

“One UN”, Two Cultures: United Nations Support for Security Sector Reform

[Master’s Research Paper]

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ABSTRACT

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a vital component in many peacebuilding programmes around the world. As a leader in international peace and security, the United Nations plays a significant role in supporting SSR processes in fragile and conflict-affected states. However, the organization is still struggling to conceptualize its role in SSR. This lack of clarity has allowed UN bodies to adopt and implement different approaches to SSR. This paper uses process tracing to highlight key distinctions between the approaches of two prominent UN bodies involved in SSR – the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – and identify each body’s evaluation process as the key factor for this difference. It is these evaluation processes that shape the institutional cultures that facilitate the development of the different approaches. The findings of this study suggest that the UN’s desire to develop a “One UN” approach to SSR will require more than just political will, but also structural and cultural change. Furthermore, these findings support arguments made elsewhere that liberal peacebuilding’s mixed record does not necessarily warrant its abandonment. Rather, better outcomes are possible by correcting the poor implementation of liberal principles.

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INTRODUCTION

In a 12 July 2005 Presidential Statement, the United Nations Security Council acknowledged the importance of conflict prevention by addressing root causes in a legitimate and fair manner.¹ The Council emphasized that security sector reform is an essential element of any post-conflict stabilization process and underlined “that it is inextricably linked with promotion of the rule of law, transitional justice, DDR and the protection of civilians, among others, and acknowledges the need for more adequate preparation, including mobilization of necessary planning resources, and more coherent approaches by the United Nations.”²

This statement began a process of examining the conceptualization and practice of security sector reform (SSR) as it pertains to the United Nations. Less than two years later, the Security Council issued another Presidential Statement noting the significant contributions the UN system has made to rebuilding security institutions in post-conflict environments and the increasing participation of UN bodies in supporting these activities.³ The Council further called on the Secretary-General to prepare a report on UN approaches to SSR, including “lessons learned, core security sector reform functions that the United Nations system can perform, roles and responsibilities of UN system entities, and how best to co-ordinate UN support for security sector reform with national and international activities in this field, as well as interaction with regional and sub-regional actors.”⁴

Upon receipt of the Security Council’s request, Secretary-General Bank Ki-Moon created the UN’s Inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (IASSRTF) to provide institutional

¹ United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/2005/30 (New York: United Nations, 12 July 2005): 1.

² UN Security Council, S/PRST/2005/30, 2.

³ UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/2007/3 (New York: United Nations, 21 February 2007): 1.

⁴ UN Security Council, S/PRST/2007/3, 2-3.

support in answering the questions set out by the Security Council and to develop an “integrated” and “coherent” UN approach to SSR. When the SG returned to the Council in 2008, he reported that a “broader understanding of security has led to the strengthening of the collective commitment of the United Nations to protect civilians and those most vulnerable to violence on the basis of the rule of law. It has also highlighted the need for greater emphasis on international humanitarian, criminal, refugee and human rights law, as well as the incorporation of human rights dimensions in all United Nations activities.”⁵ This commitment reflects an awareness that the security of individuals and communities is not just ensured by reducing the occurrence of conflicts.

According to the SG report, two themes have emerged from the UN’s search to find effective responses to combat insecurity in accordance with its Charter: “The first is that security, human rights and development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable peace. The second is the recognition that these fundamental elements can be achieved only within a broad framework of the rule of law.”⁶ These two themes are indicative of a broader understanding of security that recognizes that the security of citizens within a state depends on more than just the security of the state itself. Human security can also be affected by political, economic, and cultural factors, to name but a few examples. Accordingly, the SG’s report recognized that this broader understanding of security “has led to the strengthening of the collective commitment of the United Nations to protect civilians and those most vulnerable to violence on the basis of the rule of law.”⁷ How to do this remains a challenge, and one that different actors within the UN system have sought to tackle using their own unique approaches.

⁵ United Nations, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*, Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659 – S/2008/39) (New York: United Nations, 23 January 2008): 4.

⁶ UN, *Securing peace and development*, 3.

⁷ UN, *Securing peace and development*, 4.

In January 2013, the IASSRTF published its Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGNs) on security sector reform. The purpose of this set of notes was to facilitate the development of the comprehensive UN approach to SSR envisioned in the SG’s report. The notes provide a common framework for a “One United Nations” approach that the different UN departments and agencies involved in SSR activities can follow to ensure their assistance to Member States is both effective and respectful of the role of the UN in providing SSR assistance. According to the ITGNs and the “One UN” approach, the goal of UN SSR assistance is “to support national efforts to enhance the effectiveness, inclusiveness and accountability of security sector institutions in order to contribute to sustainable peace, security, good governance and development for the State and its peoples.”⁸

In pursuing this goal, one of the key roles foreseen for the UN – through its peacekeepers, special political missions and country teams – is providing guidance and assistance to Member States in establishing benchmarks and other evaluation processes that will help national governments and donors to assess the challenges faced in building capable and accountable security institutions and the effectiveness of their efforts.⁹

By identifying measurement and evaluation as a key role, the UN is sending the message that it possesses a level of expertise worthy of such an advisory role; that its methods and processes set a standard for other actors to follow. Thus, the question arises: how do UN actors measure and evaluate security sector reform programmes? And what does the UN’s approach to evaluation suggest anything about its vision for a “One UN” approach to SSR?

At the moment, the UN does not have a singular approach to the measurement and evaluation of its SSR assistance programmes. Rather, UN departments and agencies each have

⁸ United Nations SSR Task Force, *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (New York: United Nations, 2012): 4.

⁹ UN SSR Taskforce, *Security Sector Reform*, 4.

their own SSR culture, shaped by the demands placed on the individual organization, which influences how they measure the effectiveness of their programmes. This lack of common methodology, poses a significant obstacle to the realization of a “One UN” approach to SSR.

The existence of these different approaches points to a broader realization, within peacebuilding’s liberal institutionalist underpinnings, that there are intervening variables that affect the ability of normative changes to lead to better outcomes. However, unlike critical approaches, this paper recognizes that these intervening variables are not cause for abandoning the liberal institutionalist approach to peacebuilding. Rather, by better understanding these variables, and their affects, liberal peacebuilders can help to address gaps in the application of their model, in order to help foster improved results.

METHODOLOGY

This study begins by examining the current literature on the vital topics looked at in this study: peacebuilding, security sector reform, and aid effectiveness. This review shows that there are significant disagreements over the purpose of peacebuilding and security sector reform, and in regards to how aid effectiveness should be evaluated. A brief description of the current state of insecurity present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is provided to help contextualize the conditions the SSR programmes seek to address. Next, the evaluation processes of SSR programmes by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Development Programme are traced and then compared using sample UN evaluations and background material. This analysis shows that the two organizations have fundamentally different evaluation methodologies that are shaped by their individual reporting responsibilities within the UN system. The findings suggest that the DPKO focuses its reporting on output indicators, which reflect only changes in the physical attributes of a state’s security institutions, whereas the

UNDP uses outcome and impact indicators, which are able to capture what effects the reform programmes have on peoples' security. The process tracing also indicates that the DPKO's evaluation process is fractured, reporting to two different bodies focused on different issues. The UNDP, on the other hand, is more streamlined with a direct connection between donors and programmes, which allows resources to be directly connected to programmes' results. These processes have resulted in the development of two different cultures of evaluation of UN SSR programmes.

There are two major implications from this study that warrant attention. First of all, the integration of UN actors' practices, to create a "One UN" approach to SSR, will face a significant challenge in the development of a common approach to evaluation. The two cultures of evaluation indicate that these two actors hold fundamentally different views of the purpose of SSR and their role in assisting these reforms. These diverging views pose a significant obstacle to the integration of their SSR approaches. Secondly, the different views held by these actors suggests the existence of two different conceptualizations of SSR; the first being a bottom-up emancipatory approach that prioritizes the security of individuals over the strength of state security institutions. The other is a top-down institutionalist approach to SSR that prioritizes the building of state security institutions. These approaches will be unpacked to show how they each reflect distinct international norms.

The empirical evidence in this study is analyzed using process tracing. This approach is ideal for the purpose at hand because it can be used to expose bureaucratic factors that shape the difference evaluation practices of the DPKO and UNDP. According to Alexander George and Timothy McKeown, "[t]he process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual

behaviour that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behaviour.”¹⁰ This will be accomplished by taking “snapshots” of these actors’ evaluations process in order to characterize the key differences in the processes.¹¹ The purpose of this is to identify the “smoking gun” that highlights key differences between the two. By passing a smoking gun test, the findings of this analysis provide sufficient justification to support this paper’s initial hypothesis that the DPKO and UNDP employ significantly different approaches to SSR, which is then used to analyze the potential of developing a “One UN” approach to SSR.¹²

This study applies process tracing in a slightly different manner than how it is typically envisioned. In typical cases, such as those by George and McKeown, or George and Bennett,¹³ process tracing is used to examine specific decisions/outcomes. The units of analysis in this study, however, are not specific peacebuilding outcomes, but rather the indicators used in SSR evaluations by DPKO and UNDP. Using process tracing helps this analysis to develop an understanding of the causal complexity behind SSR evaluations by the UN bodies examined in this study.

While this analysis only utilizes a single comparison case study, there is definite merit in such a research design. Peter Hall has argued that to unfold the process that connects causes and outcomes, small-N comparisons can provide more explanatory leverage than conventional

¹⁰ Alexander L. George & Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* 2 (1985): 35.

¹¹ David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44,4 (2011): 824.

¹² According to Andrew Bennett, “smoking gun tests strongly support a given hypothesis, but failure to pass such a test does not eliminate the explanation. They provide a *sufficient but not necessary* criterion for confirmation.” Bennett likens such tests, using Stephen Van Evera’s analogy, to the ability of a “smoking gun,” in a suspect’s hands immediately after a murder, to strongly implicate that suspect, while the absence of the gun does not exonerate the suspect. Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, 2nd edition, Henry Brady & David Collier eds. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010): 210.

¹³ Alexander George & Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

comparative methods. Using small-N comparisons allows researchers to assess more complex causal processes with a much richer set of observations.¹⁴

WHAT SHOULD SSR ACCOMPLISH?

As a fundamental component of peacebuilding, SSR owes its theoretical origins to the same liberal institutionalism that shaped peacebuilding in its early years. The dominant liberal thinking at the time followed the concept of a liberal democratic peace, which held that “constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.”¹⁵ It was believed that the best way to prevent conflict was for liberal states to help rebuild non-liberal states in their own image to prevent them from falling back into conflict and warfare. By building and promoting liberal institutions and practices, states could implement a framework through which conflicts could be contained, if not prevented.¹⁶ In terms of security governance, this meant creating state security institutions that did not prey on their own citizens and were responsible to the democratic political institutions of the state (civilian control). This assistance usually entailed some form of external intervention, sometimes with the consent of the rebuilding state, sometimes without it. From a monitoring and evaluation point of view, peacebuilding and SSR’s liberal institutionalist beginnings have shaped how reform programmes are assessed for the progress (or lack thereof) they have made.

Early on, the standard for assessing whether or not peacebuilding and security sector reforms have been successful was whether the rebuilding state had joined its brethren as a member of the liberal international order. To put it differently, a rebuilding state has been

¹⁴ Peter Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics,” *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, J. Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 391-392.

¹⁵ Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12,3 (1983): 213. Original emphasis.

¹⁶ Timothy Donais, *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-conflict consensus-building*, Studies in Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (New York: Routledge, 2012): 23.

successfully rebuilt when it looks like other liberal states (political rights, democratic institutions, etc.). International organizations have played a significant role in spreading the principles of the liberal peace to states, using their influence to disseminate internationally accepted norms by providing a forum for socialization to occur. Through their interactions with both the international organization, and their fellow members, actors are influenced into adopting acceptable behaviours, individual values and identities.¹⁷ In other words, a culture is developed and then used to shape future behaviour.¹⁸ According to Roland Paris, “the world’s leading international organizations seemed almost predisposed to adopt strategies promoting liberal market democracy as a remedy for conflict.”¹⁹ For example, activities like UN peace operations are assumed by many to reinforce a liberal-democratic international order.²⁰

The criteria for determining if a rebuilding state had become a member of the liberal international order was whether or not large-scale conflict returned following the completion of the peacebuilding mission. In his seminal work, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Paris applied this test on the UN’s early peacebuilding missions. He found that most of the peacebuilding operations conducted by the UN in the early 1990s had been successful. He concluded, however, that this test set too low of a standard for success, and when he applied tougher criteria²¹, the record became much less positive.²² The results from Paris’ work

¹⁷ Donais, *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership*, 26-27.

¹⁸ Liam Swiss, “Security Sector Reform and Development Assistance: Explaining the Diffusion of Policy Priorities among Donor Agencies,” *Qualitative Sociology* 34,2 (2011): 372.

¹⁹ Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 22.

²⁰ Oliver P. Richmond, “UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus,” *International Peacekeeping* 11,1 (2004): 83.

²¹ Paris re-tested the UN’s early peacebuilding missions to see if they fulfilled the standard established by Kofi Annan, namely that peacebuilding efforts establish a sustainable peace; a peace that will last long after the peacebuilders have left the rebuilding state.

²² Paris, *At War’s End*, 6.

suggested that the liberal model of peacebuilding might be insufficient to return peace and security to a stable state.

One reason for this, according to Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher, may be that “States emerging from war do not have the necessary institutional framework or civic culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with political and market competition. Consequently, as international peacebuilders push for quick liberalization, they are sowing the seeds of conflict, encouraging rivals to wage their struggle for supremacy through markets and ballots.”²³ Neo-realists have capitalized on this to argue that rebuilding a state’s formal institutions after conflict should be the priority of the international community. The argument is “that implementing liberalization too quickly and in the absence of effective institutions can counteract efforts to consolidate peace.”²⁴ This implies that the priority for reforming security sectors is to build strong, capable security institutions (police, military, judiciary, etc.) before instilling them with the liberal democratic norms and principles that they will be expected to respect and espouse in fulfilling their mandates.

For both liberal institutionalists and neo-realists, the primary focus is the presence of capable institutions. The rationale behind this focus is the long-standing belief that the international order does not deal well with the gaps created by “ungoverned spaces” so institutions are needed to fill them. The events of September 11, 2001 brought this thesis to the forefront of the international security discourse. Upon the realization that fragile and failed states like Afghanistan and Sudan could serve as safe havens and training grounds for terrorist groups

²³ Michael Barnett & Christoph Zürcher, “The peacebuilder’s contract: how external statebuilding reinforces weak statehood,” *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk eds. (New York: Routledge, 2009): 23-24.

²⁴ Paris, *At War’s End*, 8.

like al Qaeda, these spaces were quickly labeled threats to international security.²⁵ In this atmosphere, statebuilding efforts were prioritized in order to deprive terrorist groups of safe sanctuaries, whether or not the institutions reflected liberal democratic ideals.

The rhetoric emerging from key actors within the Global War on Terror was that these efforts were benevolent; justified on the basis that the processes were “locally-owned” and aimed at improving governance. However, critics like Timothy Donais, Stephen Baranyi and Jennifer Salahub have pointed that this rhetoric ignores the fact that internationally-supported SSR efforts are tend to be top-down processes controlled by liberal-western donors, who favour “hard” security priorities (e.g. training and equipping security forces), at the expense of “soft” reforms in the area of governance and justice. As a result, “Short-term military and political expediency have trumped long-term development objectives like democratic accountability and fiscal sustainability.”²⁶ It would be wrong, though, to completely condemn liberal approaches to peacebuilding on this basis. Oliver P. Richmond has pointed out that within liberal peacebuilding there are different variations that apply liberalism’s principles in different ways.²⁷ Focusing of these efforts being on the physical (hard) attributes of the state is just one aspect of the liberal peace. For Richmond, the liberal peace can also be achieved by pursuing peace through other means than building up the strength of state institutions.

By focusing on physical institutions, official perspectives – like those criticized by Donais, Baranyi and Salahub – reflect the dominant view that it is the responsibility of the state,

²⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2002).

²⁶ Stephen Baranyi & Jennifer Salahub, “Police reform and democratic development in lower-profile fragile states,” *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 32,1 (2011): 48-63. Timothy Donais, “Peacebuilding and the Dilemmas of Local Ownership: The Case of Haiti,” *International Journal* 44,3 (2009): 753-773. Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes,” *Peace and Change* 34,1 (2009): 3-26.

²⁷ Oliver P. Richmond, “Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding,” *International Journal* 62,3 (2007): 462-3.

and its institutions, to provide security. In many fragile states and post-conflict states, state security institutions are either unable or unwilling to provide security, often resulting in a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. “In the absence of effective and legitimate state provision of security,” Louise Riis Andersen has observed, “local and informal justice and conflict management systems tend to expand, often enjoying considerable local legitimacy.”²⁸ The emergence of informal security providers, however, poses a challenge to recent approaches to SSR: what happens if the formal and informal security structures work at odds with each other and how can monitoring and evaluation methods account for such a dynamic?

Ken Menkhaus recognized this potential for tension between formal and informal security provision in studying the international community’s efforts to introduce good governance structures in Somalia in the early 2000s.²⁹ Menkhaus, who called Somalia “the world’s foremost graveyard of externally sponsored state-building initiatives,” contended from his study that the tendency among external actors to conflate state building and peacebuilding initiatives has tended to obscure the important distinctions between the two and the different challenges that can derail their efforts.³⁰ Assistance programmes that aim to build – or impose – strong, centralized state institutions may in fact destabilize an already existing peace and contribute to a worsened security situation on the ground. Alternatively, informal peace provision may prevent strong state security institutions from ever forming. Ultimately, the provider of security within a state will come down to whichever actor(s) the people on the ground feel are the most capable and the most legitimate providers of security services. If the citizens feel that they cannot rely on the state to ensure their security, they may well look to other

²⁸ Louise Riis Andersen, *Security Sector Reform and the Dilemmas of Liberal Peacebuilding*, DIIS Working Paper 2011:31 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Studies, 2011): 11.

²⁹ Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” *International Security* 31,3 (2006/2007): 74-106.

³⁰ Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia,” 76.

actors for their security. Sometimes these other actors come from the ranks of regional and international organizations, sometimes they come from private and/or sub-state actors. These actors may not necessarily reflect the liberal-democratic principles embraced by the international community. Security governance within a state is built using institutions that reflect unequal power relations within a society.

Critical approaches to understanding peacebuilding have sought to challenge institutionalist approaches by examining how power relations within a state can influence who is secure. Adopting liberalism's concern for individuals' freedom from fear,³¹ and neo-realism's concern for international stability, critical peacebuilding theory questions long-held assumptions of peacebuilding. Vincenza Scherrer has pointed out that peacebuilding and SSR "programming often takes place on the assumption that activities will lead to positive, long-term change will be felt in the lives of beneficiaries. Rarely are these assumptions tested. In fact, evaluations – when they occur – are often heavily focused on 'outputs' that do not shed light on the value of international support."³²

Critical approaches to understanding peacebuilding adopt the view of Habermas that "contemporary international society imposes important restrictions on the pursuit of commonly held moral goods,' and that "the study and practice of security ought to be shaped by a concern for human emancipation, understood as the freeing of individuals from constraints that prevent them pursuing their own vision of the good life in ways that do not inhibit others from doing likewise."³³ Like all critical theories, they seek to identify how the practice of peacebuilding reinforces the prevailing international order by questioning the origins of institutions and

³¹ Roland Paris, "Critiques of Liberal Peace," *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*, Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, & Meera Sabaratnam eds. (New York: Zed Books, 2011): 42.

³² Vincenza Scherrer, *Measuring the Impact of Peacebuilding Interventions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions*, SSR Paper 6 (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012): 6.

³³ Alex J. Bellamy, "The 'next stage' in peace operations theory?" *International Peacekeeping* 11,1 (2004): 26.

social/power relations within a rebuilding state. In terms of peacebuilding, the prevailing order is commonly understood to be the liberal international order and critical theorists seek to identify “winners” and “losers” under this system as the basis for arguing against the current order. The prevailing international order is defined by the international culture that prescribes what entitles a polity to statehood and how that state should behave.³⁴ This applies to a state’s security institutions, as well.³⁵ For critical theorists, liberal peacebuilding – and SSR – seeks to ensure that post-conflict states are rebuilt in ways that reinforce the prevailing order, including who benefits and who suffers.³⁶

Critical theories are normative, identifying a range of different social/political orders as alternatives to the prevailing order.³⁷ Critical peacebuilding theorists have sought to vilify the liberal peacebuilding for its faults, and suggest alternative models based on different social/political orders.³⁸ They do this by challenging liberal peacebuilding’s assumptions. To evaluate the progress of peacebuilding programmes from a critical theory perspective, no assumption can be made that strengthening the security institutions of the state will lead to improved security for the people of that state. Instead, the focus has to be whether or not the security sector reform efforts have improved the human security (emancipation) of people within the state. This allows analysts to understand when the prevailing order benefits the people as a

³⁴ John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, & Francisco O. Ramirez, “World society and the nation-state,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 103,1 (1997): 144-181. John W. Meyer, “Globalization: Theory and trends,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 48,4 (2007): 261-273.

³⁵ Swiss, “Security Sector Reform and Development Assistance,” 371-372; Kal Holsti, *The state, war, and the state of war* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Joel S. Midgal, *Strong societies and weak states: State-society relations and capabilities in the third world* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s weak states persist,” *World Politics* 35,1 (1982): 1-24.

³⁶ Michael Pugh, “The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10,2 (2005): 23-42.

³⁷ Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 10,2 (1981): 130.

³⁸ For example, see Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After Wars,” *International Security* 30,4 (2006): 87-112; David Chandler, “Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy,” *Review of International Studies* 32,3 (2006): 475-479.

whole, or if it benefits some at the expense of others. Furthermore, evaluating programmes in this manner allows for the possibility that security can be provided from actors other than the state and, at the same time, may provide a more accurate indication of whether a sustainable peace has developed in the state in question.

Answering critical questions, however, does not have to lead to the rejection of the liberal peacebuilding model, as some critical theorists have sought.³⁹ Rather, as Paris argues, “[c]ritical studies of peacebuilding are ‘critical’ in the sense that they ask probing questions about underlying assumptions that might otherwise be taken for granted.”⁴⁰ In his study of the supposed “crisis of liberal peacebuilding,” Paris found that liberal peacebuilding’s critics (Pugh, Chandler, Barnett) were, perhaps unknowingly, making the case not for the rejection of the liberal peace model, but rather that peacebuilders should recognize and acknowledge when a gap exists between their stated principles and their practice, assessing the impact(s) of their behaviour, to ensure that they are constantly striving to live up to their liberal principles.⁴¹ The underlying purpose, therefore, is to look for better ways to achieve one’s goals. Recent work by Donais – for example – on the conception of vertical integration in peacebuilding, as a means of closing the gap between top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding is an excellent example of such efforts.⁴²

AID EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Although first conceived by Johan Galtung in the 1970’s, peacebuilding did not receive much attention by the international community until 1992, when UN Secretary-General Boutros

³⁹ Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 339.

⁴⁰ Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” 339.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 355.

⁴² Donais, “Peacebuilding and the Dilemmas of Local Ownership: The Case of Haiti,” 753-773; Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes,” 3-26.

Boutros-Ghali, in his report *An Agenda for Peace*, linked the concept with the success of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. Boutros-Ghali's report defined peacebuilding as "efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people."⁴³

As the international community began to accept the concept of state-sponsored peacebuilding, aid agencies became increasingly concerned with concepts of peace and security. While developed states had provided assistance to the security sectors of fragile states in the past, international assistance in the years after the Cold War gained a new context, free from the politics of the superpower struggle. Gradually, donors began to shift their focus from the survival of the state to the welfare of the people in the recipient states. This shift was largely influenced by some key actors' belief that international donors should ensure that their assistance does not prove harmful to the societies they seek to aid.

During the Cold War, the support/survival/allegiance of recipient state governments was ultimately more important to donors than the welfare of the people these governments ruled. In the years after, donor agencies became increasingly involved in reducing conflicts within states and whose victims were often disproportionately civilian; a focus that naturally pushed actors to seek to better understand how their assistance would impact on a conflict, and in turn the people affected by the conflict. It was during this period that ideas like the "Do No Harm" principle began to take hold within the international development community. Such ideas sought to highlight the difference between intentions and impacts. It was no longer to be enough that states base their assistance on their good intentions, but rather on the demonstrable impact, preferably positive, that the assistance could have for recipient societies.

⁴³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 – A/47/277-S/24111 (New York: United Nations, 1992): paragraph 55.

Emerging Norms

In 2005, Ministers and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions affirmed their commitment to improving aid effectiveness. In their collective statement, known as the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, the world's development leaders envisioned that the objective for the international assistance to fragile states should be “to build legitimate, effective and resilient state and other country institutions.”⁴⁴ They recognized that “real progress at country level is critical, under the leadership of the partner country [donors] will periodically assess, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, [their] mutual progress at country level in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness.”⁴⁵ The issue of mutual progress, to which the Paris Declaration refers, reflects the recognition that both donors and recipients have a responsibility to ensure aid programmes are implemented in the most beneficial ways. Such assessments, however, have been challenging to say the least, and a constant topic of disagreement policymakers, academics and practitioners.

One of the key challenges associated with understanding the impacts of assistance programmes is defining the key concepts that shape these processes, namely what does peace look like? What does it mean to be secure? And how does one build these conditions (peacebuilding)? The way in which these concepts are defined can affect how analyses are designed and implemented. Manuela Leonhardt suggests, “a certain understanding of peace and conflict is a central part of every methodology. Such an implicit or explicit peacebuilding framework leads the conflict analysis into particular directions, offers explanatory models and

⁴⁴ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (Paris: OECD, 2005): 2.

⁴⁵ OECD, *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, 2.

guides strategy development. Conflict analysis is not neutral; it always reflects certain values and theories about the nature of conflict, and thus raises question of power and representation.”⁴⁶

A common component of many peacebuilding programmes, security sector reform also faces conceptualization challenges, which can affect how programmes are implemented and evaluated. According to Ursula C. Schroeder, the “specification of what we mean by ‘security’ necessarily forms the bedrock of any broader measurement of security sector governance. Answering the general question of ‘who is to be secured from what and by what means’, different concepts of security can focus on diverging referent objects (‘who or what is to be secured’), which can lead to vast differences in policy (‘how security is provided’).”⁴⁷

One of the clearest demonstrations of this reality is the debate that has surrounded the concept of human security and the importance it should be afforded by the international community in dealing with fragile and conflict affected states. Over the last two decades, the traditional concept of security, defined in terms of the survival of the state, has repeatedly faced challenges by newer conceptualizations that attempt to better capture the dynamics of international society. Of these, according to Taylor Owen, “human security takes the most dramatic step by making the referent object not the state, society or community, but the individual. This shift is meant to direct research and policy towards the actual issues threatening peoples’ lives.”⁴⁸ This shift is important in terms of Western-led, international SSR assistance, Schroeder points out, because “human security approaches clearly dominate current thinking about security concepts and policies.”⁴⁹ SSR programmes are now expected, at least according to

⁴⁶ Manuela Leonhardt, “Providing Aid Agencies with Tools for Conflict-Sensitive Practice: Lessons Learned from Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA),” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 1,1 (2002): 49.

⁴⁷ Ursula Schroeder, *Measuring Security Sector Governance – A Guide to Relevant Indicators*, Occasional Paper No. 20 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010): 7.

⁴⁸ Taylor Owen, “Challenges and opportunities for defining and measuring human security,” *Disarmament Forum* 6,3 (2004): 17.

⁴⁹ Ursula C. Schroeder, *Measuring Security Sector Governance*, 8.

the UN Secretary-General, to not only help improve the security of the state, but also the security of the people within the state.

A leader in the early conceptualization of SSR, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposes that SSR “should be seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing populations and states through more integrated development and security system reform policies.”⁵⁰ The accepted core values of which are that SSR is “people-centred, locally-owned and based on democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and on the rule of law” with the end goal being to ensure a society is free from fear.⁵¹ In other words, SSR “helps create a secure environment conducive to other political, economic and social developments, through the reduction of armed violence and crime.”⁵² It is a term used to describe programs and policies aimed at reforming the security institutions of a states, aided by domestic and international stakeholders, “to improve the way a state or governing body provides safety, security and justice to its civilian population within the context of *rule of law*.”⁵³ As Michael Brzoska has noted, one of SSR’s main objectives is that it “is charged with the provision of security. This pertains to the protection from and prevention of political violence by state or non-state elements (such as criminal and militant opposition groups), which are a major problem of most post-conflict situations particularly those with international presence.”⁵⁴ For both the OECD and Brzoska, the area of concern in security sector reform in not just the security of the state, but also the security

⁵⁰ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005): 22.

⁵¹ OECD-DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance*, 22.

⁵² Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007): 21.

⁵³ Sarah Meharg & Aleisha Arnusch, *Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010): 3. Original emphasis.

⁵⁴ Michael Brzoska, “Introduction: Criteria for evaluating post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform in peace support operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 13,1 (2006): 2-3.

of the people within that state. W. Andy Knight has characterized the change sought by SSR as “a fundamental restructuring of security institutions so that these institutions perform human security as well as state security functions and operate within a framework of democratic and transparent governance.”⁵⁵ However, recent experience suggests that SSR remains “confined to institutional reform, and does not focus on how individuals and communities experience security and justice. In other words, the human dimension of SSR tends to get lost.”⁵⁶ Consequently, without the human dimension of SSR, we are unable to fully understand the contribution, or “impact” of assistance programmes.

Impact Analysis

The impact analysis of peacebuilding-related activities – like SSR – is still in its infancy, and the methodologies used in these analyses are still being tested and revised. One of the early attempts at conducting such analyses was developed in the early years after the Cold War had ended. First proposed in academic circles, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) sought to distinguish impact analysis from the traditional evaluations performed in development circles. The scope of PCIA extended far beyond outputs, outcomes, goals and objectives of conventional development efforts. Instead, the aim was “to discern a project’s impact on the peace and conflict environment – an area it may not have been designed explicitly to affect. Thus, it is quite possible that a project may fail according to limited developmental criteria (e.g. irrigation targets, health care delivery, literacy levels) but succeed in reducing tensions between particular social groups by creating and institutionalizing a non-threatening and constructive development that increases neutral contact and decreases misunderstanding by dispelling stereotypes and

⁵⁵ W. Andy Knight, “Linking DDR and SSR in post conflict peace-building in Africa: An overview,” *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 4,1 (2010): 34.

⁵⁶ OECD-DAC, *Security System Reform: What Have We Learned?* (Paris: OECD, 2009): 13.

misconceptions.”⁵⁷ It was “a means of evaluating (*ex post facto*) and anticipating (*ex ante*, as far as possible) the impacts of proposed and completed development projects on: 1) those structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict, and; 2) those structures and processes that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means.”⁵⁸

Critics of initial approaches to PCIA, were quick to point out the challenges inherent in attempting to assess impact so broadly. Mary B. Anderson, Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow suggested “such assessments are not even possible or desirable because they attempt to measure effects that are ‘too remote’ or raise expectations of impact ‘too high.’”⁵⁹ Attempting to link specific assistance programmes with changes to macro-level conditions is extremely problematic. Security governance within a state is invariably influenced by multiple domestic and external factors, and as such, the results of attempts to link macro-level impacts with individual programmes could be incredibly misleading.⁶⁰ Gains (or losses) witnessed in the broader security situation could be mistakenly attributed to efforts in one area, when in fact they the result of completely different set of changes.

The big picture is not the only picture though. Impacts in peacebuilding evaluation can be understood in a number of ways, “ranging from the level of impact (micro/personal experiences of localised change to macro/structural and procedural change), to the location of change

⁵⁷ Kenneth Bush, *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*, Working Paper No. 1 (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998): 7.

⁵⁸ Bush, *A Measure of Peace*, 7.

⁵⁹ Mary B. Anderson, Diana Chiagas & Peter Woodrow, “Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance,” *OECD Journal on Development* 8,3 (2008): 30.

⁶⁰ Schroeder, *Measuring Security Sector Governance*, 6.

(internal project related versus societal external criteria).⁶¹ Instead of searching for connections between programmes and macro-level changes, for some purposes it may be more beneficial for evaluations purposes to look for impacts at the meso-level, such as structural conflict factors, institutions or vulnerable groups. For it is at this level, according to Leonhardt, that peacebuilding initiatives tend to target in their programming.⁶² But the level at which evaluations are targeted is just one point of contention in a much larger debate on how to best evaluate the effectiveness peacebuilding assistance.

The peacebuilding community also struggles with internal disagreement over which types of research methods provide the greatest insight into the effectiveness of peacebuilding programmes. It is here where the practice of peacebuilding succumbs to one of the most recurring and divisive debates within academia. Typically associated with the larger academic field of international relations, the practice of peacebuilding has been influenced by the recurring debate within the social sciences on whether quantitative or qualitative research methods are most appropriate for analyzing the effect of programmes/policies on peace and security.

Quantitative approaches employ statistical-type analyses that rely on measurable data, such as the number of conflict-related deaths in a specific period or the number of crimes reported to the police. Such analyses can convey “powerful and compelling images that communicate well, but quantification requires considerable abstraction, and thus simplification.”⁶³ Qualitative approaches rely on verbal and narrative methods, using opinion, perception, and analysis gathered through interviews, focus groups, observations, and case studies. While qualitative approaches can provide in-depth understanding of complex issues

⁶¹ Larissa Fast & Reina C. Neufeldt, “Envisioning Success: Building Blocks for Strategic and Comprehensive Peacebuilding Impact Evaluation,” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 2,2 (2005): 27.

⁶² Manuela Leonhardt, “Providing Aid Agencies with Tools for Conflict-Sensitive Practice,” 46.

⁶³ Cedric de Coning & Paul Romita, *Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations* (New York: International Peace Institute, November 2009): 6.

and/or uncover new developments, they do tend to require longer periods of study and can be expensive.⁶⁴ Despite the differences, there are no “this type of analysis is better than that type” statements to be made. Both are able to produce extremely valuable insights, therefore an actors’ choice of methods ultimately falls down to what type of knowledge it wishes to produce. For example, Cedric de Coning and Paul Romita have argued that,

Both quantitative and qualitative methods can be meaningfully applied in the monitoring and evaluation of peace operations. What is important, however, is to use them appropriately, and to understand the comparative advantage of each approach. Quantitative methods are useful when processing linear data and for statistical analysis. Qualitative methods are useful when dealing with highly dynamic, nonlinear data and higher-order considerations, such as assessing theories of change and the relevance of a specific approach. Using both in a complementary fashion should yield a more comprehensive understanding of the situation.⁶⁵

According to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), “the golden rule is to apply the right tools and methods to the right questions. Methods should be chosen according to the evaluation purpose and key objectives and should involve a credible approach to attribution that avoids potential biases.”⁶⁶ Fragile and conflict affected states are complex environments, with multiple factor often influencing conditions on the ground. Such situations generally require the use of multiple methodologies in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of conditions on the ground.⁶⁷

In its efforts to improve how it approaches the evaluation of its SSR programmes, the UN’s SSR Task Force recommends that the focus be placed on outcomes and not merely on outputs. It proposed that evaluations should be “approached as a process involving a set of relationships and not merely a series of reports.”⁶⁸ The OECD’ Development Assistance

⁶⁴ Leonhardt, “Providing Aid Agencies with Tools for Conflict-Sensitive Practice,” 43-44.

⁶⁵ de Coning & Romita, *Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations*, 6-7.

⁶⁶ OECD – DAC, *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2012): 49-50. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/evaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.htm>.

⁶⁷ OECD – DAC, *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility*, 49-50.

⁶⁸ UN SSR Task Force, *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes*, 26.

Committee (DAC) goes further, proposing that an evaluation's ability to impact on decision-making is influenced by quality of information it provides. This is because "evaluations involve real costs, including the use of resources which could otherwise be deployed elsewhere, and should therefore be judged on the value of the information they provide."⁶⁹ Truly valuable M&E requires being able to understand the relationships that exist between different factors at play in a conflict, such as the relationship between a donor's programmes/policies and conditions on the ground, or – especially in the case of SSR – the relationship between a state and its people. Understanding the effects of programmes on the ground helps to distinguish between a failed theory of change from failed implementation. This distinction is an important one; "Theory failure indicates the failure of a conflict prevention or peacebuilding activity due to a flawed causal relationship – in other words, underlying assumptions about how to bring about change in this context are false. A faulty theory of change could be based on an inaccurate conflict analysis, or it could reflect misdirected priorities or mismatched objectives."⁷⁰ This type of information is vital to evaluating the effectiveness of programming.

Actors outside of the UN system have begun to recognize the value of understanding these relationships. In constructing the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding recognized that fostering constructive relationships between donors and recipients, as well as governments and their people are central to any successful peacebuilding effort.⁷¹ By agreeing on priorities and

⁶⁹ OECD – DAC, *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility*, 41.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 61.

⁷¹ International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & Statebuilding, *The Washington Communiqué on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* (Washington: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & Statebuilding, 19 April 2013). Available at: <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Washington-Communiqu%C3%A9-19-April-2013.pdf>.

principles, the supporters are seeking to establish new norms around how peacebuilding activities are conducted.

This desire and ability to understand relationships between actors on the ground, and how they are affected by donor assistance, should draw attention away from other debate methodological debates and instead focus on another component of impact analysis, indicators. Indicators form an integral part of any performance measurement process. They are signposts used to provide a picture of a situation and changes to that situation. Increasingly in the public and not-for-profit sectors, organizations are implementing performance measurement and evaluations into their management practices, to the point that it is now widely accepted that performance information should be part of any management and budgeting strategy.⁷² Early efforts at such results-based management (RBM), according to John Mayne, “were most often focused on outputs – the direct good and services produced – rather than outcomes – the benefits achieved as a result of those goods and services. Today the focus is more on outcomes.”⁷³

There exist a number of different global and country level indicators, offering measures of governance, development, freedom and rule of law, which one may use in the analysis of peace and security. Notable examples of these include the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators Project, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, or the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV Project. These tools, however, are nice general descriptors of conditions, but are less useful when it comes to evaluating the performance of assistance programmes. The problem is that “[i]ndicators that track general trends in modes of security

⁷² John Mayne, “Challenges and Lessons in Implementing Results-Based Management,” *Evaluation* 13,1 (2007): 88.

⁷³ Mayne, “Challenges and Lessons in Results-Based Management,” 88.

sector governance do not deliver information about the causes of change for the better or worse at the same time.”⁷⁴

Performance evaluation indicators are not only categorized by their topic, but also by their type. In development-related activities, the results chain is usually as follows: *inputs* (financial and physical resources) are used to generate *outputs* (products and services produced from programming). The expectation, then, is that the outputs will help foster changes in institutional capacity, in terms of performance, stability and adaptability, known as outcomes. Finally, changes in institutional capacity will lead to changes in peoples’ lives, referred to as *impacts* or *results*.⁷⁵ The UNDP describes the importance of impacts about as well said as can possibly be, when it states that,

The completion of activities tells us little about changes in development conditions or in the lives of people. It is the results of these activities that are significant. Impact refers to the ‘big picture’ changes being sought and represents the **underlying goal** of development work. In the process of planning, it is important to frame planned interventions or outputs within a context of their desired impact. Without a clear vision of what the programme or project hopes to achieve, it is difficult to clearly define results.⁷⁶

To understand the effectiveness of their programmes/policies, peacebuilders should understand why and how their efforts can/will help achieve the desired outcomes – their “theory of change” – so that they can “set meaningful performance expectations, measure and analyze results, learn from this evidence to adjust delivery and modify or confirm programme design, and report on the performance achieved against expectations.”⁷⁷ In principle, aid effectiveness is not measured in terms of inputs and outputs, but by the changes in development conditions signified in outcomes and impacts. In practice, however, this isn’t always the case.

⁷⁴ Schroeder, *Measuring Security Sector Governance*, 11.

⁷⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Defining and Measuring Capacity Development Results* (New York: United Nations, 2010): 1.

⁷⁶ UNDP, *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results* (New York: United Nations, 2009): 56.

⁷⁷ UNDP, *Achieving Results: Evaluation of Results-Based Management at UNDP* (New York: United Nations, 2007): viii.

SITUATION IN THE DRC

The DRC has suffered from near perpetual conflict and instability since the end of the Rwandan genocide. In the last 16 years, Congo has experienced two wars – First Congo War (1996-1997) and Second Congo War (1998-2003) – and a localized internal conflict in the Kivu region (2004-present). Since 1998, more than 5.4 million deaths have resulted from the actions of legitimate and illegitimate armed groups such that the situation in the DRC has been called the world’s most deadly conflict since the Second World War.⁷⁸ In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted an opinion survey in the DRC and found that 76 percent of respondents felt that they had been affected *in some way* by armed conflict.⁷⁹ The effects of the insecurity on Congolese society are extensive enough that all aspects of social life need to be rebuilt.⁸⁰

Tellingly, the DRC has routinely been ranked as one of the most fragile states in the world. The Congolese state has placed no lower than seventh (worst) on the *Failed States Index* since 2005, and has been ranked second multiple times, right behind only the archetypal failed state, Somalia.

Political Instability

The Congolese government’s chronically poor governance has been identified as a causal factor in the two wars. The central government is an “anocracy,” exercising weak central authority over its territory, thereby limiting its legitimacy in the eyes of people and, ultimately,

⁷⁸ Caty Clement, “Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past,” *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*, DCAF Yearly Book, Hans Born & Albrecht Schnabel eds. (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2009): 89.

⁷⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Summary Report: Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, and the Philippines*. Opinion Survey and In-Depth Research, 2009 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009): 31.

⁸⁰ Caty Clement, “Security Sector Reform in the DRC,” 89-90.

its domestic sovereignty. International Alert has reported a patrimonial and predatory style of pork-barrel governance continues to be the norm in DRC, despite democratisation attempts with support from international partners and the holding of two presidential and legislative elections (2006 and 2011).

This is a form of rule that cannibalises public funds, which are redirected to the various clients of those in power. “It empties state institutions of their substance, by favouring the creation of shadowy, private systems of governance, where main decisions are not taken in the relevant ministries but more often than not behind the scenes by the ‘real’ power holders and the influential representatives of their respective clients.”⁸¹

This is backed up by World Governance Indicators (WGI) measurements in the area of Regulatory Quality⁸² and Government Effectiveness⁸³ since 2005. During this period, the DRC has received poor scores between -1.62 and -1.24 in Regulatory Quality and between -1.77 and -1.59 in Government Effectiveness (on scales from -2.5 to +2.5). These scores reflect the inability of the Kabila government to develop and implement sound policies to govern all its people and territory.

The DRC’s poor record in the area of capacity to govern paints a very bleak picture in terms of stability. The government’s inability to govern effectively (by formulating/implementing good public policies and providing public goods) has given the people plenty of reason to look to other sources/actors for their governance needs. As a result, the Kabila government has lost some of its legitimacy and, therefore, authority to govern in the eyes of at least some of the Congolese people. This is supported by the WGI’s measure of Political

⁸¹ International Alert, *Ending the Deadlock: Towards a new vision of peace in eastern DRC* (London: International Alert, 2012): 15.

⁸² The World Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset uses “Regulatory Quality” to reflect peoples’ perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

⁸³ The WGI dataset uses “Government Effectiveness” to reflect perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

Stability/No Violence⁸⁴. Between 2005 and 2011, the DRC's scores in this area have been poor, ranging between -1.95 and -2.28 (on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, where negative scores indicate poor performance), such that it has routinely been ranked as one of the most politically unstable countries in the world.

Weak Security Forces

On 4 April 2012, there was a mutiny within the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in the Kivu region of the country. General Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda and approximately 300 Congolese soldiers defected from the FARDC, calling themselves the M23 Movement. The rebels selected this name in recognition of the peace treaty signed on 23 March 2009 that integrated Ntaganda's armed group, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), into the FARDC. The M23 rebels' grievance was that the Congolese government had not fulfilled its side of the peace agreement; more specifically, that the Government had failed to integrate the former CNDP personnel into the Congolese armed forces. Complicating this matter, a recent report by a United Nations group of experts found that the Rwandan government has been providing support to the M23 rebels, even going so far as to suggest that Rwanda is directly involved in the top levels of the rebels' chain of command.⁸⁵

Open armed conflict is obviously a major concern for the stability of the DRC. The security situation, however, is more complicated than just the recent mutiny. Following the end of the Second Congo War in 2003, a regional conflict began in the Kivu region in the country's East. The roots of this conflict can be traced back to the political compromise struck between the

⁸⁴ According to the WGI, “Political Stability/NoViolence” reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.

⁸⁵ United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *Interim Report of the Group*, UN Document S/2012/348 (New York: United Nations, 2012).

belligerents of the Second War. The agreement, between the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC; the old government's army), the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-G), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML) and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National (RCD), was – at least in theory – that the armed groups would convert themselves into political parties that would share power in the capital (Kinshasa) alongside representatives from civil society.⁸⁶ Additionally, the parties' armed groups would be unified into a new, apolitical, national army, named the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).

The agreement, however, has led to unification in name only. The International Crisis Group has observed that the majority of armed units in the country remain in the same positions, and are controlled by the same command structures as before the transition. These types of parallel chains of command are also found in the administrative and financial structures in Kinshasa and the provinces.⁸⁷ In order to hold onto, and increase their power, these factions within the FARDC are engaged in predatory behaviour, subjecting the Congolese people to illegal levies on things like taxes and food.⁸⁸ Furthermore, some of these armed factions are engaged in corrupt activities like controlling local markets and natural resources.⁸⁹ The extent of this corruption points to the inability of the central government to exert control over its own armed forces. Two separate measures, produced by the World Bank and Transparency International, support this claim, ranking the DRC amongst the worst states in the world for

⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, *The Congo's Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus*, Africa Report No. 91 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005): 1.

⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, *The Congo's Transition is Failing*, 1.

⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, *Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed*, Africa Briefing No. 91 (Kinshasa/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 4 October 2012): 6. Available at:

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b091-eastern-congo-why-stabilisation-failed](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b091-eastern-congo-why-stabilisation-failed).

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, *Eastern Congo*, 6.

corruption. Between 2005 and 2011, the World Governance Indicators' evaluations of the DRC's record in "Control of Corruption" have the country scoring between -1.17 and -1.48 on a scale from -2.5 (bad) to +2.5 (good). This record has placed the DRC, on average, in the 4th percentile of all states in this area. Likewise, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has the DRC scoring between 1.7 and 2.1, on its scale out of 10, for an average world ranking of 162th worst.

The persistently high level of corruption within DRC, especially within the state's security sector institutions poses a considerable threat to the country's stability. By engaging in predatory behaviour, the factionalized FARDC lose the trust of the Congolese people to protect them. Instead, the people look to other means for their security. Faced with armed rebel groups operating almost freely within the country and a fractured military, the Congolese state is unable to effectively enforce the rule of law. Instead, authority and power is wielded by those with the greatest (armed) strength.

International Presence

Since the July 1999 signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to end the First Congo War, the United Nations has had a peacekeeping/stabilization mission in the DRC. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) – which before 2010 was known as the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) – has worked on the ground in the DRC to ensure free and fair elections and assist the government in implementing multiple political, military, rule of law, and capacity-building reforms.⁹⁰ MONUSCO was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution

⁹⁰ United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, "MONUSCO Background," *Website of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Kinshasa: MONUSCO, 2012): <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml>.

1925 (2010) to “use all necessary means” to fulfill its mandate and to protect civilians, humanitarian aid personnel and human rights workers under imminent threat of physical violence.⁹¹ At its current strength, MONUSCO is comprised of 19,109 uniformed personnel (military and police), 955 international civilian personnel, 2,886 local civilian staff and 577 United Nations Volunteers.⁹² The mission is the world’s second largest peacekeeping force (behind the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, or UNAMID) and is the largest UN-only peacekeeping mission.

In addition to the MONUSCO’s peacekeeping presence, several other UN agencies, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have delivered assistance to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congolese people. Outside of the UN system, the DRC receives assistance from bilateral partners and regional organizations including the African Union, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Despite the attention that the DRC has received from the international community, reforming the DRC’s security sectors has been no easy task and remains unfinished.

UNDP EVALUATIONS

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN’s primary development actor. Funded entirely through voluntary contributions from Member States, the UNDP “partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and

⁹¹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1925 (2010)*, UN Document S/RES/1925 (New York: UN Security Council, 2010).

⁹² MONUSCO, “Facts and Figures,” *Website of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Kinshasa: MONUSCO, 2012): <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml>.

sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone.”⁹³ The organization’s unit that is most directly involved in security sector reform is the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). The BCPR’s mission is to provide expertise on crisis issues and advocate for crisis sensitivity, “working to ensure that all UNDP’s long-term development policies and programmes address the risks and opportunities related to disaster reduction and conflict prevention.”⁹⁴

UNDP’s primary programme for SSR-related assistance is the Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations. Started in 2008, this programme seeks to establish “close linkages between protection and the rule of law, and between humanitarian action and development principles.”⁹⁵ The programme focuses on providing assistance in five areas: 1) Strengthening the rule of law within an Early Recovery Framework and during transitions; 2) Addressing women’s security and access to justice; 3) Supporting capacity development of rule of law institutions; 4) Facilitating transitional justice; and 5) Promoting confidence building and reconciliation.⁹⁶

The UNDP’s rule of law policy guidance openly admits that its “approach to strengthening security prioritises the security of the citizen and the community. This imperative derives from dignity, the right of people to live free from fear and free from want.”⁹⁷ It recognizes that the provision of security is a “central to securing peace and to establish the

⁹³ United Nations Development Programme, “Overview: What we do,” *UNDP website* (New York: UNDP, 2013): <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/overview.html>.

⁹⁴ Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, “The Peacebuilding Guide: United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,” *Geneva Peacebuilding Platform website* (Geneva: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2013): <http://www.gpplatform.ch/pbguide/organisation/united-nations-development-programme-bureau-crisis-prevention-and-recovery-undp>

⁹⁵ United Nations Development Programme – Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR), *Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict- and Post-Conflict Situations: A Global UNDP Programme for Justice and Security, 2008-2011* (New York: United Nations, 2009): 5-6.

⁹⁶ UNDP-BCPR, *Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict- and Post-Conflict Situations*, 6.

⁹⁷ UNDP-BCPR, *Strengthening the Rule of Law in Crisis-affected and Fragile Situations*, Global Programme Annual Report 2011 (New York: United Nations, 2012): 22-23.

conditions for social and economic development. Safety matters, for individuals, for national development and to prevent a return to conflict.”⁹⁸ This focus conceptualizes security in a much broader way than traditional state-centric security and this focus is reflected in the indicators UNDP/BCPR uses to evaluate its programmes.

In the early years after the Cold War, the UNDP was a leader in shifting the development agenda away from geopolitics and towards sustainable human development through instruments like the Human Development Reports on human development (1990) and human security (1994). With this shift, came the increasing expectation that development aid agencies demonstrate the effectiveness of their aid to justify its budget. Early on, UNDP adopted results-based management practices, intending to reverse shrinking resources bases and build predictable programme funding by demonstrating a performance focus to its donors.⁹⁹

With the shift have come new and more difficult challenges for UNDP’s headquarter and country office teams. UNDP staff are asked to think more critically about the programmes and policies that they implement. Staff, especially at the management level, are expected – not “encouraged,” but expected – to “understand why projects and other activities contribute to the outcomes sought – the theory of change, set meaningful performance expectations, measure and analyze results, learn from this evidence to adjust delivery and modify or confirm programme design, and report on the performance achieved against expectations.”¹⁰⁰ The objective being to support improved accountability (to governments, beneficiaries, donors, other partners and stakeholders), identify poor performance and prompt corrective actions, ensure informed decision-making, better manage risk and opportunities, and enhance learning by both the

⁹⁸ UNDP-BCPR, *Strengthening the Rule of Law in Crisis-affected and Fragile Situations*, 22-23.

⁹⁹ UNDP, *Achieving Results*, vii.

¹⁰⁰ UNDP, *Achieving Results*, viii.

organization and individuals.¹⁰¹ The UNDP's ability to demonstrate its accountability is crucial to the organization. As the organization operates entirely on donations made by Member States, the organization needs to be able to report back to its donors – annually for programme evaluations and quadrennially in the case of outcome evaluations – with evidence that the donors' money has been used in a meaningful way, so that they will continue to fund its programmes.

By shifting to results-based management, the UNDP has also shifted its focus in evaluation from outputs to outcomes. According to the UNDP's own policy guidance,

Outcome evaluations are strategic, addressing: broad-based linkages with development; partnerships across agencies; analysis of the external, local, regional and global environment in the analysis of success; and the comparative value of UNDP and significance in development. Another distinct characteristic of outcome evaluations is that they explicitly recognize the role of partners in the attainment of those outcomes and provide critical information for the purpose of enhancing development effectiveness and assisting decision and policy making beyond a particular project or initiative.¹⁰²

The objectives of outcome evaluations are to assess: 1) progress towards achieving the specified outcome – including the unintended effects of activities related to this outcome; 2) the contribution different factors have on achieving the outcomes; 3) the contribution of the UNDP's programmes and policies to achieving the outcomes; and 4) the effectiveness of the partnership strategy in achieving the outcomes.¹⁰³

Outcome evaluations differ from traditional project evaluations in a couple of key aspects. Project evaluations generally focus on inputs and outputs, rarely looking past to the impacts that these have on the broader situation, and/or the achievement of the outcome (see Table 1). Additionally, their purpose is mainly to assess the implementation of the programmes and inputs to which they are focused on. Outcome evaluations, on the other hand, look deeper

¹⁰¹ UNDP, *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results*, 11-12.

¹⁰² Ibid, 133.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 133.

than connecting inputs and outputs to assess what effect these inputs and outputs are having on situation they are trying to address, or even on other, unintended, issues. This information is then utilized to understand the effectiveness of the development assistance, to aid in decision-making and to adjust focus and resources based on what is and what isn't working.

Table 1

Differences between project and outcome evaluations		
	Project Evaluation	Outcome Evaluation
Focus	Generally speaking, inputs, activities and outputs (if and how project outputs were delivered within a sector of geographic area and if direct results occurred and can be attributed to the project)	Outcomes (whether, why and how the outcome has been achieved, and the contribution of UNDP to a change in given development situation)
Scope	Specific to project objectives, inputs and activities Also considers relevance and continued linkage with outcome	Broad, encompassing outcomes and the extent to which programmes, project, soft assistance, partners' initiatives and synergies among partners contributed to its achievement
Purpose	Project based to improve implementation, to re-direct future projects in the same area, or to allow for upscaling of project	To enhance development effectiveness, to assist decision making, to assist policy making, to re-direct future UNDP assistance, to systematize innovative approaches to sustainable human development

Source: UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring & Evaluating, Table 22

It is important to note that the growing focus on outcomes does not mean that project level evaluations of inputs and outputs have been replaced or are no longer important. Project evaluations are still used in many cases because “they yield useful information on project implementation arrangements, administrative structures and the achievement of outputs. Further, project evaluation provides a basis for the evaluation of outcomes and programmes, as well as for programme and thematic evaluations conducted by the Evaluation Office, and for distilling lessons from experience for learning and sharing knowledge.”¹⁰⁴ Thus, it is more apt to think of project and outcome evaluations as working together to provide as much understanding as

¹⁰⁴ UNDP, *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results*, 134.

possible on what really matters for results-based management in the development field: what impact is the assistance being provided have for the people on the ground in the recipient states?

UNDP Access to Justice Project in DRC

In May 2009, the UNDP launched its Access to Justice Project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of its broader programming on rule of law, the *Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations*. The project focuses on “improving access to justice and strengthening legal protection mechanisms for local communities, and is aligned with the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC, adopted in 2009. It also contributes to the Government-led *Programme de stabilisation et de reconstruction des zones sortant des conflit armés (STAREC)*.”¹⁰⁵ Like other UNDP projects, in principle the Access to Justice Project in DRC is subject to rigorous evaluation at both the programme level and as part of the UNDP’s countrywide efforts.

Programme Evaluation

Each year, the UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery prepares an evaluation of its Rule of Law programming, which it presents to officials from its donor states to show them what has been accomplished in the past year as a result of their support, and to ask for their continued (and often, increased) support. These reports are produced using the internal results-based budgeting frameworks used by UNDP staff and contain information on the outputs and some of the more easily attributable outcomes that result from the programme’s efforts. For example, the Programme’s evaluation of its activities in 2010 reported:

¹⁰⁵ United Nation Development Program – Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR), *Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations – Annual Report 2010* (New York: United Nations, 2011): 72.

In order to strengthen the judicial response to sexual violence, UNDP in collaboration with EUPOL, UNPOL and MONUSCO trained 112 police officers on victims' reception, and trained 50 judicial investigators and prosecutors on investigation techniques on sexual violence. 213 traditional leaders benefited from sensitisation campaigns, and 35 high-ranking officers and 400 soldiers received specific training on SGBV, command, leadership and disciplinary measures. These trainings were a joint effort of UNDP, the Joint Human Rights Office, MONUSCO and local prosecutors' offices. **As a result, two important investigations were launched on the mass rapes occurred in August 2010 in Lounge, Walikale territory.**¹⁰⁶

And,

UNDP supported mobile courts organised by the Goma's Military Tribunal in Walikale and Rutshuru. Nine cases were tried in Walikale, including cases of rape, murder, arbitrary arrest and illegal detention. In Rutshuru, 15 cases were tried, including eight cases of sexual violence. **The communities reacted positively to the hearings, and more than 150 people attended the legal proceedings on a daily basis. These hearings were their first opportunity to see a court of law bringing military personnel (traditionally considered as untouchables) to justice.** UNDP also supported and equipped thirteen legal aid clinics: two in North Kivu, six in South Kivu and five in Ituri (Bunia, Mahagi, Kasenyi, Nizi and Fataki). These clinics have assisted 265 cases. 160 paralegals were trained by UNDP and the Joint Human Rights Office, and are now serving in different geographical areas. With support from Avocats Sans Frontières and UNDP, the South Kivu Bar Association launched a pro-bono office that is now open daily to serve Bukavu's population.¹⁰⁷

The preceding excerpts are just a couple of examples of the how the UNDP and its BCPR are tracking both the achievements of its programme (its outputs), and the effect(s) that these achievements are having for the Congolese people (the outcomes). The bolded selection in each excerpt identify where the BCPR has been able to observe the outcomes and/or impacts of its programming. By including this information, the evaluations seek to ensure that both its staff and its donors are able to see the impacts of their work in order to ensure that its resources are utilized for the greatest effect for the people of the DRC.

UNDP Outcome Evaluation – DRC (2008-2012)

In addition to the efforts to evaluate the outcomes at the programme-level, UNDP also conducts outcome evaluations for all UNDP programmes operating within a country. The

¹⁰⁶ UNDP-BCPR, *Annual Report 2010*, 72.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. [Emphasis added].

UNDP's Country Programme for the Democratic Republic of the Congo sets out eight desired outcomes (goals) that it would like to achieve for the period in question, which for this study is 2008-2012. According to the report published detailing the results of the evaluation, the "main focus that was central to the evaluation was to determine to what extent the intended outcomes have been attained, and if they have not been realized, to define the corrective measures that could be taken to achieve them in the near future (2011-2012) or in the longer term (2013-2017).¹⁰⁸ In the report for 2008-2012, the outcomes were divided into two groups, based on their focus. UNDP's security sector reform assistance falls within both the "Poverty Reduction" and "Governance" groups of outcomes, specifically Outcomes 2, 6,7, and 8. They are defined as:

Outcome P2: The communities are pacified and local economies are revived.

Outcome G7: The public administration is more efficient and reliable and offers services to citizens effectively, equitably and with transparency.

Outcome G8: Armed violence is significantly reduced and the protection of the citizen is effectively secured by the services of the State.¹⁰⁹

To evaluate the efforts towards achieving these outcomes, the UNDP's evaluation team prepares matrices to ensure that the assessments for each group of indicators follow the same format, especially in key components of the evaluation, like principles questions, principle indicators and the sources of data used. This approach allows the evaluation team: "1) to identify the core issues of concern, how they would be addressed and how the relevant information would be obtained; and 2) to ensure a comparable methodology among the three inquiries with the same rigorous approach to identifying indicators."¹¹⁰

For the 2008-2012 outcome evaluation for the DRC, five central questions were asked:

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Development Programme, *Outcome Evaluation: UNDP Country Programme – Democratic Republic of the Congo 2008-2012* (New York: United Nations, 2011): 1.

¹⁰⁹ UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation*, x-xi.

¹¹⁰ UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation*, xii.

1. Has progress been made in achieving the results expressed in the outcomes for each of the components? Why and how have the outcomes been achieved, not achieved or partly achieved? What are the major achievements and challenges in each outcome? What exogenous factors have contributed to the realization or non-realization of the outcome?
2. To what extent has UNDP contributed to the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment at the outcome level? How can the programme be made more effective in 2011-2012 as well as in the next programme cycle 2013-2017?
3. Is the outcome relevant to current national priorities and to the UNDP Country Programme Document? Is the UNDP strategy for each outcome appropriate to the problem(s) the outcome addresses?
4. How effectively and efficiently are the key UNDP projects currently being implemented? Are there any areas that should be modified or that need significant improvement in 2011-2012? In 2013-2017?
5. Is the progress toward realizing the outcomes sustainable? Has ownership by national and provincial authorities been a central consideration in outcome implementation?¹¹¹

The focus of these questions is directed at identifying the outcomes and impacts of the programmes, rather than the input and outputs. Boxes 1, 2 and 3 contain excerpts from the evaluation with the information that comes from answering these questions. These excerpts provide information on what the programmes has accomplished, what impact these accomplishments have had on the relevant societal conditions, as well as any externalities that have resulted from the programme. This information can help the UNDP to understand if their programming is being effective and if changes need to be made.

¹¹¹ UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation*, xiii.

Box 1

Outcome P2

“Conflict remains frequent and unpredictable in North and South Kivu. Only in Ituri district is open conflict showing a downward trend. The numbers of internally displaced persons and returnees reflect the level of conflict and the extent to which pacification is taking place at the community level.”

“UNDP pacification programmes must address two different types of armed conflict. There are, on the one hand, intra-community and inter-ethnic conflicts arising from disputes over land and property, and this for the most part, has been at the core of conflicts in the Ituri District. On the other hand, there are aggressive operations by armed groups with finance their activities through trafficking in natural resources and plundering.”

“UNDP has addressed the first type of conflict with varying success. The UNDP strategy strengthens social cohesion by supporting conciliatory programming on community radios and by supporting the formation and functioning of local peace-building committees at the community, groupement or territory levels for resolving disputes. In Ituri District, local committees have been established at the community (baraza), groupement (Local Peace and Development Committee, Comité local de paix et développement (CLPD)), and territory (Local Development Committee, Comité local de développement (CLD)) levels, supplemented by women’s Noyaux pacifistes des mamans (NPM) initiatives, which intervene in peace-building and development. In addition, there are the Land Committee (Commission Foncière) units which work to resolve land disputes and which have been uniquely successful in achieving results. In South Kivu, there are the Village Development Committee (VDC) (Comité villageois de développement (CVD)) at the community level; and in North Kivu, there are barazas and a few Permanent Local Conciliation Committees (Comités locaux permanents de conciliation (CLPC)) at the groupement or the chefferie level.”

“This strategy has proven effective in promoting social cohesion in Ituri District. It has proven less effective in addressing aggressions by armed groups, which are characteristic of the conflict in the Kivus.”

“It is difficult to demonstrate any real success. Conflict continues unabated in these provinces. There has been no monitoring of the programme and one knows very little about what has happened to the participants apart from testimonies by implementing partners, who uniformly raise doubts that the ex-combatant programmes have succeeded in reinserting ex-combatants, either economically or psychologically.”

Source: UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation*, 19-20. [Emphasis added].

Box 2

Outcome G7

“A pilot administrative governance programme in Goma, N. Kivu and Bunia in Ituri District was developed to support STAREC and to make the authority of the government more effective. The support has been developed in close cooperation with UNOPS and MONUSCO and is aimed at improving infrastructure, providing training to civil servants and enhancing service delivery. **In Ituri, UNDP supported three ‘secteurs’ out of forty-six with training in local planning, which has permitted the authorities to consult the local population about development plans for the different government levels in the sectors. This support has made a positive contribution to peace building in an area where ethnic rivalries are common.”**

Source: UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation*, 44. [Emphasis added].

Outcome G8

“The Post-Brassage programme was aimed at improving the human security situation by reinforcing brigades in the Congolese army through the provision of temporary and permanent housing, clean drinking water, and the distribution of kits to help families settle in. Support was provided to soldiers’ families to become more self-reliant and training was provided to the army in an attempt to ensure peace among civilians. The programme, which was carried out in North and South Kivu and in Ituri, started before 2008 and implemented with a sense of urgency in order to maintain peace and the momentum of the political transition after the elections of 2006.”

“A joint MONUSCO, UNDP, PNC (Police nationale congolaise) and JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) capacity-building project began in December 2009 in North Kivu and Orientale provinces, supporting the basic training of 500 policemen and the upgrading of 2,100 others in four provinces in the east (North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale and Maniema). According to the country office, policemen were trained in maintaining and re-establishing public order; courses also covered human rights, gender, HIV/AIDS and the protection of minors. **They are now able to secure safety for the elections and protect the civilian population but their salaries are low and not always paid regularly.** In addition, their operational means have been strengthened through the rehabilitation of training centres, including the one in Kapalata in the Orientale province.”

“The reduction of small arms is still proving difficult but the preparatory work has advanced with the adoption by parliament of the law on small arms and various other legal texts, the distribution of a code of conduct by the FARDC, the approval of the national action plan for monitoring and managing SALW in DRC and activities aimed at reducing small arms such as training of police officers and other cadres. Antennae have been established in several provinces but are not yet operational and representatives of organizations sensitized. **The results, however, are not yet very visible and there does not really seem to be an approach that would reduce SALW, despite the fact that the national action plan to monitor and manage the SALW was recently accepted by the government. In addition, many areas remain unstable due to the presence among civilians of the FARDC and the Congolese and foreign armed groups. Given the above, civilians are inclined to keep their arms.**”

“Justice reform continues and UNDP has supported many activities, including: the development of an action plan, seminars and workshops; distribution of bulletins and booklets; training of staff and provincial assemblies in anti-corruption; training of candidate judges who are being deployed across DRC. The Superior Judicial Council has also been supported with office material and IT support, including its research and archive centre. **Most of these activities have been completed or are about to be but the impact is not yet visible.**”

“The Access to Justice project of UNDP has ensured access to justice and social redress for the victims of sexual violence. **Significant progress toward this outcome has been made through a holistic and integrated approach comprising several key components:** reinforcing the capacity of the criminal justice system and local NGOs; judicial monitoring of the entire penal process by UNDP; funding costs of trials where necessary; developing and disseminating a much-needed sexual violence referral pathway [...] **The project has also generated positive externalities with respect to the professionalism of the justice, and security sectors. A recent external evaluation of the project has noted a unifying effect for the security and justice sectors in general, although more effort is needed to encourage both local and national ownership of the practices and structures in place, including the allocation of adequate budgetary resources to support the activities of the Ministry of Justice as a whole. Nevertheless the lack of links between the Access to Justice Project and other projects in the sector, apart from a few joint activities with the American Bar Association, needs to be addressed. There is also a link to the poverty pillar for women who are forced to return home after trials and rejoin their communities. These women could benefit from micro-credit and other programmes focused on their needs and financed by the local development plans of PADDL.**”

Source: UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation*, 47-50. [Emphasis added].

The bolded selections in Boxes 1,2, and 3 point to the where the UNDP has sought to identify any outcomes and/or impacts that have emerged as a result of its programmes. As was the case in the BCPR's evaluation of its Access to Justice programme, the UNDP Outcome Evaluation assesses its contribution to the reforming the DRC's security sector institutions beyond the physical outputs that are produced. This way the UNDP is able to report not only what changes have been made to the DRC's security institutions, but also what impacts these changes are having on the security of the Congolese peoples.

DPKO EVALUATIONS

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the department of the UN secretariat charged with the planning, preparation, management and direction of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The unit within DPKO responsible for the department's SSR activities is the Security Sector Reform Unit within the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI). Established in 2007, OROLSI works to "strengthen the links and coordinate the Department's activities in the areas of police, justice and corrections, mine action, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and security sector reform."¹¹² In addition to developing DPKO's SSR policy guidance, the SSR Unit at UN Headquarter in New York supports the various peacekeeping and special political missions in the field, who work to: support national SSR efforts, mobilize resources, harmonize international support, promote institution building, and monitor and evaluate SSR programmes and results.¹¹³

Unlike some other UN bodies, DPKO provides SSR assistance only as part of a deployed peacekeeping or political mission. These missions are normally composed of military and police

¹¹² United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), "About us," *Department of Peacekeeping Operations website* (New York: United Nations, 2013): <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/>.

¹¹³ DPKO, "Security sector reform," *Department of Peacekeeping Operations website* (New York: United Nations, 2013): <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml>.

units seconded by their national governments, as well as civilian staff of the United Nations secretariat. The deployment of UN peacekeepers to a country is no small undertaking for an organization divided over the use of force in international politics. Consequently, no small amount of planning and assessment goes into the preparation, deployment and monitoring of peacekeeping operations. To facilitate such processes, the DPKO has adopted its Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) framework. This framework ensures that: 1) the United Nations system arrives at a common understanding of its strategic objectives in a particular country; 2) the right people are at the planning table, that the right issues are being discussed; and 3) the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place to motivate integrated thinking and planning.¹¹⁴ The IMPP is a dynamic and continuous process, through which programming and objectives may be revised to reflect changes to the mission's mandate or the operational environment.¹¹⁵

The reporting and evaluation process begins with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or the Head of Mission (HOM) reviewing developments in the period since the last report in order to form the basis of a report by the Secretary-General.¹¹⁶ The SG, however, does not just report to one body, but rather two.

Reports to the UN Security Council

Articles 98 and 99 of the UN Charter significantly shape the relationship the Secretary-General has with the Security Council.¹¹⁷ These articles permit the Security Council to call on the Secretary-General to study a situation and report back to the Council to inform their work. A

¹¹⁴ UN DPKO, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2008): 55.

¹¹⁵ UN DPKO, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 56.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ United Nations, "Chapter 15," *Charter of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 1945). Available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter15.shtml>.

Council resolution will normally call on the SG to report back to the Members after a set period of time. For example, in Resolution 2053 (2012), the Council:

28. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report by 14 November 2012, 14 February 2013 and 24 May 2013 on the progress on the ground, including on the progress made towards the objectives mentioned in paragraph 4 above, recommended benchmarks for measuring progress and the impact of the DDRRR process on the strength of foreign armed groups, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to include specific thematic annexes in his report in November on the assessment of the electoral process as mentioned in paragraph 15 and possible new approaches in SSR as mentioned in paragraph 9 above and in February on the review of ISSSS as mentioned in paragraph 7 above and on the strategy and efforts to effectively transfer the responsibility of some MONUSCO tasks to members of the UNCT.¹¹⁸

Reports by the SG tend to follow a regular structure; a report will have a section outlining major developments in the situation on the ground since the last time the SG reported to the Council, a section reporting on the peacekeeping/political mission's implementation of the mandate set out for it by the resolution(s) authorizing and/or re-authorizing their existence, and a section where the SG may provide "observations" on the situation and, in his capacity as Secretary-General, make appeals to actors. There may also be annexes attached, providing supplementary information, on a specific issue at request of the Council. The information contained in the recent developments section will be descriptions of the violence, suffering, conflict dynamics etc., and notable recent events. The mandate implementation section recounts recent the mission efforts to fulfill the task(s) given to them by the Council. For example:

Major Developments

47. [...] On 18 September in Mbuji-Mayi, Kasai Orientale Province, the area coordinator mechanism was launched in the presence of senior Government officials, donors and United Nations representatives. Three joint offices have been established in Bas-Congo, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental Provinces under the authority of the United Nations area coordinators, who will aim to help increase efficiency in coordination between MONUSCO and the United Nations country team and support a gradual transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and economic recovery.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2053 (2012)* (New York: United Nations, 27 June 2012): 8.

¹¹⁹ UN SG, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2012/838 (New York: United Nations, 14 November 2012): 10.

58. Nationwide, MONUSCO documented cases of sexual violence involving at least 398 victims, including 182 children, which were allegedly committed by armed groups or national security forces between mid-May and September. At least 31 alleged perpetrators involved in 28 documented cases were arrested, 26 during the reporting period. Owing to the security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was not possible to conduct missions to investigate all allegations of sexual violence.¹²⁰

Implementation of Mandate

71. At the request of the Congolese national police, the United Nations police conducted refresher training from 10 to 28 September for 1,685 National Intervention Legion personnel on crowd control and intervention techniques, in addition to protection techniques for very important persons, as part of security preparations for the fourteenth Summit of la Francophonie. In September, the United Nations police, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and funding from the Japan International Cooperation Agency, launched basic training programmes for some 1,000 national police officers. On 2 October, the United Nations police, in partnership with the national police and the United Nations Office for Project Services, completed the training of 291 officers, including 24 women, who were integrated from various armed groups within the framework of the peace agreements of 23 March 2009.¹²¹

In the case of the SG's report of 14 November 2010 (S/2012/838) concerning MONUSCO's mission in the DRC, the Council had asked for, and the SG responded with, an annex to the report on MONUSCO's support to SSR efforts. The annex outlines the context for the report, recent progress made by MONUSCO, and recommendations for future efforts. The progress section focuses on the outputs facilitated through the mission's efforts, rather than the effects of these outputs:

11. In addition, the Minister [of Justice and Human Rights] has expressed a strong interest in more effective coordination with international partners. In September, she validated the strategic approach developed under the multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme and proposed the adoption of a results-based implementation plan, taking into consideration the Ministry's priorities. A total of 400 new magistrates have been appointed by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy. Furthermore, training programmes in court administration and case management for magistrates, court registrars and other officials have been developed with the assistance of the United Nations and other partners. These and other efforts continue in order to facilitate the deployment of judicial personnel nationwide.¹²²

What is missing from the SG's reports to the Security Council is any indication of the progress the peacekeeping or political mission is having other than in the implementation of its mandate.

¹²⁰ UN SG, S/2012/838, 11.

¹²¹ Ibid, 14.

¹²² Ibid, 25.

The reports are only able to recount the extent that the Mission is conducting the activities it is authorized to and not the benefits, if any, these activities are having on the situation in the country or the needs of the people. The lack of such information reinforces the widely held perception that the existence of UN peacekeeping and political missions depends less on the impacts of these missions on the ground and more on geopolitical considerations.

Reports to the Fifth Committee

The second component of the reporting and evaluation processes for DPKO activities in the area of security sector reform is the Secretary-General's reports to the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly. While the Security Council can authorize the deployment of peacekeeping/political missions and review their mandates, the Council is not able to control the resources allocated to these missions. It is the Fifth Committee that has this capability.

The Fifth Committee is the sub-committee of the General Assembly responsible for the administrative and budgetary management of the UN. Its mandate includes reviewing and approving the financing of missions authorized by the Security Council. Much like its efforts to inform the Security Council, the Secretary-General prepares a report on each mission's achievements in the previous year, which the Committee uses in its considerations of the budget for the next year. These reports outline the priorities of the Mission for the previous year, selected indicators of achievement and the outputs resulting from the Mission's efforts. For example, the SG's submission to the committee of 1 March 2012, entitled *Budget for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013*, reported:

“37. Under component 3, the principal objective of MONUSCO is to continue, in close consultation with the Congolese authorities, to support the justice and security sectors in order to strengthen democratic and accountable institutions and to extend State authority. The focus will be on the development of the criminal justice system, the police, the judiciary and the prisons in conflict-affected areas, and on strategic programmatic support at the central level. MONUSCO will continue to support the Government in complying with international human rights standards for civilian and military judiciary personnel at the national, provincial and local levels, including through joint investigation team missions with judiciary personnel, meetings with relevant civil, military and police authorities to discuss violations of human rights and workshops on human rights with authorities and civil society. The Mission will continue to assist the Government in its efforts to apprehend and prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including sexual violence and crimes against children. In particular, the Mission will increase assistance to the military justice authorities in prosecuting alleged perpetrators of the most serious crimes through the full deployment of prosecution support cells, including organizing awareness-raising and training programmes for commanders and military contingent personnel to promote understanding and support for military justice. MONUSCO will continue to support, as required, the Government in the development of a national security sector development strategy to strengthen democratic and accountable national security institutions. The Mission will continue to provide operational support for the restructuring of FARDC units by providing logistical support and training and mobilizing donors to assist in the reform.”¹²³

Boxes 4 and 5 are excerpts from the Secretary-General’s budget report to the Fifth Committee on the accomplishments of the MONUSCO mission for 2011-2012. The information focuses on the desired ends, and the outputs that have been produced in pursuit of these ends.

¹²³ United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), *Budget for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/66/723 (New York: United Nations, 1 March 2012): 23-24.

Box 4

<i>Expected Accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of Achievement</i>
<p>3.1 Progress in combating impunity and improving human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</p>	<p>3.1.1 Increase in the number of military investigations or prosecutions for serious crimes (2010/11: 3; 2011/12: 5; 2012/13: 15)</p> <p>3.1.2 Increase in the number of prisons with physical separation of male and female prisoners including the separation of juvenile male and females, and children from adult prisoners, pending their transfer to the Établissement de garde et d'éducation de l'état juvenile rehabilitation and re-education centres in Bunia, Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa prisons (2011/12: 2 prisons; 2012/13: 4 prisons)</p> <p>3.1.3 Increase in the number of convictions related to grave human rights violations (2010/11: 360; 2011/12: 400; 2012/13: 440)</p> <p>3.1.4 Increase in the number of functioning Établissement de garde et d'éducation de l'état rehabilitation and re-education centres for minors (2011/12: 4; 2012/13: 6)</p> <p>3.1.5 Adoption by the Ministry of Justice of draft decrees and ministerial orders on the Child Protection Act</p>
<p><i>Outputs</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical advice to 7 military investigations into or prosecutions by the national authorities of serious crimes • Maintenance and updating of a database containing profiles of perpetrators of grave human rights violations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 awareness-raising seminar on gender for 50 members of the Standing Commission on the Reform of Congolese Law and 100 focal points of the relevant Congolese ministries • 7 workshops for 150 persons from civil society, local women and girls, Government officials and local administrative authorities on the psychosocial and economic challenges facing women and girls in areas of natural resource exploitation • 4 workshops, in the Kivus, with relevant national authorities on gender-specific challenges, discriminatory practices and procedures in the legal and penitentiary systems, in particular, the application of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the family code and laws relating to sexual violence • 54 meetings (48 in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 6 in Kinshasa) with juvenile justice actors, including Government representatives, on the functioning of rehabilitation and re-education institutions • Technical advice to national authorities on the drafting of the remaining decree and ministerial orders on the Child Protection Act • 2 quick-impact projects for the rehabilitation of the re-education centres for children in conflict with the law • 6 workshops for juvenile justice actors (military and civilian judiciary personnel) on special proceedings or measures for children in conflict with the law • 20 assessment missions to assist military prosecutors in the prosecution of perpetrators of grave child rights violations, including sexual violence • 35 joint investigations with the judiciary on the prosecution of gross human rights violations • 5 workshops for 165 lawyers, police, judicial officers, representatives of non-governmental organizations and victim's groups on the conduct of prosecutions under the 2011 law criminalizing torture and on the provision of legal and related assistance to victims of torture • Technical assistance to the national authorities on the development of a national policy and legal framework for the protection of victims and witnesses in trials of alleged perpetrators of serious crimes • Technical assistance to the national authorities on the development of a proposal for a national programme to monitor trials and to establish data collection and reporting systems in selected courts in South Kivu and Orientale provinces 	

Source: UNGA, A/66/723

Box 5

<i>Expected Accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of Achievement</i>
3.2 Progress towards improving the capacity and accountability of FARDC	3.2.1 Reduction in the number of reported child rights violations by FARDC, including the use of children (2010/11: 744; 2011/12: 500; 2012/13: 400) 3.2.2 Increase in the number of profiles of perpetrators of grave human rights violations in order to be able to implement the Mission’s conditionality policy (2010/11: 150; 2011/12: 300; 2012/13: 450)
<p><i>Outputs</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 military justice awareness-raising courses for a total of 200 participants, including FARDC officers and troops • 3 capacity-building and awareness-raising workshops on gender for 100 representatives of national authorities to achieve at least a 30 per cent representation of women in new recruitments and promotions within FARDC • 5 seminars for 50 trainers on gender capacity-building at the national and provincial levels for FARDC, in collaboration with the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations country team and relevant stakeholders • Co-facilitation in the development of training programmes for sexual and gender-based violence for training FARDC officers, through the joint training programmes on security sector development supported by and the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — within the framework of security sector reform, and with specific reference to the Congolese child protection legal framework • 10 training sessions for FARDC troops (100 per session) to increase awareness of and improve discipline under the provisions of the Congolese Child Protection Act • Organization of a quarterly forum of ambassadors to develop a joint understanding among international partners in support of national security sector reform efforts and to develop a joint strategy with the Congolese authorities • Monthly security sector reform working group meetings in Kinshasa to improve collaboration and overall coordination among national and provincial authorities, national and international partners and other stakeholders and to harmonize multilateral and bilateral security sector reform projects at the technical level • 3 security sector reform workshops on peace and security held in provincial capital cities for national and local authorities, non-governmental organizations and international organizations • Development of a comprehensive map of all security institutions, including the army, police and judiciary, for the national authorities and the international community • 50 meetings with national and provincial authorities to provide technical advice and support towards a national vision of security sector reform • 50 meetings with international partners, including regional organizations, non-profit organizations, Member States and financial and technical partners, on the harmonization of international support for security sector reform and development • Substantive and technical support to national authorities in the development of a security sector reform matrix on the overview of all training programmes for the national army and police with the aim of reforming FARDC and the national police, and sexual and gender-based violence programmes implemented with the support of international donors • Monitoring and coordination of a sexual and gender-based violence project supporting national police reform to be implemented by the International Organization for Migration under the auspices of the stabilization and reconstruction plan and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy 	

Source: UNGA, A/66/723

While *some* of the “Indicators of Achievement” may resemble outcome indicators, it is unclear which outputs contributed to their achievement. Furthermore, there is no information that suggests what actual impact these changes are having for the security of the Congolese people.

This is a budgetary document, and the focus is naturally on how the resources provided to the MONUSCO mission have been utilized. That said, by focusing its reporting on its inputs and outputs, the DPKO is only able to provide a limited understanding of what the Mission's resources and activities have accomplished. In the case of the DRC, the United Nations has had a continuous peacekeeping presence since 1999, during which the security situation has seen various periods of improvement and regress. Ideally, the package of resources allocated to the Mission would adjust in accordance with changes in the situation and the successfulness of specific programmes, but without information on the societal impact(s) of the Mission's activities it is very difficult to understand if the Mission is delivering the right types of programming and whether or not these programmes have adequate resources. By failing to systematically incorporate outcome or impact indicators, the SG's reports to the Fifth Committee provide very little of this valuable type of information, which thus suggests that decisions of resource allocations for DPKO's missions consider factors other than the effectiveness of their activities for the needs of the societies they seek to assist.

International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS)

To ensure that its priorities and activities are aligned with the priorities of the country for whom it is providing assistance, the UN will often work with national governments to develop a joint strategy to guide their efforts in resolving the crisis. In cases where there is a peacekeeping or political mission, these joint strategies will include consideration of how the efforts of these missions aid in achieving specified goals. These evaluations provide another opportunity for the effectiveness of DPKO's programming to be assessed.

The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) was established in 2009-2009 as the primary framework for international assistance in support of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC). Its primary focus is the achievement of the goals set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010), namely the development of sustainable state security forces and the stabilization of eastern DRC. Co-managed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO, the ISSSS has five core objectives: i) promoting security for the people of eastern DRC; ii) building political dialogue; iii) restoring state authority; iv) supporting the return, reintegration and recovery of displaced persons; and v) coordinating efforts to combat sexual violence.¹²⁴

The United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) is the multi-sectoral framework, which guides the UN's efforts as a partner in the ISSSS. Financial support for the strategy comes from the UN Peacebuilding Fund, UN agencies, as well as bilateral partners and other stakeholders. The UN's efforts are coordinated by the Stabilization Support Unit (SSU) of the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). As part of its coordination efforts, this unit prepares quarterly reports on the progress made in implementing the strategy and achieving its objectives. These reports are not methodologically rigorous, as they are "designed to give a 'quick and dirty' analysis that can feed into programming in a rapidly changing, unstable environment. It prioritizes speed and flexibility in order to provide information fast enough to be incorporated into programming designed to prevent risks from deteriorating into unstable situations."¹²⁵ The UNSSSS's monitoring and evaluation efforts utilize a "stop-light matrix" where red indicates no progress or a worsened situation, yellow indicates that mixed or uneven progress has been made, and green indicates good progress. The matrix provides "a snapshot indicator on whether progress has been

¹²⁴ MONUSCO, "The ISSSS," *United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo website* (Kinshasa: MONUSCO, 2013): <http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10831&language=en-US>.

¹²⁵ de Coning & Romita, *Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations*, 13.

made towards goals. The quarterly scorecard provides an update on progress achieved in implementing activities and developments within each of the components and subcomponents of the UNSSSS. The scorecard is primarily a strategic management tool designed to keep senior management abreast of developments.”¹²⁶ An example of these snapshot indicators is provided below:

Box 6

→ Scorecard for ISSSS outcomes: Security

■ Good progress	◆ Mixed/uneven	✘ None / reversals
----------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------

✘ **Durable integration of armed groups**

The reorganization (“regimentation”) of FARDC deployments in the Kivus continued throughout Quarter 3. This is aimed in large part at strengthening command and control and getting rid of the many non-existent “ghost soldiers” created during the large-scale integration of combatants after the peace processes of 2008-09.

While the final deployment plan is not yet known, tensions within the FARDC increased with the newly integrated FARDC units due to the assignments of ranks and command posts within the new regimental structure. Partly as a result of this, various commanders of formerly armed groups defected along with their troops and weapons.

The regimentation process remains Government-led, and to date, no request for support has been addressed to either the ISSSS or MONUSCO. Once this process is finalized, 13 FARDC regiments will be deployed to North and South Kivu. As many of the localities on the ISSSS priority axes are to be secured by these units, concerns remain regarding their operational capacities, and logistical constraints which may lead them to “live off the population” and the personal economic or political agendas of some of their commanders.

◆ **Improved FARDC effectiveness**

Construction of the Lukusa training center for the FARDC (Province Orientale) was physically completed and handed-over to the Ministry of Defense by IOM. The center has a capacity for 350 students; however no training is foreseen under the ISSSS, though.

The completion of accommodation for the FARDC and their dependents at camps Saio and Nyamuyuni in South Kivu is nearing finalization and should be handed over in the next quarter. However, due to financial difficulties, the works stopped at the end of the period under review. A financial solution is being sought at the time of writing. It is clear for the next phase that no new barracks will be constructed under the ISSSS. Also, the FARDC have not yet agreed on a deployment plan for camps Saio and Nyamuyuni. Moreover, the FARDC have stated that it would want a different (more expensive) type of barracks for its soldiers constructed in the future.

Source: ISSSS 2011 Q3 Quarterly Report

¹²⁶ de Coning & Romita, *Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations*, 13.

The scorecard provides little indication of how the UNSSSS's projects and programmes affect the conditions on the ground or the well being of the Congolese people. For example, the indicator on "Improved FARDC effectiveness" does not refer to their ability to protect Congolese citizens, but rather it tracks the progress of constructions of training centers and barracks. In other words, these indicators track outputs, not outcomes or impacts. As a result, this evaluation does not provide decision-makers in the UN and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the type of information necessary to judge whether or not the strategy is effective in its efforts to improve conditions on the ground and/or in the best interests of the Congolese people.

ANALYSIS

The findings of the previous comparison pass process tracing's smoking gun test. By selecting indicators that offer different types of results, the existence of different approaches by UNDP and DPKO to SSR is clearly evident. The following analysis shows how this difference is indicative of the different priorities and objectives they have for their SSR programmes.

Reporting Process

First, and foremost, the reporting processes these two UN bodies must undergo are significantly different. While both bodies' efforts undergo multiple evaluations, the DPKO must report on its activities to multiple authorities that are interested in, and responsible for, different aspects of the same programming. This leads to a fractured and disconnected evaluation process, where the continued political authorization of programmes is disconnected from the allocation of resources to those programmes. The fractured nature of this process is an important concern because of the highly politicized bodies to which the DPKO must report. On the one hand, the

Security Council continues to struggle with different conceptualizations of when and how the UN should intervene in a state's internal affairs – as would be the case with security sector reform. On the other hand, the Fifth Committee is increasingly faced with budget concerns, as Members seek to lessen their financial responsibility to the UN due, in part, to the recent global financial crisis.¹²⁷ Faced with decreased revenues from poor economic performance and demand for austerity, the Members States responsible for funding the DPKO's missions are demanding more information of the cost-effectiveness of the missions, and visible returns from their contributions, so that they may justify to their citizens the spending of taxpayer monies abroad rather than at home. There is also additional pressure on from the Security Council “to reduce the number and scope of missions, especially in the context of the assessed contribution system and the overall cost of UN peacekeeping operations. To do so responsibly requires clear benchmarks against which progress can be measured and mission drawdown and withdrawal can be planned.”¹²⁸

For both the Security Council and the Fifth Committee, the nature of the process draws Members' focus to the UN's activities (inputs and outputs) and away from the impacts that these activities are having. The political sensitivity of these two bodies means Members constantly have to defend their positions and expenditures, both internationally and domestically. By focusing on inputs and outputs, the Members are able to provide clear, understandable and forceful statistics to support their positions. Outcomes and impacts can much less readily available, more subjective and harder to understand, which increases Members' difficulty in using them to justify a course of action.

¹²⁷ de Coning & Romita, *Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations*, 2.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 7-8.

Ease of use in justifying a programme is also an important concern because of the disconnect between the authorization (and re-authorization) of these projects and their budgets. The political realities of the Security Council have been well-documented¹²⁹, especially as they relate to the vetoes held by the permanent members and the role of the UN in the internal affairs of a state (e.g. current deadlock in the Council regarding the crisis in Syria). Much less has been noted about the politics within the Fifth Committee. Although not explicitly required, it has become common practice for the Members of the Committee to authorize the UN's budget for peacekeeping by the consensus, with the funds coming from the annual contributions paid by Member States into the budget for the whole organization. The budgets for each mission are then drawn from the total peacekeeping budget. As a result, there is no clear link between donors' money and the programmes funded. In their examination of UN budgeting for peacekeeping activities, Cedric de Coning and Paul Romita observed that under the UN's assessed contribution system, the United States, Europe, and Japan together contribute approximately 88 percent of the total UN peacekeeping budget.¹³⁰ These countries' political commitment, however, may not match their obligatory financial commitment. Thus, they are more likely to prioritize keeping the UN's peacekeeping budget growth low and being able to justify their contributions with the kind of easily understood signs of the returns on their investment that output indicators are able to provide.

As opposed to the politicized and disconnected nature of the DPKO reporting process, the UNDP's reporting and evaluation process is more linear and less politicized. UNDP programmes and country teams need only report to their donors that fund them. While the financial

¹²⁹ Two examples of excellent reviews of Security Council politics can be found in: David M. Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); and Dimitris Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

¹³⁰ de Coning & Romita, *Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations*, 3.

implications of the global economic downturn still play a factor, the donor-programme relationship is more direct than the one found in the Fifth Committee. The creation, and continuation, of UNDP programmes depends on both the demonstrable need for such assistance and on the availability of resources. Donations to the UNDP are entirely voluntary; donors can contribute funds to the UNDP's general budget or they can choose to donate funds to specific thematic or country programmes. In this way, the UNDP's finances differ greatly from DPKO, where budgets are drawn from pooled money and states are less empowered to direct what specific activities their contributions fund. With the UNDP, donor states can ensure that their money is used to fund programmes that align with their foreign policy and international development priorities. This fosters a greater connection between donors, programmes and recipient communities. Unlike the pooled contributions, which are calculated using a formula and may not reflect individual concerns, Member States can adjust their level of commitment to the UNDP based on their priorities, and on the effectiveness of the programmes and realities on the ground.

There is also something to be said about the different political context in which development assistance is provided. As the name suggests, UNDP's programmes are considered "development" assistance, as opposed to "security." Generally, the delivery of development assistance is a much less divisive issue at the UN than its security-based counterpart. Multilateral development is seen to be less of a challenge to the sovereignty of Member States, and is associated less with the power struggle of geopolitics. Instead, UN development assistance is often viewed as "benevolent" and "altruistic"; something that should not become victim to interest-based squabbling associated with international security.

Time

Time has an important influence in fostering the two different cultures of SSR evaluation. DPKO mission budgets are authorized annually, whereas the outcomes/impacts of their activities may not be immediately visible. This leaves Members of the Fifth Committee to evaluate a mission and its programmes based on the outputs it produces, rather than on the changes that may or may not be fostered for the societies they seek to aid. Furthermore, DPKO missions are only able to guarantee their assistance for the short-term. The Security Council only authorizes a peace operation for short periods of time, so mandates are constantly up for review. Missions themselves do not tend to be withdrawn quickly, but mandates can shift priorities quite dramatically. While many, including the Department's only operational planners, would like to see the DPKO plan its activities with the long-term in mind, it cannot guarantee that its missions will have the mandate or the resources necessary for these activities beyond the next evaluation cycle. Given these circumstances, a focus on inputs and outputs is understandable; both types of indicators are readily observable in the short-term. This allows DPKO to show "progress" when it reports back to the members in order to justify its continued existence and resource levels.

In contrast to DPKO evaluations, it is normal practice for UNDP programmes to be given multi-year mandates. While each year programme and country team staffs will report back to the organization and donors on what they accomplished in the previous year, they can do so knowing that the programmes' survival is not at stake. This allows the staffs to focus not only on their immediate outputs, but also on the outcomes and impacts of their programming. Programmes are able to plan for the long-term and design evaluation methodologies that are sensitive to changes fostered by their assistance. Outcome and impact indicators can be included in the evaluations because the multi-year mandates allow time for these types of changes to emerge. More

qualitative data can be used in the evaluations because the UNDP programmes do not have to report as frequently and can utilize the types of qualitative evaluation methods that take longer to collect data but can provide a more detailed picture of the threats that people face and any changes that have occurred. This comes in stark contrast to the heavily quantitative evaluation methods used by the Fifth Committee and the Security Council to provide an understanding of the “big picture” developments on the ground, and how the UN peace operation is implementing its mandate. Using quantitative methods allows DPKO to gather data in relatively less time, which helps given that it must report more frequently, but it also limits that its ability to assess the impacts that its programmes are having on the security of the people and communities on the ground.

International Norms

The aid effectiveness agenda, defined by statements like the Paris Declaration and the New Deal, seeks to foster normative changes in the policies and programmes that shape actors behaviour towards fragile and conflict affected states. These changes are not meant to replace the current liberal international order. Rather they seek to correct bad behaviour within the current system by reinforcing appropriate norms of behaviour.

The difference between the evaluation methodologies of the UNDP and DPKO suggests that these two bodies may have different sensitivities to changes to international norms. By utilizing methodologies and indicators that are able to capture reflect changes to the relationships between donors, recipient states and societies, UNDP practices appear to be more aligned with emerging international norms concerning peacebuilding. On the other hand, DPKO’s reporting methods suggest little influence by such norms. This is an intriguing difference, given that emerging norms like the New Deal were shaped by, and are widely supported by, members of

the international community, including key members of the UN Security Council. Liam Swiss' analysis of incoherence state SSR policies suggests one potential reason for this inconsistency. His analysis shows that despite the growing push to adopt whole-of-government approaches to peacebuilding, many donors struggle with reconciling different, and often conflicting, cultures between their own government ministries.¹³¹ According to his findings, development agencies tend to be guided by cultures of benevolence that are heavily shaped by international norms, whereas the behaviour of foreign and defence ministries is guided by a culture that favours the pursuit of national interests.¹³²

When the UNDP engages with donor states, it typically does so through their development agencies. These agencies, according to Swiss, are predisposed to supporting efforts that are guided by benevolent international norms because their own cultures tend to be shaped by these norms. On the other hand, the DPKO interacts primarily with states' foreign and defence ministries, who are often reluctant to embrace new norms of benevolence, unless they align with the interests of the state. These interactions would have a significant influence on how the UNDP and DPKO operate, including their evaluation practices.

Two Cultures, One UN

In closely comparing these two bodies, two different cultures of evaluation become clearly evident: one that focuses on short-term, outputs that disproportionately focus on reporting the changes to the physical institutions that have resulted from the assistance programmes (DPKO), and one that focuses on more long-term, outcomes and impacts of programming that are able to reflect any changes to the security of the people in the recipient state (UNDP).

¹³¹ Swiss, "Security Sector Reform and Development Assistance," 371-372.

¹³² Ibid, 380-381.

The existence of these two different cultures of evaluation has implications for the UN's effort to promote integration and facilitate a "One UN" approach to SSR. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 2006 guidance note on this issue stated that integration is "the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, developmental, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy."¹³³ The purpose behind this principle is to help the UN and its various bodies to maximize their contributions to recipient countries "in a coherent and mutually supportive manner."¹³⁴

Integration depends on fostering shared understandings between different UN actors in different areas like priorities and types of programming. Evaluations processes can provide significant insight into the potential for integration to occur successfully. As this study has sought to show, the types of evaluations that UN actors employ can help identify the priorities of these actors and their programmes. Annan's successor, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, recognized the importance of evaluation to integration processes. In his decision of 25 June 2008, the SG proposed that under an integrated approach, all UN actors in the country should have:

- 1) a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives,
- 2) closely aligned or integrated planning,
- 3) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and
- 4) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.¹³⁵

It is the latter two objectives that matter most for this analysis. While the DPKO and UNDP may share common goals for a country, centered around a return to peace and stability so that

¹³³ United Nations, *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, Issued by the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 9 December 2006): parag. 4.

¹³⁴ UN, *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, parag. 4.

¹³⁵ United Nations, *Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration*, Decisions of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 25 June 2008): parag. i(c).

economic and social reconstruction may take place in earnest, their evaluation methods suggest significantly different understandings of what these desired conditions look like. It is evident from their programming that both organizations understand security sector reform to play an important role for peacebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states. Furthermore, both organizations have chosen to include results-based monitoring into their evaluations processes in order to understand what contributions their programmes are making to the peacebuilding effort. However, without agreement on the types of results that should be considered, it ultimately becomes the case where the two seek to achieve two very different types of reforms. In the case of the DPKO, its reliance upon measures of input and output strongly suggests that it is interested in being able to demonstrate that its missions are contributing to the reform of a state's security sectors in a relatively short amount of time, prioritizing readily observable changes to a state's physical security institutions like the number available personnel and/or the amount of training they have received. On the other hand, the UNDP's desire to identify its contributions by focusing on outcomes and impacts, rather than just outputs, suggests that it places a higher priority on the level of security experienced by the people in the communities where it operates, rather than the characteristics of a state's security actors. This poses significant challenges for the process of UN SSR integration.

At the country level, these two cultures may create differing, even opposing, interpretations of the progress of a state's security sector reform efforts. For instance, the DPKO might assess that a state has made significant progress in reforming its security institutions because of significant improvements in the number of trained personnel, management of logistics and equipment, and/or institutional design, even though a UNDP evaluation observes that these reforms have created little change for that State's citizens, who continue to suffer from

corruption, a lack of accountability, and/or extrajudicial killings. Who is right? And how should Member States respond to these different interpretations. Effective institutional reforms are ones that lead to changes in the level of security experienced by the people on the ground. Evaluations based on outputs are unable to capture such changes.

To offer a different hypothetical scenario, what would happen if a UNDP evaluation were to report that the citizens of a state felt their livelihoods were secure (possibly thanks to a non-State actor), even though a DPKO assessment determined that the state's security institutions still lack sufficient training, resources and proper management? Are these people secure or not? Or is the real issue the fact that it isn't the state that is providing for their security? Would the Security Council/Fifth Committee continue to provide costly resources to DPKO-led reform efforts in this scenario?

At an organizational level, different interpretations of the effectiveness of SSR programmes are likely to foster confusion among the UN's Member States, as they may have to reconcile two different messages about the progress being made on the ground and/or how their contributions are being utilized. This, in turn, may have implications could prompt changes in Member States' policies towards both the UN and the peacebuilding efforts in the recipient State. This does not bode well for an organization, like the UN, who is trying to coordinate and the efforts of its internal and external partners in order to maximize effectiveness.

Interestingly, this does not appear to be merely a case of two actors coordinating their efforts in order to avoid overlapping programmes and wasted resources.¹³⁶ While it is the case that the two organizations generally work with different security institutions – DPKO placing a

¹³⁶ Integration is currently the hot trend in the peacebuilding community. The most often repeated justification for integration is that interveners should ensure that their activities do not undo the gains made by other actors, creating a situation whereby the different interveners are working at odds with each other, and ultimately to the detriment of the broader goal of building peace. See Robert Ricigliano, "Networks of Effective Action: Implementing an Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding," *Security Dialogue* 34,4 (2003): 445-462.

greater focus on armed forces and UNDP working primarily with police and justice institutions – this doesn't explain why they approach SSR in such different manners. There is nothing intrinsically different about armed forces that would prevent the DPKO from incorporating outcomes and impacts to a greater degree in its programme evaluations. Nor are police and justice institutions more predisposed to one type of evaluation or the other. It appears that the difference is a result of the aforementioned institutional factors and how each organization chooses to cope with the demands placed on them by their respective evaluation process.

Based on their expertise and influence, the DPKO and UNDP could be driving forces towards the integration and coordination of UN SSR. However, this does not seem to be the case, or even likely. The two actors appear to conceptualize their role in SSR in a very different way, which leads them to evaluate progress in fundamentally different ways. Moreover, the demands placed on them are very different; the structure of the UN and the different levels of politicization at work create obstacles that UN departments and agencies may not be able to change or overcome without substantial agreement and political will from Member States. Given these substantial challenges, it is difficult to see how these two actors could adopt a common method of evaluation, let alone a “One UN” approach to SSR.

Theoretical Implications

In addition to their policy implications, the two cultures of SSR evaluation provide valuable insights into how security sector reform is conceptualized and theorized. By comparing the evaluations methods of two UN actors, this study suggests that there are (at least) two different conceptualizations of how the international community should approach SSR. The first, which this study associates with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is an

institutionalist approach to security reforms. The second, practiced by the UN Development Programme, is a more emancipatory form of SSR, but still based on liberal principles.

The institutionalist approach aims to re-build a state's security institutions to resemble those found in stable and prosperous states. The underlying justification behind this strategy would appear to be the belief that strong security institutions are needed to fill the vacuum of power created by conflict and state failure, and that these institutions will be able to shape the behaviour of the rebuilding state in a manner that will allow it to contribute successfully to the maintenance of international order. This end is achieved by building strong security institutions, in the physical sense, by focusing on the characteristics of the institutions. SSR reforms prioritize key aspects like the structure of the institution, the number of personnel it has and how much training they have received, proper equipment and logistics, to name just a few. To adopt this approach is to recognize that it is difficult to implement new norms and expectations about how state security apparatuses should operate without first ensuring that these organizations have the tools they need to do the job properly. This is primarily a "top-down" approach that understands that the state is the only legitimate provider of security and it is the strength and capabilities of these institutions which determines the level of security experienced.

The overarching drawback to the institutionalist approach is that there is a substantial risk that the reform efforts have the opposite effect than what was intended by the donor community. By focusing on the institutions' physical characteristics, there is the potential that these institutions may accept assistance from the international community to build stronger institutions but then return to their previous poor behaviours, or worse. The problem here is that an institutionalist approach is unable to ensure that structural changes are accompanied by positive changes in behaviour, through the establishment and normalization of practices that reinforce the

security of both individuals within the state and the state itself. This study has observed this dynamic in the methodology used to evaluate the progress of DPKO SSR programmes. By choosing to report only inputs and outputs, the DPKO is able to describe how the physical attributes of the institutions it works with are changing but not about how they operate on the ground. While DPKO missions may undertake the training of state security personnel, it is impossible to know whether the lessons and best practices being taught are implemented on the ground without looking to outcomes and impacts.

The primary benefit of the institutionalist approach is that it provides actors with the ability to clearly show how they are trying to assist in returning the state in question to rebuild following conflict. The donor community can justify its intervention by quickly showing changes that easily understood, and even if the state regresses after the intervention ends the donors can redirect any blame by focusing on all the “good” achieved by their assistance. Focusing on physical change also allows interveners to exit with greater ease; once all the boxes are ticked on the checklist of what a good security institution should look like, donors can claim “mission accomplished” and begin the process of withdrawal, even if the level of security experienced by people on the ground has not improved.

Conversely, the emancipatory approach to SSR reflects a variation of peacebuilding that focuses more on liberal principles concerning individual freedom. Rather than focus attention on the shape and strength of state security institutions, this approach to SSR shifts its focus to the security of individuals and their ability to pursue their vision of a good life. Security, in this model, understands the referent object to be the individual and is based on a human security conceptualization of security. Accordingly, the role of the state – including its security institutions – is to protect its citizens from a much broader array of threats than just external

armed forces; instead, ensuring that they are not deprived of their political, economic and religious freedoms, in addition to their personal safety. This end is achieved not only by building capable physical institutions, but ones that also behave in the best collective interests of all members of society. SSR programmes following this approach incorporate softer aspects of security into their programming, such as working to improve the relationship – especially trust – between state security forces and members of society, which likely deteriorated during the period of insecurity.

From an evaluation point of view, an emancipatory approach to SSR places more emphasis on indicators that are able to capture and convey changes in security as experienced at the individual level. As a result, outcomes and impacts are given equal, if not greater, priority in the designing and implementation of programme evaluations. In contrast to the institutionalist approach, this requires greater engagement at the local level, and understands security to also be a bottom-up process. This way, security institutions that are seen to be at least attempting to protect their citizens will be viewed as more legitimate, and will face fewer challenges from other actors, both internal and external. Additionally, by placing greater importance on outcomes and impacts, the emancipatory approach is unique in its ability to account for, and include in its evaluations, the role and influence of non-state actors in the provision of security.

The overarching drawback for this approach to SSR is that it is a much more challenging and intensive process than the institutional approach. It is next to impossible to accurately measure outcomes and impacts from afar; organizations truly have to be present in the communities and interacting with the individuals whom their reform programmes seek to serve for valid and useful data to be collected. This often requires significantly more resources, which not all actors may be able to afford. As well, it will often be necessary for actors to maintain their

substantial commitments for longer periods until visible outcomes and impacts have time to emerge. Finally, building secure communities can be more challenging than building strong institutions, the difference being the distinction between potential and results. Many donors are unwilling to commit to such goals for fear of failure and having to justify why the programme was unsuccessful and why resources were utilized in the way they were to audiences that are likely to be more hostile due to the lack of results.

This study highlights an important struggle within liberal peacebuilding. Its findings reinforce the conclusions of some analysts, like Richmond and Paris, that there are multiple peacebuilding models based on liberal principles. Moreover, this study shows that by asking critical questions about the assumptions that help shape the liberal peace, it is possible to improve the outcomes of this approach, by ensuring that its proponents' actions match their words, rather than using poor results as a justification for its abandonment.

At a more macro-level, the comparison between the UNDP and DPKO, in terms of their adoption of international norms concerning aid effectiveness, suggests that the structure of international organizations may have an influence on their ability to disseminate norms. Much like state governments, international organizations like the UN are not unitary actors and they too can experience policy incoherence. The different interactions these subsidiary bodies have with the international community can shape produce their own operational cultures. While these actors may seek the same ends, their individual cultures guide them towards that end by following different paths.

Under the current liberal institutionalist approach to peacebuilding, normative changes like the Paris Declaration or "One UN" should lead to better outcomes. However, recent experience would suggest that such changes are insufficient, as peacebuilding's record remains

mixed. There appear to be other factors that influence the ability of normative changes to produce better outcomes, which in the case of this study are the individual cultures within organizations that shape how they behave. Achieving better outcomes may also mean changing the structural factors (e.g. reporting relationships) that shape these organizational cultures, not just the normative goals.

This may also tell us something about the theory-policy divide, and the ability to close it. As with normative changes and better outcomes, closing the gap between academic theory and real-world policy may require more than just the political will to make such a normative change. It may also be necessary to alter the factors that shape the culture within a policy-oriented organization in order to create an environment more conducive to theory playing a more significant role in shaping policy.

CONCLUSION

The results of this study do not suggest that the institutionalist and emancipatory approaches to liberal peacebuilding and SSR are inherently incompatible, nor did it seek to empirically argue for one approach over the other. Each approach offers an important view of security in fragile and conflict-affected states, as well as important information on what reform looks like and how it can be measured. In theory, the two approaches could be utilized in a complementary manner, working top-down and bottom-up in order to maximize results. As it was ideally designed, results-based management foresees the use of the complete array of indicators on the results chain (inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts). But it is up to the donor actor to decide how they wish to implement and evaluate security sector reform programmes, or their political masters in the case of development agencies and UN bodies.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Development Programme are organizations with extensive expertise and responsibility in helping fragile and post-conflict states to reform their security sector institutions. However, this study has found that they conceptualize the purpose of SSR, and their role within it, very differently. These fundamental divergences are evident in how each actor approaches the monitoring and evaluation of their programmes, and what information they report back to their stakeholders.

How these two organizations conceptualize SSR, coupled with the demands placed on them by the structure of the UN poses a significant obstacle to the development of a “One UN” approach to SSR. Despite the wisdom behind the current trend towards integrated peacebuilding, overcoming this obstacle will likely prove very difficult to accomplish. To do so, would not only demand that they change their internal practices, but will also require the political will of UN Member States to agree to harmonize their reporting processes. Given the current state of politicization in both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, this does not appear likely any time soon.

The different approaches to SSR utilized by the UNDP and DPKO also show that the principles behind liberal peacebuilding model can be applied differently by different actors, and that poor outcomes do not necessarily justify abandoning the model, as some critical theorists have proposed. By understanding how actors are influenced in their pursuit of the liberal peace, efforts can be made, instead, to adjust how liberal principles are used in order to correct actors’ behaviour and achieve better outcomes.

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