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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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THE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE 'WORLD'
IN HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT

by
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Thesis presented to the School of Graduate
Studies and Research of the University of
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INTRODUCTION

Man has always wondered about his world. The question "what is world", when asked philosophically, is always problematic, for the definition sought is no ordinary one.

Philosophy questions further than the simple definition of the world, which holds that it is a totality of everything that exists, and wants to learn in what way it is a totality and in what way it relates to man. It is not an ordinary definition also because it cannot be stated in terms of entities and because it has a bearing on the understanding of the existence of man. This is why the question of the definition of the world that proceeds from the basic assumption that the Being of man and the Being of world are fundamentally connected, has always been one of the founding questions of ontology and ethics.

Philosophy has never abandoned this assumption although the man-world connection has not always been understood the same way. The history of philosophy, both eastern and western, abounds with various explanations of this relation, and with various conceptions of the world. In the east, the earliest conception of the world can be found in the Vedas, wherein 'Samsara' (world, world-cycle) is described as a reality man is ever subjected to, and his existence as driven by the law of 'Karma' (deeds), and as providing an opportunity for 'Moksha' (liberation). This insight is embraced by both Hindu and

Buddhist philosophical traditions and is further developed and variously restated by different schools of thought in the tradition. In the west, the Pre-Socratics initiated Philosophy by asking about the first principle (arche) of the world (kosmos), and soon afterwards this same philosophical quest was defined as an inquiry concerning the soul (psyche) by Socrates. Ever since, the problem of the 'kosmos' has been treated in various ways and on the basis of various presuppositions throughout the history of western thought. The question concerning the world has always been a fundamental question of philosophy.

Since the positing and the treatment of the question has always been based on different presuppositions, it is not valid to compare the various world-views without identifying the assumptions that are buried under them. Nevertheless, a study of the history of these treatments, or even a deeper study of one of these treatments enables us to realize the enormous difficulties we encounter in the issue and its importance for philosophy. At the same time, it enables us to resolve the enigma of the "definition" as such to an extent.

The purpose of this thesis is to expose Heidegger's contribution towards a philosophical definition of the notion "world". In both his manner and his aims, Heidegger is an unconventional thinker. To express his thought, he has used language in a peculiar fashion, coining new terminology as well as using the power of colloquial terms to convey philosophical insight. The aim of his thought is "singular" since he has endeavored to

"re-awaken" the question of the meaning of Being, that is, to pose it in a manner different from the one that has been used to the extent of rendering the very question vacuous in the metaphysical tradition of the west. His aim is "singular" in another sense as he regards this question all-important, and the guiding-light of all his philosophical inquiries. Hence, to interpret his thought on a particular philosophical issue is a problem itself.

The Problem of Interpreting and Evaluating Heidegger

Heidegger's language, his singular aim, and his avowed quest to overcome metaphysical thinking, and particularly, the presupposition of man as a "subject", present his interpreter with several difficulties: Firstly, what kind of language should be used for an exposition? Secondly, how can the interpretation be narrowed down to deal with the issue at hand? And thirdly, on what basis can his thought be evaluated?

As regards the problem of language, some interpreters imitating Heidegger's wont in his earlier works renounce the metaphysical terms and adopt Heidegger's own terminology for exposing his position. While this procedure is justified in so far as it does not commit the error of introducing metaphysical presuppositions, it is far from being an ideal one. There is a danger of being too much involved in the network

of Heidegger's terminology, which makes both the narrowing down of the issue, and the evaluation very difficult. Since many of these terms are etymologically connected, and are rooted in the necessity to raise the Being-question, the employment of one term demands that the kindred and the more basic terms be explained also. Perhaps, it is better to employ a simpler, but not necessarily metaphysical, terminology for interpreting Heidegger's work. This way of expression would be neither too sympathetic nor too unsympathetic towards Heidegger's enterprise. He himself regains his faith in the power of simple terms to convey newer and manifold meanings in his later works wherein he gives up the use of the so-called rigorous terminology of Being and Time.

There are no simple answers to the problem of exposing the basic position, the development, and the position of Heidegger upon a certain issue. All issues converge into one basic issue in his thought, and, at the same time, all investigations are inter-connected. Hence, there is always a danger of misinterpreting his statements if they are taken either out of context or independently of his basic question. At the same time, he often states his position by opposing the traditional standpoints in a manner that very little is said positively about his own position. Furthermore, for the purposes of stress and of explication, he seems to repeat himself endlessly. However, often the repetition is meant to serve a useful purpose, namely, of extricating the hidden and lost meaning of a seemingly

common word. His philosophical writing is not a delightful prose but it does serve to convey his insight.

Perhaps the most difficult of all problems is to evaluate his thought, and the way and the extent to which it is attempted, divides his students into two camps. On one side are the hasty-evaluators who "analyse" his position by assuming a "distance" from him and believe that they are not obliged to be sympathetic to Heidegger's all important question of Being. They take any statement of Heidegger at its own face-value and apply the same standards to evaluate him, as they do for any other philosopher. On the other side are the committed Heideggerians, who are accused by the first camp of being "too reverential" toward Heidegger, and of having lost their critical distance. Both these extremes must be avoided by any serious student. It should be acknowledged that it is not fair to judge Heidegger in a hasty and traditional manner. There are no ready-made standards to evaluate the contribution of a thinker so unconventional as he. At the same time, we have no reason to believe that it is impossible to measure his achievement. But the first requirement to do so would be to undertake a considerable work so that one's own thinking touches the deepest and the most general region of the issue. It is also important to appreciate why the question of Being is so fundamental for Heidegger. If we deal with his positions in a fragmentary way, and are too sure about our standards, it would be a very unfair assessment.

The Problem and the Method

It may be asked at the outset whether we need another discussion about the problem of the world in Heidegger's thought. Philosophical literature is replete with books and articles about the existential analytic of Being and Time , and most of these treatments also deal with "Being-in-the-world". At the same time, various works, including some doctoral dissertations, have appeared on the problem of the concept of the world in particular, along with some comparisons of the world-concept of Heidegger with that of other philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Sartre. Why, then, another study on this issue?

First of all, it is myth that a sufficient number of studies have been done about Heidegger and the problem of the definition of the world. Most of the works that address this issue specifically are short articles, and the number of larger works, both books and doctoral dissertations, as shown in our bibliography, is not too large. The comparative works on this subject can hardly be included in the category to which our study belongs. The general discussions of Being-in-the-world and of the existential analytic, cannot be considered to have treated the issue of the definition satisfactorily.

The works of adequate length, which have appeared, all suffer from one shortcoming. They have all failed to measure the value of Heidegger's later work on this issue. This has

also meant that Heidegger's treatment in Being and Time has been given too much weight, which, in turn, has come to convey the impression that his subsequent attempts to define "world" are not as important as the first one.

The commentators' excessive preoccupation with Being and Time has also resulted in their failure to distinguish between the problem of the definition of the world (Welt) and that of man's Being in his "surrounding-world" (Umwelt). At the same time, they fail to acknowledge that the world-concept cannot be defined easily, and has to be approached from different starting-points. Also, many of them have made hasty speculations about the connection between "Being" and "world" in Heidegger's work.

This thesis will expose, and to some extent evaluate Heidegger's "several" attempts to "define" world, and will focus especially on his later and more matured work. The word "define" is used here in a broad ontological sense and not in a narrow ontic sense. In Heideggerian terms, "to define" world would mean to bring into the open its nature, and to understand its "Being" to the extent that we can in a certain attempt. Our evaluation, for the most part, will be limited to bringing into view Heidegger's presuppositions, and an assessment of the extent to which his thought has ventured in a particular attempt.

The purpose of this thesis is not just to compile all the statements in which Heidegger has referred to the term "world".

U L

Rather, we will especially study those works in which he has attempted to resolve the problem of the definition in a comprehensive and in an original way. Although all the important affirmations and conclusions which have a bearing on the issue of definition will be considered, more attention will be given to the attempts themselves. In a particular work, the probe into the world-concept will be studied as a part of the problem dealt with in that work, and as part of Heidegger's fundamental project. The fragmentary and out-of-context interpretation will be avoided.

An effort will be made to avoid repetitions. Hence, the references to the world-concept in which Heidegger merely explicates an earlier position will not be given too much attention. Our primary goal is not to explicate everything Heidegger has said about man's Being-in-the-world, but to show how he resolves the problem of the definition of the world, variously and at various stages in his career. How all these attempts are related among themselves will also be exposed.

The desire will be to explicate, not further complicate, Heidegger's expression, without falling into the trap of oversimplification. Repetitions, resorted to by Heidegger merely for emphasis, will be avoided, but those which provide subtle insights of "thought" will be exposed. However, our aim is not merely clarity, for one of the major functions of philosophy is to reveal the complexity and difficulty of the fundamental issues.

CHAPTER I

WORLD AND MAN'S BEING

What is it that we call "world"? Heidegger's first major attempt to encounter this genuinely philosophical question is made in his chief work Being and Time. He asks this question within the purview of the "preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein" which is carried out in this work so that the ground can be prepared for raising the all important question of the meaning of Being. The question of Being is all important for man because his very Being remains an "issue" and is not something "given". Furthermore, it is only in the asking of the question of Being that philosophy is philosophy. Heidegger's whole work stems from these convictions. In Being and Time, the foundations can be said to have been laid of a new conception of the "world" and a significant contribution is made toward a philosophical understanding of this notion. Heidegger posits at the outset that world is neither an entity nor a totality of entities, and hence is not something easy to define. He points out that the conception of the world as a grand object containing all existent objects is a notion brought about by the "subject-ism"¹ that has driven the career of western philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche. What, then, is the world? To understand this a "destruction" of traditional ontology

must be carried out, and the relation between man and world must be rethought.

In the introduction to Being and Time, it is made clear that the fundamental analysis of Dasein is neither complete nor final but "preparatory" toward reawakening the question of the meaning of Being.² It is no wonder, then that in his later writings Heidegger shifts the point of departure, employs a new expression, and improves upon the insights gained in Being and Time. This is true especially of the conception of the world. The basic insight is never abandoned or radically altered, but often restated in newer terms, and rethought from different starting points. It is therefore, important to understand what is Heidegger's basic position in Being and Time in order to enable ourselves to view how he builds upon it in his later work to achieve the maturity of an original thinker.

The preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein begins with the identification of the most basic structure of man namely Being-in-the-world (In-der-welt-Sein) which is called an a-priori and a 'whole' structure.³ The insight is that the most striking thing about man's being man is that he is a Being-in-the-world; without world man can neither be what he is, nor comprehend himself, nor comprehend anything. Hence to learn about his Being we must understand his Being-in-the-world. Heidegger states repeatedly that Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon, a "whole" phenomenal finding (Befund).

In order to learn what it means, he considers the three constitutive items in the term, one by one, by investigating "(i) the ontological structure of the world and the idea of the worldhood (Weltlichkeit) as such (ii) the question of 'who' regarding Dasein....(iii) Being-in as such i.e. the ontological constitution of 'inhood' ".⁴

Before taking up these special investigations, Heidegger makes some general and preliminary remarks about Being-in. He distinguishes between man's Being-in (in the world), and Being contained of one entity in another, and emphasises that Dasein has a Being quite distinct from that of entities that are intra-wordly. Being-in is an "existentiale" (Existenzial) or a state of Dasein's Being. Citing from the linguistic research findings of Jacob Grimm, Heidegger points out that the term "in" is derived from the extinct verb "Innan" which means to reside, to dwell; "an" signifies "I am accustomed", "I am familiar with", "I look after something". Since Dasein's Being and Dasein's mineness (Jemeinigkeit) are interconnected,⁵ in the meaning of 'Ich bin' (I am), "bin" is related to "bei", and hence "ich bin" implies "I reside", "I dwell alongside". Since "Sein" is the infinitive of "bin", "Being" part of "Being-in" means "to be familiar with", "to reside alongside". Hence this etymological analysis indicates that Being-in is a residing or dwelling alongside (the world) characterized by familiarity. This Being-in is very different, therefore, from Being inside of one entity in another.

Heidegger stresses the need for understanding the special nature of Being-alongside (Sein-bei) the world that Dasein has, for Being-in-the-world as a primordial structure of Dasein's Being must be perceived. Since no separate linguistic terms are available for describing this Being-alongside, and traditional ontological categories do not grasp "Being-in-the-world", this examination is all the more important. Being-alongside of Dasein with the world is not at all comparable with "Being-present-at-hand-together" of things. Whenever man is taken as merely present-at-hand "in" the world, it amounts to a disregarding of his existential Being-in. This is not to say that Dasein has no presence at hand. This "facticity" can be understood "not by disregarding Dasein's specific structures but only by understanding them in advance"⁶ This is why Heidegger postpones the consideration of Dasein's facticity at this stage. It is further pointed out that Dasein's Being in space too, is to be distinguished from the spatial co-occurrence of entities within the world. Dasein's Being in space is based on its Being-in-the-world, and not vice versa.

Man's facticity is distinguished from that of things because man's Being-in-the-world "has always dispersed (zerstreut) itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in",⁷ examples of which are producing something, attending something, using something, giving something, undertaking, considering, discussing something. All these ways of

Being-in are marked by concern (Besorgen), according to Heidegger. He informs us that "concern" will be used as an "existential" and "will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world". The term is also etymologically related to care (Sorge) which is called Dasein's Being later in this analysis. Hence, it is important to notice that man's Being toward the world is a concerned Being.

Being-in is not a property that Dasein sometimes assumes. It is wrong to say that man first 'is' and then assumes a relationship with the world. Man is never free from Being-in, and all relationship toward the world is possible for it because its Being is Being-in-the-world. Heidegger observes that currently there is much talk about man and his surrounding-world (Umwelt). "To talk about having a surrounding-world is ontically trivial but ontologically it presents a problem".⁸ In the investigation of the surrounding-world the priority has to be given to Being-in-the-world as concern, to understand its nature. The phenomenon of Being-in gets a wrong interpretation the moment the distinction between man's Being, and that of things is disregarded. Heidegger studies man's surrounding-world closely in his own manner to learn about the nature of the things in man's immediate surroundings, his intercourse with them, and above all to learn about the nature of the world as such. But as he points out in a footnote in Essence of Ground (Vom Wesen des Grundes)⁹, surrounding-world is to be studied to acquire "a preliminary

characterization" of the phenomenon of the world to make way for the transcendental problem of the world. Hence an observation of the commerce between man and things in the surrounding-world reveals the nature of the connection between man and world. But the surrounding-world and the world should not be simplistically equated, nor should Being-in-the-world be defined as a mere commerce with useful things. This is one of the reasons why Heidegger acknowledges that the analysis in Being and Time does not exhaust the problem of the world, and conducts the inquiry into the notion several times and in several ways in his later works.

In accordance with his basic rejection of the concept of the world brought about by subject-ism, Heidegger dwells upon the so-called "knowing the world". He maintains that for Dasein, Being-in is always, in a way, familiar (bekannt). Being-in as "known" (erkannt) is traditionally understood as having to do with soul's relationship with the world. In this approach, Being-in-the-world is reduced to a mere relationship between one entity (soul) and another (world) and this relationship is conceived as grounded in those two entities themselves, the meaning of whose Being is taken as presence-at-hand. The pre-phenomenological experience and acquaintance that Dasein has of Being-in-the-world remains unrecognized in this interpretation that regards world-soul relationship as the most evident point of departure, and the existence of object and subject the most obvious fact.

In this way of thinking, the problem of Being-in itself is reduced to being a problem of "knowing the world", and a distinction is put forward between the so-called "theoretical behaviour" and the "practical behaviour" with a priority given to the former. Heidegger deplores the fact that "knowing the world" has been interpreted in this manner that remains both superficial and formal. It takes knowing as belonging to an "inner sphere" that transcends itself into an "outer sphere". Traditional philosophy does no more than mere asking how this transcendence is achieved. However, knowing still remains problematic, for this approach does not answer what it is, and how it is. Heidegger maintains that knowing is a mode of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. However, this statement does not entail that the problem of knowledge is nullified.

It is emphasised by Heidegger that Dasein already has a kind of knowledge of the world. Knowing, as such, is grounded in a Being-already-alongside-the-world (*schon-sein-bei-der-welt*). This Being-alongside is not a mere "staring" at things purely present-at-hand, but it is fascinated (*benommen*) by the world. Hence, concernful Being-in is more primordial than a pure observation of something. "If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a 'deficiency' in our having-to-do with the world concernfully".¹⁰ Pure 'perception' of the present-at-hand may be done by holding oneself back from the concern such as manipulation or utilization, and by

addressing oneself to something as an entity and by discussing it as such. But this act remains an 'interpretation' that makes something determinate. In this way, Heidegger attacks the basic presupposition of subject-ism that underlies the way it presents the problem of knowledge. It takes the presence-at-hand of things as "given" and their knowledge by the subject a subsequent event. For Heidegger what is given to man is the concerned Being-alongside the things which means that man already has a pre-phenomenological understanding of things. To be able to perceive and make an assertion about something is an interpretive act in which the pre-phenomenal understanding, we might say, reaches a level that it can be expressed. Hence it would be redundant to ask how things are known with the presumption that things first 'are' and then are known by the subject. Things that 'are' are already known, in a way, in our concerned Being-alongside them, they can only be better known or determined or defined or expressed. Pure presence-at-hand of a thing is not given, rather it would be the hardest thing to know, for it would require that our concerned Being-alongside it be withheld entirely.

As Dasein addresses itself toward an entity, it is not as if one gets out of an "inside" into an "outside". Dasein's Being is such that it is always alongside entities within the world it has already discovered. It does not have to abandon any "inner sphere" to know an entity. Dasein is always also inside in the sense that it is already a being "in" the world

that knows. What transpires in "knowing" is that Dasein "achieves a new status of Being (Seinsstand) toward a world which has already been discovered in Dasein itself".¹¹ In other words, Dasein always already has a pre-ontological understanding of its world; any "knowing" the world" is a super-structure.

The Worldhood of the World

After asserting that Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein and presenting a preliminary sketch of some broad implications of this fact in chapter 2, Heidegger encounters the issue of the worldhood of the world in the following chapter. Learning that Being-in-the-world is the chief feature of the Being of Dasein reveals, as shown in the preliminary considerations above, how subject-ism proceeds to pose the world as an "object" to be known by man and how ill-founded its presuppositions and the points of departure are. While in chapter 2 a critique of the traditional concept of the world and subject-ism in general has been presented, in chapter 3, a more detailed analysis aims at identifying the phenomenon of the world itself. In this chapter, firstly Heidegger studies Dasein's surrounding world (Umwelt) to learn what worldhood (Weltlichkeit) of the world might be; secondly, he contrasts his notion of the world with that of Descartes; and thirdly he considers Dasein's spatiality from the standpoint of Being-in-the-world. Sections 14 to 24 have been specifically devoted

to clarify, once again, how the tradition of subject-ism has both misunderstood and over-simplified the problem of the world. At the same time the analysis helps us to understand, from a new perspective, what is what we call the "world".

At the outset, Heidegger remarks that to describe the "world" as a phenomenon is no trivial task. It does not involve enumeration of entities "in" the world, for that would be an ontical description. We are not seeking here the substantiality of the things of Nature, or Being of Nature itself. For Nature itself is an entity within the world. World is already pre-supposed when we ontically describe the entities as well as when we ontologically interpret their Being. If the world is a characteristic of Dasein, does that mean every Dasein has its own world? The question before us is not whether the world is subjective or it is common, but what is the worldhood of the world as such. Worldhood might be an "existentiale"; nevertheless, we have to learn about the phenomenon of the world by way of the entities within the world. At the same time, it is far from obvious how 'world' must be described phenomenologically. We shall need some ontological clarifications first. Heidegger lists¹² some of the common ways the word 'world' is used, to unravel the different kinds of phenomena that these usages signify and to discover how they are interconnected:

- (1) World as the totality of entities i.e. as an ontic concept.

- (2) World as the Being of these entities i.e. as an ontological concept; or the world as a term for any realm of entities e.g. the world of a mathematician.
- (3) World as that "wherein a factual Dasein as such can be said to live" i.e. it has a "pre-ontological existentiell signification".
- (4) World as worldhood i.e. as "ontologico-existential concept".

Heidegger reserves the expression "world" for the third signification. The term "worldly" (Weltlich) he wants to apply to Dasein, never to the entities present-at-hand. These entities he calls belonging-to-the-world or within-the-world (weltzugehörig oder innerweltlich). He remarks once again that in traditional philosophy the phenomenon of the worldhood remains unconsidered, because Being-in-the-world is not seen as a state of Dasein. Instead, the world is interpreted in terms of Nature, that is taken as Being of entities present-at-hand. But conception of nature impedes rather than resolves the problem of the worldhood, which can only be encountered by understanding Being-in-the-world as such.

Traditional ontology either "operates in a blind alley" or just passes over the problem of the world. Heidegger observes that Dasein knows the world in such a way that it "passes over" the phenomenon of the world. Why it does so shall be explained in this analytic (i.e. the awareness of the worldhood of the world that Dasein has is pre-phenomenological and unthematic). Hence special care should be taken to get "the right phenomenal point of departure" (Ausgang) in our study so that 'worldhood'

is not passed over. Heidegger further clarifies his methodology. Being-in-the-world and the world itself "are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness-the kind of Being which is 'closest' to Dasein".¹³ The closest world of everyday Dasein is called surrounding-world (Umwelt) by Heidegger from which he wants his investigation to take its course (Gang) toward worldhood in general. By studying man in his intercourse (praxis) with his immediate entities in his everydayness to gain insight about man's Being, Heidegger emulates the procedure that Aristotle employs in "Nicomachean Ethics". He proposes to study the surrounding-worldliness (Umweltlichkeit) through an ontological interpretation of entities that Dasein encounters in its immediacy. The aroundness (Umherum) implied in surrounding-world has more than mere spatial meaning. But we can understand Dasein's spatiality only by acknowledging that spatiality itself is rooted in the worldhood as such. In Cartesian ontology the point of departure is taken to be the spatiality itself, and then the Being of the world is interpreted as 'res extensa' and contrastingly the Being of man as 'res cogitans'. Heidegger shows how his approach differs radically from that of Descartes by devoting a whole section of this chapter attacking the assumptions on which Cartesian system is founded.

Man and his Surrounding-world

The Being of entities that man encounters in his surrounding-world must be investigated. This can be shown phenomenologically if we consider our "dealings" (Umgang) with entities within-the-world. These dealings are concernful dealings; this concern is often to manipulate and to employ the entities. Our encounter with things is not a "bare perceptual cognition". What we want to know about is "the structure of Being which entities possess". It would explicate the understanding of Being which Dasein already has, which "comes alive" in its dealings with entities. We are not interested in studying entities as things (res) or in discovering their substantiality, materiality, extendedness etc.. When things are described as "invested with value", it remains unclarified what is meant by "value". Heidegger observes that the term used by the Greeks for "things" is "pragmata", and for concernful dealing "praxis". But even the Greeks did not explain what is the pragmatic character of the pragmata when they took them as mere things.

Heidegger calls the entities which Dasein encounters concernfully, "equipment" (Das Zeug) and proceeds to study the equipmentality of equipment. He observes that the Being of any equipment is rooted in a totality of equipment. Pieces of equipment do not exist in isolation. Equipment has an "in-order-to" (etwas um zu) structure and a 'reference' (Verweisung)

based on its usability, conduciveness, manipulability etc. Equipment has its equipmentality in terms of its belonging to other equipment. Heidegger gives the example of equipment in a room. Things in the room --- ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, table, lamp, windows, door, room --- do not show themselves at first as they are for themselves. Room is not encountered as something "between the four walls" but as equipment for residing. There lies an "arrangement" among the things in the room and it is within this structure that an individual piece of equipment belongs. Before it shows itself, the totality of equipment has already been understood. An equipment can show itself only in its own dealings, for instance, a hammer in its hammering. But this is not a knowing of hammer as a thing. When an equipment is used, equipment structure remains unknown, for the concern as such subordinates itself to the in-order-to. We do not stare at the hammer-thing but employ it. It is the hammering that uncovers the handiness (Handlichkeit) of the hammer. The kind of Being that equipment has is named readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) by Heidegger. He points out that using and manipulating of things has its own kind of "sight" which guides the manipulation and lets it acquire a specific thingly character. This sight is called 'circumspection' (Umsicht) by Heidegger.

According to Heidegger, there is no such thing as pure observation. "The fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight".¹⁴ Hence it is wrong to isolate the "practical" from

the "theoretical" in a simplistic fashion. The circumspection does not grasp what is ready-to-hand but aims primarily at the work to be accomplished at the time. The ready-to-hand must withdraw itself to be ready-to-hand. The work that is ready to hand, too, carries with it the referential totality within which the equipment is employed. The work has a usability which shows the "toward-which" (wo-zu) for which it is usable. It is not merely usable for something, but also use "of" something. It has a reference or assignment to 'materials' that are produced and those that are available. Along with the work, not only entities ready-to-hand are encountered but also Dasein-entities for which the product becomes ready-to-hand. Also encountered is the "world" in which the users as well as we ourselves live.

The readiness-to-hand is not a mere 'aspect' of entities which might be assumed to exist more primordially as "present-at-hand". The ready-to-hand is there because something is present-at-hand, yet, "readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologically-categorially".¹⁵

In section 16, Heidegger studies how the worldly character of the surrounding-world comes to the surface along with the entities in certain encounter we have with them. He emphasises that the world is not an entity, but something that is determinative for entities. "only in so far as there is a world can they be encountered and show themselves in their Being,

as entities which have been discovered".¹⁶ In Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world there are certain modes of concern with the entities that bring the worldly character of what is within the world to the fore. This happens when we encounter something unusable, among the entities ready to hand. Sometimes a tool is found to be damaged or a material happens to be unsuitable. Not the consideration of its properties, but circumspection of its use shows us that the equipment is unsuitable. As we discover its unsuitability, such equipment becomes conspicuous in its un-readiness-to-hand. But this equipment is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand, it is still not "just a thing". Pure presence-at-hand comes into view, but only to withdraw in its readiness-to-hand. Sometimes our concernful dealings point toward things that are missing, things that are not to hand. It is again an encounter with something un-ready-to-hand. The need for the missing thing renders obtrusive that which is ready-to-hand; it is so obtrusive that its presence-at-hand seems to reveal itself. At other times, we encounter the un-ready-to-hand in something that "stands in the way" of our concern. The appearance of such a disturbing entity shows us the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves. Again, the presence-at-hand of the ready-to-hand is revealed at such a time. Heidegger points out that the above-described modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy function to reveal the presence-at-hand of what is ready-to-hand. In a way, at this time, the

readiness-to-hand itself is understood, as the worldly character of the ready-to-hand comes to the surface also.

Things that are closest to us are encountered "in themselves" because the concern which employs them does so without noticing their readiness-to-hand explicitly. The assignments are not explicit when they are being carried out. An assignment becomes explicit only in the event that it has been disturbed. It is then that the toward-this (Dazu) of the assignment and along with it, everything connected with the 'work' comes into sight. Along with the equipmental context that is thus "lit-up", the world "announces itself". The world announces itself in the event of the emergence of the ready-to-hand from its inconspicuousness. This inconspicuousness is the "positive phenomenal character" of the Being of the ready-to-hand. What we view in such moments is not something that was entirely unseen before, for the circumspection (Umsicht) views the totality constantly. Yet the thematic grasping of what is ready to hand does not take place in our normal concerned intercourse with entities. However, this does not mean that such breakdowns reveal the things in their pure presence-at-hand. Rather we only view the ready-to-hand "holding itself in" and thereby, view afresh not only one thing ready-to-hand but the whole surrounding-world as we learn what the missing article was ready to hand "with", what it was ready to hand "for".

Hence "Being-in-the-world ... amounts to a non-thematic

circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment".¹⁷ Since referential totalities could become constitutive for the worldhood itself, we have to understand the phenomenon of "reference"(Verweisung) more precisely. In section 17, Heidegger attempts an ontological analysis of an equipment in which we come across such "references" in many senses, namely, of sign-structure. Signs are first of all themselves items of equipment whose character is showing or indicating. The example of sign chosen by Heidegger for closer study is the indicating light of an automobile. In the equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations this sign is ready to hand. This sign has two kinds of references. The first constitutes the sign as an equipment and the second has to do with sign as a sign. The first reference has to do with the serviceability-for (Dienlichkeit) as the sign, and the second with indicating (Zeigen) as such. Heidegger points out that sign is related in a distinctive way to the equipmental totality in question and its worldly character.

Sign such as a car signal enables us to encounter the ready-to-hand. It makes some context of the ready-to-hand accessible in such a way, that an orientation is provided for our concerned dealings and this orientation can be held securely. Sign is an item of equipment which brings the totality of equipment into our circumspection alongside which the worldly character of the ready-to-hand comes to the fore.

Heidegger points out that the peculiar equipmental character of signs can also be noticed in the way a sign is established. The establishing of a sign is based on a circumspective foresight and on the possibility that the particular environment can announce itself for circumspection by means of something ready-to-hand. It is also required here that this possibility itself is ready-to-hand. But as pointed out above, the ready-to-hand has the nature of holding itself in and not emerging explicitly. Hence our circumspective dealings in the environment need some equipment (such as a sign) which performs the task of letting the ready-to-hand become conspicuous. But reference itself is not a sign, it is not an ontical characteristic of something ready-to-hand. Rather, reference is that which constitutes readiness-to-hand, the foundation on which the signs are based.

Heidegger proceeds to probe deeper how reference is "pre-supposed ontologically in the ready-to-hand" and how it is an "ontological foundation" for the worldhood in general. In section 18, he takes up the issue of the worldhood of the world more directly than in the preceeding sections, as he examines the involvement and significance of the ready-to-hand. He observes that the readiness-to-hand has an ontological relationship toward the world. "In anything ready-to-hand the world is always 'there'. Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically".¹⁸

What we encounter within the world, has been, in a way, freed for our concernful circumspection. What does this "freeing" mean? What constitutes the ready-to-hand as equipment is reference (Verweisung). Some definite references mentioned above were serviceability for, detrimentality, usability etc. The toward-which (das Wozu) of serviceability and the for-which of a usability (das Wofür) prescribe the way in which such reference becomes definite.

"An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something and referred as that entity which it is. 'With' any such entity there is an involvement which it has 'in' something. The character of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an involvement (Bewandtnis)".¹⁹

Heidegger calls the relationship of the "with....in..." reference or assignment (Verweisung), and further points out: "When an entity within the world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its 'involvement'. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity".²⁰ The involvement of an entity ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements. But this totality ultimately refers to a 'toward-which' which is a 'for-the-sake-of-which', in which there is no further involvement, i.e. the Being of Dasein. In other words, the totality of involvements refers ultimately to the Being of man.

Heidegger maintains that ontically "letting something be

involved" means that "we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such".²¹ Such "letting be" does not mean producing or bringing into Being something. It means that something which is already an entity be discovered in its readiness-to-hand. Whereas "letting something be involved" enables it to be encountered by Dasein, it is also a freeing of everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, whether it is an entity that is ontically involved or it is the one with which we do not concern ourselves. An involvement which is the Being of something ready-to-hand is identified on the prior discovery of a totality of involvements. "In this totality of involvements which has been discovered beforehand there lurks an ontological relationship to the world".²² The understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein's Being, is essentially an understanding of Being-in-the-world, or an understanding of the world toward which Dasein is always directed. Dasein has this understanding because it has a prior disclosure of the totality of involvements. Whenever Dasein lets there be an involvement, it does have an understanding of the "with-which" and "in-which" of involvements. To it are disclosed the "toward-this" and the ultimate "for-the-sake-of which" with a certain "intelligibility" (Verstandlichkeit).

"That wherein (Worin) Dasein understands itself is that for which (Woraufhin) it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The 'wherein' of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself is that for which one lets entities be

encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this wherein is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which (Woraufhin) Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the 'worldhood' of the world".²³

In other words, Dasein has a primordial familiarity with the world, which does not mean that it theoretically comprehends the relations that are constitutive for the world. But the possibility that these relations can receive an ontological interpretation is rooted in the fact that Dasein has a familiarity with the world, which is constitutive for it and enables it to understand the world.

In the act of understanding, Dasein holds itself in the above-mentioned relations with familiarity, and being familiar with these relations, it signifies to itself. In this way it gives itself its Being and its potentiality of Being, a Being which it understands.

"The for-the-sake-of-which signifies an in-order-to; this, in turn, a 'toward-this', the latter an 'in-which' of letting something be involved, and that, in turn, the 'with-which' of an involvement.. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; they are what they are as this signifying (Bedeuten) ".²⁴

The relational totality of this signifying is called by Heidegger "significance" (Bedeutsamkeit), and it is significance which constitutes the structure of the world. In significance there also lies an ontological condition that enables Dasein to "disclose" significations upon which the Being of language is rooted. The fundamental connection between world and

language will be explored more deeply by Heidegger in his later writings.

We notice that Heidegger's new conception of the 'world' entails a rejection of Cartesianism and the principle of subjectivity. He carries out his problematic of Dasein and its world from a new philosophical standpoint which is essentially opposed to one embraced by modern philosophy. In the chapter 3, titled "The Worldhood of the World", he devotes three sections to present a contrast between his analysis of the worldhood and Descartes' conception of the world. These sections demonstrate in detail how Descartes "passes over" the 'world' that is under consideration in Heidegger's analysis, and mistakenly conceives the innerworldly entities as "given" and belonging to a realm that is separated from the 'ego cogito'. Opposing this Cartesian dualism, Heidegger endeavors to bring home that world is a horizon in which the entities and Dasein both exist. Dasein encounters entities as ready-to-hand, at first; and they do not meet it in their mere presence-at-hand, as posited in the Cartesian system. At the same time, Heidegger explains in a detailed account how spatiality or aroundness of the surrounding-world is not a property of an entity itself but is founded on man's Being-in-the-world. The understanding grasps spatiality because it already comprehends the Being-in-the-world. In this way Heidegger clarifies what 'extensio', which is taken to be definitive for the world by Descartes, is really

founded on. In summary, Heidegger points out how Being-in-the-world was not even problematic in Philosophy rooted in subject-ism that takes the world to be a container of entities and fails to grasp the sense in which the world is a horizon in which man dwells in familiarity with things. Heidegger seems to say that it is imperative for correctly posing the question regarding the world that the presuppositions of subject-ism be identified and destroyed. Otherwise, we would fail to understand what we are asking about.

Concluding Remarks

We have devoted this chapter to an exposition of Heidegger's first major statement concerning the question what it is that is called the "world". This statement is made in his chief work Being and Time in the sections immediately following the Introduction. The position expressed here will remain the foundation for Heidegger's subsequent attempt to spell out what is "world". This chapter has not taken account of other existential analyses carried out in Being and Time, which are also relevant to the problem of the definition of the world-concept. These further insights of Heidegger will be discussed in the following chapter. Since the position taken in the chief work is the basic position, it must be studied closely.

To understand what this basic position is, it is important

to view how it represents a break with the previous treatments of the question in the history of philosophy. Moreover, we must understand the context in which Heidegger has raised this question in Being and Time. Whereas most commentators of Heidegger's work agree about what his position is vis-a-vis the history of the problem, there prevails much confusion about the "context" in which the question is raised.

The expressed aim of the work Being and Time, in the parts that have actually been written and published, is to prepare the ground for asking the question of the meaning (Sinn) of Being. Heidegger hopes that

We shall proceed toward the concept of Being by way of an interpretation of a certain special entity, Dasein, in which we shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it .²⁵

Hence, the study of Dasein's Being has not been carried out for its own sake, and this is why Heidegger does not want his work to be called either a philosophical anthropology, or subjectivistic²⁶ in character. Nevertheless, the work does provide valuable insight into man's Being, and postpones a direct posing of the question of Being as such. In the words of Werner Marx

Even though Heidegger in the first phase of his development already extensively questioned the principle of subjectivity he nevertheless remained under its spell insofar as he attempted to determine Dasein's reference to 'Being' by analyzing the constitution of 'Dasein'. In breaking away from this first phase he recognized that the position of

subjectivity could be completely overcome if it were possible to conceive the reference of Dasein and Being 'the other way around' i.e. from the standpoint of Being .²⁷

Since in Being and Time , the author has "extensively questioned the principle of subjectivity" it would be simplistic to call it a subjectivistic work. It would be fair to say that subjectivity is put to question in two different ways in the two phases, one preparing the way for the other. Heidegger achieves his break with the tradition in Being and Time by rejecting the presupposition of the givenness of the subject which at once posits the givenness of the object. Furthermore, in the Being of man, he has sought unitary structures, and not the fragmentary characterizations which subject-ism is obliged to make. Hence he cannot employ terms in his analytic which have no common ground or whose connection with other basic terms is questionable. This is why he rejects the terminology handed down by subject-ism and metaphysics. Since he regards man's Being as not-given, to be re-thought in its bond with Being, and unlike that of things, it has to be spelled out in a set of terms that are meant exclusively to describe man. Hence he has to reject the traditional terms which were used to describe the "substance" of man as well as the things. According to him, Being of man not just "is" but "is an issue". The meaning of Being is also taken in the temporal sense, provisionally, by Heidegger, just as the Greeks interpreted Being. Hence man's

Being is not named in static terms but in temporal, or more simply, in dynamic terms. These are some of the ways in which Heidegger breaks with the past philosophy in principle. The details of his effort and his success will emerge in the course of this essay.

At the same time, we cannot fail to notice that his break with subject-ism is not complete in Being and Time. Whereas he is able to replace the well-entrenched metaphysical terms with new terms, he has yet to overcome the metaphysical "analysis", and he has yet to bring philosophy to "thought" and in the neighborhood of "poetry".

With regard to the context of Heidegger's probe into what "world" signifies, it is apparent that this question is posed in conjunction with, if not in subservience to, the general question "what is Being of man" which is itself asked for the sake of asking "what is Being as such". Now when Heidegger reflects about "what is Being of man?" he discovers a unitary structure which describes basically what man's Being is, namely, Being-in-the-world. It entails that man is world-oriented or submitted to world as long as he is.

By positing that man is such Heidegger is not referring to something trivial or self-evident, but is attempting to reject a position of subject-ism which has always considered man and world face-to-face, in a way, distinct from each other, so that the commerce between them is taken as a "relation". This supposed separation between man and world has misled the

conception of the "world" and of the "man" from its beginning. Man is taken to be both 'in' and 'outside' his world, and his relation with the world is thought to be the subject's relation with its object. The problem of understanding this relation was often treated as the problem of knowledge i.e. how the subject "knows" its object.

As we have seen above, Heidegger responds to both the problem of this relation between man and world and the problem of knowledge. The connection between man and world is not a "relation", but more than a relation, for "world" constitutes the Being of man; and it is for-the-sake-of man that world appears as a "sense" of totality in his comprehension. To comprehend entities in his environment, man must have this sense of the totality.

This he always has by always being in a world. Heidegger does not claim to have said the last word about the problem of the definition of the world or about the problem of man's knowledge. What he maintains is that world constitutes the Being of man, and if we closely observe man's intercourse with things in his surrounding-world (Umwelt), we notice that it is his Being-in-the-world that enables him to comprehend and use things. Hence to learn more about his Being-in-the-world, we must ask what is the world? For we know no more about what is world, than about what is man. We must not take either man or world as "given", but probe into their Being.

One of the ways Heidegger investigates the "phenom-

enon" of the world is to study Dasein in its dealings (Umgang) with entities that are in its surrounding-world. For both his project to study Dasein "proximally and for the most part -- in its average everydayness" (wie es zunächst und zumeist ist, in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit), and the phenomenological method dictate that Dasein's most basic "how of existence", its "publicness" and the way it "shows itself ... as a rule"²⁸, be studied to discover the basic structures of its Being. Hence, Heidegger's purposes to investigate the surrounding-world should not be misunderstood, as he himself warns in a footnote in his "Essence of Reasons" quoted above.²⁹ Most commentators have equated Heidegger's treatment of the "surrounding-world" and of "Being-in-the-world" and have presented expositions of the treatment in Being and Time as "Heidegger's concept of the world", implying that this treatment is both conclusive and directly answers the question concerning definition of the world.³⁰

The treatment of the world-concept in Being and Time examines through a study of man's surrounding-world the Being of intra-worldly beings and Dasein's comprehension of the totality of its involvement and significance. Thereby it attempts to positively express what constitutes the worldhood of the world. The Being of entities in man's immediacy is called "readiness-to-hand" by Heidegger which entails that man has a concernful reference toward them, the

comprehension of which lies in the comprehension of the totality of the ready-to-hand entities and of the concern. For the most part, man uses the equipmental entities and unconsciously employs his comprehension of totality as he goes about doing his daily tasks. But whenever there is a rupture in his dealings with things the readiness-to-hand of things, the totality of concern, and worldhood of the world become manifest. At this stage, Heidegger's example of this rupture are the events of breaking-down of an equipment such as a hammer, a missing equipment or an unsuitable equipment. Macomber in his Anatomy of Disillusion³¹ calls these occasions "moments of truth" in which readiness-to-hand discloses itself. But later in his analytic Heidegger examines other kinds of ruptures that take place in the mood of dread (Angst) which on rare occasions may suddenly grip man. He also examines the possibility open before man of contemplating death as a possibility (vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit) and of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). In An Introduction to Metaphysics he refers to intense moods such as acute boredom, and rejoicing.³²

All these moments of man's existence are moments of rupture in matter-of-course life and of disclosure (Erschlossenheit) in which the nature of man's concernful intercourse with entities and worldhood of the world as such is revealed. We will discuss Heidegger's analysis of the disclosure in dread and death contemplation in the following chapter.

The present analysis concludes by affirming that Dasein's circumspective-sight (Umsicht) has an understanding of the entities. Its relations are signifying relations for Dasein. Significance or the totality of signifying is what constitutes the structure of the world.

Does this treatment lead us to believe that Heidegger's concept of the world is too anthropocentric, and that he has not really overcome subject-ism? Is the Being of things nothing more than "for-the-sake-of" man? Any concept of the world has to be anthropocentric because the "world" that is problematic for philosophy is "man's" world". But is Heidegger's notion too anthropocentric? If we look closely, in his present analysis, he does leave room for a re-thinking of the Being of both "world" and "things" from the standpoint of Being as such. He does not affirm that things exist merely for-the-sake-of man, and that they have no being of their own... What he has described here is how things are comprehended, employed, and interpreted by man in his surrounding-world. Their Being appears to man as readiness-to-hand. Morrison in his article "Heidegger on the world" cannot suppress his doubts:

The obvious implication is that beings have no meaning apart from the human world, and our question -- what is it about them which makes it possible to understand them in certain ways and not in others? -- Still appears to be unanswerable in Heideggerian terms ... what beings do we interpret in the light of our categories? What is it about them that makes the interpretation non-arbitrary?

What sort of awarences do we have of them?³³

If it is understood that existential analytic is just "one" of Heidegger's "several" investigations, we would give up the habit of considering its conclusions as "the statement" of Heidegger on an issue. Furthermore, we must not forget what philosophy and thinking mean to him. Philosophy is nothing if it does not ask about Being, is his foremost conviction. When philosophy asks about Being it gains "general" insight, it learns about totalities, about essences, about origins of beings, both human and non-human. Such philosophising examines the presuppositions of thought; it can do so because the Being-concept is the most general and most fundamental concept. Hence certain specific inquiries, which are bound to be based on some assumptions, unacceptable to the spirit of this philosophising, cannot be answered by it. Hence a set of questions, considered in the epistemology of modern philosophers, whose philosophy takes its departure from the assumption that there is a "subject" that has "consciousness", cannot be answered by Heidegger's investigation. There is a level beyond which Heidegger's inquiry cannot proceed, out of the deference for the "mystery" or "concealment" of Being, and for want of new assumptions to replace those that he has already resolved to reject. Hence, whereas Heidegger posits that man employs beings with comprehension, he cannot say what exactly it is in a being that makes it understood "thus" and not otherwise. He can only say that things manifest them-

selves and are signified by man, a particular signification being rooted in the general comprehension that man has by being submitted to his world.

How understanding proceeds from the pre-ontological level to the ontological level, that Heidegger does not claim to know. Similarly, he presents an insight that man has "disposition" (Befindlichkeit) because of and as part of his Being-in-the-world. But he cannot and does not say why and how beings "affect" man so as to render him "disposed" one way or the other.

Finally, we must attempt to view Heidegger's own pre-suppositions. That man has a comprehension of Being, and that all understanding is rooted in it, points to a hermeneutical circle³⁴, that Heidegger himself acknowledges. That the question of the meaning of Being is "the" question of philosophy (thought) he is never tired of emphasising. To examine the truth of these assumptions is beyond the scope of this essay.

When Heidegger considers the various colloquial meanings of the term "world" (p.7), he picks out the third signification i.e. "where a factual Dasein is said to live" for further inquiry. However what it is because of which "world" assumes these senses, is not discussed by him. Perhaps, a philosophical question about the Being of the "world" has to assume that the "world" under consideration is "man's world" and that it is not to be taken simply as "a totality of all existents"; otherwise the very problem is nullified. Furthermore, while Heidegger is convinced that man comprehends "what it is to be" as well as

"what it is to be in the world", he does not yet speak about the connection between these two levels of comprehension, and, as pointed out above, is also reticent about the exact connection between pre-ontological comprehension and ontological comprehension. He will reflect about the connection between "Being" and "world" in his later works, cautioning us that there are no simple and conclusive answers to such fundamental philosophical issues.

Notes

1. Richardson in his Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought applies the term in an exposition of Heidegger's view of Cartesian philosophy (p.321). We are using it to describe a tendency in Western philosophy to posit the reality of the subject which at once posits the reality of the object; it is a tendency to make sense out of beings in terms of a subject-object relation.
2. Heidegger: Being and Time, trans. Maquarie, J. & Robinson, E. pp. 38, 49. This translation of Sein und Zeit, 7th ed. (Tübingen, 1953) will be cited throughout this essay with minor revisions, mostly in terminology, wherever necessary. All such revisions will be specifically mentioned in the notes.
3. Ibid., p. 65.
4. Ibid., pp. 78, 79.
5. Ibid., p. 68. "Dasein has in each case mineness".
6. Ibid., p. 82.
7. Ibid., p. 83.
8. Ibid., p. 84. "Umwelt" will be translated as "surrounding-world" and not "environment". The literal connection between "Umwelt" and "Welt" should not be missed.
9. Heidegger: Essence of Ground, p. 81. In this footnote (55) Heidegger says that "If we somehow equate (identifiziert) the ontical system of useful things, of equipment, with the world and explain Being-in-the-world as dealings (Umgang) with useful things, we then abandon any understanding of transcendence as Being-in-the-world in the sense of a 'basic constitutive feature of Dasein'. On the other hand, a study of the ontological structure of surrounding-worldly entity (in so far as it is discovered as an equipment) has one singular advantage for a 'preliminary characterization' (erste Kennzeichnung) of the phenomenon of the world: it leads over to an analysis of this phenomenon and prepares the way for the transcendental problem of the world. As is indicated clearly enough in the outline and arrangement of sections 14-24 of Being and Time, this is the 'sole' intention of the analysis of surrounding-world, which itself, considered in terms of the 'guiding aim' of the book, remains subordinate".

10. Heidegger: Being and Time, p. 88.
11. Ibid., p. 90.
12. Ibid., p. 93.
13. Ibid., p. 94. Of. p. 37,38. In the Introduction, outlining the procedure of his analytic of Dasein, Heidegger decides to adopt "The most primordial way of interpreting Being" (of Dasein). "We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself. And this means that it is to be shown as it is 'proximally and for the most part -- in its average everydayness' (wie es zunächst und zumeist ist, in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit)". Heidegger explains the sense in which these oft repeated terms are employed on p. 422 : "'Proximally' signifies the way in which Dasein is manifest in the 'with-one-another' of publicness ... 'For the most part' signifies the way in which Dasein shows itself for Everyman, not always, but as a rule ... 'Everydayness' is a definite how of existence by which Dasein is dominated through and through". This procedure is obviously part of the "phenomenological method" adopted by Heidegger in this work, and is not different in essence from the method that Aristotle finds sensible for any study of man, and employs in Nicomachean Ethics, to draw ethical conclusions by observing man in his habitual dealings (ethos). Of., 1094b, 1103a, 1139b.
14. Ibid., p. 99.
15. Ibid., p. 101.
16. Ibid., p. 102.
17. Ibid., p. 107.
18. Ibid., p. 114.
19. Ibid., p. 115.
20. Ibid., p. 116.
21. Ibid., p. 117.
22. Ibid., p. 118.
23. Ibid., p. 119.
24. Ibid., p. 120.

25. Ibid., p. 63.
26. Ibid., p. 38. "The analytic of Dasein ... cannot attempt to provide a complete ontology of Dasein, which assuredly must be constructed if anything like a 'philosophical' anthropology is to have a philosophically adequate basis". Of. also "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics", p. 211: "To lead our thinking on the way on which it may find the involvement of truth of Being in human nature, ... to do that the thinking attempted in Being & Time is 'on its way'. On this way ... it becomes necessary to stop and think about human nature".
27. Marx, W. : Reason and World, p. 86. Of. also Heidegger's "A Dialogue on Language", p. 36. : "Nobody can in just one single leap take distance from the predominant circle of ideas, especially not if he is dealing with the well-worn tracks of traditional thinking -- tracks that fade into realms where they can hardly be seen".
28. Of., Note 13.
29. Of., Note 9.
30. For instance, Biemel's Le Concept de Monde chez Heidegger; Dreyfus' "Priority of the World to My World"; Sallis' doctoral thesis "The Concept of World: A Study in the Phenomenological Ontology of Martin Heidegger"; and Sieben's doctoral thesis "Das Problem der Welt im Denken Martin Heideggers von 'Sein und Zeit' bis zum Brief über den Humanismus".
31. Macomber, W. : The Anatomy of Disillusion, p. 44.
32. Heidegger: An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1.
33. Morriston, W. : "Heidegger on World", p. 461.
34. Heidegger: Being and Time, p. 487. Of., also Heidegger: "A Dialogue on Language", p. 28.

CHAPTER II

WORLD AND THE EXISTENTIAL DISCLOSURE

The relation between man and world is the most fundamental of all relations. This is why thinkers have always inquired what the world is, and have employed their insight on this issue to build their philosophical and ethical edifice. Heidegger denies having either a philosophical world-view or an ethical system. Nevertheless, the connection between man and world remains the first point of departure for his thought. He does not disintegrate ethics from ontology, but that does not mean that his thought is either immoral or a-moral¹. He has striven to point out that the question of Being is more properly philosophical than those of 'knowing' and 'acting'.

There are several insights in Heidegger's fundamental analytic of Dasein which enable us to learn more about the Being of the world. As pointed out in the introduction, we shall refrain from explicating everything that Heidegger has to say about Being-in-the-world. Nevertheless, some moments in this analytic are more important than others to enable us to learn more about the world as such.

In the present chapter we will consider some of the important insights of this analytic which enable us to view further Heidegger's first and basic attempt to understand the Being of

the world. We have already seen how Heidegger attempts to learn about the worldhood of the world through an observation of man's concerned involvement with the entities in his surrounding-world. We have also been cautioned that man's Being-in is to be distinguished from Being-inside of an intra-worldly entity in another, and that we must avoid the erroneous presuppositions of subject-ism which fail to take this distinction seriously. To carry the analytic further Heidegger reflects more positively on man's Being-in as such. Since he has rejected the conceptions of subject and object, for an understanding of the relation between man and world, as too simplistic and ill-conceived, now he must describe in which manner the world is present in the Being of man, in order to explain why Being-in-the-world must be considered the basic and constitutive state of man.

To do so, he points toward the fact that in the Being of man, a disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) always prevails. An understanding of the fact 'that' this disclosedness takes place, which is not the same as to learn 'how' this takes place, enables us to apprehend, the existential-ontological structure of Dasein. Heidegger interprets the notion of man as "lumen naturale" as follows: it means that Dasein is "cleared (gelichtet) in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it itself is the clearing (Lichtung)".² Dasein always has its "there" (Da) with it, that is, its disclosedness with it.

Being-there essentially means having disclosedness. This disclosedness is described as three-fold by Heidegger. The three components identified by him are disposition (Befindlichkeit), comprehension (Verstehen) and speech (Rede). These are equi-primordial and basic constitutive features of the Being of Dasein. Acknowledgement of "equi-primordiality" rescues us from a tendency to "derive everything and anything from some simple 'primal ground'," an error often committed by meta-physical thinking.

In describing Being-there as disposition (Befindlichkeit), Heidegger is pointing toward the fact that we always find ourselves disposed or attuned, one way or the other. Our mood (Stimmung) makes manifest 'how we are', 'how we are faring'. In other words, moodness brings 'Being' to its 'there'. Dasein's being subjected to disposition shows us its "thrownness" (Geworfenheit), that is, "the facticity of its Being delivered over" or the fact that "it is and it has to be".³ At the same time, moods already disclose Being-in-the-world as a whole, and lay the ground for one's commerce with something. Moods manifest the prior disclosedness of the world which Dasein already has. Moods outline in advance how entities will matter to Dasein. What Heidegger wants to establish is the priority of disposition. We do not become disposed after an encounter with things. Rather, the encounter is what it is, because we are disposed toward the world in being already submitted to it. However, this is not to claim that we have learnt how and why

specific dispositions come about. Heidegger's insight confines itself to showing that disposition is a primordial structure, and a disclosive structure.

Equiprimordial with disposition is "comprehension".

To say that in existing, Dasein is its 'there' is equivalent to saying that the world is 'there'; its Being-there is its Being-in. And the latter is likewise 'there' as that for the sake of which Dasein is⁴.

To Dasein this for-the-sake-of-which (Warumwillen), and its significance are disclosed, and this disclosedness is its comprehension. To thus comprehend Being-in-the-world as a 'whole' also means that Dasein is an issue for itself.

Comprehension is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being, and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of ... Not only is the world, qua world, disclosed as possible significance but when that which is within-the-world is itself freed, this entity (Dasein) is freed for its 'own' possibilities⁵.

In other words, Dasein comprehendingly discovers the ready-to-hand in its usability, serviceability, detrimentality, as it views the totality of involvements. Heidegger further points out that comprehension has the existential structure of projection (Entwurf). "Comprehension projects Dasein's Being upon its for-the-sake-of-which and upon significance as the worldhood of its current world".⁶ In this way comprehension is "constitutive" for Being-in-the-world. Dasein is thrown into a Being which is "projecting". This is not to say that comprehension grasps thematically what it projects upon. Rather, projection "throws before itself, possibility

as possibility".

The possibilities of comprehension are not unlimited. Rather they are already sketched out within the purview of what is disclosable. Comprehension can refer primarily to what is disclosed as its world. Dasein, for the most part, comprehends itself in terms of its world. However, comprehension has a possibility to be "authentic" (*eigentliches*), that is, comprehend in terms of one's own self and not merely in those of the world. Comprehension, as it comprehends the world, also comprehends Being-in, though not thematically. "In every comprehension of the world, existence is understood with it, and vice-versa".⁷ But when existence is understood by understanding how one's Being-in is absorbed in the world, the authentic possibility for comprehension is realized.

Comprehension "interprets" the world that is already comprehended by "projecting," and in this way, something as something is comprehended. Heidegger points toward the interpretative and assertive character of comprehension, by calling assertion, the derivative mode of interpretation, and by defining it as a "pointing-out" which grants something a specific nature and one which can be communicated. In other words, the assertion levels "the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the 'as' with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character".⁸

Another significant component of man's disclosedness is called speech (*Rede*) which may also be translated as "discourse"

or "articulation". This aspect of disclosedness, that is available to man by nature, will be thought about by Heidegger in his later works wherein he makes several attempts to understand the essence of language, and repeatedly points toward the connection between language and the world. It is interesting to observe how Heidegger has already laid the foundations of his standpoint on language, in Being and Time, and has already referred to a fundamental connection between the world as disclosedness, and disclosedness as speech. Upon these foundations Heidegger continues to build throughout his career, and his humble claims will assume the form of much bolder assertions, assertions which his long thoughtful dwelling upon language will enable him to make.

Heidegger initiates his remarks by calling speech the articulation of intelligibility. It does not emerge after interpretation and assertion, but underlies them. That which is articulated may be called meaning (Sinn) or sense. Spoken articulation, articulates the totality of significations (Bedeutungsganze). This totality can be broken up into significations that carry meaning.

Speech, too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly ... The intelligibility ... expresses itself as speech. The totality of significations ... is put into words. To significations words accrue. But word-things do not get supplied with significations ... The way in which speech gets expressed is language. Language is a totality of words - a totality in which 'speech' has a worldly Being of its own⁹.

Heidegger will modify his standpoint on this simple distinction between 'speech' (discourse) and 'language' in the later works, and will point out that language is rooted in Being, rather than in worldliness. But here he is referring to language as it is usually understood i.e. as having an ontic Being. He further observes that language as "totality of words" may be encountered as ready-to-hand, broken up into word-things present-at-hand. Speech, however remains a more primordial structure of disclosedness.

Speech, being equi-primordial with comprehension, has hearing and keeping silent (Schweigen) as its original possibilities. Speech is always "speech about something", and in it there is always "something said" that is constitutive of the disclosedness of the Being-in-the-world. Speech "communicates". In its communication what gets shared is the co-disposition (Mitbefindlichkeit) and the comprehension of Being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein). Dasein-with that is already understood gets explicitly shared. Being-in and its disposition are evidenced in the speaker's intonation, modulation, tempo, the way of speaking etc. Heidegger gives an early hint of his conception of poetry as having the potential of an original ontological disclosure, as he remarks:

In poetical speech, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's disposition can become an aim in itself and this amounts to a disclosing of existence¹⁰.

Regarding 'Hearing' which is an important aspect of speech,

Heidegger observes that it is hearing that constitutes speech. Acoustic perception is based on hearing in the same way as linguistic utterance on speech.

Listening-to ... is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with others ... Dasein hears because it comprehends ... Dasein is 'in thrall' (hörig) to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thralldom (Hörigkeit) it belongs to (zugehörig) the self.

What Heidegger is saying here is not trivial, but he is identifying the primordiality of the disclosive structures of Dasein's Being. Dasein "hears" because it is disclosively submitted to its world; because it already comprehends its Being-in. It is always open, never indifferent to Being-with; it is comprehendingly co-disposed toward Being-with and toward itself. It has a potential to hear others, and its own self, for it is hearingly open to both. Dasein's capacity to hear itself is further considered by Heidegger in his discussion about authentic resoluteness, as listening to the call of conscience (das Gewissen als Ruf).

His concluding remarks in the section on speech about the fundamental connection among Man, language, and world, also foretell the major preoccupations of his later works:

Because speech is constitutive for the Being of the 'there', ... Dasein as speaking Being-in has already expressed himself. Dasein has language ...
Man shows himself as the entity which speaks. This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself¹².

Man's Absorption in the World

Dictated by the phenomenological approach and his chosen procedure of observing man "proximally and for the most part in average everydayness",¹³ Heidegger pays particular attention to the "everyday" Being of the "there", that is, how, for the most part, Dasein gains its disclosedness. He has already explicated that Dasein's Being is always a Being-in-the-world, that it is oriented toward and submitted to the world, and that it comprehends itself and the intra-worldly entities, for the most part, in terms of the world. But all this does not mean that man is entirely subservient to the world. His submission, which is a disclosive submission, has a possibility of Being authentic (eigentliches), i.e. he can have an existential disclosure and comprehend his own Being vis-a-vis the world. It is this realization of his "ownness" that enables him to comprehend, that for him, his very Being is an "issue". One of the major aims of the "fundamental analytic of Dasein" is to clarify, in what manner man is, for the most part, submitted to the world, and to point out that within this submission, not exclusively of it, there lies open before man a possibility to realize his own-ness (the root 'eigen' of 'Eigentlichkeit' means 'own'). Heidegger repeatedly reminds us in this analytic that 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' are not ethical terms in the traditional sense, and that being authentic does not mean a relinquishing of one's Being-in-the-world.

The observation of Dasein in its everydayness, enables Heidegger to identify some characteristic ways in which it gains the disclosure of its "there". Firstly, the way Dasein generally carries out talk with others reveals that the disclosedness and comprehension of 'what is' and 'what is talked about' remains superficial and indifferent, while 'what is talked as such' is shared on the basis of some commonly accepted interpretations. This routine is called "idle-talk" ('Gerede' i.e. a modified 'rede') by Heidegger. It is a functional way of talking, and is employed by Dasein in its everyday understanding and interpretation of matters, of the world and of itself. Another characteristic that shows itself in everyday Dasein is its "curiosity" (Neugier) i.e. it wants to know what is new and what is different. It does not exercise its circumspective-sight (Umsicht) too penetratingly to comprehend things, but passes on from one novelty to another. Everyday Being-in-the-world and Being-with others also contains an "ambiguity" (Zweideutigkeit) that is, for the most part, Dasein can hardly distinguish between a genuine disclosure and a superficial one. A superficial understanding is usually considered genuine because it happens to be functional. Idle-talk, curiosity, and ambiguity are not strictly Dasein's attributes, but they do constitute its everyday Being.

In these, and in the way they are interconnected in their Being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this 'falling' (Verfallen) of Dasein⁴.

By falling, Heidegger does not want us to understand a negative evaluation of Dasein, or its decline from a 'primal status'. Falling implies that Dasein, for the most part, is alongside (bei) its world. This absorption in (Aufgehen bei) means it is 'lost' in the openness of the 'they' (Offentlichkeit des Man), it has fallen-away (abgefallen) from itself, and fallen-into the world. 'Aufgehen' also implies dis-integrating or absorbing oneself into the world. For the most part, Dasein lives and functions as fallen into its world; it is fascinated by worldliness (worldly meaning) of things and by Being-with of Others. This not-Being-itself is a normal and positive state of Dasein. This is how it normally is and this is how it lives.

In idle-talk, in public interpretation of things, that is, in the way the world is generally disclosed to it, Dasein builds for itself a temptation for falling. Being-in-the-world is viewed as "tempting" (versucherisch). Idle-talk and ambiguity give rise to the supposition that everything is comprehended, and all genuine possibilities of Dasein are well-defined. Thus, falling serves as tranquilizing (beruhigend). But this does not mean Dasein has become "calm". Rather, it tempts Dasein to be on the move.

Versatile curiosity and restlessly 'knowing it all' masquerade as a universal comprehension of Dasein. But at bottom it remains indefinite 'what' is really to be understood, and the question has not even been asked¹⁵.

In falling Dasein is not surrendered to another entity or other entities but is led into a kind of Being "of itself"

which is inauthentic. Heidegger describes it as Dasein getting "entangled" (verfängt) in itself, as it moves toward an "alienation" (Entfremdung) from its own potentiality for Being. The turbulence (Wirbel) of falling shows that the "thrownness" of Dasein, that surfaces in Dasein's disposition, has an on-going character. Thrownness is not a fact that is already finished and settled. Dasein is always "in the throw", always "sucked into they's inauthenticity".

To be authentic, on the other hand, is not something that "floats above" everydayness. "It is only a modified way in which such everydayness is grasped (nur ein modifiziertes Ergreifen dieser)",¹⁶ remarks Heidegger.

Disclosure in Dread

Disclosedness that man receives in disposition, not only informs him "how he is" at a certain moment, but may also let him know "how he is" as an entity. One of the potentials of man's comprehension is to comprehend his own Being. Heidegger deplores the fact that man's moodness (Befindlichkeit) has not received as much attention from philosophers as it should have, for moodness is a phenomenological evidence of man's ontological bond with the world. Disposition is not a super-structure based on comprehension, but all dispositional affectation and all understanding of the world, takes place in man equi-primordially. This is why dispositions can be especially

revelatory and comprehension made available in them, can provide special disclosure. Heidegger attaches a great importance to the revelatory potential of the rare mood of dread (Angst) which sometimes overwhelms man. Psychologists often dismiss it as a mood of "depression" without realizing its existential grounds. Among others, Kierkegaard, Sartre, Jaspers and Grabriel Marcel have pointed to the insight that this mood provides.

For Heidegger, the disclosure in dread, provides an evidence that there exists a possibility in man's Being, of authentically grasping his existence. At the same time it enables one to witness how man's Being-in-the-world remains, for the most part, fallen-away in the world. This interpretation of the experience of dread, also seems to claim that the author's fundamental analytic of Dasein, is not merely composed of a series of assertions, but is an attempt to analyse systematically, what 'shows itself' in man's Being i.e. what is phenomenologically available. The fact that this mood is rare does not lessen its importance, for it only shows that, for the most part, man's Being is so absorbed in the world, that it fails to view the dread, which is "always present but sleeping".

Dread is not the same thing as either fear or ordinary anxiety, but is completely overwhelming. Heidegger explains that in fear, one is afraid of some threatening entity from within the world, while in dread, one is never sure what it is

that is presenting a threat. One is indefinite because what threatens in dread is not an entity but the very Being-in-the-world itself. Entities seem to lose their relevance. They remain available but seem to be of no avail. The totality of involvements seems to collapse, and the world seems to lack significance. That which threatens is "so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet, it is nowhere".¹⁷

It means that it is the world itself that is oppressive. Heidegger points out that in this state the world does not disappear, but rather obtrudes itself, as whatever is within-the-world loses significance. What oppresses us in dread is not an entity, it is not even the totality of entities, but rather the "possibility" of the ready-to-hand as such i.e. the world itself. Dread discloses "primordially and directly, world as world". This does not mean, however, that world is conceptualized.

Dread thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself ... in terms of the world and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Dread throws Dasein back upon that which it is dreadful about -- its authentic potentiality¹⁸.

By individualizing Dasein, dread points toward Dasein's freedom of "choosing itself and taking hold of itself". The unhomeliness (Unheimlichkeit) that one encounters in dread, means that Being-in enters its other mode; in which the at-homeliness of the "they" is no longer available. In everyday Dasein, Heidegger maintains, this primordial state of not-at-

home is only "dimmed down". Falling is a mode of "unhomeness", not vice versa.

Heidegger alludes to the phenomenon of dread, in his treatments of death and authentic resoluteness, and in several other moments in the analytic of Dasein. But nowhere has he given it more importance than in the discussion about Nothingness in the lecture-essay "What is Metaphysics" (1929). In this work he once again points toward the revelatory nature of disposition, and observes that in moods such as acute boredom, and in our joyful disposition in the presence of a beloved, a "wholeness" of the totality dawns upon us. But there is a mood which is so peculiarly revelatory that it reveals the Nothing as such. This is the rare and "key-mood" of Dread. Heidegger believes that dread enables us to experience what Nothingness is as such, and how it functions alongside Being. He maintains that the experience in dread does illustrate his contention that Nothingness is not an opposite pole of Being, but something that functions in conjunction with Being. In this essay, he paints another graphic picture of dread: °

Dread strikes us dumb. Because what-is-in-totality slips away and thus forces Nothingness to the fore, all affirmation ('is' - saying, Ist-sagen) fails in the face of it ... What-is is not annihilated (vernichtet) by dread ... what rather happens is that Nothing shows itself as essentially belonging to what-is¹⁹.

In the "clear night of dread's Nothingness" what-is as such

is disclosed in its original openness (Offenheit), as we comprehend "that it 'is', and not Nothing". Heidegger further observes that dread is not only an experience of Nothing, but it is also an experience of Being. One experiences Being as something "other" than everything that is. If we are courageous in the face of the "horrors of abyss", the "soundless voice" of Being can be heard.

Man alone, of all beings, when addressed by the voice of Being experiences the marvel of all marvels: that what-is 'is'.²⁰

Hence, dread, according to Heidegger, provides us a unique opportunity to comprehend not only the issue of Being in the world, but also the issue of Being as such. It is an occasion to learn "how" are we ⁱⁿ the world, as the world shows itself in its "wholeness", as a "phenomenon". This does not mean that by going through dread we are able to define the world ontically, or are able to conceptualize it. But at the same time, dread also reveals that our own Being, as well as Being of anything that 'is' is an "issue", and not a matter of course. It opens up a possibility in which one recognises one's own-ness vis-a-vis the world. Dread is a unique disclosure, that takes place but rarely. It cannot be brought about at will. However, Heidegger's analytic points toward other opportunities open before man in which man can grasp his own-ness and seize upon his existence. These possibilities also have an involvement of dread, and require courage in the face of it. In death-contemplation (sein zum Tode als Vorlaufen in die

Möglichkeit) and in resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), man obtains an existential disclosure, comprehends his absorption in the world, and resolves to be courageous against dread. It is in death-contemplation that one's 'whole' existence, one's very Being-in-the-world, presents itself as an "issue" that one cannot shrink from.

Death-Contemplation

After the conclusion of the Division I of Being and Time, Heidegger observes that the existential analysis of Dasein, thus far, has dealt merely with the inauthentic, everyday Being of Dasein and that it has yet to comprehend Dasein in its "wholeness". Hence, he initiates the division II with a study of Dasein's Being-toward-death, for no investigation of man's authenticity and of the "wholeness" of his existence can overlook the presence of death in his life. Meditation upon death apprehends the meaning of man's existence, for man is the only being who knows about the certainty of his own death, and always develops "an attitude" toward it. Heidegger's analysis aims at comprehending what death means, what is the usual (inauthentic) understanding that Dasein has of it, and what is that Being-towards-death in which Dasein grasps it authentically, and comprehends what it discloses concerning existence. Consideration of death is one of the major themes in Heidegger's thought and he takes it up again and again in

Division II of Being and Time , and in his later works. Moreover, the issue of death is closely associated with that of the world. In the present analytic, it is recognized for seizing upon the unity of Dasein's existential structures, whereas in the later works, as Heidegger begins to employ the term "mortal" instead of "Dasein" for man, death is recognized as an integral part of the "fourfold" (Geviert) of the world.

In the existential analytic, the author provides a penetrating study of the meaning of death, as he outlines its inauthentic as well as its authentic comprehension by Dasein. The first feature of death that he discovers is that in death one is alone. Death is no "experience", and nobody can experience the death of the other. The "ending" that is death is not comparable to any other ending; it is not a ripening like the ripening of a fruit, or finishing like the finishing of a painting. Death is not an event, but an existential "phenomenon". The issue is not "Being-at-an-end" but "Being-towards-the-end".

Death is a phenomenon of life, life to which belongs Being-in-the-world. "Dying" (Sterben) is to be distinguished from "demise" (Ableben). The impendence of death, is unlike any other matter that is imminent; for in this impendence, the very Being-in-the-world is at stake. It is something toward which Dasein must comport itself. And it always does, either inauthentically or authentically.

However, under the spell of the publicness of the "they"

(das Man), Dasein does not acknowledge death as a "way to be". It is taken as a mishap, happening all the time. It is often said: "one of these days, one will die too, in the end, but right now it has nothing to do with us".²¹ Heidegger calls this attitude of indifference and self-tranquillization "in-authentic". Dread about death must not be dealt with in this manner. Thinking about death is not a cowardly fear. The "they" believe that "death certainly comes, but not right away", and conceal what is special in death's certainty: that it is possible any moment.

Death-contemplation and Being authentic is the same attitude. Heidegger emphasises that death in an authentic comprehension is to be considered a "possibility". He calls this a "running-ahead of the possibility" (Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit):

The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the comprehension penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all²².

In death-contemplation, that is, in "running-ahead" of the possibility, it becomes manifest to one that there exists a possibility in which one's own-ness can be wrenched away from the self, understood in terms of the "they". As one views one's self thus individualized, one comprehends one's lostness in the surrounding-world. Hence, death-contemplation individualizes one, and

discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up; and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached²³.

At the same time, death- contemplation reveals another kind of certainty, that is more primordial than any other certainty. And this is the certainty regarding Being-in-the-world; that is, Being-in-the-world as the Being of Dasein is understood through a disclosure.

The Temporal Aspect of the World

According to Heidegger's interpretation, the meaning of Being was understood as "presence" by the Greeks, and ever since, Western metaphysics has thought of Being in a temporal sense. Hence, as soon as the question of the sense of Being arises, the first sense that comes to mind is that of presencing, or a temporal one. Heidegger decides to adopt this sense "provisionally", to further comprehend the meaning of the Being of Dasein, i.e. of its Being-in-the-world. In division II of Being and Time, he traces the temporal meaning of all the major existential structures of Dasein that are identified and investigated in division I. It may be mentioned here that the temporal is not the only meaning of Being, according to Heidegger. The other dimensions of Being, however, cannot be thought about in a hasty manner, for he views the role of his thought as a mere initiation of the reawakening of the forgotten question of Being. He is especially aware of the realms of knowledge; which his treatments cannot claim to fathom. He does not want to match

the claims made by metaphysical treatments, which, he believes, have invariably failed to examine their pre-suppositions, and their ontological grounds.

Regarding the conception of time, Heidegger deplores that it has hardly been re-thought since Aristotle. While he recognizes the popular view of time as past, present, and future, he thinks that it is simplistic to consider time as nothing but a series of "nows". He points out that time has to do with the temporalizing-process in Dasein. Dasein is a being that is constantly making-present (*gegenwärtigen*), which involves anticipation of future, and the return to having-been. These three "ecstases" of time are unified in their structure, and enable Dasein to comprehend the actuality of entities, and its own being.

In section 69, Heidegger remarks about the temporal grounds of Being-in-the-world, and of the world as such. He points out that his earlier assertion that Being-in-the-world is a unified structure was based on the fact that Being-there of Dasein is rooted in temporality. The temporal analysis of the Care (i.e. of the Being of Dasein) shows that it is the unity of temporality that makes Being-alongside entities possible. The temporal constitution of the Being-in-the-world also gives rise to the questions such as: In what way is the world possible? what is meant by saying there 'is' a world? what does the world transcend? and how does the world transcend? Heidegger remarks that "to expound these questions

'ontologically' is not to answer them".²⁴ In other words, these questions do spring up, but there are no simple answers. Heidegger emphasises that first of all, those structures must be clarified on the basis of which the problem of transcendence can be raised.

The analytic thus far leads Heidegger to conclude that "that inside which" (i.e. world) Dasein lives and comprehends things is 'there' alongside its own existence. It has "Dasein's kind of Being". Hence, "Dasein 'is' its world existingly". And since the meaning of the care-structure is temporality, "the ontological constitution of the world-must then be grounded in temporality".²⁵ This also means that in so far as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world exists. Dasein is "in a world" by virtue of its temporality. Heidegger observes that "the world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality ... If no 'Dasein' exists, no world is 'there' either".²⁶

Since the world has its ground in the unity of temporality, it is transcendent. It must already be disclosed, in order that intra-worldly entities may be discovered. But Heidegger's remarks do not venture any further than indicating that unity of Being-in-the-world is founded in the ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality, and the world as such must have a temporal foundation. He cautions us that we must proceed toward the problem of temporal transcendence step by step:

A concrete working-out of the world-structure

in general and its possible variations can be tackled only ... by clarifying the idea of Being in general. If an interpretation of this idea is to be possible, the temporality of Dasein must be exhibited beforehand²⁷.

Concluding Remarks

We have discussed some of the important insights of Heidegger's Analytic of Dasein which complement and clarify his basic notion of the world, presented in the preliminary sections of the analytic. It was pointed out in the previous chapter, that the basic reason that drives Heidegger toward the discussion of the phenomenon of the world is that he wants to reflect upon all the moments of the structure "Being-in-the-world". The ontological explication of this structure, according to him, is a step toward raising concretely the question of Being as such. Hence, this attempt to define what the world means is not only subservient to other aims, but is also inconclusive. We must discern, what, according to Heidegger, can be known about the world, in terms of the point of departure taken in his first major work. In other words, we distinguish between what he has discovered, and what he has not discovered, concerning the problem of the Being of the world at this stage.

Since the question of Being remains paramount in all the works of Heidegger, the connections that other major concepts have with Being often puzzle his students. This is especially

true in case of the notion of the world. Our explication has also endeavored to point out what is the connection between Being and World that this Analytic of Dasein enables us to view.

Heidegger's insight that in the Being of man, there prevails a disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), leads him to conclude that the world is always "there" in man's "there". The Being of the "world" as the totality of significance in man's disclosure enables man to comprehend, to be disposed toward, and to speak about, all that exists. The same disclosedness, which enables man to function as man, has a possibility to disclose to man the nature of his existence. It is in this disclosure that man discovers his lostness in the world, recognizes his own-ness, and resolutely grasps it. It is in this disclosure that the question of Being becomes for man a genuine question. As he engages in resolute death-contemplation (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) he obtains this disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), in which he comprehends existence without being tenacious with existence.

Hence, in Being and Time, world has been identified as constitutive for man's Being, and has been grasped in its connection with man, as a totality of significance. It is experienced as such, and as a "phenomenon"; in the mood of dread. Its Being can be encountered as an "issue" in resolute death-contemplation. We learn that world is a 'whole', a 'phenomenon', an 'issue', and constitutive of man's existence..

But we still do not know what the world is. We can never define it ontically because it is not an entity. At this stage, world has been investigated from the standpoint of man, i.e. how the world is a constitutive element in the Being of man. It is by way of the Being of man, that the Being of the world has been approached. Hence, these analyses do not enable us to speculate about the connection between world as such and Being as such. Nor do they even constitute "Heidegger's concept" of the world.

To say this is not to undermine the importance of Being and Time. It does treat, in an original manner, the problem of the definition of the world as such. But our claim is that Heidegger has only "attempted" to understand the world, and he has done so only to an extent. He recognizes that man cannot grasp Being of the world entirely, for primarily man can only perceive the "how" of this Being, not its "what" and "why". In other words, the question is enormously difficult. Among the attempts which Heidegger has made in this regard, the treatment in Being and Time is only "one" step. There are several other attempts that he will make in his later works to comprehend what is world.

Equally difficult is to apprehend the connection between Being and World. There are some moments in Heidegger's work which enable us to speculate about this connection. But he has not said anything either explicit, or conclusive about it, neither in his early nor in his later works, apart

from reminding us about the difficulty of resolving such fundamental issues. In Being and Time too, he has never taken up this issue explicitly. It contains only an indirect pointer showing that a deep bond exists between Being and World, as an authentic disclosure reveals that the question of Being-in-the-world and the question of Being have a common ground. But Heidegger does not explicate this ground as such.

However, there is so much confusion on this issue among Heidegger's commentators, that the assertions of some nullify the very problem of the Being of the world. Some take Heidegger's view that world constitutes man's Being too far, by believing that world is nothing but an attribute of man. Others have viewed world as equated with Being in Heidegger's thought to such an extent that they believe that the world, according to Heidegger, is nothing but Being itself.

Couturier in his Monde et etre chez Heidegger,²⁸ refuses to believe that Being and World in Heidegger can legitimately be treated as "themes," for which "some" of Heidegger's works are more important than others. He thinks that the question of Being and of World is to be found discussed in "all" of Heidegger's works, and he explicates almost all of Heidegger's works in his book under the above title. It is obvious that Couturier has equated World and Being in a way that the specific problem of the world is lost sight of. While he is correct in thinking that the question of Being is present in all of Heidegger's works, he is not justified in according the

same status to "World". It is a fact that only "some" and not all of the works of Heidegger are devoted to the problem of the world. And the meaning of Being cannot be understood simplistically, by calling it nothing but the world.

A similar confusion between World and Being characterizes —Vycinas' treatment of Heidegger's thought concerning the world in his Earth and Gods. While Vycinas is to be commended for pointing out that there is more than one phase in Heidegger's investigation of the "World", and for emphasising the importance of "dread", his treatment of these phases contains many simplistic assessments:

In his Sein und Zeit Heidegger deals with the problem of the world in two stages, namely: inauthentic world and authentic world. The inauthentic world is called Surroundings (Umwelt) ... the authentic world is called Nothingness, and it is approached from the mood of dread ... Being and World are not two different things ... Being is always its revelation, the world. To say 'Being' is to say 'openness of Being' which again is to say 'world'.²⁹

Our explication has shown clearly that Heidegger refers to the one and the only world. Dasein can be authentic, not the world. The mood of dread shows man's absorption in the world, without jeopardising his Being-in-the-world. World and Being are not the same thing. Nor is Being the same thing as its un-concealedness, or truth. Heidegger's thought does not seek to eliminate the distinctness of the general notions such as Truth, World, Man, Language, etc., in comprehending their common origin in Being.

Notes

1. Of., Heidegger: "Letter on Humanism", pp. 231-236.
2. Heidegger: Being and Time, p. 171.
3. Ibid., p. 174.
4. Ibid., p. 182.
5. Ibid., p. 184. We will translate "Verstehen" as "comprehension", and not "understanding".
6. Ibid., p. 185.
7. Ibid., p. 194.
8. Ibid., p. 201.
9. Ibid., p. 204. "Rede" will be translated as "speech", and not "discourse" or "talking". This will enable us to compare Heidegger's present standpoint with one taken in the later works. By "speech" here is meant a more primordial structure than "talking", although, being primordial, it encompasses both the senses.
10. Ibid., p. 205. "Befindlichkeit" will be translated as "disposition", and not "state-of-mind".
11. Ibid., p. 206. The etymological connection between "hörig" and "zugehörig" conveys Heidegger's insight that man's belonging to Being is a listening-belonging. In the later works he maintains that man listens and responds to Being in linguistic articulation.
12. Ibid., p. 208.
13. Of., Footnote 13, chapter I.
14. Heidegger: Being and Time, p. 219.
15. Ibid., p. 222. In other words, things are inquired into, but are too readily understood and dismissed, without raising the question of their Being.
16. Ibid., p. 224. "Ergreifen" has been translated as "grasped" instead of "seized upon", for, authenticity is a moment of grasping a disclosure, not so much a matter of "doing" something.

17. Ibid., p. 231.
18. Ibid., p. 232. "Angst" will be translated as "dread", and not "anxiety", to distinguish it from common anxiety, and to emphasise its rare occurrence.
19. Heidegger: "What is Metaphysics", pp. 336, 338.
20. Ibid., p. 355.
21. Heidegger: Being and Time, p. 297. ✓
22. Ibid., p. 307.
23. Ibid., p. 308.
24. Ibid., p. 402.
25. Ibid., p. 416.
26. Ibid., p. 417.
27. Ibid., p. 418. (
28. Of., Couturier, F. : Monde et etre chez Heidegger, p. xxv
29. Vycinas, V. : Earth and Gods, pp. 118, 120.

CHAPTER III

WORLD AND THE PROBLEM OF GROUND

In the years immediately following the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger continues to study the problem of the world, both in his treatises and in his lecture-courses. Among the works composed between 1927 and 1930, the treatise Essence of Ground (Vom Wesen des Grundes-1929) and the lecture-courses The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie-1927) and The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik-1929), published recently as part of the Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe series, take up the problem as part of their special projects. We have already discussed, in the previous chapter the importance of the explication of "dread" provided in the lecture-essay "What is Metaphysics" (Was ist Metaphysik-1929). As far as the problem of the definition of the world is concerned, all these works can be viewed as restating and explicating Heidegger's first and basic attempt to comprehend the Being of the world from the standpoint of man. However, this is not to claim that these works lack originality in their primary projects, nor do we want to underestimate their importance toward further defining the problem of the world, and toward further clarifying, the author's basic

positions.

It is for these reasons, that Essence of Ground has a special importance. For besides restating Heidegger's basic position on Being-in-the-world in terms simpler than those employed in the chief work, it outlines the problem of the world as such, and provides us with an account of how the world-concept was conceived in the history of Western philosophy. The author points out, here, how fundamental, complex, misunderstood, and philosophically indispensable the problem of the world really is. The popular view, as well as the traditional treatments, according to him, fail to acknowledge that world-concept has yet to be investigated, yet to be understood. In the present chapter, we will study how Heidegger has approached the problem of the world in his meditation on the essence of "ground". Some of his observations on the problem, in the above mentioned lecture-courses, will also be considered, to clarify his standpoints.

The Problem of Ground

It is not unnatural for a thinker whose major concern is to rekindle the question of Being, to be interested in the problem of the essence of the 'ground' of beings. In a way, Heidegger finds an affinity with Leibniz's so-called "principle of sufficient reason" which proclaims that "nothing is without ground" (*Nihil est sine ratione*). Although we are

presently informed that Leibniz's treatment hardly does justice to the problem of 'ground'. Heidegger takes this principle as a point of departure not only in the Essence of Ground but also in a lecture-course titled The Principle of Ground (Der Satz vom Grund) given in 1955-56 and published in 1957. The question that intrigues him is, when someone like Leibniz, remarks that "nothing is without ground" what does he mean by 'ground'?¹ What is the essence of what is variably called, the 'ground' or the 'reason' or the 'cause' of a being?

Heidegger starts the essay by observing that Aristotle was one of the first thinkers to raise the problem of the ground of beings, and he did so by taking the 'ground' as 'arche' (the origin) and also as 'aition' (cause). Aristotle's threefold characterization of 'arche' - interpreted by Heidegger as the first point from which a thing either is, or comes to be, or is known - and his fourfold classification of causes - as material, formal, efficient, and final - leaves the question of a common 'ground' underneath these grounds obscure, although Aristotle did attempt to understand their interrelation. Heidegger observes further that several thinkers since Aristotle have either directly or indirectly dealt with the question concerning the 'ground'. But instead of studying the history of these attempts, Heidegger chooses to take departure from Leibniz's Principle which, according to him, will help to awaken the problem. The realm from within

which the issue is confronted is expressly the realm of "transcendence", and the investigation is carried out in the following three parts:

- (1) The problem of ground,
- (2) Transcendence as the realm of the question about the essence of ground, and
- (3) The essence of ground².

Heidegger starts by examining whether the principle of sufficient reason says something about the "ground" as such. The simple version of the principle, "nothing is without ground" may be read as "every being has a ground". The principle does not say anything about the nature of the "ground", but expects it to be a self-evident notion. Why is the principle claimed to be a "basic" principle (*principium grande*)?

Leibniz thinks that this principle is rooted in the nature of truth. Heidegger quotes Leibniz to show what conception of truth was held by him:

Thus a predicate, or consequent is always present in a subject or antecedent, and in this fact consists the universal nature of truth, or the connection between the terms of the assertion.

Among other things that follow from this identity between the predicate and the subject is the axiom "nothing is without ground", which derives its validity from the fact that there are no true propositions, whose predicate cannot be derived analytically from their subject. Heidegger observes that Leibniz construes truth as truth of the assertion or proposition, and to him truth means "correspondence"; but at least

one thing is evident, the "ground" has to do with truth.

But the propositional truth is not the ultimate truth for Heidegger. He maintains that all predication is possible on the basis of a manifesting which does not have a predicative character, which is called "ontical truth" by him. This manifesting does not emerge in the form of a representation, but takes place, as explained in Being and Time, in Dasein's "situation" in the midst of beings through its disposition, and in Dasein's commerce with beings. But the reason that beings are accessible at all is that the manifesting which makes all interaction with beings possible is "guided and clarified" by a comprehension that Dasein already has, namely, of what it is "to be". This disclosedness of Being is called by Heidegger, the "Ontological truth". Hence the "propositional truth" which is taken as truth as such by Leibniz, is rooted in an "ontic truth", which is itself based in the "Ontological truth". For "in the unconcealedness of beings lies a prior unconcealedness of their Being".⁴ Heidegger points out further that the ontical and the ontological truth belong together by virtue of the ontological difference (i.e. the difference between Being and beings); since Dasein "behaves toward" beings by comprehending Being, there lies at the core of its essence, an ability to differentiate ontologically. It is this ground of ontological difference that is called "transcendence" of Dasein by Heidegger. Hence the problem of ground must grapple with the

problem of transcendence.

Next, "transcendence" as such is considered, which the author calls a "basic constitutive feature" of Dasein. Transcendence, he maintains, is not a spatial surpassing nor should it be understood as a feature of the "subject" face to face with "object". The surpassing that is transcendence does not occur toward the "object" as such. What is surpassed is what-is i.e. beings i.e. every being which can be or does become disclosed to Dasein, including the being of Dasein itself. It is transcendence which constitutes selfhood so that Dasein may relate itself (sich verhalten) to beings already surpassed. The what-is that Dasein surpasses is not a random collection of "objects". Rather, "surpassing occurs totally". By "totally" Heidegger implies a coherent totality as well as an unending happening. It is not that the surpassing is occurring sometimes, and sometimes is not, the way a 'knowing' of 'objects' is described as taking place. Rather, the surpassing is there in Being-there. That toward which Dasein transcends is the world and transcendence may be called Being-in-the-world. Dasein can be itself only because its essential constitution is Being-in-the-world. It shows us that, according to Heidegger, the world is as constitutive of man, as man is of the world. The existence of the world is not rendered subservient to the existence of man as conceived by Schopenhauer.

The further step taken by Heidegger is to attempt an

— interpretation of the phenomenon of the world, so as to learn more about transcendence, without losing the context of the problem of the ground. But before we view this interpretation, we must clarify an oddity. How is it that Heidegger is using metaphysical terms like transcendence, subject, subjectivity, self etc. in Essence of Ground, while in his chief work he evidently dismisses them as misleading and coins a new ontological terminology? The main reason for employment of these un-Heideggerian terms is that the author wants to communicate to the philosophical audience, embedded in the tradition of metaphysics and subject-ism, in its own language; his philosophical stance of the fundamental ontology. Hence, more familiar terms have been pressed into service, to convey a new meaning, much like Kant, who in his Critique of Pure Reason, employs traditional terms carrying new and special significations. In his later philosophy Heidegger abandons metaphysical terms like "transcendence" altogether, but he keeps alive the above mentioned "communication" with modern philosophy. To initiate the investigation with a critical dialogue with the metaphysical philosophy remains a feature of Heidegger's method, in both his earlier and later works.

The question that is now taken up is what "world" means, and how should the relationship of Dasein to the world be defined? At this point Heidegger attempts a sketch of "several fundamental meanings of the concept of world that have figured prominently in its history". Since,

Where elementary concepts like 'world' are concerned, the popular is usually not the primordial and essential meaning. The latter is constantly hidden; it is only seldom expressed conceptually and then with difficulty⁵.

A History of the World-concept

This historical account is begun with the observation that in ancient Greek philosophy 'kosmos' meant neither a being nor a sum of all beings, but "something like a 'condition' or 'state of affairs' i.e. the 'how' in which what-is is in its totality".⁶ Heidegger points out that 'kosmos houtos' does not imply one realm of Being but Being (on) itself in relation to the 'kosmos'. In fragment 8 of Anaxagoras⁷, 'en toi henī kosmoi' (in the one kosmos) indicates that world is not a combination of whatever is in the world, but every being, in a way, requires the world, for the world underlies every seemingly fragmentary being. Furthermore, an essential feature of the world, that it is relative to Dasein, is indicated in Heraclitus' fragment 39: "The wakeful have one single 'kosmos' that is common to all, while in sleep each man turns away from this world into his own". Hence, to the Greeks,

- (1) The world means a 'how of the Being' of what-is, and not what-is itself;
- (2) This 'how' defines what-is in totality: It is ultimately the possibility of every 'how' as limit and measure;

- (3) This 'how' in its totality is in a certain way primary;
- (4) This primary 'how' in its totality is itself relative to human Dasein⁸.

This is not to deny, observes Heidegger, that the term 'kosmos' often designates what-is as such, as experienced in this 'how'. We cannot fail to notice that this interpretation indicates that Heidegger's own concept of world has a close affinity with the ancient Greek notions, and he uses it to show that his own conception is not arbitrary.

Regarding Christian thought, Heidegger observes that it was profoundly concerned with man's relation to 'kosmos'. 'Kosmos houtos' signified a kind of human existence, the nature of man's stance with regard to the world, or man's ethical standpoint. In Paul (of. Corinthians and Galatians) 'he sophia tou kosmou' (wisdom of the world) meant "a way of thinking estranged from God" whereas in Gospel of John "world" signifies "the basic form of human Dasein as estranged from God" as well as "the whole of mankind". This anthropological concept of world functioned as an opposing concept to "the divine filiation of Jesus". Heidegger further observes that in Augustine, 'mundus' means "the whole of creation" and "mundi habitatores" signified "those who delight in the world, the impious, the carnal". Apparently, Augustine was influenced by Paul as well as the Gospel of John in conceptualizing the world this way, as is evident in his exegesis of a passage from the prologue of the Gospel. Heidegger also remarks that

in Aquinas 'mundus' is employed to mean 'universum' (universe) or 'universitas creaturarum' (the whole world of creatures), and alternatively to mean 'saeculum' (worldly way of thinking).

After considering the medieval conceptions, Heidegger makes a brief reference to the notion of the world held by the school metaphysicians, particularly Baumgarten and Crusius, before presenting a relatively more detailed interpretation of the concept in Kant's philosophy. Baumgarten is quoted as maintaining that "the world (universum, pan) is that series (multitudo, totum) of actually existing, finite things which is not equivalent to anything else", whereas Crusius' definition is given as follows: "a world is a real connection of finite things, which is not itself, however, a part of something else to which it might belong by virtue of a real connection".⁹ Heidegger comments that in school metaphysics, the doctrine of the world is subservient to the doctrine of ontology and natural theology; it is a "regional term" for the ultimate unity of connection of the entirety of creation.

Kant's position, Heidegger believes, is the one that "completely transformed" the problem of the world. Hence the major part of this historical account is devoted to Kant. Heidegger points out that the difficulties inherent in defining the 'world' were acknowledged by Kant early in his dissertation of 1770. He is quoted as maintaining in this work that "just as, in dealing with a complex of substances, analysis only ends with a part which is not a whole, i.e., with

the 'simple'; so synthesis only ends with a whole that is not a part, i.e., with the 'world'.¹⁰ Furthermore, in this work, Kant names three factors essential to the definition of the concept of the world, namely, matter, form, and entirety. About "entirety" Kant remarks that it may seem to be an easily understandable concept, when expressed negatively; but when it is closely considered it presents a problem for the philosopher.

The problem of totality raises various questions such as: "(1) To what is the 'totality' represented by the term 'world' related ... (2) What is then represented by the concept of world ... (3) What character does the representing of such a totality have ...".¹¹ Heidegger remarks that although Kant does not pose and answer these questions as above, his Critique of Pure Reason and the subsequent works do contain an answer which result in transforming completely the problem of the world. The 'totality' in Kant's concept is a totality of finite things, but it is the relation of totality to the finitude that acquires a new sense. Finitude according to Kant, is not rooted in the fact that finite things are God's creation. Rather, things are things because they are objects of finite knowledge, "a knowing that must let them 'give' themselves as already present-at-hand in the first place". The kind of Being available to "finite intuition" has been called "things in appearance" by Kant whereas the possible object of absolute intuition is named "things in themselves". The unity of the

connection of appearances, is governed by ontological principles called "synthetic apriori knowledge". The synthetic principles can be accounted for both within experience (intuitively) and independently of experience, and are said to have an objective reality. But "the unity of appearances" being necessarily dependent on factual "givenness" is "conditioned" and always "incomplete". However, what enables us to represent the manifold appearance in complete unity are the "ideas".

Ideas contain "a certain completeness which empirical knowledge never attains; reason uses them strictly in pursuit of a systematic unity, without ever attaining its goal".¹²

Ideas belong then to the employment of understanding and enable reason "to win the unconditioned over to conditions".

Hence, according to Kant:

The concept of world is that idea in which the absolute totality of objects accessible in finite knowledge can be represented apriori. World, then means no more than 'aggregate of all appearances' or 'aggregate of all objects of possible experience ... I entitle all transcendental ideas, in so far as they have to do with absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances, concepts of world'.¹³

Heidegger sums up the basic features of Kant's concept of World by way of answering the questions posed above: (1) The concept of world is not "an ontical linkage of things in themselves" but an ontological aggregate of "things as appearances." (2) It does not show a "coordination" of substances but a "Subordination". (3) It is not to be defined as a "rational representation", but as an "idea" or pure synthetic concept

of reason, that is, as distinguished from concepts of understanding.

World then is described as "surpassing" appearances. Yet, being the totality of appearances, it remains related to them. Heidegger observes that transcendence in the Kantian system has two meanings. It signifies a surpassing of what is given in experience (i.e. world as representation) on the one hand, and on the other, to surpass finite knowledge in general through absolute intuition (i.e. giving rise to the transcendental ideal). Against the transcendental ideal, the world is a "limit" and means the entire finite human knowledge. It may be affirmed that the world stands between the "possibility of experience" and the "transcendental ideal". Thus it ultimately can signify the totality of the finitude of man. Heidegger points out that there is an existentiell, besides the cosmological meaning of the world concept, by virtue of which Kant can affirm

The most important object, in the world, the object to which we can ascribe all cultural progress, is 'man', since he is his own ultimate end. Knowing him in accordance with his species i.e. as a creature endowed with reason, should be called 'knowledge about the world'.¹⁴

The existentiell meaning of the concept of world enables us to understand the validity of the recent philosophical term "Weltanschauung", and the signification of colloquial expressions such as "a man of good breeding" (Mann von Welt) and the 'beau monde' (Vornehme Welt). World here does not

mean "community of men" in contrast to the natural things but rather "men in relationship to what-is in totality".

Heidegger concludes the historical sketch by observing that the essential meaning of the terms 'kosmos' or 'mundus' or 'world' has to do with "Dasein's relationship with what-is in its totality:

For reasons that cannot be discussed here, the concept of world first assumes the meaning of the how of what-is in totality, the relationship of what-is in its totality to Dasein remains, for the most part, only vaguely understood. World belongs to a structure of relations which marks Dasein out as Dasein and is entitled Being-in-the-world. This use of the concept of world ... is not the least bit arbitrary but simply attempts to give the phenomenon of Dasein the clarity and explicitness of a 'problem'.¹⁵

The essence of Heidegger's critique is that the connection between man and world, despite several attempts through the history, remains "only vaguely understood". For it has not been adequately stressed that world is the constitutive feature of the being of man. This fact reveals itself only when Being of man is not taken as "given" but is acknowledged and reflected upon as a problem. To Dasein the whole of what-is is always, in a way, disclosed. This is not to assert that the totality is conceived explicitly or completely.

Rather, this manifestation that Dasein has is ever-varying, and the fact that it takes place is often concealed from Dasein. This totality is comprehended without having to grasp "all its peculiar connections, realms, and strata".

It is here that Heidegger warns us in an important footnote (55) that 'world' should not be equated with the ontical system of useful things or of equipment, nor should we explain Being-in-the-world as nothing but the commerce (umgang) with useful things. The analysis that is carried out as 'surrounding-world' is only "a preliminary characterisation of the phenomenon of the world" which "prepares the way for the transcendental problem of the world". By "transcendental problem" here the author does not mean an investigation into the temporal grounds, but a broader inquiry into man's Being-in-the-world than the one that takes its departure from an observation of the surrounding-world. By way of comment on the historical sketch, Heidegger outlines his own findings concerning the world-concept:

As a totality world is no particular being but rather that by means of and in terms of which Dasein gives itself to understand (signify) 'what' beings it can behave toward and 'how' it can behave toward them ... If the world is that in surpassing to which selfhood first arises, it is also that for the sake of which Dasein exists¹⁶.

Since the Being of everything is related ultimately to Dasein's 'for the sake of its...' (umwillen seiner), world has a structure of 'umwillen von', for world is what defines every 'umwillen von', i.e. grants meaning to a being. Does that mean that every man has his own world? It does not mean that Dasein is selfish or egotistical or existing in isolation, Heidegger explains. Selfhood is, at the same time, so fundamental that

it is neutral toward "being an I", or "being a thou", and toward "sexuality" (i.e. being male or female). Nor does this characterization imply that world is assimilated in Dasein and rendered "subjective". Heidegger observes that, it is only by understanding transcendence (i.e. Being-in-the-world) that we may get an idea what "subject" and "object" mean. To say that world belongs to Dasein does imply that it is in a way "subjective", but it is not subjective in the sense that it falls within the "inner sphere" of a subject. Nor is the world properly described as "objective" in the sense of "belonging among the objects". As the author also remarks in Being and Time,¹⁷ being the ground for the objectivity of an object, world is more objective than any possible object.

Referring to the "projective" character of Dasein, Heidegger points out that "as the totality of what exists for the sake of Dasein at any given time, the world is brought by Dasein before Dasein itself".¹⁸ This "primordial project of the possibilities of Dasein" is now called "the project of world". In this project the projected world is "thrown over" what-is, which allows what-is to reveal itself, although what is projected is not comprehended explicitly. It is in this "happening of the projecting" that Dasein's being-itself arises. Hence, "Dasein transcends" means that its Being is such "that it forms the world" (weltbildend). On the other hand, it may be said that what-is makes an "entrance into a world". It is

something that "happens with" what-is, and is not a happening "within" or "outside" of what-is. This happening is what has been called transcendence of Dasein. Only as a being is involved in Dasein's temporality can we speak of it as entering a world. Hence, all questions concerning the Being of what-is have to be raised within the realm of transcendence.

Before examining the problem of ground within the purview of transcendence, Heidegger makes another historical observation; i.e. concerning the concept of transcendence in Plato's thought. He observes that it might be erroneous to interpret 'agathon' (good) as the transcendence of Dasein, for the problem of 'agathon' is subservient to the question concerning the existence of Dasein in the 'polis', which is the chief problem of "The Republic". Nevertheless, Plato describes 'agathon' as 'hexis' (mastery) which masters the possibility of truth, understanding, and of Being. At the same time, the essence of 'agathon' has to do with man's mastery of himself as 'hou heneka', interpreted as synonymous with 'for the sake of ...' (umwillen) by Heidegger. But the relation between 'for the sake of ...' and Dasein is a problem that is not taken up explicitly by Plato. He is content with describing "ideas" as the most objective of objects and that they remain in a "place above the heavens" ('hyperouranios topos'). Alternatively 'ideas' are also described as innate in the subject, in Plato's discussion concerning the soul and the memory. Heidegger maintains that both these interpretations

imply that "even though the world is formed in Dasein, access to the world is denied to Dasein in non finite terms".¹⁹

Although the question of transcendence continually arises, the two possible interpretations of it are by no means resolved. The place of the unrecognized phenomenon of the world is taken by the eternal realm ('hyperouranios topos') whereas Dasein's relationship to the world is interpreted in terms of 'noein'. The lesson we learn is that transcendence cannot be understood in terms of the "objective", but only through an ontological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject, which remains distinguished from both "subjectivism" and "objectivism".

Transcendence and the Ground

Next, Heidegger studies transcendence (Being-in-the-world) more closely to comprehend its grounding-process. He wants to learn why there lies in transcendence the possibility of the "ground" of what-is. We have seen that the world "gives itself" (gibt sich) to Dasein as the actual totality of what-is 'for the sake of ...' (umwillen von) Dasein, which includes, for the sake of being-alongside things, being-with others, and Dasein's being-itself. Dasein's being "itself" involves a surpassing of itself in the 'for the sake of ...' which happens in a "will" which projects itself toward possibilities of itself. Heidegger cautions that it is not

a willing in the sense of "wanting" something or what-is traditionally understood as the "act of willing". It is, rather, a willing which creates or forms (bilden) the very 'for the sake of ...' (umwillen). That which produces the 'for the sake of ...' is called "freedom" by Heidegger. The "umwillen" is not a value or an end already present. Rather the freedom "holds itself against" (hält sich ... entgegen) it.

What Heidegger wants to convey is that Dasein is, in a sense, given the world which is the totality of what-is for the sake of Dasein. Dasein surpasses to be itself and this surpassing 'for the sake of ...' is a willing, a projecting toward possibilities. It is not a "will" in the sense of desiring something that is already in existence, rather it is a will that forms or creates a 'for the sake of ...' originally. At the same time what is created thus comes face to face with Dasein. But Dasein holds itself against i.e. retains its freedom against what exists for its sake. This free Dasein is the most fundamental mode of the being of man. Hence, Heidegger says profoundly "freedom alone can let a world govern and 'world' Dasein. World never is; it worlds".²⁰

By the above statement Heidegger means that it is because there is freedom at work in Dasein that world can happen, that is, Dasein can attain to its own being which is being-in-the-world. "World-worlds Dasein" means that world happens for Dasein, and Dasein is nothing if this happening does not happen, it enables Dasein to be itself. "World governs Dasein"

implies that as world happens it captivates Dasein completely, it is because of the world that Dasein is itself, knows itself, and knows anything at all. World governs Dasein's existence, for it grants Being as well as meaning to everything that surrounds Dasein. By "world never is" Heidegger means that world does not have a static or selfsame Being; world is not a collection of all objects or all actual or possible existents. It is not something that is "given" as such. World is not a being as other beings "are"; it is not present as other beings are present. Rather, "world worlds" i.e. it has an originaive, dynamic, and transitive Being. It is always "happening" for the sake of Dasein; it is always being formed and interpreted in various possibilities that emerge before freedom. It is better expressed through a verb than through a noun.

The familiar concept of freedom links it with "spontaneity" and a free act is thought to be one that is "initiated by itself". But this does not reach the essence of freedom, Heidegger thinks, for an ontological error is committed as the "happening" is taken as "initiating". Self has an eventful nature; only a more rigorous ontological investigation can explain what "by itself" and "initiating" mean in freedom. The causality that is freedom is distinct from other causation, for it is a grounding causality. "As transcendence, freedom is not merely a particular kind of ground, but the origin of ground in general".²¹ The relation between "freedom" and "ground" is called "grounding" (Gründen) by Heidegger.

In grounding, freedom sustains, and ground is taken. Grounding is strewn (gestreut) in three ways: grounding as "establishing" (stiften), as "obtaining a footing" (Boden-nehmen), and as "founding" (begründen).

The first aspect of grounding is the same as what has been referred to as "project of 'for the sake of ...'". The "for the sake of ..." that is thrown, is embedded in the whole of what-is that a particular "world horizon" reveals. But the "project of world" is not enough to give rise to the manifestation. Dasein is always "in the midst of" what-is (situated), and is disposed toward, and permeated by what-is. This means that it has already "obtained a footing", which is the second aspect of grounding. Heidegger cautions here that the three ways of grounding are all "simultaneous". It is so because transcendence is grounded in time. However, he will not go into a temporal interpretation in this essay, as the footnote 60 informs us.

Dasein's project of possibilities is richer than their possession. However, possibilities are not unlimited, but are based on Dasein's factual existence in the midst of what-is, which deprives it of certain other possibilities.

It is Dasein's preoccupation with what-is that

Offers the actually realizable possibilities of the project of world to Dasein as its world. And it provides the obligatory force of what is thrown-forth and remains projected with the authority of its sway in Dasein's realm of existence²².

What Heidegger is pointing out is that the project of the world is not the sole factor in the origination of the world. Dasein does not produce a world by projecting whatever suits its fancy. But Dasein's factual existence in the midst of beings enables its projecting nature to throw forth upon its possibilities. It is Dasein's "behaviour toward" beings that has traditionally been investigated under the "problem of transcendence", and it is along the same lines that the problem of "intentionality" is taken up. But it must not be overlooked that Dasein is "in the midst" of beings as well as it "behaves toward" them. What being "in the midst of" means, remains at the root of the problem. Heidegger clarifies:

Though we cannot show why here, the project of world makes a preliminary understanding of the Being of beings possible and yet is not itself a 'relationship' of Dasein to beings. Dasein, because of its preoccupation with beings can find itself disposed by and in the midst of beings though indeed never without a disclosure of world. But its preoccupation₂₃ is not a way of 'behaving' toward beings₂₃.

This is what has been called the third aspect of grounding i.e. founding. In founding, transcendence makes manifestation of beings possible. It is founding that gives rise to the possibility of the question "why". A pre-conceptual understanding of what, how, Being is implicit in the "why". It is because a pre-ontological understanding is already there that "why" can be raised at all. This understanding is the "most primary answer" and the "ultimate foundation for all

inquiry", and is called "ontological truth" by Heidegger. Because every instance of the manifestation of what-is i.e. of ontical truth is founded in a founding, it is subject to a "proving". In proving, a particular being is singled out which serves as a "cause" or "motive" for an ontical association. Heidegger points out that transcendental "ground" is often disregarded in such "proving" and "justifying" resorted to in everyday life of Dasein. The ground is possibility, basis, proof. In conclusion,

Strewn in three ways, the grounding of transcendence alone produces and primordially unifies the totality in which a Dasein must be able to exist. Freedom is in this threefold manner, freedom for grounds²⁴.

Heidegger maintains that by calling grounding three-fold, he is not reducing Aristotle's four types of grounds (causes) to three. Aristotle's exposition of the four causes does not distinguish between transcendental grounds and the ontical causes. The former are simply described as more general than the latter. The unity of the four also remains unexplained, which the present investigation has found to be consisting in the equi-primordiality of the three groundings.

Returning to the point of departure, it is clear by now that "Because 'ground' is a transcendental essential character of Being, the principle of sufficient reason is valid for every being".²⁵ Transcendence is the true "birthplace" of the principle. Heidegger refers to the elaboration of the principle stated by Leibniz:

A reason is why this exists 'rather than' something else; a reason is why something exists this way 'rather than' otherwise; a reason is why anything exists 'rather than' nothing.²⁶

It states the problem of ground succinctly, but Leibniz fails to explain adequately the connection between "why" and the "rather than", which lies in the transcendental process of grounding. Heidegger maintains that the principle has always been superficially posited, its claim of being the "basic principle" inadequately argued. Its lumping with the principle of identity has not explicated its roots either. But confusion regarding this principle should not be attributed to the "superficiality" of some philosophers.

Ground has its confusing aspects -- it may have no essence -- for it arises from finite freedom ... Freedom is the ground for ground ...

The confusion and abuse of ground is, then, only 'overcome' in factual existings; it is never 'eliminated'.²⁷

Further Elucidations of Man's World

Among the works in which Heidegger explicates his basic position concerning man's world, are to be included his lecture-courses The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927) and The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics (1929), which have been published in the Gesamtausgabe series. While these treatments explain once again how the tradition has failed to view Being-in-the-world as a basic constitutive state of Dasein and to posit

the problem of the world from a phenomenological standpoint, no "new" attempt has been made in them to comprehend the world-concept. As far as the specific problem of the definition of the world is concerned, Heidegger posits the same position that he has already advanced in Being and Time. He explicates it in accordance with the aims of the lecture-courses, and repeatedly points out how, under the sway of subject-ism, the traditional philosophy has misunderstood the connection between man and world. However, these lectures do point toward the importance Heidegger attaches to the world-problem, and toward the difficulties on the way to comprehending the world-concept. Hence, we will refrain from entering into a detailed exposition of the analyses carried out in these lectures.

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is an important work as a whole for showing the faith Heidegger had in his early years in the potential of phenomenology to provide a region and a method to raise the all-important question of Being. These lectures also serve as a sequel to Being and Time, in further exploration of temporality, and further phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, that is carried out in them. However, no detailed investigation of temporal grounds of the world as such has been attempted here, apart from a re-statement of the conclusions gained in Being and Time, namely that the world and the unity of Dasein's temporal structure have a common ground, and that this ground cannot be

known unless we are further ahead in comprehending the meaning of Being in general. In part I. of the work, "some traditional theses about Being" are given a "critical phenomenological discussion", and in Part II, the meaning of Being in general is once again inquired into in temporal terms. In Part I, a reference has been made to the problem of the world, and in Part II, to the temporal nature of Being-in-the-world.

The discussion of some traditional theses of Being brings the author to a rejection of "the thesis" of modern ontology i.e. the basic ways of Being are the Being of Nature (*res extensa*) and the Being of mind (*res cogitans*). To posit the Unity of the concept of Being, he points to the existential constitution of Dasein, and to the necessity of a more radical interpretation of Dasein's "intentionality". In this task, he remarks,

We also run up against a central problem that has remained unknown to all previous philosophy and has involved it in remarkable insoluble *apriori*. We may not hope to solve the central problem in a single attempt or indeed even to make sufficiently transparent as a problem²⁸.

The problem Heidegger is referring to is the problem of comprehending what is world, irrespective of a bisection of Being into subject and object, i.e. of comprehending Being-in-the-world as a basic structure of Dasein. A simplistic approach has often been followed in modern philosophy when a philosopher like Fichte initiates the problem by saying: "Gentlemen, think

the wall, and then think the one who thinks the wall". To Heidegger it is tantamount to saying: "Make yourselves Blind to what is already given to you",²⁹ i.e. a pre-conceptual understanding of the totality of significance, or of world. This critique of traditional philosophy further claims that

Elucidation of the world-concept is one of the most central tasks of philosophy. The concept of world, or the phenomenon thus designated, is what has hitherto not yet been recognized in philosophy ... Without entering into an investigation of the very difficult phenomenon of the world in its different possible aspects, we must strictly distinguish the phenomenological concept of world from the ordinary pre-philosophical concept³⁰.

By "pre-philosophical" Heidegger means a conception which does not view world as a philosophical problem i.e. takes it as "Nature, things, and the universe of beings".

The importance of the world-question is similarly emphasized in the lecture-course The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, where the question "what is the world" (was ist das -- Welt) is acknowledged along with questions concerning finitude (Endlichkeit) and individualization (Vereinzelung), as one of the basic quests of philosophizing, while the basic stimulus of philosophy is described as "homesickness" (das Heimweh).³¹ Philosophizing is thought to be a desire to bring oneself home in learning more about world, finitude, and individualization. In Part I an extensive discussion analyses the mood of acute boredom, which in Part II, is viewed as constituting the ground for a beginning of the metaphysical questioning, which

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itself begins with the question concerning world. The question concerning world is further extended to understand the meaning of the thesis "the animal is worldless" (das Tier ist weltarm) and of "man is worldforming" (der Mensch ist weltbildend). The investigation of the latter thesis is carried out along the same principles, as those posited in Being and Time and in Essence of Ground. We will pass over a detailed consideration of this treatment, for it is essentially yet another expression of Heidegger's first and basic attempt to learn what is world.

Concluding Remarks

Appearing two years after the publication of Being and Time, the treatise Essence of Ground is a landmark on Heidegger's way toward comprehending what is called the "world". By dwelling on the grounding-process of Being-in-the-world (transcendence), it basically deals with "the way of being" (wesen) of the "ground" of something that "is". It investigates the relation between Dasein's transcendence, and the grounding of entities. It does open the way for an understanding of the connection between "World" and "Being", without asserting anything conclusive about it. Heidegger strives to comprehend the grounding of entities as a "process", as a "happening" which has to do with the Being "itself" of Dasein, as opposed to the traditional way which understands "essence" of an

entity as something static. As Adamczewski points out in his article "On the way to Being"³² by "Wesen" Heidegger does not mean "essentia" in the traditional sense of "what-ness" but "way to be". We may also observe that, in this essay, he avoids some of the details and specific terms of Being and Time, and does not hesitate to employ some traditional terms to gain a broader perspective on the problems discussed. This is indicative of the fact that this work also serves as an explication of Being and Time.

Despite being in Richardson's words "one of the hardest diamonds in Heidegger's ample treasury",³³ this work cannot be taken as offering a new attempt to define world. Nor does it take the inquiry concerning the meaning of Being as such to a level where something conclusive can be said about the connection between "world" and "Being". Nevertheless, the work is important for our project, for it provides us with another version of Heidegger's first and basic attempt to understand the worldhood of the world. This version is expressly called an encounter with the "transcendental problem of the world", where the departure is not taken from Dasein's "surrounding-world" but from Dasein's "world". This distinction is not made too strictly in Heidegger's thought for he does not want to give the impression that there is more than one world. He repeatedly explains, in his works and the lecture-courses, that world is not "subjective" in the sense that every man has his own world. Nor does he strictly distinguish between "the world"

and "surrounding-world", or between "man's world" and "thing's world", or between "one's world" and "common-world".

Surrounding-world only provides a horizon in which the question concerning world is posed in Being and Time. This horizon is not entirely abandoned in Essence of Ground; what is no longer considered is the conception of things as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand and Dasein's involvement with them in the surrounding-world. Rather, Dasein's relation with things is viewed at a more general level, where the ontological truth happens, where things enter the sphere of Dasein's "clearing". At this level the problem of the world can also be posed from a more basic perspective. Besides further clarifying the problem, and further revealing the connection between "world" and "man", the work also provides a historical-sketch, which outlines the status of Heidegger's own interpretation and illustrates his claim that the "phenomenon" of world has never been taken as a theme in the history of western philosophy.

The author makes it clear that ontical truth, which is rooted in an ontological truth, is a manifesting that takes place in Dasein's "situation" in the middle of things. Hence, man is neither a creator of beings, nor free of his worldly situation. At the same time, beings are accessible because ontical manifesting is "guided and enabled" by "a prior unconcealedness of their Being". Dasein has an ability for ontological differentiation. Further than these insights,

Heidegger does not dwell on the relation between Dasein's pre-ontological comprehension of "Being", and that of the "world". He realizes that it is very difficult to know what this connection is, since we are not too far advanced in encountering the question of the sense of Being.

However, Heidegger's interpreters seldom show similar reticence on the issue. Many commentators have made simplistic claims about the connection between world and Being, which they either attribute to Heidegger or offer to bridge the gaps in his knowledge. For instance, John Wild in his article "Being, Meaning, and the World",³⁴ has, in the length of sixteen pages, sought to replace the priority of Being with that of world-horizon. Heidegger, he says, has never "carefully examined the relation between Being and world, nor stated his reasons, for choosing the former over the latter". Our explication shows that Heidegger has carefully examined this relation at various points in the progress of his thought, but has chosen, unlike Wild, to be silent on the issue in view of the difficulty of the matter. As far as the priority of Being is concerned each and every work of Heidegger states his reasons for this priority. Wild's bias against this priority is apparent in the following words in his conclusion: "I do not think that many of us will be converted from our 'un-Sein-like' ways by this Seinsmystik". Wild's argument is based on his conclusion that it is the world that grants meaning, not Being, and beings and Being, both need this worldly meaning.

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What is precisely missed in this kind of thinking is the priority of ontological truth over the ontic truth, which is the foundation for Heidegger's priority of Being. For Wild, on the other hand, ontic truth is the ultimate horizon, and worldly meaning the ultimate meaning.

A similar summary investigation into the meaning of the "world" is carried out by Erickson in his "Worlds and World Views",³⁵ wherein he has sought to understand this meaning in various colloquial usages of the term. On the basis of his linguistic analysis, Erickson constructs a dialectical model, to which he argues, both Freudian and Heideggerian conceptions of the world belong. Such linguistic analyses, which treat language as a totality of word-entities, are so alien to the spirit of Heidegger's philosophy, that any consideration that treats their results at par with those of Heidegger, is bound to be a very superficial comparative study.

In Essence of Ground, the author's main emphasis concerning the problem of the world is that the essential meaning of the elementary concepts like "world" is "only seldom expressed conceptually and with difficulty" (P.74), as the history of such attempts shows. "World belongs to a structure of relations which marks Dasein out as Dasein" (P.80). "Dasein's project of the world is ultimately rooted in a transcendental ground. In the lecture-courses of the period, Heidegger again affirms that the connection between man and world has not been treated as a problem i.e. as a phenomenological

problem, irrespective of the subject-object assumption. He points out in these lectures that the problem of man-world connection or of the freeing of thought from the subject-object frame can be neither resolved nor clarified "in a single attempt" (p. 97).

"World belongs to a structure of relations, which marks Dasein out as Dasein". It is this connection between man and world about which Heidegger, despite his many clarifications, has been misunderstood. He is often accused of being anthropocentric in this early phase of his thought. One of the most penetrating criticisms of this kind was addressed to Heidegger on his 80th birthday, by Karl Löwith, in a lecture titled "The Nature of World and the World of Nature".³⁶ It is the "World of Nature" that Löwith misses in Heidegger's existential analytic, and he finds it hard to agree with Heidegger's conception of Nature as a totality of intra-worldly entities. Löwith understands by Nature something that is "itself" i.e. "absolutely autonomous", something "which I presuppose first and last". And it is his regard for Nature's autonomy that leads him to have misgivings about many of Heidegger's conclusions. The first aspect of the existential analytic that he cannot agree with is concerning death:

"The real end is not one's most individual possibility. It is rather a natural necessity which is before all of us ... Death equalizes and makes us equal ... The birth and death ... are existentially not comprehensible ... They simply take place independently of our possibilities ... And how could one ever acquire the

idea of death ... if one had not seen others die.

To this it may be answered that "the real end" is not what Heidegger is concerned about but "the possibility of the impossibility of existence" which can only be conceived in thought and given comportment. Death makes us equal as well as individual. What it does is that it brings "individuality" into question. That is why Heidegger maintains that "death individualizes". "Death destroys individuality" can be interpreted both ways i.e. it equalizes, as well as, in its conception as possibility, it individualizes. Of course, we experience the death of others, in a way. But it is not an experience in the sense of one experiencing something oneself.

Next, Löwith points toward the importance of "sleep" in any existential understanding, which is missing in Heidegger's analytic. "An analysis of man which is oriented around awake Dasein suppresses half of human existence".

The nature of man is revealed not only in his total corporeality, with its world-disclosing senses and sexual drive, but above all in the inconspicuous phenomenon that we sleep away one third of our existence and live without consciousness ... (that is) ... when ... (man) is not there for himself and when he does not relate to himself and to the world ...

Löwith is right in pointing out that "sexual drive" and "sleep" are not to be dismissed as "mere biological facts", for they do serve as "existential phenomena" which enable us to learn more about the existential status of man. He is also right in saying that these important phenomena have been ignored by

Heidegger in his existential analytic. However, Löwith's own understanding of sleep and the dream-state misses their existential value. He presumes that while asleep, man is unconscious and unrelated to himself and the world. In fact, sleep does not jeopardise man's Being-in-the-world in any way; it is only a mode of one's Being-in-the-world. However, a distinction can be made between dream-sleep and dreamless sleep. It is only the dreamless sleep which introduces consciousness to Nothingness. Dream-sleep rather shows us that one is absorbed in Being-alongside entities and Being-with people, even though the world-order appears in a twisted mode. That we are able to have a dream-less sleep indicates that a possibility exists for man when he is not entirely "of the world". This distinction between the dream-sleep and the dreamless sleep has been made in the Mandukya Upanishad precisely to show that man has a possibility, in his life, to be free from his tenacity with existence, as Scharff's comparative study "Heidegger's path of thinking and the way of meditation in the Early Upanishads"³⁷ also points out.

Löwith's major criticism in this lecture is directed at Heidegger's concept of the world in Being and Time and in Essence of Ground :

This world can be conceived without an essential relation to man's Dasein, but no man is conceivable without the world ... It does not belong to us but we belong to it ... Only this 'proximate world' can be presented in a convincing way as a totality of involvement ...

Instead of concluding that the world understood in Greek manner is primarily world-order, it is asserted that it was not first the world understood in a Christian manner that is relative to human Dasein, but rather it is the Greek 'cosmos' ...

In response to these criticisms, it can be pointed out that Löwith's conception of the world of Nature is too grandiose, and it assumes some of the character that Heidegger accords to Being. Any conception of world has to do with man. This should not be interpreted as world being subservient to man, or man being creator of the world. Heidegger points out clearly that facticity limits and determines man's project of the world. The complexity of the world-concept lies in the fact that it can be and is understood denoting different conceptions of the "totality". What Greeks understood by 'cosmos' is not the same as what the medievals understood by 'mundus' or as what we understand by 'world'. And what Löwith understands by "world of Nature" is not what Heidegger understands by world. World as "Dasein's horizon" is not the same thing as world as a "totality of entities". Heidegger's major insight is that world was never seen as a horizon which belongs to the Being of Dasein, which in fact, it does. But this does not mean that the Being of beings or the thinghood of the things is subservient to man. This is only the first attempt of Heidegger to comprehend world, which happens to be from the standpoint of man. This critique shows that Löwith's definition is one, the rejection of which, constitutes Heidegger's insight.

Notes

1. Heidegger: The Principle of Ground, p. 208. "Nothing is without ground; so reads the almost unexpressed formula employed for an opinion that is decisive everywhere and to which we commonly entrust our thought".
2. Heidegger: Essence of Ground, p. 11. The translator's rendering of "Grund" as "Reasons", and of "Seiendes" as "being" is misleading; we will revise it to "Ground" and "what-is" respectively.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 27.
5. Ibid., p. 47.
6. Ibid., p. 49.
7. Fragment 8: The things in one world-order are not separated one from the other, nor cut off with an axe, neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot. Trans. Kirk, G. and Raven, J. : The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 381.
8. Heidegger: Essence of Ground, p. 51.
9. Ibid., p. 57, p. 59.
10. Ibid., p. 61.
11. Ibid., p. 63.
12. Ibid., p. 65.
13. Ibid., p. 69.
14. Ibid., p. 75.
15. Ibid., p. 83.
16. Ibid., p. 85.
17. Heidegger: Being and Time, p. 366.
18. Heidegger: Essence of Ground, p. 89.
19. Ibid., p. 95.
20. Ibid., p. 103.

21. Ibid., p. 105.
22. Ibid., p. 111.
23. Ibid., p. 113.
24. Ibid., p. 119.
25. Ibid., p. 123.
26. Ibid., p. 125.
27. Ibid., p. 129.
28. Heidegger: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 162.
29. Ibid., p. 162.
30. Ibid., p. 165.
31. Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 30, pp. 1-13.
32. Adamczewski, Z. : "On the Way to Being: Reflecting on Conversations with Martin Heidegger", P.15.
33. Richardson, W.J. : Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 161.
34. Wild, J. : "Being, Meaning, and the World".
35. Erickson, S.A. : "Worlds and World Views".
36. Löwith, K. : "The Nature of Man and the World of Nature".
37. Scharff, R. C. : "Heidegger's Path of Thinking and the Way of Meditation in the Early Upanisads".

CHAPTER IV

WORLD AND THE WORK OF ART

Among the writings of Heidegger in which the problem of the world has been articulated and treated relatively extensively, "The Origin of the work of Art" (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes) holds a special place. Delivered as a lecture in 1935-36 it was published in Holzwege in 1950 and published again with minor revisions in 1960. The times in which the work was composed, i.e. the early thirties, are those in which Heidegger's thought is struggling to dwell upon the primacy of Being and wants to disengage itself from the primacy of man. The reassertion of this primacy required that the point of departure be shifted, and the problems of the Being of man, world, truth, and history be thought, once again, irrespective of the presuppositions of subject-ism and in a thoughtful proximity to Being. This way of thinking also demanded that anthropology, even of the kind attempted in Being and Time, be underemphasized and the question about the nature of these realities be posed in a new and direct fashion. It was also acknowledged that more had to be learnt about the notion of the world besides the knowledge that man's Being is a Being-in-the-world. It is in this work that a new attempt is made to comprehend the Being of the world from a new standpoint.

an attempt which is different from the one made in Being and Time, and in Essence of Ground. In this essay, Heidegger once again brings home the realization that the problem of the worldhood of the world is far from being simple, and the treatment given to it in the early works can hardly be considered exhaustive.

However, the first aim of this essay is not to investigate the worldhood of the world, but to learn from a new standpoint the nature of art. In the process of learning about the nature of art, the nature of world too is understood in a new way. Once again, Heidegger makes only a humble claim about his conclusions concerning world's nature:

On the path we must follow here, the nature of world can only be indicated. What is more this indication limits itself to warding off anything that might at first distort our view of the world's nature.

Nevertheless, a thoughtful reading of the essay does enable us to secure a new insight into what we innocently call the 'world'. As we shall see presently, it is not entirely due to the fact that the role of the art-work is found to be the "setting-up" of a world by this investigation that makes it interesting to us. But the work is important in many other ways. The first phase of Heidegger's rejection of subjectism required a new definition of the world, in which the world was viewed as related to man in a new sense. It is in this second phase that he attempts to dispel the illusion of the primacy of man in this relationship. The establishing

of the primacy of Being required that the bestowing nature of Being reflects itself in the bestowing nature of truth, world, history, and language. Hence, a new understanding of these realities had to be reached and spelled out with a recognition that they cannot be understood in isolation from each other, although their precise inter-relation is a region of knowledge still to be thought out.

In this lecture, Heidegger deals particularly with the philosophical issues concerning the art-work which, according to him, are often raised and resolved without questioning the presuppositions of modern philosophy. Here, he launches his assault upon those who believe art is an "experience" or a "stimulation" for the beholders, and upon those he calls the "art connoisseurs" and the "functionaries" of the art industry. He attributes their hackneyed concepts regarding art to the general subjugation of the so-called aesthetics to a firmly entrenched subject-ism. At the same time, he makes an original attempt to answer the age-old question, namely, what is the nature of art, and what distinguishes an art-work from an ordinary entity, as he weaves his way from the Being of art-work to the Being of art by his singular method.

Heidegger's grounds for the primacy of Being are succinctly expressed in An Introduction to Metaphysics (Einführung in die Metaphysik), a lecture-course given in 1935, and published in 1953. This work spells out his resolve to raise the question of Being in a manner more direct than one adopted in the

early writings. These were also the times when he occupied himself with studying and teaching Nietzsche's philosophy and was especially intrigued about Nietzsche's designation of art as "the essence of all willing".

Thinghood, World, and Earth

The question about the origin i.e. "the source of the nature" of art-work, which is the chief issue to be settled in the essay, is inter-related with the "artist" and with "art". In a way the artist is the origin of the art-work; in another way art-work is the origin of the artist; in yet another way art is the origin of both the artist and the art-work. Heidegger maintains that this procedure may be circular, but it is not unwarranted. To take this circular way is a "strength of thought". Attending to the Being of the actual art-work, our first observation is that the works are as naturally present as things; they have a thingly character. Hence we need to ask what kind of a "thing" the art-work is. This raises the need to learn what a thing is.

Heidegger observes that the question about the thinghood of the thing is far from settled and the deep rooted traditional conceptions render this question a non-question. Our task is to inquire about the sphere to which the entities called things belong. This is fraught with several difficulties. Should we consider all beings that "are" as things,

including those that appear and those that do not, men as well as God, use things that are produced as well as things naturally present. The grounds on which we narrow down this sphere can enable us to understand the thingly character of the thing. Heidegger does not resolve this issue directly but examines the limitations of the dominant interpretations of the thing, embedded, in his view, in western philosophy. He thinks that traditionally the term "thing" has functioned synonymously with the term "being", for things were taken as the standard type of beings. The traditional interpretations of beings, also define, in a way, the thinghood of the thing. He identifies and examines three dominant interpretations.

Firstly, we are reminded that the core of the thing was called by the Greeks "to hupokeimenon" and the characteristics that "always turned up already along with the given core" were called "ta sumbebekota".² These designations that represent the basic Greek experience of Being as presence, were translated by the Roman-Latin thought as "subjectum" and "accidens"; and this translation replaced the Greek experience by a different way of thinking. Heidegger also indicates that today the definition of the thingness as substance and its accidents is so well entrenched that even our way of addressing ourselves to things and speaking about them is rooted in it. A relation between the sentence structure (subject-predicate) and the thing structure (subject-accidents) is evident. Instead of inquiring which one of these structures is

primordial, we should be asking about their "common and more original source". And because this common source (i.e. the Being of beings) remains forgotten, and is not approached questioningly, the tradition has been able to posit the thing as bearer of its traits as a self-evident position. This thing concept is no help in distinguishing between the thingly and the non-thingly beings.

The second dominant concept that faces the critique of Heidegger is the one which regards the thing as the "aistheton" i.e. as perceptible by the sensations in the senses. This interpretation takes the thing to be nothing but the unity of what is given in the senses. This too fails to help us know the thingly character of the thing. We do not first perceive a throng of sensations and then the thing. Things are much closer to us than all sensations. We first hear the door being shut, not mere sounds. This concept also impinges upon the self-containment of the thing.

The third interpretation that is handed down is that of thing as a "formed-matter", that is the constancy in a thing lies in the fact that matter (hule) stands together with a form (morphe) so that the thing solicits us by its aspect (eidos). In the field of aesthetics, the matter-form schema has been employed in a variety of ways. But this application is not limited to aesthetics. They are, the author tells us, "the most hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything may be subsumed".³ Hence this schema is of no help to us

to define the domain, either of things or of art-works. Heidegger rejects the view that in case of an equipment, the matter and form are more primordial than its usefulness. Usefulness, in this case, is more primordial. Rather, it was the observation of use-objects, the closest things around man, that led to the view that the things have matter and form, and the model of the being of equipment was automatically applied to all entities including the art-works.

It is also observed that these interpretations have also been combined with each other, in the history of philosophy, which has resulted in strengthening their general application to things, to equipment, and to art-works. These familiar and preconceived notions, the author thinks prevent us from an immediate and original experience of beings, and render the question of the Being of beings redundant. But it is important to know the origins of these thing-concepts so that one is aware of their presumptions, and of the mistaken self-evidence about them. Hence the author recommends:

We ought to turn toward the Being, think about it in regard to its Being, but by means of this thinking at the same time let it rest upon itself in its very own Being⁴.

Heidegger believes that the self-containing status of a being must be recognized in order to learn about the domain it belongs to. This is his way of heeding Husserl's call "back to the things themselves".

Since the equipmental being of equipment has been influential.

in establishing the thinghood of the thing, and since an equipment has often been considered something more than the thing and something less than the art-work, Heidegger decides to probe further the equipmental character of equipment.

To learn what an equipment is, he wants to avoid all current philosophical theories and wants to observe and describe some equipment as it "is". Hence he proceeds to study the Being of a pair of shoes, not an actual pair, but a pictorial representation in a well-known art-work, a painting of Van Gogh depicting a pair of peasant shoes. Heidegger wants to know what an art-work can show us regarding the equipmental character of an equipment. What the picture tells, has been described by him as follows:

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth.... In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the "earth" and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. Out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within itself.

The author graphically shows how the shoes are a part of the peasant woman's world. It is her world that gives meaning to this entity. The usefulness of the equipment does not rest in the entity itself, but in a more fundamental structure that

is the ground of the Being of an equipment. Heidegger calls it the reliability (Verlässlichkeit). This reliability of her equipment is part of the peasant woman's belonging to her earth and of her assuredness of her world. It was pointed out in Being and Time that the being of a piece of equipment is rooted in the totality of involvement and in the totality of all equipment, and it is the worldliness of the (surrounding) world that bestows significance upon a "Being-in-order-to" or upon a "Being-for-the-sake-of" of the equipment. Here, the term reliability is meant to convey familiarity and serviceability of the equipment as well as the fact that it belongs to a totality. The author observes that usefulness is a consequence of reliability and not vice-versa. Because equipment is reliably and repeatedly used, reliability itself remains invisible. The peasant woman too wears the shoes and moves about doing her daily tasks without understanding explicitly what the equipmental Being of the equipment is. But the using of equipment reliably is what makes her world a familiar world in which she lives and acts.

Hence, over and above whatever was maintained regarding the readiness-to-hand of equipment beings in Being and Time, Heidegger is pointing out that the equipmental Being of the equipment which remains invisible when we habitually use it discloses itself in a work of art. In the work, the entities depicted (in the above example, the shoes) lose their boringly obtrusive usualness, and show themselves in their belonging.

to other entities and to the involvements of the human beings who use them. In other words, in the work of art a distinct "world disclosure" takes place. We are also informed that the "earth", at the same time, emerges as a counterpole to the world. The earth represents that in which everything is rooted, that which contains within itself that which remains concealed, while the world opens up.

"World and earth exist for her, and for those who are with her in her mode of Being".⁶ It may be interpreted as follows. The painting does not merely reveal the earth and the world of a particular peasant, but in revealing the peasant's earth and the peasant's world, gives us a glimpse of the man's earth and the man's world.

The disclosure in the art-work means that the truth of an entity "comes to stand" in the work. "The art-work opens up in its way the being of beings. This opening up ... i.e. the truth of beings happens in the work".⁷ Heidegger, in one stroke, tells us what it is that constitutes the uniqueness of an art-work among ordinary things and at the same time gives us hints about the nature of the happening of truth, and the opening up of the world and the earth. How these occurrences are inter-related, he attempts to clarify by further reflecting upon the Being of the art-work.

Dwelling upon the Being of the art-work as such would require that it be known in its independence from the artist, and for the present, also from art. Heidegger thinks that

the art-work has its own independent status, its own native sphere, and its own world. This native sphere belongs more truly to the art-work, and in great art, "the artist remains inconsequential". The object-being of the work, a concern of the art connoisseurs, is not its work being. When the works are placed in the museums, and become part of the art industry, they are in a way withdrawn from their own world.

Truth and World in Art-Work

Next, Heidegger asks the question of the truth more penetratingly to study how the truth happens in the work. To do so, he decides to observe the Being of a Greek temple, choosing this time an art-work that is non-representational. This temple is situated in the middle of a rocky valley and has a figure of the god in it. The author's description of the standing-there of the temple is full of metaphor but is very instructive as to the nature of the world that is opened up and the nature of man's world:

It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people. Only from and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation.

Heidegger seems to be saying that it is the existence of an

art-work, in this case of the temple, which attains and simultaneously sustains around itself a unity of paths and relations. This unity of paths and relations is the world, the world of the people who created and installed this art-work. The world is described as a wholeness, a unity of various basic directions and relations which grant significance to human realities such as birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline. An openness that governs all significances and helps to fix the meanings of all relations is the world, the world of the people who created the temple. It is only with the help of this openness, and within this openness that a people (nation, race, historical people) knows itself, defines its uniqueness, and becomes aware of its distinct purpose, and becomes capable of achieving it. An art-work gives us a glimpse of the world of a (historical) people, and thereby opens up the nature of man's world. It shows us how the world worlds, in showing how it has worlded for this people. Some interpreters have misunderstood Heidegger's allusion to the "historical people" as meaning that now he thinks that there exist several historical or cultural worlds as opposed to the one world. What is being pointed out here is that commensurate with the presencing, and historical bestowing character of Being, the world worlds itself distinctly for distinct historical peoples.

The author describes further what the standing there of the art-work that is the temple illuminates. It illuminates

the entities that surround it. "Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket" come into appearance as what they "are":

But men and animals, plants and things, are never present and familiar as unchangeable objects, only to represent incidentally also a fitting environment for the temple, which one fine day is added to what is already there. We shall get closer to what 'is', rather, if we think of all this in reverse order⁹.

What Heidegger wants to bring home is that the temple-work opens up a world and it is this world that illuminates, discloses, and grants significance, and lets appear in their true Being, the entities in the surrounding-world. We are so accustomed to taking the entities as given, that it is the disclosure in the art-work that reveals to us that things belong to a totality, to an openness that renders them appear as they are. We think that the surrounding entities already exist and it is the temple that has been added to them. In truth, the temple first "is" (for it unconceals the world it belongs to), and then the things "are". Heidegger remarks that it is this emerging and arising "in itself" and "in all things" that the Greeks called "Physis". The temple "first gives things their look and to men their outlook on themselves ... as long as work is a work, and as long as god has not fled from it".¹⁰ What Heidegger means is that the world opened up by the art-work, not only reveals entities, but being a bestower of meanings it also enables men to comprehend themselves. But

this outlook, including man's religious meaning, alters as one era passes into the other. A work cannot be called existing in its own world, if the age in which it was established has passed, and god no longer beckons men.

The art-work such as a Greek temple "opens up" or "sets up" a world and keeps this world in a way "abiding in itself". But what is to be a world? Heidegger is aware that this question should not be dealt with simplistically. But he wants to ward off the usual mis-notions about the world and at the same time state what we have learnt from observing the art-works:

The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and unfamiliar things that are just there. But neither is it a merely imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of such given things. The 'world worlds', and is more fully in Being than the tangible and the perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being. Wherever these decisions of our history that relate to our very Being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds¹¹.

The author begins by stating what the world is not. It is neither a collection of entities, nor an abstraction added to the totality of entities. He has already told us this in Being and Time and in Essence of Ground. It is again emphasized that world worlds, and is more real than the things

we see and touch, for without the world things neither "are" nor can be experienced. If we want to use the conceptions such as subject and object, then world is an ever-present non objective reality to which man is always subjected. Now, the meaning of "the world worlds" is more fully explained. Wherever or whenever the basic decisions regarding man's very Being are made, there the worlding of the world takes place. That is, in a distinct historical era and in a distinct culture, the world, in a way, distinctly worlds. For in all such eras, distinct decisions regarding man's basic understanding of his own self and about his way of Being are taken. Heidegger here recognizes that the world has a priority to man. Man is born into a subjection to the world, for he lives in an openness that has been unfolded already. Each time the basic decisions concerning the meaning of man's Being are taken, each time this Being is distinctly defined (i.e. comprehended) in the historical manifesting of Being, the world (more distinctly) worlds.

By the opening up of a world all things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits. In a world's worlding is gathered that spaciousness out of which the protective grace of the gods is granted or withheld. Even this doom of the god remaining absent is a way in which the world worlds¹².

All things receive their meaning or value, their transience or endurance, by the openness that is the world. The sense of the divine too is a matter of how this openness has opened up.

We learn from the standing-there of the Greek temple, that it was the world's worlding that granted to the Greeks the sense of the holy. Now there are no gods. For the world worlds in a different way, and leaves no room for gods.

Besides setting up a world, the art-work also manifests the "earth". Earth is that out of which a world is opened and is sustained as open in an art-work. Earth also manifests in the material that the work is produced out of i.e. stone, wood, metal, colour, language, tone etc. Whereas in the case of an equipment, the matter disappears into usefulness, in an art-work material "comes forth" into Open of the work's world. "The rock comes to bear and rest, ... metals come to glitter and shimmer, colours to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak".¹³ As the world is opened up in the art-work, the earth appears as itself, it is perceived and preserved as what is undisclosable by nature. Heidegger posits the earth as a counterpole to the world. The interplay of the two in the art-work is concomitant with the unconcealment-concealment process or the happening of truth. "Earth" is a metaphor for what has the nature of remaining concealed. Only in the art-work the earth emerges as earth. It may be observed that Heidegger replaces form and matter ('eidos' and 'hyle') with world and earth. What kind of relationship do the world and the earth have?

The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical

people. The earth is the spontaneous forth-coming of that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing¹⁴.

Earth is that which sometimes emerges, but usually hides itself and by nature, retains and conceals. We are told further that essentially world and earth are different, but not separate. "The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world". Heidegger calls the opposition of world and earth a "striving". But this striving is not entirely a discord. In such striving, the opponents let each other assert their natures, which means a surrender to the source of own Being which lies in the other. More the opponents struggle to assert their own nature, more they belong to each other. The author points out that the art-work is an instigating of the striving between the world and the earth. In the work, this strife is never settled but remains a strife.

One of the major assertions about the Being of the art-work that Heidegger makes is that in the work, truth happens. He devotes a major part of the essay to dealing with the question of how truth happens in the work. First, he introduces his own thought about what truth as such is. He observes that we use the word truth with laxity and often understand by 'truth' this or that particular truth. Heidegger believes that truth is unconcealment and the Greek term "aletheia" describes its nature. He deplores that the nature of truth as "aletheia" remained unthought in the thinking of the Greeks as well as in

the philosophy that followed it. The modern philosophy has adhered to the notion of truth as "correctness in representation" ever since Descartes conceived truth as "certainty". Unconcealment is not purely a human activity. Heidegger clarifies how Being has a priority:

It is not we who presuppose the unconcealedness of beings, rather the unconcealedness of beings (Being) puts us into such a condition of Being that in our representation we always remain installed within and in attendance upon unconcealedness. Not only must that in 'conformity' with which a cognition orders itself be already in some way unconcealed, the entire 'realm' in which this 'conforming to something' goes on must already occur as a whole in the unconcealed¹⁵.

There occurs, the author explains, in the midst of beings, an "open place" or a "clearing". This open centre "encircles" all that is. Beings are beings within this clearing. It is due to this clearing that man obtains an access to beings, and even to his own being. Since beings are unconcealed "in certain changing degrees", they may also be concealed. Beings keep to "this curious opposition of presence". Clearing is at the same time concealment. This concealment is twofold, refusal as well as dissembling. A being can refuse to appear to us, raising the question whether it is or it is not, or one being may hide or obscure the other, it may present itself other than it is. "Concealment conceals and dissembles itself". Heidegger also points out that unconcealment is not a permanently existent state, it is a "happening". Truth as unconcealment, therefore, cannot be an attribute of factual things, nor can

it be one of propositions. We may notice that it is this understanding of truth that renders the question of Being of a being an important question. "The ordinary is not ordinary, it is extra-ordinary".

This "primal conflict" in the nature of truth gives rise to an Open. To this Open belong a world and an earth. However, the world and the earth are not simply the names for unconcealment and concealment. The world is not simply the Open and earth the closed.

Rather, the world is the clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies. Every decision, however, bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision. The earth is not simply the closed but rather that which rises up as self-closing¹⁰.

What Heidegger seems to say is that unconcealment that is truth and the openness that is the world are not exactly the same phenomenon. He does not reflect too much at this stage over the issue of how Truth and World are related, but gives us the following pointers. The unconcealment lets us know that things are, as well as how things are. World is an opening of paths which have been established, paths which enable man to take basic decisions. The taking of these basic decisions makes it possible for man to comprehend things. The world opens up "paths" for us so that we may decide how things are, how they matter to us, and at the same time how we are to operate amid things and people. We are constantly

subject to this elementary decisioning because beings are not, entirely and to the same extent, unconcealed for us. Earth is that which comes into the openness as that which is unmastered, hidden, and confusing. It is because of the presence of the hidden reality as "hidden" that we have to face the decisioning.

Works of art do not have "a truth", but "the truth" happening in them in regard to "what is as a whole". How does truth happen in something created? Since the chief feature of the work is, for Heidegger, the happening of the truth, and since the happening of the truth occurs in work-being, the work-being, to him, is primordial. To understand how truth happens in the art-work, we must think about how openness establishes itself in the Open. "This self-establishing of openness in the Open touches a sphere that cannot yet be explicated here", but this much can be said that "Being by way of its own nature lets the place of openness happen".¹⁷

Heidegger observes that the happening of truth is, in many ways, a historical happening. Truth may happen in the work, in founding of a political state, in essential sacrifice, in the thinker's questioning, and as Being brings itself nearer. Art-work is truth's distinct possibility in which it occurs "as being in the midst of being". Hence, work by nature is a being that was never before and will never be again. Creation of the work is a special bringing forth that is "a receiving" and an establishing of "a relation to unconcealedness".

Truth establishes itself as the conflict of world and earth in the work. This conflict is not there to be resolved or to be housed. It is, rather, started by the work.

As a world opens itself it submits to the decision of a historical humanity the question of victory and defeat, blessing and curse, mastery and slavery. The dawning world brings out what is as yet undecided and measureless, and thus discloses the hidden necessity of measure and decisiveness ... World demands its decisiveness and its measure and lets beings attain to the open of their paths... Earth, bearing and jutting strives to keep itself closed and to entrust everything to its law¹⁸.

Heidegger means to say that the Being of an art-work shows, in the emergence of a world, to a historical people, that the elementary questions such as victory and defeat, blessing and curse have to be reckoned with. The world in its emergence shows what they have not yet thought, examined with a measure, and what needs to be measured and about which a decision has to be made. The world establishes, and clarifies the paths, the directions of what-is. In sum, the world opened up in an art-work lets a people know what they do not as yet know about themselves, their vocation, and their destiny. At the same time, in the art-work, there arises the earth. It reveals what is concealed. It lets us know all is not open. It bears in itself and strives to keep hidden what is lawfully hidden.

The conflict between world and earth is not a rift of total separation. There prevails also an intimacy between them because of their common ground. This "rift-design", in which

the truth is established, in order to appear in a being (i.e. in the art-work) needs to be placed in the earth of this being which Heidegger calls the figure (Gestalt). The earth is not used up "as matter", in this "fixing in place of truth". It rather emerges as itself in the work. In other words, the material aspect of the work is not used up, as that of an equipment, in which it is lost in its serviceability. Moreover, in the work the createdness stands out. In contrast with the other produced things "that it is" aspect of its Being is markedly visible. It is because unconcealedness that has happened here is original:

"The more solitary the work, fixed in the figure, stands on its own and the more clearly it seems to cut all ties to human beings".¹⁹ It means that work is neither an entity ready-to-hand, nor an equipment, nor something that is part of the familiar world of man. It is something that reveals its extraordinary Being and at the same time reveals the nature of our familiar world. It transforms "our accustomed ties to world and to earth ... in order to stay within the truth that is happening in the work".²⁰ This "staying within the truth that is happening" is what Heidegger calls "preserving" of the work. This preservation is a knowing, that is, man's "entrance into and compliance with the unconcealedness of Being". It is not an "aestheticizing connoisseurship of the work's formal aspects". Preserving the work also enables man to know the historical meaning of his Being-with.

Now Heidegger must consider the question about art itself. He had provisionally defined the nature of art as the setting-into-work of truth. With what has been learnt, he improves upon this definition. At the same time that art is "the fixing in place of a self-establishing truth in the figure" it is also "the bringing of work-being into movement and happening" i.e. preservation. Dwelling further on the nature of art, Heidegger makes an apparently radical statement. "All art is ... essentially poetry". For in art, truth "happens in being composed, as a poet composes a poem".²¹ Heidegger reflects about the nature of poetry as well as language to clarify in which sense all art is poetry. By poetry he does not mean its narrow field "poesy" or the art of writing poems. Poesy is only a mode of the poetic composition in the broader sense which is essentially a happening of truth. However, poesy does have a privileged position among the arts. Heidegger also points toward some mis-notions about language:

Language is not only and not primarily an audible or written expression of what is to be communicated ... Language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time ... Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nominates beings 'to' their Being 'from out' of their Being".²²

Heidegger expresses here the basic findings of his thought about language which is one of the major concerns of his later work. He points out further that the language's "saying" is a "projecting" that is "the release of a throw by which

unconcealedness submits and infuses itself into what is as such". "Projective saying is poetry: the saying of world and earth".. Actual language is a happening of his saying.

The author is hinting at the common nature of the happening of truth, poetry, language and the world. Actual language, he says, is the happening of the happening of a projective saying that is poetry, which is an original naming and bringing forth of beings into unconcealment. In other words, language itself is poetry; poesy is the most original form of poetry; and poetry is the happening of truth; and this explains why art is poetry.

Art, which may now be called "poetic projection", is said to be a founding of truth by Heidegger in the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning. Preserving, or transporting of oneself into the uncommon disclosure in the art-work, is also poetic and has corresponding modes of the founding. Art is a founding of truth as bestowal because the truth that happens in work is an original grant. The poetic projection is the disclosure of that "into which human being as historical is already cast" or the "earth" of a historical people. Hence, it is a founding as grounding. This bestowal, and grounding have also a character of a beginning. "The beginning prepares itself for the longest time and wholly inconspicuously, ... is always a head start in which everything to come is already leaped over". Heidegger emphasizes art's historical role. "Whenever art happens ... a thrust enters history".²³

Concluding Remarks

As he investigates the essence (i.e. the way of Being) of art by way of a direct encounter with the art-work as such, Heidegger discovers more about the nature of (man's) world. Whatever new concerning the world is found out in this attempt, does not reject or alter his earlier positions. It only supplements and expands upon the basic insight from a new standpoint. World, here, is thought from the standpoint of the primacy of Being, and in its essential connection with truth and history, in a way that primacy of man in man's world is underemphasized. This does not mean that Heidegger has now "identified" world with Being and truth, and has "modified" his earlier position that world basically belongs to man. As his basic insight attempts to overcome the schism between man and world, brought about by subject-object schema, it also renders the question of the supremacy of one over the other redundant. He nowhere suggests that the world entirely rules over man, nor does he anywhere maintain that man entirely creates the world. The relation between the two is a philosophical problem which cannot be resolved by making such simplistic statements.

In the present attempt, Heidegger attains a new understanding of this relation. He has already pointed out in the early writings that world is not something static; it "happens"; "world never is, it worlds" (p.35). It is the meaning of the worlding of the world that is articulated in this essay on

art-work. It is recognized that man's disclosures of the world happen somewhat differently in the different eras of the history of Being's eventful unfolding (Ereignis). But this does not mean that the very relation of man to his world changes with the changing historical eras; nor has Heidegger in his later thought come to believe that the world that is philosophically problematic is not one but several realities. We often use the term world for a particular world-disclosure such as the world of the Greeks, the world of mathematics, the world of Shakespeare, the world of John Smith, and so forth. In the art-work essay Heidegger too speaks about "the world of the peasant woman", "the world of this historical people", "the opening up of a world". But this does not mean that these worlds either exist or happen irrespective of man's world. They are often meant to be different disclosures of man's world. In Being and Time, Heidegger reserves the term world for "wherein a factual Dasein as such can be said to live" (2.11). In the present attempt too, it is the same world wherein man "can be said to live" that is spoken about, as it worlds itself in different modes of life (e.g. for a peasant) and as it worlds historically.

In this work, Heidegger discovers that a (great) art-work is distinguished from other things and use-things in that it discloses a world and an earth, and thereby discloses man's world and man's earth. What constitutes the essence of the art-work is that truth happens in it i.e. the unconcealment-

concealment process is activated by it. Van Gogh's painting of a pair of shoes shows us how this equipment belongs within the totality of a peasant's world and earth, and at the same time shows us, how a piece of equipment, in its reliable use, belongs within the totality of man's significance. It unfolds world, and world's depth of which we were heretofore oblivious (i.e. the earth). It shows us that the totality of significance is not merely what is open, but is also based on what is still hidden.

Schrag rightly observes in his commentary that this "project of the transvaluation of aesthetics ... is basically of the same cloth as was Heidegger's 'destruction' of the history of western metaphysics".²⁴ As our exposition shows the author wants aestheticians to recognize that the work-being of the work does not lie in its formal aspects but in what the work "says" or shows. It is the relation that the work has to truth and to man's world that constitutes its work-being. Most commentators have stopped short of recognizing that the work, according to Heidegger, discloses the worldhood of "the world" over and above depicting a world and an earth. This view of the author is implicit in his description of the Van Gogh painting, but quite explicit in that of the Greek temple. The temple-work shows us how the world worlded for this historical people. It shows us how a distinct disclosure of the world constituted the "all governing expanse of this open relational context" of these people (p.115). The temple

represented their world, the world that gave "things their look and to men their outlook on themselves" (P.117). "Whenever these decisions of our history that relate to our very Being are made ... there the world worlds" (P.118). That is, in the different epochs of the eventful manifestation of Being, commensurate with distinct happening of truth, the world distinctly worlds for men. Things are rendered meaningful and given value in accordance with the way the world worlds (P.119).

The art-work also shows that alongside the world, there emerges an earth, without which the world will not be able to appear. In the early works, Heidegger spoke of world as a "disclosedness" for man. He has now realized that there is an essential counterpole to this disclosedness because of which it is what it is. Thinking about world from the standpoint of Being necessitates that just as concealedness is recognized as the counterpole and the ground of un-concealedness in the happening of truth, similarly the openness that is man's world must have a counterpole and ground, out of which or in relation with which, the world-disclosure happens. Hence the concept of the earth. To comprehend "world" in its dynamic and historical unfolding requires that its ground that obliges us to take essential decisions, and which presents what-is as something to be comprehended, be recognized. According to Heidegger, in the art-work a strife between world and earth shows itself as taking-place continually. That is why it can show us world worlding itself. Furthermore, the work is a unique disclosure

of the happening of truth; it starts and sustains the unconcealment-concealment process.

It is in accordance with historical imparting (Schickung) of Being that truth happens, maintains Heidegger. Hence, "it is not we who presuppose the unconcealedness, ... rather unconcealedness ... puts us into such a condition ... that ... we always remain installed within ... unconcealedness" (P.122). Twofold concealment, concealing and dissembling itself happens in the truth process. The happening of world and earth (for man) is not the same as the happening of truth, but is a (further) "clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies" (P.123). "World demands its decisiveness and its measure and lets beings attain to the open of their paths" (P.125). Earth is that which necessitates this decisioning, it is the concealed, confusing aspect of man's reality.

The precise connection between the happening of truth and the happening of the world has not been articulated by Heidegger. "This self-establishing of openness (i.e. unconcealment) in the open (i.e. the world) touches a sphere that cannot yet be explicated here" (P.124). But he is quite convinced that "Being by way of its own nature lets the place of openness happen" (P.124). Hence, whereas the priority of Being is recognized, the connection between truth and world is a sphere about which the author keeps his reserve.

It is the "preserving" the work or letting the work assert

its independence, that "transports us into this openness and thus at the same time transports us out of the realm of the ordinary".²⁵ The experience of the truth happening in the art-work is one of "transforming" or "transporting out of" the familiar world which enables us to comprehend the nature of man's world, by showing how the world has worlded for man. This disclosedness is not different from the revealing which occurs in the event of the breakdown of the hammer, or from the disclosure in dread. Only it reveals a little more; it acquaints us with "a specific disclosure" of a world and an earth of a people; it reveals the unique understanding they had of their Being-with. And all this enables us to comprehend how man's world worlds and how man's earth continues to contain within itself other possibilities of the openness of what-is.

Walter Marx in his Heidegger and the Tradition reflects upon the relation between Heidegger's first and later conceptions of the world:

There are tendencies in these (early) determinations that first find articulation in Heidegger's later writings ... World in the later writings is specified precisely in terms of its content ... This concept of world now moves into a closer relation to truth²⁶.

However, the issue of the connection between truth and the world, and that of the historical-worlds, has been widely misinterpreted in the commentaries on the essay. The confusion for the most part is caused by the equation of the unconcealment

with the world. For instance Bartky in her "Heidegger and the world disclosure",²⁷ makes too much out of the author's reference to "the essential ways in which the truth (historically) establishes itself" (P. 124) -- i.e. in the work, in the founding of political state (polis), in the nearness of Being, and in essential sacrifice -- by calling them "the modes of world disclosure". This over-simplification is not abused to the same extent in her more recently published "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art",²⁸ but even here, truth and world have been taken as synonymous terms, and Heidegger's sense of the "world" in this essay has been misunderstood. This is why she cannot apprehend the connection between world and earth "of the art-work" and world and earth "of man", and runs into superficial problems:

As the essay progresses the terms world and earth are expanded so that they no longer refer to the aspects of the art-work alone, but to the revealing and concealing moments of any world-disclosure at all ... there is a ... lack of symmetry between earth as the ... thingly aspect of the work, and the two fold concealment which is part of any disclosure of Being.

A misunderstanding of the sense of Heidegger's basic insight that a (great) work of art reveals man's world and man's earth has led to many radical interpretations. Wode in his "Work of Art in Heidegger"²⁹ concludes that whereas a dialectical relation between Dasein and world is revealed by Being and

Time,

in the contrary, the world of (the origin of

Art-work) is the cultured world, the 'intellectual atmosphere' of a particular people at a specific historical epoch ... It is never a world in general nor for all time.

It is no wonder that Nwodo cannot establish a connection between the world of the peasant woman and that opened up by the Greek Temple. The problem is conveniently attributed to "Heidegger's ambiguity". Heidegger's reference to historical worlds is interpreted as "in the end we need to think of worlds in the plural"³⁰ by Schrag.

It may be observed that Heidegger's conception of history does not posit different historical worlds. As Halliburton remarks "what counts is the Being at issue for Dasein -- whether that Dasein is an individual or a culture e.g. Greek Dasein -- and not the mere succession of events".³¹ It is the "how" of the world, i.e. the "how" of man's elementary decisioning about himself, that a work of (great) art shows us, and that is what distinguishes it from other things. This, in a nutshell, is Heidegger's answer to the age-old question "what is art?".

Notes

1. Heidegger: "The Origin of the Work of Art", p. 44.
2. Ibid., p. 23.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Ibid., p. 31.
5. Ibid., p. 34.
6. Ibid., p. 34.
7. Ibid., p. 39.
8. Ibid., p. 42.
9. Ibid., p. 43.
10. Ibid., p. 43.
11. Ibid., p. 44.
12. Ibid., p. 45.
13. Ibid., p. 46.
14. Ibid., p. 48.
15. Ibid., p. 52.
16. Ibid., p. 55.
17. Ibid., p. 61.
18. Ibid., p. 63.
19. Ibid., p. 66.
20. Ibid., p. 66.
21. Ibid., p. 72.
22. Ibid., p. 73.
23. Ibid., pp. 76, 77.
24. Schrag, C. O. : "The Transvaluation of Aesthetics and the Work of Art", p. 109.

25. Heidegger: "The Origin of the Work of Art", p. 66.
26. Marx, W. : Heidegger and the Tradition, pp. 184, 185.
27. Barck, S. L. : "Heidegger and the Modes of World-Disclosure".
28. Barck, S. L. : "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art", p. 267.
29. Nwodo, C. S. : "The Work of Art in Heidegger: A World Disclosure".
30. Schrag, C. C. : "The Transvaluation of Aesthetics and the Work of Art", p. 118.
31. Halliburton, D. : Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger, p. 33.

CHAPTER V

WORLD AND THE QUEST FOR THOUGHT

In many of his important works, composed between 1930 and 1950, Heidegger refers to the problem of the definition of the world, and continues to reassert his basic insight that Being in a world defines man's Being, and to explicate how the pre-supposed bifurcation of Being into 'res extensa' and 'res cogitans' has prevented modern philosophy from raising the problem of the world from a valid standpoint. His project of a positive destruction of the metaphysical roots of western philosophy, brings him on several occasions to reject the foundations on which the modern concept of the world stands. At all such moments, alongside the critique, he briefly restates his basic position on the problem. No useful purpose will be served by a compilation and reconsideration of all such brief references. Our study must concentrate on more comprehensive treatments, and especially on those in which newer insights into the problem have been secured.

There are some works composed in these creative decades in which new attempts have been made by the author to further investigate what world is and how it functions (essences, 'west'). As we have observed in the previous chapter, world now is rethought in its proximity with truth, history, and

language, as the primacy of Being is asserted in a manner more direct than one embraced in Being and Time. We have also witnessed that the meditation on the Being of the art-work provides Heidegger with an interpretation of the worlding of the world. In the concluding moments of the art-work essay, Heidegger points at the connection between the happening of truth and language (P.127). This connection is further probed in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung - 1936), a lecture-essay composed in the same year as the art-work essay. This work presents some new insights concerning the essential relation between world and language, the first hint about which was given in the discussion of speech (Rede) as disclosedness of Dasein (P.42) in Being and Time. One of the major themes in Heidegger's later writings is to investigate what kind of disclosure language is. These investigations also lead him to declare that a deep connection exists between world and language. An original encounter with Hölderlin's poetry has, in many ways, inspired the manner and the content of Heidegger's investigations in the later works. In "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry", Heidegger explains his attitude toward the poetry of Hölderlin and toward the kinship between thought and poetry. Some assertions concerning the connection between world and language that are made in this essay will be developed further in the works composed in nineteen fifties, in which the problem of the world will receive a renewed attention.

In the present chapter, we will study the basic approaches taken by the author toward the nature of language, poetry, and thinking as they appear in this Hölderlin study. We will also consider another lecture-essay of the period titled "The Age of the World-picture" (Die Zeit des Weltbildes - 1938) in which Heidegger examines the world-concept established by the tradition of metaphysics. A study of these works will not only acquaint us with the new grounds that Heidegger is covering in his attempts to define the world, but also with the basic features of his quest for "thought". We notice now that he is not only seeking to ground all concerns of philosophy in the fundamental concern, but he is also calling for a change in the manner of philosophizing. His own style now shows that he is insistent to bring home "the difference between an object of scholarship and a matter thought".¹

The Poet and the Thinker

The essay "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" contains Heidegger's first thoughtful dialogue with the poetic work of Hölderlin. Heidegger's use of the poetic work of his favourite poets has often aroused surprise in both philosophical and literary circles. Those who do not sympathise with the idea of a kinship between the poet and the thinker, accuse Heidegger of losing the philosophical rigor shown by him in his earlier works, and do not approve of his employment of some odd poems

for gaining ontological insight. Others fail to understand why a serious thinker like Heidegger has chosen to impose the poetry of his favourites such as Hölderlin, Rilke, Trakl, George upon his readers while ignoring the work of more celebrated poets in world literature in his discussions about the essence and role of poetry. At the same time, the literary critics engaged in the consideration of the poetry of the above mentioned poets are dismayed with his interpretations of their poems. According to them, Heidegger hardly pays attention to what the poet himself says and introduces too much foreign and far-fetched thought.

Replies can be found to all these objections in Heidegger's own clarifications included in his works. In the essay "What is Metaphysics" he observes that "poetry and thinking are most purely alike in their care of the word".² In other words, the way language is articulated in their work gives rise to a kinship between the thinker and the poet. He remarks also that "the thinker utters Being, the poet names what is holy ... (and) they dwell near to one another on mountains farthest apart", implying that there is both a similarity and a difference between their tasks. Heidegger also seems to believe that a dialogue between the poet and the thinker is one way thinking can be carried out. It is not, then, illegitimate that the thinker chooses for such dialogue the poets with whose poetry his thought has a kinship. Heidegger maintains that the thinker and the poet in their moment of creativity

receive a gift from Being, which they bring to language in their own peculiar way. They both express in language how beings "are", which gives poetry an ontological function comparable to that of thinking.

The dialogue between the thinker and the poet is, therefore, based on a kinship. The literary comparisons or critical analysis of celebrated poetic works would be of no help in this dialogue. The thinker must be in tune with the poet to an extent that he begins to grasp the gift that the poet has received from Being and has preserved it in language. Hence the thinker's interpretation of the poem is bound to be different from that of a literary critic equipped with the most current theories of criticism, for a literary critic is not a thinker who has a more intimate bond with the poet. It is also in order that the thoughts expressed in the thinker's interpretations are perceived by some as not being merely the poet's own. The thinker's interpretation is as much the thinker's own work as it is of the poet, for in it the thought proceeds as unbridled as the saying of the poet in the poem.

In the preface to Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (1951) Heidegger informs the reader that his interpretations have not been carried out to make contribution toward either literary research or aesthetics but they "arise from a necessity of thought".³ It would not be improper, therefore, to regard Heidegger's elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry, for our purposes, Heidegger's (thoughtful) philosophical works.

Heidegger advances various explanations regarding his choice of Hölderlin in this as well as other essays. But besides these arguments, we cannot miss some obvious sympathies they share. Heidegger is drawn toward Hölderlin because the latter is preoccupied with the essence and role of poetry in human life. He is fascinated by Hölderlin's sense of the holy, his reference to gods who have taken flight and the god who is to come, his historical insight, his love for the homeland which is distinct from mere patriotism, and so forth. In the lecture-essay "what are Poets for" (Wozu Dichter - 1946) Heidegger says:

The poet thinks his way into the locality defined by that lightening of Being which has reached its characteristic shape as the realm of western metaphysics in its self completion. Hölderlin's thinking poetry has had a share in giving its shape to this realm of poetic thinking. His composing dwells in this locality as intimately as no other poetic composition of his time⁴.

The World in Language

In the present study Heidegger seeks to learn about the essence of poetry through reflection on Hölderlin's poetic utterances. Hölderlin is chosen because his poetry "was borne on by the poetic vocation to write expressly of the essence of poetry".⁵ It is in this sense that he calls Hölderlin "the poet of the poet", and explains that his procedure will be to

thoughtfully consider five chosen utterances of the poet on the subject.

The first of these pointers is a quote from one of Hölderlin's letters in which he calls the writing of poetry "that most innocent of occupations". But the author first inquires what is language by reflecting on the second pointer which states "therefore has language, most dangerous of possessions, been given to man ... so that he may affirm what he is ...".⁶ Heidegger wants to learn in what sense language is the possession of man, why is it a dangerous possession, and who is man according to Hölderlin's saying. Interpreting the whole passage from which this quote is taken, he concludes that according to the poet, man is a being who "affirms" what he is i.e. who declares and gives in this declaration a guarantee of what is declared. Man is "heir and learner in all things", and there prevails an "intimacy" which binds things and also keeps them in opposition.

The affirmation of belonging to this 'intimacy' occurs through the creation of a world and its ascent, and likewise through the destruction of a world and its decline. The affirmation of human existence and hence its essential consummation occurs through freedom of decision. This freedom lays hold of the necessary and places itself in bonds of a supreme obligation. This bearing witness of belonging to all that is existent becomes actual as history. In order that history may be possible language has been given to man?

What Heidegger is pointing out is that language is the chief possession of man. Man is man because he has language. Man

affirms what he is, in and through language. He belongs to an intimacy among things and is "heir" of all things for he is a special entity which is able to "learn" what the Being of other entities means because he possesses language. The affirmation of his existence, the very way he realizes his existence is made possible by language and is rooted in a free decision within language. Man belongs to the "intimacy", or a meaningful order, through the rise and fall of his world. In other words, man belongs to things and comes nearer to or far from things because the possession of language enables him to have a world, the nature of which is to arise and decline. By "ascent and decline", "creation and destruction" Heidegger implies that world is not an ever present collection of all existent entities. Rather the world, in a sense, emerges in man's affirmation of the existence which takes place in language, and it is by having an understanding of the world arisen through language that man belongs to things. Furthermore, Heidegger maintains that as man witnesses his peculiar belonging to entities history presents itself; history is a perception of man of his differing ways of belonging to entities in different eras. But man realizes i.e. confronts, attains, and at the same time comprehends and declares, in a word, "affirms" his belonging to things in and through language. Hence if there was no language, there would not have been any history. Here is articulated once again the essential connection among world, history, and language.

Why has language been called the most dangerous of possessions by Hölderlin? Heidegger thinks that it is because the very possibility of any danger is founded on language. For it is by virtue of language that things become existent or remain non-existent for man. An existing thing can "afflict or enflame", and a non-existing one can "deceive or disappoint" man because man has language. Moreover, as language manifests beings, it also preserves this manifestation. It presents itself in "an appearance which it itself attests". Hence in language the "genuine saying" is always endangered. The author emphasizes that language is not just one of the possessions (gut) that man has. The essence of language does not exhaust itself in being a means to give information. Rather

It is only language that affords the very possibility of standing in the openness of the existent. Only where there is language is there world i.e. the perpetually altering circuit of decision and production, of action and responsibility, but also of commotion and arbitrariness, of decay and confusion. Only where world predominates, is there history.

"It is pointed out that language is a fundamental possession of man for it is by virtue of language that he can exist as a worldly and as a historical being. By pointing at the elementary relationship between man's having language and his Being in a world, Heidegger gives us another penetrating definition of the world. It is, he finds, "the perpetually altering circuit of decision and production, of action and responsibility". He means to say that the world is not a

static summation of all existents, but a continually changing circuit established through a process of decision-taking and production or coming into Being. For, naming of a being is a decision as well as a coming into Being. Such decision-taking, and establishing of something as "something" is an activity that carries with it a responsibility, for, as pointed out above, language presents "an appearance which it itself attests". However, the paths of this circuit are never entirely visible or objectively available. Since we understand the world through language, and since language carries with it an ambiguity by continuing to keep the existent concealed while establishing it in unconcealment, the world is also a circuit of "commotion and arbitrariness, of decay and confusion". It presents itself as an enigma to be unraveled through language, and the attempts to apprehend it are founded on arbitrary decisions taken by men in and through language. In reaching such decisions, in comprehending his world, man produces as well as destroys, affirms as well as discounts.

Next, Heidegger asserts that "only where world predominates, is there history". By this statement he implies that there exists a fundamental relation between the happening of world and that of history. As he has also hinted in the art-work essay, history becomes actual whenever man comprehends his world more essentially and more singularly. In other words, whenever man understands himself, and his own open sphere of existence, his role or purpose within this sphere, and acts

in cognizance of this knowledge, in a word, when his world predominates, history comes into Being.

The third saying of Hölderlin interpreted by Heidegger runs as follows:

Much has man learnt
Many of the heavenly ones has he named
Since we have been a conversation
And have been able to hear from one another⁹.

Hölderlin is taken to mean that mankind are a "conversation", for language is actualized in conversation. It is the conversation i.e. "the act of speaking with others about something" that brings men together. According to Heidegger's reading of the fourth line, in conversation "the ability to speak and the ability to hear are equally fundamental". To those who converse there is always disclosed a structure on which they agree and on the basis of which they are themselves. By "we have been" instead of "we are" Heidegger understands that mankind has been a conversation "ever since the time arose". For conversation to take place, the essential word has to be "constantly related to one and the same", which requires something perpetual and permanent". The first two lines are interpreted as follows.

Since language really became actual as conversation, the gods have acquired names and a world has appeared ... It is precisely in the naming of the gods, and in the transmutation of the world into word, that the real conversation, which we ourselves are, consists¹⁰.

The author maintains that language made it possible for man to

name the gods and to have a world. The actualization of language enabled man to respond to the divine claim as he named the gods. Heidegger uses the expressions like "gods brought our existence to language" or "gods led us into conversation" to convey the insight that neither the origin and nor the actualization of language is an entirely human affair. It is also emphasized that the actualization of language began with the naming of the gods. That is, this actualization was contemporaneous with the appearance of a world, and with the naming of the gods. Conversation took place, and still takes place as the world is "transmuted" into the word. Once again Heidegger indicates that the world is inseparable from language; holding a discourse is a "transmutation" of the world into the word. Comprehension of the world constitutes the actualization of language.

The fourth saying of Hölderlin that Heidegger reflects upon is: "But that which remains is established by the poets".¹¹ This saying, according to him, answers the questions such as who names the gods, and who apprehends the permanent and fixes it in the word. It is the poet who "names the gods and names all things in that which they are". In poet's naming "the existent is nominated as what it is". In other words, an original coming into Being takes place in poet's speech. Hence, poetry has a status higher than the sciences which deal derivatively with beings that are already present. Poetry is "the establishing of Being by means of the word".

To meditate further on the essence of poetry, Heidegger considers the fifth pointer from Hölderlin's sayings, which becomes the subject of a full lecture-essay delivered in 1951. This poetic utterance of Hölderlin runs: "Full of merit and yet poetically, dwells Man on this earth".¹² The poet is understood as saying that what man pursues in this life is meritorious, yet human existence is fundamentally poetic. To dwell poetically signifies "to stand in the presence of the gods and to be involved in the proximity of the essence of things". Existence is poetical" also means that existence is a "gift" not a recompense. In other words, existence is not a reward of man's meritorious actions, nor is it a product of man's will, but is a gift given to man whereby man feels the presence of the divine, possesses language, and lives in the proximity of things. Since man's belonging to things is a gift of language, and language came to him alongside the naming of the gods, his existence is poetic. Heidegger regards poetry as more fundamental than language, for he maintains that "it is poetry which first makes language possible".

Interpreting various poetic utterances of Hölderlin, Heidegger further concludes that the poet both receives and gives for he acts as a mediator between gods and the people. The poet is exposed to the divine message which he passes on to the people "wrapped in song". In genuine poetry the foundation of man's existence is revealed. It is only those who regard the

visible world as the most real who think that poetry is a fanciful and unrealistic venture.

Poetry rouses the appearance of the unreal and of dream in the face of the palpable and clamorous reality, in which we believe ourselves at home. And yet in just the reverse manner, what the poet says and undertakes to be is the real¹³.

The Dominant World-Concept

The lecture-essay "The Age of the World-picture" does not provide us with any new insights into Heidegger's own concept of the world. It is, nevertheless, an important work for it identifies the far reaching implications of the dominant world-concept established by western metaphysics. The author maintains that the positing of man as the "subject" has resulted in the modern age becoming "the age of the world-picture". For the establishment of man as subject Descartes is held responsible for the most part. This lecture comes as a sequel to the critique of the Cartesian concept of the world in Being and Time. At the outset, it is asserted that "metaphysics grounds an age". That is,

Through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age¹⁴.

Hence in order to understand the phenomena that distinguish the modern age we must comprehend their metaphysical basis. This

is to be accomplished through "reflection", that is, the courage to question our presuppositions and goals.

Heidegger names some essential phenomena that distinguish the modern age: science, machine technology, art viewed through aesthetics, the perception of human activity as culture, and the loss of the gods. He chooses to reflect on the phenomenon of science in depth for he believes that if we can reach the metaphysical ground of modern science, the essence of this age can be viewed from that ground. The author points out that today's science is essentially different from medieval "scientia" and from the Greek "episteme". And "essentially different" does not mean different in terms of degree or different in terms of progress. Unlike the ancient and medieval science, the essence of science today is "research", and the essence of research lies in the fact that knowing has established itself as a "procedure".

This procedure functions in an open sphere which is already established through a projection of a ground plan (Grundriss) within a region of what-is. Projection and rigor develop into a "methodology" which constitutes another characteristic of research. Since every science grounds itself in a distinct object-sphere, every science has an individualized character. Specialization is the foundation not the consequence of research. Modern science is also characterised by an "ongoing activity". Sciences today do not earn respect unless they are institutionalized. Hence,

Knowing as research calls whatever is to account with regard to the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the disposal of representation ... Nature and history become the objects of representing that explains¹⁵.

When science becomes research, the Being of a being is sought in its objectiveness and only that which is perceived as an object is considered to be in Being. The author believes that science could become research because the concept of truth had already become the certainty of representation. Modern metaphysics continues to follow the Cartesian interpretation of Being and of truth. The modifications of the Cartesian position attained in German philosophy since Leibniz simply expand its metaphysical scope. They do not overcome it.

In the modern age, "man frees himself from the bonds of the middle ages in freeing himself to himself".¹⁶ This happening has to be understood in its wider implications. The modern age has not only introduced subjectivism and individualism but also objectivism and collectivism. To understand what is different in the new age we must observe "the necessary interplay between subjectivism and objectivism". What is decisive is that man has become a "subject", and his essence is understood differently. The Greek equivalent of "subjectum" i.e. "hypokeimenon" meant "that-which-lies-before", which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself had no special relationship to man, maintains Heidegger.

But now man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the

manner of its Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational centre of that which is as such¹⁷.

Thinking about the modern age is thinking about the world picture. Heidegger wants to employ a signification of the term "weltbild" that was current in the nineteenth century philosophy whereby it meant "a conception of the world" or "a worldview" or "a philosophy of life". By suggesting that we should reflect upon the "modern world picture" he is indicating that the world, in this age, is conceived and regarded as a picture. The term "world" here is used as "a name for what is in its entirety", i.e. not only Nature but also history.

Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirety, is juxtaposed as that for which man is prepared, and which correspondingly, he therefore intends to bring before himself and have before himself¹⁸.

In other words, man has entered into a peculiar and decided position regarding what-is in the modern age in which the Being of what-is is established in the representation of what-is. This conception of what-is necessitates that the world lies before man to be comprehended, and in a sense, to be conquered in his representation.

The fact that world has become a picture distinguishes the modern age. One of its implications is that the "system" dominates. System does not mean merely a simplification of the given, but the unity of the structure of representations, of the projected objectivity. Another consequence of man's Being

'subjectum' is that he begins to impart values to the objects. The loss of Being that the object of representing undergoes is compensated for by man when he imparts value to the object, and measures whatever is by value, and regards values themselves as the goal of all activity.

Heidegger points out that in contrast to the modern age, the middle ages, and the age of the Greeks had different interpretations of what-is. It is only in the modern age that world becomes a picture. In the middle age, what-is was considered to be the creation of the creator God, the highest cause. To be in Being meant to belong within a rank of the order of what has been created. The Being of what is did not lie in the sole fact that it is subject to man's knowledge and disposal. The modern outlook is even more distinct from the one held by the Greeks. To illustrate it Heidegger quotes a fragment of Parmenides i.e. "To gar auto noein estin te kai einai", which is usually translated as "for thought and Being are the same thing". According to Heidegger this saying means:

The apprehending of whatever is belongs to Being because it is demanded and determined by Being. That which is, is that which arises and opens itself, which, as what presences, comes upon man as the one who presences¹⁹.

The Greeks did not think that what is comes into Being because man represents it. Rather man is the one who is "gathered toward presencing by that which opens itself".

But the newness of this happening is not that man's position

in the midst what is has changed.

What is decisive is³ that man himself expressly takes up this position as one constituted by himself, that he intentionally maintains it as that taken up by himself, and he makes it secure as the solid footing for a possible development of humanity²⁰.

This has given rise to a way of being "human" which involves measuring and executing whatever is so that man can gain mastery. The more the world is conquered, the more objectively the object is known, the more is the "subjectum" established, and the more does the observation of the world become a doctrine of man or anthropology. This anthropological interpretation of the world not only brought about "humanism" as a dominant endeavor but the position taken by man regarding what-is as a whole was called "worldview" (Weltanschauung) in the late eighteenth century. The term has gained currency in the modern philosophy since then. Later, the term was also employed to mean "view of life", which again indicates its anthropological ground. The coinage and use of these terms is in harmony with the conception of the world as picture, Heidegger observes. Man's view of himself as a being who gives the measure and guides the course of everything, also results in a "confrontation of world-views".

For the sake of this struggle of world-views and in keeping with its meaning, man brings into play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning, and moulding of all things ... With this ... the modern age first enters into the part of its history that is the most decisive²¹.

Concluding Remarks

As Heidegger's way of philosophizing proceeds to carry out the task of "thinking", his manner of positing and resolving a problem becomes even more untraditional than one adopted in

Being and Time. Contemplation on the aspect of Being that is discourse (Logos) leads him to believe that the task of a thinker has an affinity with that of a Poet, for they interpret the original Saying of language, and in giving word to it, perform an ontological function. Heidegger does not mean to say that no difference exists between thinking and poetizing, nor does he mean that all so-called philosophers and all so-called poets are akin to each other. The grounds of his overwhelming faith in poetry and the poets, lie in his perception that the concern of "thinking" is realized in the "poetry" of the poets like Hölderlin. He seems to believe that the fundamental ontology is in a way better accomplished in the words of such poets than in the work of a philosopher-metaphysician. Hence Heidegger's curious method of taking departure from poetic utterances, to think about a philosophical problem. According to Werner Marx it is Heidegger's decisive view that

Western thinking has hitherto thought of neither the clearing nor the occurrence of presencing of that which is present in that clearing. To think it becomes in a 'special' sense the matter and the task of thinking²².

It is the realization this task of thinking which brings

Heidegger in the proximity of poetry. It is obviously a radical approach toward poetry as well as philosophy. It is also the reason why Heidegger's achievement remains at a different level from that of philosophers who have dealt with more specific philosophical issues, by removing their thought ahead of and far from the "occurrence of presencing".

We notice that Heidegger's thought remains at a level so general (i.e. fundamental) that his achievement, notwithstanding its importance, fails to satisfy those who are seeking more specific answers to more specific problems. This is the reason that his insight concerning the precise connection between language and the world too, remains at a general level. However it is his conviction that to deal with the generality that is Being is the distinguished task of philosophy.

In "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry", further insights into the problem of the definition of the world are gained. As language is acknowledged to be the possession that makes man "man", it is explained that by speaking man affirms i.e. comprehends, declares and at the same time, upholds, how he is and how beings are, as a world arises and declines (P. 145). This affirmation of human existence which is at the same time, an attainment of it "occurs through freedom of decision". For in the arising of a world elementary decisions concerning the "how" of existence are taken, and are taken within language. This is the way Heidegger explains the historical unfolding of the worlding of the world also referred to in the art-work

essay, and emphatically declares "only where there is language is there the world". A new definition is phrased as follows: "The perpetually altering circuit of decision and production, of action and responsibility ... " (P. 147). This articulation of the world has been rightly called "the specification of the world in terms of its content" by Werner Marx (P. 134). Whereas in Being and Time, the structure and the fact of man's Being in a world was explicated, in the later works, the actualization or the coming into Being of the content of the world has been the theme. In other words, after defining the world as the horizon within and on the basis of which man exists as man, i.e. after spelling out the "form" of man-world relation, the worlding of the world, or the "content" of man-world relation is now articulated. As the traditional definition of world as a totality of beings that are present is rejected, and the world is described as a wholeness that functions to let presencing occur for man, it becomes necessary to explicate the coming into Being or the worlding of the world. If the world is not to be described by merely affirming that "world is", then it has to be described "how it worlds".

After explaining in the art-work essay that world's worlding is concomitant with the unfolding of the history, i.e. of the history of Being, and that the world's worlding has to do with the taking of elementary decisions, it is now observed in this Hölderlin study that this taking of decision takes place in language, and the poet plays his role in this affirma-

tion of reality. Language both facilitates and necessitates the taking of decisions so that a world may arise, for language also conceals while it unconceals existence.

We may once again observe that Heidegger's reference to "a world" or "worlds" does not posit the existence of several independent historical worlds, or several independent totalities. By adopting this common expression he is alluding to the several actualizations of man's world. By asserting "only where world predominates is there history", he means that whenever a new actualization of the world is accomplished, by basic and decisive affirmation of existence, and an old actualization is replaced, there history takes place, there Being is singularly interpreted. Hence the present definition further articulates relation between world and language and between world and history.

The connection between language and the world is further referred to as "transmutation of world into word", (P. 149) meaning thereby that arising of the world and speaking of the language do have a common ground, for Saying already comprehends world, and at the same time gives rise to the world. In the saying of the poet, language carries out this task originally. Heidegger believes that poetry enables the ontological potential of language to emerge more originally than the ordinary language which can be called a used-up poem. Poetry's power to proffer a world is not emphasized at this stage but in the works composed in the fifties (Chapter VII), it is

clearly asserted.

In the lecture-essay "The Age of the World picture", Heidegger points toward the far reaching implications of the definition of the world that has been posited by modern philosophy, and which remains dominant in all departments of knowledge especially science in our age. This conception of the world, the rejection of which is the very ground of Heidegger's definition, has by bifurcating Being into 'res extensa' and 'res cogitans', brought about an outlook in which world, in a way, stands like a picture before man. This view of the world which is distinguished from that of the ancient and the medieval conceptions has resulted in man's "freeing of himself to himself" (P. 154) and in the positing of "individualism and subjectivism" and at the same time of "collectivism and objectivism" as the focal points of man's understanding of his reality. Man unquestionably assumes himself as the being upon whose representation the Being of whatever-is depends, and assumes this by refusing to acknowledge any other grounds for the Being of what-is. Man engages in over-simplifying reality by devising "systems" to comprehend as well as control all objectivity. The objects are given values according to their utility for man. Based on his self-established supreme status, man embarks on a course of "humanism" as the highest value. He does not distinguish between a "world-view" and a "view of life", and regards the totality of beings as a something to be calculated, mastered, and conquered.

It is implied in this identification of the implications of

the modern world-concept that the presuppositions of metaphysics have not only left redundant the fundamental question of philosophy but have also shaped the basic outlook of man toward his relation with the totality of beings. This once again illustrates Heidegger's contention that world worlds differently in different eras. It is also implied that the dominant concept not only resolves the problem of the definition of the world from shaky presuppositions but does not even pose the problem properly.

Heidegger's own explication of the phenomenon of the world, and the articulation of its worlding in connection with truth (in the art-work essay) and with language (in this Hölderlin study) is part of his resolve to encounter in thinking "the occurrence of the presencing of that which is present" (P. 158). By regarding this occurrence as problematic, which metaphysics regards as self-evident, Heidegger emphasizes that it is important for thought to dwell upon it. To ignore this "happening" is not only a forgetfulness of philosophy's first task but also highly presumptuous. Since this issue has been forsaken in Western thought all the way through its ancient, medieval and modern periods, no suitable terminology is available to articulate this occurrence. Throughout his career Heidegger has endeavored to create new terms to explain the various moments, elements, and subtle distinctions in the process of this occurrence. We will defeat the purposes of Heidegger by removing the very distinctions he posits, and equating with each other

the terms he employs, to explicate the different aspects of this happening. It is simplistic to say that for Heidegger Being and the world is the same thing, and that the clearing, unconcealment, truth, presencing, arising of the world, and the historical happening, are the different names for the same happening. It is true that all these aspects of the presencing of Being have a common ground, but it seems to us that Heidegger wants to "posit" their distinctions rather than "nullify" them. If he was convinced that Being, truth, and world is the same thing he could very well have stated it. The reason he never does so is that he wants to make the issue of their interconnection more problematic and show that it is not easy to resolve such matters. It is in conformity with his conviction that "it is in the very nature of philosophy never to make things easier but only more difficult" by restoring to things "their weight".²³ It is because of these reasons that we cannot accept the following speculation of Werner Marx:

It seems to us that it is now Heidegger's intention to think of Being in general simply as world. Supporting this interpretation is perhaps his proposal to give up the alienating and separating word 'Being' just as decisively as the term 'man'.²⁴

By thinking of Being as world, Heidegger would only be defeating his own purpose, for it would entail that man is prior to Being. The reason that he crosses out "Being" rather than replace it with "world" in The Question of Being (Zur Seinsfrage)²⁵ is that the word "Being" seems to singularize and

alienate Being from beings, and Being from man. What he wants to emphasize is that Being participates in the coming into Being of things and man, it is not something separate with which they "relate".

By pointing toward the connection between linguistic articulation and world, Heidegger is not simply repeating the Greek experience of Being as "logos" but is taking it a step forward. World, which is admittedly "man's horizon", arises as Being is linguistically articulated. Man has world and has language so as to function as man and so as to interact with other men and things. Of course this insight is based on the presupposition that Being and Saying have a common ground, which was asserted by both Greek and the Hindu philosophical traditions. Heidegger's elaboration of this insight asserts that language belongs essentially to Being, and has an ontological role. Furthermore, since language expresses itself originally in poetry, he thinks common language is a used-up poem.

Why the origin of common language is poetry and poetry only, this Heidegger has not been able to substantiate. According to his own explanation the true origin of language is Being. Man speaks existentially i.e. he speaks and meaning is granted to things and Being-with. It may also be vice-versa. Man exists and therefore speaks. Existence impels him to speak as well as poetize (i.e. speak originally). It could be argued that speaking and poetizing are just two "ways of expressing".

the disclosedness of existence. Why is one way the origin of the other? The assertion that poetizing is more disclosive than speaking, is a valid one, but it still does not make poetizing the origin of common speech.

Our objection pertains merely to the description of common language as "a used-up poem". That poetic expression is more original and more disclosive cannot be denied. Heidegger's use of poetry for thought has a legitimacy even though this method is very unconventional. In support of Heidegger's assertion about the affinity between the poet and the thinker, Kockelmans explicates their ontological role as follows:

Fully realizing the tension (polemos) that lies at the root of the identity and difference of any concrete world and Being itself, they formulate their responses in such a way that every 'needless' limitation found in this world and language will be overcome²⁶.

Notes

1. Heidegger: The Thinker as Poet, p. 5.
2. Heidegger: "What is Metaphysics", p. 360.
3. Heidegger: "Remembrance of the Poet", p. 232.
4. Heidegger: "What are Poets for", p. 95.
5. Heidegger: "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry", p. 271.
6. Ibid., p. 273.
7. Ibid., p. 274.
8. Ibid., p. 276.
9. Ibid., p. 277.
10. Ibid., p. 279.
11. Ibid., p. 280.
12. Ibid., p. 282.
13. Ibid., p. 286.
14. Heidegger: "The Age of the World Picture", p. 115.
15. Ibid., p. 126.
16. Ibid., p. 127.
17. Ibid., p. 128.
18. Ibid., p. 129.
19. Ibid., p. 130.
20. Ibid., p. 132.
21. Ibid., p. 135.
22. Marx, W. : "Thinking and its Matter", p. 38.
23. Heidegger: An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 11.
24. Marx, W. : Heidegger and the Tradition, p. 191.

25. Heidegger: The Question of Being, p. 77.

26. Kockelmans, J. J. : On the Truth of Being, p. 207.

CHAPTER VI

WORLD AND MAN'S DWELLING

In several works composed in the nineteen fifties Heidegger raises the question concerning world with a renewed vigour. As we have observed in the previous chapter, in the works composed between 1937 and 1950, no new insight into the problem was obtained but rather the basic position was restated alongside the critiques of the modern world-concept¹. In some of the important lecture-essays delivered in the fifties, which we will consider in the present and the next chapters, new grounds are covered in raising, comprehending and resolving the problem of the world. These essays in themselves are at the summit of Heidegger's work, and reflect that, while his confrontation with the tradition is as resolute as ever, his inquiry has matured itself in the craft of "thinking", by removing itself away, as far as possible, from the metaphysical "philosophizing".

With regard to the definition of the world as such, these works seek to unfold further the meaning of the worlding of the world, and further comprehend the connection between world and language. The essencing or/happening of the world is articulated now through the "mirror-play of the fourfold" (Geviert), since the "worlding" as such cannot be expressed in traditional terms, i.e. in terms of causes and reasons.

The lecture-essays of the period in which the problem of the world is comprehensively treated are: "The Thing" (Das Ding-1950), "Building Dwelling Thinking" (Bauen Wohnen Denken-1951), and "Poetically man dwells" (... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ... 1951). We will consider these works in this chapter, and in the next some essays on the nature of language, also composed in this period. Heidegger's labors in these investigations point out the difficulties a thinker faces in articulating what worlding of the world means, and the limitations of knowledge in this sphere. They also convey the fact that Heidegger's own insights are far from having said the last word on the issue, and that his efforts are for the most part directed at defining the problem from newer standpoints, and at initiating inquiry in this region.

As observed above, in these works Heidegger "thinks" rather than "philosophize". He not only calls for thinking, but actually carries it out in these exercises. From a traditional view, a work of this nature seems to be a string of Heidegger's assertions. To verify these assertions from a traditional standard or manner of evaluation is both unfair and simplistic. A fair evaluation would require a considerable work in which not only the author's but our own presuppositions are brought to surface, and the problem is encountered to outline the possibilities of its resolution. A first step toward an authentic evaluation is to articulate what Heidegger means to say, which requires a

patient listening and appreciation for the unconventional.

The fundamental point of departure, which philosophy according to him, has forgotten and forsaken in its metaphysical advance, compels Heidegger to "think" in the way that he does, and present the gains of his thinking in the manner that he does. About his inquiry and about his expression in these works, he observes:

Everything here is the part of a responding that examines as it listens ...
In thinking of Being, it is never the case that only something actual is represented in our minds and then given out as that which alone is true ...
I can provide no credentials for what I have said ... that would permit a convenient check in each case whether what I say agrees with "reality" ².

The Thing Things World

Heidegger has reflected over the question concerning the thing, as we have seen, in "Origin of the Art-work" (1935) and in his lecture-course entitled "Grundfragen der Metaphysik" (1935-36) which was later published as Die Frage nach dem Ding (1962). In the essay on art-work, as well as in the lecture-course, which examines Kant's position in detail, he expresses his dissatisfaction over the way the question "what is a thing" has been resolved in ancient — i.e. by Plato and Aristotle — and in the modern eras of philosophy. In the essay "The Thing", Heidegger makes yet another attempt to

resolve the age old question taking its cue from the fact that "things" have given way to a multiplicity of "objects" in the present age of technology.

In the present times, "all distances in space and time are shrinking".³ We are able to travel to distant corners of the world in a shorter time and to communicate instantly today. Nevertheless, the "nearness of things remains absent". What does this nearness mean? It cannot be known directly, but we must learn about it by thinking about a thing that is near. Heidegger takes the example of a jug. A jug is a container which may contain something in it. However the thingly character of the jug-thing does not lie in its being a represented object, for manifestly it is a thing that stands on its own. It is also something that has been produced and given self-support. But neither the objectivity nor the self-support would enable us to understand the thingness of this thing. It is not a thing because it was made; rather it had to be made because it is this container. It might be said that in course of its making the jug shows its "outward appearance" or idea (eidos) to the maker. But "idea" cannot explain the what and how of the thing.

We often call a thing "object" or "what stands forth". Standing forth has a sense of stemming from somewhere i.e. either it is self-evolving or made by another. Standing forth also conveys a sense of unconcealedness of something present. Nevertheless, the representation of what stands forth cannot lead us to thing qua thing. A jug's thingness has to do with

its Being qua vessel. Heidegger emphasizes the "holding nature" of the jug. It is the void of the jug that holds, let us say, the wine. The scientific explanation would say that there is no void; rather the air that fills the jug is replaced by a liquid. But science is of no help in showing us the thinghood of things, for science annihilates thing as thing by turning it into an object. "This has happened and continues to happen so essentially that not only are things no longer admitted as things, but they have never yet at all been able to appear to thinking as things".⁴

We must pay attention to what the jug holds and how it holds. Holding is twofold: taking in and keeping in (of, say, wine). But it is a jug for the "outpouring". Its thing character has to do with giving, pouring out. The author's affirmations imply that the thinghood of a thing does not lie entirely in the matter and form of an entity but in its "gathering" involvement in (man's) world. The thinghood of the jug unfolds itself only when we dwell upon its Being as a vessel from which the gift of wine is poured out for mortals.

The spring stays on in the water of the gift ... In the water of the spring dwells the marriage of sky and earth ... In the gift of water, in the gift of wine, sky and earth dwell ... In the jugness of the jug, sky and earth dwell ... But the jug's gift is at times also given for consecration ... the outpouring is the libation poured out for the immortal gods⁵.

What Heidegger is pointing out is that a thing does not exist in isolation or irrespective of other entities but belongs to

the unity of man's world in a way that man's involvement with it gathers together the disparate aspects of the world, so that man dwells in nearness to things. A "thing" is one which shows itself as a meaningful element of man's world and enables man to carry out the significant tasks of his Being in his world. It is as if the world converges on this thing, as it is employed by man to perform a meaningful task such as paying homage to the gods. The way things carried significance to man before the annihilation of the thing took place, shows us how "in the jugness of the jug sky and earth (did) dwell", how in the gift of wine, the world of man arose, how everything merged in a wholeness, how the divine was acknowledged as divine and as immortal, and how man's existence was accepted as wedded to death. The thinghood of the jug does not merely lie in its equipmental Being but in its Being that gathers in itself the wholeness of man's world.

In the gift of the outpouring that is drink, mortals stay in their own way. In the gift of the outpouring that is libation the divinities stay in their own way, ... mortals and divinities each dwell in their different ways. Earth and sky dwell in the gift of the outpouring. In the gift of the outpouring, earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell 'together all at once' 6.

What Heidegger wants to convey is that as man was engaged in an original existential act such as offering libation to gods, it was if in this outpouring of wine, man's world defined itself or its essential aspects appeared in their precise significances. In this act of outpouring the wholeness of man's world emerged.

and yet the different aspects or different grounds of his existence received their essentially different meanings. This act defined the difference between the mortal man and immortal gods, and led to an acknowledgement of the divine. The distinction as well as the essential belongingness between the earth and the sky, too came to the fore. It was as if the mutual belongingness of the earth and sky, divinities and mortals appeared and made sense in the performance of this act.

Heidegger's use of the present tense in this description indicates that he believes that although things have been transformed into objects in our times yet man cannot be described to have lost the possibility of essential dwelling in the fourfold or his poetic dwelling in the world.

It is further affirmed by the author that the outpouring is a gift because it "whiles" (verweilt) earth and sky, divinities and mortals. This whiling is not mere "persisting" but an "appropriating" which brings the four into their belongingness so that they are unconcealed. The gift whiles the onefold of the fourfold, as the jug presences as jug.

The thing things. Thinging gathers.
appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the
fourfold's stay, its while, into something
that stays for a while: into this thing,
that thing?

The nature of the jug as a thing also explains the nature of "nearness". In whiling the four, the earth and sky, the divinities and mortals, the thing brings them near to each other. This is nearing. But this is a nearing that preserves

the farness. Nearness, in thinging, remains "at work in bringing near". It is implied that thinging is a happening; it is not something already settled, something static. Heidegger repeatedly stresses that the thing whiles the onefold of the fourfold and as we refer to "one" we already think of the other three. The meaning of each one of the four is articulated as follows:

Earth is the building bearer, nourishing with its fruits, tending water and rock, plant and animal

The sky is the sun's path, the course of the moon, the glitter of the stars, the year's seasons ...

The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the hidden sway of the divinities the god emerges as what he is ...

The mortals are human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death.⁸

How precisely has Heidegger defined these four aspects of the worlding of the world is a matter of speculation. But some of his purposes are manifest in this peculiar expression of his thought. First of all, he is articulating the four aspects of the world, and not the four aspects of Being, as Richardson has interpreted⁹. We do not mean to say that Being is not at issue in all this, but the major reason for introducing this metaphor is to explain the worlding of the world which is inexpressible in the traditional way of defining as such. That the fourfold has to do with the world is stated again and again by Heidegger, in the essays we are considering, without clearly

explaining the connection between world and Being. Secondly, the metaphor allows the author to express this happening as an "essencing" of the world, as opposed to the "essence" which fails to consider the connection of the worlding with the temporalizing of man. Heidegger wants to impress upon us that "world never is, it worlds". Thirdly, this expression permits the author to destroy the ontological priority of one aspect over the other, especially that of man over the world. World here is not thought from the standpoint of man, nor is earth taken as more real than sky, nor does this conception of man give the illusion that man himself is god. Fourthly, the identity and difference, among these aspects, are thought as founding each other. None of the four is exclusive of the other three. The distinctions between them are not strict, and are not comparable to the distinction between one entity and the other. In other words, all presuppositions of the traditional manner of "defining" something are avoided purposely here.

In the author's descriptions of the Being of the earth and sky, divinities and mortals, his earlier conceptions are developed and investigated further. It is the same earth that was articulated in the essay on art-work, the earth that is building bearer, the ground of beings that are unconcealed. It is not a mere counterpole of the world, but now more precisely understood as an aspect of the worlding process. Sky is the new counterpole of the earth that represents the undetermined, uncertain aspect of what-is or what could be. It is that against

which what is determined can be measured. Divinities are the embodiments of the divine, against which man measures himself, and in distinction with their immortality, knows and accepts his mortality. Mortal is he who contemplates death, accepts the possibility of the impossibility of his existence. Thought about death is developed here further than that in Being and Time:

Death is the shrine of Nothing ... (It) harbors within itself the presencing of Being ... Death is the shelter of Being ... Mortals are who they are, as mortals, present in the shelter of Being. They are the presencing relation to Being as Being¹⁰.

A new conception of man has now been adopted. Man is not an animal that is rational, but a being who "becomes mortal". Death really enables man to comprehend his relation to Being i.e. himself as there-being (Da-Sein), and to understand that he is a presencing being. Just as Nothingness functions presencingly alongside Being, death functions alongside man's existence. Hence man is more appropriately defined as mortal. The author further describes the fourfold:

Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the others ... Mirroring in this appropriating - lightening way, each of the four plays to each of the others

This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals, we call the world. The world presences by worlding. That means: world's worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor can it be fathomed through anything else ... 11.

By using the metaphor of light for unconcealment, and by taking Being in the sense of presencing, the author attempts to explain the worlding of the world as the mirror-play of the foursome. "The inexplicable and unfathomable character of the world's worlding lies in this that causes and reasons remain unsuitable". What is to be understood is the "simplicity of the simple onefold of worlding", that, the "human will to 'explain' just does not reach". In reality, the four are "grounded in and explained by one another".

Out of the ringing mirror-play, the thinging of the thing takes place. The thing whiles — gathers and unites — the fourfold. The thing things world ...
If we let the thing be present in its thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking of the thing as thing ¹².

When thing is thought as thing, the region from which it presences is "spared and protected". "Thinging is the nearing of world". The present age is suffering from a "default of nearness" and thing as thing remains annihilated. When do things appear as things? They do not appear by human design. But in the "vigilance of mortals" in which a retreat from the representational thinking, and advance toward "thinking" is made, thinghood of things can be understood. Heidegger also observes that in contrast to the countless objects and living beings, the things are modest in number. But it is only by dwelling that things are experienced as things.

Men alone, as mortals, by dwelling attain to the world as world. Only what conjoins itself out of world becomes a thing¹³.

Dwelling in the World

The essence of man's "dwelling" is thought about in the lecture-essay "Building Dwelling Thinking", which continues the way of thinking initiated in the essay on the thing. When Heidegger speaks about dwelling in the fourfold, or dwelling in nearness to things, or the poetic dwelling, he is considering the essentials of man's Being in the world. It is not a mere critique of the age of technology, nor a mere nostalgia, although an impression is given that man in the present age is missing the nearness to things, the sense of the holy, and the poetic dwelling. The basic purpose of these considerations is to recognize man in his essential relation to Being, to know man as man from the standpoint of Being. The critique of the age of the world picture, and the identification of the historical distinctions, are a part of this basic purpose, for Being's unfolding and world's worlding are understood as historical happenings. Man is understood as being in different "modes" of dwelling in different ages. It would be against the spirit of this thinking to say that man used to "dwell" in the age of the Greeks, and now in the age of technology, he is living entirely unpoetically.

In the present essay, the author reflects upon man's dwelling in the fourfold worlding of the world and upon the relation between dwelling and building. This probe into the essence of dwelling is a new way of articulating man's Being-

in-the-world. What does "building" (bauen) mean? Building is more than a mere means for dwelling. If we reflect upon the etymology of 'bauen', we learn that building signifies "dwelling". To build is "in itself already to dwell". The root-meanings of "bauen" prove this contention. Much like the Jacob Grimm's etymological analysis cited in Being and Time (P. 3), Heidegger once again concludes that "Ich bin" really means "I dwell" the high German word 'buan' means "to remain in a place". The root of 'bauen' is also present in older versions of 'nachbar' (neighbour) e.g. 'Nachgebauer', which literally means near-dweller. And the words 'bauen', 'buan', 'bhu', 'beo', are all rooted in 'bin'. Dwelling, therefore, means the manner in which we "are" on the earth. "Bauen" that is dwelling, also means to cherish and protect, to preserve, and to care for, besides its usual meaning "to construct". Building has come to mean just "constructing" in the present age because today "dwelling is not experienced as man's Being".¹⁴

Dwelling is more fundamental than building. We do not first build and then dwell. But we build because "we are dwellers". The etymology of "wohnen" reveals that while the Gothic 'wunian' meant "to remain", it also meant "to be at peace" (Friede). Since peace (Friede) is related to the free (das Freie), to free really means to spare, i.e. to leave something in its own nature, to return it to its Being. Hence the dwelling means this kind of "sparing and preserving". Dwelling of mortals on the earth is also a dwelling under the sky

and a remaining before the divinities. Hence, "mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling".

Mortals dwell in that they save the earth,
... in that they receive the sky as sky,
in that they await the divinities as divin-
ities, ... in that they initiate their own
nature ...

Dwelling itself is always staying with
things. Dwelling as preserving keeps the
fourfold in that with which mortals stay,
in things¹⁵.

By saving the earth is meant to set free the earth "in its own presencing", not mastering and not subjugating it i.e. we do not treat the earth as a mere exploit but let it be earth as such. To understand Heidegger's conception of earth, we have to think of earth as a metaphor for the aspect of reality that is concealed, deep, and out of which all coming into unconcealment takes place. It is the same old metaphor of the poets who take the earth as the silent, the deep, and the all-mother. Mortals dwell in so far as they receive the sky as sky. "They leave to the sun and the moon their journey". The author is hinting that man accepts the Nature as Nature, as he dwells. He does not assert his will to "turn night into day" or "day into harrassed unrest". In dwelling man does not overpower earth and sky but lets them be what they are, lets them bring whatever they do.

In awaiting divinities as divinities, man dwells. Man does not assert his will to install the divinities but waits for their arrival. Mortals wait for "the intimations of their coming, and do not mistake the signs of their absence". In

other words, in dwelling, men accept the fact that in their age, gods have disappeared. They refrain from "making new gods" i.e. from installing the divine by human will, but only wait for the arrival of the divine of its own accord.

Furthermore, mortals dwell in so far as they initiate their own nature i.e. they become "capable of death as death". They initiate themselves into "the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death". By "use and practice" Heidegger means the same effort that Socrates called the "practice of death" i.e. the acceptance of death as lawfully impending and as ever-present in existence. Practicing it is to develop an attitude in thought of "giving-up" not this or that but the very attachment with existence. Dwelling is also staying with things. It is the only way the stay within the fourfold is accomplished. Dwelling preserves the fourfold in things, for mortals nurse and nurture as well as construct things.

To probe how building belongs to dwelling Heidegger takes the example of a bridge. The bridge is a thing that "gathers" the earth and sky, divinities and mortals. It is not primarily a bridge expressing "much else besides". The bridge is a thing "and only that". As this thing it gathers the fourfold. Much like the description of the Greek temple in the art-work essay, the gathering of the fourfold by the bridge is expressed poetically, hinting at the merger of the four aspects of the worlding in the thinging of the bridge:

The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream ... It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood ... The bridge is ready for the sky's weather and its fickle nature ...

The bridge vaults over glen and stream-whether mortals keep in mind this vaulting of the bridge's course or forget that they, always themselves on their way to the last bridge, are actually striving to surmount all that is common and unsound in them in order to bring themselves¹⁶ before the haleness of the divinities.

The bridge gathers the fourfold by allowing a "site" for it. The site comes to existence by virtue of the bridge, not vice versa. "Spaces receive their Being from locations and not from Space". It is asserted here that the spaces through which men move about are given by "locations" whose nature is grounded in things. Heidegger expresses his contention of Being and Time that spatiality is grounded in Being-in-the-world in a new way here:

To say that mortals 'are' is to say that 'in dwelling' they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations ... The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling¹⁷.

The bridge is a location. It allows the fourfold to enter a site. The making of things that are locations is building. Building sets up locations that make site for the fourfold. Building receives its directive from the oneness of the fourfold. It is a "letting-dwell". Whenever building is letting-dwell, it has "responded to the summons of the fourfold". Heidegger points toward the two centuries old Black

forest farmhouse whose "building" provided for the fourfold. The house was built on the mountain slope in a way that it provided shelter from the whimsicalities of the weather. It had an altar besides the community table, and in its bedrooms the hallowed spaces were provided for the childbed and the coffin.

Our reference to the Black forest farm in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses; rather, it illustrates by a dwelling that 'has been' how 'it' was able to build¹⁸.

Dwelling is Poetic

Poetically man dwells. The insight contained in these words of Hölderlin has already received some treatment in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (1936), wherein it was observed that "to dwell poetically means: to stand in the presence of the gods and to be involved in the proximity of the essence of things" and that "it is poetry which first makes language possible" (P. 151). Having developed the notions of building and dwelling (in the fourfold) of man and having thought further about the nature of language, the author rethinks the meaning of Hölderlin's words in "Poetically man dwells". Why should man's dwelling be called "poetic"? It is the question once again taken up in this lecture-essay.

We are cautioned that poetry is not understood here either as a "flight into dreamland" or as a genre of literature. The

"poetizing" that qualifies man's dwelling on the earth is not a mere writing of poems, nor is "dwelling" taken as occupying of a house.

When Hölderlin speaks of dwelling, he has before his eyes the basic character of human existence. He sees the 'poetic' moreover by way of its relation to this dwelling¹⁹.

If poetry is what lets man dwell, then it obviously is a building, according to the conclusion gained in the preceding essay. What kind of building is poetry? We learn about the nature of building, dwelling, poetizing from language. Language speaks to man, and enables him to make claims about the nature of something. Man speaks only in a responding listening to the appeal of language. The authentic responding to this appeal takes place in a poetic utterance. This is why Heidegger must listen to Hölderlin's words, to think about the nature of poetry and of dwelling. He decides to consider the several lines of the poem in which the phrase "poetically man dwells" appears, and thus begins another thoughtful dialogue with the poetry of Hölderlin.

These words appear in the following lines of the Hölderlin poem: "Full of merit, yet poetically, man/dwells on this earth". Heidegger spells out what man "pursues", according to the poet's word, by affirming that man "cultivates the growing things of the earth and takes care of his increase," and that this cultivating and caring is a "building".

"On this earth" indicates the earthiness of the poetic dwelling, and that this poetizing is not a fantasizing. "Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling".²⁰

Heidegger affirms as he interprets that man toils for merits and gains them in plenty. But at the same time man looks up toward the divinities. "The upward glance spans the between of sky and earth". This dimension is that due to which sky and earth are related. Man measures himself against the heavenly, which makes man "man". He can block it or disfigure it, but he can never evade it. It is this measure-taking that constitutes the security of human dwelling. "The taking of measure is what is poetic in dwelling. Poetry is a measuring".²¹ What constitutes any measuring? It consists in taking a standard measure which is applied to every measuring act. However,

Poetizing is a measure-taking (Mass-Nahme), understood in the strict sense of the word, by which man receives the measure for the breadth of his Being. Man exists as a mortal²².

This interpretation asserts that in the measure-taking that is poetizing, measure is taken against the divine, in reference to which man measures himself. God is not known in this measure-taking but is revealed "as unknown" by the sky. "Because man 'is', his Being must now and again be measured out".

This is the way Heidegger articulates the relation between the mortal and the divine, and between the mortal and his earth and sky, in the fourfold. To know himself, to obtain the

ultimate measure with which to gauge his own Being and the essence of his actions man measures himself thus.

Man as man has always measured himself against the heavenly ... he can indeed block this spanning, trim it, and disfigure it, but he can never evade it²³.

Man knows himself, acknowledges his mortality, and measures his actions, always in reference to this basic measure. In our jurisprudence and legislation this measuring appears as trimmed and disfigured, and gives us the illusion that the laws that man legislates for himself are products of his secular wisdom. But indeed he can never "evade" the basic measure-taking of the fourfold, with which his Being "must now and again be measured out". The author implies that Man poetizes in so far as he establishes his essential relation to earth and sky, measures his Being with the divine. This original comprehension of his own status in the fourfold, that he must from time to time obtain, makes his living a poetizing. We notice that a special status is accorded to the poet's poetizing alongside man's poetizing.

The Poet makes poetry only when he takes the measure, by saying the sights of heaven in such a way that he submits to its appearances as to the alien element to which the unknown god has 'yielded' ... But dwelling occurs only when poetry comes to pass and is present ... Poetry first of all admits man's dwelling into its very nature, its presencing Being²⁴.

The making of poetry by the poets (of the like of Hölderlin) is an original case of profound building that takes place as man dwells in the fourfold. Heidegger understands by "poetry"

both man's poetry and the poet's creation, the former being the ground of the latter. This is not to contradict the earlier statement that "poetry" under consideration is not to be taken as the writing of poems. But just as it is maintained in the art-work essay that "poesy is the most original form of poetry" (P. 128), poetizing here is understood in the both senses. However, the basic concern of this investigation has to do with man's dwelling.

But is man dwelling poetically today? It may not be wrong to say we are dwelling rather unpoetically. But according to the author "dwelling can be unpoetic only because it is in essence poetic".

Man is capable of poetry at any time only -
to the degree to which his Being is appropriate to that which itself has a liking
for man and therefore needs his presence...

That is why authentic poetry does not come
to light appropriately in every period²⁵.

Concluding Remarks

Heidegger makes yet another attempt to bring to expression what world means and how worlding takes place in the lecture-essays composed in the early fifties. These new insights do not replace or alter his previous findings but further explain what was mentioned but not fully articulated in them. It was posited in the first and basic statement in Being and Time and subsequently repeatedly asserted that world is not a totality

of entities but a horizon, by Being in which, and through the disclosive understanding of which man is able to live and function as man. World is not an entity and it is not a static reality. For an understanding of its way of Being or for comprehending how it essences (west) those traditional concepts such as substance and its attributes cannot be employed. To comprehend worlding that is understood in its essential connection with truth, history, and language, in the essays on the artwork and the essence of Poetry, is not a matter of apprehending what "causes" the world, or what, in turn, the world causes. Heidegger is convinced that terms such as substance, attributes, causes, grounds, are not suitable at all for understanding and expressing the presencing of the world.

Hence in order to comprehend further the wholeness and nearness that worlding of the world brings about, Heidegger now employs the metaphor of the fourfold (Geviert) and asserts that worlding is the "mirror-play of the simple onefold of the earth and sky, divinities and mortals" (P. 179). He arrives at this curious articulation of the worlding by contemplating the nature of the "thing" and man's "dwelling". Not all beings are experienced as things, and Being in the world does not always attain to true dwelling, yet the nature of thing and the nature of dwelling explain the essentials of man-world connection. Heidegger seems to believe that thinghood of the thing and the essential dwelling are viewed differently in different ages, but they nevertheless constitute the grounds of a being and of man's Being

in the world. This is why comprehension of what is a thing is the key to an understanding of the Being not only of "equipment" and "art-work" but also of "world". Dwelling happens as the thing is acknowledged as the thing, and man dwells in nearness to what the thing gathers i.e. the fourfold of the world.

Thinking about the nature of the thing in its independence reveals that the thing has a "gathering" role. The thing things world. Taking the example of a jug, Heidegger observes that over and above its equipmental function the jug-thing gathers man's world by granting a wholesome meaning to its involvement in man's world. For instance, as the jug outpours the gift of wine to mortals after a libation to the gods has been made, the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities enters into a unison, and at the same time the precise signification of the each of the four is revealed. At this time, the four aspects of the world persist or "while" together.

We have witnessed that apart from the realization that "world's worlding cannot be explained ... and fathomed through anything else" (P. 178), there are several other reasons that lead Heidegger to adopt this expression (P. 176). He wants to grasp the "essencing" and not the "essence" of the world, and seeks to destroy the ontological priorities i.e. of cause over the effect, of "the cause" over the causes. At the same time he rejects the standard definition of the definition or the accepted way of defining anything at all. Most of all he aims to destroy the priority of man over the thing and over the world.

By replacing the world-earth dualism conceived in the art-work essay, by the "mirror-play of the onefold of the fourfold", he seems to suggest that the dimensions of the world are not strictly two or strictly four. It depends on how we proceed to investigate world's nature. We observe, however, that the conception of the fourfold is referred to again and again in the works composed after 1950. It seems to consummate all his investigations into the world's nature.

Heidegger wants especially to explain how the union of the four aspects of the world takes place. He calls their revealing of each other a "mirror-play". Each in its own Being presences, in getting near to each "other". Perhaps this is to explain that meaning unfolded by the world has neither a single face nor a single ground. Its fourfold roots lie in mortality of the mortal, the divinity of the divine, in the hiddenness of the earth, and in the uncertainty and openness of the sky.

The nature of dwelling, that is, the primordial Being in the world in nearness to things is thought by Heidegger in connection with man's building. Man builds because he is a dweller (P. 181). Dwelling is also a sparing, preserving and staying with things. "Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling (P. 182). Men dwell means they save the earth, receive the sky as sky, await the divine, and initiate their own nature. To illustrate how building is rooted in dwelling Heidegger takes the example of a bridge. The bridge is a building that provides a "site" for the fourfold. Building is a letting-dwell, or

responding to the summons of the fourfold (P. 184). Heidegger takes building in a sense much broader than mere constructing, and calls it man's response to the summons of the fourfold (i.e. of the world). It is man's creative response to all (the four) aspects of the world. Constructing and establishing of "locations" is one of the ways building is carried out.

Next, dwelling is called "poetic" by Heidegger as he interprets Hölderlin's saying. Poetizing is taken in a sense larger than the writing of poems, just as dwelling is taken in the sense of responding to the fourfold (of the world) and not merely as occupying of a house. However poetizing as a linguistic creation, and constructing and living in a house are part of the poetic dwelling. In dwelling man builds and takes a measure, he measures himself against the heavenly. This measure-taking which is a responding to the summons of the fourfold is what is poetic in dwelling (P. 187). "Man as man has always measured himself against the heavenly" (P. 188). Heidegger seems to say that to the divine aspect of the fourfold, man has always given a response; he felt its presence in the past, and now he feels its absence. But he could never be indifferent. It is because the mortal knows and measures his Being against the divine.

The most elementary measures with which man measures his own status and his actions (in the world) are taken in a measuring of his own Being vis-a-vis the other aspects of the fourfold. Man "initiates" his own nature i.e. accepts his

mortality, compares and contrasts his Being with the divine, belongs to the earth, and receives whatever the sky has in store for him. Heidegger emphasizes that just because man's existence does not seem to be poetic in this age does not mean that it is basically indifferent to poetry. Man's capacity for poetry, in both larger and narrow senses, has to do with the grant and participation of Being, and not only with man's will. "Authentic poetry does not come to light appropriately in every period" (P. 189).

Hence, we notice that in the fifties Heidegger arrives at a new way of articulating world in terms of the fourfold, the gathering thing, and the poetic dwelling. He has oriented his thought and expressed himself thus, because he has found the traditional conceptions unsuitable for conceiving and stating what he takes world to be. We have refrained from speculating at length, whether Heidegger is retrieving a Greek myth by way of Hölderlin's poetry or is hinting that thought is better carried out through "mythos". We have also avoided an extensive web-spinning on how each one of the four are to be defined, and how the conception of the earth in the art-work essay is related to the earth in the fourfold²⁶. We only say that this new expression is rooted in Heidegger's realization that the thinker and the poet are akin "in their care of the word". No wonder then, if thinking is expressed metaphorically. Let us say that the fourfold is a "metaphor" employed to articulate world's nature. Without speculating with Richardson that the

fourfold is "polyvalent Being",²⁷ let us just say with Heidegger that the world is fourfold, and concentrate on why he wants to destroy the singular ground and posit four grounds.

In the words of Kockelman:

Heidegger thus wishes to express that world, even though it is one, is nonetheless also structured, and the structure of all structures is the fourfold ...

The number four should not be taken literally, but rather as an indication of the complex structure of the world ...²⁸

Notes

1. For instance, the basic position is briefly re-stated in: Nietzsche, Bd. I II (1936-40), "Letter on Humanism" (1947), "The Pathway" (1949)
2. Heidegger: "A Letter to a Young Student", pp. 184, 186.
3. Heidegger: "The Thing", p. 165.
4. Ibid., p. 171.
5. Ibid., p. 172.
6. Ibid., p. 173.
7. Ibid., p. 174.
8. Ibid., p. 178.
9. Richardson, W. J. : Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 571.
10. Heidegger: "The Thing", p. 178.
11. Ibid., p. 179.
12. Ibid., pp. 180, 181.
13. Ibid., p. 182.
14. Heidegger: "Building Dwelling Thinking", p. 148.
15. Ibid., pp. 150, 151.
16. Ibid., pp. 152, 153.
17. Ibid., p. 157.
18. Ibid., p. 160.
19. Heidegger: "Poetically Man Dwells", p. 215.
20. Ibid., p. 218.
21. Ibid., p. 221.
22. Ibid., pp. 221, 222. Hofstadter's translation of "Dichten" as "To write poetry" is misleading. We have replaced it by "Poetizing", so that poetry here is understood in both larger and narrow senses.

23. Ibid., p. 221.
24. Ibid., pp. 225, 227.
25. Ibid., p. 228.
26. Of., Kockelmans, J. J. : On The Truth of Being, pp. 94, 141.
27. Richardson, W. J. : Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 572.
28. Kockelmans, J. J. : On The Truth of Being, pp. 95, 119.

CHAPTER VII

WORLD AND LANGUAGE

One of the major concerns of Heidegger in his later works is language. His contribution to the philosophy of language consists of a few general insights which identify and amend fundamental presumptions concerning the nature of language taken for granted in modern philosophy and philology. Since this thinking about language remains at a general level it is not vying with the insights gained within so-called philosophy of language or within linguistic science which take as self-evident what Heidegger considers problematic. Hence his thought on language should only be compared with the other fundamental conceptions of the Being of language, and not with any theory of language.

One such general insight, in which we are especially interested, happens to be concerning the connection between language and the world. The first indication of this connection is given in Being and Time where in the discussion of Dasein's disclosedness i.e. Dasein's "there", linguistic articulation (Rede), alongside disposition and comprehension, is described as constituting Dasein's disclosure of its world. (P. 42).

Hints about this connection are given in the Essence of Ground and in the essay on the art-work, but in "Hölderlin and the

Essence of Poetry" it is openly asserted that "only where there is language is there the world" (P. 147). This assertion is further articulated and elaborated in some of the essays on language composed in the nineteen fifties. More comprehensive treatments of the issue are presented in the lecture-essays titled "Language" (Die Sprache-1950) and "The Nature of Language" (Das Wesen der Sprache-1957-58), which we shall consider in the present chapter.

The author's insight concerning the co-occurrence of language and the world does not make assertions concerning "how" precisely the two are related, but articulates the implications of the fact "that" they are related. The most basic assumption concerning the nature of language that Heidegger wants to reject and modify is the one which takes language to be a purely "human" reality. He does not deny that it is only man who speaks, rather he repeatedly posits this fact. What he wants to explain is "the way" man speaks, and this he clarifies by articulating man's essential bond with Being. Man speaks in response to Being, as he comprehends, listens to, and belongs to Being. Hence, the origin of language does not lie in human will to communicate, but in the presencing nature of man which is the ground of his relation with Being. In the following elaborations of the fact that world and language happen concurrently, the priority of man is destroyed in explaining that man is not "the origin of" world and language. Man is rather "endowed with" world and language.

It may be observed once again that Heidegger exercises his characteristic reticence on those specifics of the issue, the resolution of which, according to him, is not "the proper matter for thought". His thinking of language has proceeded gradually and has not been oblivious of the limits of knowledge, as he informs the interlocutor in "A Dialogue on Language" (Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache-1953):

Because reflection on language and on Being, has determined my path of thinking from early on, therefore their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background. ... It was all of twenty years after my doctoral dissertation that I dared discuss in a class the question of language ... It took nearly another ten years before I was able to say what I was thinking — the fitting word is still lacking even today¹.

The Peal of Stillness

The connection between the worlding of the world and the speaking of the language has been pronounced by Heidegger in the lecture-essay "Language". He begins by observing that "man speaks" i.e. man is man because he speaks, and that man is never divorced from language, he belongs to it even when he is not actually speaking. How does language occur? While it is rightly said in the above senses that man speaks, thinking of language qua language, we must also observe that "language speaks".

To reflect on language means — to reach

the speaking of language in such a way that this speaking takes place as that which grants an abode for the Being of mortals².

Speech is usually understood as "the expression and communication of human feelings". This view presupposes that speaking is expression wherein something internal externalizes itself, and that it is an activity of man. Some views of language point toward its divine origin, for instance the Gospel of St. John says that "in the beginning the word was with God". Another school of thought stresses the figurative and symbolic character of language and opposes those who characterize word-meanings as concepts. Heidegger maintains that none of these explanations of linguistic phenomena is able to shake off the traditional and fixed idea of language which has always dominated grammar, logic, philosophy of language, and linguistics, namely that language is an expression of inner emotions, that it is human activity, and that it is a presentation through image and concept. These ideas cannot bring us to language as language.

To encounter the speaking of language Heidegger thoughtfully interprets a poem by George Trakl, for "what is spoken purely is the poem", and this poem describing a winter evening provides "some fruitful hints for our attempt to discuss language". The naming in the poem is not a handing out of titles or an application of terms. But it brings into presence what was previously never called. This bringing into presence by the language in the poem is unlike the presence of things actually

present around us, but it is a presence that is "sheltered in absence". The things named in the poem gather sky and earth, mortals and divinities.

The unitary fourfold ... which is stayed in the thinging of things we call the world ... Thinging, (things) unfold world ... carry out world ... gesture, gestate, world ... literally visit mortals with a world. (This) naming ... entrusts world to the things and simultaneously keeps the things in the splendor of world.

Heidegger is asserting that language in the poem is an original speaking which enables us to understand how in the naming that takes place in language, a presence sheltered in absence comes to be. This naming of things in the poem gathers the fourfold i.e. unfolds the man's world. Just as the art-work unfolds a world and an earth, the language in the poem gives rise to a thinging of the things, and the worlding of the world, as it gathers the fourfold.

The relation between the world and the thing is further contemplated by Heidegger to explicate how language speaks. World and things do not exist side by side. They penetrate each other and have a common "middle". They do not fuse into each other, but are intimate. In their middle prevails a "dif-ference", which carries out world in its worlding and thing in its thinging. This difference is not a generic concept for various differences, but each happening of it is unique. In the bidding of things and world what is really called is the dif-ference. We notice that this dif-ference is concomitant

with the ontological difference i.e. the difference between Being and beings, but we will refrain from equating them. What Heidegger is explaining here is worlding and thinging as it takes place in the speaking of language. He does not expressly say that he is taking Being as "logos", and that his reference to "dif-ference" is, in fact, an explication of the Ontological difference. It would be more proper to say that Heidegger is trying to point toward a structure that is more explicitly or phenomenologically available, i.e. in an experience with the language in the poem, without making assertions about having resolved the enigma of the ontological difference as such. Hence, we must not go one step further than him and must not equate world with Being, and thing with a being, although they are, admittedly, at one level, the same. We should also remember that in the essay on the thing, we were told that in contrast to the countless objects and living beings, "things are modest in number". (P. 179)

Language speaks by bidding "thing-world" and "world-thing" to arrive in the "dif-ference", which "stills" the thing in thinging, and the world in worlding.

The gathered bidding, the command in the form of which the dif-ference calls world and things is the peal of stillness ...
 Language speaks as the peal of stillness.
 Stillness stills by the carrying out, the bearing and enduring of world and things into their presence⁴.

From the experience with the happening of language in the Trakl's poem, Heidegger learns how language takes place or how

language speaks. Language is a bidding and a command which presences the differentiating (world) and the differentiated (things). The origin of language is a stillness, and language stills i.e. whiles or sustains, world and the thing. Language is the peal of stillness, i.e. when language speaks or happens it is as if the stillness resounds or rings sustainingly and world and thing come to be.

This "peal of stillness is not anything human". The human being is given to speech i.e. his Being comes to be out of the speaking of language or becomes itself through language.

The presencing of language needs and uses the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness for the hearing of mortals. Only as men belong within the peal of stillness are mortals able to speak in 'their own way' in sounds⁵.

While acknowledging that it is only man who speaks, and observing that man's Being comes to its own in speaking of language, Heidegger is, at the same time asserting that the peal of stillness that is language is not something human. Man speaks belongingly and respondingly to this peal. Man hears this ring and responds being attuned to it. Hence world as sustaining of the fourfold which grants meaning to the thing, and thing which bears the world, are the major factors in speaking.

The way in which mortals, called out of the difference into the difference speak on their own part is by responding. Mortal speech must first of all have listened to the command ... Receptive listening is at the same time a recognition that makes due acknowledgment⁶.

Heidegger is convinced that men speak in response to a coming into Being of the differentiating in the differentiated. As man speaks, he is listening and responding to a presencing. By speaking he recognizes a presence, acknowledges what has come into Being. He gives voice to the peal of stillness and thereby acknowledges the difference that has taken place, the world that has prevailed, thing that has obtained its meaning.

On what does the peal of stillness break?
 How does the broken stillness come to sound
 in words? ... Assuming that the thinking
 will succeed one day in answering these
 questions, it must be careful not to regard
 utterance ... as the decisive element of
 human speech?

Heidegger does not claim to have answered how stillness comes to be transformed into words and sentences. His insight confines itself to asserting utterance is only the last event in speaking. Speaking has to do with man's response to the peal of stillness and with man's essential dwelling in the world in nearness to things, and most of all with man's fundamental bond with Being.

The World-moving Saying

In December 1957 and in February 1958 Heidegger delivered three lectures at Freiburg which were published in Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959) under the title "Das Wesen der Sprache" (The Nature of Language). In these lectures, he undergoes another experience with the speaking of language by thought-

fully conversing with the poet's word, and gains insights into the nature of language, and especially in the third lecture, dwells upon the role of language in founding man's world.

When does language present itself as itself? There are occasions when we cannot find the right word for what concerns us. According to Heidegger, it is in these moments that language in its own Being fleetingly touches us. To listen to the original speaking this time he reflects over Stefan George's poem titled "The Word",⁸ concentrating on the last lines which say:

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.

Heidegger interprets it as "only where the word for the thing has been found is the thing a thing". For a better understanding of how the poet reaches this conclusion he wants to share the poet's experience in thought. By engaging in thinking that "cuts furrows into the soil of Being", he hopes to apprehend the moment where "Being of language is the language of Being".

What brings poetry and thinking together is the "saying". Saying is also the essential nature of language. The roots of 'sagen' (to say) are in Old Norse 'saga' which means to make appear, to set free i.e. to offer and extend world, lighting and concealing. "This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential Being of Saying".⁹

To illustrate further, Heidegger refers to Hölderlin's poems "Germania" and "Bread and Wine", in which the language

is called "the flower of the mouth", and the words are referred to as "words like flowers". The author thinks that in those designations Saying is the earth out of which the flower emerges.

The sound rings out in the resounding assembly call which open to the Open, makes world appear in all things ... The sound of language, its earthiness is held with the harmony that attunes the regions of the world's structure playing them in chorus¹⁰.

By this is meant that the sound of language proffers the world. The ground of the sound of language and the ground of the world-regions (the fourfold) is the same. The "saying", "holds", i.e. makes adhere to itself, the sound of language, and at the same time attunes, i.e. holds fast, the fourfold in its onefold. In other words, Heidegger is pointing toward the connection between speaking of the language and coming into Being of the world, by taking the saying as the earth of both.

Nearness and Saying, Being of the persisting nature of language, are the same. Language then is not a mere human faculty ... Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relations. It relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world's regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself-saying-in reservell.

The author is pointing out that saying has a nearing function. It presences the nearness as such. Saying persists as it presences. Language is not merely something related to man. But it is the very foundation of all relations. For it relates, sustains, lets emerge, grants meaning to the onefold of the

fourfold of the world. As it holds fast the four regions, it also holds fast its saying, that is, its saying is not entirely said but an aspect of it is kept in reserve.

Reserving itself in this way, as saying of the world's fourfold, language concerns us, us who as mortals belong within this fourfold world, us who can speak only as we respond to language¹².

Heidegger is observing that the saying of the fourfold, concerns man in an essential way. Man speaks in response to this saying. In his speaking, the saying of the fourfold is not entirely brought to the surface, but it continues to concern him, and man continues to respond to it, for an aspect of it is always held back by the Being of language.

In other words, an unconcealment-concealment process lies in the essence (i.e. way of Being) of language as well as the world. World is not merely what has worlded itself, and language is not merely what has been uttered by man. Man as a presencing being, presences world by way of responding to the Saying of language. Because an aspect of Being remains concealed, the world has to be described more appropriately as worlding.

Assuming that the mover which holds the world's ~~four~~ regions in the single nearness of their face to face encounter, rests in Saying, then only Saying confers what we call by the tiny word 'is', and thus say after Saying. Saying releases the 'is' into lighted freedom and therewith into the security of its thinkability¹³.

Heidegger is hinting at the connection between Being and Saying,

and is substantiating his earlier assertion that the "Being of language is the language of Being". If language brings the fourfold into neighborhood, which grants meaning to what-is, then it is the Saying which grants meaning to 'is', i.e. lets an assertion be assertion. Furthermore, it is the language that provides basis on which thinking thinks, for by according meaning to every 'is' it provides what thinking holds on to in its progression.

Such speculation of Heidegger should not be interpreted as asserting that Being is nothing but Logos, and as implying that he has nothing new to offer in this Greek-like articulation of Being as discourse. What is original here is an explanation of the world, in terms which are articulated especially for describing its worlding. The relation between language and the world is described as the co-occurring of Saying and worlding. The role of man is explained in his essential connection with Being, as man is conceived as an entity whom Being needs and uses in its presencing. All this is achieved by disregarding the set of traditional terms which have been employed in metaphysical philosophy to articulate the essence of any substance whatsoever, including that of the world and language. The presumed priority of man is destroyed in this approach, as the role of man is re-explicated.

Concluding Remarks

Contemplation on the essence of language, in the final period of Heidegger's philosophical career, obliges him to investigate further and pronounce the connection between language and the world. The meaning of Being as 'logos' has propelled his thought from earlier on, and he has referred to the concomitance between world-disclosure and speech at the very inception of his inquiry into the meaning of Being (P. 42).

In the Hölderlin commentary of 1936 he directly exclaims "only where there is language is there the world" (P. 147). The meaning of this insight is more fully articulated in the meditations on language's Being composed in the nineteen fifties.

As we have observed in the previous chapter, these are also the times in which the investigation into world's nature is carried out in terms of the fourfold. By these times, his way of thinking i.e. his way of positing, investigating, concluding a philosophical problem, has developed into a distinct method, rigorous according to his own convictions concerning the task of thinking.

It may be asked, why is the connection between Being and language now articulated as one between world and language, and why is the ontological difference now contemplated as the "dif-ference" between world and thing? Many commentators who do not confront this question, simply equate Being with world, and beings with things. As we have maintained at several

moments of this investigation, Heidegger posits these subtle distinctions to open up the problematic of the presence of what presences. He proceeds with the realization that neither the question of the meaning of Being nor that of the world nor that of language, can be resolved summarily, in one attempt or even in one thinker's life span. By way of his own effort, he makes several attempts, taking several departures, without ever forgetting what is fundamentally at issue, namely, Being. In his later works, Heidegger's use of philosophical language undergoes a change. Instead of coining new terms with a root 'sein' (Being) to show their ultimate relation with Being, he has now realized that all essential words are already rooted in Being. Hence his purpose of freeing these words of their metaphysical meaning does not necessarily need a literal root 'sein'. The essential meaning can be restored to these words, by under-emphasizing the meaning accorded to them by the tradition of metaphysics. This is why Heidegger now retrieves the essential meaning from out of basic terms like man, thing, living (dwelling), building, etc., rather than neologize or hyperate. This is also why he engages in etymological exploration, and meditates on the meaning of poet's word.

Furthermore, it seems to us that these later investigations concentrate on world and things, instead of on Being and beings, to comprehend the role of language, primarily because Heidegger, true to his phenomenological approach outlined in Being and Time, wants to proceed from what is more available to knowledge.

toward what is less available. This method was consciously or subconsciously followed by all western philosophers ever since Plato and Aristotle pronounced its validity. Hence Heidegger wants to learn more about the ontological difference as such, by studying how "dif-ference" between world and things happens alongside the happening of language. By showing connection between language and world he wants to authenticate that the true origin of language is Being.

Comparing Heidegger's earlier allusions to the ontological difference with this later one, Kockelmans observes that in the first period it is described as "man's thought concerning Being" while in the later period as taking place "in language's saying", and "the second approach obviously does not exclude the first".¹⁴ Richardson, on the other hand, does not distinguish between "dif-ference" between world and thing referred to here, and the "Ontological difference" between Being and beings treated in Heidegger's earlier writings¹⁵.

It is important to observe that Heidegger's insight concerning co-occurrence of world and language does not speculate "how" the two are related but it is elaborated to point out the implications of the fact "that" they are concurrent. At the same time, by pointing out that man's will is not the origin of language, but rather man is endowed with language, Heidegger refers to the essential involvement of Being in man's Being. The presumed priority of man is destroyed, as man's role is re-explicated as responding to language's "saying".

The idea that man is not the origin of language, is not an original contribution of Heidegger, for it is implicit in the Greek notion of 'logos'. Ancient Hindu thinkers and Sanskrit Grammarians maintained that all words have their source in "Brahman" (Being), and as Heidegger himself points out according to the Gospel of St. John, "in the beginning word was with God" (P. 201). All these insights seek to destroy the priority of man in the linguistic articulation. However, Heidegger offers his own explanation of the happening of language and the world, without saying too much about the precise connection of language and the world with Being.

By pointing toward the co-happening of language and the world, Heidegger also destroys the priority of man over the world, a question left unexamined in Being and Time. Now he seems to explain why language and the world are predominant over man even though manifestly it is only through man's articulation that language and world come to be. By adopting the Greek meaning of Being i.e. presence, he explains that both language and world happen (come into presence), and man is the presencing agent, whom Being needs and uses. As they arrive in presence, language and world have a persisting nature. It is implicit in Heidegger's treatment that it is the persisting of the Being of words, and of the world, that grants them their predominance over man, even though it is man who is the presencing agent.

It is emphasized in Heidegger's insight that it is only

through language that world happens. As it was stressed in the earlier works that man is always in the world, it is now added that man is always in language. Language does not happen when man actually speaks, but we are always in speech (P. 200) i.e. always responding to the saying of language. Heidegger wants to explain how speaking "grants an abode for the Being of mortals" (P. 201). Since poetic utterance realizes the language's saying more originally, the naming in Rilke's poem is taken as providing an instance of this saying. The naming in the poem brings out a presence "sheltered in absence." It gathers the thinging of things, the fourfold world. This naming "entrusts world to the things and simultaneously keeps the things in the splendor of the world" (P. 202).

In the call of the language a "dif-ference" appears between the differentiating (world) and the differentiated (thing). The bidding of language or the command of the dif-ference, is the "peal of stillness". By taking a cue from language in the poem Heidegger explains how language and the world happen concurrently. By the metaphor "peal of stillness" he wants to bring home that the origin of language is a stillness. At the same time, language performs a stilling function and a persisting function, just as the ringing (of a bell) persists. Language "stills by the carrying out, the bearing and enduring of world and things into their presence" (P. 203).

The aspect of language that is responded to by man is called "Saying" by Heidegger. It is in the "Saying" that all

actual speaking and the arising of the onefold of the fourfold is rooted (P. 207). Language as saying is world-moving.

Heidegger's investigations into the Being of language are a part of his project of fundamental ontology. Their aim is to counter the "metaphysical explanation" which does not regard as problematic "the presence of the present" i.e. the fundamental ground of different aspects of man's reality such as language, world, history, but rather compartmentalizes this reality in its endeavor to "explain" it. McCormick in his Heidegger and the Language of the World observes that in evaluating Heidegger's reflections on language one faces a "dilemma" in that they "seem to preclude their own evaluation, while evaluating those claims seems to preclude Heidegger's acknowledging them as his own".¹⁶ We may observe that any genuine evaluation of Heidegger's thought must acknowledge the distinction between fundamental ontology and metaphysical articulation. It is unfair to judge one by the standards of the other. McCormick's own attempt at an evaluation does not recognize this distinction and does not examine the validity of its own "analytical" procedure. The failure of its interpretation to take a stand concerning "what Heidegger says" can only be attributed to this procedure and not to Heidegger's so-called obscure expression.

Notes

1. Heidegger: "A Dialogue on Language", pp. 7, 8.
2. Heidegger: "Language", p. 192.
3. Ibid., pp. 199, 200, 201.
4. Ibid., p. 207.
5. Ibid., p. 208.
6. Ibid., p. 209.
7. Ibid., pp. 208, 209.
8. Heidegger: "The Nature of Language", p. 63.
9. Ibid., p. 93.
10. Ibid., p. 101.
11. Ibid., p. 107.
12. Ibid., p. 107.
13. Ibid., p. 108.
14. Kockelmans, J. J. : "Ontological Difference. Hermeneutics, and Language", pp. 217, 218.
15. Richardson, W. J. : Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. 578-581.
16. McCormick, P.J. : Heidegger and the Language of the World, p. XVII.

CONCLUSION

This study has endeavored to show Heidegger's quest to define what is called "world" in its various stages through the breadth of his career. We have shown that this quest is constituted of various attempts. The findings of each of these attempts, along with the comments on their interpretation, have been enunciated as concluding remarks at the end of each chapter of this essay. The following general conclusions, for the most part, supplement rather than summarise these remarks.

The need for articulating Heidegger's "several" attempts to define world arose from our observation that his later attempts have not been given the attention they deserve by scholars who have studied the problem of the world in his thought. The general neglect of his later writings on this issue is rooted in the assumption that Being and Time is the most representative and the most mature work of Heidegger. Our investigation has shown that this unsound assumption has led to a misunderstanding of how the problem of the definition of the world has been "posed" and "resolved" in Heidegger's thought as a whole. A deeper understanding of Heidegger's attitude toward "the question" of the world reveals why he is obliged to make several attempts in "thought" subsequent to the one made in Being and Time.

To comprehend Heidegger's attitude toward the issue it is

important to keep in mind that this issue is especially conjoined with the question of Being.

As our study shows, "man" and "world" have been the focal points through which, and on the basis of which, Heidegger articulates the question concerning Being. The reason for this approach is not difficult to guess. He realizes that an avenue to Being as such lies in comprehending how Being of man and Being of the world appear phenomenologically i.e. show themselves in Being. Hence his various attempts to apprehend the nature of man and the nature of the world.

The very first insight concerning the Being of man that impresses Heidegger is that man's Being is always a Being in the world, and the entire problematic in Being and Time proceeds from this observation. This insight at the same time posits that the Being of man and the Being of the world are rooted in each other i.e. there is no man unrelated to world, and there is no world unrelated to man. Our investigation shows that Heidegger does not ever abandon this assumption, no matter which point of departure he takes to probe world's nature. World is always man's horizon, according to both his early and later investigations, for it is only man who is endowed with world. This first insight, which seems trivial at first sight, has far reaching implications for his inquiry. Firstly, it provides him with the basis for rejecting the unphilosophical i.e. the popular definition of the world. Secondly, it is also the ground for his

rejection of other philosophical concepts of the world. The rejection of the popular conception is the very initiation of his philosophical inquiry, as he observes in the Essence of Ground (P. 74):

Where elementary concepts like 'world' are concerned, the popular is usually not the primordial and essential meaning. The latter is constantly hidden; it is only seldom expressed conceptually and then with difficulty.

It is because "the primordial and the essential meaning" of the world is "constantly hidden" that Heidegger has had to make several attempts to express it. It is because he realizes that it is difficult to comprehend and speak about this reality that he refrains from making a conclusive statement that might be taken as "the definition" of the world.

As our labours have pointed out, Heidegger finds it even more difficult to express how precisely Being as such is connected with the world as such. However, the realization that it is difficult to articulate man-world or the Being-world connection does not mean that it is impossible for man to comprehend and speak about these matters. In the above quoted remark Heidegger does not use the term "never" but "seldom". What he really wants to impress upon us is that no statement about this matter is conclusive. There always remains a necessity for further investigation such fundamental issues from different phenomenologically available points of departure. Concerning the problem of the definition of the world, Heidegger

himself does just that. It is in keeping with the spirit of this way of thinking that we have refrained from numbering the later attempts as the second, the third, and the fourth attempts.

Heidegger's basic insight is also the foundation of his rejection of the traditional and especially the modern philosophical concepts of the world. We will not repeat here his criticisms of the metaphysical character of these philosophical conceptions. It may be observed, however, that the rejection of metaphysical assumptions and of the metaphysical way of investigation and articulation, constitute the initiation of his attempts to know the world's nature. A recapitulation of the various moments of his inquiry shows that he shakes off the traditional conceptions and methods step by step. In Being and Time the priority of man and the analytical method are not entirely overcome, whereas in the later attempts, the Greek meaning of Being as "presence" is employed rather than rejected, to articulate the worlding of the world. However, the originality of Heidegger lies in the alternative resolutions and the alternative methods of philosophizing that he offers alongside his critiques of the tradition. It lies in his approach, in his firm resolve not to claim that such questions are or can be conclusively answered. Regarding his articulation of Being as "presence", he is quite aware that he is embracing the traditional Greek notion, and is employing a basis which is not necessarily the only way of dealing

with fundamental conceptions such as world, man, truth, and language. This attitude is quite evident in his designation of time as the "provisional" meaning of Being in Being and Time. In What is called Thinking he remarks:

Greek thinking, even before its beginnings is at home with the prevalence of 'on' as the presence of what is present ... (But) it remains undecided whether in the 'presence of what is present' there will appear that which constitutes the presence of what is present. It would be a mistake, then, for us to take the view that Being of beings meant merely, for all time, the presence of what is present (J.G. Gray Translation, P. 235).

Nevertheless, Heidegger carves out the role of his own thought to think about the "presence of what is present" rigorously so that its neglect that is rooted in the very inception of metaphysics, can be corrected. This is what, according to him, is the task of thinking.. The problem of the world in Heidegger's later attempts is also encountered and resolved through a dwelling on, and in terms of, the presence of what is present. It aims to correct the notion that world just "is" by positing that it "worlds" or presences, and that it functions alongside Being, truth, and language, rather than functioning as an attribute of the subjectivity of the subject, as for instance, Schopenhauer describes it. At the same time, in these attempts, the role and the status of man in the process of the unconcealment of what-is is re-explicated.

As we have pointed out at the various moments of our study, it is very important to "retain" the various distinct notions

that Heidegger employs to unfold the presence of what is present rather than "obliterate" them. We will be defeating the very aim of fundamental ontology by simplistically equating Being, truth, and world with each other and describing them as synonymous concepts. Of course, these realities have a common ground. But we must observe that Heidegger attempts to understand the presence of what is present on the basis of the several aspects of un-concealment that man is endowed with as a presencing being. Truth is described as presencing through an unconcealment-concealment process, whereas world through a mirror-play of the fourfold. Nothing conclusive or significant is said about the Being-world connection. We might say that Heidegger regards Being as essentially closest to man, whereas world as functionally closest. In other words, he employs these basic notions and attempts to articulate their meaning in newer and more metaphorical terms but he does not explicate their inter-connection. This inter-connection falls within a region of knowledge about which he finds himself obliged to be reticent. He is convinced that fundamental ontology has yet to gain the grounds on the basis of which it can make assertions about this matter.

Our study leads us to conclude that the several attempts to define world in Heidegger's thought are interconnected. The basic position pronounced in Being and Time is never abandoned or altered in the subsequent attempts; it is only further enriched, further articulated, as the world's worlding.

is understood in its essential relation with truth, language, and history. The status of man in the man-world connection is more fully explicated in the later attempts, as it is explained why world persists and predominates as it grants meaning to man's reality. The illusion of man's priority in this relation is dismissed; as this priority and this relation are redefined. It is brought home to us that it is difficult to spell out world's nature. There is nothing such as "the definition" of the world. There can only be "definitions" of the world. And it entails that philosophy must continue to perform its distinguished task by continuing to wonder and further investigate what is world.

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