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Experiences and Perceptions of Afghan-Canadian men in the Post-September 11th Context

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To my partner, Reza
For your generous love,
encouraging talks,
every day sacrifices and
never-ending support.

Abstract

The events and aftermath of the September 11th attack on the United States had profound effects on Canadians and Americans alike. For some however, the implications are deeply personal. Afghan-Canadians, particularly young men suddenly found themselves defined as "risky" in official discourses (i.e. legislation), in state practices (i.e. airports, borders), in the media and in social interactions. Ten in-depth interviews with Afghan-Canadian men where conducted in order to examine how they experience and manage this newly ascribed identity. Foucauldian governmentality and "risk" theories were employed to make sense of the structural stigma, its genesis and its impact on the lives of this minority group. In addition Goffman's symbolic interactionism approach provided the lens through which to understand Afghan-Canadian males' experiences of symbolic stigma and their stigma management techniques during personal interactions. The combination of these theoretical frameworks allows us to situate the individual within broader social, regulatory and discursive frameworks while attending to their subjectivity and recognizing their engagement with (and resistance to) regulatory discourses/practices. The accounts of my Afghan-Canadian participants affirm the experiences of structural stigma at governmental sites of regulation (i.e. borders & airports) and interpersonal stigma during social interaction. It also revealed these men to be active agents who, although intimidated, nonetheless challenged the dominant discourse through multifaceted alternate discourses and practiced "everyday acts" of resistance.

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Introduction

On September 11th 2001, a series of attacks occurred in the United States of America. Four commercial airliners were hijacked by a group[1] of Arab, Muslim males. Two of the planes were crashed into the World Trade Centre known as the twin towers in New York City, one struck the Pentagon in Washington, DC and another crashed in a field near Pennsylvania. The government of the United States concluded that terrorism was the cause of the attacks that took the lives of approximately 3000 people. Immediately, a wave of unprecedented anti-terrorism measures and security policies were enacted at the government level, which was accompanied by an anti-Middle-Eastern, Arab, and Muslim sentiment at the public level.

The "War on Terrorism" as declared by the Bush Administration had policy and practical implications. The former refers to the implementation of extensive anti-terrorism laws and security measures and the latter allude to racial profiling and surveillance of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals at the domestic level. As a part of the anti-terrorism discourse the United States, along with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces initiated a militaristic attack on Afghanistan to topple the ruling Taliban who were identified as the supporters of Bin-Laden, the alleged mastermind behind the attacks, and terrorism. Suddenly, Afghan-Canadians and Afghan-Americans found themselves as the "other" in the post September 11th official discourse.

As an Afghan-Canadian woman I was intrigued by the authoritarianism sweeping the US and Canada and the national and international support for the Bush Administration's "War on Terrorism" rhetoric. When engaged in political discussions at the time and criticized the United States government's post September 11th policies, I encountered anger and at times

[1] It is believed that a total of nineteen men were involved in hijacking of whom fifteen were from Saudi Arabia, two from United Arab Emirates, one from Lebanon and one from Egypt.

discriminatory remarks. Furthermore, whenever I disclosed my country of birth as Afghanistan to strangers I experienced stigmatizing comments disguised as "jokes". I observed that prior to September 11th, Canadians who asked about my country of origin either did not know where it was geographically located or knew very little about it. It was immediately after the terrorist events that people began to know Afghanistan as a country however; they consistently identified it as an oppressive state against women, and one that supported terrorism and Bin-Laden. Furthermore, during family and community gatherings I discovered that some members of my family and Afghan friends had similar discriminatory experiences. Additionally, the male members talked about their experiences encountering racial profiling practices that the government had implemented as a mean to enhance security at the borders and the airports. Therefore, I decided to conduct a research project to better understand the impact of the post September 11th discourse on Afghan-Canadian males' day-to-day lives and also to give them a voice.

More specifically, the purpose of this study is to examine the experiences and perceptions of Afghan-Canadian males who were suddenly defined as "risky" in government discourses, in state practices, in the media and in social interactions. The main questions addressed in my thesis are:

1. How did structural stigma (i.e. security policies) shape the experiences of Afghan-Canadian men at government regulatory sites (i.e. borders and airports) in the post September 11th period?
2. What are their experiences as Afghan-Canadian men while interacting with the public?

3. What strategies, if any, do Afghan-Canadian men employ to counter the impact and affect of the post September 11th structural and symbolic stigmas at macro and micro levels?

This thesis is divided into six chapters:

Chapter one contextualizes the post September 11th period with a focus on the United States government response to the terrorist events in terms of policy and practice. This is followed with a presentation of the Canadian government's security and policy initiatives. This section also speaks to the discriminatory reactions of American and Canadian to Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people.

Chapter two looks at various literature relevant to this research. More specifically, I review scholarly work that examines the implication of the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act. This is followed by an examination of the impact of the governmental security initiatives on the lives of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals. Then, I move on to present the Canadian and American public's reactions towards these minority groups. The last section scrutinizes the literature regarding the media and its role as the transmitter of ideology in the context of post September 11th.

Chapter three describes my theoretical framework that guides the analysis of this study. I have utilized various conceptual frameworks namely, Goffman's conceptualization of stigma, Foucault's Governmentality and resistance, and the literature on the emergent "risk" discourse in order to develop an integrated analytical approach that allows me to situate my participants within a broader social, regulatory and discursive framework. Goffman's assertion of stigma provides a microanalysis framework through which I will examine my participants' experiences in their one-on-one interactions. In order to make sense of the structural stigma and its impact on

the lives of these minority groups I apply Foucault's governmentality theory. I also employ the risk discourse to illustrate how it has facilitated, necessitated and legitimated the construction of a "risky" population and the subsequent treatment of them in terms of policy and practice. Finally, the conceptualization of resistance stemming from Foucault's notion of power, allows me to make sense of my participants' multifaceted resistance practices and alternative discourses.

Chapter four describes my methodological approach in collecting and analyzing data. Semi-structured interviews were employed as the most viable mode of data gathering for this research study. Because of the fact that I am an Afghan, a relationship already existed that made it easier for me to ask questions regarding their experiences. Due to the sensitivity of the topic an important consideration was their right to remain anonymous and have their trust repaid by the utmost confidentiality. This chapter also provides a discussion about ethical concerns, recruitment of participants, the interview process, mode of data analysis and limitations inherent to this research.

Chapter five introduces my participants' biographies. This is followed by the presentation of findings that lie outside my theoretical analysis. It includes a presentation of their integration process, recounts of structural discrimination they have experienced in Canada and a discussion on the topic of democracy.

Chapter six provides a discussion of the research findings through the lens of the aforementioned theoretical frameworks. My participants' experiences and perceptions affirm the encounters of stigma at structural and interpersonal levels. This chapter also discusses my participants' multifaceted resistance practices through the construction of alternate discourses.

The chapter ends with a discussion of the importance of an Afghan ethnic identity in the post September 11th period. The thesis concludes with a discussion on future direction for research.

Chapter One: Contextualizing September 11th Events

As already mentioned, on September 11th 2001 a series of terrorist attacks were launched against the United States of America. In total four commercial airliners were hijacked of which two struck the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City. Another was flown into the Pentagon in Washington, DC and the final plane crashed in rural Pennsylvania. The suspected hijackers were believed to have links with Al-Qaeda, a radical Islamic organization. Immediately, the Bush Administration implemented domestic legislation, administrative and judicial measures in the name of national security and the war on terrorism. Consequently, at least 100,000 Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim[2] individuals experienced the impact of one of these measures in the United States (Cainkar, 2004). These minority groups also came under attack from the public in the form of hate mail, verbal abuse, physical assaults, vandalism as well as murder in several countries around the world (Ahmed, 2001; Kaplan, 2006; Sheridan & Gillet, 2005). In order to make sense of the impact of September 11th it is imperative to first review the changes in the United States at the governmental and public levels. I will then present the Canadian government's response to the events followed with the Canadian public's reactions.

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[2] I will use the Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim label throughout my thesis and it is important to understand the differences between them. Middle-Eastern refers to the origin of people who either have come from or have ancestry backgrounds in the Middle-East countries. Basically, the Middle East is a geographical region with no clear boundaries that include several countries located in Eastern Asia and Northern Africa. The inclusion of countries as a part of the Middle East changes based on political, economical and strategic discourses. For instance Afghanistan used to be a part of the Middle East during the Cold War and was excluded after the fall of Communism. Basically the term was coined in 1850 by Great Britain while they, along with the Russian Empire were vying for influence in Central Asia, based on the strategic importance of the region. Today the term "Middle-Eastern" is used to refer to the Arab world, which makes the situation confusing, as for example, an Afghan is Middle-Eastern but is not Arab.

The label Arab refers to race and identifies an ethnic group based on their genealogical or linguistic grounds. The majority of Arabs are either from Arabic countries or have ancestry backgrounds in these countries and speak Arabic. For example, a person from the Middle East is not necessarily Arab such as Afghans and Iranians.

Muslim refers to people who believe in Islam (the religion) and the majority of Arabs and Middle-Eastern people are Muslim. For instance, people from some African countries such as Somalia and Ethiopia are Muslim but are neither Arab nor Middle-Eastern. In the post September 11th period these labels were used interchangeably as if they all mean the same thing, both in the academic literature and in the media. Therefore, I use the combination of the three in my thesis to be consistent with the literature.

The United States Response to September 11th

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist events, the Bush Administration declared "War on Terrorism" in which the aim, as iterated by President Bush, was to bring Osama Bin-Laden the leader of al-Qaeda to justice as well as prevent future acts of terrorism and the emergence of any terrorist network. In order to achieve these goals, the Administration declared economic and military sanctions against States perceived to be harbouring terrorists. At the same time the US government asked the international community to increase global surveillance and intelligence sharing. The first initiative of the "War on Terrorism" was the US-led NATO coalition military attack on Afghanistan[3], which aimed to overthrow the Taliban and destroy the Al-Qaeda training camps. In 2003, as a part of the ongoing mission of the "War on Terrorism" the Bush Administration invaded Iraq based on the allegations that Saddam Hussein's government was hiding weapons of mass destruction, an accusation that was later revealed as unfounded[4].

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[3] On October 7th, 2001 the United States led a coalition of international forces and invaded Afghanistan upon the United Nations' approval of use of military force to defend itself against those responsible for the September 11th attacks. Many countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, and Pakistan and many European nations took part in the coalition forces. However, the primary air force militaristic attack came from the US and the British forces and the Northern Alliance, while Afghan militants provided intelligence and ground troops. Initially, the objective of this invasion was to find Bin-Laden, to destroy Al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan and to topple the ruling Taliban regime for harbouring terrorist organizations. Eventually the slogan of the war changed to "Operation Enduring Freedom" in which the US acted as the bearer of democracy to the people of Afghanistan. In December 2001, the United States installed an interim government in Afghanistan with Hamid Karzai as the prime minister. Despite six years of the continuous presence of international and coalition forces, instalment of an allegedly democratic government and approximately one billion monetary donations form countries around the world, Afghanistan's political, economical and social situation has not been improved. For example, a report by the UNESEF indicates that 600 children under the age of five die everyday in Afghanistan; the country produces 90 percent of the world demand for heroin and the Taliban forces function in clandestine attacks (www.unicef.org/childsurvival/).

[4] The Bush Administration along with its British counterpart invaded Iraq without the United Nations' Council approval in March 2003. The US government accused Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi president, of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction and as such was a threat to global and specifically American security. The international community was reluctant to sanction a military attack and refused to participate in coalition forces with the US and Britain. In December 2006, Saddam Hussein was hanged in Baghdad on the charges of "crime against humanity". Up to now, two prime ministers have been elected by the Iraqi people and the American military has had strong presence in Iraq but the country has fallen into sectarian war with continuous suicide bombing where tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians and many American soldiers are being killed.

On the domestic front in 2001, the United States government created the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act), which granted unprecedented power to law enforcement officials. It passed through Congress without any opposition (Thompson, 2004). The main purpose of this Act was to provide law enforcement officials with the tools to detect and sanction individuals involved in terrorist activities and to protect Americans against the potential occurrence of terrorist attacks. It also expanded provisions of many already existing laws such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and legal status related to the CIA, border security, immigration, privacy, cyber crime, conspiracy, and other aspects of crime and criminal justice. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized the expansion of electronic surveillance and of the sharing of information regarding criminal records, student records, finances and mental health and medical records of individuals. Some of its provisions intensified Canada-US border security measures, as well as provisions related to immigration aimed at preventing terrorists from entering the United States particularly from Canada and enabled government officials to detain and deport those suspected of terrorist activities from American soil along with those who support them.

Another implication of the September 11th attacks was the creation of a cabinet-level office, known as the Department of Homeland Security[5] (hereafter DHS) which was established on November 25th, 2002 by the Homeland Security Act (Thompson, 2004). The intention behind the creation of DHS was to consolidate US executive federal agencies related to "homeland

[5] Currently 22 existing federal agencies operate under DHS, except the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

security" into a single cabinet-level agency. The main objective of DHS was to protect the United States from terrorist attacks as well as to respond to natural disasters[6].

Furthermore, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implemented a "special registration" program, also known as the National Security Entry and Exit Registry System (NSEERS) on September 11, 2002 (Cainkar, 2004). This program required certain non-citizens[7] to register with the INS, to be fingerprinted, photographed and respond to questioning and adhere to routine reporting (Cainkar, 2004). According to a report, more than 82,000 people registered with the program and about 13,000 have been deported (Cainkar, 2004). Immigrants' rights advocates have criticized the program for profiling immigrants based on their ethnicity and religion since 24 out of 25 countries enlisted are Asian and African and Muslim. The program has since been terminated and has been replaced by another system called US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) which involves the collection and analysis of biometric data which is checked against a database containing information of individuals deemed to have terrorist connections (Thompson, 2004).

Another notable implication of the September 11th attacks was the detention of thousands of Muslim Arabs living in the United States. According to Cainkar (2004) 80,000 Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals, of which the majority had immigrant status, were fingerprinted under the Alien registration Act of 1940, 8000 were interviewed and 5000 were detained under the US PATRIOT Act days after September 11th by the law enforcement officials. The United

[6] However, the DHS has been criticized for excessive bureaucracy and ineffectiveness in delivering its objectives. A notable example of DHA ineffectiveness has been cited by many in its inadequate and late response to Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, which claimed the lives of approximately 2500 people (Thompson, 2004)

[7] All males over the age of sixteen who had either entered the United States before September 11th, 2001 or after from a list of 25 countries were required to register with the NSEERS program. The list included: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Eritrea, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirate, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, and North Korea.

States government extended its arbitrary detention of the alleged Al-Qaeda and Taliban members by imprisoning 650 individuals form 42 countries in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Ratner, 2005; Steyn, 2004; Vierucci, 2003). Furthermore, the Bush Administration contended that the prisoners would not be regarded as Prisoners of War (POW) but as "enemy combatants" and as such the Geneva Convention of 1949 would not apply to them. The prisoners in Guantanamo Bay have not been officially charged with any crime, have been kept in inhumane conditions, without any due process, incommunicado and indefinitely (Ratner, 2005; Sassoli, 2004). Despite the repeated request by the international community, the Red Cross and Amnesty International for the immediate closure of the Guantanamo Bay prisons, it stays open without any improvement in living condition or legal processes for the prisoners (Cutler, 2006).

The Canadian Government Response to September 11th

Canada followed the United States example and produced its first Anti-Terrorism legislation after the September 11th terrorist attacks. The Canadian government introduced the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (ATA) in October 2001, which was proclaimed into law by the Canadian Parliament of Canada in December 2001. The objectives of the ATA were similar to the US PATRIOT Act such as protecting Canada and Canadians from terrorist acts and to bring forward tools to identify, prosecute, convict, and punish terrorists (Department of Justice, 2006). However, ATA has been criticized for its incompatibility with the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom* by the inclusion of a pre-emptive detention clause, expansion of surveillance power and suspicion as the basis for investigation (Choudhry, 2001; Roach, 2003).

Another response of the Canadian government to the events of September 11th was the creation of the department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) that facilitates information sharing and collaboration within and between the government ministries

(Bell, 2006). The department comprises ministries that were previously under the Department of Solicitor General of Canada, along with addition of the Canada Border Service Agency and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness.

Former Prime Minister Paul Martin's government introduced Canada's first national security policy in a document titled: Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy. It is intended to work as a strategic framework for protecting Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring Canada is not a threat to its allies, and contributing to international security (Bell, 2006). The policy reports increased funding and intelligence and surveillance capacities to several governmental departments such as the Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA), Transport Canada, the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of the Privy Council Office, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (Bell, 2006).

The Canadian government created the Canada Border Service Agency in 2003 by amalgamating several federal departments. The agency creation was formalized by the Canada Border Agency Act in 2005 (www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca). There have been numerous agreements signed between the CBSA and the United States as a part of the Canada-US "Smart Border" in which both countries agreed to share information and work collaboratively in order to facilitate the flow of travelers and goods while enforcing security in both countries.

International Response to September 11th

Numerous countries around the world such as Australia, as well as countries in Europe, Asia, South Asia and Africa followed the US example and implemented their own anti-terrorism legislations. They also froze the bank accounts of businesses and individuals they suspected of having ties with Al-Qaeda. Many of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies within these

countries worked closely with the CIA in order to break up militant terrorist cells. As a result many Muslim individuals were arrested as terrorist suspects around the world and were handed over to US officials. The international community also took part in the invasion of Afghanistan; troops from eight countries around the world participated in a war against the Taliban regime including Canadian Forces. However, the international community seemed reluctant in supporting United States in its invasion of Iraq.

Americans and Canadians Reactions against Middle-Easter, Arab and Muslim people

Soon after the events of the September 11th attacks, some American and Canadian individuals committed hate crimes against Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people and others perceived to be Muslim (for example, Sikhs for wearing Turbans). Within days following September 11th, these minority groups experienced defamatory remarks, physical assaults, destruction of their businesses and Mosques, and even murder (Ahmed, 2002; Brown, 2003). Many opinion polls conducted in Canada and the United States revealed an overall support of government security initiatives. The public also expressed support for the racial profiling of individuals of Middle-East origin at the borders and in airports as a means of detecting and preventing future terrorist attacks (Cainkar, 2004).

Conclusion

The preceding sections presented in very broad brushstrokes the implication of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States and Canada. The immediate response by the United States was the declaration of "War on Terrorism" followed by the introduction and implementation of US PATRIOT Act. Similarly, several countries including Canada created their own anti-terrorism laws and several security initiatives. Academics and human right activists have criticized the US PARTIOT Act and the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act as an

infringement of American and Canadian civil liberties respectively. Thousands of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals have become the target of surveillance and discriminatory practices by states officials in the United States and Canada. Similarly, the American and Canadian public reacted in discriminatory fashion against Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people in the aftermath of the events by verbal and physical attacks and in some instances, even murder.

Chapter two: A Review of Literature

The following chapter explores the abundant literature that emerged after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States addressing legal, social and political implications in the aftermath of these events. Of particular interest to my research are the legal and social implications. The legal impact refers to the enactment and enforcement of new security legislations and surveillance initiatives such as the *Anti-Terrorism Act* in Canada. Consequently, these new security policies affected the way in which governmental officials treated Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals. The social implications of the September 11th attacks refer to the public's reactions and differential attitude and treatment of these minority groups.

Another body of literature that has recently emerged has focused on the role of the mass media in the aftermath of September 11th. The majority of this literature has criticized the lack of in-depth analyses of the events as well as the journalists' and the media executives' reluctance to investigate government initiatives and an inability to show dissent against security policies that have infringed upon civil liberties.

In the first section I discuss the literature on the Canadian *Anti-Terrorism Act* and its impact on Middle Eastern, Arab and Muslim Canadians. The second section presents the literature that examines the impact of the security initiatives on the lives of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals within Canada and the United States, including a discussion on government discriminatory practices (i.e. racial profiling). The third section focuses attention on the phenomena of surveillance and its impact on the lives of Middle-Eastern and Muslim individuals, more generally. In the forth section, the literature about public attitudes and behavior towards Middle Eastern, Arabs and Muslim minorities after September 11th is presented. The last

part of the literature review dissects the role of the Media, including newsprint, radio and TV as sources of information for the majority of Canadians.

Literature on the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act

Much of the scholarly work has examined the legal changes occurring after September 11th, such as the *Anti-Terrorism Act* in Canada. The general conclusion has been that this law was passed in haste, provided inadequate definition of terrorism and terrorists, curtailed civil liberties, bestowed too much power to government officials and are ineffective in deterring terrorists (Cotler, 2001; Friedland, 200; Roach, 2001; Roach, 2003; Shaffer, 2001; Stuart, 2001; Sossin, 2001).

Several scholars believe that ATA was unnecessary to prosecute and combat terrorism because the Canadian Criminal Code is a viable and sufficient body of law for the prosecution of criminals (Cotler, 2001; Friedland, 2001; Stuart, 2001; Roach, 2001). They assert that terrorists are people who commit illegal acts and as such can be dealt with using the Criminal Code.

Consensus over the definition of terrorist activity

Moreover, many scholars unanimously criticized the definitions of "terrorism" and "terrorist activity" as defined in the ATA as sufficiently broad that it could target any group of people (Cotler, 2001; Friedland, 2001; Roach, 2003; Schneiderman & Cossman, 2001; Stuart, 2001: 211; Wark, 2001). For example, Cotler (2001) criticized the section of the ATA corresponding to the definition of "terrorist activity" as liable to "catch unlawful activity that is not a terrorist conduct such as strike or demonstration" (2002: 122). Schneiderman & Cossman (2001) also note that such an inadequate and general definition of "terrorist activity" could target any group of protesters such as those protesting against globalization, poverty coalitions, any illegal protests and strikes by unions or by Aboriginal people. Furthermore, they contend that

even domestic protests by ethnic minorities in support of foreign national liberation movements such as the anti-apartheid struggle could fall under the definition of "terrorist activity".

In addition to scholars, other agencies such as the Canadian Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Association, the Canadian Newspaper Association as well as numerous minority groups, predominately Arab Canadians voiced their concern over the definitions found in the ATA (Cotler, 2001; Roach, 2001; Siddiqui, 2002). Some minority groups, including the refugee community, felt that the broad definition of terrorism could be used to restrict immigration and to criminalize support for movements in the home countries of immigrants to Canada (Schneiderman & Cossman, 2001; Stuart, 2001).

Infringement on civil liberties

The second issue raised by scholars is that the ATA has the potential to infringe civil liberties. Austin (2001) examined other provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act and argued that many of its elements undermine the privacy of Canadians by permitting "increased collection, storage, aggregation, sharing and linking of information sometimes with few accountability mechanisms attached"(2001: 252). Furthermore, Cotler (2001) noted that the main purpose of the ATA is to facilitate the arrest and detention of suspected individuals on the mere suspicion that a terrorist activity is planned, and as such he argued that this provision is a fundamental curtailment of the rights of Canadians.

Trotter (2001) provided a detailed examination of the detention practices and procedures in the ATA provisions and concluded that some of the provisions are in stark opposition to Canadian's democratic values. For example he drew attention to the infringement of individual rights when a person suspected of terrorist activity can be held up to 72 hours without any bail

hearing (Trotter, 2001). He concluded such provisions are problematic because they disregard individual rights and due process, which are at the core of the *Charter of Rights and Freedom.*

Targeting minority groups

Similarly, Roach (2003) and Wark (2001) criticized the criminalization of politically and religiously motivated acts as mentioned in the ATA. They argue that the ATA has created an association between terrorism and extreme religious beliefs (Islamic Fanaticism & Islamic Fundamentalism) based on the fact that the terrorists who committed the September 11th attacks were Muslim. Henry & Tator (2006) also mention that the inclusion of legal, political, religious and ideological motives within the definition of terrorist activity is wrong and unconstitutional. Consequently, Choudhry (2001) expressed concerns that under the new legislation, the government will train their enforcement agents to profile individuals who are Arab and Middle Eastern in appearance, or Muslim. Siddiqui (2002) also notes that Arab Canadians and Muslim Canadians worried they would be targeted and profiled in the wake of September 11th and under the new ATA legislation.

Shaffer (2001) argued that enactment of the ATA and its provisions not only curtail civil liberties generally but also specifically place Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslim individuals and other groups who voice political dissent under the lens of suspicion. He expressed concern that Muslim Canadians will be the group who suffer the utmost consequences of such curtailment of civil liberties (Shaffer, 2001). Davis (2001) examined the provision of the ATA corresponding to "criminalization of terrorist finance" (2001: 299) and concluded that certain ethno-cultural groups who engage in ordinary commercial transactions or those who help family members abroad could be targeted under the ATA legislation.

Granting too much power to police

Another concern reiterated by scholars is that the ATA gives too much power to government officials and almost all of these powers are exempt from any review and oversight (Friedland, 2001; Roach, 2003; Sossin, 2001; Stewart, 2001). Sossin (2001) noted that the ATA provides "a number of ministries with broad, new discretionary authority relating to national security decision-making...and the Bill contain a number of ministerial powers that purport to be immunized from review" (2001: 425). He mentions that several discretionary powers are subject to judicial review, but that such reviews are to take place in privacy and with the exclusion of the affected people and their counsel (Sossin, 2001).

In addition, Henry & Tator (2006) criticized the same provision of the Act, which gives the State new investigative and prosecutorial powers. Consequently, they mention that following the passage of the Act, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security and Intelligent Services (CSIS) questioned numerous Muslim Canadians about "travel patterns, prayer habits, associations, and other seemingly innocuous matters" (Henry & Tator, 2006: 291). Furthermore, the ATA grants police expanded investigative detention, and as such undermines the principle of due process (Choudhry, 2001; Henry & Tator, 2006; Sossin, 2001). Again, these authors pointed out the infringement of civil and democratic rights of Canadians by the ATA.

The previous section reviewed literature on the Anti-Terrorism Act. Almost all the scholars criticized the Canadian government's initiative in creating the ATA as undermining the Canadian Criminal Code as a viable body of law to prosecute criminals. Subsequently, scholars who studied the ATA concluded that it infringes upon Canadian's civil rights, targets minorities such as Muslims and facilitates surveillance practices to be carried out by the police and judicial ministries. Another body of literature to emerge after September 11th examined the impact of the

government security initiatives on the lives of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals. The next section explores this body of literature.

The impact of security measures on the lives of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people in Canada and the United States

There is considerable scholarly literature that examines the impact of the security legislations on the lives of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people in the post September 11th context. Given that the hijackers were Middle-Eastern and/or Arab and/or Muslim, attention turned to these minority groups who became subject to higher scrutiny at airports and at borders (Badhi, 2003; Cainkar, 2004; Choudhry, 2001; Edley, 2003; Gill, 2006; Roberts, 2004; Roach, 2003). These authors assert that in the immediate aftermath of September 11th racial profiling of these minority groups was widely practiced. Badhi (2003: 295) defines racial profiling as:

> "...Profiling involves separating a subsection of the population from the larger whole on the basis of specific criteria that purportedly correlates to risk and subjecting the subgroup to special scrutiny for the purposes of preventing violence, crime, or some other undesirable activity."

The airports (Canadian and American) and the Canada-US border became the sites of surveillance and racial profiling of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals (Badhi, 2003; Cainkar, 2004; Choudhry, 2001). Within these spaces the personnel could exercise a level of discretion to determine whether an individual or their belongings should be subject to greater scrutiny than other travelers (Badhi, 2003). Several studies reported that members of these minority groups and those who were perceived to be a part of these groups were considered by the personnel to be a greater security risk than the general population (Abu-Laban, 2002; Badhi, 2003; Ramirez & Hoopes & Quinlan, 2003). Furthermore, Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim Canadians have been subjected to intensified surveillance and racial profiling practices in the United States despite holding a Canadian passport (Badhi, 2003).

Roach (2003) examined the impact of security practices at the Canada-US border in the aftermath of September 11th and drew attention to the discriminatory nature of such policies. He indicated that these specific policies targeted foreign-born Canadian travelers[8] by photographing and fingerprinting them upon entering the US[9]. He subsequently mentioned that several Canadians reported that American officials had intimidated them and that some were denied entry in to the United States (Roach, 2003). Furthermore, Cainkar (2004) and Badhi (2003) have highlighted several instances in which Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals experienced humiliation at the US[10] and Canadian airports by being either removed from the airplane or denied the opportunity to board.

Academics raised concern over the explosive impact of racial profiling practices in the post September 11th period (Badhi, 2003; Cainkar, 2004; Choudhry, 2001). They reiterated that policy and decision makers interpret situations through the lens of fear and adopt a mentality where it is better to infringe upon an individual's rights than risk a terrorist incident (Badhi, 2003). They warn about the outcome when decision makers (at the political and practical levels) become comfortable with prejudices and determinations of risk to a point whereby "'Arabness' and 'Muslimness' itself becomes a substitute for risk" (Badhi, 2003: 309).

There is also another group of authors who examined the relationship of racial profiling in preventing terrorism and providing security and concluded on its ineffectiveness in achieving either goal (Badhi, 2003; Fiala, 2003; Ramirez et.al, 2003). Ramirez et al., (2003) and Fiala

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[8] These countries initially included Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Sudan (Roach, 2003).

[9] He noted that by November 2004, 1400 foreign-born Canadians have been photographed, fingerprinted and interrogated at the Canada-US border (Roach, 2003).

[10] Walid Shater an American Citizen and a Secret Service Agent was removed from the American Airliners Flight 363 by the flight's pilot. He sued American Airlines because he believed he was racially profiled due to his ethnic background (Arab).

(2003) both examined the phenomenon of racial profiling of Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslim individuals in the post September 11th context and concluded that it is an inefficient tool for combating and preventing terrorism. These authors suggested that besides human rights issues, the practice of racial profiling that relies on a "Middle Eastern look[11]" to prevent potential terrorist activities is ineffective since there is no such distinct physical type (Ramirez et.al., 2003; Fiala, 2003). Furthermore, the authors pointed out that Italian, Spanish and Latin-American men are often mistaken for Middle- Eastern individuals or Arab men and have been stopped at the airports because of their physical appearances (Ramirez et. al., 2003).

In addition to the racial profiling at airports and borders, many scholars expressed concern over the arrest, deportation and surveillance of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals, which began in the days after September 11th in the United States (Ahmed, 2002; Cainkar, 2004; Roach, 2003; Roberts, 2004;). Initially, 1200 citizens and non-citizens in the US of whom the majority were Arab and/or Muslim were arrested, detained and eventually deported to their countries of origin (Cainkar, 2004). A number of researchers such as Roach (2001), and Roberts (2004) indicated that American authorities targeted these men from Muslim countries for immigration and criminal investigations and justified their detention as a security measure connected to terrorist investigations. These individuals were detained from 72 hours up to several weeks and even months before being charged or released (Roberts, 2004).

According to Cainkar (2004) and Esses et.al. (2002), both the United States and the Canadian governments "toughened" their immigration policies after September 11th. There are some national variations, however, Adelman (2002) notes that despite the changes in Canada's Refugee and Immigration Protection Act the Canadian government continues to accept

[11] I will use the term 'Middle-Eastern look' throughout my thesis and it refers to individuals who have physical features that are common to people from Middle-East countries such as dark skin complexion and dark hair.

immigrants from Middle East and Arab nations at a rate comparable to that before September 11th. Cainkar (2004) challenges this assertion and cites evidence of the latest immigration trends in the United States that point to decreased numbers of immigrants from some Arab and Middle Easter countries, including Afghanistan.

Surveillance Practices

One immediate response prompted by the September 11th attacks was enhancing surveillance operations at many sites such as the Canada-US border and at the airports (Buhr, 2002; Kruger et.al., 2004; Lyon, 2003). Scholarly work on surveillance point out two common elements of such practices; first the gathering and storing of information and second the supervision of people's behaviour (Gill, 2006; Lyon, 2001). They also pointed out that surveillance functions to discriminate and exclude the suspicious, and as such it reinforces social distinctions and divisions (Lyon, 2001). Moreover, scholars continue to explain that the excluded suspicious category after the September 11th attacks have been Arabs and Middle-Eastern individuals (Choudhry, 2001; Lyon, 2001). Badhi (2003) argued that one manifestation of this phenomenon is the racial profiling of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals. To support Badhi's assertion Kruger et. al. (2004) suggested that as the result of the September 11th attacks, individuals of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim descent became the subject of increased surveillance by Canadian law enforcement and intelligence officials.

Salter (2004) examined the surveillance practices at the Canada- US border. He contended that after September 11th the new security legislation gave border officials wide powers of search, seizure, detention, and of course, the ability to exclude travelers from entering into the United States (Salter, 2004). He also argued that the increased security controls after September

11th promoted discrimination by explicitly targeting certain 'high risk' nationals[12]. He indicated that the surveillance practices were applied to these "high risk" nationals even while they were in the United States. The same author also examined the Canadian government's establishment of a program called Canadian Accelerated Passenger Service System (CANPASS) as a part of Canada-US Smart Border agreement (Salter, 2004). He concluded that this program has employed surveillance initiatives by photographing, fingerprinting, and recording hand geometry of some of so called "high risk" individuals (Salter, 2004).

Lyon (2001) also examined the impact of the September 11th events on the phenomenon of surveillance. He asserted that this event only exposed and accelerated a number of surveillance trends that had been developing quietly and largely unnoticed by society, such as video surveillance. Lyon (2001& 2006) drew attention to the popularity of the technological gadgets after September 11th as a means of providing surveillance. He also pointed to the mundane everyday practices such as the Internet, money transactions and phone conversations that have become a part of this surveillance plethora. In his examination of the surveillance trends after September 11th, Lyon (2006) concluded, "it is more dispersed than centralized,... it is more intrusive than exclusionary..." (2006: 8).

Public reactions against Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals in Canada and the United States

Scholars also draw attention to the differential attitudes and treatment by members of the American and Canadian public towards individuals from the Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim communities. The following section explores some discriminatory reactions against these minority groups. Subsequently, in order to understand the public's attitude towards Middle-

[12] As mentioned by Roach travelers born in Pakistan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or Sudan are designated as "high risk" individuals by the United States government.

Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals the results of some of the Canadian and American public opinion polls taken after September 11th are presented.

In the days and months following the September 11th attacks, individuals from Middle-Eastern, Arab, and Muslim communities experienced a range of negative responses including hate mail, defamatory speech, physical assault, job discrimination and even murder (Abu-Laban, 2002; Cainkar, 2004; Kruger et.al., 2004; Khalema & Wannas-Jones, 2003; Muscati, 2003; Sheridan & Gillet, 2005). Six months after September 11th, 1717 cases of "bias incidents and hate crimes" were reported to the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) (Cainkar 2004: 8). Ahmed (2002) and Kundnani (2002) reported on some extreme cases of violence by the American public against Middle-Eastern and Arab individuals. They include examples such as the killing of five people who were believed to be of Muslim or Middle Eastern descent[13]. These authors provide several examples of the discrimination and harassment experienced in Canada and the United States such as: firebombing of mosques, vandalizing of Muslims' and Arabs' businesses and verbal and physical attacks (Ahmed, 2002; Cainkar, 2004; Kilgour et.al., 2002).

Many scholars referred to the phenomena of "Islamophobia[14]" in their writings (Cainkar, 2004; Kilgour et.al, 2002; Sheridan et.al, 2005) and defined it as "a two-stranded form of racism, rooted in both the different physical appearances of Muslims and also in an intolerance of their religious and cultural beliefs" (Sheridan & Gillet, 2005: 192; Cainkar, 2004: 9). In other words, Islamophobia is considered as a prejudice towards both Islam (the religion) and Muslims (the people) (Abu-Laban, 2001; Ahmed, 2001; Sheridan et. al., 2005).

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[13] The five people killed in the United States included two Sikhs, an Indian Hindu (who were mistaken as Middle-Eastern and Muslim) a Pakistani, and an Egyptian who were Muslims

[14] They trace the history of the word indicating it was first coined in 1997 by the Runnymede Trust Organization (the UK-based academic organization on ethnicity and cultural diversity) (Sheridan & Gillett, 2005:192).

Soon after the September11th attacks, public opinion polls revealed negative attitudes and perceptions against individuals from Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim communities. Kruger et al. (2004), Esses et. al. (2002) and Roach (2003) examined these polls in the United States and Canada and found that the majority of the public favoured profiling Arabs, including those who are citizens, and subjecting them to special security checks at the airports and borders. Furthermore, the polls conducted in selected cities in both the US and Canada revealed that the general public was willing to set aside their civil rights in order to fight terrorism and also believed Arab Americans should surrender more rights than others (Cainkar, 2004).

Canadian researchers found that, with the exception of an increase for the one-year anniversary of September 11th, the Canadian public's support for government's policy and increased custom scrutiny of individuals of Arabic origin decreased over time. Kruger et. al. (2004) report that a poll conducted by an independent Canadian organization EKOS two weeks after September 11th revealed that half of the respondents supported their government in its security initiatives. In other words, the respondents agreed that individuals of Middle-Eastern origin should be targeted for extra security attention (Khouri, 2003). In the same poll, 39 percent of respondents confessed to having developed negative attitudes towards Arab-Canadians (Khouri, 2003). The same author reported that two months after this event another poll found only 36 percent support their government's security initiatives that target Middle-Eastern people and similarly by the year 2004 many[15] Canadians did not see any group or individuals as the source of threat and fear (Kruger et.al., 2004).

Esses, Dovidio and Hudson (2002) extended their research to examine the public's attitude towards immigrants and immigration policy in the United States and Canada post September 11th. They concluded that the events of September 11th have had a negative impact on public

[15] The report does not provide any number.

attitudes in both Canada and the United States towards immigrants. These authors suggested that such attitudes would be considerably less favourable in the short run and it will persist over long periods of time, "particularly against those who are perceived to be of Middle-Eastern background and/or Muslim" (Esses et.al., 2002: 76). In addition, Adelman (2002: 15) reports the result of an opinion poll in which 45 percent of people indicated reduced public support for immigration after September 11th.

Despite the destructive and negative impact of September 11th, some literature demonstrated a different kind of reaction by the Canadian public. Kruger (2004) mentioned of a study that had suggested that many Canadians were empathetic and offered support and understanding to Muslim and Arab individuals within their communities. In a poll conducted two years after the September 11th attacks, 82 percent of the Canadian public expressed worries that people of Middle-Eastern or Arabic descent and Muslims in Canada may become the target of racism or personal attacks (Kruger et. al., 2004). Another positive outcome to emerge in the literature was an increased interest in acquiring knowledge about Islam in both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Kilgour et al. (2002) suggested that soon after the events of September 11th, Canadians expressed interest and curiosity in acquiring knowledge of Islam[16]. Kundnani (2002) noted that after September 11th, in Britain, young Muslim males who had broken the tie with their religion (Islam) and their ethnic origin practices, returned to Mosques and expressed interest in learning and understanding their religion.

[16] For example, a professor of religious studies at the University of Calgary mentioned that the number of students in his class, "Introduction to Islam" increased dramatically (Buhr, 2002:159). The Canadian Consumer Reports indicated an increased in book sale with topics related to Middle-East and on Islam.

Media in the Post September 11th Context

This section reviews the literature pertinent to the media. In the first section I present the general literature about the role of the media which examines its negative depiction of Arabs and Muslims. Next, I will provide an overview of the literature that specifically criticized the media for its "shallow" analysis of the September 11th events (Kellner, 2002: 345) and its repeated usage of defamatory terminology (Kellner, 2002 & 2004). The last section will present the results of some media researchers that have attempted to understand the impact of the media on people's attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims and the inverse: the Middle-Eastern, Arab, and Muslim communities' responses to the media.

Scholars have examined the powerful impact of the mass media in the construction of cultural beliefs within North American societies and have referred to television and print media as the main sources of information for many Canadians and Americans alike (Elliott, 2003; Enteman, 2003; Henry & Tator, 2006). Therefore, the role of the mass media became extremely crucial in constructing the public's understanding and beliefs about the events of September 11th and about Middle-Eastern, Arab, and Muslim individuals (Enteman, 2003).

Generally, academics in the area of media research assert that the North American media has always depicted a negative and stereotypical image of Arab and Muslim minorities (Karim, 2002; Shaheen, 2001). Badhi (2003) contends that even before the events of September 11th, Arabs and Muslims were usually portrayed as "fanatical, violent-loving maniacs in the popular press of both Canada and the United States" (2003: 304). Consequently, the North American media has continued its stereotypical portrayal of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals post September 11th as well (Abouchedid & Nasser, 2006; Brown, 2003; Dente Ross, 2003; Karim, 2002; Jackson, 2003; Shaheen, 2001).

Several authors have criticized the media coverage of the September 11th events in the sense that there was a lack of any political and historical analysis about the terrorist attacks (Bahdi, 2003; Karim, 2002; Kellner, 2002 & 2004). Zelizer & Allan (2002) noted that the media coverage of September 11th provided the public information about "who", "what", "when" and "how" of the attacks, whereas the "why" question remained "elusive" (2002: 11). They continue to explain that the media in North America substantially neglected coverage of international affairs in the past several decades. Consequently, they concluded that reports about September 11th suffered from a lack of in-depth historical, cultural, economical and political factors underpinning the event (Zelizer & Allan, 2002). Similarly, other researchers asserted that the mainstream media, especially television had a "naive and superficial" approach to the events of September 11th that indicated unwillingness by the media to discuss the United States' foreign affairs (Bahdi, 2003; Kellner, 2002: 27). Kellner (2002: 28) strongly argued that the media supported the post September 11th discourse by choosing to broadcast perspectives and views of selected "intellectuals" of which the majority were either former or current US political, official and military figures.

Moreover, many researchers concluded that objective and professional journalism disappeared during the coverage of September 11th (Finnegan, 2007; Kellner, 2002; McChesney, 2002). These authors examined the language used by the media after September 11th and concluded that the mass media consistently and increasingly have used anti-Islam, anti-Muslim and war-perpetuating terminologies (Karim, 2001; Kilgour et.al., 2002; Kostash, 2002; Kellner, 2002 & 2004). Some examples of anti-Islam terminology displayed in radio, electronic and news-print media were "Armed Islamic group", and "Islamic terrorist" (Kostash, 2002:126; Kilgour et.al., 2002). Likewise, Karim (2001) noted of the anti-Muslim term such as "Muslim

Militants" in the Canadian magazine Maclean's and "extremist Muslim terrorist groups" in the American newsprint (2001:108).

Similarly, Kellner (2002) reported that the American television networks displayed logos and banners such as "War on America," "America's New War", and "America under Attack" even before any military action was undertaken by the United States government (2002: 31). He also drew attention to the radio's war-perpetuating practices by the continuous playing of "war drums" music throughout the radio broadcasting after September 11th (Kellner, 2004: 49).

Other literature produced by journalists and media executives contended that their reports and news coverage of the September 11th events lacked an in-depth analysis and objectivity and were in effect propaganda. However, they nuance this admission with caveats such as personal involvement, corporate and political pressure obstacles to objective journalism. Schudson (2002) explained the issue of personal obstacles of reporters who had witnessed the traumatic event and were unable to detach themselves from their emotions. He continued to assert that many journalists, reporting as "patriotic American citizens" lost objectivity and professionalism. Similarly, the news editors and executives were also affected by the events and to express their patriotism, they discouraged dissent (Rosen, 2002; Schudson, 2002; Zelizer & Allan, 2002).

Additionally, Zelizer & Allan (2002) reported that the media corporations were intimidated by the Bush Administration's[17] initiatives post September 11th, and therefore harmonized their objectives to be in line with the government. Furthermore, the government enacted a new policy in October 12, 2001 in which public and the media access to information were severely restricted under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, Finnegan (2007) criticized the media in its passiveness in complying with the Bush Administration's authoritarian initiatives. She also

[17] The former National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice gathered the heads of all the news media networks and "asked them to think twice before running any more Bin Laden tapes". (Finnegan, 2007)

reiterated that despite the pressure and intimidation by the Administration the media should have upheld democratic values by "examining the government policies and practices under critical lenses" (Finnegan, 2007: 26).

To further illustrate the inability of media to dissent in the post September 11th context Roach (2003) compared Canadian and American reports and contended that the Canadian newsprint published a range of broad perspectives about causes and consequences of terrorist attacks (Roach, 2003). Whereas, there was a marked lack of dissent within the media in the United States and those who deviated from the main discourse were either fired[18] or were forced to change their reports (Roach, 2003).

Mahtani (2001) pointed out that the media have the power to influence how audiences perceive events and individuals. Therefore, the role of the mass media after September 11th becomes highly relevant in constructing viewers' understanding of the terrorist attacks. More specifically, several research studies carried out by media scholars suggest that the media was influential in constructing attitudes and understandings of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals in the post September 11th period. The results of these studies are discussed in detail in the following sections.

A research study conducted by Abouchedid & Nasser (2006) in the United States revealed the impact of the mass media on forming public opinion. More specifically, they explored college students' attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims based on the media representation after September 11th. These researchers (2006) found that the majority of the college students held stereotypical attitudes that parallel the media representation of this group of people. However,

[18]ABC did not renew Bill Maher's contract as the host of the "Politically Incorrect" show after making a controversial comment on-air on September 17th, 2001. He said "We have been the cowards lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away. That's cowardly. Staying in the airplane when it hits the building, say what you want about it, it's not cowardly".

they mentioned that participants who had very little knowledge about Islam and Arab nations tended to rely on the media reports for knowledge and at the same time rated Arabs more negatively (Abouchedid & Nasser, 2006). Participants who had prior knowledge of Arabs and Muslims (through familial or friendship relationships) expressed less negative attitudes (Abouchedid & Nasser, 2006). The latter group also relied less on the media as a source of information about Arabs and Muslims in the September 11th period.

At the same time, several researchers sought to understand the view of Arab and Muslim individuals regarding mainstream media, post September 11th. Khalema and Wannas-Jones (2003) explored Middle-Eastern individuals' perceptions of the Canadian media's representation of Muslims and concluded that the majority of the participants felt that the media have been biased in representing Muslims by portraying them as terrorists (Khalema & Wannas-Jones, 2003). Furthermore, the respondents in this research expressed that media presentations of Muslim, Islam and September 11th were misinformed, distorted, and one-sided and lacked any historical context. The authors noted that participants felt the mainstream media presentation of terrorism reflected the views of powerful groups and in order "to find out the real truth on issues" they turned to alternative media outlet such as the Internet (Khalema & Wannas-Jones, 2003: 35). The participants further contended that the mainstream media have contributed to the public's discrimination and hate discourse against Middle-Eastern and Muslim individuals (Khalema, Wannas-Jones, 2003).

In a similar study conducted in New York, Muslim college students' reactions to the media were explored (Peek, 2003). The author reported that the participants in his study expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the coverage and misinformation about Muslims, Arabs and Islam in the mainstream American media (Peek, 2003). Some mentioned that the media was 100 percent

responsible for the public acts of discrimination that occurred after September 11th. Similar to the study conducted in Canada, the participants criticized the media coverage of the events to be superficial and lacking in historical, cultural and political analysis (Peek, 2003).

Generally, media scholars have criticized the mass media's depiction of negative stereotypical images of Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslims. Academics concluded that the media exhibited passiveness and lacked any ability to dissent and inadvertently or otherwise, became the supporters and propagators for the Bush Administration. However, the body of literature written by the journalists reflecting on their work during the September 11th coverage revealed their emotional involvement, pressure from corporations and fear of the Bush Administration as obstacles in producing objective reports.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the literature relevant to my research that emerged following the September 11th events. In the first section I reviewed the scholarly work that focused on the legislation enacted post-September 11th, more specifically the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act. As was mentioned, many authors criticized the ATA as an unnecessary piece of legislation that could infringe upon Canadian civil rights, could potentially target Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals, facilitate discriminatory practices by the government officials and would be ineffective in combating terrorism.

Other bodies of literature drew attention to discriminatory practices against the Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people by government officials at the Canadian and American border and airports. Many scholars addressed the public's discriminatory behaviour towards individuals of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim descent in the post September 11th context in the form of defamatory remarks, physical assault and destruction of property. The Canadian and American

public opinion polls revealed the public's negative attitudes and an increased support of governmental initiatives in racial profiling of these minority groups.

The literature on the media criticized the mass media for its inadequacy in analyzing the events of September 11th, using anti-Muslim terminologies and aligning their reporting with the Bush Administration discourse. Recently, the media executives and journalists have acceded to some of these criticisms but highlighted some personal and corporate obstacles that hindered in-depth analyses of the event and objective journalism.

Another strand of literature that has emerged out of several research studies revealed minorities' perspective on the mass media. The results pointed to the anger and disappointment expressed by this group, as well as their criticism of the mass media in depicting Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals as violent. Similarly, some researchers concluded that the media has had a negative impact on the attitudes of some Americans in the post September 11th context.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Underpinning

In the preceding chapter I examined the literature pertinent to this research. In this chapter the theoretical framework will be presented that will guide the subsequent analysis. In order to understand the experiences of Afghan-Canadians in the aftermath of the September 11th events, a combination of micro and macro level analyses was necessary. The first section of this chapter will present Goffman's conceptualization of stigma that enables me to analyze my participants' post September 11th experiences at a micro level. To complete my analysis, a discussion of the theories regarding "risk" and Foucauldian Governmentality will be presented in the second section of this chapter, which will allow for an explanation of the changes at a structural level, hence a more macro level analysis. The last section will present the concept of resistance and alternate discourse.

It is important to consider both the micro and macro aspects of stigma, which lead into a more holistic analysis of stigma that has had an impact on the lives of Afghan-Canadians. To focus solely on Goffman's stigma theory is to ignore the impact of power and knowledge at structural level that create and shapes our interactions at individual level. On the other hand, to concentrate only on political and structural institutions that create stigma is to ignore the lived reality of those who are affected by stigma. Hence, I am applying Goffman's stigma theory and Foucaultian governmentality and risk theories in order to gain a holistic understanding of stigma of "risky" individuals in the post September 11th context. Notwithstanding, marginalized individuals have always experienced some sort of symbolic stigma and have been able to negotiate it with little problem (Bruckert, 2002). However, stigma becomes a sociological concern (Hannem, *forthcoming*) as in the post September 11th context, where agencies, institutions and government targeted a particular group of people (i.e. Arabs, Muslims and

Middle-Eastern) and exercised stigma systematically at regulatory sites (i.e. borders, airports, government institutions). It is at regulatory sites that symbolic stigma meets structural and where the individuals (i.e. Afghan-Canadians) are subject to a myriad of regulations and interventions. Moreover, it is within the sites of regulations that the "risky" individuals are marked, not based on individual factors, but on the basis of belonging to a statistically "risky" group. Finally, the experiences of stigma at the sites of regulation bridge Goffman's stigma theory and Foucaultian risk theory. Now, I present each theory separately in the following sections.

Conceptualization of Stigma by Goffman

The ancient Greeks used the term "stigmata" to describe a physical mark, usually burned or cut into the body, that communicated shame and designated the bearer as morally defective and to be avoided (Goffman, 1963). In his seminal book, Erving Goffman described stigmatized individuals as "reduced in our mind from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one" (Goffman, 1963: 3) and "not quite human" (Goffman, 1963: 5). His construction of stigma theory essentially described society as consisting of "normals" and those possessing a discrediting attribute (stigma). Furthermore, he defined stigma as "a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype" (1963: 4). The attribute must be defined as a negative characteristic by the non-stigmatized individuals on the basis of a stereotype. Once an individual has an attribute that is defined by others as an undesirable characteristic, he/she can face stereotypical assumptions and discriminatory behaviour or avoidance by the "normals".

Goffman (1963: 4) created a three-category typology of stigma. The first category is the "abomination of the body" which refers to various physical deformities including blindness and physical disabilities. In the second category he suggested that stigma was often associated with perceived "blemishes of individual character" which could include anything from a "mental

disorder" and "homosexuality" to "radical political behaviour" (Goffman, 1963: 4). In the third category Goffman designated the "tribal stigma of race, nation and religion" which are "transmitted through family lineage" and possessed equally in all members of a family (1963: 4). Thus, group membership and group identity can be in themselves significant sources of stigma. The third category has a particular relevance to this research; however as we will see, the construction of Afghan men as risky, dangerous and potential terrorists suggests that they inhabit a space that straddles the second and third categories.

Goffman as a symbolic interactionist[19], focused on the dynamics of interaction between "normals" and the stigmatized individuals. For interactionists, social actors construct their reality through interaction and the use of symbols. They also adjust their behaviour to the actions of others because they are able to interpret them. However, all individuals positioned in relation to a set of characteristics that not only defines their identity, but also limits the identity s/he might try to portray. Some examples of these characteristics are socio-economic status, occupation, gender, age and race, which could bear with them a perception of stigma within a given social context. This notion is highly relevant to my research, immediately following September 11th, Afghan ethnic identity and "Middle-Eastern appearances[20]" became negative attributes.

Goffman on the "Discredited" and the "Discreditable"

Goffman addressed the distinctions between the "discredited" and the "discreditable" individuals (1963: 4). The former refers to the individual whose differences are evident or known immediately, whereas the latter refers to the individual's differences that are neither known nor

[19] In order to understand the work of Erving Goffman, it is imperative to understand the basics of Symbolic Interactionist Theory. Symbolic Interactionism has a long intellectual history beginning with Max Weber and George Mead; however Herbert Blumer coined the term "Symbolic Interactionism" and formulated the most prominent concepts of the theory. Basically, this perspective believes people act towards things based on the meaning those things have for them; and that these meanings are derived from social interaction and are modified through interpretation.

[20] As mentioned in the previous chapter "Middle-Eastern appearances" refer to physical and facial features common to people of Middle-East, such as the olive skin complexion, dark hair, and dark brown eyes.

immediately perceivable (Goffman, 1963: 4). When the discredited individuals and "normals" come into contact with one another, the stigmatized individual is unsure how the "normal" will receive her/him; s/he must be cognizant and self-conscious about her/his behaviour (Goffman, 1963: 14, 15). However, when the individual is discreditable, the stigmatization may not occur. Instead, the stigmatized person has the choice to either hide or to disclose her/his difference to the "normals" while interacting within an informal context (Goffman, 1963).

Goffman (1963: 48) points out the "visibility" of stigma as a "crucial factor" when determining whether an individual is to be stigmatized or not. The 'discredited' individual can possess "stigma symbols" that are visible, such as skin color. For example, Afghan-Canadians who have darker skin complexions and dark hair are potentially 'discredited'; while those who do not have the stereotypical features of a "Middle-Eastern appearances" are more likely to be 'discreditable'. However, there is certain situational context (i.e. border, airport) in which a discreditable person is required to reveal a discrediting characteristic. Thus, if the "stigmatic attribute" is not perceivable, it maybe necessary to reveal it in formal interactions, making "passing" impossible.

During contact with strangers or acquaintances a 'discredited' individual can come under scrutiny and stereotypical treatment by "normals" (Goffman, 1963). Whereas the same person may feel at ease in the presence of those who are not only aware of his/her stigma but also know about his/her life personally. This assertion resonates with my participants' experiences of stigma where many, as discredited individuals, encountered differential treatment at both structural and interpersonal levels. The distinction between the discredited and discreditable stigmas is important for analytical treatment of the various modes of management techniques

utilized by the stigmatized. The goal for the former is to manage tension and for the latter to manage information, which is the focus of the next section.

Management of Stigma

Goffman (1963) suggests various ways through which stigmatized individuals manage their stigma, all of which involve the control and flow of information. I will discuss Goffman's concept of "passing" as an information-management tool used by "discreditable" individuals. Other authors have provided other methods of stigma management relevant to my analysis such as withdrawal, which could be classified as "passing" and is included in the last section (Markowitz, 1998; Yang, 2007).

Passing

Rohy (1996) states "passing designates a performance in which one presents oneself as what one is not, a performance in commonly imagined along the axis of race, class, gender or sexuality" (1996: 219). Goffman (1963) succinctly describes "passing" as: "the management of undisclosed discrediting information about self" (1963: 42). These conceptualizations of passing focus on the fact that not only is a person endowed or prescribed with some kind of personally discrediting information about their self, but that this information is undisclosed to others who observe and/or interact with that person.

For the 'discreditable' individual "passing" can take many forms. A 'discreditable' individual might choose to whom s/he wishes to open up about her/his stigma, depending on the degree of intimacy and friendship between the stigmatized and others (Goffman, 1963). Certain stigmas cannot be disclosed to strangers due to severe social sanctions (Goffman, 1963; Kanuha, 1999). For example, some of my participants intentionally decided to conceal their Afghan ethnicity in the immediate aftermath of September 11th because of the general public's anger and

discriminatory behaviour against Muslim and Middle-Eastern individuals. When the difference is unapparent, the person could keep her/his stigma as a secret. For example, as an Afghan woman I decided to lie intentionally to customers while I was working in a retail shop as to where I was from so I could avoid further questioning and unpleasant social situations. Notwithstanding that "passing" is believed to carry a high cognitive cost and can possibly lead to stress as the individual contends with the constant threat of being discredited (Kanuha 1999; Joachim & Acorn, 2000).

A different strategy for passing is employed by the 'discreditable' individuals when they have a "double biography" (Goffman, 1963: 78). This refers to when an individual leaves a community after living there for some years, abandoning, at the same time their personal identification and biography. Once in the new community, s/he develops a new biography in which new acquaintances and strangers have no idea about this past life. As such, there is a discontinuity between the two biographies. Goffman (1963) continues that the 'discreditable' individual tries to bridge this biographical discontinuity by deciding to disclose adequate information about her/his past. The general impression, as Goffman (1963) mentions, is that the individual only shares the information about her/his past that is not discrediting to her/himself. Goffman's assertion applies to my participants who have earned professional degrees while living in Afghanistan, such as, engineers and professors, who are currently working in the service industry in Canada. These groups of Afghans willingly disclose this information upon conversation with other Canadians.

Another method of "passing" presented by Goffman and elaborated by social psychologists is withdrawal. This strategy involves either removing oneself or keeping distance from social situations in which the stigma can become apparent (Joachim & Acorn, 2000). This

management technique is applicable to the experiences of one of my participants who quit his employment upon constant inquiries and interest by his co-workers in knowing his ethnic origin. Instead of disclosing his Afghan ethnicity, he decided to withdrawal from the situation. In both cases my participants perceived that disclosing their Afghan ethnic identity to strangers could have led to stigmatization such as derogatory remarks or even hate motivated attacks.

By applying Goffman's conceptualization of stigma, as laid out in the previous sections, I am able to analyze my participants' experiences and responses to stigmatization during their interpersonal interactions. However, my Afghan participants reported experiences of differential treatment, racial profiling and surveillance right after the events of September 11th at the border and the airports as well. They also encountered defamatory remarks from the public. In order to fully understand the genesis of such stigmatic practices and attitudes (by governmental agents and the general public) in the post September 11th context, I rely on two macro theories: "risk" theory and governmentality theory. The next sections present these theories respectively.

The Concept of "Risk"

There are three theoretical approaches to the contemporary social scientific analysis of risk, specifically the Cultural/Symbolic[21] perspective developed by Mary Douglas; the Risk Society/Reflexive Modernization perspective[22] developed by Giddens and Beck; and the governmentality perspective on risk emerging from the work of Michel Foucault (Lupton, 1999) which is the approach employed in this research.

[21] This perspective takes on a weak constructionist approach and is concerned with why some dangers are selected as risk and others are not. The focus is on how individuals perceive danger and attach meaning to it through cultural and symbolic process.

[22] This perspective also takes on a weak constructionist approach in which risk is an objective danger or threat of the late modernity that is inevitably mediated through social and cultural processes and can not be known in isolation from these processes.

The Foucauldian theorizing on risk discourse takes on a strong constructionist approach and contends that a risk in itself is a product of "historically, socially and politically contingent ways of seeing" (Lupton, 1999:35). Furthermore, this perspective argues "the discourses, strategies, practice and institutions around a phenomenon such as risk serve to bring it into being and to construct it as a phenomenon" (Lupton, 1999: 85-86). This does not mean that the risks are invented or fictional: "risks and uncertainties are neither real nor unreal. Rather, they are ways in which the real is imagined" (O'Malley, 2004:15). Based on the Foucauldian perspective, the risk discourse is structurally and socially produced as a "calculative rationality" of neo-liberalism (Lupton, 1999:85) in order to monitor and govern populations (Dean, 1999; Lupton, 1999). Furthermore, the discourses and practices about risk operate in the construction of subjectivity and social life (Lupton, 1999).

As mentioned earlier, risks do not refer to a concrete or real danger, but represent an "artificial entity of calculation" (Krasmann, 2006: 306), which is based on scientific statistical calculation of "expert knowledges" (Dean, 1999; Lupton, 1999: 86). For Foucaultians, they are an integral part of creating discourse (including risk discourse) because experts provide "guidelines and advice by which populations are surveyed, compared against the norms, trained to conform with these norms and rendered productive" (Lupton, 1999: 87). It is through such knowledge that "risks" are rendered calculable and governable. As such, certain groups of people are categorized as "at risk" or "high risk" based on the suspicious attributes or ascribed characteristics, requiring particular modes of intervention (Lupton, 1999: 87; Krasmann, 2006).

Risk therefore, is selective and precise and it can apply to larger groups of people (Lyon, 2006; O'Malley, 2006). This is what happened in the wake of September 11th whereby individuals, who either were, or appeared to be from Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim

backgrounds, were designated as the 'risky' people who required monitoring, surveillance and governing. This is well illustrated by the mass surveillance and interrogatory practices by the US government in the immediate aftermath of September 11th. As mentioned earlier, some 80,000 individuals from Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim backgrounds were either detained or questioned in the wake of September 11th in the United States (Cainkar, 2004). My participants, as "Middle-Eastern looking" individuals, also experienced racial profiling and interrogatory questioning at the Canada-US border and in Canadian airports. These practices speak to the ways risk discourses are experientially real when individuals are monitored based on recognition that they belong to a "statistically risky" population and not on the basis of individual factors. It also points to the genesis of stigma (at least for my participants) experienced both at the structural and interpersonal levels, as my participants reported never experiencing or perceiving any stigma before September 11th.

As risks are processed in modern society, societal priorities change in order to seek solutions that can eliminate or reduce new threats (i.e. terrorism) that people may encounter in their lives. According to Schneiderman (2002), through such processes of risk prevention, totalitarian measures can flourish at the political level. Consequently, any action taken in response to perceived risks can create further risky side-effects (Luhmann, 1993). Evidently, the US government response (i.e. national security policies) to the terrorism events of September 11th created situations in which certain priorities were cast aside (human rights, due process). One notable example, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter, is the creation and enactment of the US PATRIOT Act in the United States and the Anti-Terrorism Act in Canada which were widely criticized by academics, lawyers and humanitarians as intrusive and unnecessary laws that infringed upon the civil liberties of certain minority populations (Roach, 2002).

Another side effect of post September 11th security policies of risk prevention has been the experience of differential treatment at the structural level that has permeated the lives of many, including my Afghan-Canadian participants in the post September 11th period. Hannem (forthcoming) defines structural stigma as an intentional mode of governing and managing a group of people who are deemed to be "risky" on the basis of an awareness of the problematic attributes. This stigma is referred to as structural because the difficulties that arise from it are product of the "institutional and conceptual structures that surrounds it" and not so much because of the stigma itself (Hannem, forthcoming). Consequently, whether or not a targeted individual experiences interpersonal stigma in interaction, s/he is subjected to a series of surveillance practices and regulations at structural levels.

In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, a myriad of security policies and interventions (with the intention of providing and increasing security) were created and implemented at governmental (specifically at the airports and the borders) and non-governmental sites targeting Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim as "risky" individuals. Because risk seems to establish an objective truth about certain categories of people (Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslim in the post September 11th context), it also allows intrusive interventions to be practiced (O'Malley, 2006). However, some of the risk prevention and regulation strategies are less direct (may not seem intrusive) in the neo-liberal government and are located in non-governmental institutions such as the private sector and the mass media (Lupton, 1999).

Garland (2003) points to a trend whereby government tends to protect citizens by managing risks through expanding institutional regulation, legal norms (creation of the PATRIOT Act in US and *Anti-Terrorism Act* in Canada) and inspection (increased security checks at the border and the airports). He believes that the government's role in risk management can extend into

many domains, including security, health, safety, environment, policy etc. Therefore, the allocation of risks, their distribution and the costs involved depends to a large extent on the action undertaken by government.

Foucault's Governmentality

French philosopher, Michel Foucault coined and developed the concept of Governmentality in the later years of his life (Dean, 1999). It is a form of social regulation and control that according to Foucault, emerged in the sixteenth century Europe, associated with the breakdown of feudal societies and development of administrative states (Dean, 1999; Lupton, 1999). In its contemporary form, governmentality is characterized by the "political rule of neo-liberalism"[23] (Lupton, 1999: 86) in which individual rights and freedoms take precedent over excessive state intervention (Dean, 1999), state power is de-centralized (Rose, 1999) and people play an active role in their self-government (Lupton, 1999; Dean, 1999). The aim of the government is not to suppress individuals; instead it steers and cultivates the individuals' subjectivity in accordance with governmental aims, located in a variety of different sites (Dean, 1999; Garland, 1997). As such, governmentality refers to "the government of others and the government of one's self" (Garland, 1997: 174) with the focus upon two poles of governance: "the forms of rule by which various authorities govern population, and the technologies of the self through which individuals work on themselves to shape their own subjectivity" through the "responsibilization" of individual autonomy (Garland 1997: 174).

[23] The tern "neo-liberalism" refers to the new forms of political-economic governance based on the "extension of market relationships" (Larner, 2000: 5). It is also associated with privatization of the market which is understood to be a better method of organizing economic activity because market is associated with competition, and choice. Larner (2000) argues that "neo-liberalism" does seem to mean less government but it definitely does not mean less governance. It means that while "neo-liberalism" invokes individual choices and responsibility, it employs forms of governance that encourage both individuals and the institutions "to conform to the norms of the market" (Larner, 2000:12).

Another feature of governmentality, as exemplified in Western countries, is the assumption of individuals as rational and active subjects who are free to choose. Foucault noted the importance of this notion when he asserted "power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free (Foucault, 1982: 221). Based on his perspective, power can be defined as a broad and complex phenomenon, in that it is not an absolute possession but a result of the interactions between individuals, groups, and institutions (Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001). Furthermore, everyone is able to exercise power, albeit some can exercise more than others because every action is an act of power. It allows one group to govern others through discursive practices; however it is always faced with resistance, and every resistance is an act of countervailing power (Foucault, 1988). Resistance can also be practiced through construction of an alternate discourse and resistance practices. These topics will be discussed more fully in the next sections.

Conceptualization Resistance

Resistance refers to the "tactics, strategies and practices" subordinate groups employ, either to contest the dominant discourse and/or to assert agency (Bruckert, 2002; Pickett, 1996). There is a tremendous amount of scholarship on collective resistance such as social movement, protests, and demonstrations where people openly and directly confront the target of their resistance. In this example, the protesters' act of resistance, the target, and the goal of resisting are recognized by the parties involved (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004).

However, there are bodies of literature that challenge this common conceptualization and argue that resistance need not be recognized as such (Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001; Scott, 1990). They have drawn attention to "everyday" acts of resistance (May 1999; Scott, 1990) where the resisters rarely have the opportunity or resources to resist overtly against their suppressors or

superordinates (Scott, 1990). These acts of resistance and behaviours are much less explicitly confrontational than implicit acts, such as revolt (Scott, 1990). Everyday acts of resistance have been applied and practiced by ordinary people and can go unnoticed by those in power, and in turn can help to protect oppressed individuals from repercussions by masking their activities (May, 1999; Scott, 1990; Turiel, 2003). Furthermore, Mullaly (2002) asserts that every individual has the ability and agency to exercise every day acts of resistance against domination, and discriminatory or unfair treatment. For example Bosworth & Carrabine (2001) study of prisons point to the everyday acts of resistance by the prisoners who challenge the authoritarian conditions of the prison and assert agency through their behaviour. However, recognition of the act of resistance depends in part on the goals of the resisters. Sometimes they intend to be recognized whereas other times they purposefully conceal their resisting act.

Acts of resistance can be manifested through resistance practices and creating an alternate discourse that challenge and undermine the dominant discourse. Thomson (1998: 54) asserts, "As power operates primarily through discourse (ideas, assumptions, knowledge, framework of understanding), such dominance can be challenged through acts of resistance, through the use of countervailing power to undermine dominant discursive practices." Certainly, my participants employed both approaches to counter the dominant discourse and to assert agency. The next section will provide a theoretical framework for the alternate discourse of subordinates.

Alternate Discourse

One way of resisting, confronting and attempting to change the dominant discourse is to develop and/or promote an alternative narrative. Counter-discourses in and of themselves, provide a powerful critique. Mullaly (2002) argues that resistance should be mounted against any discourse that oppresses, directly or indirectly, any social group of people. Furthermore, Mullaly

(2002) contends that the subordinate individuals construct an alternate discourse based on the internal contradictions of the dominant discourse. A further approach is to apply reversal techniques where the dominant discourse is criticized (Mullaly, 2001). Another way of countering negative stereotypes is to develop or highlight a positive stereotype associated with the subordinate's group (Mullaly, 2001). The alternate discourse could be multifaceted and uncoordinated among the oppressed group, nonetheless at the heart of it lies the common goal to challenge the dominant discourse and the status quo (Mullaly, 2002).

Conclusion

The theoretical underpinning that guides this research and the subsequent analysis were presented in this chapter. Goffman's stigma theory provides a microanalysis framework by defining stigma, its dimensions and management techniques employed by the stigmatized. However, this theory falls short in providing a framework for macro level analysis of structural stigma. It is then that I turned to theories of 'risk' and Foucault's governmentality and biopolitics. The latter theoretical approaches enable me to understand the genesis of stigma experienced by my participants at structural level after September 11th. The last section of this chapter focused on a discussion about resistance based on Foucauldian perspective, in which he asserts that every act of power is opposed by acts of resistance. Resistance could be manifested through everyday acts of resistance and the development of an alternate discourse by the oppressed. The next chapters will provide an overview of the methodological approaches in this research.

Chapter Four: Methodological Approach

This chapter considers the issues around data collection and analysis. My research is qualitative and as such, the focus is on how individuals understand and make sense of their experiences, their social and historical locations (Berg, 1998). This chapter commences by laying out the research questions, followed by an examination of the research process that includes detailed accounts of the construction of the interview guide, a discussion regarding ethical concerns and the recruitment of participants. This is followed by an overview and justification of semi-structured interviews as the data collection, followed by a discussion on data analysis. The last section covers the limitations of this research project.

The goal of this study was to understand and explore the experiences and perceptions of Afghan-Canadian men after the events of September 11th. Specifically, this study sought to comprehend the effects of both structural and symbolic stigma on the everyday lives of this particular group of people. As such, Afghan males were provided with the opportunity to speak of their lived reality and reflect on their experiences.

Constructing the Interview Guide

The construction of the interview guide commenced once I determined the general research question. Berg (1998: 65) suggests that the creation of an interview schedule begins with constructing an outline, listing all of the broad categories that appear relevant to the study. After conducting the literature review, I developed seven areas of inquiry that were pertinent and important for my research study. The categories sought to understand Canadian-Afghans' lived realities by exploring their experiences and perceptions of: the process of integration, the events of September 11th, their understanding of the Anti-Terrorism and Security laws, their understanding of the Refugee and Immigration Protection policies, their experiences of border

and airports, their experiences with police and the mass media. Following categorization, I generated a list of questions for each of the seven major thematic categories (Berg, 1998) which were reviewed and approved by my supervisor (see Appendix A). Once the interview guide was completed it was included in the package send to the University of Ottawa Ethics' Board.

Ethical Concerns

Every effort was made to ensure that ethical concerns were taken into consideration before starting the interviews. I submitted all the required documents to the University of Ottawa Social Sciences Humanities Research Ethics Board in February 2004. Because of the sensitivity of the topic of my research study, in order to ensure anonymity the Ethics Board requested that the consent form be replaced with an information letter (see Appendix B). They outlined that the information letter must explain the purpose of my study, discuss the issues of confidentiality and anonymity[24] in detail and include name, address and contact information of three resource centres in case informants perceived themselves to need counselling services. I decided to select one cultural, one religious and one counselling resource centre. Once I was able to locate these centres I called them and informed them of my research project and had their consent to provide their information to my informants. I was then granted ethics approval (see appendix C) and proceeded to recruit Afghan males for my study.

Recruitment of Participants

Participants were recruited based on their meeting the following three criteria. First, participants had to self-identify as Afghan or Afghan-Canadian. The self-identification is very important in qualitative research, which hopes to capture the subjective identities of respondents (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Second, they must have been living in Canada when the events of

[24] In order to exercise complete confidentiality and anonymity several steps have been taken such as using pseudonym, changing all of the identifiable places and names, and keeping transcripts and interviews in a locked and secured place.

September 11th occurred. This criterion was adopted because I intended to explore and understand their experiences of structural and symbolic stigma in Canada post September 11th and also to keep consistency amongst all of my participants. Third, participants had to speak English at an advanced level and this was based on the fact that the interview would be conducted in English. This is also an important aspect because efficiency in English would generally allow them to be more engaged and communicative about September 11th and its consequences within Canadian and Afghan communities and enabled them to communicate coherently during the interview.

Before starting this research I assumed that recruiting participants for my study was going to be easy. Not only am I an Afghan woman but my mother as a teacher and a poet is very well known individual within the Afghan community in Ottawa. Initially, I started calling my mothers' friends and acquaintances by introducing who I was and then briefing them about my research project. It would appear that my optimism was misplaced and my first three calls failed to garner interviews. I turned to my mother for help and even she was unable to recruit anyone. Disappointed, I called upon male relatives and family friends and was finally able to recruit three relatives who were living in New York City[25], Toronto and Vancouver. As such, my first three interviews were conducted over the phone in which a special recording device enabled the telephone interviews to be recorded.

On several occasions I telephoned the Afghan Muslim Association of Ottawa asking for their help and finally two individuals agreed to participate and an interview time was set up. However, neither showed up for their interviews. Frustrated, I turned to my father for help and he informed a few of his friends about my research project and this resulted in two more

[25] He is an Afghan-Canadian and was residing in Ottawa when the events of September 11th occurred. At the time of our interview he had just moved to New York city.

interviews. In order to recruit more participants, I started taking part in Afghan community functions, where I was able to recruit two individuals for interviews. In turn, they helped me in recruiting the rest of my participants through "snowball" sampling. Finally, I was able to conduct a total of ten interviews.

Data Collection: Semi-Structured Interviews

As my research tool I employed semi-structured interviews as the most appropriate mode of data collection. I realized that given the goal of this study - understanding the experiences of structural and symbolic stigma amongst Afghan males - a semi-structured interview would serve as the best strategy by allowing my participants to freely express themselves and actively engage in recounting their lived realities. Berg (1993:61) defines semi-structured interviews as "located somewhere between the extremes of completely standardized and completely un-standardized interviewing structure is the semi-standardized interview". As such semi-structured interviews do not intend to test hypotheses but to understand the experiences of other people and the meaning they make of those experiences. Semi-structured interviews not only permit the interviewer to implement the predetermined questions but also allow for the researcher to digress (Berg, 1998) and the participants to elaborate on relevant personal experiences, and foster more equal information-sharing sessions (Reinharz, 1992).

The interview as a mode of data collection allows a greater degree of interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). It therefore, relies upon the relationship between the two. In this area I have an advantage in that a mutually respectful and trusting relationship already existed between my participants and myself on the basis of my status as an educated Afghan woman.

The Interviews

The first interview was conducted in December 2005 and the last one in July of 2006. As mentioned in the previous section, the sensitivity of my research topic made recruiting of participants a difficult task and as such there is eight months between the first and the last interview. The age range for my participants was between 20 and 50 years old. As previously mentioned, the first three were conducted over the phone however the remaining seven interviews were conducted in Ottawa with four at my home, two at the participant's home and one at the University of Ottawa at the Department of Criminology. The interview session began by providing the participants with a written information letter in which the purposes of the research study, anonymity and confidentiality issues, their rights and tape recording matters were thoroughly explained. They were asked to take the information letter home, which contained my phone number, as well as the information about three resource centres. They were told to contact me if they wanted to discard, edit or add anything to their interview. The information letter was sent electronically to participants in New York City (USA), Toronto and Vancouver. Before the interview began, I asked each informant if they had any questions and after this point the interview started.

During the interview I used the interview schedule which was simply a guide to assist me in structuring my interview questions and I memorized the questions to decrease either reading or looking at the guide throughout the interview. A number of my participants would touch on several themes simultaneously without being probed. Two areas, the police practices and understanding of the Refugee and Immigration Protection Act seemed to have little relevance to several participants as they neither had experience with police practices, nor knowledge of the

Act. However, I kept these two themes and brought them up during all interviews despite the short and limited answers, in order to keep consistency among all the interviews.

The interviews lasted between one hour and a half and two hours in length. At the end of the interview, the participants were thanked for their participation and their time. At this point I would serve tea and biscuits and fresh cut fruits. This is an important part of Afghan cultural duty that requires hospitality of guests by offering food, so all of my participants stayed about half an hour after the interview.

Data Analysis

Each interview was taped on a digital recording device and transcribed verbatim upon completion. Once all ten interviews and the transcriptions were completed, I listened to all interviews to detect the tone and the mood of the interview while taking notes. Then I read them all once and then started searching for common themes, ideas and categories or what is referred to as "coding". Glesne (2006) defines coding as "a progressive process of sorting and defining and defining and sorting those scraps of collected data that are applicable to your research purposes" (2006:152). In the preliminary phase of analysis, a total of 25 codes emerged that represented ideas and concepts. I used N-Vivo computer software for social science research and encoded the transcripts with the initial 25 codes. I also analyzed my participants' accounts against the general themes identified in the literature review which were: identity, experiences and perception of the ATA, and the Refugee and Immigration Protection Policy, the September 11th event, experiences at the border/airport, the police and the media. Once this step was completed, I integrated the findings from both analyses. Eventually I was able to divide my findings into two parts: one that was analyzed theoretically and the other which was outside my theoretical framework. The themes in the former category included structural stigma,

interpersonal stigma, resistance, alternate discourse and ethnic identity. Similarly, the themes in the latter category included integration process, structural discrimination, and democracy.

Some of these major categories were further narrowed into subcategories. For example, the subheading derived from data that would fall under the resistance theme includes A) resistance practices, and B) alternate discourse. These categories were narrowed even more, for instance the resistance practices as a sub-theme of resistance included further sub-headings A1) association with religious identity, A2) claiming ethnic identity and A3) strategic avoidance. Similarly, the sub-headings for alternate discourse are as follow B1) challenging the discourse of September 11th, B2) challenging the discourse on "War on Terrorism" and B3) challenging the discourse on the identity of Taliban.

Once I completed categorizing each major theme and sub-themes I divided them into two major headings: macro and micro. The former included any experience and perception of structural stigma such as racial profiling, fear, compliances at borders and airports, the media and resistance. The micro headings include all of the experiences of interpersonal stigma during public interactions and their various management strategies.

Limitations of this study

Like all research projects, mine is not without limitations. One of the important limitations of this study was an inability to continue with my "purposive sampling" (Berg, 1998: 229). Initially, I purposefully contacted a group of Afghans who are known to be religious and have been targeted by government officials for questioning and had been assaulted by the members of general public[26]. Unfortunately, they declined my request and as such I lost a few candidates

[26] One man exclusively disclosed such information during our phone conversation and expressed interest in participating in my research. He also introduced a few of his friends whom I later contacted and agreed to be a part of my study. However, they all either did not show up for the interview or never answered my repeated phone calls and phone messages. This is common in Afghan culture where saying "no" is considered rude, instead people tend

whose experiences would have enriched this research. Interestingly, one man who was contacted by my mother mentioned that the topic of September 11th was a very sensitive issue and despite his intense interest to take part in such a discussion, he would rather not participate because it would make him feel "unsafe" in such "uncertain" times. After all, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and the months that followed many of Middle-Eastern and Muslim minorities, including Afghan-Canadians were under the Canadian government officials' lens of suspicion and found their mundane everyday activities (i.e. going to mosques) questioned.

Secondly, as Glesne (2006) mentions, the location of the interview is important as participants' responses can be affected if the location of the interview is not conducive to interviewing. As other researchers have done, I let my participants decide the location where they would like the interview to take place. When the interview was conducted in my home, I had greater control over the environment and ensured that there were no interruptions. When the interview was carried out in the interviewee's home, I had very little control over the surroundings. This became an issue with both interviews conducted in my participants' home. In one of the interviews the participant's wife would constantly interrupt by serving tea, biscuits and fruit[27] and on one occasion his children walked in and I had to stop the interview to greet them. In another interview taken place in participant's home his male friend remained in the living room throughout the interview and continued watching TV. Nonetheless, it was important to respect the wishes of the participants; it was also vital to make sure the interview process was free from distractions and interruptions.

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to circumvent the situation by adopting avoidance strategies such as not returning phone calls and constantly postponing appointments.

[27] As mentioned before serving tea and fruit is an important part of Afghan culture that conveys hospitality.

As mentioned previously, three of my initial interviews took place over the phone and as such it decreased the quality of the interview because of an inability to observe nonverbal cues. Berg (1998) believes that "social interpretations are the messages transferred from one acting individual to another through nonverbal channels" (1998: 80). He contends that these nonverbal channels of communications combined with verbal channels create a "full channel communication" which provides sufficient clues and messages that create meaningful text (Berg, 1998: 80). I was not able to view my participants' body language and facial expressions, and had limited control over their physical environment. However, I paid even greater attention to the tone and pitch of their voices during the interview and analysis. Nonetheless, I was able to establish rapport with them by means of being relatives and having met them on several occasions during family functions. This had put them in ease and created a friendly and balanced interview relationship.

One important limitation of interview analysis that is also pertinent to my research study is that it is suggestive rather than definitive (Babbie, 1995). The researcher cannot rely upon the data nor generalize the data. For example, my participants' recounts of their experiences in the post September 11th period cannot be generalized and is unique to this selected sample.
The researcher also engages in reformulating and categorizing the content of data under themes that the participants might not agree with. For instance, my informants declined my assessment of some of their practices as resistance, yet I have categorized them as such.

Contribution of this Study

This research contributes to the existing knowledge about certain minorities' experiences of structural and symbolic stigma in the aftermath of September 11th events. However, it is important to note that as to my knowledge, no other study has addressed the experiences of the

Afghan ethnic group in the post September 11th events; instead some research has focused attention on Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslim individuals, where Afghans were clumped in as members of these groups[28] or were excluded completely[29]. My research study closes this gap by contributing to existing knowledge by bringing forth Afghans' experiences and perceptions in the post September 11th period as a distinctive ethnic group.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the process of research design for this study. It has considered in specific detail the research process, semi-structured interviews as the mode of data collection, data analysis and the limitations of this study. I would like to end this chapter by noting that several of my participants expressed satisfaction and relief by participating in my research. They mentioned that this study not only gave them an opportunity to reflect on their experiences as Afghans in the post September 11th period, but also enabled them to dissent. Notwithstanding that many have feared voicing their concerns and opinion since September 11th.

The next two chapters provide the findings and analysis of the interviews with my ten participants. Specifically, the next chapter introduces my respondents through their biographies, their process of integration and provides a discussion of their experiences of structural stigma. The chapter that follows analyzes the theoretical findings of this study.

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[28] In a recent book, titled "Communicating Ethnic & Cultural Identity" (2006: 53), one of the authors who happened to be the editor misrepresents and provides wrong information about Afghans by stating that, "...Afghans who are Muslim... speak Arabic". However, the spoken languages in Afghanistan are Dari and Pashto. This is an example of categorizing Afghans as Arab in the post September 11th discourse, simply because the majority of Afghans are Muslim.

[29] In a book titled "Middle-Eastern lives in America" Marvasti & McKinney (2004) conducted interviews with several ethnic groups including, Pakistani, Iranian, Turkish, Arabs in order to understand their experiences post September 11th and they have not included Afghans as part of their study group.

Chapter Five: Presentation of Research Findings

This chapter includes findings that lie outside my theoretical analysis. Initially, I introduce each participant through a brief profile, followed by a discussion of their integration into Canadian Society, their experiences of structural discrimination and their iteration of "Democracy in Canada".

Amir

Amir is 27 years old and was born in Kabul, Afghanistan. He presented as articulate and intelligent. He is Shiite Muslim[30] and speaks Dari. He has traveled and lived in several European countries before immigrating to Canada in 1991 with his family at age 11. He recounted his experiences of integration in Canada to be easy and pleasant. During our interview, on numerous occasions he mentioned that Canada is a "melting pot" for all cultures. He completed his elementary and high school education in Canada and earned a college degree in 2000. On September 11th he was living and working in Ottawa. In 2003 he moved to the United States as result of his marriage. Currently he is employed and living in New York City with his wife and daughter. Amir traveled extensively to the United States across the Canada-US border and as such experienced discrimination by the border officials. During his daily interactions at work and in public he encountered few instances of discrimination as well. The events of September 11th had an affect on his religious identity and brought him closer to Islam. One thing that angered and disappointed him was the American government's attack on Afghanistan following the

[30] There are two denominations in Islam: Shiite and Sunni. Generally, Shiites are the minority in the world comprising between 10-15% of all Muslims (Encyclopaedia Britannica). Therefore, Shiites are also the minority in Afghanistan. The majority of Shiites speaks Dari and generally live in the northern and western parts of the country. Whereas the Sunnis in Afghanistan are the majority and most of them speak Pashto and live in the southern parts of the country (i.e. Kandahar). This is an important distinction because being a Shiite and speaking Dari mark some Afghan people as the minority who have had experienced stigmatization in their own land.

events of September 11th. He also expressed his disgust with the media reports of Afghanistan and their analysis of the events of September 11th.

Hakim

Hakim is 50 years old and was born in Kabul, Afghanistan. He is married and has two teenage children and is currently residing in Ottawa. He belongs to the Sunni sect of Islam and is fluent in both of Afghanistan's official languages, Dari and Pashto. He is also fluent in English and Arabic. He is knowledgeable and is aware of the current issues. Hakim comes from a very religious and respected family. He completed his education in Kabul and upon graduation from Kabul medical school he was incarcerated as a political activist[31]. He did not disclose which political party he belonged to during our conversation. Hakim spent several years in Kabul's notorious Pol-e-Charkhi prison, which housed a range of different groups such as Mujahideen[32] . His prison years had a deep impact on his religious identity to a point where he lost faith in Islam. Hakim mentioned that he was the minority within the prison walls in which he was not only hated by the guards but also by other prisoners who consisted of Islamist Freedom Fighters. After his release from prison, he was conscripted and served two years in the military before working in a mental hospital in Kabul for a few years. Eventually Hakim found Kabul to be unsafe and moved to Pakistan with his wife. He took a job as a translator with various United Nations agencies and continued his political activities. Life in Pakistan proved to be dangerous

[31] Communist ideology became extremely popular amongst politicians and educated people in Afghanistan during the 1960's and 1970's. By 1978 there were three communist parties, namely Parcham, Khalq and Sholah. The first two groups; Khalq and Parcham were founded based on the communist ideology of the Soviet Union, and the latter was founded on the ideological Communist Party from China. In 1978 the Khalq Communist Party defeated the existing government (United Republic of Afghanistan) at the time and took power by assassinating Davood the President of Afghanistan. Within three months, other members of the Communist Party, Parcham assassinated the leader of Khalq and they took power with the help of the Russian government. In 1979, 100,000 Russian soldiers walked the streets of Kabul. The members and proponents of the other two parties (Khalq & Sholah) were either assassinated or imprisoned.

[32] Muslim guerrilla warriors engaged in Jihad (American Heritage Dictionary)

as he was warned to either stop his political activity or be killed. He witnessed the assassination of a friend and fellow political activist. Despite threats from Islamic groups, he continued his activity until his children became the subjects of threats. This is when he decided to leave Pakistan and migrated to Canada, where he has lived in Ottawa since 1998. Interestingly, he said that he was not surprised by the events of September 11th, since he "knew Islamists first hand by being housed with them, listening to their prayers five times a day for several years". Although he had his share of discrimination at the border, he supports Canadian the Anti-Terrorism Act and the US attack on Afghanistan.

Habib

Habib is in his late forties and has been living in Canada for almost twenty years. He is married and has adult and teenage children. He is a thoughtful and analytical man, as his answers to research questions were deep and interesting. Habib was born in Afghanistan in a very religious and poor family. He belongs to the Shiite sect of Islam and speaks Dari. After completing his high school Habib became involved in secularism movements, which were popular amongst young university educated students. He mentioned that religion never gave solutions to social and economical problems that Afghans faced at the time and as such he turned to secularism. This is when he lost his faith in Islam and claimed to be an atheist.

During the Soviet occupation he left Kabul and migrated to neighbouring Pakistan. Like Hakim, he was employed by the United Nations as translator and lived for a few years in Pakistan with his family, where he witnessed hardship and suffering of other Afghans living in refugee camps. Eventually, he moved to Canada as he found life to be uneasy and threatening in Pakistan, as the Islamic groups assassinated some of the other educated Afghan activists. He left

his family in Pakistan and they joined him few years later. He is very content and relieved to be in Canada even though he maintains that he has yet to find democracy.

On September 11th, Habib was living in Ottawa and like Hakim, he was not surprised to see such an act perpetrated by the Islamist group. He hid his Afghan identity for about a year. On the whole he supports the Canadian government enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act, but he is very critical of the US policies. He extensively criticized the US government for supporting and financing Mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation. Habib also criticized the mainstream media for focusing on Afghanistan only after September 11th.

Ebi

Ebi is in his mid thirties and has been living in Canada since 1991. Ebi was born in Kabul, Afghanistan and at a young age his family moved to neighbouring Iran. He was denied the opportunity of education for about two years since the Iranian government did not recognize Afghan refugees[33]. During these two years he went to Islamic school ran by the local Afghans and learned about Islamic laws and practices. Despite his previous education in Islamic laws, he does not hold strong beliefs in Islam and believes that Islam and politics must stay as two separate entities. Due to the Iranian government's discrimination against Afghan refugees, Ebi's family moved to Pakistan. Eventually, they migrated to Canada and have been living in Toronto since 1991. Ebi upgraded his high school education and earned a college degree. He seems very interested in political issues, which was evident in his discussion about the events of September 11th. He experienced discriminatory practices at the American airports and now refuses to travel

[33] Following the Soviet invasion and the consequent killings and imprisonment by the Afghan Communist government, many Afghans who held positions of power fled Afghanistan to neighbouring countries such as Iran, Pakistan and India. Many Afghans lived in the refugee camps set up by the United Nations and many others lived illegally in the major cities in Iran and Pakistan. Finally, the United Nations and the host countries (Iran, Pakistan, India) signed agreements that the host countries to recognize Afghan refugees and to issue identification cards. Meanwhile, those without any identification cards were banned from labour, education and travel.

again to the US. Ebi expressed his discontent with the Canadian government for "copying" the US in enacting its Anti-Terrorism Act and other security measures. He was angered with the United States foreign policies and perceives the American government as the co-conspirator of the September 11th attacks. Ebi was also highly critical of the mainstream media and contends that the media is a profit driven enterprise that was silent about the misery of Afghans in the past 30 years of war and destruction.

Hamid

Hamid is twenty years of age. He was born in Kabul, Afghanistan and belongs to the Sunni sect of Islam from Pashton backgrounds. When Hamid was only four years old his parents decided to migrate to Pakistan due to threats and oppression exercised by the Afghan Communist Government. They lived in Pakistan for almost ten years during which he completed his education, accompanied by religious study. In August 2001, Hamid and his family arrived in Canada as landed immigrants. Currently he is studying in a Canadian university. A month after he arrived in Canada, the terrorist events of September 11th occurred. He described his experiences during first few months to be emotional and at times very difficult. His family feared potential deportation by the government. As an Afghan, he felt discriminated against in school and work and was not able to voice his opinion during interactions with friends and acquaintances. The topic that greatly affected Hamid, was the United States attack on Afghanistan which he describes as a highly emotional period for him. He channelled his anger towards changing and challenging the image of Afghans as portrayed by the media. As a proud Afghan, Hamid would take advantage of any opportunity to openly discuss Afghanistan in order to clarify misconceptions. He comes across as a passionate and patriotic individual.

Hassan

Hassan was born in Kabul, Afghanistan and is in his late thirties. He comes form Hazareh backgrounds that are mostly Shiite Muslim and speak Dari. He came to Canada about twenty years ago as a refugee after living in Pakistan for several years. As the eldest son, he was chosen to leave Afghanistan and settle in Canada in order to provide financial support and to sponsor his younger siblings. Upon his arrival in Canada, Hassan worked two jobs and was able to send money back home to support his parents and siblings financially. Eventually his brothers and sisters, as well as his parents migrated to Germany. Hassan contends that he has never felt any discrimination for being an Afghan as the result of the September 11th terrorist attacks. He supported the United States military attack on Afghanistan since the primarily purpose was to topple the Taliban regime.

Abbass

Abbass is in his early thirties and was born in Kabul, Afghanistan as well. He speaks Dari and belongs to the Shiite Muslim sect. Abbass finished his high school education in Kabul and upon graduation immigrated to Pakistan where he lived for a number of years. In the mid-1990s, Abbass entered Canada as an immigrant and started working in order to support himself and his family back in Kabul. He described his initial experiences in Canada to be both exciting and difficult. Abbass earned his Canadian high school diploma and was starting to attend university when the September 11th attacks occurred. He described those first few months to be extremely emotional for him; not only he was angered by the US military attack but also mourned the death of his mother. He experienced discriminatory remarks from co-workers and ended up leaving several jobs in order to avoid confrontation and arguments. Due to emotional strain, Abbass was

not able to continue his education, something he regrets deeply. In order to seek emotional support he turned to prayer and started attending Friday prayers on a regular basis.

Yunis

Yunis is in late forties and was born in Kabul, Afghanistan and belongs to the Sunni sect of Islam. He is fluent in Dari, Pashto and Russian. After finishing his high school education, Yunis left Afghanistan for Moscow where he earned his Civil Engineering degree. He married while in Russia and moved back to Afghanistan in early 1978. As many other Afghans, he found life difficult and threatening in Kabul during the communist regime and he left Afghanistan and returned to Moscow. After living in this transitional country for a few years he migrated to Canada with his family in 1990. Despite upgrading and accrediting his degree, Yunis was unable to find a job in his field. This is very upsetting for him since he is not able to work in his professional field. Like many other respondents he was shocked by the events of September 11th. Interestingly, Yunis described the US military attack on Afghanistan as an intervention and was pleased to see the Taliban being eradicated. However, he expressed anger when the media included Afghans in discussions about terrorism and terrorists. On several occasions he expressed his discontent with the average Canadian's knowledge about Afghans, which he believes, stems from the mainstream media bias against immigrants.

Reza

Reza was born in Kabul, Afghanistan and comes from a Shiite Muslim, Dari speaking background. He is in his mid thirties, married and has a young daughter. When he was younger, his family fled Afghanistan to India. Along with his parents and siblings, Reza lived in India for several years where he learned the local language and went to school. Finally in 1987-88, Reza along with his parents and siblings arrived in Canada as immigrants and resided in a small town

near Toronto. Integration into Canadian society seemed to be relatively easy for Reza since he was younger and spoke English very well. He continued his education in Canada and earned a college degree in police studies. He had experienced his share of discriminatory practices by the government agents after the events of September 11th. Despite all of this, he supports the Anti-Terrorism Acts and the new security measures practiced by American and Canadian officials. Reza also expressed satisfaction with the US military attack on Afghanistan because they eliminated the Taliban.

Najib

Najib was born in Kabul, Afghanistan and belongs to the Shiite sect of Islam and speaks Dari. He described his family to be "open-minded" about religion and allowed him to discover Islam for himself. Like many other Afghans, he left Kabul in the late nineties for Pakistan and eventually migrated to Canada. He earned his high school diploma in Canada and currently is enrolled in university, studying economics. Najib described the September 11th attacks as an event that changed him "180 degrees". He started a transformational journey by reviewing his religious, cultural and political beliefs and finally dismissed all. With his new perspective, Najib supports the US attack on Afghanistan and the new security laws enacted by the American and Canadian governments. Furthermore, he endorses all of the latest security practices at the borders and airports, as well as the racial profiling of Middle-Eastern individuals and contends that the sources of all terrorist activities are Muslim people whose corrupted mentalities are blamed for "creating their own problems". He shared some of his opinions and ideas with his Afghan friends and has become, as a consequence, alienated from some. He expressed pleasure in doing this interview since it afforded him the opportunity to freely express his new ideas.

What do the biographies tell us?

The aforementioned biographies of my participants speak to the heterogeneity of cultural, ethnical, political and religious divides in Afghanistan. The thirty years of civil war and the migration experiences have fractured Afghans even more. This is an important finding of this research project, as it illustrates that Afghans cannot be defined by a set of common characteristics. For instance, Hakim and Habib as ex-political activists who lived through the tyranny of communist and Islamic regimes in Afghanistan were Atheist cultural Muslims who abhorred Islamic political groups. Ebi, Hassan and Reza expressed strong beliefs in the main pillars of Islam but identified themselves as non-practicing Muslims, whereas Amir, Hamid and Abbass's beliefs in Islam strengthen after the events of September 11th. Furthermore, this event served as a catalyst in Najib's life, where he discarded his cultural, religious and political beliefs, as he puts it "*I was pro-East and now I am pro-West and pro-USA*". Due to such diversity, I discovered that their perspectives and experiences post September 11th could be situated on a spectrum, which will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter.

I now turn to examining my participants' experiences of integration into Canadian society along with topics of structural discrimination and democracy. The latter two areas of interest were brought forth by my interviewees without being prompted and therefore suggest these are important issues.

Integration process in Canada

When asked about the process of integration into Canadian society, all of my informants conclusively expressed having smooth, positive and exciting experiences. All of my participants adopted different strategies in their attempts to assimilate to their new lives. For instance, Amir emphasized that everyone in Canada has a "foreigner" background.

> *Canada is melting pot for all nations and I wasn't single out as a foreigner as you can call it. Everybody was pretty much a foreigner, everybody had Canada in common and I tried to make the best out of it.*

For Abbass, the integration process was a combination of hardship and excitement. He described loneliness as challenging, however his new life led to self-development, which was exciting.

> *At the beginning it was hard and very exciting. Because new places and new ideas and new...I was much more younger and [I was] exploring my idea was ...that was a really good experience for me*

Fong & Chuang (2004) indicate upon migration to a new land individuals undergo self and cultural transformation in order to achieve "understanding, harmony and balance within themselves, their environments and their connection with others" which resonates with my informants' shifting identities (2004: 5).

Shifting identities as result of integration

Identity is shaped and formed through social interaction (Goffman, 1963). This illustrates that identities are not static but rather dynamic (Chuang, 2004; Goffman, 1963). These features of identity are important factors in understanding Afghans' experiences after immigrating to Canada, as their identities are constantly renegotiated in an attempt to integrate into Canadian society. My participants communicated a sense of satisfaction with their new environment which provided them with an opportunity for learning a new culture. Hamid, who came to Canada as a teenager said:

> *...I tried to learn the culture of Western civilization...what I did was to take the good side to my civilization and good sides from the Western civilization and learn from it.*

Ebi also expressed contentment with his emergent identity as result of his migration to Canada.

> *...Canada is economically, socially, and politically different than Afghanistan. So my ideas have been altered basically, I'm more moderate, more open-minded.*

Upon arrival in Canada, Habib noticed differences in the Afghan and the Canadian cultures. In order to ameliorate the process of integration for his family and himself he reconsidered some of his traditional practices and mentality. He described this reformation of thoughts as the best experience in his life. He elaborated on his experiences as such:

> *...It's not only my lifestyle, I find a lot of changes in my point of view towards what I was thinking ...when I came to Canada I saw first democratic system and secondly I find out later that democracy is not something to be injected....This is my biggest experience that my view changed about what I was thinking"*

Fong (2004) denotes that the positive and rewarding experiences of integration into a new culture and country not only facilitates the integration process but also helps the emergence of hyphenated identities. This conceptualization was present whereby all of my participants classified themselves as an "Afghan-Canadian". Ma (2000) argues that hyphenated identities are a combination of "both/and" and "neither/nor". For instance, my participants are both Afghans and naturalized Canadians (2000: 102). However, they can never entirely feel like a true "Canadian" in the White-dominant society, nor do they feel like the Afghan persons they used to be when they were back home. They have reconfigured their Afghan identity in order to facilitate the process of integration and as such they are not true "Afghan". But at the same time I have detected ambivalence in their narratives about their hyphenated Canadian identity. For instance, they criticized Canadians disinterest in political issues as ignorant and shallow:

> *...My impression is that in Canada the average Canadian is not that interested into going deeper and researching the roots of social and political issues and phenomena which effect his daily life. She or he just reads it on the paper and believes whatever in TV and then forgets about it because he is more interested in going to MacDonald's or Hockey game...*

Similarly Ebi reiterated his perspective as such:

> *...For the average Canadian or an American who has no interest in politics, the best interest is how much money they have for the weekend to buy beer and throw*

a party, I'm sorry but that's how it is in general...I talk about general public who cares about how to marinate the barbeque...

Habib asserted that the Canadian public takes precedence over the Americans when it comes to engaging in and understanding political issues. He compared the Canadians and the Americans and contended that the Americans are the "uneducated" ones about politics. Basically he is defending Canadians and he is the only participant who refused to identify as only as "Afghan" and insisted that he is an "Afghan-Canadian".

...Canada is the richest country but unfortunately the government, the media the life style and the life stress has given nothing to this people to interfere consciously with the politic...but I think the United States people are completely uneducated and they don't know anything at all about what's going on in the world, specially about the international policy of the United States...

Generally my participants expressed satisfaction and contentment with their lives in Canada as it was discussed in the above section. Despite the positive integration process, settling into a new country is not void of challenges. They expressed dissatisfaction with two issues without being prompted. The first was discriminatory nature of Canadian government policy in not recognizing some of the professional degrees they earned back home. I have framed this as structural discrimination. The second topic provided a discussion about democracy. These two topics of interest will be presented in the following section.

Structural Discrimination

During the interviews a number of my informants voiced their disappointment in regards to certain Canadian government policies that precluded the recognition of their professional educational degrees earned in Afghanistan. I would argue this is structural discrimination practiced by the state. As Pincus (1996) writes, "structural discrimination is not intentional and it is not even illegal; it is carrying on business as usual" (1996: 92). Link & Phealn (2001) adds that structural discrimination without intention of inflicting harm or disgrace is the product of

bureaucratic policies that ultimately target certain populations. However, the absence of intention to hurt is not a sufficient defense for the harmful consequence that particular policies or practices engender.

Refugees and immigrants who hold professional degrees, such as physicians and engineers are unable to practice their profession in Canada. Even when the diplomas are recognized, the government requires the individuals to go through rigorous testing and training before being able to practice. In my sample, Hakim, a trained medical doctor and Yunis, an engineer have felt the impact the most. This policy as structural discrimination blocks the individual from achieving their financial and potential intellectual capacity (Link & Phelan, 2001). Hakim communicated the impact of structural discrimination:

> *I struggled here for nine years and I just make enough to make ends meet. And I don't see any hope in achieving my potential, and being able to really have my voice heard.*

Yunis echoed the same sentiment.

> *...I was the director for one of the provinces in Afghanistan. What am I doing here right now with all my education, with upgrading my diploma; still I am not able to get a job here in my field.*

Democracy in Canada?

Many of my respondents reflected on the topic of democracy and a number of them recalled feeling relieved when they arrived in Canada. Based on their previous experiences of living in authoritarian/totalitarian countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, they thought they finally had the chance to live in a democratic society. However, the sense of relief was replaced by disappointment when they realized that the democracy they were experiencing was only limited to mundane activity and can be described as having basic rights and privileges with limits. Hakim provided his viewpoint of democracy as such:

...In the west what you see on the surface and after experiencing after a time you get to the essence of it. Your first impression is the land of democracy, the land of freedom, the individual has rights, your voice is heard, civility in politics like you don't have to resort to violence (...) this is totally admirable. But on the other hand, personally I feel that with despite all of the feeling of freedom you have, but the true freedom is with wealth proportionate to the amount of wealth you have. If you are not rich enough, you are not free...

Habib mentioned the existence of democracy in Western countries is limited:

... They have a lot of privilege that we can't find in a third world country...if you go beyond this limit then you have to going to be somebody who be beat down...

Amir talked about his disappointment with the inability to exercise the freedom of speech, which is one of the most important features of democracy. Just after the United States invasion of Iraq, Amir expressed his opposition to the war by posting a cartoon on his computer at work that conveyed an anti-war slogan. He was soon approached by his supervisor who demanded he remove it or quit his job.

...It whole freedom of speech they talk about it in Western culture does not exist...I was asked to remove the cartoon or pack my bag...

This chapter I have sought to introduce my participants and reflected on their positive experiences of integration. Despite the satisfactory nature of their experiences in Canada some expressed disappointment with the structural discrimination as result of Canadian government policies. In the next chapter I will explore and analyze my informants' experiences and perceptions as an Afghan-Canadian minority group in the context of the post September 11th period.

Chapter Six: Theoretical Analysis of the Research Findings

In this chapter I provide a detailed account of my Afghan participants' experiences and perceptions after the events of September 11th, 2001. I have categorized their challenges into two main parts: structural and interpersonal, which will be presented consecutively. First, I present a brief discussion of structural stigma and symbolic stigma stemmed specifically from September 11th. The interplay of both stigmas occurs at the airports and the borders, which are regulatory sites where my participants were subject to surveillance practices and differential treatment. I end the analysis at a structural level with a discussion about the media and move on to present my participants' strategies of resistance. They presented a multifaceted alternate discourse that challenged several aspects of the dominant discourse. This section ends with presenting my participants' every day acts of resistance. Part two of analysis focuses on the experiences and challenges of my Afghan-Canadian participants during their interaction with the general public, namely work, school and social functions. Again, after presenting their accounts of interpersonal stigma I sketch their management techniques. The very last section presents my informants' accounts on the importance of Afghan ethnic identity as a political tool that has emerged in the aftermath of September 11th.

Part one: Challenges of Structural Stigma

Conceptualization of structural stigma is imperative in order to make sense of my participants' experiences at the borders and airports in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. As mentioned in the theory chapter Hannem (forthcoming) defines structural stigma as "the result of a carefully calculated *intent* to manage individuals within a particular population, based on the risk that they are perceived to present, either to themselves or to the society at large"(forthcoming:15, *emphasis in original*). The notion of intent is central within structural

stigma in which the purpose is not to harm but to protect. The structural stigmas manifest itself as rules, policies and procedures of government, as well as public and private entities (Corrigan et.al, 2004). In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the American and Canadian governments enacted and implemented anti-terrorism laws, security policies and surveillance technologies in order to minimize and curtail the risk of future terrorist activities (Cainkar, 2004). Another central component to structural stigma as defined by Hannem is the "awareness of the problematic attributes of a particular group of people" (forthcoming: 15). In the context of post September 11th terrorist attacks these Federal government policies targeted Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals. Essentially, possessing a "Middle-Eastern appearance" marks an individual as someone who may belong to a statistically "risky" population and subjects him/her to "a myriad of interventions, regulations and surveillance" (Hannem, forthcoming: 15).

Structural stigma meets symbolic stigma when government officials enact these security and surveillance policies at the borders and at the airports by targeting mainly male Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals. In the next section I proceed to demonstrate how the security policies as structural stigma shaped the experiences of my Afghan participants. As mentioned before, the intention of the intensified security policies was not to inflict harm and/or shame onto the targeted population (Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim males) but rather to employ security policies to ensure safety. Nonetheless, my participants' experienced racial profiling and differential treatment as result of these regulatory practices.

Symbolic stigma occurs when an individual with an attribute, which is defined on the basis of a stereotype as undesirable, experiences rejection, avoidance or discriminatory behaviour as a result of that attribute (Goffman, 1963). According to Goffman (1963) individuals with visible stigma are "discredited" as they know that others can use the stigma as a basis for judging them.

The "discreditable" stigma is neither known nor perceivable by others (Goffman, 1963). Possessing a "Middle-Eastern" appearance, or being Arab or Muslim in the post September 11th period was considered as a negative or an undesirable attribute. Based on my participants' accounts, I was able to deduct two attributes that predisposed them to differential treatment and surveillance at the airports and borders in the post September 11th period. First, possessing a "Middle-Eastern look" as a discredited status and second, "being born in Afghanistan" as a discreditable status shaped their experiences. I contend that Afghan males are situated between discredited and discreditable stigmas. In the following section I explore my Afghan participants' discredited and discreditable statuses which were reinforced during their various interactions at the borders and in the airports. I would like to note that except for structural discrimination in terms of employment which was discussed in the previous chapter, many of my respondents mentioned that they never experienced any forms of discrimination prior to September 11th.

Experiences of Structural Stigma at Official Regulatory Sites: Airports & Border

Soon after the events of September 11th, security measures were tightened at the Canadian-US border and airports and Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim men came under scrutiny by border and airports officials. All of my participants who travelled to the United States or Europe post September 11th encountered differential treatment from the officials by means of racial profiling. In the following section I will introduce their direct experiences of symbolic stigma at these sites. An examination of their narratives revealed that many of them believed they were targeted initially due to their "Middle-Eastern look" and consequently, having "Afghanistan" as their place of birth resulted in further discrimination. Indeed, the discreditable status of an Afghan male must be disclosed to border and airports officials, and as such, the ability to "pass"

is not realizable. In other words, my participants' identity within these sites of regulation becomes 'spoiled' (Goffman, 1963).

Amir's experiences as someone who had traveled to the United States before and after September 11th provides a prime example of the interplay between structural and symbolic stigma. Before the events of September 11th, Amir as a Canadian citizen crossed the Canada-US border with ease and was only required to present his citizenship card. A week after the September 11th attacks, he was targeted by the border officials because of his "Middle-Eastern look". His experience resonates with many research studies which found a positive correlation between having a "Middle-Eastern look" and being racially profiled in the post Septmebr 11th period (Ramirez et. al., 2003; Cainker, 2004; Fiala, 2003). These authors conclude that if a person's physical features look like those specific to someone of "Middle Eastern" background, then they are generally more likely to be stopped and thoroughly searched than someone who has the physical features of a European person (Ramirez et.al., 2003). Amir details an encounter as an Afghan male at the Canada-US border just a week after the events of September 11th.

> *...They stopped my car and the first thing they asked me was where I was born and as soon I mentioned Afghanistan they asked me to pull over and go inside. Soon I was inside they go over the same question. Are you religious? Do you go to Mosque? Do you pray? Do you drink? They asked if I fast? How much I believe in Islam? How much I read the Qur'an? And all those things...I was sitting about six hours at the border being questioned by guys... basically some personal questions as well... at the end of the sixth hour they fingerprinted me and took my picture and sent me on my way.*

He went through the same process at the US airport as well. Like land borders, in airports racial profiling is often employed to determine who to search more carefully and extensively. It is clear that again Amir believed that the targeting practices were directly linked to his "Middle-Eastern look". He went through intrusive security checks in the airport as well.

...Couple times that I flew there [the USA]...waiting in line ready to check in, I was singled out off the line. And I was the single person taken into a room, just because you know, I looked Middle-Eastern. And they took my shoes off and searched my bag and they had to register me and take my fingerprints and picture...

Similarly, my other respondents reflected on their experiences while travelling to the United States and Europe. Again, they reiterated that their "Middle-Eastern look" and subsequent passport checks, as well as where Afghanistan was indicated as the place of birth, appear to render them a "risky" population. Hakim recounted in detail experiences of racial profiling where he was questioned, held and interrogated longer than anyone else.

I pass through the United States and then the Britain. In both times I sensed a difference in the officials' treatment of me as opposed to other travelers. Because I got Canadian passport but the place of birth is Kabul, Afghanistan. The first time in Ottawa airport when I was going through the security...I was kept in the booth much longer than others and the officials had to go and consult with someone and I saw them talking for few minutes. And I was wondering what was it all about. The only thing that prompted this kind of reaction was that I had the place of birth Kabul, Afghanistan in my passport and then they questioned me 'when was last time you were in Afghanistan?', 'have you ever gone to Pakistan?' and when I said 'yes I have' they were looking at me as if I was admitting to carrying something quiet dangerous and both times this happened...

The accounts provided by my research participants indicate the impact that structural stigma (intensified security measures targeted towards Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslim individuals including Afghans) has in their lived experiences, which manifests as symbolic stigma by means of racial profiling. Badhi (2003) argues that racial profiling and surveillance are interrelated concepts and both are practiced simultaneously to target certain populations. Furthermore, Badhi (2003) examines the dynamic relationship between these concepts by pointing out the increased surveillance practices and racial profiling of Middle Eastern and Muslims by the government agents after September 11th (Badhi, 2003). Some of my participants also experienced surveillance by the Canadian government, which will be discussed next.

Habib's experience exemplifies practices of surveillance that target "Middle-Eastern" and/or Afghans post September 11th. Prior to September 11th Habib had planned a month long holiday to visit family members in the Netherlands. He booked his flight to Europe for September 12th, 2001. The events of September 11th resulted in Habib's flight being postponed until September 25th. Ultimately however, he never flew to his vacation destination because two Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers contacted him a few days after September 11th and questioned him about the purpose of his travel, about his personal life and as well as his political views. Finally, the officers advised him not to take the trip because he would face rigorous security checks at airports.

> *...They [RCMP officers] ask me to go to their office and I went to their office. We had a very friendly conversation, ...they ask me very friendly 'do you want to go for pleasure or business', [I said] 'no just for the pleasure' and they said 'well if you go only for pleasure then don't go...well I am telling you friendly because you will have some problem in the airport on the way to Holland and coming back, it's up to you'...*

Lyon (2001) points out that the effects of surveillance are to discriminate and exclude the suspicious category, and as such it reinforces social distinction and division. Habib's experience exemplifies the operation of surveillance techniques as a mode of regulating and managing the "risky" population (Afghans) in the post September 11th period.

Covert experiences of Stigma at the border

Many of my participants revealed how, at either the border and/or the airport, officials would (apparently) unnecessarily prolong their wait times at checkpoints. This is evident in the previously story presented by Amir where he recounted waiting at the border for six hours, during which time he was repeatedly asked the same question by different personnel. After the six hour question period the officials photographed and fingerprinted him, then sent him on his

way. He also highlighted some of the more subtle methods that the border officials have shaped his experiences of stigmatization.

> *... During all of my trips, eight of them, I hade to wait for minimum of six hours at the border... I was questioned the same question over and over again by different people...And you know, I was the only person there, so they could finish their interrogation within an hour...*

My participants' experiences of prolonged waiting reinforce their discredited identity and the border and the airports personnel's dominant statuses. Taylor (1994) notes that generally waiting is a negative experience, especially when it is imposed by an authority figure. Accordingly, the extended waiting that happened at these sites is yet another manifestation of structural stigma that finds its way into my participants lived experiences.

Responses to Structural Stigma

My informants mentioned that they were expecting differential treatment at governmental sites of regulation after the events of September 11th. However, there were clear differences in their perceptions and approaches to the intensive security checks at the airports and the border. Some of my informants freely complied with the new security initiatives and accepted the legitimacy of it in detecting terrorists and providing security. The other few complied out of fear and they viewed these policies as ineffective practices in providing security. Despite the utter unpleasantness and insulting experiences my informants exercised caution during their interactions. In this section, I will examine my participants' acquiescence to differential treatment practices at the structural level.

Ebi was empathetic to Canada-US border officials when he was taken in for further questioning. He cooperated fully with custom agents despite being questioned extensively for several hours and feeling uncomfortable. He provided reasons and rationales to explain why he was targeted for questioning.

I didn't say it [security checks at the US-Canada border] didn't bother me at all but I would understand it. But before September 11th no questions were asked very easy... Well first is my name you know, it's all Arabic words... I would understand because of the sensitivity of that time... I wouldn't react to it. Probably I would have done the same if it was my country and I was at the custom controlling. It's a Muslim name, all Arabic. And [I was] born in Afghanistan, lived in Iran and then residing in Canada and this is a funny combination to them.

Hassan who regularly travels to Germany fully accepts and respects new policies such as prolonged wait periods for obtaining a Canadian passport. He respects the rule of law and contends that such practices are important to uphold security. He mentioned that it used to take a maximum of 48 hours to obtain a passport, however this time period expanded to two weeks after September 11th.

I go to the passport office [and say] it's possible to take my passport in 24 hours or 48 hours... [They respond] now everything is changed... two weeks wait time I said ok. It's law it's law I can't do nothing...

The preceding examples illustrated some of my Afghan respondents compliance with the intensive security checks as the structural level. Furthermore, many of my informants expressed support for the Canadian government decision to enact the *Anti-Terrorism Act* and the amendment to its Refugee and Immigration Protection Act. They granted that Canada, as a democratic country was entitled to protect its citizens through the creation of new laws. Despite expressing concern over potential targeting practices that could be directed at Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslim individuals, they supported the new laws. Hakim explained his argument:

On the whole I support it [Anti-Terrorism Law] because I know the reasons why it was enacted why it was brought forward. And of course every country must defend itself, its citizen, its interest and Canada is no exception and no country can be exception, especially in the light of September 11th...

Other participants expressed compliance with the regulations at the airports and border only out of fear and an inability to dissent. Reza distinguished between his approach and handling of his stigma in the European and American airports – having travelled to the United

States and Europe after September 11th. He voiced his discomfort with the German officials when he was being asked excessive questions in the Hamburg airport. However, Reza was careful to appear calm and co-operative despite feeling angry and uncomfortable when the American officials extensively searched his five-year-old daughter. He clearly reiterated that he followed rules and stayed co-operative for his own protection because he perceived that any disagreement or dissent with the US officials could have had a punitive outcome.

> *I did this in Germany [arguing about being questioned extensively by an officer] and I would have done it probably anywhere else except in US...you don't want to argue too much especially with these new laws and changes. They can...put me in jail for few days and I'm the one who's gonna lose so I accept those stupid new rules they have, so I follow that... when we were coming back from Los Angeles, after we did all of our check ups they [airport officials] checked my daughter completely, totally like checking her again before entering in the plane...At the gate before we enter they checked us, only us again and mostly my daughter, she was five at that time and I didn't like that at all, not at all...I was angry...*

As mentioned in the other section, Amir had travelled to the United States through the Canada-US border on numerous occasions and every time he was stopped and interrogated for hours. He endured and tolerated border officials' security practices only because he feared expressing his disagreement and feeling being 'powerless' in the presence of authority. At the same time he communicated his inability to dissent where he had to comply with the new regulations.

> *I wasn't expecting crossing the border to be easy as it was before September 11th. So I had to comply, what else could I have done? I was stopped and interrogated during eighth trips to America. And believe me it was not fun and I got angry every time...I had to do what they asked me to do?...*

The aforementioned stories of my Afghan participants authenticate the authoritarian quality that permeates the airports and the borders in the aftermath of the events of September 11th. Authoritarianism can be described as "a form of social and state control characterized by strict obedience to the authority of a state or organization, often maintaining and enforcing control through the use of oppressive measures" (Nelson 1994: iiv). Oppression is one of the important

pillars of authoritarian practices in which "a person…does not have certain rights that the dominant group takes for granted, or is assigned a second class citizenship…because of his or her membership in a particular group or category of people" (Mullaly 2002: 28). Furthermore, through an in-depth analysis of the post September 11th security policies Conason (2007) concluded that the United States government has exhibited authoritarian qualities by enacting laws that infringe on civil liberties, disregard due process, curtail dissent and oppressed Muslim and Middle Eastern individuals. Certainly, my participants have communicated experiences of authoritarianism within airports and borders. The potential punitive consequences associated with any opposition and/or disobedience to intrusive and invasive security checks left them no option but to comply. They were defined as members of the "risky" populations that required surveillance and intervention in the post September 11th period.

Managing Structural Stigma at Regulatory Sites

As mentioned earlier my participants anticipated experiencing enhanced security check at the borders and airports because of their discredited statuses. Having "Middle-Eastern" physical features (i.e. dark hair, olive skin complexion) forms one of the most important components of the surveillance practices employed in the airports and at the borders post September 11th (Cainkar, 2004). Nonetheless, during his frequent travel to the United States, Amir once tried to "pass" as someone born in Canada in order to avoid questioning and the prolonged waiting period imposed by the officials. His attempt was unsuccessful. His experience illustrates that "passing" as a method of stigma management by a discredited individual in the presence of authority figures is challenging; this is especially so in the context of post September 11th where Middle-Eastern and Muslim individuals are not only marked as departing from the "ordinary and

natural" as stigma theory predicts (Goffman, 1963: 3) but rather are marked as belonging to a "risky" population (Cainkar, 2004).

> *Well the first question has always been where I was born? I did not tell them [border officer] where I was born and I told them I was born in Canada, and the officer kept asking and I said Canada. Well after few times asking then the officer snapped at me that if I was born in Canada my citizenship card would have been looked different than theirs...finally I told them I was born in Afghanistan and then I was told to pull my car over and to go inside for some questioning which lasted six hours...*

Some of my other informants took precautionary measures before travelling to the United States by taking all the proper documents in order to decrease the interrogation time at the border or in the airports. For example, Reza and Ebi made sure they had all the necessary information before entering the United States. Notwithstanding, such preparatory practices did not protect or decrease the probability of being targeted by the border and airport officials.

> *I...made sure when I go to border whether driving or flying, I made sure I have every document they need...So basically not to let them to question me a lot. Like before the September 11th, I just packed everything and go and most of the time I didn't have anyone phone number over there but since then every time I go I make sure I have phone numbers and the address, documents and what are my intentions of going.*

Through the preceding section I explored my informants' experiences of structural stigma at the border and at the airports in the post September 11th period. I demonstrated how structural stigma played a crucial role in shaping the lived realities of my Afghan male participants. Their experiences at the Canada-US border and the airports exemplified how the regulatory practices of surveillance, racial profiling and differential treatment targeting Afghans in post September 11th left them with unpleasant memories and an inability to dissent. Additionally, my participants delved in an intensive discussion about media. Through their narratives I was able to categorize it as a powerful macro entity in shaping, facilitating and supporting the dominant discourse of post September 11th.

Media Analysis after September 11th

The media have been regarded as one of the most influential means through which regulatory discourses can be disseminated to the general public. Moreover, many scholars argue that trust in the government is essential to the proper functioning of any democratic system, specially in times of crisis (Gross & Aday & Brewer, 2004) and the mass media have been recognized as one of the most efficient means through which "trust in government" can be achieved (Gross et.al., 2004: 53). For example, Brody (1991) suggest that usually international crisis (September 11th here) lead to increased support for presidential policies because the opposition political parties whom would normally expect to provide negative comments either rally to the president or remain silent. In the absence of the opposition from other politicians and/or other legitimate sources, news coverage during crisis results in an "unusually uncritical mix of news" (Brody, 1991: 64). Therefore, such surges in approval of the president and/or his policies result not simply from patriotic rallying but from supportive messages that reach the public through the media (Gross et.al., 2004). The lack of critical perspective by the media in coverage of the September 11th events (Kellner, 2002; McChesney, 2001) lead not only to rallies around the Bush administration and its policies but also around the larger political discourse (i.e. War on Terrorism).

These assertions about media resonate with my participants' accounts and they contended that the media supported and reinforced the Bush discourse of "War on Terrorism", portrayed stereotypical image of terrorists as Muslim, Middle-Eastern and Afghan individuals, and fuelled the public's anger against these minority groups. Moreover, they communicated a sense of disappointment with the news and documentaries made in and about Afghanistan and questioned the objectiveness of journalism.

Ebi commented on the powerful affects of mainstream media from which most Canadians get their knowledge and developed an understanding about the events of September 11th specifically, and terrorism generally.

> *... Most of times their [Canadians] ideas about 9/11 are driven by the media and what's said in the media, it's what they hear, you know...*

During our interview, Amir emotionally mentioned, "people have Afghanistan synonymous with terrorism". His comments echoed with the findings of a research study in which the media were identified as biased in representing Muslim and Middle-Eastern individuals as synonymous with terrorists in the aftermath of September 11th (Khalema & Wannas-Jones, 2003: 33). Furthermore, his assertion point to the media's pro-government and pro-US policy messages that dominated the broadcast and the newsprint in the months following September 11th (McChesney, 2001). Amir expressed his frustration and anger with such reports that consequently affected how Canadians have come to perceive Afghans.

> *...To this day people have Afghanistan synonymous with terrorism just because they heard it on the news and not necessarily what it is...what I remember was after watching each show I slammed the remote on TV just because it was so frustrating... It was very frustrating. They would take the truth, they twist it and to get people attention...*

Yunis provided an example of the impact of the media on people by listening to a local radio hosted by a conservative personality. For him the local radio host has the ability to influence listener's perception about Muslim individuals including Afghans and reinforce the negative stereotypical image of Middle-Eastern individuals as terrorists.

> *...He is really conservative and one thing which really hurt me was that he can change peoples' idea... he's like a little bomb, he was exploding against immigrants ...that's no good. So that's what I told you... people really [have] poor [knowledge] about the political situation ...so everybody was like was going crazy against us [Afghans]...*

Amir's and Yunis' comments resonate with much media research that speaks to the "propagandistic" nature of the media during and in the post September 11th period (Kellner, 2002; McChesney, 2001: 94) and that it strengthened, supported and propagated the dominant discourse (Corrigan et. al., 2004). Furthermore, the news outlets reported the public's "jingoistic discrimination" and retaliatory attacks against Middle-Eastern, Arabs and Muslim people in an ordinary tone and also justified it to be a way for people to relieve their frustration, anger and sense of hopelessness after the attacks (Marvasti & McKinney, 2004: 140). Similarly, Ebi elaborated on his perception about the media's impact in contributing to the public's discriminatory attitude against Middle- Eastern and Muslim individuals generally, and Afghans specifically. He mentioned that the media propagated the stereotype of terrorists as Taliban and Afghans.

> *...All of sudden I guess it [the media] had to do with it [discrimination] as well. Obviously all the news reports became about Afghans and Afghans are terrorists and [that] Osama-Bin Laden was part of Taliban and every Afghan is Taliban...and public started act discriminatory against us and the news showed it to be an okay thing to do...*

My participants have recognized that the mass media are a powerful force with the ability to influence public understanding. The media became the conveyer of the dominant discourse by reiterating the stereotypical image of a terrorist as either a Middle-Eastern, or a Muslim or an Afghan male. Such depictions along with limited analysis of the issue (i.e. terrorism) and selected images formed the main venues in which most American and Canadians got their knowledge and understanding about terrorism.

For example, my participants contended that the footage showing an Afghan female being executed in the soccer stadium during the Taliban regime exemplified the tendency of the media in selecting messages that supported the United States government discourse. Often, public

opinion and reactions are shaped by strategies adopted by the media that repetitively portray certain images, which can mobilize people according to a specific agenda (war on terrorism in the post September 11th context) (Gross et.al., 2004). This specific image was shown repetitavley in mainstream media within days after September 11th, especially during pre-US military attack on Afghansitan. As Habib noted this particular incident occurred months before September 11th yet the images were shown only after the September 11th events.

> *... How come the media of United States just showed the killing of this woman in a stadium in Kabul by Taliban just after the September the 11th? Why they didn't show it before that? This incident happened months before September 11th.*

He is making an interesting point because choosing to show this specific image confirmed and reinforced the discourse about terrorists as "evil" as indicated by George W. Bush. Moreover, the Taliban, as a fanatic Muslim group are assumed not only to be "evil" but also to be "uncivilized, violent and inhuman" (Karim, 2001:105; Muscati, 2003). The media, television especially, with their reach and visual impact, could play a key role in the fostering of support for the governmental attack on Afghanistan as a part of "War on Terrorism" discourse.

Another aspect of the media criticized by my participants was the failure to report thirty years of war, destruction and bloodshed in Afghanistan and the four years of atrocities that occurred under Taliban rule. They contended that Afghanistan got attention from the North American media only after the events of September 11th.

> *...Since 1980 people were dying, bombs were dropping, people left to new countries, left their lives, their kids...and you don't see any news on Afghanistan on TV...they were suppressed by Taliban...there was no reports [about it]. It just didn't happen over night as soon as the planes hit...there are many reports...yes it was tons of media coverage about Afghanistan after September 11th ...*

My respondents were drawing attention to what Hoijer (2005: 516) and Chomsky (1988: 38) call "worthy and unworthy victims". Hoijer (2005: 516) argued that in international politics as well

as in the mass media, many victims almost never qualify as "worthy victims". She extends her discussion to say that some victims are "worthier" than others because the Western countries such as the United States government have a political interest in some regions. The qualification of "worthy" and "unworthy" victims relates to the extent of political and mass media attention (Hoijer, 2005). According to Chomsky (1988: 38) people suffering in what are regarded as enemy states are portrayed "as worthy victims, whereas those abused with equal or greater severity by its own government will be unworthy". Therefore, the Taliban regime became an enemy state to the United States only after the September 11th terrorist event, hence the focus of attention by the mass media.

Another area of concern noted by a few of my respondents was that the media were not exploring the history and rich culture of Afghanistan and argued that they simply showed superficial images that were captivating to the North American audience. Abbass analyzed the media with such a critical lens:

> *...Why they do not [show] this nice beautiful Afghani culture we have. Nice beautiful clothing we have, nice beautiful carpet industry... They keep showing the Mojaheddeen [who] kill each other, or they [the media] show they chop somebody's hand or doing something else...*

All of my research informants expressed disappointment and frustration with the media reports and believe it to be a powerful force in reinforcing the dominant discourse in the post September 11th era. The impact of the media has been instrumental in shaping and creating a stereotype of the "risky" population as Middle-Eastern, Muslim individuals including Afghans. It is clear that my participants have expressed an awareness of their subjugation in the post September 11th period and as Mullaly (2001) contends when members of a minority group are stigmatized there is potential for resistance, which is the focus of next section.

Conceptualization of Resistance

As it was defined in the theory chapter resistance refers to "tactics, strategies and practices" subordinate groups employ, either to contest the dominant discourse and/or to assert agency (Bruckert, 2002; Pickett, 1996). The notion of resistance is premised on the Foucauldian understanding of power. Creating an alternate discourse that dismisses and challenges the dominant discourse can be conceptualized as a covert act of resistance.

An analysis of my informants' narratives shows that their alternate discourses are multifaceted. I have categorized their discussion into three categories. First, I will present their challenges to the dominant discourse about September 11th, following this I will speak of their alternative discourse about the Taliban and thirdly, I focus on their discourse about the "War on Terrorism". In the very last section I will examine their actual everyday resistance practices after September 11th.

Challenging the Dominant Discourse about September 11th

One of the noteworthy strategies of resistance my participants adopted was to challenge the presentation of the events of September 11th by the Bush Administration and reiterated by the mainstream media. In a 2001 speech, Bush explained the motivations of perpetrators of the September 11th attacks as:

> They hate ... a democratically elected government. ... They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. *(President Bush, September 20, 2001: Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People)*

Many of my informants completely dismissed George W. Bush's assertion about the motivation of the September 11th attacks and several of them provided a perspective which centres on blaming the United States foreign policies in the Middle-East. For instance, Ebi argued that the

United States government's unfair policies regarding the Middle East ignited these events and hence they were responsible for provoking the attacks:

> *...I thought about the history and politics of the United States and what they've been doing so far and then I realized...it's them provoking the whole movement... maybe this was their [third world] way of fighting back with the United States...*

Habib, like Ebi, blamed the United States government as well, but presented a different position when he questioned the ability of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban organizations to be able to carry out such massive assault within the USA territory. He contended that either the US government was somehow involved in September 11th operation or deliberately ignored warnings by the other countries in order to let the terrorist incident happen.

> *...CIA and FBI has roots in every country...and all around the world...how come that this incidence happens and they didn't know about it and at the same time the Indian, French and German governments were warning the United States in summer of 2001 that there would be an attack to the United States but they didn't take it serious why?...It's not easy for...Al-Qaeda or Taliban to make this kind of plan...*

My participants' accounts demonstrate their critical assessment of the dominant discourse as well their engagement in creating an alternative discourse that could offer an explanation as to why the events of September 11th occurred.

Challenging the Dominant Discourse about the Taliban

There was also a distinct divide between my participants' discourses regarding the Taliban. Some identified them as Afghans and constructed a positive discourse about them. Others completely denied that the Taliban are Afghans by maintaining that they are mainly Arabs. As such, this second group is creating an alternate discourse by disassociating Taliban identity from Afghans and at the same time contributing to the dominant discourse by branding Arabs as Taliban members. Nonetheless, at the heart of both dialogues my participants are exerting opposition and resistance to the dominant discourse.

Amir and Hamid constructed a positive discourse about the Taliban by identifying them as Afghans who uphold traditional Afghan culture of "guest-loving". They are referring to the particular situation when the Taliban regime refused to surrender Osama Bin-Laden to the United States government just weeks after the September 11th terrorist attack. However, my participants' interpretation of the situation is dialectically different. They argued that the Taliban's reaction was based on the Afghan's culture of hospitality in which guests are deeply respected. Therefore, the Taliban could neither surrender nor betray their guest, Osama Bin-Laden. Amir's and Hamid's comments confirm the Talibans' Afghan identity and their traditional practices regarding guests:

> *...Like right after September 11th they asked Taliban to give up Osama and the Taliban refused to give up Osama just because the Taliban are from Pashton background and it's in their culture that once you become their guest, they will not give you up...*

Hamid continues within the same line of explanation, adding an additional element by speaking to Muslim religion.

> *...Osama Bin-Laden is the leader of Al-Qaeda and they were residing in Afghanistan as being guest to Taliban. And Afghan people respect their guest ... they think like guest is sent from God...Afghanistan is a very religious country so they are devoted to religion and care about their guests...*

My participants seemed offended by the failure of the dominant discourse to delve deeper into the cultural identity of Afghans. Hamid and Amir reiterated that hospitality is imbedded in Afghans' culture and Islamic religion, hence a cultural issue.

Some of my participants resisted the dominant discourse about the Taliban by drawing attention to the improved public safety in Afghanistan in the pre and post Taliban regime. They mentioned that people of Afghanistan felt safer during the Taliban than they do under the current

US installed interim government. Abbass pointed to the resurgence of corruption within the last few years.

> *...At that time a lot of people [were not committing]...crime...right now...they do paper work under the table. Like they get money under the table [bribe] ...During the Taliban those kind of crime was gone.*

Hamid contended the same argument.

> *Lives wasn't easy with Taliban regime they were kind of more safe though, if they [people] wanted to go somewhere no one could touch them, and there was not a lot of theft and not a lot of murder...*

In short, a favourable alternate discourse about the Taliban was a resistance strategy adopted by some of my informants as a means to challenge the dominant beliefs that associates the Taliban with terrorism, lack of civility and unbridled oppression.

Taliban are Arabs not Afghans

Contrary to the accounts of the previous participants several others strenuously denied that the Taliban are Afghan at all. Instead they contended that the Taliban are mostly Arabs or Pakistanis who were trained either by Pakistan or Saudi Arabia or the CIA in Afghanistan territory. In a way, this group of participants are creating an alternate discourse that identifies the Taliban as Arabs. In effect, they are defending their Afghan identity by disassociating any identification with the Taliban as Afghans. At the same time they are alleviating the shame stemming from the dominant discourse (Chaung, 2004) by identifying Arabs as the "real" Taliban. Hakim's comments provide an example:

> *These [Taliban] are mostly Arabs, mostly funded by Pakistan because they are the procreator of the Taliban who are doing such things...*

Yunis offered a continuation of the same arguments about the Arab identity of the Taliban members by admitting that some Afghans might have joined the Taliban group only to provide a means of financial support.

> *...Taliban was a group of unorganized people, which was exported from neighbourhood country Pakistan to Afghanistan and this people were sent to do political mission in Afghanistan. It has nothing to do with Afghani people... Taliban were foreigner. We have some people who were involved with them because of the hardness of their lives...*

In order to consolidate their argument they used the example of suicide bombing as a characteristic Arabic tactic. Najib stated:

> *We [Afghans] did not have suicide bombers...it' an Arabic thing, I don't know because I personally never heard of Afghanis being suicide bomber, in 25 years of war and those people [Taliban] who do that [suicide bombing] I am sure are Arabs.*

Habib delved deeper into the issue by blaming the United States and the Saudi Arabian governments for financing and creating the fundamentalist movement that led to the development of the Taliban. He also identified the Taliban to be Arabs and Pakistani and as such, he is resisting the stereotypical assumptions of 'Afghan as Taliban'.

> *...The reality is that the United States who helped this fundamentalist, financed them, trained them...it was 1981or 82 that the United States invest...and Saudi Arabia invested money and the United State was just programming and giving money to Pakistan to create the Taliban. So Taliban is not something new, Saudi created 5000 religious schools in Afghanistan... Taliban were foreigner, 80% of Taliban soldiers [were] from out of the country... they were not Afghan only 20% were Afghans and the remaining of them were Arab or Pakistanis or what ever...*

Furthermore, they are challenging the misperception defined by Chuang (2004: 352) as "being mistaken for other co-cultural groups". This is a common experience encountered by many "Middle-Eastern" people, including Afghans who are constantly assumed to be Arabs. My participants constantly iterated that they identify as "Middle-Eastern" but not as Arabs. This distinction becomes increasingly important and sensitive in the context of the post September 11th period.

Challenging the Dominant Discourse about the "War on Terrorism"

Several of my participants questioned the legitimacy and motives of the "War on Terrorism" and created a counter discourse. Their comments communicated a discourse that centres on ulterior motives of the Bush Administration, such as reaching out to an oil-rich land, policing the Middle East by creating a military base in Afghanistan and the hope of financial gains. I will present these counter discourse arguments systematically.

Access to oil-rich countries

Several of my research participants rejected the legitimacy of the "War on Terrorism" as articulated by the government of the United States and the media. Instead they contended that the real motive of this war lay in accessing oil-rich countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Amir, who expressed anger over the United States military attack of Afghanistan, stressed the Bush's Administration desire for oil was the primary motive for the "War on Terrorism" rhetoric:

> *...But the Taliban regime was also the regime that Bush's Administration was trying to stretch an oil deal with them. So, it [War on Terrorism] had as much to do with business, as it had to do with terrorism...*

Habib continued the same argument with deeper analysis of the situation:

> *...From strategic point Afghanistan is...key to connect north to the south... Afghanistan was the only one key road to gas and oil in Northern countries and the pipe line had to pass [through] Afghanistan...They [the US government] were waiting for something to happen...so September 11th was a good excuse for the United States to attack Afghanistan...*

Yunis, who expressed support for the United States military attack on Afghanistan by framing it as an 'intervention' rather than an attack, provided a critical outlook of the United States' "War on Terrorism". He explained that Afghanistan's strategic geographical position

attracted the American government to build a military base from which they could police the Middle-East region.

> *...Afghanistan has a strategic position geographically ...you can easily monitor all neighbouring countries like Russia, China, Iran which is right now the United States calling evil...that's going to be very great for the United Stats to have a base in Afghanistan...*

Making wars, making money

Amir resisted the dominant discourse of the "War on terrorism" by expanding on his alternate discourse that saw the 'war' motivated by access to oil, to include a discussion of the financial gains of such a 'never-ending' war.

> *...Right now it [war on terrorism] is pushed for political reason than the security of people... it's more of vote getter, more of attention seeker...It is not about anti-terrorism, it's not about providing security for people. It's about keeping people in paranoia...keeping people in paranoia is what these people feed of off ...what people are failing to realize is that who is benefiting form this whole thing...US army is benefiting...Dick Cheney does not have a kid in the army who has to go to war...so why not keep the war going so his pocket get bigger while some poor minority kid is fighting the war...No one is attacking the cause of problem, no one is going to the root of the problem...*

My participants' narratives exemplified how subordinate groups resist their stigmatized image by means of an alternate discourse that opposes the dominant one. Through their alternative discourse they exert power by dissociating the Afghan identity from the Taliban and terrorists and by de-legitimatizing the US government's "War on Terrorism". I will now switch lenses to examine my participants' resistance practices in the post September 11th period.

Resistance practices

The previous section focused attention on the alternate discourses developed by my participants, which implied a covert mode of resistance. In this section I overview my informants' everyday acts of resistance practices.

Stronger Association with Muslim identity

Amir spoke of his post September 11th evaluation of his Muslim identity something he suggested may have been linked to the attacks. As he sought answers he researched the religion intensively and subsequently was drawn closer to Islam and came to embrace this religion and its practices. Amir also mentioned that the Muslim identity has become an integral part of his personal identity. Kundnani (2002) examined young Muslim British men's inclination towards Islam during the post September 11th period and found that the majority embraced the religion by means of strengthening their practices and wearing Muslim "markers" (i.e. the beard for men and the head covering or hijab for women). Amir's comments resonate with Kundnani's findings.

> *That [the September 11th events] brought me closer to my religion...I was sitting in Canada looking to America. So I am not gonna sit there and get extremely upset about what happened...it really made me research it [Islam] ...I did a lot more research in it than past ten fifteen years of my life that I lived in Canada and I would say it brought me closer to my religion...*

Not only did Amir's religious beliefs in Islam grow stronger but he also started to grow his beard in October 2001. Kundnani (2002) classifies such practices as wearing stigma symbols by some Muslim men in Britain as overt acts of everyday resistance. However, when I suggested that his act (growing his beard on annual basis) could be constituted as an act of resistance Amir completely rejected such notion and instead, explained his practice as a "personal thing":

> *...I can't say that I grow a beard because of September 11th and...because of religious reasons. I don't want to point that. But I do grow my beard every year and it became a tradition since 2001. I mean I grow a beard at that time but it wasn't because of religious or political reasons. I grow beard at the beginning of October and it's a yearly thing for me now and became a tradition but I am not gonna say because of Islam and this and that. It is just a personal thing for me.*

As a practicing Muslim, Abbass intensified his religious ties after the events of September 11th. He noted that his religious identity and practices are the only available tools he can employ to resist the current dominant discourse.

...I was attending my Friday prayer occasionally in Mosque and after 9/11 I find out we didn't do any thing wrong... I didn't do wrong. My faith is strong I kept my Friday prayer in the Mosque...they get their planes and bomb it (Afghanistan) and I am going to keep my faith strong and I fight with my faith, nothing else...

The events of September 11th prompted some of my participants to renegotiate their religious identities and practices.

Claiming Ethnic Identity

Yunis, who had recently travelled to Afghanistan with his Canadian passport, noticed that Afghan custom officials withheld stamping his passport upon entering because of the stigma attached to travelling to Afghanistan. Witnessing that many Afghan travellers comply with the no-stamp policy upset Yunis, and as such he intentionally asked the Afghan custom official to stamp his Canadian passport. In fact, Yunis is resisting against the stigma attached to travelling to Afghanistan by openly 'marking' his official document. He is asserting agency by claiming his ethnic identity and expressing pride of such identity.

I went [to Afghanistan] with my Canadian passport [and] I told them I have nothing to hide just put the stamp. I don't want to hide my Afghan nationality...I'm proud to be Afghani...

The aforementioned every day resistance practices by my participants allow them a measure of control where they can exert power and agency. Although such resistant practices do not challenge stigma and discrimination directly, they may be tactically necessary where the open challenges to the dominant discourse is not always possible.

Part two: Challenges of Interpersonal Stigma

Thus far I have presented and analyzed the experiences and challenges faced by my Afghan participants at a structural level. In this section I proceed to present their perceptions and situations at interpersonal level, namely at work, in the community and in the general public. Many of them recounted experiencing defamatory remarks inflicted by strangers and

acquaintances during their various interactions. In the following section I present my participants' experiences of interpersonal stigma followed by their management techniques.

Interpersonal Stigma

Following the events of September 11th, Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people, including my participants faced negative reactions and derogatory comments in public. Amir recalled two separate incidents where he felt targeted and discriminated against by strangers. In the first instance, only two weeks after September 11th, Amir and his fiancé were at a restaurant when Amir asked the waiter for a straw, the server proceeded to throw the straw at his table. The waiter's disrespectful manner could be explained by various reasons, but Amir interpreted his behaviour as discrimination and associated to his "Middle-Eastern look". His understanding of the situation could be explained by stigma consciousness defined by Pinel (2004: 39) as "the extent to which targets believe that their stereotyped status pervades their interaction with members of the outgroup". Regardless, Amir felt discriminated against and his perception of the situation shaped his lived reality:

> *I remember I walked into a restaurant about two weeks after 9/11... and the waiter...I asked him for a straw and he threw that straw at me at the table. I am sure it was because I looked Middle-Eastern. I don't think he would do it to a White person.*

The second incident was a telling illustration of an act of discrimination by a stranger where Afghans were associated with the stereotypical depiction of terrorists. One of Amir's clients interrogated him during a phone conversation upon learning that he was born in Afghanistan. As he recalled, the conversation with his client became lengthy and he felt compelled to answer all of her questions:

> *I was actually doing help desk support for an American company and had a customer who had called from America and once I told her my name and where I was from, cause she was asking me that I was helpful and where I was from. As*

soon as I told her where I was initially from her voice just turned and all of a sudden she sound scared she asked me if I was "sleeper cell", um I thought it was funny. I laughed at it. I tried to make a joke about it but she was dead serious. She wanted to know if I was a "sleeper cell". And she was getting my name, address and all the information. And she wanted to speak to my manager just to you know, to make sure...

Reza recounted his unpleasant experience during the first night after September 11th when a friend warned him of a possible hate-motivated attack that he had overheard discussed in a conversation. Although he was never targeted he did take precautionary measures at work (making sure he was not working alone in his convenience store for several nights and reported the alleged incident to police) so that the anticipation and fear constituted his lived reality in which he had to be on alert:

I personally had not such a good a experience in the first night because that night a gentleman came to my store...it was 10-10:30 at night and he told me 'you guys should watch out' and I said 'why', he said 'I just came from a bar and there are six-seven men...one of them said 'by the way this guy [Reza] who owns a convenience store is from Afghanistan, probably you know they are terrorist', so they were talking about attacking me or my family or whoever was working in the store or damage the store...

The following encounters by Hamid illustrate the negative attribute associated with Afghan identity in the aftermath of the September 11th events. During two separate incidents in a mall cafeteria, Hamid's ethnic identity as an Afghan situated him in a position to be stigmatized. Although he had the chance to 'pass', he decided to disclose his Afghan identity:

I was in cafeteria... I was getting food and a guy started talking to me and he is like 'how are you?'... 'Where are you from?'... I said 'I am from Afghanistan' he is like 'oh one of those terrorist'.

Hamid's experience resonates with Goffman's (1963) assertion that group membership and group identity could be in themselves significant sources of stigma. The following experience demonstrates that Muslim identity as well as Afghan identity especially in the aftermath of September 11th could be a basis for stigmatization. Hamid was surprised by the man's answer:

Another Arab guy actually surprised me. He was Christian Lebanese when I said my name is Hamid and I am from Afghanistan and while we were conversing he is like 'you guys are like Osama-Bin Laden'. I said 'actually... Osama-Bin Laden is Arab and he is not Afghan, so he has more to do with you my friend'. He is like 'I am Christian I have nothing to do with him', I say what you mean you are Christian you have nothing to with him you think I have something to do with him because we share the same religion doesn't mean I support his ideas.

The preceding accounts by my research participants highlighted their experiences and perception of discriminatory challenges at the interpersonal level. As it was indicated, strangers inflicted defamatory remarks within the context of public and work interaction. However, they employed various techniques in order to manage interpersonal stigma.

Managing Interpersonal Stigma

In this section I will explore my participant's techniques of stigma management at the interpersonal level. Contrary to management techniques at the structural level, my informants as discreditable individuals were able to exercise some degree of freedom in managing information about themselves. It is important to note that my participants employed these management strategies in the immediate aftermath of September 11th. Two of my participants tried to "pass" during interactions with the strangers in order to deflect and/or protect themselves from perceived harm. Others used different methods in reducing the tension arising in each situation such as: ignoring, withdrawal, strategic avoidance and disclosing stigma to a selected group.

"Passing" for protection

Abbass and Habib whose occupations require contact with strangers employed "passing" techniques and concealed their Afghan-ethnic identity in order to protect themselves from potential hate related incidents targeted towards Middle-Eastern and Muslim individuals, including Afghans especially in the aftermath of September 11th. Kanuha (1999) asserted that the stigmatized individuals engage in passing as a mode of self-protection when the social sanction

of the stigma is severe. Cognizant of the hate motivated discriminatory acts against Afghans, Abbass employed silence as a method of stigma management but when he was repeatedly questioned about his ethnic identity he would "pass" as a Canadian citizen in order to protect himself from potential discrimination:

> *...People were toughening in Canada, I remember...a Afghan man had a pizza store restaurant they tried to burn it...they started insulting people so I thought it's better to shut my mouth a little...it's very hard to say I am one of those people over there [Afghanistan] my religion, country and society is under attack...you are either with the people [Canadians] or with them [Taliban]...so no I didn't tell those who didn't know that I was Afghani...I just said nothing...but when asked a lot [repeatedly] I said in Canada we are all Canadian and I was not Canadian Citizen at that time...*

Concealing by "passing" also provided him ways of reducing the emotional stress associated with revealing his Afghan identity and bringing back memories of the war. Social psychologists contend that the stigmatized individuals employ passing as a mode of protecting oneself from emotionally stressful situations (Croker et.al., 1998). Abbass' experience supports this notion:

> *Emotionally I wasn't feeling too much safe with my self to tell people where I was born. Some people knew where I was from Afghanistan...I was born and raised in war in Afghanistan...I did not feel to tell them. Because it was very emotional*

Habib managed information about his ethnic identity by "passing" as a Canadian and by changing the topic of conversation with his clients to avoid revealing his Afghan ethnic identity. He clearly felt the negative stigma attached to Afghan's identity following the events of September 11th and used "passing" in order to protect himself (Kanuha, 1999). It took about a year before Habib felt comfortable announcing his Afghan ethnic nationality to strangers:

> *I was talking to a lot of customer in the beginning after September 11th it was hard for me when anybody ask me 'where are you from' I couldn't say I am from Afghanistan...Instead I would say we are all Canadians and changed the subject. I was just wondering if I say I am from Afghanistan maybe, they react because I was feeling that being from Afghanistan meant being finger pointed.*
>
> *Why you didn't want anybody to know?*

Because there was a lot of hatred was distributed around the people...Maybe after a year after 9/11 then I could say yeah I am from Afghanistan and if they had any question I would clearly explain to them...

The aforementioned management techniques of my Afghan participants also speak to the centrality of fear in the post September 11th social realm.

Ignoring

Avoiding direct confrontation could take several forms, the simplest form being to intentionally refuse to respond and/or to react to derogatory remarks, as did many of the participants. Goffman (1963) noted that one method of stigma management for the discredited individuals is to try to avoid direct confrontation with the "normals" because it could lead to a state of anxiety (Crokcer et.al. 1998). Certainly, some of my participants employed these techniques by ignoring the discriminatory remarks made by strangers. Amir, who worked for a large corporation ignored many of discriminatory comments made by acquaintances during smoking breaks.

There were comments I never made big deal out of it, or respond to it. Every where you go there is ignorance and same after September 11th I just took it [discriminatory remarks] at face value and didn't really get into it and if anybody made those comments I just walked away and kept my distance... I didn't take it to the heart, I was like once you read upon it you're gonna regret it yourself.

I can speculate that Amir used ignoring, as a mean of protecting himself from further potential discriminatory acts in forms of either verbal or physical retaliation. During our talk he mentioned that the public's ignorance about political issues coupled with anger fuelled by the media created an unpleasant situation for Afghans including himself. In fact, he is protecting his self worth by interpreting the defamatory remarks of people as an indication of their fault and ignorance and as such did not see them worthy of any further discussion. Hamid employed the same technique and line of reasoning in an interaction with a stranger:

I was getting the food and the guy started talking to me and he is like... 'where are you from?'...I said from Afghanistan he is like 'oh one of those terrorist' I say why would you say that? He was like 'I was just joking' I didn't bother to argue with him because of the line up and he was ignorant. I mean why would you just name the terrorist when you hear the words Afghanistan.

Withdrawal

As mentioned earlier, Abbass concealed his Afghan identity by "passing" as a Canadian citizen in order to deflect potential harm and defamatory remarks from strangers. Nonetheless, he experienced his share of derogatory comments at work and even tried to distance himself from acquaintances that knew about his ethnicity. When his identity became 'spoiled' at work and consequently his co-workers' remarks continued on a regular basis he decided to end his employment and seek work elsewhere. By utilizing withdrawal as a mode of stigma management Abbass avoided confrontation and distanced himself from potential tension:

I was working couple of places at that time I remember because my boss knew everything and as a joking they would point the finger like 'yeah you guys tough you are Afghani' like such a things means bad horrible things...they were joking and finger pointing ...I left two, three jobs by that time, I started another job and I found the environment different, I left the job as well.

Strategic Avoidance

A number of my informants decided not to travel to, or through, the United States in order to avoid intrusive surveillance practices that have become the norm for Afghans in the post September 11th period. Goffman (1963) acknowledges that some discredited individuals isolate themselves as a mode of stigma management in order to avoid confrontation with "normals". Arguably my participants employed strategic avoidance by choosing not to travel to the United States. As such, they chose not to enter places where invasive security checks are practised and intrusive questions are asked. In order to avoid being "finger pointed" (Riesmann, 2001: 34) some strategically made a decision to avoid travelling:

...I decided not to go because I do not want somebody like border and airport agents or American people to look at me like a stranger, no. I wouldn't allow that, no...

Yunis used to travel to the United States frequently before September 11th and expressed his reluctance to travel post 9/11.

... [To] be honest with you if I have something not serious I am not going [to USA]...but I was going [used to go] before September 11th often...

Disclosing stigma to a specific group

One strategy of information control utilized by a discreditable person is "to handle his risks by dividing the world into a large group to whom he tells nothing; and a small group to whom he tells all and upon whose help he then relies" (Goffman, 1963: 95). Goffman's assertion echoed with Hamid's discretion in disclosing his political opinion to only a select group who agreed with him. In doing so, Hamid is seeking assurance and support from those who are the "wise" (Goffman, 1963:45):

See when I was talking to Canadian, I talk with those who were anti-American and they kind of agreed with me or...people who are intellectual and know what I'm talking about. But when I see people go more with emotion rather than reasons then I would try to stay away from them and don't talk politics with them I don't want to express my views to the wrong people ...If we have different views I [could be] labelled as supporting the terrorist of September 11th attacks so in that way I [was] afraid and I protected myself.

My participants' narratives demonstrated the multifaceted management techniques they used in order to protect themselves and their emotions from stigma in the public realm, especially in the immediate aftermath of September 11th.

Making Sense of Interpersonal Stigma

My participants provided some rationales to explain some of the public's anger and prejudice in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Amir explained public anger with compassion and understanding, some of which he had firsthand experience:

I just thought that people were angry and that's the way they express themselves and there was a lot of anger which is understandable people were not handling it well.

In his work place, Amir encountered numerous derogatory remarks from his co-workers. Those who knew him made such remarks in a 'joking' manner and those who were less familiar were more likely to make defamatory comments in a more serious manner. Despite this, Amir is prepared to offer an explanation and understanding of his co-workers' behaviour:

...There are bad apples wherever you go, and there were couple of comments I never made big deal out of it or respond to it. Every where you go there is ignorance and after September 11th couple people on my work, I mean I work with seven hundred people, I can't say the whole company was like that. Those who knew me joked about it and those who didn't know me made some disrespectful comment ...nothing major, I didn't take it to the heart, I was like once you read upon it you're gonna regret it yourself...

Like Amir all of my participants managed the discriminatory situation with poise and self-control. They constructed arguments that helped them in managing and making sense of the difficult time. As mentioned in the previous chapter my participants never experienced any verbal or behavioural discrimination before September 11th. Their aforementioned encounters of defamatory comments and differential treatment at both the structural and interpersonal levels can only be explained in the context of post September 11th. More specifically, the genesis of the structural and interpersonal stigma as experienced by all of my participants can be traced back to September 11th. Right in the aftermath of this event Afghan ethnicity was considered as a negative attribute by the dominant discourse at both micro and macro levels and my participants found themselves to be the target of surveillance and discriminatory practices. As such Afghan ethnic identity in itself became important in shaping my participants lived realities. The next section contains a discussion of my participants' assertion on the importance of Afghan ethnic identity.

Collective Afghan Ethnic Identity

Despite the diversity in experiences and perceptions of my participants, the majority expressed pride in belonging to the Afghan ethnic group. As mentioned earlier, some had "passed" in the immediate aftermath of September 11th as mean of self-protection. Nonetheless, all of my informants proclaimed that they would no longer hesitate in announcing their ethnic identity as Afghans. Orbe & Harris (2001:7) define ethnicity as "a cultural marker that indicates shared traditions, heritage, and ancestral origin" and Cornell (1988) adds the importance of an emotional bond of sentiments that originates from the past. Through our conversations, my participants expressed such a historical and emotional bond to their Afghan identity.

Most of my participants noted that September 11th impacted on their personal identity by bringing the Afghan ethnic identity to the forefront of their interactions. They continued this discussion by reiterating that before September 11th, they were members of one of many different ethnic groups living in Canada. After this event they were treated like members of a potentially "risky" population and became the target of surveillance practices and differential treatment at the structural level and defamatory comments at the interpersonal level. Despite all of the negative experiences associated with their Afghan ethnic identity they asserted that they are proud of their ethnicity. Even Najib, who claimed that he has become pro-American, said:

> *I have always been a proud of being an Afghan...even if there are wars in Afghanistan...And I don't hide it...*

Fong (2004) mentions that ethnic identity, as part of personal identity, is important to people and that we try to communicate it, especially if other people associate an unfavourable view of us that is unfair or untrue. During the interviews, all of my participants expressed the view that being an "Afghan" constitutes an integral part of their identity and they have recognized the need to alter erroneous assumptions on the part of the general public. A few of

my participants deliberately introduced themselves as Afghan during social interactions with acquaintances or mere strangers. They contended that such interactions gave them an opportunity to openly discuss Afghanistan and clarify any misconceptions about their homeland and the association with terrorism that emerged after the September 11th attacks. Hamid, a young Political Science student said:

> *I want to say to people I am from Afghanistan...because I want to actually change those people's mentality, because generally when you ask about Afghanistan all they think about is beating women, terrorism, Taliban regime...I really want to know how people react when you say you are from Afghanistan and that actually surprise me because they have the sense of Afghanistan as the land of terrorism and I want to clear with them that is not so...*

Yunis mentioned that he has contacted some Ottawa-based radio talk shows when the topic of Afghanistan was raised in an attempt to inform and illuminate the audiences about Afghans and Afghanistan.

> *I listen to CFRA and any subject come about Afghanistan I try to explain to make a little bit clarification about Afghan's tradition and I did couple of times and I was trying to explain to them who is this Taliban group and why they came in Afghanistan, who brought them in ...*

He expressed that every Afghan living in Canada should take advantage of any opportunity to educate the public about any misunderstandings regarding Afghanistan and Afghans.

> *...This is duty of each Afghani to complete their [Canadian public] information because the media is always incomplete... and this is our duty to complete it [information] for them*

Indeed, Mullaly (2002) has argued that an ethnic identity is a political resource that can be used to further a group's interest. Ethnicity as identity could be construed as a new social movement (Scott, 1990). Clearly, some of my participants have employed their Afghan ethnic identity as a political tool to at least challenge the erroneous beliefs held by the public about Afghans and Afghanistan.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined my Afghan participants' experiences and perceptions during the post September 11th period. As members of a "risky" group, they encountered and endured numerous instances of regulatory and discriminatory practices at the structural and interpersonal level. The punitive aura in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th events minimized their ability to openly dissent. Nonetheless, as mentioned by Scott (1990) when the consequence of open protest is severe the subordinates resist their oppression by everyday acts of resistance. My participants exhibit such characteristics and created multifaceted alternate discourses and resistance tactics. They have realized that Afghan ethnic identity is their only binding feature and an asset for changing and correcting Canadians assumptions about Afghanistan. They exerted that this identity has become political and they have engaged in proclaiming it and using it to challenge the dominant discourse.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this thesis was to examine the experiences and perceptions of Afghan-Canadian men in the post September 11th context. Given how little is known about the impact of September 11th on the lives of Afghan-Canadians, my aim was to address this lack of research in Canada. Furthermore, this thesis hoped to correct the misrepresentation of Afghans as Arabs and the simplistic construction of Afghan ethnicity made by academics and the mass media in the post September 11th literature by presenting them as a distinct, divergent and complex people. In order to situate Afghan-Canadians within the broader discursive framework and unearth the genesis of structural stigma, I employed Foucault's conception of governmentality and the "risk" discourse. Goffman's conceptualization of stigma enabled an analytical inquiry at the micro level through which my participants' encounters of interpersonal stigma were analyzed.

The ten semi-structured interviews I conducted with Afghan-Canadian males revealed experiences of interpersonal stigma in forms of defamatory remarks emanating from the public; structural stigma was also evident through racial profiling and surveillance practices by official agents at state regulatory sites (i.e. airports and borders). Moreover, my participants were cognizant of their newly ascribed "risky" identity and many tried to protect themselves during public social interactions by "passing". Notwithstanding, their efforts to "pass" were unrealizable at the borders and airports where my participants had to comply with the regulations. As a new "discredited/discreditable" group in the post September 11th context, my informants have countered this status by employing resistance practices and constructing alternate discourses in opposition to the dominant discourse. Furthermore, many of them acknowledged the importance of an Afghan ethnic identity in the aftermath of September 11th and recognized that it could be

used to challenge and correct the erroneous assumptions about Afghans and Afghanistan characteristic of the dominant discourse and communicated by the mass media.

It bears remembering that the stereotypical depiction and prejudicial treatment is not something new in political and societal discourse of North America (Mullaly, 2002). For example, Aboriginal people and African-Americans have been systematically discriminated against in judicial, political, labour and educational systems in Canada and in the United States respectively (Mullaly, 2002). However, the authoritarian and explicit stigmatizing practices against Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people including Afghan-Canadians since the events of September 11th, both at the structural and interpersonal levels are alarming. My participants' experiences of both stigmas highlight the speed through which the construction of a "risky" group can occur. In particular what become evident was the stereotype of Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim individuals, including Afghan people as supporting terrorism and as potential terrorists. This in turn forms the basis for the way these minority groups are treated in both formal institutional settings and informal everyday encounters.

Further research is needed to unearth the collective resistance practices employed by this minority group and how it conditions experiences of stigma. The impact of stigmatizing practices on the identity and identity formation processes of these minority groups in the post September 11th context should be considered in future research. Furthermore, unearthing the psychological effects of the stigmatization process can provide further points of inquiry in understanding the lived reality of Afghan-Canadians. Therefore the discussion and confrontation of such stigmatizing discourses is urgent and important.

In my thesis, I hope to have provided Afghan-Canadians with a framework for making sense of their experiences in the broader context of the system of racial inequality that has

dominated North American society. Knowing that others have had similar experiences with discrimination and prejudice could mobilize and motivate them to become better organized in their effort in fighting against stigma. My participants had already exhibited some degree of resistance by constructing alternate discourses and taking on the role of educators by correcting the erroneous assumptions held by Canadians about Afghans. However, Middle-Eastern, Arab and Muslim people in general and Afghan-Canadians in particular should be more actively engaged in political and social discussion in order to challenge and eradicate prejudice and stigma. The events of September 11th could be an impetus for these minority groups to take part in educating the public about their culture, religion and political history. They should also communicate their experiences of stigmatization and its impact on their lives so their fellow Canadians can have a better understanding of the issues at hand. As an Afghan-Canadian women I took this initiative by not only giving voice to the stigmatizing experiences of my fellow countrymen but also began my own personal fight against this social ill. What we need is not a pre-emptive "War on Terrorism" as declared by George W. Bush but a pre-emptive 'war against racism and prejudice' that has deep roots in North American political and social discourse.

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Appendix A

The Interview Guide

Demographics:

- Would you tell me a little about yourself?
- How long have you been living in Canada?
- How do you define yourself? As an Afghan? As an Afghan-Canadian? Do you other identities/
- What this/these identity/identities mean to you and how does it effect you? Personally and socially?
- How do you describe your experiences in Canada by being an Afghan-Canadian?
- Could you describe the process of integration in Canada for you and your family?

September 11th, 2001

- Were you residing in Canada when the events of September 11th happened?
- How did you experiences that day/
- How did you experiences the days following the September 11th?
- What was your perception of all of those events? (Immediately and over time?)
- How did you feel/react when the United States attacked Afghanistan?
- How did people react to you after September 11th, knowing that you were ethnically an Afghan?
  In your workplace?
  School?
  Neighbourhood?
  In shopping malls and other public spaces?
  And during your everyday interactions with friends?
  And during your everyday interactions with strangers?
- Was there any difference in the attitude of people that you had encountered after September 11th? If yes could you please elaborate?
- How did you deal with differential attitude of friends/ strangers?
- As an Afghan-Canadian man, did you or have experienced any differential attitude and/or treatment because of your beard/dark skin complexion?
- If yes, what have you done about this situation?
- Did you ever hide your ethnic origin after September 11th?
  If yes for how long and why?
  If no, why not?
- Did you ever experience instances that there was a sudden change in attitude of people upon hearing your ethnic origin?
  If yes how did you feel about it?
  If no, were you surprised?
- Has this event had any impact on your ethnic identity?
- Has this event any impact on your religious identity?
- Have you in any point after September 11th tried to learn more about your religion? Could you elaborate?
- Have you been able to voice your opinion or dissent after the September 11th?

- Could you tell me about the political thought within Afghan community in the post September 11th context?

Understanding of anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36)

- Are you familiar, aware of, know about the ATA?
- If yes, could you please tell me what do you know about it?
- If you are not familiar with the Act, would you allow me to tell you about it? (After explaining the ATA) now what do you think about it?
- Who do you think could be affected by this Act?
- What this law mean for Afghan-Canadian or Afghan immigrant in Canada?
- Have you been affected by this law?
- Do you think this Bill give too much power to authority? i.e. police?

Understanding of Refugee and Immigration Protection Act (BillC-11)

- Are you familiar, aware of, know about the RIPA?
- Are you aware that there has been an amendment to this Act? If yes, do you think it could affect you?
- If you are not aware could allow me to explain it? (After explaining the RIPA) now what do you think about it? Do you think it could affect you?
- What do you think this amendment mean for Afghan community?
- Have you ever sponsored any family members or friend from abroad/or Afghanistan after September 11th? If yes, did it take longer time for the procedures to be completed?
- Do you feel/think/experienced any delays in the procedures of your sponsorship after September 11th?if yes, how do you fell about it?

Police

- How you ever experienced differential treatment or difference in police attitude compare to before September 11th?
- Have you notice any change in Police behaviour after September 11th
- Has there been any difference in police approaches to Afghan ethnic group? If yes, in what ways?
- Do you think Afghan men are more of a target after September 11th?

Borders & Airports

- Have you traveled anywhere after September 11th? If yes could tell me about your experiences?
- If you had traveled before and after September 11th, could you please tell me if you detect any differences regarding the official treatment and attitude?
- Have you experienced any difficulties during your travel in the airports or while crossing the border to the US? If you have why you do think about it?
- Have you traveled with Afghani passport after September 11th? Could you tell me about that experience?
- Did you have to reveal your ethnic origin to the borders' and airports' officials?
- If yes, what were their reactions and what were your experiences?
- If you were stopped and questioned by the officials, how do you feel about it? Why do you think you were stopped and questioned?

- Have you continued to travel?

The Media

- How do you inquire information /news? TV, print media? Any alternative media?
- What do you think about the media reports about Afghanistan in the post September 11th context?
- Do you think there was a link made between "terrorism"/"terrorists" and Afghans/Afghanistan in the media after the September 11th? If yes, how do you feel about such depictions?
- What do you think about the media representation of Afghans and Afghanistan in their reports after September 11th?
- Do you think there were many reports and documentaries made about Afghanistan after the September 11th?
- And what do you think about the proliferation of so many news reports?

- Final word? Conclusion?

Appendix B

Information Letter for Participants

My name is Vajmeh Tabibi and I am a Master student at the University of Ottawa. I am conducting this current research under the supervision of Dr. Chris Bruckert and the title of this research project is '*Afghans' perceptions and experiences of formal and informal regulatory practices post September 11*/2001'. The purpose of this study is to understand the perception and experiences of Afghan immigrants and Afghan-Canadians regarding regulatory practices set in place after September 11/2001. Your involvement would entail participating in a semi-structured interview that would last between one to two hours. Question will focus on the extent of your understanding of the regulatory practices, their impacts on your lives, your experiences and some questions of identity.

With your permission the interview will be tape-recorded and if you are not comfortable being tape-recorded, detail notes will be taken. At the end of the interview you can review your answers and edit or delete any information from the interview, which you consider, in any way, endanger you and/or any of your friends, family or associates. The tape- recorded interviews will be transcribed. The transcribed documents will be kept in Dr. Bruckert's office and you can have access to transcribed documents by contacting Dr. Bruckert or me.

The benefits of this project are contributions to general knowledge and to participants.
The benefit to general knowledge is that there has not been any research to this date that has addressed the perceptions and experiences of Afghan immigrants in Canada post September 11/2001. This study also has the potential to make a theoretical contribution to the Governmentality Theory in the areas of resistance and regulation.
The research will provide the participants the opportunity to voice their experiences, be listened to, have their experiences respectfully attended to and contribute to the construction of knowledge. Reflecting and making sense of social regulations can be a very positive and affirming for some participants.

If you experienced any emotional discomfort giving that answer to some questions may need reflecting upon past events, some of which may have been stressful you are entitled to refuse to answer questions; interrupt or terminate the interview; and/or withdraw from the research at any time. Confidentiality of the participants will be respected; all identifying names, places and events will be changed in the transcripts and in any subsequent document.

If you experienced any emotional discomfort after the interview and felt a need to talk to someone else, a list of relevant resources is included in this letter.

In order to abide by the recommendations of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethic Board, this information letter replaces consent form and in order to ensure your complete anonymity you will not be asked to sign any form.

I would like to thank you for participating in this research project.

List of resources

Dar-al-Salam Afghan Association of Ottawa
Director: Vakil Zazy
4283 Carver Place
Ottawa, K1J 1B5
Phone: (613) 746-6372

Muslim Association of Ottawa and Mosque
Counselor and Imam: Dr. Gamal
251 Northwest Ave.
Ottawa, K1Y 0M1
Phone: (613) 728-1250

Eastern Ottawa Community Centre
Beacon Hill Shopping Centre
2339 Ogilvie RD. K1J 8M6
Phone: (613) 741-6025
Email: gccr@magma

Appendix C

November 10, 2004

Re: Afghan's Perceptions and Experiences of Formal and Informal Social Regulation after September 11/2001 (02-04-17)

Dear Professor Bruckert and Ms. Tabibi,

You will find enclosed the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board (SSH REB) Certification for your research project.
Please note that your responsibilities are as follows:

- To notify the Research Ethics Board of any change in the research
- To submit an Annual Status Report to the Protocol Officer in a year from the date indicated on the certificate, in order to either close the file or receive an approval extension. This document can be found at:
http://www.uottawa.ca/services/research/rge/rebs/eng/application_dwn.html.

A copy of this approval will be sent to Research Services, if necessary.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at extension 1787.

Sincerely yours,

Catherine Paquet
Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research

cc Richard Clément, Chair of the SSH REB

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH ETHICS BOARD

CERTIFICATION OF ETHICAL APPROVAL

This is to certify that the University of Ottawa Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board (REB) has examined the application for ethical approval for the research project **Afghan's Perceptions and Experiences of Formal and Informal Social Regulation after September 11/2001 (File 02-04-17)** submitted by Vajmeh Tabibi, and supervised by Chris Bruckert of the Department of Criminology. The members of the REB found that the research project met appropriate ethical standards as outlined in the Tri-Council Policy Statement and in the Procedures of the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Boards, and accordingly gave the research project a Category Ia (Approval).

This certification is valid for one year from the date indicated below.

_____

Catherine Paquet
Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research
For Richard Clément, Chair of the SSH REB

November 10, 2004
Date