegemonic structure of global sports. In other words, attempts to empower gender through sport actually engender the opposite effect, such as the transfer and reproduction of the Euro-American patriarchal

hegemonic system to the Global South (Saavedra, 2009). Based on Foucault's (1980) power-knowledge nexus, Nicholls et al. (2011) also see development as hegemonic Northern knowledge that exerts privileged power and functions to subjugate local knowledge in the Global South. Following this understanding, they reveal that the lack of co-creation knowledge, the politics of partnerships, and donor-driven priorities and top-down approaches are hegemonic functions of Northern SFD that serve to situate and solidify the subjugated knowledge position of grassroots practitioners, accelerating the lack of evidence discourse in SFD practice. Similarly, Adams and Harris (2014) examine how the lack of evidence discourse is produced and circulated in the field of SFD, through the assumption of SFD in which diverse stakeholders such as policy makers, private institutions, academics, and practitioners are intricately involved. They conclude with the argument that the generation of evidence in SFD is tied to neoliberal hegemony. Thus, discourses of evidence in SFD painstakingly establish a position of privilege for neoliberalism and its stakeholders (Adams & Harris, 2014).

Alternative Southern (Recipient) Perspectives.

In opposition to the hegemonic perspectives of SFD researchers from leading Western donor countries, the other perspective identified in mainstream SFD discourse states that non-Western recipients in the Global South should not simply be seen as subjugated objects and passive others in hegemonic Western SFD, but actors that actively challenge, resist, and adjust SFD knowledge and interventions within local contexts. For example, Lindsey and Grattan (2012) highlight the limits of hegemonic perspectives in SFD literature that simplify the complexity of SFD practices in the Global South, overstate the domination of neoliberal agendas, and sustain uncritical understandings of local knowledge, voices, and actors in the Global South. Thus, they call for decentred and actor-oriented approaches that require the in-depth involvement

of researchers in local SFD practices (Lindsey & Grattan, 2012). Post-development scholars (e.g. Escobar, 1984; Crush, 1995; Sachs, 1990; Ziai, 2007) see development as a systematic rule that is arbitrarily controlled and determined by Western actors and donors. This view of development is criticized by development sociologists like Long (2001) who advocates for actor-oriented approaches that require more involvement in the daily lives of individuals and their social interactions, rather than focusing on the larger system. Combining post-development perspectives with actor-oriented approaches, Hasselgård and Straume (2014) show that local agencies of the Southern recipient country critically reflected and transformed the hegemonic Western discourses of Norwegian SDP. Formal (official) discourses of Norwegian SDP in the Global North are not always transferred to local realities in Zimbabwe, but rather, translated, reinterpreted, and somehow resisted by local, informal (unofficial) practices to some extent.

Furthermore, there are cases in which the knowledge and strategies of SFD volunteers from the Global North are minimally adopted or even resisted through Southern local practices. Lucas and Jeanes's (2019) ethnographic research on the role of Northern volunteers in SFD finds that these volunteers encounter heavy resistance and even feel frustration when promoting SFD projects in local Southern contexts. This research is based on the experience of Lucas's efforts to transfer Australian-based expertise and knowledge (referred to by Lucas and Jeanes as Northern knowledge) as a volunteer assisting cricket development in the Solomon Islands (2019). They conclude by arguing that local staff and communities are not passive recipients of SFD, especially when considering how local agencies in the Solomon Islands rejected the imposition of cricket development as it did not meet local needs (Lucas & Jeanes, 2019). Thus, Lucas and Jeanes (2019) support Lindsey and Grattan's (2012) call for alternative approaches to SFD in the Global South that go beyond the Northern neocolonial assumptions. Likewise, some indigenous

researchers in and from the Global South like Mwaanga and Mwansa (2013) suggest that indigenous perspectives can be alternatives to SDP projects to help deconstruct the Northern hegemonic understanding of development practice in the South. They introduce Ubuntu, an alternative concept for understanding collective values like sympathy and reciprocity in the sub-Saharan African cultural context – a distinct contrast with the individualism of the North – and show how EduSport Foundation, an SDP NGO in Zambia, has adopted an operational model that hybridizes Northern individualism and Southern Ubuntu philosophies.

Notably, Korea is socioeconomically positioned in the Global North (Grugel & Hout, 2003) and is a member of the leading OECD's DAC donor club. It has sought Korean-specific methods of participation in international development, which is reflected by the so-called "South Korean model of ODA" (also known as Korean-style ODA) (Watson, 2012, p. 80). On the other hand, it has also long harboured a desire to be accepted into the exclusive Western (Northern) league, which is especially obvious when considering the state's enthusiastic involvement in the international development agenda, adherence to global norms and values, and repeated characterizations of Korean foreign aid as "Western value-oriented" (Watson, 2014, p. 5). Thus, through the examination of KOICA sport, which comprises the typical Korean ODA features noted above, this dissertation can provide an alternative insight and discourse to existing SFD literature, although the recipient context and local responses are not the focus of this study.

Korean SFD

The integration of sport into international development has received special attention from Korean government agencies and sport academics. It has predominantly received attention for the manner in which sport is used to carry out governmental foreign aid (Korean ODA) instead of the fulfillment of international social development goals. Attempts to apply the social

development values outlined in the UN's MDGs to sport-related Korean ODA programs have seemingly increased, but this is not a true indication that Korea has joined the twenty-first century SFD movement, which is represented by the institutionalization and global popularity of SFD and the emergence of the sport for development and peace (SDP) sector. This is because until the 2010s, there was nearly no mention in Korean-language literature (including government documents, research reports, and academic publication) of sports as relating to the MDGs, or of attempts to integrate sport as an international development tool as per relevant UN resolutions (such as the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/5 of November 16, 2003, titled "Sport as a means to promote health, education, development and peace" [United Nations, 2003]). The Korean-language literature hardly covered the introduction of different terms and abbreviations pertaining to the twenty-first century institutionalization of sport-for-development such as sport-for-development (SFD), sport-in-development (SID), sport for development and peace (SDP), and so on. Only in the late 2000s were the current concepts of SFD and the SDP sector introduced by Korean sport scholars (e.g. Ha et al., 2015; Kwon, 2015) and government-funded research reports, such as the report titled "*Uri sports sunggong sare: ODA Hwalyoung jeolryak yeon-gu*" [A Case Study on Our Sport for Korean ODA Utilization Strategy] (Kim, Park, Kang, Lee, & Kang, 2013). Notably, Korean literature on SFD is divided into English and Korean-language articles.

My dissertation refers to two exemplary English-language articles about Korean SFD: Ha et al.'s (2015) "From Development of Sport to Development through Sport: A Paradigm Shift for Sport Development in South Korea" and Na and Dallaire's (2015) "Korean sport for international development initiatives: exploring new research avenues." Studying the two notions of sport development and development through sport, Ha et al. (2015) illustrate how state

approaches to Korean sport have shifted from a historical focus on sport-specific goals (e.g. the achievement of excellence at global sports competitions) to socially oriented development goals like the MDGs. While these studies are situated in the domestic context of Korea, it is meaningful that Ha et al. (2015) provide an initial contextualization of Korea's use of sport in development following the current concept of SFD and its relevant terms, along with a conceptual attempt to categorize the integration of Korean sport and development into sport development and sport-for-development. They conclude with the recommendation that the Korean government pursue sport-for-development policy to better demonstrate its acceptance of the international development agenda and become a "truly advanced country" (Ha et al., 2015, p. 1274). The findings of the aforementioned research on Korean sport for international development (Na & Dallaire, 2015) were fundamental for laying down the foundation of my research project. I first conducted a review of Korean-language research articles pertaining to Korean sport for social development both domestically and internationally and then determined that there was a strong preference for sport diplomacy approaches, such as pursuing Korean diplomatic objectives and political interests by applying Korean sport in other countries. Following that, I reviewed the leading theories and conceptualizations of SFD in English-language literature conducted by Western sport researchers and considered the potential for applying social capital and critical sociological perspectives to future Korean SFD research (Na & Dallaire, 2015).

In general, Korean-language SFD literature discusses current SFD approaches, the advancement of SDP in the international development agenda, and considerations for the future use of Korean sport in international development, specifically focusing on its role in helping achieve Korean ODA policy goals and strategies. For example, Korean sport sociologist Kwon

(2015) aims to introduce SFD/SDP as a new trend in international sport sociology to Korean sport academics. The author illustrates some critical issues and debates in existing English-language SDP literature from a sociological perspective, including topics related to theoretical and empirical research, policy, and the governing bodies of SDP (Kwon, 2015). Focusing on four specific sport programs funded and run by the Korean MCST from 2013 to 2017, Kim and Kwon (2015) examine how these sport-specific programs are linked to eight of the MDGs. They notably connect these government programs to the fulfillment of Korean ODA, referred to as “sport ODA” (p. 327), to pursue the social development MDG goals (Kim & Kwon, 2015). They conclude that these four programs operated to serve the state’s political objectives, such as promoting the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Games and elevating Korea’s international reputation and had little to do with actually meeting the MDGs (Kim & Kwon, 2015). In the same manner, Kim, Lee, Choi, and Lim’s (2016) review of SFD literature related to the MDGs analyzes whether sport-specific programs affiliated with the Korean government are actually designed to meet the MDGs. Their research finds a lack of meaningful connection between the use of sport for international development and the role of sport in achieving the MDGs, suggesting that these programs might actually be linked to the eventual enhancement of Korean sport diplomacy (Kim et al., 2016). As argued above, this demonstrated tendency towards sport diplomacy is a conventional application for Korean sport in the international development context and will be discussed in more detail in the following “SFD in Sport Diplomacy” section of this dissertation. It is also helpful to consider Kim et al.’s (2013) government-funded research report on the use of Korean sport for Korean ODA. Through a variety of methods, including a review of sport and SFD literature, management tools, and interviews with Western SFD scholars and the directors of SFD programs, Kim et al.’s report presents a far-reaching examination of Korean sport as a

tool for fulfilling Korean ODA, defined by the authors as a “Korean sport ODA model” (Kim et al, 2013, p. 198) designed to strengthen the comparative advantages of Korean sport over the sport of recipient countries. Interestingly, this Korean sport ODA model seems to appropriately adhere to Korean ODA policy strategy, which intentionally invests in the strengthening of Korea’s comparative advantage in the international development community (Jeong, 2017; Marx & Soares, 2013; Sato & Shimomura, 2013; Watson, 2014). While this report was mainly guided by management approaches and benefits, it still offers a comprehensive portrayal of the so-called Korean sport ODA model while also considering the SDP sector and international development contexts. However, thus far, this dissertation is the sole work that focuses on providing a critical and sociopolitical analysis of Korean SFD implemented globally.

SFD in Sport Diplomacy

Foreign aid during the Cold War era was exclusively administered by the state and its national-level government agencies. The government use of sport in international development projects was predominantly planned to meet the state’s diplomatic goals. Methods included dispatching sport coaches overseas, exchanging national athletes, providing sport equipment, and supporting the construction of sport facilities (Murray, 2018). However, given the emergence of SFD in response to the global shift away from governmental intervention and domestic politics in international development (Kidd, 2008; Darnell, 2012), sport diplomacy in twenty-first century SFD has unfolded differently (Murray, 2018). This dissertation is neither concerned with the history of sport diplomacy nor the theoretical development work that ties sport to the sociopolitical momentum and historical events surrounding international diplomacy. Rather, I offer a sport diplomacy perspective to analyze how the link between sport and international development establishes a third connection with diplomacy. Thus, this section focuses entirely

on SFD literature offering sport diplomacy perspectives. Of course, it is difficult to categorize the diplomatic roles played by SFD in the twenty-first century as distinct from those of the Cold War period. Murray (2018) argues that sport diplomacy from the Cold War era is still “purely practical” (pp. 73, 96) in the present day, as sport is considered a cost-effective diplomatic strategy that is relatively low risk and garners higher public exposure. In fact, much literature on sport diplomacy compares the transitional features of sport diplomacy in the Cold War context to those of sport diplomacy in this century, rather than attempting to determine the exact turning period of sport diplomacy history (e.g. Black & Peacock, 2013; de-San-Eugenio et al., 2017; Murray & Pigman, 2014; Murray, 2018).

Sport Diplomacy Approaches in SFD Literature

Black and Peacock (2013) illustrate how the sport diplomacy of international sports organizations has transformed from the club diplomacy of the Cold War era to the present form of network diplomacy. They argue that during the Cold War, sport held cultural diplomatic value and was utilized by governments to host sports exchanges (e.g. the Ping-Pong diplomacy of the 1970s) and sport tours (e.g. the visit of the Canadian amateur ice hockey team to Europe in the 1960s), which can be seen as a “relatively benign precursor” (p. 6) to enhance cooperative international relations. In twenty-first century network diplomacy, sport diplomacy is more complicated (Black & Peacock, 2013). For example, international SFD NGOs such as Right to Play are supported by multiple development stakeholders from both the governmental and non-governmental sectors, as well as transnational corporations. Given that these SFD NGOs adopt diplomatic stances, it is difficult to identify any specific beneficiary in the intricate architecture of the stakeholder group (Black and Peacock, 2013). Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) put in great effort to integrate the development goals of the international development agenda, which

helps to present them as responsible members of the international community and promote a humanitarian image (Murray & Pigman, 2014). Related to this idea, Murray and Pigman (2014) contend that the governing bodies of international organized sport tend to work closely with development organizations like the UN, national governments, and civil society organizations, which grant them international diplomatic leverage. Furthermore, integrating sport diplomacy and the image of humanitarianism also functions to hide organizations' political concerns and boost the visibility of actors that publicly pursue human development goals (Murray, 2018). Murray (2018) introduces Australian sport diplomacy as an example of how the integration of sport diplomacy and SFD has been effective at the policy level. *The Australian Sports Diplomacy Strategy* (2015) states that it is intended to enhance "development and public diplomacy activities by providing high-quality, high-impact sport for development programs that link identified development outcomes with Australia's diplomatic goals" (p. 5). As stated in the Australian Sports Diplomacy Strategy (2015) report, the country's diplomatic goals seek to extend Australia's regional might in "the Indo-Pacific region" (p. 5) through SFD initiatives. Australia's approach is reminiscent of the Korean foreign policy strategy to promote Korean national interests by enhancing its role in regional peacebuilding and development in Asia (Howe, 2017). Howe (2017) argues that South Korea has obtained greater visibility and power as a leading regional actor through public diplomacy that integrates the development and humanitarian goals of the MDGs and SDGs.

Korea began to integrate the concept of public diplomacy into its foreign policy framework in 2008. A Korean form of public diplomacy called "Korean public diplomacy" officially emerged in 2010 (MOFA, n.d), and it has integrated sport diplomacy since 2014 (MOFA, n.d.). As mentioned earlier, sport has a long history as a state diplomatic tool employed

to achieve goals related to the rebranding of Korea's image and promotion of its international reputation (Collins, 2010). Although sport diplomacy was officially adopted as a Korean public diplomacy strategy only in 2014, sport had already served similar covert diplomatic roles for decades prior during the period of Korean nation-building. Accordingly, Murray (2018) proposes two categories of sport diplomacy: "traditional sport diplomacy" and "new sport diplomacy," mostly encompassing the mixing of sport with diplomacy from the past to the present. Murray (2018) refers to traditional sport diplomacy as a diplomatic use of sport in more temporal, tactical, and competitive ways, often drawing on elite sport athletes and elite sports competitions to achieve a state's foreign policy and diplomatic goals. The practice of traditional sport diplomacy is occasional, opportunistic, and "somewhat clumsy" (Murray, 2018, p. 61). It was popular in the Cold War context, and the Soviet Union prominently attempted to diffuse political uniqueness and superiority by demonstrating physical prowess and athletic excellence at international sporting competitions. New sport diplomacy, however, is substantially more open, casual, and all-encompassing, involving a multitude of actors from both the governmental and non-governmental sectors (Murray, 2018). It corresponds to twenty-first century diplomacy, whereby state foreign policy is no longer merely the preserve of foreign ministries and its diplomats. In this approach, state diplomacy works in partnership with many different types of diplomatic actors and networks (Murray, 2018). Just as sport diplomacy is situated under the umbrella of public diplomacy within Korea's foreign policy framework (Ma, Song, & Moore, 2012), the official application of sport diplomacy in Korean foreign policy implies that it operates to dovetail precisely with a state's public diplomacy objectives. Thus, Murray's (2018) two categories of traditional and new sport diplomacy are appropriate for this dissertation's examination of how KOICA's sport diplomacy approaches have changed from 1991 to the

present, particularly since the implementation of Korean public diplomacy in 2008. This can contribute to SDF research by providing alternative approaches that focus on the diachronic analysis of sport diplomacy and SFD integration at the international level, which have been rare. The stated diachronic analysis of the link between SFD and sport diplomacy is presented in Article II.

Korean SFD in the Sport Diplomacy Context

A small number of Korean-language research articles on Korean sport diplomacy focus on the practice of international development and SFD as a potential strategy and scenario for future Korean sport diplomacy, although the aim of these studies is not the use of sport as related to international development goals nor are they considered to be part of the SFD research body itself (e.g. Cho, 2013; Hwang, 2012; Kim & Lee, 2009). Cho (2013) focuses on new forms of Korean sport diplomacy in the emerging movement of alter-globalization, based on global civil society and aligned with various challenges to neoliberal globalization. Referring to the MDGs and UN proclamation of the International Year of Sport and Physical Education in 2005, the author suggests that Korean sport diplomacy can be strategically linked with global civil society and fully engaged with international norms and global issues (Cho, 2013). Focusing on the new direction of Korean sport diplomacy after PyeongChang's winning Olympic bid, Hwang (2012) writes that Korean sport diplomacy should be advanced in a way that conceptually blends public diplomacy and smart power (i.e. the combination of hard power and soft power) and calls for subsequent academic focus on this topic. In the face of international sport's engagement with the UN MDGs and SDGs, the author proposes that Korean sport needs to be incorporated into international cooperation initiatives to further its diplomatic advantage in the international sporting community (Hwang, 2012). Kim and Lee (2009) also consider the integration of Korean

ODA and sport as a way to enhance Korean sport's diplomatic power in the international sporting community. Identifying the current link between sport and international development in the UN MDGs, as well as studying its various manifestations in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, Kim and Lee offer policy suggestions for the future direction of Korean sport diplomacy, stating that Korean ODA needs to integrate sport into the humanitarian approaches advocated for by the current international development agenda (Kim & Lee, 2009).

Sociopolitical and Historical Factors leading to Korean Sport Diplomacy's Research

Popularity

It is important to delve into the sociopolitical and historical factors that influenced the heavy focus on sport diplomacy in Korean sport literature. First, the unwanted division of Korea by the World Powers pushed South Korea to vigorously pursue diplomatic power, which led to an emphasis on Korean sport diplomacy. Korea was colonized from 1910 to 1945 by Japan and then suffered the division of the peninsula. From 1945 to 1948, the North was occupied by the Soviet Union, while the South was under an American military trusteeship. Due to American and Soviet political considerations, two separate governments were established in 1948, named the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Republic of Korea (South Korea). The Korean War followed from 1950 to 1953, and unification of the peninsula has still not been achieved. Historical traumas resulting from these periods of helplessness and subjugation have motivated subsequent Korean administrations to put great effort into obtaining more diplomatic power in international relations (Oberdorfer & Carlin, 2014). Sport has historically been regarded as an effective method for such purposes (Merkel, 2008).

Second, sport was commonly utilized in the Cold War context as a tool to flaunt South Korea's superiority over North Korea. Merkel (2008) argues that international sporting

competitions offered an “ideological battleground for the Korean states both claiming to be the true representative of the Korean people” (p. 296). South Korea strategically engaged in a series of sport exchanges with the North, employing sport as a tool to show off its physical prowess and better international standings (Ha & Mangan, 2002).

Third, the military regimes of Park Chung-hee (1961–1979) and Chun Doo Hwan (1981–1988) intentionally shined a spotlight on sport development, to divert domestic and international attention away from their regimes’ lack of political legitimacy. Park Chung-hee seized political power through a coup in 1961 and governed in a brutal military fashion, regulating and monitoring the people through military security systems (Eckert, 2016). Chun Doo-hwan also took power by military coup and set up his dictatorship immediately after. He is particularly known for his brutal suppression of the Gwangju Uprising in 1980 through his Special Forces, which indiscriminately massacred civilians. Both regimes were obsessed with the idea of hosting international sporting events, namely the 1978 World Shooting Championship during Park’s regime, and the 1988 Seoul Olympics during Chun’s regime. Park and Chun both sought to obtain regime legitimacy by strategically hosting international sporting events, hoping they would project a democratic and organized image to the world (Mangan et al., 2011).

Sport has held a significant role in terms of peace-building and resolving conflict in the geopolitical singularity of the inter-Korean relationship. Civil war resulted in the tragic division of the Korean nation, but the inter-Korean sport relationship has continued through a series of talks regarding the formation of unified teams and their potential achievements (Merkel, 2009). For example, although talks eventually fell through, North Korea proposed a unified team for the 1960 Rome Olympic Games. The two Koreas also discussed the possibility of a unified team for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, and soccer games were hosted by both Koreas until 1990. Unified

teams were organized for the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships and 1991 International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Youth Championships, which outstandingly resulted in a gold medal win and quarter-finals appearance, respectively. The relationship between South Korea and North Korea warmed greatly during the two liberal Korean governments of Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008). Developments included unified marches with the “Korean Unification Flag” (*Hanbandogi*, or *Tongilgi*) for the 2000 Sydney Olympics, 2004 Athens Olympics, 2006 Turin Winter Olympics, and 2006 Doha Asian Games. For the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Games, the first unified women’s ice hockey Olympic team was formed. Many sport scholars like Merkel (2008, 2009) consider efforts towards a unified team, including proposals, talks, and actual team formation, to be stepping-stones for furthering the inter-Korean relationship.

Most importantly, the surge in scholarly interest in Korean sport diplomacy can be attributed to Korea’s failure to win Winter Olympic hosting rights on two separate occasions. My review of Korean-language research articles in Korean sport journals found that the notion of sport diplomacy rarely appeared, indicating little academic interest in sport relating to Korean diplomacy before Korea’s unsuccessful Olympic bids. Indeed, PyeongChang’s second bid for the 2014 Winter Olympics ended in failure in 2007, and this was followed by a noticeable research inclination towards sport diplomacy in Korean sport peer-reviewed articles (e.g. Choi, 2008; Jung, 2009, 2011; Kang, Yeo, & Lee, 2008; Kim, 2014; Kim et al., 2008; Kim, Joo, Kang, Park, & Kim, 2011; Kim & Lee, 2009; Ku et al., 2014; Lee, Kim, & Kim, 2011; Park, Ok, & Park, 2011; Shin, An, & Oh, 2008; Yoo, 2008, 2009, 2010). To summarize simply, this research trend shows that these failures were perhaps due to a lack of Korean sport diplomacy capacity.

Interestingly, the number of sport diplomacy research articles has dramatically decreased since the successful 2011 PyeongChang 2018 Winter Games bid.

I also believe it is important to mention that since the end of Japanese rule in 1945, sport has been a favourable choice for Korean diplomacy when considering particular geopolitical conditions. Losing two of its Winter Olympics bids has motivated Korean sport scholars to conduct more research on sport diplomacy and particularly focus on how enhancing Korea's sport diplomacy capacity could potentially result in successful bid campaigns. After Korea finally became successful, research interest in Korean sport diplomacy has shown an inclination towards global sport trends related to the new international development agenda (the UN MDGs) while still maintaining sport diplomacy approaches.

SFD in Domestic Policy and Politics

While the locus of SFD is beyond national governments and usually involves NGOs, SFD organizations and their programs are markedly influenced by domestic policy and their national government's political goals (Beacom, 2009). Coalter (2010b) argues that many SFD programs rely on government funding systems, which are shaped by the neoliberal policy agendas of Western donor countries. Beacom (2009) also claims that international assistance programs, including the SFD initiatives of the United Kingdom, are generally guided by the domestic political agendas of national governments. Hasselgård (2015) emphasizes the importance of recognizing the interconnected network of SDP NGOs, domestic donors, and national governments in SDP research. Focusing on Norwegian SDP in the Global South since the early 1980s, Hasselgård (2015) analyzes how SDP operates within the Norwegian development aid system. He refers to Norwegian SDP as a complex entity involving the Norwegian government, development aid agencies, sport federations, private initiatives, and SDP

NGOs. He identifies two different roles that are played by Norwegian SDP NGOs: 1) as a service provider of Norwegian sport and development aid policy goals, reflected by the Sport First strategy; and 2) enabling the implementation of transformative strategies of Norwegian development aid that relate to current international development goals such as global social inequality and poverty reduction, represented by the Development through Sport Strategy (Hasselgård, 2015). Hasselgård (2015) concludes that these two roles represent distinctively Norwegian features, which are formed by policy agenda-setting, particular traditions, and political interactions among stakeholders in the domestic context. Beacom (2009) also contends that the use of sport for international development in Western donor countries aims to fulfill social policy goals stemming from the domestic context. Problems arise when the domestic policy objectives of a donor country contradict international development goals (Beacom, 2009). From this perspective, Beacom (2009) examines disability sport to search for links between domestic policy, political agendas focusing on the improvement of disability sports, and international development assistance. He argues that increasing concerns over the importance of disability sport in British public policy have led to the consideration of social and moral imperatives for disability sports rights in international development assistance (Beacom, 2009). This suggests that the comprehensive analysis of SFD in both the domestic and international contexts should aim to clearly identify how a donor nation's domestic politics and policy agenda might be incorporated into an international development intervention.

Given that there has been increasing interest in the use of sport for social development domestically (Levermore & Beacom, 2009), it is worth taking a closer look at the SFD programs of donor countries in each of their particular domestic contexts, especially as these programs typically represent national characteristics, social ideals and modalities, and traditional

constituents in the field of sport and development. Unfortunately, Hasselgård notes (2015) that few SFD studies provide a comprehensive analysis of SFD initiatives and the complex interactions between a donor's foreign aid system, social and public policy objectives, and development stakeholders' domestic political concerns. Thus, this dissertation fills a gap in providing an analysis of Korean SFD that also considers state objectives and political schemes, working to uncover Korean characteristics and ideas that are circulated and replicated in sport for development.

Concluding Remarks

In their integrated review of SFD research literature, Schulenkorf et al. (2016) emphasize the need for more research of SFD at the international level. Furthermore, the research gap indicated by Schulenkorf et al. (2016) is related to the critical assessment that SFD studies need to provide more comprehensive perspectives of the integration of sport and international development (e.g. Darnell et al., 2019; Hasselgård, 2015; Schulenkorf et al., 2016), to cover diverse fields of study for sport, sociology, political science, international relations, domestic and foreign policy, and so on. Given the fact that each discipline has already accumulated an enormous body of literature, researchers will face difficulties in attempting holistic SFD research if they do not consider different disciplines in the larger field of social science. Interdisciplinary work focusing on the larger context of social science must be involved, and the act of simply borrowing other social science fields' technical approaches or methods of investigation is inadequate for this task.

It is also important to focus on the criticism of mainstream SFD research for being dominated by Western sport academia, particularly in the areas of sociology and management. Considering the aforementioned review of mainstream SFD literature, it is fair to argue that SFD

research is Western-oriented and focused on English-language articles. As shown through my analysis of existing Korean SFD literature, interest in the use of sport in Korean international development (particularly as a form of Korean ODA) has been shown by not only Korean sport scholars, but also those in the business sector (e.g. Kim et al., 2013) and in political science (e.g. Jung, 2009, 2011), although most scholarly interest still focuses on its political purposes.

However, SFD during the Cold War era (as a form of sport aid) received special attention as statecraft or a political (diplomatic) tool for nation states immediately after WWII (McKercher, 2012). Some Western donor countries positioned as middle powers in global politics (including Norway, Australia, and Canada) (Melissen, 2005) maintain the strategy of using SFD and sport in international development to pursue foreign policy goals (Hasselgård, 2015). It is difficult to state that scholarly interest in Korean SFD does not exist, nor that Korea-specific methods for using sport in ODA, which consider Korea's national interest, are definitively wrong or that they differ from other countries' SFD initiatives. Furthermore, other notable Asian donor countries like China and Japan seem to share a commonality with Korea in that their involvement in international development is also often state-driven (Sato & Shimomura, 2013; Watson, 2014). Thus, in addition to the need for more interdisciplinary perspectives in SFD research, my dissertation also indicates the need for future cooperative SFD research, which can benefit from an active scholarly network between Western and non-Western donor countries.

Chapter 4: Methodology – Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis following Foucault (referred to as Foucauldian discourse analysis in this study) involves not only the linguistic features of texts, but also the functions of discourse that construct certain types of social reality that legitimize the exercise of power and social structures (Willig, 2008). Indeed, Foucault (1981) writes that the aim is to “discover how this choice of truth, inside which we are caught but which we ceaselessly renew, was made – but also how it was repeated, renewed and displaced” (p. 70). Thus, Foucauldian discourse analysis is a task to not just map out a description of reality, but to explore the ways in which that reality is constructed (Ziai, 2016). It should be specifically noted that my use of Foucauldian discourse analysis in this dissertation follows Ziai’s (2016) epistemological and theoretical foundation (poststructuralism), Foucault’s concepts of discourse and power, and his methods of archaeology and genealogy. Crotty (1998) argues that the selection of a particular methodology and method is related to the ways that a researcher is led to their assumption about reality, and this assumption is a matter of theoretical perspective. This eventually results in justification for a particular choice of methodology (Crotty, 1998). May (2006) also underlines the need to place a researcher’s insight of reality on their use of methodology directed by a combination of theoretical considerations. Thus, both Crotty (1998) and May’s (2011) arguments indicate the importance of proper consideration for the selection of methodology, combined with appropriate epistemological and theoretical foundations. In other words, attempts to combine methodological approaches with epistemological and theoretical foundations can provide justification for a particular choice of methodology.

Correspondingly, this chapter first discusses Foucault’s work on discourse and power, which are two central concepts of Foucauldian discourse analysis. Then, I present more concrete methodological guidelines for Foucauldian discourse analysis – archaeology and genealogy –

with one focusing on the analysis of discursive formations and the other tracing the historical transformations of discourses. In particular, for archaeology, I follow Ziai's (2016) approach in his book *Development Discourse and Global History: From colonialism to the sustainable development goals*, along with providing explanations of the categories of rules of formation explored in Article 1. Then, I discuss genealogy and Foucault's concepts of technologies of domination, disciplinary power, and *dispositif* in his work on genealogy, which offers a central framework for understanding the analysis presented in Articles II and III. Following that, the processes of documentary research for data collection and data analysis guided by Foucauldian discourse analysis are discussed in the Methods section.

Discourse, Power, Development, and Sport

In the Foucauldian sense, discourse is rarely deemed to be a "corpus of words and texts" (Foucault, 1972, p. 111) but "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (p. 49). This is linked to Foucault's (1972) understanding of discourse as function that produces something more and something else, which makes particular words transform into something else and become imbued with meanings and effects within a particular context (Graham, 2011). Mills (1997) also supports the idea of discourse as something else that allows particular thoughts and behaviours to be taken for granted within a particular context. This exposes the conceptual understanding of discourse as a practice contingent upon particular social and political contexts (Garritty, 2010). It is also linked to the extent to which knowledge, as social practice, can potentially be accepted or rejected in a given context (Graham, 2011). At this point, Foucault (1972) comes to an understanding regarding the relationship between discourses and social practices, defined as "non-discursive practices" (p. 68), although discourse in his early work is considered autonomous and anonymous. It is then worth considering Hook's (2005) argument

that Foucault's attempt to link discourses with non-discursive practices is the turning point that allows his focus to shift to the concept of power.

In Foucault's (1978a) view, power should be understood as "the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organizations" (p. 92). This expresses a typical feature of Foucault's (1978a) conception of power, which is relational and productive rather than related to negative modes of power involving "the use of any repressive and violent means" (p. 242). This means that Foucault's notion of power is not possessed by authoritative individuals or states, but rather, disseminates itself in social relations that produce certain actions deemed to be acceptable or not (Mills, 1997). Power does not exist in a vacuum, but in relations, and he argues (1977) that "power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (p. 194). Following Foucault, Smith Maguire (2002) contends that it is important to understand a social reality as "the product of power relations" (p. 295), contingent upon the effects of everyday relations between individuals and institutions. In the working of power relations, there is "the possibility of action upon the others (which is coextensive with every social relationship)" (Foucault, 1983, p. 224). This mode of power is integrated with knowledge, and Foucault (1978a) argues that within power relations, "power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge" (p. 27). Considering this power-knowledge relationship, he also (1978a) stresses that the subjects of knowledge must be treated as the "effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations" (p. 28). This implies that the role of the subject of knowledge is not to produce a collection of knowledge contrary to power, but to give birth to the effects of power-knowledge relations, functioning to restrict which forms and domains of

knowledge are sanctioned (Foucault, 1978a). In this sense, discourse begins to move on to the operation of power relations, considered the effect of the power-knowledge nexus, which produces “the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131).

Focusing specifically on Foucault’s central concepts of discourse and power, a significant methodological turn in development studies occurred in the late 1980s when development began to be regarded as “story, as narrative, text” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010, p. 14). This implies that development is not merely policy or theory, but in fact discourse sees development as ideology in the setting of a universal path leading to the Western model of modernization (Ziai, 2007). This methodological shift was triggered by so-called post-development scholars (e.g. Crush, 1995; Escobar, 1992a, 1992b, 1995; Esteva, 1987; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997; Sachs, 2010; Watts, 1995; Ziai, 2007) who have used Foucault’s concepts of discourse and power for their analyses of development discourse, particularly for the critique calling for the deconstruction of development (Sachs, 2010). As Escobar (1995) suggests, one can “recapture it in its otherness, establish a discontinuity with a discursive practice” (p. 414) in order for it to critically rethink particular knowledge or language systems. This is a way to deconstruct development, by envisioning “a different regime of truth and perception” (Escobar, 1992b, p. 412) in which the singularity of events and actions may become visible. All of this is achievable through the application of discourse analysis à la Foucault, in development studies (Escobar, 1992b). Following Foucault’s concepts of discourse and power, Escobar (1995) seeks alternatives to development concerning how development is treated as “a historically produced discourse” (p. 6). His analytical approach intends for the deconstruction of development regarding why countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America perceive themselves as underdeveloped, how they

continue to accept development as an intrinsic problem, and the ways they position themselves as the subject in Western development to solve the problem of “un-underdeveloping” (Escobar, 1995, p. 6). In the same manner, Manzo (1995) studies how the Western-entrenched discourse of global modernity about man works to justify the subjugation of black South Africans in global power relations. Following modernity discourse in global power relations, his analysis reveals the extremes to which discourses on Western modernity continue to be promoted and circulated to justify colonial practices framed as development in South Africa, while also writing about the countering of these power relations through the development of a black consciousness inspired by the community activism and cultural political attitudes of local South Africans (Manzo, 1995). In the same manner, Watts (1995) illustrates the use of both Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy as comprehensive methodological approaches for understanding the impasse of development theory and also the crisis of development practice tracing back to the late eighteenth century. Such approaches focus in particular on the examination of how and why development manifests through particular metaphors rooted in the Western (European) knowledge of social disorder, disjuncture, and governability of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Watts, 1995). In doing so, Watts (1995) reveals that the constancy of the metaphors of this specific historical period is modified differently in the development context of the twentieth century. Thus, Foucault’s concepts of discourse and power allow post-development scholars to examine the power and political effects of development as discourse considered to be neutral and the primitive problem of development practices shaped by the First World’s view (Ziai, 2007).

Not surprisingly, the area of SFD studies has experienced a popularization of the use of Foucault’s concepts of discourse and power, especially by sport scholars writing from critical sociological perspectives (e.g. Adams & Harris, 2014; Darnell, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012; Gardam

et al., 2017; Harris & Adams, 2016; Hasselgård, 2015; Hasselgård & Straume, 2015; Hayhurst, 2009; Nicholls et al., 2010). Building on Foucault's work, Darnell (2007) analyzes the production of racial knowledge, referred to as Whiteness that dominates the subject position of intelligibility and respectability in development discourse. Considering discourses of racialized knowledge in SFD to be particular sets of historical and political constituents derived from the Northern First World, he writes that Whiteness is seen as the subject of benevolence, rationality, and expertise, which in turn positions the Other as marginalized, unrefined, and grateful (Darnell, 2007). Drawing on Foucault's work on discourse in power-knowledge relations, Nicholls et al. (2010) seek to examine the dominant 'lack of evidence' discourse by focusing on certain forms of knowledge that are privileged in the field of SFD, which are reflected in the power relations between donors of the Global North and recipients of the Global South. This argument was countered by the research of Adams and Harris (2013) on the structure of the "lack of evidence discourse" in power relations in the SFD context. They find that neoliberal elements and tendencies stem from leading SFD actors that serve to facilitate the production of evidence discourse within SFD (Adams & Harris, 2013). In general, attempts to apply Foucault's work on discourse and power within the development and SFD fields have allowed for the emergence of new topics, including the development dichotomy, globalization, race, gender, and neoliberalism. Following these approaches, one can apply Foucault's work on discourse and power to better understand the particular forms of knowledge seen in the specific sociopolitical context of the Korean branding of sport for international development. This can lead to further analysis of Korean SFD and the continuous production of privileged knowledge within the power relations between Korea, as Northern donor, and the recipient countries of the South.

Foucauldian Archaeology

Discourse in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is related to neither a group of utterances nor to individual statements. It is a group of statements that “establish between them a relation that is both constant and describable” (Foucault, 1972, p. 32) and the implication of this group of statements is argued by Foucault (1972) to be “far from referring to a single object, formed once and for all” (p. 32) and concerned with particular rules and regularities. This group of statements does not refer to a simple set of statements but to “certain forms of regularity” (p. 145) (which is Foucault’s major focus in his archaeology) that allow for the emergence of particular objects and concepts in a given context. Foucault (1972) defines this regularity as “a discursive formation” (p. 38), and thus his archaeological approach to discourse is to identify this regularity. This describes discursive formations, regulated by relations “between a number of statements, such as system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices” (p. 38). As noted, discursive formations are characterized not by single objects or concepts but by “a group of rules that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 46). Using Foucault’s (1972) archaeology as discourse analysis is therefore to analyze these regularities and “rules of formation” (p. 38) that determine the dispersion of a discourse. Notably, for the identification and analysis of a discursive formation, Foucault (1972) proposes four categories: the formation of “objects,” “enunciative modalities,” “concepts,” and “strategies.”

The Formation of Objects

Referring to the discourse of psychopathology as an example, Foucault (1972) argues that the objects of the madman “are very numerous, mostly very new, but also very precarious, subject to change and, in some cases, to rapid disappearance” (p. 40). This implies that the object

of discourse is not constant, but changes throughout different periods and in different societies (Garrity, 2010). Contingent on a variety of contexts, the object of discourse can be differently “delimited, designated, named, and established” (Foucault, 1972, p. 42). Foucault (1972) proposes methods that allow for the identification of the formation of objects. First, objects can be recognized when “we map the first surfaces of their emergence” (p. 41). Importantly, the first surfaces of these objects’ emergence are not constant but vary according to “the degree of rationalization, conceptual codes, and types of theory” (p. 41) and according to societal context (Foucault, 1972). Second, it is necessary to “describe the authorities of delimitation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 41). Foucault (1972) provides the example of medicine in the nineteenth century, stating it to be a group of individuals, institutional regulations, and set of knowledge, as medicine is considered to be a leading authority that “delimited, designated, named, and established madness as an object” (p. 42). Last, Foucault (1972) strongly suggests the analysis of “the grids of specification” (p. 42) to uncover the formation of objects. These grids of specification are forms of systems in which different types of madness, for example, “are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another as objects of psychiatric discourse” (p. 42). Following these rules, Ziai (2016) identifies objects of development discourse as being commonly demarcated into units such as states, regions, and continents. These units are further divided into categories including the developing, Global South, and Third World. Thus, one can analyze the formation of objects by focusing on when the objects appear, which authorities designate the objects, and what kinds of criteria classify the object in discourse.

The Formation of Enunciative Modalities

Foucault (1972) raises the critical question of what constitutes the different types of statements found in medical discourse in the nineteenth century. As Brown and Cousins (1980)

claim, the identification of the formation of enunciative modalities (or mode of statements) can help raise three questions: “Who is speaking? Where is it being spoken from? What is the relation between the speaker and what is being spoken of?” (p. 269). The first question – who is speaking – relates to who possesses the right to speak and provides diagnoses and prescriptions (Foucault, 1972). The second question of “where” is proposed by Foucault (1972) to identify the institutional places from which a discourse “derives its legitimate source and point of application (its specific objects and instruments of verification)” (p. 51). The third question concerns who holds the subject position enunciating a particular statement. That is, to identify the rules of enunciative modalities, it is worth studying how the subject of a discourse differs according to a range of descriptive methods, knowledge systems, and institutions (Foucault, 1972). In a way, it is of little importance who speaks the truth. Rather, understanding who can be considered to be the subject conveying the truth is essential (Foucault, 1972). According to Ziai (2016), a statement in development discourse can dictate the position of a particular person in authority who has the ability to govern who can speak, what forms of development should be pursued, and how this development can be reached. Thus, it can be seen that authorities such as development institutions, development scholars, and development practitioners in Western donor countries are qualified to act as the subject, otherwise deemed as the experts with the inherent ability to diagnose, prescribe, and determine SFD discourse.

The Formation of Concepts

Foucault (1972) writes that the formation of concepts can be identified through “the organization of the field of statements where they appeared and circulated” (p. 56) and that it should not be treated as a method to understand certain universal ideas and truths. He (1972) argues that this organization is firstly linked to “forms of succession” (p. 56), which refer to the

manner in which old concepts are used differently, new concepts emerge, and others are adopted again at a given context. Additionally, the organization of the mode of statements entails, as Foucault (1972) argues, “forms of coexistence” (p. 57), which can be understood as the manner in which statements are “formulated elsewhere and taken up in a discourse, acknowledged to be truthful” (p. 57), even though these statements might include different fields of objects and different forms of discourse. He (1972) proposes that the last step may be “procedures of intervention” (p. 58), which are bound to the ways of transcribing and rewriting statements. These three forms are also linked to the ways that certain concepts are differentially used, guided by a range of discourses, and excluded within types of statements (Foucault, 1972). In other words, discursive formations can be recognized as a continuity of particular concepts that occur in the statement (Cousins & Hussain, 1984), but this constancy does not refer to the static and transcendent (Garrity, 2010).

Following the form of concepts, Ziai (2016) states that development can be treated as a recurring concept in development discourse and policy statements. However, the concept of development also involves different types of discourse, depending on social and political context. In this respect, one may focus on the popularity of international volunteering in line with the diffusion of the concept of twenty-first century development.

The Formation of Strategies

Foucault (1972) argues that these discourses generating certain forms of objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts are contingent upon themes and theories. He (1972) calls these themes and theories in the discursive formation of archaeology “strategies” (p. 64). Thus, it can be argued that the formation of strategies is linked to the level of theoretical and thematic choices (Garrity, 2010). Foucault (1972) emphasizes that the rules of formation of objects, mode

of statements, and concepts are essentially “owing to the system of formation of strategies” (p. 67). This implies that the appearance of particular objects, statements, and concepts in discourse are strategically determined and that such strategic choices strongly depend on particular contexts (Garrity, 2010). Notably, to uncover the formation of strategies it is most important to consider Foucault’s (1972) argument that theoretical and thematic choices are regulated by “the function that the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practices” (p. 68). He (1972) writes that these non-discursive practices refer to “institutions, political events, economic practices and processes” (p. 162), which represent a range of materiality as non-linguistic domains (Ziai, 2016). It is important to note that the relationship between discursive and non-discursive practices is Foucault’s first attempt to shift the focus of his work to power relations, represented by the concept of *dispositif* in his later work (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). The concept of *dispositif* is discussed in the section on genealogy. The formation of strategies can be used to understand how the Korean SFD discourses are strategically guided by the coupling of Korean sport in the Korean ODA context with the domestic and foreign policy goals of the Korean government.

Foucauldian Genealogy

In his later work, Foucault shifts his methodological focus from archaeology to genealogy. Through this, one might reach an analysis “which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework” (Foucault, 1980, p. 117). Foucault (1980) argues that this is obviously different from the historicizing of “the subject as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that evolves through the course of history” (p. 117). That is, intentional analytical approaches may view the subject beyond the traditional ideas and

perspectives of the subject, which are unquestionably taken as authority in unilateral history (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Foucault (1980) defines genealogy to be:

a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (p. 117)

Thus, it is also important to look at Foucault's (1977) considerations of the genealogical approach, which aims to "record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality" (p. 76). Hook (2005) states that this methodological approach for understanding the singularity of events is an attempt to cut off the nature of unilateral and progressive history. Thus, it is a methodological effort to attach the event to the present form of significance, while also detaching it from the meaning of the past event. This can also be connected with Foucault's (1971) early interest in systems for control and rules of exclusion that change throughout history by the ways in which genealogical approaches focus more on "the effective formation of discourse, whether within the limits of control, or outside of them, or as is most frequent, on both sides of the delimitation" (p.26). Thus, it becomes clear that Foucault (1980), through genealogy, aims to struggle against "the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse" (p. 85). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) claim that at this point, genealogy is a matter of the relationship between power, knowledge, and the body of the present, particularly in modern society. This is supported by Foucault's (1982) attempts to show us this relationship through genealogy, which endeavours to examine the mechanisms that enable the operation of productive power.

The question of the similarity and relationship between archaeology and genealogy can also be raised. While archaeology is concerned with the strict analysis of discursivities, which

can be seen in Foucault's (1972) term "discursive formations," genealogy can be understood as "tactics" (Foucault, 1980, p. 85) that show how conditional knowledge is called into play in the identification of discursive formations. Markula and Pringle (2006) also argue that archaeology is a tool for the analysis of knowledge formations in society, whereas genealogy focuses on the examination of how knowledge, as argued by Foucault (1977), "continue[s] to exist and have value for us" (p. 81) in the workings of power relations. In this sense, genealogy can be understood as an attempt to understand discourse as a political effect of knowledge (Hook, 2005) within the underlying conditions of historical and social practices in which discourses are entrenched. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) thus argue that genealogy is formed by the basis of archeology and that genealogists may then concern themselves with the sociopolitical and historical roles of discourses after archaeological work has been done.

Ziai (2016) argues that archaeology, as the analysis of discursive formations, is more useful for the synchronic analysis of discourses; but on the contrary, genealogy is more appropriate as a diachronic approach for discourse analysis that examines the historical transformations of discourses or discursive formations. In light of this, genealogy can be used to explore the historical changes over time of the discourses of SFD programs that hold foreign policy and diplomatic value. And as pointed out by Foucault (1977), it is important to remember that genealogical analysis should remain keen on the recurrences of the event, in order to "isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles" (p. 140). That is, genealogy should aim to capture the singularities and discontinuities of various discourses (Ziai, 2016) by deliberately dissolving and relocating each event and object to different contexts (Hook, 2005). Examining the theoretical applicability of genealogy to SFD research, Shehu (2016) demonstrates how continuities and discontinuities in SFD narratives interact differently with

different gender roles and identities. In the same vein, Ziai (2016) also researches historical changes in the discursive formation of development from the 1980s to 2000s. Genealogy can appropriately examine the historical transformations of SFD discourses (discursive formations) by focusing on any singularities and discontinuities in the relations of power, without reference to the unchanging truths of a unilateral history.

Technologies of Domination

Focusing on the positive effects of power, Foucault (1988) examines how individuals produce knowledge about humans and how this knowledge regulates individuals' thoughts and behaviours. This is Foucault's primary concern regarding the workings of power, which he calls the technologies of domination (or the technologies of power). He writes that technologies of domination refer to modes of knowledge production in specific social practices, which "determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends of dominations" (1988, p. 18). This implies that technologies of domination are a means for constraining choices and capacities for the bestowal of approval for individuals' actions, thereby reproducing social regulations that shape and promote particular forms of subjectivity in which individuals should be involved (Smith Maguire, 2002). Foucault (1988) focuses on technologies of power that concern how "the self has been objectified" (p. 3) throughout history. He (1982) states this is reflected in three modes of objectification that "transform human beings into subjects" (p. 208). As outlined by Markula and Pringle (2006), the three modes are 1) scientific classification, 2) dividing practices, and 3) subjectivation (p. 23). According to Foucault (1982), the first mode of objectification, scientific classification, looks at the ways in which humans "try to give themselves the status of sciences" (p. 208). For example, they locate themselves as enunciate subjects in modern language systems, working subjects in theory of economics, and occasionally

as living subjects in biology. That is, the first mode of objectification looks at how people perceive themselves as objects and subjects of scientific knowledge, meaning that people are classified according to particular norms and rules that have been treated as universal truths (Markula & Pringle, 2006). The second mode of objectification is what Foucault (1982) calls “dividing practices” (p. 208), which causes individuals to place themselves in divisions of particular practices, such as the division of healthy and unhealthy, or normal and abnormal. During this process, one might perceive oneself to be problematic or underdeveloped, and thus deviant from normalized practices. Last, Foucault (1982) throughout his work seeks to uncover the ways in which an individual “turns him- or herself into a subject” (p. 208), otherwise known as subjectivation. He in fact focuses on the process of subjectivation in his later work on sexuality, defining subjectivation as the ways that individuals critically reflect on themselves and seek particular identities on their own (Markula & Pringle, 2006). Following the conception of power as relational, Foucault (1982) suggests two meanings for the term “subject”: to be “subject to someone else by control and dependence” (p. 212) and to be a subject “tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (p. 212). In this respect, the Foucauldian conception of subjectivation occurs when an individual attaches himself to a particular identity within relations of power that “subjugates and makes subject to” (Foucault, 1982, p. 212). Thus, it can be understood that subjectivation occurs in two ways: when the actions of individuals are governed in relations of power that produce individuals both as objects and subjects, and when individuals are bound to particular identities (Shogan, 1999). Notably, Foucault (1978b) in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, focuses on subjectivation as related to the workings of institutional and governmental power. In his two later volumes, *The Use of Pleasure* (1985) and

The Care of the Self (1986), Foucault places priority on other forms of subjectivation in the technologies of the self (1988), which:

permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts, and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (p. 18)

That is, in the technologies of the self, Foucault studies elaborate modes of subjectivation that enable individuals to choose their subject positions through ethical reflections, rather than following any preferred identities within the effects of institutional and governmental power. This dissertation does not deal with these modes of subjectivation in the technologies of the self but instead focuses on methods for controlling an individual as an “object to be manipulated” (Foucault, 1982, p. 152), also known as a disciplined body, through techniques of disciplinary power.

Disciplinary Power

Foucault (1978a) sees discipline as “a specific technique of power” in which individuals recognize themselves as objects in the service of power. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1978a) explains disciplinary power to mean that “one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines” (p. 138). Thus, it is a form of power involving the discipline and control of individual bodies that are subjected, prescribed, and transformed. It is important to differentiate between disciplinary power and sovereign power, which is a traditional model of power based on the repressive and brutal use of punishment (Foucault, 1978a). Thus, unlike disciplinary power, which is productive and relational, sovereign

power is, as argued by Foucault (1980), “an absolute power in the absolute expenditure of power” (p. 105) that takes over the existence of bodies “in the force of a prohibition” (p. 119). Foucault (1978a) argues that disciplinary power can be successfully exercised through the utilization of three instruments, which are “hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination” (p. 170).

First, Foucault (1978a) writes that disciplinary power can be exercised through a mechanism that “make[s] it possible to see induce effects of power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible” (p. 171). This refers to hierarchical observation, which Foucault (1978a) also calls “techniques of subjection and methods of exploitation” (p. 171) that render an individual body visible, knowable, and subject to surveillance. Markula and Pringle (2006) give an example of a professional rugby game, in which players, referees, surveillance cameras, and spectators might function as the hierarchical observation of a sporting practice that makes the workings of sporting bodies possible. Focusing on visible bodies and the function of power, one can presume that visible objects identified by the development observations of donors from the Global North would be subject to the workings of development bodies. Second, the normalization of judgement is categorized as another form of disciplinary technique that “imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render differences useful by fitting them on to another” (Foucault, 1978a, p. 184). Escobar (2010) argues that development plans have been deeply entrenched in the normalization and standardization of Western modernity since the eighteenth century. He (1995) also emphasizes that development, as objective forms of knowledge, abides by the power of normalization, which makes the objects of development (defined as the underdeveloped) continue to internalize prescribed norms and criteria. Lastly,

Foucault (1978a) refers to “examination” as the combination of “an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement” (p. 184) and underlines its significance in terms of techniques of disciplinary power, which are made explicit through the ways in which individuals are “described, judged, measured, compared with others” (p. 191) as well how they are observed, classified, punished, and rewarded. This explains why Foucault (1978a) refers to examination as “the heart of the procedures of discipline” (p. 184), which is “highly ritualized” (p. 184) in the mechanisms of modern discipline. This technique renders individuals as objects of power and knowledge, and this objectification subsequently also subjects them to the effects of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1978a). According to Shogan (1999), the form in which the examination is presented can be identified by determining how coaches observe athletes in comparison with others, and the standards for athletic performance within the world of competitive sports by which they are judged. By doing so, coaches can correspondingly place each athlete in a suitable position.

Dispositif (Apparatus)

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) claim that to conduct genealogy, Foucault offers the technical term “dispositif” (p. 120) (translated as “apparatus” in English) to show his consideration of concepts employed as “tools to aid in analysis” (p. 120). According to Foucault (1980), dispositif is a “heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). This shows that dispositif is a more comprehensive representation of the relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements (Foucault, 1980) and can be defined as a more rigid technique of institutional dispositions occupying the distribution, circulation, and reproduction of discourses.

Thus, Foucault (1980) underlines the nature of *dispositif* that “has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need” (p. 195). In other words, *dispositif* can be treated as a strategic function in a given context, in reaction to an impending matter.

Furthermore, *dispositif*, holding strategic purpose, can emerge at the junction point between discourse and its reliance upon non-discursive practices, such as institutional objectives and historical events (Foucault, 1980). Escobar (1995) claims that the Third World is discursively constructed and strategically produced by development as an apparatus that combines certain forms of knowledge about the Third World with certain forms and arrangements of power. Sonn and Gimm (2013) also categorize the development projects of the 1970s in Korea as apparatus of the Korean developmental state, deployed to increase the political legitimacy of its authoritarian regime. Thus, one can see that the use of sport in international development is a *dispositif* that links dominant discourses with institutional objectives, such as diplomatic goals. On the other hand, given discourses are regulated by discursive and non-discursive practices, referred to by Foucault (1972; 1980) as *dispositif* (apparatus), and dominant discourses would be an indicator of specific strategic functions and objectives.

Rationale for the Use of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

Since the late 1980s, post-development scholars have presented various sophisticated arguments on the utility of discourse analysis following Foucault, for development studies and critiques of mainstream development in particular. In the concluding chapter of his book, Ziai (2016) offers a comprehensive rationale for six contributions of discourse analysis in development studies by defending four primary critiques raised hitherto in development literature. Building on Ziai’s (2016) six contributions of discourse analysis, my research project

provides four rationales that reiterate some of the above arguments while also slightly adjusting the application of Foucauldian discourse analysis.

First, discourse analysis allows us to raise critical questions about the typical methods used to carry out development interventions and universal measurements conforming to Western/European standards of development, thus regulating the representation of reality according to these standards (Ziai, 2016). In this manner, Foucauldian discourse analysis enables me to critically look at intervention methods and common norms or criteria implemented by KOICA sport in its efforts to increase its involvement in international development cooperation. Given that Korean international development also conforms to Western-centric values and modalities (Watson, 2014), as well as considering the fact that Korean sport is highly influenced by Western sport, Foucauldian discourse analysis may be effective in exposing how KOICA sport's programs and norms are regulated by particular rules originating from Western values and ideas regarding both development and sport. Second, discourse analysis allows one to expose the discursive formations that construct the problematic "other" category in development interventions (Ziai, 2016). My use of Foucauldian discourse analysis can also be applied to the identification of particular discursive formations that register and shape the others in Korean SFD, referred to as the problematic "underdeveloped" recipient countries of the Global South. Third, the identification of the formation of development discourse also allows for strategies of hierarchization embedded in different types of knowledges – including the position of subjects with scientific, expert knowledge, and the categorization of others as unscientific and unsophisticated (Ziai, 2016). Similarly, existing SFD studies utilizing discourse analysis (e.g. Darnell, 2012; Hayhurst, 2009; Harris & Adams, 2015; Nicholls et al., 2011) show how hierarchical and unequal power relations are constructed in the SFD field, which is inherently

influenced by the policy discourses, ideas, and expert knowledge of leading SFD countries. As such, my study uses Foucauldian discourse analysis to find the particular rules and strategies that produce hierarchical power relations in the discourse of KOICA sport. This is represented by the many forms of relations between Korean coaches (volunteers) and athletes in recipient countries, Korean sport and recipient sport, and Korea (donor) and recipient countries. Last, Ziai (2016) argues that discourse analysis in development studies provides a method for revealing discursive strategies that allow for the depoliticization of development, which typically offers up a development panacea for all conditions and people within the Global South. The perception of SFD projects as being a cure-all remedy for eradicating development issues in the Global South has been criticized by sport scholars with critical sociological perspectives (e.g. Darnell, 2012; Coalter, 2010a; Hayhurst, 2014; Levermore, 2008). In the same manner, I use Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine how sport has been similarly promoted in the context of three decades of Korean ODA as a magic formula for meeting development goals in the Global South.

Methods

Following the Foucauldian discourse analysis and discussion on the concepts in his archaeology and genealogy, I adopted a documentary research approach for the process of data collection. Scott (1990) defines a document as “an artefact which has as its central feature an inscribed text” (p. 5), and this artefact is not to be treated as neutral or unrelated to the reflection of social reality, especially in social research. May (2011) similarly defines documents “as the sedimentations of social practices” (p. 191), constructed through the manner in which people have long interacted with other people, cultures, societies, and particular events in their daily lives. This approach is a way of understanding documents in relation to their surroundings, which is made explicit through the manner in which texts are related to their contexts

(McCulloch, 2004). This is also supported by Scott's (1990) approach to the use of documents in social research, which states that texts should be seen as social bricks. Documents are influenced by one's view of the social world, while also showing the historical changes of social orders, cultural ideas, and political systems (McCulloch, 2004). In this sense, it is clear that documents are social and historical products that do not simply depict physical evidence and historical processes in the course of everyday life but also enable the construction of one's versions of social reality and events (May, 2011).

It is also important to consider which types of sources might be suitable for document research, the matter of collecting documents as research data. May (2011) writes that methods used for the collection of documents depend on the aims of the research, the researcher's perspectives, accessibility to the resources, and the time available. In general, sources for document research include a broad range of materials: institutional documents such as laws, statistics, mass media, advertisements, manuals, books, and brochures; personal documents such as diaries, autobiographies, oral histories, and letters; or visual data such as maps, charts, and photographs (McCulloch, 2004; Scott, 1990). These sources cover the domains of both official and personal documents. Official documents are mostly produced by governmental agencies at the local and national level, and they are, as argued by Scott (1990), the largest single source of documents specifically useful to social science researchers. This implies that the majority of official documents are composed of materials published by governmental authorities. On the other hand, official documents also include materials from the non-governmental sectors, including corporations, schools, hospitals, and religious institutions, which are categorized as official documents of the private sector (Scott, 1990). Such official documents are mostly produced by the bureaucratic bodies of private institutions, who hold administrative objectives

for the setting of public rules, thus influencing the everyday life of individuals but also having little involvement with government goals (Scott, 1990). McCulloch (2004) also argues that official documents are not only related to government records and policy issues, but additionally composed of institutional papers, memorandums, public letters, newspapers, and interviews with public groups.

My research project focuses on KOICA sport, which is state-run, affiliated with the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and employs sport as a tool to fulfill Korean ODA goals. The two main objectives of my research project were to 1) identify the content and structure of Korean SFD discourses, and 2) examine how KOICA sport has served as a tool of the Korean government for meeting international development goals, foreign policy and diplomatic objectives, and domestic policy and political ends. Since its establishment in 1991, KOICA has published a variety of documents including annual reports, newsletters, project reports, and volunteer essay books, which are collectively referred to as *KOICA documents* in this dissertation. In addition, KOICA has recently begun running its own blog, webzine, and social media accounts on platforms like Facebook and Instagram. Internet texts are also considered important sources for document analysis in current social research (McCulloch, 2004). Thus, KOICA Internet texts related to KOICA sport were also collected as KOICA documents for this study. These KOICA print and web publications are primary sources for KOICA sport. May (2010) points out the importance of the use of secondary sources to allow for the better analysis of primary sources. While primary sources in document research are materials written by those who directly observed particular events, secondary sources are materials written by authors largely unrelated to the observation of the events (May, 2011). Secondary documents can allow us to better understand the occurrence of events and the author's descriptions in a particular

social context (McCulloch, 2004). In this sense, given that KOICA documents are primary sources, newspaper articles and government policies pertaining to KOICA are considered secondary sources for the document research portion of this research project. Importantly, KOICA and government publications are official documents. Thus, both primary (KOICA documents) and secondary documents (government policies) were collected as important sources for this research project whereas newspaper articles provide context. Following Foucault's (1972; 1980) conception of the link between discursive and non-discursive (non-linguistic) practices, the secondary documents allowed an analysis of specific strategic functions (defined as *dispositif* by Foucault) that stem from discursive–non-discursive relations.

Documentary Research Process

I conducted two levels of documentary research during the data collection stage. Scott (1990) writes on the notion of access, referring to “the availability of the documents” (p. 14) to social researchers for documentary research, which involves four types of documents: closed, restricted, open-archival, and open-published documents. According to Scott (1990), closed documents can be accessed only by authorized insiders, whereas restricted documents are available only to outsiders who have been granted permission for access. While open-archival documents are stored in archival storage open to people and researchers, open-published documents aim for public circulation and are easily accessed by everyone (Scott, 1990). My initial efforts to collect primary and secondary sources for the document research stage of this study involved the restricted, open-archival, and open-published document types discussed by Scott (1990).

First, the vast majority of KOICA documents analyzed in this study were collected in Portable Document Format (PDF) from three different open-archival sources: the KOICA ODA

Library (<http://lib.koica.go.kr/>), KOICA (http://www.koica.go.kr/sites/koica_kr/index.do), and KOICA Volunteers (<http://kov.koica.go.kr/ho/main.do>). From these websites, I collected eight different sets of KOICA documents as primary data sources: 1) annual reports; 2) anniversary books; 3) newsletters; 4) volunteer casebooks; 5) volunteer guidebooks; 6) sport aid project reports; 7) other KOICA documents including pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, statistical books, and essay guidebooks; and 8) Internet texts from official KOICA websites and social media such as blogs, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. Second, I collected government policy documents and newspaper articles. Government policy documents provide critical information relating to KOICA sport, while newspaper articles and KOICA's social media publications offered interviews and stories of overseas KOICA sport volunteers since the late 2000s.

These government policies, newspaper articles, and KOICA Internet texts were collected using two search engines: Google (<https://www.google.com/>) and Naver (<https://www.naver.com/>). Naver is a Korean online platform and search engine, commonly referred to as “the Google of South Korea” (Schwartz, 2007). Terms such as KOICA (*koika*), KOICA volunteers (*koika bongسادan*), KOICA sport volunteers (*koika cheyug bongسادan*), Taekwondo volunteers (*taegwondo bongسادan*), overseas volunteering (*haeobongسادan*), public diplomacy, sport diplomacy, and so on were used to explore these two search engines. Next, I moved onto relevant webpages and websites and then downloaded or captured relevant documents (including policy reports, newspaper articles, and blog posts) in PDF format. I often visited particular Korean government websites (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/index.do>, Office for Government Policy Coordination: <http://www.opm.go.kr/opm/index.do>, Korea Official Development Assistance: <http://odakorea.go.kr/ez.main.ODAEngMain.do>, and the Ministry of Cultural, Sports and

Tourism: <https://www.mcst.go.kr/english/index.jsp>), as well as KOICA websites (e.g. Korea International Cooperation Agency: http://www.koica.go.kr/sites/koica_en/index.do, KOICA Volunteers: <https://kov.koica.go.kr/eh/main.do>, and World Friends Korea: <http://www.worldfriendskorea.or.kr/eng/>) and KOICA's social media, including blogs (e.g. KOICA Korea International Cooperation Agency Blog: <https://blog.naver.com/prkoica>; World Friends Korea Official Blog: <https://m.blog.naver.com/PostList.nhn?blogId=wfk2012>), Facebook pages (e.g. KOICA: <https://www.facebook.com/officialKOICA>), and webzines (e.g. Together KOICA: http://www.koica.go.kr/koica_kr/999/subview.do). According to Scott (1990), the supplementary documents above can be considered to be open-public documents. Last, some KOICA documents were restricted to outsiders. For example, KOICA has published a newsletter since 1994 (KOICA, 1995), but its website provides issues only dating from 2000 onwards. In addition, information on the number of sport volunteers and Taekwondo instructors and the locations they were posted to is limited. Thus, I submitted a request to access newsletters from 1994 to 2017 and statistical data on KOICA sport volunteers and Taekwondo instructors from 1991 to 2017, through the information disclosure system on a designated government website *Jeongbo Gong-gae* [Disclosure] <https://www.open.go.kr/com/main/mainView.do>. Most of the archives, online databases, and websites mentioned above provide information in both Korean and English, but access to documents was limited or absent entirely when the website was accessed in English. This could have been a research concern, but thankfully, I am a native Korean speaker and was able to read all the documents collected.

For the second document research process conducted, I should note that aside from the English versions of the KOICA annual reports and KOICA's Twentieth Anniversary book, some government policy documents in both Korean and English, and a small percentage of aid project

reports, all documents collected in the first process were written in Korean. Thus, documents produced in both Korean and English were studied in Korean first and then compared to their English versions. Since most documents collected were published only in Korean, they were analyzed in Korean. In order to narrow down the documents collected, I focused more on sections in the documents that included texts on or related to KOICA sport, thereby allowing for insight into the various representations of KOICA sport practice, the identification of KOICA sport-relevant events, and the different linkages between KOICA sport and the political schemes (including the policy goals) of the Korean government. Therefore, it can be argued that the second process was conducted according to the major theme of KOICA sport. First, I used NVivo software to aid in sorting out primary documents involving the key theme of KOICA sport, with search terms (the following terms in brackets are the Romanized versions of Korean terms) including but not limited to “sport” (*seupocheu*), “physical education” (*cheyook*), “Taekwondo,” “physical activity” (*cheyug hwaldong* or *undong*), “sport volunteer” (*cheyug bongsa*), “sport centre” (*cheyuggwan*), and “sport facility” (*cheyug siseol*). Unfortunately, KOICA documents produced before 2000 were not detected by these search terms, and I had to look at each document one by one. Through the process of identifying which documents contained texts relating to KOICA sport and which sections of KOICA documents were related to KOICA sport, based on the documents already sorted through NVivo, I selectively examined documents from 1991 to 2017. Secondary sources were examined through three questions: 1) Are they related to the research questions and goals of the dissertation? 2) Do they include texts on KOICA sport? And 3) Do they allow the examination of non-discursive practices interacting with discourses of KOICA sport found in the primary documents?

Completing all these processes resulted in the following list of the key documents, both primary and secondary, that were used for the analysis presented in this dissertation:

1. Primary Sources (see Table 5)

- 1) KOICA Annual Report: Except for the 1992 annual report, which was written in Korean, KOICA has consistently published annual reports in both Korean and English. While the Korean title of the annual report is *Hanguk gukje hyeobryeokdan yeonbo*, the English title is “*KOICA Annual Report*.” Both Korean-language (36) and English-language (35) annual reports from 1992 to 2017 were used, and the sections on the Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors and KOICA Overseas Volunteers in the annual reports were particularly invaluable to this research project.
- 2) KOICA Newsletter: Starting in 1994, KOICA began publishing a newsletter called *Jiguchon gajok* in Korean, or “*Global Family*” in English. The newsletter was published quarterly up until 2007, and following that, it has been published monthly. These newsletters included stories of KOICA sport volunteers and Taekwondo instructors.
- 3) KOICA Anniversary Book: There are two anniversary books commemorating KOICA’s tenth and twentieth founding anniversary. The tenth anniversary book was called *Hanguk gukje hyeobryeok dan 10nyeon* and published only in Korean. In contrast, there are two versions of the twentieth anniversary book: *Hanguk gukje hyeobryeok dan 20nyeon* (Korean) and “*20 Years of KOICA*” (English).
- 4) The Casebook of KOICA Volunteers: KOICA has produced a number of stories, memoirs, and essays that were later compiled into Korean-language books. Among these compilations, I focused on four books that included essays on the experiences of KOICA sport volunteers and Taekwondo instructors: *Gukje hyeobryeok-ui hyeonjang-eseo*

hanguk cheongnyeon haeoe bongsadan hyeonji hwaldong sare [The Casebook of KOICA Overseas Volunteers], *Nanuneun sarang deo keun haengbok* [Sharing Love, Greater Happiness], *Haeoe bongsa danwon usu hwaldong sarejib* [The Casebook of KOICA Overseas Volunteers 2005], and *Hamkke ganeun deo ttatteushan sesang* [Together For a Warm World].

- 5) KOICA Volunteer Guidebook: KOICA has produced different types of volunteer guidebooks that aim to not only provide a practical guideline to volunteers in recipient countries but also to promote KOICA volunteer activities and garner the Korean public's attention. Among them, I selected seven guidebooks written by current volunteers in recipient countries: *Haeoe bongsadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo*, *beteunampyeon* [Volunteer Guidebook, Vietnam Edition], *Haeoe bongsadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo*, *kollombiapyeon* [Volunteer Guidebook, Colombia Edition], *Haeoe bongsadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo*, *ekwadleupyeon* [Volunteer Guidebook, Ecuador Edition], *Haeoe bongsadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo*, *boribiapyeon* [Volunteer Guidebook, Bolivia Edition], *Twiniiji bongsadanwondeul-ui bom iyagi* [The Spring Story of Volunteers in Tunisia], *Twiniiji bongsadanwondeul-ui yeoreum iyagi* [The Summer Story of Volunteers in Tunisia], and *Twiniiji bongsadanwondeul-ui kyeoul iyagi* [The Winter Story of Volunteers in Tunisia].
- 6) KOICA Sport Aid Project Report: In the history of KOICA sport aid, there have been three monumental projects: *The Construction of A Taekwondo Hall* in Tunisia (1997–1999), *The Project for Improving Taekwondo Training Center of Khanh Hoa Police Department* in Vietnam (1999), and *The Project for Construction of Korea-Indonesia Friendship Sports Center* in Indonesia (2003–2005). In addition, it is also worth taking a

closer look at another project launched in Tunisia in conjunction with the construction of the Taekwondo hall project, titled *Development Project of National Center for Training Trainers and Training Engineering Project* (1997–1999). I focused on the final reports of the above four projects.

- 7) Other KOICA documents: This includes brochures, pamphlets, guidebooks for new recruits, statistics, essay guidebooks, and so on, which include descriptions on sport volunteering, Taekwondo activities, and any physical activity programs of KOICA in recipient countries. I selectively examined seven documents, which were categorized into four different types during the documentary research process: 1) three brochures, 2) one volunteer recruitment guidebook, 3) three statistical books, and 4) one essay guidebook. The three statistical books specifically help trace historical changes seen in the number of KOICA volunteers posted abroad, which can present significant implications for the analysis of the link between discourses of KOICA sport and the neoliberal policy objectives of the Korean government. The essay guidebook is also useful for the examination of how the popular rhetoric of volunteer experiences is promoted and how volunteers pursue particular forms of subjectivity in KOICA practice.
- 8) Internet texts from KOICA and government websites: Considering the link between the main themes in discourses of KOICA sport and the policy goals of the Korean government, four blog posts and four web articles were selected.

(1) Posts on World Friends Korea Official Blog and KOICA Blog:

- *Kollombiaseo taekwondolo hanguk allineun KOICA danwondeul* [KOICA members promote Korea through Taekwondo in Colombia]

- *Kim yeongmok isajang, yoreudan choedae gymoui jatali nanmin kaempeureul gada* [KOICA President Kim Young-mok visits Jordan's largest Za'atari refugee camp]
- *Woldeu peurenjeu ujeubekiseutan bongsadanwon gwa koikaui aju teukbyeolhan inyeon!* [World Friends Volunteer in Uzbekistan and KOICA's special relationship]
- *Nanmin eoriniege taekwondo gareuchineun woldeupeurenjeu isejong danwon inteobu* [Interview with volunteer, Lee Sejong, who teaches Taekwondo to youth refugees]

(2) Articles on KOICA official website and the MOFA website:

- *Who we are: Korea's development cooperation management architecture*
- *Introduction of the public diplomacy: Public diplomacy of Korea*
- *Sport diplomacy and promoting taekwondo*

2. Supplementary Sources (see Table 6)

1) Government policy documents: Two key government documents were sorted:

Eemyeongbak jeongbu 100dae gukjeong-gwaje [100 Policy Tasks of the Lee Myung-bak administration] and the *Public Diplomacy Act*. These two documents were analyzed to show how thematic choices in discourses of KOICA sport are linked with policy objectives of the Korean government.

2) Newspaper articles: 12 newspaper articles containing interviews and stories of KOICA sport, and texts of Korean historical events and political choices interacting with discourses of KOICA sport were selectively examined.

- (1) *Kim daetongryeong, taekwondo segyehwa bakcha* [President Kim, the acceleration of Taekwondo's segyehwa]
- (2) *Saram, saram, saramdeul* [People, people, people]
- (3) *Taekwondo jeongpa sabeom 21myeong, 9gaeguk pagyeon yejeong* [Plan to dispatch 21 Taekwondo instructors to 9 countries]
- (4) *Gunbokmu daeshin haeobongsagaseo 'pelu taekwondo yeong-woong' doeda* [Became a Peruvian Taekwondo hero through volunteer service instead of military service]
- (5) *'Saemaul-undong-eul eotteohke pyeongka hal geoshinga' seonggonghoedae haksul balpyohwi* [How to evaluate Saemaul Undong, Sungkonghoe University conference]
- (6) *Hyeobhoe hwijangdeul-i batdeon daehanminguk cheyooksang gongrosang seulilangkaseo baegu gareuchin mumyeong kochiga badda* [An unknown coach who taught volleyball in Sri Lanka receives a sport award in Korea]
- (7) *Hanguk seupesyeol olrimpiik wiwonhwi, koika wa MOU chekyeol* [Special Olympics Korea signs MOU with KOICA]
- (8) *Saemaul-undong haeobongsadan taekwondo gyoyuk* [The Taekwondo program of Saemaul Undong overseas volunteers]
- (9) *Koika, pyeongchang-olrimpiik jojig-wi wa MOU maejgo gaedoguk-e hongbo* [KOICA signs an MOU with the PyeongChang Organizing Committee for the 2018 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games to promote the Games in developing countries]
- (10) *KOICA signs MOU offering support for PyeongChang 2018*

(11) *Korean troop's killings in Vietnam still unresolved*

(12) *Time to apologize for Korea's own war crimes in Vietnam*

Table 5

List of Primary Sources (KOICA documents)

Set	Type	Language	Title	Year(s)
1	KOICA annual report	Korean	<i>Hanguk gukje hyeobryeokdan yeonbo</i> [KOICA Annual Report]	1992–2017
		English	KOICA Annual Report	1993–2017
2	KOICA newsletter	Korean	<i>Jiguchon gajok</i> (Global Family)	
			[Quarterly]	1994–2007
			[Monthly]	2008–2017
3	KOICA anniversary book	Korean	<i>Hanguk gukje hyeobryeok dan 10nyeon</i> [10 Years of KOICA]	2001
		Korean	<i>Hanguk gukje hyeobryeok dan 20nyeon</i> [20 Years of KOICA]	2011
		English	20 Years of KOICA	2011
4	Casebook of KOICA volunteer	Korean	<i>Gukje hyeobryeok-ui hyeonjang-eseo hanguk cheongnyeon haeoe bongmadan hyeonji hwaldong sare</i> [The Casebook of KOICA Overseas Volunteers]	1992
		Korean	<i>Haeoe bongsa danwon usu hwaldong sarejib</i> [The Casebook of KOICA Overseas Volunteers]	2005
		Korean	<i>Nanuneun sarang deo keun haengbok</i> [Share Love, Greater Happiness]	2006
		Korean	<i>Hamkke ganeun deo ttatteuthan sesang</i> [Together for a Warm World]	2008
5	KOICA volunteer guidebook	Korean	<i>Haeoe bongmadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo / beteunampyeon</i> [Volunteer Guidebook, Vietnam Edition]	2011
			<i>Haeoe bongmadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo / kollumbiapyeon</i> [Volunteer Guidebook, Colombia Edition]	2011
			<i>Haeoe bongmadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo / ekwadoleupyeon</i> [Volunteer Guidebook, Ecuador Edition]	2011
			<i>Haeoe bongmadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo/ Bolivia</i> [Volunteer Guidebook, Bolivia Edition]	2016
			<i>Twiniji bongmadanwondeul-ui bom iyagi</i> [The Spring Story of Volunteers in Tunisia]	2014
			<i>Twiniji bongmadanwondeul-ui yeoreum iyagi</i> [The Summer Story of Volunteers in Tunisia]	2014
			<i>Twiniji bongmadanwondeul-ui kyeoul iyagi</i> [The Winter Story of Volunteers in Tunisia]	2014
6	Sport aid report	Korean	Final Report on the Construction of a Taekwondo Hall in Tunisia (1997-1999)	2006
			Final Report on the Development Project of National Center for Training Trainers and Training Engineering Project (1997-1999)	2006
			Final Report on the Project for Improving Taekwondo Training Center of Khanh Hoa Police Department (1999)	2006
			Final Report on the Project for Construction of Korea-Indonesia Friendship Sports Center (2003-2005)	2006

Table 5 (continued)*List of Primary Sources (KOICA documents)*

7	Other KOICA Documents			
	Brochure	Korea	Korea International Cooperation Agency	2019
		English	Korea International Cooperation Agency	2020
		Korean	World Friends Korea	2016
	Recruitment guidebook	Korean	<i>Haeobongsadan mojjib gaideubuk</i> [Volunteer Recruitment Guidebook]	
	Statistical book	Korean	<i>Hannune ilgneun 2013nyeon World Friends Korea juyo tonggye</i> [Key Statistics on World Friends Korea 2013 at a Glance]	2014
			<i>Hannune ilgneun 2015nyeon World Friends Korea juyo tonggye</i> [Key Statistics on World Friends Korea 2015 at a Glance]	2017
			<i>Hannune ilgneun 2017nyeon World Friends Korea juyo tonggye</i> [Key Statistics on World Friends Korea 2017 at a Glance]	2018
	Essay guidebook	Korean	<i>Haeoe bongsadanwon hwaldong gyeongheomdam gillajabi</i> [Guide to Write Overseas Volunteer Experience]	2016
8	Blog Post & Article			
	Blog	World Friends Korea (2013, July 19). <i>Kollombiaseo taekwondolo hanguk allineun KOICA danwondeul</i> [KOICA members promote Korea through Taekwondo in Colombia] Retrieved from https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=wfk2012&logNo=140193438267&referrerCode=0&searchKeyword=%ED%83%9C%EA%B6%8C%EB%8F%84		
		Korea International Cooperation Agency (2016, February 16). <i>Kim yeongmok isajang, yoreudan choedae gymoui jatari nanmin kaempeureul gada</i> [KOICA President Kim Young-mok visits Jordan's largest Za'atari refugee camp]. Retrieved from https://m.blog.naver.com/prkoica/220628412734		
		World Friends Korea (2016, July 25). <i>Woldeu peurenjeu ujeubekiseutan bongsadanwon gwa koikau aju teukbyeolhan inyeon!</i> [World Friends Volunteer in Uzbekistan and KOICA's special relationship]. Retrieved from https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=wfk2012&logNo=220771324887&proxyReferrer=https:%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F		
		World Friends Korea (2017, July 13). <i>Nanmin eoriniege taekwondo gareuchineun woldeupeulenjeu isejong danwon inteobu</i> [Interview with volunteer, Lee Sejong, who teaches Taekwondo to refugee children in Za'atari]. Retrieved from https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=wfk2012&logNo=221050356086&referrerCode=0&searchKeyword=%ED%83%9C%EA%B6%8C%EB%8F%84		
	Article	Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) (n.d.). <i>Who we are: Korea's development cooperation management architecture</i> . Retrieved January 11, 2020, from http://www.koica.go.kr/koica_en/3391/subview.do#gnb		

Table 6

References: Supplementary Documents

Set	Type	Source
1	Government policy and other documents	The Office of the President (2011). <i>Eemyeongbak jeongbu 100dae gukjeong gwaje</i> [100 Policy Tasks of the Lee Myung-bak administration]. Presidential Archives. Retrieved December 15, 2019 from http://17cwg.pa.go.kr/kr/policy/data/100policy.pdf
		Statutes of the Republic of Korea (2016). <i>Public diplomacy act</i> . Retrieved from http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/english/Public_Diplomacy_Act.pdf
		Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.). <i>Introduction of the public diplomacy: Public diplomacy of Korea</i> . Retrieved October 20, 2019, from http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_22841/contents.do
		Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.). <i>Sport diplomacy and promoting taekwondo</i> . Retrieved October 20, 2019, from http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_22828/contents.do
2	Newspaper articles	Choi, S. (2012, October 16). Hyeobhoe hwejangdeul-i baddeon daehanminguk cheyooksang gonglosang seulilangkaseo baegu gareuchin mumyeong kochiga badda [An unknown coach who taught volleyball in Sri Lanka receives a sport award in Korea]. <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> . Retrieved from http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/10/16/2012101600038.html
		Kim, H.E. (2011, January 27). “Became a Peruvian Taekwondo hero through volunteer service instead of military service”. <i>Jungang Ilbo</i> . Retrieved from https://news.joins.com/article/4982401
		Korea Saemaul Undong Center (2014, January 19). <i>Saemaul-undong haeeobongsadan taekwondogyoyuk</i> [The Taekwondo Program of Saemaul Undong overseas volunteers]. <i>Segye Ilbo</i> . Retrieved from https://www.segye.com/newsView/20140119002905
		Chun, H. (2013, October 8). Hanguk seupesyeol olrmpil wiwonhoe, koika wa MOU chekyeol [Special Olympics Korea signs a MOU with KOICA]. <i>Jungang Ilbo</i> . Retrieved from https://news.joins.com/article/12795556
		Choi, H. (2017, January 30). Korean troop’s killings in Vietnam still unresolved. <i>The Korea Times</i> . Retrieved from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2017/01/120_222942.html#.XeJNRbT-yIU.link
		Ock, H. (2017, November 9). ‘Time to apologize for Korea’s own war crimes in Vietnam.’ <i>The Korean Herald</i> . Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171109000945
		People, People, People (1996, April 27). <i>Donga Ilbo</i> . NAVER News Library. Retrieved from https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=1996042700209133020&editNo=45&printCount=1&publishDate=1996-04-27&officeId=00020&pageNo=33&printNo=23179&publishType=00010
		Kim, Taekwondo’s Segyehwa (1994, December 11). <i>Maeil Gyeongje</i> . NAVER News Library. Retrieved from https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=1994121100099102015&editNo=15&printCount=1&publishDate=1994-12-11&officeId=00009&pageNo=2&printNo=8953&publishType=00010
		Wang, G.H. (2015, April 6). Koica, pyeongchang-olrmpig jojik-wi wa MOU maejgo gaedoguk-e hongbo [KOICA signs MOU with PyeongChang Organising Committee for the 2018 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games to promote the Games in developing countries]. <i>YonHap News Agency</i> . Retrieved from https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20150406059800371
		Hwang, C. (2010, April 30). Taekwondo jeongpa sabeom 21myeong, 9gaeguk payeon yejeong [Plan to dispatch 21taekwondo instructors to 9 countries]. <i>Taekwondo Sinmun</i> . Retrieved from http://www.tkdnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=5603

Table 6 (continued)*References: Supplementary Documents*

	Hwang, G.S. (2011, April 25). ‘Saemaul-undong-eul eotteoh-ke pyeong-ga hal geoshinga’ seong-gonghoedae hagsul balpyohoe [How to evaluate <i>saemaul undong</i> , Sungkonghoe University conference]. <i>Kyunghyang Shinmun</i> . Retrieved from http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201104252102495
	PyeongChang Organizing Committee for the 2018 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (POCOG) (2015, April 8). <i>KOICA signs MOU offering support for PyeongChang 2018</i> . Retrieved from https://www.paralympic.org/news/koica-signs-mou-offering-support-pyeongchang-2018

Analysis

Documentary research methods were conducted using Foucauldian discourse analysis. Key documents were narrowed down clearly and sorted by an archaeological consideration of discontinuities in the field of knowledge to distinguish “several possible levels of events within the very density of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 171), as well as by a genealogical consideration of discursive changes within the relations of power. Ziai (2016) argues that archaeology is more concerned with a synchronic analysis of discourses, whereas genealogy can provide diachronic analysis. To pursue the analytic goals of both archaeology and genealogy, I attempted to obtain a large volume of KOICA documents that would show the historical transformations of discourses from KOICA’s very beginnings to the present, which were made explicit through a collection of annual reports, newsletters, and other documents that conveyed all the distinctive features of KOICA sport during any particular period.

My initial approach to Foucauldian discourse analysis was rather fragmentary and adhered to a technical understanding of archaeology and genealogy – particularly for the discursive–non-discursive nexus and *dispositif* – with little theoretical consideration. The examination of the discursive formations of Korean SFD, the topic of Article I in my dissertation, was not initially a focus of this research project. Rather, I had simply focused on

prevalent discourses and their connections with the political sites (e.g. diplomatic goals, policy objectives, and national ends) of the Korean government. Frankly, I had lacked a sophisticated understanding of archaeology and genealogy in terms of discourse analysis. After realizing that my initial findings presented only a broad picture of the Korean SFD discourse, I thus went back to read Foucault's work again for a more comprehensive understanding of the methodological use of archaeology and genealogy. I was particularly interested in Ziai's (2016) archaeological approaches to the discourse of development through Foucault's (1972) four categories of discursive formations: objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies.

Consequently, Article I of the dissertation was guided by the four categories of discursive formations. In fact, the formation of objects was identified by the following questions: Which objects came to become visible in the discourse of KOICA sport? How were these objects defined, demarcated, and classified? The formation of enunciative statements became clear when I focused on a particular mode of statements that provided the subject position of expert knowledge in KOICA sport discourse. It was followed by the identification of authorities entrenched in the conventional ideas and typical sites of Korean sport culture, as well as Korean development. Next, for the formation of concepts, I examined how the constancy of particular concepts was connected differently to different discursive aims and practices. Last, two processes were conducted for the analysis of the formation of strategies. First, I revealed the common themes prevalent in the discourse of KOICA sport and also indicated their connections with non-discursive practices. Thus, the second process examined how these common themes were linked and strategically regulated by the non-linguistic domains (e.g. social conditions, political issues, policy objectives, and historical events) by which KOICA sport was constructed.

In Articles II and III, the archaeological approach was used for the examination of the rules of strategies, focusing on the conception of the discursive–non-discursive link. Then, the links revealed were drawn into the field of genealogy by the same manner in which the link between discursive and non-discursive practices was replaced by the concept of *dispositif* (Foucault, 1980) in relations of power. In other words, discourses of KOICA sport and their interactions with policy objectives, political conditions, and historical events, defined as *dispositif*, including strategic functions in a given context, were analyzed as the manifestations of diplomatic aims (Article II) and domestic policy objectives (Article III). The specific details of the Foucauldian discourse analysis conducted for each of the three different research topics are discussed in Part Two.

Notably, the essays, interviews, memoirs, and stories included in KOICA’s various official documents provided the real names of volunteers, instructors, and staff, as the majority of KOICA documents, as official documents, can be openly accessed by the public. Nevertheless, individuals’ names in all extracts taken from key texts on KOICA sport were replaced with the pseudonym “KOICA” in this dissertation, to prevent any unintended ethical consequences that might arise from my study and its resulting analytical results.

Researcher as Translator in Cross-Language Qualitative Research

Temple (2002) defines qualitative research involving the use of an interpreter (interpretation) and translator (translation) at any point in the research process as “cross-language research” (p. 844). Cross-language research is targeted at those who do not speak English, or those who speak a native language that is not English (Temple & Edward, 2002). Conventionally, the importance of translation and interpretation is often ignored or intentionally removed in the methodological process (Berman & Tyyskä, 2011). However, a growing body of

literature on cross-language research has treated the presence of a translator/interpreter (including actions of translation and interpretation) as significant in qualitative research (e.g. Berman & Tyyskä, 2011; Regmi, Nidoo, & Pilkington, 2010; Shklarov, 2007). Temple (2002) labels them as “active producers of research” (p. 845) who convey their lives and perspectives, rather than “neutral conveyors of message” (p. 846). Thus, it can be said that my research project falls under the category of cross-language qualitative research. It should also be noted that my research concerned only issues of translation, as I was not involved in any of the interviews, surveys, or participatory research included as sources in my research project.

It is also important to clarify how each researcher, translator, and/or interpreter is positioned in cross-language research (Temple, 2002). For this research project, I hold the position of researcher as translator, similar to Shklarov’s (2007) dual role of bilingual researcher and translator. Shklarov (2007) argues that this type of dual role can contribute to the quality of analytical results in cross-language research, as the bilingual researcher is involved in the whole research process with similar insights, backgrounds, and understandings of cultural contexts. Nevertheless, Shklarov (2007) warns of the potential for the researcher-translator to be involved in “a perceived air of a ‘monopoly’ on interpreting his or her own research findings” (p. 535). That is, the dual role that is taken on might lead to an individual researcher exerting power in the interpretation of their findings, which might generate concerns over whether the study’s results are reliable and free from distortion. Regmi et al. (2010) relates such an issue with the matter of securing equivalency between two different meanings in two different social contexts. In fact, this is a common issue in cross-language research (and in cross-cultural research as well) when dual meanings are recognized in two different languages, or when there are no equivalent or corresponding words in one of the languages (Regmi et al., 2010). Shklarov (2007) suggests that

the bilingual researcher can pursue similarities between the two different words and their conceptual equivalency, instead of seeking to achieve perfect positivistic neutral equivalency. In this manner, Regmi et al. (2010) propose the idea of transliteration, the “process of replacing or complementing the words or meanings of one language with meanings of another as sometimes the exact equivalence or exact meaning might not exist” (p. 18). This implies that transliteration offers the potential to intentionally change particular words and meanings when it comes to the process of translation. Following Regmi et al.’s notion of transliteration, I added and replaced particular words and meanings that did not have ready counterparts in the analysis of texts of KOICA sport, which were extracted from Korean-language documents. Furthermore, I also used and tweaked Brislin’s (1970) method of translation, which advises recruiting at least two bilingual individuals to obtain equivalence in cross-cultural (language) research. In his method, two individuals conduct forward- and back-translation processes: one translates particular texts from the source language forward into the target language, and the other back-translates the target language results back into the source language. For my research project, my analysis was always conducted with two Korean-English bilingual individuals (including myself, researcher as translator). I played the forward-translator role from the source language (Korean) to the target language (English) first, with someone else to back-translate from the target language (English) to the source language (Korean). In some cases, this process was reversed and mixed, particularly when the need for additional translation was recognized by one of the two bilingual individuals, who then became the forward-translator. I then adopted the final version as the results negotiated between the two individuals.

Concluding Remarks

Along with the explosive increase in SFD studies over two decades, many sport scholars in the SFD research community have used Foucault's concepts of discourse and power as theoretical and methodological frameworks. However, few attempts have been made to follow the rigid methodologies of archaeology and genealogy proposed in Foucault's work. In particular, methodological efforts to identify the particular rules of discursive formations according to Foucault's (1972) four categories of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies have never been pursued in the study of SFD literature. Thus, my archaeological work in this research project, conducted in Article I to analyze the structure of the Korean sport for international development discourse, can lay the groundwork for follow-up research aiming to seek systematic approaches to Foucauldian discourse analysis to identify regularities of discursive formations and discourses laid down in a particular sociopolitical practice. In combination with genealogical work, my approaches to Foucauldian discourse analysis in the three articles of my dissertation can also provide a different insight into the analysis of SFD discourse, in which the historical changes of discursive formations are traced, thus making it possible to detect singularities, differences, and contradictions in the history of discourse. In the same vein, I heavily refer to Robert Millington's (2015) doctoral dissertation, *The United Nations and Sport for Development and Peace: A Critical History*, which draws upon Foucault's archaeology and genealogy to challenge the linear history of sport for international development, signified as the history of SDP in the twenty-first century. Through his methodological efforts, Millington (2015) uncovers a particular strategy in the workings of power relations (also seen as the will of power) that is willing to erase the history of SFD before the twenty-first century, along with the new era of international development. He (2015) does not hesitate to refer to such

a strategy/attempt as “ahistoricism of the SDP paradigm” (p. 5). Building on Millington’s work, my methodological attempts can add a more delicate touch to the analysis of SFD discourse, through the way that the discourse of Korean sport for international development can be offered as an alternative to mainstream Western SFD discourse, and in the ways discourses of Korean SFD have been juxtaposed against the politics of international development, foreign policy, and domestic policy objectives throughout the history of Korean ODA.

Last, I conclude this chapter on methodology by discussing the issues I experienced during the process of translation for this research project. As a non-native researcher writing in English (I am a native Korean speaker with a Korean social and cultural background, influenced by classically Korean traditions and ideas), when translating Korean-language documents into English, I invested a great deal of energy and effort into properly conveying the meanings of the texts examined. This was not just during the translation process, but for the entirety of the research project, from start to finish. Researchers who do not speak English as their mother tongue may often be prevented from holding a privileged position in the field of academic research publication. Nevertheless, I accept the reality that a rigid and sophisticated process of translation should be prioritized, particularly when involving terms for the method of social science research. Thus, I believe that these initial efforts to determining the appropriate translation method for this dissertation can certainly contribute to my future research work, as well as to the body of SFD literature in general.

Chapter 5 (Article 1): An Archaeology of Korean Sport for International Development

Discourse in Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)

A revised version of this article was submitted for publication in the *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*

Introduction

In April 1991, South Korea (hereafter Korea) began full-fledged participation in international development with the establishment of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). KOICA became the predominant agency for administering all government grant projects and technical cooperation programs. In September 1990, prior to its official establishment, the new state agency had already dispatched its first mission consisting of 44 volunteers to Nepal, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, including eight volunteers responsible for coordinating and implementing of sport and physical education programs. Since then, KOICA has managed sport-related volunteer placements overseas “for the social and economic development of recipient countries” (KOICA 1993, p. 40). A variety of KOICA sport aid and coaching programs were initiated in recipient countries to fulfill Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) objectives. These first steps are widely considered the start of Korea’s use of sport for the purposes of international development.

The use of sport as a tool for international development was largely focused and institutionalised by the twenty-first century with the growing popularity of sport-for-development (SFD) movements (Kidd, 2008), and the rise of the sport for development and peace (SDP) sector (Benson & Wise, 2019; Darnell, 2012). This popularity has also prompted theoretical and empirical studies of sport’s integration into the international development agenda (Darnell, Chawansky, Marchesseault, Holmes, & Hayhurst, 2018; Schulenkorf, Sherry, & Rowe, 2016). According to Schulenkorf et al. (2016), less than 2% of SFD studies published in English was produced by researchers from Asia. Although scholarly interest in sport for international development might exist in Asian donor countries such as Korea, Japan and China, researchers may approach it differently than the Western-oriented academic literature, and publish in

languages other than English. Indeed, Na and Dallaire (2015) have pointed out that a host of Korean-language research focuses on the potential role of sport as a tool for Korean ODA, but primarily on its diplomatic effects rather than its development goals. Despite increasing attempts to incorporate current SFD approaches into Korean sport programs, little follow-up research exists.

This study addresses these issues by focusing on Korean sport for international development discourse and by examining a variety of overseas sport volunteer programs, Taekwondo-specific programs and sport aid projects implemented by KOICA in the Global South. My attention centres on identifying the rules governing the Korean-specific discursive formations framing these KOICA programs, which generate distinct iterations of the Korean sport for international development discourse. Given Korea's historical context as a country formerly occupied by Japanese colonizers from 1910 to 1945, this study offers a different angle by examining the relationship between Korea and recipient countries that share similar colonial experiences and historical ordeals of humiliation. In addition, conventional organised sports such as football (soccer), basketball, and baseball are commonly featured in SFD practice (Schulenkorf et al, 2016). Contrastingly, KOICA offers Taekwondo-related activities, both as an institutionalised sport and as informal play (Sterchele 2015), to achieve the policy goals and political objectives of the Korean government. Lastly, the SFD movement is encouraged by the development of civil society (Giulianotti 2011) and the spread of new social movements (Kidd 2008). In fact, the majority of SFD studies at the international level have focused on programs and initiatives by non-government organisations (NGOs) sponsored by governmental agencies and intergovernmental organisations (e.g., Darnell, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012; Forde, 2014; Nicholls, Giles, & Sethna, 2010; Wamucii, 2011). Yet, SFD scholars have argued that national

governments are the main drivers of SFD movements, operating in accordance with the international development agenda, (e.g., Giulianotti 2011) and further claim that the majority of SFD NGOs and their programs are largely reliant on governmental aid agencies with their own specific development policy agendas (e.g., Coalter 2010a; Kidd, 2008). This explains Hasselgård's (2015) call for a more holistic approach to understanding and contextualising national SFD strategies, which are inseparable from the state's policy objectives, foreign aid system and domestic politics. Therefore, this study fosters an understanding of how state-run sport programs operate in SFD internationally, while examining how specific national and international development contexts influence SFD programs. The following section of this paper will briefly explain the KOICA sport programs and aid projects at the heart of the study. I continue by presenting Foucault's (1972) archaeology with an emphasis on the rules, or the conditions of existence, that regulate the objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies that constitute discursive formations. The findings follow and provide insight into the specifics of these four elements in the KOICA sport for international development discourse and the rules of formation that generate and govern them. The conclusion offers critical reflections on the former colony-colony relationship in sport for international development, on state-run SFD programs and on the role of Taekwondo as a distinct SFD tool.

KOICA Sport in Korea's Official Development Assistance

The narrative of Korea's ODA begins with the presentation of Korea as "one of the world's Least Developed Countries" (KOICA, 2011d, p. 36), after more than three decades of Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) and the three-year Korean War (1950–1953). However, within half a century Korea experienced such remarkable economic development that this period of growth is often described as the "Miracle on the Han River" (KOICA, 2011d, p. 34). Korea

entered the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, shedding its historical identity as an aid recipient country to become a member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the world's leading donor club. Yet Korean international development initiatives took a completely different turn than classic donors in Western Europe (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007; Watson, 2014). Korea relies on its recent experience of overcoming conditions of underdevelopment and its own development knowledge to impart what it considers important lessons and guidance to "fight global poverty and support sustainable socio-economic development" (KOICA, n.d.). The Korean government seeks to contribute to the achievement of international development goals by "sharing Korea's development experiences and know-how with its partner countries" (KOICA, n.d.). This narrative helps to frame the variety of sport volunteer programs, sport aid projects and Taekwondo-specific programs known as Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors (DTI) that KOICA has run for three decades in the Global South. These three types of KOICA sport programs are hereafter collectively termed *KOICA sport*.

First, under the name of "Korea Youth Volunteers" (which was later renamed "Korea Overseas Volunteers (KOV)," also known as "KOICA Volunteers" and "World Friends KOICA Volunteers"), eight volunteers were dispatched in September 1990 to developing countries to aid with physical education, football and Taekwondo initiatives (KOICA, 2001). This pioneering program was implemented a year prior to KOICA's establishment. Since then, sport and physical education volunteers have been dispatched continuously to the Global South, with the bulk of them serving in sport federations, sport and community centres and local schools. These volunteers typically possessed advanced athletic qualifications, including elite athletic skills, expert knowledge and practical experience, along with related certifications in their specific

sport. Second, from 1991 to 2008, KOICA also dispatched qualified Korean male Taekwondo coaches through the DTI program. DTI instructors were to enhance Taekwondo development in recipient countries by coaching national Taekwondo teams, thus achieving athletic excellence at global-level competitions. Notably, DTI's beginnings can be traced back to a government program run in 1972 during the Park Chung-hee regime, which sent Korean Taekwondo instructors to non-aligned, neutral countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Under KOICA's supervision, DTI played a critical role in assisting the development of organised Taekwondo overseas from 1991 to 2008. Third, since 1991, KOICA has implemented a host of sport aid projects in recipient countries, mostly targeting the construction of sport facilities and Taekwondo training centres. This study focuses on three significant sport aid projects: *The Construction of a Taekwondo Hall* in Tunisia (1997–1999), *The Project for Improving Taekwondo Training Center of Khanh Hoa Police Department* in Vietnam (1999), and *The Project for Construction of Korea-Indonesia Friendship Sports Center* in Indonesia (2003–2005). All three projects played a significant role in assisting the development of organised Taekwondo by providing upgraded, modern and fully equipped training centres for Taekwondo athletes preparing for international competitions.

Methodology

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), Foucault argues that discourse is not simply a group of signs, but a group of statements that defy reduction to linguistic units or grammatical categories. A statement is an event, which is “something other, something more, than a mere collection of signs” (Foucault 1972, p. 96). The groups of statements and their dispersion characterized by regularities are referred to as “discursive formations” (Foucault 1972, p. 31). In this way, archaeology can be used as an analytic guideline for uncovering discourses, which are

treated as “practices obeying certain rules” (Foucault 1972, p. 138) in terms of the formation of *objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies*. Thus, discourse analysis seen through Foucault’s lens of archaeology aims to explore the rules and regularities that constitute the unity of a discourse, giving rise to a particular function and practice where we perceive something to be meaningful (Mills 1997). To examine the structure of the Korean sport for international development discourse, I draw upon Foucault’s archaeology with a focus on identifying the rules of formation that determine the dispersion of statements.

Archaeology, Development and SFD

Escobar (1992) argues that one can “recapture [the post-war order of development] in its otherness” (p. 414). He proposes a deconstruction of development by glimpsing “a different regime of truth and perception within which a new practice of concern and action would be possible” (Escobar, 1992, p. 412). Such a deconstruction of development would be achievable through archaeological analysis of development discourse (Escobar 1995). Foucault (1972) uses archaeology to trace discontinuities, differences and distinctiveness in the historical changes of certain forms of knowledge, concepts and ideas. Watts (1995) underlines the use of both archaeology and genealogy for a more comprehensive understanding of the impasse of development theory and the crisis of development practice tracing back to the late eighteenth century. He applies archeology to examine how and why development manifests through metaphors rooted in the Western (European) knowledge of social disorder, disjuncture and governability of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Watts 1995). These metaphors consist of a linear progress of development framed by biological and evolutionary ideas that produced teleological views of social, cultural, and individual modernity in European society. In so doing, he reveals how the constancy of these late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century

metaphors differs within the specific development context of the twentieth century (Watts, 1995). This is supported by Escobar's (2010) argument that singularities in the link between development discourse and institutions in the twentieth century are distinct from those of the nineteenth century. Thus, through archaeology, one can examine how the production of certain knowledge is guided by rules and regularities entrenched in specific contexts. This can be seen as singularity in a given context. The use of archaeology as an alternative methodology, referred by Escobar (2010) as 'the possibility to think reality differently' (p. 415), focuses on the relationship between development texts and their social and historical contexts. From an archaeological perspective, development policy is not simply regarded as a unity of texts, but a system of dispersion that produces a homogeneous reality (Sachs 2010). Development is understood as discursive formations, which are the representations of power that shape the world (Sachs 2010).

Similarly, archaeology can be a useful approach for critically examining how the reiteration of specific statements in SFD policy discourses is influenced by a range of different sociopolitical and historical contexts. First, Gardam, Giles and Hayhurst (2017) focus on SFD programs implemented in Aboriginal communities in Canada's Northwest Territories funded by extractive industries. They identify four sociopolitical conditions that produce former and current discourses about the need for and funding of, SFD in the Northwest Territories. Next, Mwaanga and Mwansa's (2016) study focuses on an SDP NGO in Zambia, called the EduSport Foundation, to identify alternative perspectives – namely, Indigenous discourses within the Global South – in opposition to mainstream international SFD discourses derived from the Global North. Specifically, they employ Foucault's (1972) notion of discursive formations to uncover a system rooted in history and culture that accepts distinct statements and regulates the position of SFD subjects. Lastly, Shehu (2016) focuses on the interplay between sport, gender

and development, and finds that archaeology can be useful in analysing the intertextual discourses found in SFD policy documents and speeches, by examining its content and the holder of the subject position in SFD. While these three studies provide novel insights into SFD by applying archaeology, few attempts are made to describe the analytical process that leads to an identification of discursive formations by focussing on the conditions of existence that regulate the emergence of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies (Foucault 1972).

Rules of Formation

Critically, Ziai (2016) argues that the kernel of archaeology is to identify the rules of formation (or the conditions of existence) that govern the regularities of the discourse's objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies. He further points to a methodological weakness in using archaeology for the analysis of development discourse to merely identify common words and concepts, rather than reveal the specific rules of formation that determine relations between objects, statements and concepts in a particular context. That is, even though commonly occurring words and concepts can offer clues to finding the locus of a discourse in which certain objects emerge and are transformed (Garrity 2010), the aim of archaeology should be to analyse the rules of formations (Ziai 2016). Following this idea, development is a form of objective knowledge that creates a particular site of development intervention and its objects, and that constructs the particular social and political conditions to which the objects belong and rely upon (Lie 2007). In this knowledge system, development discourse is deliberately generated and reproduced by the rules of formation (Lie 2007) in the way that content is produced and regulated (Ziai 2016). This study fully engages with the four categories of rules of formations, and comprehensively applies archaeology to uncover the structure of the Korean sport for

international development discourse in the Korean ODA context.

First, Foucault (1972) argues that the formation of objects can be identified when we “map the first surface of their emergence” (p. 41), “describe the authorities of delimitation” (p. 41) and “analyse the grids of specification” (p. 42). The objects of discourse, that is the target in need of knowledge-based interventions (Ziai 2016), are formed and appear with a regularity that names, demarcates and classifies different objects. One can identify this regularity of objects by focusing on where and when the objects appear, the authorities (e.g., institutions and disciplines) that designate the objects and the kinds of criteria used to classify the objects. Depending on a variety of contexts, the objects of discourse can be differently “delimited, designated, named and established” (Foucault 1972, p. 42). The objects of development discourse are often demarcated by units such as states, regions and continents (Ziai 2016). These units are further divided into categories, including the developing, the Global South and the Third World (Escobar 1995). Such units can be classified as *underdeveloped* by a set of standardised models and criteria established by Western institutions, countries and regions representing the *developed world* (Williams 1995).

Second, Brown and Cousins (1980) claim that the formation of enunciative modalities (mode of statements) is associated with three questions necessary for recognising a discourse: ‘Who is speaking? Where is it being spoken from? What is the relation between the speaker and what is being spoken of?’ (p. 269). In Foucault’s (1972) perspective, the one who speaks the truth is of little importance. Rather, the one to consider is the subject conveying the truth. In other words, statements in development discourse dictate the position of a person in authority and govern who can speak, what forms of development should be pursued and how this development can be achieved (Ziai 2016). Only the holder of this subject position can enunciate

productive statements (Crush 1995). As a meaningful statement can be made only by credible institutions and development experts (Escobar 1995), organisations, universities and scholars in Western donor countries are qualified to act as the subject: the experts deemed to have the ability to diagnose, prescribe and determine SFD discourse (Hasselgård, 2015; Hayhurst, 2009).

Third, Foucault (1972) argues that a discursive formation can be a continuity of concepts determined by rules that organise the statements in which they appear and regulate the relationship between concepts. This constancy of concepts does not refer to the static and transcendent (Garritty 2010). Instead, according to Foucault (1972), it emerges through the rules that arrange the statements in 1) “forms of succession” (p. 56), 2) as well as “forms of coexistence” (p. 57) and that define 3) “the procedures of intervention” (p. 58) that can be legitimately applied to the discourse’s statements. These three sets of rules are also linked to the ways in which concepts are dispersed in the discourse and define the relationships between them; how they shift and their coherency but also how they overlap, are incompatible or excluded (Foucault 1972). In these regularities, development can be treated as a recurring concept in development policy statements, whereas development as a concept is produced in different forms and is also contingent upon a particular social context, reflected in the differences between the Global North and South (Ziai 2016). The twenty-first century has witnessed the creation of a new development agenda closely related to the field of social development and development goals set according to a standardised system for evaluating improvement (Nederveen Pieterse 2010). In the same manner, one may focus on the popularity of international volunteering consistent with the concept of twenty-first century development.

Lastly, Foucault (1972) argues that the rules of formation of objects, mode of statements and concepts are essentially “owing to the system of formation of strategies” (p. 67). In other

words, the appearance of objects and common ideas within statements are strategically determined (Ziai 2016) and these strategic choices are strongly contingent upon particular social and historical contexts (Garrity 2010). Foucault (1972) emphasises the function that “the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practices” (p. 68), in reference to non-linguistic domains such as institutions, social movements, political events and processes and economic conditions. Hasselgård (2015) suggests that Norwegian SDP NGO policy models, as a donor of the Global North, are strongly shaped by distinctive national policy characteristics and traditions. Similarly, Kim (2016) illustrates how Korean ODA policy discourses are guided by an amalgam of the politics of government stakeholders and the strategic stances of foreign policy in accordance with the international development agenda. Following these approaches, the formation of strategies can assist a better understanding of the strategies commonly seen in KOICA documents, such as the sharing of Korean development knowledge and experience.

Methods

Six sets of key documents published by KOICA were collected and analysed for this research:

- 1) KOICA Annual Reports from 1992 to 2017
- 2) KOICA Newsletters from 1994 to 2017
- 3) two anniversary books:
 - a) *10 Years of KOICA* (2001)
 - b) *20 Years of KOICA* (2011)
- 4) three casebooks including stories and essays on KOICA sport volunteer experiences:
 - a) *Gukje hyeobryeok-ui hyeonjang-eseo hanguk cheongnyeon haeoe bongsadan hyeonji hwaldong sare* [The Casebook of KOICA Overseas Volunteers, 1992]
 - b) *Nanuneun sarang deo keun haengbok* [Sharing Love, Greater Happiness, 2006]

- c) *Haeoe bongsa danwon usu hwaldong sarejib* [The Casebook of KOICA Overseas Volunteers, 2005]
- 5) three volunteer guidebooks:
 - a) *Haeoe bongmadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo, kollombiapyeon* [Volunteer Guidebook, Colombia Edition, 2011a]
 - b) *Haeoe bongmadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo, ekwadoleupyeon* [Volunteer Guidebook, Ecuador Edition, 2011b]
 - c) *Haeoe bongmadan-i sseun bongsa hwaldong annaeseo, beteunampyeon* [Volunteer Guidebook, Vietnam Edition, 2011c]
- 6) three sport aid project reports:
 - a) *Final Report on Construction of a Taekwondo Hall in Tunisia 1997–1999* (2006)
 - b) *Final Report on The Project for Improving Taekwondo Training Center of Khanh Hoa Police Department in Vietnam 1999* (2006)
 - c) *Final Report on The Project for Construction of Korea-Indonesia Friendship Sports Center in Indonesia 2003–2005* (2006)

These documents involve essential texts related to KOICA sport and present the historical transformations of KOICA sport program ideas, concepts and policy directions since the agency's establishment. Four Korean-language news articles and three posts on KOICA websites were also selected as supplementary sources because they contain interviews with sport volunteers and texts about KOICA's policy strategy. In addition, statistical data collected from KOICA was useful in identifying the number of sport volunteers and DTI instructors it dispatched and the organisations where they were placed from 1991 to 2017.

Data Analysis

Data analysis for the collected documents was fully guided by Foucault's archaeology, particularly by his four rules of discursive formations as discussed above. First, elite sport and elite athletes in recipient countries were uncovered as objects of discourses in KOICA sport when I focused on identifying the objects visible within KOICA sport discourse. Particularly, the

formation of objects in KOICA sport discourse was clear when I examined how they are categorized and directed towards specific subjectivities in the discourse. Second, three questions helped me examine the formation of enunciative modalities in discourses of KOICA sport: Which statements are legitimate in the discourse? Who is granted the subject position of the legitimate statements? And how is the subject position, which “invariably contains an authoritarian element” (Ziai, 2016, p. 43), regulated by particular elements such as institutional norms and so-called scientific knowledge? For the analysis of the rules of formation involving concepts, two steps were carried out. First, I attempted to identify the continuity of a particular key concept in discourses of KOICA sport which has been integrated into different contexts over KOICA’s three decades of history: the concept of volunteering. Given new approaches to international development emerged in the post-Cold era (Williams, 2012), including the current SFD movement (Kidd, 2008), it is important to examine how this key concept has been linked specifically with different types of KOICA sport discourses in the twenty-first century. Second, the concept of volunteering within the discourse of KOICA sport (according to different contexts) was clearly identified when I applied Csordás’s (2011) categories of input-oriented and output-oriented volunteering (p. 6). This is because international (sport) volunteering is regulated by a range of elements in a given context; much existing literature (e.g. Georgeou, & Engel, 2011; Ogle & Lamb, 2017; Schech, Mundkur, Skelton, & Kothari, 2015; Smith, Cohen, & Pickett, 2014; Treuren, 2014). Clarke and Salisbury (2017) claim that these elements can be narrowed down into Csordás’s (2011) two concepts of input-oriented and output-oriented volunteering, and their mixture. Lastly, the formation of strategies was analyzed by the manner in which the objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts occurring in discourses of KOICA sport were politically linked with the two non-discursive forms of sport and non-sport. Given

that SFD is influenced by tensions between politics in SFD and SFD in politics (Hasselgård, 2015), as well as the political schemes underlying both sport and development in Korea, it is pertinent to focus on the strategies implemented in both sport and non-sport (development) practices. In the following sections, the findings of my extended analysis are discussed, with an emphasis on the four rules of formation.

Objects: Elite Sport and Elite Athletes

“Taekwondo instructors have been responsible for coaching the national Taekwondo team in recipient countries.”

“... to construct a Taekwondo Hall as a training place of national delegation for the 2001 Mediterranean Games and 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.”

The above two quotes present the objects of discourses of KOICA sport as elite sport in recipient countries and are taken from the section outlining the aims of DTI in *10 Years of KOICA* (2001) and a sport aid report on *The Construction of a Taekwondo Hall* (KOICA, 2006d) in Tunisia, respectively. Of course, the target of KOICA sport programs is not a fixed entity. It has varied and changed throughout its history. This is evident by the various terms used to describe KOICA sport's various intended roles: ‘national team and athletes’, ‘the physical strength of local people’, ‘public health’, ‘students in physical education classes’, ‘youth and women in newly independent countries’, ‘the army and police’, and ‘people with disabilities.’ However, discourse is not formed by a single object, but by “the space in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed” (Foucault, 1972, p. 32). The focus should thus be the object described, designated and established by authorities, such as institutions, and classified through the norms and standardisations in the discourse (Garrity 2010). Among the variety of entities targeted, elite sport in recipient countries is the one object that defines and demarcates the

“success” or “achievements” of KOICA sport, making it visible in the discourse. Elite sport in recipient countries is also the entity highlighted and classified as being in need of transformation from “underdeveloped” to “developed”, the problem to be solved in the discourse. This is clear when examining the following story of a sport volunteer who served in Sri Lanka:

As a result, his pupils won the finals at the Sri Lankan National Taekwondo Games in 1998 and 1999 consecutively, and then four silver medals and seven bronze medals at the 1999 Southeast Asian Games. These were regarded as historical achievements, as it was the first time in Sri Lanka’s 20-year Taekwondo history that the team was able to win a medal at an international sporting event. (KOICA, 2005, p. 100)

The object of the discourse appears in how KOICA sport states that it enabled recipient teams to achieve excellent results at international sporting events, such as helping the country qualify for the first time ever for a global sporting event and win its first medal. KOICA sport aid projects are designed to enhance high-performance skills and athletic development and the beneficiaries of such projects include the “[Tunisian] national taekwondo team” (KOICA, 2006d, p. 5) and “Indonesian taekwondo national players” (KOICA, 2006b, p. 30).

Ziai (2016) writes that the objects of development discourse are socio-geographically and economically defined units, such as states and regions, and are classified as the underdeveloped. The underdeveloped are reliant on the guidance of development institutions in the Global North, which are categorized as the “developed” according to particular norms and criteria defining them as “properly educated” (Nandy, 2010, p. 301) and expert (based on scientific knowledge). Likewise, existing literature on international SFD shows that the objects of mainstream international SFD discourses are also subject to the guidance of so-called “well-educated experts,” including university students, sportspersons, practitioners, government officers, and

scholars from donor countries in the West (e.g. Darnell, 2011; Harris & Adams, 2015; Nicholls et al., 2011). These studies support my analysis that elite sport in recipient countries is made visible as objects needing the guidance of KOICA sport. The quote below about one sport volunteer's experience overseas describes the volunteer as an expert able to provide the proper training methods and sport techniques that athletes in the recipient country lacked.

Instructor Kim trains two groups a day, six days a week... techniques with a high level of difficulty guarantee the achievement of excellence. However, in modern sport, this achievement of excellence is impossible without utilizing an approach involving scientific training methods. (KOICA, 2005, pp. 104–105)

With this statement, recipient sport is classified as “underdeveloped” and only with the volunteer's guidance is the achievement of excellence at international sporting events possible.

An interview with another former sport volunteer also deserves a closer look:

I met the 15 national athletes for the first time. They looked like *ohabjjol* [a flock of sheep]. The team seemed to be a decade behind Korea in terms of technique. There was no [Taekwondo]-specific stadium, nor an official uniform to wear during international competitions. (Kim, 2011)

This volunteer served as a coach for the Peruvian national Taekwondo team, described as being behind in terms of elite sporting techniques and training facilities. Only with the assistance of the KOICA volunteer was the Peruvian team able to win medals at top-tier sporting competitions for the first time. Ziai (2016) argues that objects of development emerge and gain visibility when they are classified as underdeveloped and defined as deficient, a judgement handed down by experts from the developed world. This deficiency can be overcome through the intervention of experts, holders of the developed world's knowledge and experiences (Escobar 1995). Likewise,

elite sport in recipient countries emerges as the object through a grid of KOICA sport specifications that marks the state of sport in recipient countries as deficient. This is evidenced by use of the word *ohabjijol* [flock of sheep]. They are framed to be wanting and in need of KOICA sport's guidance, which alone has the power to help them become developed in modern sport. KOICA sport's interventions clearly target the elite sporting world, represented by the achievement of athletic excellence at global sporting competitions.

Furthermore, the objects of development are judged not by what they are now, but what they are required to become to achieve a certain mode of the subject (Ziai 2016). This certain mode of subjects is guided by knowledge-based intervention and, as argued above, the objects of development are directed by Western knowledge-based intervention. This intervention is then implemented by experts or authorities from the development world, such as donor countries and multilateral developmental organizations like the United Nations (Escobar 1995). In KOICA sport discourses, this refers to the developed – those able to attain sporting excellence in the elite sporting world and at international competitions. Along these lines, the objects of KOICA sport discourses shift from elite sport in recipient countries to the elite athletes of those countries. A careful look at the idealised subject of elite athletes in KOICA sport is worthwhile. They have been characterised by the ways that athletes are subjected to discipline and norms based on Korean sport knowledge, 'enabling' elite athletes in recipient countries to transform into 'ideal' elite athletes and hence made visible as objects in the developed, elite sporting world.

In fact, elite athletes in recipient countries are judged to be underdeveloped by the norm stating that an idealized subject of elite athletes must possess scientific knowledge. This is shown in the above quote, as well as a statement from KOICA declaring that "in modern sport, this achievement of excellence is impossible without utilizing an approach involving scientific

training” (KOICA, 2005, p. 105). Only elite athletes utilizing scientific training approaches can conform to this norm promoted by KOICA sport. Scientific knowledge is often referred to as the “right way” to guide elite athletes in recipient countries. As this rule diagnoses and writes up prescriptions for the objects, elite athletes in recipient countries become classified and registered as those in “the wrong,” having embraced unsuitable training methods not based in science. Thus, it is important to focus on what the scientific knowledge being referred to is and what constitutes scientific knowledge in KOICA sport discourse. Obviously, this scientific knowledge is bound to a certain pattern of specification, as proven by a workshop DTI instructor dispatched overseas took: “This program let them [instructors] learn advanced athletic skills in Korea and the updated rules of international games, thereby leading to the enhancement of their training abilities as well as the achievement of excellence in competitions” (KOICA, 2003, p. 76). This implies that scientific knowledge should be transferred to fit the specific rules and norms of international competitions, in order to achieve sporting excellence at international games in particular. In fact, all the sport centres and facilities constructed through KOICA sport aid projects were designed to meet the standards of international sporting competitions. This implies that the scientific knowledge regulating the discipline of elite athletes, the object, is dictated and allowed by the norms and standards of international sporting competitions, and adherence to these norms and standards allows the athletes to thus transform into ideal subjects.

Next, elite athletes are subjected to the Korean form of discipline, which is based on the Confucian hierarchical system and emphasises mentality and spirit. Sport volunteers and DTI instructors often mention these two virtues. Take the following example of a quote from a Taekwondo volunteer:

While Taekwondo manners have been taught, due to cultural differences it is hard to find *yeui wa jonjung* [manners and respect for coaches] in trainees. Rather than just Taekwondo techniques, I think teaching things related to one's mentality and spirit would be more helpful than offering temporary material support. (KOICA, 2011b, p. 118)

This shows that elite athletes in recipient countries emerge as the objects of the discourse, judged not by what they are but what they are meant to become through KOICA sport, frequently referred to as the "Korean style" athlete. In fact, respect for teachers is a core societal value in Korea, stemming from the Confucian-based concept of *Gunsabu-ilche*, which states that one's monarch, teacher, or father are "one body" (of utmost importance) and deserve equal respect (Sleziak 2013). Respect for coaches is also typical in Korean sport culture where elite athletes are required to embrace this type of Korea-specific disciplining, blending Confucianism with militarism (Eckert 2016). Respect for coaches is closely related to typically asymmetrical power relations that demand absolute obedience (Park, Lim, & Bretherton, 2012). With this continuity of Korean sport culture within KOICA sport's overseas programs, elite athletes in recipient countries are educated to acquiesce to all of their coaches' demands, even physical punishment. One DTI instructor noted, "when teaching spirit and manners, [I] strictly drilled [them] with my fists ... now they salute me as *Sabeom-nim* [Master] even if I'm standing 100 meters away" (KOICA, 1997, p. 33). Being able to cope with Korean coaches' disciplinary methods, including physical punishment, is considered beneficial for the athletes' mentality and inner strength (Nam, Kim, Marshall, Sung, & Mao, 2018). In this discourse, elite athletes in recipient countries are more likely to become the elite athlete subjects idealised in Korean sport if they submit to this Korean-style of discipline, allowing for the achievement of excellence at top-tier sporting competitions. KOICA sport clearly prefers the Korean-style subject, and elite athletes in

recipient countries are only made visible and defined as the objects of the discourse through the framing of elite athletes that have experienced Korean-specific discipline and culture.

Enunciative Modalities: Statements from Korean Instructors

It is important to ask “Who is qualified?” (Foucault, 1972, p. 59) to be acknowledged as the subject (or expert) when examining the statements that identify elite sport and elite athletes in recipient countries as the objects of KOICA sport discourse. One sport volunteer’s memoir stated, “Rather than training a multitude of trainees, cultivating a single talented Taekwondo athlete would be more helpful towards making a Taekwondo program sustainable even after a volunteer leaves” (KOICA, 2011b, p. 118). This statement demonstrates how Korean instructors solely focused on elite athletes in recipient countries as objects in KOICA sport discourse. Referred to as “(a) master(s) possessing a high-level specialty” (KOICA, 2005, p. 104) and “Grand Master” (KOICA, 1994, p. 32), Korean instructors hold the expert position as a group capable of teaching and imparting scientific knowledge, systematic training programs and high-level athletic techniques to local athletes. They are viewed as the only ones with the power and expertise to enable elite athletes in recipient countries to qualify for and win at the international level. In this respect, the ‘proper’ way to train and educate athletes is regulated by KOICA instructors in both sport volunteer and DTI programs as the “legitimate source” (Foucault, 1972, p. 51).

White Westerners from the Global North occupy the subject position of development experts (Ziai, 2016), which determines the indicators and standards of development, based on Western knowledge and expertise (Watts, 1995). Darnell (2007) claims that the subject position (holding rationality and expertise) in SFD practice is predominantly a Western identity. Donors, practitioners and policy makers from the West are mainly positioned as subjects holding

scientific knowledge and expertise in SFD, with the know-how necessary to provide development solutions and also direct the local people as the objects of development (Nicholls et al., 2011). Along these lines, elite sport development in recipient countries, as the object, is governed by Korean instructors offering modern sport training through so-called ‘scientific methods’ that adhere to the standards of the international elite sporting world. However, modern sport based on the scientific knowledge and standards of the international sporting world cannot hide the fact that Korean sport, just like other countries and their sporting histories, has been steeped in Western sport culture and systems (Hong, 2011; Mangan, 2011). Korean sport has pursued a path mirroring Western sport development, with a push to wholeheartedly embrace the Western knowledge, ideas and modalities that have predominantly served by indicators of global modernity – not only in Korean sport – but also in Korean development (Black & Peacock, 2011; Collins, 2011). To summarise, it is fair to argue that KOICA sport reproduces the discursive formations of both development and international SFD that construct the subject position of expert based on scientific knowledge and rational technical expertise and can thus be classified as a legitimate actor of modernity both in sport and development. Obviously, this position was predetermined by white Westerners from the Global North. In the discourse of KOICA sport, this position was eventually embraced by Korean instructors, situating Korea within the exclusive club of the “Global North” – non-Westerners from the Global North. This takes into consideration Korea’s identity as a developed country with resources and technical knowledge displayed in accordance with Western-centric sport norms and standards.

Statements pronounced by experts are not simply regulated by the rules of Western-led development discourse, which constructs the subject of scientific knowledge and expertise, but also by three different, legitimate sources derived from Korea-specific legacies: its record of

achievement at top-tier international sporting events, its identity as the birthplace of Taekwondo and its development experience. First, Korea's success at world-class international competitions such as the Olympic Games lends legitimacy to the statements made by Korean instructors. Official documents commonly state that KOICA sport is a platform for sharing the knowledge and experience accumulated by Korean instructors. The term "*jeonsu*" [transfer] appears in most statements pertaining to the role of sport volunteers and DTI instructors in KOICA sport programs. More specifically, Korean coaches are predominantly posted to sport federations and governmental agencies responsible for elite sport in recipient countries, which often request former or current Korean athletes with demonstrated success at international competitions.

After all, Korea has a storied athletic reputation due to many high-profile wins at world-class international events (Hong, 2011; Lee, 2017). In fact, many government policy documents and Korean sport studies have stated that the knowledge and experience accumulated through Korea's success at international sports events are considered to be meaningful exports to developing countries in the Global South and can be considered a form of Korean sport aid (e.g. Kim et al., 2013). Recipient countries also perceive Korea to be a sports powerhouse (Jeong, 2010) and are interested in the Korean knowledge and expertise that produced its athletic achievements. This has contributed to the modern rebranding of Korea, both on the national and international stage (Jeong, 2010). Thus, the Korean instructors who play a role in transferring this knowledge and experience to the recipients are accordingly positioned as the subjects, or the legitimate experts able to produce meaningful statements to the objects of KOICA sport discourse, i.e. elite sport and elite athletes in recipient countries.

Second, the origin of sport, and KOICA sport's Taekwondo in particular, govern the subject position held by Korean instructors. Levermore and Beacom (2009) argue that most SFD

programs are based on Northern-oriented modern sports, and Schulenkorf et al. (2016) also write that the most common SFD activities are Western-oriented organized sports such as football and basketball. Western social and cultural elements are critical attributes of modern organized sport (Levermore & Beacom, 2009; Maguire, 1999). In fact, sport has a history of being used as a tool for international social development under the name of civilization and modernization (Darnell, Field, & Kidd, 2019; Kidd, 2008; Millington & Kidd, 2019), whereby Western colonizers carry and inculcate Western knowledge and modalities in their colonies through the use of sport as a culturally depoliticized intervention (Darnell et al., 2019). In mainstream international SFD discourse, Western volunteers and practitioners are positioned as subjects able to diagnose and determine solutions for the development problems faced by recipients (Darnell, 2007, 2009; Darnell & Hayhurst, 2013; Nicholls et al., 2011), especially considering the fact that the West is seen as the historic birthplace of global civilization and modernization. In other words, SFD volunteers and practitioners from the West in the Global North, which may be categorized as the traditional (European) colonizer – a site for transferring modernization and civilization to their colonies, or recognized global modernization and civilization – are placed in the subject position when determining the need for development interventions in other countries.

Unlike mainstream SFD discourse, which derives the subject position from a regional site rather than the origin of sport itself, Korean instructors are granted an identity as legitimate experts because Taekwondo itself originates in Korea. Evidence of this emerges in statements about Korean instructors in charge of training national Taekwondo teams in recipient countries:

Through the training methods and passion of Taekwondo's *jongjuguk* [motherland], athletes trained by KOICA volunteers have achieved excellence at every competition and

are loved not only by institutions from where the volunteers belong, but by the entire Vietnamese Taekwondo world. (KOICA, 2011c, p. 78)

Such statements not only describe Korean instructors as masters and coaches, but also as hailing from “the birthplace of Taekwondo.” These statements legitimise the position of Korean Taekwondo instructors as subjects. In other words, Taekwondo’s origins position Korean instructors as subjects able to develop Taekwondo athletes and coaches in recipient countries:

During this whole while, systematic, technical Taekwondo training programs have never been conducted, and the sport’s philosophical meaning has been distorted and absent... [We] helped them realize that these are critical elements of Taekwondo to be rebuilt and corrected. (KOICA, 1995, p. 16)

Korean instructors are often identified as the only ones able to bridge the gap in local athletes’ lack of scientific knowledge, expert training methods and any other deficiency. Korean Taekwondo instructors are seen as capable of transferring not only athletic knowledge and expertise, but also of holding the ability to cultivate local athletes’ mental and philosophical development, for a more well-rounded education.

Third, statements from Korean instructors often include fabricated histories and stories, emphasize mentality and spiritual attributes, and offer a particular representation of Korea’s developmental success. Watts (1995) points out that development discourse can comprise mythical components, and Manzo (1995) regards development interventions as myths perpetuated by white people, referred to as models and norms and reflected in the modernization process of the global south. Esteva (2010) argues that development consists of not only theoretical and practical tasks, but also discursive elements that create “a perception which models reality, a myth which comforts societies, and a fantasy which unleashes passion” (p. xvi).

Coalter (2010b) also writes that the use of sport as a development tool is filled with a variety of metaphors and narratives based on the vague and mythopoetic nature of sport. KOICA sport statements on Taekwondo being the *jongjuguk*, or motherland of Taekwondo, tend to focus on the mythological nature of the sport, frequently repeating fiction such as “Korea’s traditional martial art tracing back 2,000 years” (KOICA, 2005, p. 104). However, many scholars have criticized this view, often linked to the history of Korea itself, much of it fabricated (e.g. Capener, 2016; Moenig, 2015).

An examination of the quote, “There is an effort [by recipient] to find mental strength within Taekwondo, the same mental strength that brought about [Korea’s] rapid economic development” (KOICA, 1995, p. 26) uncovers two points. In the enunciative rule of KOICA sport discourse, the legitimate role of inculcating the objects (elite Taekwondo athletes in recipient countries in this context) with important mentality or spiritual attributes belongs to Korean Taekwondo instructors. Additionally, the training of an athlete’s mentality (or inner state) in Taekwondo is emphasised and given sport-oriented legitimacy, but is also connected to Korea’s economic development and success. This thereby grants Korean instructors the position of legitimate expert. This relationship will be discussed further in the section on the formation of strategies.

Concepts: Input-Oriented Volunteering and Output-Oriented Volunteering

The concept of volunteering in KOICA sport can be divided into two categories described by Csordás (2011) as input-oriented volunteering and output-oriented volunteering. According to Csordás (2011), input-oriented volunteering – also known as traditional type volunteerism (p. 6) – refers to volunteering directed by motives including resocialization, a sense of belonging to a community, the common good, and altruistic attitudes towards giving and

knowledge transfer. In contrast, output-oriented volunteering – also known as new type volunteerism (p. 6) – is primarily targeted towards volunteers seeking personal gains, such as professional development, personal development, leisure time, and other tangible benefits (Csordás, 2011). In the KOICA sport discourse, these types of volunteering motives are manifested and distinguished through values of empathy and the spirit of sharing and respect (also known as *nanumgwa seomgim*) on the one hand and a focus on personal achievement on the other.

Input-Oriented Volunteering

First, KOICA sport tends towards compassion-based, input-oriented volunteering. The following statement illustrates volunteers' compassionate attitude towards athletes in recipient countries:

[Bae] complimented a female national representative on her swimsuit and was shocked by the swimmer's reply that she had picked it up during the Asian Games when another athlete threw it away. Bae's love for Cambodia started from that moment. (KOICA 2005, pp. 20-21)

Compassion and a desire to help others are indeed compelling motivations to engage in volunteer work (Clarke & Salisbury, 2017). Many statements on KOICA sport volunteer activities include detailed accounts about the plight of local athletes, such as the above example, in addition to mentioning the general lack of proper sport equipment and facilities that make it difficult to host team training sessions and common nutritional deficiencies in athletes that further complicated athletic development. These are some justifications commonly given for international volunteering, particularly for development interventions (Gronemeyer, 2010). The sense of benevolence that guides volunteering also plays a role in creating change (Clarke & Salisbury,

2017). Statements by KOICA instructors expressed a shared intent to “try to do something to be helpful”. This suggests they were guided by a concept of volunteering based on the altruistic and humanitarian approaches essential to volunteering (Ogle & Lamb, 2017).

Notably, the act of effecting positive change through compassionate work and the desire to be helpful to others tend to be influenced by the instructor’s view of the athletes. Gronemeyer (2010) argues that a desire to help is governed by “the watchful gaze of the helper” (p. 56). The helper’s gaze determines who is in need, who are then positioned as objects in need of enlightenment and that meet the helper’s norms and standards (Illich 2010). Such an observation leading to intervention is apparent in one sport volunteer’s memoir. He wrote, “Thus, [I] will focus on continuous enlightenment to overcome their old-fashioned ways of thinking, as well as motivate them to change their consciousness” (KOICA 1992, p. 294). Statements about the notion of “enlightenment” appear simultaneously with expressions of compassion, reflecting the instructors’ views of its suitability as a method for helping athletes in recipient countries overcome the barriers created by their country’s development condition. Importantly, the helpers in this case are the Korean instructors in the “expert” subject position due to their scientific knowledge and athletic experience. They decide whether the recipients are visible and registered as the objects of continuous enlightenment.

Second, the so-called spirit of sharing and respect was the key value of KOICA volunteering in its early stages, particularly between the early 1990s and early 2000s. For instance, this idea was explicitly stated in the purpose of the program: the “objective of Korea Overseas Volunteers (KOV) is to contribute to the building of a human society in which all human beings can live better together under the spirit of *Share and Respect*” (KOICA, 1996, p. 75). The spirit of sharing and respect appears in two general patterns in the discourses of KOICA

sport. First, it was also echoed in descriptions of KOICA sport volunteers, “volunteering as *nanumgwa seomgim* [sharing and respect]” (KOICA 2006b, p. 114) The literal meaning of *nanum* [sharing] is essentially different from that of *jeonsu* [transfer], presented above and discussed further in the paper, which involves the transfer of Korean-specific knowledge and experience. Rather, the term *nanum* is related to altruistic giving, as stated in KOICA’s official goal of volunteering for the common good. Nevertheless, in KOICA volunteer discourse, the spirit of sharing is clearly linked to the transfer of Korean development knowledge and experience. In KOICA sport discourse, this occurs by imparting Korean sport knowledge and experience of elite sport development aimed at winning medals at international sporting events.

The second pattern focuses on individual Korean instructors’ perceptions about volunteering and the spirit of sharing and respect. As stated by a Taekwondo instructor in Senegal:

Dedicated local pupils sometimes suffer from poor conditions or financial difficulties, and helping resolve such issues is also one of a master’s duties. Because I am in Africa, that’s a given. I think I practice true *nanumgwa seomgim* [sharing and respect] without special effort to do so. (KOICA, 1995, p. 33)

While Korean instructors faced difficulties like a lack of sports equipment, proper training facilities, or adequate support from KOICA, they overcame these difficulties by accepting them as expected and natural in the course of volunteering. This may be attributed to the deep integration of the concept of sharing and respect into KOICA and its volunteer programs and further enhanced through interactions with nationalism. In fact, in KOICA sport discourse, practicing the spirit of sharing and respect goes on to become linked to one’s expression of dedication to the nation. “In the spirit of ‘Sharing and Respect,’ the KOV [KOICA volunteers]

program aims at promoting friendship between the two countries” (KOICA, 1998, p. 25), is a statement illustrating how volunteering based on the spirit of sharing and respect helps promote the diplomatic relationship between Korea and other countries. In the same manner, any difficulties experienced while volunteering with KOICA sport programs are framed to be expressions of one’s sacrificial dedication to the nation, evidenced by the commonly used phrase, “our country.” Indeed, the Taekwondo instructor in Senegal mentioned earlier uses the word “*joguk*” [the motherland] at the end of his essay to express his dedication and sacrifice for his nation (KOICA, 1995, p. 33). He self-identified as a “civil diplomat” (KOICA, 1995, p. 32) serving to spread a positive image of Korea to Senegal. Furthermore, the spirit of sharing and respect, which prompts volunteers to accept any difficulties encountered during their volunteer service and to take pride in serving the nation, imposes a financial burden upon KOICA sport instructors as well. In their personal reflections, KOICA instructors frequently mentioned “spending their own money,” but also stated they did so in the spirit of sharing and respect, thereby doing praise-worthy acts that also demonstrated their dedication to Korea.

Output-Oriented Volunteering

One female sport volunteer who had studied physical education and youth pedagogy in university saw volunteering in Uzbekistan as an opportunity to put theory into practice: “First of all, as a volunteer who will be dispatched to the new area of youth development, [I] would like to coordinate a range of youth programs in Uzbekistan” (World Friends Korea 2016). Considering Csordás’s (2011) output-oriented volunteering, she appears to perceive volunteering as a way to improve her professional skills and engage in self-development, both motivations that fall under output-oriented volunteering. This perspective was especially prevalent in the later era of KOICA sport, from the late 2000s to 2010s.

A similar picture is painted by a male sport volunteer who led his team to win a series of competitions while serving as a university volleyball coach in Sri Lanka: “After hearing about KOICA’s volunteer recruitment, coach Kim applied with the resolve to take on the challenge of volleyball” (Choi, 2012). His career as an athlete in Korea was “unsuccessful”, but fortunately he was able to revive his prospects overseas and pursue his dreams through international volunteering. Interestingly, the coach’s achievement in Sri Lanka is minimally connected to Korean nationalism, which was often the case in KOICA sport discourse associated with input-oriented volunteering. This achievement is seen to be the successful fulfillment of the volunteer’s personal goals and proof of his professional development. Similarly, many sport volunteers echo the rhetoric that volunteering overseas is a “most special and beautiful time.” Three indicators demonstrate how this relates to the manifestation of output-oriented volunteering. First, obtaining tangible results, such as winning a medal at an international sporting event, is perceived as the moment that vague dreams come true. This encourages volunteers’ personal development and allows them to continue their service with confidence. It also expands the typical boundaries of volunteering to encompass volunteers’ personal lives also. Second, experiencing new cultures and customs provides volunteers with a chance to reflect upon their lives in Korea. One sport volunteer in Colombia stated, “I don’t recommend working with the Korean-typical mindset of *ppalli-ppalli*. All processes are real and necessary in volunteering and I think we should learn one at a time” (KOICA 2011a, p 69). The *ppalli-ppalli* referred to here is the Korean cultural practice of acting and doing things in a quick manner, a practice which arose from the perception that *ppalli-ppalli* allowed Korea to achieve economic development so rapidly (Hwang 2010). This *ppalli-ppalli* spirit also permeates Korean sport culture, which has historically pursued noticeable, tangible results, like the achievement of excellence at

international sporting competitions, through a culture of winning at all costs (Park *et al.* 2012). Therefore, based on this Korean (sport) cultural context, volunteering experiences through KOICA sport programs would possibly offer an opportunity to reflect upon the ways one applies Korean sport culture to local contexts in recipient countries. Third, the opportunity for personal reflection seems to raise a fundamental question of how KOICA sport, or input-oriented volunteering during its early stages in particular, deemed elite athletes in recipient countries as objects needing enlightenment. Along these lines, a sport volunteer in Cambodia offers the words, “I hope we don’t judge others by their appearance. Different doesn’t mean wrong, it just means different. I hope we don’t think of others’ cultures as strange or wrong just because it’s different from our own” (KOICA, 2011a, p. 69).

This statement suggests that KOICA sport is guided entirely by the output-oriented volunteering approach in its later stage. Nederveen Pieterse (2010) argues that since the early 1990s, development interventions have increasingly focused on the concept of diversity and differentiation, while denouncing the processes of generalization and homogenization in development and foreign aid. Local-oriented, people-friendly approaches should be emphasized, and conventional attitudes on development intervention as a “monocultural project” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010, p. 16) should no longer be welcomed. This view has led to the documentation of the importance of culture in development policy (e.g. Human Development Report in 2004). Given that the direction of Korean aid policy is predominantly determined by international norms and the global development agenda (Kim, 2016), volunteers’ awareness of local cultures in recipient countries should also extend to the acceptance of cultural differences. In fact, multiculturalism was adopted as a key principle of the Korean government and has been integrated into Korean ODA policy since 2008 (Watson, 2011). In this respect, although further

study on volunteers' perception of local people and culture in KOICA sport should be conducted, KOICA's official documents do not support monocultural, Korean-centred perspectives.

Strategies: The Formation of Sport-Oriented Strategies and Non-Sport-Oriented Strategies

The above analysis shows that the formation of objects, enunciative modalities and concepts is regulated by strategies and embodied through the theme of transfer of Korean development knowledge and experience (*jeonsu*). This strategy is manifested in two ways. In the rules of KOICA sport discourses, the first is to transfer Korea's "sport" development knowledge and experience to help recipient athletes achieve athletic excellence at international sporting competitions. In the second way this strategy is manifested, sport – KOICA sport – is employed as a means to transfer Korea's "development" knowledge and experience, as Korean development is designated as a "miracle". The rules of KOICA sport discourses can thus be categorised into sport-oriented strategies and non-sport-oriented strategies.

The Formation of Sport-Oriented Strategies

The transfer of Korean sport knowledge and experience refers to the manner in which sport is used as a tool to contribute to Korea's successful development. The state strategy for all sport and physical activities deserves closer examination. In Korea, sport falls under the umbrella category of physical education, and thus the term "physical education" is often used interchangeably with sport (Ha and Mangan 2002). Likewise, sport volunteers are commonly called "KOICA *chaeyuk gyoyuk* [physical education] volunteers", and the programs they participate in overseas are classified within the larger category of physical education. Furthermore, statements in various documents describe the typical aims of sport aid projects to be the "expansion of physical education facilities" (KOICA 2006a, p. 5) and "the improvement

of culture and physical education facilities” (KOICA 2006c, p. 5). Likewise, DTI programs also fall within the realm of physical education, although they involve institutionalised sport exclusively (Taekwondo). Any method meant to transfer Korean sport knowledge and experience must also be understood as a means of transferring Korean sociocultural characteristics in that the practice of a sport is influenced by the sociocultural attributes of its origins (Levermore, 2009). We must therefore examine the historical context of physical education in Korea and delve into the history of the Park Chung-hee military regime.

Korean sport was of little significance policy-wise until the early 1960s (Hong, 2011). With Park Chung-hee’s *coup d’état* in 1961, sport took the spotlight. The Park regime fully employed sport as a method for reconstructing and rebuilding a newly independent Korea (Hong, 2011) by placing all sport and physical activities within the field of education (Ha & Manga 2002). Then, Park integrated the educational elements of sport into his state-led national development projects, the Five-Year Economic Development Plans. Through a state-led educational program, sport was used to inculcate in the Korean people a strong sense of nationalism. He even coined catchphrases like “Physical Fitness is National Strength” (Ha & Mangan, 2002, p. 218) to help illuminate a clear path to national prosperity.

Interestingly, this approach was influenced by Park Chung-hee’s view of Korean history, in particular, the eras of the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1897) and Korean Empire (1897–1910). In his view, Korean history was characterized by repetitive periods of hardship and humiliation due to endless foreign invasions and conquests (Seo, 2016; Watson, 2014). He believed these experiences were entirely the consequences of a misplaced national obsession for scholarly pursuits and the worship of scholars, leading to the marginalization and devaluation of physical activity and martial training (Eckert, 2016). However, this view is mainly attributed to the

Japanese colonialist view of Korean history, in which Korean people were an ethnic group with no self-reliance or capability for governing themselves without Imperial Japan (Eckert, 2016). In other words, the Japanese colonialist perspective considered it to be natural for their empire to rule the Korean people. This view significantly shaped Park Chung-hee's view of Korean history and society, as he had studied at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy and served as a military officer of the Empire (Eckert, 2016). Park's internalization of these colonialist views pushed him to emphasize the importance of sport and physical activity during his regime. It became an educational method for equipping the Korean people with a sound body and sound mind (typified as "sound Korean people"), the ideal subjects of the Park regime (Ha & Mangan, 2002, p. 228). For Park Chung-hee, this approach was necessary to correct the past and lay the foundation for a nationalist road to modernisation and development. His 1962 essay expresses this idea through its title, "*Uri minjoküi nagalgil*" [Our Nation's Path] (Park, 1962).

Interestingly, the subject of the sound Korean people promoted by Park's propaganda was maintained and reproduced in KOICA sport, as noted in a DTI statement about its aim, 'to help local people develop sound body and mind' (KOICA, 1996, p. 85). In fact, decades later, the sound Korean people envisioned by Park would serve overseas to help athletes achieve excellence on the international stage, simultaneously helping to enhance Korea's international prestige (Mangan *et al.* 2011). In this respect, the reproduction of the sound Korean people subject in discourses of KOICA sport is significantly linked to a site of elite sport development in recipient countries, not to the recipients' public health concerns.

In addition, in his essay, *Jidojado: hyeogmyeong gwajeong-ui cheohayeo* [Leadership: On the Revolutionary Process] (Park, 1961), Park wrote: "Most people [Koreans] were discouraged in terms of self-awareness, self-determination, and self-responsibility, because the

habit of being controlled by their strong dependency on others had turned into second nature” (p. 16). To eliminate such negative attributes, Park believed that the Korean people needed to be enlightened and reborn through the martial spirit, which consisted of harsh training tactics (including physical punishment) and the cultivation of a strong mentality (Eckert, 2016). By doing so, a Korean nation that withstood hardship and difficulty would be reborn as a sound Korean people, thereby leading to national glory and prestige. This discursive scheme dating from Park’s regime permeated the culture of Korean sport and physical education (Hong, 2011) and was lined up with the state’s pursuit of elite sport development to raise Korea’s global prowess and promote its national rebranding on the international stage (Cho & Bairner, 2012). This continues in Korean sport today through the popular rhetoric of national prestige. Thus, sport-oriented strategies in the formation of KOICA sport discourse, aided by the transfer of Korean sport knowledge and experience, are a legacy of the Park regime and mark the path of Korean nationalism.

To go a step further, Park’s emphasis on martial spirit led to Taekwondo sport development for the purposes of promoting traditional Korean culture, to represent Korean national identity and prestige. Park justified the strong emphasis on martial spirit through *Hwarangdo* (also known as the way of *Hwarang*, or fellows of *Hwarang*), which originated from the ancient Korean kingdom of Silla (57BC–935AD). *Hwarang* means “flower youth” or “flower boys” (Moenig, 2015, p. 214); however, there are differing opinions on whether *Hwarangdo* referred to militaristic elites or the ancient Korean youth of the time who practiced martial arts (e.g. Ha & Mangan, 1998; Moenig, 2015). Regardless, *Hwarangdo* was a typical symbol of Korean militaristic nationalism for the Park regime (Ha & Mangan, 2002). Thus, the image of Taekwondo was cultivated to represent *Hwarangdo* through frequent references to the ancient

Silla kingdom (Moenig, 2015). Armed with a variety of discursive strategies to disseminate Taekwondo as an ideological amalgam of militarism, nationalism, and traditional Korean distinctiveness, the development of Taekwondo as both a traditional martial art and institutionalized sport started with the official formation of the Korea Taekwondo Association in 1965 (Capener, 2016). Taekwondo was then promoted to the status of national sport in 1971, followed by the establishment of *Kukkiwon* (the World Taekwondo Headquarters) in 1972 and the World Taekwondo Federation in 1973. These developments garnered full support from the Park regime. The state enthusiastically encouraged the spread of Taekwondo through the dispatch of Korean masters to locations worldwide (Johnson, 2018). Most importantly, attempts to promote Korean Taekwondo around the world have been adopted as shows of patriotism and nationalism, meant to not only overtake Japanese Karate following Korea's 35-year occupation by Japan, but also to ideologically compete with and secure the legitimacy of South Korean Taekwondo over North Korea's International Taekwondo Federation (ITF). These strategies are exposed in discourses of KOICA sport through the way that DTI instructors and Taekwondo volunteers serving as coaches of national Taekwondo teams in recipient countries perceive their activities as contributions to the enhancement of Korea's reputation in the global community.

The Formation of Non-Sport-Oriented Strategies

Korea's success story serves as justification for Korean perceptions of elite athletes and local people in recipient countries, for Korean-centred beliefs and training tactics and for the typical rhetoric of strong mentality pushed by instructors on recipient athletes. As argued above, KOICA sport documents highlight the mentality of recipient athletes manifested in commonly used, mindset-specific phrases like "instilling the Korean spirit," "mental strength," and "mental training." The emphasis on "internal" training and elements was primarily instilled by the Park

Chung-hee regime and continues to pervade Korean society. Given the key role of KOICA in sharing Korean development knowledge and experience, the emphasis on athletes' mentality is consistent with a development campaign representative of the Park regime, called *Saemaul Undong* [the New Village Movement]. *Saemaul Undong* was a rural modernisation project launched by Park in the 1970s that recruited Koreans to voluntarily participate in development efforts. It is widely regarded as the key to Korea's successful economic development (Doucette & Müller, 2016). The success of *Saemaul Undong* is often attributed to a state-driven mental revolution led by the developmental dictatorship (Jeong, 2017) through core values centred on a "can-do spirit" and the *Saemaul* spirit of self-help, diligence and cooperation. Volunteers echo this perspective decades later: "I hope Koreans' *hoyeonjigi* [great spirit], concentration, and diligence spreads to the people of Nepal, thereby acting as an impetus for Nepal's national development" (KOICA, 1995, p. 29). As the quote shows, the Korean instructor's emphasis on the values of *hoyeonjigi* (spirit), concentration and diligence can be understood as related to the can-do spirit and *Saemaul* spirit promoted by the Park regime.

Indeed, studies on Korean foreign aid show that the dominant discourses and governing technologies of the Park regime in the 1970s, and of *Saemaul Undong* specifically, are still alive and replicated in Korea's recent international development programs (e.g. Doucette & Müller, 2016; Jeong, 2017; Kim, 2016, Sonn & Gimm, 2013; Watson, 2012, 2014). Jeong (2017) considers Park's *Saemaul Undong* a modern dictatorship that successfully mobilised the Korean people for national development projects without exerting any suppressive power. This homogenisation process was made possible by promoting the regime's can-do spirit and *Saemaul* spirit of self-help, diligence and cooperation (Sonn & Gimm, 2013). *Saemaul Undong* was ultimately positioned as a depoliticized practice that concealed the regime's hegemonic strategy

and political aspirations, securing legitimacy and social regimentation (Doucette & Müller, 2016). In this respect, the KOICA sport focus on mentality and spiritual attributes also helps maintain and reproduce the dominant discourses and governing technologies of the Park regime, allowing his authoritarian legacy to live on today. Notably, just as development projects served the Park regime's political objectives and helped advance its hegemonic strategies, KOICA sport may similarly serve as a domestic and foreign policy tool of the Korean government. More importantly, the maintenance and reproduction of development discourses and governing technologies from the Park regime of the 1970s frame KOICA sport as a product of the depoliticization of sport, public health and social development.

Concluding Remarks

An analysis of the content and structure of Korean Sport for International Development discourse, in terms of the rules of formation of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies in the context of national development and sport policies and aspirations, leads to three critical observations about 1) the former colony-colony relationship, 2) state-run programs and 3) the role of Taekwondo as a distinct Korean SFD tool.

First, unlike mainstream international SFD discourses, which predominantly reflect relationships between former colonizers (Western) and their colonies (non-Western), the structure of Korean sport for international development discourse is entrenched in the former colony-colony relationship, as Korea and recipient countries share similar experiences as objects of colonization. Nevertheless, like the former colonizer-colony relations found in development discourse (Ziai, 2016), the structure of the KOICA sport discourse maintains characteristically asymmetrical power relations between donors and recipients. As noted by various SFD scholars (e.g. Darnell, 2010b; Darnell & Black, 2011; Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011; Hayhurst, 2009; Nicolls

et al., 2011), this is in line with the unequal power relations shaped and reproduced by the maintenance of the colonial power and legacy of Western donors. My analysis has focused on how Korea situates itself among developed countries and thus reproduces the asymmetrical power relations that characterize donor-recipient relationships in international development. The extent to which this discourse is received, challenged, and transformed within recipient countries is however beyond the scope of my analysis, which would require follow-up ethnographic field research.

The asymmetrical power relations between KOICA sport and elite athletes in recipient countries stem from the scientific knowledge and expertise that KOICA sport and its Korean coaches are deemed to have, and this scientific knowledge and expertise corresponds neatly with modern sport standards today. Furthermore, meeting modern sport standards involves evaluating Korean instructors' knowledge and expertise in order to judge whether their norms and criteria coincide with those of Western-led international sporting competitions. On the one hand, asymmetrical power relationships shaped in KOICA sport are also laid down in Korean sport culture and its training practices, which clearly delineate hierarchical relations between coaches and athletes centred on absolute obedience and an emphasis on a strong mentality and spirit. While an asymmetrical relationship between coaches and athletes is common in training practice (Shogan, 1999), such a hierarchy is often accompanied by harsh training methods and physical punishment. In this respect, asymmetrical power relations between Korean instructors and elite athletes in recipient countries, KOICA sport and elite sport in recipient countries, and Korea and recipient countries are obvious, despite the unavoidable truth that in many cases, Korea and recipient countries share similar colonial experiences and histories. Additionally, many elements of Korean sport culture are reminiscent of Japanese colonial rule, shaped by the discursive

strategies and governing technologies of Park Chung-hee's military regime. This colonial legacy still continues in Korean sport culture today and has shaped the discourses of KOICA sport that sustain and transplant the colonial-based characteristics of Korean sport culture into the sport culture and systems of recipient countries. As a result, despite the shared colonization experience between Korea and recipient countries, KOICA sport produces new manifestations of asymmetrical power relations.

Second, KOICA sport is state-run and uses sport as an international development tool, whereas the majority of international SFD programs are run by NGOs in partnership with national governmental or intergovernmental organisations of the Global North (Coalter, 2013; Giulianotti, 2011; Kidd, 2008). In mainstream SFD, the key actors of SFD programs in the twenty-first century are NGOs in the Global North, although they rely heavily on government funding and support (Kidd, 2008). Giulianotti (2011) presents four ideal types of sport for development and peace: the *neoliberal social*, *developmental interventionist*, *social justice*, and *strategic developmentalist*. The first three approaches are mainly adopted and implemented by NGOs, and the last approach, strategic developmentalism, which positions national governments as key players, is also fulfilled through partnerships made with NGOs (2011). The role of NGOs in SFD cannot be fully separated from national government policy nor the international development agenda (Hasselgård, 2015). Some SFD NGOs sponsored by governmental agencies (e.g. Commonwealth Games Canada's Canadian Sports Leadership Corps) work in alignment with government policy objectives, for example, the enhancement of domestic youth employability and global leadership (Darnell & Black, 2011). However, there is little academic research that examines how these SFD NGOs operate as government policy tools to fulfill a state's political aims. In contrast, this paper has shown how sport has been employed as a tool for

Korea's international development work and plays a role in promoting the Korean national interest and increasing its international prestige. Given that recipient athletes' achievement of excellence at international sporting events is discursively constructed as an outcome only possible through KOICA sport programs and the guidance of Korean instructors, any achievement is inevitably linked to enhancement of the mutual relationship between Korea and recipient countries, the growth of Korean sport and cultural products such as Taekwondo globally and the rebranding of Korea's image as "global leaders" (KOICA, 2012, p. 34). While sport volunteers in the later era of KOICA sport between the late 2000s to 2010s were motivated to participate in volunteering because of personal objectives and career development goals, as a whole, volunteer perceptions of KOICA sport as being representative of Korea itself have persisted since its beginnings in 1990. This is linked to discursive strategies tracing back to the 1970s Park regime, such as the social regimentation of physical education and *Saemaul Undong*, still circulating in Korean society today and through the discursive formations of KOICA sport. A growing body of research on Korean international development shows that Korea's interventions in international development are closely associated with the political aims of the Korean government, in conformity with domestic policy priorities (e.g. youth employment) and foreign policy frameworks (e.g. public diplomacy) (e.g. Kim, 2012; Kim, 2016; Snyder, 2009; Watson, 2011, 2012).

Ultimately, the discourses of KOICA sport are predominantly guided by the ways in which Korean Taekwondo is delivered, popularised and used to serve the nation. Around the world, football is the most common sport-specific activity of SFD programs, followed by other institutionalised sport such as basketball, volleyball and cricket (Schulenkorf *et al.* 2016). While these modern sports are rooted in the West, originating in England and the United States of

America, the distinct nationalistic features and traditional representations of these popular sports in SFD rarely receive academic attention (Levermore 2009). Some ethnographical SFD research has shown that Western-oriented sports and sport models are transformed to fit into recipient practices within the Global South (e.g. Hasselgård & Straume, 2014; Lindsey & Grattan, 2012; Mwaanga & Mwansa, 2013). These local programs rarely represent their own nationalistic dispositions and national interests. Conversely, Taekwondo is intentionally included in Korea's international development programs and is even promoted as a national sport and a traditional Korean martial art. In KOICA sport discourses, Taekwondo programs are commonly regulated in ways that enhance elite sport and sport development in recipient countries. As a result, athletes from recipient countries who achieve excellence at international sport competitions help Korea employ sport as a tool for enhancing its international prestige. In contrast, the extent to which Taekwondo programs embody the international development agenda and improve social development in recipient countries should be further investigated.

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**Chapter 6 (Article 2): The Diplomatic Roles Played by State-Run Sport Programs in
Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA)**

A revised version of this article was submitted for publication into the *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* (IRSS).

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, international relations have been shaped by complicated and varied historical events like the creation of the United Nations, the decolonization movement and the far-reaching, geopolitical Cold War conflict (Johns, 2014). Changing global politics have redefined sport as an alternative method for fulfilling a state's diplomatic objectives (Murray and Pigman, 2014). While this approach, often called sport diplomacy, is apparent around the world (John, 2014), its various manifestations in Asia are unique. As argued by Cha (2009), "sport might matter more in Asian politics than in other parts of the world" (p. 3). Asian states interest in sport is attributed to historical relationships between Asian countries with experiences of Japanese colonialism, their aspirations to enter the ranks of Western modernity, also categorized as the developed world (Collins, 2010), and sport's geopolitical significance in global politics. Specifically, sport diplomacy has been employed distinctively in South Korea (hereafter Korea), where it was effectively integrated into the government's political aspirations and formed a foundation for inter-Korean relations in the broader context of the Cold War. Korea has utilized sport as a diplomatic tool to while propagate South Korea's ideological superiority over North Korea (Merkel, 2008, 2009), shape international perceptions of Korea's rebirth (Collins, 2011) and justify the legitimacy of its various military regimes to the international community (Lee, 2015, 2016, 2017).

A variety of new approaches in sport diplomacy were implemented in the post-Cold War era (Black and Peacock, 2013). For instance, global sporting events surfaced as popular sites of sport diplomacy, often functioning as "coming out parties" (Collins, 2011, p. 2240) for newly industrialized countries trying to rebrand themselves internationally. Black and Peacock (2013) argue that sport diplomacy, as a vehicle for public diplomacy, has been refocused by multiple

actors including international sports organizations, civil society organizations, and multinational corporations, as well as traditional diplomatic actors like national governments. Murray and Pigman (2014) write that after 9/11, sport diplomacy became part of the American foreign policy agenda to advance the government's public and cultural diplomacy goals more effectively. Although examples of this refocusing of sport diplomacy as a new form of public and cultural diplomacy abound, little theoretical and empirical inquiry has explored this shift (Murray, 2018). In fact, much of the scholarly interest to date still focuses on the diplomatic role of sport in the Cold War context and its ideological performances in the post-Cold War era (e.g. Choi, Heo, Shin, & Lee, 2013; Johns, 2014; Merkel, 2008, 2009; Sotomayor, 2014; Yen, 2013), or the diplomatic role played by sport at major global sporting events (e.g. Bandyopadhyay, 2008; Bridges, 2007; Collins, 2010, 2011; Horne, 2016; Tan & Houlihan, 2013). In other words, sport diplomacy research rarely moves beyond the context of the Cold War or global sporting events. Similarly, existing literature on Korean sport diplomacy has largely paid attention only to the diplomatic value of mega-sporting events such as the 1986 Asian Games, 1988 Seoul Olympics, and 2018 PyeongChang Winter Games in improving Korea's international status and inter-Korean relations (e.g. Cha, 2009; Merkel, 2008; Min & Choi, 2019; Radchenko, 2012; Rowe, 2018).

While the role of the national government as a traditional diplomatic actor has diminished, a multitude of new actors (including non-governmental and private actors in international relations and global politics) and new, softer diplomatic approaches have emerged (Black & Peacock, 2013). For instance, classic donor countries like Canada, Norway and the United States have incorporated international sport-for-development (SFD) initiatives into their foreign policy and diplomatic schemes as the SFD movement became an increasingly popular

element within twenty-first century, international development agendas (Coalter, 2010; Hasselgård, 2015; Levermore & Beacom, 2009). Scholars have offered theoretical pathways to understand international SFD using diplomatic frameworks (Black & Peacock, 2013; Murray, 2018; Rofe, 2016). Unfortunately, follow-up empirical research rarely involves theoretical efforts. Therefore, building on this work, I offer a theoretically-informed, empirical analysis of the sport diplomacy efforts embedded in Korean SFD initiatives, specifically by appraising a variety of overseas sport programs and sport aid projects implemented in the Global South by the leading governmental aid agency, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). My focus on sport diplomacy for analyzing KOICA sport programs provides an alternative to the prevailing perspective in English-language international SFD studies.

The Korean government established KOICA in April 1991 as an agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to design and execute its official development assistance (ODA) grants, consisting primarily of aid projects and technical cooperation programs. Korean ODA has been largely initiated and driven by the state's political and diplomatic objectives (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007). Previous studies have shown that the Korean government uses KOICA as a tool to pursue its diplomatic interests and leverage its status in the international community as a middle power (e.g. Ayhan, 2016, 2017; Kim, 2016; Roehrig, 2013; Watson, 2014). Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, state-led foreign aid and development assistance have come to be regarded as a more sophisticated form of statecraft and diplomacy (McKercher, 2014; Melissen, 2005). I intend to examine how this change has emerged over three decades of KOICA sport initiatives. In what ways have KOICA sport funding and programs aligned with the Korean government's foreign policy and diplomatic goals? Hereafter, two forms of Korean sport grants administered by KOICA – aid projects (e.g., the construction of sport facilities and provision of sport

equipment) and sport technical cooperation programs (sport volunteering and the dispatch of Taekwondo instructors overseas) – are collectively termed *KOICA sport*. First, I present the conceptual framework of my analysis, drawing on Murray's (2018) categorization of sport diplomacy as well as Foucauldian discourse analysis, followed by details of the study's design. The findings reveal that KOICA sport initially prioritized elite sport development through an approach akin to traditional sport diplomacy, but now appears to have adopted global sport for development (SFD) strategies with a focus on social development, in step with the current UN development agenda, through a new sport-oriented public diplomacy approach. I conclude with a discussion of the contradictions inherent within KOICA sport's overt and covert aims, revealed through an analysis of the discourses framing these programs, and also uncover the conditional nature of the overseas sport aid projects funded by the Korean government.

Two Categories of Sport Diplomacy

Murray (2018) proposes two categories of sport diplomacy, encompassing the mixing of sport with diplomacy from the past to the present: "traditional sport diplomacy" and "new sport diplomacy." He argues that traditional sport diplomacy amounts to "the opportunistic use, strategic exploitation and, in some cases, abuse of elite sport, sportspeople and sporting events to advance a state's foreign policy objectives" (Murray, 2018, p. 61). A country's central government is a key role in this earlier, predominant approach, capitalizing on sport as a foreign policy tool to uphold or upset diplomatic relations, or to diffuse diplomatic messages (Murray, 2018). However, such effects were often occasional, opportunistic and ineffective. Nevertheless, Murray (2018) shows that states have used sport as an unconventional medium to project a national image to the global community in an effort to discard their historical or stereotypical national image. In this sense, Korea's hosting of the Summer Olympic Games in 1988 was an

example of the role of traditional sport diplomacy in helping rebrand Korea's international image by shedding its identity as an impoverished country and emerging as a newly minted industrialized power (e.g. Collins, 2011). Next, in instances when state leaders convene to watch sports events together in non-political settings, sport can be used to ease tensions (Murray, 2018). Such informal sports summits can later lead to formal diplomatic talks, as well as the creation of agreements between diplomats (Murray & Pigman, 2014). This approach explains why unified Korean teams have competed at global sporting events such as the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships and 2018 PyeongChang Winter Games, as a unified Korean team holds diplomatic value for promoting détente between North and South Korea. Lastly, Murray underlines how traditional sport diplomacy has brought about "purely practical" (Murray, 2018, p. 73) diplomatic effects, particularly in elite sport exchanges between states, referred to as "a relatively low-cost, low-risk but high-profile tool of foreign policy" (Keech, 2001, p. 72). In the Cold War context, for instance, sport exchanges were meant to show off physical prowess and assert ideological superiority over the other block (Merkel, 2008). Conversely, sportspeople and teams also played a significant role as "vanguard emissaries" (Murray, 2018, p. 74) in facilitating diplomatic relations. This is evident when looking at the most famous case of sport diplomacy, the Ping Pong diplomacy witnessed between China and the United States of America, which led to the normalization of Sino-US relations.

Compared to the traditional sport diplomacy approach, the new conceptualization of sport diplomacy is "a far more inclusive, amateur and networked model that embodies the type of state, non-state and public partnerships" (Murray, 2018, p. 89), corresponding to twenty-first century diplomacy in which a state's foreign policy is no longer merely the preserve of foreign ministries and their diplomats. This perspective conforms to Black and Peacock's (2013)

description of sport diplomacy in the post-Cold War era as redeployed by multiple actors, including international sport organizations, civil society organizations, multinational corporations and traditional diplomatic actors like national governments. The constant focus on elite sport in the new sport diplomacy approach is noteworthy. However, the new concept of sport diplomacy no longer centers on the opportunistic and short-term effects of elite sport in traditional sport diplomacy, but concentrates instead on the regular and long-term effects of elite sporting practices (Murray, 2018). Thus, the use of elite sport in the new sport diplomacy integrates the social development goals advocated by humanitarianism and global civil society (Jackson & Haigh, 2009). Murray (2018) also claims that state-driven foreign policy and diplomatic strategies instrumentalize sport as a vehicle for the state's public diplomacy goals. Public diplomacy is an instrument deployed by multiple actors in the governmental and non-governmental sectors "to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationship; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (Gregory, 2011, p. 353). Conceptualizing twenty-first century public diplomacy as "new public diplomacy," Melissen (2005: 12) highlights its transition from a "hierarchical state-centric model" to a "network environment" that includes not only governmental agencies and conventional official diplomatic actors, but also non-governmental organizations and civil society. Furthermore, new public diplomacy is most significantly directed towards the larger population, that is, unofficial individuals and groups. New sport diplomacy practices are thus tied to new public diplomacy. Indeed, sport diplomacy comes under the umbrella of public diplomacy within Korea's foreign policy framework (Ma, Song, & Moore, 2012), implying that sport diplomacy dovetails with the state's public diplomacy objectives.

Rofe (2016) correctly highlights that Murray's state-based approach to sport diplomacy targets the relationship between international sport and national governments whereas a global diplomacy perspective, equally linked to the new brand of public diplomacy, targets the network of various national, international, and transnational stakeholders involved in sport diplomacy. Indeed, Murray's (2018) categorization of sport diplomacy is limited to the methods by which sport is conventionally or newly regulated by the state. Most scholars, including Murray, agree that twenty-first century sport diplomacy includes varied diplomatic governmental and non-government actors, which is a distinctive feature of sport diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, Murray's (2018) sport diplomacy still underlines the role of state government as a key player in the diplomatic world. This implies that his approach would not be appropriate for analyzing international sports organizations (e.g. Black & Peacock, 2013), globally popular sports clubs (e.g. de-San Eugenio, Ginesta, & Xifra, 2017), or individual sports programs and athletes (e.g. Yen, 2013) functioning as diplomatic actors. Instead, Murray's approach may be better utilized for exploring the diplomatic roles of governmental and state-led sport programs and initiatives, making it a suitable framework for examining how KOICA sport has pursued varied foreign policy and diplomatic objectives of successive administrations in Korea. Importantly, this framework acknowledges that traditional sport diplomacy originated during the Cold War and continues to overlap with new sport diplomacy in a modified form (Murray, 2018). Thus, the division of traditional and new sport diplomacy does not represent a particular time period nor historical practice.

Foucault's Archaeology and Genealogy

Although Foucault's methodological approach to discourse analysis shifted over time from archaeology to genealogy (Garritty, 2010), I draw upon both for my study of the discourses

framing KOICA sport initiatives to examine how they are strategically determined through specific rules of formations, and to uncover the characteristics of their historical transformation. I therefore focus on “the formation of strategies” in archaeology (Foucault, 1972), and on the *dispositif* (apparatus) in genealogy (Foucault, 1980).

Foucault (1972) defines discourse in archaeology as “a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation” (p. 117). He further explains that the discursive formation is shaped by rules that define the regularity of the dispersion and emergence of objects, types of statements, concepts and strategies. Archaeology aims to identify the “rules of formation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 38) that are inherent to the social practice generated by discourse and that circumscribe it. Markula and Pringle (2006) add that archaeology can be defined as an examination of social practices juxtaposed with how knowledge and discourse are understood in a given historical moment. They use archaeology to explore discursive formations of fitness, not by seeking to uncover the historical birth of fitness, but by analyzing how fitness has been treated differently in various sociocultural and historical contexts. Escobar (1995) similarly uses archaeology to identify the rules and systems of dispersion that generated the hegemonic views of development entrenched in a particular economy, culture and society. Gardam, Giles, & Hayhurst (2017) also draw upon archaeology to identify the discursive conditions that frame Canadian Indigenous peoples’ view of SFD programs funded by the extractive industries in the Northwest Territories of Canada.

In the Chapter 5, I have analyzed the rules of formation applicable to the KOICA discourses that frame its sport initiatives and showed that; 1) elite sport and elite athletes in recipient countries are visible as objects; 2) Korean instructors are granted the subject position of legitimate expert through the formation of enunciative modalities; 3) two concepts of input-

oriented volunteering and output-oriented volunteering integrate the values of compassion and the spirit of sharing and respect along with personal achievement; and 4) the transfer of Korean (sport) development knowledge and experience emerges as sport-oriented and non-sport-oriented strategies. This paper relies on archaeology to explore how a diplomacy-centred view of KOICA sport programs is formed through state-led foreign aid projects in international development practice.

While archaeology is useful for the synchronic analysis of discourses, genealogy offers a diachronic approach to uncover their historical transformation (Ziai, 2016). Foucault (1977) claims that genealogical analysis should focus on the recurrence of a social experience or cultural form and capture the singularities of various discourses by deliberately dissolving each of the practices and objects and relocating them to different contexts (Hook, 2005). Similarly, Ziai (2016) analyzes historical changes in the discursive formation of development from the 1980s to 2000s. I use it here to explore how discourses imbuing Korean SFD programs with foreign policy and diplomatic value have changed over time, from traditional to new sport diplomacy (Murray, 2018) discourses, while emphasizing their distinctiveness.

The Formation of Strategies and *Dispositif*

Foucault (1972) explains that a discursive formation is “essentially incomplete, owing to the system of formation of its strategic choices” (p.67) that include, but also exclude, potential statements, thus implying that different or differently organized objects, concepts and types of statement are absent. The formation of strategies determines the real content of what defines the object, who can be qualified to hold the subject position, and which concepts are reiterated in discourse (Ziai, 2016). Still, any incompatible element could be tied to the same discourse through the formation of strategies system (Foucault, 1972). In this sense, we can see that themes

commonly identified in government policy discourse are regulated by strategic purposes (Ziai, 2016). However, we can infer that other themes are linked to the same discourse in reaction to strategic choices (Garrity, 2010). Most importantly, these thematic choices are exclusively regulated by “the function that the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practice” (Foucault, 1972, p. 68). According to Foucault (1972), this non-discursive practice involves non-linguistic domains such as institutional rules, policy objectives and historical events, suggesting that strategic choices are heavily dependent on non-discursive social practices (Foucault, 1980).

Dispositif, also known as apparatus, refers to the link between discursive and non-discursive practices. It concerns the “system of relations” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194) between discourses and a collection of elements that includes institutional norms, scientific knowledge, moral ideas and administrative mechanisms. *Dispositif* is a strategic function “at a given historical moment” (Foucault, 1980, p. 195) in reaction to an impending matter. In other words, a strategic purpose as *dispositif* can emerge at the juncture between discourse and its reliance upon non-discursive practices, such as institutional goals or state policy. Sonn and Gimm (2013) regard the national development projects in Korea of the 1970s as *dispositif* of the developmental state for achieving the political legitimacy of its authoritarian regime. In this respect, sport in international development, functioning as a diplomatic tool, is a *dispositif* that links dominant discourses with institutional objectives. Building upon the formation of strategies, Ziai (2016) states that common themes in development policy actually work to strategically lay down the historical context of the North-South relationship. Gardam et al. (2017) also argue that the use of sport as a development tool is politically bound to the extractive industries as part of their corporate social responsibility strategy, which usually incorporates the principles outlined in

Canada's social and governmental policy. In short, discourses regulate the increased diplomatic role of sport as a strategic response to changes in world politics, such as globalization, the need for multiple actors in the international community, and the ambiguous boundary between governmental and non-governmental roles in post-Cold War diplomacy (Black & Peacock, 2013).

Methods

Five sets of key documents published by KOICA were subjected to Foucauldian discourse analysis. They included annual reports from 1992 to 2017; newsletters from 1994 to 2017; two anniversary books, *10 Years of KOICA* and *20 Years of KOICA*; four project reports in Tunisia from 1997 to 1999, in Vietnam from 1999 and in Indonesia from 2003 to 2006; two volunteer case books published in 1992 and 2005; and one volunteer guidebook from 2011 regarding volunteer experiences in Vietnam. These documents include important statements, memoirs, historical events and interviews related to KOICA sport. In addition, two articles posted on the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_22841/contents.do) regarding public diplomacy and sport diplomacy and the *Public Diplomacy Act* (Statutes of the Republic of Korea, 2016), a key foreign policy document on Korean public diplomacy, were also used to identify the link between KOICA sport and Korean foreign policy.

The documents collected were analyzed mainly in three stages. In the first stage, discursive formations were analyzed through the identification of common themes organized around the rules of formation of strategy (Garrity, 2010). Importantly, as highlighted by Foucault (1972), these common themes are determined by their function, that is, how they interact with non-discursive practices. In other words, the appearance of critical, common themes in KOICA

sport discourses is determined by their relationship to non-discursive practices, identified for the purposes of this study as the objectives of Korean foreign policy. Furthermore, drawing on Foucault's (1980) conception of *dispositif*, I considered the linkages between themes and non-discursive practices as strategic functions and purposes of KOICA sport, in essence, as a diplomatic tool of Korean ODA policy. My initial analysis presents four critical, common themes that appear in KOICA sport discourse: "assisting elite sport development," "the dispatch of Taekwondo instructors (DTI) program," "contributing to social development," and "pursuing Korean public diplomacy." Next, using genealogical analysis to identify singularities in discursive change over time, KOICA sport discourses centred on the four themes are shown to have shifted. Indeed, by combining genealogy with Murray's (2018) categorization of sport diplomacy, distinctive features of KOICA sport discourses in its early period (early 1990s to early 2000s) and the later period (the late 2000s to the present) emerge. In the last stage of my analysis, the first two themes and features of the early period were framed by traditional sport diplomacy, whereas the latter two themes and predominating features of the later period were linked to KOICA's efforts to operate in step with new sport diplomacy. In the next section, the findings of my extended analysis are discussed, with a focus on two diplomatic roles of KOICA sport.

Traditional Roles of KOICA Sport

The deployment of KOICA sport is reminiscent of Murray's (2018) description of the use of elite sport in traditional sport diplomacy to convey specific diplomatic messages and its new international image. Interestingly, the first ever dispatch of Korean Taekwondo instructors to non-aligned countries in the Third World in 1972 was a diplomatic strategy employed by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than sports-related agencies (KOICA ODA

Institution, 2016). This indicates that Korea's approach to the use of sport (the dispatch of Taekwondo instructors) in international development was guided by traditional sport diplomacy, evident in the development assistance (including sport aid) given to recipient countries within the Cold War setting (Darnell, Field, & Kidd, 2019; Millington & Kidd, 2019; Murray, 2018).

Assisting Elite Sport Development

Developing elite sport in the Global South emerges as a central theme in early KOICA sport discourses, frequently highlighted in its promotional stories, reports and program documents. For instance, one annual report describes the impact of its Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors (DTI) program, which sent qualified Korean instructors to coach Taekwondo in recipient countries as follow: "The program has been very successful in helping the recipient countries organize national teams and win prizes at international Taekwondo competitions" (KOICA, 1996, p. 71). DTI's primary objective was to promote the development of organized Taekwondo and ultimately help local elite athletes triumph internationally. Likewise, most success stories from the program's early stages (particularly from the early 1990s to early 2000s) detailed how Korean volunteers were posted to local and national sport federations in recipient countries to serve as elite coaches, where they successfully contributed to the achievement of athletic excellence. One sport aid project in particular, *The Construction of a Taekwondo Hall*, illustrates the operations of KOICA sport in assisting elite sport development. This initiative was implemented in Tunisia from 1997 to 1999 and is widely counted among the emblematic projects of KOICA's first decade (KOICA, 2001). It was designed to support the development of organized Taekwondo in Tunisia by providing a modern, fully-equipped Taekwondo training centre to prepare national athletes for international competitions (KOICA, 2006d). Once the

facility was built, highly qualified coaches and volunteers were also dispatched to train the national team.

International Prestige

KOICA's promotional material highlighted its programs' contribution to sporting excellence, showcasing volunteers who led their teams to international success. For instance, the 2005 casebook featured a Korean volunteer who helped his athletes achieve consecutive wins at international sporting events during his two-year service as coach of Kazakhstan's national Taekwondo team, stating, "He has constantly looked for opportunities to promote Korea in the remote country of Kazakhstan, and really put his heart into Taekwondo development there" (KOICA, 2005, p. 103). The casebook focused on this example to show how the guidance of elite KOICA volunteer instructors (Taekwondo) was instrumental to elite sport development by helping developing countries win medals at global sporting events. These wins, in turn, are then explicitly described as enhancing their sporting status, "now Taekwondo has become the most important sport in this country, and further, is regarded as the sport with the most potential to boost international prestige" (KOICA, 1994b, p. 15). More importantly, these achievements (elite sport development, athletic excellence at international competitions and increased international prestige) are framed as the result of KOICA sport's knowledge and expertise. Consequently, KOICA sport's contributions to elite sport development in recipient countries ultimately serve the diplomatic goal of promoting Korea's global standing. International prestige emerges as the strategic function, the *dispositif*, that organizes the links between Korean sport knowledge, international development and the state's diplomatic objectives.

Notably, Korean elite sport knowledge delivered through KOICA as a form of international development transforms the recipient athlete into the ideal Korean athlete with an

emphasis on *ganghan jeongsinryeok* [strong willpower] and respect for coaches, two discursive strategies common to Korean elite sport culture. For instance, the coach's role in building character and willpower among athletes emerges in the description of a Taekwondo volunteer who served as a national coach for an overseas team, "athletes got tired or injured easily because of nutritional deficiencies, and training was difficult because of the hot and humid equatorial climate. However, he worked hard to train the athletes by instilling in them a *ganghan jeongsinryeok* (KOICA, 2005, p. 100). *Ganghan jeongsinryeok* refers to strengthening the athlete's drive and has circulated for decades within Korean sport culture and elite sport training specifically (Kwak, Ko, Kang, & Rosentraub, 2018). However, its methods are supported by anecdotal and mythological evidence rather than theoretical and scientific data (Moenig, 2015; Tosa, 2015). *Ganghan jeongsinryeok* is frequently evoked by volunteers in KOICA documents. It is so deeply ingrained in Korean sport culture that volunteer coaches expound this belief along with the nutrition plans, sport equipment and training facilities promised by KOICA projects. Athletes are encouraged to directly confront and overcome any difficulties they encounter. Similarly, emphasis on a "can-do spirit" has framed Korea's international sport feats, instilling national pride and confidence amongst the Korean public (Koh, 2005). This can-do subjectivity, introduced by Park Chung-hee's regime during the 1970 to mobilize the population's participation in national development initiatives, was advanced as the only viable method to attain national prosperity and modernization (Doucette & Müller, 2016). Subsequent success achieved through these projects reinforced Koreans' belief in the value of the can-do spirit (Jeong, 2017). Likewise, Korea's storied sporting victories at high-profile international competitions, including consecutive Olympic Games, sustain a conviction among KOICA instructors about the importance of mental strength to reach sporting excellence.

Local athletes are also expected to be polite and respectful towards their coaches. This emphasis on respect in the operation of KOICA sport in recipient countries is not intended to teach manners but to reinforce authority. It demands obedience from athletes. For instance, one volunteer noted:

Here, I focus on teaching manners to trainees and make them go through intensive training. In return, they show so much respect to me that they don't dare to even breathe in my presence. I also teach them proper greeting methods, and all [of the trainees] have reacted positively. (KOICA, 1992a, p. 136)

The instructor's firm conviction of the importance of instilling respect for coaches in athletes is obvious and supersedes the need for intensive athletic training. This was evident in the way he taught respect to his athletes so well they dared not even breathe in his presence. His perception of respect exceeded good manners or politeness to constitute a form of submission. The subservience expected of these coach-athlete dynamics reproduces the culture of absolute obedience to authority commonly found in Korean sport culture, intrinsically implying hierarchical power relations and reflecting the entrenched moral values of Korean society (Park et al., 2012). Korean media have often reported that athletes must defer to authority (i.e., coaches and their orders) in the Korean sport system (Park et al., 2012). This requirement mirrors the moral values of respect and veneration in Korean society (Kwak et al., 2018). In fact, these ideals are shaped and justified by prevailing, Confucian-based cultural values that include respect for one's teachers (Sleziak, 2013). Hence, sport culture normalizes the expectation that athletes are to submit to their coaches' commands without question, thereby strengthening the asymmetrical relations between them (Nam, Kim, Marshall, Sung, & Mao, 2018).

Some statements in KOICA sport discourses suggest that harsh training methods, hierarchical power relations, absolute obedience to coaches and even acceptance of physical punishment is common, as in the following statement by a former KOICA coach concerning the Cambodian national swim team: “when I was training as an athlete, I received punishment 100 times a day ...” (KOICA, 2005, p. 21). Critically, in Korean sport culture any violence from coaches is often justified or forgiven when they lead their athletes to win medals at international sport competitions (Park et al., 2012). The mentality of winning at all costs has been a key factor that transformed Korea into a sport powerhouse. This outcome-oriented approach results from the government’s efforts to promote Korea’s international reputation (Hong, 2011). Within this perspective, the harsh training and any possible physical punishment that the KOICA swim coach might have endured during her time as a young Korean athlete could be justified: after all, it had shaped her into a coach able to lead the Cambodian national team to win their first medal at the Asian Games and to qualify for the Olympics for the first time ever (KOICA, 2005).

In short, for the sake of increasing national prestige, elite athletes in recipient countries were required to enact the subjectivity typified in Korean sport culture and adopt the Korea-specific mindset of strong willpower and respect for coaches (i.e. obedience to authority). Compliance led the Cambodian national swimming team to international success and opened access to the global sporting stage. Importantly, all these achievements are credited to KOICA sport and Korean sport expertise, which in turn simultaneously bolsters the prestige of Korea and the recipient country. To take it a step further, the hierarchical relationship between KOICA coaches and local athletes in recipient countries can be replicated at the international level, framing a hierarchy of donor (Korea)/recipient relations in global politics. In the same way that traditional sport diplomacy was deployed during the Cold War era to demonstrate superiority

(Black & Peacock, 2013; Jackson & Haigh, 2009; Johns, 2014; Merkel, 2008), traditional sport diplomacy mechanisms were deployed through KOICA to establish Korea's sport expertise as valuable and better than that of recipient countries; it aimed to convert them to Korea's elite sport culture.

The 2002 FIFA World Cup.

The *Construction of Taekwondo Hall* project also illustrates another Korean strategy that executed traditional sport diplomacy schemes: conditional aid projects aimed at improving Korea's global standing. This diplomatic purpose was explicit in the nation's spending campaign to convince key FIFA decision-makers, including the president of the Tunisian Football Federation, to support its bid to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup. The *Construction of a Taekwondo Hall* project was an important KOICA sport aid project implemented in Tunisia from 1997 to 1999 along with the *National Centre for Training for Trainers and Training Engineering* project. These two projects were seemingly offered with strings attached, specifically, on the condition that Tunisia would support Korea's bid to host the football mega-event. In fact, the overview section of the report on the vocational centre project states that it was motivated by "a promise to support activities tied to our country's bid for the World Cup" (KOICA, 2006c, p. 7). It also notes that during the project's initiation period in May 1996, "the Korean special envoy was sent to Tunisia to win support for Korea's World Cup bid" (KOICA, 2006c, p. 7) shortly before FIFA's decision on May 31. According to one Korean news outlet (People People People, 1996), Kim Young-soo, the Minister of Culture and Sports, visited Tunisia and several other African countries from April 27th to May 10th, 1996, to draw support for Korea's 2002 World Cup bid. The Minister's target in Tunisia was the president of the Tunisian Football Federation, Slim Aloulou, one of FIFA's key decision-makers at the time. Furthermore, the Korean

preliminary team sent to the country to develop the vocational project worked in tandem with the team investigating the feasibility of the *Construction of a Taekwondo Hall* project (KOICA, 2006d). Delegates of this team met with the Tunisian Minister of Youth and Childhood who proclaimed, “Tunisia wishes that the World Cup is a success and supports Korea” (KOICA, 2006d, p. 81). MOFA approved the project of building an elite training facility in January 1997 before Tunisia filed its project submission in April (KOICA, 2006d, p. 29). The timeline suggests that the project was preapproved in consideration for Tunisia’s vote in the FIFA host selection.

The diplomatic significance of Korea’s conditional aid projects in Tunisia hinges on the fact that Korea and Japan were the two frontrunners in the bidding race. This meant that the 2002 FIFA World Cup would be the first held in Asia. Cha (2009) argues that although Korea initially had little interest in hosting the event, its complicated sporting and historical rivalry with Japan meant that allowing its former colonizer to succeed was unthinkable. Although Korea was a latecomer to the bidding race, it saw the World Cup as “a clear opportunity to redress its humiliating past at the hands of Japan and Japanese” (Close & Askew, 2004, p. 250). The significant worldwide attention focused on the mega-event incited ruthless competition between the two nations as they embarked on a spending campaign to win support for the right to host the event that lasted right up until the final election on May 31, 1996, as illustrated above by the KOICA delegates sent to Tunisia to discuss potential aid projects earlier that month.

The Dispatch of Taekwondo Instructors (DTI) Program

KOICA sport’s DTI program dates back to a government project initiated by the Park Chung-hee regime: “This program was started in 1972 with the dispatch of one instructor to a developing country” (KOICA, 1994a, p. 68). Relevant KOICA literature (e.g. KOICA ODA

Institute, 2016) states that Korean ODA was originally motivated by diplomatic objectives during the Cold War, so it was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that supervised the dispatch of Taekwondo instructors during the 1970s. Notably, the diplomatic role played by the Park regime's overseas Taekwondo programs seems to have been maintained and reproduced in the post-Cold War context, especially through the current DTI program run by KOICA sport.

The evidence in the following section proves how the dispatch of Korean Taekwondo instructors can be treated as the strategic stance taken by KOICA sport to adjust to changing diplomatic relations after the Cold War. Furthermore, this theme suggests two critical diplomatic roles played by KOICA sport's DTI program, and further, reveals that a cultural diplomacy approach has been adopted by KOICA sport, likely as a prototype of the form of Korean public diplomacy that has been fully implemented into the Korean foreign policy framework since 2008.

The Cultivation of Chinhan Jeja (Korea-Friendly Pupils)

KOICA began the DTI program with the aim to cultivate *chinhan jeja* [Korea-friendly pupils] in recipient countries:

As a cultural sports cooperation program, to transmit traditional Korean culture to the host country through the sharing of our national sport, Taekwondo; and to contribute to the promotion of friendly, mutual cooperative relations by cultivating many *chinhan jeja* [Korea-friendly pupils] in the host country through the dispatch of a small number of Taekwondo instructors. (KOICA, 1994a, p. 76)

This indicates that the pupils of DTI Taekwondo instructors would make connections between Korea and their own countries, thereby contributing to the betterment of mutual relations. Considering that DTI chiefly intended to train elite Taekwondo athletes at the national level in

recipient countries, the Korea-friendly athletes of recipient countries, called *chinhan jeja*, would help Korean sport exercise power in international sport and sport governing bodies by serving for “the enhancement of the World Taekwondo Federation” (KOICA, 2001, p. 110). Furthermore, DTI instructors served to “drill the presidential bodyguards, the military force, and high-ranked police officers” (KOICA, 1992b, p. 54). By counting bureaucrats and high-ranked officers among its Korea-friendly “critical human assets,” Korea expected to increase its diplomatic leverage for its dealings with the international community.

Next, it is also important to focus on the secondary role played by the *chinhan jeja* of the DTI program in transmitting Korean traditional culture and popularizing Taekwondo, the national sport, overseas. In fact, the DTI program also intended to spread Korean culture, culture-specific etiquette and manners (e.g. respect for coaches), and the *ganghan jeongsinryeok* mentality to recipient countries. In the majority of KOICA documents, the DTI program is referred to as “one of representative culture and sport cooperative programs and international cooperative projects to transfer our traditional culture” (KOICA, 1997, p. 296). In *10 Years of KOICA* (2001), KOICA assesses one of DTI’s representative achievements during its first decade to be “the transfer of our nation’s sport culture” (KOICA, 2001, p. 110). Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the Korean government treated elements of Korean culture as diplomatic tools to disseminate ideological messages and promote its national superiority over North Korea (Kang, 2015). Even after the end of this ideological war, Korea’s use of culture for diplomatic purposes has been continuously maintained (Watson, 2014). Importantly, this form of cultural diplomacy was unilaterally imposed in a top-down fashion and dominated until the diplomatic use of culture became more decentralized at the turn of the century (Kang, 2015). Furthermore, the Korean word *jeja*, which represents the teacher-student relationship in

Confucianism, implies hierarchical and asymmetrical power relations based on deference – and even absolute obedience – to authority in Korean sport. Stoddart (2006), for example, argues that British sport still exerts cultural power to perpetuate British norms, behaviour, and beliefs in its former colonies. Following these perspectives, the cultivation of Korea-friendly pupils in recipient countries, who have undergone Korean culture-specific training and discipline, is a sufficient replication of the typical relationship between athletes and coaches in the Korean context. This top-down, unilateral approach of the Korean state was meant to enhance relations between Korea and recipient countries, thus serving Korea's diplomatic interests.

Contradictions between Discursive Aims and Practical Roles

In annual reports from the early 1990s, it is stated that KOICA's DTI program "plans to establish a new strategic direction that breaks away from characteristics derived from the strategy of diplomatic superiority in North-South relations" (KOICA, 1994a, p. 76). The new DTI program would be different from its 1970s-era predecessor. According to *10 Years of KOICA*,

Taekwondo instructors have been dispatched mostly to Africa and the Middle East, where Korea has weak diplomatic relations. After the end of the Cold War, and in light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the diplomatic need diminished and this change was accompanied by a decreasing number of Taekwondo instructors being dispatched to those places. (KOICA, 2001, p. 104)

The above two statements guaranteed that KOICA's DTI would no longer serve to fulfill the state's foreign policy and diplomatic goals, differing from the DTI program of the 1970s Park regime. However, it seems this discursive change was the result of a policy shift in Korean diplomacy triggered by changes in international relations and politics. Furthermore, this change

was likely a calculated strategy of KOICA sport, based on the manner in which DTI was reinvented to serve new elaborate diplomatic roles for the Korean state, to help it actively cope with changes taking place in international relations and politics.

During this period, South Korea involved itself in global politics through a new foreign policy called *Nordpolitik* (also known as Northern policy), which was derived from a détente in the post-Cold War era West-East relationship (Oberdorfer & Carlin, 2014). Following a series of inter-Korean talks and agreements, diplomatic competition with North Korea was no longer a priority for the South Korean administration (Yi & Hayes, 2015). In fact, South Korea ceased competing with North Korea ideologically after both nations became members of the United Nations in 1991 (Watson, 2014). Furthermore, along with the establishment of KOICA, Korea's signalling of its full involvement in international development cooperation through the establishment of KOICA drove it to enthusiastically comply with the global norms that typically influenced responsible diplomatic actors in the international community (Lumsdaine & Shopf, 2007). In light of these political circumstances, Korea began establishing and normalizing diplomatic relations with socialist and communist countries (Oberdorfer & Carlin, 2014). The *Project for Improving Taekwondo Training Center of Khanh Hoa Police Department* in Vietnam in 1999 highlights these changes in global politics and Korean foreign policy. It states that "the objective and scope of the project" was for "training Taekwondo with all of the police from middle and highland provinces" (KOICA, 2006a, p. 14) and also explains that the "technical effects" of the project would be "raising police's health and technique to protect police security, politics and society" (KOICA, 2006a, p. 15), and "social and environment effects" (KOICA, 2006a, p. 15). Similarly, the KOICA scouting team sent to Vietnam reported that the initiative would "upgrade the training facilities of the *Khanh Hoa Police Department* by constructing the

Taekwondo Training Center” and “provide assistance in the area of police training focusing on Taekwondo” (KOICA, 2006a, p. 20). On the surface, the project definitely centred on sport-related goals. However, it was also clearly designed as a scheme to strengthen “the friendship” between the two nations (KOICA, 2006a, p. 15).

Guided by its *Nordpolitik*, the Korean government attempted in various ways to re-establish relations with Vietnam (Oberdorfer & Carlin, 2014) after a 17-year hiatus beginning in 1975 when the Korean army sided with anti-communist allies and was accused of committing a wartime massacre of over 60 Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam War (Griffiths, 2018; Price, 2019). The KOICA sport aid Taekwondo facility was one of various efforts seeking “the improvement of our national image” (KOICA, 2006a, p. 10) and specifically targeted the Khan Hoa province, where the former “military camp of the Korean army” (KOICA, 2006a, p. 29) had been located and where the execution occurred. Significantly, then-President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) officially expressed regret for the massacre during his visit to Vietnam in 1998, the Korean government’s first official acknowledgement of the incident (Ock, 2017). These historical events and political objectives were included in the project report. Taking into account these unresolved historical and political issues, considerations for the diplomatic normalization of relations between Korea and Vietnam weighed heavily. As a result, the contradictions made explicit in the changed discursive aims of DTI and the maintenance of covert diplomatic functions seem to be a more sophisticated strategy utilized by KOICA sport to hide its actual role as a foreign policy and diplomatic tool of the Korean state. Furthermore, the contradictions found in KOICA sport’s early years are still maintained and function as a dominant strategy of KOICA sport in its latter stage as a new sport diplomacy approach.

The New Roles of KOICA Sport

The two common themes “contributing to social development” and “pursuing Korean public diplomacy” operate to fulfill the strategic goals of KOICA sport in its latter stage from the late 2000s to 2010s, in accordance with the international development agenda and integration of public diplomacy into Korean foreign policy. Ziai (2016) argues that since the late 1990s, new buzzwords like sustainability, human rights, and gender equality have gained popularity and helped frame the critical global issues of the new twenty-first century development agenda. These social issues also seem to emerge in the KOICA sport discourse of the same period. The 9/11 attacks subsequently led to great global change and an increased refocusing of public diplomacy, observed by Melissen (2005) to be “the emergence of the new public diplomacy” (p. 17) in contemporary diplomatic practices of the twenty-first century. Korea also officially implemented public diplomacy as policy in 2010 (Ayhan, 2016, 2017) and has since regarded sport as one of its major policy pillars (Ma et al., 2012). As a consequence, the term public diplomacy has appeared more and more frequently in KOICA documents since 2008.

Contributing to Social Development

KOICA no longer exclusively connects its operations to sport-specific or sport excellence goals. Instead, it professes to address non-sport, global social issues related to twenty-first century development as per the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and post-MDGs (Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs), such as human rights, gender equality, poverty reduction and world peace. However, the shifting stated aims of development in KOICA sport discourses offer a limited vista Foucault (1972) argued that the “more” is what we attempt to reveal through discourse analysis, and that this “more” can be exposed by analyzing interactions between the social development theme and its non-discursive practices in the

twenty-first century. Taking examples from a sport aid project implemented in Indonesia from 2003 to 2005 and the 2013 Special Olympics, we show that the initial development goal of KOICA sport – elite sport development – still regulates its operations.

Contributing to Social Development through the Korea–Indonesia Friendship Sports Center

The Project for Construction of Korea–Indonesia Friendship Sports Center represents one of the more notable recent KOICA sport aid initiatives aimed at enhancing “social development through the improvement of culture and sport facilities” (KOICA, 2006b, p. 5), an obvious contrast with the sport aid projects implemented in Tunisia (1997–1999), which targeted elite athletic performance. At least on the surface of things, the Indonesian sports centre project prioritized social development goals, on the premise that promoting and facilitating greater public participation in sport activities through this new facility would enhance social development in Indonesia. This shift can be plausibly understood as a strategic response to the global popularity of the SFD movement. Currently, sport is institutionally employed as a means of achieving social development as related to the current development agenda (Darnell, 2012; Kidd, 2008, Levermore & Beacom, 2009). Similarly, scholarly interest in this movement has also surged. Classic donor countries in the West like Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States have continuously implemented a great number of sport programs in the Global South, and in Africa in particular. While the current SFD approach has only recently become popular in Korea, the use of sport for international social development in the context of the twenty-first development agenda has gained increasing attention from both governmental and non-governmental institutions beyond KOICA (Ha, Lee, & Ok, 2015). Similarly, this change in the explicit aims of the Indonesian sport aid project originates from KOICA’s desire to abide by the new global development agenda (KOICA, 2011c). Today’s ostensible KOICA sport aid goals

are therefore substantially different than they were in the organization's earlier period, with its exclusive focus on elite sport development. However, contradictions persist. Despite the discursive shift and stated motives related to social development, three of five key objectives listed in the Indonesian sport aid project report were to "improve the techniques and skills of Taekwondo and other sport [sic]," "develop the best Taekwondo athletes and [sic] their techniques level," and "to strengthen national performance of Taekwondo and some other sport" (KOICA, 2006b, p. 14): all relating to elite sport development.

Support for the Special Olympics

Likewise, KOICA's support for the Special Olympics is equally inconsistent. On October 4, 2013, KOICA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Special Olympics Korea, a regional branch of Special Olympics International (Chun, 2013). In the memorandum, KOICA committed to supporting Special Olympics regional branches in the Global South by dispatching volunteers and experts in the sport and music fields (Chun, 2013). Since then, KOICA has continued to provide support to disabled athletes and disability sport development by signing partnership MOUs with the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) in 2014, the Special Olympics International in 2015, and the Korea Paralympic Committee (KPC) in 2018. It also supported athletes from Mongolia, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, El Salvador and Uganda at the 2015 Special Olympics (KOICA, 2015). Furthermore, the number of sport volunteers dispatched to sport-related institutions for the disabled has increased since the early 2010s (KOICA, n.d.). KOICA sport discourses about disability sport and people with disabilities only emerged in the early 2010s. Previously, there were few statements from KOICA regarding disability sports and people with disabilities, and KOICA sport discourses about these areas only began emerging in the early 2010s. KOICA's support of the Special Olympics in recipient countries is another

illustration of its attempt to emulate the global normative values surrounding human rights and disability rights (e.g., right to play) central to the current UN development framework.

Nonetheless, KOICA has not discarded its sport-specific or sport excellence aims. Its support for the Special Olympics and decision to dispatch a greater number of sport volunteers to work on disability sport mainly target institutions involved in developing *elite* disability sport. In practical terms, KOICA predominantly contributes toward achieving athletic excellence at international disability sport competitions.

Incomplete Shifts in KOICA Sport Discourse

Evidently, the shift from elite sport development to sport for social development in KOICA sport discourses is incomplete: statements focused on elite sport development still circulate and for all practical purposes, programs still target the development of sport excellence. Ironically, this incomplete transformation reveals the complicated dynamics of KOICA sport diplomacy. Since the late 1990s, new themes like sustainability, human rights and gender equality have gained in popularity and help frame the critical global issues of the new twenty-first century development agenda (Ziai, 2016). KOICA sport's interest in social development and disability rights follows this trend. Indeed, starting in the early 2000s, Korea aimed to join the list of the world's leading donor group, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Watson, 2014). To achieve this goal, the Korean government adopted international development norms and humanitarian approaches (Howe, 2017). Kim (2016) uncovered a new, dominant strategic stance in Korean foreign aid policy generated in the "ethical leadership discourse" (p. 70) that frames the promotion of Korea's international image as a responsible global leader, abiding by the development norms and principles of the global community. KOICA sport also reproduces the

ethical leadership discourse to fulfill its diplomatic role in “promoting Korea’s international reputation,” evident in the speech the President of Special Olympics Korea during signing of the MOU with KOICA in 2013 (Chun, 2013). Sport-related goals (e.g., athletic excellence and winning-oriented training) have been sidelined or replaced in KOICA sport official pronouncements by internationally-favoured social development aims unrelated to sport.

Pursuing Korean Public Diplomacy

The most notable feature of KOICA sport documents since 2008 is their heavy focus on Taekwondo demonstrations performed abroad by sport volunteers. This is not to say that volunteers no longer serve as coaches in recipient countries, or that performance excellence at international sporting competitions is no longer important. Rather, it underlines how KOICA sport pays special attention to describing the effects of Taekwondo demonstrations overseas in its official and promotional material. This shift seems to result from a new foreign policy direction, the so-called “Korean public diplomacy” concept identified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.), as “one of the three axes governing our diplomatic relations.” Indeed, after public diplomacy was integrated into the foreign policy framework in 2008, the term “public diplomacy” was mentioned more frequently in KOICA documents, especially in KOICA presidential statements.

Taekwondo Demonstrations

Accounts of sport initiatives also underlined KOICA’s role in public diplomacy efforts, such as the following statement recounting a Taekwondo demonstration in Tunisia:

Following, there was a Taekwondo demonstration. The demonstration of pine boards being smashed to pieces appears simple but is actually enormously destructive... As the

audience collectively ducked to avoid the pieces of board flying towards them, they also began falling for Taekwondo's charm. (KOICA, 2011b)

This account hints at the creation of new ties between the recipient country spectators and Korean culture through an impressive sport performance. The phrase "falling for the charm of Taekwondo" suggests that the event functioned to connect the Tunisian general public to Korea through Taekwondo, its distinctive national sport. Multiple actors are considered to play a significant role in today's public diplomacy by promoting Korean cultural products, enhancing positive images and contributing to the eventual enhancement of relations with other countries (Gregory, 2011). Melissen (2005) underlines the involvement of different types of unofficial groups and individuals in twenty-first century public diplomacy practice to cultivate an intimate dialogue with foreign audiences. This approach is closely linked to KOICA sport's emphasis on Taekwondo demonstrations performed by its volunteer coaches who introduce the local general public to Korean-specific behaviours and cultural attitudes, thereby enhancing the relationship between Korea and recipient countries.

A sport volunteer's recollection of his participation in a Taekwondo demonstration is noteworthy in:

With each round of demonstrations, the more clapping and cheering there was. Our movements kept the citizens of the host country in suspense and moved them emotionally. It made me extremely happy; I felt like on the left side of my chest there was a *Taegeukgi* [Korean flag] that grew hot in exuberance. (KOICA, 2011a, p. 79)

This quote presents two critical points. First, the Taekwondo demonstrations strengthened local ties with Korea and Korean culture, which were enthusiastically received. Second, this positive reaction aroused national pride among volunteers, honoured to impart their culture to the local

population, with an emotional charge strong enough to compel this coach to evoke the “*Taegeukgi*” [Korean flag]. One KOICA report noted, “Taekwondo demonstrations by our KOICA volunteers and the interviews they did with the Tunisian public broadcast station ‘Tunisia1’ were aired, and this raised the self-esteem of volunteers ...” (KOICA, 2014, p. 2). Korean volunteers involved in these large-scale, promotional Taekwondo displays were moved by the eager response of local people.

Significantly, volunteers involved in KOICA sport programs, including Taekwondo demonstrations, are generally referred to as “citizen diplomats,” a point illustrated in this statement by former KOICA President Park Dae-won:

KOICA volunteers play a role as citizen diplomats and have not only provided dedicated volunteer service, but also lived alongside the local people to exchange culture and promote friendship ... They are leading contributors to the upgrading of South Korea’s national brand. (KOICA, 2013, p. 27)

The *Public Diplomacy Act* defines public diplomacy in Korea as “diplomacy activities through which the State enhances foreign nationals’ understanding of and confidence in the Republic of Korea” (Statutes of the Republic of Korea, 2016, p. 1). Volunteers performing Taekwondo demonstrations serve as public diplomacy actors targeting the local population to shape public opinion, enhance “the Republic of Korea’s image and prestige in the international community” (Statutes of the Republic of Korea, 2016: 1) and indirectly exert influence on the donor country’s foreign policy-making process (Hocking, 2005). This approach supports the focus of Korean public diplomacy “at home and abroad” (Statutes of the Republic of Korea, 2016, p. 5).

Taekwondo demonstrations are therefore executed efficiently alongside the Korean public

diplomacy strategy encouraging the public in Korea and in recipient countries to share its vision: “fascinating the world with Korea’s charm” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Two Strategies at Home and Abroad

KOICA sport certainly serves a public diplomacy role by influencing the public in Korea and in the Global South. To begin with, Taekwondo demonstrations in recipient countries have featured different Korean cultural practices. KOICA accounts of these events frequently described the diversified cultural program, including “*samulnori* (Korean traditional percussion quartet) performances, *buchaechum* (fan dance), and *hanbok* (traditional clothing) parade” (KOICA, 2011b). Chronicles have also highlighted the traditional Korean attire or modernized versions of the *hanbok* worn by the performers, indicating that the Taekwondo demonstrations were treated as a tool for “the promotion of our culture” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Public diplomacy was introduced into the Korean foreign policy agenda through the Global Korea Agenda (Ayhan, 2016) of the Lee Myung-bak government (2008–2012). Diplomatic policy prioritized the growth of Korea’s international influence (Snyder, 2009), and Lee’s Global Korea initiative regarded ODA as a solution for doing so. His initiative involved promoting traditional Korean culture (Ma et al., 2012) operationalized through the establishment of the Korean Culture and Information Services agency in 2008. Since 2014, the use of Taekwondo as a tool to “share Korean culture” with the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.) has increased under the Sport Public Diplomacy Project. Many KOICA documents declare Taekwondo demonstrations to be effective for sharing Korean culture with recipient nations. While the earlier purpose of KOICA sport—to develop elite athletes and teams for international success cultivating *chinhan jeja* [Korea-friendly pupils]—was also a form of cultural promotion, the

latter strategy more widely and explicitly targets a foreign public through large-scale Taekwondo demonstrations.

Next, KOICA sport narratives are also directed at a domestic public. This strategy promotes the “saviour” rhetoric surrounding KOICA sport volunteers, frequently highlighting stories about sport volunteers assigned to refugee camps. In KOICA sport discourses, sport volunteers were often assigned to refugee camps to encourage and help refugees. One example is the dispatch of KOICA sport volunteers to the *Za’atari* refugee camp since its creation in Jordan in 2012 (KOICA, 2016). The experience of one Taekwondo camp volunteer working with Syrian refugees was highlighted in the KOICA newsletter:

In particular, refugee youth, referred to as the “Lost Generation,” have been in situations where they might have lost not only their country, but also their dreams. However, there is one individual who has attempted to keep their dreams alive through Taekwondo education. (KOICA, 2017)

In such narratives, camp youths are described as desperate, but fortunately, KOICA Taekwondo volunteers, referred to as “saviours,” provide them with hope and encouragement. This rhetoric is also reproduced by the volunteer:

It can be seen as a way of expressing negative energy resulting from war trauma and undereducation. This can be positively solved through Taekwondo *kyorugi* [sparring], and further, by instilling the right competitive spirit in the youth. (KOICA, 2017)

Defining the refugees as traumatized youth with poor anger management skills, he describes Taekwondo as an effective method for healing emotional and psychological wounds and providing a behavioural guideline to lead them down the right path. He added, “I have faced lots of difficulties during the process of creating order from disorder” (KOICA, 2017), highlighting

his efforts to overturn anarchical camp conditions. Furthermore, camp youth achievements are framed as enabled by the KOICA sport volunteer in later KOICA sport discourses through repeated references to “hope,” “hero,” and “light.” This saviour rhetoric is ubiquitous in KOICA social media posts and mainstream Korean media. In this respect, it can be seen that KOICA sport has fulfilled its public diplomacy objectives, causing the Korean public at home to be won over by KOICA sport’s representation of Korea and Korean culture overseas, thus “promoting the people’s participation in public diplomacy” (Statutes of the Republic of Korea, 2016, p. 1).

Concluding Remarks

Through the contradictions exposed by the changes in the discursive aims of KOICA sport and the maintenance of its actual practical functions, this study strongly emphasizes the need for further diachronic research on sport-for-development programs in the international development context. At the turn of the century, KOICA sport began to adopt new global SFD approaches by shifting its aid priority from the assistance of elite sport development to social development in accordance with the development agenda at the time, the UN MDGs. However, as stated above, the early aim of KOICA sport – elite sport development – has been implicitly maintained. That is, KOICA sport has two new objectives: overt international social development and covert elite sport development. Importantly, through the combination of these two elements, the role played by KOICA sport as a diplomatic tool of the Korean state seems to have become more sophisticated. Combining the “unacceptable” goal of elite sport development found in traditional sport diplomacy, with the globally accepted goal of social development seen in new sport diplomacy, KOICA sport programs and activities demonstrate the complex dynamics of Korean sport diplomacy in the twenty-first century.

In the same manner, KOICA sport has focused on overseas Taekwondo demonstrations and humanitarian service at refugee camps since the late 2000s. These activities serve to simultaneously promote Korea's international reputation and also spread Korean culture, Taekwondo especially, which are the same objectives of KOICA sport in its early stage. KOICA sport has thus changed its approach to a more elaborate, humane form of new sport diplomacy that contrasts the overuse of elite sport previously preferred by traditional sport diplomacy. Of note, these changes are fully regulated by Korean public diplomacy. Thus, this mixture of new sport diplomacy and Korean public diplomacy makes the dynamics of KOICA sport diplomacy possible today.

Lastly, this study has also unearthed latent historical records that reveal a clear link between KOICA sport aid and two critical events: Korea's attempt to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the civilian massacre committed by Korean troops during the Vietnam War. Further study involving detailed historical facts and testimony is certainly warranted. Nevertheless, the evidence plainly highlights the conditional nature of the KOICA Tunisia aid projects and the intent of the Vietnam aid project to rehabilitate Korea's image. The massacre of civilians by Korean soldiers during the Vietnam War remains largely unknown to the Korean public. Although the Korean government attempted to normalize diplomatic relations with Vietnam after the end of the Cold War, the matter of an official apology and compensation remains controversial (Choi, 2017). This study opens a new research direction aiming to unearth the political schemes and diplomatic intentions of state-run sport programs in international development.

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Chapter 7 (Article 3): Strategies for the Cultivation of Young Global Leaders and Self-Development in Korean Sport for International Development Initiatives

A revised version of this article was submitted as a book chapter to *Global South Voice on Sport for Development and Peace*.

Introduction

During its development period, South Korea (referred to as Korea hereafter) suffered through two brutal military regimes within the span of three short decades. The first was headed by Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), and the second, by his successor Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988). Both dictators are known for severely suppressing national civil movements for democracy and human rights. Ironically, they are also credited for laying the foundations of Korea's present-day sport and physical education system (Ha & Mangan, 2002). Both Park and Chun seized power through *coups d'état* and used sport to garner public attention, block political resistance and counter skepticism over the legitimacy of their governments (Mangan, Ok, & Park, 2011). The junction between Korean sport and politics was consolidated during this period of Korean history in the ways that both regimes strategically employed sport to manage domestic policy and political matters—a practice that continues to this day.

As far back as the Park Chung-hee regime, all aspects of sport and physical activity shifted their focus to the education field (Ha & Mangan, 2002). The Park regime forged a connection between education and national pride using military techniques and the aggressive propagation of nationalism, framing sport as part of a national rejuvenation process. This was especially significant given that Korea was still dealing with the aftermath of the historical humiliation and social, political and economic destruction caused by Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953) (Hong, 2011; Mangan, Kwon, & Park, 2013; Tosa, 2015). The development of sport was also intended as an educational investment in the Korean restoration (Hong, 2011). Sport was transformed into an ideological model for fostering a healthy Korean public capable of contributing to the nation's modernization (Collins, 2011). Such a mechanism clearly operated according to Park's military system and authoritarian

dictatorship. In fact, it continues to affect sport in Korea today (Tosa, 2015). Between the regime's use of sport for its own dictatorial schemes and the sociohistorical conditions of the time, sport effectively functioned to render the Korean people governable for the purposes of national revival, strength and progress (Lee, 2015).

Subsequently, the Korean state's drive to host the 1988 Olympics helped solidify the political power of Chun Doo-hwan and his authoritarian ruling party (Black & Peacock, 2011). During the Chun regime's fierce crackdown on the civil movement for democracy and political liberation, the high-profile Seoul Olympics provided the perfect opportunity to showcase Korea's transformation from one of the world's poorest countries into a modern, developed nation (Collins, 2011). To the state's delight, Chun and the political elites of his Democratic Justice Party received only praise for winning their 1981 bid to host the Games. Despite the June 29 Declaration of 1987, which officially set Korea on a path to democracy and the end of authoritarian rule, the President elected in the following months was Chun's hand-picked successor, Roh Tae Woo. Unsurprisingly, the regime survived. Since the 1988 Seoul Olympics, a pattern of hosting global sporting events to consolidate Korean domestic political power clearly emerged in the way that government officials and politicians continue to fixate on hosting prestigious sporting events in their local districts (Lee, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Yoon & Wilson, 2019). For example, the former Governor of Gangwon Province (where PyeongChang is situated), Kim Jin-sun, played a significant role in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 bids to host the Winter Olympics in his province (Mackay, 2011). He went so far as to place the bid campaign at the top of his provincial policy agenda and even led the Winter Olympic Bidding Committee as its President (Mackay, 2011; Merkel & Kim, 2011). Serving three consecutive terms from 1998

to 2010, and eventually reaching his term limit, he prioritized the hosting of the Winter Games in PyeongChang during his entire time as governor (Kim & Yi, 2011).

Any concerns over democracy or human rights were dismissed in the name of protecting Korea's international prestige, in line with the classic slogan, "sport has nothing to do with politics" (Lee, 2015). Indeed, such a depoliticization of sport persists in Korean practice. State-run sport programs implemented under Korean official development assistance (ODA) can be viewed as a typical, but unexplored practice of harnessing sport to advance the state's political aspirations. Korea established the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in April 1991 as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)-affiliated government agency empowered to carry out ODA projects and technical cooperation programs. Even prior to its official establishment, KOICA sent 44 "Korea Youth Volunteers" (now called KOICA Volunteers) on a founding mission to share Korea's development experience and contribute to the social, cultural and economic development of recipient countries (KOICA, 2001). Eight members of the initial volunteer group oversaw sport programs. Since then, KOICA sport volunteers have participated in a variety of sport and physical activity programs in the Global South. As suggested by the name "Korea Youth Volunteers," most KOICA sport volunteers are university students or graduates of sport-related programs. Specifically, most KOICA sport volunteers possess the coaching or training credentials required to teach local and national athletes in recipient countries.

This study aims to examine how KOICA sport volunteers have been strategically guided by the domestic policies and political schemes of the Korean state, particularly from 1990 to 2017. Korean sport was first fused with Korean ODA in 1972, when the Park Chung-hee regime dispatched Korean Taekwondo instructors to communist and non-aligned nations during the

Cold War. Thus, examining KOICA sport volunteers as a representation of the continuous history of Korea's use of sport for international development work is inevitable for this study's needs. I start with the methodological approach based on Foucault's discourse analysis, formation of strategies, subjectivation and governmentality. Next, I present two strategies emerging in Korean sport for international development discourse—the cultivation of young global leaders and self-development—along with their sociohistorical and political contexts. I also show how these discursive strategies frame the ways in which KOICA sport volunteers interact with domestic policy objectives. I then discuss the linkage between KOICA sport volunteers and domestic neoliberal Korean state policies, tracing them back to the governing technologies inherent in the authoritarian strategies of the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes.

Methodological Approach

In his archeological approach to discourse analysis, Foucault (1972, p. 49) explains that discourse constitutes “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.” These practices, contingent upon sociocultural, political and historical contexts (Garrity, 2010), also produce subject positions. In other words, discourse dictates who can be allowed to speak and behave in a particular practice (Ziai, 2016). Understanding discourse as practice is also linked to the extent to which concepts or knowledge are accepted. Hence, the archeological approach explores discursive practices that produce recognizable subjects and objects along with concepts (forms of validating knowledge). It uncovers the formation of strategies that generate specific objects, subjects and concepts (Foucault, 1972; Willig, 2008). This analysis of the Korean international sport development discourse pursues three research goals related to identifying the formation of strategies that govern the emergence of the concept of “volunteering”: 1) to

examine how KOICA sport volunteers perceive and learn from their activities in recipient countries as an opportunity for self-development, 2) to understand how volunteers' perceptions of KOICA sport as beneficial to self-development are linked to a method for embracing and conforming to certain subject positions and 3) to present a theoretical rationale for how subjects are constituted and regulated through a combination of the dominant policy discourses and various strategies of the Korean state, tracing back to the Chun and Park authoritarian regimes. To achieve these goals, I draw on Foucault's formation of strategies described in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), along with the subjectivation and governmentality concepts of his later work.

Formation of Strategies: Discursive and Non-Discursive Practices

Foucault (1972) explains that the organization and grouping of objects, subjects and concepts in a given discourse is contingent upon theoretical and thematic choices that he calls "strategies" (p. 64). This implies that the appearance of objects, subjects and concepts is strategically determined and that such tactical choices depend heavily on context (Garrity, 2010). The rules of formation of strategies allow the same themes to occur in different discourses, while different themes can also structure specific groupings in the same discourse (Garrity, 2010). These thematic choices depend on the function, embodied in the rules of formation of strategies, that the "discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practices" (Foucault, 1972, p. 68). Thematic choices are thus regulated by the relationship between the discourse and non-discursive domains defined as "institutions, political events, economic practices and processes" (Foucault, 1972, p. 162). In other words, thematic choices are revealed through the "apparatus" of discourse (Foucault, 1980), referred to as a "strategic function" (p. 195), or strategic reaction, to a given sociohistorical context in which discourses interact with social

practices (Garrity, 2010). Ziai (2016) contends that popular themes such as poverty reduction, gender equality and empowerment in development discourse derive from the interaction between twenty-first century development goals and the advancement of global social issues. Similarly, one can examine the discourse of international sport-for-development (SFD) by focusing on how particular themes in SFD policy are strategically determined by SFD discourses and institutional authorities. Examples include a donor nation's foreign policy goals (e.g., Hasselgård, 2015), the political schemes of multilateral development institutions like the United Nations (e.g., Hayhurst, 2009), and the discursive construction of racial hierarchy in SFD (e.g. Darnell, 2007, 2011).

Subjectivation: Governed Subjects

Foucault's later work focuses on the processes of subjectivation, the "multiple ways in which humans get tied to particular identities" (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 8). This understanding of subjectivation is based on Foucault's critical notion of power. For Foucault (1978), power is neither repressive nor possessed by powerful individuals and institutions. This quality of power produces reality and truth (Foucault, 1978) insofar as relations of power determine which discourses are valued as true (Foucault, 1980). According to the Foucauldian conception, subjectivation occurs when an individual is attached to a particular identity within a relation of power that "subjugates and makes subject to" (Foucault, 1982, p. 212). This encapsulates Foucault's (1982) two meanings of subject, i.e., "subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (p. 212). In this respect, subjectivation occurs in two ways: when the actions of individuals are governed by relations of power that represent individuals both as objects and subjects, and when individuals are bound to specific identities (Markula & Pringle, 2006). This type of subjectivation seems different from other forms of subjectivation in Foucault's (1988) technologies of the self, in

which individuals transform themselves and the identities they choose. As such, Markula and Pringle (2006) refer to the earlier version of subjectivation as a process of “governed subjects” (p. 138).

Markula and Pringle (2006) apply subjectivation to an examination of how individual athletes transform their identities to align with preferred subjects of sporting practice. Shogan (1999) proposes the term “confessional technology” (p. 41), an allusion to the method of conforming to normative identities through the ways in which athletes understand and think about experiences of their performances. Foucault (1978) argues that this technology operates through an authority that asks for a confession, offers prescriptions or intervenes to judge, thereby producing an “intrinsic modification in the person who articulates [the confession]” (p. 62). Shogan (1999) draws on the confessional technology as a way of making subjects governable to understand how athletes are produced as subjects within the power relations of high-performance sports and how they acquire specific identities. Similarly, Darnell (2011) analyzes how sport volunteers from the Global North volunteering in the Global South are produced by discursive practices of hierarchy in SFD, and how, as SFD interns, they confront and reconcile their Northern privilege and limited expertise in SFD. Likewise, Ziai (2016) illustrates how identities are constituted by discourses that give subjects certain knowledge and ways of conceptualizing, speaking and constructing reality that are contingent upon sociopolitical and historical contexts. Seen this way, it can be shown that Korean athletes have embraced the role of obedient subject, accepting the absolute authority of their coaches in the dominant discourse of Korean sport culture (e.g. Nam, Kim, Marshall, Sung, & Mao, 2018; Park, Lim, & Bretherton, 2012). Subjectivation can be useful for understanding why Korean youth go abroad, especially as international volunteers, and additionally, how they can simultaneously be

considered both ordinary citizens and neoliberal subjects under strategies of the neoliberal Korean government (e.g. Kim, 2018; Park, 2010; Yoon, 2014, 2015). Following this, one can apply subjectivation to an examination of how KOICA sport volunteers understand their activities and experiences as a form of self-development, and explore how this subjectivity of self-development is configured and regulated through preferred subject positions produced through Korean state discourses aligned with domestic policy and political objectives.

Governmentality of the Korean State

Burchell (1991) explains that the concept of governmentality put forth by Foucault (1991) is “a political technology for governing the lives of individuals” (p. 142) through which they freely embrace the valued subject positions (in terms of actions and performances) that fit the varied requirements of a given society. He further argues that governmentality is characterized as the art of acting on “the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, correct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves” (Burchell, 1996, p. 19). Through governmentality, Foucault (1991) examines how the operation of power is more broadly associated with national governments, focusing on the combination of dominant discourses, different government technologies and practices of subjectivation (Gordon, 1991). Using this perspective, Sonn and Gimm (2013) drew on governmentality to understand how hegemonic discourses circulating among the Korean public are produced and disseminated by various technologies of the developmental state, represented by the state-led “*Saemaul Undong*” national development projects of Park Chung-hee’s 1970s-era authoritarian regime. Sonn and Gimm (2013) analyzed the combination of these technologies along with “*Saemaul spirit*,” the idea representing the mental revolution of the Park regime, to uncover how they produced a subordinate working-class subjectivity. Jeong (2017) further notes

that the governing technologies of Park's authoritarian regime, including the mobilization and voluntary participation of the public in national development projects, transformed the Korean public into cohesive subjects, and homogenized individual desires to suit the regime's collective goals. Koreans later voluntarily matched their individual goals with the politicized domestic goals of the Chun regime, resulting in the successful 1988 Seoul Olympics (Cho & Bairner, 2012). Many scholars (Ha & Mangan, 2002; Black & Peacock, 2011; Collins, 2011; Lee, 2015) have shown that this homogenization process was imbued with nationalistic discourses and plainly demonstrated a shared desire to rebrand a new, modern Korea on the international stage.

Foucault's governmentality closely relies on political and economic processes associated with liberalism (Burchell, 1996). Rose (1996) argues that in an "advanced liberal" society (also known as a neoliberal society), various state technologies operate in a coordinated manner to create new subject positions, enabling individuals to "'enterprise themselves', to maximize their quality of life through acts of choice, according their life a meaning and value" (p. 57).

Individuals themselves are encouraged to fulfill collective goals established by the state as responsible subjects defined by their "freedom, liberty, and autonomy" (Rose, 1996, p. 57).

Burchell (1996) also claims that the liberal government principle allows individuals to "freely conduct themselves in a certain rational way" (p. 24). While the conduct of individuals is guided by the freedom they possess, this freedom is a coordinated choice by individuals marching in step with institutional policy initiatives and technologies of the neoliberal state (Mitchell, 2006). Individual choice is seldom self-determined, even though individuals embrace neoliberal beliefs and subject positions through the autonomous choices available to responsible citizens. For instance, Mitchell (2006) shows how young immigrants integrate into European society by following neoliberal labour policy and its relevant civic programs, which transform young

immigrants into active participants—and subjects—in the transnational global market. Kim (2018) also analyzes how the policy objectives of the Korean neoliberal state work to cultivate the subjectivity of Korean youths in conformity with neoliberal values, which are reflected by the themes of self-development and profitability. Kim (2018) underlines that the singularity of neoliberal governmentality in the Korean context, which is more centered on the indispensable role of the state, is distinct from European neoliberal governmentality, which is characterized by market-driven regulation and the state's retreat. In other words, despite the worldwide trend of policy systems mixing with neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Larner, 2000), the politics of neoliberal governing technologies work differently depending on the given context. In fact, it can be observed that the manifestation of neoliberal governmentality in the European context is more likely to be directed from the bottom-up and dominated by civil society, while also emphasizing individualism, equality, and liberal subjectivity (Haughton, Allmendinger, & Oosterlynck, 2013; Mitchell, 2006; Stoney, 2004). Contrastingly, Korean neoliberal governing technologies are top-down, state-driven, and prioritize collective values and the group identity (Jeong, 2017; Kim, 2018; Yoon, 2015). Following this understanding of neoliberal governmentality, one can understand Korean overseas volunteers motivated by the pursuit of self-development as subjects produced by a combination of the Korean state's various neoliberal policy discourses and discursive technologies.

Study Design

I analyzed various KOICA documents pertaining to sport volunteers from 1991 to 2017, including KOICA Annual Reports from 1992 to 2017, two anniversary books (*10 Years of KOICA* (2001) and *20 Years of KOICA* (2011d)), four casebooks (KOICA, 1992b, 2005, 2006 and 2008) containing stories and essays on the experience of KOICA sport volunteers, and the

KOICA Newsletter from 1994 to 2017. Other documentary sources included one post from a KOICA-run official blog and four newspaper articles featuring interviews with KOICA sport volunteers. In addition, the *100 Policy Tasks* of the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013) was selected as a key government policy document used to analyze the link between KOICA sport volunteer statements and the Korean government's neoliberal policy goals. Statistical data on the number of KOICA volunteers who served abroad from 1990 to 2013 were also collected to uncover the link between KOICA sport discursive practices and the neoliberal transformation of the Korean government. Primary and secondary documentary sources were essential in understanding how KOICA sport volunteers perceived their activities and experiences in recipient countries, how they were represented and how these representations and the sport volunteers' activities were regulated by relations between discursive and non-discursive practices.

My data analysis was fully guided by Foucauldian discourse analysis, as discussed in the methodological approach section. Following Foucault's (1972, 1980) formation of strategies, my preliminary analysis examined how thematic choices are determined by the apparatus of KOICA sport discourse, functioning as strategic actions in the specific sociopolitical and historical Korean and global context. In this study, the apparatus (*dispositif*) is identified by the relations between the KOICA sport discourse, Korean neoliberal state policy objectives and governing technologies and the subjectivities that sport volunteers are expected to enact. The analysis uncovered two frequently recurring themes that regulate the subject position of the KOICA sport volunteer: "the cultivation of young global leaders" and "self-development." The following sections address how these two themes emerged strategically in reaction to Korean domestic policy and politics.

The Cultivation of Young Global Leaders

In the twenty-first century, the use of sport as a tool for international development has been considered an effective way to help young people develop leadership skills and adopt a global mindset (Levermore & Beacom, 2009). Sport volunteering teaches youth to endure and overcome challenges during their time abroad, which in turn helps shape them into young leaders better able to integrate into current global society (Fletcher & Cullinane, 2017). Fletcher and Cullinane (2017) write that the United Kingdom's (UK) International Development through Excellence and Leadership (IDEALS) programs aim to develop the leadership skills of UK youths and enhance their global awareness. Additionally, young volunteers gain professional development opportunities through their IDEALS overseas work (Reid & Tattersall, 2017). Importantly, international volunteer programs operating in partnership with government agencies are often linked to national state policy (Benson & Wise, 2017). The Canadian Sports Leadership Corps is one example. Its federally sponsored SFD volunteering internship programs aim to cultivate global awareness in Canadian youth and foster a strong sense of global citizenship. The organization is directed by the government's policy goal of increasing youth employment (Darnell, 2011). Regardless of whether the organization is governmental or non-governmental, SFD programs depend heavily on government agencies that also act as key players (Giulianotti, 2011). State-driven programs enhance the employability of youth seeking work in their fields (Coalter, 2010; Fletcher & Cullinane, 2017; Giulianotti, 2011; Kaufman, Rosenbauer & Moore, 2013; Levermore, 2010). Similarly, various overseas development programs that Korean government agencies run or sponsor aim to solve the domestic issue of high youth unemployment (Doucette, 2010; Kim, 2018; Yoon, 2015; Watson, 2011).

The cultivation of young global leaders is a common theme in volunteer statements, strategically juxtaposed with Korean domestic policy and political objectives related to employment and globalization. KOICA volunteer programs are designed, as noted in KOICA's 2009 to 2013 annual reports, to "develop global youth leaders" (KOICA, 2010, p. 134), "raise young global leaders" (KOICA, 2011c, p. 126), "cultivate young global leaders" (KOICA, 2012, p. 122) and to develop "young global leaders" (KOICA, 2013, p. 104) and "domestic youth leaders" (KOICA, 2014a, p. 117). While this theme reproduces the Canadian, UK and larger Global North framing of the youth volunteers described above, in the Korean context, their impetus was Lee Myung-bak's (2008–2013) Young Global Leader Training policy, stated in his presidential pledge to increase domestic youth employment (Yoon, 2015) and included in his administration's 100 Policy Tasks (The Office of the President, 2011). Indeed, the content of recruitment and newspaper articles about KOICA sport volunteers shows that, during Lee's presidency, KOICA sport volunteer programs centred on cultivating young global leaders (e.g., KOICA, 2010; Hwang, 2010).

The Young Global Leader policy was immediately enforced after the Lee administration's inauguration in 2008 to tackle youth unemployment. Approximately 100,000 Korean youth were dispatched overseas, including 20,000 volunteers between 2009 and 2013 alone (Kim, 2018). Following Lee's Global Young Leader Training policy, KOICA volunteer programs aimed:

(...) to cultivate Korean volunteers into global citizens with regional expertise. In 2013, in order to conduct programs that correspond to government policy, KOICA focused its efforts on implementing various policy-related programs, including the 'global youth leader training policy' and the creation of jobs for financial aid. (KOICA, 2014a, p. 116)

This statement about the KOICA Volunteers program clearly establishes the relation between the aim of the KOICA Volunteers (to cultivate young global leaders) and of Lee's Young Global Leader Training policy (youth employment). The premise was that KOICA Volunteers could nurture each Korean youth to become a "global citizen" and thereby increase their employability. As a government agency, KOICA's responsibility was to implement government policy (and the Young Global Leader Training policy specifically) and to "more effectively carry out the government's overseas voluntary programs" (KOICA, 2010, p. 138). Watson (2011) argues that Lee's presidency tightly bound Korea's development aid policy and his global policy goals to increasing the Korean public's awareness of global issues. Lee and Lee (2016) also claim that development aid functioned as a means of enhancing Korea's global leadership role, operating under the Lee government's slogan of "Global Korea." Yoon (2015) further contends that Korean youth were compelled to embrace an identity as "globally minded youth" (p. 76) through Lee's Young Global Leader Training initiative, which eventually led to increased domestic youth employment. Conceivably, the theme of cultivating young global leaders, expressed in discourses about KOICA (sport) volunteers, was guided by strategic reactions to Lee's Young Global Leader Training policy.

This strategy persists throughout the entirety of KOICA's history, interacting with the domestic policy and political objectives of the Korean state. The following section examines these relations, with particular focus placed on the analysis of the post-1988 Olympic period, Korea's globalization policy, and the neoliberal schemes of the Lee Myung-bak government.

Sport-Oriented Context: The Post-1998 Seoul Olympic Games Period

The country's remarkable economic growth has enabled her to become a 'donor country' in terms of international cooperation. Surpluses in balance of payments from 1986 to

1989, plus the great success of the '88 Seoul Olympic Games, enhanced Korea's international status. (KOICA, 1993, p. 16)

Delving into the foundational background of KOICA, this extract clearly indicates the connection between the hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games in Korea and KOICA's establishment. In fact, the success of the Seoul Olympics allowed Korea's elevated status on the international stage, as one of the select few, predominantly Western European countries, to have hosted the most popular sporting event in the world, the Summer Olympic Games, which have been over (Collins, 2011). This historical achievement encouraged Korea to become fully involved in the global community as a responsible global citizen (Park et al., 2016). Prior to the Seoul Olympics, the world's perception of Korea had been that of a developing country struggling to recover from the devastation of war. The hosting of the Olympics was a kind of coming-out party that attracted attention to Korea's entrance onto the global stage (Collins, 2011). It is noteworthy that Mangan et al. (2011) refer to the hosting of the Olympic Games in Asia as "the modern world of Asian Resurgence" (p. 2340), as well as "the barometer of global modern wealth, success and status" (p. 2340). This signifies that the hosting of the Seoul Olympics in 1988 was an indicator of sorts for Korea's entry into global modern wealth. Indeed, it was a monumental event representing Korea's successful transformation and dismantlement of the lingering vestiges of Japanese colonial rule, the Korean War, and subsequent military dictatorships. Many sport scholars, including Cho and Bairner (2012), argue that the hosting of the Seoul Olympics was an opportunity for the Korean people to perceive themselves as global citizens through a global dialogue with other people in the world – a dialogue that the Korean people had never experienced or been a part of before. Thus, the Seoul Olympics can be understood as a critical impetus that encouraged Korea to actively take part in global

development as “a responsible member of the global village” (KOICA, 1993, p. 8), as stated in a KOICA annual report. The annual report clearly states that KOICA volunteers aimed to “encourage Korean youths to develop future-oriented [sic] vision and sense of international cooperation” (KOICA, 1993, p. 40). This idea is also evident in the following excerpt from a sport volunteer’s personal reflections:

I see Korean figure and spirit, which is spreading around the world through volunteerism, and I’m proud of the Korean youth who are challenging the 21st century. In terms of international cooperation, I think language is the most important thing. So, I’m devoting most of my off time to language study. (KOICA, 1992a, p. 139)

KOICA volunteering is seen by the volunteer as an avenue allowing him to become a global youth ready for the changes of the incoming new century. The volunteer even shares his foreign language study goals, showing his acquiescence to KOICA’s intentions to cultivate a globally minded generation of Korean youth.

Non–Sport-Oriented Context: Korea’s *Segyehwa* Policy and Neoliberal Prelude

The early 1990s were a turning point for globalization policy in Korea, particularly with the inauguration of the Kim Young-sam administration (1993–1998), the first civilian government to take office after decades of authoritarian rule in Korea, and the introduction of his *Segyehwa* [globalization] policy in 1994. Samuel Kim (2000) argues that all-out globalization actions did not gain significant attention until the announcement of *Segyehwa* and under Kim’s government, this policy became the highest priority for all government agencies. Kim (2010) writes that during this time, “a ‘globalization fever’ has swept the country: no other buzzword has been more commonly used” (para. 2).

We should therefore closely examine the direction of KOICA Volunteers policy during this period, finding evidence in the 1996 KOICA Annual Report: “On the frontlines of *Segyehwa*, volunteers not only contribute to improving the quality of life based on the spirit of sharing and respect, but also are required to grow into regional experts equipped with a global mindset” (KOICA, 1997, p. 249). This suggests two points: 1) KOICA volunteer programs were regarded as a way to cultivate Korean youth’s global mindset, and 2) KOICA volunteering and its cultivation of a global mindset in youth were tied to the Kim administration’s globalization policy, as *Segyehwa* is mentioned. In fact, the term *Segyehwa* frequently appears in the KOICA Annual Reports of 1994, 1995, and 1996, all years falling under the period of *Segyehwa* policy. It is also included in KOICA’s Presidential greetings: “KOICA has conducted full-fledged international development projects and gradually expanded its business areas in line with the government’s *Segyehwa* policy” (KOICA, 1997, foreword). During the *Segyehwa* period, KOICA added so-called *Segyehwa* subjects into volunteer training sessions, naming them “*Segyehwa* and [Korean] Youth’s Role towards the 21st Century,” “Challenges and Responses for the *Segyehwa* Era” (KOICA, 1996, p. 68), “Practical ways for *Segyehwa* and Korea’s international cooperation,” and “*Segyehwa* and Women’s Roles” (KOICA, 1997, p. 254). Furthermore, during Kim’s administration, Korean sport was driven by this *Segyehwa* policy discourse, evident in President Kim’s official statements, which frequently mentioned the compound word “Taekwondo *Segyehwa*” (Acceleration of Taekwondo’s *Segyehwa*, 1994). This indicates that Korean Taekwondo was encouraged to spread beyond Korea, in accordance with the course of Kim’s *Segyehwa* policy. Indeed, evidence can be found in one KOICA Taekwondo instructor’s personal reflections, which mentions “for the nation’s *Segyehwa*” (KOICA, 1995, p. 33). Kang (2015) argues that Kim’s *Segyehwa* policy thoroughly formed the Korean response to

the growing interdependence of the globalizing world. For Kim's government, catching up to the globalization movement through *Segyehwa* policy and its consequent initiatives and programs was necessary in order for Korea to gain a competitive edge and create a new global identity (Kang, 2015). Through the transition from decades of military dictatorship to the first truly civilian government, Kim's administration strategically used globalization to reformulate the relations between Korea and the world and to show off Korea as a newly democratic, industrialized member of the global community (Kim & Gray, 2016). Yoon (2015) adds that with a range of globalization initiatives prompted by Kim's administration, the image of a globally competitive Korean public was increasingly promoted across the country. In this respect, it can be argued that KOICA sport volunteers, being involved in state-run overseas programs, would presumably follow the intended direction of Kim's *Segyehwa* policy.

Lee was elected President in December 2007 through the people's desire to elect a leader capable of solving ongoing economic issues caused by the global financial crisis (Watson, 2011). Indeed, voters demonstrated strong support for Lee Myung-bak's employment policy in the face of prolonged Korean economic stagnation and wide-scale unemployment (Kim, 2018). With strong public support, Lee initiated his term in government by fully advancing the neoliberal techniques outlined in his presidential campaign (Yoon, 2015). His administration saw youth unemployment as a matter of individual inability to compete on the job market (Watson, 2012). In other words, Lee's government viewed young Koreans as objects that needed to be transformed into more competitive, employable and profitable neoliberal subjects (Kim, 2018). This meant that cultivating young global leaders (as encouraged by the Young Global Leader Training policy) was the best way to convert Korean youth into the sought-after neoliberal subjects (Kim, 2018).

State-run volunteering programs that would send young people overseas, like KOICA sport volunteers, became a tool for Lee's neoliberal scheme to solve the problem of youth unemployment. "World Friends Korea" established in 2009 illustrates this relationship between KOICA, volunteer subjectivities and Korean politics. Lee's government combined seven different state-run overseas volunteer programs, including KOICA Volunteers, to create WFK (also known as World Friends KOICA Volunteers, or WFK-KOV). The establishment of WFK followed Lee's neoliberal policy approach to cultivating young Korean global leaders (Watson, 2012). As stated in the annual report, "KOICA created a roadmap for the training of development cooperation leaders through WFK, as part of the 'global youth leader training policy' of the Korean government" (KOICA, 2014a, p. 116). By creating WFK as a solution to domestic youth unemployment (Kim & Gary, 2016), KOICA international volunteering was intended to meet the "goal of sending out a total 5,000 volunteers between 2009 and 2013" (KOICA, 2012, p. 122). In fact, the number of KOICA volunteers sent outside the country amounted to 5,294 from 1990 to 2008, compared to 4,086 from 2009 to 2013 (KOICA, 2014b). Evidently, the number of volunteers posted to the Global South in the 5 years between 2009 and 2013 approximated the total for the previous 19 years. The number of KOICA sport volunteers sent abroad (142 in the same five-year period) was higher than the number sent from 1990 to 2008 (110).

Self-Development

The young Koreans who went overseas as KOICA sport volunteers reproduced the neoliberal subjectivity favoured by the Lee administration by approaching their time abroad as a means to enhance their skills and abilities and thereby facilitate their entry into the workforce. They described their experiences overseas as opportunities for "learning a foreign language,"

“exposure to different cultures and historical backgrounds,” “building up overseas experience,” “improvement of teaching and coaching skills in my sports field,” “volunteering abroad instead of completing military service,” “personal reflection,” “realizing the meaning of life,” and “personal growth,” indicating that these young people regarded their activities and time in recipient countries as invaluable for self-development. Altruistic motives also played a role; many studies claim that international volunteering is primarily motivated by a pure desire to help others (Devereux, 2008; Gordin & Broivskaia, 2017; Lough, 2013; Smith, Cohen, & Pickett, 2014; Wise, 2017). Interestingly, international volunteering based on altruistic compassion generally transforms into a means of personal development (Clarke & Salisbury, 2017; Lough, 2013), a shift supported by current international volunteering discourses in the neoliberal context (Benson & Wise, 2017; Darnell, 2011; Forde, 2014; Lough & Allum, 2013; Lucas & Jeanes, 2019).

Subjectivation in KOICA Sport Volunteers

Over time, the altruistic compassion initially motivating KOICA sport volunteers transforms into the more individualistic goals of self-development upon interacting with different, specific subject positions. Drawing on (neoliberal) governmentality, I will illustrate how KOICA sport volunteers take on neoliberal subjectivity favored by the Korean state as responsible global citizens, output-oriented volunteers, sports experts and Korean national identity (cultural ambassadors).

Responsible Global Citizens

First, KOICA sport volunteers tend to be motivated by altruism. These motives are evident in the following excerpt from a Taekwondo volunteer’s reflections on his service in

Indonesia. In the essay book, *Nanuneun sarang, Deokeun haengbok* [Sharing Love, Greater Happiness], he writes:

It's said that volunteering is *Nanumgwa soemgim*, and that it's like being the giving tree.

I think that volunteering is having a loving heart. If I have a loving heart, I am willing to offer my wealth, along with my time and effort. The experience may be dirty, painful, difficult, or dangerous, but I'm willing because I love it. (KOICA, 2006, p. 114)

The key word here is “*Nanum*,” or “sharing.” The young volunteer expresses his willingness to share not only his tangible and intangible assets, but also to endure the suffering to be expected in a foreign country where conditions are less than favourable. The notion of sharing appears often in the volunteer's essay, which also mentions his intention to “...teach Taekwondo as I've always done, and I'm going to share what I can share. At the same time, I'm frustrated that I'm not able to share more” (KOICA, 2006, p. 115). Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik, in *20 Years of KOICA*, emphasized the value of sharing as a way that “leads Korea to become ‘a responsible member of the international community’ as well as an ‘advanced donor country’” (KOICA, 2011d). This also fits with Korea's identity as a donor nation and “respected global citizen, a promoter of the global common good” (Kim, 2016, p. 82). Watson (2012) argues that by providing foreign aid to developing countries, ODA is helping to reformulate Korea's international image and identity. Like the recurrent rhetoric of “paying back the global community for assistance it previously received” (KOICA, 2011d, p. 312), in Korean ODA discourse, KOICA documents describe the act of voluntarily engaging in international development work as the duty of Korea and of the Korean people as former aid recipients, and as behaviour conforming to current humanitarian internationalism. In this respect, the altruistic

approach to KOICA sport volunteering is guided by the subject position of respected global citizens operating in a spirit of sharing.

Output-Oriented Volunteers

Volunteering is also performed by individuals seeking personal gain, such as a sense of self-worth, achievement or professional benefits, like career development or status by association (Clarke & Salisbury, 2017; Georgeou, & Engel, 2011; Ogle & Lamb, 2017; Schech, Mundkur, Skelton, & Kothari, 2015; Smith, Cohen, & Pickett, 2014; Treuren, 2014). This approach extends to Csordás's (2011) concept of output-oriented volunteering, as discussed in the Chapter 5, where individuals focus on "what they can get; the benefits they might receive, the new line in their CV" (p. 6). According to Csordás (2011), output-oriented volunteers tend to seek new and necessary experiences, pursue professional development and raise awareness of the benefits of their volunteering practice. Compared to traditional volunteerism, she refers to this as a new type of volunteerism (Csordás, 2011, p. 6). Such an approach to volunteering surfaces in the process typically experienced by KOICA sport volunteers in recipient countries. The process follows three sequential steps: 1) KOICA sport volunteers identify and emphasize the difficulties they face in recipient countries, 2) these difficulties are overcome and 3) the resulting experiences are perceived as personal gains, giving volunteers a sense of self-worth and achievement. In most documents, the experiences of KOICA sport volunteers in recipient countries are commonly characterized as "*yeolakhan hwangyeong*" [poor conditions], in reference to the virtual absence of the basic sports equipment or curricula needed to train and develop elite athletes. Volunteers explain that they were responsible not only for teaching athletes but also for obtaining equipment, organizing programs, planning curricula, managing participants and even lobbying local government officials and politicians to ensure that the program would run from beginning

to end. Notably, KOICA sport volunteers considered these processes and experiences an invaluable component of their personal and professional development. One volunteer wrote, “even though we are all dispatched as ‘volunteers’ to developing countries, I think the things I felt, learnt, and experienced over the course of 2 years far outweighed the help I gave out” (KOICA, 2011a, p. 70). Gordin and Borovskaia (2017) argue that volunteers are initially motivated by altruistic factors, but later become driven by personal and professional development in their own specialities. Importantly, these personal and professional gains are particularly alluring when they are identifiable and tangible (Ogle & Lamb, 2017). Likewise, the perception of KOICA sport volunteering as an effective path to self-development tended to grow stronger when the athletes in recipient countries trained by KOICA sport volunteers achieved excellence at top-tier international sporting events. This was discursively constructed as proof that KOICA sport volunteers were able to overcome difficulties and achieve significant outcomes from their service abroad, ultimately recognized as personal gains and professional development in their specialty sport.

Sport Experts.

How KOICA sport volunteers position themselves as the sport expert subject, rather than the unenlightened objects (participants) who comprise the target of their work/contribution in the Global South, is also crucial. The following quote from the volunteer casebook (KOICA, 1992a) expresses the sport expert’s general assessment of recipient athletes: “They have a great deal of enthusiasm and interest in sports, but are quite ignorant about the scientific methods and approaches to knowledge necessary for physical education specialists, which is the biggest problem” (p. 294). This young volunteer taught and trained physical education students at a university in Thailand. As an expert, he was the only one able to share the scientific knowledge

and expertise required to transform the students into qualified physical education teachers. KOICA sport volunteers commonly served as coaches for local and national sport teams in recipient countries. They often described the athletes they trained as lacking access to sport expertise to help them “overcome old-fashioned ways of thinking,” “gain the necessary fundamental skills that they lack,” and update “athletic techniques that are a decade behind Korea.” Certainly, this shows that the volunteer in this relationship occupies the subject position of sport expert exclusively able to instill “modern sport,” “advanced techniques,” and “scientific knowledge” in the objects, i.e., elite athletes in recipient countries. Only through the sport expert’s diagnosis and prescriptions are elite athletes able to achieve excellence at international sporting competitions. This constitutes the predominant discursive structure framing the success stories of KOICA sport volunteer programs. Ziai (2016) argues that the expert subject, as the one with the ability to disseminate knowledge and diagnose conditions, is constructed through a dominant discourse based on international standards for development. The recipients, as the underdeveloped, are positioned as objects guided by the development experts. Similarly, the subject position in SFD is determined by a given standard, and the preferred goal in donor SFD policy is grounded on Global North standards of knowledge (Darnell, 2011). The construction of KOICA sport volunteers as sport expert subjects is contingent upon the achievement of excellence at international competitions, functioning as a norm they must meet. In other words, the ability to train athletes in recipient countries and lead them to excellence at international sporting competitions provide a kind of benchmark for determining who is qualified to hold the subject position of sport expert.

Korean Nationalist Identity.

The pursuit of self-development ultimately culminates in connecting KOICA sport volunteers to Korean national identity. One personal essay in the casebook (KOICA, 2005) mentions, “with a sense of strong duty, he is diligently working as a cultural ambassador to enhance Korea’s international prestige, promote the Korean race, and strengthen friendly relations between the two countries through Taekwondo” (p. 101). This quote describes a volunteer Taekwondo coach for the Sri Lankan national Taekwondo team, clearly showing his role as a (cultural) ambassador obliged to serve his nation. When KOICA sport volunteers acting as cultural ambassadors are successful in helping elite athletes achieve excellence at international competitions, their achievements are lauded in KOICA casebooks. For KOICA sport volunteers, beyond coaching recipient teams, their role extended to building Korea’s prestige in recipient countries. One volunteer who coached the Vietnamese Taekwondo team noted, “we had the invaluable experience of being able to instill Korean Taekwondo into the Vietnamese people’s mind. You! Have you ever felt *Taekeukki* in your left heart? Now it’s your turn” (KOICA, 2011b, p. 79). This statement is followed by a description of the successful outcome, namely, the attainment of athletic excellence and the popularization of Taekwondo in the recipient country. Volunteer service was recognized as an “invaluable experience” to help strengthen a positive national image of Korea. Additionally, the word “*Taekeukki*” (the Korean national flag) shows that the two motives for volunteering and promoting Korea are equal. This concept commonly appears in the writings of former volunteers who described themselves as “representatives of the nation,” “members of the national team,” and “patriots.” In this respect, KOICA sport volunteers were bound to the Korean national identity, as shown by the phrases above – *Taekeukki*, cultural and civic diplomats and true patriots – and they embraced their responsibility to enhance Korea’s

prestige. More importantly, this Korean national identity may have justified KOICA sport volunteers in prioritizing self-development goals during their volunteer service.

Korean Neoliberal Governmentality and KOICA Sport Volunteers

After the end of the Cold War, nations around the world experienced reform through neoliberal policies pushing for deregulation, privatization, and flexibility in the labour market (Harvey, 2005). Following the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Korea joined the neoliberal cascade with new economic policies allowing for privatization of the public sector, market deregulation and labour market flexibility (Shin, 2012). Korean society drastically changed in response to the state's neoliberal reformation (Doucette, 2010). These social, economic and political changes urged Korean youth to embrace various forms of neoliberal subjectivity that allowed and maintained employment flexibility in the globalized market of domestic labour (Kim, 2018).

KOICA sport volunteers often saw their overseas service as a way to obtain an exemption from compulsory military service and as opportunities for “going abroad” for self-development and to hone their skills in their specific athletic fields. One Taekwondo volunteer wrote:

Concerning military service, I started to carefully think about KOICA programs. Between the army and KOICA, I finally decided on KOICA. It was like killing three birds with one stone. I could satisfy the requirements for my military service, gain overseas experience and learn a new language (KOICA, 2006, p. 104).

In terms of opportunity cost, participating in sport volunteering abroad offered the volunteer nothing but benefits. In Korea, two years of military service is compulsory for male citizens. Because this period frequently falls during university years, Korean men often view military service as a loss of critical time for self-development (Han, Lee, & Park, 2017). Furthermore,

overseas experience or foreign language skills are considered essential for employability, an attribute influenced by Korea's neoliberal system (Lo & Kim, 2011; Yoon, 2014). Kim (2018) argues that profitability is another element that defines the neoliberal subjectivity of Korean society. The decision to take part in KOICA sport volunteering—which simultaneously solves the problems of military service, foreign language acquisition and a lack of overseas experience—is sufficiently guided through an idealized employable subject, profitable to neoliberal Korean society.

Notably, since Lee's administration, neoliberal subjectivity has been fully state-driven by the process of transforming Korean youth into global leaders (Kim, 2018). Lee's Young Global Leader Training policy is a telling example. Through a range of promotional strategies, Korean youth were encouraged to travel abroad for various purposes, including international volunteering (The Office of the President, 2011, p. 46). Young Koreans now regard overseas experience as one of the most cost-effective ways to increase employability. This aim corresponds directly with the idealized subject envisioned by Lee's neoliberal government (Yoon, 2015) as illustrated in the following interview of a Taekwondo volunteer:

He said, 'the past 2 years have been like a dream because I, a mere amateur, was able to coach a national team.' Bae applied to volunteer overseas through KOICA to replace military service. He first thought that he would coach at a small [Taekwondo] centre, but surprisingly received an offer to become a national team coach. (Kim, 2011, para. 2)

Instead of serving in the Korean army, the volunteer went to serve as coach of Peru's national Taekwondo team in his senior year of university, from 2009 to 2011. Evidently, the volunteer was satisfied with his decision to participate in KOICA sport instead of military service, and described his experience as a dream. He became a national team coach while only a university

student, a promotion that would have been inconceivable in Korea where coaching national positions is reserved for very few specialists among a small group of highly qualified former Taekwondo athletes. He stated, “although I wasn’t confident, I accepted the challenge with the mindset that this would not be an opportunity I would have happen again in the future” (Kim, 2011, para. 2). This special professional experience, including wins of “5 gold, 2 silver, and 3 bronze medals at international sport competitions” (Kim, 2011, para. 5) as a national coach for Peru, would no doubt have been a tremendous boon to his future career.

In Lee’s policies, global competitiveness was usually connected to profitability, one of the critical criteria characterizing the neoliberal subject under Lee’s government (Yeo, 2017; Yoon, 2014). Students and graduates of lower-ranking universities, described as less prestigious, were constructed as less profitable members of society, typified in Lee’s policy documents as the unemployed (Kim, 2018). These unemployed university students and graduates needed to become more profitable to be seen as responsible, productive members of society (Kim, 2018). By participating in the many different overseas programs available, including KOICA sport volunteering, the so-called less profitable youth could be converted into neoliberal subjects appropriate for Korean society. Given that many university students in physical education programs volunteered overseas because they considered their universities less competitive in the job market (Kim, 2017), KOICA sport volunteering became a means to offset their perceived lower qualifications. Additionally, it is worth noting that KOICA encourages former and current volunteers to publicly share stories about their volunteer experience through official KOICA publications, and the agency has provided financial and educational support to do so since 2009 (KOICA, 2016). One KOICA annual report noted that “KOICA also made and circulated the Guidebook on Volunteer Activities written by overseas volunteers in 26 countries to provide

detailed information about host countries before new volunteers are dispatched” (KOICA, 2011c, p. 128). This support can be seen as another strategy to further promote and circulate a shared neoliberal subjectivity with current and future KOICA sport volunteers.

Considering Korean national identity as the ultimate subject of KOICA sport volunteers, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that KOICA signed with the PyeongChang Organizing Committee to help promote the 2018 Winter Games by mobilizing its overseas volunteers (Wang, 2015) is noteworthy. All 2015 KOICA volunteers were required to support Korea’s first-ever Winter Olympics during their volunteering stint overseas (Wang, 2015). For instance, one youth volunteer was assigned to a Special Olympics–related institution in Uzbekistan to work not only as an instructor for youth sport programs, but also as a PyeongChang Olympic Supporter. She said in an interview, “finally, I am going to enthusiastically engage in promotional activities as a PyeongChang Olympic Supporter” (World Friends Korea, 2016, para. 6). Interestingly, this distinct type of volunteering position, involving responsibility for local service as well as Olympics promotion, was named “civic goodwill ambassador” (Wang, 2015). Kim (2018) maintains that the categorization of youth volunteers as civic goodwill ambassadors was common in government policy documents. With service abroad seen to promote a positive image of Korea internationally, the Korean youth targeted by Lee’s Young Global Leader Training policy are commonly referred to as “honorary citizen diplomats” (Kim, 2018, p. 359). As stated by both PyeongChang 2018 President Cho Yang Ho and KOICA President Kim Young-mok in the 2015 MOU (POCOG, 2015), the role of KOICA volunteers was to “bring great positive energy and momentum” (para. 5) and achieve this “significant milestone” (para. 6) for Korea. Thus, KOICA volunteers assigned to engage in Korean

international development work and promote Korea's first-ever Winter Olympics would see themselves as contributors to the nation.

This form of Korean governmentality dates to the Chun Doo-hwan's regime and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. At the time, all Korean media were state-controlled and promoted Korea's international rebranding after its success in hosting the Seoul Olympics (Oberdorfer & Carlin, 2014). The authoritarian Chun regime dictated that front-page news stories covering any topic related to the Seoul Olympics must be followed by detailed explanations of the significance of Korea as host (Kang, 2003). The Seoul Olympics ultimately helped enhance Korea's international prestige and directed attention away from a history of its so-called national humiliation (i.e., the decades of Japanese colonial rule and the division of the Korean peninsula) to its shiny, new modern image (Mangan et al., 2011). In this context, the public would have willingly participated in any state-led national project and helped make Korea's first Olympic Games a glorious triumph, as expressed through the common catchphrase used to recruit volunteers, "Rewarding for me, Glory for my country" (Korea News, 1985).

The voluntary mobilization of the Korean public can be extended to the 1970s *Saemaul Undong* [New Village Movement], a state-led development campaign and modernization project of the Park Chung-hee authoritarian regime designed to promote rural development and build foundational infrastructure (Watson, 2014). While *Saemaul Undong* is largely seen as an important milestone of Korea's development history, it was also a modern dictatorial scheme that mobilized the Korean people to fulfill the authoritarian regime's political aims (Jeong, 2017). Because Park Chung-hee seized power in a military coup, *Saemaul Undong* was intended to enhance the regime's legitimacy and coerce citizens into participating in national development projects (Watson, 2014). Park's regime chose certain village members as so-called *Saemaul*

leaders and created a host of training programs, the *Saemaul* Leader Training programs, to effectively mobilize people (Sonn & Gimm, 2013). These *Saemaul* leaders played a pivotal role in promoting the *Saemaul* spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation. They also encouraged community members to participate in the movement (Sonn & Gimm, 2013) as a respectable means of contributing to the betterment of the nation (Doucette & Müller, 2016). They were lauded as “true” Korean citizens and “workers for the fatherland’s modernization” (Hwang, 2011). For some, *Saemaul Undong* was more than a national development project; it was a social regimentation (Doucette & Müller, 2016; Jeong, 2017; Sonn & Gimm, 2013). Jeong (2017) understands *Saemaul Undong* as a practice of mass dictatorship that, building on Foucault’s governmentality, transformed the Korean masses into willing participants in the project of an authoritarian regime. Recently, different studies on Korean ODA (Doucette & Müller, 2016; Jeong, 2017; Kim & Gray, 2016; Watson, 2014) indicate that the governing technologies of Park’s regime are still reproduced through the promotion of Korea’s development knowledge and experiences in state-led international development programs. In this respect, the Korean state’s neoliberal governmentality, which encourages KOICA sport volunteers to pursue self-development, is based on the governmentality techniques of the Chun Doo-hwan and Park Chung-hee military regimes.

Concluding Remarks

State-run sport volunteer programs – KOICA sport volunteers – in Korean ODA have served as a tool for managing domestic policy and political objectives and are deeply entrenched in the authoritarian techniques of the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan military regimes. As illustrated by Collins (2011), the success of the 1988 Seoul Olympics played a significant role in raising the international profile of the new, modern Korea, and in encouraging Korea to become

involved in the global community and its issues. This would naturally create a need for increasing Korean youth's competitiveness internationally and cultivating a global mindset to prepare them for Korea's full involvement in sport volunteering and international development work. Moving beyond the neoliberal policy context of Lee's Young Global Leader Training policy, this analysis reveals that the theme of cultivating young global leaders has been continuously promoted in KOICA (sport) volunteer programs for three decades. It shows that this thematic choice has been fully regulated by the domestic policy objectives and political aspirations of different Korean governments. It also implies that the shared national desire to cultivate young global leaders, traced back to Lee's neoliberal policy schemes, was kindled by Korea's encounters with the global community through the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Building on these results, future research may seek more direct connections between the historical trajectory of KOICA sport volunteers and the domestic policy and political schemes of the Korean government.

Popular discourse in Korean ODA holds that Korea should pay back the international aid that allowed it to transform into a wealthy, developed country. This discourse has also circulated among KOICA sport volunteers, expressed by the term *Nanum* (sharing), which turned volunteers into respectable global citizens and prompted them to accept any difficulties they encountered during their service overseas. As Csordás (2011) writes, this approach can be defined as input-oriented volunteering motivated by a sense of belonging to a community, humanitarianism and altruistic approaches to giving and knowledge transfer. Importantly, Gordin and Borovskaia (2017) argue that input-oriented volunteering is always supported by output-oriented volunteering motives throughout volunteer service. Similarly, output-oriented volunteering also maintained the initial input-oriented motives of KOICA sport volunteers.

KOICA volunteers saw themselves as sports experts, with privileged scientific knowledge and expertise in modern sport, like other sport volunteers in international development programs (e.g., Darnell, 2007, 2011; Lucas & Jeanes, 2019). Such a self-perception is regulated by a distinct Korean discursive framework in which either the individual volunteer, or Korea itself, has achieved excellence in top-tier international sporting competitions. Significantly, the various subject positions identified through this analysis eventually interact and combine with Korean nationalism, which governs the actions of KOICA sport volunteers and ensures that their conduct is consistent with Korean domestic policy and political goals. The governing technologies of the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s persist in any practice that juxtaposes Korean sport with governmental intervention. This may not necessarily be made fully explicit through a single theoretical approach, such as the neoliberal approach that currently dominates SFD studies. Future SFD research could be enhanced by an analysis of the distinctive ideas and entrenched beliefs inherent in any given SFD program in light of its particular national sociopolitical context.

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Chapter 8: Conclusion – Alternatives to Sport-For-Development

In the late 1980s, development scholars following Foucault's work (also known as the post-development school) emerged with a demand for "alternatives to development," which Escobar (1995) explains as being more focused on critical elements such as the "rejection of the entire paradigm altogether" (p. 215), the role of local knowledge and culture, the deconstruction of Eurocentric-knowledge, and the "defence and promotion of localized, pluralistic grassroots movements" (p. 215). Despite criticism that devalues these alternatives to development as "a rhetorical gridlock" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010, p. 122), seeking alternatives to development allows us to rethink development as discourse, which is entrenched in Eurocentric mainstream knowledge systems and strategies within an overarching power mechanism of West – non-West relations (or North-South relations) (Ziai, 2007). This dissertation attempted to broaden the typical Western SFD scholarship by focusing on Korea and its state-led programs to explore how domestic interests shape how former developmental Asian states exercise their new subject position as donor countries.

This concluding chapter is organized into four parts discussing how this research project's results provide new insights. The first three parts present a comprehensive analysis of KOICA sport through a contextualization of my findings within scholarship on 1) SFD, 2) sport diplomacy, and 3) domestic policy and politics. In addition, I discuss how KOICA sport demonstrates methods for SFD integration into ODA, by drawing on other researchers' work on sport aid and sport diplomacy. The last part discusses alternatives to Korean SFD, including predicting the future of KOICA sport in consideration of recent changes to Korean international development. Finally, I conclude with a remark on the intended direction of my research journey after the completion of this doctoral dissertation. I sincerely hope the following reflections contribute to the sociopolitical study of SFD.

Neither a Replicator of the West nor a Single Generator of Korean Sport

In reaction to the hegemony of the Global North in the Northern donor-Southern recipient relations of mainstream SFD discourse (e.g. Darnell, 2010; Hayhurst, 2009; Nicholls et al., 2010), recent SFD studies involving ethnographical and actor-oriented approaches (Long, 2001) have countered that SFD recipients should not simply be treated as docile objects of development, but active agents that assess, challenge, and transform Northern knowledge rules and modalities in local practice in the Global South (e.g. Hasselgård & Straume, 2015; Lindsey & Grattan, 2012; Lucas & Jeanes, 2019; Mwaanga & Mwansa, 2013). This is consistent with the movement that modifies the rigid views of early post-development scholars (e.g. Escobar, 1992a; Esteva, 1987; Sachs, 1990) who saw development as discursive formations entrenched in the Western knowledge of the Global North and ignored the agency of local actors in the Global South (Long, 2001). Of course, it is unfair to view the relationship between Northern donors and Southern recipients purely through the lens of hegemonic or ideological power. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the donor-recipient relationship is unequal (Coalter, 2010b). It is important to once again consider Foucault's (1980) conception of power, which states that power is relational, but this does not mean that all power is equal. Along this vein, my analytical results confirmed that asymmetrical donor-recipient relations are produced in Korean sport for international development discourse that is entrenched in the regularities of Western sport culture, scientific knowledge, and standardization. This subsequently enables the athletic development of recipients and achievement of excellence at global sports competitions. Such discursive formations cannot help but reproduce Northern-dominant power relations between Korea (KOICA sport) as the donor, and recipient countries (elite athletes and sport in recipient countries) as the recipients, although the popular rhetoric of Korean (sport) ODA appeals to the

shared former colonization experience between Korea and other recipient nations. In the same manner, it is worth focusing on how unequal power relations manifest in SFD practice driven by Western-oriented programs and institutions. Australia, Canada, and Norway are some notable examples of leading SFD donor nations that do not have a history of imperialism, but which still contribute to the creation of unequal power relations when they implement SFD initiatives in local settings in the Global South (e.g. Coalter, 2010b; Darnell, 2010; Levermore, 2009; Nicholls et al., 2010; Straume & Steen-Johnsen, 2010). Gardam et al., (2017) research on extractive industry-funded SFD initiatives for Canadian Aboriginal peoples in the Northwest Territories finds that unequal power relations are exercised through the (re)production of colonial discourses. This implies that the maintenance of Western-oriented knowledge and expertise cannot be freed from the exercise of unequal power relations in SFD practice led by Western donors.

However, one cannot generalize that the asymmetrical power relations seen within Korean sport for international development discourse are entirely regulated by Western sport culture and knowledge's rules of formation, nor by methods that position Korean SFD itself as the subject of Western sport knowledge and expertise. Rather, these asymmetrical relations are also greatly shaped by Korean sports culture, which has historically blended elements of Confucianism and militarism. In other words, elements of Korean sport culture (e.g. the coach-athlete hierarchy, subservience to coaches, harsh training methods, and emphasis on mental education) considered to be the entrenched governing technologies of the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s also play a significant role in generating asymmetrical power relations between Korea and recipient countries in the discursive formations of Korean SFD. This is similar to Hasselgård's (2015) analysis of Norwegian SFD,

which he concludes to be dependent on foreign aid policy and domestic political actors. His findings are reminiscent of Kidd's (2008) and Coalter's (2010b) argument that governmental actors have great influence over the direction of SFD NGOs and their decision-making process. Kim (2016) also argues that development programs relying heavily on foreign aid are strongly influenced by the policy decisions of governmental agencies, as well as the political considerations of domestic development stakeholders. In this respect, it is fair to argue that the higher the involvement of any particular SFD program with a donor country's government, the stronger the likelihood that program serves as that government's political tool, to achieve ODA policy, diplomacy, and domestic policy goals in particular.

To extend this argument further, I would like to connect my findings to SFD case studies on local SFD practice, which have found that in many cases, elements of Northern knowledge and expertise are not unquestioningly adopted, but rather, adjusted and transformed into forms more suitable for the Southern recipient context (Darnell et al., 2019; Hasselgård & Straume, 2015; Lindsey & Grattan, 2012; Lucas & Jeanes, 2019; Mwaanga & Mwansa, 2013). That is, the typical Northern knowledge and expertise transferred through SFD programs undergo transformation to emerge as local adaptations integrating the local knowledge, philosophies, and traditions of the Global South. Although my research project does not aim to examine the perception of Korean SFD (KOICA sport) by local practitioners or in recipient local practice within the Global South, my results similarly find that Korean SFD cannot be generalized to be a mere replication of Western sport knowledge and expertise, nor a monolithic generator of Korean sport culture and knowledge. Black and Peacock (2011) remind us that international sport initiatives led by Asian developmental states are entrenched in politics of nationalism consisting of catching up (i.e. following Western development and mainstream SFD), but also of

getting even (i.e. outperforming Western SFD models, manifested in KOICA sport being promoted as the epitome of Korean-style SFD). Given that this dissertation identified various Korean philosophies, technologies, and objectives common to Korean SFD discourse, it is reasonable to view Korean SFD as a Korean-Western nexus in the workings of power relations.

Diplomatic Dynamics on the Wings of SFD-Sport Diplomacy Cooperation

Many academics bring up the need for future sport diplomacy studies to focus on the ways that multilateral actors, both governmental and non-governmental, involve themselves in international diplomacy and on how they employ sport as a political tool in the more complicated politics of twenty-first century international diplomacy (e.g. Black & Peacock, 2013; Jackson & Haigh, 2009; Johns, 2014; Murray, 2018; Rofe, 2016). The research direction of Article II in this dissertation reflects these research demands. While Article II focuses on the specific case of the state-run overseas program, KOICA sport, in Korean ODA and Korean international development initiatives, I direct my analysis to 1) the examination of how the SFD program has served as a diplomatic tool for the Korean government, and 2) how its role in the complicated dynamics of sport diplomacy in Korean international development has changed over the course of three decades. Following Murray's (2018) two categories of traditional and new sport diplomacy, I establish the ways that the Korean SFD program (KOICA sport) has seemingly transitioned from holding a traditional role promoting mutual relations between Korea and recipient countries through elite sport development in recipient countries, to its new role promoting a positive image of Korea and its programs internationally through the promotion of Korean cultural programs with Taekwondo demonstrations, to impress the Korean public and citizens in recipient countries. Such changes in the discourses of KOICA sport were neither clear-cut nor did they represent a clear rejection of traditional approaches. One can see that

Korean SFD is more forthright in manipulating the combination of sport and development to achieve the government's political goals, rather than contributing to international development. Korean SFD at the international level maintains and reproduces the Korean state's use of sport as a diplomatic and ideological tool, a strategy adopted in the Cold War context. Nevertheless, twenty-first century Korean SFD did engage with international norms, social development values, and humanitarian approaches outlined in the international development agenda such as the MDGs and SDGs. Therefore, a nuanced understanding recognizes that recent Korean SFD has demonstrated the more complicated dynamics of Korean sport diplomacy, which have been synergized by a mixture of covert political aspirations and overt values of the twenty-first century's international development.

Likewise, Murray (2018) situates twenty-first century sport diplomacy under the category of new sport diplomacy, which is distinct from the version of the Cold War era. However, he claims there exists no clear boundary that can precisely classify a particular actor under one of the two categories (Murray, 2018). Emphasizing the essence of diplomacy as "duality" (p. 32), not unlike the two-faced Janus, Murray (2018) describes the duality of sport using the 2014 Sochi Winter Games, which involved both traditional and new sport diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Next, researching newspaper coverage of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Games opening and closing ceremonies, Lee (2019) contends that media representation of the ceremonies functioned as a high-profile diplomatic strategy allowing for dynamic effect. Lee argues that the dynamic effects of diplomacy revealed through this media coverage stem from the interplay between diverse actors and elements across culture, sport, and statist diplomacy (Lee, 2019). This supports the idea that the diplomatic effects of top-tier global sports events in the twenty-first century are a consequence of mixing aspects of traditional sport diplomacy (e.g.

involving nation states and state officials) with new sport diplomacy (e.g. promoting Korean traditions and culture). Comparing the 2008 Beijing Olympics with the 2012 London Olympics, Li (2013) shows how China used the Beijing Games to effectively project Chinese soft power internationally through the hybridization of rich cultural traditions and modern technologies. Viewing these two cases as examples of British and Chinese exercises of public diplomacy, the author observes that the Chinese approach to public diplomacy is more state-centred and driven by government elites, prioritizing politically oriented goals such as the projection of political soft power on the global stage (Li, 2013). Contrastingly, the public diplomacy of the London Games was less political in nature and involved a range of actors from both the governmental and non-governmental sectors (Li, 2013).

This analysis of Chinese sport diplomacy is supported by other studies (e.g. Black & Peacock, 2011; Collins, 2011, Tan & Houlihan, 2012) that also examine the duality of the Beijing Olympics, including the apolitical public messages officially disseminated by the Chinese government and its actual political ambitions, including the resurrection of Chinese power in global politics. Japan also had similar uses for its 1964 Tokyo Olympics, which functioned to promote a peaceful national image of Japan to the global community while simultaneously erasing its notorious former imperialist identity (Collins, 2011). Manzenreiter (2009) focuses on the state use of football in international diplomacy (particularly by East Asian countries such as Japan, China, and the two Koreas) to achieve foreign policy goals. Through the examination of the 2002 World Cup, 2004 Asian Cup, and second qualification games for the 2006 World Cup, he shows that football in East Asian countries has commonly been state-driven, integrating foreign policy, and targeting political goals to secure international prestige and enhance the nations' positions as regional powers in international relations (Manzenreiter, 2009).

This is supported by Black and Peacock's (2011) analysis of how Asian developmental states that achieved rapid economic growth through state-driven development projects take advantage of the hosting of mega-sporting events in their territories. Examining the five cases of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, 1988 Seoul Olympics, 2008 Beijing Olympics, 1988 Kuala Lumpur Commonwealth Games, and 2010 Delhi Commonwealth Games, the authors argue that the three Asian Olympic Games were strongly state-led (the Tokyo Games by the long-lived Liberal Democratic Party, Seoul Games by the Chun Doo-hwan regime and his ruling Democratic Justice Party, and Beijing Games by the Chinese Communist Party) and shared a common political aim to promote a modernized image to the global community (Black & Peacock, 2011).

In light of the above research findings, I suggest future research on the sport diplomacy of the three East Asian sports powerhouses – China, Japan, and South Korea – to consider the following questions: Are there common characteristics regarding how the three countries use sport as a foreign policy and diplomatic tool? If so, how are these characteristics linked with the SFD of the three countries? In other words, given that the three countries, as leading Asian developmental states, share similar development experiences and histories distinct from the Western development model (Sato, 2013; Watson, 2014), is it reasonable to suggest the three countries also share similar methods for utilizing a more forthright use of their sport programs in development assistance as diplomatic tools? Furthermore, some scholars (e.g. Black & Peacock, 2011; Cha, 2013; Collins, 2011; Lee, 2016) have theorized that the demonstrated desire of China, Japan, and South Korea to host both the Summer and Winter Olympics is an expression of the East Asian aspiration to fraternize more with the Western world, as well as a desire to maintain state-driven policy goals based on their national interests. Considering Korean-style SFD discourses, it can also be helpful to reflect on the following question: Will China, Japan, and

South Korea, as leading East Asian countries (both as donors and sports powerhouses) that have already achieved developmental success and modernization in accordance with the conventions of the West, still employ sport as a method for pursuing closer ties with the nations of the West? Or do they have different political aspirations for twenty-first century sport diplomacy? I believe these questions can contribute to both SFD and sport diplomacy research literature.

A Prolonged Alliance between Sport, Domestic Policy, and Politics

I would like to mention Schulenkorf et al. (2016) review, as well as Darnell et al. (2018) related concerns regarding the lack of scholarly research on international SFD. Recalling Hasselgård's (2015) argument on the "*donor-state-SDP NGO* research agenda" (p. 2), Giulianotti et al (2019) underline the need for future SFD research to examine how SFD initiatives connect with the domestic policy and politics of a donor state, especially in contexts where SFD NGOs rely heavily on government support. Based on these findings, as well as my own review of SFD research literature in this dissertation (Chapters Two and Three), there exists little research specifically focusing on how international SFD programs operate as domestic policy and political tools of donor states and their governmental agencies. This might be the result of twenty-first century SFD, which is distinctly NGO-led and shies away from excessive governmental intervention (Kidd, 2008; Millington & Kidd, 2019). Alternatively, it may arise from the knowledge required to understand how sport is integrated within a variety of processes across international development, foreign aid systems, government policies and politics, and so on. Yet, because Korean engagement in international development has been characterized by strong state involvement and the pursuit of political goals (Lumsdaine and Schopf, 2008), the challenges that constrain scholarly research on the connections between donor state domestic interests and SFD programs must be overcome.

To continue, let us begin afresh by recalling my literature review in Article III, which examines the ways Korea has used sport as a state tool to manage policy and political issues domestically. Case studies of other countries show the integration of SFD with domestic policy and politics in a fashion similar to Korea (e.g. Cornelissen, 2008; Reiche, 2015; Reis et al., 2013). For example, focusing on the relationship between sports, domestic and foreign policy, and the South African state during the post-apartheid era, Cornelissen (2008) examines how sport, especially the hosting of mega sporting events, has been utilized as a government tool to deal with domestic political issues, pursue foreign policy objectives, and aid the nation-building process. According to the author, South Africa has consistently put forth a series of bids in an effort to host global sporting events (e.g. the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 1996 African Cup of Nations, 2003 Cricket World Cup, and 2010 FIFA World Cup), and these campaigns have been closely juxtaposed with national and international political objectives guided by the domestic and foreign policy agendas (Cornelissen, 2008). With respect to the locus of domestic policy and politics in particular, Cornelissen (2008) claims that South Africa's attempts to host these first and second-order global sporting events are linked to two domestic goals: 1) to achieve economic growth, social inclusion, and alleviate racial conflict; and 2) to promote black empowerment and enhance ties between black political groups in post-apartheid South Africa. Similarly, Reiche (2015) studies Qatar's motivations for continuing to invest in bids for hosting international sporting events (e.g. the 2006 Asian Games, the 2015 Handball World Cup, and the 2022 FIFA World Cup) and achieving athletic excellence at global-level sporting competitions, despite the decreasing need to do so. In other words, the author argues that the Qatar public is mostly satisfied with their government and its domestic affairs, demonstrating high national pride and low social and racial conflict – which are common reasons for why sport has been

employed as a domestic policy tool in other nations (Reiche, 2015). Reiche (2015) provides two reasons that specifically explain Qatar's interest in sport: their desire to 1) promote a healthy society, which is a domestic policy goal; and 2) diversify the economic structure, moving away from the oil and gas economic monopoly to different sectors of business, tourism, commerce, and technologies through new connections with transnational companies. Reis et al. (2016) focus on a particular SFD program in Brazil, *Vilas Olímpicas do Rio de Janeiro*, funded by the Rio de Janeiro Municipal Government, to examine how it relates to public policy and community social development goals following current SDP. According to the authors, this program is designed to promote social development by providing sports equipment, sports facilities, and physical recreation programs to communities of lower socioeconomic status (Reis et al., 2016). Despite its stated goals to increase social development, the program actually focused more on covert aims to draw national and international attention for the upcoming 2016 Rio Olympics, as well as to pursue sport-specific goals including high-performance skills development and the construction of training facilities for elite athletes. Reis et al. (2016) conclude that this is attributable to the strong intervention of both local and national government, a finding reminiscent of the Korean situation (e.g. the Dream Together Program and Sport Partnership Program, which have overtly aimed to achieve the social development goals of the current SDP movement since 2013). These programs still focus more on sport development, which is inconsistent with the principles of twenty-first century SFD (Ha et al., 2015; Na & Dallaire, 2015).

Overall, these examples present three critical points. First, they represent the integration of sport and national development, which can be classified as a form of domestic SFD. Additionally, this approach is manipulated by states to play important policy and political roles at global sporting events (e.g. South Africa, Qatar, and Brazil). Second, while their surface level

aim is to meet social development goals, they also simultaneously place importance on pursuing covert sport-specific goals. This is evident when looking at the large-scale campaigns that are launched to host competitive international sports events, and the intense pursuit of excellence at sports competitions. Third, all three cases are characterized by strong state involvement, successfully utilizing sport as a tool to manage domestic issues, political events, and to meet policy objectives of the nation-building process. This integration of sport with nation-building processes seems to differ greatly from twenty-first century SFD which focuses on lessening the role of states, increasing NGO capacity, and emphasizing the principles of social justice, human rights, and civil society. It is important to also examine how states employ sport as a domestic policy tool to achieve social, economic, and democratic development during the nation-building process, especially in developmental states like South Korea. In this respect, current SFD in the twenty-first century can be understood as “a prolonged alliance” between sport and nation-building, which was common in the twentieth century. Thus, I would like to situate this *mélange* of sport and nation-building under the umbrella of SFD, to define it specifically as twentieth century SFD. I believe that this alternative approach can offer significant contributions to the sociopolitical (domestic policy and politics) study of SFD.

Alternatives to Future SFD

Based on the results of this research project, I predict some potential uses for KOICA sport in the future, which can be seen as an alternative to Korean sport for international development. First, as proposed by both English- and Korean-language studies on Korean SFD (e.g. Ha et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2013; Kim & Kwon, 2015), KOICA sport may choose to pursue a gradual distancing from government influence and eventually enter the non-governmental sector. Importantly, KOICA sport’s DTI programs were transferred in 2008 to the supervision of

World Friends Taekwondo Peace Corps, which is a non-governmental organization (albeit still sponsored and supervised by the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism). In a similar manner, KOICA might gradually relinquish authority for a range of sport volunteer programs and aid projects, which still fall under two axes of KOICA sport, to different SFD NGOs in Korea. Kim (2016) argues that Korean ODA policy intentionally follows the preferred norms, standards, and values of the international community, evident from Korea's foreign aid policy strategy to promote its "ethical leader" or "responsible global citizen" identity. In keeping with that, since the late 2000s the number of Korean NGOs involved in international development has gradually increased, assuming certain roles in Korean ODA typically held by ministries and governmental aid agencies (Lee & Lee, 2016; Watson, 2012). Furthermore, early KOICA sport in the 1990s was strategically employed to maximize the promotional effect of Korean ODA, especially when considering the fact that local recipient athletes coached by Korean (Taekwondo) instructors were able to achieve excellence at international sports competitions in such short periods of time. These visible outcomes served to justify the value and necessity of Korean ODA (KOICA, 2001). Indeed, Korean ODA has already obtained a solid reputation worldwide, with sufficient public consensus on Korea's value and role as a member of OECD-DAC from the global aid community (KOICA, 2011b). This means the need to utilize KOICA sport for promotional purposes – and justify Korea's involvement in international development and foreign assistance – has lessened. In this respect, we can see KOICA sport (e.g. KOICA and other state aid agencies) potentially develop more partnerships with SFD NGOs in Korea in the future, as a strategic response to changes in Korean international development and calls to adopt twenty-first century SFD approaches based on the current international development agenda.

I conclude this dissertation by discussing the future direction of my research journey, after the completion of this doctoral dissertation. As argued above, this research project is the first step in laying down the groundwork of my lifelong research on SFD. First, I will fill in the gaps of Korean-funded international SFD literature, through 1) the examination of KOICA sport's acceptance in local practices in recipient countries, through a variety of ethnographic research methods; and 2) the study of other SFD initiatives in Korean international development, both in the governmental and non-governmental sectors, which have gradually increased since late 2000s. Second, I will focus on other domestic Korean SFD programs in detail, including exploring how sport has been used historically as a tool for nation-building and development. In this manner, I will be able to complete my comprehensive study on Korean SFD. Third, the leading donor countries of East Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea) share similar cultural, historical, and development experiences that are different from the West. The similarities of these three countries' SFD practices can be tentatively defined as "Asian SFD." According to Darnell et al (2019), 283 sport volunteers from the United States Peace Corps were dispatched to over 25 countries from 1970 to 1975, and athletes in recipient countries coached by the American volunteers excelled at the 1972 Olympic Games. In the context of the Cold War, it was common for international sport volunteers, particularly from the USA (Western Bloc) and the then Soviet Union (Eastern Bloc), to help athletes in recipient countries achieve athletic excellence at global sporting events (Johns, 2014). Although the US Peace Corps is still a governmental aid agency like KOICA, the majority of international SFD programs (including international sport volunteering) have been administered by NGOs from the West in the post-Cold War era (Benson & Wise, 2017) and this continues. In this respect, comparative research on the SFD of China, Japan, and South Korea can reveal Asian SFD's commonalities and disparities

with Western SFD, eventually leading to the completion of a “big picture” understanding of Asian SFD.

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