

Covert Action, Hidden Influence :
American Hegemony and the Coup d'Etat,
1946-2002

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Abstract

This paper uses the concept of hegemony to situate coups d'état within a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework. Through a review of the relevant theoretical literature on hegemony and research on coups d'état, and drawing heavily on the documented American uses of covert action to promote coups in Iran, Guatemala and Chile, the paper identifies a number of channels of American hegemonic influence relevant to coups d'état and proposes several independent variables to capture these channels of influence: trade, military transfers, military aid, and political openness. The extent of American military aid to a country is found to have a statistically significant and positive impact on alignment following a coup. The duration of American military-to-military contact through arms transfers is generally found to have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a coup d'état will be attempted, and on the likelihood of a successful coup d'état in countries that are identified as having an anti-American alignment. Conversely, these variables are found to have no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of either a coup attempt or a durable coup in countries that are identified as having a pro-American alignment. These results are consistent with the neo-Gramscian hypotheses of coups that are developed in this paper. An appendix is also included that details a method for adjusting data from the Affinity of Nations index to better reflect alignment in the context of global trends in measured affinity with the United States.

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1) Introduction

The concept of hegemony in Gramscian IR traces its roots back to Antonio Gramsci's analysis of class politics. Gramsci recognised that the dominant class could wield the coercive machinery of the state to protect its interests against challenges from subordinate classes. However, he also proposed that resilient political orders were based on more than just this coercive capability. If subordinate classes viewed the political-economic order headed by the dominant class as being legitimate, the dominant class could preclude challenges to its rule from emerging in the first place. The hegemony of the dominant class was constituted by this combination of legitimacy backed up by coercive power.

Robert Cox, the founder of Gramscian IR theory (also called neo-Gramscian theory or the Italian school of IR), saw similar patterns repeated in the realm of international affairs. For Cox, hegemony in the international sphere consisted of a dominant state heading up an international order based not only on that state's material superiority but also on the general acceptance of the dominant state's leadership.¹ Cox also extended Gramsci's concept of the 'historic bloc', a coalition of social classes and the state unified by a common understanding of the world and ideological purpose, into the international arena to encompass the political and economic elites in the dominant state as well as key elites in subordinate states.² While Gramsci primarily looked at relations between classes within a country and Cox focused on relations between states, class therefore remains an important component of Cox' conception of hegemony, with class interests forming one strand in a complex international web of ideational and material links between the hegemon and other countries. The international hegemonic order is thus "centered on, but not exclusive to" the dominant state.³ In the latter half of the twentieth century, this dominant state has been the United States, and it is specifically American hegemony that this paper considers.

Hegemony is a recurring feature of history. However, every hegemonic order is different, conditioned by the specific nature of the hegemon. As Ruggie has put it: "it was the fact of an *American* hegemony after World War II that was decisive, and not merely an American *hegemony*."⁴ Certain aspects of American hegemony have parallels in other hegemonic orders; for example, both the United States and its counter-hegemonic rival, the USSR, sought to extend their influence by promoting their respective ideologies

¹ Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 12 (1983): 162-175

² *Ibid.*, 167

³ Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, "Introduction," in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9-11*, ed. Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 4 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010)

⁴ John Gerard Ruggie, "Anatomy of an Institution," in *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie, 31 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) It should be noted that Ruggie's piece looks at fairly benign aspects of American hegemony, in contrast to this paper.

abroad. On the other hand, there was no direct Soviet counterpart to the dynamic interaction between corporate interests and the American state, which is a critical aspect of the American historic bloc.

One well documented tool of American foreign policy in the twentieth century has been the promotion of foreign coups d'état, especially through the use of covert action. Covert action to undermine a foreign regime is a deliberate and direct exercise of power by one state over another, and is a reflection of international hegemony. However, neo-Gramscian theory suggests that more subtle and indirect influences are equally important components of hegemonic power. A neo-Gramscian theory of hegemonic influence on coups, as this paper seeks to develop and apply, must also account for these indirect modes of influence.

At an indirect, yet volitional level, a dominant state can encourage a coup by manipulating the material incentives of elites within a foreign country or use personal networks between elites to signal its preferences and support of regime change. Internationalized economic elites in either country may take a reactionary stance against a government if they see it as potentially jeopardizing their economic interests, and can bring substantial economic power and political influence to bear. At a more subtle level, a coup d'état may be a reflection of ideological entanglement between the elites of the target country and the dominant state: military elites socialized into the norms and world view of the dominant country may come to identify strongly with the dominant country, and take a reactionary stance against their own government's positions.

These channels of international influence on a coup are indirect compared to covert action. However, direct and indirect channels of influence are facets of the same hegemonic power dynamics. Furthermore, the line between the direct channels and indirect channels is blurred; ideological socialization and the development of interpersonal networks may be the result of the deliberate actions of the dominant state, and deliberate covert action can signal a state's preferences to sympathetic elites abroad.

This first section of this paper will outline a number of hypotheses of how a dominant state can influence coups d'état against hostile foreign regimes and provide historical examples to illustrate and support these hypotheses. The historical focus of this section is on the post-WWII period American of hegemony⁵, and so the case studies focus on the Iranian coup of 1953, the Guatemalan coup of 1954, and the Chilean coup of 1973: three well known coups d'état that were largely driven by direct American influence through covert action. While these were all instances of fairly direct involvement by the hegemonic power in fomenting a coup, the important role that indirect channels of influence played in these coups is also explored. These modes of influence are situated within the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework of hegemony.

The second section will put this framework through a large-N empirical test. Variables for trade, military transfers, military aid and polity are used to represent the indirect and direct channels of external influence that might precipitate a coup. The impact of these

⁵ American hegemony is considered here to have generally existed from the end of WWII to today.

variables is tested on the likelihood of a coup in countries that are aligned with the US compared to those that are dis-aligned with the US, as well as on the movement in alignment following a successful coup d'état. While some of the variables thought to have an impact on coups d'état are found to have no effect, military aid and military transfers from the United States are both found to have a statistically significant effect on the probability of coups d'état and on international alignment following successful coups that is broadly consistent with the notion of hegemonic influence.

Following a brief discussion of results and concluding section, a few appendices detail the adjustments that were made to the data sets used. In particular, a method of adjusting Erik Gartzke's Affinity of Nations data to adjust for global trends in measured alignment with the US is presented. This adjustment, it is argued, better reflects the concept of alignment in the context of global trends in measured affinity with the United States.

2) Modes of Influence: Socialization, Bureaucratic Interests, Economic Integration, Military Capacity and Access to Foreign Regimes

A coup d'état is

a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country's ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime (although not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of governance⁶

Research on the subject of coups has produced no shortage of theories, hypotheses and explanatory models of coups, and identified a number of relevant variables: underdevelopment (including economic development, literacy, and urbanization rates), the size of the military relative to the size of the population, and a previous history of coups in the country;⁷ the lack of established democratic institutions;⁸ and ethnic diversity and competition within the country.⁹ The objective of this paper is not to develop a general model of coups, nor is subject of this paper coup d'état activity, per se. The goal here is to investigate international influences on the coup d'état and, more specifically, to develop a theoretical and empirical examination of how coups d'état might reflect American hegemonic power in a neo-Gramscian sense.

⁶ Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, "Coup d'Etat Events 1946-2009: Codebook," Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>

⁷ Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, "Towards an Examination of the General Causes of Coups d'Etat," *Euroean Journal of Political Research*, 11 (1983): 27-44

⁸ Patrick J. McGowan, "African military coups d'état, 1956-2001: frequency, trends and distribution," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41 (2003): 339-370

⁹ J. Craig Jenkins and Augustine Kpsowa, "Explaining Military Coups d'Etat: Black Africa, 1957-1984," *American Sociological Review*, 55 (1990): 861-875

2.1) Socialization of Foreign Elites

At the international level, the ‘historic bloc’ consists not just of the dominant classes in the hegemonic state, but also includes key elites of peripheral countries. Successful hegemony relies on the co-opting of national elites into the international political order i.e. these elites must buy into the legitimacy of the hegemonic power’s claim to authority. As Ikenberry and Kupchan describe it:

But there is also a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites in secondary states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon's notion of international order. The exercise of power—and hence the mechanism through which compliance is achieved—involves the projection by the hegemon of a set of norms and their embrace by leaders in other nations. Elite (as opposed to mass) receptivity to the norms articulated by the hegemon is essential to the socialization process. Norms may first take root among the populace, but they must then spread to the elite level if they are to have important effects on state behavior.¹⁰

As a powerful elite in many societies, the socialization of foreign militaries and especially of the officer corps can therefore be an important component of hegemony. Socialization into democratic norms and values is, in fact, an explicitly stated goal of US military training programmes¹¹ and there is some research that suggests that US training has consequently been associated with general long-term trends towards democratization in recipient states.¹²

The norms articulated by the hegemonic power can include concepts of justice, of legitimacy, and a shared perception of what constitutes a threat.¹³ In the context of the cold war, American promulgation of anti-communist doctrine was one of the principal norms that the US sought to spread to military elites in other countries.¹⁴ In this dichotomous period, anti-communist ideology was often identified with the belief in the

¹⁰ G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” *International Organization*, 44 (1990): 283-315

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress – Operational Benefits to US Forces,” US Department of State Website, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2002/10606.htm>

¹² Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 50 (2006): 509-537 It should be noted that Atkinson’s paper deals with long-term, structural changes, and is not necessarily inconsistent with the finding that coups (which may be against authoritarian or democratic governments) could also be promoted by military socialization.

¹³ Dan O’Meara, “Hegemony, Militarism, and Identity: Locating the United States as the Global Power,” in *Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security After 9-11*, ed. Bruno Charbonneau and Wayne S. Cox, 37 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010)

¹⁴ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in Latin America*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 61, 108

supremacy of the American system of free market capitalism and consumerism. In an in-depth study of the effect of training at the School of the Americas (SOA) on Latin American military officers' political perceptions, Lesley Gill highlights the how deliberate exposure of trainees to the American way of life, and in particular the availability of cheap consumer goods shaped these officers' ideas about America:

...military training [at SOA] ... not only promoted career mobility but also helped to consolidate their connections to a transnational vision of modernity...the possibility of acquiring cheap commodities was one of the central attractions of a sojourn in the United States for SOA students... Participation in conspicuous consumption enabled trainees to maintain the appearance of class comfort and modernity in their home countries, while simultaneously reinforcing the status differences within their own countries.¹⁵

Aside from anti-communist indoctrination as part of SOA counter-insurgency training, officers were subtly encouraged to see themselves as part of a global socio-economic elite, centred on America and having the American way of life as its founding principle. Through contact between the US and Latin American militaries, "...imperial networks of power and privilege developed and shared understandings about national security emerged"¹⁶ This is well aligned with the Gramscian concept of hegemony.

Military elites that internalize a pro-American worldview can be expected to resist (or at least to oppose) government policy directions that are seen as anti-American. At the extreme, this resistance to their government's policies may manifest itself in the form of a coup that seeks to restore the status quo and re-establish alignment with American hegemony. Gill notes that almost all of the Chilean officers involved in the Chilean coup of 1973 had received training at the School of the Americas.¹⁷ Writing in his diary shortly after the overthrow of Allende, a loyalist general noted that:

As far as the internal enemy is concerned the opinion acquired by those who have attended courses at the SOA and others... they have responded to the thoughts which were inculcated in them in these courses and, believing they were liberating the country from the 'internal enemy', have committed a crime [the coup d'etat].¹⁸

US military aid and exposure to foreign security doctrines may also have helped precipitate the Uruguayan coup d'etat of 1973. Jeffrey Ryan's examination of how changing Uruguayan military identity led to the decision to seize power concludes that socialization through these external contacts caused the military to see itself as part of a continental struggle against internal subversion and communism, rather than defence

¹⁵ Ibid., 36

¹⁶ Ibid., 93

¹⁷ Ibid., 2

¹⁸ Ibid., 79

against external enemies.¹⁹ More generally, in a small sample-sized study of both left wing and right wing political coups d'etat in the third world between 1945 and 1959, Wolpin found that socialization through military-to-military contacts under US military aid programs increased the likelihood of a coup d'etat being politically conservative and hence, pro-hegemonic.²⁰ These cases are examples where militaries' adoption of US values contributed in part their carrying out coups.

The examples given above are of third world countries during the cold war, but the United States continues to view ties to foreign militaries as important instruments in furthering US interests abroad.²¹ While the cold war is now over, the continuing war on drugs and the relatively new global war on terror have become important focal points of US training and aid.²²

2.2) Military Bureaucratic Interest

Powerful states often seek to use military aid and transfers to influence client states, either by using the threat of restricted arms supplies or the promise of arms transfers to secure cooperative behaviour.²³ While the use of arms transfers and military aid to further foreign policy objectives have long been a part of great powers' foreign policies, at the level of the target state there is mixed evidence as to how successfully arms suppliers can actually use these levers to induce cooperative behaviour. Sislin, for example, finds that military transfers can foster dependence on the supplier state, granting that state leverage over its client (contingent on certain other factors).²⁴ Other research has found the impact of arms transfers on recipient state cooperation to be ambiguous at best.²⁵

Most of the research that looks at the how arms transfers and aid can give supplier states leverage over recipients focuses on state to state interactions and looks for this leverage at the level of the recipient state's actions, but transfers and aid can also have an effect on military organizations at the sub-state level. As outlined above, military aid has often

¹⁹ Jeffrey J. Ryan, "Turning on Their Masters: State Terrorism and Unlearning Democracy in Uruguay," in *When States Kill: Latin America, the US, and Technologies of Terror*, ed. Cecilia Menjivar and Néstor Rodríguez 278-300 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005)

²⁰ Miles D. Wolpin "External Political Socialization as a Source of Conservative Military Behavior in the Third World," *Comparative International Development*, 8 (1973): 3-23

²¹ Maria Luisa Rivera, "Wikileaks: US Efforts to Undermine the Influence of Chavez," *Pravda*, December 16, 2010, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/16-12-2010/116245-wikileaks_us_efforts_to_undermine_chavez-0/

²² Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in Latin America*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 83

²³ Keith Krause "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships," *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (1991) 313-336; See also Keith Krause *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 4, 5, and 8 in particular

²⁴ John Sislin, "Arms as Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38 (1994): 665-689

²⁵ Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman and Xiaojun Li, "US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7 (2011): 275-294

been used by the United States as a vehicle for socializing foreign militaries. Along with arms transfers, a contingent of military advisors and technicians is usually needed to instruct the client military on the use of the equipment. This increases contacts between the supplier and client state's military and allows the US greater access and influence with foreign militaries.²⁶ Arms transfers can therefore also enable socialization of the military into hegemonic norms.²⁷

As well as being groups of people that can hold or be socialized into, both individually and collectively, certain perceptions about the world and ideological dispositions, military organizations are also bureaucratic organizations. As such, at the organizational level militaries have their own unique bureaucratic interests. Research by Collier and Hoeffler on military spending and the risks of a military coup has found that governments can 'buy off' their own militaries with increased military spending. By helping their military achieve the organizational interest of increased military capability, these governments reduce the likelihood of a coup by dissatisfied officers.²⁸

Access to military technology can materially strengthen the military and bring increased prestige to the organization, especially in third world countries. While generally dismissing the alleged direct role of the US in promoting coups d'etat in Guatemala (with the exception of the 1954 CIA backed coup), Schlewitz nonetheless notes that

Contact with the US military fed the desires of Guatemalan officers to modernize their own military, gain the benefits they believed commensurate with their duties, and carve out autonomy from Guatemalan state leaders²⁹

At the level of the military bureaucracy, US military aid and technology transfers provide a path to military modernity and increased capacity for many third world military forces. Withdrawal or threatened withdrawal of this aid can directly affect what a military organization sees as its *raison d'etre*; that is, the military may perceive its core bureaucratic interests as being threatened by a worsening of relations with a supplier state. Recipient military organizations may consequently resist their governments if they believe their actions may put the relationship with the arms supplier in jeopardy. For example, when the United States was seeking to avert Allende's rise to the presidency in Chile, then Chilean minister of the Economy Figueroa told the American ambassador to "get the word to the [Chilean] military promptly that, with Allende waiting in the wings,

²⁶ Keith Krause "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships," *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (1991): 315; Keith Krause *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 196

²⁷ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in Latin America*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 64

²⁸ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d'Etat" (2007) Working paper, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/conflict.htm> ; The paper identifies a u-shaped relationship between military spending and the risk of a coup with increased spending decreasing the risk of a coup up to a certain threshold.

²⁹ Andrew J. Schlewitz, "Imperial Incompetence and Guatemalan Militarism 1931-1966" *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 4 (2004): 589

relations between the United States and Chile were bound to undergo drastic change and that any flow of military equipment was bound to end,” with the implication that this would prompt the military to act against Allende.³⁰

2.3) Military Capacity:

Arms transfers and military aid can also increase the chances of a military coup through the increased capacity of recipient militaries. In a study of US military aid and the propensity for military political interventions in Latin America, John Fitch found evidence that the greater professionalism, institutional and organizational capacity and the development of an independent military identity, all of which were fostered by US military aid, were important contributors to military decisions to undertake coups d'etat.³¹ In a similar vein, Rowe finds that US military aid increases recipient military capacity for both taking and holding political power, with military aid associated with an increase in the risks of coups in non-military governments and a decreased risk of coups in military governments.³²

Unlike the bureaucratic interest / leverage and socialization modes, however, this mode of foreign influence on coup d'etat activity would by itself not be expected to have any impact on political alignment following the coup, and neither would the likelihood of coups under this model be expected to be affected by the international alignment of the target government. The 'leverage' and 'socialization' hypotheses suggest that military transfers and aid will be more likely to lead to pro-supplier coups, and coups against governments which threaten relations with the suppliers and / or move against the supplier state's hegemonic order. That military aid and transfers may lead to increased capacity to undertake a coup d'etat and seize control of a country says nothing about the role of alignment in a coup, and so is a non-hegemonic mode of foreign influence on coup activity.

2.4) Regime Access:

There are a number of times historically when great powers have used covert action to directly precipitate military coups d'etat in target countries. To successfully mount a covert operation, the intervening power needs some level of access to the target country:

“In terms of covert intervention, the access question is primary. If the planners and implementers of covert interventions are unable to employ covert instruments, then there can be no intervention. A good example is Ukraine, where a very large rebellion by Ukrainian nationalists against Soviet occupation took place between 1945 and 1948-9. However, it was only after

³⁰ CIA FOIA Reading Library, *TO A/S MEYER AND MR. KISSINGER: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 20 SEPTEMBER* [Declassified US diplomatic cable from US embassy in Santiago, Chile, September 1970] http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000449478/DOC_0000449478.pdf

³¹ John Samuel Fitch, “The Political Impact of US Military Aid to Latin America: Institutional and Individual Effects,” *Armed Forces and Society*, 5 (1979): 360-386

³² Edward Thomas Rowe, “Aid and Coups d'Etat: Aspects of the Impact of American Military Assistance Programs in the Less Developed Countries,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 18 (1974): 239-255

the rebellion was to a large extent quashed, and many nationalists had to flee west, that the CIA was able to make contact with (now exiled) groups and launch raids in Ukraine”³³

In addition to the socialization of local military elites noted previously, US aid and training programs also foster personal ties between the recipient country and US militaries. Gill, quoting from an interview with a retired Colombian general, notes that:

“[SOA students] learn many things, but that is really of secondary importance. The relations that they establish with others are at bottom the most important... The school also permits the United States to have the future leaders of the [Latin American] armed forces in its hands.”³⁴

These interpersonal networks were and continue to be important tools for the US in exerting its power in Latin America.³⁵ Such networks were particularly conspicuous in the case of the Chilean coup of 1973. As the Church Report investigation into the CIA activities in Chile noted:

“United States relations with the Chilean military during 1970-1973 must be viewed against the backdrop not only of the tradition of close cooperation between the American and the Chilean military services and the continuing intelligence collection efforts, but also in the context of Track II -an attempt to foment a military coup.”³⁶

Early on in the campaign against Allende’s presidency, US contacts in the Chilean military were used to organize (abortive) coup attempts, and also to pass information about US preferences to Chilean officers.³⁷ Directly prior to leading the 1973 coup, Pinochet made contact with American officers that he knew personally from his days at the School of the Americas, who assured him that the US would support him in a coup d’etat.³⁸ More indirectly, US contacts in the Chilean military were important in signalling US preference and support for a coup that would overthrow Allende.³⁹ These personal networks helped to widely diffuse knowledge of US attempts at fomenting a coup and thus broadly signalling preferences to the Chilean military establishment. The deliberate US covert actions to sponsor a coup d’etat against Allende became common

³³ James Bevan "The Third Choice: North-South Policy and United States Covert Intervention" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, Mar 22, 2006): 7
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p98062_index.html,

³⁴ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in Latin America*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 110

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 113, 236-237

³⁶ United States Department of State, “COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973” [the Church Report], US Department of State FOIA, <http://foia.state.gov/reports/churchreport.asp>

³⁷ Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 360

³⁸ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 191

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 192

knowledge among the Chilean military classes, and knowledge of these actions ultimately made a coup d'état more likely, albeit through indirect channels.⁴⁰

In the US/British coup against Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, a US military officer who had been involved in running US training programs for Iranian officers was an important contact point for the CIA, through whom it was able to enlist a network of pro-coup Iranian military officers.⁴¹ There was also extensive penetration of the Iranian military at the working level through the American Military Mission to Iran⁴² and Britain had also cultivated an extensive network of Iranian military officers, journalists, and clerics; a legacy of its long involvement in Iranian affairs.⁴³

Aside from access to military figures, however, the literature on covert action suggests other forms of access are also important to successful interventions. In particular, there are numerous examples of how democratic institutions in other countries have been subverted and used to advance great power agendas, including fostering coups.

The CIA coup against Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 was based outside the borders of Guatemala. To overthrow the Guatemalan government, the CIA recruited Castillo Armas, a disaffected Guatemalan army officer, to lead a small band of soldiers into Guatemala from Honduras and start a rebellion.⁴⁴ A military victory was never the objective of the action – the 'liberation army' was more of a stage prop than it was an invasion force. The true offensive against the Arbenz regime came in the form of CIA propaganda broadcasts over the 'Voice of Liberation' radio station (physically located in Honduras). Despite the fact that Armas' small armed band made little actual progress in the field, the 'Voice of Liberation' broadcast continual 'updates' on the rebels' stunning (and largely imaginary) military successes. These broadcasts sowed confusion among the Guatemalan people, military and government, and made President Arbenz and his military advisors believe that the very minor threat posed by the rebel group was in fact much larger. This ultimately led to Arbenz' abdication.⁴⁵

In this operation, the CIA did manage to co-opt the Guatemalan clergy into its anti-Arbenz campaign,⁴⁶ and the CIA made some limited use of the free press in Guatemala, taking out an ad in a Guatemalan newspaper announcing the launch of their propaganda

⁴⁰ Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 360

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 99

⁴² Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, "Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953" *Middle Eastern Studies*, 29 (1993): 480

⁴³ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 119

⁴⁴ It should be noted that while Castillo Armas, the Guatemalan military officer who was put in charge of the American coup, did receive some training at American military facilities, there is little evidence that these contacts were instrumental in his recruitment. Source: CIA FOIA Reading Library, *Stage One Report Annex B friendly Assets and Potential* [Declassified CIA report on possible allies in Guatemalan coup operation; RUFUS is codename for Castillo Armas]

http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000923959/DOC_0000923959.pdf

⁴⁵ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 144

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 138

radio station.⁴⁷ Overall, however, the subversion of democratic institutions played a minor role in the covert campaign.

In the coup d'etat against Iran's Mossadegh the CIA made extensive use of that country's openness to subvert civil and democratic institutions, to sow dissent and to organize opposition to Mossadegh. By some estimates, up to four-fifths of Iranian newspapers were under CIA influence in the months leading up to the 1953 coup.⁴⁸ These co-opted newspapers were used to disseminate anti-Mossadegh propaganda. As well as subverting the Iranian media to carry anti-Mossadegh messages, the CIA also paid off Iranian clerics to preach anti-Mossadegh sermons, hired thousands of Iranians to stage anti-Mossadegh demonstrations, and bribed members of the Iranian parliament.⁴⁹

The subversion of Chilean civil society and media by the CIA in the lead up to the 1973 coup was also extensive:

“The CIA spent \$3million to ensure that Frei would defeat Allende in the 1964 election, paying more than half the cost of his campaign. He won easily. Over the next four years the CIA spent \$2million on covert projects aimed at supporting Frei, along with 175k in covert aid to twenty-two candidates who ran for congress in 1965, nine of whom were elected. It also subsidized an anti-communist women's group, supported a breakaway faction of the socialist party, paid for political organizing campaigns in the slums outside Santiago, sponsored dissident groups within the communist-dominated labour movement, endowed a news wire service and a right-wing weekly newspaper, and regularly placed editorials in *El Mercurio*.⁵⁰

When the CIA's efforts to prevent Allende's election failed, they again used subversion of various democratic institutions, including the press, trade unions, political parties and the media, to lay the groundwork for the 1973 coup d'etat.⁵¹

While Allende and Mossadegh had alienated substantial portions of their countries' respective political and economic elites,⁵² the CIA nonetheless played an important role in overthrowing these governments, and used access to democratic institutions to do so. In other cases, democratic institutions have allowed foreign powers to influence domestic politics without the need for a coup d'etat, for example by manipulating elections. These

⁴⁷ Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The CIA and the Limits to American Intervention in the Post-War World*, (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 15

⁴⁸ Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America*, (New York: Random House, 2005), 65

⁴⁹ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 123-124

⁵⁰ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 175

⁵¹ United States Department of State, “COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973” [the Church Report], US Department of State FOIA, <http://foia.state.gov/reports/churchreport.asp>

⁵² See, for example: Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, “Operation ‘Ajax’ Revisited: Iran, 1953” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 29 (1993); or Fariborz Mokhtari, “Iran's 1953 coup revisited: internal dynamics versus external intrigue” *The Middle East Journal*, 62 (2008): 457-486

channels of influence are significantly restricted in a dictatorial state. Studies of how certain regimes have resisted coups d'etat, have noted the value of a repressive security apparatus, as well as other factors, to dictatorships hoping to avert a coup.⁵³ While covert action against authoritarian regimes is definitely possible and has been undertaken, dictatorial control over the media, the government, and civil society restricts the channels for access that an external power can use.

As outlined above, the cases of the Chilean, Iranian and, to a lesser extent, the Guatemalan coups suggest that democracy and democratic institutions, such as a free press and elected parliament, can be an important channel for exercising political influence and undertaking covert action against a foreign government. Furthermore, theories of 'coup proofing' regimes contend that a repressive state apparatus can prevent the mobilization of an organized opposition to a regime. At the same time, democratic institutions provide an internal means of regime change which may decrease the tendency for groups to seek power through coups, and even in cases of foreign covert intervention, democracies may provide channels for influence that preclude the need to resort to sponsoring a coup- for example, through the subversion of the electoral process. Consequently, the effect of a democratic polity on whether hegemonic influence as reflected in coups is ambiguous. Nonetheless, the historical case studies on CIA sponsored coups suggest that this is a mode of influence worth exploring.

2.5) Economic Factors

It may be an exaggeration to say that "Americans overthrew governments only when economic interests coincided with ideological ones."⁵⁴ However, to varying extents economic interests were an important factor in the CIA sponsored coups d'etat in Guatemala, Iran and Chile. The evidence of class and interpersonal ties between business and the state, and the shared ideological perception that capital and the US state were both united in advancing a common global agenda fit well with the Gramscian notion of the 'historic bloc'.

While fears of spreading communism seem to be the principal reason for the American covert action against the Iranian government of Mossadegh in 1953, the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and subsequent disputes over compensation with Britain was a key factor that led the British first to try and mount their own coup d'etat, and later to ask for American help in overthrowing Mossadegh.⁵⁵ In the strongly anti-communist climate that prevailed in the US administration in the early nineteen-fifties, the British

⁵³ James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East" *International Security*, 24 (1999): 131-165 ; Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, "Ensuring Compliance: Strategies for Popular Cooptation by the Party and State Security in Communist Europe and in Ba'thist Iraq", <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ensuring-compliance-strategies-for-popular-cooptation-the-party-and-state-security-communist>

⁵⁴ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 215

⁵⁵ Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America*, (New York: Random House, 2005), 60-65

and their American sympathizers in the CIA were easily able to convince the Eisenhower administration that Iran was likely to fall into the Soviet camp if Mossadegh remained in power.⁵⁶

The following year, in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company played a crucial role in influencing the US government to use the CIA to unseat Arbenz following the expropriation and redistribution of its land holdings. Even before CIA involvement in the country, United Fruit was active in sponsoring its own campaign against Arbenz,⁵⁷ and other CIA anti-Arbenz contacts in Guatemala alleged that Armas was already working with United Fruit against Arbenz prior to his CIA recruitment.⁵⁸ After his recruitment by the CIA, United Fruit also helped supply Armas' rebel group with arms.⁵⁹

The American campaign against Allende saw heavy involvement by American companies. In particular, ITT and Pepsi, both companies that were heavily invested in Chile, had important roles in urging the US administration to take action against the Chilean government. John McCone, a former CIA director who sat on the board of ITT, was able to secure meetings with the Nixon administration at the highest levels and press the case for action against Allende.⁶⁰ The US government and US companies worked together to try and undermine Allende; the CIA even helped ITT channel funds covertly to the electoral campaign of an Allende opponent.⁶¹ In concert with US government efforts to isolate Chile through international organizations, US companies that were invested in Chile organized amongst themselves to incapacitate the Chilean economy.⁶²

In the examples of the Chilean and Guatemalan and, to an extent, the Iranian coups, corporations headquartered in the hegemonic country not only played a role in promoting regime change in the target countries, but were instrumental in pushing for state action against these countries' governments. The threat of a communism was played up by executives from these companies in meetings with administration officials, and, given the geopolitical climate of the cold war and American state concerns about the spread of communism, these messages found a receptive audience.⁶³ American state interests, namely preventing the spread of 'communism' (or anything that seemed remotely anti-capitalist) came to be seen as identical to American corporate interests; as an American

⁵⁶ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 121

⁵⁷ Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The CIA and the Limits to American Intervention in the Post-War World*, (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 59; Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006),. 134

⁵⁸ US Department of State, Office of the Historian "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Retrospective Volume, Guatemala", doc. no. 57, October 8, 1953 <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d57>

⁵⁹ Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The CIA and the Limits to American Intervention in the Post-War World*, (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 81 ; Nick Cullather "Operation PB Success: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954" *Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency*, (1994) 10

⁶⁰ Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 170-173

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 178

⁶² *Ibid.*, 186

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 136, 170-173

embassy official explained: “If the Guatemalans want to handle a Guatemalan company roughly, that is none of our business. But if they handle an American company roughly it is our business.”⁶⁴

Economic integration with the dominant power may therefore have an impact on coup d’etat activity. The dominant power is likely to take an unfavourable view of foreign governments if countries in which it has substantial economic interests are seen to be moving out of its sphere of influence, and American companies have in the past pushed their government to act against countries which have threatened their business, and have even mobilized to take political action against these countries themselves. Secondly, and while not explored here in detail, economic elites in the target country may also have an interest in maintaining a close political relationship with the United States if their businesses trade with the United States, and so may also support action against governments they see as threatening this relationship.

3) Alignment, Contact and Coups

3.1) Alignment and Coups d’Etat:

The historical evidence reviewed so far suggests that a dominant or hegemonic power (the United States in the period under consideration) is more likely to seek to promote a coup d’etat against a foreign government if it sees this government as opposing its interests, however these latter are defined. The cases outlined above also suggest that military elites that have been integrated into the dominant country’s hegemony are also more likely to move against their own governments if they believe these governments are opposing the hegemonic order. An empirical measurement of ‘alignment’ between countries is therefore needed to test these modes of hegemonic influence on coups.

Erik Gartzke has compiled a well-known and frequently used database which maps countries’ voting positions relative to each other in the United Nations General Assembly. Gartzke’s Affinity of Nations index is a distance measure (S) which is a calculation of the yearly similarity of voting patterns between any two countries in the United Nations General Assembly. If two countries vote exactly the same way on all votes in the UNGA in a year, the S-score for these two countries in that year would be 1; similarly, if two countries take opposite positions on every vote in the UNGA in a year, the S-score for these two countries in this year would be -1. Of the available affinity index series produced by Gartzke, the series used in this paper calculates dyadic affinities using three possible responses to a vote - yes, no or abstention - and includes interpolated data for the year 1964 (the s3uni series.) This series was adjusted to better reflect alignment with the United States, in a process that is detailed in Appendix 1 of this paper.

The key assumption that is made in using the S-score to proxy alignment is that countries that are more aligned with each other will have similar voting patterns in the United

⁶⁴ Nick Cullather “Operation PB Success: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954” *Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency*, (1994) 8

Nations, while countries that are not aligned with each other will have more divergent voting patterns. This assumption seems valid in most cases, but there are some regions and cases where this assumption seems more valid than others. (see Appendix 1)

Studies of coups use a variety of available sources, and it is quite common for studies to be based on the authors' own compilation of coup events, generally drawn from historical records and news sources.⁶⁵ A number of databases of notable international events include some coups d'etat but excluded others based on the specific focus of the database.⁶⁶ Other data sources include information on successful coups, globally, but not on attempted coups (and require a subscription).⁶⁷ Some interesting research has been based on compilations of specifically the use of covert action, including the sponsorship of coups.⁶⁸ As well as potentially being open to debate about whether such an approach would yield a complete and accurate dataset given the secretive nature of covert action, limiting the study of coups to only instances of direct covert action precludes a variety of modes of influence suggested by neo-Gramscian theory.

Data on coups d'etat used here come from the Centre for Systemic Peace Coup D'etat Events, 1946-2009 database.⁶⁹ The Coup d'Etat Events database has the advantage that it is, first, a comprehensive attempt to document all coups, attempted but unsuccessful coups, and alleged coups. This provides a very complete (though of course fallible) picture of coup d'etat activity. Secondly, the Coup d'Etat Events database covers coups from 1945 up until very recently (2009), and so is suited to the period under study. Finally, the Coup d'Etat Events database is open-access. For these reasons, the data from the Coup d'Etat Events database was selected to construct the dependent coup variables.

3.2) Dependent Variables:

COUPTRIED: A binary variable reflecting either a documented coup attempt or a successful coup d'etat.

COUPDURAB: A binary variable reflecting a successful, isolated coup d'etat. This includes only successful coups that were neither preceded by coups in the two years prior to the coup nor followed by coups in the two next years. This variable was used in place of successful coups because of the large number of coups that occurred in clusters of political instability over a short number of years. Changes in alignment following an

⁶⁵ Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, "Towards an Examination of the General Causes of Coups d'Etat," *Eruopean Journal of Political Research*, 11 (1983): 27-44

⁶⁶ Center for International Development and Conflict Management, "International Crisis Behavior Project", <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>; Center for the Study of Civil War, "Data on Armed Conflict", <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/>

⁶⁷ Databanks International, "Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive", <http://www.databanksinternational.com/53.html>

⁶⁸ James Bevan "The Third Choice: North-South Policy and United States Covert Intervention" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, Mar 22, 2006)

⁶⁹ Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, "Coups D'etat, 1946-2009" Center for Systemic Peace <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>

isolated coup are less ambiguous than are changes in alignment following a coup which is subsequently overthrown by another coup within two years (the period over which alignment changes are measured).

s3r2o2: The measure of alignment movement used in the models below. As per above, this measure is based on Gartzke's Affinity of Nations data s3uni series, which measures the distance between countries in UNGA votes by year. The data represent proximity to the US voting position in each country and for each available year, and have been regionally adjusted (see Appendix 1). The series represents the difference of the average of the two following years from the two preceding years, i.e. alignment in the year itself is excluded, i.e. the s3r2o2 value for 1995 would be:

$$s3r2o2_{1995} = [\text{avg}(s3r_{1996}, s3r_{1997}) - \text{avg}(s3r_{1993}, s3r_{1994})]$$

s3r3ymal1: The measure of pro- or anti-US alignment used in the models below. This is a moving average of the regionally adjusted affinity index in the three prior years (i.e. lagged by one year). It is used to differentiate 'aligned' country-years from 'disaligned' country years.

There is a notable issue with the application of this last variable: in the three cases of US-supported coups which were heavily cited above, the s3r3yma measure gives ambiguous results. In the case of Iran, the regionally adjusted s3uni averaged for the three years prior to the 1953 coup show Iran as being 'aligned' with the US. In the case of the Guatemalan coup of 1954, while the regionally adjusted data show the Arbenz years as being years in which Guatemala was dis-aligned with the United States, the years directly following the coup also show dis-alignment. In the case of Chile, the data are more in line with expectations: the Allende years show up as a pronounced period of dis-alignment with the US, and Chile shifts into positive alignment with the United States following the coup. The dependent variables for all three cases are displayed graphically in Appendix 2 of this report. It should be noted that despite the problems with the alignment *position*, in all three cases the *movement* of alignment (represented by s3r2o2) is what would be expected: the average alignment of the two years directly following the US sponsored coup is higher than the average of the two years directly preceding the coup.

3.3) Independent Variables:

3.3.1) Military Contact Variables:

The following variables are used to measure military-to-military contacts between the United States and other countries:

AIDMILEX5YMA: This is a 5 year moving average of US military aid normalized to the size of the recipient country's military expenditures. This reflects the importance of US military aid relative to the size of a country's military expenditures, and can be interpreted through the 'bureaucratic interest' paradigm as a measure of the recipient

country military's dependence on the United States. It can also be seen through the 'socialization' frame to reflect the magnitude of US military ties to a foreign military, and can also reflect US access to the recipient country's military. It might also affect recipient state military capacity.

The data for military aid come from the US Overseas Grants and Loans (Greenbook) online resource, from the Detailed Foreign Assistance database;⁷⁰ the data for military expenditures were generated through the EUGene software (version 3.204), available online.⁷¹ Greenbook US military aid figures were available in both constant (2009) USD and current dollars. The same conversion rate was applied to the EUGene military expenditures data to express this series in constant (2009) USD.

TRANMILEX5YMA: This is a measure of the importance of US military arms transfers to the country's military. It is the 5 year moving average of military transfers from the US to the target country normalized to the size of the country's military expenditures, and can be interpreted along the same lines as AIMILEX5YMA.

The data for military transfers come from the SIPRI Arms Transfers database Trend Indicator Value series of military transfers.⁷² Figures are expressed in constant 1990 USD. The inflation rate derived from the US military aid data from the US Greenbook was used to convert the 1990 constant dollars to current dollars, and then to convert these into constant 2009 USD.

AIDPAST10: This variable represents the number of years in the past 10 years in which the country received military aid from the United States. This variable assumes that as well as the size of military aid the US provides, the duration of contact with the US through military aid programs may have an impact on the development of informal military-military ties. It can be interpreted as being relevant both to the 'socialization' model and the 'access' mode of foreign influence on coups through military-to-military contacts. It is less relevant, however, to the 'bureaucratic interest' mode.

TRANPAST10: This variable represents the number of years in the past 10 years in which the country received military transfers from the United States. It can be interpreted along the same lines as AIDPAST10.

3.3.2) Economic Interaction Variables:

TRADFLO5YMA: This is a five-year moving average of total trade flows, i.e. the sum of exports to and imports from the United States and the target country. A higher value indicates a greater US economic interaction with the country, which should be positively

⁷⁰ US Overseas Loans and Grants, "Detailed Foreign Assistance Data," <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html>

⁷¹ Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual." *International Interactions* 26:179-204. Website: <http://eugenesoftware.org>.

⁷² Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database: Importer/Exporter TIV Tables" <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>

associated with coups in dis-aligned countries as this dis-alignment poses a greater threat both to US national economic interests and to the business interests of US corporations.

TRADFLO5YMAPOP: This is five-year moving average of total trade flows normalized to the size of the target country's population. It can be interpreted as the importance of US economic ties to the country and the country's economic elites. It can also be a proxy for the relative magnitude of the US economic presence in the country; as outlined above, US corporations with a strong presence in a foreign country may be able to mobilize their own political resources against its government. The hegemonic theory of coups presented here suggests that higher per-capita economic ties to the US should be positively correlated with coups in dis-aligned countries.

Data on trade flows were obtained from the Correlates of War Trade Data database.⁷³ Trade data were available in current USD, so these were converted to constant 2009 USD using the same conversion factor as was applied to military transfers figures. Data on population size was obtained using the EUGene software.

3.3.3) Polity:

DEMOC2PRIOR: This is the average of the Polity IV democracy score of a country in the two previous years. It is thought that this variable might have a positive impact on the likelihood of a coup occurring in dis-aligned countries. The Polity IV database was the source of countries' democracy scores, with a scores ranging from 10 for a 'perfect' democracy to -10 for an autocracy.

3.4) Models:

Two regression techniques are used in these models. To model movement in alignment following a coup, panel least squares was applied to the data set. Cross-sectional and time fixed effects were not used. Essentially then the model is a cross-sectional least-squares regression on pooled panel data, with the sample consisting of every country-year in which a durable coup occurred.

To model the probability of a coup or attempted in aligned and dis-aligned countries, two sub-samples of data were created, one consisting of all country-years with a measured 'positive' alignment to the US in the previous three years, and one consisting of all country-years with a measured 'negative' alignment to the US in the previous three years ('aligned' and 'dis-aligned'). A probit regression model was used to test the impact of the independent variables on the binary variable of whether a coup or an attempted coup did or did not occur in that year, and the results for the aligned and the dis-aligned samples were compared. Again, while the data was compiled in panel form, neither cross-sectional nor time fixed effects were used in these models.

⁷³ Barbieri, Katherine, Omar Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2008. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 2.0. Online: <http://correlatesofwar.org>.

Mode of Influence	Independent Variable						
	Arms Transfers + Military Expenditures	Military Aid + Military Expenditures	Duration of Military Transfers	Duration of Military Aid	Trade Flows per Capita	Total Trade Flows	Polity
Regime Access	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Military Elite Socialization	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Military Bureaucratic Interest	✓	✓					
Economic Integration					✓	✓	
Military Capacity*	✓	✓					

The table above identifies the five proposed modes of international influence on coups d'état. The 'Regime Access', 'Elite Socialization', 'Bureaucratic Interest' and 'Economic Integration' modes are all consistent with the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony. The 'Military Capacity' mode is not incompatible with a neo-Gramscian interpretation, but does not follow from it.

3.4.1) Model 1: Post-Coup Alignment Movement

Variable	(World)		(Third World)		(Latin America and Caribbean)	
	Coefficient	Prob.	Coefficient	Prob.	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.167603	0.0624	0.149747	0.0941	0.1652	0.6766
AIDPAST10	0.001775	0.7632	0.004363	0.4708	0.013675	0.5613
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.321537	0.1632	0.004942	0.4999	0.006782	0.792
TRANPAST10	0.001468	0.8335	-1.68E-08	0.1454	-0.000000016	0.7326
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	-1.21E-08	0.2714	-2.35E-04	0.111	-2.04E-04	0.6278
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.000231	0.1121	0.002785	0.3795	0.007888	0.5202
DEMOC2PRIOR	0.00401	0.1629	-0.398447	0.189	0.055223	0.9344
C	0.023798	0.4313	0.00685	0.8317	-0.117752	0.6759
	R-squared	0.140646	R-squared	0.151617	R-squared	0.111294
	Adjusted R-	0.054711	Adjusted R-	0.054261	Adjusted R-	-0.333059

Using the sample of all available countries, following an isolated, successful coup d'état, only the 5-year moving average of US military aid as a share of target country military expenditures had a statistically significant effect on the change in alignment. The impact of US military aid as a share of recipient country military expenditures was positive, suggesting that coups in countries where the military has received relatively more aid are more likely to align towards the United States following the coup.

Restricting the sample to durable coups in the third world (i.e. excluding Canada, Western Europe and the Socialist Bloc countries) yields similar results as the model

applied to the world as a whole. The adjusted R-Squared is slightly better, albeit still quite low, suggesting that many determinants of alignment relative to the US are not included in this model.

Restricting the model to Latin America and the Caribbean yields no statistically significant results on any of the explanatory variables, and the adjusted R-Squared result suggests the model is an exceedingly poor fit.

3.4.2) Model 2: Attempted Coups

Model 2: Attempted Coups, World, Aligned Countries

Dependent Variable: COUPTRIED
 Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
 Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1>0
 Included observations: 1754

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.1294	0.133
AIDPAST10	0.0072	0.657
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.4136	0.405
TRANPAST10	0.0203	0.315
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.046
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0005	0.041
DEMOC2PRIOR	-0.0086	0.349
C	-1.5531	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0865	
Obs with Dep=0	1678	
Obs with Dep=1	76	

Model 2: Attempted Coups, World, Disaligned Countries

Dependent Variable: COUPTRIED
 Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
 Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1<0
 Included observations: 2830

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.2508	0.565
AIDPAST10	0.0170	0.119
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.3182	0.244
TRANPAST10	0.0132	0.281
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.092
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0005	0.003
DEMOC2PRIOR	-0.0167	0.011
C	-1.5868	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0412	
Obs with Dep=0	2661	
Obs with Dep=1	169	

In both ‘aligned’ and ‘disaligned’ country years (i.e. countries which have, in the three prior years, been more or less aligned with the US position in the UN than their regional neighbours), trade flows with the US and these flows normalized to the size of the population have a statistically significant and negative impact on whether or not a coup d’etat is attempted. The democracy variable has a statistically significant and negative effect on the likelihood of coup attempts in disaligned countries, but not in aligned countries. This is contrary to the theory’s predictions that democracy will allow the US greater access to effectuate regime change in disaligned countries. Though only statistically significant in the case of dis-aligned countries, the sign on the democracy variable’s coefficient is negative in both aligned and disaligned countries, which perhaps reflects the findings from general models of coups that democratic institutions tend to be negatively correlated with coup activity. It should also be noted that while it is not quite statistically significant at the 10% threshold (p value of 0.13), the sign on the US military aid as a share of target country military expenditures in aligned countries is positive, which is also contrary to the predictions of the theory.

Model 2: Attempted Coups, Third World, Aligned Countries

Dependent Variable: COUPTRIED

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1>0 AND EUCOM=0 AND SOCBLOC=0

Included observations: 1224

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.1244	0.160
AIDPAST10	-0.0080	0.637
TRANPAST10	0.0181	0.412
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.150
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0006	0.036
DEMOC2PRIOR	0.0005	0.962
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.4897	0.517
C	-1.3671	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0487	
Obs with Dep=0	1153	
Obs with Dep=1	71	

Model 2: Attempted Coups, Third World, Disaligned Countries

Dependent Variable: COUPTRIED

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1<0 AND EUCOM=0 AND SOCBLOC=0

Included observations: 2154

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.7580	0.297
AIDPAST10	-0.0085	0.501
TRANPAST10	0.0438	0.005
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.017
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0006	0.002
DEMOC2PRIOR	-0.0093	0.215
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.4968	0.495
C	-1.4153	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0385	
Obs with Dep=0	1997	
Obs with Dep=1	157	

Restricting the sample only to 3rd world countries, the model now suggests that the duration of military transfers from the US (TRANPAST10) is positively associated with the probability of a coup d'état attempt in dis-aligned countries, but not in aligned countries. This is in keeping with the theory's predictions. The coefficient on AIDMILEX5YMA(-1) is positive in aligned countries, but, while close, is not statistically significant at the 10% level. This is similar to the result that was obtained by running the model for the full sample of countries, and is not in keeping with the theory. Even more problematic for the theory is the fact that the sign on AIDMILEX5YMA(-1) switches from positive for aligned countries, to negative for dis-aligned countries, i.e. suggesting that the extent of US military aid is more likely to cause coup attempts in dis-aligned countries than in aligned countries. Again, however, neither of these results is statistically significant at the 10% level.

Model 2: Attempted Coups, L. America & Carib., Aligned Countries

Dependent Variable: COUPTRIED

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1>0 AND SOUTHCOM=1

Included observations: 393

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.3288	0.662
AIDPAST10	0.0052	0.880
TRANPAST10	0.0019	0.962
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.192
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0002	0.752
DEMOC2PRIOR	-0.0148	0.387
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.0891	0.919
C	-1.2220	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0325	
Obs with Dep=0	357	
Obs with Dep=1	36	

Model 2: Attempted Coups, L. Am & Carib., Disaligned Countries

Dependent Variable: COUPTRIED

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1<0 AND SOUTHCOM=1

Included observations: 517

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.2967	0.741
AIDPAST10	0.0498	0.161
TRANPAST10	0.0959	0.006
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.115
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0002	0.552
DEMOC2PRIOR	-0.0396	0.013
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	-1.7723	0.398
C	-2.1997	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.1374	
Obs with Dep=0	488	
Obs with Dep=1	29	

Restricting the sample to Latin American and Caribbean countries yields statistically significant results on the duration of military transfers and likelihood of an attempted coup in disaligned countries. This result is in holding with the theory, in that longer duration of contact through military transfers is found to have a positive effect on the likelihood of a coup attempt in disaligned countries, but not in aligned countries. The democracy variable is also found to have a statistically significant, and negative, impact on the probability of a coup attempt in disaligned countries, which is again contrary to the theory's postulates regarding access.

3.4.3) Model 3: Successful / Durable Coups

Model 3: Successful, Isolated Coups, World, Aligned			Model 3: Successful, Isolated Coups, World, Disaligned		
Dependent Variable: COUPDURAB			Dependent Variable: COUPDURAB		
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)			Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)		
Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1>0			Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1<0		
Included observations: 1748			Included observations: 2836		
Variable	Coefficient	Prob.	Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.0055	0.972	AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.0348	0.891
AIDPAST10	0.0229	0.358	AIDPAST10	0.0140	0.384
TRANPAST10	0.0191	0.562	TRANPAST10	0.0373	0.041
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.110	TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.040
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0002	0.595	TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0017	0.009
DEMOC2PRIOR	0.0044	0.752	DEMOC2PRIOR	0.0100	0.306
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.5153	0.561	TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.0982	0.801
C	-2.0775	0.000	C	-1.9690	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0744		McFadden R-squared	0.0674	
Obs with Dep=0	1724		Obs with Dep=0	2779	
Obs with Dep=1	24		Obs with Dep=1	57	

The magnitude of trade flows had a negative impact on the likelihood of a durable coup d'état in both aligned and disaligned countries, though the statistical significance was stronger for disaligned countries. Duration of military transfers had a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a successful coup d'état in disaligned countries, but not in aligned countries, which is in keeping with theory.

Model 3: Successful, Isolated Coups, Third World, Aligned			Model 3: Successful, Isolated Coups, Third World, Disaligned		
Dependent Variable: COUPDURAB			Dependent Variable: COUPDURAB		
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)			Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)		
Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1>0 AND EUCOM=0 AND SOCBL0C=0			Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1<0 AND EUCOM=0 AND SOCBL0C=0		
Included observations: 1224			Included observations: 2154		
Variable	Coefficient	Prob.	Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.0048	0.976	AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.2092	0.708
AIDPAST10	0.0106	0.683	AIDPAST10	-0.0077	0.689
TRANPAST10	0.0121	0.739	TRANPAST10	0.0648	0.007
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.172	TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.031
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0002	0.550	TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0017	0.014
DEMOC2PRIOR	0.0163	0.301	DEMOC2PRIOR	0.0165	0.136
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.2873	0.799	TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.6797	0.498
C	-1.9233	0.000	C	-1.8659	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0441		McFadden R-squared	0.0700	
Obs with Dep=0	1202		Obs with Dep=0	2104	
Obs with Dep=1	22		Obs with Dep=1	50	

Restricting the model to third world countries yielded similar results, with the duration of arms transfers leading to an increased likelihood of a successful coup d'état in disaligned, but not in aligned, countries. Trade flows with the United States, both aggregated and normalized to population, both seemed to have a negative impact on the likelihood of successful coup d'états in disaligned countries, though no statistically significant results were obtained for these variables in aligned countries. The coefficient on the democracy variable was positive, suggesting that a country being democratic leads to an increased likelihood of a successful coup in disaligned countries; however, the p-value of .136 means that this effect was not significant at the 10% level (though it was close).

Model 3: Successful, Isolated Coups, L. Am & Carib., Aligned

Dependent Variable: COUPDURAB

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1>0 AND SOUTHCOM=1

Included observations: 393

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.5385	0.573
AIDPAST10	0.0252	0.636
TRANPAST10	-0.0344	0.543
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.449
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0002	0.762
DEMOC2PRIOR	-0.0055	0.824
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	-0.1300	0.918
C	-1.7193	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.0307	
Obs with Dep=0	381	
Obs with Dep=1	12	

Model 3: Successful, Isolated Coups, L. Am & Carib., Disaligned

Dependent Variable: COUPDURAB

Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)

Sample: 1946 2009 IF S3R3YMAL1<0 AND SOUTHCOM=1

Included observations: 517

Variable	Coefficient	Prob.
AIDMILEX5YMA(-1)	0.8424	0.584
AIDPAST10	0.0946	0.265
TRANPAST10	0.1291	0.108
TRADFLO5YMA(-1)	0.0000	0.276
TRADFLO5YMAPOP(-1)	-0.0043	0.053
DEMOC2PRIOR	-0.0187	0.465
TRANMILEX5YMA(-1)	2.2175	0.420
C	-2.7718	0.000
McFadden R-squared	0.2588	
Obs with Dep=0	507	
Obs with Dep=1	10	

The only statistically significant result that was obtained when the model was restricted to Latin American and Caribbean countries was on the duration of military transfers. The effect was the same as when the model was applied to all countries and to all third world countries; namely, duration of military transfers was positively associated with an increased likelihood of a successful coup d'état in disaligned countries, but not in aligned countries.

3.5) Discussion of Results:

As evidenced by the low R-squared values on these models, the models do underperform at predicting overall coup occurrences and alignment movement. There are obviously numerous other factors which influence both international alignment and the occurrence of coups d'états. The objective of the analysis was not, however, to develop a comprehensive model either of coup d'état events or of international alignment, but rather to specifically examine the impact of a small set of variables that represented international influences on coups and post-coup alignment.

The economic influence variables were all found to have the opposite effect of the model's predictions. In each model where the effects of these variables were found to be statistically significant, they were found to decrease the likelihood of a coup d'état. The level of economic development may be an important factor here, as more developed countries are thought less likely to experience coups than less developed countries.⁷⁴ Similarly, despite the documented utility of democratic institutions in facilitating the CIA sponsored coups in Iran, Guatemala and Chile, the democracy variable was generally found to have no statistical significance in contradiction to the expected effect under the 'regime access' mode of influence.

US military aid as a share of recipient country military spending was found to have a statistically significant and positive effect on foreign policy alignment towards the United States following a successful coup d'état. This could be interpreted as supporting either the 'bureaucratic interest' model of foreign influence on coups, or the 'socialization'

⁷⁴ See, for example, John B. Londregan, J and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power", *World Politics*, 42 (1990): 151-183

model. That the duration of contact, through military transfers, was more important in increasing the likelihood of coup activity in dis-aligned countries would seem to support the ‘socialization’ model of influence, rather than the ‘bureaucratic interest’ model. One of these models does not necessarily preclude the other, however, and the available documentation of foreign-influenced coups suggests that they are complementary to each other. The fact that these variables can be interpreted as supporting either of the two models is therefore not problematic.

The models presented above provide some weak evidence of the impact of US to third world military to military ties on coup d’etat events, and on the alignment of these countries following coup d’etats. US provided military aid as a share of target country military expenditures is found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on foreign policy re-alignment of these countries towards the US position following a successful, isolated coup d’etat. The duration of US military transfers is generally found to have a statistically significant and positive effect on the likelihood of an isolated coup d’etat occurring, and also on the likelihood of an attempted coup d’etat, when countries have a recent history of foreign policy dis-alignment with the US. The converse does not hold, however- in countries with a recent history of positive alignment with the US, US military transfers do not have any statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a coup d’etat or attempted coup. These results are generally in keeping with two key predictions of the hegemonic model of coups proposed here, i.e. that US military aid and transfers have an impact on foreign policy alignment in the third world through the promotion of pro-US coups d’etat.

4) Conclusion

Economically, the hegemonic order founded by the United States following WWII consisted initially of what Ruggie has termed ‘embedded liberalism’. This international economic order, based on the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, gold convertibility of the USD and capital controls, was intended to allow for the operation of international market forces while at the same time also seeking to “minimize socially disruptive domestic adjustment costs as well as any national economic and political vulnerabilities that might accrue” from the operation of free markets.⁷⁵ This order was made possible by the enormous economic might of the United States. It was also based on forging a consensus among Western capitalist countries about legitimate socio-economic goals and norms regarding the role of the state in achieving these goals.⁷⁶ International economic institutions, notably the IMF and the World Bank, supported and maintained this order.

Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, international economic orthodoxy moved from ‘embedded liberalism’ towards the decidedly less interventionist ‘neo-liberal’ model of free capital movements and limited state

⁷⁵ John Gerard Ruggie (1982) “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order” *International Organization*, 36:2 (Spring) p. 399

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 393-395

intervention. Again, this order was based not only on the economic clout of the United States, but also on the widespread acceptance of the norms embodied in the ‘Washington Consensus’. Just as the IMF and World Bank had supported the system of embedded liberalism, so these international institutions’ roles adapted to this new flavour of American hegemony.⁷⁷

The hegemonic political order founded in large part by the United States after WWII included international organizations, notably the United Nations, and was based on the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states. When the United States ignored the United Nations to undertake a war of regime change in Iraq, it certainly violated the principles of this established framework, and the international and popular legitimacy of the United States was undermined. Many neo-Gramscians, notably including Cox, have proposed that the decline in perceptions of American legitimacy means that the United States can no longer be seen as the global hegemon.⁷⁸

While there was widespread international condemnation of US actions, it nonetheless retained substantial influence and legitimacy, especially among certain foreign elites. For example, Cox and Charbonneau have documented how the historic process of US-Canadian military integration has led Canadian military elites to identify strongly with US national interests, even at times leading them to circumvent Canadian civil authority structures.⁷⁹ In the wake of the US decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, high-level Canadian armed forces personnel expressed to American diplomats their wish to join American forces in Iraq, despite the fact that the war was deeply unpopular with Canadians and that the Chretien government had refused Canadian participation.⁸⁰ The support of the Canadian military, despite the objections of its government, for the US invasion of Iraq suggests that while the US may not be a global hegemon by some definitions, it is still a hegemonic power with global reach.

Nonetheless, the international backlash against the US war in Iraq highlights what has been termed the “paradox of hegemony”: since the hegemon’s power depends in large part on perceptions of legitimacy, the hegemon risks undermining its own power if it exercises its material strength illegitimately; i.e., outside of the set of norms that define the hegemonic order.⁸¹

In the context of a world order in which respect for state sovereignty is a guiding principle, the coup d’etat can help resolve hegemonic paradox. The G.W. Bush

⁷⁷ Arne Ruckert (2007) “Reproducing Neo-Liberal Hegemony? A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in Nicaragua” *Studies in Political Economy*, 79 (Spring) p. 91-118

⁷⁸ Cox, R. (2004) “Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order” *New Political Economy*, 9:3 (September), p. 311-312

⁷⁹ Wayne S. Cox and Bruno Charbonneau, “Global Order, US Hegemony and Military Integration: The Canadian-American Defense Relationship” *International Political Sociology*, 4 (2008): 305-321

⁸⁰ CBC, “Wikileaks cable notes Harper’s senate ‘about face’”, CBC.ca/news, April 28, 2011, <http://www.cbc.ca/m/rich/canada/sudbury/story/2011/04/28/wiki-leaks.html>

⁸¹ Cronin, R. (2001) “The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations” *European Journal of International Relation*, 7:1 (March)

administration considered sponsoring a coup to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, and only settled on overt military action once it was determined that the effectiveness of Hussein's internal security apparatus precluded this possibility.⁸² Lilley and Downes' analysis of de-classified US government documents detailing the deliberations surrounding the Guatemalan and Chilean coups suggests that the decision to engage in covert action was motivated in part by the desire to achieve regime change without the reputational impact that more overt forms of intervention would have had.⁸³ Successful covert action to undermine a foreign regime achieves the goal of regime change while maintaining plausible deniability of involvement in foreign affairs. This is doubly true of pro-hegemonic coups which, while not directly the result of deliberate action on the part of the hegemon, reflect the cooptation of national elites into the hegemonic order.

Arguably, we are now seeing the emergence of a new international political hegemonic order in which, for Western nations at least, the principle of state sovereignty has been supplanted by the principle of 'responsibility to protect', however selectively this latter is applied. Contrasting the recent NATO operations in Libya to the 2003 Iraq war highlights this possibility.

In 2003, the United States undertook a war explicitly aimed at overthrowing the Iraqi Regime, and did so without UN authorization. While, unlike in the Iraq case, the United Nations Security Council did authorize military intervention in Libya, the way the campaign has been carried out and public pronouncements by Western leaders have made it clear that NATO's objective in Libya is regime change, a goal that far exceeds the protection of civilians that was authorized by the Security Council resolution. In either case, the target of military action was a dictator with a reprehensible record of political repression, and similar moralistic arguments could be made in support of ousting either Gaddafi or Hussein. In the lead-up to the US led war to oust Saddam Hussein, popular opposition to the war around the world was widespread and vocal. By comparison, opposition to the Western regime change operation against Libya has been extraordinarily muted, suggesting either apathy or a high level of popular acceptance of the operation. Just as covert action can be seen as a tool to overcome the 'hegemonic paradox' in an era where respect for sovereignty was a source of legitimacy, the humanitarian war may fill this role in an era of 'responsibility to protect'.

⁸² Woodward, B. *Plan Of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004) p. 71-72

⁸³ Mary Lauren Lilley., Alexander B. Downes (2007) "Covert Action, Democratic Peace, And the Cold War" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2007*

Appendix 1: Data Adjustments


Measuring Alignment

In examining the s_{3uni} series, it was found that many (in fact, almost all) countries exhibited a pronounced downwards trend in affinity with the US over the sample period (1946-2002). This trend was especially pronounced from 1978 to the end of the cold war, approximately. This raises questions about the use of the raw S from UNGA voting records to approximate alignment or dis-alignment with the US: if the US takes generally contrarian positions in the United Nations, all nations may exhibit voting patterns that are less aligned with the United States than they were previously. Those countries that are more aligned with the US can still be expected to vote more in line with the US than those that are opposed to it, however.


The presence of the global trend also raises a methodological problem for measuring alignment movement following a coup d'état. A coup d'état that occurs in a global period of 'downward' shifting in global voting affinity with the US might be captured as being 'anti-American', since the voting affinity after the coup would be lower than the voting affinity before the coup, even if this drop in affinity were merely reflective of the global change in voting positions.

Rather than using the unadjusted affinity index data, this paper applies a regional adjustment to the s_{3uni} series to remove the global trend. The simple adjustment is a subtraction of individual country S -scores with the United States from the mean of regional country scores with the United States in every year. America's allies abroad can be expected to vote more in line with the US position than its enemies, regardless of the adoption of US positions that are regionally (or globally) unpopular. The regions are defined based on US Unified Strategic Commands, as this is assumed to be a good proxy of US strategic thinking, and so relative 'regional' allies can be assessed based on the affinity score these countries show relative to other countries in these regions.


Some examples of how this adjustment impacts the data are given below. A visual inspection of this adjustment to some key historical cases suggests that a country's voting position relative to the regional mean voting position is a better indicator of relative alignment or dis-alignment with the United States than its 'raw' S -score, which can be influenced by US positions in the United Nations that are globally (or regionally) disliked.



The raw affinity data for the United Kingdom show that even during the Thatcher years, which were characterised by a close ideological affinity between the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom and close cooperation on security issues, the United Kingdom's voting position in the UNGA followed a trend away from that of the United States. Using the unadjusted UK s3uni data would suggest that the Thatcher years were years where the US and UK became less aligned.





However, after adjusting for the global mean of UNGA votes, the adjusted UK s3uni shows that the Thatcher years were years in which the UK had a (relatively to the rest of the world) pronounced increase in its affinity with the United States, which is in keeping with commonly accepted knowledge of UK-US relations over this period.




A similar, though less pronounced pattern is seen in the regionally adjusted UK affinity index data. While the Thatcher-Reagan years still stand out as a period of close US-UK alignment, the regionally adjusted series shows a less pronounced increase in affinity, because the EUCOM country grouping (comprised of Europe and Canada) is generally closer in affinity to the US than the rest of the world; consequently, the difference between the UK and the EUCOM regional average is less than the difference between the UK and the global mean.

The CENTCOM unified strategic command includes the Middle East and the Central Asian Republics. In this paper, the Central Asian Republics are excluded from CENTCOM, despite their inclusion in this Unified Strategic Command by the United States. Since these countries only joined the UN following the cold war, and were formerly in the USSR, they are instead included in the regional classification ‘Socialist Bloc’ in this exercise. This regional classification is not a Unified Strategic Command classification but is theoretically justifiable.

CENTCOM countries display a remarkable propensity to vote in apparent lockstep in the UNGA. This is likely owing to the influence of the Arab League in this region in dictating a unified Arab Voting bloc in the United Nations. Furthermore, countries in this region display a pronounced dis-affinity with the United States in their voting records.



The un-adjusted data for the Yemen Arab Republic and the Yemen People's Republic (distinct entities in the UNGA from 1967-1990) show a remarkable amount of similarity in voting patterns relative to the United States. This is true both for the unadjusted data and for the globally adjusted data, which reflects the degree of similarity in Arab country voting behaviour.




However, the regionally adjusted data show a generally positive (though varying) regionally adjusted voting affinity of the Yemen Arab Republic, contrasted with a consistently negative regionally adjusted affinity of the Yemen People’s Republic. This reflects the YPR’s general alignment with the Soviet Union and the YAR’s general alignment with the United States during the Cold War. The differences here are quite small. Indeed, this is also the case with other ostensible US allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt under Mubarak.⁸⁴


Regionally adjusting the s3uni series does seem to generally improve the data, but there are still a number of cases where this clearly does not hold, particularly in the Middle East. For example, because it is included CENTCOM region, which displays a very strong and persistent anti-US voting record in the UNGA, Iran actually ends up being described as being positively aligned with the US compared to other CENTCOM countries following the 1978 revolution. Some further issues with the regionally adjusted s3uni data for some countries are also explored below in Appendix 2.

An alternate means of proxying alignment is to use an S-measure based on countries’ alliance portfolios. This measure is constructed in the same way as the S-measure based on countries’ voting records, but rather than calculating a distance matrix based on voting patterns in the UNGA this method uses a distance matrix based on whether or not countries are similarly allied with other countries in the global system of states, i.e. it is a measure of any two countries similarity of alliance portfolios. Theoretically, the reasoning behind the use of such a measure is quite sound. However, one disadvantage that this measure seems to have is that it ‘moves’ quite slowly. Long-term differences between countries that are known to be aligned vs. dis-aligned with the US are clear (as in the comparison of Canada and the USSR/Russia, below, using the S-Leader variable from generated by the EUGene software, which is the alliance portfolio S-score of countries with the United States from 1946 onwards):

⁸⁴ Data and analysis available upon request.



However, this measure does not seem to adequately describe some periods of pronounced dis-alignment with the US that are captured by the s3uni data. For example, the regionally adjusted s3uni data for Nicaragua is compared to the alliance portfolio S-leader data below:



The Sandinista period is clearly caught as a dis-alignment from the United States in the regionally adjusted affinity index data, but the alliance portfolio data actually suggest a positive re-alignment with the United States over this period:

The difficulties described above with using either the unadjusted UNGA voting data or the S-score based on alliance portfolios led to the choice to use the regionally adjusted s3uni in the modelling. The regionally adjusted s3uni data is theoretically defensible, and yields (on visual inspection) results that conform closely to ‘common knowledge’ about various countries’ alignment to the United States.

Other Data Adjustments:

Affinity of Nations Data:

It should be noted that the raw Affinity of Nations data downloaded appeared to have some coding errors. A visual inspection, for example, showed that the data for East and West Germany were switched for the year 1986. Some countries that were absent from UN voting for certain years were also coded as voting 1, i.e. perfect alignment with the United States. These figures were removed from the data. There were other instances where a country's vote in a given year was 1 that could have been a coding error, but where this was not certain. In cases where the votes around that year were also fairly high, the possibility was not ruled out that the country had voted in lockstep with the United States. In what could be criticized as a fairly subjective process, scores of 1 in the data were either left as they were if the adjacent years were similarly high, replaced with the average of the adjacent years, or removed as probable coding errors.



Coups D'Etat Events Data:


A technical problem with using the Coups D'etat events data was the presence of multiple coups in a given country in a single year. In these cases, multiple coup events in a single year were coded according to the 'highest' activity: if there were two attempted coups and one successful coup in a year, this was coded as a single coup d'etat. If there were two successful coups in a year (e.g. in instances of coups and counter-coups), this was similarly coded as a single coup d'etat. Two measures of annual coup activity were constructed, but not used in the models. These were 'maximum coup activity' and 'sum of coup activity'. To construct these two measures, coup events were assigned values at 1 for a successful coup, 0.5 for an attempted coup, 0.33 for a coup plot, and 0.25 for an alleged coup (the inverse of the 'success' variables used in the database). For 'maximum coup activity', the highest score was used: in a year where there were two alleged coup events and one attempted coup, the score given would be 0.5. For 'sum coup activity', the annual value represents the sum of all coup activity in that year: in a year where there was a successful coup and a coup plot event, the score for the year would be 1.33.

Minor Adjustments

Minor adjustments to the data included adjusting all monetary values to thousands of constant 2009 USD. Adjustments were also made to match the Correlates of War country-year identifiers to the Polity IV identifiers.

Appendix 2: Regionally Adjusted Affinity Data for Iran, Guatemala and Chile





Appendix 3: America’s Best Friends and Worst Enemies Through the Decades

These tables present the six countries with the highest S-scores in UNGA voting (i.e. most aligned with the US) and the six countries with the lowest scores, averaged over every decade for the sample period. The last average is from 1993-2002, reflecting the fact that the Affinity of Nations data are only available for UNGA voting records up to 2002. The regionally adjusted scores for these countries are also presented. It is interesting to watch the end of the cold war in these tables, as Eastern Bloc countries stop being in the enemies list, replaced by Socialist bloc holdouts and Arab countries. It is also interesting to see European countries gradually replaced following the Cold War by countries where the United States played a positive diplomatic role in the nineties (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.) Proponents of the theory of ‘soft balancing’ might also suggest European powers began to use international institutions to somewhat limit American international influence after the Cold War. Also worth mentioning is the case of Yugoslavia- while initially one of the United States’ ‘worst enemies’, the regionally adjusted data for Yugoslavia shows its relative independence from other European socialist countries at the time.

1946-1955: America's Six Worst Enemies			1966-1975: America's Six Worst Enemies			1986-1995: America's Six Worst Enemies		
	10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted
Belarus	-0.388	-0.049	Bulgaria	-0.152	-0.065	Cuba	-0.514	-0.296
Ukraine	-0.383	-0.045	Hungary	-0.152	-0.065	Libya	-0.475	-0.199
Russia	-0.382	-0.044	Russia	-0.148	-0.061	Vietnam	-0.473	-0.213
Poland	-0.359	-0.021	Algeria	-0.148	-0.318	India	-0.469	-0.209
Czechoslo	-0.350	-0.012	Czechoslo	-0.143	-0.056	Syria	-0.453	-0.070
Yugoslavia	-0.137	0.202	Poland	-0.143	-0.056	Algeria	-0.451	-0.175
1946-1955: America's Six Best Friends			1966-1975: America's Six Best Friends			1986-1995: America's Six Best Friends		
	10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted
Paraguay	0.670	0.130	Canada	0.659	0.120	Netherland	0.234	0.109
Netherland	0.677	0.070	Italy	0.682	0.143	Belgium	0.239	0.114
Turkey	0.678	0.071	Netherland	0.697	0.158	France	0.310	0.185
Iceland	0.687	0.080	Belgium	0.746	0.206	Dominica	0.323	0.542
Canada	0.701	0.094	Luxembou	0.757	0.218	United Kin	0.446	0.321
Nicaragua	0.706	0.166	United Kin	0.773	0.233	Israel	0.568	0.443
1956-1965: America's Six Worst Enemies			1976-1985: America's Six Worst Enemies			1993-2002: America's Six Worst Enemies		
	10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted
Romania	-0.329	-0.042	Cuba	-0.317	-0.324	Libya	-0.448	-0.313
Russia	-0.327	-0.041	Belarus	-0.303	-0.078	India	-0.445	-0.304
Czechoslo	-0.325	-0.038	Russia	-0.301	-0.076	Cuba	-0.444	-0.304
Ukraine	-0.324	-0.037	Hungary	-0.299	-0.074	China	-0.418	-0.276
Belarus	-0.322	-0.035	Czechoslo	-0.297	-0.072	Sudan	-0.415	-0.279
Bulgaria	-0.318	-0.032	Ukraine	-0.296	-0.071	Syria	-0.411	-0.108
1956-1965: America's Six Best Friends			1976-1985: America's Six Best Friends			1993-2002: America's Six Best Friends		
	10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted		10 year average voting alignment	Regionally adjusted
New Zeala	0.792	0.386	Luxembou	0.506	0.212	St. Kitts ar	0.459	0.599
Netherland	0.795	0.127	Belgium	0.510	0.216	Bosnia and	0.534	0.378
United Kin	0.797	0.129	France	0.516	0.222	Rwanda	0.563	0.699
Italy	0.800	0.132	German Fe	0.557	0.263	D R Congc	0.585	0.721
Canada	0.801	0.133	United Kin	0.644	0.350	Turkmenis	0.605	0.449
Nicaragua	0.840	0.201	Israel	0.644	0.350	Israel	0.733	0.567