

The Shield of Achilles: Nationalist *Seinsvergessenheit* and  
Heidegger's *Heimat*

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## Abstract

This thesis concerns the highly contested relationship between Martin Heidegger's articulation of authentic *Dasein* and the nationalism of some of Heidegger's contemporaries. While granting their shared hostility to liberalism, "levelling down," cosmopolitanism, and materialism, this thesis concludes that Heidegger's pursuit of an authentic temporal and spatial relation to Being is impeded by this nationalism. From this thesis, a Heideggerian conception of authenticity emerges which has certain admirable qualities—leading us away from dishonest or propagandistic historical myth-making and from a chauvinistic deification of one's national inheritance at the expense of curiosity about anything different. However, this thesis also highlights the dangers that are inherent to foundational aspects of Heidegger's thought- in particular an innate tendency towards exclusion, indifference to suffering, apologetics for tyranny, and antisemitism. Heidegger's thought is distanced from the primordialist nationalist's conception of origins as foundations of character and situation, their mytho-historical narratives of national greatness, and their promise of eternity through sacrifice in the name of the nation. Instead, Heidegger calls us to a form of authenticity that emerges both from the unfolding of the historical consciousness of one's people and from the temporal unfolding of the experience of Being. One is also compelled to reject the primordialist nationalist conception of the political space, their chauvinistic cultural particularism and their reverential relation to the local. An authentic spatiality, this thesis finds, depends upon being able to balance the need to belong alongside one's fellows in one's home and the capacity of thinking persons to strike out from home and venture into a strange and unnerving conceptual space where the nature of Being is in question. Authentic belonging, we find, depends upon our being able to dwell in the "in-between" of these distinct modalities of Being.

## Contents

1. <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> and the Question of Heidegger's Nationalism	1
2. Methodology	24
<b>Part One: Time</b>	
3. Origins	55
4. Taking up the Mantle	80
5. Death	104
6. The Uses and Abuses of Memory	130
<b>Entr'acte</b>	
7. Pathways and Perdition	156
<b>Part Two: Space</b>	
8. To Sojourn in Syracuse?	185
9. The House of Being	209
10. <i>Mitsein</i> and Community	231
11. The Wanderer and the Heimat	258
<b>Conclusions</b>	285

## Abbreviations

<b>Heidegger</b>		<b>Barrès</b>	
<b>PMD</b>	Poetically Man Dwells	<b>FF</b>	The Faith of France
<b>AAH</b>	Avowal to Adolf Hitler	<b>LTM</b>	La Terre et les Morts
<b>AOW</b>	The Age of the Worldview	<b>OG</b>	Officers and Gentlemen
<b>AWP</b>	The Age of the World Picture	<b>SDN</b>	<i>Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme: Tome I</i>
<b>BC</b>	Basic Concepts	<b>TEF</b>	Les Traits Éternels de la France
<b>BDT</b>	Building, Dwelling, thinking	<b>Jünger</b>	
<b>BF</b>	The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures	<b>GO</b>	<i>A German Officer in Occupied Paris: The War Journals</i>
<b>BT</b>	Being and Time	<b>OD</b>	On Danger
<b>CL</b>	Creative Landscapes: Why I stay in the Provinces	<b>SoS</b>	<i>Storm of Steel</i>
<b>CLS</b>	The Call to Labour Service	<b>TM</b>	The Total Mobilization
<b>CPE</b>	<i>Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing)</i>	<b>TW</b>	<i>The Worker: Dominion and Form</i>
<b>DL</b>	A Dialogue on Language	<b>Mann</b>	
<b>DT</b>	Discourse on Thinking	<b>D</b>	<i>Thomas Mann: Diaries 1918-1939</i>
<b>EHF</b>	The Essence of Human Freedom	<b>OGR</b>	On the German Republic
<b>EOG</b>	On the Essence of Ground	<b>R</b>	<i>Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man</i>
<b>EOP</b>	The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking	<b>TIW</b>	Thoughts in Wartime
<b>FCM</b>	<i>The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics</i>	<b>Péguy</b>	
<b>FF</b>	Follow the Führer	<b>A</b>	L'Argent
<b>GS</b>	German Students	<b>AS</b>	L'Argent Suite
<b>GSW</b>	The German Student as Worker	<b>C</b>	Clio
<b>H</b>	Hegel	<b>CR</b>	Courrier de Russie
<b>HG</b>	Hegel and the Greeks	<b>CRM</b>	Compte Rendu de Mandat
<b>HGR</b>	<i>Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "the Rhine"</i>	<b>CQ</b>	Cahiers de la Quinzaine
<b>HHI</b>	<i>Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister."</i>	<b>DLR</b>	De la Raison
<b>HPS</b>	Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit	<b>DPL</b>	Discours pour la Liberté
<b>IM</b>	Introduction to Metaphysics	<b>EDM</b>	Un Essai de Monopole
<b>INSUM</b>	<i>Interpretation of Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation</i>	<b>JC</b>	De Jean Coste
<b>JPW</b>	Karl Jaspers's <i>Psychology of Worldviews</i>	<b>LG</b>	Louis de Gonzagues
<b>KPM</b>	<i>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</i>	<b>LP</b>	Lettre du Provincial
<b>KTB</b>	Kant's Thesis about Being	<b>LSP</b>	Les Suppliants Parallèles
<b>L</b>	Language	<b>MSD</b>	Avertissement A: Angasarian, Le Monde sans Dieu
<b>LiP</b>	Language in the Poem	<b>NC</b>	Notre Conjointe
<b>LoH</b>	Letter on Humanism	<b>NJ</b>	<i>Notre Jeunesse</i>
<b>LSU</b>	Labour Service and the University	<b>NP</b>	<i>Notre Patrie</i>
<b>MSM</b>		<b>NT</b>	Un Nouveau Théologien M. Fernand Laudet
<b>M</b>	Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics	<b>PCS</b>	Préparation de Congrès Socialiste National
<b>MWO</b>	My Way to Phenomenology	<b>PIM</b>	
<b>NHS</b>	Nature, History, State	<b>M</b>	Parti Intellectuel dans le Monde Moderne
<b>NL</b>	The Nature of Language		

<b>OGSU</b>	Only a God can save us: the Spiegel interview (1966)	<b>PM</b>	Pour Moi
<b>OQB</b>	On the Question of Being	<b>RPP</b>	Reprise Politique Parlementaire
<b>OWA</b>	The Origin of the Work of Art	<b>TFD</b>	Textes Formant Dossier
<b>PDT</b>	Plato's Doctrine of Truth	<b>Arendt</b>	
<b>PL</b>	<i>Selected "Problems" of "Logic"</i>	<b>ATH</b>	At Table with Hitler
<b>PT</b>	Phenomenology and Theology	Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought	
<b>PWIM</b>	Postscript to "What is Metaphysics?"	<b>CPEP</b>	
<b>QCT</b>	The Question Concerning Technology	<b>HC</b>	<i>The Human Condition</i>
<b>QoB</b>	The Question of Being	<b>HF</b>	Heidegger the Fox
<b>SAGU</b>	The Self-Assertion of the German University	<b>IH</b>	The Image of Hell
<b>SR</b>	Science and Reflection	<b>NF</b>	Nightmare and Flight
<b>TB</b>	On Time and Being	<b>OT</b>	The Origins of Totalitarianism
<b>TBWP</b>	The Beginning of Western Philosophy	<b>SFI</b>	The Seeds of a Fascist International Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding)
<b>TT</b>	The Thing	<b>UP</b>	
<b>Ttu</b>	The Turning	<b>WEP</b>	What is Existential Philosophy?
<b>UNR</b>	The University Under the New Reich."	<b>Camus</b>	
<b>W</b>	Words	<b>FK</b>	Hope and the Absurd in the Work of Franz Kafka
<b>WCT</b>	What Calls for Thinking?	<b>MoS</b>	The Myth of Sisyphus
<b>WICT</b>	<i>What is Called Thinking?</i>		
<b>WIM</b>	What is Metaphysics?		
<b>WON</b>	The Word of Nietzsche		
<b>WPF</b>	What are Poets For?		
<b>WTL</b>	The Way to Language		
<b>ZEJ</b>	Zu Ernst Jünger		

## The Shield of Achilles

She looked over his shoulder  
 For vines and olive trees,  
 Marble well-governed cities  
 And ships upon untamed seas,  
 But there on the shining metal  
 His hands had put instead  
 An artificial wilderness  
 And a sky like lead.

A plain without a feature, bare and brown,  
 No blade of grass, no sign of neighbourhood,  
 Nothing to eat and nowhere to sit down,  
 Yet, congregated on its blankness, stood  
 An unintelligible multitude,  
 A million eyes, a million boots in line,  
 Without expression, waiting for a sign.

Out of the air a voice without a face  
 Proved by statistics that some cause was just  
 In tones as dry and level as the place:  
 No one was cheered and nothing was  
 discussed;  
 Column by column in a cloud of dust  
 They marched away enduring a belief  
 Whose logic brought them, somewhere else, to  
 grief.

She looked over his shoulder  
 For ritual pieties,  
 White flower-garlanded heifers,  
 Libation and sacrifice,  
 But there on the shining metal  
 Where the altar should have been,  
 She saw by his flickering forge-light  
 Quite another scene.

Barbed wire enclosed an arbitrary spot  
 Where bored officials lounged (one cracked a  
 joke)  
 And sentries sweated for the day was hot:  
 A crowd of ordinary decent folk  
 Watched from without and neither moved nor  
 spoke

As three pale figures were led forth and bound  
 To three posts driven upright in the ground.

The mass and majesty of this world, all  
 That carries weight and always weighs the  
 same  
 Lay in the hands of others; they were small  
 And could not hope for help and no help came:  
 What their foes liked to do was done, their  
 shame  
 Was all the worst could wish; they lost their  
 pride  
 And died as men before their bodies died.

She looked over his shoulder  
 For athletes at their games,  
 Men and women in a dance  
 Moving their sweet limbs  
 Quick, quick, to music,  
 But there on the shining shield  
 His hands had set no dancing-floor  
 But a weed-choked field.

A ragged urchin, aimless and alone,  
 Loitered about that vacancy; a bird  
 Flew up to safety from his well-aimed stone:  
 That girls are raped, that two boys knife a  
 third,  
 Were axioms to him, who'd never heard  
 Of any world where promises were kept,  
 Or one could weep because another wept.

The thin-lipped armorer,  
 Hephaestos, hobbled away,  
 Thetis of the shining breasts  
 Cried out in dismay  
 At what the god had wrought  
 To please her son, the strong  
 Iron-hearted man-slaying Achilles  
 Who would not live long.

(W.H. Auden, The Shield of Achilles, 1955)

**Eigentlichkeit and the Question of Heidegger's Nationalism**

§ *A Plain Without a Feature*

In W.H Auden's "The Shield of Achilles," Thetis looks over the shoulder of Hephaestos, at the shield he has forged for Achilles. Thetis looks at the shield, expecting to find depictions of "ritual pieties, white flower-garlanded heifers, libation and sacrifice" but instead finds "a voice without face" which "proved by statistics that some cause was just" to columns of faceless beings— who march away "enduring a belief whose logic brought them, somewhere else, to grief." Auden feared that a calculative form of rationalism could alienate us from ritual, tradition, and history— denying us the spiritual wealth that our ancestors enjoyed. Similarly, Thetis expects "vines and olive trees, marble well-governed cities and ships upon untamed seas," but finds instead "a plain without a feature, bare and brown, no blade of grass, no sign of neighbourhood." Auden conveyed, here, an anxiety that we have irreversibly lost a holistic relationship between the natural and man-made worlds, resulting in our alienation from nature. Worst of all, the beings that populate this wasteland have been transformed. Where Thetis sought "athletes at their games, men and women in a dance" she found instead "an unintelligible multitude, a million eyes, a million boots in line, without expression, waiting for a sign." Where once there was authentic fellowship, forged by our dancing and playing together, there is instead an undifferentiated mass of human material waiting to be hurled into the maw of the industrialized war-machine. The experience of such people is entirely depersonalized, they are merely resources to be used by others. The denizens of Hephaestos' nightmarish *polis* have been robbed of any authentic bond to the place where they belong, in favour of bare life in a featureless wasteland.

Though Auden is associated with the left, the anxieties he expressed often find a political home today on the right. The way in which these concerns are linked— critics would say hijacked— by the right is best demonstrated by Georgia Meloni's "*Io sonno Giorgia*" speech. In this speech, Meloni predicts the reduction of Italians to "perfect consumer slaves," robbed of any authentic identity.<sup>1</sup> This results, she argues, from an attack on specific loci of identity— nation, religion, gender— and the reduction of Italians

to “category x, category y.”<sup>2</sup> In this, Meloni evokes the *cris-de-cœur*— long heard in Germany, France, the UK<sup>3</sup> and, increasingly, in Canada<sup>4</sup>: that “we have become strangers in our own lands.” This estrangement is sometimes blamed, for example by right-wing commentator Carl Benjamin, on “liberalism” reducing us to interchangeable blank slates who are everywhere the same.<sup>5</sup> In David Goodhart’s terminology, we are being transformed from “somewhere” into “anywheres”<sup>6</sup> and— so the rallying cry goes— “we want our country back.”<sup>7</sup> Meloni argues that her movement inspires fear on the part of the “elites” because Italians “do not want to be numbers” and will “defend the value of the human being”— each of us being unique.<sup>8</sup> Meloni will resist this estrangement, she vows, by defending “God, country, and family”— three sources of authenticity which she feels “disgust” her enemies.<sup>9</sup> However, one who would see Meloni as the avatar of an Auden-inspired resistance to alienation should consider the penultimate claim of this speech— where she vows that “we will never be slaves and simple consumers at the mercy of financial speculators.”<sup>10</sup> The reference to “financial speculators,” with its undeniably Nazi undertones— coupled with Brothers of Italy’s historical links to fascism and Meloni’s obfuscatory behaviour<sup>11</sup>— raises a disturbing possibility. The form of politics that profits today from anxiety about belonging might lead us to the horrors that Auden— an inveterate enemy of totalitarianism— deplored. Thinking through this paradox inspired this dissertation, which interrogates the relationship between philosophical debates about authentic belonging and right-wing nationalist politics. This thesis will argue that though one might be tempted to look to nationalism as a way to re-establish the pre-modern idyll that Auden’s Thetis sought upon the shield of Achilles, the greater likelihood is that nationalism is no more able than Hephaestos to bring it about.

### § *Authenticity*

Theodore Adorno— in *The Jargon of Authenticity*— described a cult of authenticity<sup>12</sup> which depends upon the irrational<sup>13</sup> embrace of authenticity as a good.<sup>14</sup> Andrew Potter, in *The Authenticity Hoax*, went further, claiming that “the quest for authenticity has— at best— amounted to a centuries long exercise in rainbow-

chasing.”<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, this remains a rainbow that many continue to pursue. Charles Taylor reminds us that there is a “powerful moral idea at work here, however debased and travestied its expression might be.”<sup>16</sup> This study explores authenticity as theorized by Martin Heidegger, whose critique of technology articulated many of the anxieties discussed above. Authenticity was not born with Heidegger,<sup>17</sup> but he provided perhaps the most protracted and influential exploration of it. While, as Richard E. Palmer notes, some see Heidegger as a “crank,”<sup>18</sup> there is a broad acknowledgement that Heidegger was among the greatest of philosophers— calling into question the “underlying view of language [...] the character and goals of thinking, and the definitions of truth” that so many assumed axiomatic.<sup>19</sup> Few dispute Pettigrew and Raffoul’s contention that Heidegger’s ideas have affected myriad academic disciplines and fields— “first and foremost phenomenology, but also ethics, esthetics, theology,<sup>20</sup> theories of action (Ricoeur), gender theory, philosophies of technology and of the environment.”<sup>21</sup>

Heidegger outlined a way of conceptualizing our belonging both to the tactile world of things and people and to the world of abstract concepts and philosophical questions. Heidegger also provided a fascinating conception of community, defined by the balancing of concern for the wider world with embeddedness in the part of that world which we share with our fellows. Importantly, Heidegger’s conception of authentic belonging does not depend upon mythmaking, propagandistic calls for the dissolution of the individual into the collective, incuriosity about difference, or dogmatic reverence for the traditional. Heidegger makes a compelling case for the importance of art and poetry— sadly undervalued in our time— and inspires us to question how we love and care for our home without losing our curiosity about the unfamiliar. Finally, Heidegger always called us back to questioning— it being the piety of thought. One does well to heed this call. There are areas, though, where Heidegger’s legacy is troubling.

One cannot observe “patriots” brandishing the Swastika (the symbol of a historical enemy) without concluding that ours is an age of forgetfulness. One might look for salvation to Heidegger— for example to his conception of historical thrownness— but, of course, Heidegger himself embraced the Swastika and

did so in part *because* of his historical sensibility.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, his localism and centring of the natural world could function as the basis for a potent environmentalism but also interacts with a discourse of rootedness whose sinister potentialities we know all-too-well. Heidegger's thought can inspire aloofness regarding the less fortunate, a lack of ethical restraint, a tendency towards dictatorial politics, an indifference to practical concerns. Furthermore, Heidegger's powerful argument about the nature of community carries within itself justifications for exclusion and can legitimize prejudice and, most notably, antisemitism. Heidegger embodies both the promise and the pitfalls of this challenging but intriguing way of thinking about belonging. The Heidegger of humility, listening, dwelling, and questioning portrayed by Jeff Malpas<sup>23</sup> is the same Heidegger who provides ammunition to far-right ethno-nationalists. As David Tabachnick notes: it can appear as though there are two Heideggers— an “apolitical” scholar who advocates “personal freedom from an oppressive, ‘inauthentic’ society; and the foremost philosopher of the Nazi party.”<sup>24</sup> This complexity, though, enhances the insight offered by Heidegger— opening a window into the inter-related virtues and vices of authenticity discourse. Heidegger is an illuminating interlocutor, not in spite of his failings but because of them. This complexity is reflected in the scholarship concerning the relationship between Heidegger's thought and nationalism. In the coming analysis of that scholarship, we will also find clarity regarding the central questions that will guide this study: The nature of the community to which we primarily belong, the relationship between nationalism and authentic belonging and the place of nationalism in Heidegger's idiosyncratic vision of the history of philosophy.

### *§ Heidegger and Nationalism: Perspectives on an Ambiguous Association*

The political implications of Heidegger's thought— in particular, its compatibility with nationalist, far-right, fascist, or reactionary politics— have fascinated and divided Heidegger scholars in equal measure. There is no consensus that Heidegger's thought *had* political content— and even this apoliticality can be interpreted differently, as quietism or as an aristocratic disdain for everyday politics— which itself has political implications. Beyond this, the scholarship concerning the relationship between Heidegger's

thought and nationalism can be divided into those parts that portray Heidegger's thought as either essentially or strategically ambiguous about politics, those that portray it as fundamentally nationalistic and those that, on the contrary, portray it as incompatible with— even antithetical to— nationalism.

It should first be noted that the matter of Heidegger's Nazism, which is perhaps the foremost pre-occupation of Heidegger scholarship, is discussed in a later chapter. Our survey of the literature proceeds as follows: We begin by comparing the claim that Heidegger was strategically ambiguous in order to conceal his true intentions with the claim that Heidegger was genuinely ambivalent about nationalism. Then, the question of whether Heidegger can be considered a political thinker is broached, with "quietist" readings compared with those that interpret his thought as a direct political intervention. Finally, the part of the literature to which this study most directly contributes, that questioning Heidegger's nationalism, is discussed— comparing the pro and anti-nationalist interpretations of Heidegger's thought.

### Heidegger's Ambiguity

One must acknowledge the ambiguous nature of Heidegger's writing— upon which a significant scholarship focuses. For example, Palmer argues that Heidegger's political prescriptions "resist categories" and remain suggestive rather than overt.<sup>25</sup> This leads Thomas Sheehan to conclude that Heidegger does not "encourage you to work to change the direction of history."<sup>26</sup> For Pierre Bourdieu, Heidegger's obscurantism was in the defence of the status quo, dragging debates that challenge the "dominant ideology" into a morass of impenetrable jargon which takes us nowhere.<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, for Bourdieu, was a master of this dark art— a thinker who could drag the language of "care" from the concrete ground of social welfare policies into an overcomplicated, politically ineffectual parlour game.<sup>28</sup> Worse yet, this makes the mere discussion of care inaccessible to anybody lacking an expensive philosophical education— enforcing a lexicon of philosophy which excludes ordinary "syntax, lexicon, and references"<sup>29</sup> such that philosophy becomes a luxury product accessible only to the fortunate. However, the larger part

of the literature takes this ambiguity to be a sincere expression of a complicated relationship with politics in Heidegger's thought.

This essential ambiguity can mean, as it does for Jason Blakely, that Heidegger's thought is not calling us to any particular form of politics. The "*Da-sein* is arguably as free to become a fascist as a monarchist, socialist, or republican" because "authenticity as such does nothing to determine the outcome of political reasoning or judgements."<sup>30</sup> Thus, while authenticity guides our questioning it does not dictate the answers. This echoes a point made by both Jonathan Dronsfield and Rüdiger Safranski: that Heidegger was more concerned with the art of questioning rather than with answers.<sup>31</sup> What matters is that we pose the correct questions— that we are, as Beatrice Han-Pile puts it, "free in the pressing ahead of a particular possibility" not that we pursue any "specific ontic content for that possibility."<sup>32</sup> This is what Richard Rorty identifies as hermeneutic modesty— discouraging fanaticism and promoting openness.<sup>33</sup>

What Rorty sees as open-mindedness, though, is elsewhere characterized as ambivalence. In some readings, such as that of Stuart Elden, this resembles the tumultuous coexistence of "words that cannot fail to carry political overtones"— "people (*Volk*), homeland, soil (*Boden*), earth"— and criticisms of "contemporary snivelling about national character, blood, and soil."<sup>34</sup> Though Elden concludes that this tension resolves in favour of a Hölderlin inspired attachment to a mythic "*Heimat*" over and above "the mighty fatherland ("*Vaterland*"),"<sup>35</sup> it is clear that there is a duality in Heidegger's thought. At times, he threw himself into the nationalistic fervour of his time and at others remained aloof. Theodore Kisiel argued that this ambivalence is reflected in the Heideggerian term: *Bodenständigkeit*— which speaks to a rootedness grounded in a mythological relationship between a people and a place. This would resonate in a particular way with his German audience,<sup>36</sup> but Heidegger did not link it to the nation state and, Kisiel thought, was as likely proposing regional localism as nationalism.<sup>37</sup> This is a common interpretation, with Malpas noting that Heidegger's understanding of dwelling undeniably ties us to a particular "location [...] in which we are ourselves taken up" but the question of the precise nature and shape of this place is

“constantly put anew.”<sup>38</sup> Again, like Kisiel, Malpas identifies an ambivalence in Heidegger’s thought about the viability of any politicization of spatial rootedness. David Kolb criticizes this as a failure to clarify how different levels of locale interact,<sup>39</sup> leaving us confused about the relation between world, nation, and region.

The fact that we are left in suspense on this point is not always seen as a failing of Heidegger’s thought, in fact for many the mystery is precisely the point. In turning us, as Martin Nitsche puts it, “from emptiness to openness,”<sup>40</sup> Heidegger can be seen as pushing us towards an embrace of not-yet-knowing. Andrew Mitchell sees this as an evolution in Heidegger’s thought, with Heidegger seeing ambiguous language as a necessary evil in *Being and Time* but embracing it as an essential part of the encounter with truth and concealment by the time of the *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing)*.<sup>41</sup> Jason Winfree too believes that Heidegger’s “voice” became more unconventional, increasingly unmoored from conventional grammar<sup>42</sup> as time went on. What Bourdieu saw as obscurantism would then become a linguistic subtlety. In this context, Heidegger’s esoteric language ceases to seem a vice. However, it is not necessarily apolitical. Safranski saw Heidegger’s idiosyncratic language as an ideological revolt on behalf of the “beautiful, good, and true” against the “false soulfulness, grand phrases, and sham profundity” of the liberal order and its “culture of hollow exaltation.”<sup>43</sup> Alternatively, one might turn to the image of the gadfly, and Heidegger would appear as, borrowing Catherine Zuckert’s term,<sup>44</sup> a post-modern Plato—challenging the assumptions of the powerful. As Merleau-Ponty argued, Heidegger’s thought is “in essence a thinking of *aletheia*, understood as emerging latency, never unhidden altogether, and in that sense, as “mystery.”<sup>45</sup> As Jean-Luc Nancy noted, the world provides “no value, no ideal floating above anyone’s concrete, everyday existence”<sup>46</sup> from which we can derive a sense of what ought to be done. Simultaneously, a request emanates from our very Being demanding that we make sense of our existence,<sup>47</sup> including wishing to grasp what projects— including political ones— we should participate in.

Whether Heidegger's ambiguity is a cynical ploy or reflective of a genuine ambivalence, it would be a mistake to iron it out, for it is fundamental to a proper understanding of Heidegger's work. Fred Dallmayr was correct to assert the "inadequacy of a univocal or monolithic image of Heidegger."<sup>48</sup> We should not force a choice between, in Waller Newell's words, a Heidegger who "made over his philosophy heart and soul" to the worst political excesses of his time and an aloof Heidegger who "before and after a brief personal lapse" maintained "a lofty remove from such worldly matters."<sup>49</sup> Indeed, Newell's conclusion with respect to Nazism— that there is much that could be interpreted as both support and opposition<sup>50</sup>— also applies to nationalism. This thesis, though, takes a firm position. This has two major consequences: firstly, whether Heidegger's ambiguity was strategic or not, his thought must not be forced into a nationalist or anti-nationalist box— and the boldness of any conclusion must be tempered by a recognition that there is much to support either interpretation. Secondly, we require a methodological approach that brings clarity within the ambiguity of Heidegger's words. Attention now turns to two major interpretative debates to which this study contributes: the political consequences of Heidegger's thought and the matter of whether it was nationalistic.

### Heidegger and the Polis

The interpretation of Heidegger's thought as having been fundamentally apolitical divides into two groups— those who see this apoliticality as a blind spot and those who interpret it as an argument for withdrawal from the fray of politics. The former interpretation suggests that Heidegger failed to adequately consider the political. Jacques Taminiaux, for example, noted that "one searches in vain for a political philosophy"<sup>51</sup> while David Hoy questions the extent to which any concrete "manifestation of Being"<sup>52</sup> can be extracted from Heidegger's poetic constructions. Indeed, this notion of Heidegger having simply been blind to the political, having little of value to say about politics, is central to Robert Savage's claim that Heidegger ended up championing a return to a Ruritanian idyll where we wander in the woods thinking of Being while the great political matters of our time are settled by others.<sup>53</sup> It is also central to Richard

Wolin's critique of Heidegger's thought as wholly unable to resist technology on account of its disavowal of action and neglect of the "prosaic sphere" of history.<sup>54</sup> One finds a similar critique with Karston Harries, who concludes that the "metaphysical-technological world which Heidegger sketched is not the world in which we live."<sup>55</sup> This blindness is consequential, John C. Caputo claims that it was this— in particular Heidegger's inability to consider the victims of a given politics<sup>56</sup>— that allowed his entanglement with Nazism.

Far more common, though, is the claim that Heidegger actively scorned politics. Heidegger, in Zimmerman's terms, "refuses to sully himself by participating in the political struggle."<sup>57</sup> This position begins from the observation that history— so central to Heidegger's *Dasein*— "does not consist in the happening and deeds of the world" and does not turn upon the "cultural achievements of man."<sup>58</sup> Rather, there is a different history, what Wrathall calls the "history of metaphysical efforts to understand the being of what is"<sup>59</sup>— what we will refer to as the unfolding of the *Seinsfrage* (question of Being).<sup>60</sup> With respect to history, Shane Montgomery Ewegen notes, Heidegger called us away from the politics that prevailed in his time (and our own)— characterized by "grappling for power within the law courts and the jockeying for position and prominence"— towards "consideration of the gift of being."<sup>61</sup> This implies, Taminiaux claimed, "disdain for human affairs"<sup>62</sup> whereby "the very distinction between authentic and inauthentic seems to coincide with the distinction between public and private."<sup>63</sup> As Nicolas Tertulian noted, even the Spanish Civil War— a defining event for many of his generation— did not move Heidegger.<sup>64</sup> Dominique Janicaud noted that Heidegger, in his late seminars, warned students against seeking publicity<sup>65</sup> and pointed them towards quiet contemplation.<sup>66</sup> For Charles Spinosa and Hubert Dreyfus,<sup>67</sup> Heidegger is not announcing a "reactionary rebellion against technology"<sup>68</sup> nor a progressive "way to get technology under control so that it can serve our rationally chosen ends"<sup>69</sup> nor even a romantic retreat from the battleground.<sup>70</sup> As Leo Strauss puts it, "there is no room for political philosophy in Heidegger's work."<sup>71</sup>

Even if one leaves to one side, for now, the fact that Heidegger most certainly put his thought to the service of a political movement, there remain many reasons why the quietist reading of Heidegger finds significant opposition in the literature. Heidegger's thought was one of action and, as Gregory Swer notes, affirmed our capacity to establish a new relationship with technology.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, Reiner Schürmann noted that Heidegger never severed the link between the philosopher and the broader context of politics.<sup>73</sup> For all that Dreyfus' Heidegger wished us to wander the forests of Southern California, we can only do so in the knowledge that we never detach ourselves entirely from others.<sup>74</sup> William Lovitt pointed out that Heidegger's thought does not give us an escape from the "burdens and responsibilities of contemporary life."<sup>75</sup> Charles Scott substantiates this by arguing that Heidegger's scorn for politics turns us towards a "dynamic texturing" of the world that is profoundly, if idiosyncratically, political.<sup>76</sup> *Dasein* is communal, we never have a *Da* entirely to ourselves, and Heidegger did not ignore that.<sup>77</sup>

Zimmerman evokes the language of revolution because he believes that in calling us to think about Being, Heidegger called us to engage in a "dangerous struggle," challenging the bases upon which our philosophical word has been built in order to "open up a [new] world."<sup>78</sup> In a sense, Zimmerman is pointing to the possibility that Heideggerians sitting in their studies, thinking about Being, might be more revolutionary than their colleagues tearing up the paving stones. Thus, though Heidegger's thought may not be party political, it remains concerned with the *polis*. Tracy Strong outlined this position perfectly, explaining that the *polis* should be understood as the "space of the encounter of beings with Being"<sup>79</sup>— it is neither "state" nor "city-state" but "the site [*die Stätte*] of the abode of human history that belongs to humans in the midst of beings."<sup>80</sup> In simpler terms, Strong argued that, for Heidegger, it was not the political that determined the *polis*— the state deciding on the border and institution, who is inside and who is outside— but the *polis* that determined the political.<sup>81</sup> In this, Strong echoed Mark Blitz' identification of Heidegger's *polis* as a site within which history happens.<sup>82</sup> Love and Meng, too, identify the Heideggerian conception of space as being inherently political, arguing that it "forecloses and grants

certain fundamental creative possibilities.”<sup>83</sup> Therefore, to the extent that Heidegger eschewed the political, it was only to engage at a more meaningful level. As such, it is argued by scholars like Timothy Clark that there was a clear ethical dimension to Heidegger’s thought.<sup>84</sup> Any distinction, Dreyfus and Jennifer Rubin argued, between authenticity and inauthenticity is normative and when one notes the association of technology with “nihilism” and a poetic approach to culture with “salvation” the notion that these distinctions are without ethical content becomes untenable.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, the language of the sacred imbued much of Heidegger’s thought and is associated with the primacy given to the questioning of Being noted by Albert Hofstadter.<sup>86</sup> This leads Hans-Georg Gadamer to conclude that the core of Heidegger’s “real intention”— in his dispute with Husserl— had been to “face the question of how an adequate interpretation of Christian belief might be possible.”<sup>87</sup> It is clear that ethics involves others and, by extension, the *polis*. In addition, Taminiaux— though he rejected the association of Heidegger with political activism— notes that the organisation of people into states does not rob them of their character as *Dasein*.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, we cannot rule out the state as the way of gathering the *Volk*. As Safranski puts it, we do not find in Heidegger an “ideological revelation counselling how one should behave” but he was nevertheless “involving the *Dasein* in man.”<sup>89</sup> In Dallmayr’s terms: though Heidegger eschews political theorizing, his “entire opus is suffused with ethical preoccupations.”<sup>90</sup>

While these positions seem diametrically opposed, their differences have less to do with differing interpretations of Heidegger’s thought than with differing definitions of “politics.” It is clear that Heidegger proposed neither a constitutional order nor set of policies but, at the same time, *Dasein* concerned everything which, for Heidegger, was worthy of serious thought.<sup>91</sup> This dynamic is perfectly illustrated by Dennis Skocz, who notes that Heidegger provides “intellectualistic” remedies to problems that undoubtedly concern the “real world.”<sup>92</sup> Skocz further notes if one understands politics to contain such things as “the temples, the games, the festivities, the gods,”<sup>93</sup> then Heidegger’s thought is “quite arguably already political.”<sup>94</sup> The quietist reading captures Heidegger’s indifference to ordinary politics, and one

should not reduce Heidegger to a propagandist or ideologue. However, the political interpretation of Heidegger more accurately captures the multifaceted nature of the realm of politics.

Clark described Heidegger's project as opposing the dominant politics of his time with a "quietist, patriotic programme of political renewal," suggesting that the identification of quietism in Heidegger's thought is not necessarily evidence against a nationalistic interpretation of Heidegger. Also, Schmidt's reminder that Heidegger's oeuvre remains unfinished<sup>95</sup> should not be overlooked— as perhaps politics was to come. Bourdieu's was correct in noting the political implications of an appeal to rise above the concerns of the *polis*. This is especially so when, as Bourdieu noted, this calls us to look away from matters of economic distribution, social welfare, taxation and so on. Heed must be paid to the quietist reading and is no denying that Heidegger placed our salvation in the hands of those who meditate upon Being, not those who barricade the boulevards. However, this study takes the desire to prioritize the questioning of Being over ordinary political matters to be political.

### Heidegger the (anti)Nationalist

Otto Pöggeler argued that as early as *Being and Time*, Heidegger tied "the individual and his or her fate to history and an encompassing community."<sup>96</sup> Central to the interpretation of Heidegger as a nationalist is the understanding of this community as a national community. One finds this, for example, with Jean Greisch's claim that when Heidegger addressed the "we", he meant, in his case, "the German people."<sup>97</sup> Heidegger, we are told by Michael Gillespie, placed precisely this "German communal life" at the centre of a "new aesthetic religion."<sup>98</sup> Richard Polt too argued that Heidegger, by putting the thought of Being into language, necessarily directed us to the question of "who are we?"<sup>99</sup> As a result, for Polt, Heidegger's thought demands that we seek salvation not in "intellectualist abstractions" but in the "living, shared meanings of a particular group" necessitating a politics that is "nationalist in some sense."<sup>100</sup> This does not reduce Heidegger's thought to chauvinism. Maddalena Cerrato describes Heidegger's thought as a "philosophical nationalism," which provided a foundation for nationalistic sentiment but reserved a

privileged place for philosophy. This makes nationalism the “philosophical universal call for the gathering of humanity in the site of its unique essence.”<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, Derrida credited Heidegger with inquiring into “the philosophical posture that provides for all nationalism.”<sup>102</sup>

The nationalistic interpretation of Heidegger’s thought is by no means always flattering. There is a significant body of literature arguing that Heidegger merely gave a patina of philosophical sophistication to nationalistic demagoguery and chauvinism. Ronald Beiner argued that Heidegger had snuck a “polemics contrived for the purposes of getting us to yearn for some more ancient culture”<sup>103</sup> into his considerations of Being and had done so as part of a broader propagandising of rootedness, tradition and particularism over-and-against the “open-horizon universalism of modernity.”<sup>104</sup> Beiner posits that Heidegger chose to mask his intentions because “the *Volk* is far more heroic (“metaphysically” or ontologically heroic) if it serves as the guardian of Being than if it is merely in the service of the glory of Germany”<sup>105</sup> and, in a competitive market-place of nationalistic chest-thumping, Heidegger elevated German chauvinism to a higher plane. Beiner is not alone, Schürmann too noticed a populist streak in Heidegger’s writing<sup>106</sup> and Julian Göppfarth alleges that Heidegger’s ideas have allowed “New Right” politics to find new forms of expression in a Germany where straightforward chauvinism is no longer *au fait*<sup>107</sup>— an appropriation no doubt, but one which Beiner believes Heidegger’s thought lends itself to rather readily.<sup>108</sup>

The parallels drawn by Beiner<sup>109</sup> and Göppfarth between Heidegger’s thought and modern far-right movements resemble the ways in which Heidegger’s thought has been associated with the nationalisms of his own time. Elden, for example, notes that the foundational, existential importance given by Heidegger to language means that the political community is, first and foremost, a community of language<sup>110</sup>— a claim echoed by Clark<sup>111</sup> and Schürmann<sup>112</sup>— and thus Heidegger’s understanding of the foundations of political community resembles the cultural-linguistic nationalism theorized by Friedrich Meinecke.<sup>113</sup> Indeed, Zuckert ascribes Heidegger’s support for *Anschluss* to his prioritising of language above all other grounds of community.<sup>114</sup> Safranski too explores this connection, noting that the formative years of

Heidegger's youth occurred before the backdrop of a breakdown of the "spirit of realism and *realpolitik*" of the "Weimar coalition."<sup>115</sup> Heidegger would seek to intervene, in his earliest lectures,<sup>116</sup> in the controversies of this time— lining up besides conservative revolutionary figures like Paul Tillich, Oswald Spengler, Nikolai Berdyaev and Jünger against the Weberian old-guard.<sup>117</sup> In making this association, they echo Daniel Morat's association of Heidegger with Jünger and the broader "conservative revolution"<sup>118</sup>— though Morat would conclude that Heidegger ended up on the periphery of this movement.<sup>119</sup> Zimmerman made a similar association, though he called these revolutionary conservatives "reactionary modernists."<sup>120</sup> Heidegger is tied to these movements and to these sorts of thinkers by his revulsion at the assimilation "of oneself to the other," noted by Julian Young,<sup>121</sup> and the poetic orientation of his nationalism, noted by Gregory Schufreider.<sup>122</sup> This placement of Heidegger within a right-wing coalition is well summarized by Tom Rockmore & Joseph Margolis— who argued that Heidegger's thought was "particularly rooted" in the "conservative, virulently nationalistic" politics of his youth. They note, in particular, a shared focus on "self-reliance, authenticity, resolute action, future-directedness, and the realization of what was specifically German in the most difficult and humiliating of historical circumstances."<sup>123</sup>

It is also possible that nationalism represents precisely that which we must overcome in pursuit of an authentic relation to Being. For Gregory Fried and Polt, it cannot be sufficient, for Heidegger, to simply accept an identity that is given to us from without.<sup>124</sup> Given that we "do not explicitly choose our identity, but simply behave the way "one" does in our community," we cannot hope that such an experience of Being will shock us into confronting Being.<sup>125</sup> Hans Christian Lucas, too, associates nationalism with the inadequacies of the conventional and sees a clear link between Heidegger's discussion of the "they"— which tends towards the negative— and a nationalistic understanding of *das Volk*.<sup>126</sup> Heidegger's evident scepticism about extant forms of political organisation emerged from what Richard Velkley called "the analysis of a comprehensive crisis of Western Civilization,"<sup>127</sup> and is likely forgotten by those, described by Frank Schalow, who caricature Heidegger as a "primitivist" who "sought refuge in a pristine form of

Germanic provincialism.”<sup>128</sup> Indeed, Newell associates the crisis of the West, as understood by Heidegger, with “a collective subjectivism bent on the lordly domination of external reality,”<sup>129</sup> Gail Soffer with cultivation as “an organized program”<sup>130</sup> and James Magrini with the instrumentalizing of our “entire existence” for “our nation’s technological-economic advancement.”<sup>131</sup> In other words, Newell, Soffer and Magrini see parallels between nationalism and Heidegger’s conception of the inauthentic. This position is perhaps best summarised by Nancy: “One cannot ease the 'distress' by filling up the horizon with those same 'values' whose inconsistency it was— once their metaphysical foundation had collapsed— that precisely let the 'will to power' unfold.”<sup>132</sup>

In light of the above, scholars have often recontextualized Heidegger’s grandiose language about Germany so as to complicate its apparent hyper-patriotism. Richard Detsch, for example, concludes that Heidegger’s admiration for Germany is tempered by his belief that it is no less embroiled in our “*durftige Zeit*” than is anywhere else— and thus his claims regarding the special role of the Germans should not be understood as “adamant German chauvinism.”<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, alienation from being-at-home in the world— a *sine qua non*, we will discover, of the philosophical journey to authentic *Dasein*— requires, Steven Segal argues, that “the human being loses all sense of its identity,” including “geographical and thus national identity.”<sup>134</sup> Thus, Segal continues, it is only when “the category “German” has lost all meaning that the possibility of being attuned to what is arises.”<sup>135</sup> Similarly, Denis McManus posits that Heidegger called us to an active resistance to the “they”<sup>136</sup>— an individualism that is hard to square with hyper-patriotic collectivism. In short, German nationalism may well be no less a product and servant of the metaphysical will-to-power than liberalism or communism.<sup>137</sup> Indeed, if this association of nationalism to the dominant political forms of Heidegger’s own time is accurate, then his thought would constitute a call away from nationalism. Thomas Langan noted that, for Heidegger, we are only really engaging in philosophical inquiry when our thinking “moves within the current of Being itself”<sup>138</sup>— or, in Nicholas Dungey’s language, when we “philosophically clarify who we are.”<sup>139</sup> This focus on Being— not *a being*

(such as a German)— gives Heidegger’s thought an aspect that Skocz calls “transnational”<sup>140</sup> and which Florian Grosser argues calls for a pluralistic community, not an exclusive *Volk*.<sup>141</sup>

As with our discussion of politics, where one stands on the matter of Heidegger and nationalism will, to a degree, depend on what one believes nationalism to be. On the one hand, we have seen many scholars point to the lack of a tub-thumping, “my country right or wrong” chauvinism as evidence of anti-nationalism while others point to the pro-Germany rhetoric that one *does* find in Heidegger as evidence of nationalism. Similarly, whether or not Heidegger’s focus on philosophy— often hard to relate to the concrete concerns of nationalism— is evidence of anti-nationalism or, on the contrary, an integral part of a philosophical nationalism depends, once again, on how one defines nationalism. Two scholars may concur with Dungey that Heidegger sought to recover “the ethical dimension of dwelling”<sup>142</sup> in order to “transform our metaphysical conception of the self from one of solitary insolation and possessive mastery, to an awareness of the being-with-others that defines our existence.”<sup>143</sup> One scholar could conclude from this that Heidegger’s thought is irreconcilable with a nationalism that they define as possessive mastery, the other may conclude that Heidegger’s thought accords perfectly with a nationalism that *they* define as an apolitical “non-domineering relationship between human beings.”<sup>144</sup> Both would be right according to their respective definitions of nationalism. This motivates the decision of this study to pose the question “is nationalism compatible with a Heideggerian conception of authenticity?” rather than “is Heidegger a nationalist?” We have noted that there is much in Heidegger’s oeuvre that could be called nationalistic, alongside a number of expressions that could be deemed anti-nationalist. Here again, one’s conclusions, should the latter question be posed, would likely be pre-determined by the precise boundaries that one draws around nationalism. Once again, one scholar who begins with the assumption that it is enough to qualify as nationalism that one evokes the category of “*das volk*” or makes jingoistic claims about the greatness of one’s country would not but conclude that Heidegger is a nationalist. However, another scholar, who believes that nationalism requires one to believe that the nation is the primary locus of one’s

identity and that the interests of the country must take precedence over other considerations, could not but conclude that Heidegger, for whom the question of Being is paramount, is not a nationalist. Both, again, would be correct according to their definition of nationalism. As we shall see in the following chapter, though Heidegger's thought is complex, it is possible to draw far firmer borders around what is and is not authentic- by Heidegger's understanding of the term- than it is to draw boundaries around the fuzzy concept of nationalism. Thus, the line of questioning pursued in this these is far less subject to the whims and definitional preferences of the author.

To conclude, this literature review identified three questions emerging from the debate. The first of these is the question of what to do with the undeniable ambiguity of the positions Heidegger took on matters relating to the question of nationalism. From the outset, this study takes this ambiguity to be the result of a genuine ambivalence on Heidegger's part with respect to the nation and will not seek to iron out this complexity. This is in part to avoid falling prey to Quentin Skinner's mythology of coherence<sup>145</sup> but, more importantly, because it is perfectly possible for a thoughtful and coherent thinker to maintain an ambivalent, even conflicted attitude towards political matters (indeed arguably a thoughtful person cannot but do so). Heidegger's thought will also be treated as essentially ambiguous. We find, as this study unfolds, that the textual evidence points in this direction, and that ambiguity is wholly commensurable with Heidegger's broader understanding of where he stood within the universe of ideas. This study also takes, from the outset, the position that Heidegger was, whether he accepted it or not, a political thinker. While one must grant to the quietist interpretations that Heidegger is not political in a conventional sense, this study favours the position that, put simply, anti-politics is still politics. What remains unclear from this review of the literature is the extent to which the particular, bounded, historical community that constitutes the "we" among whom, for Heidegger, one dwells is, or at least can be, a national community. This is a question that should be approached on a number of levels. Firstly, one must pose the question of whether the world that is, the world in which we find ourselves born, is one in which we primarily co-

belong within a national community. Secondly, if this is so, whether nationalism would have a place at all in a world of authentic belonging. Finally, if this second question is answered in the negative, whether nationalism aids or impedes us in transitioning from inauthentic to the authentic belonging.

### § *Whose Nationalism?*

#### Primordialist Nationalism

Nationalism is a broad concept. It can mean, as for Michael Billig, the mere presence of a flag in a classroom<sup>146</sup> or, as for Lloyd Kramer, the very religion of a post-Christian world.<sup>147</sup> The diversity of nationalisms can make overly general claims effectively meaningless. One might choose a particular figure as illustrative of nationalism as a whole and make general claims based upon the positions of, for example, Benito Mussolini and seek to apply them to Vaclav Havel. On the other hand, one might seek to ground one's study so broadly as to encapsulate all nationalisms, defined via vague notions of "othering" or "love of one's own" that are by no means exclusive to nationalism. This problem demands a certain degree of humility in response— firstly the humility to narrow our gaze and focus upon a particular type of nationalism rather than nationalism as a whole, and secondly to accept the aid of colleagues in other fields who have provided extensive scholarship on the typologies of nationalism.

One typology commonly identified in the literature is primordialist nationalism. It is associated by Zohar Moar with a timeless unity of spirit and corporeality,<sup>148</sup> Isaiah Berlin with inherited ties of kinship and spirituality<sup>149</sup> and Edward Shils with "primordial ties"<sup>150</sup> of "we-consciousness."<sup>151</sup> Primordialism accords, *prima facie*, rather well with Heideggerian sensibilities. Furthermore, primordialist nationalism grounds its claims in a relationship to time and place, concepts which are at the heart of this study. It should be noted that most nationalists will combine elements of many typologies of nationalism. There are no "pure" primordialists. Furthermore, the term being obscure and, in fact, quite novel means that we cannot easily call upon a group of "primordialists" to represent the nationalist position in this study.

Instead, claims *about* primordialist nationalism from the scholarly literature are combined with analysis of four thinkers who exemplified primordialist nationalist positions in their work—and did so in an historical context similar to Heidegger’s. These are: Thomas Mann, Ernst Jünger, Maurice Barrès, and Charles Péguy. These four present an illuminating comparison, because their underlying beliefs are analogous to core tenets of Heidegger’s philosophy. Furthermore, we find a consistent point of divergence between Heidegger and these four thinkers: that they are consistently unwilling or unable to take things beyond the realm of beings to that of Being. This deceptively simple assertion reveals a vital contrast between Heidegger’s understanding of authentic belonging and that promoted by nationalism. It also provides an intriguing avenue to explore the belonging we *are* called towards by Heidegger.

### The Revolutionary Young Conservatives

Mann was arguably the most famous literary figure of this period, known primarily for *Buddenbrooks* and *The Magic Mountain*. Mann’s inclusion might surprise some because he would eventually come to recognize that the German character he so admired was more complex than he imagined<sup>152</sup> and clearly also had major defects,<sup>153</sup> that England was perhaps not the cartoon villain he imagined<sup>154</sup> and is, therefore, associated with the anti-fascist, humanistic, cosmopolitan positions that he would take in works like “On the German Republic.”<sup>155</sup> However, this study focuses more on the earlier, lesser-known part of Mann’s oeuvre where he threw himself into the nationalistic fervour of his time— though spanning the period of his slowly dawning realization that such sentiments were rife for exploitation by charlatans like Hitler. Charles de Gaulle, famously, credited Péguy as the foundation for all of his political beliefs<sup>156</sup>— Julian Jackson puts this down to the inclusive<sup>157</sup> and syncretic<sup>158</sup> alternative that Péguy offered to Maurras. Therefore, Péguy represents the Gaullist strain of French nationalism. Barrès, a thinker whose influence upon French right-wing thought is beyond dispute, represents the reactionary, Catholic nationalism of the era. This strain of French thought, Wolin notes, influenced and was in turn influenced by Heideggerian ideas,<sup>159</sup> with Barrès receiving special mention as an influence upon the Heideggerian critique of

modernity.<sup>160</sup> Wolin argues that Heidegger saw Jünger as one of the only “authentic heirs to Nietzsche.”<sup>161</sup> Though Jünger’s relationship with the Nazi Party was complicated— in spite of his faithful service to the Third Reich in the Wehrmacht— his influence upon and celebrity within Nazi Germany is undeniable. Together, these figures provide an illuminating sampling of right-wing nationalist thought in this time period.

These writers contributed to the milieu in which Heidegger matured. Edward Grant Andrew notes Heidegger’s proximity to a “revolutionary young conservatism,”<sup>162</sup> and all of these thinkers were at least adjacent to that movement. Though acknowledged by name only in a letter to Hannah Arendt,<sup>163</sup> Mann’s influence on Heidegger’s understanding of temporality and *Dasein*,<sup>164</sup> as well as their desire to challenge “what measure tells us”<sup>165</sup>— is recognized in the literature.<sup>166</sup> Jünger is accepted as having influenced Heidegger in the 1930’s<sup>167</sup>— which Heidegger acknowledged.<sup>168</sup> Bourdieu claimed that Jünger was a rare contemporary whom Heidegger felt worthy of direct engagement,<sup>169</sup> and Wolin and Zaborowski note the influence of Jünger’s *The Worker* on Heidegger’s view of modernity.<sup>170</sup> Fred Dallmayr identified a Jüngerian influence in Heidegger’s discussion of the standing reserve<sup>171</sup> as well as in his Nazi-era contributions.<sup>172</sup> Interestingly, Dallmayr would note that Heidegger drew heavily from Jüngerian ideas of “total mobilisation” in his most pro-Nazi contributions, such as the *Rektoratsrede*.<sup>173</sup> Otto Pöggeler added to this a paranoia about the coming hegemony of America and association of Americanism with the post-War malaise of Europe.<sup>174</sup> Elsewhere, Michael Zimmerman highlights similarities between Heidegger’s conception of technology and Jünger’s discussion of *gestalt*,<sup>175</sup> the relationship between technology and art<sup>176</sup> and their impact on society.<sup>177</sup> The connection between *Action Française* and German revolutionary young conservatism is known,<sup>178</sup> but has not led to an extensive literature exploring the relationship between Barrès and Heidegger.<sup>179</sup> With respect to Péguy, Alain de Benoist gathered them together in his *Ce Que Penser Veut Dire*<sup>180</sup> and Aaron Hill counted both, as well as Barrès, as part of the “temporally inflected revolutionary philosophies” prominent in France and Germany in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup>

centuries.<sup>181</sup> Here, though, an extensive comparative literature is lacking. In short, these are thinkers who shaped the nationalism that Heidegger encountered in his early life and who evolved alongside him in the tumult of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The primary reason, though, for putting Heidegger in conversation with these writers is their shared disenchantment with the spirit of the age.

### The Modern Malaise

For these thinkers, it is not merely bad politics that ail society, but a deficient mode of thinking. We shall see that this deficient mode is evident in technology and modern metaphysics for Heidegger and, respectively, pacifism, intellectualism, liberalism, and materialism for Jünger, Mann, Barrès and Péguy. For both Heidegger and the primordialist nationalists, these ills are rooted in the history of Western thought, and everything has been forced to conform to these deficient modes of thinking. Thus, all things are reduced to the superficial— dragging us towards nihilism. We think only in calculative ways, and everything is “levelled down” into what is calculable. As Heidegger noted in the postscript to “What is Metaphysics?”: “Calculation refuses to let anything appear except what is countable. Everything is only whatever it counts.”<sup>182</sup> Vitality, a consequence of this is an acute threat to the relationship between the individual and their historical and geographic context. These writers shared a sense of living in a world of profound disenchantment, and laid the blame, broadly speaking, at the same feet.

Jünger’s perspective was shaped by the Great War. He saw “anonymous victims”<sup>183</sup> ordered into trenches and fed into the furnace<sup>184</sup> of a war of machines.<sup>185</sup> The entire mass of humanity, for Jünger, is conscripted by the Total Mobilization.<sup>186</sup> Even in peace time, the population is mobilized by a “labour process,” resulting in the dominion of the worker.<sup>187</sup> The person is transformed by this technological modality of thinking<sup>188</sup>— as knowledge becomes a specific mode of thinking which seeks only the expansion of power<sup>189</sup>— such that our sole engagement with the world will be as “technicians.”<sup>190</sup> Jünger saw in this the blueprint for the “rationalized” modern state, exemplified by the Soviet Union<sup>191</sup> but, by the time of *The Total Mobilization* and *The Worker*, also characteristic of democracies.<sup>192</sup> This

transformation invalidates any other way of thinking.<sup>193</sup> We are reduced— in terms redolent of Auden’s poem— to a “man of sorrows,”<sup>194</sup> reduced to the status, almost, of an automaton,<sup>195</sup> incapable of chivalry<sup>196</sup> and reduced to a “new form of slavery.”<sup>197</sup> The Great War, though, exposed the utter incapacity of technological modes of thinking to address the horrific possibilities of the age of total mobilization.<sup>198</sup> A “new form of armament” is needed to provide man with “the means of his own self-realization.”<sup>199</sup> Mann believed that a shallow rationalism had undermined the sacred— Auden’s ritual pieties— and replaced it with what he called— in his 1918 work: *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*— the “absolute tables of values” imposed by our own “inner tyrant.”<sup>200</sup> Modernity, for Mann, is marked by instrumentalization— where spiritual concerns give way<sup>201</sup> to economic and political “equality”<sup>202</sup> in a synthesis of power and intellect<sup>203</sup>— championed by “civilization’s literary man.”<sup>204</sup> Germany must, Mann argued, resist this by looking to the arts— where deeper truths<sup>205</sup> are found in an “attitude of worship.”<sup>206</sup>

There was a remarkable similarity in the characterization of modernity in France. Barrès blamed it on a technocratic elite— whom he called, in *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme*, intellectuals.<sup>207</sup> Barrès balked at an “industrial discipline” of the mind which made rebellion appear unjustifiable,<sup>208</sup> elbowing aside other intellectual virtues<sup>209</sup> as the prestige of science allowed its practitioners to opine about things that they do not understand<sup>210</sup> using abstract reasoning and “empty words, good only for politicians.”<sup>211</sup> Intellectualism displaced intelligence<sup>212</sup> and dismissed the wisdom bequeathed to the French by their ancestors<sup>213</sup>— severing the link between France and her past.<sup>214</sup> Like Jünger, Péguy experienced the Great War. He concluded that it revealed how thin was the veil of order drawn by modernity over barbarism.<sup>215</sup> This re-enforced Péguy’s distaste for “rational,” systemic ordering<sup>216</sup>— Auden’s million boots in line— driven by a “climatic, atmospheric” metaphysics.<sup>217</sup> “*Le monde des méthodes*” organizes everything around it, including man, methodically<sup>218</sup>— like a technological process of producing parts for an economic whole.<sup>219</sup> This would produce a cadre populated by the “political intellectual,” a “falsifier of reason” who pretends to omnipotence.<sup>220</sup> For Péguy, “all begins in mystique and ends in politics,”<sup>221</sup>

France had fallen from its medieval pomp into the rule of money.<sup>222</sup> Furthermore, presaging Heidegger's later critiques, Péguy descried the invalidation of the work of artists *and* artisans,<sup>223</sup> seeking to balance the “poet” or “philosopher” and the “logician”— in a “dialectical” synthesis of these tendencies.<sup>224</sup>

All of these accounts of our modern malaise speak to the anxieties articulated in “The Shield of Achilles.” We see the claim that a particular mode of thinking has masqueraded as the sum of all thought and neutralized any other approach to the world. This was identified as a central concern of primordialist nationalists by Edward Shils,<sup>225</sup> Walker Connor,<sup>226</sup> and Craig Calhoun.<sup>227</sup> We also find the belief that rationalization is ordering us into an artificial construction, a concern which again appears in the literature on primordialist nationalism— for example in the work of Paul Gilbert,<sup>228</sup> Lloyd Kramer<sup>229</sup> and (though from a critical stance) Francis Fukuyama.<sup>230</sup> Rationalization pulls our gaze down. Péguy saw in this a perversion of Christianity,<sup>231</sup> as did Mann.<sup>232</sup> Jünger associated the loss of transcendence with the false idol of a “spirit of progress.”<sup>233</sup> In sharing these concerns, the primordialist nationalists conform to the expectations of those who have linked primordialist nationalism to a rejection of the “radical enlightenment,”<sup>234</sup> an appeal to transcendence,<sup>235</sup> a rejection of mass society,<sup>236</sup> and a distaste for cosmopolitanism.<sup>237</sup> Finally, we see a shared concern that modernity is wrenching us out of space and time, reflecting anti-globalization narratives noted by scholars such as Anna Trandafyllidou and Eva Piiramä.<sup>238</sup> Having proposed Heidegger as an appropriate ambassador of the authenticity concept, and the examples of Mann, Jünger, Barrès, and Péguy as illuminating figures for comparison, we find the central question of this study: How does primordialist nationalism, as exemplified by four near contemporaries of Heidegger, relate to the conception of authentic belonging found in Heidegger's philosophy of Being?

## Methodology

§ *An historical questioning and the “double-lecture.”*

Two major methodological challenges must be addressed. Firstly, we must establish how we can derive a coherent conception of Heidegger’s understanding of the nature of authentic belonging from his wide-ranging oeuvre. Secondly, we must clarify the grounds upon which Heidegger and primordialist nationalism are to be compared. One should not hope in vain that one is about to discover, in the following pages, the precise nature of the authentic relation to Being. That, for Heidegger, will only reveal itself in due time. However, Heidegger does allow for the possibility that certain, particularly articulate works of art can offer us furtive glimpses of what awaits us. The exploration of Heidegger’s thought and nationalism will guide us through the realms of those furtive, experimentative steps that Heidegger took in order to articulate what he could glimpse. These glimpses will, sadly, not allow us to conclude that authentic belonging shall be this or that. However, we will find that Heidegger paints a picture of how the thinking person ought to relate to their context, and how one can belong to one’s community while retaining the capacity to explore the mystery of Being. To establish the methodology by which these glimpses will be sought, we will now discuss *Eigentlichkeit*, *Seinsgeschichte*, Heidegger’s corpus, the relationship between Heidegger’s “new thinking” and philosophy, and Bourdieu’s methodology of the “double-lecture.”

### Initial Approach via *Eigentlichkeit*

An obvious starting point is Heidegger’s direct evocations of authenticity. Heidegger presented us with a term, *Eigentlichkeit*, derived from the word *eigentlich*, meaning “truly”— as in “I am truly honoured.” Heidegger traced this term to the stem word: *eigen*, meaning “own”<sup>239</sup> or “proper”— as in “fit and proper.” Heidegger’s delving into the etymology of the word is consequential. To say that one is “authentically” sorry— “I am truly sorry”— implies a conception of authenticity as accordance with certain formal characteristics of sorrow. On the other hand, to say one is “authentically” sorry, in the sense of I am

“ownedly” sorry, implies a sense of authenticity as simultaneously possessing and being possessed. One can see why this conception of authenticity appeals to nationalists. Peter Emberly argued that in George Grant’s *Lament for a Nation*, for example, a sense of own-ness influences the “proper” *Gestalt* of the Canadian nationalist.<sup>240</sup> Authentic Canadian-ness, where authenticity implies “ownedness,” must be both our most cherished possession and something which, more than anything else, defines who we are. In short, this implies a sense of Canadian-ness as the existentially definitive characteristic of the self.

However, Heidegger differentiated our “ownmost possibility” from the “possibility of the they-self.”<sup>241</sup> He made a distinction between being comfortable alongside our fellows, doing the things we are expected to do, and seeking out, thoughtfully and of our own accord, an authentic relationship to our immediate environs and those with whom we share them. To be authentic, one must refrain from joining in with a baying mob yet, as Dallmayr noted, “one’s selfhood is never an I.”<sup>242</sup> One must, it seems, simultaneously lead what John Haugeland called an “individual, cohesive” life that is one’s own<sup>243</sup> while remaining true, as McManus reminds us, to one’s ownmost judgements.<sup>244</sup> At the same time, Samogy Varga notes that we must enfold our lives into collective projects.<sup>245</sup> Similarly, Charles Guignot argues that we must live as the parts of a broader totality that we, in fact, are.<sup>246</sup> Even at this most elementary level, we see why uncertainty reigns with respect to the viability of the nationalist appropriation of a Heideggerian authenticity concept. *Eigentlichkeit* would seem to be, on the one hand, communitarian and concrete but, on the other, individualistic. For some, like Adorno, this lack of clarity directly links to the amenability of Heidegger’s authenticity concept to “the dark drives of the intelligentsia before 1933”<sup>247</sup>—a matter explored in this study. Of course, one person’s obscurantism can be another’s nuance, and Safranski, for example, sees the lack of “results” in Heidegger as the product of his “piety of thinking.”<sup>248</sup>

However, one cannot say Heidegger prevaricated. The understanding of one’s situation is either, Heidegger told us, “authentic, originating from its own self as such, or else inauthentic.”<sup>249</sup> As such, Heidegger’s protestations, in “Letter on Humanism,” that the distinction between the authentic and

inauthentic are nor to be taken as normative judgements<sup>250</sup> are unconvincing. Normativity introduces a further problem for this study. Whether or not one belongs authentically by understanding one's situation from a particular articulation of a national experience— such as we will find all of our writers positing in one way or another— always risks devolving into a discussion of the “true” nature of any given nation. That is to say, where Mann extolls the virtues of Germany and posits that adopting those virtues is vital for a German to be true to their authentic self, there is always the option of retorting that this is inauthentic because those virtues are imaginary, and Mann is delusional about the true nature of Germany. Our purpose here is not to engage in historical critique of the particular image of a nation provided by its champions. Such debates would shed little light on the matter at hand and are thus best avoided.

However, two things can be asserted with confidence. Firstly, authenticity requires intercourse with others— as Taminiaux put it, “to exist is to be in the mode of a relationship.”<sup>251</sup> This is well demonstrated in McManus' identification of five characteristics of the authentic *Dasein*. Three of these characteristics are interactional. The authentic *Dasein* must be “answerable” (it must be accountable to), it must be resolute (which by definition must be in the face of something), and it must be “open to the concrete.”<sup>252</sup> This last reference to the concrete illustrates the other aspect of *Eigentlichkeit* which is clear. The authentic is not a relation to some abstraction, such as a theoretical ontological model or the soul, but to that which is concrete, that which is manifest before us. Here again, two things are clear. Firstly, the authentic relation to Being has a temporal aspect. This is fairly uncontroversial. In the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, for example, Heidegger re-enforced the link between time and the authentic experience of being by linking “*aletheia*”— a concept related to truth-seeking— to the “the fulness of the history of being” and its “epochs.”<sup>253</sup> Secondly, Heidegger evoked a specifically German essence in his “Letter on Humanism,”<sup>254</sup> “the homeland” in his analyses of Hölderlin<sup>255</sup> and, in *Nature, History, State*, spoke of “our German space.”<sup>256</sup> Sloterdijk argues that as early as *Being and Time*, one finds an “embryonically revolutionary treatise on Being and space.”<sup>257</sup> It is clear that there was always, for Heidegger, a spatial aspect to the

concrete situation— an observation reflected in the literature.<sup>258</sup> Heidegger makes clear, in *Nature, History, State*, that it is an “error” to think space only in terms of “geography or geopolitics, as a bounded geometric surface that we can measure.”<sup>259</sup> Space will be understood both in the literal sense of the physical space within a country's borders and in the metaphorical sense in which we may discuss, for example, the “political space” or the “realm of the familiar.” We can conclude, along with Carl de Hira Mika, that *Eigentlichkeit* concerns being-in-the-world understood in terms of a particular locale.<sup>260</sup> Heidegger, as early as *Being and Time*, dedicated numerous sections to the importance of time to Being and identifies place as “always the definite “over there” [...] of a useful thing belonging there.”<sup>261</sup> In his Nietzsche lectures, he identified thought with “standing in the most essential relationships [of] historical existence in the midst of beings as a whole”<sup>262</sup>— in other words, to time and place. In *Contributions*, he described “*Da-sein*” as the “ownmost grounding” of “time-space.”<sup>263</sup> We will, therefore, focus on the authentic relation to time and space.

What remains less clear is precisely by what standards we judge whether something is authentic. *Eigentlichkeit*, as described, does not give clear standards against which nationalism can be judged. Furthermore, *Eigentlichkeit*, as Heidegger understands it, is such that one cannot evaluate nationalism according to formal characteristics derived from its definition. One cannot posit that *Eigentlichkeit* = x + y without doing violence to the work of Heidegger. One must dig deeper into Heidegger's writings to find the standards by which a potential articulation of authentic belonging can be judged.

### An Historical Inquiry into the Authenticity of Nationalism

Across the Heideggerian oeuvre, a clear picture emerges of his understanding of the history of Western thought. Sadly, there is not space here to give this the attention it deserves,<sup>264</sup> but certain key consequences can be found in Heidegger's engagement with canonical thinkers. In particular, those who, in Sloterdijk's words, inaugurated “revolution(s)” in the Western “economy of truth.”<sup>265</sup> We began in a pre-Socratic Eden,<sup>266</sup> where thinkers like Heraclitus<sup>267</sup> and Anaximander<sup>268</sup> engaged directly with Being by way of what

Taminiaux called a “naïve ontology.”<sup>269</sup> This gave way to the Socratics,<sup>270</sup> who introduced the idea of the forms and thereby inaugurated an age of idealism<sup>271</sup> which centred the perspective of the thinker.<sup>272</sup> Throughout the middle-ages, the basic tenets of Platonism held firm, until what Dallmayr called the modern “insurgency” against Christianity<sup>273</sup>— where thinkers like Descartes<sup>274</sup> and Kant<sup>275</sup> elevated the thinking individual to the role previously occupied by God. This did not overthrow metaphysics, but in fact allowed it to reach its apotheosis— Feuerhahn and Arel argue— in the works of Hegel.<sup>276</sup> With Hegel, the “absolute spirit” came to stand in and for itself as the “absolute idea,” manifesting its own self “in the unconditional truth of its own essence,”<sup>277</sup> like Plato’s Sun, as the unconditioned idea of the good.<sup>278</sup> However, the last great metaphysician was not Hegel but Nietzsche.<sup>279</sup> With Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche,<sup>280</sup> we discover that nihilism is the ultimate end of metaphysics<sup>281</sup> and now await a new thinking to guide the coming epoch of Western thought. There are four points to be highlighted here. First, there is, to borrow a term from Trawny, a profoundly eschatological<sup>282</sup> aspect to Heidegger’s history of Western thought, with a fall— a “steady deterioration or falling away,”<sup>283</sup> from an Eden followed by toil. As with Eden, we cannot return.<sup>284</sup> Second, Western thought, from Plato onwards, is “fallen”— that is to say, belongs under the umbrella of metaphysics. Thirdly, we are living, since Nietzsche, in a transitional period where the fundamentally nihilistic consequences of metaphysics are clear to us, but we are not yet able to escape from such ways of thinking. Finally, Heidegger anticipates that we will one day overcome metaphysics and discover a new way of thinking about Being, but this day has not yet come.

One should not think of the philosophers with whom Heidegger engaged as a rogue’s gallery. On the contrary, Heidegger’s judgements were nuanced when it came to canonical thinkers. This is best illustrated by the example of Nietzsche. Nietzsche thinks “in the sense of the tradition” but, vitally, “carries out [its] most extreme consequences.”<sup>285</sup> Nietzsche, for Heidegger, promised a reversal of the Platonic “doctrine of the Ideas,”<sup>286</sup> but only succeeded in turning it upside-down.<sup>287</sup> Nietzsche had, in William Lovitt’s language, consummated<sup>288</sup>— but not overcome— metaphysics. Nietzsche, for Heidegger, brought

to fulfilment modern science and technology as well as post-Platonic philosophy.<sup>289</sup> However, Nietzsche's revaluation of all values revealed a nihilistic shadow and the need for a new thinking born, for Nietzsche, of the "reversal of the ancient, long-standing valuation."<sup>290</sup> The shadow revealed by Nietzsche is not gloom,<sup>291</sup> but reveals by obscuring and points us in the direction of the path beyond metaphysics. The consummation of metaphysics, as Greisch argues, promises a new beginning.<sup>292</sup> Nietzsche, in short, came upon the grounding question of philosophy (the question of Being) and revealed, in doing so, the limitations of metaphysics, demonstrating the need for something new. This tells us that there are two possible relations between metaphysical philosophies and the authentic relation to Being. On the one hand, we find Heidegger's great enemies, forms of metaphysics— primary among them technology— which actively impede any attempt to get to the truths of Being. On the other hand, we have figures like Nietzsche whose metaphysics can be termed "salutary error." That is to say, an error that reveals, rather than conceals, the fundamental limitations of metaphysical modes of thought and, as a result, are an invaluable part of the eventual overcoming of metaphysics.

We can derive conclusive information about the relationship between Heidegger's thought and nationalism by interrogating where nationalism fits into the history of Being-philosophy (*Seinsgeschichte*) just outlined. We can dismiss in advance the possibility of a return to the pre-Socratic Garden of Eden.<sup>293</sup> Firstly, we have seen Heidegger make clear that such a return is impossible. And secondly, it will quickly become evident that nationalism bears too many of the markers of metaphysics to be categorized, substantively, as a pre-Socratic articulation of Being. Furthermore— here we dispense with phony suspense— it will quickly become evident that nationalism is not, as it has thus far existed, the new mode of thinking which Heidegger awaits. Firstly, this new thinking is new— nationalism is not. Also, we will see Heidegger constantly argue that the new thinking is, as yet, unknown to us— beyond the occasional hint as to its nature. Nevertheless, we cannot congratulate ourselves on a job well done— for it is the manner in which nationalism is metaphysical that will decide the game. Two aspects of the end of

metaphysics need to be noted here. Firstly, it can only be ascertained in hindsight and secondly, it must work itself out. Metaphysics will predominate throughout a twilight period where we are aware that Western philosophy is playing its final tune but do not know what happens when the final note has sounded.

As such, we will ask the following of nationalism: Does nationalism illuminate the limitations of, and therefore the path beyond, metaphysics? Or does it inhibit the overcoming of metaphysics? In order to answer these questions, the study will explore the manner in which nationalism is metaphysical— those aspects of it which illustrate a fundamental metaphysicality and the way in which they relate to Heidegger's thought. We will also explore whether, in its erring, nationalism pushes its adherents towards or away from the necessary confrontation with the shortcomings of metaphysics. Should it prove that nationalism obscures the path beyond metaphysics and runs counter to what we know of the new thinking, we may confidently conclude that Heidegger's philosophy of Being is irreconcilable with nationalism.

This has two major consequences. Firstly, it is a novel approach to the relationship between Heidegger's thought and nationalism. Should it be found that nationalism covers over the path beyond metaphysics, the antithetical relationship between authenticity and nationalism can be asserted irrespective of statements made by Heidegger which appear favourable towards nationalism. That is to say, Heidegger does not believe that modes of thinking which are tied to metaphysics are without any merit at all. It is perfectly possible that Heidegger liked many things about nationalism while still thinking it inhibitive of the new thinking. Thus, establishing the proper location of nationalism within Heidegger's *Seinsgeschichte* allows us to cut through the confusion of Heidegger's highly varied and at times contradictory statements on matters pertaining to nations and nationalism. Secondly, the comparison brings into question the purportedly authentic nature of the bonds of community and belonging so beloved of nationalist political entrepreneurs. To discover that nationalism is an artificial intermediary which, in fact, stands between the thinker and the truth of Being— including who we are— would show nationalist conceptions of belonging

to be subject to precisely the same charge of artificiality that nationalists level at their opponents. This represents a challenge to perhaps the most potent rhetorical weapon wielded by nationalists.

### The Heideggerian Corpus and Die Kehre

One's interpretation of Heidegger's position can vary according to one's delineation of his corpus. One who sidelines Heidegger's political interventions will surely conclude that he was concerned only with "abstract" philosophical questions. Alternatively, one who gives greater weight to Heidegger's forays into the politics of his time— such as in speeches as Rector of Freiburg University— than to his far larger body of, for example, lecture series will surely exaggerate Heidegger's political stridency. The challenge lies in identifying— from this wide and diverse array of philosophical, political, and personal writings— what is essential without simply extracting that which is convenient and omitting that which is not. Traditionally, Heidegger's corpus has been divided in three ways. Most common is the chronological division, pivoting upon an inflection point in Heidegger's thought— the exact location of which varies<sup>294</sup>— referred to as *die Kehre* [the turn]. One can divide Heidegger's corpus into a "early" or "late" Heidegger— as do Grosser<sup>295</sup> and Hofstadter<sup>296</sup>— in order to grapple with the evident linguistic changes that occur over his career— from the neologicistic but recognizably phenomenological language of *Being and Time* to the poetic language of *Contributions*. Heidegger's evocation of "the turning," though, was not generally related to the organization of his own corpus. Rather, the concept describes a part of the thinking process where we "turn" back towards home and think about the implications of our philosophical sojourn for our place of dwelling. Such a division does not shed much light on the question of Heidegger and nationalism. If one focuses on nationalism, one can understand why Wayne Froman acknowledged no major contradictions between early and late Heidegger,<sup>297</sup> Hofstadter characterized Heidegger's life-work as "a struggle to attain a single thought,"<sup>298</sup> and Dastur saw only a change of emphasis.<sup>299</sup> Heidegger's later works demonstrate the same nuanced relationship with the nation as do his earlier works— a point which Wolin makes in critical terms.<sup>300</sup> Thus, like John Anderson and Gendre, we conclude that Heidegger's methods

shifted but—insofar as they relate to the matter at hand—his arguments<sup>301</sup> and indeed “prejudices”<sup>302</sup>—retained what Robert Dostal called a “fundamental continuity.”<sup>303</sup>

Certain concessions must be made to those who would divide the Heideggerian corpus. This is clear from even a cursory comparison of an early work, *Being and Time*, a latter work, *Contributions*, and a work from the “Nazi-period,” the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Heidegger’s understanding of the nature of his philosophical enquiry differed between these three texts. *Being and Time* argued that “ontology is possible only as phenomenology,”<sup>304</sup> *Introduction to Metaphysics* claimed that “we find ourselves forced to proceed from linguistic considerations”<sup>305</sup> and the *Contributions* evoked a “knowing awareness”—where questioning “reaches far ahead into be-ing, whose question-worthiness forces all creativity into distress, sets up a world for beings, and saves what of earth is reliable.”<sup>306</sup> This evolution is characterized by Magrini and Schweiler as a “turn” away from philosophy toward “thinking.”<sup>307</sup> This implies what Gendre calls an abandonment of the “project of fundamental ontology” that defined Heidegger’s early work.<sup>308</sup> The notion of a fundamental change in Heidegger’s thought is supported by the very noticeable evolution of his language. *Being and Time* is characterized by a complex but familiar existential philosophical argot, while *Introduction to Metaphysics* moves towards a more poetic form of expression and *Contributions* is at times almost incomprehensible to all but the most initiated in Heidegger’s poetics. Heidegger recognized the increasing strangeness of his language. He explained, in *Contributions*, that in the present moment any exploration of the question of Being would seem to many to be “the most useless jabbering.”<sup>309</sup>

However, Magrini and Schweiler are correct that it is reductive to think of *die Kehre* as simply a change in Heidegger’s language from the “representational” to the “nonrepresentational.”<sup>310</sup> Heidegger’s understanding of key concepts in his thought clearly underwent an evolution. George Pattison, for example, notes that metaphysics evolved in interesting ways between Heidegger’s earlier and later works. Pattison describes Heidegger’s undertaking in *Being and Time* and “What is Metaphysics?” as a “relaunch

of metaphysics”<sup>311</sup>— that is to say, an attempt to strip metaphysics back down to its fundamentals in order that it can be rescued from technology. By the early thirties, Pattison continues, Heidegger saw metaphysics as innately unhelpful and, over the next decades, would turn from this rescuing of metaphysics to an attempt to replace it with something altogether different.<sup>312</sup> Even here, though, one might question the significance of this change. In a sense, Heidegger had merely switched from criticizing the contemporary iteration of metaphysics — believing that metaphysics could be otherwise— to a criticism of a metaphysics that he no longer believed could be otherwise. It remains the case, even in the earlier works, that the extant form of metaphysics poses a threat, and thus, effectively, we find a continuity in Heidegger’s identification of metaphysics as the problem. This remains the case irrespective of whether it is a new thinking or an as-yet-unknown metaphysics that will have to replace it— a difference, no doubt, but not necessarily sufficient to represent a rupture (rather than mere evolution) in Heidegger’s thinking. Furthermore, Heidegger’s explanation for his changing language applies across his thought. Heidegger sought a new relation to Being, and this seeking began with the prevalent philosophical argot of the time. Heidegger experimented with different linguistic forms, and his evaluation of metaphysics certainly changed, but— as we shall now see— much remained consistent across these experiments.

Firstly, for all that the methodological approach to the question may have changed— to the point even of abandoning fundamental ontology— the basic undertaking, the pursuit of the truth of Being (of which, of course, figuring out the correct question to ask is a part) remains largely the same. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explained that he was seeking to “work out adequately the formulation of the question” that must be asked in order to get to the “answer to the question of being.”<sup>313</sup> *Introduction to Metaphysics* also begins by posing the question of Being, this time phrased as “why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”<sup>314</sup> Heidegger explicitly ties this formulation to metaphysics before extracting from it the formulation of the question: “How does it stand with Being?”<sup>315</sup> Here again, then, we are questioning Being and identifying metaphysics as an obstacle. Even in the poetic language of the *Contributions*, it is

the “essential swaying of be-ing” which is sought<sup>316</sup> and, again, we can only “attempt to think” this in the “age of crossing from metaphysics into be-ing historical.”<sup>317</sup> Importantly, even in this late work Heidegger compared a key part of his task to a “preparatory exercise”<sup>318</sup>— thinking through previous formulations of the question of Being— suggesting, as Gendre correctly notes, that “Heidegger continued to maintain, or only partly discarded, the original reticence of *Sein und Zeit*.”<sup>319</sup>

It is not only the basic task— confronting metaphysics, formulating the question of being, and the pursuit of the truth of Being— that remained consistent. As Magrini and Schweiler concede, *die Kehre* is not “the abandonment of *Dasein*’s perspective in favour of a perspective focused exclusively on Being.”<sup>320</sup> Indeed, the explication of *Dasein* as a relation-to temporality and spatiality is also a constant across Heidegger’s oeuvre. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger identified temporality as the “meaning of that being that we call *Dasein*”<sup>321</sup> and he argued that, in the *Dasein*’s understanding of being, “the world is understood ontologically reflected back upon the interpretation of *Dasein*.”<sup>322</sup> *Introduction to Metaphysics* argued that *Dasein* must be grasped according to the historical<sup>323</sup> and praised poetry for speaking within a “world-space.”<sup>324</sup> In *Contributions*, Heidegger argued that the relationship between time and space is a vital characteristic of *Dasein*<sup>325</sup> and that an exploration of this relationship is what raises our thinking to the level necessary to confront the question of Being.<sup>326</sup> Whatever evolutions occurred in Heidegger’s thinking over the course of his career, the focus on time and space— and the belief in their centrality to posing the question of Being— remained consistent.

Heidegger— Gendre notes— provided frequent justifications of and references to his early work in his later years.<sup>327</sup> Heidegger explicitly claimed, in the “Letter on Humanism,” that “this turning is not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*,” but instead should be understood as a moment when he himself became fully aware of the “dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced.”<sup>328</sup> That is to say, as Gendre notes, that Heidegger changed his approach to the *Seinsfrage* but the fundamental pursuit of this question remains. Heidegger’s emphasis shifted, but *Being and Time* remained a foundational text

to which he always referred back in his later writing.<sup>329</sup> Heidegger, in Pattison's words, had to "work through what he had inherited from the past before he could move beyond it."<sup>330</sup> Later works should therefore be understood as the continuation of the exploration begun in *Being and Time*. This does not invalidate the concept of *die Kehre* in and of itself. Whatever evolutions did take place, Heidegger remained fundamentally concerned with Being, understood the grasping of Being as residing in a relation to it, put temporality and spatiality at the centre of that relation-to, and identified technology and metaphysics— even accepting the evolution in how this term was understood— as a grave threat to his task. It should be acknowledged that changes in emphasis— for example, the emphatic shift towards the negative aspects of metaphysics in Heidegger's later works noted by Gadamer<sup>331</sup>— are not meaningless and should not be ignored. It will also be relevant to the coming discussion of Nazism to note if a work is pre, during, or post-Nazi in date of publication. However, Taminioux's claim that Heidegger's *Kehre* was a change of approach<sup>332</sup> but not an abandonment of the project of fundamental ontology<sup>333</sup> and Safranski's belief that "throughout Heidegger's philosophical life he continually asked one question about Being"<sup>334</sup> are convincing. Heidegger's thought— to borrow, as do Pierre Jacerme<sup>335</sup> and Peter Trawny,<sup>336</sup> Heidegger's pathways metaphor— resembles those roads which lead to mountaintops, whose sharp turns do not change the ultimate destination at the summit.

Insofar as it regards the themes that will be central to this study, there is considerable continuity and so we shall not divide the Heidegger corpus chronologically. We will undoubtedly note an evolution in Heidegger's thinking about belonging and community in certain instances. Elsewhere, we will take time to note intriguing continuities that span areas of Heidegger's thought where continuity is unexpected. Here, the breadth of the Heideggerian texts being examined should be illuminating, showing the ways in which the philosophical pathways taken by Heidegger's thought led to refinements of certain key ideas. However, at least in the context of the subject matter at hand, these evolutions do not represent major and fundamental ruptures which render obsolete previous positions that Heidegger took. As such, Heidegger's

thought is treated here as a dynamic but coherent whole. Furthermore, though there will be in-depth treatments of passages from certain texts, texts are not examined one at a time with certain chapters dedicated to certain texts. Rather, this study often groups relevant texts together, to paint a dynamic picture of Heidegger's thinking regarding the subjects under consideration. For the purposes of this study, this approach best balances the recognition of changes that did occur in Heidegger's thinking with the retention of a coherent picture of Heidegger's thought that can be subjected to the comparison being undertaken.

One might also divide Heidegger's corpus according to formal considerations— between philosophical, political, and personal interventions. There are not grounds to exclude texts on account of being political rather than philosophical— as the interplay between these two forms sheds great light upon Heidegger's complex relationship with the nation. However, given that this study aims to generate conclusions that speak to the interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy— as opposed to contributing to the evaluation of Heidegger's character or moral standing as a man— Heidegger's personal correspondences and diaries are not discussed, except for the *Black Notebooks*. This exception is undeniably partly motivated by a desire to avoid papering over Heidegger's antisemitism, which finds its most blunt expression in that work. While Heidegger's writings always contain some philosophical reflection, there are few, if any, philosophical claims found in his private writings that are not better expressed in public works. Also excluded are unedited lecture notes, as Heidegger treats their themes in formats that were intended for public consumption and edited and polished accordingly. Texts which speak only tangentially, or not at all, to the central concerns of this study are excluded. Specifically, those texts which speak to questions of theology (e.g., *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*) or provide textual interpretation of less prominent (in Heidegger's history of Western *Dasein*) thinkers and texts written before Heidegger's professorship (e.g., "Recent Research in Logic", *The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy*) are excluded. A primary corpus is subject to close reading and exegetical analysis, consisting of book-length studies (for example, *Being and Time*), essay compendia (for example, *Poetry, Language, Thought*) and

edited book-length lecture transcripts (for example, *The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*). A secondary corpus, also read closely but analysed less exegetically, includes philosophical correspondences (e.g., “Letter on Humanism”) and public interventions (e.g., “The Rektoratsrede”). Within each, there is a prioritization based upon subject matter, with precedence given to texts which provide a protracted treatment of the themes of this study (e.g., *Nature, History, State*) over those which require circuitous interpretation.

### Philosophy and the New Thinking

It was noted above that Heidegger spoke, as Magrini and Schweiler note, of moving away from philosophy.<sup>337</sup> Given the just stated ambition of deriving a coherent picture of a Heideggerian philosophy of Being from his diverse and wide-ranging oeuvre, it is vital to briefly speak to the question of whether Heidegger can rightly be said to present us with a philosophy. Heidegger often employed the term “philosophy” in a narrow sense, in order to evoke precisely the kind of systemic, metaphysics that he intended to move away from. As such, Heidegger scholars will, on occasion, abjure the term philosophy entirely in favour of alternatives like “thought,” or “*Denken*.” In this study, reference will be made to a Heideggerian philosophy. Behind this reasoning, it should briefly be noted, is a recognition of the need to remain focused on the goals of the analysis and to avoid major digressions. This applies especially to discussions of whether Heidegger’s thought cannot be called a philosophy because it lacks this or that quality which one holds to be definitive of “real” philosophy. Wading into the small matter of the true nature of philosophy would be an unnecessary digression.

The reasons that we will refer to a “Heideggerian philosophy”— notwithstanding the complexity around this nomenclature in the Heideggerian context, are as follows: Firstly, we aim, here, to take Heidegger seriously as a thinker, but not to follow him as if he were an omniscient prophet. As such, we are not always beholden to Heidegger’s categories. This is important because his underlying claim— that all of Western thought from Plato onwards can be categorized in a uniform manner— is highly dubious

and accepting it as a given is unduly deferential to his terminology. Secondly, because the term “philosophy” is not used in this narrower sense in much of the secondary literature, nor is it used in the field of political philosophy writ large, cleaving at all times to Heidegger’s distinction would create unnecessary confusion for readers. Finally, this decision reflects the belief that philosophy is, in fact, a capacious category which is best understood in the broadest sense derived from its etymological meaning as “love of wisdom.” Given that Heidegger’s thought gives a primacy to questioning and seeking wisdom, and to the pursuit of truth, it certainly can, in this broader sense, be accurately categorized as a philosophy even though this runs afoul of Heidegger’s idiosyncratic definitions. Therefore, for reasons of accuracy, clarity, and critical distance, we will refer, in this study, to Heidegger’s thinking as a “philosophy.” Nevertheless, there is a circumstance where the term philosophy will be abjured in favour of “the new thinking.” That is: where we speak of the modality of thought which Heidegger anticipates will emerge once metaphysics is overcome. Here, the distinction provides clarity— it is the least cumbersome way to make the vital distinction between Heidegger’s own thought— which it will be argued is not post-metaphysical (nor does Heidegger claim it to be)— and the new thinking that he anticipates is to come.

### The Double Reading

It was stated above that the interplay between Heidegger’s philosophical and political writings is of particular interest with respect to the question of Heidegger and nationalism. This presents an acute methodological challenge: how to bring into dialogue these two distinct modalities of thinking. Furthermore, we are comparing Heidegger’s thought to nationalism, a primarily political (rather than philosophical) phenomenon. The great danger for a study such as this is that one simply finds oneself differentiating Heidegger’s thought from nationalism on account of the one being a sophisticated philosophical exercise and the other being a more practically oriented defence of a particular political modality. To avoid this pitfall, this study draws inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu, and the way in which he applied a “*double-lecture*” to works, including those of Heidegger. For Bourdieu, a scholar ought to

understand the works of any writer in light of their emergence from a context defined by the interplay between their status as participants in a broader social, political, and economic structures- *le champ*- and their status as individuals who have a particular relationship with those broader structures- *l'habitus*. For reasons of parsimony, to be discussed shortly, the decision has been made here to focus on Heidegger's ideas as they are presented in his written works, and not to spend a great deal of time discussing his biography. This precludes any lengthy treatment of his relationship with the institution of the university, the social environs in which he moved and the economic realities of Germany in his time. However, the nature of the project is such that a consideration of the relationship between Heidegger as a thinker of Being, and Heidegger as a self-aware participant in the political *champ*, particularly that of the nationalist right of his time, is inevitable. Here, helpfully, Bourdieu speaks directly to the matter in *l'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*. Bourdieu criticizes Heidegger for concealing behind the philosophical complexity of his words a kind of conservatism, by enforcing certain taboos and tacitly promoting a philosophical aristocratism that casts more workaday political concerns- such as improvements to social provision- as a form of profanity that does not belong in the sacred *champs* of the philosopher. Emerging from this is the idea that a political and a philosophical position coexist within Heidegger's oeuvre— a duality of which Heidegger was aware and frequently exploited.<sup>338</sup> Heidegger located himself, Bourdieu continued, in both the world of the philosophers and political essayists<sup>339</sup>— as likely to put his work into conversation with Jünger or Spengler as Hegel or Kant. Bourdieu responded to this challenge by “reading between the lines.”<sup>340</sup> It is this manner of reading, this integral mechanic in Bourdieu's much broader exploration of the *champ* and the *habitus* in the Heidegger case that is being operationalized in this study, rather than a comprehensive *Bourdieuian* analysis which would require lengthy discussion of the Heidegger's social, economic, and institutional relations. This is an admittedly extractive approach to take to Bourdieu's work, but one which allows this study to practice parsimony while nevertheless availing itself of the interpretative potential opened by the mechanics of Bourdieu's approach.

Heidegger grants— in “What is Called Thinking?”— that interpretation always allows for a multiplicity of interpretative possibilities,<sup>341</sup> that our presuppositions will lead us in different directions and that interpretation is a dialogical process.<sup>342</sup> Nevertheless, one must still note that there are controversial aspects of Bourdieu’s between the lines reading, seeming to depend upon an underlying belief that every philosophical claim must be a sublimated political claim. However, this study neglects Bourdieu’s exhortation that we “abandon the opposition between the political and philosophical readings.”<sup>343</sup> In practical terms, this implies a double-reading which does not negate difference. This can be conceptualized as follows. “Reading A” consists of a political reconstruction of Heidegger’s thought. Both his overtly political writings and his less obviously political interventions are interpreted according to the over-arching themes of the study (to be discussed shortly) and brought together into a broad reconstruction of a Heideggerian position regarding these themes. This reading is supplemented by “Reading B:” the positive philosophical reading (where we explore what Heidegger envisioned in general rather than solely its relation to nationalism). Rather than seeking a “true” political reading lurking behind the philosophical reading, this thesis recognizes the duality of Heidegger’s thought, employing “Reading A” in the comparison with nationalism but turning to “Reading B” to explore Heidegger’s thought on its own terms. This allows nationalism to be compared with a political reconstruction of Heidegger’s thought and located within the broader scope of his philosophy of Being. I take it as a given that there is a political reading of Heidegger’s work and that this can shed light onto the question of nationalism. Heidegger, Rüdiger Safranski records, challenged us with the following: “There is need for contemplation whether and how, in the age of a uniform technological world civilization, there can still be such a thing as home.”<sup>344</sup> Much of the appeal of nationalism stems from purporting to meet this challenge. This study will show that it does not and ask what it means, for Heidegger, to belong in a home that is our own.

### § *Technology, Metaphysics, and Error*

We turn, now, to the second methodological challenge, how we will go about comparing Heidegger's understanding of authentic spatio-temporal belonging to the primordialist nationalism found in Jünger, Péguy, Barrès, and Mann. The following sections will discuss Heidegger's critique of technology and identify potential points of tension between his position and theirs. Furthermore, these concerns link our exemplars to core concepts in Heidegger's critique of metaphysics: enframing, entrapping-securing,<sup>345</sup> ordering, the standing reserve, and the pictorialization of the world. It will be argued that it is where these thinkers confront modernity that the irreconcilability of Heidegger's thought and primordialist nationalism is clearest, and where we catch a glimpse of what, instead, Heidegger's thought calls us towards.

#### Technology and Modernity

Technology combines *technē* and *logos*. This unites thinking and making and blurs the boundary between thought and action. Technology is a *modality* of Being—a way of thinking and doing. Technology is not entirely new, after all the Ancient Greeks had *technē*. Ancient *technē*, though, was an *epistēmē* which reveals, and, Heidegger claims in *The Essence of Human Freedom*, “produces” in the broad sense of making beings present, not merely in the narrow sense of crafting something.<sup>346</sup> What distinguishes modern technology from its Ancient counterpart is that it is dominated by mathematics and seeks to be “useful”<sup>347</sup> by providing certainty.<sup>348</sup> As Todd Mei puts it, technology is a “type of knowledge” characterized by a “specialized understanding [...] or practice” oriented towards *production*.<sup>349</sup>

Don Ihde parodied Heidegger- as an amusing introduction to what was ultimately a fair-minded evaluation of Heidegger's thought- as being like those preoccupied with the fear that typewriters would destroy culture.<sup>350</sup> Many scholars, though, warn against focusing on technological objects. Dreyfus argued that Heidegger's concern is the “human distress” that results from the predominance of technology rather than immediate technological challenges.<sup>351</sup> Kisiel argued that Heidegger does not want to arrest the

development of technology but wants meditation upon its “destining essence.”<sup>352</sup> Froman argued that we are not to destroy technology but “get over” it<sup>353</sup>— make use of it without being shaped by it. Andrew Feenberg goes as far as to say that if one remains focused upon devices, one cannot speak to the vital “ontological dispensation” which is the core of Heidegger’s critique of technology.<sup>354</sup> Thus, shifting our “mode of revealing” may not require changing the devices we use.<sup>355</sup> Though Heidegger can amuse with his dire warnings about the radio, it is the impact of the technological modality of Being which matters.

### Entrapping, Enframing, and the Re-presentation of Beings

Central to this impact is the “entrapping-securing.” This is the process— described in “Science and Reflection”— where science “sets upon the real” and renders it “surveyable”<sup>356</sup> while theory maps out in advance the “possibilities for the posing of questions”<sup>357</sup> so that only the scientific can make the grade.<sup>358</sup> Magrini notes that this leads to a disastrous neglect of poetry<sup>359</sup> and art,<sup>360</sup> but the scope for this invasion is limitless. Science does this, Heidegger continued, by establishing a standard of truth whereby the “real will exhibit itself as an interactive network” of surveyable causes by making the real “secured in its objectness.”<sup>361</sup> This network of causes can be divided into “spheres or areas of objects” which become the matter of scientific investigation.<sup>362</sup> Modern thought, therefore, proceeds by splitting and arranging the ways in which we question into a variety of “subjects” and schools. Heidegger argued that “every new phenomenon emerging within an area of science is refined to such a point that it fits into the normative objective coherence of the theory”<sup>363</sup>— referring to the way in which the unknown can be subjected to a process where the end goal— the procurement of an object to be subjected to calculation— is posited in advance of the investigation. Thus, the subject matter is guaranteed to appear calculable. Heidegger expressed this most clearly in “The Age of the World Picture,” arguing that technological procedures are granted definite precedence over Being, defining what is real by its legibility to technological methods.<sup>364</sup>

However, it is perhaps best illustrated by considering the example of Sam Harris’ *The Moral Landscape*— a work of popular ethical philosophy which posits a moral system founded in science. Harris

begins by substituting morals for values, and then substitutes those values in turn with “questions about the wellbeing of conscious creatures.”<sup>365</sup> He then proposes that the wellbeing of conscious creatures can be measured because “thought and intentions arise in the human brain,” and the “consequences that follow in terms of human relationships [...] translate into differences in our brains.”<sup>366</sup> Therefore, moral and immoral are understood by looking at neurological activity to determine the intentions and consequences of an act. Harris, in fact, concludes his methodology by acclaiming that “morality should be considered an undeveloped part of science.”<sup>367</sup> Here we see a perfect illustration of Heidegger’s concept of entrapping-securing. Harris begins by forcing the subject matter— morality— to take on the objective, observable form that is accessible to the scientific method. He substitutes a nonsensuous thing— morality— with an object, the human brain. Having secured the object for science, so to speak, he proceeds to entrap the region of ethics under the domain of the ever-expanding kingdom of the hard sciences.

We see here that technology gives us a definite, though insufficient idea of Being which neglects the nonsensuous<sup>368</sup> or substitutes it for a quantifiable representation. Technology, as Peterson puts it, “proceeds thoughtlessly and without self-reflection.”<sup>369</sup> It allows us to see only raw materials and, Milchman and Roseberg claim, blinds us to the danger of our situation.<sup>370</sup> Worst of all, the entrapping-securing threatens philosophy. Technological modes of thinking have an acute capacity to assimilate those things that are most unlike it.<sup>371</sup> Throughout his oeuvre, for example in his Kant lectures, Heidegger ties this to the ability to force everything into conformity with scientific categories, forms and procedures.<sup>372</sup> Accordance with the fixed ground plan, or correctness, comes to stand, Heidegger argued in *Basic Questions*, for truth itself— and today the “original essence of truth has been lost.”<sup>373</sup> Reason becomes “ever more rational” and captures “all beings” in “the planning and projects of calculation.”<sup>374</sup> In short, as Skocz puts it, technology conceals “other ways of being.”<sup>375</sup>

Philosophy, Heidegger claimed in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” will eventually be replaced by empirical science<sup>376</sup> and thought with ruthless calculation.<sup>377</sup> In the simplest

terms, the process of entrapping-securing is a consequence of scientific methodology— where the subject matter is posited in advance as something objective and therefore accessible to the scientific method. This “securing” of the matter at hand gives the impression that the scientific method can be applied to absolutely everything, leading to its steady encroachment in all fields of inquiry, the “entrapping” leading eventually to the marginalization of all other ways of knowing. There is no doubt that there is a widely held perception that the STEM fields are more rigorous, and thus more valuable, than the humanities and Heidegger is correct that this attitude obstructs philosophical inquiry. However, for the purposes of this study, the most significant aspect of this process is the “securing” of the subject matter as an object, and the fact that this objectification occurs so as to render the thing in question accessible to the framework being applied— be it science or, in our case, primordialist nationalism.

Objectification— identified as a central aspect of metaphysics by, among others, Newell,<sup>378</sup> Kolb,<sup>379</sup> Dostal,<sup>380</sup> and Kockelman<sup>381</sup>— consists of the transformation of the world encountered by *Dasein* from the world of Being itself to a world of symbolic representative objects, mediated in such a way as to render Being legible.<sup>382</sup> Heidegger argued, in “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” that Platonism “yoked” truth “under the idea” by making “correctness”— meaning accordance with the idea— the essence of truth. As a result, the pursuit of truth becomes the “achieving of a correct view of ideas.”<sup>383</sup> Heidegger would develop this argument four years later in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, arguing that Plato and the sophists elevated the “idea” to a “supersensory realm [...] somewhere up there” in the realm of the forms, relegating the “merely apparent beings here below” to the status of “mere seeming.”<sup>384</sup> In other words, actual things are subservient to the fixed and clearly defined contours of ideas. We encounter objects in the world with a symbolic image in our minds, the idea, of the “form” that we expect. We measure the thing in the world against that idea and determine truth according to the degree of resemblance.<sup>385</sup> Truth thus becomes the accordance of the object with the form and thought becomes the measuring of things against ideas. To illustrate by example, the idea one has of a cat will likely not change a great deal over

the course of one's life. In contrast, one's cats will always be changing— indeed, every cell in their bodies is constantly evolving, dying, and regenerating. The actual cat at my feet is characterized by this flux while the cat-concept remains stable. Heidegger makes clear, in *Contributions*, that we must move away from “talking “about” something and representing something objective.”<sup>386</sup> Concerning oneself with symbolic representations of things is characteristic of metaphysics— and is baneful where there is tension between ideas and reality. We will, therefore, question whether nationalism elevates symbolic objectifications of those things most pertinent to belonging, rendering them as fixed and stable abstractions and filtering the world through the prism of those abstract objectifications.

### Ordering, The Standing Reserve, and Instrumentalism

As noted, we too are enframed beings. So constituted, we are “set upon” and “challenged forth” much like any other “thing.” Technology, Heidegger explained in “The Question Concerning Technology” proceeds by extracting “energy” from the natural world and storing it for future use.<sup>387</sup> This storing for future use defines what Heidegger calls the “standing reserve”— a stored mass lying in reserve, waiting for its energies to be put to use. Heidegger would argue in *The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures* that in the standing reserve, the nature of a thing itself is left “without guard,”<sup>388</sup> that is to say, the essence of the thing remains undetermined and is not thought about because all that matters is the way in which it can be harnessed and put to use. All bodies, all beings, are alike, and all laws of thought are merely matters of form— processes where formulaic calculations are run without “regard for either the content of the objects each time considered or for the [...] thought process.”<sup>389</sup> Technology does something similar to man, hammering us into shape<sup>390</sup> so that we can be ordered into the “standing-reserve” of available “stuff.”

Heidegger— in defiance of the belief that he had *nothing* to say about economics— gave some substance to the above in a sustained critique of the modern work world across his oeuvre. In “What are Poets For?” he tied engagement in the “unprotected market of the exchangers” to the “common life”<sup>391</sup> of humanity in the age of modern technology— which Hofstadter called a “dark and deprived time”<sup>392</sup> In his

Nietzsche lectures he would critique the reduction of all work to production, which ties creativity to technological efficiency<sup>393</sup> and, in *The Essence of Human Freedom*, he descried the way in which work had been corrupted into “producedness”— where all that matters is bringing a finished product to stand at our disposal.<sup>394</sup> Heidegger— aside from during the Nazi period<sup>395</sup>— critiqued the obsession with production as grounded in technological modalities of Being and thus merely the tool of a nihilistic will-to-power.<sup>396</sup> In light of this, Carl Te Hari Mika sees in Heidegger an “excitingly critical approach to the notion of earth”<sup>397</sup>— with significant potential to augment discussions about the environment.<sup>398</sup> For Mika, Heidegger saw the tendency— which he thinks typical of the West— to “think of entities in terms of their properties” as part of the baneful influence of Platonism.<sup>399</sup> Mika is referring to the tendency to set upon the objects of the earth, to pull them apart into “properties” and then reconstitute them and make them useful. This removes us from the natural world— outside of which we stand in our scientific posture.

For Heidegger, Ancient Greek life could be separated into the *bios praktikos* and the *bios theōrētikos*. Technology blurs the lines between these two modes of thinking and ties knowledge to “cunning and calculation,” resourcefulness and utilitarianism.<sup>400</sup> The greatest goods, for the *Dasein* thus enframed, are, as Dreyfus put it, “more and more flexibility and efficiency.”<sup>401</sup> Dallmayr connected this to a “complete insensitivity” to “the ambiguity of phenomena.”<sup>402</sup> In pursuit of efficiency, only that which is useful has a place and all else is lost to this crude utilitarian calculation. In “The Way to Language,” Heidegger argued that this utilitarian calculus gathers human beings into the mass of things which lie about, never construing *Dasein* as more than another being among many— with our language reduced to merely another item in the “technical inventory” of available and potentially useful things.<sup>403</sup>

The distinction between purposiveness and instrumentalism lies, for the purposes of this study, in the relationship between the object of use and the person using it. In simple terms— and leaving aside for now objections about Heidegger’s understanding of craftsmanship and engineering— it can be explained as follows. Purposiveness resembles the relationship between a craftsman and his materials, there being

an end state intended for the materials being used, but a humble understanding that one must work *with* one's materials and cannot simply bend them to one's will. Instrumentalism is more akin to our relationship with electricity, for example, where one (within reason) can put the material to whatever use one sees fit. This is a distinction between our seeking to impose our will upon the world and our desire to achieve certain things within the confines imposed upon us by the nature of things. This introduces a dichotomy between the purposeful *Dasein* seeking the truth of being and the individual oriented towards a task whose ends are not "authentically" its ownmost. Should it be found that nationalism instrumentalizes the individual in pursuit of goals decided by others, this will constitute evidence that nationalism not only does not constitute an authentic relation to Being, but also that it inhibits our pursuit of such a relation to Being.

All instruments are dispensed with according to the will (often the will of others). Under the influence of technology, therefore, the world revolves around the self, not due to some failure to be objective<sup>404</sup> but on account of the representational nature of technological modes of reporting. It is Aristotle who, Heidegger argued, showed the logical conclusion of representational thinking. Aristotle proposed the logos as a means by which *Dasein* "worlds," so to speak, its world.<sup>405</sup> Through speech, in other words, we create a logocentric system of symbolic representations which reproduces and, to an extent, replaces the world in which we move. We then give the concept, or signifier, priority over the thing signified in words, and talk, think and debate constantly about words rather than the things they signify. A consequence of this, for Aristotle, is that language, and by extension humanity (we being, as Stuart Elden puts it, the "*zoon echon logon*")<sup>406</sup> becomes the centre of the world.<sup>407</sup> The world of nature thus becomes, Mika argues, a kind of artifice existing for the sake of the human subject.<sup>408</sup>

This evolves into Descartes famous formulation: *Cogito ergo Sum*. Here, Descartes is, Heidegger argued, reducing everything to an object of contemplation and discussion for the "I [which] becomes the special subject."<sup>409</sup> The subject, as a result, becomes the "highest principle" according to which all things "receive their thingness."<sup>410</sup> In layman's terms, if *Cogito ergo Sum*, then Being is entirely dependent upon

the “I” that thinks and the thinking of the “I” becomes the centre of the universe. As such, the question of Being falls by the wayside in favour of the contemplation of how the thing relates to the “I.” This representation of beings secures us in certitude according to the needs of the representing subject: us.

Science depends, Heidegger explained in his Nietzsche lectures, upon our senses and our interpretations of what we observe. Science cannot ground a relation to beings as such,<sup>411</sup> only to representations which report to its methods— something which, Wrathall argues, was central to Heidegger’s claim that science is blind to its own grounding in metaphysics.<sup>412</sup> Science takes Being as a given, assuming the grounds of its inquiries, and cannot ever really speak to Being. Being, and by extension all that is, is transformed into a subject for value-thinking and is thus “degraded to a condition posited by the will to power itself.”<sup>413</sup> This is the power of the subject: to posit the world according to its subjectivity, to devalue all that once stood outside and above, and to make space for new values.<sup>414</sup> Truth becomes tied to will, as “truth concerning beings as such for value thinking in general.”<sup>415</sup> In time, this brings everything under its power,<sup>416</sup> and value becomes what “counts”<sup>417</sup> for the subject. Heidegger explained, in “The Word of Nietzsche,” that value thinking is connected to will<sup>418</sup> because values originate from the imposition of will upon our conception of the good (as what *we* find to be valuable as we pursue our goals) and because it is will, ultimately, which guides the resultant assessment of the value of a thing.<sup>419</sup>

Heidegger stated, in *The Question of Being*, that it would be crude to say that this puts us into the place of a creator God.<sup>420</sup> However, he noted that representation can make the subject central to the definition of what is, insofar as the subject is what legitimizes a particular representation of what is represented to it.<sup>421</sup> We are— as Soffer,<sup>422</sup> Langan,<sup>423</sup> Bourdieu,<sup>424</sup> Dostal,<sup>425</sup> and Taminioux<sup>426</sup> have identified— only, at present, able to encounter Being in the way that we represent it to ourselves. Nationalism often positions itself as the antidote to the egotism of modernity. Thus, the question of whether or not nationalism is simply another variation on subjectivity— as much subject to the mastery of the *ego* as the “degenerate” liberalism it positions itself against— represents a profound and politically salient

challenge for nationalism. Therefore, nationalism is interrogated, in this study, as to whether it represents, as it claims to, a force pushing us away from the egoism of modern individualism or whether it merely replaces egoism of the individual subject with egoism of the collective national subject.

### The Fixed Ground Plan and the Pictorialization of the World

We see perhaps the greatest similarity between Heidegger's thought and primordialist nationalism in the way that the malaise of modernity is tied to the threat of a universalizing quality of technology. This threatens all that is particular to a community.<sup>427</sup> For Heidegger, this is grounded in the tendency of technology to obliterate distance, including the conceptual distances which separate one thing from another. Heidegger felt that the obliteration of distance would mean that "everything washes together into the uniformly distanceless."<sup>428</sup> He believed, Zimmerman argues, that "progress [...] had undermined the unique character of different historical peoples"<sup>429</sup> and, in Young's terms, robbed man of his dwelling.<sup>430</sup> This, as Dreyfus noted, led Heidegger to fear a "disaggregation" of our identities."<sup>431</sup> Alienated from *our* place, Heidegger argued in "The Age of the World Picture," we live in the "gigantic"<sup>432</sup>— which emerges from the unlimited capacity of quantification to capture ever larger scale<sup>433</sup>— to a magnitude that is far beyond comprehension. Heidegger presents, Greisch concludes "a symptomology of the manifestations of power: gigantism, massification, globalization, totalizing, levelling"<sup>434</sup>— similar threats to those identified by the primordialist nationalists.<sup>435</sup> Most pertinent is a threat that might apply to nationalism as much as to cosmopolitanism— linked to pictorialization.

Pictorialization, as a concept, is best explained in "The Age of the World Picture." Here, Heidegger wrote that to "get the picture concerning something does not mean only that what is, is set before us [...] but that what is stands before us— in all that belongs and all that stands together in it— as a system."<sup>436</sup> If we, as beings with limited cognitive capacities, are to be able to get the picture, it must be accessible to our modes of encountering things in general. It must, in short, be sensible and, if it is not, we must sensibelize it. Heidegger argued that our conception of what it means to seek truth is heavily influenced by

the practices of scientific research.<sup>437</sup> While this is intrinsically connected to the scientific approach to nature, the institutionalization of historical research in the universities has led those logics to be imposed upon the study of the past.<sup>438</sup> For Heidegger, this means that we are beholden to a particular conception of rigour and thus “project” or “sketch in advance” what he calls a “fixed ground plan.” This ground plan is not precisely a set of instructions but operates more as a guidebook which tells us what we are looking for, what the legitimate means are by which we can look for it, and how we can legitimately articulate our findings. As a result, the fixed ground plan provides us in advance with “rule” and “law”<sup>439</sup>— which constrain and determine what we encounter and how.<sup>440</sup> Vitaly, things must often be altered to iron out pesky details that do not conform to the “fixed ground plan.”<sup>441</sup> These rules also provide us with a consistency in our representations which gives things the appearance of unity and structure.<sup>442</sup> This can be extended to the whole world, and Heidegger believed that this “conquest of the world as picture” was the “fundamental event of the modern age.”<sup>443</sup> It should be noted that while this process certainly places us at a remove from the direct relation to Being that Heidegger credits the pre-Socratics with retaining, it is a charge that can be levelled at any post-Socratic mode of thought. Thus, to say that nationalism pictorializes Being would be barely more insightful than noting that it is a fairly modern concept.

Pictorialization is not, in and of itself, a bad thing. Heidegger argued that “to get the picture throbs with being acquainted with something, with being equipped and prepared for it.”<sup>444</sup> It is clear, from this statement, that pictorialization can help us to get to grips with the world that confronts us. Where pictorialization becomes a problem is when we elevate the rules of our fixed ground plan to a type of transcendence, where we treat them like immutable laws of the universe rather than conveniences we contrived in order to get to grips with a tricky problem. In the political sphere, this often manifests as the forcing into conformity of all that is under the auspices of a heuristic that may initially have been intended to help us to get to grips with a particularly complex situation, but which take on a new life as a kind of political variant of the laws of physics. Inconvenient truths are negated as they do not fit the rules of the

game. When we encounter the world in this way, we struggle to engage with anything that cannot be interpreted into our rule-system. We thus redefine, marginalize, or negate such things. The pictorialization of the world according to these rules comes to stand, in practice, prior to the world itself, and where non-conformity is acknowledged it is the world that must change to fit the picture. Eventually, everything is subsumed by our pictorialization— with the world itself sliding into irrelevance. In short, pictorialization is not just trying to think of things in a way that has an underlying logic but is the act of confusing the construct— which may originally have helped us to grasp a truth — with the truth of Being itself.

Heidegger explained the concept of the *Weltanschauung* in “The Age of the World Picture.” Here, he argued that an inevitable result of the pictorialization of the world is the casting of a person’s relationship to that world as a worldview.<sup>445</sup> This has the consequence that “whatever is, is considered to be in being only to the degree and to the extent that it is taken into and referred back to this life [the life of the viewer of the world picture]”<sup>446</sup> The *Weltanschauung* thus represents the ultimate modern manifestation of the “structured image [*Gebild*]”<sup>447</sup> and the events of history and the present world come to be understood as “a confrontation of world views.”<sup>448</sup> It is here, then, that we find the material of our analysis. While the discussion of pictorialization above was largely in relation to modern metaphysics, technology, and the sciences, we will observe a similar dynamic at play in nationalism. We will find that nationalists, too, construct heuristics to articulate their nations place in the world. The decisive matter, though, is if these *Weltanschauungen* are manifestations of the type of inauthentic pictorialization discussed above— whether these heuristics take on a life of their own, ceasing to be a useful tool and becoming a constraining vision of what can be and what is authentically possible for a nation. This depends on whether Jünger, Mann, Péguy and Barrès engage with their respective *Weltanschauungen* in a way that suggests a degree of awareness that they are contrivances designed to help us to get to grips with the complexities of being, or whether they blithely subsume all that is under the rules of their pictorialization of the world and confuse this with an adequate engagement with the experience of Being itself. This latter

possibility, we call inauthentic world pictorialization (henceforth, for brevity, “pictorialization”). Should nationalism constitute a form of inauthentic world pictorialization — this will be evidence that nationalism mires us in the metaphysical and inhibits our pursuit of the new thinking.

### The Possibility of Salutory Error

A sceptic might object that we are posing a question that Heidegger already answered. In the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger spoke to the question of nationalism in a way that was dismissive. He praised Hölderlin for conceptualizing the homeland “not patriotically or nationalistically” and for having looked beyond the “egoism of his nation.”<sup>449</sup> At this stage, one might object that Heidegger may only have been scorning an egoistic strand of nationalism. However, this objection falls apart where Heidegger continued, writing that “every nationalism is metaphysically an anthropologism, and as such subjectivism.”<sup>450</sup> This is why we dispensed with phony suspense. Nationalism is metaphysical, and the subjectivism and anthropologism noted in this quote is central to this conclusion, such that Heidegger’s comment here in the “Letter on Humanism” is coherent with his broader body of thought. What matters is the manner in which nationalism is metaphysical. It was noted that certain metaphysicians, such as Nietzsche, can be termed “salutory.” This possibility exists for Mann, Jünger, Péguy, and Barrès.

Over the course of the history of Western thought, the “naïve ontology”<sup>451</sup> of pre-Socratic thinkers transformed into the modern metaphysics described above. This “first end” though, leads to a “new beginning,” revealing that we must partake in “the questioning of truth” and of “who we are.”<sup>452</sup> In other words, our metaphysical questioning of Being leads us away from an authentic relation to being, but does so in such a way as to point out to us precisely what it is that we are missing and must question if we are to reach a new beginning. This suggests that there is a way of failing which has a saving grace. Heidegger argues, in *Contributions*, that “mindfulness of what the truth of being is not,” especially in the context of elucidating historical errors about Being, undeniably plays a role in the pursuit of authentic *Dasein* by making the “positions of Western thinking more transparent and the shelteredness of being-history more

penetrating.”<sup>453</sup> In other words, where Heidegger critiques thinkers for participating in metaphysical modes of thinking Being— which he, as we have seen, fears may push us towards forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*)— it remains possible that they are erring in a way that is enlightening.

Nationalism, then, will also be interrogated as to whether it covers over or alights the path beyond metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Heidegger, contains within itself evidence of the questionable nature of Being— he sometimes refers to this as a saving power— and therefore the grounds for its own overcoming. Metaphysics, Heidegger argued, “helps and hinders at the same time, [as its essence] shelters the unconcealment of Being.”<sup>454</sup> We might find that, similarly, the shortcomings of nationalism, even if inadvertently, actually shed light onto the shortcomings of our metaphysical mode of thinking and thus provokes a questioning of the truth of Being— bringing to our attention the need for a new thinking. If that should be the case, then notwithstanding all the flaws of nationalism, and though it is not itself the new thinking, we will conclude that Heidegger’s philosophy is fundamentally favourable towards nationalism on account of its being a salutary error. Should we find, in contrast, that it inhibits that kind of questioning, then we may conclude that not only is nationalism inauthentic, but it is also the enemy of *Eigentlichkeit*.

We have narrowed the question of whether nationalism is commensurate with Heidegger philosophy to ask whether primordialist nationalism covers over or alights the path beyond metaphysics. The analysis is in two parts: the first concerns time, the second space. Each section contains four chapters, three interrogating core themes of primordialist nationalism and comparing them with Heidegger’s positions and one exploring what the comparison tells us about Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity with respect to time and space. We have the tools in hand, now, to get underway.

**Part One: Time**

## Origins

### § *First Things*

Surprisingly, Mann, Jünger, Barrès, and Péguy do not concern themselves with the precise moment at which their nations came into being. Though they make claims regarding the distant past— connecting present concerns to supposedly ancient ones— this does not generally build upon a chronological claim about the beginning of the nation. The most illustrative example of this is Jünger. Jünger, in *The Worker*, argued that “ancient symbols” embody the “primal force” which gives form to the *Gestalt*<sup>455</sup> of a people. He credited the “romantic outlook” for recognizing that bourgeois society had not extinguished the “elemental”<sup>456</sup>— arguing that only those who engage “at every hour and every location in the elemental space” can resist the dominant culture.<sup>457</sup> The elemental, for Jünger, refers to basic biological functions— the “beating of the heart or the action of the kidneys” and psychology— the “yearning for play and adventures, for hate and love”<sup>458</sup>— not to the beginning of Germany. Furthermore, where Jünger saw the modern world succeeding in preserving the elemental, he spoke of nature reserves rather than monuments to the national founding.<sup>459</sup> This is undoubtedly primordialism, but it does not, as one might expect, involve evocations of founding fathers or moments of national birth. As a result, we require a more appropriate line of questioning. Fortunately, Heidegger provides us with help in this regard.

Heidegger’s understanding of time was idiosyncratic<sup>460</sup>— and he made clear, in *Being and Time*, that time must be “correctly viewed” if one is ever to grasp Being.<sup>461</sup> To that end, history as *Geschichte* must be distinguished from historiography. Heidegger explained in “Science and Reflection” that historiography explores the past in order “to make visible” a representation of the past.<sup>462</sup> In contrast, *Geschichte* concerns itself with what is “set in order and sent forth” to us when we encounter what is past.<sup>463</sup> Such a distinction resembles that made by George Grant, in *Time and History*, between *Historia* and *Geschichte*<sup>464</sup> and is described by Soffer as a distinction between the “lived, existential phenomenological historicity of man” and the “reflective scientific objectification” of the past.<sup>465</sup>

Specifically, Heidegger charted the paths that Western thought took to get to where it is today. This, Safranski notes, ties *Geschichte* to the *Seinsfrage*.<sup>466</sup> Indeed, as Heidegger himself put it in *What is Called Thinking?*, the “history of that thinking is at bottom a sequence of variations on this one theme.”<sup>467</sup> The span of this history runs from the moment we began to question Being to our present epoch. As Hoy notes, history and the “explicit theorizing of philosophy” begin only when something “inexplicit and inadequately conceptualized” such as Being, comes to be questioned.<sup>468</sup> Jonathan Salem-Wiseman explains the art of the *Geschichte*-historian as an attunement to the dominant way in which beings are revealed in a particular epoch.<sup>469</sup> Gregory Swer sees it as a capacity to grasp the different ways in which “being is realized”<sup>470</sup> in “different, overlapping episodes.”<sup>471</sup> What both are describing is an attempt to grasp what Mark Wrathall calls the “ontological background”<sup>472</sup>— the predominant way of thinking about Being— as it existed in the epoch in question. In short, we are to chart the development of our thinking about Being, rather than trying to establish an empirically verifiable historical record of philosophical writings. Heidegger would re-affirm this distinction throughout his career, but it is most clearly outlined in *On Time and Being*. Here, Heidegger clarified that Being does not have a history in precisely the way that a city has a history<sup>473</sup>— but is defined by the way in which Being is (mis)understood across a series of “epochs” defined by the predominant way of thinking about Being.<sup>474</sup> That is to say, this history charts the unfolding of the *Seinsfrage* across epochs defined, as Clark argues, by a particular approach to the question of Being.<sup>475</sup> The *Geschichte*-historian explores, in short, what Taminiaux called the “progressive maturation of fundamental ontology.”<sup>476</sup> Maturation implies, perforce, a beginning.

Caputo notes that one of the mysteries of Being is its primordial beginning.<sup>477</sup> In his Hölderlin lectures, Heidegger argued that the origin of “that which has purely sprung forth” is enigmatic and mysterious.<sup>478</sup> This enigma provokes the question of how one can engage productively with origins as a concept, an engagement which Heidegger clearly identifies as of vital importance. Strong described this as an “openness to the mystery” of that “which shows itself and at the same time withdraws”<sup>479</sup> while

Nancy characterised it as the acceptance of a gift.<sup>480</sup> Metaphorically, one can grasp the difference between being open to receiving a surprise gift and seeking out a particular thing, but it is far from self-evident what Heidegger is asking of us. What Heidegger stated explicitly, for example in *Being and Time*, is that origins are inaccessible to empirical questioning because ontological foundations are “always already there” and thus appear self-evident to empirical reasoning.<sup>481</sup> Structured from the present vantage point, Heidegger saw time as something which emerges from a being looking back on the past or forward to the future. Time is not extrinsic to *Dasein* and thus the questioning of history, for example, must begin with a consideration of the self and, by extension, of Being. This is a claim that Heidegger had previously substantiated in a work titled “Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” where Heidegger claimed that primordially can only be accessed via a historically oriented “self-critique” that is “without presuppositions.”<sup>482</sup> This implies a questioning of the self and the fundamental presuppositions that underly our encounter with the past rather than quibbling about this or that historical fact about Charlemagne or Frederick Barbarossa. It is also clear that we cannot turn from empiricism to a metaphorical exploration. Nor can we look to the anthropology of a Spengler—because, returning to *Being and Time*, treating Being like a phenomenon of nature then “stripping away” the artifice to reveal the nature of a thing presupposes “the phenomenon whose totality is to be re-established in the reconstruction.”<sup>483</sup> That is to say, a thought construct—like Spengler’s organism metaphor in *Decline of the West*—discards the question of what it means to be fairly quickly, asserting that the Being of a culture, in Spengler’s case, is analogous to an organism and proceeding rapidly to a discussion of the culture-as-organism. Like historical critique, thought experiments substitute the questioning of Being for the questioning of a metaphorical representation of Being.

Both approaches constitute the renunciation of the questioning of Being in favour of a questioning of something other than Being. The question of who the French and Germans are could quickly become the questioning of whether a Latin and *germanique* speaking Frank like Charlemagne should be considered

a Frenchman or a German or whether Barbarossa belongs as much to Italy, where he was also King, as to Germany. It is important to note that the problem is not the use of allegory or metaphor— these are undeniably useful parts of our philosophical vocabulary— but rather in the way that metaphors become the subject of contestation rather than a means to the end of discussing Being. This precludes any approach where we interrogate symbols as a stand in— because this makes the representation the locus of debate.

One might be tempted to dismiss the question of origins entirely.<sup>484</sup> However, in his Nietzsche lectures Heidegger presents another possibility, emerging from the dual meaning of the term *proteron*, which to the Greeks has the “twofold sense” of both *pros hēmas* (the sequential “first”) and *tēi physei* (the essential or ontological first).<sup>485</sup> This duality is also, as it happens, preset in our own Latinate word “primordial”— which can mean both “existing at or from the beginning” and “basic and fundamental.” Heidegger combined the two types of primordality in his definition of *vor-heriege* as “beforehand, from out of itself towards us.”<sup>486</sup> This sheds the sequential temporality of “primordial.” To inquire into *essential* origins means to think about that which constitutes the foundation of our Being. Though we need not refer to a chronological “first of all,” we must look to the past to find that which is passed down us. Elden explains this well, differentiating “experiential time,” emanating from the temporal experience of *Dasein*— which he links to *Geschichte*— from “clock-time,” which defines historiography.<sup>487</sup> Paul Gilbert calls the former “episodic” and the latter “serial” time.<sup>488</sup>

Heidegger was searching for origins, as he explained in *Basic Concepts*, alongside “bindingness for our history”<sup>489</sup>— in terms of its importance to our place in the world and the possibilities that emerge therefrom.<sup>490</sup> One can see how such an understanding of origins could make the claims of primordialist nationalism plausible, even true, in spite of the elusiveness of the empirical origins of a nation. Heidegger argued, in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” that “the origin of something is the source of its nature” and thus “that from and by which something is what it is.”<sup>491</sup> his questioning would not ask whether the nation has literally always existed. A more Heideggerian questioning would ask whether the nation represents

what Heidegger described in *Hölderlin's Hymns* as “that wherein *Dasein* is grounded”<sup>492</sup>— or that which is foundational to our Being. This analysis, returning to the Nietzsche lectures, would have to explore the viability of the nation as the *archē*— that on the basis of which we determine who we are and where we stand.<sup>493</sup> In other words, rather than asking if an origin concept is in keeping with the historical record, we ask if it articulates the foundations upon which the Being of a nation is built.

### The Originary Moment and The Concrete Situation

We have defined the primordial as that which lies at the foundations— that which is basic and fundamental. These foundations come to us from the past, no doubt, but need not lie at the chronological beginning. This kind of primordially is evident in the writing of Barrès, Mann, Jünger and Péguy. For example, the idea that national origins condition one’s fundamental characteristics<sup>494</sup> is common among all of these writers.<sup>495</sup> For Barrès, a “French temperament”<sup>496</sup> is learned from the “voice of our ancestors”<sup>497</sup>— which bequeaths us an “hereditary national order.”<sup>498</sup> Péguy tied the French spirit to a profound, common, interior resonance arising from the “internal voice,” common to those who are French.<sup>499</sup> Barrès believed that the French carried their history in their blood,<sup>500</sup> and thus posited strict barriers to entry into French being.<sup>501</sup> Generally, claims of this nature laud the characteristics of one’s own nation. For example, Mann celebrated the innate anti-radicalism of the German people; arguing, at the time of his *Reflections*, that radicalism betrays the German spirit.<sup>502</sup> Mann also recognized that nations tend, in reality, to be defined by disagreement rather than uniformity<sup>503</sup> and Péguy took this even further— arguing that France is characterized by a dialectic of traditionalism<sup>504</sup> and radicalism<sup>505</sup> summed up by his “*République/Royaume*” synthesis.<sup>506</sup> The relationship between the two was constant throughout French history.<sup>507</sup> Péguy claimed, in *Louis de Gonzagues*, that France must embrace, not resolve, this tension if it is to remain French.<sup>508</sup> Barrès would identify this same dichotomy at the heart of the French character—<sup>509</sup> between France the “emancipator of peoples”<sup>510</sup> and the “soldier of the Church”<sup>511</sup>— fruits of diverse

seasons, but one tree.<sup>512</sup> Barrès and Péguy substantiate Fox's identification of the love of a country as it is<sup>513</sup>— what Margaret Moore calls “an empirical given”<sup>514</sup>— as a central tenet of primordialist nationalism.

It is not just the character of the nation that is held to be primordial, but also certain key conditions. For Mann, the German historical situation is defined by an existential death-struggle<sup>515</sup> between, he told us in *This War*, the “soul and dream” of Germany and the rationalism of France.<sup>516</sup> Within this context, Germany's potentialities of Being are circumscribed.<sup>517</sup> This contemporary conflict is simply the continuation of the primordial struggle<sup>518</sup> between the German protest<sup>519</sup>— which stands for a German revolt against universalism and rationalism,<sup>520</sup> and the Romano-Catholic impulse which post-revolutionary France embodied in his time.<sup>521</sup> Jünger identified a connection between a contemporary German struggle for *Kultur* against *Zivilisation*<sup>522</sup> and the historical resistance of the German tribes against Rome and her Church.<sup>523</sup> Our French interlocutors disagree neither with respect to the essential importance of the Franco-German enmity nor the grounds of their dispute. The notion of France and Germany as existential enemies was long-lived — underpinning Ernest Renan's, Friedrich Meinecke's and, even much later, Rogers Brubaker's<sup>524</sup> dichotomies of nationalism. Even Barrès, a great critic of cosmopolitanism, recognized a French predilection for universalizing the local<sup>525</sup> and linked France's conflicts with Germany to a preternatural need to universalize what they see as the good.<sup>526</sup> Though Péguy would, in *Les Suppliants Parrallèles*, describe an existential struggle between a revolutionary France and a counterrevolutionary Germany,<sup>527</sup> the struggle into which his France is thrown is, for him, primarily internal.<sup>528</sup>

Common to Mann, Péguy, Barrès, and Jünger— alongside rather reductive generalizations— is the notion that a nation enters into history with an already formed character which conditions its relation to— and authentic possibilities within— a situation emanating from the same primordial origin. All assert the existence of certain primordial characteristics considered ownmost to each national being— which pervade across their unfolding in history<sup>529</sup>— and a relation to a primordial “concrete situation”— which “holds sway” over the possibilities available to a nation or national people. Thus, a primordialist nationalist

conception of *Eigentlichkeit* could be understood as an embrace of that which is characteristic of our engagement with the concrete situation into which we are thrown. What remains unclear, though, is what these origins actually are.

The notion that the origins of a nation are a poetical, rather than empirical, phenomenon is a common belief. Jünger, for example, argued that only poetry<sup>530</sup> can reveal to us the elemental. Barrès too argued, in *Gentlemen and Officers*, that it is in art and in poetry<sup>531</sup> that France's "moral force"<sup>532</sup> and "vision of life and man" can be found.<sup>533</sup> Mann sees the poet as one who is able to speak the language of "beauty, gesture, and passion,"<sup>534</sup> and holds that it is the poets who can properly articulate the German origin.<sup>535</sup> Péguy was the most Heideggerian here. For him, the great poet functions like a spokesperson for the spirit of the nation,<sup>536</sup> poetizing France's originary internal conflict.<sup>537</sup> Common to all is the sense that it is through poetry that we access the foundational. Origins are found by looking to poetic accounts of the primordial character of the nation and the concrete situation in which it unfolds. Thus, the primordial is an ontological first of all, a post-facto poetical construct which emerges when a community becomes self-consciously a community and is able to articulate its primordial essence and originary concrete situation. In simple terms, a nation is born when it is able to forge for itself an origin myth.

In sum, the originary moment is not found in the historical record—they are not seeking to question whether France, for example, begins with the coronation of Charlemagne or Napoleon's *Levée en Masse*—but in an altogether more mystical source. It is largely a matter of the coming into being of a community of people united by certain characteristics, emerging from the conditions under which the nation entered into history and pervading the character of community members as they act in the world. Nations find themselves thrown into an unfolding concrete situation, a primordial condition which often concerns the relation to neighbouring communities, and to which one must relate in a particular way in order to belong, authentically, to the community. Of course, implicit to this would seem to be the counterclaim that failing to relate to history in this way is inauthentic, carrying within it a justification for excluding those who may

have reason to relate differently to the fellowship— even demarcating them as the enemies within. Parts of a society whose historical experience may be in one way or another discomfiting to the wider narrative would seem particularly vulnerable to such an exclusion— a danger which we will discover in Heidegger’s thought as well. Finally, one finds the claim that poetry is an integral part of both the establishment of the national being and our coming to know it. In short, the origin of a national community is a mysterious, poetical-mythological source which pervades in our Being and holds sway over our relation to the world. Notably, the claims explored above can be separated into two types: claims regarding the context into which members of a national community are thrown and claims regarding the characteristics of the people who are thus thrown. This provides us with an interesting point of comparison with Heidegger.

### Wellsprings

In order to articulate how the origin concept must be understood, Heidegger grasped for “primal words.” These words, he explained in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, need not be of ancient origin but must emerge from an “essential and originary human experience,”<sup>538</sup> untainted by *Seinsvergessenheit*. Heidegger experimented with different words. For example, in the 1926 work *Basic Concepts* Heidegger used the language of “inception” in his discussion of Anaximander’s foundational role in Western thinking,<sup>539</sup> but eventually turned, as in *The Introduction to Metaphysics*, to terms such as *Parousia*<sup>540</sup> and *Anwesen*<sup>541</sup> as enunciations of the originary moment as a coming to presence of a thing as such. However, in his Hölderlin lectures Heidegger couched this concept in terms that speak directly to the matter at hand. He described the “pure origin” as a “commencement whose power constantly leaps over what has sprung forth, outlasts it in leaping ahead of it, and is thus present in the grounding of that which remains.”<sup>542</sup> The language of springing points us towards a vital concept: the wellspring.

When Hölderlin speaks of the Alpine source of the Rhine, we are not to see in this an “illustrative image”<sup>543</sup> that symbolizes the birthplace of the German spirit. Neither can we hope to uncover the

wellspring of German *Dasein* by some kind of philosophical elaboration of Hölderlin's imagery.<sup>544</sup> The wellspring only becomes knowable to us when we learn to hear as the poets hear. When Hölderlin listens to the Rhine, he hears the "pining of the as-yet fettered river, of the origin before its leap, yet pressing forward in its readiness to leap."<sup>545</sup> The poet is able to see that the course of the river belongs to the originary wellspring, and is only apprehended when experienced from within its unfolding.<sup>546</sup> Only when we see the river having flowed can we understand the "originary thrust" of the water spurting from the source, and see that it "manifests something decisive."<sup>547</sup> Heidegger is articulating, in metaphorical language, that the wellspring is simultaneously a thing that has passed<sup>548</sup> *and* something ongoing.<sup>549</sup>

This poetically articulated wellspring contains that which Heidegger, drawing upon Rilke, described as the "unheard of centre."<sup>550</sup> The unheard-of centre functions as a primordial source, or wellspring, from which Being emerges and unfolds— even determining the nature of that unfolding. Simultaneously, there is an ongoing quality to the beginnings represented by a wellspring. A river does not 'spring' once but continues to spring even as each molecule it gives forth flows downstream. That from which something emerges, Heidegger explained in *Basic Concepts*, contains a "threefold unity" of egress, pervasion, and dominion.<sup>551</sup> We can summarize this as follows: Heidegger understood the originary moment as the emergence of Being into apprehensibility (egress), an emergence whose character will shape the thing throughout its unfolding in time (pervasion), determining the possibilities of that unfolding and how we may interact with that thing (dominion). Thus, we can see that the Heideggerian conception of the wellspring-as-origin is comparable to the articulation of primordiality found among the primordialist nationalists. However, certain key differences emerge from the comparison.

We must not consider ourselves above statements of the obvious. Heidegger was an existential philosopher and our primordialist nationalist interlocutors were not. Heidegger concerned himself primarily with the meaning of Being<sup>552</sup>— and certainly did not limit his inquiry to the particular being of his national people. Rather, Heidegger sought to get to grips with the Being of beings. This line of

questioning calls us to something, as the primary matter of concern, which precedes the poetic creation which, as we have seen, is foundational for primordialist nationalism. Indeed, as we “venture forth to the most primordial problematic of the things themselves,”<sup>553</sup> the foundations that are taken as *a priori* even in the statement that “the nation came into being with *x*” are to be questioned, not assumed. In simpler terms, the origin myths discussed above seek, essentially, to answer the question of how a particular nation came into being. They define the essence of the character of a nation’s being, avoiding the question of the essence of Being itself. Primordialist nationalism takes *Being* as a given, building the national character upon this basis. This renders the thing itself subservient to the idea and makes the primordial ground an unquestioned *a priori*.<sup>554</sup> In short, the originary questioning of Being, even in the specific sense of the Being of a national people, is lost when the questioning of *Dasein* is replaced by an analysis of “national spirits.”

With Heidegger, a degree of ambiguity characterizes the relationship between a particular community and Being as such. It should be noted that, as Richard Detsch points out, at different points in Heidegger’s career the relationship between the German people and the *Seinsfrage* is understood differently.<sup>555</sup> In his earlier works, Heidegger tended to associate the questioning of Being with the history of the “West,” rather than solely Germany. In his 1931 Hegel lectures, for example, he went as far as to argue that “there is no philosophy other than western philosophy”<sup>556</sup> and would, the following year in *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, substantiate this claim by tying the thinking of being to the legacy of the pre-Socratic Greeks.<sup>557</sup> Perhaps unsurprisingly, this connection between a Greek past and Western present takes a more chauvinistic turn during the period of the Third Reich, with the claim, in the 1934-35 Hölderlin lectures that the Germans are endowed with a special ability to “come to be struck by” Being<sup>558</sup>— though even here he credits the Greeks as precursors whose endowment was “a rousing proximity to the fire from the heavens.”<sup>559</sup> Nevertheless, even during this period Heidegger would speak elsewhere in terms of the West. For example, in the infamous rectoral address of 1933, Heidegger re-

iterated the Greekness of Germany's origins and argued that it is the *Westerner*, not solely the German, who "stands up to the totality of what is"<sup>560</sup>— a claim that is re-iterated in a 1941's *Basic Concepts*.<sup>561</sup> Even in his post-war "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger rejected the idea of the Germans remaking the world in their image and asserted that Germans are subject to a "fateful belongingness to the nations" along with whom "they might become world-historical." In the same sentence, though, Heidegger claimed that "the homeland of this historical [German] dwelling is nearness to Being."<sup>562</sup> He also clarified that the essential is not found in the "egoism of the nation"— and he separated his view of the West from a negative identity defined by non-Easternness— but in terms of "nearness to the [Greek] source."<sup>563</sup> There are a couple of important things to note here. Firstly, it should be clarified that the credit given to the Greeks is pertinent to the question of primordiality but does not represent, in itself, a major point of distinction between Heidegger and the primordialist nationalists. Indeed, assertions of a classical inheritance have been a fairly consistent feature of European nationalisms for centuries. However, the Greeks are not posited as proto-Germans by Heidegger, nor is their contribution simply a matter of preparing for the emergence of the German nation. They are, in some ways, the superiors of the modern Germans, with a relation to Being that is to be envied. More importantly, the way in which Heidegger maintained ambiguity regarding precisely how unique Germany's place is vis-à-vis the West is difficult to reconcile with the claims of unique national virtue of the primordialist nationalists. Heidegger is by no means a universalist, and he is not renowned for modesty on behalf of Germany, but there is ambiguity about the particular Germanness of the *Seinsgeschichte*.

Furthermore, Heidegger made clear in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* that it is an error to seek clarity by reference to the collective because "there is no being to which we are closer than the one we ourselves are."<sup>564</sup> We cannot use a national group identity as a stand-in for ourselves. Here we are in accordance with John C. Caputo, who argues that one cannot seek "awakening from the oblivion of being" simply by positing some mysterious "primordial beginning" and thinking one has found the "secret of a

New Dawn.”<sup>565</sup> This remains the case even where this it allows for what Mitchell calls a “prevailing situation”<sup>566</sup>— a term referring to the broad, thematic way in which portray the significance of the moment in time that we inhabit to ourselves— to be posited as a salve for conflict and confusion.<sup>567</sup> In simple terms, our primordialist nationalists began with an idea of the national spirit and worked backwards to place it into historical situations like the Roman invasions or battles between France and Germany. This does not align with Heidegger’s belief that one should begin with Being and not shy away from the ambiguities of the real.

A reliable gage of the relationship between the primordialist nationalist and the Heideggerian conception of the role of the poet can be found in comparing Heidegger’s poets to his interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power as art. This shows that the primordialist nationalist conception of the poet as spokesperson of the essence of a nation is closer to Nietzsche’s value-positing creative intellect than to Heidegger’s poet as retriever of the original saying of Being. Heidegger credited Nietzsche with realizing that is more than merely a “cultural phenomenon” or “monument to civilization.”<sup>568</sup> Instead, he understood it as part of a broader phenomenon of creativity, wherein the will to power makes itself visible in the bringing into being of a thing.<sup>569</sup> Nietzsche’s artist is thus a participant<sup>570</sup> in creation who is able to bring something forth,<sup>571</sup> to establish it in and as being. Art, for Nietzsche, becomes the highest value— creating things and by extension revealing possibilities for *life*.<sup>572</sup> As with Heidegger, the capacity of art to create beauty is paramount.<sup>573</sup> Art allows for truth to be found in the sensuous, a direct relationship— contra Plato— between art and the bringing-forth of truth.

Interestingly, Heidegger shares Nietzsche’s distaste for Richard Wagner, who he feels elevates pure sensation<sup>574</sup> and emotion as a kind of narcotic in the place of a genuine bringing forth of truth.<sup>575</sup> This clashes with Barrès and Péguy, both of whom saw national consciousness as a phenomenon of pure passion.<sup>576</sup> Mann best exemplified this, arguing that a romantic, confessional style of art— part of a “musical, contrapuntal experience of the world”<sup>577</sup>— could reveal to Germans their historical essence.<sup>578</sup>

Mann's artist has an "inalienable right to individual ethos" and may not be deprived of his "evangelical freedom, even in times of the strictest social constraint."<sup>579</sup> In this way, Mann's artists and poets, beholden to nothing besides their artistic calling, resemble the creative intellect of Nietzsche— bringing forth the thing according to their will-to-power— rather than the Heideggerian poet founder— who, as we will discuss, has rather less freedom to create.

For Heidegger, the poet retrieves the essence of a thing from the realm of concealment and brings it forth into the world whereas the Nietzschean artist *is* the source of the thing brought into the world. This requires some clarification. The key difference is that the "thing" whose essence art reveals is, for Heidegger, external to the artist himself while for Nietzsche, it is a direct emanation of the artist's will to power. For Heidegger, the artist is like an intermediary, retrieving the thing from concealment and bringing it into unconcealment. In Clark's terms, Heidegger's conception of the artwork "is not simply the creative projection"<sup>580</sup> of an artist. In fact, the artist is not even the primary source of the work.<sup>581</sup> The Nietzschean artist is a fundamentally metaphysical figure, discerning the "main features" of the thing— to be emphasized— and striking away what is ancillary.<sup>582</sup> Art, so understood, is *technē*, the application of technique to bring forth what is willed with the greatest fidelity. To the extent, then, that primordialist nationalism posits the origin concept as a poetical construction— a new beginning tied, as Hoy puts it, to a "new poetics"<sup>583</sup>— without drawing this poetizing back to the grounding question— the question of Being— they are closer to Heidegger's Nietzsche— a salutary metaphysician— than to Heidegger.

One cannot overstate the importance of this distinction, not only for the comparison that is being made here but for nationalism as a whole. Heidegger discusses, in *What is Called Thinking?*, the impact of logistics— the application of mathematical thinking to the physical environment— and notes that it is displacing all other considerations.<sup>584</sup> Heidegger's sophisticated discussion of poetry appeals a great deal to those who believe art to be something more than decoration and would welcome another tool to defend it from those who, for one reason or another, would see it neglected. It is equally appealing to those who

suspect that the arts might contain within them some truth that cannot be captured by an algorithm. It is perhaps for this reason that so much of the appeal of nationalism lies in its capacity to present itself as the defender of the beauty of a nation's tradition<sup>585</sup>— against “others” deemed to be cultural vandals. That nationalism *itself* might engage in vandalism— twisting the beauty of the poetic into a monument to the “genius” of the nation, alienating it from its essential grounding in truth— distances it from this most appealing aspect of Heidegger's thought, and so undermines one of nationalism's most potent claims.

We are left with an important question. If Heidegger's origin concept differs from what we found among the primordialist nationalists, what kind of understanding of origins does he call us towards instead? It is clear, from the discussion thus far, that Heidegger's understanding of authentic temporality demands an interaction of some kind between the historical situation of *Dasein* and Being. As such, the remainder of this chapter will proceed with a discussion of this relationship, the role of art and poetry in articulating it and, finally, the way that this speaks to the question of origins through the figure of the founder poet.

### § *Poetically Man Finds*

*Dasein*'s relation to Being emerges from a particular context. Therefore, looking to the origins of one's community and attending to Being as an historical matter are not unrelated tasks. When a thoughtful person looks to the history of their community, they become aware that there is history outside of it. This can lead to a confrontation with the broader historical context within which a people's history occurred. We can even come to confront time itself in our exploration of the history of our people. Thus, an engagement with history, including with the question of origins, should combine a consideration of beings and Being.

For Heidegger, the human being is, in Newell's words, “the being who wonders about the source of all Beings.”<sup>586</sup> In other words, an essential part of what it means to be human is to question who we are, and because an essential part of who we are is our curiosity about “the source of all beings” (Being), a genuine historical questioning contains within itself the *Seinsfrage*. Heidegger explained this in

*Contributions*. He argued that “the projecting-open unfolds the thrower and at the same time seizes it within what opens up.”<sup>587</sup> In other words, in thinking seriously about Being (“projecting open”) we learn about our own *Dasein* (“unfolds the thrower”) while we learn about our belonging, as beings, within the broader category of Being (“what opens up”). As such, the question of origins, as described here, is not solely a matter of historical interest, but is tied to the quest for proper self-understanding and an authentic relation to Being. The relationship between the ontic— the beings that we think about— and the ontological— the way we think about Being— are combined in an authentic historical questioning of origins. In fact, in order to attain what Heidegger called the “new beginning”— the starting point of a new thinking about Being<sup>588</sup>— we must “win back” the other beginning.<sup>589</sup> Thus, going back to the beginnings is to be a central part of the reclaiming of Being from metaphysics— again tying historical analysis— though analysis of the history of metaphysics described in the first chapter rather than the nationalistic origins discourse discussed in this chapter— to the *Seinsfrage*. The authentic *Dasein*, in Dahlstrom’s terms, “triangulates”<sup>590</sup> between the Being and beings. Thus, the originary moment is best understood as an entry into the relationship between Being and beings. The way in which we enter this relationship is through art.

### The Work of Art

The work of art, Heidegger explained in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” “says something other than the mere thing itself” and “makes public something other than itself.”<sup>591</sup> We cannot, therefore, reduce the *objet d’art* to a mere vessel for meaning— depriving it of its character as a thing-in-itself. In other words, we must not dismiss the physical presence of the object as merely incidental, with the real import lying in what it symbolizes.<sup>592</sup> The thingliness of it remains integral to what it is. At the same time, it would be an error to reduce the work of art purely to its material, to understand music as merely acoustic vibrations for example. Here too an integral part of what the *objet d’art* is, its meaning and symbolism, is sidelined and the thing is not grasped.<sup>593</sup> Heidegger explained in “Language” that poetry should be understood as authentic *speech*— a “primal calling” which “bids the intimacy of the world and thing to come.”<sup>594</sup> Poetry

portrays its subjects not only as instances of being— *genera* taken in isolation— but also locates them within a world brought forth by the work of art.<sup>595</sup> The primal and authentic speaking of poetic language occupies the in-between of “thing-world and world-thing.” That is to say, it reveals to us the way its subject fits into the network of relations that makes up its world whilst simultaneously showing us that the world itself can emanate from out of that subject. Strong demonstrated this via Heidegger’s analysis of Van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes, which simultaneously shows us how the shoes fit into the peasant’s world and that the world of the peasant can be opened to us by the poetical rendition of the shoe-object.<sup>596</sup>

Esoteric as it sounds, this is rather intuitive. When we look upon a work of art, the world in which it is situated unfolds before us in our meditations on the objects before us. For example, when we look at Constable’s “The Hay Wain,” we see an object before us, the wain, which makes up a part of the network of relations that form the world of the English yeoman, a tool that forms part of the work of “taking care” of the “business” of rural life. Simultaneously, our meditation upon that object allows to unfold before us the world around the wain— the being of the yeoman’s world. The wain is simultaneously part of a world, and a worlding thing. Jonathan Salem-Wiseman clarifies that art should not be thought of as a constant, something which can be defined categorically with hard borders demarcating it from the artless. Rather, it should be considered a process, historical in nature, where a community gains an understanding of its being.<sup>597</sup> This, Zimmerman tells us, “opens up new ways in which entities can manifest themselves.”<sup>598</sup> In simple terms, the artwork is the space— think of a canvas— within which an artist or poet makes visible to us a being that has become, incrementally, over time. In doing so, it allows us, when we are attuned to hear it,<sup>599</sup> to experience hints of the lost direct relation to Being.

Though poetry is ostensibly one form of art among many, Heidegger certainly elevated it to a prestigious position among the arts. Heidegger argued, in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” that it allows us to dwell on the earth.<sup>600</sup> Poets are defined, Taminiaux noted, by their capacity to see what is,<sup>601</sup> to articulate, Corngold notes, the states of mind that we all experience<sup>602</sup> and to do so, Gelvin reminded us,

in beautiful language.<sup>603</sup> Most importantly, Harries explains, the poet knows how to preserve the silence.<sup>604</sup> Poetic “creation” has the capacity<sup>605</sup> to communicate those things that are most highly valued by Heidegger. It conveys truths concerning “the thinking of Being,” and, interestingly, the founding of a “political state.”<sup>606</sup> The poetic work brings a truth that already stands in the realm of concealment— that is to say a truth that already exists but to which we are not yet privy— and causes it to shine forth.<sup>607</sup>

Heidegger substantiates this argument in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*, where he explains that poetry is “capable of the telling of beyng”<sup>608</sup> because it speaks not *about* Being but *from out of* Being. The poet engages in a “creating that has no object,” a matter of “intimating” and “waiting.”<sup>609</sup> What is achieved is not a semblance that brings forth new possibilities, but an illumination of existing forms. It provides us with hints and intimations,<sup>610</sup> glimpses of Being as such which connect the particular experience of a particular *Dasein* to the origins of Being as such. It is the poetization of the origins of an historical *Dasein*, a poetization which speaks to both particular beginnings and to Being *qua* Being, which is the wellspring from which *Dasein* springs forth. In doing so, it also unveils a profound “originary unity” between the stability of Being and the flux of becoming,<sup>611</sup> and thus reveals that *Dasein* is thoroughly pervaded by its having been thrown from the origin. Heidegger elaborates upon this idea in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where he argues that in the metaphysical language of our time, we insist upon thinking of Being and becoming as two concepts that are in opposition to one another— often associating the former with Parmenides and the latter with Heraclitus.<sup>612</sup> However, Heraclitus and Parmenides themselves— having access to the pre-Socratic way of looking at Being itself<sup>613</sup>— did not, as the conventional interpretation goes, place Being and becoming in opposition.<sup>614</sup> Their capacity to access a pure language, in short, got them beyond the artifices and false-oppositions that, for Heidegger, lie at the foundations of the modern experience of Being. They were able to allow the strife between Being and becoming to be a site for the pursuit of the *Seinsfrage*. Poetry is the closest extant approximation of this purer, more direct pre-Socratic Greek way of approaching Being. Nevertheless, we still lack clarity as to precisely what this

foundational, poetically uncovered wellspring is, how we come into consciousness of it and how, in Martin Buber's language, it "ripples towards" us from "some prehistorical age"?<sup>615</sup> It is clear that it is through poetry that we encounter fundamental truths about the origins of our Being, but also of our people. There is, here, an interplay between poetry as a means of articulating the unstable and mysterious relation that we have to Being and the role of a poet as one who speaks to and about *das Volk*.

The role of the poet in national life is a contested subject in the scholarly literature on Heidegger. While poetry is clearly vital to the capacity of *Dasein* to encounter Being directly, it is not clear how political the poet ought to be. Feenberg, Hofstadter and Peterson have understood Heidegger's poets as oriented primarily towards existential philosophy<sup>616</sup>— charged with liberating us from the technological modes of thinking which dominate,<sup>617</sup> not with founding national consciousness.' Poetry is, as Dallmayr put it, the "eminent mode of the epiphany of being" where we hear the "original voice or language of a people"<sup>618</sup> and thus apprehend the "wink of the gods" that turns us towards the "constitution of Being."<sup>619</sup> It is, though, in Dallmayr's evocation of the language *of a people* that the political role of poetry can be seen. Zimmerman sees poetry as oriented towards the generation of something "useful to humanity,"<sup>620</sup> an instrument which Zuckert notes was often used by Heidegger for nationalistic ends.<sup>621</sup> Strong too saw the poetic, in Heidegger, as oriented towards the formation of a political space,<sup>622</sup> which Cerrato calls the "proper place of the national community."<sup>623</sup> Bourdieu, employing the *double lecture* described previously, sees poetic language as part of a distinction of the sacred<sup>624</sup> and the profane, a highly political hierarchy separating initiates who speak the poetic language from plebs who cannot.<sup>625</sup> As such, the poetic retrieval of origins would be, for Bourdieu, a radically political act.<sup>626</sup>

Poetry can certainly be political. This is complicated— as Strong noted— by the fact that Heidegger "leaves us with more to do"<sup>627</sup> and did not provide a theory, nor even an extensive treatment, of the concept of the political. Nevertheless, the poetical was listed by Heidegger, in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, alongside the "work of the *polis* as the site of history that grounds and preserves."<sup>628</sup> He

illustrated this, in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” by describing the way in which Athenian temples were *public* forms of art which opened citizens to the world of the Athenian people.<sup>629</sup> These temples revealed the Athenians place in their universe— their glimpse of the gods<sup>630</sup> and their belonging to the Athenian *polis*. The work, as Heidegger put it, “opens up a *world*.”<sup>631</sup> Works are not solely designed to be beautiful or speak to the citizens about their gods but are intended to form a nodal point at the centre of the political space.<sup>632</sup> That is to say, the temple was to convey, in its architecture, the social and political order as well as the identity of the city. While Andrew is correct to note that poetry is far removed from the “blaring of microphones,”<sup>633</sup> Heidegger clearly posited that poetry concerns us in terms of the *res publica* and here agreed with Mann, who also rejected “*l’art pour l’art*” in favour of “art as ethics.” The world built by art is, for Mann, “like a building [...] bound without mortar”<sup>634</sup>— an illustration of a very Heideggerian conception of art as that which shapes the shared world of an historical *Dasein*.

However, for Heidegger, the poetic must bring forth truth [as *aletheia*, meaning disclosure or unconcealment] — not just something pleasing, useful, or edifying. It cannot, in short, simply be a form of political propaganda. In fact, propaganda stands in opposition to Heidegger’s ideal of art, as can be seen in his critique of Nietzsche’s claim that “we have art so as not to perish from truth.”<sup>635</sup> For Heidegger, the conception of art as a salutary illusion cannot stand when artistic illusions obscure the shortcomings which we must face up to in order to overcome metaphysics. This is not, it should be noted, a distinction between hard facts and poetic fancy. Heidegger presented the relationship between Being and seeming in *Introduction to Metaphysics*<sup>636</sup>— arguing that semblance place a vital role in revealing to us that something beyond what seems is being obscured (a saving power of sorts). Illusion, though, is by definition subterfuge, seeking to divert us from any notion that what we are seeing may not be entirely the truth and thereby concealing the concealedness of Being. Therefore, assertions of origin carry a poetic truth-revealing character only if they truly illuminate the historical *Dasein* of a people and must justify themselves on those grounds. Salem-Wiseman crystallizes this into three truth-telling characteristics of the

work of art: the clarification of the world of a historical community, an “embeddedness” in the public collective conscience and an historical specificity to the community in question.<sup>637</sup> All art is, for Heidegger, an exercise in the poetic,<sup>638</sup> and poetry is the most important means by which we bring the truths that concern us, at the end of metaphysics, into unconcealment. In short, art and poetry are the wellspring—the *Ursprung*, literally, the primal leap-<sup>639</sup> from which the truth of a thing can be brought before us—without the imposition of a metaphysical lens— from out of its own essence and nature. The poet nevertheless needs an audience. Our discovering the essence of an historical *Dasein* is not simply a matter of the poet presenting their discovery to us— it is not sufficient merely for the poet to find the right words and place them in the right order. The poet, in order to perform their role, depends upon their audience having the capacity to truly hear.<sup>640</sup>

### The Founder Poet

Above all, poetry builds for us our place of dwelling,<sup>641</sup> forming the spiritual world of a people.<sup>642</sup> This presages the Heideggerian conception of taking up or taking over the thrown that will be discussed in the next chapter. It was given a distinctly nationalistic aspect in “the German Student as Worker”— where Heidegger evoked a “concealed tradition of heredity [*Vererbung*] of essential predispositions and instinctual directives.”<sup>643</sup> Here, in other words, Heidegger is relating the poetically founded dwelling space to precisely the originary characteristics (essential predispositions) and concrete situations (instinctual directives) discussed above. Though Heidegger was usually far less overt in making such a connection, he always accorded to the poet a uniquely elevated position in the life of a nation, and here we can speak without compunction in terms of the nation because Heidegger identified *Germania* as poetized by Hölderlin as the “fundamentally first” origin of the historical *Dasein* of his people.<sup>644</sup>

The poet is the only real equal of the philosopher,<sup>645</sup> and, importantly, is uniquely able to “hear” the origin. This hearing arises from the capacity of poetry to speak and hear being in an originary way, to strip it of all the accoutrements applied by metaphysics and technology, simply naming the thing. As such,

it the poet who is capable of “an originary apprehending of what the origin then is as such.”<sup>646</sup> This capacity to hear and speak “originally,” empowers poetizing as that which can found, as the poet alone can apprehend the essence of Being as such and to tell [*Sagen*] this essence via poetic language so as to bring it forth into the world by the placing of a “myth [*Sage*] into the *Dasein* of a people.”<sup>647</sup> Furthermore, this origin must be poetized in the primordial language of a people, providing the link between the shared world and the primordial origins, so as to become the primary means by which we are historical.<sup>648</sup>

Poetry gives an historical *Dasein* the heritage that is its “ownmost” and thus the substance of the temporal *Da*. It is not the history of textbooks, perverted by the metaphysical outlook of the research men who wrote them, but the words of the poets which found, in Zimmerman’s terms, the historical epoch<sup>649</sup> or, in those of Strong, the polis in the work of art.<sup>650</sup> These constructions are specific to the nations for whom they are intended and are comprehensible, often very compelling, to their audience. Poetry is not simply a matter of meditating on the world, it speaks to and for a people. It thus has political valence. At the same time, a poetical propaganda would lack the clarification of essential “truth” about an historical *Dasein*, obscuring it behind edifying fictions which aim to ennoble above all. Bourdieu was undoubtedly correct in noting that the act of positing a hierarchy between elevated, sacred, poetic language and the ordinary language that can be understood without expensive cultural education is inherently political. However, one should not read into the poetry itself a practical-political purpose. Poetry, in short, speaks to a national community. Poetry articulates the form that the national community takes, its meaning, in short, its Being— but it is not, and cannot be, nationalistic propaganda.<sup>651</sup>

The poet, drawing upon a capacity to speak being originally, brings forth the hidden essence of an historical *Dasein* from concealment into unconcealment. This originary saying, taking the form usually of a contestable myth around which dialogue flourishes, establishes the world within which dwells the *Dasein* of a people. It does this by letting the essence of the thing shine forth and placing it into the world such that it may be embodied by a people who are attuned to its bestowal. It cannot be the pure invention of a

creative intellect able to summon a thing from the realm of ideas according to its will-to-power. It must be external to and independent from the poet, who is more of a facilitator bringing it before the people in a way that may, hopefully, captivate them. The founder poet must bring something of the truth of the essence of an historical *Dasein* into light so as to establish the historical realm wherein man, poetically, may dwell. Importantly, for our purposes, Heidegger described this poetically founded historical *Dasein*, in his analysis of Hölderlin, in terms of the homeland.<sup>652</sup>

There is an ambiguous relationship, then, between the poet as founder of homelands and the poet as explorer of Being. Heidegger speaks most directly to this in his discussion of Goethe— who he did not always admire. Heidegger used the example, in *Basic Concepts*, of Goethe’s line “Above all summits/ Is rest” as an example of how dwelling in the homeland and the need to explore Being can be reconciled. In these lines, the word “is” was not employed in order to extract the meaning of Being from the experience of seeing rest above the summits. Goethe, Heidegger told us, simply allows the word “is” to stand before us with “the inexhaustibility of a wealth to which we are not immediately equal”<sup>653</sup> revealing to us our lacking in something— an understanding of Being— which Heidegger also indicates is connected to that which we desire, rest. At first glance, in fact, the word appears to do nothing more than simply denote that something is about to be named: rest. The “is,” thus understood merely as a copula, shows itself, in Goethe’s lines, to be without content. Goethe did not tell us what is means to be at rest, nor what it means to be at all, he simply revealed to us the poverty of meaning that characterizes the simple employment of the word is.<sup>654</sup> We recognize, in reading the words, that restfulness is something we desire, and that it lies just beyond our grasp (above all summits). More importantly, we come to realize that it is the poverty of our conception of the “is” which makes this rest so elusive. Goethe showed us that Being, the meaning of “is,” exists for us simultaneously as that most obvious of things, a simple copula denoting a thing to be named, and that most elusive of things, the essence of our relation to that which is named. The poetic, then, brings us from the everyday and quotidian— such as the use of simple words like “is”— to the fundamental

guiding question of metaphysics, the question of Being. It shows us that dwelling in our homeland, at rest, will never be possible until we get to the bottom of what the “is” means in this context— that there is an innate connection between Being and being-at-rest or being-at-home. However, the first step in the path to this eventual state of rest is the recognition of the poverty of meaning, the essential mystery, which characterizes our current relationship with the *Seinsfrage*— with the meaning of “is.”

The idea that the role of the poet is not to try to resolve the mysteries of Being, but to turn us towards precisely their mysterious quality— as Goethe does above— is a constant refrain of Heidegger’s early works which presents a significant challenge to the primordialist nationalists— with the possible exception of Péguy, whose embrace of *la mystique française* would no doubt allow for the mysterious to remain mysterious. Where they sought to, in their manner, demystify the origins of their nations by presenting fairly clear notions of originary characteristic and the concrete situation, they found themselves in conflict with the Heideggerian exhortation always to encounter the mysterious, through art and poetry, in such a way as to protect its mysterious character. In his 1934-5 analysis of Hölderlin, for example, Heidegger highlighted the importance of always encountering the poetic in a poetic manner<sup>655</sup>— rather than trying to transform it into something akin to a treatise. In his 1936-37 lectures on language, he called upon his students to respond to authentic language by throwing themselves into it, without trying to rationalize or analyse it according to some novel method.<sup>656</sup> Most importantly, in *Contributions*, Heidegger highlighted the significance of the originary tension between what is evident and what remains sheltered from us — which is proper to authentic Being in particular.<sup>657</sup> Most directly, in a 1941 work titled *Basic Concepts*, Heidegger stated that encountering Being in its wholeness requires forswearing the desire to resolve what is discordant— through a dialectic for example.<sup>658</sup> The poet, in short, turns kindred souls towards a relation to being that is within reach today yet beyond our grasp. To demystify the mysterious, to bastardize origins into a neat and tidy formulation surely represents a failure to guard the mystery of the faded traces of “the fugitive gods”— the relation to Being that we have lost and must find anew.

## Primordality

Over the course of this chapter a complex picture has emerged. We found that primordialist nationalism does not necessarily depend upon an engagement with the historical moment of the founding or birth of a nation, something which is also not the case with respect to Heidegger. Instead, Mann, Jünger, Barrès, and Péguy were found to be focused on positing certain characteristics of a national people and a particular historical situation as being primordial to a nation, something which, *prima facie*, appeared well aligned with Heidegger's view of experiential— as opposed to chronological— primordality. Furthermore, both they and Heidegger were found to give a particular precedence to the poetic as a result of its unique capacity to speak to these kinds of origins. However, Heidegger's understanding of the wellspring always calls us to the ultimate source, that of Being itself, rather than merely to the origins of a particular nation or national spirit. Instead, Heidegger ties the poetic questioning of history directly to the questioning of Being and values art only insofar as it can open us to Being, rejecting the kind of art that might, instead, mislead or mollify. Heidegger, we found, elevates poetry to a particularly illustrious position among the arts as it has a particular capacity to bring the truths of Being before us. There is an interesting tension between the poets potentially political role in the life of a nation and their role as our envoys into the realm of the *Seinsfrage*. This tension can only be resolved by those great founder poets who are able to show us that the task of belonging to the homeland and the task of exploring Being are complimentary and mutual rather than oppositional. In short, our primordality as peoples and as Beings are intimately connected.

However, they are not identical, and it is for this reason that nothing here clears Heidegger of the charge levelled at nationalism earlier in this chapter: that there is an inherent danger of excluding and even demonizing groups of different origins. Especially when combined with Heidegger's failure to properly account for diversity and, of course, his prejudices, there is an inherent danger. Even this more abstract, poetic conception of national origins could provide a patina of philosophical sophistication to the exclusion of those with non-conforming heritages and to their eventual demonization as the enemy within.

Furthermore, though Heidegger ultimately orients the poetic exploration of origins to the mystery of Being, and the primordialist nationalists tend towards a more solipsistic focus, it would be hasty to discount the possibility that nationalism might, for Heidegger, represent an adequate starting point in the search for the poetically founded homeland. The differences between Heidegger and the primordialist nationalists do not, in themselves, suggest that nationalism is actively inhibitive of the pursuit of an authentic relation to Being. In short, we see much to suggest that Heidegger's conception of origins is at least reconcilable with the origin stories told by primordialist nationalists but also hints that this comity may soon fall apart.

### Taking up the Mantle

Our circumstances precede our birth, and the world will go on after our death— history marches on with or without us. For Arendt, the construction of narratives in response to this is perhaps *the* definitive characteristic of humanity.<sup>659</sup> Furthermore, as Paul Ricoeur noted, communities construct historical narratives to give meaning and context to past actions and future projects.<sup>660</sup> The “national story” has been a locus of political contestation and Göppfarth argues that nationalists, in Germany and elsewhere, appeal to Heideggerian conceptions of temporality in these contests.<sup>661</sup> They thus conform to Maddalena Cerrato’s belief that a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the history of their country is a central aspect of nationalism.<sup>662</sup> It is, therefore, important to question the validity of this association.

To do so, this chapter begins by analysing the role of mythological accounts of a nation’s history. These mytho-historical narratives are revealed as the primary way in which a national historical identity and sense of destiny is articulated by primordialist nationalism. Two questions emerge from this analysis which coincide with interesting disputes among Heidegger scholars. Firstly, one must consider whether the temporality of Heidegger’s *Dasein* can be articulated by myth, as Scott and Mitchell believe, or whether, as Soffer, Hofstadter and Salem-Wiseman argue, Heidegger was dismissive of such things. Secondly, one wonders whether Heidegger’s understanding of destiny functions, as Trawny and Pöggeler argued, in a way that ties the destiny of the individual to their community or whether, as Swer and Gelvin argue, choice is paramount. Finally, this chapter explores authentic temporality as proposed by Heidegger. The cracks that began to emerge in the previous chapter widen here, as we again see edifying but fatalistic mytho-histories clashing with Heidegger’s focus on choice and decision.

#### *§ The Eternal Struggle: National Mytho-Historical Narratives and the Predestined Peoples*

A focus on what is inherited from previous generations— in “culturally mediated relationships”<sup>663</sup> of transmission through high culture,<sup>664</sup> folk tales<sup>665</sup> and the continuity of the national landscape<sup>666</sup>— is, Shils,

Gilbert, Alan Bairner, and Anthony May tell us, a definitive characteristic of primordialist nationalism. Central to this, Smith explained, is a myth of common ancestry and shared memory, shared as part of a public culture<sup>667</sup> and central to identity<sup>668</sup>— especially when it opposes the identity of another *ethnie*.<sup>669</sup> Smith saw such identification resurging in times of weakening national identification.<sup>670</sup> As Fukuyama notes, nostalgia is central to this.<sup>671</sup> Myths retain— even when evidently ahistorical— a very real influence on the relationship between a people and their nation.<sup>672</sup> This necessarily places the symbolism of history— which Buber calls the “secret history of the people’s history made manifest”<sup>673</sup>— and the way in which this can shape political possibilities<sup>674</sup> at the centre of primordialist nationalism.

Péguy, Mann, Barrès, and Jünger place mythology at the centre of national identity. In *Notre Patrie*, Péguy defined the French as the inheritors of a tradition articulated through poetry.<sup>675</sup> It is the *myth* of France which shapes France in the present<sup>676</sup> notwithstanding the protests of those who think themselves too sophisticated for such things.<sup>677</sup> Thrown from the origins discussed previously,<sup>678</sup> the French have little choice but to continue the epic of France— imitating those ancestors “*dont nous sommes, qui nous sommes*,” [from whom we come, and who we are].<sup>679</sup> Mann saw himself as an inheritor of a “burgherly” national tradition<sup>680</sup>— a mythic thread which ties Germans across generations<sup>681</sup>— and saw the Great War as merely another episode in the German epic of heroic protest.<sup>682</sup> Barrès tied the continuity of France to an inter-generational contract of sorts,<sup>683</sup> a “treasure chest” which imposes the duty of contributing to the unfolding of France’s glorious myth— playing one’s role in the “wine, ferment and blood” of France’s “*chansons de geste*.”<sup>684</sup> He calls on the French to respond to this call and prove that those (to borrow a phrase) whom they call fathers did indeed beget them. Jünger, like Barrès, saw the severing of the connection between a people and the “temporal course of its movements”<sup>685</sup> as among the worst outcomes of a technological approach to history which neglects the poetic.<sup>686</sup> This poetic history is embraced for its subjectivity<sup>687</sup> and “in this sense myth looms into every age.”<sup>688</sup> Myth is a potent aspect of contemporary nationalist authenticity claims. Jean-François Caron found that attachment to a shared history and folklore,

always full of heroism and virtue,<sup>689</sup> was the most broadly confessed basis for French identity.<sup>690</sup> There is no doubt that contemporary nationalist political entrepreneurs have fostered an image of themselves as those defending the memory of our illustrious ancestors against the vandals, iconoclasts and the “woke.” However, nationalists— far from myopically focusing on an imagined, better past— articulate narratives which are, in Uriel Abulof’s terms, “Janus-faced.”<sup>691</sup> Furthermore, as Karl Löwith put it in *Meaning in History*, history is made “meaningful only by indicating some transcendent purpose.”<sup>692</sup> While scholars dispute the sincerity of national destiny discourse,<sup>693</sup> destiny is clearly central to nationalist mytho-historical narratives.<sup>694</sup>

In *Storm of Steel*, Jünger described his experience at the battle of Langemark— which would become central to the Nazi betrayal myth— in terms redolent of Erich Maria Remarque.<sup>695</sup> However, by the time of *The Worker*, he felt that his comrades were strengthened by this war— as it distilled Germany’s mytho-historic destiny.<sup>696</sup> The destiny discourse, here, functions as the conduit through which the forces driving history can be grasped and made inspiring.<sup>697</sup> Barrès, in contrast, tied France’s destiny directly to a mytho-poetic narrative, arguing that France is destined to be ever engaged in “the same struggle of the soul rebelling against the brutal aggression of the Germanic race.”<sup>698</sup> Mann shared Barrès’ belief in the inevitability of this conflict, but believed that Germany is destined to triumph— not necessarily on the battlefield<sup>699</sup> but in spirit, for they will never “succumb to the civilizing process”<sup>700</sup> and thus this conflict will end with German pre-eminence.<sup>701</sup> Mann confessed to having, in his youth,<sup>702</sup> believed in a historical process whereby a “young revolutionary nation,” Germany, “can do no otherwise than to conquer” those old “over-civilized” nations like France which stand in the way of her destiny.”<sup>703</sup>

Péguy’s view, though, is particularly interesting. France, he argued, has a calling<sup>704</sup> and is destined by both its historical character and vocation to fight Germany<sup>705</sup>— though this is tempered by Péguy’s aversion to militarism.<sup>706</sup> We are tied to destiny, for Péguy, because we bathe in the waters of our nation’s mytho-history, and are profoundly shaped by it.<sup>707</sup> Péguy left space for individual choice, as the French

destiny consists of a menu of options— some linked to one and some the other branch of the French mytho-historical narrative, either as “*mère de la liberté*” of “*fille aînée de l’Église*.”<sup>708</sup> Mytho-historical narratives, therefore, shape perceptions of the past but also future possibilities. Myths call us to destiny, and this calling is linked to the poetic account of the nation’s past. Destiny narratives can either dictate the authentic course of action itself or, as in the case of Péguy, provide a menu of authentic options.<sup>709</sup>

It is worth momentarily stepping outside of the scope of this study to consider a general critique of what we are discussing. Jünger and Barrès both clearly admire the nations against whom they found themselves at war.<sup>710</sup> Rather than leading them to question whether Germany *needs* to keep invading France— perhaps they might establish an economic and monetary union instead<sup>711</sup>— both resolve their evident admiration for the other via a tragic sense of predestined enmity-without-hatred.<sup>712</sup> Arendt identifies the national mission as the “most dangerous concept of nationalism.”<sup>713</sup> For Arendt, this danger lies in the freedom from responsibility that is granted when “legendary explanations” allow us to claim deeds we have not done and re-assign culpability for mistakes and crimes.<sup>714</sup> Arendt argued that this disempowering fatalism was vital to the German nationalism of her time<sup>715</sup>— a fatalism that emerged from the edifying, inspiring national historical narratives discussed above. While narratives may give meaning to our lives, call us to greatness, inspire us to efforts and stir our souls they can also rob us of a great deal of freedom with respect to the choices available to us. There are two questions that emerge from the above which are highly significant to the Heideggerian comparison. Firstly, to what extent can mythological narratives stand for the past? Secondly, what to make of all of this talk of destiny and fate? Interestingly, both questions speak to controversies regarding the interpretation of Heidegger’s thought.

#### § *The Mythological Saying and the Anointed Task*

Heidegger stated, in *Contributions*, that “there is no need at all for mythical representations.”<sup>716</sup> While this sounds dispositive, it may be the representational, not the mythological, that is surplus to requirements. This is especially so since we find Heidegger, in *What is Called Thinking?*, praising Parmenides for

understanding *mythos* as the “appeal of foremost and radical concern.”<sup>717</sup> *Mythos* does not do this in opposition to *logos*. *Logos*, in fact, fulfils the same role.<sup>718</sup> These two positions are not contradictory if we speak of a non-representational *mythos*. The extent to which such a *mythos* can be equated with myths and legends of the type observed above, though, is a subject of debate among Heidegger scholars.

### Myth, Legend, and *Die Sage*

Charles E. Scott believes Heidegger to be a nationalist. He holds, furthermore, that mythology was, alongside “tribal emotions,” central to Heidegger’s “German Nationalism.”<sup>719</sup> Indeed, for Scott, a “nationalistic mythological element” — evident in a romanticization of Germany and her language— tied Heidegger both to Hölderlin and to Nazism.<sup>720</sup> Göppfarth sees a mythology of “socio-cultural decline” at the core of Heidegger’s thought, and compares this to contemporary far-right discourse.<sup>721</sup> Mitchell argues that the “the saying” (*die Sage*) is “a different way of telling history,” which is “legendary.”<sup>722</sup> Hofstadter, similarly, saw myth as central to the way in which the *Dasein* “imagines itself in its world,” and understands “how all belongs to all.”<sup>723</sup> On the other hand, there are scholars who bring into question the extent to which the mythological *Sage* identified by Scott, Mitchell and Göppfarth resembles the national mythologies of Heidegger’s time. For example, Salem-Wiseman notes that Heidegger scorned the saccharine paeons to Germanic mediocrity in the folkloric legendarium of Wagner— which he felt prioritized making us feel a certain way over revealing truth.<sup>724</sup> Steven Segal too felt that Heidegger was not interested in his people “appropriating” their “nation’s attunement”<sup>725</sup> through myths. In fact, myths may even be harmful when they obscure the necessary realization that, in Heidegger’s time, “the category “German” has lost all meaning”<sup>726</sup> in the face of modern technology. There is unanimity that some kind of non-empirical encounter with history is vital to the *Dasein*’s understanding of its context. What is questionable is the extent to which national myths like those found in the works of Mann, Péguy, Jünger and Barrès correspond to what Soffer called “Heidegger thoughtful approach to history.”<sup>727</sup>

What may appear to one as a thoughtful approach to history may appear to another as propagandistic abuse of history. Helpfully, Heidegger provides a detailed description of a particular abuse in his critique of what he calls “monumental history.” Heidegger first explores this in *Being and Time*. Here, Heidegger notes that *Dasein* will tend to understand itself, initially, “in terms of what it encounters in the surrounding world” which often takes the form of the “common sense” of the “they.”<sup>728</sup> This tends to focus on what is “useful” and makes up a great deal of the material, including historical material, that the *Dasein* initially encounters. We will initially understand our historicity in light of an entanglement in taking care of whatever is useful. Thus, we initially come to understand ourselves as being contextualized by a form of “vulgar understanding” which Heidegger calls “world history.”<sup>729</sup> In simpler terms, we tend to think about history from the vantage point of the things that concern us in the moment, things which are heavily influenced by received wisdom and by the concerns and projects which we adopt from those around us. We adopt, as well, a broader sense of a historical world of things of concern from the they, which we understand in turn in terms of utility. This is world history.

World history is approached “tactically” as the “inauthentically existing *Dasein* first calculates its history in terms of what it takes care of.”<sup>730</sup> That is to say, if one has, for example, adopted belligerence towards France as one’s “concern,” history can be tactically mined in order to serve that goal. Thus, the past is understood in terms of the present, with those matters pertaining to the *Seinsfrage* entirely subjugated to the desire to make use of history. The past thus becomes the source of “remains, monuments, and records”<sup>731</sup> which are exploited to advance the cause of the day. This brings Heidegger to Nietzsche, who introduces three characteristics of such a history: “the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical.”<sup>732</sup> Heidegger explains Nietzsche’s historiography in *Being and Time* and elaborates upon it in his *Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation*. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger reminds us that Nietzsche is proposing a historiography— a theoretical structuring of the way in which we think about the past— as opposed to articulating historicity— the way in which we are historical. Nevertheless,

Nietzsche's historiography "arises" from the historicity of *Dasein*.<sup>733</sup> This historiology is "monumental" insofar as it is able to find and "appropriate" from the past those possibilities that are authentically available to us.<sup>734</sup> Nietzsche's historiography also appears to grasp the insight that an authentic temporality requires that we grasp the past with some fidelity, and therefore a "reverent" preserving of what was (antiquarian history) is required.<sup>735</sup> However, Nietzsche also grasps that history is not of interest only as far as it concerns the past, but is encountered with an eye towards the future. Thus, a "critical history"—where we look to the past in order to "critique" the present—is also required.<sup>736</sup> Nietzsche's historiography combines these three approaches, with the historian exploring the past, trying to discover that which was in terms of its proper context, thinking about what it means to us in the present and attempting to elucidate, in doing so, the authentic possibilities that the past reveals to us for our futures.

There are, though, dangers inherent to these three approaches to history, outlined by Heidegger in his *Interpretation of Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation*. Here, Heidegger warns that antiquarian history can take an excessively reverential attitude towards a past which is reduced to something "rigidified, immutable" and "venerable"—leading to an attitude to the past that "retains and preserves bygone, and does not create."<sup>737</sup> On the other hand, a critical approach to history can be taken to excess when we wrench the things of the past out of their proper context in order to put them under the microscope. Though Heidegger is sure to distinguish critical history as Nietzsche describes it from "the mere vilification of a past age,"<sup>738</sup> it nevertheless carries the danger of creating a conflict between "the tradition and what is newly desired"<sup>739</sup> where we negate the past as something we wish to "progress beyond" or "problematize"—as we hear it put in our time—and become ignorant of the continued, inescapable impact that our past has on our present. It is monumental history though, in particular Heidegger's elucidation of its potential dangers, which is most relevant to the subject at hand.

Though Heidegger's oeuvre is to be treated as unitary, Heidegger's thought did evolve on the matter of monumental history. Michael J. Sigrist notes that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger believed that

monumental history reveals “an insight into the original unity of authentic temporality.”<sup>740</sup> However, Heidegger would later present it in a more negative light— as part of the final forgetting of Being<sup>741</sup>— in *Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation* (which has the most in-depth treatment of monumental history). Two things should be noted: Firstly, the matter of whether primordialist nationalism constitutes an authentic relation to being is not impacted by the divergence between these two texts— as, should it be monumental history, it is inauthentic in any event. Secondly— recalling that we are not giving precedence to later positions— the fact that the negative interpretation comes later is not sufficient for us to conclude that a monumental history necessarily covers over being. Thus, we require evidence beyond the monumentality of a nationalistic mythological narrative to evaluate it.

Heidegger described the monumental as a “sign of commemoration” which “makes us remember” the past in order to inspire action— “urging us on to “great” things.”<sup>742</sup> These events belong to the past like a statue, something from the past that stands as an object in our world, a thing of both past and present, lifted out of its context and placed into our midst. Heidegger identified a tendency, emerging from the metaphysical interpretation of the individual as subject, to think of the monuments lifted from the past in terms of what they mean *for me*.<sup>743</sup> It is when this tendency is collectivised— when we start to think of the past in terms of what it says about us, as a people— that we engage in inauthentic appropriations of the past (amongst which Heidegger included a “national [völkisch] worldview”).<sup>744</sup> We then mine the past for symbols, narratives, archetypes and lessons which inspire us to perform patriotic acts and advance our nations. The greatest sin of monumental history, though, is its loose relationship with truth. Heidegger stated, in *Contributions*, that we are called to leap into the *truth* of being.<sup>745</sup> He similarly argued, in *What is Called Thinking?*, that philosophical exploration leads us to a point where this leap is required if we are to proceed any further.<sup>746</sup> Across the Heideggerian oeuvre, there is a consistent call to have the courage to pursue the truth even where it is disturbing or inconvenient. Monumental history, returning to the *Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation*, instead engages in “retouching, leaving out,

making up, rewriting” the past in the name of desirable “effects.”<sup>747</sup> Heidegger, here, was explicitly criticizing those appropriations of the past that are selective, edifying and dishonest. These appropriations make the past accessible only in an inadequate manner. Furthermore, political worldviews— which make “care for the people” into the “foundation and the goal”<sup>748</sup>— will retain an incredible internal coherence, having been constructed in order to tell a neat and tidy story. They will therefore never bring things into question, satisfying us with an approximation of the past that appears whole but leaves unopened the ground of being as such. This is well illustrated, precisely as Salem-Wiseman noted, by Heidegger’s critique of Wagner— who is accused of “making greatness impossible! by appealing to the fact that it is already there. [...] instead of bringing forth greatness, it hinders its emergence.”<sup>749</sup> As a result, Hofstadter, Salem-Wiseman, Segal, and Soffer are more convincing than Scott or Mitchell with respect to the relationship between the *mythos* which, in Hofstadter’s language, exists in “closest affinity” with “truth unconcealment,” and the monumental history that Heidegger encountered in the politics of his time, as we conventionally think of them today and as we found them among Mann, Jünger, and Barrès.

One finds monumentalism even in Péguy’s moderate historical sensibility. The interest in history is instrumental, even with the politically ambivalent Péguy, and the historical material is reduced to a monument standing for something. It is precisely in such uses and abuses of history that even Péguy engages in monumental history.<sup>750</sup> History, for Péguy, helps us to inculcate the young with a taste for the French mystique<sup>751</sup>— and is a key tool in the struggle against a prevailing culture which debases heroes and saints alike.<sup>752</sup> It is worth noting the extent to which this mirrors contemporary nationalist complaints about the “cancellation” of the great figures of their nations past. Some things, it seems, are perennial. Anthony Smith noted the importance of the sharing of myths and memories to the inculcation of the “common rights and duties” upon which primordialist nationalism depends.<sup>753</sup> It is, therefore, unsurprising that iconoclasm is a bugbear of nationalists. These mythologies, though, concerned the future as surely as the past, and so we turn our attention to the future, and Heidegger’s conception of destiny.

### The Choice to Choose One's Destiny

That Heidegger employed the language of destiny across his oeuvre is beyond doubt. Destiny is part of the “innerworldly experience” of Being-in-the-world in *Being and Time*,<sup>754</sup> and part of the experience of Westerners at the time of the “Letter on Humanism.”<sup>755</sup> Furthermore, destiny, as we shall see, does not always belong to an individual, but in different parts of Heidegger’s oeuvre is discussed as belonging to Germany (*Introduction to Metaphysics*),<sup>756</sup> the state (“Self-Assertion of the German University”),<sup>757</sup> and a people (*Hölderlin’s Hymns*).<sup>758</sup> The texts noted in the previous two sentences span the dividing line of *die Kehre* and transcend purposive or formal divisions of the Heideggerian oeuvre. Common to all, in spite of changes in context, is belief in a destiny that *can* be made manifest in the inner and outer lives of individuals *and* communities.<sup>759</sup> The manner in which an individual is bound by the destiny of the community to whom they belong, though, is an area of controversy among Heidegger scholars.

For Trawny, the “life path” of an individual is inextricably linked to the destiny of the community,<sup>760</sup> such that the “definite possibilities” available to an individual have “already been guided in advance.”<sup>761</sup> This interpretation of Heidegger’s destiny concept is shared by Pöggeler, who argued that, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger connected the fate of the individual directly to the destiny of the “encompassing community.”<sup>762</sup> Göppfarth too believes that Heidegger’s thought ties the individual to a collective context, arguing that “authentic individual *Dasein* depends upon its relation to the collective *Dasein* of a *Volk*.”<sup>763</sup> Faye interprets this as a form of race destiny.<sup>764</sup> The fatalism of such interpretations was challenged by Lovitt, who emphasises that Heidegger was not a determinist<sup>765</sup> and his conception of destiny was never a “blind fate that compels man from beyond himself.”<sup>766</sup> Swer also rejects fatalistic interpretations, arguing that hope is integral to Heidegger’s understanding of what is to come.<sup>767</sup> Indeed, Michael Gelvin argued that fatalism is in fact anathema to Heidegger’s conception of authenticity, for the possibility of choosing to live inauthentically is what makes authentic decision possible.<sup>768</sup> Furthermore, the guilt associated with living inauthentically makes “the human person capable of being aware of the

meaning of existence.”<sup>769</sup> In other words, much as virtue is meaningless if we are not free to sin, authenticity is meaningless if we are not free to live inauthentically. Needless to say, there are some, like Zimmerman, who note that there is a very clearly “correct” choice that one can make, to take up the “endowment” and “anointed task.”<sup>770</sup> This leads Han-Pile, though she sees Heidegger’s destiny concept as liberating,<sup>771</sup> to argue that he posits the *authentic* choice as the clearly correct choice.<sup>772</sup> While one is free to choose, Heidegger presents a choice between something obviously undesirable and something obviously desirable— which is arguably no real choice at all.

Some also object to the collectivist aspect of Trawny, Pöggeler and Faye’s interpretations. Han-Pile, in spite of noting the limitations placed on our choices— argues that the decisions we take in pursuit of our destinies are primarily about “understanding oneself in the right way,”<sup>773</sup>— “*Dasein*’s self-relation”<sup>774</sup>— rather than as a collective. Lovitt argued that we are sent to our destinies “from out of Being” and that this destiny is “self-orienting” and “a true expression of human freedom.”<sup>775</sup> According to such interpretations, the authentic destiny is not so much a matter of reconciling oneself with an irrevocable fate, but of, in Taminiaux’s words, “opening oneself to one’s can be.”<sup>776</sup> That is to say, authentic temporality involves opening ourselves to what is truly our ownmost, rather than being compelled to embrace a collective fate. Interpretative disputes regarding Heidegger’s understanding of destiny appear, then, to hinge upon the question of how free we are in relation both to the destiny towards which we are thrown and the community alongside whom we are thrown.

The first thing to note is that destiny, as it has been discussed so far, is separated into two types by Heidegger. *Schicksal* (fate) belongs to some individuals while *Geschick* (destiny) belongs to a collective. Destiny, for Heidegger, is “not composed of individual fates” nor is it the sum total of individual fates.<sup>777</sup> Indeed, because *Dasein* exists “as being-in-the-world in being-with-others,”<sup>778</sup> our fates are a product of our thrownness, alongside others, into a common destiny. The “fateful destiny of *Dasein*” lies “in and with” its “generation”— the people alongside whom it is thrown into history.<sup>779</sup> However, one can still

choose how one relates to this thrownness and those alongside whom one is thrown. We face no external compulsion to seek an authentic relation to Being. The *Dasein* must “choose itself” and in doing so “it can win itself, it can lose itself”<sup>780</sup> but, importantly, it does both *itself*. Therefore, though we probably *ought* to wish for authenticity there is nothing preventing us from simply enjoying our lives without a care for Being. The freedom of the *Dasein* lies in its agency, not in the specific content of its choices. This agency emerges from our having the options of choosing for ourselves to strike out in search of an authentic relation to being or choosing for ourselves to remain in the comfort of the everyday.<sup>781</sup> The choices that matter, for Heidegger, are those that relate to the *Dasein*’s “essential” concerns about Being. One could protest that the choice being offered here is rather tokenistic. It is a choice, essentially, between *Eigentlichkeit*, something that for Heidegger is clearly good, and *Seinsvergessenheit*, something which he associates with all of the ills of the world. In its own way, then, it is no less a choice between glory and disgrace than that offered by Barrès. Furthermore, the choice which is so clearly being held up as “correct”— notwithstanding Heidegger’s rather unconvincing protest that an inauthentic *Dasein* is not lesser— requires us to freely take up what is rightfully our destiny, seemingly precluding any real possibility of both rejecting the thrown destiny *and* remaining true to what is one’s ownmost.

There is a useful indication of how Heidegger might have spoken to such a critique in his brief discussion— in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*— of the relationship between religious belief and the *Dasein*’s questioning of Being.<sup>782</sup> Religion, for Heidegger, provides a divinely ordained answer to the question of why there are beings at all instead of nothing “before it is even asked.”<sup>783</sup> As a result, the religious person cannot— if they simply take this as “something that has somehow been handed down”— “authentically question without giving himself up as a believer.”<sup>784</sup> This does not mean that a religious person cannot be a serious thinker of Being, but does require that the believer “continually expose itself to the possibility of unfaith” in order that their belief not be a mere convenience.<sup>785</sup> Heidegger, here, demands that we question that which we most admire— religion in this case but a nationalistic narrative or authentic

*Dasein* surely no less. This is, in itself, undoubtedly a significant point of distinction from primordialist nationalism. Additionally, Heidegger noted, in *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, that “no matter how wholly and genuinely admiration may be carried” it should involve “a certain freedom over and against what is admired.”<sup>786</sup> Thus, the action to which one is committed by thrownness into an unfolding history is no duty to be discharged without question.<sup>787</sup> Even though, notwithstanding Heidegger’s protests, there is clearly *some* relationship between authenticity and the good, one must approach even that which we most esteem with a questioning spirit rather than dogmatic reverence.

As important as questioning, though, is resoluteness. This will be discussed at length in the next chapter, but for now it suffices to say that resoluteness is what distinguishes one who *has* fate from one who is merely the plaything of fate. We are all, Heidegger wrote in *Being and Time*, “reached by the blows of fate” because “it *is* fate.”<sup>788</sup> That is to say, the *Da* is essential to *Dasein* and the context of the *Da* will inevitably change around the *Dasein* in a way that it cannot control. One who grasps that these happenings are part of the thrown nature of being-in-the-world can, for Heidegger, be said to be resolute while those who are simply buffeted by the “collision of circumstances and event [...] can have no fate.”<sup>789</sup> It is, as Heidegger put it, a “powerless higher power”<sup>790</sup>— not deluded into thinking it can escape what is coming but strong enough to take up the task of meeting it. We do not, merely by being resolute, gain a full understanding of our historical inheritance, the moment we inhabit and the future into which we are thrown.<sup>791</sup> Rather, resoluteness allows us to “fetch” our authentic possibilities of being<sup>792</sup> from what might otherwise seem to be a mess of events. In doing so, one “makes oneself free for the struggle over what is to follow”<sup>793</sup> as one is now freely taking up the task bestowed by history rather than merely suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Of course, one may protest that this distinction between fate as conventionally understood (*Bestimmung*) and this resolute experience of fate (*Schicksal*) is rather meaningless— that Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, is simply calling us to embrace, even love, our fate. Heidegger would speak directly to the matter of *amor fati* in *Nietzsche Volume II*.

Heidegger argued that conventional scholarship plays the “will to power” and the “eternal return of the same” against one another, but the two belong together. The will to power, for Heidegger’s Nietzsche, represents the “constitution” of Being while the eternal recurrence represents its “way” of Being.<sup>794</sup> That is to say, the will to power is the characteristic that makes a being a being and the eternal recurrence is characteristic of the way in which that being exists in the world. There is no conflict between our capacity for freedom (our will to will) and the fate that is in store (the eternal recurrence). *Amor fati* recognizes the co-constitutive relation between Being and its context— in that way resembling Heidegger’s own philosophy of Being. One might initially see fate as an unwelcome impingement on our freedom, but we learn to love it when we realize that our fate is nothing less than the realization of our authentic being. Our fate makes us who we are, and who we are defines our fate. We must, therefore, recognize the co-constitutive relationship between will to power and fate— or, in the more practical terms identified by Trawny, between the historical destiny of a people and the “life paths” of individuals.<sup>795</sup> This seems to fit comfortably with Heidegger’s definition of freedom in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, as “not the independence of doing and letting, but carrying through the inevitability of being, taking over the historical being in the knowing will.”<sup>796</sup> Within the eternal recurrence, according to Heidegger’s Nietzsche, our fate and our will are aligned such that we may have *amor* for the *fatum*. However, *Amor fati* is the result of our refracting the experience of being through the lens of the eternal recurrence. It is a form of subterfuge whereby man, having killed God (at least cut him down to size<sup>797</sup>) structures the world according to their will. We can abandon any sense of anxiety or desire that goes beyond merely wishing to conform our will to what seems inevitable. However, when we do this, we covertly rely upon the very temporality that we, in our fatalism, are seeking to take leave from.<sup>798</sup> When *amor fati* is decoupled from the eternal recurrence, the matter is rather less clear.

Bourdieu provided an intriguing iteration of the concept in his analysis of Guillaume Apollinaire’s *Automne III*— and in interpreting it from a poem he is surely, for Heidegger, further removed from the

world of calculation. Bourdieu's Apollinaire pronounces not only the "*fatum*" that waits, death, but also exhorts us to love it. We are to accept this fate and learn how to die well; as to die well is to die in beauty.<sup>799</sup> However, our fate is lovable only because it is lovely,<sup>800</sup> revealing to us our thrownness into time— "the transitory and transient nature of all realities inscribed within."<sup>801</sup> This conception of *amor fati* is attuned to Heidegger's conception of temporality. In part, this is because it is decoupled from the pictorialization of time and history which characterizes both the eternal return and, for example, Péguy's *république-royaume* binary. The *amor fati* of Guillaume's *Apollinaire* unconceals in its concealing, pointing us to that obscure and concealed region where deeper truths lie beyond the horizon of the everyday. Here, our fate frees us from entanglement in the everyday and turns us toward our true fate as beings. This is a free relation to our authentic destiny, rooted in thoughtfulness and meditation, which directs our thinking from the everyday things that we might want to get done before we die to the *Seinsfrage*. In this way, our destiny, though it may circumscribe our choices with respect to the everyday, opens the realm where we may free ourselves from *Seinsvergessenheit* and relate freely to Being. We are therefore in accordance with Zimmerman and Han-Pile, who do not interpret Heidegger's destiny concept fatalistically but nevertheless grant that our choices are heavily circumscribed. In this respect, primordialist nationalism has proven to be fairly close to Heidegger. While the subject matter at hand might differ greatly— the one concerning a national mission and the other a relationship with Being— the basic fact of our being free only to choose between embracing what is authentically our destiny or surrendering ourselves to inauthenticity remains constant. However, the differences in the nature of *mythos* and destiny strongly suggest that a nationalistic mytho-historical narrative is not an authentic articulation of the historicity of *Dasein*.

### § *Answering the Call of Being*

Heidegger, in *Basic Concepts*, provided a precise question which one can ask of the mytho-historical narratives discussed above. Do we, in taking up our heritage as articulated in that mythology, "set upon the path to reflection," or are we simply "taking up bygone cultural aims" as a "pretext for

thoughtlessness?”<sup>802</sup> In other words, Heidegger compels us to ask whether the way we relate to our history gives us easy answers to the great existential questions or whether it is a means for “history itself to make us remember and give us hints for reflection.”<sup>803</sup> We have found that the historicity of Heidegger’s authentic *Dasein* shares with primordialist nationalism a call to a certain *amor fati* but differs from it with respect to the kind of *mythos* by which this content is made knowable. What remains, to reach a firm conclusion, is to explore in concrete terms how it is that we are, for Heidegger, to relate to a non-monumental *mythos*. We also ask what it means to choose the destiny that is authentically one’s ownmost. Heidegger claims, in *Being and Time*, that, when scrutinized, the “interpretation of the historicity of *Dasein* turns out to be basically just a more concrete elaboration of temporality.”<sup>804</sup> As such, it is logical that our exploration should begin with a discussion of the experience of temporal thrownness in general.

### Thrown into Becoming

Firstly, one must grasp that, like us, the world has a hinterland. Thus, we must figure with the fact that we find ourselves operating within the flow of circumstances— that have been shaped before we could act upon the world. As Hofstadter put it, “life and history follow the paths that are opened to them through the endowment,”<sup>805</sup> they are limited by a social, institutional, political and, vitally, cultural<sup>806</sup> context that they inherit.<sup>807</sup> The *Dasein* unfolds within this flow— we are, as Mann puts it, “not being, but becoming”<sup>808</sup>— and freedom is tempered by the historical current pushing us along. We are free to act within this current. We may even choose to swim against it, though this likely will not get us very far. What is vital, if we are to apprehend the primordial truth of our condition, is that we recognize that we are thrown into this moving current of history. As such, we must figure with what we have already become. The *Dasein*, in *Being and Time*, does not exist “before” or outside of our thrown ground, but “only from it and as it.”<sup>809</sup> We are not born a blank slate, but into a world which has a history behind it.

One of the consequences of grasping this is the possibility of guilt. Guilt, for Heidegger, emerges from our neglect of the thrown grounds of Being and the claims that this thrownness makes upon us. As

Michael Gelvin correctly argued, guilt makes “the human person capable of being aware of the meaning of existence.”<sup>810</sup> This is not a historical mandate that compels us to action. Rather, Heidegger understood existential guilt as arising from the incongruence of a *Dasein*’s projects with respect to their thrown potentialities, such that the *Dasein* “closes itself off from itself as thrown as fallen prey.”<sup>811</sup> In simple terms, our historical thrownness is a call which, if ignored, makes us feel guilty. Whether this guilt is best described, as by Schalow, as an “indebtedness”— with the guilty mood being triggered by the sense that we have been loaned a “potential for selfhood”<sup>812</sup> and are squandering it— or, as Gelvin and Sludds describe, a sense of failure at not having lived up to our potential as beings,<sup>813</sup> the result is the same. We are not compelled to be true to our thrownness but will feel a sense that we are not doing what we ought — whether repaying a debt or failing to make the most of a gift— and feel guilty about it. This call, for Heidegger, summons us forth to the possibility of taking over the mantle of what is historically thrown, a summons which awakens us to our “ownmost authentic potentiality-of-being,”<sup>814</sup> and the futural possibilities that are truly our ownmost. How, though, are we to understand what it is we are being called towards?

Heidegger does not use the term “understanding” in a conventional sense. It is less a matter of being able to explain something or “grasping something thematically” as it is a matter of knowing “what is going on with oneself.”<sup>815</sup> In the everyday experience of time, we primarily understand our “thrownness” in the “futural” terms of those projects that we take care of.<sup>816</sup> This is an almost intuitive understanding, which we likely struggle to describe to others, that we exist within the context of the “thrownness” discussed above. The present is understood in terms of such projects, with success or failure defined “with regard to what is actually taken care of” and thus “potentiality-of-being” is understood in terms of “making present” the end goal of this project.<sup>817</sup> This inauthentic conception of understanding is deceptively intuitive but is best illustrated by example. One can easily imagine an adolescent middle-class woman whose young life has been defined by the task of gaining acceptance to a prestigious university. Such a

person might understand the entire course of her life in terms of that project, evaluating everything according to whether or not it advanced her towards that goal. It is likely that she would be entirely unable to provide a thematic account of why this is her goal— it is doubtful she will be able to trace it to the development of modern European bourgeois culture nor articulate the reasons why education came to be so highly valued among her class. She will, though, intuitively understand that society expects this of her because this is what people like her do. This initial, everyday experience of thrownness is inauthentic because her potentiality-of-being is not her ownmost, but a goal demanded of her by others.

Authentic understanding is also not a matter of explaining things. It is a mode of *Dasein* where one throws oneself into the possibilities that “come-toward-oneself” from Being.<sup>818</sup> Of course, one will still at times be caught up in inauthentic understanding, as one must take care of business, but one will also be capable of experiencing the passage of time without the mind-clutter of the everyday. In quiet moments of contemplation one can look back on what has been, understand the manner in which one has arrived at the moment one is in and project forward to the authentic potentiality-of-being which emerges from this journey. In such moments nothing may happen, but that very stillness allows us to properly encounter the world around us for the first time. We can reside authentically within time only when we come to anticipate our futural possibilities properly in terms of our “ownmost selves thrown into [one’s] individuation.”<sup>819</sup> That is to say, rather than simply accepting the future expected of us, we grasp how we ourselves are thrown into the historical unfolding of the world around us and adopt projects that align with that potentiality-of-Being that is truly our ownmost. At the same time, we begin to understand ourselves only when we grasp that we exist alongside others within a world containing the “constitutive factors of their [and our] experience”<sup>820</sup>— the things that define the experience of our collective sojourn in the world. It is this attunement to the historically constituted context of our Being<sup>821</sup> that allows for a genuine understanding of our thrown nature. Thus, a genuine understanding of thrownness requires that we acknowledge our existing within a tension between the individuating nature of what is our ownmost and

the collective nature of the world within which we exist. Returning to our young woman— now happily ensconced in her prestigious university— we find her sat quietly in the quad, unmolested by deadlines or social obligations, looking upon the old buildings around her. In this still contemplation, she comes to an understanding of the historical hinterland of her university, of the university as an institution and of the presence of a young middle-class female at such an institution. She no longer sees her surroundings as a site wherein she takes care of the business of getting the degree her parents expect of her. Rather, she sees a part of the world into which and alongside which she— an individual who belongs to a context without being defined by others— is thrown from a past that long predated her birth to a future that will be her own.

Though it is one's own, Heidegger clarifies that understanding is "never free floating." It is, rather, "always attuned."<sup>822</sup> Attunement is compared, by Heidegger, with a mood— in that "mood represents the ways in which I am."<sup>823</sup> In short, attunement is not so much an achievement or a task as it is a disposition. This disposition involves, Heidegger argued, "turning away and toward one's own *Dasein* [...] bringing *Dasein* before the That of its own thrownness."<sup>824</sup> He continues to describe how this "does not first bring one face-to-face with the thrown being that one is oneself, but the ecstasy of having been first makes possible finding oneself in the mode of how-I-find myself."<sup>825</sup> The simultaneous turning away and towards one's own *Dasein* exemplifies a duality which will become something of a theme in the analysis to come. Heidegger, here, is calling for a self-examination that does not fall into solipsism. That is to say, we must be Janus-faced, capable of looking at ourselves and asking questions such as "where do I belong" but also able to look outside of ourselves and be curious about our community, undoubtedly, but also the wider world. When we are able to do this, we will be "brought before" our fundamentally thrown nature. That is to say, we come to understand ourselves as thrown creatures and the world around us as a thrown world. This does not, by itself, reveal to us "the thrown being that one is oneself" but it is a necessary first step towards what, temporally speaking, is truly one's ownmost.

When we come to an attuned understanding, we come to realise that we belong to a world which is, itself, thrown into becoming. Furthermore, we approach that world in a way that is content with what it is, rather than setting upon it and trying to force it into the categories that govern vulgar historical thinking. This is particularly difficult for those who have been conditioned by metaphysics to elevate themselves above history and “interpret” it from a detached vantage point— deaf to what history has to say. At the same time, “the primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future,”<sup>826</sup> and so we ought not think of attunement to historical thrownness as deference to the past.<sup>827</sup> We must remain concerned about the *potentiality* of being<sup>828</sup> which emerges from the simultaneous orientation of *Dasein* towards its past and future discussed in the first chapter. This requires, Soffer tells us, that one “penetrate the distortions of the tradition [of metaphysics]”<sup>829</sup> to be open, in attunement, to real understanding. Rockmore and Margolis were correct to warn that this does not mean we are to reject the traditional out of hand, for what conceals also reveals.<sup>830</sup> Nevertheless, Heidegger makes clear in *Being and Time* that vulgar conceptions of past, present and future must be overcome.<sup>831</sup> This implicates the obsession with traditional conceptions of a nation’s past which characterized much of the nationalism discussed above and, indeed, that is observable in much contemporary nationalism as well. But if such articulations of the thrown world into which we find ourselves, in turn, to be thrown are inadequate, how should this temporality be articulated. The answer, once again, lies with poetry.

### The Call of the Unheard

As noted in the previous chapter, the historical world into which the German *Dasein*, for example, finds itself thrown is fore-structured by a poetic inheritance which has already defined, to varying degrees, the pervading characteristics of Germanness which hold sway, and which locate the German *Dasein* within the broader sweep of world history. This poetic fore-structure is not gathered about us by our requisitioning of beings from an undifferentiated mass of stuff. That is to say, we cannot mine the world for materials that we can use to construct a poem, separated from a shapeless mass of things that do not matter— as one

might if writing a poetic, dithyrambic history of a nation which separated out the wheat of military glory from the chaff of wartime human suffering. Rather, Heidegger describes a process of “worlding”, in his *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, as follows: a thing that lies near to us, in its becoming as a thing (its “thinging”) “brings the world near and lets the world abide,”<sup>832</sup> in a “clearing-guarding.”<sup>833</sup> In other words, as things “thing” before us, a world comes to be near at hand— accessible and within our grasp— in such a way that allows those things to abide peacefully alongside us, provided we let them. One of the great virtuosi of this art was Rainer Maria Rilke.

Rilke, Heidegger argued in “What are Poets For?,” recognized that there is a “destitution” with respect to the relationship between modern man and time— the sacred time of Christianity having fallen away with the death of God— such that we no longer have ownership of our mortality.<sup>834</sup> Rilke’s poetry speaks to the time-experience of we who live in this destitute time. His is the song of those “particular beings” who have “developed since the completion of Western metaphysics by Nietzsche.”<sup>835</sup> Rilke— in a posthumously published poem titles “Improvised Verses”<sup>836</sup>— gathered together the natural world that we share with plants and animals,<sup>837</sup> our will to bring things nearer to us, and our desire to venture beyond the protected and secure.<sup>838</sup> Rilke articulated our sense of the danger<sup>839</sup> of this venture into “unprotectedness.”<sup>840</sup> What is ventured is what Rilke, in *Sonnets to Orpheus II*, calls the “unheard of centre.”<sup>841</sup> Heidegger explained this concept by exploring the word “*Bezug*,” which translates as “relation.” This translation, like the conventional German usage of *Bezug*, leads us astray by centring the perceiving ego.<sup>842</sup> Instead, we should relate to objects as merely another part of the network of things organized around the “unheard of centre” of a poetically uncovered world.<sup>843</sup> Rilke did not take us into the mystery of Being itself, but brought us to the “barrier”<sup>844</sup> separating what we can apprehend from what is obscure to us— poetizing our desire for admittance into this obscure realm. Thus, we see a different way of thinking about the temporal. We do not inhabit this world as egos interacting with the objects of history,<sup>845</sup> but as

beings gathered together alongside other beings— orbiting the unheard-of centre (Being), conscious that we desire entry into a realm that we have not yet the tools to access.

Those who can, will hear Being calling out to them. To call, Heidegger explained in *What is Called Thinking?*, “means to set in motion, to get something underway.”<sup>846</sup> Importantly, this call is not an order which demands that we do something. It is a call which “offers an abode”<sup>847</sup>— as when, in Heidegger’s example, we “call a guest welcome” and “call him to come in and complete his arrival.”<sup>848</sup> In other words, Being is calling us to come home to Being, to be at home in Being and cease our travails— as when one’s spouse calls one to close the damned laptop on a sunny Saturday. When we are called by the poetic, we are invited to behold the unfolding situation that we are, by dint of belonging to our historical people, thrown into. We are also shown, by the poetic, the ways in which we abide in, are at home in, the unfolding we see before us. Where we may previously have seen a motley crew of people around us, and a random sequence of events occurring, the poetic shows us the coherence of all of this, the shape of the historical *Dasein* and the coherent sequencing of the unfolding of its history. The poet calls us to complete our entering by showing us that we are home. The call is taken up, Heidegger argued in *Contributions*, by way of a “leap”— when one has the courage to “throw aside everything familiar” and enter into a different domain of history.<sup>849</sup> How, though, are we to understand this domain of history into which we are to leap? Are we to understand it exclusively as a call to leap into the *Seinsfrage*, to leap “back into the originary and fundamental experience of the thinking through of be-ing.”<sup>850</sup>? Or are we to understand it, for example, as a call to throw ourselves into the historical *mythos* of our people?

There is undoubtedly some accord between the articulation of a national calling and Heidegger’s conception of a “spiritual undertaking” as emphasised during the Nazi era in “The Call to Labour Service.” Here, he stated that the intellectual undertaking of German students must be directed toward “higher spiritual matters,” which could quite plausibly be interpreted to include the preservation of the essence of an historical *Dasein*, and must, for Heidegger, reach “far back into the need of the *historical existence* of

a people.”<sup>851</sup> Furthermore, there are similarities between Heidegger’s position and the nationalist mytho-historical narratives presented in this chapter with respect to the substance of the thrown situation. For example— and this is unsurprising given they shared certain influences (Goethe among them)— there is much similarity between Mann’s Rome-Germany binary and the tension described by Heidegger between the German *Dasein* and metaphysics. Furthermore, Heidegger, understood tension to be in itself integral to German being— bringing to mind Péguy’s French *république-royaume*— as a form of blessed or supreme enmity that constitutes its unity.<sup>852</sup> After the Second World War, in *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger would still indicate that *mythos* is a valuable approach to truth which manages both to reveal to us the world we inhabit and to shed light upon our relationship with that world.<sup>853</sup> That is to say, myths tell us about our world and give us an indication of what things in that world mean to us.

*Mythos* and *logos*, for Heidegger, are not to be put in opposition, but the myth is to be understood as the appeal which calls us back to the ground of *poiēsis*, the mechanism by which we recollect the history, all the way back to the source, of our people. In simple terms, Heidegger appears open to the possibility that some form of *mythos* could function as a means by which we come to know the authentic history of an historical *Dasein*. Poetry is not, though, solely concerned with the question of “who we are as a people?” Our curiosity is not satisfied, if we are Rilkean, simply by providing a convincing tale about our national history. It does, no doubt, tell us about our near-at-hand, about the context of our lives (in which our nations can surely play a vital role) but it does so with an eye towards the grounds of Being. It is, we conclude, this eye towards Being that separates authentic from inauthentic articulations of the historicity of *Dasein*. The narratives found with Barrès, Péguy, Mann, and Jünger were too tied up in the political imperatives of their time to achieve this. They remained in the instrumentalist logics of metaphysics, they being monumental histories with clear ambitions to produce some beneficial political outcome. Instead, Heidegger called us to take up the task of thinking about our relation to the unfolding historical experience of our community in order that we may think our way to a free and authentic relation to it— that we may

come to understand how we genuinely stand with respect to our historical communities, free from the influence of others, but also to understand this as only a part of the broader unfolding of the *Seinsgeschichte*, and to pay heed, also, to how we relate, simultaneously, to that unfolding.

While one might praise Heidegger's ultimate location of the destiny-concept in the questioning of Being, it should be noted that this did not stop him from supporting the Nazis while they pursued a very different type of national destiny. Furthermore, the ultimate focus on Being seems to direct Heidegger's attention far away from everyday political concerns—pursuing the German destiny does not seem to involve making life better for German citizens. Nevertheless, Heidegger calls us to think critically about the way in which we think about and relate to our history. It is notable that the salutary, is primarily derived from Heidegger's discussion of our relationship with the past. The focus on our finding this for ourselves from our own perspectives, and via thinking about the nature of Being, calls us away from the crude, manipulative menu of options that are offered to one by the they. The dangers attendant to Heidegger's position primarily result from his discussion of destiny. Before dismissing Heidegger's take of destiny, though, we must consider Heidegger's confrontation with the ultimate destiny that awaits us all.

## Death

This chapter begins with an overview of the evocations of glorious death found among the primordialist nationalists, which posit a particular relation to death as a central font of collective meaning and do so in a manner which is here termed: “Homeric.” Though this resembles Heidegger’s position— due to the privileged place reserved for death— it does so in a way which inhibits our pursuit of an authentic relation to being in favour of a promise that finitude can, in a sense, be circumvented by glorious deeds. We show that instead, Heidegger’s thinking about the purpose of life is slanted towards the generation of necessary conditions for a new thinking about Being. Heidegger’s thinking about death demands that we overcome our fears by facing the fact of our mortality unflinchingly and rejecting any avoidance of this confrontation. Furthermore, the confrontation with death must turn us towards the questioning of Being. To the extent that one may give one’s life to a cause, it must be to the cause of Being. In short, we find the approach to death that characterises primordialist nationalism obfuscatory with respect to the realities of death, neutralizing the invaluable role that mortality plays in an authentic relation to Being.

### *§ The Shield of Achilles*

#### The Limit Situation

Heidegger took pains to explain, in *Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation*, that death is not merely the antithesis of life. This challenges the belief, expressed by Margaret Canovan, that Heidegger neglected life in his focus on death.<sup>854</sup> In fact, privation— which Heidegger associates with the negation of life<sup>855</sup>— is not “opposed to what has been deprived” (life) but “genuinely belongs to it and to its essence.”<sup>856</sup> Death, as Blattner notes, is the inevitability that reveals the totality of our lives.<sup>857</sup> Death is the destiny that awaits and is perhaps *the* definitive characteristic of life. Death, therefore, *belongs* to life as an “act” of life<sup>858</sup> (a thing that all living things do). Julian Young notes, though, that death is the “side of life that is averted from us.”<sup>859</sup> We hate thinking about death because it terrifies us. As a result,

Heidegger dismissed most thinking about death as unsatisfactory euphemism.<sup>860</sup> He claimed, for example, that Hegel synthesized,<sup>861</sup> and sterilized<sup>862</sup> death by placing it in a dialectical relationship with life. Heidegger made this point clearly in *Basic Concepts*, arguing that “the nothing is related in its essence to Being.”<sup>863</sup> The nothing, he explained, does not need beings in order to exist, but nothingness cannot exist without Being. Thus, “the nothing is not something other than being”<sup>864</sup> and therefore we are led astray if we think of Being and nothing, life and death, as things apart— this separateness being necessary for synthesis. Dissatisfied with what he found, Heidegger sought a different approach.

Death as a constant and central presence in the experience of Being was a consistent theme across Heidegger’s career. For example, Heidegger described death, in *Being and Time*, as an ‘imminence [*Bevorstand*],’ the “most extreme not yet” to which we relate;<sup>865</sup> in *Contributions*, as the “utmost testimonial for be-ing;”<sup>866</sup> and in *The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, as the “highest refuge [*Gebirg*] of the truth of beyng itself, the refuge that in itself shelters [*birgt*] the concealment [*Verborgenheit*] of the essence of beyng”— the “refuge of beyng in the poem of the world.”<sup>867</sup> Heidegger tied this directly to temporality in *Time and Being*— arguing that “time and the temporal mean what is perishable, what passes away in the course of time.”<sup>868</sup> If we were immortal, we would be bereft of the very temporality that is central to our essential character as *Dasein*. Mortality, in short, makes *Dasein* the Being that it is. The essential significance of mortality leads, necessarily, to a consideration of non-Being: the nothingness, which Heidegger felt to be every bit as poorly understood a concept as Being.<sup>869</sup> Becoming— Heidegger explained in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*— is “shot through with not-Being,” because not-Being bookends the *Dasein*’s thrownness from nothingness, towards the as yet indeterminate.<sup>870</sup> One might say that from dust you come, and to dust you shall return— meaning that the state of non-Being is both the before and after of *Dasein*, the boundary around it which distinguishes and defines it as a thing.

This means, as Newell clarifies, “the generative origin of all beings, the source from which they emerge and into which they pass away, Being "is" nothing.”<sup>871</sup> Furthermore, it signifies, Dungey tells us,

that which is beyond our capacity to master and control through our technology<sup>872</sup> and it reveals, Löwith added, the similarly limited nature of our temporal existence.<sup>873</sup> Death is impossible to avoid— we are, in Schürmann’s words, “riveted to this monstrous site”<sup>874</sup>— as “the human being has no way out in the face of death— not only when it is time to die, but constantly and essentially.”<sup>875</sup> To live, in short, is already to be in anticipation<sup>876</sup> of dying. Death is, in Blattner’s formulation, the “limit situation” of our “ability-to-be.”<sup>877</sup> Mortal Being is thus being-toward-death and inhabits the in-between<sup>878</sup> of Being and non-Being. As Heidegger put it in *Being and Time*: “*Dasein* is the between.”<sup>879</sup> The belief that mortality makes us who we are, we find, sits well with the primordialist nationalists, but we will also find that significant differences emerge with respect to the art of dying.

### The Passion of the Primordialist

Löwith posited a link between Heidegger’s call to “stand in the storm” and nationalistic conceptions of heroism that gained currency during the Nazi period,<sup>880</sup> which Dungey described as “a reinvigorated political duty to one’s homeland and ethnic and linguistic community.”<sup>881</sup> Similarly, Wolin and Strauss compared Heidegger’s call to resoluteness with nationalistic demands for self-sacrifice<sup>882</sup> due to the apparent link between resoluteness and the fearlessness with which some face their doom. McManus, too, saw a call to live a certain way, not merely think certain thoughts,<sup>883</sup> and an exhortation to be ready for death<sup>884</sup> as vital to an authentic, Heideggerian experience of Being.<sup>885</sup> Theorists of primordialist nationalism, such as John Rex<sup>886</sup> and Edward Shils,<sup>887</sup> argued that nationalism revolves around practical questions while others, such as Moar and Kramer, see nationalism as a spiritual phenomenon associated with quasi-religious objectives like the ennoblement of the soul<sup>888</sup> and the transfiguration of death.<sup>889</sup> The prominence of death discourse among the primordialist nationalists, to be explored now, strongly suggests that however irrational it may be,<sup>890</sup> the attempt to make sense of our mortality plays a significant role in the claims primordialist nationalism makes upon authenticity.

Primordialist nationalism approaches death from the perspective of moods and passions.<sup>891</sup> War is central in all cases, though as the realities of war set in, for Jünger, Mann and Barrès,<sup>892</sup> the significance of war became more ambiguous— as the desolation that was the actual destiny of their comrades came into horrifying relief. Mann— in his later works— rejected saccharine romanticism about the dead<sup>893</sup> but, like Heidegger, saw death as the moment at which life is fulfilled.<sup>894</sup> Barrès argued that self-sacrifice fulfills us existentially<sup>895</sup> but raised the possibility of living on through one’s legacy.<sup>896</sup> Barrès was also deeply Catholic and thus did not see death as the ultimate end,<sup>897</sup> leading to a certain degree of resigned fatalism.<sup>898</sup> Jünger, who saw death in all its “glory” up close,<sup>899</sup> is more complex.<sup>900</sup> He posited that the encounter with death is the moment when life comes to stand before us.<sup>901</sup> There are significant similarities to Heidegger with respect to the way death turns us from the banal<sup>902</sup> to the essential (but only if we are resolute in its face).<sup>903</sup> However, Jünger believed that the enlivening mood that accompanies *danger*, rather than a mood directly provoked by *death*,<sup>904</sup> is the catalyst for this turning. Though there is much to justify the association of Heidegger’s approach to death with nationalistic death discourse, we already see differences.

We turn, now, to the most significant divergence. A central concept of the following analysis will be “Homerism.” As Grant notes, Greek tragedies tie the fates of individual characters to a “timeless eternity, in an ultimate perfection”<sup>905</sup> which results in the glorious dead not only being estimable,<sup>906</sup> but being immortalized in the songs of poets. Arendt provides a useful analysis of Homerism, noting that it emerges from the realization that a durable cultural world far outlives the individual,<sup>907</sup> and that in eschewing temporary goods for immortal fame one lives forever.<sup>908</sup> This understanding would seem align Homerism quite well with Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics and our primordialist nationalists. As Alastair Hannay noted, “sacrifice in a higher cause is a familiar enough occurrence. In history and in myth; usually it is in the interests of the nation or the state, and the sacrifice is made to the (tearful) applause of those who identify their own interests with the nation or State”<sup>909</sup> Ernest Renan added that is less a matter

of expending human life to obtain an *immediate*<sup>910</sup> goal, but rather that death can be a source of myth which will strengthen national identification.<sup>911</sup>

One can find no better example of the “tearful applause” described by Hannay than in Barrès’ *The Faith of France*. Here, Barrès associated death with an everlasting struggle for “eternal justice,”<sup>912</sup> wherein those who die come to be “held as God’s own.”<sup>913</sup> He also reports a conviction, on the part of the *poilus*, that they will attain immortality if they sacrifice themselves for their nation.<sup>914</sup> Soldiers are portrayed as “pure” and Christ-like both in the “innocence” of their blood<sup>915</sup> and in the sublimation that awaits them when their “great acts” culminate in “great deaths.”<sup>916</sup> Barrès portrayed these soldiers subsuming their individuality entirely into the worldly projects of France<sup>917</sup>— whose essence is reified<sup>918</sup> not via the rationality of theories,<sup>919</sup> but in the spectacle of public acts of self-sacrifice “for the glory of France.”<sup>920</sup> Most significantly of all, this sacrifice would inspire the multi-confessional and often highly internally divided French people to set aside their differences.<sup>921</sup> This must take priority over any pondering of existential questions.<sup>922</sup> It must also transcend any personal consideration— to the extent that he will criticize Captain Dreyfus for not simply knuckling under on Devil’s Island for the sake of France.<sup>923</sup> The nation, in short, requires the total abnegation of one’s self, in complete contrast with the individuation that we find in Péguy. The best example of Barrès’ Homerism is in *Officers and Gentlemen*, where Barrès eulogized Paul Driant, a friend killed at Verdun.<sup>924</sup> Men like Driant overcome fear of death,<sup>925</sup> and consummate their Being in sacrifice— entering the “ranks of heroes.”<sup>926</sup> Barrès is not ignorant of the purposeless death associated with war,<sup>927</sup> but argues that it is in the sacrifice itself that we find “greater worth” than the “merits” of whatever objective was taken.<sup>928</sup> Here we see all of the elements of Homerism: the consummation of a life, the practical good of inspiring one’s fellows and the romantic good of taking one’s place in the apostolic procession. Most significantly, we see the transformation of death from a source of fear into something joyful.<sup>929</sup> Barrès negates the authentic experience of death by transforming it into hope for immortality and happiness at dying well.<sup>930</sup>

Jünger, saw the memory of the “holy” dead as the “spark” that drives us to entrust ourselves<sup>931</sup> with the “true and spiritual welfare of our people”<sup>932</sup>— a bulwark against the spiritual dissolution of the fatherland.<sup>933</sup> Zimmerman credits *The Storm of Steel* with inspiring a generation to see war as an “eruption of primitive forces” that would blow away the cobwebs of Germany’s “exhausted bourgeois trappings.”<sup>934</sup> Jünger saw combat as an experience where the primal part of man comes to the fore<sup>935</sup> and associated this experience with the sweeping away of “civilized” limitations<sup>936</sup> alongside the rediscovery of mystery and transcendence.<sup>937</sup> However, there is a complexity to this which was perhaps lost to those romantics who took inspiration from Jünger. The same contempt for bourgeois values that might, in one case, inspire the “insatiable daredevilry” of those war heroes “encircled by a nimbus of romance”<sup>938</sup> led other soldiers to shoot at stretcher bearers and indulge their “atavistic impulse to destroy.”<sup>939</sup> Furthermore, though Jünger remained committed to his duty,<sup>940</sup> he began to notice that this involved flattening centuries old churches and reducing ancient forests to matchwood.<sup>941</sup> Nevertheless, Jünger believed that he was, in some way, ennobled by his experiences of war.<sup>942</sup> He also continued to lionise fallen “heroes” who faced these dangers and died for their country.<sup>943</sup> By dying meaningfully,<sup>944</sup> they came to “harbour the whole within themselves”<sup>945</sup> and consummate their being.

David Pan posits that dyadic relationships between culture and war, violent destruction and creative order lie at the heart of Jünger’s perspective on war.<sup>946</sup> We see this in the public memorialization of those who die in war.<sup>947</sup> Memorials provoke a mixture of sadness and pride, making us aware that these dead both belong to the eternal and live on in we who remember.<sup>948</sup> In contrast, Jünger found the soldiers at the front so brutalized as to be indifferent to the deaths of others,<sup>949</sup> barely noticing them before returning to work.<sup>950</sup> Jünger expressed concern, in *The Worker*, that modern warfare has transformed what was once a daring encounter with the face of death<sup>951</sup> into an anonymizing<sup>952</sup> affair— though one which does have the virtue of sharpening the “typus” as the dominant form of modernity.<sup>953</sup> Most of the time, though, he was simply bored.<sup>954</sup> Jünger had imagined that he would be *Lohengrin*, but instead found himself idling around

overlooking the gratuitous mistreatment of Jewish bystanders by his own soldiers.<sup>955</sup> This is far more significant than it seems. Where Jünger lamented boredom, Heidegger valued it. For Heidegger, it is in moments of “profound boredom”— where we are “drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffled fog”<sup>956</sup>— that our thoughts return meditatively to Being. As Safranski puts it, the need that drives us to question Being is experienced “more particularly in the mood of boredom.”<sup>957</sup> It is boredom, not danger and excitement, which “reveals beings as a whole.”<sup>958</sup> This difference is indicative of a fundamental tension between the primordialist nationalists and Heidegger’s understanding of how we ought to relate to death.

Before moving on, it should be noted that the exemplars of primordialism chosen here are not unanimous on this matter. Péguy is a peculiar case. He argued, to the French Socialist Convention,<sup>959</sup> that war was a merely bourgeois class conflict<sup>960</sup> and expressed scepticism that the working class believed the Imperial Guard had died for them.<sup>961</sup> Furthermore, Péguy disputed that death was truly the font of existential completion— arguing that Being is surely better served by continuing to live.<sup>962</sup> However, he also saw, when faced with Russian liberals dying to resist the Tzar, the relationship between a willingness to die and individuation.<sup>963</sup> Péguy gave great importance to those crises and even defeats wherein the “interior life” of a nation becomes clear<sup>964</sup>— preferring a romantic vision of war (focused upon honouring the national essence) to a pragmatic one (focused on victory).<sup>965</sup> Péguy tied this romantic vision of war directly to Homer.<sup>966</sup> Thus, an element of the Homeric is present even when we encounter a more nuanced attitude towards death and sacrifice in the case of Péguy.

### Mortal Instruments

Heidegger explained in, *Being and Time*, that the everyday relation to death<sup>967</sup> impedes us in two ways. Firstly, it interposes between us and our death a series of “urgencies” to distract ourselves with.<sup>968</sup> We are compelled to “make good use” of the time we have, pushing us towards goals whose utility is obvious<sup>969</sup> rather than the less obviously “useful” act of meditating upon death. Secondly, where we do think of death,

it is covered over with busyness— an “entangled evasion” where we avoid confronting death by busying ourselves with arrangements. Anybody who has lost a family member knows that the time we have to meditate upon their death is brief, before we are to start making funeral arrangements and taking care of the will. In short, “everyday, entangled evasion of death is an *inauthentic* being toward it.”<sup>970</sup>

Heidegger distinguished, in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, between *telos* as an instrumental end—the purpose of something— and *telos* as a “coming to fulfilment <*Vollendung*>.”<sup>971</sup> Ends, in the context of death, ought to be understood in this second sense— not as the achievement of a goal but as a fulfilment of the limited nature that “makes a being a being as opposed to a nonbeing”<sup>972</sup>: temporality. Death, then, forces us to confront the whole of Being from beginning to end. All temporal things are bound by horizons,<sup>973</sup> and these can be temporal horizons as well as conceptual boundaries. By making manifest before us the boundaries of our own being, death awakens us to the possibility that there is space outside of these boundaries, and we catch a glimpse of *Dasein* as a whole— one which is not otherwise accessible. This is, no doubt, an end, but it is far removed from the pursuit of political, military, or religious goals. While our nationalists posited glorious death as an alternative to entanglement in petty concerns, their conception of glorious death still serves the purpose of, depending on the circumstances, saving<sup>974</sup> or aggrandizing<sup>975</sup> the nation rather than unveiling essential truths of Being.

It is not solely the instrumentalism of primordialist nationalist death passion which runs afoul of Heidegger’s understanding of authentic being-toward-death. Heidegger posited that part of an authentic relation to death depends upon abandoning our orientation towards personal lived experiences and instead being compelled by the “innermost and most far-reaching need” of *Dasein*.<sup>976</sup> At first glance, the demand that one sacrifice oneself for the nation might align with the sacrifice of personal lived experience for *Dasein*— particularly with respect to the historical *Dasein* of one’s people. However, as Kisiel noticed, a mass of humans beings marching towards death resembles the standing reserve of material in the era of mass production.<sup>977</sup> Furthermore, where Péguy saw the willingness to sacrifice for a symbol as a central

element of the “mystique” of national life,<sup>978</sup> Heidegger— in “What is Metaphysics?”— rejected the elevation of “idols” as a crutch that we must abandon to “allow space for beings as a whole.”<sup>979</sup> By this, Heidegger meant that we must not elevate idols and symbols as a stand in for life and be done with the barriers we place between death and Being. We cannot look to the death of a great hero instead of to our own nor can we cheat death. There can be no substitute for engagement with our own death.

### The Achilles Heel of Homerism

It is not necessarily the case that primordialist nationalism, and the death-cults that it inspires, must be limited to the entanglements in the everyday discussed thus far. It is not *only* immediate concerns that characterize nationalistic engagements with death. As Arendt notes, a rich tradition of ritual seeks to “sanctify” and sublimate us in our deaths.<sup>980</sup> Primordialist nationalism does not eschew this task. Indeed, as Moar notes, the “unity of the spiritual and corporeal,” the notion that the nation can “convey man to eternity,”<sup>981</sup> is central to the appeal of nationalism. However, this itself presents complications. Heidegger believed that glory had become perverted in his time, falling from a Greek conception of glory as the “highest manner of Being” to a mere celebrity that is thrown around with abandon.<sup>982</sup> Indeed, it is worth noting that Heidegger— in his Nietzsche lectures— regarded the importance of “the soldier fallen in battle” primarily in the capacity of their “sacrifice” to point us “in thought” towards “an origin”<sup>983</sup>— turning us, in doing so, towards the *Seinsfrage*. The soldiers themselves do not figure in the apostolic succession of German heroes alongside the poets who write about them. It is the poetization of the act or sacrifice, not the act itself, that really matters. The inherent promise of immortality that Homerism offers implies precisely the kind of “overcoming” of death which blinds us to the true temporality of *Dasein*.

Heidegger recognized, in *Being and Time*, that the need to tranquilize our fear of death is entirely understandable.<sup>984</sup> However, resoluteness in anticipation of death requires precisely that we “disperse” any “fugitive self covering over” by any fabricated “overcoming” of death.<sup>985</sup> Indeed, even if it is not a personal escape from death— but a promise that one lives on, in a sense, through one’s nation— we still rob

ourselves of the chance to face up to death. We are still seeking to think ourselves infinite in some sense. For Heidegger, that which tranquilizes our fears and consoles us about our mortality is anathema to the anxiety needed to turn and *be* towards death itself. As Dungey correctly notes, we cannot master death.<sup>986</sup> Any attempt to negate our fears about death is an aversion of our gaze from the frightful truth. As such, elevating the nation as the symbol for which one may martyr oneself is subject to the critique of the general *omerta* surrounding the subject of death in ordinary life: where “the they does not permit the courage to have anxiety about death.”<sup>987</sup> The martyr is serene in the certainty of sublimation and thus represents the total absence of that fear and trembling which, we shall see, is the *sine qua non* of authentic engagement with mortality. Homeric immortality,<sup>988</sup> then, constitutes an evasion of death, a “flight from death” which re-interprets our mortality into something less anxiety inducing. By thinking of our deaths in terms of our nation, we replace the anxiety inducing matter of ceasing to be with this symbol, the nation, which comes to represent our romantic aspirations. Death falls from view as we dream of patriotic glory. This is, perhaps, Heidegger at his most salutary. The topics of destiny, death and what it means to die for something lead inevitably into territories where one would expect a right-wing German thinker to sing the grim siren song that Wilfred Owen called “The Old Lie.” What one finds instead is a call towards a thoughtful engagement with our mortality. What, then, does this thoughtful engagement involve?

### § *The Art of Dying*

#### Death as Inner Experience

We are, Heidegger argued, first confronted by our mortality when we experience the death of another, in which we see foreshadowed our own.<sup>989</sup> In this experience, death becomes “objectively accessible.”<sup>990</sup> The dying person is not, to be sure, death itself. Thus, we do not grasp death *itself* as an object but, in seeing the dead person— Dreyfus and Spinoza noted— anticipate and fear our own death.<sup>991</sup> Heidegger expanded upon this in the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, arguing that understanding ourselves in terms of “this most extreme possibility” is central to being free for our death as the “proper and authentic way of

being a self.”<sup>992</sup> Far from evoking a feeling that the individual is insignificant, as it did for Jünger,<sup>993</sup> the solitude of the Heideggerian encounter with death individuates *Dasein*<sup>994</sup>— for we cannot, Taminiaux noted, pass our death (which is ours and ours alone<sup>995</sup>) onto another.<sup>996</sup>

Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, provides three “theses” regarding death.<sup>997</sup> One: death is a constantly awaiting, essential, and unavoidable part of life. Two: death is a state of non-Being, lying outside of the boundaries Being. Three: death is that which we do not share with anybody else. Though everybody dies, the anticipation of *our* lives ending and of *us* no longer existing— that nothing can replace us once we are gone— isolates us from the “they.” As Heidegger put it: death reveals itself as our “ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable [*Unüberholbar*] potentiality-of-being.”<sup>998</sup> Therefore, Heidegger argued in *Being and Time* that we anticipate death as a *nonrelational* possibility,<sup>999</sup> both in the sense that we have nothing else to compare it to and in that we cannot grasp our own death by comparison to the death of another. Thus, anticipation “absolutely individualizes” *Dasein*.<sup>1000</sup> Importantly, for this study, the fact that “death is always essentially my own”<sup>1001</sup> does not only mean that we face death alone, but also that no other can expropriate us of this ownmost potentiality-of-being. The anticipation of death gives us a chance to think of ourselves independently of the “they” to whom we are otherwise bound— it frees us from their “illusions.”<sup>1002</sup> As Han-Pile notes, this anticipation intimidates but also empowers us, as we may then choose to take ownership of our selves.<sup>1003</sup> Anxiety pushes us to seek a free relation to being so as to escape from the “nullifying” effect of death towards more “authentic possibilities.”<sup>1004</sup> This empowers us to pursue our ownmost projects and anxiety can, in Heidegger’s words, “bring *Dasein* before its being free for.”<sup>1005</sup>

Mark Lilla notes that for Heidegger, the crowd and its idle chatter absorb the *Dasein* in “average everydayness” in order to “avoid the fundamental question.”<sup>1006</sup> However, Heidegger’s belief that anxiety about our own mortality draws us away from the community into an individual relationship with Being certainly softens over time. In *Being and Time*, for example, the individuating effect of anxiety was held

to be very strong. Heidegger made clear that our anxiety is about something alien from the world of beings, something “completely indefinite” which is not “at hand and present within the world.”<sup>1007</sup> As a result, when we experience anxiety the world constructed for the *Dasein* by others will “sink away” as the “world” of “*Dasein*-with others” cannot offer us what our anxiety demands.<sup>1008</sup> In fact, Heidegger explicitly identifies, here, the “way things get publically interpreted” as the reason why *Dasein* “mostly remains concealed from itself.”<sup>1009</sup> As such, that which is disclosed to us in our experience of anxiety is the possibility of “individuation [*Vereinzelung*].”<sup>1010</sup> However, even here it remains the case that— though Heidegger explicitly states a connection between anxiety and solipsism<sup>1011</sup>— he clarifies that this is a very particular form of solipsism wherein “*Dasein* is individualized [*vereinzelt*], but as being-in-the-world.”<sup>1012</sup> Therefore, anxiety pulls *Dasein* away from the everyday experience of living alongside fellow members of our community, but this does not mean that the experience of anxiety about death necessarily pulls us away from any common experience of the world that we might share with our fellows.

One can observe a definite shift of emphasis, with a more detailed exploration of this last proviso, in *Hölderlin's Hymns*. Heidegger argued here that “we are a dialogue” because we are properly temporal, and therefore properly *Dasein*, only when we enter into the “event of language.”<sup>1013</sup> Language, as will be discussed further in chapter nine, necessarily ties us to those with whom we share our language. We are, of course, not constantly talking, and therefore dialogue is something that “we enter into temporarily”<sup>1014</sup> without forever abandoning the possibility of solitary contemplation. Heidegger also clarifies that idle-talk— which generates the “public interpretations” described above— is a perversion of, as opposed to a totally distinct phenomenon from, dialogue.<sup>1015</sup> Furthermore, “language enables us reciprocally to inform one another about our lived experiences.”<sup>1016</sup> This is vital because Heidegger differentiates community from society— the latter being merely a matter or reciprocal relation— by the role that discourse plays in our articulating to one another the fact that “each individual’s being” is “bound in advance to something that binds and determines every individual in exceeding them.”<sup>1017</sup> In layman’s terms, it is only by

engaging with others that an individual might realise that they belong to a larger historical situation— that our thoughts and experiences are not *sui generis*, totally unlike anything that anyone else has thought or experienced. We are not alone in thinking about being— but rather are merely the latest in a long line of people to wonder about such things. Finally, and most importantly of all, Heidegger projects this interesting interplay between the individual and collective experiences onto the question of death. He argued, here, that a shared sense of “the nearness of death” placed “everyone in advance into the same nothingness” in such a way that it “individuates each individual” but also “creates in advance the space of community.”<sup>1018</sup> Anxiety about death, then, is an individual experience, because we are all facing our own deaths, and a shared experience, because we all share in anxiety about dying. In short, our experience of death, which consists of apprehensiveness and anticipation, must emerge from the belonging of our deaths to the essence of our *Dasein*— which is both exclusively our own and characterized by the experience of being-with-others. Heidegger makes clear in his Hölderlin lectures that there is a tempered relationship between individual and collective, but this was absolutely foreshadowed in *Being and Time*. Therefore, the claim that death reveals to us a formative interplay between these two aspects of *Dasein* remains constant.

However, the “they” is not the only threat to an appropriation of our mortality. As McManus notes, the “challenge of holding true” to mortality requires that we avoid falling into excessively “gloomy” attitude towards it.<sup>1019</sup> The tendency to feel this way— and our understanding that spending our lives being depressed that they will end is unsustainable— introduces the risk that we avoid confronting death altogether. Indeed, Péguy notes— reflecting on the last days of his friend Bernard-Lazare— that an immense tissue of lies surrounds the matter of death, designed to avoid confronting mortality.<sup>1020</sup> For Heidegger, this is the result of the strangeness of being brought, by death, before Being and our shrinking away from this confrontation.<sup>1021</sup> Put simply, obsessing over death is not immediately beneficial and most

find it too disturbing anyway— it is simpler to avoid the matter entirely. However, this avoidance robs us of something precious. For philosophy, as Safranski claims, “should first of all give man a fright.”<sup>1022</sup>

In André Malraux’s *The Temptation of the West*, his fictional Chinese interlocutor, Ling, differentiates a Western mood surrounding death, characterized by terror, from his own mixture of “sadness and awe.”<sup>1023</sup> This speaks to Heidegger’s own analysis of attitudes towards death, some characterized by running in terror from the fact of our mortality, others transforming this fear into moods<sup>1024</sup> of anxiety, turbulence and, finally, wonder. At first, one is “stunned” by the “naked uncanniness” of “being-toward-death,” but it is precisely in fear that one first becomes attuned to finitude.<sup>1025</sup> Experiencing fear, as Segal puts it, “*Dasein* is overcome by the strangeness” of its lot, and thus “finds itself in the midst of asking the question of what is.”<sup>1026</sup> Fear, and even despair, are necessary moods with which we face up to our mortality, and if we run from our fears we rob ourselves of the opportunities which anxiety and despair grant us. Resoluteness allows *Dasein* to dwell in the “anxiety of their lostness”<sup>1027</sup> in the uncanniness of Being. Therefore, being-toward-death, we are told in Heidegger’s *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, requires our being thrown into turbulence by this fear.<sup>1028</sup> Heidegger would frequently sing the praises of turbulence. In *Basic Questions*, for example, he would argue that it is precisely in distress with respect to death that we experience the distress of Being itself<sup>1029</sup> which causes us to need to know what only a questioning of Being can reveal.

Turbulence, though, is salutary only when transformed into wonder. Heidegger claimed, in *Basic Questions*, that wonder occurs when we are shocked out of the quotidian by the confusing and terrifying fact of death. We come, in wonder, to be awed by Being.<sup>1030</sup> Unlike the anguish of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith, who *resigns* everything infinitely,<sup>1031</sup> the wondrous *Dasein* will initially “hold fast to beings as being in pure acknowledgement.”<sup>1032</sup> This is to say that in wonder, far from resignation,<sup>1033</sup> the *Dasein* is in fact liberated by the “total strangeness” that so oppressed it in fear and anxiety. Though we may hold on to beings, we do so in a way that acknowledges Being. Only thus does the grounding question of Being

emerge as *the* question. Thusly does the project of inquiring into this grounding question emerge as the authentic question for the *Dasein*.<sup>1034</sup>

It is anxiety, however, that is *the* indispensable mood. Anxiety is not necessarily anxiety about a specific thing<sup>1035</sup>—one cannot really be anxious *about* death itself as it is unknown to us— but is a general anxiety about being-in-the-world. That is to say, our anxieties about death become anxieties about the possibility of no longer being-in-the-world. This revealing to us the world, and our being in it, as matters about which we are concerned.<sup>1036</sup> We worry about what we are doing with our brief sojourn among our fellows and the very fact that we want for time, being mortals, triggers us to ask what it all means. Arendt identified two solutions to the problem of mortality. One, associated with Malraux, involves defiance of death<sup>1037</sup> while the second— associated with Camus, challenges us to “live in the midst of absurdity.”<sup>1038</sup> This, for Camus, involves a confrontation with death that frees us from the trivial and turns us towards the question of death as *the* philosophical question *par excellence*.<sup>1039</sup> The vital difference is that, for Camus, the question of death forces us to seek to come to terms with,<sup>1040</sup> rather than overcome<sup>1041</sup> the fear and anxiety occasioned by death— and to do so by revolting<sup>1042</sup> against the absurdity of our existence.<sup>1043</sup>

Heidegger, in Camusian terms, “seeks his way amid these ruins.”<sup>1044</sup> This makes anxiety about death— a misery that is known to everyone “that is honest with himself”<sup>1045</sup>— something that we can seek to *overcome*, not merely come to terms with. Far from having to stand “apart from time” in revolt, like Camus’ absurd man,<sup>1046</sup> Heidegger’s authentic *Dasein* turns *towards* the primordial temporality that destroys the everyday meaning of life. As Han-Pile puts it, “*Dasein* has to choose to choose itself,”<sup>1047</sup> to make, as Heidegger termed it in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*, “an authentic decision for or against our entering into the fundamental attunement.”<sup>1048</sup> We must choose to reject what Segal terms a frightened recoiling from death, which might lead us to seek solace in some distraction from it. Instead, we must discover a “firm resolve in the terror”— where we face up to our fears without falling into pessimism.<sup>1049</sup>

As Heidegger noted in *Being and Time*, the act of turning in fear is evidence that we have noticed something frightful.<sup>1050</sup> As he later argued in “What is Metaphysics?,” we need ‘no unusual event to rouse it [anxiety]’<sup>1051</sup>— to grasp that we are anxious about something that “surpasses” beings as a whole. Simply put, the fact that we fear death sufficiently to turn away is evidence, in and of itself, of our awareness that we are dealing with something that brings into question what we have hitherto taken for granted.<sup>1052</sup> Only, Heidegger argues in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, if we are “seized by terror” may we find “the bliss of astonishment” where we are “torn away,” consciously and thoughtfully, from the everyday.”<sup>1053</sup> This requires that the encounter with death be free of any attempt to “cover over” or “reinterpret”<sup>1054</sup> it into something less terrifying. This precludes anything that mollifies us emotionally, such as the promise of eternal life— be it in religious or Homeric form.

Any flight, or escape, from the fact of death is a flight from Being itself. We must, therefore, be prepared for the fact we will die and see this as a gift, not a curse. It is a gift because acknowledging our mortality allows us to realize that what concerns us most is the question of Being. In resoluteness, Heidegger explained in *Being and Time*, we “harbour ourselves” in “authentic being-toward-death” as the “existential modality” (manner of Being) that is authentically our own.<sup>1055</sup> To be resolute involves, Taminioux told us, facing the fact that we cannot share the burden of our mortality<sup>1056</sup> and that much will be held back from us in our lives. In light of this, we must not shy away from the “exposure to the reserve and the enigma present at the core of the *Lichtung*.”<sup>1057</sup> Being itself, as Lilly puts it, is “traumatic”<sup>1058</sup> and it is in standing firm in the face of trauma that we discover what resoluteness is. Though Adorno correctly notes that Heidegger’s discussion of death is sterile— cleansed of its “misery and stench”<sup>1059</sup>— it is hard to see why this matters. Heidegger may not regale us with tales of bodies crushed by tanks— as Jünger does— but challenges us with something far more imposing: facing up, without euphemism, to our own end.

Moritūrī tē Salūtant

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger critiqued any attempt to treat death as a simple lack, a mere ceasing to be,<sup>1060</sup> or simple biological function with no greater meaning.<sup>1061</sup> Our typical engagement with death does not involve such intellectualizations. It is notable that Heidegger begins his discussion of death “with regard to the fore-having of the whole of *Dasein*” and with the question of whether and how we grasp our being as a whole when wholeness is attained upon our ceasing to be.<sup>1062</sup> Heidegger tied our questioning of death to curiosity about Being, to the posing of the *Seinsfrage* and the matter of how Being relates to time. While our thinking about being might be triggered by the encounter with death—the body lying before us making us aware of our mortality<sup>1063</sup>—it is only in revisiting the question of death—this time questioning what it means with regard to Being rather than our own mortality—that we relate *authentically* to death.

Here, we find a positive appropriation of our finitude, less consumed by the thought of no longer being here and more resolute—understanding that death is completion rather than loss. We must, for Heidegger, resist the comforting but deceptive certainties that characterize everyday engagement with death.<sup>1064</sup> We must understand that the “tranquilization” of anxiety about death is a flight from Being itself<sup>1065</sup> because what is ignored is the thing that is coming to an end, Being. Heidegger put this unambiguously in *Contributions*: “the question of death stands in essential relation to the *truth of be-ing*, and only in that relation.”<sup>1066</sup> The confrontation with death can only occur if it is a springboard for a proper consideration of Being, if we recognize that what comes to completion when we die is that which is truly our ownmost. Thus, returning to *Being and Time*, “death is the ownmost, nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and insuperable possibility of *Dasein*. As the end of *Dasein*, death is in the being [*Sein*] of this being [*Seienden*] toward its end.”<sup>1067</sup> Our death-cults and rites should turn us toward death, and establish death as the ultimate, insuperable coming into fulfilment of the potentiality that is truly our ownmost. How, then, are we to we relate to death thus understood?

Taminiaux described “authentic comportment toward death” as “being open to the possibility [of death] as such— without any attenuation whatsoever of its character of possibility.”<sup>1068</sup> Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, held that we must understand, cultivate, and endure death as a “possibility.”<sup>1069</sup> We relate to death via a particular form of expectation that Heidegger called anticipation. Heidegger wrote that “Being-toward-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-of-being of *that* being whose kind of being is anticipation itself.”<sup>1070</sup> This abstruse claim requires explanation. What Heidegger conveyed, here, was that in treating death as a thing to be anticipated— and knowing that what we anticipate is the completion of our becoming— we must also recognize our capacity that to anticipate death in this manner is a central, distinguishing element of the kind of Being that we are. We come to know ourselves, to grasp what kind of Being we are, when we anticipate death as the realization of our Being. Put most simply, the fact that we know that we will die and are actually capable of grasping the implications of this— that we are coming to an end, never to return, but also are being completed by this end— is what separates us from beasts. This is what it means, in Taminiaux’s terms, to be “on intimate terms with death.”<sup>1071</sup>

Our relation to death also frees us to pursue our ownmost potentialities— for an authentic attunement to death turns us towards our completion as Beings who lived and were resolute and took care according to our own authentic possibilities. This attunement reveals to us that we are free for a death that is a completion of who we are, and which is independent of the expectations of the “they.” Anticipating our death, further, reveals to a being that it lost in the “they,” and “brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself [...] in passionate, anxious freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of the they, factual, and certain of itself.”<sup>1072</sup> When we come to terms with death, we are freed towards possibilities which are *truly our ownmost*<sup>1073</sup>— or authentic [*Eigentlich*]. As a result, Dungey finds the solitude of death irreconcilable with the political.<sup>1074</sup> Though there are certainly some important similarities between the exhortation to die for one’s country and the language of resoluteness highlighted by Löwith, it is Dungey who best grasps the tension between solitude in being-toward-death and nationalistic death passion.

### The Destiny of the Rhine

It has already become a theme of the analysis thus far that inauthenticity often results from elevating worldly goals above the pursuit of Being. One might conclude that the highest good is thinking about Being, and that therefore—since one must be alive in order to think about Being—there can be no rational reason to give one’s life for anything. That said, we have seen already that one can serve the pursuit of Being other than by thinking about it oneself, for example one’s body might be observed and inspire the pursuit of the *Seinsfrage* in another. Indeed, the possibility of inspiring others to think about Being by dying could, conceivably, lead to the endorsement of self-sacrifice as modelled by Socrates<sup>1075</sup>—giving one’s life, in one manner or another, for philosophy. Nothing we have seen outright precludes the possibility that one’s insuperable potentiality of Being may lie in dying *for* something other than oneself. However, this is not the evocation of sacrifice that we typically find in Heidegger’s writing.

What we find instead, in the “Letter on Humanism,” is an admiration for “those young Germans who knew about Hölderlin” who “when confronted with death [...] lived and thought something other than what the public held to be the typical German attitude.”<sup>1076</sup> It is important to note that even in the context of “The German Student as Worker”—one of Heidegger’s most fascistic interventions, where he made direct reference to Langemark<sup>1077</sup>—Heidegger still accentuated the “unbloody” nature of the “act of self-sacrifice.”<sup>1078</sup> Returning to the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger lionised these young Germans for their resistance to homelessness and their taking up of a Hölderlin inspired historical rootedness. Thus, we see the potential for the glorification of death in Heidegger’s celebration of young men who faced death in defence of the world-historical thinking of Hölderlin against metaphysical cosmopolitanism.<sup>1079</sup> While, it seems, the greatest good is the thinking of Being, not all are capable of this. The non-thinker can still contribute to the world-historical destiny of the German historical *Dasein* by fighting against that which threatens its realization— even sacrificing oneself so that others may bring us to the truth of Being. While perhaps not worth dying for, what is worth *living* for— for Heidegger— is taking up this task and perhaps,

as Safranski notes, inspiring others to do the same.<sup>1080</sup> Two things are clear. Firstly, the attitude of these young Germans is differentiated from a post-war perception of the “typical German attitude”— implicating the “Homeric” attitude towards death. Secondly, Heidegger praised the way these young Germans “lived and thought”— not “fought and died.” This clarifies that Heidegger calls us to something different than do the primordialist nationalists. However, it is simplistic to conclude that Heidegger wished us only to live and think, not fight, and die because— as ever with Heidegger— there are significant contributions to his oeuvre which complicate this rather-too-tidy conclusion.

Before we proceed, though, it should be noted that— as Zimmerman, Judaken, Donovan, and Peterson<sup>1081</sup> note— Heidegger’s discussion of resoluteness, destiny and overcoming was always likely to be interpreted by laymen as a call for young men to throw their lives away for Germany— especially when Heidegger was speaking at Nazi rallies. Furthermore, Heidegger evokes the idea of a German destiny, and though he may not openly call people to die for it, it is uncomfortably close to the kind of sentiment that Hitler exploited to extinguish the lives of millions of those he pretended to champion. Nevertheless, it is in keeping with what we have seen thus far that Heidegger’s take on destiny is less immediately recognisable than what was found among the primordialist nationalists.<sup>1082</sup> The German destiny is inseparable from Hölderlin, he being the great poet who— according to Heidegger— poetized that destiny. Thus, in order to know the German destiny, we must look to Hölderlin’s hymn to the Rhine. For, Heidegger told us, “precisely this Rhine— this demigod— is a destiny”<sup>1083</sup> and it is the poet who hears that destiny from the Rhine. Hölderlin’s poem is not itself an articulation of the content of Germany’s destiny.<sup>1084</sup> However, Hölderlin’s poems create within us the conditions under which we experience the river and the German homeland to which it belongs.<sup>1085</sup> The course of a river flows only one way, downstream. Thus, there is an element of compulsion inherent to any destiny portrayed as a river. Standing firm in the current is not a matter of resistance on behalf of one’s own egoistic designs, but of being able to hear when we are told of the “uncircumventable”— the ineluctable destiny which is ours as thrown into an historical

*Dasein*.<sup>1086</sup> As discussed, this is not a compulsion which allows us only to go with the flow,<sup>1087</sup> but it dictates to us the authentic course. The collective nature of this destiny does not rob us of individuality. It emerges from the fact that each is individually thrown into an historical being-with-one-another on account of the fundamentally social nature of human existence. We “must pass through decisions that no one can ever take from another”<sup>1088</sup> but these decision-points will be common. In clearer, but metaphorical, terms, each drop of water that makes up the Rhine is unique, and follows a unique course, but starting at the same source and subject to the same physical effects, each atom follows the course of the river.

The course of the Rhine— beginning in the Alps, starting off on its way towards Greece and the East before turning, around Chur, towards the Northern heartlands of the Germanic people.<sup>1089</sup> It is vital to note that the Eastern course, while abandoned, continues to be carried forward in the flowing of the Rhine. That is to say, the Rhine’s destiny once seemed to lie in the east and the east does not cease to matter because the river has chosen to divert from this initial course.<sup>1090</sup> Germany, in other words, is to bridge the gap between the classical south and the wilds of the north, between East and West, between old and new. Heidegger makes clear that it is smallminded to think of this in terms of calculating one’s way to the fulfilment of a “desire to make history”<sup>1091</sup> — and one can apply this critique to the ambitions expressed by the primordialist nationalists. Heidegger dismisses such things as “trivial,” or as the “petty ambition” of the “little people.”<sup>1092</sup> What, then, is this destiny which lies concealed in the song of the Rhine?

The shortest answer is as follows: the destiny that is uncovered by Hölderlin’s Rhine is that the Germans will come to rest in their properly apportioned space, an in-between realm where the strife of Being will play out and reach its conclusion. The Rhine, Heidegger stated— somewhat overlooking that the Rhine’s delta is in the Netherlands— is “brought to fulfilment” in “contenting himself in the German land [...] as the fulfilled harmony of origin and having sprung forth.”<sup>1093</sup> It is the lonely<sup>1094</sup> destiny of the demigods (of which the Rhine is one) to “open up a realm that is broad and deep enough to be able to think

both the Beyng of the gods and that of humans.”<sup>1095</sup> The Rhine comes to settle—that is to say that it comes to be at home in—the counter-striving impulses towards the Greek and Germanic.<sup>1096</sup> The Rhine combines the Greek endowment—a “rousing proximity to the fire from the heavens,” such that one can be “struck by the violence of beyng”—and the German endowment—a talent for the “planning of domains and calculating, setting in order to the point of organisation.”<sup>1097</sup> In bringing the two together, in the German heartlands, the Rhine gifts to Germany the appropriate space for the “free usage” of “the national.”<sup>1098</sup>

Heidegger evokes the language of Nietzsche to explain that Germany’s “endowment and task” is to unite the Apollonian and Dionysian.<sup>1099</sup> Germany will be the country where all of the rifts, ruptures, divisions and contradictions that define our relation to being shine forth before a people whose historically endowed task is to “come to be struck by beyng.”<sup>1100</sup> It is “assigned as a task to the people of this land [Germany]: to be a between, a middle, out of which and in which history is grounded.”<sup>1101</sup> The nation, Heidegger clarifies, is that which is given to a people as endowment, it is where we are free to play with ideas, to ground our poetic expressions and, ultimately, to “freely transform” the nation “into history.”<sup>1102</sup> In practical terms, Germany is the space that is given to the Germans, as an historical *Dasein*, to think through the crisis of metaphysics and, eventually, to found Being anew in authentic *Dasein*. Germany is the land where a “poetizing and thinking that break the abysses of Being” will be articulated.<sup>1103</sup> We cannot yet know what that poetry will be, but Hölderlin’s Rhine-hymn reveals to us that it is the Germans who will find out. In conclusion, two elements tie the German destiny thus understood to the question of what is worth dying for: Germany and the Germans. Germany is destined to be the space in which the Germans will be provoked, inspired, and then given the freedom to experience all of the contradictions of our contemporary situation. From there, they can think their way towards a new, authentic relation to Being. Where Heidegger spoke of those young Germans who had read their Hölderlin, he felt they were risking their lives not for *Lebensraum* or for glory but for the fulfilment of the destiny of the German historical

*Dasein* as those who will alight the way to Being itself. In short, it *can* hypothetically be sweet and fitting to die for one's country, but only if by doing so we are dying for Being.

In whatever capacity one might be engaging with Heidegger, the discussion of this chapter—regarding the reasons why, for a Heideggerian, sacrificing one's life for the party is precisely the opposite of an authentic being-toward-death should be at the forefront of interpretation. We have found ample evidence to support Soffer's contention that nationalism functioned as a substitute religion.<sup>1104</sup> We find this, for example, in Mann's contention that war can destroy the body but perfect the soul<sup>1105</sup> and that glorious death makes our suffering beautiful.<sup>1106</sup> This equally true of the consolation promised by Barrès to the dead and dying—that their deaths will deliver a better tomorrow for their children<sup>1107</sup> and his frequent blurring of Christian and nationalistic rhetoric.<sup>1108</sup> Even Jünger, in spite of his awareness of the horror of battle death, argued that those who were brave in the face of death would be rewarded with excitement and glory.<sup>1109</sup> The sad exception was Péguy,<sup>1110</sup> who died at Villeroy as a sceptic of the idea of sublimation through suffering and death.<sup>1111</sup> For Heidegger, what “threatens man in his very nature” is precisely such a “peaceful release” where the human condition becomes “tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects”—in fact this, for Heidegger, is a greater threat than the “much-discussed atomic bomb.”<sup>1112</sup> Comforting promises constitute a perverse sort of sentimentality that inhibits the distress which, Heidegger argued in his Hegel lectures, is necessary for a proper encounter with death.<sup>1113</sup> One could characterize it, in the terms of Heidegger's *Basic Concepts*, as a “comfortable retreat.”<sup>1114</sup> We get, then, a strong indication that the Homeric death-cults described in this chapter constitute a comforting self-assurance in the face of the uncertainty of the confrontation with Being. Death-cults provoke an image of eternity, through great heroic deeds. They thus align precisely with the perversions of finitude critiqued by Heidegger in his Hölderlin lectures—those images of eternity that are “comfortable to think” but render us “incapable of experiencing the power of temporality from the ground up.”<sup>1115</sup> They obscure from our view the end of our Being, the vital moment that bounds the *Dasein* in its ownmost, essential wholeness.

To hold out hope for such an immortalization would simply return us to what Péguy considered the conventional attitude towards death, where we know of it without truly believing in it.<sup>1116</sup> It is this which separates a salutary call to come to terms with the fact of mortality and a sinister invitation to immolate oneself in the interests of others.<sup>1117</sup> Heidegger called us to make our life and death mean something and to do so through thinking, writing and understanding. It was a rousing call to philosophy. Furthermore, this was a time where the fear that the decline of religion left us without meaning<sup>1118</sup> was leading many in Heidegger's orbit to encourage romantic calls to glorious death on the battlefield. Heidegger will be criticized in this study, without equivocation, for his contributions to the environment in which Nazism flourished. It is only fair that we should pause, here, to highlight that Heidegger offered a compelling philosophical case to reject the cult of Horst Wessel—the Nazi activist who became the official martyr of the Nazi cause. Heidegger also provided a strong defence against the weaponization of the search for meaning that many a nationalist exploited in order to throw young men into machine-gun fire.

### From Berlin to Being-as-Such

This chapter concludes with the following questions: Does a national mythology articulate the inherited historical situation as a poetic account of the history of one's nation? Or, alternatively, does a national mythology only *appear* to gather together the fore-structure of the world into which one finds oneself thrown, while in fact gathering together an ideologically or politically oriented assemblage of historical material? It is clear, now, that the latter is the case. This is, above all, because the nationalistic death discourse we have considered distorts the historicity of the world around us through the lens of a politically charged narrative. Being, having “no equal whatever,” cannot be brought before us *by* an intermediary— it must, as Heidegger put it in “The Turning,” “bring itself to pass” from “out of its essence.”<sup>1119</sup> This constitutes a fundamental point of disaccord between Heidegger and our nationalists. In particular, the arrangement of things into the pre-established categories of, to take one example,

*République* or *Royaume*, make those categories the equals of Being. As a result, we remain in the world of beings, and of metaphysics, at the cost of a chance to attune ourselves to and come to understand Being.

Segal correctly notices that the heritage into which the *Dasein* is thrown does not generate easily known and publicly apprehensible destinies, and thus the ordering of the authentic possibilities of *Dasein* cannot be done from without.<sup>1120</sup> As Tertullian notes, the construction of a “total *Weltanschauung*” according to the exigencies of political activity, as opposed to the thinking of Being, represents “the refusal to problematize the foundations and the so-called certainties” of our everyday experience of Being<sup>1121</sup>— and can lead to a “rigidity” which, Safranski argues, “captures thinking” and can cause philosophy to “die.”<sup>1122</sup> Furthermore, the attempt to make a national tradition into an edifying story— a cultural narrative which inspires and encourages heroic acts— reduces the historical *Dasein* of a people to (in Heidegger’s language) an “altered” cultural object promoted by “professors of indigenous knowledge and primal history.”<sup>1123</sup> In simple terms, an edifying nationalist mythology transforms the historical unfolding of *Dasein* into a monument— an object oriented towards the ends of inspiring, shaming or corraling us to action. This monument is placed between the *Dasein* and the experience of temporality, forcing us to sublimate our experience with a narrative authored by others. The intention of our primordialist nationalists to inspire, edify and elevate the national people, through the propagation of these historical narratives, clashes with a Heideggerian imperative to pull us, via the articulation of our thrownness, towards the posing of the question of Being. We cannot see nationalistic mytho-history as an acceptable realization of the fore-structuring of an historical *Dasein*. It remains possible, though, that the propagation of nationalist mytho-historical narratives opens the door to a genuine, authentic understanding of this fore-structure. It may, in and of itself, fall short but— by turning our attention in the direction of national history— at the very least it points us in the right direction and help us to develop the necessary historical sensibility.

We have, in this chapter, made the case that the death cults which emerge from primordialist nationalism can serve only, from a Heideggerian perspective, to inhibit our attunement to death and cover

over the decisive confrontation with mortality with a “Homeric” promise of immortality through glorious death. It is clear, because it blinds us to our actual finitude, that such an approach to death resembles the perverse conception of *Amor Fati* described in “Taking up the Mantle” to a far greater extent than it does the more salutary Apollinairian version theorized by Bourdieu and explained in that same chapter. As such, one must turn away from such a view of death in order to authentically be-toward-death. The authentic encounter with death, so vital to an authentic encounter with *Dasein*, requires an anxious apprehension of the disturbing fact of death—the great nothing that reveals the wholeness of Being and directs us towards it. This, by necessity, involves a sacrifice, where we give up the comfort and security that we enjoy if we focus only on the preservation of the world around us. We must, for Heidegger, tear ourselves violently from the safe, certain, and comfortable experience of the everyday. It is only this process which will lead us from fear to anxiety with regard to death—and lead us on the path through wonder towards resoluteness in its face. If young Germans were to die for Germany, it could only be justified as part of a larger struggle to obtain a new and better relation to Being, not merely to advance the interests of the Party. This is praiseworthy insofar as it turns one away from the call to sacrifice oneself for the ambitions of political leaders, but it is also clear that it nevertheless leaves space for sacrifice in the name of advancing the questioning of Being—which is left open to interpretation and, arguably, abuse.

The ritual we build around death must, for Heidegger, turn our minds towards the *Seinsfrage* and the creation or preservation of the spaces wherein philosophy is possible. Primordialist nationalism, in contrast, links the anticipation of death to undertakings which entangle the minds of the aspirant glorious dead. The death-cult holds out a promise of immortality that makes us encounter death with a delusional hope for everlasting life, covering over authentic being-toward-death. Segal is correct that, far from aligning with nationalistic attitudes towards self-sacrifice, Heidegger requires that the “human being has nothing,”<sup>1124</sup> that might console, mollify and, ultimately, blind the *Dasein* to death. This we cannot abide, for “mortal thinking must let itself down into the dark depths of the well if it is to see the stars by day.”<sup>1125</sup>

### The Uses and Abuses of Memory

We have gathered ample evidence to support both nationalist and anti-nationalist interpretations of time in Heidegger's work. Nationalists wishing to call upon Heidegger can point to the pervasive influence of origins, the mytho-poetic articulation of history, and the importance given to collective destiny. These are not superficial similarities. Anti-nationalists can point to the mysterious and pre-national sources sought by Heidegger, his understanding of the relationship between poetry and truth, the freedom the authentic *Dasein* must maintain from the "they," and the inauthenticity of abstractions and representations. These are not superficial differences. Heideggerian and nationalist thought are not comfortable bedfellows when nationalism requires that we do so many things which Heidegger explicitly believed appear antithetical to authenticity. The chapter to come demonstrates that primordialist nationalism is grounded in metaphysics in a way that salves curiosity about Being, covering over the path beyond— thus aligning our findings with those of Fried, Polt, Magrini, Newell, and Nancy. Then, we explore the relationship between *Seinsgeschichte* and *Volksgeschichte*, arguing that this is the key to Heidegger's authentic temporality.

§ *My Country 'tis of Me*

#### The Metaphysicality of Primordialist Nationalist Temporality

Heidegger believed that individuals and their fate are inextricable from their "encompassing community."<sup>1126</sup> However, to understand itself the *Dasein* must grasp *itself* as thrown into a world. The encounter with the world can only be *prepared for* the *Dasein* but never *effected on behalf of* it. Our awakening to our world, "is a matter for each individual human being."<sup>1127</sup> We have found a complex interplay, in Heidegger's works, between collective and individual beings. Subjectivity, Heidegger argued, grounds the encounter with the world in the representation of things *to* the subject according to its internal impulses.<sup>1128</sup> It is an "interpretation of the world" which shapes the world to be apprehended in advance in its own image.<sup>1129</sup> There is ample evidence that the mytho-historical accounts of history, for all that

Heidegger might have sympathized with their spirit, construct a collective imaginary. As Nancy noted, Heidegger allowed for no “value” or “ideal” that is “floating above anyone’s concrete, everyday existence” to provide us in advance with norms and significations.<sup>1130</sup> The conception of a national mission as emanating from a mytho-historical construct, for example, is undeniably a man-made approximation and is thus not the appropriate source, described in the “Letter on Humanism,” for the “assignment of those directives that must become law and rule,” which must come from Being itself.<sup>1131</sup> In short, the mytho-historical narrative summons us to arms in defence of a subjective imaginary which merely stands in for *Dasein* itself. Furthermore, the historical *Dasein* is rendered by such mytho-history as something present-at-hand, an existing national body with institutions and territory. Thus, the nationalization of the subject, so to speak, does nothing to solve the problem of metaphysics’ subjectification of the experience of Being.

Contemporary nationalists present themselves as a salve to the egoism of modernity. Were this claim true, it would accord with Heidegger’s sustained criticisms of egocentricity in modern thought. Egoism, though, can be on the part of an individual, a community, a state, a nation, or humanity as a whole. Barrès spoke of “*une état d’âme social*” which prevails over and above the individual soul<sup>1132</sup>—rendering meaningless personal commitments, even core religious ones,<sup>1133</sup> and dissolving them into a “national consciousness” which is “necessarily accordant with the destiny of the country.”<sup>1134</sup> Jünger, during the war, “felt his personality fall away” and understood his destiny as “playing a part”<sup>1135</sup> and taking his “place in the battle” on behalf of the collective personage of a nation which “relies on you to do your job.”<sup>1136</sup> We find among the primordialist nationalists an egoism which might seem anti-subjective due to its dissolution of the individual but which merely transfers egotism to a collective subject: the nation.

For Heidegger, philosophical knowledge cannot depend upon such a present-at-hand representation,<sup>1137</sup> irrespective of whether that representation is of a readily available national polity or a general representation of national “culture” oriented within a “world-historical situation.”<sup>1138</sup> These only mollify us with an unchallenging approximation of the questioning of Being.<sup>1139</sup> Most importantly, though,

the primordialist nationalist approximation does not only serve the end of providing an embodiment of the collective subject but is the subject in which all is grounded— in service of which history is set upon in order to extract material of political utility. One cannot deny that Barrès, Péguy, Mann, and Jünger described history as they did in order to ground their political preferences in history. As such they provided only an approximation of historical truth inherently bound up with their political goals.

Though Heidegger was critical of instrumentalism, one cannot say that he did not want us to "gain" anything from our engagement with history. As Lilla notes, we experience "anxious care" about existence<sup>1140</sup>— and to care for a thing surely implies investment in its fate. Furthermore, in his analysis of Hölderlin, Heidegger placed the poet *alongside* the philosopher and statesman as the "three creative forces of historical *Dasein*" which "bring about that to which we can alone attribute greatness."<sup>1141</sup> Nevertheless, this does not necessarily align Heidegger with the primordialist nationalists, even though they too celebrate great heroes who are statesmen. The primacy of the national idea inherently puts the individual in the shade, especially when— as in Péguy's critique of secularism— the moral standing of the nation is the subject of discussion.<sup>1142</sup> Nevertheless, there is an immediate political purpose to their evocations of history: Mann wanted Germans to fight France, Jünger to prepare Germany for the clash of global worker-empires, Barrès to promote a Christian conception of France, and Péguy's to reconcile the tumult of France's history. The historical *Dasein* is contextualized according to what is wanted from them. This is irreconcilable with Heidegger's conception of the poetic founding and the relation to Being itself.

We observed, in French and German mytho-historical narratives, precisely the publicly accessible reification of the relation to the "soul" or "spirit" of an historical *Dasein* which Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, associated with a vulgar experience of "world time."<sup>1143</sup> Inauthentic understanding construes its projects in terms of what can be taken care of, limited by the horizons of its superficiality.<sup>1144</sup> We have seen that "good" Frenchmen or Germans throw themselves into their national mission— taking up the projects of their ancestors and adapting their behaviour according to these mytho-historical contrivances.

This involves scouring the past for useful things— such as an historical justification for a particular political or military goal— as has been observed in the portrayal of the Great War as the moment when the historical conflict ripens into a decisive moment where the destiny of France and Germany will be fulfilled. All that came before is degraded into a preparation for this final battle, the past is meaningful only by reference to the present and is to be understood solely in terms of its relation to us in the current moment.

For Heidegger, we cannot equate the potentiality-of-being proper to the *Dasein* with the expectation of fulfilling an immediate goal<sup>1145</sup> and we cannot, as Steven Segal puts it, appropriate “”dawning” or “disclosure” or “unconcealment” as “our”— [or] a nation’s— attunement.”<sup>1146</sup> As we saw, that which holds sway over our historical thrownness is, for Heidegger, a directive emanating from the thrownness of Being itself. If it is to be our ownmost, authentically ours, we must retrieve it by way of the *Seinsfrage*. Though, as we saw, Heidegger briefly attempted to make an exception for Hitler— leading Heidegger’s thinking into a preposterous and unsustainable muddle— it is otherwise clear that no politician or military officer can invent that which holds sway over our historical thrownness if it is truly our ownmost. This implicates, for example, Barrès’ hagiography of Lieutenant Péricard,<sup>1147</sup> who gave his life (under the orders of Philippe Pétain) in defence of a fort deemed essential (by Joseph Joffre) to war aims delineated by Georges Clemenceau. Philosophy, for Heidegger, cannot simply be a reflection on culture as something that can “subsequently be applied to whatever is at hand”<sup>1148</sup> in such a way as to solve a contemporary political problem (such as inspiring the young to die in trenches) or to underpin the political logics of a particular cause. As such, we cannot expect the authentic potentialities-of-being to accord neatly with our political preferences and national interest as they often do for primordialist nationalists.

Additionally, over the course of this section, we have repeatedly seen the nation represented by objects. These include political figures (like Frederick the Great<sup>1149</sup>), cultural figures (like Goethe<sup>1150</sup> and

Victor Hugo<sup>1151</sup>) and even buildings (like Notre Dame de Paris<sup>1152</sup>). Through the construction of an historical narrative, these representative objects serve as both an example for and reflection of the audience.<sup>1153</sup> The nation-form is determined by those things of the past that are held to represent the thrown essence of the nation in a national mytho-historical objectification. This roots such a mythology in the tradition of representation that, as Kockelman notes, Heidegger critiques in his theory of references.<sup>1154</sup>

Primordialist nationalism remains firmly within the realm of metaphysics because, like metaphysics, it takes the matter of the Being of beings for granted. Instead of thinking Being “from the ground up”— as Heidegger would put it— the nationalist takes Being as a given and starts thinking about a world of beings organized around the ur-Being— the national being. The nation becomes a focal point: its origins are the beginning of history, its locale is the centre of the earth, its perspective is the truth. Our primordialist nationalists looked for the origins of their nations— as opposed to thinking of the nation as one social form among many— then proceeded to think backwards into a past in which symbols and avatars of that presently existing nation could be found. That which predates the nation is consigned to a pre-historical state, an aimless wandering in the desert, so to speak, in anticipation of the advent of the nation.

This problem pervades the nationalist *Weltanschauung*, which requires that we, as Tertulian put it “refuse to problematize the so-called certainties.”<sup>1155</sup> Furthermore, many of the characteristics of monumental history highlighted in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures are present in nationalist mytho-historical narratives. Monumental history elevates the “rare” and the “great” as “archetype, teaching, [or] consolation.”<sup>1156</sup> This objectifies history as a tradition-object oriented towards imperatives of the present.<sup>1157</sup> This implicates the *Weltanschauung*, Lilla notes, in the covering over of the actual truth of matters<sup>1158</sup> because there is a mysterious quality to Being which cannot be circumvented. Furthermore, nationalist mytho-historical narratives often resemble what Heidegger called the “grand style.” For Heidegger, the grand style is a form of wickedness<sup>1159</sup> which takes figures from history or mythology,

imbues them with “swaggering heroics” and glorifies them via the medium of aesthetics.<sup>1160</sup> Worse yet, as Krell notes, the grand style serves the “pathos of the artist” above all else.<sup>1161</sup> Though, as we have seen, there must be a poetic aspect to the retrieval of an historical *Dasein* from the mists of the past, this must not be aesthetically focused— whether “swaggering” or kitsch— and must speak to the truths of *Being*, even if via myth, legend and song. As such, where we see the grandiosity of Barrès and Mann’s discussion of the heroes of the past or find Péguy and Jünger glorifying heroic deeds, we are confronted by a grand style that is associated with inauthenticity and wickedness by Heidegger.

An adequate engagement with Being is not easily accessible, nor should the enigma be quickly resolved. This enigma, Heidegger explained in his Hölderlin lectures, is not an “additional aspect” that we eliminate through explanation but the “inner essence of what has sprung forth” itself.<sup>1162</sup> To solve it would be to misunderstand it and deny ourselves the chance to determine ourselves “from out of the middle of being.”<sup>1163</sup> Should we eliminate all mysterious qualities, we would no longer be dealing with the thing as it actually is. The mysterious is so integral to the truth of *Dasein* that we are no more able to understand it in its absence than if we tried to understand how fish swim while denying the existence of water. Rather than trying to “solve” the *Seinsfrage*, we should be captivated by its mystery.<sup>1164</sup> When we think well, the mystery is not solved but rather the “entire fullness of the mystery of what has purely sprung forth lie[s] open before us.”<sup>1165</sup> We ought not be satisfied by substitutes. Later, in his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger would dismiss attempts to explain the world through “doctrinal systems” as “flight in the face of the unknown ground”<sup>1166</sup> which is, he continued, precisely what is “worthy of question.”<sup>1167</sup> In other words, demystification makes the mysterious seem intuitive and grants certainty where there should be curiosity. Being itself, Heidegger wrote later in *Basic Concepts*, denies us certainty.<sup>1168</sup> Heidegger would state clearly, in a late work titled “A Dialogue on Language,” that we are “surrounded by the danger” of “talking too loudly about the mystery”— and thus demystifying it— and instead must “guard the purity of the mystery.”<sup>1169</sup> By weaving a founding myth, primordialist nationalism salves the oppressiveness of the

mysterious nature of our origins. Whether by trivializing, ignoring, or replacing the mysterious with something more compelling and useful— primordialist nationalism forbids us access to the grounds in which the *Seinsfrage* can be pursued.

### Pictorialization and the *Weltanschauung*

We have considered the possibility that nationalism might function as an initial-and-for-the-most-part experience of history, a starting point from which the authentic *Dasein* can pursue that “covert” history of the West— the struggle of the poet and thinker which lies “beyond war and peace, outside success and defeat” and “remains unconcerned about the destiny of individuals.”<sup>1170</sup> It is theoretically possible that the “feeling of valuelessness of beings as a whole” that arises when the philosophically minded encounter inadequacies of the prevailing historical ground plan might constitute a “saving power.” It might, for example, provoke a yearning for an authentically temporal experience. However, the evidence of this section strongly suggests that, instead, primordialist nationalism causes anything not legible to the mytho-historical pictorialization to be covered over or cast aside. On the basis of this, we concur with Polt’s conclusion that “nationalist ideology does not open us to the process of presentation and meaning but freezes and denies any such process.”<sup>1171</sup> Nationalism is emotionally compelling and births a coherent and edifying symbology— which many people are willing to die for. This power, though, is a mortal weakness. As Gray notes, for Heidegger, thinking is about questioning, not about having all the answers.<sup>1172</sup> Alienated from the mysterious and satisfied by a seemingly adequate explanation we are never compelled to question Being itself and take up our historical endowment: the *Seinsfrage*. We can, therefore, conclude that insofar as temporality is concerned, primordialist nationalism inhibits our eventual exploration of the *Seinsfrage*. It is thus a mode of metaphysical thinking that covers over the path to an authentic temporality. This entails a strong rejection of Wolin’s charge that Heidegger was enthusiastic “for the metaphysics of myth”<sup>1173</sup>— which he believes was, for Heidegger, “epistemologically superior” to fact<sup>1174</sup>— in favour of a Soffer’s

position— which better conveys Heidegger’s “misty ambiguity between an authentic retrieval of the past and a future-oriented mythologization.”<sup>1175</sup>

Primordialist nationalism orders Being into a complex of interweaving nationalistic narratives and sets this structure “above Being” as the organizing historical paradigm. We see precisely this dynamic at play when, for example, Mann concluded that the German people, on account of their being thrown into the fixed ground plan of this essential struggle between German *Kultur* and French *Zivilisation*, will never be able to embrace democracy.<sup>1176</sup> Mann’s *Weltanschauung* enframes Germanness in a way that allows no stepping out from underneath it. It is not by reference to the truths of Being, so much as one’s place within his pictorialization, that he reaches his conclusion. Similarly, Jünger’s conception of the German *Dasein* appears to be so limiting as to what the purpose, or project, of a German *Dasein* might be that he must deny the Germanness of those of his compatriots who celebrated the end of the war.<sup>1177</sup> Again this is by reference to his *Zivilization-Kultur*<sup>1178</sup> binary rather than any reflection on the German *Dasein* emanating from an engagement with the *Seinsfrage*. These claims are about the German Being, no doubt, but emanate from the fixed ground plan rather than growing out of the questioning of Being.

Jünger’s realization that the German war effort would involve turning the *Heimat* to rubble with modern technology mirrors, in certain ways, the realization on the part of Heidegger, noted by Dreyfus and Spinoza, that romanticism is a doomed “technological reaction to technology.”<sup>1179</sup> This is particularly evident with respect to the mass conscription and total mobilization of a generation of men and women<sup>1180</sup> as “human resources” in the military machine. Indeed, the phenomenon of total mobilization aligns almost perfectly with Heidegger’s conception of the standing reserve [*Bestand*], where we are challenged and “ordered”— literally in this case— into the “inclusive rubric”<sup>1181</sup> of the military hierarchy, where it will be used up— lives expended according to the imperatives of high command.<sup>1182</sup> Furthermore, technological thinking can remove a thing from the world in which it properly belongs, thus stripping it of *Dasein*. Such a conception of history reduces that which it immortalizes to “antiquities”<sup>1183</sup>— objects

which belong to the past and yet are “objectively present in the present.”<sup>1184</sup> They are, in other words, alienated from the “world within which they were encountered as things at hand” and are thus “no longer what they were.”<sup>1185</sup> To establish an apostolic procession of great national heroes, lining them up in books as names to be reeled off by students, represents, one could argue, a non-physical version of the lining up of antiquities along the hallways of a museum. A *Dasein* cannot be immortalized in deeds and acts commemorated in books and in museums. To do so would take the figure outside of the context in which their sacrifice makes sense and would arrange them in such a way as to serve whatever propagandistic ends animate this monumental history.

However, it is the pictorialized character of the national mytho-histories themselves— not their content— which is most pertinent here. Perhaps the strongest critique of pictorialization-as-such can be found in Heidegger’s analysis of Hegel, where the Hegelian dialectic is portrayed as an intermediary, inserted between *Dasein* and its encounter with temporality.<sup>1186</sup> Hegel’s dialectic is not a thing that one could actually find in the world,<sup>1187</sup> but is a “solvent construction” inspired by an impulse to grasp the guiding problem of Being. However, it covers Being over due to its dependence on its own internal logics.<sup>1188</sup> The fact of pictorialization, rather than any particular quality of Hegel’s dialectic, is sufficient to traduce the flux of becoming into an abstract, objective reification. We may “fall prey” to this reification of time and fall “out of primordial, authentic temporality.”<sup>1189</sup> Interestingly, Jünger and Mann presented similar critiques of their rivals. Jünger described the imposition of a progressive paradigm upon history as an “optical illusion” which enjoys “real authority and uncritical faith” but is little more than a “cultic” belief<sup>1190</sup> while Barrès critiqued of the idea of history-as-progress.<sup>1191</sup> However, such a critical eye was not turned upon their own pictorializations, which made the past stable, consistent, and cohesive<sup>1192</sup> at the cost of a genuine engagement with the mysterious reality of our temporal experience.

The reasons for this conclusion become clearer when one considers Heidegger’s reflections upon chaos. Heidegger described, in his Nietzsche lectures, the conventional understanding of chaos as follows:

“For us, the chaotic means the jumbled, the tangled, the pell-mell. Chaos means not only what is unordered but also entanglement in confusion, the jumble of something in shambles.”<sup>1193</sup> Needless to say, in our everyday lives the “jumble of something in shambles” is an inopportune condition for any effective action, particularly for the fulfilment of our day-to-day projects. Practical need compels us to impose order. This generates the “need for a schema” which, for Heidegger, necessarily contains the jumble within a certain horizon.<sup>1194</sup> Heidegger discussed this impulse with respect to history, and by extension to nationalist mytho-history, in his critique of the attempt to impose order upon the happening of history. This, like all formal or “academic history,” depends upon the presupposition of the basic structure of the schema.<sup>1195</sup> Furthermore, as Heidegger explained in *Nietzsche: Volume II*, calculative thinking, when applied to history, also presupposes that very questionable thing, temporality, upon which it depends.<sup>1196</sup> The positing of a national myth as the fore-structure by which the chaos of history is ordered represents the attempt to will that chaos into an order arranged according to an artificial imposition that is not, as we have seen, grounded directly in the essential and authentic character of Being.

Heidegger, in *Contributions*, identified the “worldview [*Weltanschauung*]”— which appears to explain everything and is thus “never put into question”<sup>1197</sup>— as a major obstacle to the task of the philosopher.<sup>1198</sup> Furthermore, Heidegger demanded that we be aware that it would be a surrender to the “highest form of nihilism” if we were to think that we could “rescue culture” with a “culture-oriented politics”<sup>1199</sup> from within a *Weltanschauung*. Safranski, in short, is correct in arguing that Heidegger rejects “all attempts to erect the “worldview”” as a political edifice”<sup>1200</sup> and Skocz is correct in seeking to differentiate the “political-historical sense” of being-historical from what Heidegger had in mind.<sup>1201</sup> It is precisely the comfort provided by cultural politics— a “lack of distress” and satisfaction with calculating and deciding what is to be done without asking “who we are”<sup>1202</sup> (and thus the *Seinsfrage*)— that we must, as our primary task, undermine. Heidegger wrote, in terms that sound rather revolutionary, that we must reject the “feeble meditating and rescue attempt” that comes from within the total *Weltanschauung* only

entangle us “even more in abandonment of being” and that therefore “only after enormous ruinings and downfalls” will the truth of being be accessible to us.<sup>1203</sup> Furthermore, any kind of “counter-movement” will fail to overcome what it counters because “counter-movements and counter-forces are to a large degree co-determined by *what* they are against [...] they are clamped onto what they conquer.”<sup>1204</sup>

However, it is clear that Heidegger was not calling for historical deconstruction— where we claim to show that everything we have hitherto thought to be true was a lie. On the contrary, the historical tradition as generally accepted should remain the font from which historical self-knowledge and inspiration is drawn. Heidegger described a process by which meditation upon our conventional understanding of “what belongs to being a people” constitutes an “essential passageway”<sup>1205</sup> where we are “moved into the question of who we are.”<sup>1206</sup> Genuine thinking, though, “does not tolerate an immediate conclusion and evaluation”<sup>1207</sup> and thus pulls us into the task of a sustained questioning of Being. The conventionally accepted history of a people— and there is no reason why this cannot be patriotic in nature— is only beneficial if it inspires us to think Being. In short, Heidegger’s warning against any attempt at rescue from within the *Weltanschauung* should not be taken as a call to debunk the self-understanding of one’s people. In fact, it precisely that historical self-understanding which awakens us to our need to question Being. Nevertheless, the wise will not be satisfied with the conventional, and this grounding can only be a point of departure.

Today, right-wing figures present a particular image of veneration of one’s country and its history as a salve to the perceived nihilism of modernity.<sup>1208</sup> Here, too we have encountered the notion that a trend towards irreverence for national idols occasions destructive nihilism.<sup>1209</sup> However, in his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger criticized attempts to overcome nihilism through means that “would not mean heeding Being itself as Being”<sup>1210</sup> as a “dismal relapse into the inauthenticity of its [nihilisms] essence.”<sup>1211</sup> We have observed a nationalism that does not heed Being itself as Being in its approach to history, thus covering over the mystery that is the authentic ground of the historical condition. This does not mean that

history is encountered only as a jumbled chaos but rather that whatever horizons are imposed upon it must emanate from a primordial thinking of Being.<sup>1212</sup> Clearly, though, some relationship with history is essential to Heidegger's conception of authentic *Dasein*. Having rejected the viability of the mytho-historical narratives of primordialist nationalism we now seek to glimpse what this relationship should be.

### § *Time and the Poet*

The dichotomy between authentic and “vulgar” temporality emerges, in large part, from a tension between the “primary” experience of mortality and the “secondary” experience of the world around us. Taminiaux identified this tension, linked to that between the everyday experience of time and history and the *Seinsgeschichte*, as being the central struggle of authentic *Dasein*.<sup>1213</sup> In simple terms, we recognize the constant flux of our own becoming<sup>1214</sup> but struggle to think of other things, especially things of the past, as having this same characteristic. Instead, we transform them into static and de-contextualized monuments to bygone times. This does not mean, Heidegger told us in *Problems of Logic*, that we should abandon the art of the conventional historian. We must still be bound by the fixed nature of facts and the rigorous pursuit of knowledge, and we cannot approach the past with “unbounded freedom.”<sup>1215</sup> This, in itself, would preclude myth-making that is entirely divorced from reality, but cannot result in making of the study of history a kind of pseudo-science. Science, Heidegger argued in *What is Called Thinking*, “does not, and cannot think.”<sup>1216</sup> In short, the historical analysis that matters most, for Heidegger, is that which we have previously called *Seinsgeschichte*. The nature of Heidegger's understanding of the history of Being—which places us in a time of *Seinsvergessenheit*— makes it impossible to fully determine what a post-metaphysical, authentic relation to time will be. That said, we still see glimpses of the fugitive gods, so to speak, and can interpret from these glimpses some of the general principals according to which one might attain an authentic relation to temporality. We can, as will be demonstrated, derive from Heidegger's discussion of the quadrilinear relationship between world, earth, the gods, and man that an authentic relation to time will blend a conservative impulse towards stewardship— linked to *Volksgeschichte*— and

a radical ambition to prepare the ground for a new relation to Being— and, in doing so, to make a mark on the *Seinsgeschichte*.

### Between *Volk* and *Sein*

Martin Travers draws our attention to a diagram drawn by Heidegger in *Contributions*, illustrating his concept of “Enowning.” This diagram portrays two axes, one spanning from mankind to the gods and the other from world to earth.<sup>1217</sup> It likely appears strange that a discussion of world and earth should occur here, at the end of a section dedicated to temporality. While it has been stated that Heidegger united the two as time-space, we must still explore how world and earth can be understood as temporal phenomena.

Heidegger provided an interesting discussion of “world” in his description of a sacramental jug in “The Thing.” The jug brings together the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals<sup>1218</sup> into the “mirror-play” of what “we call the world.”<sup>1219</sup> While the reference to “mirror-play” might suggest an element of deception, this need not be the case.<sup>1220</sup> It is important, instead, to focus on this last aspect: that which “we call the world.” This implies that the world is the result of *our* calling together earth, sky, divinities, and mortals and enjoining them into a single, cohesive thing. In Dreyfus’ terms, it is we who disclose the world.<sup>1221</sup> Moreover, those worlds can, as Lilla notes, be shaped by our subjectivity<sup>1222</sup> and, by extension, our nation. In other words, our world is, to a certain degree, an artifice emerging from our thinking and, as Blok notes, is heavily influenced by the equipment and *praxis* with which we form it.<sup>1223</sup> World is something that we think, and thus our manner of thinking will influence that which we call world. Insofar as this is related to history, one can think of a world-history, a nationalistic mytho-history, or even a *Volksgeschichte* as a construction that we have erected in order to name the fourfold.

However, as Heidegger put it, “if we are looking for a mighty being, the earth is nearby.”<sup>1224</sup> Blok helpfully explains that the earth, in Heidegger’s understanding, is distinct from the world but is not *physis*<sup>1225</sup> nor natural matter “impregnated with a form.”<sup>1226</sup> We should not think of the earth as a

multiplicity of inanimate objects, something which, at best, we can impose symbolic meaning upon. Nor is the earth merely the neutral space in which the history of human beings takes place. Returning to *Hölderlin's Hymns*, the earth cannot be understood merely as “space delimited by external borders” nor as a simple locality to function as a “possible arena for this or that event.”<sup>1227</sup> The earth, Blok continues, mostly shows itself to us when we fail to cover it over and it refuses to conform to our explanations of it.<sup>1228</sup> This is the “critical approach to the notion of earth”<sup>1229</sup>— which treats it as an unstable and not especially well-known quantity— that so appeals to Mika.<sup>1230</sup> The earth is the space that is “held open for an encounter with the prevailing of the gods in the course of the changing seasons of the year and their festivals.”<sup>1231</sup> In other words, where the world operates as a construction born of the intellect of man— used to name the totality of the *Da* of *Dasein*— the earth refers to the region in which we might encounter the gods and encounter Being. We are all, Heidegger clarified, “sons of the earth” and it is precisely being born of the earth, as opposed to the world, that makes us human.<sup>1232</sup> In other words, central to our humanity is the fact that though we are thrown into a socially and historically circumscribed context, we are also thrown into the realm of Being *qua* being. In simpler terms, we belong within the unfolding history of such things as our nations and their cultural worlds, but also to the much longer history of Being itself. Being is as old as the earth and predates not only our nation but our species, both of which it will outlast. In short, the history of the world of a people is a tiny fraction of the immense history of Being and earth.

This ties the earthly to the temporal unfolding of the *Seinsfrage*, and thus to *Seinsgeschichte*. While the world relates directly to the historical narrative, the earth relates to the unfolding of the *Seinsfrage* in history. In short, the world is the time-space in which the everyday *Volksgeschichte* of a people unfolds, while the earth is the time-space where *Seinsgeschichte* unfolds. As Blok puts it, we are “intentionally involved” in the world as it is “correlated to human thought” but it is the earth in which “everything that arises” including this world is “brought back and is sheltered.”<sup>1233</sup> There is an intimate relationship between world and earth. “World is earthly,” we learn in *Contributions*, and “earth is worldly.”<sup>1234</sup> That

this may seem a rather enigmatic claim is no coincidence. The enigmatic is an integral aspect of Being, and if we properly understand our situation we will not seek to “surmise” or “explain” by means of a sketch.<sup>1235</sup> To do so would constitute a kind of blasphemy, something “insulting” which “brings that which is explained back to the level of what is readily familiar to everyone.”<sup>1236</sup> Understanding, in this context, is “authentically—regarded in its essence—knowledge of the inexplicable.”<sup>1237</sup> Rather than seeking to eliminate the enigma by explaining it, or by solving it, an “authentic knowing” requires us to be comfortable with the mysterious, “holding fast to that which is inexplicable.”<sup>1238</sup> Here, Heidegger resembles Péguy, especially where Heidegger argued that mystery “must stand within the *Dasein* of the historical people,”<sup>1239</sup> suggesting that an authentic relation to Being may lie in Péguy’s *mystique Française*. However, it also means that, from the present vantage point, one cannot but be left unfulfilled.

In “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Heidegger explained that the German word *bin* “belongs” to the old German word *Bauen*, meaning “dwelling.”<sup>1240</sup> Heidegger continued, “to be a human being means to be on earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. [...] but also, at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, cultivate the vine.”<sup>1241</sup> In short, the primary role of the mortal is to maintain a relation of care vis-à-vis the earth, to protect and conserve it— to “save the earth.”<sup>1242</sup> This is part of a fourfold nature of dwelling, the others being a potential to “receive the sky as sky,” to “await the divinities as divinities” and to “initiate their own nature.”<sup>1243</sup> In short, mortals are to steward and conserve, to build to the extent that this allows for the reception of the divinities (in temple-building for example) and to cultivate themselves in order to be prepared to receive glimpses of the fugitive gods. Heidegger links his conception of earth to history, arguing, in his Hölderlin lectures, that the earth comes “fully and properly into play” as the place of interaction between a people and the gods<sup>1244</sup>— or, in *Hegel*, the place of the “strife in which alone the open clears”<sup>1245</sup>— between god and mortal, earth and world. To understanding how we dwell within this enigma, it is to those fugitive gods that we must look.

Heidegger began his intellectual life as a Catholic theologian and, notwithstanding a temporary interest in “nondogmatic Protestantism,”<sup>1246</sup> would genuflect before the Blessed Sacrament until his death (followed by a Catholic funeral).<sup>1247</sup> While engagement with the complex and not always fruitful contestation of Heidegger’s religious beliefs<sup>1248</sup> will be avoided here, there are things worth noting. Firstly, Heidegger employed the language of blasphemy with respect to Being, suggesting a relationship between Being and the holy. Lilly would highlight Heidegger’s tendency to use the language of transcendence<sup>1249</sup> while Nancy noted a tendency to speak in the conceptual language of blessedness and virtue.<sup>1250</sup> For example, in “On the Essence of Ground,” Heidegger would provide a slightly idiosyncratic definition of the transcendent which is clearly redolent— in its use of the language of “surpassing,” of the notion of “overcoming” which is so central to Heidegger’s understanding of the way in which the thinker enters the rarified realm of the *Seinsgeschichte*.<sup>1251</sup> The task of the thinker, for Heidegger, clearly involves surpassing the limitations of metaphysics— and attaining a realm that lies beyond and, in many respect, *above* that ordinary realm.<sup>1252</sup> On the other hand, Heidegger criticized “Christendom,” in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*, for having “demoted” nature to something created, paving the way for the modern scientific impulse to “dissolve nature into domains of power” subject, now, to technology as once it was subject to the dominion of God.<sup>1253</sup> More pointedly, Zimmerman notes, Heidegger felt that it was paramount that the German people “expose themselves to the awful truth of Nietzsche: God is dead.”<sup>1254</sup> As such, the desire of Barrès to see a Christian revival and Péguy to reserve a privileged place for Catholicism sit uneasily beside Heidegger’s complex relationship with the Christian God. For Heidegger, neither Christianity nor any “secularized transference”<sup>1255</sup> thereof can save us from *Seinsvergessenheit*. Though the shadow of the holy casts across Heidegger’s thinking, and he clearly retains some conception of the divine, he rejects unambiguously any notion that we can be saved by a Christian revival.

Heidegger undeniably did, though, make space for god-like figures in his account of Being— to the extent that one can see why Bourdieu would see in Heidegger a “theological mode of thought.”<sup>1256</sup> For

example, the fourfold, Heidegger explained in “The Thing,” reserves a space for “the immortal gods”— for whom, in his example of a ceremonial jug, libations are poured.<sup>1257</sup> Heidegger also included, in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*, “the gods”— this time alongside the earth, human beings and “humans in their history”— as part of “Beyng as [...] founded in poetizing.”<sup>1258</sup> Interestingly, Young posits the “gods of the fourfold” as being the embodiment of the “unwritten heritage of an historical people,” household gods linking us to the “ethos of a community.”<sup>1259</sup> These gods figure into the unheard-of centre<sup>1260</sup> of our dwelling place and can broadly be understood as part of the traditional social and cultural organization into which we are thrown. This image of household gods is a valuable metaphor to keep in mind as we continue.

The world clearly correlates to the realm of mortals, and the earth to that of the gods— for “the earth and the God” are named the combined “powers of origin”<sup>1261</sup> in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*, where we also learn that “the earth is, after all, a goddess.”<sup>1262</sup> The gods “are veiled”— we “intimate only a wisp of them.”<sup>1263</sup> Heidegger would be similarly reticent in the post-war “Letter on Humanism,” writing that “only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word “God” is to signify.”<sup>1264</sup> In short, we cannot yet give a firm answer to the question of what exactly these gods are, for Heidegger.

Fortunately, we learn in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*— which contains the most sustained evocation of these concepts— that we mortals can encounter “in-between beings.”<sup>1265</sup> These are “not themselves gods, but beings that point in the direction of the gods”— “overhumans, who nevertheless remain beneath the stature of the gods: *undergods*.”<sup>1266</sup> These beings, who we can name<sup>1267</sup> and discuss, are the demigods.<sup>1268</sup> It is they who most intensely suffer the dislocation occasioned by the flight of the gods and our forgetfulness of Being. In the demigods, there is “an intimating directedness toward the gods themselves; yet, at the same time, in the direction of the human being.”<sup>1269</sup> Furthermore, the demigods provide an “incitement”

which “awakens” and “impassions” mortals with respect to their being.<sup>1270</sup> If this sounds familiar, it is because the demigods bear a resemblance to the founder poet. A demigod is endowed with a special attunement to suffering occasioned by our current condition of *Seinsvergessenheit*, which results in having a unique capacity to inspire questioning while intimating towards glimpses of truth.<sup>1271</sup> This is in part because “poetic-thoughtful knowing is bestowed by that familiarity with beyng that remains strong enough to be a site for the encounters with the God, whether he appears on sultry paths and in the darkness of Earth, or in the clouds, in lightning flashes.”<sup>1272</sup> If one substitutes the language of god and mortals for that of being and beings, one is close to the founder poet.<sup>1273</sup>

A demigod highlighted by Heidegger is Dionysos. Hölderlin’s Dionysos “brings the trace of the flown gods down to the godless,” brings the “beckonings” of the gods *down* from above.<sup>1274</sup> Dionysos operates “between the beyng of humans and of gods.”<sup>1275</sup> Hölderlin, Heidegger argued, understood “the essence and calling of the poet [as] starting [also] from this being in the middle— beyng in the manner of the demigods,” thus pointing to a “deep connection between the beyng of the demigods and the calling of the poet.”<sup>1276</sup> It remains ambiguous whether founder poets *are*, after a fashion, demigods, but this does not matter. The poets can “think and experience” like demigods— and can see what Nancy called the “wink of the gods”<sup>1277</sup>— because they experience the “suffering of beyng.”<sup>1278</sup> Heidegger returns to this in “What are Poets for?,” arguing that it is Dionysos who brings the earth and sky together.<sup>1279</sup> Whether or not they are demigods, the “thinking and telling of the poet” is “entwined and interwoven” with “Dionysos as the demigod.”<sup>1280</sup> The poet is not, Taminiaux identified, the “author of a *Weltanschauung*,”<sup>1281</sup> but is the one at whom the fugitive gods wink. We must not await the self-announcing of the new god to the poets, nor can a new god be conjured by arranging things to that end. Rather, poets seek an active movement between realms— between “the powers of poetizing, thinking, and acting” or, metaphorically, from the hearth of one’s hut to the “concealed mountain peaks.”<sup>1282</sup>

The artist, Heidegger explained in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” articulates the experience of moving between these realms and unveils a tension between world and earth<sup>1283</sup>— as surely as between man and gods or beings and Being. Importantly, true artists always “let the earth be an earth.”<sup>1284</sup> In other words, as a product of thought, the work of art is inherently tied to world, but it does not seek to supplant or obliterate earth— rather it leaves it be as part of the fourfold or earth and sky, divinities and mortals. In his Hölderlin lectures, Heidegger’s poet can be found “at the threshold between this unfolding turning away from such remoteness and the barely awakening question.”<sup>1285</sup> That is to say, the poet lingers at the threshold between a comprehensible but always insufficient world and an uncanny earth, between the familiar realm of man and the remote realm of the gods. In simpler terms, the poet realizes that there is a tension between the everyday way of thinking about our place in world-history and the suspicion that we are thrown into a greater unfolding of Being. The poet is pushed by this to stand at the threshold between the familiar and knowable, and that which is shrouded in mystery but full of promise.

Between *Volksgeschichte* and *Seinsgeschichte*: (In)abiding *Im Zwischen*

It is curious that, in *Contributions*, Heidegger described our capacity to belong in the realm of Being by another evocation of the holy. Heidegger concluded this work by describing the “in between” that is authentic to *Dasein* as the “hearth fire” (symbolizing the centre from which at-homeness radiates) in the “midst of the abode of the gods.”<sup>1286</sup> Furthermore, he posited authentic *Dasein* as involving “guardianship of the needfulness of the gods” and as “a steady bridge” between this “need of god” and the “guardianship of man.”<sup>1287</sup> Finally, this is in service of “preserving be-ing (preserving [thought of] enowing-historically). [...] So that gods come to *truth*.”<sup>1288</sup> The most authentic relation to temporality that is accessible to us— until we are delivered from *Seinsvergessenheit*— is that modelled by the demigods and the poets. They are the ones who, in Trawny’s words, “take up residence in this between.”<sup>1289</sup> Heidegger would make clear in *Contributions*, that *Dasein* is found in that opening which “lights up and shelters” the “between [Zwischen] [...] earth and world, the midpoint of their strife and thus the site for the most intimate

belongingness.”<sup>1290</sup> This ties the position of the poet to the discovery of the truths of *Dasein*. Insofar as this regards time, it means dwelling in between our everyday experience as members of an historical community—the world-historical *Volksgeschichte*—and the historical unfolding of Being—the realm of *Seinsgeschichte*. We do not abandon our *Volksgeschichte*, it is our initial manner of being temporalized, so to speak, and drove us to think Being. However, it is not sufficient. We are possessed by the need to grasp and participate in the unfolding of *Seinsgeschichte* when we think beyond and under world into earth. Insofar as temporality is concerned, this means that we are tied both the familiar mortal world of our particular people’s *Volksgeschichte* and to the uncanny world of *Seinsgeschichte*.

This has political consequences. The ordinary person, the mere mortal, is tasked with maintaining things as they are, protecting them from degradation, in short: stewardship. Otherwise, their role is passive: to await and, in time, receive. Poets, though, have a more active role. Interestingly, Dallmayr understood the task of a poet, standing at this threshold,<sup>1291</sup> as something difficult to square with nationalism—because it required that the homeland be a “potential dwelling place of the gods” rather than of a particular national community.<sup>1292</sup> There is no doubt that we have found significant evidence in Heidegger’s work that Dallmayr was correct. However, this does not in and of itself preclude the possibility that some political implications may arise from what we have thus far discussed. As such, this section will conclude with an analysis of Heidegger’s *Contributions*, wherein the liminality discussed above finds expression in ways that hold immediate consequences for our relation to time and history.

There are, Heidegger determined, four types of people: <sup>1293</sup> those who have the capacity to get to the truths of Being,<sup>1294</sup> their “allies” (who try to make manifest these truths in law),<sup>1295</sup> the “many,”<sup>1296</sup> and, finally, those who are simply stuck in the past.<sup>1297</sup> With respect to the first group, the “founders of the truth of be-ing *go under*.”<sup>1298</sup> They are, in a sense, to take a look under the bonnet of Being, to look past the surface and see how Being really occurs. When interrogated by these founders, the “unsettledness of Be-ing” will “open up”<sup>1299</sup>—they will see what lies behind the façade. That is to say, these special few

are those who reveal that the certainties and assumptions upon which day-to-day life depend merely serve to obscure our fundamental uncertainty with respect to Being and our relation to it. This unsettling of Being constitutes what Heidegger called the “inceptual struggle”<sup>1300</sup>— pitting our desire to stand in the clarity that we gain by sweeping away all that stands between us and Being against our desire to be sheltered within “what is created by historical man,”<sup>1301</sup> which includes our national community. This positioning of the “few” depends on their remaining a part of the everyday world but never belonging comfortably within it.<sup>1302</sup> This uncomfortable belonging is what Heidegger termed “inabiding.” This “inabiding” in an “in-between” is “the *uniqueness* of Da-sein,”<sup>1303</sup> Heidegger believed, as it encapsulates an essential and exclusive quality of the *Dasein*— that it is located both within the historical unfolding of a world worlded by the art of man and within the unfolding of the pure problematic of Being. In other words, the authentic *Dasein* will have a complex insider-outsider relationship with respect to a historically constituted national community being both sheltered within it as a dwelling place and thrown-ground but always inclined to “go under” it, to look beyond and within it, in order to encounter Being itself.

The first task— the undermining of the stability of the given— must be tempered by a recognition of the liminal space that *Dasein* occupies, standing between the unfolding of the *Seinsfrage* and the more conventionally historical unfolding of deeds and decisions on the part of a people. As Heidegger put it:

“The strife of world and earth arises in the clearing of the sheltering of the “between” [*Zwischen*], which comes forth from within and along with the countering enownment. And only in the free-play of time-space of this strife is there preserving and loss of enownment and does that which is called a being enter into the open.”<sup>1304</sup>

In light of the prior discussion, this statement can be rendered comprehensible. Heidegger is arguing that the tension between the world (the realm of everyday political and cultural life) and earth (the realm of Being) is the space where it is possible for one to enter and get an unencumbered glimpse of the truth of things. This notion of a free-space of space-time clearly mirrors the *Spielraum*, where one is free from the constraints of rigid doctrines of thought but also where one has a measure of freedom from social, cultural, or political constraints. The historicity of *Dasein* does not lie in synthesis, but precisely in struggle

*within* the tension between our belonging to a particular historical community and our belonging to Being as such. It is the job of the thinker, one might say, to take up their place in this “strife.”<sup>1305</sup>

It is important to note that the aforementioned continues to tie the temporality of *Dasein* to traditional modes of being-historical, we are not to abandon them but must understand our own historical calling as taken up from them. Heidegger clarifies that we should not see our current situation as a curse but as both an inescapable part of what has made us the people we are<sup>1306</sup> and an opportunity. Indeed, we must think of the current era of “metaphysical forgetfulness” as a “gift of metaphysics”<sup>1307</sup> because it is precisely the shortcoming of metaphysics which draw attention to the *Seinsfrage*. It is indispensable to an authentic experience of temporality that we preserve the historical sense that we inherit, but only to the extent that it helps our eventual plunging into the *Seinsfrage*. In other words, we must experience both “needfulness of god”—that is to say, we must feel a compulsion to explore the uncharted realm of Being itself—and “guardianship of Da-sein.”<sup>1308</sup> The latter implies a conservative political role carved out for the thinker. For all that Heidegger critiqued monumental history, he recognized, in his interpretation of Nietzsche, that our tendency to monumentalize the “classical” or the “rare” arises from an understanding that such things can teach and console.<sup>1309</sup> This combines with Heidegger’s use of the language of guardianship which is familiar to any reader of conservative thought to suggest that we are to protect the tradition and the heritage from iconoclasm, forgetfulness, and ignorance.

Heidegger made clear that we would not find an authentic historical experience in the past, and certainly not in any extant form of historicity. In order to be genuinely historical, what is ownmost to us (and temporality is central to this) “must become especially questionable” in order that “being [...] become questionable.”<sup>1310</sup> Therefore, the historical sense that we have of our people is precisely the kind of thing that, for Heidegger, we should be questioning rather than always preserving or cherishing. In pursuing an authentic relation to history, we are seeking something entirely unprecedented. Safeguarding no doubt plays a role, but this preserving is not a task apart from the pursuit of Being and is valuable only

insofar as it moves us towards questioning. While we are to preserve the tradition, we are in no way to be deferent to it, and we are certainly not to be sentimental.<sup>1311</sup> In short, we preserve in order to question.

With respect to nationalism, we would preserve and protect our historical myths and legends, our sense of historical mission and our beliefs about the destiny of our people, but always and only in such a way as to constantly question them with respect to how they stand with Being. They would not, therefore, be preserved as static matters of consensus but as the matter of philosophical questioning. Heidegger tied, as we have seen, Being to history and made clear that it is from history that we make the determination of what is truly our ownmost. However, this task can only belong to those who think both in terms of belongingness to their people and to “belonging to themselves out of belongingness to god.”<sup>1312</sup> As such, we must be able to engage with the history of our people, with the history of the thinking of Being, and with the tensions that might exist between the two.

Perhaps, though, it is presumptuous to say “we” here, for only the few may occupy this position. We find a strict stratification of “mortals,” with a great many whose only conceivable role is to preserve what is bequeathed to them as heritage. Indeed, “the people” need not even *know* their “purposes and objectives.”<sup>1313</sup> Only a select few are able, from this basis, to pursue the fugitive gods. The few are not ethereal figures with their heads in the clouds. In fact, Heidegger argued in his Hölderlin lectures that the attunement of authentic temporality requires a capacity to participate both in the “opening up of beings”—the questioning of the things that make up our world and “the grounding of being”<sup>1314</sup>—the matter of how we are to pose the question of what it means for a thing to be. They operate, in fact, across the threshold of the two.<sup>1315</sup> Heidegger stresses that it is not patriotism that binds them to the homeland, but the fact that it is precisely *from* the homeland that they are “transported” into the realm of being.<sup>1316</sup> We note, here, the inegalitarianism of assigning to the many the role of taking care of what lies to hand—stewarding the traditional and performing the tasks allotted by one’s *Volksgeschichte*—while assigning to a select few this liminal role. Furthermore, there is clearly some fusion of conservatism and radicalism in the poetic

thinking associated, metaphorically, with the demigods. They, too, are to cherish the national tradition, to be motivated by a strong rootedness in home and to protect the inherited from the ravages of modernity, but also to undermine the bases of a large part of that inheritance, to, like Dionysos, embrace “life at its wildest, inexhaustible creative urge.”<sup>1317</sup>

Again, here, one can interpret fairly clear political implications. We are called, it seems, to passive Toryism for the masses and revolutionary conservatism for the authentically temporal. Heidegger’s *Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation* argues that a vital part of what separates us from other animals is that we seek to get to “grips with the past,” or even to brace ourselves against it.<sup>1318</sup> We do not simply remember, memory of the past is something to which we relate and with which we might even struggle.<sup>1319</sup> We seek, at times, to break free from our past (for example, we might seek to break with tradition at a collective level or to move on from some traumatic event at a personal level) while at others we seek to embrace it— we have seen much of this above. An essential element of being authentically temporal is carrying within oneself the tension between our desire to belong to history and to break free from it. This requires that we know, even take up to some extent, the national historical consciousness typified by the primordialist nationalism we have discussed here. However, we must also know that we will never overcome metaphysics if we dedicate ourselves entirely to taking up a history that elevates the community above the *Seinsfrage*. Thus, we embrace a conventional, traditional historical narrative as the starting point of an eventual striking out into the questioning of Being. In short, we find in *Volksgeschichte* the firm grounds in the soil of which we root ourselves in order that we be moored as we strike out into the insecure and uncanny world of *Seinsgeschichte*.

#### § *The Vulgar Historicity of Primordialist Nationalism*

Primordialist nationalism seeks to articulate the historical experience of a people, but approaches temporality in ways that are, for Heidegger, profoundly metaphysical. Primordialist nationalism traduces the historical experience of a nation to serve the practical needs of the present, re-presenting a collective

national subject via the object of a grand narrative— where an idealized image of the nation plays a starring role. We considered the possibility that the kind of nationalist mytho-historical narratives *could* function as an articulation of the everyday “sphere of dwelling” and therefore might be a salutary error. While the matter of whether or not the primordialist nationalists are guilty of jingoism or fabrication is a matter of opinion, it is rather less disputable that all of them engage to varying degrees in a grand style of monumental history. We found, furthermore, that primordialist nationalism forces the truth of the historical experience of a people into a *Weltanschauung*— which itself is elevated as the “rule” to which past, present, and future must be brought into conformity. Our consideration of temporality has led us to an unambiguous conclusion: that the conception of time that underpins and characterises primordialist nationalism is deeply metaphysical— possessing all of the characteristics identified in this study, and doing so in a way that covers over, rather than enlightens, the path to the new relation to Being sought by Heidegger.

Nationalism promises to show us how to reconnect our lives to the uninterrupted historical thread within which we discover the projects and the destiny that is truly our ownmost. What we have found, though, is something far more akin to the disembodied voice blaring from the microphone— in Auden’s poem— “proving by statistics that some cause was just”— convincing us to subordinate our own projects to the ambition of others. Heidegger’s path requires, instead, that we push through the end of metaphysics, see through it, and come to relate to it in a way that no longer blinds us to its limitations. This depends upon an understanding of history that simultaneously orients the thinker within the unfolding of the historical *Dasein* of the people, the *Volks-geshichte*, and in the unfolding of the *Seinsfrage*. It is in taking up this liminal position that the thinker may pursue an authentic relation to time and history. Some political consequences of this were identified, in particular it was noted that there is a rather iniquitous division proposed between the many, who steward the conventional historical wisdom of the community, and the enlightened few who see this as a mere starting point from which to launch into participation in the grand

historical unfolding of our thinking about Being.<sup>1320</sup> It has also been clear throughout that the kind of concerns that impact the wellbeing of those without the good fortune to be philosophers, poets, artist, or statesmen— such as a good plumbing system but also democratic constitutions and rule of law— do not play much of a role in the history to which we are seeking to relate authentically.

### Entr'acte: Pathways and Perdition

One might object that the somewhat moderate Heidegger of the analysis thus far is hard to square with the Nazi that he was. As such, it is to Heidegger's Nazism that we must turn before we are free to head into the matter of spatiality. Intense controversy has long surrounded Heidegger's involvement with the German National Socialist Workers Party. There is no need to duplicate the work of Emmanuel Faye and Victor Farias,<sup>1321</sup> nor to delve into the well-known scandals that their works occasioned. We will begin, instead, with the inescapable conclusion of those debates, that Heidegger was— for a period of time,<sup>1322</sup> in a meaningful capacity, with some enthusiasm<sup>1323</sup> and resulting in dire consequences for others<sup>1324</sup>— a Nazi.

This chapter focuses on what Heidegger did and wrote during the Late-Weimar and Nazi periods,<sup>1325</sup> but parallels are noted with earlier works. Both Heidegger's engagement *and* his eventual disillusionment with Nazism will be shown to cohere with parts of his thought, which undeniably contained Nazi elements. However, we will conclude that Heidegger's thought cannot be reduced to a philosophy of Nazism. It was established at the outset of this study that Heidegger's thought must not be quarantined from his politics. The responsible scholar must incorporate an engagement with the politically noxious potential of certain themes when making use of Heidegger's great insights. At the outset, some of these noxious elements were identified: a lack of ethical restraint, a tendency towards dictatorial politics, an indifference to human suffering and, of course, antisemitism.

#### *§ Heidegger Inside, Outside, Through or Alongside Nazism*

Holger Zaborowski argues that Heidegger's Nazism did not long survive his move to Freiburg,<sup>1326</sup> Gjermund Wollan confines it to the 1930's<sup>1327</sup> and Fried and Polt date his turn against it to 1940.<sup>1328</sup> After a dalliance, Edward Grant Andrew argues, Heidegger realized he had erred.<sup>1329</sup> Andrew Feenberg characterizes it as a "fling."<sup>1330</sup> Nevertheless, Heidegger was a party member for roughly a decade— not

a lifetime but surely long enough.<sup>1331</sup> Furthermore, Heidegger never denounced National Socialism nor his involvement in it,<sup>1332</sup> and tended to criticize it as part of “the allegedly homogeneous “metaphysical” history of the West.”<sup>1333</sup> Rockmore and Margolis were thus correct that Heidegger was a Nazi in more than a “transient sense.”<sup>1334</sup> The depth of Heidegger’s Nazism is more contentious. Even at the height of Nazi power, Dallmayr argued, Heidegger offered oblique criticisms of Nazi chauvinism in his Hölderlin lectures, as well as overt critiques of Nazi ideologues (e.g. Alfred Rosenberg) and the “doctrine of biological racism.”<sup>1335</sup> Similarly, Zaborowski and Jonathan Salem-Wiseman see criticisms of Nazism in Heidegger’s reflections on Jünger<sup>1336</sup> and Wagner<sup>1337</sup> while Elden detects it in Heidegger’s reflections on the Greeks.<sup>1338</sup> The identification of a subterranean anti-Nazism in Heidegger’s wartime work leads Clark to claim that the “argument that Heidegger was a Nazi throughout his life and his work thoroughly fascistic” is “easy to dismiss.”<sup>1339</sup> However, Safranski claims that Heidegger’s objections were that Nazism was “not revolutionary enough”<sup>1340</sup> and he saw himself as a “herald who came too early”<sup>1341</sup> for the revolution which he hoped Nazism would awaken.<sup>1342</sup>

Heidegger, in the *Black Notebooks*, portrayed National Socialism as a missed opportunity, a game but quixotic attempt to do something worthy—vulgar in nature, but in its own way necessary.<sup>1343</sup> He criticized those who opposed Nazism out of concern for culture<sup>1344</sup> arguing, in *Pondering VII*, that while Nazism was not necessary for the “transformation of being” it helped to “press towards a decision concerning the essence and destiny of Germans.”<sup>1345</sup> On the other hand, Heidegger distinguished Nazism’s inner spirit from its political form. The former challenges the technological order<sup>1346</sup> while the latter administers mediocrity.<sup>1347</sup> The latter, which he called “vulgar National Socialism” in *Ponderings III*, included the “brainless appeal of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*”<sup>1348</sup>—though this did not prevent him offering the book as a gift to his brother. Vulgar National Socialism was barely even a *Weltanschauung*<sup>1349</sup> lacking any philosophical essence<sup>1350</sup> and those who bought into it grounded themselves in a “complete lack of questioning,”<sup>1351</sup> and cut themselves off from the traditions<sup>1352</sup> of Germany. Nazism, for Heidegger, had a

nascent power (and contained something truthful)<sup>1353</sup> but was corrupted into an ideology<sup>1354</sup>— a spiritless<sup>1355</sup> means of wielding technocratic power.<sup>1356</sup>

Heidegger eventually distanced himself from Nazism— arguing that he had no desire to “underpin National Socialism theoretically,” nor to provide a “nationalist socialist philosophy.”<sup>1357</sup> He wrote, in *Ponderings XI*, that he had once seen “the possibility of [...] another beginning” in National Socialism, but now saw that it was just another “consummation of modernity.”<sup>1358</sup> This is, by any objective measure, an utterly inadequate description of the catastrophe that Nazism truly represented for civilization. Heidegger presented an ambiguous position on Nazism, summed up well by the following: “National Socialism can never be the principle of a philosophy but must always be placed under philosophy as the principle.”<sup>1359</sup> In simple terms, Nazism carried within itself the possibility of a new awakening, but ultimately proved vulgar, barbaric and unphilosophical. Loyalty to the inner spirit, Heidegger suggested, clashed with commitment to the party. In short, as Safranski argues, Heidegger believed for a time that National Socialism was a new way to “open up the West “towards a renewal”<sup>1360</sup> but would come to dismiss it as just another part of the “general mischief of the age.”<sup>1361</sup> Heidegger, we conclude, was undeniably a Nazi and was so for some time. He lost faith in Nazism— though in this he was hardly unique— and was, from a relatively early stage, critical of aspects of it (though his condemnations were never commensurate with the scale of Nazi evil). Heidegger may have been a difficult and disgruntled Nazi, but was a Nazi nonetheless. Like Bourdieu, we begin from the belief that Heidegger’s Nazism is a matter of fact— and stand in firm disagreement with any who would deny or minimize this fact.<sup>1362</sup> This clarity frees us to focus on the relationship between Heidegger’s Nazism and his thought.

There are four common propositions in the literature regarding the relationship between Heidegger’s politics and philosophy. The first is that Heidegger’s philosophy is incommensurable with his Nazism. Clark, for example, portrays a forlorn attempt by Heidegger to reconcile a “racist and militarist cult” with the “genuine national renewal”<sup>1363</sup> sought by his philosophy. This may explain why, as Safranski

documents, Heidegger was denounced in the Nazi press,<sup>1364</sup> under suspicion of only “playing at national socialism.” The second proposition is that Heidegger’s political positions are independent from his philosophy. Without minimizing Heidegger’s culpability, for example, William Spanos questioned the good-faith of many who dismiss Heidegger’s thought as fascistic.<sup>1365</sup> As early as 1936, Elden records, Karl Löwith would question what Heidegger’s wearing of the swastika could possibly have to do with his questioning of “the essential nature of poetry.”<sup>1366</sup> In contrast, Faye highlights Heidegger’s critique of Kant,<sup>1367</sup> arguing that Heidegger made explicit connections between his struggle against nihilism and the politics of Hitler.<sup>1368</sup> Michael Gendre notes continuities between the *Rektoratsrede* and Heidegger’s “project of fundamental ontology.”<sup>1369</sup> For critics like Wolin, this renders any difference between Heidegger’s “spiritual National Socialism and the Nazi ideological mainstream” meaningless.<sup>1370</sup> Even for Peter Trawny, a defender of Heidegger, such connections preclude the relegation of Heidegger’s Nazism to “political errancies.”<sup>1371</sup> Finally, some argue that Heidegger shaped the environment from which Nazism emerged. For Losurdo, Heidegger laid the groundwork of an anti-democratic, anti-socialist, antisemitic—“revolutionary political tradition.”<sup>1372</sup> Peterson believes that the seeds of this revolution were sowed in the universities, which cultivated the soil in which Nazism germinated and grew.<sup>1373</sup>

### § *Der Führer, Das Volk, and the Limits of Dissent*

Malpas argues that the *Black Notebooks* tell us a great deal about the “dead-ends” into which Heidegger ran, and the dangers one encounters with his thought, but grants no great insight into his thought that is not better expressed elsewhere.<sup>1374</sup> Similarly, Schalow argued that though Heidegger adopted a “reactionary” posture that “might explain why the politics of National Socialism appeared so seductive to him,”<sup>1375</sup> it is superficial to define Heidegger by this. Even Sloterdijk, who is often critical of Heidegger’s thought, portrays Heidegger’s Nazism as a result of his having got “carried away by imperial delirium” and the desire to “enjoy being a bigshot.”<sup>1376</sup> Safranski argues that Heidegger’s Nazism was so misaligned with his thought that it required he betray core aspects of his thinking.<sup>1377</sup> For example, Zuckert argues

that in defining the German people by race, the Nazi movement was “absorbed into the reigning ideological-technological”<sup>1378</sup> paradigm.

Some scholars claim that Heidegger’s thought was fundamentally anti-Nazi. Young, for example, argues that Heidegger’s compromise with Nazi “biological thinking” was in defiance of a conception of community that rejected “technological” conceptions of Being.<sup>1379</sup> Young resembles Dallmayr<sup>1380</sup> and Aret Karademir,<sup>1381</sup> both of whom argue that the Heideggerian *Volk* was an alternative to a racial *Volk*. For Janicaud, it is inconceivable that the “technological extravagance” of Hitler’s “exterminative racism” could be reconciled with “Heidegger’s dream.”<sup>1382</sup> Roberts sees Heidegger’s critique of technology as a critique of “totalitarian mobilization”<sup>1383</sup> and Savage argues that the Nazi dictatorship was part of the “global malaise” lamented by Heidegger.<sup>1384</sup> For Safranski, Nazi totalitarianism convinced Heidegger of its inadequacy<sup>1385</sup>— for a politician like Hitler could never be the hero of Being.<sup>1386</sup> Pöggeler argued that this was why Nazi authorities eventually categorized Heidegger’s work as “Jewish.”<sup>1387</sup> The defence of Heidegger hinges on the dual claim that his thought was on a higher plane than his politics and that aspects of his philosophy were fundamentally antithetical to National Socialism. His fallout with the regime is cast as the slowly dawning realization that he had put his faith into an agent of the planetary domination of technology. However, when we consider Heidegger’s positions regarding race and the *Führerstaat* in detail, things become rather more complicated.

### Heidegger and Racial “Science”

Heidegger undeniably did demur from Nazi racial “science.” As early as *Being and Time*, Heidegger expressed doubts that human being could be grasped, its “structure” be “determined,” through a “positive science” like biology.<sup>1388</sup> The reasons for these doubts are grounded, Safranski notes,<sup>1389</sup> in his critique of positivism and the technological “enframing” of man. As a result, Savage concludes that Heidegger’s nationalism was “irreconcilable with the biologism of National Socialism.”<sup>1390</sup> This remains consistent in Heidegger’s work, throughout and beyond the era of Nazi rule. Notably, in lectures given between 1939

and 1940— at the height of Nazi power— Heidegger criticized the “racial breeding of man” as a “simplification of all beings”<sup>1391</sup>— a direct critique of a specific Nazi policy (the selective breeding programme). Clark believes this to be illustrative of Heidegger’s position in this period.<sup>1392</sup>

Heidegger interpreted Nietzsche’s overman, a figure liable to be traduced into a symbol of racial superiority, as “by no means designating a merely superdimensional human being”— a person similar in type but greater in “dimension” than an ordinary human being.<sup>1393</sup> The overman would have to be typologically different<sup>1394</sup> from the man of today, not merely a particularly powerful, beautiful or “pure” iteration of contemporary man— like the blond beasts of the SS. He continued, arguing that the overman cannot, either, be understood as a special species of man who has “cast of all that is humane” and made “naked wilfulness its law and titanic rage its rule.”<sup>1395</sup> It is, of course, impossible to know whether Heidegger specifically sought to evoke the Triumph of the Will these reference to wilfulness. Nevertheless, as Newell notes, Riefenstahl and Hitler did not choose such words haphazardly.<sup>1396</sup> The idea of an unbridled will and limitless capacity to impose that will upon events is widely understood as being a chief characteristic of a so-called master race. Equally, grandeur and titanic scale<sup>1397</sup> was central to the aesthetic of Nazism and were, as Newell notes, propagandized at times with language taken directly from Nietzsche’s thought.<sup>1398</sup> For Heidegger to associate a law of naked wilfulness, rage and an ambition for the titanic with a bad reading of Nietzsche was, whether intentionally or not, damning of Nazism.

We will, in time, cast doubt upon the level of danger Heidegger exposed himself to. However, this should not detract from the interpretative and philosophical significance of such disaccord. While Heidegger’s reservations about Nazism certainly become more acute under the eye of the denazification committees, his postwar critiques were nevertheless expressions of long-held beliefs rather than a convenient *volte-face*. These include his claims in the “Letter on Humanism” regarding the “blindness and arbitrariness” of biologism<sup>1399</sup> or that the belief that physiology can get to the essence of man has “as little validity as the notion that the essence of nature has been discovered in atomic energy.”<sup>1400</sup> Such critiques

are consistent with longstanding views about positivism and the subjectivity of wilfulness. On the other hand, Robert Bernasconi notes that “Heidegger’s antisemitism and anti-Black racism are well documented.”<sup>1401</sup> While we will focus on the philosophical bases of Heidegger’s antisemitism, one should not discount the impact of rank prejudice— visible in Heidegger’s characterization of Africans as uncivilized or primitive. Though Heidegger will be praised for advocating the questioning of generally held beliefs and prejudices of other kinds, it should be noted that this was not a virtue he always demonstrated himself.

Arendt— though she questions the association of racialism with scientific thinking<sup>1402</sup>— credits Heidegger with having seen through racial science. For Arendt, this would lead the Nazis to conclude that they had little use for the “old fashioned”<sup>1403</sup> and “narrow-minded”<sup>1404</sup> nationalism of Heidegger. Bernasconi too would note that Heidegger maintained his rejection of racial “science” even when criticized in politically dangerous terms by Oskar Becker<sup>1405</sup> at a time when pedagogues were expected to affirm the precepts of this “science” in their teaching.<sup>1406</sup> On the other hand, Zimmerman notes that the difference between the Heideggerian and Nazi conception of the *Volk* are hardly insurmountable— an “ordinary listener” would “struggle to distinguish between Hitler's talk of Germany's racial superiority and Heidegger's talk of the metaphysical superiority of the German *Volk*.”<sup>1407</sup> Jonathan Judaken— though he erred in dismissing Heidegger’s rejection of pseudoscientific racism<sup>1408</sup>— argues that Heidegger’s conception of the *Völkish* tradition was “one strand that legitimated Nazi state policy.”<sup>1409</sup> Josephine Donovan,<sup>1410</sup> Peterson<sup>1411</sup> and Zimmerman<sup>1412</sup> doubted the significance of any distinction between Heidegger’s conception of community— rooted in dwelling, rootedness and at-homeness and clearly placed in opposition to the “wordless” Jew— and the Nazi cult of blood and soil. Gillespie roots Heidegger’s embrace of Nazism precisely in this similarity.<sup>1413</sup> In the contemporary context, Göppfarth identifies the rhetorical distinction between Heideggerian and Nazi conceptions of *Volk* as a tool for

modern far-right movements to distance themselves from neo-Nazism without substantially repudiating it.<sup>1414</sup>

In his “Avowal to Adolf Hitler,” Heidegger contrasted a “noncommittal” conception of “world brotherhood” with the “open and manly independence and cooperation of peoples and states.”<sup>1415</sup> In “The Call to Labour Service” he argues that “comradeship” is fostered by shared experiences of danger and devotion to a national mission.<sup>1416</sup> This community is not determined by political borders, but historical experience. Heidegger highlights the fact that millions in this community lived outside of Germany, in what could justifiably be interpreted as either a philosophical justification for *Anschluss*<sup>1417</sup> or a call towards a broader conception of belonging. In short, the distinctions between the Heideggerian and Nazi position can be abstruse, and it is unlikely that listeners would have interpreted Heidegger’s criticisms of biologism as violent denunciations rather than fraternal corrections. This does not invalidate the differences that have emerged. It is clear that Heidegger’s thought contains elements that are utterly antithetical to Nazism. Thus, for the virtuous exponent of Heidegger’s philosophy, there is a strong critique of the fundamental bases of a racial “science” that is, sadly and somewhat incredibly, re-emerging as a political force today. There is also, though, the lesson that Heidegger did not go nearly far enough, and thus likely provided intellectual ballast to Nazi racism even while rejecting its biological foundations.

### Führer and Thinker

A similarly complicated picture appears when one explores the evolution of Heidegger’s decisionism—a concept which can be found as early as *Being and Time*<sup>1418</sup>—into the demand that his students “prove your talents” with “aggressive action”<sup>1419</sup> within a state structure of service<sup>1420</sup> oriented towards the “word”— which is “your law”— of the *Führer*.<sup>1421</sup> Decisionism, and its relationship with *das Volk*, is explained in detail in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*. Interestingly, in this 1934 lecture series, Heidegger would discuss this in ways that clash fundamentally with his later embrace of the *Führerprinzip*. Heidegger noted that we have a common-sense idea of the *Volk* and that, in most

circumstances, this suffices.<sup>1422</sup> However, when we discuss it more concretely, we tend to do so in terms of census data (which does not distinguish community members from those who merely live somewhere<sup>1423</sup>) race (which is no less ambiguous a concept than *Volk*<sup>1424</sup>), folk culture, or high culture (both of which Heidegger recognized were not part of the life-experience of most people).<sup>1425</sup> Instead, “the *Volk* has the character of a decision.”<sup>1426</sup> The simple language version is that he is essentially saying that to belong to a particular “we” is to be involved in a common situation which generates a collective self being (as when a group of students get collectively become an audience, defined collectively by their engagement with the lecturer). The *Volk* are those who decide how they are to respond to that situation, be it by taking up the collective task, rejecting it or refusing the choice.<sup>1427</sup> Thus, the *Volk* is a community defined by common concern. They need not respond in the same way but must respond to the same historically thrown decision-points. Vitality, this decision must be freely taken. Heidegger continues, in this same lecture, to argue that it is “only the genuine decision,” not any kind of forced choice, that “turns the judge into who he should be”— though “without egotistical self-centeredness.”<sup>1428</sup>

The decision consists of the “single act” of “pulling *myself* together,” “saying “*I am decided*” and tilling “*my post*” (emphases added) in order to become “an honest man and a useful member of society.”<sup>1429</sup> One might, then, characterize Heidegger’s Nazi-era praise of subordinating oneself to power<sup>1430</sup> as a flagrant betrayal of the principles he espoused as late as 1934. Nowhere is this more striking than when, in “The German Student as Worker,” Heidegger called for the very literal requisitioning and ordering of his students into the various “brigades” of the Nazi apparatus.<sup>1431</sup> This is utterly irreconcilable with what we have encountered thus far. The totalitarian need to categorize and control everything— dividing the populace into desirable and undesirable, productive and unproductive, and militarizing society— evokes our earlier discussions of ordering and pictorialization. Bourdieu would compare the totalitarian state to an enormous technological assemblage and posit that those, like Heidegger, who sought the essence of things would *perforce* oppose it.<sup>1432</sup> A totalitarian pictorialization *must* constitute a flight from the

troubling question of Being into the certainties of *Seinsvergessenheit*. It would seem, then, that Heidegger's thought must be profoundly anti-totalitarian, whatever Heidegger may have done, and that to submit oneself to totalitarian rule would be the height of *Seinsvergessenheit*.

The *Führerprinzip* (leader principle) posited that Hitler embodied the authentic spirit of the German people. One might interpret this, in Heideggerian terms, as the belief that Hitler had a unique capacity to interpret the German historical *Dasein* and, therefore, would know better than oneself what is truly one's ownmost (*Eigentlich*). Such a principle facilitates Heidegger's elision, in that period, of the state, the individual and the people.<sup>1433</sup> This elision leads to the curious fact of Heidegger's having, during the Nazi period, compared Nazism to Jünger's worker-state<sup>1434</sup> in order to praise, rather than discredit, it. Alternatively, one might interpret this evolution, as did Bourdieu, as a result of Heidegger appointing himself to the role of *Führer*— the “philosopher-king” who can “promise philosophical salvation” to those who hear above the din of the “false prophets.”<sup>1435</sup> In either case, the importance given to freedom in the free relation to Being— and the individuality of one's encounter with it— cannot be squared with this call to obedience and conformity. One must, then, believe either that Heidegger had blundered into an elementary logical contradiction or, at least in this moment, was an advocate of the *Führerprinzip* if one is to make sense of this position. One can see this as a natural evolution of his decisionism, leading him to conclude that the authentic choice is the choice to choose oneself as embodied by the *Führer*, or as a betrayal of the thought that had gone before. It is worth dwelling on this for a moment.

In *Nature, History, State*, there is tension between Heidegger's scepticism of the inauthentic collectivism of the “they” and his claim that the “*Führer* state” represents “the completion of the historical development: the actualization of the people in the leader.”<sup>1436</sup> During the Nazi period, Zabrowski notes, Heidegger argued that the practical means of awakening authentic will was through service to the state.<sup>1437</sup> Through institutions, the ruler reveals what is truly desired by the people<sup>1438</sup>— which they may not be able to see for themselves— through persuasive speech *or* action. Heidegger was clear that this “can also be

implemented by coercion, where commands are a form of carrying out the will.”<sup>1439</sup> However, one cannot coerce another into willing something, and so the “implementation of the will is not based on coercion, but on the awakening of the same will in another.”<sup>1440</sup> As Gillespie puts it, the authentic leader “must share in the fundamental feeling or mood of the people.”<sup>1441</sup> Only an authentic leader can transform the mass of willing individuals into a “following.”<sup>1442</sup> Heidegger argued that leadership is distinct from the exercise of political power, involving the revelation of the “paths and goals” of the ruled.<sup>1443</sup> Even when thwarting the individual, a leader can guarantee the “higher freedom” which comes from the “highest bond” that ties together an historical people according to their shared commitments.<sup>1444</sup> In the seventh lecture, though, Heidegger criticized Schmitt overstating the importance of the great man and failing to distinguish between the political entity and the “state and people.”<sup>1445</sup> He re-iterates this in the tenth lecture and adds that a people “always outlasts its form or state.”<sup>1446</sup> In *Nature, History, State*, in short, we see a rather incoherent theoretical defence of the *Führerprinzip*. Perhaps nothing sums up so well the contradictions in Heidegger’s thought during this period than the fact that he concluded the seventh lecture telling his students that “only where the leader and the led bind themselves together to *one* fate and fight to actualize *one* idea does true order arise”<sup>1447</sup> and the ninth telling them they “should never equate the will of an individual with the will of a people.”<sup>1448</sup> Where Heidegger sought to square his position on freedom, being and independence of thought with his embrace of totalitarianism he fell into a morass of convoluted reasoning and confusion. Heidegger is sometimes accused of obscurantism, but the degree of self-contradiction we observe here exceeds anything elsewhere in his oeuvre. This suggests, one may submit, that Heidegger committed a veritable betrayal of his thought— and of thought and philosophy *tout court*— in attempting to justify the *Führerprinzip*.

Even in Heidegger post-war self-defence in *Der Spiegel*, one sees a tension between “self-governance”— where we “set our own task” and “determine ourselves”<sup>1449</sup>— and the claim that a people “knows itself in its state.”<sup>1450</sup> In this interview, Heidegger argued (unconvincingly) that he had accepted

the rectorship to prevent a Nazi takeover of the university.<sup>1451</sup> He also claimed to have offered esoteric critiques of Nazism that intelligent students (but not Nazi censors) would have grasped<sup>1452</sup> and to have prevented colleagues from being denounced.<sup>1453</sup> More generally, he claimed to have attempted to redirect the energy of Nazism from militarism to self-defence<sup>1454</sup> and from politics to philosophy.<sup>1455</sup> Nevertheless, Heidegger found it necessary to retroactively “shadow edit” the infamous “inner truth and greatness” statement from the *Introduction to Metaphysics*.<sup>1456</sup>

Heidegger, as rector of Freiburg, demanded loyalty to the Nazi state but also encouraged a mood of need, exhorting his students to be comfortable with the “unknown”<sup>1457</sup> before they can “impel the leaders of our State.”<sup>1458</sup> In *Ponderings III*, Heidegger credited Hitler with having “awakened a new actuality”<sup>1459</sup> but criticised a “puffed up bourgeoisie” for appointing itself *Führer*.<sup>1460</sup> He lamented that the role of *Führer* was being associated with technological ends<sup>1461</sup> and saw the “leadership of the leader” devolving, within the modern university, into an “evasion of the spiritual” in favour of “political action.”<sup>1462</sup> Though in theory it is not clear whether the *Führer* is the authentic champion of the people or a puppet of the Heideggerian philosopher king, the practical realities of the *Führerstaat* disappointed Heidegger. So much so, in fact, that Heidegger would conclude: “Against the levelling and unrestricted application of the *Führer*-principle!”<sup>1463</sup> This represented a return to a position taken in 1934’s *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, which includes a protracted and specific criticism of the Nazification of German universities.<sup>1464</sup> While one would appreciate his having stated such a viewpoint more publicly, forcefully and frequently it nevertheless suggests that Heidegger ultimately recognized the futility of his attempt to square the *Führerprinzip* with his thought— a tacit concession that his prior efforts to reconcile the two were ill-considered. There is a lesson, here, for those who seek to make use of Heidegger’s thought. Heidegger’s confused relationship with the figure of Adolf Hitler speaks to a tension between the anti-democratic nature of Heidegger’s aversion to the “they”— and tendency towards dictatorship when this is combined with Heidegger’s discussion of statesmen— and the questioning, independent mindedness that

has been praised throughout this study so far. While the investiture of the role of ideal statesman upon a philistine like Hitler inevitably devolves into nonsense, Heidegger's elitism and aloofness still readily lend themselves towards support for an enlightened despot.

### Compliance and Dissent in Nazi Germany

It is tempting to see Heidegger's dissent from race-theory and eventual rejection of the *Führerprinzip* as remarkable acts. This position, though, depends upon the "intentionalist" theory of Nazi power outlined in Karl Dietrich Bracher's seminal *The German Dictatorship*<sup>1465</sup>— and the characterization of Nazi Germany as a classic coercive state.<sup>1466</sup> This is disputed by Richard J. Evans, who emphasised "voluntarism"— the theory that the Nazi Party depended on non-compelled complicity.<sup>1467</sup> For Arendt, the base of Nazi power was less its fanatical following, who never numbered in the majority, than the apolitical, "apparently indifferent people"<sup>1468</sup> whose passivity facilitated the rise of Nazism. Furthermore, according to Robert Gellately, Nazi terror was mostly exercised against "social outcasts,"<sup>1469</sup> and "undesirables."<sup>1470</sup> This suggests that we risk overstating the danger Heidegger faced if we see his dissent from Nazi doctrine as, in Salem-Wiseman's words, "hardly a gambit without risk"<sup>1471</sup>— or, in Dallmayr's "border[ing] on high treason."<sup>1472</sup> While Nazi rule can hardly be considered conducive to academic freedom, Heidegger was by no means alone in demurring from aspects of Nazi doctrine. It would be excessive to discount the dissent he did offer, but one should not exaggerate the risk he faced.

Heidegger complained that his critics obsessed over works that were neither his most philosophical nor most freely expressed— overlooking his other works.<sup>1473</sup> However, *Nature, History, State* cannot be dismissed as an "unphilosophical" work. One might say that where his thought was ambiguous, he "chose to choose" the path of self-serving complicity. Whether this choice was motivated, as Andrew believes, by the belief that he could shape the new Germany in his image<sup>1474</sup>— a delusion that did not last long<sup>1475</sup>— or, as Arendt believes, by Heidegger having caught himself in the "trap" of his own intelligence,<sup>1476</sup> it remains the case that the choice was his to make. Herf notes that many who followed what he calls the

“reactionary modernism” of the Nazis— which blended “romantic obfuscation”<sup>1477</sup> with the autobahn— would find ways to reconcile themselves with this blend of romanticism and utilitarianism.<sup>1478</sup> For a time, Heidegger chose to overlook those parts of Nazism that violated tenets of his philosophy. He was not alone in doing so. While many who lived under the Nazi jackboot had no real alternative, a man of Heidegger’s means had the option of doing what Thomas Mann would do: fleeing Germany and becoming perhaps its most fierce, though imperfect,<sup>1479</sup> critic.<sup>1480</sup>

The situation is nevertheless more complicated than Jaspers’ essentially dictatorial characterization of Heidegger’s thought allows<sup>1481</sup> and Dagobert Runes was wrong to claim that Heidegger’s “whole involved metaphysical structure” is “a vicious, despotic scheme.”<sup>1482</sup> Heidegger seems to have relegated those incapable of creativity— who, as Harries puts it, “lack the strength to create their own work”<sup>1483</sup>— to the role of following others<sup>1484</sup> and to have sneered at liberal ideas.<sup>1485</sup> However, as Bourdieu put it: “Heidegger offers philosophical salvation to the most simple, so long as we are able to hear, [...] the authentic reflections of a *Führer philosophique*.”<sup>1486</sup> It seems that Heidegger was, as Adorno notes,<sup>1487</sup> “according to the taste of fascism” but, as Schufreider puts it, had “all the resources available to him in his thinking in 1933 to oppose National Socialism,”<sup>1488</sup> even if ultimately he did not. As a result, we align with those scholars— such as Löwith, Newell, Zimmerman, and Kisiel— who neither discount the most troubling aspects of Heidegger’s nor reduce his philosophy to an intellectualization of Nazism and consider its value to be exhausted by the comparison. However, under no circumstances should we imagine that those moments of dissent which we have observed thus far absolve Heidegger the man. One might therefore be tempted to jettison Heidegger’s philosophy, arguing that no philosophy that can compromise with Nazism is worthy of the name. Indeed, one might say that philosophy, especially in so morally consequential a context, requires a critical stance. Such protestations likely over-estimate the inherent goodness of the philosophical enterprise— whose track record, from Plato’s sojourn in Syracuse to Shaw’s Holodomor denial, is hardly faultless. Furthermore, there is great pedagogical utility in seeing the

corruption of a great mind and noting the pitfalls and dead-ends into which Heidegger stumbled. What, then, are the consequences of Heidegger's Nazism for those who still wish to avail themselves of his great insights? This question will be approached with respect to three areas in which Heidegger's political failings and philosophy intertwine in ways that are relevant to the topic of this study. These are: the relationship between Heidegger's concept of *Destruktion* and revolutionary politics, the blindness of Heidegger as a thinker toward human suffering and, of course, Heidegger's antisemitism.

§ *Between Indifference and Evil: Heidegger's Sonderweg*

Revolution and Ruin

An interesting line of questioning regards the relationship between Nazism and revolutionary conservatism. Fritsche appeals to this in his refutation of Trawny— claiming that Heidegger's revolution of Being seemed, for a time, to be embodied by a “revolutionary-rightist” conservatism.<sup>1489</sup> Andrew believed that Heidegger embraced Hitler in part as a potential leader of a conservative revolution— guiding the German people through “a counter-movement to the effects of the French Revolution”<sup>1490</sup> that might, in Matthew Feldman's words, “reverse historical decay”<sup>1491</sup> and, as Tertulian put it, “curb the dominant nihilism.”<sup>1492</sup> Safranski describes a relatively short lived belief, on the part of Heidegger, that the Nazi party might be the catalyst for a political revolution that would prepare the ground for philosophical revolution.<sup>1493</sup> Bourdieu noted that Heidegger, revolutionary conservatism and Nazism shared common enemies<sup>1494</sup> and Beiner notes a shared belief in German “specialness,” and “hyper-nationalism” as the forces most likely to overthrow the liberal order.<sup>1495</sup> Such similarities lead Jeffrey Herf to argue that Heidegger and the revolutionary conservatives provided philosophical ballast to the rise of Nazism.<sup>1496</sup>

Heidegger had a tendency to employ violent language. For Lezsek Kolakowski, this could *only* have been understood as “encouragement and praise for German imperialism then and there.”<sup>1497</sup> Bourdieu was more measured but notes that it *could* legitimize the violence of National Socialism.<sup>1498</sup> In his

*Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger argued that “humanity” has to “be historical in doing violence in the midst of being.”<sup>1499</sup> Notably, this is a metaphorical violence— to be done by the *Dasein* against itself, to tear itself from the conventional experience of Being<sup>1500</sup>— rather than literal violence against others.<sup>1501</sup> Furthermore, Heidegger explained that violence is something which, after the initial tearing away, risks begetting “its own unessence [...] so that it shuts itself out from the way of meditation.”<sup>1502</sup> In James S. Churchill’s understanding, this destruction is directed towards the tradition, which must be “loosened up” to make accessible the “original sources of a problem.”<sup>1503</sup> Magrini disassociates it from total war.<sup>1504</sup> Zimmerman notes that where Heidegger spoke of “authentic revolution,” he referred to a “dangerous struggle by which creators bring Being to a stand in works that open up a world in which beings can come to be.”<sup>1505</sup> Such language was not limited to the Nazi period, even in a 1921 work on Karl Jaspers one finds Heidegger arguing for a “sharpening of the conscience” which is to be “enacted” by way of a “destruction”<sup>1506</sup>— which is “tantamount to explicating the original motivational situations in which the fundamental experiences of philosophy have arisen.”<sup>1507</sup> Zimmerman captures the ambiguity of this revolutionary struggle. On the one hand, it is carried out in the realms of “works that open up a world”— works of art, thought, and poetry— but on the other, the struggle is dangerous and revolutionary.

For Feenberg, the abstract nature of this violence results from the distinction between the ontic and the ontological. To engage with the ontics of, say, “actual machines and the nature they transform”— which requires “political strife and struggle”— could not, for Heidegger, “change the ontological dispensation within which the world appears as technological.”<sup>1508</sup> In other words, the engagement with near-at-hand manifestations of technology cannot get to the essence of things. In contrast, Bourdieu saw a direct link between Heidegger’s critique of technology and the technological self-destruction wrought by the Nazis. Heidegger does not call for street-violence, but there is a link between the “aristocratism” of *Being and Time* and a desire to cheer on the Nazis as they lay waste to the world created by technology. For, as Bourdieu noted, if one sees the status quo as doomed to nihilism, one might well embrace the “will

to rupture, revolution and awakening.”<sup>1509</sup> In this reading, political violence is encouraged as a key part of the ontological struggle for *Dasein*, even if Heidegger is not calling on thinkers to dirty their hands.

Heidegger, in *The Essence of Human Freedom*, wrote that “all philosophical interpretation is destruction, controversy, and radicalization [...] or else it is nothing at all,”<sup>1510</sup> suggesting an interpretative doing of violence to texts rather than beating up the author. The ontological engagement described by Feenberg and Dronsfield,<sup>1511</sup> the making of new worlds, must involve metaphorical violence against the foundations of the world that came before. We must, Clark puts it, engage in the “a de-layering of structures of the obvious.”<sup>1512</sup> Gonzalez and Löwith are correct to note that calls to metaphorical violence can very easily metastasize into bloodshed<sup>1513</sup> and thus where Polt describes Heidegger as embracing an “abstract spirit of revolution,”<sup>1514</sup> one cannot but think of the tragedies, too numerous to count, of so many revolutions turned to terror. Joseph Grange noted that Heidegger struggled to articulate what “something better” would be,<sup>1515</sup> and thus the risk certainly existed, in Heidegger’s thought, that we embrace *Destruktion* for the sake of a better future only to find ourselves empty handed among the ruins.

There is much of this metaphorical violence— which Newell describes as a resolve to violently sweep away<sup>1516</sup> and Grant as the clearing of fertile ground<sup>1517</sup>— in Nazism too. As Arendt notes, everything was to be razed in order to make space for the Nazi cult of barbarity.<sup>1518</sup> This sweeping away of what had come before was a terrifyingly literal endeavour, smashing things being, according to Arendt, more or less the point. Where Heidegger, in *What is Called Thinking?*, cast doubt on the idea of fighting wars in the name of peace,<sup>1519</sup> the Nazis happily fought wars in the name of war. There is a difference between the “violence” of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and the violence of *Kristallnacht*.<sup>1520</sup> However, Heidegger never denounced the violence of *Kristallnacht* and a shared lust for a diluvian moment— or at least an assault on the bastions of modernity— remains an important point of accord between these two types of violence-doing. Notably, this metaphorical violence-doing is present across Heidegger’s oeuvre— the passages cited above spanning all the major periods of Heidegger’s career.

We have found, then, that National Socialism is connected to Heidegger's philosophy in significant part *because* of its revolutionary destructiveness. As Tabachnick argues, the "outer violence" of Nazism had, for Heidegger, the potential to make space for a "more authentic, spiritually rich, and (in the end) peaceful existence."<sup>1521</sup> Heidegger broke with Nazism because it was not sufficiently revolutionary to "overcome the challenge of technology"<sup>1522</sup>— being just another "dreary technological frenzy" like Americanism and Communism.<sup>1523</sup> Heidegger was also primed to embrace Nazism by his hostility to democratic institutions which biased him in favour of their enemies<sup>1524</sup> and this aspect of his thought— which spans his philosophical oeuvre— links, Pöggeler told us, his political errors to his philosophy.<sup>1525</sup> However, as Cerrato notes, this political "posture" masked a radical philosophical proposition.<sup>1526</sup> Bourdieu noted that Heidegger's central criticism of Nazism was that it did not go far enough, that it remained beholden to technological modes of thinking.<sup>1527</sup> Heidegger thought that National Socialism could serve his ends and pave the way for the Hölderlin inspired salvation he sought— it could, if nothing else, bring the old world crashing down.<sup>1528</sup> This, Gonzalez argues, was the meaning of the "inner truth and greatness of National Socialism" statement: that Heidegger believed the Nazis represented the fiery "completion of modernity,"<sup>1529</sup> the impetus for the transition from metaphysics "to and through a new beginning."<sup>1530</sup> In other words, it appears that Heidegger believed that the Nazi Party would do the dirty work of destroying metaphysics, technology, and democracy— which, Gonzalez explains, Heidegger believed too weak to meet the moment<sup>1531</sup>— and modernity, freeing up the space wherein the Hölderlins and Heideggers might create a new, better alternative. While challenging the given, questioning what is taken for granted and the rejection of comforting nostalgia without scorning the past are positive aspects of Heidegger's thought, they carry within themselves the danger of precisely the kind of destructive revolutionary zeal that we have seen here. Heidegger at his most revolutionary is Heidegger at his worst, and those who wish to make good use of his insights should, as a result, proceed with an awareness that while Heidegger's more revolutionary ideas might be an effective weapon to wield against contemporary

right-wing nationalism— as they have surely been wielded in this study— they are themselves dangerous things.

### Turning a Blind Eye

Gonzalez notes that Heidegger made the raising of political or moral objections to Nazism seem trivial<sup>1532</sup> while Taminiaux argued that Heidegger's thought created conditions for total political blindness.<sup>1533</sup> For some, there is an ethical hole in Heidegger's thought that rendered it incapable of responding correctly to Nazism. Heidegger is thought to call us "away from the orbit of any existing morality"<sup>1534</sup> or ethic and cannot, Dostal tells us, "attend adequately to the significant distinctiveness of the Good."<sup>1535</sup> To be politically blind in ordinary times is one thing, but Heidegger's was the time of the Shoah. The full extent of Heidegger's antisemitism will be discussed, here it suffices to note that a number of scholars argue that it was the result of what Clark calls a "remorseless attention to essential and historical issues"<sup>1536</sup> which blinded him to the all-to-human impacts of things like the Nuremberg laws.

Trawny sees the mitigation of the internal other as a vital step taken by Heidegger in constructing his "narrative of the history of being."<sup>1537</sup> Heidegger builds his grand historical narrative around the historical *Dasein*— a conception of a community that allows for little internal diversity— and he spoke rarely, if ever, of human suffering. That this lack of compassion contributed to Heidegger's embrace of Nazism is likely. Counterintuitively, this myopia is confirmed where Heidegger is alleged to have behaved admirably— such as his attempt to defend Jewish colleagues Edmund Fraenkel and Georg von Hevey from dismissal<sup>1538</sup> and his arguments against the excision of Baruch Spinoza from the curriculum.<sup>1539</sup> Safranski notes that this appeared to be motivated less by sympathy for the victims of prejudice than by an aversion to political interference in the domain of philosophy.<sup>1540</sup> As Steven Smith, paraphrasing Strauss, puts it, "Heidegger's concern for Being, rather than beings, [...] led to his indifference to tyranny"<sup>1541</sup> for he was, in Charles Rubin's phrase, "deafened to the calls of humanity by the silence of Being."<sup>1542</sup> This is especially so where it applies to the marginalized and disempowered— those least likely

to be embodied by the great national-historical *dramatis-personae* that populate Heidegger's *Geschichte*. It is for this reason that one should doubt Bourdieu's claim that Heidegger deliberately engaged in political obscurantism in order to protect a particular economic order.<sup>1543</sup> Rather, it seems that a something like a social welfare program, in Bourdieu's example, simply does not register with Heidegger as a thing worthy of thought.<sup>1544</sup> In Caputo's words: "in the history that runs from shining Greek temples to industrial pollution, there is no place for victims."<sup>1545</sup>

However plausible one finds Safranski's claim that Heidegger's critique of technology "always, explicitly or not, also means Auschwitz"<sup>1546</sup>— on account of the brutally technological nature of the mechanized processing of human lives<sup>1547</sup>— it is clear that Heidegger never made that connection known. Furthermore, as Adorno put it, Heidegger "chalks up the mutilation to the fault of the mutilated" and to "existence in general"<sup>1548</sup> rather than recognizing any special fault on the part of Nazi Germany. While Heidegger's general critique of technology may implicate the Holocaust, it only does so, Wolin and Ihde argue convincingly, alongside mechanized agriculture<sup>1549</sup> and word processors.<sup>1550</sup> Heidegger's most direct treatment of the Holocaust consisted of a general and gnomic statement in *the Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*<sup>1551</sup>— which obfuscated any Nazi, German, or even personal culpability for the "liquidation" of "hundreds of thousands" (in truth millions) in "annihilation camps"— which Heidegger blamed upon a general tendency towards technology and the standing reserve. If this is a condemnation of the Holocaust, it is utterly inadequate. This is consequential for Heideggerians, not only because it is a major flaw in Heidegger's own thinking but because it speaks to the broader ethical hole in Heidegger's thought. Even without the influence of Heidegger's prejudices, there is nothing in Heidegger's oeuvre that speaks to the protection of human beings from abuse, violence, or extermination. One can certainly critique the holocaust as a technological phenomenon, and it surely was, but this remains a criticism of the methods rather than the ends. Heidegger's thought does not provide us with a reason to see the inherent value of human life, nor does his thought place limitations on what sorts of things a person should or shouldn't do

to another. Any who wish to avail themselves of Heidegger's insights should pay heed to this ethical hole and recognize Heidegger's thought as something incomplete as a result.

It is by no means a matter of consensus, though, that Heidegger's culpability is limited to mere myopia or oversight. In fact, Rubin argues that there is a "less resigned aspect to Heidegger's thought" which "showed itself in his active support for National Socialism."<sup>1552</sup> One might, for example, point to the connection drawn by Heidegger between technology and Americanism. This contributed to a belief that Germany was caught between "the great pincers"<sup>1553</sup> of the U.S.S.R and America.<sup>1554</sup> Wolin argues that this was a central part of both Heidegger's and Hitler's worldviews,<sup>1555</sup> though Pöggeler noted that it was a widely held belief in Germany at this time.<sup>1556</sup> However, with Heidegger this was not necessarily a defensive posture, Tabachnick sees Heidegger's active pursuit of the destruction of "both the American and Russian forms of democracy" as having for a time been central to his task of regaining "authentic existence."<sup>1557</sup> This sense of mortal threat undeniably helped to sell the promise that the Nazi gangster-state could function as a protection racket— using their viciousness to shield Germans from American and Soviet rapaciousness— to the German bourgeoisie. For all that Heidegger may have rejected aspects of Nazism, he nevertheless gave the imprimatur of intellectual respectability to stances such as this. In doing so, he laid the groundwork for the rise of Nazism and cultivated the soil in which it grew.

### Heidegger's Existential Antisemitism

Heidegger proved incapable of grasping the evil of the regime which was emerging, often simply thinking of it as one among a number of wretched political options.<sup>1558</sup> Nowhere is this clearer than with respect to antisemitism. Adorno accuses Heidegger of lacking insight into how his ideas would impact the world<sup>1559</sup> and Safranski too concedes that Heidegger was inattentive to the fact that his ideas might be wielded against Jews.<sup>1560</sup> Lillian Alweiss, for example, sees antisemitism as an extension of a philosophy that precluded the possibility of a Jew being a "guardian of Being."<sup>1561</sup> Sometimes, though, even this is too weak a denunciation, as with the crass antisemitism of Heidegger's lamentation, noted by Andrew, of the

“Jewification of the German spirit.”<sup>1562</sup> Heidegger’s discourse was riddled with tropes of antisemitism—such as the association, noted by Judaken, of “world Jewry” with both the British Empire and Bolshevism and the belief, noted by Strong, that Jews have “divided loyalties.”<sup>1563</sup> This, Grosser argues, inflects Heidegger’s diagnosis of the ills of his time.<sup>1564</sup> Donovan concludes that Heidegger always saw the hand of the Jew behind the universal imperium of technology.<sup>1565</sup> Two key debates emerge from this scholarship. Firstly, the extent to which Heidegger’s antisemitism infected his philosophical oeuvre and secondly, whether Heidegger’s antisemitism was typical of his time.

There are some aspects of Heidegger’s antisemitism that are highly idiosyncratic. For example, he criticized Judaism alongside Christianity as part of the story of the forgetting of Being<sup>1566</sup> and, in *Ponderings X*, criticized formal policies of antisemitism as an example of the ways in which a political *Weltanschauung* leads us astray.<sup>1567</sup> However, a nefarious entity called “international Judaism” is held, in *Ponderings XIII*, to have availed itself simultaneously of imperialism and pacifism in order to entangle Being in meaningless toil<sup>1568</sup> and Jewish emigres from Germany have caused non-Jewish people to die for Jewish aims.<sup>1569</sup> He even argued—rather gallingly—that “racial thinking” is an error caused by the influence of the Jews<sup>1570</sup> that Jews have been central to the vulgar and simplistic “*völkish*-political” worldviews<sup>1571</sup> that have undermined his critique of positivism.<sup>1572</sup> Base antisemitic conspiracy theories are prominent in the *Black Notebooks*. It suffices to say that Heidegger was an antisemite. The more difficult question is how this related to his philosophy.

Heidegger stated, in *Ponderings XIV*, that “the question of the role of world-Judaism is not a racial question, but a metaphysical one, a question that concerns the kind of human existence which in an utterly unrestrained way can undertake as a world-historical “task” the uprooting of all beings from being.”<sup>1573</sup> Here, Heidegger is linking his antisemitic conspiracism to the overarching concern of his philosophy: the question of Being. Here we see a specific accusation made against the Jewish people: that they are essentially alien to any particular place—“world” Judaism is “utterly unrestrained”—and this essence is

inherently destructive of the rootedness of other peoples. Heidegger argued that Judaism itself is grounded in “empty rationality and calculative capacity” and depends upon the creation of an “abode” where there is no “decisive domain.”<sup>1574</sup> While he distanced his antisemitism from pseudo-scientific biological claims, he did so in a way that kept antisemitism at the centre of his philosophical concern, making it, if anything, even more damning. This cannot be dismissed as mere personal prejudice. Furthermore, Heidegger’s antisemitism is universal<sup>1575</sup>—Jewishness-as-such represents a threat to rootedness-as-such, not a specific group of Jews to a particular nation. Though, as Judaken noted, Heidegger linked Judaism to Bolshevism,<sup>1576</sup> the threat that Jews purportedly posed was primarily existential—touching on “every essential political problem of the time.”<sup>1577</sup> The Jews are groundless in their being, and thus *must*, by force of who they are, undermine *Kultur*<sup>1578</sup> and push the world towards “groundlessness.”<sup>1579</sup> While one does see, in *Nature, History, State*, a critique of the “Volk-based” fatherland of the Second Reich that is tied too closely to “what we call patriotism”<sup>1580</sup>—and, significantly, an overt critique of Nazi conceptions of Lebensraum<sup>1581</sup>—it remains the case that Heidegger advocates for rootedness in a “German space” from which “Semitic Nomads”<sup>1582</sup> are, inherently and essentially, alien. This represents, it will now be argued, a particularly destructive form of antisemitism.

Arendt opposed a “run of the mill” antisemitism—like that which animated the Dreyfus Affair—to Nazi antisemitism. Nationalist writers tended, she argued, to be afflicted by a “nineteenth century” antisemitism which, compared to the more potent Nazi strain, already had an “antiquated quality” and “rather useless character.”<sup>1583</sup> Whether Heidegger belongs alongside Arendt’s antiquated conventional antisemites or the Nazi antisemites requires consideration here. It is useful to begin by noting that it was by no means inevitable that a man of this period would be an antisemite. Among our nationalists, for example, one finds Péguy—a man of the generation before Heidegger’s—despising antisemitism as a “modern” corruption<sup>1584</sup> which blinded conservatives to the affinity they ought to have for Jews.<sup>1585</sup> At the other extreme, again in France, one finds the deranged antisemitism of Ferdinand Céline—whose repute

across Europe was not damaged by his spittle-flecked screeds against “conspiring,”<sup>1586</sup> “cowardly,”<sup>1587</sup> “repugnant”<sup>1588</sup> Jews. While he was not so ludicrously unhinged, Heidegger was closer on this matter to Céline’s than Péguy’s end of the spectrum. The comparison with Barrès, though, is most interesting. Barrès accused Jews of harbouring dual loyalties<sup>1589</sup> and occasionally tied nationality to blood,<sup>1590</sup> but allowed for the possibility that Jews could, by behaving in certain ways, be good Frenchmen.<sup>1591</sup> Of course, it should be noted that this change essentially requires that Jews, as well as Protestants, will abandon all but the most superficial aspects of their religious identity for co-membership of this French unified whole. The Catholic, naturally, is granted a special dispensation to “face his double duty” as both the executor of a French and a Catholic mission.<sup>1592</sup> Though Barrès was still fundamentally antisemitic, he did not posit Jewish villainy as essential or immutable. Furthermore, the Jew is not posited as a global force for disintegration, but rather as a specific *political* threat to national loyalty— one that could be diminished by Jews changing their allegedly errant behaviour (rather than by annihilating them).<sup>1593</sup>

This brings to mind what Peter Sloterdijk calls the “moral-immunological” distinction “between inside and outside”<sup>1594</sup> that he sees as a consequence of the need to border a political community.<sup>1595</sup> For Sloterdijk, the “cultic integration” of political communities necessitates an “autogenous stress” from an “enemy,”<sup>1596</sup> internal or external. This is political, contingent, and grounded in the logics of otherness and exclusion, and the result of a perception of mutable, political, and cultural characteristics of Jewishness. It is difficult, on the other hand, to see what the Jews of Heidegger’s imagination could do to stop being, in an essential sense, forces for technological disintegration. For if the Jews are guilty of “planetary criminality” as a part of “world Jewry” [*Judentum*]— as Wolin alleges Heidegger originally put it (before it was expunged by Trawny under pressure from the Heidegger estate) in his 1939 lectures *Die Geschichte des Seyns*<sup>1597</sup>— then it is death and death alone which can expel them from the Sloterdijkian “safe” sphere. Thus, for Heidegger and the Nazis, antisemitism was an existential matter, grounded in an essence of Jewishness which is immutable, universal, and fundamental to their Being. This places us in disagreement

with Trawny, who portrays Heidegger's antisemitism as the "private *ressentiment*"<sup>1598</sup> of a man of his time— unrelated to the Shoah<sup>1599</sup> and relatable to Heidegger's philosophy only in so far as it suited Heidegger to pretend.<sup>1600</sup> This distinction is not of great normative significance— the Vichyite anti-Semite selling out their Jewish neighbour<sup>1601</sup> is no less contemptible for believing that, by converting to Christianity, their victims could redeem themselves. It is, though, significant to the Heidegger-Nazi question, as it demonstrates a tie binding Heidegger specifically to the Nazi worldview.

§ *After the Master of Messkirch*

The relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and Nazism would not have occasioned quite the deluge of spilled ink were it a simple matter. Heidegger was a complicated man and an ambiguous and subtle thinker who also demonstrated, after the fall of Nazism, a talent for dissembling. Furthermore, totalitarian regimes thrive on their capacity to muddy the waters of the ethical and use compulsion and manipulation to implicate in their crimes those who subsist under their thumb. However, Heidegger's case is particular. He left ample documentary evidence of his views and thought processes throughout this time and was in a position where he was afforded rather more leeway than less famous compatriots. Furthermore, he never repudiated his idiosyncratic version of Nazism and organized the posthumous publication of some of his most incendiary views on the topic. Certain things, then, can be stated clearly. Martin Heidegger was a funny kind of Nazi, but a funny kind of Nazi is a Nazi nonetheless. He was so, with enthusiasm, for about a decade. Furthermore, Heidegger was drawn to Nazism, as Shawn Kelley and Theodore Kisiel argue, because it intersected with some, but not all, of the pathways and strands of his philosophy.<sup>1602</sup> As Sharpe notes, the publication of the *Black Notebooks* make it impossible to maintain the separation of "the purifying fire of Heidegger's discourse" from his Nazism.<sup>1603</sup> Even if one focuses solely on Heidegger's philosophical works, Fried and Polt are correct to note that Heidegger's political choices were "connected to some enduring elements in his philosophy."<sup>1604</sup> At the same time, it is equally evident that Heidegger's embrace of Nazism defied core Heideggerian philosophical commitments. We noted, in particular, a

longstanding streak of independence-of-thought and scepticism of the masses that simply cannot be squared with a mass movement predicated on slavish obedience to a gangster tyranny. Furthermore, we have found evidence to support the argument, made by Alans Milchman and Rosenberg, that while Heidegger's philosophy informed his entry into the Nazi orbit, it was also integral to his break from it.<sup>1605</sup>

We have seen evidence of what Rubin calls a “less resigned”<sup>1606</sup> aspect of Heidegger's thought, which relates it to Nazism in a meaningful way. Indeed, a lot of evidence in this chapter supports the position of Peterson, Herf, Zimmerman, Judaken, and Gonzalez: that whatever the similarities and differences may be, Heidegger contributed to the cultivation of the soil in which Nazism flourished. The connections are robust and have spanned Heidegger's oeuvre to an extent that Malpas' belief that Heidegger's Nazism tells us little of import about his thought<sup>1607</sup> cannot be maintained. Similarly, we must conclude that those defences offered by Spanos, Young, Karademir, Safranski and Janicaud— though they highlight vital points of distinction between Heidegger's core philosophical commitments and his Nazism— understate the significance of this relationship. However, it is impossible to conclude in accord with Farias, Faye, Wolin, or Runes, who see Heidegger's thought as little more than a pretentiously worded theoretical defence of Nazism. There are undeniably elements of Heidegger's thought that were amenable to, consistent with and impacted by his Nazism. However, the differences noted with respect to politics, the *Volk*, and freedom are sufficient that we conclude, alongside Schalow, Bourdieu, Newell, Taminioux and Löwith that one cannot deny or minimize the relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics, but nor can one reduce Heidegger's thought to philosophical Nazism.

We reject, here, any attempt to amputate parts of Heidegger's thought on account of their being afflicted by the cancer of Nazism. Though we might wish to separate those tainted parts of Heidegger's thought from others which remain pure, we have found that so neat a division is not always possible. This chapter spoke to five themes in Heidegger's thought: the nature of *das Volk*, political power, *Destruktion*, the place of the victim, and antisemitism. Excepting the last two of these, the conclusions were defined, in

each case, by a significant degree of ambiguity. We found that Heidegger absolutely rejects Nazi biological/racial essentialism, but we tempered this with the realization that this was not a particularly important point of disagreement in practical terms. We found that even though Heidegger made a protracted effort to use the *Führerprinzip* to reconcile his philosophical focus on questioning with blind obedience to Hitler, the result was a chaotic mess which Heidegger fairly quickly recognized as utterly untenable. We note that while there is a clear difference between the metaphorical destruction he calls for and physical violence, there is nevertheless a revolutionary zeal which one could well argue legitimated and laid the groundwork for the Nazi cult of destruction. These concepts touch many parts of Heidegger's thought and are themselves morally complicated. There is no real possibility, even if there were the intent, to sanitize Heidegger's thought or to extract from this troubling oeuvre an untainted Heidegger.

However, there is truth in Kolb's statement that though "his way looks suspicious now, and his prophetic mantle is in tatters, his questions continue to resonate."<sup>1608</sup> Newell argues "it would be a mistake to believe that the significance of Heidegger's thought was exhausted by this [Nazi] connection."<sup>1609</sup> Schalow too was correct to note the simultaneous danger of blinding oneself to the "imbalances in Heidegger's thought" and of allowing clarity regarding his Nazism to cloud "his more positive suggestion on the nature of politics."<sup>1610</sup> We cannot sanitize Heidegger, but neither should we repudiate his thought entirely. It is possible for one to consider those questions provoked by Heidegger's works and to avail oneself of their insights— aided by the knowledge of where he erred— without blinding oneself to his abhorrent views. How, then, should one do this?

We are duty bound to, as Polt puts it, "draw the line between Heidegger's insights and his errors."<sup>1611</sup> This should be done by highlighting, not downplaying, where he went astray. Furthermore, in questioning Heidegger's Nazism we found further evidence that the worst aspects of Heidegger's thought are often— though not always— directly linked to praiseworthy aspects of his thought. We have seen already that where Heidegger offers resistance to propagandistic nationalistic historical narratives by

drawing our attention to the deeper matters of Being he invites us to seek a free and independent relation to our historical hinterlands and to resist the call to throw away our lives for the goals of others. Precisely this, though, can lead to exclusion and the demonization of internal others, or else indifference to those practical political projects that are vital to human flourishing. In the chapters to come, this dynamic will take on a greater salience. In chapter eight, where we discuss politics, Heidegger's indifference to "*le petit peuple*" and the everyday problems that people face will be highlighted. In chapter nine, the narrowness of the kind of community that can be grounded in Heidegger's occasionally rather chauvinistic view of language and the problems posed by diversity to his conception of the role of custom will become highly relevant. In chapter ten, the challenge posed by mobility, multiracial polities, and religious and cultural minorities to Heidegger's conception of *Mitsein* will be discussed. These discussions will speak to the way in which Heidegger's ideas *can*, even if they need not, lead one astray when accepted uncritically. As Janicaud noted, Heidegger did not pretend at being a faultless thinker,<sup>1612</sup> and it would be folly to eschew criticizing him where it is merited out of deference for the brilliance of his thought as a whole.<sup>1613</sup>

Francisco Gonzalez guides us here.<sup>1614</sup> Heidegger's thought should be taken seriously but not be held up as an indisputable font of truth. His greatness must be recognized without his being adopted as a "master" who we are to follow. There ought to be a recognition of, in Gonzalez' words, "how susceptible Heidegger's own thought is to degenerate into ideology of the most repugnant sort."<sup>1615</sup> Heidegger was a great philosopher with incisive, influential thoughts about what it means to belong— thoughts which can illuminate questions surrounding identity and belonging that so excite contemporary minds— but should not be held up as a hero. We deal, in short, with a Heidegger who has been "liberated" from the aura of the Master of Messkirch and is ready "for genuinely critical engagement"<sup>1616</sup>

**Part Two: Space**

### To Sojourn in Syracuse?

The remainder of this study concerns that other aspect of the *Da* in *Dasein*: the spatial “there” of Being. Excepting chapter ten, which considers our physical surrounding, this section understands spatiality metaphorically. Chapter seven concerns the political space, chapter eight attends to the social and cultural spatiality, and chapter ten considers our relationship with the natural world around us.

#### Modalities of the Political

Before diving in, the conceptions of the political which guide this analysis must be introduced, beginning with the *die Politik* vs. *das Politische* dichotomy employed in Dallmayr’s<sup>1617</sup> *The Other Heidegger*. *Die Politik* is the realm of “concrete decision-making,” activism and practicality. *Das Politische* refers to the “sphere or realm” and the “specific modality” according to which we “speak of phenomena— events, persons, actions, institution etc.— as to their political quality.”<sup>1618</sup> For example, the pursuit of energy independence from Russia belongs to *die Politik* but the decision of whether, in doing so, to style ourselves champions of liberty belongs to *das Politische*. Dallmayr identified, in Heidegger, a distancing of “ideological politicization” from the “classical *polis*”— a “place of questioning and unsettled openness.”<sup>1619</sup> Dallmayr did not make a normative distinction between the two, but associates *die Politik* with “ideological politicization” and *das Politische* with “questioning and unsettled openness.”<sup>1620</sup>

There is also analytic potential in Nietzsche’s distinction between *grosse* and *kleine Politik*. McIntyre neatly explicates the elements of Nietzschean *grosse Politik*, identifying a scorn for power politics as foundational. He argues that Nietzsche employed Bismarck’s terminology ironically and specifically posited an antagonistic relationship between the “power politics of the state” and the “matters of culture” which shape the context in which politics takes place.<sup>1621</sup> McIntyre identifies four significant components of *grosse Politik*: the presence of an overman, the importance of higher breeding and cultivation (*Züchtung*),<sup>1622</sup> a natural hierarchy of rank (*Rangordnung*)<sup>1623</sup> and “communion in joy

(*Mitfreude*).”<sup>1624</sup> The overman has been discussed in chapter seven and the notion of communion in joy relates to the discussion to come in chapter ten. However, scorn for everyday politics combined with rank derived from higher cultivation<sup>1625</sup> represents a guiding light for the coming analysis.

With these concepts in mind, we are prepared to proceed. We begin with an overview of the positions of Mann, Barrès, Jünger, and Péguy. Here, we see significant similarities with Nietzsche’s *grosse Politik*. These writers scorn the *kleine Politik* that they see predominating in their polities— which they believe to be corrupted and corrupting. They call upon a special cadre of thinkers— functioning as an aristocracy of sorts, leading by example rather than through political activism— to direct the gaze of the people upwards towards a *grosse Politik* that is defined in ways that differ in content, but cohere in spirit. We then argue that Heidegger posited something similar with regard to the banality of *die Politik*— and the need for thinkers to abjure this as much as possible— and similarly posited that there is a higher plane upon which we can engage with the political. However, it will be noted that differences emerge, even here, with respect to the manner in which the thinker is compelled to engage with everyday politics and in the nature of the higher plane. These differences, though, are less significant than the major distinction between an aristocratic cadre and Heidegger’s understanding of the thinker as a wanderer, dwelling at the crossing between the *polis*— understood as the dwelling place of an historical community— and the *Seinsfrage*.

§ “Only Spiritual Education Liberates”: Primordialist Nationalism and the Raising of the Gaze

Primordialist nationalism has been characterized by its focus on matters pertaining to *das Politische*— those “inner springs of communal identity and regeneration,”<sup>1626</sup> which in some circumstances are positioned, as by Anna Triandafyllidou, “beyond or in contrast to political institutions.”<sup>1627</sup> It need not be wholly indifferent to the traditional concerns of political life— Anthony Marx, for example, sees the legitimation of the political order as a central goal of primordialist nationalism.<sup>1628</sup> However, this is secured by attending to the shared emotional attachments which define a national community.<sup>1629</sup> Importantly, it

is often the constitution of the *people* which legitimates political institutions,<sup>1630</sup> and therefore, as Bernard Yack argues, the people are prior to political institutions and boundaries.<sup>1631</sup> The nation is, for primordialist nationalists, the incarnation of the people,<sup>1632</sup> legitimized by sustained subjective affirmation.<sup>1633</sup> As such, concern is not primarily with the legal, institutional, or practical<sup>1634</sup> circumscription of a bounded sphere, jurisdiction, or sovereign space. This means that the “realm of what Durkheim called the collective conscience” is of greater significance to the “direction of public life” than the goings on “in parliaments and presidiums.”<sup>1635</sup> The expectations of these scholars are largely met by Mann, Jünger, Barrès and Péguy—all of whom, to some degree, favour a species of demagogic-aristocratism where the *aristoi* lead the *demos* by raising their gaze from *die Politik* to *das Politische*.

A foundational characteristic of the approach to politics which is, in this case, common to Mann, Jünger, Barrès, and Péguy is the belief that ordinary politics has an innately corruptive nature and is, therefore, to be scorned. Mann, for example, saw “politicization” as an obsession of civilization’s literary man and is tied to the “continually growing public nature of modern life”<sup>1636</sup>—infected by “ineradicable and jealous republican hatred of every superiority.”<sup>1637</sup> A similar dynamic is visible in Jünger, who believed that ordinary politics crushes our capacity to experience “heroic feelings”<sup>1638</sup> and thus flattens society at the level of the most base and unimaginative among us.<sup>1639</sup> Barrès saw everyday politics as a triviality whose pettiness becomes clear when the community finds itself under threat. He argued that, during the Great War, all of the differences resulting from the religious, political, and cultural diversity of the French troops dissolved into “a unity of spirit and a sympathy unrivalled in beauty and inspiration”<sup>1640</sup>—illustrating the triviality of those differences that had roiled France in the preceding years. Péguy too criticized politicians and feared the banalization of politics into managerialism. In particular, he counted day-to-day politics among those things which turn our heads away from reasoned and reasonable disputations towards crude majoritarian thoughtlessness.<sup>1641</sup>

There is much more that could be said about the critiques these writers offered of the politics of their time, but much of it was, naturally, bound up in the specific situations in which they wrote. Mann and Péguy, in particular, offer fascinating and evolving critiques of the turbulent years their nations were experiencing. Mann's *Reflections* and Péguy's *Le République... Notre Royaume de France* are an invaluable testament to the tumult of late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe. However, for current purposes the significant takeaway is that they saw political activism as a suspect enterprise with a fundamentally corruptive influence on the intellect. It should be noted that the examples of all four of these writers stand as a warning that one should not consider scorn for *das Politische* as necessarily leading to a political quietism<sup>1642</sup>— for all threw themselves into the world of politics to varying degrees.<sup>1643</sup> On the contrary, a scorn for politics can as much inspire one towards a higher political engagement— *das Politische*.

The nature of this higher political engagement varies somewhat, though distinct themes emerge. Mann contrasted the world of everyday politics with the “Pedagogical Province of Goethe,” wherein a spiritual education raises one from the morass into the higher realm of culture.<sup>1644</sup> There is an aesthetic way of engaging with the world, for Mann— which he believes to be more natural for Germans— involving an orientation towards beauty and truth.<sup>1645</sup> In practical terms, this means turning away from the tumult of politics and elevating one's gaze to the world of high culture. For Barrès, the higher plane lies in the dissolution of the individual into a national collective<sup>1646</sup> Even in peace time, counterintuitively, our individuality is tied to our advancing and executing the “conventional things”<sup>1647</sup> we obtain from our culture. As with Mann, we are to turn to culture, though in Barrès case this need not necessarily be high culture. In short, a higher political engagement lies in throwing oneself into the national cultural life of our people and carrying out those praxes which, for Barrès, make up the national way of life.

Péguy was, not for the first time, an exception. Péguy feared the corruptive influence of politics,<sup>1648</sup> but argued it was hopeless to try to escape from its influence.<sup>1649</sup> This would, for Péguy, be embodied in the person of Jean Jaurés— whose star fell when the political world transformed him from a great moral

pedagogue to a common politician.<sup>1650</sup> Péguy spoke the language of romantic apoliticality— arguing that to be true to one’s own individual judgement, one must prioritize that “peace of the heart” which comes from giving each man his due and refusing to debase oneself before the collective.<sup>1651</sup> However, for Péguy, doctrines are the tribute intelligence pays to the necessity of action.<sup>1652</sup>

It is Jünger, though, who most diverges. Jünger, in *Storm of Steel*, warned against throwing oneself into the fashions of the time— which then meant being “blinded by an excessive national feeling.”<sup>1653</sup> However, by the time of *The Worker*, he asserted that the “tragic destiny” of the individual was to be abandoned to the world<sup>1654</sup> of a work project where individuality is sacrificed to the design. Jünger became increasingly fatalistic<sup>1655</sup>— moving from a belief that one can resist a collective rush into patriotic fervour to one where we are tragically destined to be subsumed into the broader currents of thought that define the coming worker state. For Jünger, it would be futile to retreat to a monastic life of the mind.<sup>1656</sup> Thus, Jünger tied freedom to participation in this new worker-state,<sup>1657</sup> tying individualism to political engagement<sup>1658</sup> and devotion to the collective.<sup>1659</sup> We cannot resist the increasingly mechanistic nature of modern life, nor do we retain conventional freedom of will.<sup>1660</sup> As such, the state must be embraced as the sole means through which freedom can be pursued.<sup>1661</sup> We must be done with the cosmetic political engagement of *die Politik* and focus instead on the more profound transformations that can only be inaugurated by those who engage at the level of *das Politische*.

In general, we see among the primordialist nationalists the belief that a higher plane, whether an alternate political realm or an inner province of the soul— represents the proper space for *das Politische*. Thus, the world of *kleine Politik* is to be scorned in favour of a purportedly deeper, cultural high politics. Notwithstanding the subtle differences noted, Mann, Péguy, Jünger and Barrès are in agreement that a certain type of thinker has both access to this higher plane and a capacity to turn the gaze of others upwards. Mann scorned those who think themselves too clever for patriotism but nevertheless celebrated his good burgher as a “romantic individualist”<sup>1662</sup> with a special capacity for being originally and metaphysically

free.”<sup>1663</sup> Among these good burghers one finds the aesthete, “a doer” and the champion of creativity and religiosity against scepticism and relativism.<sup>1664</sup> The aesthete seeks a “spiritual path,”<sup>1665</sup> reconciling individuality with the need to live with others. Mann’s aesthete elevates the gaze of the German *Volk* towards the burgherly way of being through their example— by living the life of the aesthete— raising the gaze from *die Politik* to *das Politische*. For Mann, in short, an aristocracy of manners seeks to shake the *demos* from their demotic torpor. Barrès too advocated for a fairly straightforward cultural aristocratism. He argued, in *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme*, that a minority<sup>1666</sup> must generate the sense of collective being that defines France without the participation of the masses, who passively reap the benefits<sup>1667</sup> of a national interest clarified by this enlightened caste.<sup>1668</sup> This caste must exercise a spiritual leadership, providing “clarification of opinion regarding the national interest” and leading France, spiritually, into the coming years.<sup>1669</sup> Due to the fatalism noted above, Jünger’s version<sup>1670</sup> of aristocratism at times resembled the counterintuitively aristo-Marxian concept of the vanguard. The coming worker-typus was to transform the standards of measure, the reference points, and the “identity of freedom and obedience” in order to remove and replace the old bonds of the liberal order.<sup>1670</sup> The powers who effectively fight for German freedom are those which recognize themselves as “the bearers of German responsibility.”<sup>1671</sup> Jünger nevertheless posited a key role for the poet, artist and man of faith— who will turn their talents towards a “sense of responsibility and eagerness to serve”<sup>1672</sup> the state as it takes on the task of dominating the new work-imperium. Jüngerian aristocratism combines Mann’s aristocracy of manners— the leaders of the *demos* embody the *Gestalt* of the worker— and the political demagogic-aristocracy of Barrès — as this leadership plays a political role in the organisation of the state and economy.

The inward nature of Péguy’s higher realm does not preclude some degree of engagement in political action<sup>1673</sup>— Péguy himself chose the life of an activist and pamphleteer. For Péguy, the first task must be to protect the philosophical tradition through the wilderness years,<sup>1674</sup> and safeguard the

“mystique” of France without falling prey to politics.<sup>1675</sup> Due to the centrality of his concept of the *mystique française*, the figure who can operate in the more elevated inner realm is the mystic. The mystic will be drawn into the political arena by great injustices like the Dreyfus Affair but will find that mysticism is never far removed from demagoguery<sup>1676</sup>— that enemies will co-opt<sup>1677</sup> and friends politicize<sup>1678</sup> it. If such people can be resisted, the mystic— and only the mystic<sup>1679</sup>— can bring the mystique of France into the realm of action while ensuring it is not consumed by politics.<sup>1680</sup> Thus, the mystic stands with one foot in each realm, engaging with politics, leading others but tempering the “authority of domination.” Thus, though the role of the mystic is passive in the short term, Péguy is no less clear than the other primordialist nationalists that a special cadre must work to elevate the gaze of the *demos* from the corruptive banality of *die Politik* towards the more refined arena of *das Politische*.

### § *An Aristocracy of Being?*

The positions outlined above are consistent and relatively straightforward. Firstly, ordinary politics is corruptive, trivial, banal, and subject to scorn. Secondly, there is a higher, more refined, and more meaningful modality of politics that exist, usually, in the realms of art and culture— which are more conversant with broader historical and philosophical concerns. Finally, a special cadre of thinkers are able to turn the gazes of others upwards towards that higher realm— improving the tenor of politics by way of an indirect but genuine aristocratism.<sup>1681</sup> Though our analysis thus far has tended to suggest that Heidegger called us away from politics,<sup>1682</sup> this is not necessarily so straightforward. Heidegger asserted, in the *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, that “historical reflection, [...], is possible, and indeed necessary, only where history is grasped creatively and co-formatively-in the creation of the poet, the architect, the thinker, the statesman.”<sup>1683</sup> The role of the poet has been prominent in the analysis thus far, and the architect will feature in the coming chapters. That the remainder of this quartet consists of the thinker and the statesman presents a challenge. How can so central a role be reserved for the statesman if politics is a source of distraction and mediocrity? In light of the discussion of primordialist nationalism above, we shall consider

the possibility that Heidegger, too, might be calling for an aristocratic form of leadership which, by way of good example, turns the attention of *das Volk* from the tawdry to the sublime.

### Heidegger and *die Politik*

It is tempting to view Heidegger's philosopher as one who would not sully himself with any form of politics.<sup>1684</sup> For Zimmerman, Heidegger argued that an integral part of being a thinker was recognizing the futility of politics.<sup>1685</sup> Taminiaux argued that Heidegger favoured an ancient conception of being-in the *polis*.<sup>1686</sup> According to Young, this has little connection to politics as conventionally understood.<sup>1687</sup> Han-Pile, furthermore, notes the need of the *Dasein* to seek a freedom of which it is "deprived"<sup>1688</sup>— the freedom to pursue its ownmost potentialities of being<sup>1689</sup> and to take responsibility for its own attunement.<sup>1690</sup> This can be interpreted as a call to reject the public life of the politician in favour of a private life of reflection. Taminiaux noted an association of human affairs with the covering over of the essential,<sup>1691</sup> informing what Safranski describes as a "contempt for the entire political sphere."<sup>1692</sup> Most famously of all, perhaps, Dreyfus heard a call of the wild— where clarity is found in the cultivation of "humble everyday practices"<sup>1693</sup> amidst real, as well as metaphorical, trees. According to this reading, the political drags the *Dasein* into averageness, distracting us from the call of Being. As such, the philosopher ought to seek a space wherein serious reflection can occur, absent the distractions of politics— be it in the form of *die Politick* or *das Politische*. It is worth dwelling here on the relationship between publicness, idle-talk and the entanglement of the *Dasein* in everyday political discourse.

Heidegger's discussion of public life in *Being and Time* sometimes mirrored the aristocratism described above. He denounced a public realm in which ambiguity is ironed out, everybody purports to know everything and all know precisely what must be done.<sup>1694</sup> The dominant discourse in this realm is idle-talk. Idle-talk forbids authentic discourse and cuts us off from "genuine relations of being toward the world"<sup>1695</sup> in favour of fashionable causes and the transient controversies of the day— the business (or busyness) of public life. This leads the *Dasein* "astray" from its ownmost projects and "genuine

possibilities of being.”<sup>1696</sup> Entering this public realm, the *Dasein* risks becoming entangled and alienated. Even worse, idle-talk might circumscribe curiosity, driving us to abandon certain trains of thought, or ignore certain works, to avoid falling foul of orthodoxy— which circumscribes what “one is to have read and seen” and “the ways in which one may be curious.”<sup>1697</sup> The call of Being is distorted, finally, into a conversation between the they-self and itself, where we cease to heed the call of Being and are instead drawn into endless, fatuous conversations about our identities— usually superficially defined.<sup>1698</sup> Where Arendt feared a growing indifference political matters,<sup>1699</sup> Heidegger feared an excess of interest where one falls into a “versatile curiosity”— pouring over every scandal, opinion poll, and morsel of breaking news, leaving undetermined and unasked the essential questions. This busy-yet-idle *Politikization* of everything provides the comforting feeling that we are finding our place, when in fact we are flying from Being.<sup>1700</sup> Drowning in this over-abundance, thoughtlessness reigns through easy access to information and— Heidegger notes in *Discourse on Thinking*— constant, saccharine commemorations of historical events.<sup>1701</sup> Thus, with our anxieties salved by the belief that our frenetic consumption of every nugget of political trivia is sufficient, the *Dasein* comes to be diverted from the questioning of Being.

Heidegger’s concern that a perverse kind of public discourse— which he links directly to political polemics in “What is Called Thinking?”<sup>1702</sup>— could blind us to the important things was a constant. One finds, for example in *Contributions*, the fear that we will lose any connection to our real history, and with it the history of Being, because of politically motivated revisionism<sup>1703</sup>— a claim that one often hears today in denunciations of “woke” history. In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger would outline the threat that publicness poses to philosophy— in brief that philosophy may be dismissed as an indulgence that doesn’t *do* anything.<sup>1704</sup> In the broadest sense, as Heidegger explains in his Nietzsche lectures, the danger of idle-talk stems from the fact that it makes difficult things appear so easy as to be intuitive to the general public. Thus, the most complex matters are bastardized into trite heuristics.<sup>1705</sup> In light of this, there is ample reason to believe Heidegger might wish the philosopher to get away from all

of this— to recognize, as Skocz puts it, that “the state cannot be the solution to the problems of technology”<sup>1706</sup> and so retreat, like Dreyfus, into the relative peace and quiet of rural California or the Black Forest. However, even those who present the most depoliticized portrayal of Heidegger’s thought recognize that the *Dasein* cannot entirely separate itself from the public space.

Others— Dreyfus & Spinoza noted— shape the way in which the *Dasein* speaks, acts, and thinks by “subtle coercion or co-optation.”<sup>1707</sup> This naturally emerges from the distinct contexts in which we do things (resulting from standing-alongside-others [*Abständigkeit*]<sup>1708</sup>). Some, like Michael Gillespie, posit that Heidegger sought a “new aesthetic religion” intended to “reconstitute” German “communal life.”<sup>1709</sup> Furthermore, Nancy argued that the essence of *Dasein* itself regards action,<sup>1710</sup> that the way that we *are* in the *there* is not simply a matter of occupying space but involves our doing things and thus constitutes an ethos.<sup>1711</sup> In simpler terms, when the act of being is understood other than by subjective valuation, we are confronted with something undeniably ethical in nature.<sup>1712</sup> This is necessarily oriented towards engaging with others, even coercive or persuasive engagement which ties Heidegger’s thought to the political realm and makes of it (if in an eccentric way) a philosophy of political action.

Even in works, such as *Time and Being*, where Heidegger explicitly stated his fears that philosophy was being reduced to a “worldly wisdom”— oriented towards solving the problems of the everyday— he also expressed fears that it can become so abstract as to be worthless.<sup>1713</sup> It is an error to think that the *Dasein*<sup>1714</sup> can be removed from that which surrounds it— and we are undeniably shaped by the politics of our community. We cannot, as Harries notes, grasp what we are supposed to be doing in life if we do not have an awareness of where we are and amongst whom we are dwelling.<sup>1715</sup> Even the greatest thinkers, Heidegger notes in his Nietzsche lectures, are influenced by their contemporaries and shared traditions— they do not inhabit a “supraworldly” place.<sup>1716</sup> The thinker will not attempt to escape this and will even, initially, allow their thinking to be determined by “what is to be thought.” The impetus will come, in part, from others and from the shared context.<sup>1717</sup> It is important to note that this “shared context” does not

consist exclusively of those matters we have associated with *das Politische*. The laws by which we abide, newspapers we read and politicians who govern us are integral to this, and *die Politik* as well as *das Politische* plays a significant role in shaping the *Da*. One cannot think about *Dasein* without thinking about actual human beings who, for the most part, live in a political context. For Heidegger, the political is an inevitable aspect of authentic *Dasein*. As much as he scorned the world of the politician, we cannot construct a philosophical Versailles and isolate ourselves from the rest of the polity— for however much the thinker may wish to ignore the world of politics, politics will not ignore the philosopher in return.

Heidegger's thinker is no doubt something of a heretic with respect to the gods that the city honours— for it is doubt which inspires us to think Being.<sup>1718</sup> For Heidegger, thinkers are those whose experience is defined by participating in the community while maintaining, always, a sense of uncertainty about things— unlike the “able-bodied know-it-alls”<sup>1719</sup> who are always certain that they know everything. Indeed, even where Heidegger called upon his students to throw themselves into the political fervour of the time— during the period of Nazi rule in *The German Student as Worker*— he reminded his students to continue to question, to expose themselves to the “sublimity of things” and never to close themselves off from “the terror of what is untamed.”<sup>1720</sup> Elsewhere in his oeuvre, though, Heidegger described political engagement in terms that suggest there may be more going on than the image of the philosopher-as-Cincinnatus we have just painted. There is, for Heidegger, a deeply rooted compulsion toward the political. As Dungey notes, our sharing of a world which provides context for the enterprises we undertake with others— whom we cannot hope to dominate but must reckon with— is not merely incidental.<sup>1721</sup> In fact, this shared thrownness and the concomitant need to compromise with others is essential to the experience of *Dasein*.<sup>1722</sup> As such, to escape from the political, by retreating into an “apolitical” private existence would represent a flight from Being. It is here that we begin to see Heidegger's position and that of the primordialist nationalists diverging. Both are scornful of the petty machinations of politicians, and both recognize that one is nevertheless obliged to attend to the political— however reluctantly. However, there

is clearly a positive potential inherent to politics for Heidegger. Not for the first time, this leads us to Heidegger's concept of the "saving power."

Every horizon, for Heidegger, carries within itself the promise of something beyond.<sup>1723</sup> Even in the midst of a long passage describing all of the ways in which embeddedness in public life inhibits philosophy— in the "Letter on Humanism"— Heidegger maintained that we need to experience public existence if we are to realize that we *need* something more meaningful. In engaging in our everyday business— we ask questions and grow curious. As with technology and metaphysics, it is precisely in this everyday mode of being that the saving power lies. He argued that one can only find "a home for dwelling in the truth of Being" if one can recognize "the seductions of the private realm."<sup>1724</sup> In other words, we will never experience the overwhelming need to explore beyond the ordinary if we are not first driven by everyday experience to conclude that there simply must be more to life than this. The everyday reveals to us, in short, that we lack something which we desire.<sup>1725</sup> Heidegger had made a similar argument in *Being and Time*, where he wrote that *Dasein* finds itself "initially thrown into the publicness of the they" and a "specific disclosedness" emerges from this.<sup>1726</sup> Practically speaking, one receives from one's community an already formed designation of who or what one is— for example, a social class or perhaps a regional identity. For Heidegger, "authentic Being a self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject"<sup>1727</sup>— we need not remove ourselves *entirely* from everyday being-with to gain the capacity to be authentically. Rather, we retain this capacity in our everyday being and need only modify the way we relate to others. Heidegger re-iterated this point in *The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, arguing that we cannot begin thinking in an abyss but must instead begin with something grounded— and one can think of the conventional political world as part of our quotidian grounding. Only then can we recognize that the given "cannot claim to be a founding" of Being— as it provides a false concreteness and thus blinds us to the fact that we are staring into the abyss of *Seinsvergessenheit*.<sup>1728</sup> Without this initial encounter, we would not be gripped by the willing which inspires us to the venture. Alternatively, in the language of *The*

*Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, this initial public falling-prey inspires in us the desire to “twist free from our ordinary conceptions of beings.”<sup>1729</sup> Across his oeuvre, then, Heidegger posits that we must begin and remain within the everyday *but* cannot be absorbed by it. We can, in short, be neither quietist nor activist, but must concern ourselves with the political without falling prey to it.

### Raising the Gaze

Perhaps the foremost danger to which we might fall pray is the temptation that we become philosophers of *die Politik*— simply adding a philosophical veneer to a political discourse that remains within the vista of the everyday. A thinker who is content to remain within familiar paradigms, Heidegger explained in *Basic Questions*, tends to the tackle familiar old “problems” and offers only modifications of familiar answers.<sup>1730</sup> This takes as given “ideas,” which “become the only standard” to which all questions must be assimilated.<sup>1731</sup> The philosopher must avoid the conventional and engage only in the elevated manner appropriate to the rarified realm from which they descent unto us. Heidegger’s philosophers, therefore, might appear to function as an aristocracy of Being, with the luxury of focusing on, in Anderson’s terms, “meditative thinking [...] a difficult and cryptic exercise”<sup>1732</sup> free from the burden of having to worry about securing one’s survival or rights.

In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger strikes an aristocratic tone in arguing that one cannot will oneself into being a thinker: one either is or is not.<sup>1733</sup> Furthermore, Heidegger certainly could sound like a snob— as in his haughty dismissal of Americans in *Basic Concepts*.<sup>1734</sup> However, Heidegger clarifies— in *What is Called Thinking?*— that it is an error to think in terms of the refined and the crude, for the common is as much a part of being as the rarified.<sup>1735</sup> Rather, what separates “conventional man”<sup>1736</sup> from the philosopher is the latter’s interest in “riddlesome” and “towering” questions. Much as the Russian aristocracy once literally spoke a different language, French, than did the people of Russia, Heidegger’s philosopher philosophizes in a language that the uninitiated will likely misconstrue. Importantly for our purposes, he gives the example in *Hölderlin’s Hymns* of the tendency of people to interpret the “fatherland”

evoked by Hölderlin in the language of ordinary patriotism<sup>1737</sup> and, in *Contributions*, of the limited accessibility of genuine historical knowledge.<sup>1738</sup>

In stark contrast with the populist flavour of much contemporary nationalism, Heidegger, for all his criticism of intellectuals, was far from proposing common sense as a superior mode of thought. Heidegger respected common sense—hence his admiration for the peasantry—but, in his Nietzsche lectures, argued that “there are realms that it does not penetrate.”<sup>1739</sup> Though, as Schürmann noted, Heidegger never severed the link between the thinker and the *polis*,<sup>1740</sup> Heidegger’s philosopher retains a degree of separation from non-philosophers. Heidegger was adamant that this is not a normative distinction but described, in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the knowledge of “one who has experienced the sweeping storm on the way of Being” as “superior knowing.”<sup>1741</sup> Though Schürmann was correct to note that even the loftiest thinker has some involvement in the *polis*, this involvement can very generously be described as subtle. We ought to pause, then, before concluding that Heidegger wished to see an aristocratic class of thinkers actively involved in tearing the masses from the everyday, turning their gaze towards the fundamental question of Being and modelling ways in which a “superior knowing” can be attained.

Firstly, Heidegger made it clear that he was sceptical of the extent to which philosophy can fulfil a public-pedagogical role. Indeed, Heidegger criticizes public pedagogy in *What is Called Thinking?* in part because of the artificial hierarchy it creates between those who teach and those who learn, especially when the pedagogue is tied to officialdom.<sup>1742</sup> Attunement, for Heidegger, is not something that one can will oneself towards, and certainly cannot be willed unto others. To teach is, in Gray’s terms, to let learn, not to lead.<sup>1743</sup> To believe that “philosophy professors should conduct the conduct the affairs of the state” would be, Heidegger claimed in his Nietzsche lectures, to miss the point.<sup>1744</sup> Though, as Strong noted, Heidegger argued that the philosopher must be a “liberator from the dark,”<sup>1745</sup> for the teacher to forcibly turn the chained prisoner towards the light would represent the destruction of the possibility of attunement.<sup>1746</sup> Nevertheless, curiosity needs to be pointed in the right direction, towards Being. Heidegger

would later try to substantiate an alternative pedagogical approach in his epistemology of “enowing.” Enowing resembles ennoblement in that it is not to be sought out. As with nobility, it is inauthentic when one aggressively pursues Enowing— it’s purity can be sacrificed in the name of its possession. In order to truly know Being, we must have the call of Being bestowed unto us by Being. The first, fleeting murmurs of that call awaken the mood of distress and curiosity in us, so long as we are sensitive to it. As Andrew notes, Heidegger leaves unclear exactly how one might be led into a new way of thinking<sup>1747</sup> and though he clearly did not see such leadership in the “blaring of microphones or loudspeakers” he left rather vague how else “the man on the street is led to recognize his own voice.”<sup>1748</sup>

What is clear, is that to crown a thinker as king— or indeed a group of thinkers or thinkers in general as *aristoi*— would inhibit the “liberation of the *Dasein* in man.”<sup>1749</sup> Liberation cannot be granted by a teacher, but depends on each person freely taking up the burden of essential freedom of their own accord.<sup>1750</sup> We must engage, then, with the fact that the philosopher cannot reach into the “lower” realm of *die Politik* and pull the gaze of the people up towards *das Politische*— neither can the realms be separated, nor can one be “present” only in one or the other. As such, the romantic image of the thinker inhabiting an elevated realm, participating in an elevated political modality (*das Politische*), and inspiring the national community is insufficient. Heidegger’s thinker builds, dwells, and thinks in both realms.

We have seen evidence that aspects of Nietzsche’s *grosse Politik* are shared in common by Heidegger and the primordialist nationalists. In both cases, there is a scorn for *kleine Politik* and a belief that this is something that— though it can never be escaped entirely— must be kept at a safe distance by the thinker. Furthermore, there is a shared sense that there is a higher plane upon which the political can be conducted. Though there is variance in the nature of that plane— aesthetics, “the national,” high culture, and the *Seinsfrage*— the variance that one finds between the primordialist nationalists is no less that that between they and Heidegger. Certain differences, though, have emerged. The hierarchy posited by the primordialist nationalists between the lower and higher form of political engagement leads to a fairly

straightforward call to indulge *die Politik* only to the point that is necessary to secure the survival of a space amenable to the higher form of politics. For Heidegger, in contrast, we must go *through* the experience of *die Politik* if we are ever to be awakened to the possibility of this higher form. Secondly, Heidegger appears to reject the idea that a priestly class of thinkers can reach down into the world of the everyday and direct the gaze of the masses upwards. This latter difference in particular will become clearer as we now turn towards a positive exploration of precisely how Heidegger's thinker is to engage in the political. Here, the relatively modest differences we have observed thus far will widen considerably.

### § Sojourns in and out of Being

#### The Philosopher King of the In-Between

Heidegger indicated what role the philosopher *could* play in the *polis* in his "Letter on Humanism." To grasp Heidegger's position, one must begin by understanding that there is no hard border between thought and action. Thinking is an act.<sup>1751</sup> Furthermore, Heidegger distinguished between utility and accomplishment, the latter meaning "to unfold something into the fulness of its essence, to lead it forth into this fulness."<sup>1752</sup> Heidegger continued, explaining that "only what already is can be accomplished" and "what "is," above all, is Being."<sup>1753</sup> Put simply, where utility aims to realize an immediate goal, accomplishment is always oriented towards accomplishing the revelation of what is. The thinker acts most meaningfully, then, when "claimed by Being." That is to say, when their acting in the world is dominated by an almost obsessive preoccupation with the *Seinsfrage*— when they act "by and for the truth of Being,"<sup>1754</sup> fulfilling their properly appointed role in the world. The philosopher must "preserve" being "in its essence,"<sup>1755</sup> rather than for the sake of some other goal. In simpler terms, the philosopher has a job, to think Being, and is absolutely acting in and contributing to the *polis* when engaged in this peculiar task. Heidegger is conscious that few will recognize the value of philosophy, and thinkers will always be pushed to justify themselves "before the sciences."<sup>1756</sup> Nevertheless, the thinker must resist this, for such justifications represent the "abandonment of the essence of thinking."<sup>1757</sup> Indeed, the thinker— teaching

their students, thinking along with their books, pondering Being— is a truer “activist” than their colleagues tearing up the cobble-stones.

We might ask what all of this means in a practical sense. What immediately becomes clear is that there is a defensive, almost clandestine aspect to what follows this rather abstruse beginning. Heidegger speaks of the “rapidly spreading devastation of language,” a “threat to the essence of humanity”<sup>1758</sup> which will, if left unchecked, render us homeless by denying us the essence of our language.<sup>1759</sup> In response, the philosopher is to be attentive, in their thinking of Being, to the elementary language that we use to articulate the simplest concepts. Thinkers must try to extract the “right word”— simple, essential, “long-traditional” language<sup>1760</sup>— from the chatter of modernity. This does not take the philosopher away from the business of the city. Nevertheless, it suggests an anti-political politics— one where politics serves philosophy largely by demonstrating its own inadequacy. This is likely why the sections of “Letter on Humanism” where Heidegger criticized the humanism of Marx and Sartre,<sup>1761</sup> the *Seinsvergessenheit* of the language of metaphysics,<sup>1762</sup> and the “isms” that emerge therefrom can so easily be interpreted as a rejection of political action *tout court*. However, if the philosopher’s sojourn in Syracuse remains driven by the impetus of the *Seinsfrage*, if the pursuit of the truth of Being remains the sole and final goal— if, in short, the philosopher “thoughtfully attends to that dimension of the truth of Being”<sup>1763</sup>— then the realm of politics carries the saving power. It is only through this saving power, and turning to the questioning of Being, that the thinker can think those things that are most pressing to the *polis*. In fact, *the* fundamental question of the *polis*: “which are those gods that the city honours?” can only properly be thought, for Heidegger, by way of the *Seinsfrage*. As Heidegger put it: “Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word “God” is to signify.”<sup>1764</sup>

This relationship, though, is not entirely one-way. Heidegger made clear that he saw an ethical dimension to the questioning of Being, especially insofar as this constitutes resistance against technology.

In the “Letter on Humanism,” he wrote:

*“The greatest care must be fostered upon the ethical bond at a time when technological man, delivered over to mass society, can be kept [...] in a way that corresponds to technology. Who can disregard our predicament? Should we not safeguard and secure the existing bonds even if they hold human beings together ever so tenuously and merely for the present? Certainly. But does this need ever release thought from the task of thinking what still remains principally to be thought and, as Being, prior to all beings, is their guarantor and their truth? Even further, can thinking refuse to think Being”*<sup>1765</sup>

There are two concrete conclusions that can be derived from this. Firstly, that the thinking of Being is a matter of public ethics— concerning, as it does, our collective relationship with technology and then with Being. Heidegger made this clear in saying that “ethos means abode”<sup>1766</sup> and, therefore, to speak and think in terms of language (the house of Being) is by definition to be engaged in ethics. Secondly, there is a clear call to a conservative politics of “safeguarding” and “securing” where the traditional bonds, however imperfect, must be maintained as bulwarks against technology. At the same time, the task of thinking demands that the thinker turn away from the everyday, such that the thinker safeguards what is only such that it may inspire the pursuit of the *Seinsfrage*.

What is fascinating about this aspect of Heidegger’s thought is how much it simultaneously attracts and repels. Salem Wiseman portrays Heidegger as calling us to eschew *kleine Politik* in favour of a *grosse Politik* that speaks to the things that *really* matter— things such as whether Hölderlin’s poetry or Wagner’s music better articulate the German historical *Dasein*. On the one hand, this call responds to legitimate anxieties about the corruption of philosophy by politics. That one can think profoundly about politics, but do so at a level of remove that, as Heidegger convincingly argues, actually allows one to focus on what really matters— rather than transitory political controversies— suggests at the possibility of a sophisticated, thoughtful and philosophically substantial participation in the life of the *polis*. This higher politics is understood as “not merely the opposition of domination and submission, of rulers and rules, but

also the dimension of human aspiration, hopes, and dreams”<sup>1767</sup>— and the questioning of Being equally so with respect to “rules of human conduct.”<sup>1768</sup> There is much here to recommend Heidegger’s thought as a salve against a totalising, all-encompassing capture of thought by political activism and instrumentalism.

This virtue, though, becomes vice when taken to excess. Heidegger’s call does not provide us with the template for a thinker who will be of much use to the poor and the hungry, nor— especially when one thinks of Heidegger himself— one who will be much use to the struggle against the totalitarian impulse. Worse, Heidegger’s thinker would likely remain aloof from such things, seeing such vital matters as who can vote and how the law is upheld as trivialities unworthy of a serious thinker. Bourdieu noted that Heidegger’s political thought cannot be reduced to an argument for a priestly class of philosopher kings,<sup>1769</sup> and he contrasts this specifically with Jünger’s aristocratism.<sup>1770</sup> However, Bourdieu nevertheless charged Heidegger with encouraging a political indifference to those who suffer<sup>1771</sup> which resonates in a particularly sinister way in light of much of this work being contemporaneous with Nazism.

For Bourdieu, Heidegger’s writing style alone is political, an attempt to make serious thinking inaccessible to the vast majority<sup>1772</sup> and thus to obscure<sup>1773</sup> and complicate thinking in order to defend the status quo.<sup>1774</sup> Heidegger frequently employed language that associated the rarefied, the grand and the elite with authenticity while evoking concepts of averageness and levelling to describe inauthenticity— which Bourdieu noted hints at elitism as central to Heidegger’s philosophy of Being.<sup>1775</sup> This led Bourdieu to see in Heidegger’s anti-politics a tacit defence of the interests of the powerful.<sup>1776</sup> Bourdieu, helpfully, provided a concrete example of this— pointing to the way in which care, as a concept, is removed from the realm of ordinary speech in which it might speak to such things as social welfare.<sup>1777</sup> It has been moved to an elevated realm of metaphysical interpretation where such a practical conception of care could only be scorned as mediocre and unphilosophical.<sup>1778</sup> As Adorno notes, this constantly postpones any practical confrontation until after we have concluded our exploration of Being,<sup>1779</sup> thus perhaps effectively for ever.

Heidegger's politics is certainly oriented, ultimately, towards a rarified plane— that of the *Seinsfrage*— that is no less far removed from the subject matter of the average election than the realms sought by Mann's aesthete or Péguy's mystic.<sup>1780</sup> Tertulian noted that even the Spanish Civil War— so politically definitive for so many of his generation— was, for Heidegger, merely a battle between two forms of forgetfulness of Being.<sup>1781</sup> Furthermore, as Blakely notes, it might appear a matter of indifference to Being whether one is fascist, communist, or liberal.<sup>1782</sup> In the context of the times in which Heidegger lived, this is damning. However, there are subtleties in Heidegger thinking here that— though they do not invalidate Bourdieu's perspicacious critique— should give us pause before thinking of Heidegger's thinker as a detached aristocratic figure.

### The Metaphysical Magellan

This chapter instead settles upon the characterization of Heidegger's thinker as a peripatetic figure, wandering between the realm of the *polis* and the more numinous realm wherefrom the essential matters of *das Politische* can be retrieved and brought to bear. Here again, the inability of our primordialist nationalists— as a result of fundamental commitments derived from their nationalism— to properly escape from the instrumentalism the age of metaphysics renders their conception of the relationship between the philosopher and the *polis* fundamentally irreconcilable with the position outlined by Heidegger. Heidegger's poets “comprehend solitude as a metaphysical necessity”<sup>1783</sup> and must not fall prey to “the they”— but poetry does not, Heidegger reminded us in “Poetically Man Dwells,” “fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it.”<sup>1784</sup> The sense of Heidegger's thought as calling us to wander back and forth between distinct regions is a common conclusion in the literature. For, Churchill, Heidegger's thinker operates between a temporal orientation towards a new dawn and the backwards looking orientation towards a to a primordial past<sup>1785</sup> and Karston Harries sees Heidegger's thinker dwelling in two distinct, even incompatible, places simultaneously.<sup>1786</sup>

The political realm, in this conception, is not the world of gossip and controversy but of a *polis* tied directly to the historical *Dasein* of a people. In *Nature, History, State*— a Nazi era text where Heidegger provided his most direct and overt treatment of the state— Heidegger tied such a conception of the *polis* directly to the matter of Being as an expression of the community in which “the possibility and the necessity of giving form to and fulfilling one’s own Being” exists.<sup>1787</sup> It requires no creativity to interpret this in political terms— Heidegger overtly did so with his identification of the state as one of the interlocking domains of *Dasein*.<sup>1788</sup> The constitution of the state, as an embodiment of this collective context, is an “essential expression of what the people takes to be the meaning of its own Being.”<sup>1789</sup> The constitution, Heidegger continues, is also the site in which the decision of an historical *Dasein* is made and the “task we are trying to live out” occurs.<sup>1790</sup> Again, we should pause to note that Heidegger was not, here, employing the language of “initial and for the most part” nor, indeed, of “inauthentic,” or “everyday.” The state, and therefore the political, is not merely an unfortunate reality of ordinary life that ceases to be a domain of Being once we begin to think properly. Rather, the state, alongside nature and history, is integral to *Dasein* itself. Indeed, Heidegger would go as far as to state that the state is no less than the “pre-eminent Being of the people.”<sup>1791</sup> Ewgen argues that it becomes, for Heidegger, a marker of “true politics” that it is oriented towards the “gift of Being.”<sup>1792</sup> Heidegger himself— Pattison and Kirkpatrick note— looked to such things as medieval mysticism, which was not always apolitical, to “locate the point at which the rational finds its grounds”<sup>1793</sup> and Dreyfus and Rubin noted that Heidegger seemed to propose a politics oriented towards the “preservation of cultural practices,” even “salvation of the culture as a whole” against technology and nihilism.<sup>1794</sup> For Dallmayr, Heidegger’s rejection of everyday politics was a call to escape from formalistic conceptions of the good and rediscover our capacity to speak to the “good life.”<sup>1795</sup> As such, the finding of the appropriate attunement to Being— far from calling for “meek conformism”<sup>1796</sup>— is *absolutely* connected, as Dallmayr concluded, to a higher politics.

We are called to join our compatriots in community *and* to create in our work that which is truly our ownmost. Heidegger's thinker, in such a reading, dwells in the abode between two worlds as a kind of insider-outsider who participates in and enjoys the "dance" of political "jabbering" but, like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, "known that it is an illusion, that this garden is not the world."<sup>1797</sup> However, Heidegger argued in his Hölderlin lectures that "thinking precisely does not move within an intermediate realm *to the exclusion of the remaining realms* [my emphasis]."<sup>1798</sup> In the absence of this, one might accuse Heidegger's thinker of being a Utopian in the literal sense, a denizen of nowhere, dwelling in an as yet undetermined realm which, until it shines forth to us with the coming of a new god, is a realm of nothing. However, the appearance of the philosopher standing between two realms, or in both at once, is only an illusion occasioned by the dynamic nature of wandering— as a metronome set to the highest tempo may appear to the naked eye to be at every point in its arc simultaneously. We find ourselves, therefore, in accordance with Dallmayr. For Dallmayr, Heidegger shifted the accent of the *Dasein's* participation away from the "instrumental pursuit of objectives"<sup>1799</sup> implicit in the "organized purposiveness"<sup>1800</sup> of "any affirmative kind of popular sovereignty"<sup>1801</sup> and *die Politik* but did not, in doing so, sever the link. Heidegger's thinker would concern himself with conceptions of the national interest or mission and up to a point with political and factional struggle.<sup>1802</sup> Yet such engagements are always at a degree of remove from the political fray. Thinkers know that they do not fully belong to this world, and they must attend to their duties in the other. Dallmayr further noted Heidegger's tendency to focus on individual choice and the pursuit of authentic *Dasein* within this world and points out that politics plays an important formational role in this.<sup>1803</sup> This is reflective of a general trend, in Heidegger, of keeping one foot in the political realm and the other in the "Open" region of the unconcealed wherein one is always focused upon the questioning of Being. Such a notion of Heidegger's thinker (and Heidegger himself) as one who inhabits both the realm of the *polis* and of the gods— with a foot on each side of the border between them— led Zuckert to draw the evident parallel and count Heidegger among her "postmodern Platos."<sup>1804</sup> Heidegger's thinker leaps

back and forth, bringing together the “earth of his homeland” and the “historical *Dasein*,”<sup>1805</sup>— appearing to presence simultaneously in both of them by meditation and reflection.

In *Contributions*, Heidegger would describe this as the thinker existing in “the crossing.”<sup>1806</sup> Figuratively speaking, Heidegger’s philosophers are those who move in the “Open” but always also amongst the “they” of their community. They must “hold out,” as Heidegger puts in in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*, in the “middle of Beyng”<sup>1807</sup> and are unable to permanently remain or to leave, constantly thrown towards the farthest possibilities of Being but always still subject to the actualities of the beings with whom they abide. As a practical matter, this remains frustratingly elusive. We can be certain that bickering about the latest twitter controversy is inadmissible, but it is not entirely clear whether discussions of important constitutional matters would be, for Heidegger, a distraction for the serious thinker. The state, as Detsch puts it, seems to need to be founded on the historical mission<sup>1808</sup> (and the philosopher and poet are the best attuned to knowing this mission) but we search in vain for substantial discussion of the means by which this is to be done. It is clear that only the philosopher has the capacity to enter into a genuine and meaningful exploration of the misty realms of Being that lie beyond the horizons of everyday politics, and it is equally clear that the philosopher must leave to the statesman the task of writing the nation’s constitution. Yet, the task of bringing together the historical necessities that arise from the thrown destiny of one’s historical *Dasein* and the actual possibilities that by necessity must require a political constitution conducive to philosophy appear to be assigned, respectively, to the philosopher and the statesman. Heidegger’s scepticism of the possibilities of pedagogy would seem to preclude the philosopher re-enacting Plato’s sojourn in Syracuse and seeking to lead the leader, so to speak, and thus it remains unclear precisely how the thinker, as they wander between the realms, should act in a political sense. What we can be sure of, though, is that the thinker’s role in the political space is more akin to that of an explorer, one who charts regions unknown but does so in the name of a homeland to which they must always return, rather than that of a mannered and exemplary aristocrat, a politically engaged demagogue, or a hermit in

the Black Forest. Like an explorer, Heidegger's thinker cannot be indifferent to the court politics of the land they leave behind, even if only to ensure the support or at least toleration necessary to continue their wanderings. Also like an explorer, Heidegger's thinker does not merely wander for pleasure but does so with some sense of wanting to bring back from these travels new, exciting possibilities for the benefit of their homeland. Finally, the philosopher, like an explorer, will hear the call of both the mysterious and the familiar, looking wistfully to the oceans when at port and thinking of home when away.

We have seen, then, that Heidegger's understanding of an authentic relation to the political space shares certain things in common with those of the primordialist nationalists. In both cases, throwing oneself into political activism is a profoundly inauthentic choice— prostrating us before the misguided and shallow priorities of politicians and the masses they seek to exploit. Furthermore, it is clear that in both cases there is a call to a higher plane of political engagement, rooted in the polis as a metaphorical space where the more long-term, profound, and philosophically elevated concerns of an historical community reside. Subtle differences exist even here. Heidegger calls upon the thinker to journey through the realm of everyday politics— for it is here that the saving power lies— and he is sceptical of the capacity of great thinkers to educate the masses. This leads to the accusation that Heidegger is indifferent to the experiences of the ordinary citizen and is therefore a *de facto* supporter of the status quo, however unjust that status quo might be. This differs greatly from advocacy for a special caste of thinkers to guide the people towards a better *grosse Politik*. However, the primary point of difference lay in the nature of the higher caste of thinker— the nationalist intellectual bearing little resemblance to the explorer of Being described by Heidegger. We have seen a salutary call for the philosopher to raise his gaze above the sordid ephemera of partisan politics, but also the danger of indifference to practical political questions. However, the matter of whether, in this instance, primordialist nationalism inhibits or illuminates the path beyond metaphysics is not clarified by this comparison. For that, we must leave the political realm for the cultural.

### The House of Being

The previous chapter left undetermined the precise nature of the community in which the thinker plays their role. This is because the political was, for Heidegger, secondary to a metaphorically spatial relationship which is ontologically prior to the *polis*. It is helpful to dig further into the nature of the “they” amongst whom the thinker dwells, so we turn to the cultural and linguistic context in which this “they” dwells. This chapter begins with a discussion of cosmopolitanism in both Heidegger’s thought and the works of Mann, Jünger, Barrès, and Péguy. We then discuss the role of language as a foundation of the common experience of Being in Heidegger and its relationship with linguistic nationalism. Finally, we turn to matters of tradition and custom, showing that Heidegger’s understanding of the place of tradition and culture— as starting points for an exploration of Being— contrasts fundamentally with the reverence for tradition and custom that one finds in the works of Mann, Jünger, Barrès, and Péguy.

#### *§ Rootedness and Cosmopolitanism*

Heidegger argued, in “The Thing” that modern technology had resulted in the “abolition of great distances.”<sup>1809</sup> Technology can render the farthest things closest— as when the savannah is beamed into our living rooms through the television— and create a “uniform distancelessness.”<sup>1810</sup> This is particularly well illustrated where we see aviation technologies reducing large portions of the earth to what some dismissively call “flyover country”— an undifferentiated space with no significance other than the time it takes to fly over it. Young argues that the “loss of place in the age of modern technology”— a place “in the sense of dwelling place; *Heimat* or “homeland””— is central to the “condition that Heidegger responds to.”<sup>1811</sup> Dallmayr noted that the erosion of “*Dasein*’s spatial-temporal location in being and world— that is, human rootedness or autochthony (*Bodenständigkeit*)”— is, for Heidegger, among the worst consequences of the dominion of technology.<sup>1812</sup> Additionally, as Newell notes, the cosmopolitan response to this— where we “rummage around in “exotic and alien cultures” to find a “solution to human alienation”— leads to our “floating” further away from Being.”<sup>1813</sup> Heidegger contrasted a localized

experience of being-in-the-world from cosmopolitanism— showing a strong dislike of the latter. Andrew argues that the repudiation of “rootlessness” in favour of “the national soil of tradition” is central to Heidegger’s spatiality.<sup>1814</sup> Thus, cosmopolitanism can be tied directly to Heidegger’s concerns about rootlessness and despatialization. Heidegger’s concerns resemble an anti-cosmopolitan discourse that is often associated with nationalism.<sup>1815</sup> It also resonates with contemporary arguments that portray cosmopolitanism as the globalization of “Americanism”— or indeed the reduction of Canada to an extended suburban Toronto. Here too, space is a mere distance that we traverse on the way to the next metropolis.

Here one finds one of the strongest, and least flattering, links between Heidegger’s thought and primordialist nationalism. Connor and Shils spoke to the importance placed, in nationalism, on the connection between a population and a particular territory<sup>1816</sup>— one which trumps, Calhoun and Fox note, personal coreferences.<sup>1817</sup> This is contrasted with a cosmopolitanism that understands spatial belonging as the passive occupation of space. The primordialist aspect of primordialist nationalism ties this belonging to deeply rooted, existentially formative aspects of being in a particular territory, as Heidegger— according to Dreyfus and Spinoza— tied the *Da* of *Dasein* to rootedness in place and time.<sup>1818</sup> Such impulses led Mann to condemn a “political aesthetic”<sup>1819</sup> that he believed “hostile” to the “German way of life,”<sup>1820</sup> Jünger to fret that “social atomization” was among the “self evidences of every liberal worldview”<sup>1821</sup> and Barrès to lament that modernity would transform every “young Breton of Parisian” into an “abstract man, ideal, identical everywhere.”<sup>1822</sup> In all of these cases, we see a rejection of cosmopolitanism and an embrace of a particularism that is deemed to be more deeply rooted, formative and authentic. We discussed, in chapter seven, how anti-cosmopolitanism fuelled antisemitism in Heidegger’s time. To this should be added a recognition that anti-cosmopolitanism continues to fuel antisemitism, and other forms racism, today. Even here, though, we see a difference between Heidegger and, in particular, Barrès and Mann. As Dallmayr cautioned us, Heidegger tied our capacity to find our home to a capacity to look

beyond our own borders with curiosity<sup>1823</sup>— a dynamic discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the fact that both defend particularity from cosmopolitan uniformization requires we identify the particular. Theoretically, that which is “particular’ could be anything— from a national sport (especially when idiosyncratic, like Aussie-rules football) to iconic architectural or natural landmarks. For Heidegger, though, there is an even more elemental feature that distinguishes the particular: the diverse languages in which we put our world into words.

### § *The House of Being*

#### What is Language?: The Form and the Function

Notably, the relationship that one has to language is ontologically primordial. This is not to say that language is a chronological first of all— most of human history has unfolded amidst a chorus of grunts and shrieks. Rather, language is necessary for the thinking and, most importantly of all, the poetry that Heidegger placed at the beginnings of an historical *Dasein*. Heidegger noted that the relationship between thinking, being, and language is “dark and foreign to us.”<sup>1824</sup> However, it is clearly defined by belonging and reciprocity.<sup>1825</sup> We must be in order to think and, ideally, one’s words and thoughts are more than nodding acquaintances. Simultaneously, we cannot share thoughts in the absence of language. However, Heidegger, Dallmayr noted, did not see language as a “mere medium of communication.”<sup>1826</sup> Furthermore, we often communicate using commonly understood words without a common sense of their meaning.<sup>1827</sup> For Nancy, this meant that communication is different to the use of language to make “sense of the common.”<sup>1828</sup>

According to Grosser, a vital aspect of language— for Heidegger— is the capacity it gives us to articulate the “spatiotemporal world” that a “specific community” inhabits.<sup>1829</sup> This can, as in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, be understood in *völkish* terms: where poetry allows for the “concepts of an historical people’s nature” to be “formed for that folk” in such a way that it articulates their “belonging to world

history.”<sup>1830</sup> It can also be understood, as it was by Taminiaux, in a general sense: where a community of any kind can be the basis of a “reciprocal understanding of the communication of the individuals between themselves.”<sup>1831</sup> However, this *need* not be understood *only* in such terms— as purely language giving voice to a nation’s historical *Dasein*. For Heidegger, as Magrini notes, language *tout court* is central to the “historical vocation” of *Dasein* in general— its disclosure, “through speech” (its special capacity to “name things,”<sup>1832</sup>) of the “relational context” in which its Being unfolds.”<sup>1833</sup> In other words, it is through *our* language that we grasp the historical context and vocation of *our* people, and through language *in general* that we can grasp the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world *in general*.

It is important to note that, for Heidegger, language is not a mere tool. Heidegger wrote in “Poetically Man Dwells,” that it is an error— one which leads to “strange manoeuvres”— when we fool ourselves into thinking we are the masters of language, and not it of us.<sup>1834</sup> At the same time, we are not merely passive recipients of a relation to world supplied to us by language.<sup>1835</sup> We “may help” the “appeal” of language “to be voiced.”<sup>1836</sup> We do this by responding “in the element of poetry” and by listening “authentically.”<sup>1837</sup> Language does not simply provide us with a context that we passively accept as our own but instead “beckons us”<sup>1838</sup>— providing hints about the nature of our world. If we are to help the beckonings of language to become the kind of appeals that allow a world to world poetically around us, we must listen to the hints provided by language. We must then speak “in the element of poetry” to voice those hints in a more concrete way. While this makes clear the reciprocal nature of our relationship with language, this remains rather abstract. We must dig deeper into the nature of language.

Language exists in two distinct but interrelated (sometimes conflictual) ways. On the one hand, language is a formal assemblage of vocabulary, conventions, and rules— in dictionaries, language instruction textbooks etc.— and, on the other hand, a dynamic, even living entity that exists in our conversations. The former will be referred to as grammar, standing for formally “correct” vocabulary, and the latter discourse, which includes colloquial or “common usage” vocabulary. Heidegger made clear, in

a 1927 work titled “Phenomenology and Theology,” that there is little to be gained from trying to approach language by thinking *about* language—arguing that we should instead focus on engaging directly in “an unprejudiced experience of language.”<sup>1839</sup> However, this position would moderate. By 1929’s *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger recognized that there is an important interplay between linguistics and language use, neither alone can get us to the essence of things.<sup>1840</sup>

Heidegger identified the inclination to concern ourselves with our own Being as a unique and definitive characteristic of *Dasein*, and it is language which articulates this concern. However, language has both the capacity to allow Being to shine forth and, simultaneously, to conceal it behind a wall of “idle-talk.” Thus, language is described in the “Letter on Humanism” as a “clearing-concealing”<sup>1841</sup> and, in Heidegger’s famous formulation, the “house of the truth of Being”<sup>1842</sup>—the site wherein which we engage with Being. It is through language that we articulate the space in which we dwell and “belong together” with those who share our language, relating together to the things we encounter in and through our language. Heidegger would elaborate upon this in his Nietzsche lectures, arguing that it is in discourse, in *using* rather than talking *about* it, that we come to language.<sup>1843</sup> Language provides us with historically conditioned words, phrases and concepts which colour the way in which we interpret and articulate the things we seek to describe,<sup>1844</sup> even if we are not aware of what we are doing. Our use of established terms—whose literal and symbolic meaning are known to all—reflects a relationship of “resonant signification” between language and history. A word signifies something, this signification resonates as a result of historical thrownness. Simultaneously, resonant significance acts in the opposite direction, as it is through language that we articulate our historical thrownness. Heidegger would clarify in his Hölderlin lectures that it is only through language that man “testifies” on behalf of Being, only “where there is language does world prevail,” and only “by virtue of language” is “the human being” the “witness of being.”<sup>1845</sup>

While discourse, as we shall see, offers flexibility, grammar— Heidegger claimed in *The Essence of Human Freedom*— is generally treated as something pre-given and therefore non-negotiable.<sup>1846</sup> Grammar, furthermore, has an existence external to both the speaker and hearer.<sup>1847</sup> Grammar, like technology, is not merely a tool, but simultaneously shapes and limits what it is possible for us to express in language. This given aspect of language, grammar, can be seen as a part of our inheritance. In other words, we encounter grammar as a part of the historically thrown grounds of our *Dasein*— an element of the world into which we are born, decided for us before our Being— which we must, to an extent, accept if we are to participate in *Dasein* by talking. We act as though we are the master of language, when in fact often it is language which is master,<sup>1848</sup> binding us to what is grammatically “correct.”

Heidegger, though, argued that it is primarily discourse which grounds us in space, claiming in *Being and Time*: that “the existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse” and discourse is the “articulation of intelligibility of the there.”<sup>1849</sup> In other words, discourse is what allows for disclosure and comprehension— as the world comes to us via the disclosure, in discourse, of those things that are intelligible.<sup>1850</sup> One must not conclude from this that the world consists of inert empirical phenomena merely awaiting our naming them with the tool of language. Our relationship with our world is, for Heidegger, far more mutually co-constitutive than such a proposition allows. Furthermore, long before we are capable of language in the sense of a complex system of signification, syntax, and grammar, we are capable of effectively communicating to one another the presence of things in our immediate world. For Mark Wrathall, language is, in fact, preceded by the gathering together of entities, activities, and relationships as conveyed through familiar and basic speech, as opposed to depending upon language as a structured totality of words and concepts.<sup>1851</sup> Heidegger would re-iterate this point later, in *The Essence of Human Freedom*. Here, he claimed that there is an element of being-in and indeed being-with which predates our capacity for language— a “silent comportment” towards those things which surround us that predates our using language to reflect, theoretically, upon them.<sup>1852</sup> Heidegger gave the example of a table.

We encounter tables as objects of use and “operate within an understanding” of what a table is and what it is for long before we are “in a position to give a correct definition of its essence.”<sup>1853</sup> It is through discoursing about our comportment to these things, not in the construction of a linguistic system, that language enters into the picture. In short, our language is conditioned by its historical hinterlands and the context in which it is employed. It is initially intelligible, as discourse, with respect to those things that the *Dasein* wishes to articulate, and for those to whom it wishes to communicate. Simultaneously, language structures and circumscribes the potentialities of Being-in-the-world— as well as “heedful being-with-one-another.”<sup>1854</sup> Language is grounded in the spatiotemporal locale of the community and, simultaneously, central to the grounding of that same community. Its primordially, though, does not necessarily veil its origins behind the mists of time. Heidegger, in fact, provides an intriguing account of how we came to language.

### The Way to Language

Heidegger began “The Way to Language” by telling us that he would not provide us with a historical or scientific account of how the primal grunts of early homonids became the complex language of today but would, instead, explore the role of language in the unfolding of *Dasein*.<sup>1855</sup> It is challenging to speak about language because we are thrown into its already well-developed unfolding— so much so that we define ourselves by language (*zoon logon echon*) without properly considering how complicated our relationship with language can be.<sup>1856</sup> Heidegger recognized the impossibility of stripping language down to its barest form— freed from the accoutrements of fashion, grammatical rules, or idiom— so that language itself stands before us, but he nevertheless believed that it is possible to “get a view” of language itself.

Heidegger described those extraneous things which surround language as a “weft”— as in weaving— which we should not remove but loosen to see language clearly within its appropriate context.<sup>1857</sup> Heidegger began this loosening by turning to Aristotle. The Aristotelian conception of language, Heidegger argues, consisted of words, letters, grammar and the suchlike— which brought

together the *sēmia* (that which shows— such as the speaker), the *symbola* (that which holds together— that which gives a solidity to the form of the thing being shown) and the *homoiōmata* (that which approximates) into a “showing,” or even a “revealing (*alētheia*).”<sup>1858</sup> He points out, though, that Aristotle connects “showing” and “what it shows” in a structure where it is the “showing”— rather than “what it shows”— that is the indispensable component. It is “showing,” talking about things as opposed to the things that we are talking about, that “brings something to appear, lets what appears be apprehended, and enables what is apprehended to be thoroughly discussed (so that we can act on it).”<sup>1859</sup> As a result, we construct sophisticated systems of meaning, linguistic worlds which become the primary realm in which thought occurs. Thus, the philosopher passes (if one is feeling Beaudelairian) through a forest of symbols, too busy thinking about words to experience the living columns.

This way of looking at and using language, as a system of signifiers with more or less proximity to the thing signified reaches, for Heidegger, its apotheosis in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt. Humboldt, Heidegger explained, posited language as a “particular labour of spirit.”<sup>1860</sup> However, the goal of this labour is not to get *x* or *y* done, but to articulate a “view upon the world.”<sup>1861</sup> Heidegger saw this as a reduction of language to merely one “source” amongst many from which we can draw in order to conceptualize the world for the sake of the “demonstration and depiction of the intellectual development of the human race.”<sup>1862</sup>— a technological, metaphysical approach to language which reduces it to a standing reserve, to be dispensed with according to this rather self-aggrandizing end goal.

Heidegger believed, contra Humboldt, that language can only be a very particular mode of “labour.” Heidegger granted that it is something we *do*, but in an unusual way. One must explain to others what one is doing and usually needs language to do the whatever that may be. Speech and language thus bind us to others.<sup>1863</sup> As such, the essence of language is not the approximate application of the correct signifier to the thing signified but, rather, lies in the act of “saying.”<sup>1864</sup> Of course, given that all interpersonal communication occurs within a “world,” we do not find, with Humboldt or Heidegger, anything

like a theory of “private language.” Nevertheless, Krell notes that Heidegger diverted our attention from the written word to the spoken.<sup>1865</sup> In speech, we point towards things themselves— “look at that table over there”— and in doing so invite our listener to look upon that thing within the context of the world in which it fits. In writing, on the other hand, it is the symbol (the word “table” rather than *a* table) that is conveyed— and the reader is invited to think of the thing in the context of an assemblage of symbols.

The “well” from which we draw in language, such as it is, is not a reserve of words but an historical source that we inherit from the past, in our linguistic tradition. We receive as given a vocabulary which points to many of the things around us, as well as a system of grammar and a canon of written and spoken “saying”— which is ours because we belong to the historical thrownness from whence this canon itself emerges. This tradition circumscribes the way in which we hear and speak, mediating the distance of otherness between speaker and hearer and determining the “way” that we arrive, by listening and saying, to understanding. It forms, in short, the thrown grounds of the *Da* of what one might call the psychic space in which we dwell in thinking. Our relationship with language is thus more complicated than that between a craftsperson and their tools. We use language to express things but are also shaped by the language use: “we not only *speak language*, we speak *from out of it*.”<sup>1866</sup> It is only by listening, and hearing that which has been said, that we “gain entry into the saying” and come to “belong to it.”<sup>1867</sup>

Heidegger believed that Humboldt had elided significant differences between language and speaker, between speaker and subject of speech, and between spoken and unspoken.<sup>1868</sup> To rectify this, Heidegger identified two elements without which we could not have language: speech and speakers. Speech sets the speaker into the world<sup>1869</sup> as a thing in the world that is speaking. The speaker brings speech into the world.<sup>1870</sup> Also important to language is “what is spoken.”<sup>1871</sup> This need not necessarily be in the world in an immediate sense, we can speak about things that have passed for example.<sup>1872</sup> What is spoken about, for Heidegger, belongs *within* the unity of language, it is not something apart— a subject matter *about which* we speak. Heidegger sought, to ascertain what it is that unifies this “multiplicity of

elements” that show themselves when we think of language<sup>1873</sup>— as well as such things as words, grammar, signification, syntax etc.

Heidegger believed that we are unable to get to the essence of language, but that a “rift-design” becomes visible when we approach the question of language as a unity of speaker, speech, and what is spoken. “Rift-design” is a term inspired by its linguistic similarity, in German, to terms used in certain dialects for ploughing furrows into a field. Much as ploughs turn over the earth and reveal the soil which may “harbour seed and growth,”<sup>1874</sup> the rift-design disturbs that which we take for granted about language and reveals the soil from which an understanding of the essence of language may grow. The precise nature of the rift-design remains veiled, of course, but we can tell that it “enjoins the speakers and their speech, enjoins the spoken and the unspoken.”<sup>1875</sup> In simpler terms, when we say things to one another, and think about what we are doing, it becomes clear that there is a mutual “showing” of something. We seek mutual understanding, and this can often occur as much through what we do not say as what we do say.<sup>1876</sup> In this occurrence, we come to see that the essence of language lies in the saying, in engaging in this practice that brings together those things in the rift-design.<sup>1877</sup> In short, the rift-design is the conceptual space within which, in using language, we bring the mystery of the essence of language before us. Language operates much as history and politics have been argued to function in previous chapters. Language does not, by itself tell us what the authentic is, but clarifies to us that there is a mystery at the heart of a thing and indicates the grounds from which this mystery can be encountered and, in time, solved.

What is not mysterious, though, is that our belonging is tied to the linguistic community in which we find ourselves— because it is only by speaking with other speakers about mutually comprehended things that the rift-design is revealed— a claim which *prima facie* matches rather well with the linguistic nationalism of Meinecke. This becomes especially important, for our purposes, when Heidegger asserts that no language is “natural” and that all languages are the product of complex history.<sup>1878</sup> The attempt to escape from the contingency of language through formalization, furthermore, is central to the “enframing”

and “ordering” of language into something universalizable and abstract<sup>1879</sup>— a claim which resonates with the discussion of cosmopolitanism above. We are destined to remain, Heidegger tells us, “within the essence of language to which we have been granted entry” and this, counterintuitively, is advantageous because it grants us entry into the exceptional realm in which we dwell.<sup>1880</sup> In some respects, this is frustratingly abstract. Heidegger does not even hint at how this might apply in situations where a language alien to the land is the spoken language. Can one, for example, gain entry into the exceptional realm of North America if one speaks a European language? Do the English have access to the realm of England given their language is Germanic in origin? Heidegger does attend to such questions, nor to matters of bilingualism. Furthermore, the task of pursuing the way to language remains incomplete. As Krell puts it, “the way to language is never finished.”<sup>1881</sup> Therefore, the “possibility of an appropriate transformation of language,” which we are awakened to by reading Humboldt well,<sup>1882</sup> co-exists with the danger that we be led astray into bad speech, bad poetry, and bad thought.

Both the givenness of grammar and the flexibility of discourse pose a threat: we might be led astray by the grammatical rules and discursive practices that are given to us as limitations. Idle-talk has been discussed at length, but here it is useful to remind ourselves that the degeneration of language can function both, as Heidegger notes in his Hölderlin lectures, through the “bad prose” of inept poets and by “the most shallow turning away and of becoming entangled in worn-out idle talk and the semblance that goes with it.”<sup>1883</sup> Much of our everyday social interaction, Dreyfus noted, is characterized by both kinds of covering over.<sup>1884</sup> Losurdo argued that this is especially true when we engage in a kitsch ornamentalization of our cultural practices.<sup>1885</sup> This can occur because our grammar structures our language in a way that prejudices us towards certain modes of thinking. It can also occur through a discourse which pulls the *Dasein* into the averageness of the “they.” Rather than dwell again on idle-talk, we turn to a potential implication of the givenness of grammar and the practice of discourse, which tie language as a general concept to the grammatical and conversational particularities of different languages.

We have seen evidence of a complex inter-relation between our language and the world that we find ourselves thrown into. Much as this world exists at a variety of levels— from the immediate circle of things at hand to the region encompassing Being itself— our language influences our relationship with things at a variety of different levels— from the metaphysical language we may rely upon to discuss questions of science and philosophy to the way in which we name geographic landmarks or refer to our family members. Heidegger, at times, makes direct reference to the relationship between language and our particular historical community: claiming in *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language* that “language is the ruling of world-forming and preserving center of the historical *Dasein* of the *Volk*.”<sup>1886</sup> There is much that could be said about language at the level of the *Seinsfrage*. One could, for example, explore how the language of our philosophical tradition shapes the modern technological milieu or speculate about the new language through which we will one day articulate a post-metaphysical relation to Being. However, we do not wish to lose sight of the goals of this study. We have established the centrality of language, for Heidegger, to the particular relation we have to our world— and by extension to Being. Intuitively, one might think that in light of this, differences in language would be connected to differences in one’s relation to the world and to Being. We will soon find that Heidegger often spoke in patriotic terms about the special attributes of the German language, and this, when combined with the connection noted above between language and “the historical *Dasein* of the *Volk*” introduces the possibility that authentic *Dasein* might depend upon a form of linguistic nationalism.

### Linguistic Nationalism

Jünger argued that it is through language that dominion is realized over a locale, through the issuing of commands and the making intelligible of obedience<sup>1887</sup>— though it did not matter to him *which* language did this, merely that it take place.<sup>1888</sup> Though Péguy granted a foremost importance to language, arguing that the perversion of language leads ineluctably to the perversion of politics and even the spirit,<sup>1889</sup> he did not list language a major part of what makes France French<sup>1890</sup> nor did he associate the vices of Germany

with her language. Barrès, too, did not grant language so central a role in the essential otherness of the French and Germans, going as far as to argue that the German truth is different from the French truth but grounded this in differences of interest, blood,<sup>1891</sup> and soil,<sup>1892</sup> not language. Nevertheless, there is a tendency for claims of linguistic formativeness and particularity to morph into claims of superiority. Among our primordialist nationalists, it is primarily Mann who made such claims. Mann posited a clear connection between language and virtue.<sup>1893</sup> The French language, for example is given to “chauvinistic-humanitarian phraseology”<sup>1894</sup>— inclining its speakers towards bravura, “rational” mercilessness,<sup>1895</sup> and insipid sentimentalism-<sup>1896</sup> as opposed to German, which tends to be moderate, perspicacious and Burgherly. What we see here is straightforward linguistic chauvinism.

Heidegger was no doubt given to the occasional patriotic effusion regarding the German language throughout his career. Like Mann, Heidegger compared German particularly favourably with French, which he disparaged in the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures* as a language given to hyper-rationalism and the obscuring of sophisticated thought.<sup>1897</sup> Later, he would claim to *der Spiegel* that French people, the moment they began to philosophize seriously, are forced to switch to German.<sup>1898</sup> There is no doubt that Heidegger thought German was special and had a special relationship with Attic Greek<sup>1899</sup>— the language in which the purest relation to Being was expressed. German is, alongside Greek, the language in which philosophy can be done.<sup>1900</sup> As Dallmayr noted, the special endowment of the Germans, including the language in which it is expressed, is “precisely the talent for structure, for compact organization, for blueprints and elaborate designs.”<sup>1901</sup> What Heidegger believed German lacks, according to Dallmayr, is precisely the “fire from heaven,” associated with the “southland,” that some, like Hölderlin, can embody but which is not native to Germany.<sup>1902</sup> Being the metaphysical language exposes Germany to the ravages of technology but also gives them the sharpest glimpse of its saving power. German is the language of philosophy for good or ill, the language of the *Seinsfrage* and *Seinsvergessenheit*. Heidegger would seek, in the “Letter on Humanism,” to distance his Hölderlin inspired conception of the homeland from those

who construe it “patriotically or nationalistically.”<sup>1903</sup> How else, though, can one take the claims discussed above? Heidegger, then, shared much in common with our primordialist nationalists when it comes to language. This is why Cerrato argues that Heidegger’s understanding of language can provide nationalism with a “philosophical topography both as originary ground and destination.”<sup>1904</sup> For both Heidegger and the primordialist nationalists, excepting Péguy and Barrès, language is a vital part of the formation of our spatial relation to being— with which the historical vocation of a nation is articulated. For both, language is not merely a means of communicating things and, as a result, certain languages are superior to others— not in their communicative effectiveness but in their capacity to reveal the forms of thought, culture and spirit which are so essential to Being. That Heidegger did not embrace an unalloyed chauvinism with respect to the superiority of German, though at times boasts about the language, does not distance him significantly from our primordialist nationalists who, with the exception of Mann, tended not to do so either.

On the other hand, Heidegger complicated the relationship between a mastery of German and existential acuity. For example, in *Basic Concepts* he noted that most German speakers cannot really understand Kant or Hölderlin,<sup>1905</sup> and would be incapable of truly engaging with either metaphysics or the poetic articulation of the German *Dasein*. In *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, Heidegger argued that when we divide up *Dasein* into different categories of person— such as linguistic groups— we are not really getting to the core of the *Seinsfrage*, but are simply shuffling about categories of beings into “a kind of herbarium.”<sup>1906</sup> Furthermore, it is primarily through poetry that language fulfils its potential, and it is often in being silent and hearing the poetic song that we are saved, rather than by speaking. This is rather different from Meinecke, who roots the national community in the sharing of language in general, not solely in poetic or high-cultural employment of it. Where there is linguistic chauvinism in Heidegger, it is usually in the celebration of great poets like Hölderlin: mighty cultural figures whose poetic use of German makes manifest the essential and reveals the homeland in poetic word.

It seems, then, that it is not only the nature of the role of language in putting our world into words that differs between Heidegger and the linguistic nationalism of Mann. However, when one considers— as we now will— the nature of the purportedly particularizing traditions and customs being put into words, one finds significant divergence between Heidegger and Péguy, Jünger, and Barrès as well.

### *§ Language, Tradition and Custom: Fonts and Forms*

#### The Whence of Thrownness

A consequence of Heidegger's approach to Being as becoming is that, as Harries notes, we find ourselves thrown into a world which we did not choose but inherited without much say in the matter.<sup>1907</sup> One of the practical consequences of this is that we are born into a particular tradition. For Heidegger, these traditions are not, Feenberg notes, “abstractions from particular instances of behaviour and speech”— a coincidental by-product of what we do and think— but have a co-constitutive relationship with speech and behaviour. They form what we do and say as, simultaneously, what we say and do shapes our culture<sup>1908</sup> (if what we say and do is significant). Swer argues that, for Heidegger, our horizons of disclosure are, in part, “culturally and historically relative” and emanate from “limits of intelligibility” derived from language and cultural idiom.<sup>1909</sup> This does not mean that truth becomes culturally relative, Swer continues, but may mean that certain truths will be unintelligible for us from within the vantage point of our culturally determined horizons.<sup>1910</sup> It is notable that in discussing the founding of an historical *Dasein*, Heidegger showed no interest in elections, treaties or battles.<sup>1911</sup> So important, in fact, are tradition, custom, and culture for Heidegger that Bourdieu concluded that he saw philosophy as a whole as a way of relating to “sacred tradition.”<sup>1912</sup> Such an understanding of tradition as a part of, or conduit for, the thrown grounds of Being— even as something potentially sacred— can lead one to conceptualize culture as Arendt does. For Arendt, the fact that the “public realm” will “transcend our lifespan into past and future alike” necessitates something akin to a Burkean contract between the living, dead and not yet born.<sup>1913</sup> We are, for Arendt, to understand culture as a common good and to

preserve and improve this public culture which will be passed down. In doing so, one can find something akin to the salvation offered by religion.<sup>1914</sup>

Tradition, be it a folk tradition or, in Heidegger's case from *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, the tradition of metaphysics "designates in advance [our] possible points of departure."<sup>1915</sup> That is to say, there are limitations placed on where we are likely to start our task which emerge from the tradition to which we belong.<sup>1916</sup> As we seek truth, if we are serious thinkers, we are pushed into the fundamentally historical questioning of Being and this will, by its nature, push us to look back into our traditions for an account of our current situation— as when we look to the tradition of metaphysics. In simpler terms, when we look to define our projects and begin with the reasonable question, "who are we?" we are already asking the question of our heritage. This led Heidegger, at a variety of points in his career, to express conservative sentiments. For example, in his Hölderlin lectures, Heidegger claimed that community— being-at-home with others in our dwelling place— depends upon our sharing "something that binds and determines each individual in exceeding them."<sup>1917</sup> This ties the community to something shared but greater than themselves. Similarly, in the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger made clear that, whatever the flaws of our current situation, we must "safeguard and secure the existing bonds that hold human beings together."<sup>1918</sup> However, he then reminds us that this must not "ever release thought from the task of thinking."<sup>1919</sup> Heidegger elaborated on this last point in *Contributions*. Here, he argued that ideally we will be led by reflection on current discourse about "who we are" into the questioning of Being,<sup>1920</sup> questioning which, as it happens, is dangerous to the status quo.<sup>1921</sup> Alternatively, there is a danger that we may find ourselves "idolizing" what are "only conditions" for our existence.<sup>1922</sup> In other words, Heidegger did not elevate tradition to the semi-divine status that it holds for some. In fact, he associated "being-in tradition" with everyday modes of *Dasein*. An excessive reverence will transform tradition into a fore-having, a thing that we have before we are capable of critical engagement. Making an idol of one's tradition, counterintuitively, denigrates it. Heidegger makes clear that tradition furnishes our place of dwelling and

is no jail cell.<sup>1923</sup> It is also worth noting that Heidegger saw the traditions that we interact with today as significantly corrupted—our fall into forgetfulness of Being, for Heidegger, long predates the period of Mann’s “literary man” or the modern intellectuals derided by Péguy and Barrès.

While some might celebrate this aspect of Heidegger’s thought as a riposte to an excessively hidebound conservative reverence of tradition, it is important to recognize the potential intersection between this view of “being-in-tradition” as a form of everydayness and Heidegger’s antisemitism. In keeping with the generally two-faced character of antisemitism, Jews have paradoxically been charged both with being consummate enemies of the traditional bases of communal existence and as being intransigent traditionalists who refuse to get on board with progress. The purported role of Jews as a universalizing threat to “groundedness” has been discussed, and so here we highlight the supplementary danger. There is a strongly orthopractic aspect to Judaism, and the memetic carrying out of traditional practices could well be construed as a very profound kind of “being-in-tradition.” Therefore, this superficially edifying aspect of Heidegger’s thought—his call that we do not idolize the traditions handed down to us because this traps us in the everyday and inhibits our pursuit of something greater—can so easily be operationalized as yet another excuse for antisemitism.

An excessive cultural conservatism can, when done poorly, lead to kitsch sentimentalism. Indeed, Heidegger seems to have feared this to the point that, as Gonzalez notes, his references to cultural conservatism are almost exclusively contemptuous<sup>1924</sup>—a claim which rings true even though we have found, here, elements of conservatism in Heidegger’s thought. Dallmayr would link Heidegger’s concerns about such abuses of culture to his dislike of America<sup>1925</sup> and the abuses of culture he often descried bear a resemblance to what Adorno and Horkheimer would later call the “culture industry.”<sup>1926</sup> For example, Heidegger claimed in *Problems of Logic* that philosophies of culture reduce culture to “the development of self-positing human capacities” and philosophy to “but one cultural asset among others.”<sup>1927</sup> In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he argued that a culture cannot be manufactured intentionally out of the

materials of history—and it is certainly the case that the “philosopher can never *directly* supply the forces and create the mechanisms and opportunities that bring about a historical state,” in no small part because “philosophy is always the direct concern of only the few.”<sup>1928</sup>

Culture should instead, Heidegger notes in his *Interpretation of Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation*, be an emergence from the reality of our being with other people— “not a bringing together after the fact but standing in one light”<sup>1929</sup>— which can be articulated through the unheard-of centre of great works of *poiesis*.<sup>1930</sup> Importantly, though, not as part of a deliberate project of constructing a national or regional culture. Like the jug of wine, to use Dreyfus’ example, organic cultural practices involve “gathering of people around things” in a way that is not driven by technicity, but by our sharing in common those little worlds— built around fulcra of village squares, cathedrals, bridges and the suchlike<sup>1931</sup>— that “solicit fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, children, familiar warmth, good humour, and loyalty to come to the fore in their excellence.”<sup>1932</sup> There is a spontaneity to culture and only in a limited sense one can influence what that culture is. One can, through poetry, reveal truths of an historical *Dasein* but cannot create or shape a culture according to instrumental designs.<sup>1933</sup> Simultaneously, though he does seem radical at times, Heidegger rejected iconoclasm. As Taminioux and Spanos noted, one must, for Heidegger, be in dialogue even with those parts of the tradition that one rejects.<sup>1934</sup> It is because of this call for what Clark calls the “patient and thoughtful transformation”<sup>1935</sup> of the tradition— rather than its gleeful destruction— that Adorno concludes that in spite of Heidegger’s revolutionary language “an overtone of the word “cultural-philosophical” cannot fail to be heard.”<sup>1936</sup>

As neither creator nor destroyer of culture, the thinker does not wage culture war. To do so in a conservative manner, to make oneself the great defender of the tradition from foreign or progressive influences, is to engage in precisely the “negating of the age” that Heidegger criticizes as a “flight into tradition” which makes one powerless.<sup>1937</sup> Equally, one cannot take an iconoclastic stance towards the tradition, as this would destroy the thrown grounds of an historical *Dasein*. Instead, we are to balance an

awareness of the danger of accepting everything that is simply because it is— as one might if one makes an idol of one’s traditions — and a scepticism of ambitious plans for cultural reform. This is not a matter of being Janus-faced, for always looking ahead and behind would mean neglecting the present. Rather, Heidegger explained in *Being and Time* that *Dasein* must engage in the repetition of traditional forms in a way that “neither abandons itself to the past, no does it aim at progress.”<sup>1938</sup> Tradition and culture ought to be seen as a vital source of truth. They are the communicable articulation of the thrown historical space within which a primordial, poetic saying of Being can be comprehensible. There are, of course, political implications to such an approach to culture and tradition. The final section of this chapter will, then, address the ways in which these differing conceptions of culture and tradition can be put into action.

### Culture, Tradition and Dwelling

The approach to tradition and culture that we find among our primordialist nationalists can be defined as a conservative iteration of a culture war. Primordialist nationalism often posits that national borders are established according to what Anthony Smith called “invisible and primordial ties”<sup>1939</sup> as opposed to political borders established by treaty.<sup>1940</sup> The view of these scholars is given immediate credence by Péguy’s grounding of the “glory of France” in its customs and traditions of ceremony and commemoration.<sup>1941</sup> Barrès too located the “centre” of France not in Paris or Farges-Allichamps<sup>1942</sup> but in devotion to traditions.<sup>1943</sup> For Barrès, the first task of the nationalist must therefore be to mend the historical thread, to protect and maintain the character<sup>1944</sup> and “continuity of France”<sup>1945</sup> and to “reconcile”<sup>1946</sup> contemporary France to her soil and her dead.<sup>1947</sup> Precisely as Zohar Moar,<sup>1948</sup> Anthony Marx,<sup>1949</sup> and Murat Bayar<sup>1950</sup> theorise, Barrès understands nationalism as being a continuation of, supplement to and, arguably, a potential substitute for religion. Indeed, Barrès went so far as to describe his nationalism as a lowering of his “piety from the sky to the earth [...] of my dead.”<sup>1951</sup> Jünger too lamented, during his time in France, that the French appeared to be better than the Germans at the maintenance of “traditions passed down from hand to hand” even with their “largely rational policies.”<sup>1952</sup> This can only be resisted by a

culturally sophisticated minority, those “islands of intellect and taste”<sup>1953</sup> who operate somewhat like a holy order seeking to influence the values of this new world from on high.<sup>1954</sup> Mann, for his part, felt alienated from “non-traditional taste”<sup>1955</sup> and placed the national culture above its politics, institutions and laws in terms of its importance to the “higher and true life of the nation.”<sup>1956</sup> Mann’s aesthete must turn art to the protection<sup>1957</sup> and maintenance of the organic order,<sup>1958</sup> to take up the “earthly task” of perfecting the forms in order to inspire the German people to remain resolute in the onslaught of civilization.<sup>1959</sup> Here again is a conventional conservative appeal to the maintenance of historically rooted cultural practices in the face of a modernity that would bulldoze such things in the name of its merciless gods. Tradition and culture were, for these thinkers, things to be nourished, dwelled in, preserved, and glorified.<sup>1960</sup> For Péguy, Mann, Barrès, and Jünger, tradition and culture are goods in themselves— being both bases for grounding a community and sources of beauty.

Vitality, for this study, metaphysics is inseparable from the tradition thus taken over as thrown. A consequence of this, for Heidegger, was the replacement of a natural participation in the rites and rituals of one’s cultural tradition with a detached, almost anthropological posture towards even one’s own customs— a replacement of participation in culture with philosophizing *about* culture. This is particularly consequential because it suggests that Heidegger would have seen many of the cultural icons celebrated by our primordialist nationalists (Hugo, Jaurès, Clemenceau etc.) as residing, and being poetized, within a cultural moment already profoundly corrupted by metaphysics. That is to say, such figures have already been subjected to the logics of objectification, subjectification, instrumentalization, and pictorialization. The national cultures of France and Germany are complicated by their post-Socratic origins, and these cultural traditions, centuries old though they are, are thus compromised. Thus, even where Péguy demands that his political allies find a deeper traditional root than their Maurrassian opponents,<sup>1961</sup> it would, if it remained a French tradition, still be grounded after the post-Platonic fall away from Being. Though the German case is complicated somewhat by ideas of the “German protest” and the *Sonderweg* thesis— which

might allow for the objection that Germany's tradition is less corrupted than that of France— it remains the case that the cultures of both of these countries emerge from the being-with of people whose relation to being has been profoundly influenced by metaphysics. Heidegger feared such an entrapment in corrupted tradition when, in his Hölderlin lectures, he bemoaned the proliferation of “culture clubs” and the selling of culture as a commodity as part of “the domination of what is today called “liberalism.””<sup>1962</sup> Similarly, in “the Age of the World Picture,” he criticized the way that culture tends to be discussed— in his own time but certainly also today<sup>1963</sup>— with idle-talk about “cultural values [...] in the service of man's making himself secure as *subiectum*.”<sup>1964</sup> It is hard to argue that the primordialist nationalists were not a part of this metaphysical debasement of culture, in light of what we have seen over the course of this study.

Culture, custom and tradition, for Heidegger, are not to be pushed aside or left behind, but must be appropriated in order for the *Dasein* to be liberated in its relation to being.<sup>1965</sup> Tradition is a significant way in which the particular nature of our dwelling place shines forth before us, and the grasping of one's place of dwelling is integral to one's relation to Being. We have, no doubt, found that the reverence for culture and custom that we find among our primordial nationalists is a vital similarity with Heidegger. However, we cannot grasp culture if we are encouraged to confuse our particular plot of earth, and the way of being that predominates within it, with the whole of Being. Neither, Heidegger explained in *Basic Questions*, should we be hamstrung by “the indolence of an uncreative adherence to the past”— only conserving what is or resuscitating a lost tradition (he gives the example of Christianity).<sup>1966</sup>

In other words, we must not content ourselves with having preserved our national “values.” These values emanate from the they and convince us that we have secured our essential selves in resoluteness when, in fact, we have merely re-enforced our own subjectivity and entangled ourselves further in the fixed ground plan of the national-values object. This is a particularly appealing aspect of Heidegger's thought. The seeming appropriation of tradition by the political far-right— aided at times by some frustratingly counter-productive philistinism from elsewhere— is a tragedy for those who value those

customary rites and rituals that bind us to one another and to those long dead. That Heidegger offers a way to think of tradition as something more than an object for preservation— as an integral part of a forward thinking and philosophically open-minded approach to life— is undeniably a salve. That he explains his view of tradition in such a way as to distance it, as we have seen, from the more exclusionary and instrumentalist abuses of tradition found among some, but not all, primordialist nationalists only helps his cause. Of course, it was noted in “Pathways and Perdition” that this nuanced view of tradition does, elsewhere, leave Heidegger’s thought insufficiently fortified against revolutionary destructiveness.

Heidegger’s thought is primarily differentiated from linguistic and cultural nationalism by the fact that the familiar and the customary is a starting point for an authentic relation to Being but not an end-goal. We cannot understand ourselves, nor our place in history, if we do not have a firm grounding in our communities. However, we are not to revel in self-glorification, but to use the familiar as a home-base from which to explore the *Seinsfrage*. A national tradition, in sum, is not the elucidation of a final, ideal form of Being but *can*, if marshalled correctly, be a font from which such an elucidation might shine forth. It is clear that Mann, Jünger, Barrès, and Péguy are too reverential of their traditions to allow for such a critical openness, and therefore their articulations of the roles of language, custom and tradition bar our accessing a more authentic relation to Being.

### *Mitsein* and Community

There is no doubt that, for Heidegger, the physical space that one occupies and the community with whom one shares this space have a significant impact on the constitution of *Dasein*. However, the precise nature of this relationship,<sup>1967</sup> and the extent to which the space in question accords with the nation, is contested. There is a broad consensus in the literature that Heidegger posits a spatial particularism as an alternative to a de-spatializing tendency of modernity. Kolb believes that this particularist alternative helps to undermine the solipsistic view of a place as simply a facet of one's identity.<sup>1968</sup> Winfree argues that the experience of "belonging together" in our particular plot of earth is not only a way to resist modernity but reveals to us the authentic nature of our co-existence (or alternatively, our being-with [*Mitsein*]) with the beings alongside whom one dwells.<sup>1969</sup> Andrew notes that being "embedded" in one's particular place is important to Heidegger<sup>1970</sup> and Cerrato argues that an embrace of the "proper place" of one's *Volk* is central, for Heidegger, to the escape from nihilism.<sup>1971</sup> Heidegger's understanding of the role of the physical space is among the more celebrated parts of his thought. For Mika, Heidegger's spatial thinking is a "genuine thinking [...] linked to authentic experience of being-in-the-world"<sup>1972</sup> which opens possibilities for inter-cultural dialogue.<sup>1973</sup> For Dungey, this introduces a strong normative tendency into Heidegger's thought, providing a clear understanding of the "ethical dimension of dwelling."<sup>1974</sup> Indeed, the normative aspect of the question of how we relate to the space around us is of particular importance in a time of climate crisis— though there is not space here to build upon the work of Mika and Dreyfus (among others) exploring the possibility of a Heideggerian environmentalism.

There are, nevertheless, significant points of disagreement. Göppfarth, for example, sees Heidegger's spatial particularism and glorification of "local attachments" as central to his appeal to contemporary far-right movements. Furthermore, where Mika and Dreyfus see great environmental promise, Göppfarth cites former AfD faction-leader Björn Höcke's evocations of Heidegger's "teaching of the environment as a whole, including cultural landscapes, rituals and customs" as an example of

Heidegger's ideas being employed by the far-right to hijack environmental concerns.<sup>1975</sup> Though less critical, Young notes that there are evident connections between the way Heidegger discusses the spatiality of *Dasein*— especially in light of his evocations of the sacred<sup>1976</sup>— and nationalist evocations of the *Heilige Heimat*.<sup>1977</sup> Dallmayr, on the other hand, thought that Heidegger's conception of *Mitsein* cannot be associated with “newer and recent models of communitarianism.”<sup>1978</sup> In fact, Dallmayr held that, for Heidegger, such communitarianism needs to be overcome if the *Dasein* is to come home to Being.<sup>1979</sup> The disagreement about the commensurability of Heidegger's spatial particularism and nationalism hinges upon two questions. Firstly, how the physical space, the world of rivers and mountains, relates to more abstract spatiality.<sup>1980</sup> Secondly, the appropriate scale of the locale of authentic belonging— whether the large scale of a nation or at the smaller scale of, for example, a sub-national region.

The locale, for Heidegger, clearly emerges from the interplay between a physical space and other, more abstract loci of spatiality. What varies is the level of concreteness with respect to the non-physical part of this. For Dreyfus and Spinoza, for example, it is physical practices like participating in a cultural ritual that shape our relationship with our locale<sup>1981</sup> while for Young, it is action.<sup>1982</sup> For Dungey, the physical world— which he notes includes man-made structures as much as trees and rivers— interacts with the “rules that govern our behaviour” and the way we understand “who we are.”<sup>1983</sup> Similarly, Cerrato argues that the physical “site” of a community and the meaning that a community gives to its place are co-equal and co-constitutive.<sup>1984</sup> Similarly, for Göppfarth, the *Heimat* emerges from the “union” of “nature, culture and heritage.”<sup>1985</sup> Göppfarth clarifies that “culture” is not produced by the “rational association of individuals” but is, for Heidegger, deeply rooted in a “historically handed-down determination to act together” on the part of a *Volk*.<sup>1986</sup> For other thinkers, though, the non-physical participant in this interplay is highly abstracted. It lies, for Gillespie, in the psychic space of a “fundamental mood” and, for Dallmayr, in a metaphorical “arena”<sup>1987</sup>-a space characterized as an “openness” or a “clearing” which “opens up the self-concealment of Being.”<sup>1988</sup> Dallmayr explicitly clarified that this “is not a geographic place”<sup>1989</sup> but

in fact is a local which resides “beyond morning-land and evening-land.”<sup>1990</sup> Authentic spatiality emerges from the interplay between a physical space and a manner of engaging with that space. This may emerge in three places: in ordinary, practical behaviours; in engagement with culture and tradition; or in the highly abstract philosophical pursuit of the clearing wherein truth is found.

The physical locale is a contested phenomenon. There is little disagreement with Young’s claim that Heidegger sought to resist any assimilation of the particularities of Germany to a universalism driven by liberal logics,<sup>1991</sup> and that this resistance, as Dallmayr put it, came from an idiosyncratic form of *Volkishness*.<sup>1992</sup> However, there remains some doubt as to whether this resistance could be carried out by Germany or if it required a smaller spatial horizon be drawn around a sub-national community. Cerrato notes that nationalism is able to find its “philosophical topography” in the relationship that Heidegger posits between “man, language and historicity,”<sup>1993</sup> such that the region as a “place of gathering” constitutes the “proper [pace of the national community.]”<sup>1994</sup> Fried and Polt highlight the importance of everyday engagement with the world— which encompasses the kind of practices described by Dreyfus, Spinoza, and Young— and note that whatever we may think of the nation philosophically, it is undoubtedly part of the norms and the identity of the community into which we are born.<sup>1995</sup> For Göppfarth, the “togetherness” of a “historical people” that live alongside one another forms a “*Volk*”<sup>1996</sup> and it is, therefore, legitimate to see the call to take care of that which lies at-hand as a call to care for the nation.<sup>1997</sup> In contrast, Waddington points to Heidegger’s admiration for the pre-Socratics as partially explained by a parochialism<sup>1998</sup> with an almost medieval sense of locality<sup>1999</sup>— where greatest dignity was given to our relation to the objects nearest to us.<sup>2000</sup> Rockmore & Margolis pointed instead to Heidegger’s discussions of geographical features like rivers and mountains and argue that this appears to ground Heidegger’s own spatial thinking specifically in the regions of Southwestern Germany,<sup>2001</sup> not Germany as a whole. For similar reasons, Elden concludes that there is, in fact, something of an opposition in Heidegger’s thought between an “intimate and personal native region” and the “mighty” “*Vaterland*.”<sup>2002</sup>

We have narrowed the two vital questions with which this chapter began<sup>2003</sup> as follows. Firstly, what is the relationship to place implied in Heidegger's understanding of *Mitsein* and does it resemble that posited by primordialist nationalists? Secondly, to what extent is the space in which the *Dasein* is-with-others compatible with the borders of nations? In order to answer these questions, this chapter outlines the relationships to place found in the work of Mann, Péguy, Barrès and Jünger. It is then shown that Heidegger posits a relation to place which combines the everyday experience of taking care, alongside our "authentic allies," of what is relevant to us and a poetic articulation of the *Heimat* as a place of dwelling. It will be argued that Heidegger does not require us to choose a particular scale at which to try to belong but understands authentic belonging as occurring simultaneously at various inter-related scales. This will conclude with a discussion of the nature of the Heideggerian *Volk* and the spatial *Da* of *Dasein*.

#### The Poetry of these Bounded Plains

Anthony Smith differentiated primordialism from "modernist" theories of the nation<sup>2004</sup> by the fact that it does not posit empirical borders established according to political imperatives. Smith gave the example of German nationalists of the nineteenth century, who compared the nation to an organism, as opposed to a social association.<sup>2005</sup> However, this dichotomy between the organic and the social is not universally recognized. Bayar, for example, points out that territorial boundaries often coincide with boundaries of ethnicity *and* those derived from social interactions, and thus questions the "dichotomy between constructivism and primordialism."<sup>2006</sup> As Bairner and May explain, primordialists tend to see the landscape as deeply enmeshed in the "process by which social and subjective identities are formed."<sup>2007</sup> This led Pierre Van der Berghe, a primordialist, to dismiss the dichotomies between "heredity vs. environment, nature vs. nurture, instinct vs. learning."<sup>2008</sup> As a result, the expectation of the scholarship seems to be that, for primordialist nationalism, there will not be a strong separation between the physical space and more abstract loci of spatiality. These types of spatiality will not compete, according to such expectations, but will be bound together in an interactive relationship.

These expectations are born out in the works of Péguy, Barrès, Mann, and Jünger. In *Scènes et Doctrines de Nationalisme*, Barrès argued that we are at home when engaged with our land,<sup>2009</sup> families, comrades and local religious institutions.<sup>2010</sup> Péguy bound the French space in accordance with natural features *and* the memory of those events that give these natural features their cultural meaning.<sup>2011</sup> Mann, in his *Reflections*, posits a dichotomy between the organizational— linked to the “enslavement of the individual” by “state absolutism”— and the organic, showing a clear preference for the latter.<sup>2012</sup> However, the organic was not identical to the natural world, but was equally present in the man-made environment of the town.<sup>2013</sup> In all cases we find that the physical and non-physical loci of spatial belonging are not necessarily in opposition but are inter-related aspects of a belonging which is at once material and spiritual. The complementarity, as opposed to oppositionality, of the physical and the abstract form of spatiality appears initially to be a point of agreement between Barrès, Péguy, Mann, and Jünger.

However, an important point of distinction emerges with respect to the way in which one is to relate to the community with whom one shares this space. Barrès celebrated common-sense and promoted a conformist vision of national belonging.<sup>2014</sup> Conformity to the collective is also present, though differently, in Jünger. He argued that belonging has nothing to do with “individual assent of the will”— associated with “bourgeois freedom”— but is the necessary result of “material interconnection.”<sup>2015</sup> Mann took an entirely different position. He argued that it is absurd to imagine that the virtue of the individual and the collective can be so conflated<sup>2016</sup> and that the community and the individual are, to a degree, always in tension.<sup>2017</sup> Interestingly, there is diversity with respect to the relative merits of rural and urban life— best illustrated by Jünger and Péguy. During his time in France, Jünger pined for the “age of magic,” which he associated with the farmsteads of St. Michel,<sup>2018</sup> and he romanticized the “salt of the earth”<sup>2019</sup> people who lived by the rhythms of nature and seemed untouched by the historical traumas unfolding nearby.<sup>2020</sup> Péguy, on the other hand, called for a subtle and historically sophisticated relation to France and her “*mystique*”— which demands no small amount of cultural education. He also believed that the

transmission of this mystique will have to come from the educated classes,<sup>2021</sup> and not from what he describes as the “heavy and cowardly mass of a formless people.”<sup>2022</sup> Only those, it seems, with the time and cultivation to do serious reading<sup>2023</sup>— a necessity for a “big internal life”<sup>2024</sup> of culture— can both cultivate everyday practices<sup>2025</sup> and access the poetic locale.

Additionally, the question of conflicting regional and national loyalties, and the question of how one might navigate a possible multiplicity of regions of dwelling, is dismissed by Jünger as a mere relic of the bourgeois age— meaningless in the coming imperium of the work-project.<sup>2026</sup> Mann, Péguy and Barrès also negated the interaction of sub-national, national and supra-national loci of *Mitsein*. Barrès tended to treat the regional identity as a source of and supplement to the national identity<sup>2027</sup>— a useful, politically potent source from which nationalist political movements can draw.<sup>2028</sup> Péguy, for his part, saw the local as a source of resistance to global capital,<sup>2029</sup> an important ally in that respect to the nation. Mann too noted with approval the porous boundaries between these levels.<sup>2030</sup> In different ways, we find that all four were, one way or another, neglecting the question of how to reconcile conflicting regional and national horizons of one’s poetically articulated region of Being. This was not a matter of dodging a discomfiting question but reflected a belief that these differing layers of belonging are complimentary.

For Barrès, it is the “poetry of these boundless plains,”<sup>2031</sup> which renders apprehensible the world of “the sky, of the woods, of the rivers, of French soil.”<sup>2032</sup> In other words, the significance of the land itself is *primarily* derived from the poetic images we conjure about it. Péguy, in *Notre Patrie*, uses the example of Notre Dame cathedral to demonstrate the centrality of the poetic to the inter-relation between the physical and non-physical locale. He argues that the very stones of the cathedral are imbued with the cultural memory of the ceremonies, mythologies and glories of France,<sup>2033</sup> such that they are as alive as the people praying within her walls.<sup>2034</sup> The physical space operates largely as a vehicle for the poetic, and thus we see, with both Péguy and Barrès, a certain primacy being given to the poetization of space over the physical locale itself. Jünger, on the other hand— though he lamented the degradation of the

environment by the systematization of space<sup>2035</sup>— argued that it is futile<sup>2036</sup> to resist the revolutionary transformation of our relationship with place.<sup>2037</sup> The poetic is subservient to the spirit of the age<sup>2038</sup> and will be instrumentalized towards “new tasks to master.”<sup>2039</sup> For Heidegger, as we shall see, the role of the poets is vital— yet Jünger is dismissive of this kind of orientation towards the surrounding world.

The physical space is a constitutive factor in the formation of the spatiality of Being for all of these writers. For Jünger and Mann— though not Barrès and Péguy— it is the space itself, every bit as much as any poetic account of it, that is formative. The community alongside whom we dwell in this space is, for Jünger and Barrès, the font of our proper relation to home— though Mann is fearful of the baneful potential of conformity. Finally, the inter-relation between different scales of belonging is not disruptive. The regional serves to bolster the national and, in Mann’s case, the national serves the international in turn. There are four themes that can be drawn from this, which will guide the analysis to come. Firstly, the nature of the inter-relation between the physical and the abstract locale. Secondly, the relationship between the individual and the community with whom that space is shared. Thirdly, the relationship between the regional and national place of belonging. Fourthly, and finally, the role of poetry.

#### *§ Mitsein and the Relational Network of Care*

By the time we begin to reflect on our existence, we are already some way into our experience of existing within the world. We initially encounter our surroundings “non-thematically” as something which was “always already there.”<sup>2040</sup> Our initial engagement with our world is pre-rational. Heidegger notes that “*the world is already presupposed* in one’s being together with things.”<sup>2041</sup> We do not immediately encounter an ordered theoretical contrivance but a network of inter-related things which, as far as we are concerned, has always been where they are now and always will be.<sup>2042</sup> We do not need to think the world in order to dwell within it. In fact, by the time we ask ourselves about this world, we have already developed relationships with other beings— be it our families, homes, or neighbours. We are thrown into a process of finding ourselves in the world that has already begun when we take it up consciously. It

quickly becomes apparent, though, that things are not arranged pell-mell, there is an apparent order to our world.

### The Relational Network of Care

Heidegger linked the concept of nearness to the “circumspection of taking care of things”— which Taminiaux described as a circumspect variant of *Phrōnesis*.<sup>2043</sup> Heidegger explained spatiality-as-circumspection in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* by using the example of a blackboard. He noted that when we say a blackboard is badly positioned, we are not adding an ideal of positionality to the concept of blackboard.<sup>2044</sup> The blackboard is not disclosed as an isolated phenomenon but as a part of a larger whole.<sup>2045</sup> We evaluate the position of the blackboard as a part of the classroom.<sup>2046</sup> The blackboard seems to be in the wrong place, seems not to be “at home,” when we notice its *incongruence* with the “manifestness of the lecture theatre.”<sup>2047</sup> The position appears incongruous both because it clashes with the orientation of other objects — as it would if it were at a forty-five degree angle to the direction of the seats— but also because it does not match our experience of being around objects like blackboards in our lives. We have experience of sitting in lectures, and it is not conventional that the lecturer lecture at a forty-five-degree angle. In other words, the “correct” orientation of things is historically conditioned. It is both the physical functionality of the orientation of things (more on this shortly) and our historically conditioned expectations that contribute to the positionality of things. The correctness of the placement, in Polt’s words, does not emerge from “geometrical abstraction” but from “a complex of places where things and human beings belong— or fail to belong.”<sup>2048</sup>

Things seem at-home when they are appropriately oriented and thus fit comfortably. Heidegger illustrated this in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” by discussing a bridge in Heidelberg. For Heidegger, “the bridge *gathers* the earth as landscape around the stream”— it “lets the stream run its course” but straddles it and “grants their way to mortals so they may come and go from shore to shore.”<sup>2049</sup> It sits perfectly on the pathway from the precincts of the castle to the surrounding villages. This location is not

inherently perfect according to formal geometric criteria— the bridge was placed somewhat more organically— but the location became perfect as the world around the bridge (such as the pathways) re-oriented themselves in light of its existence. Thus, positioning is co-constitutive, the bridge is located according to a surrounding world which itself changes to accommodate the bridge. The space of the bridge's *Dasein* is one where space has been “cleared” to accommodate a thing which itself conforms to a position within the broader network.<sup>2050</sup> The significance of this is that this network is an emergence, not an *a priori* structure to which things must conform. It is, in Dallmayr's words, a mutually constitutive relation of “co-being” marked by engagement and attentiveness<sup>2051</sup> or, in Heidegger's language, by care.

Utility is vital to understanding everyday *Mitsein*, which primarily involves heedfully encountering being within the context of work— in taking up, literally, things that are “handy in [our] taking care” of our world.<sup>2052</sup> We decide, as Harries puts it, that certain things matter and in saying that something matters we are called into a particular relation to it,<sup>2053</sup> creating a world of meaning within which we and the thing exist.<sup>2054</sup> We do not see the “meaning” of a thing merely by looking at it,<sup>2055</sup> but must interact with it and thus ascertain the “definite possibilities of its existence.”<sup>2056</sup> We see the objects before us as parts of broader “*totality of useful things*”<sup>2057</sup> to which we also belong. However, we can easily fall into the habit of ascertaining the “relevance” of a thing only *to us*— to our projects— in taking care of that which lies at hand.<sup>2058</sup> As such, our knowing of things, our capacity to grasp the things around us, is constituted by the *projects* that clarify what a thing means *for us*.<sup>2059</sup> Thus, knowing itself is grounded in care within the context of the already existing at-hand network of things that we look at and dwell with.<sup>2060</sup>

We are initially called to our region— away from an uncanny “standing together” with that which lies about us<sup>2061</sup>— by what Heidegger called the “call of care.”<sup>2062</sup> Simultaneously, we are called “*back to thrownness*” as the null ground which we *have* to “take up into existence.” In simpler terms, we become aware that we have inherited a specific region of Being, over which we have no choice but which our existence requires us to take up.<sup>2063</sup> Importantly, this allows us to project before ourselves our “ownmost

potentiality-of-being”— those options that are available to us.<sup>2064</sup> *Dasein*, there-being, is disclosed in these interactions, revealing itself as the centre around which we gather things— determining their proximity according to their relevance— and bring them to abide beside us within the region of relevant things that lie nearby. The locale, in Traver’s terms, is transformed from the “inchoate plenitude” of things within a measurable radius to a “tangible place” within which the *Dasein* “finds its identity.”<sup>2065</sup>

We do not, though, only dwell among things. We also share our world, for better or worse, with other people. It is hard, Heidegger notes in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” for us to reduce other people to the status of “mere things,” as we might do with stones or pieces of wood.<sup>2066</sup> Heidegger explains, returning to *Being and Time*, that another person does not “have the kind of being of useful things at hand”— we cannot just pick them up and use them as tools— but can tell that the other person “is itself *Dasein*,”<sup>2067</sup> a being capable of. Thus, the relation with human beings must be considered separately, as it now will be.

### They-Being

*Dasein* is never isolated from others— Dreyfus noted that we are impacted by things as small as observing how others use their cutlery.<sup>2068</sup> Dreyfus was also correct to point out that before we enter into any intentional state of being-with others, we have already been socialized into living with others.<sup>2069</sup> Heidegger argues in *Being and Time* that the *Dasein* finds itself,<sup>2070</sup> and decides what to do, within the world that it shares with other people.<sup>2071</sup> These others are not primarily those from whom we distinguish ourselves but those from whom we *do not* distinguish ourselves.<sup>2072</sup> That is to say, when one encounters another, one is struck by the realization that this other has an inner life, shares our concern about Being and is engaged in a similar project of trying to grasp what Being is. In this sense, we encounter a mirror-image of ourselves. The other, here, does not press upon us and push us towards conformity with “public” expectations, for the encounter with others is a mutually co-constitutive meeting of ontological equals. It

is in these encounters that the worldly character of those beings immediately surrounding us is revealed.<sup>2073</sup> Thus, people around us have the potential of awakening our need to answer the *Seinsfrage*.

There is, though, a danger that stalks the *Dasein* in its everyday engagement with those around it. Heidegger explained, in his Nietzsche lectures, that the utilitarian character of our interactions with things can, and often does, lead to a way of thinking that is subservient to our turning those things to our purposes.<sup>2074</sup> We are born into a world that appears, to a great extent, to have been oriented primarily towards utility. Heidegger returns to the example of the lecture hall, noting that when we look around we are not seeing “chaos” but rather an “ordered, articulated region out of which objects that pertain to one another stand over against us.”<sup>2075</sup> The order that has been imposed upon “chaos” is determined by “practical needs” which relate to the “practical behaviour” or “praxis of life” that is the context in which our everyday engagement with the world is grounded.<sup>2076</sup> It is precisely in our ordinary, everyday engagement with the world that we come to be entangled in a relation of utility to objects, and as a result to be entangled in a relation to the world as a whole where knowing becomes an exercise in the “schematizing of chaos carried out in accordance with practical life-needs.”<sup>2077</sup> Heidegger stated this most pointedly in *What is Called Thinking?*, arguing that what we engage with initially has the “unearthly power to break us of the habit of abiding in what is essential, often so definitely that we never come to abide anywhere.”<sup>2078</sup> In simpler terms, when we participate in the activities of everyday life, we are being socialized into a way of relating to objects which understands them in terms of a particular utility. We will see the lecture hall, returning to a favourite example, as a constellation of objects gathered together from the chaos of mere matter and oriented towards the production of educated persons, which itself is understood as part of broader constellation of objects oriented towards the advancement of society or the expansion of the economy. Thus, an initial engagement with a world where things seem to be organised for a reason becomes a comprehensive, instrumentalist view of the world. This causes us to be blinded to the essence of a thing and to the way it fits into the broader network of world.

This danger, though, is worth the risk because of what stands to be gained. It is the care relation that, initially and for the most part, reveals to us the world and our place within it. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger tied resoluteness to care<sup>2079</sup> and argued that from our place of dwelling we gain insight into our place in our world. So far, this appears to lend itself quite readily to a communitarian reading, with the surrounding human beings and our relations to them conditioning not only our socialization but also our sense of self and way of being-in-the-world. However, Heidegger argues in the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures* that there is a “customary” conception of “belonging together” which involves the other defining our “useful” properties and then classifying us “under the gathering of a together,” within “the unity of a system.”<sup>2080</sup> One can think of this, practically, as the possibility that our community might categorize us as a “convict,” a “dependant,” an “enemy of the state” etc. (as well as more conventional forms of categorization like plumber, teacher, or “senior”). We cease to be ourselves, becoming exemplars of the category to which we have been assigned. Often, the individual contributes to this. For example, one might adopt the standards and preferences of the “they” as absolute— or one might decide to subsume one’s own projects and ambitions in favour of the community. One is particularly likely to make this choice in light of the obliteration of private space— our refuge from the they— by modern technologies.<sup>2081</sup>

Placing such a premium on the nearby— and lamenting that nearness is being lost to the abstractions of modernity— aligns Heidegger with primordialist nationalism’s focus upon the intimate and lamentation of the spatial void opened by universalist abstraction.<sup>2082</sup> Simultaneously, as Dreyfus noted, the they cover overs, and blinds us to, the truth.<sup>2083</sup> As a result, any nationalism that would make the *vox populi vox Dei* would be falling prey to the “they” in the manner described by Heidegger.

### The Authentic Alliance

The inner and outerworldly are intertwined, our projects and the things we encounter as potential tools co-constitute one-another’s being. Heidegger frequently specified that spatiality is not uniquely a phenomenon of the external world, but also a characterization of our internal worlds.<sup>2084</sup> There can be no

firm boundary between what Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, called the “innerworldly” region— or “inner sphere”— of the conscious being and the external world within which we exist.<sup>2085</sup> Also, in the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger speaks to a conceptual spatiality, melding the “worldly” and the “spiritual.”<sup>2086</sup> Heidegger’s discussion of space in *Basic Concepts*, too, refers as much to the space of “the clearing”— a “peculiar abode”<sup>2087</sup> which is, at present “still concealed”<sup>2088</sup>— as it does to any physical space. Heidegger makes frequent reference to this concept of the clearing. It is evident, in light of this prior discussion, that he is not speaking about an escape from the physical space of the polis, it is not necessary to retreat into the wilderness or to a hut in the Black Forest to find it. The clearing is, rather, a conceptual space where we are able to gain an unfettered view of the truth. In ordinary conversation, we might say that we are seeking or that we have having gained clarity about a situation, and many can relate to the experience of finding a perspective from which a matter suddenly appears clear. This does not necessarily require that we move from our armchairs. On the other hand, Heidegger was, famously, the scholar who stayed in the provinces, praised the wisdom of country-folk, and secluded himself in a cabin in the woods. Furthermore, Heidegger employed the analogy with the forest clearing, which we find by traversing through the woods. This metaphorical change of place— in light of the seeming connection between everyday business and urban life— might seem intrinsically linked to, at the very least, finding a quiet spot to think. Heidegger would argue in his Hegel lectures that our sensory experiences are connected to the world of ideas.<sup>2089</sup> Thus we see, across Heidegger’s oeuvre, an argument for the inter-relation of physical and conceptual space. What, then, does it mean to dwell within these inter-related physical and conceptual spaces?

Heidegger, in the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, distinguished the “part”— which shares in the whole while retaining its status as a unique thing<sup>2090</sup>— from the “piece”— which has no substantial being outside of the machine.<sup>2091</sup> The piece is replaceable, there are equivalents lying in reserve,<sup>2092</sup> and its purpose is flexible. The part, in contrast, is hard to replace, having a specific and distinct purpose, and is thus resolute in its being itself. This distinction can be illustrated as follows: The part may to be considered

as akin to a cartwright, a part of the rural economy, as opposed to a piece, which is like a spring in a clock. The cartwright is resolutely a cartwright because the significant investment of training and education needed to perform their task is such that they cannot simply be replaced by drawing a new cartwright from an undifferentiated manifold of tradespeople in the village. In contrast, should a spring in a clock begin to malfunction, one could simply reach into a box of springs and find an almost identical piece that is equally capable of performing the task, replacing the original without a discernible impact on the performance of the clock.<sup>2093</sup> We exist within this spatiotemporal world as parts, rather than pieces. Heidegger turned, unsurprisingly, to *poiesis* to demonstrate this— specifically to *Shoes* (1888) by Vincent Van Gogh (who, we note *en passant*, was “deemed a degenerate painter by the Nazis”<sup>2094</sup>).

The shoes, Wollan notes, are dirty and worn<sup>2095</sup> from the peasant woman wearing them as she labours (or abides perhaps) in the fields. The Being of the shoes shines forth in this unveiling of the place of the shoe-part in the work and the world of their owner.<sup>2096</sup> Heidegger explained, in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, that each shoe is, “resting-within-itself” as a thing that *belongs* to a place.<sup>2097</sup> In painting them, Van Gogh— Krell notes— brings us before the “world of the peasant.”<sup>2098</sup> The shoe, as Taminioux put it, “exhibits the world as well as [its] natural ground”<sup>2099</sup> and reveals its *Dasein*— enlightening us to the possible discovery of our own *Dasein*<sup>2100</sup> and that of our people.<sup>2101</sup> As we gaze upon the peasant woman’s world, the place of her shoes “emerges into the unconcealedness of Being’s *aletheia*”<sup>2102</sup> coming to stand in the light of the region of being that the shoes inhabit and interact with.<sup>2103</sup> Outside of this, the shoes might be an inscrutable thing whose form and material are visible but whose meaning is obscured.<sup>2104</sup> To encounter things in this way— to stand before them, gaze on them, and allow their region to shine forth before us— constitutes what Wollan calls the circumspect discovery of space.<sup>2105</sup>

Notably, Heidegger might have given us a similar analysis of Aimé-Jules Dalou’s *Le Grand Paysan*, demonstrating that the thingliness of a pair of shoes and the thingliness of a human being relate rather closely. One can imagine the peasant woman passing by Dalou’s *paysan*, or at least his Dutch

equivalent, and recognizing— to borrow the language of *Being and Time*— that “they devote themselves to the same thing in common” (the working of the land) and that “their doing so is determined by the *Dasein* that each has grasped as their own” (be it as the Dutch or the peasant *Dasein*).<sup>2106</sup> They thus share an “authentic alliance”— a fellowship born of their shared orientation in and relation of care towards a shared region of Being, the field. This authentic alliance emerges from our sharing common projects with others which, Heidegger argues in *Being and Time*, “makes possible the proper kind of objectivity [*Sachlichkeit*] which frees the other for himself in his freedom.”<sup>2107</sup> In this encounter— in the context of a region, in the course of work— we encounter something other than interchangeable labourers standing in reserve.<sup>2108</sup> *Mitsein*, in this encounter, is revealed to be a matter of “Being-together.” One should note use of the word “together” in place of the more conventional translation: “with.” There is a difference between the simple coinciding of my presence *with* that of others— as when conscripts are ordered into battalions alongside lines of other recruits— and being present somewhere *together* with others— as when friends band together to cook an ostentatious meal together. It is the difference between having been thrown into the same milieu and a genuine fellowship with those alongside whom acts.

We have distinguished between *Mitsein* as the mutual co-constitution of Self and other and the relation of utility where the they-self determines the “equipment use and the point of such use”<sup>2109</sup> within the standing reserve. There is an innate equality to the authentic alliance. It is not the community setting upon us and deciding that we are convicts, unemployed persons etc. Rather, the self encounters the other and the two mutually recognize one another within the relational network that emerges from the care-projects of each. These care projects are themselves derived from an authentic orientation within the broader world that emerges from a mutual thrownness into becoming and a mutual belonging to the *Heimat*. As a result— and this is a clear reflection of Heidegger’s rather romantic conception of country life— we do not define the other egoistically as competitors or people to be used, but we and the other mutually recognize one another as parts of the broader world of people and things with whom we interact

as we live our lives. Authentic *Mitsein* is not merely a matter of living alongside one's fellows, nor of happening to coincide with them according to some categorical definition (race, nationality, etc.). It is a matter of being, in vulgar terms, team-mates. We take care of projects which, though they may be our own, tie us into a world of interdependence with others, thus creating an alliance born of common embeddedness in a shared world, generating the togetherness which is integral to authentic *Mitsein*.

We should, of course, take pause here to complicate the lovely pastoral image that is being painted. It is of course possible to continue building outwards from this conception of authentic alliances, to eventually encompass a conception of our common care for our continent with those other nations with whom we share it, and then our need to take care of our planet, creating a kind of authentic alliance between all peoples and an all-inclusive authentic *Mitsein*. Of course, this is not what Heidegger himself did and merely to describe it is to sound naïve at best. In fact, the authentic alliance is inextricably linked to the logics of exclusion and the demonization of enemies, both without and within, that have been identified as dangers in Heidegger's thought. Alliances, almost always, are against something or someone, and thus to be allied with one is, usually, to be in alliance against another. One sees this clearly in the way that Heidegger construes America and Russia as an enemy alliance arraigned not only against Germany but against the project of authentic belonging itself. Similarly, in a society that contains cultural, religious, and political diversity there is also little possibility that everyone will understand the authentic care project in exactly the same way. Some members of the community can easily come to be seen as saboteurs. Even outside of nationalistic appropriation one can see how the person who construes our authentic project as being the protection of the earth from climate change could come to see the oilman—who might see the authentic project as being energy independence from Russia—as an enemy. Under normal circumstances, diversity can be managed by compromise, but where alliances are tied to authenticity, the other can easily become the enemy of authenticity itself, with whom one cannot negotiate, compromise, or learn to live.

Such alliances *can* function as an inclusive community— one need only take care of one’s surroundings— but also carries the danger of making those divisions that inevitably arise in diverse societies existential.

It is vital to note that *poiesis* plays an invaluable role in allowing the “authentic alliance” to take the place of a simple existing in the vicinity of another. This poetic founding of one’s native region simply cannot be replicated through *theoria*. It is important to distinguish the natural acculturation to the environment into which we are born from the artificial, metaphysical simulacrum. We think ourselves capable of grasping, for example, a foreign culture by setting upon it and categorizing it in some way— covering over the strangeness of the alien. Central to Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics was the charge that it replaces the bound space within which we look at the actual things that surround us with abstractions. Thus, we engage thoughtlessly with semblances of place rather than with our actual places of “habitation.”<sup>2110</sup> For Heidegger, the essence of *Dasein* lies in existence,<sup>2111</sup> as opposed to what Kolb sees as the abstraction of representation.<sup>2112</sup> Existing within in a particular region is a non-negotiable, eternal and fundamental characteristic of *Dasein*, and it is clear that this region is founded in *poiēsis*. To substantiate the nature of space that so arises, though, we must attend to the matter of borders.

### § *Whither the Borders?*

#### Horizons, Spheres, and the Gigantic

In the immediate sense, place is bordered by what we can reach out and find at-hand, what is literally, metaphorically, or psychologically within our grasp— for example, concepts we easily understand and communicate in conversation. However, place also has the more capacious borders of what Gjermund Wollan terms the “space character in our understanding.”<sup>2113</sup> This represents the limits of what we can grasp, and determines our “region of sensibility” which is but “one section of the great chaos that the world itself is.”<sup>2114</sup> The projection of distance up to physical or political boundaries surrounding our locale is less decisive than what Heidegger, in *Basic Concepts*, called the conceptual “differentia” which separate what

is familiar and what is strange and foreign.<sup>2115</sup> The abode, in such a telling, is delimited by a border separating that which we can grasp intuitively and that which we struggle to get to grips with. This, already, precludes the idea that the boundaries of the *Heimat* could be established simply by fact of a battle being lost or won, a treaty signed, or a territorial transfer imposed here or there. The formal, political borders of the homeland pale in comparison with the relationship of familiarity or estrangement that a person may hold with a particular place. Thus, a political bordered space constitutes, to borrow from Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures, "no *milieu* at all."<sup>2116</sup> The question remains, though, as to the scale upon which such horizons of sensibility can be imposed.

The scale of these horizons is clarified by comparison with Sloterdijk's social-spatial inside-outside dynamic. Sloterdijk, like Heidegger, describes an inside wherein we secure ourselves— within our "temples, walls and stores"<sup>2117</sup>— which in turn form our immediate, everyday world of being. It protects, sometime literally, those inside from external forces.<sup>2118</sup> Vitally, Sloterdijk's spheres are established according to the limits of practicality. In particular, the horizons of the shared home-sphere are limited by our capacity to deal with human waste,<sup>2119</sup> such that he amusingly concludes that "when Heidegger emphasizes that "in *Dasein* there lies an essential tendency towards closeness," the approving exegete can only add that this closeness must, like it or not, include proximity to the constitutive latrines."<sup>2120</sup> Sloterdijk inserts "like it or not" because, quite obviously, Heidegger would not like it. For Heidegger, it is our comportment towards things in general which allows the horizons to radiate out away from us, establishing a region whose borders are established from out of the *Dasein* itself— centred on the mind, rather than the practical limits established by the capacities of a sewage system. Sloterdijk is unconvinced of the viability of the nation as the reification of this home-sphere, arguing that the political reification of the "life-world" is "clearly unachievable in large-scale bodies politic."<sup>2121</sup> One might conclude that this is the result of sewage systems being more difficult to extend over vast terrains than it is to project, poetically, a sense of belonging-to over the span of a large nation like Germany or France.

There is ample evidence in Heidegger's work that he was sceptical that a large-scale body politic could embody the region of at-homeness. For example, a central aspect of his critique of modern communications technology is that they give the appearance of bringing the far away "near" while annihilating spatiality itself. However, Heidegger's own discussion of truth will, as we see in "The Thing," employed the metaphorical language of bringing a thing from far to near— though in this case near as in readily available to our understanding.<sup>2122</sup> This cannot, though, be done by a mere shift in attitude nor, certainly, by a monarch telling someone that they are no longer a Mercian but are now an Englishman. As Malpas notes, Heidegger called us to a relation to place where we listen and learn from that which lies at hand, to which we are attuned,<sup>2123</sup> and never abandon this in favour of something grander.

Heidegger argued in *The Essence of Human Freedom* that certain things "stand at one's disposal" because they are "fixed and stable" and, therefore, "constantly attainable and at hand."<sup>2124</sup> We need not seek such things out but find ourselves already at home amongst them. We grasp our native culture, for example, without effort because we are acculturated into it.<sup>2125</sup> This does, though, raise several important questions. For example, one might protest that it is not necessarily the case that one's "own" geographic locale aligns with the space character of one's understanding. One can imagine a Canadian gap-year student backpacking in Cambodia and claiming that they "vibe" with Cambodian culture and thus find it more graspable than a Canadian "home" that they detest. In this case, the Heideggerian would be dismissive. The historical thrownness of *Dasein* and the centrality of initial, everyday experience— which is inherently tied to the place one lives— to *Dasein* precludes the possibility that one might stumble across one's "true" home on holiday. However, this becomes less clear if our gap-year student is inspired to dedicate the next fifty years of their life to the study of all things Cambodian. At what point would they obtain an everyday at-homeness in Cambodia? Can the taking up of a Cambodian historical thrownness be learned over time? Heidegger, of course, wrote before the age of Schengen but, nevertheless, lived in a

Germany where immigration, exile and nomadism were known quantities. The status of dual nationals, immigrants, or exiles remains unanswered by Heidegger. Also pressing is the matter of regionalism.

### Regionalism or Nationalism?

It is not clear that a country can contain only things that are familiar to a person living within it. A Saxon who has never visited Baden-Württemberg, for example, can hardly claim that Baden-Württemberg is familiar to them, nor can they realistically claim it to be “unconcealed” and “apprehensible” given that they might not even know where precisely it is. On the other hand, a French citizen in the Basque region might realistically claim that the Spanish Basque— nearby physically, economically, culturally, religiously, and socially— *is* apprehensible in a way that Paris is not. The nationalist might counter that this is too practically focused, too Sloterdijkian, and that the Saxon is tied to Baden-Württemberg by the shared, poetically constructed experience of essential thrownness into the German region of Rilke and Hölderlin’s poetry.<sup>2126</sup> When Heidegger called us to a “fidelity to being” that can never “readily abandon the locale,”<sup>2127</sup> it is unclear whether he was calling us to our nations, counties, towns, or villages.

Heidegger, no doubt, showed a strong preference for regions like Swabia over Berlin, and Adorno effectively mocks the rather delusional aspect of some of his romanticization of Swabia.<sup>2128</sup> In 1933, Heidegger refused a post at the University of Berlin and justified this, according to Adrian Wilding, by arguing that one cannot think Berlin.<sup>2129</sup> At the same time, Heidegger was at pains to point out that philosophical conversation does not *have* to take place with reference only to the more “tied to nature” existence of a peasant.<sup>2130</sup> He specified that the realm of the earth that he called the homeland [*Heimat*] is not merely a realm of nature<sup>2131</sup> and that the sort of organicism (the “biological-organic worldview”) that might lead us to think of spaces of trees and rivers as superior to a worldless or “artificial” realm of universities and banks ignores the “all-encompassing” aspect of nature. Heidegger, in fact, associated organicism in general with scientism, the will to power and, thus, nihilism. Heidegger made this point most explicitly in “Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” where he connected organicism directly to

a schematic of life which “destroys the essence of life, i.e., the restlessness and movement.”<sup>2132</sup> Cities are as much a part of Hölderlin’s poetic whole as are rural towns. Heidegger’s preference for Swabia did not rest upon a claim that one can more authentically be-in within the more intimate region of a province. Rather, it resulted, as Wilding posits, from it being *his* region, the one in which he grew up<sup>2133</sup>— though Heidegger gave some objective reasons for this preference.<sup>2134</sup> Furthermore, though Berlin is Germany’s capital, one must, for Heidegger, resist the temptation to associate Berlin with the German national idea— Heidegger seeing the spirit of the German historical *Dasein* in the world of Hölderlin’s Rhine. As Wilder again notes, a strong pastoralism typifies Heidegger’s thinking regarding Germany.<sup>2135</sup>

For Heidegger, our alienation from Being is encouraged by influences that cloud our encounter with it and inhibit our capacity to perceive that which lies around us. Metaphysics pushes us, instead, to abstract our surroundings into an assemblage of symbols to which we can relate subjectively.<sup>2136</sup> The baneful impact of these abstractions lies in their moving reflection away from the particularities that surround the thinker. What Heidegger admired in the peasantry was not primarily their character, but their way of relating to the world. As Savage notes, he admired them for relating to the homeland not as the “locus communis [...] a featureless terrain flattened out by cartographers” but as the “daimónios tópos of the people of Being, the ‘creative landscape’ to which professor and peasant co-respond through their wordless agreement.”<sup>2137</sup> In particular, he admired their capacity to engage with their surroundings in a way which is, as Josephine Donovan puts it, “uncontaminated” by “modernity” and “closer to authentic Being.”<sup>2138</sup> In short, they are circumspect in their engagement with their world and other people in it.

Things become more equivocal, though, when one notes Heidegger’s own language— and this is meant both in terms of language *for* Heidegger and the language *of* Heidegger— with respect to this subject. Heidegger certainly, as Donovan notes, made claims for the special, revelatory, and luminous quality of the dialects of the German regions.<sup>2139</sup> At the same time, as Dallmayr noted, this regional dialect is a “nourishing stream” rather than an “isolated backwater.”<sup>2140</sup> That is to say, much as folk culture can

feed high culture, regional dialects feed into the luminous qualities of the German language itself. There is, then, a layered relationship between regional dialects and the national language, the former functioning as a source and foundation for the latter, and they are not in competition. This reflects Heidegger's conception of the relationship between region and nation. Heidegger often speaks of Germany as *Heimat*, but, in his eulogy for the composer Conradin Kreutzer, describes Swabia as a *Heimat* alongside East Prussia, Silesia, and Bohemia.<sup>2141</sup> Much as with language, Heidegger's own loyalty to Swabia— and indeed rootedness in a sub-national region in general— should not be seen as a form of resistance against nationalism.

For Heidegger, then, region and nation are not in conflict because of the layered nature of our dwelling. The notion that national conceptions of community are necessarily in conflict with sub-national,<sup>2142</sup> religious,<sup>2143</sup> or civilizational<sup>2144</sup> loci of community informs much nationalism scholarship. However, the central primordial assertion— that belonging to one's group is, in some fundamental sense, natural and innate— tends to lead to the affirmation of whatever ties of community hold sway with the people in question. As such, the mere fact of porous and co-existent levels of spatiality in Heidegger's thought is less significant to the discussion at hand than expected, for we find that Mann, Péguy, and Barrès accounted for multilayered forms of spatially bound belonging and posited that different levels of community can even complement one another. However, we find, in Heidegger a more detailed exploration of the way in which these layers interact, to which attention will now be turned.

### § *Das Volk and the Concentric Circles of the Heimat*

#### Who is the *Volk*?

In simple terms, the *Volk* consists of those who initially ground themselves in a limited locale according to a shared understanding of the concrete situation of being in a particular place— in the initial relation of care with respect to what lies at hand within that space. If it seeks an authentic relation to Being, though,

the *Volk* will also seek to ground itself in a relation to Being as such and as a whole. This conceptual space, the “Spielraum” [play-space]<sup>2145</sup> where we seek the truth of Being, is as integral to the *Heimat* as the physical space of fields and forests. This link between the initial experience of dwelling and the questioning of Being was a theme common to early and late works. For example, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that it is in encountering other people that we realize human beings are distinguished from other beings by the fact that “this being is concerned *about* its very being.”<sup>2146</sup> This realization eventually leads us to question Being itself.<sup>2147</sup>

However, this argument is made most clearly in “On the Essence of Ground,” where Heidegger states that “grounding something means *making possible to why-question in general*”<sup>2148</sup> and that, therefore, “even the earliest questioning concerning the essence of *ground* shows itself to be entwined with the task of shedding light upon the essence of *being* and *truth*.”<sup>2149</sup> This leaves us in no doubt that grounding ourselves in our place of belonging is not merely a matter of everyday taking care, but links that experience of *Mitsein* directly to the *Seinsfrage*. It is for this reason that our definition of *Mitsein* as “Being-together” capitalized Being. Heidegger, as Dallmayr noted, linked the “spatial-temporal site of thereness” to the manifestation of “ontological truth.”<sup>2150</sup> More important still, Dallmayr noted that our place within the bounds of the world of a *Dasein* is not necessarily a “stable habitat” like a valley or hill but is the “arena of the perennial contest between being and nothingness.”<sup>2151</sup> Dallmayr was entirely correct: It is clear that, for Heidegger, the stimulation of the questioning of Being— as opposed to mere satisfaction with belonging at the level of beings— is vital to authentic community. Indeed, it is what separates one’s authentic allies— those alongside whom we are thrown into our everyday engagements of care but also the existential project of questioning Being— from the they-self. In simple terms, what separates authentic *Mitsein* from falling prey to the they is whether or not one’s community acts upon one in a way that stimulates or impedes curiosity about Being.

The region of the *Volk* emanates outwardly from particular cultural nodal points, but it does not fix us in place. One should not shrink one's world down to one's particular horizon, which would result in the kind of "region of perspectives and horizons" which Heidegger associated with relativism and meaninglessness.<sup>2152</sup> Rather, our rootedness in the local ought always lead us back to the primordial relation to Being which transposes us into the expanse of beings. Thus, our relation to the near-at-hand will simultaneously bind us to the local sphere and push us outward into the expanse of the unconcealed. Therefore, while the nation will be integral to these concentric circles of the horizons of *Mitsein*; the nation is not, and can never be, our whole world.

### The *Spielraum* of the Poets

Heidegger bounds region not only with natural barriers — mountains for example— but with the finitude of the space in which we can have "familiar and heedful dealing" with the beings we encounter<sup>2153</sup>— thus linking region to history. However, as Mitchell notes, the gathering together of things around the *Dasein*— which establishes, and also delimits, the familiar space— cannot be a "framework that surrounds from without."<sup>2154</sup> In practical terms, this means that if, to give one example, a schoolteacher were to attempt to inculcate a sense of national identity in their students by showing them a map of France, telling them that this hexagon is theirs and outside of it is the realm of others— and that this France-object, thus bound, is imbued with this or that character— they would be attempting to sensitize the students to an externally given fixed ground plan of the region-as-object.<sup>2155</sup> This would represent a conscription of the students into the national body, rather than a gathering by the students themselves of the region of the *Heimat* according to heedful concern with what lies around them as they dwell. Heedful concern requires a narrower conception of world— defined by a familiarity born of working on and with the things around us. Therein lies the distinction between existing *alongside* unfamiliar things and *dwelling* amongst the near and the familiar.<sup>2156</sup> "Being-in" concerns the manner in which we stand amongst familiar things, things

that we protect, care for and nurture. This is integral to our relation to space, we *are* according to our “stay among things and locations,”<sup>2157</sup> and are defined by this cultivation.

Once again, a special role is reserved for poets and artists. Hölderlin, for example, brings before us the tradition of Germanness contained by the Rhine— revealing, in doing so, that which is to be taken up by the German *Dasein*. This arises from the shared destiny, thrown from a shared endowment, that makes Germans authentic allies in Being. In Fritsche’s words, the German historical community “tears the authentic individuals back out of the possibilities practised so far, back out of society, and reveals to them their fates, their role in history and their places in the community of the people.”<sup>2158</sup> Heidegger noted in his Nietzsche lectures that, “every creating is a sharing with others,”<sup>2159</sup> therefore where Hölderlin uses his talents to “found” the historical *Dasein* of the German people, he is performing an invaluable and irreplaceable “service.” He is revealing— or more accurately allowing to shine-forth before us— the truth of the homeland. He reveals the shared space of the authentic projects that we are to take up as thrown and those who will be our authentic allies in this endeavour. When combined with the centrality of the poetic founding described above, this leads us to conclude by recognizing the inter-relatedness of the physical and the conceptual space, but granting— even if Heidegger himself did not do so overtly— a greater existential import to the poetical retrieval of the truths of the *Heimat* embedded within the physical locale than to geographic features themselves.

Poetic spatiality makes possible our accessing of the special, conceptual space which Heidegger calls the *Spielraum*. The *Spielraum*, literally the “space of play” is the open space in which we are free to engage in the play of thinking— the experimentation, the debate, the exploration etc. that is the stuff of a Heideggerian *Denken*. It is only within this *Spielraum* that the *Volk* can “freely transform itself into history.”<sup>2160</sup> For Zimmerman, it is in establishing this *Spielraum* that we truly take up our historical endowment and discharge our anointed task.<sup>2161</sup> The *Spielraum* can be understood as a conceptual space— though doubtless dependent on practical political or institutional conditions— wherein one is free to

engage in play with ideas and concepts. It contains both a physical free-space wherein this play may occur— such as a seminar room (provided the university and government do not inhibit freedom of thought)— and the inner, psychological space where one is free from both the clutter of everyday business and from the inhibitions imposed by limiting systems of thought. In other words, one enters into the *Spielraum* only when one is free, in a literal sense, to play with ideas<sup>2162</sup> but also a conceptual space where one is able to engage with mystery, with uncertainty and with the genuinely novel without being compelled, by an intellectual force, to try to make things fit, for example, into a pictorialization.

*Dasein* is never “initially the sort of a being which is free from being-in”<sup>2163</sup> and, as such, its essence can only be understood in the context of the space it occupies. The *Da*, our place of dwelling, belongs to us and we belong within it. We continually “have to do with” the beings that immediately surround us, though in the modern condition we are also alienated from them. At the same time, there is a simultaneous boundedness and boundlessness to the *Volk*, a community defined by its shared concern with, simultaneously, the highly localised world of the things that lie immediately before us and our linguistic and cultural community and the capacious “world” of those who are concerned with the question of Being. The *Volk* is thus, as Young notes, bound to a “fixed and stable location”<sup>2164</sup> but these boundaries are porous. It should be noted that while the nationalist thought that has been brought to bear on this comparison has shown some capacity— particularly in the cases of Mann and Péguy— to account for some porousness, this remains a significant challenge to the brand of nationalism that one can observe rising in contemporary Europe. Today, the solidity of borders lies at the centre of the nationalist political pitch— with opposition to immigration and “open borders” being integral. Where this is grounded on practical or economic arguments about hospital capacity and joblessness, or even where it is defended by appeal to democracy and rule of law, it represents a myopic focus on the everyday politics discussed in chapter eight— where it makes appeal to a more identitarian notion that we cannot meaningfully be a

people if we do not draw hard and impenetrable borders between inside and outside, it falls foul of this conception of the *Spielraum*. This becomes clear when we approach this matter via the concept of horizons.

Horizons are, Heidegger explained in *Nietzsche: Vol III*, “not a wall that cuts man off” but are “translucent.”<sup>2165</sup> Horizons can be “measured and seen through” to something that lies outside<sup>2166</sup>— to a region that is obscured in our everyday, local relations of care. Here, of course, we recall that this openness does not preclude the possibility of dangerous forms of exclusion and demonization of those who might, for one reason or another, come to be deemed as outside of the authentic fellowship. We can, nevertheless, conceptualize the *Heimat* of a *Volk* in terms of concentric circles with translucent horizons, the spaces within which become less immediately ready-to-hand as they expand. At the centre we have the immediate locale— the space of those objects near at hand about which we are concerned. These emanate outward from a nodal point, such as a temple, which centres— as Dreyfus, Rubin and Clark note— the life of a community.<sup>2167</sup> Through the horizons, we ascertain the region of the historical *Dasein* of our people, circumscribed by our thrownness into common origins, projects and destinies. Beyond that lies the region of the nation and, further still, a supranational region— in Heidegger’s case, this is the West: bound by the history of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche. Further still, one can perhaps barely discern a further horizon, that beyond which lie the misty regions of Being as such.

### The Wanderer and the Heimat

Where the primordialist nationalist conception of origins, thrownness and destiny (particularly death) clearly fell afoul of a Heideggerian understanding of an authentic relation to Being, it is less immediately obvious that this is the case with respect to place. The political locationality of the thinker has been shown to be markedly different between Heidegger and Mann, Péguy, Barrès and Jünger<sup>2168</sup>— though in both cases tradition and custom are a central social font of an authentic being-with. Furthermore, the physical aspect of the land itself— with the caveat that Heidegger accentuated the poetization of the homeland— was shown to have a significant impact on the *Da* of *Dasein*. Most of our primordialist nationalists share in Heidegger’s preference for rural life, his suspicion of irreverence and his distaste for a cosmopolitanism that negates place. On the other hand, it is far from obvious that Heidegger’s conception of the authentic spatiality of *Dasein* can be reconciled with a nation-state. The following chapter demonstrates that, as with time, the primordialist nationalist understanding of spatiality falls short of an authentic relation to Being and inhibits our attaining one. This authentic relation to Being will then be explored by way of an analysis of Heidegger’s god-concept and his metaphorical language of wandering and homecoming.

#### *§ The Inauthenticity of Primordialist Nationalist Spatiality*

The instrumentalist nature of primordialist nationalism is clear from its deep enmeshment in practical politics. Barrès, in the clearest example, justified his philosophical project as an instrument— though he described it in terms of service<sup>2169</sup>— to ensure French patriotism and courage in the coming battles with Germany.<sup>2170</sup> The matter of pictorialization is equally clear. The simple fact of dividing the world according to the fixed ground plan of the Westphalian system divides and orders the world according to this schema. The nation-state system operates as something of a projection of the collective ego into the world. The gathering about us of the “being and the human” ought instead to be marked by a spatial “positionality” which “lets human and being belong to each other.”<sup>2171</sup> Though more could be said, we find ourselves retreading the ground of chapter seven. Matters are more interesting with respect to

objectification and subjectification. Here, one finds a peculiar relationship between nationalism and the Heideggerian quest to overcome metaphysics.

### Letting Beings Stand

It is characteristic of our modern world, as has been discussed, to set upon the world and order it according to our needs. Heidegger would outline an alternative to this relation in *What is Called Thinking?* Here, he argued that we should “stand before a tree [...] and the tree stands before us”<sup>2172</sup> and “for once let it stand where it stands”<sup>2173</sup> in a non-instrumental relation-to where we do not “debase what is being used.”<sup>2174</sup> This does not only apply to natural objects, of course, but to all those things that constitute our world. What lies before us might be the sea or the village, the city or the island, the temple, or the sky— we are not only able to find this relation-to in the forest. For all that Heidegger romanticized country life, in other words, this seems more a matter of preference than an imperative drawn from his philosophy. There is no compelling reason why one cannot allow a cathedral, train station, museum or library stand before us in this manner as well as one can a tree, river, or hedgerow. If one is an urbanite, such things constitute our world. It is the way in which we relate to our world— as opposed to the nature of the world that is our own— that counts. Thus, for an urbanite to flee the city for the country would result in our replacing their ownmost native world with that of others. It may therefore be counterproductive.

While the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, it should be noted that nothing that we have seen over the past few chapters indicates that our primordialist nationalists are in any way drawing us beyond metaphysical objectification towards this new conception of truth. Where we have seen criticisms of contemporary approaches to spatiality, they have primarily concerned insufficient piety with respect to the customary, disregard for that which lies close by or simply the contention that the wrong articulations of place predominate. Simultaneously, one can observe in the previous chapters a surprising lack— on the part of our exemplars of primordialist nationalism— of obvious symbolic objectification of iconic natural features of a nation. One might be surprised to have seen so few examples of a river,

mountain range or forest being made to stand for the essential spirit of a national people or so few examples of a particular style of music, form of dance or cultural-traditional practice being held to do the same. One even finds certain negative consequences of representational thinking being acknowledged: such as Jünger claiming that when we grant ourselves the power to determine the constitution of art, we are effectively granting to “the victor [who] writes the history” the power to “determine what counts as art.”<sup>2175</sup> There is, inherently, an element of such thinking in the unification of the diverse regions of a national territory under a politically or poetically constructed idea like France or Germany. While one frequently sees such language used in broader nationalist discourses— one can think here of the Statue of Liberty symbolizing the American dream<sup>2176</sup>— we have not seen a great deal of such rhetoric among our examples. This complicates the assumption that nationalist writers *per force* engaging in such discourse. The most interesting complication, though, emerges when one considers Péguy’s striking lucidity in response to a challenge to his image of France.

### Standing with and Amongst Beings

In June of 1905, the royal carriage of King Alphonso XIII of Spain, wherein he sat with President Ferdinand Loubet of France, advanced down the Rue de Rivoli. It would take them past exultant crowds, among them Péguy, drawn seemingly from all parts of Parisian society— without distinction of political, social, or ethnic category— celebrating in a manner that seemed to bring together France’s republican and monarchic traditions in perfect harmony.<sup>2177</sup> Péguy would later write, in *Notre Patrie*, that in this moment his poetic image of *La République, notre Royaume de France* was made manifest before him as never before.<sup>2178</sup> The sublime moment would not last— “the week would finish badly.”<sup>2179</sup> The joy would be shattered by a “most stupid and criminal of assassination attempts” by anarchist Matteo Morral.<sup>2180</sup> Morral would not just ruin the festivities, his act of “rebellious reality”<sup>2181</sup> would break Péguy’s enchantment<sup>2182</sup> and reveal to him that the joyous realization of his image of France was fundamentally imaginary.<sup>2183</sup> In short, Morral’s act would make clear to Péguy that the flesh-and-blood France was a far more fractious

and uncertain place than his imaginings allowed. Here, to return to the themes of this study, Péguy articulated the limitations of his symbolic representation of the objects around him. For him, the procession represented the essence of France, for others—including the assassin, those who let him escape and those who celebrated him as a martyr<sup>2184</sup>—it manifestly did not.

Heidegger demonstrated a longstanding scepticism of egoism. Indeed, he saw the preponderance and eventually the hegemony of egocentric encounters with the world as being among the most baneful of the ultimate consequences of the dominance of metaphysics. In his 1946 lecture, “What are Poets For?” Heidegger would lament that the modern deification of productivity had transformed man into “the producer.”<sup>2185</sup> This mirrors a concern expressed in his 1938 work “The Age of the World Picture,” that when man is made the “first and real *Subjectum*” he “becomes the centre to which the existent at such is related.”<sup>2186</sup> A year prior, Heidegger would argue, in his *Nietzsche* lectures, that the centring of the self will result in the triumph of a version of Nietzsche’s overman—he who, in the grand style, posits all values according to his will to power. The “existent as a whole” becomes the *Weltanschauung*—the world-view from the perspective of the viewer presented to itself in terms of how “it matters to us.”<sup>2187</sup> Heidegger claimed, in his 1930-31 Hegel lectures, that we cannot, from such a subjective standpoint, grasp the “absolute fullness” of the world but we *can* grasp something that is absolute relative to ourselves—the totality of *our* world.<sup>2188</sup> Young puts Hegel’s subjective absolute knowledge in opposition to Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry—arguing that *Geist* gives us an illusion of absoluteness, which Hölderlin sought to overcome.<sup>2189</sup> An important question emerges here. Heidegger was critical of an egoism associated with our constructing a view of the world purely from our own vantage point. Yet, in the previous chapter, we saw him extoll the virtues of a rooted, initial, everyday encounter with those things that lie near-at-hand—those things that are immediate *from our vantage point*. Why, then, is he so critical of such subjectivity when he finds it, for example, in Hegel?

Hegel's system retains the presuppositions of metaphysics, remaining within the "common Western historical standpoint."<sup>2190</sup> Hegel, Heidegger argued, stripped metaphysics of the need for the "higher standpoint of self-consciousness of spirit beyond it"<sup>2191</sup> and made it function as a self-contained system of thought. At the same time, Heidegger saw Hegel, Kolb notes, as the ultimate subjectivist.<sup>2192</sup> For Heidegger, Hegel turned the questioning of Being into introspection and elevated the self to the god-like position.<sup>2193</sup> In doing this, Hegel embraced the dependence of Metaphysics on representation<sup>2194</sup> and made the "self-differentiation of the subject from the object" the essence of consciousness.<sup>2195</sup> We still come to know the object in terms of the near-at-hand but, unlike with everyday *Mitsein*, the truth of the object is mediated by a theoretical construction, *Geist*, which makes possible absolute knowledge. In other words, Hegel's theoretical construction is guilty not only of standing between the *Dasein* and nearby beings, but also of extrapolating from out of this an absolute subjectivity where the whole of history, for example, can be grasped from this standpoint— as opposed to only that which we encounter in our immediate circle of care. Furthermore, Hegel gave this a robust philosophical grounding. *Geist*, which Heidegger argued represents absolute self-consciousness,<sup>2196</sup> is a stable concept, an object which is known to us and to others. Thus, Hegel is the ultimate metaphysician, representing the completion of the unfolding of metaphysics<sup>2197</sup>— bringing forth its hitherto concealed elements and allowing us to see the guiding question played out to completion— though it would take Nietzsche to consummate this completion. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* effectively and convincingly ties all of Being into the imperative of the consciousness to know itself but does so by transforming *Dasein*. Hegel's subjectivity, in short, traps thinking within metaphysics in such a way as to give the illusion of wholeness. Where Péguy revealed to us the horizons of his system— actively pointing us to where it stops and, thus, bringing before us the possibility of something further— Hegel clouds his horizon with the brilliance of his thought and the comprehensiveness of his all-encompassing system of total knowledge.

To a certain extent, it is the relative philosophical paucity (philosophical paucity in comparison with Hegel being no insult) of our primordialist nationalists that spares them the accusation, here, of covering over the path beyond metaphysical spatial subjectivity. Where, for example, Péguy provoked the question of whether his myth of France rings true if we do not share his politics,<sup>2198</sup> he raised a vital question which, if convincingly answered, might cover over the route beyond metaphysics with a seductive, superficially compelling but philosophically lacking alternative.<sup>2199</sup> The fact he could not do so becomes, in this study, a strength. The failure to convince on this matter leaves open the possibility of our discovering, in engaging with these works, both that there is a fundamental shortcoming of the nationalist conception of spatiality and that this shortcoming relates to the subjectivity of our relation to a nation. Nationalism, in such cases, clearly renders the space in which we dwell as an object of symbolic representation— and thus clearly falls short of being an authentic spatiality founded upon “authentic alliances.” In short, though we undoubtedly still find ourselves in the metaphysical, we cannot pretend that we have truly found the essence of authentic spatiality— due to the unanswered questions that primordialist nationalism raises— and thus we do not “bar the way to its interrogation”<sup>2200</sup> with an illusory completeness. This leaves open the possibility that our moving through and beyond primordialist nationalism’s subjectivity could be stage in the movement towards the *Seinsgeschichte*. In practical terms, primordialist nationalist subjectivity might be bringing us to the edge of the abyss, provoking the questions that we must ask in order to get beyond a metaphysical relationship with place. Primordialist nationalism would thus constitute, at least in this regard, a salutary error— a *Holzwege* which looks like a dead end but is in fact vital to the journey towards truth.<sup>2201</sup> It would be as if the disembodied voice blaring through the microphone in Auden’s poem had manifestly failed to “prove by statistics that some cause was just”— such that the crown trudged off questioning what truth was being hidden from them. It has become clear that primordialist nationalism is less inhibitive of an authentic relation to Being with respect to space than time, but one might argue that at best it neither helps nor hinders. Mann, Péguy, Barrès and Jünger cannot

be said to aid us in any significant way in obtaining an authentic relation to place. To the extent that primordialist nationalism helps it does so largely as a result of philosophical paucity. Therefore, one might conclude that with respect to the pursuit of an authentic relation to Being, it is a sideways step at best. If one wishes to advance down the path to authentic spatiality, then, one might well look elsewhere.

### *§ Awaiting the New God*

#### The Old World is Dying, and the New World Struggles to be Born

In order to obtain an authentic relation to place we must begin by grasping that we can never get to Being within the limitations imposed by metaphysics. Metaphysics, put simply, directs our questioning poorly, and neither Christianity nor the heritage of the ancient world— both having been integral to setting us on our way— will help get us off of this false path.<sup>2202</sup> We must, instead, leap into the abyss to which we have been brought, from the metaphysical tradition into an as-yet-unrevealed mode of thinking. Leaping into the abyss does not mean embracing meaninglessness or nihilism but requires our embracing the reality of an almost total uncertainty with respect to the truths of Being. Furthermore, what we leap into appears to be limitless— literally abyssal (without bottom). While primordialist nationalism does not, as it does with temporality, actively impede us it is at best a waste of our time— distracting us while, as Heidegger put it in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” the “scientific-technological worldview” triumphs completely.<sup>2203</sup> Heidegger did not dwell much on whether this triumph would beget a dystopian hellscape or a pleasant and peaceable— albeit artless and unphilosophical— existence. What is clear, though, is that we are at the end of a journey that has taken us from Socrates to Nietzsche.<sup>2204</sup>

This does not mean, Heidegger clarified in the Nietzsche lectures, that metaphysics is over and done— nor that it will cease<sup>2205</sup>— but that we have reached the completion of its possibilities. It has, one might say, fulfilled its promise. It is only once we grasp this that the mood is awakened within us whereby we feel within ourselves an absence because we have “ventured into the uttermost need of nihilism” and

thus are capable of thinking the “overcoming thought.”<sup>2206</sup> This overcoming thought is, for Nietzsche, related to the overcoming of nihilism. For Heidegger, though, overcoming is primarily a matter of venturing beyond metaphysics, leaving behind the very basis upon which our grasp of the world is built. Instead of recoiling in fear, we must feel compelled to venture further into that uncertainty to find the truths which we suspect lie beyond our grasp. In time, neither metaphysics nor the task of getting beyond it will occupy our thoughts, and metaphysics will be overcome.<sup>2207</sup> Importantly, once metaphysics is overcome, a free relation to technology may pertain. Heidegger describes, in a 1962 lecture titled “The Turning,” a “restoring surmounting” of technology.<sup>2208</sup> He compared this to when one “gets over” grief or pain, when we come to see our enframing by technology as something which has come to pass<sup>2209</sup> which we have, one way or another, made peace with. This relation to technology calls us towards the fundamental question, but it can never be allowed to command our thinking. Heidegger, returning to the Nietzsche lectures, posited that technology, and the nihilism it occasions, cannot be overcome from the outside,<sup>2210</sup> but from the “ground up” — by venturing to “grapple with the very head of it.”<sup>2211</sup> Getting technology in hand requires that we learn reflection<sup>2212</sup> and cease to be enthralled by the assumptions upon which our thinking has hitherto been grounded.

However, we are not there yet. At present, we exist in a form of limbo, simultaneously aware of the impending overcoming of metaphysics but as yet unable to articulate what it means to think post-metaphysically. How, then, are we to navigate this state where, as Gramsci might put it, the old is dying and the new cannot be born? In short, we are to await the coming of the new *Denken* in a state which Heidegger names holy mourning. This state of holy mourning is exemplified in the work of Hölderlin who— Heidegger tells us in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*— embodies a “readied distress” emanating from a preparedness for, or attunement to, a new experience of Being.<sup>2213</sup> It should be noted that this state of mourning does not reflect a descent into superstition nor, as we saw in prior discussions of Nietzsche, is it simply a matter of a tragic patriotism committed to a “grand style”— this would serve only the will to

power.<sup>2214</sup> Rather, “holy mourning” is “holy” in the sense that it is “beyond all contingency”— not linked to a specific object of lamentation— but also “beyond all indeterminacy,” that is to say, not linked to mere abstraction either.<sup>2215</sup> What Hölderlin mourned in this determinate but non-contingent way, Heidegger argued, is the alienation of the I from the “homeland”<sup>2216</sup> within which it must, but cannot at present, belong. This homeland is not to be represented by objects like flags or a place name but is instead the earth upon which we can dwell “poetically, in each case in accordance with [our] historical *Dasein*.”<sup>2217</sup>

A tempting conclusion might be that this implies of a form of self-worship on the part of the historical *Dasein*— an interpretation explored by Göppfarth, who notes the link between history and the collective *Dasein*<sup>2218</sup> and that a nation could be interpreted as the embodiment of this new god to come. Heidegger certainly saw a correlation between a culture and an historical *Dasein*.<sup>2219</sup> At times, this is presented in overtly nationalistic terms, as in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* where Heidegger makes grandiose claims about the “greatness, breadth, and originality” of a “spiritual world” which he links to the German nation<sup>2220</sup>— a nation which he believes is “at the centre of the West.”<sup>2221</sup> Here, it is the German historical community, a national one, which embodies the thrown drama of the Western *Dasein*. Furthermore, Heidegger places Germany in opposition to a similarly nationally defined American and Russian historical spirit, the prime movers of the technological indeterminacy<sup>2222</sup> against which Germany struggled. The nation, then, is not obsolete. However, the nation is deeply enmeshed in the nihilistic order that characterizes modernity more generally.

Heidegger was critical of those who do not question the conventional wisdom, desecrating the “good man” who “submits himself” to what is<sup>2223</sup>— a figure who resembles in many ways Mann’s good burgher. More explicitly, Heidegger— in *The Question of Being*, an essay published in honour of Ernst Jünger in 1955— commended Jünger’s desire to “get out of the zone of complete nihilism.”<sup>2224</sup> However, Heidegger argued that Jünger ended up covering over Being with his worker typus<sup>2225</sup>— building a *Weltanschauung* around this somewhat artificial category of Being and, in doing so, circumventing the question of Being

itself. To make, as we have seen our primordialist nationalists make, the community into an object which stands for the essence of the historical *Dasein* seems, in short, to be an unquestioning continuation of the objectification of the world. Finding our way out of this fog, then, will require stepping beyond the world of metaphysics and, indeed, the world of the nation as it is. With this step beyond we will set out on a journey towards a new relationship with Being. That is to say, we will set out in search of a relation to being that is unencumbered by precisely the kind of metaphysical intermediary between *Dasein* and the essence of Being that, it has been argued, primordialist nationalism represents. Therefore, those on the “German New Right,” in Göppfarth’s example, who make an idol the nation and posit this as the necessary antidote to modern ennui are in error. At its core, what Heidegger described was a love for one’s homeland as the space within which one seeks an authentic relation to Being, Heidegger, in his Nietzsche lectures, directly ties love to the desire for the object of love to “be what it is in its essence.”<sup>2226</sup> As such, to love one’s country is not to idolize what it currently is— and certainly not to deny any and all of its shortcomings— but is precisely to recognize where it is failing to fulfil the supreme possibilities of its Being. In other words, an authentic love of Germany is not expressed by glorifying everything German but precisely in the act of critiquing the ways in which it has fallen into *Seinsvergessenheit*— in the interest of pushing it to fulfil the special destiny discussed previously.

We are fated to belong in the place where the thrown historical Being of our people unfolds. We cannot but be the product of the place and time in which we were born and are fated to discover the new *Denken* from within this place of belonging. Furthermore, this discovery will show us our own potentiality and that of this homeland. Our coming to the full potential of our Being is thus tied to the historical *Dasein* of our people and our homeland, without which we would never have the grounding to strike out into the new. If we retain a metaphysical nationalism, like primordialist nationalism, what initially shines forth from Being would be refracted through, and thus corrupted by, our primordialist nationalist prism. In short, the homeland is lost to us. The nations that we know simply cannot be considered equivalent to this *Heilige*

*Heimat*. What is mourned, then, is this lost sense of being at home in our homelands. But why is this mourning “holy”? To answer this question, we must turn to the complicated question of Heidegger’s gods.

### Heidegger’s Mysterious God

Heidegger, Travers notes, understood our relationship with the world as having both horizontal elements—linking us to the things of the world— and vertical elements— linking “mankind and the gods.”<sup>2227</sup> There is undeniably an aspect of the divine in Heidegger’s thought which predates the famous “only a god can save us” statement— which might otherwise be interpreted as Heidegger throwing in the towel at the end of his career. Indeed, Heidegger used religious language to talk about Being across his oeuvre. It is observable in Heidegger’s description of Being— in *Hegel*— as part of the “*e-venting* of man and of the gods into the need for the essence of mankind and of divinity.”<sup>2228</sup> Heidegger tied, in his Hölderlin lectures, an originary experience of Being to the preservation of a relation to those gods who are proper to our “we.”<sup>2229</sup> At times, Heidegger talked about being in ways that seem quite Christian. For example, in “The Word of Nietzsche,” he argued that that we should not take an atheists view of the “Death of God” and conclude that Christianity has lost its claim to power “within the shaping of Western humanity.”<sup>2230</sup> The possibility of a latent Christianity in his thought is particularly acute when we replace the word “Being” with “God” in the following from *The Turning*: “only in Being[/*God*] and as Being[/*God*] does that which the “is” names bring itself to pass; that which is, is Being[/*God*] from out of its essence.”<sup>2231</sup>

While we cannot make gods of our countries or our heritage, we might be tempted to see Heidegger’s god-concept as being a return to his Catholic roots. Heidegger appears to have struggled with the place of Christianity in his thought for a significant part of his career. However, in this same piece Heidegger noted that “the god [...] stands as a being *within* [my emphasis] Being”<sup>2232</sup>— as in *inside of* being as opposed to *as* Being. Furthermore— in the “Letter on Humanism”— Heidegger warned against the interpretation of “man’s ek-sistent essence” as the secular expression of “a thought that Christian theology expressed about God.”<sup>2233</sup> He also associated, in *Contributions*, the “prolonged Christianization

of god” with the “burying” of the essential<sup>2234</sup> and, in *What is Called Thinking?*, argued against the idea that the argument “God is the Absolute,” can meaningfully speak to the question of Being.<sup>2235</sup> As such we cannot see this new god as an embodiment of any god we know today and, for all that he may have struggled with the question concerning Christianity, much would need to be overlooked to produce a Christian Heideggerianism. If not the Christian God, then what?

The central difficulty in asking this question is that Heidegger understood his philosophical project as incomplete. Furthermore, though he understood his oeuvre as a process of preparing for the later completion of his project, he always maintained that the “new god” to whom he frequently referred remained beyond our, and his, grasp. In the mid-thirties he would still identify the need for a confrontation *before* we can expect to grasp the relationship between “gods and human beings.”<sup>2236</sup> By the turn of the forties he would still maintain that the new god is as yet undetermined<sup>2237</sup> and he believed that Germany was experiencing the birth pangs of an entirely new *Denken*, for which neither the old standards of logical proof nor the old intermediaries of science and metaphysics— or, indeed, nationalism— are adequate. He would still, in the mid-fifties, be talking in terms of preparing ourselves to “perceive a clue.”<sup>2238</sup> Similarly, in *Contributions* Heidegger spoke of a duty to prepare for “what is most question-worthy.”<sup>2239</sup> Heidegger’s late lament, to *Der Spiegel*, that we require a god to come and save us suggests strongly that he never felt the new god to be within his grasp.

We are, Heidegger clarified in “Hegel and the Greeks,” living within a “not-yet.” This “not-yet” does not imply an inability of the truth to satisfy our needs. Rather, this “not-yet” signifies that we are not, at present, any more worthy than were the ancient Greeks.<sup>2240</sup> We cannot yet, in short, grasp the new god— for we need a new *Denken* in order to be worthy of the revelation of this new god. This will not consist, Carman tells us, of the supplementation of flawed metaphysical theories with “greater philosophical refinement.”<sup>2241</sup> As Feenberg notes, nothing in the world— and one can include in this already extant paradigms such as a present-at-hand form of nationalism— has “escaped the enframing sufficiently to

constitute a new god.”<sup>2242</sup> Though Heidegger would likely balk at his god-concept being related to so conventional a concept, it is clear that Heidegger’s new god is very much the god of the gaps. We feel the absence of mysterious thing, a concealed thing that lies beyond our grasp, but cannot find it from where we currently stand. Heidegger claimed, in *Contributions*, that we find ourselves waiting for the “gentle release into the intimacy of the *godding* of the god of gods,”<sup>2243</sup> a gnomic sentence (rather typical of this work). When the god-concept is understood as a standing for the concealed truth that we desire, this means that we find ourselves waiting for the moment when we have the capacity to see those things that are inaccessible to us in our current metaphysical state. In doing so, we gain insight into how metaphysics obscures our view— thus opening the possibility that we can grasp not only one thing that eluded us before but grasp the elusive itself. We thus find ourselves waiting to be granted entry into the realm of the unknown wherein resides the mystery of mysteries— the holy of holies— the truth of Being.

This granting of entry has the character of a gift.<sup>2244</sup> We must prepare ourselves to receive— to recognize it as a gift and be capable of accepting it. This gift is not simply conferred upon us<sup>2245</sup>— for if we cannot attune ourselves correctly, Han-Pile notes, we will be unable to receive it.<sup>2246</sup> Receipt of the gift becomes possible only when we, metaphorically speaking, stand in the clearing where this gift can fall from the sky into our hands without getting stuck in the branches of the trees of metaphysics. That this all sounds rather vague is not evidence of a failing on Heidegger’s part. Rather, it reflects the fact that, according to Heidegger, we are unprepared to receive the gift, for we do not have the language in which we could properly articulate what it would reveal. Heidegger would conclude “My Way to Phenomenology”— a lecture delivered close to the end of his career— that “the age of phenomenology seems to be over” and that we await the moment when “it can disappear as a designation in favour of the matter of thinking whose manifestness remains a mystery.”<sup>2247</sup> This constant appeal to mystery will, no doubt, strike some as frustratingly mystical, and understandably so.<sup>2248</sup> Furthermore, this frustration might, as in the case of Bourdieu, centre around the possibility that Heidegger’s mysticism, arguably an

obscurantism, is an intentional strategy to conceal reactionary politics.<sup>2249</sup> That a relationship existed, and continues to exist, between certain forms of fascism and certain forms of mysticism is broadly understood.<sup>2250</sup> Italian fascism in particular self-consciously sought to promote a “*mistica fascista*” through the arts<sup>2251</sup> and German fascists were famously fascinated by the occult.<sup>2252</sup> It is interesting, then, that Heidegger— notably in later works— would be rather critical of the kind of esoterica that fascinated many on the German right of his time.<sup>2253</sup> Importantly, as we have seen with Péguy, it is not necessarily the case that an appeal to the mystical is, in and of itself, politically illiberal. As such, while the mysticism might frustrate, it is not the most politically troubling aspect of Heidegger’s thought. Furthermore, it is not self-evident that the appeal to mystery, in Heidegger’s case, is best described as mysticism at all.

Anderson describes mystics as those “who, by an extraordinary and poetic use of words, want to take us with them beyond the ordinary and the familiar, to what is ultimate.”<sup>2254</sup> While this is certainly redolent of the characterization of the poet that has been prominent in this study, Heidegger’s infrequent references to the concept suggested an interesting relationship with mysticism. For example, though Heidegger’s work in the 1950’s was clearly beginning to move towards more poetic, abstruse and— one can fairly say— mystical form of expression, he would nevertheless, in “Dialogue on Language” warn of the danger of “talking too loudly about the mystery” rather than taking on the harder task “to guard the purity of the mystery’s wellspring.”<sup>2255</sup> Moreover, he would make clear, in “Language in the Poem,” that while “only a poetic dialogue with a poet’s statement is a true dialogue,” the thinker is not to try to emulate the poet— for dialogue between thinker and poet requires that some difference be maintained between thought and poetry itself.<sup>2256</sup> These statements clarify two important things about the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and mysticism. Firstly, Heidegger’s thinker is to safeguard the mysterious, to protect it from those who would seek to bastardize it through over-hasty explanations which rob it of its essential character as mystery. Secondly, the logical and the rational are not abandoned. The thinker reflects upon the words of the poet in their own manner, without simply adopting the tools of the poetic. In short, where

we employ the term “mysticism” with respect to Heidegger, it should be understood as to mean “in dialogue with the mysterious.” Fortunately, Heidegger does begin the process of preparing for us a guide for the exploration of the mystery.

### Preparing the Venture: Thinker and Poet

There is a process of preparation that we must undergo in order, as Anderson puts it, to be capable of “releasement towards things and openness to mystery.”<sup>2257</sup> Anderson characterizes this as a liberating transmutation of the self<sup>2258</sup> from the calculating technological metaphysician to a “higher activity of meditative thinking.”<sup>2259</sup> This process begins, so to speak, with a clearing of the air, a slowing down of the pace of thinking and a stilling of the busyness which prevents meditative thinking from occurring,<sup>2260</sup> such that we may come into an intimate relation with what is. Meditative thinking, Heidegger argued in the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, is not vague pondering but is always about something— it has a content but must always be open-ended and open-minded.<sup>2261</sup> We must, in short, remain open to a “bring[ing] here from concealment forth into unconcealment” by “letting something arrive and presence of its own accord.”<sup>2262</sup> This requires that we release ourselves from wilfulness, from any kind of busy curiosity that separates our thinking from our Being, and adopt what Ewegen calls “a posture of harmonious receptivity.”<sup>2263</sup>

Heidegger explained, in *Contributions*, that what we patiently await is the coming of those “great and unrevealed individuals” who “provide the stillness”<sup>2264</sup> necessary to catch a fleeting glimpse of the god to come. These individuals are described— in highly mystical terms— as individuals who are “capable of having an inkling of the essential sway of being and, in such a mindfulness, [...] of preparing truth for what is coming as true.”<sup>2265</sup> They do not belong to a philosophical school, they have no current representatives and no epistemology of their own. The members of this strange caste of thinkers— the “ones to come”<sup>2266</sup>— will be those who “reside in masterful knowing” without allowing their thought to be “computed and coerced.”<sup>2267</sup> These will be the thinkers who “know that god awaits the grounding of

the truth of be-ing and thus awaits man's leaping-into Da-sein<sup>2268</sup> and thus seek the "site for thinking questioning of the renewed inceptual question [of Being]."<sup>2269</sup> It must be admitted that it is hard to know what to make of this.

There are, though, certain things that Heidegger can reveal to us about the nature of this new thinking. Firstly, that it is oriented towards the questioning of Being, which we must recognize as something questionworthy and understand to be a shared concern that we must question along with others. In *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, Heidegger specified that we must re-educate ourselves in order to "glance" at things anew— not as objects, subjects, abstractions, or things at-hand.<sup>2270</sup> Only when we recognize that our metaphysical questioning leaves unanswered the fundamental question is genuine listening possible. We must abandon the desire to control and dominate in favour of contentment with listening and abiding. As Albert Hofstadter put it, we must "respond to the appeal" of Being,<sup>2271</sup> not seek to get Being under control. We can then be satisfied with the "authentic language" of poetry<sup>2272</sup>— rather than trying to fashion it into a rational and "useful" form— and eventually learn to dwell poetically.

Heidegger used the language of questioning-the "piety of thought"<sup>2273</sup>— and reflection in order to describe his project. This formulation is most easily associated with the final words of "The Question Concerning Technology," but he would explain this best a decade later in "The Nature of Language." Here, Heidegger explained that piety was not necessarily meant in a religious sense but in an "ancient sense: obedient, or submissive, and in this case submitted to what thinking has to think about."<sup>2274</sup> He would continue to tie, explicitly, this kind of pious thinking to the *Seinsfrage*.<sup>2275</sup> This pious thinking leads us inevitably to the arts.<sup>2276</sup> Heidegger did not argue that by turning to art the scales will fall from our eyes and we will find Being itself on the canvas. Poets and artists alone are not sufficient. In fact, our preparedness to venture into the mysterious realm of the *Seinsfrage* depends upon a collaboration between the poets and the thinkers. Heidegger does not propose to provide a new epistemology combining poetry and thinking, nor a lens which we can apply or set aside at will, nor a practical and systematic explanation

of how the two are to benefit from one another. He does not tell us, for example, that all thinkers should begin with particular poetic texts and analyse them according to *x* or *y* methodology. This is not only because methodologies are often tied to technology, but also because the precise nature of the best relationship between poetry and thought will only be revealed once we have overcome metaphysics.<sup>2277</sup> It is also, more substantially, because the relationship is not the result of any kind of process— they are not drawn together by some approach. Rather, it is the result of their “proper nature” which draws them together into the same neighbourhood.<sup>2278</sup> In other words, if somebody is thinking correctly, so to speak, then they will invariably find themselves getting close to the realm of poetry— thinking about poetry and what it tells us about Being. At the same time a poet, if they are truly a poet, will find themselves being drawn into the vicinity of thought. At heart, this is because proper thinking and proper poetry, as we have already seen, concern the truths of Being.

In “The Nature of Language,” Heidegger spoke metaphorically of the thinker and the poet belonging in the same “neighbourhood.” Each “needs the other in its neighbourhood” and— though they will relate to it differently and even define it in different terms— they will always find one another nearby.<sup>2279</sup> This neighbourhood is that of saying— defined as discussed in “Origins”— which is a common element to the authentic task of both the thinker and the poet, though both say in a different way.<sup>2280</sup> Precisely like good neighbours, the two co-exist in a way that maintains their separateness— good fences, after all, make good neighbours— but contribute to a mutually beneficial common space. It is among the great tragedies of our time that poetry, literature, art, music, and philosophy have been siloed off into different departments with, often, little to no interaction between them. We would do well to heed Heidegger’s call to recognize the fundamental kinship of such things, especially when he explains, in greater detail, the nature of the relationship between the two.

It is the poet who first intuits that there is a secret concealed within the kind of language that we employ on a regular basis— that we tend to use the most basic words to explain our world without having

grasped their meaning. Heidegger gives the example of Stefan George who, in an untitled work, describes “the intuited secret of the word” which speaks of the real meaning of words lying just out of reach, in a “mysterious nearness” which seems so close and yet which we cannot access.<sup>2281</sup> Language truly belongs within this “mysterious landscape,” and the poet is the one to make the first venture in order to retrieve the real meaning of language. The realm of poetry is the closest to this mysterious space of originary meaning<sup>2282</sup>— it being the kind of saying best able to deal with “wonders and dreams” whilst also finding the most precise language by which such things can be grasped.<sup>2283</sup> It is the poet, Heidegger explained in “Language in the Poem,” who is best placed, and therefore the first, to explore the “strange” realm of the concealed.<sup>2284</sup> If, Heidegger explained in “Words,” we listen to the poem, we will “let the poet tell us [...] what is worthy of poetic being,”<sup>2285</sup> and, by extension, will come to learn that which is most questionable and be set upon the path of the *Seinsfrage*. In “Language in the Poem,” Heidegger uses the example of Trakl to explain that the poet leads us, by their poetic explanation, onto the path of the new way of thinking, away from that “old degenerate generation” of thinking tainted by metaphysics and into the modality of thought of the as yet “unborn generation” of those who will possess the thinking that remains “in store” for us.<sup>2286</sup> However, what they bring back is not, Heidegger clarifies in “Words,” all that easy to grasp. The poet is clearly holding a “treasure,” but can do nothing more than hold it.<sup>2287</sup> They need the thinker to follow on after to make sense of the journey they have taken. But how?

### § Heidegger's Holzwege

#### The Thinker as Wanderer

Heidegger enjoyed the metaphor of walking, particularly in nature, as an illustration of the art of philosophy. The action of *Conversation on a Country Path*, for example, picks up in the middle of a conversation between a scholar and teacher. They are already “underway.”<sup>2288</sup> They have walked down a country path into the middle of a forest and now, as night falls, they begin to head home to town, noting that this forest, in the dimming light, is the perfect environment for meditation.<sup>2289</sup> The *Heimat*, a homeland

as opposed to mere dwelling place, can be obtained only when we, like the scholar and teacher, journey out from our place of habitation to the strange, forested regions beyond its walls towards which we have felt compelled. As Peter Monaghan puts it, “one cannot know home without knowing the foreign.”<sup>2290</sup> For Dallmayr, this journey is compelled by a dissatisfaction with knowing only one’s native endowment and this dissatisfaction draws us towards the “encounter with the alien.”<sup>2291</sup> This has implications with respect to nationalism. While it does not require us to be globetrotters<sup>2292</sup> it does require that we not content ourselves with the familiarity of our home-space but be curious about what lies beyond. Thus, incuriosity about the foreign is not reconcilable with authentic belonging. The foreign refers to the different<sup>2293</sup>— that which is unfamiliar. As Travers correctly notes, Heidegger sought out a space outside of the clutter of our everyday lives, a space which “points beyond the material world.”<sup>2294</sup> Therefore, when Heidegger, in his Hölderlin lectures, charged us with the alienation of ourselves from the familiar— including our time as well as place<sup>2295</sup>— we take it as a call to travel metaphorically into the ungraspable.<sup>2296</sup> It is, simply put, a call to be open both to the experience of the “inabiding”— the experience of *not* being at home— and to the truth. Returning to the “Conversation on a Country Path,” Heidegger’s scholar sought to venture into the forest with his teacher because he recognized that the truth of Being is found by journeying from the familiar into the region of otherness beyond. It is therefore incorrect to see Heidegger as a parochial thinker who wishes only that we learn to be content and comfortable with our native soil and culture.

Heidegger articulates a sophisticated understanding of the value of curiosity about the unfamiliar, which is always oriented towards truths of Being. He rejects the fetishization of the foreign, snobbish oikophobia and chauvinistic disdain and disinterest towards all things foreign— both so well parodied by George Orwell.<sup>2297</sup> Indeed, contemporary debates regarding the nation often seem to polarize unnecessarily between a position where it is held to be sacrilegious to imagine that anything can be learned from other cultures and a position where one’s country must always be posited as utterly inferior to more fashionable places abroad. More important is the notion that the thinker might question that which the

community takes as self-evident. Thinkers do this not to distinguish themselves as a superior caste but precisely in order that they may, in time, bring truths back for the betterment of that community whilst also recognizing that one must have a home from which to strike out in pursuit of those truths. Here, again, we find a valuable pathway— if we are able to avoid the pitfalls that befell Heidegger himself— between the hubris of a self-anointed who believe themselves so superior as to be able to dismiss all that is conventional as “false-consciousness” and the demotism of those who denounce even the most well-intentioned heterodoxy as a quasi-seditious conspiracy of a treacherous intelligencia.

Answering the call of Being nevertheless requires a certain degree of solipsism. Being calls to us individually. This call summons us to bring ourselves outside of the they-self and into what Harries describes as “the place where Being opens itself and unconcealment happens”<sup>2298</sup> and Safranski identifies as the realm of true freedom.<sup>2299</sup> As Heidegger explained in *Being and Time*, we are called to deny ourselves the “refuge” of comfort behind which we may otherwise hide; in order that we can be unencumbered by the assumptions, prejudices, and myopia that afflicts us if we are unwilling to challenge the conventional attitudes of “the they.”<sup>2300</sup> In other words, in order to be in a position where we will actually be able to ascertain authentic *Dasein*, we must leave behind the false comforts of our false certainties— however challenging this may be— in order that we be free to gain an unobstructed view of the truth of Being. The analytic of *Dasein*, Heidegger argued, begins within familiar surroundings.<sup>2301</sup> Our primary attunement to being emanates from this everyday experience and we first begin to question *our own* Being from the vantage point of the space we inhabit. Both everyday and metaphysical modes of thinking space, though, carry the danger that they might posit an excessively strong inside-outside distinction. Heidegger explained, in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, that even our initial, everyday encounters with beings can place certain things within and others without the horizons of what is accessible to our cognition. However, when we encounter the world in this easily accessible form, we are also

inadvertently exposing ourselves to the possibility that something we desire to uncover might be lying just beyond the horizons of what is easily accessible to us.<sup>2302</sup>

When wandering the realm of the concealed, one feels as a “plight” the absence of a home in which to dwell. This plight, though, discloses to us the true nature of home. We feel at home in our region, but once these horizons have revealed themselves to us, and have revealed that they are concealing something beyond them, we come to realize that “the ordinary is not ordinary” and that, in fact, it is characterized by a “constant concealing in the double form of refusal and dissembling.”<sup>2303</sup> In other words, we become aware that our dominant intellectual paradigm circumvents the questions that most trouble it either by denying their validity as questions or by obscuring those questions behind a smokescreen. When we notice this, the foreign, alien, and unfamiliar become objects of interest. We realize that there is something which we are not grasping, something strange and interesting which lies beyond the normal and the everyday. Mann, interestingly, notes this tension in the relationship between intellectuals and their national communities. One feels at home in one’s nation but also cannot help being curious about what lies beyond its borders.<sup>2304</sup> Though nationalism may evoke images of incurious parochialism it should be noted that none of the writers discussed in this paper have actively advocated for ignorance of the foreign nor for a total refusal of all that is unfamiliar. Heidegger, though, went further.

As Heidegger argued in *Being and Time*, we are given familiar beings in the midst of whom we locate our own *Dasein* while— as a result of the revealing-concealing character of the horizons of our dwelling place— we ascertain another, broader conception of Being.<sup>2305</sup> Being retreats from us as we attempt to grasp it from within the everyday. Those who are curious come to hear the call of the concealed— a “silence which calls from beyond the world of the everyday”<sup>2306</sup>— and they recognize that a preliminary, familiar “look at being” is only “tentatively articulated.”<sup>2307</sup> As Anderson puts it, we “stand within” our local region but “effectively resolve” for the disclosure of that which lies outside of its borders.<sup>2308</sup> We long to approach what “lies afar” and are agonized by how close it seems to be whilst

remaining beyond our grasp. Along with this disclosure comes the suspicion that what lies beyond might be the region wherein the essence of Being will be discovered.

### There and Back Again

Heidegger's *Conversation on a Country Path* starts as the companions begin their return home.<sup>2309</sup> It is clear that neither scholar nor teacher are creatures of the forest, and thus do not *belong* there.<sup>2310</sup> Indeed, Heidegger clarifies in "On the Essence of Ground" that living alongside one's fellows is a fundamental aspect of the nature of "Human *Dasein*"<sup>2311</sup> and he describes what we have called "wandering" in terms of transcendence— pointing out that the realm of the transcendent is by its nature exceptional,<sup>2312</sup> thus it cannot be the normal site of day-to-day existence. Before their journey, both the scholar and the student dwelt in town, among the familiar surroundings and busy activity of town life. The wanderers do not lose their need for home— the scholar and teacher are not exiles nor sovereign citizens, simply burghers who have wandered out into the woods. They always struggle to belong in one or the other realm, but both are vital to their capacity to grasp the otherness of what they encounter without. The pair venture into the uncanny – the term Heidegger uses to describe those things that which we find difficult to grasp and which call us to explore further by provoking our curiosity— and the indefinite.<sup>2313</sup>

In *Contributions*, Heidegger described the "sacrifice"<sup>2314</sup> of those who turn back<sup>2315</sup>— giving up their exploration and the satisfaction of their curiosity in order to become "forerunners" for "those who are to come."<sup>2316</sup> That is to say, precisely when we become adept at navigating the unfamiliar terrain of the concealed, we are compelled to attend to our duty to the *Heimat*— to return to the hometown in order to show the way to the next generation. Thinking beyond the familiar is an exciting undertaking, especially when one believes that some greater, deeper truth is on the verge of revealing itself. However, precisely when we feel ourselves on the cusp of discovery, it becomes clear that we do not yet have ears to hear. Thus, Heidegger calls us to return to the *Heimat* in the hopes of preparing the way for a new generation who will be ready to receive those truths which elude us. The return is central to the task of thinking and

here we note again that the thinker returns for the benefit of the thinking of Being, with any ambition to use their knowledge to help others— especially non-philosophers— being secondary. Indeed, as Tabachnick notes, “Heidegger clearly sees most people losing their struggle for authenticity, and falling back into everydayness,”<sup>2317</sup> and so there is a profound elitism in the philosophers return to the *Heimat*.

What thinkers find upon their return, Dallmayr argued, is a dwelling place that has been transformed by their experience of the foreign and strange into a home, into the *Heimat*. For Dallmayr, the homeland is the fruit of a process of journeying into the strange, being open to the truths that strangeness reveals, and then returning home.<sup>2318</sup> Furthermore, Dallmayr pointed out that the Danube, in Hölderlin’s poem, derives its essence primarily from the way in which it points the German abroad, inviting the German to join the river on its journey out of the country.<sup>2319</sup> This is because the homeland is not some “ready made possession,” which we carry within us as a birthright<sup>2320</sup> or conquer from others,<sup>2321</sup> but rather “one’s own distinctiveness is gained only through distant peregrinations.”<sup>2322</sup> We are not, for Heidegger, initially at home in the homeland, we merely dwell in a familiar place, until we experience otherness<sup>2323</sup> and estrangement before returning to our hearth (*Hestia*).<sup>2324</sup> This homecoming is independent from our willing.<sup>2325</sup> Like Odysseus, we cannot be sure if we will like what we find upon our return, and it is not some nostalgic return to the familiar, but the fulfilment of the promise inherent to all journeys.<sup>2326</sup> One will return home with a greater understanding of the world, and Being, as a whole and one’s particular place within it. Here again, though, we should pause to remind ourselves that as inclusive as this has potential to be, it carries within itself a justification for deeming others innately inauthentic, even enemies of authenticity— a determination with potentially dangerous consequences.

The ownmost task of the thinker, for Heidegger, involves care for that which surrounds us. *Dasein* and “being-as-a-whole,” by extension “the human” and “being” in itself are, Heidegger explained in the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, “pervaded by a belonging-to-one-another.”<sup>2327</sup> The philosopher must wander in solitude, but this cannot mean that they cease, in doing so, to be a member of their community.

To do so would be a denial of their essential character as *Dasein*. At the same time, this cannot cause the *Dasein* to close itself off from the external world, taking shelter in *or* from the community. Rather, the thinker is called to bring the “soundless saying” of the essence of Being into the “resonance of language,” to articulate it in a way that is comprehensible to others.<sup>2328</sup> This, Heidegger explained in “On The Essence of Ground,” ties the solitary pursuit of philosophy to the historical *Dasein* of the *Volk*, in whose language it is articulated and in whose history the philosophical sojourn takes place. The thinker returns home as the one who is “open for being”— the one who is summoned to the task of being open to its presencing, an openness which, Heidegger argued— returning to the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*— requires what Heidegger called the “open of an illuminated clearing.”<sup>2329</sup> This need for a “clearing” is vital, here, because it requires the establishment of the conditions for thinking— implying a need to carve out a space within the world where the thinker can think.

The philosopher must engage in solitary peregrination but remains tied to the *Heimat* in a way that is not disinterested or coincidental. Heidegger called us to act upon a common space and to transform what that space is in order that it be suited to the questioning of Being. This makes Heidegger’s philosopher a curious figure in the *Heimat*, whose projects, in the terminology of Heidegger’s *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, involve an “irruption into this between”<sup>2330</sup>— insider-outsiders<sup>2331</sup> wandering between the shared world and the solitude of reflection— tending to their gardens while knowing, as Heidegger reminded us in his Nietzsche lectures, that “this garden is not the world.”<sup>2332</sup>

### The Heimat as Base Camp

The *Heimat*, in conclusion, cannot be a prison for *Dasein*<sup>2333</sup> and it would be the height of nihilism simply to cling to what is close by.<sup>2334</sup> On the other hand, that which has not immediate resonance [*Widerklang*] to our everyday life is precisely that which may “prelude” the “authentic happening” of our people.<sup>2335</sup> Heidegger’s *Heimat* is metaphorically comparable to a base camp at the foot of a mountain. This imagery is not chosen on a whim, Heidegger often evokes mountains, such as in *Contributions*, where he wrote that

“the great philosophies are towering mountains [...] They stand as the aiming point and forever form the sphere of sight; they bear transparency and concealment”<sup>2336</sup> and Heidegger chooses, in *What is Called Thinking?*, the mountain as an example of the way in which nature can turn our thoughts to Being.<sup>2337</sup> Dallmayr described it as the “in-between zone between earth and sky.”<sup>2338</sup> Heidegger stresses the in-betweenness of the thinker’s spatiality at many points, from the claim that truth resides between beings and being in *Contributions*,<sup>2339</sup> to the claim, in *What is Called Thinking?*, that the thinker’s passage “passes through” a “duality”<sup>2340</sup> or the claim, in *Hölderlin’s Hymn*, that “the poet sits at the threshold.”<sup>2341</sup>

Returning to the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, we find that the base camp is the last post of ordinary life that we take with us to the foot of the mountain. It is the place in which we dwell and feel safe. Most importantly, we must have one if we are to have any hope of making the summit.<sup>2342</sup> We must, though, always look up at the strange, uncanny, and threatening figure of the mountain rising before us, knowing that journeying in this strange, imposing place will reveal to us the truths that we seek. Our frustration at being cooped up in the camp, waiting for the weather to turn and call us to our journey, is akin to the saving power of everyday politics which causes us to long for the authentic experience of Being.

This, Heidegger explained in “What are Poets For?,” is more accessible to those poets whose will is most intensely directed towards the unconcealing of the concealed and are most daring in their willingness to turn “our unprotected being into the Open.”<sup>2343</sup> There is, though, no permanent abandonment of the everyday being-with, nor should such a thing be desired in itself, our expedition has, after all, gone horribly awry if we never return to base camp. We remain human, and humans must dwell. We must attend, as Dronsfeld argues, both to our being as those who “respond to the being that one is” and the being that is doing this responding.<sup>2344</sup> As such, the thinker would be no happier than the peasant or the statesman to simply wander the forests of Being without a village to return home to. Far from abandoning this familiar realm, there is something of a cyclical nature to the wanderings of the thinker. They strike out from the everyday world, to be sure, but their responsibilities to the *Heimat* are not forsaken. In fact, the

very fact of their having ventured endows them with a special responsibility to the *Heimat*. While perhaps not a coup-d'état, this does mean bringing back new knowledge gained atop the mountains, shaping the community to which they return. They are to move back and forth, bringing with themselves a part of each realm as they wander between the two. It is only by this journeying that we grasp an experience of Being that is more essential than that which was familiar to us in our dwelling place. Only then can we return, and only then do we find that our habitation has become, for us, our *Heimat*.

Based upon the evidence uncovered in this study we cannot say that nationalism, primordialist or otherwise, prevents us from undertaking such wanderings. But we find little reason to believe that it facilitates our doing so. It is, at best, a form inauthenticity which, by its inability to satisfy the intellectually curious, may provide the impetus for an exploration of the *Seinsfrage*. However, we see no reason to believe that it has a special capacity to do this. Across this section, we have found primordialist nationalism providing an articulation of the everyday mode of existing within space— one which is less inhibitive of an authentic relation to Being that was observed with respect to time. This everyday articulation, though, is deeply enmeshed in the world of practical politics— for all it claims to transcend petty politics. It is also excessively reverent towards custom— and thus lacking in curiosity about other ways in which one might relate to the common context of Being. In short, where it promises to return us to those “marble well governed cities,” libations and sacrifice” and “vines and olive trees” evoked in Auden’s *Shield of Achilles*, primordialist nationalism likely promises only another “barbed wire enclosed” “plane without a feature.”

Finally, nationalism cannot combine the concentric circles of spatiality that define the thoughtful person’s relation to place. Heidegger calls us to wander between these circles. With our clear-eyed acknowledgement of Heidegger’s flaws, we wander these circles knowing that Heidegger might lead us towards indifference to suffering and dangerous modes of excluding outsiders. Our wanderings, Hofstadter noted, are not aimless, there shall be a “pole star” that guides us.<sup>2345</sup> This requires leaping into the “abyss” which “the earliest beginnings of Western destiny point to”<sup>2346</sup>— a leap which we struggle to make because

of our having fallen away from Being. It is because of the falling away that Heidegger appears to call us to leap into the unknown, and that the answer to the question of “who is the new god?” is that we cannot yet know. We must, then, prepare to venture into the uncanny, hear the song of the poem and wait for the new *Denken* that might combine with the poetic to bestow unto us the gift of Being. We know it will not resemble any extant relation to the *Heimat*. Taminiaux characterized it best: “the ownmost potentiality-for-Being” is “linked to the retrieval or repetition of a thrown condition, at the juncture of which the instantaneous moment of vision reveals resoluteness as the tension between the ownmost and the alien, the authentic and the inauthentic.”<sup>2347</sup> This is the end of the *Sonderweg* along which Heidegger guides us, turning on its head Péguy’s maxim that “*tout commence en mystique et finit en politique*,”<sup>2348</sup> beginning in the obvious “there is...” and ending in the mysterious “over all the peaks/ is peace.”

## Conclusions

### *§ The Inauthenticity of Primordialist Nationalism*

Over the course of this exploration, the reasons for the incommensurability of the writings of Jünger, Mann, Péguy and Barrès with Heidegger's philosophy of Being have become clear. At the most fundamental level, these writers were either unwilling or unable to take the next step beyond an artificial but edifying approximation of the truth. They favoured, over an unflinching confrontation with the experience of Being, an inspiring, uniting, beautiful, and comforting half-truth. The nationalism that we found with Jünger, Mann, Péguy and Barrès was— outside of certain passages— far less obviously delusional or deceptive than some critics of nationalism might expect. We did not, for example, find claims that France or Germany were eternal nations in any literal sense, that they were perfect, undefeatable in war, nor that they were right in everything they had done in their histories and in the present. Indeed, Mann's condemnations of Nazism, Jünger's acknowledgement of the morally dubious nature of the destruction of French towns, Barrès' objections to the French Revolution and, most forthright of all, *Péguy's cris-de-cœur* against the shameful persecution of Alfred Dreyfus distance these thinkers from the sentiment of "my country right or wrong." However, it remains the case that the understanding of belonging that emerges from their explanations of our relationship with time and space gives precedence to social utility. They thus discourage curiosity about those inconvenient complications that emerge when we question such things without fear or favour. This includes a willingness to settle for what Heidegger would deem a metaphysical approach to the question of Being which, for Heidegger, lingers behind any attempt to understand ourselves and how or to where we belong. Jünger, Mann, Péguy and Barrès occasionally take us to the brink, but at no point do they get beyond the articulation of objective representations, interpreted from a subjective standpoint, and arranged into an overarching *Weltanschauung* in order to serve some practical purpose. Worse, their pictorializations serve, in many cases, to gild our metaphysical cage— such that we come to love it and never think of breaking out. A

nationalist *Weltanschauung* covers over the path beyond metaphysics by presenting a compelling, consoling, and inspiring approximation of an authentic relation to Being. This deceives us into thinking that we are resisting technology while, in reality, only offering a superficial riposte grounded in a fundamentally technological modality of thinking.

Heidegger's understanding of authentic belonging, in contrast, is characterized by a liminality driven by the piety of thought: questioning. Our relationship with our temporality is to be characterized by a concern with the particular thrown historical condition of our community, but only insofar as this interacts with the unfolding of the *Seinsgeschichte*. The historical sensibility into which we are born functions as a starting point which triggers curious questioning of the enigma that it reveals, when approached critically, regarding the relationship between our common historical context (*Volksgeschichte*) and the broader Being-context (*Seinsgeschichte*). If we are endowed with the right attunement— if, for example, we have the sensibility of the great founder poets— we will be like the demigods, bringing hints of this other world back to our historical community and able to dwell in the in-between. In this in-between, we can preserve what is best of the historical world into which we find ourselves thrown but always and only to the end of ultimately directing our gaze towards the philosophical questioning of the unfolding of our relationship with Being. With respect to space, we begin by mourning the fact that we are alienated from belonging by the influence of metaphysics. The home in which we are no longer at home, though, represents an ideal starting point to strike out in pursuit of Being. For Heidegger we should seek to enter into a spatial experience defined by the interplay between our homelands as limited, contingent regions and the higher realm of Being. This other realm is ever-present in ours as a mystery that shows itself when we engage critically with the familiar and finds gaps in our certainty. The philosopher and poet belong in the shared neighbourhood that straddles the familiar and the mysterious. The poet explores and the philosopher charts that other realm, always looking to the unfamiliar and thus always being something of an outsider in the community. Simultaneously, they are always to return home from their peregrinations

in the realm of Being as they belong in their homeland. There is an interplay that defines authentic spatiality, between our belonging to the home into which our becoming unfolds and the nagging sense that a deeper truth lies beyond the familiar. The authentic spatial experience is that of an explorer, who explores the uncharted realms but always return to the home port bearing gifts for their fellows.

There are two major interpretative conclusions that emerge from the comparison between Heidegger and the representatives of primordialist nationalism discussed here. Firstly, there is the centrality of what Heidegger calls the “piety of thought” to his understanding of authentic belonging. This formulation— which may at first blush appear little more than a pithy way to bring “The Question Concerning Technology” to an end— revealed itself as being an indispensable imperative for Heidegger’s thinker. Most of the Heideggerian critiques of Mann, Jünger, Barrès and Péguy presented in this analysis are grounded in the failure of those thinkers to pursue their lines of questioning further once they began to bore into the foundations upon which their worldviews depend. In contrast, Heidegger calls us to question all things, in order to recognize that we exist in a context where the essential remains fundamentally mysterious. This is not to become cynicism, nor does it represent a belief that the essential is fundamentally unknowable. Mysteries can be resolved; indeed, solubility is what separates the mysterious from the ineffable. The questioning to which we are called by Heidegger is not intended to undermine or deconstruct everything that we have hitherto valued. Rather, questioning the basis of our belonging will reveal to us that we do not yet possess what we desire, exposing what is illusory and shattering any sense of satisfaction that we may have with the artifice. In doing so, it turns our attention to an unfamiliar space, to the gaps in our understanding of ourselves wherein we are compelled to search for what is missing. This leads us to the second major interpretative conclusion, the centrality of “wandering” to authentic belonging. For Heidegger, those who seek an authentic relation to Being must be prepared to venture out from the familiar and the given, and to throw themselves into uncomfortable and unfamiliar thoughts. This pushes Heidegger towards his famously idiosyncratic language, as he seeks his way beyond our typical ways of thinking and

writing about Being. These wanderings are not merely explorations of other given contexts but require that we risk everything upon which our sense of belonging has hitherto rested. In these wanderings, we strip away everything that has been built, in thought, around Being. This is done in order to ascertain what is essential and what is contingent, what can function as the familiar home to which we will return after our wanderings and what traps us with comfort and prevents our journey into Being from continuing. Thus, we will come to a form of belonging where we embrace that within our heritage which inspires our questioning— and gives us a home to which we can return and reside when we are not exploring Being— but reject those parts of our tradition that impede our wanderings. When at home, we will steward those better parts of our inheritance, when away we interrogate them in order to find their shortcomings, knowing that herein lies the answer to the mystery that we seek to solve.

We remind ourselves here that we clarified, at the outset, that to find nationalism irreconcilable with Heidegger's thought is not the equivalent of stating that Heidegger was not a nationalist. The ultimate conclusions of this thesis do not vitiate the nationalistic positions that Heidegger took nor the nationalistic statements that he made. Of the options available to Heidegger in his lifetime, nationalism may well have been the most appealing. Nevertheless, recalling our definition of *Eigentlichkeit* as “truly one's ownmost,” this study concludes with our taking the position that nationalism is irreconcilable with Heidegger's thought because it fails both at being “truly” and at being “one's ownmost.” In the former case, we have concluded, in accordance with Taminiaux, that “to be a self in one's ownmost, means to choose oneself authentically. Hence, to understand oneself in the ownmost means to understand oneself “from the most proper and most extreme possibilities of one's existence.”<sup>2349</sup> Primordialist nationalism does not allow us to do this. This is because the mythological nature of its poetic representations— and instrumentalization of this mythic past— couples with the subjectivism of its heroic narratives to cloud our view of the true temporality of whatever historical *Dasein* we belong to. Furthermore, its focus on the symbolic space within the national borders, its emotive relation to the symbols of this space and the political activism that

it promotes within the nation-state paradigm clouds our view of the true spatiality of our experience of Being. We also conclude, in concurrence with Taminiaux, that to be inauthentic is to “leave one’s own Being determined by others.”<sup>2350</sup> We have found, here, that primordialist nationalism turns over control of the articulation of our thrown context to mythmakers and ideologues while expropriating our temporal and spatial encounter with Being on behalf of a pre-determined idea of the national entity. As such, nationalism cannot claim to be the political articulation of Heidegger’s conception of authentic belonging.

### § *The Hermit and the Pilgrim*

The comparison between Heidegger and Mann, Jünger, Barrès and Péguy can be explained effectively by comparing two hypothetical figures: the nationalist hermit and the Heideggerian pilgrim. The nationalist hermit resides within a space which brings together those objects which, for the hermit, are deemed worthy of reverence. Within the walls of the hermitage, these objects are arranged in order to create a little world wherein the nationalist, no doubt, feels that they belong and are at home. The experience of living in this little world, though, livens hermits to the possibility of something greater than themselves— something edifying, inspiring, and numinous. The hermitage is bordered in such a way that only what lies within can be a part of this little world, and the hermit will see the world only from the vantage point offered by the particular structure and locale of their hermitage. They will obtain only a view of the world that is enframed, so to speak, by the direction and parameters of the windows they are allowed to the outside. The closed nature of the hermitage by necessity creates a strong inside-outside distinction, with the world beyond the walls often viewed as corruptive and threatening to the harmonious order of the inside. Furthermore, this latter aspect creates the dangerous possibility not only that those who live outside of the hermitage may come to be seen as enemies, but also that certain persons on the inside— who are deemed insufficiently insular for one reason or another— may come to be deemed as traitors. Of course we have found, it should be noted, that similar dangers are inherent to the Heideggerian perspective as well. Additionally, with respect to the nationalist hermitage, there is the danger that those who wield power

within the hierarchies of that little world wield an almost unlimited power to define what, and who, belongs and what does not— and may abuse this power to advance their own selfish ends. The fatal flaw of the hermitage, from the Heideggerian perspective, is that it is not, in fact, a world created by the gods. It is, rather, something fashioned by human beings who are no less fallible, shortsighted, or venal than the hermits who follow them.

Ultimately, this criticism of the nationalistic hermit cuts to the centre of the Heideggerian critique of the nationalisms found in Mann, Péguy, Jünger and Barrès. Though many differences exist between the four, all can be fairly accused of taking things that are ultimately the product of a particular set of geographic and historical circumstances— those matters of culture, history, topography, politics, and custom which Mann categorizes under the umbrella of “the national”— and treating them as though they are holy writ, bestowed unto us as gifts emanating from the truth itself. This results in our taking a partial and, for Heidegger, technologically corrupted worldview and adorning it with a grandeur and glory that satisfy us with the approximation of the truths of Being. The nationalist hermit comes to exalt in the cage that, in fact, bars entry to the deeper truth which resides, for Heidegger, far from the familiar in the misty wilds of the uncanny regions of the unknown.

Our previous chapter concluded by speaking of “peregrinations.” The word peregrination was not chosen for aesthetic purposes, but because of its derivation from the Latin word *peregrinatus*, meaning to travel outside of Rome, to wander about and to roam. Thus, peregrination reflects the circumambulatory nature of the philosophical journey— not a straight line from question to answer but an open-ended exploration of an unknown space. In peregrination, we take our time to appreciate the surroundings, to feel at home in the previously unknown space and to allow the experience of it to overcome our being. We do not plunder it for the answer to our question but dwell within the unknown— if only for a time— in order to receive whatever insights it holds in store for us. Peregrination shares in the etymological genealogy of the Old French *pelegrin*, ancestor to today’s *pèlerins*, *Pilger*, and pilgrims. The pilgrim’s progress is of a

particular kind. They are not aimless wanderings, though wanderings they no doubt are— the route is circuitous, and the journey as important, if not more, than the destination. We learned that the pilgrim of Being, so to speak, will come to abide in the in-between— between the particular experience of the historical people to whom they belong and the broader unfolding of the experience of Being-as-such. The authentic *Dasein* vacillates between the unfolding of the history of their community— and this *can* be a national community— and the unfolding of the *Seinsfrage*, between everyday experiences of living alongside others within the *polis*, between the poetry of the nearby— of hearth and home, of one’s blessed plot of earth— and the shrouded realms of the uncanny, the alien, and the mysterious.

Where the nationalist believes that authentic belonging lies in finding those deeper truths that are always already there, hidden in the familiar world and accessible through a proper attunement to the national consciousness, the pilgrim believes that the truths of an authentic relation to Being lie in the exploration of the unfamiliar realm. Home is not to be scorned or abandoned— the pilgrim always returns— but should be understood as lacking something vital, necessitating our striking out beyond its boundaries. We are not, for Heidegger, to imagine that the answers to the essential question— the question of Being— are lying about us waiting to be discovered, but to recognize that we are fundamentally alienated from them in our current state. An uncomfortable, and possibly dangerous, philosophical journey must be undertaken in order to gain the necessary insights. We should, in short, approach the familiar critically, to discover where it falls short of our needs, where it depends upon intellectual approximations, or where it leads us into error, and take these as hints as to where our explorations should be directed. Our home should always be in our thoughts, and we wander in order to bring truths back and use them to furnish our house of Being, but we should never seal ourselves within the familiar.

### § *Questioning the Prophet*

We will soon discuss what we might do if we wish to be Heideggerians. However, much of what has been raised in this study brings into question whether one should aspire to this label at all. It is clear, from

Heidegger's writings, that a special role must be reserved for thinkers and poets, as thought leaders, of a kind, who lead the political leadership in the struggle against technology and in the pursuit of Being. It seems (not least in light of Heidegger's own attempts to lead the leader) that this implies an interest in education oriented towards the preparation of the worthy for the task of apprehending being. This would involve both steeling their minds against technology and the "they," and helping the capable to open themselves to the moods and attunement necessary for the reception of the gift of Being. Though Heidegger was careful to elevate others, such as Hölderlin, to this special role, it is fairly evident that it is Hölderlin as interpreted, in a typically idiosyncratic manner, by Heidegger that is presented as our guiding light. Indeed, Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin, as we have seen, is so heavily inflected by Heidegger's own patterns of thought that it is often difficult to distinguish between Heidegger's Hölderlin and Heidegger himself. Furthermore, we have noted a prophetic tendency in Heidegger's thought—where Heidegger seems to hold the key to uncovering the secret history of Western thought as well as being the one to mark out the first steps of the pilgrim's path. Therefore, it is worth considering what the implications of this study have been for our estimation of Heidegger as a thinker.

Notably, some of the distinctions drawn in this study have distanced Heidegger from some of the more unedifying aspects of nationalism. The Heideggerian approach to temporality has been distanced from delusional, patriotic glorifications of imperfect national pasts and the propagandistic exploitation of mytho-historical narratives aimed at inspiring the young to toss their lives away for glory—often, in practice, the glory of their commanders. Heidegger's approach to space has also been distanced from suspicion of or incuriosity about the foreign, from an unquestioning and dogmatic reverence for the traditional and from populist demagoguery. However, this comparison has not always flattered Heidegger. In particular, it was argued that Heidegger's brand of antisemitism was of a particularly troubling nature and that his thought betrays an extraordinary indifference to the suffering of the oppressed. Furthermore, Heidegger's thought has appeared especially ill-attuned to confront those more quotidian matters—such

as how to fill potholes, ensure that we have enough nurses, etc.— which, arguably, are of greatest importance to human flourishing. Furthermore, where he does speak to practical politics, as Gonzalez notes, Heidegger shows a preference for dictatorship.<sup>2351</sup>

Heidegger remains an indispensable thinker whose critique of technology and exhortation to think, as Arendt put it, without a banister has only become more necessary in our time. One might even lament that contemporary nationalism is not more Heideggerian in certain respects. More curiosity about the unfamiliar, an understanding of the permeable nature of horizons, and a humility with respect to how much we can really know about ourselves with the limited philosophical tools that we possess would certainly benefit the nationalists of our time. Most of all, they would do well to learn from Heidegger's understanding that there is a greater but also more profound "region" than the nation, that of Being. Ideally this would give the nationalists pause to consider the possibility that people of all nations reside within this region of Being, and can, in a sense, discover "authentic alliances" with one another without abandoning their at-homeness in their own plot of earth.

Nevertheless, one should not overlook the disturbing nature of Heidegger's thought, nor fail to acknowledge that Heidegger's influence can be extremely malign. In order to outline the attitude to Heidegger recommended in light of the findings of this study, it is important to recall two key, inter-related Heideggerian concepts: danger— which has been a theme throughout this study— and saving power— discussed in detail in chapter two. The very aspects of Heidegger's thought that have just been praised each carry within themselves distinct dangers. Heidegger's curiosity about the unfamiliar, and call to throw ourselves into a mode of thinking that requires idiosyncratic language and unusual approaches to philosophical questions can lead to an obscurantism, where we recuse ourselves from clear and necessary ethical and political judgements in favour of abstruse formulations about Being. This was most evident in Heidegger's waffling evasions of a clear and necessary reckoning with his Nazi past and with the relationship between the positions he took under the Third Reich and the horrors wrought by that regime.

Similarly, the permeable nature of the horizons that Heidegger projects around the world of the familiar, with the unfamiliar lying beyond, retains a strong inside-outside distinction which leaves unresolved the question— relevant to Heidegger’s time and vital to our own— of the place of those who belong to our familiar worlds but have some connection to the unfamiliar realms which lie beyond. The place of people, within the familiar realm of that which lies nearby, who come from other traditions, speak other languages, or follow other gods remains unresolved by Heidegger and the inherent danger exists that any adoption of a Heideggerian spatiality will leave large parts of the communities in which we reside out in the cold.

The humility of Heidegger’s pious questioning can certainly be a salve in our age of unwarranted certainty and stridency but carries within itself the danger that we constantly defer necessary practical considerations in favour of a constant stance of questioning. Heidegger’s having nothing of use to say about constitutions, economics, or even sewage systems is testament to the potential for a lack of interest in those things that most impact the lives of individuals. Worse, it leads to a vagueness and obscurity that Heidegger used to avoid reckoning with his worst political engagements— and arguably contributed to their having occurred in the first place. This leads Heidegger to a seeming indifference to the suffering occasioned by failures to successfully execute these more workaday things— he has, for example, nothing to offer the homeless. Connected to this, is the focus of the aforementioned humble questioning always, ultimately, of the matter of Being. We have seen that this can lead to an elitism which carves out a special role for thinkers— or more precisely, those thinkers who consent to follow the prophet Heidegger along his particular pathways of questioning. This, it has been argued, lends itself to an entire political order oriented towards facilitating the peregrinations of thinkers of Being to the deficit of every other part of society. Finally, even the possibility of an authentic alliance between people, of all nations, who seek the truths of Being carries within itself a terrifying danger. Alliances, in almost all cases, are alliances against some kind of enemy.<sup>2352</sup> When such an alliance is forged in the pursuit of an authentic relation to Being, enemies become the enemies of not merely some contingent and negotiable political goal, but the goal of

authentic Being itself. In chapter seven, this possibility was linked to the greatest crimes of the Nazi regime. This led Heidegger himself to a particularly noxious and murderous strain of antisemitism in his own life and represents a danger for anybody wishing to avail themselves of even a more open-minded conception of the authentic alliance. Indeed, one suspects that were we to replace primordialist nationalism with Heidegger as the Hephaestus figure in our “Shield of Achilles” Analogy, Thetis would still be horrified by what she would see upon the shield.

Such dangers lead some to argue that we should be done with Heidegger altogether, and to argue, as Faye does, that Heidegger should be relegated to the “History of Nazism” section of the library and excluded from the philosophical canon. However, if we do this, and try to cobble together some approximation of Heidegger’s insights from more sanitary alternatives, we would be robbing ourselves of the chance to benefit from the saving power that lies precisely in the confrontation with Heidegger’s darker side. Heideggerian ideas have proven to appeal to scholars and, perhaps most importantly, students. Those who confront them via a more palatable alternative risk handling them in ignorance of the fundamentally unstable nature of the material in their possession. The fact of seeing Heidegger expound such ideas in the most brilliant ways, and yet falling into the greatest political depravity, stands as a vital warning to the dangers inherent to such ideas. There is, therefore, a saving power inherent to the study of Heidegger which can, if done correctly, inoculate one against some of Heidegger’s superficially appealing ideas. In other cases, Heidegger’s example warns us to handle some thoughts with care, in the knowledge that there are certain dead-ends that these ideas lead us towards to the ruin of all. The reading of Heidegger, in short, has potentially to be greatly edifying so long as Heidegger is not approached as the great prophet of Being who we are to follow into the new *Denken*. Instead, we must approach Heidegger as judicious scholars, open-minded but critically engaged and willing to acknowledge that philosophical brilliance can coexist with moral turpitude and myopia. We began this study with an attitude of respect towards the brilliance of Heidegger’s thought, but with a conscious scepticism towards taking him to be, in any way, the arbiter of

the good. We sought, in Bourdieu's formulation, the "*vérité sacrée du texte*" not the "*vérité du texte sacré*."<sup>2353</sup> We conclude similarly, with this study having buttressed an attitude towards Heidegger's thought summarized by Francisco Gonzalez in "Heidegger's Remains.":

*What does not or should not remain are 'Heideggerians' understood as those who identify with the teaching of the 'Master,' [...] We should celebrate that the idol is destroyed, that it is no longer possible to be Heideggerian without also being anti-Heideggerian, and that some of the most important philosophical texts of the twentieth century are now liberated for genuinely critical engagement.*<sup>2354</sup>

### *§ Navigating Heideggerian Pathways*

What does it mean, then, to engage with Heidegger in this non-reverential manner? We must, I believe, go beyond simply acknowledging his imperfections and reflecting on the relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and certain troubling passages in his work. Rather, it is incumbent upon the responsible Heidegger scholar to explore where Heidegger went astray, and then to sacrifice a certain degree of fidelity to Heidegger's oeuvre in order to think along with Heidegger, so to speak, without being beholden to his flaws. The way in which the broader flaws in Heidegger's oeuvre are articulated will, no doubt, somewhat reflect the beliefs and prejudices of the interpreter, and thus where we speak of a "virtuous Heideggerian" position this should not be seen as exclusive. A socialist, a liberal, and a Tory will have different intuitions about why Heidegger erred and thus their version of a virtuous Heideggerian will be subtly different. Nevertheless, the goal of availing oneself of Heidegger while guarding against his antisemitism, ethno-cultural chauvinism, and indifference to human suffering ought to be common to all.

To this end, we begin by re-iterating that, across this study, we have seen Heidegger fall into precisely the kinds of thought patterns that he himself associated with inauthenticity, metaphysics, technology, and thoughtlessness. We have seen, for example, that Heidegger often retreated into comforting narratives that ordered the world into elect nations, such as his own, and other, lesser nations.

We also have found ample evidence of Heidegger elevating certain groups against whom he held negative prejudices— Bolsheviks and Americans but above all Jews— as objects of symbolic representation standing for inauthenticity, while others— mostly his favourite poets— come to stand, through their works, as symbolic representations of something better. Worst of all, Heidegger’s political misadventures saw him requisitioning his most elevated considerations of the nature of Being precisely in order to intervene in the petty, everyday squabbling of mediocre political minds— all in the name of refining the barbaric and idiotic cause of National Socialism. Indeed, when Heidegger talked about certain subjects, about which he seemed singularly incapable of sensible thought— German greatness, America, and Judaism primary among them— we found him sounding like a less thoughtful and sophisticated primordialist nationalist. Indeed, when compared with Péguy and Mann these aspects of Heidegger’s thought at times are outright embarrassing— though too dangerous to be amusingly so. The comparison is especially unflattering with respect to Mann, whose thought evolved and matured as a result of the evidence presented to him by the historical moment he experienced— in contrast with the obfuscation and avoidance that typifies Heidegger’s reaction to the historical events that defined his life. Though we will return to the question of what to do with the less salutary parts of Heidegger’s oeuvre, it is beneficial to step for a moment outside of the texts and speak in more general terms about Heidegger’s shortcomings.

For my part, I believe that Heidegger’s audacity— the tendency to boldness and originality that make him so compelling— carried within itself the vice of pride. Heidegger lacked the humility to properly learn the lessons presented to him by the example of thinkers that came before. This is evident in the practical sense that he did not apply the lessons of Plato’s failure in Syracuse when the opportunity to embed himself in the Nazi regime was presented to him. Also, when confronting his writings, one often feels a frustration at the way he ventriloquizes certain thinkers without synthesizing some of the best aspects of their work. Though there is not space here to go into lengthy critiques of Heidegger’s interpretative tendencies, it is often the case that aspects of the works of thinkers whom Heidegger treats

at length offered a salve to Heidegger's worst instincts which he overlooked or dismissed. How one, for example, can write at such length about Kant and Plato only to proceed to neglect entirely the ethical dimension of philosophy at times beggars belief. Similarly, Heidegger's pride also leads him into a certain imprudence, a lack of moderation which results in an unconstrained vision of how thinking is to proceed. There is little evidence that Heidegger accounts, for example, for the possibility that he might be wrong, or that space should be reserved in a community for those who reject the Heideggerian conception of belonging. There is, as a result, no sense in which Heidegger places limitations on what one might be permitted to do in pursuit of authenticity, and thus no internal mechanism by which he could have observed the inhumanity visited upon the victims of Nazism and concluded that nothing in the pursuit of the truths of Being could possibly justify such barbarity. This failure to abide by the great Camusian maxim, "*un homme ça s'empêche*," also ties into the third notable consequence of Heidegger's pride, his haughty disinterest— much discussed by this point— in the concerns, experience, and suffering of the "little people." Acknowledging the role played by the vice of pride in Heidegger's failings- which led Heidegger to a lack of constraint, prudence, and compassion- provides a strong starting point for a consideration of what a virtuous Heideggerianism might entail. How, we ask now, can one avail oneself of Heidegger's insights while self-consciously seeking to embody humility, constraint, prudence, and compassion where he failed to do so.

It is clear that Heidegger requires us to resist the continued entrapping-securing of technology. This requires political engagement. Concretely, it requires engagement with the universities (preventing total technologization), influence being exercised upon the general prejudices of the culture (to ensure the thinker and the poet are listened to) and thus an engagement— even if this is an arm's length engagement— with the political leadership and the *polis*. In short, Heidegger undeniably requires defensive political commitments. Were we simply to withdraw into contemplation, wandering the forest with all connection to the political world severed, we might find, upon our philosophically necessary return, that we return to

a place where the task of thinking is no longer possible. It is clear that Heidegger also thought that this required resistance to the twin threats of Americanism and Bolshevism, and against agents of inauthentic thinking—the metaphysicians, particularly those beholden to liberal or communist ideas but undeniably also, for Heidegger, Jews. The virtuous Heideggerian would recognize this tendency of Heidegger’s to scapegoat particular groups in relation to his concept of entrapping-securing. The great insight, that there is a tendency in modern societies to give greater credence to claims that couch themselves in the language of scientific or mathematical objectivity, even where the subject matter does not at all lend itself to those methodologies, remains valuable. Furthermore, it does not at all depend upon the paranoia and scapegoating that accompanies it in Heidegger’s writings. However, the responsible scholar must attend to the danger that thinking about technology in this way can lead to the identification of certain groups as the agents, so to speak, of entrapping-securing and ensure at all times that they are not falling into the habit of ascribing malign motives to those who employ the modes of thinking that they deem “technological,” nor to associate such thinking unnecessarily with specific groups. With this in mind, the virtuous Heideggerian will be able to avail themselves of Heidegger’s argumentation in order to resist the encroachment of scientific and mathematical kinds of reasoning into territories where they do not belong (art, poetry, literature, etc.) as well as to provide a coherent explanation for and critique of the underlying factors that drive this encroachment— such as the corporatization of the university or the decline of liberal arts education in secondary schools.

Another valuable Heideggerian insight emerges from the intricate relationship that he posits between the conventional ways in which communities articulate themselves to themselves and others—including the controversial matter of the stories that a community tells about itself and its history— and an unflinching questioning of Being that is unafraid, even anxious to challenge those things upon which everyday commodious living may depend. In the contemporary context, this is a particularly interesting way of getting around interminable and unenlightening “history wars” where every side posits their

interpretation of historical events as “the facts” and opposed it to a historical “myth” that is to be debunked or deconstructed. More often than not, this is an exercise in seeking to substitute one mytho-historical narrative with another. The virtuous Heideggerian will recognize this exercise for what it is but will also reject the idea of a simple oppositional binary between “the facts” and “the myth” on account of the inter-related nature of the two. Heidegger’s great insight, here, is that there must be a preservation of the traditional grounds of the everyday, including mytho-historical narratives, but only in order that they inspire us into the exploration of the unfolding of the question of Being. It appears that mytho-historical narratives speak to some fundamental human need, and recent history suggests that inspiring and edifying narratives will likely resonate more widely than alternatives along the lines of “your forebears were despicable.” Therefore, there is good reason to hope that a Heideggerian framework, seeking to incorporate this edifying *Volksgeschichte* alongside the unflinching pursuit of the truths of Being, the *Seinsgeschichte*, might bear more fruit than the “history wars” as they prevail at present.

Again, the virtuous Heideggerian benefits from an awareness of Heidegger’s failings. Specifically, Heidegger posits a monadic conception of the traditional, everyday articulation of a people’s historicity which accounts neither for the diversity of historical narratives that might coexist within a national community nor for the diversity of the ways in which one might relate to these narratives. Also, when Heidegger shifts his attention from the everyday *Volksgeschichte* to the *Seinsgeschichte* he retains the unwarranted belief, never adequately defended, that certain elect nations have a special role in the unfolding of humanity’s understanding of and relationship with Being. Interestingly, we have seen Péguy introduce an approach that might allow the virtuous Heideggerian to avail themselves of Heidegger’s insight while avoiding his mistakes. Péguy outlines a broad, dialogical conception of an everyday historical experience that does not enforce one view. Rather, it creates the space for creative interactions to which people of all backgrounds can contribute, bringing their own historical hinterlands along with them.

There is similar promise in Heidegger's liminal approach to space. A Heideggerian *polis*— such as one can exist— would have to protect and encourage a similarly peripatetic relationship. It would preserve the customs and traditions of a people but simultaneously would encourage and protect our exploration of Being, our search for the origins of Being itself, our relation to the unfolding of Being in time, our understanding of what it means to be, and our attunement to the existential consequences of our finitude. This suggests at a political mediation of these two levels. This can include the preservation of a beloved aspect of the character of one's nation— but only insofar as it is ultimately directed towards facilitating the exploration of Being— and the preservation of the thinker's freedom and capacity to wander between the two. At a practical level, this implies an education that grounds people in the customs of their people— never compelling reverence for the traditional but demanding an understanding of it. This relationship with tradition should provoke a curiosity about what lies beyond the familiar. An authentic relation to the tradition allows the philosopher a freedom to wander— even where wandering might be discomfiting— and protects the philosopher from those influences that would inhibit philosophical exploration. One cannot separate these two modalities of being, and there is no escaping the everyday as it is the natural starting point of any philosophical inquiry— and an integral part of the hinterland of both the thinker and the historical *Dasein* in whose company they find themselves thrown. However, it does preclude one's being satisfied with belonging within the hermitage discussed above. The promise of this approach lies in the possibility of a traditionalism that does not slip into an uncritical reverence for what is— precluding the possibility of any improvements in those areas where the tradition serves people ill— and a localism that strengthens the initial bond to the at-hand without binding us to it so tightly that we abjure the unfamiliar.

Again, the virtuous Heideggerian benefits from an honest appraisal of Heidegger's failings. With Heidegger, there is an undeniable and excessive prioritization of the pursuits of great minds, the rest of the society functioning mostly to secure the grounds from which the philosopher sets off, having the result

that it seems that most are just to repeat the traditional practices of their forebears *ad infinitum*. Simultaneously, the thinker, for Heidegger, seems to engage with the “everyday” world only as a home base, and does not seem to contribute much to shaping it beyond bringing philosophical truths back and ensuring their own capacity to think. This results in a thinker who seems indifferent to those things that impact the wellbeing of their compatriots, and in particular seems to lend itself to an indifference to the suffering experienced by ordinary people when politics fails or, more importantly, is captured by malevolent forces. Thus, the virtuous Heideggerian, armed with the cautionary example of Heidegger’s own shortcomings, would balance the thinker’s engagement more equitably and would be conscious of the need to think about material wellbeing as well as existential matters.

In short, the virtuous Heideggerian that emerges from this study orients our everyday relation to space and time in such a way as to hold us to the first of the three Delphic maxims: know thyself— but above all, question thyself. Our homes— national or otherwise— can thus operate as a home base or port from which the thinker departs for the unexplored regions of Being and to which they return— *oikophile* but curious with respect to the alien, rooted in the inherited but questioning of the given— intrepid explorer of the unknown and taciturn steward of the home.

#### *§ Applying the anti-Nationalist Reading of Heidegger*

This study has pointed at ways in which the authenticity claims of nationalist political entrepreneurs might be challenged from a Heideggerian perspective. It has been shown that nationalism has no special efficacy when speaking to the question of who one authentically is. In fact— in giving us an appealing approximation while simultaneously expropriating our freedom to define ourselves— it blinds us to the pursuit of authenticity. It simply cannot satisfy one who thinks the question of Being, even if it were to be shorn of its more obnoxious aspects. At the centre of this critique of nationalism has been the claim that it encourages, at least in its primordialist form, a combination of solipsism, determinism, and idolatry of the self which comes at the expense of the pursuit of the *truth* of our historical and spatial contextuality. It is,

ultimately, because they make truth subservient to usefulness that we find the nationalist among the “false ones [...] those that believe to know and possess the night when they light up the night and eliminate it with their borrowed light?”<sup>2355</sup> This study began with reference to the image of Thetis looking over the shoulder of Hephaestus, in horror of the scenes of alienation that he had carved upon the shield of Achilles. We have looked over the shoulder of some of the most influential and important thinkers of primordialist nationalist thoughts of Heidegger’s time, and, like Thetis, have found the replication of the worst tendencies of what Heidegger termed modern technology where the nationalist might have hoped for an idyllic image of authentic pre-modern community.

Our exploration of Heidegger’s thought does not lead to the call to abolish the *nation* and be done with all that it implies. There is clearly some sense in which the nation, and our relation to it, could persist as we pursue the path beyond metaphysics. There is no doubt that there must be some manner of concretizing the *Da* of *Dasein*, and it has become only clearer that the *Da* is encountered via some articulation of our temporal and spatial context. We need, in short, to ground ourselves in some conception of the “there.” This “there” must refer to a particular historical and spatial experience as well as to some relation to those with whom we share it. Needless to say, it would be absurd to overlook the significance of the nation to shaping that context in most cases. The nation can be, for Heidegger, a reasonable locus for establishing both the historical role of an historical *Dasein* in the overcoming of metaphysics and as the home base from which the thinker strikes out from their everyday experience of Being-with in pursuit of the *Seinsfrage*. Note, here, that we speak of the nation, not nationalism. Once we begin to build nationalism around the nation, it becomes clear that, at best, it is little better than any other form of communal organization— other than the hyper-technological ones— and, furthermore, it seems far more obstructive of authentic belonging than a less emotionally compelling alternative.

Furthermore, any nationalism which attempted to adapt in order to persist in Heidegger’s anticipated future would have to sacrifice much of what it holds most dear. For example, its particular

brand of mytho-historical consciousness, its concept of the sacred, its sanctification of death, its political potency, and its populism. Furthermore, it would have to accept the subservience of the national interest to the philosophical interest. This is best illustrated with respect to Germany. For Heidegger, the German historical mission primarily serves the advancement of Western thought, and the *Dasein*'s attachment to the particularities of the German serve to advance their coming to rest in dwelling in Being *qua* Being. Furthermore, engagement with great German poets or with the Rhine is to be oriented towards facilitating a philosophical exploration of existential questions, rather than simply being enjoyed as examples of German greatness. In short, our nationalism, such as it could be, would always be a secondary commitment and our status as thinkers of Being (truth-seekers in the realm of the concealed) would take precedence. One wonders whether a nationalism that accepted this could truly call itself nationalism. In short, nationalism cannot solve the problem of being—nor can it effectively counter the expanding imperium of the technological—though a role seems to remain for the *nation* as a part—only a part—of our apprehension of the everyday experience of temporality and spatiality from which we set out in search of Being.

How, then, should one relate to one's nation as a part of one's broader relation to Being? To answer this question directly and comprehensively would, of course, do violence to the concept of *Eigentlichkeit*—as what is “truly one's ownmost” cannot really be dictated to everybody on earth by one doctoral candidate in Ottawa—and could fairly be accused of replacing a brilliant but flawed prophet (Heidegger) with a less brilliant, though hopefully less flawed prophet (myself). However, certain things are clear. Firstly, nothing is gained by believing that one can, so to speak, extract oneself from one's thrownness into a temporal and spatial context that is profoundly shaped by one's nation. Therefore, attempting to transcend that thrownness and standing in judgement from the perspective of an ever-so-wise person that is simply above such silly things as the nation is little more than an exercise in self-deception. Similarly, to substitute for a nationalist *Weltanschauung* an alternative grounded in a “better” nationalism or alternatives grounded in

religion or ideology, to take two examples, would simply replace one obstacle to a Heideggerian *Denken* with another. To the extent that one is convinced by the critiques of the nationalist lens presented in this study, one ought to consider the ways in which the same critiques might be applied to such alternatives. Instead, one should recall what Heidegger called the “piety of thought”: questioning.

This questioning should challenge not only that which we take as a given when thinking of our own belonging, but also those areas where Heidegger himself fails to provide compelling answers. In the former case, we might ask questions such as: How can we articulate our historical and spatial context in a way that opens the door to thinking more generally about Being without denying our fundamental belonging to that context? How can we balance our need to belong to something that we share in common with the people around us without making ourselves subject to publicly held assumptions and prejudices? How can we balance the understanding that the national context, for example, is absolutely integral to our having become who we are at present with the belief that there are deeper needs that nationalism obstructs? In the latter case, we might ask: How can we integrate the wisdom that we know lies in art and poetry into our thought without falling into the habit of ventriloquizing our favourite poets and artists (as Heidegger too often did)? How can we put into speech our thoughts about Being and articulate what we might come to learn about a direct relation to it without engaging in the kind of representational objectifications that, for Heidegger, are the first step on the path to ruin? How can I articulate an historically resonant, spatiotemporally grounded, substantial and profound understanding of what it means to belong-together with my “authentic allies” while acknowledging the diversity— in all its forms— which is the undeniable reality of my countries (France, the UK, and Canada) as they actually exist? Importantly, in asking these questions, we must always be questioning the specific and contingent facts of our context and the broader confrontation with the fundamental question: what is Being? In order to fulfil the task of “protecting the night so that false days of everydayness are restrained,”<sup>2356</sup> we find ourselves under way along pathways of questioning. Along these pathways we are called back by Heidegger’s *Denken*, *above all else*, towards

the truly “authentic” task: the pursuit of truth of Being. Therefore, when questioning belonging, we must ask not “what does this mean to me?” but instead ask “where does it stand with Being?”

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### Endnotes

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#### **Eigentlichkeit and the Question of Heidegger's Nationalism**

<sup>1</sup> Meloni, Giorgia, "Discorso: XIII Congresso Mondiale delle famiglia di Verona." *Verona*, 2019

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> For example, it was employed by Mark Khan-Holoch of the AfD (Stroud, Liv, "Why are German young people so easily seduced by the AfD's ideas." *Euronews*, 2024), by Claude Géant, then interior minister (Agence France Presse, "Selon lui, les Français "ont parfois le sentiment de ne plus être chez eux" du fait d'une "immigration incontrôlée."" *Franceinfo*, 2011), and by Nigel Farage, (Morris, Nigel, "Ukip leader Nigel Farage provokes anger after agreeing with 'basic principle' of Enoch Powell's 'rivers of blood' speech." *The Independent*, 2014)

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Bock-Coté, Mathieu, "La France demeure une inspiration." *Le Journal de Montréal*, 2021

<sup>5</sup> Benjamin, Carl, "Five False Assumptions of Liberalism." *Lotuseaters.com*

<sup>6</sup> Goodhart, David, *The Road to Somewhere: The populist Revolt and the Future of Politics*, C Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 2017

<sup>7</sup> This slogan was among the most common refrains heard in the riots that occurred in England and Northern Ireland in July and August of 2024. (Le Monde, "Au Royaume-Uni, l'influence sous-évaluée de l'extrême droite." *Editorial*, 2024)

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ghiglione, Giorgio, "Why Giorgia Meloni Won't Distance Herself from Italy's Fascist Past." *Foreign Policy*, 2023

<sup>12</sup> Adorno, Theodore, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, London: Routledge, 2013, 3

<sup>13</sup> Adorno, 2013, 38

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- <sup>14</sup> Adorno, 2013, 16
- <sup>15</sup> Potter, Andrew, *The Authenticity Hoax*, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011, 14
- <sup>16</sup> Taylor, Charles, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2018, 15
- <sup>17</sup> Potter, for example, ascribes it to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. (Potter, 2011, 54)
- <sup>18</sup> Palmer, Richard E., "The Postmodernity of Heidegger." in *Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Spanos, William V., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 71
- <sup>19</sup> Palmer, 1979, 72-73
- <sup>20</sup> Heidegger saw theology as a "fully autonomous ontic science." (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hart, James G., & Maraldo, John C., "Phenomenology and Theology." in *Pathmarks*, Ed. McNeill, William, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 50)
- <sup>21</sup> Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, "Introduction." in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, Pettigrew, State University of New York Press, 2008, 20
- <sup>22</sup> This claim is elaborated upon and defended in this thesis.
- <sup>23</sup> The Heidegger who calls us to "stand in such a relation of attentiveness and responsiveness, of listening and of questioning, [...] a question constantly put anew" (Malpas, Jeff, "Rethinking Dwelling: Heidegger and the Question of Place." *Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology* 25 1, 2014, 14) is the same Heidegger who calls us to "a mode of thinking that is attuned to place, [where] the possibility of genuine questioning – as well as listening – itself appears." (Malpas, 2014, 16)
- <sup>24</sup> Tabachnick, David, "Heidegger's Polemical Peace: Outer Violence for Inner Harmony." *The Question of Peace in Modern Political Thought*, Tabachnick, David & Koivukoski, Toivo, Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2015, 183-184
- <sup>25</sup> Palmer, 1979, 87-88
- <sup>26</sup> Sheehan, Thoman, "Nihilism and its Discontents." In *Heidegger and Practical Politics*, Raffoul, François & Pettigrew, David, State University of New York Press, 2002, 297
- <sup>27</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre, "L'Ontologie Politique de Martin Heidegger." *Actes et Recherches en Sciences Sociales* 1 5-6, 1975, 109-110
- <sup>28</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 112
- <sup>29</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 110
- <sup>30</sup> Blakely, Jason, "Political Relativism in the Work of Martin Heidegger." *Perspectives on Political Science* 41 3, 2012, 142.
- <sup>31</sup> Dronsfield, Jonathan, "Between Deleuze and Heidegger: There is Never any Difference." In *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York Press, 2008, 152; Safranski, Rüdiger, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, ix
- <sup>32</sup> Han-Pile, Beatrice, "Freedom to Choose Oneself in Being and Time." in *The Cambridge Companion to Being and Time*, 2009, 316
- <sup>33</sup> Rorty, Richard, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press, 1979, 371-372
- <sup>34</sup> Elden, Stuart, "Heidegger's Hölderlin and the Importance of Place." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 30 3, 1999, 264
- <sup>35</sup> Elden, 1999, 265
- <sup>36</sup> Kisiel, Theodore, "How Heidegger Resolved the Tension between Technological Globalization and Indigenous Localization: A Twenty-First-Century Retrieval." in *Heidegger and the Question of Being*, Zaborowski, Holger, Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017, 201
- <sup>37</sup> Kisiel, 2017, 201-202
- <sup>38</sup> Malpas, 2014, 14
- <sup>39</sup> "His insistence on a finitude that is not a partial view of a fuller revelation to come leaves Heidegger with very few tools to deal with questions about the relation of different finite revelations of being."

(Kolb, David, "Science and Self: Ontological Communities in Hegel and Heidegger." *Philosophy Today* 59 1, 2015, 96)

<sup>40</sup> Nitsche, Martin, "A Place of Encounter with a Divine. Heidegger on the Spatiality of Religious Experience." *Open Theology* 3 1, 2017, 340

<sup>41</sup> Mitchell, Andrew, "Contamination, Essence, and Decomposition." in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 146

<sup>42</sup> Winfree, Jason, "Concealing Difference: Derrida and Heidegger's Thinking of Becoming." *Research in Phenomenology* 29 1, 1999, 176

<sup>43</sup> Safranski rather amusingly describes this as a "Dadaist episode in philosophy." (Safranski, 1998, 99)

<sup>44</sup> Zuckert, Catherine H., *Postmodern Platos*, University of Chicago Press, 1996

<sup>45</sup> Froman, Wayne, "Merleau-Ponty's 1959 Heidegger Lectures: The Task of Thinking and the Possibility of Philosophy Today." in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 93

<sup>46</sup> Nancy, Jean-Luc, Heidegger's 'Originary Ethics'" in *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy* François Raffoul & David Pettigrew, State University of New York Press, 2002, 71

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Dallmayr, Fred, *The Other Heidegger*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, ix

<sup>49</sup> Newell, Waller R., "Politics and Progress in Heidegger's Philosophy of History." in *Democratic Theory and Technological Society*, Richard B. Day et al, Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2016, 252

<sup>50</sup> Newell, Waller R., "Heidegger on Freedom and Community: Some Political Implications of his Early Thought." *The American Political Science Review* 78 3, 1984, 775-776

<sup>51</sup> Taminaux, Jacques, "Heidegger and Praxis." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, 1992, 199

<sup>52</sup> Hoy, David C., "The Owl and the Poet: Heidegger's Critique of Hegel." in *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 67

<sup>53</sup> Savage, Robert, "My Own Private Swabia: On the Idiocy of Heidegger's Nationalism" *Thesis Eleven* 87 1, 2006, 120

<sup>54</sup> Wolin, Richard, *Heidegger in Ruins*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023, 368

<sup>55</sup> Harries, Karston, "Language and Silence: Heidegger's Dialogue with George Trakl." in *Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Spanos, William V., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 169

<sup>56</sup> Caputo, John C., "Heidegger's Scandal: Thinking and the Essence of the Victim." in *the Heidegger Case*. Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, 279

<sup>57</sup> Zimmerman, Michael E., "Ontological Aestheticism: Heidegger, Jünger, and National Socialism." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, 1992, 56

<sup>58</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Anderson, John M. & Freund, Hans, *Discourse on Thinking*, New York: Harper & Row, 1966, 79

<sup>59</sup> Wrathall, Mark, "Philosophy, Thinkers, and Heidegger's Place in the History of Being." in *Appropriating Heidegger*, Mark Wrathall & James E. Falconer, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 10

<sup>60</sup> The *Seinsfrage* refers to that history of Western thought spanning from Heraclitus— who Ewegen identifies as the one who "initiated that very history" (Ewegen, Shane Montgomery, "The Birth of Philosophy, The Philosophy of Birth: Heidegger, Plato and the Gift of Being." *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* 12 3, 2020, 235)— to Nietzsche.

<sup>61</sup> Ewegen, 2020, 236-237

<sup>62</sup> Taminaux, Jacques, trans. Gendre, Michael, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, Albany: State of New York University Press, 1991, 130

<sup>63</sup> Taminaux, 1992, 200

<sup>64</sup> "Even the struggle of the Spanish Catholic Right against its mortal enemies, the Communists, cannot find grace in his eyes, for its doctrinal foundation is still located in the sphere of the forgetfulness of

Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*)." (Tertulian, Nicolas, "The History of Being and Political Revolution: Reflections on a Posthumous Work of Heidegger." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, 1992, 219)

<sup>65</sup> Janicaud, Dominique, "Toward the End of the "French Exception."" in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 30

<sup>66</sup> As Pattison and Kirkpatrick put it, a life of "watching the swans, pondering the poet's word-picture of their movement across the water [...] open and receptive to the world and freed from remaking that world in the image of our own will." (Pattison, George & Kirkpatrick, Kate, *The Mystical Sources of Existential Thought*, Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2018, 66)

<sup>67</sup> Dreyfus and Spinoza famously interpreted Heidegger as having called us to "discover and cultivate humble everyday practices such as playing with our children, gardening, or backpacking into the wilderness." (Dreyfus, Hubert & Spinoza, Charles, "Further Reflections on Heidegger, technology, and the Everyday." *Bulletin of Science, Technology Society* 23 5, 2003, 344)

<sup>68</sup> Dreyfus, Hubert, *Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 24

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> "Focusing on loss and destruction, as late Romantics do, is itself a technological reaction to technology." (Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 340)

<sup>71</sup> Strauss, Leo, *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy*, University of Chicago Press, 1983, 30

<sup>72</sup> Swer, Gregory Morgan, "Technology and the End of Western Civilization: Spengler's and Heidegger's Histories of Life/Being." *The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology* 19 1, 2019, 6

<sup>73</sup> Schürmann, Reiner, "Riveted to a Monstrous Site: On Heidegger's *Beitrag zu Philosophie*." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, 1992, 319

<sup>74</sup> "We constantly and unconsciously shape up others' pronunciation, the distance they stand from us, and how they use their knives and forks, and the like; they shape us up in the same way." (Dreyfus, Hubert, "Interpreting Heidegger on Das Man." *Inquiry* 38 4, 1995, 427)

<sup>75</sup> Lovitt, William. "Introduction" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, Heidegger, Martin trans. Lovitt, William. New York: Harper & Row, 1977, xiv

<sup>76</sup> Scott, Charles E., "Heidegger's Practical Politics: Of Time and the River." in *Heidegger and Practical Politics*, Raffoul, François & Pettigrew, David, State University of New York Press, 2002, 176

<sup>77</sup> Milchman, Alan & Rosenberg, Alan, "Self-Fashioning as a Response to the Crisis of "Ethics": A Foucault/Heidegger *Auseinandersetzung*." in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David, & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 108

<sup>78</sup> Zimmerman, Michael E., "The Ontological Decline of the West." in *A Companion to Heidegger's "Introduction to Metaphysics*, Polt, Richard & Fried, Gregory, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, 188

<sup>79</sup> Strong, Tracy, "Heidegger, the Polis, the Political and Gelassenheit." *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology* 72 2, 2016, 165

<sup>80</sup> Strong, 2016, 160

<sup>81</sup> Strong, 2016, 169

<sup>82</sup> Blitz, Mark, "Heidegger and the Political." *Political Theory* 28 2, 2000, 185

<sup>83</sup> Love, Jeff & Meng, Michael, "Heidegger's Metapolitics." *Cultural Critique* 99, 2018, 97

<sup>84</sup> Clark, Timothy, *Martin Heidegger*, New York: Taylor & Routledge, 2011, 40

<sup>85</sup> Dreyfus, Hubert L. & Rubin, Jane, "You Can't Get Something for Nothing: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on How Not to Overcome Nihilism." *Inquiry* 30 1-2, 1987, 70

<sup>86</sup> "It is the poetry of truth and Being that he has been composing all his life." (Hofstadter, Albert. "Introduction." In *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper and Row 1971, xxii)

- <sup>87</sup> Gadamer, Hans-Georg & Campbell, Karen, "Heidegger and the History of Philosophy." *The Monist* 64 4, 1981, 435
- <sup>88</sup> Taminiaux, 1992, 202
- <sup>89</sup> Safranski, 1998, 176-177
- <sup>90</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 109
- <sup>91</sup> As Heidegger put it in "Kant's Thesis about Being.": "In the unobtrusive "is" lies concealed everything of being that is worth  
y of thought." (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Klein, Ted E. Jr & Pohl, William, "Kant's Thesis about Being." in *Pathmarks*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 362)
- <sup>92</sup> Skocz, Dennis, "Postscripts to the "Letter on 'Humanism'": Heidegger, Sartre, and Being-Human." in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 82
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>94</sup> Skocz, 2008, 83
- <sup>95</sup> Schmidt, Dennis J. "Forward." in *Being and Time*, Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, State University of New York Press, 2010, xvii
- <sup>96</sup> Pöggeler, Otto, "Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Politics." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, 1992, 127
- <sup>97</sup> Greisch, Jean, "The Poverty of Heidegger's "Last God."" in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 257
- <sup>98</sup> Gillespie, Michael A., "Martin Heidegger's Aristotelian National Socialism." *Political Theory* 28 2, 2000, 142
- <sup>99</sup> Polt, Richard, "Drawing the Line: Political Thought in Heidegger's Lecture Courses and Seminars of 1933-35." in *Heidegger's Question of Being*, Zaborowski, Holger, Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017, 110-111
- <sup>100</sup> Polt, 2017, 112
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>102</sup> Cerrato, Maddalena, "Heidegger's Philosophical Nationalism: Topology and Tropology." *Politica Commun* 14, 2020
- <sup>103</sup> Beiner, Ronald, *Dangerous Minds: Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Return of the Far Right*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018, 47
- <sup>104</sup> Beiner, 2018, 51
- <sup>105</sup> Beiner, 2018, 52
- <sup>106</sup> Schürmann, 1992, 316
- <sup>107</sup> Göppfarth, Julian, "Rethinking the German Nation as German *Dasein*: Intellectuals and Heidegger's Philosophy in Contemporary German New Right Nationalism." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 25 3, 2020, 253
- <sup>108</sup> Beiner, 2018, 38
- <sup>109</sup> Beiner notes that the appropriation of Heideggerian ideas by the modern far-right is part of a broader revival of thinkers associated with what he terms, borrowing from Armin Mohler, "the Conservative Revolution." (Beiner, Ronald, "Dangerous Minds in Dangerous Times." *Thesis Eleven* 163 1, 2021, 39)
- <sup>110</sup> Elden, Stuart, "Reading Logos as Speech: Heidegger, Aristotle and Rhetorical Politics." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 38 4, 2005, 292
- <sup>111</sup> Clark, 2011, 90
- <sup>112</sup> Schürmann, Reiner, "Situation René Char: Hölderlin, Heidegger, Char and the "There is."" in *Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Spanos, William V., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 191
- <sup>113</sup> Meinecke, Friedrich, *Cosmopolitanism and the Nation State*, Princeton University Press, 1970

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- <sup>114</sup> Zuckert, Catherine, "Martin Heidegger: His Philosophy and His Politics." *Political Theory* 18 1, 1990, 61
- <sup>115</sup> Safranski, 1998, 93
- <sup>116</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>117</sup> Safranski, 1998, 225-226
- <sup>118</sup> Morat, Daniel, "No Inner Remigration: Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, and the Early Federal Republic of Germany." *Modern Intellectual History* 9 3, 2012, 664
- <sup>119</sup> Morat, 2012, 679
- <sup>120</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 61
- <sup>121</sup> Young, Julian, "Poets and Rivers: Heidegger on Hölderlin's "Der Ister"." *Dialogue— Canadian Philosophical Association* 38 2, 1999, 404
- <sup>122</sup> Schufreider, Gregory, "Sticking Heidegger with a Stela." in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 212
- <sup>123</sup> Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, Introduction." in *The Heidegger Case*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, 6
- <sup>124</sup> Fried, Gregory & Polt, Richard. "Translators' Introduction" in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Martin Heidegger, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004, xii
- <sup>125</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>126</sup> Lucas, Hans-Christian, "Philosophy, Politics— and the "New" Questions for Hegel, for Heidegger, and for Phantasy." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, 240
- <sup>127</sup> Velkley, Richard, "Political Philosophy and the Ontological Question: Preliminary Remarks on Heidegger and Strauss." in *Heidegger's Question of Being*, Zaborowski, Holger, Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017, 145
- <sup>128</sup> Schalow, Frank, *Departures at the Crossroads between Heidegger and Kant*, Boston: De Gruyter, 2013, 149
- <sup>129</sup> Newell, 2016, 260
- <sup>130</sup> Soffer, Gail, "Heidegger, Humanism, and the Destruction of History." *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 3, 1996, 556
- <sup>131</sup> Magrini, James M., "Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heidegger, Technology, and the Poetic Attunement of Literature." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 44 5, 2012, 506
- <sup>132</sup> Nancy, 2002, 82
- <sup>133</sup> Detsch, Richard, "The Intersection of Heidegger's Philosophy and his Politics as Reflected in the Views of his Contemporaries at the University of Freiburg." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 38 3, 2000, 427
- <sup>134</sup> Segal, Steven, "Narcissism, Nationalism and Philosophy in Heidegger." *Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology* 5 2, 2005, 3-4
- <sup>135</sup> Segal, 2005, 4
- <sup>136</sup> McManus, Denis, "Being-Towards-Death and Owning One's Judgment." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 91 2, 2015, 262
- <sup>137</sup> Roberts, David, "Technology and Modernity: Spengler, Jünger, Heidegger, Cassirer." *Thesis Eleven* 111 1, 2012, 24
- <sup>138</sup> Langan, Thomas, "Foreword." in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger, Martin, trans. Churchill, James S., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962, xiii
- <sup>139</sup> Dungey, Nicholas, "the Ethics and Politics of Dwelling." *Polity* 39 2, 2007, 238
- <sup>140</sup> Skocz, 2008, 74

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- <sup>141</sup> Grosser, Florian, "Heidegger, the Politics of Space, and the Space of Politics." *Geographica Helvetica* 72 1, 2017, 93. NB: Grosser separates an early from a late Heidegger and ascribes this position only to the latter.
- <sup>142</sup> Dungey, 2007, 242
- <sup>143</sup> Dungey, 2007, 253
- <sup>144</sup> Dungey, 2007, 242
- <sup>145</sup> Skinner, Quentin, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas." *History and Theory* 8 1, 1969, 16
- <sup>146</sup> Billig, Michael, *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage Publishing, 1995, 38
- <sup>147</sup> Kramer, Lloyd, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58 3, 1997, 534
- <sup>148</sup> Moar, Zohar, "Hans Kohn: The Idea of Secularized Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalisms* 23 4, 2017, 670
- <sup>149</sup> Berlin, Isaiah, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power." *Partisan Review* 46 3, 1979, 346
- <sup>150</sup> Shils, Edward, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties." *The British Journal of Sociology* 8 2, 1957, 130
- <sup>151</sup> Shils, 1957, 138
- <sup>152</sup> Mann, Thomas, trans. Rainey, Lawrence, "On the German Republic." in *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, New York Review of Books, 2021, 525
- <sup>153</sup> Mann, Thomas, *This War*, London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1940, 33 & 37
- <sup>154</sup> Mann, *This War*, 1940, 16
- <sup>155</sup> Mann, *OGR*, 2021, 517-518
- <sup>156</sup> Jackson, Julian, *A Certain Idea of France*, London: Penguin Random House, 2018, 20
- <sup>157</sup> Jackson, 2018, 80
- <sup>158</sup> Jackson, 2018, 196
- <sup>159</sup> Wolin, 2023, 322
- <sup>160</sup> Wolin, 2023, 384-385
- <sup>161</sup> Wolin, 2023, 172-173
- <sup>162</sup> Andrew, Edward Grant, "Heidegger's *Führerprinzip*: Leadership Out of and Into Nihilism." in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership*, Molchanov, Mikhail A., London: Routledge, 2016, 123
- <sup>163</sup> Heidegger identified *The Magic Mountain* as major inspiration for his work. (Heidegger, Martin & Arendt, Hannah, trans. Shields, Andrew, *Letters: 1925-1975*, London: Harcourt, 2004, 28)
- <sup>164</sup> Eubanks, Kevin P., "Heidegger Reading Mann, or What Time is it, Hans Castorp?" *Death, Bildung, and the Possibility of Time in the Magic Mountain.* *College Literature* 44 2, 2017, 257
- <sup>165</sup> Jaron, François, "The Contribution of "Time Novels" to a Phenomenology of Temporality. Thomas Mann, Martin Heidegger, and our Experience of Time." *Phainomenon* 32 1, 2021, 115. This refers to the matter of temporality, how we relate to it and the extent to which it can, or more importantly cannot, be grasped as we generally discuss it, as measured by hours, seconds, and minutes.
- <sup>166</sup> E.g., Wilding, Adrian, "Why We Don't Remain in the Provinces." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 31 1, 2015, 126-127.
- <sup>167</sup> Blok, Vincent, "An Indication of Being-Reflections in Heidegger's Engagement with Ernst Jünger." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 49 2, 2011, 194
- <sup>168</sup> For example, he is mentioned by name in "On the Question of Being" (Heidegger, Martin, trans. McNeill, William, "On the Question of Being." *Pathmarks*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 295) and is the subject of Heidegger's "Zu Ernst Jünger." (Heidegger, Martin, "Zu Ernst Jünger." *Gesamtausgabe Band 90*, Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004)
- <sup>169</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 137

- <sup>170</sup> Wolin, 2023, 172 & Zaborowski, Holger, “Technology, Truth, and Thinking: Martin Heidegger’s Reading of Ernst Jünger’s *The Worker*.” in Heidegger’s Question of Being: *Dasein*, Truth, and History, Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017, 170
- <sup>171</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 101.
- <sup>172</sup> Dallmayr, Fred, “Heidegger and Politics: Some Lessons.” in *The Heidegger Case*. Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, 1992, 290
- <sup>173</sup> Dallmayr, 1992, 290
- <sup>174</sup> Pöggeler, 1992, 134
- <sup>175</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 52-53, 59-62 & 65
- <sup>176</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 72 & 76-77
- <sup>177</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 83
- <sup>178</sup> Jeffrey Mehlman explores the similarity between Barrès’ involvement with that movement and Heidegger’s with the Nazi party. (Mehlman, Jeffrey, “On Literature and the Occupation of France: Blanchot vs. Drieu.” *Substance* 27 3, 1998, 6-16)
- <sup>179</sup> The question of Heidegger’s influence on later French thinkers is well covered ground. (e, g. Janicaud, Dominique, trans. Raffoul, François & Pettigrew, David, *Heidegger in France*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015 & Kleinberg, Ethan, *Generations Existential: Heidegger’s Philosophy in France, 1927-1961*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005
- <sup>180</sup> Benoist, Alain de, *Ce que penser veut dire : penser avec Goethe, Heidegger, Rousseau, Schmitt, Péguy, Arendt*, Monaco : Éditions de Rocher, 2017
- <sup>181</sup> Hill, Aaron, “The Centrality of Historical Consciousness in Revolutionary Ideology: France and Germany 1890-1934 (Dissertation),” *University of Chicago ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global*, 2014, 2
- <sup>182</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans, McNeill, William, “Postscript to “What is Metaphysics?”” in *Pathmarks*, 1998, 235
- <sup>183</sup> Jünger, Ernst, trans, Hemming, Laurence P. & Costa, Bogdan, *The Worker: Dominion and Form*, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2017, 67
- <sup>184</sup> Here, men were to be sacrificed without mercy (Jünger, Ernst, trans. Creighton, Basil, *Storm of Steel: From the Diary of a German Storm-Troop Officer on the Western Front*, New York: Howard Fertig Inc., 1975, 235) in a war turned bureaucratic (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 284-284)— though importantly this should not obscure the responsibility of bloodthirsty individuals who took “cold pleasure in destroying human beings.” (Jünger, Ernst, trans. Hansen, Anny J., Hansen, Thomas S. & Neaman, Elliot, *A German Officer in Occupied Paris: The War Journals, 1941-1945*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2019, 49)
- <sup>185</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 109. This was not because of the weaponry, but the “fine imponderable emanations” of technology. (Jünger, Ernst, trans. Gold, Joe & Wolin, Richard, “The Total Mobilization,” in *the Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, Wolin, Richard, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993, 121)
- <sup>186</sup> Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 126
- <sup>187</sup> Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 125-126. Jünger links this to a “world domination of reason” (Jünger, Ernst, “On Danger,” *New German Critique* 59, 1993, 28) which is the world dominion of the Gestalt of the worker.
- <sup>188</sup> Man does not become machine, (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 80) but we are reduced to pieces of material defined by abstract specializations (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 36) to which our lives are dedicated.
- <sup>189</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 56
- <sup>190</sup> Hyper-ambitious power-hungry individuals who will sacrifice anything to dominate and respect only that which advances the project of technological domination. (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 36)
- <sup>191</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 33
- <sup>192</sup> Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 128; Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 61
- <sup>193</sup> It makes it appear irrational and regressive to make claims on any other basis. (Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 127)
- <sup>194</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 60

<sup>195</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 68

<sup>196</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 82

<sup>197</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 87

<sup>198</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 96

<sup>199</sup> Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 138

<sup>200</sup> Mann, Thomas, trans. Morris, Walter D., *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, ed. Lilla, Mark, New York Review of Books, 2021, 428

<sup>201</sup> Mann saw iconoclasm as an inherent tendency of the new political morality. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 455)

<sup>202</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 198-199. Mann is also critical of a political corruption of the concept of freedom, which is made equivalent to being able to vote. He borrows from Treitschke the joke that many spiritual orders elect their leaders and, after all, “who ever sought freedom in a nunnery?” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 325)

<sup>203</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 294

<sup>204</sup> Civilization’s Literary Man is cosmopolitan and materialistic. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 57 & 400)

<sup>205</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 331

<sup>206</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 332

<sup>207</sup> He defined the “intellectual” as follows: “an individual who convinces himself that society must be founded in logic and who fails to understand that it in fact rests upon hereditary necessities and can be a stranger to individual reason” (Barrès, Maurice, *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme: Tome I*, Paris: Librairie Plon, 1925, 48) The intellectual is characterized by coyness about the full implications of their thought (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 5) but is defined primarily by a shallow form of rationalism. These figures would, Barrès argued, weaponize the masses to “transform the French mentality”— specifically to import from abroad a rationalism in place of the natural principles of the French. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 70)

<sup>208</sup> Barrès, Maurice, *Les Traits Éternels de la France*, Paris : Éditions Croisées, 1916, 114. This wartime innovation would translate in peacetime into an economism where money— specifically the “intrigues of the parties of money” would come to dominate. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 36)

<sup>209</sup> Barrès uses Antigone as a metaphor here, arguing that the cold *raison d’état* of Creon was eliminating the compassionate wisdom of Antigone. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 11)

<sup>210</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 51

<sup>211</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 59

<sup>212</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 69

<sup>213</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 82

<sup>214</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 121

<sup>215</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Les Suppliants Parallèles.” in *La République ... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 174. Péguy, though, would die early in the war, and would not therefore be able to reflect on the full horror of mechanized warfare.

<sup>216</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Avertissement A : Angasarian, Le Monde sans Dieu.” in *La République ... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 97-98

<sup>217</sup> In this environment, what we consider valuable, legitimate, and defensible is conditioned by logics we do not question. (Péguy, Charles, *Notre Jeunesse*, Paris : Gallimard, 1933, 86)

<sup>218</sup> Péguy, Charles, “De la Situation Faite à l’Histoire et à la Sociologie dans les Temps Modernes.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 193. For Péguy, the triumph of modernity was so absolute that even reactionaries had been co-opted. He specifically mentions *Action Française*, asking “What would happen if they were in power?” and answering, “rationalist forms which have only ever fooled themselves.” (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 29)

<sup>219</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Un Essai de Monopole.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 122

<sup>220</sup> Péguy, Charles, “De la Raison.” in *La République ... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 44

- <sup>221</sup> Péguy, Charles, *Notre Patrie*, Paris : Gallimard, 2017, 27
- <sup>222</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Notre Conjointe” in *La République ... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 350
- <sup>223</sup> He laments that we no longer appreciate the worth of butchers, bakers, and masons as much as he laments our loss of literacy in art and architecture. (Péguy, Charles, “Clio.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 367)
- <sup>224</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Préparation de Congrès Socialiste National.” in *La République ... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 24.
- <sup>225</sup> Shils, 1957, 144-145 & Shils, Edward, “Tradition.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13 2, 1971, 158
- <sup>226</sup> Connor, Walker, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16 3, 1993, 385
- <sup>227</sup> Calhoun, Craig, “Morality, Identity, and Historical Explanation.” *Sociological Theory* 9 2, 1991, 252
- <sup>228</sup> Gilbert, Paul, *The Philosophy of Nationalism*, New York: Routledge, 1998, 172
- <sup>229</sup> Kramer, 1997, 528
- <sup>230</sup> Fukuyama, Francis, *Identity*, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2018, 131
- <sup>231</sup> Péguy describes the “modern mentality” as a “crude theology.” (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 126)
- <sup>232</sup> Mann, R, 2021, 18-20
- <sup>233</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 77
- <sup>234</sup> Calhoun, 1991, 252
- <sup>235</sup> Abulof, Uriel, *The Mortality and Morality of Nations*, Cambridge University Press, 2015, vi; Moar, 2017, 671
- <sup>236</sup> Shils, Edward, “Mass Society and its Culture.” *Deadalus* 89 2, 1960, 288
- <sup>237</sup> Calhoun, Craig, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism.” *Nations and Nationalism* 14 3, 2008, 443
- <sup>238</sup> Triandafyllidou, Anna, “Nationalism in the 21st Century: Neo-Tribal or Plural?” *Nations and Nationalisms* 26 4, 2020, 803; Piiramä, Eva, "Sociability, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Herder's Early Philosophy of History." *History of Political Thought* 36 3, 2015, 559
- Methodology**
- <sup>239</sup> “The term typically translated as "authenticity"—*Eigentlichkeit*— could be translated more literally as "ownness" or "ownedness.”” (McManus, 2015, 245)
- <sup>240</sup> Emberly, Peter C. “Preface.” in *By Loving our Own: George Grant and the Legacy of Lament for a Nation*, Montreal: McGill-Queens Press, 1990, xiv-xvi
- <sup>241</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, *Being and Time*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010, GA263
- <sup>242</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 56
- <sup>243</sup> Haugeland, John, *Dasein Disclosed*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013, 14-15
- <sup>244</sup> McManus, Denis, “On a Judgement of One’s Own: Heideggerian Authenticity, Standpoints, and All Things Considered.” *Mind* 128 512, 2018, 1201
- <sup>245</sup> Varga, Somogy, *Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal*, London, Routledge, 2013, 7
- <sup>246</sup> Guignon, Charles, “Authenticity and Integrity: A Heideggerian Perspective.” in *The Psychology of Mature Spirituality: Integrity, Wisdom, Transcendence*, Young-Eisendrath P. & Miller, M. E., London: Routledge, 2000, 89
- <sup>247</sup> Adorno, 2013, 2
- <sup>248</sup> Safranski, 1998, 429
- <sup>249</sup> Heidegger, BT, 2010, GA146
- <sup>250</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Krell, David F., “Letter on Humanism.” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, 236
- <sup>251</sup> Taminiiaux, 1991, 85

<sup>252</sup> McManus, 2018, 1188

<sup>253</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Mitchell, Andrew J., *The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012, 47

<sup>254</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 242

<sup>255</sup> “Homeland—not as a mere birth place, nor as a mere landscape familiar to us, but as the power of the Earth upon which the human being “dwells poetically,” in each case in accordance with his historical *Dasein*.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Ireland, Julia Neill, William, *Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “the Rhine”* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014, 80), it is also evoked in his analysis of “The Ister.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. McNeill, William & Davis, Julia, *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister.”* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, 47)

<sup>256</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Fried, Gregory & Polt, Richard, *Nature, History, State*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015, 56

<sup>257</sup> Sloterdijk, Peter, trans. Turner, Christopher & Alexander, Ian, *Not Saved: Essays after Heidegger*, Massachusetts: Polity, 2017, 237

<sup>258</sup> Young, Julian, “Heidegger’s Heimat.” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 2, 2011, 291; Dungey, 2007, 237; Hofstadter, 1971, x)

<sup>259</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 53

<sup>260</sup> Mika, Carl Te Hira, “The Enowing of Thought and Whakapapa: Heidegger’s Fourfold.” *Review of Contemporary Philosophy*, 2014, 52

<sup>261</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA102

<sup>262</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, *Nietzsche: Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987, 24

<sup>263</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Emad, Parvis & Kaly, Kenneth, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing)*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, 13.

<sup>264</sup> Heidegger’s historical account of the great epochs of Western thought has been subject to a lot of criticism. Sloterdijk, for example, notes that it has many of the hallmarks of classical storytelling: “Like all premodern storytellers he employs a triadic schema of an undisturbed primary state, a disturbed middle state, and a restored, or in the best case enriched, neo-primary state.” (Sloterdijk, 2017, 174)

<sup>265</sup> Sloterdijk, 2017, 171

<sup>266</sup> Though the analogy of the Eden is helpful, metaphysics is not “sin.” In fact, Grant notes that, for Heidegger: “Metaphysics has been at the core of the greatness of Western human beings.” (Grant, George, “Confronting Heidegger’s Nietzsche.” in *The Collected Works of George Grant*, 2005, 558)

<sup>267</sup> Heidegger credited Heraclitus with letting “gods and human beings step forth in their Being.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Fried, Gregory & Polt, Richard, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004, GA110)

<sup>268</sup> Heidegger praised Anaximander for cultivating a receptivity to the truths that the world laid out before him. (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014, GA7)

<sup>269</sup> A “naïve ontology,” that is, an ontology based on the field of everydayness, or *praktische Umsicht*.” (Taminiaux, 1991, 102-103)

<sup>270</sup> The West fell from the irenic pre-Socratic state with the outbreak of a battle over Being in ancient metaphysics. (Heidegger, Martin, trans. James S. Churchill, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962, 248)

<sup>271</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA80. The theory of the forms, for Heidegger, separates the thing as it exists in the world from an otherworldly idea of the thing. The opening of a space between the essence of the thing in ideational form “above” and the appearance of the thing, derived from that purer *idéā*, “below” inaugurates the age of metaphysics— where philosophy is transported into the realm of ideas.

<sup>272</sup> Newell, 2016, 255. One should not conclude, as a result, that Heidegger was rejecting everything Socratic. In fact, as he made clear in *What is Called Thinking?*, “it is not to say that philosophy after the Greeks is false and a mistake. It is to say at most that philosophy, despite all logic and all dialectic, does not attain to the discussion of the question “What is called thinking?”” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Wieck, Fred D. & Gray, J. Glenn, *What is Called Thinking?* New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 211)

<sup>273</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 57. As William Lovitt told us, modernity began in the desire to remove God from the equation (Lovitt, 1977, xxv) to ask in Heidegger’s words, how man can “on his own terms and for himself, first arrive at a primary, unshakeable truth.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, *Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism*, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987, 89)

<sup>274</sup> The first great insurgent was Descartes who, Heidegger explained in *Problems of Logic*, posited the “certainty of the ego” as the foundation for knowledge. It was Descartes who “for the first time posited the certainty of the ego” in its “representations” as the foundation for knowing, with no need for God. (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard & Schuwer, André, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “logic,”* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, 129)

<sup>275</sup> It is with Kant that the consequences of the usurpation of God— that was only implicit in Descartes— became clear. Kant builds upon Descartes famous “I think, therefore I am” formulation and develops it into an understanding of a “pure consciousness” which is “essentially an “I can” (Heidegger, *KPM*, 1962, 83)— a capacity of a thinking being to orient the universe around itself as the entity which represents.

<sup>276</sup> Feuerhahn, Niels & Arel, Joseph, “Translator’s Introduction.” in *Hegel*, Heidegger, Martin, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, ix. As Heidegger puts in *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, “Hegel signalled the ultimate potentialities-of-being of metaphysics by gathering together its “decisive approaches and lines of inquiry,” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Emad, parvis & Maly, Kenneth, *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, 126) and bringing to “completion the task which was implied in ancient philosophy.” (Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 12) This is somewhat similar to Hegel’s distinction between the end of history in thought and the end of history in fact.

<sup>277</sup> Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 80

<sup>278</sup> Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 81

<sup>279</sup> Grant notes that for Heidegger, there is a direct line to be drawn between Plato, the first metaphysician, and Nietzsche, the last. (Grant, 2005, 553)

<sup>280</sup> It is Nietzsche as interpreted by Heidegger rather than Nietzsche himself who truly consummates metaphysics, as Nietzsche remains trapped in the metaphysical tradition. (Carman, Taylor, “Heidegger’s Nietzsche.” *Inquiry* 63 1, 2020, 116)

<sup>281</sup> It was Nietzsche who revealed “nothing but a turning aside into its own inessentiality and disarray.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Lovitt, William, “The Word of Nietzsche.” in *The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays*, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 53) This is how Heidegger interprets Nietzsche’s misunderstood formulation about the death of God: as a signal that metaphysics has been taken as far as it can go. Heidegger wrote: “The pronouncement “God is dead” means: The suprasensory world is without effective power. It bestows no life. Metaphysics, i.e., for Nietzsche Western philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an end.” (Heidegger, *WON*, 1977, 61)

<sup>282</sup> “Heidegger has in mind precisely that which is commonly termed eschatology.” (Trawny, Peter, “The Future of Time: Reflections on the Conception of Time in Hegel and Heidegger.” *Research in Phenomenology* 30 1, 2000, 27) Newell also employs this term. (Newell, 2016, 266)

<sup>283</sup> Caputo, John C., “Demythologizing Heidegger: ‘Aletheia’ and the History of Being.” *The Review of Metaphysics* 41 3, 1988, 521

<sup>284</sup> As far as Heidegger is concerned, “any such attempt would be vain and absurd.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Kaufmann, Walter, “Introduction to “What is Metaphysics?”” in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, William, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 279)

- <sup>285</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, *Nietzsche Volume III: The Will to Power as Metaphysics*, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987, 75
- <sup>286</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 97
- <sup>287</sup> Nietzsche belongs to “the long tradition of Western thought” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, *Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art*, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979, 153)
- <sup>288</sup> “Heidegger sees in Nietzsche’s philosophy the completion and consummation of metaphysics” (Lovitt, 1977, xxxi)
- <sup>289</sup> “As the fulfilment of modern metaphysics, Nietzsche’s metaphysics is at the same time the fulfilment of Western Metaphysics in general and is thus— in a correctly understood sense— the end of metaphysics as such.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 138)
- <sup>290</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 16-17
- <sup>291</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 157
- <sup>292</sup> Greisch, 2008, 253
- <sup>293</sup> Heidegger dismissed the belief that we could simply copy the mode of thinking of pre-Socratics as “childish.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 185)
- <sup>294</sup> Carman placed *die Kehre* around 1936, (Carman, 2020, 115) Ihde during the Denazification of Germany (Ihde, Don, “Heidegger on Technology: One Size Fits All.” *Philosophy Today* 54, 2010, 104) and Gray as late as the 1950’s. (Gray, J. Glenn, “Introduction.” in *What is Called Thinking*, Heidegger, Martin trans. Wieck, Fred D. & Gray, J. Glenn, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, xix)
- <sup>295</sup> Grosser separates “the “early Heidegger” who, in *Being and Time* or in several texts written during his activist period in support of Nazism, sees the *Volk*, the people, as the paradigmatic manifestation of authentic communality” from “the “late Heidegger,” who, in texts such as *The Thing or Art and Space*, comes to conceive meaningful communality differently, i.e., independent of essentially closed notions of a people’s belonging.” (Grosser, 2017, 93)
- <sup>296</sup> “I do not say that the difference of earlier and later thought here is absolutely sharp, but it is considerable.” Hofstadter continued, “although the effect of clearing, opening, brightening, and lighting remained, there was added to it a sense associated with the adjective *leicht*, that is, light in the sense of opposed to heavy [...] in inseparable union the senses of: to illuminate, to clear, to make nimble and easy, enabling the four to nestle into the circling compliancy of their presencing.” (Hofstadter, 1971, xx-xxi)
- <sup>297</sup> “There is no reversal, if that means taking a position that is somehow basically contrary to what is said in *Being and Time*.” (Froman, 2008, 90)
- <sup>298</sup> Hofstadter, Albert, “Enowment.” in *Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Spanos, William V., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 17
- <sup>299</sup> Dastur, Françoise, “The Reception and Nonreception of Heidegger in France.” in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 282
- <sup>300</sup> “Heidegger continued to embrace a self-avowed philosophical provincialism: a standpoint that narrowly associated truth and meaning with “the native soil of the Heimat.” ” (Wolin, 2023, 384)
- <sup>301</sup> Anderson, John M. “Introduction.” in *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger, Martin trans. Anderson, John M. & Freund, Hans, New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 21
- <sup>302</sup> Gendreau, Michael, “Forward” in *Heidegger and the Problem of Fundamental Ontology*, Taminiaux, Jacques, trans. Gendreau, Michael, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, xxiii
- <sup>303</sup> Dostal, Robert J., “Beyond Being: Heidegger’s Plato.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 23 1, 1982, 73
- <sup>304</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA35
- <sup>305</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA39
- <sup>306</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 44

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- <sup>307</sup> Magrini, James M. & Schweiler, Elias, *Heidegger on Literature, Poetry, and Education after the "Turn": At the Limits of Metaphysics*, London: Routledge, 2017, 9
- <sup>308</sup> Gendre, 1991, xvii
- <sup>309</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 8
- <sup>310</sup> Magrini and Schweiler, 2017, 3
- <sup>311</sup> Pattison, George, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to the Later Heidegger*, London: Routledge, 2013, 11-12
- <sup>312</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>313</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA4
- <sup>314</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA1
- <sup>315</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA32
- <sup>316</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 4
- <sup>317</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 3
- <sup>318</sup> "And yet here already, as in a preparatory exercise, we must attempt the thinking-saying of philosophy which comes from another beginning." (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 4)
- <sup>319</sup> Gendre, 1991, xvii
- <sup>320</sup> Magrini & Schweiler, 2017, 2
- <sup>321</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA17
- <sup>322</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA16
- <sup>323</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA32
- <sup>324</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA20
- <sup>325</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 134-135
- <sup>326</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 21
- <sup>327</sup> Gendre, 1991, xvii
- <sup>328</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 231-232. Similarly, in one of his later works, *Contributions*, he references back to *Being and Time* as the book which "shows the way in the crossing." (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 260)
- <sup>329</sup> Gendre, 1991, xviii
- <sup>330</sup> Pattison, 2013, 13-14
- <sup>331</sup> Gadamer & Campbell, 1981, 437
- <sup>332</sup> "The turning (*Kehre*) [...] toppled the project of fundamental ontology as the science of the meaning of Being and opened the way to the more meditative thinking on the historical withdrawal of Being." (Taminiaux, 1991, 193)
- <sup>333</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 216 & 219
- <sup>334</sup> Safranski, 1998, ix
- <sup>335</sup> Jacerme, Pierre, "The Thoughtful Dialogue between Martin Heidegger and Jean Beaufret: A New Way of Doing Philosophy." in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York Press, 2008, 69
- <sup>336</sup> Trawny, Peter, *Heidegger: A Critical Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, 1-4
- <sup>337</sup> Magrini & Schweiler, 2017, 9
- <sup>338</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 121
- <sup>339</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 140
- <sup>340</sup> "To understand is also to grasp the implicit and to read between the lines." (Bourdieu, 1975, 122)
- <sup>341</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 71
- <sup>342</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 178
- <sup>343</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 139
- <sup>344</sup> Safranski, 1998, 432

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- <sup>345</sup> Or alternatively, as it is put by David Waddington, “bringing-forth, challenging-forth to standing-reserve, and Ge-stell.” (Waddington, David T., “A Field Guide to Heidegger: Understanding “The Question Concerning Technology.” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 37 4, 2005, 579)
- <sup>346</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Sadler, Ted, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, New York: Continuum, 2002, 50-51
- <sup>347</sup> Calculating the parabolas of a stone launched from a Ballista has a more immediate benefit, not getting crushed, than meditating upon the essence of Being.
- <sup>348</sup> Modern technology substitutes certainty about the accordance of mathematical claims within the “selfgrounded” structure of the number system for truth itself.
- <sup>349</sup> Mei, Tod, “Heidegger and the Machine: The Difference between Techne and Mechane.” *Continental Philosophy* 49 3, 2016, 270
- <sup>350</sup> Ihde, 2010, 103
- <sup>351</sup> Dreyfus, 1993.
- <sup>352</sup> Kisiel, 2017, 193
- <sup>353</sup> Froman, 2008, 97
- <sup>354</sup> Feenberg, Andrew, “The Ontic and the Ontological in Heidegger's Philosophy of Technology: Response to Thomson.” *Inquiry* 43 4, 2000, 446
- <sup>355</sup> Feenberg, 2000, 445
- <sup>356</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. William Lovitt, “Science and Reflection.” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, 167-168
- <sup>357</sup> Heidegger, *SR*, 1977, 169. For example, the technician will forcefully insist that the “unscientific” assertion is, by definition, without value.
- <sup>358</sup> Heidegger argues in *Discourse on Thinking* that the “approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced *as the only* way of thinking.” (Heidegger, *DT*, 1966, 56)
- <sup>359</sup> Magrini, 2012, 503
- <sup>360</sup> Magrini, 2012, 505
- <sup>361</sup> Heidegger, *SR*, 1977, 168
- <sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>363</sup> Heidegger, *SR*, 1977, 169
- <sup>364</sup> Such that only “that which becomes an object in this way *is*.” (Heidegger, Martin trans. Lovitt, William, “The Age of the World Picture.” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 127)
- <sup>365</sup> Harris, Sam, *The Moral Landscape*, New York: Free Press, 2010, 1
- <sup>366</sup> Harris, 2010, 4
- <sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>368</sup> I.e., that which cannot be observed as an object of scientific empiricism.
- <sup>369</sup> Peterson, Thomas E., “Notes of Heidegger’s Authoritarian Pedagogy.” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 37 4, 2005, 605
- <sup>370</sup> Milchmann & Rosenberg, 2008, 111
- <sup>371</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche Vol II*, 1984, 114
- <sup>372</sup> Procedures tend to subject philosophy to a kind of problem solving, where the solution is “to be found in the disclosure of the essence of the categories.” (Heidegger, *KPM*, 1962, 92)
- <sup>373</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 96
- <sup>374</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 122
- <sup>375</sup> Skocz, 2008, 81
- <sup>376</sup> For, today, “philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all that can become for man the experiential object of his technology, the technology by which he establishes himself in the world by

working on it in the manifold modes of making and shaping.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Krell, David F., “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, 434)

<sup>377</sup> “The end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of the social order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means the beginning of the world civilization that is based upon Western European thinking.” (Heidegger, *EOP*, 2008, 435)

<sup>378</sup> Newell, 2016, 258

<sup>379</sup> Kolb, 2015, 95

<sup>380</sup> Dostal, 1982, 97

<sup>381</sup> Kockelman focused his analysis on representational thinking, arguing that “Heidegger was critiquing a tradition that focused on representations.” (Kockelman, Paul, “Four Theories of Things: Aristotle, Marx, Heidegger, and Pierce.” *Signs and Society* 3 1, 2015, 166)

<sup>382</sup> This concept of legibility is explained, in the context of science, in “The Thing.” Here, Heidegger argues that science “always encounters only what *its* kind of representation has admitted beforehand as an object.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Albert Hofstadter, “The Thing.” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, 168) While metaphysics and science are not identical, this critique applies as much to metaphysics as to its scientific tributary.

<sup>383</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Sheehan, Thomas, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.” in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, William, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 179

<sup>384</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA80. This dynamic is well described by Sloterdijk in *Spheres* with his discussion of the “pictorialization of the world.” (Sloterdijk, Peter, *Spheres Volume 2: Globes Macrospherology*, South Pasadena: Semoitext(e), 2014, 48)

<sup>385</sup> In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger describes this conception of truth as “correctness of representation.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche Vol III*, 1987, 34)

<sup>386</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 3

<sup>387</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Lovitt, William, “The Question Concerning Technology.” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 14

<sup>388</sup> Heidegger defines “unguarded” as: “without the guard of its essence as thing.” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 44-45)

<sup>389</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 77

<sup>390</sup> This is not a one-way relationship. As Mitchell notes, the “thing,” as constituted scientifically, “needs the standing reserve to be what it is” (Mitchell, Andrew J., “Introduction.” in *The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, Heidegger, Martin, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012, viii) as surely as technology needs to order things into that reserve.

<sup>391</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hofstadter, Albert, “What are Poets For?” in, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, 134

<sup>392</sup> Hofstadter, 1971, xv

<sup>393</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 176

<sup>394</sup> Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 48

<sup>395</sup> During his tenure as rector of Freiburg, for example, he exhorts his students to join the national labour force, arguing that when work is being done in the name of the State it is a service to the people rather than an act of production. (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Runes, Dagobert D., “Follow the Führer.” in *German Existentialism*, New York: Philosophical Library 1965, 41)

<sup>396</sup> Heidegger, Martin trans. Aylesworth, Gary E., *Basic Concepts*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, 32

<sup>397</sup> Mika, Carl Te Hira, “An Indigenous Dialogue with Heidegger: The Consequences of Presence.” in *Indigenous Education and the Metaphysics of Presence*, London: Routledge, 2017, 100

<sup>398</sup> Mika, 2017, 88

<sup>399</sup> Ibid. Lilla also highlights Heidegger's departure from the Platonic understanding of the relationship between concepts and objects. (Lilla, Mark, *The Reckless Mind*, New York Review Books, 2001, 14)

<sup>400</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 211

<sup>401</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 342. He defines efficiency as follows: "Efficiency—getting the most out of ourselves and everything else, "being all you can be"—is fine, as long as we see that efficiency for its own sake is not the only end for man, dictated by reality itself, but is just our current understanding." (Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 343-344)

<sup>402</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 100

<sup>403</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Krell, David F., "The Way to Language." in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, 2008, 420

<sup>404</sup> Heidegger was critical of those who elevate the objective over the subjective. He wrote in *Basic Concepts*: "why is the "subjective" immediately burdened with suspicion?" (Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 66)

<sup>405</sup> *Logos* combines with intellect, energy and dynamism in order to make of the thinking being the ultimate determination of Being. (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 64)

<sup>406</sup> Elden, 2005, 281-282

<sup>407</sup> Man is, in Sloterdijk's terms the "creature that has an orb placed in its hand." (Sloterdijk, 2014, 41)

<sup>408</sup> Mika, 2017, 92

<sup>409</sup> "Until Descartes, every thing at hand for itself was a "subject"; but now the "I" becomes the special subject, that with regard to which all the remaining things first determine themselves as such." (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Krell, David F., "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics." in *Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, 303)

<sup>410</sup> Ibid. Dallmayr described the Cartesian Sum, as interpreted by Heidegger, as "the ego constructed as thinking substance." (Dallmayr, 1993, 54)

<sup>411</sup> "The sciences are never capable of grounding the opening relation [*erschließender Bezug*] to beings as such." (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Sinclair, Mark et al, *Interpretation of Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, 127)

<sup>412</sup> The myopia of science has led, Mark Wrathall tells us, to what Heidegger considered to be a fundamental "error of the metaphysical past," the dismissal of metaphysical philosophy as mere "conceptual analysis" separate from the scientific and technological project. (Wrathall, 2000, 11)

<sup>413</sup> Heidegger, *WON*, 1977, 103

<sup>414</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 204

<sup>415</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 200

<sup>416</sup> "By virtue of the transformation of the human being into the subject, the history of modern mankind does not merely receive new "contents" and areas of activity, rather, the course of history itself takes a different direction. To all appearances, everything is merely discovery of the world, research into the world, portrayal of the world, arrangement of the world, and dominion over the world in which man extends himself, and in such extension stretches his essence thin, flattens it, and loses it." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 145-146)

<sup>417</sup> "Value is value inasmuch as it counts." (Heidegger, *WON*, 1977, 72)

<sup>418</sup> "Value is the twofold condition of the will to power itself, posited in the will to power for the will to power." (Heidegger, *WON*, 1977, 94)

<sup>419</sup> Heidegger, *WON*, 1977, 75

<sup>420</sup> "It would be an all too crude statement to say that here man moves in a secularized world in place of God as the creator of the Being of being." (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Wilde, Jean T., Kluback, William, *The Question of Being*, Albany: NCUP, 1958, 55)

<sup>421</sup> Heidegger, *QoB*, 1958, 56-57

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- <sup>422</sup> “The cogito of Descartes, the transcendental idealism of Kant, and the value thinking of Nietzsche, each of which posits the subject as the ultimate ground of being.” (Soffer, 1996, 550)
- <sup>423</sup> Langan, 1962, x
- <sup>424</sup> Bourdieu went as far as to characterize Heidegger’s work as a “struggle against the philosophy of the subject.” (Bourdieu, 1975, 144)
- <sup>425</sup> Dostal, 1982, 78-79
- <sup>426</sup> “As such a *subjectum*, man becomes the only being to which the concept applies, so that every being other than he is an object for him, the only subject. [...] Truth is no longer experienced as an unconcealment to which man is entrusted. From now on, “the true is merely secured, the certain.”” (Taminiaux, 1991, 166)
- <sup>427</sup> Technology, Pöggeler noted, threatens everything and concerns everyone. (Pöggeler, 1992, 114)
- <sup>428</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 4
- <sup>429</sup> Zimmerman, Michael E., “Philosophy and Politics: The Case of Heidegger.” *Philosophy Today* 33 1, 1989, 9-10. Or, as Göppfarth puts it, it “hollows out the authentic *Dasein* of the *Volk*.” (Göppfarth, GNGD, 2020, 256)
- <sup>430</sup> “The condition Heidegger responds to, it seems to me, is first and foremost the loss of place in the age of modern technology: place not in the sense, merely, of a bounded region of space but in the sense of dwelling place; Heimat or ‘homeland’.” (Young, 2011, 285)
- <sup>431</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 348
- <sup>432</sup> Heidegger defines the gigantic as follows: “The gigantic is rather that through which the quantitative becomes a special quality and thus a remarkable kind of greatness” (Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 135)
- <sup>433</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>434</sup> Greisch, 2008, 257
- <sup>435</sup> Triandafyllidou, 2020, 803. Indeed, Péguy specifically spoke to this threat in his critique of the bureaucratic mindset. (Péguy, Charles, “De la Situation Faite au Parti Intellectuel dans le Monde Moderne devant les Accidents de la Gloire Temporelle.” in *La République ... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 204)
- <sup>436</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 129
- <sup>437</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 118
- <sup>438</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 125
- <sup>439</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 120
- <sup>440</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 121
- <sup>441</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 134
- <sup>442</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 141
- <sup>443</sup> Heidegger *AWP*, 1977, 134
- <sup>444</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 129
- <sup>445</sup> He wrote: “As soon as the world becomes picture, the position of man is conceived as a world view” (Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 133-134)
- <sup>446</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 134
- <sup>447</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>448</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>449</sup> “When Hölderlin composes “Homecoming” he is concerned that his “countrymen” find their essence. He does not at all seek that essence in an egoism of his nation. He sees it rather in the context of a belongingness to the destiny of the West.” (Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 241)
- <sup>450</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 244
- <sup>451</sup> A “naïve ontology,” is “based on the field of everydayness.” (Taminiaux, 1991, 102-103)
- <sup>452</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 163
- <sup>453</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 65)

<sup>454</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 250

### Origins

<sup>455</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 127-129

<sup>456</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 190

<sup>457</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 31

<sup>458</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 30

<sup>459</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>460</sup> Elden notes that Heidegger saw the conventional conception of time as inadequate. (Elden, 1999, 261)

<sup>461</sup> The “central range of problems of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time correctly viewed and correctly explained.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA18)

<sup>462</sup> Heidegger, *SR*, 1977, 175

<sup>463</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>464</sup> Grant, George, *Time as History*, University of Toronto Press, 1995, 9

<sup>465</sup> Soffer, 1996, 566

<sup>466</sup> “The history of Being is thus for Heidegger a historical sequence of fundamental Being-relations.” (Safranski, 1998, 304)

<sup>467</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 242

<sup>468</sup> Hoy, 1979, 61-62

<sup>469</sup> Salem-Wiseman, Jonathan, “Heidegger, Wagner and the History of Aesthetics.” *PhaenEx7 7 1*, 2012, 168

<sup>470</sup> Swer, 2019, 3

<sup>471</sup> Swer, 2019, 7

<sup>472</sup> Wrathall, 2000, 12

<sup>473</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, *On Time and Being*, New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977, 8

<sup>474</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>475</sup> Clark, 2011, 30-31

<sup>476</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 172

<sup>477</sup> Indeed, as John Caputo notes, the history of metaphysics, that falling away from being, can also be “read as a steady deterioration or falling away (*Abfall*) from the primordial beginning (*Anfang*)” (Caputo, 1988, 521) suggesting that the apprehension of origins will be a particularly difficult task for Western Man, who resides under the hegemony of metaphysics.

<sup>478</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 213

<sup>479</sup> Strong, 2016, 157

<sup>480</sup> Nancy, 2002, 68

<sup>481</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA50

<sup>482</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Van Buren, John, “Karl Jaspers’s *Psychology of Worldviews*.” in *Pathmarks*, Heidegger, Martin, McNeill, William, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 4

<sup>483</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA99

<sup>484</sup> And indeed, many primordialist nationalist theorists have done so. Connor, for example, argued that we should abandon the search for the truth of origins because, as a practical matter, it is the *perception* of the nation as eternal that matters (Connor, Walker, “The Timelessness of Nations.” *Nations and Nationalism 10 1-2*, 2004, 45)

<sup>485</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 161. This twofold means, in Heidegger’s interpretation, that which is primary, foundational, or indispensable to a thing being what it is.

<sup>486</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 163

<sup>487</sup> Elden, 1999, 261

<sup>488</sup> Gilbert, 1998, 157

<sup>489</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 6

<sup>490</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>491</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hofstadter, Albert, "The Origin of the Work of Art." in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, 17

<sup>492</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 126

<sup>493</sup> The question would ask if nationalism can be akin to a "principle" as described in Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures: "the ground on which something stands, pervading it, guiding it in its whole structure and essence." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 30)

<sup>494</sup> It should be noted that none of these thinkers claims that people of a particular nation all identical. One can, it seems, chose not to behave in the way "proper" to one's nation but it is clear that to do so is to fall into a kind of inauthenticity.

<sup>495</sup> At times, this veers into the territory of crude stereotypes.

<sup>496</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 109

<sup>497</sup> Which speaks to us from the soil in which they lie (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 93) and whom we betray if we do not listen. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 31)

<sup>498</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1926, 280

<sup>499</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 100-101

<sup>500</sup> Barrès, Maurice, *La Terre et les Morts*, Paris: FV Éditions, 2021, 29

<sup>501</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 110 & Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 214

<sup>502</sup> So much so that even a figure like Nietzsche, for Mann, embodies this "antiradicalism— stated without praise of blame— [that] is the specific, distinguishing, and decisive quality or peculiarity of the German spirit." (Mann, *R*, 2021, 68)

<sup>503</sup> Mann, *R*, 1983, 43. Mann also recognized that national communities are not monolithic, an individual can imbue characteristics of contradictory spirits and can be, for example, both a cosmopolitan and a particularist. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 25) Though internal differences, such as between an English liberal and Tory or French republican and royalist are not ignored, the Englishmen and Frenchmen of each camp relate far more easily, for Mann, to their domestic opponent than to fellow-travellers abroad. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 43)

<sup>504</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 26

<sup>505</sup> Péguy sums up this tension in the following, regarding the simultaneous retention of the old gods of tradition and the new gods of progress: "historical idealism receives from it [France] a discreet adoration, because we must revere the old gods ; historical materialism receives from it [France] a more marked homage, because we must preserve ourselves before the new gods" (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 92)

<sup>506</sup> « La République une et indivisible, c'est notre royaume de France. » (Péguy, Charles, « L'Argent Suite » in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 319)

<sup>507</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 39

<sup>508</sup> "We ask of the ancients that these moral obligations remain beautiful, we ask of the Christians that these obligations remain pure, remain charitable, of the messianic we ask that they remain ardent, of the Cartésians we ask that they remain distinguishable and clear, of the Bergsonians we ask that they remain profound, introspective and lively, dynamic and real". » (Péguy, Charles, "Louis de Gonzagues." in *La République... notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 177)

<sup>509</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 53

<sup>510</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 54

<sup>511</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1926, 86. As such, the French must accept the legacy of Robespierre *and* that of a Charlemagne or Louis XIV. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1926, 87)

<sup>512</sup> Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 16

<sup>513</sup> As it is, as opposed to as the representative of some higher ideal. (Fox, Russel Arben, "J.G. Herder on Language and the Metaphysics of National Community." *The Review of Politics* 65 2, 2003, 239)

<sup>514</sup> Moore, Margaret, “Nationalism and Political Philosophy.” *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, London: Sage Publications, 2006, 96

<sup>515</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 505

<sup>516</sup> Mann, *This War*, 1940, 56. This primordial struggle holds sway over the politics of Mann’s time, between a conservative, (Mann, *R*, 2021, 99) patriotic (Mann, *R*, 2021, 277) Germany and a France which is incapable of such a spirit. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 303) Though we are in more sophisticated territory than the “lazy Greeks” discourse highlighted by Van Vossolle in the contemporary context (Van Vossolle, Jonas, “Framing PIGS: Patterns of Racism and Neocolonialism in the Euro Crisis.” *Patterns of Prejudice* 50 I, 2016) we are not entirely free from the realms of facile national stereotypes.

<sup>517</sup> They must, for example, find a form of democracy that is proper to their nature. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 96) This “German” democracy would have to be markedly different from the “cosmopolitan radicalism” that, for Mann, typified French democracy and would, if adopted, represent the de-Germanization of Germany. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 224)

<sup>518</sup> Germany, Mann holds in his *Reflections*, has been from its beginning— in Heideggerian language one might say it is thrown from its origins— engaged in a struggle between “culture and civilization, soul and society, freedom and voting rights, art and literature” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 25)

<sup>519</sup> Mann defines Germany as the “Protestant Nation,” this refers less to the Protestant faith than to a spirit of particularism (as opposed to the universal church). The Protestant religious revolution, for Mann, was another iteration of the age-old struggle between the German and Roman spirit.

<sup>520</sup> Mann is intervening here in the *Kultur vs Zivilisation* discourses that were popular at the time of his *Thoughts in Wartime*, where *Kultur* represents “unity, style, form, bearing, and taste” and *Zivilisation* “reason, enlightenment, moderation, moral education, scepticism,” (Mann, Thomas trans. Morris, Walter D., “Thoughts in Wartime.” in *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, New York Review Books, 2021, 493)

<sup>521</sup> Mann is specifically criticizing Barrès here. Barrès, Mann argued, cannot but be Catholic, and therefore his desire, shared with Mann, to rescue France from the decadence of modernity would, by necessity, appeal to the political and to the universal. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 165-166) If Barrès were German, Mann continues, this appeal would be to the Protestant, to the cult of tradition, an inner sense of duty, to, in short, the “Kantian-Prussian.” (Ibid.)

<sup>522</sup> Germany is “incapable of convincingly taking on the spirit” of *Zivilisation*. (Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 131)

<sup>523</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 50. The German spirit was formed in this battle, (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 8) and though the proximate causes of these wars changed, their essences were always connected to the same elemental “motif.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 58)

<sup>524</sup> Renan, Ernest, *Qu’est ce Qu’une Nation?*, Paris: Ancienne Maison Michel Lévy Frères, 1882; Meinecke, 1970; Brubaker, Rogers, *Citizenship and Nationality in France and Germany*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992

<sup>525</sup> For the French, Barrès tells us in *Les Traits Éternels de la France*, the “local always contains universality” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 195) and thus the French are preoccupied with “the whole of humanity,” a “deep and noble note which lends harmony to every diversity of expression.” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 196)

<sup>526</sup> Whether this be the task of striving “that humanity may be more beautiful,” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 31) or a global fight against injustice, (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 33) this need pervades across French history from the pious crusades of the Christian knights to the secular crusades of the First Republic. “When the crusader cries: “God wills it,” when the volunteer at Valmy cries: “the republic calls to us,” it is the same call to arms. Its aim is more justice and more beauty on the earth.” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 30) It also encompasses the *mission civilisatrice*, and unites the French of Barrès’ time over and above their religious, political or social divisions. He wrote: “Catholics, Protestants, Israelites, Socialists, Traditionalists, all suddenly forgot their grievances. The blades of hate were miraculously turned aside, an eternal quarrel was silenced beneath a blazing sky. [...] It is sursum corda; it is the harvest of a

nation's soul. It is even more; it is a mobilization of the secret forces that spring from within. (Barrès, Maurice, trans. Elisabeth Marbury, *The Faith of France*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918, 2-3)

<sup>527</sup> By this Péguy means, appealing to a staid stereotype of Germans as “a submissive and obedient people, to say no more, a people of bowed heads and passive discipline.” (Péguy, *LSP*, 1946, 171)

<sup>528</sup> The inner conflict between the Greek and Roman heritage. In this iteration, Greece would stand for the mystical and Rome the rational part of the French spirit. (Péguy, Charles, “Un Nouveau Théologien M. Fernand Laudet.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, 1946, 280)

<sup>529</sup> To pervade, in this context, means that the originary, or primordial, characteristic would be retained across the various circumstances which arise as the national being moves through history.

<sup>530</sup> Poetry is available to those “dramatists” who can speak to both the mystical and the everyday and “breathe life into past ages.” (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 3)

<sup>531</sup> Barrès, Maurice, “Officers and Gentlemen.” *Atlantic Monthly* 121 1, 1918, 765

<sup>532</sup> Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 762

<sup>533</sup> It is by reading, for example, Anatole-France, he tells us in *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme*, that one discovers the French race as it truly is. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1926, 52)

<sup>534</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 453

<sup>535</sup> Poetry reveals to the Germans the nature of their spirit, (Mann, *Thoughts in Wartime*, 2021, 500) their unique genius— their capacity to temper the spiritual and sensual with the intellectual (Mann, *Thoughts in Wartime*, 2021, 493-494)— and thus reconnects the modern German with their “elemental and fundamental life force.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 494)

<sup>536</sup> Indeed, this notion of the poet as spokesperson reflects exactly the role ascribed to Goethe by Hannah Arendt in the minds of the Berlin intellectuals of her youth. (Arendt, Hannah, “Berlin Salon.” in *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, New York, Schocken Books, 1994, 59)

<sup>537</sup> “Maker of protests, maker of ceremonies.” (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 35)

<sup>538</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. McNeill, William & walker, Nicholas, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, 25

<sup>539</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 105-106

<sup>540</sup> *Parousia* is an Attic Greek term meaning season, time, moment, or arrival.

<sup>541</sup> Meaning “coming-to-presence.” (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, 46) Hemming notes the tense here, arguing that Heidegger means that which is at once present or absent, constantly presencing or absencing. (Hemming, Laurence, “Review (Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, Rowman and Littlefield, 2015)” *Notre Dame Philosophical Review*, 2015.

<sup>542</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 219

<sup>543</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 176

<sup>544</sup> This is because “rivers are not simply images of something, but are intended to be taken for themselves, and together with them the Earth of the homeland.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 178)

<sup>545</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 185

<sup>546</sup> “Yet just as the origin that has merely sprung forth is not the origin, neither is the merely fettered origin. Rather, the entire essence of the origin is the fettered origin in its springing forth. Yet the springing forth itself first comes to be what it is as the river runs its entire course; it is not limited to the beginning of its course. The entire course of the river itself belongs to the origin. The origin is fully apprehended only as the fettered origin in its springing forth as having sprung forth.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 184)

<sup>547</sup> “The originary thrust, previously fettered and now unfettered, is surveyed with regard to the direction it assumes when set loose. The shape that the river’s direction takes now manifests something decisive.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 186)

<sup>548</sup> The wellspring lies at the beginning of an ongoing thing.

<sup>549</sup> The spring continues to spring, so to speak, throughout the history of the river.

- <sup>550</sup> We speak here still of the ontological centre in temporal terms, as the origin from which something is thrown into time. The link between this unheard-of centre and what Young calls the “steadfast centre” (Young, 1999, 395) of the Heimat will soon be discussed.
- <sup>551</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 93-94
- <sup>552</sup> Heidegger explains his task in *Being and Time* as the elucidation of what we mean by such statements as “the sky *is* blue” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA4) He would make a similar claim later, in his *Nietzsche* lectures, that “Being is the sole, though still unstipulated, goal of essential thought.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 191).
- <sup>553</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA94-95
- <sup>554</sup> Heidegger criticizes a “methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from a simple “primordial ground” disregarding the equiprimordiality of “constitutive factors.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA131)
- <sup>555</sup> Richard Detsch posits that this relationship changed over time, for Heidegger, from being the result of an equiprimordial origin in the Greek and Christian *Dasein* to being solely a special relationship with Greece. (Detsch, 2000, 408)
- <sup>556</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Arel, Joseph, *Hegel*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 8
- <sup>557</sup> Heidegger, *TBWP*, 2014, GA16
- <sup>558</sup> “The Germans are given as their endowment: the ability to grasp, the preparation and planning of domains and calculating, setting in order to the point of organization. It is given to them as a task to come to be struck by being.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 265)
- <sup>559</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>560</sup> Heidegger, Martin, “The Self-Assertion of the German University: Address, Delivered in the Solemn Assumption of the Rectorate of the University of Freiburg the Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts.” *The Review of Metaphysics* 38 3, 1985, 471
- <sup>561</sup> In this work, Heidegger locates the originary moment of this Western *Dasein* in “the inception of our history” with “the Greeks.” (Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 13)
- <sup>562</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 241— 242
- <sup>563</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 241
- <sup>564</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA53. Though we are, at present, also rather alienated from ourselves, such that “we cannot say that we are close to the being that we ourselves in each case are.” (*Ibid.*)
- <sup>565</sup> Caputo, 1988, 520
- <sup>566</sup> Mitchell, 2012, xii
- <sup>567</sup> Again, thinking about the nationalization of pre-national history is helpful here. It may well be the case that history is easier to grasp and easier to draw lessons from if we transform Brythonic tribes into proto-Englishmen, but we cannot pretend to have grasped the English origins in all their actual complexity merely by positing some kind of primordial mystery that allows all of this to be simplified.
- <sup>568</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 77
- <sup>569</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 72
- <sup>570</sup> “The artist is but one of those things that together make up the actuality of art as a whole.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 70)
- <sup>571</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 69
- <sup>572</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 81. We highlight the word “life” because for Heidegger, *Lebensphilosophie*, famously, was among the most significant philosophical errors of his time.
- <sup>573</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 137
- <sup>574</sup> Here we see Heidegger in opposition to the Camusian conception of art as intrinsically linked to the carnal and to a “refusal to reason the concrete.” (Camus, Albert, “The Myth of Sisyphus.” in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, New York: Vintage Books, 1955, 97 & 102)
- <sup>575</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 86-88

- <sup>576</sup> For Barrès, a “state of sensibility” prevails at the root of all nationalism. Reason leads us only into uncertainty and it is only sentiment which can truly ground us. (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 21) For Péguy, it is more a question of resonance. The people are, he feels, disinterested in the rationalism of the “Universités Populaires” and only find true resonance in the ceremonial. (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 31)
- <sup>577</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 419-420
- <sup>578</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 342-343.
- <sup>579</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 407
- <sup>580</sup> Clark, 2011, 55
- <sup>581</sup> Clark, 2011, 52
- <sup>582</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 116-117
- <sup>583</sup> Hoy, 1979, 53-54
- <sup>584</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 21-22
- <sup>585</sup> Jean-François Caron demonstrates, in fascinating research, that a strong attachment to the shared historical and traditional symbology of France— be that her official symbology, the tales of her great heroes, the *Chant des Partisans*, her architectural beauty or her sublime *délices du terroir*— is a strong indicator of nationalistic political opinions (far more so than any racial or ethnic conception of Frenchness). (Caron, Jean-François, “Understanding and Interpreting France’s National Identity: the Meanings of Being French.” *National Identities* 15 3, 2013, 225-226)
- <sup>586</sup> Newell, 2016, 254
- <sup>587</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 39
- <sup>588</sup> For, as Heidegger continued, “the beginning is be-in itself.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 41)
- <sup>589</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 40
- <sup>590</sup> Dahlstrom, Daniel, “Rethinking Difference.” in *Heidegger’s Question of Being: Dasein, Truth, and History*, Zaborowski, Holger, Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017, 22
- <sup>591</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 19
- <sup>592</sup> “Allegory and symbol provide the conceptual framework within whose channel of vision the art work has for a long time been characterized. But this one element in a work that manifests another, this one element that joins with another, is the thingly feature in the art work. It seems almost as though the thingly element in the art work is like the substructure into and upon which the other, authentic element is built.” (Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 20)
- <sup>593</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 26. Heidegger here is criticizing both the sociologist who would seek to explain Verdi’s *Requiem* solely by exploring its relation to a “Christian imaginary” and the scientist who would observe the neurological effect of its acoustic vibrations on the brain without actually listening to it. This is certainly an exaggeration but does speak to attitudes towards art which exist.
- <sup>594</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hofstadter, Albert, “Language.” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, 203. This is particularly true of the greatest poets, who bring forth not merely truths about beings, but about Being as such.
- <sup>595</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>596</sup> Strong, 2016, 161
- <sup>597</sup> Salem-Wiseman, 2012, 167. Interestingly, Anthony Smith identified the failure to distinguish a construct from a long-term historical process, in the sense of thinking of a nation as something that was consciously constructed as opposed to having come into being gradually over decades— if not centuries— as a central reason why nations evade the understanding of so many scholars. (Smith, Anthony D., *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford University Press, 1999, 9)
- <sup>598</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 80
- <sup>599</sup> The “fundamental attunement of poetizing” requires that the poets themselves be attuned to this originary truth of Being *and* that the reader understand what is said from the *Gestalt* of the poet. There will also be a need for the broader environment to be attuned to this originary saying such that a general

understanding of what is being said by the poets and their readers can be understood by the community, such that a poetic way of being can be “founded” for the historical *Dasein*.

<sup>600</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 45. Poetry does not literally us to construct our first shelters, but—Heidegger explains in *Hölderlin’s Hymns*, reveals that “river and poet are the same in their originary belonging to the essence of beyng.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 234) It reveals to us that the earth upon which we dwell exists alongside us in being, that we share with it belonging to the manifold of Being.

<sup>601</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 60

<sup>602</sup> Corngold, Stanley, “*Sein and Zeit*: implications for Poetics.” in *Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Spanos, William V., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 107 & 111

<sup>603</sup> Gelvin, Michael, “Heidegger and Tragedy.” in *Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Spanos, William V., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 224. It should be noted, here, that it is not merely a means of putting the truth into the right words. The words are themselves more essential, more originary and more authentic to us than other ways of speaking (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 128)—employing words which are not terms, but the “wellsprings that are found and dug up in the telling.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 130)

<sup>604</sup> Harries, 1979, 160

<sup>605</sup> This is, indeed, a capacity because Heidegger was careful to clarify that not all poetic and artistic creation necessarily has this virtue. Some works of art and some poems are not properly poetic, so to speak, in much the same way that not all thought is thoughtful (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 96) and, in simple terms, there is good poetry and bad poetry.

<sup>606</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 60. As Magrini puts it “it holds the power to put us in touch with our *potentiality-for-Being*” (Magrini, 2012, 501).

<sup>607</sup> This, for Heidegger, is the essence of the beautiful: “*Beauty is one way in which truth occurs as unconcealedness.*” (Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 54)

<sup>608</sup> Heidegger, *HRG*, 2014, 228

<sup>609</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 233

<sup>610</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>611</sup> “Originary unity, by contrast, is that which unites in letting spring forth, and as such letting spring forth, and, at the same time, holds apart that which has sprung forth in the hostility of its essential powers.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 226)

<sup>612</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA73

<sup>613</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA74

<sup>614</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>615</sup> Buber, Martin, “The Man of Today and the Jewish Bible.” *Commentary* 6 1, 1948, 330

<sup>616</sup> Feenberg, 2000, 448 & Hofstadter, 1971, xv

<sup>617</sup> Peterson, 2005, 605

<sup>618</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 135

<sup>619</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 138

<sup>620</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 80

<sup>621</sup> Zuckert, 1990

<sup>622</sup> Strong, 2016, 161

<sup>623</sup> Cerrato, 2020

<sup>624</sup> “Philosophy is not the truth of the sacred text, but the sacred truth of the text.” (Bourdieu, 1975, 145)

<sup>625</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 114

<sup>626</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 146

<sup>627</sup> Strong, 2016, 172

<sup>628</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA146

<sup>629</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 41

<sup>630</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 42

<sup>631</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 43. To take Heidegger's example of a Greek temple, the cosmology of the Greeks opened up before them when they observed the divine trigonometry of the architecture and the depictions of their gods within the properly defined architectural context of the temple complex—especially if observed as they participated in the rituals of their faith. Malraux puts it more simply, in discussing the temple of Lamas, when he claims that the depiction of idols in this temple does not merely provide the faithful with an allegory, but forces them to meditate upon how different the nature of the world of the gods must be from our own to make it necessary for a god to have multiple arms. (Malraux, Andre, trans. Hollander, Robert, *The Temptation of the West*, New York: Jubilee Books, 1974, 86)

<sup>632</sup> More will be said about horizons and the spatiality of Being and section two of this study.

<sup>633</sup> Andrew, 2016, 132

<sup>634</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 263

<sup>635</sup> Heidegger rejected this view because it requires that art “stands in metaphysical opposition to truth as illusion” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 25) when, as we have seen, Heidegger saw art and truth as being fundamentally connected.

<sup>636</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, 75-89

<sup>637</sup> Salem-Wiseman, 2012, 167

<sup>638</sup> “*All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.*” (Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 70)

<sup>639</sup> “Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work. To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap—this is what the word origin (German *Ursprung*, literally, primal leap) means.” (Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 75)

<sup>640</sup> “The opening up of truth that configures and shapes the historical *Dasein* of a people occurs in and from out of a fundamental attunement whose originary character, clarity, extent, and binding force are never brought to bear at a single stroke. The fundamental attunement itself, however, must first of all be awakened.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 128)

<sup>641</sup> “Poetry first causes dwelling to be dwelling. Poetry is what really lets us dwell.” (Heidegger, Martin “Poetically Man Dwells.” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hofstadter, Albert, New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 213). As Pattison & Kirkpatrick put it, with art, “we are let be in the midst of things, open and receptive to the world and freed from remaking that world.” (Pattison & Kirkpatrick, 2018, 66)

<sup>642</sup> The spiritual world is not a cultural superstructure nor a reporting of facts about a particular cultural community. Heidegger is clear about this in the *Rektoratsrede*. (Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 475)

<sup>643</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Struck, Christian, “The German Student as Worker: Matriculation Ceremony Speech November 25<sup>th</sup>, 1933.” *Logos Journal RSS*, 1993

<sup>644</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 4

<sup>645</sup> As Heidegger states, in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, that the poet and the philosopher are the only ones able speak to the mysterious nature of things: “In the poetry of the poet and in the thinking of the thinker, there is always so much world-space to spare that each and every thing—a tree, a mountain, a house, the call of a bird—completely loses its monotony and familiarity.” (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA20) In his more nationalistic Hölderlin lectures, he elevates the “creators of the state” to the level of those who “properly ground and found the historical *Dasein* of a people.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 49-50)

<sup>646</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 183

<sup>647</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 195. It is in this telling of the essence of the historical *Dasein*, by way of the poetic articulation of the essence of the people, that the poet retrieves the essence from its origins, brings it forth into the world and articulates its future possibilities.

<sup>648</sup> “Poetizing founds beyng. Poetizing is the primordial language of a people. With such language, there occurs a being exposed to beings as they thereby open themselves up. As the accomplishment of such exposure, the human being is historical.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 67-68) The notion of the worlding of the world of *Dasein* speaks, in the context of the politics of poetry, to the way in which our poetical conceptions of our people and their history shape the political and cultural context in which we find ourselves. What stands as a legitimate possibility for Americans, with their poetic history as the shining city on the hill, is markedly different from those of Russians, with their poetical history as the bulwark against Western radicalism. As such, the poetical construction of the public realm shapes the political landscape of the nations. Secondly, Heidegger is positing that it is in the poetics of our histories, rather than historical facts, that we locate ourselves as beings defined by history. In short, we must distinguish this poetical grounding in history from a more anthropological account of the determinative impact of history, such as in “path-dependency” theories.

<sup>649</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 72

<sup>650</sup> Strong, 2016, 162

<sup>651</sup> In practice it is often, of course, a challenge to distinguish poetic truth from political propaganda.

<sup>652</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 95

<sup>653</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 38

<sup>654</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 38-39

<sup>655</sup> “Yet if it is the task allotted to the poetry to bring this lightning flash, shrouded in the word, into the *Dasein* of the people, then this word can address us only if we partake in the poetry [...] We must in the end actually partake in the poetry in order to first create the necessary condition for it becoming the time in which we are then able to experience in the first place who we are.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 55)

<sup>656</sup> “It is not a matter here of stating a new view of language. What is important is learning to live in the speaking of language [...] This responding is a hearing. It hears because it listens to the command of stillness.” (Heidegger, *L*, 1971, 207)

<sup>657</sup> “The origin brings itself into its open only in and through the occurrence of sheltering truth in accord with the path of sheltering that is in each case necessary.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 262)

<sup>658</sup> “Above all, we resist the temptation to take this emerging discordance within being as the occasion for a dialectical accounting of being, and thus to choke off all reflection.” (Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 43)

#### **Taking up the Mantle**

<sup>659</sup> Arendt, Hannah, *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press, 1958, 97

<sup>660</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, “History as Narrative and Practice.” *Philosophy Today* 29 3, 1985, 215

<sup>661</sup> Göppfarth, *GNGD*, 2020, 264

<sup>662</sup> Cerrato, 2020

<sup>663</sup> Gilbert, 1998, 156

<sup>664</sup> Shils, 1960, 292

<sup>665</sup> Shils, 1971, 132

<sup>666</sup> “It can be argued that the roots and persistence of nationalism owe much to something that can be described as primordial, has material substance, changes little over time and does not assign primacy to ethnicity. National and regional landscapes, unlike built environments, have generally evolved relatively slowly” (Bairner, Alan & May, Anthony, “Sport, British National Identities and the Land: Reflections on Primordialism.” *Sport in Society*, 2021, 1851)

<sup>667</sup> Smith, Anthony, “Dating the Nation.” in *Ethnonationalism and the Contemporary World*” Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism, Conversi, Daniele, London: Routledge, 2002, 65

<sup>668</sup> Smith, 1999, 13.

<sup>669</sup> Smith, 1999, 247

<sup>670</sup> It is important to note here that both Heidegger and our primordialist nationalists strongly believed that they lived in times when particular, regionalised identities were being displaced by cosmopolitanism. They

also, we shall see, would have agreed with Smith that historical groundedness is a salve against the “fundamentally memoryless nature of any cosmopolitan culture.” (Smith, 1999, 237)

<sup>671</sup> Fukuyama, 2018, 65. Fukuyama describes these myths as stories that people tell about themselves: “where they came from, what they celebrate, their shared historical memories.” (Fukuyama, 2018, 126)

<sup>672</sup> He gives the example of the way in which Serbian ethnonationalists created a bastardized history and folklore of Serbia, turning historical figures into “utterly ahistorical heroes of legends that inhabit a cyclical universe of popular fantasy.” (Pantelic, Bratislav, “Memories of a Time Forgotten: The Myth of the Perennial Nation.” *Nations and Nationalisms* 17 2, 2011, 447)

<sup>673</sup> Buber, 1948, 328

<sup>674</sup> Clark, Christopher, *Time and Power: Visions of History in German Politics, from the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich*, Princeton University Press, 2019, 1. Or, as Anthony Smith put it, these myths “predispose certain outcomes for members and for the community.” (Smith, Anthony D., “Ethnic Myths and Ethnic Revivals.” *European Journal of Sociology* 25 2, 1984, 285)

<sup>675</sup> He grants that much is erased from memory in this poetical rendition, and that, in particular, traditions can “violently chase away” failures. (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 77)

<sup>676</sup> The memories of France’s ancestors compel the French to “obey” an inner impulse towards continuity. (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 49) Greatness is, to an extent, tied to one’s capacity to take up this heritage. Péguy gives the example of Clemenceau, who took up the tradition of Voltaire and Diderot with his moral and rhetorical clarity. (Péguy, Charles, “Discours pour la Liberté.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 116)

<sup>677</sup> Péguy believed that this inheritance is threatened in his time by the *parti intellectuelle*, who consider themselves above believing in myths and wish to tarnish them as part of their struggle against the *Royaume* half of the French tradition. (Péguy, *NT*, 1946, 277) Péguy parodies this mentality in his depiction of political radicals within the *Dreyfusard* movement who essentially believed Dreyfus guilty for *failing* to betray his country. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 151-152)

<sup>678</sup> A tradition that is simultaneously monarchist and republican, religious and anticlerical, imperious, and populist. (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 23)

<sup>679</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 29. Indeed, he argues in *L’Argent Suite*, this impulse transcends political, social, and temporal difference such that the conservative Poincaré government of 1913 is essentially a continuation of the Jacobin National Convention of 1792 which was, itself, essentially a continuation of Cardinal Richelieu’s tenure as First Minister. (Péguy, *AS*, 1946, 316)

<sup>680</sup> The burgherly tradition that is national to Germany, a primarily cultural as opposed to political, tradition inherited from the city states of the Hanseatic league. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 93)

<sup>681</sup> From the Germanic tribes resisting Rome to the “pre-Bismarkian idea of Greater Germany.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 97)

<sup>682</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 12. This thread takes the form of the grand narrative of a German struggle against various forms of pan-European imperialism— key episodes being battles against Rome, the Papal States, and France. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 41) Mark Lilla, in his introduction to Mann’s reflections, notes the similarity of this conception of German history and the broader trend of opposing Kultur and Zivilisation which was prominent among Mann’s contemporaries. (Lilla, Mark, “Introduction.” in *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, Mann, Thomas, New York Review Books, 2021, xii)

<sup>683</sup> As he wrote in *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme*, that “When each of us turns our heads over our shoulder, we see an indefinite sequence of mysteries, of which the most recent events are called France. We are the product of a community who speaks within us. May the influence of our ancestors be permanent, and the sons will be energetic and righteous, the nation one.” (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 94)

<sup>684</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 24-25

<sup>685</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 26

<sup>686</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 29

<sup>687</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 126

<sup>688</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 58

<sup>689</sup> Caron, Jean-François, “Understanding and Interpreting France’s National Identity: The Meanings of Being French.” *National Identities* 15 3, 2013, 225

<sup>690</sup> Caron, 2013, 226

<sup>691</sup> Abulof, 2015, 9

<sup>692</sup> Löwith, Karl, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History*, University of Chicago Press, 2011, 5

<sup>693</sup> Clark, for example, sees it primarily as a way of legitimizing the political choices of the “sovereign authority” (Clark, 2019, 14) and Harris Mylonas and Maya Tudor a means of legitimizing the “power and policies” of “government leaders.” (Mylonas, Harris & Tudor, Maya, “Nationalism: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 24, 2021, 111) On the other hand, Gilbert sees it as akin to religious belief, an “article of faith” that is genuinely believed, even in spite of evidence, and which reinforces a “shared understanding” of the situation of a community (Gilbert, 1998, 161) and Anton Allahar sees it as a natural response to the vulnerability or mortal beings, who wish to believe that they belong to something greater than themselves. (Allahar, Anton L., “Ethnicity and the Social Construction of Primordial Attachment.” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 26 3, 1994, 20)

<sup>694</sup> This can be, as Margaret Moore describes, the presentation of a menu of legitimate options in the present (Moore, 2006, 97) or a matter of, as Hans Kohn put it, the participation of a community in the “governing or directing of the destiny of their country.” (Kohn, Hans, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955, 3)

<sup>695</sup> Jünger began the battle dreaming of a glorious death (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 179) but found himself cowering in a hole as “the victim of a pitiless thirst for destruction” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 180) The similarities with Remarque are noted here because *All Quite on the Western Front* and *Storm of Steel* are, at times, held as diametrically opposed accounts of Germany’s Great War— this depends on an oversimplification of Jünger’s position.

<sup>696</sup> It made abundantly clear that they were thrown into a confrontation between two eras, where “an emerging one devours one in decline” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 98) This is an interesting comment because, of course, Germany lost. Jünger, though, argues that in truth there were victors and vanquished on both sides, (Ibid.) and that this confrontation was less between nations than between the rising imperium of the worker (a concept that will be explored in full in time) and the declining world of chivalry.

<sup>697</sup> Throughout Jünger’s interwar *The Worker*, one finds a fatalistic belief that Germany has only one option, imperialism, available to it. Jünger argues that “life itself represents the choice between downfall or conquest.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 35) The next phase in world history will involve all of the great nations arming themselves with “imperialistic demands” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 43) and striving to become the dominant empire. Thus, Germany will either arm itself or be absorbed. There is no choice in the matter.

<sup>698</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 132-133. Barrès was critical of a fatalism that would have us simply await our destiny, without actively taking it in hand (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 28) — a concept to be kept in mind when Heidegger’s discussion of destiny comes into view. However, Barrès believed that a particular destiny awaits all those in France who are willing and able to take it up.

<sup>699</sup> Mann argues, in his *Reflections*, that the young Germans of his time were able to sense in battle that the predestined “moments of grandeur and honour” have arrived and that her “time had come, the moment of trial and of greatness.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 279)

<sup>700</sup> Mann, *TIW*, 2021, 506

<sup>701</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 279.

<sup>702</sup> He is reflecting, here in *This War*, upon his thought at the time of *Reflections*.

<sup>703</sup> Mann, *This War*, 2021, 28. And, Mann tells us, should she fail to rise to this destiny, it is Germany that will die. As he puts it, “A giant put Germany in the saddle, now she must ride, for she must not fall off.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 201)

<sup>704</sup> France’s mission is to be “the mother of liberty in the world” (Péguy, Charles, “Cahier de la Quinzaine V CQV (Mars, 1904) in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 109-110) Péguy saw this mission as thrown not from an originary character of liberty but from the experience of “le froid contact de la tyrannie” in France’s age of absolutism. (Péguy, *CQV (Mars, 1904)*, 1946, 110)

<sup>705</sup> Péguy, *LG*, 1946, 178

<sup>706</sup> Péguy believes that peace can never be established by forcing the bellicose to submit to the pacific. (Péguy, *PCS*, 1946, 19)

<sup>707</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 53

<sup>708</sup> Péguy, *AS*, 1946, 325. This plurality is, of course, not without limit. One may wish to be the inheritor of Robespierre or of Richelieu, for example, but in both cases one would be taking up the defence of France against foreign aggression. (Péguy, *AS*, 1946, 310) To do otherwise, it seems, cannot accord with either the Republican or Royalist tradition. (Ibid.) Péguy does not speak in terms of fate and does emphasise freedom and choice to a greater extent than many of his political bent. It should, though, be noted that such conceptions of destiny do, in practice, result in those who do not “live up” to expectations being ostracised, spiritually, from the national community. For example, Péguy includes all those who defend French territory as a part of a spiritual lineage which stretches back to the heroes of the Napoleonic Wars and even the crusades while excluding those who capitulated in the Franco-Prussian Wars. (Péguy, *AS*, 1946, 317)

<sup>709</sup> Péguy asserts the authenticity of a diversity of positions within the context of this thrown narrative even with respect to the highly vexed matter of the Dreyfus Affair. Péguy granted that the debates over the innocence of guilt of Captain Dreyfus were between two sides who were, for better or worse, profoundly French. We spoke exactly the same patriotic language. We spoke from the same patriotic standpoint. The *antidreyfusards* said: Military treason is a crime and Dreyfus committed military treason. We said: military treason is a crime, and Dreyfus did not commit treason.” (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 151)

<sup>710</sup> Jünger praised the English in particular for their poetic sensibilities (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 302) and the Russians, especially their women, for their strength (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 73) while Barrès identified a “great beauty” in the “colossal dreams [...] spirit [and] heroism” of the Germans. (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 153)

<sup>711</sup> This is not a trivial point. The fact that these nations, whose nationalists for so long mutually recognized one another as *the* great enemy, would eventually enter into a political, monetary and economic union would seem to be entirely impossible if the future was driven by the past in the way in which we have seen described by our nationalists. Interestingly, Alain Renaud, in *La France, un Destin*, roots this union in a mythic account of France’s history, explaining European integration as part of a French destiny, thrown from an historical mission. (Renaud, Alain, *La France, un Destin*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2016, 219)

<sup>712</sup> For Barrès, this is expressed as follows: “I loathe them cordially, but only because their destiny is opposed to ours.” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 153) For Jünger, we are defined in large part by our enemies and so we are honoured to have great enemies, he quotes Nietzsche as having said: “You must be proud of your enemy, and then the enemy’s success if your success also.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 154)

<sup>713</sup> Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, San Diego: Harvest/HBJ, 1973, 182

<sup>714</sup> Arendt *OT*, 1973, 208. This form of irresponsibility is not only a problem when people apply “legendary” explanations for their own behaviour. In fact, the whole practice of explaining historical events through world historical causality can exculpate us from responsibility for our actions.

<sup>715</sup> In the most extreme case, with respect to the Holocaust, Arendt notes that the “doctrine of eternal antisemitism” the belief that antisemitism was the result of a world historical force thrown from the Ancient Roman persecution of Jews to the present day, allowed the “murderers themselves” to “uncannily resemble the “innocent instruments of an inhuman impersonal course of events.” (Arendt, *OT*, 1973, 8)

<sup>716</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 261

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- <sup>717</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 10
- <sup>718</sup> “*Mythos* and *logos* are not, as our current historians of philosophy claim, placed into opposition by philosophy as such; on the contrary, the early Greek thinkers (Parmenides, fragment 8) are precisely the ones to use *mythos* and *logos* in the same sense.” (Ibid.)
- <sup>719</sup> Scott, 2002, 173
- <sup>720</sup> Scott, 2002, 186
- <sup>721</sup> Göppfarth, *GNGD*, 2020, 254
- <sup>722</sup> Mitchell, 2012, xiii
- <sup>723</sup> Hofstadter, 1979, 35
- <sup>724</sup> Salem-Wiseman, 2012, 178
- <sup>725</sup> Segal, 2005, 2
- <sup>726</sup> Segal, 2005, 4
- <sup>727</sup> Soffer, 1996, 568
- <sup>728</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA87
- <sup>729</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA389
- <sup>730</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA390
- <sup>731</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA394
- <sup>732</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA396
- <sup>733</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>734</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>735</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA396-397
- <sup>736</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA397
- <sup>737</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 63-64
- <sup>738</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 63
- <sup>739</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 64
- <sup>740</sup> Sigrist, Michael J., “(Review) Martin Heidegger: Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation (trans. Haase, Ullrich & Sinclair, Mark, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016)” *Phenomenological Reviews*, April 25<sup>th</sup> 2017
- <sup>741</sup> Sigrist, 2017
- <sup>742</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 57
- <sup>743</sup> Generally, to think of the things of the past in terms of “encounterability and mastery.” (Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 21)
- <sup>744</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 48
- <sup>745</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 129 & 169
- <sup>746</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 12
- <sup>747</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 58
- <sup>748</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 51
- <sup>749</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 59
- <sup>750</sup> Interestingly, Spengler acknowledges this tendency, saying that we primarily experience history in terms of its relation to ourselves, and how it presents ourselves in light of our subjective perception. (Spengler, Oswald, trans. Atkinson, Charles F., *Decline of the West— Perspectives of World History*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1922, 23-24)
- <sup>751</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 46. The “mystique” refers to all encompassing, complex fusion of the republican and pre-revolutionary spirit against barbarism, money worship and politics. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 31)
- <sup>752</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 32
- <sup>753</sup> Smith, 2002, 65
- <sup>754</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA56
- <sup>755</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 242

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- <sup>756</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA38
- <sup>757</sup> Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 477
- <sup>758</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 106
- <sup>759</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA384
- <sup>760</sup> Trawny, Peter, trans. Mitchell, Andrew J., *Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy*, University of Chicago Press, 2015, 9
- <sup>761</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>762</sup> Pöggeler, 1992, 127
- <sup>763</sup> Göppfarth, 2020, 255
- <sup>764</sup> Faye, Emmanuel, “Heidegger : *L’Introduction de Nazisme dans la Philosophie*, Paris : Albin Michel, 2005, 55-65 ; Faye, Emmanuel, “The Nazi Foundations in Heidegger’s Work.” *South Central Review* 23 1, 2006, 57
- <sup>765</sup> ““Heidegger, is not a “determinist.” He does not believe “that man’s actions are completely controlled by forces outside him or that man has no effective freedom.” (Lovitt, 1977, xiii)
- <sup>766</sup> Lovitt, 1977, xxxiii-xxxiv
- <sup>767</sup> Swer, 2019, 6
- <sup>768</sup> Gelvin, 1979, 221
- <sup>769</sup> Gelvin, 1979, 223
- <sup>770</sup> Zimmerman, 1989, 8
- <sup>771</sup> She believes this because there is no specific “ideal of existence with any special content” that we are bound to, but we are only “essentially free in the pressing ahead of a particular possibility.” (Han-Pile, 2009, 316)
- <sup>772</sup> “Existentiell freedom lies in making the right choice. We now discover that such a choice is not a matter of deliberation, of weighing pros and cons, but of understanding oneself in the right way and being ‘in thrall’ to such understanding” (Han-Pile, 2009, 302)
- <sup>773</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 302
- <sup>774</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 316
- <sup>775</sup> Lovitt, 1977, xiii
- <sup>776</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 65
- <sup>777</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA384
- <sup>778</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>779</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>780</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2040, GA42
- <sup>781</sup> Again, we should not be overly generous to Heidegger here. Yes, we can choose, but this choice is framed in loaded terms— authenticity, freedom and belonging versus, essentially, subjugation.
- <sup>782</sup> Lloyd Kramer, among others, draws a direct parallel between nationalism and religious faith, arguing that nationalism inherited religious traditions, symbols, and practices in order to replace the “religious sense” that had been lost by the time of the French Revolution. (Kramer, 1997, 533)
- <sup>783</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA5
- <sup>784</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>785</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>786</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 142
- <sup>787</sup> To bastardize Kipling: ours indeed to question why, not just to do and die.
- <sup>788</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA384
- <sup>789</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>790</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA385
- <sup>791</sup> “It is not necessary that resoluteness *explicitly* know the provenance of the possibilities upon which it projects itself.” (*Ibid.*)

<sup>792</sup> Ibid.

<sup>793</sup> Ibid.

<sup>794</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 199

<sup>795</sup> Trawny, 2015, 9

<sup>796</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Gregory, Wanda Torres & Unna, Yvonne, *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, State University of New York Press, 2009, 136

<sup>797</sup> “He [God] died because human beings murdered him. They murdered him when they reckoned his divine grandeur in terms of their own petty needs for recompense, when they cut him down to their own size.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 66)

<sup>798</sup> “We can estimate and decide about our relationship with beings as a whole from out of ourselves, in terms of the time each of us experiences; or we can remove ourselves from this time of our temporality—covertly relying on such time, however—and settle accounts with the whole by means of an infinite calculation.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 137)

<sup>799</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre, & Speller, John, “Apollinaire, Autumn III.” *Paragraph 35 1*, 2012, 132. Bourdieu noted the influence of *amor fati* on the *fin-de-siècle* spirit, describing a romantic embrace of the “fatal beauty of a luxurious decadence.” (Ibid.) For these *fin-de-siècle* writers, ““Love of death, which makes death beautiful, decadent love of decadence, this is the very spleen.” (Bourdieu, *AIII*, 2012, 133)

<sup>800</sup> What is lovely is the “fleeting, fragile, elusive” nature of life. Apollinaire calls upon us to love autumn, the season when we are reminded that all things come to an end. (Bourdieu, *AIII*, 2012, 134)

<sup>801</sup> Bourdieu, *AIII*, 2012, 135

<sup>802</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 8

<sup>803</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 72

<sup>804</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA382

<sup>805</sup> Hofstadter, 1979, 34

<sup>806</sup> “The opening of that clearing of earth-world, mortals-divinities, which is a human society is the opening of a sphere of endowment in which the heroes and villains of bygone days remain in their absence and in which the historic events of the past and the actualities and possibilities of the present and future take shape as a destiny which the group takes upon itself as its own. The myths and legends by which it imagines itself in its in its world express its sense of how all belongs to all.” (Hofstadter, 1979, 35)

<sup>807</sup> Hofstadter, 1979, 34

<sup>808</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 445

<sup>809</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 284

<sup>810</sup> Gelvin, 1979, 223

<sup>811</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 286

<sup>812</sup> Schalow, Frank, “The Hermeneutical Design of Heidegger’s Analysis of Guilt.” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 3*, 1985, 365

<sup>813</sup> Gelvin, Michael, “Authenticity and Guilt,” in *Heidegger’s Existential Analytic*, Ellison, Frederick, New York: Mouton Publishers, 1978, 233-246; Sludds, Kevin, “Towards Authentic Existence— Heidegger’s Understanding of Guilt.” *Existential Analysis 20 1*, 2009, 134

<sup>814</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA287

<sup>815</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA336

<sup>816</sup> “Initially and for the most part, the being-in-the-world that takes care understands itself in terms of *what* it takes care of. [...] what can be taken care of, what can be done, what is urgent or indispensable in the business of everyday activity.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA337)

<sup>817</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA338

<sup>818</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA336

<sup>819</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA339

<sup>820</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA146

<sup>821</sup> It is clear, for Heidegger, that the two are intimately connected, that we are to be “re-thinking being-historically” if we are to properly think Being. (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 71) In other words, our thinking of history must be in some manner about Being and our thinking of Being must, in turn, be in some manner a thinking about history.

<sup>822</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA339

<sup>823</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA340

<sup>824</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>825</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>826</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA329

<sup>827</sup> Though, as we will see, Heidegger talks in terms of repetition and mimesis, it must be understood that this repetition consists of “an unfolding that is each time new.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 147)

<sup>828</sup> “The “before” and the “ahead of” indicate the future that first makes possible in general the fact that *Dasein* can be in such a way that it is concerned *about* its potentiality-of-being. The self-project grounded in the “for the sake of itself” in the future is an essential quality of *existentiality*. *Its primary meaning is the future.*” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA327)

<sup>829</sup> Soffer, 1996, 568

<sup>830</sup> Rockmore & Margolis, 1992, 4

<sup>831</sup> “We must now keep the terminological use of this expression at a distance from all of the meanings of “future,” “past,” and “present” initially urging themselves upon us from the vulgar concept of time.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA326)

<sup>832</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 45

<sup>833</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 46

<sup>834</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 94

<sup>835</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 95

<sup>836</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 97

<sup>837</sup> Heidegger is at pains to point out that when Rilke speaks of nature, we should not understand him to be talking solely of a place or of organisms, but also of history. History, for Heidegger, is itself a part of nature, as all natural things have a past, present, and future. (Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 98-99)

<sup>838</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 101

<sup>839</sup> “If that which has been flung were to remain out of danger, it would not have been ventured.” (Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 100)

<sup>840</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 101

<sup>841</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 102

<sup>842</sup> It is precisely in this understanding of *Bezug* as relation that we, according to Heidegger, fall into the trap of thinking of the orientation of being within the world as the “human ego’s referring or relating itself to the object.” (Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 103)

<sup>843</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 102-103.

<sup>844</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 104

<sup>845</sup> Rilkean man would not be the one who “places before himself the world as the whole of everything objective, and he places himself before the world.” (Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 107) Rilke, Heidegger tells us, “experiences the Open as the nonobjective character of full Nature.” (Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 110)

<sup>846</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 117

<sup>847</sup> Heidegger links the calling to dwelling, stating that it “offers an abode.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 124)

<sup>848</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 123-124

<sup>849</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 161

<sup>850</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 165

<sup>851</sup> Heidegger, Martin, “The Call to Labour Service.” in *German Existentialism* by Dagobert D. Runes, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965, 35

<sup>852</sup> “Enmity [*Feindseligkeit*] as blessedness [*Seligkeit*] constitutes the unity of one being.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 219)

<sup>853</sup> “*Mythos* is what has its essence in its telling— what appears in the unconcealment of its appeal. The *mythos* is that appeal of foremost and radical concern to all human beings.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Krell, David F., “What Calls for Thinking?” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, 375) The association of *Mythos* with *die Sage* here draws upon Mitchell, who relates *die Sage* to the telling of legends— the construction of a realm-in-speech where the *Dasein* can be reached by the disclosure and concealment of Being. (Mitchell, 2012, xiii)

### Death

<sup>854</sup> Margaret Canovan highlighted Hannah Arendt’s influential critique of Heidegger’s focus on death as a central moment in her evolution away from his influence. (Canovan, Margaret, “Introduction.” in *The Human Condition*, Arendt, Hannah, University of Chicago Press, 1958, xvii) Canovan was correct to note that Heidegger did not have a great deal to say about birth. He briefly discussed “getting born” with respect to *natura* in *Nature, History, State* but explained it more as an inauguration of growth and becoming than as a moment in itself of equal existential significance to death. (Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 23) Notably, Heidegger moves on rather quickly and by the next page is talking about death (Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 24) substantiating somewhat the belief that he is preoccupied with death at the cost of birth. However, as we shall see, Canovan erred in failing to grant that it is not the moment of death, or even really death in itself, that fascinated Heidegger.

<sup>855</sup> In Heidegger’s handwritten notes for his lecture on Nietzsche’s Second Untimely Meditation, he draws a line with an arrowhead on each end between the words “*privation and negation*” and the word “*life*” four lines down. (Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 213)

<sup>856</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>857</sup> Blattner, William, “The Concept of Death in Being and Time.” *Man and World* 27 1, 1994, 67-68

<sup>858</sup> “Death belongs so essentially to life that the latter is thought most profoundly when we grasp the living being as that which is capable of suffering death “to die death— as an “act” of life itself.” Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 200

<sup>859</sup> Young, *HH*, 2011, 288

<sup>860</sup> As Arendt notes, the discussion of death in Western thought is actually very rich (Arendt, Hannah, “What is Existential Philosophy?” in *Essays in Understanding 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 176-177)— defying Heidegger’s claim that we hate talking about it and suggesting that his dismissal of the prevailing view of death may have been hasty.

<sup>861</sup> Hegel, for Heidegger, approaches the nothing “not as “negating [*Verneinung*] but [as] “synthesis.” (Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 27)

<sup>862</sup> Heidegger criticized Hegel because, within his absolute philosophy, “everything is already unconditionally secured.” (Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 19) “Philosophy as absolute, as un— conditioned philosophy must *enclose negativity* in a peculiar manner, and that basically means *not* to take it seriously. The *de-tachment as retention*, the complete conciliation in everything. There is no nothing. And that appears to be quite all right. The nothing “is” nothing and is not.” (*Ibid.*)

<sup>863</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 46

<sup>864</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>865</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA250

<sup>866</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 163

<sup>867</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 53

<sup>868</sup> Heidegger, *TB*, 1977, 3

<sup>869</sup> “Nothing,” Heidegger argued in “What is Metaphysics?,” is a word that we “rattle off every day” with little consideration of what the nothing, ontologically, is. (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Krell, David F., “What is Metaphysics?” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, 98)

- <sup>870</sup> “What maintains itself in becoming is, on the one hand, no longer Nothing, but on the other hand it is not yet what it is destined to be.” (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA87)
- <sup>871</sup> Newell, 2016, 254
- <sup>872</sup> “Our death is something that we cannot master and, therefore, our death signifies the impossibility of our very being. [...] Insofar as death gives nothing to calculate, measure, or master, it reveals the 'nothing' of our existence.” (Dungey, 2007, 236)
- <sup>873</sup> Löwith, Karl, “The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism.” *New German Critique* 45, 1988, 119
- <sup>874</sup> Schürmann, 1992
- <sup>875</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA121. This not only means that we will inevitably die, but that this possibility is an inevitable and constant presence in our lives.
- <sup>876</sup> Anticipation, for Heidegger, is not a question of waiting passively but is an active readying of ourselves for an oncoming event. It is, above all, a “readiness to make ourselves free for the essential.” (Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 10)
- <sup>877</sup> Blattner, 1994, 67
- <sup>878</sup> This is to say the temporal region of being-there, between our not yet being there before we were born and our no longer being there after we die.
- <sup>879</sup> “Factual *Dasein* exists as being born [*esistiert gebürtig*], and in being born it is also already dying [*gebürtig sribt es*] in the sense of being-toward-death. [...] In the unity of thrownness and the fleeting, or else anticipatory being-toward-death, birth, and death “are connected” in the way appropriate to *Dasein*. As care, *Dasein* is the between.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA374)
- <sup>880</sup> Löwith, 1988, 125-126
- <sup>881</sup> Dungey, 2007, 237
- <sup>882</sup> Wolin, Richard, *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991; Strauss, Leo, “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism.” in *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the thought of Leo Strauss*, University of Chicago Press, 1989, 27-46
- <sup>883</sup> “To live a certain kind of life; as one might put it, it is not to think a certain thought— or to have a view about something— but to *be* a certain way.” (McManus, 2015, 252)
- <sup>884</sup> McManus, 2015, 257
- <sup>885</sup> McManus, 2015, 245-246
- <sup>886</sup> Rex, John, “Review of van der Berghe 'The Ethnic Phenomenon.’” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 6 3, 1983, 369-370
- <sup>887</sup> Shils, 1957, 130-131
- <sup>888</sup> Moar, 2017, 681
- <sup>889</sup> Kramer, 1997, 534
- <sup>890</sup> Allahar grants that the intense focus on death flies in the face of the rational calculi evoked by scholars such as Rex and Shils, but that this really does not matter because the emotional intensity of this kind of rhetoric overwhelms rational objections. (Allahar, 1994, 22)
- <sup>891</sup> “As Chateaubriand expressed it nearly 200 years ago: 'Men don't allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions.'” (Connor, 1993, 386)
- <sup>892</sup> It is ironic that Péguy must be excluded from this conversation about glorious self-sacrifice on account of being, by this point, *mort pour la France*— killed near Villeroy at the Battle of the Marne in September of 1914. Péguy, though, had fascinating thoughts about the brief experience of war he did have. He had a complicated relationship with militarism and mixed feelings about the patriotic fervour that gripped France in the lead up to the Great War. The French tend, Péguy argued, to condemn war, and those who fight it, while simultaneously demanding of it that it be the source of inspiration. Péguy describes this as an insufferable duplicity (Péguy, NP, 2017, 59) or elsewhere a “a perfectly insufferable

hypocrisy.” (Péguy, NP, 2017, 65) Péguy was conscious that he himself embodies this confusion, damning war in some moments whilst elsewhere seeing it as the great foundation upon which France is built. He wrote: “That so many men have lived through so much and suffered so much for the republic, that is what founds.” (Péguy, NJ, 1933, 215)

<sup>893</sup> Mann, *OGR*, 2021, 545

<sup>894</sup> Far from a power opposed to life, death is “absorbed within life.” (Mann, *OGR*, 202, 546)

<sup>895</sup> These good Frenchmen have the satisfaction of having found their right places and to have united themselves to something mysterious and superior for which their souls were thirsting and by which they were elevated and expanded.” (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 176)

<sup>896</sup> “Sons of martyrs, sons of thirty similar generations, you will live tomorrow in the France of victory.” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 36)

<sup>897</sup> “After all, should you die, you will merely be leaving a material life to pass into a life that is infinitely better.” (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 18)

<sup>898</sup> “Real liberty consists in subjecting and in resigning one's self to the inevitable, and in being willing to become a mere part of a piece of mechanism of which one might have been the actual inventor.” (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 112)

<sup>899</sup> In particular when he witnessed the horrifying sight of an execution. (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 15)

<sup>900</sup> As such he and Péguy will be given a more elaborate treatment below.

<sup>901</sup> Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 119. The closer we get to dying, the more we grasp life in its fulness. (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 220) In part, this is because the near-death experience strips away the distractions of the everyday. (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 192)

<sup>902</sup> “A revolutionary protest against the values of the bourgeois world.” (Jünger, *OD*, 1993, 29)

<sup>903</sup> Jünger, *OD*, 1975, 86

<sup>904</sup> It is suffering, for Jünger, that is linked to “ascension” rather than death itself. (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 9)

<sup>905</sup> Grant, 1995, 54

<sup>906</sup> They share in this characteristic of, for example, the Kierkegaardian hero— an object of admiration who supplies moral encouragement to emulate their estimable acts. (Kierkegaard, Søren, *The Present Age*, New York: Harper Collins, 1962, 9)

<sup>907</sup> Arendt, *HC*, 1958, 120

<sup>908</sup> Arendt, *HC*, 1958, 19

<sup>909</sup> Hannay, Alistair, “Introduction.” in *Fear and Trembling*, Søren Kierkegaard, London: Penguin Classics, 1985, 22

<sup>910</sup> Here we distinguish immediate goals from imminent goals. Imminence, which derives from Latin and means “to project upon,” here accords with Heideggerian conceptions of objectivity, the projection of a “thing concept,” as, in this case, the “goal” for which one is to die, such as “for the nation” or “for liberty.” In contrast immediacy, derived from Old French and meaning “nearest in space or order” refers to, in Heideggerian terms, that which lies ready to hand, the practical “goal” for which one is to die, such as taking that hill or neutralizing that machine gunner.

<sup>911</sup> Renan, 1882, 10

<sup>912</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 124

<sup>913</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 137

<sup>914</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 23

<sup>915</sup> “These soldiers have become innocent victims whose blood is being spilled in atonement for the sake of humanity.” (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 38)

<sup>916</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 39

<sup>917</sup> “I am glad to forfeit my life in order that my country may be delivered. Say to our friends that I am going to victory with a smile on my lips, rejoicing more than have all the stoics and all the martyrs

throughout the ages. We are only one moment in eternal France. France must live — France shall live.” (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 59)

<sup>918</sup> This speaks precisely to the theoretical argument of Steven van Evera, who argued that memories of “collective struggle and sacrifice for the common good [...] solidify primordial identification.” (Van Evera, Steven, “Primordialism Lives!” *APSA-CP: Newsletter of the organized section in comparative politics of the American Political Science Association* 12 1, 2001, 20)

<sup>919</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 236

<sup>920</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 242. Barrès illustrated this by arguing that the men on the front in the Great War were contributing, in dying, to “the march of their country” (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 8) They were doing this, he argued, by erasing the shame of the defeat of 1870, (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 23) by consecrating themselves for a “more happy future” (Barrès, *LTM*, 1918, 213) and “to create a France that would finally become more beautiful.” (Barrès, *LTM*, 1918, 224)

<sup>921</sup> Barrès defends this idea of war and sacrifice inspiring the nation to transcend differences by giving the example of the failure of Blucher’s attempt to appeal to royalists and regional separatists to resist Napoleon’s return from exile during the 100 days. (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 18) The many wars of the First Republic and Empire had united the populace in such a way that Blucher could not exploit the divisions that were now very much internal to a nation unified by suffering.

<sup>922</sup> ““To be or not to be,” he said. We enthusiastically swore that what matters above all was that France would remain.” (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 215)

<sup>923</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 149. Barrès linked the Dreyfus Affair to his dichotomy between monarchic and revolutionary Frenchness. He saw the monarchic impulse motivating the *antidreyfusards* and the revolutionary the *dreyfusards*. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 9) It is notable that this sense of one part of the French tradition, the revolutionary, betraying, corrupting or otherwise undermining the older, a better monarchical tradition was a common position on the far-right of French politics at this time.

<sup>924</sup> Here we see one aspect of the Homeric. Barrès told the story of how Driant inspired his troops by pointing to a group of dead French soldiers and challenging them to show the same willingness to sacrifice that those men had shown. (Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 759) This is a demonstration of what Péguy called, above, the “immanent” approach to death in war.

<sup>925</sup> Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 765

<sup>926</sup> Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 764

<sup>927</sup> Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 765

<sup>928</sup> Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 766. Driant himself— in his death— would, Barrès tells us, live on as an example in the hearts of his men, (Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 763) and would find in death a harmony with the whole of his existence. (Barrès, *OG*, 1918, 763-764)

<sup>929</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 46-47

<sup>930</sup> Barrès is an extreme case. He is, at times, risible in the sanitized fiction of war that he presents, and the clear political and religious motivation of this work, designed to inspire men to sign up and to elide French patriotism with Catholic faith, is none too subtle.

<sup>931</sup> It is death which causes us to emerge from “blind will.” (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 36)

<sup>932</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 318-319

<sup>933</sup> Jünger argues, in *The Storm of Steel*, that in the “cold light of reason” we would see only the “paltry and the mean,” as in the immediate expediency of glorious death (that a bunker was taken, or an ammunition depot exploded) rather than its reification of the “idea of the Fatherland.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 317) Death saves us from our being doomed to be isolated individuals as death “tears down the walls of individuation” and reveals “the mystical knot tied to eternity.” (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 51)

<sup>934</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 58

- <sup>935</sup> “You are aquiver with two violent sensations— the tense excitement of the hunter and the terror of the hunted. You are a world in yourself, and the dark and horrible atmosphere that broods over the waste land has sucked you in utterly to itself.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 69-70)
- <sup>936</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 254-255
- <sup>937</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 109
- <sup>938</sup> Jünger, *SoS* 1975, 211-212
- <sup>939</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 219. This, along with mutilated corpses and wounded men, was a moment where “the war had shown its claws and torn off its pleasant mask.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 3)
- <sup>940</sup> “I have of course, as a Prussian officer, no doubt whatever. War means destruction of the enemy without scruple and by any means.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 126-127)
- <sup>941</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 99. Such experiences would lead Jünger to conclude that “surely the day that God has given; has better uses than to kill.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 139)
- <sup>942</sup> The war allowed him to experience danger, which he described as a “sublime moment” and an opportunity to prove his honour and gallantry. (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 27) As Zimmerman notes, this ennoblement was in many respects because of, not in spite of, the pain that was experienced. (Zimmerman, 1992, 68)
- <sup>943</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 241
- <sup>944</sup> The dead fall, in this telling, according to historical tradition and, in those moments, they are “transfigured” and “fuse together” with a higher meaning. (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 21)
- <sup>945</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 21
- <sup>946</sup> Pan, David, “Introduction.” in *Sturm*, Jünger, Ernst trans. Walker, Alexis p., New York: Telos Press, 2015, xvii
- <sup>947</sup> Jünger saw this as a “fine contemporary habit,” one which forces us, at least for a moment, to take a break from our business and think about mortality for a while. (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 26)
- <sup>948</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 37. This leads to the very Homeric conclusion that “each of the fallen is today more alive than ever, and this is because, as form, he belongs to eternity.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 22)
- <sup>949</sup> The Second World war, for Jünger, would be particularly harrowing. He would witness corpses being eaten, (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 55) plundered (He witnesses this both in WWI (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 155) and in WWII. (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 61)) and run over by tanks. (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 57)
- <sup>950</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 43. Indeed, they became so desensitized that piles of bodies came to be used as landmarks to navigate the terrain. (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 97) Far from living on forever like Achilles, the dead were quickly forgotten.
- <sup>951</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 15
- <sup>952</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 63
- <sup>953</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 63. This claim was also made by Barrès, who argued that in the past, the military exploits that advanced France’s destiny could be tied to the undertakings of particular heroic individuals—he gave the examples of Gautier de Chatillon and Richard Cœur de Lion. However, the great conflagrations of Barrès’ time were defined by an anonymous mass of soldiers, too numerous to retain any individuality. (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 29)
- <sup>954</sup> Jünger spent far more of the Great War battling “mud and work and sleepless nights” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 9) than he did staring death in the face— in spite of having seen an absurd amount of action— and he quickly came to find this dispiriting. (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 285-286)
- <sup>955</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 78
- <sup>956</sup> Heidegger, *WIM*, 2008, 99. Without the distraction of matters of immediate concern.
- <sup>957</sup> Safranski, 1998, 195-196
- <sup>958</sup> Heidegger, *WIM*, 2008, 99
- <sup>959</sup> Its actual name is the “Congrès Socialiste National” but in translating I wished to avoid “national socialist” so as not to evoke the German National Socialist Workers Party.

<sup>960</sup> Péguy, *PCS*, 1946, 19

<sup>961</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 54-55

<sup>962</sup> “Be bold! Forward! They are afraid! They’re going to flee! with the obligatory refrain: There’s a drop to drink up there! This is how people end up drinking a drop there-below. We don’t want to drink a drop.” (Péguy, “Pour Moi.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 31)

<sup>963</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Courrier de Russie.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 165

<sup>964</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Textes Formant Dossier.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 133

<sup>965</sup> Péguy, *NC*, 1946, 335. He also argues, in this same essay, that France is the modern avatar of the romantic approach to war and Germany the avatar of the more pragmatic, or in his words “imminent” one. (Péguy, *NC*, 1946, 337)

<sup>966</sup> He pointed to Homer’s portrayal of battles as a series of duels governed by convention (Péguy, *NC*, 1946, 336) where, vitally, the battle seems to pause and the narrative focuses in on the great clashes of, for example, Hector and Patroclus— such that they are witnessed, recorded and, later, committed to eternal memory by the poet.

<sup>967</sup> And we do, for Heidegger, engage in some way with death every day. Even if it does not obviously surround us, as it does not in rich countries like Canada, the simple fact of the way we talk about time (“we need time; we gain time; we lose time and so on”) Heidegger argued— in *Nature, History, State*— is predicated on an understanding of time as a finite and, as such, rather precious commodity. (Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 32) Thus, even where we may not be consciously thinking about dying, we are thinking about time in a way that implicitly acknowledges that we are mortal.

<sup>968</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA258

<sup>969</sup> Heidegger gave the examples of making aircraft faster, radios clearer and finding the “correct solution of economic difficulties.” (Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 29)

<sup>970</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA259

<sup>971</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA46

<sup>972</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>973</sup> Heidegger put this most clearly in *Being and Time*, where he explained that “the existential and temporal condition of the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA365)

<sup>974</sup> “These many sad sacrifices of individual lives will eventually save the life of France.” (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 231)

<sup>975</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 36

<sup>976</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 103. The need, as discussed, to know the essential truth of Being.

<sup>977</sup> Kisiel, 2017, 190

<sup>978</sup> He believed that, for example, he and his friends sacrificed much for what Dreyfus symbolized. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 65) Péguy grants that Dreyfus never sought to be a martyr but nevertheless came to be arguably the most famous Frenchman since Napoleon and, for the *Dreyfusards*, a symbol of everything that they wished to defend about France. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 197)

<sup>979</sup> Heidegger, *WIM*, 2008, 110

<sup>980</sup> Arendt, Hannah “Nightmare and Flight.” in *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 135

<sup>981</sup> Moar, 2017, 670

<sup>982</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA78

<sup>983</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 33

<sup>984</sup> It is, Heidegger explains, normal and proper that one is moved to want to comfort a dying person, and thus “the They provides a constant tranquilization about death.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA253-254)

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- <sup>985</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA310
- <sup>986</sup> Dungey, 2007, 236
- <sup>987</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA254
- <sup>988</sup> Where the great hero lives on forever in the songs.
- <sup>989</sup> Heidegger notes that the fact that our own deaths can be represented to us in the death of another also reveals our being-with-others in the world, (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA239) in important facet of *Dasein* to be discussed in chapter ten.
- <sup>990</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA237
- <sup>991</sup> The moment that we realize, as Dreyfus put it, that “one’s identity and world [are] fragile and temporary.” (Dreyfus & Spinosa, 2003, 347)
- <sup>992</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 294
- <sup>993</sup> “It comes to one quite simply that [...] the death of a single individual is no such great matter.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 144)
- <sup>994</sup> “In becoming finite, however, there ultimately occurs an *individuation* of man with respect to his *Dasein*.” (Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 6)
- <sup>995</sup> “Such an existing is strictly individuated since it is the ownmost of everyone. Because mineness determines it in its ownmost.” (Taminiaux, 1991, 37)
- <sup>996</sup> Taminiaux, 1992, 190
- <sup>997</sup> “1. As Long as *Dasein* is, a not-yet belongs to it, which it will be-what is constantly outstanding. 2. The coming-to-its-end of what is not-yet-at-an-end (in which what is outstanding is, according to its being, removed) has the character of no-longer *Dasein*. 3. Coming-to-an-end implies a mode of being in which each and every actual *Dasein* simply cannot be represented by someone else.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA242)
- <sup>998</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA251
- <sup>999</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA307
- <sup>1000</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA266
- <sup>1001</sup> “Every *Dasein* itself must take dying upon itself in every instance.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA240)
- <sup>1002</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA266
- <sup>1003</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 307
- <sup>1004</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA344
- <sup>1005</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA188
- <sup>1006</sup> Lilla, 2001, 27
- <sup>1007</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 186
- <sup>1008</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 187
- <sup>1009</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 190
- <sup>1010</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 188
- <sup>1011</sup> “Anxiety individualizes and thus discloses *Dasein* as “*solus ipse*.” (Ibid.)
- <sup>1012</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 189
- <sup>1013</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 63
- <sup>1014</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 64
- <sup>1015</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>1016</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 65
- <sup>1017</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 66
- <sup>1018</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>1019</sup> McManus, 2015, 268
- <sup>1020</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 107
- <sup>1021</sup> “In anxiety there occurs a shrinking back before” (Heidegger, *WIM*, 2008, 102)
- <sup>1022</sup> Safranski, 1998, 187

<sup>1023</sup> Malraux, 1974, 21

<sup>1024</sup> As Dallmayr noted, moods are less feelings than ways of relating to Being. (Dallmayr, 1993, 143)

<sup>1025</sup> “*Dasein* is taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and stunned [*benommen*] by it. But this feeling of being stunned not only *takes Dasein* back from its “worldly” possibilities, but at the same time *gives* it the possibility of an *authentic* potentiality-of-being.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA344)

<sup>1026</sup> Segal, 2005, 2

<sup>1027</sup> Segal, 2005, 3

<sup>1028</sup> “Philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance. It is turbulence, [...] into which man is spun, so as in this way alone to comprehend *Dasein* without delusion” (Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 19)

<sup>1029</sup> “This distress pertains to the truth of Being itself. It possesses its highest gift in being the ground of the necessity toward the highest possibilities, on the path of which man in his creations surpasses himself and returns through beings to the truth of Being.” (Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 133)

<sup>1030</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 146

<sup>1031</sup> “He resigned everything infinitely, and then took everything back on the strength of the absurd.” (Kierkegaard, Søren, *Fear and Trembling*, London: Penguin Classics, 1985, 70) Nevertheless it ought to be noted that Kierkegaard shares a certain elitism with Heidegger, most will never be either Knights of Faith nor obtain a wondrous mood toward death. As Kierkegaard puts it, anguish is a dangerous affair for the squeamish, so people forget it.” (Kierkegaard, 1985, 58)

<sup>1032</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 150

<sup>1033</sup> Heidegger describes resignation as a flight and “yearning for nothingness.” For Heidegger, the importance of terror, fear and the other moods discussed lies in their capacity to affirm being and their “affiliation with the beautiful.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 29)

<sup>1034</sup> Heidegger made this claim in “What is Metaphysics?,” where he argued that “only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of *Dasein* can the total strangeness of beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder—the revelation of the nothing—does the “why?” loom before us. Only because the “why” is possible as such can we in a definite way inquire into grounds, and ground them.” (Heidegger, *WIM*, 2008, 109)

<sup>1035</sup> In fact, “anxiety “does not know” what it is anxious about.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA186)

<sup>1036</sup> Concerned in a manner relating to ontology (what it means to *be* not in the world) rather than care (what I need to do today).

<sup>1037</sup> Arendt, Hannah, “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought.” in *Essays in Understanding 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 438-439

<sup>1038</sup> Anxiety, as an impetus for an existentially revelatory relationship with death is redolent of the treatment of suicide, mortality, and absurdity in Camus’ *The Myth of Sisyphus*. The distinctions between the two approaches help to clarify Heidegger’s conception of anxiety.

<sup>1039</sup> Camus, *MoS*, 1955, 59

<sup>1040</sup> The absurd is lucid reason noticing its limits.” (Camus, *MoS*, 1955, 49)

<sup>1041</sup> For Camus, the Kafkas, Kierkegaards, and Chestovs have “embraced the God that consumes”—meaning the absurd—rather than seeking to overcome it. (Camus, Albert, “Hope and the Absurd in the Work of Franz Kafka.” *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, 1955, 134-135)

<sup>1042</sup> Camus, *MoS*, 1955, 90

<sup>1043</sup> “This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd if the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart.” (Camus, *MoS*, 1955, 21)

<sup>1044</sup> Camus, *MoS*, 1955, 24

<sup>1045</sup> Everybody that does not fool themselves or allow themselves to be “confused by all the uproar about Being and Experience.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 217). Everybody who refuses to cover over death and faced up to it will be made miserable at first by the thought, being-toward-death is not easy.

<sup>1046</sup> Camus, *MoS*, 1955, 72

<sup>1047</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 294

<sup>1048</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 102

<sup>1049</sup> Segal, 2005, 8. As Dallmayr noted, Heidegger took exception to the “doom and gloom” of declinism, arguing that what might seem like a culture going “down into decay” could also be, if the correct choice was made in the face of this finitude, an opportunity to find a new path. (Dallmayr, 1993, 175)

<sup>1050</sup> “On account of its character of being disclosed, this existentially-ontic turning away makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existentially and ontologically what the flight is from.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA185)

<sup>1051</sup> Heidegger, *WIM*, 2008, 106

<sup>1052</sup> That question which has been handed over to obviousness, the question of Being.

<sup>1053</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 366.

<sup>1054</sup> “*Authentic* being-toward-death *cannot evade* its ownmost, non-relational possibility or *cover it over* in this flight and *reinterpret* it for the common sense of the they.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA260)

<sup>1055</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA305. Segal is correct that Heidegger does not give us an obviously practicable answer to the question of what actions or influences would lead us to this type of response to anxiety about death, (Segal, 2005, 8) but, by Heideggerian standards, this is not especially esoteric.

<sup>1056</sup> Taminiaux, 1992, 190

<sup>1057</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 226

<sup>1058</sup> Lilly, Reginald, “Levinas’ Heideggerian Fantasm.” in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, David & Raffoul, François, State University of New York Press, 2008, 52

<sup>1059</sup> Adorno, 2013, 129

<sup>1060</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA238

<sup>1061</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA247

<sup>1062</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA236

<sup>1063</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA238-239

<sup>1064</sup> “For the most part, everyday *Dasein* covers over its ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable possibility of being. This factual tendency to cover over confirms our thesis that *Dasein*, as factual, is in “untruth.”” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA256-257)

<sup>1065</sup> “Tranquilization is not only for the dying person, but just as much for “those comforting him.” And even in the case of demise, the carefreeness that the public has provided for itself is still not to be disturbed and made uneasy by the event.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA254)

<sup>1066</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 200. By focusing the significance of death on the *Seinsfrage* and nothing else, Heidegger put the art of dying into the domain of poets and philosophers, not soldiers. However, “not everyone needs to enact this be-ing toward death [...] this enactment is only necessary within the sphere of the task of laying the foundation for the question of be-ing.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1067</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA258-259

<sup>1068</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 178

<sup>1069</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA261

<sup>1070</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA262

<sup>1071</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 177

<sup>1072</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA266

<sup>1073</sup> In Taminiaux’s words, “The persistent imminence of the possibility to death therefore throws each and every *Dasein* upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.” (Taminiaux, 1991, 177)

<sup>1074</sup> Dungey, 2007, 255

<sup>1075</sup> This would be different from the blind conformity to other people's rules that Vieth identifies as being associated, by Heidegger, with inauthenticity. (Veith, Gene E., *Modern Fascism: Liquidating the Judeo-Christian Worldview*, St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1993, 95)

<sup>1076</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 243

<sup>1077</sup> The so called "Myth of Langemark" was central to Nazi propaganda (to the extent that a Langemark commemoration day was inaugurated where German's paid tribute to "Germany's eternal youth") transforming a military debacle into a tale of German heroism and moral victory in the face of overwhelming British force. Jünger participated in the actual battle, and some of his accounts of the carnage, horror and barbarity of war are taken directly from his experience at precisely this battle. Generally, though, the evocation of Langemark in Germany at this time was positive, speaking to the glorious self-sacrifice of German soldiers.

<sup>1078</sup> Heidegger, *GSW*, 1993

<sup>1079</sup> This aligns Heidegger with Péguy and Mann, though not Jünger or Barrès.

<sup>1080</sup> Safranski, 1998, 191

<sup>1081</sup> Zimmerman, 1989, 7; Judaken, Jonathan, "Heidegger's Shadow: Levinas, Arendt, and the Magician from Messkirch." in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Race*, Alcoff, LM, Anderson, L, Taylor, PC, London: Routledge, 2017, 66; Donovan, Josephine, "The Jewish Literary Tradition in Heidegger's Heimat," *Orbis Litterarum* 73 3, 2018, 278-279; Peterson, 2005, 615

<sup>1082</sup> To those of us raised in contemporary Western post-Christendom, the possibility of coming to love one's fate evokes images of Christian and national martyrs. The images of Saint Sebastian and Jean Moulin come to mind, but there is also a great degree of overlap between the two categories, such as with Jeanne d'Arc who is simultaneously a martyr for the Church and to France.

<sup>1083</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 188

<sup>1084</sup> Hölderlin will not tell us that in the year  $x$  Germans will do  $y$ — as poetizing "neither seeks, nor is able, to provide such a concept." (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 164)

<sup>1085</sup> For Heidegger, "poetic thinking of such being first of all creates, in an anticipatory manner, the condition for experiencing river and homeland in what they are." (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 179)

<sup>1086</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 184

<sup>1087</sup> "The poet is not thinking "destiny" in the sense of a '*fatum*' or 'fatality,' by which we represent being in the sense of a will-less, unknowing progression amid the perpetual unfolding of some impassive fatality within the totality of beings that remain enveloped within themselves." (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 158)

<sup>1088</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 159

<sup>1089</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 186

<sup>1090</sup> "This originary direction of the river itself becomes broken off. Yet the break does not become a shattering for that which has sprung forth." (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 187)

<sup>1091</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 190

<sup>1092</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1093</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 239

<sup>1094</sup> "The German nation is lonely amid the other nations. It has ventures too far forward with its revolution, into the uncertainty of "that-which-is-in-the-whole." This is familiar ground from his rectoral address: the nation has advanced under the empty heaven of Zarathustra, a community that has set out to venture the giving of meaning amid the meaningless, a nation organized in formations, retinues, alliances. The German nation, the metaphysical nation." (Safranski, 1998, 266)

<sup>1095</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 157

<sup>1096</sup> Fritsche reminds us of the belief in a special relationship between the Germans and the Greeks, the "two main actors in this history [of Being]." (Fritsche, Johannes, "National Socialism, Anti-Semitism,

and Philosophy in Heidegger and Scheler: On Peter Trawny's Heidegger & the Myth of a Jewish World-Conspiracy." *Philosophy Today* 60 2, 2016, 584)

<sup>1097</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 265

<sup>1098</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1099</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 266

<sup>1100</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 265

<sup>1101</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 262

<sup>1102</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 264-265

<sup>1103</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 263

<sup>1104</sup> In particular, the modern world replaced the consolation regarding death provided by Christianity. (Soffer, 1996, 558)

<sup>1105</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 380-381

<sup>1106</sup> This is a clear secularization of the Christian martyr concept, as the act of dying for one's country is not only good for the country but is an intrinsic good. This intrinsic good is tied directly, by Mann, to those things which he considers to be the greatest virtues: steadfastness, modesty (Mann, *R*, 2021, 387) and, above all, beauty. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 839)

<sup>1107</sup> "Tomorrow, upon our tombs the wheat will grow more beautiful" (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 204-205)

<sup>1108</sup> For example, Barrès flirted with blasphemy when he argued that the deaths of soldiers, rather than preparing them to leave this fallen earth behind, granted them a worldly eternity through the legacy of the "noble task" which their deaths began and advanced. This is a legacy secured not by God, but by a France which "will never cease their holy patriotic work." (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 228) The seamless elision of patriotism and holiness speaks to the worldliness of the immortality being pursued. The soldiers live forever, not in the Kingdom of Heaven but in the inspiration they provide for future generations and in the memory of those who honour their sacrifice and take up their struggle.

<sup>1109</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 158. Importantly, this is an experience that "no one can take from us." (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 60)

<sup>1110</sup> Though he did believe that there was grandeur and honour in war: "As horrific as the miseries of war may become, at least they can be recompensed. There is honour in war. There is grandeur in war." (Péguy, *AS*, 1946, 328)

<sup>1111</sup> Péguy, *PCS*, 1946, 27. He did, though, author a poem titled "*La Mort n'est Rien*," so one hopes he died feeling he had *seulement passé, dans la pièce à coté*.

<sup>1112</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 114

<sup>1113</sup> Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 39

<sup>1114</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 11

<sup>1115</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 100-101

<sup>1116</sup> "We know our death, but we do not believe it." (Péguy, *PIMM*, 1946, 205-206)

<sup>1117</sup> For, as George Brassens put it in *Mourir pour des Idées*: "*les Saint Jean bouche d'or, qui prêchent le martyre, le plus souvent d'ailleurs s'attardent ici-bas.*"

<sup>1118</sup> A concern of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century that one still encounters today.

<sup>1119</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Lovitt, William, "The Turning." in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 44

<sup>1120</sup> "We do not know what possibilities the destining of Western history holds in store for our people and the West. Moreover, the external shaping and ordering of those possibilities is not primarily what is needed." (Heidegger, *WON*, 1977, 56)

<sup>1121</sup> Tertulian, 1992, 219-220

<sup>1122</sup> Safranski, 1998, 190

<sup>1123</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 90

<sup>1124</sup> Segal, 2005, 3-4

<sup>1125</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 89

### The Uses and Abuses of Memory

<sup>1126</sup> Pöggeler, 1992, 127

<sup>1127</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 351

<sup>1128</sup> “Referred back to the self-consciousness of the human subject as the unshakeable ground of all certainty.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 86)

<sup>1129</sup> “Every interpretation of the world, be it naïve or calculated, is a positing of values and thus a forming and shaping of the world according to the image of man.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 83)

<sup>1130</sup> Nancy, 2002, 71

<sup>1131</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 262

<sup>1132</sup> It does so to the extent that the Prussian spirit could persist despite the commitment of her state and society, after the treaty of Tilsitt, to transform her into a small France. (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 6-7)

<sup>1133</sup> Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 10

<sup>1134</sup> Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 30-31

<sup>1135</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 354

<sup>1136</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 254. Jünger too noted that the pursuit of German destiny required that each soldier have “obedience drilled into him so that his natural instincts can be curbed by the spiritual compulsion of his commander.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 301)

<sup>1137</sup> “Philosophical knowledge of the essence of world is not and never can be an awareness of something present-at-hand.” (Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 292)

<sup>1138</sup> Such as the world-historical situation of the *Kultur-Zivilisation* conflict.

<sup>1139</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 75

<sup>1140</sup> Lilla, 2001, 10

<sup>1141</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 127

<sup>1142</sup> For Péguy, “no governmental authority, no state authority, counts in debates of conscience” (Péguy, *MSD*, 1946, 96) and thus the moral status of France is independent of the practical political outcomes sought by its leadership.

<sup>1143</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA427

<sup>1144</sup> “Beings “have” meaning only because, as being that has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the project of that being [*Sein*], that is, in terms of the upon-which of this project.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA324-325)

<sup>1145</sup> This would be to misunderstand the notion of the orientation of the toward-which [*Wozu*] of the *Dasein*, which is “neither a reflection upon the “goal” nor an expectation of the imminent completion of the work to be produced.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA353)

<sup>1146</sup> Segal, 2005, 2

<sup>1147</sup> Lieutenant Péricard fought at the Battle of Verdun and, so the legend goes, sprang up from his trench shouting “*debout, debout les morts*” before leading a doomed charge in which he was killed. This moment is referenced by Barrès in *Les Traits Éternels de la France* as a quasi-miraculous moment of the French mission being embodied in an individual. (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 20-23) Barrès is not ignorant of the likely exaggerated nature (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 20) of this legend, but this, for him, is without importance.

<sup>1148</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 22

<sup>1149</sup> Mann, *TIW*, 2021, 497

<sup>1150</sup> Mann, Thomas trans, Winston, Richard & Winston, Clara, *Thomas Mann: Diaries 1918-1939*, New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc., 1982, 5

<sup>1151</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 52-53

<sup>1152</sup> Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 27

- <sup>1153</sup> In Mann's words this mythologization, which he sees as an integral role of the artist as the figure who can bring out the "primitive" element of being, is intended to cause us "to regard nations as mythical individuals." (Mann, *R*, 2021, 124)
- <sup>1154</sup> Kockelman, 2015, 166
- <sup>1155</sup> Tertulian, 1992, 219-220
- <sup>1156</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 71
- <sup>1157</sup> Heidegger could have been speaking of nationalism when he criticized an approach to history that "stands in service of the will of human cultures to establish themselves among beings according to a comprehensible order." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 240)
- <sup>1158</sup> Lilla, 2001, 14
- <sup>1159</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 126
- <sup>1160</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1984, 124-125
- <sup>1161</sup> Krell, David F., "Art and Truth in Raging Discord: Heidegger and Nietzsche on the Will to Power." in *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature*, Spanos, William V., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 41
- <sup>1162</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 223
- <sup>1163</sup> "The mystery, as something said, must stand within the *Dasein* of the historical people, if such *Dasein* is to determine itself from out of the middle of being." (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 259)
- <sup>1164</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 238
- <sup>1165</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 257
- <sup>1166</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 155
- <sup>1167</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 155-156
- <sup>1168</sup> "Being, otherwise constantly used and called upon, offers us no foundation and no ground upon which we can immediately place whatever we erect, undertake, and bring about every day." (Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 53)
- <sup>1169</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hertz, Peter D., "A Dialogue on Language." in *On the way to Language*, New York: Harper Collins, 1971, 50
- <sup>1170</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 19
- <sup>1171</sup> Polt, 2017, 113. For Polt, we are called by Heidegger to "leap into the obscure," (Polt, 2017, 116)
- <sup>1172</sup> Gray, 1968, xxiii. Dronsfield also points this out, we are to ceaselessly expose ourselves to the "strife of questioning," (Dronsfield, 2008, 161) not tell ourselves that we know it all.
- <sup>1173</sup> Wolin, 2023, 304
- <sup>1174</sup> Wolin, 2023, 291
- <sup>1175</sup> Soffer, 1996, 572
- <sup>1176</sup> Mann argues that this is because Germans are defined by their enmity with the kind of politics (an inherently anti-German politics) that underpin it. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 22)
- <sup>1177</sup> He likened these people to a French Trojan horse belonging, essentially, with the Entente. (Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 134-135)
- <sup>1178</sup> Jünger's thinking on this gained nuance due to his wartime experience. He noted, in "On Danger" that because Germany tended more towards *Kultur*, it had a predilection for barbarism (a term not necessarily used in a pejorative sense but certainly associated, by Jünger, with negative outcomes, such as the brutalization of men in trenches). (Jünger, *OD*, 1993, 30-31) Nevertheless, Jünger saw the Great War as the distillation of the great German struggle for *Kultur* against *Zivilisation*. (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 316)
- <sup>1179</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 340
- <sup>1180</sup> Aside from nurses operating at the front, women were mobilized on the home front in munitions factories, for example, in a similarly "technological" manner.
- <sup>1181</sup> Heidegger, *QCT*, 1977, 17-18

<sup>1182</sup> This is precisely what Jünger witnessed, noticing that conceptions of chivalry (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 51) were impossible to square with blind obedience to a military machine. (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 30)

<sup>1183</sup> Hoy explains the problem with antiquarianism: “When the purely antiquarian historian forgets the meaning of his research for the present— and the future— and simply loses himself in an aesthetic contemplation of the past for the past’s sake alone, then he is objectifying the past (as *Vergangenheit*) and treating it like a thing that is merely no longer present-to-hand (*vorhanden*).” (Hoy, 1979, 55)

<sup>1184</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA380

<sup>1185</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1186</sup> Heidegger saw in Hegel the imposition of a fixed ground plan, characterized by the dialectical confrontation between the object of consciousness as thesis and self-consciousness as antithesis. Heidegger understood all of the dialectical aspects of Hegel’s system as resolving in this tension between the subject grasping external objects as matters of consciousness and the subject understanding itself as an object of self-consciousness. This results in the “taking back” of objects of consciousness into self-consciousness itself. (Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 69) This dialectic unfolds within a phenomenological articulation of time-as-spirit which moves, for Heidegger, within the “vulgar understanding of time” and covers the temporality of *Dasein* over with “abstraction.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA431)

<sup>1187</sup> “One never finds *the* dialectic, as if it were a mill which exists somewhere and into which one empties whatever one chooses, or whose mechanism one could modify according to taste and need.” (Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 112)

<sup>1188</sup> Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 112-113

<sup>1189</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 436. This experience of authentic, primordial temporality cannot, for Heidegger, be grounded in “formal and logical “abstractions.”” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 437)

<sup>1190</sup> Jünger, *TM*, 1993, 121

<sup>1191</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 90

<sup>1192</sup> Arendt have had such qualities in mind when criticizing “ideologies” that “pretend to be the keys to history but are actually nothing but desperate efforts to escape responsibility.” (Arendt, *OT*, 1973, 9)

<sup>1193</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 77

<sup>1194</sup> It is for this reason that Heidegger believes that the forming of horizons “belongs to the inner essence of living beings themselves.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 86)

<sup>1195</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 69-70

<sup>1196</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 137

<sup>1197</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 26

<sup>1198</sup> Heidegger presents a pithy set of contradistinctions in *Contributions*: “The “worldview” arranges the experience in a certain direction and into its range [...] philosophy *opens up* experience [...] worldview is always an end [...] philosophy is always a beginning [...] worldview has to refuse any new possibility, in order to preserve itself. Philosophy can cease for a long time and apparently disappear.” (*Ibid.*)

<sup>1199</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 97-98

<sup>1200</sup> Safranski, 1998, 197

<sup>1201</sup> Skocz, 2008, 74

<sup>1202</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 87

<sup>1203</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 170

<sup>1204</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 130-131

<sup>1205</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 30

<sup>1206</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 31

<sup>1207</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 33

<sup>1208</sup> This is well exemplified by Victor Davis Hanson who, writing for the Hoover Institute, warned of a new nihilism— associated with younger Democrats— which entailed the rejection of patriotic, Christian, and capitalist principles. (Hanson, Victor Davis, “The New Nihilism.” *Hoover Institute: Defining Ideas*,

2019) Hanson here presents an argument that suggests an inherent connection between a meaningful (as opposed to meaningless, which tends to represent the popular understanding of nihilism) life and love of God, country and, in his case, prosperity.

<sup>1209</sup> E.g. Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 26 & Mann, *R*, 2021, 455 & 472

<sup>1210</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 224

<sup>1211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1212</sup> Should the imposed horizons emanate from anything else, the *Dasein* will be led into nihilism, (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 201) a “dismal relapse into the inauthenticity of its essence” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 224)

<sup>1213</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 201-202

<sup>1214</sup> And, as Kisiel noted, it is in the recognition of our own individual historical situation that the way is opened to a more general historical sensibility. (Kisiel, 2017, 196)

<sup>1215</sup> “Since we said historical reflection is accomplished only by creative thinkers within various domains, one might suppose that it can treat the past with completely unbounded freedom. But historical reflection is in fact bound to the past in an essentially more rigorous way than historiography is.” (Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 45)

<sup>1216</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 8

<sup>1217</sup> Travers, Martin, “Trees, Rivers and Gods: Paganism in the Work of Martin Heidegger.” *Journal of European Studies* 48 2, 2018, 135. These four were discussed by Hofstadter: “To think being, Heidegger says, means to respond to the appeal of its presence, [...] this means to exist as a human being in an authentic relationship as mortal to other mortals, to earth and sky, to the divinities present or absent, to things and plants and animals, it means, to let each of these be.” (Hofstadter, 1971, x)

<sup>1218</sup> Heidegger, *TT*, 1971, 175-176

<sup>1219</sup> Heidegger, *TT*, 1971, 177

<sup>1220</sup> Both because it evokes the “shadow-play” on the wall of the cave in Plato’s Republic and also the “House of Mirrors” at the carnival, where mirrors deceive one about one’s very Being.

<sup>1221</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 339

<sup>1222</sup> To the extent that this is true, Lilla concedes, this would make of Heidegger’s philosophy a “programme for national regeneration.” (Lilla, 2001, 27-28)

<sup>1223</sup> Blok, Vincent, “Thinking the Earth after Heidegger: Critical Reflections on Meillassoux’s and Heidegger’s Conception of the Earth,” *Environmental Ethics* 38 4, 2016, 447

<sup>1224</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA58

<sup>1225</sup> Blok, 2016, 450

<sup>1226</sup> Blok, 2016, 446-447

<sup>1227</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 95

<sup>1228</sup> Blok, 2016, 453. One can think here of those moments when the awesome power and unpredictability of nature makes a mockery of our pretensions of having mastered it through science.

<sup>1229</sup> Mika, 2017, 100

<sup>1230</sup> For he sees in it parallels with Indigenous conceptions of earth and land. For example, ““The metaphysical, traditional notions of Earth Mother and Sky Father and their teachings for the self, for instance, that tend to diffuse through much indigenous belief would now have to be laid in an exercise in poiesis alongside the modernist drive to say what earth and sky are.” (Mika, Carl te Hira. “Some Thinking From, and Away From, Heidegger.” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 48 8, 2016, 830)

<sup>1231</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1232</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 253. One cannot but lament that Heidegger did not better integrate this statement of universal human fraternity into his comportment towards all sons of the earth.

<sup>1233</sup> Blok, 2016, 449. To remain with Blok, we know the world, it is familiar to us, and we naturally feel at home within it, and the “earth itself is not understood.” (Blok, 2016, 452)

<sup>1234</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 193

<sup>1235</sup> “Yet that which has purely sprung forth is an “enigma.” With this, we approach what has purely sprung forth as a mystery. In its grounds, however, the mysterious character pertaining to that which has purely sprung forth is not an additional aspect; rather, the enigmatic belongs to the inner essence of what has purely sprung forth. Therefore, we shall not be able to surmise, or ever to explain, such being by means of the sketch” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 223)

<sup>1236</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 224

<sup>1237</sup> “Not in the sense of being able to explain it but releasing the enigma as that concerning which and with regard to which we have no known counsel in the sense of our everyday, calculative means of disposal.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1238</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 225

<sup>1239</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 259

<sup>1240</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hofstadter, Albert, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, 145

<sup>1241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1242</sup> “Mortals dwell in that they save the earth.” (Heidegger, *BDT*, 1971, 148)

<sup>1243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1244</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 95

<sup>1245</sup> Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 34

<sup>1246</sup> Wolfe, Judith, “A Philosopher’s Secret: Nazism and Theology.” *The Tablet*, Aug 16, 2017

<sup>1247</sup> Safranski, 1998, 432-433

<sup>1248</sup> Heidegger has, unfortunately, been dragged into the less than salutary discourse surrounding post-modernism. This is best exemplified by Veith, whose argument is essentially that in turning his back on Christianity, Heidegger embraced a nihilistic relativism that led, inevitably, to his Nazism. (Veith, 1993) There is, though, a lot of interesting discussion to be had about Heidegger’s Catholicism.

<sup>1249</sup> Lilly, 2008, 42

<sup>1250</sup> Nancy, 2002, 84

<sup>1251</sup> Heidegger wrote: “Transcendence means surpassing (*Übersteig*). That which accomplishes such surpassing and dwells in this surpassing is transcendent (transcending). As an occurrence, this surpassing pertains to something that is. Formally speaking, surpassing may be grasped as a “relation” that passes “from” something “to” something. To surpassing there thus belongs that *toward which* such surpassing occurs, that which usually is, though inaccurately, called the “transcendent.” And finally, there is in each case something that is surpassed in this surpassing.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. McNeill, William, “On the Essence of Ground.” in *Pathways*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 107)

<sup>1252</sup> This becomes only clearer when, in the same work, Heidegger argued that “transcendence comprises an *exceptional domain* for the elaboration of all questions that concern being as such i.e., in their being.” (Heidegger, *EoG*, 1998, 123)

<sup>1253</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 178

<sup>1254</sup> Zimmerman, 1989, 9

<sup>1255</sup> “But it would be the ultimate error if one wished to explain the sentence about man’s ek-sistent essence as if it were the secularized transference to human beings of a thought that Christian theology expressed about God (*Deus es suum esse* [God is His Being]); for ek-sistence is not the realization of an essence, nor does ek-sistence itself even effect and posit what is essential” (Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 231)

<sup>1256</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 146

<sup>1257</sup> Heidegger, *TT*, 1971, 170-171

<sup>1258</sup> “Being as in this way founded in poetizing, however, always embraces beings as a whole: the gods, the Earth, human beings, and humans in their history.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 195)

<sup>1259</sup> Young, 2011, 289

1260 These are my words rather than Young's.

1261 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 241

1262 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 253

1263 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 150

1264 Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 253

1265 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 149

1266 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 150

1267 ““Demigods”—frequently in the context of Hölderlin's late poetry we encounter the naming of the demigods.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 148)

1268 The liminal nature of these figures does not imply that there is a discreet region of Being lying below the heavens but above the earth, the demigods do not “move within an intermediate realm to the exclusion of the remaining realms (humans and gods).” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 151) Rather, thinking about the demigods “founds and breaks open the realm of being in general” (Ibid.)

1269 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 163

1270 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 163-164

1271 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 249

1272 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 260

1273 For example, Heidegger described the poet's “vocation” as “nothing other than thrownness into this *Dasein* of the creators who stand between gods and humans.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 249)

1274 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 172

1275 Ibid.

1276 Ibid.

1277 For Nancy, the “wink” is a “quasi-concept” which functions as a kind of signal sent by the gods to man which we can glance at if we are properly attuned. (Nancy, Jean-Luc, “On a Divine Wink.” in *French Interpretations of Heidegger*, Pettigrew, Davis & Raffoul, François, State University of New York, 2008, 171) This wink is the hint that there is some greater force at play than what we see in the everyday experience of Being (Nancy, 2008, 172) which points us to the “proper signification” (Nancy, 2008, 175) of what we see before us.

1278 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 166

1279 Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 91

1280 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 174

1281 Taminiaux, 1991, 196

1282 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 168

1283 Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 48

1284 Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 45

1285 Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 180

1286 Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 343

1287 Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 344

1288 Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 349

1289 Trawny, 2000, 30

1290 Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 226

1291 The threshold between world and earth correlating, for Dallmayr, to that between revelation and concealment—the interplay between which is the primary *métier* of the poet and the true philosopher. (Dallmayr, Fred, “Earth and World, Roots and Routes.” *Social Alternatives 36 1*, 2017, 12)

1292 Dallmayr, 1993, 146

1293 Sentences that start this way seldom go well.

1294 Heidegger referred here to those whom we have called poets above. These few, he stated, “create the swaying possibility for the various shelterings of truth” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 66-67)

<sup>1295</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 67

<sup>1296</sup> Heidegger appears to be referring to *das Volk* rather than *das Man*. He describes the many as “those many who are interrelated by their common historical (earth and world-bound) origins” and distinguishes them from those who “still stand partly in the old and current and planned arrangements.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1298</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 6

<sup>1299</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 221

<sup>1300</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1301</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1302</sup> The clearing, Jacerme explains, is only accessible if we maintain “enduring contact” which the “very thing which is to be thought” (the *Seinsfrage*), (Jacerme, 2008, 63) a contact which is initiated, Milchman & Roseberg note, by the everyday experience. (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2008, 117)

<sup>1303</sup> “The inbetween [*das Inzwischen*] of the turning and, indeed as, historically, specifically inabiding! [...] The *uniqueness* of *Dasein*. Hence the uniqueness of knowing” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 259)

<sup>1304</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 336

<sup>1305</sup> Taminiaux effectively explained this liminality in *Heidegger and Fundamental Ontology*. He portrays these two realms as the realm of the “they,” and all the compromises that go along with it, (Taminiaux, 1991, 66) and the realm of the “*Dasein*’s ownmost can-be”— its authentic potential. (Taminiaux, 1991, 168)

<sup>1306</sup> For Heidegger, the history of metaphysics cannot be rejected “when in the originary projecting-opening of be-ing what is ownmost to history first comes into play.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 338)

<sup>1307</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1308</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 343

<sup>1309</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 71

<sup>1310</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 346-347

<sup>1311</sup> Heidegger distanced his thought from sentimentalism in *What is Called Thinking?*, writing that a proper disposition, or relation, towards Being is not a manner of ‘the sensitive and emotive side of human consciousness, but the essential being of all human nature.’” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 148)

<sup>1312</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 279

<sup>1313</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 42

<sup>1314</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 165

<sup>1315</sup> “The inner trait of such thinking of the demigods accordingly maintains itself precisely in the domain of an essential transport out into divine and human beyng itself”— residing in the “historical *Dasein* and its Earthly rootedness” but always also rooted in the “Earth of his homeland.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1316</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1317</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 173

<sup>1318</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 15

<sup>1319</sup> Heidegger explained his understanding of memory in *What is Called Thinking?* Memory is a form of devotion, not to something that is passed, but to the present. (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 140) We receive many gifts from the past, but the ultimate gift— the crown jewel of our endowment— is the “thinking” that we inherit. (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 142) To remember is to gather together this endowment (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 143)— to study the history of thought while also thinking in the present and about what is to come. (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 145) In simple terms, Heidegger sees authentic memory as a devotion to the taking up of the historical-philosophical questioning of Being as the hereditary task of thinking. Heidegger hopes we will be capable of this in the future (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 146-147)— suggesting that it cannot be represented by something extant.

<sup>1320</sup> For Heidegger, “we must not imagine it to be enough for any man merely to inhabit the world of his own representational ideas, and to express only them. For the world of this expression is shot through with

blindly adopted and un-re-examined ideas and concepts. How could this confused manner of forming ideas be called thinking, however loudly it may claim to be creative?” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 231)

### Pathways and Perdition

<sup>1321</sup> Faye, 2006; Farias, Victor, *Heidegger and Nazism*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989

<sup>1322</sup> Mark Lilla dates Heidegger’s embrace of Nazism to “at least since the end of 1931” (Lilla, 2001, 22) and Peter Monaghan notes that his party membership was retained until after the War. (Monaghan, Peter, “Time and the River (and Heidegger).” *The Chronical of Higher Education* 51 40, 2005, 13)

<sup>1323</sup> For example, “Heidegger ended his inaugural address as rector of the University of Freiburg with a spirited “Heil, Hitler.”” and “threw all his energies into “revolutionizing” the university and gave propaganda lectures across Germany” (Lilla, 2001, 22)

<sup>1324</sup> This refers the denunciation of his Jewish colleagues, often in secret letters to Nazi officials. (Ibid.)

<sup>1325</sup> This includes the Black Notebooks, written during the period but published only posthumously.

<sup>1326</sup> Zaborowski, 2017, 175

<sup>1327</sup> Wollan, Gjermund, “Heidegger's Philosophy of Space and Place.” *Norwegian Journal of Geography* 57 1, 2003, 32

<sup>1328</sup> Fried & Polt, 2004, xv

<sup>1329</sup> Andrew, 2016, 126

<sup>1330</sup> Feenberg, 2000, 445-446

<sup>1331</sup> For context, Heidegger joined the Nazi party on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May, 1933, and his defenders tend to date his disillusionment to the late 30’s. According to this timeline, Heidegger was a committed Nazi for about seven of the twelve years of Nazi rule (58%) and 26 years of the party’s existence (26%). Even according to this generous metric, Heidegger’s Nazism cannot be dismissed as a short-lived folly.

<sup>1332</sup> Schufreider, 2008, 191

<sup>1333</sup> Grosser, 2017, 96

<sup>1334</sup> Rockmore & Margolis, 1992, 1

<sup>1335</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 141

<sup>1336</sup> Zaborowski, 2017, 175

<sup>1337</sup> Salem-Wiseman, 2012, 165

<sup>1338</sup> Elden, 1999, 269

<sup>1339</sup> Clark, 2011, 125

<sup>1340</sup> Safranski, 1998, 271. He gives the example of Heidegger’s resignation from the rectorship as a result— notwithstanding what Detsch calls his “predilection for authoritarianism” (Detsch, 2000, 428)— of his belief that to think a strong man can solve our problems is a vestige of a defunct technological politics. (Safranski, 1998, 196-197)

<sup>1341</sup> Safranski, 1998, 290

<sup>1342</sup> Safranski, 1998, 288

<sup>1343</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA42

<sup>1344</sup> “One does not know what one wants if on the basis of concern for culture one believes one must persuade oneself into an opposition to “National Socialism.”” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings VII Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA6)

<sup>1345</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings VII Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA23-24

<sup>1346</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA42

<sup>1347</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA71

<sup>1348</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA52-53

<sup>1349</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA140

<sup>1350</sup> “By that measure, all philosophical bustle, especially the “National Socialistic” one, remains outside the domain of essential knowledge.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings XI Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA77)

<sup>1351</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings X Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA101

<sup>1352</sup> “In National Socialism, from the sheer emphasis on what is other and new, one runs the risk of cutting oneself off from the great tradition and going astray” (Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA122)

<sup>1353</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA8

<sup>1354</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA52

<sup>1355</sup> “One regrets the absence of “spirit” in National Socialism and fears and laments the destruction of spirit.” (Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA121)

<sup>1356</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA74-75

<sup>1357</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA40. Philosophical Nazism is as possible, for Heidegger, as a courageous triangle. (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings V Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA53-54)

<sup>1358</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings XI Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA76

<sup>1359</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA129

<sup>1360</sup> Safranski, 1998, 419

<sup>1361</sup> Safranski, 1998, 297

<sup>1362</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 256

<sup>1363</sup> Clark, 2011, 127

<sup>1364</sup> Describing him as a “philosopher who owes his celebrity to the fact that nobody can understand him, and who teaches the doctrine of Nothing.” (Safranski, 1998, 269 & 275)

<sup>1365</sup> Spanos argued that Heidegger’s embrace of Nazis is often exploited to discredit “postmodernism” and the “new left” it has influenced (Spanos, William V., “Heidegger, Nazism, and the Repressive Hypothesis: The American Appropriation of the Question.” *Boundary 2* 17, 1990, 202-203)

<sup>1366</sup> Elden, 1999, 260. It should be noted that for all the doubts Löwith may have expresses at this time, he would later find consistencies between the “fundamental thesis of Sein and Zeit” and Heidegger’s political involvements. (Löwith, 1988, 119) Though too weighty for passing comment here— it being in some respects the essence of this entire chapter— Taminiaux provided a fascinating and nuanced answer to Löwith’s question of how the swastika may have related to Hölderlin’s verses in *Heidegger and Fundamental Ontology*. (Taminiaux, 1991, 208-210)

<sup>1367</sup> “In addition, the lectures currently available from 1933–34 reveal to us that Heidegger, in his book on Kant from 1929, only re-addresses the question “What is man?” so as to transform it in his seminars and writings from the 1930s, into “Who are we?” He responds, “we are the people,” the only people who still have a “history” and a “völkisch destiny.” In effect, Heidegger understands this people as “völkisch,” that is to say according to his own terms, as a race (*Rasse*).” (Faye, 2006, 57)

<sup>1368</sup> Faye, 2006, 61

<sup>1369</sup> Gendre, 1991, xxii

<sup>1370</sup> Wolin, 2023, 126

<sup>1371</sup> Trawny, 2009, 2

<sup>1372</sup> Losurdo, Domenico, “Heidegger and Hitler’s War.” in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, 159

<sup>1373</sup> Peterson, 2005, 600

<sup>1374</sup> Malpas, Jeff, “Assessing the Significance of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks.” *Geographical Helvetica* 73 1, 2018, 113

<sup>1375</sup> Schalow, 2013, 113

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- <sup>1376</sup> Sloterdijk, 2017, 240
- <sup>1377</sup> For example, Safranski characterizes Heidegger's call for "an instrumentalization of scholarship for national goals" in the *Rektorsrede* as a betrayal of his commitment to keeping "philosophy free from any consideration of utility." (Safranski, 1998, 260)
- <sup>1378</sup> Zuckert, 1990, 71
- <sup>1379</sup> Young, 2011, 291
- <sup>1380</sup> "Heidegger argued that the term "folk" should refer not to a given race or empirical entity but to a common search or aspiration." (Dallmayr, 1992, 292-293)
- <sup>1381</sup> Karademir, Aret, "Heidegger and Nazism: On the relation between German Conservatism, Heidegger, and the National Socialist Ideology." *Philosophical Forum* 44 2, 2013, 100 & 122
- <sup>1382</sup> Janicaud, Dominique, "The Purloined Letter." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, 360
- <sup>1383</sup> Roberts, 2012, 25
- <sup>1384</sup> Savage, 2006, 118
- <sup>1385</sup> Safranski, 1998, 278
- <sup>1386</sup> Safranski, 1998, 281
- <sup>1387</sup> Pöggeler, 1992, 138
- <sup>1388</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA58
- <sup>1389</sup> Safranski, 1998, 290
- <sup>1390</sup> Savage, 2006, 115
- <sup>1391</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 231
- <sup>1392</sup> Clark, 2011, 136
- <sup>1393</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 215
- <sup>1394</sup> Heidegger would explain this in greater detail after the war, in *What is Called Thinking*, where he explained that "the superman is the man who first leads the essential nature of existing man over into its truth, and so assumes that truth" (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 59) but, vitally, "nor is the superman a wizard who will lead mankind toward a paradise on earth." (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 60)
- <sup>1395</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 215
- <sup>1396</sup> "The similarities between tropes from Nietzsche's thought and Nazi ideology are transparent: the Will to Power (evoked by Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will), the Superman, the master race, the Lords of the Earth, a new epoch to endure for millennia, the elimination of the unfit." (Newell, Waller, *Tyranny and Revolution: Rousseau to Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, 2022, 180)
- <sup>1397</sup> Whether with respect to the longevity of their empire or their absurd architectural plans.
- <sup>1398</sup> Newell, 2022, 180-181
- <sup>1399</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 254
- <sup>1400</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 228-229
- <sup>1401</sup> Bernasconi, Robert, "Race and Earth in Heidegger's Thinking During the Late 1930's." *The Southern Journal of Political Philosophy* 48 1, 2010, 49
- <sup>1402</sup> Arendt, *OT*, 1973, 160
- <sup>1403</sup> Arendt, Hannah, "The Image of Hell." in *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 202
- <sup>1404</sup> Arendt, Hannah, "At Table with Hitler." in *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 294
- <sup>1405</sup> Bernasconi, 2010, 51
- <sup>1406</sup> Bernasconi, 2010, 52
- <sup>1407</sup> Zimmerman, 1989, 7
- <sup>1408</sup> Judaken, 2017, 63
- <sup>1409</sup> Judaken, 2017, 66

<sup>1410</sup> Donovan, 2018, 278-279

<sup>1411</sup> Peterson, 2005, 615

<sup>1412</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 72

<sup>1413</sup> Gillespie, 2000, 143

<sup>1414</sup> Göpffarth, Julian, “Why did Heidegger Emerge as the Central Philosopher of the Far Right?” *OpenDemocracy*, London, 2020

<sup>1415</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Runes, Dagobert D., “Avowal to Adolf Hitler.” in *German Existentialism*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965, 30-31

<sup>1416</sup> Heidegger, *CLS*, 1965, 34-35

<sup>1417</sup> Certainly, in the context of “Follow the Führer,” where Heidegger discusses the “coming healing of the German body” (Heidegger, *FF*, 1965, 38) and includes in this healing that the Germans “will be given back to the soil of the land through settlements” and adds “*you must know the implications of the fact that eighteen million Germans belong to the German people, but not to the German state because they live beyond the state frontiers.*” (Heidegger, *FF*, 1965, 39)

<sup>1418</sup> “Because *Dasein* is always essentially its possibility, it *can* “choose” itself in its being, it can win itself, it can lose itself” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA42-43)

<sup>1419</sup> Heidegger, Martin, “German Students” in *German Existentialism*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965, 27-28

<sup>1420</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Runes, Dagobert D., “Labour Service and the University.” in *German Existentialism*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965, 21-22

<sup>1421</sup> Heidegger, *GS*, 1965, 28

<sup>1422</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 54

<sup>1423</sup> “In a census, the *Volk* is counted in the sense of the population [...] The German nationals living abroad are not included [...] those can also be included in the count, those who, taken racially, are of alien breed. [...] Census is, therefore, only a census of residents.” (Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 56-57)

<sup>1424</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 57

<sup>1425</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 58

<sup>1426</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 61

<sup>1427</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 50-53

<sup>1428</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 62

<sup>1429</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 63

<sup>1430</sup> “And he *is* what he *becomes* by subordinating himself to the commanding power of the new German reality for the sake of implementing the new claim to knowledge.” (Heidegger, *GSW*, 1933)

<sup>1431</sup> “The German student now passes through the *Arbeitsdienst*; he serves in the SA; he carries out *Geländedienst* [rural service]. That is new. And we wholly welcome this—even more so, when it is guaranteed that the student now really “studies.”” (Heidegger, *GSW*, 1993)

<sup>1432</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 138

<sup>1433</sup> “To us, “work” is the title of every regulated act and undertaking that is performed with responsibility toward the individual, the group, and the State, and so becomes of service to the people.” (Heidegger, *FF*, 1965, 41)

<sup>1434</sup> “*Work* transposes and organizes the *Volk* in the sphere of activity of all essential powers of Being. The structure of *völkisch Dasein*, taking shape *in* work and *through* work, is the *State*. The National Socialist State is the work-state [*Arbeitsstaat*].” (Heidegger, *GSW*, 1993)

<sup>1435</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 118

<sup>1436</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 64. It is statements such as these which led Edward Grant Andrew to see the adoption of the *Führerprinzip* by Heidegger as an aspect of the repudiation of “Platonic-Aristotelian political theory” in favour of “Machiavellian primacy of action.” (Andrew, 2016, 148)

<sup>1437</sup> “For Heidegger, the students should understand their position and their duties within the totality of their *Volk*. This is to say that they are not primarily to be considered individuals and as such free citizens of a liberal state, but ought to be understood as scholars, workers, and soldiers who belong to a superior whole, the German *Volksgemeinschaft*, and, through their services, actively support it” (Zaborowski, 2017, 169)

<sup>1438</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 62

<sup>1439</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1440</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1441</sup> Gillespie, 2000, 158

<sup>1442</sup> Polt is precisely correct, then, in noting in this lecture series “views that could easily lend themselves to a personality cult.” (Polt, 2017, 128)

<sup>1443</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 61

<sup>1444</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 63

<sup>1445</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 46

<sup>1446</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 61

<sup>1447</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 49

<sup>1448</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 60

<sup>1449</sup> Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 470

<sup>1450</sup> Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 471

<sup>1451</sup> Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 484

<sup>1452</sup> Interestingly, the evocation of the Nazi censor evokes the self-defence offered by Carl Schmitt, *during* the Nazi period, to Ernst Jünger, comparing himself to Herman Melville’s Benito Cerano held prisoner in a slave ship. (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 26) Clearly, this excuse was being prepared as a contingency measure before the fall of the Nazis. It is interesting to note, *en passant*, that Heidegger claimed these censors prevented him, specifically, from discussing Jünger’s *The Worker*. (Heidegger, *QoB*, 1958, 43)

<sup>1453</sup> Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 492. One suspects this was scant consolation to those whom he himself denounced.

<sup>1454</sup> Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 487

<sup>1455</sup> Heidegger, *SAGU*, 1985, 485

<sup>1456</sup> He would add in ellipses a clarification that this inner truth was merely to say Nazism revealed, whilst simultaneously being a part of, the encounter between global technology and modern humanity. (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA152) While this certainly makes sense within the broader context of Heidegger’s work, one doubts that even the most attuned student would have understood this rather well hidden “esoteric meaning” behind the claim that Nazism contains an inner truth and greatness.

<sup>1457</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Runes, Dagobert D., “The University Under the New Reich.” in *German Existentialism*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965, 25

<sup>1458</sup> Heidegger, *UNR*, 1965, 23-24. Heidegger appeared, at times, to have seen himself as the philosopher king who could lead (as pedagogue) the leaders (the people) of the leader (the *Führer*). Taminioux noted that the *Rektoratsrede* in particular seems to be “in close agreement with Plato’s concept of the philosopher-king.” (Taminioux, 1991, 164)

<sup>1459</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA4

<sup>1460</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA16

<sup>1461</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA60

<sup>1462</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA69-70

<sup>1463</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings III Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA77

<sup>1464</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 63-65

<sup>1465</sup> Bracher, Karl Dietrich, trans. Steinberg, Jean & Gay, Peter, *The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Consequences of National Socialism*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973

<sup>1466</sup> Where an “all-encompassing apparatus of surveillance and control allowed the individual citizen little freedom of thought or action.” (Evans, Richard J., “Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany.” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 151, 2007, 53)

<sup>1467</sup> Evans, 2007, 55. The Nazi party was genuinely popular, regularly commanding massive majorities in plebiscites. (Evans, 2007, 54)

<sup>1468</sup> Arendt, *OT*, 1973, 311

<sup>1469</sup> Gellately, Robert, “Social Outsiders and the Consolidation of Hitler’s Dictatorship, 1933-1939.” in *Nazism, War and Genocide. Essays in Honour of Jeremy Noakes*, Gregor, Neil, University of Exeter Press, 2008, 58

<sup>1470</sup> Notably, Jews, Roma, Homosexuals, the Disabled, and Communists. Heidegger was none of these.

<sup>1471</sup> Salem-Wiseman, 2012, 165. It should be noted here that Salem-Wiseman is not talking about a major challenge to Nazi ideas in this case, but merely Heidegger’s dislike of Wagner.

<sup>1472</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 141

<sup>1473</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA233

<sup>1474</sup> Andrew, 2016, 130

<sup>1475</sup> Andrew, 2016, 126

<sup>1476</sup> Arendt, Hannah, “Heidegger the Fox.” in *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 361-362

<sup>1477</sup> Herf, Jeffrey, “The Engineer as Ideologue: Reactionary Modernists in Weimar and Nazi Germany.” *The Journal of Contemporary History* 19 4, 1984, 647

<sup>1478</sup> Herf, 1984, 645-646

<sup>1479</sup> Mann matures as a thinker, and is admirable for his stand against Nazism, but one would like to have seen, from Mann, a more substantial *mea culpa* with respect to the influence that his past words, and allusions to conspiracies of “Italo-French Freemasons,” likely had on Germany’s descent into barbarism. Indeed, Péguy, who we know Mann had read, already noted that anti-Freemason conspiracy theories had operated, during the Dreyfus Affair, as the thin edge of the antisemitic wedge. (Péguy, *MSD*, 1946, 102) This lack of genuine reflection upon his own culpability makes Mann’s later brutality with respect to the fire-bombing of Lübeck by RAF Bomber Command (“everything must be paid for”) somewhat unsavoury.

<sup>1480</sup> For example, in 1940, Thomas Mann, now exiled to America, offered, via the BBC, the following to the German people: “how do you like the Messianic role allotted to you, not by God, nor by destiny, but by a handful of perverted and bloody-minded men?” (Mann, *This War*, 2021, 49-50)

<sup>1481</sup> As Lilla characterizes it: ““Heidegger’s manner of thinking,” Jaspers concluded, “to me seems in its essence unfree, dictatorial [...] his manner of speaking and his actions have a certain affinity with National Socialist characteristics.”” (Lilla, 2001, 31)

<sup>1482</sup> Runes, Dagobert D., “Introduction.” in *German Existentialism*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965, 12

<sup>1483</sup> Harries, Karston, “Heidegger as a Political Thinker.” *The Review of Metaphysics*, 1976, 645

<sup>1484</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1485</sup> Zimmerman notes a tendency to disparage “democratic principles and guarantees of individual liberties” (Zimmerman, 1989, 3) as well as a scorn for the enlightenment and its “liberative political dimension” (Zimmerman, 1992, 83)

<sup>1486</sup> “The core intention of this elitism, accessible to the masses, is to offer the promise of philosophical salvation to the “simple,” provided they are able to hear, beyond the adulterated messages of false shepherds, the “authentic” reflection of a philosophical *Führer*.” (Bourdieu, 1975, 118)

<sup>1487</sup> Adorno, 2013, 81

<sup>1488</sup> Schufreider, 2008, 213

<sup>1489</sup> Fritsche, 2016, 595. Such that Fritsche calls it a “revolutionary rightist theory of Being and Time. (Fritsche, 2016, 592)

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- <sup>1490</sup> Andrew, 2016, 123
- <sup>1491</sup> Feldman, Matthew, "Between Geist and Zeitgeist: Martin Heidegger as Ideologue of "Metapolitical Fascism."" *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6 2, 2005, 183
- <sup>1492</sup> Tertulian, 1992, 210
- <sup>1493</sup> Safranski, 1998, 228 & 244
- <sup>1494</sup> Those being, liberal modernity and Marxism.
- <sup>1495</sup> Beiner, 2018, 51
- <sup>1496</sup> Herf, 1984, 633
- <sup>1497</sup> Kolakowski, Lezsek, "A Comment on Heidegger's Comment on Nietzsche's alleged Comment on Hegel's Comment on the Power of Negativity." in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, 261
- <sup>1498</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 110
- <sup>1499</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA120
- <sup>1500</sup> "Here, the uncanniest possibility of *Dasein* shows itself: to break the excessive violence of Being through *Dasein*'s ultimate act of violence against itself. *Dasein* does not have this possibility as an empty way out, but it *is* this possibility insofar as it is; for as *Dasein*, it must indeed shatter against Being in every act of violence." (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA135)
- <sup>1501</sup> As Dallmayr noted, the emphasis Heidegger places, even in the Nazi era, on "reticence," "reserve," and "renunciation" suggest at an equanimity of spirit that represents, for Dallmayr, "an alternative vision for the future of Germany in opposition to the prevailing chauvinistic militancy." (Dallmayr, 1993, 7)
- <sup>1502</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA121
- <sup>1503</sup> Churchill, James S., "Translator's Introduction." in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger, Martin, trans. Churchill, James S., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962, xx
- <sup>1504</sup> "Moreover, what brings Patočka and Heidegger together on the world-historical significance of the twentieth century's 'total war' (*totale Krieg*) is the fact that, for both thinkers, these are not fortuitous events," (Maggini, Golfo, "Wars of the Twentieth (and Twenty-First Century) and the Twentieth (and Twenty-First Century) as War: Jan Patočka on Sacrifice and the Crisis of Europe's 'Supercivilization'." in *Dictatorship of Failure: The Discourse of Democratic Failure in the Current European Crisis*, Helsinki, 2013, 170)
- <sup>1505</sup> Zimmerman, 1999, 188
- <sup>1506</sup> "It is certain that such sharpening of the conscience cannot be taken care of, or approached in any genuine manner whatsoever, by "creating" a "new" philosophical program; rather, it must be enacted in a very concrete manner in the form of a destruction that is directed precisely to what has been handed down to us in the history of ideas." (Heidegger, *JPW*, 1998, 3)
- <sup>1507</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>1508</sup> Feenberg, 2000, 446
- <sup>1509</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 132
- <sup>1510</sup> Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 119
- <sup>1511</sup> "For Heidegger violence must be exerted for man to think and to say I." (Dronsfield, 2008, 160)
- <sup>1512</sup> Clark, 2011, 74
- <sup>1513</sup> Gonzalez, Francisco, "Did Heidegger go to Syracuse?" in *Plato in Syracuse: Essays on Plato in Western Greece with a new Translation of the Seventh Letter by John Radding*, Reid, Heather L. & Ralkowski, Mark, Fonte Aretusa: Parnassos Press, 2019, 281; Löwith, 1988, 122
- <sup>1514</sup> Polt, 2017, 116
- <sup>1515</sup> Grange, Joseph, "Heidegger as Nazi: a Postmodern Scandal." *Philosophy East and West* 41 4, 1991, 517
- <sup>1516</sup> Newell, 1984, 782
- <sup>1517</sup> Grant, 1995, 34

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- <sup>1518</sup> Arendt, *OT*, 1973, 461
- <sup>1519</sup> “With a wink the nations are informed that peace is the elimination of war, but that meanwhile this peace which eliminates war can be secured only by war. [...] War—the securing of peace; and peace—the elimination of war. How is peace to be secured by what it eliminates?” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 83)
- <sup>1520</sup> This must not be forgotten, as the definition of “violence” becomes more capacious in our time.
- <sup>1521</sup> Tabachnick, 2015, 183
- <sup>1522</sup> Tabachnick, Davind “Heidegger’s Essentialist Response to the Challenge of Technology.” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40 2, 2007, 489
- <sup>1523</sup> Tabachnick, 2007, 497-498
- <sup>1524</sup> Lucas, 1992, 248
- <sup>1525</sup> Pöggeler, 1992, 133
- <sup>1526</sup> Cerrato, 2020
- <sup>1527</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 138
- <sup>1528</sup> Polt, 2017, 112-113
- <sup>1529</sup> Gonzalez, 2019, 278
- <sup>1530</sup> Gonzalez, 2019, 279 & 282
- <sup>1531</sup> Gonzalez, 2019, 280
- <sup>1532</sup> Gonzalez, 2019, 284
- <sup>1533</sup> Taminiaux, 1992, 199
- <sup>1534</sup> Schmidt, Dennis J., “The Monstrous, Catastrophe, and Ethical Life: Hegel, Heidegger, and Antigone.” *Philosophy Today* 59 1, 2015, 70
- <sup>1535</sup> Dostal, 1982, 82
- <sup>1536</sup> Clark, 2011, 134
- <sup>1537</sup> Trawny, 2009, 6
- <sup>1538</sup> Safranski, 1998, 254
- <sup>1539</sup> Safranski, 1998, 256. At no point, as far as we are aware, did Heidegger grapple with his contribution to the environment in which Spinoza was deemed too corrupting an influence for pristine German minds.
- <sup>1540</sup> “When Heidegger did formulate his first cautious criticism of official policy, it was not because he was outraged by its anti-Semitic excesses but because he was outraged by its concessions to the old bourgeois forces.” (Safranski, 1998, 257)
- <sup>1541</sup> Smith, Steven B., *Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism*, University of Chicago Press, 2006, 130
- <sup>1542</sup> Rubin, Charles T., “Heidegger’s Ecology of Modernity— Review of Michael E. Zimmerman: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity (Indiana University Press, 1990)” *The Review of Politics* 52 4, 1990, 643
- <sup>1543</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 113
- <sup>1544</sup> Heidegger seems to have been entirely uninterested in economics, to the extent that his anti-Bolshevism was absent any critique of the economics of communism. It seems rather more likely that Bourdieu was, here, reading into Heidegger’s work his own interests and priorities. This mirrors Gadamer’s critique of Bourdieu: ““Bourdieu’s interpretation is interesting, but it makes an assumption I cannot accept (even from a sociologist): namely, that philosophy exists only as a particular worldly institution, which we must first observe critically from various socio-theoretical viewpoints if we are to unmask it and its cognitive claims.” (Gadamer, Hans-Georg, “the Political Incompetence of Philosophy.” in *The Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992, 365)
- <sup>1545</sup> Caputo, 1992, 279
- <sup>1546</sup> Safranski, 1998, 421

- <sup>1547</sup> An in-depth exploration of the extent to which the Holocaust was designed as an industrial process driven by concerns about efficiency and input/output balancing occurs in Jean François Steiner's seminal *Treblinka*. (Steiner, Jean François, *Treblinka*, Bergenfield: New American Library, 1967)
- <sup>1548</sup> Adorno, 2013, 92
- <sup>1549</sup> Wolin, Richard, "On Heidegger's Antisemitism: The Peter Trawny Affair." *Antisemitism Studies* 1 2, 2017, 249
- <sup>1550</sup> Ihde, 2010, 102
- <sup>1551</sup> "Hundreds of thousands die in masses. Do they die? They perish. They are put down. Do they die? They become pieces of inventory of a standing reserve for the fabrication of corpses. Do they die? They are unobtrusively liquidated in annihilation camps." (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 53)
- <sup>1552</sup> Rubin, 1990, 640
- <sup>1553</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA28
- <sup>1554</sup> Who collectively represent the "darkening of the world" (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA29)
- <sup>1555</sup> It is this, Wolin argues, that caused Heidegger to claim that: "I expected from National Socialism a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety, a reconciliation of social antagonisms and a deliverance of Western *Dasein* from the dangers of communism." (Wolin, 1991, 162)
- <sup>1556</sup> A belief in which Heidegger was likely inspired by Jünger (Pöggeler, 1992, 134) who had turned his back on Hegel's optimism about "the West" (Pöggeler, 1992, 115) and come to be suspicious of it. (Pöggeler, 1992, 116-117)
- <sup>1557</sup> Tabachnick, David, "Phronesis, Democracy and Technology." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 37 4, 2004, 1010
- <sup>1558</sup> Alongside Bolshevism, Liberalism, and the continuation of Late Weimar disintegration
- <sup>1559</sup> Adorno, 2013, 13-14
- <sup>1560</sup> Safranski, 1998, 253
- <sup>1561</sup> Alweiss, Lilian, "Heidegger's Black Notebooks." *Philosophy* 90 2, 2015, 315
- <sup>1562</sup> Andrew, 2016, 125
- <sup>1563</sup> Strong, 2016, 165
- <sup>1564</sup> "The purported missing placedness, rootedness, and belongingness of the Jews is a crucial enabling factor" (Grosser, 2017, 94)
- <sup>1565</sup> Donovan, 2017, 279
- <sup>1566</sup> He argues, for example, that monotheism anthropomorphizes God and so is "anthropological." (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings VI Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA85) As such, the sin lies in any "Christian Hellenistic—Jewish and Socratic-Platonic anthropology." (Heidegger, *Ponderings X Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA74)
- <sup>1567</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings X Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA79
- <sup>1568</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings XIII Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA77
- <sup>1569</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings XV Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA17
- <sup>1570</sup> "Racial thinking makes "life" a form of breeding, which is a kind of calculation. With their emphatically calculative giftedness, the Jews have for the longest time been "living" in accord with the principle of race, which is why they are also offering the most vehement resistance to its unrestricted application." (Heidegger, *Ponderings XII Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA82)
- <sup>1571</sup> He is damning of "Jewish Psychoanalysis" (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings IX Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA123)
- <sup>1572</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings VIII Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA118

- <sup>1573</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Rojcewicz, Richard, *Ponderings XIV Black Notebooks 1931–1938*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, GA121
- <sup>1574</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings XII Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA67-68
- <sup>1575</sup> “From the very beginning it functions as an International.” (Arendt, Hannah, “The Seeds of a Fascist International.” in *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 141)
- <sup>1576</sup> Judaken, 2017, 63
- <sup>1577</sup> Arendt, *SFI*, 1994, 142.
- <sup>1578</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings X Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA80
- <sup>1579</sup> Heidegger, *Ponderings VIII Black Notebooks*, 2016, GA9
- <sup>1580</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 52
- <sup>1581</sup> “If we ask about the people in space, we must fend off two misconceptions from the start. [...] If by that we mean living space [*Lebensraum*], then without a doubt we have said too much. [...] there is no such thing as a “people without space” in the most literal sense. — The second error consists in taking the space of the people or the state, following geography or geopolitics, as a bounded geometrical surface that we can measure precisely in terms of square kilometres.” (Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 53)
- <sup>1582</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 56
- <sup>1583</sup> Arendt, *OT*, 1973, 45-46
- <sup>1584</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 179
- <sup>1585</sup> Jews were, for Péguy, natural allies of conservatives on account of a hard learned antiradicalism, (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 69) one half of the Judeo-Christian (Péguy, *LG*, 1946, 176) and particularly attuned to the French spirit on account of the universality of their persecution: “A heart bleeding in Romania and Turkey, in Russia and Algeria, in America and Hungary, everywhere the Jew is persecuted, that is to say, in a certain sense, everywhere.” (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 87)
- <sup>1586</sup> They allegedly controlled the media, (Céline, Louis-Ferdinand, *Les Beaux Draps*, Paris: Nouvelles Editions Françaises, 1941, 25) the USA, (Céline, *LBD*, 1941, 31) and the Soviet Union (Céline, *LBD*, 1941, 77 & Céline, *LBD*, 1941, 112)— of course abetted by the Freemasons. (Céline, *LBD*, 1941, 78)
- <sup>1587</sup> Céline, *LBD*, 1941, 26
- <sup>1588</sup> What Céline says here is rather too vulgar for the present context, but if curious, one can look to pages 42-45 and 112-113 of the 1941 edition of *Les Beaux Draps*.
- <sup>1589</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 65. Importantly, their loyalties were not so much split between France and Israel as between humanist universalism and Israeli nationalism. (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 67)
- <sup>1590</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 96
- <sup>1591</sup> Needless to say, this “improvement” tended to consist of Jews becoming more like Barrès. The Jews *could*, for Barrès, discover “a reason for devotion” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 730) to France— as did those who fought in the trenches (Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 71)— and, in doing so, would become French (though in a limited way where they would do their duty to France but not ask for anything much politically in return). (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 59)
- <sup>1592</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 153
- <sup>1593</sup> One notes, throughout the *Faith of France*, that the “good” Jewish soldiers seem to “elevate” themselves to the unifying “faith of France” by becoming, for Barrès, more like Catholics.
- <sup>1594</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 177
- <sup>1595</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 258
- <sup>1596</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 179
- <sup>1597</sup> Wolin, 2023, 35-36
- <sup>1598</sup> Trawny, 2015, 62
- <sup>1599</sup> “Heidegger’s utterances about the Jews cannot be tied to Auschwitz.” (Trawny, 2015, 4)
- <sup>1600</sup> Trawny, 2015, 16. Trawny suggests that Heidegger only took up the discourses of National Socialism to position himself within them but also against them as a kind of internal critic: “to take up the dominant

discourse so as to set himself apart from it at the same time;" (Trawny, 2015, 39 & 41–42) in short "to position himself far from actual National Socialism." (Trawny, 2015, 16) Trawny does not believe that antisemitism, for example, is necessarily a consequence of Heidegger's history of being (Trawny, 2015, 101)— and argues that Heidegger does not even really talk about Jews after the war. (Trawny, 2015, 88)

<sup>1601</sup> It is when considering things such as the Vichy regime that Arendt characterization of an almost quaint old-fashioned French antisemitism leaves one rather ill at ease.

<sup>1602</sup> Kelley, Shawn, "Aesthetic Fascism: Heidegger, Anti-Semitism, and the Quest for Christian Origins." *Semeia* 77, 1997, 198 & 200; Kisiel, Theodore, "Heidegger's Apology: Biography as Philosophy and Ideology." in *the Heidegger Case*, Rockmore, Tom & Margolis, Joseph, 1992, 45

<sup>1603</sup> Sharpe, Matthew. "On Reading Heidegger-After the 'Heidegger Case'?" *Critical Horizons: Heidegger and the Political — Counter-voices* 19 4, 2018, 349

<sup>1604</sup> Fried & Polt, 2004, xiv

<sup>1605</sup> Milchman, Alan & Rosenberg, Alan, "The Obtuse Philosopher— Rüdiger Safranski: Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil. trans. Ewald Osers. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998)." *The Review of Politics* 61 1, 1999, 154

<sup>1606</sup> Rubin, 1990, 640

<sup>1607</sup> Malpas, 2018, 113

<sup>1608</sup> Kolb, David, "Heidegger at 100." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 52 1, 1991, 151

<sup>1609</sup> Newell, 1984, 782

<sup>1610</sup> Schalow, Frank, "Review of On Heidegger's Philosophy and Nazism," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 33, 1993, 241-243

<sup>1611</sup> Polt, 2017, 106

<sup>1612</sup> Janicaud, 2008, 31

<sup>1613</sup> Heidegger's ideas, as Madsbjerg and Fried put it, "are more relevant than ever. [...] tackle today's most important philosophical question: how can humans find meaning in modern lives?" (Madsbjerg, Christian & Fried, Gregory, "Haters Gonna Hate: Does it Matter that Heidegger was a Nazi?" *Foreign Affairs*, 2015, 174)

<sup>1614</sup> "What does not or should not remain are 'Heideggerians' understood as those who identify with the teaching of the 'Master,' [...] 'Heidegger societies' if these are understood as advocacy groups. It should be obvious that to read Heidegger's texts and take them seriously is not to advocate for them. [...] The "Black Notebooks" only reveal how dangerous this is and how susceptible Heidegger's own thought is to degenerate into ideology of the most repugnant sort. We should celebrate that the idol is destroyed, that it is no longer possible to be Heideggerian without also being anti-Heideggerian, and that some of the most important philosophical texts of the twentieth century are now liberated for genuinely critical engagement." (Gonzalez, Francisco, "Heidegger's Remains," *Acta Philosophica* 11 25, 2016, 341)

<sup>1615</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1616</sup> Ibid.

### To Sojourn in Syracuse?

<sup>1617</sup> Though it was Dallmayr who applied it to Heidegger, Dallmayr credited it to Ernst Vollrath.

<sup>1618</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 50

<sup>1619</sup> Dallmayr, 1992, 291

<sup>1620</sup> As such, a hierarchy is assumed here between the two. At times, the language of high and low, raising and lowering, will be employed— even if this is inconsistent with Vollrath's dichotomy.

<sup>1621</sup> Indeed, power politics is demoted to the rank of petty politics (*kleine Politik*). (McIntyre, Alex, *The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche's Vision of Grand Politics*, University of Toronto Press, 1997, 10-11) while *grosse Politik* is focused, according to McIntyre, upon "a process of building a new cultural edifice, a new style of human dwelling, whose foundations will no longer be solid earth because he is building it 'right into the sea.'" (McIntyre, 1997, 9)

<sup>1622</sup> McIntyre explains this cultivation as follows: “To the anti-natural morality, Nietzsche counterposes a natural morality of cultivation — nature cultivating itself, 'a going-up — up into a high, free, even frightful nature and naturalness. In brief, grand politics is an education of the 'spirit' understood as beginning with the cultivation of the body.” (McIntyre, 1997, 13)

<sup>1623</sup> McIntyre clarifies that this “should not, as it often is, be reduced to a class structure or any sort of social stratification.” (McIntyre, 1997, 12) Rather, it “underlies all social relations” and places power of a spiritual type “above and outside the guardians of state power.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1624</sup> McIntyre, 1997, 10

<sup>1625</sup> “Nietzsche's notion of hierarchy or order of rank (*Rangordnung*) [...] should not, as it often is, be reduced to a class structure or any sort of social stratification. He describes his order of rank as division of noble and base types which is radically distinct from a social structure of power between ruler and ruled. Nietzsche emphasizes this in two ways. He characterizes this hierarchy as a differentiation of three 'physiological types,' not social classes. In contrast to class structure, hierarchy is not a relation of economic or political power, but a relation between that which encompasses and that which is encompassed. Far from being the fossilization of class differences, this hierarchical structure precedes and underlies all social relations just as polity precedes and encompasses politics. For Nietzsche, culture is merely the sanctioning in law of this encompassing order. He also emphasizes its distance from a class structure of power by placing the spiritual types above and outside the 'guardians' of state power” (McIntyre, 1997, 12)

<sup>1626</sup> Smith, 1984, 299

<sup>1627</sup> Triandafyllidou, 2020, 801

<sup>1628</sup> Marx, Anthony W., *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 4

<sup>1629</sup> Connor, 1993, 374; Shils, 1957, 138

<sup>1630</sup> Abulof, 2015, 20

<sup>1631</sup> Such as national borders surrounding a realm of popular sovereignty. (Yack, Bernard, "Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism." *Political Theory* 29 4, 2004, 53)

<sup>1632</sup> Mitchell, M. Marion, “Emile Durkheim and the Philosophy of Nationalism.” *Political Science Quarterly* 46 1, 1931, 96

<sup>1633</sup> Guibernau, Montserrat & Hutchinson, John, “History and National Destiny.” *Nations and Nationalism* 10 1-2, 2004, 8

<sup>1634</sup> That is to say, one cannot appeal to administrative, constitutional, or jurisdictional boundaries over and above those which are affirmed by the national people.

<sup>1635</sup> Geertz, Clifford, “The Politics of Meaning.” in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, 316

<sup>1636</sup> Mann, R, 2021, 213

<sup>1637</sup> Mann, R, 2021, 249

<sup>1638</sup> Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 60

<sup>1639</sup> The revolutionary parties of Jünger’s time did not, he argued, challenge the bases of modern democratic societies. (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 159) The modern state, Jünger explained, insulated itself from any challenge and guaranteed its predominance in this domain— for no rival is “backed up by total and incontestable dominion.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 112)

<sup>1640</sup> Barrès, *FF*, 1918, 14

<sup>1641</sup> He expresses this in a defence of reason: “Reason does not proceed through parliamentary authority [...] Reason has neither president nor assessor, nor secretary, nor any office. [...] It does not proceed by votes. It is not subject to the law of the majority [...] Reason does not proceed by demagogic authority. To stir up the masses, the mobilize mobs is an exercise of authority no less estranged from reason that amassing some majority.” (Péguy, *DLR*, 1946, 43)

<sup>1642</sup> For Péguy, politics has both immense potential and terrible risk. (Péguy, Charles, “Compte Rendu de Mandat.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 35)

<sup>1643</sup> Mann, over the course of *Reflections*, becomes rather disillusioned about politics but attempted to intervene with essays and pamphlets for many years before becoming an early advocate of European integration, Péguy would be closely involved with the Socialist Party and a key *Dreyfusard*, Barrès would become a significant figure in *Action Française* and Jünger would be a fervent critic of liberalism and had, as we have seen, a complex and controversial relationship with Nazism.

<sup>1644</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1645</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 182

<sup>1646</sup> Soldiers in particular are praised for embracing “total self-abnegation.” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 112.)

<sup>1647</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 249

<sup>1648</sup> He particularly descried the politicization of republican education as an attempt to “cumulate” the roles of “representative of the government” and “representative of humanity.” (Péguy, Charles, “De Jean Coste.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 51) This, for Péguy, was impossible because these two modes of thinking are irreconcilable: a poet or philosopher can never truly reign. (Péguy, Charles, “Reprise Politique Parlementaire.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 71) A philosopher-statesman would be, for Péguy, an “intellectual” (think Pyotr Boborykin’s “intelligentsia”) with the heart of a politician, rejoicing in political domination of others in a way that no true scholar, for Péguy, ever could. (Péguy, *PIMM*, 1946, 197) All serious speech, when inserted into political institutions, is degraded into falsification and alteration (Péguy, *RPP*, 1946, 78) due to the abyss between serious thought and political actionability. (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 15)

<sup>1649</sup> This is so however much Péguy might have wished that the government would stick to regulating the making of matchsticks. (Péguy, *PIMM*, 1946, 198)

<sup>1650</sup> For Péguy, Jaurés’ success led to a slow slide from the persuasion of the thinker to the “authority of commandment: of the politician.” (Péguy, *RPP*, 1946, 72) The jaurésistes who followed swapped their desire to dominate the intellectual space to the pursuit of political power. (Péguy, *PIMM*, 1946, 195)

<sup>1651</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 164

<sup>1652</sup> Péguy, Charles, “Lettre du Provincial.” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 12

<sup>1653</sup> One’s national consciousness, for Jünger, ought to be worn with aristocratic grace: it should be “unobtrusive,” a “matter of course.” (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 53)

<sup>1654</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 68

<sup>1655</sup> Jünger argues that ““life itself represents the choice between downfall or conquest.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 35) Germany would, for Jünger, either arm itself and become this dominant empire or will be absorbed into another. (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 43) There is no choice in the matter. Importantly, though, this fate is less of a derivation from Germany’s mytho-historical narrative than the result of the logics of the “age of masses and machines” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 47) working themselves out.

<sup>1656</sup> “To serve Ahasverus, we would not guide him toward libraries where books are piled on books— or, if we were to lead him there, it would only be to show him how the books are bound, what titles we like, and how the patrons are dressed. [...] The gesture with which an individual opens and browses his newspaper is more telling than all the lead articles in the world, and nothing is more informative than a quarter of an hour standing at a traffic junction.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 84-85)

<sup>1657</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 14

<sup>1658</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 49. Though he also argued, in *Storm of Steel*, that there was something grubby and invalidating about any overt attempt to politicize the German mission in propaganda or to exploit it to mobilize the public to participate. (Jünger, *SoS*, 1975, 130-131) For Jünger, this mission is proper to the German and must call to him directly. It cannot be mediated through the technologies of mass mobilization.

<sup>1659</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 101

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- <sup>1660</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 62
- <sup>1661</sup> This emerges from the “total work-character” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 182) and, paradoxically, recognizes that the will to total mobilization aligns with the “will to total dictatorship.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 25)
- <sup>1662</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 111
- <sup>1663</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 109
- <sup>1664</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 189
- <sup>1665</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 211
- <sup>1666</sup> Barrès saw the potential for a genuinely historical view of French peoplehood in only a small minority, with the majority simply consuming what is given to them. (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 21)
- <sup>1667</sup> The majority, on the other hand, simply consume what is given to them. (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 21)
- <sup>1668</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 99
- <sup>1669</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 99
- <sup>1670</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 94 In order to regain a genuine capacity to choose, the worker must reframe the “comprehensive level of a different hierarchy” according to its proper typological Gestalt. (Ibid.)
- <sup>1671</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 22
- <sup>1672</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 129
- <sup>1673</sup> For Péguy, the example they must follow was that of Clemenceau, who never lost his disdain for politics but realized that if thoughtful men abstained from power, it would be left to those who would seek only to abuse and pervert philosophy to the ends of assuring their political dominance. (Péguy, Charles, “Cahiers de la Quinzaine VIII (Février, 1907)” in *La République... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 199)
- <sup>1674</sup> This present age where the mystique of France is reduced to a mere “republican thesis,” one rationally defensible theory among many which the youth of France accept or reject with total indifference. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 19-20)
- <sup>1675</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 47
- <sup>1676</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 60
- <sup>1677</sup> He speaks of those who tried to turn the mystical *dreyfusisme* of him and his friends into a “double game” designed to fleece the poor and advance their own careers. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 123)
- <sup>1678</sup> “When they fight you, the fight your mystiques with political baseness. When the support you they betray you and, which is infinitely worse, they betray your mystiques with political baseness.” (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 210)
- <sup>1679</sup> Péguy believes that the République-Royaume is only self-contradictory when it is approached politically, as politics involves fighting over finite resources like committee chairmanship’s and the suchlike, while the mystic has no issue being both a good Christian and a good citizen of the Republic. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 51)
- <sup>1680</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 28
- <sup>1681</sup> In the literal meaning of the world: rule of the best.
- <sup>1682</sup> That he called for the thinker to retreat from public life— perhaps to a cabin in the Black Forest.
- <sup>1683</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 40
- <sup>1684</sup> Zimmerman, 1992, 56
- <sup>1685</sup> Zimmerman, 1989, 9
- <sup>1686</sup> “Heidegger in fact aligns himself with Plato. In one stroke he turns the city into the work of a creator and assigns it to the activity of poiesis from which precisely— as we indicated earlier— action in the Greek *polis* intended to distinguish itself.” (Taminiaux, 1991, 218)
- <sup>1687</sup> “The Greek polis is not, Heidegger insists, a political concept.” (Young, 1999, 408)
- <sup>1688</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 291
- <sup>1689</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 292
- <sup>1690</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 312

- <sup>1691</sup> Taminioux, 1991, 136-137
- <sup>1692</sup> Safranski, 1998, 206
- <sup>1693</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 344
- <sup>1694</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA173
- <sup>1695</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA170
- <sup>1696</sup> “The understanding of *Dasein* in the they thus constantly *goes astray* in its projects with regard to the genuine possibilities of being.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA174)
- <sup>1697</sup> “Idle-talk also controls the ways in which one may be curious.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA173)
- <sup>1698</sup> These, in the nationalist context, would include the types of conversations about “What are Canadian values?” “What does it mean to be British?” etc.
- <sup>1699</sup> Arendt, Hannah, “Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding).” *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, 316-317
- <sup>1700</sup> “Entangled flight *into* the being-at-home of publicness is flight from not-being-at-home, that is, from the uncanniness which lies in *Dasein* as thrown, as being-in-the-world entrusted to itself in its being.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA189)
- <sup>1701</sup> “Commemoration and thoughtlessness are found hand in hand.” (Heidegger, *DT*, 1966, 45)
- <sup>1702</sup> Indeed, Heidegger claimed, here that “any kind of polemics fails from the outset to assume the attitude of thinking.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 13)
- <sup>1703</sup> “Our history cannot be demonstrated by any “analysis” of the “spiritual” or “political” “situation” of the time [...] the “political” perspectives proceed from what is superficial and belongs to the heretofore and has already refused to experience the actual history.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 217)
- <sup>1704</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 21
- <sup>1705</sup> Heidegger gave the example, here, of interpretations of Nietzsche’s famous “God is dead” aphorism, which should, for Heidegger, turn our thoughts towards the fundamental-ontological consequences of a godless universe but instead tends to be interpreted as a trivial dismissal of the Christian God on account of his failing to live up to their worldly needs, leading us to replace God with “their God” of “Progress.”” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 66)
- <sup>1706</sup> Skocz, 2008, 85. Indeed, Skocz finds one of the central difficulties that Heidegger faces is that whenever he speaks politically, he lapses into the language of metaphysics (Skocz, 2008, 84) and Skocz feels that this is a major reason why Heidegger looks for salvation in poetry rather than politics. (Ibid.)
- <sup>1707</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 339
- <sup>1708</sup> Dreyfus, 1995, 427
- <sup>1709</sup> Gillespie, 2000, 142
- <sup>1710</sup> Nancy, 2002, 72
- <sup>1711</sup> Nancy, 2002, 84. This is especially so, for Nancy, when one considers the action orientation in combination with Heidegger’s hatred of value thinking. (Nancy, 2002, 82)
- <sup>1712</sup> As there is an inherent assertion that there is some manner in which we ought to be in the there.
- <sup>1713</sup> He began *On Time and Being* by lamenting that “the thinking that is called philosophy [...] is supposed to offer “worldly wisdom” and perhaps even be a “Way to a Blessed Life”” but also that “this kind of thinking is today placed in a position which demands of it reflections that are far removed from any useful, practical wisdom.” (Heidegger, *TB*, 1977, 1-2)
- <sup>1714</sup> Whether it be Being as the Being of the philosopher or Being as the object of philosophical inquiry.
- <sup>1715</sup> Harries, 1976, 657
- <sup>1716</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 23
- <sup>1717</sup> As established in the prior discussion of the venture and dwelling, it is the context in which we initially and for the most part dwell which bestows upon us that about which we are curious.
- <sup>1718</sup> If we think we know it all, that the whole of Being stands in the region of unconcealment, we will never undertake the venture. Heidegger aspires for us to reach the position where “we truly know what we

do not know and cannot know, so as to become strong ourselves by genuinely running up against these barriers and setting resistance against resistance.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 70)

<sup>1719</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 91

<sup>1720</sup> Heidegger, *GSW*, 1993. Curiosity and doubt, he maintained, is a “*higher* response that the overhasty information furnished by artificially contrived systems of thought.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1721</sup> Dungey, 2007, 255

<sup>1722</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1723</sup> Heidegger puts this particularly well in “Language,” where he used the imagery of a horizon, the threshold, which is also a portal: “The threshold is the ground-beam that bears the doorway as a whole. It sustains the middle in which the two, the outside and the inside, penetrate each other.” (Heidegger, *L*, 1971, 201)

<sup>1724</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 223

<sup>1725</sup> Some object of curiosity lurking in the regions of Being that lie beyond the horizons of what stands unconcealed in the region of the everyday.

<sup>1726</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA167

<sup>1727</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA130. Arendt goes further still, arguing that if we were to seek an exceptional state of Being outside of the community, we would in fact forfeit all power and become impotent in the face of Being. (Arendt, *HC*, 1958, 201)

<sup>1728</sup> “If thinking is to consider the relation to ground and the ground as such, it cannot again adhere to a ground; more, it cannot claim to be a founding. Thus, thinking must properly reach into the abyss in order to be able to release the essential realm for the ground and our relation to it.” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 145)

<sup>1729</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 296

<sup>1730</sup> These old “problems “have been frozen as questions, and it is only a matter of finding the answer or, rather, modifying answers already found, collating previous opinions and reconciling them.” (Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 8)

<sup>1731</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 156

<sup>1732</sup> Anderson, 1966, 12

<sup>1733</sup> “We do not *want* to become “philosophers” [...] one cannot “want” such a thing. Someone either is or is not a thinker; and if one is a thinker, then that means that one *must* be the thinker that one is.” (Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 3)

<sup>1734</sup> Heidegger’s claim that Americans can only barely comprehend what “reading” actually means is practically indistinguishable from the kind of snobbish discourse one might encounter in day-to-day life. (Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 11)

<sup>1735</sup> Indeed, the refined depends, to some degree, on the crude. Heidegger writes: “The crude is not an addition to the pure. Nor does the pure have need of the crude. But the crude must be there in order that the pure may become manifest to itself as the pure and thus as that which is other.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 194) he continues, “the pure itself can be the pure only as it admits the crude close to its own essence and there holds it. This does not affirm the crude. Yet the crude exists by rights, because it is being so used with essential rightness.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 195)

<sup>1736</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 57

<sup>1737</sup> “For the poet, this does not mean some dubious greatness of an even more dubious patriotism full of noise.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 108)

<sup>1738</sup> He claimed, “genuine historical thinking will thus be recognizable by only a few. And from these few only the rare will rescue historical knowing all the way through the general hodgepodge of historical [*historischen*] opinion, to a future generation’s being ready for decision.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 107)

<sup>1739</sup> “We respect sound common sense, but there are realms that it does not penetrate, and they are the most essential ones. There are things that demand a *stricter* kind of thinking. If truth is to reign in all thinking,

then its *essence* presumably cannot be conceived by ordinary thinking and its rules of the game.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 27-28)

<sup>1740</sup> Schürmann, 1992, 319

<sup>1741</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA86

<sup>1742</sup> “The teacher is far less assured of his ground than those who learn are of theirs. If the relation between the teacher and the taught is genuine, therefore, there is never a place in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the authoritative sway of the official.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 15)

<sup>1743</sup> Gray, 1968, xvii-xviii

<sup>1744</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 166

<sup>1745</sup> Strong, 2016, 159

<sup>1746</sup> “With respect to attunement, all making conscious means destroying, altering in each case, whereas in awakening an attunement we are concerned to let this attunement be as it is, as this attunement.” (Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 65)

<sup>1747</sup> Though, for a time he appeared to believe a “leader with a holy national cause” might be able to do so. (Andrew, 2016, 124)

<sup>1748</sup> Andrew, 2016, 132

<sup>1749</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 166

<sup>1750</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1751</sup> “Thinking acts insofar as it thinks.” (Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 217)

<sup>1752</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1753</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1754</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 218

<sup>1755</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 220

<sup>1756</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1757</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 218-219

<sup>1758</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 222

<sup>1759</sup> Heidegger posits that language is the “house of the truth of Being.” (Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 223)

<sup>1760</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 237

<sup>1761</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008 225

<sup>1762</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 226-227

<sup>1763</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 233

<sup>1764</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 253

<sup>1765</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 255

<sup>1766</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 256

<sup>1767</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 177

<sup>1768</sup> “As Heidegger writes in the “Letter on Humanism,” only being can yield guideposts that might become rules of human conduct.” (Dallmayr, 1993, 130)

<sup>1769</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 117

<sup>1770</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 117-118

<sup>1771</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 110

<sup>1772</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1773</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 112

<sup>1774</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 109-110

<sup>1775</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 113

<sup>1776</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 116

<sup>1777</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 112

<sup>1778</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 115

<sup>1779</sup> Adorno, 2013, 66-67

<sup>1780</sup> The mystic will oppose all forms of politics (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 73) and only seek to influence politics indirectly— such as by being the invisible force behind philosopher-statesmen, like the young Jaurés, (Péguy, *PCS*, 1933, 22) who are to restore France to her glory. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 202)

<sup>1781</sup> Tertulian, 1992, 219

<sup>1782</sup> Blakely, 2012, 142

<sup>1783</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 120

<sup>1784</sup> Heidegger, *PMD*, 1971, 216

<sup>1785</sup> Churchill, 1962, xx

<sup>1786</sup> Harries, 1976, 648

<sup>1787</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 41

<sup>1788</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 17

<sup>1789</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 48

<sup>1790</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 48-49

<sup>1791</sup> Heidegger, *NHS*, 2015, 57

<sup>1792</sup> Ewegen, 2020, 236-237

<sup>1793</sup> Pattison & Kirkpatrick, 2018, 54

<sup>1794</sup> Dreyfus & Rubin, 1987, 70

<sup>1795</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 126

<sup>1796</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 195

<sup>1797</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 53

<sup>1798</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 151

<sup>1799</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 58

<sup>1800</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 64

<sup>1801</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 98, 104-105

<sup>1802</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 128. And of course, this did, for a time, lead Heidegger to populist appeals, though Dallmayr thought he was quickly disabused of the idea that such “bland populism” could be the mechanism by which he might bring his ideas of the German historical mission into the polis. (Dallmayr, 1993, 147)

<sup>1803</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 109

<sup>1804</sup> Zuckert, 1996. Heidegger’s thinker, for Zuckert, “breaks open the realm of beyng in general.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1805</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 165

<sup>1806</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 306. Note that “in the crossing” implies an act, crossing, which is underway.

<sup>1807</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 261

<sup>1808</sup> Detsch, 2000, 421

### **The House of Being**

<sup>1809</sup> Heidegger, *TT*, 1971, 164

<sup>1810</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1811</sup> Young, 2011, 285

<sup>1812</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 70

<sup>1813</sup> Newell, 2016, 256

<sup>1814</sup> “In repudiating the language of values, Heidegger turned to *das Volk*, its heritage, embedded in the soil of national tradition.” (Andrew, 2016, 128)

<sup>1815</sup> Ranging from arguably reasonable calls to preserve particular, even eccentric, ways of life against homogenization (whether one calls this globalization, commodification, Americanization, or something else) to inchoate fulminations against “globalists” and “elites.”

<sup>1816</sup> Connor, 1993, 385; Shils, 1957, 133

<sup>1817</sup> Calhoun, 2008, 427-448; Fox, 2003, 238

<sup>1818</sup> He also, as Dreyfus noted, doubts one can easily reconcile particularism and cosmopolitanism by simply “setting up” local worlds within an over-arching “total world.” (Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 349)

- <sup>1819</sup> A character that is obsessed with the exotic, thinking that beauty can be found only in the “distant and foreign” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 460) — an “insane” form of “exotic aestheticism.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 467)
- <sup>1820</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 470
- <sup>1821</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 154
- <sup>1822</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 60
- <sup>1823</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 159
- <sup>1824</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 157
- <sup>1825</sup> “We still lack the view for this relationship, but also the ear for what the word here says. Nevertheless, we seek assistance to bring the relationship of these three into view and in so doing find out that we ourselves belong in this relationship in that we, as needed in the relationship, dwell in it and build on it.” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 155)
- <sup>1826</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 62
- <sup>1827</sup> This is the cause of much conflict. For example, two people may discuss justice while both sharing a communicable but not common sense of the term and thus speak across one another.
- <sup>1828</sup> Nancy, 2002, 83
- <sup>1829</sup> Grosser, 2017, 94
- <sup>1830</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 71
- <sup>1831</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 198
- <sup>1832</sup> Magrini, 2012, 511
- <sup>1833</sup> Magrini, 2012, 510
- <sup>1834</sup> Heidegger, *PMD*, 1971, 213
- <sup>1835</sup> Heidegger, *PMD*, 1971, 214
- <sup>1836</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>1837</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>1838</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>1839</sup> “Language is a primal phenomenon which, in what is proper to it, is not amenable to factual proof but can be caught sight of only in an unprejudiced experience of language.” (Heidegger, *PT*, 1998, 57)
- <sup>1840</sup> Heidegger explored this in a discussion of the word “as.” (Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 293)
- <sup>1841</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 230
- <sup>1842</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 223
- <sup>1843</sup> Heidegger credits Nietzsche with having understood this, claiming that “in the dialogue between Zarathustra and his animals the thought of thoughts is now brought to language. It is not presented as a “theory;” only in conversation does it prove itself.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 51-52)
- <sup>1844</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol I*, 1979, 144
- <sup>1845</sup> Heidegger, *HRG*, 2014, 58
- <sup>1846</sup> Unlike the meaning of discourse, it is not a matter of what is commonly understood but of what is “correct” or “proper.” As Heidegger puts it, “the primary and proper use of language is common because it is proper, not the other way around. The proper meaning is the reason for frequency in language use.” (Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 59-60)
- <sup>1847</sup> One might use the “wrong” word but be well understood by one’s interlocutors, and the definition of a word can shift through usage over time. In contrast, grammar operates according to externally given “rules” which are either honoured or broken, no matter that those to whom one is speaking might adopt the grammatical error or at least understand what they hear.
- <sup>1848</sup> We cannot, as Clark reminds us, step outside of language to act upon it. (Clark, 2011, 90)
- <sup>1849</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 161
- <sup>1850</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>1851</sup> Wrathall, Mark, *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History*. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 152

<sup>1852</sup> Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 29-30

<sup>1853</sup> Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 31

<sup>1854</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 161

<sup>1855</sup> “If we grasp what we shall now try to say as a sequence of assertions about language, it will remain a concatenation of unverified and scientifically unverifiable claims. If on the contrary we experience the way to language in terms of what transpires with the way while we are under way on it, then a kind of surmise could awaken, a surmise by which language would henceforth strike is as exceedingly strange.” (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 397)

<sup>1856</sup> Heidegger points out that language is not necessarily so existentially definitive, in fact it is not even necessarily a “secure possession” as we are often rendered speechless, and some are even mute, without losing our humanity. (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 400)

<sup>1857</sup> “The formula must compel our meditation to try, not of course to eliminate the weft, but to loosen it in such a way that it grants a view upon the unconstrained cohesion of the various elements designated in the formula.” (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 399)

<sup>1858</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 401

<sup>1859</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1860</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 403

<sup>1861</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 404

<sup>1862</sup> “A conception of the world that sets out in this fashion can draw from various wells, [...] Humboldt recognizes and selects language as one of the principal sources.” (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 405)

<sup>1863</sup> “In speech the speakers have their presencing. Where to? Presencing to the wherewithal of their speech, to that by which they linger, that which in any given situation already matters to them. Which is to say, their fellow human beings and the things, each in its own way; everything that makes a thing a thing and everything that sets the tone for our relations with our fellows.” (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 406)

<sup>1864</sup> An act which can proceed in a variety of ways, and which allow us to speak of the same thing in many ways. (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 409)

<sup>1865</sup> Krell, David F., “Introduction to “The Way to Language”.” *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, Heidegger, Martin, trans. Krell, David F., New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, 395

<sup>1866</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 411

<sup>1867</sup> *Ibid.* There is an element of what Heidegger called “appropriation” here. It is in belonging to language that language becomes ours but also, in a sense, we come to reside in it, to be owned by it. (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 415)

<sup>1868</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 408

<sup>1869</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1870</sup> There would be no speech if we were all mute, after all.

<sup>1871</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 407

<sup>1872</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1873</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 406

<sup>1874</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 408

<sup>1875</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1876</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 409

<sup>1877</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1878</sup> “There is no such thing as a natural language, a language that would be the language of a human nature at hand in itself and without its own destiny. Every language is historical, also in cases where human beings know nothing of the discipline of history in the modern European sense.” (Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 422)

- <sup>1879</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 420-421. Indeed, Heidegger predicts, in *Contributions*, that the “future first thinker” will be characterized by a talent for the “simplest saying of the simplest image.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 50)
- <sup>1880</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 423
- <sup>1881</sup> Krell, 2008, 395
- <sup>1882</sup> Heidegger, *WTL*, 2008, 425
- <sup>1883</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 59
- <sup>1884</sup> Dreyfus, 1995, 424
- <sup>1885</sup> Losurdo, 1992, 156
- <sup>1886</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 140
- <sup>1887</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 58
- <sup>1888</sup> He gives the example of monuments dedicated to “the unknown soldier” to illustrate that it is not *how* but *that* we name a thing that counts (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 65)
- <sup>1889</sup> Péguy, *RPP*, 1946, 82-83
- <sup>1890</sup> He chooses instead to focus on “houses of resonance, buildings of music, monuments of sound, powerful and singular buildings, constructions which the love among all.” (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 4)
- <sup>1891</sup> Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 29
- <sup>1892</sup> Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 30
- <sup>1893</sup> For example, Mann argued that *Buddenbrooks*—his most famous novel, until *Magic Mountain* at least—was also his most linguistically German and *Royal Highness*, his least favourite of his books, is also the most spiritually French. Though written in German, *Royal Highness* had a “renaissance form,” a French “artificiality” that gave only an imitation of life. (Mann, *R*, 2021, 78)
- <sup>1894</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 319
- <sup>1895</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 319-320
- <sup>1896</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 320
- <sup>1897</sup> “The country that counts among its great thinkers R. Descartes, the founder of the doctrine of the subjectivity of human beings, has no word in its language for history [*Geschichte*] to distinguish it from historiology [*Historie*]. No one of any insight will proclaim that this is by chance. There where a language has to say what is essential for it, there is no chance.” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 97)
- <sup>1898</sup> Heidegger, Martin, “Only a God can save us: the Spiegel interview (1966)” in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, Sheehan, Thomas, London: Transaction Publishers, 2011, 62
- <sup>1899</sup> Indeed, Heidegger claimed in the *Essence of Human Freedom* that German is the *only* language with the “deep and creative philosophical character to compare with the Greek,” (Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 36) presaging a claim he would later make in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* that German is, along with Greek, “the most powerful and the most spiritual of languages.” (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA43)
- <sup>1900</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>1901</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 166. Dallmayr argued that Heidegger, far from glorifying German as a perfect language, believes that the aforementioned aspects of German can lead one to be “carried away” by the zest for “frameworks and disciplines, schemata and taxonomies.” (*Ibid.*)
- <sup>1902</sup> Indeed, this fiery, passionate, poetic voice is the foreign (Greek) “southern” form “to which he [Heidegger] is now seeking to return.” (*Ibid.*)
- <sup>1903</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 241
- <sup>1904</sup> Cerrato, 2020
- <sup>1905</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 7
- <sup>1906</sup> Heidegger, *LQ*, 2009, 30
- <sup>1907</sup> Harries, 1976, 660
- <sup>1908</sup> Feenberg, 2000, 447
- <sup>1909</sup> Swer, 2019, 3

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<sup>1910</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1911</sup> For example, he made no mention of the Frankfurt Treaty of 1871 in his discussions of the German historical *Dasein*.

<sup>1912</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 145

<sup>1913</sup> Arendt, *HC*, 1958, 55

<sup>1914</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1915</sup> Heidegger, *KPM*, 1962, 5

<sup>1916</sup> For example, it is highly unlikely that a scholar working within a Catholic university will begin their inquiries with Islamic presuppositions— though they may end up there, as it is only the point of departure that is tradition-bound.

<sup>1917</sup> “Community *is* through *each individual’s* being bound in advance to something that binds and determines every individual in exceeding them.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 66)

<sup>1918</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 255

<sup>1919</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1920</sup> For, “the who-question asks the question concerning the *self*-being and thus the question concerning what is ownmost to selfhood.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 36)

<sup>1921</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 38

<sup>1922</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 279

<sup>1923</sup> Importantly, though, this must never metastasize into a fetishization of the remote, strange, or exotic found in foreign lands. (Ibid.)

<sup>1924</sup> Gonzalez, 2019, 282

<sup>1925</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 177-178

<sup>1926</sup> Horkheimer, Max, & Adorno, Theodor W., *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, New York: Continuum, 1991

<sup>1927</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 157

<sup>1928</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA8

<sup>1929</sup> Heidegger, *INSUM*, 2016, 47

<sup>1930</sup> Heidegger’s use of the term *poiēsis* refers to the mode of revealing which holds sway in all of the fine arts, that is, the poetical bringing-forth into unconcealment. (Heidegger, *QCT*, 1977, 34) Thus poetry retrieves the concealed truth of a thing, by bringing it to shine forth in the stanzas, on the canvas, or between the staves.

<sup>1931</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 346

<sup>1932</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 344-345

<sup>1933</sup> Dreyfus associated the distinction between the culture thrown from history and that shaped according to contemporary designs as being central to the distinction between *das Volk* and *das Man*. (Dreyfus, 1995, 424-425)

<sup>1934</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 82

<sup>1935</sup> Clark, 2011, 77

<sup>1936</sup> Adorno, 2013, 79

<sup>1937</sup> Heidegger criticized a “flight to tradition” which “can bring about nothing in itself other than self-deception and blindness with respect to the historical moment.” (Heidegger, *AWP*, 1971, 136)

<sup>1938</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA386

<sup>1939</sup> “Beyond consciousness and rational apprehension.” (Smith, Anthony, “Nationalism.” *Current Sociology* 21 3, 1973, 15)

<sup>1940</sup> These borders encompass a primordial national space formed by language, as in Meinecke (Meinecke, 1970) or by custom and culture (including myths and legends), as for Clifford Geertz. (Geertz, 1973, 312) One could also point to Paul Gilbert’s argument that language is held, in nationalism, both to embody and, in turn, shape the “national character.” (Gilbert, 1998, 133)

<sup>1941</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 22-23. Particularly in rural locales where the connection between the present mode of life and the old ways is held to be stronger. (Péguy, Charles, “L’Argent.” in *La République ... Notre Royaume de France*, Paris : Gallimard, 1946, 284)

<sup>1942</sup> The geographic centre of France.

<sup>1943</sup> Tradition, for Barrès, can “grant a centre and inspire sentiments of veneration.” (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 9-10)

<sup>1944</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 84

<sup>1945</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 65

<sup>1946</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 121

<sup>1947</sup> Ibid. In practice, this means the fighting a cultural war on behalf of a highly traditionalist, Catholic vision of France. For Barrès, nationalism is inherently connected to religion, (Barrès, *LTM*, 2021, 27) It connects the “invisible worlds of heroes and gods.” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 21-22) Barrès believes that the establishing of order is the will of God, (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 148) and that therefore the re-establishing of France as an “spiritual state” (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 10) is Godly work.

<sup>1948</sup> Moar, 2017, 670 & 679

<sup>1949</sup> Marx, 2003, 193

<sup>1950</sup> Like Barrès, Bayar sees nationalist kinship as being inculcated rather than simply received from nature (Bayar, Murat, “Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 9, 2009, 1643) and, like Barrès, he argues that this sense of kinship is vital to the “internal cohesion” of a national community. (Bayar, 2009, 1650)

<sup>1951</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 10. This resembles ethno-nationalism as described by Stephen van Evera, based on a fixed ethnic identity that need not be “stamped on our genes.” (Van Evera, 2001, 20)

<sup>1952</sup> As such, France will “not be ploughed under” and built over with “chain stores from Chicago [...] which is what will happen in Germany.” (Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 104)

<sup>1953</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 125

<sup>1954</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 97. In this evocation of the holy, Jünger met the expectations of Clifford Geertz who saw in nationalism a strong “drive to make sense of experience” (Geertz, Clifford, “Ethos, World-View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols.” *The Antioch Review* 73 3, 1957, 636) by encouraging devotion to a “holy” commitment (Geertz, 1957, 622) to the “symbolic activities” of the community.

<sup>1955</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 59

<sup>1956</sup> Mann, *R*, 221-222

<sup>1957</sup> Mann appeals to an organic “culture,” binding natural communities in organic harmony as a defence against rational “civilization.” As he put it in a pithy formulation: “Culture binds together; civilization dissolves.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 141)

<sup>1958</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 325

<sup>1959</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 349

<sup>1960</sup> Culture is defined broadly here, encapsulating everything from a football game to the work of great poets and artists. We are not to be uncritical or closed minded, but it is clear that tradition and culture are to be almost sacred objects towards whom a reverential attitude is to be expected.

<sup>1961</sup> Péguy, *MSD*, 1946, 105

<sup>1962</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 89

<sup>1963</sup> From French politicians touting their *valeurs républicaines* to the “Canadian Values Test.”

<sup>1964</sup> Heidegger, *AWP*, 1977, 142

<sup>1965</sup> “Liberation from something is genuine only when it masters and appropriates whatever it is liberating itself from. *Liberation from the tradition is an ever-new appropriation of its newly recognized strengths.*” (Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 352)

<sup>1966</sup> Heidegger, *PL*, 1994, 24

### Mitsein and Community

- <sup>1967</sup> In particular, as Monaghan notes, the question of “what constitutes the notions of place and home” and “humanity’s relationship to nature.” (Monaghan, 2005, 12)
- <sup>1968</sup> Kolb, 2015, 95
- <sup>1969</sup> Winfree, 1999, 166
- <sup>1970</sup> Andrew, 2016, 128
- <sup>1971</sup> Cerrato, 2020
- <sup>1972</sup> Mika, 2014, 52
- <sup>1973</sup> Mika himself makes several important contributions to this literature. (E.g. Mika, 2016, 827-831; 2017, 85-108; 2014, 46-80)
- <sup>1974</sup> Dungey, 2007, 242
- <sup>1975</sup> Göppfarth, *WHE*, 2020
- <sup>1976</sup> “‘Earth’ – ‘the building bearer nourishing with its fruits, tending water and rock, plant and animal’ – and ‘sky’ – ‘the sun’s path the course of the moon, the glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons, the light and dusk of day ...’ – are, collectively, nature; nature as experienced by the poet, nature – since what poetry does is to ‘found the holy’ – as a holy place. (Young, 2011, 287)
- <sup>1977</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>1978</sup> Even those which are “advanced as antidotes to social atomism and grounded either in the continuity of shared traditions or the unity of traditional goals.” (Dallmayr, 1993, 63)
- <sup>1979</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 103
- <sup>1980</sup> In particular, as Monaghan notes, the question of “what constitutes the notions of place and home” and “humanity’s relationship to nature.” (Monaghan, 2005, 12)
- <sup>1981</sup> Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 344-345
- <sup>1982</sup> “What is this Heimat? [...] the “steadfast” centre around which action is “concentrated.”” (Young, 1999, 395)
- <sup>1983</sup> Dungey, 2007, 238
- <sup>1984</sup> Cerrato, 2020
- <sup>1985</sup> Göppfarth, *WHE*, 2020
- <sup>1986</sup> Göppfarth, *WHE*, 2020, 256
- <sup>1987</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 65
- <sup>1988</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 55
- <sup>1989</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 168
- <sup>1990</sup> Dallmayr, 1992, 307
- <sup>1991</sup> Young, 1999, 404
- <sup>1992</sup> “Among the ideologies criticized are Bolshevism with its planned social progress; liberalism with its treatment of ideals and culture as “values to be implemented;” and “folkish” ideology with its focus on political training and racial breeding. At the time, Heidegger argued that the term “folk” should refer not to a given race or empirical entity but to a common search or aspiration.” (Dallmayr, 1992, 292-293)
- <sup>1993</sup> Cerrato, 2020
- <sup>1994</sup> Cerrato, 2020
- <sup>1995</sup> They write: “each of us acts and handles things in terms of some possible ways for us to be (say, being a physician, a mother, or an Italian). Normally we do not explicitly choose our identity, but simply behave the way “one” does in our community— we conform to the norm.” (Fried and Polt, 2004, xii)
- <sup>1996</sup> Göppfarth, *GNGD*, 2020, 255
- <sup>1997</sup> Göppfarth, *GNGD*, 2020, 258
- <sup>1998</sup> Waddington, 2005, 570
- <sup>1999</sup> Waddington, 2005, 572
- <sup>2000</sup> Waddington, 2005, 574
- <sup>2001</sup> Rockmore & Margolis, 1992, 6

<sup>2002</sup> Elden, 1999, 265

<sup>2003</sup> Firstly, we asked how the physical space, the world of rivers and mountains, relates to more abstract spatiality. Secondly, we asked what the appropriate scale of the locale of authentic belonging would be—whether the large scale of a nation or at the smaller scale of, for example, a sub-national region.

<sup>2004</sup> Modernist theories of nationalism (e.g., Isiah Berlin, István Hont, John Breuilly) are those which posit that nationalism emerges, in most European cases, around the time of the French Revolution, (Smith, Antony D., *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979, 2) though perhaps a little earlier in England, and that it is, essentially, a product of enlightenment rationalism, bureaucratic centralization and *raison d'État*.

<sup>2005</sup> Smith, 1973, 15

<sup>2006</sup> Bayar, 2009, 1652

<sup>2007</sup> Bairner & May, 2021, 1860

<sup>2008</sup> Van der Berghe, Pierre L., “Why most Sociologists Don’t (and Won’t) Think Evolutionarily.” *Sociological Forum* 5 2, 1990, 178

<sup>2009</sup> “I have learned to love this French soil, these marvellous lands, while tramping over them, these lands of ours” (Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 184)

<sup>2010</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 220

<sup>2011</sup> Péguy, *LSP*, 1946, 71

<sup>2012</sup> ““Organization”— a highly intellectual word! “Organism”— truly a word of life! For an organism is more than the sum of its parts, and precisely this “more” is spirit, is life.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 230-231)

<sup>2013</sup> Where one can still come to love “what is human, alive, and ordinary.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 451)

<sup>2014</sup> Where one must “accept the national heritage and not try, out of some bizarre quirkiness of personality, to modify the general condition of which we are necessarily the product.” (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 134-35)

<sup>2015</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 73. This bourgeois freedom, for Jünger, often consists of little more than some quixotic quest to stand out. It should instead be understood as “the certainty of having a part in the most intimate nucleus of time” and acting according to the necessities of being a “bearer of historical power and necessity.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 35)

<sup>2016</sup> Mann, *R*, 2021, 126-127

<sup>2017</sup> “Never will the harmony of individual interests come down to that of the community.” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 269)

<sup>2018</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 7

<sup>2019</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 34

<sup>2020</sup> Jünger, *GO*, 2019, 99. Jünger did, though, show some understanding of how silly the romanticization of country life can be in *The Worker*. He acknowledged that it is “not true that the existence of the peasant is timeless” and understood that modern farming is highly technologically advanced (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 103) to the extent that the “celebrated difference between city and countryside survives today only in the romantic imagination.” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 104)

<sup>2021</sup> Péguy states that reformers and revolutionaries usually come from within. (Péguy, *MSD*, 1946, 108)

<sup>2022</sup> Péguy, *MSD*, 1946, 103

<sup>2023</sup> Even those Frenchmen living in at-the-time occupied Alsace-Lorraine are, for Péguy, to look for deliverance in their books and in mediation before thinking of military liberation. (Péguy, *CR*, 1946, 165)

<sup>2024</sup> Péguy, *MSD*, 1946, 108

<sup>2025</sup> There is, Péguy tells us, nothing better than doing one’s everyday duties. (Péguy, *LG*, 1946, 180)

<sup>2026</sup> Strikingly, Jünger argued, also in *The Worker*, that individuality (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 147) and freedom (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 177-178) will have no place in this new world, ordered according to the “planned landscape”— with its “stages reached at specific times, calculated with military precision” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 175) ready to be transformed into the forges of the worker. (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 107)

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- <sup>2027</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 77
- <sup>2028</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 6
- <sup>2029</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 147
- <sup>2030</sup> Mann approvingly quoted Novalis' claim that everything local can contribute to the universal, never mind the national. (Mann, *OGR*, 2021, 516-517)
- <sup>2031</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 184. This poetry consisting of, as he put it in *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme*, “our art, our politics and all of our activities.” (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 13)
- <sup>2032</sup> Barrès, *TEF*, 1916, 218. As with Heidegger, this is not merely something for the servants but should equally inspire the great thinkers. Thus, Barrès linked the genius of Chateaubriand to his almost childlike love of the landscape or France. (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 157)
- <sup>2033</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 22-23
- <sup>2034</sup> The cathedral becomes “*le même poète en deux mémoires*,” (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 45) carrying within itself the poetical and the physical memory—a “house of resonances, a building of music, a monument of song.” (Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 50)
- <sup>2035</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 142
- <sup>2036</sup> It is inevitable, for Jünger, that space will be transformed by the total work project into an “organic construction” (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 142) which unifies worker and means of work. (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 140)
- <sup>2037</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 147
- <sup>2038</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 149
- <sup>2039</sup> Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 150
- <sup>2040</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA83
- <sup>2041</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA365
- <sup>2042</sup> “The world is something “in which” [*worin*] *Dasein* as a being always already *was*.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA76)
- <sup>2043</sup> Taminiaux, 1992, 192
- <sup>2044</sup> We are not arguing that there is a “correct” position that is innate to blackboards as a category of Being, such as to say that a blackboard ought always to be one foot from the ground and equidistant between the door and the window for example.
- <sup>2045</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 319
- <sup>2046</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 318
- <sup>2047</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 345
- <sup>2048</sup> Polt, 2017, 129
- <sup>2049</sup> Heidegger, *BDT*, 1971, 150
- <sup>2050</sup> “A space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free.” (Heidegger, *BDT*, 1971, 152)
- <sup>2051</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 60-61
- <sup>2052</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA71
- <sup>2053</sup> Harries, 1976, 648
- <sup>2054</sup> Harries, 1976, 657
- <sup>2055</sup> “What is discovered for sight is not a “meaning.”” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA154)
- <sup>2056</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA315. For example, one might pick up a hammer and feel its weight and shape, thereby determining that it does not have the potential to exist as a flotation device but does have the potential to exist as a tool for bashing things.
- <sup>2057</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA80
- <sup>2058</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA83-84. For example, in manipulating and “trying out” the hammer we will see the relevance of its relation to nails, and also, depending on the kind of “taking care” that concerns us, building a house for example or writing poems, how relevant it is to us, very much so in the former case but less obviously so in the latter.

- <sup>2059</sup> This is true to the extent that our initial discovery of things, conditioned by our expectations of adopting things, or not, into our relations of care, is itself a form of care. (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA220)
- <sup>2060</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA61
- <sup>2061</sup> One might think here of the infant surrounded by strange shapes that form the surrounding world, a world with which it thoughtlessly engages— into the possibility of a “taking over in existence the thrown being.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA287)
- <sup>2062</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA286
- <sup>2063</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>2064</sup> Equally, this can reveal to us the “authentic potentiality for becoming guilty” (Ibid.)— the possibility that we might realize that we are not doing what we ought to be doing, which can provoke the guilt whose importance has already been discussed.
- <sup>2065</sup> Travers, 2018, 136
- <sup>2066</sup> “We hesitate to consider the peasant in the field, the stoker at the boiler, the teacher in the school as things. A man is not a thing.” (Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 21)
- <sup>2067</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA121
- <sup>2068</sup> Dreyfus, 1995, 427
- <sup>2069</sup> Dreyfus, 1995, 425
- <sup>2070</sup> “*Dasein* initially finds “itself” in *what* it does, needs, expects, has charge of, in the things at hand which it initially *takes care of* in the surrounding world.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA119)
- <sup>2071</sup> “A mere subject without a world “is” not initially and is also never given. And, thus, an isolated I without the others is in the end just as far from being given initially.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA116) Dallmayr described this as “co-being” as “a connective juncture of correlation.” (Dallmayr, 1993, 182)
- <sup>2072</sup> ““Others” does not mean everybody else but me— those from whom the I distinguishes itself. Others are, rather, those from whom one mostly does *not* distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA118)
- <sup>2073</sup> Innerworldly “beings are discoverable in their “substantial” “in itself” only on the basis of the worldliness of the world.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA88)
- <sup>2074</sup> It drags us thinking in terms of how “measuring rods and pegs can be cut to size, so that everyone now can measure up as painlessly as possible, demonstrating to everyone else all the impressive things he can do” such that the matter of Being is abandoned. (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 181)
- <sup>2075</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 72
- <sup>2076</sup> Ibid. According to Heidegger, “Nietzsche himself seems to indicate the perspective from which his thinking is determined when he says that our “practical needs” are decisive for knowing.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 72)
- <sup>2077</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 73
- <sup>2078</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 129
- <sup>2079</sup> “*Resoluteness is only the authenticity of care itself, cared for in care and possible as care.*” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA301)
- <sup>2080</sup> ““If we think the belonging-*together* in a customary manner then, as the emphasis of the word already indicates, the sense of belonging is determined by the together, i.e., by its unity. In such cases belonging means to be assigned to and classified under the gathering of a together, arranged within the unity of a manifold, placed together in the unity of a system, mediated in the uniting middle of a standardizing synthesis.” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 112)
- <sup>2081</sup> Particularly the radio, which brought the public world into people’s kitchens, (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 36) thereby blurring the public-private divide.
- <sup>2082</sup> This can be observed most clearly and most frequently in Péguy. (Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 176; Péguy, *AA*, 1946, 224)

<sup>2083</sup> Dreyfus, 1995, 424. Dreyfus' interpretation is buttressed, here, by Veith who notes that conformity to "other people's rules" allows us to "deny responsibility" for our lives and let others "make their decisions for them." (Veith, 1993, 95) One cannot choose to choose Being if we are not in the business of choosing at all.

<sup>2084</sup> "Since *innerworldly* beings are also in space, their spatiality has an ontological connection with the world." (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA101)

<sup>2085</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA209

<sup>2086</sup> "In the name "being-in-the-world," "world" does not in any way imply earthly as opposed to heavenly being, nor the "worldly" as opposed to the "spiritual." For us "world" does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the openness of Being." (Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 252)

<sup>2087</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 68

<sup>2088</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 70

<sup>2089</sup> This is because our sensing and representation of things as communicable ideas generates a "by=play (*Bei-spiel*)" (Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 59) between intending, representing, and perceiving.

<sup>2090</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 35. In the way that the peasant occupies a place in the broader economy, society and, indeed, ecosystem of the countryside without losing their individual status and becoming mere human resource.

<sup>2091</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 34

<sup>2092</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 338

<sup>2093</sup> The cartwright is resolutely a cartwright because their investment of time and education is such that the cartwright cannot suddenly become a plumber. In contrast, one could easily move a spring—accounting for size of course— from clock, to toy, to radio without need to alter the form or functioning of that spring. The spring simply lies there uselessly until we place in into the machinery, it has no purpose or project that is proper to itself, it merely lies in wait for us to put it to use according to the designs of the machine we are building. Such can be the fate of a human being as well. Rather than a cartwright, one might be a "programmer," who lies purposelessly in wait until it is decided that they will go and be a resource for a telemarketing company, a plastics factory, or the National Post. One's status in being a "programmer" is not inherently tied to any particular project but rather is as a general resource to be picked up and put to work wherever the broader "they-being" of the economy decides to use it.

<sup>2094</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 226

<sup>2095</sup> Wollan believes this is particularly important because "it is our work-world, meaningful bodily actions and orientations that make representations of 'world-space' possible." (Wollan, 2003, 38)

<sup>2096</sup> Wollan describes such a region as "the space we are in through our daily influence; where we work, occupy and live; for example, the office, the park, and home. Region is linked to our use associated with things, ready-to-hand." (Wollan, 2003, 36)

<sup>2097</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 32-33. The place of belonging is not revealed by pulling the shoe apart and challenging its elements to report to us as "useful" things or giving a "report on the process of making shoes." (Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 35) It is not, in Krell's words, "a "positing" of an idea nor the establishment or expression of some supercelestial truth." (Krell, 1979, 50)

<sup>2098</sup> Krell, 1979, 49

<sup>2099</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 107

<sup>2100</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 224. By causing us to ponder the *Dasein* rather than the pure objectivity of the shoes, van Gogh exposes us to what Taminiaux called the "enigma of Being." (Taminiaux, 1991, 109)

<sup>2101</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 223-224

<sup>2102</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 35

<sup>2103</sup> In Kisiel's terms, the truth of its world is fixed in place in the "*Gestalt* of an artwork." (Kisiel, 2017, 204)

<sup>2104</sup> We would look upon them as a flat-bottomed leather thing with laces and a large hole at the top rather than seeing before us a pair of peasant shoes.

<sup>2105</sup> Wollan, 2003, 37

<sup>2106</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA122. Of course, this embrace of one's place in the world is rather dubious. We cannot know that the peasant woman would not have rather been an accountant, nor that the labourer might not secretly have wished to be a ballet dancer.

<sup>2107</sup> *Ibid.* Again, quite how "free" these figures are, given they would in truth likely lack the education and opportunity to pursue other forms of being-in-the-world (accountancy or ballet to return to our above examples) is highly questionable.

<sup>2108</sup> Sloterdijk describes this standing perfectly and thus will be quoted at length here: "This gives rise to the decisive cooperative model in large-scale worlds: the metaphysics of collaboration— service to the center. The calm epicenter accepts employment everywhere as a worker in the vineyard of the middle. [...] the tool itself is meant to be actively helpful, which is why the spontaneous forces of the human epicenters are invited to set themselves in motion for the intentions of the center, as if they somehow had a share in the central power after all." (Sloterdijk, 2014, 104)

<sup>2109</sup> Dreyfus, 1995, 424-425

<sup>2110</sup> The map, after all, is not the territory.

<sup>2111</sup> "*The "essence" ["Wesen"] of Dasein lies in its existence [Existenz].*" (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA42)

<sup>2112</sup> Kolb, 2015, 95

<sup>2113</sup> Wollan, 2003, 36. As opposed to the "geometric space" limited by our "lived reality." (Wollan, 2003, 36)

<sup>2114</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 80

<sup>2115</sup> Heidegger, *BC*, 1993, 41

<sup>2116</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 23

<sup>2117</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 250

<sup>2118</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 258

<sup>2119</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 232;235

<sup>2120</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 327-328)

<sup>2121</sup> Sloterdijk, 2014, 322

<sup>2122</sup> "Thinging is the nearing of world. Nearing is the nature of nearness. As we preserve the thing *qua* thing we inhabit nearness. The nearing of nearness is the true and sole dimension of the mirror-play of the world." (Heidegger, *TT*, 1971, 179)

<sup>2123</sup> Malpas, 2014, 16

<sup>2124</sup> Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 36

<sup>2125</sup> Furthermore, we always have access to our cultural idiom and thus to the cultural significance of those things that are nearby.

<sup>2126</sup> While the French Basque would weigh up the force of competing Basque and French national poetic claims upon them.

<sup>2127</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 176

<sup>2128</sup> "In 1956 the stable professions, which are themselves a stage of social development, are still the norms for Heidegger. "He praises them [rural regions like Swabia] in the name of a false eternity of agrarian conditions" (Adorno, 2013, 45)

<sup>2129</sup> Wilding, 2015, 111

<sup>2130</sup> There is something of a tension here between his insistence that romanticising rural life is foolish and his denunciation of the "gloom and busyness" of the "everyday concern" of the "petty bourgeois." (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 255) We are not to romanticise the peasant, but simultaneously we are to associate, it seems, the modes of being that Heidegger denounces with urban living.

<sup>2131</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 95

<sup>2132</sup> He states, in full: “Life as a whole in the “encompassing” region in which processes of composition and decomposition run their course. That a certain “direction” is ascribed to the driving forces, processes, and phenomena of movement generally does not change the slightest thing in the basic aspect of life that is described here as an encompassing realm and as a flowing “stream” that bears all movements within itself. [...] Every attempt to understand life is forced to turn the surge and flux of the aforementioned process into a static concept and thereby *destroy the essence of life*, i.e., the restlessness and movement” (Heidegger, *JPW*, 1998, 16)

<sup>2133</sup> Wilding, 2005, 110

<sup>2134</sup> Stating that because Swabia is less crowded and busy than Berlin, one can have the solitude necessary for thinking. (Heidegger, Martin, “Creative Landscape: Why do we Stay in the Provinces?” in *Weimer Republic Sourcebook*, Kaes, Anton, Jay, Martin, Dimendberg, Edward, Berkely: University of California Press, 1994, 427)

<sup>2135</sup> Wilding, 2005, 115

<sup>2136</sup> Heidegger, *KPM*, 1962, 212-213

<sup>2137</sup> Savage, 2006, 116

<sup>2138</sup> Donovan, 2018, 278

<sup>2139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2140</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 183

<sup>2141</sup> Heidegger, *DT*, 1966, 47

<sup>2142</sup> E.g., Renaud, 2016, 39

<sup>2143</sup> E.g., Marx, 2003, 195

<sup>2144</sup> E.g., Cannadine, David, “Civilization.” *The Yale Review* 101 1, 2013

<sup>2145</sup> Or, as translated by James S. Churchill, “a free-space.” (Heidegger, *KPM*, 1962, 75)

<sup>2146</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 12

<sup>2147</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 13

<sup>2148</sup> Heidegger, *EoG*, 1998, 129

<sup>2149</sup> Heidegger, *EoG*, 1998, 132

<sup>2150</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 55; 65

<sup>2151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2152</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 173

<sup>2153</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA104

<sup>2154</sup> Mitchell, 2012, xi

<sup>2155</sup> Region-as-object also freezes, one might say, the form of the region in place. As Malpas notes, the everyday, interactive character of dwelling precludes a fixed and stable region, (Malpas, 2014, 14) such as is posited by a map, from constituting the *Heimat*.

<sup>2156</sup> Heidegger explains this distinction in *Being and Time*, in a comparison of what it means to live somewhere versus to dwell somewhere: ““in” stems from *innan-*, to live, *habitare*, to dwell. “An” means I am used to, familiar with, I take care of something. It has the meaning of *colo* in the sense of *habito* and *diligo*. [...] Being as the infinitive of “I am”: that is, understood as an existential, means to dwell near..., to be familiar with... *Being-in* is thus the formal existential expression of the being of *Dasein* which has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, 54)

<sup>2157</sup> “To say that mortals *are* is to say that *in dwelling* they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations.” (Heidegger, *BDT*, 1971, 155)

<sup>2158</sup> Fritsche, 2016, 590

<sup>2159</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 126-27

<sup>2160</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 264-265

<sup>2161</sup> Zimmerman, 1989, 8

<sup>2162</sup> And not worried about the Nazi informant in the audience or fearful of being reported to the NKVD (or indeed the HUAC).

<sup>2163</sup> Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA57

<sup>2164</sup> Young, 2011, 292

<sup>2165</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 87

<sup>2166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2167</sup> As Dreyfus & Rubin noted: "Heidegger's description of the Greek temple as a paradigm which defines what is important for a whole culture is his description of what cultural salvation would look like" (Dreyfus & Rubin, 1987, 70), or for Clark, "the whole 'world' of the classical Greeks – how all things appeared to them – is projected by the temple, something we may sense even now, though that world has perished." (Clark, 2011, 47)

### The Wanderer and the Heimat

<sup>2168</sup> The arm's length relationship preferred by Heidegger clashed with the reluctant (to differing degrees) activism of most of our primordialist nationalists.

<sup>2169</sup> "For nationalism, it is necessary to render the same type of service as was rendered to the opportunists by Hugo, in *Les Misérables*." (Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 129)

<sup>2170</sup> Barrès, *SDN*, 1925, 29

<sup>2171</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 116

<sup>2172</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 41. Our understanding of a tree is shaped by the world that we fit it into while the world that we fit it into is simultaneously shaped by its standing before us, such that we may ask: "Does the tree stand "in our consciousness," or does it stand on the meadow? Does the meadow lie in the soul, as experience, or is it spread out there on earth? Is the earth in our head? Or do we stand on the earth?" (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 43)

<sup>2173</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 44

<sup>2174</sup> Heidegger makes clear that not all "using" is a debasement: "Proper use does not debase what is being used— on the contrary, use is determined and defined by leaving the used thing in an essential nature. [...] Proper use is neither a mere utilizing, nor a mere needing. What we merely need, we utilize from the necessity of a need. Utilizing and needing always fall short of proper use. Proper use is rarely manifest, and in general is not the business of mortals." (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 187)

<sup>2175</sup> Art will thus be, even in the coming age of the worker, "not the means, but the object of transformation." (Jünger, *TW*, 2017, 132)

<sup>2176</sup> One might reasonably ask why the statue of Liberty is an object of symbolic representation, while a Greek temple (in one of Heidegger's examples) is as the nodal point from which the spatiality of an authentic community emanates. The Statue of Liberty is not a space towards which New Yorkers orient their day-to-day lives. They will almost never enter it and do not engage in communal practices or cultural rituals which centre around it. Where it is used as a cultural reference point, it is as a symbol of a political ideal. No New Yorker could claim that the Statue of Liberty is a nodal point for the life of that City. In contrast, one could see the Stephen A. Schwartzman Building (the flagship library of the New York public library system) as being more akin to Heidegger's Greek temple. Unlike the Statue of Liberty, people will enter into it on a regular basis in order to engage in the quotidian business of New York life. Furthermore, it stands as a central meeting point and "pathmark" as one navigates Manhattan and, most importantly of all, contains an enormous collection of books which grant access, in some cases, to the historical *Dasein* of the New York *Volk* which, in some cases, may even lead one to the questioning of Being.

<sup>2177</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 91-92

<sup>2178</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 90-92

<sup>2179</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 93

<sup>2180</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2182</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 95

<sup>2183</sup> Péguy, *NP*, 2017, 96

<sup>2184</sup> He died following a second failed attempt on King Alphonso's life.

<sup>2185</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 109

<sup>2186</sup> Favouring Grene's translation here: Heidegger, Martin, trans. Grene, Marjorie, "The Age of the Worldview." *Boundary 4* 2, 1976, 349-350

<sup>2187</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2188</sup> Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 51

<sup>2189</sup> Young, 1999, 393

<sup>2190</sup> Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 24

<sup>2191</sup> "The singularity of Hegel's philosophy consists primarily in the fact that there is no longer a higher standpoint of self-consciousness of spirit beyond it." (Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 3)

<sup>2192</sup> Kolb, 2015, 93

<sup>2193</sup> Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 42. One must avoid here the misunderstanding that this refers to the spirit, as a sort of symbolic representation of the self as an infinite, all-encompassing *ego*. The spirit, Heidegger clarifies, is not the *object* of the *Phenomenology*, (Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 24) that rather is the consciousness, but a "process or movement" of that consciousness. (Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 25)

<sup>2194</sup> "Being is the representedness of the unconditionally representing representation (of thinking) [...] For Hegel, "being" is this only a one-sided determination of that which philosophy, and also Hegelian philosophy, thinks and interrogates." (Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 9)

<sup>2195</sup> Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 18. Heidegger clarifies this later, saying: "The essence of consciousness is self-consciousness; every cogito is an *ego cogito me cogitare*" (Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 59) and "being an object of consciousness is now the essence of the being of all beings. All being is objectness of "consciousness."" (Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 61)

<sup>2196</sup> Heidegger, *HPS*, 1988, 101

<sup>2197</sup> It is Hegel who, according to Heidegger, gives us the "system of a historical worldview which is most powerful with regards to its fullness, its depth, its conceptuality, and the richness of its experiences." (Feuerhahn & Arel, 2015, ix)

<sup>2198</sup> There is no compelling reason given for why a liberal should agree with Péguy's conservative (nor indeed Barrès reactionary) conception of France, nor why a communist should pay heed to Mann and Jünger's characterization of Germany.

<sup>2199</sup> Much as we saw occur with Homerism and national historical mythology.

<sup>2200</sup> As Heidegger believes Platonism does. (Heidegger, *EHF*, 2002, 35)

<sup>2201</sup> We learn that "many *Holzwege* along the way may not be paths that led nowhere, the "wrong-track," or a dead end on the way to the Truth, but rather than going "off the beaten track" may yet be the best way into the *Sache* to which he devoted his life." (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2008, 105)

<sup>2202</sup> "But what obstructs or misleads the basic question of the being of *Dasein* is the orientation thoroughly coloured by the anthropology of Christianity and the ancient world, whose inadequate ontological foundations personalism and the philosophy of life also ignore." (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA48)

<sup>2203</sup> Heidegger, *EOP*, 2008, 435

<sup>2204</sup> Ewegen notices a pleasing circularity to this story, pointing out that the beginning of metaphysics, in Heidegger's telling, is with Socrates seeking the "overcoming of the sophistic will to power"—an approach to thought which subordinated truth to the will of the sophist—and its end lies in the overcoming of a metaphysics that has reached its conclusion in a Nietzschean will to power. (Ewegen, 2020, 235)

<sup>2205</sup> As Heidegger puts it, we will not "cast metaphysics aside." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 244) That is to say will continue to think metaphysically where appropriate in the coming world—after all, doctors and engineers will still be needed.

<sup>2206</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 175

- <sup>2207</sup> After the War, in “On Time and Being,” Heidegger would explain that once metaphysics is overcome, it will cease even to be a major point of contention (in the negative sense of having to overcome it) and we will be driven neither by metaphysics itself nor the need to overcome it: “To think Being without beings means: to think being without regard to metaphysics. Yet a regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself.” (Heidegger, *TB*, 1977, 24)
- <sup>2208</sup> Heidegger, *TTu*, 1977, 39
- <sup>2209</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>2210</sup> Heidegger argues that this is one of the lessons of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “nihilism cannot be overcome from the outside. We do not overcome it by tearing away at it or shoving it aside—which is what we do when we replace the Christian God with yet another ideal, such as Reason, Progress, political and economic “Socialism,” or mere Democracy. Try as we might to cast it aside, the black snake attaches itself ever more firmly.” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 179)
- <sup>2211</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 180
- <sup>2212</sup> Heidegger provides a definition of reflection in the *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures* “Reflection means the shining back upon thinking of what is thought in thinking and, conversely, of thinking upon what is thought.” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 131)
- <sup>2213</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 121
- <sup>2214</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol III*, 1987, 232
- <sup>2215</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 79-80
- <sup>2216</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 80
- <sup>2217</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>2218</sup> Göppfarth, *GNGD*, 2020, 257
- <sup>2219</sup> It should be noted that Heidegger means correlation in the sense of co-relation rather than in the sense we employ the term in statistics or social science today.
- <sup>2220</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA35
- <sup>2221</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA38
- <sup>2222</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA35
- <sup>2223</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol IV*, 1987, 78-79
- <sup>2224</sup> Heidegger, *QoB*, 1958, 47
- <sup>2225</sup> Heidegger, *QoB*, 1958, 57
- <sup>2226</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 207
- <sup>2227</sup> Travers, 2018, 135
- <sup>2228</sup> Heidegger, *H*, 2015, 34
- <sup>2229</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 91
- <sup>2230</sup> Heidegger, *WON*, 1977, 63-64
- <sup>2231</sup> Heidegger, *TTu*, 1977, 44
- <sup>2232</sup> Heidegger, *TTu*, 1977, 47
- <sup>2233</sup> Heidegger, *LoH*, 2008, 231
- <sup>2234</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 18
- <sup>2235</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 156
- <sup>2236</sup> “We know that the disjunction of god and humans happens only in *polemos*, in the confrontational setting-asunder <*Aus-einander-setzung*> (of Being). [...] It lets gods and human beings step forth in their Being.” (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA110)
- <sup>2237</sup> Indeed, any God whose existence required proof or could be refuted by a logic game would hardly be a god worthy of the name. (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 106)
- <sup>2238</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 138
- <sup>2239</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 9

<sup>2240</sup> “The philosophy of the Greeks shows itself to our thinking too in a “not yet.” But this is the “not yet” of the unthought— not a “not yet” that does not satisfy us, but rather a “not yet” to which *we* are not sufficient, and which *we* fail to satisfy.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Metcalf, Robert. “Hegel and the Greeks.” in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill, William, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 336)

<sup>2241</sup> Carman, 2020, 107

<sup>2242</sup> Feenberg, 2000, 446

<sup>2243</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 3-4

<sup>2244</sup> In *Time and Being*, for example, Heidegger described the “discernability of the gift [...] of Being.” (Heidegger, *TB*, 1977, 9)

<sup>2245</sup> “Being is not a ‘fact’ in this sense— it is not something given, but that there is a gift— and sense cannot be conferred on it as a signification brought from elsewhere. [...] sense conceived as signification conferred or found in addition to Being itself could not properly be the sense *of* Being, still less Being itself as sense.” (Nancy, 2002, 68)

<sup>2246</sup> Han-Pile, 2009, 312

<sup>2247</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Stambaugh, Joan, “My Way to Phenomenology.” in *On Time and Being*, New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977, 82. Interestingly, Heidegger added a “supplement” to this sentence in 1969, linking the statement about the end of phenomenology back to a statement made in *Being and Time*. (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA62-63) While this may primarily have been intended to show continuity, and does, it also gives weight to the proposition that Heidegger’s career consisted of a failed attempt to unveil this new *Denken*, and that he was no closer after 42 years of trying.

<sup>2248</sup> Indeed, one could be forgiven the impression that one is in the company of a New Age guru when reading the following, from Hofstadter: “What man Shepards is the mystery of Being. To do this he must be able to receive the blessing of the earth, to become at home in the law of this reception.” (Hofstadter, 1979, 18) This impression is only fortified when one sees Heidegger evoking the concept of “divination” in *What is Called Thinking*. (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 207) Though Pattison & Kirkpatrick, fairly, reject the characterization of Heidegger’s thought as irrationalism, (Pattison & Kirkpatrick, 2018, 54) it is hard to disagree with Milchman, Rosenberg, and Hofstadter’s association of Heidegger’s conclusions with the mystical. (Milchmann & Rosenberg, 2008, 106; Hofstadter, 1979, 22)

<sup>2249</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 132

<sup>2250</sup> See Goodrick-Clarke, Nicholas. *Black sun: Aryan cults, esoteric Nazism, and the politics of identity*. NYU Press, 2003

<sup>2251</sup> Günter, Berghaus, “The Ritual Core of Fascist Theatre. An Anthropological Perspective.” in *Fascism and Theatre: Comparative Studies on the Aesthetics and Politics of Performance in Europe, 1925–1945*, New York: Berghahn Books, 1996, 54

<sup>2252</sup> See, among others, Goodrick-Clarke, Nicholas, *The occult roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan cults and their influence on Nazi ideology*. NYU Press, 1992 and Staudenmaier, Peter, *Between occultism and fascism: Anthroposophy and the politics of race and nation in Germany and Italy, 1900–1945*, Ithaca: Cornell University, 2010

<sup>2253</sup> E.g. Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 231 & Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 120

<sup>2254</sup> Anderson, 1966, 14

<sup>2255</sup> Heidegger, *DL*, 1971, 50

<sup>2256</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hertz, Peter D., “Language in the Poem.” in *On the Way to Language*, New York: Harper Collins, 1971, 160-161

<sup>2257</sup> Anderson, 1966, 12

<sup>2258</sup> Anderson, 1966, 13

<sup>2259</sup> Anderson, 1966, 26.

<sup>2260</sup> One can do this particularly effectively when out in nature, as Heidegger’s teacher and student are walking in the woods. It is this which led Dreyfus to think of backpacking in the wilderness as an example

of this kind of meditation. (Dreyfus & Spinoza, 2003, 344) As Travers puts it, “When we enter the forest we must do so in a spirit of devotion, attuned to its mystery, its power to transform. Bringing oneself to this world requires the childlike faith of our ancestors.” (Travers, 2018, 139)

<sup>2261</sup> We are not “bringing-here-forth in the inexact and all-to-common meaning [to produce, to beget].” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 61)

<sup>2262</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 60

<sup>2263</sup> Ewegen, 2020, 232

<sup>2264</sup> “Only the great and unrevealed individuals will provide the stillness for the passing of the god and among themselves for the reticent accord for those who are prepared.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 291)

<sup>2265</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 37

<sup>2266</sup> “[The ones to come are] those strangers of like mind who are equally decided for the gifting and refusing that has been allotted to them. Mace bearers of the truth of be-ing, in which a being is uplifted to the simple mastery that prevails in everything and every breath. The stillest witness to the stillest stillness, in which an imperceptible tug turns the truth back, out of the confusion of all calculated correctness into what is ownmost: keeping sheltered what is most sheltered, the enquivering of the passing of the decision of gods, the essential swaying of be-ing.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 277)

<sup>2267</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 278

<sup>2268</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 293

<sup>2269</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 15. A few of these new thinkers exist already. Heidegger does not name any but does reveal to us that “Hölderlin is their poet.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 281) It is surely not a coincidence that Hölderlin was Heidegger’s poet.

<sup>2270</sup> Heidegger, *TBWP*, 2014, GA5

<sup>2271</sup> Hofstadter, 1971, x

<sup>2272</sup> Hofstadter, 1971, xii-xiii

<sup>2273</sup> Heidegger, *QCT*, 1977, 35

<sup>2274</sup> Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 72

<sup>2275</sup> “All questioning begins to be a questioning only in virtue of pursuing its quest for essential being.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2276</sup> As Magrini notes, art “facilitates Being’s manifestation.” (Magrini, 2012, 510)

<sup>2277</sup> “We cannot here decide flatly whether poetry is really a kind of thinking, or thinking really a kind of poetry. It remains dark to us what determines their real relation, and from what source what we so casually call the “real” really comes.” (Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hertz, Peter D., “The Nature of Language.” in *On the Way to Language*, New York: Harper Collins, 1971, 83)

<sup>2278</sup> Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 90

<sup>2279</sup> Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 70

<sup>2280</sup> Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 84

<sup>2281</sup> Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 89

<sup>2282</sup> Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 67

<sup>2283</sup> Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 68

<sup>2284</sup> Heidegger, *LiP*, 1971, 163

<sup>2285</sup> Heidegger, Martin, trans. Hertz, Peter D., “Words.” in *On the Way to Language*, New York” Harper Collins, 1971, 155

<sup>2286</sup> Heidegger, *LiP*, 1971, 191

<sup>2287</sup> Heidegger, *W*, 1971, 145

<sup>2288</sup> Heidegger explained what it means to be underway in *What is Called Thinking?* “We are underway. What does that mean? We are still *inter vias*, between divergent ways. Nothing has been decided yet about which is the one inevitable, and hence perhaps the only, way.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 45-46) It is important that we are underway, we could not think if we were not already set on our way, by the

inheritance we take up, but would also not meaningfully be underway if we do not continue to ask questions, to get away from “well worn rut[s]” and “roam away into the unknown.” (Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 169) To participate in the *Seinsfrage*, in short, is to pick up *in medias res*, pressing on.

<sup>2289</sup> In the night, “without forcing comes concentration.” (Heidegger, *DT*, 1966, 60)

<sup>2290</sup> Monaghan, 2005, 14

<sup>2291</sup> Dallmayr, 1992, 307

<sup>2292</sup> This may even be counterproductive, as Dastur notes the simple translation of the foreign into the familiar (a tendency of the superficially worldly) as an impediment to the genuine reception of the foreign in all of its foreignness. (Dastur, 2008, 266)

<sup>2293</sup> Heidegger defines difference as follows: “the dif-ference calls world and thing into the middle of their intimacy. The dif-ference is the bidder. The dif-ference gathers the two out of itself as it calls them into the rift that is the dif-ference itself.” (Heidegger, *L*, 1971, 204)

<sup>2294</sup> Travers, 2018, 141

<sup>2295</sup> “If, however, someone is transported beyond his own time and its calculable ‘today’—if someone is to be transported and freed like the poet—then he must alienate himself in turn from those to whom he belongs in his lifetime.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 48) Or, more pithily: “In search of the true time for his own time he removes himself from the time of the present day.” (Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 49)

<sup>2296</sup> As Young notes, “To properly appropriate—to become free in, rather than consumed by—the Heimat, the Germans need to revive their atrophied sense of the “fire,” to “grasp the ungraspable and themselves in the face of the ungraspable.” They need, therefore, to “travel” into the foreign, or, at least, into that which must “be encountered by them as that which is foreign.”” (Young, 1999, 403)

<sup>2297</sup> In “England Your England,” Orwell skewers both those who would rather be seen stealing from a poor-box than standing for God Save the King and the brandy-sodden chauvinist. (Orwell, George, “England Your England.” in *England Your England and Other Essays*, Secker and Warburg, 1953)

<sup>2298</sup> Harries, 1976, 659

<sup>2299</sup> Safranski, 1998, 224

<sup>2300</sup> “Because only the *self* of the they-self is summoned and made to hear, the *they* collapses. [...] But, robbed of its refuge and this subterfuge by the summons, the self is brought to itself by the call.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA273)

<sup>2301</sup> We must not confuse Heidegger’s focus on the familiar with what he calls, in his Kant lectures, an “anthropo-psychological description of the “experiences” and “faculties” of man.” (Heidegger, *KPM*, 1962, 243) This “anthropo-psychological knowledge” (Ibid.) is roughly consistent with the focus on the ordinary that characterizes, for example, “history from the ground up.”

<sup>2302</sup> Much like Truman in *The Truman Show*, our hitting upon these borders, often experienced when we struggle with the language of poetry—which does not, generally speaking, render itself in a way that is easily grasped—hints to us that there are truths to be pursued which lie outside of our horizons.

<sup>2303</sup> Heidegger, *OWA*, 1971, 52-53

<sup>2304</sup> Other, lesser souls will “declare it to be an unctuous betrayal of the people” (Mann, *R*, 2021, 210) when the intellectual displays their curiosity about the foreign or unfamiliar, but the intellectual will not cease to wonder what is concealed beyond the horizons of what is familiar.

<sup>2305</sup> We come to realize that “the spatiality of *Dasein*, on the basis of which existence actually determines its “place,” is grounded in the constitution of being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA299) In other words, our town only exists as a town in light of a world outside of its boundaries, and as such in the disclosure of the everyday region of Being there lies a disclosure of being-in-the-world.

<sup>2306</sup> Harries, 1979, 162. Harries continues to argue that it is poetry which has the special saying-capacity to make silence call us. (Harries, 1979, 164)

<sup>2307</sup> ““Presupposing” being has the character of taking a preliminary look at being in such a way that on the basis of this look beings that are already given are tentatively articulated in their being. This guiding

look at being grows out of the average understanding of being in which we are always already involved.” (Heidegger, *BT*, 2010, GA8)

<sup>2308</sup> Anderson, 1966, 32

<sup>2309</sup> This return, Heidegger argued in “The Nature of Language,” is “infinitely harder than are hasty excursions to places where we are not yet and will never be.” (Heidegger, *NL*, 1971, 85) It is worth noting that there is a clear parallel here with Plato’s philosopher’s struggles upon returning to the cave.

<sup>2310</sup> Though they may gain much from being there, it is not their home.

<sup>2311</sup> “Human *Dasein*— a being that finds itself situates *in the midst* of beings, comporting itself *toward* beings.” (Heidegger, *EoG*, 1998, 121)

<sup>2312</sup> Heidegger, *EOG*, 1998, 123

<sup>2313</sup> Forests have always been, at least for Europeans, symbolic of the unknown, the frightening, the chaotic, the strange and the dangerous.

<sup>2314</sup> “Without the sacrifice of those who are on the way back [*die Rückwegigen*], there would not even be dawning of the possibility of the hinting of the last god. Those who are on the way back are the true forerunners [*Vorläufer*] of those who are to come.” (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 289)

<sup>2315</sup> Heidegger relates turning back to *die Kehre*, (Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 240) further substantiating our contention that the turning refers to the process of thinking Being.

<sup>2316</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 289

<sup>2317</sup> Tabachnick, 2015, 185

<sup>2318</sup> Dallmayr pointed to Hölderlin’s line, with which Heidegger began *Hölderlin’s Hymns*: “Forbidden fruit, like the laurel, however,/ is most of all the fatherland. This [fruit]/ Everyone should taste last.”” (Dallmayr, 1993, 152) That is to say we enjoy being at home only at the *end* of our journey of discovery.

<sup>2319</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 160-161

<sup>2320</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 154. Indeed, if this were the case, if our connection to homeland was some sort of genetic inheritance, it would be the result of a haphazard accident of birth.

<sup>2321</sup> Importantly, Dallmayr pointed to this as part of his argument that Heidegger’s conception of the homeland does not imply an imperialistic securing of *Lebensraum*.

<sup>2322</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 154

<sup>2323</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 155

<sup>2324</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 164

<sup>2325</sup> “Heidegger stresses the uncontrollable quality of homecoming. To taste the fatherland’s fruit last, he notes, means that everyone can undertake the journey and get prepared for self-discovery.” (Dallmayr, 1993, 159)

<sup>2326</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 180

<sup>2327</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 114

<sup>2328</sup> At least as comprehensible as Heidegger’s own writing.

<sup>2329</sup> “Presencing *needs* the open of an illuminated clearing and is thereby transferred into the ownership of the human essence.” (Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 114)

<sup>2330</sup> Heidegger, *FCM*, 1995, 364

<sup>2331</sup> These are my words not Heidegger’s.

<sup>2332</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol II*, 1984, 53

<sup>2333</sup> As Sloterdijk puts it, “The house [*Haus*] of Being, however, is also not an enclosure [*Gehäuse*] in which those existing enter and exit.” (Sloterdijk, 2017, 238)

<sup>2334</sup> “But where is the real nihilism at work? Where one clings to current beings and believes it is enough to take beings, as before, just as the beings that they are.” (Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA155)

<sup>2335</sup> Heidegger, *IM*, 2004, GA7

<sup>2336</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 131

<sup>2337</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 236

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<sup>2338</sup> Dallmayr, 1993, 185.

<sup>2339</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 10

<sup>2340</sup> Heidegger, *WICT*, 1968, 227-228

<sup>2341</sup> Heidegger, *HGR*, 2014, 156

<sup>2342</sup> That is to say, if we leave the metaphor behind momentarily, that "Heidegger regarded "rootedness-in soil" as an ontological precondition for experiencing Being." (Wolin, 2023, 254)

<sup>2343</sup> Heidegger, *WPF*, 1971, 137

<sup>2344</sup> Dronsfield, 2008, 158

<sup>2345</sup> Hofstadter, 1979, 19

<sup>2346</sup> Heidegger, *BF*, 2012, 143

<sup>2347</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 200

<sup>2348</sup> Péguy, *NJ*, 1933, 27

### Conclusions

<sup>2349</sup> Taminiaux, 1991, 88

<sup>2350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2351</sup> Gonzalez, 2019, 280

<sup>2352</sup> Even in those cases where the other is not an enemy, the forging of such alliances necessitates the exclusion from said alliance of those who are not participants in it.

<sup>2353</sup> Bourdieu, 1975, 145

<sup>2354</sup> Gonzalez, 2016, 341

<sup>2355</sup> Heidegger, *CPE*, 1999, 343

<sup>2356</sup> Ibid.