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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANADA'S TOKYO LEGATION IN 1928:
CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, 1894-1933

By

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Thesis submitted to
the School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
M.A. degree in History.

Université d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa



Tou Chu Dou Lynhiavu, Ottawa, Canada, 1991



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ABSTRACT

Canada's decision to establish a Tokyo Legation in 1928 was a major foreign-policy initiative. The Tokyo Legation demonstrated a clear shift, slight as it may have been, in Canada's international outlook away from its traditional North Atlantic orientation. Japan had emerged from World War One a major power on the international scene and the key actor in the far east. The establishment of the diplomatic mission in Tokyo at such an early date clearly demonstrated that the Department of External Affairs recognized the importance of Canada's relations with Asia/Pacific in general and Japan in particular.

The Tokyo initiative came at a critical moment. Commercially, Canada had long pursued closer and better relations with Asia. Culturally, however, Canada considered itself part of the Anglo-saxon world and tried to keep Asia at arms-length. Earlier agreements restricted Japanese emigration, yet trade between Canada and Japan had increased steadily. After the war Japanese trade had clearly and consistently favored Canada; by 1926, Japan was Canada's fourth best customer. At the same time Japanese producers, particularly after the onset of the depression, increasingly put pressure on the Japanese government to adopt protective measures. Such measures, if adopted, might severely damage the huge benefits Canada enjoyed. Canadian Trade Commissioners had neither the authority nor the ability to influence the Japanese government's political decision. Canada needed a diplomatic status.

The Tokyo Legation also proved critical in another way. One of the mission's specific responsibilities was to keep Ottawa informed of the far eastern theatre and, by extension, to gather material essential to the

formulation of Canada's far eastern policy. Despite neglect and without adequate staff the Legation, nonetheless, performed reasonably well. Shortly after the Legation was established, it satisfactorily implemented the 1928 Canada-Japan Immigration Agreement. The Legation also pursued further trade expansion with Japan and other far eastern countries. Unfortunately, as a result of the collapse of international trading system, the Legation worked very hard just to maintain the existing benefits Canada enjoyed. The Legation, meanwhile, consistently forwarded to Ottawa accurate and useable information on Japanese political affairs. Although providing good information on Japan, there was little intelligence information on the broader Asian scene. There was no "China view" to provide balance. This situation reflects not the competence of the Legation staff but its size and the Department of External Affairs' unrealistic expectations. The attempt to gather materials essential for the formulation of Canada's "Far Eastern" policy proved a vision beyond the reach of a single understaffed diplomatic mission in Tokyo.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As an undergraduate history student, I found a great deal of imbalance in studies on Canada's international relations. Canadian diplomatic history has been almost completely dominated by concern for Canada's relations with the North Atlantic Triangle; studies of Canada's Asia/Pacific diplomatic relations are almost non-existent. After entering the graduate program Professor Michael Piva, who I have known and come to respect and admire, suggested that I examine Canada's decision to create its Tokyo Legation. I owe much of my success to him not only in terms of ideas, supervision and encouragement but also his valuable criticism and editorial help. Without Professor Piva I would neither have undertaken nor completed this research. Whatever inaccuracies, faults and/or shortcomings this research may still contain, Professor Piva is in no way responsible. The responsibility is exclusively mine.

I also owe much to many people for their valuable assistance and constructive criticism. I would like to thank Professor R. Jones of Carleton University with whom I occasionally discussed my topic and who gave a number of useful suggestions. Professor Michael Behiels of University of Ottawa who read this essay before I submitted it for defense also deserves a great deal of thanks. Equally, I would like to thank Diane Duguay and the staff at the National Archives of Canada who assisted me during my research stage. Finally, and most importantly, I must thank my wife, Françoise Bitz, whose encouragement and help have given me that extra energy to complete this essay.

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INTRODUCTION

On January 10, 1928 a small article entitled, "Minister For Tokio [sic] Planned By Canada, So London Is Told," appeared in the *Toronto Globe*.¹ According to this article, "The Canadian Government, besides elevating its Commissioner-General in Paris to that of a Minister, has decided to appoint a Minister to Tokio." Although short, the article identified all the key issues involved in this decision. The desire to expand Canada's diplomatic ties with other nations, the article stated, "is not a departure in principle" from the conclusions of the 1926 Imperial Conference. Rather, "It is a more rapid extension of the principle than was expected at the time of the [Imperial] Conference." The *London Times* shared this view. "There is nothing in the world, except her own sense of expediency and of the bearing of Imperial Interests, to prevent Canada . . . from sending diplomatic representatives to any country she may please."² The decision, the *Globe* suggested, had been made "with a view to advancing the cordial relations between Japan and Canada."³ Despite the bland coverage in the press, this decision generated heated debates both inside and outside the House of Commons over Canada's position within the Empire. Canada's decision to establish a diplomatic mission in Tokyo, moreover, shifted Canada's international focus, if ever so slightly, away from the North Atlantic Triangle.

¹ The *Toronto Globe*, January 10, 1928 found in newspaper clippings in National Archives of Canada (NAC), W. L. M. King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 166, file 18.

² The *London Times*, January 12, 1928, *Ibid*. See also *Ottawa Morning Citizen* and *La Presse*, January 27, 1928.

³ The *Toronto Globe*, January 10, 1928 found in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 166, file 18.

The 1928 decision to open the Tokyo Legation has received little scholarly attention. Many Canadian diplomatic historians and Department of External Affairs' officials make only occasional, often cursory, comments on the topic. Too often they ignore completely Canada's Asia/Pacific relations prior to World War Two.⁴ The result of this lack of scholarly interests is, according to Eric Downton, the development of a "Pacific-Blind-Spot."⁵ What research has been done on Canada-Japan relations in the 1920's and 1930's, meanwhile, emphasize the issues of immigration and trade.⁶ The most recent work by John Hilliker, for example, suggests that "Plans for a legation in Tokyo were in part a response to renewed hostility in British Columbia to immigration from Japan."⁷ He continues that "In public," however, "the proposed legation was presented as a means of expanding trade and acknowledging Canada's growing interest in the Pacific." Thus, Hilliker suggests, Canada's main interest had always been immigration while trade was secondary.⁸ This interpretation is not sufficient.

⁴ For example, J. E. Read, "Problems of an External Affairs Legal Advisor, 1928-46," *International Journal*, Vol. XXII no. 3 (Summer, 1967). Read did not even mention the Tokyo Legation. H. F. Angus, "The Development of Canadian Far Eastern Policy," in *Twenty Five Years of Canadian Foreign Policy* edited by E. McInnes (Toronto, 1953), pp. 41-50. Angus worked as special Assistant to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. It is hard to believe that the analysis of Canada's Far Eastern policy could have been written without acknowledging the existence of or making reference to the legation.

⁵ Eric Downton, *Pacific Challenge: Canada's Future in the New Asia* (Toronto, 1986), p. 10 and 30.

⁶ Gordon H. Skilling, "The Rise of Canadian Diplomatic Service," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 9 no. 2 (May, 1947), p. 214 and G. P. de T. Glazebrook, *A History of Canadian External Relations* (Toronto, 1950), p. 385 and p. 388. For criticism, see Lester B. Pearson's article in *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1951), p. 20.

⁷ John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal and Kingston, 1990), p. 112.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

A careful examination of archival sources suggests that the motives of the Department of External Affairs were not limited to immigration and trade. By themselves, immigration and trade concerns were insufficient to warrant the establishment of formal diplomatic ties. Canada had similar concerns, for example, with India and China, yet Canada did not exchange diplomatic representatives with those countries. These two issues, moreover, had a long history dating back to the nineteenth century. At the same time, Canada had been dealing successfully with trade and immigration for many years without benefit of diplomatic contact. Although trade issues and immigration problems no doubt provided primary motives, Canada had broader objectives.

At the turn of the century, Japan emerged as the dominant power in Asia. Japan possessed the third most powerful navy in the world and was recognized as a major power on the international scene. Canada recognized the importance of Asia/Pacific in general; Japan was a major player in international relations and global geo-politics. As Canada inched its way toward an independent foreign policy during the 1920s, the government sought a "window" on Asia, a "listening post" to better access information on the changing international relations in the far east. This thesis will explore these issues by examining the political, economic and diplomatic factors which led to the decision to establish the Canadian Legation in Tokyo in 1928.

Canada's intentions when establishing the Tokyo Legation were admirable. What would become clear, however, was that the effort proved half-hearted. The Legation was to keep the government informed of political developments in Asia, yet the Department of External Affairs was not willing to commit adequate resources for the tasks. The Legation staff, although competent and qualified, was simply too small. The Legation performed its work competently and

professionally. Headquartered in Tokyo, political information on Japanese developments was particularly good. The Legation's coverage of the far east and Asia as a whole, not surprisingly, left much to be desired.

Chapter I examines Canada's relations with Britain, its position within the empire, and the struggle for autonomy in foreign policy decisions which culminated in the decisions taken at the Imperial Conference of 1926. Chapter II looks at Canada's relations with Japan in particular and Asia/Pacific in general during the first decades of this century. Two problems dominated those relations: trade and immigration. Both, meanwhile, would be resolved satisfactorily by the early 1920s. Chapter III examines in detail the process of establishing diplomatic representation with Japan. Particular attention will be given to the choice of personnel sent to Tokyo. Chapter IV evaluates the performance of the Legation both in terms of its official agenda and in terms of the general work associated with diplomatic missions. In short, it addresses the question of whether or not the intelligence provided by the Tokyo Legation was usable in formulating Canada's Asian-Pacific foreign policy.

Chapter I

The Long Road To Independent Diplomatic Representation

The search for expanding trade led to the establishment of Canada's first representation abroad. As early as 1865 an eight-man delegation travelled to London to discuss how trade could be expanded or extended to the West Indies, Spain and its colonies, Brazil and Mexico.¹ Later in 1872, the Honorable J. H. Gary, a New Brunswicker, suggested that Canada "would not be injured by being thrown upon its own resources" in the conduct of its own trade negotiation.² It was not, however, until after the Washington Treaty of 1871 that Canada received the right to negotiate its own commercial treaties with other nations.³ This search for markets and desire to negotiate trade agreements meant the sending of officials, without diplomatic standing, to foreign lands.

Although a High Commission had been established in London in 1880, Canada's first representation abroad outside the Empire was in Paris in 1882.⁴ Sir John A. Macdonald made the Honorable Hector Fabre, already the Agent General of the

¹ Mary O. Hill, *Canada's Salesman To The World* (Montreal, 1977), pp. 9-11.

² J. H. Gray, *Confederation Or The Political and Parliamentary History of Canada*, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1872), pp. 295-6.

³ For a more detailed treatment of the Washington Treaty of 1871, see Glazebrook, *A History of Canadian External Relations*, pp. 110-136 and C. P. Stacey, *Canada and The Age of Conflict*, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1977), pp. 19-30.

⁴ For a quick summary of Franco-Canadian diplomatic relations, see *La Presse*, 20 Août, 1960, p. 13.

province of Quebec, the representative of the federal government by appointing him the Canadian Commissioner General. While Fabre was to gather information on trade and commerce, one of his specific functions was to deal with immigration.⁵ After this Paris initiative, commercial services or tours abroad began to expand. In 1885, for example, the federal government sent four agents abroad in search of potential trade: Colonel Walker Powell went to the Sandwich Islands (now Hawaii), John T. Wylde to the West Indies, Cuba and Puerto Rico, Alex Woods to Australia and Simeon Jones to Argentina and Brazil.⁶

The Department of Trade and Commerce, 1867-1923

To co-ordinate these various missions the government proposed creating the Department of Trade and Commerce in 1887. An economic slump, financial difficulties, political considerations and complications with the Colonial Office, however, delayed effective action until 1892. The new minister, according to the legislation introduced to the House of Commons that year, would be responsible for all "matters connected with trade and commerce generally as are not by law assigned to any other Department of the Government of Canada."⁷

⁵ G. H. Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy* (Toronto, 1945), p. 10.

⁶ Hill, *Canada's Salesman*, p. 11.

⁷ Canada. *Statute of the Dominion*. Ottawa: 1888. 50-51 Victoria (1887), c. 10, s. 3.

Despite posting Trade Commissioners abroad and pursuing its own trade agreements, Canada remained a British colony which exercised little political control over its external relations. Because of its political status, questions of Imperial ties dominated Canada's external relations with Britain. Canada's geographical position also insured that its primary concerns centered on economic, political and military relations with the United States. Trade with other nations pursued through the agents of the Department of Trade and Commerce became a means to lessen Canada's dependence on these two giants. This became particularly important at the turn of the century as new economic opportunities presented themselves.

As the Canadian economy boomed at the turn of the century commercial tours abroad increased dramatically, often with the appointment of part-time agents. The employment of part-time agents created inefficiencies, and by 1910 it became clear that better supervision and coordination of activities and agents abroad was required. The supervisory powers shifted from the Deputy Minister for Trade and Commerce, F. C. T. O'Hara, to the Commercial Intelligence Service headed by Richard Grigg after the latter's resignation from British commercial service.⁸ The service's budget increased more rapidly than its duties: from \$11,045 (1896-97) to \$117,060 (1911-12).⁹ By 1911, there were twenty five Trade Commissioners

⁸ NAC, Privy Council, RG 2, Vol. 2808 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 44, PC 120/1133, (May 3, 1912); PC 866 (April 9, 1912) and PC 1485 (May 28, 1912). See also NAC, Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 2, file A-32, O'Hara to Grigg, April 23, 1912 and Grigg to O'Hara, April 24, 1912.

⁹ Auditor General *Annual Report*, 3 George V, 1897, *Sessional Papers*, no. 1, Y-12. Hereafter cited as *Auditor General Report*.

or Commercial Agents abroad.¹⁰ The service offered advice to exporters and provided information on general tariff levels as well as on specific commodities.

The commercial connections with foreign countries as well as the Imperial ties to the Colonial Office provided Canada with a window on the outside world. Prior to the 1920's these Canadian Trade Commissioners were the only official representatives of Canada in foreign countries. They not only gathered information about foreign nations but introduced Canada to the nations in which they were stationed. Growth, however, ensured that such limited representation abroad was no longer adequate. Commercial agents by definition were not diplomatic representatives of governments and were treated as such. As more diplomatic exchanges among nations took place and as the bureaucracy and institutions of modern governments evolved, communication among nations became more important and more complicated. Canadian Trade Commissioners found themselves increasingly handicapped in conducting their business because they lacked diplomatic status. Diplomatic representation became increasingly necessary to the pursuit of trade as well as diplomacy.

The lack of diplomatic status posed many professional, social and financial problems. Without diplomatic standing, Trade Commissioners could not approach the officials of host governments. "At times, [our] Trade Commissioners," as the Minister of Trade and Commerce observed, "have been courteously informed by certain foreign officials that as they have no standing they can have no communication, no matter how trifling the subject may be."¹¹ Although officers

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1911-12.

¹¹ For a detailed discussion, see NAC, Honorable James S. Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 12, file "Trade and Commerce 1927-29," "Memorandum: Status of Canadian Government Trade Commissioners in Foreign Countries, November 3, 1926." This same document and other related memos are also found in Trade and

stationed within the empire faced fewer problems, all required the assistance of British officials posted in the host countries. Adequate access to British diplomatic help, however, was never guaranteed. The problem was especially acute in Latin America and in the orient where status played a critical, if not vital, role. The creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1909 failed to solve this problem.

The Department of External Affairs, 1909-1923

The desire to create a new department to handle external relations emerged at the turn of the century. When Joseph Pope (later Sir), the private secretary of Sir John A. Macdonald (1882-1891) and an Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council (1891-96), became Under-Secretary of State in 1896, he began to gather together records covering Canada's relations with both Britain and other foreign countries. In 1904, he suggested to Laurier that a separate department should be created specifically "charged with all the matters of a quasi-diplomatic character."¹² Like the British, the Canadian government had its own version of "muddling through". Since no central registry existed records coming from the Colonial Office were distributed to the appropriate departments. Dispatches could often wind up misplaced or lost. It sometimes took repeated reminders from the Colonial Office before Canada responded to requests from Britain, and responses

Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I.

¹² NAC, Sir Wilfred Laurier Papers, MG 26, G, Vol. 348, Pope to Laurier, December 27, 1904.

did not always follow a consistent and logical pattern.¹³ This resulted from the fact that usually two or three people, sometimes in different departments, dealt with the same issues at different times. On occasion two or three responses whose contents might be quite contradictory would be sent to the Colonial Office. Despite such problems, Laurier's initial reaction to Pope's suggestion was cool, and little was done in the short-term.

Not until May 25, 1907 did the question of a Department of External Affairs receive official consideration. In that year, the government set up a Royal Commission on the Civil Service to deal with the enormous problems of administrating federal departments. Although not specifically created to deal with External Affairs, the Royal Commission provided a glorious opportunity for Pope to pursue his favorite project. His memorandum to the Royal Commission on the Civil Service read:

I desire, with the permission of the Commissioners, to offer a few observations upon a matter akin to the subject of their inquiry. I refer to the desirableness of establishing a more systematic mode of dealing with what I may term, for want of a better phrase, the external affairs of the Dominion. . . .

In the early days of Confederation, when these questions were few, the Prime Minister of the day kept them pretty much in his own hands; but with the growth and development of the Dominion this is no longer possible.

The practical result of the system in vogue is that there does not exist to-day in any department a complete record of any correspondence to which I alluded. It has been so scattered, and passed through so many hands, that there is no approach to continuity in any of the departmental files.

¹³ H. L. Keenleyside, "The Department of External Affairs," *Queen's Quarterly*, Vol. XLIV no. 4 (Winter, 1937), p. 485. According to Keenleyside, who headed the Far Eastern Division in the Department of External Affairs, similar incidents also took place with foreign governments and "on more than one occasion which inconsistencies were brought to the attention of the Canadian Government by foreign power to which both decisions had been communicated."

Such knowledge concerning them as is available is, for the most part, lodged in the memories of a few officials¹⁴

The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission proved as cool as Laurier had been three years earlier. The Royal Commission promised only to give "proper consideration" to Pope's suggestion.

In light of this cool reception Pope sought allies. Although copies of his brief went to various members of the government, only L. P. Brodeur, the Minister of Marine and Naval Defence, responded. Brodeur was "very impressed with your arguments, and they are exactly in accord with my own views."¹⁵ Yet, Brodeur failed to push Pope's initiative in Cabinet. Administrative reform of Canada's external relations, however, was about to receive a major boost.

Problems dealing with Japan provided the critical, if by no means the only, catalyst for the creation of the Department of External Affairs. Shortly after the Vancouver Riot in September 1907, R. Lemieux, the Minister of Labour, and Pope travelled to Japan to negotiate a "Gentleman's Agreement" which would limit Japanese immigration to Canada. The preparation for and the experience during the negotiations in Tokyo confirmed Pope's belief that the administration of external relations needed to be centralized in a single department. Preparation for the negotiations had been haphazard, and Lemieux soon began complaining to colleagues that

il est malheureusement trop évident que nous n'avons suivi, au Canada, les négociations d'assez près. Nous pouvions — au début — obtenir des Concessions et c'est à peine si nous avons répondu par un accusé de

¹⁴ "Memorandum for Consideration of the Civil Service Commissioners, 25 May, 1907," *Civil Service Commission 1908: Minutes of Evidence*, I, pp. 48-50, *Sessional Papers of Canada*, XLII no. 15, 1907-08. For further correspondence between Pope and J. M. Courtney, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, see NAC, Sir Joseph Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 20, file 191.

¹⁵ Laurier Papers, MG 26, G, Vol. 348, Brodeur to Pope, October 21, 1907.

réception aux propositions avantageuses qui nous étaient faites! Nous manquons absolument de tradition et de correction. L'affaire de toute le monde n'est l'affaire de personne. . . . Je n'ai pu obtenir à Ottawa que des bribes de documents et de correspondances, ce rapportant à ce traité. Il faut avoir au contraire comme les records du F.O. à Londres sont parfaits et comme la genèse du traité en est complète. J'ai pu mettre la main sur ces records Il faut que Sir W. [Laurier] réorganise dans le service public tout ce qui a trait à la correspondance officielle. Il ne faut plus qu'elle soit répartie entre les différents ministères. Tout devrait être remis au Secrétaire d'État et nous aurions alors des Records intelligibles.

Tout ceci pour dire que si, comme j'en ai maintenant la certitude, je réussis à régler cette affaire, il faudra se garer à l'avenir.¹⁶

Fortunately, Pope had asked the Foreign Office for copies of records regarding immigration and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1894 prior to their departure.¹⁷ Although no copies had been given to Canada at the time, the whole set of records was now sent to the British Embassy in Tokyo for Lemieux's use.¹⁸ Lemieux "found the record of the British Embassy . . . [in Tokyo] very useful" during his negotiations with his Japanese counterpart, Count Hayashi.¹⁹ With complete and organized records, negotiations proceeded more quickly. Misunderstandings could now be quickly clarified and resolved.

Experience convinced Lemieux that Pope's project was vital. Lemieux wrote directly to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, asking for "a complete series of Foreign Confidential Print" much of which related to Canada.²⁰ Although Grey initially declined the request because of "the strict

¹⁶ Laurier Papers, MG 26, G, Vol. 348, Lemieux to Jetté, December 4, 1907.

¹⁷ Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 132, folder 191, Under-Secretary of State: Semi-Official Correspondence, February 10, 1908.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ NAC, Rudolphe Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D10, Vol. 7, Lemieux to Sir Edward Grey, December 13, 1907.

²⁰ *Ibid.* The Foreign Confidential Print is available only to British Cabinet members and the Foreign Office officials.

rules we are obliged to observe with regard to their distribution and the principle involved in these rules," he nonetheless suggested that "if you will specify what special documents you may wish to have, I will gladly do my best to meet your wishes."²¹ Grey's response disappointed both Lemieux and Pope:

What a commentary this affords on our lack of system! If my suggestion had been listened to years ago, we should not have to ask anybody for these papers to-day, for we should have had them ourselves."²²

The need for a separate department had been clearly demonstrated.

Despite this initial rejection, Lemieux persisted. "At this moment," Lemieux wrote to Sir Edward Grey, "it is a little difficult, nay, impossible, for me to specify any particular documents, as the file has running through it references to Canada, and it is the documents containing these references that I desire in particular."²³ Lemieux assured Grey that confidentiality and secrecy would be observed and maintained "with the greatest care."²⁴ MacKenzie King's, the Deputy Minister of Labour, pending visit to London would be used to better inform Grey of the necessity of the government having access to these documents. A copy of the whole set, Lemieux suggested, could be given to King before he returned to Canada. Much to everyone's surprise, particularly Pope's, King

²¹ Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D10, Vol. 7, Sir Edward Grey to Lemieux, February 11, 1908.

²² Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D10, Vol. 7, Pope to Lemieux, February 24, 1908.

²³ Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D10, Vol. 7, Lemieux to Sir Edward Grey, March 5, 1908.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

returned with a copy of these records.²⁵ The first step toward the creation of a Department of External Affairs had been taken.

Pope's third and most influential ally in the fight for his project was the Governor General of Canada, Earl Grey. As the official channel of communication between the Canadian government, the British government and various British Embassies abroad, Grey became increasingly involved in Canada's external relations. Like Pope, he realized the necessity for a separate department whose responsibility it would be to deal with treaties and their negotiation. Canada's bureaucratic short-comings brought criticism from Grey who commented in 1908 that:

Bryce's [British Ambassador to the U.S.] difficulties in conducting the negotiations (with the U.S. Government) have, I am sorry to say, been increased by the chaotic condition of the Administration here qua External Affairs. There is no Department, no official through whose hands all matters dealing with external affairs must go. Consequently there is no record, no continuity, no method, no consistency.

I have presented all this to Laurier, who agrees with every word I say

James Bryce, like Grey, proved to be another ally. Charged with looking after Canada's interests in the United States, Bryce had more than enough first-hand experience with and knowledge about Canada's disorganized bureaucracy. "Too frequently he found himself on the point of reaching agreement with the U.S. State Department only to discover with concern and chagrin that the Canadian government had changed its stand on the issue or had allowed issues to lie unattended while disposing of other business. On occasion Bryce suggested

²⁵ James Eayrs, "The Origins of Canada's Department of External Affairs," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. XXV no. 2 (May, 1959), p. 115.

²⁶ NAC, Grey of Howick Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 14, drawer 7, file 25, Grey to Lord Elgin, March 23, 1908.

questions had been altogether forgotten about by Canada."²⁷ In 1908, for example, he complained that,

All this shows once more the frightful inconvenience of not having in Ottawa a Dept. of External Affairs. Knowing how Sir Wilfred Laurier is worked . . . I entirely understand his difficulties. But the loss of time which this constant breaking the chain of negotiations and then trying to rivet the sundered links afresh involves is so great that really nothing seems so urgent as to create at once the needed department. Will you not continue to press for doing this?²⁸

The pressure to create a separate Department was mounting.

The Colonial Office, however, opposed the idea. It feared that a Department of External Affairs in Ottawa might be tempted to communicate directly with the Foreign Office cutting the Colonial Office out from critical decisions and initiatives.²⁹ Grey quickly assured both the British government and the Colonial Office officials that such a department in Ottawa would not create diplomatic disunity within the empire. Far from becoming an independent entity, a Canadian Department of External Affairs would be attached to the Prime Minister Office and officials in such a Department "will keep him properly posted."³⁰ In the end, the Colonial Office came to accept such a Department as "indispensable," and convinced itself as well that a "secretariat attached to the Prime Minister . . . need not do any harm."³¹

²⁷ Eayrs, "The Origins of Canada's Department of External Affairs," p. 117.

²⁸ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 8, folder U, Bryce to Grey, May 11, 1908.

²⁹ Keenleyside, "Department of External Affairs," p. 486.

³⁰ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 15, folder 30, Grey to Elgin, July 14, 1908.

³¹ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 8, folder X, Bryce to Grey, August 10, 1908.

Finally, in 1908, after years of prompting, Laurier came to support the idea.³² Shortly after the federal elections, Laurier announced his intention to create a new Department and to put Pope in charge.³³ Few serious objections were raised when Parliament discussed legislation in early 1909. Robert Borden, the Conservative leader, suggested, as a personal preference, that the new Department should be placed under the authority of the Prime Minister.³⁴ Like Borden, Sir George Foster, a former Minister of Finance (1888-96), suggested a similar arrangement. Foster worried that the Minister responsible for the Department "is the man who has to determine the policy and is the man who has to lay down the tenor of despatch and submit it to his colleagues."³⁵ Foster preferred "a little body of experts (be attached) to the Privy Council" who would work under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister so that "the nature and sensitiveness of certain issue could be kept confidential and secret." Laurier, meanwhile, stressed the pragmatic nature of his initiative when he declared,

We have given the matter a good deal of consideration and the conclusion we have arrived at is that the foreign affairs with which Canada has to deal are becoming of such absorbing moment as to necessitate special machinery. Look at the volume of business of an external character which has been transacted in the past year The volume of foreign affairs has assumed such proportions as to make it indispensable that we should have officers, trained for the purpose, whose business it shall be to deal with such questions and such questions alone.³⁶

Legislation passed quickly and came into effect on June 1, 1909.

³² Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 14, folder 5, Grey to Lord Elgin, March 28, 1908.

³³ Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Diary, September 9, 1909.

³⁴ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, Session 1909, I, March 4, col. 2002.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, March 4, 1909, col. 1988.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 1980.

Initially the Prime Minister became *ex officio* head of the Department of External Affairs. Then, in early 1911, responsibility shifted to the Secretary of State who would, in turn, be assisted by an Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs with the rank of deputy head of the Department. The duty of the Secretary of State included

the conduct of all official communications between the Government of Canada and the Government of any other country in connection with the external affairs of Canada, and shall be charged with such other duties as may, from time to time, be assigned to the department by order of the Governor in Council in relation to such external affairs, or to the conduct and management of international or intercolonial negotiations so far as they may appertain to the Government of Canada.³⁷

Not everyone, however, supported this definition. The Governor General objected to the term "conduct". Grey saw the word as an "improper attempt to shelve the Governor General."³⁸ He wanted to replace the word "conduct" with "care". A Colonial Office official commented on this occasion that "There was a great deal of fuss here about nothing,"³⁹ yet in the House of Commons, the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, seemed to support Grey. "This Department is merely intended -- like the Corresponding Department of the Commonwealth Government [of Australia] -- to conduct correspondence with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, and with the several departments of the Canadian Government." Asquith assured the House that "No suggestion has been made by the Canadian Government for the increase of their

³⁷ "An Act to Create a Department of External Affairs," 8-9 Edward VII, c. 13, located in Canada's Department of External Affairs Records, *Documents Relatifs Aux Relations Extérieures Du Canada/Documents On Canadian External Relations*, Vol. I, (Ottawa, 1967). Hereafter it will be cited as *Relations Extérieures/External Relations*.

³⁸ Keenleyside, "The Dept. of External Affairs," p. 487.

³⁹ Colonial Office Records, Co 42/930/18380 (available in NAC microfilm reel C-2249), "Minute on Grey," Keith to Crewe, May 8, 1909.

powers in dealing with external affairs."⁴⁰ The *London Times* saw the matter similarly and suggested that the new Department merely created "a clearing house between all the branches of the Canadian public service and the Colonial Office."⁴¹ The French Consul General in Montreal, Joseph de Loynes, alternatively, saw the creation of the Department as a step toward Canada's "indépendance diplomatique."⁴²

The Canadian press reaction was mixed. The *Winnipeg Tribune* argued that the new department would change little. It would operate just as other departments have done, and its staff would simply be filled with too many "idle men."⁴³ The *Ottawa Citizen* would accept a designate official responsible for international affairs and relations but not a separate department.⁴⁴ The *Ottawa Morning Journal* reluctantly accepted the new department as a clerical body as long as the full responsibility remained under the prime minister.⁴⁵ The *Mail and Empire* saw it as an archive for collecting and repassing documents.⁴⁶ Only two newspapers saw the new department as evidence of a significant policy initiative. The *Montreal Daily Star* was convinced that Canada's international relations had of

⁴⁰ Britain, House of Commons, *Debates*, March 3, 1909, cols. 1421-22.

⁴¹ *London Times*, February 19, 1909.

⁴² Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Canada N. S. 2, f^o 56-57, 22 février 1909, cited in B. Pénisson, "Le Commissariat canadien à Paris, 1882-1928," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, Vol. 34 no. 3 (Décembre, 1980), pp. 362-3.

⁴³ *Winnipeg Tribune*, March 5, 1909.

⁴⁴ *Ottawa Citizen*, March 6, 1909.

⁴⁵ *Ottawa Morning Journal*, March 8, 1909.

⁴⁶ *The Mail and Empire*, March 5, 1909.

late become essential and would increase dramatically.⁴⁷ Thus, it was time Canada had a separate department and a minister to deal with such issues. Similarly, the *Regina Morning Leader* saw the new Department as a vital step towards self reliance.⁴⁸ It remained for the Department to define its role.

The Department co-ordinated the flow of information from the various federal Departments and, where appropriate, with the provinces.⁴⁹ It dealt as well with the communications between Canada, Great Britain, other members of the Commonwealth and with foreign countries. No longer would the Colonial Office communicate directly with the Privy Council or individual members of Cabinet:

all despatches, at present communicated by Your Excellency to the Privy Council, or direct[ed] to individual Ministers, should be, in the first instance, referred to the Prime Minister, and also to the Secretary of State as head of the Department of External Affairs, which Department shall then distribute them among the several departments to which they relate, for the necessary consideration and action, and the committee recommend accordingly.⁵⁰

In addition, the Department would also handle all matters relating to all foreign consular services in Canada and the issuance of Canadian passports.⁵¹

The change of government in 1911 brought another reconsideration of who should head the Department. Pope, the Under-Secretary, proposed to have the Prime Minister take over the responsibilities of the Secretary of State and Head of the

⁴⁷ *Montreal Daily Star*, March 5, 1909.

⁴⁸ The *Regina Morning Leader*, March 10, 1909.

⁴⁹ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 44, 60.

⁵⁰ "An Act to Create a Department of External Affairs," cited in Keenleyside, "Department of External Affairs," p. 487.

⁵¹ H. L. Keenleyside, "Canada's Department of External Affairs," *International Journal*, Vol. 1 no. 3 (July, 1946), pp. 196-7.

Department,⁵² a proposal Borden had suggested back in 1909 when the creation of the Department of External Affairs had been debated in the House of Commons. Borden set a precedent which would hold until after World War Two; Canadian Prime Ministers would be their own Ministers of External Affairs. The position of the Under-Secretary remained unaltered, and Pope remained at the job until 1925. O. D. Skelton, the Dean of Queen's University Political Science Faculty, succeeded Pope in 1925 and remained in office until 1941.⁵³

As Canadian autonomy grew and its importance increased, the concerns and responsibilities of the Department expanded. At the same time, there was a great deal of hesitation which manifested itself most clearly in the slow expansion of staff. The Department of External Affairs was so small and its work so limited that it could not properly speaking be called a "Foreign Service." In 1909, at the time of its creation, the Department had but 34 members. By 1922 the staff had expanded to only 35 members, and more than half of these dealt with passports. The following three years, however, witnessed a rapid expansion leaving the Department with 101 employees in 1925. Out of this total, 21 dealt with passports; 15 served in the Prime Minister Office and 48 worked in Washington, London, Paris and Geneva.⁵⁴ Headquarters staff in Ottawa, meanwhile, increased from 61 to only 80 members between 1925 and 1929. More than one-third of these continued to work with the Prime Minister and the Passport Office. The

⁵² Keenleyside, "Dept. of External Affairs," *Queen's Quarterly*, p. 488.

⁵³ For O. D. Skelton's role and influence, see C. P. Stacey, "Laurier, King and External Affairs," pp. 85-98 in John S. Moir, ed., *Character and Circumstance* (Toronto, 1970).

⁵⁴ Auditor General *Annual Report*, years ending 1925-26.

remaining members of the staff performed accounting, translating, secretarial, stenographer and record duties.⁵⁵

Although the government created a Department in 1909, it did not, then, intend to pursue "external affairs." With the single exception of Washington, there were no diplomatic missions abroad until 1927. Although it could be argued that many of the existing representatives in foreign countries provided some quasi-diplomatic or consular service, these initiatives were not properly speaking "Foreign Services." What emerged as a result of the creation of the Department was an administrative mechanism promoting co-ordination and co-operation between the Department of External Affairs and other individual departments and ministries at both the federal and provincial levels.⁵⁶ Only gradually did the Department begin to develop a policy role. World War One then provided a formative event as Canada adopted a more assertive posture regarding its place within the British Empire and the international community. The British Empire at Canada's and other Dominions' insistence transformed itself into a Commonwealth of Nations.

Imperial Relations, 1920-1926

The first evidence of an effective attempt to break both the formal and informal ties of colonial subordination came in the middle of the war. The 1917 Imperial War Conference, according to Sir Robert Borden, reorganized itself to

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, years ending 1925-26 and 1928-29.

⁵⁶ Hilliker, *Canada's Dept. of External Affairs*, p. 44, 60.

ensure an "adequate voice" for the colonies, including India, in war policy.⁵⁷ The conference recognized the need for effective and continuous consultation and unified action. This Conference "based the constitutional relations of the Empire upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth." The 1917 Declaration was carried to its logical conclusion during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Canada participated in these talks and on its own behalf signed the Versailles Treaty. Canada then received a separate seat in the League of Nations created by the Treaty. Canada henceforth began to pursue actively its independence in foreign affairs, although that pursuit remained within the parameters of the British Empire/Commonwealth.

Canada's new assertiveness for an independent foreign policy generated heated debate which centered on Canada's position within the empire.⁵⁸ There were two options in this debate: either 1) Canada would assume that her interests were identical to those of Britain and other Dominions or 2) Canada would define what were Canada's interests and pursue them independently. If the first option were adopted, little or no re-organization of the existing imperial ties and arrangements would be needed. Canada would continue to use British Embassies and Consular Offices abroad when dealing with foreign countries. In such a case what Canada needed was simply to find ways and means to adequately influence British

⁵⁷ Sir Robert L. Borden, "Canadian Constitutional Studies," cited in NAC, King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2712, p. 8420. See also, "Right Honorable Sir Robert Borden's Address before the Institute of Politics, Williamston, Mass., U.S.A., August 17, 1925. The Dominion and Foreign Relations," p. 6. A copy of this address is available at the National Library in Ottawa.

⁵⁸ For detailed analysis see J. H. Thompson and A. Seager, *Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord* (Toronto, 1986), Chapter 3; R. Cook, et als., *Canada: A Modern Study* (Toronto, 1977), pp. 190-199; R. Brown and R. Cook, *Canada 1896-1921* (Toronto, 1983), Chapter 14 and J. M. S. Careless, *Canada: A Story of Challenge* (Toronto, 1972), Chapter 17.

officials in their conduct so as to protect Canadian interests. If the second choice were accepted, Canada required clear recognition of its autonomy.

The imperialists preferred the first option. Die-hard believers in Pax Britannica found their most likely potential allies in Sir Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen. They believed that Canada's future lay within an Empire which granted equal status and influence to the Dominions. This new Empire would be run by a committee of representatives from the whole empire. Within this new British Empire/Commonwealth of Nations, they argued, tasks could be divided: Canada could represent the Empire in France, Australia could do the same in Japan, and Britain would represent the Empire in the United States.⁵⁹ The imperialists looked to the war for models and to the war-time leaders for allies. The Imperial War Cabinet during World War One and Sir Robert Borden's participation in the Paris Peace Conference as a member of the British Empire delegation provided the precedents for co-operative unified diplomacy.⁶⁰ Both the Imperial War Cabinet and the British Empire delegation had worked relatively smoothly which suggested that a new organization could operate along similar lines without great difficulties. Within this Imperial Federation, they believed, Canada should claim and assume part of the responsibility in making the system work by designating a resident representative in London where the ultimate decisions were made, and attaching a Canadian to British Embassies and/or Consular Offices abroad as its

⁵⁹ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2712, "Exchange of Ministers," subsection "Amity and International Relations," p. 84237, 8240-1. See also (NAC) Department of External Affairs Records, RG 25, Vol. 796, file 486, "Developments Since The Peace Conference," (n.d.).

⁶⁰ For detailed analysis see D. Creighton, *Canada's First Century* (Toronto, 1984), pp. 169-172, 181-186, Thompson and Seager, *Canada 1922-1939*, Chapter 3, J. I. Granatstein et al., *Twentieth Century Canada* (Toronto, 1985), pp. 203-212, Careless, *Canada: A Story of Challenge*, pp. 338-350 and Brown and Cook, *Canada 1896-1921*, pp. 280-293.

representative (popularly known as the Borden Proposal) to ensure that decisions were implemented. The Canadian representatives would look after Canadian interests in those foreign countries wherever they may be and co-operate with British and other Dominions' representatives as circumstances required.

Post-war events would prove that the dream would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In this case, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902 and renewed in 1905 and again in 1911, provided a key element in the debate. The question whether or not to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance sparked heated discussion in 1921. At the Imperial Conference that year, Meighen sternly opposed renewal. Meighen saw the renewal as another mechanism which would draw Canada into war should Britain decide to help Japan. In addition, renewal also meant a direct challenge to the United States.⁶¹ Fortunately, Meighen's opposition found support in the United States; Americans came to regard the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as British support for Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Although American opposition brought an end to this Anglo-Japanese bilateral military alliance,⁶² Meighen's apparent success demonstrated, at least to imperialists, that the Dominions could play a significant and positive role in formulating a single imperial policy. This argument ignores the heated confrontation with Australia and New Zealand over the Treaty which demonstrated the divergent views and the lack of consensus within the Empire. Any "consultative and co-operative

⁶¹ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2796, "Canada's Political Relations With Japan," p. 15734. It is worth noting that in 1933 Britain tried to revive the alliance, but Japan ignored the attempt.

⁶² See John Bartlett Brebner, "Canada, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and The Washington Conference," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. L (1935), p. 45. For a more balanced analysis, see Michael G. Fry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and The Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 39 no. 1 (March, 1967), p. 57.

effort" would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Also, during the Conference, there had neither been any discussion on common imperial policy nor was there any definite conclusion about the alliance. The British decision to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had little, or nothing, to do with Meighen's suggestion; it had everything to do with great power relations, particularly Anglo-American relations. Meighen, meanwhile, soon lost power, defeated in the 1921 federal election. With Meighen went the last hope of the imperialists.

Mackenzie King, the new Prime Minister, represented those who favored an independent foreign policy for Canada complete with diplomatic representation abroad. The 1917 Declaration which recognized some members of the Empire as "autonomous" and gave the Dominions "adequate voice" in the formulation of British foreign policy was neither adequate nor was it meant to be a *quid pro quo*. Autonomy was a fundamental right due to the Dominions. For King the models were Canada's War Mission in Washington and its separate membership in the League of Nations' Council and the International Labour Office. Actual practice in the League of Nations' Council demonstrated, meanwhile, that the members of the "British Empire" held divergent views on many issues. The problem with the imperialists' argument, the nationalists suggested, was its impracticality.⁶³ Britain, Australia or other members of the Empire could not be expected to represent Canada and its interests adequately. Moreover, other members of the Empire could be expected to have interests at stake which might conflict. What would Canada do in a situation where Britain or Australia might sacrifice

⁶³ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2712, "Exchange of Ministers," Subsection "Amity and International Relations," pp. 84240-41. See also External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 796, file 486, "Developments Since The Peace Conference."

Canada's interests in order to achieve their own objectives? The immigration policies and exclusion acts and movements in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, for example, always resulted in embarrassment for Britain.⁶⁴ Of far greater concern, however, was the fear that the Dominion might again be dragged into a war in pursuit of Britain's interests. Preserving the Empire could best be achieved by allowing each member to pursue its own interests.

Although imperialists found support for their arguments in the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, nationalists found evidence of the difficulties developing a unified imperial policy. Canada needed Anglo-American friendship to ensure its security while both New Zealand and Australia looked to the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to check Japanese expansion.⁶⁵ Given the divergent views of the Dominions and American opposition to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, satisfying the objectives of all Dominions might prove difficult. What was needed, many argued, was a "joint-responsibility".⁶⁶ Canada would look after its own interests and concerns. Imperial concerns would be dealt with through consultation and co-operation. "Joint responsibility" promised to provide solutions to the independence question consistent with the maintenance of "unity" within the Empire.

The nationalists won the argument. In 1920, the constitutional right of the Dominions to establish their own diplomatic missions with the United States was

⁶⁴ G. Dewey, *The Dominions and Diplomacy: The Canadian Contribution* (Toronto, 1929), p. 302.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2478, "Legations: Paris and Tokio, Arguments for," pp.45508-45513.

conceded by Britain and recognized by the United States.⁶⁷ Although both Canada and Australia expressed early their intentions of taking advantage of new opportunity, the Irish Free State surprised everyone by establishing a diplomatic mission in Washington in 1924. After designating Vincent Massey as its Canadian Minister in November 1926, Canada finally opened its legation in Washington in 1927.

Canada's seven-year delay, according to Gordon H. Skilling, remains a puzzle.⁶⁸ Skilling speculates that British opposition, the reluctance on the part of the United States to accept an independent representation for Canada, the opposition of die-hard imperialists combined with the general political situation in Canada during the early twenties tempered Prime Minister King's desire to establish a Canadian diplomatic mission in Washington. Skilling also suggests the lack of wealthy qualified men and resources and the opposition of both Rudolphe Lemieux, the Minister for Labour, and W. S. Fielding, the Minister for Finance, within Cabinet contributed to the long delay. Skilling's analysis, however, is not altogether satisfying. As Skilling himself recognizes there was support for the decision in Canada as well as in Britain.

The real reason for delay lies elsewhere. The years 1921-1926 witnessed a struggle for genuine recognition of Canadian nationhood. It was only natural that the United States, or any other sovereign nation for that matter, would prefer to wait until Canada sorted out its relationship with Britain before accepting Canadian diplomatic representation. King certainly understood this. King concentrated his efforts on obtaining a clear and unequivocal recognition of

⁶⁷ Borden, *Address*, pp. 7-8. See also, House of Commons, *Debates*, May 20, 1920 and April 21, 1921.

⁶⁸ Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad*, pp. 200-211.

Canadian autonomy from Britain before moving to establish a diplomatic presence in other countries.

King's objection to having Canadian Ministers attached to British Embassies had hardened with the Chanak Crisis in September 1922. Chanak was a tiny place situated in Asia Minor near the Dardanelles Strait. It had been "given" to Britain at the end of World War One under the Treaty of Sèvres. The terms of the Treaty had been imposed upon the Sultan who was then overthrown by the nationalist Turkish revolutionary movement led by Mustafa Kemal. Kemal not only repudiated the Treaty of Sèvres but demanded the British evacuate Chanak. The Turks seemed prepared to use force if necessary, and a military confrontation appeared inevitable. The Lloyd George government decided to display its military might and that of its Empire. Britain then took Canadian and other Dominions' support for granted and committed them to the defence of Chanak. With British Cabinet sanction, Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, cabled the Prime Ministers of the senior Dominions and invited them "to associate themselves with [British] action" and asked "whether they desire to be represented by a contingent." This news broke before King and his cabinet were officially informed. Headlines such as "British Lion Calls Cubs to Face the Beast of Asia" and "Motherland Musters Resources of Empire to Face Turk Menace"⁶⁹ spread across Canada. King learned about the invitation when a *Toronto Star* reporter demanded to know how he would respond.⁷⁰ King was justifiably outraged at this clear violation of the principle of consultation and co-operation.

⁶⁹ *Toronto Globe and Toronto Star*, September 16, 1922.

⁷⁰ Stacey, *Age of Conflict*, Vol. II, pp. 17-31.

For public consumption, King uttered that much quoted phrase "Parliament will decide." In his diary he confided his belief that the British invitation had been "drafted designedly [sic] to play the imperial game, to test out centralization vs. autonomy as regards to European Wars."⁷¹ Fortunately, Parliament was not in session, and King had no intention of calling it back into session. The Cabinet itself was far from unanimous: W. S. Fielding supported British action, Ernest Lapointe opposed it. Both, however, were in Geneva representing Canada in the League of Nations Assembly. King fearing the Chanak Crisis would once again divide the nation decided not to support Britain, and his decision quickly became Canada's policy. By September 19, King had convinced himself that rather than an "unfortunate" episode Chanak had been "the best that could have come up."⁷² Although the crisis was eventually and peacefully resolved by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Chanak Crisis ended for all intents and purposes any pretence of a common Imperial Foreign Policy and focused attention on the need to define more precisely Canada's relationship with Britain.

The chance to resolve the issue came in 1923 during the Imperial Conference. In addition to King himself the two most prominent members of the Canadian delegation were J. W. Dafoe,⁷³ the editor of the *Manitoba Free Press*,

⁷¹ King Papers, MG 26, J13, Diary, September 17, 1922. For a detailed analysis, see P. G. Wigley, *Canada And The Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926* (Cambridge, 1977).

⁷² King Papers, MG 26, J13, Diary, September 17 and 19, 1922.

⁷³ R. Cook, "J. W. Dafoe At The Imperial Conference of 1923," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. XLI no. 1 (1960), pp. 36-37; *Shelburne Gazette*, August 16, 1923 cited in J. A. Schultz, *Canadian Attitudes Towards The Empire, 1919-1939*, (PhD Thesis, Dalhousie University Press, 1975), p. 34; M. Donnelly, *Dafoe Of The Free Press* (Toronto, 1968), pp. 116-22.

and O. D. Skelton. Dafoe, a strong nationalist, was specifically invited to London to ensure that the Canadian press received a steady flow of information and dispatches sympathetic to King's position. Skelton had been hired as special assistant to prepare memoranda, background papers and to advise King. Skelton argued that the Borden-Meighen version of consultation and co-operation had been "a direct reversal of the whole of Dominion development in the past century." King's primary responsibility, Skelton suggested, "was to see that the effects of this aberration were removed."⁷⁴ With Mackenzie King, Skelton was talking to the converted.

During the Imperial Conference, King challenged every statement which even vaguely suggested a centralized Empire.⁷⁵ Canada would make no advance commitments to support British external policies, and Britain, King made clear, had better not count on Canada's support unless "a great and clear call of duty" existed as in 1914. Nor, King insisted, should the Imperial Conference even try to shape the foreign policies of the members of the Empire. King summed up Canada's position by suggesting that "Our attitude is not one of unconditional isolation nor is it one of unconditional intervention."⁷⁶ In the end, the Imperial Conference largely confirmed King's position that the Dominions enjoyed the right to pursue their own diplomatic interests. Treaties involving only one Dominion would no longer need to be approved and countersigned by Britain as the

⁷⁴ Skelton quoted in Cook, "J. W. Dafoe At The Imperial Conference Of 1923," pp. 36-37.

⁷⁵ Thompson and Seager, *Canada 1922-1939*, p. 46.

⁷⁶ "Statement by King to the Imperial Conference," October 17, 1923 cited in J. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Vol. I, pp. 329-31 and "King's statement on foreign policy," cited in Stacey, *Historical Documents of Canada*, Vol. V, (Toronto, 1972), pp. 442, 435-43.

representative of the Empire. The Imperial Conference Report, on King's insistence, concluded that all the resolutions and "views . . . recorded above are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire."⁷⁷ The *de facto* decentralization of the British Empire had begun. Although a common imperial foreign policy did not exist, *de jure* recognition of Canadian autonomy would await the Imperial Conference of 1926.

If the evolution of policy was slow, so too was administrative reform in the field. The creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1909 helped centralize and co-ordinate activities at head office and within the cabinet, but it had failed to address the problems faced by Canadian representatives abroad. The problems hindering effective co-operation resulted from both the Department of Trade and Commerce's fear of losing control over its agents abroad and the Department of External Affairs' failure to conduct "foreign policy" abroad. As late as 1923 the Trade Minister, James A. Robb, prepared a memorandum which suggested that "The status occupied by Canadian Trade Commissioners in foreign countries had been the source of grievous embarrassment."⁷⁸ The embarrassment, according to Robb, "has tended not a little to materially restrict their usefulness in the promotion of Canadian trade." Although Robb argued that Canada should not seek "to unduly elevate its trade representatives abroad, nor . . .

⁷⁷ "Proceedings of the Conference," cited in Stacey, *Historical Documents of Canada*, Vol. V., *The Arts Of War and Peace*, pp. 445-51; King Papers, MG 26, J, Skelton to King, March 31, 1925; Wigley, *Transformation to Commonwealth*, p. 199; and G. P. de T. Glazebrook, "Canadian Opinion And Foreign Policy," pp. 134-35 in Moir, *Character And Circumstance*.

⁷⁸ NAC, Department of Trade and Commerce Records, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, PC 2124 (March 5, 1923). Hereafter, cited as Trade and Commerce.

undertake important trade negotiations," Canada, none-the-less, needed to come to some "understanding . . . which will permit Canadian Trade Commissioners to be duly accredited to the various foreign governments." The lack of diplomatic status blocked adequate accessibility to foreign governments as Trade Commissioners often could not interview officials on "matters respecting industry, commerce, trade, customs and finance." Moreover, Canadian Trade Commissioners were left uninvited to official and social events thus missing valuable opportunities to promote Canadian products, to establish important contacts, and to promote trading relations. The result was a clear loss for Canada. As Frederic Hudd, the Trade Commissioner in New York City, suggested,

As far as I am aware the Department of State of the United States is unaware of the existence of a Canadian Trade Commissioner in this country, and I feel it is no more than proper that the Department of Trade and Commerce should ask the co-operation of the Department of External Affairs of Canada in communicating the fact of my appointment and status to the Dept. of State of the United States through the British Embassy.⁷⁹

The divided jurisdiction between Trade and Commerce and External Affairs, it seemed, created as many problems as the division of control between Canada and the British Foreign Office.

Robb requested that the matter be raised with the Americans. This request followed the usual circuitous route from the Canadian government to the Governor General to the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, to the British Embassy in Washington. Two months later, the request finally found its way from the Embassy to the American Secretary of State. The fact that it took two months to notify the American government of the appointment of a Trade and an Assistant Trade Commissioner, F. Hudd and F. H. Palmer respectively, illustrated the bureaucratic roadblock to effective action. In this case, Canada wanted only "to bring these

⁷⁹ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1082, file 18-191, Part I, Hudd to O'Hara, March 2, 1923.

appointments to the notice of the competent authorities of the United States Government, and to express the hope that such facilities and courtesies as may be possible may be extended to these officers."⁸⁰ Such delays and difficulties might prove intolerable when weightier matters arose.

Palmer's troubles had not ended and once again illustrated the difficulties of Canadian representatives abroad without diplomatic status. In 1922 when Palmer went to New York *en route* to his post, American officials insisted that he pay a head tax like any other immigrant.⁸¹ Palmer refused and contacted the Department of Trade and Commerce. Deputy Minister O'Hara, through the Department of External Affairs, tried very hard to have Palmer exempted. Although Trade Commissioners were exempt, Assistants were not. The Under-Secretary for External Affairs, Pope, informed O'Hara that nothing could be done and payment had to be made. This situation would persist until the appointment of a Canadian Minister at Washington.⁸²

A partial solution to the problem came in December 1922 when O'Hara through the Department of External Affairs notified both the Colonial Office and Foreign Office of the appointment of a number of Assistant Trade Commissioners. On this occasion, Britain responded that "His Majesty's Government will gladly accredit Canadian Trade Commissioners to Foreign countries in the same manner as they have been accredited to United States."⁸³ The term "accredit" clearly implied the

⁸⁰ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, British Ambassador, Washington, to U.S. Secretary of State, May 15, 1923.

⁸¹ Hill, *Canada's Salesman*, p. 423.

⁸² Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, Pope to O'Hara, June 28, 1922.

⁸³ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, Colonial Secretary to Governor General, September 14, 1923.

granting of diplomatic status and was, therefore, deemed satisfactory as far as H. R. Poussette, the Director of Canadian Commercial Intelligence Service, was concerned. Almost all Trade Commissioners, however, disagreed. The actual presentation proved merely an introduction, and Trade Commissioners continued to believe official recognition needed to be extended to the commercial representatives of Canada.⁸⁴ Such recognition would allow them to deal directly with officials of the host government without relying either on British help or personal contacts with the host nation's officials. Wendell Clarke, in Milan, proved the most outspoken of Canada's Trade Commissioners.

It is not a formal recommendation which the Trade Commissioner needs primarily but an authentic recognition, not a preliminary introduction but a continual access, not an outsider's privilege but the inalienable right of an accredited representative.

Evidently the realization is dawning in some foreign parts that Canada is not only a colony but a nation, not only an understudy but also a principal. The conception would be clarified I believe by the granting of the diplomatic status requested.⁸⁵

Trade Commissioners clearly linked their concerns to the broader question of an independent diplomatic representation.

Despite promises, Canadian Trade Commissioners felt that British assistance was not always available to them. Indeed, it was occasionally withheld. This was certainly true with E. L. McColl in Buenos Aires who with time became so frustrated he demanded a transfer.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, Clarke to O'Hara, October 6, 1926.

⁸⁵ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, Clarke to Poussette, July 30, 1923.

⁸⁶ For McColl's disappointment and request for transfer, see External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 795, file 476, "Trade Commissioners - Status."

McColl's personal relations with the British Embassy got off to a rocky start when a staff member at the British Embassy refused a request for assistance clearing his belongings through customs. Relations between Canadians and the British in Buenos Aires had in fact been poor for many years. Letters from McColl's predecessor to the Argentinean Foreign Office routed through the British Embassy occasionally failed to reach their destination. Later, McColl's request for interviews with the British Ambassador were repeatedly ignored. The situation was so bad that McColl eventually refused to enter the Embassy.⁸⁷ Although the Ambassador finally gave McColl an interview and apologized for the misconduct of his subordinates, the damage had already been done. "The whole incident, or chain of incidents," McColl wrote, "shows that our position depends completely on the personal feelings of the British officials with whom we come in contact, and is emphatic proof that our status should be such as to preclude the possibility of a repetition."⁸⁸ Similar difficulties also faced the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Italy.⁸⁹ He could not approach the Italian Foreign Office regarding the change urged by the British Columbian Packers Association in the marking of salmon containers and the interpretation of the new marking law. Such a *note verbale* had to be submitted through the British Embassy. Though this problem was subsequently settled, the delay was intolerable. A Canadian Commercial Agent, as Clark had argued and now McColl repeated, should enjoy not only "a formal recommendation" and "preliminary introduction" but also "an authentic

⁸⁷ Hill, *Canada's Salesman*, p. 424.

⁸⁸ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file T-18-62, part I, McColl to Poussette, November 19, 1923.

⁸⁹ Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 12, file, "Trade and Commerce 1927-29." "Memorandum: Status of Canadian Government Trade Commissioners." See also Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1082, file 18-191, part I.

recognition", "continuing access," and "prescriptive rights of a duly accredited representative."⁹⁰

Headquarters of Trade and Commerce in Ottawa, however, proved reluctant to seek diplomatic standing for its Trade Commissioners. There was neither much sympathy nor understanding at Headquarters. Too often the Department of Trade and Commerce retorted that diplomatic status would not be of any use. Such attitudes ensured little was done. Poussette, for example, blamed McColl for his troubles.⁹¹ Roy Stevens, the Trade Commissioner in Jamaica, meanwhile, suggested that

He [McColl] is . . . utterly wrong in supposing that any status granted to Canadian Trade Commissioners would improve their standing with Diplomatic Officials. One has only to note the treatment accorded by Diplomatic or Foreign Office Officials to their own Consular Officials to be assured of the futility of this⁹²

Like Poussette, Deputy Minister O'Hara frequently laid the blame for difficulties on Commissioners themselves. When A. S. Bleakney, the Trade Commissioner in Brussels, for instance, complained about his problems O'Hara commented that:

I am tired of Bleakney's whining. If he has nothing better to do than yelp about his official status, the sooner we put him in his place the better . . . Canada grants foreign consuls no precedence of any kind whatever, so how can Canada ask for any precedence for Mr. Bleakney?"⁹³

After Canada's assertion of independence at the 1923 Imperial Conference, however, signs of change were not long in coming, although in the short-term

⁹⁰ Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 12, file "Trade and Commerce, 1927-29." *"Memorandum: Status of Canadian Government Trade Commissioners."*

⁹¹ Hill, *Canada's Salesman*, p. 424.

⁹² Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1082, file 18-191, part I, Stevens to O'Hara, December 5, 1922.

⁹³ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, O'Hara to Payne, March 11, 1925.

Canada looked to the British Foreign Office rather than External Affairs for a solution.

In 1925, Wendell Clarke, the former Trade Commissioner in Milan, became the Director of the Service. His experience and past frustration as a Trade Commissioner provided the driving force behind renewed efforts at Headquarters to improve the condition and the status of Trade Commissioners abroad. Just prior to the Imperial Conference in 1926, Clarke suggested to O'Hara who in turn convinced the Prime Minister that the matter of Canadian Trade Commissioners be raised with the Foreign Office. Clarke wanted Canadian Trade Commissioners stationed outside the empire to be regarded as

the Canadian Commercial Secretary or Counsellor of the British Embassy or Legation, and as such be entitled to those privileges with foreign governments which his present colleague, His Britannic Majesty's Counsellor and Secretary, at such Embassies and Legation now enjoys.⁹⁴

During his preparation for the Imperial Conference O'Hara formulated an official brief from the Department based upon Clarke's idea.

As expected, Canada's brief retraced familiar ground. It argued that the absence of any official standing on the part of the Canadian Trade Commissioners considerably handicapped their work. Such problems became more acute whenever a Canadian Trade Commissioner found himself outside the Empire. Although the initial introduction given by British Ambassadors to the host government provided some leverage, it was not durable. Because of their lack of diplomatic status, Trade Commissioners had to work through the British Embassy and officials. British officials, however, sometimes ignored Canadian interests or saw Canadian Trade Commissioners as rivals. "At times, official British support," James Malcolm, the Minister of Trade and Commerce commented, "has been withheld from

⁹⁴ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1082, file 18-191, part I, Clarke to O'Hara, October 6, 1926.

Trade Commissioners, support which the Trade Commissioner has felt he reasonably should receive."⁹⁵ Malcolm cited one instance where the British Minister presenting a Canadian government mission failed to invite the Canadian Trade Commissioner to be present during talks.⁹⁶ Canadian agents, O'Hara now believed, should have the same official standing and enjoy the same treatment as those of Britain in any foreign country. Despite the debate and various attempts to deal with the specific problems in an *ad hoc* fashion, a permanent solution would not be found until Canada's political status was clarified.

Some individual Commissioners continued to be frustrated with the lack of progress. F. H. Palmer, Clarke's successor in Milan, was so disappointed with both the British officials and the Department's cool attitude that he took matters into his own hand. During the Imperial Conference, Palmer wrote directly to Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice, who accompanied King to London. O'Hara, as expected, responded strongly to Palmer's action. Here was a clear violation of procedure bordering on insubordination. O'Hara informed Palmer of his "extreme amazement that you should have addressed a Minister of the Government directly, thus ignoring not only the director of the Commercial Intelligence Service and myself, but the Minister of this Department."⁹⁷ Remarkably O'Hara argued that the problems faced by Trade Commissioners "has nothing whatever to do with the Imperial Conference." O'Hara went on to conclude that "Your action, therefore, in bothering the Minister of Justice under the

⁹⁵ Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 12, file "Trade and Commerce 1927-1929." *Memorandum: Status of Canadian Government Trade Commissioners.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Malcolm did not provide detail of the specific event he was discussing.

⁹⁷ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, O'Hara to Palmer, November 10, 1926.

circumstances is most reprehensible." Roy Stevens, Trade Commissioner in Kingston, Jamaica, meanwhile, commented to C. H. Payne, Trade Commissioner in Havana, Cuba, that "Where the Trade Commissioners require status is not abroad but at home."⁹⁸ Stevens concluded that "If the time ever comes when his status is enhanced by his own superiors, he will very quickly acquire all the status that he needs in other parts of the world." Many Trade Commissioners, it seems, felt that Canada too willingly accepted its colonial status.

The 1926 Imperial Conference, despite O'Hara's comments to Palmer, dealt directly with the issue of Canada's, if not its Trade Commissioners', diplomatic status. According to O'Hara, Sir William Tyrrell, the permanent Under-secretary at the Foreign Office in London, tentatively suggested that Dominion representatives abroad be accorded status as "Commercial Secretaries." This might provide them with "direct access to Ministers of Foreign Countries" when dealing with matters "affecting their respective countries." Commercial Secretaries could unofficially "negotiate with Foreign Ministers." This would leave Canada in a subordinate position to British Diplomatic Staff. O'Hara, meanwhile, had begun to bend to the opinions of his commissioners. "For a long time," he informed Malcolm in 1927, "I strenuously objected to Trade Commissioners making so much fuss over the fact that they had not been invited to attend various official functions." Now, he had been "reluctantly forced to [accept] the conclusion that whether we like it or not, to be put on the official list in a Latin Country, is absolutely necessary."⁹⁹ O. D. Skelton, the new Under-secretary for External Affairs, also proved more supportive by 1926-27. He promised to take up the issue

⁹⁸ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 18-191, part I, Stevens to Payne, November 10, 1926.

⁹⁹ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1028, file 28131, O'Hara to Malcolm, April 20, 1927.

of status with the Foreign Office and suggested that "If there were a Canadian Minister or Chargé d'affaires, it might be found possible in certain cases to make Trade Commissioners Commercial Attachés, and thus entitle them to diplomatic privileges."¹⁰⁰ The first experiment would come in Tokyo: James A. Langley, the Trade Commissioner, was named Commercial Attaché to the Legation in 1929 and given diplomatic standing.¹⁰¹

Langley's appointment as Commercial Attaché in Tokyo was made possible because Canada in 1926 committed itself to establishing its own diplomatic representation abroad. Although the 1923 Imperial Conference witnessed the end of a centralized empire with a unified imperial policy, it stopped short of recognizing the sovereign right of each member of the Commonwealth to pursue an independent policy. The Imperial Conference of 1926 dealt specifically with this issue. Every government, including the British, recognized and agreed that the existing political relationship between the colonies and the mother country had changed fundamentally. The Dominions insisted that all formal and informal signs of subjugation and subordination to Britain be removed. In the end, all Dominions save India received *de jure* independence. From a constitutional point of view, the senior members of the British Empire had developed and evolved into a "group

¹⁰⁰ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 195, file 28131, part 2, Skelton to O'Hara, July 2, 1927.

¹⁰¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 795, file, 476, Skelton to O'Hara, April 24, 1929 and O'Hara to Skelton, April 29, 1919. This is available in microfilm T-1804, file 476.

of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions."¹⁰²

The Balfour Report which was approved by the Imperial Conference stated that,

*They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of British Commonwealth of Nations.*¹⁰³

The Governor General would continue to represent the Crown in the Dominions but would no longer be the resident representative of the British government. Nor would diplomatic exchanges with the mother country flow through the Governor General to the Colonial Office. Rather, "It was thought that the recognized official channel of communication should be, in future, between Government and Government direct." Matters and issues not related to the crown would be communicated through their respective Foreign Office representatives as ambassadors would be exchanged between the British government and its former colonies. Henceforth, the High Commissioners in London and in the capitals of the Dominions became the normal channel of communication until such a date as the formal establishment of diplomatic ties took place. Although pressure to support Imperial unity remained, "Geographical and other conditions made this impossible of attainment by the way of federation." The only alternative, the Conference believed, was to recognize that "Every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its own destiny."¹⁰⁴ Finally, the *de jure* autonomy of Canada was recognized.

¹⁰² Canada, *Imperial Conference 1926: Summary of Proceedings* (Ottawa, 1926), p. 12. A copy is available at the National Library in Ottawa.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 12. Emphasis in original.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

The British government, meanwhile, encouraged its former colonies to continue to use the "normal diplomatic channels" which were British Embassies abroad.¹⁰⁵ With the formal recognition of the Dominions as "self-governing and autonomous," Canada had to find ways and means of implementing the decisions and conclusions of the 1926 Imperial Conference. Canada would move quickly to establish its own diplomatic channels first with Britain and the United States, then with France and Japan.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Chapter II

Canada's Asian Connections

There was an irony in Canada/Asia-Pacific relations. Commercially, Canada desired a closer and better relationship with this part of the world. Politically, as a result of general Imperial connections and the Anglo-Japanese military alliance, concluded in 1902 and applied to the whole Empire, the British Empire was more closely tied to Japan than to the United States or any other countries. Culturally, however, Canada wanted to keep Asia at arms-length. By far the most outstanding issue in Canada's external relations with Asia in general and Japan in particular was Asian immigration. Anti-oriental racism centered in British Columbia created difficulties not only for federal-provincial relations but also for Canada's external relations. It made diplomatic contacts with Japan difficult long before a formal legation was established in 1928. Attempts, although without much success, had been made to bridge this dichotomy.

Oriental Immigration

A clear example of this irony was the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1894. Although Canada wanted to adhere to the treaty and benefit from its terms, Canada finally rejected the treaty because,

The subjects of each of the two high contracting parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the dominions or possessions of the other contracting party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property.¹

¹ *Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Great Britain and Japan, 1894*, (London, 1894), *British Parliamentary Papers*, C. 7588, Vol. CIX. Article I. A copy of this treaty is available in the National Library in Ottawa in microprint

This clause implied Canada would be open to Japanese immigration. After considering the matter the Canadian government passed an Order-in-Council on August 6, 1895 expressing its willingness to adhere if Japan agreed to insert a clause which would restrict Japanese immigration to Canada. Canada and Japan then conducted a series of bilateral discussions during which Japan agreed in February 1896 to insert a clause allowing Canada to bring in rigidly restrictive measures against Japanese immigration without violating the Treaty. Japan also agreed to add the expression "including artisans" to the clause restricting the movement of "labourers".² Despite this agreement, the Canadian government again decided in July 1896 to reject the Treaty because of difficulties with the "most-favoured-nation clause." A decade later Canada reconsidered its position.³

Canada considered itself part of an Anglo-Saxon world and formulated its immigration policy accordingly. Although settled by many nationalities and ethnic groups, Anglo-Saxons dominated the new nation. During the nineteenth century, some non-Anglo-Saxon groups were "non-preferred;" others were excluded entirely. "Oriental Immigration" proved an explosive issue which led to racially discriminatory legislation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Discrimination was most explicit in British Columbia.⁴

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² External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1571, file 503, "Canadian Relations With Japan," p. 11.

³ In 1905, Canada unilaterally declared that all the original obstacles hindering Canada's acceptance of the Anglo-Japanese Commerce and Navigation Treaty had been removed. Canada asked for admission and it was granted.

⁴ For detailed analysis see Peter W. Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia* (Toronto, 1978) and Patricia Roy, *A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigration, 1850-1914* (Vancouver, 1989).

In 1849, the Hudson's Bay Company received permission from the Imperial government to trade in the Pacific area. The Imperial government also decided to create a Crown colony of "British subjects" in Vancouver Island. With the creation of the Crown Colony and through the frame work of the trading company, British immigrants began to arrive in significant numbers. These immigrants were very conscious of their British heritage, and both they and their administrators desired to keep it that way. It was into this atmosphere of devotion to a white British Empire that the first Chinese arriving on Canada's western shores in the 1850's.⁵

The discovery of gold in California in late 1848, the demand for labour, and the new opportunities for individual initiatives first brought Chinese immigrants to the United States. In 1858, another gold discovery in the Fraser River Valley brought them to British Columbia; by 1860 an estimated 2000 Chinese worked in British Columbia's gold fields.⁶ By 1870, Chinese immigrants began to arrive directly from China in even larger numbers. The Chinese immigrants found employment in railway construction and in cities whose appetite for cheap labour drew thousands to British Columbia. Between 1881 and 1884, an estimated 15,000 Chinese arrived in the Province.⁷

As the railway neared completion new employment was needed. Their industrious nature and willingness to accept lower wages allowed the Chinese to compete successfully with both the Europeans and the Native people in a wide

⁵ For China's attempt to discourage emigration, see Lai David, Chuen-Yan, "Chinese Attempts to Discourage Emigration to Canada: Some Findings from the Chinese Archives in Victoria," *BC Studies*, no. 18 (Summer, 1973), pp. 33-49.

⁶ C. Young and H. Reid, *The Japanese Canadians* (Toronto, 1938), p. 8.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 217-9; Roy, *A White Man's Province*, pp. x-xi and *Canada Year Book*, 1936, pp. 196-8.

variety of jobs including fishing, shoemaking and tailoring.⁸ Their successes, however, generated antagonism. The degree and intensity of oriental racism fluctuated with the degree of economic stagnation and prosperity. With time, the Chinese community became ghettoized and, in the eyes of "white" Canadians, "unassimilable".⁹ As early as 1860, citizens in Victoria demanded that a special poll-tax of \$100 be imposed upon the Chinese. The federal government came to support this idea, and in 1903 it imposed a \$500 head-tax on the Chinese.¹⁰ Discriminatory legislation would systematically deny the Chinese both civil and

⁸ It was estimated that at the time there were in the province "about 300 Chinese domestic servants, 150 shoemakers, 300 laundrymen, 100 tailors, 700 general labourers, 1800 gold miners, 50 peddlers, 1500 gardeners and farm hands and 1100 employed in the fisheries," Young and Reid, *The Japanese Canadians*, p. 218.

⁹ For race and class relations, see P. W. Ward, "Class and Race In The Social Structure of British Columbia, 1870-1939," *BC Studies*, no. 45 (Spring, 1980), pp. 17-35; R. Warburton, "Race and Class In British Columbia: A Comment," *BC Studies*, no. 49 (Spring, 1981), pp. 79-85; P. W. Ward, "Race and Class In British Columbia: A Reply," *BC Studies*, no. 50 (Summer, 1981), p. 52. For the Protestant Clergy and Church view, see P. W. Ward, "The Oriental Immigrants and Canada's Protestant Clergy, 1855-1925," *BC Studies*, no. 22 (Summer, 1974), pp. 40-55.

¹⁰ Legislation passed in 1885 (48-49 Vict., c. 71) provided that thereafter Chinese of the labouring class be required as a condition of their entry into Canada to pay a head tax of \$50 each. In January 1901 (62-64 Vict., c. 32) this amount was increased to \$100; in January 1904 (3 Edw. VII, C. 8) it was increased again to \$500.

The Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 (13-14 Geo. V, c. 38), meanwhile, restricts the entry to immigrants of Chinese origin or descent, irrespective of allegiance or citizenship. Exceptions were provided for Chinese children born in Canada, merchants, as defined by what regulations the Dept. of Immigration and Colonization, and students. The last two classes, however, were required to possess passports issued by the Chinese government and endorsed by Canadian immigration officers.

political rights; some of this legislation would remain in force as late as 1967.¹¹

If the "unassimilability" of Oriental immigrants posed a problem for British Columbia, the federal government was in no hurry to offer solutions. British Columbian legislation aimed at prohibiting and restricting Asian immigration and economic competition in the province. Such legislation would be repeatedly disallowed by the federal government. The stage had been set for confrontation.

The confrontation between the federal government and British Columbia over immigration involved questions of provincial jurisdiction. The British North America Act gave the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada "plenary powers of legislation on all matters of immigration."¹² If the federal government chose, it could have gone a long way in satisfying British Columbia. Ottawa, however, chose to do nothing. The federal government did not have an "oriental problem" as such. From the federal point of view Chinese immigrants were cheap and effective labour essential to the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, to furthering the goals of the National Policy, and to populating the West. Not until 1923, with the passage of the Chinese Immigration Act, did Canada exclude Chinese immigrants. A new agreement with Japan, meanwhile, limited Japanese labourers to 150 annually. If in domestic politics, immigration generated

¹¹ The Chinese lost their right to vote in 1872. British Columbia, *Statutes*, 39 Victoria, c. 1, s. 9. The Japanese lost their franchise in 1895 and the East Indians in 1907. British Columbia, *Statutes*, 58 Victoria, c. 20, s. 3; 58 Victoria, c. 65, s. 3; 59 Victoria, c. 38; 7 Ed. VII, c. 16; 8 Ed. VII, c. 14. For the analysis of their struggle to achieve political rights, see Lee F. Carol, "The Road To Enfranchisement: Chinese and Japanese In British Columbia," *BC Studies*, no. 30 (Summer, 1976), pp. 44-76.

¹² Robert E. Wynne, *Reaction To The Chinese In The Pacific Northwest and British Columbia* (Toronto, 1964), p. 153.

federal-provincial conflict, the agreement with Japan clearly demonstrates the foreign policy implications of the issue.

Racism toward the Japanese was often simply an extension of anti-Chinese attitudes and policies, although the Japanese faced less severe racially discriminatory legislation. Popular stereotypes ranked the Japanese above other orientals in a racial hierarchy, yet they remained "orientals."¹³ The *Victorian Colonist*, for example, commented in December 1884 that,

The Japanese are intelligent, have peculiar[ly] active minds, and acquire knowledge readily . . . of the Oriental races give us the Japanese always.¹⁴

Such opinions proved short-lived. In the face of "yellow scares" which swept the province fine distinctions were lost.

Unlike the Chinese, Japanese immigration to Canada developed relatively late. Between 1877 and 1895 an estimated 1000 Japanese came to Canada.¹⁵ Prior to 1896, for both domestic and international reasons, Japan encouraged, without great success, the colonization of its northern region. Such efforts did, however, restrict the number of potential emigrants during the last part of the nineteenth century. In 1896, however, two years after the first signing of the Commercial Convention between Britain and Japan, the number of Japanese arrivals in Canada increased sharply. Initially that convention was to be automatically

¹³ "The trouble," according to R. G. Park, "is not with the Japanese mind but with the Japanese skin. The Japanese is not the right colour. The fact that the Japanese bears in his features a distinctive racial hall mark, that he wears so to speak, a racial uniform, classifies him." R. G. Park, "Racial Assimilation In Secondary Group," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX no. 5 (March, 1914), p. 611.

¹⁴ *Victorian Colonist*, December 6, 1884, cited in K. Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was* (Toronto, 1976), p. 38.

¹⁵ R. A. MacKay and E. B. Rogers, *Canada Looks Abroad* (Toronto, 1938), p. 156. See also P. W. Ward, *The Japanese In Canada* (Ottawa, 1982), p. 4.

extended to their respective empires. Fierce opposition in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa, however, ensured exemption from the free movement clauses in Britain's "White Dominions." Although exempted, about 12,000 Japanese nonetheless entered Canada between 1896 and 1900. Most moved on to the United States.¹⁶ The 1901 census reported only 4,738 Japanese living in Canada.¹⁷

Unlike China, Japan unilaterally restricted emigration. Prior to 1885 no authorization was given to any Japanese wishing to emigrate. Although the government later relaxed this restrictive policy, emigration would only be permitted on the condition that all emigrants maintained allegiance to the Emperor — a requirement not abandoned until 1926 — and that each and every emigrant obtain appropriate documentation.¹⁸ During the first phase of emigration, the Japanese government set up minimal guidelines to ensure that emigration would be orderly and organized. Japan was trying to cultivate and protect its international image as a new, modern and progressive nation. These emigrants went to North America through privately owned steamships, but under the auspices of the Japanese government. Ship-owners took advantage of the

¹⁶ Ward, *The Japanese In Canada*, p. 4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4 and Roy, *A White Man's Province*, p. xii. It is also possible that the census officers may have missed some of them.

¹⁸ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 727, file 83, "The Report of the Honourable Rodolphe Lemieux, K. C., Minister of Labour, Of His Mission To Japan On The Subject of The Influx Of Oriental Labourers Into The Province of British Columbia, January 12, 1908," pp. 4-5. Hereafter cited as *Lemieux Report*. See also External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1430, file 799-FP, W. L. M. King's Report on *How Oriental Labourers Have Been Induced to Come To Canada*, Document no. 25, Japanese Consul, Shimizu, to Governor General, May 10, 1898. Hereafter, this Report will be cited as *Report On Oriental Labourers*. See also External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1571, file 503, "Japanese Immigration To Canada," p. 13; Young and Reid, *The Japanese Canadians*, Chapter 1, and P. Roy, J. L. Granatstein, M. Iino and H. Takamura, *Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese during the Second World War* (Toronto, 1990), pp. 3-8.

government's sanction as well as the potential emigrants; they were more concerned about profit than the fate of their clients and the image of Japan.¹⁹ Despite Japan's restrictive efforts, many British Columbians believed that the Japanese government had in fact purposely and systematically flooded their province. Japan responded with further restrictions. In 1896, "for matter of foreign policy," a decree required that emigrants obtain a passport or visa and gave the Foreign Office the authority to "cancel a permit already granted". Japanese emigration, however, continued despite the decree. Again, in 1900, the Japanese Foreign Office issued an order prohibiting migration from Japan to North America.²⁰ Although this action was in part a response to the Oriental exclusion movements, it remained a unilateral decision. The Japanese government did not request co-operation from Canada. This remained the case until the 1929 diplomatic exchange between the two nations, despite the fact that Japan had established its first Consulate in Vancouver in 1889, and in Montreal in 1902. The Montreal office moved to Ottawa in 1904. In Vancouver, the Japanese consul was much more interested in maintaining good relations with Canada than helping Japanese in Canada and settling their grievances.²¹

The "failure" of Japan's restrictive emigration policy was the direct result of a number of factors. Demographically, there was an explosion of population shortly after the Meiji Restoration. Japan's limited space ensured

¹⁹ Roy, et als., *Mutual Hostages*, pp. 3-4.

²⁰ *Lemieux Report*, pp. 4-5. See also External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1571, file 503, "Japanese Immigration To Canada," p. 13.

²¹ See, for example, the RCMP report on the dispute between the Consul and his compatriots in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1541, file 249. For detailed analysis see Roy, *A White Man's Province* and P. W. Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia*, (Toronto, 1978).

there could never be land for everyone. Rapid industrialization, although impressive, could not absorb everyone into the labour force. By the mid-1890's Japan had to import food to feed its ever increasing population along with other essential resources for its industries. Emigration proved one solution, albeit a temporary and unsatisfactory one.

Although emigration helped to ease the demographic pressure in Japan, it contributed to anti-Japanese feelings abroad and to the growth of exclusion movements. In Canada, for example, the Japanese were soon being described as "highly unassimilable," "less desirable" and a "more serious menace."²² Sensitive to racist attacks, the Japanese government believed a solution to its problem lay in the military conquest of mainland Asia, particularly Korea and Northeastern China where rich and abundant mineral deposits and fertile agricultural land could be found. Although a large population already inhabited these areas, Japanese racism could be as overt as Europe's. The only way to create room for the Japanese was to disperse and exploit the local people. To attain these objectives, Japan had to dominate the Far East. These factors dominated Japanese foreign policy for more than half a century and led Japan from the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 to Pearl Harbour and the Pacific War between 1941-1945.²³

²² For an early account and analysis in Japan's expansion, see George Kennan, "How Japan Lost Her Chance In The Pacific," *The Outlook*, (June 27, 1914), p. 488. See also, A. Asada, "Japan's 'Special Interests' and The Washington Conference," *American Historical Review*, LXVII (October, 1961), pp. 62-70.

²³ For detailed analysis, see C. J. LeBra, *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War Two* (N.Y., 1975), M. Royama, *Foreign Policy of Japan, 1914-1939* (Westport, 1973), W. Mendel, *Issues In Japan's China Policy* (London, 1978) and I. Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1941* (London, 1977).

The relatively large concentration of Japanese in British Columbia and their successful competition against "whiteman" in lumbering and fishing industries²⁴ and later in agriculture²⁵ led, as with the Chinese, to white protest, agitation and discriminatory legislation. In 1897, the British Columbia Legislature passed a series of anti-oriental Acts including, according to External Affairs records, "an anti-Japanese Bill that was reserved and never assented to."²⁶ A series of private member bills introduced and promulgated in 1898 restricted the employment of Japanese and Chinese people. The provincial legislature also passed a Labour Regulation Act and a Tramway Incorporation Act which restricted the employment of Japanese in certain sectors and industries. Japan in turn protested this legislation. Britain requested disallowance, and the

²⁴ The fisheries question had a long history. As Young and Reid observed: "In 1896, 452 fishing licenses were issued to the Japanese; in 1901, 1958 licenses; in 1919, 3267 licenses; but by 1922, the number was reduced by 33%; in 1923, reduced 11% more and further reduction followed between 1924-26. Fearing that further reduction was on the way, the Japanese fishermen took their case to court. In May 1, 1928, however, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favour of the Japanese fishermen. The federal government appealed the decision to the Privy Council in October 1929 but lost. According to the Privy Council, the federal government minister did not have the discriminatory power to withhold the licenses from a duly naturalized Canadian citizen. The federal government then responded by passing an Order-in-Council, empowering the minister to do so. In 1930, when the federal government considered further reduction, both white and Japanese fishermen sent petitions, arguing that the policy had already achieved its objective and its continuation would be unwise and unfair. They requested its abandonment and the federal government agreed." Young and Reid, *The Japanese Canadians*, pp. 43-44. See also H. Yonemura, "Japanese Fishermen In British Columbia and British Fair Play," *Canadian Forum*, (July, 1930), p. 357.

²⁵ As Young and Reid point out, "Agitation and restrictive measures of either a *de facto* or legal nature in the fishing and lumbering industries and occupations expelled and excluded the Japanese from occupations in which the government exercised a certain degree of control, and drove them into agriculture where it was extremely difficult to protect their white competitors," Young and Reid, *The Japanese Canadians*, p. 53.

²⁶ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1571, file 503, "Japanese Immigration To Canada," p. 11.

federal government agreed. The federal government intervened not because it wanted Japanese immigrants but because, it suggested, "'nominatim' [sic] discrimination was improper."²⁷

Subsequent years witnessed additional federal disallowances. In 1899, the federal government disallowed the Liquor Licenses Act and the Coal Mines Regulation Act which attacked the Japanese and, for the first time, East Indians.²⁸ In 1900, a provincial Immigration Act based on the Natal Model in New South Wales and a Labour Regulation Act, employing a language test, experienced the same fate.²⁹ Subsequent attempts by the British Columbia legislature to reinstate the language test between 1900 and 1908 repeatedly met federal government disallowances.³⁰

In response to rising anti-Japanese racism, the Japanese government on August 2, 1900 issued an order prohibiting for the time being "the emigration of

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11, and MacKay and Rogers, *Canada Looks Abroad*, p. 157. For detailed treatment of East Indians and Canadian immigration policy see Hugh Johnston, *The Voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar* (Delhi, 1979).

²⁹ For a comparative analysis of immigration policy in Canada and elsewhere see Charles A. Price, *The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration To North America and Australasia, 1836-1888* (Canberra, 1974) and R. A. Huttenback, *Racism And Empire: White Settlers and Coloured Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-1910* (Ithaca, N.Y. and London, 1976).

³⁰ For a brief history of disallowance of B.C. anti-Oriental Acts and Regulations, see Pope Papers, MG 30 E 86, Vol. 134, file 149, "The Honourable Lemieux's Mission to Japan, 1907-08." "Papers: Privately Communicated to Mr. Lemieux by His Excellency Lord Grey, Governor General of Canada." See also Roy, et als., *Mutual Hostages*, p. 8.

Japanese labourers to the Dominion of Canada and also to the United States.³¹

In the short-term, the measure was quite effective. (See TABLE I below) Immi-

TABLE I
JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO CANADA

YEARS	JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS	YEARS	JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS	YEARS	JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS
1900-01	6	1908	858	1916	553
1901-02	-	1909	244	1917	887
1902-03	-	1910	420	1918	1036
1903-04	-	1911	727	1919	892
1904-05	354	1912	675	1920	525
1905-06	1922	1913	886	1921	481
1906-07	2042	1914	681	1922	395
1907-08	7601	1915	380	1923	404

*Fiscal Years from 1900-01 to 1907-08.

SOURCES: Canada. Division of Immigration;
Department of Manpower and Immigration;
Department of Citizenship and Immigration.³²

³¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1571, file 503, "Japanese Immigration To Canada," p. 12.

³² There seems to be a great deal of discrepancy on the number of Japanese immigrants. According to the records of the Department of External Affairs, Vol. 1571, file 503, "Japanese Immigration To Canada," p. 17, in 1908 there were 7601; in 1909, 495; in 1910, 271; in 1911, 437; in 1912, 765; in 1913, 724; in 1914, 856; in 1915, 592; in 1916, 401; in 1917, 648; in 1918, 883; in 1919, 1178; in 1920, 711; in 1921, 523; in 1922, 471; and in 1923, 369. The Japanese officials maintained that the Canadian statistics were much higher than their own; the total number of Japanese emigrants going to North America through Victoria did not add up to the Canadian figure. See King's *Report On How Oriental Labourers*, p. 166. A copy is available in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1430, file 799-FP, p. 166. Both the Japanese and Canadian statistics are reported in Roy et als., *Mutual Hostages*, pp. 18-19.

gration, however, resumed shortly after Canada's adherence to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1905. As a result of Canada's adherence, Japan wished to relax its restrictive emigration policy. The Japanese government instructed its Consul General in Vancouver, Morikawa Kishiro,³³ to assess the situation and its Consul General in Ottawa, Nosse Tatsugoro, to ask whether or not Canada had any particular concern that Japan should take into consideration. Morikawa warned that emigrants should be restricted and only a "small number at a time" should be allowed to come to Canada. Nosse agreed that a large influx would "stimulate vehement opposition against Japanese immigration."³⁴ The Canadian government discussed the issue on September 1 and came to the conclusion that, although Canada had no power to take exception to Japanese immigration, it preferred Japan to maintain some degree of unilateral restriction. By maintaining the restrictive policy and by adhering to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the Japanese government in effect strengthened the federal government's position in dealing with British Columbia's successive exclusion acts.³⁵

Japanese immigration peaked dramatically in 1907. Between January and October 1907, 4,400 Japanese immigrants arrived in British Columbia.³⁶ This brought a response; in September an anti-Asiatic demonstration led to riots in

³³ I use the Japanese convention by giving sir name first and given name last. North American source, however, reverses this practice. I will not change the convention if the citation is from North American sources.

³⁴ Roy et als., *Mutual Hostages*, pp. 8-9.

³⁵ Laurier Papers, MG 26, G, microfilm C-853, Sydney to Laurier, September 20, 1905, pp. 130531-32.

³⁶ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, pp. 53-54 and Ward, *White Canada Forever*, pp. 55-56, 65.

Vancouver which damaged a substantial amount of property and businesses.³⁷ "[T]he troubles in Vancouver," Laurier informed Grey, "have been very much exaggerated"³⁸ and hopefully "the storm of unreasoning panic would soon blow itself out."³⁹ Following the riot, Canada made an official apology to Japan and established a Royal Commission to investigate. That investigation tried to discover why Japanese immigration had not been "restricted to the figure privately agreed upon some few years ago."⁴⁰ Laurier personally wanted to know "whether the Japanese authorities connived at this violation, or whether the wily Jap [sic] worked a fraud upon his government." Laurier hoped that "an understanding with Japan" on immigration could be reached which would be "strictly carried out." The government, meanwhile, decided to pay compensation. Although the Japanese claim was smaller than that of the Chinese, Canada paid the Japanese first. China's weak political and international status meant delay in payment. Canada eventually paid because the Imperial government was trying to get

³⁷ While there was no sufficient evidence to support the claim that the riot was instigated by Americans, American citizens were certainly present at the meeting prior to the riot. During negotiations in Tokyo, meanwhile, the American Ambassador to Japan approached the British Ambassador with the view to making a "common cause" with Canada. After Lemieux and Pope left Japan, the American President offered assistance to Laurier in dealing with Japan. King was then sent to Washington to enquire about the American President's intentions. See Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 1-2, drawer 5, file 14 and Vol. 14-15, drawer 5, file 14 and drawer 7, file 18, 22 and 23, and *Lemieux Report*, p. 16.

³⁸ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 14-15, drawer 5, file 14, Laurier to Grey, September 16, 1907.

³⁹ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 14-15, drawer 7, file 16, Grey to Elgin, October 1, 1907 and drawer 7, file 18, Grey to Elgin, November 14, 1907.

⁴⁰ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 14-15, drawer 5, file 14, Laurier to Grey, September 16, 1907.

compensation from the Chinese government for Shanghai riot,⁴¹ and China successfully linked the two issues.

The commission of enquiry, in the end, declined to make any recommendation for exclusion.⁴² The riot and the Commission's conclusions again illustrated the division between the federal government and British Columbia. The former stood by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty while the latter continued to fear a "systematic invasion," a "Yellow Peril," and an "Oriental Flood." Although rejecting exclusion, the Royal Commission suggested a political solution to the problem, a "Gentleman's Agreement" between Japan and Canada to reduce emigration.

The federal government proceeded quickly with its Gentleman's Agreement. As its delegation the federal government named Rudolphe Lemieux, the Minister for Labour, Sir Joseph Pope, the Under-Secretary for External Affairs, and William Lyon MacKenzie King, the Deputy Minister for Labour. They travelled to Tokyo to discuss the question of emigration. Although King went to Japan as Lemieux's secretary, he chaired the *Report on How Oriental Labourers Have Been Induced To Come To Canada*⁴³ and made the recommendation that the Japanese be compensated first. This experience proved critical for later as Minister of External Affairs during the 1920s. King was the only high ranking official in the Department ever to have visited the far east. King had first-hand, though limited, knowledge of Japan.

⁴¹ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 182, Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, London, December 12, 1907. See also Ward, *White Canada Forever*, p. 74.

⁴² Ward, *White Canada Forever*, p. 74 and Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration* (Montreal, 1972), p. 90.

⁴³ See above Chapter II, note 18.

Japan, meanwhile, showed little enthusiasm for Canada's request to receive the Canadian representatives. In their view, the question was "not diplomatic, but rather domestic and political."⁴⁴ Japan, however, wishing not to irritate Britain and to maintain good relations with Canada decided to receive Canadian representatives.⁴⁵ With the support of the British Ambassador in Tokyo, negotiations went smoothly. The Japanese government was prepared not only to overlook the immigration clauses in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty but was also willing to carry out the restriction "unilaterally."⁴⁶ Japan also agreed not to object to Canada exercising its Alien Labour Act⁴⁷ against any Japanese coming from either Hawaii or Japan without the proper documents. The Canadian government then hesitated. Laurier considered the proposal "not satisfactory," but finally accepted it.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ *The Japan Times*, December 29, 1907, found in press clipping in Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 146.

⁴⁵ For the Japanese view and reaction to the Vancouver Riot, see M. Iino, "Japan's Reaction To The Vancouver Riot of 1907," *BC Studies*, no. 60 (Winter, 1983-84), pp. 28-47. For Grey's view on Oriental immigration, see Mary E. Hallett, "A Governor-General's View On Oriental Immigration To British Columbia, 1904-1911," *BC Studies*, no. 14 (Summer, 1972), pp. 3-16.

⁴⁶ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 175, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to First Minister, December 9, 1907; Document no. 189, the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, December 20, 1907, and Document no. 192, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to the Governor General, December 21, 1907.

⁴⁷ For an analysis of organized labour's views, see Gillian Creese, "Exclusion or Solidarity? Vancouver Workers Confront The 'Oriental Problems'," *BC Studies*, no. 80 (Winter, 1988-89), pp. 24-51; see also *The Alien Labour Law: The Double-Faced Policy of the Laurier Government, A Law Which Was Never Intended To be Enforced*. A copy is available in microfiche series MCF2-ZZM-CIHM, no. 39333 (1987) at the University of Ottawa's library.

⁴⁸ John Hilliker suggests that the agreement was rejected, and Lemieux was recalled despite Pope's attempt to persuade Laurier to accept it. Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 27, note 59. Hilliker did not look at the correspondence between Laurier and Lemieux on December 10, 21, 23, 1907

Laurier's suggestion that the present "Proposed arrangement [is] not satisfactory" angered Lemieux.⁴⁹ Laurier's initial reaction stemmed from his belief that Japan had failed to comply with the "Japanese Consul's letter to Fisher [Canadian Minister of Agriculture] of 18th September, 1905, [which] gives assurances of restricting all kind of labour."⁵⁰ Japanese Foreign Affairs officials repudiated that statement and informed Lemieux that if such a statement had been made, the Consul General had clearly exceeded his instruction and authority.⁵¹ Japanese newspapers quickly argued that "the rumour relating to the restriction of Japanese immigrants to Canada to 600 a year must be dismissed as entirely groundless."⁵² They doubted whether or not a "morally pledged assurance" on the part of Nosse "ever really existed."⁵³ Laurier based his position on Nosse's letter to Fisher. Although Lemieux had seen only part of that

and December 21, from British Ambassador in Tokyo to Governor General. All of these correspondences are contained in *Report On Oriental Labourers*. Nor did Hilliker consult Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D24, Vol. 7.

⁴⁹ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 172, the First Minister to the Postmaster General, December 8, 1907; Document no. 176, Canadian Postmaster General to the First Minister, December 10, 1907; Document no. 188, Postmaster to the First Minister, December 18, 1907; Document no. 191 Postmaster to the First Minister, December 20, 1907.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Document no. 184, the First Minister to the Postmaster, Ottawa, December 14, 1907.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Document no. 176, the Canadian Postmaster General to the First Minister, December 10, 1907; Document no. 188, Postmaster General to First Minister, December 18, 1907 and Document no. 191, Postmaster General to First Minister, December 20, 1907.

⁵² *Japan Herald* and *Japan Chronicle*, December 27, 1907, in press clipping found in Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 146.

⁵³ *Japan Gazette*, December 26, 1907. See also *Japan Times*, December 29, 1907 and *Japan Daily Mail*, December 30, 1907 found in press clipping in Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 146.

letter, he argued that it could "hardly be used in the negotiations."⁵⁴ Lemieux suggested that if one read carefully, one would see that Mr. Nosse "only promises a *voluntary restriction* on the part of Japan."⁵⁵ Lemieux reminded Laurier of Nosse's warning that "if we insist our efforts will *come to nothing*." Japan, according to Lemieux, was doing Canada a favour by allowing her to adhere to the Treaty and "we should not ask for any concession or restriction." What Japan suggested and agreed to do was the best Canada could expect.⁵⁶ Lemieux added that "Pope fully agrees."⁵⁷ The British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Claude MacDonald, also wrote to the Canadian Governor General that "there seems to be some serious misunderstanding on the part of the Canadian Cabinet."⁵⁸ The following day, Laurier sent Lemieux a telegram informing him that, "I confess we

⁵⁴ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 188, The Canadian Postmaster General to the First Minister, December 18, 1907. For the correspondence between Nosse and Sydney see Laurier Papers, MG 26, G, microfilm reel C-853, Nosse to Sydney, September 18, 1905, pp. 130527-28 and Sydney to Laurier, September 20, 1905, pp. 130529-32. For the earlier correspondence between Laurier and Nosse, see microfilm reel C-842, pp. 118353-75. See also Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 145, Lemieux to Laurier, December 20, 1907.

⁵⁵ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 188, the Canadian Postmaster General to the First Minister, December 18, 1907. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁶ Although Japan did not agree to insert a written numerical limitation within the text, Japan did agree that the total labourers permitted to come to Canada will not exceed 400. This guarantee would be given to Canada and to the British Ambassador in Japan in a confidential letter as a sign of good faith. Instructions would also be issued to its prefectural governors and consular services in Canada. For copies of these instructions, see Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D24, Vol. 7.

⁵⁷ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 176, the Canadian Postmaster General to the First Minister, December 10, 1907.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Document no. 192, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to the Governor General, December 21, 1907.

do not perhaps exactly understand their offer here."⁵⁹ On December 23, 1907, Laurier sent a telegram to Lemieux, telling him to come home for consultation without "either accepting or rejecting [the] proposal."⁶⁰ After his return, Canada accepted the terms negotiated by Lemieux and Pope.⁶¹

Just prior to Lemieux's arrival in Canada, the Governor General, Earl Grey, wrote Laurier that the Agreement was a good one:

You can safely shake the proffered hand without any manifestation of distrust - and at the very worst, if the regulations which your people have drafted are not properly enforced, you can always bring the Treaty to an end at short notice and close your gates.⁶²

The consequence of not accepting the agreement, Grey suggested, would be great. Canada's security depended on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and British naval superiority. "The U.S. Fleet and the Monroe Doctrine offer you no protection on which you can count." Canada should not, Grey concluded, create a situation whereby ill-feeling could be the seed of future war.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Document no. 193, the First Minister to Postmaster General, December 21, 1907.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Document no. 200, the First Minister to Postmaster General, December 23, 1907. The telegraphic communication did not permit the Canadian Government to fully understand the terms of the proposed agreement. See Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 145, Lemieux to Count Hayashi, December 25, 1907, typewritten and contained in "Précis of the Meeting of the 25th of December 1907 at the Foreign Office."

⁶¹ Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D24, Vol. 7, Lemieux to Preston, January 14, 1908; Lemieux to Lindley, January 16, 1908; Lemieux to Sir Claude MacDonald, January 16, 1908 and Lemieux to Count Tadasu Hayashi, January 22, 1908. See also Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 2-4, Laurier to Grey, January 13, 1908. See also House of Commons, *Debates*, Lemieux, January 21, 1908.

⁶² Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 1-2, drawer 5, file 19, Grey to Laurier, December 27, 1907 and Vol. 2-4, Laurier to Grey, January 7, 1908.

After consultation, instructions were sent to Tokyo asking the British Ambassador to exchange the notes on the proposed agreement with the Japanese.⁶³ Fearing that the Canadian government might once more change its mind, the British Ambassador, following the exchange of notes, warned that

it is not possible to induce them [the Japanese] to come to any agreement by which Canada should have the right to control Japanese immigration herself; rather than give way on this vital question of principle the Japanese Government would prefer that Canada should take the extreme course of denouncing the Commercial Treaty and passing a Japanese exclusion Bill.⁶⁴

In the end Canada accepted the agreement, although its terms were not made public. Japan had specifically asked Canada not to do so.⁶⁵

Once again emigration had been restricted by unilateral action on the part of Japan. The door, however, remained partially open. Japan would continue to allow some of its citizens to emigrate. These would include prior residents in Canada, their wives and children, those specially engaged by Japanese residents in Canada for *bona fide* personal and domestic service,⁶⁶ contract emigrants

⁶³ For instruction to exchange notes with the Japanese, see *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 209, the Governor General to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio, January 13, 1908; Document no. 216, the Governor General to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio, January 16, 1908; Document 217, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to the Governor General, January 18, 1908 and Document no. 219, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to the Governor General, January 20, 1908.

⁶⁴ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 221, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to the Governor General, January 20, 1908.

⁶⁵ See Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 145, "Précis of the Meeting of the 25th of December 1907 at the Foreign Office."

⁶⁶ Lemieux assured Japanese officials that Japanese immigrants within this category coming from Hawaii will enjoy the same treatment. See *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 166, Canadian Postmaster General to Japanese Foreign Minister, British Embassy in Tokyo, December 5, 1907; Document no. 168, Canadian Postmaster General to First Minister, December 5, 1907; Document no. 171, "Précis of Meeting Between Baron Chinda, Mr. Ishii, Honourable F. O. Lindley, and Mr. Pope, at the Foreign Office," December 7, 1907; Document no. 175, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the First Minister, December 9, 1907;

whose term of contract, work to be done, names and standing of the intended employers were satisfactorily specified, and agricultural labourers brought in by Japanese land holders in Canada. Japan would not object to the enforcement of Canadian Alien Labour Law against Japanese coming from Hawaii. Clearly contracted labourers from either Hawaii or Japan constituted a violation of the Alien Labour Law; Canada agreed to these two groups on the conditions that such emigrants be obliged to seek certificates from the Japanese consuls in conjunction with the request and/or approval of the Canadian government.⁶⁷ Moreover, the number of agricultural labourers was to be limited to ten for each one hundred acres of land owned by Japanese in Canada. Finally, the total number of both agricultural and domestic labourers entering Canada should not exceed four hundred annually, although this restriction did not apply to students, tourists and merchants.

Canada assumed few obligations under the Gentleman's Agreement. All those who had the proper documents would be allowed into Canada. Japan would issue passports or visas and, with Canada's consent, Japan proposed sending officials to Victoria and Vancouver to turn away anyone who attempted to emigrate to Canada illegally. The latter point was aimed at those Japanese who tried to enter Canada from Hawaii or other parts of the world where the Japanese government had neither authority nor jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the special legislation empowering Japanese officials to carry out such tasks where no Japanese extra-territorial rights existed and the delicate nature of the matter as well as the difficulties

Document no. 176, Canadian Postmaster General to the First Minister, December 10, 1907; Document no. 193, the First Minister to the Postmaster General, December 21, 1907 and Document no. 197, the Postmaster General to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, British Embassy in Tokyo, December 23, 1907.

⁶⁷ *Lemieux Report*, p. 9 and Canada, Dept. of Labour, *Labour Gazette*, Vol. 8, p. 928 and 932.

getting such legislation passed in the Japanese Diet effectively killed the proposal to have Japanese officials stationed in Canada to turn back any illegal emigrants.⁶⁸ Canada, however, continued to rely on Japan to carry out the agreement.

The Gentleman's Agreement could be considered a "failure" as far as allaying fears in British Columbia. The federal government did not explain the agreement to the Canadian public in general and British Columbians in particular. The limit of 400 people per year, meanwhile, applied to "labourers,"⁶⁹ not the total number admitted; immigration in 1908 clearly exceeded 400 people. Most of these immigrants had obtained the appropriate documents before the Gentleman's Agreement came into effect, and the majority were children and wives of Japanese already established in Canada. There were also "picture brides," as women of long distance arranged marriages were known, who either came to visit or to stay with their husbands in Canada for the first time since the wedding.⁷⁰ The large number of arrivals created a great deal of misunderstanding.⁷¹ Many in British Columbia accused Japan of bad faith, and the federal politicians did their best to convince British Columbians otherwise. The provincial government in turn accused the federal government of deliberately opening British Columbia to

⁶⁸ *Report On Oriental Labourers*, Document no. 168, Canadian Postmaster General to First Minister, December 5, 1907; Document no. 181, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to Governor General, December 12, 1907; Document no. 194, Postmaster General to First Minister, December 21, 1907 and Document no. 201, "Précis of the Meeting of the 25th December, 1907, at the Foreign Office."

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Document no. 221, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to Governor General, Tokyo, January 20, 1908.

⁷⁰ Roy, et als., *Mutual Hostages*, p. 12.

⁷¹ See Tom MacInnes, *Oriental Occupation of British Columbia* (Vancouver, 1927), p. 12, 18 and C. E. Hope and W. K. Earle, "The Oriental Threat," *Maclean's Magazine*, (May 1, 1933).

oriental immigration and of protecting Japan. Premier Richard McBride even went to London in 1911 where he asked for and obtained assurance from Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, that steps would be taken to remove British Columbia's grievances.¹² On this occasion Grey seemed to support the province.

Despite British Columbia's resentment the Gentleman's Agreement remained in force for a decade. Then, as enlistment increased during World War One, the shortage of manpower in the labour force seemed to soften the edge of bigotry and racism. Although this easing of tensions proved short-lived, orientals were allowed to work in industries and other projects as part of the contribution to the war effort. Post-war economic hardships, however, soon revived anti-Asiatic agitation. In November 1921 the British Columbia legislature demanded amendments to Canada's immigration laws to exclude all Asians. Although the federal government officially refused, it tried to satisfy some of British Columbia's grievances. In 1923, the federal government completely excluded Chinese immigrants and negotiated a new agreement with Japan to limit Japanese labourers to only 150 annually excluding students and businessmen. Such a restriction had more symbolic than practical impact as the number of labourers rarely exceeded 100 per annum.¹³ Japan's decision to address its population problem by concentrating on the growth of export trade and by expanding in mainland Asia probably had a greater effect on limiting emigration than its new agreement with Canada.

Despite the lack of significant immigration during the 1920s, the issue provided a critical context for Canada's 1928 decision to establish its Legation

¹² Young and Reid, *The Japanese Canadians*, pp. 12-13.

¹³ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1571, file 503, "Asiatic Immigration," p. 19.

in Tokyo. After months of negotiation, a new and more restrictive agreement came into force in September 1929. Unlike the previous agreements, only 150 Japanese emigrants could obtain passports to Canada annually. Of this total, there was a mutual agreement — not to be publicized — by both Canada and Japan that the number of "females"⁷⁴ would not exceed seventy-five. There would also be an end to the system of "picture brides." The establishment of diplomatic representation between the two nations gave the responsibility of issuing passports and visas to the Canadian Minister in Tokyo thus removing any doubt as to the validity of immigration documents.⁷⁵ As reported in *Japan Times*, "the services of the Tokyo Legation are essential and the [Japanese] consuls will no longer be under the necessity of handling this type of business."⁷⁶ With such an arrangement, the immigration issue was finally settled in a satisfactory manner.

The immigration issue, then, had a long and controversial history dating back to the mid-nineteenth century. Politically, it was an explosive issue, yet it remained largely a federal-provincial jurisdictional dispute rather than a cause for international difficulties. Although the federal government consistently disallowed British Columbia's discriminatory legislation, it eventually gave in to British Columbia's demands by imposing a head-tax (which was subsequently raised) on the Chinese and later excluding both the Chinese and

⁷⁴ It is not clear whether this generic term applied exclusively to adult females or both adults and children.

⁷⁵ Although immediately upon his arrival, H. L. Keenleyside, the Canadian Chargé d'affaires, set up machinery to deal with the issuing of passports and visas, administrative delay insured that the Canadian Legation in Tokyo did not take complete charge until April 1930. H. L. Keenleyside, *Memoirs: Hammer The Golden Days*, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1981), p. 280.

⁷⁶ *Japan Times*, April 18, 1930. See also *Japan Advertiser*, April 18, 1930, found in press clipping in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 129, file 22.

East Indians from Canada. The federal government, meanwhile, did everything it could to avoid offending Japan. Canada found *ad hoc* political means such as the Lemieux Mission in 1907, and the 1923 and the 1928 Immigration Agreements between Canada and Japan to deal satisfactorily with Japanese immigration. This had been done without diplomatic ties. There was, then, no pressing need in 1927-28 to create a diplomatic mission in order to deal with Japanese immigration, although the Tokyo Legation no doubt facilitated the implementation of the terms of the 1928 Immigration Agreement.

Trade With Asia-Pacific and Japan

Important as it was immigration did not represent the total picture of Canada/Asia-Pacific and Canada-Japan relations. Unlike immigration where the Canadian objective was to restrict contact, Canada pursued economic objectives which sought closer commercial ties. Although the legendary riches of the Orient had been in the minds of Canadians for a long time, a large and prosperous trade with the Orient -- especially with China -- failed to materialize.¹¹ The first direct official contact between Canada and Japan took place on June 1889 when John Heggart, the Postmaster-General in Sir John A. Macdonald's Cabinet, signed in Ottawa the "Convention for the Exchange of Money Orders" between the Post Office of the Dominion of Canada and the Department of Communications of the Empire of Japan. This agreement provided a mechanism for exchange which would facilitate trade. Other initiatives, however, were less direct as Britain continued to conduct foreign policy for its North American Dominion.

¹¹ For detailed analysis in Sino-Canadian trade, see Ho Pin-Yin, "A Survey of Sino-Canadian Trade," *Chinese Economics Journal*, (February, 1934), p. 141.

The critical "breakthrough" came in 1894 with the negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty on Commerce and Navigation. Canada initially rejected that agreement because Article I, as we have seen, allowed the citizens of each of the two parties to move to, travel in and reside in the territories and possessions of the other. Canada demanded a clause be inserted to restrict Japanese immigration to Canada. Although Japan agreed, the Canadian government in July 1896 rejected the Treaty because of the difficulties arising from the "most-favoured-nation" clause. Despite this decision the door to Dominion participation remained open.

The rejection of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, as Senator Scott explained in 1897, resulted from Canada having suffered "so much from the most favoured nation clauses in treaties that we prefer not to be included in them."⁷⁸ On this occasion, Scott referred to the Commercial Treaties between Britain and Germany and Britain and Belgium which guaranteed their products access to Canadian markets on terms equivalent to British imports. Senator MacDonald went further. According to him, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty

would be a lamentable thing, and an injury to the country if we allowed Japanese goods to come in under favoured-nation clauses. I hope the government will resist . . . and not allow this country to be bound by any treaty made with China and Japan [sic]. The competition of Germany, Belgium and France is nothing compared with the competition that there will be coming from the people of Japan⁷⁹

The Right Honourable S. Fisher, the Minister of Agriculture, later admitted that the most-favoured-nation clause rather than difficulties over immigration proved

⁷⁸ Canada, *Senate Debates*, Second Session - Eight Parliament, May 4, 1897, p. 261 and 269. See also Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 145, "Memorandum From Count Hayashi to Lemieux," December 21, 1907.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

the primary source of Canada's concern.⁸⁰ This remained the case several years later when an exchange of notes between Britain and Japan extended the period of accession for one more year. Canada failed to avail itself of this opportunity and did not accede to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty for another decade.

Despite the rejection of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1894, Canada continued to pursue trade with Japan. In May 1897, three years after Canada rejected the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, an Order-in-Council authorized Richard Cartwright, the Minister for Trade and Commerce, to send "a Commissioner or Agent of the Dominion government to visit Japan" to explore prospects for expanded trade.⁸¹ Cartwright chose George Anderson of Toronto who responded enthusiastically to the challenge. Anderson planned to advertise Canadian products by distributing pamphlets and leaflets, but W. G. Parmelee, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, discouraged this initiative. Parmelee suggested that Anderson's "mission will be a quiet and unassuming one for the purpose of using your eyes in ascertaining in what manner the trade between the two countries can be advanced."⁸² Anderson received neither authority nor permission to discuss any possible trade arrangements with the Japanese during his two-month stay in Japan.

The government failed to pursue this initial effort. Not until 1904 did Department of Trade and Commerce appoint a Commercial Agent to Yokohama. For this mission, the government chose Alexander MacLean, an Ottawa businessman already

⁸⁰ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, June 22, 1905, cols. 7908-15.

⁸¹ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1153, file 5059, PC 1089 (May 4, 1897). See also, NAC, Privy Council, RG 2, Vol. 2790 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 29.

⁸² Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1153, file 5059, Parmelee to Anderson, June 4, 1897.

in his 70's. Later, Fisher cynically commented that "Maclean is too old and has not had experience in recent business lines in Canada." What was needed was "a good smart young business man in Japan, the type of successful commercial traveller."⁸³ A year later the government transferred MacLean to Shanghai where he died soon after.

Despite the government's half-hearted initiatives interest in trade with the Orient in general and Japan, in particular, was growing. The clearest indication of this came on June 7, 1905 when Canada announced that the obstacles to acceptance of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty had been removed.⁸⁴ By an Order-in-Council, in September 1905 Canada asked to become part of the Treaty "absolutely and without reserve." Five months later, on 31 January, 1906, both Britain and Japan signed a Supplementary Convention in Tokyo making the Treaty applicable to Canada. Parliament ratified this convention in January 1907 without any alteration in Article I which allowed Japanese citizen to enter, to travel and to reside in Canada. The Treaty would be renewed in 1911. Japan, however, in July 1911 denounced the Treaty and began renegotiating a series of new agreements with its trading partners. Canada, nevertheless, chose to adhere to the Treaty for another two years while new negotiations were under way. Despite Japan's denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, the Gentleman's Agreement remained in force. The immigration issue "is quite independent of existing Treaty

⁸³ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 26-26A, drawer 2, file 11, "Japan Trade Etc.," Fisher to Grey, September 21, 1905.

⁸⁴ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, June 7, 1905, cols. 7912-13. See also King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2796, "Canada's Political Relations With Japan," p. 15726-28.

concluded in 1906," Japan informed Canada, "and does not terminate on the expiration of the Treaty."⁸⁵

While the negotiations for Canada's acceptance of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty were taking place, Grey and Fisher, the Agriculture Minister, were discussing the role of the Canadian government in promoting a trans-Pacific trade. Grey wanted the Canadian government to be actively involved and to help as many sectors of the economy as possible. Fisher, however, told Grey that the federal government would not and "could not do for bread and butter what it was not willing to do for lumber."⁸⁶ By implication Fisher would not aid one industry because it might imply discrimination against others. Grey was unhappy with Fisher's explanation and wrote Laurier. Grey wanted the Canadian government to change its attitude and to cultivate the Far Eastern market for the future "benefit of the Dominion." Fisher got wind of this and quickly wrote Grey that "it is hard to get them [Canadians] to cultivate the market for future benefit."⁸⁷ The basic problem was the fact that Canadians were able to sell their product everywhere, and the "short-sightedness is one of the faults of our people." Canadians, according to Fisher, "do not think for the future, but only for the day and I might say that 'sufficient for the day is the prosperity thereof' is their philosophy." Another reason for the cool attitude towards the trans-Pacific trade, Fisher continued, was the unfortunate fact that "our people are prejudiced against the Oriental people" and therefore had not "worked up to the importance of the trans-Pacific

⁸⁵ Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 121, file 14, "Japanese Treaty of 1911," p. 4, Document no. 16, Colonial Secretary to Governor General, March 17, 1911.

⁸⁶ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 1-2, drawer 2, file 8, Grey to Laurier, July 13, 1906.

⁸⁷ Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 26-26A, drawer 2, file 11, Fisher to Grey, September 21, 1905.

trade." While there might be some truth in this elaborate explanation, the fact of the matter was that, given the abundantly available market for Canadian goods and produce elsewhere, there were no urgent need to search for new markets in Asia. The government, however, was about to change its mind.

With Canada's adherence to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, the Laurier government named W. T. R. Preston, a former immigrant agent in Europe, to succeed MacLean as Canada's Trade Commissioner in 1905 in Japan. Younger and more energetic, Preston was "a pusher and a kicker of approved quality."⁸⁸ Highly regarded by Laurier, Preston was

to visit China, Korea [sic] and Japan with a view to ascertaining from personal investigation, under such instructions as may be given him by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, to what extent and what manner an increase between the Dominion of Canada and China, Korea and Japan can be brought about.⁸⁹

Although his appointment was to be only temporary, he remained at this post until 1911 when G. Harris relieved him. Preston found the existing situation in Asia quite unsatisfactory.

Preston's first report discussed potential markets for wheat and flour in Japan and explored the possibilities for timber exports for naval construction and bases in China and Japan. Preston recommended that Canadian businessmen and companies deal directly with Japan rather than the existing practice of working through agents in the United States. Such practice made preferential treatment for Canadian goods difficult, if not impossible, since many Canadian goods passed

⁸⁸ Laurier Papers, MG 26, G, Vol. 455, Cartwright to Laurier, March 15, 1907, p. 122457.

⁸⁹ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 2, file A-35, PC 1542 (August 31, 1906). See also Privy Council, RG 2, Vol. 2790 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 29.

through the United States and bore stamps on trans-shipments.⁹⁰ Again, despite Preston's recommendations, no consistent efforts were made. During the Lemieux's Mission to Japan in 1907, there had been efforts to discuss trade issues, yet the trade aspects of the mission were quietly dropped.⁹¹

In 1909 the Laurier government named a second Trade Commissioner to the Far East: J. B. Jackson moved from Britain to Shanghai. Unlike Preston, Jackson proved too lethargic, and in November 1911 the Department asked for his resignation.⁹² Not until May 1913 was a new Trade Commissioner, J. W. Ross, appointed. In the interim, the Department of Trade and Commerce instructed Major G. B. Johnson, a railway construction engineer and a former officer with the Royal Engineers who had been working in Yokohama railway construction for some time, to look after the Shanghai Office.

The whole far eastern operation, meanwhile, underwent an evaluation. For this task, the Canadian government turned to a British civil servant, Richard Grigg. Born in Britain in 1847 Grigg spent a good part of his early life in Ontario. In 1908, he resided in Montreal and gathered statistics and evaluated economic conditions in Canada for the British Commercial Intelligence Service.

⁹⁰ Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 149, "The Honourable Rodolphe Lemieux's Mission to Japan," subsection III, "Japan Trade."

⁹¹ Pope Papers, MG 30, E86, Vol. 134, file 149, "Trade Between Canada and Japan," subsection III and IV, "The Honourable R. Lemieux's Mission to Japan, 1907-08: On The Development of Trade with Japan with special reference to the establishment of Canadian bakeries in that country." and Vol. 121, file 41, "Treaties and Agreement - Japanese Treaty of 1911 and Proposed Customs Tariff, 1909-1913," and Grey Papers, MG 27, II, B2, Vol. 26-26A, drawer 2, file 11, "Japan Trade Etc.," Fisher to Grey, September 21, 1905 and drawer 4, file 1 and 2, "Canadian Letters, 1907," Grey to Lemieux, October 23, 1907 and Vol. 1-2, drawer 5, file 8, "Correspondence with Laurier, 1905-06," Grey to Laurier, July 13, 1906.

⁹² Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 3, file A-710, PC 2704 (November 25, 1911). See also Privy Council, RG 2, Vol 2807 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 43.

Through his work he came to know "Canada, both East and West," according to the *Ottawa Citizen*, "as very few Canadians do."⁹³ Grigg was also well acquainted with the new Minister of Trade and Commerce, Sir George Foster, who he had met in late 1911. On leave in England, Foster wrote to Grigg asking him to join the Canadian Service as soon as he was free from the British Service.⁹⁴ Grigg did just that and joined the Canadian Service in 1912. He quickly took control of Canadian Commercial Intelligence and Service in Ottawa.

An enthusiastic supporter of trade diversification, Grigg suggested in 1913 that the Department of Trade and Commerce concentrated too heavily on the British market. "At present, it appears to be a matter for consideration whether the immediate and larger efforts of the Department of Trade and Commerce," Grigg wrote, "should not be directed toward rising markets in the far east or in non-manufacturing countries such as South America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Russia."⁹⁵ Grigg was well placed to promote such initiatives.

In 1913, Sir George Foster sent Grigg to Japan and China to study the economic situation. Although completed earlier, his report was finally published in the Department's *Weekly Report* in June 1914. Grigg believed that "a development of trade in the North Pacific will occur and that Canada will enjoy an important proportion of that trade."⁹⁶ Of the countries of the far east, Japan and China dominated Canada's vision. Wheat, flour and timber, he suggested,

⁹³ *Ottawa Citizen*, January 7, 1916.

⁹⁴ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 2, file A-32, Foster to Grigg, December 20, 1911.

⁹⁵ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 43, file 18165, part I, Grigg to Foster, April 11, 1912.

⁹⁶ Foreword by Foster to Report on the Trade of China and Japan, supplement to Trade and Commerce *Weekly Report*, (Ottawa, 1914), p. 6.

were the most promising commodities despite stiff competition from American flour. British Columbians, Grigg believed, should pay more attention to the Far East in marketing their timber and wood products. Significantly, Grigg saw greater potential for trade with Japan than with China. China was "seething with revolution." Japan, on the other hand, was a small country, but its industrialization "has been rapid." Economic circumstances in Japan provided a "remarkable contrast to conditions which prevail in China."⁹⁷ This ensured a renewed interest in commercial treaties with Japan.

Following the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911, Britain and Japan renewed the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. This reopened the issue of Canadian adherence as the two articles to which Canada had initially objected remained unchanged. Canada opened talks with the Japanese Consul General in Ottawa and expressed its willingness to endorse the Treaty, yet reiterated that it in no way affected any provisions of the 1910 Immigration Act. Although that Act was not aimed specifically at any particular group, the government had empowered itself to exclude whatever racial or national groups it chose. The Japanese Consul General in Ottawa found the concern to be perfectly reasonable because it meant that Canadian immigration laws applied to all countries including Britain.⁹⁸ The Japanese government, however, maintained that restrictions on Japanese immigration were agreed to only on the basis of "voluntary resolution of the Japanese government."⁹⁹ The Canadian government

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2796, "Canada's Political Relations With Japan, August 28, 1929," p. 15732.

⁹⁹ *Japanese Diplomatic Documents*, Taisho 2-1, Nakamura to Makino, March 1, 1913, cited in Roy et als., *Mutual Hostages*, p. 13, note 48.

then passed the Japanese Treaty Act of 1913 in which it agreed to adhere to the 1911 renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty for a period of two years.

Despite these developments, the Department of Trade and Commerce's attitude towards the trans-Pacific trade remained surprisingly cool. The lack of enthusiasm as well as consistent pursuit of potential opportunities for trade were clearly reflected in the number of Commercial Agents in Asia, although efforts and workload of these agents were augmented. By 1920 there were only three agents in East Asia; by 1930 there were only six.¹⁰⁰ Although the numbers remained small, they seem to have done an effective job as trade between Canada and Asia increased steadily. More importantly, Canada-Japan trade clearly and consistently favoured Canada.¹⁰¹

Although significant trade with the western Pacific did not develop until about the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the first decades of this century witnessed a rapid expansion and diversification. In the Pacific Japan loomed ever larger in this expanding trade. Canada consistently ran a trade deficit with Japan between 1871 and 1921. The gap, however, had been closing steadily and, by 1922, the deficit became a surplus. (See TABLE II below). Henceforth, Canada's exports to Japan increased steadily to an annual average of 2.5 times its imports. By 1926, Japan was Canada's third best customer. Canada's exports to Japan in the late 1920s were 300 times greater than they had been three decades earlier.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Auditor General's *Annual Reports*, 1910-11, 1920-21 and 1930-31.

¹⁰¹ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 296. See also *Canada Year Books*, 1921 through to 1930.

¹⁰² King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2478, "Trade with The Far East: Japan and China," p. 45523.

TABLE II

CANADA'S TRADE WITH JAPAN IN SELECTED YEARS, 1890-1934

YEAR	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	BALANCE
1890	1,258,763	26,825	- 1,231,938
1895	1,567,558	10,307	- 1,557,251
1900	1,762,534	112,300	- 1,650,226
1905	1,928,886	508,609	- 1,420,277
1910	2,179,936	659,118	- 1,520,818
1915	2,783,465	963,631	- 1,819,834
1916	4,015,125	996,575	- 3,018,550
1917	8,122,735	1,205,067	- 6,917,668
1918	12,255,319	4,861,244	- 7,394,075
1919	13,618,122	12,245,439	- 1,372,683
1920	13,637,287	7,732,514	- 5,904,773
1921	11,359,003	6,414,920	- 4,944,083
1922	8,192,238	14,831,520	+ 6,639,282
1923	7,211,015	14,510,133	+ 7,299,118
1924	6,292,867	26,931,860	+ 20,638,993
1925	6,985,056	22,046,986	+ 15,061,430
1926	9,564,074	34,694,862	+ 25,130,788
1927	11,170,373	29,929,031	+ 18,758,658
1928	12,505,373	32,957,162	+ 20,451,789
1929	12,921,317	42,009,968	+ 29,088,651
1930	12,537,253	30,475,581	+ 17,938,328
1931	9,342,967	18,958,965	+ 9,615,998
1932	5,990,401	16,555,690	+ 10,565,289
1933	3,860,911	10,327,492	+ 6,466,581
1934	3,311,687	13,802,760	+ 10,491,073

SOURCES: *Canada Year Books*, 1890 to 1934.

Trade and trade promotion, like the immigration issue, could be pursued satisfactorily without establishing formal diplomatic exchanges. Canadian Trade

Commissioners were competent and performed their duties admirably despite their not having diplomatic status. Trade Commissioners, however, were not the official representatives of a nation. They had no diplomatic status, no authority to approach the host nation's officials and no way to influence the political decisions especially if those decisions were politically motivated. Although not a necessary condition, diplomatic relations would none-the-less facilitate and supplement the work of Trade Commissioners. This clearly was the case in Canada-Japan trade. After World War One Canada enjoyed an enormous advantage in its bilateral trade; Japan was unhappy about the situation and tried, like other nations, to redress this problem by instituting protective tariffs. Canada's desire to maintain its beneficial trading relationship with Japan constituted one of the motives which led to the establishment of diplomatic exchanges.

The Anglo-Japanese Military Alliance

Canada could delay acceptance of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty because on matters of commerce and immigration it exercised autonomy within the empire. The same could not be said about political and military matters. These jurisdictions remained in the hands of the Imperial government. The Anglo-Japanese military alliance of 1902 automatically applied to the entire Empire. That alliance provided that if either's territorial rights and special interests were attacked by a third party or parties, the other would come to its defence.

Canada worried about the implication of this alliance. In particular, Canada worried about the potential for conflict between Japan and the United States. Should war occur between Britain and the United States or between Japan and the United States, Canada might well find itself the first country to be

invaded. When the time came for renewal, Canada raised the matter at the Imperial Conference of 1911. Canada insisted that a clause be added to the Treaty making the Alliance inapplicable in the case of war between Japan and the United States. Britain acquiesced not because of Canada's insistence but because both Britain and Japan had come to the conclusion, either separately or jointly, that in case of war with the United States, Britain would not assist Japan.¹⁰³ Article IV of the 1911 renewal made this clear in an unusually ambiguous way.

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.¹⁰⁴

The United States was the only power which had a Treaty of Arbitration with one of these two parties, Great Britain; the negotiations for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Anglo-American negotiations on the Treaty of Arbitration had been conducted simultaneously. Britain preferred to name specifically the United States as the power with which Britain would not go to war so that the United States Senate would ratify the Arbitration Treaty; Japan, however, preferred not to be so specific, and Britain eventually agreed.¹⁰⁵ This created potential difficulties as, although concluded shortly after the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the United States did not ratify the Arbitration Treaty.

¹⁰³ I. Nish, *Alliance In Decline: A Study In Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923* (London, 1972), p. 64. See also C. Balfour, ed., *Balfour's Life, 1906-1930* (London, 1950), p. 328.

¹⁰⁴ *Japanese Diplomatic Documents*, 44/I no. 102, cited in Nish, *Alliance In Decline*, p. 67, note 21.

¹⁰⁵ Nish, *Alliance In Decline*, p. 65.

The renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to last ten years and would automatically continue in force unless one of the two parties gave one year's notice of its intention to terminate the Alliance. During its life neither party would have cause for complaint, although Japan entered World War One more in pursuit of its own interests than as a duty to an ally. Japan quickly took a number of German possessions in China and the northern Pacific. Britain took German possessions in the southern Pacific and distributed these to New Zealand and Australia. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, Canadian forces served side by side with the Japanese Imperial Army in Siberia under the general command of General Otani. Thus, when the tenth anniversary of the military treaty approached, neither side gave notice that it should be terminated.

The United States was not so convinced. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance gave Japan, according to American opinion, a *carte blanche* to expand in Asia at the expense of China and American interests. As Japan expanded, Anglo-American relations became less and less cordial. Fear of a post-war naval arms race compounded American concerns about an Anglo-Japanese combined effort against the American interests in the Pacific. However, Britain with its huge American debt could ill afford an arms race with the United States;¹⁰⁶ Britain was trying to cultivate American friendship. In this context Britain persuaded Japan to submit

¹⁰⁶ See Lloyd George's speech in *Literary Digest*, May 21, 1922, p. 17. There was evidence suggesting that the United States did use the debt question as a *quid pro quo* for the abrogation of the alliance. See Sir Edward Grigg, *British Foreign Policy* (London, 1944), p. 140; H. G. Wells, *Washington And The Riddle Of Peace* (N.Y., 1922), pp. 183-4, 274; R. Butler and J. P. T. Barry, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1 series, I-XIV, (London, 1967), p. 400 and Y. Ichihashi, *The Washington Conference And After* (Stanford, 1928), p. 215. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see R. A. Dayer, "The British War Debt To The United States And The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1920-1923," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 45 No. 4 (November, 1976), p. 569.

a joint statement to the League of Nations which opened the debate on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

The Governments of Japan and Great Britain have come to the conclusion that the treaty of alliance now existing between their two countries, though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant, which both Governments earnestly desire to respect. They accordingly have the honour jointly to inform the League that they recognize the principle that the said Treaty can only be continued after July, 1921, in a form which is not inconsistent with the Covenant.¹⁰⁷

What would replace the alliance was not yet clear.

Canada used this opportunity to renew its opposition to the Alliance during the Imperial Conference in June 1921. Canada suggested that the original reasons which required the formation and maintenance of the alliance no longer existed. Renewal also meant, according to Canada, a direct challenge to the United State.¹⁰⁸ Britain, New Zealand and Australia disagreed and supported renewal. Although this clearly contradicted its League of Nations' statement, Britain suggested renewal was a question of honour: one does not abandon one's ally for no good reason. New Zealand and Australia had other concerns.¹⁰⁹ British military weakness in the Pacific dictated, they believed, the maintenance of the Alliance. These Dominions relied on the goodwill of Japan for their security, and

¹⁰⁷ Kajima Morinosuke, ed., *The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922: First World War, Paris Conference and Washington Conference*, Vol. 3. Trans. and compiled by Kajima Institute of International Peace, (Tokyo, 1980), pp. 424-426.

¹⁰⁸ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2796, "Canada's Political Relations With Japan," p. 15734.

¹⁰⁹ Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers, 1921*, Vol. XIV, Cmd. 1474, *Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India held in June, July and August, 1921*. See also W. S. Livingston and W. R. Louis, eds., *Australia, New Zealand And The Pacific Islands Since The First World War* (N.Y. and London, 1979).

they believed that this could best be achieved through an alliance which would restrain Japan from flexing its muscle in the far east.

Fortunately for Canada, the United States opposed the Alliance.¹¹⁰ As an international player, the United States took the initiative in efforts to construct a "New Diplomacy" for the maintenance of security and peace in Asia. Although the United States had embraced the alliance in 1902, it now saw the alliance as British acquiescence and encouragement of Japanese expansion in the Far East. That expansion threatened the "Open Door" policy. The United States made it clear that renewal in any form would mean American "disquietude."¹¹¹ Instead United States called a naval conference to be held in Washington in 1921-22; success in Washington would mean the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

At the Washington Naval Conference Britain, France, Japan and the United States signed the Four-Power Treaty which guaranteed the *status quo* in the Pacific in general and China in particular. Italy then joined these four in the Five-Power Treaty which limited the size of their navies. Finally a Nine-Power Treaty promised to maintain and respect the existing territorial and political integrity of China and promised to help China develop itself into a modern state. The most important of these agreements was the Four-Power Treaty by which Britain, France, Japan and the United States agreed to co-operate in seeking solutions to all problems which might arise in East Asia. Unilateral military

¹¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of the historical debate see M. Tate and F. Foy, "More Light On The Abrogation of The Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXIX no 4 (December, 1959), p. 535.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* See also R. Dingman, *Power In The Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitations, 1914-1922* (N.Y., 1970).

intervention would only be undertaken if the other three members of the Washington System were informed and presumably acquiesced.¹¹²

By the mid-1920s Canada faced an Asia-Pacific challenge. International relations during the post-war period combined with Canada's concerns over oriental immigration and its growing trade with Asia helped focus increasing attention at External Affairs on Canada's Asia/Pacific connection. Japan had emerged after World War One as the dominant power in Asia. Japan possessed the third most powerful naval force and was a major international player in the Washington System. Canada as a Pacific country re-evaluated its predominantly North Atlantic Triangle orientation. Thus, the increasing importance of Canada-Japan and Canada-Asia/Pacific relations necessitated the establishment of better diplomatic representation in the Far East. Canada needed some means by which it could better inform itself on Asian developments.

¹¹² See Chaval J. Vinsen, "The Drafting of the Four-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XXV no 1 (March, 1953), pp. 40-49.

Chapter III

Opening A Legation

The 1928 decision to expand Canadian diplomatic representation abroad constituted a major policy decision. It was a necessary step for Canada to break with its colonial past and achieve nationhood in the full sense of the term.¹ Establishing diplomatic missions carried the decisions of the 1926 Imperial Conference to their logical conclusion and brought new responsibilities and rights. No longer would Canada entrust its interests to Britain nor would it limit its interests to the North Atlantic Triangle. Canada's social, economic, political and military ties with both Britain and the United States ensured that Canada's first diplomatic missions abroad would be the upgrading of its High Commissioner Office in London originally opened in 1887, and the Legation in Washington created in 1927. The establishment of a third Legation in Tokyo clearly demonstrated an increased interest in Asia.

The decision to create the Tokyo Legation stemmed from a number of motives. The Legation would facilitate the implementation of the terms of the 1928 Immigration Agreement between Canada and Japan. It would enhance the status of Canadian Trade Commissioner in Japan. It would help to prevent as well as to solve other potential disputes. In addition, Canada recognized Asia-Pacific as an emerging geo-political force and Japan as one of the major international players. The Tokyo Legation would provide a "window" or a "listening post" gathering the intelligence essential for the formulation of an Asia-Pacific policy.

¹ *London Times*, January 12, 1928 and April 16, 1929 found in press clipping in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 155, file 18.

Canada having made its decision moved to implement it. The Tokyo Legation, unlike Canada's other diplomatic missions, was a brand new establishment. Logistical and administrative difficulties ensured that its creation would prove a lengthy process. Although the Department was slow to create the Legation, the government selected experienced candidates to staff its Tokyo mission. That staff, although small and given insufficient resources, proved to be competent and qualified.

Taking The Decision

After the 1926 Imperial Conference, the Canadian government moved quickly to carry these decisions to their logical conclusion. The Imperial Conference urged all members of the Commonwealth to use "the existing diplomatic channel . . . as between the Dominion Governments and foreign governments, in matters of general and political concern."² The Canadian government clearly intended to go further, and on November 22, 1927 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, notified the Secretary of the Dominions, Sir Austen Chamberlain, that

The Canadian Government has been considering the question of further diplomatic representation abroad. It is of opinion that it is not desirable . . . to limit exchange of ministers to the United States alone. There are certain countries [France and Japan] with which diplomatic relations in the near future would be very desirable. . . . our Pacific interests indicate that an exchange with Japan in the near future would be to common advantage.³

² *Imperial Conference 1926*, p. 22.

³ Department of External Affairs, *Relations Extérieures/External Relations*, Vol. 4, (Ottawa, 1970), Document no. 35, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominion Secretary, November 22, 1927.

There seems to have been no direct British response to this notice. Several weeks later Senator Dandurand, the Canadian representative at the League of Nations, stopped in London on his way to Geneva and had a conversation with Sir Austen Chamberlain. Dandurand reported that

Chamberlain desires to help. Asks what action you wish him to take regarding Japan. I answered . . . you would communicate with him as you want to be prepared to explain your estimate policy next [Parliamentary] session.

Canada appreciated Sir Austen Chamberlain's "readiness to aid in securing exchange of Ministers between Canada and Japan" and informed the British government of actions already taken. Ottawa indicated that discussion between the Canadian government and the Japanese Consul General Matsunaga were already under way and would continue until "his return to Japan in October." Matsunaga would then be in a better position to explain the Canadian situation fully to his government.⁵ The British government instructed its Ambassador in Tokyo to inform the Japanese of the Canadian desire for a Legation.⁶ This practice corresponded to the principle set out by the Imperial Conference in 1926.

Matsunaga, meanwhile, seems to have dismissed the Canadian initiative. In January 1928, the British Ambassador in Tokyo reported that Matsunaga had not fully explained the situation to his government. The Japanese Foreign Minister, however, "promised an early reply but was doubtful whether consent will be

⁴ *Ibid.*, Document no. 36, Representative to League of Nations to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, (Geneva), December 4, 1927.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Document no. 37, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, December 6, 1927.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Document no. 39, Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 22, 1927.

obtained in time for Speech from the Throne at Opening of Parliament of Canada."⁷ Anxious to have the proposal confirmed by Japan and announced to the House of Commons, King once more asked if British officials might help accelerate negotiations.⁸ Two weeks later, London confirmed that the British Ambassador in Tokyo had been "informed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs last night that the government of Japan will be happy to receive a Canadian Minister in Japan and to send a Minister to Canada."⁹ Matters now moved ahead more expeditiously.

On January 26, 1928, the King government announced in its Speech from the Throne its intention to open two new Legations abroad. "By agreement between the Governments of France and Canada and between the Governments of Japan and Canada, it is proposed that each of these countries shall be represented in the other by a minister or plenipotentiary."¹⁰ For sentimental as well as political reasons, no one objected to the French initiative.¹¹ Indeed, it was only natural that a diplomatic exchange between Canada and France would take place sooner than later, given the demographic composition of Canada. King wrote in his diary that the announcement would be seen and received by French Canadians as a "compliment."¹²

⁷ *Ibid.*, Document no. 43, Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 13, 1928.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Document no. 40, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, January 5, 1928.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Document no. 43, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, January 13, 1928.

¹⁰ House of Commons, *Debates*, "Speech from the Throne," January 26, 1928, p. 2.

¹¹ For those who supported the decision, see the House of Commons, *Debates*, Isley (January 27, 1928), Woodsworth (January 30, 1928), Thorson (February 3, 1928), and Bourassa (May 28, 1928). For the opposition, see Bennett (January 30, 1928) and Perley (March 28, 1928).

¹² King's Diary, October 18, 1927.

King also commented that every effort must be put into upgrading the existing building in Paris and elevating the status of the Agent General so as to give him diplomatic status. The case of Japan, however, was more surprising.

Most opinion-makers supported King's initiative. The *Toronto Globe* suggested it was not "a departure in principle" but perhaps it "is a more rapid extension of the principle than was expected at the time of the conference."¹³ Similarly the *Manitoba Free Press* suggested that "if the ministers abroad can promote the interest of Canada" then Canada should "send them forth." In accordance with the decisions of the 1926 Imperial Conference "none of the arguments advanced by those who opposed the principle for political or other reasons, will likely to have any effect in changing the course of event."¹⁴ The *Vancouver Sun* also congratulated the government. The decision keeps "the name of Canada prominent" and "raises Canada's international status." Canada, according to the *Sun*, was making "an impressive bid for world trade." Its editors, however, demanded that Canada pursue "the diplomacy of salesmanship" rather than that of "cultivating the ability to drink tea with grand air."¹⁵ Both the Japan Society and the Board of Trade of Vancouver expressed similar views.¹⁶ The Japan Society requested that "your diplomatic representative or someone of his staff be given ample opportunity of studying" trade and the "oriental question" so that first-

¹³ *Toronto Globe*, January 10, 1928, found in press clipping, King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 166, file 18.

¹⁴ *Manitoba Free Press*, February 10, 1928, *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Vancouver Sun*, January 28, 1928.

¹⁶ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, Japan Society of Vancouver to King, December 29, 1928 and W. E. Payne, the Executive Secretary of the Vancouver Board of Trade to King, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 4, 1929.

hand knowledge be obtained "before proceeding to Tokio."¹⁷ The MP from Row River, Mr. E. J. Garland, went so far as to suggest that Canada should establish a second Legation in China and should not use the Tokyo Legation as its only information-gathering centre for Asia.¹⁸

Most Japanese newspaper reactions, however, were both cautious and reserved. The *Kokumin* hoped that the diplomatic exchange was an indication of "growing importance in trade" between the two countries and a sign of change in the "anti-Japanese attitude of Canadian people."¹⁹ The *Nichi-Nichi* hoped that the decision would lead "to a complete settlement of immigration and fisheries questions which at the present effectually block better intercourse between the two nations."²⁰ The paper hoped that the diplomatic exchange would lead to the removal of restrictions on Japanese naturalization and fishing rights on the Canadian Pacific coast. The *Yorodzu*, however, saw little value in Canada's decision suggesting that it simply reflected a desire on the part of Canada to assert its independence. Less diplomatically, the *Yamato* adopted a far more critical posture and took the occasion to vent Japanese grievances against Canada. It stated that Canadians, in copying the anti-Japanese movement in the United States, had showed similar racial hatred and discrimination against the Japanese. Unless Canada could give a good reason for practising discrimination

¹⁷ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, Japan Society of Vancouver to King, December 29, 1928.

¹⁸ Canada. House of Commons, *Debates*, Garland, January 30, 1928, p. 109.

¹⁹ All quotations from Japanese press cited here are from the diplomatic exchange, External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, "The Japanese Press Reaction," from Secretary for the Dominions to Secretary of State for External Affairs, April 20, 1928.

²⁰ See above Chapter II, notes 24 and 25.

and restriction it did not deserve to be accorded diplomatic treatment. It is far from clear whether or not *Yamato* advocated severing diplomatic ties with the United States because of its racist policies. In any case, Canada, *Yamato* argued, should be content to be represented by the British Ambassador. A Japanese Consul General in Canada, it was suggested, was more than sufficient, and there was no need to send a minister to Canada. Should Canada insist on sending a representative, that representative would have to be empowered to settle the question of exclusion once for all.

Despite such reactions in the Japanese press, the decision had been made, and the debate unfolded in Parliament. In that debate Canada's desire to carry out the decision of the 1926 Imperial Conference drew fire from the Conservatives. R. B. Bennett, the Conservative leader, quarrelled with the decisions of the 1926 Imperial Conference and suggested that Canada was not ready to assume independence by establishing diplomatic ties with Japan. The Japanese were "highly specialized in international laws" and "unaccustomed to our institutions" and would, Bennett suggested, "treat Canada as an independent nation." This would create a situation "fraught with greatest possible danger to this country."²¹ While understanding and accepting the Paris Legation, Bennett intended to oppose the Tokyo initiative. "I have said, and I repeat, that as far as I am concerned I propose to die protesting against that independent condition being achieved."²² Although an opponent, Bennett came to support the Tokyo Legation once he became Prime Minister. For the moment, however, King responded

²¹ House of Commons, *Debates*, Bennett, January 30, 1928, pp. 28-29.

²² *Ibid.*, June 11, 1928, Bennett, p. 4165. Sir George Perley also opposed this initiative. See Perley's speech on February 2, 1928, pp. 116-7 and March 28, 1928, pp. 1776-7.

that it was the Tory rather than the Oriental mind which failed to understand the principle of Canadian sovereignty within the British Empire.²³

As we have seen two issues dominated Canadian-Japanese relations: trade and immigration. Some observers argue that of the two immigration was by far the more significant.²⁴ Immigration, however, could be handled and had been handled without full diplomatic relations being established. Trade, on the other hand, particularly the effectiveness of Trade Commissioners, would be, it was hoped, considerably enhanced by Canada's new initiative. Trade, trade relations and other international considerations rather than immigration provided the primary motive behind the 1928 decision to establish a diplomatic exchange. According to Bennett, "What this country wants in Japan and all other countries are Trade Commissioners who would carry forward Canada's trade, not our diplomatic skill and power."²⁵ Bennett later criticized H. M. Marler, the Canadian Minister to Japan, just before the latter set sail for Japan, as "a glorified trade commissioner in the disguise of a minister."²⁶ The problem was the status of Canadian commercial agents. In response to Bennett, King reiterated that

no trade commissioner as such, it must be remembered, has any right to approach the ministers of the government of the country in which he holds office, nor does he speak with any authority on behalf of the government by whom he may be employed. He is not the representative of that government, he is the agent of a government department.

²³ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2478, "Legations: Paris and Tokio," p. 45511. See also, House of Commons, *Debates*, King, June 11, 1928, pp. 4156-7, pp. 4158-9 and pp. 4160-3.

²⁴ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 112 and p. 206.

²⁵ House of Commons, *Debates*, Bennett, January 30, 1928, p. 29.

²⁶ For Bennett's attack on Marler see *Vancouver Daily Province*, August 22, 1929, *Vancouver Star*, August 23, 1929, *Vancouver Sun*, August 23, 1929 and *Toronto Daily Star*, August 30, 1929.

Canada was suffering because they [commercial agents] had not the [diplomatic] status which would enable them on behalf of the Dominion to have those relations with the governments of the countries in which they stationed²⁷

Commercial agents had neither the diplomatic status, nor the official responsibility, nor the authority to approach the host nation's officials. They could as a result exert little influence on the host nation's political decisions. In Japan Canada needed to have diplomatic officials who would be in the position to present the Canadian case and influence the Japanese government particularly if that government began adopting discriminatory trading practices against Canadian goods.

Canada, according to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, J. Malcolm, should be "encouraging trade with those who want to trade."²⁸ One of the countries wanting to trade was Japan. Indeed, Canada exported about three times as much as Canada imported from Japan. The Canadian-Japanese trade had increased during "the previous fifteen years from \$5,000,000 to \$55,000,000." In the light of the prosperous and advantageous trading relations, "there are very great possibilities of developing [further] trade with the Orient." Malcolm went on to say that because "Japan was the gateway to the Orient, Canada should have a minister there." By establishing a Legation, "Canada will," according to Malcolm, "win a recognition in Japan that she could not get in any other way. She will be in a better position to develop her trade with Japan and the rest of the Orient."²⁹ According to Hugh L. Keenleyside, the Canadian Chargé d'Affairs,

²⁷ House of Commons, *Debates*, January 31, 1928, MacKenzie King, p. 60.

²⁸ *Manitoba Free Press*, July 8, 1929. See also, *Montreal Daily Star*, June 27, 1929.

²⁹ *Manitoba Free Press*, July 8, 1929.

Many of our most active contacts with the Japanese Government were concerned with economic matters rather than with international or domestic politics or cultural relationships, and almost from the beginning a considerable part of our time was spent in working up material relating to trade between Canada and Japan. We had a large and consistently favourable balance with which the Japanese were naturally dissatisfied.³⁰

Enjoying a very advantageous trade with Japan, Canada had some cause for concern. Japan preferred to redress its trade imbalance with Canada. Like other countries Japan might try to achieve this by adopting protective tariffs to cut imports.³¹

The problem was how should Canada respond in order to maintain and protect its "large and consistently favourable balance." Japan was one of Asia's most prosperous nations, but Japan desired a better trading relationship with its partners. In light of its economic problems and its imbalanced trade, Japanese protectionist demanded measures which if pursued would mean substantial losses for Canada.

The timing of the establishment of the Canadian Legation would prove fortuitous. No sooner had the Legation been opened than the crash of 1929-33 disrupted the international economic system and exacerbated both Canadian and Japanese economic problems. Japanese producers pressured the Japanese government to adopt protective measures. It was in this context that the Legation proved critical. In the end, the Legation dealt less with expanding trade than trying to maintain and protect Canada's advantage. With hindsight both immigration and

³⁰ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 296.

³¹ For detailed analysis, see E. E. Ware, *Business and Politics In The Far East: World Economic Problems* (N.Y., 1932); F. H. Michael and G. E. Taylor, *The Far East In The Modern World* (N.Y., 1964); A. Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search For A New Order In The Far East* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), Chapter 9; E. Marcus, *Canada And The International Business Cycle, 1927-1939* (N.Y., 1954); C. P. Kindleberger, *The World In Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley, 1973) and R. Bothwell and N. Hillmer, eds., *The In-Between Time: Canadian External Policy In The 1930s* (Toronto, 1975).

trade may have been on equal footing when the decision to open the Tokyo Legation was announced in 1928, but trade and its related problems turned out to be the primary preoccupation of that Legation.

A number of other international considerations also motivated Canada's decision. As King noted, "[T]he Pacific [was] bound to be of increasing and decisive importance in world's developments; for this Tokyo [is the] natural centre."³² King believed that world politics had changed significantly, and Canada could not afford to see itself as exclusively a North Atlantic nation. The Pacific, he argued, would soon have as great an impact "upon world's destinies . . . [as] the Atlantic in the next fifty years."³³ In a memo outlining Canada's broad objectives, King wrote in pen at the bottom: "present difficulties; unrest in Orient - China, India, Japan; further international goodwill."³⁴ Geographically, according to King, Canada was ideally located to bridge the two worlds of the Atlantic and Pacific which "offers a great opportunity and imposes a great responsibility." The least Canada could do was to "learn more of our neighbours across the sea, study their problem [and] adjust our relationships."

³² King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2712, "Exchange of Ministers," pp. 84221-84222.

³³ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2478, "Legations: Paris and Tokio," p. 45521.

³⁴ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2712, "Exchange of Ministers," p. 84222. See also E. P. Bell, "Pillars of World Peace: Interview with MacKenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, Discuss the Problems of the Pacific and Gives Formula for International Good Relations," for *Chicago Daily News*, 1925. A copy is available at the National Library in Ottawa and listed under MacKenzie King as the author.

The best way of achieving these objectives was "through the method of diplomatic exchange which every country has recognized as the necessary and best means."³⁵

According to King, Canada's political relationship with Great Britain and the latter's relations with France, Japan and the United States was a principal concern.³⁶ It is interesting to note that King did not mention Germany. In any case, King believed any disputes involving Britain in this four-power relationship would directly affect Canada:

Whether we like it or not, our country cannot escape rapid growth in her international relations, and least of all can she escape those special responsibilities and obligations, as well as opportunities, which arise out of her geographical position and her position as a nation in the British Commonwealth of Nations.³⁷

King believed that "The problems of the Atlantic and . . . of the Pacific, and all that lie between, are bound up in that relation. This is, in turn, an all-sufficient reason why Canada should seek to inform herself."³⁸ The post-war naval arms-race, the Imperial Conference of 1921, the Anglo-American and American-Japanese tensions and the Washington Conference of 1921-22 all confirmed King's view that Canada had every interest in the maintenance of good relations among these four powers. The first step clearly was to ensure that Canada would be kept informed.

³⁵ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2478, "Legations: Paris and Tokio," p. 45521.

³⁶ See King's address to the Toronto Board of Trade. "Some Recent Developments in Canada's External Relations, November 22, 1928," pp. 28-29. A copy is available at the National Library in Ottawa.

³⁷ W. L. M. King, "Canada's Legations Abroad," *The Canadian Nation*, Vol. 2 no. 1 (March-April, 1929), p. 26. A copy is available in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 155. See also, House of Commons, *Debates*, June 11, 1928, pp. 4156-59.

³⁸ King, "Some Recent Developments," pp. 28-29.

We intended to appoint a minister to Japan who will be the sole representative on the continent of Asia. To appoint but one representative in Europe, one in Asia, in addition to one in America, each of whom will have the standing of ministers and be in a position to meet the diplomats and members of governments of other countries on an equal footing, is surely not in the present stage of our international relations proceeding with undue haste.³⁹

Moreover, Canada was elected to a non-permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations in 1927; increased diplomatic contacts with others, especially with Asia-Pacific where Canada had almost no significant ties, could neither be limited nor postponed. As an international organization, the League's primary objective was to help nations avoid political, military or economic confrontations. As a responsible member of the Council Canada needed to be better informed.

Canada's decision to open a Legation in Tokyo, then, was based on a number of factors and considerations. Immigration and trade were important, but there were other critical issues as well, particularly Canada's recognition of the geopolitical importance of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. Having made the decision, the Department of External Affairs turned its attention to the logistical problems of creating a Legation and choosing a staff.

Choosing A Staff

The preparation for the establishment of the Canadian Legation in Japan proved a lengthier process than anticipated. King was anxious to get things moving,⁴⁰ yet a Canadian minister to Japan would not be recommended for

³⁹ House of Commons, *Debates*, January 31, 1928, King, p. 60.

⁴⁰ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 257.

appointment until January 7, 1929. Japan, meanwhile, had already closed its Consulate General in Ottawa and opened its Legation with the appointment of a Chargé d'Affairs in June 1928. The Canadian delay worried the Japanese. Vincent Massey, the Canadian Minister in Washington, reported that the Japanese Ambassador to the United States had privately and personally reminded him that Canada should accelerate the process. The Japanese Ambassador went on to say that, although his was a private suggestion, the view of the Japanese government was little different. The Ambassador hoped that Canada would accelerate the reciprocal treatment. "particularly in view that the initiative in the matter had been taken by the Dominion."⁴¹ Again, on November 6, 1928, the Japanese Chargé d'Affairs in Ottawa called and asked Prime Minister King when a Minister would be appointed. The appointment, King assured him, would be made before the end of the present year.⁴² Despite the assurance, it would take until May 1929 before Canada finally established its Legation and until June before the government appointed its minister.

Difficulties in finding a suitable candidate explains part of this delay. In early May, 1928, King approached George Stephens, a successful Vancouver businessman.⁴³ After distinguished military service, Stephens went on to serve on the Saar Commission where he demonstrated his considerable diplomatic skill in settling the conflicting claims of the French and the Germans. Stephens' wife,

⁴¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, Vincent Massey to O. D. Skelton, October 31, 1928.

⁴² King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2701, "Memorandum of Discussion with the Japanese Minister In Canada," p. 70842. See also the *Ottawa Citizen*, December 11, 1928.

⁴³ For the correspondence between King and Stephens, see King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2307, pp. 134677-82. See also External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, W. E. Payne to W. L. M. King, January 4, 1929.

however, objected to the appointment and persuaded him to decline. With Stephens out of the picture, King became anxious.⁴⁴ The long delay had led, as we have seen, to questions as to the government's commitment particularly from the watchful British and Japanese governments.

King quickly settled on his second choice, Herbert M. Marler, a friend and a former Cabinet member. On January 1, 1929, King wrote Marler an informal letter thanking him for his warm New Year's wishes. King also wondered whether or not Marler would be interested "in inaugurating the Canadian Legation to be established in Japan" that year; "in other words, would you be prepared to accept the position of first minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary from Canada to Japan . . . the first minister to go from Canada to the Orient?" King continued:

I see possibilities of the highest kind of public service in such a post as regards both our political and commercial relations with the Orient. You know the success that Massey has made of our Legation at Washington. I believe there are, in the Orient, opportunities of service even greater.⁴⁵

Should he be interested, Marler should come to Ottawa to discuss the matter. The message was repeated in a telephone call. Marler, on the following day, phoned in response, but King could not be reached. His secretary's memo read:

Mr. Marler phoned this morning to let me know he had received the letter; he did not want you to be worried over its delay. Mr. Marler asked me to say that he was deeply grateful for the letter itself and was extremely flattered by its tribute to himself; that if there proved to be no "family

⁴⁴ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 257.

⁴⁵ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2311, King to Marler, January 1, 1929. p. 140084.

ties" there could be nothing that he would "jump at quicker" because he realized the tremendous opportunities of service.⁴⁶

King had found his man.

Marler had been a member of King's Cabinet in 1925 but had then been defeated in the general election. A Montrealer, he belonged to a family which had lived in Canada since 1768.⁴⁷ He had graduated in law from McGill with first-class honours before becoming a partner with his father in the notarial firm of Marler & Marler. In addition to his private practice, he held a number of important public positions. For many years, he was a member of the Council of Education for the Province of Quebec, and between 1917-1918 he held the post of Quebec's Fuel Administrator. Elected Member of Parliament in 1921 for the constituency of St. Lawrence-St. Georges, Marler became the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Soldiers Pensions and Civil Re-establishment in 1922, served as Chairman of the Committee on Transportation and helped negotiate a commercial treaty with British West Indies in 1925. He played an active role in the last revision of the Bank Act and made a number of studies involving Dominion Railway finance and tariff questions before joining King's Cabinet in 1925. After his resignation from the Cabinet he became National Treasurer and Chairman of the Finance Committee of the National Committee for the Celebration of Diamond Jubilee of Confederation in 1927.

Marler was an interesting character. He was tall and handsome but stiff in figure and face. His hair was light in colour, sparse and closely trimmed. He was quite intelligent and had considerable private wealth. In a somewhat wooden way,

⁴⁶ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2311, Marler to King, January 18, 1929, 140089 and see also microfilm reel C-2478, "Memorandum: Canadian Relation With Japan, January 5, 1929," p. 45511.

⁴⁷ *Ottawa Morning Journal*, January 12, 1929.

he fit the ideal type for ambassador,⁴⁸ yet he lacked a sense of humour and was a dull public speaker. Marler insisted that uniforms were essential for a diplomatic corps. Funds were later allocated for the purchase of uniforms for all senior diplomatic personnel at the cost of \$250 each.⁴⁹ All existing and subsequent Canadian diplomatic missions took the same uniform. Marler insisted as well that all Commercial Attachés wear the uniform of the official personnel of the Canadian Diplomatic mission in Japan.⁵⁰ Since all Commercial Attachés, except James Langley, the Trade Commissioner in Kobe, Japan, were the appointees of the Department of Trade and Commerce, and were paid by that Department, this initiative was eventually abandoned.⁵¹ The uniform requirement for diplomatic personnel, however, remained until after the Second World War.⁵²

Although intelligent, Marler lacked experience and background in diplomacy. According to Keenleyside, the Canadian Chargé d'Affairs, he "was largely ignorant of history and economics." Marler travelled little and had no experience in foreign relations beyond his active participation in the Canada-British West Indies Commercial Treaty of 1925.⁵³ Marler was, however, ambitious and not a little pushy. For example, a year after his arrival in Japan, Marler suggested to both King and Skelton that it would not be inappropriate if he were appointed

⁴⁸ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 252.

⁴⁹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1548, file 627, PC 13/1297 (July 20, 1929). See also NAC, Privy Council, RG 2, Vol. 2825 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 61.

⁵⁰ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1548, file 627, Marler to Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 5, 1931.

⁵¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1548, file 627, Skelton to Marler, November 28, 1931.

⁵² Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 256.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

as the British as well as the Canadian Ambassador.⁵⁴ King was polite in his dismissal of such a suggestion: "There were many reasons which, at the time, prevented me from giving you my views on this suggestion. I have always meant however to write and say that I hope you will not proceed further with the thought."⁵⁵

Marler held interesting if arrogant and elitist views on the qualifications necessary for service in his Tokyo Legation and in the Canadian diplomatic service in general. All must have the proper training, he argued, in order to acquire "sufficient experience and training to act eventually in the capacity of First Secretary or second-in-command of a legation." More than experience and training, however, were required of a minister. A minister needed as well social status and financial means; both constituted a pre-requisite for the job. As Marler put it,

The question is can men of that [ordinary] class and training as a rule be promoted to the position of Minister? By reason of training yes. By reason of social position and financial status not always. The position of Minister it is submitted will for many years be required to be filled by some one who possesses not only training and position but also the financial ability to maintain that position.⁵⁶

According to Marler, the Canadian diplomatic service was still in its infancy, and it was not too late to adopt such restrictive practices. Indeed, the "Canadian Diplomatic Corps should try and attract to its service the very best class in the country." Enticements or incentives should be given to "wealthy men

⁵⁴ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, Marler to King, July 8, 1930, pp. 151555-66. See also Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 254.

⁵⁵ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, King to Marler, November 21, 1930, p. 151585.

⁵⁶ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 2611, "Recommendations For The Canadian Legation In Japan, March 7, 1929," Submitted by H. M. Marler to Secretary of State for External Affairs, pp. 8-9.

to educate and train their sons" for "a worthy cause." Talking about wealth, Marler admitted, was not pleasant; Canada, however, could not avoid it. For, "in most countries of the world those who are appointed as Ministers must have personal means." In the case of the Tokyo Legation, Marler intended to implement his recommendations. He believed

that there should be attached to a Legation in a semi-honourary position an attache who possesses the necessary qualifications - who desires to rise in the service - who possesses or will later possess the required financial status - and who after the necessary training has been undergone would eventually be able to become a Minister and suitably maintain the dignity of that position.

The Minister recommends such an appointment to the Canadian Legation in Japan and is willing to do all in his power to assist in the training of one or more so appointed having the above mentioned object in view.⁵⁷

Marler got as Chargé d'Affairs a man who clearly wanted to rise in the service, but not one who appreciated his elitism. While there was no clue as to how either Skelton or King reacted, Skelton showed Keenleyside Marler's recommendations. Not being part of the "wealthy class," Keenleyside and many other competent officials in Canadian diplomatic service could, if Marler's arguments were accepted, never go beyond the position of First Secretary. Keenleyside counted on both Skelton and Prime Minister King to oppose the implementation of these recommendations. Should they be implemented the government, Keenleyside suggested, would "have to struggle along without Pearson and myself."⁵⁸

In line with his elitism, Marler insisted on being called "His Excellency" rather than "Honourable Mr. Marler" the title approved by the Canadian government. According to Keenleyside, the use of "His Excellency" would be

⁵⁷ Marler, "Recommendations," p. 9.

⁵⁸ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 257.

officially prohibited on August 22, 1930.⁵⁹ Marler, meanwhile, became Sir Herbert. He had been recommended for this honour by the new Prime Minister, R. B. Bennett, despite Bennett's earlier characterization of him as a "glorified salesman in the disguise of a Minister."

Yet despite his faults Marler made many positive contributions. In his conversations with King in January 1929 he offered to go to Japan without a salary. In addition he offered to annually spend \$50,000 of his own money in addition to what was given to him as the Minister so that "whatever entertaining was done might be on the scale and in a way which allow people to see that he was anxious to do all that could be done on Canada's behalf."⁶⁰ He was concerned as well with the welfare of his staff. Immediately after he arrived in Japan, he insisted that Keenleyside and Langley, the Commercial Attaché, should have their own cars. To help them avoid debilitating debts, he offered them loans at low interest rates and promised to raise their salaries — a promise he kept.⁶¹ In addition, he was generous and more than willing to help the Canadian government in constructing the Embassy Building in Tokyo; he contributed \$25,000 of his personal wealth to the construction of the new Legation Building.⁶² According to Keenleyside, Marler's greatest and lasting achievement in Tokyo was the

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁶⁰ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2478, "Memorandum: Canadian Relations With Japan, January 5, 1929," pp. 45555-6.

⁶¹ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 283.

⁶² NAC, R. B. Bennett Papers, MG 26, K, microfilm reel M-892, Marler to Bennett, August 19, 1931, p. 166623. For detailed discussion of, drawings for and cost of the Canadian Legation, see Bennett Papers, microfilm M-891, pp. 166258-166353 and M-892, pp. 166616-166630.

construction of a "magnificent building" for the Legation. With its "dark walnut panelling" the Canadian Legation Building was "probably the best in Tokyo."⁶³

Marler's selection as Minister to Japan seemed to be politically motivated. He was about to accept the Liberal nomination for a by-election in Stanstead, but his conversation with King altered his political plans. King advised Marler that

it would be a mistake for him to re-enter Parliament just now; that there were many who were jealous of him and that to open a constituency might lead to his defeat There was the possibility of a French candidate being put against him. The situation would be different in a General Election.⁶⁴

King suggested that a diplomatic position was "the preferred" option. King, however, offered to accept Marler's re-entry to politics in a General Election and would arrange to have someone else go to Japan should Marler wish.⁶⁵ Marler did not insist; he seemed to have already "made up his mind to make a success of diplomatic life." He had asked King to "help him free himself from the constituency in a way that would not disappoint his friends and supporters." Marler suggested King should see one of his leading French Canadian supporters, Goulet, and tell him that "the Government wanted Marler's services in the Orient and that the part which they had played in the constituency in bringing him to the fore was partly responsible for his being thought of at this moment for the position of Minister to Japan."⁶⁶

⁶³ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 292. Pictures of the Tokyo Legation and its executive staff members are available at the National Archives (PA 120399-120408).

⁶⁴ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2478, "Memorandum: Canadian Relations With Japan," p. 45553.

⁶⁵ There had been some pressure and discussion to send Dr. King, the Deputy Minister of Labour, to Japan but Prime Minister King was not yet prepared to make any alteration within the Ministry.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 45553-45555.

The recommendation that Marler be appointed by His Majesty⁶⁷ as Canadian Minister to Japan was made on January 11, 1929⁶⁸ and officially announced on the following day.⁶⁹ On January 18, 1929, a response came. In a memorandum, Skelton informed King that Sir William Clark, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, had just telephoned and confirmed that Marler "had been approved by the Counsellor of State acting for His Majesty" and that a telegram had been sent to the British Ambassador at Tokyo instructing him to "communicate with the Japanese Government along the lines which Sir William discussed with you this morning."⁷⁰ Japan reciprocated by announcing the name of its designated appointee for Canadian approval.

As its representative, Japan chose Prince Tokugawa Iyemasa. He, according to *Toronto Star Weekly*, "belongs to one of the truly great families of the human race."⁷¹ Tokugawa was the grand son of the last Tokugawa Shogun and the son of the Speaker of the Japanese House of Peers. He had been born in 1884, educated at the Perse School, Cambridge, England and the Imperial University. From 1909 to 1913, Tokugawa served as a junior in the Japanese Embassy in London before

⁶⁷ *Relations Extérieures/External Relations*, Vol. 4, Document no. 75, Secretary, His Majesty the King, to Governor General, Buckingham Palace, January 10, 1929.

⁶⁸ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1548, file 627, PC 37 (January 11, 1929). See also Privy Council, RG 2, Vol. 2825 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 61.

⁶⁹ *Toronto Star and Le Droit*, January 12, 1929.

⁷⁰ *Relations Extérieures/External Relations*, Vol. 4, Document no. 77, "Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs," January 18, 1929.

⁷¹ *Toronto Star Weekly*, February 15, 1930. See also *The Regina Leader*, October 16, 1929, *Ottawa Morning Journal*, October 21 and 22, 1930, *The Toronto Globe*, October 22, 1929, *The Mail and Empire*, February 14, 1930, *The Evening Telegram*, February 15, 1930, *Ottawa Morning Citizen*, February 18, 1930.

returning to Tokyo to become secretary of the Foreign Office and private secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had then been appointed the first secretary in the Japanese Legation in Beijing before being transferred to the secretaryship of the embassy in London. He became consul-general of the Legation in Australia in 1925. According to the American Minister to Canada, William Phillips,

Though it has not been my privilege to meet Mr. Tokugawa personally, I have heard much of him for many years and knew him by reputation to be one of the most eminent of the Japanese diplomatists.⁷²

Canada approved Tokugawa's appointment with no hesitation on April 26, 1929.⁷³

Once landed in Canada Tokugawa commented that there were no urgent issues in Canada-Japan relationship. He commented as well that there was no need to urge Canada to accept Japanese immigration unless Japanese immigrants to Canada were welcome. Japan would divert its emigration to countries like Brazil where such immigrants were welcome.⁷⁴ His mission, he suggested, was to bring about understanding and ensure peace in the Pacific area.⁷⁵

⁷² *Ottawa Morning Citizen*, May 1, 1929.

⁷³ *Relations Extérieures/External Relations*, Vol. 4, Document no. 95, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Japanese Chargé d'Affairs, April 26, 1929.

⁷⁴ The first Japanese emigrants sailed for Brazil in 1908. In 1937 the Japanese Government created a company in charge of financing Japanese emigrant to Brazil. After the war, in 1955, the government revived it under the name of Japan Overseas Emigration Promotion Company, a wholly government-owned company, controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1963 it was upgraded and in 1974 became known as the International Co-operation Agency. Both prewar and postwar public enterprises lent money to emigrants to cover their cost of travel and settlement.

⁷⁵ For Tokugawa Iyemasa's speech, see the following newspapers: *The Mail and Empire*, February 14, 1930, *Toronto Star Weekly*, February 15, 1930 and *Evening Telegrams*, February 15, 1930. For Marler's comment on immigration, see *Toronto Evening Telegram*, July 15, 1929.

Although Marler would not reach Tokyo until early September 1929, the Canadian government had already appointed Hugh L. Keenleyside as the First Secretary and Chargé d'Affairs; Keenleyside would open the Canadian Legation in Tokyo in May 1929.⁷⁶ Mid-June to mid-July was the rainy season and from then until mid-September the heat and humidity ensured that most of the diplomatic and consular corps were not working. There was then no need for Marler to reach Tokyo before mid-September.⁷⁷ In no hurry to take up his ministerial duties, Marler went to England while Keenleyside journeyed to Japan. Only after Marler reached Japan would Tokugawa leave for Canada.

From May 7 to June 15, 1929, Marler was in France and England. In France he arranged for his younger son to study French and for his wife to buy "the appropriate costumes" so as to "create in all details with respect to the Tokyo Legation not merely an ordinary impression but the best in every way we were both capable of accomplishing." Of great urgency, he wanted to see the Canadian Legation for ideas on how to run and to decorate the office in Tokyo. He found the Canadian Legation in Paris "leaves nothing to be desired." He had no doubt that the Legation increased the reputation and prestige of Canada. Wherever he went "the name Canada and Canadians . . . were known as such . . . [and] were universally respected and admired." Canadians, Marler wrote, "are differentiated from Frenchmen, Englishmen and Americans. In other words, they are known as Canadians." This debt was owed to the Canadian Minister, Phillip Roy, and his

⁷⁶ *Relations Extérieures/External Relations*, Vol. 4, Document no. 96, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Japanese Chargé d'Affairs, April 26, 1929.

⁷⁷ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, J. Langley, Trade Commissioner in Kobe, Japan, to F. C. T. O'Hara, the Deputy Minister for Trade and Commerce, February 12, 1929.

"unrelenting service and energy in the interests of Canada." Marler liked what he saw, and he hoped to render his service to Canada in the same manner as Roy did in France.⁷⁸

In May, Marler left France for England; he wanted to purchase a diplomatic uniform and other home appliances, kitchen wares, and fine china. He also sought an audience with the King.⁷⁹ Both the Canada Club and the Japan Society, meanwhile, invited him for dinner and luncheon. Although the Japanese Ambassador to Britain personally urged him to accept, Marler held back. "Not yet being the Minister for that reason alone I felt I could do neither." After consultation with Peter Larkin, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Marler accepted the invitation of the Canada Club on the condition that his name not be on the list of guests. He deferred the decision on the Japan Society, hoping that the notice "of definitive appointment" which Skelton had expected to send while Marler was in transit to France would arrive shortly. Marler was not pleased "that my formal appointment" had become "the cause of some embarrassment [sic] at this point."⁸⁰

⁷⁸ For detailed report see King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2311, Marler to Skelton, June 19, and 20, 1929, pp. 140094-140104.

⁷⁹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, High Commissioner in London to Secretary of State for External Affairs, June 12, 1929. See also, Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 255.

⁸⁰ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm C-2311, Marler to Skelton, June 19, 1929, pp. 140099-140100. As late as June 1929, Marler had not yet been officially appointed. The problem lay with the Canadian Government which, as late as June 1929, had still not specified the responsibilities of its minister beyond the very generalized instruction to pursue Canadian interests. External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, June 7, 1929 and *Relations Extérieures/External Relations*, Vol. 4, Document no. 102, Secretary of State to High Commissioner, June 11, 1929.

Finally, on June 26, Marler was officially appointed and Letters of Credence issued.⁸¹ On July 19, 1929, a new Order-in-Council recommended by the Secretary of State for External Affairs provided Marler a salary of \$12,000 per year, effective from January 11, 1929. Marler would also be provided with a house, a representation allowance of \$10,000 per year, and a car allowance of \$3,000. These allowances were to be effective May 21, 1929.⁸² The official acceptance of Marler on the part of the Japanese government arrived in Ottawa on September 4, 1929.⁸³ Appointed and accepted as Minister for Japan, Marler now concentrated his efforts on selecting a staff.

Marler was concerned about possible careless behaviour of the staff members. Tokyo was a very different cultural environment which required special care when selecting staff members. A "false move by any of our official staff," he believed, "will be serious in the extreme." The characters and qualification of potential staff members would be closely and carefully examined because once chosen, the possibility for alteration would be limited. Marler worked to ensure that

Nothing will occur to mar or diminish the success he [the Minister] hopes to achieve, not to his personal advantage, but to the advantage of the Government he represents. And every member of his staff must be fully imbued with precisely the same viewpoint.⁸⁴

⁸¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1548, file 627, from the Secretary of State for the Dominions Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 12, 1929.

⁸² External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1548, file 627, PC 1316 (July 1929). See also Privy Council, RG 2, Vol. 2025 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 61.

⁸³ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, Dominion Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 4, 1929.

⁸⁴ Marler, "Recommendations," pp. 7-8.

Thus, the selection of staff members must be carefully planned so as to avoid any potential embarrassment.

Marler wanted three Secretaries, one Assistant Secretary, and two Commercial Attachés. The First Secretary would be in charge of the Chancellery under the Minister. His duties and responsibilities would be primarily diplomatic, although some commercial matters would have to be considered especially if they had some bearing on diplomatic or governmental relations.⁸⁵ For this position, Marler "chose" H. L. Keenleyside. Keenleyside had in fact already been appointed and arrived in Tokyo several months before Marler.

Keenleyside had been born in Toronto on July 7, 1898. His parents shortly moved to British Columbia. He attended public schools and Langara School in Vancouver before graduating from the University of British Columbia in 1920 with a B.A. in history. He subsequently went to Clark University in the United States for graduate studies. He received his M.A. in 1921 and his Ph. D. in 1923. Between 1918-1919, he had served with the Canadian Field Artillery. Keenleyside lectured extensively both in the United States and, from 1925 to 1927, at the University of British Columbia. Before leaving for Japan he wrote a book entitled *Canada and the United States*.⁸⁶ While staying in Japan he collaborated with A. F. Thomas in the preparation of a *History of Japanese Education*. Reacting to his appointment the *Canadian Gazette* commented that

It is interesting to note that H. L. Keenleyside, the First Secretary, is a Vancouver man. It seems . . . peculiarly appropriate that . . . not only

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* See also NAC, K. P. Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 5, file "Legation - Memorandum."

⁸⁶ For reactions to and reviews of his book, see *New York Times*, July 12, 1929, *Toronto Saturday Night*, July 6, 1929, *Ottawa Morning Citizen*, June 29, 1929, *Vancouver Sun*, June 8, 1929 and *London Times*, June 7, 1929, found in press clipping in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 130, file 2.

for sentimental reasons, as a compliment to the Great Pacific port but also because of the importance that the holder of the office should be familiar with the port from which all Canadian trade with Japan must come.⁸⁷

It is doubtful, however, that his early residence in Vancouver had much effect on his appointment.

Keenleyside entered the Department of External Affairs as Third Secretary in 1928 and was quickly promoted to Second Secretary in January, 1929. At the Department, he headed the Far Eastern Division and became the logical choice for the positions of both the First Secretary and Chargé d'Affairs in Tokyo. He would be the first Canadian diplomatic official in Japan, and established and opened the Canadian Legation. Although he agreed to go to Japan with the understanding that his mission should not be longer than two years, he remained in Tokyo until 1936. "For many reasons," Keenleyside wrote, "I regretted leaving Ottawa." He regretted particularly no longer working "directly under the guidance of Skelton" who had helped his professional career.⁸⁸ Keenleyside was later reported to have commented that staying away from Ottawa, North America and Europe, resulted in "a brake upon the progress of his career."⁸⁹ If this were the case it proved an ineffective brake as Keenleyside would go on to a long and varied career at External Affairs.

Upon his return to Canada in 1936, he was attached for a few months to the Secretariat of the Prime Minister before resuming his duties in the Department of External Affairs. In 1937, he was the chairman of the Board of Review charged

⁸⁷ *Canadian Gazette*, May 30, 1929, found in press clipping in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 130, file 2.

⁸⁸ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 265.

⁸⁹ Keenleyside quoted in John English, *Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1897-1948*, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1989), p. 151, note 16. See also p. 146.

with the study of immigration and other questions.⁹⁰ In 1939 he was a member and the Secretary of the Inter-Departmental Committee which managed the Royal Tour in 1939 and was promoted to the rank of Counsellor. Keenleyside would serve on several councils and commissions throughout his public life including the Canada-United States Joint Board on Defence where he served as Secretary between 1940-44 and as acting chairman between 1944-45. He also served on the War Technical and Scientific Development Committee (1941-1945), the Northwest Territories Council (1941-1945), the Canadian Shipping Board (1939-1941), and the Joint Economic Committee (1941-1944). In June 1941, he was designated Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Keenleyside also occupied other positions. In January 1947 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources and Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. On January 18, 1950 he was appointed to the newly organized Department of Resources and Development. At various times, he was the Vice-President of the National Council of the Y.M.C.A. of Canada (1942-1945), Vice-Chairman of the Canadian Youth Commission (1943-1946), and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of Carleton College in Ottawa (1942-45). In 1944, he became President of the Canadian Club of Ottawa and President of the Association of Canadian Clubs in 1948. He was also a founding member of the Board of Governors of the Arctic Institute of North America (1944) and a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Geographic Society. He was a member of the Royal Historical Society and Royal Geographical Society of Great Britain and of the Asiatic Society of Japan. He received honorary degrees from University of

⁹⁰ Keenleyside was put in charge of studying the immigration problems because of his un-biased and fair judgment. His fair-mindedness was clearly demonstrated during the debate on whether or not the Japanese Canadians should be removed from British Columbia during the Second World War. See Roy et als., *Mutual Hostages*, pp.42-6, 81-3, 140.

British Columbia (1945) Carleton College, Minnesota (1947) and McMaster University (1949).

Although his wartime positions were limited within the North American arena, the post-war era witnessed active service abroad. Before his ambassadorial appointment to Mexico on November 17, 1944 Keenleyside, on August 27, 1946, was named an alternate delegate to the second part of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly which met in New York from October 23 to December 25, 1946. He relinquished his position as Canadian Ambassador to Mexico on March 15, 1947. He campaigned for disarmament and was later appointed as a member of Canadian Nuclear Disarmament Delegation in the 1950s and 1960s. This distinguished career had begun with Keenleyside's long and very successful sojourn in Tokyo. There he would be the most important of several figures.

The Second Secretary, according to Marler, would act as the Minister's private secretary;⁹¹ duties and responsibilities would not be precisely defined. This position was quickly filled when K. P. Kirkwood was promoted to the position of Second Secretary.

The Third Secretary was to be in charge of commercial matters under the control of the Minister.⁹² The Third Secretary reported directly to the Minister, and, on direction of the minister, acted in co-operation with the Commercial Attaché. Skelton informed Kirkwood of his appointment to the position on July 5, 1929, about two months prior to his departure for Japan.⁹³ "The staff of the Canadian Legation in Japan," the *Montreal Gazette* commented, "has been

⁹¹ Marler, "Recommendation," p. 8.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Kirkwood, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, file "Diplomatic Diary." "Diplomatic Diary: Canadian Legation In Tokyo, 1929-1930," July 14, 1929.

completed by the appointment of Kenneth P. Kirkwood as Third Secretary.⁹⁴ After Kirkwood was promoted to the Second Secretary, the position of Third Secretary remained vacant until J. M. Menon was sent to Tokyo in early 1931.

Kirkwood (1899-1968) was a diplomat and author. Together with Arnold Toynbee, the Director of the Royal British Institute of International Affairs, he had authored a volume on Turkey in the Modern World Series. He saw service in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and in the Royal Air Force during the war. He had engaged in aerial warfare over Italy and in submarine combat in the Adriatic. During the 1920s he was on the staff of Appleby College, Columbia University, the Brooklyn Law School and the International College at Smyrna. He had received his B.A. and M.A. from Columbia University in 1927 and joined the Canadian Diplomatic Service in 1928. Kirkwood held a number of appointments including Second Secretary to the Canadian Legation in Washington, 1928-29, before moving to Tokyo in 1929 where he served until 1939. He then moved to the Hague between 1939-1940 and later served as First Secretary to the Canadian Consul in Greenland between 1940-41. He assisted in opening new Canadian Legations in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in 1941, Santiago in 1942, and Warsaw between 1947-50. He served as well as advisor to the Canadian Delegation of the U.N. General Assembly in Paris in 1948 and New York in 1954. Additional appointments included High Commissioner to Pakistan, 1952-54; Ambassador to Egypt and Minister to Lebanon, 1954-56, High Commissioner to New Zealand between 1950-57 and at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, 1957-59. He retired in 1959 and died in 1968.

Kirkwood's appointment was both unexpected and a disappointment. Although he had hoped for a European post, he accepted the Tokyo position. The government

⁹⁴ *Montreal Gazette*, August 8, 1929.

had few options. Kirkwood had worked in the Canadian Legation in Washington as the Second Secretary; no one else with comparable experience was available for the Tokyo position. Kirkwood, meanwhile, was unenthusiastic and mused to his diary that:

I sometimes wonder what a Canadian Legation can accomplish in Japan. Unlike our European missions, which are largely concerned with encouraging immigration, our Japanese Legation must be concerned with discouraging immigration, with all the tact and diplomacy at our command.⁹⁵

Despite this initial lack of enthusiasm, Kirkwood followed the internal political developments in Japan and the international relations in the far east very closely.⁹⁶

For stenographer Marler preferred a female and "a Canadian whose character and ability are well known in this position owing to the highly confidential nature of certain of the correspondence."⁹⁷ For this position Marler chose Miss Agnes R. M. Baird. She had been born in Scotland in 1901 and had moved to Ottawa with her parents in 1910. She went to Ottawa Collegiate Institute and took commercial courses. She followed this up with business courses in college. For three years, during night classes, she studied French. In 1918, Baird worked in the Department of Militia and Defence.⁹⁸ Two years later she went to work in the Japanese Consulate-General in Ottawa, and over the next seven years she served under three different Consuls-General. Baird possessed, as a result, a good knowledge of Canadian-Japanese Consular and diplomatic affairs. She left the

⁹⁵ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, file "Diplomatic Diary: Canadian Legation In Tokyo, 1929-1930," July 14, 1929.

⁹⁶ Kirkwood's close observation of these developments were clearly and abundantly apparent in his private papers in the NAC which remain the only private and insightful daily account of the work of the Legation during its first years.

⁹⁷ Marler, "Recommendations," p. 11.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Japanese Consulate in October, 1927 for a position as Assistant to the Private Secretary of the Chairman of the Tariff Board in Ottawa before moving to her new position in Tokyo. After selecting the "political" staff, Marler turned to those in trade.

For commercial and trade purposes, Marler wanted two Commercial Attachés,⁹⁹ James W. Thornton and James A. Langley. He would get only one. Langley moved to the Legation in Tokyo as First Commercial Secretary. He had worked for the Trade and Commerce Ministry before being sent to Kobe, Japan in 1923 as Trade Commissioner. He had served in Kobe for about six years before moving to the Canadian Legation.

All of the above positions, according to Marler, had to be filled by Canadians. "Any others required could it is believed be obtained in Japan."¹⁰⁰ This plan, however, was modified before leaving for Japan. Other Legation staff from Canada in 1929 included Mrs. Marler's private secretary, Miss M. Logan, and a typist, Miss K. M. Slack. Once in Japan additional staff members were hired. A typist, Mrs. C. Yoshio, a translator, Mr. Y. Mikasa, and two messengers, Mr. M. Terajima and Mr. K. Kiuchi. Mr. R. Yoshimura became the Japanese assistant to the commercial office.¹⁰¹ No effort, meanwhile, was made to find a Canadian for the sensitive position of translator. It is also worth noting that it was not until September 12, 1929, three days after the Canadian Minister and the rest of the staff landed in Japan, that the Department of External Affairs finally

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁰¹ Yoshio, Mikasa, Terajima, Kiuchi and Yoshimura were Japanese nationals.

recommended that this establishment be authorized effective May 21, 1929.¹⁰² This proved largely a confirmation of the existing staff in Tokyo and Marler's recommendations.

Marler, meanwhile, acknowledged that his staff did not include a "Canadian of French descent." Although there had been quite a few applicants, "none have fulfilled all the essential requirements." Although his action reflected personal bias, Marler suggested to King that choosing a French Canadian would restrict management prerogatives. If a French Canadian was chosen no possibility of dismissal could be contemplated as the political backlash would be too great. The political repercussion of dismissing English Canadians would be quite different. Marler was quite explicit:

If one [French Canadian] had been selected and for some reason after arrival in Japan had been dismissed the Minister cannot contemplate with any degree of equanimity what the political result in Canada would be. He feels that he cannot take any risk in that respect for reasons too obvious to mention. The dismissal of an English-speaking Canadian would not have the same result by any means.¹⁰³

A bilingual official, however, had been chosen.

A successful Montreal businessman and a Quebec politician, Marler was bilingual. Yet, Marler unilaterally adopted an English-only practice for the Canadian diplomatic mission under his responsibility in Japan. In Tokyo both French and English were used between the Japanese Foreign Office and other Foreign Embassies with no stated preference. Marler, however, decided that there would no longer be any correspondence in French; he would not sign any dispatch written in French. As Kirkwood wrote,

¹⁰² External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1548, file 627, PC 1316 (July 19, 1929). See also Privy Council, RG 2, Vol. 2825 and RG 2, series 4, Vol. 61.

¹⁰³ Marler, "Recommendations," p. 9.

The Minister startled me yesterday by exclaiming rather suddenly and forcefully that hereafter he would sign no more diplomatic form dispatches written in French, (which is still used in routine communications here); all our official correspondence will hereafter be in English. . . . It is . . . interesting to see the initiative being taken by a newcomer, the Canadian Minister, for whom French is an official and recognized second language at home, but for whom custom, tradition and "protocol" carry small weight as opposed to practicality and common sense.¹⁰⁴

The Canadian Legation in Tokyo functioned in English only.

Soon after submitting his recommendations to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Marler left for Europe. In May, the Department decided that Keenleyside should go immediately to Japan to establish the Legation.¹⁰⁵ Before leaving for Tokyo, however, Keenleyside travelled to Washington to observe how that Legation was run. If Keenleyside learned anything on this trip it was what to avoid. Physically, according to Keenleyside, the Washington Legation was all wrong.¹⁰⁶ The minister's living quarters and the Legation chancellery spread over all the four floors. The ground level was the Minister's office and library-waiting room. The next two levels were family premises. Communication between the minister and the staff was by a rather uncertain elevator. With a questionable physical plant the Legation also enjoyed a "reputation of aloofness, impracticality" and "excessive addiction to social activity." The Legation, Keenleyside believed, was "overstaffed and followed the U.S. tradition of excessive expenditure on administrative machinery. Its multiplication of forms, rules, and regulations was . . . oppressively heavy for a comparatively small unit." The same thing was true, he believed, in London and Paris. Keenleyside was

¹⁰⁴ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Diplomatic Diary: The Canadian Legation In Tokyo," February 17, 1931.

¹⁰⁵ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 257.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.247-249.

determined not to emulate it in Tokyo. He worked to minimize cost as much as possible, and the Tokyo Legation would prove the least costly of Canada's diplomatic missions abroad. (See Table III below)

TABLE III
APPROPRIATIONS FOR OFFICES ABROAD

YEARS	HIGH COMMISSION LONDON	WASHINGTON	PARIS	TOKYO
1928-29	49,240.00	99,771.06	74,122.44	47,687.88
1929-30	188,006.91	99,676.08	78,872.78	74,959.42
1930-31	103,227.84	81,785.45	78,783.61	78,064.89
1931-32	139,570.31	98,858.82	82,561.89	78,568.17
1932-33	129,452.81	91,000.15	75,668.49	71,714.04
1933-34	121,970.10	90,822.53	75,575.64	65,168.47

SOURCES: Auditor General *Report* years ending from 1928 through to 1934.

Opening A Legation

On May 1, 1929, Keenleyside, accompanied by Nancy Baird, left Ottawa, set sail from Vancouver on May 9, and reached Japan on May 20. Unlike other missions, the Tokyo Legation was brand new in all respects. The opening of Legations in Washington, London,¹⁰⁷ and Paris had involved upgrading existing establishments. In Tokyo there was no diplomatic establishment to upgrade and no set of

¹⁰⁷ London is the exception. After the 1926 Imperial Conference, the High Commission Office began operating as a diplomatic mission.

guidelines on how Keenleyside was to proceed.¹⁰⁸ Keenleyside would also have to avoid the perception of British patronage in the eyes of the Japanese and the diplomatic community. Sir John Tilley, the British Ambassador, invited Keenleyside to stay in the British Embassy until he could find appropriate accommodation. Although the invitation may have been well-intended, Keenleyside worried about how his acceptance would be interpreted by other diplomatic corps and especially the host country. Concerned that the Japanese might view the Canadians as under the supervision of the British, Keenleyside declined the invitation and cabled Ottawa informing the Department of his decision.¹⁰⁹ He also cabled Langley in Kobe to make appropriate accommodation for him. Keenleyside clearly was determined to avoid being seen as dependent upon the British. Canada, through its Legation, intended to operate as a sovereign and separate entity.

An embarrassing moment came, however, when the Canadian Chargé d'Affairs reached Yokohama. Langley had been in Kobe far removed from Yokohama and had not been adequately forewarned of Keenleyside's arrival. When asked to make arrangements for accommodations, Langley telephoned the British Embassy and asked a personal friend to arrange accommodations, to meet Canada's first diplomatic official and to arrange a meeting between Keenleyside and the Japanese Foreign Minister.¹¹⁰ Langley himself did not show up until about 24 hours later.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 263 and pp. 304-5. According to Keenleyside, there were no specific instructions. At the last minute Skelton told him to use his own judgment and to telegraph headquarters should there be any trouble. The only specific instruction was to keep the Department of External Affairs well-informed of any Japanese industrial and economic developments and policies.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 264-5. Keenleyside did not receive a response until he was "well at sea."

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 266-7.

Although a "minor incident," much needed to be done to improve communications. No instructions, meanwhile, came from home until May 21, 1929.

External Affairs directed Keenleyside to prepare an official letter addressed to the Japanese Foreign Minister, announcing both his arrival and the fact that a Canadian Legation had been established.¹¹² The message also dealt with the official title of the Canadian Legation. The First Secretary of the British Embassy in Tokyo had suggested that the official title should be "La Légation du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique au Canada;" Keenleyside disagreed. For the sake of clarity and distinction, the Canadian Legation should be called "La Légation du Canada."¹¹³ Skelton approved Keenleyside's action, although he suggested that the Canadian minister could be called either "The Canadian Minister" or "His Majesty's Minister for Canada."¹¹⁴ Despite concern over questions of autonomy the British Ambassador was to introduce Keenleyside to the Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, General Tanaka Giichi.¹¹⁵

Keenleyside spent his first few days in Japan searching for accommodation. On May 24, a residence in the Nagai Compound, a western-styled building, was rented and the head office of Teikoku Seimei (Imperial Life Insurance Company) became the home of the Canadian Legation until the completion of a new building in 1933. It was next door to Dai Chi Bank which would later be used by General

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 264-5.

¹¹³ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, Keenleyside to Skelton, May 30, 1929.

¹¹⁴ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, Skelton to Keenleyside, July 17, 1929.

¹¹⁵ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 270.

McArthur after 1945 as his headquarters. For its Minister, Canada rented a poorly designed building which had once belonged to the Rumanian Ambassador.¹¹⁶ On July 1 celebrations of Canada Day doubled for the official flag-raising over the Legation. Both "God Save The King" and "O Canada" were played. Many Canadians residing in Japan as well as British diplomatic officials attended the celebrations. This event was filmed¹¹⁷ and received newspaper coverage both in the Canadian and Japanese press. The *Montreal Gazette* stated that, "It was the first public function to be held at Canada's new Legation here . . . and most inspiring of all . . . the Canadian flag was officially raised for the first time in the Orient."¹¹⁸ The *Ottawa Citizen* reported that "As the flag reached the top of the flagstaff, on the upper balcony of the Legation, 'O Canada' was sung, followed immediately by the national anthem."¹¹⁹ The American owned *Japan Advertiser* went beyond the flag-raising and, with perhaps exaggerated exuberance, suggested that

The British Empire does not exist The British Empire is not the empire of Great Britain. . . . The British Empire is a league of Nations in itself, the most amazing collection of communities ever brought together.¹²⁰

Canada's first diplomatic adventure in Asia had been successfully launched.

Prior to the arrival of the Canadian Minister, the initial work of the Legation dealt with both technical and administrative problems. A translator was

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

¹¹⁸ *Montreal Gazette*, July 19, 1929, found in press clipping, Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 6, files "Japan, 1929-1938."

¹¹⁹ *Ottawa Morning Citizen*, July 19, 1929, *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Japan Advertiser*, July 2, 1929, found in press clipping in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 166, file 18.

found when Mr. Yoshito Mikasa joined the staff. Although he had been born in Japan, Mikasa had lived many years in California, and, according to Keenleyside, had both knowledge and experience in commercial activities. Although his English left something to be desired, he was conscientious, industrious, friendly and quick to adapt. Other initial tasks included registering all Canadians residing in Japan, drafting a budget which later Marler accepted, creating a filing system which remained unchanged until after World War Two and making calls to all other diplomatic missions in Tokyo notifying them of the Canadian presence.¹²¹ The heads of these diplomatic missions in turn visited the Canadian Legation.

With Keenleyside hard at work in Tokyo, Marler and the rest of the staff left Canada on August 31, 1929 and reached Japan on September 9, 1929. On September 18, the Canadian Minister officially presented his credentials to the Emperor. Illustrating Canada's problem of status, the American owned *Japan Advertiser*, reported the event as "Introducing The British Empire." The newspaper's editors clearly recognized the significance of the event:

Canada is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations she is an independent nation in complete control of her own destiny. She is, like the United States, Japan's nearest Occidental neighbour; the peace of the Pacific is as important to Canada as to the United States and Japan. . . . Canada desires to cultivate closer relations with Japan in whom she recognizes the leading Asiatic power Mr. Marler . . . will have the pleasure of introducing something of the vital, vigorous, confident spirit of those young nations to a community in which they are little more than geographical expressions.¹²²

These sentiments were echoed in the Canadian press. "Canada, Canadian Affairs and Canadian prospects," wrote the correspondent of the *Vancouver Sun*, "were

¹²¹ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, pp. 278-9. The Soviet Embassy was not notified as Canada had severed all contacts with that country in 1923.

¹²² *Japan Advertiser*, July 1, 1929, found in press clipping in King Papers, MG 26, J6, Vol. 166, file 18.

emphasized in the Empire of Japan today as never before. In a splendid ceremony, Honourable Herbert Marler, first minister to be accredited by the Dominion to any monarchy, was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Hirohito."¹²³ With the audience with the Emperor, Canada's first diplomatic mission in the Orient was firmly established.

The decision to establish the Tokyo Legation represented a major policy decision to end Canada's single-mindedly orientation towards the North Atlantic Triangle. The government finally accepted the geographical reality that Canada was as much a Pacific nation as an Atlantic one. Canada had come to recognize the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and Japan as a major force in the international relations. Canada needed a "window" on Asia to provide better access to and greater information on this part of the world.

The effort, however, would prove half-hearted. The scope and responsibilities of the Legation were enormous, yet the resources committed proved insufficient. The staff was well-chosen, qualified and competent, yet it remained very small. Although elitist and anti-French, Marler was obsessed with trade. Both Keenleyside and Kirkwood were bright, perceptive and well-informed. Keenleyside had previously headed the Far Eastern Division at the Department of External Affairs; Kirkwood had worked at the Canadian Legation in Washington. The question posed concerns the capacities of but three men to meet the challenge given to them.

¹²³ *Vancouver Daily Province*, July 1, 1929, *Ibid.*

Chapter IV

THE LEGATION IN ACTION:
Performance and Evaluation

The Canadian Legation in Japan exhibited a number of peculiarities not present in any of the other Canadian Legations.¹ Cultural and linguistic differences were obvious difficulties. More significantly, 1927-28 proved a critical period in Japan's political and economic history. The Legation not only had to implement the 1928 Immigration Agreement and promote trade, it was a listening post gathering information on both Japan and Asia in general. The complexities of Asian issues would constitute a major test for the Canadian diplomatic service. Evaluating the success or failure of the Legation is a difficult task best tackled by addressing Canada's official agenda first. That agenda included administering regulations on immigration, promoting trade and commerce, and establishing and maintaining good-will and friendship. In addition, diplomatic missions should provide accurate intelligence, information and advice to the government. Between 1929 and 1931 there were a number of events which tested the Tokyo Legation including the London Naval Conference, the Manchurian Crisis, and the Lytton Commission. There was as well the rapidly changing political and economic situation in Japan itself. These issues provide the context for an evaluation of the performance of the Tokyo mission.

With the establishment of the diplomatic mission the attention of the Legation turned to Trade Commissioners and their status. In the first instance this involved the trade commission in Kobe. In April 1929 the Department of

¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 2811, H. M. Marler, "Recommendations For The Canadian Legation In Japan," submitted by H. M. Marler to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 7, 1929, p. 5.

External Affairs and Trade and Commerce discussed two options: either 1) J. Langley would remain in Kobe but be appointed a Commercial Attaché giving him a diplomatic standing or 2) Langley would move to Tokyo and hold positions as both Commercial Secretary and Trade Commissioner. In the latter case Langley would become a member of the diplomatic staff, would become involved in the work of the Legation and would be responsible to both the Department of Trade and Commerce and External Affairs.² As Commercial Secretary, Langley would come under the direct authority and supervision of the Minister of the Department of External Affairs and would provide materials and information to the Canadian Legation and its minister in Japan. As a Trade Commissioner Langley would continue to direct his office in Kobe, would remain "a member of the staff of the Department of Trade and Commerce and under its direction."³

The government opted to move Langley and make him Commercial Attaché. External Affairs suggested that the Department of Trade and Commerce pay Langley's salary while External Affairs pay his allowances. In the end, Trade and Commerce continued to pay Langley's salary and living allowance "until advised . . . to the contrary." Shortly after Marler's arrival in Japan, Langley was transferred to Tokyo and became the first Trade Commissioner to be attached to a Canadian diplomatic mission. With Langley's transfer to Tokyo, instructions on procedures followed shortly directing that all communications and dispatches from the Legation be sent to External Affairs. The instructions, however, were not clear on whether or not they included those which "Mr. Langley has been accustomed to send to Trade and Commerce." To be sure, all commercial

² For detailed discussion see King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2712, "Diplomatic, Consular and Trade Commissioner Representative," pp. 84250-57.

³ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 795, Vol. 476, Skelton to O'Hara, April 24, 1929 and O'Hara to Skelton, April 29, 1929.

communications, Marler suggested, "should go to your department [External Affairs] for transmission to Trade and Commerce."⁴ While this change went smoothly, the Tokyo legation's relation with other Trade Commissioners in the far east, as we shall shortly see, would prove far more troublesome. For the moment, however, everything moved according to plan.

Immigration and Trade

No sooner had the Legation been established, then the administrative side of the new Canada-Japan Immigration Agreement went into operation. The political issue of limiting Japanese immigration to only 150 annually had already been settled in 1928. The Legation now undertook the work of issuing passports and visas. Although the Legation did not assume complete control of passports and visas until April, 1930, the administrative work began as soon as Keenleyside arrived in Tokyo.⁵ This work fell largely on Keenleyside whose sensitive judgment insured fair and just treatment for those Japanese who merited visas. There were, however, some additional complications. First, the Japanese Foreign Office suggested that if the Japanese immigration fell short of 150 in any fiscal year Japan should be allowed to increase passports in subsequent years so as to average 150 annually. Alternatively it was suggested that the six-months validity of Japanese passports be extended to a year. Marler suggested that this request be rejected. Another misunderstanding emerged over whether or not the total number of 150 applied only to the number of passports issued or to the combined

⁴ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2311, Marler to King, October 16, 1929, p. 140153.

⁵ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 280.

number of passports and visas.⁶ The Canadian Legation argued that the number 150 meant both combined; the Japanese disagreed. On this occasion, Skelton seemed to overrule his officials:

Under the present arrangement, it is the number of passports rather than the number of visas issued in a given year which it is understood will not exceed the maximum of one hundred and fifty. In view further of the fact that Japanese passports at present have a validity of six months, it is quite conceivable that in the course of a single year more than one hundred and fifty passports should be presented by applicants entitled to the grant of a visa. We agree that in this case it would be within the terms of the present understanding to issue more than one hundred and fifty visas within a given year.

Skelton, however, cautioned Marler that whatever the number of passports and visas issued may have been, care should be taken that only 150 persons come to Canada annually. The number arriving in Canada and not the number of passports or visas issued would attract attention. As Skelton observed,

the number of one hundred and fifty is a maximum, and that it is assumed that the investigations conducted by the Department of Immigration in Canada hereafter will result in the rejection of a considerable number of applications. If this proves to be so and the number of visas is consequently reduced considerably below one hundred and fifty, the variation between the number of passport or visas and of arrivals will not be of importance. It is only when passports and visas are issued to the maximum that difficulty arises.

Japan was notified of the Canadian position and no further complications arose. The administration of the 1928 immigration Agreement thereafter proceeded smoothly. Finally, Canada "controlled" Japanese immigration. "Control" translated into a sharp drop in new arrivals. (See TABLE IV below)

⁶ For detailed communication between the Legation in Tokyo and the Department of External Affairs see King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, Marler to King, February 5, 1930 and Shidehara to Marler, February 3, 1930, pp. 151483-151486.

⁷ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, Skelton to Marler, April 10, 1930, pp. 151514-16.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 151516.

TABLE IV
RECORD OF JAPANESE IMMIGRATION, 1925 TO 1936

YEAR	IMMIGRANT	YEAR	IMMIGRANT
1924-25	501	1930-31	205
1925-26	421	1931-32	195
1926-27	475	1932-33	115
1927-28	478	1933-34	105
1928-29	445	1934-35	93
1929-30	194	1935-36	83

SOURCES: *Canada Year Books*, Fiscal Years, 1925 to 1936.

The Canadian Minister, meanwhile, was very keen to promote trade;⁹ in no other Canadian diplomatic mission was diplomacy and trade so closely linked. According to Marler, "the functions of a Minister were both political and economic."¹⁰ Marler intended to promote "the most friendly relations between the country he represented and that to which he was sent," and, "In his opinion trade and foreign trade in particular indicated the progress of a nation." Marler pointed out that Japan was already Canada's fifth largest trading partner. Even before leaving for Japan, Marler took a number of initiatives to entice Canadian commercial and financial institutions to expand their interests and holdings in both Japan and the broader Asia/Pacific region. In particular Marler wanted

⁹ See Marler's speech in *The Proceedings of the Canadian Club of Toronto, 1929-30*, Vol. XXVII (July 13, 1929), pp. 3-14 and External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 795, file 472, "Canada and Trade With Japan."

¹⁰ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1561, file 80-G (FP), "Press Conference Note of Canadian Minister to Japan, March 1930," contained in his report on "Conditions in China, March 1930."

Canadian banks to establish branches in Japan to facilitate commercial transactions.

[B]anks in Canada were accorded some special privileges and advantages not accorded to other organizations and as a consequence it was not improper for the country to call on them for special service where such service was advantageous to it as a whole, even if the service demanded might not in its initial stages be profitable to the banks themselves.¹¹

Marler was so enthusiastic that he even brought one official from the Bank of Montreal with him to Japan to investigate the possibility of setting up a branch. Judging from reports, however, Bank officials shared little of Marler's enthusiasm. Their lack of interest, Marler argued, prevented Canada from becoming better known. He went so far as to suggest that should individual Banks or the Banking Association refuse to recognize their "public obligation," the government should "indicate to the Banker Association that the opening of a Bank in Japan by the joint effort of the four larger banks is deemed desirable in the public interest." Marler pointed out that, "Canadian Banks had numerous branches in other foreign countries." He saw no reason why they should not enter the Japanese market as "it would increase the prestige of Canada to have a Canadian Bank in Japan and assist, if not actually promote, trade between the two nations."

In Japan Marler actively pursued economic opportunities. He visited industrial centres and took advantage of every occasion to stress the need for increased trade. "By comparatively few in Canada," Marler wrote,

is appreciated the immense importance and possibilities of the markets of the Pacific Area. Even less know of the efforts of various nations other than Canada in seeking a share of those markets for the sale of their products. . . . If we want to procure our fair share of the trade of the

¹¹ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2311, Marler to King, September 5, 1929, p. 140109.

Orient . . . we must make our name and our products far better known than they are at the present time.¹²

Marler pursued trade so diligently that it almost became an obsession. He never seemed to stop searching for markets. Shortly after the Manchurian Crisis had begun, he wrote to King and Malcolm that "In view of the international character of this important city [Tientsin]," Canada should go ahead and open an office there.¹³ According to Keenleyside, Marler "would sink the League of Nations [just] to sell a million bushels of Canadian wheat."¹⁴

Marler realized that "increased trade must be founded on increased friendship and confidence."¹⁵ The problems and difficulties which he constantly faced resulted from ignorance: "Canadians do not understand at all what is necessary in the Far East."¹⁶ Marler informed King that "Approaches are so entirely different and methods of accomplishment [sic] anything at all must be pursued in a way utterly different from such pursuit in Canada." Marler was convinced that Canada's interests could not and should not be limited to either its own border or the North Atlantic Triangle.¹⁷ Canada's interests lay beyond these two parameters. Trade for Marler would be but an entrée to this larger world. Canada should express to the world its greater and higher aspirations such

¹² External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1575, file 894, Marler to Skelton, September 1, 1930.

¹³ NAC, Governor General Office, RG 7, G 21, Vol. 394, file 6278, Marler to King, December 9, 1931.

¹⁴ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 405.

¹⁵ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, Marler to King, December 13, 1930, p. 151593.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 151587.

¹⁷ See Marler's speech "Canadian And Trade With Japan," in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 795, file 472.

as peace, security and friendship so "that Canada's position in the Orient will be most marked . . . [and that in] not too many years will be the outstanding factor in Far-Eastern diplomacy."¹⁸

Cultivating good-will and friendship required greater exposure to the Japanese people. Canadians did not know Japan very well;¹⁹ Asian perceptions of Canada were primarily influenced by the racism and bigotry of its immigration policies.²⁰ Among many important tasks Marler spent most of his time explaining both to the Japanese people and to the British community in Japan that Canada had established "its own separate machinery in the Orient."²¹ Besides having formal dinners and banquets, the Minister gave speeches at Canada-Japan Society and industrial centres, made efforts to know and keep in touch with prominent Japanese officials, gave donations to the Japanese Earthquake Fund, visited the Canadian School in Tokyo and sponsored cultural events such as a Canadian Art Exhibition in Tokyo in 1930. All of these efforts were the necessary prerequisites in building better relations. Marler was so anxious to expose Canada to Japan and its people that he went so far as to talk directly to the Japanese people in a live radio address.²²

¹⁸ King Papers, MG 26, J8, Vol. 26, file 2, Marler to King, October 15, 1929.

¹⁹ See the speech of the Japanese Minister to Canada, Tokugawa Iyemasa, in *The Canadian Club of Toronto*, Vol. XXVII (February 17, 1930), pp. 191-199.

²⁰ See External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901-B, "Japanese Press Reaction," Secretary for the Dominions to Secretary of State for External Affairs, April 20, 1928.

²¹ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, file "Diplomatic Diary." "Diplomatic Diary: The Canadian Legation in Tokyo, 1929-1930," September 26, 1929.

²² *Ibid.*, July 1, 1930.

Marler also made two trips to China in search of markets. The first took place in early 1930; the second occurred in January 1931. Since Canada was an exporting nation, Marler "intended to do all in his power to assist in the finding of these markets."²³ Under the instructions of the federal government, Marler's second trip to China aimed specifically at selling wheat to the Chinese government "in order to relieve the surplus wheat supplies in Canada."²⁴ On this occasion, the Chinese government which faced political instability and financial difficulties declined the long-term credits for wheat purchases offered by Canada. Private buyers, meanwhile, wanted credit but R. B. Bennett, the new Prime Minister in 1930, was "not prepared to propose credits to private individuals."²⁵ This initiative, as a result, proved "fruitless."

Although Marler's mission was supposed to be secret, it received extensive publicity in Canada. That publicity in turn generated great expectations at home. During a press conference on Marler's return from China, he evaded "the matter of his special mission but gives an optimistic view of the future for increased Canadian trade in China."²⁶ Although he had failed to sell wheat to China,

²³ "Press Conference Note of Canadian Minister to Japan, March 1930," contained in his report on "Conditions in China, March 1930," in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1561, file 80-G (FP).

²⁴ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Diplomatic Diary: The Canadian Legation in Tokyo," February 2, 1930.

²⁵ Bennett Papers, MG 26, K, Vol. 332, no. 216123, Bennett to Marler, January 22, 1931. See also Dept. of External Affairs, *Relations Extérieures/External Relations Documents, 1931-35*, Vol. 5, (Ottawa, 1973), Document no. 545.

²⁶ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2 "Diplomatic Diary: The Canadian Legation," February 2, 1931.

Marler could not be faulted. The depression made sales difficult particularly since the price for Australian wheat fell below that of Canadian wheat.²⁷

Those two trips convinced Marler that existing commercial practices were insufficient and that long-term goals should be kept in mind. "[T]he markets of the Far East present more possibilities for the additional sale of Canadian product [sic] in the future than do other markets in any other section of the world."²⁸ In order to capture those markets Canada needed to expand its "partial organization" in the far east. Canada should, Marler argued, station more Trade Commissioners in Asia, particularly in China.²⁹ Moreover, the practice of an occasional visit made by a

Trade Commissioner from one area to another cannot enable him to sufficiently absorb the atmosphere or approach of the Chinese or the Japanese or to learn their likes or dislikes or to pay them the attention they demand. . . .³⁰

Canadian Trade Commissioners, he believed, needed to learn the language and be part of the local community. Understanding and being part of the local community, he believed, was "particularly essential in the Far East" and Canadian Trade

²⁷ *Ibid.* See also Desmond Morton, *A Short History of Canada* (Edmonton, 1980), pp. 173-4. For Japanese Minister's comment on trade, see *Edmonton Bulletin*, December 1, 1933, *Ottawa Morning Journal*, December 2, 1933 and *Toronto Star*, May 19, 1934.

²⁸ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1561, file 80-G (FP), Report on "Minister's Visit to Korea, Manchuria and North China, September-October, 1930," Vol. I, p. 198. See also the speech of John Imrie, a member of the Canadian Trade Delegation to visit the Far East in 1930, in *Empire Club of Canada* (February 5, 1931), pp. 36-46.

²⁹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1561, file 80-G (FP), Marler's "Visit to Korea, Manchuria and North China," p. 199.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

Commissioners should learn to deal "with Eastern methods" rather than apply methods learned in Canada, the United States or Europe.³¹

Marler suggested that Canada should make Tokyo "the natural and most convenient point at which to establish a central office for Canadian interests . . . in Japan and China."³² He suggested as well creating a training centre in Tokyo. The Department of Trade and Commerce, he believed, should send its officials there to be trained before posting these agents elsewhere in the far east.³³ To help co-ordinate such efforts, Canada should have a Chargé d'Affairs in Shanghai "under the minister at Tokyo" whose "attention could be directed practically entirely - if not entirely - to trade matters."³⁴ Such an arrangement, Marler believed, would solve the problem of an independent diplomatic mission in China.

Back in 1928 when the decision to create the Tokyo mission was made, there had been some unofficial talk that Canada might exchange diplomatic representation with China as well. This suggestion, however, never materialized. Canada ignored China's repeated requests for diplomatic exchanges, and External Affairs remained cool to the idea of extending on an interim basis Marler's jurisdiction so as to cover China.³⁵ Not until 1942 did Canada and China exchange diplomatic representation. For the moment, the Tokyo Legation did its best to facilitate and co-ordinate operations in all of the far east.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

³⁵ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, King to Marler, February 28, 1930, p. 151494.

In the short term the attempt to promote co-operation, as Marler's first visit to China showed, proved difficult. In early 1930, Marler planned a visit to China subsequent to his attending a conference in Hong Kong scheduled for mid-March. The conference was to discuss and devise plans for co-operation and co-ordination of Canadian activities in the far east. Paul Sykes, the Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, under instructions from James Malcolm, the Minister for Trade and Commerce had already "made plans to visit George Heasman, the Trade Commissioner in Batavia, Singapore." The objective of Sykes' mission was to discuss with Heasman the expansion of Canadian operations into French Indochina and Manila, and the jurisdictional question as to who should go to the area. The Tokyo Legation then instructed Sykes to return to Hong Kong pending Marler's visit. Who issued these instructions as well as the precise nature of the instructions remained unclear. In any case, Malcolm got wind of the situation when Sykes cancelled his tour and asked for authorization for expenses which might arise from Marler's visit.³⁶ Malcolm immediately protested to Skelton: "I do not admit that instructions to our Trade Commissioners in China should come from any other source than from this office."³⁷ Malcolm wanted the situation "cleared up immediately, as undoubtedly it may arise again." After discussing the matter, King sided with Trade and Commerce and wrote Marler enquiring as to what had happened.³⁸

³⁶ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm C-2320, Malcolm to Skelton, February 19, 1930.

³⁷ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, Skelton to Malcolm, February 25, 1930, p. 151415 and King to Marler, February 28, 1930, pp. 151492-96.

³⁸ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, Marler to King, March 4, 1930, p. 151498.

Had it not been for the question of jurisdiction, there would have been no cause for concern or complaint. Sykes had more than enough time to make his trip and return to Hong Kong. The "instruction" had been issued in mid-February, about a month before the conference. Upon receiving King's letter, Marler talked to Langley who confirmed that Sykes would be back on March 8, seven days before the conference was to take place. Marler, nevertheless, commented that, as far as he knew, there had been "No instructions from Tokyo to any Trade Commissioner in China over whom no authority is claimed." Marler "Knew nothing about Sykes's trip [to] Singapore although I understood [Sykes was] making a short trip."³⁹ Marler followed up his April 4 telegram with a rather long letter. The incident had "caused me some concerns." He did not, he repeated, know of such "instruction."⁴⁰ Marler also wrote to Malcolm suggesting his intention was to help not to interfere.⁴¹ Marler regretted that such an incident occurred and repeated to King his belief that his presence "would be welcomed at the meeting of Trade Commissioners at Shanghai."

Although on this occasion the problem had been a mix-up in communication, personality conflicts would make subsequent co-operation even more difficult to achieve. Sykes' jealousy and sensitivity about perceived interference always complicated relations. Sykes often complained about other Trade Commissioner's "excursion" into his territory. In one dispute between Sykes and L. M. Cosgrave,

³⁹ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, Marler to King, March 31, 1930, p. 151499.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 2, file "Correspondence, 1928-35," Marler to Malcolm, March 1, 1930.

Trade Commissioner in Shanghai, W. G. Wilgress, the Director of Commercial Intelligence Service, had to intervene. On that occasion, Wilgress wrote Sykes,

I do not think that any good can come from adopting a provocative attitude with regard to co-operation with our other offices in China, and if you have been guilty of such an attitude it probably explains why there has not been more co-operation A little self-effacement is occasionally good in the general interest.⁴²

With this background, Sykes no doubt saw the "instruction" from Tokyo Legation as yet another intrusion into his territory and jurisdiction.

Attempts were made to prevent a recurrence of the Sykes incident. H. H. Stevens, the new Tory Minister for Trade and Commerce, tried to create an atmosphere more favourable to co-operation both between the Legation in Tokyo and various Trade Commissioners and among the different Trade Commissioners themselves. Stevens and Marler worked out a plan that would allow the Minister in Tokyo to "have official supervision over the Trade Commissioners in China and Japan."⁴³ Stevens explained to Bennett that, although "it would be unwise to create a definite official control," he intended "to notify all Trade Commissioners to work in co-operation with the Minister to Japan, and instruct them to be guided by his advice in all local matters." During Marler's visit to the Department while on home leave in 1931 he discussed the situation with W. G. Parmelee, the Deputy Minister for Trade and Commerce. Marler wanted Tokyo to "keep in touch with all the Trade Commissioners in the Far East, be of assistance to them, know speedily how they were progressing, and in particular see that they

⁴² Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 1446, file 18-1-1, part II, Wilgress to Sykes, October 16, 1933.

⁴³ NAC, H. H. Stevens Papers, MG 27, III, B9, Vol. 12, file 3, Stevens to Bennett, June 15, 1931.

were active and progressive in their duties."⁴⁴ Parmelee, unlike his Minister, did not want such an arrangement. Although Parmelee worried about his Department's loss of "prestige and control over all trade ventures in the Far East,"⁴⁵ he nevertheless went along on the condition that the limits on Marler's control be communicated to the Trade Commissioners. This proved difficult to accomplish in practise. The limits of Marler's control were never adequately defined nor was Marler's semi-official supervision promptly communicated to the Trade Commissioners.

When Marler tried to proceed with the plan Trade Commissioners often felt him to be patronizing. This led to resentment. Sykes proved to be an outspoken critic. Marler in turn wrote Parmelee.

Mr. Sykes tells me in his letter that he has not received advice as to the proposed cooperation and coordination of our offices in the Far East. I think the Minister, yourself and myself very fully understand what we mean by those terms and also what I meant by saying I would like to have general supervision. . . . The idea I think was that a private letter will be written to the various trade commissioners and then a more formal letter directing them as to reports, letters, telegrams and such like . . . All involved in our service in the Far East must certainly by myself be made to realize that they are associated with me and are not to be, crudely speaking, "ordered around" by me.⁴⁶

The problem was not immediately resolved. Sykes who, according to H. W. Cheney, assistant Director of Commercial Service, was "of a temperament which does not permit him to co-operate to the best advantage with his colleague in

⁴⁴ Stevens Papers, MG 27, III, B9, Vol. 12, file 3, Marler to Stevens, June 9, 1931.

⁴⁵ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 139, file 26128, part I, Parmelee to Stevens, July 27, 1931.

⁴⁶ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 133, file 26308, Marler to Parmelee, November 26, 1931. For personality conflict and divergent views between Marler and Sykes, see Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 419.

China"⁴⁷ would eventually be reposted to Europe in 1934. Jurisdiction over Manchuria, meanwhile, would eventually be transferred to the Canadian Legation in Tokyo. Both the Department of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce remained cool to the idea of the Tokyo Legation's supervisory role.⁴⁸ The Manchurian Crisis and the war in China soon compounded problems when the Department of Trade and Commerce began to remove those who had acquired experience in the far east for postings elsewhere. The removal of experienced Trade Commissioners, according to both the Department of Trade and Commerce and individual Trade Commissioners, stemmed from the harsh conditions of climate and instabilities in Asia. It was more likely a result of the desire of Trade Commissioners for promotion; Europe provided a quicker route up the bureaucratic ladder. Marler, meanwhile, was quite upset by such policies and at one point commented to Malcolm that,

the more I see of our foreign service as now developing the less confidence I have in it. People are shifted around from this Far Eastern area after they have learned something about it and others are sent out who can only acquire experience by years of training.⁴⁹

Effective co-operation would not come until after the Second World War.

⁴⁷ Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Historical Section Records, Industry, Trade and Commerce, file 559, H. W. Cheney to W. G. Parmelee, September 28, 1934.

⁴⁸ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2320, King to Marler, February 28, 1930, pp. 151494-96. See also, Bennett Papers, MG 26, K, Vol. 42, file 5; Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 2, file M, no. 1345, Marler to Malcolm, March 27, 1933; Stevens Papers, MG 27, III, B9, Vol. 12, file 3, Stevens to Bennett, June 15, 1931; and Trade and Commerce, RG 20, Vol. 139, file 26128, Parmelee to Stevens, July 27, 1931; Parmelee to Marler, November 17, 1932 and Wilgress to Parmelee, November 25, 1932; and Vol. 218, file 29595, part I, Parmelee to Skelton, February 8, 1932; Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 433.

⁴⁹ Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 2, file M, Marler to Malcolm, March 18, 1935.

Despite the difficulties with Trade Commissioners the Tokyo Legation operated reasonably well. The administrative dimension of the 1928 Immigration Agreement with Japan was satisfactorily implemented without Japanese complaint. Efforts to cultivate good-will and friendship were moving ahead. The Legation certainly helped enhance the position of Trade Commissioners in Japan, although this benefit failed to flow to Trade Commissioners elsewhere in Asia. Effective co-operation between the Legation and the Trade Commissioners proved difficult, yet even here some improvements were achieved. The search for more extended markets, meanwhile, continued. Whatever its shortcomings in achieving economic results, the collapse of the international economic system made the mandate of the Legation doubly difficult to carry out. Similarly the rapid deterioration in Sino-Japanese relationships so soon after the establishment of the Legation provided a quick test for Canada's fledgling diplomatic corps.

Geo-politics

In addition to other activities, diplomatic missions provide political reports, intelligence and advice to government. On November 2, 1929 the Tokyo Legation sent its first such report entitled "Political Development in Japan, October, 1929."⁵⁰ It was the Minister's "intention to have a similar report prepared each month thus presenting a connected outline and interpretation of events of importance in this country."⁵¹ Such reports could be highly sensitive; Marler wanted only three copies of each monthly report made available. One was

⁵⁰ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2311, "Political Developments In Japan, October 1929," pp. 140162-197. For subsequent monthly political reports, see External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, part I, II, III.

⁵¹ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2311, Marler to King, November 2, 1929, p. 140161.

to be forwarded to Ottawa; one was kept in a general confidential file, and one would be placed in the locked file. These reports provide a basis for evaluation of the Legation's performance.

Keenleyside was largely responsible for gathering intelligence and giving analysis. Occasionally Kirkwood would assist. For such vital analysis, the Canadian staff was extremely small and their views markedly different, particularly as regards China. Marler in particular was either indifferent or critical of China.⁵² Occasionally, Marler attached a lengthy letter to the Monthly Political Report giving his own views on issues. Although one expected a favourable analysis on Japan, a "China view" was clearly absent. The analysis provided by the Canadian Legation, however, was very accurate.

The accuracy of Canadian reports no doubt owed much to the academic training, as well as good solid judgment on the part of Keenleyside, although Marler approved all reports before sending them to Ottawa. An examination of the reports indicates that Keenleyside relied heavily on foreign language newspapers, mainly English, and daily radio news. It is not clear whether or not he used any other sources. No doubt contacts with the British and the Americans in Tokyo provided informal sources of information. If colleagues were an important source there was no clear indication that the Canadian Legation and the British and American Embassies in Tokyo co-ordinated their efforts in any official way.

When Canada first established its Legation the stability provided by the so-called "Washington System" remained unchallenged. Following the great war the major Pacific powers had gathered at the Washington Conference in 1921-22 to discuss their difficulties. The conference dealt with the Anglo-Japanese

⁵² Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 221, pp. 404-406 and p. 425. For Marler's later change of attitude when Japan became more and more aggressive, see *Ibid.*, p. 432.

Alliance, the naval arms race and the future political development of China.⁵³ While the first two issues were dealt with satisfactorily, the conference produced only a vague declaration that all the powers would seek no further concessions and would respect the territorial integrity of China. The powers also agreed to respect the political *status quo* and to co-operate in helping China develop gradually into a modern state. China naturally resented the resolutions of the Washington Conference which confirmed existing concessions. The Washington System from China's point of view perpetuated China's semi-colonial status. Subsequent developments, however, gave cause for optimism. New treaties to eliminate the extra-territorial rights of Britain, France, Japan and the United States in China demonstrated that the Washington System could promote slow but steady progress.

Japan during the early 1920's was an ardent supporter of the Washington System as well as the League of Nations. One of Japan's specific gestures was the withdrawal of its troops in 1925 from Shantung province.⁵⁴ With time, however, Japan came to challenge the Washington System. The first critical challenge came with the Manchurian Crisis of 1931.⁵⁵

⁵³ For detailed analysis of this issue, see A. Iriye, *The Origins Of The Second World War In Asia And The Pacific* (N.Y., 1987), p. 2. See also, P. H. B. Kent, *The Twentieth Century In The Far East: A Perspective of Events, Cultural Influences and Policies*, (N.Y., 1970).

⁵⁴ For detailed analysis, see R. H. Fifield, *Woodrow Wilson And The Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question* (N.Y., 1952).

⁵⁵ For detailed analysis, see S. Ogata, *Defiance In Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-32* (N.Y., 1963) and T. Yoshihashi, *Conspiracy At Mukden: The Rise of The Japanese Military* (N.Y., 1963). For British and American views and reaction to the Manchurian Crisis, see P. Lowe, *Great Britain And The Origins Of The Pacific War* (London., 1977) and A. Rappaport, *Henry L. Stimson And Japan, 1931-1933* (N.Y., 1963). Marler was on home leave during the Manchurian Crisis. It is also interesting to note that during the Manchurian Crisis and Canadian response to it in Geneva and Canadian public quest for more

Sino-Japanese relations had always been tense.⁵⁶ Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, China had made repeated attempts to modernize and to improve its international status particularly after the 1911 revolution led by Sun Yat-Sen. After Sun's death, Chiang Kai-Shek carried on the reforms. By 1927-28, with the purge of the Communists and the defeat of rival warlords the political reunification of China was almost complete. The successful reunification of China might mean that Japan would be gradually edged out of northern China. Both Manchuria and Chosen (Korea⁵⁷) were rich in natural resources and fertile agricultural land. Control over both were regarded by many Japanese as essential for Japan's socio-economic and political well-being. As China's strength grew, anti-foreign and anti-Japanese movements became more widespread.⁵⁸ As demonstrations, economic boycotts, riots and bloody clashes became more frequent, the Japanese military became more and more restless insisting that the government protect more vigorously Japanese interests in China. According to the military, Japan should pursue a more forceful policy

information, it was Vincent Massey rather than Marler who addressed the issue. See Massey's speech in *Empire Club of Canada*, (January 14, 1932), pp. 1-15.

⁵⁶ For detailed treatment of this subject, see Lee Chao-Jin, *Japan Faces China* (Baltimore, 1976), C. J. LeBra, *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere In World War II* (N.Y., 1975) and M. Royama, *Foreign Policy of Japan, 1914-1939* (Westport, 1973).

⁵⁷ Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and Korea became Chosen. After World War Two, however, the name reversed back to Korea. To be consistent and for the purpose of this thesis, I will use Korea.

⁵⁸ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, file 577, "Political Developments In Japan," July 1931, pp. 2-8. For the moderate's position see Shidehara's speech outlining Japan's foreign policy problems and solutions in *The Japan Advertiser*, January 22, 1930. For the nationalist view of China's problems see Chiang Kai-Shek, *China's Destiny and Economic Theory*, (N.Y., 1947).

rather than the "weak-knee" diplomacy practised by Shidehara Kijuro.⁵⁹ The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, his critics argued, embraced too completely the international order as defined by both the Washington Conference and the League of Nations. The military was determined to destroy Japan's commitment to internationalism. The Army and the Navy as well as the War Ministry successfully sought increases in military spending and encouraged anti-Chinese demonstrations. A major crisis emerged in 1930 when the military refused to co-operate with the civilian government in ratifying the London Naval Treaty.

Although held in check in the short term, the military had seized the initiative. Militant nationalists, meanwhile, began assassinating those who favoured international co-operation including Prime Minister Hamaguchi. The military also formed a secret society known as the Cherry Blossom Society in 1930 which instigated a failed *Coup d'Etat* in March 1931. Defeated temporarily the military instigated the Manchurian Crisis on September 18, 1931.

Economic stagnation and depression facilitated the emergence of extreme nationalism in Japan.⁶⁰ The Depression began early in Japan and was as severe as in any other country. Just as Japan began to recover in 1929 the international economic system in the West collapsed. Most governments adopted autarchic policies; widespread protectionism further exacerbated the situation effectively

⁵⁹ Shidehara did not belong to any political party despite the fact that the Menseito Party endorsed his policy. For a short time following Hamaguchi attempted assassination in early 1930 Shidehara took over the prime ministership while maintaining his post as foreign minister. He "retired" from politics in 1931 and did not return until after the Second World War. He would later become one of the chief architects of Article IX, the clause which outlawed belligerency in the Japanese Constitution. For detailed analysis of "Shidehara Diplomacy," see I. Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1864-1942*, Chapters 7 and 8.

⁶⁰ See King Papers, MG 26, J, Political Report, October 1929, microfilm reel C-2311, pp. 140162-66.

killing any chance of short-term recovery. The immediate consequences in Japan were increasing isolation, the disappearance of moderation and internationalism and the further increase of political extremism in Japan from communists on the left and from the Army and other nationalists on the right. It was within this context that the Canadian Legation began its operation.

The Canadian Legation, opened in May 1929, could not have been established at a more propitious moment. Charged with keeping the Canadian government informed on the political and socio-economic developments in Japan and in the far east, the Legation immediately confronted Japan's desire to improve its balance of trade through tariff revision.⁶¹ There was, in addition, the question of Japan's proposed return to the gold standard in its international exchange dealings. Concerned about protecting their gold reserves Britain and France had imposed embargoes on gold shipments in 1918; Japan had followed suit. Although other powers lifted their embargoes in 1922-23, Japan maintained its embargoes policy until 1929. At the same time Japan's balance of trade deficit increased. By 1929-30 Japan wanted to lift the gold embargo to improve its trading position. In the light of economic depression it was, according to the Canadian Legation, "logical to expect that the removal of the gold embargo will adversely affect the Canadian export trade with Japan."⁶² This would result from the fact that the imports from Canada for the most part were "the essential[s] rather than luxury class." There was, however, hope that with the return to the gold standard, Canada would still benefit, although there was a great deal of uncertainty.

⁶¹ King Papers, MG 26, J, Political Report, November 1929; External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, February, 1930, pp. 7-9; Political Report, July 1930, pp. 5-8 and Political Report, September 1930, pp. 6-8.

⁶² Political Report, November 1929 in King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2701, p. 70813.

The Japanese domestic scene, meanwhile, was far from stable. In its very first report, the Legation described the internal turmoil in Japan.⁶³ The government had implemented, Ottawa learned, several repressive measures designed to "stamp out Radical propaganda and even to suppress the fact that such propaganda exists." The report cited the March 15, 1928 nation-wide search in which 483 alleged communists had been arrested. After a year of steady and persistent monitoring another "fifty radical propagandists were incarcerated." Then on April 16, 1929, the government arrested another 300 radicals. All these raids, the report stated, had been kept secret until early November 1929. The report went on to suggest that the radical agitators were university students who posed no serious threat to the peace of the nation.⁶⁴

The political upheavals and protests stemmed from the economic hardship and depression. As Japan sank deeper into depression, the debate on economic solutions took an extreme course. Between 1927-31 the debate centred around the issues of international economic co-operation versus autarky. The great industrial, commercial and financial groups known as the zaibatsu were heavily involved in the debate. The two outstanding and largest groups were the Mitsui and Mitsubishi. In analyzing the situation, Marler reminded King that

In the political realm the Seiyukai Party is generally supposed to represent the Mitsui group, while the Menseito had maintained very close relations with Mitsubishi. This alignment is clearly evident in the development and denouement of the recent political crisis. . . . The

⁶³ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2701, Canadian Minister in Tokyo to Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Political Developments in Japan, November 1929," p. 70817.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 70818-20. See also External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, file 577, Political Report, May 1930, p. 7.

Mitsubishi group refrained almost entirely from speculation and supported the Government in every possible way.⁶⁵

Those associated with the autarky included the military, the extreme nationalists and at least one of the big zaibatsu, Mitsui.⁶⁶ The economic well-being and the security of Japan, they argued, could only be maintained through the military conquest of mainland China and Asia. A "sphere of influence," later to be known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, should be created to provide Japan with a self-sufficient empire.

The "internationalists," a general term used for those who supported the Washington System, including some zaibatsu such as Mitsubishi, supported the "Shidehara Diplomacy" which sought co-operation with the West, namely Britain and the United States. As R. A. Hoover observes, Shidehara

envisaged a broader and more liberal program which emphasized peaceful economic penetration throughout the China continent, rather than narrowly concentrating its efforts to Manchuria backed by dubious political and military manoeuvres. Such a policy presumed the emergence of China in the not too distant future as a united, stable, and prosperous nation, organized to produce and able to buy. . . . [Japan should] . . . support a proposal looking forward to the abolition of sphere of influence in China. . . . [T]he relinquishment of Japan's exclusive spheres would be more than amply compensated for by the removal of barrier to her free economic expansion throughout the territory. . . . According to this view, Japan, favoured by her peculiar geographical and political relationship to

⁶⁵ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, file 577, part I, Marler to King, December 24, 1931.

⁶⁶ W. W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938* (Princeton, 1954), p. 221 and p. 224. See also K. Yamamura, "Zaibatsu Prewar and Zaibatsu Postwar," *The Journal of Asia Studies*, XXIII (August, 1964), pp. 539-554; A. Iriye, "The Failure of Economic Expansion: 1918-1931," pp. 237-269, J. Crowley, "A New Asian Order: Some Notes on Prewar Japanese Nationalism," pp. 270-298 and K. Yamamura, "The Japanese Economy, 1911-1930: Concentration, Conflicts and Crises," pp. 299-329 in *Japan In Crisis*, edited by B. Silberman, (Princeton, 1970); T. Bisson, "The Zaibatsu's Wartime Role," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 18 no. 4 (December, 1945).

the Continent of Asia. could easily withstand economic competition with other, more affluent Powers in China.⁶⁷

The Shidehara position clearly won Canadian approval. "[I]t would be next to madness," Marler informed King, "to adopt any other attitude with the Chinese in their present frame of mind and growing national consciousness."⁶⁸

The moderates organized in the Menseito Party sought, according to Keenleyside, to enhance business efficiency,⁶⁹ rationalize industry, reduce national and local taxes, lift the gold embargo, adjust and reduce excise taxes on the necessities of life, and increase public works programmes. They intended as well to subsidize schools in order to achieve "more practical education and moral culture." The militant opposition organized in the Seiyukei Party favoured similar economic programmes.⁷⁰ Their similarity was clearly reflected, the Canadians observed, in their support for the three Commissions on Social Policy which called for publicly funded work projects to deal with the massive

⁶⁷ R. A. Hoover, *Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements* (Denver, Col., 1980), p. 18.

⁶⁸ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, file 577 part I, Marler to King, March 11, 1931.

⁶⁹ There is a great deal of misunderstanding in the western and Japanese concept of "efficiency." The Japanese frequently employ the term "effective" rather than "efficient" to measure performance. The distinction is particularly important when referring to strategic industries which the Japanese government considers vital for a self-sufficient and competitive advantage. For example, in his book, *MITI And Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford, 1982), pp. 21-2, Chalmers Johnson comments that "Both Americans and Japanese tend to get meanings of efficiency and effectiveness mixed up. Americans often and understandably criticize their official bureaucracy for its efficiency . . . [while] Japanese continue to tolerate their wildly inefficient and even inappropriate agricultural structure at least in part [for example] because it is mildly effective: it provides food that does not have to be imported."

⁷⁰ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, February 1930, pp. 7-9.

unemployment.⁷¹ They differed, however, on defence policy. While Menseito wanted a reduction in military spending, Seiyukai wanted adjustments in the size of the army, a shortened but broader conscription period which would in effect inject more manpower to the armed forces, the abolition of government's control in military schools and the reform of the armed service in all aspects except the infantry units.⁷² The Canadian political reports from Tokyo provided extensive coverage of these debates and the ensuing political manoeuvres.

While the Legation reported the internal uncertainties in Japan, it also kept Headquarters informed on more general developments in the far east. Soviet-Japanese relations constituted one critical factor in far eastern diplomacy.⁷³

Like Sino-Japanese relations, Soviet-Japanese relations were far from cordial and were rooted in their struggle to dominate and control the northern Pacific regions which had led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.⁷⁴ Following the war, relations between Japan and Russia/Soviet Union had deteriorated. One specific issue was Sakhalin Island. In the 1860's Russia took it over; Japan then recovered the southern half of the island in the Russo-Japanese War. Sakhalin

⁷¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1930, pp. 5-7.

⁷² External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, February 1930, pp. 7-9.

⁷³ For the Soviet view see Leonid N. Kutakov, *Japanese Foreign Policy: A Soviet View*. Translated by Quincy Wright. (N.Y., 1972).

⁷⁴ For a firsthand account of this war, see M. Halstead, *War Of Russia and Japan* (Washington, 1904) and Sir Ernest Satow, *Korea and Manchuria Between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904: The Observations of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister Plenipotentiary To Japan 1895-1900 and China 1900-1906* (London and N.Y., 1906). For detailed analysis, see K. Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues* (N.Y. and London, 1970); S. Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and The Russo-Japanese War* (London and N.Y., 1970); I. Nish, *The Origins of The Russo-Japanese War* (N.Y., 1985).

remained disputed territory. During the Bolshevik Revolution, Japan along with other Allies intervened militarily in Siberia. Japan stationed and maintained its troops inside the Soviet Union until 1925. By 1928, Japanese militarists and rightists, fearing leftist movements and Soviet influence in Japan, demanded and received the implementations of harsh measures to deal with perceived threat. The Legation frequently reported the subsequent nation-wide crackdowns, suppression and arrests of labour leaders, demonstrators and radical students.⁷⁵

In addition to the generalized fear of radicals, Soviet patrol boats began shooting at and seizing Japanese fishing vessels around Sakhalin Island. Japan increased its naval forces in the north and began arming its fishing vessels. The Canadian Legation reported that the dispute began in July 1930 when Japanese vessels were "approaching the shore of the Soviet Union, and, according to the authorities of that Country, actually encroaching upon the territorial waters within the three-mile limit."⁷⁶ Without revealing its source the Legation reported that "the Soviet officials have in fact fired on Japanese vessels when the latter were far at sea." The Soviet Union as a result of these tensions had also increased its naval presence. "One Destroyer, six patrol ships, and four vessels of the Far Eastern Volunteer Fleet were mobilized" to patrol the territorial waters near Kamchatka. The report went on to say that the Japanese fishing vessels had "decided to arm" themselves for defensive purposes. The decision had been taken, Ottawa was told, "with the connivance of the Departments of War, Navy, Agriculture and Forestry." The Legation report added, however, that the Japanese government, although it had recalled its Ambassador for

⁷⁵ Political Report, November 1929, in King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2701, pp. 70816-70818.

⁷⁶ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1930, pp. 1-3.

consultation, "has been hesitating to take action and advising restraint." For the moment, "alarmed by the possible complications" of this policy, the Foreign Office also advised restraint on the part of Japanese fishing companies. Marler attached to the Legation Report a personal letter to King. As far as the present situation was concerned, Marler informed King, nothing profitable could be achieved except the maintenance of "a pacific nature" as shown by Shidehara.⁷⁷

While discussions in Japan proceeded, the Soviet Union seized one Japanese vessel. After consultation among several Vice-Ministers of departments, including the Vice-Minister of the Foreign Office, the Japanese government "would offer no opposition to the purchase of machine gun and rifles by the fishing companies," although the government made it clear that it would not "sell these weapons to the fishermen." As a response to the Soviet Union's increased activity, the Legation informed Ottawa that Japan had again increased its naval forces in the north. The Legation did its best to keep Ottawa posted on these difficult and potentially dangerous developments.

As Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated, two other key issues dominated Canada's Pacific concerns: the London Naval Conference (January to October 1930) and the Manchurian Crisis (September 19, 1931). Shortly before the London Naval Conference began the Legation informed Ottawa that the Japanese political leadership desired a real and significant reduction in armaments; a success in London would allow the government to implement its retrenchment program.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Marler to King, March 11, 1931, attached to Political Report, March 1931 in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546.

⁷⁸ King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2701, "Political Developments In Japan, November 1929," p. 708201. See also External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, February 1930, pp. 7-8.

Although the official Japanese line was to achieve a greater degree of relative strength in some areas and parity in others, there was, according to Keenleyside, a "constantly expressed hope that a positive reduction in naval forces, rather than mere limitation, may be achieved."⁷⁹ Economic difficulties and political instability meant that Japan was in no position to maintain a navy as powerful as that authorized by the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference. Moreover, the Washington Conference did not adequately deal with new naval technology particularly aircraft carriers and submarines. Keenleyside concluded that,

it would be exceedingly unfortunate if the other countries represented at the London Conference fail to take advantage of the pacific attitude of the Far-Eastern Empire to effectuate a comprehensive plan of reduction. If this opportunity is overlooked it may well be that, when at a later date Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy are themselves desirous of reducing their forces, Japan may prove recalcitrant. When this country enters an era of economic prosperity it may not be so willing to forego the psychological satisfaction which comes from rapidly growing naval armaments.⁸⁰

Although the United States was determined to force naval reductions on Japan, the compromise Reed-Matsudaira Proposal provided Japan with parity in submarines and relative increased strength in capital ships. The old ratio of 5:5:3 for the United States, Britain and Japan was replaced by a 10:10:7 formula.

Such a ratio, according to the Japanese military, was not sufficient. They demanded instead parity with Britain and the United States. The Japanese civilian government had neither consulted nor received approval from the Navy, yet it

⁷⁹ Political Report, November 1929, contained in King Papers, MG 26, J, microfilm reel C-2701, pp. 70820-1. See also Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War And Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (N.Y., 1935), Chapter XXV.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.70821.

instructed its delegates in London to accept the compromise.⁸¹ The Navy continued to oppose the new treaty. Within the Privy Council, a body representing the Emperor and in which the civilian government formed only a small part, hard-liners exerted considerable influence against acceptance of the new Treaty.⁸²

Canadian diplomats followed the ensuing debate over ratification very carefully. According to their reports, Baron Sakamoto, a retired Admiral and a defender of the treaty, believed that

Japan's national dignity will not be affected in the least simply because the strength of the navy or the arms [sic] is a little bit above or a little bit below what some people might want it to be. A slight lowering of our naval and military strength, I am confident, will not mechanically affect the dignity of our nation.⁸³

He suggested that the treaty be accepted. Sakamoto warned that nothing would be gained by giving "a false impression abroad that Japan is bent on opposing America and Britain by struggling to maintain as high a naval standard as possible."⁸⁴ Baron Shidehara expressed a similar view.⁸⁵ The press in general,

⁸¹ For detailed description of Japanese Government's position and view on the London Naval Conference see the speech and the interview of the Japanese head delegation to London, Wakatsuki, in *Japan Chronicle*, June 20, 1930. For Kato's position see External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, May 1930, p. 5 and June 1930, pp. 1-2. For Togo's position see External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1930, p. 7. For the American viewpoint, treaty texts, and pertinent figures regarding relative naval strength see *United States Foreign Relations, 1930*, Vol. I, pp. 1-131; for the fullest account of the Conference proceedings see E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (London, 1946) Second Series, Vol. I (1930).

⁸² External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, May 1930, p. 5.

⁸³ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ During the debate over the Naval Arms Limitations, according to American records, Shidehara "was personally willing to accept the American position but was afraid of the Navy." U. S. Ambassador Castle (to Japan) to Cotton (Acting Secretary of State), March 7, 1930, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Far Eastern Series*. (Washington D.C.: Government

meanwhile, as well as many individual Japanese supported the government, although they wanted an even stronger position taken against the military. "[T]he only reason we can see why the Government hesitates to cut down the army," the *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi* reported, "is its cowardice." It asked, "Will it [the government] side with the people and wage war against the Army, or will it flirt with the Army betraying the nation? Such is a choice now before the Government."⁸⁶ In the midst of this debate the Legation added that "There can be no doubt that within the next few years the Japanese people will have to face this issue of the Army versus the Government."⁸⁷ Worried also about the corrosive effect of continued economic depression the Legation also suggested that "it is not beyond the realm of possibility that if economic conditions continue their decline the government may be forced to resign." The defeat of the Menseito government and the possible emergence of a Seiyukei administration "cannot be viewed with equanimity by those who are unselfishly interested in the political progress of Japan."⁸⁸

The militarists, meanwhile, continued to press their case. According to the Legation's reports, the Navy scored a major victory when it convinced Admiral Kato, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, to oppose the treaty and to resign in protest. Kato's resignation lent force to Admiral Togo's opposition. Although the civilian government, the Canadian report continued, tried hard to have the

Printing Office, 1930), Vol. 1, pp. 49-50. See also Shidehara's speeches on foreign policy and foreign policy review printed in their entirety in *Japan Times*, September 29, 1930 and January 23, 1931, and *Japan Chronicle*, January 24, 1931.

⁸⁶ *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi*, as quoted in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report July 1930, pp. 3-4.

⁸⁷ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1930, p. 4.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

treaty ratified, arguments by opponents centred on "supposedly misconduct" of the government and its failure to co-operate with the military.⁸⁹ The government had failed to consult the navy before instructing its delegate to accept the Reed-Matsudaira Proposal. According to the Legation's reports:

It is noteworthy that criticism of the Government was not so much directed against the terms of the Treaty as against the manner in which the Government issued instructions without full consultation with the Naval authorities. This has raised a serious constitutional issue, as to the relation of the Naval and Military Councils to the Cabinet⁹⁰

The public and the press, meanwhile, became increasingly discontented, according to Canadian diplomats, with the way the military pressed their case.⁹¹

Although concerned, the Legation remained optimistic. "The Government," the report suggested, "is showing real determination in its support of the Treaty and it is expected that very heavy pressure will be brought to bear upon Privy Council in order to achieve the desired ratification."⁹² The Hamaguchi government, Ottawa was told, defended Japan's commitment to international co-operation, and the London Naval Treaty had become a critical test for that commitment. A Special Committee, the Legation reported, headed by Count Ito, one of Japan's leading political, naval and constitutional academics, eventually facilitated ratification, and the Emperor finally signed the naval treaty in October 1930. Count Ito pointed out that the failure to ratify would create "much anxiety . . . to the Throne." Although the government may have been of some

⁸⁹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, May 1930, pp. 3-5.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4 and External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, August 1930, pp. 4-5.

⁹¹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1930, p. 5-6.

⁹² See *Asahi* as quoted in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1930, p. 9.

"misconduct," there was no sufficient reason "to cause an adverse report" or to reject the Treaty. This triumph of the government over opponents in the Privy Council clearly signaled, according to Keenleyside, Hamaguchi's personal hold on power. The uncompromising battle against the Privy Council clearly demonstrated, Keenleyside argued, Japan's commitment to internationalism.⁹³

While the debate over the ratification proceeded, the Legation provided Ottawa additional information on other political developments and warned Ottawa about Army and Navy plans for a military build-up. As a *quid pro quo*, the Legation reported, the naval authorities would support the terms of the London Naval Conference if there was no reduction in its budget and if "The Government [agrees] to confer with the Naval General Staff fully when determining the tonnage of the navy in the future so as to preclude an unfortunate situation like the present."⁹⁴ The Legation's report, however, did not say whether or not the government accepted these conditions.

For the moment, the Treaty, according to the Navy, "tied its [Japan's] hands in advance of the 1935 [naval] conference" which would deal with further reductions.⁹⁵ The Navy wanted to rectify the situation. Without revealing its source, the Legation reported that after a secret meeting of the Supreme Military Council the Navy issued a memorandum demanding "a higher efficiency of the destroyer classes, and an extended air force." This would involve a substantial "increase of the naval aeroplanes to two or three times their present number and

⁹³ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, September 1930, p. 3.

⁹⁴ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, May 1930, pp. 5-6.

⁹⁵ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1930, p. 4.

the construction of an additional aeroplane-carrier."⁹⁶ In July the Legation observed that the government faced "great difficulty in reducing the expenditure this year" primarily because of "the opposition of the two great spending departments -- the War Department and the Navy."⁹⁷

The Army, like the Navy, also demanded expansion. In 1925 universal service had been re-instituted, and by 1930 the army numbered 210,000 men. The General Staff considered this insufficient to defend the nation.⁹⁸ Before the 1930 election, according to the Legation's report, Menseito, led by Hamaguchi, planned to reduce the Army budget. It did not for the moment honour that promise once the crisis over the London Naval Treaty erupted. The government wanted a solution to its naval problems "before antagonizing another large group of Japanese officials and public men by a direct attack on the military junts [sic]."⁹⁹ In general, the press, the public and "many of the more liberal leaders of the Menseito party itself have been prominent . . . in attacking the government for not taking more vigorous action." Sandwiched between the public pressure and the military influence which was "still exceedingly great," the Hamaguchi government appointed a Military System Enquiry Commission to examine the Army establishment and to report on the possibility and desirability of reducing expenditures. As the Legation reported, the Commission's report, "*with the approval of the Minister*

⁹⁶ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, June 1930, p. 3.

⁹⁷ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1930, p. 2.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁹⁹ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, June 1931, p. 5.

of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Inspector-General of Military Education,"¹⁰⁰ largely concluded that there should be no reduction.

The need to maintain such an Army stemmed from Japan's interests in Korea and in China. To this could be added a fear of communism and public disorder as well as the possibility of war with the Soviet Union. The Commission, however, went further. The Commission suggested that the Army should readjust the existing units with technical developments and the money saved should be spent on the further mechanization of the army. There were clear signs that trouble was brewing between the government and the military.

The ambitions of the military soon focused on southern Manchuria. Here the army could and would play an independent and ultimately critical role in determining the course of events. Any action initiated by militant factions on either side would provoke serious consequences and complications for the peace of East Asia. In this context the Manchurian Crisis proved to be the turning point in Sino-Japanese relationship. Without informing the Tokyo government, the Japanese army in Manchuria, on September 18, 1931, instigated the Mukden Incident. A section of the Manchurian railway was destroyed and blame placed on the Chinese army.¹⁰¹ Before any investigation could begin, the Japanese military commanders Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishiro ordered swift military "retaliation." The Manchurian Crisis created a *fait accompli*; the Japanese

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* Emphasis in original.

¹⁰¹ For detailed analysis of this crisis, see Saito Hiroshi, *Japan's Policies and Purposes* (Boston, 1935); C. Thorne, *The Limit of Foreign Policy: The West, The League of Nations and The Far Eastern Crisis in 1931-33* (N.Y., 1972); and P. M. Coble Jr., "Chiang Kai-Shek and The Anti-Japanese Movement In China: Zou Tao-Fen and The National Salvation Association, 1931-1937," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XLIV no. 2 (February, 1985), pp. 293-310.

civilian government was left in the dark, trying to find out what had happened and how to deal with the international ramifications. The Canadian Legation reported on the tense atmosphere surrounding these events. Its reports between June and August covered the immediate events leading up to the Manchurian Crisis.

In July there had been a clash between Korean farmers and Chinese military officers in Wanpaoshan, Manchuria. Some of these farm lands had been legally leased to the Koreans prior to the 1911 Revolution. The Revolution rendered the leases invalid, yet the Chinese authorities failed to make this clear to the Korean farmers. When the Koreans argued that the land had been legally leased, the Chinese attacked the Koreans. With the active encouragement of local Japanese authorities, Koreans attacked Chinese throughout Korea resulting in a substantial loss of property. China in turn protested Japanese actions in Korea. According to the Legation's Report, after an unsatisfactory response from Japan, China filed its complaint to the League of Nations and re-submitted its complaint to Japan with the statement that Japan "had failed to take proper precautions prior to the outbreak or adequate measures to protect the Chinese after the disturbances began."¹⁰² China promised to prevent future incidents but warned that success depended upon Japan's willingness to co-operate.

While negotiations proceeded anti-Japanese feeling in China "came violently to the fore." Many people, including political and business leaders, encouraged boycotts of Japanese goods. Although Chinese officials "formally and officially deprecated such action," they were either "unable or unwilling effectively to suppress it." Indeed, the agitators were so dissatisfied with the way the Chinese government handled the issue that they stormed the Chinese Foreign Minister's residence. The agitators called on Chiang Kai-Shek to resign the presidency and

¹⁰² External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1931, pp. 5-6.

demanded that the Chinese government 1) "enforce the revolutionary diplomacy and recover all lands from the Korean farmers," 2) boycott Japanese goods and sever economic as well as diplomatic ties with Japan, 3) force Japan to withdraw its police and pay indemnities and, most important of all, 4) give all members of the Koumintang "military training for a proclamation of war against Japan." The Legation Report went further and informed Ottawa that the Chinese divisional commander, General Chang Hsueh-Liang, had proposed to mass "500,000 Chinese troops on the Chosen Border for the purpose of enforcing Chinese claim." The tone of the report clearly reflected an anti-Chinese bias on the part of the Canadian Legation.

The Legation did not believe that a Sino-Japanese armed confrontation was inevitable so long as the moderates on both sides remained in control. New revolts had just broken out in the northeast, and the Chinese government would not and could not go to war with Japan. The Legation pointed out that despite numerous difficulties diplomatic channels had remained open. Despite the Chinese economic boycott of Japanese goods, Japan and China still exchanged diplomatic representation.¹⁰³ Economic aid to China had been provided as a result of the devastating floods in the Yellow River Valley in late 1930, and this helped to lessen the tension. Despite "attacks upon the Chinese residents of Chosen" by Japanese police in July which "were much more serious than those made" by Chinese "upon the Koreans in Manchuria,"¹⁰⁴ a confrontation had been avoided. Japan, meanwhile, decided to put aside ¥125,000 to pay indemnities while "denying all

¹⁰³ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, p. 9.

¹⁰⁴ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1931, p. 5.

legal responsibility" from the attacks.¹⁰⁵ Under the leadership of the Seiyukai Party, moreover, a Japanese commission of investigation went to Chosen. The Canadian Legation, at any rate, believed such a commission would surely "give indirect support to Chinese accusations of Japanese police brutality." The Canadian Legation commented that

This, it is hardly necessary to point out, will be unusual attitude for the members of the Seiyukai Party, as they have been most prominent in the past in demanding a "strong" policy with reference to Chinese affairs.¹⁰⁶

Such a move clearly showed that despite political differences, the civilians for the moment at least remained committed to non-military options.

Difficulties, however, continued to compound themselves as one "incident" followed another. The most serious proved to be the murder of Captain Nakamura in Manchuria.¹⁰⁷ Nakamura, accompanied by a Mongolian guide, a Russian and a Japanese, and reportedly carrying ¥100,000, was on an "educational and geological expedition."¹⁰⁸ In late July news arrived that the group had been murdered by

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* See also Shidehara's outlining of Japan foreign policy in the Japanese Diet which was published in full in *The Japan Advertiser and Japan Chronicle*, April 27, 1930.

¹⁰⁷ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, p. 6. See also Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, file "Manchurian Journal," section III, "Nakamura Murder."

¹⁰⁸ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, p. 6. See also Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," subsection "Nakamura Murder." Although the August 1931 Political Report stated that the purpose of the mission was "unknown," Kirkwood stated that the mission was under the order of the General Staff. It is reasonable to conclude that Kirkwood's statement was probably the correct one, given the organized search by the Japanese Military Staff when the Nakamura Expedition failed to reach its destination in Inner Mongolia.

Chinese troops at Mukden, and their bodies burned near Taonan in Manchuria.¹⁰⁹ Since the Nakamura Expedition was private and civilian in status, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt that only a normal diplomatic protest should be issued. The military, however, "foster[s] a bitter anti-Chinese agitation, claiming that it was a deliberate 'massacre' of a Japanese Staff Officer and his companions."¹¹⁰ As events unfolded Kirkwood wrote in his diary that the military became more and more restless.¹¹¹ Attempts to have the matter dealt with diplomatically failed as a result, the Legation reported, of China's half-hearted effort and insincerity.¹¹² China's failure to co-operate, Kirkwood suggested, gave the extremists in Japan even more publicity. The more moderate policies pursued by Baron Shidehara became more and more "incompatible with the aspirations of the military element . . . and may in future become critical."¹¹³

In its August Report the Legation sounded a clear alarm: "relations between Japan and China, always somewhat precarious, have during the past month or so reached a stage of unusual tension, incidentally being reflected in the extra Japanese police guard which has recently been maintained day and night at the Chinese Legation in Tokyo."¹¹⁴ The report informed Ottawa that on August 4, 1931, General Minami, the Minister for War, gave a speech to a number of Japanese

¹⁰⁹ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," subsection "Nakamura Murder," p. 1.

¹¹⁰ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, p. 7.

¹¹¹ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," subsection "Mukden Incident," p. 7.

¹¹² Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2 "Manchurian Journal," subsection "Nakamura Murder," pp. 6-8.

¹¹³ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, p. 12.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

divisional commanders in which he suggested that the problems in Manchuria and Mongolia were the direct results of the "decline in Japan's prestige," and of Chinese "anti-foreign sentiment." He wanted the military to have "a stronger sense of loyalty and public service." Minami wanted the military to prevent the situation from developing into "a more serious phase." The report concluded that "The present situation is therefore not without serious possibilities."¹¹⁵ It did not take long for these "possibilities" to materialize. On September 9, 1931, immediately after a Cabinet session, Kirkwood wrote in his diary, General Minami gave a short speech outlining the government's plan to deal with the Nakamura Incident. Kirkwood quoted Minami as having said that,

no questions were asked. . . . The War Office will, however, cooperate with the Foreign Office in collecting further proof. Regarding the proper measures to take if negotiations fail, I have definite plans. I shall not disclose them for the present. . . . It is my duty to place reliance on the Foreign Office and to watch the attitude of Japan and public opinion in home. It is noteworthy that public opinion in Japan is changing and is assuming a serious tone. . . . Because of the proofs, the Army is determined to take proper measures should the Chinese authorities deny the truth of the accusation.¹¹⁶

About a week later, the Commander of the Japanese Force in Kwantung, General Honjo, issued mobilization orders.¹¹⁷ Determined to punish the "Chinese agitators," General Minami proposed on September 19 sending more troops to the area.¹¹⁸ Although the cabinet rejected this idea,¹¹⁹ the proposal demonstrated

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," subsection III, "Nakamura Murder," p. 5.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹¹⁸ External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, p. 7. See also Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," subsection "Nakamura Murder," p. 2.

the increased influence of extremists within the Japanese government. As one of Japan's leading foreign language newspapers commented,

preparedness which makes a collision certain has been in evidence on the Japanese side for some time. There has been a steadily increasing demand for a more assured position in Manchuria; and since General Minami made his warlike speech to the divisional commanders, and gave it out to the press, there has been talk of war.¹¹⁹

Still hoping for moderation, the editors of *Japan Chronicle* added that "it cannot be maintained that the whole blame lies with the Chinese."

Within hours of the clash in Mukden, Keenleyside quickly informed Ottawa and emphasized that fact that, for the moment, all information "had been received from Japanese sources only."¹²¹ Officials on both sides gave different and contradictory accounts of the situation. Within days of the Mukden Incident the Tokyo Legation appraised Ottawa of unfolding events. For the moment the Legation remained optimistic. The "Foreign Minister states that," according to Keenleyside's telegram, the "Manchurian conflict will not be resumed and that troops occupying Mukden will be withdrawn as soon as order is restored without waiting for final settlement." For the moment, however, the telegram continued, "Cabinet so far [is] supporting Shidehara rather than military representatives."¹²² Decades later, scholars revealed that the Emperor too

¹¹⁹ Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," subsection, "Nakamura Murder," p. 9.

¹²⁰ *Japan Chronicle*, September 20, 1930 cited in Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," section IV, "The Mukden Incident," pp. 12-14.

¹²¹ Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 399.

¹²² NAC, Governor General Office, RG 7, Vol. 394, file 6274, part 5, Chargé d'Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 24, 1931. This is also available in microfilm reel T-1488.

favoured containment of the war.¹²³ In the light of confusion and increasing hostilities towards Chinese, the Japanese government undertook "Drastic orders to protect Chinese in Japan."¹²⁴ For now there was "No likelihood of war though [sic] attacks upon Japanese residents in Chinese cities may cause new complications." It was clear to the Canadian Legation that "Military authorities have been acting without sanction of the Cabinet." The Legation went on to suggest that the military was "trying to gain control. Pressure through League of Nations highly desirable." On the same day, another telegram added that "The Japanese Government [is] reported to have decided to accept League of Nations co-operation in settling Manchurian problem."¹²⁵

Despite this optimism, the situation worsened. The League of Nations and the main players in the Washington System tried to find out what had happened and what action to take. China, after repeated appeals for help, received little more than moral support. The international community, meanwhile, accepted Japan's proposal to settle the incident on a bilateral basis between China and Japan. Such acceptance was less a reflection of negligence than an attempt to help the Japanese civilian government reassert control over the army. In this they failed.

While the debate was going in Geneva, the war in China gradually expanded. China was in no condition to resist Japanese military aggression: Chiang Kai-Shek had already committed himself to military campaigns against the Chinese

¹²³ A. Iriye, *The Origins Of The Second World War In Asia*, p. 9.

¹²⁴ Governor General Office, RG 7, Vol. 394, file 6274, part 5, Chargé d'Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 24, 1931. The British reports are contained in and arranged chronologically following each Canadian telegram in this file.

¹²⁵ Governor General Office, RG 7, Vol. 394, file 6274, part 5, Chargé d'Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 24, 1931.

communists which in itself lent force to Japan's claim that China was in a state of chaos. The League of Nations in turn created the Lytton Commission to investigate the situation. That Commission eventually concluded that Japan was in fact the aggressor. Japan in turn walked out of the League of Nations.¹²⁶ The Manchurian Crisis was a direct challenge to the Washington System as well as that of the League of Nations and marked the beginning of their disintegration. The first step along the road to the Pacific War had been taken.

During these crises, the Legation had performed very well. The Legation assessed both the general problems and specific issues and provided Ottawa with accurate analysis as well as useable information and advice. It clearly identified the key players on the Japanese political scene as well as the problems. Although detailed reports of events in Manchuria were less complete than those provided by British officials, this reflected the size and scope of the Legation rather than its competence. The Legation was only a few years old and lacked experience. With only a small staff in Tokyo, the Legation lacked a China perspective. When commenting on the internal political turmoil in Japan, the Legation clearly favoured the policies pursued by Shidehara. When Sino-Japanese conflict occurred, however, the Legation often presented Japan as the aggrieved party. Although Marler, Keenleyside and Kirkwood kept Ottawa informed on events in Japan, they were less successful gathering information on the whole of the far east. The lack of coverage of Asia in general and China in particular reflected the unrealistic expectations of the Department of External Affairs

¹²⁶ A copy of Japanese Government's withdrawal notice to the League of Nations is available in External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1615, file 65-H. See also the Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida's speech in *Japan Advertiser*, August 26, 1932.

which presumed that the Tokyo Legation would be able to cover the whole of Asia. Canada's attempt to formulate its Asian-Pacific policy was not so much a vision beyond reach as a failure to appreciate the complexities of issues. Yet on the whole decision-makers in Ottawa had the benefit of clear and reliable information when determining Canada's Asian-Pacific policies. Specifically, Canada had more than sufficient knowledge to make an informed decision when the Lytton Commission submitted its report to the League of Nations.

Conclusion

The opening of the Tokyo Legation represented a major step in the gradual development of Canadian nationhood. The struggle for independence, as we have seen, was a lengthy process. Canada's representation abroad through its Commercial Agents had proven inadequate. The fault lay as much with the British as with the Canadian government. Although it was only natural that the British should grudgingly guard their control over the empire, the Canadian government proved hesitant to push its own case for independence. Canada had its own version of "muddling through" as witnessed by the unwillingness of the Department of External Affairs to initiate foreign policy prior to World War One. The Canadian government chose to maintain its semi-colonial status and, as a consequence, made the Department of External Affairs little more than an archive of correspondence and a channel of communication. This situation lasted until the war during which Canada achieved a degree of recognition as a separate entity within the British Empire.

The turning point in Canada's struggle for independent foreign policy came as a result of the Chanak Crisis. After Chanak, Canada decided that the autonomy of each of the senior Dominions had to be formally recognized. The Dominions must, Canada insisted, be allowed to pursue their own individual interests and foreign policy. This principle was recognized and accepted at the 1926 Imperial Conference. Following the Conference, Canada moved quickly to implement that decision.

The Department of External Affairs would henceforth formulate and conduct foreign policy. The first steps towards this new independent foreign policy was the exchange of diplomatic representations with other countries. Canada's socio-

economic, political and military ties with both Britain and the United States ensured that Canada's international outlook would concentrate on relations within the North Atlantic Triangle. In addition, Canada's demographical composition meant that diplomatic exchanges with France would and should take place sooner rather than later. International relations, meanwhile, had significantly changed after World War One. The rise of Japan to the position of a major power helped focus greater attention on the Pacific. This situation provided a context for the establishment by Canada of diplomatic relations with Japan.

Canada's relations with Asian-Pacific countries dated back to the mid-nineteenth century. Commercially, the riches of the Orient had attracted Canadians, and Canada pursued, although only half-heartedly, closer trade relations with Asia. Culturally, however, Canada considered itself part of the Anglo-saxon world and formulated its immigration policy accordingly. Racism in British Columbia led to a series of legislative attempts to bar oriental immigrants which were repeatedly disallowed by the federal government. Eventually Ottawa would support British Columbia's demands for restrictions when such policies served federal purposes. This confrontation between British Columbia and Ottawa over the province's desire to restrict Asian immigration had inevitable foreign policy implications which in turn made the goal of closer and better commercial relations with Asian-Pacific countries, particularly Japan, more difficult to achieve.

Historians who have looked at the decision to establish diplomatic ties with Japan generally conclude that "the Canadian Government's main interests were always immigration . . . followed by trade." Although these were primary motives, they alone cannot explain the 1928 decision to open the Tokyo Legation. Had trade and immigration been Canada's only motives the Tokyo Legation would not have been

worth the time, effort and money spent on it. Although Asian-Pacific relations clearly revolved around these issues, Canada's primary trade and immigration objectives, as we have seen, had been achieved without establishing diplomatic contacts. Exclusion Acts in the case of the Chinese, the prevention from landing in the case of East Indians and *ad hoc* restrictions of emigration in the case of the Gentleman's Agreement and the Canada-Japan Immigration Agreement in 1923 and 1928 had proven efficient and effective policy options. Thus, there was no pressing need to create a diplomatic mission to deal with the immigration issue.

Immigration was more a federal-provincial issue than cause for international difficulties, and the same could be said for trade policy. The promotion of trade and the sale of Canadian goods did not necessarily require diplomatic missions. Canadian Trade Commissioners were competent and carried out their responsibilities despite their not having diplomatic status. No doubt diplomatic exchanges would smooth the process, yet Canada could and did negotiate bilateral trade agreements without formal diplomatic representation.

These two issues, trade and immigration, alone were not sufficient explanation for Canada's decision to establish a diplomatic mission in Tokyo. Indeed, they were not sufficient to warrant the establishment of Legations in China or India, countries with which Canada had similar trade and immigration concerns. As Lester B. Pearson observed in 1951: Canada's concerns with trade and immigration were not sufficient "for Canada to have what could conceivably be called a Far Eastern policy."¹

The diplomatic exchange between Canada and Japan indicated that Canada wanted more than just the prevention of immigration and the promotion of trade.

¹ Lester B. Pearson, "The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30 no. 1 (October, 1951), p. 20.

Ottawa's decision stemmed from Canada's need to have a resident diplomatic official who could make Canada's presence felt and who would be in the position to intervene should Japan adopt policies which might injure Canada's interests. Although the North Atlantic Triangle dominated Canada's concerns, this emphasis did not negate a concern with other global issues. Although Canada did not have a "Far Eastern policy" in the full sense of the term, it remained concerned about its relationship with Asia. Establishing a diplomatic mission in Tokyo in 1928 immediately improved Canada's relations with the dominant power in the region. Canada also provided itself with the machinery for gathering information essential to the process of formulating its Far Eastern and Asia-Pacific policy.

The execution of that policy initiative proved a half-hearted effort to which Canada failed to commit sufficient staff or other resources. The executive personnel were certainly competent, but they were few in number — Marler, Keenleyside and Kirkwood. The Department of External Affairs failed to appreciate the difficulties and complexities of the situation. A single Legation in Tokyo could not realistically be expected to provide External Affairs with adequate analysis of all the divergent and opposing views in Asia. The Legation represented a window through which Canada could see the far east, but it provided a restrictive and limited view of the political landscape. The establishment of the Tokyo Legation indicates that Canada had no "Pacific Blind Spot;" it would be more accurate to suggest that Canada had tunnel vision. As Keenleyside concluded

I had not been long in Tokyo before we began to suffer in a mild way from the disease that afflicts all field officers: apparent lack of interests on the part of the headquarters at home. . . . In our case, of course, although our initial problems were of concern to ourselves, once we were settled Ottawa had little reason to spend time worrying about legation

affairs. There were no major problems disturbing Canada-Japan relations . . . Nevertheless, we did begin to feel a bit deserted.²

Keenleyside clearly felt alone, if not abandoned, in his new posting. The Minister too felt that the Legation was "in a distant part of the world" and seemed to "be entirely forgotten."³

Despite neglect and without adequate staff the Legation, nonetheless, performed reasonably well. Shortly after the Legation was established, it satisfactorily implemented the 1928 Canada-Japan Immigration Agreement. The Legation also pursued further trade expansion with Japan and other far eastern countries. Unfortunately, as a result of the collapse of international trading system, protective tariffs and natural disasters, the Legation worked very hard just to maintain the existing benefits Canada enjoyed; yet, in the end, the benefits would gradually disappear. The Legation, in addition, consistently forwarded to Ottawa accurate and usable information. These materials, however, were from Tokyo; there was no "China view" to provide balance. Although providing good information on Japan, there was very little intelligence information on the broader Asian scene. This situation reflects not the competence of the Legation staff but its size and the Department of External Affairs' unrealistic expectations. The attempt to gather materials essential for the formulation of Canadian Far Eastern policy proved a vision beyond the reach of a single understaffed diplomatic mission in Tokyo.

² Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, p. 281.

³ Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 2, file "Correspondence, 1926-1935," Marler to Malcolm, March 1, 1930.

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