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Major Research Paper
The Boko Haram Insurgency - Driving Factors Behind the Existence of the Boko Haram Group
in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the factors driving the emergence and evolution of Boko Haram, the Islamist group that has displaced some 2.2 million people and killed close to 20,000 people in Northern Nigeria. It traces the group's emergence to multiple factors, including Nigeria's colonial history, political instability, the role of ideology, the North-South divide, and the role of Northern political elites in contributing to the backwardness of Northern Nigeria. The paper also shows how the contemporary insurgency has historical echoes of Islamist groups of the 19th century. Finally, the paper proposes some counter-terrorism strategies to curb violent extremism in Nigeria.

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“It takes billions of years to create a human being. And it takes only a few seconds to die.”

— Jostein Gaarder

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
LIST OF ACRONYMS	v
Introduction.....	6
Chapter I: Historical Background - Political Instability	8
North - South Divide – Neopatrimonialism.....	15
Chapter II: Boko Haram.....	22
Introduction: Boko Haram Islamism.....	22
Why Insurgency Exists	32
Funding of Boko Haram	35
Reputation of Boko Haram	39
Chapter III: Counter Terrorism Strategies for the Nigerian Government	44
Conclusion	46
Annex A: Anatomy of African Terrorism.....	49
Bibliography	50

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AG	Action Group
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BH	Boko Haram
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
EPRM	European Protestant Reformation Movement
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IS	Islamic State
ISWAP	Islamic State's Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya
NCNC	National Convention of Nigerian Citizens
NGN	Nigerian Naira
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC	Northern People's Congress
PDP	People's Democratic Party
RAS	Revenue Allocation System
SALWs	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
YIM	Yusufiyya Islamic Movement
DPA	Distributable Pool Account

Introduction

Since 2009, Nigeria has been experiencing a deadly insurgency led by Boko Haram (BH), after the extrajudicial killing of its leader Muhammad Yusuf by the police. The group is known as “Jama’atul alhul sunnah lidda’ wat, wal jihad” (translated as “Association of the People of the Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad”) or “Boko Haram”. In March 2015, the group pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (IS) and now, the group calls itself “Islamic State’s West African Province” or “Islamic State’s Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya” (ISWAP).¹ However, the group is still referred to as “Boko Haram”. The group is responsible for the deaths of 15,525 civilians between May 2011 and May 2016.² Furthermore, BH has overtaken the IS as the world’s deadliest organizations.³ The insurgency has internally displaced 2.2 million people, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.⁴

President Muhammadu Buhari, after assuming power in May 2015, vowed to eradicate the insurgency militarily. The military operations have been quite successful as BH is losing ground. However, it still remains a serious threat to stability and peace in Nigeria. Due to historical political instability, i.e. the collapse of successive governments because of military coups and the lack of ability of the government’s institutions to support the needs of its citizens,⁵ the people of Northeastern Nigeria have lost confidence in the federal and state governments and their politicians. The communities have distanced themselves from participation in the political and governmental system.

¹ "Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants 'technically Defeated' - Buhari," BBC News, accessed July 15, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618>

² "Nigeria Security Tracker: Mapping Violence in Nigeria," *Council of Foreign Relations*, June 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483>

³ Rose Troup Buchanan, "ISIS overtaken by Boko Haram as World’s Deadliest Terrorist Organization," *The Independent*, November 17, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.html>

⁴ Vincent Foucher, "Boko Haram is losing ground – but will not be defeated by weapons alone," *The Guardian*, May 13, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/13/boko-haram-losing-ground-will-not-be-defeated-by-weapons-alone-lake-chad-basin-summit>

⁵ "Global Peace Index," *Institute for Economics and Peace*, last accessed June 20, 2016, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2016/NGA/OVER>

The paper will provide an analysis of the political culture of Nigeria, which is mired in political instability, and the North-South divide fostered through neopatrimonialism. The paper aims to explain how the political and military struggle for power has created resentment and economic decline in the whole of Nigeria, but particularly, in Northern Nigeria, which produced an environment conducive to the birth of different insurgent groups including the Maitatsine Movement and Boko Haram (BH). In addition, the paper will explore the historical development of Islamism in Northern Nigeria and how it has contributed to the birth of such movements. The birth of the BH insurgency is complex. The group came into being because of converging economic, political and religious factors. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the factors that can explain the birth and development of the BH insurgency and its survival, despite muscled military operations since spring 2015. The paper will also propose some counterinsurgency strategies that could help eradicate this violent group in Northeastern Nigeria.

Due to the impossibility of fieldwork and the difficulty of gaining first-hand information on violent insurgency groups, the paper draws on secondary sources, including peer reviewed journal articles as well as newspaper and magazine articles. The paper also incorporates data from reports from Human Rights Watch and Mercy Corps. The latter's report "Motivations and Empty Promises" comprises interviews conducted with former BH members who either willingly or unwillingly joined the group.

Chapter I: Historical Background - Political Instability

While still a British colony, Nigeria was declared a federal state in 1954 with the introduction of the Lyttleton Constitution. It comprised a national government and three regional governments: Eastern, Western and Northern.⁶ In 1960, when Nigeria gained independence from Britain, there was optimism about the future of the country. However, it became mired in political instability at the very onset of independence. This section of the paper outlines the historical context of Nigeria, as the factors that gave rise to the BH insurgency are embedded in the country's history. One of these factors is political instability. From the onset of independence, Nigerian politicians have focused on the contest for power between the ruling governing class belonging to the majority ethnic group in each region and their minority counterparts. As a consequence, the political elite became detached from the population in its struggle for control over the federal government. Political instability was also created by governments replaced one after the other by successive coups, which did not provide the adequate environment for the government to create and implement policies of development.

For the purpose of this paper, 'political instability' will be defined as "the propensity of a change in the executive, either by constitutional or unconstitutional means"⁷. From the onset of independence, Nigerian politics and political parties have been divided along ethnic, tribal and regional lines. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) was composed of the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups of the North; the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), of the Igbos of

⁶ Ladipo Adamolekum, "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria," *Publius*, 21,4 (1991): 1, accessed April 4, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330307>

the East and Mid-west; the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), a Christian nationalist party, and Action Group (AG), of the Yoruba in the West.⁸

The First Republic (1960 – 1966) was composed of a coalition of NPC and NCNC whereas the AG remained in the opposition. The latter was systemically attacked by the coalition government, including the federal government declaring the state of emergency in the Western region in 1962, and clearing the Western Regional Assembly by police force. Most of the party leaders were detained without trial. When the emergency was eventually lifted, the AG regional government was not restored. Instead, it was replaced by AG defectors and NCNC party members.⁹

During the tenure of the First Republic, the contest for power was over the control of the federal government. At the same appeared the contentious issue of creation of states in Nigeria. The aspirations for the creation of new states began seriously in 1954, when the regions were formally institutionalized as political entities, especially with the adoption of the federal system, which gave residual powers to the component units.¹⁰ After independence, the AG of the Western region was disadvantaged because it was excluded from the cabinet. The federal government further weakened the opposition's political base by carving out a Midwestern region out of Western region, thus making the country a federation of four regional governments instead of the previous three.¹¹ "Major parties supported the creation of more states for minority groups,

⁸ K.C Anyanwu, "The Bases of Political Instability in Nigeria," *Journal of Black Studies* 13(1982): 101, accessed, April 3, 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2783978>

⁹ Douglas G. Anglin, "Brinkmanship in Nigeria: The Federal Elections of 1964-65," *International Journal* 20, 2(1965):3 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40199517>

¹⁰ Henry E. Alapiki, "State creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy," *African Studies Review*, 48, 3 (2005):53 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>

¹¹ Ladipo Adamolekum, "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria," *Publius*, 21,4 (1991): 5, accessed April 4, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330307>

but only outside their own regional power base. It was obvious that the creation of any new states or (regions) would come from a region that was excluded from the central government”¹²

The North’s political primacy compelled an Igbo group (eastern and Christian) of mid-ranking officers to launch a coup d’état on January 15, 1966. The coup was bloody: the federal Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa and the Premier of the Northern region Ahmadu Bello were assassinated, along with other senior Northern officers.¹³ In the light of these events, what remained of the federal government gave the power to the army’s General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. The military aimed to remove the federal system and replace it with a unitary government. General Ironsi promulgated Decree no. 34, which abolished the regions and transformed Nigeria into a unitary state.¹⁴ In the beginning, the coup was welcomed by the Nigerian population. However, later on, it was seen as a plot by the Igbo to dominate Nigeria.

Six months after the coup, a second coup d’état was orchestrated on July 29, 1966, by Northern army officers. General Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed and most senior Northern General Yakubu Gowon took power. He abolished Decree No. 34 and re-instituted federalism in Nigeria, with a total of twelve states.¹⁵ The military governor of the Eastern Region, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, refused to accept General Gowon’s accession to power.¹⁶ Furthermore, he also rejected General Gowon’s move to split Nigeria’s existing four regions into twelve states, particularly the division of the Eastern region. Colonel Ojukwu thus declared the Eastern Region an independent

¹² Henry E. Alapiki, “State creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy,” *African Studies Review*, 48, 3 (2005):9 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>

¹³ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. *Nigeria: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991, accessed April 3, 2016, <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/22.htm>

¹⁴ Ugbana Okpu, “Nigeria’s Dilemma: Development or New States,” *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi E Documentazione Dell’Istituto Italiano per L’Africa E L’Oriente*, 38, 2 (1983): 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852774>

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4

¹⁶ Jonathan Hill, “Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile?,” (United Kingdom: Palgrave, 2012), 67, Kindle Edition.

Republic called Biafra.¹⁷ Civil war broke out between the federal and Biafran forces on July 6, 1967, and lasted until January 15, 1970, when the secessionist Biafra was defeated. The civil war resulted in the death of 1 million civilians who either died of fighting or of hunger.¹⁸

The military periodically ruled Nigeria from 1966 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1998, promulgating and then annulling hundreds of transitional decrees. Successive military leaderships have been mainly responsible for the creation of states. Closely connected to the creation of more states was the formal establishment of a three tier federal system in 1976, with the country being gradually divided into a number of local government areas (LGAs) which rose from an initial 50 to over 700, whereas the number of states rose from an initial of 3 to 36 today.¹⁹ One of the reasons for this fragmentation is oil revenues; the multiplicity of authorities and agencies occurred due to 'fiscal federalism or centralization of oil revenues',²⁰ allowing the state to distribute oil resource to key allies. Nigerian political elite became fixated on creating an "oil nation".²¹ Thus, the very national identity of the country became the one of an oil nation.

During the colonial period, the revenue allocation principle was based on the derivation principle; the regions enjoyed 100% of their revenues. The North kept the revenues from groundnut and cotton, the West kept the revenues from cocoa, and the East kept the revenues from coal and palm oil.²² Nigeria is split between agricultural and solid minerals rich Northern states, and oil rich Southern states. In a federal government system, there is sharing of power

¹⁷ Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Odumegwu Ojukwu", accessed April, 5, 2016 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Odumegwu-Ojukwu>

¹⁸ "Biafra Thirty Years On," *BBC*, January 13, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/596712.stm>

¹⁹ Ugbana Okpu, "Nigeria's Dilemma: Development or New States," *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi E Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per L'Africa E L'Oriente*, 38, 2 (1983): 74, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852774>

²⁰ Adedotun O. Phillips, "Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 21, 4(1991): 2, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330314>

²¹ Michael Watts, "Resource curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria," *Geopolitics*, 9,1 (2004): 72, DOI: 10.1080/14650040412331307832

²² Oyedele Kazeem Lamidi, Francis Oluyemi Fagbohun, "Advocating for Direct Revenue Allocation to Nigerian Local Governments: A Catalyst for National Development," *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research*, 5, 6(2013): 1, <http://www.academicjournals.org/journal/JPAPR/article-full-text-pdf/EB0461B41327> (accessed April 8, 2016).

between two or more tiers of government and the revenue allocation is based on two mechanisms. The first mechanism is based on vertical revenue sharing between the federal government and other levels of government. The revenue is generated from royalties, exports, import duties, mining rates, etc. The second mechanism is the horizontal revenue sharing. “Horizontal revenue sharing arises out of variations from the revenue generation capacities of component units”.²³ It works on the logic that the areas which have a higher income pay higher revenues to the central government, which would then redistribute some of these revenues to areas with lower incomes.

The problem in the horizontal mechanism of revenue allocation has been the formula for sharing revenues among states and regions. Sixteen sharing principles were recommended by different commissions. However, out of the sixteen principles, only three dominated the revenue allocation system i.e. derivation, population and equality. During the colonial period and the post-colonial period ‘till the 1970s, each region heavily relied on the derivation principle and wanted to derive maximum benefit from the natural resources located in the geographical area it controlled.²⁴

In 1970, by a decree of the military government, the Federal Revenue Allocation System was changed and a new formula was adopted to divide the “Distributable Pool Account (DPA)”, which allocated 50 percent of resources equally among states and 50 percent proportionally, according to their populations.²⁵ This formula worked in favour of those regions that had a higher number of states and population, whereas regions with a lower number of states and

23 Chukwunonye Abovu Akujuru, “Revenue Allocation in Nigeria, Dependency on Oil Revenue: The Need for Alternate Solutions,” *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, 3, 2(2015): 5, ISSN: 2052-6369

24 Adedotun O. Phillips, “Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues,” *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 21, 4(1991): 2, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330314>

25 Henry E. Alapiki, “State creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy,” *African Studies Review*, 48, 3 (2005):12 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>

population saw a decline in their revenues. Thus, regions with a fewer number of states agitated to have more states created to restore the financial status quo. Only in this way can one understand how and why, between 1966 and the present, the number of Local Government Areas (LGAs) and states has grown so drastically. The purpose of the creation of numerous states and local government areas worked against “the creation of a national imagined community of [Nigeria] of the sort that is synonymous with nationalism”.²⁶ In fact, all these political entities called states and LGAs have become vehicles for massive corruption and fraud. In addition, the consequences and effects of change of the DPA in 1970 *de facto* penalised the states which were less densely populated.

It was initially assumed that the new states would work on the principle of minority recognition and development. However, this was not the case; new states rarely represented marginalized minorities. Instead, they were often the creatures of local political barons trading support from the military regime for access to new resources.²⁷ The introduction of centralized revenues fragmented and destabilised the institutional and political practices.²⁸ In addition, changes in the formula in the DPA made the political and military elites maximize the population of their states in order to attain maximum revenues, which also resulted in the politicization of the census.²⁹ The reason for the politicization of the 1962, 1963, 1973 and 1991 censuses was that seats in the National Assembly were allocated on the basis of the population. Furthermore, the number of local governments in a state was also dependent on the overall size of the

²⁶ Michael Watts, “Resource curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” *Geopolitics*, 9,1 (2004): 72, DOI: 10.1080/14650040412331307832

²⁷ Brandon Kendhammer, “Getting Our Piece of National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21, 2 (2015): 15, DOI:10.1080/13537113.2015.1032023

²⁸ Michael Watts, “Resource curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” *Geopolitics*, 9,1 (2004): 73, DOI: 10.1080/14650040412331307832

²⁹ Henry E. Alapiki, “State creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy,” *African Studies Review*, 48, 3 (2005):8 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>

population. For these reasons, whenever there was a census in Nigeria, people living away from home were forced back to their local governments to register.³⁰

The government's practice of creating states between 1967 – 1996 adversely affected the population in all three original regions i.e. Northern, Southern and Western. For the majority of the population, state creation only brought misery because soon after the state creation exercise, conflict arose over the distribution of assets to be shared among states. This made national political integration difficult because Nigerians felt strangers in their own country as they often lost their right to property, residence and employment in newly created states where they were previously considered indigenous.³¹

It is noteworthy to mention that, among the other factors discussed later in the paper, the unintended consequence of the state creation process was the contribution to the birth of the Maitatsine Movement and the riots that occurred in Northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1985.

One factor contributing to the birth of the Maitatsine Movement goes back to 1968, when Kano State, in Northern Nigeria, was formed. As a consequence of the creation of the new state, most public and private investments migrated to newly created state capital Kano, whereas rural areas started to experience drastic reversal in economic activities due to the collapse of the groundnut industry, which was the economic backbone of the State.³² Given these conditions, the rural population started to migrate to metropolitan Kano, whose population grew from 300,000 to 1 million from 1963 to 1980.³³ The problem of rural-urban migration led to massive unemployment as the rural migrants did not have suitable skills for the jobs in the city. Kano city

³⁰ Ibid., 9

³¹ Henry E. Alapiki, "State creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy," *African Studies Review*, 48, 3 (2005):16 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>

³² Eghosa E. Osaghae et al, "Violence in metropolitan Kano: A Historical Perspective," in *Urban Violence in Africa*, ed. Isaac Olowale Albert, (Africa: Institut francais de recherche en Afrique, 1994), <http://books.openedition.org/ifra/788?lang=en>

³³ Ibid.

planners did little to integrate the incoming population and many became liabilities to the urban system, with the cosmopolitan city becoming mired in poverty.

Another factor contributing to the birth of the Movement is that even though Nigeria is abundant in human and natural resources, the central government has consistently failed to create a meaningful wealth to improve the standard of living of the Nigerians, particularly in the North. Today, Northern Nigeria has an average poverty incidence of 70.1 percent as compared to 34.9 percent in the Southern part.³⁴ This leads to the conclusion that persistent high level of poverty is more a Northern phenomenon.³⁵ On the education front, there is a huge disparity between the educational attainment in the two regions. The Northern part of the country contributes less than 30 percent of the young people going to university.³⁶ Literacy rates are much lower among states in the North, where 72 percent of children aged between 6 – 16 never attended schools.

These few statistics show that the Nigerian government, from the onset of independence, has not delivered.

North - South Divide – Neopatrimonialism

The history of Nigeria as a country is relatively short but rather complex. Lagos, the largest city of Nigeria in the South, was annexed by the United Kingdom in 1861.³⁷ In 1906, Lagos colony was part of the Southern Protectorate.³⁸ In 1914, the administrations of both Northern and Southern Protectorates were merged and became the Colony and Protectorate of

³⁴ Abee Olufemi Salaam, "Boko Haram: Beyond Religious Fanaticism," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 7, 2 (2012): 6, DOI:10.1080/18335330.2012.719096

³⁵ Ibid., 6

³⁶ Ibid., 6

³⁷ K.C Anyanwu, "The Bases of Political Instability in Nigeria," *Journal of Black Studies* 13(1982): 101, accessed, April 3, 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2783978>

³⁸ Henry E. Alapiki, "State creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy," *African Studies Review*, 48, 3 (2005): 5 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>

Nigeria.³⁹ This marked the merger of two administrations, which subsequently gave rise to the North-South dichotomy.⁴⁰ The reasons for the amalgamation of the two protectorates were based on economic necessity and political convenience. There was a need to use revenues from the Southern Protectorate to fund the administration of less-endowed feudal Northern Protectorate.⁴¹ Some essential departments such as customs, education, police and prisons were amalgamated whereas little effort was made for integration. Thus the country emerged in 1946 with two separate administrations and alienation in terms of tradition, culture, and orientation.⁴²

The North-South divide was deepened by the political culture of the country which includes neopatrimonialism. Political culture, for the purposes of this paper, is defined as “the subjective orientation toward, and assumption about the political world that characterises the members of a particular society and that guides and inform their political behaviour.”⁴³ Neopatrimonial practices form a system based on personalised structure of authority where patron client relationships operate behind the façade of ostensibly rational state bureaucracies. For the political elite, the priority of the regime is state security over human security of citizens.⁴⁴ Neopatrimonialism involves infusion of two types of Weberian rule. It is a combination of both modern ‘rational-legal authority’ and ‘patrimonial rule’, which is a traditional pre-state arrangement.

Rational-legal authority involves written laws and the presence of bureaucratic institutions which routinize the exercise of authority and protect individuals and their property

³⁹ K.C Anyanwu, “The Bases of Political Instability in Nigeria,” *Journal of Black Studies* 13(1982): 101, accessed, April 3, 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2783978>

⁴⁰ Henry E. Alapiki, “State creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy,” *African Studies Review*, 48, 3 (2005):5 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139>

⁴¹ Ibid., 6

⁴² Ibid., 6

⁴³ Ian Taylor and Paul D. Williams, “Political Culture, State Elites and Regional Security in West Africa,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 26, 2 (2008):3, DOI:10.1080/02589000802124797

⁴⁴ Ibid., 1

from capricious leaders.⁴⁵ Patrimonialism serves as a merely personal instrument of the ruler.⁴⁶ It is maintained by ruler's granting of benefices; the ruler recruits staff according to his particularistic, rather than merit based criteria (for example, family membership, personal loyalty, and ethnicity) to serve the private ends of his leadership.⁴⁷ It takes the form of patron-client relations, patronage, corruption, and rent-seeking.⁴⁸ Neopatrimonialism is a hybrid arrangement whereby patrimonial features are built into the formally structured bureaucratic organization.⁴⁹ Bratton and van de Walle describe such constellation in terms of incorporation of patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions.⁵⁰

At the onset of independence, North's NPC party possessed electoral advantage at the federal level. However, much of the country's real powers such as education, technology, and economic wealth were in the South.⁵¹ In addition, the federal revenues were also captured in the North by the NPC. These conditions fostered regional politics driven by competition over access to resources, which led to successive military coups.⁵² The first republic committed to power sharing. However, the political elite's efforts were limited to providing Northerners compensatory access to the military corps and the federal civil service, as the participation of Northerners lagged behind their better credentialed Southern counterparts.⁵³ Furthermore, under the leadership of Prime Minister Balewa and President Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, government officials looted public funds with impunity. Endemic corruption and other factors provided the

⁴⁵ Michael Bratton, Nicholas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Rule in Africa," in *Democratic Experiments in Africa, Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3, chapter doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174657.006>

⁴⁶ Farid Guliyev, "Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies: integrating Dahlian and Weberian approaches to regime studies," *Democratization*, 18, 3 (2011): 9, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.563115

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 10

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 11

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11

⁵¹ Brandon Kendhammer, "Getting Our Piece of National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21, 2 (2015): 11, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2015.1032023

⁵² *Ibid.*, 11

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 11

pretext for the first coup d'état, which was welcomed by the Nigerian population, as mentioned earlier.

As discussed earlier, the coup was short-lived and another Northern military man, General Gowon, seized power in a second coup d'état and turned Nigeria into a rentier state. The process began when the military accelerated oil production following the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) instigated price increases of 1973-74.⁵⁴ General Gowon's administration increased the government's revenue, but also increased corruption. By 1975, oil provided 93 percent of export value and 81 percent of government revenues, which increased the power of the central state.⁵⁵ Federal ministers, military governors and others closely related to the regime made flaunting amounts of wealth.⁵⁶ The same year witnessed massive salary hikes for civil servants. Furthermore, "the country also witnessed a massive increase in the number of state-owned enterprises, which created an incentive for the mobilization of informal ethnic networks in pursuit of the sinecures these new opportunities provided".⁵⁷

Civilian rule returned in 1979, and President Shehu Shagari, a Northerner, took the reins of the government until 1983. Under his leadership, corruption surged to higher levels. His economic team provided inadequate corruption checks on growing demands on the federal budget. As a result, the flood of state spending went unmonitored by the central authority, and President Shagari did nothing to stop the embezzlement of oil revenues by elected officials. Between 1979 and 1983, \$16 billion in oil revenues were lost.⁵⁸ During his presidency, it was

⁵⁴ Ibid., 14

⁵⁵ Ibid., 14

⁵⁶ Larry Jay Diamond, "Political Corruption: Nigeria's Perennial Struggle," *Journal of Democracy*, 2, 4 (1991): 4, 10.1353/jod.1991.0056

⁵⁷ Ibid., 14

⁵⁸ Michael M. Ogbeyidi, "Political Leadership and Corruption in Nigeria Since 1960: A Socio-Economic Analysis," *Journal of Nigerian Studies*, 1, 2 (2012): 8

http://www.unh.edu/nigerianstudies/articles/Issue2/Political_leadership.pdf (accessed April 6, 2016).

quite common for federal buildings to engulf in flames just before the audits of government accounts.⁵⁹ The beneficiaries were the states and local level patrons who turned federal allocation into opportunities for expanding their networks.⁶⁰ In addition, under Shagari's rule, politicians and civil servants also saw an enormous surge in their salaries and fringe benefits.⁶¹

Patronage, clientelism and corruption have remained the standard features of Nigerian politics until today. 'Big men' control patron-client relationships, which are often determined by ethnicity. Political support and recruitment of government positions are also often based on ethnicity whereas merit plays a very little role or no role at all. Ethnicity is thus instrumentalised to gain political support, loyalty and to remain in power. "A politically neutral, professional core of senior administrators is rare in Nigeria, largely because incoming political leaders tend to reward their supporters with jobs in bureaucracy, often replacing incumbent senior servants".⁶² By appointing retainees at the top level administrative-bureaucratic positions, the ruler creates an informal network whereby he stands as the chief patron.⁶³ Thus the ruler forms a loyalist network in place. Furthermore, the top level clients use their status and access to state resources to benefit themselves and distribute the spoils of the office to their cronies, relatives, and friends.⁶⁴

The second republic of Shagari ended in another military coup by General Muhammadu Buhari in 1983. The end of the era of the second republic witnessed public indebtedness, which resulted in cuts in public salaries and expenditures. General Ibrahim Babangida (1985 – 1993) took power through another coup, and deposed General Buhari. Babangida introduced the

⁵⁹ Ibid.,8

⁶⁰ Brandon Kendhammer, "Getting Our Piece of National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21, 2 (2015): 14, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2015.1032023

⁶¹ Ibid.,14

⁶² Daan Beekers and Bas van Gool, "From Patronage to Neopatrimonialism. Postcolonial Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond," ASC Working Paper 101 / 2012 (African Studies Center, 2012), <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/19547/WP101.pdf?sequence=4> (accessed April 6, 2016).

⁶³ Farid Guliyev, Personal rule, neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies: integrating Dahlian and Weberian approaches to regime studies, *Democratization*, 18, 3 (2011): 12, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.563115

⁶⁴ Ibid., 12

famous, “Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which resulted in massive unemployment and salary cuts.⁶⁵ Babangida’s successor, General Sani Abacha (1993 – 1998), also skilfully linked state creation with neopatrimonialism spoils. “He was able to induce the Yoruba proponents of a new Ekiti state in the Southwest to split with their co-ethnics (who vehemently opposed Abacha for his role in repudiating the results of the annulled 1993 presidential elections, which had given the victory to the Yoruba candidate M. K. O. Abiola) in exchange for advancing their proposal”.⁶⁶

In conclusion, one of the reasons why it is so important to examine the historical developments of political culture of Nigeria is encapsulated by Claude Ake: “the struggle for power had become so intense and so absorbing that it overshadowed everything else, including development.”⁶⁷ The problem with the neopatrimonial system is that it produced and bred resentment in the individuals and groups that were excluded from the governing regime and were denied access to state resources.⁶⁸ The small military and political elite amassed vast amounts of wealth, leaving the Nigerian population mired in poverty. As a consequence, the income distribution in Nigeria is the most unequal in the world.⁶⁹ Other consequences include under-development in the North, and unemployment and poor living conditions, particularly in the Northeast. These conditions provided a fertile ground for the birth of the Maitatsine Movement, followed later on by the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement or Boko Haram, as it was popularly called. These movements were able to manipulate already present grievances against the Northern elite and the federal government, as people felt neglected and demanded changes in

⁶⁵ Brandon Kendhammer, “Getting Our Piece of National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21, 2 (2015): 14, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2015.1032023

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 15

⁶⁷ Ian Taylor and Paul D. Williams, “Political Culture, State Elites and Regional Security in West Africa,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 26, 2 (2008):4, DOI:10.1080/02589000802124797

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 4

⁶⁹ John Campbell, “Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink,” (Kindle Locations 777-779). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Kindle Edition.

the system. The population in the Northeast saw the emergence of these movements as a justified criticism of their poor living conditions.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Jan Sanding, "Framing Protest and Insurgency: Boko Haram and MASSOB in Nigeria," *Civil Wars*, 17, 2, (2015): 12, DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2015.1070450

Chapter II: Boko Haram

Introduction: Boko Haram Islamism

The concept of ‘Islamism’ is a relatively new topic in the field of social sciences and oftentimes treated as a concept similar to ‘Political Islam’. According to Guilain Denoeux, the term ‘Islamism’ or ‘Political Islam’ was coined in the 1970s to refer to the rise of movements and ideologies drawing on traditional Islamic terms, symbols and events, in order to articulate a distinctly political agenda.⁷¹ In ‘Islamism’, politics lie at the heart of an agenda which has more to do with power than religion. However, there is a distinction between ‘Political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’. ‘Political Islam’ is an old concept which dates back to Prophet Muhammad’s time and refers to all political manifestations of Islam. Political Islam has largely manifested itself in the form of state actors.⁷² Islamism is an ideology which is a 20th century response to the Westernized secular nation-state-based international system.

Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai have provided a deeper analytical analysis of ‘Political Islam’. According to the authors, prior to the Ottoman Empire’s collapse, there was more or less a continuity of the Islamic geopolitical order established by the Prophet in 622 in Medina that evolved greatly over a millennium under various regimes. Thus, all of the many caliphates, emirates, and sultanates were manifestations of a pre-modern ‘Political Islam’. In contrast, ‘Islamism’ is a specific ideology, adhered to by a distinct collection of non-state actors seeking the geopolitical revival of Islam in the post-imperial age”. ‘Islamism’ is an early twentieth century concept, which is seeking a Muslim religious-political response to secular modernity. The goal of ‘Islamists’ is to establish an Islamic State which is governed by Sharia law.

⁷¹ Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” *Middle East Policy*, no.2 (2002): 61. DOI: 10.1111/1475-4967.00057

⁷² Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Kindle Edition.

The ideology of ‘Islamism’ also has variations. Within the main public discourse, ‘Islamism’ is treated as if it were a monolithic ideology. This is however not the case. ‘Islamism’ has many sub-sects, which makes it difficult for the ‘Islamists’ themselves to agree upon the fundamental principles. For instance, there is little agreement on what constitutes Sharia law and how they should operationalize it; whether a republic or an alternative is preferred; and whether to embrace the nation-state or a transnational entity, and how to establish the desired polity.⁷³ Moreover, within ‘Islamism’, there are three categories of ‘Islamists’: i) participators – who see Islam and democracy as compatible; ii) conditionalists – who participate and accept democratic channels, but believe in divine sovereignty instead of human sovereignty; and iii) rejecters – who promote ultraconservative ‘Islamism’; the final category cannot fathom democracy, secularism or western values.⁷⁴ In the next section, this last category of ‘rejecters’ will be explained through the Maitatsine Movement and BH. The rationale for analyzing Maitatsine and BH through the Islamist rejecter category is to define the distinction between hardliners and those who have a softer approach. This way, at the end of the paper, some counter-terrorism strategies can be proposed, taking into account the context of each group and subgroup.

Boko Haram Evolution

This section of the paper outlines the similarities between Maitatsine and BH. The emergence of these two groups has rather complex roots in the pre-colonial era i.e. a demand for the implementation of the Sharia law, which also converges with economic and political factors. The inferences drawn from these groups show a cyclical pattern in their emergence and the continuation of insurgencies. According to Murray Last, a leading specialist on Islam in Nigeria,

⁷³ Kamran Bokhari and Farid Sensai, *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Kindle Edition.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

“the BH incident follow[s] a pattern that goes back to 200 years in Northern Nigeria”.⁷⁵ Even though the Nigerian government is claiming today military victory over the BH insurgency, this paper will show that converging factors related to history, religion, and the political-economic milieu of northern Nigeria provide an environment conducive to the re-emergence and survival of insurgent groups such as the BH group.

After its defeat, the Sokoto Caliphate formed in 1903 an alliance with the British. Sir Lugard made a pledge to the Sultan of Sokoto at the time of the conquest that the colonial government would not interfere with Islam. The Sultan warned the British that the Muslim reaction would be very violent if there was any invitation to infidelity.⁷⁶ The British administrators therefore identified Northern Nigeria as an Islamic African Civilization and tasked themselves to protect it from the attacks of outside ideas, particularly, from the Southerners, who embraced Western ways and education. Missionary historian Jan Boer coined the expression “Great Prohibition” to describe the British administrators’ practices that banned proselytization of the Muslims in Northern Nigeria.⁷⁷ An indirect rule was introduced by the British colonisers who allowed Sultan of Sokoto Caliphate to keep its governance structure. Sharia law was not totally dismantled. However, some of its aspects were curtailed. The *hudud* penalties involving capital punishments and severance of extremities as punishments for crimes under Sharia law were abolished. This clearly shows that the Sharia law was only partially implemented and was confined to matters of family and personal law until the time Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960. Before leaving Nigeria, the British administrators did

⁷⁵ John Azumah, “Boko Haram in Retrospect,” *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations*, 26, 1 (2014): 3, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2014.967930

⁷⁶ Andrew E. Barnes, “The Great Prohibition: The Expansion of Christianity in Colonial Northern Nigeria,” *History Compass*, 8, 6(2010): 4, doi: 10.1111/j.1478-0542.2010. 00686.x

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*,4

not reintroduce *hudud* penalties.⁷⁸ The consequence of this was that there were vigorous demands for the return of the application of the full Sharia law in Northern Nigeria by the Islamists and moderate Muslims between 1960 and 1999.

The Maitatsine Movement emerged in the 1970s, and was led by Muhammadu Marwa, who was originally from northern Cameroon, with a long period of residence in Kano.⁷⁹ “Maitatsine” was the name given to Marwa; it means “one who curses”; it is derived from his regular cursing of the Nigerian State. The followers of the Maitatsine were called Yan Tatsine. The group, which received the name of Marwa’s nickname, emerged in Kano.

Maitatsine used a strong anti-western and anti-modernism rhetoric. His movement was against private ownership of properties such as houses; riding a car or a bicycle; wearing a watch; and sending one’s children to state schools – which were labelled as infidel.⁸⁰ In addition, other sources of bitterness for him were western materialism and urbanization brought in by the British colonial administrators. Maitatsine completely rejected western materialism and technology, and called for returning to the pre-colonial period i.e. to the time of the original Sokoto Caliphate.

Maitatsine is the continuation of the debate which started among ulemas and members of the ruling elite on the eve of the British conquest.⁸¹ “There were those who opted for the total rejection of European rule [and way of life]; they called for jihad and, in case of defeat, a *hijra* or mass migration to a land where they could practice their Islam without hindrance. Those who

⁷⁸ John Azumah, “Boko Haram in Retrospect,” *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations*, 26, 1 (2014): 3, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2014.967930

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 3

⁸⁰ Elizabeth Isichei, “The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of Disinherited,” *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17, 3(1987):106 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580874>

⁸¹ John Azumah, “Boko Haram in Retrospect,” *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations*, 26, 1 (2014): 7, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2014.967930

held this view included the Caliph of Sokoto himself, Attahiru Ahmadu and the Emir of Kano, Alu b. Abdullahi”⁸²

Maitatsine established a separate community, disliked police, regarded other Muslims who did not conform to the movement’s ideology as non-Muslims, and used violence against non-members of the sect and civil authorities.⁸³ Maitatsine partly enjoyed the support of the people because they supported his ideology. However, they did not agree with his methods.⁸⁴ The political milieu of Nigeria i.e. the patronage feature of neopatrimonialism also played a role in the sustainability and existence of the Maitatsine. The Movement held a high prestige in the eyes of the political elite of successive governments and regimes of Kano State, from whom it enjoyed special treatment.⁸⁵

It is noteworthy to mention here that the trajectory of Northern Nigeria Islam was oriented by Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi.⁸⁶ His teachings and activities laid the foundation for future radical groups. He was a religious advisor to the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello. “From the 1940s, Gumi held himself up as a reformer of Islam and spoke of “the golden period of the Sokoto Caliphate”.⁸⁷ Gumi had close connections with Saudi scholars and he became the agent for Salafi-Wahabi thought in Nigeria; he received the King Faisal International Award for his services to Islam in 1987.⁸⁸ His influence in politics and the murder of Premier Bello during the first coup in 1966 adversely affected Muslim-Christian relations. Gumi politicized the death of Bello and called upon the plotters of the coup “to admit their hatred

⁸² Ibid.,7

⁸³ M. Adeleye Ojo, “The Maitatsine Revolution in Nigeria,” *Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 2, 2(1985): 2

⁸⁴ John Azumah, “Boko Haram in Retrospect,” *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations*, 26, 1 (2014): 7, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2014.967930

⁸⁵ M. Adeleye Ojo, “The Maitatsine Revolution in Nigeria,” *Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 2, 2(1985): 2.

⁸⁶ John Azumah, “Boko Haram in Retrospect,” *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations*, 26, 1 (2014): 7, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2014.967930

⁸⁷ Ibid.,6

⁸⁸ Ibid. 6

against Islam as the real motive for their action”.⁸⁹ Gumi also forbade Muslims to join any party headed by a non-Muslim and promoted the idea that if “Christians refuse to accept Muslim leadership, then we have to divide the country”.⁹⁰

Gumi’s activities and ideology inspired his student Ismaila Idris, who founded in 1978 the *Jamā‘at Izālat al-Bid‘a wa-Iqāmat al-Sunna* (Society for Removal of Heretical Innovation and Reestablishment of the Traditions of the Prophet) with Gumi as its spiritual and ideological head. The members of this movement were also known as Yan Izala. Yan Izala rejected secular notions in the Nigerian democracy and called for the establishment of an Islamic State. “Yan Izala alumni, in particular, have gone on to found other radical movements, which are still active in Nigeria today”.⁹¹ Gumi’s aggressive preaching produced an environment that was conducive to give rise to the Yan Izala, the Maitatsine Movement and, later on, BH. Both Maitatsine and BH teachings and activities fitted into the Yan Izala’s pattern of teachings and dissent.⁹²

Due to the Maitatsine Movement’s violent practices, it was given two weeks to leave Kano State by Governor Abubakar Rimi. In the wake of this order, the Movement launched on December 18, 1980 an attack on police stations, government establishments, churches, Christians, and moderate Muslims. The turmoil lasted for eleven days, until President Shagari ordered the military to intervene. Muhammad Marwa was killed and more than 1000 members of the Maitatsine Movement were arrested and received abusive treatment from the police.⁹³ Many of the Maitatsine followers and fighters found sanctuary in the Northeast of Nigeria, the region

⁸⁹ Ibid., 6

⁹⁰ Ibid., 8

⁹¹ Ibid., 7

⁹² Ibid., 8

⁹³ Ezeani Emmanuel Onyebuchi, and Chilaka Francis Chigozie, “Islamic Fundamentalism and the Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Phenomenon,” *IOSR Journal of Humanities And Social Science*, 15,3(2013): 5, e-ISSN: 2279-0837

where BH later on emerged.⁹⁴ The latter group started in Borno State with the movement “*Jama’atul alhul sunnah lidda’ wat, wal jihad*” (translated as “Association of the People of the Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad”) whose goal was to establish the Sharia legal system in Northern Nigeria. With mounting public and Islamists’ pressure in the North, Sharia law was gradually implemented in the states of Northern Nigeria between 1999 and 2003.⁹⁵

The exact date, place of origin and identity of the founder of the movement later called BH are still contested. According to the most accepted account, the origin of the movement can be traced back to 1995, founded by Lawan Abubakar in Northeast Nigeria.⁹⁶ When Lawan Abubakar left for Saudi Arabia for further studies, Ustadh Muhammad Yusuf overtook the affairs of the movement.⁹⁷ The members of the movement however have officially recognized Ustadh Muhammad Yusuf as its founder and set the exact foundation year as 2002.⁹⁸ This movement was referred to as Yusufiyya Islamic Movement (YIM). Because of the method used in its operations, it is believed that the residents of Maiduguri, capital of Borno State in Northeastern Nigeria, dubbed the group as “Boko Haram”.⁹⁹

It is noteworthy to mention here that Yusuf decided to participate in the local political system for the furtherance and implementation of the Sharia law, which was eventually implemented in Borno State in 2000. BH had massive following in Borno State. However, as in the case of the Maitatsine Movement in Kano State, local Borno State politicians found Yusuf’s movement detrimental to their neopatrimonial practice of providing patronage to people to buy

⁹⁴ John Azumah, “Boko Haram in Retrospect,” *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations*, 26, 1 (2014): 8, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2014.967930

⁹⁵ Stuart Elden, “Geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria’s War on Terror,” *The Geographical Journal*, 180, 4(2014): 1, doi: 10.1111/geoj.12120

⁹⁶ Muraina Monsuru Babatunde, Uyanga Unwana-Obong D, and Muraina Kamilu Olanrewaju, “Historical Antecedents of Boko Haram Insurgency and Its Implications for Sustainable and Educational Development in North Central Nigeria.” *Journal of Education and Practice*, 5, 22(2014): 3, ISSN 2222-288X (Online)

⁹⁷ Ibid.,3

⁹⁸ Ibid.,3

⁹⁹ Ezeani Emmanuel Onyebuchi, and Chilaka Francis Chigozie, “Islamic Fundamentalism and the Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Phenomenon,” *IOSR Journal of Humanities And Social Science*, 15,3(2013): 5, e-ISSN: 2279-0837

their loyalty because BH was intimidating political rivals and winning the elections. Thus, some local politicians felt forced to align their campaign promises with some of Yusufiyya's or BH's demands.¹⁰⁰ For example, in the 2003 local elections, the clandestine support by BH and some local militias made Ali Modu Sheriff executive governor of Borno State for four years.¹⁰¹ He was re-elected for a second term in 2007, until 2011. During these years, Yusuf was made member of the Borno Sharia State Board, which was responsible for supervising the implementation of Sharia law.¹⁰² However, over time, Yusuf fell out with his local political allies and he became a major critic of the system he was once part of.¹⁰³

The BH outrightly rejected the state machinery ruled by corrupt modern elites, which, the group claimed, were the product of secular school, popularly known as 'yan boko'.¹⁰⁴ The group also claimed that the 'yan boko' government, and especially the military, are unjust, evil, corrupt and full of all misconducts of secular ideology, without any divine background; they were therefore deemed bound to fail.¹⁰⁵ The word 'Boko' has a deeper meaning than just ascribed by the mainstream media as 'western education'. It was coined at the inception of colonial rule and was used by Islamic scholars and clerics to describe any Northern elite who acted, spoke, or ruled like the colonial administrator. In addition, whoever was in a government position was referred to as 'yan boko'.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the group's rejection of the 'yan boko' translates as the rejection of the Northern elites who had failed to provide a better livelihood and opportunities. In addition, the reason for Yusuf to fall out with the political elite is also attributed to their selective implementation of Sharia penal codes. The Sharia penal codes were only applied on the poor and

¹⁰⁰ Olabanji Akinola, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Between Islamic Fundamentalism, Politics, and Poverty," *African Security*, 8,1(2015): 10, DOI:10.1080/19392206.2015.998539

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 10

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 10

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 10

¹⁰⁴ Gbadamosi Musa Olaposi, "Understanding Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria," *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 27(2014): 2, ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 2

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 2

the vulnerable in the society whereas religious and political elites did not subject themselves to the tenets of full Sharia.¹⁰⁷ This shows again the corrupt neopatrimonial practices of ruling elites being above the law. On the face of it, it seems that BH was only demanding the implementation of a more rigorous Sharia. However, looking objectively at the group's demands, it wanted the implementation of Sharia on both the political elite and society equally.

BH, like the predecessor Maitatsine Movement, also launched a separationist community around a new compound which contained a mosque named Ibn Taymiyya Masjid, "after the seventh/thirteenth-century Islamist jurist-theologian and universally acclaimed father of modern radical Islamism, Ibn Taymiyya".¹⁰⁸ This development also coincides with Islamism and the fact that Yusuf falls under the category of 'rejecters'. "Yusuf rejected the secular nature of the Nigerian state and government as based on *kufur*, unbelief. He contended that it was obligatory for Muslims to embark on civil disobedience against such a government, shun its services and institutions, remove it from power by force, if need be, and replace it with an Islamic government".¹⁰⁹ Yusuf, along with his hardliner deputy "Abubakar Sheiku alias Darul Tauhid", began to establish a state within a state. Together, the duo created its own departments, including the cabinet, the Shura, the Hisbah, the brigade of guards, a military wing, and an effective microfinance scheme. Yusuf played the role of a judge to settle disputes.¹¹⁰ "Each state had an Amir (leader), including Amirs in the neighbouring countries Chad and Niger, who gave accounts of their stewardship to Yusuf directly".¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Olabanji Akinola, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Between Islamic Fundamentalism, Politics, and Poverty," *African Security*, 8,1(2015): 10, DOI:8.1080/19392206.2015.998539

¹⁰⁸ John Azumah, "Boko Haram in Retrospect," *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations*, 26, 1 (2014): 9, DOI: 10.1080/09596410.2014.967930

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 15

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 9

¹¹¹ Samuel Oyewole, "Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War," *Defense and Security Analysis*, 29, 3 (2013): 9, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2013.820968

Yusufiyya or BH group used tactics of sporadic attacks on police and government institutions similar to the ones of Maitatsine, and it eventually led the group to face an identical fate. In addition, BH also attacked Christian villages in Bulama in March of 2005, looted shops, and abducted several businessmen, whom they forced to convert to Islam.¹¹² The Yusufiyya Uprising began in 2009, in the wake of a bomb planted near Maiduguri Floor Mills on July 25, 2009. The police arrested eight Yusufiyya members. The next day, on 26 July 2009, under the pretext of demanding the release of their detained members, BH attacked and overpowered many police stations, and plundered and demolished government affiliated buildings and churches. The Army was called in and ended on July 30, 2009 the riots that raged across Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno States.¹¹³ The operation resulted in the death of 800 people and BH leader Muhammad Yusuf was arrested. He was later extrajudicially executed while in police custody.¹¹⁴

After Muhammad Yusuf's demise, his movement became an insurgency, and Abubakar Muhammad Shekau became its leader. The insurgent group started employing guerrilla tactics with the goal to topple a constituted government.¹¹⁵ Before 2009, the group did not aim to violently overthrow the government. In the aftermath of the uprising and the killing of its leader, Boko Haram launched revenge attacks indiscriminately on police officers, police stations, military barracks, and civilians. The spokesperson of BH demanded the prosecution of those who were responsible for the killing of Muhammad Yusuf and his comrades; the release of their detained colleagues; the restoration of their mosque; and compensation to the members of the

¹¹² Ibid.,9

¹¹³ Ibid.,9

¹¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Spiraling Violence: *Boko Haram Attacks And Security Forces Abuses in Nigeria*," New York: Human Rights Watch, accessed April 10, 2016,

https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webwcover_0.pdf

¹¹⁵ Ibid.,6

group.¹¹⁶ In addition, BH also demanded the establishment of Sharia law in all 36 states of Nigeria.¹¹⁷ Today, BH has overtaken the so-called Islamic State (IS) as the world's deadliest terrorist organisation¹¹⁸

Why Insurgency Exists

As rightfully posited by Steven Metz, 'an insurgency is born when a governing power fails to address social or regional polarization, sectarianism, endemic corruption, crime, various forms of radicalism, or rising expectations'.¹¹⁹ The insurgencies in Northern Nigeria follow similar patterns: they are cyclical, and produced by identical religious, economic and political factors. As mentioned earlier, political and military elites became so absorbed in the struggle for power that they neglected everything else, including development. The elites' lust for power also coincided with a sudden oil boom, which only benefited them but not the citizens. Transforming Nigeria into an oil nation in the 1970s led to the destruction of the agriculture and transportation sectors. This produced economic ills such as high prices, retrenchment and unemployment in Northern Nigeria, and particularly in Kano.¹²⁰ Maitatsine was able to manipulate the grievances and attracted the jobless and homeless youth from the countryside, which were involved in petty jobs such as barbering, cobbling, cap knitting and petty trade.¹²¹

Similarly, Yusuf also tapped into widespread grievances such as declining standards of living, corruption, unemployment, military dictatorship, police brutality, police exploitation, and

¹¹⁶ International Crisis Group, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): *The Issue of Boko Haram Insurgency*," Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf>

¹¹⁷ "Boko Haram launches first deadly attack in Chad," *Al-Jazeera*, last modified, February 13, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/boko-haram-launches-deadly-attack-chad-150213114519161.html>

¹¹⁸ Rose Troup Buchanan, "ISIS overtaken by Boko Haram as World's Deadliest Terrorist Organization," *The Independent*, November 17, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.html>

¹¹⁹ Eric Brahm, Stabilization and the Problem of Insurgency, *Beyond Intractability*, July 2006, accessed April 10, 2016, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/stabilization>

¹²⁰ Elizabeth Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of Disinherited," *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17, 3(1987):9 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580874>

¹²¹ Abimbola O. Adesoji, "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State," *Africa Today*, 57, 4(2011): 7, DOI:10.1353/at.2011.0016

the havoc brought in by the Structural Adjustment Program.¹²² The group attracted poor peasants, farmers, school dropouts and university graduates who could not find employment, and blamed the government for the inefficiency in the distribution of resources.¹²³ Yusuf could garner massive support beyond Maiduguri, not only in Borno State but across Northern Nigeria, and even in the neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon¹²⁴

Nigerian elites have failed the ordinary Nigerian citizens. Even today, Northern Nigeria displays some of the worst human development indicators in the world. 71.5 percent of Northeast Nigerians live in absolute poverty, and more than half are malnourished.¹²⁵ The decline in the farming sector, which is the main livelihood of the Northerners, is due mainly to neglect, in addition to flooding, insecurity, and desertification.¹²⁶ The literacy rate in Lagos state, in the Southwest, is 90 percent, whereas in Kano State, it is 49 percent, and in Borno State, where the BH insurgency was born, it is 15 percent. Similarly, 9 out of 19 Northern states have a 40 percent youth unemployment.¹²⁷

The policies of the Nigerian elites gave birth and fostered the phenomenon of ‘relative deprivation’ in Northern Nigeria, an expression coined by Samuel Stouffer. The latter’s theory has been further explained by Ted Gurr in his book, “Why Men Rebel”. The hypothesis of ‘relative deprivation’ is described as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve

¹²² Gbadamosi Musa Olaposi, “Understanding Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria,” *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 27(2014): 1, ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)

¹²³ Ezeani Emmanuel Onyebuchi, and Chilaka Francis Chigozie, “Islamic Fundamentalism and the Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Phenomenon,” *IOSR Journal of Humanities And Social Science*, 15,3(2013): 7, e-ISSN: 2279-0837

¹²⁴ Xan Rice, “Changing Face of Nigeria’s Boko Haram - FT.com,” *Financial Times*, May 22, 2012, , accessed July 18, 2016, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d2ab750-9ac1-11e1-9c98-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4EK70ZJfO>

¹²⁵ Leena Koni Hoffmann, “Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria,” *Africa Programme, The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 6. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140703NorthernNigeriaHoffmann.pdf

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*,6

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*,6

and what they actually think they can get.¹²⁸ The North-South divide in the country and localised inequality between the mainly poor majority and the elites in the Northeast are compelling youth to dream of more than what they actually have.¹²⁹

According to a recent report by Mercy Corps, many of the youth who joined BH reported scarce employment opportunities. In addition, business ownership is an important part of identity in Nigeria.¹³⁰ For many youth, successful business ownership is a way of advancing in society. Half of the former recruits interviewed by Mercy Corps ran small enterprises or micro-businesses. These entrepreneurs ranged from small traders to bigger inter-city traders, from shop owners to tailors to salon owners to butchers.¹³¹”

In the report, the individuals described having few options without powerful “godfathers” to support them with capital for their businesses or small cash transfers to buy new equipment or goods”.¹³² BH was filling this void by providing financial services to these individuals. Some of the youth interviewed by Mercy Corps explained that they accepted loans prior to joining the BH group. If these individuals were unable to repay their loans, they faced death threats. The way to get out of this situation was for them to join BH. Furthermore, some of the former recruits interviewed had regular employment and wanted to expand a business on the side. This report demonstrates that it is not only the abjectly poor or unemployed who were joining BH. Some of these young men were seeking to improve their economic condition and status.

¹²⁸ “Why Men Rebel,” *Beyond Intractability*, accessed June 19, 2016, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/gurr-men>

¹²⁹ “New Report Investigates How Boko Haram Recruits Youth,” *Mercy Corps*, April 8, 2016, <https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/nigeria/new-report-investigates-how-boko-haram-recruits-youth>

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 13

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 13

¹³² *Ibid.*, 13

Funding of Boko Haram

Like any business, terror enterprises also require capital to survive and carry out their activities. BH has a net worth of \$25 million and is ranked 10th in the world's richest terror organisations.¹³³ Money making activities range from criminal activities such as robberies, kidnapping, attacks on police, to alleged political support and affiliation with other terrorist networks. However, there is difficulty in obtaining reliable information and data on this topic due to its very nature. The group is also involved in cocaine smuggling, which is produced and exported by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other drug cartels.¹³⁴ The group means of income generation in 2011 initiated with bank robberies in Northeast Nigeria. The same year, approximately 100 banks were attacked, with BH responsible for 30 percent of the total.¹³⁵ The group took control of the town of Mubi in Adamawa state in late 2014 and stole NGN100 million (Nigerian naira) from a Diamond Bank branch located there.¹³⁶

BH also has connections with local criminal networks. Back in 2011, seven suspects were charged with stealing more than US\$100,000 from two bank robberies on behalf of BH in Bauchi State. Furthermore, ambushing local government convoys carrying salaries of employees is also one of the tactics employed by the group to raise capital. Extortion is another common tactic employed. In 2012, in Maiduguri, Borno State, the Nigerian Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) alerted that the group was sending threatening text messages to wealthy individuals to provide funds to the group; otherwise, one of the individual's family members would face consequences.

¹³³ Vasudevan Sridharan, "List of World's Richest Terror Networks Revealed," *International Business Times*, November 12, 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/list-worlds-richest-terror-networks-unveiled-1474351>

¹³⁴ Mary Anastasia O'grady, "The Bolivia-Jihadist Axis Of Cocaine," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 7, 2016 <http://www.Wsj.Com/Articles/The-Bolivia-Jihadist-Axis-Of-Cocaine-1454882756>

¹³⁵ "The unique and ambiguous financing streams of Boko Haram," *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst*, 15, 5(2015): 4. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1686689391?accountid=14701>

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*,4

Another important source of funding of the group is kidnapping of foreign nationals for ransom. In February 2013, a family of seven French nationals was abducted near the Waza National Park in Cameroon. The family was only released after payment of a ransom of US\$3million.¹³⁷ Similar cases of kidnapping happened in November of the same year, when a French priest was abducted in Koza. He was released two months later, after payment of US\$12.5-million.¹³⁸ Ten Chinese workers and 17 Cameroonian citizens, along with the wife of a Cameroon Deputy Minister, were abducted near Waza in May 2014. They were later released, after payment of an undisclosed amount and a prisoner exchange. Kidnappings are not only limited to foreign nationals; they also entail local wealthy Nigerians. For instance, in May 2013, Borno elder statesman Shettima Ali Mongou was abducted in Maiduguri. He was also released a few days later, after payment of a ransom of NGN50 million.¹³⁹ However, the Borno State government denied that any ransom was paid. In a recent development about the kidnapped Chibok girls, BH is seeking a ransom of US\$50 million for the release of 219 schoolgirls.¹⁴⁰

The group also preys on the local population for financial and material support. BH militants routinely attack villages for non-financial supplies such as food, water, livestock, and cars, and also loot shops for other basic goods. This practice extends beyond Nigeria's border to Cameroon and Chad. BH also sends threat letters to traders, mostly in Borno State. These are not empty threats for those who are not able to meet the demands of BH. In May 2014, Kamuyya, a

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*,5

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*,5

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*,5

¹⁴⁰ Colin Freeman, "Boko Haram demands '\$50m ransom' for release of kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls," *The Telegraph*, April 9, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/09/boko-haram-demands-50m-ransom-for-release-of-kidnapped-chibok-sc/>

small village in Borno State, was attacked by BH militants. Twenty villagers were killed as they failed to provide the full amount of the demanded “Islamist tax”.¹⁴¹

In 2014, BH embarked on a new phase of taking hold of territory in the Northern part of Nigeria. The group took over a number of local governments in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. In other parts of the Northern states, government personnel and security forces fled, leaving the region open for BH to take over. BH established its own governance system and set up checkpoints to collect taxes. Furthermore, it also started receiving funds to release people from makeshift BH jails. According to one civil servant, he paid NGN 25,000 to BH militants to secure the release of his family.¹⁴² Traders travelling to Gwoza paid US\$40.00 as “checkpoint fee” to the BH militants.

There are also claims that the group has ties with international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and its offshoots Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabab (Somalia). In 2002, Osama Bin Laden dispatched US\$3 million to BH leader Mohammad Yusuf to set up a cell in the country.¹⁴³ The groups listed above are providing training to the BH militants. The BH group is in addition receiving funding from foreign civic organisations such as Saudi Arabia’s Islamic World Society and Britain’s Al-Muntada Trust Fund. The funding is coming in the form of charity and informal money-transfer centers.¹⁴⁴

The role of neopatrimonial political culture in Nigeria cannot be ignored in the formation and existence of the militant groups such as BH. The group had been receiving patronage from some politicians of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and All Nigeria People’s Party

¹⁴¹ Cheryl K. Chumley, “Boko Haram Slaughters 20 over non-payment of Islamist Tax,” *The Washington Times*, May 27, 2014, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/27/boko-haram-slaughters-20-over-nonpayment-islamist/>

¹⁴² “The Unique and Ambiguous Financing Streams of Boko Haram.” *Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst* 15, no. 5 (May 01, 2015). <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1686689391?accountid=14701>. 6.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 7

¹⁴⁴ “The Unique and Ambiguous Financing Streams of Boko Haram.” *Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst* 15, no. 5 (May 01, 2015). <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1686689391?accountid=14701>. 1

(ANPP). Isa Yuguda, Governor of Bauchi State (PDP), and Ibrahim Shekaru, former Governor of Kano State, paid BH NGN10 million per month.¹⁴⁵ However, these two State Governors stopped payments in 2011. The connections between the local politicians and militia groups show a zero-sum game in Nigerian politics i.e. to win elections, politicians resort to militia groups to intimidate opponents and citizens who oppose them. After using these groups' services, politicians usually abandon them following the elections, but arms and ammunitions remain in their hands, which leads to the formation of private militia groups.¹⁴⁶

In 2013, Nigeria's Minister of Interior, Abba Moro, disclosed that there were 1,499 illegal and 84 legal entry routes into Nigeria. This state of porous borders allows illicit transnational trafficking and has allowed both smugglers and terrorists to smuggle small arms and light weapons (SALWs) into Nigeria. "As a result, over 70 percent of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa were reported to be in Nigeria."¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, during the Libyan Uprising, "state armoury was either ordered opened in February 2011 by Muammar Gaddafi or looted by rebel forces and mercenaries, and the majority of these weapons were never recovered. Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) acquired heavy weapons such as SAM-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, transporting them back to the Sahel region (See Annex: A).¹⁴⁸ They were either surreptitiously obtained by posing as Gaddafi's supporters or indirectly purchased from mercenaries who had

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 1

¹⁴⁶ Olabanji Akinola, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Between Islamic Fundamentalism, Politics, and Poverty," *African Security*, 8, 1(2015): 10, DOI:8.1080/19392206.2015.998539

¹⁴⁷ Freedom C. Onuoha, "Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria," *Al Jazeera Center For Studies*, September 8, 2013, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.html>

¹⁴⁸ Carlo Davis, "Anatomy: African Terrorism: Boko Haram: Nigeria's Homegrown Terror Network," *World Policy Journal*, 29, 4 (2012): 1 doi:10.1177/0740277512470924.

acquired these arms from Libyan depositories”.¹⁴⁹ AQIM transferred these weapons to groups like BH in Nigeria, and Ansar Dine in Mali.

Reputation of Boko Haram

A recent study by Efe Tokdemir and Seden Akcinaroglu outlines different types of reputation built by domestic terror groups, and analyzes how reputation has helped these groups to survive and achieve their goals. They have also studied how recruitment patterns change with reputation. Here, Martha Crenshaw’s definition of terrorism is employed, describing terrorism as a form of violence that is primarily intended to influence an audience. It depends on concealment, surprise, stealth, conspiracy and deception. Terrorism is not spontaneous and does not involve mass participation; it is carried out by a handful of people claiming to act on behalf of a larger group. The act itself communicates a future threat to people who identify with the victims – it conveys the sense of “You will be next”. The choice of time, place and victim is meant to create shock, fear or anger. Psychological impact is key as it involves maximum impact with minimum effort.”¹⁵⁰ The reason for employing this definition of terrorism is to provide a neutral definition, because terror groups are targeting not only civilians but also security forces. In addition, terror groups do not at times employ excessive or consistent violence against civilians. However, to understand the concept of reputation building, the paper will specifically focus on how terrorists impact civilians.

Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu have defined “reputation” in their study as “collective and common assessment of a terror group based on its behavior that results in favorable or unfavorable predisposition by a given audience”.¹⁵¹ Terror groups employ two types of

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Sidney Jones, “Terrorism: Myths and Facts,” *International Crisis Group*, January 18, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/jones-terrorism-myths-facts.aspx>

¹⁵¹ Efe Tokdemir & Seden Akcinaroglu, “Reputation of terror groups Dataset: Measuring Popularity of Terror Groups,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 53,2(2016):2, doi:10.1177/0022343315626506

reputation building: negative and positive. Negative reputation building entails coercive policies towards constituents and target population. Towards constituents, terror tactics include forced recruitment and funding, and child recruitment. Terror tactics towards target population entail targeting children and extreme violence against civilians. Positive reputation building includes the provision of public goods and services, in addition to an established political party and media outlets. These types of tactics can be employed by terror groups against the target population and their constituencies – the group of people that the terror group claims to represent.¹⁵² BH has been utilizing both types of reputation building, positive and negative.

BH's negative reputation building is nothing new. Bloodshed has corroded support to the group. In the beginning, the group enjoyed support in the Northern parts of the country because it exploited the deeply held grievances of many communities in Northeast Nigeria. "About half of former members said their communities at some time supported BH, believing it would help bring about a change in government."¹⁵³ However, the BH tactics changed. Once claiming to represent the disenfranchised population in the North, the group became violent against its own constituents. Indiscriminate killing of Muslims and Christians and civilians alike by the group changed the attitude of the population. In the areas that the group took over, BH forced the subjugated population either to join BH and convert to its ideology or get ready to be killed or to leave their homes.¹⁵⁴

Given these circumstances, BH lost support from its constituents. The group has then resorted to the abduction of women and children – both boys and girls. Boys are mainly abducted for indoctrination and recruitment. Old women are kept for cooking and cleaning, whereas young

¹⁵² Ibid., 3

¹⁵³ Geoffrey York, "Survivors' stories show Boko Haram's shift to violence as driving force," *The Globe and Mail*, May 18, 2016, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/survivors-stories-show-boko-harams-shift-to-violence-as-driving-force/article30078263/>

¹⁵⁴ "Our Job is to Shoot and Slaughter: Boko Haram's Reign of Terror in North-East Nigeria," London: Amnesty International, 2015, 16. <http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/nigeriabhreport2015.compressed.pdf>

women are abducted for sexual purposes, forced marriages, labour and religious conversion.¹⁵⁵ Recently, BH has started using young girls as suicide bombers, as mentioned earlier in this paper. In addition, in early 2016, BH burnt children alive in an attack on a village in Dalori, Northeast Nigeria.¹⁵⁶

On the positive reputation building aspect, BH has not been engaged in providing public goods or services such as free education, food, security or health services to the constituents it claims to represent. Not only none of these public goods is provided by BH, but the group has in fact destroyed many health centers, markets, roads, homes and schools.¹⁵⁷ The only opportunity that is provided by the group is to young women with little or no schooling, by offering them a chance to acquire Quranic knowledge, which former BH female members claim was a positive aspect of their experience in the group.¹⁵⁸ Security is only provided to those who pledge allegiance to the group. In a recent bid to secure supporters, since BH is losing ground, it is again handing out business loans to youth.¹⁵⁹ It is difficult to ascertain whether the group is trying to build 'positive reputation' among the population by giving out loans or is trying to find badly needed new recruits through the method explained earlier.

Terror groups also use media to display their heroic struggle, elevate their victories, spread their propaganda, and create a global outreach.¹⁶⁰ BH has been disseminating its message

¹⁵⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human rights in the affected countries" A/HRC/30/67, September 29, 2015, p. 17.

¹⁵⁶ "Boko Haram: Children Among Villagers Burned to Death in Nigeria Attack," *The Guardian*, February 1, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/01/boko-haram-attack-children-among-villagers-burned-to-death-in-nigeria>

¹⁵⁷ Lauren Ploch Blanchard 2016. Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions. CRS Report no. R43558. Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf>

¹⁵⁸ "New Report Investigates How Boko Haram Recruits Youth," *Mercy Corps*, April 8, 2016, <https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/nigeria/new-report-investigates-how-boko-haram-recruits-youth>

¹⁵⁹ Geoffrey York, "Survivors' stories show Boko Haram's shift to violence as driving force," *The Globe and Mail*, May 18, 2016, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/survivors-stories-show-boko-harams-shift-to-violence-as-driving-force/article30078263/>

¹⁶⁰ Efe Tokdemir & Seden Akcinaroglu, "Reputation of terror groups Dataset: Measuring Popularity of Terror Groups," *Journal of Peace Research*, 53,2(2016):2, doi:10.1177/0022343315626506

and propaganda through many media platforms. In the beginning, the group distributed videotapes to journalists through couriers. Now, however, the group is directly uploading its videos on YouTube. It also established a twitter account under the username @Urwatu_Wutqa; it had tweeted only 19 times before the account was flagged for inappropriate content and suspended.¹⁶¹ The videos initially focused on statements by BH leader Abubakar Shekau. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, after pledging allegiance to the so-called Islamic State on March 7, 2015, the group rebranded itself as the Islamic State's Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya, even though it continues to be referred to as BH. The media strategy of BH also changed, and it established a media wing in June 2015, and media outlets such as Amaq News Agency and Arabic language newsletter Al-Naba publish infographics detailing BH operations.¹⁶²

The themes of the message in the videos are the rejection of the Nigerian government's narrative about victory and the portrayal of BH as a strong fighting force. The videos have focused on major attacks on symbolic locations such as Abuja, Nigeria's capital, or Maiduguri, Borno State's capital, or on specific targets such as Shia Muslims, civilian militias and security forces. In their selective reporting, BH has completely ignored female suicide bombers and the targeting of civilians, which make up a substantial portion of BH violence. "In the 12 months since allegiance to the so-called IS, more than 90% of fatalities have been attributed to BH".¹⁶³ The reason for selective reporting of events is that the group's reputation is already damaged; it is losing legitimacy and support on the part of the local population. Showing atrocities would further undermine BH's credibility and eventually, existence. The second theme that is prominent in the videos is the legitimization of violence through Quranic injunctions and

¹⁶¹ Jack Moore, "Twitter Shuts Down Boko Haram Account," *The Newsweek*, February 25, 2015, <http://www.newsweek.com/twitter-shuts-down-boko-haram-account-309320>

¹⁶² Omar Mahmood, "JTIC Brief: The Evolution of Boko Haram's Media Operations." IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor 16, no. 5 (May 01, 2016).

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/1780070653?accountid=14701>.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 7

sermons on the duty of Muslims. However, there is little focus on ideological indoctrination.¹⁶⁴

The last tactic usually employed by a terror group is having a political party. BH does not have a political party which would allow it to gain popularity and support to spread its ideology and message.

From the above analysis, it can be concluded that even though the group's positive reputation has dwindled, it is still able to find recruits through negative reputation. Thus, even if the group is losing ground, it still poses a major threat to the internal security and peace of Nigeria.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.,7

Chapter III: Counter Terrorism Strategies for the Nigerian Government

The United Nations General Assembly's Global Counter Terrorism Strategy was adopted unanimously in 2006 by all member states, including Nigeria. The Strategy has four pillars: Pillar I proposes to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Pillar II proposes to prevent and combat terrorism; Pillar III proposes governments to build state capacity and strengthen the role of the United Nations; and Pillar IV proposes to ensure human rights and the rule of law.¹⁶⁵ The Nigerian government might be able to overcome BH militarily, but it needs to take rehabilitative measures as well to counter terrorism. After all, before BH became violent, it had the support of the local population. The paper suggests the following counterterrorism strategies to the Nigerian government:

- The Nigerian government needs to train the military, police and civilian militia – the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) – in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) before sending them out on the field to track down BH militants. Both the Nigerian military and CJTF are involved in slaughtering and human rights abuses of civilians and militants alike.¹⁶⁶ Nigeria has accessioned the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols I and II. In addition, the Nigerian government has accessioned dozens of other treaties including: Convention on the Rights of Child; its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict; Convention for Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. The Nigerian government

¹⁶⁵ "United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force," *United Nations*, Accessed June 21, 2016, <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy>

¹⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks And Security Forces Abuses in Nigeria," New York: Human Rights Watch, accessed April 10, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webwcover_0.pdf

needs to enforce the treaties it has accessioned as it is legally bound to limit the suffering in armed conflict. Abuses by the security forces is also one of the factors why individuals are being driven to groups like BH and alike.

- Most of the militants or militant groups do not give up arms because of the fear of persecution by the state and the population in general. The Nigerian government needs to ensure that it will provide fair trial to the captured militants, according to domestic laws and IHL. Furthermore, the Nigerian government can reintegrate the ex-combatants who are not ideologically extremists or war criminals. This will create a sense of security in the minds of the combatants, who will feel that if they put down arms, they can be part of mainstream society again.
- Nigeria has an ongoing platform under the name of Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN), which is providing Sharia education and enlightenment programs on women's rights in all 12 Sharia implementing states. A similar program can be initiated which would educate the masses in Northern Nigeria about Sharia in different Islamic schools of thought. This program would be essential because the masses need to understand there is not just one school of thought of Sharia. Indeed, the population is divided between Sunnis (the majority of the Nigerian Muslim population), Shias, and Sufis. It can create a pluralistic mindset within the population.
- Since the Sokoto Caliphate, which implemented a strict version of Islam and Sharia law, and its days "of glory" are in the collective memory of people, the Nigerian government should also introduce a program which can enlighten and educate the masses of a moderate version of Islam and counter the narratives of the likes of BH or Ahmed Gumi, who could spread their movements through their propaganda and teachings.

- The Nigerian government has to incorporate both Islamic and Christian education in Northern Nigeria. Sidelining any of the two will garner support for BH or similar groups. One example of such education system is the Day Waterman College (secondary school) in Ogun State (Southwestern Nigeria), where Christian and Muslim students sit together in class to study all three monotheistic religions.
- President Buhari's government needs to provide social services, including healthcare, education, food, and housing to the population of the areas affected by the insurgency. In the beginning, people lent support to BH because there was a vacuum of social services in the region. Disappointment with the government provides a breeding ground for youth wanting to join militant groups such as BH.
- On the political front, the Nigerian government can meet one of the demands of BH i.e. prosecution of the killers of Muhammad Yusuf, the previous leader of the group. Counterterrorism strategy does not work only with punitive measures.

Conclusion

The BH insurgency is a complex issue as many factors are intertwined. The paper has attempted to examine BH in the historical context of Nigeria, and particularly Northern Nigeria, including the converging driving economic, political and religious factors that gave birth to, and sustenance of BH. Historical political instability of the country and neopatrimonial practices of the political elite being absorbed in gaining control at the federal level and neglecting development have fostered economic decline, particularly in Northern Nigeria. At the same time, they created the North-South divide. In addition, the political elite became fixated on creating an oil nation and neglected other sectors, mainly agriculture, which was the economic backbone of Northern Nigeria. Mired in poverty, Northern Nigeria became a nest of formation of different

groups such as BH, which was able to tap into widespread grievances of the local population in the North.

The inability of the government to provide social services to its population, corruption, and patron-client relationships provided an environment conducive for people to either demand reforms or, if the demands are not addressed, to retaliate against the state machinery. The above analysis has also shown that politicians turned a blind eye or even sympathised with BH, and provided their patronage in the formative stage of the group for political reasons, which set the stage for future chaos in Northern Nigeria.

The paper also concludes that the history of Northern Nigeria and the widely perceived “glory” of the Sokoto Caliphate cannot be neglected while addressing BH. The Sokoto Caliphate is in collective memory of people, which is driving some individuals to revive the Islamic Caliphate. Hence, Islamism and the Islamist ‘rejecters’ category is getting supporting Northern Nigeria. Today’s BH under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership aims to violently overthrow the present government and wants to establish an Islamic State in Nigeria. This characterises the group as Islamists in the third category of rejectionists. Islamism cannot be separated from the BH insurgency. Some of the BH group members who were interviewed were employed when they joined the Islamist group. In addition, many of the former recruits interviewed by Mercy Corps identified ‘Islamism’ as the common factor that inspired youth to join BH.

President Muhammadu Buhari’s military intervention is bringing results and BH is losing ground. The group is however still a threat and continues to conduct numerous surprise attacks, mainly against isolated villages in Northeastern Nigeria. BH has lost most of the large territory it used to control until a year and a half ago, and it now lacks the ability to extort money or food out of local communities, which makes it very difficult for the group to operate. However, as

examined in the paper, even though the group's positive reputation has dwindled, it is still able to find new recruits. Thus, sporadic attacks on the civilians and the government will continue in the short to mid-term.


As some previous conflicts have shown in the past in other parts of the world, it is difficult to defeat through only conventional military means a group using guerrilla warfare methods. The government too has an essential role to play in providing social services, proper education, employment to the youth, and economic development in general in the region in order not only to convince people not to support BH anymore, but also to prevent a similar insurgency from reappearing again. Only the future will tell whether the Nigerian government will be willing and able to rise up to the challenge.

Annex A: Anatomy of African Terrorism

ANATOMY OF AFRICAN TERRORISM

BOKO HARAM: NIGERIA'S HOMETOWN TERROR NETWORK

Nigeria is under relentless attack by Boko Haram, an Islamic extremist militia, that has engaged in mafia-like criminal activities and a brutal campaign to expand sharia beyond the 12 states in northern Nigeria already under Islamic law. The ugly byproduct of an economic divide between the oil-rich south and impoverished north and a demographic boom that leaves many youths angry and unemployed, Boko Haram is an object lesson across Africa of what can go wrong when terror takes root in a vacuum—winning political support at home, funding through terror, and training from affiliates abroad.



Source: Anatomy of African terrorism. (2012). World Policy Journal, 29(4), 16+. Retrieved from <http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA314275631&v=2.1&u=otta77973&it=r&p=AO NE&sw=w&asid=1c9418425bbb30b5030d2119e0208c5d>

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