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**The Freudian Ego and Its Relation To
The Self In American Psychoanalytic Theory**

by

Jennifer Susan Kelen

**Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Ph. D. in Clinical Psychology**



Jennifer Susan Kelen, Ottawa, Canada, 1990



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ISBN 0-315-60096-9

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was prepared and completed under the supervision of Dr. Jorge Ruda, Ph.D., O.M.D., M.D. (MA) Professor of the School of Psychology, University of Ottawa. I wish to express my appreciation for his guidance and coaching throughout the period that this thesis was in preparation.

I would also like to thank Dr. Dean Eyre, Mrs. Beth Firth and my father, Dr. Andrew Kelen, for their assistance and continued support.

CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Jennifer Susan Kelen was born June 8, 1952 in Rochester, Minnesota, United States of America. She received the Bachelor of Science (Occupational Therapy) from McGill University in 1976, and the Masters of Arts (Education) from the University of Ottawa in 1985. Her Master's dissertation was titled "A Behavioural Description of Preschool Children with Early and Late Day Care Experience".

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ABSTRACT

The Freudian Ego and its Relation to The Self in American Psychoanalytic Theory

This thesis finds that "the self" as a concept has been included in psychoanalytic theory but has not been emphasized. The ego is defined in this thesis as a psychoanalytic term. "The self" is defined as a philosophical concept that integrates the subject (an experiential, first person quality), and object (a sense of being an individual as a whole) in mental life. Theoretical writings on the ego are observed to separate the subject and object. This lack of integration has resulted in the ego being perceived as being ambiguous. The dilemma of addressing this duality is not a new problem but is seen in the philosophical classification of categories.

In psychoanalysis, the debate on the status of the self in relationship to the ego is found to originate in the 1940s. Five areas of research indicate that while Freud did not stress "the self", he did not omit it. 1) The historical antecedents to psychoanalysis in German scientific materialism illustrate the pressure on psychoanalysis to be identified with scientific and not metaphysical thought. The mind-body relationship in German materialism formulates "the self" as a function of the body, not of the spirit. This is seen to be consistent with Freud's psychic structure in which the ego is a function of the psyche and the psyche a function of the body. 2) The pressure to affiliate with the scientific movement is also apparent in the terminological choices in early and recent English translations (cf. Jones, 1908; Strachey, 1966a). The absence of a personal reference in the translation of *das Ich* as "the ego" (instead of "the I") is found to detract from Freud's intention. However, when the English translation is reviewed in the context of its evolution, it was found that many decisions were the result of historical-political and cultural considerations. Latin and Greek terminology were required to ensure

the survival of psychoanalytic thought. 3) A review of the conceptual development of the ego supports the assumption that Freud included a central aspect within the psyche. Physiological/structural and psychological descriptors are seen to be combined. The ambiguity in Freud's presentation of the ego is suggested to be the result of integrating these descriptors and due to Freud's focus on pathological, not normal, ego functioning. Freud's continued interest in splitting of the ego (not integration) is seen to be consistent with nineteenth century psychiatry. 4) It is also observed that the emphasis in Freudian theory is on the analysis of the psyche. Psychological synthesis was seen to follow automatically the removal of psychological obstacles. This underlying premise indicates that Freud did not ignore a central aspect within the psyche. 5) The foundation of "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory is traced to the reformulation of the ego. Modifications to the ego began with the introduction of "self-representations" (Hartmann, 1950) and led to the presentation of "the self" as a structure comparable to the id, ego and superego (Kohut, 1978; Kernberg, 1982). The basis of these changes originated in discussions of narcissism. Alterations in psychoanalytic theory are suggested to be an attempt to integrate the objective and subjective functions of "the self" within the ego.

The ego is found to be a two-dimensional structure that includes "the self". While "the self" is a term with wide public use, it is seen to be a concept that is vague and poorly defined. The addition of "the self" to the Freudian psyche places the ego in a narrow framework and changes the structural foundations of psychoanalysis. It is concluded that "the self" emerged to clarify the ambiguity in Freud's ego concept and that Freud did not neglect "the self".

PREFACE

Following psychoanalytic custom, the abbreviations "Standard Edition" or "S.E." will be used to denote The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, edited by James Strachey and his assistants Alix Strachey, Alan Tyson and Angela Richards between 1953 and 1974. The accompanying number will refer to the volume number of the twenty four books in the edition.

INTRODUCTION

The focus on "the self" and its role in the psychic structure is one that is of particular interest in current North American psychoanalytic formulations. The introduction of the concept of "the self" as a transformation of the ego and addition to the psychic structure has resulted in much debate in psychoanalytic theory. This dissertation attempts to clarify the connection between "the self" and the ego in classical psychoanalysis.

The underlying question in this debate is whether Freud included a central aspect of the personality in psychoanalysis. This dissertation examines the relation of the Freudian ego to "the self" in American Psychoanalytic theory. This research supports two hypotheses: 1) That while Freud did not emphasize a central aspect of the personality, this aspect is implied in psychoanalytic theory; 2) That the concept of "self" as it is being used in current psychoanalytic theory, is included in the Freudian ego. Subjective and objective aspects of the ego, while consistent with the philosophical definition of "the self", will be seen to result in a search for theoretical integration of the ego concept. This dissertation will show that the addition of "the self" to psychoanalytic theory is an attempt to resolve the ambiguity found in the ego concept. Support for these hypotheses is found in historical, theoretical and conceptual research. This thesis examines the problem of ego and "the self" with reference to five areas of research:

- 1) The review of the literature reveals that the debate on the addition of "the self" in psychoanalysis began in the 1940s. This debate began by asking whether "the self" was a theoretical development or a shift in emphasis. Later, the discussion centred on conceptual uses of the terms and criticized the English translation of Freud's works. The debate then focused on whether Freud included "the self" as a concept in his writings.

2) The English translation has been criticized for removing the personal nature of Freud's thought, resulting in the addition of "the self". It has been suggested that the emergence of concepts, such as "the self", is the outcome of a faulty translation. The choice of Latin and Greek terminology is a particular focus of these criticisms. A historical review of the English translation and a discussion of Freud's style of presentation will provide support for decisions made by the translators but will note the resulting discrepancies.

3) The historical antecedents of the ego and "the self" can be traced in nineteenth century German thought. The transition in emphasis from the philosophical to the scientific is suggested to have influenced the development of psychoanalytic thought. German materialism stressed scientific and not metaphysical concepts. Concepts that could not be defined, such as our spiritual nature (i.e., the soul or self), were no longer emphasized in scientific study. The mind-body relationship made "the self" a function of the mind, or in Freud's theory, the ego. This research will place these concepts and their use in psychoanalysis in a historical perspective.

4) The conceptual development of the ego in Freud's works will be investigated to examine when the ego includes an aspect of "the self". Freud's ego category will be shown to include a psychological aspect in all but one period of writings. It will be observed that even when the physiological aspect is stressed, the psychological aspect is implied. This research will suggest that "the self" has been considered as a function of the ego. Ambiguity in the definition of the ego is shown to be the result of Freud's presentation of the concept: the mixing of psychological and physiological referents, the careless use of terms, and an emphasis on pathological functioning. These foci did not highlight the synthetic aspect of the psyche.

5) The basis of "the self" will be placed in the context of American

psychoanalytic theory. The foundations of this new concept are seen in the reformulations undertaken by Ego Psychology. The transformation of "the self", from a function of the ego to a "suprastructure" (separate and above the id, ego and superego) will be traced. In psychoanalytic theory, "the self" was used in the 1920s-1940s interchangeably with the ego. In the 1940s, it was defined as a function of the ego and integrated into Freudian theory (Hartmann, Kris & Lowenstein, 1946). In theoretical discussions of narcissism, attention was focussed on "the self" when it became a "self-representation" (Hartmann, 1950). This concept was then expanded and used descriptively (cf. Jacobson, 1954, 1964; Mahler, 1958). A change occurred in the 1960s, and "the self" became a focus. Kohut (1966, 1971) and Kernberg (1966, 1976) initially presented theories that were consistent with traditional Freudian theory. As their theories progressed, "the self" became a structure that was equal to (Kernberg, 1977) or greater than (Kohut, 1977; Kernberg, 1982) the id, the ego and the superego. It will be suggested that "the self" was introduced because it was seen to resolve the ambiguity in the ego concept.

This thesis suggests that the examination of these topics will provide support for the hypothesis that Freud did not neglect "the self". It will be seen that Freud's ego included subjective and objective components that are currently being presented as new additions to Freudian theory. This thesis provides a historical perspective which has not previously been investigated with reference to the ego and "the self".

Definition of Terms

Freud's lack of clear differentiation of "the self" and the ego has been underscored for several decades (cf. Hartmann, 1950; Strachey, 1961; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967). The overlap between the ego and "the self" has resulted in

confusion. But these terms have evolved from different frames of reference.

The ego (*das Ich*) is a technical term that Freud used to refer to an aspect of the psyche. *Das Ich* appears in Freud's writings as early as 1893. Its use has been considered ambiguous. At times it appears to represent an agency in the psychic structure and at other times it represents the individual as a whole (Strachey, 1961, pp. 7-8; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 13; Brull, 1975; Spruiell, 1982; Bettelheim, 1982). Some of these authors criticized Freud's English translators for their choice of the Latin word (Erikson, 1954; Brull, 1975; Bettelheim, 1982). The Latin term ego was used in the first English translations of Freud's works in 1908 (cf. Jones, 1908; Brill, 1909; Chase, 1910). Unlike the Germanic *das Ich*, the ego does not have the experiential first-person quality. The literal translation of the German term (*das Ich*) is "the I", not the Latin personal pronoun *ego*.

"The self" (*das Selbst*) occurs infrequently in Freud's work. In the German language, it is most commonly used as a prefix (Betteridge, 1968; Ticho, 1982, p. 852). "The self" does not appear as a technical term in Freud's writings. Consequently, "the self" does not appear in Laplanche and Pontalis' (1967, 1973) dictionary of classical psychoanalysis.

However, "the self" is defined in a broader dictionary of psychoanalysis which includes philosophical conceptualizations (Rycroft, 1968). "The self" is presented as a term that has both an object and a subject: 1) an objective, substantial element representing the person as an individual whole; and 2) a subjective, non-substantial element created from successive and varying states of consciousness (Rycroft, 1968, 1975). This classification is consistent with The Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles and will be used in this dissertation (Onions, 1955, p. 1834). The subject-object division is a paradoxical one, as "the self" may act simultaneously as subject or an object to itself. Its

reflexive feeling state contrasts with its assessment of its behaviour or emotional state.

The ability of "the self" to act as an object or as a subject has resulted in the description of two different senses of personal identity. The subjectivity of experiencing is contrasted with the objective experience of being aware of one's identity. "The fleetingness of images and feeling and the like is contrasted with the temporal persistence [required by] their owner" (Edwards, 1972, V. 6, p. 96). These substantial characteristics have been addressed by many philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant (Fronzizi, 1953; Edwards, 1972, V. 8, pp. 37-40). While the classical substantialistic perspective suggested the existence of an immutable soul, this theory implied the lack of growth and change. Less radical substantialists described a more flexible model. Unity and continuity of "the self" was compared to changes in observable matter. The alterations in "the self" were explained as modifications of the individual's attributes, modes or qualities (Fronzizi, 1953).

Rycroft (1975) refers to substantiality when he describes "mutually exclusive states of mind". He considers that a "disappearing trick" occurs when "the self" tries to observe itself in the subjective state of "dreaming, imagining and creating". But in the objectivity of evaluation (i.e., inspection and introspection), the subjective experience is lost (Rycroft, 1975, p. 276).

"The self" is often equated with the soul or the psyche (Strunk, 1962; Edwards, V. 6, 1972; Reese, 1980). This association while broadening the definition of "the self" underlines the ambiguity and diversity of its meaning. Consequently, this term is sometimes written between inverted commas ("the self"). This thesis will use this type of demarcation ("the self") to reinforce the broad nature of the concept and the difficulties of defining it.

Rationale for the Definition of the Self

The rationale behind my choice of the above definition of "the self" is as follows. This definition of "self" is consistent with both psychoanalysis (Rycroft, 1968, 1975) and philosophy (Onions, 1955; Edwards, V. 6, 1972). The examination of the use of "the self" in psychoanalytic writings should be done using a definition that is congruent with psychoanalytic thought and one that has the power of philosophical thought. There are two key elements within this definition: 1) the dialectic between the subject and object; and 2) the substantiality and non-substantiality of "the self".

The dialectic between subject and object is essential to the definition of the self. In all the definitions examined, whether in psychology, philosophy or psychoanalysis, this dichotomy is either implicit or explicit. The strength of this type of formulation is further supported by the methodology used in this thesis: The analysis of categories addresses the integration of the subject and object within a concept.

The relevance of my choice of definition is seen in its application. The utility of this definition will form the basis for the study of the ego and "the self" in this thesis. It will be used both in the examination of Freud's concept of the ego, and in the examination of the emergence of "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory. The duality of "the self" will be observed to be present in Freud's work but not integrated. The ambiguity in the Freud's ego concept has influenced current discussions of "the self". In the examination of the use of "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory, it will be observed that "the self" (comprised of both subject and object) has not been addressed. Instead it will be seen that in most cases, only one aspect is focussed upon: the experiential aspect of being (subject) or the sense of the person as a whole (object).

The question of substantiality is the second key element in the definition of "the self" stated above. The psychological and psychoanalytic use of the term

conflicts with the definition of "the self" in philosophy: In philosophy, "the self" remains indefinable due to the substantiality and non-substantiality problem. The position taken in this paper is that "the self" is not reducible to a definable substance. This position conflicts with many clinical and social psychologists who propose "the self" can be empirically examined through personality characteristics or self-concept (cf. Ewen, 1980). These measures of "self" suggest an organized structure and presumes the existence of "the self" as "substance". As well, the use of the term in American psychoanalytic theory sometimes implies substance. In contrast, the dilemma of substantiality has led philosophers to suggest that at best "the self" can be defined as a broad aspect of "personal identity" (Edwards, V. 6, 1972). This thesis will examine Freud's concept of ego and the American psychoanalytic concept of "the self" using the two key elements in the above definition. This definition will be used to support the argument that Freud included a central aspect within the ego and that "the self" is included within his concept of ego.

The organization of this thesis is as follows:

In Chapter I, a review of the literature traces the debate on the introduction of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory.

In Chapter II, the translation of Freud's writings is examined. Emphasis is placed on the criticisms of terminology and on the historical basis by which these decisions were made.

Chapter III examines the philosophical and scientific antecedents to the ego in nineteenth century German thought.

In Chapter IV, a critical review of the development of the ego in Freud's work is examined.

Chapter V traces the basis of "the self" in American psychoanalytic thought, beginning with developments in Ego Psychology.

Chapter VI summarizes the research that suggests that Freud did not neglect "the self". Historical, conceptual, and theoretical arguments found in this dissertation are summarized. Suggestions for further research will follow.

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation is essentially an investigation of the history of modern and contemporary psychology. The most appropriate approach is the Historical-Comparative method (Topolski, 1976; Ruda, 1977). This method explores and explains phenomena through an investigation of common origin and development. As well, it has played a fundamental role in the history of the social sciences. Applying the historical-comparative method to the development of ideas in psychoanalytic theory is consistent with the genetic approach of this method and with psychoanalytic thought.

Central to this method is the analysis of categories. The term, category comes from the Greek *katēgoria*, which means "enunciation". Categories are the widest concepts reflecting the fundamental properties of phenomena and the process of objective reality. Historical, scientific and philosophical thought is determined by categories. One of the most important tasks of epistemology and of scientific methodology consists of the analysis of categories. Systems of categories have been described by Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and other philosophers (Edwards, V.2, 1972; Ruda, 1977).

There are three main characteristics of categories: 1) They have the highest degree of universality as concepts. They may be classified according to substance, quality, quantity, matter, movement, time; etc. 2) They originate in the analysis of objects, of things, of properties and of phenomena. Categories belong to cognitive activity and also to language. 3) Categories reflect the dialectical relationship between subject and object through the instance of theory and practice. By consequence, categories are not subjective or objective classifications but are the integration of both (Ruda, 1977).

Categories represent a union of opposites. They express the universal

mode of human cognition or *Weltanschauung*. They reflect the most general and essential properties of social and natural reality, the inter-relation of subject and object. Categories are not just a "convenient" form of organization of human experience, linguistic formations or expressions of experiential data. They are not a closed and immutable system. Development of thought and cognition finds that they are transformed. Their content is enriched. The additions and restrictions to categories show that they are dynamic, logical structures produced historically by human thinking and experiencing of reality. Categories are not perfect but are the only way that we may build a scientific view of the world (Edwards, V. 2, 1972; Ruda, 1977).

Each science has its own categories. In psychology, there are very few categories that belong to it strictly. For example, the concept of consciousness belongs to philosophy, biology and physiology. The concept of mind is ontological in origin but is also used by natural science, social science and philosophy in general. Included within the category of mind are soul, spirit, personality, personal identity, ego, and self. They reflect "the knowledge of being". Basic to the categorical analysis of ontology is the subject-object relationship which embraces all the possibilities of knowledge: scientific, philosophical, aesthetic, etc. (Edwards, V. 2, 1972; Ruda, 1977.).

This dissertation will show that Freud included both the subject and the object within his category of "ego". When Freud transposed "ego" to the clinical realm, he addressed the object in his structural definition of the psyche and the subject in the psychoanalytical/psychological description of the psyche. It will be suggested that the Ego Psychologists and Self Psychologists did not recognize the ego's duality. Consequently, the ego was seen to be an ambiguous figure. This led American psychoanalytic theorists to introduce a new concept ("the self") that is based primarily in the subjective. The emphasis on the social experience of

humanity results in vagueness. This dissertation will refer to categorical analysis to show that Freud included both the subject and the object in the ego. This will help to clarify the relationship between the ego and "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory.

CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE:
THE THEORETICAL DEBATE AROUND THE EGO AND THE SELF

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the debate on the introduction of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory. In the 1980's, the concept of "the self" became prominent. It has figured prominently in discussions on psychic development (e.g., Kohut, 1977; Kernberg, 1977) and has had one school of psychoanalysis named for it.¹

The review of the literature reveals the debate on the usefulness of this concept began in the 1940's. The foundation of this discussion centres about the reformulation of American psychoanalytic theory. European psychoanalysts who introduced Ego Psychology to the United States raised questions about the interpretation of Freudian theory. The debate began with a discussion of whether new developments of psychoanalytic theory were a shift of emphasis or a clarification of Freud's original work. The use of the term "self" is evident in these discussions. Later this developed into a discussion of the ambiguity of the ego concept and of the broad use of the term "self". Most recently, the choice of terms in the English translation has been questioned. The contributions and problems of the inclusion of "the self" are also addressed.

This chapter presents the review chronologically. This debate is divided into three periods: the 1940s and 1950s; the 1960s and 1970s; and the 1980s.

¹ Heinz Kohut (1913-1981) referred to "the psychology of the self" in his 1971 and 1977 books. After 1977, his theory was referred to as "Self Psychology".

The Self in the 1940s and 1950s

The discussion on the status of "the self" in relation to the ego begins with the question whether the ego and "the self" could be used interchangeably or whether this would result in a theoretical shift in emphasis (Hartmann, Kris, & Lowenstein, 1946). Concern is expressed on the use of varying terminologies, which is seen to result in inconsistencies in Freudian theory (Kris, 1947; Jones, 1953). In Ego psychology, "the self" was defined as a function of the ego, as a "self-representation" (Hartmann, 1950, 1956).

Theoretical Clarification or Shift in Emphasis

The predominant theoretical emergence in the last fifty years in American psychoanalytic theory is the appearance of "the self". While previously introduced to psychoanalysis in the 1920s and 1930s by authors such as Alexander (1930), Glover (1930), and Masserman (1940), "the self" was dismissed in 1946 by Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein due to its focus on "anthropomorphism" and "introspection". In addition, this concept was not considered to adhere to Freud's structural model of the psyche. Hartmann et al. (1946) suggested that concepts such as "the self" emerged due to the broad interest by health professionals not schooled in psychoanalysis.² This resulted in a "shift of emphasis" away from traditional psychoanalytic theory:

A systematic understanding of hypotheses seems to indicate that shifts in emphasis are unavoidable. Without these shifts,

² Hartmann et al. (1946) may be referring to the broad general use of psychoanalytic theory in mental health (cf. Jones, 1924; A. Freud, 1931 and Chapter II below). The animosity in the 1940's was strong enough for psychologist Carl Rogers to be charged for practising medicine without a license. His 1942 book, Counselling and Psychotherapy, is recognized as extending psychotherapy skills to practitioners other than "orthodox" psychiatrists (cf. Ewen, 1980, p. 322).

progress in insight tends to be retarded...[when it] lends itself uniquely to concentrated efforts of research. In restating some of the most general propositions of psychoanalysis, we have concentrated [our research] efforts (Hartmann et al., 1946, p. 12).

The increased interest in psychoanalytic concepts was taken as an opportunity to re-examine traditional theory and establish Ego Psychology. Hartmann et al. suggested that shifts encouraged the "systematic study" of Ego Psychology and its clinical application. This was seen as a positive outcome that could "yield therapeutic advances". The ego concept became prominent clinically replacing the emphasis on the unconscious and the instinctual drives.

Hartmann et al. observed that "the self" was being used interchangeably with the ego without regard for Freud's definition. They considered that the term was being used as a category to represent both the psychic organization (as a whole) and the whole person (Hartmann et al., 1946, p. 16). They suggested that "the self" as a term was useful "perhaps" in making the distinction between the inner and outer world (reality) and explaining the process of psychic development and formation.

Kris (1947) expressed concern that Freud's rich metaphors would be misunderstood. Kris predicted confusion would result over the different interpretations of Freud's language:

Freud was not concerned with semantics. The correct use of a term had little meaning to him; it was the context that mattered. When a generation or two of scientists arrogate such a prerogative the lack of concern for semantics may well lead to confusion.... Even more urgent is the systematic need for

clarification. Throughout fifty years, psychoanalytic hypotheses have frequently been revised and reformulated. Rarely, however, have all previous findings been integrated with new insight (Kris, 1947, p. 210).

Kris saw a need for theoretical clarification four decades ago. Kris also implied that Freud revised his theory several times. He suggested that Freud's final formulation came in 1926 in "Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety". The danger that Kris foresaw, evident in the "varying terminologies" used by theoretical writers of his time, is now a present concern (cf. Schafer, 1976, below).

In 1950 Hartmann discussed theoretical clarifications that resulted in the change of emphasis in psychoanalysis. The interest in the ego was seen as a new "chapter" of psychoanalysis that succeeded Id Psychology.³ The expansion of the ego was seen to follow Freud's later writings. It was considered that while the ego was an integral part of psychoanalytic thought, the implications of Freud's modifications were not yet realized. Hartmann observed that there was an imbalance "in the equilibrium" due to the varied theoretical positions, especially in regard to the therapeutic applications. Hartmann was interested in theoretical and clinical applications of Ego Psychology.⁴ One problem he focussed on was the overlap between the terms "ego" and "self".

The Overlap Between the Ego and Self

Hartmann (1950, 1956) was the first to delineate the ambiguity of Freud's differentiation of the ego as a psychic structure; and "the self" as a whole person, an entire personality or as a "self-representation" (Hartmann, 1950, p. 127).

Hartmann (1950) considered that he was being consistent with Freud

³ Id Psychology refers to traditional Freudian theory based on the instinctual drives.

⁴ Hartmann's development of Ego Psychology is discussed in Chapter V.

when he defined the ego.⁵ [In contrast, Glover (1966) and Laplanche and Pontalis (1967, 1973) imply that Hartmann began the process from which "the self" emerged.] In his definition, Hartmann differentiated between the ego as a psychic structure which acted in relation to the internal and external world and the synthetic function of the ego, the outcome of which was identified as "the person's character". Hartmann discussed the confusion around the term "the self" and the ego. He clearly stated that the ego and "the self" were not synonymous.

"Ego", in analysis, is not synonymous with "personality" or with "individual"; it does not coincide with the "subject" as opposed to the "object" of experience; and it is by no means only the "awareness" or the "feeling" of one's own self" (Hartmann, 1950, p. 114).

Instead he suggested that "the self" was a function of the ego. In his reclarification of narcissism, he explained the development of the ego as a product of the internalization of "self-representations".

Was Freud Systematic?

Hartmann (1956) proposed three reasons why Freud did not expand on the concept of the ego. Hartmann suggested that Freud recognized the complexity of the ego but was too busy focussing on his other "big discoveries". Hartmann also observed that Freud may have wanted to avoid philosophical and metaphysical interpretations of his work. The later stages of Freud's work are considered to be focussed on "conceptualization and integration". Hartmann also criticized Freud for not stating his ideas systematically and for not indicating when "new thinking supplanted" earlier concepts (Hartmann, 1956, p. 269). He felt Freud should have

⁵ When Hartmann (1950, 1956) defined ego autonomy, adaptive functions, the primary and secondary ego, and self-representations, he stated that he was following Freudian theory.

provided a longitudinal perspective on the development of his concepts.

Hartmann considered that Freud was not explicit in his theoretical changes and instead required that the changes be deduced by his followers.

Although [Freud] did so occasionally, in many cases his changes of thinking are not made explicit but must be deduced from the changes he makes in the use of concepts (Hartmann, 1956, p. 269).

Theoretical changes resulted in a situation where ideas were "abandoned and then revived". Hartmann (1956) reiterated Kris' (1947) concern when he suggested that difficulties occurred as psychoanalysts became "fixed on a certain phase of Freud's work".

Jones (1953) would have contested Hartmann's (1956) criticisms that Freud's ideas were not stated systematically. Jones considered that there was consistency in Freud's development of ideas. Included in his biography of Freud, is a listing of 23 concepts that are found in "The Project for a Scientific Psychology" (S.E. 1,1895). Jones (1953, p. 392) observed that all of the topics listed, except for the last three, were developed by Freud in the subsequent thirty years.⁶ Jones' list includes the inhibitory function of the ego, its ability to divide

⁶ This list of topics was compiled by Jones (1953, p. 392) from Freud's 1895 work,

"The Project for a Scientific Psychology".

Principles of Inertia and Constancy

Primary and Secondary Processes

Unconscious and Preconscious

Urge Towards Wish-Fulfillment

Hallucinatory and real fulfillment of Wishes

Criteria of Reality

Inhibitory function of the ego - Mobile and bound energy

Separation of function between perception and memory

Relation of Memory to contact-barriers and facilitations

Three conditions for the arising of consciousness

Significance of Speech

Thought as experimental small-scale action

Traumas and pain as excessive stimuli

Protective screen against them and concentration of cathexes to deal with irruptions

No screen against internal stimuli

or split, and its associated energy which reappear in Freud's later work. [The historical development of these topics may be found in Nagera (1966) and Laplanche and Pontalis (1973).]

The Self Becomes A Focus: 1960s & 1970s

In the 1960s and 1970s the theoretical discussions became more specific. Ambiguity in the definition of the ego was outlined (Strachey 1961; Laplanche & Pontalis 1967, 1973; Ricoeur, 1970). The debate in the literature addressed the new developments in Ego Psychology (Laplanche & Pontalis 1967, 1973).⁷ These discussions now focussed on "the self". Glover (1966) examined the concept with specific reference to Jacobson's work (1954, 1964). Levin (1969) "welcomed" the inclusion of "the self" as a psychoanalytic concept. Ricoeur (1970) referred to the symbolic nature of "the self" which, in Lacanian terms, is a subjective representation. A comprehensive critique of this concept was presented by Schafer (1976). The structural implications of the inclusion of "the self" in Freud's model were also examined (Glover, 1966; Schafer, 1976).

Ambiguity of the Ego Concept

In Freud's writings, the concept of ego, *das Ich*, is laden with ambiguity. The ego's representation in the early writings is considered to be

Signals of unpleasure instead of full doses
 Dreams: wishful, hallucinatory, regressive, distorted
 No motility during sleep
 Parallelism of dreams and neurotic symptoms
 Importance of sexuality in neuroses
 Hysteria: defence, repression, displacement, distortion
 Significance of Attention
 Analysis of intellectual processes, including logical errors, etc.
 Connection between repression and retardation of puberty

⁷ Their work, Vocabulaire de La Psychoanalyse, was translated into English in 1973. The quotations used in this dissertation are taken from the English edition.

broader and more diverse than in the later writings. Both Strachey (1961) and Laplanche and Pontalis (1967, 1973) suggested that the ego has been used by Freud to denote two separate ideas: the individual as a whole and a psychic agency.

Strachey described how the definition of the ego was not clarified in Freud's work. In Strachey's introduction to The Ego and the Id (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923), he discussed this issue.

The position in regard to *das Ich* is a good deal less clear.

The term had of course been in familiar use before the days of Freud; but the precise sense which he himself attached to it is not unambiguous. It seems possible to detect two main uses: one in which the term distinguishes a person's self as a whole (including perhaps, his body)...and the other in which it denotes a particular part of the mind characterized by special attributes and functions....It is not always easy, however, to draw a line between these two senses of the word (Strachey, 1961, p. 7-8).

Strachey noted that the definition of the ego in the 1920s as the central agency of the personality did not change the confusion on Freud's definition of the ego.

Laplanche and Pontalis proposed that Freud combined traditional usage of the term ego with his conceptual definition. They suggested that Freud's contribution was to exploit the different uses of *das Ich*.

It seems inadvisable to draw an outright distinction between the ego as a *person* and the ego as a *psychical agency*, for the very simple reason that the interplay between these two meanings is the core of the problematic ego. Freud is implicitly concerned with this question from the early days, and his preoccupation with it does not come to an end in 1920

(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 131).

Laplanche and Pontalis observed that the ego or "psi" is used in its fullest sense at the beginning of Freud's work but is gradually moderated in his later writings. They considered that this began in Freud's work beginning in 1915 with the introduction of the concepts of narcissism and identification. The concept of ego in these writings is synonymous with the individual. Freud's work in 1923, which described the ego as an agency within the structural model, limited its role. Although the ego, within this model, remained a central agency of the personality, the structural theory imposed many restrictions. Laplanche and Pontalis then suggested that there are no simple interpretations to the meaning of the ego. Further, they considered that it was inadvisable to make an "outright distinction" between the two uses of the ego (as a person or as an agency), as the duality of meaning is "the core of the problematic ego".

Focussed Criticisms of Ego Psychology

Laplanche and Pontalis launched a criticism specifically at the reformulation of the ego in Ego Psychology. Laplanche and Pontalis suggested that Ego Psychologists were attempting to integrate psychoanalytic theory with a "multitude" of disciplines, such as psychophysiology, learning theory, as well as child and social psychology (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 139). This new approach to psychoanalysis tried to integrate all psychoanalytic contributions with the concept of the ego.

Even supposing that any of these ideas could be shown to have some initial support in Freud's thought, it would still be hard to see how they could be said to represent the most consistent expression of the final Freudian theory of the

psychical apparatus (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 139).

Laplanche and Pontalis' early criticism of the developments in Ego Psychology was that this school reduced all psychical aspects to the realm of the ego and denied the importance of Freud's tenets (such as the unconscious). References to the unconscious and the instincts, the hallmark of Freud's work, were no longer stressed. Instead, Laplanche and Pontalis consider that the desire of Ego Psychologists to clarify Freud's concepts resulted in a theoretical oversimplification.

For Freud exploits traditional usages....What is more he plays on the ambiguities thus created....It is this complexity that is shunned by those who want a different word for every shade of meaning (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, pp. 131-132).

The Self: Redundant or Neglected

Edward Glover (1966) presented one of the early comprehensive criticisms of "the self". He considered the introduction of the term redundant, and an indicator of the erratic nature that theorizing had taken following Freud's death. He considered the concept of the self to be metaphysical not metapsychological as Freud preferred. Glover cautioned that theoretically "one is about to be snared in the tortuosities of metaphysical reconstruction" (p. 174).

Glover labelled "the self" a "journalistic term with a Jungian bent". He cautioned writers about adopting its use and directly criticized a work of the time, Jacobson's (1964) The Self and the Object World. Glover suggested that "the self" as a concept emerged in America due to a misinterpretation of Freud's "hypothetical primary ego". The interpretation of this term left a "plethora of questionable terms" such as the "psyche soma, psychic ego, total ego, body ego, total personalities, and primal psychophysiological self" (Glover, 1966, p. 178).

Glover forewarned the reader that the integration of "the self" would affect the model of the psychic structure adversely. Glover also predicted that many hybrid terms would result. He referred to Jacobson's (1964) "primal psychophysiological self" and questioned whether it had any psychological meaning due to its "undeterminable conscious, unconscious or preconscious connections". This legacy of theoretical terms was considered by Glover to be narrow and redundant.

E. Glover (1966) suggested that these writers should have read up on "ego nuclei". In J. Glover's 1926 theory, the ego is formed out of "nuclei" which are established by primitive affective experiences. [The influence of Melanie Klein is evident in the emphasis on anxiety in the infant and on the pre-oedipal defences (Wyss, 1973, p. 198)]. As the "ego nuclei" develop, they cluster into homogeneous "islands". These "islands" then converge to form a "continent" or structure that we know as the ego (J. Glover, 1926).⁸

Glover recognized the breadth of the term "the self" and recognized the problem in its definition: Its wide usage and conflicting meaning defied definition. (If a definition for "the self" was found, he asks, how would the feeling of loss of self be explained.) Glover (1966) cautioned the problem of definition shared parallels with philosophy's unresolvable "mind-body" problem. Glover's (1966) conclusion was that there was no place for "the self" and that the need for "the self" in psychoanalytic theory was merely a "linguistic matter that effects English speaking groups".

Levin (1969) took a different tack. While Levin suggested that Freud would have been "astonished to learn" that he had "neglected the self" in his work or that he had never developed an elaborate theory of "the self", Levin proposed

⁸ In Kohut's 1978 book, The Search for the Self, he credits Glover's "ego nuclei" in his description of "self nuclei" (p. 748).

that this concept should be considered seriously. Levin thought that "there was room for the concept of the self". He drew his support from Hartmann's (1950) statement that psychoanalysis was affected by a lack of integration between theory and technique, resulting in a "technical lag" (Levin, 1969, p. 41). Levin observed that the "breadth" of Freudian theory resulted from an integration of theory, clinical observation and technical applications and suggested that Freudian theory historically underwent amendment and abandonment. (Levin cited the seduction theory's disappearance in 1897 as an example.)

While Levin suggested that the concept of the self had been neglected in psychoanalytic theory as a "functional unit", he added that the position of "the self" was not yet established as "the gains and losses from theoretical changes" had not been consolidated. He recognized that psychoanalytic theory required an organization and coherence and that the proposed changes (the inclusion of "the self") needed further clarification.

The Self as Symbolic

Ricoeur (1970) examined language, symbols and interpretation in Freud and Philosophy. He observed that, like religion, psychoanalysis has many symbols that are elusive when defined (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 7). This results in "double meanings" in language and actions. Symbols, such as "the self", contain both subjective and objective aspects. The structural interaction within the psyche (between the id, ego and superego) allows separate symbols to coexist. The ambiguity in symbolism for Freudian theory was understood by Ricoeur as a strength.

True symbols are at the crossroads of the two functions
which...have by turns [been] opposed to and grounded in one

another. Such symbols disguise and reveal. While they conceal the aim of our instincts, they disclose the process of self-consciousness (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 497).

Ricoeur considered that the essence of psychoanalysis, both in language and treatment requires an understanding of the "vectors" that result in "double meanings". Psychoanalytic interventions (that is, interpretations) were seen to utilize double meanings. Ricoeur observed that as language has inherent double meanings, so must complex psychoanalytic concepts.

Ricoeur suggested that "the self" is a symbol that exists in Freudian theory. "The self" was not emphasized by Freud, as analysis was stressed, not psychic synthesis (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 473). The focus in psychoanalysis is on understanding the influence of the id, ego and superego on the psyche, not on attaining a synthesis of these structures.

Ricoeur discussed the inter-relation between the ego and "the self". The notion of the Freudian self, Ricoeur considered, could be understood using dialectics: "the self" emerges from the interaction of "ego" and "non-ego" (i.e., the consciousness of the patient and the consciousness of the analyst). This is described as a process relying on synthesis.

Ricoeur identified the task in psychoanalysis as "the attainment of consciousness". (Without consciousness, parts of the ego remain foreign to itself: "as anonymous and neuter, as id".) Self-consciousness is achieved through a dialectic between the ego and non-ego, and a new unified "absolute ego" may be established which is "the self" or "the I".

The task of becoming conscious...defines the finality
[completion] of analysis,...ultimately, the task of becoming I,
of becoming ego...But this task remains the unspoken factor
in Freud's doctrine (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 492).

Ricoeur's concept of self is based in Lacanian thought. However, Jacques Lacan and *L'Ecole Freudienne de Paris* considered the concept self was "antithetical" to the understanding of the psychic structure, because it was a symbol. In 1953 Lacan compared "the self" and "body image". Both were images or reflections of the psychic structure. Lacan stressed that the ego was formed by a composite of false and distorted introjections. Neurotic conflicts were inherent. The "I" and the "other" were easily confused in the unconscious concept of the self. There was no central concept except as "an imaginary misrecognition".

Lacan (1953) described three registers of being: the real, the symbolic and the imaginary. In Lacanian terms, the real is that which can never be known, as it is obscured by the symbolic and the imaginary. In contrast, the symbolic comes closest to what is commonly called reality. The symbolic is structured by language but is never fixed in the same fashion as language. The symbolic is not definitive due to its inherent subjectivity. The imaginary refers to the internal world in which images and identifications (including the ego) exist. In the imaginary, the ego has a relation to "the self". This relation is always considered to be mediated by symbolic order, referring to the experiences in the external world.

For Lacan, "the self" is imaginary in a quite literal sense. The baby confuses others with its own mirror reflection and since "the self" is formed from a composite of introjections based on such misrecognitions, it can hardly constitute a unified personality, even for "normal" people....According to Lacan, we all experience a "divided self" (Turtle, 1978, p. 146).

The Lacanian formulation conflicts with those that consider there is a separate structure called "the self" (cf., Kernberg, 1982; Kohut, 1977) as this requires that "the self" exist apart from the ego. This is unacceptable to the

Lacanian as they consider "the self" and the ego to be based on distorted introjections. Lacanians also consider that the American schools of psychoanalysis do not emphasize the unconscious or the id but instead focus on the ego's defensive mechanisms (David-Menard, 1981; Turkle, 1978). This change in emphasis results in the psychic structure not being adequately addressed (Safvan, 1979; Turkle, 1978; Warner, 1973).

A Comprehensive Critique of the Self

In the United States, Schafer (1976) placed "the self" in context with the ego. He recognized that interest in "the self" reached beyond psychoanalytic circles. Its "humanistic and intentionalistic rhetoric" appealed to other psychological theorists.

Schafer noted that in humanistic and existential writing, "the self" is referred to as being concrete or substantialistic. "The self" was also identified as an agency whose referents are subjective or experiential and whose use extends to the "adverbial" (as in "self-actualization" or "self-esteem"). He considered that the definition of "the self" has resulted in confusion as it is seen:

not only as the existential referent of behaviour but as, all at once, the motor, the fuel, the driver and the end point of the journey of existence. It is ironic that self as "*the* self" has become an It: The shadow of natural science theorizing has fallen on humanistic understanding (Schafer, 1976, p. 117).

He identified two contradictory components of "the self": an agency that has the capacity to act and a structure that operates according to mechanistic principles.

Schafer observed that neo-Freudian theory has suffered in the same fashion as modern psychoanalytic theory: When an attempt is made to define "the self", the experiential aspects become confused with the structural aspects. He

suggested that Kohut's (1966, 1977) presentation of the narcissistic self, as a "new dynamic structural entity as well as life theme", was an attempt to integrate theory with practice (Schafer, 1977, pp. 116-117). But like the problem of identity (Erikson, 1950), Kohut's formulation uses two types of "discourse": Freud's natural science model and the model of a person as an agent. These two models are considered to be contradictory.

A second problem is seen in the definition of the terms self and identity. When these concepts are given properties, such as a boundary, contents, location, size, force, and degree of brittleness, their essence is lost (Schafer, 1976, p. 188). Schafer suggested that "the self" has been so broadly used its definition has become ambiguous.

It is obvious, however, that they have used self as an all purpose term. Like identity, which they also favor, self refers to, at different times, to personality, person, mind, ego, life-theme, "I", and subjective life in general. Used this loosely, self is of little use in the quest for clarity of thought (Schafer, 1976, p. 117).

He emphasized this point by illustrating how the term is used in a variety of ways. This is seen in the expression of "the self" with references to one's body, personality, actions, competence, continuity, needs, agency, and subjective space:

I hit myself; I hate myself; I'm self-sufficient; I feel like my old self; I'm selfish; my humiliation was self-inflicted; and I couldn't contain myself (Schafer, 1976, p. 189).

Schafer showed how diffuse "the self" can be. Like "I" and "me", "the self" was a multipurpose word; being that comprehensive did not result in conceptual clarity.

Schafer described Freud's writing as being a mixture of "physiochemical

and evolutionary biological language". He cited Freud (1916) to remind the reader of the hypothetical nature of Freud's theory.

I need to ask you to bear [the] mind as a model...[In] our view the phenomena that are perceived must yield an importance to trends that are only hypothetical (Freud, S.E. 15, 1916, p. 67).

Schafer (1976) then, considered that it was time to overcome the "hypothetical nature" of psychoanalysis. He suggested that the introduction of a concept such as "the self" was due to a general reaction against the mechanistic model and an affinity to those terms that referred to the subjective experience.

Schafer also observed that the English language itself creates a distancing that other languages do not. He described the English language as "mechanistic anthropomorphic". This allows the individual to disclaim actions and not express true intentions. [e.g., The expression, "It must have slipped my mind" instead of "I forgot you", absolves one party from guilt and hides the intention (Schafer, 1976, p. 144).]

Schafer offered structural criticisms to the theoreticians who introduced the term self and suggested that they did not recognize the resulting theoretical inconsistencies. He considered "the self" to be a mixed concept that was phenomenological, experiential, and representational in nature while traditional in structure. The mixture of experiential and traditional resulted in a conflict, as one cannot define the other. He observed that these theoreticians added to their difficulties

first by thinking of [the] argument...merely as risking anthropomorphism and then by suggesting in vain that the richness of clinical connotation can eliminate the risk of "real" anthropomorphism (Schafer, 1976, p. 116).

This problem parallels one that has been addressed in philosophy. Like personal

identity, "the self" is a dual concept that has subjective and objective referents. Consequently, it is difficult to define.

Schafer suggested theorists who wish to utilize "the self" are either being redundant, as their ideas are included in Waelder's 1936 concept of multiple function of the ego, or they are intentionally abandoning "the natural science model" of traditional psychoanalytic theory. He observed that if a different model is used, it will lack the correlates required to make any affiliation with Freudian concepts.

Schafer recognized that the use of "the self" is reflective of the times. He considered it to be symptomatic of a need to recognize the subjective nature of psychoanalytic treatment. While "the self" is ambiguous and diffuse, it could be considered for its contribution to general theoretical discussion. He presented the hypothesis that the concept of self emerged at a time when psychoanalysts found their theory to be "remote, impersonal, austere and overly complex". This climate resulted in the "need to identify" concepts that reflected the subjectivity of clinical experience which could be theoretically based. Schafer observed that there has always been a tendency to reify and personalize terms in Freudian theory. While reification has been curbed by theoretical writings on the id, ego and superego, this tendency has re-emerged in the concept of the self.

He concluded that the presence of "the self" is transitional in psychoanalytic theory. He considered that a new language has to be used in psychoanalytic writing. This action language would then remove the mechanistic anthropomorphic tendency of the English language and would personalize psychoanalytic theory.

Re-Evaluation in the 1980s

In the 1980s the discussion continued to focus on the problem of defining "the self". The usefulness of this concept in psychoanalysis is discussed and structural criticisms are alluded to (Spruiell, 1981; Rangell, 1982). Questions on confusion of terminology and the accuracy of the English translation received more attention (Bettelheim, 1982; Blum, 1982; Ellenberger, Personal Communication, March 11, 1987; Kernberg, 1982; Ticho, 1982;) For others, the ambiguity in the concept of the self was overlooked since it is seen to return a personal quality to psychoanalytic theory (Sutherland, 1983; Padel, 1985). Self Psychologists did not discuss the concept of the self directly but instead referred to the phenomenological trend this school has added to psychoanalysis (Cooper, 1983; Wallerstein, 1983, 1985; Wolf, 1983). Kohut's (e.g., 1977) and Kernberg's (1976) presentation of "the self" is criticized directly and it is suggested that this concept was included by Freud within the ego functions (Spruiell, 1981; Rangell, 1982; McIntosh, 1986).

The Self as Redundant

Spruiell's (1981) paper reiterates the major arguments against the inclusion of the concept of the self in psychoanalytic theory. Spruiell observed that the theoretical speculations over the definition of "the self" has resulted in "enormous confusion". The problem with the discussion of "the self" is that "if kept to strict limits it amounts to very little, and if unchecked, it gets into practically everything" (Spruiell, 1981, p. 338).

Spruiell added to the arguments when he examined the issue of whether "the self", phenomenologically, can be examined by another. He recalled a similar debate when the term "identity" (Erikson, 1950) was introduced. Now there is confusion whether "identity" is part of "the self", separate from "the self" or a function of the ego. The tendency towards the phenomenological rationale has

afforded "the self" (versus identity) more acceptance by some theorists.

Spruiell observed that the individual, and only the individual, can experience "the self" directly. "The self's" reflexive nature makes it definable only as a series of fantasies and introspective judgements. This discrepancy is observed in the psychoanalytical relationship, when the analysand and analyst are defining inner experience.

What the analysand calls his self, the analyst calls ego, which is definable, either in the sense of what can be known of the analysand's experience, or in the non-experiential sense of an abstraction (Spruiell, 1981, pp. 341-342).

The duality of this experience is consistent with the problem of defining personal identity in philosophy. "The self", Spruiell concluded, has "no place in a theoretical vocabulary". The ubiquitous nature of "the self", its philosophical connotations and its diverse use in psychoanalysis has resulted in a redundancy of terms.

Rangell (1982) questioned the identification of "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory. He observed that "the person or the self" existed prior to Freudian theory. Psychoanalysis contributed to the knowledge of our inner structure by "dissect[ing] the whole into its parts"; i.e., the id, ego and superego (Rangell, 1982, p. 869).

He declared that the association of "the self" and narcissism has been an "error of psychoanalytic history". Kohut and Kernberg are considered to have ignored traditional theory and recent clinical findings. This has resulted in the narrowing of psychoanalysis, not in "advances and contributions" (Rangell, 1982, p. 880-881).

Rangell placed the interest in "the self" and narcissism within a larger

sociological frame. The emphasis in modern society has changed. He referred to Lasch's (1978) observation that "the age of anxiety" has been replaced by a cultural regression to narcissism in which "the self" predominates (Rangell, 1982, p. 885).

Problems in Translation

Problems in the translation of terminology became the focus of criticism in 1982 with Bettelheim's work. The choice of the classical languages for professional terms in the English translation had been criticized previously (Erikson, 1954; Brull, 1975). Bettelheim's work examined many concepts in depth and suggested that the choices made in the English translation removed the "personal nature" of Freud's language. The issue of the ego and "the self" are included here. The literal translation of *das Ich* into English is "the I". Instead, *das Ich* was translated into the Latin term, "ego", which is literally translated as a first person, personal pronoun ("I").

This discrepancy is especially apparent to this writer when the translations of Freud's *das Ich* to other languages are examined: the French use *moi*; the Italians use *io*; the Portuguese use *ego* and the Spanish use *yo* (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 130). Except for the Portuguese translation, these are all personal pronouns. (The first person pronoun in Portuguese is *eu*.) For the most part, the personal nature of Freud's *das Ich* is maintained (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). But in English, the personal nature is lost and for some this creates a weakness in (English) psychoanalytical theory (Bettelheim, 1982).

Das Ich was frequently used by Freud to refer to both the subjective sense of self and an abstract metapsychological system (Strachey, 1966a; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967; Brull, 1975; Spruiell, 1982; Bettelheim, 1982). The use of *das Ich* by Freud may be considered to be an example of a category that has more than one meaning. Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) observed that the ego has a broad

definition. Spruiell (1982) considered that, "It is a virtue, not a vice, that both sets of meaning reside in the same word" (Spruiell, 1982, p. 322). In addition, Ticho (1982) pointed out that the German noun for "the self", *Selbst*, is awkward and has rarely been used. Its occurrence is mainly seen in hyphenated words. Ticho attributed its use in the German psychoanalytic literature today as being due to the influence of the American theories (Ticho, 1982, p. 850).

Freud's English translators were criticized for their choice of the Latin word (Brull, 1975; Spruiell, 1982; Bettelheim, 1982). Unlike the Germanic *das Ich*, the ego does not have the experiential first person quality. The ego is limited to the abstract and does not include "the self"; self-representations then have to be used when a phenomenological sense is inferred.

An historical psycho-linguistic perspective on the utilization of the term "ego" is suggested by Ellenberger (Personal communication, March 11, 1987). Ellenberger observed that this Latin term was in use long before Freud. The relation of the psychic structure to the personal pronoun was evident in René Descartes' (1596-1650) work. When Descartes translated *Cogito, ergo sum* into French a personal pronoun appeared separate from the verb: *Je pense donc je suis*.⁹ A suitable term was then required that reflected the meaning of *cogito* and *Je*. Ellenberger suggested that the choice of a Latin term (i.e., the *ego*) would have been the most appropriate as Latin was the language of communication for all scholars and philosophers of that time. Freud's English translators, then, followed philosophical and academic tradition when they chose the ego and not "the I".

The alterations of the ego have been criticized in that the American representations have not taken into account Freud's inherent meaning in his phraseology. It is argued that the self-system that is sought in the later American

⁹ The English translation is "I think, therefore I am".

psychoanalytical theories is already inherent in Freud's traditional theory. Freud would be "astonished to learn" that he had "neglected the self" in his work (Levin, 1969) or that he had never developed an elaborate theory of self (Bettelheim, 1982). In any case, a gap between the theory and practice of psychoanalysis has been identified by psychoanalytic theorists in the United States.

The Self is Recognized

At the height of the debate on the translation, The Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association devoted an entire issue to "the self" (Volume 30(4), 1982). This issue was made up of papers presented at a conference, titled "Psychoanalytic Theories of The Self". Three themes predominate in these papers: the issue of translation; terminological confusion between the use of the terms ego and self; and the issue of whether "the self" is a novel concept. The papers of Kernberg (1982), Ticho (1982) and Blum (1982) are discussed below.

Kernberg (1982) addressed some of the criticisms of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory. He recognized that there was "terminological confusion" around the ego and "the self". Kernberg observed that while sometimes these terms were carefully distinguished, more often they were not. The pattern of interchangeable use and ambiguity in the definition of these terms, Kernberg asserted, was based historically in Freud's use of *das Ich*, was continued in the translation of Freud's work by Strachey, and then was compounded by subsequent writers.

Kernberg gave examples of when he agreed and disagreed with the translation of the text. He considered that some of the ambiguity might be resolved if a third term were introduced, "the character". The character would be differentiated from "the self" as the character would be defined as the outcome of the ego structure that could be viewed in the "behavioural, psychosocial and

interactional" realm. In contrast, "the self" would be defined as an intrapsychic structure that was formed by the sum of all self-representations and object-representations. "The self", then, was imbedded within the psychic structure while the character was a product of the structure. Kernberg suggests that Ego Psychologists (such as Hartmann, 1950, and Jacobson, 1964) dealt with the subjective functions of the ego. The underlying problem is seen to be ambiguity in the ego as a concept.

Ticho (1982) suggested that the psychology of the self was "not as new as many seem to think". In a short history of neo-Freudian theory, he referred to recent and contemporary theoreticians who utilized the concept. Included in his list were C.G. Jung, K. Horney, H. S. Sullivan, J. Gedo, and G. S. Klein. While the definition of "the self" in each of these theorists varied, all referred to the "subjective, creative experiencing aspects of the psyche" (Ticho, 1982, p. 849).

Blum (1982) provided a synopsis of the papers and presentations on "the self" at this conference. He observed the status of "the self" had become a topic of contemporary psychoanalytic controversy. He placed "the self" within the history of Ego Psychology and warned that the new emphasis on "the self" might be detrimental to psychoanalysis as a whole.

The shifts in language and theoretical framework which change the meaning of words serve the avoidance of rigidity in the areas of exploration and imprecision, but also lead to further ambiguity and conceptual obscurity (Blum, 1982, p. 961.)

He noted the variance between definitions of "the self". The varied fashion in which this concept was utilized by theoreticians depended upon not only the frame of reference used but also upon the "level of discourse". Blum found that

the references to "the self" ranged from colloquial speech in which the phenomenological emphasis was apparent (i.e., self-awareness or self-consciousness) to "highly abstract metaphysical constructions". He observed that the term "the self" had been utilized by a number of schools both in academic psychology and in neo-Freudian theories. He also observed that controversy surrounding "the self" has been "long-standing".

Support for The Self

In The Future of Psychoanalysis, a series of articles dedicated in memory of Kohut present Self Psychology as being the "next stage" in psychoanalysis. The concept of the self is described within this school of psychoanalysis. The personal aspects of psychoanalytic theory and treatment are emphasized. Reviews of articles by Cooper (1983), Wallerstein (1983, 1985), Stolorow & Atwood (1983) and Wolf (1983) are discussed below.

Cooper (1983) placed Self Psychology within the history of psychoanalysis. He suggested that Self Psychology mirrors the change in society and culture. While Freud saw the individual as neurotic, conflicted and guilty, Self Psychology takes the position that the individual experiences "tragic defeat" from the insignificance of human existence. Deficits in "the self" are seen as a consequence of this dilemma. "The self" is presented as the central aspect that unifies the personality. This new theory is seen as an addition, "a set of derivatives", rather than a change in basic propositions (Cooper, 1983, p. 5). Self Psychology is considered to be appealing due to its "value system". Based on optimism, "joyful creativity", a belief in human potential and in the individual's core strengths, this theory is suggested as being more philosophical than the "scientific" Freudian theory. Cooper, however, implied that Self Psychology may be addressing different aspects of psychoanalytic theory when he wrote, "We may

not be touching the same parts of the elephant" (Cooper, 1983, p. 16).

Wallerstein (1983) suggested that "the self" has become a focus in psychoanalytic theory as it is the "most central and salient aspect of psychological functioning" (Wallerstein, 1983, p. 21). He did not find Kohut's contributions "revolutionary" but instead found that Kohut "sharpened" clinical perspective (Wallerstein, 1983, p. 25). He suggested that Self Psychology and traditional theory are basically the same, as the constructs of both are embedded in states of conflict. In a 1985 article, he proposed that Self Psychology and Ego Psychology differed primarily in the clinical application. While some critics consider it to be a form of supportive psychotherapy, Wallerstein suggested that Self Psychology was an "enriching supplementation" to classical psychoanalysis (Wallerstein, 1985, p. 402).

Stolorow & Atwood (1983) suggested that a new foundation has been developed in psychoanalytic theory. The introduction of "the self" was part of this trend as it reflected the subjectivity of human experience. Termed "psychoanalytic phenomenology", this new development added "common conceptual language" and recognized the subjectivity and diversity of human experience (Stolorow & Atwood 1983, p. 97). At the same time, this new theory was considered to respect traditional psychoanalytic theory. The emphasis on "the self" in Self Psychology was seen to be part of this trend.

Wolf (1983) suggested that the introduction of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory (specifically in Self Psychology) is a continuation of the trend that Freud began. This change in emphasis replaced the mechanistic nineteenth century scientific framework that resulted in the "depersonalization" of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Self Psychology was found to emphasize Freud's interest in depth psychology. The focus on "the self" as the center of human wholeness has

personalized the clinical and theoretical study of human inner experience in psychoanalysis.

The Self as Humanizing

Sutherland (1983) noted that "the absence of the personal" in Freud's theory was felt in Britain and considered that "the self" was welcome.

The absence of the personal nature from Freud's metapsychology has imposed more strain on psychoanalysis, creating an increasing need for a psychological theory of "the self" (Sutherland, 1983, p. 525).

He suggested that the personal nature of psychoanalytic theory was lost, creating a weakness in (English) psychoanalytic theory.

Padel (1985) observed that "many theorists" were doubtful of the new emphasis on "the self" due to its inherent exclusion of the ego. He considered that the theorists, however, "appreciated" the rationale for its ("the self's") introduction. He suggested that the introduction of this concept was an attempt "to humanize" psychoanalytic theory that did not work. Like the ego, "the self" became a categorization which was troubled by the same difficulties as those of the ego. These concepts lost their qualities when defined by a structure.

The Self as Central in Freud's Model

McIntosh (1986) examined the theoretical relation between the ego and "the self" in Freud's thought. McIntosh argued that while the term self (*das Selbst*) occurred rarely in Freud's writing, the concept was "central" in his thinking. McIntosh supported his arguments by drawing from three sources: Freud's ego concept; Brentano's philosophy; and a critique of the translation. He

considered that a "textual analysis" of Freud's work would confirm that an idea of "the person" was inherent in the ego concept. In an examination of the psyche, it would be seen that Freud had used concepts that "designated aspects of the person as a whole".

McIntosh also drew from the philosophy of Freud's time to substantiate his hypothesis. He considered that Freud used a conceptualization of his professor, Franz Brentano, in the formation of the psyche. Brentano held "that mental representations were formed by an intentional process" which McIntosh saw as being consistent with Freud's idea of cathexis.¹⁰ "The self" was an object in both of these theories that was dependent on the individual's perception (or psychic investment) of him or herself. This could be a libidinal investment, resulting in self-love (a narcissistic cathexis) or it could be an aggressive investment, resulting in a critical or angry cathexis.

McIntosh criticized the translation of the term *das Ich* as he considered it to reflect several different senses of "I". He suggested that three meanings were discernable: 1) The ego as a flexible concept that acts as a subject who thinks, acts, feels, and desires. It is both "a conscious purposive agent" and a technical concept representing a psychic subsystem or the whole psychic system. 2) "The self" as a perception of ourselves (which reflects our idea of who we are). This perception may not be accurate. The self then is an object in which there is a narcissistic or aggressive cathexis. 3) The character as a stable formation founded on "traits of behaviour and thought". Both the ego and "the self" contribute to character formation in different ways. The character occurs as a product of "the self" and the ego.

McIntosh considered that the concept of the self in Self Psychology was

¹⁰ Cathexis is defined as the investment of mental or emotional energy in a person, object or idea. (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 62.)

drawn directly from Freudian theory but was not acknowledged. He considered that Kohut's (1971) model of "the self" was similar to Freud's model. McIntosh concluded that while "Freud's terms are often imprecise, his concepts are not".

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter found that there has been a debate for almost fifty years about the status of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory. In the 1940s, it was discussed whether the ego and self were synonyms. While "the self" was defined as a function of the ego by Hartmann (1950), this term appeared in both psychoanalytic and humanistic theories resulting in a predictable confusion in terminology. "Shifts in emphasis" were welcomed due to a lag felt between psychoanalytic theory and the subjective nature of clinical practice.

In the 1960s and 1970s, "the self" became a prominent topic of debate. It was argued that this concept was redundant or neglected. The ambiguity in Freud's presentation of the ego was recognized. The inclusion of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory was seen to affect psychoanalytic theory structurally, implying the exclusion of the ego both theoretically and clinically.

A central problem identified in the 1970s was the multiple uses of the term self. The diverse uses of the term were attributed to: the influence of humanism on psychoanalysis; the mixing of structural and experiential models; the concrete (not symbolic) interpretation of Freud's language; and the "mechanistic anthropomorphic" nature of the English language. The variance in frames of reference (between theoreticians) did not allow similar issues to be addressed.

The debate on the status of "the self" in Freudian theory continued in the 1980s. "The self", as a concept, became prominent. While this addition to Freudian theory was welcomed, it was also felt that Freud did include this concept in his model. Several theoreticians criticized the accuracy of the English translation

and suggested that the translation omitted "the self".

While "the self" was found to personalize psychoanalysis, few articles supported the concept unconditionally. Self Psychologists did not focus on the term self, but instead suggested that their theory as a whole added a new dimension to psychoanalytic theory.

The central question of this dissertation remains unresolved. The review of the literature does not answer whether Freud neglected "the self" in his formulation of the psyche. The question has been posed in different ways for the last half century and answered with reference to topics that require additional investigation. Three of these topics will be explored in this thesis: the issue of translation; the categorical status of the ego in Freud's writings; and whether "the self" can be historically based in American psychoanalytic theory.

The next chapter will address one of the focal issues referred to in the 1980s. Chapter II will examine the criticisms and comments on the translation of Freud's work.

CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION:
IN DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD EDITION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the development of the English translation of Freud's work. This review will address the problem of terminological choice, with specific reference to the Latin term *ego*. This chapter provides support for the use of the English translation, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Strachey, 1953-1974). However, it will be suggested that the choice of Latin and Greek terminology has created a theoretical misunderstanding for some readers. This problem is particularly evident in conceptual presentation of the ego and "the self".

Criticisms of the English translation are now common in psychoanalytic journals and at international conferences. While the current English translation is admired by some as a "great scientific and literary achievement", it has also been argued that this translation has resulted in "a far greater uniformity than Freud himself intended" (Pines, 1985). It has been implied that the English translation has affected both theoretical development and clinical practice (Bettelheim, 1982; Steiner, 1987). In American psychoanalytic theory, it has been suggested that the translation has contributed to the creation of tangents, such as the introduction of "the self". Critics question whether Freud's translators have incorrectly translated *das Ich* as the ego and have in the process excluded references to "the self".

It will be seen, however, that social and political pressures required certain translation decisions to be made. Fears of over simplification and censorship, combined with hostility towards German writings, led to concerns that Freud's work would be lost. Following the current trend, a medical-scientific

model was adopted.

This chapter will provide support for use of the Standard Edition in this thesis. When the issues of translation are considered in historical perspective, when the translation is evaluated as a whole, and when use of the terminology is considered with respect to the context of the text, it will be suggested that the English translation is useable for the study of these issues.

The Strachey Translation

The primary source for the English-speaking person's understanding of Freud's work is the Standard Edition (Strachey, 1966a). This work is twenty-four volumes in length. It was edited and translated by James Strachey, with the assistance of Alix Strachey, Alan Tyson and Angela Richards and in collaboration with Anna Freud over a twenty-one year time span (1953-1974). Strachey undertook the translation with the purpose of providing the "most correct" version of Freud's writings. The commentaries, notations and cross-references are noted for their extensiveness (A. Freud, 1969b). Strachey's translation is based on the last German edition that was published in Freud's lifetime (Strachey, 1966a, p. xv). The German edition contained many errors. As well, it did not include the addenda and the clarifications that Freud made throughout his lifetime. When Strachey found these discrepancies, he referred to the original manuscripts. Strachey's version became the most complete and exact translation of Freud's work (Strachey, 1966a; Pines, 1985). The "absence of any trustworthy German edition" (Strachey, 1966a) continues today, and German psychoanalytic students refer to Strachey's English edition in their research (Jones, 1957; Grubich-Simitus, 1987; Laplanche, 1987; Steiner, 1987).

Strachey's Standard Edition offered a replacement for earlier translations

that were considered to have misrepresented and distorted Freud's work. These translations often conflicted with each other. As well, they were not always internally consistent. In 1950, Freud's work had not been copyrighted in the United States. Twenty-nine papers had been published, with ten of these translated by Brill (E. Freud, 1950, in Steiner, 1987, p. 40). The decision to prepare a "Memorial Edition", as the Standard Edition was first known, was welcomed as it offered to bring uniformity and clarity to Freud's work. This "Memorial Edition" was proposed a few days following Freud's funeral, with the underlying impetus being that the first generation of psychoanalysts would be able to provide the "most correct" translation. In a letter written by Ernest Jones to Strachey, dated September 28, 1939, Jones invited Strachey, at the suggestion of Princess Marie Bonaparte, to translate the *Gesammelte Schriften* into English. Jones considered that

If it is done after our time, it can never be done so well....I would suggest that we form an "ad hoc" committee, say we two, Mrs. Riviere, Drs. Payne and Rickman to thrash the matter out (Steiner, 1987, pp. 41-42).

The committee of such "highly skilled and knowledgeable group of psychoanalysts" who worked on the translation was well recognized and their efforts were "praised, admired and welcomed" (Pines, 1985).

The Strachey translation must be regarded in its historical context. While the work of the Standard Edition took two decades in mid-century, it is evident that many of the fundamental decisions that are attributed to Strachey and his editors were made as early as 1910. The decisions made during the translation of the Standard Edition are well chronicled in several sources. Many of these decisions are chronicled in documents housed in the Archives of the British Psychoanalytic Society (Steiner, 1987). The Archives reveal, in letters to Strachey from Jones and

others, and in corrected manuscripts, the extent of the corrections and revisions that were made. The Standard Edition was edited and corrected at five different levels: by the editorial committee (A. Strachey, E. Jones, and J. Lariviere); by Strachey himself and his three editorial assistants (Alix Strachey, Alan Tyson and Angela Richards); by consultation with Anna Freud; by a committee of members from the International Psychoanalytic Association; and by the Hogarth Press. Several of these people had a long history of involvement in the translation and all were practising psychoanalysts.

The Choice of Technical Terms

One of the difficulties in the translation was that James Strachey and Anna Freud had to choose technical terms and be consistent with them throughout. A glossary of technical terms is found in the first volume in the Standard Edition. Prefaces to many of Freud's papers expound on why terms were chosen. Reference is usually made to the original German wording. This glossary was written for English translators of Freud's work.

The technical terms chosen for the most part were from Alix Strachey's (1943) work, A German-English Psychoanalytic Vocabulary, which itself was based on the suggestions of a "Glossary Committee" organized by Ernest Jones two decades previously (in 1924). (It is of interest that the critics of the English translation do not review either of these works or refer to them, perhaps because only a few copies are available.) The origin of the English terms is particularly important; while they have been attributed solely to James Strachey, this researcher has found that they have a history that precedes either of the Stracheys' involvement in psychoanalytic writings.

In 1924, the Glossary for the Use of Translators of Psychoanalytic Works

was published as the first supplement to volume one of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis. In this supplement, it was proposed that the new technical terms "be coined from Latin and Greek" and not English. The choice of classical terms was consistent with the tradition observed in all the sciences (Jones, 1924, p. 2). The use of this nomenclature was considered to have many advantages. First, the new terms would be free of the connotations of the English language. Words would be given a more definite meaning and the "temptation to assume meaning" by translators and readers would be reduced. Secondly, it was considered that Latin and Greek terminology would promote "an interchange of thought" between countries. This was especially important as certain terms were untranslatable in some languages. Thirdly, the "classically formed term" had fluidity and derivations of the new terms to adjectives and verbs would be facilitated (Jones, 1924, p. 2). The new terms, then, were chosen to assist translators in making consistent translations. The convention of terms coined from the classical languages confirmed psychoanalysis' affiliation with medicine; Latin and Greek terminology was used, and continues to be used, by the Western sciences.

The scientific frame of reference, and the pressure to ensure the continued existence of psychoanalytic thought, are seen in the objectives set out when the Institute of Psychoanalysis was founded in 1927. In the "Memorandum and Articles", the first objective outlined is

to print, publish and to sell in any language and in any part of the world works on the science of psychoanalysis (in Steiner, 1987, p. 40).

Within this memorandum, the scientific affiliation of psychoanalysis is firmly stated.

The nature of psychoanalytic writing made translation and circulation

difficult, particularly in America. Aligning psychoanalysis with the medical sciences helped overcome any censorship (Hale, 1971; Steiner, 1987). The broad use of classical terminology in psychoanalytic writings can then be seen in this context; the acceptance of classical terminology was common and customary in medical circles at this time and still is today. The use of Latin and Greek in medical texts reflected a blend of late Victorian and *fin du siècle* Viennese prudence and prestige. Censorship of medical texts was avoided by authors, such as Havelock Ellis and Kraft-Ebbing, with the inclusion of Latin and Greek terminology. Classical terms were also used in medical and psychological dictionaries at the turn of the century. Freud, himself, sometimes used Latin in his letters and writing when conveying anecdotes that contained sensitive or vulgar (sexual) ideas (Steiner, 1987, p. 68).

The Use of the Term "Ego"

The use of classical terms in psychoanalytic translations dates back to the turn of the century. One term that is of particular interest is "the ego". This term was in general use in both Britain and in the United States. The popular press on both sides of the Atlantic used the term when referring to contrasting character traits, egoism and altruism (Edwards, V.2, 1972, p. 466). The presence of this term in English literature is evident in an 1881 quotation from Rudyard Kipling: "There is too much Ego in my Cosmos" (in Steiner, 1987, p. 74).

The term ego also appeared in medical and psychological works. British neurologist/psychiatrist Henry Maudsley included a chapter titled "Disintegrations of the Ego" in his 1883 treatise, Body and Will (in Steiner, 1987, p. 74). The American philosopher/psychologist, William James, used the term to define "our

unconscious intelligence" in 1892.¹ And when the Harvard physiologist, B. Sachs, translated *das Ich* in a work by one of Freud's teachers, Theodore Meynert, he chose *the 'ego'* (in Steiner, 1987, p. 74; cf. Meynert, 1885, pp. 171-172).

Meynert outlined a mechanistic formulation of cortical functioning in his work *Psychiatrie*. His influence is evident in Freud's first formulations (Amacher, 1965). [There are similarities in the organization of cortical structures and in the choice of terms, such as "the primary and secondary ego"(Meynert, 1885, p. 175).] The status of the ego is reflected in Meynert's definition of this concept, "as a term used by abstract psychologists" and in its delineation as a metaphysical concept. [The ego was placed within inverted commas, i.e., *the 'ego'* (Meynert, 1885, p. 168; Hartmann, 1956; Steiner, 1987).]

The use of the term "ego" in psychological works was used by Freud's first translators: Ernest Jones, A.A. Brill and H.W. Chase. Jones translated the first of the Five Essays on Psychoanalysis in 1908 and Brill translated Selected Papers on Hysteria and Psychoneuroses in 1909. Freud endorsed the translations of these two men. Freud was directly involved in an American translation of a third work, The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis. This 1910 translation was undertaken by H.W. Chase which was supervised and revised by Freud. Freud's direct involvement makes this translation a "fundamental linguistic reference point" (Steiner, 1987, p. 71).

Chase's 1910 translation used terminology that was consistent with Jones' and Brill's translations. The terminology was often identical. The term they used to translate *das Ich* was presented as "a technical term" (Steiner, 1987, p. 73). While Chase's work seemed to delineate this term with capitalization ("the

¹ Interestingly, both Maudsley and James attempted to differentiate the 'ego' and 'self'. In 1883, Maudsley discussed the 'ego', 'self' and 'organic ego' (in Steiner, 1987, p.74). In 1892, James described three aspects of "the self" (the psychological, material and social). Continuity of being and personal identity was attributed to an over-riding structure, which he called "the pure ego" (James, 1892, p. 159).

Ego"), Jones (1908) and Brill (1909) both used a descriptive term ("the conscious ego") in their works.

The choice of Latin terminology in psychoanalytic writing, then, was one that was made at the turn of the century. The appearance of the term, "the ego", in the early translations, including one supervised and authorized by Freud, supports the idea that Freud approved the use of Latin.

James Strachey's translation employed the approved terminology in pursuing his goal of presenting "Freud, the whole of Freud, and nothing but Freud" (Strachey, 1966a, p. xix). His aim was to allow Freud "to be his own expositor". Strachey felt that his role as editor was to assist the reader in attaining a correct rendering of Freud's meaning....For wherever Freud becomes difficult or obscure, it is necessary to move closer to a literal translation at the cost of stylistic elegance (Strachey, 1966a, p. xix).

Problems of Translation

Strachey openly discussed his difficult editorial role. Many of the works had never before been translated from the original German. The care he took to correct the ambiguities may be observed in the numerous editorial notes, annotations and cross-references.

Despite Strachey's efforts, many criticisms have been directed at his translation. Some critics feel that he acted on his own in the choice of terminology (e.g., Brill, 1975; Bettelheim, 1982) and were not aware the history of these choices. It should also be noted that there are criticisms of translation that precede Strachey's work. These criticisms allude to difficulties arising from other sources.

Freud criticized his own writing for not being more exact. Jones quotes

Freud as blaming his sloppiness ("pure *schlamperei*") for obscurities and ambiguities in his choice of terms (Jones, 1953, p. 34). Jones describes Freud as being "orderly" and "systematic", but one who "spurned exactitude and precise definition". Freud's writing style was such that he followed his ideas in his prose in a manner that sounds somewhat like "free association".

[Freud] liked to give himself up to his thoughts freely, to see where they would take him, leaving aside for the moment any question of precise delineation; that could be left for further consideration (Jones, 1953, p. 34).

The ambiguities due to Freud's writing style were a trial to his translators from the beginning. Jones (1953) observed that these problems could have easily been avoided. One of the difficulties in the translation was that Freud presented many findings as tentative and considered that his opinions awaited scientific verification (Freud, 1900, S.E. 4, p. xxv). Freud was particularly conservative in the area of metapsychological theorizing (Freud, 1923a, S.E. 18, p. 254). In his personal correspondence, Freud refers to the lack of clarification in his work and attributes it to his analytic attitude.

In a letter to Carl Jung, dated December 19, 1911, Freud wrote:

Often it seems that I can go a long while without feeling the need to clarify an obscure point, and then one day I am compelled by the pressure of facts or by the influence of someone's ideas (in McGuire, 1974, p. 472).

In another letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé, dated July 30, 1915, Freud emphasized his analytic bent.

I so rarely feel the need for synthesis. The unity of this would seem to me to be so self-evident as not to need emphasis.

What interests me is the separation and breaking up into

component parts of what would otherwise revert to an inchoate mass... In short, I am of course an analyst, and believe that synthesis offers no obstacles once analysis has been achieved (in Pfeiffer, 1972, p. 32).

It is suggested, then, that Freud was not concerned with developing a central structure within the psyche (such as "the self"). Freud considered that once the psyche had been analyzed, synthesis would "automatically and inevitably" follow (Freud, S.E. 17, 1918, p. 161). The ambiguity that resulted has become a focus for criticism of Strachey's translation.

The first formal criticism of the Strachey translation is found in an article by H. Frank Brull (1975). Brull considered Freud's work in German to be a blend of styles: the artistic, the philosophical and the scientific. In the English translation, Brull observed that only a scientific orientation was evident.

Brull suggested this emphasis resulted from two factors. First, psychoanalysis was attempting to overcome critics who felt it was "romantic nonsense". By omitting the artistry in Freud's writing, then, psychoanalysis could be established as a science. Second, the difficult job of translation was undertaken by a group of people who were English and had a "proclivity for understatement". These difficulties are especially evident in the translations of particular terms.

Criticisms of Terminology: Brull and Bettelheim

One such problematic term is the translation of *die Seele*. *Seele*, according to Brull, is the of soul, not mind or psyche as Strachey's translation has made it. Brull considered that "psyche" and "mind" and "mental processes" were the preferred translations as they avoid "unscientific and mystical overtones".

[What Brull did not recognize in his article is that what he referred to as the

"preferred translations" are in actuality the internationally accepted translations that appear in dictionaries, cf. Cassell's German English Dictionary, (Betteridge, 1975, p. 422)]. Brull questioned the translators' choice of terminology, believing that they lost the essence of the meaning of the word *Seele*. In German, *Seele* implied the seat of cognitive and intellectual processes" (Brull, 1975, p. 275). "Mind", in the English language, does not carry such connotations and in Brull's thinking, does not integrate the conscious and unconscious processes as in *Seele*.

The lack of emphasis on "the soul" in the Strachey translation is also a central criticism in Bruno Bettelheim's (1982) work. He presented the strongest and most extensive criticism to date of the Strachey translation. Bettelheim argued that *die Seele* should have been translated as "the Soul". Expanding on Brull's opinion, he suggested that Freud implicitly included the soul in his writings as Freud outlined the soul by "its nature, its structure, its development, its attributes, [and] how it reveals itself in all we do and overcome" (Bettelheim, 1982, p. 4). Freud's references that allude to the soul's relation to the psychic structure are considered lost due to the faulty translation.

Bettelheim described the definitions of the soul in English and in German. Both languages define the soul as "the principle of life in man". In today's English, "the soul" has strong religious overtones and is no longer in common use except in religion. Bettelheim suggested that the secular essence of this term remains current in the German language and emphasized that Freud specifically chose commonly used German words that were emotionally laden. Bettelheim considered that the English translation lost the meaning of Freud's terms, either through the choice of English word (as in "mind", "mental apparatus" or "psyche") or through the translators' preference for Latin names (as in "the ego" instead of "the I", which is the literal translation of *das Ich*). As well, Bettelheim felt that the English translation was at fault as it created a "third person distance". The outcome of these

problems, according to Bettelheim, is that Freud's work has lost its appeal in America as the translation has removed "the personal touch".

Bettelheim's criticisms imply that Strachey did not acknowledge the problems of translation. Strachey, however, openly admitted difficulties with the translation, especially with some of the technical terms. *Psyche* and *Seele* are German words that are included in the Standard Edition glossary (Strachey, 1966a, pp. xxiii-xxvi). Strachey considered *psyche* and *Seele* to be synonyms meaning *psyche* (*psuché*), psychical, mind or mental. Bettelheim suggests that references to "the soul" should have been included. [In contrast, A. Strachey's (1943) German-English Psychoanalytic Dictionary defined *Seele* as mind, *psyche* and "more rarely soul" (p. 61). In the Standard Edition, although soul appears occasionally, it does not appear in Strachey's translation of technical terms.]

Similarly, Bettelheim's remarks about Strachey's translation of *das Ich*, the German term for ego, did not include references to "the self" or "individuality", which the German term implies. Reference to A. Strachey's (1943) dictionary finds *das Ich* translated as "the ego". An historical review of this term may yield more information on its use in English. Bettelheim acknowledged that Freud never attempted to define *die Seele*, yet Bettelheim attempted to equate it with the essence of the psychic structure.

Nowhere in his writings does Freud give us a precise definition of the term "soul". I suspect he chose the term for its inexactitude, its emotional resonance. Its ambiguity speaks for the *psyche* itself, which reflects many different warring levels of consciousness simultaneously (Bettelheim, 1982, p. 77).

Bettelheim suggested that the essence of *die Seele* would have been

revealed in a 1905 paper of Freud's. In "Psychical (or Mental) Treatment", *die Seele* is translated as "mind" or "psyche" instead of soul, as Bettelheim suggests.

However, when Freud's paper is reviewed in its entirety, it can be seen that the focus of this paper is on the relation of the mind and body. The mind-body problem is a philosophical question that has a history of its own. Indeed, to change the terms of this paper would be inconsistent with the philosophical context, in which this argument has been made.

Bettelheim found the terms chosen in the Standard Edition to be misleading; consequently, this has led to the misinterpretation of psychoanalysis in America. The translation of *die Seele* as "mind" and "psyche", and of *das Ich* as "the ego", led to critical differences in the development of American psychoanalytic theory. Bettelheim implied that this mistranslation affected subsequent development of the ego in Ego Psychology and other theories originating in the United States (Bettelheim, 1982, p. 40). His reflection on American psychoanalytic theories re-emphasizes the need to establish the historical foundation of the ego.

Bettelheim acknowledged that Freud may have wanted to avoid references to the soul for several reasons. Aside from the ambiguity of the term and the religious connotations, there was a distinct need to establish psychoanalytic thought in the English-speaking world. The frame of reference that was considered the best to convey psychoanalysis was medical science. This was consistent with Freud's earliest writings, which were based on a mechanistic/neurological model. The association of psychoanalysis with medical science was considered a requirement for the dissemination of psychoanalytic knowledge in the United States (Bettelheim, 1982).

Psychoanalytic theory needed a definitive translation as it had already been seriously misinterpreted. This was evident in its applications to child development.

For example, the misinterpretation of Freud's theories resulted in "chaos in classrooms". Some schools had decided that to avoid the development of childhood neurosis, teachers were to permit the expression of "natural instincts". This led Anna Freud to give a lecture series where the teacher's role was described as supporting the developing ego, not the id instincts (cf. A. Freud, 1931). Jones (1924) also expressed his concern that psychoanalytic terms were being simplified. He cites the general misuse of the term "repression" as a "physical restriction", not a defensive process or a means to satisfy the instincts.

Bettelheim considered that the "mistranslations" were compounded by two other factors: "the unavoidable distortions from the span of time" and a difference of cultural environments. Few Americans, Bettelheim observed, have the cultural background to understand the references to classical European literature that educated people in Freud's time would have understood.

While Bettelheim has expressed concern that the Standard Edition has been misinterpreted by current American psychoanalytic readers, he is in error when he suggests that psychoanalytic theory in the United States has been handicapped in this way. The major theoretical writers in America are Germanic in origin. For example, many of the prominent writers of the forties and fifties, (e.g., Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, Rudolph Lowenstein, Edith Jacobson and Erik Erikson), were German-speaking and were trained by Freud in Vienna. They would have read Freud in the original German. As well, the main theoreticians and teachers of the seventies and eighties are also fluent in German (e.g., Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut) and would have been able to read Freud's original papers. The foundation from which these theorists made their contributions cannot be attributed to the English translation as these writers would have had access to Freud's original papers. Bettelheim's criticisms of the interpretation of Freud's work in the United States, then, are valid only for the second generation of

psychoanalytic students who are unilingual in English and who are reading but are not publishing psychoanalytic work.

The consequence of the English translation of Freud's work is that psychoanalytic theory has become "more dogmatic and obtuse than the original German" (Bettelheim, 1982, p. 32). While he recognizes the English translation has given Freud's work "a degree of clarity and definitiveness that the German writing does not", Bettelheim is concerned that the "emotional bond between author and reader" is missing (Bettelheim, 1982, p. 44).

In Defence of Freud's Style: Mahony

Mahony (1982) provides a counter argument to the critics of the terminology chosen in the English translation. His book, Freud as a Writer, appeared in the same year Bettelheim (1982) published Man and his Soul. While Mahony offered some of the same criticisms, he considered that some of the criticisms are based on restricted excerpts of Freud's works. Mahony's work, then, is a retort to the critics of the choice in terminology.

Mahony suggested that understanding Freud is a often difficult and refers the reader to Robert Holt's (1973) guidance in "On How to Read Freud". The full meaning of Freud's work is considered to be best obtained by following his train of thought. Freud was a writer who never expressed an idea in one phrase or paragraph. His development of ideas resembles an associative process.

Mahony considered that Freud's writing style reflected his era. Freud's style makes use of metaphors; The puns and ambiguities he uses are consistent with those of the Jewish middle class in Vienna. His style is popular yet scholarly, and fits into the "styles of his literary predecessors and contemporaries" (Mahony, 1982, p. 14).² Freud's writing style, according to Mahony, is deceptive as it

² Mahony's opinion has been previously expressed. The Italian writer Giovanni Papini (1958)

appears superficially easy to comprehend.

His wonderful ease of expression and his masterfully articulated syntax make his writing appear at first blush, clear and less ambiguous than it is (Mahony, 1982, p. 105).

Freud's ideas are presented as epigrams. To understand his writings, the successive progression of his ideas must be examined, and the impact of his culture and the era must be acknowledged, otherwise only a simplistic understanding of Freud can be obtained.

Mahony also remarked that Freud's writings have never been the sole source of information for students of psychoanalysis. He observes that the "oral tradition", by seminars and discussion, have always been a means by which "psychoanalytic candidates" (or students) have received much of their understanding of theoretical concepts. This tradition began informally in 1902 when Freud began his Wednesday night meetings. When the meetings were formalized in 1908, they became known as the Viennese Psychoanalytic Society. In 1908 the first annual meeting was held with its associated publication. Freud commented on his appreciation of these forums to Jung in one of his letters dated October 17, 1909.

It seems that since the emergence of the *Jahrbuch* I could change my mode of presentation...It is no longer necessary to restate our most elementary assumptions and refute the most primitive objections to every single paper. It is just as absurd for people to expect to understand our papers without the prerequisite training as to pick up a treatise on integral calculus without having gone beyond elementary arithmetic (in

described Freud's style as one belonging to "an unsuccessful novelist" (*un romanziere mancato*). Papini read literary German.

McGuire, 1974, p. 254).

Freud considered that these meetings provided a needed forum as they "lightened the burden of transmission". Meetings, seminars and auxiliary readings are still used to gain an understanding of psychoanalytic concepts. Mahony observed that the multimodal approach is standard in learning Freud. Mahony, then, is critical of those who attempt to interpret Freud solely by phrase, sentence or single passage. A complete understanding of Freud requires extensive readings and seminars in which Freud's ideas may be discussed with colleagues.

Mahony also addressed the difficulties Freud faced in defining psychic structures when there was no scientific evidence for their existence. Freud acknowledged the criticisms directed toward his work in "An Autobiographical Study".

In the natural sciences, of which psychology is one, such clear-cut general concepts are superfluous and indeed impossible (Freud, S.E. 20, 1925, pp. 57-58).

Freud recognized the difficulty of attempting to define psychic structures. Mahony presented the idea that a definition of psychic phenomena was not possible. He quoted Freud from the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society: "One should refrain from definitions when psychic phenomena are concerned" (Nunberg & Federn, 1962, V.1, p. 222).

Mahony suggested that the ambiguity of Freud's prose has not been fully appreciated by his English-speaking readers and that this difficulty is particularly evident in the developments that followed Ego Psychology.

Many an Anglo-Saxon critic who endorses a conflict-free ego misconstrues Freud's elaborations as definitive (Mahony, 1982, p. 172).

Mahony suggested that these recent theorists have not understood the style by which Freud conveyed his theory. Mahony considered Freud's prose to be "an open discourse that required a psychoanalytic sensibility". He suggests that English-speaking people can not comprehend Freud as they have treated excerpts of his work as definitive.

The question remains why it is nevertheless routinely treated in Anglo-American circles as if (Freud's) statements were closed and declarative - nearly pharmacological prescriptions (Mahony, 1982, p. 172).

Mahony, then, provides several observations suggesting that the interpretation of Freud's work in America has been hampered by restricted reading. His reply to the critics of terminological choices gives support to the English translation.

A Historical Perspective: Steiner

Steiner (1987) addressed the problem of translation utilizing a historical perspective. This perspective included descriptions of the first English translations from the turn of the century, and highlights the social and political problems that directly influenced these translations. Steiner suggested that Strachey, as editor of the first Standard Edition of Freud's work, was confronted continually with these problems.

Steiner presented an historical analysis that focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the first translations. Steiner found evidence that the first translations offered by Jones in 1908 and by Brill in 1909 were sincere in their attempt to offer a literal translation that respected the original text. Their priority was to convey psychoanalytic theory to the English-speaking reader. Brill reflected:

I made no effort to produce literary excellencies, I was only interested in conveying these new ideas into comprehensible English (Brill, 1942, in Steiner, 1987, p. 81).³

Jones (1909) shared these concerns and was well aware of the problems of translation. His early translations included the German words alongside the English words when "technical terminology" was to be translated into English. Still, Jones considered that there were

barbarisms found in the translation....For one thing, it must be borne in mind that aside from the subject matter, Freud is not easy to read in the original. Indeed, I feel quite certain that only those who have read the original will best appreciate the task of the translator. But no matter how devoid of literary excellencies this translation may be, it can at least claim, to wit, it is a faithful reproduction of the author's thoughts. This is really all that should be required of a translation (Jones, 1909, in Steiner, 1987, p. 82).

Steiner gave a number of references that indicate that Freud's first two translators did attempt to offer "literal" and not "beautiful" translations. Terms such as 'narcissism', 'autoeroticism', 'object love' and 'latency period' and 'self-preservation instincts' have their origin in the first translations. [For a more complete listing, see Steiner (1987, pp. 78-81).]

Steiner also discusses criticisms of the early translations. These criticisms

³ However, Roazen (1984) describes Brill as having made numerous changes in his translations of Freud's papers. Brill dropped passages that would "interfere with sales" and added his own clinical examples without identifying them as such. While Brill was criticized for this by Jones and others, Roazen suggests that this tactic was taken to popularize psychoanalysis. Freud was not particularly concerned about the American translations and attributed the criticisms to Jones' jealousy (Roazen, 1984, p. 381).

reflect a rivalry between early translators and also open up the issue of the translators' fluency in either English or German. The criticisms of Brill's capacity to express himself in English, as recorded in a letter written by J.J. Putnam to Freud, lead Steiner to suggest that this concern was broad. Steiner examined the educational background of the early translators. He then reviewed anecdotal notes referring to the English and German oral and written fluency of those involved in the translations of Freud's work. Steiner then infers that every one of these people, including Freud, his daughter, Jones, Brill and J. Strachey, did not possess an sufficient knowledge of the two languages to have been able to make an accurate translation.

Steiner also suggested that the first translations of Freud were done too quickly and without the care a modern translator would bring to the task. Steiner, however, considered that these early translations should be placed in perspective. First, he considered that the problem of translation in Freud's case was complex due to the "highly semantic content and markedly expressive style." Second, he considered the pressure to disseminate Freud's ideas. Even at the time of his death there was a fear that Freud's work would be lost. Steiner recalled the "hostility" the English-speaking world felt towards the German-speaking countries, including Austro-Hungary (Steiner, 1987, p. 88). Third, it was observed that the psychoanalytic theories that were widely discussed were greatly simplified (Jones, 1924; A. Freud, 1931; Steiner, 1987). Finally, it was considered that Freud's work, with its references to sexual matters, would be rejected in America. In a letter Freud wrote to Carl Jung, on January 14, 1909, this concern is expressed.

I also think that once they (Americans) discover the sexual nature of our theories, they will drop us. Their prudery and their material dependence on the public are too great (in McGuire, 1974, p. 196).

The reality of this fear is evidenced in an American publisher's hesitancy to print Freud's articles due to "their containing sexual matter". Terms were refused for fear of offending the "lay reader and ladies" (Steiner, 1987, p. 64). [Consequently, the term "homosexual" was translated as "invert". This latter term is consistently used in Freud's famous essay on sexual development and deviations (Freud, S.E. 7, 1905a)].

Medical texts in this era found the solution to this difficulty by using the ancient languages. Steiner attributed the preference for Latin in the English translations to Ernest Jones. Steiner considered that Freud could not be assumed "to have advocated a mass Latinization of his terminology". Instead, Steiner proposed that Latinization came about from the need to establish psychoanalytic thought in the English-speaking world.

The English translations of Freud's work, with Latinization in lieu of the simpler German words, assisted the foundation of psychoanalytic thought. Theoretical accessibility was limited to a group of practioners and the specificity of the language helped in the establishment of a professional identity. Steiner stresses, then, that the Standard Edition provided

a working model for the standardization of the new professional knowledge through a particular linguistic instrument" [Steiner's underlining](Steiner, 1987, p. 84).

Steiner observed, then, that the language chosen contributed to the development of the psychoanalytic movement. The use of Latin and Greek in Freud's English translations was thus a tactic adopted at the turn of the century.

Ironically, considering the intensity of the criticisms aimed at the Standard Edition, the translation theorists have remarked that English-German translations are at an advantage as the two languages are related. The stylistic and linguistic

similarities of these two languages, in contrast to their dissimilarity to the romance languages, have allowed far greater accuracy and clarity (Steiner, 1987, p. 37). Consequently, the English translation is considered to have many assets.

Steiner's support of the English edition, as edited by Strachey, is drawn from a historical perspective. The reconstruction of the early phases of the translation illustrates the rationale behind the adoption of the technical terms. The tactical nature behind these decisions was required for the diffusion of psychoanalytic writing, the establishment of the psychoanalytic movement in English-speaking countries, and credible affiliation with the medical sciences. This ideology, then, influenced the psychoanalytic writings long before Strachey's edition. (However, some terms, such as the ego, already had a history in the English language.) Steiner suggested that alterations in Freud's work were made out of necessity and for the most part, the early translations were consistent with the underlying meaning that Freud intended.

An International Assessment of the Strachey Translation

The problem of translation was discussed by an international panel at the 35th International Psychoanalytic Congress in Montreal in July, 1987. Members of this panel were: Darius Ornston (Chairman) and Alex Hoffer of the United States; Ilse Grubich-Simitus and Alex Holder of Germany; Jean Laplanche of France; and Inga Villareal of Columbia. The panel focussed on the status of the translations of Freud in English, French, German and Spanish and on the problems observed in the development of these translations. Strachey's (1953-1966) edition was a primary focus in these discussions.

The panel recognized Strachey's work as an "editorial accomplishment". The extent of Strachey's contribution was evident when the international panel discussed the quality and the existence of Freud's work in languages other than

English.

No critical edition comparable to Strachey's is available in German partly because of the disruptions of World War II. Freud's works were burned by the Nazis and his work did not re-emerge in publishing houses until 1952. Anna Freud authorized a German edition only in the 1960s when the German psychoanalytic movement was reestablished. An annotated critical edition has not yet been completed due to various setbacks, including health and financial matters. (Grubich-Simitus, 1987; Holder, 1987).

Two Spanish standard editions exist. One is described as being a technical translation that is difficult to read. The other captures Freud's style of prose. While it is easier to read, it is criticized for using a variety of Spanish words for the same German word. Like the criticisms of the English translation, the Spanish edition is thought to interpret. Consequently, Villareal (1987) suggested that neither edition adequately conveys Freud's ideas. Some of these problems are attributed to differences between the German and Spanish languages.

In France, the problem of politics has kept a French standard edition from emerging. Laplanche (1987) observed that the five schools of psychoanalysis in France have made the coordination of such an effort possible only recently. It is only in this decade that an editorial board has been established.

The interest in re-editing and re-translating Freud was suggested by the panel discussants to be influenced by the expiration of the copyright of the works of Freud. In England, this expires 50 years after an author's death and in Germany after 70 years. This means that new editions of Freud's work may be published in English in 1989 and in Germany in 2009. The utility of the English translation was a focus of the Congress panel. The strengths and weaknesses of this translation were explored, particularly with regard to choices of terminology.

Holder (1987) criticized the Strachey edition for its limited choices in terminology. He observed that the English word "structure" was used for eleven German words that all had different shades of meaning. He suggested that a literal translation should be done with the German word in parentheses.

Hoffer (1987) observed that there were gains and losses in meaning when any translation was undertaken. He considered that it was easy to criticize Strachey's choices, but harder to find new words. Hoffer considered that translations were evaluated over time and that awkward words gradually become altered to regain their meaning. Hoffer gave the example of how "parapraxes" became "the slip of the tongue" and "the Freudian slip".

Hoffer wondered whether a literal translation would confuse today's readers. Hoffer cited his translation experience in the translation of The Phylogenetic Phantasy, Freud's metapsychological paper that was written in 1917 but was discovered only in 1985. Literal translation, while "tempting" to the translator, would complicate the reading of Freud. A German term such as *indifferenz* would be translated as "indifference" and not the current technical translation "neutrality". Hoffer cited other examples where no English equivalent to the German word exists. The translation of *ungeschehenmachen* as "undoing" instead of the literal translation, "to make unhappen", does not describe "a defensive mechanism typical of the magical thinking of an obsessional" which is evident in the German. While Hoffer suggested that Strachey was mechanical and technical in his language choices, he recognized that this was an "inevitable problem in translating Freud". To counteract the problem of "translation without interpretation", he suggested publishing German and English text on facing pages.

Villareal (1987) considered that if the translation were more exact, it would not be readable. She cited this as a problem in the Spanish editions. While she criticized Strachey for not choosing words that conveyed more meaning, she

recognized the influence of the era and the culture on Strachey and his assistants.

Jean Laplanche (1987), the most senior member of the panel, expressed his views on the utility of the English translation at the 35th International Psychoanalytic Congress. He observed that the Strachey translation was initiated due to a fear that Freud's thought would be lost due to the variety of translations available. Laplanche observed that this is currently a problem in France where 36 editions of Freud's work are available and no standard annotated collection of essays is available.

Laplanche's (1987) opinion was that despite the criticisms, the Strachey edition remains "admirable". The extensive footnotes, addenda and introduction make this edition the only critical edition. The actual translation is also considered to be of good quality. "Even if he sometimes levels off the meaning, you will almost never find him guilty of a mistranslation" (Laplanche, 1987, p. 2). The problem of terminology is one that all translators have to confront.

Here at the crossroads between common vocabulary and scientific terminology, lies the essence of the terminological problem....Vocabularies, codes of different languages do not overlap term by term...to take a very simple example, that our French *mouton* is a sheep in the field of the British and is a mutton on his plate (Laplanche, 1987, p. 5).

Laplanche considered that neologisms can help in conveying meaning in translation and are one way to elude the "limits of translation". In these cases, the words can take on a meaning of their own. Laplanche concluded that there are two languages that exist in psychoanalysis; the original German and that of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), which is used in the Standard Edition. Laplanche observed that the "IPA has evolved a language of its own",

which is now internationally used and has proved to be functional.

Laplanche then considered that Strachey's translation was satisfactory and that an improvement would be made if historical notes were added. He also considered that each new generation of psychoanalysts would find problems in the translation and that no definitive edition that would be satisfactory to all would be possible.

When the problem of translation was presented to one of Canada's leading psychoanalysts, one other issue emerged. Dr. Clifford Scott (Personal Communication, January 14, 1987) agreed that there were many ambiguities in Freud's wording and that the essence of these words was not always determinable. Scott agreed that Strachey does justify his translation by his numerous comments and annotations. Scott commented that if a new translation were done, the editors would have to begin with a translation of Freud's work from old German to modern German before a new English translation was started. Dr. Scott considered that the current translation was "useable despite its shortcomings".

Conclusion

This chapter found support for the English translation. Current research suggests that none of the problems in the Standard Edition are unique to the English translation or translations in general (Hoffer, 1987, Laplanche, 1987; Steiner, 1987; Villareal, 1987; Mahony, 1987). Specialists in translation assess the Standard Edition favourably. Others argue that this translation has removed the "personal quality" from Freud's writing, replacing it with a mechanistic and reductionistic frame of reference (Erikson, 1954; Brull, 1975; Bettelheim, 1982).

Of the problems in translation, the choice of terminology has been most severely criticized. One of the specific problems in translation that this chapter

identified is the translation of *das Ich*. The choice of a literal translation, "the I", would have had more impact as a term than the Latin word *ego*. What is lacking in the term "ego", is the direct reference to a central aspect of the personality (such as "the self"). "The ego", along with the terms "mental apparatus" and "mind", are seen to subsume the terms "the soul" and "the self" (Brull, 1975; Bettelheim, 1982). This is not entirely true, however, as the terms "soul" and "self", do appear in the Standard Edition. These terms, then, have not been completely omitted. In addition, it is argued that understanding Freud's terms requires extensive reading and discussion, not limited textual analyses.

When the English translation is reviewed in the context of its evolution, this chapter found that many decisions were the result of historical-political pressure. Latin and Greek terminology was required to ensure the survival of psychoanalytic thought.

In a study such as this one, the problem of translation is a focal issue. As *das Ich* is most consistently translated as the ego, it should then be possible to determine the use of this term by examining the context in which it is used in Freud's complete works. As a prominent term in Freud's papers, its use could be understood by means of a critical analysis of the development of the ego. An examination of Freud's major papers on the topic will be presented in Chapter IV. While it is recognized that working from the English edition is a limitation in this research, it is also noted that the criticisms of the translation are based in the United States, which relies primarily on the English translation. This dissertation will attempt to put these criticisms in perspective.

Before a critical analysis of Freud's concept of the ego is undertaken, an interpretation of the use of the concept in Freud's writings should be considered in conjunction with Freud's era. Chapter III will provide an historical review of German nineteenth century philosophical and scientific antecedents to Freudian

theory. This chapter will illustrate how Freud's conception of the psyche and his de-emphasis on metaphysical constructs were consistent with his period. The question of the English translation of *das Ich* may be put in perspective when the influence of nineteenth century German materialism is considered and Freud's use of the ego concept is examined.

CHAPTER III
THE PHILOSOPHICAL-SCIENTIFIC ANTECEDENTS OF FREUD'S
EGO THEORY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY GERMANY

The purpose of this chapter is to explain why Freud did not focus on a unifying and integrating concept in the psyche. A general review of philosophical and scientific theories in nineteenth century Germany will illustrate a radical change in the conception of the mind-body relationship. Historical evidence supports the idea that Freud was consistent with scientific writers of his generation when he did not stress a unifying and integrating concept, such as the soul or "the self", as central part of his theory.

This review will show that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, philosophy and the sciences sought proof of human connection with God or some other irreducible force. It will be seen that this changed with the introduction of materialism: the mind became a function of the body, and not a separate entity. Consequently, the conscious and unconscious mind were studied as functions of the brain. The materialistic model, both in its conception of the mind-body relationship and its mechanistic explanations, is evident in Freudian theory. This chapter will trace the development of German materialism and place psychoanalysis within this model. It will be suggested that an emphasis on a central aspect (such as "the self") within the psyche in psychoanalysis would not have been tenable due to the change in understanding of the mind-body relationship.

This chapter will also observe a repetition in the discussion of the inclusion of a central concept within the personality. The problem of including the soul in nineteenth century scientific studies will be seen to be resurrected in the debate on the addition of "the self" to psychoanalytic theory in the twentieth century.

Materialism and the Soul

The predominant trend in the sciences in mid-nineteenth century Germany was the materialistic movement. Emphasis was placed on mechanistic and not on chemical, biological or metaphysical principles. (These latter principles were considered to include formulations based on reasoning or empirical data that could not be objectively explained.) One of the outcomes of this movement was a transformation in the perception of human inner nature. The development of this movement resulted in a lack of emphasis on a "unifying force", "spirit", or "soul" in scientific works of the day. The change in emphasis can be used to explain why Freud did not include a unifying concept in his model of the psyche and instead described a multi-dimensional structure (e.g., the id, ego, and superego).

During the nineteenth century, philosophical and scientific thought went in separate ways and the chasm continues to this day. While the eighteenth century utilized philosophical methods in scientific logic, developments in the nineteenth century gradually brought about a new separation. The separation of scientific thought from metaphysical philosophy was a gradual one that resulted from a new emphasis on the materialistic movement.

Materialism was a philosophical theory that suggested physical matter was the fundamental reality and that all being, processes and phenomena could be explained as manifestations of matter (Reese, 1980, p. 338). This movement, then, reduced the importance of spiritual factors in metaphysics, as well as epistemological or historical explanations of phenomena. In addition, physiology and vitalism were de-emphasized and the materialistic movement focussed on mechanical and not on biological or chemical principles.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, most philosophical and scientific writings included a hypothesis regarding our spiritual connection with a

greater being. This connection was sought in the relationship between mind (spirit) and body (matter). The mind-body association implied that if the soul were "localized" then a spiritual relation to a greater force could be established. These scientific writings, then, retained a tie to metaphysics.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the metaphysical issues were separated from scientific experimentation. Historically important allegiances between scientists were made establishing a focus on empirical studies (Merz, 1903; Cranefield, 1957, 1966). This new emphasis on materialism brought about investigations of the conscious and the unconscious in the field of neurology. Freud began his career in neurology in laboratory research. The influence of the materialistic movement is evident in his presentation of the mechanistic functioning of the "mental apparatus" (psyche).

The Soul, the Psyche and the Self

Historically, the existence of "a unifying force, a governing or vital principle in man" has been identified as "the soul". Equivalent terms in Greek are *psyche* or *pneuma*, in Hebrew *nephesh* and in Latin *anima* (Hastings, 1946; Reese, 1980).¹ The terms "soul", "psyche" and "self" are considered to be used

¹ It could be hypothesized that Freud's conception of the psyche was influenced by the materialistic movement but also by the conception of the human spirit proposed by Judaism. The Greek notion of "soul" is absent from Biblical Judaism. However, other terms used. Burt (1960) presents Biblical synonyms and their semantic implications found in the Old and New Testament. For example: *leb* ("heart"), which means the seat of emotions and intellect, appears 249 times with this meaning in the Old Testament; *ruach* ("spirit") appears 378 times; and *nephesh* ("soul" or "life") appears 754 times. Ancient Hebrews considered "consciousness" in relationship to the body organs (and even viscera), thereby resembling psychosomatics.

Individual personality in the Old and New Testament is considered a concrete whole. The organism is the whole person. Individual personality is not absent from the Bible but is wholistically understood.

synonymously; it is observed that there is "no fixed pattern of usage" (Strunk, 1962, p. 14; Reese, 1980, p. 541). In the 1800s, the term of choice referring to "inner life" in philosophy and theology was "the soul" whereas in psychology the term of choice was "the self". These terms are considered to be two ways of referring to the same concept. The historical relationship between these two terms is well documented by both theologians and psychologists (Strunk, 1962, p. 14).

The Attempt to Define the Soul:

Vitalism, Objective Idealism, and Natural Philosophy

In the history of philosophical writings, the search for the definition of the soul has been a primary focus. The nature of the topic required a conceptual interpretation that went beyond the empirical sciences. This system of knowledge was originally described by Aristotle, who named it "metaphysics". (Metaphysics is literally defined as "beyond physics".) Metaphysicians hoped to promote the development of a system of ideas that would be used to understand the nature of ontology, the general nature of being, and cosmology, the theory of the world.

An interest in the resolution of these metaphysical questions at the beginning of the nineteenth century is found in the language of philosophical and scientific writings. The words "soul" and "psychology" are observed to be used more frequently in German writings than in French or English (Merz, 1903, p. 197). In these countries, a different emphasis was evident. Works on the "soul" denoted the study of the spiritual side of human nature, whereas "studies of man" (or the human mind) were equivalent to the study of the psyche or "psychology".

In Germany, the differentiation of philosophy and science was not as

The influence of Judaism on Freud's conception of the ego suggests that the individuality of the spirit is considered. While this area of study supports my hypothesis that Freud included "the self" in his concept of ego, the development of this idea is left for another time.

great. Initially, the search for the soul was undertaken utilizing an empirical method. When it was found that the soul could not be empirically defined, psychological descriptors to promote investigation were introduced.

The philosophical trend considered that there were unobservable forces that formed the human "inner essence". One movement, vitalism, proposed there was an unobservable force that stimulated life. Representatives of this school included anatomists and physiologists such as Michel F. X. Bichat (1771-1802), and Johann Müller (1801-1888). Another movement, objective idealism, considered human reality could be understood by the transcendence of ideas, reason, and spirit. Through that process, a general reality or power could be identified. Proponents of this school include philosophers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). A third movement, natural philosophy (*Natürphilosophie*), emphasized the natural order and qualitative aspect of life. This movement considered that all aspects of mental life, and the basic elements of society and culture (including language and the arts) were connected to the elemental forces of nature. The school of natural philosophy included biologists and philosophers. This movement was founded by Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854), included Lorenz Oken (1779-1855) and influenced John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) in England. Natural philosophy was a complex movement that sometimes attempted to integrate vitalism and idealism. Its previous use by physicists is evident in Isaac Newton's 1687 treatise on gravity, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.

These three movements all countered the materialistic movement in that they considered there was an aspect of life that was not reducible. Instead of attributing the essence of humanity to God, these three movements recognized that there was an aspect of humanity that was unique and inherent unto itself. This

position will be seen to differ from that held by the materialistic movement which did not recognize this inner aspect and instead saw it as a function of the body.

The philosophical and scientific writings of this period attempt to integrate the materialistic approach with irreducible ideas. One central, irreducible idea was the soul. Consequently, scientists and philosophers focussed at least some aspect of their writings on this topic (Boring, 1929; Watson, 1968; Ellenberger, 1970). The emphasis on the soul did not diminish until the middle of the nineteenth century. The trend towards materialism led to changes in the way mental life was conceived. It shall be seen that the soul became a function of the body in "new" materialism.

The New Materialism:

The Integration of Mind within Body

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, materialism in Germany was a focus of discussion for both physiologists and philosophers. The separation of mind (*res cogitans*) and body (*res extensa*) originated in Descartes' seventeenth century reflection, *Cogito, ergo sum*. In this statement, Descartes proposed that the only aspect of existence he could not doubt was the act of doubting. This led him to conclude his thinking indicated existence. The division between the "thinking self" and the "being self" created one division between philosophy and the sciences, and subsequently between idealism and materialism.

While it had been traditional to consider matter and spirit to be opposed, the new materialistic movement considered that spirit could be a property of matter. This countered the older idea that nothing spiritual could arise from matter, as the division between the spiritual and the natural (i.e., matter) was too great. The new materialism raised issues that were never resolved. Instead, an integration took

place and the problem was addressed as a question of "human inner essence". It was thought that

man could owe his humanity to the fact that he could rise above the mere material and to the level of the spirit (Feibleman, 1970, p. 147).

This question created confusion in all areas of study as it focussed on the overlap of matter and spirit through the association of mind and body. The relation of the spirit to the body, the latter of which was clearly matter, needed to be qualified.

Some philosophers considered [the] spirit natural and were willing to grant some association with matter through the body but were not clear on the connection (Feibleman, 1970, p. 148).

The materialistic movement attempted to resolve this issue by considering that there were several levels of organization of the material. These levels were organized first into a physical division which could include the chemical, biological and psychological. In this context, the spirit could become a property of matter.

Spirit is chief among the internal properties of matter and may accordingly be defined as the dominant inner quality of a material thing. The term "essence" suggests itself in this connection; spirit as essence of matter (Feibleman, 1970, p. 151).

The complexity of life was explained in terms of the intensity of the inner quality. This explanation allowed for the differentiation of plant and animal from man. The "hierarchy of being" followed the historical idea of degrees of consciousness. These theories date back theoretically to "atomism" as described by Democritus (460-370 B.C.) and may be seen in the German philosophy of "monads", a theory proposed by Leibniz.²

The change in the emphasis in the relationship of the mind to the body occurred in the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the 1800s, the separateness of these aspects was highlighted, and by the end of the century, a unity was found. The mind became a property of matter. This new conceptualization of mind and body, where these aspects are united, is continued in Freudian theory.

Three Approaches to Defining Inner Life: Empiricism, Rationalism, and Physiological

Conflicting trends resulted in different divisions within the materialistic movement. These divisions, or orientations, had separate methods of defining inner life. These divisions were the Rational, the Empirical and the Physiological. Merz (1903, p. 200) thought that these divisions were "not sufficiently distinct".

² In Democritus' theory, life was explained as a function of atoms that were in constant motion. These atoms differed in size, shape and velocity. Quantitative and qualitative differences in atoms were evident. Consciousness was considered to be a function of the spherically shaped "soul atoms". These atoms were diffused throughout the body. Quantitative losses resulted in sleep, fainting or death. The quantitative and qualitative differences resulted in a hierarchy of consciousness (Burnet, 1892; Edwards, 1972, V. 4, pp. 448-449).

Leibniz's theory of monads has many similarities to Democritus' "atomism". Leibniz developed his theory from the cosmological doctrine of monads described by Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) (Ruda, Personal Communication, August 4, 1989). The monad was an ontological unit that had an inherent energy. Four species of monads were described: primitive monads that existed in a dream-like state and lacked consciousness (included in this category were plants, trees, and stones); animal monads which had an associative capacity and memory; monads of man, which had the capacity for self-consciousness and perception of the laws of change in the universe; and the monad of monads, God, who maintained the pre-established harmony.

Leibniz described "degrees of consciousness" in a hierarchical fashion. *Petites perceptions* were subliminal but when totaled, the perception became conscious (an "apperception"). Leibniz gave an example of an apperception developing. The *petites perceptions* of droplets of water could be an apperception. When these droplets were synchronized, the sound of breakers on the beach was heard (Boring, 1929, p. 167; Ruda, 1965, pp. 14-15.).

The first two divisions were initially made by Christian Wolff (1679-1754). The "Wolffian Classification" proposed two methods of study in psychology and philosophy: an empirical method which was based on experience and a rational method which was based on reason. This classification is presented in *Psychologia Empirica* (1732) and *Psychologia Rationalis* (1734).

The empirical orientation attempted to describe inner or mental life. It utilized experience to define the essence of man but confined itself to metaphysical statements and methods that were historically traceable to Aristotle's (384 BC - 322 BC) treatise on the soul, *De Anima (peri psyches)* (Merz, 1903, p. 201). The empirical approach had its foundation in European writings of philosophers, moralists and encyclopaedists. In Germany, Kant's (1781, 1783) contribution was to distinguish mental functions of thinking, willing and feeling. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) later described phenomenology as a scientific method based on description, classification, and induction. Empirical psychology in Germany contrasted with the British approach, which was more associationistic. In Germany, the empirical approach was criticized due to the "fragmentary" nature of the knowledge it developed.

German philosophers' primary focus was on rational psychology. This form of psychology utilized theoretical reason as the main criterion of truth. In the nineteenth century, it emphasized new knowledge rather than traditional thought (Reese, 1980, p. 479). The theoretical foundations, however, were ontologically based. Questions such as the nature of the soul, its fate and its destiny were addressed using references to cosmology and theology.

Rational and empirical psychology overlapped in theoretical discussions due to their interest in the nature of things. While empirical psychology considered "detailed facts and phenomena in the life of the soul", rational psychology dealt with questions of principles and with fundamentals (Merz, 1903, p. 202).

The third branch of research developed from mathematics, natural science, and medical science. It became known as the physiological school. The men of this school were "connectivists". They studied the connections between neurons, receptors in sense organs and muscle tissue, and brain functioning. While they searched for a central organization, they avoided defining its essence. Gross anatomical analysis did not account for all of brain function, but this was not seen as a problem (Boring, 1929, p. 61). Consciousness was sometimes considered a product of connections but mostly as a "localized seat" (Boring, 1929, p. 77). The evolution of materialism in these three schools was encouraged, at least in part, by the criticisms of metaphysics, the most prominent philosophical method of discourse of that era.

From the Soul to the Study of the Mind:

The Conscious and Unconscious

The examination of metaphysics marks the beginning of the emphasis on the conscious and unconscious aspects of the mind and the de-emphasis on the study of the soul. The criticism of metaphysics began with Kant's work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (1783). In Kant's view, metaphysics had been superseded by the pure sciences (such as Newtonian physics), as it "flounder[ed] in perpetual arguments" flawed with "inherent contradictions". The sciences based themselves on "pure experience" (experimentation) upon which "an expanding knowledge base" had developed. Metaphysics, in contrast, lacked a knowledge base and "only led philosophers to contradict themselves". Kant proposed that the traditional disputes about "substance", "cause" and proofs of immortality be replaced by "objective idealism". Objective idealism would focus on "what is certain" and "what is

universal", with ultimate reality being known by transcending phenomena.

One subject that Kant dealt with extensively in the Critique of Pure Reason was the status of the soul. Kant devoted a specific section of this work to examining the limitations of metaphysical proofs and scientific experience (Kant, 1781, pp. 328-383).

Kant considered that while the soul was rationally unknowable, it could not be proven or disproven. The soul could be identified as a "transcendental unification" that resulted in "pure consciousness". Kant proposed that instead of studying the soul, the mind, or consciousness, a focus be placed on intuition (*Anschauung*), understanding, reason, and judgement. Kant's new emphasis had far reaching implications. First, he directly addressed the limitations of metaphysics. Metaphysics relied on *a priori* knowledge that could not be "ascribed" to the objects of study. The principles proposed were not based on verifiable knowledge of empirical phenomena. Kant, then, considered metaphysics to be speculative instead of being based on "pure reason" (practical or theoretical).

Second, in outlining the limitations of metaphysics, Kant had criticized the foundations of the method used in rational psychology.

The perplexity into which it falls is not due to any fault of its own. It...finds itself compelled to resort to principles which overstep all possible empirical employment and which yet seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary consciousness readily accepts them. But by this procedure human reason precipitates into darkness and contradictions (Kant, 1791, p. 71).

Kant's new critical analysis changed the direction of (rational) psychology. In Kant's mind, he had begun a revolution that was comparable to Copernicus' primary hypothesis (Kant, 1781, p. 22).

Rational psychology was altered by Hegel, Kant's philosophical successor. Hegel considered rationalism to be a systematic philosophy that sought a higher principle. Rationalism, for Hegel, was not limited to "enumerating empirically the data of consciousness". Hegel's position was idealistic, with an emphasis on an Absolute Spirit or Mind (*Geist*). An important contribution that was inherent to his theory was the idea of separate existences, (i.e., the existence of the spirit within the individual which seeks to attain universal reason).

While the influence of objective idealism "died" with Hegel in 1831 (Merz, 1903, p. 204), aspects of his theoretical conceptualization of the individual were retained. The individual mind became a focus of study. Philosophical studies, however, considered the individual as an example of the universal or general mind. In this process of focussing on the individual to make general statements on the higher nature of being, the issues of individuation and personality were "either forgotten or denied" (Merz, 1903, p. 255).

The recurrent focus on the individual and the methodological problems of this type of study is observed in twentieth century psychology. This researcher suggests that the focus on "the self" in the United States is part of the continuum in philosophy where the the individual has become the focus of study.

The third implication of Kant's work was seen in the transformation in the study of the soul. These changes were initially an alteration in vocabulary (Merz, 1903, p. 290). By the middle of the nineteenth century, the word, soul, had "all but disappeared" from psychological studies, and when referred to, the emphasis was placed more on the "the methodical study of the phenomena of the inner world" (Merz, 1903, p. 290). Instead of the soul, the conscious and unconscious mind became the focus.

The Search for Newtonian Correlates of the Soul

Two prominent philosopher/psychologists illustrate the new integration of research methods of the time. The principles of physics were applied to metaphysics with the express purpose of finding the correlates of the soul. These two men, Johann F. Herbart (1776-1841), a disciple of Kant, and Gustav T. Fechner (1801-1887) were prominent in Germany and are known to have strongly influenced both Freud and his teachers (Ellenberger, 1970; Jones, 1953, pp. 371-374; Sulloway, 1979, pp. 66-67). Their influence is evident particularly in their mechanistic model of psychic functioning. But while Herbart and Fechner both attempted to base psychology on scientific knowledge, their orientation in research was primarily metaphysical.

Herbart's psychology was a science that was based on experience, mathematics and metaphysics. These divergent trends were never considered contradictory. Throughout Herbart's work is a basic concept of being (Watson, 1968, p. 223). While his conception of the universe included independent elements, Herbart's theory differed from previous formulations in that it excluded the conception of a Leibnizian pre-established harmony. Instead, Herbart defined psychology according to a current trend which promoted and explained the functioning of the mind as "the mechanical interaction of ideas". Herbart conceived a mechanical model of the mind that relied on the principles of Newtonian physics.

Herbart aligned psychology with the sciences through mathematics. ("Pure science" was based on mathematical principles.) Herbart's formulas were based on static and dynamic principles of physics and included gravitational forces, vectors, attraction, repulsion and equilibrium. He proposed that ideas became forces when they resisted one another, and that ideas, once formed, were never lost.

Herbart developed a series of equations which explained the functioning

of the psyche. For example, Herbart postulated that how much an idea (o) was suppressed depended on the number of ideas (e) which were suppressed (S) over time (t). The formula given was $O = S(1 - e^{-t})$. Consciousness was mechanistically explained as a "threshold" where ideas struggled to appear. The presence of ideas in the unconscious was implied. His model of the psyche provided the foundation for the theory of inhibition which was later developed by Freud in his theory of repression. Herbart made no actual measurements. Following Kant, he considered experimentation in the psychological sciences was "impossible".

Herbart's primary contribution was to formulate psychology as a science. While the basis of his theory in mathematics was weak, his emphasis on Newtonian mechanics in the explanation of mental functioning was subsequently followed and developed by neurologists, including Freud (Jones, 1953; Watson, 1968; Sulloway, 1979).

The work of a contemporary of Herbart, Gustav T. Fechner, illustrates the juxtaposition of scientific investigation with "mystical" conceptions of the mind (Boring, 1929). Fechner's work integrates physiology with metaphysics. The focus of his studies was to resolve "the most fundamental problem of life: psychophysics". Psychophysics was defined as "the scientific investigation of the functional relations of dependency between body and mind" (Watson, 1968, p. 229). Fechner's intention was to find where the mind and body overlap. Fechner considered that mind and body were aspects of a unity. He observed that there was a relation between mental sensation and bodily stimulus that could be quantified. Following materialistic logic, he reasoned that consciousness (mind) could be functionally related to matter (the body). Fechner sought to demonstrate this relation in investigations of the senses (e.g., sight, sound, cutaneous and muscular

senses). Fechner's "psychophysical law" gives a mathematical formulation of the relation between the stimulus and sensation ($S = K \log R$). In this equation S symbolizes the magnitude of sensations, K is a constant and R is the magnitude of the response to the stimulus. His experiments investigated the threshold of sensation. While Fechner's model formed the basis of what was to be experimental psychology, it must be remembered that the intention of his investigations was to find the nature of the relation between the soul and the body (Ellenberger, 1956; Watson, 1968; Ruda, 1977). Although Fechner's investigations were not successful in making the metaphysical link, his methodology advanced psychology as a science. He is credited with providing the first empirical studies of unconscious mental functioning (Ellenberger, 1970).

The first half of the nineteenth century brought about a transition in how the psyche was perceived. This transition, as illustrated in Herbart's and Fechner's work, promoted the empirical collection of data which was then applied metaphysically. In those days *die Seele* included "mind", "consciousness", "will", and "soul", and the establishment of its physiological correlates was very important (Boring, 1929, pp. 38-39). The psyche was then studied using scientific examination of consciousness and its indicators (such as sensation, hearing and vision). The metaphysical link remained the end goal of the research.

The Beginning of "Scientific" Materialism

"Scientific" materialism began when German empiricism gained prominence over metaphysics. The first formal break with metaphysics is considered to have occurred at mid-century. In 1847 a group of students formed a private scientific club that promoted empirical investigations and radically reduced the emphasis on metaphysical extrapolation. The young men who made up this group were Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894), Ernst Von Brücke (1819-1892),

Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896) and Karl Ludwig (1816-1895). These men were students of Johannes Müller, a physiologist at the University of Berlin. Their agreement was formalized in an oath that stated their scientific work would be directed towards expounding and proving physiological interactions. In a letter dated 1842, du Bois-Reymond wrote to Ludwig,

Brücke and I pledge a solemn oath to put into effect this truth.

No other forces than common physical-chemical ones are active within an organism. In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by these forces one has to either find the specific way or form of their action by means of the physical mathematical method or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion (du Bois-Reymond in Bernfeld, 1944, p. 348).

Subsequent research undertaken by this group was directed toward describing the functioning of the organism using physical terms. Principles of chemistry and physics were applied. The group became known as the Helmholtz School due to Helmholtz's outstanding research.³

The principles of the Helmholtz School are evident in Freud's (1895) Project for a Scientific Psychology. One of his teachers, Von Brücke, was a member of the Helmholtz School.

By 1874 it was observed that the emphasis of the Helmholtz School had gained complete acceptance within experimental physiological circles. But while the phenomena of life were explained in chemical and mathematical terms, an

³ Helmholtz was a great physiologist and a physicist. Helmholtz studied the peripheral nerve fibers, the velocity of neural conduction and co-discovered the conservation of energy. He did outstanding work on acoustics and sound. He also invented the ophthalmoscope.

underlying hope continued that the research would resolve the question of the basis of life.

The mechanistic explanation of vital processes still received acceptance as the ultimate goal of physiology, but the immediate daily research in 1874 was directly connected to practical problems (Cranefield, 1957, p. 414).

The essence of scientific investigation was then aimed at providing a sound basis for research and the soul no longer figured in the writings of these authors. Instead, research focussed on physiology, and the examination of the mental functions, including consciousness.

The trend towards a new conception of the soul was continued in other scientific writings of the mid-century. This integration is observed in the work of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Eduard von Hartmann (1847-1906).

A further challenge to the concept of the soul was made in Charles Darwin's theory of evolution (Bowler, 1984). The Origin of the Species (1859) had a tremendous effect on the development of psychology (Boring, 1929, p. 471). Darwin's theory considered that there was continuity of mind and body in humans and in animals. Darwin presented the idea that animals had a mind and, with that, consciousness. This position elicited questions on Cartesian dualism. Darwin, following Lamarck and others, implied a continuity between species, including human beings. Darwin's studies indirectly questioned the immortality of the soul, a position strongly held by nineteenth century religious orthodoxy.

The recognition of the unconscious element in psychology was evident in Eduard von Hartmann's three volume work, The Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869). The book, published in Germany, received wide recognition and was popular until the turn of the century (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 311). It outlines the historical perception of the unconscious and metaphysical problems, and describes

four divisions within the unconscious [the metaphysical, the objective (collective), the subjective (individual) and the physiological].

Von Hartmann developed an empirical proof of individual existence. Two concepts were referred to: *das Ich* (the ego) and the unconscious. Individual existence was not due to the soul but due to the ego which he referred to as "a common internal unity" and "mental life". The ego was a product of the unconscious (von Hartmann, V. 2, 1869, pp. 190-191).

Von Hartmann observed that "unity in mental life" (the ego) was a universal phenomenon, not due to "an Absolute Power" but due to the unconscious. He proposed an indirect proof of the individual unconscious. He considered that "if we were all part of one existence, no real relations between ourselves would be possible" (von Hartmann, 1869, V. 2, p. 230). He suggested that the unconscious was manifested in two ways: in ideas and in "the will" (instincts). These attributes were inseparable. The "existence and activity" of unconscious operations were considered observable universally. (Some examples given were: the fear of death, "the instinct of repulsion", the similarity of sexual relationships in man and animals; and shame, as observed in primitive tribes and in the deaf and dumb.)

Von Hartmann presented a mechanistic and naturalistic explanation of the conscious and unconscious. Consciousness resulted from a mysterious self-agitation of "ultimate particles of matter". Intensity of feeling resulted in reflection, which made previously unconscious ideas conscious. The boundary between the two was not, as Leibniz suggested, due to perception, but rather to the intensity of feeling that was the outcome of "the force accumulation of atoms" (Darnoi, 1967, p. 51). The unconscious was a "unitary totality" which organized all of the physical functions of the individual (Von Hartmann, 1869, Appendix, p. 287).

This resulted in individuality and distinctness which some philosophers considered to be the absolute connection, or "the soul".

Von Hartmann's work was an attempt to reconcile idealism and materialism (Darnoi, 1967, p. 167). This is considered evident in the use of inductive empiricism to substantiate the unconscious. The conclusions drawn from observations on the intensity of feeling and human inter-relationships illustrate his reliance on inductive logic. The universality of his observations was taken as proof. The mechanistic model used to describe the conscious and unconscious was typical of the materialistic side of natural philosophy.

Von Hartmann's book further reduced the emphasis on the soul and instead considered that individuality (*das Ich* or "the self") could be explained by understanding the functioning of the unconscious.

We have now reviewed in general the different modes in which feeling may be determined by unconscious ideas, and...the importance of unconscious ideas for the whole emotional life...This importance can not be rated too highly. Let anyone take for test whatever feeling he pleases, and seek to grasp it with perfectly clear conscience in its whole extent. It is in vain....The process...[by] which we become...self-conscious once [and] for all, is the translation of unconscious ideas which determined feeling into conscious ideas, i.e., thoughts and words (von Hartmann, 1869, V.1, pp. 258-259).

Von Hartmann is credited as the philosopher/psychologist who substantiated the unconscious as a decisive factor in understanding human actions and thoughts (Edwards, 1972, V. 3, p. 421). His work prepared the foundation from which subsequent theorists, including Freud, developed their ideas of mental function,

with the emphasis being on the conscious and unconscious mind and not on the presence of a central aspect within the personality.

Implications for Freudian Theory and the Self

The influence of nineteenth century German philosophy and science is evident in Freud's conceptualization of the psyche. Following the historical trend of his time, Freud does not include a description of an "inner essence" (or "self"). Instead the conscious and unconscious are the focus.

The materialistic influence is evident in Freud's first "outline of a mental apparatus" in 1895. Freud's subsequent models of the mind utilized these principles, but in a moderated form. (These models will be described in Chapter IV). The mechanistic principles, the hallmark of the materialistic movement, were applied to neurology.

Freud's first representation of the psychic apparatus was founded on principles of energy and motion that were current in German neurology of the day. Freud's emphasis on natural science and avoidance of metaphysics led him to careful postulations about energy transfer and excitation in the psyche. As Freud recognized that these principles were postulates, he described his theory as "metapsychology". At the time, psychology was aligned with physiology and the medical sciences. Only theoretical speculations that were not metaphysical in basis were accepted. Freud coined the term "metapsychology" to differentiate this type of speculation in psychoanalysis from metaphysics (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 250).

Freud's intention in basing his theory on these principles was to legitimize psychoanalysis and affiliate it with the natural sciences (Freud, 1895, S.E. 1, p. 295). Including an irreducible force (as seen in idealism, vitalism and natural

philosophy) would have threatened the alliance of psychoanalysis with the sciences. Psychoanalysis could not include a concept equivalent to "the soul" if it wanted to remain viable. Consequently, Freud's writing did not emphasize the existence of a "unifying force in the psyche" which theorists in some schools (e.g., Kohut, 1977; Kernberg, 1982) and critics of Strachey's translation consider is "missing".

This researcher suggests that Freud did not emphasize a unifying concept because the main thrust of the nineteenth century was to integrate mind with body. Including a concept like "the self" would have been consistent with the idea that there was an irreducible force within the psyche. To some, this was tied to an Absolute Power or Deity. Since Descartes time, mind (*res cogitans*) and body (*res extensa*) had been separated. The idea that spirit could have substance (and be formed in the body) was "revolutionary" in the mid-nineteenth century. It had taken almost 400 years (after Cartesian dualism) to reach this position. In the "new" materialism, scientists regarded the psyche as a property of matter. The interplay between the unconscious and the conscious mind became the subject of study, not the presence of a central aspect in the psyche. Freud's position, as a scientist, was set.

Freud's conceptualization of the ego is consistent with his materialistic conception of the mind. Like the mind-body relationship in materialism, the ego has its basis in experience and is seen to be a function of the body. Freud's first models of the psyche considered that the ego developed from perceptual processes based in consciousness (cf. Chapter IV). These perceptions are then internalized, and are based in the body's experience in the environment. Later, Freud elaborated on this process in relation to the body as a whole: "The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego" (1923b, S.E. 19, p. 26) The ego's subjective perceptions linked the mind with the body.

This researcher suggests that the mind-body relationship defined in

Freudian theory changes with the introduction of "the self" as a concept in American psychoanalysis. "The self" is not just a function of the body or ego but is an organization that acts as an over-riding structure (cf. Kernberg, 1982; Kohut, 1977 and Chapter 5 below). The inclusion of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory has resurrected metaphysical problems that resulted in the exclusion of the soul from scientific writings. Like the soul, "the self" has not been operationally defined due to its amorphous and elusive nature. When "the self" is discussed, it is unclear which referents are being utilized. This has eliminated fruitful discussions in the literature due to the variety of referents used.

Conclusion

This chapter found that Freud was consistent with scientific writers of his generation when he did not focus on a unifying concept as a central part of his theory. It was shown that the German materialistic movement supported empirical studies, excluding metaphysical constructs. This resulted in the integration of mind and body, making the mind (soul or self) a function of the body. These aspects of the mind were subsumed within the body. The relationship of mind and body in German materialism is consistent with Freud's ego development (which is based on conscious perceptions of bodily experience).

The chapter notes the influence of the materialistic movement on all scientific theories of the nineteenth century, including Freudian theory. The scientific method encouraged investigation of the functions of the brain, particularly the conscious and unconscious mind. This method excluded the soul, individuality, and personality as these concepts could not be empirically studied. The materialistic influence is seen in Freud's mechanistic model of the psyche.

This chapter also suggests that the difficulty of introducing "the self" in

psychoanalytic theory today is reminiscent of the problems of emphasizing the soul in nineteenth century materialism. The introduction of "the self" resurrects the metapsychical problems noted in scientific studies of the soul in the nineteenth century. With both of these concepts, there are problems of definition and a mixing of referents: Theoretical discussion is consequently difficult.

The next chapter presents a critical review of Freud's writings on the ego. The influence of German materialism will be seen in the mechanistic basis of the psyche. This chapter will present evidence that while Freud did not emphasize a central aspect in his psychic model, a personal aspect was still evident.

CHAPTER IV
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EGO IN FREUD'S THOUGHT

This chapter will provide a review of the development of the ego in Freud's writings. This examination is presented to determine the foundation of the term in his writings. This review will demonstrate how the presentation of the ego in the psychological sense is consistently implied. The ego's structure will be shown to be consistent with nineteenth century German materialism. This will be evident in the mechanistic "physiological" functioning of the psyche and the developmental relationship of the ego and the body.

The problem of defining the ego will be found in several stages of Freud's writings. Confusion of this term with "the self" has been observed by theoreticians. This ambiguity will be shown to be the result of several factors: a mixing of physiological and psychological referents; a careless use of these terms; and an emphasis on pathology, not on normal functioning.

It will be suggested that Freud did not omit "the self". The integration of the subject and object will be observed to be inherent in Freud's ego category. References to a central aspect of the personality will be found in the review of the conceptual presentation of the ego, including Freud's case material. Further support will be found when the literal translation of *das Ich* ("the I") is considered.

This chapter will also examine those aspects of the ego that have become the basis for Ego Psychology. Topics such as the relationship between the ego and reality, and the concept of narcissism will be addressed in conjunction with the traditional ego.

The theoretical conceptualization of the ego will be presented in five stages. These stages are identified by the dates of Freud's writings on the ego. This review draws from four sources, in addition to Freud's works: Hartmann (1956), Rapaport (1958), Strachey (1961, 1966b) and Laplanche & Pontalis (1973).

Stage I: 1890-1899

Freud uses the term "ego" in four different ways after placing it as part of the metapsychology. This section discusses the ego accordingly: a) as part of the metapsychology; b) as including physiological and psychological aspects; c) as a concept that represents the whole person; d) as a model of defensive conflict; and e) as a theory of treatment. References to "the self" are evident in the identification of psychological functions of the ego, and the illustration of these functions in case histories.

a) Metapsychology and the Ego

Freud's psychic structure was presented as a formulation, "a scientific endeavour to redress the constructions of "metaphysics" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 249). He termed this "metapsychology". While metaphysics was based on philosophical knowledge, metapsychology drew on the basic assumptions current in scientific knowledge (Strachey in Freud, S.E. 3, pp. 62-65). In a letter to Fliess, on March 10, 1898, Freud wrote:

I hope you will lend me your ear for a few metapsychology questions... When I was young, the only thing I longed for was philosophical knowledge and now that I am going over from medicine to psychology I am in the process on attaining it (Freud, S.E. 1, 1898, p. 274).

Freud later postulated that metaphysics was a projection of unconscious forces onto the outside world and metapsychology could provide a framework for the scientific study of the unconscious (S.E. 6, 1901, pp. 258-259). Freud's metapsychology provided the means by which he based his theoretical formulations. This indicates that he saw the ego as a theoretical concept.

b) Physiological and Psychological Aspects in Metapsychology

Freud's first psychic structure included the concept of the ego with physiological and psychological parameters. Freud's first formulation of the psychic apparatus is found in "The Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895). In "The Project", as it is known, Freud describes a neural organization of interconnecting neurons that functioned on the energetic principles of nineteenth century German materialism.¹ This work was only published posthumously in 1950 as Freud thought it was incomplete (Strachey in Freud, S.E.1, p. 370).² The mechanistic-materialistic foundation of "The Project" has been described as "the invisible ghost" that haunts all of Freud's theoretical writings (Pribram & Gill,

¹ For example, one of the fundamental laws in psychic functioning was the physiological Principle of Inertia. This principle stated that there was a natural tendency of neurons "to divest themselves" by "reflex movement of quantities of (neural) excitation" abbreviated as *Q'n* (Freud, S.E. 1, p. 296). The principle of neuronal inertia indicated that energy flowed from a region of high energy to low energy and that the sum of forces remained constant. The system worked as a "biological reflex" where sensory input that was received was balanced by motor discharge. When the system achieved a state of balance, a neuronal discharge occurred. When a state of imbalance resulted, "an experience of pain" or frustration was felt, and could result in displacement and defence formation or symptomatology.

² Jones (1953) and Amacher (1965) suggest that Freud did not publish "The Project" during his lifetime as it closely duplicated his teachers views. [e.g., Exner's 1894 work on the physiological nature of psychological functioning is organized in a similar fashion to "The Project" and contains a similar ideas but is eight times the length. Exner's work is considered to be based on Brücke's lectures (Jones, 1953, p. 380; Amacher, 1965, pp. 42-45.)]

1976).

Freud defined the ego in "The Project" in both a 1) physiological and 2) psychological sense.

1) Physiological Aspects. In the physiological sense, the ego was defined as "an organization of neurons" within the "psi system" (ψ), a system that was able to retain memories, utilize resistance, and hold energy ($Q'n$) (Freud, S.E. 1, 1895, p. 300). It did not have direct access to reality. A separate perceptual system (W) allowed for consciousness to occur (Freud, S.E. 1, p. 311).

The ego consists originally of nuclear neurones [sic], which receive endogenous $Q'n$ through paths of conduction and discharge it along a pathway to internal change (Freud, S.E. 1; p. 369)

The ego's task was to take the energy ($Q'n$) and attempt to inhibit it from being discharged on the "earliest satisfying object" or in hallucination and instead direct $Q'n$ toward differentiating internal needs from outside reality. If inhibition was not possible, then a "side cathexis" of energy could be used to deflect the neuronal tension ($Q'n$) resulting in repression.

Freud's neuronal diagram of the ego in Figure 1 illustrates the ego's function in directing energy that comes from "a hostile image". Pathway " a " represents the ego's successful re-direction of energy away from conflict (S.E. 1, 1895, p. 324).

Insert Figure 1 about here

The ego's function was primarily inhibitory (Freud, S.E. 1, p. 325). Through inhibition, the ego was seen to control "mnemic images" (memories) and consequently allow reality testing to be maintained. In moderating wish-fulfillment, the ego promoted secondary processes (reality testing not hallucination). The physiological process then allowed psychological functioning to be maintained.

2) Psychological Aspects. In the psychological sense, the ego was described as a separate structure within a neuronal foundation. The psychological nature of ego functioning in "The Project" has been recognized (e.g., Jones, 1953, p. 383; Pribram & Gill, 1976, p. 15).

Freud described the ego as a distinct part of the psychic structure. Its psychological essence is indicated both in the definition, (as "an organization of ideas"), its psychological properties, and in descriptors that indicate the ego's capacity to change while retaining its basic nature.

The ego is to be defined as the totality of the ψ [psi] cathexis, at the given time, in which a permanent component is distinguished from a changing one (Freud, S.E. 1, p. 323).

The ego's psychological foundation is seen in Freud's emphasis on reality in the development and functioning of the ego. Despite the emphasis on the balance of energy within the system, Freud refers to early environmental experiences as the "genetic basis of ego development".

In both physiological and psychological terms, the ego is seen to be given a "privileged position" in "The Project" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 134). While the ego is not considered to be identified with the individual as a whole or even the whole of the mental apparatus, the functions of the ego are consistent with representations of these concepts. Psychological descriptors are given to convey the meaning of the ego's functions. The functions that the ego is responsible for

are consistent with the subjective functioning of "the self". These functions include defence formation, judging, cognition, expecting, criticizing, observing and theorizing.

In Freud's writings on the ego, the blend of physiological and psychological qualities has created some confusion. For example, Freud writes of the development of a "state of identity" within the ego and uses physiological terms to explain how this comes about. The use of the term 'identity' is not thought by Strachey (in Freud, 1895, S.E. 1, p. 332) to be psychological due to Freud's explanation of this process using energetic principles. However, the term, "identity" is clearly a psychological descriptor and there is no evidence to assume that Freud was not considering the individual as a whole in his use of the term. The use of this term is a good example of what Laplanche & Pontalis (1973, pp. 131-132) suggest to be Freud's "exploitation of traditional uses" of a term to convey meaning and the objective use of the term "self". Freud's ability to convey more than one meaning in his terms, however, seems to have resulted in problems of defining the ego concept. [cf. Ricoeur's (1970, p. 3) comments on the "multiple functions" of language in psychoanalysis.]

3) Consistency with the Era. Freud's reliance on the mechanistic functioning of the ego is consistent with the descriptions utilized in the writings of his teachers. This is evident in Freud's emphasis on mnemonic images (memories) in psychical development and in his description of the psychological basis of the psyche.

Freud's conception of the ego in "The Project" is comparable to those of Meynert, Brücke, and Exner who proposed *das Ich* to develop due to "well developed cortical pathways" where memories became "firmly fixed" (Amacher, 1965, p. 51), and to Brentano who supported a "physiological mechanism" as the basis of *das Ich* (Brentano, 1874, p. 116).

Freud's elaboration on the fundamental issues describing psychological aspects of the ego is not as definitive as his teachers. Consequently, it is unclear which position he supports. For example, if Freud referred to Brentano's (1874) descriptions of the special attributes of the psyche (e.g., "the intentional inexistence of all mental phenomena" and "the unity of consciousness" as a property of the mind), the ego's psychological emphasis might be deduced. Or if Meynert's (1885, p. 172) views of "individuality" and "character" and the psyche were presented as "artificial one[s], though valuable from a practical point of view", then the physiological emphasis could be considered. The omission of his teachers' descriptors adds to the ambiguity in Freud's early description of the ego.

c) A Concept that Represents the Whole Person

In some of Freud's early works, his use of the term 'ego' is indicative of references to concepts such as the "self", or "whole person". This is evident in the special attributes and functions that the ego is given in "The Project" (Freud, S.E.1, 1895) and in Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, S.E. 2, 1895) according to Rapaport (1958, p. 746) and Strachey (1961, pp. 7-8). Further clarification of the use of this term at the turn of the century is discussed in Ellenberger (1970).

Strachey (1961, p. 8) suggests that there is confusion in the meaning of *das Ich* as it was both a term in familiar use and a technical term in psychoanalysis. Sometimes it was difficult to determine which sense of the word was intended. Strachey suggests that there are two main uses of the term, *das Ich*, in Freud's work:

One in which the term distinguishes the person's self as a whole (including perhaps the whole body) from other people, and the other in which it denotes a particular part of the mind

characterized by special attributes and functions (Strachey, 1961, p. 8).

Strachey considers that the mechanistic use of *das Ich* was prominent in Freud's early work and that this did not change until his discussions on narcissism in 1914. Strachey also notes that in some later works the use of *das Ich* is clearly meant to signify "the self" and is translated (by Strachey) as such.

The presentation of the ego between inverted commas (the 'ego') is suggested to high-light Freud's intention to represent "the whole person" (Rapaport, 1958; Strachey, 1961). Hartmann (1956, p. 282) disagreed, suggesting that this presentation (the 'ego') was to de-emphasize the metaphysical aspects of Freud's psychic formulation while supporting both physicalist and philosophical thought.

Hartmann observes that this style of demarcation was consistent with Freud's physiology teachers (cf. Bernfeld, 1944). It also reflected philosophical thinking. Nietzsche, amongst others, had considered the soul and the ego were based in "superstitious [i.e., religious] beliefs" (in Hartmann, 1956). Preference for physicalist and mechanistic thought is felt to be evident in Freud's description of the psyche as the "mental apparatus".

Ellenberger (1970) writes that the ego was a common term in Vienna in the 1880s. It was an "old philosophical concept in new psychological dress" (Ellenberger 1970, p. 517). The ego was used to represent the whole person - "the entity through which the individual becomes conscious of existence of individuality and of the existence of the external world" (Ellenberger 1970, p. 517). It was considered that "individuality could be altered, divided or subjected to another man's will" (Ellenberger 1970, p. 159). Clinicians explained this process as an ego function. Evidence was drawn from studies of dual personalities, hypnosis, and studies of hysteria. The works on hysteria by Pierre Janet [L'état mental des

hystériques, (1892)] and Jean Martin Charcot [Leçon sur les Maladies du Système Nerveux (1890)] suggested that the personality could be split resulting in a "narrowing of the field of consciousness". Freud developed and extended the work on consciousness when he proposed that psychic conflict resulted in splitting of the ego (cf. Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 428).

Rapaport (1958) suggests that the emphasis on the 'ego' was to represent "the person", the "self" or "consciousness". Rapaport gives three references from Studies on Hysteria to illustrate this use of the ego (cf. Breuer & Freud, S.E.2, 1895, pp. 122-123, 133, 225). These examples are suggested by this researcher to refer to the ego's ability to split-off unwanted ideas from consciousness.

It turns out to be *sine qua non* for the acquisition of hysteria that incompatibility should develop between the ego and some idea presented to it...Different neurotic disturbances arise from the different methods adopted by the 'ego' in order to escape from this incompatibility (Freud in Breuer & Freud, S.E. 2, 1895, p. 122).

The ego's control of consciousness differentiated one person from the next. Consciousness was commanded by the ego, "the dominant mass of ideas" (Rapaport, 1958, p. 746). The essence of a person's individuality was found in the configuration of ideas cathected (invested in) by the ego.

Rapaport's examples all focus on the ability of the ego to split off ideas from consciousness. It is suggested that Rapaport's references to Freud's examples of ego-splitting indicate the psychological presence of the whole person.

This researcher suggests that a general inference may be made: when the psyche was functioning in normalcy, there was no pathological splitting of the ego, resulting in psychic unity. The historical perspective provided by Ellenberger

reveals that the splitting of the ego was observed in individuals under emotional duress. This term's initial use was descriptive of personality functioning, where the ego is used almost synonymously with the personality as a whole. In conflict, according to Freud, the ego is seen to be comprised of a part that observes and a part that is observed. The concept of ego-splitting is evident in his formulations of defence mechanisms. As well, the term reappears in Freud's later writings. One of Freud's last papers was titled, "Ego Splitting in the Process of Defence" (S.E. 23, 1940a; cf. Stage 5 below). When Freud referred to the feeling of being "divided within oneself" as a defence, he implied that unity in the psyche existed in normal mental health.

When the aforementioned theoreticians and historians discussed Freud's use of the ego as representing the whole person they remain focussed on the technical discussion. The essence of the individual, however, is found in Freud's descriptions of the ego's special attributes. Also, it is suggested that the case histories reveal Freud's interest in the whole person, in his patient's "self". It is through the case histories that the subjective and objective sense of experiencing is related in these early works. This personalization of treatment contrasts with the mechanistic theoretical application that the above theoreticians dwell on.

d) Model of Defensive Conflict

This attribute of the ego is considered to have set the basis of Ego Psychology (Hartmann, 1956; Rapaport, 1958). The ego is described as taking a central role in neurotic conflict. The ego defences are subdivided into "modes", "mechanisms", "procedures" and "devices" that are correlated with psychoneuroses such as hysteria, paranoia, and obsessional neurosis (Freud, S.E. 3, 1894; Freud, S.E. 3, 1896b). These neuroses are thought to result when there is an incompatibility of certain ideas with the ego (Breuer & Freud, S.E. 2, 1895).

When confronted with a conflict of ideas or wishes, the ego, as "the dominant mass of ideas", may attempt to ignore them. The ego protects itself from psychic conflict by repressing ideas that conflict with its own. As "the dominant mass of ideas", the ego is no longer threatened. The ego's relation to the defences is both as an agent and as the object on which the defences act (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, pp. 133-134). These dual functions present the ego both as the initiator of the defences and as a central agency that requires protection.

Case examples illustrate the ego's functions. References are made to the objective and subjective sense of self in the descriptions of patients and their symptomatology. Descriptions are given of a sense of guilt, self-reproaches and fears that the patient determines are unrealistic but uncontrollable (cf. Freud, S.E. 3, 1894, pp. 55-57.)

In Hartmann's and Rapaport's writings on Freud's early model of the ego, the mechanistic nature of the ego's defensive function is emphasized. However, psychological conceptions are inherent as "affect" (i.e., the subjective sense of emotion) and not the instinctual drives is referred to. If these writers had referred only to quantitative aspects of the instincts and had not addressed the subjective aspect (affect) then it would seem that "the self" had been overlooked in the interpretation of Freud's writings.

Hartmann linked the defensive functioning of the ego, Freud's idea of dynamic conflicts, and the dynamic unconscious (the unconscious nature of the defences) with the relationship of the ego to the external world. Hartmann considered this representation of the ego to be the foundation of Ego Psychology.

We can say in retrospect that this emphasis on conflict, on defence, and on the dynamic unconscious was to become the corner-stone of analysis in its clinical and technical as well as

theoretical aspects (Hartmann, 1956, p. 277).

Rapaport identified the defensive functions of the ego and its role in relation to reality as two aspects in Freud's theory that foreshadowed Ego Psychology. He observed that the early concept of defence differed from later formulations; the initial conception of defence was to moderate "affect not drive cathexis". Rapaport suggested, however, that the concept of defence remained consistent as its role was to "forestall" painful memories and reality experiences.

e) A Theory of Treatment

The ego's role in treatment in Freud's early work is found in its central role in "working through" unconscious material. The ego is considered to be part of a mechanistic system.

"Ego-consciousness" permits the unconscious psychogenic material to be dominated in manageable pieces. By allowing "only a single memory" to enter consciousness at a time, treatment can be successful and conflicts may be resolved without resulting in resistance (by the ego). This conceptualization is presented in Freud's chapter titled, "Psychotherapy of Hysteria" in Studies on Hysteria (S.E. 2, pp. 291-305).

The term "ego consciousness" implies a link between the ego and consciousness and differentiates these two concepts; "consciousness", includes all that is being perceived whereas "ego consciousness" implies selectivity. "Ego consciousness" then, allows the regulation of memory recall thereby avoiding psychic conflict (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, pp. 132-133).

This link between the ego and consciousness was made more specific in the metapsychological models presented in "Letter 52" to Wilhelm Fliess (Freud, S.E. 1, 1896a, p. 234). In this "provisional diagram", which is seen in Figure 2, the ego is included in the preconscious. This diagram illustrates the stratification

of memories in the mental apparatus.

Insert Figure 2 about here

This concept is further developed in the topographical model of the psychic apparatus outlined in The Interpretation of Dreams (S.E. 5, 1900, p. 541).

Stage II: 1900

In the second stage of Freud's theory, the ego is not emphasized. Freud's focus was on the development of understanding fantasy or the unconscious. Consequently the ego was given a secondary role in the topographical model. The ego's subsumed functions are mechanistic. The second stage is presented in The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, S.E. 4 & 5, 1900).

The emphasis on fantasy and not on reality is considered to be the outcome of Freud's realization that his patients' reports on infantile seduction were not substantiated (Rapaport, 1958, p. 747). This resulted in a lack of emphasis on experiences in reality in Freudian theory. The interest in reality and in the defences of the ego are seen to emerge only in the middle and later phases of Freud's works (i.e., beginning in 1914).

a) The Ego in a Secondary Role

In The Interpretation of Dreams, the ego is not referred to as part of the psychic structure. The three systems are described: the unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious. These systems retain the neuronal basis and reflexive properties that were previously described in "The Project".

Figure 3 shows how Freud represented energy entering and exiting the psychical system (S.E. 5, 1900, p. 541). The arrows show the direction of the energy flow. This model is based on a simple reflex arc.

Insert Figure 3 about here

In this "Picket Fence Model", a stimulus enters from the outer world and is received as a sensory perception. The stimulus then travels through the pickets (which represent memory traces acquired from previous experiences) and continues until it reaches the motor end and is discharged.

Various aspects of Freud's previous conception of the ego are present but are subsumed under different terms (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973):

1) The censor. The censor takes over the ego's position as an agent of defence. The censor lacks the complexity of the ego as previously described and acts only proscriptively (that is, to impose restraints or restrictions).

2) The preconscious. The preconscious (*Pcs*) acts like the ego in its restraining and inhibiting influence on primary process thought during waking

hours.

3) Initiator of sleep. The "normal ego" is a psychical agency that mediates the psychological and physiological need for sleep. (Freud, S.E. 5, 1900, pp. 679-680).

Stage III: 1910-1915

In this period Freud's writings on the ego took him in four directions: a) the ego-instincts; b) the ego and the real world; c) the ego as a defensive agent in obsessional neurosis; and d) the introduction of the ego as a love object.

a) Ego-instincts

The instincts of self-preservation are introduced in "The Psycho-analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision" (S.E. 11, 1910). The aim of self-preservation was evident in the activities of nutrition, defecation, micturition and muscular activity. The ego-instincts countered the sexual instinct. The ego-instincts differed from the sexual instinct in that the former were satisfied only by real objects unlike the sexual instinct which could be satisfied by fantasy. It may be seen, then, that the ego-instincts combined both physiological and psychological elements.

The ego is not referred to as having a place in the psychical agency or having a relation to psychical energy. However, the nature of the ego-instincts requires a relation to reality and to consciousness. These aspects, reality relations and consciousness, are seen as fundamental to the early ego (1895) and to the later (1923) development of the structural conception of the ego (Rapaport, 1958, pp. 746, 748).

b) The Ego and the Real World

There is a change in emphasis in the description of the relationship between the ego and the real world in "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (S.E. 12, 1911). The basis of the reality principle and the pleasure principle are similar to earlier formulations.³ These new concepts are associated with the development of the second phase of Ego Psychology, the first phase being the relationship of the ego to the defences (Rapaport, 1958, p. 747).

The introduction of the reality principle and pleasure principle as dimensions of mental functioning expanded the functioning of the psyche. The reality principle provided a means of regulating the primary processes (phantasy), which was termed reality testing. The reality principle was a regulatory principle that modified the pleasure principle. Its establishment allowed for the development of conscious functions: attention, judgement, memory, thinking, moderating phantasy (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1976, p. 380).

These attributes are discussed in healthy and neurotic adults and in children. The moderation of the drives are evident in art and education through the process of sublimation.

The psychological applications of the pleasure and reality principles are evident in normal functioning (Rapaport, 1958, p. 748). The ego's relation to these principles is central. While the whole person is not emphasized, the problems of primitive and neurotic functioning in the real world are evident.

c) The Ego as a Defensive Agent

In clinical observations of obsessional neurosis, the ego is recognized as

³ The reality principle is preceded by "the experience of satisfaction" (S.E. 1, 1895, p. 318) and the pleasure principle is preceded by the "unpleasure principle" in The Interpretation of Dreams (S.E. 5, 1900, p. 574). Phantasy and hallucination is contrasted with reality in both the 1900 and 1911 models.

an agent of defence. In "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis" (Freud, S.E. 10, 1913), the "infantile neurosis" of "The Rat Man" is seen as the result of the ego's revolt against the erotic instinct. The confrontation of these two forces results in "distressed affect and an impulsion towards the performance of defensive acts" (Freud, S.E. 10, p. 163). The antagonism between the two forces is identified as a struggle between the sexual instincts and the ego instincts. While the ego in this paper functions mechanistically, the material it struggles against is psychological.

d) As a Love Object

This period also presents the ego as its own love object. The psychological parameter of the ego is central to this period. This new conception is initially applied to the understanding of psychosis and homosexuality. In the next phase, 1914-1921, this attribute becomes dominant in Freud's work (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 136).

Stage IV: 1914-1921

This period is seen as a transition period for the ego as it becomes predominant in Freud's work. While it becomes an agent in its own right, it remains closely tied to the instinctual drives. Psychological functioning is described in terms of the individual and inter-personal relationships. Three ideas are developed: a) narcissism, b) identification as constitutive of the ego, and c) the differentiation within the ego of an "ideal" component. The first of these ideas, narcissism, has been criticized and clarified by the German/American Ego Psychologist, Heinz Hartmann. (Hartmann's theoretical formulation will be reviewed in the discussion on American psychoanalytic theory in Chapter V.)

a) Narcissism

In Freud's paper "On Narcissism" (S.E. 14, 1914), variations in the style of love relationships are examined. The capacity for libidinal investment in an object external to the ego is a mark of mental health. The narcissist's relationship, where the libido is withdrawn from the external world, is contrasted with those of normals and neurotics. These latter groups are able to extend the ego's libido to others. This whole process is developmentally based. After a stage of auto-eroticism, the ego develops through a process of "psychic differentiation". In this process, the ego takes itself as a love object. This stage, narcissism, is considered to be part of normal sexual development.⁴

Two states of narcissism are defined: "primary narcissism" and "secondary narcissism". The more primitive state, primary narcissism, has been seen as "theoretically problematic" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Freud's presentation of primary narcissism in 1914 differs from later developments of this concept (when described in the structural model of 1923).

In the 1914 presentation of primary narcissism, the ego becomes established by the cathexes of itself as a love object. The processes by which this occurs are identification and internalization. The ego's unification is precipitated by the subject's acquisition of his or her own image, the image being the ego itself. The ego's formation results from a process of internalization, which is considered the basis of the development of relationships (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 256).

The application of this theory to human development is as follows. In primary narcissism, young children take themselves as their own love object before they take an external love object. An extension of this state is observed by Freud in the children's "over-estimation of the power of their wishes and and mental acts"

⁴ The sequence of object choices is: auto-eroticism (an objectless state), primary and secondary narcissism, homosexual object choices, and heterosexual object choices.

(S.E. 14, 1914, p. 75). The omnipotence that is attributed to their thoughts has a grandiose quality. The grandiose quality gives children a feeling of control over the internal and external world. The child's ego is described as an amorphous organism with a central energy source.

Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out (Freud, S.E. 14, 1914, p. 75).

The ego, then, incorporates experiences from the external environment.

In the 1923 structural theory, primary narcissism is characterized by an objectless state, "auto-eroticism". There is no differentiation between the ego and the id, and there is an absence of any form of relationship to the outside world. It is unclear, then, in the 1923 formulation what the ego is cathecting. Primary narcissism, in this formulation, is an "objectless" state or at best an undifferentiated state, where there is no split between the internal and external world.

Freud's description of "secondary narcissism" is consistent in both the 1914 and 1923 theoretical formulations. In secondary narcissism, libido is extended to objects. The process of identification allows energy to flow into the ego. The ego is then free to invest libido in an external object.⁵

The outcome of the stage of narcissism is "self-regard". This term is used as "an expression of the size of the ego" (S.E. 14, 1914, p. 98). The foundation of self-regard is set in infancy. Freud believed that this attribute was based on a

⁵ In the 1914 formulation, secondary narcissism allows sexual energy to be distinguished from the energy of the ego-instincts (Freud, S.E. 14, 1914, p. 76). In the structural formation of 1923, the separation of these energies is seen in the origin of the ego, as the ego is derived from the id.

residue of primary narcissism, omnipotence corroborated by experience, and satisfaction in the object libido. In adulthood, self-regard influences the choice of a love object. Self-regard is a determining feature in healthy emotional development, particularly in the ability to love another.

Freud's paper integrates theory with an explanation of the individual's style of relating. While On Narcissism begins with questions on pathology and the relationship of libido theory to omnipotence, and while theoretical ideas predominate, Freud's paper ends with a discussion on self-regard and love. His interest in interpersonal functioning places the theoretical discussion on narcissism in context. But Freud's focus on the ability to love in this paper is not usually emphasized in theoretical discussion (cf. Confusion and Ambiguity, below). Instead, the predominance of the ego is recognized as a turning point: The discussion of the ego's origins in this paper marks the beginning of structural theory. It is suggested by this researcher that the underlying emphasis of this paper is to answer questions on basic psychological issues - the relationship of ego libido to the development of human relationships. While the structural relationship of the ego is very important, it seems that the psychological essence of this paper has been lost.

1) Confusion and Ambiguity in the Ego. The presentation of the ego in Freud's paper has created confusion in psychoanalytical literature. It is unclear when Freud is referring to "the self" and when he is referring to a psychic structure. This ambiguity is referred to in writings by Hartmann (1950), Strachey (1966b), and Laplanche & Pontalis (1973).

Hartmann (1950) observed that Freud did not always make a "distinction" in his terminology. An overlap between the terms "ego", "self" and "personality" is noted particularly in Freud's 1914 paper. Hartmann suggested that a differentiation

of these terms is required so that the structural theory may be understood: Freud's concept of narcissism inferred the libidinal cathexes of "sets of opposites": "the self" (or person) versus the object; and the ego (as a psychic structure) versus the other substructures of the personality. Hartmann saw Freud describing only object cathexis and ego cathexis in his theory of narcissism. Hartmann proposed that the theory of narcissism was clarified with the introduction of "the self-representation" (Hartmann, 1950, p. 127).

Rapaport & Gill refuted these ideas. They asserted that "the term 'person' has no conceptual status in psychoanalysis" and the introduction of a self-representation by Hartmann did not change this (Rapaport & Gill, 1957, pp. 688-689). (The implication here is that "person" cannot be structurally defined as there are no unconscious, preconscious and conscious correlates. In contrast, Freud's definition of the psyche included a dynamic sense - the interaction of the conscious and unconscious. Rapaport & Gill considered that 'person' was a colloquial not a theoretical term.)

An editor's note by Strachey observed a lack of "great precision" in Freud's use of *das Ich* at the beginning of this paper, and stated that a better translation might be the use of "the self". Due to the emphasis on the structure of the mind in the rest of the paper, the editorial decision was to consistently use the term "ego" (Strachey, 1966b, p. 71).

Laplanche & Pontalis (1973) found that the definition of the ego as an object and the developmental sequence of object choices has important implications. They suggested that these attributes of the ego "prohibits any identification of it [the ego] with the subject's internal world as a whole" (Laplanche & Pontalis; p. 137).

The question of whether the ego was a structural entity or a representation of a central aspect of the personality has created problems in definition. This writer suggests that this ambiguity could be clarified if Freud's clinical vignettes were

better integrated with the theory. The personal aspect that Freud reported in his descriptions of cases is easily lost due to the complexity and obtuseness of psychoanalytic theory. This occurs even though the subjective psychological aspects are inherent to the pathology.

b) Identification

Identification is defined as "the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person" (Freud, S.E. 18, 1921, p. 105). It implies a transformation of a central aspect of the ego. Later, internalizations of the ego are associated with the individual's character (cf. Stage V below). Freud's theory of identification suggests that the ego is initially formed by object cathexes (energy investment) of experiences in the environment. This begins in infancy, through "oral incorporation". Later the object-cathexes are replaced with a narcissistic object choice, usually modeled from parental figures in the environment. Identification is defined as

a psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 205).

The influence of identifications on the development of the individual is examined with reference to normals, hysterics, homosexuals. In melancholia, the identification is based on the lost object. In groups, empathy and identification with the leader result in shared emotional experience. The two papers that refer to the development of identification are: "Mourning and Melancholia" (S.E. 14, 1917) and "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (S.E. 18, 1921).

c) The Ego Ideal

The ego ideal represents the individual's conception of a model to be emulated. The process of idealization is found in the ego in narcissism and later in identification with the parent. In adult life these models are replaced with the ideals of our fellow citizens. The ego ideal is similar to but not synonymous with the conscience (later termed the superego). A conflict with the ego ideal results in shame and a conflict with the superego results in guilt. These issues are discussed in several papers including "On Narcissism" (S.E. 14, 1914), "Mourning and Melancholia" (S.E. 14, 1917) and "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (S.E. 18, 1921)

Stage V: 1923-1939

In this stage, the ego becomes one of three agents in the psyche. Freud's model of the ego is explained in both mechanistic and dynamic terms. This researcher suggests that this stage clarifies Freud's conception of the ego. The influences of nineteenth century physiology and psychiatry (notably the mechanistic model of psychic function and the theory of ego-splitting) are integrated with Freud's later ideas. In the later papers, the ego is given autonomy from the other psychic structures. Its choice of defences is considered a mark of "individuality" and results in "character".

Three aspects of the ego are presented in this stage of Freud's thought: a) the ego as a mechanistic agent; b) the ego as an autonomous agent; c) ego-splitting as indicative of the whole person.

The quotations (cf. below) used to illustrate the ego's autonomy are suggested by this researcher to be examples of the problem of translation. In the quotations selected, the terms "ego" and "self" seem interchangeable. Freud's editor was aware of this problem (cf. Strachey in Freud, S.E. 19, pp. 7-8).

It is suggested that this stage of Freud's writings integrates his ideas developed over a period of 40 years and indicates that "the self" was not neglected. It is also suggested that the ambiguity in the ego concept came from the emphasis on the ego's contradictory attributes: its mechanistic structure based in nineteenth century physiology; its ability to act as an autonomous agent; and its tendency to split in pathology.

a) The Ego as a Mechanistic Agent

In "The Ego and the Id" (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923b), the ego is elevated to the rank of agency or system and the superego and id are defined. These agencies are distinctive to each individual. Freud's new model does not supercede the unconscious, conscious, and preconscious elements but instead integrates and stratifies these functions within the agencies.

The relationship of the ego to these other systems is illustrated in Figure 4 (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 24). The descriptors used are consistent with the mechanistic model that Freud presented in 1895. The ego's genetic basis is in the perception-consciousness system (*Pcpt.-Cs.*) that develops mnemonic images, and acoustical word images (*acoust.*). This system allows reality testing to occur (S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 55). Consciousness is placed on the "surface of the mental apparatus" where external and internal perceptions are addressed (S.E. 19, 1923b, pp. 19, 23). Consciousness becomes an exclusive function of the ego, but not its sole function and, consequently, consciousness loses its role as an autonomous system [the *W* system in "The Project" (Freud, S.E. 1, 1895)]. The preconscious (*Pcs.*) is also a function of the ego but does not "correspond to our official ego" as it did in the 1896 model (cf. Figure 2; Freud, S.E. 1, 1896a, pp. 234-235). Freud adds to the ego's complexity by emphasizing its unconscious properties. Note that

Freud did not include the superego in this diagram.

Insert Figure 4 about here

The ego's origins begin with an identification with the body that are based in mechanistic projections. In infancy physical sensations, including oral incorporation and even "painful illnesses", give perceptions that become a "mental projection". These mental projections of physical experiences are the basis of the ego.

The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface. If we wish to find an anatomical analogy for it we can best identify it with the 'cortical homunculus' of the anatomists (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 26).

The association of the ego with physical perception is consistent with Freud's mechanistic model of the psyche. In addition, the relationship of the ego to the body in Freudian theory is consistent with the redefinition of the mind-body problem in German materialism. In both cases, the mind is related to the physical functions of the body (cf. Chapter 3).

b) The Ego as an Autonomous Agent

The ego is recognized in this stage to be the agency that gives the person individuality and character. It is described as an autonomous organization that

moderates internal and external (i.e., reality) conflict in a distinct idiosyncratic fashion.

The ego was formulated by Freud in order to explain the "dynamic factor" within the psyche. This agency's role was to clarify the workings of the unconscious, preconscious, and unconscious.

This has become clear in more ways than one...We have formed the idea that in each individual there is a coherent organization of mental processes; and we call this the ego (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 17).

"The Ego and the Id" expanded the conception of the ego. It was considered to have an independent source of libidinal energy (S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 63). Its autonomy was the outcome of the identification process, which gave rise to the individuality of each person (S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 29). The ego's "object-cathexis" (identifications) determined an individual's "character" (S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 28). The strength of the ego in dealing with conflicting demands was dependent on the individual's identifications.

We have come to understand that this kind of substitution [identification] has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards building what is called its "character" (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 28).

The ego's capacities are particular to the individual. Its functions, such as motility and perception, reality testing, anticipation, and rational thought, are elicited by the psyche to counter the pressures from internal and external conflict.

We see this same ego as a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the

external world, from the libido of the id and from the severity of the superego....As a frontier creature, the ego tries to mediate between the world and the id, to make the id pliable to the world and by means of its muscular activity, to make the world fall in with the wishes of the id (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923b, p. 56).

The character of the individual was the product of the ego's ability to cope with the demands of reality and the demands of the internal world.

In a subsequent paper, "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (Freud, S.E. 20, 1926), the ego's "autonomy" was extended. The ego is no longer "subservient" to the id or "merged" with the superego but instead is described as being an "organization" in its own right. The ego is given a desexualized source of energy with which it may "bind and unify" neurotic symptoms and in that way "synthesize" and "strengthen" the ego as a structure (Freud, S.E. 20, pp. 97-98). The ego is described as being able to initiate defences when a state of anxiety is anticipated (Freud, S.E. 20, p. 166). Inhibitions and symptoms are ego defences that are preceded by a state of anxiety.⁶ Restriction in the ego-function due to conflict is considered to result in sexual dysfunction, phobias, hysteria, and depression. Case examples are given but these do not predominate. The emphasis in this paper is primarily on the technical workings of the ego.

The description of the ego in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" is considered by Kris (1947), Rapaport (1958) and Hartmann (1956) to be the

⁶ Freud differentiated inhibitions from symptoms. In inhibition, there is a "simple lowering of function". Symptoms occur when there is an unusual change in ego functioning. This may result in new phenomenon, such as a behaviour or thought formation (Freud, S.E. 20, 1926, p. 87).

"culmination" of Freud's ego concept. This paper gives the ego some autonomy from the other psychic structures. In addition, external reality is given a central role. Rapaport (1958) suggests that the concept of adaptation is implied in the ego's ability to moderate reality and the instinctual drives. These concepts (adaptation of the ego, the role of reality and the autonomy of the ego) are fundamental to American Ego Psychology. [Curiously, this article is not referred to in the survey of the ego by Laplanche & Pontalis (1973)].

In two subsequent papers, the issue of ego autonomy is developed further. In "Civilization and its Discontents" (Freud, S.E. 21, 1930), the ego's relative autonomy is described. While Freud recognizes the universality of the sense of self, his preference for a structural/mechanistic explanation de-emphasizes this type of psychological quality. (This is evident in his dynamic formulation of the psyche.) In the following quotation, Freud refers to the dynamic interaction of the id and ego as influencing the feeling of self.

Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than our feeling of our self, of our own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything else. That such an appearance is deceptive,...[due to] the relation of the ego to the id. But towards the outside, at any rate, the ego is seen to maintain clear sharp lines of demarcation (Freud, S.E. 21, 1930, pp. 65-66).

The ego gave a sense of unity within the person and provided a separation between "the self" and the outside world (except in love and pathology). A scientific explanation of the feeling of "self" was given in the structural definition of the ego

despite the subjectivity and mutability of the experience.

In "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (Freud, S.E., 23, 1937a), the ego is given an independent core that is separate from the id and superego.

We have no reason to dispute the existence and importance of original, innate distinguishing characteristics of the ego. This is made certain by the single fact that each person makes a selection from the possible mechanisms of defence.... This would seem to indicate that each ego is endowed from the first with individual dispositions and trends (Freud, S.E. 23, 1937b, pp. 240).

In Freud's last theoretical paper, the ego is given its own disposition. This autonomy is evident in the ego's distinct methods of handling conflict. The end result of this central structure is the appearance of character in the individual. The presentation of the ego, in this paper, seems similar to the objective aspects of "the self". The objective aspects of "the self" and the ego both address the person's autonomy, the intrinsic nature of being human.

c) Ego-Splitting as indicative of the Whole Person

The reappearance of the concept of ego-splitting in the final stage of Freud's writings is suggested by this researcher to give the ego concept continuity. The splitting of the ego was a fundamental concept in nineteenth century psychiatry and a focus in Freud's first psychic formulations (cf. Stage 1, part c, above). Reference to ego-splitting is found in three of the later papers: "Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis" (Freud, S.E., 22, 1933); "An Outline of Psychoanalysis", (Freud, S.E. 23, 1940a); "Splitting of the Ego in the Concept of

Defence" (Freud, S.E. 23, 1940b). It is suggested that these papers clarify the ambiguity of Freud's ego concept. While his focus is on conflict and pathology, Freud seems to be referring to the ego as an agent that offers psychic unity.

Freud's discussion on psychic-splitting is found in the chapter titled "The Dissection of the Personality" in "New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis" (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933). This chapter describes the ability of the ego to split when under conflict. Examples of splitting are given in normals, neurotics and psychotics. Freud's chapter also includes the final diagram of the psyche. This concept (ego-splitting) and diagram (cf. Figure 5 below) are suggested in this research to show the consistency of Freud's concepts. These two points are found to clarify the ambiguity of the ego.

1) A Tendency Towards Psychic Unity. The chapter begins by addressing the problem of scientifically viewing the ego and recognizing that the ego's tendency is towards unification even in duress. Reference is made to the ego's ability to perceive itself as an object and subject, mirroring the subjective and objective elements defined in "the self". In fact, in the following quotation, it appears that the term "self" could be substituted for the term "ego".

We wish to make the ego the matter of our enquiry, our very own ego. But is that possible? After all the ego is in its very essence a subject; how can it be made into an object? Well, there is no doubt that it can be. The ego can take itself as an object, can treat itself like other objects, can observe itself, criticize itself, and do Heaven knows what with itself. In this, one part of the ego is setting itself over against the rest. So the ego can be split; it splits itself during a number of its functions

- temporarily at least. Its parts can come together afterwards.

That is...generally known (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933, p. 58).

This quotation begins by addressing the difficulty of making an impartial analysis of the ego. Freud then suggests that the ego has this capacity within itself. He suggests that the ego can split itself during several functions. This results in one aspect of the ego conflicting with the other. Later in this paper, the initiator of the split is seen to be the observing ego, which Freud calls the superego (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933, p. 60). The ego's tendency toward integration results in the maintenance of its basic structure even in conflict. This continuity of a basic essence is consistent with the objective aspects of "the self" described in this research.

The characteristic and transitory nature of ego splitting is illustrated in mental illness. In 'melancholia', for example, the super-ego is seen to attack the "poor, helpless ego" for the smallest incidents. In remission, the ego can rehabilitate itself and regain "its normal rights" (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933, p. 61). In normals and neurotics this process results from a conflict between the instinctual drives and the pressures of reality. Resistance and repression are given as two examples of the ego's defences that allow internal conflict without creating distress in the individual (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933, p. 68). Behaviours such as doing something accidentally (i.e., a Freudian slip) reveal the ego's two positions in the conflict.

2) Freud's Final Diagram of the Psyche. A "pictorial representation" of the ego's structural relationships is found in Figure 5 (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933, p. 78). This diagram is an elaboration of the 1923 diagram. It differs from previous models in that it includes the superego.

Insert Figure 5 about here

This diagram illustrates continuity in Freud's model of the psyche. The conscious, preconscious, and unconscious are present. The two horizontal lines of dots represent mnemonic registrations of the mechanistic model (illustrated in the 1896 model as "x's"; in the picket fence model of 1900 as perpendicular lines and dots; and in the 1923 model as horizontal rows of dots). The ego's basis within a system of perception-consciousness (*pcpt.-cs.*) remains. Its association with the preconscious (which began in 1896) allows it to "simultaneously satisfy" the demands of reality and the instincts.

Ego-splitting is inferred in this diagram as the ego's method of mediation. The basis of this process is found in "inhibitory action", described in the 1895 model (cf. Figure 1). The ego uses inhibition in the 1933 model in its use of defences. The end result is a division within the ego (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933, p. 59). Rationalization and denial are the defences given in the following quotation.

In [the ego's] attempts to mediate between the id and reality, it is often obliged to cloak the *Ucs.* [unconscious] commands of the id with its own *Pcs.* [preconscious] rationalizations, to conceal the id's conflicts with reality, to profess with

diplomatic disingenuousness, to be taking notice of reality even when the id has remained rigid and unyielding (Freud, S.E. 22, 1933, p. 78).

The ego's defences "preserve the structural relations within the personality". Freud ends his discussion with a focus on the psyche as a whole. He reminds the reader that the elements he has dissected (in his "pictorial representation") are really "merged together". His focus in "therapeutic psychoanalysis" is to strengthen the ego by giving it more independence from the superego and giving it more control of its perceptual process and the influence of the id (p. 80). In that way the ego is assumed to be unified.

3) The Ego and the Sense of Self. The ego's strength is later directly associated with the splitting process. This is discussed in "An Outline of Psychoanalysis" (Freud, S.E. 23, 1940a, pp. 201-204). He suggests that even in a severe split, as in psychoses, the person retains a sense of self.

One learns from patients after their recovery [of hallucinatory confusion] that at the time in some corner of their mind (as they put it) there was a normal person hidden, who like a detached spectator, watched the hubbub go past him (Freud, S.E. 23, 1940a, p. 202)

This quotation suggests that Freud recognized a sense of continuity in the individual. He makes the ego the focus of this continuity. It may be that his emphasis on the splitting of the ego in pathology has resulted in subsequent theoretical writers not recognizing the ego as a central part of the person.

In "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence" (S.E. 23, 1940b), Freud presents a case example of splitting. In this example, he shows how a boy

deals with psychic distress by using two simultaneous procedures of defence; one which dismisses reality, and the other the instincts. This "coexistence of contrary attitudes" is characteristic of splitting within the psyche (Freud, S.E. 23, 1940a, p. 204). A "rift" within the ego, results in symptoms such as phobias. (The boy was threatened with castration for masturbation which did not result in the cessation of his behaviour but created a phobia and denial.) Freud observed that the synthetic nature of the ego, even "under a number of disturbances", including a "centre-point" split, is "taken for granted" (p. 276). Freud then recognized the unity within the ego as an agency even in pathology.

Conclusion

A critical review of the development of the ego category reveals an organization that has both structural and psychological attributes. While the ego's structure is mechanistically based, it does retain individuality, autonomy and character. The ego is seen to be developed from internalized representations of the body's experience. Freud's physiological-mechanistic model of the ego is consistent with German materialism. The emphasis on the structural aspects succeeds the mechanistic basis of ego functioning. It is suggested that the personal essence of *das Ich* ("the I") is not developed but instead is implied as a result of this historical-scientific emphasis. Subsequent psychoanalytic theoreticians continued the emphasis on the structural - not the personal aspects - of Freudian theory.

In Freud's writings, there is a difficulty differentiating the ego from "the self". Ambiguity in the definition of the ego is found to be the result of a number of

factors. The basis of this confusion appears to be the use of both physiological and psychological parameters to describe the ego. Freud's writings never dealt solely with one parameter without some reference to the other. It was also shown that he was not precise in his use of the two terms, ego and self. Finally, it is noted that Freud's interest was in pathological (not normal) ego function. In pathology, the ego's psychological unity is lost. This is illustrated in the ego's capacity to split itself under emotional duress (including love). In normalcy, the ego is able to retain its independence from the demands of the external world, the instincts and the conscience. The ego is able to maintain its independence. Freud's interest in the total functioning of the individual is evident in his references to ego unity. In addition, his case examples reflect an interest in the whole person, not an impersonal dissection of the psyche.

The conceptual review of the ego in this chapter adds support for the hypothesis that Freud did not neglect "the self". This support is seen in the categorical analysis of the ego where all but one of the stages in Freud's writings do refer to the ego with special attributes and functions that are psychological in nature. Examples are given where the terms "ego" and "self" are interchangeable

It is relevant that the focus in recent American psychoanalytic theory has been on the re-interpretation of Freud's traditional model and on the addition of "the self". The basis for this addition is traced by the American theoreticians to Freud's writings, particularly those papers that discuss the relationship of the ego to narcissism. This connection is of interest as it implies that the ego is the basis from which "the self" develops. An overview of the development of Ego Psychology and the basis of "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory will be presented in Chapter V.

CHAPTER V
AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY:
THE BASIS OF THE SELF WITHIN FREUDIAN THEORY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief history of the development of the ego in American psychoanalytic theory. This review will show an increasing emphasis on the ego. The transformation of the ego begins with reinterpretations of narcissism (which lead to the introduction of "self-representations" as an ego function) and later results in the formulation of an independent self-structure, separate from the ego.

It will be observed that the theoretical formulations that have developed in Ego Psychology have been an attempt to deal with the ambiguity in Freud's ego concept. It is suggested that "the self" was introduced as a separate structure in order to resolve this ambiguity. This chapter will suggest that only one of two different aspects of the ego has been emphasized in these discussions: either "the self" as the experiencing ego that acts as an agent ("the self" as subject); or "the self" as a sense of oneself as a separate identity ("the self" as object) (Rycroft, 1968, p. 149). It is suggested that Kernberg (1982) has been the most successful in describing the ego's duality. These aspects are found to be consistent with the subject-object integration required in the philosophical category of "self".

The modifications in the ego are observed to be most evident in psychoanalytic theory in the United States (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 131). Developments of this trend will be historically tracked in the works of: Anna Freud (1936); Hartmann, Kris & Lowenstein (1946); Hartmann (1950); Jacobson (1954, 1964); Mahler (1958); Erikson (1950); Kernberg (1966, 1975, 1976, 1982); and Kohut (1966, 1971a, 1971b, 1977, 1980, 1984).

Anna Freud's Contribution

Historically, it is observed that there have been many periods in the development of psychoanalysis when the theoretical study of the individual ego was "distinctly unpopular" (Anna Freud, 1936). The ego was considered to be a "superficial psychic structure". Consequently, the focus was on the depth of the psychic strata. The original emphasis in psychoanalysis was not on the ego but on unconscious mechanisms and on the instinctual drives (A. Freud, 1936, p. 4; Hartmann, 1956, p. 430).

Initially, it was felt that psychoanalysis should be reserved for the study of the unconscious. Anna Freud's book changed that emphasis in The Ego and Mechanisms of Defense (1936).¹ Here, she highlighted the relation of the id to the ego and gave the ego prominence. While the 1923 structure (where the ego, id and superego were identified as psychic structures) changed the role and position of the ego in psychoanalytic theory, Anna Freud's 1936 work resulted in a new interest in the ego and its functions.

The purpose of Anna Freud's work was to examine the mechanisms of the ego with particular attention given to its role in defence formation. The change in interest in the ego can be placed here. While Freud's initial emphasis in works such as "Studies on Hysteria" (e.g., Breuer & Freud, S.E. 2, 1893-1895, p. 133) was on the "elimination" or "overpowering" of the ego in order to gain access to the unconscious, Anna Freud considered that the ego itself was "the object of analysis": the ego's role was central in psychoanalytic treatment. Its capacity for "self-observation" gave it commonality with the analyst. Its unconscious defensive operations were understood as protecting the ego from instinctual demands, the

¹ This book was presented to Freud on his eightieth birthday and is considered to have been written by Anna Freud in collaboration with her father.

demands of the superego and the external world. The analysis of the defences of the ego made these processes conscious which then allowed the id impulses to be understood. The unconscious defence operations were seen as protecting the ego from instinctual demands and the demands of the external world (A. Freud, 1936, pp. 30, 43).

Anna Freud also addressed the influence of reality on the ego. She illustrated theoretically and clinically how the internal demands and reality worked as forces on the ego. Eleven methods of defence were described as the ego's means of integrating these experiences. The pressures of reality are seen to cause conflict within the ego and to result in symptom formation.

The ego's relations with reality in Anna Freud's work were primarily a defensive one. Anna Freud referred to the ego's methods of defence as an attempt to deny reality. The focus on the denial of reality was in sharp contrast with a later conceptual development in American Ego Psychology, where importance was placed on reality testing and reality relations. Anna Freud's work was consistent with traditional Freudian theory due to her emphasis on psychic structure and the ego's protective role.

The New York Group

The increased emphasis on the functions of the ego is observed when European psychoanalysts came to the United States around the time of the Second World War. One group of Viennese and German analysts, Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein, promoted the emphasis on the ego within the traditional analytic

framework.² "The New York Group", as they were known, set out to "clarify terminology" and in the process outlined the functioning of the ego.

In their article, "Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure", the id, ego, and superego are presented following Freud's tradition:

[Not as] independent parts of the personality that invariably oppose each other, but as three centers of psychic functioning that can be characterized according to their developmental level, to the amount of energy vested in them, and their interdependence at a given time (Hartmann, Kris & Lowenstein, 1946, p. 14).

Fresh from Vienna, this group re-established traditional Freudian theory in the United States. Following Anna Freud's (1936) lead, they focussed on the ego. This is evident in their definition of the ego and their description of ego development and its relationship to narcissism.

² In contrast, other analytic writers in the United States and in Europe were focussing on the pre-oedipal phases and were examining the mother-infant relationship in normal and pathological development. This was the beginning of Object Relations theory.

The *Zeitgeist* of the 1930's in the analytical world emphasized the subjective reality following the trend set by phenomenology. The focus on reality in psychoanalysis was the outcome of observations of normal and pathological development in children. The preoedipal phases were given more attention, as were the relations between mother and infant. This perspective was evident in the work of theoreticians such as Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenczi, Melanie Klein, and Michael Balint. (This position directly conflicted with Freud's perception of mothering, in which the relationship developed secondarily to the infant's need for physical care.)

The Budapest Psychoanalytic Conference of 1935 addressed these issues specifically. At this conference Michael Balint presented a paper titled, "Early Developmental States of the Ego". This paper expanded Ferenczi's concept of the dependency of the infant in the mother-infant relationship and introduced the concept 'primary object love'. Balint's concept was presented to replace Freud's theory of primary narcissism (Balint, 1949). Balint's paper is recognized as it anticipated contemporary attachment theory and interactionalism, the foundations of Object Relations theory (Balint, 1949; Hamilton, 1982, pp. 78-79).

Defining the Ego

The redefinition of the psychic structure (with an emphasis on the ego) was an outcome of the concern that the concepts in psychoanalysis were becoming "obscured" by the clinical descriptions that were "dramatic in the anthropomorphic sense". Hartmann et al. cautioned that "metaphorical language [had] crept into scientific discourse". They noted the increased interest in psychoanalysis by professionals not schooled in psychoanalytic theory. A specific concern was that "the self" was being used interchangeably with the ego. [The works of Alexander (1930), Glover (1930), and Masserman (1946) are cited. A review of these works by this researcher finds the term "self" is used minimally. Curiously, the works of Federn (e.g., 1926) which describe "ego feeling" and "self-experiences" are not mentioned. It may be that the term was used by more popular theoreticians who were not associated with traditional psychoanalysis. The appearance of the term is seen in works by Carl Jung and Harry Stack Sullivan but are not cited by Hartmann et al.³ The use of "the self" was seen as restricting "the general conceptual understanding" of Freud's terminology due to its specificity. The term, however, was recognized as being closer to human experience. Metaphorical expression, they forewarned, can become "dangerous" if the metaphor used infringes upon the

³ Jung included "the self" and "the ego" in his 1922 list of definitions. "The self" was described as "express[ing] the unity of the personality as a whole" and was almost synonymous with his definition of the psyche - "the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious". The development of "the self" was associated with the process of "individuation". He distinguished between "the self" and "the ego" with the ego being "the subject of my consciousness while the self is the subject of my total psyche" (Jung, 1922). Sullivan used the term "self" along with "self-dynamism" and "self system", beginning in 1938 (cf. Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 97). In contrast, Rogers referred to the term "self" in relation to "the concept of self" and "self-actualization" in 1951. This latter term is based on Kurt Goldstein's 1939 use (cf. Ewen, 1980, pp. 329-330).

meaning of a term.

The functional connotation may be lost and one of the psychic systems may be substituted for the total personality (Hartmann et al., 1946, p. 16).

The ego was identified as a structure vulnerable to this type of substitution. Hartmann et al. considered that Freud's references to the ego were ambiguous in that Freud used this term in reference both to the "psychic organization and to the whole person". They suggested that "the self" can be substituted for the ego when it was "defined as part of the personality" (Hartmann et al., 1946, p.16).

They reminded their reader that while metaphors can assist in immediate understanding, metaphors can obscure the dynamic nature of the psyche. Clinical understanding is attained with the use of structural concepts. Anthropomorphism, then, should not replace Freud's model of psychic tension. This is clearly stated in their discussion on the libidinal presentation of the ego to the superego.

In a more rigorous sense, we find it advisable not to speak of "approval" and "disapproval" by the superego, but simply to speak of different kinds and degrees of tension between the two psychic organizations, according to the presence or absence of conflict between their functions (Hartmann et al., 1946, p. 16).

The emphasis in the Hartmann et al. paper is on the presence of instinctual tensions as a driving force in the psychic structure which is consistent with the traditional Freudian model.

Ego Development, Reality and Narcissism

The influence of reality is emphasized in the Hartmann et al. formulation of the ego. The ego was seen as "an organ of adjustment" as it mediated between reality and the psychic structure. The ego's central function was in its relation to reality. If, however, the instinctual or moral demands took precedence, as in pathology, then this function was utilized by the id and superego (Hartmann et al., 1946, p. 14).

Two phases of ego development were outlined: an undifferentiated phase and an integration phase. The influence of reality was predominant in these phases.

The undifferentiated phase is similar to Freud's formulation but without the "obvious disadvantages". While the id and the ego came from "a common matrix" they have independent roots. This new formulation was proposed to explain the role of maturation of the psychic structures in which instinctual drives were moderated by reality. This adjustment was considered to distinguish man from animal. The "organ of adaptation" that allowed this to occur was identified as the ego.

In the second phase, differentiation is seen to be the result of the infant's "experience" in the environment (with "experience" being equated with "learning" or "cognition"). The "most essential part" of the environment was the mother who offers gratification and deprivation. While Freud suggested that the infant differentiated himself from the mother in the weaning phase through deprivation, Hartmann et al. suggested that the deprivation had to be perceived cognitively and that this change relied on both maturation and the environment.⁴

⁴ Hartmann (1939) previously described the infant's need for "the average expectable environment" which referred to the infant's innate biological capacity to adapt. His position contrasts with Winnicott's (1965) "facilitating environment" in which object relations predominate and instincts are object seeking and not drive reducing.

When Hartmann et al. explained the infant's differentiation from the mother, they referred to the differentiation of "the self" from the "external object", or "the world around him". (Their use of the term "the self" is somewhat surprising to this writer due to their criticisms of its use by their contemporaries.)

The New York Group considered that "the self" is the "first product" of the concentration of psychic energy, resulting in primary narcissism. They observed that this was consistent with Freud's 1923 formulation. In the differentiation phase, they suggested that "the self" separated into two separate cathexes: an object cathexis that is based on the external world and an independent cathexis that is an autonomous part of the ego. The object cathexis was seen as emerging from and replacing the narcissistic cathexis (or state of self-love).

When we speak of a distinction between the self and the external object, we assume that the object which is experienced as independent from the self has retained cathexis in spite of the separation; we infer that primary narcissistic cathexis has been transformed into object cathexis (Hartmann et al., 1946, p. 21).

This process was not seen to occur in one step but as a result of "repeated trial experiences". These trial experiences followed an established pattern that is physiologically based on the "predominant modes" of incorporation and ejection or their "psychological counterparts", introjection and projection. From these modes, cognition developed. Cognition allowed the infant to delay gratification needs, as the experience of frustration could then be replaced with the ability to anticipate reality. Psychic integration was the end product of this process.

Hartmann: The Ego and the Self

Hartmann (1950) subsequently discussed the problem of definition in the

ego in 'current' psychoanalytic theory. He was the first to delineate the ambiguity of Freud's use of the term ego. He explicitly stated that the ego is not equivalent to the "personality", "individual", or the "feeling of one's self" (p.114). Instead, he considered the ego to be a structure within the personality that includes many functions, with one of these functions being "what we attribute to the person's character".

The ego was given three functions: 1) the organization and control of motility and perception of reality and "probably also of the self" (with the exclusion of self-criticism which is an attribute of the superego); 2) a protective barrier against "excessive" external and internal stimuli; and 3) a synthetic function that allows mental self-regulation (Hartmann, 1950, pp. 114-115).

Hartmann's writings are considered by many to have clarified the ambiguity in Freud's works (Wyss, 1973; Fine, 1979; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Hartmann (1939, 1950, 1956) proposed theoretical "specifications" that "fill[ed] in the gaps" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 246). Hartmann observed a discrepancy in Freud's writings as to the dominance of the instincts as a motivational force and noted intermittent references to the "ego instincts", autonomous from the id. While the description of the ego in the metapsychological papers (Freud, S.E. 14, 1914, 1917) focussed on the ego as an agent in its own right, the structural model of 1923 limited the ego as a derivative of the id. Hartmann developed the model of the ego presented in Freud's 1914 paper, "On Narcissism" (not the 1923 paper, "The Ego and the Id") as he found the basis of the earlier model of the ego consistent with Freud's later writings.

Hartmann's contributions were in the areas of ego autonomy (from the id), and the relationship of the ego to reality. Hartmann provided the specificity that was lacking in Freud's theory of the ego's narcissistic aims. Hartmann proposed

that the individual's relationship to reality was mediated by the ego, which utilized its adaptive functions. The predominant concepts that Hartmann introduced were: the conflict-free sphere, adaption, ego autonomy, and the reality principle. Hartmann's theories on ego development and narcissism influenced American psychoanalytic theory. These theories are reviewed in the following two sections.

Ego Development: Autonomy and Adaptive Functions

Hartmann's work (1950, 1955, 1956) expanded the concept of the ego in his description of its genetic root and its autonomous functions. The adaptive functions of the ego are the end result of this process.

Ego development was seen to be the result of three factors: 1) inherited characteristics of the ego, 2) the influence of the instincts, and 3) the influence of reality (Hartmann, 1950, p. 120). This constitutional core gave the ego a "primary autonomy" from the internal and external tensions and allowed the development of cognitive functions. The ego's "secondary autonomy" refers to its ability to maintain an independence from conflicts resulting from the instincts and reality. This phase is marked by the development of "neutral energy" (Freud, S.E. 19, 1923b) which allows the ego to function without the threat of the libidinal drive. Hartmann termed this attribute of the ego "the conflict-free sphere", as it permitted the exclusion of both aggressive and sexual drives (Hartmann, 1950, p.128). The adaptive capacity of the ego (to resist the drives with its defences) was seen as unique to each individual. The degree of secondary autonomy developed was considered to reflect the individual's "ego strength".

Hartmann (1964) considered that his theory of the ego and its development was consistent with traditional psychoanalysis. As in Freudian theory, the ego begins as preconscious memory traces. The capacity of the ego to develop a "conflict free sphere" (or "neutral energy") was expanded to include the

aggressive drives as well as the libidinal drives. The instinct of self-preservation was an ego function that was maintained in the strict Freudian sense, under the control of the ego itself. While the ego developed "greater importance" in its relation to "the total personality", it remained a substructure that was defined "by its functions" (Hartmann, 1964, p. ix).

Narcissism and the Self

The clarification of Freud's conception of the ego was found by Hartmann (1950) in a re-examination of Freud's description of narcissism. In Hartmann's discussion, he defined "the self" as "one's own person" and the ego as a "psychic structure".

In using the term, narcissism, two different sets of opposites are fused into one. The one refers to the self (one's own person) in contradistinction to the object, the second to the ego (as a psychic system) in contradistinction to the other substructures of the personality (Hartmann, 1950, p. 127).

Hartmann's (1950) definition of narcissism consequently established "the self" as a self-cathexis which was a function of the ego. Hartmann (1950;1956) digressed from Freud's (S. E. 19, 1923b) formulation of primary narcissism, which was an objectless or auto-erotic state. Hartmann (1950) returned to Freud's first theory of primary narcissism, in which the infant is described as taking himself as the first love object through a process of identification.

Hartmann's theory then gave the ego an added dimension. The capacity for self-representation allowed the ego autonomy from the instincts. Hartmann's formulation laid the ground work for the emergence of the concept of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory when this dimension was added. Hartmann's contribution

returned the original meaning to the state of primary narcissism, with the libidinal cathexis of the self being part of the psychic structure.

The equivalence of narcissism and libidinal cathexis of the ego...is widely used in psychoanalytic literature but in some passages Freud also refers to it as cathexis of one's own person, of the body or of the self. In analysis a clear distinction between the terms ego, self and personality is not always made. But a differentiation of these concepts is essential....It therefore will be clarifying if we define narcissism as the libidinal cathexis not of the ego but of the self....Often, in speaking of ego libido, what we do mean is not that this form of energy cathects the ego, but that it cathects one's own person rather than an object representation (Hartmann, 1950, p. 127).

The concept of the self that Hartmann presented was the "self-representation": An experiential construct that was formed in a fashion similar to and parallel with object representations. "The self" had been integrated into "the powerful triad of functions" of the ego. While the drives were often referred to as the "biological aspect of the personality", the ego was able to "underscore" their strength using "adaptation, control and integration (the synthetic function)" (Hartmann, 1956, pp. 290-291.)

Hartmann laid the foundation so that others could consider aspects of behavioural development and cognitive functioning that were relatively autonomous from the instinctual drives. This allowed the traditional Freudian framework (the structural model of 1923 which is based on instincts) to maintain its importance while the definition of the ego was expanded. The focus on the ego began with Anna Freud's (1936) work and was developed in American psychoanalytic theory.

Ego Psychology, as reformulated by the European analysts in the United States, accounted for both the biological and cognitive factors in development. Eagle summarized the impact of Ego Psychology.

While important for psychoanalytic theory this is hardly an empirical discovery; as a substantive statement, it amounted to merely acknowledging and admitting into psychoanalytic theory the phenomenon and facts of biological maturation as applied to cognitive functions...facts with which biology, medicine, experimental and developmental psychologists were long familiar (Eagle, 1984, p.16).

The emphasis on biological and cognitive factors is suggested by this researcher not to have resolved the separation that Hartmann (1950) found between psychoanalytic theory and practice. Instead, it seems that this led to a trend in which the subjective, personal aspects of Freud's ego were not affirmed - which was contrary to the understanding of psychoanalytic theory by Freud's colleagues (Levin, 1969; Bettelheim, 1982; Ticho, 1982; McIntosh, 1986). The redefinition of the ego through the re-interpretation of narcissism (Hartmann, 1950) marks the beginning of a series of modifications to psychoanalytic theory in the United States.

Modifications in the Ego

The basis of American psychoanalytic theory is found in the model provided in Ego Psychology. The theoretical legacy that Ego Psychology has contributed is the enhanced functions of the ego and the focus on reality (or the external world) while respecting Freud's theory of instinctual drives. Gradually, the American model has been modified. When the works of major American psychoanalytic theorists are reviewed, it may be seen that their point of departure

relies on theoretical concepts presented by Ego Psychology. Hartmann, in particular, is seen to be the transitional figure (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 236). It can be observed that the role of reality and the adaptive functions of the ego have been expanded. The constraints of traditional psychoanalytic theory were lessened, allowing for a theory of "the self" to emerge. In the following sections, the transformations of the ego and the emergence of Self Psychology will be outlined.

Jacobson, Mahler and Erikson

Hartmann's work was elaborated on by Edith Jacobson (1954, 1964) first in an article and a decade later in her book, The Self and the Object World. Jacobson describes a series of complex interactions which are organized around the demands of the drives and integrated with a broad band of developmental needs.

Jacobson's work relied on the theoretical conceptualizations of Hartmann (1939, 1950) and Hartmann et al. (1946). She expanded the concept of primary narcissism and, following Freud's proposition, included primary masochism. The "primary psychophysiological self" was an undifferentiated psychosomatic matrix, the recipient of both libidinal and aggressive drives that are directed inwardly (Jacobson, 1964, p. 6).

Jacobson (1964) credited "the introduction" of the term self in psychoanalytic theory to Hartmann (1950). Jacobson interpreted Hartmann's concept of self to mean: "the whole person as an individual", including his body and psychic organization. Like Hartmann, Jacobson presented the concept of self as secondary to the psychic organization as it is being used as a representation (and does not have a metapsychological status of its own). She considered this concept useful, however, as it placed the individual in context with the environment.

The "self" is an auxiliary descriptive term, which points to the

person as a subject in distinction from the surrounding world of objects. (Jacobson, 1964, p. 6).

She distinguished between the structural conception of the ego and self-representations and "the self". The term "self" is described as a descriptive term- "the totality of the psychic and bodily person" which is distinct from the world of objects. Self-representation is a psychic representation that is within the system of the ego.

Jacobson proposed that the image that each individual has of "the self" emanated from two sources: 1) a direct awareness of inner experience, emotions and thought processes; and 2) an indirect awareness of "the self" from observation and introspection. Indirect awareness is based on perceptions of the body and mental self as an object. Our capacity to perceive ourselves objectively is limited due to the subjectivity of the emotional experience. Similarly, in self-representations (in contrast to object representations) there is only implied conceptual detachment.

The development of "the self" begins as "self images" that form from memory traces of pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences in the environment. Experiences in the object world, or environment, are fused with "self images", beginning in infancy. (This terminology and development pattern, i.e., "fused self images", foreshadows the model presented in Self Psychology).

The concept of self in Jacobson's work, then was a "subjective emotional experience" that relied on the satisfaction (or frustration) of the drives in order to develop (Jacobson, 1964, pp. 20-21). The subjective nature of "the self" differentiated it from the structural concepts. Jacobson, then, was consistent with Hartmann in her placement of "the self" as a function of the structural ego.

Jacobson's theoretical contributions to psychoanalysis are considered to

have "infiltrated" all subsequent American theories but are often not credited (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 325). Jacobson's influence is evident in the integration of object relations theory with classical theory, the description of interpersonal experiences in infancy, and the establishment of the term "the self" in psychoanalytic terminology, in addition to her work on psychopathology and metapsychology (Fine, 1979, p. 414; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 326).

In Mahler's (1958) theory of separation-individuation, Hartmann's (1939, 1950) and Jacobson's (1954) influence is clear. This is seen particularly in her use and development of terms such as "environment", "autonomous functions", and "adaptive functions".

Mahler built on the concepts of "the average expectable environment" and the "problem of adaptation". She humanized and personalized the "environment" when she added the concept of "the ordinary devoted mother". She expanded the ego's "autonomous functions" through the developmental process of separation-individuation. The end result of this process was psychic growth - "the psychological birth of the infant" (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). Mahler's (1958) theory is organized around the adaptive functions of the ego and the resolution of instinctual tension.

This last principle, instinctual tension, is characteristic of traditional Freudian theory. This foundation is evident in Erikson's (1950) "Seven Stages of Man". In this article, Erikson described the epigenesis of the ego as the product of instinctual tension and social reality. While Erikson did not refer to "the self", he did refer to "ego identity" as a stable organization of identifications which were an integrated ego function.

The Self Emerges: Kernberg and Kohut

Kernberg (1966, 1976) and Kohut (1966, 1971a, 1971b) became

interested in theoretical formulations as an outcome of their work with patients who were not usually treated with psychoanalysis: the borderline and narcissistic personality. They initially presented theories that were consistent with traditional Ego Psychology. Both used the language of the drive model and discussed the relation of the drives to the psychic structure. "The self" is initially referred to as an image - a representation within the ego. This position made their theories consistent with Hartmann's (1950, 1956). As their theories progressed, their formulation of the psyche changed and the importance of the drives was replaced by a structural reformulation of the psyche. "The self" became a "supraordinate" structure that was apart from the id, ego and superego (Kohut, 1977, p. 97) or an executive of the ego (Kernberg, 1982, p. 914). This new position has placed "the self" in the forefront of American psychoanalytic theory and became popular perhaps because of its ready clinical application. Kernberg's theory differs from Kohut's formulations in that while Kernberg maintains his tie with the traditional structural model but Kohut does not. In Kohut's work this is particularly evident in his rejection of the drives in the preoedipal phase.⁵

Kernberg's Theory

In Kernberg's (1966, 1976, 1977) works, he presented a theory of psychic development that includes "the self-image". In these formulations, "the image of the self" was presented as Hartmann described it, as a " self-

⁵ There have been many criticisms of Kohut's and Kernberg's work. It is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss the difficulties of these theories. Kernberg and Kohut's work have been criticized for juxtaposing and combining concepts from drive theory (the foundation of traditional Freudian theory and Ego Psychology) and from Object Relations theory. The "mixing of models" creates a lack of consistency in the theories. Critiques of Kernberg's and Kohut's theories may be found in Kohut (1977, p.xix), Fine (1979), Klein & Tribich (1981), Greenberg & Mitchell (1983) and Wallerstein (1983, 1985).

representation" (cf. Kernberg, 1966, p. 241). Kernberg utilized the term "the self" only when referring to the highest level of psychic organization in opposition to an (external) object. His use of the term "the self" is generally meant to mean "self-image", "self-representation" or "self-concept" until his 1982 work, in which he uses it, somewhat ambiguously, to refer to a separate structure.

Kernberg (1966) placed "the self" in relation to "ego identity", the most mature level of the internalization process. (The term "ego identity" is based on Erikson's [1950] conceptualization.) Ego identity is the outcome of a process of "introjections", and "identifications" which have been synthesized by the ego. These first two phases utilize splitting, in which self-images (or self-representations) and object images (or object-representations) are given "positive and negative valences" (Kernberg, 1966, p. 244), seemingly modelled after "good objects" and "bad objects" [cf. M. Klein, 1946, in Greenberg & Mitchell (1983, p. 128)].

The ego synthesizes these images and an "ego identity" is developed. This consolidation results in a "sense of continuity of the self". "The self" relied on the consistency of positive and negative valences of the "self-images". The self structure is defined as:

the organization of the self-image components of introjections and identifications, to which the child's perception of its functioning in all areas of its life and its progressive sense of mastering basic adaptational tasks, contribute significantly" (Kernberg, 1966, p. 242).

"The self", then, is made up of a composite of self-images and is a function of the ego.

In Kernberg's (1976) later book, five stages of psychic development are

presented.⁶ In the final stage, there is consolidation of superego and ego integration. (Ego identity evolves as an outcome of the integration of self- and object-representations.) Included within the concept "ego identity", is the "integrated self or self-concept" (Kernberg, 1976, p. 72). The "self-concept" evolves from the consolidation of internalized self- and object-representations. The "self-concept", which is based on real experiences and internal representations, is reshaped and unified in this stage giving the individual "inner resources".

The outcome of Stage 5 is the formation of "character structure". (Character structure is defined as "the automatized, predominantly behavioural components" of ego identity that can be influenced by the external environment.) There is a dependent relationship between the "self-concept" and "character structure": when these aspects are harmonious, then others in the external world observe consistency in the individual's personality and behaviour. It can be seen then that Kernberg's use of the "self-concept" is within the functioning of the ego. While he occasionally utilizes the term "the self" on its own, he is consistent in referring to this concept in relation to "self-representations".

In Kernberg's 1982 paper, a change in the status of "the self" is evident. "The self" is equated with the subjective executive functions of the ego. Kernberg's rationale was to address the ambiguity that has been described between

⁶ Kernberg's (1976) Five Stages of Psychic Development:

Stage 1: Normal "Autism or Primary Undifferentiated Stage

Stage 2: Normal "Symbiosis" or Stage of the Primary Undifferentiated Self-Object Representations.

Stage 3: Differentiation of Self- from Object-Representations

Stage 4: Integration of Self-Representations and Object-Representations and the Development of Higher Level Object Relations Derived Structures. (This stage forms the basis of Ego Identity.)

Stage 5: Consolidation of Superego and Ego Integration (The end result of this stage is the development of Character.)

"the self" and the ego. This ambiguity has been previously noted (Hartmann, 1950, 1956; Strachey, 1961; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Kernberg found that Freud intended to equate "the self" with the ego. To support his argument, he translates one excerpt of Freud's work showing the ego equated with "the self".

Kernberg (1982) considered that his concept of "the self" is an attempt to be harmonious with the duality of Freud's "das Ich". Kernberg suggested that Freud's use of the ego reflected an open-ended and flexible concept that included both a "metapsychological ego" and an "experiencing self" (Kernberg, 1982, p. 894). The duality is subsequently described:

The first is [Freud's] idea that the ego differentiates from the id or an original undifferentiated ego-id matrix by its crystallization around the system perception-consciousness.

The second is his suggestion that the character of the ego is a precipitate, by means of internalization, of the representations of instinctually invested objects (Kernberg, 1982, p. 901).

These two conceptions of the ego reflect both its structural and subjective aspects.

Kernberg cautioned against the use of the term "self", when the intended meaning is to refer to the "person", as this confuses psychosocial with psychoanalytic descriptors. "Character" is his preferred term as it is precise, clinically useful, and as it reflects the "various configurations of normal or abnormal ego structure" (Kernberg, 1982, p. 900). The term "character" could be also used to refer to the objective sense of self, where personal identity is observed.

Instead, Kernberg suggested that "the self" be reserved for a structure that is "the sum total of integrated self-representations from all developmental levels" (Kernberg, 1982, p. 911). This structure "originates" from and is "clearly embedded in the ego" (Kernberg, 1982, p. 900) but then becomes a "supraordinate structure" that takes on executive ego functions (Kernberg, 1982, pp. 905, 914).

The normal self...emerges naturally as the tripartite intrapsychic structure is constructed and integrated...We can thus define the self as an integrated structure that has affective and cognitive components, a structure embedded in the ego, but derived from the forerunners of the ego (Kernberg, 1982, p. 914).

This new structure organizes the ego's key functions including memory, cognition, reality testing, a self concept, and a concept of others.

The self is...an ego function and structure that evolves gradually from the integration of its component self-representations into a supraordinate structure that incorporates other ego functions - such as memory and cognitive structures (Kernberg, 1982, p. 905).

Kernberg's redefinition linked "the self" with the subjective functions of the ego. This superordinate structure is made up of self-representations and is consistent with the formulations of Ego Psychology.

Kohut's Theory

Kohut's theories of Self Psychology began with formulations on narcissistic personality disorder. He proposed the existence of a pathological developmental disorder within the psyche that could be used to explain the resulting deficit. Kohut began by defining narcissism as "the libidinal investment in the self" not the ego (Kohut, 1966, p. 427). In this paper, Kohut described "forms and transformations" within the psyche that occurred as a developmental problem resulting in the lack of resolution of normal primary narcissism. One of these transformations was the "narcissistic self". (Kohut compared this concept to

Freud's description of the "purified pleasure ego" but places his concept, the "narcissistic self", within pathology.)

In 1971, Kohut presented his first formulation of the psychic structure and included "the self" as part of the psychic structure.

It is best to confine ourselves to defining the self as an important content (a structure or configuration) within the mental apparatus, i.e., as self-representations...of the self that are located within the mental apparatus, i.e., the ego, the id and the superego (Kohut, 1971, p. 588).

This construction was not the result of "pathological transformations" but was an addition, like a self-representation, to the id, ego, and superego.

While this conceptualization was seen to expand the psyche, Ornstein suggested that Kohut was careful not to make "the self" a "fourth agency" of the mind (P. Ornstein, 1978, pp. 93-94). Ornstein supported his position with three observations: Kohut's "self" was conceptually less developed; it was not seen as a "constituent" of the mind; and it was not analogous in status to the ego, id, and superego. Instead, "the self" was at a comparatively lower level as it was an "experience-near, psychoanalytic abstraction", as a content within the mind (P. Ornstein, 1978, p. 95).

Kohut expanded his theory in 1977, when he conceived of "the self" as a separate structure. In The Restoration of the Self, "the self" emerged as a "supraordinate configuration" with its own centre of initiative. Ornstein considered that Kohut was "freeing" himself theoretically from the Freudian theory, as this traditional model would have interfered with his conceptualizations (P. Ornstein, 1978, p. 97). Kohut's concept became one that was independent of the Freudian mental apparatus and agencies and allowed the "psychology of the self" to begin an era of its own. "The supraordinate self" was no longer a representation or a

product of the ego, but became an active, independent agent.

Kohut (1977) presents "the self" as a psychoanalytic concept which can be differentiated from the ego as well as from "personality" or "identity". Kohut suggested that the infant had a rudimentary self ("the nuclear self"). Its innate potential could be nourished or thwarted by the sustained and specific interactions between the self and the selfobjects (the object often being another person). "Selfobjects are objects we experience as part of the self" (Kohut, 1980, p. 414; cf. Kohut, 1971, p. xiv).

The relationship with the selfobject (termed "the self-selfobject") begins with total or partial lack of differentiation and culminates in a sense of autonomy. The ability of the selfobject to respond to the infant's nuclear self determines the development of his or her potential. A "healthy self" requires both a "basic intuneness" and "non-traumatic failures" from "faulty empathy" (Kohut, 1984, p. 70). The nuclear self then develops into the supraordinate self - "the cohesive and enduring psychic configuration" (Kohut, 1977, p. 177).

The self-selfobject relationship is described in developmental terms. The transition from dependency (symbiosis) to independence (autonomy) is described in three "experiences with selfobjects". The first is a "mirroring experience" in which the infant feels a sense of omnipotence, grandiosity and acceptance. The second is an "idealizing" experience in which the infant merges with "the greatness, strength and calmness" of his parents. The third is a "twinship" or "alter ego" experience which is an identification process. In infancy and pathology, the "selfobject" experiences are "archaic" (primitive) but in normal development these "mature". The "selfobjects" fuse and become "self-nuclei" through a slow process of "transmuting internalization". It is from this foundation that the psychic structure known as "the self" emerges.

Two opposing aspects of "the self" are identified. Either aspect of "the bipolar self" may be expanded to form the nucleus of the mature self. These aspects are 1) "the idealized parent imago" and 2) "the grandiose self" (initially named "the narcissistic self" in 1966). The nature of the personality is considered to be the result of the integration of these two poles. A failure to develop one pole, leads to compensation in the other pole. While one aspect of the "bipolar self" may be used to compensate when problems in development occur, a failure to develop either pole results in narcissistic psychopathology, evident in a "defective sense of self" and fluctuating self-esteem.

A healthy self...is a structure that...is not prone to become fragmented, weakened or disharmonious during maturity, at least not severely and/or for extended periods (Kohut, 1984, p. 70).

Kohut's clinical focus was to understand the bi-polar essence within the individual and promote change by "empathy and introspection" (Kohut, 1977, p. xiii; cf. Wallerstein, 1985, pp. 391, 402).

While Kohut seems to be defining "the self" as a psychic structure, he was careful not to assign "an inflexible meaning to the term self" as he wanted to ensure that "the self" retained its meaning in the broadest sense - as an "unknowable psychological essence" (Kohut, 1977, pp. 310-311). In this researcher's opinion, the hesitancy to define "the self" is compounded by a lack of differentiation of the terms self and supraordinate self in his writing (as is evident above). It is unclear whether the two terms are equivalent. The lack of development in his terminology and the need for specific definitions of terms is currently referred to as a problem in Self Psychology (Eagle, 1984; Wallerstein, 1985; A. Ornstein, 1987).

The maintenance needs of Kohut's "basic cohesive self" are more primitive and constant in comparison to the other psychic structures. Kohut's self requires "positive selfobjects" to reflect "the self" throughout the lifespan. All

adults, he suggests, need "selfobjects" to mirror, idealize or twin with them in order to maintain psychological health (Kohut, 1984, p.49). Kohut does not adhere to a developmental progression of needs (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). He proposes that infants and adults do not differ in their psychological make up. The infant

is not dependent, clinging or weak, but independent, assertive, strong - it is psychologically complete so long as it breathes the psychological oxygen provided by the contact with empathetically responsive selfobjects and, in this respect, it is no different from the adult who is complete, independent, and strong only as long as he feels responded to (Kohut, 1980, pp. 480-481).

Kohut suggested that the ongoing need for "selfobjects" in the adult psychic organization results from remaining elements of "psychological infantilism" that are the result of "flaws" in emotional development. [This position has been criticized because it dismisses the work of developmental psychologists and as it contradicts the linear progression of Kohut's own work (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).]

Kohut saw his work not as a "deviation from traditional theory but as an expansion of analytic understanding" (Kohut, 1984, p. 208). He argued that Self Psychology complemented Ego Psychology in that his theory provided formulations and explanations in three areas that psychoanalytic theory has not adequately explained: how the psyche moves towards health; how the psyche soothes itself; and how the "sense of self" has continuity over time (Kohut, 1984, p. 65).

Kohut did recognize that he went beyond what Freud and traditional psychoanalysts would accept. His theory included the concept of "cure", which

other psychoanalysts do not promise (cf. Kohut, 1984, pp. 66-100). (Freud considered analysis to be an ongoing process without a distinct end.) Kohut's conception of cure includes the expansion of the ego's "conflict free sphere" and the dominance of the reality principle over the pleasure principle (which is consistent with treatment objectives of the Ego Psychologists). Kohut's cure also includes the development of a self structure that is maintained by mature (versus archaic) selfobject transferences, and self-love ("healthy narcissism") that does not exclude love for others (Kohut, 1984, pp. 208-209).

The Resolution of Ambiguity

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the modifications of the ego in Ego Psychology. These modifications began as mental health professionals were observing a separation between the "personal" nature of clinical practice and the analytic theory. Terms were being used "anthropomorphically". One term that was focussed on at the time was the ego, as it was being used interchangeably with "the self". Subsequently, the ego was redefined. It was observed that Freud's use of the term was ambiguous. An attempt to explain the dual nature of the ego began.

The basis of these modifications in the United States originates in the discussions of primary narcissism. Initially, there was an emphasis on theoretical problems of narcissism and, later, on clinical considerations. The problem was how to explain Freud's subjective and objective use of the term ego when his focus seemed to be on the (objective) psychic structure. It seemed that duality of the ego could not be considered if the structural foundation of Freudian theory was to be maintained.

The dilemma presented in describing the subjective and objective aspects of the ego has been previously examined. This dilemma is a central aspect of personal identity and "the self", as discussed in philosophy (Edwards, 1972, p.

96). In philosophy, the subjective experience of being is contrasted with the objective, temporal experience of awareness of one's personal identity. The substantiality (continuity and unity) of the self was questioned (Fronzizi, 1953). In psychoanalysis, Rycroft (1977, p. 276) explains this as a "disappearing trick": in which the objective sense of self or of person, distracts from the subjective experience of being and doing. For example, when one is involved in dreaming, creating or imagining, "the self" acts as an agent. In the process, the objective sense of self is lost: That is, the sense of personal identity is temporarily lost. The duality of the ego has created confusion, particularly in the United States. The resulting emphasis is on one aspect of the ego: its subjective, experiencing aspect, or its objective aspect (its structure).

It is suggested by this writer that Freud did not experience this confusion. While Freud emphasized the psychic structure, he did not forget the experience of being human. The basis of his writings was understanding the human condition. He included both the objective and subjective aspect of the ego in his writings. It may be that the English translation has created problems in understanding the nature of "das Ich". The literal translation of *das Ich* is "the I", making it a concept that implied an underlying personal aspect (i.e., like "the self"). The perceived, impersonal nature of the Latin term *ego* is one of the central issues that has led to a re-examination of the Strachey translation. The subjective and objective aspects of the ego are implicit in Freud's ego, even in his discussions of its mechanistic structure.

Historical evidence finds that "the self" was introduced into psychoanalytic theory in the English-speaking world. "The self" appeared in the 1920s and was prominent enough for Hartmann et al. (1946) to refer to it. Their paper effectively brought the traditional emphasis on the ego to the United States.

The ego was expanded as a concept but remained within the psychic structure.

"The self" was considered with respect to primary narcissism. Hartmann (1950) redefined primary narcissism and provided an integration of Freud's 1914 description of the ego and placed it in the 1923 model of the psychic structure.

"The self" was a cathexis that was a function of the ego. The ego was given an added dimension; the capacity for "self-representation". This ego function, however, was described in structural terms.

A transitional period then followed in which Jacobson (1954, 1964) used "the self" as a descriptive hypothetical term representing the whole person (which was contrasted with the object). "Self-representations" were considered to be structurally part of the ego. Theoretically these concepts were placed in relation to primary narcissism. Mahler (1958) did not refer to primary narcissism but instead focussed on a similar objectless state, normal autism. Erikson (1950) considered "ego identity" to be an ego function. These 'transitional' theorists all refer to the traditional Freudian theory. Their emphasis on the instincts is retained, but they include a focus on the subjective, experiencing aspects of "the self".

In 1966 Kohut and Kernberg published work that was consistent with Hartmann's (1950) theory. Initially, "the self" was seen as a function of the ego. Later, it became a "supraordinate concept". When Kohut's (1977) work was based on subjective experience of "the self", the ego lost its structural prominence. Interestingly, Kohut's formulations are based on narcissism. His theory relies heavily on his clinical formulations of psychic development in personality disorders. Kernberg's work also began with clinical studies of cases not traditionally treated with psychoanalysis. Kernberg (1976), however, refers to narcissism in relationship to pathological development. He does not see it as a stage in normal development. Both Kohut's and Kernberg's emphasis on "the self" may be considered to be an attempt to examine the functions of the ego with respect

to "the self". It seems that Kohut stresses the subjective experiencing aspects of "the self" but refers generally to the objective aspects; He does not address the ego as a structure. Kernberg, in contrast, seems to provide a model in which all three aspects may be included.

This chapter suggests that Kernberg (1982) has solved a dilemma that has troubled Ego Psychologists since the 1940s. That is, he has provided a model where both the objective and the subjective aspects of "the self" are "indissolubly linked" with the ego structure (Kernberg, 1982, p. 900). This can be seen to reduce the ambiguity within the concept of the ego. The objective and subjective nature of individual functioning is structurally explained.

The ego's subjective aspect is evident in self-representations. The ego's objective aspect is expressed as the integration of all self-representations. This supraordinate structure, called "the self", originates from and is embedded in the ego. With this framework, it is suggested that all the basic aspects of the Freudian ego are maintained. Psychoanalytic theory attains the clarification that was sought and the ambiguity within the ego is resolved.

The traditional Freudian ego is seen in this research to be a broad category that includes the functions that have been attributed to "the self". It may be considered that Kernberg's (1982) formulation is the first that successfully integrates the duality within the ego as it addresses both the subjective and objective sense of self while retaining the traditional ego structure.

This historical review then suggests that "the self" emerged as a concept that attempted to explain and resolve the ambiguity in the ego. The duality of the ego concept has not been understood theoretically and has resulted in narrow interpretations of Freudian ego. The complexity that has been observed in the development of the ego concept suggests that these authors are trying to develop an

aspect of the ego concept that was included by Freud. Their attempt to clarify Freud's writings used their own emphasis and in that process introduced "the self" into psychoanalytic theory.

Conclusion

The introduction of "the self" as a psychoanalytic concept in the United States is historically based in the development of the ego. This chapter follows the transition in American psychoanalytic theory over a period of forty years and has found the basis of the concept "the self" within the ego. These concepts were consistently interrelated, as observed in the formulations on narcissism. The impetus was to correct ambiguities that were seen in Freudian theory and to integrate theory and practice. Initially "the self" was presented as a self-representation (Hartmann, 1950; Kohut, 1966; Kernberg, 1966) and later as a supraordinate structure (Kohut, 1977; Kernberg, 1982). This is suggested to create a problem in the structural foundations in Freudian theory because it places the ego in a narrow framework. The ego's functions become one dimensional and the fluidity of the concept is lost.

The formulation of "the self" within the subjective executive functions of the ego (Kernberg, 1982) is suggested to be an attempt to place "the self" within psychoanalytic theory and resolve the ambiguity in Freud's ego concept. The subjective emotional side of the ego and the objective side which results in identity are addressed while the traditional structural formulation is maintained. The integration of subject and object is consistent with categorical analysis.

The final chapter will discuss the main issues presented in this dissertation that examine the status of "the self" in relation to the Freudian ego. The arguments presented in this chapter and previous chapters will summarize the historical and theoretical evidence that "the self" was not neglected by Freud.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation attempts to clarify the connection between the ego in classical psychoanalysis and "the self". It is found that Freud's concept of the ego does include a central aspect of the personality but that this aspect is not emphasized. As a result, the ego was perceived as ambiguous and led to the introduction of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory. The two hypotheses of this dissertation are supported: 1) That Freud included but did not emphasize a central synthesizing structure in his theory; and 2) That the concept of self is included in Freud's ego.

The review of the literature finds that the debate on the status of "the self" in relationship to the ego is not a new one: In fact, this debate has been going on for half a century. While the emphasis in the arguments changed over time, an underlying issue remained: How can the personal nature of clinical practice be explained by psychoanalysis when its theory seems to be remote, austere and overly complex? In this dissertation it is argued that the ambiguity of the term "ego" is at the root of this question. This ambiguity results from the fact that Freud implies but does not emphasize the integration of the subjective and objective aspects of the ego, resulting in a lack of emphasis in a central aspect of the personality. This research suggests that if Freud's work is examined historically and conceptually, it will be seen that he did not omit "the self" in his theory. Support for the hypotheses of this dissertation are evident in five areas of research:

1) The Historical Antecedents of the Ego. A historical review of nineteenth century German thought provides evidence suggesting that Freud was consistent with scientific writers of his generation by not stressing a unifying concept, such as "the soul" or "the self", as a central part of his theory. The philosophical-scientific antecedents in Germany established a strong bias toward scientific materialism. Thinking in the nineteenth century was directed away from the metaphysical. Instead emphasis on the experimental-physiological method was preferred. This method excluded the soul, individuality and personality, for these concepts could not be experimentally studied. Instead, functions of the brain, such as the unconscious, became the focus. Consequently, the mind was seen as a part of the body, and not a separate entity. The de-emphasis on the metaphysical and the emphasis on the scientific is typical of this era and is evident in Freud's theory of the psyche. The mechanistic model became a hallmark of this period. Mechanistic explanations of psychic functioning were used by neurologists - including Freud.

The historical review shows that the model of the ego presented by Freud was consistent with the nineteenth century materialistic mind-body representation. In Freud's model, the ego is connected to some aspect of the body, originating in a system based on perception and consciousness. Later, its association with the body is defined: "The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego" (Freud, S.E. 21, 1923b, p.26). The integration of the ego with the body is consistent with the principles of materialism.

Adding a metaphysical entity, such as "the self", would have changed Freud's model of the psyche and threatened his association with the scientific model. Like the soul, "the self" there is a problem finding an operational definition which philosophers and psychoanalysts can agree on. These terms have a personal meaning for each individual: The broad nature of these terms limits productive

discussion.

Including "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory is suggested to resurrect a metaphysical dilemma that is reminiscent of the problem of emphasizing the soul in the nineteenth century.

2) The Literal Translation of *das Ich*. The English translation has created problems in delineating the conceptual meaning of Freud's terms. The translation has also complicated our understanding of Freud's intention to include a central aspect of the personality. While some recent researchers suggest that the translation is accurate and literal, others argue that Freud's terms, both in German and in English, are imprecise.

Das Ich (which literally translates as "the I") is one example. *Das Ich* has a particular connotation; it refers to a central aspect of the personality. "The I" is comparable to "the self" in common parlance (in the English language) as both refer to a central aspect. The terms *das Ich* and "the self" are suggested to present a similar connotation.

In addition, it is observed that literal translations of these terms are not found in German or English. The noun, *Selbst* (self), is rarely used in German, except in hyphenated words (Betteridge, 1975; Ticho, 1982). Similarly, "the I" is an awkward construction in English and is not used as a technical term even by the International Psychoanalytic Association.

It is suggested that Freud's choice of *das Ich* indicates that he meant to refer to a central aspect of the personality. This is not apparent in the choice of the Latin term "ego" in the English translation. The literal translation of *das Ich* would have preserved the personal aspect that Freud inferred.

The lack of precise terminology in psychoanalysis has been felt primarily in the United States. Ironically, it was the historical-political climate in North

America that first led to the choice of Latin and Greek terms in Freud's work. It is curious that in the early part of the century there was a trend to formalize terminology and now at the end of the century, the trend is to personalize it.

3) Conceptual Development in the Ego. As Freud's strength is in conceptual development, it was suggested that the reader could determine meaning of a term through the text. A review of the development of the ego in Freud's writings reveals a structure that has inherent personal attributes. In normalcy, the ego is given unity, independence and individuality. Freud's case histories are known for their sensitive accounts of patients' psychological functioning. These subjective aspects of the ego contrast with its objective presentation, in which the emphasis is first on mechanistic-physiological functioning and later on structure. Ambiguity in the definition of the ego is seen to be the result of Freud's reference to apparently different parameters, his emphasis on pathology, and the lack of precision in his use of terms. This ambiguity seems to have led subsequent theorists to develop the structural aspects of Freud's theory and include the personal aspects only as illustrations in case histories.

While Freud described two aspects of the ego (physiological/structural and psychological), he did not integrate them. However, it is noted that his writings on the ego never dealt solely with one aspect without some reference to the other. The continual emphasis on individual functioning (as seen in the case histories) implies the integration of these two frames of reference.

Freud's focus on pathology led to the dissection of the personality. Postulates on the splitting of consciousness, and on defense formation, were prominent in nineteenth century psychiatry. But Freud's descriptions of "ego-splitting" and defence formation did not exclude ego unity. In fact, Freud did consider psychic synthesis as evidence of mental health.

4) Synthesis is Assumed. The emphasis on the analysis of the psyche and not synthesis is seen in Freud's approach to clinical treatment. It is suggested that this position might explain why Freud did not stress an over-riding psychic structure.

In theoretical writings, Freud proposes that once the analysis was complete synthesis would follow. The striving towards psychic "unity" was "self-evident". Freud saw the psyche before analysis as an "inchoate mass". The removal of the obstacles through psychoanalysis allowed psychological "unity" (synthesis) to follow. It is suggested that Freud believed that striving toward psychic synthesis was automatic: Therefore, he did not believe that synthesis was a function of a central organizing self. This theoretical assumption, which is basic to Freudian theory, clarifies why Freud did not find it necessary to elaborate on "the synthesis" of the personality.

5) The Self is a Function of the Ego. It is suggested that "the self" emerged in American psychoanalytic theory in order to clarify the ambiguity in the ego concept. This "new" concept was introduced in American psychoanalytic theory in the 1950s, at a time when psychoanalytic theory was found to be formal and impersonal. The introduction of "the self" was welcomed by many as it reflected the subjectivity of clinical practice. The Freudian ego was redefined in discussions on primary narcissism. "The self" was included as a function of the ego, within the internalization process.

The historical review of psychoanalytic theory in the United States, indicates that the reformulations of the ego included only one aspect of "the self". The focus on the objective sense of "the self" as representing the whole person, or the focus on the subjective, experiential nature of "the self", led to many formulations of the ego as a structure. The ego's essence seemed forgotten

theoretically. It is suggested that Kernberg's (1982) theory of "the self" was one that recognized the dual nature of the ego and placed this concept ("the self") within the ego's functions.

The Ego Needs Recognition

The traditional Freudian ego is found to be a broader concept that includes functions that have been attributed to "the self". While "the self" has wide public use, it has been found to be too vague a concept resulting in a problem of definition and a mixing of referents. Freud's ego category needs re-evaluation and its dual aspects need recognition.

The addition of "the self" as a separate concept in the United States has created theoretical problems and has reduced the functioning of the ego category. The emphasis on "the self" in psychoanalytic theory creates a problem in the structural foundations of Freudian theory. The difficulty is that the ego is placed in a narrow framework. The ego's functions become one dimensional and the fluidity of the concept is lost. The ego is then displaced. When the ego is recognized as a concept that includes the central aspect of the personality, then "the self", as a function, becomes integrated within psychoanalytic theory.

Freud's conceptualization of the ego includes the subject-object dichotomy that is the essential part of the classification of categories. The examination of the translation, the conceptual review and the review of American psychoanalytic theory support the ego as a complex category that includes "the self".

In conclusion, this thesis finds that "the self" as a concept has been included in traditional psychoanalytic theory but has not been emphasized. It is suggested that the personal qualities of "the self" are evident in the psychological aspects of the ego. The subjective aspects are found to be a function of the ego. The objective aspects are seen as represented within the ego's structure. It is

suggested that theoreticians in psychoanalysis have had difficulty conceptualizing the duality of the ego due to Freud's focus on structure and pathology.

The problem of including subjective aspects of the ego clarifies its relation to "the self". The theoretical formulations of the ego in the United States were generally found to focus either on the subjective or objective attributes of the ego. This definitional dilemma is suggested to parallel the difficulty of defining "the self" in philosophy, in which one aspect of being overshadows the other: The subjective sense of experiencing is lost when the objective sense of personal identity is felt. A definition of the ego that includes the dual aspects of personal identity integrates Freud's conceptual presentation of the ego. This categorical analysis resolves the ambiguity found in the ego for theoreticians in the United States.

Five areas of research were used to explain Freud's position on "the self". The historical antecedents to psychoanalysis illustrate the pressure on psychoanalysis to be identified with scientific and not philosophical thought. This pressure is apparent in the terminological choices in early and recent English translations (cf. Jones, 1908, 1924; Brill, 1909; Chase, 1910; Strachey, 1966a). The absence of a personal reference in the translation of *das Ich* is noted to be troublesome, particularly to writers in the United States. The personal nature of the literal translation ("the I") is found to be missing in the English edition. This concept is seen to emerge when the theoretical foundations of psychoanalysis are reviewed. The ego is found to have the capacity for unity in normal mental health. In pathology the theoretical focus is on understanding the dissection of the psyche: ego-splitting. Further, the task of clinical treatment is analysis not synthesis. Synthesis within the psychic structure is an outcome of psychoanalysis, and may be seen as improved ego functioning, not the development of a separate self structure. Theoretical developments in the United States show that "the self" was introduced

as a concept that would fill the gap between psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice. It was suggested that "the self" emerged to clarify the position of the ego in psychoanalytic theory. This research then finds "the self" is included in Freudian theory. Freud did not neglect "the self".

Topics for Further Research

1) Psychoanalytic theoretical formulations that include "the self" are more prominent in the United States than in England or Europe. An examination of American sociological trends in the 1950s and 1960s might explain the interest in the development of this concept. It is observed that the emphasis on the individual in North American society coincides with the focus on "the self" in sociological and psychological theory. A study tracing the focus on the individual in North America may explain the interest in "the self" in psychoanalytic theory.

2) "The self" has also been used in British and French psychoanalytic theory. This term was presented by Object Relations theorists and Lacanians in a fashion which did not conflict with the structural basis of traditional Freudian theory. A comparative study of the uses of "the self" would be a valuable addition to the psychoanalytic literature.

3) The possibility is raised that Freud's conception of the psyche may have been influenced by Judaism. The status of "the self" in American psychoanalytic theory could be examined in relation to the individuality of the spirit in Judaism. In the Old Testament, the "soul" is not referred to. Instead, terms referring to the heart (*leb*), spirit (*ruach*) or life (*nephesh*) are given. In Judaism, there is no separation of the soul from the body. But in Christianity, emphasis is placed on the soul and its redemption. Freud's lack of emphasis of the soul may be following Judaism and not Christianity. Parallels may be drawn between the soul and its modern counterpart, "the self". This area of research would explain Freud's lack of focus on "the self".

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FIGURES

FIGURE 1

The Neuronal Basis of the Ego

From "Project for a Scientific Psychology" by S. Freud
(1895). In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, 1, 1966, p.324.





FIGURE 2

Provisional Diagram of the Psychic Apparatus

From "Letter 52: Extracts from the Fliess Papers" by S. Freud (Dec.6,1896). In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 1, 1966, pp. 234-235.



[Fig. 7]¹

W [*Wahrnehmungen* (perceptions)] are neurones in which perceptions originate, to which consciousness attaches, but which in themselves retain no trace of what has happened. For *consciousness and memory are mutually exclusive*.²

Wz [*Wahrnehmungszeichen* (indication of perception)] is the first registration³ of the perceptions; it is quite incapable of consciousness, and arranged according to associations by simultaneity.

Ub (*Unbewusstsein* [unconsciousness]) is the second registration, arranged according to other (perhaps causal) relations. *Ub* traces would perhaps correspond to conceptual memories; equally inaccessible to consciousness.

Vb (*Vorbewusstsein*⁴ [preconsciousness]) is the third transcription, attached to word-presentations and corresponding to our official ego./

FIGURE 3

Reflex Arc within the Psychic Apparatus

From "The Interpretation of Dreams" by S. Freud (1900).
In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 5, 1966, p.541.




FIGURE 4

Stratification in the Mental Apparatus

From "The Ego and the Id" by S. Freud (1923).
In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 19, 1966, p.24.




FIGURE 5

Freud's Final Model of the Psyche

From "New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis",
by S. Freud. In J. Strachey, The Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, 22, 1933/1966, p.78 .

