


(A CRITICISM OF THE PHILOSOPHIC PRINCIPLES
UNDERLYING KAREN HORNEY'S PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES)

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INTRODUCTION

The recent increase in mental illness is due, in large part, to an unfortunate mass-departure from those spiritual values which represent the very foundations of man's psychic health. To the Christian alive to the meaning of the times, it is extremely significant that a new science, psychiatry, along with its most popular branch, psychoanalysis, has arisen to keep abreast of this change. For him also it is not nearly so accidental that the theories of the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, have met with their warmest welcome in more recent times.

Christian thought has been vividly aware of this current and of its significance. In the light of recent publications it would appear a belaboring of the obvious to state that a thorough study of Freud's theories has been undertaken. The same, however, cannot unqualifiedly be said of the Freudian off-shoots. The theories of Dr. Karen Horney represent a vivid case in point.

Dr. Horney, at one time a disciple of Freud, represented and still represents through the considerable influence of her writings and of her colleagues, a potent force in one of many anti-Freudian movements. In contrast to Freud's emphasis on biologically determined drives in the formation of neurosis, her theories have stressed the importance of interpersonal relations. Stated thus briefly,

Horney's position represents a significant advance over that of her former master. But it is evident that no psychoanalytic theory can be so rapidly and superficially dispatched. Rather it must be considered that the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis is therapy. In short any psychoanalytic theory implicitly or explicitly proposes to make a mentally disturbed individual what he ought to be. Consequently,¹ it is of paramount importance to discover and evaluate the view of human nature which underlies such a theory, as well as any other significant basic positions which serve as a foundation for its more empirical aspects.

The coeval interest which has been accorded to the writings of Dr. Horney seems to suggest the need of subjecting her writings to nice analysis. Such a task appears all the more urgent in view of the all too scarce attention accorded to Dr. Horney in Catholic circles. Such recent publications as Psychiatry and Catholicism, and Psycheanalysis and Personality, have merely mentioned her in passing. The only serious attempt at an evaluation of Horney known to the author has been undertaken by his thesis director, Rev. Henri Gratton, in a work entitled Psychanalyses D'Hier et D'aujourd'hui. But the very nature of the work dismissed the possibility of an extensive study of Dr. Horney's thought. In short, no conclusive Christian study and evaluation of Karen Horney's theories has been

attempted.

This thesis makes no pretenses at fully amending this neglect. The very nature of a master's thesis often limits its extension. Therefore, the chapters to follow are not intended to represent a comprehensive study. Rather, the author has restricted himself, almost exclusively, to the presentation and evaluation of certain fundamental philosophical positions which appear, either explicitly or implicitly, in Dr. Horney's theories.

Chapter One concerns itself with a general presentation of Karen Horney's view of human nature and its origin. Her view of the causes of neurosis is briefly introduced and seen to suggest a position amounting to environmental determinism. Several questions, reflective of the ambiguity of many of Horney's terms and expressions, are introduced.

Chapter Two treats of the influence of the environment on neurosis. The chapter is subdivided into two sections. The first section deals with Horney's concept of "normality", and the second with the influence of the social environment on human nature. Horney's view of "normality" is seen to be manifestly relativistic. Her position as it concerned the role of the environment is seen to predicate a social determinism.

Chapter Three illustrates, without actually entering into Horney's empirical theories, the manner in which her more ultimate concepts affected her view of what constitutes and causes neurosis. The chapter also attempts to answer the questions previously put to Horney.

Chapter Four attempts to evaluate Horney's principles as presented in the first three chapters. The critique used is Christian thought as expressed by or inferred from Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy.

Some qualifying remarks concerning the sources and the definition of terms appear to be in order. Dr. Horney has committed her theories to paper in two languages, German and English. The sources consulted in the writing of the thesis represent her "English phase". This is, however, but an apparent neglect. Horney's contributions in German date back to a period prior to her open break with Freud and do not concern the material dealt with in this thesis. Finally, the definition of Horney's terms is left to the thesis proper. At present, an explanation of Horney's often peculiar language would result in a catalogue and prove most ineffective unless her thought were simultaneously introduced.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPT OF MAN

The writings of Karen Horney do not afford a wholly explicit and separate presentation of her view of man. Far rather there are numerous and often-repeated affirmations concerning the nature of man. Her position is in some instances supported by what may be loosely termed "proofs".

Karen Horney was, for several years, an orthodox Freudian. It is significant for this thesis that her departure from Freudian psychoanalytic theory was ultimately due to a growing difference in views concerning the basic driving forces in man. Her growing dissatisfaction with therapeutic results, while at first attributed by Horney to her lack of experience, was later credited to the doubtful grounds on which many of Freud's theories stood. Although her first questionings of Freud concerned feminine psychology, it was soon evident to Horney that this difference was merely a symbol of something much more fundamental. It appears that her secessionary activities were further aided by her leaving Germany and entering the United States. There, she maintains, she was free from the burden of taking psychoanalytical theories for granted and could proceed along the lines which she considered correct. Significant also were the influences of Harry Stack Sullivan, whose theory of interpersonal relations left its

unmistakeable imprint on Horney, and the psychoanalyst and sociologist Erich Fromm. The end result of these factors was what Horney termed "a shift of emphasis".¹ Although the "shift" was at first primarily concerned with giving environmental factors a more prominent place among the causes of neurosis, it soon was elaborated into a view radically different from the one of Freud, one which clashed not only with Freud's view of neurosis, but with the very nature of man. In point of fact so radical was her digression that Horney herself later expressed it in terms of opposites.

The basic philosophy of Freud is a pessimistic one [..] man is at bottom driven by elemental instincts of sex, greed, and cruelty. Freud himself has expressed the same idea in terms of men being like porcupines who are bound to hurt one another if close.

We, on the other hand, believe that man has potentialities for good and evil, and we see that he does develop into a good human being if he grows up under favorable conditions of warmth and respect for his individuality. [..] Between these two philosophies there is no bridge.²

The basic difference in view between Horney and Freud, epitomized in this quotation, could not help but bear its obvious repercussions. Having denied the Freudian explanation of man, Horney had to follow her new road to

¹ KAREN HORNEY, "Culture and Neurosis", in The American Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, issue of April-May 1936, p. 221.

² Id., "The Future of Psychoanalysis", (Contribution to Symposium) in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1947, p. 66.

what, as it appeared to her, was its logical conclusion. As shall be shown in the later chapters, Horney's view of man effected her concept of normality, the role which she assigned to the environment, and as might be expected her very conception of neurosis. What constituted this view?

1. Nature of Man

"In his letter to the Romans, Paul says: 'Avenge not thyself, vengeance is mine, says the Lord, I will repay'. We understand that God will repay and does repay indeed".³ Here is the only glimmer of light among the Theistic darkness of Karen Horney's works. There is no other remotely explicit comment of the psychoanalyst that imparts any further knowledge of her belief in the existence of, or creative activity of, a spiritual First Cause. But sketchy and scanty as the evidence may be, it may be surmised, in part from the above statement and in part from its implications, that Horney did admit the existence of a Creator who will repay us, at least here and now, for our deeds. Man, therefore, is not an unexplainable existent. He is a created and at least partially responsible agent.

Human nature can be looked upon, according to Horney, from three basic points of view. Man may be viewed as a

³ Id., "The Value of Vindictiveness", in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 2, No.1, 1948, p. 3.

higher animal, plagued by biologically determined and destructive primitive instincts. Such, according to Horney, would be the view of Freud. Man may also be viewed as a creature in whose nature there is something intrinsically "good" and something intrinsically "bad", "sinful", or "destructive". The latter, Horney maintained, is expressed traditionally by the Christian symbol of original sin. Finally, and this is Horney's position, man may be viewed as a being in whose nature there are "constructive" forces which tend to evolve naturally towards the actualization of his individual potentialities.

As an analyst Horney felt that she was in an excellent position to scrutinize human beings, and consequently human nature, most intimately. Although many of her explicit statements concerning human nature are prefaced by such subjective openings as "we believe"⁴ and "my own belief"⁵ she does offer a certain amount of "evidence" to substantiate her convictions. Her view of man, which postulates the existence of "constructive forces

⁴ Id., "The Future of Psychoanalysis", (Contribution to Symposium) in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1947, p. 66.

⁵ Id., Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945, p. 19.

moving us toward realization"⁶, is arrived at by presupposing its validity and then verifying it through therapy. Horney perceived, time and time again, that patients began psychoanalysis almost "bed-ridden" with destructive drives, only to emerge, from successful treatment, essentially constructive individuals. From this, she concluded that the destructiveness was promoted by distressing situations which most likely derived their origins from early childhood experiences. Consequently, there was nothing destructive in human nature itself.

To elaborate upon what may be justly considered the kernel of Horney's optimistic view of human nature, it is necessary to return to her basic position. It will be recalled that Horney allowed for three basic ways of looking at man, and adhered to the third. Concerning the other two, she dismissed Freud's as pessimistic and unreal, and granted a certain correctness to the "Christian" position. That is, she admitted that in human nature may be found both "good" and "bad". But there is one palpable difference. The constructive and destructive forces do not originate from the same source. They appear to differ in both origin and kind. In short, they are not both intrinsic to human nature.

⁶ Id., "Psychoanalysis and the Constructive Forces in Man", (Contribution to Symposium) in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1951, p. 54.

In refuting the "Freudian" and "Christian" view of man, and by way of validating her own position, Karen Horney offered three kinds of evidence. The first kind is based upon observation of a child's behaviour. If the conditions for growth are favorable, the child will naturally tend to develop his potentialities. This he will do since, like every other form of life, he has an innate tendency toward growth. Horney affirmed that her observations are supported by educators and anthropologists. If unfavorable conditions prevail, however, the child's development will not proceed according to nature's plan. Reactions of hostility or overdependency may come to the surface. If, in sufficient time to counteract the harm done, there is a favorable change in the human environment, the child may again take the path toward healthy growth. But if the unpleasant conditions continue to exert their unhappy influence, a process labelled "neurotic" may set in.

What a neurosis is will be outlined in the third chapter. But it must be stressed here that this disturbance brings about "all kinds of unconstructive or destructive attitudes".⁷ The factors which bring about a neurosis are many but, Horney argued,

⁷ Id., "Human Nature Can Change", in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 68.

You could not call the result of this process his essential nature, any more than you would do so with a tree. If a tree, because of storms, too little sun or too poor soil, becomes warped and crooked, you would not call this its essential nature.⁸

The conclusion that Horney drew from this argument seems to be that inasmuch as the destructiveness of neurotics is determined by the unfavorable environment, destructiveness or badness or sinfulness as such, (Horney used the terms interchangeably) does not constitute something essential to human nature, but rather is the result of an unfavorable environment.

The second kind of evidence is supplied by clinical experience. In the analytical situation, the analyst encounters persons who are arrogant or vindictive or unduly compliant. He also perceives, if he is of Horney's school, that the patient has little or nothing to say about these unfavorable traits. He is driven to these attitudes by forces which are essentially unconscious. In his particular psychological situation he cannot escape them. The forces are compulsive. Horney compared them to diabolical possession. (She seems to imply that the less prejudiced have outgrown this "superstitious" view.) But although a person may be arrogant or vindictive or unduly compliant he remains so only as long as the effect of his unfavorable

⁸ Ibid., p. 68.

environment makes him view reality in such a way that the maintenance of these essentially self-destructive crutches continues to remain necessary for his neurotic equilibrium. The conclusion again seems to be that destructive drives directed toward oneself or toward others, are the result of a crushing life situation rather than reflections of a wholly or partially destructive human nature.

Finally Horney spoke of the changes which may be perceived during therapy. This last proof was alluded to when it was said that Horney had witnessed countless instances of patients who had begun analysis most destructively minded, and had emerged from treatment essentially constructive individuals. Through analysis the patient was able to experience the unreality and futility of his destructiveness. A radical change followed. Horney again concluded that destructive impulses are clearly manifestations of the neurotic disturbance. The fact that they are abandoned by the patient as he is restored to himself indicates that destructiveness is not something essential to human nature, but rather is the result of an unfavorable life situation.

These arguments appear to have convinced Horney of the intrinsic worth and goodness of the individual. Throughout her works there are repeated and essentially similar statements that leave little doubt of her outlook

on human nature. One or two of these assertions will illustrate the many:

Briefly, our belief is that the constructive possibilities stem from man's essential nature, from the core of his being, from what we call his real self. Conversely, we believe that man turns unconstructive or destructive only if he cannot fulfill himself - that it is an unfulfilled life which makes him barren and destructive. This belief is not mere speculation....⁹

and again:

But with such a belief in the autonomous striving toward self-realization, we do not need an inner straight jacket with which to shackle our spontaneity, nor the whip of inner dictates to drive us toward perfection. There is no doubt that such disciplinary methods can succeed in suppressing undesirable factors, but there is also no doubt that they are injurious to our growth.¹⁰

There is little room left for speculation as to the meaning which Horney attached to the terms "inner straight jacket" and "the whip of inner dictates". If the quotation is viewed in its context, they are expressive of an unfavorable evaluation of both Freudian and "Christian" man. Although Horney admitted an essential difference in the two positions, she also recognized an essential similarity in their methods of dealing with human nature. For Freudians the goal must be to overcome the status naturae, by imposing upon it checks and controls.

⁹ Ibid., p. 68.

¹⁰ Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 15.

"Christians" must overcome not the status naturae as such but that part of it which is "bad, sinful or destructive". This will be done by insuring the success of the "good" part, utilizing such means as faith, reason, will or grace depending upon the particular religious or ethical views. The goals differ somewhat as do the methods of achieving them but both, Horney argued, aim at crushing at least in part, our real selves. To the extent that they succeed in doing this, they are, in effect, crushing man's nature.

The references to Horney, which have thus far appeared, would seem to present sufficient and convincing evidence of her basic position toward human nature. But a perusal of Patrick Mullahy's review of psychoanalytic theories, reveals a statement which, at first glance, appears most puzzling. According to Mullahy, Karen Horney "implies that she does not believe in a human nature common to all men or at least suggests that neuroses do not represent problems common to all men".¹¹ This statement, however, does not long remain paradoxical if that characteristic of Horney's writings hinted to in the introduction, be ruminated. Horney's meaning is not always clear. The confusion is due, in part, to a carelessness with words sometimes amounting to an equivocal use of

¹¹ PATRICK MULLAHY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 15.

language. And the habit is not peculiar to Horney. It is unfortunate that many psychoanalysts assign a subjective connotation to most important terms, taking it for granted that, within the context, the reader will understand. But the meaning is not always so un-ambiguous. Several of Horney's more important statements are open to various interpretations. It is often necessary to read several chapters of a work before one can be assured of her meaning and it is not uncommon that texts have to be compared and her position deduced. Such would be this instance. It is true that Horney "suggests that neuroses do not represent problems common to all men", and one might well assume that such a position contains an implicit denial of the existence of a universal human nature. But a more careful reading reveals that Horney's suggestion sprang not from her view of human nature, but, as shall be shown, from her concept of normality.

Her ambiguous use of terminology is ubiquitous. "Human Nature Can Change", the title of one of her more important articles, is a vivid case in point. This paper, already referred to, indicated that the objective of Horney was to establish a view of human nature which was at once optimistic and universal. In the light of such an aim, it is bewildering that she should select a title clearly suggestive of a relativistic view. Horney did not actually

intend to imply that man's nature is mutable. Rather she felt that man can become destructive or constructive depending on his surroundings. But clearly such changes do not reflect changes in human nature.

Horney's basic view of man has been presented. It has been shown that Horneyan man is a created and at least partially responsible agent. He is an intrinsically constructive being possessing potentialities for both "good" and "evil". The constructive tendencies stem from man's "essential nature", from the "core of his being", from his "real self". The destructive tendencies stem from a crushing life situation. Such a position reveals an intrinsically optimistic view of man, but also leaves itself open to further questions. Throughout her writings Karen Horney continually asserted the positive attributes of human nature. But what is human nature? What is the significance of "the real self, man's essential nature, the core of his being"? What is to be understood by the "constructive" and "destructive" potentialities of man? What constitute "conditions of warmth and respect for his individuality"? What is a "good human being"? If the conditions for growth are favorable will man inevitably evolve into a "constructive" individual? If so, in what sense is man a responsible agent? Does Horney offer a moral norm to which man is responsible?

Horney's writings do not reveal an explicit definition of human nature. The best that can be suggested is that human nature designates that which is proper to man as man. This suggestion springs from Horney's universalization of the constructiveness of the individual. It is not this man or that man who is constructive. Man as such, is inherently constructive. The constructiveness, therefore, expresses something common to all men. This something appears to be human nature. Of this nature, responsibility or will, by implication rationality, and constructiveness may be predicated. Horney's concept of human nature might be loosely compared to the Scholastic concept of essence. Essence is "that which makes a thing to be what it is".¹² Since Horney implied that "constructiveness", "responsibility" and "rationality" are proper to man as man, it is difficult to understand how Horney could have conceived of a man who did not, at least potentially if not operationally possess these attributes. Therefore these attributes characterize something essential to man as man. But to scrutinize Horney's concept of human nature for further metaphysical implications, would be to risk seeing what is not there.

¹² CELESTINE N. BITTLE, The Domain of Being, Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1939, p. 382.

However, the terms "real self, man's essential nature, and the core of his being" do allow elaboration. It appears that they are at least logically distinct from human nature. Not all of these terms were defined by Horney. In point of fact, they are used interchangeably in her writings. She does offer a definition of the "real self". It is "that central inner force, common to all human beings and yet unique in each, which is the deep source of growth".¹³ "Real Self" is also defined as the "original force toward individual growth and fulfillment, with which we may again achieve full identification when freed of the crippling shackles of neurosis".¹⁴ "Growth" refers to "free, healthy development in accordance with the potentialities of one's generic and individual nature".¹⁵ It would seem, then, that the uniqueness of the "central inner force" stems from man's individual nature. (What individuates the generic nature will be discussed in the third chapter when the meaning of the term "growth" is clarified.)

The term "real self" and by implication, "essential nature" and the "core of his being" is reminiscent of the

¹³ KAREN HORNEY, Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 17.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

Scholastic concept of "essence" dynamically viewed, or more precisely, the Scholastic concept of "nature". "Nature" designates "substantial being as a principle of action"¹⁶, or "The essence of a being considered as the ultimate principle of its operations".¹⁷ The "real self" seems to approach these definitions, for it designates individualized human nature as the principle of growth or self-actualization.

It is conceivable that man may lose his "nature" if his actions, for whatever reason, are not in keeping with his nature. In such a case his actions do not reflect the principle from which they ought to spring. Similarly, if a man is in the grips of "the crippling shackles of neurosis", he cannot truly act in keeping with his "real self". His actions do not reflect the principle of "growth" from which they ought to spring since he has lost touch with it. It is true that, strictly speaking, man cannot lose his nature. But then neither can he lose his "real self". Rather these principles, if seriously impaired, cannot reflect their proper operations. Therefore they are, in a sense, lost. In view of the loss of the

¹⁶ CARDINAL MERCIER, A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company, Ltd., Vol. 1, 1938, p. 483.

¹⁷ CELESTINE N. BITTLE, The Domain of Being, p. 385.

"real self" man's development, according to Horney, takes a destructive rather than constructive path.

There is yet to consider the significance which Horney attached to the terms "constructive" and "destructive". These are closely connected with Horney's understanding of "free, healthy development" and as might be expected the latter cannot be separated from "conditions of warmth and respect for his individuality". For a clearer understanding of these catch-phrases and of such other elements as the significance of a "good human being", and the meaning and extension of "responsibility", Horney's concept of normality and her view of the role played by the environment, can hardly be ignored. Since these two factors form the more proximate background of Horney's theory of neurosis, they are best discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

"CULTURE AND NEUROSIS"

The gulf between Horney and Freud did not only involve a difference in the philosophical view of man as man. It is interesting to note that Karen Horney drew a very real distinction between her concept of human nature and her view of normality. Such a distinction is implicit in any philosophical approach to man. If the Thomistic position be taken as an example, it must be affirmed that there is a distinction between the freedom of man and the free acts of man. If man acts freely, he reflects human nature. Therefore he is, in some sense, normal. And since man's freedom subsists even when he does not exercise it, the distinction is real. But Horney's distinction goes much further. It is not merely a question of man acting in keeping with what she conceived to be his nature.

In seeking the negative factor from which Horney's view of normality partially sprang Freud cannot be by-passed. The master of Vienna was essentially a biological determinist. Such a position, faulty in itself, was all the more an unhappy one since Freud saw the determinism as directed toward evil. Horney objected to both the determinism and its direction. This two-fold grievance brought its inevitable implications into Horney's concept of normality. For if man was not what Freud made

him to be, neither could "normal" man be the end-product of the sublimation of biologically determined destructive instincts. Another view of normality, one which did not require man to overcome the basic evil in his nature was desired. In short, a more optimistic approach seemed essential.

The dichotomy between Freud and his pupil brought even more significant repercussions. Having denied the validity of Freud's "pessimistic" view of human nature, and yet all too cognizant of the "destructive" tendencies of neurotics, it fell to Horney to seek an explanation. If man is not inherently "destructive", "bad", or "sinful", then something outside of man must be the cause. This "something" was alluded to when Horney's proofs of the constructiveness of human nature were advanced. "Destructiveness" was ultimately due to a crushing life situation. The role of the environment will be seen to assume almost monumental proportions.

Finally, and as shall be shown in the following chapter, Horney's convictions as they concerned these fundamental points, brought her to a totally fresh view of neurosis.

1. Concept of Normality

In contrast to Horney's crusading insistence on the constructiveness and universality of human nature, her view of normality is surprisingly restrictive. The criteria which she advanced does not flow from the nature of man. Quite to the contrary, it is imposed upon him by his human environment.

The only proofs which she submitted in defense of this position are an appeal to common knowledge since, "to some extent every educated person knows that there are variations in what is regarded as normal"¹, and the seemingly indisputable findings of anthropologists. It appears that Horney had more than a passing interest in this science. Perhaps her concern was in part motivated by "... acquaintance with a culture which in many ways is different from the European..."². Horney was referring to the United States. It is a truism that many of the customs, habits, ideas and even ideals of the United States are unacceptable, or at least were unacceptable to Europeans. This obvious dichotomy may have moved Horney to seek more

¹ KAREN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937, p. 16.

² Id., New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1939, p. 12-13.

vivid differences in cultures. Anthropology offered a most fertile field. Her repeated references to such significant figures as Ruth Benedict, Edward Sapir, Margaret Mead, and Peter Freuchen, indicate close observation of anthropological findings. Horney learned, for instance, that the Jicarilla Apache culture takes a dim view of even the most innocent reference to a deceased relative while the people in the United States do not generally consider this an offensive practice. Eskimos do not feel that murderers should be made to pay for their crimes. Reparation may be made by providing a substitute for the deceased. In fact, in some cultures a mother's grief, following the murder of her son, may be lessened if the murderer allows himself to be adopted. (Apparently it escaped Horney that these, in themselves, may be forms of punishment.)

The diversity of customs in these cultures led Horney to conclude that although "... every culture clings to the belief that its own feelings and drives are the one normal expression of 'human nature'"³, the belief is nonetheless nothing more than the word implies. Furthermore,

The conception of what is normal varies not only with the culture but also within the same culture, in the course of time. [...] The

³ Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 16-17.

conception of normality varies also within different classes of society.⁴

These findings appear to have provided Horney with sufficient evidence to convince her of the futility of attempting to establish any absolute norm of normality. However, she did explicitly impart how one arrives at a conception of normality:

Our conception of normality is arrived at by the approval of certain standards of behaviour and feeling within a certain group which imposes these standards upon its members. But the standards vary with culture, period, class and sex.⁵

Therefore though there is no universally normal man, that man is considered "normal" who abides by the sanctions of the particular culture in which he happens to exist. It is clear that in stating her position, not of the universally normal man, but of normality, Horney had a rich opportunity to distinguish between "our conception of normality" and normality as such. But the distinction is not made since Horney obviously regarded it as fruitless. What is left then is a relativistic view. On this she is explicit. This relativism is also reflected in Horney's theory of neurosis. Since a neurosis implies, at least in part, a deviation from the "normal" behaviour pattern,

⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

⁵ Ibid., p. 18.

it is senseless to speak of neurotic trends that hold for all mankind. There are at least as many neuroses as there are concepts of normality.

In the light of these considerations it is clear why Horney suggested that "neuroses do not represent problems common to all men".⁶ Since a neurosis is, at least in part, a deviation from the "normal", and since the concept of normality varies with the culture, the problems which arise from these deviations are not common to all men. But this is not to imply, as Patrick Mullahy believes, that there is no such thing as a universal human nature.

The concept of normality then, according to Horney, is man-made and differs with the culture. Since Horney's interest was specifically directed to "the neurotic personality of our time" in the United States or places with an essentially similar culture, a distinction must be drawn between how one arrives at a concept of normality and the concept of the "normal" man existing in the United States. This last concept is most nebulous in Horney's works. There is general agreement, among commentators of Horney, that she did not specifically set out to establish such a norm. Her works do not reflect an explicit position. She

⁶ PATRICK MULLAHY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, New York, Grove Press, 1955, p. 213.

merely asserts, and agrees with, the method which societies use to establish a concept of normality.

Horney's interest throughout her works was the neurotic personality. Her concern inevitably demanded a definition of neurosis. Furthermore, there was the obvious problem of recognizing the neurotic. One of the more important criteria which Horney advanced was "deviation from the normal".⁷ But as to what the "normal" in the United States was, Horney had little to say. Since these deviations are scrutinized in great detail by Horney it may be supposed that their opposites constitute normality. Ruth Monroe, in her excellent exposition of Horney's theories, sounds this very note:

... her concept of the normal - actually the ideal - personality is not explicitly and systematically stated but appears as the rich multiform obverse of the neurotic trends which she describes acutely.⁸

To discover, then, what Horney understood to be "normal", in the United States or places with an essentially similar culture, one need but turn the coin. The other side of it, however, does not reveal the "normal" man. It is devoid of any markings. Its true face must be supplied by studying the neurotic trends and considering either their

⁷ KAREN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 21.

⁸ RUTH L. MONROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, New York, The Dryden Press, 1955, p. 348.

opposites or their less exaggerated or one-sided expressions. For many neurotic characteristics are neurotic, not in themselves, but in their intensifications.

Horney's view of the "normal" man in the United States will not be presented in this thesis. Rather the emphasis will be on the neurotic. But it may be mentioned in passing that if an attempt to extricate her position were made, it would be doomed from the start to at least partial failure. Horney's concept of the "normal" man can only be derived through an examination of the "rich multi-form obverse of the neurotic trends". The best that might be expected then, would be an approximation. For Horney's exposition of the neurotic character is descriptive, and a concept of normality ought to be definitive. Before considering Horney's view of neurosis, however, the role of the environment, as she conceived it, must be clarified.

2. Human Nature and Social Environment

Horneyan man has been described as a responsible creature possessing constructive inner forces which spur him toward self-realization. Such would be human nature viewed in the abstract. But Karen Horney was a psychoanalyst. As such she could hardly ignore what happens to human nature when it is concretized, that is, as it appears in an actually existing man. The most superficial

observation could not fail to reveal that man must come in contact with, and to some degree be affected by, his surroundings. The question which must be answered is: what was Horney's view of the role played by the environment?

The following extracts, from a brief criticism and appreciation of Horney, by Patrick Mullahy, clearly point to the environmental abyss existing between Horney and Freud:

Karen Horney was among the first psychoanalysts in this country to abandon the artificial and cumbersome libido theory; she thereby paved the way for an understanding of people primarily in terms of the social environment and the problems which it generates. [...] Culture is no longer conceived as playing a mechanical role by frustrating libidinal or other drives but as providing the framework within which personality develops and operates.⁹

The above quotation provides an important insight into the significant role which Horney ascribed to the environment. However, and as shall be shown, culture or environment (the two terms seem to have the same meaning for Horney) does not merely supply the framework within which man's personality grows. It would be more in keeping with Horney's writings to suggest that environment provides the mould. More precisely, the environment will be seen to provide two basic moulds, the healthy and the unhealthy. Whether man emerges "healthy" or neurotic, will depend upon

⁹ PATRICK MULLAHY, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, p. 328.

which of the two moulds he is cast into. But would not such a deterministic approach to the role of the environment render human nature little more than a static factor; something acted upon by, rather than interacting with the environment?

If some of Horney's more significant statements are brought to light, it would seem not. For Horney understood that "God will repay and does repay indeed".¹⁰ Furthermore, in speaking of the task of the patient in psychoanalytic therapy, she maintained that the patient must strive "toward a clearer perception of his direction, with the assumption of responsibility for himself and his decisions".¹¹ Finally, Horney spoke of a criterion for self-realization, one which the individual ought to recognize and honor. The criterion posits the question: "Is a particular attitude or drive inductive or obstructive to my human growth"?¹² These assertions, taken at face value, would hardly suggest that human nature is something static, a potentially fertile tabula rasa to be moulded for better or for worse by the environment. But these

¹⁰ KAREN HORNEY, "The Value of Vindictiveness", in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1948, p. 3.

¹¹ Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 364.

¹² Ibid., p. 15.

assertions cannot be evaluated out of context. They must be incorporated with, and examined in the light of, Horney's view of the role of the environment. What constituted this view?

It will be recalled that Horney ardently denied Freud's "pessimistic" view of human nature. Nevertheless she was left with the problem of explaining the origin of neurotic "destructiveness". If man's nature is not inherently "destructive, bad, or sinful", then something outside of man must be the cause. And is not what is outside of man his environment? Man is inherently constructive. If he becomes destructive, it must be due to the crushing influence of his surroundings.

Although Horney's interest was the neurotic personality, she could not long evade, even had she so wished, the basic question which every analyst must answer, or act as though he had answered it. The question is somewhat obvious and its answer is a sine qua non to psychoanalytic therapy. The question is: what is man?

It was shown, in the last chapter, that Horney did not seek to escape this issue. From the "destructiveness in neurotics due to environment", she argued the constructiveness of human nature as such. Environment then, ultimately decides whether man shall be "constructive" or "destructive". Since "destructiveness" characterizes

a neurotic, it must follow that the environment ultimately decides whether man shall be "healthy" or neurotic.

Horney's writings inevitably point to a deterministic role of the environment. She insisted, in the face of Freud's biological determinism, that man can and does develop into a "good" human being if the conditions for growth are favorable. She asserted that "it is an unfulfilled life which makes man barren and destructive"¹³, but this "unfulfillment" again seems due to unhappy surroundings. The "central inner force" which all human beings possess, is the wellspring of "growth". But "growth" is "free, healthy development". If the environmental conditions are crushingly unfavorable, would Horney's position have allowed her to speak of "free, healthy development"? In the light of these considerations, what active role is left to human nature?

Although Horney's view of the role played by the environment may be classified as deterministic, the term should be applied with qualifications. The environment ultimately decides whether an individual will be "healthy" or "neurotic". So far as these two possibilities are concerned, Horney left little if any room to the exercise of will. If one's surroundings are "healthy", the "real self"

¹³ Id., "Human Nature Can Change", in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 68.

will be able to act out its role and realize the "constructive" tendencies inherent in human nature. If, on the other hand, the environment is of an unfavorably crushing character, the individual will become a neurotic. He will lose his "real self" and fall prey to the "crippling shackles of neurosis". And it is of no purpose to ask Horney why individuals who are subject to environments which are essentially similar in their crippling nature, do not both become neurotic. The answer is ready-made:

The question remains why certain persons become neurotic while others, living under similar conditions, are able to cope with the existing difficulties. [...] Only the general psychic atmosphere is the same. [...] In detail, however, the experiences of one child may be entirely different from those of another. [...] The persons who succumb to a neurosis are those who have been more severely hit by the existing difficulties, particularly in their childhood.¹⁴

Horney appears to have been of the opinion that unless the environmental conditions are identical the point is irrelevant. Since identity defies division, the question, at least for the present moment, is ended. Furthermore, the above quotation verifies the coercive nature of the environment. Man falls, despite himself, into the category of "healthy" or "neurotic", "constructive" or "destructive". Taken in this sense, Horney's position was clearly deterministic. It is not man that becomes "healthy" or

¹⁴ Id., New Ways in Psychoanalysis, p. 177-178.

"neurotic". He is made "healthy" or "neurotic". Human nature then, so far as this question is concerned, must remain silent. As commentators have pointed out, it has the value of a constant,

... les causes déterminantes de la névrose doivent être recherchées dans les facteurs culturels du milieu, d'une époque. Elle estime enfin que la seule nature humaine, laissée à elle-même, en chaque individu, ne causerait pas de problèmes: elle aurait valeur d'une constante.¹⁵

But having fallen into one of the two categories, that is, healthy or neurotic, can then human nature exercise any degree of self-activity? It is at this point that Horney's statements, indicative of her belief in the responsibility of the individual, should be examined.

The patient must strive "toward a clearer perception of his direction, with the assumption of responsibility for himself and his decisions". The neurotic, then, lacks both a clear sense of direction and the ability to assume responsibility. Horney asserted this in no uncertain terms: "Neurotic trends impair self-determination because a person is then driven instead of being himself the driver".¹⁶ But although Horney used the word "impaired", her more practical discussions of the neurotic structure

¹⁵ HENRI GRATTON, O.M.I., Psychanalyses D'hier et D'aujourd'hui, Paris, Cerf, 1955, p. 194.

¹⁶ KAREN HORNEY, Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945, p. 100.

clearly leave the reader with the impression that the neurotic has very little if any freedom of will at his disposal. At least in theory, then, to the degree that the individual has lost his "real self", since that is exactly what a neurosis is, he is driven by the neurotic trends, cannot really choose and consequently cannot be considered "responsible". But then surely the "healthy" individual must be "responsible" for his "real self" is not hampered. His human nature is free to evolve, and freedom implies responsibility. Therefore the "healthy" individual and, in theory, that part of the neurotic which is not driven, are "responsible", and in this sense, the role of human nature is not that of a constant but rather that of an active agent. In this sense, also, human nature is not determined. But to whom or to what is man responsible?

If Herney's concept of normality, that is, if Herney's criterion of normality, as elaborated in the last section, is to be followed to its logical conclusion, it would appear that man is responsible to those "standards of behaviour and feeling" which are imposed upon him by his surroundings. These standards, however, vary even within the society. Therefore it seems that there is a possibility of choice. God then "will repay and does repay indeed", according to the responses that the individual makes to the lights that are presented to him. The same seems to hold

true for Horney's criterion for self-realization. The individual is to ask himself whether a particular attitude or drive will help or hinder his human "growth". But again he can only answer with the norms that his environment supplies. His responsibility rests in his abiding to these norms.

To sum up, Horney's position as it concerned the role of the environment predicates a social determinism with regard to the "healthy" or "neurotic" development of the individual, but allows human nature, at least in theory, an active role within these two categories. The active role implies responsibility, the norm being dictated by the environment. There is now to consider, in greater detail, the specific environmental factors leading to a neurosis and their end-result, namely the neurotic.

CHAPTER III

HORNEYAN MAN, NEUROTIC

Whatever the starting point and however tortuous the road, we must finally arrive at a disturbance of personality as the source of psychic illness. [...] In modern terms, every neurosis, no matter what the symptomatic picture, is a character neurosis. Hence our endeavour in theory and therapy must be directed toward a better understanding of the neurotic character structure.¹

This statement lays the groundwork for a clear understanding of the essential elements of Horney's theory of neurosis. A neurosis is above all a disturbance of the personality. To greater or lesser degrees it effects the whole individual. Symptoms such as "phobias, depressions, functional physical disorders", may or may not be present. Inhibitions may be so well disguised as to escape the eye of even the most acute observer. At best these are the superficial manifestations of a deeply personal disturbance. Neurosis, taken in its true sense, must be distinguished from what Horney termed a "situation neurosis" in which an "abnormal" reaction to a situation may exist without, however, effecting the whole personality. In a true neurosis "the main disturbance lies in the deformation of the character".² Indeed Horney's definition is clearly

¹ KAREN HORNEY, Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945, p. 12.

² Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937, p. 30.

indicative of this position, as is her criteria for discovering the neurotic, and her explanation of the genesis of neurosis. A sense of logic would seem to demand that a presentation of Horney's view of the neurotic should begin with her definition of neurosis. But other than observing a sense of the fitness of things, this approach would be of no practical value. Horney's "definition" of neurosis when disengaged from her characteristics of the neurotic, affords but a superficial insight into the meaning of this disturbance.

1. Characteristics of the Neurotic

The first criterion which Horney advanced was already alluded to in the first section of the last chapter. It amounts to the fact that a neurotic's behaviour deviates from the behaviour considered "normal" in the environment. But this criterion does not suffice. "Persons may deviate from the general pattern without having a neurosis".³ In other words, though neurotics deviate from the "general pattern", not all who deviate from it are neurotics. What then are they? Horney does not elaborate on this point. It would be of interest to ask Horney whether one may be "abnormal" without being neurotic. At the very least,

³ Ibid., p. 21.

it appears that one may be unconventional without being neurotic. But why are some of the individuals who deviate in their reactions, from the "general pattern", neurotic? The obvious reason would seem to lie in the motives for the deviations. These are so many that they defy enumeration. But at this point, it may be said, that the reasons stem from the "neurotic structure". Since this structure represents, in the eyes of Horney, an unreal way of dealing with reality, the reasons do not justify categorizing the deviations as simply unconventional. They must be labelled neurotic. It must be emphatically stressed here that these neurotic deviations are neurotic only within the culture which considers their opposite expression "normal". The criterion is still insufficient for an accurate segregation of the neurotic from the "healthy" individual. Observation of the "manifest picture" (depressions, functional physical disorders, phobias, inhibitions, etc.) has, as already implied, no conclusive value since these characteristics may be either absent or too well disguised. Horney, however, proceeded to narrow the possibilities by introducing two further characteristics to be found in all neuroses. Neurotics, apart from their "deviations from the general pattern" of behaviour exhibit, to surface observation, "a certain rigidity in reaction and a

discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments".⁴

What is the exact meaning of these characteristics?

By "rigidity in reaction" Horney seems to have meant, an inability on the part of the neurotic to respond accordingly, to the situations which he encounters from day to day. She elaborated by offering examples:

The normal person, for instance, is suspicious when he senses or sees reasons for being so; a neurotic person may be suspicious, regardless of the situation. [...] A normal person will be spiteful if he feels an unwarranted imposition; a neurotic may react with spite to any situation...⁵

But again it must be stressed that this lack of flexibility symbolizes a neurotic only if it is not in keeping with the cultural norm, for "a rigid suspicion of anything new or strange is a normal pattern among a large proportion of peasants in Western civilization..."⁶

By "a discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments" Horney meant, the result of a feeling which the neurotic invariably experiences, namely the feeling that he is his own stumbling block, his own barrier to self-actualization. Because of this deterring element in his personality he cannot be "productive", and this even "in spite of gifts and favorable external possibilities

⁴ Ibid., p. 22.

⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

for their development".⁷ By "productive" Horney did not intend wealth, position or social prestige, for many of her patients possessed all of these and yet were in need of analysis. By "productive" Horney again referred to that elusive aspect which the "normal" person possesses, namely the ability to "grow". But as shall be shown, the understanding of "growth" also varies with the culture.

It must be noted that these attitudes clearly imply a loss of freedom on the part of the neurotic; freedom to be flexible in the presence of different situations and freedom to achieve what his potentialities expect of him. It is also apparent now, why the deviations of the neurotic may be labelled "neurotic". They do not spring from choice as do the deviations of the "unconventional" person. Rather the rigidity and the sense of stagnation of the neurotic render the manifestations compulsive. In short, they arise from the neurotic structure.

In addition to these Horney furnished another "essential characteristic" which symbolizes the neurotic:

The presence of conflicting tendencies, [...] for which he automatically tries to reach compromise solutions. [...] These solutions are less satisfactory than those of the average individual and are achieved at great expense to the whole personality.

⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

⁸ Ibid., p. 28.

The neurotic, it appears, is literally driven in different, often opposite directions at the same time. His equilibrium demands solutions, but he is, for all practical considerations, driven also to these. And the solutions more often than not precipitate him into greater conflicts. Horney again gives the impression that the neurotic is a person who has lost freedom.

These last three characteristics are to be found in all neuroses. But it is not explicitly stated, by Horney, whether this "all" is to be taken as having a universal extension. Certainly Horney could not draw a universal conclusion based on personal observations of neuroses in all cultures. If she believed that all neurotics everywhere exhibit these characteristics, the conclusion must have been prompted by her view of the nature of man. The evidence, in favor of this supposition, seems very strong. If "rigidity, [...], is indicative of a neurosis only when it deviates from the cultural patterns"⁹, then it may be supposed that it is possible for all to acquire an inflexible attitude not in keeping with the established patterns. Again, since by "productivity" Horney understood, the capacity to "grow", then it seems that any and all may fail to actualize this capacity, since the

⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

source of "growth" is the "real self". Finally it is obvious that a conflict situation may arise in any culture. If the individual is rigid and unproductive, his understanding of the conflict may be perverted and his response to it will suffer accordingly. In fact the very rigidity will provoke conflicts.

These characteristics, then, appear to be applicable to man as man. If the environment is sufficiently crushing, a neurosis results. The disturbance is characterized by these ear-marks, though the ways in which they find expression vary with the culture. This conclusion seems all the more warranted in view of Horney's first "definition" of neurosis and the qualification which she placed upon it.

2. Definition of Neurosis

There are, apparently, two definitions. This necessity sprang from the fact that the passing of time saw certain significant elaborations in Horney's theories which demanded a re-formulation of the definition. However, Horney's writings do not reflect two explicit definitions although she stated in her last book that "the definition of neurosis too had changed".¹⁰ It must

¹⁰ Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 368.

be assumed that Horney referred to what she herself, in an earlier work, termed a "description", since "we are not yet able to give a well rounded definition..."¹¹ The description appeared in her first book. There she referred to neurosis as,

... a psychic disturbance brought about by fears and defenses against these fears, and by attempts to find compromise solutions for conflicting tendencies. For practical reasons it is advisable to call this disturbance a neurosis only if it deviates from the pattern common to the particular culture.¹²

This description brings into clear relief the relativism implicit in Horney's theory of neurosis. The relativism is obviously motivated by Horney's concept of normality. At this early stage of her writing career Horney saw neurosis as a conflict between the individual and the environment brought about by a life situation which stifled the inner freedom of the individual. In short, the conflict was primarily interpersonal. Further observation of the neurotic character, coupled with more thoughtful deductions, brought Horney to a conclusion which had been implicit in her earlier description, and which without emphasizing, she had had to include in her discussions of the neurotic character. The conflicts

¹¹ Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 28.

¹² Ibid., p. 28-29.

really involved not only the relationship of the individual toward others, but also of the individual toward himself. This explicitly new position received generous attention in Horney's last book. There she defined neurosis as "a disturbance in one's relation to self and others".¹³ But even this definition, other than implying a conflict involving one's self as well as others is restricted unless seen in conjunction with the causes effective in producing a neurosis.

3. Genesis of Neurosis

The causes, as has been shown, must be sought in the environment. In the final analysis, it is the surroundings that make a potentially "constructive" individual "destructive" or, in short, neurotic. But to say that environment causes neurosis is to give a correct but all too general presentation of Horney's position.

The environmental factors may be loosely grouped under two categories, the patterns of the culture and the interpersonal relations. The latter are those with which the individual comes into more intimate contact. The cultural patterns influence the interpersonal relations. In point of fact it was Horney's conviction that the

¹³ Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 368.

cultural factors set the pattern of the interpersonal relations.

It is an individual fate, for example, to have a domineering or a "self-sacrificing" mother, but it is also under definite cultural conditions that we find domineering or self-sacrificing mothers, and it is also because of these existing conditions that such an experience will have an influence on later life.¹⁴

For purposes of simplification and accuracy it will be of use of pursue Horney's method and treat the cultural and interpersonal causes as two logically distinct categories, bearing in mind that in the real order they are far from distinct. Again it must be stressed that Horney's interest was "the neurotic personality of our time" in the United States or places with an essentially similar culture. Therefore, though the discussions of the characteristics of the neurotic and of the "definition" of neurosis bore a universal significance, the remaining sections are subject to restrictions of both time and place as designated above.

Horney's position, as it concerned the deterministic role of the culture, is so clearly expressed in her writings that it would be the more expedient alternative to reproduce it in full:

The fact that in general the majority of the individuals in a culture have to face the same problems suggests the conclusion that these problems have been created by the specific life conditions

¹⁴ Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, Vlll.

existing in that culture. That they do not represent problems common to "human nature" seems to be warranted by the fact that the motivating forces and conflicts in other cultures are different from ours.

Hence in speaking of a neurotic personality of our time, I not only mean that there are neurotic persons having essential peculiarities in common, but also that these basic similarities are essentially produced by the difficulties existing in our time and culture.¹⁵

Horney consistently maintained that it was the environment that ultimately caused a neurosis. So far as the patterns of the culture are concerned, the difference between the environment of the "healthy" person and that of the neurotic is negligible, if indeed, even existent. For the cultural environment is essentially the same for all who live within the culture. Since the problems generated by the culture differ with the culture, Horney felt that they are not representative of problems common to human nature. Furthermore, since not all individuals in a culture become neurotic, the cause of neurosis must lie in something deeper than the mere cultural patterns. The latter merely lay the ground-work. The causes will be seen to lie in the interpersonal relations, provided they are of an intensely unfavorable nature. But the pattern of these relations depends greatly on the cultural patterns, as do the responses which the neurotic-to-be makes to

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 34.

these unfavorable relations. Therefore Horney concluded that neurotics in any one culture, barring superficial differences, exhibit essentially similar peculiarities, peculiarities fostered by the culture itself. What are these cultural difficulties in the United States which, if encountered in union with intensely unfavorable interpersonal relations, will precipitate a neurosis?

Our present society, particularly as it finds its expression in the United States is geared on the principle of competition. All must compete, be they "healthy" or neurotic. This element is not proper only to occupational groups. The principle of competition pervades the entire life of the individual. It exists in the business sphere, but in the social sphere as well. Most important, it even pervades the domestic sphere, that is, the family. "The child is inoculated with this germ at the very beginning".¹⁶ Furthermore it is not merely a matter of competition. Certain off-shoots cannot fail to develop in the psychological domain. The most vivid psychic consequences are an over-all feeling of hostility toward others coupled with a fear of retaliation for any injuries inflicted or believed to be inflicted in the competitive struggles.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 285.

Closely allied to the fear of retaliation is the fear of failure. This fear is all the more significant in a competitive society since all kinds of frustrations follow close upon it. These may be roughly grouped under loss of security or a sense of security and loss of prestige and emotional balance, not to mention the effect on self-esteem. Since in Western civilization, and particularly in the United States, the reigning ideology asserts that success is dependent on the personal efficiency of the individual, in almost complete disregard of existing external limitations, it is easy to understand how the competitive struggles might all too probably result in a crushed self-esteem. For the factual limitations are almost numberless as, of consequence, are the possibilities of "failure".

These elements, flowing from the principle of competition harry the individual with a feeling of emotional isolation, and this in spite of ample social contacts. The remedy for this feeling lies in the acquisition of affection. To put the same thing in an even more significant way, the feeling of isolation creates a greater need for affection. (Horney calls the need for love a "vital need"¹⁷, perhaps implying that man as such needs love. If this is true,

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 287.

then the need must flow from his nature.) But the need for affection in a competitive society is perverted by the overevaluation which the individuals of that society place upon it. It becomes a cure-all. Ironically enough, the very elements which create this exaggerated need, render its fulfillment an impossibility. Therefore the individual remains as isolated as ever.

In addition to these factors, there are certain most significant contradictory tendencies in the culture. Perhaps the most blatant is that "between competition and success on the one hand, and brotherly love and humility on the other".¹⁸ Horney was of the opinion that the culture demands both of the individual. He must succeed and it appears that success in Western civilization, especially in the United States, demands assertiveness and aggressiveness. At the same time Western man must be humble and loving. This dilemma, according to Horney, may be solved in either of two ways: One of the two strivings is discarded, or both are accepted. The latter solution is really no solution. The individual then can be neither assertive nor humble.

Secondly, there is a contradiction between "the stimulation of our needs and our factual frustrations in

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 288.

satisfying them".¹⁹ These, in point of fact, are so-called needs for they amount to "keeping up with the Joneses". The result of this contradiction is a continuous dichotomy between the wishes of the individual and their actualization.

Finally a contradiction exists between "the alleged freedom of the individual and all his factual limitations".²⁰ This contradiction is crushingly exposed in the United States where it is said that all men are equal. But the unreality of the individual's alleged freedom and equality is painfully shown to him through the game of life. However the attractiveness of the notion of freedom lingers with the individual. Consequently he is caught between feelings of power and helplessness. What is the relationship between all these factors and neurosis?

Horney proceeded to point out that the element of competition and its consequents lay the ground-work for the disturbance while the contradictory tendencies of the culture determine the quality or types of contradictions or conflicts operating in the neurotic structure itself. "A neurotic development in the individual arises ultimately from feelings of alienation, hostility, fear and diminished

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 288.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 289.

self-confidence".²¹ These feelings do not cause neurosis but they lay the foundations for what Horney terms "the basic anxiety". It will be noted that these feelings are quite analogous if not identical to the cultural factors operating in Western civilization. (An apparent inconsistency should be clarified in passing. Horney's interest, as already stated, was "the neurotic personality of our time" in the United States or places with an essentially similar culture. In presenting Horney's concept of normality, it was said that she had noticed what she considered to be significant differences in what was considered "normal" in Europe and what was considered "normal" in the United States. Yet in her discussions of the cultural and personal factors promoting neurosis Horney often implicitly and even explicitly speaks of "Western civilization", including in this term both the United States and Europe. Therefore it would appear that there are both differences and significant similarities in what is considered "normal" in the States and abroad. So far as the cultural factors are concerned, it would appear that the United States represents the ones outlined by Horney to a severer degree than Europe does. Consequently, the interpersonal relations take on a character which in degree,

²¹ Id., New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1932, p. 172.

though Horney sometimes implies even in kind, differs from the European.)

Furthermore the conflicts moving the actual neurotic bear an unmistakable similarity to the cultural conflicts.

In fact Horney stated that the cultural conflicts are:

.... precisely the conflicts that the neurotic struggles to reconcile: his tendencies toward aggressiveness and his tendencies toward yielding, his excessive demands and his fear of never getting anything, his striving toward self-aggrandizement and his feeling of personal helplessness.²²

Clearly then, the difference between the conflicts moving the neurotic and those moving the "normal" person is, to a large extent, one of degree. This difference of degree accounts for the fact that the normal person can deal with his conflicts and maintain his psychic equilibrium. But there is yet to consider the more proximate causes of neurosis, those dealing with the interpersonal relations and moulded by the cultural factors. These causes account for the difference in degree between the conflicts of the "healthy" and those of the neurotic. They appear to exert their most significant influence during early childhood.

Whatever the environment, the child will not fail to be effected by it. What counts, obviously, is whether the effect will help or hinder the child. Unfortunately,

²² Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 289.

Western civilization seems to be laden with environmental factors which stunt psychic growth. These unfavorable trends do not fail to show themselves in the domestic sphere. Since it is here that the child first begins to evolve for better or for worse, the potential danger of these unfavorable elements is manifest. If the family atmosphere is "one of warmth, of mutual respect and consideration, the child can grow unimpeded".²³ But if the family environment is unfavorable to an intense degree the end-product will very likely be a neurotic. What are these unfavorable conditions?

A child, though not yet equipped with the developed intellect of the adult, possesses, as it were, a sixth sense, a deeply intuitive facility for registering the real feelings which people harbour toward him. It is most important to the child's "healthy" development that the sixth sense register good feelings. A child needs to feel wanted and loved. But a lack of love seems to characterize a goodly number of parents. The inability of parents to show love stems from their own neuroses. But it is one thing not to be able to show love and it is another to admit it or even be conscious of it. Therefore an insidious process of camouflaging sets in. The parents claim to love

²³ Id., Self-Analysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1942, p. 43.

the child. As Lady Macbeth, they "protest too much" in their almost fanatical attempt to convince the child of their affection. But "a child feels keenly whether love is genuine, and cannot be fooled by any faked demonstrations".²⁴ Love, that is the realization on the part of the child that he is really loved, acts as a shock-absorber in the face of other unfavorable conditions. Therefore its importance can hardly be undervalued.

In addition to this lack of genuine affection, there are several actions or attitudes on the part of the parents which hinder the child's "healthy" development. These are so compactly stated by Horney that paraphrasing them would seem a pointless task.

.... preference for other children, unjust reproaches, unpredictable changes between over-indulgence and scornful rejection, unfulfilled promises, and not least important, an attitude toward the child's needs which goes through all gradations from temporary inconsideration to a consistent interfering with the most legitimate wishes of the child, such as disturbing friendships, ridiculing independent thinking, spoiling its interest in its own pursuits whether artistic, athletic or mechanical - altogether an attitude of the parents which if not in intention nevertheless in effect means breaking the child's will.²⁵

also:

Parents may impress the child with the dangers

²⁴ Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 80.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 80-81.

awaiting him outside the walls of his home. One parent may force the child to side with him against the other. [...] Particularly important, a child may be led to feel that his right to existence lies solely in his living up to the parents' expectations. ... The effectiveness of such influences is not diminished by the fact that they are often subtle and veiled. Moreover, there is usually not just one adverse factor but several in combination.²⁶

The result of all these unfavorable influences is a loss of self-respect on the part of the child. "He becomes insecure, apprehensive, isolated and resentful".²⁷ But the child cannot really take a positive stand against these tyrannical dictates. In the first place the cultural pattern is against him. A child is made to feel guilty and despicable if he is hostile or opposed to his parents. Furthermore the child, being a child, is biologically helpless. But the helplessness pervades his psychic life as well, particularly when reinforced by the parental patterns outlined above. The child therefore must repress his hostility because, due to his feeling of helplessness, he is in great need of "protection".

The great verbal emphasis on love, which the parents must show in view of the absence of their real love, also acts as a barrier to the expression of the child's real feelings. In fact, in the absence of real love, he may

²⁶ Id., Self-Analysis, p. 44.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 44.

cling to the verbal love and fear lest he lose it. It is obvious that in such circumstances any revolutionary reaction must be held back. Fear may also take possession of the child when subjected to constant parental quarrels, temper tantrums directed toward him, and also when intimidated by the "great dangers of the outside world". Again the child seeks protection and fears his own hostile feelings. As a result, he suppresses his real feelings but in so doing he lays the foundations for his own neurosis. For suppressed hostility leads to "basic anxiety" and basic anxiety is "the motor which sets the neurotic process going and keeps it in motion".²⁸ Horney describes the basic anxiety as: "a feeling of being small, insignificant, helpless, deserted, endangered, in a world that is out to abuse, cheat, attack, humiliate, betray, envy".²⁹

But although repressed hostility leads to basic anxiety there is yet another contributing factor. Whether basic anxiety develops or not depends, to a large extent, on whether the hostility which has developed within the child, takes in more than the immediate family. If there are favorable counteracting factors the hostility may remain directed toward the parents and a definite neurotic

²⁸ Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 23.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 92.

development put off, perhaps indefinitely. Horney exemplifies these factors by a loving grandmother, an understanding teacher, good friends etc. However the more unhappy are the experiences with the parents the lesser are the possibilities of favorable external factors having a counteracting effect. If these factors are lacking there seems little if any doubt that the basic anxiety will set in and crystallize into a mental attitude conducive to a neurotic structure.

It will be of some purpose now to comment briefly on the interpersonal factors. It is not at all clear how the cultural factors already presented determine the particular form that the interpersonal relations will take. Nor does Horney attempt a demonstration. What forces in the culture, for example, make parents prefer one child over and above another? What, in the culture, accounts for the unfulfilled promises of parents? What cultural factors account for a "self-sacrificing" mother? The same questions could be asked for each of the interpersonal factors enumerated by Horney. It is true that these parent-child relationships arise, according to Horney, because of the parents' own neuroses. But even if this is true, it is far from a satisfactory answer. It merely postpones the question, which now can be asked of the parents. What cultural factors account for the particular interpersonal

relations which rendered the parents neurotic? As already stated, Horney does not explain the specific relations.

She simply states that:

.... the person who is likely to become neurotic is one who has experienced the culturally determined difficulties in an accentuated form, mostly through the medium of childhood experiences, and who has consequently been unable to solve them, or has solved them only at great cost to his personality.³⁰

But although there may be a relation, and even at times a causal relation, there seems to be no necessary element of causality between the cultural factors and the specific forms which the interpersonal relations take. Furthermore the specific significance of some of the interpersonal factors is not clear. While the surface meaning of such factors as "unjust reproaches, temporary inconsideration, interfering with the most legitimate wishes of the child, spoiling its interest in its own pursuits", is manifest, the inner meaning of these expressions is not quite so obvious. To what extent may a parent reproach a child and remain just? What are to be recognized as inconsiderate actions? What constitute "legitimate wishes" for a child? Does it follow that none of a child's pursuits should be interfered with? Again, Horney does not explain, taking it for granted that surely the reader will understand. But if the reader agrees with Horney it is only

³⁰ Ibid., p. 48.

because the surface meaning is clear and correct. Surely no parent should be inconsiderate. Neither should he reproach a child unjustly. The same assent can be given to all of Horney's interpersonal factors. But as the reader assents he consciously or unconsciously applies or rather introduces his own philosophy of education, his own view of man into these factors. Then he is no longer agreeing with Horney but with himself. If Horney were to be pressed for an explanation, she would most likely reply that the inner meanings of the interpersonal factors are to be decided by the standards of the culture. But in Western civilization, and even more so, in the United States, there is hardly a uniform view. In the absence of a penetrating inquiry, on the part of Horney, into the deeper meanings of her own assertions, the reader is left with high-sounding phrases.

In the light of Horney's view of normality and of the role of the environment and keeping in mind her position with regard to the more proximate background of neurosis, it may be opportune, at this point, to answer the questions which were put to Horney in the first chapter.

The "real self", it will be recalled, was defined as "that central inner force, common to all human beings and yet unique in each, which is the deep source of growth". Growth, in turn, was defined as "free, healthy development in accordance with the potentialities of one's generic and

individual nature". It would appear then, that the "uniqueness" of the "central inner force" stems from man's individual nature. But what individuates the generic nature? Horney's works reveal two factors, both closely inter-related. The first is temperament. People, according to Horney, are born with a biological predisposition affecting the formal side of their behaviour. The second factor is difference in native gifts. This difference is to be understood as being both quantitative and qualitative. In discussing the problem of neurosis and art, Horney asks whether neurosis is an indispensable condition for artistic creativity and answers that:

.... there is little if any doubt that the existing gifts themselves are independent of neurosis. Recent educational ventures have shown that most people can paint when properly encouraged, but even so, not everyone can become a Rembrandt or a Renoir.³¹

Temperament then, along with the degree of intellectual ability and quality of native gifts, (if possessed), individualize the generic nature of man. If this individualized nature is allowed to develop freely and healthily, the individual in turn will be "healthy" and will "grow". But what constitutes "free, healthy development"? The environment must be "free" and "healthy" in order to promote "growth". But what conditions promote "freedom" and

³¹ Id., Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 328.

"mental health"? Perhaps some clarification may be had if the meaning of one of Horney's catch-phrases be analyzed. What is to be understood by "conditions of warmth and respect for his individuality"? A consideration of the opposites of those interpersonal factors which seem to promote neurosis may provide a clue. It would appear that the conditions should reflect real love on the part of the parents. Furthermore parents ought to keep promises made to the child. Their attitude should be a consistent one. At all times, regardless of circumstances the child should be made to know that he is really wanted. His wishes and pursuits, that is, his individuality, should be respected. Furthermore the attitude between parents should not be such as to instill fear in the child. Finally he should be made to feel that he is to "grow" for his own sake and according to his own inclinations. That is, he should not be made to feel that "his right to existence lies solely in his living up to the parents' expectations". If this environment prevails the child will grow "healthy". As to the specific meaning of these conditions, again the norms of the culture should be consulted. But if the parent-child relationship reflects the unfavorable factors to an intense degree and is not alleviated by favorable external factors, a "basic anxiety" develops. When this occurs, a neurosis seems but a matter of time.

A "free" and "healthy" development, then, is tantamount to a "normal" environment. But, again, as has been shown, the concept of normality varies with the culture and even within the culture. This being the case, it follows that the conception of "growth" also varies with the culture. That is "growth" itself, must be understood as having a relative connotation.

It might also be more profitably asked at this point, what Horney meant by "destructive" and "constructive" tendencies. "Destructive tendencies" may be considered a term inclusive of the entire neurotic structure with particular emphasis on the neurotic trends, that is the various devices which the neurotic utilizes to rid himself of his "basic anxiety", of his "basic conflict" and of the conflicts which his very solutions generate. (This structure, as stated in the introduction, will not be dealt with in the thesis.) The neurotic structure and the neurotic trends are destructive since they represent a barrier to "growth", to self-realization, in short, to the activity of the "real self". Neurosis is an escape from reality and from the "normal" way of dealing with reality. To the extent that the individual, because of his neurosis, cannot realize his individual nature, the neurosis is "destructive". In addition to the destructiveness of the self, neurosis also destroys others since it creates

unhealthy interpersonal relations, which, particularly in the parental sphere, can generate neuroses in others. Conversely the term "constructive" signifies both the nature of man before it encounters an "unhealthy" environment, and the essential characteristics of the "normal" individual in a given culture. But again it must be stressed that these terms have been only generally defined. So defined they may be said to have a universal extension. Their precise meaning, however, varies with the culture, for the destructiveness of one culture may be the constructiveness of another. Cannibalism, for example, would hardly be considered a "constructive" tendency in the United States, but quite conducive to psychic health among cannibals.

What then constitutes a "good" human being? The answer, at this point, almost writes itself. A "good" human being is one who has been allowed to "grow" through a "healthy" environment. "Growth" and "health" again vary with the culture. Consequently the meaning of "good human being" varies with the culture. Furthermore since Horney implies that man is responsible to his Creator, at least partially, for his actions, the term "good" may be understood in still another sense. A human being may be "good" in the sense that he is "normal". If he is normal he will, to varying degrees, actualize himself. An individual may also be "good" if he adheres to the standards of conduct imposed

by the culture. Where there is more than one standard there is, it appears, a possibility of choice. Therefore it is possible for an individual to be "good" in one sense, and "bad" in another. He may be "good" in the sense of being "constructive" but "bad" in the sense that although "normal", he nevertheless does not fully adhere to the standard or standards of morality set by the culture.

The answer to this last question supplies the background for a clarification of the other puzzles submitted at the end of chapter one. If the conditions for growth are "favorable" will man inevitably evolve into a constructive individual? If the conditions for growth are "favorable" man will inevitably evolve into a constructive individual, in the sense that he will not be a neurotic and will consequently actualize himself to various degrees. But Horney implies that he may and in most instances will show, traces of "normal" destructiveness, caused by his straying away from the fulfillment of the standard or standards of morality of his environment. This last point clarifies, all the more, the sense in which man is a responsible agent. (Man's responsibility was alluded to in the second chapter, when it was asked to whom or to what man was responsible.) Man has a responsibility to actualize his individual nature to the best of his ability and he has a responsibility to abide by the standards of his

environment. This responsibility rests primarily with the "normal" individual. Finally, the moral norm offered by Horney rings now all the clearer. The norm is, in short, her criterion for self-realization. Man has a moral responsibility to "grow". He must, in order to honor his responsibility, ask himself whether a particular attitude, striving or drive is conducive or obstructive to his human "growth". But the path that the observance of this norm will take, that is, the path which his "growth" will take, will again vary with the standards of the environment. Human nature, in short, may be actualized in several ways.

To sum up the general content of the first three chapters then, it may be said that Horneyan man is an inherently constructive and responsible being. These attributes characterize the nature of man, hence they have a universal extension. The constructiveness of the individual is actualized through the activity of the "real self" which is a central inner force possessed by all men and yet unique in each. The uniqueness stems from man's individual nature. The individualizing factors are the temperament, the degree of intelligence and the degree and quality of the native gifts, if any are possessed, of the individual child. But the "real self" can only operate to its full expectancy if brought in contact with a favorable environment. For it is the environment that will act upon

the individual and render him "healthy" or "unhealthy", or, more clearly, "normal" or neurotic. But the concept of normality and, consequently, the significance of a "favorable" environment vary with the culture and sometimes within the culture. Therefore, "there is no such thing as a normal psychology which holds for all mankind".³² If the environment is "healthy", in accordance with the meaning that the term "healthy" has in the particular culture, the child will "grow" and actualize himself. If the environment is of a crushingly "unhealthy" nature, the child will develop a "basic anxiety" which, unless counter-balanced in time by a favorable change in the human environment, will almost inevitably result in a neurosis. This disturbance entails several "unreal" defense mechanisms adapted by the individual in order to resolve the conflicts which he experiences with himself and with others.

A neurotic is characterized by certain traits. Although the expression of a neurosis varies with the culture, the characteristics of a neurotic are essentially similar in all cultures. They seem to stem from the nature of man. These characteristics imply a loss of freedom on the part of the individual, for they entail an inflexibility in his reactions, a discrepancy between his potentialities

³² Id., The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 19.

and his achievements, and the presence of conflicting tendencies. But the specific expressions of these characteristics varies with, and is conditioned by, the individual culture.

The causes of neurosis are to be found in part in the trying situations which are culturally determined and to which, consequently, all the individuals in a culture are subjected. But the more proximate causes are to be found in the interpersonal relations, particularly the parent-child relations. These are conditioned by the culture. If the latter are intensely unfavorable, the child will not be able to face the difficulties inherent in the culture itself. He will, most likely, become neurotic, that is, "full of nervousness" and anxiety. In order to gain an inner sense of security he will make use of several devices which promise to give him integration. These Horney termed the neurotic "trends". They represent a way of coping with the environment. But as stated in an earlier section of the chapter, "These solutions are less satisfactory than those of the average individual and are achieved at great expense to the whole personality". It was Horney's conviction that psychoanalytic therapy, involving an intensive probing into the individual's past and present situation, with a view toward unloosening the knots which the unfavorable environment and the neurotic have tied around his "real self", affords a true solution.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICISM OF HORNEY'S POSITION

The first two chapters of the thesis set forth some of the more significant philosophic principles governing the psychoanalytic theories of Dr. Karen Horney. The third chapter might also have been titled: "Horney's Principles Applied", for its task was to illustrate, through a sketchy presentation of Horney's view of the more practical and proximate background of neurosis, the manner in which her more ultimate concepts affected her psychoanalytic formulations.

This, the last chapter, proposes to evaluate both the principles and those aspects of Horney's theories presented in the third chapter, which reflect them. This objective, however, cannot be realized through the direct application of a critique of psychoanalysis discovered in any one Christian philosophic system, be it Thomistic or Augustinian. The times in which these philosophers had their being, although not devoid of human conflicts (ultimately arising from human acts), did not nevertheless see such a flowering of psychoanalytic theories as man is witness to, perhaps at times the unfortunate witness, in our times. Consequently there was no urgent need for an additional tract, "De Psychoanalisi", which, when applied, might serve as a measuring rod for the evaluation of a psycho-

analytic theory. The need is a contemporary one, and although Christian philosophic thought has not been blind to it, and in several instances made significant contributions, there is not, at present, a complete, explicit, and systematic expression of this need, reflective of the philosophic principles of any one Christian philosopher.

It is not within the objectives of this thesis to infer, from the perennial thought of the Angelic Doctor, a complete body of principles which might be termed "Aristotelian-Thomistic Psychoanalysis". Such a task would indeed be a momentous one, but unrealizable in this thesis for obvious reasons, a lack of space being, perhaps, the least significant of them. Furthermore the nature of this thesis does not reveal such a need. Those aspects of Horney's theories which have been selected for criticism may be evaluated either through a direct application of Thomistic principles or through what may reasonably be inferred from them. The Thomistic principles used in the criticism would doubtless be found in a "Thomistic Psychoanalysis" if such existed, but, for present purposes, such a tract is not a necessity. This chapter, then, will restrict itself to a critical examination of the philosophic implications put forth in the preceeding pages, through an application of Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine.

The thought of Karen Horney, as presented in the earlier chapters reveals three focal points. These are

truly philosophical in nature for they reveal Horney's more ultimate views of man. They concern man's universal nature, that is, the nature proper to man as man, and the role of man's individual nature in the process of its realization. Finally, they concern the different ways in which that nature may be actualized. Their significance is all the more appreciated in Horney's view of neurosis, for there they are brought into full play. The evaluation of both these principles and their applications will be much facilitated if they be briefly and separately reviewed.

1. Recapitulation of Points to be Criticized

Concept of man - It has been shown that Horney's differences with Freud, while having their apparent beginnings in feminine psychology, soon expressed themselves in a theory of neurosis reflective of a completely opposed view of man. In contrast to Freud's "pessimistic" view of man, Horney's new position revealed an unbounded optimism. Horney, furthermore, took issue not only with the Freudian view of man but also with the "Christian". Although she recognized significant differences in the two positions, the similarities were such as to discourage her allegiance. Both the Freudian and "Christian" views, recognized something intrinsically "bad, evil, sinful or destructive" in man's nature. This unfavorable tendency appeared to be a birth-

right pure and simple. Freud attributed it to elemental instincts and "Christians" to original sin. But the fact remained that both recognized its existence. Furthermore both the Freudian and "Christian" positions demanded that something be done about the "evil" in man's nature, and although the solutions advanced by these two "factions" were not altogether identical, nevertheless they were both in agreement in their desire to control that aspect of human nature which was not altogether "constructive". But these controls could only serve to shackle man's spontaneity and consequently impede his self-realization, for man, Horney argued, was not "bad, sinful or destructive", either in a "Christian" or a Freudian sense. Man was, in point of fact, a wholly constructive God-made creature. He was a responsible being possessing potentialities for both "good" and "evil". But these potentialities were shown not to stem from the same source. The "goodness" in man stemmed from his very nature, the "evil" from an unfavorable life situation. Horney advanced three "proofs" to validate this position. They were derived from her study of neurotics and amounted to the conviction that inasmuch as the "destructiveness" in neurotics was brought about by an unfavorable human environment but abandoned through therapy, there was no reason to conclude that human nature, as such, was destructive. This latter position, having its beginnings

as a general explanation of the cause of neurosis, later pervaded her entire theory. It is, perhaps, best termed, "Social Determinism".

Horneyan social determinism - The "constructiveness" of human nature-is actualized through the activity of the "real self". This is a central inner force common to all men and yet individualized in each man through his temperament, his intelligence, and whatever qualitative native gifts he might be endowed with at birth. (Human nature was loosely likened, in the first chapter, to the Scholastic concept of "essence", while the notion of the "real self" was compared to the Scholastic notion of "nature" strictly viewed.)

The "destructive" tendencies in man were shown, by Horney, to be caused by an unfavorable human environment. Whether a man grows "healthy" or neurotic is ultimately and unqualifiedly decided by his surroundings.

A child has little to say about his early environment, particularly his parental environment. If it is "favorable", the child will be "healthy". If it is intensely "unfavorable" and not alleviated by strong counter-acting factors, the child will become neurotic. The environment, in short, determines which of the two possibilities will be realized in the individual. Since Horney associated the term "constructive" with psychic health, and the term

"destructive" predominantly with neurosis, it is clear that the environment ultimately determines whether the individual will be essentially "constructive" or "destructive".

Evidence of this strict determinism is seen not only in Horney's basic position as outlined above, but, as has been shown in the previous chapters, and as will be reiterated, it appears as the natural off-shoot in Horney's theories of neurosis.

Closely allied to and, in point of fact, inseparable from Horney's social determinism is a relativism having its beginnings in her concept of normality. This relativism too infiltrated Horney's entire theory of neurosis.

Horneyan relativism - "There is no such thing as a normal psychology which holds for all mankind", because there is no such thing as a concept of normality which holds for all mankind. The concept of what is normal is man-made. It differs with the culture and, in the course of time, even within the culture.

Human nature may be actualized in a multitude of ways, in point of fact, in at least as many ways as there are concepts of normality. For really actualized human nature is "normal" human nature, but the concept of what is normal varies with the culture. Consequently the significance of such expressions as, "good human being", "favorable conditions", "responsibility", "free, healthy

development", must be understood in the light of the criterion of what "should be" in a particular culture. Consequently also, the definition of neurosis must allow for cultural differences. Horney saw to it that it did and then proceeded to apply her relativism to her theory of neurosis. It is in this theory that a blending of Horney's social determinism with her relativism is clearly perceivable.

The conflicts moving the individuals within a culture are culturally determined and vary with the culture. Since the culture also determines the pattern of the interpersonal relations, these too vary with the culture. Although the characteristics of a neurotic seem to have a universal extension, their expression is determined by and differs with the culture. Again, the "unfavorable" interpersonal relations leading to a neurosis must be considered unfavorable in the light of the cultural norm.

2. Evaluation of Horney

Concept of man - Horney's concept of man, must be approached from two diverse aspects, the logical and the ontological. For Horney's position, as it concerns her view of man, is open to a two-fold inquiry. It may be purposefully asked whether it violates the basic rules of logic, that is, whether granting the major and minor premises one must inevitably assent to her conclusion. Secondly it may

be asked whether the premises and the conclusion, drawn from them, are truly representative of what is. The logic underlying Horney's concept of man, being the more immediately striking of the two aspects, should be considered first.

As stated in the first chapter and reiterated in the recapitulation, Horney offered three kinds of "evidence", which, if accepted, would establish most conclusively the total "constructiveness" of human nature. It would follow irrevocably from such an acceptance that any "destructiveness" found in man must have an external source, that is, it could not be essential to man's nature. These "proofs" have already been presented in the first chapter. A rephrasing could serve no better purpose than that of unnecessary repetition. Since it is the logic behind these proofs which is, at present, open to scrutiny, it would be the more expedient alternative to resubmit them in syllogistic form.¹ The syllogisms, observing the order of Horney's "proofs" as presented in Chapter I, are as follows:

1. Neuroses are caused by the environment;
Neuroses are characterized by "destructive" tendencies;
Ergo, the environment causes "destructive" tendencies.

¹ Whether these syllogisms reflect a fair presentation of Horney's three "proofs" may be verified by reconsidering these "proofs" as presented in p. 6-8, of Chapter I, and as expounded by Horney herself, in "Human Nature Can Change", Ref. footnote 7, p. 6, Chapter I of this Thesis.

or in effect
Ergo, "destructiveness" is not essential to
human nature.

2. Neuroses are characterized by "destructive"
tendencies;
Neuroses are caused by the environment;
Ergo, the environment is the cause of
"destructive" tendencies.
or in effect
Ergo, "destructiveness" is not essential to
human nature.
3. That which is cured by analysis is not
essential to human nature;
But "destructiveness" is cured by
analysis;
Ergo, "destructiveness" is not essential
to human nature.

The difference between the first two syllogisms may, and indeed ought to be, questioned. For, in point of fact, the major and minor premises and the middle terms are, for all practical purposes, identical. But if these syllogisms are truly reflective of Horney's first two "proofs", it should be asked, rather, whether these are in any way different from one another.

There are, in fact, some differences in the order of Horney's presentation of the data leading to the conclusions, and in the nature of the observations, but the "proofs" themselves, cannot be considered different. In her first "proof" the observations may, according to Horney, be made by anyone. (In speaking of her "evidence" Horney states that, "the first kind can be seen by anyone who

keeps his eyes open")² The second "proof", on the other hand, is supplied by clinical experience. Furthermore, in her first "proof", Horney argued from the observation of the deterministic role of the environment in causing neurosis, to that which characterizes a neurosis, namely "destructive" tendencies. In her second "proof" she began with neurotics and observed their "destructive" tendencies. But mere observation of neurotic "destructiveness" cannot reveal its cause. Therefore Horney's ultimate conclusion, regarding the constructiveness of human nature, must have followed an investigation of the causes underlying the "destructiveness" of her patients. But then the product of this investigation could only be a refined carbon copy of the observations of those who "keep their eyes open". Even granting the different approaches to the same conclusion, the "facts" necessitating the conclusion are, in the final analysis, identical. Whether the observations begin with a child's behaviour or with the compulsive "destructiveness" of neurotics, the data leading to the conclusion remains the same. "Destructiveness", according to Horney, is not essential to human nature because, in the first instance, the environment was seen to cause neurosis, and

² KAREN HORNEY, "Human Nature Can Change", in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 68.

"destructiveness" was seen as an expression of the disturbance. In the second instance, "destructiveness" was not perceived as essential to human nature, since the compulsive "destructiveness" of neurotics could be traced back to an unfavorable environment. In short, the conclusion that "destructiveness" is not essential to human nature was drawn by Horney in the light of two previous conclusions, namely that neurosis was determined by the environment and that "destructiveness" was a reflection of neurosis. Whether Horney drew her ultimate conclusions (regarding the constructiveness of human nature), by introducing the latter conclusion first, or the former, both had to be put forth before her ultimate conclusion could be drawn. The first two syllogisms attempted to observe this difference of approach, but the terms of the syllogisms, other than being differently arranged, could not reflect a further distinction.

Horney's third "proof" does differ from the other two, for it is based not on the previous observations, be they general or clinical, but on the results of her therapy. The third syllogism clearly reveals this difference. But what is to be said of the logic underlying Horney's "proofs" as expressed through the syllogisms?

Convinced as Horney may have been, of the constructiveness of human nature, her data did not warrant such

unbounded optimism. The syllogisms, from a logical point of view, are valid. The conclusions seem, indeed, to follow inevitably from the premises. (Upon first considering the syllogisms the temptation might be to accuse Horney of violating one of the most fundamental rules of logic. The error might seem to lie in universalizing the particular. That is, it might appear that the major and minor terms of the three syllogisms are universal in the conclusion, while they were particular terms in the major and minor premises. But Horney's conclusion was, rather, that neurotic destructiveness was environmentally produced.) It is not the logic underlying the syllogisms which ought to be questioned but rather the logic behind Horney's method. For what, in the final analysis, were these "proofs" to prove? They were to show that contrary to the Freudian and "Christian" view, human nature was wholly "constructive". And what, in fact, did they show? That the "destructiveness" of neurotics was caused by the environment. How does it follow from this that human nature is entirely "constructive"? In short, if Horney's premises be granted, her "proofs", as expressed through the syllogisms, do prove something, but they do not however prove what she had intended them to.

That Horney did not perceive this fundamental fallacy in her reasoning appears, at first, somewhat

perplexing. But it must be brought to mind that, so far as theorizing was concerned, "destructiveness" for Horney could originate from but one of two possible sources, namely human nature or environment. If it could be demonstrated that the environment did promote "destructiveness", then there was no need to seek it in human nature, to allow for contributing factors, or to distinguish between kinds or types of "destructiveness".

The whys of this limited and ultimately dogmatic view are not entirely clear. But Horney had long "suffered" the Freudian view of man in Germany, and very often a reaction has a way of going to extremes. Furthermore it must be recalled that Horney believed in the existence of a Creator, but was most relativistic with regard to other values. Consequently the "Christian" position which predicated "absolutes" could not be expected to meet with her approval.

There shall be further opportunity to discuss the logic behind Horney's ramifications of her concept of man, for it will need to be asked whether Horney, in her later elaborations, remained faithful to her earlier position. But such a question involves Horney's concept of normality and for the sake of order it is perhaps best to treat that problem after the validity of Horney's view of man has been decided. At present, the ontological value of Horney's

concept of human nature should be questioned.

Original sin is a fact. This fact is most vividly brought to man's awareness through Revelation, for it is from this source that he learns of his fall and its effect, namely a disturbed relationship with his Creator and with himself. Horney, in denying the reality of original sin, relegated it to the realm of superstition, or at the very best myth. Although Horney can be justly accused of denying a position which she did not really understand, and although the truth of Christian Theology can be defended on its own grounds, the nature of this thesis demands that the problem of man's nature be approached through reason alone. It must be shown then, that Horney's view ultimately stemmed from her failure to "take a good look" at man's nature. This failure, ironically enough, reduced Horneyan man to a philosophical abstraction. If Horney had been a little more observing she would have concluded, even without the aid of Revelation, that man was not as entirely "constructive" as she had believed, that there was indeed, a disorder in his nature. Unaided reason can arrive at this conclusion, for although the knowledge of the philosopher must, by reason of its imperfect sources, be less perfect than that of the theologian, this is not to say that the philosopher is incapable of observing that disorder. As Vernon J. Bourke, in his "Ethics" significantly remarks:

But a good ethicist recognizes the omnipresent ethical fact of the disturbance of the life of reason by the passions. The moral philosopher and the moral theologian do not differ widely on the actual facts of human existence.³

The data, then, is observable. There remains but to observe or, to use one of Horney's own expressions, "to keep our eyes open". It is precisely this that the ancients did, and their observations bear witness to a more penetrating insight into the disorder in man's soul. For as one Catholic thinker points out: "Though psychiatrists have rediscovered man's conflict and described it on the unconscious level, the human race has always known about it".⁴ And, indeed, evidence of the knowledge of this conflict is found in the writings of Plato and of Sophocles. The former has described personality in the form of a charioteer who experienced considerable difficulty in keeping two steeds moving in the same direction. The steeds were named appetite and spirit. Sophocles, in turn, seemed to go even deeper into the roots of the problem as he spoke of a conflict originated in pre-historic times which, even in his own day, infected all men.

³ VERNON J. BOURKE, Ethics, New York, the Macmillan Company, 1951, p. 10.

⁴ FULTON J. SHEEN, Peace of Soul, New York, Whittlesey House, 1949, p. 35-36.

The disorder of man's internal powers is indeed too obvious to deny and any conscientious and open-minded observer of human nature cannot fail to take note of it. A psychoanalytic theory which attributes an accentuated expression of this inner disharmony, namely a neurosis, to the environment alone, fails to account for its universality. And Horney not only failed to account for it but, in point of fact, denied it.

The ultimate why of the observable disharmony reflected by man's nature cannot be answered by the Thomistic ethicist. Such is the task of the theologian, though there are some contemporary Thomists who affirm that philosophy can supply an answer.⁵ This point, however, concerns the present argument only accidentally for although, on superficial observation, it would appear that Horney's position can only be refuted by showing the real source of man's darkened intellect and weak will, it is in fact only necessary to point to the universality of this basic conflict. Had Horney perceived that "destructive" tendencies are not only peculiar to neurotics but to human nature as such, she would never have sought in the environment the ultimate explanation.

⁵ (Robert E. Brennan, in his "Thomistic Psychology" has remarked that the doctrine of original sin can be established on purely philosophic grounds.)

As has been shown, the testimony of mankind throughout the ages bears ample witness to the universal disorder in man's soul. Though it is admittedly difficult for a natural scientist to understand this universal strife between the human flesh and the human spirit, that is hardly reason enough to deny its existence. What Horney perceived, in effect, were certain "destructive" tendencies in her patients, and she argued, justifiably enough, that the source of the destructiveness must be sought in the patients' past and present life situation. But to reason from this, that human nature is wholly "constructive" and, as shall be discussed later, to conclude even that the destructive tendencies of neurotics are entirely due to the environment, is to view human nature in an entirely too idealistic light. If, as Horney affirmed, Freud's pessimism saw man as little more than a wholly material, instinct-ridden evil being, her own unbounded optimism relegated human nature almost to the realm of the angelic. A more realistic approach, even if only on the natural level, might have been realized through a blending of the two.

Horney's basic view of human nature is, in the final analysis, unreal, for it chooses to disregard a most significant aspect of that nature. Furthermore the "proofs" which she presents to validate her convictions have been shown to be redundant and inadequate. But there are,

nonetheless, certain aspects of Horney's view of man which find their parallel in Thomistic thought.

The unique central inner force, the "real self" has already been mentioned in passing and compared favorably to the Scholastic concept of "nature" strictly viewed. The Thomist finds no difficulty in agreeing that everything that exists exists for action, that beings come into existence with potentialities to be actualized and that the potentialities are not the same in each being or even in each representative of a species. Thomism clearly perceives that things exist for an end that is intrinsic to them. Considered thus dynamically a being is a nature. And if Horney asserts the existence of a force, the "real self", which is the deep source of growth, the Thomist is in accord though he might put it somewhat differently. The principle of activity which in Horneyan language is "the real self" is, in Thomist language, "nature" or substance as a principle of activity working toward an inherent end.⁶ The uniqueness of this nature or, viewing it more statically, this substance, stems, in man, through the soul's union with matter. As St. Thomas, himself, remarks in dealing with the problem of individual differences:

⁶ The essence of the above considerations on the Scholastic teaching on "nature" have been derived from Cardinal Mercier's "Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy", Ref: footnote 16, p. 15, Chapter I of this thesis.

For it is plain that the better the disposition of the body, the better the soul allotted to it.

[.] The reason for this is that act and form are received into matter according to the capacity of matter; and thus because some men have bodies of better disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding.⁷

St. Thomas, of course, was speaking not of the substantial nature of the soul but of its powers as individualized through the soul's union with matter. Since Horney suggests that the "real self" is rendered unique in each individual through his intelligence, his temperament and his native gifts, and since she in no wise speaks of these as environmentally determined qualities, or (and who could expect it of her), as infused qualities, or as individualizing factors arising from the substantial nature of the soul, it is clear that she thought of them as biologically-given factors. Here then, is another point of agreement. Finally, Thomism will readily grant that there is a nature common to man as man. But Horney's view of man, as a being existing in a "state of pure nature" can hardly strike a familiar note in Christian thought. In seeking in the environment the cause of "destructiveness" Horney brought in its wake her concept of social determinism.

⁷ ANTON C. PEGIS, (Ed. by), Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, New York, Random House, 1945, p. 827. (S.T., Ia, 85, 7).

Horneyan social determinism - Since Horney had denied both Freud's "pessimistic" view of human nature and the Christian position which saw a tendency to both good and evil in man, there was little left to do but to predicate the unqualified "goodness" of human nature and seek in some source other than man, the reason for the "destructiveness" of her patients. Horney's view of human nature has already been evaluated but there is left to consider its logical consequents. Does the environment unqualifiedly cause neurosis? Is man really environmentally determined in his healthy or neurotic growth? (It will be recalled that it was Horney's conviction that the environment was the sole factor to be considered when seeking the causes of neurosis. It would follow from this that the environment does unqualifiedly determine the healthy or neurotic development of the individual.)

There is substantial agreement among all psychiatrists irrespective of their particular school, and including the Horneyan, with the fact that neuroses are characterized by faulty habits of thinking, feeling and willing. The fact that Horney's relativism might oppose an absolute view of what might constitute faulty mental habits, is not to the point in the present discussion. The crux of the question will lie in whether these faulty habits are ultimately and unqualifiedly determined by the environment.

It will be of considerable import to reconsider at this point, a reply which Horney made in her works, to a question which she clearly foresaw as one which would likely occur to anyone who came in contact with her theories. This reply was reproduced in the second chapter of the thesis.⁸ Through it, Horney clearly eliminated the possibility of considering seriously a source, other than the environment, as a cause of neurosis. She maintained that it was impossible to imagine how two environments might be identical. Therefore it was pure fiction to inquire why two individuals who had been placed in similar environments did not both become neurotic. Now although it is a truism that no two environments can be identical, the situation need not be pushed to such an extreme in order to allow some reasonable ground to the enquiry. It is certainly an observable fact, that many individuals live in essentially similar, if not identical, unfavorable environments. Not all these individuals become neurotic. What can explain this difference in reaction? It is not a valid reply to say that obviously those who did not become neurotic were not in such unfavorable surroundings as those who did, for that denies the very ground of the discussion. If this ground is to be denied it can only be denied on reasonable evidence to the contrary and not by categorically

⁸ The quotation appears on p. 29.

affirming that this is simply not so. But that, in effect, is Horney's position. The validity of this position is a matter of considerable interest. Horney, after all, came in contact, at least in her work, with people who were neurotic. Analysis revealed that these individuals were the victims of a crushingly unfavorable environment. But there were healthy people who did not seek her aid. On what grounds could she affirm that the only factor separating them from her clinical couch was a favorable environment? Surely not therapeutic success. It cannot be reasonably argued that success in psychoanalytic therapy stems solely from a proper analysis and elimination of the cause or causes underlying the disturbance, for it is a well known fact that it is possible for psychoanalysts of different schools to create at least a reasonably superficial psychic balance among patients suffering from the same disturbance. This curious phenomenon ought to suggest that therapeutic success cannot always be unqualifiedly attributed to the psychoanalytic theories themselves. It may be mentioned in passing that in some instances the power of suggestion is not entirely absent and might play at least a contributory role in affecting a cure.

Analysts are wont to present their therapeutic successes as an argument to prove their concepts and theories. Their ideas must be right, so they reason, because they work. The answer to this pragmatist way of thinking is that good results

do not necessarily prove the truth of a theory.

.....
Some psychiatrists point out that there is a great deal of catharsis and suggestion involved in any form of psychoanalysis, and those authors believe that many cures can be explained by these factors rather than by analysis proper.⁹

Horney, in short, does not prove that the environment is the unqualified and sole cause of neurosis. She merely affirms it. Her "proofs" of the constructiveness of human nature, as already stated, do not prove human nature to be wholly constructive. So far as proving that the environment alone causes "destructiveness", her "proofs" presuppose the validity of her premises. Now it is precisely these which are open to question, for although it is an observable fact that neuroses are characterized by destructive tendencies, it is not indisputable that neuroses are solely caused by the environment. And in the light of the above consideration, Horney's position is clearly disputable.

Vanderveldt and Odenwald, in their treatise "Psychiatry and Catholicism", after discussing several theories which proposed to explain the cause or causes of neurosis, and granting some truth to each, introduce a factor whose validity seems to spring from its very

⁹ VANDERVELDT and ODENWALD, Psychiatry and Catholicism, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952, p. 154-155.

consideration. They introduce this factor by observing that the different theories advanced indicate that the determinants of neurosis must be sought not unqualifiedly in the experiences that an individual is subjected to during his life, but, far rather, "in the manner in which an individual experiences these events according to his personality structure".¹⁰ They go on to state and, it would appear, with validity most manifest that:

One's personality structure depends upon his physical and psychic constitution. Therefore a certain constitutional disposition must be assumed in order to make the exogeneous factors operative in such a way as to cause neurosis.¹¹

Apart from the self-evident fact that man, being a composite of body and soul, cannot be objectively considered as a being unaffected by his biological make-up, these two authors submit the consideration which has already been advanced in connection with Horney's rhetorical question:

The postulation of such an endogenous constitutional predisposition in neurotic individuals is all the more compelling because it is necessary to explain the fact that they break down under the strain and stress of life's conflicts; whereas other people, although confronted with the same, or even more serious, problems, remain at peace with themselves and with the world. This predisposition to neurotic disturbances is probably present to some degree in every individual, since - as has been observed - every person is liable at times to neurotic reactions, but it is apparently more developed in

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 271.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 271.

the psychoneurotic. The normal person is possessed of a physical and psychic make-up capable of accepting and solving his life problems with relative tranquility, but even for him there exists a breaking point. In certain personalities this breaking point is rather low; when faced with problems and conflicts, they break down speedily and often permanently unless they learn to face reality.¹²

This position seems indeed to take more objectively into account, the data of our experience. It is most interesting to note that St. Thomas went to the extent of affirming that a man's biological make-up may influence his moral life. The Angelic Doctor has been previously quoted in the chapter¹³ as admitting differences in the excellence of the operations of souls by virtue of their union with matter. Although St. Thomas's situation in history, does not permit us to seek in his writings an explicit statement reflective of his conviction of a biological and psychic predisposition contributing in the formation of a neurosis, his awareness of biological and intellectual differences among individuals lends favorable ground to the consideration of a predisposition in the formation of a neurosis. This position, as already stated is reinforced if reality be accepted as conclusive testimony. For it is a fact that all do not react in the same way to the same situations,

¹² Ibid., p. 271.

¹³ The quotation appears on p. 104.

and Vanderveldt and Odenwald press the point even further when they observe that it is not only true that individuals who have been subjected to an essentially similar unfavorable environment, do not all become neurotic, but it is also true, and ought to be most disconcerting to an extreme environmental determinist such as Horney, that very often individuals who have been subjected to life situations which have been more crushing than those of a neurotic, have not themselves, become neurotic.

Finally the position of these two authors, apart from combining contemporary observations with Thomistic Doctrine, remains all the more in touch with reality for they openly suggest that even the person who is normal at the start, that is, the one who is not significantly predisposed to become neurotic has his breaking point. In other words, even he, may become neurotic.

Horney's unreal approach to reality could not help but bring its unfavorable repercussions. A position which fails to take into account all the factors responsible for the production of an effect, cannot fail to exaggerate those factors which it does recognize. For upon their shoulders falls the difficult task of explaining the whole effect. It is precisely this error which inevitably led Horney to exaggerate her determinism and to further limit the freedom of the individual. Her view of the will

remained, understandably enough, in large part theoretical. Man was in effect, for Horney, a being possessing a body and soul, an intelligence and a will. But in his healthy or neurotic growth, his body had little effect on his intelligence and free-will. Rather it is the environment which ought to be recognized as the sole unqualified and adequate cause of his healthy or neurotic development. This position is even the more peculiar, if Horney's view of the factors which, as she clearly implied in her works, individualize the generic nature, be reconsidered. These were described as temperament, degree of intelligence, and the possession of qualitative native gifts. It is bewildering that Horney should admit the existence of these biological and psychic individuating factors, but fail to consider them when explaining the causes of neurosis. In fairness to Horney it must be admitted that, in considering the genesis of neurosis, she did not completely fail to consider the possibility of a biological and psychic predisposition. But here is another example of a reaction going to extremes. For, as has been shown, Horney was vehemently opposed to Freud's explanation of neurosis in terms of biological drives.

When we realize the great import of cultural conditions on neuroses the biological and physiological conditions, which are considered by Freud to be their root, recede into the background. The influence of these latter factors should be

considered on the basis of well established evidence.¹⁴

The above quotation appears sufficiently mild and open-minded. But Horney's later works do not reveal any serious consideration of "the influence of these latter factors". In her third work, *Self-Analysis*, she circumvents predisposition toward neurosis by off-handedly remarking that "we know less of the constitutional factors than of the environmental ones".¹⁵ Her theories proceeded to relegate the constitutional factors to non-existence. This truncated view of man, as has already been stated, resulted in an exaggeration of her social determinism. This exaggeration had its telling effects. As a neurosis is unqualifiedly environmentally determined irrespective of man's biological and psychic individuality, the accomplished neurotic is determined in his reactions to situations. It will be recalled that neurosis, for Horney, was a disturbance which pervaded the entire individual. It results in the "deformation of character". In virtue of the extensive grip which "the crippling shackles of neurosis" exert on the neurotic, he cannot be considered a responsible agent. Although Horney, in her more theoretical moments, asserted

¹⁴ KAREN HORNEY, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1937, VIII.

¹⁵ Id., Self-Analysis, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1942, p. 43.

that the neurotic's freedom is merely "impaired", the bulk of her writings leave the reader with the impression that the neurotic's free will is no longer at his disposal. He is, in short, irresponsible. This position clearly contains severe ethical consequences, for a neurosis, as seen by Christian psychologists and psychiatrists, impairs the individual's freedom only in those facets of his existence which are pervaded by his psychic disturbance. In other aspects he is, at least in part, a responsible agent and many of his actions are imputable to him.

The criticism of the first two focal points, namely Horney's concept of man and her social determinism has, it is hoped, also shown that perhaps the most significant factor which motivated Horney and which caused her to assume such disputable positions was an antipathy for both the Freudian view and for the view which she considered to be the "Christian" one. For in considering the genesis of neurosis, her dislike for Freud's "pessimism" appears to have caused her to sever man in two. By virtue of this separation man's biological make-up could have no telling effect on his psychic development. Furthermore her view of man is clearly illustrative of her desire to discredit both the Freudian and what she considered to be the "Christian" positions. Her crusading desire to demonstrate that human nature was wholly constructive was in stark opposition to

Freud's "evil instinct theory" and to the Christian view of human nature. But the result was not an objective refutation of these positions, but rather an angelic and uniform view of man which paved the way to an exaggerated determinism. It was this refusal to view human nature as it was, which caused Horney to assume some rather incredible positions. Her view of the environment is a most palpable case in point. Horney repeatedly asserted that it was the environment, rather than any evil, badness, or weakness in man's nature, which caused neurosis. But what is environment? Is it not partly composed of human actions which come to bear upon the individual? (Horney herself often spoke of the human environment, and asserted that the proximate causes of neurosis must be sought in the interpersonal relations, particularly in the parental sphere.) But how is it possible to admit the existence of an intensely unfavorable environment without also admitting that the unfavorable interpersonal relations are an expression of unfavorable human conduct. It is true that these unfavorable interpersonal relations arise, Horney said, through parents who are themselves neurotic. This leaves the puzzle open to two possible solutions. Either someone was born neurotic and caused others to become neurotic (but this is opposed to Horney's environmental determinism for it supposes that someone may become

neurotic without being subjected to an unfavorable environment) or the acts of individuals were either in intent or in effect or in both detrimental to the healthy up-bringing of the child. But if this is true, and what other possibility is there, how can human nature be said to be wholly constructive? Horney neatly avoided this question. The result was a view of the environment devoid, for all practical considerations, of any human note.

There seems little need of stressing that the preceeding pages in no way intended to ignore or minimize the objective role of the environment in the formation of the character and personality of the individual, be he healthy or neurotic. The external factors which come to bear on man have their decisive influences whose impact is more often than not far-reaching in both his life and those around him. Consequently there can be little argument with a position which attributes to an unfavorable environment a strong contributory role in the formation of a neurosis. But it is precisely here that the Horneyan and Christian view part company. For Horney's exaggerated determinism does violence to both the Christian view of the role of those factors which spring from individualized human nature, and to the responsible role which Christian thought attributes to that part of the neurotic which is not affected by his disturbance. Christian thought will readily

admit that if an individual is physically and psychically predisposed to be a neurotic and is further cast in his early years into an environment teeming with conflicts, his responsibility, that is, his will, so far as his psychic development is concerned, is rendered inactive. In these extreme circumstances, he may be viewed as a passive agent. But this is not to state, either in theory or in practice, that man, the neurotic, has no responsibility for his acts while neurotic.

There is now left to consider the third focal point, namely Horney's concept of normality. This concept was described, in the second chapter, as manifestly relativistic.

Horneyan relativism - It will be recalled that Horney could not conceive of "a normal psychology which holds for all mankind", since she could not allow for a concept of normality which holds for all mankind. This concept, rather, is man-made and varies with the culture. There is no such thing then, as a universally normal man.

Horney, partly through comparing the ways of the United States and those of Europe, and partly through her readings in anthropology accepted the differences in what is considered "normal" in different cultures as indisputable and most significant facts. And indeed they are surely that. Unfortunately, however, she went further, for her

acceptance provided, in her eyes, sufficient ground with which to draw a rather staggering conclusion, one which did not at all follow with necessity from her readings and from her observations. She concluded, in effect, that since there were so many views of normality, there could not be a universal concept of normality. The validity of this position shall receive extensive attention. Before its evaluation, however, it ought to be inquired whether there is any truth to Horney's relativistic view of normality and whether this view has any value in the discovery and treatment of neurotics.

There are, in fact, differences in what is considered "normal" in different cultures. The examples offered by Horney, and included in the second chapter are, on the whole, excellent. These conceptions of normality can be of definite value in discovering the neurotic and in readjusting him, through analysis, to himself and his environment. An individual who blatantly disregards the norms of normality of his culture may indeed be in need of treatment. If, for example, a young man living in the United States were to exhibit an extreme chronic suspicion of everything and everyone, there might be reasonable ground to assume that he was not well-balanced. If he could not assert himself in ordinary life situations with other people, if he were to show a marked indifference toward a goal in life

in keeping with his education and native abilities; if he were to exhibit a marked indecision in the most elementary affairs of life; if he reflected an undue fear of automobiles or of crowds, or if he were unable to keep up a conversation when again his background and native ability presented no barriers, there would be sufficient ground to at least suspect that this individual was mentally disturbed. The ground for these conclusions would, of course, be provided by the patterns of behaviour existing in the United States. There, it is expected that an individual be on his guard against the injustices of others, but it is not considered "normal" to be continually and chronically suspicious of everything and everyone particularly when satisfactory evidence to the contrary has been provided. Similarly, in the United States, the normal pattern of behaviour demands that a person be reasonably self-assertive in his interpersonal relations. He is expected to choose a goal in keeping with his likes and abilities and to pursue it with a tenacity that will assure at least moderate success. He is expected to think on his feet, to see the pros and cons of a situation and to arrive at a judgement. His daily contact with crowds, automobiles, and individuals would render fear of these, most peculiar. And the reason why he is expected to conform to this standard of "normality" is because the environment, parental and other-

wise, is expected to train the individual to conform reasonably to these norms. Therefore if he does not, there is strong ground for supposing a maladjustment. People who are mentally disturbed do, in point of fact, swerve from the pattern of behaviour accepted as "normal" in their culture, for, being maladjusted they fail to respond accordingly to the life situations which they daily encounter. Therefore there is both validity and value to Horney's relativistic view of normality. It is of value in discovering the neurotic¹⁶, and, in virtue of the fact that the "normal" man is adjusted to his surroundings, these

¹⁶ It is true that Horney supplied criteria other than "deviation from the normal" with which to discover the neurotic. In the third chapter of the thesis other patterns of behaviour which, for Horney, characterized the neurotic, were mentioned. These were: rigidity in reaction, a discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments, and the presence of conflicting tendencies. However, although Horney presented these last three characteristics as separate and distinct from the first, they are, in effect, but its ramifications. For Horney herself explained that rigidity in reaction characterized a neurotic only if its particular manifestation was not in keeping with the norms of the culture. Similarly a discrepancy between potentialities and accomplishments can only be viewed as a discrepancy in the light of what is expected of an individual in his culture. The conflicting tendencies seem to allow the same qualification. Therefore, though the last three characteristics have been assumed, in the third chapter, to have a universal extension, their particular expression has been seen to vary with the culture. These variations, therefore, amount to deviations from the "normal" pattern in the culture. Therefore, though the present discussion, treats of only the first criterion it, in effect, includes them all.

relative concepts of normality are of value to the psychiatrist since they provide a norm toward which he can move his patient. (Whether all who depart from the accepted standards of the culture must be considered neurotic and whether it is unqualifiedly of value to adjust the patient to the norms of his culture will be discussed later.) But it ought to be emphatically stressed here that these relative norms are proximate and empirical norms. Being this they are not sufficient to make of man what he ought to be. Nor is their plurality as exemplified in different cultures, exclusive of a more ultimate and stable norm, one that is applicable to man as man. There is, in fact, a more ultimate and unchanging concept of normality. How is it reached?

A norm is "a rule of measurement, an authoritative standard".¹⁷ The adjective suffix "al" denotes "belonging to, of or pertaining to, having the character of, appropriate to". It is clear then that when normal is predicated of a thing, the implication is that that thing reflects to a satisfactory degree the rule of measurement or authoritative standard applicable to it. Surely there can be no misunderstanding between Horney and Thomism on

¹⁷ THOMAS J. HIGGINS, Man as Man, The Science and Art of Ethics, Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1949, p. 47.

the meaning of the word. The difficulty arises, rather, when a criterion of normality is demanded. In short, how is it to be decided what standard of behaviour, operation or activity ought to be observed by a thing so that if it is observed, normality may be predicated of it?

It would appear evident that the standard by which a thing is to be judged ought to be intimately connected with its essence, so much so in fact that in the final analysis it is derived from its essence. Essence was defined in the first chapter, as "that which makes a thing to be what it is". One example with a view toward clarifying the intimacy between the standard by which a thing is to be judged in its activity, and its essence, will serve for many.

If one were to set about the task of defining a rubber ball, one would be most likely to conclude, after some observation of several such objects of different sizes and shapes, in both their appearances and activities, that a rubber ball is a bodily, inorganic substance, of a spherical or oval shape, composed or constituted of rubber. This would be the definition or essence of a rubber ball. This object, in virtue of its essence possesses a property which might be termed resiliency or elasticity. Because of this property a rubber ball is capable of performing a peculiar activity or operation, that is, it is capable of

bounding back when brought in contact with a relatively solid object. Now if a rubber ball were incapable of performing this operation, it would not be correct to say that it is no longer a rubber ball, for what a thing is, is clearly designated not by the thing's properties but by its essence. If a rubber ball were incapable of bounding either because intentionally or accidentally deflated, punctured or in any way damaged on its surface it would not cease to be what it is. It would cease to be what it is if one or more of its essential notes were lost. If, for example, a spherical rubber ball were to break in two, one could no longer maintain that it is a rubber ball since it would no longer possess the shape which partly characterizes its essence. But although the loss or impairment of an activity flowing from the essence of a thing does not alter the essential reality of that being, it might be justly asked whether this individual being is performing the function or functions which its nature intends. If any reasonable answer is to be given to this question it is clear that another question must precede it. What is demanded of a rubber ball in virtue of its nature? It is apparent that in answering this question a standard or norm for any and all such objects results. This standard may then be applied to the individuals. If they adhere to or reflect the standard or norm derived from the observation

of the operations or activities which flow from their nature, then the adjective "normal" may be applied. If on the other hand, they do not, another adjective abnormal, clearly meaning, 'not normal' would require application.

What is demanded of a rubber ball in virtue of its nature has been shown. Therefore a rubber ball which exhibits a reasonable degree of resiliency or elasticity may be termed normal, while one which does not may be termed abnormal. It is interesting and important to note, that the exact degree of resiliency required for such an object to be classified as normal is rather elusive. It is even more important to note, once more, that the norm by which rubber balls are to be judged is derived by investigating the nature of a rubber ball and deducing the operations which ought to flow from that nature. The norm is, in short, objective. It does not depend on the individual observer or observers, rather on the thing itself, and ultimately whether a norm is true or false depends on whether the observer has truly perceived the nature of the object in question.

To say, for example, that a rubber ball is abnormal if it refuses, of itself, to return to its owner when thrown away from him, is to apply a subjective and invalid norm of normality. It is not in the nature of a rubber ball to act in a reasonable manner or to be trained to obedience.

In a similar manner, it would not do to say that a rubber ball is abnormal if its color is blue rather than red. It is not of its essence to be any particular color. The color is clearly an accident. If such a ball were to find its way into a collection of rubber balls all red in color, it might be said, analogously, that this ball is unconventional, but certainly not abnormal.

There would seem to be little need of multiplying examples. It appears self-evident that a thing, be it living or non-living, rational or irrational, cannot be expected to do more than it can do. And what a thing can do clearly depends on what it is.

With these considerations in mind it might be appropriate at this time to return to Horney's view of normality. One brief point, however, should be made in advance. It was shown, in the first chapter, that Horney did admit of the existence of a universal human nature. Her view of human nature was shown to represent man as an inherently "constructive", intelligent, responsible and partially free created being. Therefore in considering Horney's relativistic view of normality, it must not be thought that her relativism sprang from her unwillingness or inability to perceive man as man. Her view of human nature was shown to be shallow and unreal, and her proofs in support of her theories were shown to be inadequate.

But she did maintain the existence of a nature common to all men. How then did Horney's concept of normality come to be so unqualifiedly relativistic and how did it come to exclude a more ultimate and absolute view of normality?

The most striking reason appears to be that Horney was, in the final analysis, not a philosopher but a scientist. Although she often assumed positions which were clearly philosophical both in their nature and consequences, her conclusions were often based on observations which seldom went further than the empiriological level. Thus it was that Horney perceived differences in what was considered "normal" in different cultures. Having perceived multiplicity she concluded that unity was impossible, that is, she failed, in effect, to admit a most significant distinction namely the one existing between normality as such, and men's "conceptions of normality". She failed, in short, to admit the difference between the accidental and the essential. The relative norms of normality are manifestly accidental for they are based partly on conventions and partly on individual manifestations of the absolute norm of normality. Man's desire to choose and perservere in a goal and man's sociability or rather the demand, in the United States, that "normal" man exhibit these traits are palpable examples of individual instances emanating from a more absolute norm based on the nature of

man as man.

In view of these observations it ought to be inquired, at this point, whether the validity and value of the relative norms ought not to be accepted with qualifications.

An individual is not necessarily abnormal if he departs from the accepted standards of the culture. A man who is aware of his nature and of the manner in which that nature ought to be actualized, may purposely depart from the norms of his culture which have gained the upper hand, if he perceives these norms to be perverted. His departure would not place him in the category of "abnormal", except in the eyes of the standard of the culture. Rather his deviation would represent a highly desirable unconventionality, and the result might be a truly normal individual.

Similarly, it may not be the wisest procedure to readjust the neurotic to the norms of his culture, if these norms leave much to be desired. The so-called readjustment might make him conventional but hardly "normal" in the proper sense of the word. Along the same line of thought, in speaking of the therapeutic task of the analyst, Bishop Sheen observes:

To ask the client to adjust himself to his environment is not to cure him, even if he can obey; For the world's environment today is itself in a state of considerable maladjustment. It is conceivable

that some patients are too well adjusted to their environment....¹⁸

The value of these relative norms, in discovering and readjusting the neurotic, would seem to depend on the direction which the individual's deviation has taken and on the ontological value of the norms themselves. These are indeed significant qualifications. They emphasize all the more the need of a more ultimate and absolute standard.

Horney's position as it concerns her concept of normality has been shown to be valid in itself with qualifications, but invalid in its implications, since it fails to recognize both an absolute criterion and the method through which it may be derived, namely the consideration of man's nature. In conclusion, the more significant offshoots of Horney's concept of normality, along with some puzzling departures, on the part of Horney, from her basic positions should be considered.

The repercussions of Horney's concept of normality are manifested through a relativism in those aspects of Horney's views which represent the more proximate background of neurosis, in short, her more detailed discussion of the cultural and interpersonal factors. Perhaps Horney's view of the nature of the problems existing in a particular

¹⁸FULTON J. SHREVE, Peace of Soul, p. 142.

culture¹⁹, affords the most palpable example. As has been shown, these problems, according to Horney, are created by the culture. Hence they are not essential to human nature. Similarly the interpersonal relations, inasmuch as they are largely moulded by the culture, do not represent reactions essential to human nature. Further examples of relativism may be perceived in Horney's view of man's responsibility. He is responsible to the patterns, beliefs, principles, traditions of the culture. But, these, if Horney is to remain consistent, are also relative. Since "growth" lies in actualizing one's self in keeping with one's culture, it is clear that human nature may be actualized in several different ways, even if the differences among cultures allow for contradictory ways. Along similar lines, such catch-phrases as "conditions of warmth and respect for his individuality", "constructive tendencies", "destructive tendencies" etc. have been shown to bear relative connotations. Finally Horney's very description of neurosis²⁰ and the answers supplied in the later chapters of the thesis to the questions submitted in Chapter I have clearly shown Horney's consistent tendency to do away with absolute standards.

¹⁹ The quotation appears on p. 44.

²⁰ The quotation appears on p. 41.

Since the above have been described as off-shoots of Horney's concept of normality the criticism submitted for that concept is applicable also to these. Horney again appeared unwilling or perhaps unable from her own particular position, to reduce multiplicity to unity. She failed, in effect, to consider that the differences in the problems existing among different cultures, that the differences in interpersonal relations, traditions, customs, ideals, etc. are, in the most cases, accidental differences. Behind them lies man's nature, subject to the same temptations, weaknesses, injustices, even perversions and goodness. The fact that these basic aspects of man's nature find different ways of manifesting themselves does not argue against the existence of absolutes, for the multiplicity as already stated is, in most instances accidental and in all cases finds its source in man's nature. But to say that man's reactions in any culture are a constructive or destructive manifestation of human nature is not to allow that human nature may be actualized in many different ways. For many of the principles of our culture and of others are perversions of what is expected of human nature. In short, differences among cultures cannot be argued, but neither can their ultimate source be denied. These differences, in the final analysis, are not so very different. To grant their existence is not to agree with an almost uncompromis-

ing relativism. Nor is it to grant that as long as the individual conforms to his culture, his nature has inevitably found a constructive expression. It is surprising that Horney would allow for a nature proper to man as man but refused to delve more deeply into that nature. The ultimate result appears to have been an inconsistent relativism. This last qualification seems necessitated by the fact that it was Horney's opinion that the neurotic structure represents an unreal way of dealing with reality. Upon first considering this position it may appear that there is really no contradiction, no departure from Horney's basic concepts. That is, it might be argued that Horney actually meant that the neurotic structure represents an unreal way of dealing with the reality presented to the individual by the society in which he exists. This interpretation would imply no contradiction since Horney's relativism would remain intact. But again, as in other instances, the bulk of Horney's writings seems to imply that the neurotic structure represents an unreal way of dealing with a very absolute reality, that is, that the neurotic's reactions are not in keeping with what his human nature and the nature of his fellow men would expect of him. In the light of Horney's relativism, this dogmatism is most peculiar. A similar puzzle may be perceived upon comparing two pieces of "evidence". Horney, beyond a doubt attacked

the Freudian and Christian view of man. In her words, as quoted in Chapter One, "we do not need an inner straight jacket with which to shackle our spontaneity, nor the whip of inner dictates to drive us toward perfection".²¹ These words represented an unfavorable evaluation of both Freudian and Christian man. But the Christian position, if not the Freudian, represents one of the choices of behaviour to which man is responsible. If "normality" consists in following one of these choices, if human nature can be actualized in so many ways, how can the Christian position be said to "shackle our spontaneity"? This position remains a question mark unless it be admitted that Horney, despite her relativism, had a very absolute and detailed view of what was good for man as man. But if this be the case her concept of normality stood on most precarious ground.

²¹ The quotation appears on p. 9.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Any science whose formal object contains an implicit or explicit demand that it view man in terms of his composite nature, must of necessity take some stand regarding that nature and the things that effect it. Psychoanalysis is such a science.

This thesis has endeavoured to present and evaluate the fundamental philosophical position of one psychoanalyst, Karen Horney. The first three chapters were intended as an exposition of Horney's thought while the final chapter attempted to evaluate the findings. In keeping with this objective it was shown that Horney viewed man as a created and at least partially responsible being. Man's nature, according to Horney, is essentially constructive and possesses a spontaneous tendency toward self-actualization. But man is not an abstraction. He not only possesses a generic nature, that is, a nature in common with all men, but an individual nature as well. The factors which serve to individualize that nature are, broadly speaking, the individual's temperament, his degree of intellectual ability, and any particular aptitudes with which he may be gifted.

The spontaneous movement toward self-realization may be impeded by unfavorable external factors. This, indeed, is usually the case but the significance of this external barrier is seen to lie in its intensity. If the

environment is crushingly unfavorable the individual will not only be unable to fully unfold his individual nature but will be forced to pervert it. The end-result of this perversion is a psychic disturbance termed neurosis. In short whether the individual develops healthy or neurotic tendencies ultimately and unqualifiedly depends on his environment. The force of the environment is most significantly brought to bear on the individual through the medium of interpersonal relations, particularly the one's experienced in the early years of his childhood, and even more particularly those of a parental nature. This position was described in the thesis as amounting to environmental determinism. Furthermore it was shown that in the light of Horney's conception of the role of the environment and in the light of Horney's view of man's nature it is impossible to conceive of any negative, unfavorable or destructive aspect which may be predicated of man as man. Man is essentially "good". Any "badness" must ultimately be explained in terms of an unfavorable life situation.

A neurosis is a psychic difficulty brought about by intensely unfavorable interpersonal relations which, by impeding the individual's freedom, create a disturbed relation with himself and with others. But it must be carefully borne in mind that it is advisable to call this disturbance a neurosis, only if the individual's behaviour

deviates from the pattern considered "normal" in his culture. In other words, there is no such thing as an absolute norm of normality. The concept of what is normal is man-made and differs with the culture. Consequently there may be at least as many different types of neuroses as there are concepts of normality. Conversely man's nature may be actualized in as many ways as there are concepts of normality.

These three fundamental positions, that is, Horney's view of human nature, of the environment, and of normality, along with their off-shoots were evaluated in the final chapter. There it was shown that Horney's view of human nature was unreal for it refused to take into account an observable disharmony in man. Furthermore it was shown that Horney's view of the role of the environment suffered by excess. Although the considerable influence of the environment was admitted, it was shown that this factor in itself was not sufficient to explain neurosis. Another factor, a certain constitutional predisposition, was introduced and shown to constitute a significant contributory cause. Finally Horney's concept of normality was shown to possess a relative truth as well as a relative though insufficient therapeutic value. But her incapacity or unwillingness to grant the existence of a more absolute norm was shown to be in contrast with the data of reflection based on experience.

Conversely it was indicated that man's nature, being one, cannot in any significant sense be actualized in as many ways as there are concepts of normality. The off-shoots of these basic positions, being exactly what the term implies, were criticized in the same light. Some striking inconsistencies in Horney's theories were also noted.

The scope of this thesis did not include an exposition of Horney's more empirical theories or an evaluation of her therapeutic method. These two aspects clearly present fertile ground for continued and extensive study. But it may be mentioned in passing that in the light of the principles evaluated in this thesis, Horney's more empirical theories as well as her therapy might occasion a significant lifting of Christian eye-brows.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bittle, Celestine N., The Domain of Being, Ontology, Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1939, x-401 p.
A fundamental text-book in Aristotelian-Thomistic Ontology. It provides an excellent presentation of the basic Thomistic doctrines of general metaphysics. The text was of use in furnishing a clear expression of the Thomistic notion of 'essence'. This notion was compared in the thesis with Dr. Horney's conception of human nature.

Bourke, Vernon J., Ethics, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1951, xii-497 p.
An outstanding addition to Thomistic moral philosophy. The book presents a detailed study of Thomistic Ethics. This work was of use in refreshing the author's memory on the relation between Theology and philosophy. The pages consulted revealed a provocative comment which was included in the thesis.

Gratton, Henri, Psychanalyses D'hier et D'aujourd'hui, Paris, Cerf, 1955, 306 p.
Father Gratton's work represents a thorough survey of the major psychoanalytic currents from the time of the Master of Vienna. The section dealing with Karen Horney was invaluable to the author in that it presented a brief though penetrating evaluation of Dr. Horney. Father Gratton was quoted in passing to lend weight to the charge of determinism in Horney's theories.

Higgins, Thomas J., Man as Man, The Science and Art of Ethics, Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1949, xii-610 p.
This lengthy text is a veritable milestone in Thomistic Ethics. The author consulted the work on numerous occasions when dealing with the notions of 'responsibility', 'habit formation' and 'the natural law'. Father Higgins's definition of a 'norm' was of considerable value in the section dealing with normality.

Horney, Karen, "Culture and Neurosis", in The American Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, issue of April-May 1936, p. 221-235.
Horney's initial attempt at emphasizing the deterministic role of the environment in the formation of neurosis, in contrast to Freud's insistence on

biologically determined drives. The article was consequential in that it supplemented that portion of Horney's first book which treated of the effect of the environment on the individual's development.

-----, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1937, xii-299 p.
Dr. Horney's first book. The work represents the first explicit and lengthy attempt, on the part of Horney, to part company with Freud and present a somewhat elaborate introduction to a dynamic theory of neurosis based on the influence of interpersonal relations. Dr. Horney's views, particularly those dealing with the neurotic personality and the impact of the environment on the individual's development, as well as her description of neurosis, her concept of normality and her criteria for discovering the neurotic, were almost exclusively gleaned from this book. The work presented a fertile field for direct quotations.

-----, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1939, 313 p.
An extensive re-valuation of Freud's psychoanalytic theories. The book was of interest in that it clearly depicted the main points on which Horney found herself at odds with Freud. Since it is one of the significant points of this thesis that Horney's extreme positions were in large part motivated by her crusading opposition to Freud, the significance of this work for the thesis is manifest. Furthermore, it served to strengthen the thesis's contention that Horney attributed to the environment an unqualifiedly deterministic role.

-----, Self-Analysis, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1942, 309 p.
Horney defends at some length the possibility and value of self-analysis. This contention, though interesting, was not utilized in the thesis. Rather the work was of value since it contained a section which presented a somewhat more refined exposition of Horney's view of the nature and causes of neurosis.

-----, Our Inner Conflicts, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1945, 250 p.
A book reflective of a significant advance in Karen Horney's theories. The work though not repudiating her previous theories represents a clear refining

of, as well as additions upon, her previous views. Its pages reveal Horney's growing awareness of a need for greater unity in her theories, as well as the importance of stressing intrapsychic processes in the neurotic structure. Apart from indicating an interesting advance in Dr. Horney's views, the work was also of a somewhat opposite value for it also manifested Horney's continued insistence on the pervasive nature of neurosis as well as her sustained stand on the environment as the exclusive and unqualified cause of this disturbance.

-----, "The Future of Psychoanalysis" (Contribution to Symposium), in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1946, p. 66-67.

The article is essentially an explanation of the reasons which prompted Horney and her colleagues to form a new psychoanalytic association. The ultimate motive, in short, was the growing differences with their orthodox-Freudian colleagues. Horney's contribution to the symposium was of value to the thesis since it contained a clear and explicit condemnation of Freud's evil instinct theory, as well as an unmistakable assertion of her own position. Horney's words to the above effect were quoted in the first chapter.

-----, "The Value of Vindictiveness" in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1948, p. 3-12.

This contribution has more of an empirical than philosophical value. It treats of the value which vindictiveness has for the accomplished neurotic. But a highly significant insight was drawn from the article, for it is here that Horney makes the only assertion known to the author, reflective of her belief in the existence of an Infinite being and of man's responsibility to this being.

-----, Neurosis and Human Growth, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950, 391 p.

Dr. Horney's most outstanding contribution to psychoanalytic theory. This work, her last, is manifestly representative of her more mature thought. The work refines and expands the views presented in Our Inner Conflicts. The work was of value to the thesis since it reflected Horney's continued insistence on the wholly constructive nature of man. The work also reflects once more Horney's objection to any absolute standard as symbolized by Christianity.

Her relativism, in short, is reinforced and the individuating factors in man's nature are more explicitly presented.

-----, "Psychoanalysis and the Constructive Forces in Man" (Contribution to Symposium), in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1951, p. 53-62. Horney explains the manner in which psychoanalysts arrive at the concept of 'constructive inner forces moving man towards self-realization'. It is learned that the existence of these forces is presupposed and the validity of the supposition is verified through therapy. The article contributes to that portion of the thesis dealing with an exposition of Horney's view of human nature.

-----, "Human Nature Can Change", (Contribution to Symposium), in The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1952, p. 62-68. The article deals with some of Horney's most fundamental positions, namely her belief in the complete and unqualified constructiveness of human nature and her view of the deterministic role of the environment in causing neurosis. It was from this article that Horney's 'proofs' of the constructiveness of human nature were derived.

Mercier, Cardinal, A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., Vol. 1, 1938, xxvi-584 p.

A well known synthesis of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. The work was of value in that it provided a clear exposition of the Thomistic concept of 'nature'. This concept was utilized in the thesis in establishing a favorable though general comparison between the Thomistic view of 'nature' and Dr. Horney's conception of the 'real self'.

Monroe, Ruth L., Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, New York, The Dryden Press, 1955, xvi-670 p.

Miss Monroe has ably exposed the essentials of the more important psychoanalytic theories. Although her criticisms bear more upon the empirical and logical aspects of the theories which she presents, her views are often eye-opening along more ultimate lines. Dr. Horney receives generous treatment. The work was of particular value in affording a clear summary of Dr. Horney's theories and in helping to explain away some of the ambiguities.

Mullahy, Patrick, Oedipus, Myth and Complex, New York, The Grove Press, 1955, xii-370 p.

A highly entertaining survey of psychoanalytic theory. Though the author's views do not always reflect the Christian position, his expositions and evaluations of the different psychoanalytic theories are always of interest and often of consequence. Mr. Mullahy's work afforded a somewhat extensive summary of Dr. Horney's theories as well as a brief evaluation. The book was of value in giving the author a bird's eye view of Dr. Horney as well as in opening his eyes to the necessity of close scrutiny of Dr. Horney's language. Mr. Mullahy was quoted in passing.

Pegis, Anton C., Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, New York Random House, Vol. 1, 1945, liii-1097 p. This work requires little introduction. It presents a scholarly gathering of the basic teachings of the Angelic Doctor. Mr. Pegis's work was utilized as a primary source of Thomistic doctrine. St. Thomas was quoted through this work, in a section of the thesis dealing with the effect of man's body on the operations of his soul.

Sheen, Fulton J., Peace of Soul, New York, Whittlesey House, 1949, 292 p.

Bishop Sheen's popular work provided many rich and provocative pages dealing with the Christian view of the causes of mental illness and the value of psychiatric treatment. The book presents, primarily, a long reflection on the basic difficulties which hamper man's peace of soul as well as the indisputable remedy. Specifically, the work was utilized to lend force to the thesis that man's fallen nature is and has been clearly perceivable and that relative norms of normality are always insufficient and often damaging in psychoanalytic therapy.

Vanderveldt, James H., and Odenwald, Robert F., Psychiatry and Catholicism, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952, ix-433 p.

The relation between psychiatry and Catholicism is amply treated in this significant book. The work proposes to, and succeeds in demonstrating that there is no conflict between Catholicism, and psychiatry properly viewed. This text also furnishes a clear and concise exposition of mental diseases and related disturbances. The author derived the material for one of his fundamental differences with Dr. Horney,

namely his contention that an unfavorable environment did not provide a sufficient explanation for neurosis.

APPENDIX I

Biographical Sketch of Karen Horney

Karen Horney was born in Hamburg, Germany on September 16, 1885. She pursued her medical studies in Freiburg, Goettingen and Berlin. Her interest in psychoanalysis appears to have stemmed from her studies at the University of Berlin. She began her medical practice in 1913, and for the following two years was the avid pupil of Dr. Karl Abraham, the well-known disciple of Freud. Following this period of advanced preparation she remained a resident physician in Berlin until the end of the first World War. In the following years she was kept occupied as both a psychoanalyst and teacher at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. Her growing recognition as a practicing analyst and lecturer gave rise to an invitation by the Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago. She travelled to the United States in 1932 having accepted the position of associate director of the Chicago Institute. Dr. Horney was naturalized in 1938. Two years after her arrival in the United States Dr. Horney left Chicago and took the position of instructor at the Institute of Psychoanalysis in New York. She also taught at the New School for Social Research. In 1941 she, and her colleagues, formed the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis. This move followed her disqualification as a training analyst at the New York

Psychoanalytic Institute. Although no reason was given for her dismissal, it appears evident that the cause lay in her growing differences with Freudian theories coupled with a dogmatic and unbending insistence on the same on the part of the Institute. The new association formed by Horney quickly established a training center, The American Institute for Psychoanalysis. Dr. Horney was elected Dean. The Institute was a direct and open reaction against the Freudian school. Horney served in both the capacity of Dean and teacher. She also maintained a most extensive private practice, and contributed several books and articles to her field. The latter bear ample witness to her differences with the Freudian school, by way of both open condemnations of the Master of Vienna and detailed presentations of her own views on neurosis.

Dr. Horney continued in her varied duties until 1952 when, at the age of sixty seven, she died following a brief illness.

APPENDIX 2

ABSTRACT OF

A Criticism of the Philosophic Principles Underlying Karen Horney's Psychoanalytic Theories.¹

The raison d'être of psychoanalytic therapy is the cure or relief of psychic disturbances. Modern man's extensive and distressing departure from those fundamental truths which alone can give meaning and direction to his existence has borne its unfortunate fruits in an ever-increasing number of mental-illnesses. To the thoughtful Christian then, the recent interest in the science of psychoanalysis is neither perplexing nor accidental.

Christian thought has been significantly aware of the implications of psychoanalysis in terms of man's nature, his origin and his end. Consequently, a thorough and comprehensive study of the theories of its founder, Sigmund Freud, has been repeatedly undertaken in Catholic circles. Unfortunately the theories of Freud's disciples or ex-disciples have not always received such generous attention. Dr. Karen Horney's psychoanalytic theories represent an instance of such neglect.

This thesis, by presenting and evaluating Dr. Horney's fundamental philosophical positions has attempted

¹ M.A. Thesis presented by Sergio D. Petraroja, in 1957, to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ottawa through the Department of Philosophy, 126 pages.

a partial amendment of this slight. The work is divided into four chapters. The first three chapters concern themselves with presenting Dr. Horney's views and the last with evaluating them.

Chapter One deals with Horney's view of human nature and its origin. What may be considered the essential notes of man's nature, as seen by Horney, are presented. Man is described as a created and at least partially responsible being. He is further depicted as the possessor of exclusively "constructive" tendencies which spring from his very nature and which, unless significantly impeded in their actualization by external circumstances, tend to evolve spontaneously. Horney is allowed to "prove" the validity of her view of human nature. It is gleaned from her arguments that neurosis, the psychic disturbance with which her works are concerned, is ultimately and unqualifiedly determined by the environment. The ambiguous use of terms, on the part of Horney, is stressed and several questions are introduced at the end of the chapter. Their answers, which will serve to dissolve some of the nebulousness, are left to a later chapter.

Chapter Two stresses the significant role of the culture in the production of neurosis. Horney's concept of normality and her view of the influential role of the environment are presented, each in a separate section.

The relativism reflected by Horney's first concept and the determinism implicit in Horney's position, as it concerned the environment, are exposed in some detail.

Chapter Three deals with certain behaviour patterns which, according to Horney, characterize the neurotic. Her definition of neurosis is presented, as well as her view of the genesis of neurosis. The environmental factors which, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, determine the healthy or neurotic development of the individual are discussed at some length. The chapter also attempts to dissolve the ambiguities presented in the first chapter. The ultimate purpose of the third chapter is to show the significant element of causality in Dr. Horney's theories. In other words it attempts to show how her philosophical positions affected the more proximate aspects of her theories.

Finally, Chapter Four evaluates the material presented in the preceeding pages. The philosophical doctrines of the Angelic Doctor as explicitly stated in, or inferred from his writings, are utilized as a general critique.