


KAREN Horney's Theory of Neurosis
AN ARISTOTELIAN-EMPIRIC CRITIQUE
WITH
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCHOOL OF
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS

by Sergio D. Petraroja

Thesis presented to the Faculty of Arts
of the University of Ottawa through the
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GENERAL DISCUSSION

Recent times have witnessed a dismaying increase of mental illness. It is only the very ingenuous who can suppose that this phenomenon is more apparent than real. It cannot seriously be argued that other centuries were plagued by an equal intensity of psychic disorders and that the seeming increase is due to nothing more than the significant advancements in psychological medicine coupled with an increase in hospital facilities and more humane treatment of the mentally ill. It is of course true that our modern society by and large no longer looks upon people with mental illness as "freaks" unfit for social intercourse, or as spiritual and moral offenders reaping the fruits of their own responsible deficiencies. Consequently the mentally ill are no longer subjected to cruel disciplines nor are they any longer reviled or subjected to ridicule, at the least by the more informed and charitable strata of our society. And it is also self-evident that such an improved outlook should give rise to increased facilities and to advancements in the field, resulting in a highly increased emergence of unfortunates who in other times and in other circumstances would have justly feared to make themselves known. Nevertheless, the present situation cannot be so superficially explained. The fact cannot be ignored that the number of patients admitted to mental hospitals increases each year. In the United States in particular over fifty percent of hospital beds are occupied by patients with mental disorders. Statistics seem to indicate that the chances of an individual in the United States requiring psychiatric treatment during his lifetime are better than one in thirteen. During the last war, of 4,217,000

rejected for military service in the United States, 1,283,000 were classified as suffering from mental disease or mental deficiency, an impressive figure when one considers that this statistic represents the youth of a nation.

Much good ink has already been spilled on both sides of the heredity vs. environment dispute. However one need not necessarily champion either cause to admit quite readily that, the environment, both cultural and personal, must have some impact on the individual's formation, and the most cursory observation of our unhappy century should be sufficient to indicate that it has not been conducive to mental tranquillity. Surely there must be at the least a conditioning factor involved. Therefore, to the Christian alive to the meaning of the times, it is extremely significant that a new science, psychiatry, along with its most popular branch, psychoanalysis, has arisen to keep abreast of the times. For him also it is not nearly so accidental that the theories of the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, have, of late, met with the most scrutinizing observation. Thus Christian thought has been vividly aware of this current and of its significance. In the light of recent publications it would appear a belaboring of the obvious to state that a thorough study of Freud's theories has been undertaken. The same, however, cannot unqualifiedly be said of the Freudian off-shoots. The theories of Dr. Karen Horney represent a striking case in point.

Dr. Horney, at one time a disciple of Freud, represented and still represents through the considerable influence of her writings and of her colleagues, a potent force in one of many anti-Freudian move-

ments. In contrast to Freud her theories have stressed the importance of interpersonal relations. Stated thus briefly, Horney's position would seem to represent a significant advance. But it is evident that no psychoanalytic theory can be so rapidly and superficially dispatched. Rather it must be considered that the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis is therapy. In short any psychoanalytic school implicitly or explicitly proposes to make a mentally disturbed individual what he "ought to be". Consequently, it is of paramount importance to discover and evaluate the view of human nature which underlies such a theory, as well as any other basic positions which serve as a foundation for its more empirical aspects.

The coeval interest which has been accorded to the writings of Dr. Horney seems to suggest the need of subjecting them to nice analysis. Such a task appears all the more urgent in view of the all too scarce attention accorded to Dr. Horney in Christian circles. Such recent publications as Psychiatry and Catholicism, Psychoanalysis and Personality and Psychoanalysis Today have merely mentioned her in passing and then in a manner which was not altogether conducive to the conclusion that the authors had made a penetrating inquiry into Horney's thought. In short, no conclusive Christian study and evaluation of Karen Horney's theories has been attempted. This thesis makes no pretenses at fully amending this neglect. Rather the author has restricted himself, as much as possible, to the presentation and evaluation of certain fundamental philosophical positions which appear, either implicitly or explicitly in Dr. Horney's works.

The thesis is divided into three parts. Since Horney has been classified in psychoanalytic literature as belonging to the school of interpersonal relations it was felt that a brief presentation of the leading exponents of the school, other than Horney, would serve the dual purpose of enriching the grounds of the study as well as placing Horney in more proper focus. Such is the raison d'être of Part One. But it should be stressed that the thesis deals primarily and in fact almost exclusively with the theories of Karen Horney. Hence Part One should be regarded as an introduction to the forces which influenced her thought.

The second part of the thesis is dedicated to a presentation of Dr. Horney's more fundamental positions. Chapter One concerns itself with a general presentation of Karen Horney's view of human nature and of its origin. Her view of the causes of neurosis is briefly introduced and seen to suggest a position amounting to environmental determinism. Several questions reflective of the ambiguity of many of Horney's terms and expressions, are introduced.

Chapter Two treats of the influence of the environment in the formation of neurosis. The chapter is subdivided into two sections. The first section deals with Horney's conception of "normality", and the second with the influence of the social environment on human nature. Horney's view of normality is exposed as manifestly relativistic while her position as it concerns the role of the environment is seen to predicate a qualified social determinism.

Chapter Three illustrates, without actually entering into Horney's empirical theories, the manner in which her more ultimate

concepts affected her view of what constitutes and causes neurosis. An attempt is also made to answer the questions raised in the first chapter.

The final chapter of this part indicates the connection between Horney's causal analysis of neurosis and the neurotic structure. The chapter is of significance to the formal object of this thesis, in spite of its predominantly empirical bent since its contents are later used to draw out Horney's views regarding neurosis and freedom, a facet manifestly fraught with ethical implications.

The last part of the study essays to evaluate Horney's more basic theories as presented in the second part. The philosophical doctrines of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as explicitly stated in or inferred from their writings are utilized as a general critique. This final part is itself subdivided into four chapters each one dealing with one or more of the cardinal points developed in the previous section. Thus Horney's concept of man is scrutinized for both logical and ontological validity. Her etiology of neurosis is compared with the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of man with a view to determining whether Horney's explanation of this disturbance can be reconciled with normal nature. Similarly Horney's notion of responsibility as applied to the causes of neurosis and the status quo of the neurotic is submitted to ethical analysis, an analysis complemented by the findings of other psychiatrists. Finally Horney's conception of normality is re-examined to determine whether her conclusion is indeed an inescapable one and whether such a conclusion might have a bearing in therapy.

In conclusion some qualifying remarks concerning the method of procedure, the sources consulted and the definitions of Horney's terms appear to be in order:

It may be wondered why the order of criticism in the third part differs from the order of presentation in the second. (There Horney's concept of normality and her theory of environmental determinism precede the etiology of neurosis.) While it was mandatory in presenting Horney's theories to follow this particular order, the same order was neither necessary nor helpful in the critical section. To present Horney's causes of neurosis first and then to impart Horney's determinism and relativism would have resulted in confusion in the first instance and redundancy in the second. But in criticizing Horney's theories it was first necessary to vindicate Horney's etiology of neurosis before appreciating her qualified determinism. Similarly while her concept of normality might have been evaluated following her concept of man the notion of "constructiveness" and "destructiveness" expounded in this chapter was more intimately connected with Horney's etiology. Hence it appeared but good procedure to leave the concept of normality for the concluding chapter.

With regard to the sources one may ask why Fromm's latest books were not consulted. The answer is that they were but their content, though indubitably illuminating did not appear to offer more than a working out of more basic notions and for purposes of an introduction the basic tenets were required. Fromm himself informs us that his more recent book, The Sane Society, is "... a continuation of Escape from Freedom and to some extent of Man for Himself. (The Sane Society, VII.)

It may also be wondered whether the list of Horney's works presented in the thesis is exhaustive. It must be admitted that Dr. Horney has committed herself in print in both German and English. The sources consulted in the writing of this thesis represent her "English phase". This is, however, but an apparent neglect. Dr. Horney's contribution in German date back to a period prior to her open break with the Freudian school and do not concern the material here dealt with.

Finally the definition of terms is left to the thesis proper. At present an explanation of Horney's often peculiar language would result in a catalogue and prove most ineffective unless her thought were simultaneously introduced.

PART I

**THE SCHOOL OF
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS**

CHAPTER I

THE SCHOOL

Depuis une vingtaine d'années, il existe un fort courant psychanalytique qui pousse à mettre un accent très marqué sur les influences du milieu culturel, dans la formation de l'inconscient et de la personnalité. Les auteurs responsables de la nouvelle orientation semblent être les suivants: Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm et Karen Horney.¹

Edward Sapir, an anthropologist, is usually given credit for being the pioneer in the belief that sociology, anthropology and psychiatry should work more closely. Harry Stack Sullivan was trained in the United States and developed independently of any direct Freudian influence. From the beginning he was in doubt as to the validity of the libido theory. Although Sullivan was doubtless influenced by William Alanson White and Adolf Meyer, to the extent that the kernels of his social orientation can be gleaned in their teachings, he is usually given credit for being the first psychoanalyst in the United States to see clearly and to expound systematically the theory of interpersonal relations. In the meantime Erich Fromm in Germany, a sociologist and psychoanalyst by training, was reaching similar conclusions. Karen Horney was deeply influenced by his theories even while she was still in Germany, and this despite the fact that her training as a psychoanalyst had been exclusively Freudian. When Fromm and Horney came to the United States, Sullivan gladly joined forces with them. Though they eventually separated, their basic position, that is the rejection of Freud's

1.

HENRI GRATTON, O.M.I., Psychanalyses D'hier et D'aujourd'hui
Paris, Cerf, 1955, p. 190.

THE SCHOOL

biological position in favor of the theory of interpersonal relations remained the same. Fromm and Horney went on to expound their theories extensively in several books. Horney, in particular, concentrated on a study of the neurotic of our times, the causes of his disturbance and the forces which move him.

Since Horney's theories are the subject of this study they shall be discussed at length in the second part. The present chapter then will concern itself with sketching the formulations of Sullivan and Fromm, emphasizing their more fundamental positions, with a view toward placing Horney in focus.

2

1. Harry Stack Sullivan

Harry Stack Sullivan became deeply interested in the social factors contributing to mental illness through his work with schizophrenia.

2.

Harry Stack Sullivan was born in 1892 in Norwich, New York. After receiving the degree of doctor of medicine from the Chicago College of Medicine and Surgery, he began his psychiatric career under the guidance of William Alanson White. His early years were spent in intensive study and research with schizophrenic patients. The results appear to have been quite favorable. In private practice he dealt intensively with the neuroses. Apparently Sullivan's work with schizophrenics convinced him of importance of social factors in the explanation of mental illness. This orientation led to the formulation of his theory of interpersonal relations. Sullivan held several significant posts during his life among which was the office of President of the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation. He also helped to found the journal, Psychiatry. Sullivan died in Paris in 1949 while attending a conference of the World Federation for Mental Health.

It is important to note this fact since the manner in which he became interested in the less empirical aspects of man has colored all his theories. Sullivan was first and foremost a clinician. His contribution to psychiatry appears to rest in his theory of interpersonal relations. Indeed it was the view that we are much more influenced by our relations with others than had hitherto been assumed in psychoanalytic circles, which gave him a different approach to the very nature of psychiatry.

The Subject Matter of Psychiatry - Psychiatry is not, according to Sullivan, the study of the mentally ill. The relief of mental disorder may be a goal of psychoanalytic therapy but the science of psychiatry as such has a much more universal scope. What then is psychiatry? It is "...the study of processes that evolve or go on between people. The field of psychiatry is the field of interpersonal relations under any and all circumstances in which these relations exist."³ Psychiatry, in short, is the study of interpersonal relations.

Though the theory that psychiatry is fundamentally the science which studies interpersonal relations and their effects appears at first to be a belaboring of the obvious, it is in fact a most complicated notion. Furthermore, Sullivan's contribution does not lie in his

3.
HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, Washington, The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1945, pp. 4-5.

having pointed out that personality is the result of interpersonal processes. Indeed this had been said before. Rather his uniqueness stems in his having attempted to show exactly how this comes about. To gain an understanding of Sullivan's view of psychiatry it is necessary to break through the apparent superficiality of his definition and consider at least the more essential elements of his theory.

Basic Human Needs - It appears that human performances may be classified under two general headings. The classification is based on the ends towards which human actions tend. The two ends are satisfaction and security. The former refers to man's biological needs, the latter to man's cultural demands.

Satisfactions in this specialized sense are all those end states which are rather closely connected with the bodily organization of man. Thus the desire for food and drink leads to certain performances which are in this category. ... On the other hand, the pursuit of security pertains rather more closely to man's cultural equipment than to his bodily organization. By "cultural" I mean what the anthropologist means - all that which is man-made, which survives as a monument to pre-existent man, that is the cultural. And as I say, all those movements, actions, speech, thoughts, reveries and so on which pertain more to the culture which has been imbedded in a particular individual than to the organization of his tissues and glands, is apt to belong in this classification of the pursuit of security.¹

Though Sullivan was convinced that without the need for security man could not be human, he also felt that it was through the satisfaction of this need that man did become human. And since security, for Sullivan, is gained by a process of acculturation, the process of becoming human is synonymous with the process of acculturation or socialization.

¹.

Ibid., p. 6.

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Development of the self-Dynamism. Sullivan defines dynamism as,
 "a relatively enduring configuration of energy which manifests itself
 in characterisable processes in interpersonal relations."⁵

The beginnings of the self can be traced back to the individual's first second of existence outside the womb. "From birth it is demonstrable that the infant shows a curious relationship or connection with the significant adult, ordinarily the mother."⁶ The infant is not left in ignorance of the mother's mental and emotional disposition. The communication is quite obviously not made on the intellectual level. But neither can it be accounted for on the level of sense. Its precise nature is obscure. Sullivan uses the term "empathy" to refer to the link between infant and significant adults. It would appear that this early influence is far from being a superficial one. According to Sullivan the effects of empathy endure in some people throughout life. Depending upon the quality of the empathic linkage its influence will be to the help or hindrance of the self-dynamism.

At this point another term requires introduction. It is "euphoria". By it Sullivan intends a feeling of security or "well-being" on the part of the infant. Thus if the mother or nurse happens

5.

Id., "Introduction to the Study of Interpersonal Relations", Psychiatry, Vol. I, 1938, P. 123, (footnote).

6.

Id., Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, p. 7.

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to be angry or nervous the infant's "euphoria" is said to be markedly decreased. But the feeling of discomfort or insecurity which follows close upon the decrease of euphoria is not yet 'anxiety'. Anxiety is a term which Sullivan reserves for a later stage of development, namely childhood.

As the infant acquires the capacity for language he enters into the phase of childhood. This capacity, as may well be expected, is of incalculable value in terms of acculturation. But beyond this acquisition there is the most important factor of education.

The very notion of education implies that the child must be taught certain modes of procedure in interpersonal relations which he might not tend to adopt were he left to his own devices. Furthermore he will be asked to discontinue certain performances which hitherto he had been allowed. With these restraints there comes a "marked evolution of the self system". As a result of these restraints the child is introduced to a new experience, namely the experience of anxiety. Precisely what anxiety is, Sullivan does not say. Although the nature of anxiety is not altogether clear, it must be distinguished from fear. Anxiety is not "internal fear". Nor is it fear the cause of which one does not apprehend. Rather the distinction is based on the aspect of the being that is effected. "Any danger to the existence or biological

integrity of the organism arouses fear, whether in a mild form or in the extreme form of terror."⁷ Anxiety, on the other hand, "... is related to loss of esteem for one by oneself or by others."⁸

In childhood, anxiety results from the disapproval and dissatisfaction which the parents and significant others reflect toward some of the actions of the child. This dissatisfaction is at first experienced by the child through the empathic linkage and later through the understanding of language.

Correlative with the experiences of disapproval and dissatisfaction are those of "rewards and approbations for successes". These are accompanied not by anxiety but by euphoria, well-being, security. It will be recalled that the need for security is a basic human need. Therefore the child patterns his self according to the demands of the significant adults. It is understandable then, that Sullivan should say that "the self dynamism is built up out of this experience of approbation and disapproval, of reward and punishment."⁹

⁷. PATRICK MULLAHY (Ed. by), The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, New York, Hermitage House, 1952, p. 33

⁸. Ibid., p. 33

⁹. HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry p. 10.

It is also clear why Sullivan should say that, in the last analysis,
 "the self may be said to be made up of reflected appraisals."¹⁰

Anxiety is experienced by everyone. Though the effect is not necessarily detrimental in terms of mental illness, nevertheless it has a tendency in everyone, to restrict awareness of reality. Since anxiety plays a tremendous role in the development of the self-system, it may logically be inferred that the self-system itself tends to restrict one's awareness of reality. Yet how can anyone escape this fate? For a clarification of Sullivan's position two further conceptions must be introduced.

Selective inattention and dissociation - The self-dynamism is only a part of man's being. It is the conscious part. But there is also a sub-conscious part and an unconscious part. As Sullivan puts it, the self is "The custodian of awareness". The self allows into awareness only those factors which were approved or disapproved by the significant others. And it allows the disapproved factors as reminders that they are disapproved so that they may be recast into a new and approved mould. Since the self-dynamism is built up out of a need for security it is understandable that it should be a somewhat rigid construction. "... It is self-perpetuating, if you please, tends very strongly to maintain the direction and characteristics which it was given in infancy and childhood."¹¹ Therefore, the self will not allow into

10.

Ibid., p. 11 .

11.

Ibid., p. 10 .

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awareness anything which is contrary to the self-system. But not to allow into awareness does not mean that these impulses, needs and desires are completely discarded from the personality. They are either dissociated or selectively inattended.

Although Sullivan uses these two terms he fails to distinguish clearly between them. The distinction is to be found in Mullahy's writings. The latter received it in an oral communication with Sullivan. The child,

selectively ignores, selectively inattends, whatever happens which is not obviously conducive to winning the approval or avoiding the disapproval of the significant adults. ... When these other, one might say neutral, needs and performances occur, they are not clearly discriminated, if at all. They exist outside awareness; but under appropriate circumstances they are accessible to the self.¹²

The significant elements in the above quotation are the neutral nature of the strivings and their accessibility to the self. Not so, with the dissociated.

Dissociated dynamisms not only exist outside awareness but ordinarily are not accessible to the self. ... dissociated dynamisms, once they are recognized by the self, involve an immediate and perhaps great alteration in the basic characteristics of the self. In other words, the recognition and discrimination of previously dissociated dynamisms, imply a change, frequently a profound change, in the sorts of interpersonal relations in which one will be integrated.¹³

¹². PATRICK MULLAHY, "A Theory of Interpersonal Relations and the Evolution of Personality", Psychiatry, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1945, p. 189.

¹³.

Ibid., p. 189.

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Therefore, the dissociated dynamism are dissociated since they are far from neutral to the stability of the self. The difference between the dissociated and the selectively inattended is one of degree of awareness, the degree based on the threat to the self.

The above distinction should be of some help in understanding how it is possible for anyone to escape a severe restriction of one's awareness of reality. Actually, it would appear, no one can escape some degree of restriction since everyone in his childhood will suffer anxiety, attempt to conform to the expectations of the significant others, selectively inattend neutral factors and dissociate those which threaten the self-dynamism. But there is obviously a question of degree and of quality. If the expectations of the significant others are of a constructive nature, if they have respect and love for the child, little selective inattention and dissociation will take place. And the anxiety will not be oppressive. Rather it will be of a kind that will tend to promote growth. But more of this when the question of normality is discussed. In the meantime it is somewhat understandable why Sullivan should say that "development of personality is inversely proportional to the amount, to the number, of tendencies which have come¹⁴ to exist in dissociation."

¹⁴.

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, p. 22.

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With the utilisation of security operations, only the self is conscious to the individual. The rest of the personality continues to exist just the same, but outside of awareness. In other words, "the personality compensates for the limitations of the self by accepting
15
and maintaining dissociated tendency systems".

The rigidity of the self-dynamism must not be interpreted as an absolute and unbending rigidity. Indeed, Sullivan could not possibly adhere to this view, for it would render the very notion of psychoanalytic therapy ridiculous. The self reacts adversely when it is presented with dissociated tendency systems since it does not entertain favorably the notion of a strategic overhaul. And this is true even if the self happens to be an unhappy construction. But despite its rigidity there is the possibility of change. And this change may be for better or for worse.

This capacity for change in the self-dynamism is not restricted to children although it appears that their self-system is more plastic and therefore more susceptible to change. But even the adult, as was suggested above, may change his self-dynamism. More often than not the change cannot be actualized without expert help. Needless to say it is a very difficult task, for by the time the individual has reached

15.

PATRICK MULLAHY, "A Theory of Interpersonal Relations and the Evolution of Personality," Psychiatry, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1948, p. 193.

THE SCHOOL

the adult stage he is, for better or for worse, "set" in his ways. This consideration introduces another and most important facet of the theories of Harry Stack Sullivan, namely the "stages of personality development". As might be expected these are so intimately connected with the development of the self-dynamism that they are, in point of fact, inseparable.

The stages of personality development - Sullivan defines personality as "the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life."¹⁶

The evolution of the personality requires several years. It can be divided into several epochs or stages. The stages are not rigidly fixed. They appear to vary from culture to culture. But the variation is merely in terms of the time of their appearance. The stages themselves are universal. Sullivan enumerates six: infancy, childhood, the juvenile period, preadolescence, adolescence and mature adulthood. Although everyone passes through these stages, in the sense that all experience biological growth of the organism and the physical and psychological changes which accompany this growth, not all pass through the stages constructively. Furthermore, some of us remain blocked at an earlier stage. In point of fact Sullivan goes so far as to say that,

^{16.}HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, VI.

... for a great majority of people, preadolescence is the nearest that they come to untroubled human life - that from then on the stresses of life distort them to inferior caricatures of what they might have been.¹⁷

The new-born is completely at the mercy of those around him.

The importance of the "mothering one" has already been stressed.

During this period much is communicated to the infant by the mothering one and the significant others through the medium of "empathy".

The self begins to evolve at a rapid rate in late infancy.

In the last third of infancy, the roots of the self are said to be fixed. Much has been learned during this time through the empathic linkage. As the infant acquires the capacity for language behaviour he passes into the childhood stage. It will be recalled that correlative with the learning of language and, to a great extent, by means of it, education of the child by the significant adults begins. The self-dynamism develops rapidly through the experience of anxiety and the utilization of the already mentioned security measures. He learns ways of handling people and situations. He acquires a facility for sublimating impulses which collide with the self-dynamism. They are "unwittingly combined with socially approved patterns of performance so that the basic impulse is partially satisfied without provoking anxiety."¹⁸ Anger is often used to overcome anxiety. That is, one

17.

Ibid., p. 27.

18.

PATRICK MULLAHY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, New York Grove Press, 1948, pp 103-104.

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projects his anxiety by becoming angry with someone. The child acquires complex patterns of behavior. With the mastering of language the activity of thinking becomes more pronounced. The self-dynamism for better or worse, is given a very strong foundation.

The end of childhood and the beginning of the juvenile era is signalled by the need for compeers. "By compeers I mean people who are on our level, and have generically similar attitudes toward authoritative figures, activities and the like."¹⁹ During the juvenile era important capacities are developed. These are the ability for cooperation, competition and compromise.

The next phase in personality development occurs anywhere between the ages of eight and one-half and nine and one-half and lasts until about the age of twelve or, more precisely, to the maturation of the "genital lust dynamism". This stage Sullivan calls "The quiet miracle of preadolescence." During this time most significant personality changes occur. The most striking change of all is that from "egocentricity, toward a fully social state". Up to this time any thoughtfulness, love, or consideration for others is, according to Sullivan, more apparent than real. It is rather,

... that marvellous human thing, great adaptive possibilities applied successfully to a situation.

I suggest thus the egocentric character of personality up to the epoch of preadolescence.²⁰

19.

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, p. 17

20.

Ibid., p. 20.

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The shedding of egocentricity and the sincere concern for others signals the maturation of the capacity to love, and this capacity symbolizes a tremendous expansion in the personality in terms of constructive growth. With the coming of the pre-adolescent stage the desire for satisfaction and for security of others becomes as important as these same drives in oneself. Sullivan conceives love in a manner most reminiscent of the Christian view.

When the satisfaction or the security of another person becomes as significant to one as is one's own satisfaction or security, then the state of love exists. So far as I know, under no other circumstances is a state of love present, regardless of the popular usage of the word.²¹

During the preadolescent stage, the genital lust dynamism has not yet matured. When it does the individual has entered the adolescent stage of personality development. This maturation varies from one culture to another. Apparently, environmental influences from the significant people can either accelerate or retard later stages of personality development.

The patterning of genital behavior varies with the culture. Sullivan does not make as much of this as some psychiatrists. As a matter of fact it is interesting to note that Sullivan does not make of sex a "nuclear explanatory concept" of personality. He does maintain that only if the individual passes through adolescence successfully can he grow into a mature and 'normal' individual. But this should be taken to mean that if the previous stages have been gone through successfully

21.

Ibid., p. 20.

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one can pass through adolescence productively. It would seem that if the conditions have been favorable the individual almost inevitably goes through the stages of personality development successfully and emerges a mature person.

Once successfully negotiated, the person comes forth with self-respect adequate to almost any situation, with the respect for others that this competent self-respect entails, with the dignity that befits the high achievement of competent personality, and with the freedom of personal initiative that represents a comfortable adaptation of one's personal situation to the circumstances that characterize the social order of which one is a part. ²²

But for a great many people this condition is never realized. To one degree or another they become "inferior caricatures of what they might have been".

Although the first stages of personality development are perhaps of the greatest importance every stage is important in its own right. Upon the successful negotiation of the stages rests the happiness and normal growth of the individual. But precisely what does Sullivan mean by normality? And what is his understanding of the nature and sources of mental illness?

²².

Ibid., p. 28.

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Normality and Mental Illness - Sullivan begins with the assumption that man by his very nature, is inclined to mental health.

Personality tends towards the state that we call mental health or interpersonal adjustive success, handicaps by way of acculturation notwithstanding. The basic direction of the organism is forward. Regardless of the ways incorporated in the self, the psychiatrist, given sufficient insight and skill, may expect favorable changes to ensue from his study of the patient's situation. ²³

But though the basic human tendency is toward mental health, whether that tendency is realized depends upon the type of interpersonal situations to which the individual is subjected and the type of self-dynamism which results from these influences. Hence, in the last analysis, mental health and mental illness are environmental products. The question naturally arises: What of the role of the will? Sullivan had little patience with the notion of free-will.

A great deal of time and effort is wasted in discussion of will-power, choice and decision. These three terms which refer to products of acculturation in the home, endure and are functionally very important because they are potent terms of rationalization in our culture. They are, in fact, embodied in many institutions of law and religion, and all too often are powerful factors in the work of the psychiatrist himself.

.....
I know of no evidence of a force or power that may be called a will in contradistinction to the vector addition of integrating tendencies.

23.

Ibid., p. 48.

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Situations call out motivation; if there is conflict of motivation outside of awareness, a compromise or a temporary domination of behavior and suppression of the weaker motive occurs. If the conflict is within awareness, the self system is involved, with the corresponding element of insecurity. In these cases, more complex products result, but these too are vector additions, not interventions of some sort of personal will-power.²⁴

In contrast to some psychiatrists who hold that the individual's free will is impaired by mental illness and if the illness be serious enough, rendered completely inactive, Sullivan maintains that there is no will to begin with. The individual whether healthy or neurotic acts in accordance with the motive which is creating the greatest tendency towards actualization. In short, we are left with a deterministic position. Ultimately, whether an individual becomes mentally healthy or mentally ill in no way depends on him. Rather the decision is made by the sorts of interpersonal situations which go into evolving his self-system.

In discussing the question of normality and mental illness it should be mentioned that Sullivan suggests that individual differences may, along with unfortunate interpersonal situations, lead to maladjustment.

²⁴.

Ibid., pp. 94-95.

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Some people are ill-equipped for life by defect of ability - particularly the intelligence factor. If now they have been trained to expect some day to be President, the maladjustment which they present may be prohibitively difficult of attack - primarily because of difficulty of communication and of elaborating information.²⁵

The stress, however, is always on interpersonal situations.

As to the question: What constitutes normality or mental health one may refer to isolated passages in Sullivan's writings. One of the most significant passages has already been quoted.²⁶ According to this passage the normal person, the truly integrated personality, is one who has passed through the stages of personality development successfully and consequently developed the type of self-system which allows him to respect himself and consequently others. If adolescence has been "successfully negotiated" the person is equal to the situations of life which he encounters. He has freedom of personal initiative, a sense of dignity and of adaptability to situations. A person who can manifest these characteristics is to be considered normal. But what norm of action when applied can insure self-respect and consequent respect for others, and to what extent and in what way the integrated personality should adopt itself to its culture is not altogether clear.

Conversely, mental illness arises from the type of self-dynamism which has not allowed for the fulfillment of basic human strivings.

25.

Ibid., p. 48.

26.

See p. 16.

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... limitations and peculiarities of the self may interfere with the pursuit of biologically necessary satisfactions. When this happens the person is to that extent mentally ill. Similarly, they may interfere with security, and to that extent also the person is mentally ill.²⁷

When Sullivan speaks of limitations which interfere with "the pursuit of biologically necessary satisfactions" he has in mind primarily the "genital lust dynamism". This dynamism cannot be easily dissociated. In some instances it cannot be dissociated at all. But in any event, if the early environmental conditions are such that the individual has to dissociate his genital drive, grave consequences may follow in terms of mental health. Therefore, though Sullivan does not make of sex a "nuclear explanatory concept" neither does he consider it insignificant.

The statement that "limitations and peculiarities may interfere with security" should be understood to mean that though the self-dynamism is "a product of reflected appraisals" and a symbol of one's attempt at gaining security, the security which one gains is often more apparent than real, since the dissociated processes will bring havoc in terms of mental equilibrium. It is for this reason that Sullivan

27.

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, p. 10.

has referred to the self-dynamism as "the tree that all too frequently²⁸ reflects the way the twig was bent in the developmental years".

Finally, it should be emphasized once more that the stress with regard to both mental health and mental illness, is on the interpersonal situations to which the individual has been subjected even though some instances of mental illness may have a partial somatic basis.

In approaching the subject of mental disorder, I must emphasize that, in my view, persons showing mental disorder do not manifest anything specifically different in kind, from what is manifested by practically all human beings. The only exception to this statement are those people who are very badly crippled by hereditary or birth injury factors.²⁹

But regardless of the causes of mental disorder, and especially when the cause, as in most instances, is due to a faulty personality formation, the psychiatrist, if he is well trained, has great hope of correcting past errors. The procedure which he employs constitutes for Sullivan, psychoanalytic therapy.

Psychoanalytic Therapy - Not all the facets of Sullivan's psychoanalytic therapy need be treated in this summary. Only the essentials will be discussed.

28.

Id., "Towards a Psychiatry of Peoples", Psychiatry, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1948, p. 110.

29.

Id., Clinical Studies in Psychiatry, (Ed. by Helen Swick Perry, Mary Ladd Caswell and Martha Gilbon), New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1956, p. 3.

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The psychoanalytic interview should be regarded as one more instance of an interpersonal situation. The psychiatrist is a "participant observer", and much can be learned about the patient by observing carefully the way in which the patient responds to the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist does not observe a self-contained entity but the product of many interpersonal situations involved in a new interpersonal situation.

When the first psychoanalytic interview begins the psychiatrist is faced with a self-system which to one degree or another and in one way or another has failed to evolve productively.

The self-system is "no friend of the analyst" since it presents a rigid structure not easily susceptible to change. Yet it is precisely this change which the psychiatrist must bring forth. The way in which he will do this are many and varied. They include such traditional procedures as hypnosis, free association, discussion with the analyst, dream interpretations etc., all elaborated according to the particular therapeutic views of Sullivan. These are of no special concern to this summary. But what is important is that all these devices are utilized in order to facilitate the "accession to awareness of information which will clarify for the patient the more troublesome aspects of his life." Therapy consists in bringing dissociated dynamism to awareness in order to effect re-integration of the personality along healthier lines. "One achieves mental health to the extent that one becomes aware of one's interpersonal relations".

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Sullivan divides the betterment of the self-dynamism or cure into two types or stages. They are psychiatric cure and social cure.

Progressively, in the course of identifying all the more important parataxically surviving, unresolved situations of the patient's past, and their consequent dissolutions, there goes an expanding of the self to such final effect that the patient as known to himself is much the same person as the patient behaving with others. This is psychiatric cure. There may remain a need for a great deal of experience and education before the psychiatric cure is a social cure, implying a more abundant life in the community. ³⁰

But Sullivan says that social cure or not, the person who knows himself, that is, the person that has undergone psychiatric cure, has mental health. This interesting distinction appears at first to evade neatly the question of orientation of patient by psychiatrist and hence the question of value judgements, since it seems to imply that it is not for the psychiatrist to provide the social cure. But upon further consideration it is clear that psychiatric cure cannot consist merely in unfolding the patient to himself but rather in further showing how some of his mechanisms have been unproductive and why. And this surely implies a notion of what is good for the patient and hence a norm of conduct even in psychiatric cure. Sullivan will emphatically assert that "There are few things that I think are so harrowing as the occasional psychiatrist who knows a great deal about

30.

Id., Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, p. 117.

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right and wrong, how things should be done, what is good taste and so forth and so on"³¹ but he would also maintain, in speaking of "the final statement" in a psychoanalytic interview,

I don't believe there is a person in the world who doesn't get something positively constructive from a careful review, by someone who has some judgement of what really does matter in life...³²

Therefore either as a matter of fact, or at least as a strong possibility the question of value judgements played a part in Sullivan's therapy. This makes Sullivan's concept of man and his end all the more significant.

Human Nature and Human Acts - In his summary and clarification of the theories of Harry Stack Sullivan, Patrick Mullahy begins by discussing the theories from the "philosophical" side "in an attempt to clarify some of the things which make an understanding of the theory or theories more difficult". He then warns the reader that,

31.

Id., The Psychiatric Interview, (Ed. by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawell), New York, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., p. 214, (footnote).

32.

Ibid., p. 210.

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We are still struggling with at least two influential conceptions which are a hindrance to our understanding of psychiatry as a study of interpersonal relations. The first pertains to the notion that man has a dual nature. The second has to do with the idea that man is a more or less self-contained entity, an idea which springs primarily from atomistic or individualistic conceptions of man.³³

These remarks, taken from the writings of a man who is considered in psychoanalytic circles to be the most competent interpreter of Sullivan's thought, and who, it might be said, had Sullivan's blessing, should be taken as most significant to an understanding of Sullivan's basic positions. It is clear that in the above quotation, Mullahy wishes to emphasize the interpersonal element of human existence as opposed to the self-contained. Finally, it is clear that he wishes to stress the physical unity of the human organism, a unity which, he feels, would be violated if one were to posit a composite nature. In short it appears that Sullivan, as might be expected from his clinical orientation, was a materialistic monist. But precisely how did Sullivan envisage man? After dismissing several philosophical as well as unphilosophical positions Sullivan ventures his own definition.

33.

PATRICK MULLAHY (Ed. by), The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, p. 14.

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As we survey the present, we can see four significant conceptions. For the general biologist, man is the most complexly integrated organism thus far evolved. For the psychobiologist, man is an individual organism the total function of which is mentally integrated life. For the social psychologist, man is the human animal transformed by social experience into a human being. For the psychiatrist as a student of interpersonal relations, man is the tangible substrate of human life.³⁴

Sullivan does not take issue with the last four definitions. The last one is, of course, his own. But the fact that he does not take issue with the other three seems to imply that he considers them partial definitions, each one inspired by the particular frame of reference from which man is approached. By inference his too is a partial definition since it is that of the psychiatrist as a student of interpersonal relations. But since Sullivan appears to grant each definition truth from its own particular point of departure, and since Sullivan seems to deny the notion of a dualistic nature in man, it does not seem altogether rash to suggest that Sullivan views man as man, as a complexly integrated wholly material animal, transformed by social experience, that is, by interpersonal situations into a human being. But, what can the definition of Sullivan, the psychiatrist, mean? The definition should be understood to mean that to the individual trained in the intricacies of interpersonal situations, the psychiatrist in short, man is the intelligible product of human acculturation. The

³⁴.HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, p. 14.

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definition merely exemplifies Sullivan's stress on the importance of our relations with others.

Since Sullivan views man's nature as a wholly material one, the question of a spiritual intellect is quite understandably waved aside. Man, of course, has intelligence. But this is merely the effect of the operation of exceedingly complex brain cells. As for man's will, it has already been shown³⁵ that Sullivan had little sympathy with the notion of free will. Man simply acts in accordance with the most pressing motive. Sullivan's position as it regards man's action appears to be a deterministic one. Though the human organism naturally tends to mental health, given any individual, it can be shown how the impact of interpersonal situations shapes him into the sort of person that he is. If the person has not acquired the capacity to love there can be no question of willful self-centeredness. Rather, for one reason or another the individual became arrested at the juvenile stage of personality development. If the individual cannot accommodate himself to the personality of others his exaggerated self-assertiveness can be traced back to some difficulty during the juvenile era. Examples could be multiplied but the point seems clear. And Sullivan's determinism holds even in psychoanalytic therapy. At first glance it might appear that Sullivan has involved himself in a contradiction

35.

See pp. 17-18.

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since given the reasons for his maladjustments the patient must will to change direction. But again, to Sullivan, the success or failure of psychoanalytic therapy lies in presenting to the patient a stronger motive for changing his self-dynamism than he has for retaining it. Then the change is automatic.

Can human nature be said to have any essential aspects, properties, or needs? The two basic human needs, the needs for satisfaction and security have already been discussed. In attempting to delineate specifically human aspects of man Sullivan remarks that, as far as the need for satisfaction is concerned,

We share most, in not all, of this large congeries of recurrent needs with a good many others species of the living - even including our recurrent need for contact with others, often felt as loneliness, which is paralleled in the gregarious animals.³⁶

The need for satisfaction then, is not specifically human. As for the need for security, even this does not appear to be definitively peculiar to man, although Sullivan admits that it is restricted to man and some creatures that have been domesticated.

36.

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, "Towards a Psychiatry of Peoples", Psychiatry, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1948, p. 107.

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The single other great congeries of recurrent tensions, some grasp on the nature of which is simply fundamental to understanding human life, is probably restricted to man and some of the creatures which he has domesticated. It arises not from the impact of physiochemical and biological events directly connected with keeping alive and reproducing the species, but from the impact of people.³⁷

The experience of anxiety, however, seems reserved for man alone. At the very least it must be said that though some animals other than man may experience the need for security and the effect of its frustration, anxiety, they experience it in a way somewhat inferior to man. Man is said to have an "innate capacity for being anxious".³⁸

Finally, Sullivan speaks of "the most remarkable human characteristic". It is "foresight".

I touch here on what I believe is the most remarkable of human characteristics, the importance exercised by often but vaguely formulated aspirations, anticipations and expectations which can be summed up in the term, foresight, the manifest influence of which make the near future a thoroughly real factor in explaining human events.³⁹

But in the final analysis, it would seem that what Sullivan considers to be the most remarkable human characteristic should be, even for Sullivan, a manifestation of other more basic human characteristics.

37.

Ibid., p. 107.

38.

Ibid., p. 107.

39.

Ibid., p. 106.

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Reference is here made to memory and intelligence.

In conclusion, did Sullivan elaborate any principles of action?
Can an ethical norm be inferred from his writings?

The self-dynamism has been seen to be made up of reflected appraisals. But significant adults in different cultures have different norms by which they expect the young to conform. Is any existent form considered by Sullivan to be the most desirable? Sullivan accepts the existence of different norms but does not pass judgement except in specific instances.

The lurid twilight which invests sex in our culture is primarily a function of two factors. We still try to discourage premarital sexual performances; hold that abstinence is the moral course before marriage. And we discourage early marriage; in fact progressively widen the gap between the adolescent awakening of lust and the proper circumstances for marriage.⁴⁰

At another point in his writings he would state that "the level of general insecurity is rising, that the social order is in a sense itself gravely disturbed".⁴¹ And attention has already been drawn to the fact that he does seem to imply a norm of conduct in psychoanalytic therapy.⁴² However, these are individual instances. Viewed in the context of all his writings it would be difficult to classify Sullivan as a psychiatrist with an explicit point of view with regard to Ethics. Mullahy himself recognizes this.

L0.

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry*, pp. 28-29.

L1.

Ibid., p. 87.

L2.

See p. 24.

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... he seems to have given little attention to the qualitative differences in acculturation. ... Is there any trans-cultural criterion for appraising such differences?....

In other words, are there any values which are so intrinsically important for the well-being of the person that any culture which slights them is self-defeating? Are morality and ethics unique to a given culture, which no outsider can legitimately criticize, or has mankind in the course of its history discovered certain values which serve as a criterion in judging the success or failure of a given culture in its function of providing the materials of humanness to its members? ⁴³

The answers to these questions do not appear in Sullivan's writings. Perhaps the best that can be said is that Sullivan was a cultural relativist in theory, although in practice he seems to have held some rather definite views regarding what was desirable for man.

⁴³.

PATRICK MULLAHY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, pp. 333-335.

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LH

2. ERICH FROMM

Combining data from sociology and anthropology and interpreting his findings along more ultimate lines, Erich Fromm early arrived at a conception of man and of the forces which move him which, if not in complete opposition to the Freudian view, exhibited nevertheless a most significant departure. In contrast to Freud's biological approach, Fromm's orientation is essentially a social one. For him, the most important problem of psychology is that of the relatedness of the individual to the world around him. But, according to Fromm, this problem did not always exist. It came into being when man by a long and complicated process of biological evolution became sufficiently distinct from the rest of the world to be aware of himself as a separate entity.

LH.

Erich Fromm was born in Frankfurt, Germany in 1900. He received his M.D. degree from the University of Heidelberg in 1922, then studied at the University of Munich and the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin. Fromm also holds a doctor's degree in philosophy from the University of Heidelberg. In 1934 he settled in the United States where he practiced psychoanalysis. He has taught at Columbia and Yale Universities, Dennington College, and the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry. Fromm's first book, in which he expounded the theory that man is a product of his culture, in contrast to Freud's biological orientation, appeared in 1941. Since then he has had several other works to his credit.

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The Emergence of the Individual

The social history of man started from his emerging from a state of oneness with the natural world to an awareness of himself as an entity separate from surrounding nature and men.⁴⁵

As a result of this process man differs radically from other animals in that he has become capable of learning in opposition to "instinctual determination". He is, furthermore, capable of free acts.

The process of individuation which marks man's social history is not, however, without its disadvantages. Man is no longer a part of nature since he transcends nature. But his growing individuation has meant "isolation, insecurity, and thereby growing doubt concerning one's role in the universe, the meaning of one's life..."⁴⁶

Fromm suggests that this negative aspect of man's social evolution was not mandatory. It is conceivable that the process of growing strength and growing individuation might have proceeded at an even pace. But he considers it a historical fact that they did not. Hence "the history of mankind is one of conflict and strife". But despite this dichotomy the individual has managed to emerge. In point of fact "European and American history since the end of the Middle Ages is the history of the full emergence of the individual". But the freedom gained by most men has been mostly a "freedom from" and not a "freedom to". It is not enough to be free from slavery. One must learn

⁴⁵.

ERICH FROMM, Escape From Freedom, New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1941, p. 24.

⁴⁶.

Ibid., pp. 35-36.

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to act as a free man. Because man has failed in large part to make positive use of his freedom the human situation is experiencing its present state.

Such, in brief, is Fromm's analysis of the development of mankind. As might be expected the evolution of the individual follows an analogous pattern. The child remains "functionally one with its mother for a considerable period". This situation does not make for freedom. Hence the child is not truly an individual. But in place of freedom he has "security and a feeling of belonging and being rooted somewhere". As the child progresses into adulthood he, either voluntarily or by sheer necessity must give up his ties. The dialectic aspect of the development of mankind is thus repeated in the development of the individual. If the processes of separation and individuation were paralleled by a corresponding growth of the self the development would be a wholesome one. Unfortunately, due to a number of individual and social reasons this is seldom the case. The disproportion between the process of individuation and the growth of the self gives rise to feelings of isolation and powerlessness. These feelings must be eliminated at all costs. Hence the individual adopts various escape mechanisms. These mechanisms are intimately connected with and, in point of fact, dictated by, the social process. It is clear that these are not solutions in the true sense for in the final analysis they fail to produce growth. Rather the individual gives up his freedom in exchange for a false security. Fromm terms these escape routes,

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authoritarianism, destructiveness and automaton conformity. The nature of these processes transcends the scope of this summary. Suffice it to say that according to Fromm, these mechanisms are utilized to various degrees by mankind as such. But if this be true in what sense can Fromm, the psychoanalyst, speak of the neurotic. Is the most of mankind more or less neurotic?

Normality and neurosis - Fromm distinguishes between the term normal and neurotic. The normal may be viewed in two ways. A person may be termed normal in the sense that he is adapted to his society. Normalcy may also be regarded as "the optimum of growth and happiness of the individual". It is in the latter sense that man may truly be said to be normal. Although Fromm admits it as conceivable that the atmosphere of a given society could be such as to permit the "optimum of growth and happiness" he feels that this has not been and is not at present the case. Hence most people are normal in the sense that they are well adapted to their society. In short, most people are "crippled in the growth of their personality". In trying to ascertain what Fromm understands by the term neurotic it is important to bear in mind both conceptions of normality.

A neurotic is distinguished from the really normal by a completely different "adjustment" to reality. The "really normal", and Fromm suggests that there are not too many, has achieved his "optimum of growth and happiness". The neurotic, on the other hand, "instead of expressing himself productively ... sought salvation through neurotic symptoms and by a withdrawing into a phantasy life".

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It would appear that the achievement of real normality as opposed to mere conventionality, lies in man's realization of the "self", that is, by man's being himself. Fromm is careful to point out that this realization is not achieved by intellectual insight alone.

We believe that the realization of the self is accomplished not only by an act of thinking, but also by the realization of man's total personality, by the active expression of his emotional and intellectual potentialities. ... In other words, positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality.⁴⁷

The most important attributes of spontaneous activity are said to be "love" and "work". But Fromm is careful to qualify the meaning of both terms. Thus love must be understood not,

... as the possession of another person, but love as spontaneous affirmation of others, as the union of the individual with others on the basis of the preservation of the individual self. The dynamic quality of love lies in this very polarity: that it springs from the need of overcoming separateness, that it leads to oneness - and yet that individuality is not eliminated.⁴⁸

In turn, "work" must be understood not,

... as compulsive activity in order to escape aloneness, not work as a relationship to nature which is partly one of dominating her, partly one of worship of and enslavement by the very products of man's hands, but work as creation in which man becomes one with nature in the act of creation. The basic dichotomy that is inherent in freedom - the birth of individuality and the pain of aloneness - is dissolved on a higher plane by man's spontaneous action.⁴⁹

47.

Ibid., p. 258.

48.

Ibid., p. 261.

49.

Ibid., p. 261.

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On the other hand, the difference between the neurotic and the individual who is adjusted to the norms of his society, appears to be to a large extent one of degree. The underlying difference must be sought in the intensity of the unfavorable environmental factors and even more particularly in those transmitted to the child by the psychic agency of society, the family. Thus both the neurotic and the "conventionally normal" may adopt the same escape mechanisms though the result in the former case will be the more disastrous.

In addition to environmental factors, Fromm also suggests the possibility of a constitutional basis for neurosis.

... I think we still know little of what constitutes a neurosis and less what its origins are. Many physiological, anthropological and sociological data will have to be collected before we can hope to arrive at any conclusive answer.⁵⁰

Finally Fromm also maintains that in addition to the aforementioned escape mechanisms which the neurotic will use more compulsively and hence more irrationally, he will utilize other as well. Thus both in extent and in kind and possibly through a biological predisposition the neurotic's approach to reality is less real. His maladjustment reaches a state wherein his efficiency as a functioning being is greatly impaired. When such a situation obtains, psychoanalysis is in order.

50. 1

Id., "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis", American Sociological Review, Vol. II, No. 4, 1944, p. 381.

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Psychoanalytic therapy - Fromm's general approach to therapy is fundamentally identical to that of all other schools. The goal of therapy is to bring the patient to an understanding of the irrational forces which have been working within him and which have been hampering a positive approach to reality. The goal of therapy is to make the patient truly himself. The actualization of this goal does not necessarily make the patient adjusted to his culture for in many instances it is the very culture which is in need of adjustment. Under the facilitating atmosphere of psychoanalysis the patient is encouraged to re-live his experiences and re-evaluate them. Both current attitudes and childhood memories are brought within the sphere of analysis. Sexual experiences are not neglected but are considered as "foci of especially vivid interpersonal problems rather than as dynamic foci in their own right". The end-result is the development of insight. Effective insight involves more than intellectual penetration. Rather it involves the ability to "feel" the situation and thus "feel" differently in the future. Though Fromm would agree with Freud in the belief that the analyst must not allow himself to condemn the patient for the unproductive paths which his development has taken, nevertheless he feels that the analyst's view of what is desirable for man, cannot be divorced from the goal of therapy. But if Fromm cannot do away with value judgements it would appear that he must assign a most significant role to Ethics in the psychoanalytic process. Thus before discussing Fromm's view of the relationship between ethics and psychoanalysis it

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appears necessary to say something regarding Fromm's view of ethics.

Concept of Ethics - Fromm's second book, "Man For Himself", though containing and elaborating upon many of the views expressed in his first work, is fundamentally an ethical treatise. In this work he maintains that Ethics must play a most significant role in psychoanalysis. But Fromm wants it clearly understood that it is humanistic ethics whose validity he wishes to reaffirm and defend. He is strongly opposed to both relativism and what he terms "authoritarianism" in ethics. The former implicitly or explicitly states that there is no such thing as a human nature proper to man as man. Hence any attempt at deducing an objectively valid norm of conduct must be considered fruitless. The latter, "denies man's capacity to know what is good or bad; the norm giver is always an authority transcending the individual"⁵¹. Furthermore authoritarian ethics is always exploitative since it "answers the question of what is good or bad primarily in terms of the interests of the authority, not the interest of the subject"⁵². Humanistic ethics then, is the only remaining alternative. But though humanistic ethics maintains that man's reason is capable of attaining objectively valid norms of conduct, this must not be understood to mean that humanistic ethics lays claim to absolute norms. Rather, the term absolute is rooted in theological thinking and hence has an authoritarian content.

⁵¹.

Id., Man for Himself. New York, Rinehart & Company Inc., 1947
p. 10.

⁵².

Ibid., p. 10.

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The expression 'objectively valid' must be understood in the sense of the empirical sciences. "Hence, "... a statement of probability, of approximation, or any hypothesis can be valid and at the same time 'relative'", but relative not in the sense of being purely subjective, but rather "in the sense of having been established on limited evidence and being subject to future refinements if fact or procedures warrant it". Fromm reiterates his position when he says,

The history of thought is the history of an ever-increasing approximation to the truth. Scientific knowledge is not absolute but "optimal"; it contains the optimum of truth attainable in a given historical period.⁵³

It would appear from the above that the relativism to which Fromm is opposed is an out-and-out relativism, one which denies even the faintest possibility of objective ethical norms and which refuses to admit that there is such a thing as human nature. He is not opposed to the possibility of a revision of ethical principles on the basis of new findings. Fromm defines humanistic ethics as "The applied science of the 'art of living' based upon the theoretical 'science of man'".⁵⁵ Ethics, in short, is applied psychology and psychology is the 'science of man'. Hence Fromm's view of Ethics presupposes the existence of a nature proper to man as man.

53.

Ibid., p. 16.

54.

Ibid., p. 239.

55.

Ibid., p. 18.

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Nature of Man - in contrast to authoritarian thinkers, on the one hand, who admit a fixed and unchangeable human nature, but a nature which is "... a reflection of their norms and interests - and not the result of objective inquiry", and out-and-out relativists on the other, who maintain that so-called human nature is infinitely malleable, Fromm proposes to embark on a middle road.

Man is not a blank sheet of paper on which culture can write its text; he is an entity charged with energy and structured in specific ways, which, while adapting itself, reacts in specific and ascertainable ways to specific conditions.⁵⁶

Thus, behind the manifold possibilities for adaptation there lies something peculiar to man. What is this something and how is it perceived? Here Fromm borrows a page from Aristotle and maintains that from the operations we come to the essence. But in typically empirical fashion he cautions the reader that, "Despite the wealth of data offered by anthropology and psychology, we have only a tentative picture of human nature".⁵⁷ What then are those characteristics by which one may tentatively describe human nature?

Fromm speaks of self-awareness, reason and imagination as distinctively human qualities. It is these very qualities which "have disrupted the 'harmony' which characterizes animal existence". Furthermore, "human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable".

56.

Ibid., p. 23.

57.

Ibid., p. 24.

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In his earlier book "Escape From Freedom", Fromm had also spoken of certain factors in man's nature which are fixed and unchangeable: The necessity to satisfy the physiologically conditioned drives⁵⁸ and the necessity to avoid isolation and moral aloneness.

Finally, and perhaps most important from the point of view of psychoanalysis, Fromm maintains that:

... the normal individual possesses in himself the tendency to develop, to grow, and to be productive, and that the paralysis of this tendency is in itself the symptom of mental sickness.⁵⁹

Thus, this innate tendency to grow as a human being, coupled with the desire to satisfy physiological and psychological needs and⁶⁰ further specified by rationality, freedom, self-consciousness and

58.

Id., Escape From Freedom, p. 22.

59.

Id., Man for Himself, p. 218.

60.

It should be mentioned in passing that though Fromm openly states that "human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable", the role which he assigns to man's will is a somewhat ambiguous one. For Fromm, man's will is a manifestation of his character. Character results from the combined effects of heredity and environment and determines our decisions. Fromm tries to escape the charge of determinism by maintaining that "we are, indeed, able to change and to influence forces inside and outside ourselves and to control, at least to some extent, the conditions which play upon us" (Ibid., p. 233) but then proceeds to state that reason and conscience the very forces which, according to Fromm, move the will to act against unfavorable circumstances are inseparably linked with our character.

Finally, it should not be thought that in granting man intelligence and freedom Fromm posits a spiritual nature. Man is the outcome of a complicated biological evolution; in short he is a much-refined animal. God exists for Fromm merely as "a symbol of man's own powers which he tries to realize in his life... (Id., Psychoanalysis and Religion, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952, p. 37).

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imagination seem to be the outstanding aspects of Fromm's tentative description of human nature. These, all men seem to have in common and though these tendencies, drives, and powers can to some degree or other be moulded for better or worse, nevertheless as Fromm puts it "...something, say X, is reacting to environmental influences in ascertainable ways that follow from its properties."⁶¹

On this tentative concept of human nature then, Fromm builds his science of ethics. It is an objective science whose principles are rooted in human nature and hence accessible to human reason though subject to change on the basis of new findings or new situations. Yet in searching Fromm's writings for specific ethical principles the reader finds himself at a stale-mate. Fromm does not actually elaborate moral principles. Rather, he maintains that man is the center and purpose of his life, and finds the ideal of moral behaviour in the integrated personality.

I shall attempt to show that the character structure of the mature and integrated personality, the productive character constitutes the source and the basis of virtue and that vice, in the last analysis, is indifference to one's own self and self-mutilation.⁶²

61.

Id., Man For Himself, p. 22.

62.

ibid., p. 7.

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Fromm's concept of the "productive character" has been mentioned in the preceding pages.⁶³ It is in fact an expansion of his notion of spontaneity, and would serve no useful purpose at this point since it does not explicitly contain principles of ethics. Fromm merely indicates that the individual who has not been crippled by an extremely unfavorable environment will reflect the productive orientation. Productiveness is "Man's realization of the potentialities characteristic of him, the use of his power".⁶⁴ Hence it is clear that the productiveness of one individual will vary in degree to that of another, depending upon the powers of each, the person's "innate vitality". Yet the basic aspects of the productive orientation, "productive love and thinking" will be present in all productive individuals. But to the question: What are the specific ethical principles which, when applied, allow an individual human act to be judged moral or immoral, there is no detailed answer in Fromm's writings. But Fromm is quite definitive about the mutability of the principles of humanistic ethics. Ethical propositions are subject to revision "like all scientific statements". Furthermore certain situations are "inherently insoluble"⁶⁵ and do not permit any choice which can be considered "the right one".

63.

See p. 36.

64.

ERICH FROMM, Man For Himself, p. 87.

65.

Ibid., p. 239

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Ethics and Psychoanalysis - As has already been stated, Fromm maintains that Ethics must play a most significant role in psychoanalysis.

The value judgements we make determine our action, and upon their validity rests our mental health and happiness. To consider evaluations only as so many rationalizations of unconscious irrational desires - although they can be that too - narrows down and distorts our picture of the total personality. ... In many instances a neurotic symptom is the specific expression of moral conflict, and the success of the therapeutic effort depends on the understanding and solution of the person's moral problem.⁶⁶

Although the above quotation refers primarily to the fact that a moral problem must be recognized as such, it follows as a logical consequence that if invalid value judgements have caused, or contributed to mental illness, then it is the psychoanalyst's task to submit the patient to a moral re-education. Indeed this point was brought up before when it was said that Fromm holds that the analyst's view of what is desirable for man cannot be divorced from the goal of therapy. It is manifest that Fromm's position would lead him to re-educate his patient along principles of 'humanistic' ethics, whatever these may be. Furthermore, Fromm views the relationship between Ethics and psychoanalysis as an interactionary one. Ethics cannot be divorced from psychoanalysis and the findings of psychoanalysis can and should be used in the development of ethical theory. Fromm points to the fact that "psychoanalytic theory is the first modern psychological system

66.

Ibid., VIII.

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the subject matter of which is not isolated aspects of man but his
total personality".⁶⁷ This is a most important consideration since
"all the virtues and vices with which traditional ethics deals ...
lose their ambiguity only if they are understood in connection with
the character structure of the person of whom a virtue or vice is
predicated".⁶⁸

Fromm further points to the phenomenon of unconscious
motivation as a psychoanalytic concept which cannot be disregarded by
the ethicist. Judgements concerning human conduct cannot disregard
the unconscious in man. Hence "the understanding of unconscious
motivation opens up a new dimension for ethical inquiry".⁶⁹

⁶⁷.

Ibid., p. 31.

⁶⁸.

Ibid., p. 32.

⁶⁹.

Ibid., p. 53.

PART II

THE THEORIES

OF KAREN HORNEY

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND PART

The purpose of the preceeding section was to outline the more basic positions of Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm, as they concerned their view of human nature and the nature and causes of neurosis. However, since it is Horney's theories which represent the subject matter of this study, Sullivan and Fromm were introduced not for their own sake, but rather inasmuch as Horney was significantly and favorably influenced by their theory of interpersonal relations. Their views thus represent the roots of Horney's own position and it is often of interest and more often than not of consequence to trace such roots.

Since the stress in this study shall be on Horney's theories rather than on a comparative appraisal of the three, the pages that follow will include only a footnote commentary by way of maintaining a running comparison among basic tenets. By this means the reader may easily detect the points of similarity and of contrast among the three leading exponents of the school. It is to be hoped that the end-result of such a contrasting of basic views may be, in addition to clarifying Horney's theories, that of enriching the reader's appreciation of the school as a whole, a school which, it cannot be overstressed, is playing a most significant role in present-day psychoanalytic thought.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPT OF MAN

The writings of Karen Horney do not afford a wholly explicit and separate presentation of her view of man. Far rather there are numerous and often-repeated affirmations concerning the nature of man. Her position is in some instances supported by what may be loosely termed "proofs".

Karen Horney was, for several years, an orthodox Freudian. It is significant to this study to note that her departure from Freudian psychoanalytic theory was ultimately due to a growing difference in views concerning the basic driving forces in man. Her growing dissatisfaction with therapeutic results, while at first attributed by Horney to her lack of experience, was later credited to the doubtful grounds on which many of Freud's theories stood. Although her first questionings of Freud concerned feminine psychology, it was soon evident to Horney that this difference was merely a symbol of something much more fundamental. It appears that her secessionary activities were further aided by her leaving Germany and entering the United States. There, she maintains, she was free from the burden of taking psychoanalytical theories for granted and could proceed along the lines which she considered correct. Significant also, as will appear obvious in the course of this presentation, was the influence of Harry Stack Sullivan, whose theory of interpersonal relations left its unmistakable imprint on Horney, and that of the psychoanalyst and sociologist Erich Fromm. The end result of these factors was what Horney termed "a shift

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¹
of emphasis". Although the "shift" was at first primarily concerned with giving environmental factors a more prominent place among the causes of neurosis, it soon was elaborated into a view radically different from the one of Freud, on which clashed not only with Freud's view of neurosis, but with his very conception of man. In point of fact so radical was her digression that Horney herself later expressed it in terms of opposites.

The basic philosophy of Freud is a pessimistic one ... man is at bottom driven by elemental instincts of sex, greed, and cruelty. Freud himself has expressed the same idea in terms of men being like porcupines who are bound to hurt one another if close.

We, on the other hand, believe that man has potentialities for good and evil, and we see that he does develop into a good human being if he grows up under favorable conditions of warmth and respect for his individuality. ... Between these two there is no bridge.²

The basic difference in view between Horney and Freud, epitomised in this quotation, could not help but bear its obvious repercussions. Having denied the Freudian explanation of man, Horney had to follow her new road to its, as it appeared to her, logical termination. As shall be shown in the later chapters, Horney's view of man affected her concept of normality, the role which she assigned to the environment, and as might be expected her very conception of neurosis. It is thus of paramount importance to consider this view.

1.

KAREN HORNEY, "Culture and Neurosis", The American Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1936, p. 221.

2.

Id., "The Future of Psychoanalysis", (Contribution to Symposium), The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1947, p. 66.

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1. Nature of Man

"In his letter to the Romans, Paul says: Avenge not thyself, vengeance is mine, says the Lord, I will repay," We understand that God will repay and does repay indeed.³ Here is the only possible glimmer of light among the Theistic darkness of Karen Horney's works. There is no other remotely explicit comment of the psychoanalyst that imparts any further knowledge of her belief in the existence or creative activity of a spiritual First Cause. Sketchy and scanty as the evidence may be, it may be surmised, in part from the above statement and in part from its implications, that perhaps Horney did admit the existence of a Creator Who will repay us, at least here and now, for our deeds. Man, therefore, may not be an unexplainable existent. It is at the least conceivable that Horney visualized man as a created being, and, as shall be shown, Horney did allow for human responsibility within certain areas of activity.

Human nature can be looked upon, according to Horney, from three basic points of view. Man may be viewed as a higher animal, plagued by biologically determined and destructive primitive instincts. Such, according to Horney, would be the view of Freud. Man may also be viewed as a creature in whose nature there is something intrinsically "good" and something intrinsically "bad", sinful, or destructive.

3.

Id., "The Value of Vindictiveness", The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1948, p. 3.

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The latter, Horney maintained, is expressed traditionally by the Christian symbol of original sin. Finally, and this is Horney's position, man may be viewed as a being in whose nature there are constructive forces which tend to evolve naturally towards the actualization of his individual potentialities.

As an analyst Horney felt that she was in an excellent position to scrutinize human beings, and consequently human nature. Although many of her explicit statements concerning human nature are prefaced by such subjective openings as "we believe"⁴ and "my own belief"⁵ she does offer a certain amount of "evidence" to substantiate her convictions. Her view of man, which postulates the existence of "constructive forces moving us toward realization",⁶ is arrived at by presupposing its validity and then verifying it through therapy. Horney perceived, time and time again, that patients began psychoanalysis almost "bed-ridden" with destructive drives, only to emerge, from successful treatment, essentially constructive individuals. From this, she concluded that the destructiveness was promoted by distressing situations which most likely derived their origins from early childhood experiences. Conse-

4. Id., "The Future of Psychoanalysis", (Contribution to Symposium) The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1947, p. 66.

5. Id., Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945, p. 19.

6. Id., "Psychoanalysis and the Constructive Forces in Man", (Contribution to Symposium) The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1951, p. 54.

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quently, there was nothing destructive in human nature itself.

To elaborate upon what may be justly considered the kernel of Horney's optimistic view of human nature, it is necessary to return to her basic position. It will be recalled that Horney allowed for three basic ways of looking at man, and adhered to the third. Concerning the other two, she dismissed Freud's as pessimistic and unreal, and granted a certain correctness to the "Christian" position. That is, she admitted that in human nature may be found both "good" and "bad". But there is one palpable difference. The constructive and destructive forces do not originate from the same source. They appear to differ not only in kind but also in origin. In short, they are not both intrinsic to human nature.

In refuting the "Freudian" and "Christian" view of man, and by way of validating her own position, Karen Horney offered three kinds of evidence. The first kind is based upon observation of a child's behaviour. If the conditions for growth are favorable, the child will naturally tend to develop his potentialities. This he will do since, like every other form of life, he has an innate tendency toward growth. Horney affirmed that her observations are supported by educators and anthropologists. If unfavorable conditions prevail, however, the child's development will not proceed according to nature's plan. Reactions of hostility or overdependency may come to the surface. If, in sufficient time to counteract the harm done, there is a favorable change in the human environment, the child may again take the path

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toward healthy growth. But if the unpleasant conditions continue to exert their unfortunate influence, a process labelled "neurotic" may set in.

What a neurosis is will be outlined in the third chapter. But it must be stressed here that this disturbance brings about "all kinds of unconstructive or destructive attitudes."⁷ The factors which bring about a neurosis are many but, Horney argues,

You could not call the result of this process his essential nature, any more than you would do so with a tree. If a tree, because of storms, too little sun or too poor soil, becomes⁸ warped and crooked you would not call this its essential nature.

The conclusion that Horney drew from this argument seems to be that inasmuch as the destructiveness of neurotics is determined by the unfavorable environment, destructiveness or "badness" or "sinfulness" as such (Horney uses the terms interchangeably) does not constitute something essential to human nature, but rather is the result of an unfavorable environment.

The second kind of evidence is supplied by clinical experience. In the analytical situation, the analyst encounters persons who are arrogant or vindictive or unduly compliant. He also perceives, if he is of Horney's school, that the patient has little or nothing to say about these unfavorable traits. He is driven to these attitudes by forces

⁷. Id., "Human Nature Can Change", The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 68.

⁸. Ibid., p. 68.

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which are essentially unconscious. In his particular psychological situation he cannot escape them. The forces are compulsive. Horney compares them to diabolical possession. But although a person may be arrogant or vindictive or unduly compliant he remains so only as long as the effects of his unfavorable environment make him view reality in such a way, that the maintenance of these essentially self-destructive crutches continues to remain necessary for his neurotic equilibrium. The conclusion again seems to be that destructive drives directed toward oneself or toward others, are the result of a crushing life situation rather than reflections of a wholly or partially destructive human nature.

Finally Horney spoke of the changes which may be perceived during therapy.⁹ This last proof was alluded to when it was said that Horney had witnessed countless instances of patients who had begun analysis most destructively minded, and had emerged from treatment essentially constructive individuals. Through analysis the patient was able to experience the unreality and futility of his destructiveness. A radical change followed. Horney again concluded that destructive impulses are clearly manifestations of the neurotic disturbance. The fact that they are abandoned by the patient as he is restored to

9.

Whether this argument constitutes in fact a separate "proof" will be discussed in Chapter I, of the Third Part.

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himself indicates that destructiveness is not something essential to human nature, but rather is the result of an unfavorable life situation.

These arguments appear to have convinced Horney of the intrinsic worth and goodness of the individual. Throughout her works there are repeated and essentially similar statements that leave little doubt of her outlook on human nature. One or two of these assertions will illustrate the many:

Briefly, our belief is that the constructive possibilities stem from man's essential nature, from the core of his being, from what we call his real self. Conversely, we believe that man turns unconstructive or destructive only if he cannot fulfill himself - that it is an unfulfilled life which makes 10 him barren and destructive. This belief is not mere speculation...

and again:

But with such a belief in the autonomous striving toward self-realization, we do not need an inner straight jacket with which to shackle our spontaneity, nor the whip of inner dictates to drive us toward perfection. There is no doubt that such disciplinary methods can succeed in suppressing undesirable factors, but there is also no doubt that they are injurious to our growth.¹¹

There is little room left for speculation as to the meaning which Horney attaches to the expressions, "inner straight jacket" and "the whip of inner dictates". If the quotation is viewed in its context, it appears manifest that they are expressive of an unfavorable

10.

KAREN HORNEY, "Human Nature Can Change", The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 68.

11.

Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 15.

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evaluation of both Freudian and "Christian" man. Although Horney admitted an essential difference in the two positions, she also recognized an essential similarity in their methods of dealing with human nature. For Freudians the goal must be to overcome the "status naturae", by imposing upon it checks and controls. "Christians" must overcome not the "status naturae" as such but that part of it which is "bad, sinful or destructive". This will be done by insuring the success of the "good" part, utilizing such means as faith, reason, will or grace depending upon the particular religious or ethical views. The goals differ somewhat as do the methods of achieving them but both, Horney argued, aim at crushing at least in part, our real selves. To the extent that they succeed in doing this, they are in effect crushing man's nature.

The references to Horney, which have thus far appeared, would seem to present sufficient and convincing evidence of her basic position toward human nature. But a perusal of Patrick Mullahy's review of psychoanalytic theories, reveals a statement which, at first glance, appears most puzzling. According to Mullahy, Karen Horney "implies that she does not believe in a human nature common to all men or at least suggests that neuroses do not represent problems common to all men".¹² This statement, however, does not long remain paradoxical

12.

PATRICK MULLAHY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 15.

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if one considers that Horney's meaning is not always clear. The confusion is due, in part, to what sometimes amounts to an equivocal use of language. Several of Horney's more important statements are open to various interpretations. It is often necessary to read several chapters of a work before one can be assured of her meaning and it is not uncommon that texts have to be compared and her position deduced. Such would appear to be this instance. It is true that Horney "suggests that neuroses do not represent problems common to all men", and one might well assume that such a position contains an implicit denial of the existence of a universal human nature. But a more careful reading reveals that Horney's suggestions sprang not from her view of human nature but, as shall be shown, from her concept of normality. "Human Nature Can Change", the title of one of her more important articles, represents a striking instance of confusing terminology. This paper, already referred to, reflected a desire on Horney's part to establish a view of human nature which was at once optimistic and universal. In the light of such an aim, it is bewildering that she should select a title clearly suggestive of a relativistic view. Horney did not actually intend to imply that man's nature is mutable. Rather she felt that man can become destructive or constructive depending on his surroundings. But clearly such changes represent developmental possibilities rather than changes in human nature.

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Horney's basic view of man thus begins to emerge. It has been shown that Horneyan man appears to be a created and at least partially responsible agent. He is an intrinsically constructive being possessing potentialities for both "good" and "evil". The constructive tendencies stem from man's "essential nature", from the "core of his being", from his "real self". The destructive tendencies stem from a crushing life situation.¹³ Such a position reveals an intrinsically optimistic view of man, but also leaves itself open to further questions. Throughout her writings Karen Horney continually asserted the positive attributes of human nature. But what is human nature? What is the significance of "the real self, man's essential nature, the core of his being"? What is to be understood by the "constructive" and "destructive" potentialities of man? What constitute "conditions of warmth and respect

 13.

Although neither Sullivan nor Fromm share Horney's belief in the existence of a spiritual First Cause, and although Sullivan denied the existence of free will while Fromm admits it, though on somewhat nebulous grounds, nevertheless it is clear that the three members of the school are in basic agreement with regard to the theory of interpersonal relations. In the final analysis man is an essentially constructive being, (for Horney perhaps created, while for Sullivan and Fromm a wholly material entity and the product of an inexplicable process or biological evolution), to be moulded for better or for worse by the environment.

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for his individuality"? What is a "good human being"? Is "destructiveness" found only in neurotics? If the conditions for growth are favorable will man inevitably evolve into a "constructive" individual? If so, in what sense is man a responsible agent? Does Horney offer a moral norm to which man is responsible?

Horney's writings do not reveal an explicit definition of human nature. The best that can be suggested is that human nature designates that which is proper to man as man. This suggestion springs from Horney's universalization of the "constructiveness" of the individual. It is not this man or that man who is "constructive". Man as such, is inherently "constructive". "Constructiveness", therefore, expresses something common to all men, and since what is common springs from a common source it would appear that there is such a thing as a distinctively human nature. Of this nature, responsibility or will, by implication rationality, (although Horney did not concern herself with the spiritual aspect of either human cognition or volition) and constructiveness may be predicated. Since Horney implied that "constructiveness", responsibility and rationality are proper to man as man, it is difficult to understand how Horney could conceive of a man who did not, at least potentially if not operationally, possess these attributes. Therefore these attributes characterize something essential to man as man. But to scrutinize Horney's concept of human nature for further philosophical implications, should be to risk seeing what is not there.

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However, the terms "real self, man's essential nature, and the core of his being" do allow elaboration. Not all of these terms are defined by Horney. In point of fact, they are used interchangeably in her writings. She does offer a definition of the "real self". It is "that central inner force, common to all human beings and yet unique in each, which is the deep source of growth".¹⁴ "Real Self" is also defined as the "original force toward individual growth and fulfillment, with which we may again achieve full identification when freed of the crippling shackles of neurosis".¹⁵ "Growth" refers to "free" healthy development in accordance with the potentialities of one's generic and individual nature".¹⁶ It would seem, then, that the uniqueness of the "central inner force" stems from man's individual nature. (What individuates the generic nature will be discussed in the third chapter when the meaning of the term "growth" is clarified).

There is yet to consider the significance which Horney attached to the terms "constructive" and "destructive". These are closely connected with Horney's understanding of "free, healthy development" and as might be expected the latter cannot be separated from "conditions of warmth and respect for his individuality". For a clearer understand-

14.

KAREN HORNEY, Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 17.

15.

Ibid., p. 158.

16.

Ibid., p. 17.

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ing of these catch-phrases and of such other elements as the significance of a "good human being", and the meaning and extension of "responsibility", Horney's concept of normality and her view of the role played by the environment, can hardly be ignored. Since these two factors form the more proximate background of Horney's theory of neurosis, they are best discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

"CULTURE AND NEUROSIS"

The gulf between Horney and Freud did not only involve a difference in the philosophical view of man. It is interesting to note that Karen Horney drew a very real distinction between her concept of human nature and her view of normality. Such a distinction should be implicit in any philosophical approach to man, since it fundamentally springs from the distinction between a being and its operations. Action follows being but action is not the being, since actions come and go but the being remains. But Horney's distinction goes much further. It is not merely a difference between human nature and human nature in act. /

In seeking the negative factor from which Horney's view of normality partially sprang Freud cannot be by-passed. Horney considered the master of Vienna to be essentially a biological determinist. For her, such a position, faulty in itself, was all the more an unhappy one since she regarded Freud's determinism as directed toward evil.

Horney objected to both the determinism and its direction. This two-fold grievance brought its inevitable implications into Horney's concept of normality. For if man was not what Freud made him to be, neither could "normal" man be the end-product or the sublimation of biologically determined destructive instincts. Another view of normality, one which did not require man to overcome the basic evil in his nature was desired. In short, a more optimistic approach seemed essential.

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The dichotomy between Freud and his pupil brought even more significant repercussions. Having denied the validity of Freud's "pessimistic" view of human nature, and yet all too cognizant of the "destructive" tendencies of neurotics, it fell to Horney to seek an explanation. If man is not inherently "destructive", "bad", or "sinful", then something outside of man must be the cause. This something was alluded to when Horney's proofs of the constructiveness of human nature were advanced. "Destructiveness" was ultimately due to a crushing life situation. Thus the role of the environment will be seen to assume almost monumental proportions.

Finally, and as shall be shown in the next chapter, Horney's convictions as they concerned these fundamental points, brought her to a fresh view of neurosis.

1. Concept of Normality

In contrast to Horney's crusading insistence on the constructiveness and universality of human nature, her view of normality is surprisingly restrictive. The criteria which she advanced does not flow from the nature of man. Quite to the contrary, it is imposed upon him by his human environment.

The only proofs which she submitted in defense of this position are an appeal to common knowledge since, "to some extent every educated person knows that there are variations in what is regarded as normal",¹

1.

KARLEN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937, p. 16.

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and the seemingly indisputable findings of anthropologists. It appears that Horney had more than a passing interest in this science. Perhaps her concern was in part motivated by "... acquaintance with a culture which in many ways is different from the European ...² Horney was referring to the United States. It is a truism that many of the customs, and even ideals of the United States are unacceptable, or at least were unacceptable to Europeans. This obvious dichotomy may have moved Horney to seek more vivid differences in cultures. Anthropology offered a most fertile field. Her repeated references to such significant figures as Ruth Benedict, Edward Sapir, Margaret Mead, and Peter Frauchen, indicate close observation of anthropological findings. Horney learned, for instance, that the Jicarilla Apache culture takes a dim view of even the most innocent reference to a deceased relative while the people in the United States do not generally consider this an offensive practice. Eskimos do not feel that murderers should be made to pay for their crimes. Reparation may be made by providing a substitute for the deceased. In fact, in some cultures a mother's grief, following the murder of her son, may be lessened if the murderer allows himself to be adopted. (Apparently it escaped Horney that these, in themselves, may be forms of punishment).

2.

Id., New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1939, pp. 12-13.

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The diversity of customs in these cultures led Horney to conclude that although "... every culture clings to the belief that its own feelings and drives are the one normal expression of 'human nature'³", the belief is nonetheless unfounded. Furthermore,

The conception of what is normal varies not only with the culture but also within the same culture, in the course of time. ... The conception of normality varies also within different classes of society.⁴

These findings appear to have provided Horney with sufficient evidence to convince her of the futility of attempting to establish any absolute norm of normality. However, she did explicitly impart how one arrives at a conception of normality:

Our conception of normality is arrived at by the approval of certain standards of behaviour and feeling, within a certain group which imposes these standards upon its members. But the standards vary with culture, period, class and sex.⁵

3. Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, pp. 15-17.
 4. Ibid., p. 15.
 5. Ibid., p. 18.

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Therefore though there is no universally normal man, that man is considered "normal" who abides by the sanctions of the particular culture in which he happens to exist. ⁶ It is clear that in stating her position, Horney had a rich opportunity to distinguish between "our conception of normality" and normality as such. But the distinction is not made since Horney obviously regarded it as fruitless. What is left then at the least in theory is a relativistic view. On this she is explicit. This relativism is also reflected in Horney's theory of neurosis. Since, as shall be shown, a neurosis implies a deviation from the "normal" behaviour patterns, it is senseless to speak of neurotic trends that hold for all mankind. There are as many neuroses as there are concepts of normality.

In the light of these considerations it is clear why Horney suggested that "neuroses do not represent problems common to all men". ⁷

6.

It should be noted in passing that Fromm does not sympathize with this relativistic view of normality. It will be remembered that in his writings he distinguished between mere conventionality and "the optimum of growth and happiness of the individual." The latter criterion of normality appears to spring from an analysis of human nature. Sullivan, on the other hand, appears to have been more of a cultural relativist and this despite the basic needs and drives of all human beings as expounded in his stages of personality development, and in spite of such universally applicable statements as "... the social order is in a sense itself greatly disturbed". (See p. 30).

7.

PATRICK MOLLANEY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, New York Grove Press, 1955, p. 213.

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But this is not necessarily to imply that there is no such thing as a universal human nature.

The concept of normality then, according to Horney, is man-made and differs with the culture. Since Horney's interest was specifically directed to "the neurotic personality of our time" in the United States or places with an essentially similar culture, a distinction must be drawn between how one arrives at a concept of normality and the concept of the "normal" man existing in the United States. This last concept is most nebulous in Horney's works. There is general agreement, among commentators of Horney, that she did not specifically set out to establish such a norm. Her works do not reflect an explicit position. She merely asserts, and agrees with, the method which societies use to establish a concept of normality.

Horney's interest, throughout her works, was the neurotic personality. Her concern inevitably demanded a definition of neurosis. Furthermore, there was the obvious problem of recognizing the neurotic. One of the more important criteria which Horney advanced was "deviation from the normal".⁸ But as to what the "normal" in the United States was, Horney had little to say. Since these deviations are scrutinized in great detail by Horney, it may be supposed that their opposites constitute normality. Ruth Monroe, in her excellent exposition of Horney's theories, sounds this very note:

8.

KAREN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 21.

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... her concept of the normal - actually the ideal - personality is not explicitly and systematically stated but appears as the rich multi-form obverse of the neurotic trends which she describes acutely.⁹

To discover, then, what Horney understood to be "normal", in the United States, one needs to turn the coin. The other side of it, however, does not reveal the "normal" man. It is devoid of any markings. Its true face must be supplied by studying the neurotic trends and considering either their opposites or their less exaggerated or one-sided expressions. For many neurotic characteristics are neurotic, not in themselves, but in their intensifications.

Horney's view of the "normal" man in the United States will not be presented in this study. Rather the emphasis will be on the neurotic. But it may be mentioned in passing that if an attempt to extricate her position were made, it would be doomed from the start to at least partial failure. Horney's concept of the "normal" man can only be derived through an examination of the "rich multi-form obverse of the neurotic trends". The best that might be expected then, would be an approximation. Before considering Horney's view of neurosis however, the role of the environment, as conceived by Horney, must be clarified.

9.

RUTH L. MONROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, New York, The Dryden Press, 1955, p. 348.

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2. Human Nature and Social Environment

Horneyan man has been described as a responsible creature possessing constructive inner forces which spur him toward self-realization. Such would be human nature viewed in the abstract. But Karen Horney was a psychoanalyst. As such she could hardly ignore the dynamic aspect of man's nature. The most superficial observation could not fail to reveal that man must come in contact with, and to some degree be affected by, his surroundings. Thus any psychoanalyst cannot help but take into account the fact of an environment and must of consequence consider it a factor of greater or lesser importance in explaining a given individual.

The following extracts, from a brief criticism and appreciation of Horney, by Patrick Mullaney, clearly point to the environmental abyss existing between Horney and Freud:

Karen Horney was among the first psychoanalysts in this country to abandon the artificial and cumbersome libido theory; she thereby paved the way for an understanding of people primarily in terms of the social environment and the problems which it generates. ... Culture is no longer conceived as playing a mechanical role by frustrating libidinal or other drives but as providing the framework within which personality develops and operates.¹⁰

10.

PATRICK MULLANEY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, p. 328.

"CULTURE AND NEUROSIS"

The above quotation provides an important insight into the significant role which Horney ascribed to the environment. However, and as shall be shown, culture or environment (the two terms seem to have had the same meaning for Horney) does not supply merely a framework within which man's personality grows. It would be more in keeping with Horney's writings to suggest that environment provides the mould. More precisely, the environment will be seen to provide two basic moulds, the healthy and the unhealthy. Whether man emerges "healthy" or neurotic, will depend upon which of the two moulds he is cast into. But would not such a deterministic approach to the role of the environment render human nature little more than a static factor; something acted upon by rather than interacting with the environment?

If some of Horney's more significant statements are brought to light, it would seem not. For Horney understood that "God will repay¹¹ and does repay indeed". Furthermore, in speaking of the task of the patient in psychoanalytic therapy, she maintained that the patient must strive "toward a clearer perception of his direction, with the¹² assumption of responsibility for himself and his decisions".

11.

KAREN HORNEY, "The Value of Vindictiveness", in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1948, p. 3.

12.

Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 364.

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Finally, Horney spoke of a criterion for self-realization. The criterion posits the question: "Is a particular attitude or drive inductive or obstructive to my human growth?"¹³ These assertions, taken at face value, would hardly suggest that human nature is something static, a potentially fertile tabula rasa to be moulded for better or for worse by the environment. But these assertions cannot be evaluated out of context. They must be incorporated with, and examined in the light of, Horney's view of the role of the environment.

It will be recalled that Horney ardently denied Freud's "pessimistic" view of human nature. Nevertheless she was left with the problem of explaining the origin of neurotic "destructiveness". If man's nature is not inherently "destructive, bad, or sinful", there must be some other explanation, something, in short, which is extrinsic to man. And is not what is outside of man his environment? Man is inherently constructive. If he becomes destructive, it must be due to the crushing influence of his surroundings.

Although Horney's interest was the neurotic personality, she could not long evade, even had she so wished, the basic question which every analyst must answer, or act as though he had answered it. The question is somewhat obvious and its answer is a "sine qua non" to psychoanalytic therapy. The question is: what is man?

13.

Ibid., p. 15.

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It was shown, in the last chapter, that Horney did not seek to escape this issue. From the disappearance of destructive tendencies in neurotics through psychoanalytic therapy, she argued the constructiveness of human nature as such. Environment then, ultimately decides whether a man shall be "constructive" or "destructive", (It is true that Horney implies that there are elements of "destructiveness" even in the "healthy" individual, but in him the "destructiveness" is neither pervasive nor compulsive. The distinction will receive lengthier attention in the third chapter).

Horney's writings inevitably point to a deterministic role of the environment. She insisted, in the face of Freud's biological determinism, that man can and does develop into a "good" human being if the conditions for growth are favorable. She asserted that "it is an unfulfilled life which makes man barren and destructive",¹⁴ but this "unfulfillment" again seems to be due to unhappy surroundings. The "central inner force" which all human beings possess, is the wellspring of "growth". But "growth" is "free, healthy development". If the

14.

Id., "Human Nature Can Change", The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 68

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environmental conditions are crushingly unfavorable, would Horney's position allow her to speak of "free, healthy development"?¹⁵

Although Horney's view of the role played by the environment may be classified as deterministic, the term should be applied with qualifications. The environment ultimately decides whether an individual will be "healthy" or "neurotic". So far as these two possibilities are concerned, Horney left little if any room to the exercise of freedom. If one's surroundings are "healthy", the "real self" will be able to act out its role and realize the "constructive" tendencies inherent in human nature. If, on the other hand, the environment is of an unfavorable, more, of a crushing character, the individual will become neurotic. He will lose his "real self" and fall prey to the "crippling shackles of neurosis". And it is of no purpose to ask Horney why individuals who are subject to environments which are essentially similar in their crippling nature, do not both become neurotic. The answer is ready-made:

15.

It will be noted once again that, on this issue, Sullivan and Fromm are in basic agreement with Horney. Sullivan denies free will and states that the self may be said to be made up of reflected appraisals, while Fromm admits the existence of will but regards it as a manifestation of character the latter resulting from the combined effect of heredity and environment and ultimately determining our decisions. It is quite understandable why Horney, Sullivan and Fromm should see eye to eye on the question of environment since it lies at the very root of the theory of interpersonal relations.

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The question remains why certain persons become neurotic while others, living under similar conditions, are able to cope with the existing difficulties. ... Only the general psychic atmosphere is the same. ... In detail, however, the experiences of one child may be entirely different from those of another. ... The persons who succumb to a neurosis are those who have been more severely hit by the existing difficulties, particularly in their childhood.¹⁶

The above quotation verifies the coercive nature of the environment. Man falls, despite himself, into the category of "healthy" or "neurotic", "constructive" or "destructive". Taken in this sense, Horney's position is clearly deterministic. It is not man that becomes "healthy" or "neurotic". He is made "healthy" or "neurotic". Human nature then, so far as this question is concerned, must remain silent. As commentators have pointed out, it has the value of a constant,

... les causes déterminantes de la névrose doivent être recherchées dans les facteurs culturels du milieu, d'une époque. Elle estime enfin que la seule nature humaine, laissée à elle-même, en chaque individu, ne causerait pas de problèmes: elle aurait valeur d'une constante.¹⁷

But having fallen into one of the two categories, that is, healthy or neurotic, can then human nature exercise any degree of self-direction? It is at this point that Horney's statements, indicative of her belief in the responsibility of the individual, should be examined.

16.

KAREN HORNEY, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, p. 177-178.

17.

HENRI GRATTON, O.M.I., Psychanalyses D'hier et D'aujourd'hui, Paris, Cerf, 1955, p. 194.

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The patient must strive "toward a clearer perception of his direction, with the assumption of responsibility for himself and his decisions". The neurotic, then, lacks both a clear sense of direction and the ability to assume responsibility. Horney asserted this in no uncertain terms: "Neurotic trends impair self-determination because a person is then driven instead of being himself the driver".¹⁸ But although Horney used the word "impaired", her expositions of the neurotic structure clearly leave the reader with the impression that the neurotic has very little if any freedom at his disposal.¹⁹ At least in theory then, to the degree that the individual has lost his "real self", since for Horney that is precisely what a neurosis is, he cannot really choose and consequently cannot be considered "responsible". But then surely the "healthy individual must be "responsible" for his "real self" is not hampered. His human nature is free to evolve, and freedom implies responsibility. Therefore the "healthy" individual and, in theory, that part of the neurotic which is not "driven", are "responsible", and in this sense, the role of human nature is not that of a constant but rather that of an active agent.

18.

KAREN HORNEY, Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945, p. 100.

19.

This particular aspect will be treated in Chapter 4 of this part, and will receive critical attention in the last part of the thesis, when discussing neurosis and human acts.

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In this sense, human nature is not determined. But to whom or to what is man responsible?

If Horney's concept of normality, that is, if Horney's criterion of normality, as elaborated in the last section, is to be followed to its logical conclusion, it would appear that man is responsible to those "standards of behaviour and feeling" which are imposed upon him by his surroundings. These standards, however, vary even within the society. Therefore it seems that there is a possibility of choice. God then "will repay and does repay indeed", according to the responses that the individual makes to the lights that are presented to him. The same seems to hold true for Horney's criterion for self-realization. The individual is to ask himself whether a particular attitude or drive will help or hinder his human "growth". But again he can only answer with the norms that his environment supplies. His responsibility rests in his abiding to these norms.

20.

Here again we see that Fromm and Horney do not see eye to eye, at least in theory. For Fromm man is responsible to himself and hence to his human nature. Sullivan despite his stages of personality development, would tend to lean more in Horney's direction.

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To sum up,orney's position as it concerned the role of the environment predicates a social determinism with regard to the "healthy" or "neurotic" development of the individual, but allows human nature, at least in theory, an active role within these two categories. This active role implies responsibility, the norm being dictated by the environment.

There is now to consider, in greater detail, the specific environmental factors leading to a neurosis and their end-result, namely the neurotic.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE AND GENESIS OF NEUROSIS

Whatever the starting point and however tortuous the road, we must finally arrive at a disturbance of personality as the source of psychic illness. ... In modern terms, every neurosis, no matter what the symptomatic picture, is a character neurosis.¹ Hence our endeavour in theory and therapy must be directed toward a better understanding of the neurotic character structure.

This statement lays the groundwork for a clear understanding of the essential elements of Horney's theory of neurosis. A neurosis is above all a disturbance of the personality. Symptoms such as "phobias, depressions, functional physical disorders", may or may not be present. Inhibitions may be so well disguised as to escape the eye of even the most astute observer. At best these are the manifestations of a deeply personal disturbance. Neurosis, taken in its true sense, must be distinguished from what Horney termed a "situation neurosis" in which an "abnormal" reaction to a situation may exist without, however, affecting the whole personality. In a true neurosis "the main disturbance lies in the deformation of the character".² Indeed Horney's definition is clearly indicative of this position, as is her criteria for discovering the neurotic, and her explanation of the

1.

KAREN HORNEY, Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.L. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945, p. 12.

2.

Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, W.L. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937, p. 30.

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genesis of neurosis. A sense of order would seem to demand that a presentation of Horney's view of the neurotic should begin with her definition of neurosis. But other than observing a sense of the fitness of things, this approach would be of no practical value. Horney's "definition" of neurosis when disengaged from her characteristics of the neurotic, affords but a superficial insight into the meaning of this disturbance.

1. Characteristics of the Neurotic

The first criterion which Horney advanced was already alluded to in the first section of the last chapter. It amounts to the fact that a neurotic's behaviour deviates from the behaviour considered "normal" in his environment.³ But this criterion does not suffice for an accurate segregation of the neurotic from the "healthy" individual. Observation of the manifest picture, (depressions, functional physical disorders, phobias, inhibitions, etc.) has, as already stated, no conclusive value since these characteristics may be either absent or too well disguised. Horney, however, proceeded to narrow the possibilities by introducing two further characteristics to be found in all neuroses. Neurotics, apart from their deviations from the general pattern of behaviour exhibit, to surface observation, "a certain rigidity in reaction and a discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments."⁴

3. Ibid., p. 21.

4. Ibid., p. 22.

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By "rigidity" in reaction" Horney seems to have meant, an inability on the part of the neurotic to respond accordingly, to the situations which he encounters from day to day.

The normal person, for instance, is suspicious when he senses or sees reasons for being so; a neurotic person may be suspicious, regardless of the situation. ... A normal person will be spiteful if he feels an unwarranted imposition; a neurotic may react with spite to any situation...⁵

But again it must be stressed that this lack of flexibility symbolizes a neurotic only if it is not in keeping with the cultural norm, for "a rigid suspicion of anything new or strange is a normal pattern among a large proportion of peasants in Western civilization..."⁶

By "a discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments" Horney meant, the result of a feeling which the neurotic invariably experiences, namely the feeling that he is his own stumbling block, his own barrier to self-actualization. Because of this deterring element in his personality he cannot be "productive", and this even "in spite of gifts and favorable external possibilities for their development".⁷ By "productive" Horney did not intend wealth, position or social prestige, for many of her patients possessed all of these and yet were in need of analysis. Rather Horney referred to that elusive

5. Ibid., p. 22.

6. Ibid., p. 23.

7. Ibid., p. 23.

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aspect which the "normal" person possesses, namely the ability to "grow". But as shall be shown, the understanding of "growth" also varies with the culture.

It must be noted that these attitudes clearly imply a loss of freedom on the part of the neurotic; freedom to be flexible in the presence of different situations and freedom to achieve what his potentialities expect of him. It is also apparent now, why the deviations of the neurotic may be labelled "neurotic". They do not spring from choice. Rather the rigidity and the sense of stagnation of the neurotic render the manifestations compulsive. In short, they arise from the neurotic structure.

In addition to these, Horney furnished another "essential characteristic" of neuroses:

The presence of conflicting tendencies, ... for which he automatically tries to reach compromise solutions. ... These solutions are less satisfactory than those of the average individual and are achieved at great expense to the whole personality".⁸

The neurotic, it appears, is literally driven in different, often opposite directions, at the same time. His need for equilibrium demands solutions, but he is, for all practical considerations, driven also to these. And the "solutions" as will become apparent when considering the neurotic structure, more often than not precipitate him into greater conflicts. Horney again gives the impression that the neurotic is a person who has lost freedom.

8.

Ibid., p. 28.

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These last three characteristics are to be found in all neuroses. But it is not explicitly stated, by Horney, whether this "all" is to be taken as having a universal extension. Certainly Horney could not draw a universal conclusion based on personal observations of neuroses in all cultures. If she believed that all neurotics everywhere exhibit these characteristics, the conclusion must have been prompted by her view of the nature of man. The evidence, in favor of this supposition, seems very strong. If "rigidity" ... , is indicative of a neurosis only when⁹ it deviates from the cultural patterns", then it may be supposed that it is possible for all to acquire an inflexible attitude, one not in keeping with the established patterns. Again, since by "productivity" Horney understood, the capacity to "grow", then it seems that any and all may fail to actualize this capacity, since the source of "growth" is the "real self". Finally it is obvious that a conflict situation may arise in any culture. If the individual is rigid and unproductive, his understanding of the conflict may be perverted and his response to it will suffer accordingly. In fact the very rigidity will provoke conflicts.

These characteristics then, appear to be applicable to man as man. If the environment is sufficiently crushing, a neurosis results.

9.

Ibid., p. 23.

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The disturbance is characterized by these ear-marks, though the ways in which they find expression vary with the culture. This conclusion seems all the more warranted in view of Horney's first "definition" of neurosis and the qualification which she placed upon it.

2. Definition of Neurosis

These are, apparently, two definitions. This necessity sprang from the fact that the passing of time saw certain significant elaborations in Horney's theories which demanded a re-formulation of the definition. However, Horney's writings do not reflect two explicit definitions although she stated in her last work that "the definition of neurosis too had changed".¹⁰ It must be assumed that Horney referred to what she herself, in an earlier work, termed a "description",¹¹ since "we are not yet able to give a well rounded definition"..¹¹ The description appeared in her first book. There she referred to neurosis as,

... a psychic disturbance brought about by fears and defenses against these fears, and by attempts to find compromise solutions for conflicting tendencies. For practical reasons it is advisable to call this disturbance a neurosis only if it deviates from the pattern common to the particular culture.¹²

This description brings into clear relief the relativism implicit in Horney's theory of neurosis. It is obviously motivated by

10. Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 368.

11. Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 28.

12. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

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Horney's concept of normality. At this early stage of her career Horney saw neurosis as a conflict between the individual and the environment brought about by a life situation which stifled the inner freedom of the individual. In short, the conflict was primarily interpersonal. Further observation of the neurotic character, coupled with more thoughtful deductions, brought Horney to a conclusion which had been implicit in her earlier description, and which, without emphasizing, she had had to include in her discussions of the neurotic character. The conflicts really involved not only the relationship of the individual toward others, but also of the individual toward himself. This explicitly new position received generous attention in Horney's last book. There she defined neurosis as "a disturbance in one's relation to self and others"¹³. But even this definition, other than implying a conflict involving one's self as well as others is restricted unless seen in conjunction with the causes effective in producing a neurosis.

3. Genesis of Neurosis

The causes, as has been shown, must be sought in the environment. In the final analysis, it is the surroundings that make a potentially "constructive" individual "destructive", or in short, neurotic. But to say that environment causes neurosis is to give a correct but all too general presentation of Horney's position.

13.

Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 368.

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The environmental factors may be loosely grouped under two categories, the patterns of the culture and the interpersonal relations. The latter are those with which the individual comes into more intimate contact. The cultural patterns influence the interpersonal relations. In point of fact it was Horney's conviction that the cultural factors set the pattern of the interpersonal relations.

It is an individual fate, for example, to have a domineering or a "self-sacrificing" mother, but it is also under definite cultural conditions that we find domineering or self-sacrificing mothers, and it is also because of these existing conditions¹⁴ that such an experience will have an influence on later life.

For purposes of simplification and accuracy, it will be of use to pursue Horney's method and treat the cultural and interpersonal causes as two logically distinct categories, bearing in mind that in the real order they are far from distinct. Again it must be stressed that Horney's interest was "the neurotic personality of our time" in the United States or places with an essentially similar culture. Therefore, though the discussions of the characteristics of the neurotic and of the "definition" of neurosis bore a universal significance, the remaining sections are subject to restrictions of both time and place as designated above.

¹⁴.

Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, VIII.

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Horney's position, as it concerned the deterministic role of the culture, is so clearly expressed in her writings that it would be the more expedient alternative to reproduce it in full:

The fact that in general the majority of the individuals in a culture have to face the same problems suggests the conclusion that these problems have been created by the specific life conditions existing in that culture. That they do not represent problems common to "human nature" seems to be warranted by the fact that the motivating forces and conflicts in other cultures are different from ours.

Hence in speaking of a neurotic personality of our time, I not only mean that there are neurotic persons having essential peculiarities in common, but also that these basic similarities are essentially produced by the difficulties existing in our time and culture.¹⁵

Horney consistently maintained that it was the environment that ultimately caused a neurosis. So far as the patterns of the culture are concerned, the difference between the environment of the "healthy" person and that of the neurotic is negligible, if indeed, even existent. The cultural environment is essentially the same for all who live within the culture. Since the problems generated by the culture differ with the culture, Horney felt that they are not representative of problems common to human nature. Furthermore, since not all individuals in a culture become neurotic, the cause of neurosis must lie in something deeper than the mere cultural patterns. The latter merely lay the ground-work. The causes will be seen to lie in

15.

Ibid., p. 34.

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the interpersonal relations, provided they are of an intensely unfavorable nature. But the pattern of these relations depends greatly on the cultural patterns, as do the responses which the neurotic-to-be makes to these unfavorable relations. Therefore Horney concluded that neurotics in any one culture, barring superficial differences, exhibit essentially similar peculiarities, peculiarities fostered by the culture itself. There is then to consider those cultural difficulties in the United States which, if encountered in union with intensely unfavorable interpersonal relations, will precipitate a neurosis:

Horney considered our present society to revolve around the principle of competition. All must compete, be they "healthy" or neurotic. This element is not proper only to occupational groups. The principle of competition pervades the entire life of the individual. It exists in the business sphere, but in the social sphere as well. It even pervades the domestic sphere, the family. "The child is inoculated with this germ at the very beginning".¹⁶ Furthermore it is not merely a matter of competition. Certain off-shoots cannot fail to develop in the psychological domain. The most vivid psychic consequences are, an over-all feeling of hostility toward others coupled with a fear of retaliation for any injuries inflicted or believed to be inflicted in the competitive struggles. (It may be opportune at this point to

16.

Ibid., p. 285.

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answer one of the questions which were put to Horney in the first chapter.

Is "destructiveness" found only in neurotics?

The "destructiveness" of neurotics is peculiar to them. But there is yet another type. For "in the competitive struggles in our culture it is often expedient to try to damage a competitor in order to enhance one's own position or glory or to keep down a potential rival".¹⁷ Such calculated moves toward self-advancement cannot fail to include some elements of destructiveness, although the "healthy" individual remains nonetheless essentially "constructive". (Horney's meaning of "destructiveness", to the extent that it can be understood, will be presented in the coming section. At this point it may be briefly stated that the term signifies harm inflicted to either self or others.) It appears, on the other hand, that the "destructiveness" of the neurotic is of an almost irresponsible nature. The neurotic is driven to his attitudes by forces which are essentially unconscious. The "healthy" individual's "destructiveness" is conscious and calculated. The distinction seems to argue responsibility on the part of the latter. But even with this distinction in mind, it is obvious that the "healthy" individual can only be destructive in the light of a culturally determined pattern of behaviour. Neurotic "destructiveness" then is but an accentuated and perverted expression of "healthy" "destructiveness" but both seem ultimately to spring from the demands of either the

¹⁷.

Ibid., p. 193.

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culture or the human environment, rather than from human nature itself.)

Closely allied to the fear of retaliation is the fear of failure. This fear is all the more significant in a competitive society since all kinds of frustrations follow close upon it. These may be roughly grouped under loss of security or of a sense of security, loss of prestige and emotional balance, not to mention the effect on self-esteem. Since in Western civilization the reigning ideology asserts that success is dependent on the personal efficiency of the individual, in almost complete disregard of existing external limitations, it is easy to understand how the competitive struggles might all too probably result in a crushed self-esteem. For the factual limitations are almost numberless as, of consequence, are the possibilities of "failure".

These elements, flowing from the principle of competition harry the individual with a feeling of emotional isolation, and this in spite of ample social contacts. The remedy for this feeling lies in the acquisition of affection. To put the same thing in a more vivid way, the feeling of isolation creates a greater need for affection. Horney¹⁸ calls the need for love a "vital need", perhaps implying that man as such needs love. If this is true, then the need would seem to flow from his nature. But the need for affection in a competitive society

18.

Ibid., p. 287.

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is perverted by the overevaluation which the individuals of that society place upon it. It becomes a cure-all. Ironically enough, the very elements which create this exaggerated need, render its fulfillment an impossibility. Therefore the individual remains as isolated as ever.

In addition to these factors, there are certain most significant contradictory tendencies in the culture. Perhaps the most blatant is that "between competition and success on the one hand, and brotherly
19 love and humility on the other". Horney maintained that our culture demands both of the individual. He must succeed and it appears that success in Western civilization, especially in the United States, demands assertiveness and aggressiveness. At the same time Western man must be humble and loving. This dilemma, according to Horney, may be solved in either of two ways: One of the two strivings is discarded, or both are accepted. But, for her, the latter solution is really no solution since the individual then can be neither assertive nor humble.

Secondly there is a contradiction between "the stimulation of
20 our needs and our factual frustrations in satisfying them". These, in point of fact, are so-called needs for they amount to "keeping up with the Joneses". The result of this contradiction is a continuous dichotomy between the wishes of the individual and their actualization.

19. Ibid., p. 288.

20. Ibid., p. 288.

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Finally a contradiction exists between "the alleged freedom of
²¹
 the individual and all his factual limitations". This contradiction
 is crushingly exposed in the United States where it is said that all men
 are equal.. But the unreality of the individual's alleged freedom and
 equality is painfully shown to him through the game of life. However
 the attractiveness of the notion of freedom lingers with the individual.
 Consequently he is caught between feelings of power and helplessness.
 What is the relationship between all these factors and neurosis?

Horney proceeded to point out that the element of competition
 and its consequents lay the ground-work for the disturbance while the
 contradictory tendencies of the culture determine the quality or types
 of contradictions or conflicts operating in the neurotic structure
 itself. "A neurotic development in the individual arises ultimately
 from feelings of alienation, hostility, fear and diminished self-
²²
 confidence". The feelings do not cause neurosis but they lay the
 foundations for what Horney termed "the basic anxiety". It will be
 noted that these feelings are quite analogous if not identical to the
 cultural factors operating in Western civilization. Furthermore the
 conflicts moving the actual neurotic bear an unmistakable similarity
 to the cultural conflicts. In fact Horney stated that the cultural
 conflicts are:

21.

Ibid., p. 289.

22.

Id., New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, N.Y. Norton and
 Company, Inc., 1939, p. 172.

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...precisely the conflicts that the neurotic struggles to reconcile: his tendencies toward aggressiveness and his tendencies toward yielding, his excessive demands and his fear of never getting anything, his striving toward self-aggrandisement and his feeling of personal helplessness.²³

Clearly then, the difference between the conflicts moving the neurotic and those moving the "normal" person is, to a large extent, one of degree. This difference of degree accounts for the fact that the normal person can deal with his conflicts and maintain his psychic equilibrium. But there is yet to consider the more proximate causes of neurosis, those exercising their influence through interpersonal relations and in turn moulded by the cultural factors. These causes account for the difference in degree between the conflicts of the "healthy" and those of the neurotic. They appear to exert their most significant influence during early childhood.

Whatever the environment, the child will not fail to be affected by it. What counts, obviously, is whether the effect will help or hinder the child. Unfortunately, Western civilization seems to be laden with environmental factors which stunt psychic growth. These unfavorable trends do not fail to show themselves in the domestic sphere. Since it is here that the child first begins to evolve for better or for worse, the potential danger of these unfavorable elements is manifest. If the

²³.

Id., The Neurotic Personality of our Time, p. 289.

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family atmosphere is "one of warmth, of mutual respect and consideration,
 24
 the child can grow unimpeded". But if the family environment is unfavorable to an intense degree the end-product will very likely be a neurosis. What are these unfavorable conditions?

A child, though not yet equipped with the developed intellect of the adult, possesses, as it were, a sixth sense, a deeply intuitive facility for registering the real feelings which people harbour toward him. It is most important to the child's "healthy" development that the sixth sense register good feelings. A child needs to feel wanted and loved. But a lack of love seems to characterize a goodly number of parents. The inability of parents to show love stems from their own neuroses. But it is one thing not to be able to show love and it is another to admit it or even be conscious of it. Therefore an insidious process of camouflaging sets in. The parents claim to love the child. As Lady Macbeth, they "protest too much" in their almost fanatical attempt to convince the child of their affection. But "a child feels keenly whether love is genuine, and cannot be fooled by any faked
 25
 demonstrations". Love, that is the realization on the part of the

24.
 Id., Self-Analysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
 1942, p. 43.
 25.
 Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 80.

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child that he is really loved, acts as a shock-absorber in the face of other unfavorable conditions. Therefore its importance can hardly be underestimated.

In addition to this lack of genuine affection there are several actions or attitudes on the part of the parents which hinder the child's "healthy" development. These are so compactly stated by Horney that paraphrasing them would seem a pointless task.

.... preference for other children, unjust reproaches, unpredictable changes between overindulgence and scornful rejection, unfulfilled promises, and not least important, an attitude toward the child's needs which goes through all gradations from temporary inconsideration to a consistent interfering with the most legitimate wishes of the child, such as disturbing friendships, ridiculing independent thinking, spoiling its interest in its own pursuits whether artistic, athletic or mechanical - altogether an attitude of the parents which if not in intention nevertheless in effect means breaking the child's will.²⁶

also:

Parents may impress the child with the dangers awaiting him outside the walls of his home. One parent may force the child to side with him against the other. ... Particularly important, a child may be led to feel that his right to existence lies solely in his living up to the parents' expectations. ... The effectiveness of such influence is not diminished by the fact that they are often subtle and veiled. Moreover, there is usually not just one adverse factor but several in combination.²⁷

26.

Ibid., pp. 80-81.

27.

Id., Self-Analysis, p. 44.

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The result of all these unfavorable influences is a loss of self-respect on the part of the child. "He becomes insecure, apprehensive, isolated and resentful".²⁸ But the child cannot really take a positive stand against these tyrannical dictates. In the first place the cultural pattern is against him. A child is made to feel guilty and despicable if he is hostile or opposed to his parents. Furthermore the child, being a child, is biologically helpless. But the helplessness pervades his psychic life as well, particularly when reinforced by the parental patterns outlined above. The child therefore must repress his hostility because, due to his feeling of helplessness, he is in great need of "protection".

The great verbal emphasis on love, which the parents must show in view of the absence of their real love, also acts as a barrier to the expression of the child's real feelings. In fact, in the absence of real love, he may cling to the verbal love and fear lest he lose it. It is obvious that in such circumstances any revolutionary reaction must be held back. Fear may also take possession of the child when subjected to constant parental quarrels, temper tantrums directed toward him, and also when intimidated by the "great dangers of the outside world". Again the child seeks protection and fears his own hostile feelings. As a result, he suppresses his real feelings but in so doing he lays the

28.

Ibid., p. 44.

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foundations for his own neurosis, for suppressed hostility leads to "basic anxiety" and basic anxiety is "the motor which sets the neurotic process going and keeps it in motion".²⁹ Horney describes the basic anxiety as: "a feeling of being small, insignificant, helpless, deserted, endangered, in a world that is out to abuse, cheat, attack, humiliate, betray, envy".³⁰

But although repressed hostility leads to basic anxiety there is yet another contributing factor. Whether basic anxiety develops or not depends, to a large extent, on whether the hostility which has developed within the child, takes in more than the immediate family. If there are favorable counteracting factors the hostility may remain directed toward the parents and a definite neurotic development put off, perhaps indefinitely. Horney exemplifies these factors by a loving grandmother, an understanding teacher, good friends etc. However the more unhappy are the experiences with the parents the lesser are the possibilities of favorable external factors having a counteracting effect. If these

29.

Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 23.

30.

Ibid., p. 92.

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factors are lacking there seems little if any doubt that the basic anxiety will set in and crystallize into a mental attitude conducive to
 31
 a neurotic structure.

In the light of Horney's view of normality and of the role which she assigned to the environment not only as a general moulding factor in a culture, but also and more particularly on the interpersonal relation level, it will be somewhat more possible to give a more adequate answer to the questions put at the end of the first chapter.

The "real self", it will be recalled, was defined as "that central inner force, common to all human beings and yet unique in each, which is the deep source of growth". Growth, in turn, was defined as "free" healthy development in accordance with the potentialities of one's generic and individual nature". It would appear then, that the uniqueness of the "central inner force" stems from man's individual

 31.

Although Fromm does not share Horney's relativism, nevertheless he strongly endorses her preoccupation with the role of the environment in the formation of the individual. It will be recalled that his orientation is essentially not biological but social. He stresses the importance of spontaneous activity, of the growth of the self, a growth which can only take place if the human and cultural surroundings are of a favorable nature. In the absence of such conditions escape mechanisms will be utilized. Depending upon the intensity of the unfavorable environment the individual will or will not become neurotic. Sullivan too, stresses the all-pervading influence of the environment in the formation of the self-dynamism. Therefore, though each of the three may tend to stress one aspect more than another they are all in agreement as to the decisive influence of interpersonal relations in the formation of the individual.

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nature. But what individuates that nature? Horney's works reveal two factors, both closely inter-related. The first is temperament. People, according to Horney, are born with a biological predisposition affecting the formal side of their behaviour. The second factor is a difference in native gifts. This difference is to be understood as being both quantitative and qualitative. In discussing the problem of neurosis and art, Horney asks whether neurosis is an indispensable condition for artistic creativity and answers that:

....there is little if any doubt that the existing gifts themselves are independent of neurosis. Recent educational ventures have shown that most people can paint when properly encouraged, but even so, not everyone can become a Rembrandt or a Renoir.³²

Temperament then, along with the degree of intellectual ability and quality of native gifts, (if possessed), individuate man's nature. If this individualized nature is allowed to develop freely and healthily, the individual in turn will be "healthy" and will "grow". But what constitutes "free, healthy development"? The environment must be "free" and "healthy" in order to promote "growth". But what conditions promote "freedom" and "mental health"? It would appear that they should be conditions which reflect love, and warmth and respect for the child's individuality. But precisely what these conditions should be varies with

32.

Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 328.

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the culture. An approximation of what they should be in Western culture may be had through a consideration of the opposites of those interpersonal factors which seem to promote neurosis. It would appear that the conditions should reflect real love on the part of the parents. Furthermore parents ought to keep promises made to the child. Their attitudes should be a consistent one. At all times, regardless of circumstances the child should be made to know that he is really wanted. His wishes and pursuits, that is, his individuality, should be respected. Furthermore the attitude between parents should not be such as to instill fear in the child. Finally he should be made to feel that he is to "grow" for his own sake and according to his own inclinations. That is, he should not be made to feel that "his right to existence lies solely in his living up to the parents' expectations". If this environment prevails the child will grow "healthy". As to the specific meaning of these conditions, again the norms of the culture should be consulted. But if the parent-child relationship reflects the unfavorable factors to an intense degree and is not alleviated by favorable external factors, a "basic anxiety" develops. When this occurs, a neurosis seems but a matter of time.

A "free" and "healthy" development, then, is tantamount to a "normal" environment. But, again, as has been shown, the concept of normality varies with the culture and even within the culture. This being the case, it follows that the conception of "growth" itself, must be understood as having a relative connotation.

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It might also be the more profitably asked at this point, what Horney meant by "destructive" and "constructive" tendencies. "Destructive tendencies" may be considered a term inclusive of the entire neurotic structure with particular emphasis on the neurotic trends, that is the various devices which the neurotic utilizes to rid himself of his "basic anxiety", of his "basic conflict" and of the conflicts which his very "solutions" generate. The neurotic structure and the neurotic trends are destructive since they represent a barrier to "growth", to self-realization, in short, to the activity of the "real self". Neurosis is an escape from reality and from the "normal" way of dealing with reality. To the extent that the individual, because of his neurosis, cannot realize his individual nature, the neurosis is "destructive". In addition to the destructiveness of the self, neurosis also destroys others since it creates unhealthy interpersonal relations, which, particularly in the parental sphere, can generate neuroses in others. Conversely the term "constructive" signifies both the nature of man before it encounters an "unhealthy" environment, and the essential characteristics of the "normal" individual in a given culture. But again it must be stressed that these terms have been only generally defined. So defined they may be said to have a universal extension. Their precise meaning, however, varies with the culture, for the destructiveness of one culture may be the

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constructiveness of another. Cannibalism, for example, would hardly be considered a "constructive" tendency in the United States, but quite conducive to psychic health among cannibals.

What then constitutes a "good" human being? The answer, at this point, almost writes itself. A "good" human being is one who has been allowed to "grow" through a "healthy" environment. "Growth" and "health" again vary with the culture. Consequently the meaning of "good" human being varies with the culture. Furthermore since Horney seems to imply that man is responsible to his Creator, at least partially, for his actions, the term "good" may be understood in still another sense. A human being may be "good" in the sense that he is "normal". If he is normal he will, to varying degrees, actualize himself. An individual may also be "good" if he adheres to the standards of conduct imposed by the culture.

The answer to this last question supplies the back-ground for a clarification of the other puzzles submitted at the end of chapter one. If the conditions for growth are "favorable" will man inevitably evolve into a constructive individual? This question must be answered affirmatively but with the same qualifications advanced in the previous question. If the conditions for growth are "favorable" man will inevitably evolve into a constructive individual, in the sense that he will not be a neurotic and will consequently actualize himself to various degrees. But he may and in most instances will show, traces of "normal" destructiveness, in part dictated by the culture, such as "destructiveness" implicit in the "normal" competitive struggles of Western

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civilization, and in part caused by his straying away from the fulfillment of the standard or standards of his environment. This last point clarifies, all the more, the sense in which man is a responsible agent. (Man's responsibility was alluded to in the second chapter, when it was asked to whom or to what man was responsible). Man has a responsibility to actualize his individual nature to the best of his ability and he has a responsibility to abide by the standards of his environment. This responsibility rests primarily with the "normal" individual but theoretically also with the neurotic to the extent that he possesses some measure of freedom. Finally, the moral norm offered by Horney rings now all the clearer. The norm is, in short, her criterion for self-realization. Man has a moral responsibility to "grow". In order to fulfill this responsibility, he must ask himself whether a particular attitude, striving or drive is inductive or obstructive to his human "growth". But the path that the observance of this norm will take, that is, the path which his "growth" will take, will again vary with the standards of the environment. Human nature, in short, may be actualized in several ways. It would appear also that these different ways admit of degrees within the range of "normality". But at a certain elusive point the thin line is passed and the individual becomes neurotic. Since every neurosis is, according to Horney, a pervasive disturbance, that is, a character neurosis, a fuller understanding of Horney's theories will require some consideration of the neurotic structure.

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The "basic anxiety", it will be recalled, is to be considered as an experience of helplessness, danger and isolation in the face of a hostile and abusive world. In terms of its causal role, it is, as Patrick Mullahy puts it, the "efficient cause or "motor" that sets the neurotic process going and keeps it going."² Horney did not say that a neurosis inevitably follows the "basic anxiety". Rather she asserted that the anxiety gives rise to a mental and emotional outlook from which a neurosis may spring forth at any time. What can prevent a neurosis from developing? It appears that, as in the case of the "basic anxiety", there is a slim possibility that even at this stage, a neurosis may be avoided if there is a favorable change in the human environment. However it would seem that in the greater number of instances a neurosis follows close upon the heels of "basic anxiety".

 1.

Since the neurotic structure, as seen by Sullivan and Fromm was not treated in any detail in Part I of the thesis, no attempts at a comparison shall be made here. It may be mentioned in passing, however, that there are obvious similarities between Fromm's escape mechanisms, Sullivan's concept of selective inattention and dissociation and the self-dynamism that results from it, and Horney's neurotic structure and its focal points, the neurotic trends.

2.

PATRICK MULLAHY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, New York Grove Press, 1955, p. 211.

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The neurotic is a very unhappy individual assertions to the contrary on his part notwithstanding. Once the line existing between the "healthy" and the "unhealthy" has been passed, the individual becomes alienated from himself and from others as well. He is "driven rather than being himself the driver". The reason for this lies in the fact that unconscious strivings develop to counteract the "basic anxiety" and give him an inner sense of security. These unconscious strivings soon find their expression in character attitudes, and the character attitudes amount to an unreflective *modus vivendi*.

It was Horney's conviction that man, be he healthy or neurotic, has but three ways of encountering the human environment. He can move toward people, against them or away from them. However there is a significant difference between the moves of the "normal" individual and those of the neurotic. In the "healthy" individual the moves are not mutually exclusive. The balanced person will be compliant, assertive or retiring as the occasion may require even though his attitude will reflect one of these moves predominantly. Though the normal individual, will adopt one of the three moves predominantly, he will nevertheless be quite able to utilize the other two approaches as the situation may demand. The neurotic has these three approaches open to him as well. However the three moves will not interact harmoniously. In the neurotic child, these moves become "extreme and rigid". Horney illustrates this difference most vividly:

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affection, for instance, becomes clinging, compliance becomes appeasement. Similarly he is driven to rebel or to keep aloof, without reference to his real feelings and regardless of the inappropriateness of his attitude in a particular situation.³

The child then, because of the extremeness and rigidity of his attitudes is actually driven in opposite directions and develops contradictory attitudes toward people. These attitudes, therefore, take on the character of a "basic conflict" which, because creating greater insecurity, must be solved at all costs. The solution seems to lie in allowing one of these moves to predominate. Which it will be depends on some part on the child's temperament but mostly on the influence of the "unhealthy" environment. In other words, it appears that at a certain point the child "solves" his "basic conflict" by unconsciously deciding to make one of these three attitudes the predominant one. But again he is driven to this "decision".

The differences between the predominant move of the normal person and that of the neurotic, then, would seem to lie in the reasons for the move and in the role which the move plays in the character of the individual. The normal person is, as it were, eased into one of these attitudes while the neurotic is driven. Furthermore the normal person can still utilize the other two moves while the neurotic's rigidity demands that he discard them as much as possible.

3.

KAREN HORNEY, Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 19.

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These three approaches clearly represent a way of dealing with life. They do not simply represent ways of dealing with others. Invariably they tend to affect the individual. Furthermore to say that a person may move toward, away from or against people is merely to sketch an approach to the human environment. The matter is actually much more involved. In the neurotic certain compulsive drives or "trends" emanate from each of these approaches and characterize them. If, for instance, the neurotic moves towards people, he will exhibit an indiscriminate and exorbitant need for affection and approval. He will tend to lose his "center of gravity" since his indiscriminate need for approval will result in an automatic living up to the expectations of others. He will be afraid to assert himself, dreading the hostility of others. In keeping with these trends there will also appear a compulsive modesty and a need for someone else, a "partner" to assume the responsibilities of his life. His "center of gravity" then, will be in the partner. He will dread being alone and will almost inevitably tend to place too much emphasis on "love" regarding it as a cure-all.

If the neurotic moves against people his actions will reflect a compulsive craving for power, prestige and possession. Strength will be admired and weakness detested. He will dread uncontrollable situations. His craving for power will also reflect itself in an "essential disrespect for others, their individuality, their dignity, their feelings, the only concern being their subordination". The craving for power will not manifest itself only with things but with people as well.

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Therefore there will be a tendency to exploit and to feel superior. In point of fact, there will be "pride in exploitative skill". Emotions will be regarded with contempt and the powers of intelligence and foresight will be held in the highest esteem. There will be a need for perfection, a need to excel others at all costs. This Horney terms the "neurotic ambition for personal achievement".

Finally, if the neurotic moves away from people, he will tend to restrict his life. There will be a compulsive need for independence, for self-sufficiency. He will dread needing others. Therefore any kind of tie, including love will be feared. He will force himself to be undemanding and inconspicuous. Distance seems to be his means of gaining security.

These are only a few of the neurotic "trends", but they are sufficient to indicate their pervasive character. Furthermore they are all the more pervasive since, in time, certain strategies grow out of each trend to strengthen it. The neurotic who moves toward people, for example, "tends not only to subordinate himself to others and to lean on them but also tries to be unselfish and good"⁴. Also related to each trend are special "sensitivities, fears and inhibitions"⁵.

4.

Ibid., p. 19.

5.

These inhibitions embrace all spheres including the sexual. But like Sullivan and Fromm, Horney is careful to point out that sexual difficulties are a manifestation rather than a cause of neurotic conflicts.

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People whose trends indicate a movement toward others are "especially sensitive to displeasure or anger in others, are fearful of anything approaching an argument or fight and are unable to be demanding or aggressive".⁶

In view of the pervasive character of the neurotic trends it should be clear now why Horney believed that these character attitudes amount to a way of life. But Horney emphasized again and again that the trends described above are not per-se neurotic. Rather it is the use to which the neurotic puts them which renders them abnormal. In point of fact, the justification of the trends as normal appears to be one of the defense mechanisms of the neurotic patient. Thus, it might be argued that granting that certain of these trends might predominate with some individuals, granting even that they may possess a certain degree of rigidity, could not these differences be merely,

...the expression of different sets of values, different ways of coping with life? Is it not natural, for instance, that a tenderhearted person will put stock in affection and a stronger person in independence and leadership?⁷

Horney's answer is an emphatic "no". The neurotic need for affection, for instance, is strikingly different from the normal need.

6.

KAREN HORNEY, (Edited by), Are You Considering Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1946, p. 71.

7.

Id., Self-Analysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1942, p. 60.

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A wish for affection from others is meaningful only if there is affection for them, a feeling of having something in common with them. ... But the neurotic need for affection is devoid of the value of reciprocity. ... To be accurate, he does not even really want the other's affection, but is merely concerned keenly and strenuously, that they make no aggressive move against him. The singular value lying in mutual understanding, tolerance, concern, sympathy has no place in the relationship.

Similarly the striving for perfection is but a travesty of the normal need to actualise one's gifts.

But the neurotic need for perfection, while it may be expressed in identical terms, has lost this special value, because it represents an attempt to be or appear perfect without change. There is no possibility of improvement, because finding areas within the self that would need change is frightening and therefore avoided. The only real concern is to juggle away any deficiency lest one be exposed to attacks, and to preserve the secret feeling of superiority over others.⁸

Finally, as has been already indicated, the individual is driven to these trends. They do not actually represent what he wants. Consequently the moves become "extreme and rigid". "It is as if he were flying in an airplane which he believes he is piloting, while actually the plane is directed by remote control". Daniel Ivimey, a colleague of Horney, explains that the trends are called neurotic because:

8.

Ibid., p. 61.

9.

Ibid., p. 62.

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Provoked by an inner state of trepidation and alarm, they are imbued with excessive tensions and are carried out with an excessive amount of energy in striving for the particular goal of each trend, which in each case means safety.¹⁰

While Horney at first reserved the term "neurotic trend" for the drives which immediately emanated from the three basic approaches to the human environment, the label was later extended to include any neurotic attempt at gaining a false equilibrium or a false sense of security.

The "resolution" of the "basic conflict" by allowing one of the three approaches to predominate is considered by Horney to be the first neurotic attempt at gaining a sense of balance. But like all other neurotic solutions it is far from satisfactory and engenders, in point of fact, more conflicts. Other solutions must be found. Horney described several asserting that all, to one degree or another, are utilized by the neurotic.

It appears that the movement away from people, apart from presenting a neurotic solution to the "basic conflict", (if it is allowed to predominate), may also serve as a second solution, one separate and unto itself. The difference seems to lie in the motives prompting the "choice". In the first instance the neurotic allows the movement away from people to predominate in order to resolve the "basic conflict". In

10.

Id., Are You Considering Psychoanalysis, p. 71.

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the second, he moves away from others so that "the conflicts are set
 out of operation".¹¹ (But this distinction is not at all clear).

The "idealized image" provides another major avenue of escape for neurotic conflicts. The neurotic, it appears, cannot really fool himself. He is at all times, though to varying degrees, keenly and painfully aware of the staggering discrepancy existing between what he is and what he could be. This difference, again, is not to be understood in terms of material gains, but in terms of the unfolding one's real self. In the face of his "basic conflict" and of the further difficulties created by his previous "solutions" he may attempt to escape from what he has become by creating, in his imagination, a puppet self, an illusory or idealized picture of what he is, or rather what he should like to be. What the picture will be like, depends in large part, on the approach which he has "allowed" to predominate in his first solution. This false image allows the neurotic to gain a further false sense of security, for he soon begins to believe that he is his idealized image. But, as is obvious, this solution has the significant drawback of withdrawing the individual more and more from his actual self and thus reduces or at least renders the possibilities of a real solution, all the more difficult to realize. But again it appears that the neurotic cannot wholly submerge himself in his idealized image. That is, even

11.

Id., Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945, p. 78.

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this solution will not allow him to deceive himself completely. And when the discrepancy between his idealized self and his actual self becomes glaringly obvious he will resort to another attempt, one which Horney terms "externalization". She defines externalization as: "the tendency to experience internal processes as if they occurred outside oneself and, as a rule, to hold these external factors responsible for one's difficulties"¹². Through this "solution" the neurotic projects all his difficulties to the outside world. More precisely, all the factors in the neurotic's personality, which are considered by him to be faults, are actually experienced as existing not in himself but in others. However, "externalization", is a much more comprehensive solution. One's feelings are also experienced through others. For example, "he will feel that someone else is angry with him when he is actually angry with himself"¹³. In other words the entire process of externalization is aimed at removing the individual from himself by centering on the outside world. This shift naturally tends to make the individual overdependent on external factors. Furthermore it makes for a "gnawing sense of emptiness and shallowness". Finally it serves to reinforce his "basic anxiety". His feeling that the world is responsible for any and all of his difficulties renders him more hostile and more helpless than before.

12.

Ibid., p. 115.

13.

Ibid., p. 116.

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These four attempts at solution for neurotic difficulties (allowing one of the three approaches to the human environment to predominate, moving away from people, the idealized image, and externalization) are considered by Horney to be major attempts. In addition to these there are other pseudo-solutions utilized by the neurotic in his attempts to gain some measure of psychic equilibrium. These devices are again expressive of the neurotic's partial unwillingness and partial inability to go to the heart of his difficulties. They provide a temporary "patchwork" but again lead to further conflicts. Horney terms them "auxiliary approaches to artificial harmony",¹⁴ indicating that they have not the pervasiveness of the other attempts. These approaches are excellently summarized by Muriel Ivimey:

These are the cultivation of blind spots by which the individual can remain blissfully unaware of contradictions and discrepancies; rationalization, by which he explains away inconsistencies by plausible but spurious justifications.

He also compartmentalizes his thinking, that is, he sees no inconsistency in behaving and acting one way in private, another way in public; one way toward members of the family, another way toward friends and acquaintances outside of the family; one way toward social equals, another way toward those he does not consider his social equals, etc. Another common defense is to claim arbitrary and unquestioned rightness for everything he feels and does, including all his fragrant contradictions and inconsistencies. He may attempt to protect himself from awareness of uncontrollable impulses by maintaining an iron control over his feelings.

¹⁴.

Ibid., p. 131.

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Still another way of avoiding recognition of contradictions is to reduce everything to total inconsequentiality by being cynical or flippant. The individual tends to take the position that there is no right or wrong, no truth or falsehood, that nothing matters enough to constitute an issue. Finally he may avoid issues concerning his inner problems by resorting to extreme elusiveness. People who exhibit this tendency are slippery, devious, so highly circumstantial that their part in events is lost in a mass of detail.¹⁵

All the outlined solutions, major and secondary, alienate the individual all the more from himself. They might be roughly compared to the false economy of the spend-thrift who, in his fanatical attempts to save pennies, succeeds only in spending more money. The neurotic, unable to unwind the web into which his environment has cast him, deepens himself all the more in his neurosis believing, with each attempt at "solution", that he has actually resolved his conflicts. The steps that he takes are essentially unconscious although as Horney often repeats "we cannot really fool ourselves". And as in the case of the spend-thrift, the neurotic does not really save himself work. Rather he spends a fantastic amount of time and energy in his pathetic attempts to find himself, and the end-result, ironically enough, is not self-enrichment but rather impoverishment of the personality.

This rough sketch constitutes a bird's-eye view of the forces moving the neurotic as seen by Horney in her first five books. Her final work bears witness to a significant advance in her theories. This

^{15.}

Id., (edited by), Are You Considering Psychoanalysis, pp. 82-83.

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16

advance was alluded to in an earlier chapter,¹⁶ when discussing Horney's definitions of neurosis. There it was said that Horney had later come to realize that a neurosis involves not only a conflict in the relationship of the individual toward himself. "Neurosis and Human Growth" Horney's last work places great emphasis on intra-psychic factors. The recognition of these factors had, of course, been implicit in her earlier works. In point of fact "Neurosis and Human Growth" might be considered an extensive elaboration of one of the earlier major attempts at solution, namely the creation of the "idealized image". It is in this work that Horney places great weight on the loss of the "real self". (The meaning and implications of this term were explained in Chapter 3 of the thesis). This loss is initiated by the unhealthy environment but continued by the neurotic's attempts at solution. These have been sketchily presented. But, as has been stated Horney's last work concerns itself mainly with the idealized image. Previously she had been this image as one more attempt to solve inner conflicts. However, it later became for Horney "the gateway to the whole area of intra-¹⁷psychic processes".

16.

See p. 85.

17.

Id., KAREN HORNEY, Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 367.

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Horney's new formulations divided the neurotic into three selves, the actual, the idealized and the real. "The actual self is an all-inclusive term for everything that a person is at a given time: body and¹⁸ soul, healthy and neurotic". The "idealized self", "is what we are in our irrational imagination, or what we should be according to the dictates of neurotic pride".¹⁹ The "real self" has already been defined. It must be stressed here that Horney's new concept of the "idealized self" is much more pervasive than her former. It still represents a neurotic attempt at solution of inner conflicts but here it becomes "the" solution.

I now saw gradually that the neurotic's idealized image did not merely constitute a false belief in his value and significance, it was rather like the creation of a Frankenstein monster which in time usurped his best energies. It eventually usurped his drive to grow, to realize his given potentialities. And this meant that he was no longer interested in realistically tackling or outgrowing his difficulties and in fulfilling his potentials, but was bent on actualizing his idealized self. It entails ... also the tyrannical inner system by which he tries to mold himself into a god-like being; it entails neurotic claims and the development of neurotic pride.²⁰

Furthermore it became evident to Horney that while neurotics idealized themselves they also strongly hated themselves. This apparent contradiction was reconciled in Horney's theories when it became evident that the neurotic's "idealized self" actually hated the "actual self".

18.

Ibid., p. 158.

19.

Ibid., p. 158.

20.

Ibid., pp. 367-368.

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It was this significant discovery which cast even greater light on the intra-psychic factors operating in the neurotic. Neurosis then clearly became "a disturbance in one's relation to self and others".

The details of this new theory are too intricate to be treated here. Furthermore these ramifications fall outside the objectives of this study. An attempt has been made to show the direction which the neurotic structure will take in Western civilization, particularly in the United States, when the combined cultural and interpersonal factors exercise an intensely adverse influence on the life of the individual. It may be mentioned in passing that the idealization of the self carries in its wake even greater unfavorable repercussions. The neurotic becomes all the more alienated from himself. His human relationships are all the more disturbed. He becomes tyrannical and proud. These unfavorable traits cast him into even greater conflicts and his further attempts at solution bring him only more tension, more anxiety. In short they place greater and greater distance between his "actual self" and what he might have been. He may remain in this unhappy condition for the remainder of his days, living untold sufferings the extent of which even he does not fully realize, and dying never really having lived. Or it is conceivable that the experience of life may bring about a constructive change.

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Life itself still remains a very effective therapist. Experience of any one of a number of kinds may be sufficiently telling to bring about personality changes. It may be the inspiring example of a truly great person; it may be a common tragedy which by bringing the neurotic in close touch with others takes him out of his egocentric isolation. It may be association with persons so congenial that manipulating them or avoiding them appears less necessary. In other instances the consequences of neurotic behaviour may be so drastic and of such frequent occurrence that they impress themselves on the neurotic's mind and make him less fearful and less rigid.²¹

however, this is more the exception than the rule .

The therapy affected by life itself is not, however, within one's control. Neither hardships nor friendships nor religious experience can be arranged to meet the needs of the particular individual. Life as a therapist is ruthless; circumstances that are helpful to one neurotic may entirely crush another. And, as we have seen, the capacity of the neurotic to recognize the consequences of his neurotic behaviour and to learn from them is highly limited.²²

A more hopeful solution to neurotic conflicts appears to be provided by psychoanalytic therapy.

21.

Id., Our Inner Conflicts, p. 240.

22.

Ibid., p. 240.

PART III

EVALUATION OF
HORNEY'S THEORIES

INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD PART

The first two chapters of the second part of the thesis set forth the more significant principles governing Dr. Horney's theories of neurosis. The third chapter had as its end the presentation of Horney's view of the more proximate background of neurosis, that is, the manner in which her more ultimate concepts affected her psychoanalytic formulations. Finally, the fourth and last chapter, sketched the actual structure of a neurosis, as seen by Horney.

The thought of Karen Horney, as set forth in these preceeding chapters reveals three focal points. These are truly philosophical in nature since they reveal Horney's more ultimate views of man. They concern the nature proper to man as man, the role of man's individual nature in the process of its realization, and the different ways in which that nature may be actualized. The evaluation of these focal points as well as of their ramifications will be much facilitated if they be briefly and separately reviewed.

1. Recapitulation of Points to be Criticized

Concept of Man - it has been shown that Horney's differences with Freud, while having their apparent beginnings in feminine psychology soon expressed themselves in a way which Horney felt to be reflective of a completely opposed view of man. In contrast to Freud's "pessimistic" view of man, Horney's new position reflected an unbounded optimism. Horney, furthermore, took issue not only with what she

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considered to be the Freudian view of man, but also with what she accepted to be the Christian outlook. Although she recognized significant differences in the two positions, the similarities were such as to discourage her allegiance. Both the Freudian and Christian view, according to Horney, recognized something intrinsically "bad , evil, sinful or destructive" in man's nature. This unfavorable tendency appeared to be a birthright pure and simple. Freud attributed it to elemental instincts and "Christians" to original sin, but the fact remained that both recognized its existence. Furthermore both the Freudian and "Christian" positions demanded that something be done about the "evil" in man's nature, and although the solutions advanced by the two were not altogether identical, nevertheless both were in agreement in their desire to control that aspect of human nature which was destructive. But these controls, Horney argued, could only serve to shackle man's spontaneity and impede his self-realization. Man was not "bad, sinful, or destructive" either in a "Christian" or in a Freudian sense. Man, in point of fact, was born a wholly constructive being. He was a responsible being possessing potentialities for both "good" and "evil". But contrary to the Freudian and Christian view, these potentialities did not both arise from human nature. The "goodness" in man stemmed from his very nature, the "evil" from an unfavorable life situation. Horney advanced three "proofs" with which to justify her position. They were derived from her study of neurotics and amounted to the conviction that inasmuch as the "destructiveness"

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in neurotics was brought about by an unfavorable human environment but abandoned at the conclusion of a successful analysis, there was no reason to conclude that human nature was either in whole or in part destructive. This emphasis on the environment as the total explanation of all unfavorable tendencies later pervaded her entire theory. It is perhaps best termed "social determinism".

Horneyan Social Determinism - The "constructiveness" of human nature is actualized through the activity of the "real self". This is a central inner force common to all men and yet individualized in each man through his temperament, his intelligence, and whatever qualitative native gifts he might be endowed with at birth. The "destructive" tendencies, as has been stated, are caused by an unfavorable human environment. The environment, in short, determines which of the two possibilities will be realized in the individual. Since Horney associated the term "destructive" with neurosis, it is clear that the environment shall decide whether an individual will or will not become neurotic. But to say that the environment determines whether an individual will be "constructive" or "destructive" was not, according to Horney, to deny human freedom. It is only to deny freedom with regard to these two possibilities. The constructive individual is responsible for his actions while the neurotic may be considered impaired. (Neurotic trends impair self-determination...) Evidence of this determinism is seen not only in Horney's basic position as outlined above but, as has been shown in the previous chapters and as will be reiterated, it appears as the

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natural off-shoot in Horney's theories of neurosis. These points, will be considered in chapters two and three of this part.

Closely allied to Horney's social determinism is a relativism having its beginnings in her concept of normality. This relativism too, infiltrated Horney's entire theory of neurosis.

Horneyan relativism - "There is no such thing as a normal psychology which holds for all mankind", since there is no such thing as a concept of normality which holds for all mankind. The concept of what is normal is man-made. It differs with the culture and, in the course of time, even within the culture.

Human nature may be actualized in a multitude of ways in point of fact, in at least as many ways as there are concepts of normality. Consequently the significance of such expressions as "good human being", "favorable conditions", "responsibility", "free healthy development", must be understood in the light of the criterion of what "should be" in a particular culture. Consequently also, the definition of neurosis must allow for cultural differences. Horney saw to it that it did and then proceeded to apply her relativism to her theory of neurosis. It is in this theory that a blending of Horney's social determinism with her relativism is clearly perceivable:

The conflicts moving the individuals within a culture are culturally determined and vary with the culture. Since the culture also determines the pattern of the interpersonal relations, these too vary with the culture. Although the characteristics of a neurotic seem to

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have a universal extension, their expression is determined by and differs with the culture. Again the "unfavorable" interpersonal relations leading to a neurosis must be considered unfavorable in the light of the cultural norm. Finally, since "neuroses" do not represent problems common to all men" it may be inferred that many of the solutions employed by a neurotic in a given culture are not common to all men.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPT OF MAN

Horney's position, as it concerns her view of man, is open to a two-fold inquiry. It may be purposefully asked whether Horney's "proofs" of man's constructiveness violate the basic rules of reasoning, that is, whether they are formally valid. Secondly it may be asked whether the premises and the conclusions drawn from them are materially true. The formal logic underlying Horney's proofs, being the more immediately striking of the two, should be considered first.

As stated in the first chapter and reiterated in the recapitulation, Horney offered three kinds of "evidence" which were to prove conclusively that any destructiveness found in man was due to an external source, in short, that it was not part of his nature. These "proofs" have already been presented in the first chapter. A rephrasing could serve no better purpose than that of unnecessary repetition. Since it is the logic behind these proofs which is at present open to scrutiny, it would be the more expedient alternative to resubmit them in syllogistic form.¹ The syllogisms, observing the order of Horney's proofs as presented, would read as follows:

1.

Whether these syllogisms reflect a fair presentation of Horney's three "proofs" may be verified by reconsidering these "proofs" as presented in pages 53-56 of the thesis and as expounded by Horney herself in "Human Nature Can Change", The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 68.

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1. That which is caused by the environment cannot be attributed to human nature.
But neurotic destructiveness is caused by the environment.
Ergo, destructiveness cannot be attributed to human nature.
2. That which can be removed from one's character make-up cannot be attributed to human nature.
But neurotic destructiveness can be removed from one's character make-up.
Ergo, destructiveness cannot be attributed to human nature.
3. That which is removed by analysis cannot be attributed to human nature.
But neurotic destructiveness is removed by analysis
Ergo, destructiveness cannot be attributed to human nature.

Two questions seem to spring immediately from the presentation of these syllogisms: Is there really, in effect, any difference between the second and the third syllogism? Is Horney not guilty of drawing a universal conclusion from particular premises, or how does it follow that because the destructiveness found in neurotics cannot be attributed to human nature, human nature is then wholly constructive?

It would appear that Horney's second and third "proofs" reflect a difference that is more apparent than real. The third "proof" would seem to be nothing more than an application of the second. For if what can be removed from the character make-up of an individual, in any way whatsoever, is of consequence not essential to his nature as a human being, then it follows inescapably that if neurotic destructiveness may be removed by one such way, namely psychoanalysis, such destructiveness

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is not essential to human nature. In presenting her second proof² Horney stated that although a person may be destructive he remains so only as long as the effects of his unfavorable environment cause him to view reality in such a way as to make destructive tendencies necessary. Therefore if some means are available to allow the individual to regain his psychic equilibrium he will, according to Horney's view, abandon his destructiveness. Psychoanalysis is obviously such a means.³ Life itself, Horney informs us, is another. Since these proofs, then, are hardly distinct one from the other, it is clear that the syllogisms cannot reflect any substantial differences.

The second question cannot be so quickly dispatched. The syllogisms, as presented, do indeed reflect a basic logical fallacy. In all three instances the minor term is a universal in the conclusion whereas it is only a particular term in the premises. In the language of formal logic, terms indistributed in the premises must be undistributed in the conclusion. The violation of this rule, in this instance, involves the fallacy of the illicit minor. Furthermore, the conclusion must follow the weaker side, so that if one premise is particular, as in this case it is, the conclusion must be particular. The conclusion

2.

See pp. 54-55.

3.

See p. 119.

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should have been that the destructiveness found in neurotics cannot be attributed to human nature.⁴ But is this really all that Horney intended to show?

It will be recalled that Horney was opposed to both the "Freudian" and "Christian" view of man. Both, according to Horney, recognized destructive elements as existing in the very nature of man. It was her conviction, an explicitly stated one,⁵ that contrary to the "Freudian" and "Christian" position man's nature was not destructive either in whole or in part. Her proofs then intended to establish not only that neurotic destructiveness was environmentally produced but that furthermore human nature was not destructive in any sense of the word. Whether Horney's interpretation of the Freudian and "Christian" view was a valid one is not to the point here. But it is quite obvious that Horney could not have interpreted either the Freudian or the Christian view to mean that the only destructiveness in man is the destructiveness to be found in neurotics and that furthermore this destructiveness was due in the case of Freud (according to Horney's interpretation) to biologically determined and destructive primitive

⁴. See also: Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elencis*, Ch.V, 166^b38-167^a20. (This passage concerns the fallacy of proceeding from a term used in a qualified sense to the same term used without qualification).

⁵. See pp. 56-57.

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instincts, and for "Christians" to original sin. It would appear manifest that Horney in attempting to understand the "Freudian" and "Christian" view must have concluded that they regarded neurotic destructiveness as an accentuated expression of the destructiveness rooted in the very nature of man. Her environmental determinism theory, then, attempts to refute not only what she considered to be the Freudian and "Christian" explanation of neurotic destructiveness, but of destructiveness as such. Yet her conclusions are based on observations of neurotics or neurotics-to-be. Assuming her environment-theory to be valid, one can only conclude that the destructiveness perceived in neurotics is environmentally produced and therefore not directly due to the nature of man.

That Horney did not perceive this fundamental fallacy in her reasoning appears, at first, somewhat perplexing. But it must be remembered that Horney had long suffered what she considered to be the "Freudian" view, and very often a reaction has a way of going to extremes. Finally though Horney seemed to believe in the existence of a Creator she also seemed, at least in theory, to have been opposed to

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any absolute standards. Consequently the "Christian"⁶ position could not be expected to meet with her approval.

It has been shown that Horney's "proofs" of the constructiveness of human nature are somewhat repetitious and in opposition to the basic rules of reasoning. It may be asked at this point whether Horney's⁷ conception of human nature has any ontological value.

6.

Horney used the term "Christian" in a most vague sense. It is not at all clear from her writings whether she had in mind the Protestant denominations or the Catholic Faith or Christianity as a whole. It would seem, however, that she was inclined to interpret the Christian conception of man as an extremely pessimistic one. Hence it is quite likely that her experience of Christianity (especially when one considers that she was German) came through her contact with the Lutheran Church. "Luther ... was convinced of the complete corruption of human nature by sin and of the insuperable nature of concupiscence Further, he concluded that all human acts, no matter how good they may seem are really mortal sins since, as a result of the primal sin of Adam, original sin lodges in man as a sinful direction of the will, which necessarily binds him to evil and makes him incapable of anything truly good" (Algermissen Konrad, Christian Denomination, Trans. by Joseph Grundner, St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1945, p. 742).

7.

Original sin is a fact. This fact is brought to man's awareness through Revelation, for it is from this source that he learns of his fall and its effect, namely a disturbed relationship with his Creator and with himself. Horney, in denying the reality of original sin, relegated it to the realm of superstition, or at the very best myth. Although Horney can be justly accused of denying a position which she did not really understand, although the truth of Christian Theology can be defended on its own grounds, the requirements of this thesis demand that the problem of man's nature be approached through reason alone.

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Whether the ultimate why of the disharmony in man's nature can be explained through reason alone is a question which has been answered both affirmatively and negatively. Among those who hold to the possibility of a purely rational demonstration may be mentioned such outstanding figures as St. Augustine, John Henry Newman and Blaise Pascal. Their arguments, as might well be expected, are basically identical. They amount to the conviction that God could not have created man as he is and that therefore man's present condition can only be explained by some primeval moral catastrophe. Thus St. Augustine in his Contra Julianum argues,

Sed in iis quae meminisse jam non potes, parvulos intueri, quot et quanta mala patiantur, in quibus vanitatibus, cruciatibus, erroribus, terroribus crescant. Deinde jam grandes, etiam Deo servientes tentat error, ut decipiat; tentat labor aut dolor, ut frangat; tentat libido, ut accendat; tentat moeror, ut sternat; tentat typhus, ut extollat. Et quis explicet omnia festinanter, quibus gravatur jugum super filios Adam? Hujus evidentia miseriae gentium philosophos, nihil de peccato primi hominis sive scientes, sive credentes, compulit dicere, ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum luendarum causa non esse natos, et animos nostros corruptibilibus corporis, eo supplicio quo Etrusci praedones captos affligere consueverant, tanquam vivos cum mortuis esse conjunctos. Apostolus autem amputat opinionem, qua creduntur singulae animae pro meritis ante actae vitae diversis corporibus inseri. Quid igitur restat, nisi ut causa istorum malorum sit ut causa iniquitas vel impotentia Dei, aut poena primi veterisque peccati? Sed quia nec injustus, nec impotens est Deus; restat quod non vis, sed cogaris confiteri, quod grave jugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris oerum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium non fuisset, nisi delicti originalis meritum praecessisset.⁸

8.

St. Aurelii Augustine, CONTRA JULIANUM, IV, 16. (Quoted from: PATROLOGIA LATINA, Vol. 44, Ed. by S. Mauri, Paris, Migne, 1841, Col. 782)

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In one of the celebrated pages of his Apologia, Cardinal Newman reiterates much the same argument.

To consider the world in its length and breadth, its various history, the many races of man, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual alienation, their conflicts; the progress of things as if from unreasoning elements, not towards final causes, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin, the prevailing idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irrationality, the condition of the whole human race ... - all this is a vision to dizzy and appal ...

What shall be said to this heart-piercing, reason-bewildering fact? ... And so I argue about the world: - if there be a God, since there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God.⁹

Pascal too has been interpreted to affirm at least implicitly that the doctrine of original sin may be arrived at by unaided reason. Although he speaks of it as a "mystery" it would appear that the mystery lies not in the fact of original sin, but rather in the nature of the sin itself. In commenting on one of Pascal's texts Scheeben, the well known German theologian observed that,

⁹. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Chap. 5 (Quoted from: New Edition of the Works of John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Ed. by Charles Frederick Harold, New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1947 pp. 219-220.)

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For my part I should hold that in this view no mystery at all would remain. The original state is no mystery if it is so completely intelligible in itself; The present state in which we are born, and which is known by experience, is no mystery if its explanation necessarily requires original sin; even original sin itself is no mystery if it is postulated as the sole possible basis for the actual and observable state of affairs, and hence is known by the unaided reason. At the most it could be called a mystery on account of the incomprehensibility of its nature.¹⁰

Scheeben was referring to the following passage in Pascal's

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Car enfin, si l'homme n'avoit jamais esté corrompu, il jouiroit dans son innocence et de la vérité et de la félicité avec assurance; et si l'homme n'avoit jamais esté que corrompu, il n'auroit aucune idée ni de la vérité ni de la béatitude. Mais malheureux que nous sommes, et plus que s'il n'y avoit point de grandeur dans notre condition, nous avons un idée du bonheur, et ne pouvons y arriver; nous sentons un image de la vérité, et ne possédons que le mensonge; incapables d'ignorer absolument et de sçavoir certainement, tant il est manifest que nous avons esté dans un degré de perfection dont nous sommes malheureusement décheus.

...Et cependant sans ce mystère, le plus incompréhensible de tous, nous sommes incompréhensibles à nous memes. Le noeud de nostre condition prend ses replis et ses tours dans cet abisme; de sorte que l'homme est plus inconcevable sans ce mystère que ce mystère n'est inconcevable à l'homme.¹¹

10.

MATTHIAS JOSEPH SCHEEBEN, The Mysteries of Christianity (Trans. by Cyril Vollert S.J.) St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1946, p. 203.

11.

BLAISE PASCAL, Pensées, Part II, No. 258. (Quoted from the bilingual edition of H.F. STEWART, ROUTLEDGE and KEGAN PAUL, London, 1950, pp. 150-152).

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It is clear that Scheeben did not hold to the discovery of original sin by unaided reason. Nor is he the only theologian who interprets the doctrine of original sin as a mystery in the total sense of the word. Garrigou la Orange, for example, is quite explicit as to the need of revelation in the matter.

Reason alone, from the miseries of this life, which affect even infants, cannot prove the existence of original sin, which remains a mystery in the proper sense, just as the elevation of the human race to the life of grace is a mystery, for God could have created man in the state of pure nature, in which he would not be immune from pain, death, ignorance and concupiscence.¹²

Cordevani pursues much the same line of argument,

Alcuni apologisti credettero poter dimostrare l'esistenza del peccato originale analizzando le condizioni presenti dall'umanità, e dichiarando che non potevano ammettersi se non come una pena di peccati commessi, tanto sono misere e disastrose. ... Ma è difficile dimostrare che i peccati attuali non siano sufficienti a spiegare tanta parte di mali che gravano sopra di noi, e non si deve dire che Dio non potesse creare l'uomo in condizioni di pura natura, senza doni soprannaturali o preternaturali, cioè nella nostra condizione prima del battesimo e senza il peccato.¹³

12.

REGINALD GARRIGOU-LA-ORANGE, The Trinity and God the Creator, (Trans. by Rev. Frederic C. Eckhoff). St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1952, p. 650.

13.

MARIANO CORDEVANI, Il Salvatore, Rome Editrice Studium. 1946, p. 330.

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It would seem, then, that authors who hold to the latter view are not lacking.¹⁴ According to these authorities, the present condition of man can suggest that something may have gone astray at the beginning. But reason alone cannot demonstrate this as an indisputable fact. As St. Thomas himself has stated,

Sic igitur huiusmodi defectus, quanvis naturales homini videantur absolute considerando humanam naturam ex parte eius quod est in ea inferius, tamen, considerando divinam providentiam et dignitatem superioris partis humanae naturae, satis probabiler probari potest huiusmodi defectus esse poenales. Et sic colligi potest humanum genus peccato aliquo originaliter esse infectum.¹⁵

There is then a unanimity of opinion on the part of the above authors concerning the fact that man's plight is observable. And by observing all of these authors have concluded that human nature does suffer from most unfortunate defects. In short it is far from being wholly constructive. Although it is interesting to note that opinions are divided regarding the possibility of arriving at the fact of an original sin through unaided reason such is really not the crux of the question here. All reason need show, in the present discussion, is the universality of this basic conflict. Even if the philosopher cannot

14.

See also: LUDWIG OTT, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, (trans. by Patrick Lynch), Cork, The Mercier Press Limited, 1960, p. 110; GEORGE D. SMITH, The Teaching of The Catholic Faith, Vol. I, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1953, p. 342; JEAN MOURoux, The Meaning of Man (trans. by A.H.G. Downes), New York, Sheed and Ward, 1948, pp. 73-74.

15.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, Chap. 52, par. 4 (Italics mine).

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demonstrate the ultimate why of the observable disharmony in man's nature, the disharmony is not the less observable. As the well-known contemporary Thomist, Vernon J. Bourke, has observed,

But a good ethicist recognizes the omnipresent ethical fact of the disturbance of the life of reason by the passions. The moral philosopher and the moral theologian do not differ widely on the actual facts of human existence. They differ in this: The moral theologian has an ultimate explanation (in the fall of man and consequent original sin) of a group of observable data, whereas the moral philosopher has but a proximate and imperfect explanation of the same data.¹⁶

And again,

Those who believe the account, given in the Book of Genesis, of the origin and life of Adam and Eve, accept the fact that all descendants of the first man and woman are subject to a distortion of personality, which is one element in the constitution of what is called original sin. This distortion consists in a lack of obedience of the sense appetites to reason. Human emotions, or passions, tend to get out of hand and make it hard to be reasonable in thought and action. It is not too much to say that this distortion is an observable empirical fact. The struggles of "the flesh and the spirit" has been noticed by many natural philosophers.¹⁷

Indeed, it is not at all necessary to restrict examples to Christian authors. Plato's theory of the ideas is too well-known to require a detailed presentation. Briefly, our ideas are nothing more than images of the eternal ideas. Knowledge is innate, it is not derived from the senses. In a previous life, a life in which the soul had not been united to the body, a life, in short, far superior to the present one, the soul received ideas through intuition. The human soul

¹⁶.

VERNON J. BOURKE, Ethics, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1951, p. 10.

¹⁷.

Ibid., p. 42.

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was united, "tied" in fact, to a body as punishment for some pre-natal sin. The senses merely help us to recall what we already know. The body being the seat of the passions is not a help but a hindrance to the living of the good life. Man's present state was, for Plato, far from wholly constructive. In point of fact, it is interesting to note that Plato viewed personality in the form of a charioteer who experienced considerable difficulty in keeping two steeds moving in the same¹⁸ direction. The steeds were named appetite and spirit.

If we consider the myths of ancient Greece, we discover a vein of thought strikingly similar to that disclosed in the Fall story of Genesis. Hesiod, the systemizer of Greek mythology and recognized father of didactic poetry tells in his Works and Days of a Golden age at a time when Cronus (Saturn) ruled the heavens. During this age men lived happily, free of care, untroubled by sickness and sorrow, indeed almost like gods. Even death was but a state of untroubled sleep. But "sin" changes this blissful state. Prometheus, "the friend and benefactor of mankind" in his attempt to become like the gods steals fire from heaven. The angry gods, in retaliation, order Hephaestus, the fire god, to make a lovely maiden, Pandora. She is sent on earth with a magic box, the famed "Pandora's box" with strict instructions not to open it. As is well-known, the box is opened, its contents freeing every kind of ill that could afflict mankind. The resemblance between this myth and the

18.

Plato, Phaedrus. (See: The Works of Plato, (trans. by) E. V. Rieu, New York, Tudor Publishing Co., Vol. 3 pp. 403-406.)

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Fall-story is indeed striking. It is re-told by Aeschylus in his Prometheus Bound, and remembered even by Horace.

If the inquiry be shifted to the literature of Babylonia we find striking parallels to the fall-story in the epic of Gilgamesh and the Adapa legend.

Whether these legends were inspired by a desire to explain the observable state of mankind; whether they are to be explained as remnants of the Primitive Revelation, or finally whether they in some way can be accounted for by direct or indirect contact with the Hebrews is not to the point here. What should be considered, rather, is that all of them see man's plight as being far from desirable.

Finally, if we wish to bring the discussion back to the present, we find collaborative statements by such outstanding figures as C.E.M. Joad and Reinhold Niebuhr.

I mean the evils of cruelty, savagery, oppression, violence, egotism, aggrandisement, and lust of power. So pervasive and insistent have these evils become that it is at times difficult to avoid concluding that the Devil has been given a longer rope than usual for the tempting and corrupting of men. Insofar as evil becomes more obtrusive, it becomes correspondingly more difficult to explain it away by the various 19 methods which have been fashionable during the last twenty years.

19.

C.E.M. JOAD, God and Evil, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1943, p. 14.

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Reinhold Niehbur felt compelled to abandon his liberal Theology when a closer observation of human nature revealed it to be far from ideal. He seems to have been struck particularly by the dichotomy between the relatively good man and the most of man. He found his explanation in the opposing tendencies of man's composite nature. The result was what has been called "The startling 'discovery' of original sin".

The obvious fact is that man is a child of nature subject to its vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its impulses. ... The other less obvious fact is that man is a spirit who stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason, and the world.²⁰

The disorder of man's powers is indeed too obvious to deny. Every serious observer of human nature has been aware of the struggle within man. Its recognition is universal and echoes down the centuries. It would appear that nothing but the truth of this observation can account for its universal acceptance.

But, it may be argued, has it not been shown that Horney did admit of "normal" destructiveness? Although Horney did allow for "normal" destructiveness, there is, for her, every indication that this destructiveness too is promoted by the culture and not by human nature. A striking example of this in Western civilization and particularly in the United States, is the destructiveness implicit in the "normal" competitive struggles. "The child is inoculated with this germ at

20.

REINHOLD NIEHUR, Nature and Destiny of Man, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1941, Vol. 1, pp. 3-4.

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the very beginning". In effect then we are left with a position very much analogous to Rousseau's, since culture or environment appears to be the root of all evil. The poignant description of Rousseau's romanticism given by Jacques Maritain might well apply here:

It means that man originally lived in a purely natural paradise of happiness and goodness, and that Nature herself will in the future perform the function which grace fulfilled in the Catholic conception. It also means that such a state of happiness and goodness, of exemption from servile work and suffering, is natural to man, that is to say, essentially required by our nature. Not only then, is there no original sin of which we bear the guilt at our birth and still keep the wounds, not only is there no seat of concupiscence and unhealthy proclivities to incline us to evil, but, further, the state of suffering and hardship is one essentially opposed to nature and started by civilization, and our nature demands that we should, at any cost, be freed from it. That is what the dogma of the natural Goodness amounts to.²¹

But although Horney appears to have leaned very heavily toward this view, she failed to present any acceptable arguments to defend it. As has been stated, the fact that neurosis may be due to the environment in no way warrants the conclusion that human nature is wholly constructive. What is more, as has been shown, the testimony of mankind is hardly conducive to this view. If, as Horney affirmed, Freud's pessimism saw man as little more than a wholly material, instinct-ridden evil being, her own unbounded optimism relegated him almost to the realm of the angelic. A more realistic approach might have been realized through a blending of the two.

21.

JACQUES MARITAIN, Three Reformers, London, Sheed and Ward, 1950, p. 144.

CHAPTER II

NATURE AND ETIOLOGY OF NEUROSIS

Since Horney had denied both Freud's "pessimistic" view of human nature and the Christian position which saw a tendency to both good and evil in man, there seemed little left to do but predicate the unqualified "constructiveness" of human nature and seek in some source other than man, the reason for the destructiveness of her patients. Horney's view of human nature has already been discussed but there is left to consider its logical consequences. Does the environment unqualifiedly cause neurosis? Is man really environmentally determined in his healthy or neurotic growth?¹ In short, can Horney's position be reconciled with the nature of man? Any attempt at an adequate answer to this question must presuppose the answer to another: What constitutes a realistic view of human nature?

1.

Although the answer to these questions implicitly provides an answer to the question: "is man responsible for becoming neurotic?", nevertheless the question is sufficiently distinct and significant to require separate treatment. Therefore it will be dealt with in the chapter to follow along with the related topic of "responsibility while neurotic".

Nature and Etiology of Neurosis

1. An Evaluational Criterion

a) ²Rational Psychology - Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology

views man as a being composed of body and soul. That man has a body is evident. That man possesses a soul is clear from the fact that man is a living being. To be alive is to possess a principle of immanent action. It is this principle of activity which is called the soul.³ Furthermore although the body and soul of man are really distinct one from the other, in the sense that the body is not the soul, observation of man's activities indicates that body and soul enter into a union which in view of its intimate nature must be termed substantial.⁴ It follows from this that should man possess different orders or levels of being the substantial unity of man makes it such that in many if not all instances activities or effects on one level make themselves felt on

2.

The material that follows is not intended to reflect an exhaustive presentation of the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of man. Rather it is to be considered a brief outline of those aspects which are pertinent to the topic. Although the reasonableness of the basic tenets of Aquinas' psychology will be stressed, the purpose cannot be that of a total justification of the Thomistic position. Hence more often than not the reader will be referred to pertinent sections in the writing of St. Thomas.

3.

St. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 75, a.1.

4.

Ibid., Ia., q. 76, aa. 1-3.

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the others. Now man's activities do indicate different orders. These are traditionally termed the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational. The vegetative order comprises those basic processes which man shares with all other forms of life. These are nutrition, growth and reproduction.⁵ (It is of course true that in man the organs required for these basic functions are more numerous and more intricate. But this does not alter the functions as such).

Above and beyond the vegetative order there is another level of being which man shares with other animals. This is the realm of sensory life. This addition is of the utmost importance since it allows for a radical change in the exercise of being. It allows the subject not only 'to be' but to be 'aware'. Again the number and perfection of the powers which constitute sensitive life differ with the level of animal life. In man they manifestly find their fullest expression.

Sense knowledge is obtained by the sense faculties. These are divided into external and internal. The external senses, as is well known, are those of sight, hearing, smell, taste and somesthesia.⁶ The internal are the sensus communis, imagination, estimative power and memory.⁷ These, as is the case with the external senses, are distin-

5. Ibid., Ia, q. 78, a2.

6. Ibid., Q. 78, a. 3.

7. Ibid., Q. 78, a. 4.

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guished among themselves by their proper objects. A lengthy treatment of man's cognitive sense life falls outside the pale of the present discussion, but it is to be noted that although these potencies are organic in nature since their proper object is something material, in man they are enriched in virtue of a higher faculty of knowledge, the intellect. Thus, whereas irrational animals are capable of merely retaining the impressions of objects as gathered by the central sense, man in virtue of his intellect is capable of what is usually termed, creative imagination. Man may reproduce perceptions at will and even combine them so as to represent beings which the senses have not actually experienced.

Similarly, man's estimative power gains immeasurably by its association with intellect. In point of fact, Aquinas indicates its higher status by calling it 'cogitative power' or 'particular reason'. In contrast to brutes whose estimative power is so determined that it results in an almost unchanging set of reactions to beneficial and obnoxious situation, man's cogitative power comes to be under the control of reason, "so that the insensate aspect of objects are appreciated by him either ideationally, or by particular reason acting in conjunction with universal reason".

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Thus far, in speaking of sensitive life, we have kept to the cognitive aspect. But for every type of knowledge there must be a corresponding movement toward the object of knowledge. This movement⁸ is called appetite. The need of appetites becomes manifest when we consider that without them knowledge would be a dead-end. In such a case, the knowing subject, apart from having become 'another' in virtue of the cognitive union, would be no further advanced than a non-knowing subject since the knowledge could not be utilized. Since a neurosis is by general consensus basically an emotional disturbance, it will be useful to consider the passions in some detail.

Two basic kinds of sense appetites must be distinguished, the concupiscible and the irascible.⁹ Through the concupiscible appetites the animal is inclined to those goods which it requires for the perfection of its nature. The irascible appetites, in turn, are to the concupiscible as means to an end. Their concern is with the difficulty involved in the acquisition of the pleasurable object. Thus while the formal object of the concupiscible appetite is the pleasurable good, that of the irascible appetite is the arduous good.

8. Ibid., q. 80, a. 1.

9. Ibid., q. 81, a. 2.

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There are several fundamental movements to be considered in
¹⁰
each of the two appetites. Beginning with the concupiscible we may distinguish movements regarding a known good and a known evil. In the former case we experience first 'love' here taken to mean pleasure or 'complacency' in the object. This movement is followed by 'desire' and finally culminates in 'joy' an emotion experienced when the object desired is attained. In the case of the known evil, we experience first "hatred", that is intense dislike, then 'aversion' and finally "sadness" in the event that the known evil 'overtakes' and 'oppresses' us. (It should be noted that although a distinction has been drawn within the concupiscible appetite between known good and known evil, the formal object of the concupiscible appetite remains the same since evil is merely the absence of good. Thus, 'sadness' may result if a desired good is not obtained, since this would be an evil. Similarly if one escapes an evil, this escape is considered a good. Hence one experiences joy.)

The irascible appetite, in turn, is traditionally divided into five stages or movements. It should be noted that since the irascible appetites are to the concupiscible as means to an end their coming into activity presupposes a movement in the concupiscible appetites. Thus if there is a good which cannot be easily acquired desire gives way to

10.

Ibid., Ia.-IIae. qq. 22-48.

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'hope'. If, on the other hand, it seems that all efforts to acquire the good are useless, there will be a turning away from the good. This passion is termed 'despair'.

We have said that in the presence of a known evil, we experience first the passion of 'hatred'. If we consider ourselves capable of overcoming the evil in order, let us say, to avoid an even greater evil, we experience the passion known as 'courage' or 'daring'. Should we consider the evil, not as something to be overcome, but as something to be shunned, we experience 'fear'. This passion is stronger than that of 'aversion' since aversion implies an immediate reaction to a situation, whereas 'fear' is experienced when the evil is sensed to be inescapable. This experience obviously dampens our courage with resulting fear. Finally, 'anger' or 'rage' comes into play when an evil is resisted but must nonetheless be suffered. It is interesting to note that St. Thomas views the passion of anger as resulting from what is considered to be an injustice. The passion includes the note of desired revenge.

Finally, it should be noted that the movements of the sense appetites, or emotions (passions, emotions, feelings are here used interchangeably) are formally immaterial. That is, a sensible object is known by the external or internal senses as a result of which a psychic movement to or away from an object is experienced. In this sense, it can be said that man's sensory and intellectual life, in effect, constitute man's mental life. But although a psychic inclination, passions have their material element as well. Hence some physical

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change is to be considered essential to the nature of an emotion. Since passions are considered movements of the soul, and the soul is said to be the act of the body, it follows that these body changes result from the movement of the soul. It is to be noted further that the physical changes which result from the movements of the soul, vary with each individual. This is a most significant point since it shall be seen to have its repercussions in explaining the etiology of neurosis. It will be of some importance then, to consider the ultimate principle from which individual variations will stem:

It is clear that two persons do not differ one from the other because of their specific nature. If that were the case either one or the other would not be a man. The specific nature is a reason for similarity, not differences. All men are specifically the same. But differences in temperamental disposition, etc. are nonetheless observable. It could be argued of course, that such differences are purely environmental determinations. However such an argument would be both philosophically and experimentally unsound. In point of fact everyday observation of young children, and even infants indicates individual differences which cannot be adequately explained by an unqualifiedly environmental theory.

Ultimately viewed, the reason for individual differences lies
 11
 in matter. This is nothing more than an application of the principle

 11.

Id., De Ente Et Essentia, Chap. 2. Sec.6.

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that potency limits act. Here act is taken to be the specific nature and potency is taken to be the individual nature, that is the individual body.

...oportet considerare quod alicuid dicitur alicui homini naturale dupliciter: uno modo, ex natura speciei; alio modo, ex natura individui. Et quia unusquisque habet speciem secundum suam formam, individuatur vero secundum materiam; forma vero hominis est anima rationalis, materia vero corpus; id quod convenit homini secundum animam rationalem, est ei naturale secundum rationem speciei; id vero quod est ei naturale secundum determinatum corporis complexionem est ei naturale secundum naturam individui. Quod enim est naturale homini ex parte corporis secundum speciem, quodammodo refertur ad animam: inquantum scilicet tale corpus est tali animae proportionatum. ... Secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quasdam virtutes: ... Et secundum hoc, unus homo habet naturalem aptitudinem ad scientiam, alius ad fortitudinem, alius ad temperantiam.¹²

The appetitive life of individuals is thus seen to differ. This difference is in part at least 'a birthright pure and simple'. It is due to the somatic constitution, to the body in short, and, philosophically speaking, to matter as the principle of individuation. Such differences then, cannot be explained by the environment alone. As has already been noted, and as shall be shown, this is not an idle issue. It will be seen to have a very practical application when explaining at least some neuroses, and in dealing with the question of responsibility.

12.

Id., Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae., Q. 63, a. 1.

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At the beginning of the outline of Thomistic Psychology, it was said that man possesses a principle of immanent activity known as the soul. This principle man shares with all other forms of life. But in man this source of operation is seen to be of an entirely different order. This order is perceived by observing man's achievements on the intellectual level. It is not to the point in the present outline to enter into a detailed presentation of the proofs for the spirituality of the intellect. Nor is it to the point to discuss at length the process of knowledge. However, some brief observations are in order. The very presence of universal ideas in the mind (ex. animal) as well as our knowledge of the immaterial (ex. being) argues the existence of an immaterial faculty¹³ since it is manifest that a cognitive potency must be proportionate to its object. But to say that the intellect is immaterial is not to say that it is completely independent of matter. Knowledge begins with the senses. The individual is born "tabula rasa"¹⁴ and proceeds to acquire knowledge by his contact with reality. But the senses, both external and internal are organic in nature. Hence the process of cognition must go further in order to arrive at knowledge of the immaterial. It should be noted once again that the power capable of arriving at such knowledge must itself be immaterial.

¹³.

Id., Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Chaps. 49, 66; Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q. 75, a. 2; De Veritate, Q. 10, a. 8.

¹⁴.

Ibid., Ia, Q. 84, a. 3.

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What has been said regarding sense knowledge must be reiterated in our consideration of intellectual life. All knowledge is sterile by itself. It must be complemented by an appetitive power. In the case of the intellect such a power is known as the will. Now the intellect knows things under the aspect of the universal, the abstract, the immaterial. Hence its appetitive counterpart must be of such a nature as to move to the universal goods perceived by the intellect. Such a need points not only to the existence of a faculty other than the sense appetites, since the sense appetites being organic in nature are directed to material goods, but to a faculty which, in order to be proportionate to its task must be spiritual.¹⁵ Thus the proper object of the will is not the concrete individual good, but the universal good. It might be mentioned here in passing that since the proper object of the will is the universal good, the will is compelled to act only in the presence of such good. In the case of particular goods the will is not compelled to act. These considerations form the basis for the doctrine of human freedom and consequent responsibility, since to be free in the sense of possessing free will is to be responsible.

In conclusion, what was implied when it was said that the principle of man's operations is of an entirely different order, should be made more explicit. Although the operations of intellect and will in

¹⁵.

Ibid., Ia-IIae, Q. 9, a.5.

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man are extrinsically dependent upon matter inasmuch as will follows intellect and intellect depends upon the senses for knowledge of the external world, there is nonetheless an intrinsic independence from matter in those operations proper to these powers. Therefore, the soul,¹⁶ which is the principle of operations must be spiritual.

Such, in brief, is the Thomistic view of human nature. Man appears as a composite of body and soul. The powers of the soul are intellect and will. Man's will, granting limitations, is free. Since these powers are spiritual, the principle from which they emanate, the soul, is also spiritual. Body and soul enter into a substantial union. Man's operations indicate three orders of life, the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational. In view of the fact that man is a substance these three orders are fused into a potentially integrated unit. The word 'potentially' has been carefully chosen. In the normal course of events these three aspects should function in harmony, the end-result being equilibrium. This is particularly true of the cognitive and appetitive life of man. This equilibrium can be achieved only when the lower aspects of man are subordinated to the higher. This consideration becomes all the more evident if we reconsider briefly man's sensory appetites and their relationship to the spiritual appetitive power. As has been said already, the tendential movement of the sensory appetites

16.

Ibid., Ia, q.75, aa. 1-5; Id. De Anima a.6.

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is toward concrete goods. The will, on the other hand, moves towards the universal good. But the concrete good for man can only be a good inasmuch as it is part of the universal good. Or to put it another way, a particular good can only be a good for man if it benefits the whole man. Therefore it is of the very nature of the sensitive appetites to be subordinated to man's higher appetite and ultimately to reason. Where this condition exists there is integration and harmony. But man's powers do not always reflect this ideal subordination; deviations can and do occur.

17

b) Basic Needs - The discussion thus far has dealt primarily with a static view of human nature. But a neurosis whatever its specific causes must be, at least in part, the result of a developmental process. Therefore any attempt at evaluating a theory of neurosis, must be preceded not only by a presentation of human nature as such, but also of human nature dynamically viewed. In short, some consideration must be given to that toward which man's nature tends. It will not be necessary to enter into a detailed presentation of developmental psychology. Such an endeavour would transcend the scope of this chapter.

 17.

The remainder of this section represents a summary of the essential aspects of Father Joseph Muttin's position regarding man's fundamental needs. His theory appears in his Psychoanalysis and Personality, London, Sheed and Ward, 1954. Since its publication, this work, and particularly the second part. ('A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality') has rapidly come to be accepted as a classic in the field.

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But it will be necessary to take at least a short chapter from dynamic psychology, a psychology which is the natural complement of rational psychology. For it is only by seeing that human appetites naturally tend to certain objects, that one can begin to appreciate how the frustration of the attainment of these objects can have such far-reaching repercussions.

In treating of man from the point of view of rational psychology it was said that man's operations indicate three levels of life, the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational. Attention was also drawn to the fact that the unity of man's nature is a substantial unity. The appetitive life of man was discussed in some detail. We are about to consider now, the object of man's appetites. In view of man's composite nature it is clear that the goods towards which man's appetites can tend are numberless. They range from the most mundane to the most spiritual. But our concern will be with man's fundamental needs. In the light of the cardinal points outlined above we may well expect that man's nature, when viewed dynamically should reveal needs in keeping with that nature. As Father Nuttin points out, "The needs of a being have their source in that which it is".¹⁸ Furthermore these needs will naturally manifest themselves on all levels of that nature. Finally,

18.

JOSEPH NUTTIN, Psychoanalysis and Personality, London, Sheed and Ward, 1954, p. 235.

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in view of the unity of man's nature we may well expect that in the same way that man's vegetative, sensitive and rational powers are inextricably interwoven, so will the experience of the needs corresponding to man's nature be experienced to one degree or another by the whole man.

Three levels of activity may be distinguished in the human mind. On the lowest level we discern those needs connected with the physiological aspect of man. Thirst, for example, is not merely an expression of an organic necessity. It is actually grasped as such. In other words there is an awareness of this biological need. This level, then, is termed the "psycho-physiological" level of psychic life.

Above this level man reflects activities which are linked with the world of other men. This may be termed "the level of our life of¹⁹ relationships on the 'social' or 'worldly level'". In order to maintain parallel terminology this level may be termed "psycho-social". Since this level and the drives connected with it will be discussed in some detail we shall content ourselves at the moment with having mentioned it.

Finally, an examination of the contents of our mind also reveals elements which transcend the other two levels. Examples of such

¹⁹.

Ibid., p. 207.

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elements would be "the problem of man's destiny and his existence; the affirmation of absolute being or value which he makes about certain realities, the experience of moral obligations; the problems concerning the value of his knowledge etc." Since the contents of this level obviously transcend the world of matter, it is called the "spiritual" level. Perhaps it cannot be overstressed that in virtue of the unity of man's nature these levels are far from being isolated one from the other.

With the release of the nervous stimulus and the whole psycho-physiological process, there is not simply a "sensation" of pain, etc. but a grasp of a meaningful situation. A man will realize, for example, that something is going badly, or that as a result of illness he will not be able to realize a certain project. There is furthermore the metaphysical content of the conscious "I" finding itself face to face with itself or an "object" or an external situation. ... the "I" ... becomes conscious of a "given" situation and thus "transcends the mere fact of being "affected".²⁰

Having indicated the different levels of man's psychic life we may pass on to the fundamental needs which arise from them.

On the biological level we perceive a striking difference between the organism and its external environment. Whereas the latter may be constantly changing, the former attempts to maintain its "internal environment" within definite limits. Body temperature, and

20.

Ibid., p. 208.

21.

Ibid., p. 209.

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the amounts of certain basic bodily substances such as calcium, sugar, water, etc. must be kept at an equilibrium without which the body would not long survive. This organic co-ordination in spite of changes in the external environment may be termed "homoeostasis". It appears to be "the primary dynamic force in a living being at the biological level".²² But this tendency gives way to complex reaction patterns of the organism. These are known as "behaviour". In other words changes in the biological equilibrium of man involve not merely chemical and physiological reactions, but reactions on the psycho-physiological level, "... as an experienced, concrete sensation, producing meaningful kinds of reactions that emanate from man as a vital unity..." For example, sensations of heat and cold have given rise to the development of air-conditioning. Any break in organic equilibrium registers on the psychological level as an experienced need, the need to return to an experienced condition of organic well-being. The need obviously manifests itself in many forms such as hunger, thirst, cold etc. But in spite of the variety of its manifestations there is a "dynamic unity". This unity may be expressed as "the need for organic preservation and development". But self-preservation and self-development imply another need, namely that of "close contact, i.e. mutual exchanges with the surrounding biological sphere". This, indeed, appears to be self-evident.

22.

Ibid., p. 211.

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The organism is not sufficient unto itself. It must open out to its external environment in order that it may preserve itself and develop. This opening out implies contacts and exchanges. Once again this need manifests itself in different ways, but a dynamic unity underlies it as well. It is the "active openness" of the organism. As might well be expected the need for organic preservation and development and the need for biological contact are closely interlinked since "it is in and through biological contact that the organism preserves itself and develops."

The most striking form of the need for contact on the psycho-physiological level is that of sexual contact.

The biological organism is not only a "mouth", "open" to certain elements in the biochemical sphere, it is also an appeal for total contact with certain bodily forms in the social sphere (i.e. one's fellow-creatures). Here too, special physiological, chemical and physical factors condition the sexual need; nevertheless, as psychically experienced and as manifested in behaviour, the sexual need is one aspect of this need to enter into contact with "others". It is this need which spontaneously impels the individual to physical intimacy, and to total contacts with others... ²⁴

It is of interest to note then that even on the biological and psycho-physiological level, the human organism is not self-centered. It needs contact. Should these contacts be denied for one reason or another, the organism experiences discomfort ranging from uneasiness to anxiety to death. Conversely the organism experiences pleasures of various degrees in the exercise of vital contacts.

23.

Ibid., p. 215.

24.

Ibid., p. 216.

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Such are man's needs on the biological level. But it should be remembered that,

... in man all these so-called "instinctive" or biological needs act in a specifically human fashion, as regards both the kinds of behaviour in which they are manifested, and the emotional and 25 dynamic potentialities and repercussions which correspond to them.

The needs for vital development and contact may also be perceived on the psycho-social level. It has already been said that in virtue of his peculiar nature man is able to grasp external objects as meaningful situations. In the same way that man strives to preserve his existence as an organism, he also is driven to preserve his social well-being. Man does not wish to "disappear socially". Should the individual feel neglected or ignored, the reaction will be in terms of a fear of a "loss to his personal and social existence". Therefore man strives at all times to prevent his social annihilation. He experiences a need for social recognition and esteem and his behaviour reflects his attempts at gaining this social equilibrium.

In the same way that the importance of the needs for self-preservation, development and contact are best detected on the biological level when a lack has disturbed the organic equilibrium, so on the psycho-social level are the needs and their strength most obvious when for one reason or another the individual ²⁵ "fears that his effort to be 'himself amongst others' is being defeated". This last quotation is

25.

Ibid., pp. 217, 218.

26.

Ibid., p. 218.

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of the utmost importance since it indicates something peculiar to man, namely the need not only to be a man but to be an individual, if you will, a person. Should such a need be frustrated, "then a state of extreme tension develops and a break of the normal equilibrium may follow".²⁷

When speaking of man's fundamental needs on the biological level, it was said that the need for vital development was complemented by the need for contact. As might well be expected such is also the case on the psycho-social level. The only way in which man may survive socially is by developing the social level of his existence. And the only way in which he can do this is by social contact. Thus,

man experiences and manifests a need for others. Apart from any external dependence on his fellow-men, he feels an internal need of contact, exchange, communication, support, sympathy, self-giving. This need for psychic contact and exchange, under forms which may be more or less passive or more or less active, lies at the very root of man's psycho-social life.

.....
Nothing is so disturbing, so "stifling" to psychic-life, as the experience of feeling derelict and alone; it seems to correspond to the condition of the organism cut off from all contact with the surrounding air."²⁸

This need too, has its different manifestations which may be active or passive. Striking instances are "love, friendship, sympathy, respect, domination and submission etc." Furthermore these needs for

27.

Ibid., p. 219.

28.

Ibid., p. 219.

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social development and social contact not only complement one another, but as was the case on the psycho-physiological level, are inextricably interwoven. Of particular interest to our topic is the connection of these two needs in the early stages of the individual's development.

Thus the child, for example, needs support and affection (contact) whilst at the same time he wants to "be somebody" amongst others (self-preservation and development); but it is only by feeling that he is loved and surrounded by affection that he can acquire confidence in himself, feel himself to be "someone" and preserve and develop himself psychologically.

The opposite is also true; being oneself and having confidence in oneself are indispensable conditions for being able to make contact with others. It is necessary to possess a minimum of self-confidence- i.e., to be oneself - in order to be able to come out of oneself and enrich oneself by a psychic contact in which one both gives and takes.²⁹

One final point regarding the need for social contact. Thus far the discussion of man's fundamental needs has centered on the aspect of self-preservation both on the biological and social level. Because man does not wish to go out of existence either as an organism or a social being he must make use of contact on both levels. This may have given the impression that man's tendencies are purely egoistic. But such in fact is not the case or, at the least, should not be. Rather, it is an observable fact that man becomes most human the less he concentrates on himself. This Father Muttin calls, "the gift of self to what is objective."³⁰ Indeed, "the most efficient and efficacious way

²⁹.

Ibid., p. 220.

³⁰.

Ibid., p. 221.

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way of developing through one's actions is to be not immediately occupied with oneself, in order to give oneself completely, psychologically to 'others'". The example of the shy individual is a typical case in point. Too preoccupied with himself in his activities he fails to make a significant impact on his social environment. And what is true on the social level is also applicable to the individual's moral development, though here this gift of self to the object is not to be taken to mean "psychic concentration". Rather it implies the giving of oneself to another "in one's aim or intention". But once again the unity of man's nature will not have it that moral perfection may be achieved in spite of a lack of psychic self-detachment. The latter is indeed to be considered a prerequisite. Conversely, "even from the psychological point of view it is only through the moral gift of self that man reaches the full development of his personality."³¹ Thus, "moral egocentrism" contracts "psychic openness" and lack of psychic self-detachment explains how it is "that in some people the moral qualities, or virtues, often seem to have something 'unnatural' about them, something which betrays the absence of a healthy psychic basis."³²

31.

Ibid., p. 225.

32.

Ibid., p. 225.

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Viewed in this way man's fundamental drives and particularly his need for contact cannot be explained as instances of egoism pure and simple, but rather as the only valid means, supposing them to be properly used, by which the individual can survive and unfold his potentialities as a distinct human being.

There is one level left to consider, that of the spiritual. Man is not totally immersed in his biological and social environment. Rather he transcends them. This fact is all too obvious. Anyone can demonstrate it to himself by reflecting upon the content of some of his conscious states. Man, does not merely exist but "asks himself questions about his very existence." Thus the need for self-preservation and development is also perceivable on this level "in certain universal religious tendencies of mankind; a need sometimes expressed in the saying that man wants to 'save his soul'".³³ And once again we perceive the existence of the need for contact even on this level for, "'saving one's soul' means primarily maintaining oneself in existence as a personality integrated with the absolute".³⁴ It is of course true, and especially true in Western civilization, that these tendencies do not always take religious forms. For some these needs take the form of

33.

Ibid., p. 227.

34.

Ibid., p. 227.

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evolving philosophical systems, and the systems themselves may conclude that there is no after-life, that man is simply a link in the chain of the evolution of matter. But there may nonetheless be a yearning to continue to live in the memories of others or to find meaning in existence in the fulfillment of all the potentialities of that existence here and now. And it may well be that,

...at a certain moment in the individual's existence or in the development of human culture, this general need for self-preservation and self-development can appear in a much more pronounced fashion at the psycho-social level than at the absolute level, so that it will be difficult to recognize this need in its absolute form. A man of thirty, for example, experiences this need much more intensely in its social form than as a desire to make sure of his eternal salvation. The opposite can be true of the man who retires from social life.³⁵

But many and varied as the forms of this need may be, and however remote from the need in its most absolute form, it is nonetheless a fact that it is a need "felt universally by man, to preserve and develop himself on the specifically human level to which he has been raised by his transcendent spirit."³⁶ In effect it is a need to develop the moral personality of man since having challenged his existence and answered in one way or another the question of the meaning of that existence, man tries to develop in terms of that answer

³⁵.

Ibid., p. 226.

³⁶.

Ibid., p. 229.

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and by contact with the moral object, whether it be in terms of an "absolute" or even merely fidelity to himself, he attempts to integrate himself with the object and thus preserve himself and develop. Thus,

Before any biological or bodily interaction, and even before communion of any other kind with his fellow-men, man needs a more universal sort of communication and support and integration; he needs to be able to know and feel himself integrated into an absolute order of existence.³⁷

There is a tendency in the would-be-wise man to equalize conditions in history. Everything, we are told, is pretty much today as it was in the days of old. Man, for better and for worse, is still man. To consider other days as "the good old days" is merely to reflect one's incapacity to view life as a challenge. The man who looks back and sees the past as better, views the past through rose-colored glasses.

There is of course some grain of truth to these observations. It is difficult if not indeed impossible to utter such vague generalities and miss the mark altogether. But when in the process of human history there comes a break between past and present, "when the various attachments to a past and future, to the earth and the family - when the thousand and one things to which existence attaches itself, and which give existence its meaning and value - have been dissolved,³⁸ man feels utterly up-rooted". Such, indeed, is the situation today.

³⁷,
Ibid., p. 229.

³⁸,
Ibid., p. 229.

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In such a situation man's most fundamental need on the spiritual level, the need to find a meaning for his existence and to become integrated with it is frustrated. Such a condition brings into clearer view the "reality of man's spiritual needs" and explains also the "metaphysical misery" in which so many of us find ourselves today. Once again, as was the case on the psycho-biological and psycho-social level, the power of this spiritual need is most obvious when it is least satisfied.

Thus the needs for self-development and contact are seen to appear on all three levels of psychic life. It is important to realize that in the same way that man's vegetative sensitive and rational powers are irreducible and together form man's substantially united nature, so are these three levels irreducible since they spring from these irreducible powers.

Indeed the experience of the environment as a meaningful situation is quite a different thing from the biochemical experience of the same environment in the process of metabolism. And the experience of meaning, as such has no physiological equivalent.³⁹

A final word, by way of re-emphasizing the fundamental origin of these needs. It was said at the beginning of this presentation that man's basic needs or drives must reflect what man is. Ultimately then they must have their origin in man's nature, and must be reflected on all levels of that nature. As has been shown man does have needs on all levels of his nature. Furthermore these needs interpenetrate each other

³⁹.Ibid., p. 208.

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and are basically the expression, on different levels, of two fundamental needs in man, the need for self-development and the need for contact. These two are the most fundamental since they are "rooted in the two essential aspects of human existence", namely the existence of man as a person but a person not sufficient unto himself. Viewed in this manner this system of needs cannot be interpreted as a logical structure erected for the sake of proving something else. Rather it can only be regarded as the natural outgrowth of an analysis of human nature in both its static and dynamic forms.

2. Origin and Development of Neurosis: An evaluation

With the preceding considerations as points of departure we are in a position to attempt a comparison and appreciation. Horney's position was presented in Part 2. A view of human nature in both its static and dynamic aspects has also been put forth. There is then left to consider whether this radical departure from the normal behaviour pattern, namely a neurosis, can be explained as Horney did without involving oneself in positions which cannot be reconciled with man's nature. However, before attempting an evaluation, it will be of value to reconsider briefly her view of the matter.

a) Nature, Genesis and Structure of Neurosis - It will be recalled that Horney regarded a neurosis as "a psychic disturbance brought about by fears and by attempts to find compromise solutions for conflicting tendencies". The disturbance manifested itself in an impairment of one's relation to self and others. It came about through the

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combined effect of cultural and family influences and as the logical aftermath of the development of "basic anxiety". This in turn was the result of repression. The notion that neuroses come about as a result of repression has come to be accepted as an indisputable fact in psychiatric circles. Horney's theories do not represent an exception.

Freud has not only revealed the importance of unconscious processes in the formation of character and neuroses, but has taught us a great deal about the dynamics of these processes. The shutting out of awareness of an affect or impulse Freud has called repression. The process of repression can be compared to the ostrich policy: The repressed effect or impulse is as effective as it was before, but we "pretend" that it does not exist. The only difference between repression and pretense, in its usual meaning, is that in the former we are subjectively convinced that we do not have the impulse. Simply repressing a drive usually does not suffice, if it is of any consequence to keep it in abeyance. For this purpose other defensive measures are necessary.⁴⁰

As to what it was that was repressed, Horney maintained it to be hostility. As a result of the combined effects of cultural conditions and unfavorable interpersonal relations in the family, a child becomes "insecure, apprehensive, isolated and resentful". These unfavorable family influences were described as a lack of love on the part of the parents because of their own neurosis, this lack manifesting itself in an absence of warmth, mutual respect and consideration.⁴¹

⁴⁰.

KAREN HORNEY, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1939, p. 35.

⁴¹.

For a more comprehensive treatment see pages 94-96.

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The child's helplessness combined with cultural norms forces him to repress his hostility. But unfortunately the matter does not end there. Repression of hostility has far-reaching psychological consequences.

Repressing a hostility means "pretending" that everything is all right and thus refraining from fighting when we ought to fight or at least when we wish to fight. Hence the first unavoidable consequence of such a repression is that it generates a feeling of defenselessness, or to be more exact, it reinforces an already given feeling of defenselessness.⁴²

In the absence of favorable counteracting factors basic anxiety results. Horney described it as a "feeling of being small, insignificant, helpless, deserted endangered, in a world that is out to abuse, cheat, attack, humiliate, betray, envy." The anxiety, in short is experienced not only with regard to the family but takes in the entire environment. It will be recalled that basic anxiety was compared to an "efficient cause or 'motor' that sets the neurotic process going and keeps it going." The basic anxiety is said to crystallize into a character structure. This process seems especially well expressed in the following lines:

In order to allay basic anxiety, the child mobilizes his resources and energies, and his attitudes and behaviour toward others are modified in the interest of insuring his safety.⁴³

⁴².

KAREN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937, p. 64.

⁴³.

Ed. by Karen Horney, Are You Considering Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1946, p. 69.

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The structure will differ to some extent with the neurotic, depending upon whether he moves primarily toward, away from or against his environment, and which of these moves predominates depends in turn on the individual and the circumstances. From these three basic moves, different trends are said to emanate. Among the more significant one would be:

1. An indiscriminate need for affection and approval.
2. The need for a "partner" amounting to the relinquishing of one's responsibility for his own life.
3. The need to restrict one's life with a false modesty as the supreme value. (One's existing faculties and potentialities are said to be belittled).
4. The need for power accompanied by a desire to dominate others and by an essential disrespect for them as human beings. The need to control others through reason and foresight attended by a denial of the power of the emotions and a contempt of them.
5. The need to exploit others and by hook or crook to get the better of them.
6. The need for social recognition and prestige.
7. The need for personal admiration.
8. Ambition for personal achievement accompanied by destructive tendencies (toward the defeat of others).
9. The need for self-sufficiency and independence (Necessity never to need anybody, or to yield to any influence, or to be tied down to anything).
10. The neurotic need for perfection and unassailability, accompanied by feelings of superiority over others.⁴⁴

It should be noted once again that in spite of a superficial similarity⁴⁵ these trends are significantly different from normal drives.

⁴⁴.

For a more detailed outline of the above trends, see Karen Horney, Self-Analysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1942, pp. 54-60. See also, Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, Chapters 6, 10 and pp. 98-99. Also Id., New Ways in Psychoanalysis, Chapters B, 15.

⁴⁵.

See pp. 109-111.

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It was indicated when discussing the neurotic structure, that apart from "allowing" one of the three basic moves to predominate, the neurotic was forced to seek other means of solving his problems. A major escape trend was described as externalization, "The tendency to experience internal processes as if they occurred outside oneself and, as a rule, to hold these external factors responsible for one's difficulties." This escape mechanism amounts to projection on a grand scale. It renders the individual totally irresponsible by rendering the world responsible for all his vicissitudes.

The "idealized image" was also presented as a major attempt at solution. The individual tries to escape from himself by building in his imagination an ideal self. He tries to live a dream life since his actual life is too unpleasant. This escape mechanism was later seen by Horney to be "the" escape mechanism of the neurotic. It entailed the development of a fantastic amount of neurotic pride. Finally, there were other minor protective devices which Horney termed "auxiliary approaches to artificial harmony".

Such is Horney's picture of neurosis in terms of its nature, causes and resulting character structure. For Horney, then, the fundamental causes of neurosis lie in the combined effect that unfavorable cultural conditions and intensely unfavorable interpersonal relations, particularly within the family, have upon the child.

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b) An Evaluation - We may begin by considering in greater detail the more proximate causes, those brought about by unfavorable family influences, since in Horney's view a neurosis does not result unless they exist to a pronounced degree.

46

When discussing the genesis of neurosis, in terms of the force exerted by unfavorable family influences, several factors were brought to light. The most important, as might well be expected, was a lack of genuine love on the part of the parents. This lack is not to be interpreted merely as a negation. Far rather it is to be considered a privation of a most fundamental need. It will be recalled that man's most basic needs are for vital development and contact. The need for vital development may be considered the "strong form of the drive toward self-preservation". Now the child is to a great extent a human being only in potency. His powers do not appear at the peak of perfection at birth. Rather they develop. This is true particularly of the emotional and intellectual spheres. Indeed this point is all too obvious to require elaboration. But in order for such development to take place the child must feel wanted and loved. This, then, is a most basic manifestation of the need for contact. ⁴⁷ If this need is frustrated it should not be at all surprising that the child experiences fear, a fear which is well akin to a fear of annihilation.

46.

See pp. 93-98.

47.

See quotations 161-162 of this chapter.

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....The drive for self-preservation is completely developed from the very beginning; in fact, in the baby it plays a dominant role. For this reason one of the first emotions known to the child is the fear of annihilation. More than once, we have felt that deep seated fear states in neurotic persons had their origin in this basic fear which existed in the earliest period of their life.⁴⁸

As has been already indicated, this lack of love is not merely an absence. At the baby stage it may be experienced as a lack of physical contact with the mother, perhaps because the child might not have been wanted to begin with, or because of peculiar methods of upbringing, or because of preference for other children. It may be, on the other hand, that there was physical contact but a contact laden with nervousness and anxiety. The end-result in any case would be one ranging from uneasiness to fear of annihilation. But a lack of love manifests itself in other ways as well, and this is particularly true when the child begins to pass the baby stage and progresses to that of the infant and the child. It will be well to reconsider the factors put forth by Horney since these too amount to a frustration of man's basic needs:

48.

A.A.A. TERRONE, The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology, New York, P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1960, p. 63.

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Preference for other children is not experienced as such during the first few weeks or even months of life. But the child becomes conscious of this preference within a relatively short period.⁴⁹ Indeed it is the very nature of the child to be self-centered. Children tend to resent any show of affection bestowed upon others and this even when they have been given their due. If, apart from this apparently natural tendency, the child is made to realize that there objectively is a difference in affection, that indeed he does not count as much as others, he cannot help but register hostility, inferiority-feelings and fear of survival. (We need not enter here into a discussion of the precise nature of this fear of annihilation. The child will not explicitly fear that he is going to disappear from existence. This reflection is impossible for him. What he will register however will be a general fear of survival and more particularly as he passes the baby stage, of survival as a social being, as he really is, as a unique and worthwhile person.).

 49.

We are not being so naive here as to believe that parents can be attracted to their children to precisely the same extent and in precisely the same way. This is a manifest impossibility. Physical and temperamental differences in the child coupled with the individual personality of the parents cannot help but bring about differences in the way parents react to one child as opposed to another. But these differences are basically insignificant provided there is genuine affection for each child.

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This is a reaction to but one unfavorable situation. But situations such as these do not appear in isolated form. Lack of love on the part of parents is many-sided in its manifestations and obviously varies in intensity. Unjust reproaches and unpredictable changes between over-indulgence and scornful rejection are striking instances. The latter may well be complemented by temper-tantrums directed at the child. These of course are manifestations of a tendency which is perhaps more basic, namely that of inconsideration for the child as a potentially constructive and unique human being, yet basically helpless and inculpably ignorant, therefore easily capable of performing "annoying" things; a being whose life of reason has not yet conquered his emotional life, hence a being directed to the concrete as an object of the greatest importance to him, a being who is thus easily frustrated in his normal pursuits and finally a being who can only unfold and grow if these natural limitations are understood and loved and gently but firmly channelled along proper paths. In the absence of such active consideration and active love and in the presence of unjust reproaches and inconsistent disciplinary attitudes, the child does indeed begin to feel that "his right to existence lies solely in his living up to his parents expectations". If these expectations apart from being rigid and unreasonable are also inconsistent, if so-called discipline is meted out while the parent is emotionally out of control, the child naturally registers confusion and anxiety for his well-being possibly in an obscure form on the level of pure existence but certainly on the level of social existence and self-development.

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Let us consider some of the other factors. Hornay speaks of unfulfilled promises, of interfering with a child's legitimate wishes, of ridiculing independent thinking, of spoiling its interests in its own pursuits. All these attitudes have at least one factor in common. Once again there is a failure to consider the child as a biologically, emotionally and rationally helpless creature who can only rid himself of this detrimental state if he is intelligently loved. This implies, among many other things, making the child feel that he is significant and that the fulfillment of legitimate desire is not promised simply for the sake of temporarily avoiding an annoying reaction without any real intention of fulfilling that desire at the designated time, but because a child's legitimate wishes should be attended to and because there is a realization on the part of the parent that a child is a feelingful being who cannot help but register disappointment and, perhaps obscurely but nonetheless quite really, a lack of respect and conscious hostility, and once again fear of his own significance as a human being, toward the parents who promise only to frustrate the child in the end. Similarly if the child is to grow, his natural desire for self-development and consequent independence cannot be frustrated without often incurring intense psychic damage. The child who is constantly ridiculed for arriving at an incorrect, possibly ridiculous but nonetheless independent conclusion; the child whose legitimate but perhaps erratic pursuits are vehemently and possibly sarcastically interfered with under the pretext that he doesn't know what he is at,

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that he is stupid, that he is inconsiderately ruining property etc., is again the child whose needs for self-development and contact are being if not in intent, certainly in effect, cruelly, in fact inhumanly, frustrated.

To continue our examination of Horney's individual causes of neurosis, we might well consider the effects of parental quarrels on the growing child, as well as the effects of the child being made to feel that the outside world is a treacherous, dangerous place from which there is much to be feared and little to be gained. Once again the child becomes fearful, apprehensive, confused, anxious. If the very people who are to help him to survive and develop are incapable of contacting each other in a mutually constructive manner, how is he to feel for his own safety? If the world is made to appear to him as a den of hostility and danger how is he to contact that world in a way that will help him to actualize in a beneficial manner his basic need for social contact not only with the family but with playmates and other adults? Finally, if a child is made to side against the other parent how can he help but register hostility, fear of retaliation, possibly guilt, and certainly a consciousness that what should be unified is divided that what should be a combined source of strength and love is in fact a camp of quarrels and accusations in which he is more or less forced or convinced to take sides and in which he is in any case the tragic loser?

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It cannot be overemphasized that "the effectiveness of such influence is not dismissed by the fact that they are often subtle and veiled. Moreover there is usually not just one adverse factor but several in combination."

What is the common denominator in all these instances? In terms of man's nature, the question might be phrased as: What effect have all these factors on the satisfaction of man's most fundamental needs on the psycho-physiological, psycho-social and spiritual level? Such would be the question put by those concerned with the dynamic aspect of man's nature. In terms of man's nature as man, his, shall we say, more static nature, we might well inquire into the effect that the above factors have on the integration of his powers. What role do the passions come to have in the light of such situations? What effect has the resulting state of the passions or emotions on that which makes a man to be precisely a man, namely his rational powers of intellect and will?

In the light of our presentation of man's fundamental needs on all three levels of psychic life, it would appear manifest that the child has been frustrated on the psycho-physiological level in that he has come to fear his total annihilation.

On the psycho-social level the child has been seriously impaired in the fulfillment of both the needs for development and contact. He has not really grown. Rather he has come to be fearful and hostile. He has lost his spontaneity, his confidence, his feeling of worth, and with this attitude of mind has come an incapability or at least a heavily

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diminished capability of opening out to the world, of contacting it as a social being. Conversely, incapable of making proper contacts, his feelings of being peculiar, inferior, inconsequent are also re-inforced. He will have become pervertedly self-centered. That forgetfulness of self which is so essential for constructive contact and growth has been seriously impaired. And this lack of psychic self-detachment cannot help but have its repercussions on the moral sphere. One cannot be said to live a truly wholesome moral life if he is constantly concerned with himself and tacitly but nonetheless vehemently, in the manner of a volcano, at war with the world. Thus, the effects of frustrated needs make themselves felt on the spiritual level as well and not only by robbing moral life of that sincerity and spontaneity which make the moral act completely praiseworthy, but also and as a natural consequence, by not permitting the individual to properly fulfill his need of integration with the absolute. Thus the neurotic will indeed question the meaning of his existence. But it should be stressed here that the neurotic's questioning of the meaning of his existence is not identical to that of the normal individual. There can be little doubt that there are similarities since both normal and neurotic are children of the times. But when the normal individual questions the meaning of existence he questions the meaning of man's existence. Naturally he includes himself. The neurotic, on the other hand, questions the value of his own existence independent of anyone else's. Perhaps it would be coming closer to the mark to say that he questions the meaning of his existence in contrast

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to rather than together with that of others. Isolated from the world and cognizant of his failure to realize his potentialities, his natural desire for happiness frustrated, he gives way to hopelessness and despair, and the questioning of his existence really amounts to asking whether such a life is really worth living. And there will be a natural tendency to blame, at times himself, at other times parents, friends, fate or God Himself. Such a state of mind clearly reflects a metaphysical misery though here it must be considered the result of an inexorable process. This does not of course mean that all religious tendencies vanish. In fact, they may not even appear as religious tendencies since, as Father Nuttin has remarked, cultural or personal factors may make it such that it is difficult to perceive this need in its absolute form. Rather, the needs for development and contact on the spiritual level are to one degree or another frustrated. Horney's perceptiveness could not but bring her to the conclusion that neuroses do involve moral problems:

Meanwhile the consequences of all these unresolved conflicts were gradually becoming clearer to me. I saw the manifold fears that were generated, the waste of energy, the inevitable impairment of moral integrity, the deep 50 hopelessness that resulted from feeling inextricably entangled.

In terms of rational psychology, the effect has been a serious frustration of the fundamental objects of man's appetites. Man's external and internal cognitive powers have brought him in contact with

50.

KAREN HORNEY, Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945, p. 177.

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an environment which cannot allow him to satisfy the most basic requirements of his nature. This frustration registers in the life of the passions. The concupiscible appetites and the intellectual appetite innately loved those situations and objects which satisfied his fundamental needs on all levels of his existence. But that movement of the concupiscible appetite known as joy was not experienced since the objects were not attained. Rather their attainment was frustrated, the end result being the unnatural development of the irascible emotions of fear, anger, hostility and despair, toward objects which in the normal course of development should not elicit such passions. Conversely the passion known as courage or daring, so manifestly important

51.

It should be of extreme interest that A.A.A. Terruwe, M.D., has published the book referred to in an earlier footnote, The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology. The work represents an attempt at a rapprochement between Aristotelian-Thomistic Psychology and dynamic Psychiatry. Terruwe attempts to explain neurosis in the light of the Thomistic view of man. Her basic thesis is that a neurosis comes about as a result of repression, as arising "by an unnatural attitude toward an emotion which, having been frustrated, cannot come to rest but remains active in the unconscious life." More in the language of rational psychology, a neurosis is "a disturbance of the proper order of the psycho-logical faculties", or "the neurosis is a disorder caused by an abnormal condition in man's sensory appetitive life, wherein the emotions fail to receive their natural guidance from the intellect because of the interference and repressing action of the irascible emotions." (In speaking of the action of the irascible emotions Terruwe has, to a large extent, in mind the abnormal role which particular reason assumes in the life of the child, when there is a "premature development of the intellect before the emotional life has matured sufficiently." Her philosophical analysis of the nature of neurosis presents challenging ground for study. Her position has not been elaborated in this chapter since such a presentation would go beyond our scope. Our concern here is not with the evaluation of a lengthy and tentative philosophical interpretation of neurosis in the light of

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for self-development and contact has atrophied. Since these irascible emotions have so pervasively attached themselves to objects so fundamental to the well-being of the whole man it is clear that they will condition most unfavorably the life of the whole man. There will be on the biological level functional disorders ranging from minor to most severe and there will surely be disorder in the intellectual life of man. The neurotic, victim of the agitated state of his emotional life, finds that the life of the passions has in large part usurped the role of the life of reason. "Their emotional life has a natural, innate tendency to act in accordance with reason but it cannot actually do so because it has become distorted and is subject to abnormal tensions".⁵²

(cont. 51.)

Rational Psychology. Rather the point here is to show that Lornay's more dynamic explanations can be reconciled with man's nature as that nature really exists. Nevertheless, the author acknowledges his debt to Dr. Terruwe in supplying an atmosphere in which much of the content of this chapter has evolved. Dr. Terruwe's pioneer effort at harmonising rational psychology and empirical psychology should be considered a distinct contribution to the field and one worthy of the most serious attention.

52.

A.A.A. TERRUWE, The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology, p. 26.

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Similarly,

The repressive process is a disorder in man's sensory life, a disturbance of the natural relationships between its various elements...

The mental disturbances caused by the repression manifest themselves especially by a certain unrest which pervades the mental life. Initially this state of unresolved tension is hardly noticeable, but later, when the acts of repression multiply, it develops into an unrest which dominates the entire mental life.⁵³

The mind of the neurotic is then in a more or less constant state of agitation. There will be differing intensities depending upon the external and internal situations, but the substrate or what Horney terms the "basic anxiety" will always be there since it has now assumed the role of a habit of mind. The unity of man has thus been disrupted in its dynamic aspect. The most important conclusion to be drawn here is that such a disruption can lead to an abnormal condition termed neurotic, a condition characterized by abnormal fears, by rigidity in reaction, and quite naturally by the existence of conflicting tendencies, and, in view of the continuous state of trepidation, by a discrepancy between potentialities and achievements.

It should be of interest to consider briefly the essentials of Horney's neurotic structure. Not only are they the logical consequence of basic anxiety, they also serve to re-inforce the objective reality of the needs which, have been described as fundamental. Indeed Horney's

⁵³.

Ibid., p. 63.

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presentation of the neurotic character represents in a most piercing manner the need of the neurotic to survive and maintain some measure of self-respect in spite of psychically suffocating circumstances.

Horney has stated in her writings that the individual can react to his human environment in but three ways, by moving towards, away from or against people. This after all can hardly be argued, since they exhaust the possibilities. It should be noted that in spite of an apparent contradiction, there is really no contradiction in man moving against people or away from them and his basic need for social contact. The need exists in the neurotic, though as an unfulfilled wish and it is the pathetic desire of the neurotic not to be hurt anymore by contacts which merely reinforce his feelings of inadequacy, which leads him to retire. Similarly, it is the need for experiencing his worth as an individual, his power, his strength, his independence which causes him to move against people, for to move against, is after all to "contact" though in a destructive manner. Furthermore all the neurotic trends are perverted attempts at survival, development and contact. The child and the adult neurotic use the means at their disposal to rid themselves of their conflicts. The briefest perusal of the neurotic trends should be convincing.⁵⁴ Indiscriminate need for affection and approval, the need for a "partner" and the need for social recognition clearly indicate the neurotic's need for contact, love, acceptance. So do the needs for

⁵⁴.

See p. 171.

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personal achievement, for perfection, admiration, and unassailability. And the more aggressive and more retiring trends can be interpreted in the same manner as the basic moves against people and away from them since they logically emanate from them. Similarly, externalization represents the neurotic's concerted effort to get rid of the status quo and of his sense of responsibility for his situation, for it must not be forgotten that the neurotic unaware of the true nature of his condition and of his inculpable role in its formation cannot help but register to various degrees his destructive feelings towards others and his failure to realize himself. Hence his mental torment is increased by self-recriminations.

The "idealized image" forcefully indicates the neurotic's dissatisfaction with himself and his inability to accept himself as he is. And here again the need for self-development appears most vividly, since the neurotic fashions himself into the person that he would like to be, an exaggeration perhaps, but nonetheless a reflection of the need not to disappear. It is here also that we see one of the internal sensitive powers (adverted to in our discussion of rational psychology) namely, the imagination performing its task on the human level as creative imagination, but put to the task of alienating man from himself. Finally, the fact that these trends do reflect attempts at satisfying man's basic needs can also be proved by considering that they are, in the final analysis, nothing more than the extreme, rigid, and indiscriminate counterpart; a pathetic travesty of normal drives. And the

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obvious destructiveness and hostility which underlie them though far from morally acceptable should be understood as emanating from the more or less confused state of an individual suffering emotional torments whose depths are difficult to sound.

It may be difficult then to see that behind all the odd vanities, demands, hostilities, there is a human being who suffers, who feels forever excluded from all that makes life desirable, who knows that even if he gets what he wants he cannot enjoy it. When one recognizes the existence of all this hopelessness it should not be difficult to understand what appears to be an excessive aggressiveness or even meanness, unexplainable by the particular situation. A person so shut out from every possibility of happiness would have to be a veritable angel if he did not feel hatred toward a world he cannot belong to.⁵⁵

We have attempted to show that since the causes advanced by Horney attack the fundamental needs of man's nature at all its levels, the psychic disturbance described by Horney as a neurosis appears as an effect to be expected. But to put the matter in this way is perhaps not to give a direct answer to the question put at the beginning of this chapter. Does the environment unqualifiedly cause neurosis? In the light of what has been said it should be clear that the environment by itself can cause a neurosis. Yet in our brief analysis of human nature the principle of individuation received some degree of attention particularly in connection with man's emotional life. The conclusion drawn was that there were differences in temperamental dispositions and

55.

KAREN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 228.

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differences in the appetitive life of individuals on the level of sense appetency, and that these differences were in part at least due to differences in somatic constitution. These differences were ultimately explained by "matter" as the principle of individuation. The question then logically arises: Could not some neuroses be explained, at least in part, by a somatic pre-disposition?

It must be admitted that Horney did not deny the possibility of a constitutional basis for neurosis. A perusal of her writings reveals isolated but nevertheless quite definite statements reflective of her willingness to consider the influence of the physical on the psychic. Yet Horney was vehemently opposed to Freud's explanation of neurosis in terms of biological drives. Hence her acceptance of a constitutional basis was an extremely cautious one.

When we realize the great import of cultural conditions on neuroses the biological and physiological conditions, which are considered by Freud to be their root, recede into the background. The influence of these latter factors ⁵⁶ should be considered on the basis of well-established evidence.

Horney's later works do not reveal any serious consideration of "the influence of these latter factors". In her third work, Self Analysis, she circumvented the issue by remarking that "we know less of the constitutional factors than of the environmental ones". ⁵⁷ Her later theories

56.

Ibid., VIII.

57.

Id., Self-Analysis, p. 43.

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proceed to relegate the constitutional factors to virtual non-existence. One has the impression that Horney's admission of a physical basis for neurosis was more in the line of a concession. In point of fact, after having granted the point, she proceeds to explain neurosis completely in terms of environmental determinism.

I believe that with sufficient detailed knowledge of relevant factors in childhood, one can understand why a child develops a particular set of trends.⁵⁸

But if there is a constitutional basis for neurosis it might well be that relevant factors in childhood might not be sufficient to explain "a particular set of trends". It is at least conceivable that another child placed in the self-same environment might develop a different set of trends, or perhaps not become neurotic at all. But Horney avoided this possibility by suggesting that there can be no such thing as identical environments.⁵⁹ Now although this is manifestly true one can still speculate about what might have happened if another child had been born into that environment. Furthermore although no two environments can be identical, still there are essentially similar environments, environments in which the accidental differences would not be sufficient to explain why one child becomes more neurotic than another. In short, one's personality structure depends on both his

58.

Ibid., p. 45.

59.

See p. 75.

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physical and psychic constitution. Stated along more ultimate lines, man, being a composite, cannot be objectively considered as a being unaffected by his biological make-up. Although Horney would probably have admitted this, her writings, if not in intent certainly in effect, leave the reader with the very strong impression that when all is said and done, all neuroses may be explained on environmental grounds alone. As has already been remarked, Horney's theories seem to have signalled more than a mere "shift of emphasis". One is left, in the end, with a truncated view of man, since the environment becomes for Horney a "deus-ex-machina". It is to explain everything. As was shown in the last chapter the environment appears to explain any and all destructiveness. The material side of man's nature seems to have the value of a constant. Individual differences, though accepted in theory, seem to play an insignificant role on the effect which ensues from the impact of the environment on the individual. This, indeed appears peculiar especially since, as has been shown, Horney did seem to admit that the uniqueness of the "central inner force" stems from man's individual nature.⁶⁰

It is to be noted that this is not merely a speculative issue, an attempt at introducing an abstract doctrine into a concrete situation. A disregard of the somatic side of man could have its repercussion in therapy. Nor have all psychiatrists ignored constitutional differences.

60.

See pp. 98-99.

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One's personality structure depends upon his physical and psychic constitution. Therefore a certain constitutional disposition must be assumed in order to make the exogenous factors operative in such a way as to cause neurosis.⁶¹

To say that all neurotics must have been predisposed to their disorder appears to be stretching the point. It would appear, on the basis of Horney's thesis, that anyone may become neurotic if the unfavorable external conditions are sufficiently crushing and if they are operative in the early stages of a child's development. This would seem manifest since, as has been stressed, the unfavorable environment succeeds in seriously frustrating man's most fundamental needs on all levels of his nature, and at a time when the individual's intellectual and volitional life has not matured to the point where he can take a positive and mature stand toward these conditions. (This explains once again why neuroses have their roots in childhood).

It may be, in the final analysis, that Horney did not stress constitutional factors for three basic reasons: Her antagonism for the Freudian view, her whole-hearted acceptance of the school of interpersonal relations and finally her conviction that even if there were constitutional factors there was little that she could do about them. In fact this last point need not remain hypothetical. "Since we know less of the constitutional factors than of the environmental ones,

61.

JAMES H. VANDERVELDT and ROBERT P. ODENWALD, Psychiatry and Catholicism, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957, p. 333.

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and since the latter are the only ones susceptible of change..."⁶²

Still, from the point of view of an adequate theoretical explanation of all neuroses there appears to be a gap. It is very likely this overemphasis on the deterministic role of the environment which caused Horney to give, at the least, an impression, that the neurotic has little if indeed any freedom at his disposal. (But this particular point will receive attention in the following chapter). We may also note in passing that a disregard of the somatic side of man could have its repercussion in therapy.

There is still to consider Horney's more ultimate factors. It will be recalled that a neurosis arises through the combined effect of cultural factors and interpersonal relations. In point of fact, for Horney, the cultural climate sets the pattern of the interpersonal relations. In other words the cultural climate peculiar to Western civilization breeds the type of neurosis which has been considered.⁶³ Horney concluded from this that these problems "do not represent problems common to 'human nature'". An evaluation of Horney's relativism will be left to another chapter. At this point we are concerned with whether it is correct to say that particular cultures create particular conflicts and whether Horney's analysis of Western Civilization really goes to the heart of the matter.

62.

KAREN HORNEY, Self-Analysis, p. 43, (Italics mine).

63.

See pp. 86-87.

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There is ample reason to support a cultural cause-and-effect analysis. In fact Horney's cultural factors should appear as most evident to even the more superficial observers of our society. Western society is largely built on the principle of exaggerated competition and, it may be added, a competition stressing the more mundane aspects of existence. The competitive struggles which follow do incourage underhanded methods and these methods certainly inspire a fear of retaliation. Furthermore the unreasonableness which often accompanies our competitive struggles, in terms of possibility of achievement, must promote insecurity and diminished self-esteem. Hence man begins to doubt his powers and in view of the competitive atmosphere must experience isolation and increased need for affection, a need which in view of the circumstances is often doomed to frustration. And Western man may indeed be perplexed by the Society's demand for almost unrestrained competition on the one hand and brotherly love on the other. Finally, we don't really attain to all that our materialistic society implicitly assures us that we can. Therefore our apparently unlimited freedom does give way to a feeling of intense frustration in the face of existing limitations. Such a view then appears to reflect a correct analysis of the status quo in our society in those aspects which touch man forcibly. There is therefore every reason to expect that maladjustments will be but the more pronounced expression of the unwholesome state of the society and of the contradictions which spring from it. The end-result can only be that the most of men in such a culture will, in the words

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of Erich Fromm be "crippled in the growth of their personality". But Horney's analysis, though accurate, does not exhaust the possibilities of penetration. In point of fact it seems to bring out all the more clearly that she is an outstanding exponent of the school of interpersonal relations, a school which appears most concerned with such relations primarily on the social level. Viewed in the light of man's ultimate nature the condition of Western Civilization reflects more than a cultural dilemma. Rather it exposes what Father Muttin has called the "metaphysical misery" of modern man. In this atmosphere we observe "an ideal of personality which does not allow sufficiently for the total reality of human nature". Modern man is a truncated man, and truncated at the precise level which makes him especially human, the level of the spiritual. Man has largely lost the real meaning of life. But his need for development makes itself felt nonetheless. Hence we see in modern man an abnormal preoccupation with the material universe. But such a universe, by itself, cannot satisfy man's needs as man. Hence the hectic concern with competition on the social level and the resulting isolation and insecurity. The social causes and conditions then are only secondary causes. Viewed more closely they appear as the logical effects of man's spiritual impoverishment. Thus Horney's explanation is correct but inadequate.

These last considerations invite a critical summarization of Horney's position in all its aspects: Horney's theories of neurosis appear as a correct and striking explanation of an inculpable deviation

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from that state of psychic harmony which is the natural result of the proper integration and subordination of man's powers. Her etiological analysis on both the cultural and interpersonal level and her descriptions of the neurotic character structure represent a penetrating insight into what must occur when man's most fundamental needs are frustrated on all levels of his existence. This last observation holds in spite of the fact that it is quite probable that Horney did not envisage the spiritual level in the Christian sense. But this apparent failure to consider the spiritual as spiritual did not prevent her from considering man's needs in terms of more ultimate values. Hence when Horney speaks of moral values and man's obligation to fulfill himself she obviously transcends the psycho-social sphere. In this she reminds us of Father Nuttin's penetrating remark when he says that at times cultural or personal conditions may be such as to render it difficult to discover man's spiritual need in its pure form. But the need exists in any case since it is rooted in the very nature of man, and Horney according to her own lights did not fail to take it into account. For her then, man's need to be integrated with an absolute order appears to take the form of fidelity to his "real self", though the nature of the "absolute" will be dictated by and vary with the culture.

In conclusion it may well be asked whether Horney's tendency to neglect the somatic aspect of man did not in fact cause her to minimize one of the more significant forces at work in human nature. In spite of Horney's antagonism for the Freudian view is it nonetheless a fact that

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the sexual drive is one of the most powerful drives in man? In point of fact we need not stop at Freud since Christian psychiatrists have not been blind to its significance.

However, repression of the sexual drive, in itself and also as it develops in the infantile gratifications of the sense of touch, is such a frequent occurrence and has such far-reaching consequences that it is advisable to consider it as a possibility in every case of neurosis. This also explains why Freud concluded that repression of the infantile sexual drive is the cause of all neuroses. We believe, however, that it is the cause, not of all, but of many neuroses.⁶⁴

In our treatment of man's fundamental needs we also spoke of the sexual drive as the most striking form of the need for contact on the psycho-physiological level. Yet Horney did not ignore sexual factors. Rather in the manner of Harry Stack Sullivan, she did not make of them a "nuclear explanatory concept". That incorrect sexual education can cause conflicts Horney could not deny. On the other hand she could not envisage this as an isolated cause of neurosis. The parents who pervert their children's sexual development will usually interfere with other fundamental needs as well. Hence many other factors would have to be taken into consideration to explain the ultimate neurosis. Furthermore Horney believed that what appear to be pure sexual problems are more often than not the manifestation of more comprehensive personality disorders. Impotence and frigidity are striking instances. The theory that a deep-seated feeling of inferiority may lead to impotence has come

64.

A.A.A.TERRUWE, The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology, p. 65.

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to be generally accepted in psychiatric circles. This approach appears to us to be more in keeping with man's substantial nature. It reflects a willingness to view a phenomenon in its totality rather than in terms of a "pet" theory. It would seem that such a comprehensive approach to human nature is to be welcomed and a reductionist view to be discouraged. These considerations should also explain why Horney's works do not reflect the traditional division of the neuroses.

You will have noticed that I have used few of the familiar diagnostic terms in this chapter such as Psycho-neurosis, neurasthenia, obsessive-compulsive states, claustrophobia, agoraphobia. These terms in themselves describe the manifestation in Greek derivatives or other language compounds; but thinking in terms of symptoms does not offer any real guide to understanding and treatment. Our interest lies in attempting to understand the character structure as a whole, its development, and the dynamics of the neurotic process in their present form and complexity. By this route we get light on the particular manifestation in the individual character structure.⁶⁵

In other words, "every neurosis, no matter what the symptomatic picture is a character neurosis". Although, as has been suggested, Horney did tend to slight constitutional factors, her acute analysis of the role of the environment and, by implication, her penetrating appreciation of the driving forces of human nature do reflect a movement toward an understanding of man in his totality. Thus her position as it regards the nature and etiology of neurosis should be considered a distinct contribution and a valuable advance in the field.

65.

Ed. by KAREN HORNEY, Are You Considering Psychoanalysis, p.90.

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Dr. Horney incorporates some of Adler's ideas into her theory of psychic troubles, and so her system is more open to specifically human and social problems, especially those raised by the attitude of the personality towards itself and its own line of development...

This fusion of Adlerian and Freudian elements in 66
Dr. Horney's system seems to us to represent a real advance.

66.

JOSEPH NUTTIN, Psychoanalysis and Personality, p. 84.

CHAPTER III

NEUROSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY

Apart from the mental and emotional anguish which the neurotic experiences as a result of the frustration of his fundamental needs and the unsatisfactory "solutions" to his conflicts, he also is haunted by deep-rooted and pervasive guilt feelings. "In the manifest picture of neuroses guilt feelings seem to play a paramount role." It appears quite true that many of these guilt feelings have a strategic value for the neurotic. They may, for example, serve to convince him of his keen moral nature and thus enhance his self-respect. They may also serve to evade basic issues by "diverting attention from what should be concealed." However, the self-recriminations which concern us here are of a perhaps more genuine nature. We are interested in the neurotic's blaming himself from time to time for his own condition, for his inability or, as it might appear to him, unwillingness to conquer himself; for standing in his own way, for stagnating while others get ahead, for his destructiveness, for the discrepancy between his potentialities and his actual achievements. And we are concerned with such self-recriminations not only from the psychological point of view but from the moral one as well. We are concerned here with two questions: Are such guilt feelings objectively justifiable? Or to put the matter in terms of responsibility: Is a person responsible for becoming

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neurotic? (It will be recalled that according to Horney the environment ultimately "decides" whether an individual will be healthy or neurotic.)¹ Secondly, we wish to know if a person is responsible for any of his actions while neurotic.

1 - Responsibility for a Neurosis

It may be recalled that in speaking of "externalization" it was remarked that the neurotic attempted to hold extrinsic factors responsible for his dilemma and that although this trend was obviously an exaggeration, nevertheless it represented an attempt at ridding himself of a sense of guilt, a guilt which was in large part subjective since the neurotic was not basically responsible for his neurosis.² This affirmation may indeed appear as surprising in some religious and philosophical circles. There is an unfortunate tendency at work in some of the exponents of the Christian position in both its theological and philosophical spheres, a tendency which exalts man's specifically human powers to the point where he is made to appear as a spirit without a body or at least as man existing in the state before the Fall. This is particularly true in the sphere of human responsibility. Man, it is argued, possesses free will. Hence man is responsible. Having vindicated human freedom there appears little left to do but praise the "constructive" individual and condemn the "destructive". The concern is

1.

See pp. 70-78.

2.

See p. 186.

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with the effect rather than the individual causes and the judgement is made in the light of the fact of human responsibility and the moral nature of the effect. Viewed in this way a neurosis appears as the unfortunate but at least partly imputable result of the individual's inability to master an admittedly unwholesome environment. It is of course true that most Christian thinkers accept the doctrine of limited freedom. Hence the difficulty arises not in the speculative but in the practical order. It is somewhat simple by a process of logical gymnastics to discover what appears to be some measure of freedom in any human activity. The situation is further complicated and partly justified or, at the least, explained by the fact that the term neurotic appears to have no precise meaning. Hence a confirmed sinner who in his actions reflects emotional unrest and confusion is often dubbed neurotic. Thus, the individual whose difficulties belong in the confessional may be urged by school of psychoanalysis which denies the supernatural, to seek psychoanalytic help. It is somewhat understandable then, how some thinkers might tend to go to the other extreme and maintain that surely man's nature is not such as to suffer the ill-effects of an unfavorable environment without lifting a responsible finger to overcome it.

But though the matter might thus be partly explained, the fact nonetheless remains that human nature cannot be so viewed. This is particularly true of human nature as exercised by the child. It has already been remarked that in many ways a child is a human being only

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in potency, and it is an almost generally accepted fact that a neurosis originates in childhood.

All neuroses have their origin in childhood, for it is in these years that the emotional life, growing and unfolding and lacking the stability of later years, is extremely susceptible to psycho-pathogenic factors.³

Since the unfavorable family environment comes to bear upon the child from the very cradle, and, barring strong counteracting factors, continues to exert its intense unwholesome influence during the early years of childhood, it can scarcely be argued that the child is responsible for his neurotic development at that point. Neurotic disorders aside, a child does not become a responsible agent until he has reached the age of reason. Granting that such an age is elusive, varying with the individual and a host of external circumstances, it is nonetheless safe to assume that in the first five or six years of life a child can hardly be held accountable for so complex a character structure as is reflected in a neurosis. Nor can it be argued that though the child may not be responsible, surely the child-become-man can be, since his rational and volitional powers have developed. The neurotic even in the early years of childhood has lost his true psychic equilibrium. He is oppressed by fears and anxieties which are not

3.

A.A.A.TERRUWE, The Neurosis in the Light of Rational Psychology, New York, P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1960, p. 185.

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merely subjective but rather the result of very real causes. We are not speaking here of mere situation neuroses but rather of character neuroses, of psychic disturbances which pervade the whole person. Therefore we are faced with the dilemma of an individual who does not quite understand his situation yet suffers from it and whose intellectual and volitional powers are in a constant state of trepidation. What is more, his attempts to find solutions to his conflicts, as may well be expected, will be conditional hence perverted by his psychic state. The neurotic then can be blamed neither for becoming nor for remaining neurotic insofar as remaining neurotic depends strictly upon his own initiative.⁴ A neurosis then cannot be considered a moral "fault" subject to change if only the individual "pulls himself together." Thus in speaking of repression Terruwe remarks:

4.

We are not here considering whether a neurotic has a moral responsibility to seek psychoanalytic help. Nor are we considering whether self-analysis can overcome a neurosis. The latter is not a philosophical problem and psychiatrists themselves are divided on this issue. Horney, for example, maintained that though severe neuroses belong in the hands of experts, self-analysis is feasible in some cases as a supplement to regular analysis. Whether self-analysis is possible without outside analytic help, she left an open question. (See, Karen Horney, Self-Analysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1942, Chapter I.) Gemelli, on the other hand, unqualifiedly rejects the possibility of Auto-Analysis considering Horney's a "wrong approach." (See Agostino Gemelli, Psychoanalysis Today, New York, P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1955, p. 48.)

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The characteristic feature of this symptom is that it is entirely out of reach of the will. It is completely impossible for the will to exact influences on these psychogenic manifestations. No matter how much the patient wants the symptom to disappear there is not the slightest chance that by mere willing the conversion symptom can be influenced. From the clinician's point of view there is no doubt that the conversion symptom is beyond the control of the will. The only possibility to achieve something in the way of therapy is by attempting to influence the sensory life through suggestion, hypnosis, analysis with accompanied catharsis of the psychic trauma, and other methods. But every appeal to the will-act is futile.⁵

In the light of these considerations statements such as the following appear extremely perplexing.

Habits are important in the development of mental disorders. It is the habitual employment of defective methods of thinking, willing and feeling which give rise to these disorders. It is important to note that in the beginning these habits are willingly accepted by the individual. With each repetition of the act there is less advertence to its use, but it is subject in each act to the command of the will. 6

Here, it would appear, is a striking instance of a philosophical notion extracted from its context and wedged into a theory of mental disorder. How the faulty methods of thinking, feeling, and willing can be termed habits in any but a loose sense, is difficult to understand especially since these authors seem to admit that many neuroses originate in childhood.

⁵.
A.A.A.TERRUWE, The Neuroses in The Light of Rational Psychology
p. 196.

⁶.
JOHN R. CAVANACH and JAMES B. MCGOLDRICK, Fundamental Psychiatry,
Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1954, p. 56.

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The defective use of the intellect, the emotions or the will may begin at any time. More usually the individual is exposed in childhood to the first traumatic events. ... It is our belief that the individual at first willingly accepts these various devices for avoiding painful reality; these reactions,⁷ however, soon become habitual and are adopted as a way of life.

Since we are told that these faulty methods are "subject in each act to the command of the will", it would hardly appear that a loose meaning of "habit" is intended. Nevertheless if such faulty devices were recognized according to their true nature the term "habit" would be seen to be wholly inapplicable. A habit, taken in its true sense, has two distinguishing features: "activity illumined by knowledge,⁸ under the direction of the will." In view of the fact that such "habits" originate in earliest childhood, that is before human acts can be undertaken on any significant scale, and considering that they issue from an agitated state, it would be more precise to regard them as reaction patterns, their precise nature being dictated by the individual's particular disposition and the environmental possibilities. Furthermore, as has been shown these habits are not under the control of the will even in the adult neurotic.

7. Ibid., p. 174.

8. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Ia-IIae, q. 50, aa. 3, 4, 5.

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Another palpable example of an equivocal use of language may be perceived in the following statement:

Neusosis, is, in fact, what one may call a moral disease; psychology speaks of neurosis as psychogenic, meaning that its causes have to be sought for in mental facts; but it would be quite correct to speak of these troubles as "ethogenic", meaning that they spring from causes related to morality. It is, of course, unknown to what percentage the excessive egoists become a prey to neurotic disturbances; but it is well-known that extreme egoism is the rule with all cases of neurosis coming under observation.⁹

It is indeed true that the neurotic is self-centered. But to unqualifiedly term such lack of self-detachment egoism, is to eliminate the distinction between the responsible selfishness of the normal individual and the inability that the neurotic experiences in opening up to the world as a result of the frustration of his needs for development and contact.

In connection with the question of responsibility, particular attention should be drawn to a relatively new trend in psychiatry, that reflected in the tenets of the school of existential analysis. This school has been hailed as the "third school to originate in Vienna", and appears to have gained a most sympathetic audience in many Christian circles. Its leading exponent is Victor Frankl. Frankl's thought has

⁹.
RUDOLF ALLERS, Self-Improvement, New York, Penziger Brothers, Inc. 1939, pp. 229-230.

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reached the English speaking public chiefly through the translation of his Arztliche Seelsorge, rendered in English as The Doctor and the Soul. According to Frankl, man exercises his existence on three levels; the somatic, the mental and the spiritual. It is the spiritual dimension which makes man specifically human. It is this dimension which allows man to question his own existence, to concern himself with the meaning of life. Psychoanalysis has concerned itself with the will to pleasure and reduced man to that one level. Individual psychology, on the other hand, has emphasized the will to power. Both then have neglected the spiritual side of man. Frankl maintains that in the final analysis man is dominated neither by the will to pleasure nor by the will to power but "by the deep seated innate striving and struggling for a higher ultimate meaning to his existence." This will to meaning may be frustrated. He terms this "existential frustration" and contends that in our own times it plays as much of a role in the formation of neurosis as sexual frustration, and the sense of inferiority. He calls such a neurosis "existential neurosis" or "noogenic neurosis."

I call such neuroses noogenic neuroses - that is to say, neuroses with their roots not in psychological complexes and the traumata, but in spiritual conflicts and ethical problems, but I would certainly never maintain that every neurosis is noogenic...¹⁰

10.

VIKTOR FRANKL, On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis, The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 18, 1958, p. 31.

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Frankl's analysis of human nature reveals to him that human existence is characterized by three factors; spirituality, freedom and responsibility. Freedom is to be understood as freedom in the face of one's destiny. This destiny appears in three principal forms:

(1) As his natural disposition or endowment, what Tandler has called man's "somatic fate"; (2) as his situation, the total of his external environments; (3) disposition and situation together make up man's position.¹¹

By "disposition" Frankl has in mind man's individual "biological fate". His situation represents his "sociological destiny". But toward the above factors man takes a position and this position varies with the individual. In short man is free to assume a position in the face of these factors. Does this mean that man is free to choose a neurosis? It would appear so.

Neurotic fatalists, impressed with the ideas of individual psychology (which they misunderstand and misuse) are prone to blame childhood educational and environmental influences for "making" them what they are and having determined their destinies. These persons are attempting to excuse their weakness of character.¹²

And again, in speaking of "unemployment neurosis" (the very terminology seems to indicate a situation rather than a character neurosis) Frankl broadens the discussion to include any and all neuroses.

11.

Id., The Doctor and the Soul, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955, p. 91.

12.

Ibid., p. 99.

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Like every neurotic symptom, then, unemployment neurosis is at one and the same time a consequence, an expression of something else, and a means to an end. We may therefore expect that from the ultimate and decisive point of view it will prove to be, like every other neurosis, also a mode of existence, a "position taken" by the mind, an existential decision.¹³

Frankl, then, begins by introducing a new type of neurosis, the existential neurosis, considers it to be the effect of a rational decision but proceeds to suggest that since man is free in the face of his biological and sociological destiny all neuroses in the final analysis represent a species of moral decision. In point of fact Frankl is so taken with the necessity of vindicating human freedom that he goes so far as to suggest that even the psychotic's will is free:

....the psychotic patient's manifest behaviour is already something more than the mere direct consequence of the fated "creatural" affliction, it is also the expression of his mental attitude. This attitude is free, and therefore we have a right to demand that it be-or-become - a correct attitude.¹⁴

The views of Frankl have been touched upon at some length since they so strikingly exemplify that exaggerated emphasis on human responsibility of which we have been speaking. Although his preoccupation with the spiritual side of man represents an encouraging advance in the field, it is nevertheless a somewhat one-sided preoccupation. One has the impression that Frankl's thought lacks a solid, philosophical foundation.

13.

Ibid., p. 140, (*Italics mine*).

14.

Ibid., p. 239.

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His emphasis on the spiritual side of man threatens to view man too much from the supernatural thus losing sight of the limitations imposed upon him by his partially material nature. This indeed is the danger in any theory which tends to overemphasize the role of the will. The end-result is an exaggerated dualism. (Though Frankl has been introduced solely in order to exemplify a trend, it may be mentioned in passing that it is difficult to understand how existential frustration could result in neurosis. It must be granted that Frankl's understanding of the term tends to vary. Thus in certain passages he speaks of existential neurosis as though it were a species of neurosis, whereas at other times he speaks of it as neurosis "in the widest sense of the term."¹⁵ Still it would seem that to call the product of severe existential anxiety, a neurosis, is to approach an equivocal meaning. In existential "neurosis" it is the ontophobia which gives rise to difficulties with self and others, while in the traditional neurosis the process is reversed; difficulties in childhood give rise to an impairment of relations with self and others and this in turn causes the neurotic to

15.

Id., The Concept of Man in Psychotherapy, Pastoral Psychology, 6, No. 58, 1955, p. 17.

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question the meaning of his own existence. It would appear that the two are sufficiently distinct to require different terms.)¹⁶

To sum up, a neurotic cannot be considered responsible for his condition since the roots of a neurosis are to be found in early childhood, that is, at a time when few if any human acts are placed. The accomplished neurotic cannot be considered responsible for persisting in a neurosis, that is, for not unshackling himself by himself of his disturbance, since the trepidation of mind characteristic of a neurosis does not permit him to overcome so pervasive a disturbance. Thus Horney appears to have been quite correct in maintaining that it is not the individual but the environment which determines the healthy or destructive outcome in any given case, though, as has been shown, one's somatic predisposition must be considered as well. However one may agree with

16.

See also: VIKTOR FRANKL, *The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy*, American Journal of Psychotherapy, 7, 1953, pp. 8-15.

Along similar lines see also Igor Caruso, *Personalistic Psychoanalysis as Symbolic Knowledge*, Journal of Psychotherapy as a Religious Process, 2, 1955, pp. 2-23. Caruso is opposed to all forms of rationalistic psychotherapy and considers neurosis to be "an exaggeration of relative values", an "existential heresy" and, it would appear, involving untruth and sin. His disciple, Wilfred Daim (See: *Depth Psychology and Grace*, Journal of Psychotherapy as a Religious Process, 1, 1954, pp. 31-40; *On Depth Psychology and Salvation*, Ibid., 2, 1955, pp. 24-37; *On Depth Psychology and Freedom*, Ibid., 3, 1956, pp. 92-109.) is equally insistent on describing neurosis as a turning away from God to relative values. In the light of contemporary man he considers neurosis a mass phenomenon.

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Horney if the term "destructive" is restricted to mean "neurotic", since as was shown in the first chapter of this part, human nature is not wholly constructive, and this latter lack of harmony is observable in both the neurotic and the non-neurotic and is not environmentally determined.

2 - Neurosis and Human Acts

Horney's elucidation of the structure of neurosis in terms of neurotic trends and later in terms of combinations of trends arising from more basic attitudes clearly gives the impression that the whole individual is to a greater or lesser degree effected by his neurosis, and that therefore all his actions are to a greater or lesser degree
17
colored by his disturbance.

I was, however, not entirely satisfied with my presentation of individual trends. The trends themselves were accurately described, but I was haunted by a feeling that in a simple enumeration they appeared in a too isolated fashion. I could see that a neurotic need for affection, compulsive modesty, and the need for a "partner" belonged together. What I failed to see was that together they represented a basic attitude toward others and toward the self and a particular philosophy of life.¹⁸

A neurosis then appears to embrace the whole individual. To what extent is the individual's freedom impaired by his disturbance?

17.

See chapter IV of Part II "The Neurotic Structure".

18.

KAREN Horney, Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1945, p. 11.

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In attempting to arrive at Horney's answer one is faced with a series of perplexing statements. It has already been shown that Horney spoke of neurosis as involving "greater or lesser parts of the personality in a greater or lesser intensity." Here would surely appear to be a position which granted the neurotic at least partial responsibility for some of his actions.¹⁹ Horney has also been quoted as saying that neurotic trends "impair"²⁰ self-determination. Yet there are other statements which cast serious doubt as to the constancy of Horney's view.

Often the only feelings experienced consciously and clearly are reactions of fear and anger to blows dealt to vulnerable spots. And even these may be repressed. Such authentic ideals as do exist are so pervaded by compulsive standards that they are deprived of their power to give direction. Under the sway of these compulsive tendencies the faculty to renounce is rendered impotent, and the capacity to assume responsibility for oneself all but lost.²¹

19.

"An Animal's actions are largely determined by instinct. ... In contrast it is the prerogative as well as the burden of human being to be able to exert choice, to have to make decisions".
KAREN HORNEY, Our Inner Conflicts, p. 23."

20.

See p. 76.

21.

KAREN HORNEY, Our Inner Conflicts, pp. 27-28.

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And again,

Nor do we mean to embark her upon the philosophical intricacies of moral responsibility. The compulsive factors in neuroses are so prevailing that freedom of choice is negligible.²²

How reconcile these statements? Could Horney have meant that the degree of responsibility varies with the seriousness of the neurosis? The last quotation hardly seems to allow for such a distinction. Furthermore, a careful consideration of Horney's view of the neurotic's development, that is, the general course of the neurotic structure leaves the reader with the impression that the neurotic is being "driven" at all times and to such an extent that to speak of responsible acts would be pure fiction. The three basic moves, to, away from, and against people are, according to Horney, in large part environmentally determined, and this is especially true in the case of the neurotic-to-be. The trends or strategies which emanate from these moves are remotely determined by environment, since they are logical off-shoots of the three basic moves, and more proximately determined by the nature of the moves themselves. The neurotic appears to be coerced into these trends by a combination of the general tone of the culture, the more intimate interpersonal relations and the nature of the basic moves. There appears to be no question of choice. The "solution" which the neurotic adopts as he deepens himself more and more in his neurosis, namely movements away from people, the idealized image, externalization, auxiliary approaches

22.

Id., NEUROSIS AND HUMAN GROWTH, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1950, p. 169.

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to artificial harmony and finally "the" neurotic solution, the last inglorious step toward the loss of the real self, that is, the "idealized self", appear to be inexorably imposed upon the neurotic, and it would appear even in that order, by the very structure of neurosis. If the neurotic's will is merely impaired it is difficult to understand how these steps could be so little subject to either deviation or gradation of intensity through the individual's exercise of what freedom there is left him. This unbending road towards a more and more serious alienation from self clearly indicates what little freedom Horney's neurotic actually has. Granted that a logical distinction could be drawn between the course of the neurotic's development which might be viewed as independent of the neurotic's exercise of freedom, and individual acts which are not directly connected with the specific course of that development, still it is difficult to see how such a division could really withstand a practical application. If, in Horney's view, a neurosis results in the "deformation of character", if "the compulsive factors in neurosis are so prevailing that freedom of choice is negligible", then it is more likely that the neurotic's individual acts are more or less direct offshoots of the neurotic structure. And if this is the case, then it would appear that he is driven also to these. This, in effect, is Horney's implicit if not explicit conclusion. Although in theory she seemed to want to retain for the neurotic some measure of freedom, in point of fact she leaves the reader with the very vivid impression that

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her neurotic is a wholly irresponsible individual. What can be said of such a view?

If any reasonable answer is to be given it is clear that neither empirical nor philosophical principles alone will suffice. Three questions must be answered: What constitutes a free act? Are there impediments to free acts? How "gripping" is a neurosis? It is only after answering these questions that the responsibility of the neurotic, if he has any responsibility, can be determined. It is to be noted that the question here is not whether an individual is responsible for becoming neurotic. This question was answered in the preceding section. Rather the question is whether the neurotic, as neurotic, is responsible for some of his actions. Nor can this question receive so facile an answer as that all psychoanalysts including Horney must admit that the neurotic must possess some measure of freedom since the cure itself depends on the sane part of the personality as a starting point. In the first place, some psychiatrists do not admit of free will. Harry Stack Sullivan is a striking instance.²³ Furthermore, for Horney at least, to be partly sane is not necessarily to be partly free. Rather it means to possess some potential will impulses whose exercise must be mobilized by the combined activity of patient and analyst.

23.

See p.

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The psychoanalyst's way of mobilizing will power is to bring certain connections or motivations to the patient's awareness and thereby enable him to judge and to decide. To what extent²⁴ this result occurs depends on the depth of the insight gained.

To return then to the first problem, what constitutes a free act? Horney herself has informed us that in contrast to animals "it is the prerogative as well as the burden of human beings to be able to exert choice, to have to make decisions." It would appear manifest then that man can do what an animal cannot do because of his characteristically human faculties.

Respondet dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem; unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini convenient, possunt dici quidem hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo.²⁵

A free act, then, is an act knowingly and deliberately performed.

But it is manifest that not all the actions of man are done knowingly and deliberately. Some cannot be so performed because the very nature of the act does not require the interposition of intellect and will. Digestion is a striking case in point. However other acts may or may not be human acts, not because of the nature of the act itself, but rather

24.

KAREN HORNEY, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1939, p. 233.

25.

THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae, q. 1, a. 1.

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because of the circumstances surrounding the act. These modifications of the volitional character of man's actions are of such significance to the point under discussion that they require elaboration:

The will is an appetite following upon intellectual cognition. It is apparent then, that in the act of choice both intellect and will play their part.²⁶ Since this is so, it follows that whatever can effect either the intellect or the will when a choice is to be made must of necessity have a modifying effect on the volitional character of the act. In short there are impediments to or modifiers of human acts. These are traditionally listed as ignorance, passion, habit and violence. Our concern will be with the influence of passion and habit on the freedom

26.

Such questions as the manner in which the will is moved in the order of efficient causality, and the interaction between intellect and will in the act of choice, although of marked importance in a discussion of the will do not strictly fall within the pale of this presentation. For a consideration of the first problem See: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae., Q.9, aa. 2,4,5,6; Ia.,Q. 82, a.4. Regarding the role of intellect and will, See: Ibid., Ia.,Q.82, a.3; Ia-IIae, Q. 9, a. 1.

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27
of a human act.

The sense appetites or passions have already been enumerated
28
and discussed. The point at issue here is whether the passions can act
as impediments to human acts, and if so, in what way. That the passions
can and do effect one's free choice does not require demonstration. It
is a fact which anyone can verify by self-reflection. The second
question, however, requires some precisions.

27.
Since our interest lies in whether a neurosis impairs or
destroys freedom we will be concerned only with such impediments
as a neurosis may bring about. "Ignorance" and "violence" may be
considered causes of neurosis rather than effects of it. Hence
they have been discussed implicitly in the previous section when
it was asked whether a neurotic was responsible for his condition.
"Ignorance" is absence of knowledge in one capable of knowledge
(S.T., I-II, 3.76, a.2). The child who becomes neurotic is ignorant
of the effects which his somatic predisposition and his own reaction
to his cultural and more personal environment will have on his
psychic equilibrium. But the ignorance must be termed inculpable
or invincible since, as has been seen, it is not due to neglect.
Similarly one may speak loosely of a "long-term violence", in the
sense of extended psychological abuse, in the formation of neurosis.
This type of violence comes from without in the form of cultural
and interpersonal situations which are imposed upon the growing
child and which cripple him in his psychic growth. (Whether such
abuse is intentional or not is not to the point.) Hence both
"ignorance" and "violence", taken in the above sense, may be viewed
as causes while the emotional unrest (state of the passions), and
the neurotic trends (loosely "habits") are to be considered the
effects. These effects may impair or wholly destroy freedom. It may
well be that "ignorance" and "violence" in other spheres may influence
a neurotic's freedom in a given instance (assuming that he still
possesses some measure of freedom and it is precisely this which
requires some proof), but then they would not influence him as neurotic
but as a human being.

28.

See chapter 2, Section I of this Part.

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The passions, considered in themselves are morally neutral. They assume a moral aspect when they fall under the jurisdiction of reason, for then they fall into the pale of the human act. A distinction is to be drawn between passions that are antecedent and passions that are consequent. Antecedent passions are those which begin to operate without any recourse to reason or will. Thus most persons when faced with a poisonous snake will, if knowing it to be poisonous, experience the passion of fear, and this prior to any act of the will. Consequent passion, as the term implies, is a movement of a sense appetite which is either allowed or deliberately chosen by the agent. A person who allows the passion of anger, which might have arisen antecedently as the result of an insult, to continue and even encourages its prolongation by working himself into a rage, exhibits consequent passion.

The voluntariness or freedom of a human act is not affected in the same manner by these two types of passions. Antecedent passions decrease the voluntariness of an act since they becloud to one degree or another the rational judgement. In short, antecedent passions impair freedom. But to impair does not mean to destroy. Hence, in spite of antecedent passion some degree of voluntariness may still be left in an act attended by antecedent passion but involving reason and will. Should the passion be such as to render the act not a human act but an act of man, the individual must be judged to be, at least temporarily, insane, or unreasonable. It should be emphasized, however, that though an act performed in an extreme passion may be regarded as an act of man, the

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individual may still be responsible antecedently in that he may have failed to make himself master of his passions. Consequent passion, on the other hand, does not decrease the voluntariness of an act. When such passion is merely permitted, as in the instance given above, it is at the very least an indication of the force of the act therefore of its greater voluntariness. If such passion is encouraged to continue and even to increase, it in turn increases the voluntariness of the human act. It should also be noted that evil actions which are foreseen, even though confusedly, as resulting from a stimulated passion are also voluntary, though indirectly so, since they are foreseen as the result of an act which is directly voluntary.²⁹

Our next concern is with "habit" as a modifier of human acts. A habit, that is an operative habit, may be considered as a fairly permanent quality superimposed upon an operative potency (will, intellect, sense powers) and facilitating certain of its activities.³⁰ This facility is obviously acquired by repetition of the same act. In this way both virtues and vices come into existence. Before indicating the relationship between habit and voluntariness, one should distinguish between habits which are freely acquired and those which are not. Under

²⁹.

For an excellent summary of the morality of the passions, see: THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae, Q. 24, a.3c, ad primum, et ad 3 m.

³⁰.

Ibid., Ia-IIae, qq. 49-50.

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the latter would be included all those habits acquired in early childhood and especially those acquired before the age of reason. It should be obvious, once the distinction has been made, that the imputability for actions arising under these two classifications would not be the same. Freely acquired habits do not destroy voluntariness. Even though the individual act might be considered an act of man, inasmuch as it may be done inadvertently, nevertheless it is a human act in cause, since it is the individual who is responsible for the development of the habit. Profanity is a striking case in point. However, an exception may be made in the case of an agent who, aware of an evil habit, makes a concentrated and enduring effort to overcome it. In such a case the habit is no longer willed or allowed, though it may take a lengthy period to destroy it.

On the other hand, habits that are not freely acquired do effect the voluntariness of the agent in the area in which they induce activity. In point of fact it is quite conceivable that habits acquired in early childhood might give rise to acts of man rather than human acts. As has already been stated some of these should more properly be termed "reaction patterns" or "routine behaviour" since the criteria which characterizes habits, knowledge and will, may be absent. On the other hand, other acts may be subject to at least partial control. Hence they will be partly imputable to the agent.

What bearing have all these considerations on the possible responsibility of the neurotic? The answer obviously hinges on the

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degree of impairment which results from a neurosis. This is not a philosophical question. Rather the ones best equipped to answer it are those in the field of abnormal psychology. It will be of consequence then to consider definitions and descriptions of neurosis as given by various authors in the field.

By psychoneurosis we mean the milder abnormalities of the cognitive, emotional and motor processes, which usually only partly incapacitate the individual and where the basic symptoms are somehow connected with anxiety.³¹

The psychoneuroses are essentially different from the psychoses. In general, the psychoses involve marked disruptions of personality and total abandonments of reality. In the psychoneurotic, there is much less personality upheaval and disorganization (...) Psychoneuroses to be sure are maladaptations, but the failure to adapt is partial, and is much nearer to a hypothetical norm than it is to the psychoses.³²

The distinguishing features of a neurosis are that the patient retains insight into his condition and awareness of his surroundings, and that while his reaction to these is disturbed, there is no complete overthrow of the personality. The disturbance moreover, does not affect conduct to the extent of rendering him certifiable and in need of detention although he may be an invalid, and unable to follow his occupation.³³

31.

F.J. BROWN and KARL HUNNINGER, The Psychodynamics of Abnormal Behaviour, New York, McGraw-Hill Co., 1940, p. 351.

32.

EDWARD A. STAECKEL, Fundamentals of Psychiatry, Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1947, pp. 229-230.

33.

A.F. TREDGOLD, Manual of Psychological Medicine, Baltimore, The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1943, p. 11.

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It can be stated that the common denominator of all neurotic phenomena is an insufficiency of the normal control apparatus³⁴

The personality organization of the psychoneurotic is only partially disrupted and his conflict with reality is one of degree.³⁵

Thus a neurosis does not seem to totally incapacitate the individual. What effect then has a neurosis on freedom and consequent responsibility? It would appear manifest from the preceeding quotations that neuroses result in emotional abnormalities, in personality upheavals, in insufficiency of self-control, but not of so marked a degree as to completely cut off the neurotic from both himself and reality. It would appear, furthermore, in the light of Horney's exhaustive description of neurosis, that this disturbance affects the emotional processes by, as has been stated, frustrating the attainment of the most basic requirements of man's nature, the end result being the unnatural development of the irascible emotions of fear, anger, hostility and despair toward objects which in the natural course of development should not elicit such passions. Hence the neurotic's emotional life is intensely disturbed. The sense appetites are not subordinated to reason.

34.

OTTO FENICHEL M.D., The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955, p. 19.

35,

JAMES H. VANDERVELDT and ROBERT P. ODENWALD, Psychiatry and Catholicism, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957, p. 331

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Terruwe puts it quite incisively in saying that "The mental disturbances caused by the repression manifest themselves especially by a certain unrest which pervades the entire mental life."³⁶ This state of trepidation is quite reminiscent of what has been described by Horney as "basic anxiety" as a "feeling of being small, insignificant, helpless, deserted, endangered, in a world that is out to abuse, cheat, attack, humiliate, betray, envy." Such is a conceptual analysis of "basic anxiety" but the anxiety itself, as the very term indicates, is fundamentally an emotional experience. This emotional unrest, it may be recalled, is to be regarded as an emotional sub-stratum at all times present in the neurotic and further intensified by the flaring up of the previously mentioned appetites as given situations arise. Such a state of emotional upheaval must surely be regarded as an obstacle to free acts in the sense that it must diminish freedom and consequently responsibility. This conclusion follows with force if we consider that here we are surely in the realm of antecedent passion. The basic anxiety does not follow a given act but must precede it inasmuch as it is continuously present. And since the basic anxiety is very much a part of the neurosis, the neurotic is not responsible for its existence. Furthermore such passions as anger, hostility, fear and despair are to be considered as spontaneous reactions to given situations, spontaneous

^{36.}

See p. 184.

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in the light of the neurotic structure. Hence any activity which follows from such passions is obviously preceeded and conditioned by them. To say that the neurotic is responsible for not having made himself master of these passions is tantamount to saying that he is responsible for his neurosis, and this contention, as has been shown, is not tenable.

Similarly the neurotic trends may be loosely termed "habits" inasmuch as they represent a facility in certain actions acquired by repetition. Since these trends are often destructive of self or others they can hardly be said to fall outside the pale of objective morality.³⁷ Furthermore the trends naturally issue in individual acts which reflect the nature of the trends. But again, it should be stressed that these "habits" are not freely acquired since they represent an enforced way of dealing with reality.³⁸ Furthermore they are acquired in childhood. Hence it must be concluded that in those areas in which they induce activity such "habits" must be considered to reduce responsibility and perhaps, in given instances, destroy it altogether. Similarly the neurotic's emotional state in a given situation might be such as to result in acts of man rather than human acts. In point of fact the division between passions and "habits" has been largely an arbitrary one since, as has already been noted, the emotional life of the neurotic is

37.

Outstanding examples would be the need to control others, to exploit them, and destructive tendencies toward the defeat of others. (See p. 171.)

38.

See chapter IV, Part I, "THE NEUROTIC STRUCTURE".

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in a continuous state of disruption. Thus any action of the neurotic, emanating from the neurotic structure, is conditioned by his emotional state.

If one considers a neurosis to be a mental disorder affecting the whole personality, then from the point of view of freedom and responsibility, the entire disturbance must be considered a habitual impediment to free acts. Naturally the extent to which a neurosis impairs freedom depends on its severity. Thus in speaking of the effect of emotional unbalance on voluntary action, Moore observes that,

Excitement, also may interfere with voluntary action by the acceleration of the stream of thought so that normal insight into conduct, its purpose, and its consequences is impaired and the will has not the opportunity to control the patient's behaviour. 39
Anxiety, also, may limit or even destroy responsibility.

Similarly, Dempsey remarks that,

...if fear is so great that the active use of practical reason and judgement is intercepted and cut off, the act being no longer strictly a human act, would lose its quality of freedom. It is by this principle that one can judge the imputability of acts carried out under stress of grave neurotic anxiety. Light fear obviously does not interfere with the volitional quality of activities.⁴⁰

39.

THOMAS VERNON MOORE, The Driving Forces of Human Nature, New York, Grune & Stratton, 1948, p. 383.

40.

PETER J.R. DEMPSEY, Freud, Psychoanalysis, Catholicism, Cork, The Mercier Press, Ltd., 1956, p. 146

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Vanderveldt and Odenwald are quite explicit as to the partial responsibility of the neurotic.

It cannot be established as a general rule that all mental patients are morally irresponsible. Such a rule certainly does not hold for the psychoneurotics, and neither does it hold in its generality for the mental defectives and psychotics. Each case must be judged individually. ... It is also true that modern psychiatry rejects the older opinion that a mental patient can be ill only in one particular point; rather, it considers a mental disorder as affecting the whole personality. That does not imply, however, that the individual's reason and will are always so affected that he is freed from all responsibility.⁴¹

However to assert that, in contrast to the impression that Horney imparts to her readers, a neurotic is not wholly irresponsible as neurotic, and to maintain that the degree of responsibility for his individual acts varies with the severity of the neurosis is not to disagree with Horney's analysis of either the genesis of neurosis or the neurotic structure itself. The evolution of neurosis, as described by Horney, is not at variance with a realistic view of human nature. But in the light of the preceding quotations it cannot be argued that the development of neurosis can at any given point wholly destroy freedom though it is quite conceivable that inasmuch as the development of the neurotic structure as put forth by Horney, indicates an intensification of the disturbance, freedom would be more and more impaired. It may be

⁴¹.

JAMES H. VANDERVELDT and ROBERT P. ODENWALD, Psychiatry and Catholicism, p. 41.

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that Horney was so intent on describing the evolution of neurosis that the question of freedom eluded her. Consequently she gave the impression that the neurotic or at the least many neurotics, were not capable of free acts. This suggestion, however, is not advanced as a complete explanation since, as has been shown in earlier quotations, Horney did state at times that to speak of freedom in neurosis was to raise an idle issue since "under the sway of these compulsive tendencies the faculty to renounce is rendered impotent, and the capacity to assume responsibility for oneself all but lost." On the basis of the authors quoted, this extreme must be rejected, though it may be granted that in given instances of a given neurosis, freedom may be wholly absent. This point must be granted since if it is conceivable that a "normal" individual could be so moved by his passions as to lose his capacity for free acts in a given situation (extreme anger is a traditional instance), surely such a possibility must be granted all the more when a person is habitually disturbed emotionally. What is more it must be recalled that the emotional dispositions of individuals differ, and this too must be taken into account as it was taken into account when discussing the genesis of neurosis.⁴² In the greater number of instances, however, freedom is diminished since, to repeat, a neurosis may be considered a

⁴².

See pp. 187-192. Also, the presentation of the "principle of individuation", pp. 149-150.

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habitual impediment to free acts since its impact causes a disturbance of attention of varying degrees. The degree of responsibility in a given case is admittedly elusive, but such pin-pointing is not within the scope of this chapter. We have been dealing with ethical considerations and "the purpose of ethics is not to enable us to judge the moral acts of other people."

CHAPTER IV

CONCEPT OF NORMALITY

It will be recalled that Horney could not conceive of a normal psychology which holds for all mankind since she could not admit a¹ concept of normality which holds for all mankind. This concept, rather, is man-made and varies with the culture. There is no such thing then, as a universally normal man.

Horney, partly through comparing the ways of the United States with those of Europe, and partly through her readings in anthropology accepted the differences in what is considered "normal" in different cultures as indisputable and most significant facts. And indeed they are surely that. Unfortunately, however, she went further and concluded that since there are so many views of normality there cannot be a trans-cultural concept of normality. It remains then to be discussed whether the admittedly numerous criterions must be their very plurality exclude even the possibility of a more ultimate and stable norm, one that is

1.

See pp. 64-69.

CONCEPT OF NORMALITY

²
applicable to man as man.

A norm is "a rule or authoritative standard".³ The suffix "al"⁴ denotes "of the kind of, pertaining to". It is clear then that when "normal" is predicated of a thing, the implication is that it reflects to a satisfactory degree the standard or rule applicable to it. Surely there can be no misunderstanding on the meaning of the word. The difficulty arises, rather, when a criterion of normality is demanded. How is it to be decided what standard of behaviour is to be observed by the

2.

It will not be necessary at this point to enter into a detailed exposition of what would constitute the truly normal personality, since Horney did not arrive at a trans-cultural concept of normality with which one could take issue. Rather she maintained that there can be no such thing. In effect she concluded that a criterion of normality does not spring from the nature of the object in question. The burden of the following discussion, then, lies in showing how one should arrive at a criterion of normality. It may, however, be noted that the section falling under "basic needs" (Chapter II of this Part), did treat of the most fundamental needs in man's psychic dynamism on all levels of his being, the physiological, the social and the spiritual. Since these needs have their source in human nature it follows that if their frustration may result in abnormal behaviour, their proper fulfillment may conversely bear witness to an integrated personality. This observation, however, serves but to point the way since the matter is manifestly much more involved. For an excellent general theory of the normal personality, one basing itself on general psychology rather than on psychopathological mechanisms, see: JOSEPH NUTTIN, Psychoanalysis and Personality, London Sheed and Ward, 1954, Part II, A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality.

3.

WILLIAM LITTLE, H.W. Fowler, J. Coulson etc. (Edited and Revised by C.T. Onions, etc.) The Oxford Universal Dictionary On Historical Principles, London, Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 1337.

4.

Ibid., p. 39

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object in question in order that "normal" may be predicated of it?

It would appear evident that the standard by which a thing is to be judged ought to be intimately connected with its essence, so much so in fact that in the final analysis it is derived from its essence.⁵ One example with a view toward stressing the intimacy which exists between the standard by which a thing is to be judged in its activity and its essence will serve for many.

If one were to set about the task of determining the essence of a rubber ball, one would be most likely to conclude after close observation of several objects of different sizes and shapes, that a rubber ball is a corporeal inorganic substance, usually spherical or oval in shape, composed or constituted of an elastic material, and assuming its peculiar shape either by inflation or through being wholly composed of its constitutive material.⁶ In virtue of its essence this object

5.

Here understood as: "Hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid."
(St. THOMAS AQUINAS, De Ente et Essentia, Chap. 1, Sec. 2.

6.

This is admittedly a definition by "common" accident rather than an essential definition. However we are dealing with an artificial object. The rule of convertibility in definition is satisfied since the definition involves more than one "common" accident. (The following text would appear to allow for an analogous application: "... differentiae essentialis, quae ignotae et innominatae sunt, secundum philosophum in VII Metaph., text 35, etc., designantur differentiis accidentalibus, quae ex essentialibus causantur, sicut causa designatur per suum effectum, sicut callidum et frigidum assignantur differentiae ignis et aquae." THOMAS AQUINAS, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1 a. 6, Solut.

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7
 possesses a property⁷ which might be termed resiliency. Because of this property a rubber ball is capable of a peculiar activity. It is capable of bounding back when brought in contact with a relatively solid surface. Now if a rubber ball were incapable of performing this operation, or if the exercise of this activity were impaired it would not be correct to say that this object has ceased to be a rubber ball. What a thing is is designated not by its properties but by its essence. Therefore if a rubber ball were incapable of bounding either because intentionally or accidentally deflated, punctured or in any way damaged it would not cease to be what it is. However, it would cease to be what it is if one or more of its essential notes were lost. If, for example, the ball were to break in two, one could no longer maintain that it is a ball since it would no longer possess the shape which partly characterizes its essence.

But although the loss or impairment of the exercise of an activity immediately flowing from the essence of a thing does not alter that thing's essential reality, it may well be asked whether the object is any longer acting in keeping with its nature. If any reasonable answer is to be given to this question another question must precede it. What is demanded of the object, in this instance a rubber ball, in virtue of its nature? It is clear that in answering this question a standard or norm for any and all such objects results. This standard may then be applied to the individual specimen. If it adheres to and

7.
 Here understood as "that which belongs to a species always, but does not belong only to it". (ARISTOTLE, Topica, I, 5, 102^a, 25-30.)

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reflects the standard or norm applicable to it, then it may be judged to be normal. If, on the other hand, it does not, then it must be considered abnormal. What then is demanded of a rubber ball in virtue of its nature? It would seem manifest that a certain resiliency might well be expected. And how should this expectation arise? One might be tempted to say that it should arise by seeing several rubber balls bouncing. But this would be an incorrect approach. It is not because rubber balls are seen to bounce that one determines that they should bounce. This type of induction results only in an affirmation of the status quo. To maintain that the status quo reflects the "ought" necessarily, is to make an assertion for which there is no sustaining evidence. Thus in discussing whether "The good" normative social theory can be arrived at by scientific method F.S.C. Northrop significantly remarks that,

... the distinction between normative social theory and factual social theory must be maintained. Consequently the scientific method which gives the one cannot be the scientific method which is appropriate for the other.

...The methods of natural science prescribe that no theory can be regarded as confirmed by these methods unless the facts in the subject matter to which the theory purports to refer are completely in accord with what the theory calls for. It follows, therefore, that when the methods of natural science are applied to the facts of society, rather than to the facts of natural science, the only type of social theory which such methods can give is a social theory which is completely in accord with all the facts of society. This is but another way of saying that 3 the methods of natural science can give only factual social theory.

8.

F.S.C. Northrop, The Logic of The Sciences and The Humanities, New York, Meridian Books, Inc., 1959, p. 331.

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In other words, one does not determine what a thing should do by what it does do, since it may well be that it is not doing what its nature requires. For example, if one were to encounter one thousand damaged rubber balls, and only those, he would tend to conclude, if he were using their activity as a criterion of normality, that the impaired resiliency which they displayed was normal, whereas in point of fact it would not be normal.

However it does not follow from this that if one were to use activity as a criterion of normality he would necessarily be doomed to error. If upon encountering one thousand undamaged rubber balls the observer were to conclude that their high degree of resiliency constituted a normal characteristic for such objects, he would be quite correct, but and this is the point, only because these balls, in each bounce, are manifesting their nature. In other words it is not because these balls bounce that they are normal. Rather, because they are normal they bounce. By noticing that they bounce we verify their normality but do not derive what is normal for them. Thus, although in the latter instance we would arrive at a correct concept of normality it would be correct only "per accidens", inasmuch as in this instance what "is" corresponds to what "ought to be".

How then is the normality of rubber balls to be determined? By determining the nature of a rubber ball and deducing, from a consideration of that nature, the activities which should flow from it. Now

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man's way of knowing is such that he does not have an immediate insight into the nature of things but must proceed to such knowledge by way of their operations.⁹ Furthermore the limited character of man's knowledge more often than not prevents him from knowing the complete nature of things. Hence he must often be content with only a partial knowledge of natures. When the object does not possess a nature in the strict sense, an essential definition is impossible. Nevertheless in a looser sense a rubber ball does possess a characteristic nature, that is a certain principle of activity in virtue of the material of which it is composed and in virtue of the shape which it has been made to assume by the maker in view of his own end, and this nature can be arrived at by a close observation of the object in its activities.¹⁰ The end-result

9.

"In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales ignotae sunt; unde significatur per differentias accidentales quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum, sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis" (THOMAS AQUINAS, De Ente et Essentia, V, Sec.25.)

10.

Thus Aristotle remarks that with regard to artificial products, "None of them has in itself the source of its own production. But while in some cases (for instance houses and the other products of manual labor) that principle is in something else external to the thing, in others - those which may cause a change in themselves in virtue of a concomitant attribute- it lies in the things themselves (but not in virtue of what they are)" (Phys. II, 1, 192^b, 25-35.) It would seem that a rubber ball belongs in the latter category.

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of this approach would be the already stated definition. Having arrived at the essence of a rubber ball it may then be inquired what activities this object should be capable of in virtue of its essence.¹¹ Since the matter of the ball is rubber and rubber is resilient, the ball should be capable of bounding. Since a ball is oval or spherical in shape it should be able to move through the air with relative facility. Furthermore in virtue of its characteristic shape the thrower should be capable

 II.

The attempt at determining the "ought" for man by analogy with artificial objects is not wholly without precedent. Aristotle, in attempting to give a clearer account of the final end of man states that, "this might perhaps be given; if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist.....the good and the "well" is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man if he has a function." (*Eth. Nic.*, I, 7; 1097^b, 25-30.) Aristotle then proceeds to show that in the same way as "the function of a lyre player is to play the lyre and that of a good lyre player is to do so well" the function of a good man is "the good and noble performance of these." (the activities proper to man or "an activity of the soul implying a rational principle" *Ibid.*, 1098^a, 5-15.) What is even more significant for this presentation is that in the above passages, Aristotle indicates that one cannot determine the function of the lyre player unless one first determines the nature of the lyre. Thus because a lyre is a musical instrument, the function of the lyre player is to produce notes and the function of the good lyre player is to produce "good" notes.

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of imparting "spin" to the ball, and this once again facilitates its aerial travels. Rubber balls which reflect these activities may be termed normal; Those which do not may be termed abnormal. ¹² It is important to note, then, that the norm by which rubber balls are to be judged is derived by investigating the nature of a rubber ball and deducing the operations which ought to flow from that nature. The norm

12.

It might be argued that the manufacturer could produce a "dud" for a definite purpose, in which case one could not say that the ball is abnormal since the final cause of this ball would differ from that of the others. (For example, the manufacturer might intentionally fill a ball with sand and cause it to be flat at a certain point since he wishes to use the ball as a paper-weight). This objection could be raised with a view to showing that the nature of artificial objects cannot be arrived at except by consulting the efficient cause since in artifacts the principle is in the artist rather than in the object. To this it may be answered once again that certain artifacts do have an intrinsic principle through not in virtue of what they are (see footnote 11 of this chapter). Furthermore it is one thing to say that in artifacts the principle is extrinsic, and quite another to say that that principle can only be discovered by consulting the artist. Both maker and observer participate in the same kind of intelligence. Hence the artifact may reveal the intention of the maker even if the principle is extrinsic to the artifact. We may also distinguish at this point between substantial and accidental differences. A rubber ball, flattened and filled with sand, is nevertheless a rubber ball. We may also distinguish between what a thing should do in virtue of its nature and the uses to which it may be put. A rubber ball, in virtue of its nature should be capable of bounding. If the manufacturer fills the ball with sand for his own ends, we may say that from the point of view of the secondary end being achieved, the object is normal, but that as a rubber ball, it fails to manifest its nature. And it should not be said that we are imposing a criterion which the maker never intended to have applied since, whether he will or no, he has produced a rubber ball.

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is, in short, objective and essential. It does not necessarily coincide with operation. Once again it must be stressed that what a thing does may not be what a thing should do in virtue of its nature. And if this is true of rubber balls then it is surely obvious that to use activity as a criterion of normality would be all the more dangerous when applied to free agents, since in their case the possibility of a deviation between the "de facto" state and the "ought" is all the more present. In short, one does not determine what is normal for man by the proverbial "counting of noses", though it is conceivable that "per accidens" one could arrive at a true criterion by this method. Ultimately then, whether a norm is true or false depends on whether the observer has truly perceived the nature of the object in question.

The verification of normative social theory is to be obtained not by checking its basic philosophical postulates, either directly or indirectly, against the facts of society either in the present or in the future but by checking them with the postulates of the philosophy of natural science prescribed by the facts of nature. When the relations between the postulates of the philosophy of culture and the postulates of the philosophy of nature is that of identity, the philosophy of culture is true. When the relation is not that of identity, the philosophy of culture is false or incomplete.¹³

It follows as a logical corollary of what has been said that a true norm does not depend on the individual observer or observers. A norm cannot be imposed, rather it must be discovered. To say, for example, that a rubber ball is abnormal if it refuses, of itself, to

¹³. F.S.C. NORTHROP, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, p. 338.

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return to its owner after having been thrown, is to apply a subjective and invalid norm of normality. It is not in the nature of a rubber ball to act in a reasonable manner or to be trained to obedience. In a similar manner, it would not do to say that a rubber ball is abnormal if its color is blue rather than red. It is not of its essence to be of any particular color. If such a ball were to be discovered among a collection of balls all red in color, it might be said, analogously, that such a ball is unconventional in comparison to the others, but certainly not abnormal. There would seem to be little need of multiplying examples. It appears clear that what a thing can do and should do depends upon what it is.

However, one could object that this method would not necessarily result in a true criterion of normality and that when such a criterion did result the method would be somewhat redundant since the same criterion could have been achieved by remaining on the level of activity. By this is meant that if, by supposition, one were to encounter one thousand punctured rubber balls and these alone, the nature which would be arrived at by applying the principle that "action follows being" would be a perverted nature. Therefore the criterion of normality deduced from this nature would itself be invalid. On the other hand, if the activities were not perverted, assuming that we were to examine one thousand rubber balls in good condition, the concept of normality which would ultimately result would be identical with the activities with which the investigation began. In other words, rubber balls in good condition do bounce, and can be thrown with ease. Hence in the latter

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case the application of the method does not appear to have been fruitful, since we end precisely where we began.

We may begin by considering the first alternative. It does not follow with necessity that observation of perverted activities results in a false view of the nature of the object from which nature a false conception of normality would automatically flow. Whether such a situation obtains or not depends on the manner in which the principle that "action follows being" is utilized. If one concentrates on the particular manifestations of an activity, and the activities are perverted, then the resulting nature will itself be a perverted nature. But if one goes beyond the individual activities and abstracts "the" activity, the universal, (elasticity as opposed to many poor bounces),¹⁴ the nature arrived at, will be the real nature and the major premise

14.

Furthermore, the observer would recognize damage as damage and would conclude that a higher degree of resiliency should be expected of a rubber ball. This consideration would naturally enter into his criterion of normality.

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which would result, (the criterion of normality), will be a true premise.¹⁵

In other words, one may arrive at the essence of a rubber ball even by considering punctured rubber balls (unless of course one wishes to introduce the highly hypothetical situation in which the damage is identical in each ball, in which case, one might tend to consider it as part of the nature.),¹⁶ but one will not arrive at a true criterion of normality if he remains on the level of operations if the operations are not what they ought to be in the light of the true nature.

15.

It is to be noted that this is precisely how the major premise of a certain deductive process comes about. Every deduction is based on a previous induction, but strict demonstration can be had only when the major premise results from induction from sensible particulars rather than from an enumeration of singulars, an enumeration which by its very nature is bound to be incomplete. "We conclude that these states of Knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed from other higher states of Knowledge, but from sense perception. It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has been restored. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process. ... When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand, the earliest universal is present in the soul; for though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal - is man, for example, not the man Callias. (Aristotle, A. Po. II, 19, 100^a, 10-bl.)

16.

Needless to say this would be impossible in the case of man in view of his complex nature and also in view of differing intensities even within any one level of his nature.

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This last observation sets the scene for the answer to the second alternative. One cannot know at the start whether the method will or will not lead to a criterion identical to the observed activities since one cannot know by a mere observation of activities whether they do or do not reflect the object's true nature. Furthermore one may also question whether the method would be redundant in any sense since there appears to be a radical difference in the knowledge which results. One should not mistake knowledge of fact with causal knowledge. By observing activities we have knowledge of a fact. By deducing what activities ought to flow from nature we have knowledge of a cause. In the first instance we know that balls bounce. In the second instance we know why they bounce and that they should bounce in virtue of the nature of rubber. Once again it must be stressed that it is not because balls bounce that they are normal. Rather because they are normal, they bounce. If one arrives at a true criterion of normality while remaining on the level of operation his success is a "per accidens" success, inasmuch as in this instance the operations would be in keeping with the nature. But this "per accidens" success should not be considered as resulting from a strict demonstration. We do not have strict science since the middle term is not a true universal but an incomplete enumeration of singulars. If this approach were arranged in syllogistic form it would appear as:

OBJECTS No. 1,2,3,4,5,etc. all bounce
But OBJECTS No. 1,2,3,4,5, are all balls

Therefore, All balls bounce. (That is, all balls should bounce).

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Two observations are in order:

- 1) Balls No. 1,2,3,4,5, etc. are not all the rubber balls that exist.
- 2) It does not follow that, because they bounce, they should bounce and that therefore all rubber balls should bounce.

In other words in addition to the fact that this kind of induction though perfectly legitimate in the physical sciences, gives only a knowledge of a fact from which fact a cause is inferred, an inference which in some instances amounts to a great "perhaps" (which incidentally explains at least in part why the work of the physical sciences is basically one of "progress by substitution."¹⁷) the cause inferred in this instance has the force of an "ought". The inference is not merely that all balls bounce since we have examined a representative number. Rather all balls should bounce since we have seen many balls bouncing. And it should hardly need stressing at this point that one cannot reasonably arrive at a norm by an examination of the "de facto" state.

In conclusion it would appear a belaboring of the obvious to say that the analogy of the rubber ball is precisely that, an analogy. Man is a much more complex being. A ball is an artificial being, while man is a natural being. Furthermore, as was shown in Chapter II of this

17.

JACQUES MARITAIN, A Preface to Metaphysics, New York, Sheed & Ward Inc., 1939, p. 9.

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part, man is capable of immanent acts. A rubber ball must be moved by another. Again man's immanent acts manifest themselves on three levels and these levels reflect substantial unity. A ball is only accidentally unified. Man has needs corresponding to his levels and these needs, in virtue of his unity, are closely intertwined. Furthermore man is a free agent. But these differences, although momentous and certainly to be considered when arriving at a criterion of normality for man are not, at present, our concern. They would represent the "somewhat different" of the analogy. It is the "somewhat the same" that concerns us here, and it is this: one arrives at a true criterion of normality for any object, not by considering behaviour alone (although "per accidens" a true criterion might be had in this way), nor by imposing rules of behaviour, but by educing from the nature of the object the activities which ought to flow from it.

How may these considerations be related to Horney's position? Within this question there would appear to be many questions. Perhaps the points might best be made by asking and answering the following:

What bearing has the preceeding demonstration on Horney's concept of normality?

Are the relative norms of any value in psychoanalysis?

Would Horney's concept of normality have any bearing on her psychotherapy?

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Horney maintained that a conception of normality is reached "by the approval of certain standards of behaviour and feeling within a certain group which imposes these standards upon its members."¹⁸ It has already been stated that Horney did not distinguish between different conceptions of normality and normality as such. It would appear that the reason behind Horney's unwillingness to consider an absolute norm for man lay in the fact that, in her view, conceptions of normality are imposed from without. In other words one does not arrive at what is normal for man by considering human nature, and if one wishes to determine whether an individual is normal or not one considers what he does and compares it to what the most of men in that culture do, since the most of men express the dictates of the culture. It is hoped that the above example has established the main points at issue, namely that one cannot maintain that there is necessarily normality in number that is, in operation, and that even if one were to say that by this method the normality of an individual would obtain so far as a particular culture, is concerned, the question would still remain as to the absolute value of that particular norm. Now although it can hardly be argued that a culture intentionally imposes a criterion of normality on its members while fully realizing that that criterion expresses a deviation from human nature, it should nevertheless be noted that an imposition can be had either by intent or by effect, and it is in the latter way

18.

KAREN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1937, p. 18.

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that a culture can impose a faulty criterion of normality upon its members. Therefore a culture which fails to consider human nature for what it really is, and puts forth a criterion of normality which is not in keeping with that nature, to one degree or another imposes rather than discovers the "ought" for man for, once again, what a thing should do depends upon what it is.

At the beginning of the chapter it was said that differences do indeed exist in what is considered "normal" in different cultures. Horney's observations along this line were quite correct. However it does not necessarily follow from this that neuroses "do not represent problems common to human nature". Nor can it be said that since what constitutes "growth" varies with the culture, human nature may be actualized in several different ways, even if the differences among cultures allow for contradictory ways. This tendency, on the part of Horney, to do away with absolute standards is a clear indication of an inability to reconcile opposites, to reduce multiplicity to unity, as well as of a tendency to accept what is as what ought to be. Indeed, it appears most strange that Horney would allow for a nature proper to man as man and yet refused to delve more deeply into that nature. The most striking reason for this paradox appears to be that although Horney often assumed positions which both in their nature and consequences were philosophical, her conclusions were often based on observations which did not go beyond the empiriological level. Indeed, if one does make an attempt at reducing multiplicity to unity he ends in agreeing with

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Horney's contention that "deviation from the normal" may be an indication of neurosis. But the agreement is with the "fact" and not with the "reasons" for the fact. An example might help to illustrate the point:

If a young man living in the United States were to exhibit an extreme and chronic suspicion of everything and everyone, there might be reasonable ground to assume that he was not well-balanced. If he were unable to assert himself with others in ordinary life situations, if he were to indicate by his attitude a marked indifference toward a goal in life in keeping with his education and native abilities; if he were to exhibit a marked indecision in the most elementary affairs of life; if he reflected an undue fear of automobiles or of crowds, or if he were incapable of keeping up a conversation when again his background and native ability presented no barriers, there would be sufficient ground to at least suspect that this individual was mentally disturbed. The ground for these conclusions would be provided by the patterns of behaviour existing in the United States. There, it is expected that an individual be on his guard against the injustices of others, but it is not considered "normal" to be continually and chronically suspicious of everything and everyone particularly when satisfactory evidence to the contrary has been provided. Similarly, in the United States, the normal pattern of behaviour demands that a person be reasonably self-assertive in his interpersonal relations. He is expected to choose a goal in keeping with his likes and abilities and to pursue it with a tenacity that will assure at least moderate success. He is expected

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to think on his feet, to see the pros and cons of a situation and to arrive at a judgement. His daily contact with crowds and automobiles would render fear of these most peculiar. In short these departures from the established norm might indeed be indicative of a neurosis. Thus there is agreement with the "fact". But the reason why these departures would indicate a neurosis is not the mere fact of a deviation from an established norm, but rather a realization that these norm are nothing more than the more proximate expressions of what is expected of human nature. Thus a man who is aware of his true nature and of the manner in which that nature ought to be actualized may purposely depart from the norms of his culture if he perceives these norms to be perversions. His departure would not place him in the category of "abnormal" except in the eyes of the standard of the culture. Rather his deviation would represent a highly desirable unconventionality and the result might be a truly normal individual. The value of relative norms in discovering the neurotic, would seem to depend on the direction which the individual's deviations have taken and on the ultimate value of the norms, rather than on the mere fact of a deviation. These are indeed significant qualifications. They emphasize all the more the need of a more ultimate and absolute standard.

Finally we must consider that the purpose of psychoanalysis is not merely the discovery of neuroses. Psychoanalysis is not a speculative science. It is naturally oriented to therapy and the final cause of psychoanalytic therapy is the cure of relief of psychic illness. But

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to cure or relieve is to bring about a change for the better and to bring about a change for the better implies a knowledge, or at the least an assumed knowledge of what is if not best at least better for man. This is indeed a highly controversial issue in psychoanalytic circles since it has often been maintained that psychiatrists should remain neutral, should not in any way impose a philosophy of life upon their patients. Whether such neutrality is possible or not need not be discussed at this point. However it is most consequential in this context to consider that Horney regarded it as neither possible nor desirable.

Since neuroses involve questions of human behaviour and human motivations, social and traditional evaluations inadvertently determine the problems tackled and the goal arrived at.¹⁹

.....

My own opinion is that an absence of value judgements belong among those ideals we should try rather to overcome than to cultivate. A limitless willingness to understand the inner necessities forcing the neurotic to develop and to maintain moral pretenses, parasitic desires, power drives and the like, does not prevent my considering these attitudes as negative values interfering with real happiness.²⁰

19.

KAREN HORNEY, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1939, p. 296.

20.

Ibid., pp. 297-298.

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Similarly,

In other words the contradistinction between the medical and the moral concepts of psychic disturbances, is less irreconcilable than it appeared to be: The moral problems are an integral part of the illness. As a consequence we should regard as belonging to our medical task the function 21 of helping the patient in the clarification of these problems.

And again,

It is important for you to know in what school of therapy the analyst has been trained. ... Some people hold that theoretical differences in psychoanalytic theory are ultimately of little import, but actually they are of very great import. The theory according to which the analyst practices is an expression of his philosophy of life. Your analyst's philosophy of life is important because it will influence you in the course of analysis. ... It is inevitable that questions about human values come up quite frequently in the course of analysis.²²

Therefore Horney's set of values, her "norms" did, by her own admission enter into her therapy. 23 In attempting then to determine Horney's goals of therapy one may glean at the least a general answer from her criterion for discovering the neurotic. It will be recalled that Horney's first criterion was "deviation from the normal." It will also be recalled that for Horney "the conception of what is normal varies not only with the culture but within the same culture in the course of time."

21.

Ibid., p. 301.

22.

Id. (Ed. by) Are You Considering Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1946, p. 151.

23.

It will be remembered that Fromm too maintains that value judgments cannot be divorced from therapy. Sullivan, on the other hand, distinguished between psychiatric cure and social cure. But it has already been suggested that this distinction is somewhat dubious.

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Therefore Horney felt justified in concluding that "there is no such thing as a normal psychology which holds for all mankind" and that although a neurosis is ".... a psychic disturbance brought about by fears and by attempts to find compromise solutions for conflicting tendencies," nevertheless, "it is advisable to call this disturbance a neurosis only if it deviates from the pattern common to the particular culture". In short, "neuroses do not represent problems common to all men". Now if a neurotic is characterized primarily by a deviation from the pattern of behaviour considered normal in his culture, ²⁴ then it would appear obvious that a cure would consist in getting the patient to conform to the patterns of the culture, in short to cease his

24.

It is true that Horney supplied criteria other than "deviation from the normal" with which to discover the neurotic. In the third chapter of the thesis (Part II), other patterns of behaviour which, for Horney, characterized the neurotic, were mentioned. These were: rigidity in reaction, a discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments, and the presence of conflicting tendencies. However, although Horney presented these last three characteristics as separate and distinct from the first, they are, in effect, but its ramifications. Horney herself explained that a rigidity in reaction characterized a neurotic only if its particular manifestation was not in keeping with the norms of the culture. Similarly a discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments can only be viewed as a discrepancy in the light of what is expected of an individual in his culture. The conflicting tendencies seem to allow the same qualification. Therefore, though the last three characteristics have been assumed to have a universal extension, their particular expression has been seen to vary with the culture. These variations then, either in kind or in degree amount to deviations from the "normal" pattern in the culture. Therefore, though the present discussion treats only of the first criterion, it, in effect, includes them all.

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deviations from the "normal". And since Horney maintained that "there is no such thing as a normal psychology which holds for all mankind" it would also appear clear that her goals of therapy would be relative goals, relative to what is considered normal in the culture of the patient. If one puts these two pieces of evidence together, (Horney's insistence on value judgements in therapy and a relativity in therapeutic goals) it becomes immediately obvious that the preceding discussion has been far from merely academic. Several questions immediately arise: what were Horney's specific therapeutic goals? Can they be reconciled with the nature of man and if so would the reconciliation be "per accidens" or at the price of an inconsistency? Is it unqualifiedly of value to adjust the patient to his environment? These are indeed significant questions and clearly represent fertile ground for further study.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Any science whose final cause contains an implicit or explicit demand that it view man in terms of his nature must of necessity take some stand regarding that nature and the things that affect it. Psychoanalysis is such a science.

This thesis has endeavoured to present and evaluate the fundamental philosophical positions of one psychoanalyst, Karen Horney. The subject matter treated was sufficiently diversified to require a tripartite division.

Part one is concerned with a brief presentation of the outstanding members of the school of interpersonal relations, Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm. Since Horney was a member of the school and since she was significantly influenced by the above-named psychoanalysts a presentation of their more basic tenets was considered fruitful both as a means of giving the reader a bird's-eye-view of the whole school, and by way of understanding more fully the effect of which the thesis treats, Karen Horney.

Part Two was intended as an exposition of Horney's basic thought. In keeping with this objective it was shown that Horney viewed man as a being possibly created and responsible within limits, whose nature is wholly constructive, and endowed with a spontaneous tendency toward self-actualization. Man not only possesses a generic nature, that is a nature in common with all other men, but an individual nature. The factors which serve to individualize that nature appear to be temperament, intellectual ability and more particular aptitudes.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The spontaneous movement toward self-realization may be impeded by unfavorable external factors. If the environment is unfavorable to the extent of crushing man's natural development, the individual, in order to survive in some measure, will be forced to pervert his nature. Rather than evolving constructively he will grow destructive of self and others. The end-result of this perversion is a psychic disturbance termed neurosis. In short, whether an individual develops as normal or neurotic depends upon the quality of the environment. The force of the environment is most significantly brought to bear on the individual through the medium of interpersonal relations, particularly those experienced in the early childhood years. Of greatest consequence would be interpersonal relations of a parental nature, but parental or not such relations are in the final effect but the by-product of the cultural climate. This position was described in the thesis as amounting to environmental determinism. This determinism was, however, of a qualified nature. According to Horney man was determined in his "normal" or neurotic development but both normal and neurotic remained responsible agents, though in the case of a neurotic his freedom was "impaired". However a more careful analysis of the status quo of Horney's neurotic, as revealed through a presentation of the neurotic structure, and coupled with some pointed remarks on Horney's part, seemed to indicate that in point of fact the neurotic was in all respects driven and hence his freedom was more apparent than real.

A neurosis, as viewed by Horney, was a psychic difficulty brought about by intensely unfavorable interpersonal relations which created a disturbed state involving the individual's relation to him-

self and others. But it would be advisable to call this disturbance a neurosis only if the individual's behaviour deviates from the pattern considered "normal" in his culture. In other words, there is no such thing as an absolute norm of normality. The concept of what is normal is man-made and varies with the culture. Consequently there would appear to be at least as many types of neuroses as there are conceptions of normality. Conversely man's nature may be actualized in as many ways as there are conceptions of normality.

These three fundamental positions, that is, Horney's view of human nature, of the environment, and of normality, along with their off-shoots were evaluated in the third part. There it was shown that Horney's view of human nature was unreal since it refused to take into account an observable disharmony not merely in neurotics but in all men. It was further shown that the proofs which Horney had advanced to defend her convictions were far from conclusive. Furthermore it was shown that although Horney's view of the role of the environment in producing neurosis represented a striking instance of penetrating observation, one which implicitly indicate a rich insight into human nature and its more fundamental needs, nevertheless her environmental determinism seemed to suffer by excess. Although the considerable influence of the environment was admitted, although it was conceded that it explained a very large number of neuroses, there was nonetheless a tendency on Horney's part to slight any other factor. Thus it was shown that a constitutional pre-disposition should also be considered to play a causal role in the explanation of at least some neuroses. Furthermore although the individual could not be considered responsible for becom-

ing neurotic, nevertheless he did retain some measure of freedom as neurotic, and this Horney seemed to admit more in theory than in practice. The ethical implications of such a position were brought to light.

Finally Horney's conception of normality was shown to reflect an apparent incapacity to reconcile opposites, since the admittedly numerous criterions of normality did not automatically eliminate the possibility of a more stable norm. Since Horney's position implicitly amounted to the conviction that what is normal for man is not derived from human nature, it was shown, by means of an extended analogy, how one should arrive at a criterion of normality. Thus deviations from the "normal" were shown to be helpful in detecting a neurosis if the normal were indeed an expression of human nature rather than an arbitrary cultural imposition.

The scope of this thesis did not include an extensive exposition and evaluation of Horney's therapy. But in concluding it may be asked whether those facets of Horney's theories which were adversely criticized in the thesis, would of necessity have prevented Horney from being a good psychoanalyst, or from achieving an impressive number of cures. All practical indications point to Horney's being held in the highest esteem in psychiatric circles. In point of fact the many responsible positions which she assumed during her lifetime bear ample witness to her stature (See Appendix I). Yet it would seem that to be mistaken on such crucial issues as: Is man's nature as that nature exists today wholly constructive; Is there such a thing as an objectively normal man; and are neurotics at all responsible agents;

should at the least impair success in a field so intimately related to human nature as psychoanalysis. It could of course be replied that to be held in high esteem in a given circle does not necessarily argue objective worth. It might also be objected that therapeutic successes do not constitute irrefutable proof of the value of a psychoanalytic theory, since "there is a great deal of catharsis and suggestion involved in any form of psychoanalysis". Thus Horney's successes, and she was apparently an extremely successful analyst, would have come about not because of, but in spite of her therapy.

To explain away Horney's stature as a psychoanalyst in so glib a manner is to do a glaring injustice to one of the most capable psychoanalysts of our time. Her death should be considered a very definite loss to psychiatry and to the mentally ill. Karen Horney was successful not in spite of but because of her views. Here there appears to be a contradiction but the contradiction does not lie in the explanation of Horney's theories but rather in Horney herself. What is more, some of Horney's philosophical positions although incorrect did not really affect her therapy and if they did at all, it was peculiarly enough by way of help rather than hindrance. Particular attention should be drawn to her view of human nature. Horney's conclusion here went much beyond her premises, yet in viewing human nature as wholly constructive her attempts at seeking environmental factors were understandably intensified. This ran, of course, the risk of finding what was not there. Yet in point of fact this did not occur. Horney's explanations of individual cases throughout her work reveal, on the whole, an extremely objective, penetrating, and disciplined mind.

What was said regarding contradictions in Horney rather than in this presentation would seem to require some explanation. At the end of the final chapter it was asked whether Horney's goals of therapy could be reconciled with man's nature and if so, whether such a reconciliation would be merely accidental or achieved at the price of an inconsistency. Although this question could not be answered in that chapter, without prefacing it with an exhaustive presentation and evaluation of Horney's therapy, a task which goes beyond the objectives of this study and which furthermore runs the risk of dealing with material not properly philosophical, it may be appropriate in concluding to suggest at the least a line of inquiry. Even if one were to argue, and one could do so consistently, that Horney's therapeutic goals in spite of an appearance of universality (she maintained, for example that the re-integrated personality reflects: "... the capacity to assume responsibility for himself, in the sense of feeling himself the active responsible force in his life, capable of making decisions and taking the consequences", Our Inner Conflicts p. 241) were nevertheless culturally determined since "there is no such thing as a normal psychology which holds for all mankind", still when Horney begins to apply her therapeutic goals she gives the distinct impression that the actual expressions of these goals are not merely applicable to the United States but to man as man. Therefore her relativism appears as somewhat inconsistent since she at times gives the impression that in spite of her relativism she had a very absolute and detailed view of how human nature should be actualized. It is suggested further that this view does not appear at all incompatible with the Christian view. And it is this inconsistency

which might explain at least in part her success as an analyst. Thus Horney succeeded not in spite of but because of her therapy yet there appears to have been a difference between theory and therapy. All this is but to say that Horney was first and foremost a psychoanalyst and an observer of human nature in action. It is in this realm that her true worth is to be sought and there is much to be found. Her more ultimate positions do reflect a rather lamentable tendency, that of drawing explicit or implicit philosophical conclusion from the disadvantageous position of the empirical scientist.

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APPENDIX I

Biographical Sketch of Karen Horney

Karen Horney was born in Hamburg, Germany on September 16, 1885. Her mother was of German nationality, her father, a Norwegian sea captain. She pursued her medical studies in Freiburg, Goettingen and Berlin. Her medical degree was received from the University of Berlin in 1913. Four years before, she had married Oscar Horney, a Berlin lawyer. They were divorced in 1937. The marriage had yielded three daughters.

Horney's interest in psychoanalysis appears to have stemmed from her studies at the University of Berlin. From 1914 to 1918 she pursued graduate studies in psychiatry at Berlin-Lankwitz. During much of this period she was the avid pupil of Dr. Karl Abraham, the well-known disciple of Freud. In the following years (1918-1932) she was kept occupied as both a psychoanalyst and teacher at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. During the same period she also participated in several International Congresses on psychoanalysis, including the now historic discussion of lay analysis, a discussion chaired by Freud himself.

In 1932 Dr. Horney travelled to the United States at the invitation of Franz Alexander. She had accepted the position of Associate-Director of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. The post was held for two years, but in 1934, it would appear because of differences with Alexander, she settled in New York, engaged in private practice, and took the position of instructor at the Institute of

Psychoanalysis. She also gave courses at the New School for Social Research. Dr. Horney was naturalized in 1938.

In 1941, differences with the members of the teaching staff at the New York Institute brought on her disqualification as a training analyst. Although no specific reasons were given for her dismissal, it would appear that the cause lay in her growing differences with Freudian theories. However Horney and her colleagues soon formed the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis. The new body quickly established a training center, The American Institute For Psychoanalysis of which Horney was to become Dean. The Institute was a direct and open reaction to the Freudian School. Horney served not only as Dean but also teacher and editor of the Institute's literary organ, The American Journal of Psychoanalysis. She was also a fellow of the American Psychiatric association and honorary President of the Karen Horney Foundation for low-cost psychoanalytic help to the needy. In spite of her several duties, she contributed many books and articles to the field and maintained a most extensive private practice.

Dr. Horney continued in her various tasks until 1952 when, at the age of sixty-seven, she died following a brief illness.

APPENDIX 2

ABSTRACT OF

Karen Horney's Theory of Neurosis: An Aristotelian-Thomistic Critique,
With an Introduction to the School of Interpersonal Relations.¹

The raison d'être of psychoanalytic therapy is the cure or relief of mental illnesses, particularly of the psychoneuroses. Such a scope must necessarily include a knowledge or at the least an assumed knowledge of what man ought to be. To make such a commitment is in effect to adopt either implicitly or explicitly some position regarding the nature of man. It is of course true that not all psychoanalysts will sanction this line of reasoning. Many will maintain that psychoanalysis and value judgements need not, in fact should not, make their acquaintance. But what psychoanalysts say is not always what psychoanalysts do and what psychoanalysts say is not necessarily true.

Christian thought has been significantly aware of the implications of psychoanalysis in terms of man's nature, his origin and his end. Consequently, a thorough and comprehensive study of the theories of its founder, Sigmund Freud, has been repeatedly undertaken in Christian circles. Unfortunately the theories of Freud's disciples or ex-disciples have not always received such generous attention. Dr. Karen Horney's psychoanalytic theories represent an instance of such neglect. This study, by presenting and evaluating Dr. Horney's more

1.

Ph.D. Thesis presented by Sergio D. Petraroja, in 1962, to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ottawa through the Institute of Philosophy, 272 pages.

basic views has attempted a partial amendment of this slight. The need of subjecting Dr. Horney's views to closer scrutiny appears all the more urgent when one considers that, by her own admission, value judgements cannot be divorced from therapy.

The study is divided into three parts. Since Horney was a prominent member of the school of interpersonal relations, a brief survey of the thought of the outstanding members of the school, Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm, was thought to help in placing Horney in focus by introducing the reader to those forces which influenced her more mature thought. Such would be the final cause and the content of part one.

The second part deals with the matter proper of the study, Karen Horney. The entire content of this part is of a chiefly presentative nature. There is no sustained effort at an evaluation. The section is divided into four chapters though the division is not intended to be clear-cut. The nature of the material demanded a certain overlapping.

Chapter One deals with Horney's view of human nature and its origin. What may be considered the essential notes of man's nature, as seen by Horney, are presented. Man is described as a possibly created and at least partially responsible being. He is further depicted as the possessor of exclusively "constructive" tendencies which spring from his very nature and which, unless significantly impeded in their actualization by external circumstances, tend to evolve spontaneously. Horney's "proofs" of her view of human nature are put forth. It is gleaned from her arguments that a neurosis, the psychic disturbance with which her works are concerned, is ultimately and unqualifiedly determined by the

environment. Her often ambiguous use of terms is stressed and several questions are introduced at the end of the chapter. Their answers, which will serve to dissolve some of the nebulousness, are left to a later chapter.

Chapter Two stresses the significant role of the culture in the production of neurosis. Horney's concept of normality and her view of the influential role of the environment are presented, each in a separate section. The relativism reflected by Horney's first concept and Horney's qualified environmental determinism are exposed in some detail.

Chapter Three is concerned with Horney's view of the nature and causes of neurosis. Certain behaviour patterns which serve to characterize the neurotic are indicated. Horney's definition of neurosis is presented as well as a detailed exposition of the genesis of neurosis in terms of cultural factors and interpersonal relations. The chapter also attempts to resolve the ambiguities alluded to in the first chapter.

The final chapter of this part is concerned with the neurotic structure itself. While it might at first appear that this chapter amounts to a little more than a "curiosity" in a study that is concerned with implicit or explicit philosophical notions, it is later shown that the evolution of neurosis, as seen by Horney, will have very definite ethical implications in terms of freedom and consequent responsibility.

Finally, the last part of the thesis has as its end a criticism of Dr. Horney's more basic views as expounded in the pages before. It is divided into four chapters. Chapter One considers Horney's view of man. It is shown that her conclusions regarding human nature stem from

faulty argumentation and are not only contestable on logical grounds but also are contradicted by the testimony of mankind throughout the centuries.

Chapter Two focuses on an evaluation of Horney's causes of neurosis. The chapter treats briefly of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of human nature. This in turn is complimented by a presentation of human nature in its more dynamic aspects, particularly as that nature, in order to achieve its proper fulfillment and integration requires the satisfaction of certain basic needs. These criterions are then brought to bear on Horney's etiology of neurosis and it is in this realm that she emerges at her scrutinizing best.

The third chapter of this part considers the problem of neurosis and responsibility both in terms of responsibility for becoming neurotic, and freedom as neurotic. Horney's qualified determinism appears vindicated in the first instance but brought to an exaggerated extreme in the second.

The final chapter deals with Horney's conception of normality. It is shown that to admit that there are many conceptions of normality in existence is not to do away with a more absolute norm, one arising from the nature of man. The bearing of Horney's relativism on her views regarding psychoanalytic therapy is also sketched.

A summary and conclusion is appended at the end of the study in which Dr. Horney's value as a psychoanalyst is defended in spite of basic differences on somewhat crucial issues.