

Getting Beyond Good and Evil:
Reconciling Naturalism and Skepticism in Nietzsche's Middle Period

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LEGEND

The following abbreviations are to facilitate references to Nietzsche's works. I only include those works that I use in my thesis. A full bibliography can be found at the end. The letters refer to the work, Arabic numbers refer to the section (not pages), and roman numerals refer to major parts or chapters.

<i>A</i>	<i>The Antichrist: An Essay Towards A Criticism of Christianity</i>
<i>BGE</i>	<i>Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future</i>
<i>GM</i>	<i>On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic</i>
<i>GS</i>	<i>The Gay Science</i>
<i>H</i>	<i>Human, All-too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits</i>
<i>OTL</i>	<i>On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense</i>
<i>TI</i>	<i>Twilight of the Idols: or How to Philosophise with a Hammer</i>
<i>Z</i>	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One</i>

ABSTRACT

Philosophers such as Clark and Leiter propose that Nietzsche's position on the concept of truth, while controversial in his early and middle periods, developed into something far less radical in his later works. They claim that Nietzsche should be understood as a naturalist who contends that we can attain truth, and that his falsification thesis, along with skeptical interpretations of it, is incoherent due to self-contradiction. I challenge these thinkers and what I call the naturalist interpretations because if Nietzsche's middle period is incoherent then little or nothing can be seen as valuable in GS, Z, or BGE. In order to defend Nietzsche from his alleged self-contradiction I examine positions offered by Clark & Dudrick and Berry who attempt to offer a coherent interpretation of his middle period. While neither provides a convincing position, they help me reveal that what Nietzsche calls "strong skepticism" is integral towards his project. Strong skepticism is the notion that we should continuously perpetuate inquiry, while also creating new values. Nietzsche's project is to get beyond good and evil, which can be achieved by recognizing untruth as a strong skeptic. To get beyond good and evil, Nietzsche asserts that the thing-in-itself must be properly rejected along with any other metaphysical faith. In so doing philosophers of the future can create new values by being honest about their personal judgements as well as recognizing that falsification is necessary for getting around in the world. Ultimately, I conclude that Nietzsche is neither a skeptic nor a naturalist, and instead utilizes elements from both without committing to either.

Chapter I - Reading Nietzsche

My thesis is an examination of Friedrich Nietzsche's views on truth. I contend that Nietzsche has been misunderstood by what I call the "naturalist interpretations" and show that while Nietzsche includes naturalistic and skeptical elements in his philosophy, labeling him either as a naturalist or a skeptic only serves to distract from his actual concerns. In these six chapters I develop the position that Nietzsche's views on truth are not rooted in naturalist or skeptical commitments, but instead in what he calls the philosophers of the future, creating value, and perpetuating inquiry.

When reading Nietzsche there is always a question as to *how* to read the text. While one could debate at length how best to read Nietzsche, I wish merely to explain how I read his texts for the purpose of my thesis. When reading a problematic section, or sections, in Nietzsche's works, I have decided to try and follow his train of thought as closely as possible, especially when focusing on any one specific passage. I do this in order to remain as faithful to the text as possible. Unfortunately, in doing so, passages become difficult to follow since Nietzsche frequently presents his ideas in such a way as to force questions upon the reader. Consequently, while addressing one problem, such as whether or not Nietzsche is internally coherent, a host of other questions arise, which make it difficult to follow Nietzsche's narrative.

One way to look at the problem is that Nietzsche does not offer arguments in a conventional sense. He does not present typical premises before coming to a conclusion. Instead, Nietzsche offers pieces of a puzzle, which sometimes appear wholly unrelated. This is problematic when trying to fit the pieces of the puzzle together in that Nietzsche appears to leave out bits of information, or presents something as if the reader should already know to what he is referring. Nietzsche is notorious for assuming his reader has read his previous works and this issue comes up in my later chapters such as when I need to refer back to previous works in order to make sense of later books. Nietzsche's assumption creates a methodological problem for my work in that, for the most part, I must present one piece of Nietzsche's puzzle at a time and hold off from delving too far into one concept or another for fear of losing the thread. Furthermore, as in chapter four and five, Nietzsche's picture – the image the pieces are intended to make – remains unclear until all the connections between Nietzsche's ideas are connected at the end. The sudden revelation forces a large number of deductions all at once, which can cause some difficulty in viewing his theories as a whole. Due to these considerations, I recommend only that

the conclusions of each chapter be taken slowly and judgements reserved until the full picture is within view.

I begin my second chapter by presenting the interpretations offered by three books: *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* by Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Morality* by Brian Leiter, and *The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil* written jointly by Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick¹. I refer to these three books as the naturalist interpretations and offer an examination of two of them in chapter two. These interpretations are “naturalist” in the sense that they provide reason to believe that Nietzsche supports, and to some extent uses, the natural sciences in his philosophy. The naturalist interpretations serve as my starting point to understand Nietzsche’s position on truth because while they offer insight into naturalistic elements in Nietzsche’s philosophy, these interpretations are also preoccupied with rejecting old “received” views of Nietzsche that they identify as “skeptical.” What “skepticism” means for the naturalist interpretations will have to be developed in later chapters, but they commonly refer to these old interpretations as “postmodern” or the “epistemological left” (Clark, 1990, 3). They contend that postmodern interpretations defend the view that Nietzsche denies truth and that, roughly speaking, everything is false. Clark claims that postmodern interpretations lead to “hopeless self-contradiction” and that “while this view on Nietzsche and truth may be embraced only in the most radical of contemporary intellectuals, Nietzsche’s claims about truth have undoubtedly exerted great influence in more respectable circles” (Clark, 1990, 2). Consequently, it is a part of Clark’s project, and the naturalist interpretations generally, to separate Nietzsche from his postmodern interpreters.

Clark asserts that for any of Nietzsche’s philosophical views (revaluation of values, will to power, the role of morality, and so on) to be taken seriously we must suppose that he believes these views are true (Clark, 1990, 3). If Nietzsche does not believe that his own views are true, then it is not at all clear what he is doing. Leiter makes a similar observation when he says the postmodern interpretation “of Nietzsche has always been in profound tension with Nietzsche’s actual philosophical practice, in which he repeatedly and regularly employs the *epistemic value* terms in attacking competing views and promoting his own” (Leiter, 2002, 13); Nietzsche uses words that imply that there is truth to what he is saying. As an example, Leiter cites *BGE* 128: “The more abstract the truth is that you would teach, the more you have to seduce the senses to

¹ Hereafter referred to as “Clark & Dudrick.”

it.” The passage suggests that Nietzsche presupposes there is truth, and makes a claim about truth: the more abstract it is, the more difficult it is to hold the belief if it contradicts the senses. For example, it is true that the earth revolves around the sun but our senses would tell us that the sun revolves around the earth. Because of the tension between the skeptical or truth-denying ideas in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and Nietzsche’s actual truth-affirming philosophical practice, the naturalist interpretations want to put forward a way of interpreting Nietzsche that escapes this tension and offers the most reasonable and defensible position possible.

The naturalist interpretations offer new ways of interpreting Nietzsche’s views on truth due to a void they believe is created by postmodern interpretations, as they find the postmodern attempts to defend the skeptical Nietzsche unconvincing. However, while Clark and Leiter briefly engage those they associate with the postmodern affiliation, such as Nehamas and Derrida, they tend to treat them dismissively. In putting forward my arguments in subsequent chapters, both against the naturalist interpretation and in favor of more skeptical views, it might seem sensible to use postmodern arguments in support of my views and point to the apparent negligence of the naturalist interpretations in their dismissal of postmodern interpretations. To the contrary, since the naturalist interpretations do not appear to take the postmodern interpretation seriously, if I were to use postmodern arguments to respond to the naturalist reading, my arguments would fall on deaf ears. Furthermore, such an approach, in my mind, is far less interesting than taking the naturalist interpretations seriously. It is for these reasons that I intend neither to defend nor reject the postmodern interpretation generally, and instead focus on providing analysis on the naturalist interpretations and Nietzsche directly. In this way I avoid any initial objections, dismissive or otherwise, that come about through association, or for being “radical.” Nevertheless, I do consider thinkers such as Nehamas when considering objections to and concerns about my own views in the final chapters. Otherwise, I explicitly abstain from drawing any arguments from Nietzsche’s *On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense* (OTL). Leiter, in particular, insists that the postmodern and deconstructionist interpretations rely too strongly upon OTL (Leiter, 2002, 14) and so I take it upon myself to examine Nietzsche’s skeptical motivations without the help of his most overtly skeptical text.

Instead of relying on postmodern arguments in response to the naturalist interpretations, I end chapter two by pointing out a flaw in Clark’s narrative. Clark divides Nietzsche’s texts into three periods of his writing: early, middle, and late. On Clark’s account, Nietzsche’s early period

includes everything before *The Gay Science* (*GS*), while the middle period includes *GS*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Z*), and *Beyond Good and Evil: A Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (*BGE*), and everything after constitutes Nietzsche's late period. She contends that the late Nietzsche is the most defensible and interesting period in Nietzsche's writing with respect to truth, and holds that the early and middle periods are riddled with contradictions. In support of her claim, she cites a section from *Twilight of the Idols* (*TI*) to argue that Nietzsche would support this distinction between the periods of his work. A problem arises in Clark's narrative when one considers the fact that Nietzsche explicitly includes *Z* as a part of his later period.² Furthermore, and of central importance to my thesis, *BGE* would also need to be included in his later period both due to the fact that it was written after *Z* and because Nietzsche claims that *Z* and *BGE* are very closely related (Acampora and Pearson, 2011, 5).

I focus on *BGE* and the "middle" period of Nietzsche's work as my site of investigation for my thesis due to its importance in Clark's narrative and the naturalist interpretations in general. She interprets *BGE* as the turning point in Nietzsche's thought from a philosopher who promotes skepticism, to a philosopher who rejects his earlier views and promotes naturalism instead. Clark's interpretation of *TI* also suggests Nietzsche is in agreement. If there were no turning point in Nietzsche's thought, then, under the naturalist interpretations, Nietzsche would remain an incoherent skeptic. The naturalist interpretations' treatment of the middle period is therefore central to the rest of their interpretations. If I can show that there is a problem with Clark's narrative, the naturalist interpretations are brought into question. Additionally, I agree with Clark & Dudrick who hold that *BGE* seems to have the most explicit content in the form of understanding Nietzsche's philosophy, which is especially true for the first half of *BGE*. While *On the Genealogy of Morals* (*GM*) is a popular contender for understanding Nietzsche's philosophy, Clark & Dudrick remark that "on the back of the title page of *GM*, in the print manuscript submitted to his publisher, Nietzsche instructed that it be 'appended' to *BGE* 'as clarification and supplement'" (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 2), as such, while *GM* can further assist in understanding Nietzsche's philosophy, it was his intent that the original formulations of his views around that time be found in *BGE*. Finally, since I am primarily concerned about *BGE*, I make neither arguments nor claims about Nietzsche the man or his oeuvre. I narrow the scope of

² While Nietzsche does not specifically divide his works in an "early," "middle," or "late," the section in *TI* that is in question suggests that Nietzsche acknowledges some kind of division. More will be explored in chapter two.

my thesis to be concerned with *BGE* and reserve all my arguments in reference to Nietzsche to refer to Nietzsche in *BGE* and his middle period.

After bringing attention to the inconsistency in Clark's narrative as to how to situate *BGE* in Nietzsche's thought in chapter two, I consider arguments offered by Clark & Dudrick who attempt to address this issue. *BGE* is problematic in that it contains both naturalistic elements, which the naturalist interpretations want, and skeptical elements, which they want to reject. My third chapter is occupied with trying to understand *BGE*, and whether it can be saved from the alleged contradiction. To this end, I consider two avenues, the first being Clark & Dudrick's interpretation, while the second is an interpretation offered by Jessica Berry in *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition*. In order to save *BGE* from incoherence, while also staying true to the philosophy offered by Clark, Clark & Dudrick attempt to explain away the skeptical elements found in *BGE*. In so doing, they hope to place *BGE*, and therefore *Z*, in Nietzsche's later period and thereby address the problem of Clark's narrative. I claim that they fail to explain away the skeptical elements in *BGE* 3 and *BGE* 4. By closely reading *BGE* 3 and 4, I urge that the skeptical elements in *BGE* are essential to Nietzsche's project, and therefore Clark & Dudrick fail.

I turn then to Berry who argues that Nietzsche is a Pyrrhonian skeptic, and that Nietzsche's philosophy remains coherent throughout his career. In order to verify Berry's argument, I consider three philosophical categorizations made by Sextus Empiricus, which he calls dogmatic, academic, and skeptic. Berry relies on these categorizations and so I compare them to three philosophical categorizations made by Nietzsche, which I call the objective spirit, weak skepticism, and strong skepticism. By comparing these categorizations, I come to show that the dogmatic branch resembles Nietzsche's objective spirit, and that the academic branch resembles something like his weak skepticism. Conversely, I conclude that Sextus's branch of skepticism does not resemble Nietzsche's strong skepticism, because Sextus's Pyrrhonian skepticism does not go far enough. Under Berry's interpretation, Pyrrhonian skepticism is tantamount to abstaining from making any judgements. That is to say, when a philosophical dilemma is presented, the Pyrrhonian skeptic refrains from siding with any position. But as I will reveal, Nietzsche's philosophy defends the notion that any good philosophy should create value, which entails that it cannot merely abstain from passing judgements.

While my third chapter sets out to answer a problem with the naturalist interpretations, it only exposes further complications in Nietzsche's project and his concept of the philosophers of the future, of what it means to create value, and so on. In order to address these issues I offer my interpretation of *BGE* in chapter four. I give a close reading of a number of passages in the early sections of *BGE* to conclude that Nietzsche's project is to get beyond good and evil, which is about overcoming moral prejudice. Yet, what Nietzsche means by overcoming moral prejudice is different from what one might expect. Normally, when overcoming prejudice, one thinks of removing prejudice, of coming to know a thing objectively and without bias. However, Nietzsche's criticisms in the early sections of *BGE* suggest that it is not possible for philosophers to overcome their prejudices in this way. In fact, by attempting to view the concept of truth objectively, Nietzsche suggests that the old philosophers are only deluding themselves. I further urge that overcoming prejudice involves acknowledging one's moral judgements, one's prejudices, and being honest about them. Nietzsche criticizes the old philosophers for blindly trusting in the will to truth, which is the desire to attain truth. If one merely pursues truth at any cost, Nietzsche believes that one will be ignorant to their prejudices.

Ultimately, my interpretation sets the stage for a "radically" skeptical interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy. Nonetheless, by examining what Nietzsche has to say about his concept of philosophers of the future, one can see that his views on truth are not radical, but merely frustrating. As I will show, Nietzsche's position is frustrating in the sense that it is impossible to come to a definitive answer to any question. The philosophers of the future are philosophers who get beyond good and evil, and who recognize that "truth" and "untruth" can be equally valuable. While these ideas will require further development in the subsequent chapters, the importance is that these ideas lead to perpetual inquiry. When posed with a question of truth, the philosophers of the future do not abstain from casting judgement, but instead cast their judgment and then continue to search, to inquire, and attempt to make sense of the world. In other words, the philosophers of the future are not afraid of giving answers to questions, but they are never satisfied with those answers, they will always seek new evidence and different ideas. In order to make these points clear, I return back to Clark and Leiter's concerns about skeptical interpretations of Nietzsche's from chapter two, and address them each in turn. I argue that there is no tension between Nietzsche's philosophical theory and practice as Leiter suggests, and I dispute Clark's objections that Nietzsche contradicts himself by presupposing the thing-in-itself.

Instead, I contend that if a philosophy fails to acknowledge its subjective position, and what's more, attempts to assert that it is the one truth, then such a philosophy is objectionable. Nietzsche states that instead of imposing prejudice upon others, one must be wary of the complexity of the world; instead of making truth claims about the world, one can identify one's own truths; and it is the goal of the philosophers of the future to find these truths, to continue inquiring about them, and ultimately create values through them. It is the continuation of inquiry, the questioning of dominant values, and the creation of new values that constitutes Nietzsche's project to get beyond good and evil (cf. *BGE* 203).

In the fifth chapter, I take the opportunity to examine potential problems with my interpretation, most of which have to do with an issue I have already mentioned: philosophical frustration. I take on objections that suggest that my interpretation leads to relativism, to a lack of philosophical credibility, and entails that Nietzsche's philosophy is circular. Ultimately, I argue that all these objections are raised due to philosophical frustration toward Nietzsche's position. As I mentioned, Nietzsche's philosophy requires perpetual inquiry: to being forever critical of the answers provided. Such a proposition is not only philosophical frustrating, but could also be frustrating on a practical level. If we cannot come to know things, or be certain of anything, how do we act – how do we move about in the world? I show that while Nietzsche is aware of this frustration, he embraces it, and offers an interpretation of the world that accounts for this dilemma: the will to power. In short, the will to power serves as a means of explaining how it is we go about in the world when dealing with conflicting judgements, and how it is we come to hold what we call truth. Nevertheless, while Nietzsche's will to power offers an explanation of why it is we are doomed to philosophical frustration, it could still be the case that Nietzsche's position is unsatisfying. I claim that Nietzsche's overall position is coherent with the remainder of his philosophy, and leave the matter of whether or not we should accept Nietzsche's views aside.

Finally, at the end of the chapter I return to the question of naturalism. While it should be abundantly clear that the naturalist interpretations should be rejected in light of their views about Nietzsche's middle period, I leave the question as to whether or not naturalism has any relevance to Nietzsche's philosophy until the final section. In the end I argue that Nietzsche offers vaguely naturalistic considerations, but that Nietzsche's naturalism does not resemble the naturalism set out by the naturalist interpretations. By reading *GS* 372 and 373 I suggest Nietzsche supports the

natural sciences and reason that Nietzsche's interest in the natural sciences is not only consistent with his skeptical motivations but actually a consequence of it. Nonetheless, despite having these qualities, I conclude that Nietzsche should not be labeled a skeptic or a naturalist. Such labels serve only to mislead those interested in Nietzsche's philosophy by subjecting him to methodological commitments to which he may have never even considered. One should therefore come to notice that all my responses to the problems and struggles posed by the secondary literature are my attempts to understand Nietzsche outside the confines of the concepts of skepticism and naturalism. Ultimately, while both naturalism and skepticism play a role, and can be useful in understanding Nietzsche's positions, they do not define them.

Chapter II – The Naturalist Interpretations

2.0 Introduction

The purposes of this chapter are first, to understand Clark, Leiter, and Clark & Dudrick's claim that Nietzsche is a naturalist and second, to prove that their interpretations of *BGE* is inconsistent with Nietzsche's own reflections on his prior works. While these three naturalist interpretations differ over subtle issues, they all rest on similar arguments. In this chapter I focus primarily on Clark and Leiter, deferring the bulk of my discussion of Clark & Dudrick to chapter three as they offer a possible solution to the problem I raise against Clark and Leiter's interpretations. I begin by presenting reasons for thinking Nietzsche is a naturalist by focusing on *BGE* 230 and Leiter's arguments for the view that Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist who supports what Leiter calls result continuity. I also examine how the naturalist interpretations are motivated by a desire to reject Nietzsche's early views about truth. Clark and Leiter's projects are not merely in favour of interpreting Nietzsche as a naturalist, but also criticise what they call "radical" (Clark, 12, 1990) or "postmodern" (Leiter, 2002, 3) interpretations that defend what Clark calls the falsification thesis. All three naturalist interpretations reject the falsification thesis – Nietzsche's claim that we falsify reality – and suggest that after *BGE* Nietzsche abandons the falsification thesis in support of a truth-affirming philosophy. Ultimately, they contend that Nietzsche's earlier rejection of truth is contradictory and therefore untenable. Clark provides textual evidence from *TI*, where Nietzsche offers six stages of epistemology, to suggest that Nietzsche changes his epistemological position from his early truth-denying position to a truth-affirming position. I take a close look at the stages offered in *TI*, particularly the last three, and argue that Clark's categorization of the six epistemological stages does not correspond with what Nietzsche says about the sixth stage. Finally, I show that Clark's interpretation entails that *BGE* is muddled and confused, which is the motivation for my larger critique in chapter three.

2.1 Motivations

All three naturalist interpretations begin in contrast and in rejection of previous interpretations that support any form of skepticism. The interpreters dismiss any reading that defends Nietzsche's rejection of truth or that the best humans can do is offer interpretations and perspectives (Clark, 1990, 2). Clark categorizes these skeptical interpretations as the "epistemological left" (Clark, 1990, 2) or the "Nontraditional interpretations" (Clark, 1990, 11) and claims Arthur Danto, Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, and Sarah Kofman fall into this

category. She objects to all of these skeptical interpretations in the following manner: These interpreters put forward their interpretations as true for Nietzsche, but if there can be a true interpretation of Nietzsche, why can we not have truth with respect to the rest of the world (Clark, 1990, 17)? Clark suggests that interpretations that defend Nietzsche's falsification thesis are defending the view that we cannot attain the truth, while at the same time claiming to have understood what is true in Nietzsche's philosophy. Clark finds such a position highly unsatisfying. Any such interpretation has to conclude that Nietzsche has nothing useful to say, because their attempt to understand what is true in Nietzsche, contradicts Nietzsche's attempts to deny truth.

Leiter offers a similar argument to Clark's in his rejection of skeptical interpretations. Leiter sees himself and thinkers such as Clark, Wilcox, Schacht, and Westphal as attacking the old "received view" of Nietzsche, which Leiter characterises as postmodern and collectively refers to as the "Skeptical Reading" (Leiter, 2002, 13). If Nietzsche denies truth then there is an unresolvable tension between his theoretical skepticism and his philosophical practice. Despite his rejection of truth, Nietzsche still uses "epistemic value terms" which "presuppose the possibility of objective truth and our knowledge of it" (Leiter, 2002, 13). Any time Nietzsche makes an affirmative judgement, or more specifically uses the epistemic value terms such as "surest and firmest fact that we can lay eyes on" (*BGE* 34), such usage presupposes that there is objective truth and that we can come to know it. Leiter contends that if Nietzsche denies truth, then Nietzsche contradicts himself in all areas where he uses objective epistemic value terms since he is denying truth while still implicitly affirming it. Clark and Leiter see skeptical or truth-denying interpretations as inherently incoherent. When a philosopher makes the assertion that truth is unattainable, Clark and Leiter's objections suggest, the philosopher must either believe that his or her claim is true or false. If she or he believes it is false, then his or her assertion is nonsensical. On the other hand, if she or he believes that it is true that there can be no truth, then he or she contradicts him or herself by implying that there is at least one truth. Likewise, if Nietzsche actually holds that we falsify reality then he is of no use philosophically since we cannot come to hold any true beliefs. It is for these reasons that Clark, Leiter, and Clark & Dudrick are motivated to put forward their naturalist interpretations in opposition to skeptical interpretations. They assert that Nietzsche has something interesting and important to say about truth, while skeptical interpreters fail to deliver a coherent interpretation of Nietzsche.

Each naturalist interpreter offers slightly different reasons for understanding Nietzsche as a naturalist. Clark proposes that understanding Nietzsche as a naturalist offers a coherent narrative of Nietzsche's later works which can tell us something interesting about truth, whereas Leiter advances the idea that Nietzsche resembles thinkers such as Hume and Freud because Nietzsche philosophy is concerned human nature (Leiter, 2002, 2-3). Regardless of their reasons for turning to naturalism, one of the strongest pieces of evidence in support of a naturalist interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy comes from *BGE*:

To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of *homo natura*; to see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, 'you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!' – that may be a strange and insane task, but it is a *task* – who would deny that? Why did we choose this insane task? Or putting it differently: 'why have knowledge at all?' (*BGE* 230)

"To translate man back into nature" means that Nietzsche thinks humans should not be considered separate from the animal kingdom. This is in contrast to the view that "man" stands outside of nature due to its capacity for reason. Nietzsche calls for humanity to stand "hardened in the discipline of science," which for Leiter means that Nietzsche supports the scientific *method* (Leiter, 2002, 7). While Clark and Clark & Dudrick offer separate accounts of what it means for Nietzsche to support the scientific method, Leiter offers the most detailed account. Leiter contends that Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist, which is the doctrine that "philosophical inquiry should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences" (Leiter, 2002, 3). While "Hard-Naturalism" (Leiter, 2002, 3) demands that continuity with the sciences refers only to "*hard*" or "*physical*" sciences, Leiter claims Nietzsche's naturalism only requires continuity with successful sciences, whether natural or social. By "Continuity with the sciences," Leiter means that Nietzsche supports "results continuity, which "requires that philosophical theories ... be supported or justified by the results of the sciences" and that "philosophical theories that do not enjoy the support of our best science are simply *bad* theories" (Leiter, 2002, 4). Result continuity implies that the best, or most successful, scientific theories of the time are to be accepted. When Nietzsche proposes that humans are not "higher," not of a "different origin," and that "[man] stands before the rest of nature," Leiter interprets him as saying that humans are a natural object, just like any other. On this view, humans are not inherently special

or different from any other object in the world, such as animals or inanimate objects. The observation that humans are natural objects is, according to Leiter, continuous with the views of the mid-nineteenth-century Germans and therefore supports his notion of result continuity. For Leiter, Nietzsche “aims to offer theories that explain various important human phenomena, and that do so in ways that both draw on actual scientific results, particularly in physiology, but are also modeled on science in the sense that they seek to reveal the causal determinants of these phenomena” (Leiter, 2002, 8). Under Leiter’s interpretation, to claim Nietzsche is a naturalist is to maintain that he supports the sciences, believes that philosophy should be continuous with scientific discoveries, and that philosophy should use scientific methods.

2.2 The Falsification Thesis and How the World Became a Fable

While the naturalist interpretations offer a means to save Nietzsche from incoherence, they qualify their interpretation by claiming that Nietzsche is only consistent in his later work: “Nietzsche’s position was contradictory in its early and middle formulations, but ... he progressed toward, and finally arrived at, a coherent and defensible position in the works of his final two years” (Clark, 1990, 1). The naturalist interpreters contend that in Nietzsche’s early and middle works he is incoherent due to his skepticism, which they call the falsification thesis. In order to properly explain the falsification thesis, I examine the narrative offered by John T. Wilcox, whom Clark takes from heavily.

Wilcox claims that “[Nietzsche] sometimes suggests that the ‘erroneous’ character of concepts is what led philosophers to the other error, the error of the thing-in-itself” (Wilcox 1974, 135). The falsification thesis is Nietzsche’s idea that when we form concepts, we do so based on an error. This error, Nietzsche postulates, has led to the thing-in-itself and it is because of this error in concept formation that we cannot attain the truth and instead falsify the world. According to Nietzsche in his earlier works, concepts falsify reality by over-simplifying the world. For example in *OTL*, Nietzsche affirms that when we form the concept of a “leaf” we are “arbitrarily discarding” and “forgetting” all the unique aspects of the individual leaf. The point of forming a concept, he reasons, is to determine what we believe is essential about all leaves, which entails that we must discard some characteristics. The act of discarding individual traits and making objects fit a concept is the error that falsifies reality. Wilcox explains that according to Nietzsche, this simplification is what leads to the thing-in-itself. Nietzsche maintains that once a concept is formed, and the philosopher tries to apply it to the empirical world, the philosopher

is confronted with the fact that his or her concept differs from their experience. For example, the philosopher might include in their concept of “leaf” that all leaves are green, but discover this is not the case. The philosopher then makes the erroneous judgement that since there is incoherence between their mental concept and their experience of an object then there must be a thing-in-itself. That is to say, the object exists independently of his or her experience of it. The incoherence between concept and experience takes place when the philosopher observes that he or she can only observe one side of the leaf and therefore only experience a part of the object. The philosopher goes on to determine that the object must exist independently from one’s experience of it. That is to say, the philosopher makes the further judgement that there must be a thing-in-itself, the leaf-itself, that exists independently of sense perception. The falsification thesis is Nietzsche’s idea that all concepts are formed based on an error, the action of forming a concept, which has led to the thing-in-itself. It is because of this error that not only do we not attain the truth, but we ultimately falsify the world.

It is important to note that the way in which Wilcox presents the falsification thesis and Nietzsche’s rejection of the thing-in-itself is only Nietzsche’s earliest formulation. The falsification thesis and Nietzsche’s rejection of truth change over the course of his career. This is important for Clark and Leiter because they contend that the shift in Nietzsche’s position on truth is connected to his treatment of the thing-in-itself. In order to explain this connection, I consider Nietzsche’s comments in “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” in *TI*, which Leiter claims serves as a “veiled description of Nietzsche’s own epistemological evolution” (Leiter, 2002, 15). In this section Nietzsche describes six stages in the evolution of epistemology. The first three describe Platonism, Christianity, and Kantianism, in that order (Clark, 1990, 111). The first three stages are positions that Nietzsche never accepted, and are therefore of little interest to me. However, the three following stages require examination:

4. The true world – unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?
(Gray Morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The “true world” – an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating – an idea which has become useless and superfluous – consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Bright day; breakfast, return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato’s embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)

6. The true world we have abolished. What world remains? The apparent world perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.) (*TI*, 4, 4-6)

Clark sets out to determine which of these epistemological positions Nietzsche accepted and in which works he defended them. The general consensus is that Nietzsche's mature philosophy ends in the sixth stage, but there is disagreement as to where his early and middle periods should be placed. For example, Magnus believed all of Nietzsche's works belong solely in the sixth stage, whereas Heidegger puts the early Nietzsche in stage five (Clark, 1990, 112).

Clark defends an interpretation originally presented by Wilcox: Nietzsche's early and middle periods fall into the fourth and fifth stages respectively, while his mature philosophy ends in the sixth. Clark describes the fourth stage as offering a kind of "agnosticism" toward truth, which could be more accurately described as abstaining from coming to a conclusion: we cannot claim that the true world is inaccessible, but at the very least we have not attained it. This corresponds with Clark's interpretation of *Human, All-too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits* (*HA*) and the "early Nietzsche": "Nietzsche argues that the true or metaphysical world has no function to play, but does not deny its existence (*HA*, 9). The occupant of stage four argues that the true world plays no cognitive, and therefore, no practical role, but does not deny its existence" (Clark, 1990, 112). Clark asserts that in *HA* Nietzsche is agnostic toward the "metaphysical": "we cannot know whether or not our truths correspond to things-in-themselves or possess metaphysical truth" (Clark, 1990, 99). Therefore, on this reading, Nietzsche has yet to deny the conceivability of the thing-in-itself, and instead must acknowledge its possibility, while still claiming that truth is so far inaccessible to us. Nietzsche maintains that it is so far inaccessible because if one were to insist that it is impossible to attain the truth, then that would be tantamount to making a metaphysical assertion. Therefore, Nietzsche is forced to acknowledge that the truth and the thing-in-itself *could* be achieved one day.

It is not until *BGE* and *GS*, Nietzsche's middle period, where he believes he can properly deal with the thing-in-itself, and where Nietzsche reaches the fifth stage according to Clark. The abolition of the "true world" amounts to a rejection of the thing-in-itself, which is the falsification thesis. Yet, Clark contends that Nietzsche offers only partial explanations as to why the thing-in-itself is inconceivable or "involves a *contradictio in adjecto*" (*BGE* 16), which is to say a "contradiction between the noun and the adjective" (Kaufmann, 1967, 213). She turns to

GS 54 for help in understanding Nietzsche's rejection of the thing-in-itself (Clark, 1990, 100). In this section Nietzsche argues that if we can only think of an object's essence, or the thing-in-itself, in terms of its possible appearances, then we cannot think of the thing-in-itself as independent objects. If the conceivability of the thing-in-itself is dependent upon appearances, then it is not really independent from us, and therefore nonsensical. The fifth stage's rejection of the true world is the rejection of the idea of an independent metaphysical world. The thing-in-itself is inconceivable, since its conceivability is dependent upon its possible appearances, and is therefore what Nietzsche means in *TI* when he says the "true world" is "no longer good for anything" (*TI*, 4, 5). Clark argues that it is at this point that Nietzsche contradicts himself.

Clark contends that Nietzsche, while claiming to remain agnostic toward or reject the thing-in-itself, actually presuppose it in the falsification thesis of his early and middle periods. Clark cites two passages from *GS* 354 where Nietzsche explicitly deals with such an accusation and she explains why he is mistaken. The first passage is a reiteration of the falsification thesis: "all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization," (*GS* 354). The claim is the same as explained earlier on Wilcox's account: when we create a concept (become conscious) we over-simplify an object, which leads to falsification. Nietzsche then goes on to say that the falsification thesis "is even less the opposition of 'thing-in-itself' and appearance; for we do not 'know' nearly enough to be entitled to any such distinction" (*GS* 354). Nietzsche does not see the falsification thesis as being opposed to the thing-in-itself, because as explained, he claims that the thing-in-itself is inconceivable. Nietzsche is proposing that the falsification thesis, his philosophy, does not resemble or rely upon the distinction between the thing-in-itself and appearance. Clark offers the following argument to explain why Nietzsche is wrong on this account and that his falsification thesis presupposes the thing-in-itself:

If life is a dream, the objects of consciousness exists only as representations; they have no existence except in relation to the knower/dreamer. In that case, Nietzsche has only two options: Either there are independently existing things which cannot be direct objects of knowledge or only representations exist. The first option commits him to the thing-in-itself; the second amounts to subjective idealism. (Clark 1990, 118-119)

Clark's usage of the "dream" is meant to be synonymous with Nietzsche's falsification thesis, where dreaming is taken to be how we live in a world where creating concepts leads to falsifications. Since we cannot have access to things-themselves, all that remains is

representations or the perspective of the knower/dreamer. If this is the case, then Nietzsche is caught between two unsatisfying positions. In the first case, if the knower/dreamer does not have direct access to objects, then Clark asserts that Nietzsche must presupposes the thing-in-itself. He presupposes the thing-in-itself because if experience is mere representation, then the representations or perspectives have to be a representation of some object. Since the knower/dreamer does not have access to the object then it must exist independently from us. Therefore, Nietzsche presupposes an independent object: the thing-in-itself. However, if Nietzsche claims the world is only representation, and denies any independent existence, then the falsification thesis no longer makes sense because there would be nothing for us to falsify.

Clark argues that it is only once Nietzsche abandons the falsification thesis that he can avoid contradiction and avoid Leiter's concern about the problematic tension between theory and practice, that Nietzsche denies truth while using epistemic value terms. Clark and Leiter assert that once Nietzsche reaches the sixth stage, the mature Nietzsche, these problems go away. In the sixth stage, Nietzsche holds that both the true and apparent worlds have been abolished. This entails that the empirical world cannot be considered illusory (Clark, 1990, 113-114), but does not entail that the apparent is the true world, since for Nietzsche the usage of the language "true world" is tantamount to the thing-in-itself and metaphysics. Instead of being agnostic toward the true world (stage four) or settling for the apparent world (stage five), Nietzsche abandons both options in stage six. Yet, Nietzsche offers very little in terms of describing what this sixth stage looks like, aside from being different from the preceding stages. Clark affirms that it is the distinction between the real and apparent that led to Nietzsche's falsification thesis, but after properly rejecting the distinction, his philosophy evolved into a truth-affirming stance. The truth-affirming stance is one where Nietzsche supports the methodologies of the natural sciences. Clark alleges that the "most important evidence" in support of interpreting Nietzsche as coming to this truth-affirming philosophy, is due to the fact that "in the six books that followed [*BGE*], there is no evidence of Nietzsche's earlier denial of truth: no claim that the human world is a falsification, no claim that science, logic, or mathematics falsify reality" (Clark, 1990, 103). After *BGE*, Nietzsche goes on to write that there are such things as "truths" (*GM*, I, 1), that we should celebrate science as the "wisdom of the world" (*A*, 47), and that the senses are a "magnificent instrument" that can be sharpened by the sciences (*TI*, III, 3). On Clark's

interpretation, Nietzsche completely abandons the falsification thesis, the notion of erroneous concept formation, and any other idea that might lead to denying truth.

2.3 The Catalyst for Further Investigation

I claim that the rejection of skeptical interpretations, Leiter's observations on how to interpret sections like *BGE* 230, and Clark's assertion that Nietzsche abandons the falsification thesis in his later work, is the shared core of the naturalist interpretations. Clark and Leiter ascribe to this line of argument explicitly, while Clark & Dudrick presuppose it. I now shift my discussion from merely explain the naturalist interpretations to pointing out an obvious problem in Clark's narrative.

Nietzsche explicitly places *Z* in the sixth stage of his epistemological categorization, while according to Clark's argument *Z* should be placed in the fifth stage. *Z* was written after *GS* and before *BGE* therefore placing it right at the centre of Nietzsche's middle period. Furthermore, Nietzsche confirms that *BGE* says the "same thing" as *Z*, although in a very different manner (Acampora and Pearson, 2011, 5). This entails that Nietzsche includes *BGE* in the sixth stage, not the fifth as Clark's interpretation argues. Clark is not unaware of this problem, however. Her response is that *BGE* falls between the fifth and sixth stage, as she alleges that *BGE* "largely belongs to stage 6." Sections such as *BGE* 4 and *BGE* 25 show signs of holding on to the falsification thesis, which she only describes as "hardly surprising" (Clark, 1990, 114). Her suggestion is that it is reasonable to suppose that Nietzsche was still holding on to some of his earlier (truth-denying) formulations, despite beginning to move past them. While this argument offers a solution to this interpretive problem, it also gives rise to some questions.

A minor issue is that Clark does not take into account another section of Nietzsche's work that must be included in stage six. Kaufmann explains in his introduction to his translation of *GS* that the majority of the book was written before both *Z* and *BGE*, but the Preface was added and Book V was written afterward. This is evident from the fact that Nietzsche's final section of Book IV in *GS* is nearly identical to the first section of "Zarathustra's Prologue," serving as a kind of preliminary introduction, and then Book V is written in a very similar fashion to *BGE*. Therefore at least Book V of *GS* should also fall within the sixth stage. The issue is that Clark's interpretation makes no mention of it, and consequently includes it as a part of stage five.

If Clark is right about her categorization, and that *Z*, *BGE*, and Book V of *GS* are actually stuck between stage five and six, then it would suggest that these books are not only incoherent

because of the skeptical philosophy that is being held over, but also incoherent in that they attempt to argue in favor of the falsification thesis, while beginning to formulate his truth-affirming philosophy. This entails that *BGE*, and Nietzsche's middle period is, at best, a transitional period but, more accurately, an incoherent mess. I find that such a conclusion is highly suspicious due to the sheer volume of philosophical insight offered by *BGE*. If an interpretation of *BGE* can give a coherent account of *BGE* that does not result in contradiction and inconsistencies, then such an interpretation should be preferred. I take it upon myself in the remaining chapters to show that *BGE* is coherent and demonstrate that it does not merely consist of a transitional period in Nietzsche career as the naturalist interpreters claim. That said, it should be noted that Clark & Dudrick were also aware of this issue and wanted to save *BGE* from incoherence. They attempt to do so by explaining away sections where Nietzsche appears to argue in favour of the falsification thesis. That is to say that they attempt to fully bring *BGE* into stage six. I discuss these attempts at length in chapter three.

Clark and Leiter's interpretations entail that Nietzsche's writing in *GS* Book V, Z, and *BGE* is chaotic and confused, stuck between two opposing philosophical strains. They claim that after this period, Nietzsche becomes a naturalist that supports result continuity and methodological naturalism, but before this period Nietzsche's philosophy is riddled with self-contradiction and confusion. At the centre of the matter is the acceptance and rejection of the falsification thesis, which Clark maintains is the key to Nietzsche's transitioning philosophy. However, I argue that the instability of Clark's reading of Nietzsche's middle period gives reason to re-examine whether or not the naturalist interpretations are correct. In the following chapter I analyze Clark & Dudrick's attempts to save *BGE* from its alleged incoherent state, but conclude that their interpretation fails to rid *BGE* of skepticism, and show that skepticism is an inseparable part of *BGE*. The naturalist interpretations offer a simplistic understanding of how one should understand skepticism since, for them, skepticism amounts only to the falsification thesis. By considering Berry's pyrrhonian interpretation I demonstrate that skepticism is an integral part of *BGE*'s project to get beyond good and evil. This opens the way for my interpretation in chapter four where I contend that Nietzsche offers a coherent philosophy in *BGE*.

Chapter III – Getting Beyond Good and Evil

3.0 Introduction

In chapter two, I focused on the naturalist interpretations of Nietzsche's work and the motivations of its defenders for rejecting skeptical interpretations. The naturalist interpretations entail that *BGE* is an incoherent compilation of aphorisms because it is caught between two opposing treatments of the concept of truth. Nietzsche's comments in *TI* suggest that he sees *Z* as the focus of his sixth and final stage of epistemology, but this sits uneasily with the naturalists' conclusion because *BGE* is meant to express the same concepts as *Z* (Acampora and Pearson, 2011, 5). In contrast to the naturalist interpretations, I see *BGE* as a coherent philosophical treatise. To defend this view, I analyze two opposing efforts to understand *BGE* as a coherent work. I begin by analysing Clark & Dudrick as they acknowledge that Clark's conclusion – that *BGE* is incoherent – is unsatisfying. Instead, they attempt to explain away the skeptical elements in *BGE* in order to defend a naturalist interpretation. I propose that Clark & Dudrick's project fails because they fail to properly explain passages found in *BGE* 3 and 4, which show that the falsification thesis, and therefore skepticism, is inseparable from Nietzsche's philosophy in *BGE*. I then turn to Berry who says that until her work all interpretations of Nietzsche that make mention of skepticism do so without properly engaging its methodological commitments. In contrast to the naturalist interpretations, Berry claims that Nietzsche is what she calls a pyrrhonian skeptic, a skeptic who does not deny truth, but instead abstains from assigning truth values. To assess her view I examine Sextus' three branches of philosophy and compare them to three sections in *BGE* that are strikingly similar. I show that despite these similarities, Berry's account fails to accurately reflect Nietzsche's project because pyrrhonian skepticism calls for withholding judgements, whereas Nietzsche's project requires actively making judgements. Although Clark & Dudrick and Berry fail to save Nietzsche from incoherence, my analysis establishes that Nietzsche's skepticism is an integral part of his project in *BGE* to get "beyond good and evil." This sets the groundwork for explaining how *BGE* can be coherent while holding onto the falsification thesis in my fourth chapter.

3.1 Clark & Dudrick: Reconciling *BGE* with the Naturalist Interpretations

Clark & Dudrick praise *BGE* and declare that it is plausibly "the most important statement of his philosophy" (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 2). They acknowledge, however, that there are two problems that arise on a first reading: first, *BGE* appears to be a collection of unrelated or only

partly related aphorisms, and second, Nietzsche poorly supports – if at all – many of his claims. Clark & Dudrick propose that these problems disappear by reading Nietzsche “esoterically.” They take the term “esoteric” from Laurence Lampert, and suggest that when reading Nietzsche we have to find the hidden meaning in his work, and try “to make the best sense of what he actually says in the most rigorous way possible” (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 8). I am in agreement with Clark & Dudrick that we must try to make the best sense possible of what Nietzsche says, but I will show that there are significant leaps in their reasoning. Nietzsche undoubtedly uses metaphors, but my concern is that Clark & Dudrick misunderstand these tools and reach for conclusions not found in the text. Nonetheless, Clark & Dudrick are on the right path: if a coherent reading of *BGE* can be given then this would eliminate both the problem of *BGE* being a collection of random aphorisms, and offer argumentative strength behind Nietzsche’s seemingly unsupported statements.

Clark & Dudrick propose that *BGE* should be understood as two uneven parts. The first part focuses on philosophical theory and the second on putting that theory into practice. They refer to the first twenty three sections of *BGE*, which constitutes the Preface and Part One, as “*BGE* One.” While this split is certainly helpful in pointing out that there is a difference between the first and later part of the book, this division should not be understood as a rigid division in the text. One might say *BGE* One is the philosophical foundation for the rest of the book, however Nietzsche’s philosophy is qualified and developed in later sections not only through putting it into practice but also through further elaborations. One cannot simply read the first twenty three sections and hope to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy. Clark & Dudrick do not claim that an individual could simply read these first passages and understand Nietzsche, although they fail to mention important passages in later sections that undermine the coherence of their interpretation, particularly *BGE* 207 to 210.

They contend that if they can explain away the apparent skepticism in Nietzsche’s theorizing in *BGE* One then their interpretation can be applied to the remainder of the book. Doing so would support a naturalist interpretation by reconciling *BGE* with Nietzsche’s sixth stage of epistemology in *TI* since *BGE* would no longer be haunted by skepticism, and therefore provide a naturalist interpretation that is fully consistent with Nietzsche’s claims in *TI*. That said, this endeavour would then require determining how all of Nietzsche’s aphorisms fit together, and determining the project or purpose of this book. The title of the book “Beyond Good and Evil:

Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future” offers some clear signs about Nietzsche’s project. The first sign is that it is clear from both the title and when reading *BGE* as a whole that Nietzsche wants to “get beyond good and evil.” Furthermore, the second sign is that Nietzsche proposes that his book, and his project to get beyond good and evil, is meant to be a prelude to some new form of philosophy. Yet, at least at the beginning of the book, it is not clear what it means to get beyond good and evil, or what the philosophers of the future are meant to look like. Nietzsche begins the book and the preface with the following seemingly unrelated passage:

Supposing truth is a woman – what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman’s heart? What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won – and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged. *If* it is left standing at all! For there are scoffers who claim that it has fallen, that all dogmatism lies on the ground – even more, that all dogmatism is dying. (*BGE P*)

Clark & Dudrick translate the first line slightly differently from Kaufmann’s for their interpretation as simply “Supposing truth is a woman – what?” (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 13). They claim that “Presupposing truth to be a female has nothing to do with women and very little to do with truth” (14). They suggest the image Nietzsche is offering is meant to surprise or confuse the reader to make the point that just as men have failed to understand women they have failed to understand truth. Clark & Dudrick are correct in drawing this analogy, but my analysis will show that their translation misplaces the emphasis. Although he has yet to give any reason why, I suggest that Nietzsche wants to explore the analogy and use it as a means to explain his views on truth.

Nietzsche immediately uses his analogy between truth and woman to make an observation about an, as yet, undefined state of dogmatism. Clark & Dudrick believe that Nietzsche clearly rejects dogmatism. He expresses his rejection of dogmatism when maintaining that the dogmatist has failed to “win” over woman or truth and remains “dispirited.” Although he expresses his rejection of it, he does not yet explain what dogmatism is or how it has failed. Instead, Nietzsche subtly develops his notion of dogmatism throughout the book. Despite Nietzsche’s rejection of dogmatism, Clark & Dudrick claim he still “want[s] [dogmatism’s] promise to be fulfilled” (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 22). Clark & Dudrick maintain that dogmatism promises to attain the truth and that Nietzsche wants to take on this task. Nietzsche declares we should “not be ungrateful” (*BGE P*) toward dogmatism, as he compares it to the idea that astrology, despite

being entirely fabricated, led to a “grand style of architecture in Asia and Egypt” (*BGE* P). From this show of gratitude Clark & Dudrick deduce that while Nietzsche rejects dogmatism, he agrees with its aim to attain truth; just as astrology was a stepping stone to architecture, dogmatism is a stepping stone for truth. I must, however, point out that at this point there is not enough evidence to support their deduction. Nietzsche has at most said that dogmatism has unidentified redeemable qualities, yet should still be rejected. While Nietzsche says we should not be ungrateful to dogmatism, he also claims that “it must certainly be conceded that the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a dogmatic error” (*BGE* P). Nietzsche asserts that dogmatism has committed the most dangerous error, which he identifies as Plato’s concepts of the pure spirit and the good as such. Again, Nietzsche provides no reason as to why Plato’s concepts are the most dangerous errors or why they are dogmatic, but provides the hint that these concepts “meant standing truth on her head and denying *perspective*” (*BGE* P). This passage hints that the matter of dogmatism has to do with denying perspective, and that doing so is connected to committing dogmatism’s dangerous error. With these considerations in mind based solely on the preface, one can only conclude that Nietzsche believes there is an unidentified redeemable part of dogmatism and that dogmatism has given rise to Plato’s dangerous error. In this passage Nietzsche only expresses his distaste for Plato’s dogmatism, and not whether he agrees with its aims. To conclude that Nietzsche shares the dogmatist’s desire for truth from this passage is hasty, and as I will show, in Clark & Dudrick’s case, leads to faulty conclusions.

While dogmatism is set out in the preface as an important part of *BGE*, it should be noted that Nietzsche only explicitly refers to dogmatism in three other places (*BGE* 43, 209, and 211), none of which can be found in *BGE* One. Therefore, Nietzsche’s project cannot be primarily interested in dogmatism per se. Instead, a more frequent theme that appears in *BGE* and is likely at the centre of Nietzsche project is dogmatism’s desire for truth: the will to truth (*BGE* 1). The will to truth appears to be, at its most basic, the desire to attain the truth. He claims that the will to truth is a temptation for philosophers, and that the will to truth has forced Nietzsche to ask a series of questions:

Is it any wonder that we should finally become suspicious, lose patience, and turn away [from the will to truth] impatiently? That we should finally learn from this Sphinx to ask questions, too? Who is it really that puts questions to us here? What in us really wants “truth”? (*BGE* 1)

Nietzsche poses these questions in order to make the reader question why we desire truth. Nietzsche sets out to interrogate the will to truth, but does not yet provide any answer to these questions. While one could jump to the conclusion that Nietzsche is posing these questions in the form of rejecting or doubting the will to truth, this would be hasty. Instead, I suggest that Nietzsche is using his analogy of truth as woman. Despite the fact that Clark & Dudrick claim the analogy of truth as a woman plays an insignificant role, the Sphinx serves as a strong metaphor for truth that helps explain his earlier remark. The Sphinx, being a woman, stands in for truth. The Sphinx from the tale of Oedipus poses questions or riddles to those who approach, which suggests that the concept of truth forces questions upon any who confront it. That is to say, when the dogmatist pursues truth, only further questions are imposed upon the dogmatist. Nietzsche is recommending that instead of trying to blindly pursue truth like the dogmatist, it is time to be like the Sphinx and ask questions of our own. In particular, Nietzsche asks: “Suppose we want truth: *why not rather untruth?* and uncertainty? even ignorance?” (*BGE* 1). Nietzsche acknowledges that we want truth, but he wants to ask why we do not desire the opposite of truth. Therefore the first part of Nietzsche’s project in *BGE* is to explore the value of truth.³

The views expressed in these first few passages, while somewhat fragmented are nevertheless coherent and unproblematic. Nietzsche has only expressed his rejection of an undefined concept of dogmatism, introduced the concept of the will to truth, and expressed his desire to understand the motive behind the will to truth. A problematic element arises in *BGE* 3-4 as Clark cites *BGE* 4 as a section that contains a remnant of the falsification thesis. Clark & Dudrick attempt to explain away the skepticism in this section in order to defend their naturalist interpretation of *BGE*. Nietzsche’s problematic claim is that “The falseness of a judgement is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgement; in this respect our new language may sound strangest” (*BGE* 4). A standard reading of this passage takes Nietzsche’s remarks literally: determining that a judgement is a false does not necessitate that it is objectionable. Clark & Dudrick, however, find such a reading confusing: “what is the point of calling [a judgement] false? As it functions in ordinary discourse, to call a judgement ‘false’ is certainly to object to it

³ One might question why Nietzsche is concerned about the value of truth as opposed to truth itself. Answering this question would prove a distraction from the text and so I offer only a very brief explanation: Nietzsche is concerned about the value of truth, as opposed to truth itself, because even if we came to know truth itself, it is ultimately, in Nietzsche’s mind, the value of truth that guides our actions. Even if we know something is true, it is our value judgements that decide how we react to truth. Furthermore, just because something is true does not mean that it is good, just as something false is not necessarily bad.

as a candidate for belief or acceptance” (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 50). They go so far as to claim that if Nietzsche insists that falsity of a judgement does not entail an objection then he is either “incoherent,” “lying,” “utterly confused,” or “is not in a position to believe anything and therefore to think at all” (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 50) because we cannot bring ourselves to believe something if we know it is false (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 51). To suggest that believing something false does not entail objection is nonsensical. If Clark & Dudrick are correct in their assessment, then this first reading is incorrect and an alternative interpretation should be put forward.

Clark & Dudrick allege that Nietzsche’s “new language” is the key to understanding this passage and must be understood as referring to a new standard for truth. They come to this conclusion based on his comments in *BGE* 3. In *BGE* 3 Nietzsche proposes that the principles of logic might be false. Clark & Dudrick propose that the possibility of the principles of logic being false “presupposes that there is some outside standard” for truth (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 55), a standard that justifies Nietzsche’s claim that they could be false. Nietzsche’s proposal that the principles of logic could be false takes the following form: “Behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement too, there stand valuations or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life” (*BGE* 3) and that these principles of logic might be “mere foreground estimates” (*BGE* 3). Nietzsche suggests that the principles of logic persevere due to a physiological demand. He is proposing that if the principles of logic come from physiological demand, then they are mere estimates since they themselves do not rely on some reason. The notion that the principles of logic could be mere estimates or a reflection of needs, as opposed to unquestionable truths, opens the possibility that they could be false. Clark & Dudrick hold that the possibility that the principles of logic are false suggests that Nietzsche is using an unidentified standard for truth because in order to state that something is or could be false they claim Nietzsche needs some standard for what is true and false.

Clark & Dudrick argue that Nietzsche’s standard for truth is hidden in his final line of *BGE* 3 where he adds: “Supposing, that is, that not just man is the ‘measure of things’ –”(*BGE* 3). This line implies that the possibility of logic being false “presupposes the denial of Protagoras’s claim that ‘man is the measure’” (Clark & Dudrick, 2012, 54). An initial reading of this passage would suggest that Nietzsche agrees with his own propositions: it’s possible that the principles of logic are false because man is not the measure. Clark & Dudrick, however, think that the

contents of *BGE* 3 and 4 are not actually Nietzsche's views but that of another voice. For them, Nietzsche is presenting ideas that are not his own, and the final line of *BGE* 3 that "man is the 'measure of things'" is meant to indicate his disagreement with what he has presented in this section. They come to this conclusion based on the fact that Nietzsche poses this problem at the end of the section, as though to force the reader to question his claims that the principles of logic could be false. Otherwise, they reason, there is no point for Nietzsche to add this remark at the end of the section. Clark & Dudrick conclude from this that *BGE* 3-4 does not express Nietzsche actual views, but offers views that Nietzsche does not accept in *BGE*.

While Clark & Dudrick go on to explain what their conclusion entails, I will argue that the information considered so far is enough to show that Clark & Dudrick's account of *BGE* 3 and 4 serves as a strong and early example of taking their "esoteric" approach too far. Clark & Dudrick's interpretation of *BGE* 3 and 4 does not make sense in light of Nietzsche's final line of *BGE* 4: "To recognize untruth as a condition for life – that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil." Nietzsche states that false propositions are a condition for life and that a philosophy that recognizes this places itself beyond good and evil. Although he has yet to explain the connection, this is the most explicit expression of his project in *BGE*. Nietzsche claims that a philosophy that recognizes untruth as a condition for life is required to fulfill his project of getting beyond good and evil. Clark & Dudrick's suggestion that *BGE* 3 and 4 is not an expression of Nietzsche's view is irreconcilable with the final line of *BGE* 4 given my reading of Nietzsche's project in *BGE*. Clark & Dudrick's project is to rid Nietzsche of anything remotely skeptical, but this passage entails that recognizing false judgements is an integral part of Nietzsche project. Therefore an argument must be presented that defends this passage from Clark & Dudrick's objection that the falseness of a judgement entails its rejection and that anything to suggest otherwise is utterly confused.

3.2 Reaching for an Alternative Approach

I offer a closer reading of *BGE* 3 and 4 in order to understand Nietzsche's project. Part One of *BGE* is titled "On the Prejudices of Philosophers" which indicates that this section of the book is meant to discuss the prejudices of philosophers. At the start of *BGE* 3 Nietzsche makes the following supposition: "by far the greater part of conscious thinking must still be included among instinctive activities, and that goes for philosophical thinking" (*BGE* 3). He is suggesting

that “instinct” plays a large role in philosophical thought. Nietzsche’s use of “instinct” refers to the desire to have physiological needs fulfilled, and that instinct is not brought about through conscious thought since it is presented as its opposite. Nietzsche notes that philosophers believe they are not guided by instinct, but instead by their own “conscious [thinking].” In this way, “being conscious” is meant to reflect coming to conclusions based on conscious, intentional, or reflective thought. The instinctive and “being conscious,” Nietzsche maintains, are generally understood as opposites, but in *BGE 2* Nietzsche claims that “It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of these good and revered things [truth and selflessness] is precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these wicked [deceptive, selfish, and lustful], seemingly opposite things” (*BGE 2*). In *BGE 2* Nietzsche suggests that things like truth and deception or selflessness and selfishness are presumed to be opposites, they seem as though they are mutually exclusive but might be closely related.

When taken in conjunction with *BGE 2*, the dichotomy between instinct and consciousness in *BGE 3* suggests that Nietzsche questions whether instinct and consciousness are opposites, and suggests instead that they are inconspicuously related by their role in forming judgements. When Nietzsche goes on to talk about the possibility of logical principles being false, he does this because he is suggesting that instead of logic being purely theoretical, brought about solely through conscious thought or reason, it is related to a physiological demand or instinct. We need principles of logic because they “may be necessary for the preservation of” beings such as us (*BGE 3*); they help us, and might be necessary for us to live the kinds of lives we have now. Despite this necessity, the principles of logic might nevertheless be false. With that said, it is also possible that the principles of logic could still be true. Nietzsche is stating only that the principles of logic *could* be false, not that they are false. His criticism is that instead of acknowledging that principles of logic might be false, the philosopher confuses their physiological need of logical principles for a reasoned “truth.” He is suggesting that the physiological demand creates a valuation that goes unnoticed: the physiological demand being the desire to live our lives a particular way and the valuation being that fulfilling such a desire is good. The physiological demand, in this case, is met through utilising the principles of logic. Nietzsche criticizes the philosophers because they take a further step and mistakes their valuation that the principles of logic are good toward leading a particular kind of life, for the judgement that the principles of logic are “true.”

The above considerations allow for a hypothesis to be made about Nietzsche's project to get beyond good and evil. Nietzsche's criticism is that the philosophers fail to acknowledge their instincts which give rise to a value judgement, such as the principles of logic being "good." In the most literal sense then, to get beyond good and evil entails that a philosopher not make this mistake. Yet, how a philosopher is meant to do this is still unclear, and furthermore I cannot yet say how this ties in to recognizing untruth as a condition for life. To make this connection, I must read on.

My reading of *BGE* 3 entails a standard reading of *BGE* 4: Nietzsche maintains that the falseness of a judgement does not entail its rejection. Nevertheless, it is still unclear what it means for a judgement to be false. Nietzsche holds that the acceptance or rejection of a judgement is a matter of value. Whether or not we accept the principles of logic have little to do with truth, instead it is a matter of whether they fulfil our desire to live our lives in a particular way. He postulates that truth is a secondary concern because instinct – which is indifferent to truth – is a motive in judgment formation. After postulating that falseness does not entail an objection, Nietzsche states that "the question is to what extent [a judgement] is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating" (*BGE* 4). Although he does not explain why, for Nietzsche whether a claim is false is secondary compared to whether or not a claim is valuable to human kind. Furthermore, he states that "we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgements are the most indispensable for us" (*BGE* 4). He indicates that *a priori* judgements, logic, and mathematics constitute the "falsest judgements," but as a matter of fact are the most important for us. The most basic principles of mathematics and logic are surely important toward preserving one's life insofar as one needs to be able to distinguish between objects, use numbers, or make decisions. Nietzsche moves from the possibility of the principles of logic being false in *BGE* 3, to claiming that they are the falsest judgements in *BGE* 4. Unfortunately, Nietzsche does not offer any insight into what it means for judgements to have degrees of falsehood in this section. He also has yet to explain how these things are false, or why we shouldn't try to determine both a judgement's value as well as whether or not it is true. In order to address these uncertainties, more of *BGE* must be analyzed.

Before further analysis, Clark & Dudrick's objection that in ordinary discourse falsehood entails rejection must still be addressed. If someone believes something they know to be false, then they are being incoherent; it is not possible to believe something known to be false. I

respond to this objection by pointing out that Nietzsche is not proposing that an individual knows something to be false and believes it nevertheless. In fact, Nietzsche makes no mention of belief in *BGE* 3 or 4. He simply states that a judgement can be false but nevertheless useful toward the betterment of humankind. For example, one can coherently believe that capitalism is built upon false premises or ideologies, but that it is nevertheless useful toward the betterment of humankind. Likewise, one can believe capitalism is built on true premises, but that it is detrimental toward the betterment of humankind. In the first instance, such an individual does not claim that capitalism is based on false judgements and that they believe in those judgements regardless. The distinction is merely between what is “true” and what is “valuable.” It is in this way that Clark & Dudrick have missed the point; they think his “new language” is meant to show he does not support what he is proposing, but in fact Nietzsche’s “new language” is referring to the fact that whether or not a claim is objectionable is based upon its value independently of its epistemic status as true or false.

Clark & Dudrick are correct in trying to find a coherent understanding of *BGE* but my analysis entails that their interpretation fails to accurately account for what Nietzsche says in these first few sections. Their “esoteric” approach attempts to discover hidden meaning in the text, but that meaning is not there. By reading the sections considered so far in their entirety, all that is clear is that *BGE* P to 4 gives a glance into Nietzsche’s project in *BGE*. Nietzsche wants to examine and critique the prejudices of philosophers, which come about through dogmatic trust in the will to truth. Furthermore, any philosophy that recognizes that “untruth” can be just as, if not more, valuable than “truth” places itself beyond good and evil. Unfortunately, Nietzsche has only offered hints as to the purpose of getting beyond good and evil. While he informs us how a philosophy can achieve his goal, he has yet to explain the goal itself, how it is connected to truth, or why one should try to achieve it.

3.3 The Pyrrhonian Approach: What it means to be a Skeptic

At this point I have more or less defended what the naturalist interpretations have called “standard” or “postmodern” views about *BGE* insofar as I have merely rejected the naturalist critiques in favor of views similar to what they wanted to reject. Furthermore, it is these very same views that they allege results in Nietzsche’s contradictions and lead to an incoherent interpretation of *BGE*. I have established that Clark & Dudrick’s first attempts to save *BGE* from its skeptical arguments have failed and therefore only put *BGE* back in danger of being

incoherent. If Nietzsche believes untruth is required for his project, then this could suggest that the falsification thesis is required for his project, and it is the falsification thesis that leads to incoherence. I have shown so far that it is the naturalist interpreters' attempts to avoid skepticism that divorces their interpretation from the text. It is for these reasons that I turn to Berry to see what it would mean for Nietzsche to be committed to skepticism and whether or not this can save Nietzsche from epistemological incoherence.

Berry makes an important point that “almost without exception, the connection between Nietzsche and skepticism has been alleged without any head-on engagement with philosophical skepticism, its history, or its methodological commitments” (Berry, 2011, 4). This is not only true for the naturalist interpretations I have considered but also my own considerations so far. No one considered so far has offered an account of what it means to be a skeptic, or the methodological commitments that would constrain Nietzsche's philosophy. Equally, those considered so far only account for the objectionable conclusions of the falsification thesis, his denial of truth. Clark pointed out that Nietzsche's falsification thesis presupposes the thing-in-itself, which contradicts Nietzsche's rejection of the thing-in-itself, while Leiter pointed out the irreconcilable tension between Nietzsche making skeptical claims (such as the falsification thesis) and making truth claims of his own. Berry contends that Nietzsche is a pyrrhonian skeptic – someone who abstains from making philosophical judgements – and that Nietzsche maintained the same themes and concerns throughout his career: “though his responses to them became more refined over time, my interpretation will suggest that the basic outlook they reflect and the methodological constraints on what could count as good responses to these worries did not change substantially” (Berry, 2011, 6). Berry mentions “Nietzsche's concern with the corrosive effect of morality,” “nihilism in contemporary Europe”, and “the health and sickness ... of human beings” (Berry, 2011, 6) as some of his chief concerns. She affirms that while Nietzsche's skepticism cannot be considered a “doctrine” because skepticism cannot take the form of a doctrine (since it would contradict itself), it can nevertheless provide guidance by which we can see a coherent narrative throughout the course of his career. In a way, Berry's project is not very different from Clark & Dudrick's in that she is trying to find coherence among Nietzsche's seemingly irreconcilable views on truth. However, while Clark & Dudrick assume that Clark's division between the early, middle, and late Nietzsche is mostly correct and argue *BGE* belongs

in the late period, Berry is suggesting that her pyrrhonian interpretation can offer a coherent interpretation across the course of Nietzsche's career.

For the purposes of this thesis, I do not consider whether or not Berry is correct in claiming that Nietzsche is a pyrrhonian skeptic throughout his career, but instead focus only on *BGE* to see if interpreting him as a pyrrhonian skeptic can deal with the problems and considerations I raised by analyzing the naturalist interpretations. Recall that defenders of the naturalist interpretations believe Nietzsche's thought developed into a truth-affirming stance after rejecting his old truth-denying views. Conversely, Berry maintains that pyrrhonian skepticism offers a third position: truth-abstaining. In order to understand this third position, Berry draws a parallel between the positions of truth-affirming, truth-denying, and truth abstaining, and Sextus' three branches of philosophy: dogmatic, academic, and skeptical. Berry explains that

While all three groups are seekers after knowledge, Dogmatists as Sextus presents them give up seeking and say they are satisfied once they arrive at an answer ... Skeptics identify themselves by contrast to the Dogmatists – those who make a professional habit of forming theories and beliefs (dogmata) and who subsequently stop investigating. (Berry, 2011, 34)

The dogmatists resemble a truth-affirming stance, since once they have found an answer to any particular problem they accept the answer as true and cease to search for alternatives. For the academics "there are no answers to be found; epistemic frustration is the inevitable outcome of inquiry" (Berry, 2011, 34-35). The academic branch maintains the truth-denying position that we cannot come to hold the truth. Finally, the skeptical branch is born from the observation that the dogmatists' and academics' "arrival at a judgement calls a halt to inquiry for the simple reason that once we think we have found what we are looking for, we generally stop looking" (Berry, 2012, 35). While the dogmatist stops their search because they believe they have come to the truth, the academic ceases their investigation because they assert truth is unattainable. The point of the skeptical branch is to continue investigating and to suspend judgement on any question being investigated. Berry explains that "only the Pyrrhonist, who suspends judgement and continues to inquire, is entitled to the name 'Skeptic', since the Skeptics (by definition) 'are still investigating' (PH I 3)" (Berry, 2012, 35-36). The point of skepticism is not to deny or affirm truth, but to continue inquiry. The third, truth-abstaining, position is to abstain from passing judgement as to whether or not we hold a true belief and to continue investigation.

According to Berry, the pyrrhonian skeptic contends that the dogmatic and academic branches fail to achieve eudaimonia: "Adherence to dogmas, the Skeptics say, is not only

anathema to the spirit of inquiry; it is also an obstacle to well-being” (Berry, 2011, 39). The skeptic is concerned with well-being or eudaimonia. Conversely, eudaimonia is not itself a causal principle, in that the skeptic would take this to be a truth or ultimate goal (since this would entail an inherent contradiction). Instead, they maintain that by holding on to beliefs their dogmatic counterparts happen to fail to live fulfilling lives due to epistemic frustration. This is relevant to Nietzsche in that the pyrrhonian skeptic’s view of eudaimonia and Nietzsche’s treatment of the old philosophers in Part Two of *BGE* are strikingly similar. He voices his concern that the old philosopher’s attempts at “defending themselves” (*BGE* 25) and “martyrdom” for “truth’s sake” (*BGE* 25) results in a “tragedy.” That is to say, the unwillingness to continue inquiry (dogmatist), or the complete denial of inquiry (academic), leads to an unfavourable position, or even tragedy.

An apparent problem with Berry’s interpretation is that the pyrrhonian skeptic, as she describes it, so far looks nothing like the sections of *BGE* considered so far. While Nietzsche speaks of recognizing untruth as a condition of life, the pyrrhonian skeptic wants to abstain from concerns with truth. So far, Nietzsche has said that some propositions (logic, a priori, etc) are false, and left open the possibility of truth, which is not to abstain. Furthermore, it is not clear how a pyrrhonian interpretation could provide any insight into Nietzsche’s project to get beyond good and evil. At most, Nietzsche’s project to question the will to truth could coincide with a pyrrhonian sceptic’s continual inquiry since asking questions necessarily prolongs investigation. In order to find a proper parallel between Berry’s pyrrhonian skepticism and Nietzsche, one needs to look deeper into *BGE*. First, Nietzsche gives an aphorism that is very similar to Sextus’ view that the dogmatic branch calls a halt to inquiry: “A matter that becomes clear ceases to concern us” (*BGE* 80). When we believe we understand something, we no longer inquire into it, just as the skeptic observes that once we find what we are looking for we stop investigating. Regrettably, a lone aphorism, such as this, is hardly sufficient, especially in light of the fact that the preceding and subsequent aphorisms offer no further insight on the matter. Alternatively, I suggest that a strong parallel between Nietzsche and pyrrhonian skepticism can be found in *BGE* 207-209 where Nietzsche presents three epistemological positions that are strikingly similar to Sextus’ three branches: the objective spirit, weak skepticism, and strong skepticism.

3.4 The Three Branches

In *BGE* 207 Nietzsche talks about the “objective spirit,” which he also refers to as the “objective person” and “objective man.” Characteristically, Nietzsche offers colourful metaphors, which he does not explain. His opening lines suggest that the objective spirit is born through the rejection of subjectivity: “is there anyone who has never been mortally sick of everything subjective and of his cursed ipsissimosity?” (*BGE* 207). “Ipsissimosity” is taken from “ipsissima” which means “very own,” and serves as a term Nietzsche uses to describe our struggle to escape our own subjective position. The objective spirit is motivated to view the world objectively, which is to say to view the world independently of bias. Nietzsche is suggesting that the objective spirit’s position is tempting since it is only natural to become “mortally sick” of subjectivity. However, he also cautions against the objective spirit because he postulates that the objective spirit undergoes “depersonalization of the spirit.” Nietzsche presents the depersonalization of the spirit as attempts to provide meaning to concepts without personal considerations, which he then claims leads to pessimism. He only very briefly mentions pessimism and does not explain what he means other than to suggest that it is a negative outlook on life that he rejects. In this sense, he views the depersonalization of the spirit as a criticism of the objective spirit. He then goes on to describe a positive form of the objective spirit that moves past pessimism:

The objective person who no longer curses and scolds like the pessimist, the ideal scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousands of total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end, is certainly one of the most precious instruments there are. (*BGE* 207)

In this passage Nietzsche offers praise for the objective spirit, and more interestingly states that they have a “scientific instinct.” The objective spirit is inspired by their scientific instinct to be non-subjective, and for this reason he or she is a “precious instruments,” he or she is to be used for some purpose. Nietzsche does not explicitly say what the objective spirit is used for, but I will show in chapter four that it is for Nietzsche’s own project: getting beyond good and evil.

I argue that the objective spirit is similar to Sextus’ dogmatist due to the objective spirit’s scientific instinct, and what Nietzsche goes on to describe as its “mirror” nature. Throughout *BGE* 207 Nietzsche consistently refers to the objective spirit as a reflection: “the objective man is indeed a mirror” (*BGE* 207). Nietzsche does not explain what it is the objective spirit is reflecting, but being a mirror it presumably reflects whatever it encounters. Furthermore, he pairs

the description of “mirroring” with “knowing”: “[the objective man] is accustomed to submit before whatever wants to be known, without any other pleasure than that found in knowing and ‘mirroring’” (*BGE* 207), which means Nietzsche is describing how the objective spirit comes to know things. The objective spirit comes to know the world by mirroring, or reflecting, the world. I propose that the objective spirit is similar to the dogmatist in this case because “mirroring” suggests that there is only one possible way in which the world can be represented (through reflection), and would therefore call a halt to inquiry. A mirror can only reflect that which stands before it and cannot change or make anything. I suggest that Nietzsche’s metaphor of the mirror is meant to show that the objective spirit is limited in his or her scholarship because the objective spirit is incapable of creating anything.

Nietzsche goes on to claim that because the objective spirit can only reflect what appears before him or her and that he or she sees knowing and mirroring as a pleasure in and of itself, he or she has a “dangerous unconcern about Yes and No” (*BGE* 207). “Yes and No” in this passage refers to judgements, in that we either judge “Yes” or “No.” The objective spirit’s unconcern about “Yes and No,” refers to the fact that he or she does not question or care about what it means to say “Yes” or “No” to a judgement, to accept or reject a judgement, because the objective spirit cares only about knowing the truth. The objective spirit makes his or her scientific and unbiased judgement – they say either “Yes” or “No” – without question or concern for how or why it is they make such judgements. While one might object that someone with a proper scientific instinct would be concerned with how we make such judgements, Nietzsche’s criticism is directed toward the fact that the scientific instinct does not question the will to truth. Therefore, while the objective spirit may question “Yes and No” to some degree, they do not question it far enough. For these reasons, the objective spirit is a dogmatist insofar as they do not inquire enough about the judgements themselves.

The second parallel is between Sextus’ academic branch and *BGE* 208. In *BGE* 208 Nietzsche writes about skepticism, which I refer to as “weak skepticism,” in order to differentiate it from Nietzsche’s “strong skepticism” in *BGE* 209. In this section, Nietzsche expresses contempt for weak skepticism as he describes it as a “sickness” bad for health, and as an easily frightened and “delicate creature” (*BGE* 208). This is why I have called it “weak” skepticism. Nietzsche claims that what frightens the weak skeptic is “Yes and No” (*BGE* 208), which means that the weak skeptic is afraid of passing judgements altogether. The Yes and No of *BGE* 208 is

clearly the same as *BGE* 207, but the weak skeptic avoids passing judgements. While Nietzsche ridicules the weak skeptic for their fear, this is not his primary objection. Instead, Nietzsche's objection to weak skepticism is the "sickness" it embodies. He declares that this form of skepticism is "the most spiritual expression of a certain complex physiological condition" (*BGE* 208). He describes weak skepticism as a "paralysis of the will" and that this is the means by which weak skepticism expresses itself. If the weak skeptic refuses to pass judgements on any topic, then this would in fact lead to a form of paralysis. If the weak skeptic cannot recognize either truth or untruth, then the weak skeptic can neither seek truth like the old philosophers, nor get beyond good and evil. This makes the weak skeptic entirely useless toward philosophy, since his or her paralysis of will entails that she or he cannot create anything, which Nietzsche thinks is necessary for philosophy. This could prove problematic for Berry's interpretation, since Berry wants to offer a truth-abstaining interpretation of Nietzsche. As I have presented it so far, weak skepticism appears to be abstaining from passing any judgements as either true or false, but Nietzsche's project requires that one be capable of recognizing false judgements as necessary for life.

I will demonstrate that Berry's pyrrhonian skepticism does not resemble weak skepticism and that even if one finds Berry's reasons for being distinct from weak skepticism unsatisfying, weak skepticism still more closely resembles Sextus' academic branch. In order to distinguish pyrrhonian skepticism from weak skepticism, I suggest that pyrrhonian skepticism is not afraid of Yes and No, of passing judgement. Berry considers the following problem: "even if it appears to [the skeptic] that he has come across a sound (even highly persuasive) argument that *p*, his response will not be to be persuaded, but to continue investigating" (Berry, 2012, 36). One could object by arguing that the skeptic's response is peculiar, if not irrational. If someone encounters a sound and highly persuasive argument, then it is only rational to accept it. To do otherwise would be irrational. Sextus responds to this kind of objection by stating that the initial motivation of the skeptic is not all that different from the dogmatist: both are curious about the world, set off on their intellectual journey with a number of prejudgements about the world, and their end goal is the good life. However, while both begin in the same position, the skeptic "discovers not that he is moved to accept this or that answer, but that he consistently comes across equipollent arguments, or arguments of roughly equal persuasive weight" (Berry, 2012, 37). The skeptic discovers that there are arguments for and against any position, and that it is therefore better to

abstain from siding with any position. Therefore, the pyrrhonian skeptic is not afraid of Yes and No because he or she directly engages both positive and negative judgements before deciding he or she is equally satisfied or unsatisfied by both and abstains from passing judgement for either side.

On the other hand, the academic branch is certainly fearful of Yes and No. Like the weak skeptic, Sextus' academic branch claims that there are no answers to be found, and that frustration is all that can be found in attempting to attain the truth. Nietzsche's critique of the academic branch would be nearly identical to his critique of weak skepticism: by contending that we cannot come to any answers and that only epistemic frustration awaits us, the academic branch is admitting that it is afraid of Yes and No because it is afraid of becoming philosophically frustrated. This shows that Sextus' academic branch more closely resembles Nietzsche's weak skepticism, and gives reason to suppose that Nietzsche is not objecting to pyrrhonian skepticism in this passage.

The final comparison is between *BGE* 209, where Nietzsche offers a "stronger type of skepticism," and Berry's pyrrhonian skepticism. Regrettably, Nietzsche only offers a parable as explanation for what a stronger type of skepticism might look like:

This skepticism despises and nevertheless seizes; it undermines and takes possession; it does not believe but does not lose it-self in the process; it gives the spirit dangerous freedom, but it is severe to the heart; it is the German form of skepticism. (*BGE* 209)

Because Nietzsche offers this section in the form of a parable I analyze his narrative to try and understand his main points. The first part that "skepticism despises ... seizes ... undermines and takes possession" (*BGE* 209) demonstrates that strong skepticism is an active philosophy. What I mean by "active" can be explained by examining the remainder of the passage. When Nietzsche claims that strong skepticism does not believe "but does not lose it-self in the process," Nietzsche is comparing the strong skeptic to the position of the weak skeptic. The weak skeptic does not believe, and in the process loses themselves to the paralysis of the will. Additionally, the fact that strong skepticism is "severe to the heart" acknowledges weak skepticism's fear that by searching for answers, frustration is inevitable, but the strong skeptic does not allow the heart to rest content and searches indefinitely. It is in this sense that strong skepticism is active; it is active contrary to the weak skeptic who becomes paralyzed by their fear. Lastly, he calls it German because he believes the German "spirit" is "through which Europe was after all awakened from her 'dogmatic slumber'" (*BGE* 209). The German spirit appears as another

expression for “strength” in this passage as he describes it as having “the inclination to virile skepticism” and being “decisive” (*BGE* 209). Kauffman suggests that “dogmatic slumber” is an allusion to Kant’s dictum that Hume interrupted his own “dogmatic slumber” (Kaufmann, 1967, 323), which suggests that Nietzsche trusts that strong skepticism – since the German spirit is just an expression of strong skepticism – is capable of saving us from dogmatism.

3.5 Implications

BGE 209 is one of the few passages where Nietzsche explicitly refers back to dogmatism, which I mentioned was an important theme in Nietzsche’s project because of his comments in *BGE* P and 1. Therefore, this passage should be taken very seriously. *BGE* 209 suggests that strong skepticism can offer a solution to the problem of dogmatism, and therefore to the problem created by the will to truth. Nietzsche sees the will to truth as something that tempts philosophers to commit dangerous errors, but strong skepticism can avoid these errors through continuous inquiry. This shows that skepticism, in the form that Nietzsche supports, is a central part of his philosophy in *BGE* and cannot be explained away. In order to save Nietzsche from incoherence I must offer an account of Nietzsche’s strong skepticism that is coherent and does not fall to Clark and Leiter’s objections from chapter two that the falsification thesis presupposes the thing-in-itself and creates a tension between Nietzsche’s philosophical theory and practice. However, there still remains the issue as to whether or not strong skepticism is similar to Sextus’ third branch of pyrrhonian skepticism. I suggest that while they are similar, in that they both claim inquiry should be continuous, Nietzsche wants more from his skepticism than Berry’s pyrrhonian version offers.

Strong skepticism and pyrrhonian skepticism both support perpetual inquiry. However, strong skepticism continues inquiry insofar as it does not partake in the reflective nature of the objective spirit and the fear of the weak skeptic, which is to say does not merely reflect that which appears before it and is not afraid of Yes and No. Strong skepticism finds a balance between passing judgements dogmatically like the objective spirit, and not passing any judgements at all like the weak skeptic. This is similar to the pyrrhonian skeptic, who is born through the rejection of the dogmatic and academic branches, but the balance strong skepticism strikes is different from Berry’s view of pyrrhonian skepticism. While Berry suggests that the balance between the two branches results in the suspension of judgement, and therefore abstention from truth, Nietzsche’s strong skepticism requires action. Suspension of judgement

constitutes an active philosophy insofar as it continues to inquire, but Nietzsche is presenting a philosophy that is active insofar as it creates, a notion that I expand on in the following chapter. For now, what can be said is that he rejects both the objective spirit and weak skepticism, by criticising them for their inability to create judgements. Pyrrhonian skepticism, while not afraid of examining judgements, still abstains from passing them, due to being equally persuaded by opposing sides. Nietzsche's strong skepticism suggests that Nietzsche is uninterested in persuasion, and instead wants to offer new judgements of his own. Furthermore, while pyrrhonian skepticism completely rejects dogmatism, which most closely resembles the objective spirit, Nietzsche sees the objective spirit as an instrument to be used. Nietzsche claims that the objective spirit "belongs in the hand of one more powerful" (*BGE* 207), which can only refer to the strong skeptic who is described as strong, virile, and dangerous. This suggests that Nietzsche sees a purpose for dogmatism, which makes sense in light of his comments in *BGE* 4 where he stated that the falsest judgements are the most essential to us due to their importance toward promoting certain kinds of life. The objective spirit is the type of person to be concerned about the principles of logic, and can mirror those judgements that are essential toward living our lives. Furthermore, this shows that strong skepticism is a philosophy that can get beyond good and evil, because it recognizes "untruth as a condition of life" (*BGE* 4) and so recognizes the usefulness of false judgements. Even if the objective spirit comes to judgements dogmatically, those judgements can nevertheless be useful for the preservation of human life. If one merely abstains from judgement, one cannot hope to use the objective spirit as an instrument or recognize "untruth."

From these considerations I conclude that while Berry was on the right track in her attempt to explain Nietzsche's philosophy by comparing it to pyrrhonian skepticism, Nietzsche is inevitably offering his own form of skepticism, with its own commitments. The question that remains unanswered is whether or not Nietzsche's strong skepticism can save him from incoherence. While Clark & Dudrick tried to save Nietzsche from incoherence in *BGE* by explaining away its skepticism, I have shown that skepticism is integral to Nietzsche's project, and therefore cannot be explained away. In order to save Nietzsche from incoherence with a skeptical interpretation I turned to Berry and her pyrrhonian interpretation to see whether or not Nietzsche's philosophy was committed to pyrrhonian views. However, while Sextus' dogmatic and academic branches were comparable to Nietzsche's objective spirit and weak skepticism, I

argued that pyrrhonian skepticism was not sufficiently similar to strong skepticism. Nietzsche requires more than mere abstention from judgement, he needs his skepticism to be an active philosophy in order to get beyond good and evil. In the following chapter I fully explore the implications of Nietzsche's strong skepticism and present my interpretation of Nietzsche by arguing that Nietzsche offers a coherent and interesting philosophy in *BGE*.

Chapter IV – My Nietzsche

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter I object to Clark and Leiter's rejection of skeptical interpretations and offer an interpretation of Nietzsche that not only avoids all the problems of the naturalist interpretations, but also suggests that Nietzsche's philosophy is both coherent and includes skepticism. I must therefore address the objections Clark and Leiter have against skeptical interpretations. Clark's objections take two forms: first, she states that Nietzsche's falsification thesis presupposes the thing-in-itself in *BGE*, which creates a contradiction, and second, Clark claims that *BGE* is incoherent because it puts forth views that affirm truth and others that deny truth. Leiter's objection to Nietzsche's falsification thesis is that if Nietzsche denies truth, then he contradicts himself whenever he uses epistemic value terms. For instance, when he asserts that something is a fact (implying that he *knows* something). In chapter three, I analyzed two attempts to save Nietzsche from this contradiction and incoherence, but both failed to reflect what Nietzsche actually says in *BGE*. Nevertheless, by examining both Clark & Dudrick and Berry's attempts to address Nietzsche's incoherence, I concluded that strong skepticism is required to understand Nietzsche's project in *BGE*.

In response to Clark and Leiter's objections I contend that Nietzsche's project relies on his conception of what he calls the philosophers of the future or *Versucher*. The philosophers of the future are meant to be philosophers capable of getting beyond good and evil and creating new philosophies. To this end, I show how Nietzsche avoids Leiter's objection that his falsification thesis is irreconcilable with using epistemic value terms by demonstrating how Nietzsche's philosophers of the future are strong skeptics. In addition to this, by addressing Leiter's objection I expose another issue as to how the philosophers of the future manage to avoid being dogmatists, but nevertheless seek truth. I discuss how Nietzsche avoids dogmatism through his rejection of the thing-in-itself, and argue furthermore that Clark is mistaken in her analysis that the falsification thesis presupposes the thing-in-itself. In so doing I will have shown that *BGE* is free from epistemic contradiction. Finally, I then go on to explain how Clark mistakes Nietzsche's distinction between what I call the personal and the shared for the traditional distinction between the real and apparent. Once this misunderstanding is corrected, it will be evident that Nietzsche offers a coherent philosophy throughout his middle period.

By offering my interpretation of Nietzsche's view on truth in *BGE* and offering counter-arguments to Clark and Leiter's objections, I will have addressed all of Clark's major concerns. I will consequently contend that *BGE* is not chaotic and confused, but instead offers a coherent philosophy. However, while these considerations address *BGE*'s internal coherence, a different problem arises. Recall that Clark claimed the problem of incoherence in *BGE* arose through the tension between two opposing epistemological categorizations drawn from *TI*, stages five and six. Given these categorizations, there is a question as to which stage *BGE* falls into under my interpretation. A defender of the naturalist interpretations could counter my interpretation by claiming that while I offer an internally coherent account of *BGE*, it only manages to firmly place *BGE* in stage five and therefore nevertheless inconsistent with his later philosophy. In response to this new problem, I will contend that *BGE* fits in stage six and provide an example from *GM* to demonstrate how Nietzsche puts his falsification thesis into practice in his later work. I argue that this provides sufficient reason to suppose that Nietzsche was right to include *Z*, and consequently *BGE*, in his final stage in *TI* and conclude that Nietzsche offers a coherent philosophy in *BGE* that fits within his final stage of epistemology. I turn now to explaining *Versucher*: the philosophers of the future.

4.1 The Philosophers of the Future

When speaking of getting beyond good and evil, Nietzsche mentions that it will be accomplished by a philosophy (*BGE* 4). If getting beyond good and evil requires a philosophy, there must therefore be a philosopher. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in *BGE* 4 Nietzsche claims that "To recognize untruth as a condition for life ... a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil." Presumably, insofar as he intends for the philosophers of the future to be included in his project, they will aspire to get beyond good and evil, and therefore recognize the value of "untruth." Nietzsche first mentions these philosophers in *BGE* 2: "in all seriousness: I see such new philosophers coming up." In *BGE* 2, as I discussed in chapter three, Nietzsche is critical about the "faith in opposite values" (*BGE* 2), that philosophers have so far presumed there are opposite values. He wants to suggest, however, that "maybe" these opposites are insidiously related and merely appear as opposites. He then goes on to say the following:

But who has the will to concern himself with such dangerous maybes? For that, one really has to wait for the advent of a new species of philosophers, such as have

somehow another and converse taste and propensity for those we have known so far – philosophers of the dangerous ‘maybe’ in every sense. (*BGE* 2)

He claims that these new philosophers will be concerned about “dangerous maybes,” about asking dangerous question – questions philosophers do not want to acknowledge. This leads the new philosophers to inquire about “dangerous” topics. As the discussion from chapter three shows, such dangerous questions include doubting the principles of logic. Nietzsche immediately identifies these new philosophers as important for his project of getting beyond good and evil, but does not yet explain why.

I suggest that *BGE* P to *BGE* 4 serve as an introduction for Nietzsche’s project in *BGE*, while the remainder of Part One and a portion of Part Two are tantamount to Nietzsche’s first analysis (of many) of the prejudices of philosophers. Nietzsche makes a number of assertions about the prejudices of old philosophers throughout Part One and Two of *BGE*, for instance in *BGE* 5 where Nietzsche claims philosophers are “childlike” due to their inability to recognize their own desires and “inspiration,” and in *BGE* 6 Nietzsche states that “it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author.” Nietzsche contends that it is not “consciousness” (*BGE* 3) or objective philosophical thought that gives rise to ideas or even truth, but rather it is “moral intentions” that constitute the foundation of philosophical thought (*BGE* 6). He believes that while philosophers try to devise a means by which to divorce themselves from their moral prejudices by employing concepts such as “reason,” it is ultimately their intentions, or moral prejudices, that motivate their philosophical thought. Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that philosophers deceive themselves with words (*BGE* 9, 16, and 24) in the sense that philosophers use tautology in order to give justification for their judgements, without mention of their moral prejudices. To put this observation into context, one might say that the old philosophers operate within the context of good and evil. The philosophers are unaware, but they practice their philosophy within the framework of their moral prejudice, and it is Nietzsche’s project to move beyond these prejudices. How he intends to do this can be found with his new philosophers.

It is not until *BGE* 42 where Nietzsche returns to the new philosophers. Nietzsche toys with the notion of calling them “*Versucher*,” although he later goes on to refer to them as “very free spirits” and “philosophers of the future” (*BGE* 44). Kaufmann translates this as “attempters” but notes that “*Versucher* could also mean tempters (which does not seem intended here, at least as the primary meaning) or experimenters (which is meant but would spoil the triple play on

words)” (Kaufmann, 2000, 242-243). *Versucher* is also comparable to “skepticism”: “The Greek verb *skeptesthai* means ‘to inquire’ or ‘to examine’ and is a cognate of *skeptikos*, which eventually came into English as ‘skeptic.’ Skeptics were also known as ‘Zetetics’, a name that derives from the verb *zetein* (‘to search’)” (Berry, 2012, 36). To search, to inquire, to examine, to attempt, and to experiment, while not necessarily synonymous, these terms undoubtedly form a set of concepts that are related, if not identical, to skepticism, if we understand the latter in the way suggested by Berry. Nietzsche goes to say that “This name [*Versucher*] itself is in the end an attempt and, if you will, a temptation” (*BGE* 42). While the new philosophers attempt or experiment in some way, this feature does not define them.

Aside from the comparable linguistic roots between *Versucher* and skepticism, Nietzsche explicitly claims that the philosophers of the future are strong skeptics (*BGE* 210), which further supports my argument that skepticism is an integral part of Nietzsche’s project. Despite making this connection between his philosophers of the future and strong skepticism, he emphasizes that such a connection does not define his philosophers of the future: “Suppose then that some trait in the philosophers of the future poses the riddle whether they would not perhaps have to be skeptics in the sense suggested last (strong skepticism), this would still designate only one feature and not them as a whole” (*BGE* 210). Nietzsche acknowledges the philosophers of the future are skeptics, but that is not all they are. He suggests one could also call them “critics”, as well as “men of experiments” (*BGE* 210). He qualifies each title by clarifying that while they describe the philosopher of the future, they do not solely define him; the philosopher of the future is complex. Nietzsche’s insistence on this point suggests that he does not want the philosophers of the future to be constrained by a rigid definition; he does not want to exclude further inquiry into what it means to be a philosopher of the future. What we can say, is that the philosophers of the future are strong skeptics in their attempt to create value while continuing to inquire into new possibilities.

4.2 Leiter’s Objection: Prelude to a Common Misunderstanding

The philosophers of the future are important to Nietzsche because they are strong skeptics who recognize “untruth” as a condition for life and therefore provide philosophies that place themselves beyond good and evil. However, recognizing “untruth” might seem to some, such as Leiter, as tantamount to the falsification thesis since recognizing untruth could simply mean denying truth. Leiter might ask how it is possible for the philosophers of the future to claim that

things such as the principles of logic are false while at the same time making assertions of their own. As discussed in chapter two, Leiter argues that Nietzsche's falsification thesis leads to a tension between Nietzsche's theory and practice. Leiter's objection is that in theory, Nietzsche claims that we cannot attain the truth, but in practice he puts forth his own assertions, which he takes to be true.

In response to Leiter's objection, one need only read *BGE* 43 where Nietzsche addresses this concern. There, Nietzsche asks "are these coming philosophers new friends of 'truth'?" to which he replies "that is probable enough" (*BGE* 43). But how can a philosophy both be a friend of "truth," while at the same time recognizing "untruth" as a condition of life? Nietzsche offers the following in explanation: "My judgement is *my* judgement': no one else is easily entitled to it – that is what such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say to himself" (*BGE* 43). I suggest interpreting this passage in the following way: when a philosopher of the future claims that something is "true" or makes a judgement, he or she is acknowledging that it is only his or her judgement, and as such it is not "true" in a metaphysical sense. Leiter therefore misunderstands Nietzsche's use of epistemic value terms.

When Nietzsche says we falsify (*BGE* 24), and at the same time maintains that the "erroneousness of the world" is the "surest and firmest fact we can lay eyes on" (*BGE* 34) he is stating that he comes to these judgements from his own perspective. In other words, when Nietzsche uses epistemic value terms, he uses them to designate his perspective, one might say a personal standard, as opposed to applying them to an objective standard – as Leiter presumes. Indeed, under Leiter's understanding, when someone claims that something is a "fact" or asserts something positively, then he or she is asserting it is true about the world in a metaphysical sense. While this might be a reasonable assumption under ordinary circumstances, Nietzsche stated in *BGE* 4 that he is using a "new language" and consequently his use of epistemic value terms, such as "true" and "false" must be understood differently. This interpretation opens a number of questions as to how to understand Nietzsche's conceptions of "truth" and "false" and what it means to say something is true from a perspective. These questions will be addressed throughout this chapter once other considerations are taken into account. For this reason, I turn now to the question of dogmatism.

4.3 Dogmatism and the thing-in-itself

In this chapter, I concern myself only with laying out my interpretation and leave most objections to chapter five. However, there is one concern that is immediately useful toward explaining Nietzsche's position. If Nietzsche and his philosophers of the future are "friends of 'truth'" (*BGE* 43), what distinguishes them from dogmatists? He states that the philosophers of the future "will certainly not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman – which has so far been the secret wish and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations" (*BGE* 43). In this passage Nietzsche identifies the distinguishing feature between philosophers of the future and dogmatists: their aim. The aim of the dogmatists, according to Nietzsche, is to offer truths that pertain to all people, to discover universal truths. The philosophers of the future, as I will demonstrate in this section, see truth as a personal affair due to the subjective nature of casting judgements.

While it is clear that Nietzsche rejects dogmatism and its aims, it is not yet clear why we should reject dogmatism as he presents it. Why should we not seek universal truths that pertain to "everyman" (*BGE* 43)? I will argue that Nietzsche's rejection of dogmatism stems from its blind faith in the will to truth. Furthermore, Nietzsche objects the dogmatism of the old philosophers in that they fail to recognize their moral intentions. Furthermore, I will go on to suggest that Nietzsche rejects the proposition that we can offer truths for all people due to his rejection of the thing-in-itself.

As I suggested in chapter three, *BGE* 1 raises the question of the value of the classic conception of truth, but does not yet affirm or reject its value. While Nietzsche examines a number of prejudices of old philosophers, it is not until *BGE* 25 that Nietzsche begins to really give his answer: "Take care, philosophers and friends, of knowledge, and beware of martyrdom! Of suffering 'for the truth's sake'!" (*BGE* 25). In this section Nietzsche warns old philosophers from blindly trusting in the will to truth. By trusting in the will to truth the old philosophers can become martyrs and suffer because blind trust "stupefies" them and makes them "headstrong against objections." Nietzsche's point is that blindly trusting in the will to truth amounts to closing oneself off from casting alternative judgements. In this way, Nietzsche's suggestion in *BGE* 1, that we should question the value of truth, leads to his later criticism that following the will to truth blindly only results in "worse consequences of hostility" (*BGE* 25). Nietzsche goes so far as to believe that by trusting in the will to truth and becoming head-strong against

objections, a philosopher can become openly hostile, although he does not offer specifics. I suggest that this passage be read colloquially. What I mean by this is that Nietzsche is not making a deep philosophical point, but offering an observation about philosophers generally. When an individual believes they have come to know the truth, in the classical sense, they have no reason to suppose they could be mistaken. Consequently they halt further inquiry and become defensive when other question or criticize their judgements. Note also that Nietzsche is not objecting to the will to truth itself, but rather the blind faith placed in it. It is not the will to truth itself or the desire to attain the truth that Nietzsche is objecting to. Nietzsche is objecting to the unquestioned trust old philosophers have placed in the value of truth. In other words, he objects to how the old philosophers deny perspective. Therefore, the philosophers of the future are not dogmatists insofar as they do not blindly trust in the value of truth, and remain skeptical (continue inquiry and do not become head-strong against objections).

Turning now to the question of the thing-in-itself, in *BGE* 16 Nietzsche suggests that one cannot distinguish between “thinking,” “feeling,” or “willing” without making assumptions that are problematic for the notions of “immediate certainties” and the thing-in-itself. In particular he wants to criticize the immediate certainty of “I think” (as well as Schopenhauer’s “I will”). He begins his train of thought by claiming “that ‘immediate certainty,’ as well as ‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself,’ involve a *contradictio in adjecto* [contradiction between noun and adjective]” (*BGE* 16). Determining what Nietzsche’s means by this contradiction will require reading on. Nietzsche immediately jumps into a discussion where he attempts to analyze what happens when a philosopher utters the sentence “I think,” and suggests a host of problems arise. He says one must assume the “*I*” who is thinking, and presuppose that something thinks, that thinking involves a “cause,” that there is an “ego,” and lastly that this ego already knows what thinking is. This final presumption creates a problem insofar as to reflect upon thinking, one must already know what thinking is. He then goes on to say that “if I had not already decided within myself what [thinking] is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’?” (*BGE* 16). Without invoking an inner standard for thinking, how can we distinguish thinking from merely feeling? There is no outside standard by which we can come to think of things as opposed to merely “feeling” or “willing” them. In order to distinguish “thinking” from “feeling” we must compare them, which requires knowing

them. Instead of denying immediate certainties outright, Nietzsche claims that at the very least there are none for him:

In short, the assertion ‘I think’ assumes that I *compare* my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further ‘knowledge,’ it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me. (*BGE* 16)

In this section, one might suppose that Nietzsche leads the reader to believe that we cannot have knowledge or that knowledge is itself a contradiction. Instead, Nietzsche takes a step back and says that immediate certainty is not available to *him*. Nietzsche does not see knowledge as immediately certain because it requires him to compare his current state of knowledge with other states of himself (feeling, willing), which removes any sense of immediacy or certainty for him. This line on its own, offers a somewhat weak proposition, but if reconsidered after Nietzsche’s comments in *BGE* 43 where Nietzsche talks about “my judgement,” this section reveals a lot more. Let me elaborate.

When considering *BGE* 16 on its own, one can only conclude that the thing-in-itself and immediate certainties are not clear to Nietzsche, and instead of siding with or against the thing-in-itself Nietzsche abstains from passing judgement. However, in light of the considerations in chapter three, – that Nietzsche wants to offer an active philosophy that does more than merely abstain from passing judgements – this section appears odd. If one considers Nietzsche’s subtle inclusion of “for me” in this passage, it could be that Nietzsche intends to be understood as a philosopher of the future. In this passage he acknowledges that the thing-in-itself could be a truth for others, but he is claiming that from his perspective the thing-in-itself is inconceivable. Nietzsche is proposing that the thing-in-itself and immediate certainties are merely another expression of the blind trust in the will to truth. By contending that something is immediately certain, the old philosophers trust that there is something that is evidently true, as well as valuable. Likewise, the conception of the thing-in-itself trusts that there are things that are true about the world independently of our knowledge of them. In the final passage of *BGE* 16, Nietzsche offers the same proposition as he did when speaking of the Sphinx in *BGE* 1: “In place of the ‘immediate certainty’ in which the people may believe in the case at hand, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him, truly searching questions of the intellect; to wit” (*BGE* 16). The propositions of immediate certainty and the thing-in-itself forces upon the philosopher more questions than it can possibly answer. This is similar to *BGE* 1 where

Nietzsche suggests it is time to learn from woman (truth), the Sphinx, to ask questions and to question the value of truth. The thing-in-itself merely presents more questions, and Nietzsche believes we should learn from these questions and doubt the blind faith of the philosophers. At the very least, he wants to ask: “why insist on truth?” (*BGE* 16). This final line asks two things: why insist on the possibility of the classical conception of truth, and why insist that this truth has value?

Despite these considerations, one might find Nietzsche’s rejection of the thing-in-itself unconvincing. I will demonstrate that Nietzsche’s rejection of the thing-in-itself can only be convincing by coming to fully understand what Nietzsche means by falsification. Nietzsche states that the old philosophers, like Schopenhauer, presuppose that “knowledge ... got hold of its object purely and nakedly as ‘the thing-in-itself,’ without any falsification on the part of either the subject of the object” (*BGE* 16). This means that a part of Nietzsche’s rejection of the thing-in-itself is that the thing-in-itself falsifies. In order to make sense of this consideration I turn to Clark’s objection in order to help understand the connection between the thing-in-itself and falsification. By showing how Clark misunderstands Nietzsche’s position toward the thing-in-itself, I will further clarify his position.

4.4 Clark’s Objection: a Misunderstood Distinction

As discussed in chapter two, Clark claims that Nietzsche’s falsification thesis presupposes the thing-in-itself and is therefore contradictory. To defend my interpretation of Nietzsche, I argue that Clark’s objection misunderstands Nietzsche, particularly in her treatment of *GS* 354 where Nietzsche explains a part of his views about conscience and perspective. Recall that it is *GS* 354 where, Clark argues, Nietzsche fails to reject the thing-in-itself. I will show that upon an initial reading it seems as though Clark’s objection is correct: Nietzsche appears to contradict himself by presupposing the thing-in-itself. Upon a closer reading, however, I establish that Clark misreads the passage and that Nietzsche even warns against this initial reading. While Clark’s initial reading presupposes a distinction between the real and apparent, Nietzsche’s actual distinction is between what I call the shared and personal. Exploring Clark’s misunderstanding will allow me to explain falsification and give a clearer understanding of why Nietzsche rejects the thing-in-itself due to the shared and personal distinction. As a first step, I must say something about Nietzsche’s stance on consciousness, as this is a central theme of *GS*

354 and as I discussed in previous chapters, it is the error of concept formation that ultimately leads to falsification.

GS 354 is concerned with “the problem of consciousness” which he titles “*On the ‘genius of the species.’*” The concept of consciousness has already arisen in my discussion, as it comes up in *BGE* 3 where Nietzsche states that “being conscious” is not the opposite of “instinct” but is actually motivated by instinct. Nietzsche, however, does not offer an explanation for his claim in *BGE* 3 since he has already given an extensive account of consciousness in *GS* Book V. Nietzsche’s goal in *GS* 354 is to explain what he believes is the origin of consciousness and consequently wants to argue that consciousness was developed “*under the need for communication*” (*GS* 354). His claim is that consciousness only comes about through the need to communicate with others. He says this under the supposition that “a solitary human being who lived like a beast of prey would not need [consciousness]” (*GS* 354). What he means is that a human in a state of nature – isolated from others and therefore unable to communicate – has no need to become conscious of his or her own thinking. This gives us an understanding of what Nietzsche means by consciousness: awareness of thought. Nietzsche postulates, providing no reason for it, that “man, like every living being, thinks continually without knowing it” and that “the thinking that rises to *consciousness* is only the smallest part [of thinking]” (*GS* 354). In Nietzsche’s view, humans are always thinking in the sense that they use their mind to get around in the world and to live. Once humans need communication, they are required to bring their unconscious thoughts to consciousness in order to present them to others. Nietzsche believes that this becoming conscious is the “most superficial and worst part [of thinking]” (*GS* 354) because it is only conscious thinking that “*takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication*” (*GS* 354). To be clear, it is not the “worst” part of thinking in the sense that it is bad for getting around in the world, since communication is necessary insofar as one wants to live in the company of others. Nietzsche has not yet offered his critique of consciousness, merely expressed distaste for becoming conscious. Because consciousness arises from the need to communicate, Nietzsche concludes that “consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature” (*GS* 354). Becoming conscious of something, including one’s self, is the result of attempting to communicate our thoughts to others.

It is the shared, or as he calls it “herd,” nature of consciousness that Nietzsche wants to criticize. He contends that “fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual ... but as soon as we translate them into consciousness *they do not seem to be*” (GS 354). Nietzsche claims that our judgements are the result of our individual and therefore subjective experiences (cf. BGE 43), and when we attempt to communicate these judgements and experiences (become conscious of them) they appear as though they are shared, or common. This is similar to the idea of error of concept formation discussed in chapter two; we falsify by forming concepts that can be shared with others because they over-simplify. This entails that consciousness falsifies that which it tries to communicate. Nietzsche spells this out explicitly in the following passage:

this is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as *I* understand them: Owing to the nature of *animal consciousness*, the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious *becomes* by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal. (GS 354)

In Nietzsche’s view, we can only become conscious of a surface/sign-world and it is for this reason that Nietzsche puts forth his falsification thesis: “all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficiality, and generalization” (GS 354). Humans falsify by becoming conscious, and this means simplifying and generalizing about the world.

Equipped with these considerations, I can now address Clark’s objection. On a first reading, Clark’s objection that Nietzsche’s falsification thesis is a contradiction because it presupposes the thing-in-itself seems painfully obvious because of his comments about a surface/sign world. The notion of a surface/sign world implies that there is a representation of the world, which leads to a distinction between the real and apparent. Nietzsche contends that we falsify by becoming conscious, but it is not clear what it is that we are falsifying. Clark reasons that we can only understand falsification in terms of falsifying *reality*, which in this case would refer to the world independent from us. When we become conscious of something, we commit an error (falsify) in our concept formation about the world. Consequently this means the notion of falsification presupposes the thing-in-itself. As discussed in chapter two, if we cannot access things-in-themselves, then all that remains are representations, or Nietzsche’s “surface- and sign-world.” If Nietzsche is proposing that we do not have direct access to objects due to falsification, then he acknowledges that there are independent objects to falsify. If he acknowledges that there

are objects that exist independently of us, then he presupposes the thing-in-itself. The alternative, that the world is only representation, or surface/sign-world, cannot make sense under Nietzsche's philosophy because then there would be nothing to falsify.

Despite this obvious problem, Nietzsche goes on at the end of *GS* 354 to claim that his arguments about consciousness and communication have nothing to do with the thing-in-itself:

You will guess that it is not the opposition of subject and object that concerns me here: This distinction I leave to the epistemologists who have become entangled in the snares of grammar (the metaphysics of the people). It is even less the opposition of 'thing-in-itself' and appearance; for we do not 'know' nearly enough to be entitled to any such distinction. We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for 'truth'. (*GS* 354)

Contrary to Nietzsche's supposition that we will have guessed he is not concerned with "subject and object," Clark's interpretation is that Nietzsche is falling into the same grammatical trap that he rejects in *BGE*. She claims that Nietzsche fails to properly reject the thing-in-itself because his falsification thesis presupposes the subject and object. With that said, it should appear odd that Nietzsche would mention the "opposition of subject and object," which implies that he has something like *BGE* 16 (his rejection of the thing-in-itself), in mind when writing this passage. If he had his rejection of the thing-in-itself in mind, it seems to me that it is far more likely that Clark has misread this passage. This leads me to contend that Nietzsche is actually proposing something different from Clark's distinction between the thing-in-itself and the apparent, just as he claims.

The only way to save Nietzsche from contradiction is to determine what Nietzsche could mean by "falsify," other than "falsify reality." My suggestion is that Nietzsche is not proposing that we falsify reality (the thing-in-itself), but that we falsify our *own perspectives*. At no point in *GS* 354 – and, I might add, in all other areas where Nietzsche presents the falsification thesis in the passages considered herein – does Nietzsche claim that we falsify reality, the world, or the thing-in-itself. In *GS* 354 Nietzsche is concerned about consciousness and how consciousness, through the necessity of communication, misleads us by making our thoughts no longer seem "incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual." What constitutes these unique experiences is yet to be explored. Nevertheless, what I can say at this point is that falsification and simplification, does not occur with respect to reality, but with respect to our unique experiences of the world. Nietzsche was even aware of the fact that he could be misinterpreted as Clark does, and praises the good readers for not making this exact mistake when he postulates

that “You will guess that it is not the opposition of subject and object that concerns me here” (*GS* 354). He does not presuppose any distinction between the thing-in-itself and the apparent, what he is proposing is a distinction between the personal and the common or the private and the shared. By identifying this distinction, the remainder of my interpretation falls into place, which I now turn to.

4.5 Putting the Pieces Together: Understanding Nietzsche’s Narrative

My explanation for what Nietzsche means by “falsification” offers insight into the rest of *BGE* and everything discussed so far. This is especially important for understanding *BGE* 4, where Nietzsche claimed that falsification is not tantamount to an objection, and that falsification or “untruth” is necessary for life. If the falsification of personal truth occurs naturally due to the necessity of communication, then it should be evident that those things that are falsest could prove to be the most indispensable for us. Granted communication is indispensable toward maintaining our way of life, then some of the falsest, most shared, judgements are required to maintain communication. This can also help to explain what Nietzsche means by “falsest” – the concern I set aside in the previous chapter. A judgement can be more or less false based on its level of detachment from an individual’s perspective, where the further detached entails a greater degree of falsification. Or another way to see it is that a judgment becomes more or less false based on how well it can be accepted by all. In this way, the principles of logic are a perfect example of the falsest judgements since they could be some of the most commonly accepted judgements.

Furthermore, Nietzsche refers to falsification as committing an error (*BGE* 34), which I will explain offers further clarification as to how falseness can be understood as a matter of degree. In so doing I will set the stage to connect Nietzsche’s depiction of falsification as error and everything considered so far back to *TT*’s sixth categorization. To do this, I take a look at the end of *BGE* 34 where Nietzsche lays out some of his motivation for seeing truth and falsity as a matter of degree:

It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is even the worst proved assumption there is in the world ... and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and clumsiness of some philosophers, one wanted to abolish the “apparent world” altogether – well, supposing *you* could do that, at least nothing would be left of your “truth” either. Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of “true” and “false”? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees [...]?

This passage must be read carefully. The first part of this passage is a reiteration of Nietzsche's distaste for assumptions that truth is always to be preferred. He then claims that even if the real-apparent distinction were true, there is no basis to suppose that the real is more valuable than the apparent. Moreover, Nietzsche states that even if the old philosopher wanted to abolish the apparent, the real would be gone with it, which entails that the real requires that there is also an apparent. Finally, he poses the question as to whether truth and falsity should be understood as a matter of degree. With this question, I suggest he is inviting his reader to consider falsification as a matter of degree. Nietzsche explains what understanding falsification as a matter of degree entails at the beginning of the section: "from every point of view the *erroneousness* of the world in which we think we live is the surest and firmest fact that we can lay eyes on." Now it is clear that if one was unaware of Nietzsche's views on consciousness, this passage would be troublesome. Upon an initial reading it appears as if he is claiming that the only thing we can be sure of is the erroneous character of reality. Such a proposition would presuppose the thing-in-itself by being concerned with reality, and justify Clark's objection. Nonetheless, Nietzsche includes "in which we think we live" in his statement. As my earlier discussion revealed, "thinking" involves "becoming conscious," which is what leads to falsification. Nietzsche is not stating that the error comes from a dissonance with reality, but our shared views of the world and its dissonance with the personal. Nietzsche is proposing that the falsification of our personal judgements, how we view the world, is the closest we can come to sharing a judgement that is personal. Therefore, the degree of falsity comes from making the error of becoming conscious, of simplifying, and sharing the world. The degree of falsehood of any judgement is based upon the extent to which we deny or move away from our personal judgements.

This connects well with the sixth stage of epistemology in *TI* where Nietzsche states that the abandonment of the apparent and true world is the "end of the longest error" (*TI*, 4, 6). Instead of falsifying the world or reality, as Clark suggests, it is our personal judgements that are falsified by errors such as the thing-in-itself, which attempt to deny the personal. That is to say, the falsification thesis – once properly understood within the confines of this period in Nietzsche's career as the falsification of personal judgements – is what gets Nietzsche to the sixth stage in *TI*. When Nietzsche claims that something falsifies the world, he is maintaining that such a judgment is making an error by denying personal truths. The sixth stage is the "end of the longest error" (*TI*, 4, 6), of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself, and ideas that take a similar

form are, for Nietzsche, the “most dangerous of all errors” (*BGE P*). They are the dogmatists’ errors whose purpose is “denying perspective” (*BGE P*). The falsification thesis acknowledges that we falsify, it acknowledges our longest error of denying perspective. The falsification thesis is the prelude to the new philosophies to come.

Finally, to return to the problem of dogmatism, all these considerations demonstrate why the philosophers of the future are not dogmatists and furthermore how the philosophers of the future manage to get beyond good and evil. The philosophers of the future avoid dogmatism and still seek truth by acknowledging their perspective and by seeking their own personal truths. While I have stated that the philosophers of the future get beyond good and evil by recognizing untruth as a condition for life, one might still imagine that getting beyond good and evil involves removing moral prejudice. As Nietzsche claims in *BGE* 34, among other places, it is moral prejudice that is at the center of his critique of the old philosophers as it constitutes the prejudice of old philosophers. One might assume that by abandoning moral prejudice, one gets beyond good and evil, but this would be to commit the same error as the old philosophers. Ignoring or dismissing our moral positions is the equivalent to denying the personal and therefore committing falsification. Such a position cannot get one beyond good and evil. Alternatively, this does not entail that getting beyond good and evil requires that an individual avoid falsification. Merely by communicating, conceptualizing, or being conscious, we begin to falsify. Insofar as one does not become entirely isolated without need of communication, it is necessary to falsify. Consequently, the philosophers of the future, just as the old, will inevitably falsify to some degree. But just as I have pointed out since chapter two, falsification is not a problem in itself. The problem is the blind faith in the will to truth. Therefore, in order to understand Nietzsche properly, one must understand this crucial point: the philosophers of the future manage to get beyond good and evil by *acknowledging* their moral prejudice, by being *honest* about the fact that they are presenting their own truth. By presenting one’s judgements in this way, an individual can move beyond good and evil, where good and evil are rigid concepts of what it means for something to be good or bad. For the purposes of my thesis, one could see good and evil as an expression of the thing-in-itself, which is to say understanding moral judgements as things-in-themselves. The philosophers of the future get beyond good and evil by rejecting the thing-in-itself and acknowledging their own personal judgements.

4.6 Placing *BGE* in the Sixth Stage

Despite the evidence I have provided so far, one might still make the following remark: even though *BGE* is shown to be internally coherent, the connection to Nietzsche's sixth stage in *TI* is too weak and so I have only demonstrated that *BGE* is fully within the fifth stage. Recall that for Clark, stage five constitutes Nietzsche's middle period, where he is struggling between two opposing views (truth affirming and truth denying), whereas stage six is meant to constitute Nietzsche final period where he properly abandons the thing-on-itself. For the remainder of this chapter I argue that any further attempts to include *BGE* as a part of the fifth stage of *TI* can only hope to offer *ad hoc* arguments. To do this, I temporarily shift my attention to his subsequent work *GM* where I establish that Nietzsche applies his falsification thesis, and that if one were to insist that *BGE* were a part of stage five, *GM* would also have to be included in stage five.

Based on my explanation so far, the old philosophers are accused of dishonesty and blind faith, in the sense that they have blindly trusted in the will to truth and subsequently failed to acknowledge their prejudices. While Nietzsche's criticism might be entirely merited, it is a somewhat uninteresting problem; if the old philosophers can simply apologize for their dishonesty, and acknowledge their prejudices, then Nietzsche's criticism would be dealt with. I want to show that Nietzsche has a deeper and more interesting problem with the old philosophers. I turn now to *GM* where I demonstrate that Nietzsche's falsification thesis is still present and that he offers an example of the objectionable character of the old philosophers that is more interesting than what has so far been considered.

First, Nietzsche claims that *GM* is concerned with the origin of moral prejudice (*GM*, P, 2). He also mentions some early attempts to deal with morality, but says "Fortunately, I learned to separate theological prejudice from moral prejudice and ceased to look for the origin of evil *behind* the world" (*GM*, P, 3). He mentions this to indicate that that very early on⁴ he had attempted to understand the thing-in-itself to get to the "essence" of evil in the world (*GM*, P, 3). He wanted to believe that morality, or more precisely "evil," was a thing-in-itself that was independent from human valuations. The core issue of Nietzsche's project in *GM* is that "we need a critique of moral values, *the value of these values themselves must be first called in question*" (*GM*, P, 6). Nietzsche is continuing his project from *BGE*, but toward a new direction. In *BGE* he wanted to question the value of truth and revealed that it is motivated, not by reason,

⁴ At the age of thirteen.

but by instincts and prejudices. In *GM* he wants to question the next presupposition: the value of valuations themselves. In his search for modes of valuation, Nietzsche identifies two predominant moralities. On the one hand, there is master morality, which comes from the “knightly-aristocratic” class whose “value judgements presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health” (*GM*, I, 7). Conversely, there is slave morality, which is born through the “slave revolt” (cf. *GM*, I, 7 and 10). While both modes of valuation offer different interpretations of the world and offer opposing judgments on most moral issues, Nietzsche does not side with either morality. For those who claim that Nietzsche sides with master morality, one need only read *GM*, I, 10:

When the noble mode of valuation blunders and sins against reality, it does so in respect to the sphere with which it is *not* sufficiently familiar, and against a real knowledge of which it has indeed inflexibly guarded itself: in some circumstances it misunderstands the sphere it despises, that of the common man.

He goes on to say that master morality falsifies those it looks down upon. I am suggesting that Nietzsche neither objects to nor accepts master morality, but is simply calling the values into question. However, while he does not accept master morality, he does suggest that there is something wrong with slave morality in that “[master morality] will at any rate, still be a much less serious *falsification* (emphasis mine) than that perpetrated on its opponents ... by the submerged hatred, the vengefulness of the impotent” (*GM*, I, 10). The point here is that slave morality is accused of committing a more serious falsification.

First of all, and before I examine the seriousness of falsification, the passage considered demonstrates that Clark is simply wrong to claim Nietzsche never mentions the falsification thesis after *BGE*. More importantly, this also demonstrates that for Nietzsche there are ways in which falsification is objectionable, and some more than others. Slave morality’s objectionable falsification comes about through what Nietzsche calls a lie – a special kind of lie, as I am about to show. Consider the following passage where Nietzsche criticizes the demands of slave morality:

To demand of strength that it should *not* express itself as strength, that it should *not* be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength. (*GM*, I, 13)

To tell those who are strong to act as if they are not is to place an absurd burden upon those who do not subscribe to slave morality. To do so would be like asking the bird of prey to stop eating

little lambs. Slave morality attempts to impose its values onto the masters. However, there is more to it than merely imposing values. In *GM*, II, 18 while Nietzsche argues against “bad conscience” (a part of slave morality), which he describes as an illness, he believes a strange beauty can be born from it. It is not that slave values themselves are problematic but that slave morality entails that the slave moralist’s understanding of the “good” is transcendental and absolute. He identifies this understanding as a “metaphysical faith” (*GM*, III, 24). This critique then, takes on a similar form of objection against the old philosophers and their faith in the will to truth. The “good” for the slave moralist is a thing-in-itself, which exists independent of human valuation, and once properly understood is unchanging and unquestionable. Furthermore, it is not the lie itself that is a problem. A lie for Nietzsche is the same as his use of “error” and “simplification,” since he treats a lie as an unintentional lie or a kind of mistake. Instead, it is the kind of lie the slave moralist commits that is problematic: “All [slave moralists] are capable of is a *dishonest* lie” (*GM*, III, 19). The *dishonest* lie can be easily contrasted with the new philosophers’ honesty, in that the new philosophers still commit simplification and falsification, but they are *aware* and *honest* about it. On Nietzsche’s view, the slave moralists fail to acknowledge their subjective position, and it is in this sense that they are dishonest. They distort and deny perspective to defend what they believe is universal truth.

Slave morality operates through “bad conscious,” where “consciousness” is when we bring personal judgements to the shared through communication; it is not the personal judgements of the slave moralist that are the problem, but their “metaphysical faith,” or as I have called it their blind faith in truth; and slave morality’s blind faith gives rise to a *dishonest* lie that imposes itself upon others by denying perspective. The dishonesty of slave morality is the result of actively blinding oneself from questioning values themselves. As Nietzsche’s project in *GM* is to question the value of moral values, the slave moralist denies that their moral judgements can be questioned. They deny inquiry by claiming there is only one good, one truth. Just as Nietzsche described the weak skeptics, the slave moralists are also afraid of looking at the “Yes” and “No” because they deny the possibility that the value of their judgements could be different. In this way they commit the dogmatic error, or more accurately, the dogmatic lie.

GM is ripe with reasons to suppose it is a continuation of *BGE*, and explicitly makes use of Nietzsche’s falsification thesis. To suggest that *BGE* is still a part of stage five, his so-called confused middle period, would entail that at least a part – one might even say an integral part –

of *GM* is also in stage five. Such an interpretation, however, only further divorces itself from the text. Nietzsche explicitly places *Z* in stage six, and while one could potentially suspend disbelief enough to suppose Nietzsche was mistaken to include *Z* in this stage six (and therefore *BGE*), including any of his further works becomes problematic. Nietzsche would have to be mistaken about how he categorized at least three of his own works.⁵ Such an implication suggests that an interpretation that includes *BGE*, and therefore *GM*, in stage five is misguided. Furthermore, the connections I drew between stage six's "end of the longest error," and the explanation I took from *BGE* of what Nietzsche means by an error, only emphasizes the fact that Nietzsche had *BGE* in mind when making his categorization in the first place.

4.7 Conclusion

Nietzsche's critique against slave morality is that slave morality entails a denial of perspective, it denies personal judgements, and requires that there is only *one* truth, *one* mode of valuation. The objectionable form of falsification is dishonesty and imposition. If a philosophy fails to acknowledge its subjective position, and what's more, attempts to claim that it is the one truth, the only way in which we can understand value, or the world, then such a philosophy is objectionable. Nietzsche is suggesting that instead of imposing prejudice upon others, one must be wary of the complexity of our relations and values; instead of making truth claims about the world, one can identify one's own truths; and it is the goal of the philosophers of the future to find these truths, to continue inquiring about them, and ultimately create value through them. It is the continuation of inquiry, the questioning of dominant values, and creation of new values that constitutes Nietzsche's project to get beyond good and evil (cf. *BGE* 203). What's more, one could make the case that Nietzsche has similar goals in *GS* Book V and *GM*. At the very least Clark is wrong to claim that Nietzsche abandons any mention of falsification after *BGE*, since my example from *GM* demonstrate how the falsification thesis is involved in both master and slave moralities. Furthermore, any attempts to insist that *BGE* is a part of the fifth stage, would become *ad hoc*. If one were to insist *BGE* was in stage five, then *GM* would have to go with it, which would only further alienate such an interpretation from what Nietzsche explicitly states.

In order to defend my argument that skepticism is integral to *BGE* and that Nietzsche offers a coherent philosophy, I had to offer a coherent narrative of what Nietzsche's philosophy looks like, while at the same time rejecting Clark and Leiter's objections against Nietzsche's

⁵ Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, and On the Genealogy of Morality.

falsification thesis. In Leiter's case, I argued that Nietzsche was not subject to any tension between his philosophical theory and practice, since Leiter misunderstood Nietzsche's use of epistemic value terms. One could say that Leiter's objection presupposed that Nietzsche's use of "truth" and "fact" could only refer to truth as the thing-in-itself. Likewise, Clark's objection that the falsification thesis presupposes the thing-in-itself was rejected after a close reading of *GS* 354. Nietzsche is not concerned about "truth" as referring to the thing-in-itself, and was even aware of the fact that he could be misinterpreted that way. Instead, Nietzsche offers a distinction between the personal and the shared. Falsification arises through consciousness, or, as it was discussed in chapter three, as forming concepts. By becoming conscious of something we necessarily simplify, and therefore falsify our personal judgements in order to make them readily available to others. Nevertheless, this falsification is not objectionable in and of itself since it is necessary to communicate with others. Instead, the objectionable character of old philosophies, such as slave morality, is its failure to acknowledge personal judgements. Old philosophers attempt to impose their own truths on others in the world as the one, ultimate, metaphysical, "truth." Nietzsche wants to get beyond these old philosophies, and instead look toward the future, the philosophers of the future, where we can acknowledge our prejudices and recognize this falsification as a necessary tool for living.

In the next chapter I go over a number of objections that could be raised against my interpretation of Nietzsche. I do this in the hope of dispelling doubt and offering further clarification on the implications of the interpretation I am presenting herein. I not only defend my interpretation of Nietzsche, but I also argue that Nietzsche's philosophy is philosophically interesting. Furthermore, I return to the matter of naturalism and science in Nietzsche's thought to show that the interpretation I have presented and will have defended is consistent with Nietzsche's naturalistic claims.

Chapter V – Objections and Reconciliation

5.0 Introduction

There are two final things I set out to do in this chapter. First, I defend my interpretation from a number of objections to expand and develop what has already been said. Secondly, I aim to return to the question of naturalism and see what Nietzsche has to say about the natural sciences under my interpretation. I begin this chapter by considering several problems and objections to the effect that my interpretation leads to philosophically frustrating, if not outright unacceptable, conclusions. Once I've laid out all the objections, I answer each in turn. The first objection that I consider is the proposition that my interpretation of Nietzsche merely endorses a form of relativism. If truth is merely subjective then the world is filled with nothing but competing and potentially irreconcilable judgements with no mediation or standard to provide common ground. In such a world, humans would be doomed to irreconcilable and indefinite conflict, and this would result in a kind of nihilism. The second problem I examine comes from Nehamas' worry about Nietzsche's statement "My judgement, is *my* judgement" (*BGE* 42). Nehamas is concerned that if, at the end of every argument, a philosopher must add the canvass "this is my interpretation," then it is difficult to take such a philosopher seriously. Nehamas is worried that Nietzsche's philosophy is promoting an argumentative defence that could be used by otherwise weak arguments. If all that is required to offer a sound philosophical judgement is to acknowledge one's subjective position, then *any* judgement could be philosophically sound under Nietzsche's argument. Another way to view the problem is to ask the following: under Nietzsche's philosophy, how can we dispute the judgements of others? The third objection claims that Nietzsche's philosophy, as laid out in the last chapter, is circular. If all philosophers can offer is different prejudices and perspectives, does this not entail that Nietzsche's own philosophy is merely a presentation of his own prejudices? Nietzsche is aware of this concern throughout his works and acknowledges that there is circularity in his philosophy. However, Nietzsche seems to suggest that such circularity is not only non-vicious, but actually to be preferred. I respond to these problems and objections by detailing how Nietzsche's philosophy avoids vicious circularity and actually requires a degree of circularity. I then contend that his philosophy differs from relativism and demonstrate how Nietzsche proposes we can dispute the judgements of others by offering a brief interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of "will to power."

I argue that despite the fact that one could find Nietzsche's conclusions frustrating, his views are nevertheless coherent.

For the second part of this chapter I return to the problem of naturalism. The naturalist interpretations I have considered have presumed that Nietzsche's skepticism is irreconcilable with his naturalism. Under my revised understanding of Nietzsche's skepticism, however, the reconcilability of his skepticism and naturalism has been left alone. I use the remainder of this chapter to consider whether or not Nietzsche's skepticism is reconcilable with his naturalistic claims. I give a close reading of *GS* 371-373 in order to examine the kinds of science Nietzsche supports and the kinds he rejects. I argue that Nietzsche offers a philosophy that is both motivated by skepticism and supports the natural sciences. In the end I recommend that the labels "naturalist" and "skeptical" should be dropped due to the unnecessary implications they bring to the discussion. In conclusion, I emphasize that Nietzsche's main focus is promoting the philosophers of the future – *Versucher* – and that these philosophers, while born through skeptical motivations and supporters of naturalistic philosophies, are not defined by either of their naturalist arguments or skeptical motivations.

5.1 The Nihilistic Threat

The first objection I consider is the possibility that my emphasis on the subjectivity of judgements leads to relativism, where relativism is understood as a philosophy that believes knowledge and truth exist as expressions of individual values and that therefore all judgements are equally valid. One might see Nietzsche as a relativist when looking at the following statement: "Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that" (*GS* 354). If every action is not only unique but also incomparable then this necessitates that experiences cannot be shared. If all judgements cannot be shared or compared then they could be considered equally valid. As discussed in the previous chapter, Nietzsche goes on to claim that judgements are the result of our subjective experiences and it is when we become conscious of experiences that we end up falsifying and simplifying them through communication. Not only do we come to our judgements relative to our subjective position, but Nietzsche's philosophy entails that we cannot even properly convey these judgements to others. If all we can do is convey falsified information to one another, then this implies that we are stuck in a deep relativistic position where we cannot share experiences, judgements, or truths. In addition, Nietzsche's proposition that "my judgement, is *my*

judgement,” that the philosophers of the future seek their own personal truths, offers no standard by which to compare these truths. If there is no standard by which to compare personal truths, then humans are doomed to irreconcilable and indefinite conflict due to being incapable of finding common ground. If we cannot share any truths, then the same holds for moral judgements. If there is no standard by which to address moral dilemmas, then all we can conclude is nihilism’s “all is permissible.”

I will argue that this concern is based on subtle misunderstandings, which should become clear once one more closely considers Nietzsche’s remarks on the subjective position of the philosophers of the future. When Nietzsche says “my judgement, is *my* judgement” he adds that “no one else is *easily*⁶ entitled to it” (*BGE* 43). This subtle addition suggests that while Nietzsche thinks that an individual’s judgements are mostly private, he does not exclude the possibility that another could come to have the same judgement. Therefore while actions are unique to an individual, the judgements individuals come to have can be shared, although he does not explain how easily such judgements can come to be shared. If one considers how he recurrently refers to the “herd,” Nietzsche might believe that it is easy for some individuals to come to the same judgements. Conversely, a comparison between those who subscribe to slave morality and those who subscribe to master morality also entails that there are some individuals who are incapable of, or at least have a very difficult time with, sharing judgements. This offers a means to avoiding the threat of nihilism to a degree: insofar as enough people ascribe to similar judgements, they can develop a moral code. By having a moral code, not all is permissible between those who share judgements. Nevertheless, the concern of relativism is still present: despite being capable of finding a common ground there is still no standard to which one can refer to when there is a conflict of judgements. For example, my interpretation of Nietzsche entails that if a slave moralist and master moralist were to try and sincerely convince one another of their personal judgements, they would fall into one of two problems: either their judgements would be entirely irreconcilable, otherwise either, or both, sides of the conflict would have to dramatically generalize and falsify their judgements (truths) to the extent that they would have to *lie*. That is to say they would have to rely on attempting to create judgements that could be accepted by a larger audience and further deny their own perspective.

⁶ Emphasis mine.

If there were a standard for truth, such as the thing-in-itself, then one would merely have to determine the facts of the disagreement and then the truth value of the judgements could be determined. In my example, either the slave or the master would be proved right and the other wrong, or both could be incorrect. This is what makes philosophical positions on truth acknowledging a standard more appealing. Despite this, Nietzsche still holds that this type of reasoning is incorrect. He objects to the very proposition that there should be a standard for truth, in order to find common ground. Here, I will suggest that by examining how he treats the concept of “knowledge” one can come to understand his reasons for denying a standard for truth. Nietzsche describes “knowledge” in the following manner: “Something strange is to be reduced to something *familiar*” (GS 355), and knowledge is born through the “*instinct of fear*” (GS 355). Knowledge is merely what remains once someone forms a concept; in forming a concept one simplifies, and an easy means of simplification is to reduce a thing to something else already known. He proposes that the attempt to attain further knowledge, which is to say make something more familiar, is due to an instinctive fear of the strange. Nietzsche, under my interpretation, would object to the concern that a standard for truth is required to resolve conflicting judgements because he would suggest that the desire for a standard for truth is merely born through the instinct of fear, the fear of the unknown (insecurity). One might say that the idea that we need a standard for truth is the result of an appeal to familiarity, emotion, or instinct, none of which provides compelling reason to suppose a standard for truth is necessary. Hence, Nietzsche is aware of the problem of conflicting judgements and is fine with the subjective component of his philosophy. Relativism, on this view, is not a problem for Nietzsche; the attempts to escape relativism are merely a sign of fear. Therefore, while Nietzsche’s position is philosophically frustrating – since he contends that there is no standard by which to compare conflicting judgements – he does not see the relativistic elements of his philosophy as a problem, but merely a natural consequence. An individual might still find Nietzsche position unacceptable, but somewhat comically, Nietzsche could assert that such an individual’s judgements are simply irreconcilable with his own – and this in turn, in a perverted way, only further supports his point. There will be individuals who have irreconcilable judgements, and while this can be frustrating it does not amount to a real objection. Such a response, however, leads to a second problem.

5.2 The Problems of Scrutiny and Circularity

I take the second concern from the following passage from Nehamas:

To set a view out in detail and then to add, ‘But this is only an interpretation,’ disposes one’s audience either to disregard the view in question altogether or, if they are independently attracted to it, to disregard the qualification. The perspectivist, therefore, is faced with a dilemma between simply not being believed on the one hand and being accepted dogmatically on the other. (Nehamas, 1988, 62-63)

In this section Nehamas refers to Nietzsche as the “perspectivist” and is concerned with Nietzsche’s “my judgement is *my* judgement.” Nehamas is pointing out that generally, when someone concludes their argument by declaring “this is only my interpretation”, or more crudely, “this is just my opinion,” an audience cannot take the argument seriously. By admitting one’s argument is “merely an interpretation” it suggests that once I state that a judgement is *mine* it can no longer be scrutinized because no one has access to *my* judgement or truth. With the previous objection, I addressed the fact that while an individual’s judgements are not easily accessed, they are nevertheless accessible. Even so, three problems remain. Firstly, it is still unclear how someone can scrutinize the views of another without any standard for truth. Another way to see the issue is to determine if there is any point to criticising others, or if all scrutiny is empty. Second, even if criticism can be offered, the connotation behind the addition of “this is my interpretation” involves an unwillingness to accept scrutiny. And lastly, there is a final problem that even if someone were to believe Nietzsche that it is still possible to scrutinize others as well as accept criticism then such an individual could only trust Nietzsche dogmatically.

I begin by addressing the concern about the addition of “this is only my interpretation” at the end of an argument, since it is the simplest of the problems to address. The issue appears to be that the addition of acknowledging one’s subjective position belittles one’s argument and closes off the possibility of scrutiny. Based on the considerations so far, I would argue that Nietzsche’s position embodies the opposite. When Nietzsche and the philosophers of the future claim that their judgements are personal, they are employing strong skepticism. Strong skepticism, as discussed in chapter three, is the idea that a philosopher should come to decisive conclusions, yet nevertheless acknowledge that such conclusions are always subject to revision. The strong skeptic tries to create, while at the same time continuing to investigate. By acknowledging their subjective position the philosophers of the future are *inviting* scrutiny, revision, and investigation. Nietzsche argues throughout Part One of *BGE* that it is the prejudices of philosophers, their assumption to access an objective truth, which leads to closing one’s

philosophy off from scrutiny. Nietzsche would therefore redirect this concern back at itself: the disposition of the audience to not take the acknowledgment of one's subjective position seriously is merely the result of the prejudices of philosophers.

While Nietzsche's strong skepticism requires that revision is always possible, it is still unclear how to scrutinize the judgements of others under my interpretation. What does it take for a judgement or its criticism to be *justified*? Nietzsche submits that it is possible to access and scrutinize the judgements of others, but he does not explain how. There are two ways I could attempt to understand how he believes we can access and scrutinize the judgements of others. The first is to examine how Nietzsche criticizes the judgements of others and determine whether there is a common means by which he scrutinizes judgements, while the second is to seek some kind of standard or explanation for how it is we come to scrutinize others. Both ways are initially problematic since both seek some kind of rule or standard by which to scrutinize. Despite this problem, some explanation for how we can scrutinize the judgements of others must be found, otherwise my interpretation is incomplete. Thus, I will try to examine what Nietzsche finds objectionable about particular judgements to see if it's possible to scrutinize others without appealing to some form of standard for truth under his philosophy.

In chapter four I talked about how Nietzsche scrutinizes the thing-in-itself and how Nietzsche objects to slave morality. In both cases Nietzsche objects to them due to their denial of perspective and their attempt to universalize truth, metaphysically in the case of the thing-in-itself, and morally in the case of slave morality. Regrettably, this only offers a single means of rejecting or scrutinizing the views of others: if a judgement rejects subjectivity or attempts to impose itself on others, then it should be rejected. This still leaves open the problem that two views could be irreconcilably opposed, while both acknowledging their subjective positions. For example, one could argue in favor of communism while another in favor of capitalism, while both acknowledging that their position is subjective and open to scrutiny. Furthermore, another problem arises once one looks at Nietzsche's criticism of other philosophies. Nietzsche scrutinizes the thing-in-itself and slave morality on the basis that they fail to acknowledge that they are interpretations and not a metaphysical or moral truth, but is Nietzsche's scrutiny not itself an interpretation? Nietzsche claims judgements are revisable interpretations, however this entails that Nietzsche's proposition is itself revisable. Therefore Nietzsche's philosophy falls into a potential problem of circularity.

At this point there are two central problems: there is the matter of how we can scrutinize others, and the fact that Nietzsche's philosophy appears circular. I will address these problems by referring back to Nietzsche's text in *BGE*. Particularly, I examine *BGE* 22 where Nietzsche introduces his concept of will to power and gives a clue as to what he thinks of circularity. I address these problems by showing that his circularity is non-problematic through his strong skepticism and propose that the will to power explains how we scrutinize others under my interpretation of Nietzsche. With that said, I leave open the question as to whether or not these responses are convincing, and warn ahead of time that it might appear to some as only more philosophically frustrating than before. Despite this philosophical frustration, I maintain only that my response to these problems upholds a coherent and textually sound philosophy.

Nietzsche touches on the problems of scrutiny and circularity in *BGE* 22 where he acknowledges that he commonly points toward "bad modes of interpretation." He states that when it comes to offering interpretations there is no sense of "equality," which is to say we cannot assume all interpretations are equal. A bad mode of interpretation is to presume that all interpretations are equal and that to assume as much is "naively humanitarian" (*BGE* 22). Nietzsche is emphasizing that interpretations are unequal. What Nietzsche means by equal and unequal only makes sense through his concept of "will to power." He states that if one were to interpret the world in the form of will to power then they would have a better understanding of what it means for interpretations to be unequal due to the "tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of claims of power" (*BGE* 22). Nietzsche suggests that instead of interpretations starting from a position of equal standing, their fundamental inequality comes about from the enforcement of power. In other words, when considering different interpretations, they are not accepted or rejected on merit alone, but instead based on a host of related conditions, that Nietzsche has identified as "power." At this point, however, Nietzsche offers no further comment on the will to power and therefore this only diverts the problem. For now then I would focus on his final passage where he says "Supposing that this also is only interpretation – and you will be eager enough to make this objection? – well, so much the better" (*BGE* 22). He very concisely implies that circularity is not only non-problematic, but that it is a good thing if his reader identifies the circularity. He acknowledges that his interpretation is just that – an interpretation – and therefore open to revision and criticism.

With *BGE* 22 Nietzsche touches on both the problem of scrutiny and the problem of circularity, but merely shifts the bulk of the problem onto the will to power. The will to power can offer an explanation as to how we criticize others: we criticize others insofar as we have the power to do so. Such an explanation, however, succeeds only in raising further questions. It is not at all clear what the will to power means. Because of the problematic nature of the will to power, I set it aside temporarily so that I might first address the question of circularity. Nietzsche suggests that the circularity of applying his own philosophy to itself is non-problematic and that if one were to try and do so, then “so much the better.” Unfortunately, Nietzsche does not offer a direct explanation as to why it’s non-problematic, but presumably, as with other matters, this is because Nietzsche assumes that once the rest of his philosophy is taken into consideration the problem addresses itself.

I will show that the circularity of interpretation is unproblematic and merely a consequence of his strong skepticism. As discussed in previous chapters, skepticism requires continuous inquiry, that the skeptic continues his or her quest for truth indefinitely. This entails that regardless of a skeptic’s interpretation he or she must concede that what he or she offers is “merely” an interpretation and could therefore be incorrect, whether or not over the entire interpretation or the smallest of details. This concern over circularity is therefore not a problem, but actually a virtue of Nietzsche’s philosophy: it attempts to acknowledge its own fallibility and opens itself up to the notion of scrutiny whether or not from the judgement owner, or others who wish to scrutinize the judgement. In Nietzsche’s view his circularity is not only non-vicious, but adds credibility and honesty to his philosophy. His circularity is in fact a virtue.

5.3 The Will to Power

I return now to fully addressing the problem of scrutiny: how does one scrutinize the beliefs of another? As already noted, Nietzsche offers an explanation of how we scrutinize beliefs in the form of will to power. It should be noted, however, that Nietzsche does not offer a standard or justification for scrutiny, but merely confronts the fact that we scrutinize the judgements regardless of whether or not we have a shared standard or reason by which to criticize. I come to this conclusion by reading *BGE* 211. In this section Nietzsche makes a distinction between “philosophical laborers” and “genuine philosophers.” Nietzsche’s goal in this section is to give both types of philosophers “each his due,” while establishing what he means by genuine philosophical work. He elaborates by claiming that it may be necessary that a

genuine philosopher “stood on all these steps on which his servants, the scientific laborers of philosophy, remain standing – *have to remain standing*” (*BGE* 211). Recall my discussion of the sections *BGE* 207 to 209 where Nietzsche presents the objective spirit, weak skepticism, and strong skepticism. In these sections Nietzsche tells us that strong skepticism is meant to use the objective spirit. In *BGE* 211 Nietzsche continues this narrative by placing the objective spirit as philosophical laborers, and the strong skeptic (and therefore the philosophers of the future) as genuine philosophers. Nietzsche claims that a genuine philosopher likely begins with philosophical labor and moves on to genuine philosophy. The philosopher does this “in order to pass through the whole range of human values and value feelings and to be *able* to see with many different eyes and consciences,” or one might add: from different perspectives. Again, Nietzsche returns to the acknowledgment of different perspectives and therefore interpretations, however this time he goes further: “But all these are merely preconditions of his task: this task demands something different – it demands that he *create values*” (*BGE* 211).

Nietzsche is not concerned about what values are created, but merely that they are created. Nietzsche states that “*Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators*” and that “Their ‘knowing’ is *creating*, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is – *will to power*” (*BGE* 211). To unpack these claims, first I need a clearer understanding of what it means for a philosophy to be genuine, which can be done by first understanding philosophical labor. The philosophical laborers “have to determine and press into formulas ... former *positings* of values, creations of value which have become dominant and are for a time called ‘truths’” (*BGE* 211). Philosophical laborers attempt to explain and understand the philosophy, and therefore the created values, of genuine philosophers. For example, this very thesis is an example of philosophical labor; it doesn’t attempt to create value, but to explain the values of another. The genuine philosophers therefore create new philosophies that can dominate over others and become a shared “truth.” The will to truth of the genuine philosophers is to create new truths through a show of power. Unfortunately, Nietzsche does not offer a clear explanation for what he means by power, but I will propose here a simple understanding of his use. When Nietzsche refers to “power,” I understand it in the simplest manner: power is the means of getting what one wants. In the case of genuine philosophy, this entails convincing others of one’s position, whether it is through a display of force, an expression of wit, or a strong argument. The will to

power is just the desire to get what one wants; how one manages to achieve their goals is inconsequential.

The will to power gives a description of what takes place when competing judgements conflict, which is to say when we scrutinize others: it is a matter of which judgement dominates the other. Deciding between two judgements, or scrutinizing another judgement is a matter of power, of expressing one's will to power. Whether or not a judgement or criticism is philosophically successful is determined by whether or not it succeeds in overcoming or overpowering previous judgements. While this conclusion might be undesirable from a social perspective, one must remember that Nietzsche is not claiming that the dominant "truth" *should* be decided through a matter of power, but he is offer an interpretation of how he sees competing judgements interact in the world. Offering criticism of a judgement is, on this view, a show of power, and is merely something we do. Under Nietzsche's view there is no standard by which to scrutinize, except our own, and it is a matter of power as to whether or not our criticism is taken seriously. That is to say, on this view, scrutiny is not a matter of *justification*. Hence, for Nietzsche the problem of scrutiny is a non-problem, as the will to power explains that individuals offer scrutiny based on their power to do so.

5.4 A Problem with Genuine Philosophy

There is a final difficulty that I believe arises from my considerations of will to power that must be dealt with: will to power entails that a genuine philosophy should attempt to dominate over other philosophies, but Nietzsche criticizes the thing-in-itself and slave morality for attempting to impose themselves onto others and denying perspective. How can a philosophy dominate, yet not impose itself? It appears as though Nietzsche contradicts himself. This can be addressed by observing that genuine philosophers are not *synonymous* with philosophers of the future.

There are two ways in which a reader could resolve the tension between the philosophers of the future and the genuine philosopher. The first way would be to understand the philosophers of the future's will to power as something purely personal. When the philosophers of the future create value, they create it only for themselves, and no one else. The second way is to propose that the philosophers of the future still attempt to persuade others of their position, but nevertheless do not impose their truths on others in the shape of claiming their truths are the *only* truths. I propose that *Z* holds the solution to this problem. However, for the purposes of this

thesis, I will consider both options equally persuasive because without offering a detailed reading of *Z* – which I have so far avoided – it's not clear which of the two options Nietzsche would adopt. For these reasons I will very briefly touch on elements from *Z* in order to demonstrate how either option is feasible.

Z begins when Zarathustra comes down from his mountain in order to share his love and wisdom (*Z*, I, 1). Throughout his speeches he attempts to offer his truths to people, for instance his conception of the *Superman* (*Z*, P, 3) or his denouncement of the concept of pity (*Z*, II, *Of the Compassionate*), but in his attempts to persuade others of his truths, he finds himself misunderstood and rejected. At the end of his adventures he returns home to find many of the people he's spoken with at his cave, where he explains that there is no use in trying to convince the herd about the *Superman* or his other truths (*Z*, IV, *Of the Higher Man*). Instead, he seems to suggest that he can teach his truths to individuals. Zarathustra struggles with whether or not he can or should try to convince others of his truths. Furthermore, there is also the possibility that despite Zarathustra's desires to convince individuals of his truths, he could nevertheless be misunderstood. This leaves open the two possibilities mentioned when trying to discuss how the philosophers of the future are different from genuine philosophers: either Zarathustra should try to persuade individuals of his judgements without imposition, or Nietzsche is trying to tell his us that Zarathustra should avoid others altogether.

In the first instance, Nietzsche could claim that philosophers of the future are genuine philosophers insofar as they create value, but the philosophers of the future do not impose their philosophy on others since they acknowledge that there are multiple perspectives. The philosophers of the future may attempt to sway others to share their judgements, just as Zarathustra did, whether through convincing arguments or clever wit, but in the end the philosophers of the future do not contend that their judgements are universal or absolute. In the second instance, Nietzsche could claim that the philosophers of the future are meant to abandon the idea of sharing their truths altogether and instead focus on creating values only for themselves. Under this option the philosophers of the future are genuine philosophers insofar as they create value for themselves, and avoid the problem of imposition entirely. One might find this second option somewhat strange since it certainly appears as though Nietzsche wants to convince others of his position. Nonetheless, as far as I am concerned, and based on the textual

evidence considered so far, this question is left open. What's important is that in either case Nietzsche avoids the problem that arises through the dominant nature of genuine philosophy.

Just as with skepticism, genuine philosophy designates only a part of the philosophers of the future, but not them as a whole. Nietzsche's concept of "genuine philosopher" does not designate the acceptability or rejection of a philosopher, but only designates what Nietzsche contends philosophy is meant to do: create value. Nietzsche has two ways to avoid the problem of imposition that genuine philosophy creates, either by declaring that the philosophers of the future do not advocate truths that claim to be absolute, or by proposing that the philosophers of the future are only interested in creating truths for themselves. Further inquiry into *Z* would be required in order to determine which Nietzsche would accept, but for my purposes this is sufficient.

So far in this chapter, I have determined that despite the concerns I raised at the beginning, Nietzsche is unconcerned by accusations of being called a relativist. Additionally, under my interpretation, it is possible for Nietzsche to criticise the arguments of others despite every interpretation being derived from perspective and unique experiences. Under Nietzsche's narrative, whether or not people criticize one another, or their arguments, has little to do with justification and instead, we do so as a result of will to power. Furthermore, I have shown that another part of the philosophers of the future is to be genuine philosophers, which entails expressing their will to power by creating new values, new truths. For the remainder of this chapter I return to the matter of naturalism in order to connect back to the concerns raised by the naturalist interpretations in chapter two.

5.5 The Shadow of Naturalism: Reconciling Naturalism and Skepticism

With my interpretation of Nietzsche presented and defended, I return now to the question of naturalism. In chapter two I discussed the naturalist interpretations and in chapter three I rejected them outright. With that said, I only rejected the naturalist interpretations' attempts to divorce Nietzsche from his skepticism, and have not explained the role naturalism plays in his philosophy. I back the position that Nietzsche does offer naturalistic considerations insofar as we understand naturalism broadly as supporting the natural sciences. By reading *GS* 372 and 373 I suggest I can present a clear interpretation of Nietzsche's support of the natural sciences and argue that Nietzsche's interest in the natural sciences is not only consistent with his falsification thesis but actually a consequence of it.

Nietzsche supports the natural sciences in a number of passages, many of which I have already considered. In *BGE* 230 Nietzsche proposes we should “translate man back into nature” and “hardened in the discipline of science.” He also suggests that the natural sciences help to avoid metaphysics (*BGE* 230). He also affirms that “All credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of truth come only from the senses,” (*BGE* 134) which is often interpreted in support of empirical inquiry. Additionally, I have shown that the objective spirit – one who, let us remember, relies on the sciences – is not only a stepping stone for the philosopher of the future, but is actually necessary for him or her to create value (*BGE* 211). All these passages support the notion that Nietzsche supports the natural sciences, or at the very least sees the natural sciences as a necessary component of philosophy. Yet it is not clear by these comments whether it makes sense to call Nietzsche a naturalist. In chapter two, I laid out Leiter’s conception of what it means for Nietzsche to be a naturalist. For Leiter, Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist who supports result continuity, which entails that philosophy should model itself after the scientific method and that the conclusions drawn by one’s philosophy should be continuous with the results of the natural sciences. However, while the passages I have considered so far express support for the natural sciences, Nietzsche does not specify in what way. It is for this reason that I offer a close reading of *GS* 372 and 373 in order to examine in what way Nietzsche does *not* support the natural sciences. I will argue that Nietzsche supports the natural sciences, but not as a methodological naturalist.

Nietzsche titles *GS* 372 “*Why we are no idealists*” and gives a short interpretation of the history of philosophical thought on the concept of “ideology.” Nietzsche claims that “Formerly philosophers were afraid of the senses. Have we perhaps unlearned this fear too much? Today all of us are believers in the senses, we philosophers of the present and the future, *not* in theory but in praxis, in practice” (*GS* 372). The former philosophers are later identified as the ancient philosophers, specifically referring to Plato, while also mentioning Spinoza. Nietzsche proposes that it is possible we trust the senses too much, which is the opposite of the ancients like Plato. Interestingly enough, Nietzsche identifies the philosophers of the future among those who trust the senses in practice, which suggests that the philosophers of the future might trust in the senses too much as well. Nietzsche goes on to mount a criticism of the old philosophers when he states that the old philosophers “thought the senses might lure them away from their own world, from the cold realm of ‘ideas.’” He suggests that the old philosophers are too concerned about

ideology and ideas, while he also wants to propose the opposite: “We today are inclined to make the opposite judgement (which actually could be equally wrong), namely that *ideas* are worse seductresses than our senses” (*GS* 373). Nietzsche places his philosophy in opposition to the notion of ideas, the notion that ideas reveal more truth than the senses. Nietzsche goes on to describe the idealism of the ancients and Spinoza as a “vampirism,” because he believes that the idealists actually get their ideas from the senses. This symbol implies two things: ideas have to rely on the senses to function and ideas strip the senses of life and meaning. Nietzsche sees this vampirism as a kind of desensualization, which can connect back to the notion of the objective spirit. The objective spirit has a “mirror” nature, which may have been intended as a metaphorical connection to the vampirism of the ancients (since some vampires do not have a reflection). Metaphors aside, it appears as though the potential pessimism of the objective spirit – the type of the objective spirit that Nietzsche rejects – is connected to the idealists. In either case, Nietzsche states that “All philosophical idealism to date was something like a disease” (*GS* 373). He claims that the ancients, Spinoza, and the pessimists are idealists, and that their desensualization of the world is something like a disease, or vampirism, that strips the world of meaning.

This connects to the natural sciences by considering the subsequent section “‘Science’ as a prejudice” (*GS* 373). There are two things to note before I explain the next section. First, one should take notice that Nietzsche places “science” in quotation marks, which indicates he is talking about a specific group who claim to practice science, but whom Nietzsche goes on to show fails to live up to the name. Furthermore, the title of this section, as well as Nietzsche’s discussion of the old philosophers in the preceding section shares a striking similarity to Nietzsche’s Part One in *BGE* where Nietzsche attempts to uproot the prejudices of philosophers. I take this to mean Nietzsche intends to uproot the prejudices of some kind of science. Nietzsche begins *GS* 373 by offering a criticism of “scholars,” one of whom he identifies as Herbert Spencer. Nietzsche states, similarly to how he begins his inquiry in *BGE*, that scholars “never catch sight of the really great problems and question marks” and that they “come to rest and are satisfied too soon” (*GS* 373). Nietzsche is claiming that these scholars fail to ask the appropriate questions, and merely aim to satisfy their “assumptions and desires,” exactly like the old philosophers. They also seem to bear a resemblance to the objective spirit insofar as the objective

spirit had a dangerous unconcern with “Yes and No” similarly to how the scholar gives up inquiry and is unconcerned once their assumptions are met.

Nietzsche’s real criticism of scholars like Spencer comes out in the following passage:

It is no different with the faith with which so many materialistic natural scientists rest content nowadays, the faith in a world that is supposed to have its equivalent and its measure in human thought and human valuations – a ‘world of truth’ that can be mastered completely and forever with the aid of our square little reason. (*GS* 373)

Nietzsche claims that the scholar’s inability to ask questions is the equivalent to natural scientists that have faith in the notion of a “true world.” Nietzsche is undoubtedly referring to the “true world” that he rejects, the idea of a thing-in-itself. Moreover, he couples this with the notion of desensualization as he consistently refers back to how this faith degrades existence and reduces existence to “a mere exercise for a calculator” (*GS* 373). More importantly, Nietzsche believes that “Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its *rich ambiguity*” (*GS* 373).

Nietzsche is making a similar objection to these types of natural scientists as he does toward the old philosophers and their blind faith in the will to truth. The scholars, the natural scientists, and the old philosophers cease asking questions, cease inquiry, and are too easily satisfied with the answers they find due to their prejudices. In a way, they are making the same mistake as the idealists. Nietzsche hinted at the idea that we may have unlearned our fear of the senses too much in *GS* 372, and in *GS* 373 he points out that there are some who have. The lack of caution of the senses, and the new fear of ideas, makes the scholars form their own ideology, their own blind faith.

If read superficially, these two sections could suggest that Nietzsche is entirely against the natural sciences, but all the considerations from the preceding chapters should make it clear that that is not the case. Nietzsche’s criticism that the proponents of natural sciences have blind faith in the metaphysical only refers to particular natural scientists that follow the will to truth without question. Just as with the philosophers of the future, the natural science that Nietzsche supports is a natural science that is aware of its limitations. Nietzsche sees the natural sciences as a tool to be used like the objective spirit: it can be useful toward some end, but is not itself the goal (*BGE* 207). This means Leiter’s claim that Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist does not fit squarely with Nietzsche’s philosophy. Under Leiter’s interpretation “philosophical inquiry should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences” (Leiter, 2002, 3), that philosophy should essentially try to resemble the natural sciences. This would entail that the goal of

philosophy is to conform to scientific inquiry, but that is the exact opposite of what Nietzsche has suggested. Nietzsche is saying that scientific inquiry should be informed by the values created by genuine philosophical inquiry, the philosophers of the future. He claims that the natural sciences are “an instrument, a hammer” (*BGE* 211) that must be used by the philosophers of the future, and therefore this does defend a form of result continuity between the values created by the philosopher of the future and the natural sciences. If the results of natural sciences are not continuous with the values created by the philosopher of the future, then they cannot hope to be an instrument for the philosopher. However, this is much different from the result continuity Leiter envisioned.

5.6 Conclusion

Nietzsche supports the natural sciences, but in a very different way from what the naturalist interpretations considered. Nietzsche supports natural sciences insofar as they resemble the philosophers of the future, which is to say insofar as they are aware of their limitations and do not cease inquiry. The naturalist interpretations presumed that Nietzsche’s support for the natural sciences excluded the possibility that Nietzsche could also apply his falsification thesis and skepticism, but he only supports the natural sciences insofar as they apply strong skepticism. As I have proposed throughout this work, while Nietzsche employs skepticism and supports the natural sciences, to label Nietzsche a skeptic or a naturalist, merely distracts away from the core of his philosophy. A part of the problem of the naturalist interpretation is that they fixate on the postmodern arguments that claim Nietzsche is a skeptic, and posit their naturalist interpretation in its stead. If we merely drop the labels and focus on the fact that Nietzsche is concerned about the philosophers of the future, creating new values, and encouraging continuous inquiry, the labels of skeptic and naturalist become unimportant. Nietzsche is neither a skeptic nor a naturalist, instead he puts forth an interpretation that suggests our experiences are unique, that our judgements can be shared, that there is no standard by which to scrutinize the judgements of others, and that ultimately we will criticize others as a show of will to power regardless of whether or not there is a standard by which to judge.

Chapter VI – Philosophical Labor

My thesis is an examination of Nietzsche's ideas having to do with truth, but in the end, truth was a secondary concern. His real interest was not about truth itself, but how we understand and use the concept of truth to get around in the world: the value of truth. Regrettably, determining what Nietzsche thinks of the value of truth is no easy task. As I've said, understanding Nietzsche is much like assembling a puzzle; while it is simple enough to see individual connections, it is impossible to get a look at the overall picture until it is nearly complete. To make understanding Nietzsche even more complex, it can appear as though Nietzsche includes unrelated thoughts, or pieces to other puzzles, which can lead to confusion or even frustration. With respect to Nietzsche's so-called middle period, I have concluded that the truth's value is over exaggerated, and that it is a part of Nietzsche's project to show that "untruth" is just as, if not more, valuable than truth. In order to eventually argue in favor of this position, I began with my motivation: to understand, yet ultimately reject the naturalist interpretations of Nietzsche.

As my starting point, I analyzed the naturalist interpretations in chapter two. In so doing, I explained their motivations, what they meant by calling Nietzsche a naturalist, and their textual evidence. Their motivation stems primarily, and in all three cases, from the desire to separate Nietzsche from "postmodern" interpretations due to their skeptical nature and support for the falsification thesis. Instead, they offered their interpretation to understand Nietzsche as a naturalist in the sense that Nietzsche should be understood as someone who supports scientific method and believes that philosophy should be continuous with the results of scientific inquiry. Despite these considerations, it was the textual evidence offered by the naturalist interpretations that leads to their undoing. Clark relies upon the categorizations from *TI*, just as Wilcox before her, in order to present a narrative that fits the naturalist interpretations' agenda. They suggest that the three final epistemological stages from *TI* are a direct representation of the path that Nietzsche's own philosophy took. The first of these stages, stage four, was what Clark called "agnosticism" toward the thing-in-itself, and represents Nietzsche early period in his career (everything up until *GS*). The fifth stage was a representation of Nietzsche's middle period (*GS*, *BGE*, and *Z*) where he presents his falsification thesis and outright rejection of the thing-in-itself. Finally, the sixth stage was meant to be Nietzsche's late period (*GM* onward), and his most mature, where he abandons the falsification thesis. However, my thesis has determined that

Clark's narrative crumbles once the text is more closely examined. The main evidence I consider, which is outlined at the end of chapter two, is the fact that Nietzsche includes *Z* in his final stage, and therefore as a part of his later period. Furthermore, as I showed, if *Z* is a part of his late period, then all of *BGE* and the end of *GS* must also be included, leaving a very small and unsubstantial middle period. Clark's response to these problems was to call *BGE* a transitional book, from Nietzsche's middle truth-denying philosophy to his late truth-affirming position. Unfortunately, such an interpretation means that *BGE* is nothing but a chaotic and incoherent mess riddled with contradictions and I found such a conclusion unsatisfying. These considerations served as my motivations for my overall goal: to find an alternative to the naturalist interpretations by focusing on *BGE* and his middle period in order to discern whether or not *BGE* is coherent.

My third chapter I considered two solutions to Clark's problematic narrative. The first was Clark & Dudrick's attempt to give a naturalist defense of *BGE* and fit it into the sixth stage of *TI* as understood by Clark. This entailed explaining away sections in *BGE* that proved problematic. In particular, I focused on their treatment of *BGE* 4 as Clark mentions it explicitly as a problematic section and Clark & Dudrick go to great lengths to explain it away. In their attempts to explain away skepticism and the falsification thesis, I determined that they commit a number of leaps in judgement. They claimed that in *BGE* 3 and 4 Nietzsche is speaking in a different voice and putting forth ideas that are not his own. Not only did they not have enough textual evidence to support this theory but Nietzsche explicitly connects these two sections to his project of getting beyond good and evil. Upon further investigation I determine that not only is it a mistake to try and remove skepticism from Nietzsche's philosophy, but that the so-called problematic section is integral toward Nietzsche's project.

I went on to entertain the possibility of a second solution to the problem of incoherence in *BGE*: Berry's pyrrhonian skepticism. Berry remarks that no one has taken a close look at what it would mean for Nietzsche to be a skeptic and I observed that up until that point my analysis fell prey to the same objection. Berry points to two components of skepticism that are essential: a skeptic both promotes perpetual inquiry and suspends judgement. In order to determine whether or not these two components could be found in Nietzsche's middle period, I compared Sextus's three branches of philosophy to three epistemological positions found in *BGE*. I determined that two of the branches, dogmatic and academic, shared similarities with Nietzsche's objective spirit

and weak skeptic respectively. Yet, when I compared pyrrhonian skepticism, the final branch, with Nietzsche's strong skepticism, I discovered a discrepancy. While strong skepticism demands perpetual inquiry, much like the pyrrhonian, strong skepticism cannot merely suspend judgement as the pyrrhonian argues. Furthermore, while pyrrhonian skepticism rejects dogmatism, the strong skeptic views the objective spirit as a tool to be used for some purpose. Evidently, Nietzsche's form of skepticism is very different from the kind Berry supports, while at the same time it solidifies just how important skepticism is for Nietzsche's project to get beyond good and evil.

In order to get beyond good and evil, I suggested that Nietzsche puts forth his notion of the philosophers of the future. In chapter four, my two goals were to present my interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy and to finally dismiss Clark and Leiter's objections to all interpretations that attempt to include skepticism. I determined first and foremost that the philosophers of the future are *Versucher*, which is to say individuals who attempt, experiment, and inquire indefinitely. It is in this way that the philosophers of the future take on characteristics from strong skepticism, although as I've emphasized these characteristics do not define them. With this first part of my interpretation laid out, I turned toward dismantling Leiter and Clark's arguments against skepticism and the falsification thesis. In both cases, their objections were due to misunderstanding Nietzsche's notion of what it means for something to be true, and ultimately failing to recognize his distinction between the personal and the shared. By examining GS 354, I determined that Nietzsche does not presuppose the thing-in-itself, as Clark argued, but instead proposes a distinction between personal and shared judgements, and that it is when we attempt to share our judgements that we falsify.

As stated, falsification is not tantamount to rejection since it is necessary for communication; instead whether or not a claim is objectionable has to do with whether a claim fails to acknowledge the personal and furthermore where it attempts to impose itself on the judgements of others. Slave morality and old philosophers are examples of judgements that deny perspective and attempt to impose their truths on others. In this sense they commit a dishonest lie, or a dogmatic lie, as they hold on to their blind faith in the will to truth. The philosophers of the future offer a way to escape the problems of old philosophers in that they acknowledge their moral prejudices and recognize that falsification and simplification are necessary for getting around in the world. Not only that, but it is because they *acknowledge* their moral prejudices and

are *honest* about presenting their personal judgements that they can get beyond good and evil. To get beyond good and evil is to reject the dated concept of the thing-in-itself, to see clearly past the blind faith in the will to truth, and to create new values through personal judgements.

As a means of solidifying my interpretation and connecting the remainder of this Nietzschean puzzle together, I considered a number of objections and problems that could be raised against my interpretation. The first part of my fifth chapter consisted of addressing three problems: the threat of nihilism, the problem of scrutiny, and the possibility of circularity. The threat of nihilism was the accusation that Nietzsche's philosophy is tantamount to relativism, because if all judgements are unique and incomparable then they cannot be shared or weighted against one another. To address this problem I examined areas in *BGE* where he states that it is actually possible for individuals to share judgements, and therefore moral codes can be developed. If moral codes can be developed, then nihilism is averted, but Nietzsche still leaves open the possibility of relativism. With the notion that all judgements are relative, the second problem became evident: it would appear as though it is impossible to scrutinize others since there is no standard by which to compare judgements to determine which is preferred.

To answer these concerns I turned to the will to power. In so doing, I also replied to the third problem, circularity. Nietzsche says all judgements are revisable interpretations, but this means Nietzsche's philosophy is itself revisable, and is therefore susceptible to circularity. In examining *BGE* 22 I determined two things: "power" can explain how we scrutinize others, and circularity is not a problem but a virtue of Nietzsche's philosophy. In the first case, while the concept of will to power is offered as an explanation for how we can criticize others, it is not explained, and so I set it aside temporarily in order to address circularity. I argued that circularity is a virtue because it is a natural consequence of strong skepticism in that it supports perpetual inquiry and merely admits fallibility. In this sense, of course Nietzsche's philosophy is revisable; this is something all philosophers should admit. The problem of scrutiny, unlike circularity, required much more depth in order to address fully. In order to understand will to power, I turned to *BGE* 211 where I presented Nietzsche's distinction between philosophical laborers and genuine philosophers. The former resemble me in this thesis, in that philosophical laborers merely examine the philosophy of others, whereas the latter create new philosophies. However, genuine philosophers do not merely present new philosophies, but attempt to dominate one another in order to be considered "true." This offers a picture where the judgements of

philosophers compete against one another for supremacy and it is this image that fuels the notion of the will to power. The will to power does not offer a standard or justification for how we can criticize others, but merely explains that judgements will compete regardless of justification. Determining the victor between competing judgements is not a matter of reason or justification, but power, where power is understood at its most basic as getting what one desires. The will to power is not a normative concept but a descriptive one, which is to say Nietzsche is not proposing we *should* decide the victor by a means of power, but merely that this is the way of things.

The second and final part of chapter five was a return to the question of naturalism in order to reconnect with where my thesis began. In this final section I suggested that sections *GS* 372 and 373 offered insight into Nietzsche's position on naturalism. Ultimately, my aim was to defend that Nietzsche's naturalistic tendencies, that is to say his tendency to propose naturalistic ideas, is consistent with his falsification thesis. This is evident when observing Nietzsche's criticism of ideologists, or those who claim to support the natural sciences, but in Nietzsche's mind fail to do so. The ideologists, I showed, are very similar to the old philosophers in that they blindly trust in the will to truth, and their "vampirism" is very much akin to the pessimism of the objective spirit from chapter three. Nietzsche criticizes the ideologists for failing to live up to strong skepticism, for closing themselves off from further inquiry, and for attempting to impose their judgements on the world. Aside from the "science" of the ideologists, Nietzsche fully supports the natural sciences. However, I argued that these naturalistic sympathies do not resemble Leiter's explanation as to how he thought we should see Nietzsche as a naturalist in chapter two. While Leiter alleges that Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist who defends result continuity, this requires that Nietzsche's philosophy bend to the judgements set out by the sciences. Instead, Nietzsche proposes the opposite: the natural sciences should be continuous with philosophical judgements. In this perverted way, one can argue that Nietzsche supports result continuity.

While I set out to answer the question as to whether or not Nietzsche is a skeptic or a naturalist, I have concluded that this question is rather empty. Calling Nietzsche a skeptic or a naturalist, while having practical uses, ultimately only pulls further away from what Nietzsche actually states. To use the terminology developed throughout my thesis, calling Nietzsche a skeptic or a naturalist is to form a concept, and in concept formation an error occurs. In the

attempt to label his philosophy one can only hope to further falsify his beliefs. This, however, does not make my thesis void of falsification. To the contrary, my thesis takes the form of philosophical labor which cannot do anything other than falsify as it attempts to communicate my personal judgements about Nietzsche's texts (which are themselves falsifications). As I've reiterated, falsification does not necessarily amount to any kind of objection. To avoid falling into the prejudices of the old philosophers, I must recognize that it cannot hope to offer to an absolute understanding of Nietzsche's position on truth. Instead, I merely offer *my* interpretation of Nietzsche's middle period of *GS* Book V, *BGE*, and elements of *Z*, where I defend his skeptical sections in conjunction with his naturalistic ones. Ultimately, I argued that Nietzsche's project is to get beyond good and evil, and he calls on the philosophers of the future to do so. Whereas getting beyond good and evil is to abandon the notion of metaphysical certainty such as the thing-in-itself or an absolute moral code, Nietzsche contends the philosophers of the future can create new values and judgements by recognizing that untruth; falsification is just as, if not more, important to life than the "truth."

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