Evaluating the Protestant Community's Action Towards Democratization during the Period of Martial Law in Taiwan

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Abstract

This thesis examines the reasons why certain Protestant churches in Taiwan during the martial law period advocated democratization, while others did not. It uses an institutional and organizational theory to better understand the inner workings of these churches to understand their norms and values in terms of their overall group culture. This is set against previous English-language research that focused primarily on the ideals of essentialized or reified religions, broadly defined, without looking at the variations that exist between different churches. It argues that in order to understand the actions of these churches towards democratization, we must look at the whole of each organization. The norms and values, on their own, are insufficient to explain their motivations.

Dedication and Thanks

I would like to personally thank the University of Ottawa for their support and funding.

I would also like to thank my supervisor, André Laliberté, for his patience and tremendous efforts in making this endeavour possible.

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Introduction

This thesis proposes a way to move beyond simplistic and essentialist notions that some religions are compatible or not with democracy, by focusing on organizations and institutions rather than only norms, ideals, and theology. I demonstrate the merit of this approach by taking Taiwan's protestant churches as a case study and will endeavour to explain why different organizations belonging to the same religious tradition have used their theology to promote very different political attitudes on the fundamental issue of democratization. My thesis will use a combination of institutional and organizational theories to understand the behavior of churches. This research seeks to add its voice to the growing literature on religion and society in Asia. This introductory chapter will outline the research questions, the approach used to answer it, and the methodology I will use.

General introduction to the issue of religion and politics

The role of religion in the political sphere continues to be an interesting and important topic of research. From the involvement of religious lobby groups in the United States, to growing religious fundamentalism in the Middle East, to a resurgence of religious activity in countries like China; it is important to reconsider many Western theoretical positions regarding religion. The tenacious notions of modernization and secularization are no longer adequate in understanding the various dimensions of religious belief and its influence on society.[1]

Anthony Gill, for instance, explains that secularization theory is one of the most "durable, yet outdated, theoretical perspective in the social sciences," wherein "religion would eventually become an irrelevant player in both social and private life."[2] This kind of theorizing also falls into popular notions

[1] See Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) and Peter Berger, *The Deseculaization of the World,* (Washington, DC: William B. Eerdmans Pub Co., 1999).

[2] Anthony Gill, "Religion and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 120.

of modernization. However, there has been a resurgence of religious growth over the past few decades. Even in China, a country that has experienced some of the harshest anti-religious policies in history, researchers point to the growth of religious believers,[3] especially following the end of the Cultural Revolution.[4] This growth means that, at the very least, the influence of religious believers and groups needs to be taken into account.

Brent Nelson et al. demonstrate that religious involvement in politics is not isolated to any one region or country. In the case of Nelson et al., the authors argue that there is a lack of academic research regarding the intersection of religion and politics.[5] The issues they raise range from the controversy over wearing the hijab while taking the oath of citizenship to the way that one's religious belief will shape an individual's support for European integration.[6]

It also goes beyond attitudes towards political issues: There is also heavy religious involvement in the political sphere and in civil society. For example, Melanie Cammett and Sukriti Issar explain that in countries with a less developed social support infrastructure, "ethnic or religious organizations use service provision as a means of building support; welfare therefore is an integral component of ethnic and sectarian politics."[7] By analyzing the Sunni Muslim Future Movement and the Shiite Muslim Hezbollah, the authors demonstrate how these two religious organizations vary in their provision of social goods towards the population. These texts demonstrate the continuing relevance of religion for comparative research for any country.

However, as important as religion and religious belief are in the political arena, I wish to avoid its reification as an objective or universal category that possesses, *a priori*, certain characteristics that

3 Yang Fenggang, *Religion in China: Survival & Revival Under Communist Rule* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 5; David Palmer and Vincent Goossaert, *The Religious Question in Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

4 Richard Madsen, "Religious Renaissance in China Today," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 2 (2011): 17.

5 Brent F. Nelson and Brian Highsmith, "Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes Toward Integration in Europe," *Politics and Religion* 4, no. 1 (2011): 2.

6 Ibid., 1.

7 Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar, "Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon," *World Politics* 62, no. 3 (2010): 382.

are imbued in believers. We see this type of classification in Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations". For Huntington,

> the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.[8]

Indeed, Huntington says that the division between First, Second, and Thirds Worlds has become irrelevant and we must now look at countries "in terms of their culture and civilization[9]." A civilization, according to him, is the highest cultural grouping of people and also the broadest, elements of which contains language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and self-identification. These categorizations of civilizations objectify and reify their cultural traits into homogenous categories that include vast swaths of people. Though variations exist within these civilizations, they are overlooked in Huntington's text for the benefit of his clash theory.

This is not to deny the importance of cultural traits such as religion, but what matters is to promote a more nuanced use of such a dimension of social life. Authors like Lisa Wedeen mention the importance of culture as a "semiotic practice" that creates a meaning-making process for individuals and groups.[10] Culture, in her text, is a theoretical category which works as a lens that focuses on meaning and its construction. This definition of culture is relevant to religion. This also resembles my approach to cultural variables and the creation of meaning found in organization and institutional theories.

We see an application of this approach in Anne Grzymala-Busse's article. She describes how religious faith affects the political behavior of individuals and organizations.[11] For example, one's

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8 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22.

9 Ibid., 23.

10 Lisa Wedeen, "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 4 (2002): 720.

11 Anna Gryzmala-Busse, "Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More) Seriously," *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 427.

religious belief may impact how one votes. This can also be seen in the many religious organizations and leaders around the world who are very involved in politics. In the United States, for example, there are many church leaders who actively seek to influence the voting behavior and political actions of believers, along with government policy. We can also look at political groups that revolve around religious belief, such as Christian Democracy in Germany and Italy, the BJP in India, the Komeito in Japan, and Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas. This phenomenon of religious political parties exists in many different cultural areas all over the world.

The question of religion is important because it exerts considerable influence on political and social life and should be seen as comparable to other subjects in political science. How we look at religion and people's religious beliefs is an important and difficult process because, as we can see in the simplifications made by scholars such as Huntington, it is easy to get it wrong. The most effective approach to avoid this kind of reductionism, I argue in this thesis, is the cultural meaning-making approach, wherein religious faith and membership in religious organizations affects how a person perceives the world and how they act.

Case Studies

The questions remains, then: why did I choose Taiwan as a case study, and why the protestant churches specifically? Initially, the objective was to research religious actors in mainland China. There has been a tremendous increase in the number of scholars looking at the importance of religion to politics in that country.[12] These authors, however, focus on religion and the state, and do not say much on the issue of the political disposition of religious actors. In fact, there are few studies on religion in

[12] Anthony Yu, *State and Religion in China: Historical and Textual Perspectives* (Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2005); Yang Fenggang and Joseph Tamney, eds., *State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies* (Brill Publishers, 2005); Christopher Marsh, *Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival, and Revival* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

China that argue that these actors have a political role.[13] However, because China is not a democracy, this may be an unfeasible research project to undertake now. To understand what role a religious group played in the democratization of its country, it is better to look at a comparable country that has gone through such a transition. This is where Taiwan comes in as an interesting case study. Taiwan has the benefit of having been an authoritarian state that eventually democratized, with certain religious groups taking various positions regarding its support for this process.

The history of Taiwan is one of changing control. From 1624 – 1662 the Southern part of it was under Dutch colonial rule, with the capital Zeelandia becoming later on Taiwan. The Spanish and the French also briefly controlled parts of the North. The name 'Formosa (beautiful island)' was from Portuguese sailors who had stopped by on their way to Japan and to Macau, but Portugal never controlled the island. The Dutch were driven out by Koxinga (also known in Taiwan as Cheng Cheng-kung), a loyalist to the defeated Ming Dynasty of China, who established in the island as the Kingdom of Tungning, before finally being defeated by the new Qing Government in 1683. Taiwan remained under Qing control until 1895 when it was ceded by China to Imperial Japan at the end of the First Sino-Chinese War though the Treaty of Shimonoseki.[14]

In 1865, before the Japanese took over, Presbyterians missionaries had arrived from England and Canada. They established schools and hospitals, focusing on social services along with some evangelism. They continued these services during the Japanese occupation, until the foreign missionary leaders were expelled in the 1930s. Then, the Taiwanese members of the church took over the leadership.[15]

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[13] There are exceptions: David Palmer, "Modernity and Millenialism in China: Qigong and the Birth of Falun Gong," *Asian Anthropology* 2, no. 1 (2003): 79–109; David Aikman, *Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Transforming China and Changing the Global Balance of Power* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2003); Daniel Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China* (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012); Ching-Kun Yang, *Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

[14] John E. Wills, Jr, "The Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Taiwan Under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray Rubinstein (London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), 84.

[15] Murray Rubinstein, "The Presbyterian Church in the Formation of Taiwan's Democratic Society, 1945 – 2004," in

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the Japanese ceded Taiwan to the Republic of China, which was then under the control of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). In February 1947, while the KMT was fighting the Chinese communists in the Mainland, a riot erupted in Taiwan triggered by what many saw as abuses from the occupying forces of the KMT. In response to the unrest that spread to the island, Chiang Kai-shek sent signals of his willingness to negotiate with the leaders of the revolts, but in fact, he send troops who then received the order to enforce martial law and crack down on the elites throughout the island.[16]

The KMT lost to the Communists in 1949 and fled to Taiwan; hoping to retake the Mainland from there in the future. Around this time, the other two churches studied in this thesis, the Southern Baptists and the Local Church, established their missions on the island. However, these two churches steered clear of most social involvement, whether it be school or hospitals, and focused solely on conversion and worship.

When the KMT relocated their government in Taiwan, they were not only concerned with possibly communist infiltration, but also with keeping the island's population under control. As such, they established a one-party authoritarian state with government agencies in place to keep people in check. In general, these took the form of secret police, censorship laws, and surveillance. For religious groups, who were under government suspicion as possible communist or foreign infiltrators, where subjected to a series of laws and regulations meant to control their activities. For instance, the Buddhist and Daoist groups were subjected to laws that governed their religious activities, festivals, and temple operations. Most religions were also forced to operate under national organizations that represented their interests to the government.[17]

Such was the situation for the next 40 or so years, until rising discontent and protests eventually

Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia, ed. Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), 110, 111.

16 Kuo Cheng-Tien, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008), 10.

17 Ibid.

led to the lifting of martial law and the relaxing of legal and political constraints in 1987. In 1996, the first presidential elections were held, completing Taiwan's transition towards a democracy.[18] In terms of religious groups involving themselves in the political sphere, the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan emerged as an opponent force supporting reforms that benefited from, among other things, international connections and its own organization, while other Protestant churches on the island isolated themselves. When discussing the relevance of religious belief in Taiwan during its democratization, and the influence of Presbyterians, there is one factor that bears mentioning. It concerns Chiang Ching-kuo's (son of Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT's leader since the early 1920s) successor, Lee Teng-hui. Lee was instrumental in Taiwan's democratization. From within the party-apparatus, he took on an authoritarian regime and made it into a full-fledged democracy; holding the first ever presidential elections in 1996 and subsequently winning. He held this post from 1988 – 2000.

Lee's actions and beliefs are all the more striking when taking into account that not only is he a devout Presbyterian, but of Hakka descent, which cements his ties to the island.[19] Many of the political beliefs held by the PCT from the early 60s onward are to be found in Lee, as well. That one of the main architects of Taiwanese democracy was part of the only Protestant church to advocate for democratization is very pertinent for my research. Moreover, and equally significant is the influence of the PCT on the leadership of the DPP, the main opposition party to the KMT. and in particular the affiliation of its candidate to the 1996 Presidential election, Peng Ming-min.

Contemporary China has many similarities to martial law Taiwan, wherein the CCP is the only legal political party. However, for the moment there is no possibility that religious groups can fulfill a similar role as the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. There are other religious organizations, however, which the CCP fears, such as the Falungong. It is difficult to say with any certainty if such group can

[18] Murray Rubinstein, *The Protestant Community of Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991).
[19] Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 13.

represent a possible source of organized opposition – but this is a potential which the CCP considers seriously in its attempts to control religion. The theoretical framework I use for Taiwan represents an imperfect, but nevertheless interesting, blueprint for further research in China. These points establish the importance of the general topic of the thesis. The importance of the thesis itself rests on testing a way to assess and evaluate a religious group's actions towards democratization.

The Ambiguous Relationship between Christianity and Democracy

Why do certain religious organizations advocate for democratization, and others do not? More specifically, how can we explain the contrasting actions and motivations of different Protestant churches in Taiwan who share the same religious heritage; theoretically? Presumably, theology, on its own, does not immediately predispose a church to adopt a certain political view. What, then, does explain churches' specific behavior? The research design will provide more context and the process that will help us in answering these questions.

The thesis seeks to explain why Christian churches in Taiwan held such a variety of views in their support and advocacy for democracy, or lack thereof, during the martial law period (1945 – 1987). This particular period has been chosen due to the fact that Taiwan was under an authoritarian regime, but has since transitioned into a democracy. During this transition, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) opposed the KMT, supported the right to self-determination for Taiwanese, which meant independence but also democracy and respect for human rights. However, other Christian churches were either silent or critical of the PCT's actions during this time, and even acquiesced by their silence to the authoritarian regime's repression against the PCT.

There is a large body of research, as I mentioned previously, regarding the [in]compatibility of religion and democratization and the activities of religious groups in East Asia (such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand and China). Certain authors have looked at the possible link

between Christian, Daoist, Confucian, and Buddhist belief and its possible support for democracy in Taiwan and China.[20]

Similarly, this thesis wishes to provide an original perspective to understand the contrasting attitudes of different Christian churches that either supported, or remained silent on, the subject of democracy during the period of martial law Taiwan. In doing so, the thesis seeks to build from existing theoretical frameworks an approach that better understands the contexts of these individual churches to understand their behaviors and motivations when making their decisions.

The thesis will argue that, so far, the research has been mostly descriptive and lacking in a strong theoretical backing when it comes to political science. There are some exceptions, of course, such as Kuo Cheng-Tian's work, who concludes that religion does matter in Taiwan, and that Christians show a higher propensity towards pro-democratic stances,[21] wherein he applies a statistical method to evaluate a believer's support for democratic ideals. These approaches, however, are unsatisfactory because they do not explain the divergences of views among Protestants. This is why I have chosen an alternative path of inquiry, which I will lay out in the next chapter. The first notable difference between our approach and Kuo's is the use of a qualitative framework. We also place much more emphasis on what he refers to as political theology and political ecclesiology, but from the perspective of churches as institutional actors, not attributes that exist within the religion itself.

In other words, where I differ from Kuo is on how these two facets are enforced and internalized by members. In this thesis I am interested in explaining *why* churches hold these political beliefs. The question isn't so much as to whether there *is* a link between Christianity and democracy, but *why* a religious group chooses to support or oppose democratization and how do we come to know

[20] Gerda Wielander, "Bridging the Gap? An Investigation of Beijing Intellectual House Church Activities and Their Implications for China's Democratization," *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 62 (2009); Kuo Cheng-Tien, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008); Richard Madsen, *Democracy's Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Development in Taiwan* (University of California Press, 2007).

[21] Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 115.

this information? I propose a theoretical lens that can be used for other case studies to better understand the different attitude regarding support or opposition to democracy among churches.

Approach, Methodology, and Research Design

Given the country in question, numerous methodological concerns emerge. A more personal obstacle is the fact that the I do not read Mandarin, which limits, to a certain extent, the material available for research. Another methodological concern is a lack of comprehensive texts on religion in Taiwan, especially during the martial law period. Murray Rubinstein has become the leading research on the Presbyterians in Taiwan,[22] and few other sources seem to have their own original research on that subject. There are two comprehensive English language texts on the question of religion and democracy in Taiwan: One by Kuo Cheng-Tian,[23] and another by Richard Madsen.[24] An anthology of religion and democracy in Asia was also published, with a handful of chapters on certain religious groups in Taiwan. These texts will be analyzed in more detail in the literature review.

As for my case studies, I will focus on Protestant groups in Taiwan. Specifically the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, the Southern Baptists, and the Local Churches. The reasoning behind this choice lies in the variety that exists between these groups, from more centralized and unified groups, such as the Baptists and Presbyterians, to looser conglomerations found in the Local Churches. There also exist important differences in the actions taken, from democratic support by the Presbyterians, to criticism of these actions from the others. Though certain cultural variables will not be available due to the aforementioned lack of information in certain areas, a detailed picture can still be drawn from these groups to satisfy our theoretical lens. Another reason for this decision is to demonstrate that religious denominations are not simply homogeneous blocks without any variety

[22] Murray Rubinstein, "The Presbyterian Church in the Formation of Taiwan's Democratic Society, 1945 – 2004," in *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia*.
[23] Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*.
[24] Madsen, *Democracy's Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Development in Taiwan*.

between them.

The first chapter will be a comprehensive literature review. It will consist of an analysis of principle texts on the subject of religion and democracy in Asia, with a particular emphasis on Taiwan. It will look at their research questions, their methods and approaches, and conclusions. A second task of the review will be to demonstrate exactly how the sources will be used, since critiquing them consists of only part of my research goal. It is not simply contesting them and leaving them aside, but a synthesis of what has been written on the subject so far and new avenues of research. It will also look at the literature on the religious politics of Taiwan from the Japanese period until the end of the martial law period, as well as the primary sources and publications by the church groups. These two factors are paramount in understanding the behavior of these actors.

Following this, the second chapter will establish the theory. It consists of adapting an institutional and organizational framework to analyze religious actors, heavily influenced by the work of James March and Johan Olsen. It will argue that the best way to understand and explain the actions of these actors is to understand the institutional environment that they operate in, which means understanding their hierarchy, the tasks of various members, their espoused values and goals, their formal philosophy, and how they aim to accomplish these various goals. All of these factors do not perfectly determine their actions, but constrain and influence how an actor will behave when confronted with a situation. They will seek out the appropriate action, which has been conditioned in them by their leaders and other members, and attempt to actualize it.

The third chapter describes the politico-religious context of Taiwan during the martial law period. It will be argued that it is necessary to see these religious institutions in the environment in which they operate. Laws on how they can organize, the establishment of national associations, and other regulations create permutations in their institutional makeup and directly influence how they go about accomplishing their goals.

After describing the political context, two chapters will apply this theory on the various Protestant churches in Taiwan. A brief historical overview of these churches on the island, along with a time line of events (such as the protests in 1979) to set the stage. The next step will involve the theoretical application: the organizational structure of these groups, their interpretation of doctrine, and their approach to political activity. This holistic approach is meant to bring out a complete picture of these groups, in their environment, to properly assess why they acted the way they did during the martial law period (Such as the PCT actively promoting democratization, but other Protestant denominations remaining either silent or critical of the PCT), using the previously laid out theory.

The concluding chapter will summarize the research and present new avenues of research and further projects with this theory, with a focus on Protestant House Churches in China. The similarities in regulation and historical roots make Taiwan an ideal blueprint for further analysis

Chapter 1

Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter presents the background in which this research rests, including research on religion and politics in Taiwan in general. To that end, it analyzes and synthesizes the current research on religion in Taiwan, specifically the various texts written on Christian churches in Taiwan: their beliefs, their history, their actions and activities, and their contributions to society and politics, if any exist. The purpose is to raise questions out of the findings in the existing research on religion and democracy in Taiwan. The literature on democracy and religion in Asia has been very descriptive and historical. Richard Madsen work on the Buddhist and Daoist contributions to democracy in Taiwan, for example, relies primarily on a description of their actions, with an emphasis in civil society, without any clear-cut theoretical lens.[25]

As such, this literature review will look at the research texts on this topic and analyze their methodology and conclusions. This will be divided into three categories: research with large-N samples; research on Asia in general; and research on Taiwan specifically. The intention of our research is to help us understand the differences among Christian churches in Taiwan, an issue that few others have tried to explain systematically.[26] It will also look into some of the primary sources, such as those of the PCT and other churches during the period of martial law, along with articles on the religious policy of the KMT during the martial law period.

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[25] Ibid.

[26] That is to say, have not relied on any particular theoretical lens to explain their conclusions

Democracy and Religion

This section will look at three categories of texts on the study of religion and democracy and contrast them with the research undertaken here. These are: generalizations with large-N; research on Asia in general; and research on Taiwan in particular. The major points of analysis will be sample selection, how they look at religion (and how they define it) and its relationship with democracy, their approach, and conclusions. All of these texts present different ways of approaching the question of religion and democracy. Some look at whether or not holding a particular belief makes an individual for or less likely to support democracy / democratization, others look at the question of the compatibility of religion with these processes.

Research with large-N on Religion and Democracy

This category looks at works that are, for the most part, of a statistical nature. They are mostly studies that analyze the relationship between multiple religions and democracy worldwide. Their approach tends to be more of a macro perspective that looks at a general picture than the individual or even organizational level: They seek to observe, generally speaking, the effect of religion on democracy and democratization, and whether or not holding a particular religious belief makes one more likely to support or hinder democracy.

Carsten Anckar, for instance, in his *Religion and Democracy: A worldwide comparison* sees religion as a "system-characteristic, which permeates the whole of society and also affects the building and functioning of political institutions via factors like religious dominance."[27] What this means is that his definition of religions is more ideational and, also, broader and more generalized. However, Anckar does note that religions are not internally homogeneous and that there is an inherent difficulty in classifying and subclassifying them. In the end, which is a point of contention that I will comment on

[27] Carsten Anckar, *Religion and Democracy: A Worldwide Comparison* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 3.

later, Anckar chooses broad categorizations to simplify the study.[28]

An example of this is his categorization of Christianity. He divides the religion into three groups: Catholicism, Protestantism, and Eastern Orthodox, while explaining that Protestantism has typically been viewed as highly compatible and conducive to democratization and democracy itself, referring to the classic Weberian argument.[29] His arguments stem from the ideas contained within Protestantism: It possesses a natural pluralism, strong support for a vivid civil society, and an inherent concern for others and a community spirit.[30] There is a noticeable lack of any organizational factors that might, in fact, influence the dissemination or these religious ideals and theology. In the case of Protestant Christianity, Anckar notes that the empirical evidence strongly supports the positive effects of Protestantism on democracy in countries that have a high dominance of Protestant Christians.

This reliance on theology and ideals is not restricted to these large works. Jodok Troy's chapter on the potential of Catholicism in democratization in *Religion and Democratization* examines Huntington's claim of the massive involvement of the Catholic Church in the so-called Third Wave of Democratization. This approach is very values-based. Specifically, he refers to those expressed in the Vatican II Council.[31] There is, in fact, a specific diminishing of the influence of "earthly constraints," which material and political considerations, to focus on values and motivations for actions.[32] Troy's argument concludes that these theological considerations have made Catholicism conducive towards democratization.

However, some texts do look at institutional factors when determining religion's role in democracy. Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger's chapter in the same collection look at the role of religion in five country when they newly democratized, drawing on Freedom House and BTI indexes to

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28 Ibid., 5.
29 Ibid., 30, 36.
30 Ibid., 37.
31 Jodok Troy, "'Catholic Waves' of Democratization? Roman Catholicism and Its Potential for Democratization," in *Religion and Democratizations*, ed. Jeffrey Hanes (New York: Routledge, 2011), 54.
32 Troy, "'Catholic Waves' of Democratization? Roman Catholicism and Its Potential for Democratization."

evaluate levels of democracy in those countries. Theirs is a revisit of the (in)compatibility argument. They also provide, contrary to the previous texts, definitions and an analysis of religious institutions and actors as "those that address the spiritual, economic and/or political needs and interests of a religious group."[33]

Another example of a text that provides a more nuanced approach to religion is an article by Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and Gizem Arikan. Once again, we see a large-N project that look at data from 54 countries (using the World Values Survey) to look at how a person's religiosity affects their support for democracy. They state that private aspects of religious belief are associated with traditional and survival values, which is less conducive to democratic values, while the communal aspect increases political interest in institutions.[34]

The private and the communal are analyzed through what the authors call a multidimensional phenomenon: belief, behavior, and belonging. These different dimensions each have a different effect on attitudes towards democracy.[35] However, despite a focus on the communal, that is to say institutional / organized facet of religion, Bloom and Arikan are still only interested in how it affects an individual's standpoint. All three variables are directed towards an individual's view of religion and democracy. While the belonging aspect hints at an organization's influence on members, it only goes so far as claim that "places of worship hold great potential for deliberative democracy, provide organizational and philosophical bases for a wide range of social movements, and aid the development of civic skills and democratic norms."[36] A very difficult claim to make when one thinks of the highly centralized and almost authoritarian church groups around the world. Regardless, the authors explain that their data and

[33] Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger, "The Multi-Faceted Role of Religious Actors in Democratization Processes: Empirical Evidence from Five Young Democracies," in *Religion and Democratizations*, ed. Jeffrey Hanes (New York: Routledge, 2011).
[34] Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and Gizem Arikan, "Religion and Support for Democracy: A Cross-National Test of the Mediating Mechanisms," *Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 2 (2013): 375.
[35] Ibid., 376.
[36] Ibid., 377.

analysis support the hypotheses that a) the more individual-based religiosity has a negative effect on democratic support while b) communal and social religious behavior has a positive effect.

What we see with these texts is a need to generalize classifications and descriptions of both religions and democracy / democratization. Despite the nuance demonstrated by authors like Bloom and Arikan, and Künkler and Leininger, who see the need to add an institutional factor to their approach because they fail to show the inner workings of the various religious groups. They tend to see them as a ubiquitous unit that more or less supports democratization due to their social nature.

In the other camp, we see a strong emphasis on the values and ideas in a given religion. In a sense, they reify these religions and give them what seem to be universal qualities. Protestant Christianity, for the most part, is said to hold a certain set of beliefs and values that individual believers share, or that Vatican II has imbued Catholicism with a more rigorous awareness for human rights.

However, these texts do not make the effort to demonstrate *how*, exactly, these values are instilled in a given person or if, presented with the possibility of action, would, in fact, follow them through. Furthermore, they do not indicate how belonging to a given religious group affects their support of these values if they are held. It is important to note, though, that many of these texts do not seek to discover these facts and are mainly interested if a correlation between religious belief and support for democracy or democratization exists. I argue that it is still important, and necessary, to understand *why* such a correlation exists if it does.

With this area of research examined, the next section will look at the research conducted on the relationship between religion and democracy in Asia, in general. This is to better establish the work that has been done before exploring the scholarship that looks at Taiwan in particular.

Religion and Democracy in Asia

There has been a significant growth in the scholarship of religion and democracy in Asia in the past 20 years. Increasingly, a lot of attention is being given to China's remarkable religious growth since the Reform Era and how this affects the Chinese government's approach to controlling and monitoring religious activity. This section will look at various authors who examine the effect of religion in Asian countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and China. These texts are largely descriptions of the history of a given church and its involvement (or lack thereof) in democratization movements or democratic consolidation.

Hyug Baeg Im's text, for instance, asks why Korean Christian churches, who had a history of accommodation with the authorities, eventually supported the democratization movements in South Korea, what forms their participation took, and why were they successful.[37] He concludes that the Protestants, for their part, exploited the social pressures of Korea's rapid industrialization to recruit the disenfranchised population, and force the churches to address sociopolitical issues.[38] This is similar to the Doubling Movement the PCT undertook in the 1960s and the rapid influx of younger and more socially active members who rose to positions of leadership and eventually solidified the church's stance for social justice.

Deborah Brown's text on the Catholic Church and its conflict with the PRC in Hong Kong relies heavily on what we saw in the previous section: a strong emphasis on ideas and values and their influence on individual or institutional actions. Brown explains that the Church has a history of encouraging freedom and creative fulfillment in many places around the world, such as Chile, Poland, and the Ukraine.[39]

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[37] Hyug Baeh Im, "Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea," in *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia*, ed. Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), 136.

[38] Ibid., 151.

[39] Deborah A. Brown, "Hong Kong's Catholic Church and the Challenge of Democratization in the Special Administrative Region," in *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia*, ed. Tun-Jen Cheng

Though this seems mostly ideational, it is used alongside the self-interest of the Church in Hong Kong, especially in areas of education. Brown shows that, historically, the Catholic Church was called in by the British government to step in and build the educational system and has become, according to Brown, a means through which the Church instills its aforementioned beliefs. To protect its own self-interests, however, the Catholic elites in Hong Kong "seeks to nurture a sense of preservation of the freedom of choices enjoyed under British rule and push for an expansion of rights."[40] However, her chapter does not tie these two concepts (values and self-interest) together through any institutional theory, relying mainly on a historical analysis of events.

Though there is significant research on Christianity in Asia, much research has also been conducted on the relationship between Islam and democracy in Asia. Greg Barton looks at the mainstream incompatibility argument regarding Islam, which he says has been reinforced in the Western mind by radical and Jihadist Islamists.[41] To better understand the actual relationship between Islam and democracy, Barton decides to look at its impact in Indonesia through four factors: Islamic mass organizations; individual Islamic thinkers; development of Islamic thought in Indonesia; and the party politics of the country.

Barton presents a compelling case of Islamic believers positive impact on Indonesian society. Their key involvement in civil society,[42] the prominence of these groups in party politics,[43] and the shaping of Islamic thought through its interactions with the state and society as a force of moderation[44] all serve to show that while radical elements exist within the country, the moderates still enjoy a large-scale influence and presence in politics.

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and Deborah A. Brown (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), 180.

40 Ibid., 205.

41 Greg Barton, "Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia," in *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia*, ed. Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), 221.

42 Ibid., 225.

43 Ibid., 229.

44 Ibid., 236.

Barton's article is a great example of research that contradicts the essentialist claims that this thesis fights against and the reification of religion. He makes an effort to look at actors, groups, and philosophies and their interconnections to prove his argument. The problem, however, mainly lies with his choice of factors to demonstrate this. No justification is given for why these four points in particular are chosen. It is often argued that a robust civil society is important for a thriving democracy (which is the argument taken by Richard Madsen seen later), but no such argument is given. A common thread that connects these four points together and their links to a) democracy and b) influencing actors would have solidified his arguments further.

There has also been an effort to include a more institutional bent towards research in this field, headed by Yoshiko Ashiwa and David Wank. The texts contained in their volume however, are not specifically about the relationship between religion and democracy or democratization, but more about the interactions between religion and the state and the formation of both.[45]

Their express purpose is to establish an institutional framework in the study of church-state relations in China to counteract what they call dichotomous frameworks. The latter pits the two sides in an antagonist relationship instead of one that has multiple processes: competition, adaptation, cooperation, and conflict.[46] Religion is seen as a social construct instead of an essentialist quality. Religion, in this context, is institutionalized which stems from the multiple actors that engage the state.[47]

Two important aspects include the definition of institutions as "rules that constitute community, shaping how individuals see themselves in relation to others, and providing a foundation for purposive action" and, also, the use of an institutional logic similar to our own:

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[45] Ashiwa Yoshiko and David Wank, "Making Religion, Making the State: An Introductory Essay," in *Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China*, ed. Ashiwa Yoshiko and David Wank (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 3.

[46] Ibid., 5.

[47] Ibid., 6.

> Some of the most important struggles between groups, organizations, and social classes are over the appropriate relationship's between institutions, and by which institutional logic different activities should be regulated and to which categories of persons they apply.[48]

This institutional framework is used to describe and analyze the relationship between church and state. Specifically, it looks at the context of modernity and how religious organizations in China were negotiating their space and jurisdiction within the state-making of the Chinese government.[49]

However, two important differences exist between my work and that of Ashiwa and Wank. First, the institutional perspective is, by the authors' statement, focused on the state side of institutions (such as the Religious Affairs Bureau in China), while I look more towards the specific churches. Second, my interest does not lie in the process of state-making, but the process that makes a given religious group support or hinder democratization. While looking at the governmental apparatus and the interactions these organizations have is important, it largely ignores the other non-governmental groups that also impact society and politics.

All of these texts demonstrate the variety of research done on religion and democracy throughout Asia. Their questions differ from whether or not a religion is compatible with democracy, why a particular church went from support of authoritarian governments to opposition, and what the underlying motivations are for said opposition. However, the biggest flaw in these texts, Ashiwa and Wank's work aside, is the distinct lack of any theoretical framework to support their arguments.

Religion and Democracy in Taiwan

In the English language research on religion and democracy in Taiwan, there exist but a few comprehensive studies. There is a collection of essays that looks at the theme of religion and democracy in most of Asia under the direction of Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown from 2006,

[48] Ibid., 8.
[49] Ibid., 3.

with articles by Murray Rubinstein and André Laliberté that treat with Taiwan directly, and another volume on religion in Taiwan,[50] in general, edited by Philip Clart and Charles B. Jones published in 2003.[51] As far as comprehensive texts are concerned, with specific focus on the question of religion and democracy in Taiwan, two stand out: Kuo Cheng-Tien's *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan* and Richard Madsen's *Democracy's Dharma*. This section will begin by looking at some of the texts mentioned here, and others, that touch on the topic of religion and democracy in Taiwan. It will be focusing, once more, on their research questions, approach and methodology, and conclusions. It will then demonstrate where our research differs and how we plan to incorporate these texts in the overall argument.

Murray Rubinstein, whose work I will rely upon, gives a thorough account of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan's opposition to the KMT during the 1970s,[52] along with an extensive survey of Protestant beliefs, missions, and attitudes towards politics in Taiwan.[53] His main focus is on the role of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and its involvement with social justice and its fight for democracy during martial law and beyond. Notably, he spends much of his text on the evolution of the PCT as "an agent of social and political change."[54] He explains the PCT's devotion to human rights by its effort to identify with the native population, its long history on the island (which preceded the KMT arrival), its form of Christianity that focuses on communities and benevolent work. Perhaps most striking is his argument that the PCT is the "very embodiment of a universal and liberal form of Christianity."[55]

Rubinstein's work resembles my own in that we also look to these same variables to explain why the PCT began supporting democratization in Taiwan. He explains that the PCT ties to the native

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50 Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown, eds., *Religious Organizations and Democratization" Case Studies From Contemporary Asia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006).
51 Philip Clart and Charles B. Jones, eds., *Religion in Modern Taiwan* (Hawai'i: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003).
52 Rubinstein, "The Presbyterian Church in the Formation of Taiwan's Democratic Society, 1945 – 2004."
53 Murray Rubinstein, *The Protestant Community of Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church*.
54 Rubinstein, "The Presbyterian Church in the Formation of Taiwan's Democratic Society, 1945 – 2004," 110.
55 Ibid., 130.

population (especially Hakka), and its connection to the long history of the island, its norms and values have made its support to democracy more likely than other Protestant churches on the island. Rubinstein does not, however, provide adequate information as to why these points matter: How the founding of the church and its historical legacy impacted the direction of a church, how the membership composition influenced the given path of an organization and which norms and values are put forward over others, for instance.

In his analysis on the absence of Buddhist involvement in the process of democratization in Taiwan, André Laliberté[56] confronts the issue of how to understand this apparent silence and refusal to become involved. He also notes, like Kuo, that it is not enough to rely on their professed theology,[57] nor is any reliance on conceptions of "Chinese culture", which tend to be left vague and undefined.[58] Instead, in an approach that resembles mine, he seeks to properly contextualize them in their political environment, such as Foguanshan's membership to BAROC and the benefits received from this association,[59] along with the socioeconomic context that influenced their actions and attitudes.[60]

With regards to comprehensive (that is to say, looks at more than one religion / religious group), there are, as I have said, two key English texts that focus on the question of the influence of religious groups on democratization in Taiwan: Kuo Cheng-Tien's *Religion and Democracy in China* and Richard Madsen's *Democracy's Dharma*. Only the former, however, uses any sort of theoretical tools to analyze the question. The next part of this section will look at these two texts more closely.

While Kuo and Madsen's works differ in their views about the compatibility between democracy and religion, or the contribution of the latter to the former, they both agree that the older theories that underplay the role of religion in supporting or consolidating a democracy are problematic

[56] André Laliberté, "'Buddhism for the Human Realm' and Taiwanese Democracy," in *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006).
[57] Ibid., 60.
[58] Ibid., 61.
[59] Ibid., 62.
[60] Ibid., 63.

and do not necessarily conform to empirical data, and both believe that religious and democratic ideals are not mutually exclusive.[61]

First, this is clear in their choice of case studies. For Kuo, he studies a larger number of case studies than Madsen, both in the religions he chooses and the various groups that represent that religion. In fact, he sees a flaw in methodology with the focus on a smaller number of case studies.[62] To more accurately represent the ways in which religion in Taiwan interacts with democracy and democratic ideals, Kuo believes it is necessary to look at the religions worshiped by most of Taiwan's population (Christianity, Buddhism, Daoism, and so-called folk beliefs,[63] which, together, consist of approximately 78% of the population though the number is higher when folk beliefs are included.[64] Madsen's focus on Buddhists and Daoists is meant, in a way, to suggest that Christianity is not the only religion that holds this democratic potential.[65]

Second, as far as their methodology is concerned, both authors also diverge. Madsen's text, for the most part, describes the contributions of four Buddhist and one Daoist groups in instilling individual initiative, morality, civic virtue, a sense of community, and a strong sense of agency in Taiwan's rapidly growing middle class.[66] From a theoretical perspective, there is not much to criticize other than a lack of rigour when defining civil society and its influence on democracy and democratic consolidation. A consequence of this would be a lack of inclusion of more spontaneous movements, such as the student protests in Taiwan in 2014, who also contribute to the consolidation of democracy. Essentially, this research is meant to take the conclusions and descriptions of authors like Madsen bring out certain elements they either lack or obscure..

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61 Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 4; Madsen, *Democracy's Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Development in Taiwan*, xx.

62 Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 7.

63 It is important to note that the term folk beliefs (or folk religion) remains a contentious nomenclature for a wide variety of religious and spiritual practices. We do not wish to undermine this diversity, but for the sake of brevity we will use this term here.

64 Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*.

65 Madsen, *Democracy's Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Development in Taiwan*, 17.

66 Ibid.

Kuo's research does employ a certain theoretical approach when analyzing religious groups. He describes two variables: democratic theology and democratic ecclesiology. These are meant to assess the possibility of support from these groups and their compatibility with democratic concepts.[67] The former seeks to understand a group's religious ideals and their similarities to democratic ones. It represents the conceptual level.[68] However, this is not sufficient in gauging a group, because these ideals must be practiced, which consists of the ecclesiology, or structure, of the group and its compatibility with the aforementioned ideals.[69] For example, a highly centralized structure with a powerful, charismatic leader does not "cultivate rules and norms that are directly related to the functioning of a democracy,"[70] while a congregation that elect its leaders may.

This conceptual framework is problematic in a number of ways. It is the case that the theological foundation of a religious group, and its structure, does influence how it interacts with others on the political front, but not necessarily in the way that Kuo suggests. For instance, a strong, centralized structure with an all-powerful leader does not, in itself, lead to a lack of support for democracy or democratization. Instead, in anticipation of the theoretical chapter, it would create constraints on how members of the group would act, and what would be deemed an appropriate action. That is not to say that because they are centralized, a pluralist democratic structure would be inappropriate, but if they view their goals as spreading the faith, or contributing to charities, they would simply act in a way that would further those goals. A democratic society may or may not impede this, but it does not necessarily forgo the possibility of support.

This section sought to provide a sketch of the current, and past, field of research on the topic of religion and democracy in Taiwan. As I have mentioned, my research is not meant to replace or negate previous research in this field, but to offer a different set of questions and a different methodology to

[67] Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 6.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.

answer them. While Kuo and Madsen seek to understand *what* the influence of religion is for democracy, my goal is to understand how and why different religious organisations within one tradition, Christianity, chose to support democracy or remain silent. Now that we have analyzed the current research, the next section will examine the scholarship on religious policy in Taiwan, which will be followed by an analysis of the primary literature to be used.

Religious Policy

Kuo Cheng-Tien mentions that there are few texts that focus on the regulation of religion in Taiwan, whether it is the martial law period, or the democratic period that followed.[71] Among them there are works by Kuo, Laliberté,[72] Rubinstein, and Katz.[73] The information they contain on the history of church regulations in China is valuable for my thesis: they present the various laws adopted to regulate religion, from the Republican Era to the present, the various ministries that oversaw these regulations, the national associations that represented the religious groups in the political sphere, and so on. The chapter on religious policy in Taiwan will rely heavily on the information these texts provide: the laws, agencies, and government officials responsible for enacting them.

Primary Literature

While I will rely on previous work in the field in this thesis, especially the interviews conducted by the researchers and the data they have acquired regarding government policies, I will also use primary literature from the churches in Taiwan. For example, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, during its opposition of the KMT, published a handful of pamphlets stating its positions and how it

[71] Kuo Cheng-Tien, "State-Religion Relations in Taiwan: From Statism and Separatism to Checks and Balances," *Issues & Studies* 49, no. 1 (2013): 16.
[72] André Laliberté, "The Regulation of Religious Affairs in Taiwan: From State Control to Laisser-Faire?," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 38, no. 2 (2009): 53–83.
[73] Paul R. Katz, "Religion and the State in Post-War Taiwan," *The China Quarterly*, no. 174 (2003).

justified them. Three of these publications will be used at length in this research: The first is the "Statement of Our National Fate,"[74] published in 1971 and written by the Reverend Doctor C. M. Kao, who was the General Secretary of the Church from 1970 until 1989. In this publication, Reverend Kao answers questions regarding the political involvement of the Church. This involvement; according to other churches, was seen as improper, due to a common belief among them that religion should remain separate from the state. Using biblical and theological arguments, Reverend Kao outlines *why* on religious grounds, political actions by the Presbyterian Church are seen as proper and necessary. Two other publications, "Our Appeal"[75] (1975) and "A Declaration on Human Rights"[76] (1977), continue this trend, wherein the Church advocates for a transition towards a democracy and a respect of human rights by the KMT government (once again couched in religious language). Such literature also exists for the Local Church congregations in Taiwan, based on the theology of Watchman Nee and Witness Lee, which outlines how the various groups should operate and act in given situations, what their goals are, and how to accomplish them.[77]

These publications serve as primary material. They offer a historical glimpse into the norms and values of these churches, and how they are articulated in their respective institutions. Combined with the already written research on how these churches operate, how they are structured, and the roles of their leaders, these texts provide the information necessary to illustrate and validate the theory tested in this research. We have the linguistic paradigms used to communicate these values, the groups' goals, how each member ought to accomplish their given tasks, and what are the limits and parameters (i.e. what is an appropriate action in a given situation) with which they have to contend.

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74 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. "Statement on Our National Fate: Motivation Based on Faith and Theology (1972)." Accessed June 20th, 2014. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19720500.html

75 Ibid. "Our Appeal: Concerning the Bible, the Church and the Nation (1975)." Accessed June 20th, 2014. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19751118.html

76 Ibid. "A Declaration on Human Rights (1977)." Accessed June 20th, 2014. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19770816.html

77 Local Churches. "The Belief and Practices of the Local Churches" Accessed June 20th, 2014. http://localchurches.org/beliefs/index.html

Conclusion

This literature review had two goals: To present the current state of research on religion and democracy in general, and Taiwan specifically, and to outline the source material for the research. The former presented a variety of texts on the question of religion and democracy, from empirical research to qualitative work. Finally, I summarized the conclusions of two major comprehensive texts on the topic, which analyzed the major religions in Taiwan, and sought to understand what contributions they brought to democratic consolidation in the country. Both had different theoretical approaches; one statistical and the other more descriptive and historical. While important in their own right, this research poses different questions and utilizes a different theoretical framework to answer them.

To accomplish my research, two categories of literature are needed: Primary sources written by the government (laws and ministries), along with official church publications from the era that outline their various positions on issues, and previous research that explores church-state relations in Taiwan. Combining these with the previous work that describes the structure and actions of religious groups in Taiwan, it will add these elements with the theory to draw a holistic picture of their motivations and reasoning. The next chapter will outline the institutional framework needed to best utilize these sources.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Introduction

Faced with the evidence presented in the previous chapter of religious institutions' various attitudes towards democratization in Taiwan and the fact that there is so little explanation for this discrepancy, in this chapter I am discussing theories that try to address this issue. From previous readings, I have found existing institutional and organizational theories, specifically the logic of appropriateness and organizational culture, extremely relevant to understand and study the behavior of associations in general, and I propose to use that approach for the study of religious organizations in Taiwan. The foundation of this theory views the actions of an actor through his or her membership in a given institution or group, and how these actions are constrained by the norms and values of said group. This can be learned through explicit means, such as rules of conduct, or implicit means, such as learning through the actions of senior members.

This chapter will lay out the theory formally and then outline how it may have to be recast to fit the specific case of Taiwan. The first step in presenting my theoretical approach will be to describe the context and history of the institutional and organizational theories used in the thesis. I will first properly contextualize these theories and their typical objects of analysis (firms, government ministries, non-government groups, etc.). Then I will address how it can be applied to countries like Taiwan.

Once the theory has been introduced and contextualized, I will outline how I will operationalise the theory in the thesis. This section will lay out the concepts to be used: The logic of appropriateness, organizational culture, institutions / organizations,[78] norms and values, hierarchy, and socialization,

[78] No distinction is made between these terms. Institutions, organizations, and groups all point to the same thing.

through the works of Johan Olsen and James March[79], Tom Christensen[80], Edgar Schein[81], and others. These concepts make up the institutional environment that members operate which tells us how the institution itself will act. I will argue that to understand institutions, it is imperative to describe the structure of that organization and to understand its underlying culture. This means that an emphasis will be placed on members who come to associate their identity with the institutions in question and that their actions will reflect what a *proper* member would do in a given situation. Understanding this helps us understand the culture and logic of appropriateness of the institution.

The next section takes the framework and looks at the issue of adapting a Western theory to a non-Western subject. Scholars like Fan Lizhu[82], Eileen Barker[83], and Daniel Olson[84] mention multiple issues when using a Western theory outside of that context, such as the very definition of religion. The concern is that these concepts may not be commensurable with non-Western experiences. In our case studies, the repressive environment under the KMT in Taiwan presents a different type of institution than the firms and companies typically analyzed by these institutional theories. During the martial law period in Taiwan, there were restrictions placed on religious gatherings and events, along with a national organization that represented these groups in the political sphere.

Added emphasis will be given to sketching out the political and legal context in which religious groups operate. This means describing the laws on religious practice in Taiwan, as well as the structure and beliefs of the churches. These state-church relationships create a different atmosphere than the type of laws and regulation faced by the firms and ministries observed in typical institutional texts.

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79 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

80 Tom Christensen, Per Laegreid, and Paul G. Roness, *Organizational Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture, and Myth* (London: Routledge, 2007).

81 Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010).

82 Lizhu Fan, "The Dilemma of Pursuing Chinese Religious Studies within the Framework of Western Religious Theories," in *Social Scientific Study of Religion in China*, ed. Fenggang Yang and Graeme Lang (Boston: Brill, 2011), 87–108.

83 Eileen Barker, "Religion in China: Some Introductory Notes for the Intrepid Western Scholar," in *Social Scientific Study of Religion in China*, ed. Fenggang Yang and Graeme Lang (Boston: Brill, 2011), 109–32.

84 Daniel V.A. Olson, "Three Explanations of International Differences in Religion That May Apply to China," in *Social Scientific Study of Religion in China*, ed. Fenggang Yang and Graeme Lang (Boston: Brill, 2011), 61–86.

Concluding remarks will follow.

Context and History of the Theory

The theoretical framework is adapted from two distinct, but compatible, fields of study known as institutional theory and organizational theory. The concepts used in this thesis are the logic of appropriateness and organizational culture. Again, while they are both distinct, in certain ways, they emphasize much of the same aspects. The latter, in fact, uses the logic of appropriateness as one of its central tenants.[85] This section will serve to contextualize and describe the state of the theory today before adapting it for our means.

The brand of institutionalism that utilizes the logic of appropriateness is typically known as "normative institutionalism"[86] which has been spearheaded by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. The reason for this appellation, as B. Guy Peters explains, is due to how it "reflects the central role assigned to norms and values within organizations in explaining behavior."[87] For March and Olsen, the so-called rational theorists and their emphasis on individualistic actions were "individuals who are either rational utility maximizers or have many of their political values formed by sociological or psychological processes."[88] The goal of this theory is to look at formal institutions (such as firms or government departments) and understand the behavior of the actors involved. It also focuses on how institutions are formed, what brings about change in the practice of the institutions, how they operate, and what makes for a "good" (that is to say, effective) institution.[89]

Contrary to their supposed individualistic counter-parts, this brand of institutionalism claims that actors actively participate in, and instil themselves with, a certain brand of norms and rules that are

[85] Christensen, Laegreid, and Roness, *Organizational Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture, and Myth*, 41.
[86] Guy B. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), 26.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid., 25.
[89] Ibid.

"appropriate" for that institution. That is to say, it the institutions they participate in constrict and influence the way they act when representing that institution or how to accomplish certain tasks.

During the same time period, organizational theory was taking off, especially the concept of organizational culture, along with discourse and identity.[90] There are many overlaps between these three ideas due to the the use of language and meaning in conveying the norms and values of a given group. Mark Alvesson explains that during the 90s:

> [The] term organizational culture [was] used as an umbrella concept for a way of thinking that takes a serious interest in cultural and symbolic phenomena or aspects in organizations. This term directs the spotlight in a particular direction rather than [mirroring] a concrete reality for study. Culture refers to shared orientation to social reality created through the negotiation of meaning and the use of symbols in social interactions.[91]

An emphasis on communication of these social realities resembles the role of leaders in institutional theory, wherein they teach new members the "appropriate" response to situations and tasks with routines, rules, guidelines, and so on.[92]

However, after the 1990s, both the institutionalism of March and Olsen and the study of organizational culture faded from academic discourse. Alvesson explains that "academics and practitioners probably agree that shared meaning and the intersubjective are necessary conditions in reference to a range of topics from innovation, mergers, and change, to motivation and leadership."[93] Similarly, the focus on the logic of appropriateness has been fading over the years over criticisms of it being vague and difficult to define.[94]

Despite this loss of interest and criticisms, these theoretical approaches are seen as the best way to understand and analyze the behavior of members of religious organizations within China and Taiwan. However, the context of these approaches, that of formal institutions, does not necessarily fit the context and environment of these religious organizations. The latter sections of this chapter will

[90] Mats Alvesson, *Understanding Organizational Culture* (New York: Sage Publications, 22), 11.
[91] Ibid., 14.
[92] March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*, 24.
[93] Alvesson, *Understanding Organizational Culture*, 12.
[94] Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*, 42–43.

outline how it will be adapted and also specifically address the criticisms and limitations of the theory. The next section will focus on the concepts to be used in this thesis.

Theoretical Framework

With the context of the theory outlined, it is now time to sketch out the framework itself. This means not only defining the logic of appropriateness and organizational culture mentioned in the previous sections, but also what an institution is, what the individual actors are (along with the hierarchy that they occupy), and how meaning and rules are typically conveyed (in an institutional context).

The reason for this particular theoretical approach, as has been mentioned, is to look at religious groups as institutions or organizations that influence the actions of their members. Religion, in this sense, is not a universal quality that bestows a certain mindset upon individuals *a priori*, but is internalized and interpreted in a certain institutional context whether as rules of conduct or moral actions. I will start by defining the logic of appropriateness, followed by organizational culture, before delineating concepts like institutions, leadership, and socialization.

Organizational Culture

Organizational culture "has to do with the *informal norms* and *values* that evolve and become important for the activities of formal organizations."[95] This differs, to some extent, despite being influenced by it, from the logic of appropriateness which discusses formal rules and expectations that a member draws upon when acting in a given situation. Christensen et al. contrasts this with the instrumental aspects of an organization:

> According to a logic of consequence, goals are often given a priori, or are agreed upon by political leaders,

[95] Christensen, Laegreid, and Roness, *Organizational Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture, and Myth*, 37.

> and they are achieved via formal structures and norms. Goals in a logic of cultural appropriateness, by contrast, are discovered in the course of a process, while informal norms, values, and identities develop gradually.[96]

The authors explain that uncovering this culture is not as simple as the formal aspects:

> How can one grasp the organizational culture in a public organization? This is not as easy as finding out about formal norms, where one can take recourse in explicit and relatively easily communicated laws, rules, organizational charts and work manuals.[97]

These two aspects, the formal and the informal, are crucial in understanding the operations of an institution. The informal, which comprises the cultural aspect, emerges out of a gradual and organic process:

> Through *evolutionary, natural development processes,* the organization gradually adapts via internal and external pressure. *Unintended* and *unplanned,* these institutionalization processes create a distinct identity, a '*soul*' or *culture.* Culture is something an institution *is.*[98]

In essence, the organizational culture, according to this perspective, is not necessarily a deliberate creation, contrary to the formal rules and make-up of the organization.

Other authors combine the two as a whole: The formal and the informal. Edgar Schein, for instance, while still heavily emphasizing the informal aspect, also stresses the formal philosophy of an organization in his eleven models of culture, which contains "the broad policies that guide a group's actions toward stockholders, employees, customers, and other stakeholders..."[99] This contrast is even less apparent when it comes to institutional writers like March and Olsen, who explicitly include formal rules and routines when discussing their logic of appropriateness.

Despite this, authors like Schein still maintain culture as an implicit and not an entirely communicated phenomenon. He explains that "perhaps the most intriguing aspect of culture as a concept is that it points us to phenomena that are below the surface, that are powerful in their impact but invisible and to a considerable degree unconscious" and that "culture creates within us mindsets

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96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 38.
98 Ibid., 43.
99 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 15.

and frames of reference that [are] identified as one of a number of important *covert* processes."[100]

I will use the models of culture elaborated by Schein. He outlines eleven models in all. We will use 10 for our purposes and give a brief reason for their use in the Chinese and Taiwanese context. We will combine both the more formal aspects of an institution (such as what hymns to sing and how meetings will be organized[101]), along with the more informal aspects. An example of this would be the more formal ideology of opposition to the state (which is viewed as the Red Dragon) in the Eastern Lightning movement, but their implicit guideline to respect the laws and avoid protesting.[102]

Schein explains that these models "refer to a wide range of observable events and underlying force."[103] His examples point to the Western / firm context explained earlier, but are applicable to other groups:

1. Observed behavioral regularities when people interact: The language they use, the customs and traditions that evolve, and the rituals they employ in a wide variety of situations.

2. Espoused values: The articulated publicly announced principles and values that the group claims to be trying to achieve. An example of this would be a house church's goal of spreading the gospel to as many people as possible, or provide miracles, as their main goal.

3. Formal philosophy: The broad policies and ideological principles that guide a group's actions toward others, be it church members, the public, or the government. For example, this could include concepts of a social gospel, neoevangelism, or liberation theology.

4. Rules of the game: The implicit, unwritten rules for getting along in the organization, "the ropes" that a newcomer must learn to become an accepted member, "the way we do things around here," such as religious groups stating that they are not to get involved in the political sphere; that they should remain separate.

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[100] Ibid., 14.
[101] Emily Dunn, "'Cult,' Church, and the CCP: Introducing Eastern Lightning," *Modern China* 31, no. 1 (2009): 104.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 15.

5. Climate: The feeling that is conveyed in a group by the physical layout and the way in which members of the organization interact with each other, or with other outsiders. A Taiwanese church that demonstrates a Western architecture that demonstrates its foreign influence.

6. Embedded skills: The special competencies displayed by group members in accomplishing certain tasks, the ability to make certain things that get passed on from generation to generation without necessarily being articulated in writing. Such as the distinction between lay people and pastors, or those trained by the official church. Who performs the baptisms, for instance

7. Habits of thinking, mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms: The shared cognitive frames that guide the perceptions, thought, and language used by the members of a group and are taught to new members in the early socialization process.

8. Shared meanings: The emergent understandings that are created by group members as they interact with each other. This, along with the seventh variable, represents the religious context. Biblical foundation that contextualizes their mode of thinking. Thoughts and actions are filtered through these.

9. Formal rituals and celebrations: The ways in which a group celebrates key events that reflect that reflect important values or important "passages" by members. These could be large revival meetings, baptisms, or the ordination of a priest.[104]

It is important to note that the information required by these models might not be available. Issues of access, secrecy, and general lack of information mean it is possible that only half, if not less, of these models are available in the literature. This is part of the restrictive nature of religious studies in China and in Taiwan during the martial law period. When the information is absent, the most plausible assumptions and arguments will be made with a caveat that new information may cause the conclusions to change.

[104] Ibid., 16.

Logic of Appropriateness

In both normative institutionalism and organizational culture, the concept of the logic of appropriateness is key to our understanding. The idea is that the institutional setting, with its norms, rules, and values, will influence and constrain how the institution will act in a given situation, which makes the logic of appropriateness central to our research.

March and Olsen explain that "humans maintain a repertoire of roles and identities, each providing rules of appropriate behavior in situations for which they are relevant" and "to act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good."[105] An institution will have a given purpose or purposes and have defined means of achieving them. These aspects are then socialized into the members through various methods (training programs, courses, seminaries, and so on), typically through those who are ranked higher in the institution. The formation of their identity as a member of this group will trigger a process of matching, where given situations are resolved with pre-established and appropriate responses that emerge from the socialization.

As Christensen et al explained, this concept is the linchpin of the entire theory. It is the foundation through which we establish the concepts of culture, institutions, leaders, and socialization. All of these notions revolve around instilling in a new member what it means to act appropriately, what it means for them to be a member of this group, and how they accomplish that.

Institutions

The institution is my primary subject of research in this thesis. Specifically, religious institutions in the forms of churches. However, one of the main criticisms levied against the

[105] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "Logic of Appropriateness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 690.

institutional approach of scholars like March and Olsen is the vagueness of their concepts and how institutions are defined. Peters notes that "The term [institution] is also used somewhat loosely in sociology, often seeming to mean the same thing as an organization."[106] This is why the mixing of both perspectives is seen as commensurable and legitimate for this research project. Often, institutions and organizations are used interchangeably in the literature, as mentioned by Peters. Even scholars of organizational theory used both terms when referring to the same entity.[107] Similarly, both perspectives view institutions not as formal structures necessarily, but as a "collection of norms, rules, understandings, and perhaps most importantly routines."[108] Furthermore, and most importantly, "institutions are argued to possess an almost inherent legitimacy that commits their members to behave in ways that may even violate their own self-interest."[109] March and Olsen define institutions as such:

> Organizational arrangements that link roles/identities, accounts of situations, resources, and prescriptive rules and practices. They create actors and meeting places and organize the relations and interactions among actors. They guide behaviour and stabilize expectations. Specific institutional settings also provide vocabularies that frame thought and understandings and define what are legitimate arguments and standards of justification and criticism in different situations.[110]

Individuals join institutions, most likely willingly, and the institution, in turn, through the aforementioned linking of roles and identities, shapes their behavior when they are representing said institutions or acting within them. That is to say, they are not acting out of mere self-interest, but take into account the relational aspect of this institution and what it means to be a member. This is key for the theoretical framework and will be explored in more detail in the following pages. While I am emphasizing individuals, it is because they are an incredibly important variable when considering the institution as a whole. The members are the ones that are socialized into the culture and are told to follow the proper logic of appropriateness.

The definition of institutions still needs to be completed. For instance, institutions are not

[106] Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*, 29.
[107] Christensen, Laegreid, and Roness, *Organizational Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture, and Myth*, 43.
[108] Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*, 30.
[109] Ibid.
[110] March and Olsen, "Logic of Appropriateness," 691.

closed systems, and they did not emerge from a vacuum. According to March and Olsen: "institutions derive a good deal of their structure of meaning, and their logic of appropriateness, from the society from which they are formed. Thus, when individuals are inducted into an institution, he or she will in most instances have been pre-socialized by their membership in the society."[111] This conception, however, leaves out what this pre-socializing is and what the founders of the institution intend when forming their organization. The society in which institutions emerge will play an especially important role; specifically the political and legal environment. The various laws that govern religion in China heavily influence how the various house churches, who are technically illegal, behave, especially in relation to the state.

Leadership and Hierarchy

When it comes to transmitting and upholding the various rules and norms, and culture, of a given organization; the role of the leader or leaders is paramount. Christensen et al and March and Olsen all establish the importance of leaders. As mentioned earlier, the leader provides the authority and interpretative school that actualizes many of these rules. They provide a means for members to understand ambiguous situations where various conflicting rules may apply.

However, the authors mentioned do not go into too much depth in how one evaluates the role of a leader or which variables to look for when describing them. Mats Alvesson notices this lack of rigour in the description of leaders, wherein "'leadership' is defined in general terms. The diversity of relations, situations and cultural contexts in which superior–subordinate interactions take place means that a coherent definition with universal aspirations may tell us relatively little in terms of the richness and complexity of the phenomena it supposedly refers to."[112] The tactic is to be as broad as possible,

[111] Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*, 34.
[112] Alvesson, *Understanding Organizational Culture*, 93.

but at the cost of any descriptive power.

In following Alvesson's example, I will continue to apply our context-specific analysis when looking at various leaders in religious organizations. As Alvesson explains: "What is defined as 'leadership' calls for not just a theoretical definition but also close consideration of what a particular group mean by 'leadership' and how it relates to 'leaders' and 'leadership'. For different groups 'leadership' has different meanings and value."[113] Instead of outlying general characteristics of a leader, aside from the property of charisma, the very context of the organization in question will be analyzed. The leader will not be seen as a lone figure that is then inserted into the institution, but as part of a whole. As Alvesson explains, what is the case for one group may not be the same for another. It is not merely a leader-follower dichotomy.

It is possible, however, to establish one important variable in our analysis of church leaders: Charisma. C-Y Kao explains that many house churches have a Pentecostal-style of worship that focuses on miracles, faith healing, exorcism, and so on.[114] For instance, Kao argues that the success of a particular house church in a town, compared to the official church, was due to the leader having "charismatic gifts", using the typology established by Weber.[115] Weber describes this charismatic authority, with Christianity in mind, thus:

> Charismatic grounds--resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority). In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma.[116]

Alvesson also notes the power and influence of charismatic leaders. The influence of the individual is increased immensely by these traits. Followers "are more or less spell- bound by the key person. They

[113] Ibid., 94.
[114] C-Y Kao, "The House-Church Identity and Preservation of Pentecostal-Style Protestantism in China," in *Christianity in Contemporary China: Socio-Cultural Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 208.
[115] Ibid., 213.
[116] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Hendersen and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: Free Press, 1947), 325.

are willing to suspend critical thinking and disbelief and develop strong faith and emotional energy in the project of the charismatic leader."[117]

Another powerful influence on an organization's culture is that of a founder. The founder or founders of an organization set the initial culture and goals that are to be instilled in members and carried out. Their influence continues throughout the history of the organization, especially if they are still leading. Schein explains that "Founders not only choose the basic mission and the environmental context in which the new group will operate, but they choose the group members and thereby shape the kinds of responses that the group will make in its efforts to succeed in its environment and to integrate itself."[118] The founder provides the initial impetus that sets the field for future actions. In the context of strong founders and leaders, such as charismatic leaders, this foundation can be very pervasive and powerful. The Tzu-Chi Buddhist group in Taiwan, for instance, was founded by Master Cheng Yen in 1966, which she continues to lead today. Her writings and edicts establish her interpretation of Buddhism and also outline the organization and tasks of the various members. It is a highly centralized institution that derives its authority from Cheng Yen herself.

This section detailed the main elements that will be taken into consideration when evaluating the role of leaders in the religious organizations. It looked at the charismatic quality of the leaders, when applicable, but also evaluate each group contextually. No formal definition can truly be given without generalizing such individuals to the point of vagueness. Mostly, leaders will be understood and analyzed in their role and capacity as interpreters of norms and values. Also included will be the influence of founders in establishing said norms and the initial culture of the organization.

[117] Alvesson, *Understanding Organizational Culture*, 105–6.
[118] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 219.

Adaptation

Adapting the institutional and organization framework is not only an issue of taking it from its typical business / governmental context, but also whether or not it is possible to use a Western social theory to describe a Chinese situation. That is to say, whether or not this theory, which was developed in a distinctly Western context, is applicable to situations outside of this geographic and cultural setting or not, remains to be seen. Fan Lizhu addresses this concern by stating that "due to the cultural differences that exist between China and the West, a number of disparities and dilemmas have appeared in the academic research on religion in China."[119] These issues, Fan points out, emerge from using familiar concepts, such as Western definitions of religion, to explain various phenomena in China, which can lead to misunderstandings.[120] This section will look at these potential issues and explain how it applies, if at all, to the institutional and organizational theories described in this chapter. It will concern itself, first, with the very conception of religion in both Western and Chinese contexts, and, second, the issues with institutionalizing believers as it pertains to the political context found in China.

One of the main issues pointed out by Fan, which affects our research, concerns how religion is practised. Can we talk about formal membership to a religious institution, like a specific church, when talking about house churches in China? Fan describes the distinction as such:

> Within the Western cultural context, it is customary to assume that the possession of religious belief implies membership in a religious organization; hence, in discussing religion, a Westerner may inquire as to an individual's membership in a religious institution.[121]

This fact ties into the regulatory environment Protestant Churches faced in Taiwan. While they were not under any umbrella association, or specifically targeted with the laws on temples and shrines, such an environment existed. The Presbyterian's efforts to create their own national group were also frustrated by the KMT. These realities need to be taken into account.

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[119] Fan, "The Dilemma of Pursuing Chinese Religious Studies within the Framework of Western Religious Theories," 87.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid., 90.

Another issue is the concept of religion and religious belief itself. Fan, along with authors like Vincent Goossaert, contend that Chinese people "do not consider themselves members of a religion, but of a community: household, clan, professional guild, etc."[122] and, in fact, "it is in ordinary, everyday gatherings – rather than in formal religious organizations, - that many Chinese give expression to their deepest beliefs."[123] This means that, contrary to the "organizational structures and systematic doctrines common to the West, [Chinese religious belief is] immersed in the usual activities of daily life and expressed through the various elements of Chinese culture,"[124] such as "Chinese traditional medicine, the Chinese surname system, ancestral veneration rituals, augury, geomancy, and other local rituals."[125] It is often the case that when asked what religion they belong to, a "Chinese person is likely to respond, "It's hard to say!""[126]

This means that there a strict strict religious doctrine that is adhered to, as may be found in various Western countries. Protestants, for instance, may implement many facets of folk religions. We cannot directly compare Protestant belief in, say, Canada, with Protestant belief in China. This is further complicated by the forced breach of contact with Western missionaries during the Cultural Revolution in China, leaving many Christian believers on their own in understand and interpreting doctrine.

Response

How does this affect this research? Fortunately, the theoretical framework manages to avoid these pitfalls and indirectly applies the recommendations given by these authors. That is to say, to look at the specific contexts of religious groups and how they gather, instead of assuming, *a priori*, a strict

[122] Ibid., 91.
[123] Ibid., 95.
[124] Ibid., 96.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid., 90.

religious structure such as that of the Catholic Church. Even though they are called Protestants of various denominations, no assumptions are made in terms of their beliefs or organization. The various surveys written by scholars give emphasis to how these groups express their belief and what, exactly, they believe in, without resorting to Western assumptions. The context-specific nature of this theory allows us to bypass these issues, despite it being Western-based. It simply looks at *how* groups are organized and how this organization affects their behavior, which means that their beliefs are taken at their word and understood by their actions. There are no *a priori* assumptions made regarding their beliefs, nor do we transfer any other Protestant doctrine upon them.

As far as the structure and institutions of these groups are concerned, that is what the theory seeks to discover. The historical analysis of doctrine, structure, and actions are meant to illustrate how they are organized and how they act in given situations to establish a portrait of the group and general patterns. The roles of pastors and lay believers are not seen as identical to other believers in other countries, but understood through their own associations. No universal qualities are imposed before the fact, only it remains fully contextual. For example, the Local Churches are more of an affiliation of members and less organized / centralized than the Presbyterians and the Baptists. It would be incorrect to assume the the same beliefs and hierarchy of the Local Churches matches that of the latter groups.

Conclusion

The theory presented here, and the research project, is aimed at re-opening the topic of religion and democratization in Taiwan. It also represents the main contribution of this research to the field of religious studies. I argued in the literature review that many works that study the relationship between democracy and religion in Asia in general and Taiwan in particular often lack a theoretical lens through which to analyze the subject religious groups or their relationship with the state. This often takes the role of the place of ideas and values and how they influence the behavior of religious actors. However,

they tend to reify religious ideas without properly contextualizing them or examining how they are instilled into believers. They take on an objective and universal role.

This theoretical chapter demonstrates how ideas and values are socialized into members of a given religious institution. I argued that institutions have particular goals and philosophies that guide their actions and any ideal or particular value / norm is understood through them. New members are socialized into the organization via senior members and leaders who are seen as the legitimate interpreter of the given culture. Ideas of social welfare, for instance, can take many different forms if a religious group is interested in evangelism or education. It is key that we understand the organization culture of an institution or group before looking at how norms and values fit in. This is done by figuring out not only the organization culture and logic of appropriateness of an institution, but its hierarchy, the types of members, the strength and role of leaders, its foundation, and their goals. All of these factors work together to determine how an institution will act in a given situation (such as democratization).

The next chapter will look at the regulatory framework that governed religious activity in Taiwan during the martial law period. This is done for two reasons: The first is to test the hypothesis of whether or not autonomy of action might explain the PCT's active involvement the democratization movement. The second reason is to properly understand the political, legal, and social environment these religious groups operated in. It is important to make clear how the government sought to control religious groups and take that into consideration when figuring out an institutions goal and how they achieve them. Government scrutiny, infiltration, threats, and propaganda all impact how individuals act, especially in terms of opposing the government.

The final two chapters look at our case studies. This is done by splitting the churches into two groups: those that actively supported democratization in Taiwan (the PCT), and those who were either silent or critical of the movement (the Baptists and the Local Church). The aim is to understand which organizational factors influenced these three groups to act the way they did. Through the application of

the theoretical lens, I seek to find out the ins and outs of these three churches: their hierarchy, foundation, membership, past actions in relation to the government, and, most important of all, their organizational culture and logic of appropriateness.

Chapter 3

Religious Policy in Martial Law Taiwan

Introduction

This chapter's aim is to lay out the legal and political environment that religious groups in Taiwan operated in during the martial law period. It will begin with a short history of these laws in Taiwan, starting from the Japanese Occupation to the lifting of martial law in 1987. The laws governing religion will then be explored, such as the Laws Regulating Temples and Shrines, and the national umbrella associations that represented the interests of the believers of each religion, such as the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC), and the Chinese Regional Bishops' Conference. Interestingly, for our purposes, no such association existed for the protestants; the ramifications of which will be explored here, as well.

The goals of this chapter are twofold: First, establish one side of the institutional coin. Religious groups do not operate in a vacuum. One of our cultural variables regards the environment in which they operate. When trying to accomplish their goals, members of a given organization or institution will take into account the possible political and social repercussions of their actions, or if their interests are better served accommodating the state instead of opposing it. Second, to determine whether or not the general autonomy experienced by the Protestant churches in Taiwan during martial law explains the actions of the PCT. Other groups, however, such as Buddhists and Catholics, were institutionally linked to the government and lacked the freedom of action enjoyed by the Protestants.

It will be argued that while this may help explain why the PCT was able to be as vocal as they were, it does not give a full explanation since other Protestant churches in the country, such as the Baptists and the Local Church, were either silent on the issue of democratization or critical of the

PCT's advocacy and opposition to the government. This means that the legal factor alone is insufficient in understanding why, among the Protestant churches, the PCT alone acted in this way.

History

From 1895 to 1945, the island of Taiwan was under the colonial rule of the Japanese Empire. During this period, the Japanese enacted the "Kominka movement" of 1936, with the goal of assimilating the Taiwanese into loyal Japanese subjects.[127] This involved, among other actions, the expulsion of Christian missionaries out of fear for espionage, and forcing religious organizations to join state-sponsored organizations; thus putting them under political control, and forcing many Buddhist and Daoist temples to turn into Shinto temples.[128] As Kuo explains,[129] however, these efforts were short-lived and the island recovered from these events soon after retrocession.[130]

The island was given to Chinese control at the conclusion of World War Two (nominally led by the KMT). After riots erupted in 1947, the KMT enacted martial law. After their defeat by the Communist Party in Mainland China in 1949, "the ROC government and its ruling political party ... was forced to relocate to Taiwan, claiming then to set up a provisional capital in Taibei before an eventual recovery of the Mainland."[131] This retreat brought with it "members of the armed forces, civil servants, and party cadres" along with many who "feared persecution in the hands of the Communist Party."[132]

The KMT feared and suspected many of the religious organizations and believers who entered Taiwan without proper registration; they were seen with suspicion and as possible Communist

[127] Kuo Cheng-Tian. "State-Religion Relations in Taiwan: From Statism and Separatism to Checks and Balances," 15.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid, 16.
[130] Retrocession of the island is when the Japanese ceded control over Taiwan to the KMT at the end of the Second World War.
[131] André Laliberté. "The Regulation of Religious Affairs in Taiwan: From State Control to *Laisser-faire?,*" 61-2.
[132] Ibid, 62.

infiltrators.[133] This led the KMT to instal a Leninist party-state with a corporatist structure, which bear many similarities to the structure of the People's Republic of China, which will be defined later in this chapter. According to Kuo, the KMT managed to exert considerable control over religious groups during the Martial Law period, with many adopting submissive or separationist attitudes towards the government and the political sphere.[134] Eventually. many challenges against the regime began to emerge in the 1970s, with the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan releasing pamphlets calling for the lifting of martial law and democratization.[135] This opposition, along with the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party founded in 1986, culminated in the lifting of martial law in 1987, the relaxation of many regulations, and elections in 1996.

Regulatory Framework and Religious Policy

With the historical context established, this section will delve into greater detail on the various means of religious control undertaken by the KMT during the martial law period. This is the key historical period. The KMT, at the end of the Chinese Civil War, retreated to the island and declared martial law and established an authoritarian government. During this period, as I have mentioned, a growing movement advocating democratization opposed the government until martial law was lifted and free elections were held. As such, this section will look at the various government institutions and organizations that regulated and controlled religious activity in Taiwan. The Leninist-state, laws, and umbrella associations will all be explored. This will effectively outline the political environment that religious groups operated in and how it influenced their actions. There are not many comprehensive texts on religious policy in Taiwan during this period, as Kuo notes,[136] so I will rely heavily on his own work in creating this politico-legal outline.

[133] Ibid.
[134] Kuo, 18.
[135] Laliberté, 64.
[136] Kuo, 13.

In his texts on religion and democracy, and religious regulation in Taiwan, Kuo outlines the styles of government control and regulation over religion during the martial law period. During this time, the KMT government was a Leninist-state with a high degree of power, while the religious makeup of the country was pluralist and syncretic,[137] and the control over religion was a strong form of statism with little religious liberty.[138]

A Leninist party-state is defined as the infiltration of the reigning political party into every segment of society (in this case religion), to the point of establishing party cells in religious associations to influence their behavior, recruit members, and monitor their actions.[139] A corporatist structures, as defined by Kuo, are "social organizations based on the criteria of singularity, compulsion, government sponsorship, noncompetitiveness, and functional differentiation."[140] The latter manifested as a series of umbrella national associations that represented the interests of the various religions in the political arena. The Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (BAROC) represented the Buddhists, the Chinese Regional Bishops' Conference (CRBC) represented the Catholics, the Daoist Association of the Republic of China (DAROC) for the Daoists, and the Confucian Association of the Republic of China (CAROC) for the Confucians.[141] These were the only associations that were permitted to exist to represent religious groups politically.

What is interesting, and very important for this research, is that no such association existed for the Protestants. Kuo[142] and Laliberté[143] argue that their long-time involvement in Taiwan, their connections to powerful religious lobby groups in the US, and decentralized nature within the country, deterred the KMT to extend overt control over them. This differs from Mainland China where they are

[137] Syncretism, in the religious context, is the blending of two or more religious belief systems into a new system, or the incorporation into a religious tradition of beliefs from unrelated traditions.
[138] Kuo, 9.
[139] Ibid, 17.
[140] Ibid, 16.
[141] Ibid, 17.
[142] Ibid, 18-9.
[143] Laliberté, 64.

placed under the control of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and often lack foreign connections due to them being severed during the early years of the Communist government. This lack of structural control provides some insight into the institutional influences that motivated the leaders of the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan to protest the government in the 1970s. With the style of government explained, I will now proceed with the formal and informal means that the KMT used to control religion in Taiwan – focusing on the various laws, government departments, and methods deployed during martial law. Some of these laws do not directly target religious activity, but indirectly affected them.

When the KMT fled to Taiwan following their defeat, they brought with them intellectuals that were educated and raised during the Republican Period of China, taking that heritage with them[144] and it "remained unchanged for decades."[145] This included the Laws Regulating Temples and Shrines (1929): "It contained regulations on the registration of religions, religious buildings, artifacts, management, and finance."[146] Though it had limited success in Republican China, the KMT had more luck implementing it in Taiwan. The Laws Regulating Temples and Shrines did not affect Christians in Taiwan, however, but was restricted to the Daoist and Buddhist temples on the island.

These laws and regulations were often overseen by the Ministry of the Interior[147] and the First Office of the Social Works department,[148] but the success of this control, according to Kuo, came from the "various intelligence-gathering services": the local police, the Taiwan Garrison Command, the Investigation Bureau, the military intelligence office, and the National Security Bureau.[149] This included more informal means, as well, such as the party cells mentioned previously. This also included a party caucus within BAROC, but no such cells seemed to have existed in the temples, or in any of the

144 Kuo, 13.
145 Laliberté, 69.
146 Ibid.
147 Katz "Religion and State in Post-war Taiwan," 402.
148 Kuo, 18.
149 Kuo, 17.

Christian denominations.[150] These measures were effective in containing the activities of the various religious groups within Taiwan. Combined with an ideology that was already isolationist (which will be explored in the next chapter), the early regulatory framework of the KMT proved successful.

There was an eventual shift in these cultural policies from "mere negative control to promotion of its own agenda"[151]: To remove certain cultural elements it disliked. This led to the creation of two government agencies, with the most important one being the Committee for the Revival of Chinese Culture in August of 1967 "as a response to the Cultural Revolution in China (1966 – 1976)".[152] Paul Katz, in his article on religion and state in Taiwan, gives an explanation of their goals:

> This agency was mainly responsible for promoting the KMT's vision of Chinese culture (referred to as Zhongyuan wenhua or Zhonghua wenhua), which combined traditional Confucian values such as loyalty to the state and filial piety with doctrines created by party leaders like Sun Yat- Sen and Chiang Kai-shek.[153]

This process included various programs that affected religious practice, as well: "The MOI sought to regulate regular festivals as early as 1968, via a number of guidelines promulgated in a language that seemed neutral, but that had nonetheless the consequence of restricting local religious practices"[154] and the activities of the major religions. This is all despite Article 13 of the Constitution of the ROC supposedly guaranteeing the freedom of religious belief.[155]

With the changes in economic conditions and other factors in Taiwan, unrest at the government's tactics and authoritarian nature began in earnest in the 1970s, with the PCT outright opposing the KMT. This lead to the eventual lifting of martial law and a transition to democracy.

To summarize, when the KMT fled to Taiwan following its defeat, its concern for stability and

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150 Kuo, 18.
151 Katz, 402.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Laliberté, 69.
155 Laliberté, 67.

desire to law down its rule led it to view religious groups with suspicion – mostly due to the perceived possibility of Communist cells infiltrating them. Certain religious groups, also concerned with Communist takeover and their harsh attitude towards religion, went along with these policies (the details of which will be explored in the following chapter). These measures proved successful, with religious activity being limited and co-opted by the government, at least until the PCT actions in the 1970s.

Analysis

With the regulatory framework and actions of the government explained, what can be learned from them regarding the actions of religious groups in Taiwan? These laws and regulations cannot, on their own, fully explain why the PCT supported democratization and other Protestant churches did not. It might give some explanation, or rationalization, on the inaction of groups who were under the umbrella organizations and the infiltration of party cells in the churches, but this only goes as far as giving a possible reason for their inaction, not the inaction of Baptists and the Local Church. However, it is also not self-evident that opposition to these oppressive laws would motivate religious groups to protest. It may seem, on the surface, that advocating for democratization, much like the PCT did in the 1970s, would be in their best interest: freedom of practice, belief, publication, meeting, and organization of events, but many, such as Tzu Chi, remained completely silent during the martial law period, even tacitly supporting the government. Their interests, in fact, were seen as better served with the national associations, such as BAROC, and the influence it gave them to govern over believers. Furthermore, the PCT was not motivated by this freedom to oppose the government and support democratization. To understand this, we must delve deeper into the organization's history and beliefs, and how, and why, they choose to act on those beliefs.

However, aside from looking at the question of the role of religious autonomy in supporting or

hindering democratization, this chapter serves another purpose. These organizations operate in a specific political and social context, which has been described in this chapter. Their given environment is important, especially when we need to understand who they are opposing.

What we have is a set of regulations and organizations that set out to contain the religious element in society to better secure their place in the country. This process sought to, more or less, assimilate these groups and make them dependent upon and under the control of the government. The Protestants were in a favourable position compared to the rest. First, the Protestants had a considerable advantage over the other groups insofar that the Laws Regulating Temples and Shrines did not affect them, nor were they subject to a national association like the Buddhist, Daoists, Catholics and Confucians. Second, the various Protestant denominations seem to have been free of any party infiltration / party cells. Third, the PCT's foreign connections gave them powerful allies, especially in the United States, which the KMT were desperately trying to win over as their situation became more precarious in the 1970s.

These three points gives us an insight into why the PCT were as bold in their opposition. Rather then looking at their relative freedom of action as an indication of *why* they opposed the government, we should see it as an impetus to act. Their key place in religious matters and society allowed them to pursue their actions as much as they did. It is also important to note that the lack of regulation of Protestant denominations, compared to other religions in Taiwan, did not mean freedom from reprisal for opposing the government or free rein. During their protests and pamphlets that criticized the KMT, many Presbyterian church leaders were arrested and imprisoned.[156] Their actions were not without risk.

[156] Murray Rubinstein. "The Presbyterian Church in the Formation of Taiwan's Democratic Society, 1945 – 2004," 108.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to describe the political and legal environment religious groups faced in Taiwan during martial law. The KMT adopted a Leninist style of governing with a corporatist structure that included national umbrella associations. The aim was to infiltrate and control these groups for fear of subversion and infiltration from the Mainland, and to solidify their hold on the island. This involved laws that regulated buildings, organizations, events, and control over religious liberty.

The purpose of this is to give some emphasis to the government side when trying to understand the actions of religious actors, but not so much that the religious is subordinate to it. Not only do the institutions that these actors are a part of constrain and influence their actions, as the institutional framework argues, but the political environment adds to their considerations. When establishing what is an appropriate action when interacting with the public and society, and institution will also consider if their actions are appropriate in the political environment, especially when it comes to an authoritarian regime. Many churches have strict guidelines when it comes to interaction with the state and it is imperative to adapt that consideration to an institutional framework and sketch out what the state is when analyzing those guidelines.

The KMT's style of governance over religion also mirrors, in certain ways, the current modus operandi of the CCP government in the Mainland. Similar to the KMT, umbrella associations, or "official churches", are meant to represent the interests of these religions to the government. In the Mainland, however, this goes further with the training of the clergy and the approval of doctrine. The next chapter will look at the Protestant groups in Taiwan and sketch out their history on the island, their composition, the events leading up to the lifting of martial law, and the application of the theoretical framework to apply a rigorous means of understanding these actions and events.

Chapter 4

The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan

Introduction

This chapter presents our first case study: The Presbyterian Church. In contrast to our final chapter, the Presbyterians differ completely. The Presbyterians were the only Protestant group in Taiwan to publicly fight for Taiwanese democratization and self-determination. Why did the Presbyterians become supporters for democracy? What made them different from other Protestant churches that remained silent during these events? Did the church possess, from its inception, norms and values that made it compatible with such a stance?

This chapter will argue that their history tied them to the cause of the island, and that their norms and values had the seeds of democratic advocacy, though this support was often mixed if not non-existent at the time. For instance, they fought for the right to teach and publish using Taiwanese dialects instead of the mandated Mandarin, but were largely silent during the crack downs during the 2/28 Incident. This shows the evolution and change of the culture and appropriateness of the organization. They did not instantly come to actively support democratization, nor were their actions always in line with their beliefs in human rights deriving from God.

I will begin by outlining the history of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, focusing on their activities and relationship with the government, beginning from its inception in 1865 to the lifting of martial law in 1987. I will then look at the evolution of their norms and values and how the church adapted to the political situation in Taiwan. Starting from a timid, if not quiet, response to government actions during martial law, to publications of their support during the protest years. We will see these norms reinforced by the church membership, consisting largely of politically active Taiwanese. These,

together, present the theoretical factors that demonstrate the reasons why the Presbyterians acted as they did.

History

As of 2009, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan claims approximately 240 000 members[157] from a total population of 23 million (about 1% of the island's population). These members are spread out through 23 Presbyteries, with 1205 congregations.[158] Though numbers are scant for the early to mid 20th century, the PCT claims around four to five thousand baptisms at the beginning of Japanese rule (1895),[159] and, after the "doubling movement" in the late 1950s, 80 000 members.[160]

Despite representing such a small portion of the population, the PCT has been very active in Taiwanese society since its inception in 1865 (which is the year of their founding).[161] This includes the construction of schools and hospitals and establishing close links with the indigenous and Hakka population[162]. This section will give a brief overview of this history to give a sense of the church's role in society and its relationship to the state.

The mission was started by the British Presbyterian Church, led by William Burns and James Maxwell, who gained entry into Taiwan through the recently negotiated port treaties with China in the 1860s.[163] They were soon followed by George Leslie MacKay from the Canadian Presbyterian Church, who spent his time in the northern part of the island,[164] which counts a numerically important Hakka[165]

157 The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. "Structure and Statistics." Accessed on June 20th, 2014. http://english.pct.org.tw/enWho_int_Sta.htm

158 Ibid.

159 The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. "Our Christians Roots and Heritage." Accessed on June 20th, 2014. http://english.pct.org.tw/enWho_int_Cro.htm

160 Rubinstein, Murray. "Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan," 223.

161 The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, ibid.

162 Ibid.

163 Rubinstein, "Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan*,"* 207.

164 Ibid, 208.

165 The Hakka consist of approximately 15-20% of the Taiwanese population, largely descended from Guangdong

population,[166] This period of development consisted, as stated above, of the construction of schools, hospitals, and churches. As such, they were well established in the island before the arrival of the Japanese in 1895.

During the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, the churches in Taiwan were still heavily subsidized and influenced by their foreign founders in Great Britain and Canada.[167] This meant that few the people from the island were involved in the daily running of the church's affairs. However, during the 1930s and 1940s, the Japanese began enforcing new religious policy,[168] which began promoting Shintoism as the state religion and closing the schools, before finally expelling the foreign missionaries from the island.[169] This forced the churches to become autonomous and also allowed it to forge its identity, which would eventually culminate into a force for social justice,[170] and an opposition to a government that wished to enforce its control over their activities.

I argue that there are three significant periods and events regarding the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan following retrocession: 1) The 2/28 Incident in 1947 and the White Terror; 2) The formative years leading to 1965 (the Doubling Movement, especially); 3) The protest years, culminating in the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979.

Before the KMT was defeated by the Chinese communists and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, a defining moment in Taiwan's post-Japan history occurred two years previously. Rubinstein explains that the 2-28 Incident forced the Presbyterian Church and their leaders "to define the role that they would play in the now KMT-controlled island."[171] On February 28th, 1947, a conflict erupted between police officers and a woman trying to sell cigarettes (an illegal act). A bystander who protested the

immigrants.

166 Ibid, 209.
167 Ibid.
168 Which we have documented in our third chapter.
169 Rubinstein, "Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan," 210.
170 The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. "PCT Contextual and Holistic Mission." Accessed June 20th, 2014.
171 Rubinstein, "Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan," 211.

officers was shot, and the authorities refused to hand over the officers involved.[172] A riot broke out soon after. Two months after this event, thousands of KMT troops landed on the island and began killing the population in retaliation. This, according to Rubinstein, had a deep and lasting impact on the PCT leaders, who felt that they have to speak out not only for Hakka and indigenous islanders, but also for the whole population of Taiwan.[173]

Kuo, however, disagrees with this assessment of the PCT's actions during 2/28 and during the White Terror. He states that, before the 1970s, "Presbyterian churches were very submissive to and cooperative with both the Japanese colonial government and the KMT government" and explains that the "nightmares of the 2/28 Incident and the White Terror of the 1950s intimidated the postwar first-generation church leaders from thinking otherwise."[174] It is difficult to know for certain the motivations that influenced the PCT during this time. For instance, Christine Lin argues that

> While many participants in the first Taiwan independence movements were members of the Presbyterian Church, the PCT as an organization did not publicly support the independence movements during the twenty years following the 2-28 Uprising.

But she goes on to say that "although the government did target members of the PCT during the March Massacre, it was too dangerous for the PCT to publicly display its outrage during this period."[175] Though, according to Lin, the PCT "kept a low profile during this time and did not engage in any public activities that promoted Taiwanese identity or spoke out against the government,"[176] Rubinstein notes resistance by the PCT towards KMT policy involving the native Yuanzhumin's language rights: The PCT continued their efforts to romanize these dialects despite KMT policy. Though not an explicit or public demonstration against the government, it does present evidence against Kuo's assessment of total submission.

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172 Ibid, 214.
173 Ibid, 216,
174 Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan,* 43.
175 Christine Lin, "The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy," *Sino-Platonic Papers, 92* (1999): 28-30.
176 Ibid, 30.

Overall, it is difficult to blame the PCT for their actions during the White Terror. Death estimates from the 2/28 Incident range from 18000 to 28000.[177] It is not unreasonable for the PCT to lay low during these dangerous years. We still see that total submission was not the case. PCT members were involved in the riots of 2/28 and resistance towards KMT policy existed. It is true, however, that no political involvement like the one we see in the 60s and 70s existed, at the time. It took two decades and a sharp increase in Taiwanese members to develop, the latter of which we will discuss now..

Another determining factor in the PCT's history is the Doubling Movement, which had an immense influence on the membership of the Church and the composition of its leaders. From 1955 – 1965, "when a Ten-Year Double the Church Movement, culminating in the church's Centenary, succeeded in doubling both the number of churches and the membership. The indigenous churches increased especially during this time."[178] This had the effect of infusing the PCT with a younger generation of islanders, and generated "not only self-confidence but also sociopolitical consciousness among the new generation of church leadership."[179] This is incredibly important, especially in terms of our theoretical analysis in terms of membership identity, overwhelmingly Hakka and Yuanzhumin in composition. This is contrary to the island's population after the KMT arrived, which brought a large number of Han Chinese refugees and officials. The sense of the PCT being the church of Taiwan increased after this doubling.

From this point, starting in 1965, the PCT began to directly and openly oppose the government. Since 1949, it has disobeyed the government's edicts on the use of the island dialects in schools and publications. But now, as Rubinstein says, "the church abandoned the gentleman's agreement that it had with the neutral or more pro-KMT churches" and the government itself.[180] Starting in 1971, the diplomatic fortunes of the KMT were beginning to falter: Starting with the Security Council replacing

[177] Ibid, 28.
[178] PCT, "PCT Contextual and Holistic Mission." Accessed on June 20th, 2014.
[179] Kuo, ibid.
[180] Ibid, 224.

Taiwan with the People's Republic of China as the Chinese representative, and with the Nixon and Kissinger visits in Beijing.[181] This vulnerability motivated the PCT and others to begin protests and calling for reforms. The first of which was the "Statement on our National Fate," which outlined the Church's position and role in the political arena (which will be described in more detail in the Norms and Values section of this chapter). The publication of more pamphlets that touched on the subjects of self-determination and political reform followed in the late 1970s.

Tensions among the government and the population continued to rise, eventually exploding in 1979, with what was known as the Kaohsiung incident, when many protest leaders were arrested during rallies, including many leaders of the PCT churches, who remained imprisoned for the duration of the martial law period. The PCT showed its support to its leaders by keeping their posts vacant until they returned from captivity[182]. They continued these actions until martial law formally ended, and today still talks about political matters.

With the PCT's history established, I will proceed to the norms and values. We will see the evolution of their ideals and values of the PCT in terms of support for human rights that eventually translated into support for democratization.

Norms and Values

Looking at the history of the Presbyterians, it is clear that they developed a mission and gospel that eventually focused on social justice. We saw how their early mission focused on conversion and the establishment of various social services in the form of schools and hospitals, with what Rubinstein calls a social gospel, compared to the neoevangelism of the Baptists and Local Church (which we will explore.[183] We also saw that the early Church established a social gospel that advocated for the concern

[181] Rubinstein, "The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan," 120-121
[182] Rubinstein, "Christianity and Democratization in Taiwan," 236.
[183] Rubinstein, *The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan,* 36.

of the islanders in a material and societal sense: hospitals, language, and schools. They supported these issues in spite of Japanese pressure to conform to their own ideals. This is contrary to the next two churches in this thesis. In the cases of the Baptists and the Local Church, these core beliefs translate into their goals and explain their lack of involvement in the political, and even social, sphere. This is a marked difference with the PCT. The political opposition of the PCT became so important that some members, including the General Secretary, were eventually imprisoned.

Fortunately, the PCT published many texts that laid out their norms and values regarding democratization, and how it tied to their beliefs. In 1985, six years after the Kaohsiung Incident, the PCT Faith and Order Committee of the General Assembly wrote and published the "Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan." As I will show in the next chapter, there are many points that are similar, such as the belief that "the Church is the fellowship of God's people, called to proclaim the salvation of Jesus Christ and to be ambassador of reconciliation," but with an incredibly important difference: "It is both universal and rooted in this land, identifying with all its inhabitants, and through love and suffering becoming the sign of hope."[184] The emphasis on salvation and redemption, a common feature in the Protestant community, is also paired with a concern for humanity and their country's fate. They add an explicitly social element to their faith by stating that:

> We believe that God has given human beings dignity, talents and a homeland. So that they may share in God's creation, and have responsibility with Him for taking care of the world. Therefore, they have social political and economic systems. arts and sciences. and a spirit which seeks after the true God.[185]

This statement was published towards the end of martial law and seem to be a concise version of their religious beliefs following their previous political pamphlets. They serve, however, as a good religious context to view those publications. The PCT wrote the aforementioned pamphlets that stated their positions regarding the government and the fate of Taiwan. Their first statement, released in 1971,

[184] "Confession of Faith of The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan" in Lin, "The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy," 119.
[185] Ibid.

stated their concern regarding Nixon's visit to the PRC and how this might affect the people of Taiwan. To improve their diplomatic standing, the PCT suggested that the KMT hold elections to replace those that took power almost 25 years previously.[186]

However, these were not presented in religious terms. After the document's release, many questions and criticisms were raised against the PCT's involvement in political affairs. The Baptists, for instance, advocated for a separation of church and state, and the PCT violated that principle. Though I will discuss this more in depth in the analytical section, it is important to note how the theory ties into this issue. One of the cultural variables revolves around the notion of shared mental frames and a specific language to communicate norms and values. In the case of Protestant groups like the PCT, we see this as revolving around God and His purpose for believers on Earth. The PCT, a religious institution, sought to advise on political matters in a language that first came off as secular, which was interpreted as a breach of the separation of church and state, and beyond the scope of their organization's sphere of influence.

To counter these accusations, the PCT released a second pamphlet, also called the "Statement on our National Fate," but with an added subtitle: "Motivation Based on Faith and Theology."[187] The significance of this move cannot be ignored. A given value, on its own, distilled to its most general quality does not mean much in an institutional context. As I argued earlier, it must be interpreted through its own linguistic paradigm; in this case it is religious. Instead of merely calling for elections or advocating for social justice, members of the PCT Executive Committee gave a theological backing for their positions. They explain:

> Except for a few extremely conservative groups, however, most orthodox Protestant churches have encouraged their members to be responsible citizens and to participate in constructive activities in society and politics, and thus to be "the light of the world" and "the salt of the earth". This shows that

[186] Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. "Statement on our National Fate" (1971) Accessed June 20th, 2014.
[187] Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. "Statement on our National Fate: Motivation Based on Faith and Theology" (1972). Accessed June 20th, 2014.

> individual Christians do have a responsibility in the rise and fall of nations.[188]

For the PCT, human rights emerge from God and Christians have a responsibility to maintain them. Even the call for elections in the previous statement falls into this religious interpretation.[189] The separation of church and state, as the Baptists advocated, or the separation from the corrupt world as preached by the Local Church, was not seen as viable for the PCT.

This was followed by a third statement, "Our Appeal," which went even further. Once again, we must note that "The issuing of the "Statement on Our National Fate" was based on our church's faith in the Lordship of Jesus Christ over the world."[190] Here the PCT argued that "the government should establish a direct relationship with the church authorities, and that both sides share their views of the future of the nation and the reforming of society honestly together."[191] Furthermore, the statement reaffirmed the PCT's support for social justice and human rights and states:

> The church cannot, here and now, keep silent, sitting by and watching the world sink into ruin; besides participating in the spreading of the gospel and leading men to repent and believe in the Lord, it must express concern for the whole nation, for society, and for the whole of mankind. Only in this way will it not fail to live up to the mission entrusted to it by God.[192]

This, combined with comments about more conservative churches, indicates an attempt to separate themselves from isolationist churches like the Local Church and the Baptists, who maintained a strict separation from political concerns.

The PCT saw the need to help others in the political sphere as spreading God's love, whereas others viewed it as salvation from our sins. We see these same terms interpreted differently by each group, even within the church (where it seems the PCT tried to create unity within their own ranks).[193] The two other churches analyzed in the next chapter will provide a significant contrast to the PCT's

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188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. "Our Appeal: Concerning the Bible, the Church and the Nation." Accessed June 20th 2014.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.

interpretation of the Bible and a Christian's mission in this world.

These statements establish certain cultural variables. The espoused values and formal philosophy of social gospel / justice combined with conversion and evangelism demonstrates the new culture that developed in the 1970s for the PCT. To live a Christian life was to have a care for human rights. Most importantly, the linguistic paradigm that conveyed this was developed after the first statement was published. In a moment of crisis and challenge, we see, in fact, that the second statement addressed the very models and habits of thought that were necessary for their actions to make sense in their Christian context: Human rights come from God and to be a good Christian (to be a good member of this church) is to fight for these very human rights.

Organization, Hierarchy, and Leadership

The middle ground approach to leadership occupied by the Presbyterians, between authoritarian and completely deliberative or decentralized, lies in the existence of the General Assembly, which is "the highest decision-making body of the PCT," with the multiple medium committees making most of the "real decisions."[194] The responsibilities of the medium committees involved collecting the donations of local churches, decisions on church discipline, pastor recruitment, and financial allocations.[195] There was, up until 1985, more or less a superiority of the clergy over the laity. Pastors were responsible for sermons, baptism ceremonies, the Lord's Supper, and "other important sacraments."[196] All of the committee chairs (small committees, medium committees, and the General Assembly) had to be pastors, as well.

I explained previously that the leadership of the PCT was initially composed of foreigners, both British and Canadian. These leaders had a significant influence on the direction of the church in the

[194] Ibid, 42.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid.

early years, but eventually ceded their control over to native pastors. Kuo notes the lack of a supreme master who exercised total control over the churches. Instead, the leadership of the PCT General Assembly "[was] composed of the speaker, vice speaker, and general secretary," though the first two were only nominal leaders.[197] The general secretary is the highest rank in the central leadership, but it is not absolute. Though the general secretary can propose, coordinate, and execute various activities for the PCT, he or she is bound by the decision of the Assembly. These restraints, however, do not necessarily make the secretary a mere figurehead who is bound by the will of the Assembly. It would seem, given the actions of the General Secretary during the 1970s, that the PCT followed his lead regarding political actions.

This support was shown when the KMT began harassing the PCT in 1977 and 1978, first by confiscating and destroying copies of the *Taiwan Presbyterian News* which contained its declaration on human rights. The Northern Synod met to discuss church policy. First, it started by debating the actions taken by the church against the government. Second, it cast a vote on the re-election of Pastor Gao, who drafted and signed the documents criticizing the government, as head of the church.[198] In the first instance, the vote of support passed with 235 members being in favour, with 49 against, and 10 abstentions. The second vote saw Gao re-elected with 255 votes, with 49 against, and 8 abstentions.

As we see, though the power of the General Secretary, and the General Assembly, were not absolute, the leaders of the church still exercised influence over its running and direction. These checks and balances are important when understanding the deliberative nature of their hierarchy, but it is equally important to note that during the PCT's conflicts with the state during the 1970s, the General Secretary took charge of the church's positions regarding democracy, self-determination, and as a protector and supporter of human rights. In this aspect, the organizational culture of the church was

[197] Ibid, 41.
[198] Rubinstein, "The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan," 122 – 123.

directed by these leaders, especially Gao. However, it was also a process that demonstrated that the hierarchy, from all levels, supported these actions.

An important factor that influenced the actions of the PCT was the Doubling Movement, which I discussed earlier. I argued that an individual holds multiple identities, not just the one of the institution they belong to, and that members are both influenced by the institution they belong to, but also influence it in turn. During the Doubling Movement, many young Taiwanese people joined the church, bringing with them their concern for their rights and of opposition to the government. A closer tie to the island's history and concerns than the Baptists and Local Church, these Taiwanese did not have a pre-existing relationship with the KMT, nor were government actions towards them likely to garner their support. As Rubinstein explained earlier, this had the effect of influencing the PCT's stance towards the government.

Overall, the leadership structure, socialization, and membership composition all differed from both the Local Church and the Baptists. The decision-making process and input from members was more deliberative in the PCT than in the others, where the leader of each church has supreme authority. This, I argue, allowed the pressure from members to be heard and actually impact church policy regarding democratization and shaped how the institution as a whole acted during these important years.

Analysis

Now that I have introduced all major variables, I will look at how they impacted the Presbyterian's decision to support democratization. This means I will study the founding of the organization, its initial organizational culture, and its impact on the future path of the organization. As for the culture itself, it means that I will outline as many of the variables as possible to properly understand its nature. Then, I will analyze the leadership, membership composition, and actions of the

church to assess if the expressed norms and values are in line with the group's culture. I argued before that any value can be stated, but only the group's culture, its implicit norms and values, can tell us if they are adhered to or not.

First, the theoretical lens describes the power of a group's founding in terms of its emerging organizational culture. It sets the initial path followed by the organization. While this path can change, this initial culture is influential when it comes to future decisions. The PCT, in this respect, has a founding that differs greatly from the other churches analyzed in this thesis. In the first instance, the PCT established itself before the arrival of the Japanese and established a synod in the North, with a strong Hakka population, which helped determine the types of converts the Northern Synod would get. Though related to the Han Chinese historically, they became attached to Taiwan more than the mainland. This is especially relevant when we look at former President Lee Tung-hui's Presbyterian faith and his Hakka ancestry. Without attributing all of Lee's actions to these factors, it remains undeniable that a church as politically active as the Presbyterians, along with their engaged members, would have left a strong impression on Lee. It is important to stress the socialization of a church's norms and values into their individual members, Lee included.

Also differing from the other two case studies, they immediately focused on building schools and hospitals. This was later interpreted as the beginning of the church's concern for social justice. The church's long presence on the island and its focus on the local population, versus the Chinese-immigrants and refugees of the Baptists and the Local Church, had the effect of cementing their ties to the island. The connection to the mainland was nowhere near as strong as that of the other churches and this helped the church in its becoming a force for social justice. While the PCT's culture was not in any way democratic (which should not be expected given the historical period of the 1800s), a concern for the population in matters other than spiritual were influential when the church decided to oppose the government more than a hundred years later. They saw their early history on the island as concern for

Taiwan, and democratization for Taiwan was in the best interest of the population and had to be fought for.

Their support for democratization in the 1970s was seen as a natural progression from the church's starting point. While I acknowledge that this history and their past culture made the church more suited towards democratic support, it cannot inferred from these origins alone that they would have inevitably moved in the direction of democratic activism. This is exemplified in the PCT's apparent silence and passivity during the 2/28 Incident. Even Rubinstein, who argues that the PCT were, and remain, supporters of democracy, says that the church's response was not very vocal. He argues that they were biding their time, which, as we saw, Kuo denies.

Whether they were simply waiting for the chance to act or not, the PCT was not a player during the conflict. What does this tell us? It tells us that the PCT, as an institutional actor, did not fully possess, at the start, the means to enforce any potential democratic values it held. PCT members were active in the demonstrations in the early years, but without the public backing of the church itself.

Unlike the Baptists and Local Churches, the PCT's views towards democratization and political involvement changed over the years. Fortunately from the perspective of my research on this subject, the PCT published pamphlets that directly addressed their norms and values as they related to democratization, which we already touched upon in our norms section of this chapter.. However, there is a clear difference between their first publication in 1971 and their second pamphlet published the year after. In the first, they describe their support for free elections and Taiwanese self-determination, but notably lacked any religious language. I previously brought up the point that an organization's culture is immersed in a particular language that speaks to the members and to other groups who share that language (in this case, a Christian context). This falls into the modes of thinking and linguistic paradigms variables presented in the theoretical chapter. An institution's culture means that it will communicate in a way that is known to them. They come to understand events and act through these

paradigms. The lack of this language early on shows that the church was still adapting to this new situation and its organizational culture was still evolving when it came to political action.

A year later, the PCT second pamphlet outlined the reasons that justify why, in religious terms, its support for democratization was natural and in line with its stated goals. It discussed that human rights came from God and to be a good Christian, one had to work towards social justice for all. The mission of the faithful was not only one of spreading the gospel, which was strictly the case for the Baptists and the Local Church, but also one of political involvement. According to the Presbyterians, the fate of nations was important to Christians as it was part of God's mission on earth.. Concern for others was not limited to salvation, but involved taking care of their earthly needs, as well.

We see many cultural variables explicitly stated in the PCT statements. The formal philosophy of the group, which influences its goals and operations, was not limited to spreading the gospel, but also included, ”get involved in the actualities of modern society and through service seek to change the conditions of society.”[199] Their espoused values included not only Biblical ones, but concern for human rights and social justice. They also, though not immediately, adopted a language and mental model that tied these norms together in a religious context. These cultural values show that, over the decades, the church's norms and values developed into a culture that supported democratization.

The evolution of the organization's membership and leaders, a key theoretical variable that shows us how these norms and values are put into play, is also in line with the changes in the group's culture. At the start, the church was dominated by foreign missionaries and foreign financing; the day-to-day decision-making was out of the hands of the Taiwanese members. After the expulsion of the missionary leaders in the 1930s, the Taiwanese believers were left to fend for themselves without any outside support. The Taiwanese took control of the church and adapted to the political involvement of

[199] The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, “Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan: Concerning the Bible, the Church and the Nation.” (1975) http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19751118.html

the KMT controlled island, and began to express opposition, mostly in terms of their language rights. The Doubling Movement coincided with the eventual change in the governing body of the church. Rubinstein told us that this infused the church with fresh, politically active members. As our theory indicates, the multiple identities of individual members influenced their behavior in the church. These politically-inspired Taiwanese who joined the PCT added their voice to the church's own goals and purposes; harkening back to their history of social justice.

The leadership, though not absolute, showed how leaders determined the legitimacy and interpretation of norms and values. Pastor Gao, the General Secretary during the protest years, was instrumental in the content of the pamphlets published in the 1970s. The voting in the General Assembly also showed us that the various medium committees, key institutions with the PCT, largely favoured and accepted this political direction and its focus on self-determination, democratization, and human rights. For instance, the 1975 "Appeal" was "was adopted unanimously by the Executive Committee of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan on 18 November 1975 expressing the position of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan."[200] The votes for staying the course during the protest years and to keep Gao as General Secretary were passed by large margins. We see the more inclusive manner in which the PCT operates and can glean from it a broad support for the church's actions.

There are two important theoretical points to take away from this: The first is that despite the PCT's interpretation of their history as a natural progression towards democratic activism, it took time, effort, and change to eventually possess an organizational culture that was fully compatible with their eventual support for democratization. It took a surge of politically-motivated Taiwanese, for one, and a search for the proper way to interpret their cause in a way that fit their given religious context.

The second is that norms and values, on their own, are not sufficient in understanding a group's

[200] Ibid.

motivations and reasoning behind their support for democracy. Despite possessing compatible ideals, the PCT did not act against the KMT government much later. The 2/28 Incident represented a confusion between the PCT's stance as an institution and the members' support for the rioters. Over time, with a change in membership and a re-evaluation of their goals, norms, values, and philosophies, the PCT emerged as an opponent of the government.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the Presbyterians as our first case study. They alone among Protestants in Taiwan opposed the government during the period of martial law, and actively fought for democratization and Taiwanese self-determination. My goal, then, was to figure out which factors led to this activism and support. The research in my literature review argued that the ideals held by a particular religion influenced these decisions. While I agreed that norms and values were important, we were not certain about the degree of its influence and were concerned about the reification of religion. This is why I looked at the internal workings of an organization and how they worked with their norms and values.

I began by tracing the history of the Presbyterians from their inception in 1865 to the end of martial law in 1987. I saw an initial organizational culture that did emphasize social involvement and a concern for the local population. The membership at the time of the church foundation was Hakka and Yuanzhumin-based, which created more of a tie to the Taiwanese people than the eventual Han Chinese who fled to the island, and was an important distinction to other churches in Taiwan who mostly held Chinese mainlander refugees. However, any mass opposition against the government or any notion of democratization was non-existent at the time. The leadership was eventually transferred to the local population during the 1930s, after foreign missionaries were expelled, and the PCT had to forge a new identity. I argued that, during a critical moment (the 2/28 Incident), the PCT had not yet developed a culture that was critical of the state. It was only during the 1960s, when the church saw an increase in

membership and an influx of younger members, a reevaluation of its norms and values, and how they sought to put those into action. that the church became politically engaged.

From this, we see the evolution of the organization's culture regarding democratization. This change was immediately apparent in its pamphlets. The first pamphlet contained no religious linguistic and mental paradigms through which believers could interpret the statements of the church. After a round of criticisms, the subsequent publications couched their democratic statements and call of human rights through religious language. It was a language that was made to be compatible with an interpretation of the PCT history. It was also seen as a natural progression which developed from its concern for social justice at its founding. This carried over in the early years of the KMT presence in Taiwan up to the protests of the 1970s and 1980s, when the PCT stated that human rights were derived from God, which meant that a good Christian was someone who fought for them. The leadership of the church was also far more deliberative and represented more of a consensus amongst the members than the other two churches in this thesis. In this case, there was less of a need to socialize members into this new culture as the members were instrumental in bringing about this change. The overwhelming support of Pastor Gao during his fight against the KMT and his imprisonment demonstrates how universal this support in the culture was. Enforcement of norms was less necessary than in the other churches we will examine. That is to say, the voting records show that there was broad support for the church's actions. We will see that, in the case of the Baptists, the leaders had to threaten excommunications to force their members to fall in line.

This chapter presented a case where a church actively fought for and supported democratization. I identified key theoretical points that explained why this occurred. However, to strengthen these theoretical arguments, it is necessary to contrast the attitude of the PCT with case studies that were not active in the democratization movement in Taiwan: The Southern Baptists and the Local Churches. When the same procedure is used, the key differences will become apparent.

Chapter 5

The Southern Baptists and the Local Church

Introduction

Now that I have described the political and social landscape of Taiwan under martial law, it is time to look at our case studies. We have chosen three churches to look at: The Southern Baptists, the Local Church, and the Presbyterians. The first two, the subjects of this chapter, did not involve themselves with politics during martial law, nor did they support the Presbyterians when they called for democratization. How can we understand the inaction of the Baptists and Local Church? How did they differ from the Presbyterians in their organizational culture? Does this explain why they remained isolated from politics? The answer lies in our institutional and organizational theory. This chapter, similar to the previous, will analyze the institutional and cultural makeup of these churches to best determine why they choose not to oppose the KMT. Why did they decide to not support the PCT? I will examine aspects of the church's culture, and ask what their effects were on the decision to remain neutral in the confrontations of the 1960s and 1970s. Together, these factors will show that the Baptists and Local Church had a culture of neoevangelism that focused more on conversion and salvation, which strongly excluded any political involvement.

I will also look at the structure of these institutions and ask how that influenced the attitude of the churches towards the government. Did their neoevangelical philosophy inspire them to focus on conversion above any sort of political action? Was their leadership-style likely encourage passivity and obedience

The Baptists

History

Though smaller in number than the Presbyterians, as of 2009 the Baptists still boast a membership of 23000 members across 200 churches.[201] They also represented, and still do, one of the more organized Christian denominations in Taiwan. Their history in Taiwan begins after the end of Japanese control and their involvement in political matters was non-existent, which means that this section will be particularly brief.

There are many important differences between the foundation of the Baptist Church in Taiwan and the Presbyterian Church. The first involves its ties to Chinese Christians. Kuo notes that "compared to the Taiwanese Presbyterians who had little connection with Chinese Christians, the Taiwanese Baptists had a stronger connection with Chinese Baptists."[202] The American Southern Baptists, in fact, began their foreign mission in northern China in the 1920s and 30s[203] (about 70 years after the British and Canadian Presbyterians arrived in Taiwan). The Taiwan churches affiliated to the Southern Baptists were founded later, after retrocession, with the help of Chinese pastors.[204] This means that the early years of the church in Taiwan were dominated by foreign and Chinese leadership and financing.

The South Baptist missionaries only began establishing a church in Taiwan near the end of the civil war. This initial process, however, was more informal and consisted of ground work with Mandarin-speaking refugees and Chinese Baptists who fled from Mainland China to the island previously.[205] Similar to the beginning of the Presbyterian Church, foreigners made up the majority of the leadership. Their primary targets were Chinese immigrants; a marked difference from the

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201 Kuo, Religion and Democracy in Taiwan, 45

202 Ibid.

203 Ibid.

204 Ibid.

205 Rubinstein, *The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church,* 65.

Presbyterians who focused their evangelism on the Taiwanese population.[206] The Baptists in Taiwan were extremely isolationist. In that regard they took their cue from their American counterparts who insisted on the separation of church and state. The only difference was that they do not just want to keep the government out of religion, but they also wanted to keep religion out of the state: "Even this active isolationist view was revised into one of passivity."[207]

The Baptists shirked participation in other areas. Because of the earlier arrival of the Presbyterians and the Seventh Day Adventists,[208] schools and hospitals were already established,[209] which, to the Baptists, negated the need to get involved. Another reason for this lack of involvement, especially regarding schools, is the fact that the Baptists concluded that their efforts would be hindered by government regulation, which would reduce their ability to evangelize in these institutions. This lack of action, and the reasoning behind it, gives a clear historical example of the Baptists' willingness to stay out of issues that pertain to the government. Instead, according to Rubinstein, they focused solely on conversion.[210]

During their first decade of presence in Taiwan, the Baptists enjoyed great success. Their numbers grew rapidly. However, this slowed considerably in the 1960s,[211] which led to a reorganization effort that changed missionary responsibilities and accountability in the 1970s.[212] Regarding matters of church and state, they never supported any political party or candidate and during the conflicts between the Presbyterian Church and the government: "The Taiwanese Baptists chose to keep silent."[213] Compared to the Presbyterians, the Baptists remained wholly uninvolved in political activism.

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206 Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*: 45.
207 Ibid, 46.
208 Though they are not studied here, they constitute an important Protestant group nonetheless.
209 Rubinstein, *The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan,* 67.
210 Ibid, 66.
211 Ibid, 67.
212 Ibid.
213 Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan,* 49.

Norms and Values

We have seen, through Rubinstein's and Kuo's texts, that the Baptists in Taiwan are fairly conservative and isolated themselves from most facets of politics and society. They are part of a neoevangelical movement and view their church as the true church. Rubinstein explains that the neoevangelical churches have a "politics and theology [that] may be defined as conservative. The theology was heavily centered on the Bible and on the personal role of Christ in the believer's life."[214] This belief of being the one true church has meant that the Baptists kept their distance from interdenominational efforts undertaken by other churches in Taiwan.[215]

For instance, the Taiwan Baptists, much like their American founders, believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, the death and resurrection of Christ, the concept of Original Sin, and the need to be saved.[216] In fact, Rubinstein explains that "only when one recognizes one's sinfulness and that Christ died on the cross for man's sins can one receive the gift of God's freely given grace. By recognizing Christ as the Lord, the believer can then change his sinful nature."[217] This establishes the bedrock of evangelism and what it seeks to accomplish: To free humanity from their sinful nature by having them acknowledge their sins and accept that Christ died for their salvation.[218] This stands as the formal philosophy of the Baptists, which guided their actions and theological mission.

This meant that Jesus established the church so that believers who have been baptized may gather together to pray and "transmit the doctrine of the church, and preach the gospel and the principles of church organizations."[219] In a doctrinal sense, this meant that everyone, from pastors to new believers, were viewed as equal under God. However, in practice this played out differently, which will be explained later on in this chapter.

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214 Rubinstein, *The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan, 55.*
215 Ibid, 69.
216 Ibid, 68.
217 Ibid.
218 Calvary International Baptist Church (Taiwan), "Church Covenant and Statement of Faith," Section 1.05.
219 Ibid.

With evangelism as the key to implementing their goals, Taiwanese Baptists employed American methods, specifically those of C. E. Autrey and his *Basic Evangelism* text.[220] This revolved around the concept of pastoral evangelism, which undermined the concept of equality of all members. The pastor was the central figure in spreading the gospel and the tenets of salvation. This was done in a number of ways: Visitation evangelism (door-to-door visits to people in their homes) and large revival meetings, which were structured events with deliberate performances that focused on enthusiastic preaching, hymn singing, and prayer.

Another aspect that demonstrated their evangelical norms were their seminaries, which are key institutions in training and socializing members into the culture of the church. What is important to note in these seminaries, and in their publications as well, is how they emphasized and transmitted their norms. It demonstrates where their values lie: Most of the Baptist literature did not focus on the everyday situation of the citizens of Taiwan. They were made in Hong Kong and simply transplanted into another context without modification.[221] This gives us an indication of how their evangelism was applied, in a stark contrast to the Presbyterian example. The goal was to convert and grow spiritually, wherein politics and history were not major factors to consider.

Their lack of political involvement was also interpreted through religious subtexts. Their constitution explicitly states that "This convention insists on the separation of church and state."[222] As I've explained earlier, this was different from the American position of government removing itself from religious life; the Baptists viewed this separation as church retreating from political involvement. They interpret Matthew 22:21 (Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and unto God what is God's) by stating that citizens must obey the government unless government law violates God's law.[223] This is also made clear in Calvary International Baptist Church in Taiwan:

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220 Ibid, 70.
221 Ibid, 73.
222 Chinese Baptist Convention, quoted in Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 46.
223 Education Committee of Chinese Baptist Church 1985, quoted in Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 46,

> We believe that civil government is ordained by God in the interests of law and order within society, and that we should therefore pray for the governing authorities. We also believe we must honor and obey them in everything that is not contrary to the teachings of the Bible.[224]

We see, then, how the Taiwan Baptists interpreted their norms and values: both through religious doctrine and in terms of accomplishing their stated goals. These beliefs were maintained throughout the martial law period. Despite evangelism being a stated goal of the Presbyterians, the specifics of their evangelical goal, and the nature of their beliefs that drive it, differ. For the Baptists, it is about saving souls, especially since the return of Christ will cast out those who did not accept his salvation.[225]

Organization, Hierarchy, and Leadership

The Taiwan Baptist Convention has been strongly influenced by its Chinese origins and American guidance. In its early years, foreign leaders ran the churches and its various institutions. Those Chinese pastors who did run their own churches did so under the supervision of American evangelists, with a focus on converting Chinese immigrants.[226] Over the years, there was an eventual transfer of leadership to mainland Chinese pastors, who eventually transferred their leadership to their Taiwanese counterparts.[227] Despite this transfer, it is important to note that the main language of the Baptists in Taiwan remained Mandarin; which is a compelling contrast to the Presbyterians who not only preferred the Taiwanese dialects, but actively fought for their right to use it.[228]

We can see the effect of the founders and its heritage in the sort of buildings they built, which translate to the climate of an institution in our cultural analysis. This climate is the physical space that the members operate in. It reveals their influences and functions. As Rubinstein mentions, the Baptist

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[224] Calvary International Baptist Church, "Church Covenant and Statement of Faith," Section 1.10.
[225] Rubinstein, *The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan*, 69.
[226] Ibid, 46.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid.

buildings combine a Chinese sensibility with American practicality. We have, in material form, an indication of the influence both heritages had on the Baptists: Clear indication of their American and Chinese influence.

In terms of leadership style, the church's documents stated that they were "democratic, self-governing, spiritual groups ruled by God" and that "the rights and status among pastors, deacons, and co-workers, and believers should be equal."[229] However, this did not translate perfectly into practice. Though there were no supreme masters that ruled over *all* the churches, the individual churches had what Kuo calls "little masters."[230] This meant that strong, charismatic leaders with nearly unlimited powers governed their own local institutions. Kuo asserts that lay believers "did not feel uncomfortable with strong leadership, because they served in government institutions led by authoritarian leaders."[231]

While I do not agree with this argument (it is a leap in logic to assert that employment in an authoritarian institution necessarily leads to support of such a structure or to submission to it in other areas), the composition of the member is important. The Taiwan Baptist Convention is mainly comprised of Chinese immigrants: Many of whom fled to the island following the end of the civil war in Mainland China. I have mentioned before that the majority of the members were "teachers or military or government employees[232]." This is very significant, as I've argued that members of an institution have more than one identity. That is to say, they do not enter into an institution as a blank slate, but hold other responsibilities and beliefs that they then bring into the institution. Their identities as possible government employees and as Mainlander refugees fleeing from the Communists, were compatible with the Baptists' lack of interest in opposing government and anti-Communist stance.

We have here, then, many important elements for the theory to help us understand the actions of the Baptists during the martial law period. First, we have a decentralized organization that allows

[229] Ibid, 47.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid, 48.
[232] Ibid, 46,

considerable autonomy to its branch churches, combined with a lack of central headquarters / leadership. The closest institution, the Taiwanese Baptist Convention (later changed to the Chinese Baptist Convention) was very weak and lacked authority, money, and personnel.[233] Second, the leaders themselves tended to be charismatic, which arguably gave them a more dedicated membership, and are bestowed with great powers in how they run their congregation. Third, the church members were descended or are themselves Chinese refuges, many with links to the government.

An important event that gives an indication about the ways in which the leadership interacted with the church and its members, and how it enforced its rules and the culture of the organization, involves the court pastor to President Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek): the Reverend Zhou Lian-hua. Despite avoiding any political statements in his sermons to the president, Reverend Zhou was involved in the publication of the PCT's political documents, and very active in the process of indigenizing Christianity in Taiwan.[234] He was eventually given an ultimatum by the deacons of his church (Grace Church) to either stop his political involvement, or leave the church. He chose the former.[235] This demonstrates how the church clergy reacted to someone who was perceived as deviating from their core mission and its organizational culture. We see how the rules of the game were enforced by the leadership of the church and how the actions of this pastor were seen as contrary to the norms and values of the Baptists.

Having presented the history of the church, its founding legacy, its norms and values and how the latter determine its organizational culture, along with the leadership and hierarchy, I will proceed with the analysis.

[233] Ibid, 48.
[234] Ibid, 49.
[235] Ibid.

Analysis

When we look at the Baptists through the theoretical lens, it is clear that nearly every important cultural category points to how the Baptists differed from the Presbyterians. This section will draw out the key theoretical points that indicate why this is the case in the same way we did in the previous chapter.

First, their rules and norms that make up their organizational culture and logic of appropriateness all point towards political inaction. Recalling the cultural categories, there is little room for ambiguity regarding what the stated purpose of the church was and what place politics had in it. Their formal philosophy, which represents the broad ideational position that guides an institution's actions, and their espoused values both revolve around evangelism. This, in itself, is not surprising: Most religious groups concern themselves with evangelism. However, as Rubinstein indicated, the Southern Baptists were part of a neoevangelism that pushed a more conservative doctrine. The teaching of God's salvation took precedence over other concerns. While not as dismissive of worldly affairs as the Local Churches, the Southern Baptists certainly demonstrated a pragmatism that showed a strong emphasis for church matters only. Original sin, the need to be saved through Christ, the church as a meeting place to show the miracles of God and to espouse the teachings of salvation, along with beliefs in the end of the world all figured prominently. No where do we see any mention of social justice, as is the case for the Presbyterians.

To further strengthen this argument, there are other cultural variables: Observed behavioral regularities, mental models, linguistic paradigms, and habits of thinking, along with rituals and celebrations, which paint a similar picture. Institutions adopt their own language that legitimize and clarify their various rules. The Baptists, like the other churches studied in this thesis, adopted a religious language in their justification of political inaction. “One must render unto Caesar what is

Caesar's and God's what is God's." Affairs of state are in the realm of governments, while spiritual matters are the church's. Their rituals, their practices, also pointed towards the evangelical position they held. Their charismatic rallies, for instance, touched on the subject of salvation alone. The role of the church was to tend to the fruits of salvation that had been cultivated during these rallies:

> Revival meetings were structured events, almost performances. A suitable style of preaching had to be practiced---enthusiastic, simple, and close to basic Biblical teachings and messages. Preaching was only one element in revival, however. Hymn singing was also very important and music had to be selected for maximum effect. Special attention also had to be given to prayer; the powerful preaching set the stage for this central activity. Then, after a revival, its organizers had to develop a program of visitation to reinforce the work of the meetings. Every revival service and every worship service concluded with an invitation to accept the Savior-the key to evangelism and the central moment in any evangelistic endeavor, in the church, the home, or the revival hall.[236]

This falls into the category of charisma and the particular hold it has over people. We see within the revival itself many other rituals such as hymn singing. All of these traditions, put together, continue to point to the values of conversion and salvation.

In terms of leadership, despite supposedly being one member among equals, the pastors, who lead the individual churches, play a prominent role.[237] As spiritual guides, their place in the church was near-absolute. These "little masters," as Kuo calls them, controlled all facets of the church. Their embedded skills, another cultural factor (which consists of special tasks that only certain members can perform, thus giving them legitimacy and authority in an organization), enhanced their power. For instance, the pastors performs the full-immersion baptisms, a ritual that is seen as important for the Baptists and as more 'authentic'.[238] They also exerted control over the actions of members if they ever strayed into politics, such as the example of the President's chaplain being told to either cease his political rhetoric or resign from his post.

Another important aspect of the theory is the membership and the socialization of members into

[236] Ibid, 71-72.
[237] Ibid, 70.
[238] Ibid.

institutions. I mentioned how the Southern Baptists Church was composed mainly of mainland Chinese and not of Taiwanese (either Hakka or aboriginals). Ties to the political situation of the island during the Japanese occupation, for instance, was largely non-existent for the Southern Baptist Church, in contrast to the Presbyterians, who mention this as important in their development as an agent for social change.

The new members of the Baptist Church were also socialized almost immediately. Rubinstein tells us that after a conversion "the individual had to be shown that he or she had a role to play in the life of the church."[239] This was accomplished through institutions like Sunday schools and Bible studies, which "kept the individual within the church while teaching him spiritual growth."[240] Other means of socialization and integration were available, as mentioned above: the seminaries, for instance, trained new pastors and church workers. Once again, the culture of the church was demonstrated with the seminaries and publications lacking any sort of Taiwanese context – a sign of the indifference the Baptists held towards the political and social situation of the island.

All of these theoretical points, when brought together, help explain the behavior of the Southern Baptists during martial law. Upon arriving on the island, they saw that many social services, such as education and medicine, were already taken care of by other religious groups and the government. The early years did not see much involvement with the Hakka population or aboriginal groups, but instead focused on other Chinese mainlanders and refugees. This separated the Baptists from the concerns the islanders faced during Japanese colonial rule and at the start of KMT rule, along with a series of identities that were more compatible with KMT actions in regards to the fight against Communism and its ambition of reclaiming Mainland China.

Not seeing the need to involve themselves, or challenge the government's regulations on what

[239] Ibid, 72.
[240] Ibid.

could be taught in schools they instead focused all their attention on evangelism. This was accomplished through extensive campaigns, charismatic revivals, publications, and door-to-door visitations. The strong leaders in the individual churches also saw that this culture of isolation would be enforced. Socialization was immediate and taken very seriously. Salvation is key and must be conserved.

With the exploration of the Baptists completed, I will turn my attention to the Local Churches. Like the Baptists, the Local Churches did not involve themselves in the politics of Taiwan. Many of the traits we've noted as conducive to political isolation in the Baptists are also present here. In fact, some of these traits are even more pronounced; such as the strength and role of the leaders and the emphasis on salvation. I will repeat the process once more: Starting with the history of the church in Taiwan, its stated norms and values and how it shaped the culture of the organization, and its membership and leadership, followed by an analysis.

The Local Church

History

As of 2009, the Local Church is the second largest Protestant denomination in China (next to the Presbyterians) with approximately 91 000 members in Taiwan tied to 170 churches.[241] Since, like the Baptists, the Local Church has no history prior to 1949 in Taiwan, this section will also be brief.

The Local Church, also known as the Little Flock, was founded in China by Ni Tuo-sheng (Watchman Nee), an evangelist Christian, during the 1920s. Ni sent his disciple, Li Cheng-shou (Witness Li), to Taipei in 1949 to build a church and gather other members who had migrated from China.[242] This is similar to the chronology of the Baptist Church's arrival in Taiwan and its ethnic

[241] Kuo, 50.
[242] Ibid.

composition. The Local Church, like the Baptist Church, was comprised primarily of people born in China who had arrived in Taiwan in the mid-1940s. However, the main difference between the Local Church and the Baptist Church lies in the lack of a foreign support network for the former, and the fact that its founder was born in China.

Even compared to the Baptists, the Local Church's stance on political involvement is extremely isolationist. Kuo explains:

> Neither Ni nor Li were very interested in political issues. They never encouraged their church members to vote, organize political parties, become government officials, or join the army. The only connection between the church and the state was the Christians' prayer and their total submission to government laws.[243]

Kuo also adds:

> Although the Local Church claimed that their submission to government laws was under the condition that secular laws did not violate biblical laws, they have never publicly challenged any secular laws, including pro-abortion or pro-divorce laws.[244]

The primary focus of the Local Church was always evangelism. This focus was so pronounced that they "were not even interested in non-evangelical charity activities or community services, which they regarded as secular matters."[245] This is an important contrast to the Baptists who, while also advocating isolation from political involvement, had a different reasoning for not participating in school and hospital creation. The lack of evangelic opportunities was only half of the issue, the other being redundancy.

The history of the Local Church in Taiwan, due to its lack of involvement in most facets of society and politics, is rather short. Ni and Li kept a very close grip on their followers and any deviation from their orders was met with expulsion. During the martial law period and the Presbyterian's opposition to the government, Kuo states that the church "kept itself entirely out of

[243] Ibid, 51.
[244] Ibid.
[245] Ibid, 52.

politics before 1987,"[246] which is the year martial law was lifted. It was not until the death of Witness Li in 1997 that the position of an autocratic ended, with a new class of clergy emerging in the 1980s.[247] While there have been changes to the isolationist policy of the past, with participation in community services, the Local Church has not made many changes in its interaction with the state.[248]

Norms and Values

Some of the core tenants of the Local Church resemble those of the Baptists. On their main website, there is a series of documents that outline a range of beliefs and practices that are based on the writings of Watchman Nee. Common elements with the Baptists include Biblical inerrancy; God as the Trinity which co-exists "equally from eternity to eternity;" salvation through Christ, who is God made flesh, who came to Earth to become our "Redeemer and Saviour;" and a belief in the Second Coming.[249] Their stated mission stems from these beliefs, wherein they preach "the Gospel of Grace to sinners so they might repent and be saved" and wherein they seek to build up the church, which is seen as the Body of Christ, so that they may be ready for His return.[250] As such, their efforts were aimed at reaching so-called sinners and save them before the return of Christ. This plays into the conservatism we saw with the Baptists, where concern for social justice, like the PCT, is downplayed or ignored. When it comes to living a Christian life, the Local Church stated that a believer's new life begins with their regeneration (redemption through Christ), and advocated the following:

> The true Christian life requires a proper separation from this corrupt and evil world. This separation is not according to legalistic, man-made rules; it is according to the life and nature of the holy One who dwells within us. We are separated unto God by the redeeming blood of Christ, by the Holy Spirit, and in the name of the Lord Jesus. In order to live a proper Christian life, we must maintain such a separated position.

246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
249 The Local Church of Taiwan. "Our Beliefs." Accessed June 20th, 2014.
250 The Local Church of Taiwan. "Our Mission." Accessed June 20th, 2014.

> Although we are not of the world, we nevertheless live a godly life in the world.[251]

Despite having to live in this sinful world, members of the Local Church encouraged a separation from it. One must maintain a godly life in this world, so as to receive God's grace in the next. This statement encouraged a disconnection from society and an emphasis on church community. The church life consisted in "mutual care for one another," which involves the sharing of religious experience and support for believers (both practically and spiritually), but did not extend beyond this. Any contact with the rest of the world revolved around conversion.

The American branch of the Local Church, in its 1970s text on its beliefs and organization, corroborates this position. Directly addressing the notion of social welfare, it explains that "Certain of its [Local Church's] objectives, such as those to make a contribution to the social welfare of our secular society … must never be placed as primary church objectives."[252] These primary objectives are: the spiritual growth of Christians; recognition, development, and use of spiritual gifts; growth of Christian love; maintenance of Christian values; and spreading the Gospel.[253] The authors go on to say that "these are the bases for our existence as a church; we should direct our efforts, and our time totally to these primary objectives."[254] Kuo came across a similar sentiment when interviewing a church elder in 2002, who stated that "We absolutely abhor political and non-biblical activities on the church's premise" and added "they were not even interested in non-evangelical activities or community services, which they regarded as a secular matter."[255]

For the Local Church in Taiwan, its beliefs centered around an even harsher isolation from political and social life than the Baptists, even shying away from engagement in most forms of social welfare. Its stated goals focused on the spreading of the Gospel and salvation through Christ, with a

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[251] The Local Church of Taiwan. "Concerning the Christian Life." Accessed June 20th, 2014.
[252] Killinski, Kenneth K. and Jerry C. Wofford. *Organization and Leadership in the Local Church*, (Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1974): 137 – 138.
[253] Ibid.
[254] Ibid, 139.
[255] Kuo, *Religion and Democracy in Taiwan*, 52.

belief in his impending return. Whilst the PCT viewed church life extending towards the community in matters secular, the Local Church showed little to no interest.

Organization, Hierarchy, and Leadership

In terms of leadership, the Local Church goes even further than the Baptists' little masters. The church exercised its authority through the leadership embodied in Watchman Nee and Witness Lee: "Ni (Nee) was the supreme master of all church members, including Ni's successor, Li (Lee) Chang-shou, who served Ni as his own son."[256] Nee's writings served as the basis for instruction and interpretation of doctrine, along with the power of appointing elders in local churches.

A text written by two religious authors involved in the American branch of the Local Church backs this interpretation of leadership: "Those who are under this authority are to obey and submit to the leaders, imitate this faith, give them double honor, and are not to despise their acts of leadership."[257] They comment that modern society wishes to move away from this style of leadership, and deplore this lessening of authority.[258]

Despite individual churches' autonomy, as suggested in the name Local Church, the informal headquarters is responsible for the training of workers, owns all of the property owned by the churches, collect all of the donations, and makes the decisions regarding activities and personnel. If they disobey, they are excommunicated and driven out of the church.[259]

A major difference between the Local Church, and the Baptists and Presbyterians also lie in the composition and influence of the leadership. Whereas the latter two had foreign guidance, the Local Church was founded and run by native Chinese in China itself. As Kuo notes, Nee was influenced by Western evangelism in his training, but he developed an "indigenized theology critical of the principal

[256] Ibid, 51.
[257] Killinski and Wofford. *Organization and Leadership in the Local Church*, 152.
[258] Ibid, 153.
[259] Ibid.

churches but accessible to ordinary Chinese."[260] Its foundation in Taiwan consisted of an evangelical effort towards immigrants and Chinese refugees, similar to the Baptists.

Analysis

The factors that I argued important to explain the Baptists' inaction in politics are even more present in the Local Church. Similar to the Baptists, the Local Church was founded in Taiwan near the end of the Chinese Civil War and did not have any pre-established ties with the islanders – it was disconnected from the islanders' struggles and history. Another similarity is the focus on Chinese mainlanders and refugees, further distancing the church from the Hakka and aboriginal population. Many who fled to the island did so with the KMT government, fearing Communist repression.

In terms of norms and values, and the organization's culture, each facet I identified with the Baptists are also more severe in the Local Church. The attention paid to salvation and acknowledging one's sin is the foundation of the Local Church's activities. As we have seen, this is emphasized to the point where Christians should only concern themselves with spiritual matters, and not care about worldly-matters. It is all in preparation for the Second Coming of Christ and the end of the world. The pragmatism seen in the Baptists' decision to shirk any sort of community services is seen here as a core tenet instead. Anything that detracted from spreading the gospel and nurturing spiritual growth was seen as irrelevant.

We also see one very important similarity between the Baptists and the Local Church that helps us understand its underlying culture better. It is the explanation that isolation from political activities is in line with religious doctrine and that the church must only interfere when secular law violates Biblical law. Just as with the Baptists, however, the reality is that even when such clear violations occurred, the church remained silent. It is clear, once again, that stated ideals, on their own, are insufficient. It is the culture of the Local Church, how they understand and view these ideals, and enact them, that mattered

[260] Ibid, 50.

in the end.

In terms of leadership and enforcement of culture, we see, once again, the similarities with the Baptists. The absolutism of the leadership, however, is even more intense. Instead of the little masters, the Local Church was run by Ni and Li since its inception in China and Taiwan up until the death of Li in 1997. Ni and Li's interpretation of Biblical doctrine was absolute. The couching of norms and values in religious language, an important part of our theory, demonstrates the power and authority the two founders had over their members and the enforcement of said values. In fact, Kuo tells us that "except for the supreme leaderships of Ni and Li, the relationships among believers and between the clergy and the laity are much more equal than those in the principal churches."[261] The churches and members must obey or face expulsion.

Similar to the Baptists, then, it is not surprising why the Local Church chose a path of isolation from political involvement. Many of the theoretical factors I argued influenced the decision of the Baptists are present in the Local Church, as well.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the final half of my case studies. In looking at the Southern Baptists and the Local Church, the goal was to present two case studies that did not participate politically in Taiwan during martial law. Using both institutional and organizational theories, I analyzed three major themes: the history / founding of the churches; their norms and values (both explicit and implicit); and their leadership and membership (the latter of which is tied to notions of identity). These three broad categories, grouped together within the concepts of organizational culture, helped determine which factors contributed to their inaction. Many of them existed in both churches.

Both churches were founded in Taiwan towards the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1948-49.

[261] Ibid, 51.

These dates are significant as they exclude the Baptists and Local Church from being present during the 2/28 Incident. Their targets for conversion were Chinese refugees and other mainlanders (who tended to be Christians of other denominations). The membership of the Church was more in line with the KMT than the islanders when looked at from the perspective of identities: Government employees, for instance.

The stated norms and values of each church placed a strong emphasis on salvation, to the point of totally neglecting any involvement in society. In an example that illustrated this implicit culture, the leaders made it clear to members that even though they claimed that secular laws had to be in line with Biblical laws, no actions were taken when violations occurred. We also saw the example of the court pastor told to cease his involvement with the PCT's campaigns or face expulsion from the church. These moments reveal the culture of the organizations these members belong to.

In terms of leadership, both had strong pastors governing the affairs of the churches. It is important to note that I am not arguing that an authoritarian structure makes any given group more prone to supporting a similar government-type, as Kuo does, but that when it comes to understanding the role of leaders in enforcing the group's culture, an authoritarian style means more emphasis and weight is given to leaders than individual members when analyzing a given institution.

What is significant about these traits, however, is how they are mostly absent from the Presbyterians. We see that the Presbyterians had a different history in Taiwan compared to the Local Church and Baptists, along with a Hakka-based membership, and norms and values that promote the preservation of human rights. This contrast makes it clear why the PCT differed so much from these churches and go far to explain why they decided to oppose the government during the 1970s.

Conclusion

This paper sought to apply an institutional and organizational framework on Protestant churches in Taiwan to better understand their actions towards democratization during the martial law period.. Central to this task was discovering each church's organizational culture, the implicit norms and values that influenced how a member acted. We argued that past research on the relationship between religion and democracy reified religion and its core tenets without giving due weight the individual variations that may exist within each denomination and argued that certain religions, such as Protestant Christianity, were compatible with democracy.

To demonstrate this problem, I looked at research and pointed out how common a reliance on theology was in explaining why religious believers supported or acted against a particular issue. We saw the argument that the Vatican II Council changed how Catholics approached democratization throughout the world, or how Protestant Christianity had values compatible with democracy, making it more likely for believers to support it. These often lacked any sort of theory to explain the connection between the values of a religion and the actions of said believers.

To offer a solution for this problem, I analyzed three churches in Taiwan: The Presbyterian Church, the Southern Baptists, and the Local Church. I chose Taiwan because it is a country that went through a period of authoritarian rule before democratizing, and I chose these three churches because though they are all Protestant, only the PCT actively fought for democratization in Taiwan. This provided me with a useful historical sketch with which we could apply our theory.

I asked the question: Why did only one Protestant church out of many decide to oppose the government? The answer, I argued, was in how each church organized themselves and enforced their norms and values. The latter, on their own, was insufficient to understand the action or inaction of

individual churches, even if they were all nominally part of the same denomination.

Theory and Application:

To better understand the variation within each religious group, I applied an institutional and organizational framework, with organizational culture at its core. Though a Western-based theory, it allowed us to create a lens through which we could analyze each organization in their own context. This meant looking at how each church was founded and the decisions and actions the initial leaders took that eventually formed the initial culture. This culture helped set the future path of the church and influenced any decisions from then on. Of course, the theory is not deterministic and any conclusion is based on the most probable path given past actions.

Though I criticized how prominently norms and values featured in past research, they still played a crucial role in my work. However, these norms had to be placed in their proper context; they did not simply exist in a vacuum outside of the those who held them. In terms of organizations, each organization had a way of socializing their members into the group via leaders, senior members, publications, and training.

Though my focus was on institutions as political actors, this still meant that members also played a prominent role in the theory. Each member, I argued, held a number of identities. This could mean identities as employees, church members, or of a particular ethnic group. These identities influenced an individual's actions: They look at which decision is the most appropriate for the identity they are currently holding at the time. As a member of a given church, would participation in a democratization movement be acceptable? Or will their identity as, say, a Taiwanese override the other identity, as a religious believers, and compel them to act differently? In turn, these members, depending on how much sway they held, could influence the workings of an institution. In the Prebysterian church, the influx of new members with strong political sentiments came to dominate the church

structure and change its culture. Two such members, as I've mentioned before, were President Lee Teng-hui, the reformer who oversaw Taiwan's democratic transition, and Peng Ming-min, the DPP candidate that faced Lee in 1996.

Overall, this meant that I was able to look at these case studies throughout the martial law period and understand why they chose the path they did. Certain values and how they were enforced, the influence of the members, and its resulting organizational culture shed light on these questions. I discovered that the largely Hakka and Yuanzhumin membership of the PCT, their social gospels and theology that was tied to the well-being of Taiwan, along with past advocacy for islander rights made their support for democratization more possible than the Baptists and Local Church, who not only advocated separation from church and state, but their highly centralized authority allowed them to enforce these norms on dissenters.

Limitations, Concluding Thoughts, and Future Research

I outlined a number of limitations in my research in the introduction in terms of methodology, language, and scope. First, my approach to this thesis was one of a review of current research. I did not conduct any field work. This meant that I restricted myself to research and publications without any interviews or on-site research.

Second, the fact that I do not speak or write Mandarin Chinese meant that the access to research was limited. I restricted myself to English language research on religion and democracy in Taiwan. This also meant a reliance on translations of religious publications and government laws, which meant that there were likely other texts that remained unknown to me.

Third, the scope of the thesis meant that I could only look at a handful of case studies when the religious sphere in Taiwan is far greater than I could hope to analyze. Though only the PCT was active in the democratization movement, there were many Protestant churches that chose to remain inactive,

not just the Baptists and Local Church. However, for the sake of space and to give each church enough time, I decided to focus instead on the largest of the churches in Taiwan at the time.

Despite these limitations, I was still able to make several important points on the subject. While it may seem obvious that more conservative churches were more prone to silence, and the liberal ones more supportive of democratization, other important variables needed to be taken into account. First, even though the Southern Baptists and Local Church were both isolationist towards the state, it did not mean that it was universally approved. I pointed out clear examples of members stepping out of line to oppose the government or speak on political matters. The fact that the leaders of both groups had to either give ultimatums or excommunicate members underlines the importance individual members in how an institution acts. Enforcement of norms and values, along with the identity and values of members, play a crucial role in shaping the institution's culture. Those actions also demonstrated that not just the leaders, but the members themselves, were an important theoretical variable to consider.

This also opens up many avenues of potential research for other countries, especially China. The People's Republic of China shares a common history with Taiwan and many of the policies put in place by the PRC resemble those of the early Republic and KMT-controlled Taiwan. I encountered the same issue with the research on China emphasizing that certain religions, especially Protestant Christianity, hold immense potential in pushing for democratization[262] and a lack of specifically theoretical work to understand the actions and positions of the Protestant house churches.[263]

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[262] Gerda Wielander, "Bridging the Gap? An Investigation of Beijing Intellectual House Church Activities and Their Implications for China's Democratization," *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 62 (2009); David Aikman, *Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Transforming China and Changing the Global Balance of Power* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2003); Carsten T. Vala and Kevin J. O'Brien, "Recruitment to Protestant House Churches," in Popular *Protest in China*, ed. Kevin J. O'Brien (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Kim-Kwong Chan, "The Christian Community in China: The Leaven Effect," in *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Asia*, ed. David H. Lumsdaine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[263] Mark McLeister, "A Three-Self Protestant Church, the Local State and Religious Policy Implementation in a Coastal Chinese City," in *Christianity in Contemporary China: Socio-Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Francis Khek Gee Lim (London: Routledge, 2013); Carsten T. Vala, "Protestant Reactions to the Nationalism Agenda in Contemporary China," in *Christianity in Contemporary China: Socio-Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Francis Khek Gee Lim (London: Routledge, 2013).

The same approach used in my thesis can be applied here. That is to say, I can utilize the abundant research on Protestant churches[264] in China and church-state relations[265] to theoretically evaluate the religious groups in China and evaluate their potential in supporting democratization. Many of the traits identified in my thesis, for instance, seem present in some of these house churches. One example is Eastern Lightning which, despite seeing the PRC as the embodiment of Satan, still tells its members to obey the laws and not disrupt the peace.[266] This demonstrates the need to look deeper than the stated values of the house churches, which our research encouraged.

To conclude, this thesis attempted to instigate a new line of research into the study of religion and democracy in Asia. It hoped to go beyond any essentialist claim regarding religion and treat it like any other set of values that are grounded in a given organization. Despite the limitations of case studies, language, and approach, I've managed to outline important traits that can help us determine the potential actions of religious groups in countries that are not democratic.

[264] Emily Dunn, "'Cult,' Church, and the CCP: Introducing Eastern Lightning," *Modern China* 31, no. 1 (2009); C-Y Kao, "The House-Church Identity and Preservation of Pentecostal-Style Protestantism in China," in *Christianity in Contemporary China: Socio-Cultural Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Joseph Tse-Hei Lee and Christie Chui-Shan Chow, "Christian Revival from within: Seventh-Day Adventism in China," in *Christianity in Contemporary China: Socio-Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Francis Khek Gee Lim (London: Routledge, n.d.).

[265] Hong Qu, "Religion Policy in the People's Republic of China: An Alternative Perspective," *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 70 (2011): 433–48; Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin, eds., *God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, n.d.).

[266] Dunn, "'Cult,' Church, and the CCP: Introducing Eastern Lightning," 100.

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