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POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES**

Craig Mackie

AUTEUR DE LA THÈSE / AUTHOR OF THESIS

M.A. (Philosophy)

GRADE / DEGREE

Department of Philosophy

FACULTÉ, ÉCOLE, DÉPARTEMENT / FACULTY, SCHOOL, DEPARTMENT

**Edmund Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness:
Significance for the development of the phenomenological method**

TITRE DE LA THÈSE / TITLE OF THESIS

Denis Dumas

DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS SUPERVISOR

CO-DIRECTEUR (CO-DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS CO-SUPERVISOR

EXAMINATEURS (EXAMINATRICES) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS EXAMINERS

Sonia Sikka

Paul Rusnock

Gary W. Slater

Le Doyen de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies

**Edmund Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness:
Significance for the development of the phenomenological method**

Craig Mackie

**Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the MA degree in Philosophy**

**Supervisor: Prof. Denis Dumas
Committee: Prof. Sonia Sikka
Prof. Paul Rusnock**

**Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts
University of Ottawa**

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Abstract

This thesis is an exploration of Edmund Husserl's early writings on internal time-consciousness (Husserliana X, 1893-1917). Developments in Husserl's method of phenomenological exploration are presented. Changes in Husserl's models of internal time consciousness are also presented. In the concluding sections of this thesis, the developments in Husserl's early writings on time are examined in the context of Husserl's overall philosophical project. This thesis supports the secondary literature that argues that Husserl underwent significant developments in his phenomenological method because of his early exploration of time and time-consciousness.

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Introduction

0.1 Introduction

This thesis is a look at the development of the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl. Husserl is considered the father of modern phenomenology. He writes of phenomenology:

[P]henomenology...*the science of pure consciousness.*

...[T]he word phenomenon. In its first sense, phenomenon (always understood in the sense of phenomenology) signifies the particular real *cogitatio, the real consciousness*; but it also signifies, in its second sense, the *intentional content of consciousness* – that which is perceived, represented, and meant, as it is perceived, represented, and meant in the perception, representation, and act of meaning in question.¹

According to this definition, we can take phenomenology to be the study of consciousness that examines the structures that make possible the meaningful experience of objects. Phenomenology, at its core, is a method of analysis that is capable of determining the relationship between consciousness and its objects.

0.2 The Question

The question I seek to answer in this thesis is: How may Edmund Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness have influenced the development of his phenomenological method? In answering this question, I will argue that there is a major methodological shift in Edmund Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness.² I will use the methodological shift found in his early writings on time-consciousness (*Hua X*) to help trace a significant development in Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness are well-tilled ground; therefore, the account that I will give will be a more global look at how the developments in this period of dense writing

¹ Sketch No 51 of *Husserliana X*, p. 335-336, first delivered as summer session lecture in 1909 at the University of Göttingen.

² The primary text for this thesis is *Husserliana X*, "Zur Phaenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917)", abbreviated as *Hua X*, the English translation used is by John Barnett Brough in the *Husserl Collected Works Series IV*, "On the Phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917)", abbreviated as *CW IV*. All citations will first be given in the original German page reference as *Hua X* then the translated page reference as *CW IV*.

fit in to Husserl's overall philosophical project. This is a period of intense writing and development of ideas and therefore is a particularly rich source of material.¹

I will show the influence of Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness to be operative in two main areas of his overall project. First, the analysis of time-consciousness helps Husserl to significantly develop his notion of *constitutive phenomenology*. Second, the introduction of temporality lays the foundation for Husserl to develop aspects of his mature philosophy such as the *genetic method of phenomenology*, the notion of the "living-present," and intersubjectivity.

0.3 Method

In exploring these developments, I will first consider the origins of the debate surrounding time-consciousness at the turn of the twentieth century. Husserl's response to the contemporary models of time-consciousness, in particular those of his teacher, Franz Brentano, are presented. Second, Husserl's early models of time-consciousness are outlined. Here, I will focus on the problems Husserl encounters within his models of time-consciousness and, in turn, how they cause him to deepen his constitutional understanding of consciousness. Lastly, the changes in Husserl's early constitutional model of time-consciousness are considered in the context of his turn towards transcendental phenomenology.

In Husserl's work, constitution, and constitutional models, refer to the structures of consciousness that make possible the experience of objects in a meaningful way. For Husserl, objects can have physical properties, for example, the sound of a musical note in a melody, or the sight and feeling of a chair. Objects can also be abstract, lacking physical properties, for example, the images in dreams and imaginary thoughts, or mathematical properties. Husserl is not concerned with *whether* objects exist, but rather, he is concerned with the way we experience objects. Husserl takes for granted that objects exist and that we know objects. In his early writings, he addresses the way in which we combine the properties of an object, like the blueness, roundness, and bounciness of a ball to know that it is a blue bouncy ball. Husserl's description of the way we combine properties of experience gives rise to the relationships, rules and structures that consciousness follows when it relates to objects. Those relationships are the

constitution of consciousness. The Husserlian assumption that, “[A]ll objects derive their meaning from structures of consciousness,” (J.N. Mohanty 1995, p.45) is the foundation of a phenomenological analysis that is concerned with the make up, or constitution, of consciousness.

In Chapters 1 and 2, the method used to identify significant developments in Husserl’s phenomenology is to examine Husserl’s various models of time-consciousness and to present the methodological and theoretical problems that he identifies in them. Some of the solutions to these problems examined/proposed by Husserl are explored. Secondary literature is used to help identify how and why Husserl changes the structures of his models. Finally, the developments Husserl has made in his models are highlighted, which in turn brings to light significant developments in his phenomenology. The question that is posed in this portion of Chapters 1 and 2 is: How does Husserl refine his own method that is directed at determining the constitution of consciousness?

The methodology for Chapter 3 differs in two ways. Rather than primarily using references to original texts, it relies more heavily on secondary literature for an explication of Husserl’s more mature phenomenology. Chapter 3 presents and evaluates some of the developments that Husserl makes in his early models of time-consciousness. As a whole, the method used to identify the significance of his early writings comes in the form of identifying the *patterns of development* that Husserl uses when applying the phenomenological method of analysis to the experience of time. The developments in Husserl’s models of time-consciousness are linked to his possible motivation for developing some of the mature aspects of his phenomenology. The method used for this final speculative section of Chapter 3 is to identify the questions that Husserl’s early models of time-consciousness leave unanswered and compare them with the questions that his mature method of analysis seeks to answer. In so doing, a link between Husserl’s early writings on time-consciousness and his mature phenomenology can be established.

In speculating about Husserl’s methodological motivation to develop the later aspects of his phenomenology, this thesis makes an original contribution to secondary literature devoted to Husserl’s phenomenology. Whereas most analyses of Husserl’s early writings on time focus on the methodological developments found *within* the

constitutional models Husserl puts forth, this thesis introduces a new analysis devoted to the methodological developments that occur *because* of Husserl's early writings.

The method for the final section is to compare the structures of Husserl's early model of internal time-consciousness with the relevant principles he develops in his later phenomenology in order to determine their structural similarities. The final portion looks at how Husserl's early writings on inner time-consciousness may have impacted his mature phenomenology.

In sum: I have chosen Husserl's early writings on time because they represent an explosive period of thinking and writing in his philosophical development. I have chosen to explore this period because of the rich developments that occur in these texts. Of particular interests is the impact that this period has on Husserl's overall approach to phenomenology.

0.4 Synopsis of Thesis

Husserl wrote *Hua X* over the course of 25 years. *Hua X* is a collection of manuscripts in which Husserl explores the aspects of conscious that make possible the experience of time. He does so by looking at the relationship between consciousness and the world. He asks: how is it possible that I am able to know an object's identity even though my experience of that object is one that changes as it moves through time? What is it about the structure of consciousness that gives rise to the possibility of an object being experienced as moving through time?

For Husserl, the problem of time-consciousness arises because objects are experienced as having constant identities even though the point from which experience originates, i.e. the viewpoint from which consciousness streams, is constantly moving through time. Given that we are moving through time, how does Husserl account for the experience of the identity of objects? How does the meaningful identity of an object endure through time?

This is not problematic if one merely considers that consciousness and the world it relates to move through time at the same pace: the flow of experience of the world matches the flow of time in the world. It is problematic when one goes beyond the exact moment in which experience takes place and considers the embedded properties of experience that help to create meaning. For Husserl, properties such as memory and expectation are essential to create a meaningful unified experience. In Husserl's explorations of time-consciousness, memory and expectation do not just pertain to the distant past and future; they are embedded in the experience of the present as well. Husserl devotes a major portion of his writings on time-consciousness to an explanation of how the past and future are linked to the present.

Husserl uses the example of a melody to illustrate the structures involved in the experience of an object moving through time, i.e. a temporally extended object. A melody consists of several individual notes or chords played for a duration of time and in a certain sequence. The entire melody is only meaningful if there is a specific sequence and duration. If the duration is cut short, then the melody is incomplete and its meaning has changed. If the sequence and quality of tones are altered then the meaning of the melody is again changed. If each note is experienced individually and there is no synthesis or connection between the notes, then the melody is not perceived as a unified object. By looking at all of the relationships of sequence, duration and unity Husserl is able to identify the structures of consciousness that give rise to the experience of objects flowing through time.

In fact, an analysis of the consciousness of time is possible only through an exploration of the experience of objects flowing through time. Accordingly, when Husserl explores time-consciousness he is actually exploring the experience of objects flowing through time. This may appear to imply that to speak of an analysis of time-consciousness is to point to an analysis that looks at the fact *that* we know time exists – a consciousness *of* time. But, this is not the way in which Husserl initially conducts his exploration of time-consciousness.

Rather, there are two parts to Husserl's exploration of time-consciousness. He begins with an analysis of the experience of objects flowing through time. In the first

exploration Husserl looks at the structures of consciousness that make possible an experience of objects that flow through time. This analysis would better be termed an exploration of the experience of consciousness *through* time. This exploration results in a description of a model of consciousness that is concerned with structural relationships in consciousness that provide a unified experience of objects in the world.

In the second part Husserl looks at the implications of this exploration and seeks to determine how it is possible that we know that we are experiencing objects flowing through time. This is an analysis of an experience *of* time-consciousness. This analysis addresses the underlying structures that make possible the consciousness of an experience of objects flowing through time. This exploration results in a model of consciousness that unifies objects in time and the entire experience of knowing those objects as they flow through time. His second exploration is not concerned with the direct experience of the world; it is concerned with the structures of experience that give rise to the capacity to know the qualities of time through which we know the time of the world. Husserl's final analysis of time-consciousness is of *internal* time. The structures that are to become important for Husserl are those that relate to the internal experience of consciousness, not those that relate to the experience of external time.

Between the two analyses, we may begin to understand how Husserl changes his method of exploration. This requires a comparison of Husserl's models of consciousness that result from his different levels of analysis. Most importantly, we can begin to see a pattern of how Husserl refines his method of inquiry that is directed at the structural make up of consciousness. The pattern of methodological development is important for a greater understanding of Husserl's philosophy in general.

The following three sections summarize the contents of each chapter of this thesis.

0.5 Husserl's First Exploration of Time: The Direct Level of Consciousness

Husserl's first account of time-consciousness lays out the structures of the experience that account for our relationship to objects as they flow through time. In his first account of time consciousness Husserl analyzes the acts of consciousness directed

towards objects in time. He says that it is because of the nature of the acts of consciousness that objects are experienced as being in the past, present or future. Husserl argues that consciousness has three modes in which it experiences objects. Each mode classifies objects through a temporal modification, by virtue of which the objects are known to be in the past, present or future. Present objects are beheld in the mode that is given presently. In the present mode, objects are modified such that they are known to exist right now. Past objects are beheld in the mode of memory. Objects that are yet to come are modified in the mode of expectation and are beheld as future objects. The modification of the objects in each mode is a sort of coloration of the experience of the object. All of these modes are simultaneously experienced by consciousness and make up the component parts of our immediate experience. A helpful analogy is to think of each mode of experience as a lens. When objects of experience go from a present moment into a past moment, they travel from the present lens into the lens of memory. When all three lenses are held together, they form a complete picture of experience and the ensuing knowledge of objects that exist now. Every object that is experienced now has correlated objects in the past and future that are experienced in the modes of memory and expectation.

Here are two examples that will help highlight first hand the structures of consciousness within **Husserl's** his [pick one] first analysis of time-consciousness: the first is Husserl's example of a melody; the second is an example of an experience of a chair.

Husserl uses an example of the act of hearing a melody to help highlight first hand the structures of consciousness within his first analysis of time-consciousness. Played on a radio, there is a melody that consists of three tones repeated sequentially 'A-B-C.' When 'B' is heard, 'A' has just passed and 'C' is anticipated as just to come. 'B' is not experienced without the context of 'A' and 'C,' because we do not know 'B' as an independent note, but rather as a part of a sequence that makes up the melody 'A-B-C.' When 'B' is heard there still lingers in consciousness the experience of 'A.' At this point, 'A' is experienced in the mode of experience that is memory. Likewise, when 'C' is heard both 'A' and 'B' linger in memory that is attached to the presently heard 'C'.

Husserl says that we owe it to memory that we are capable of an experience of unity. As the sequence repeats itself, there is anticipation that 'B' and 'C' will follow after 'A.' When 'C' is experienced in the present mode 'A' is experienced in the expectation mode. Expectation would become particularly evident if one were to abruptly stop a recording and observe a response of surprise. When 'A' has passed through the present mode of experience it is modified into a past object that is experienced in the mode of memory. There is a constant modification that occurs as objects change experiential modes.

The second example involves an experience of a chair. I behold a chair in front of me in a room. As I approach the chair, I sit down. I read a book for a duration of time while sitting in the chair and then get up and leave the room. My experience of the chair passes through a series of moments, all of which are inherently tied to each other such that I have a unified experience of the chair. As I approach the chair, were I to blink my eyes or turn away, it is not as if I forget that I have just seen a chair in front of me and a totally new chair appears. Likewise, as I turn to sit down I am able to anticipate that I will not fall on the ground because I know that there is a chair awaiting the weight of my body. When I get up and leave the room and the chair is no longer in my immediate primarily given experience, though I am still able to remember the time that I spent in the room with the chair. Tomorrow, I will be able to recall the sequence of events that relate to my experience of the previous day's chair.

The first question is: how do I know that the chair that I am sitting on is the same chair that I have just approached? In other words, how is each tone linked to the others? Husserl explains that, as I immediately experience the chair I am able to experience a memory of it at the same time. However, the experience of the memory of the chair and the present experience of the chair have to be different somehow or else I would be confused as to which is the real chair right now – the one that I am remembering or the one that I am experiencing? The fact is, they are the same chair, but they are experienced in different moments in time. The three different modes of experience allow for qualitatively distinct experience of objects at different moments in time. The simultaneous perception of these objects as existing in qualitatively distinct moments allows for the experience of temporal objects in sequence. This means that objects can be

perceived as temporally relative to each other and relative to what is happening in the present. The modes of experience modify objects such that they have a sequence as they flow through time.

We can know the serial position of objects in moments in the past, present and future because consciousness has three different modes of experience. These are structures of consciousness Husserl posits in his early model of time-consciousness. The modes of experience that modify objects give rise to the ability to determine the serial position of objects in time. By extension, the consciousness of time is dependent on the way in which objects are experienced.

In Husserl's example of the melody we have an account of the structure of experience of past, present and anticipated future. 'B' is experienced right now 'A' is still being experienced as just past in the mode of memory and 'C' is being experienced as just to come in the mode of expectation. Husserl argues that we know past, present and future objects as distinct because of the three modes of consciousness. However, he is unable to account for *how* the three part structure of experience is able to *know* the difference between the three positions in time. He is unable to account for the links between those positions. This is because, at this point in his analysis of time, Husserl's model of time-consciousness is only dealing with direct experience of the world.

Husserl's first model of time-consciousness runs into two problems. First, the mere fact that we know the positions of objects in relation to each other *does not mean* that we know they are linked – it only gives us a sequence of moments in which consciousness can know the objects exist. Second, in order to know the links between the moments that objects are experienced, consciousness must have some capacity to distance itself from its direct experience. It cannot determine the links between objects in time from the same level at which it gives them the properties of a position in time. If time qualities such as past, present and future are qualities that consciousness adds to objects through the way in which they are experienced then time qualities that consciousness adds to experience are not themselves objects in the world – they are objects of *internal* consciousness. How can consciousness determine the relationships

between the time qualities it has given to objects of experience if it is stuck at a level of experience that can only operate in a mode that knows objects in the world?

In order to gain perspective on experience such that the links between time qualities can be determined, consciousness cannot do so from the perspective of looking at experience as if it were an object in the world. Experience needs another level of consciousness in order to gain perspective on the qualities of time. This must be a level of consciousness that can determine the relationships between the different time qualities. It is a level that cannot be experienced as an object in the world because, if it were an object in the world, it would have to gain perspective on itself in relation to itself as an object in the world.

0.6 Husserl's Second Exploration of Time: The Absolute Level of Consciousness

In the first exploration of the experience of time, Husserl is able to account for an experience of sequence, but he is unable to account for the other two properties of time that are necessary for a complete model of time consciousness, namely, duration and unity. Husserl argues in his first model that it is the way in which we experience objects that gives rise to the capacity to know identities throughout the flow of time. We can know that objects are relative to each other in past, present and future and in so knowing we can determine their temporal relationships.

Because of the two problems that Husserl encounters, he realizes that time-consciousness cannot simply be based on the ability to modify the experience of objects such that their serial position can be known. At the level of direct experience of objects in the world the sequence of the notes 'A-B-C' can be identified. But, operating on this level, no structures in consciousness can determine the relationships that link the serial positions of the moments in which 'A-B-C' are heard. Their serial positions are evident, but the relationship between their positions is not. Their order is known, but the duration of the unified object that is the melody is not known. That consciousness can demarcate each position in a relative order does not necessarily mean that it can know that each is linked to the other and for how long. In order to do so, consciousness needs to have another level added to experience, one that is directed towards experience of objects in the world.

For this reason, Husserl posits another level of consciousness that is directed toward a structuring of the experience of objects in the world. This level of consciousness, which he calls the *absolute* level, can determine the relationship between serial positions of objects in past, present and future. This level of consciousness is once removed from the direct experience of objects flowing through time. Consciousness at this level has two objects of experience, namely, the three modes of experience that give time qualities to objects in the world on the one hand and it has its own experience on the other.

However, because the absolute consciousness is once removed from the experience of objects in the world, it is capable of linking the serial positions of each object that is experienced. Consciousness needs to be able to link these moments together in order to establish an enduring object identity. The nature of experience at this level is similar to that which occurs at the level of experience that is directed towards objects in the world. There are still three modes of experience, except rather than have these modes directed at objects flowing through consciousness, they are directed at the modes of experience that give the qualities of past, present and future. For example, when an object passes from the present into the past it is experienced in the mode of memory. In order to link the many memories that encompass the sequence of moments that make up the duration of the experience, a second mode of experience in the mode of memory is directed at the remembered moments that are drifting into the past. This creates a chain of memories that form a recursive flow of memories of remembered experiences. The same holds true for the experience of the structures that make possible the expectations of objects in the future.

When experience links objects in past, present and future it is a self-referential process because consciousness at the absolute level is referring to elements of experience that it has itself posited. Serial positioning of objects is known because of the act of modification involved in the experience of objects in the world. Consciousness directs experience towards something other than itself. When consciousness links the qualities of time that it has added to objects, it is directing experience towards *acts* of experience. In

this sense, consciousness is directing experience at an aspect of experience that it has created.

The final important feature of Husserl's absolute level of consciousness is that it must account for its own flow of experience since it is not situated within the flow of time that comes from an experience of the world. The direct level of consciousness experiences objects situated in time that is related to the world. The absolute level of consciousness experiences the *product* of the direct level of consciousness that experiences the world. The nature of the experience at the absolute level cannot avoid having a flow because its experience is structured sequentially as well. However, since its only objects of experience are the product of aspects of experience that it creates, it can be said to create its own flow of time. In so doing, it also is responsible for unifying itself by creating an experience of consciousness that is directed back at itself.

0.7 The Developments in Husserl's Method

This thesis looks at two developments for Husserl. It first looks at the developments of Husserl's method **within** his early writings on time-consciousness. These developments relate to Husserl's deepened understanding of constitutional phenomenology. They are evident in the analysis of the various levels of consciousness that Husserl explores and their ensuing constitutional frameworks.

The second analysis of methodological development looks at those developments that might have occurred **because of** Husserl's early writings. In this line of analysis the significance of the impact that his early writings may have had for his later phenomenological method can be determined. Patterns of development that lead to methodological advancements in Husserl's early writings can be placed in relation to some of his later phenomenological principles that may be governed by similar patterns of development. The question to be answered here is: What impact did his early writings on time-consciousness have on the way in which Husserl develops his phenomenology?

In the early writings on time, Husserl goes from looking at the structures of consciousness that explain meaningful experience of the world to looking at the structures that allow for the experience of the world to be unified. Husserl first looks at

how we experience objects flowing through time. He finds himself stuck with the problem of not being able to account for duration. In his initial work, he can only account for objects' serial position in time and in relation to one another. He needs a method of analysis that yields a description of consciousness that can account for the unification of the modes of experience that give objects their temporal qualities of past, present and future. This can only happen from a different level of consciousness – one that is removed from direct experience of the world. Direct experience of the world still takes place, but it takes place along with unifying structures that order and relate the experience of time qualities to each other.

The development of an absolute level of consciousness has the effect of opening a new level of structure to experience. Husserl now posits the structures that allow us to see how consciousness can both structure itself as well as experience its own structure. By introducing a new level of consciousness, Husserl is introducing a new method of analysis – a method that is capable of determining the self-referential relationships involved in consciousness. This is important because this method opens up a new field of analysis for Husserl. It forms a significant development and a new archetype of structures that can be self-referential, and in this sense, self-generating. Prior to this, Husserl had only looked at levels of consciousness that had structures of experience directed towards objects that were other than, or external, to consciousness.

Within his writings on time-consciousness Husserl's method of analysis is to look at the essential structures that make experience possible. He starts by examining experience of external objects flowing through time and then moves to examining internal objects flowing through internally mediated time. The significance of this move is that he is dealing with a different type of experience on each level. By changing his level of analysis he discovers deeper structures within consciousness. In his early writings, Husserl eventually gets to the limit of his method of analysis and uncovers the deepest structures of consciousness upon which all experience is built. This is the absolute level of consciousness.

By looking at the different structures of each of the levels of consciousness, we can see significant developments in the method by which Husserl examined each. In his time-consciousness writings, Husserl develops a method of analysis by which certain essential structures involved in experience can be determined. There is some debate as to whether or not Husserl developed this tool principally within the time-consciousness writings or if these writings were an application of this method of analysis that he had developed elsewhere.

One possible observation about his early writings is this: Husserl has a pattern of analysis that starts from a very basic observation about the product of experience, i.e. the meaning that we take from experience, and seeks to determine the structures of experience that make such meaning possible. However, Husserl seems to point only at unifying structures of experience that link one moment in which an object is experienced in the past or future to the moment in which that object is experienced in the present. He is able to account for the acts involved in the experience of objects through the flow of time but he cannot account for how we know that the objects themselves are changing throughout time. This allows for the possibility of looking at what questions are left unanswered in Husserl's early writings on time. In so doing, the impact on Husserl's later phenomenological method may be explored.

Take for example an experience of a sunset. At the absolute level of consciousness Husserl is able to account for the unity of the distribution of acts that relate to the sunset, but in so doing he has forgotten about the object (i.e. the sunset) itself. How can the changing colors of the sunset be accounted for if all that we are capable of knowing is the distribution of the acts that experience the sunset? How is the redness of the sky related to the purple that follows it or the orange that precedes it? What structures are in place that make it possible to know that the past moment of the sunset is related to same sunset that is presently experienced?

These are the questions that Husserl is left with at the end of his early writings on time consciousness. However, he then goes on to explore the structural aspect of experience that detects similarities in objects that is capable of making relations between two, or more, moments in which objects are experienced as flowing through time. These

structures of consciousness are capable of recognizing that, even though objects may change over time, because they have enough significantly similar qualities, they are the same object. Husserl would not be able to perform such an analysis if he did not, a) have the structures of consciousness that he determined in his early writings to use as a context for the structures of consciousness that are at work in his new direction of analysis, b) reach the limit of his analysis of the acts of experience that resulted in the structures in consciousness in his early writings, and c) develop the method by which he can determine, through a series of questions, the essential make up of experience in his early writings on time-consciousness.

An example of Husserl's application of the pattern of analysis he employs in his early writings is this: he first looks at experience of the world (external time), and then looks at the experience of the self (internal time). In his later writings on time, Husserl asks how it is that we know the changing object through time. Applying a similar development in his early writings, he then goes on to explore how we know the changing self that is experiencing itself as it flows through time. Again, Husserl pushes his analysis of conscious experience to a deeper level that explores the most fundamental structures of consciousness. By observing such an application, we can see how Husserl has developed the basis for his phenomenological investigation in his early writings on time.

0.8 Conclusion

As evidenced by secondary literature, it is clear that some of the developments that Husserl undergoes in his early writings have an impact on his overall phenomenology. J.N. Mohanty (1995) argues that Husserl developed the foundation of his entire philosophy in the years spanning 1900-1916. Supporting Mohanty's argument is the idea that Husserl develops his most powerful phenomenological insights by reworking and reapplying his most basic methods of analysis at deeper and different levels. Mohanty's observation can be applied to Husserl's writings on time-consciousness on a more global scale. Many authors (Dan Zahavi, Donn Welton, Lanei Rodemeyer, Tonie Kortooms) point out that the genetic analysis Husserl cultivates in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (1918-1926)* is linked to his early writings on time. The conditions for the link between static and genetic phenomenology will be

examined through the usage of secondary literature. In the work of John Brough we can see the progression of Husserl's methodological approach reaching the limits of static phenomenology in the early time-consciousness lectures. By examining these texts and others by Rudolf Bernet and James Mensch, this thesis will trace the path through Husserl's early writings that links static and genetic phenomenology.

This thesis will make a contribution to the body of literature devoted to Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness by taking a global look at the role that Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness play in his philosophical development. More precisely, I will expand on the notion that Husserl has characteristic pattern of application of his phenomenological method throughout his phenomenological development. By using his analysis, Husserl also refines his method of analysis. This pattern is significantly evident in his early writings on time-consciousness. Second, there is an original observation about the motivation for Husserl to develop his phenomenological model and method based on what problems he faces because of his early writings on time-consciousness.

Through an explication of Husserl's early writings on time, we can see that by entering into the phenomenological exploration of time, Husserl has been forced to develop his phenomenological method. The final problem of the constitution of the absolute consciousness requires a major shift in his notion of the nature of the exploration of phenomenological objects. This new phenomenological level of analysis points Husserl in the direction of a new type of phenomenology that is found in his shift towards transcendental idealism. This shift is solidified by the introduction of the phenomenological reduction in *Ideas I* (1913) but begins eight years earlier and develops as Husserl lectures and writes on inner time-consciousness.

A similar development occurs in his shift from static to genetic phenomenological analysis. However, I do not wish to argue that Husserl is undertaking genetic phenomenology towards the end of his early writings on time-consciousness. In the absolute level of consciousness, Husserl is confronted with a new field of phenomenological analysis that requires a new genetic methodology. Husserl first develops genetic phenomenology in the works following his early writings on time-consciousness.³ An underlying thesis to be made about this shift is that the genetic groundwork is laid down in the early time-consciousness writings.

In exploring the developments of Husserl's phenomenological method it will be demonstrated that a) a number of phenomenological problems Husserl encounters in his early analysis of the phenomenology of time causes him to significantly develop his phenomenological method within his early writings, and b) there is a pattern of development in Husserl's early writings on time that is significant because it establishes a framework for Husserl's later phenomenological method.

Though many disagree with Husserl's conclusions about the purpose and product of phenomenology, if we are to be "good philosophers" and phenomenologists in our own right, it is best we become acquainted with the evolution of Husserl's rigorous methods that provide the foundation for fundamental concepts of phenomenology. By examining the patterns of development and performing an analysis of Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness, we may both gain an understanding of the structures and relationships that Husserl put forth to explain time-consciousness as well as develop our own phenomenological method of analysis.

³ *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, which is based on lectures from 1917-1918.

Chapter 1 Husserl's Earliest Time-Consciousness Models 1893-1905

1.0 Introduction

Husserl begins his analysis of time-consciousness by critiquing the lectures on time given by Franz Brentano.⁴ Husserl states that Brentano believed that an object's temporality is determined by its content. Contents are the qualities that, when combined, comprise the meaning of an object. For example, the blue sphere with a certain texture and size has the meaningful identity of a blue bouncy ball. Husserl points out the problems with this theory: he argues that temporality is actually accounted for in the distribution of the acts of apprehension intentionally directed towards an object's contents. Husserl is then faced with determining the constitution of immanent temporality. Immanent is Husserl's term that encompasses aspects that are inherently a part of the acts of consciousness. Immanent also implies an immediacy of all the aspects that make up the acts of consciousness. In this sense, immanent temporality already begs the question of exactly what is inherently a part of the acts of consciousness involved in the experience of objects in time. Husserl finds, in his own theory, similar problems to those that he pointed to in Brentano's theory. Husserl therefore argues that the internal constitution of immanent temporality must itself be constituted at a higher level of intentional consciousness.

Husserl's phenomenological method changes as the constitutional level of his analysis deepens. Put differently, he presents a method of analysis wherein the framework is dictated by the object and constitutional level with which he is concerned; the object in question determines the method of analysis. As new objects arise in new levels of constitution, Husserl looks for a different constitutional model that can accommodate the structural requirements of the objects of analysis. By examining Husserl's process of encountering problems and altering his temporal models, we may highlight the developmental progression of his understanding of the constitution of internal time-consciousness. At every new level of constitution, we will ask how Husserl's method evolves.

⁴ Reference to Brentano's theory here is based on Husserl's depiction of Brentano's theory found in *Hua X*.

The method of this chapter is to go through the early sections of Husserl's writings on time-consciousness and identify exactly what is his model of internal time-consciousness. Then the problems that Husserl encounters with this model will be explored. These problems are read as Husserl himself would have read them such that we are evaluating Husserl's models on his own terms. The goal for this chapter is first to identify what his earliest models looked like and what are some of the significant new features of his models in relation to the existing notions of time-consciousness. The second goal for this chapter is to introduce what phenomenological problems caused Husserl to progress beyond these early models. It is important to understand the early problems in his time-consciousness models in order to establish the pattern of application and refinement that Husserl uses to develop his phenomenological method.

1.1 Entering the Debate about Time

Roughly around the time William James' book *The Principles of Psychology* (1890)⁵ was published, there was a heated discussion among philosophers and psychologists around the issue of the origin and nature of time-consciousness. The focus of this debate was the problem of the perception of time, which is synonymous with the problem of the perception of objects that have temporal duration. Among those who participated in this debate were C.A. Strong, W. James, A. Meinong, L.W. Stern, Franz Brentano and finally Edmund Husserl.⁶

The perception of a unified object that falls in the stream of consciousness (stream denoting a flow or progression of consciousness through time) entails a simultaneity of perceptions in which a present object is held in the same moment with just past perceptions of that object. The act of perception, which is directed towards an object extended through time, must be able to connect moments (i.e. contents of moments) of past perceptions with the now-moment in which the perception takes place. In order for an object to have duration it must be linked relatively to past (and future) perceptual moments. In this debate, Meinong hypothesises that if the perception of objects in time is

⁵ W. James (1890) *The Principles of Psychology*, New York: Henry Holt & Co.

⁶ For a summary of this debate, see Kortooms (2002), section 2.1-2.2 pp. 39-54 or Findlay (1975) pp. 5-9.

not possible, then perception altogether is impossible.⁷ Because it is the apprehension of the object's duration that gives it unity, and thus makes it meaningful, the question of time-consciousness becomes a question of how one perceives an object's enduring unity, i.e. its duration. According to Husserl, Meinong does not answer the question of how we are able to perceive duration. The problem of duration comes from the question of how our experience moving through time is capable of knowing that objects are also moving through time. How does consciousness account for the links made between the moments in which objects are known as past, present and future, if all that we can account for is *that* consciousness is also moving through time? This is a problem that Meinong is unable to solve.⁸

The debate is formulated around what qualities or functions of consciousness allow for perception of duration. It remained to be determined by the various theorists at the time whether or not duration of perception can account for perception of duration. Both objects and experience have duration; hence, models of time-consciousness have to be able to account for both. Husserl disagrees with the majority of his contemporaries, saying that duration of perception cannot account for perception of duration. Husserl argues that the perception of an object has the same duration as the object in time and this does not sufficiently account for the perception of duration.⁹ There must be some modifications by the acts of consciousness in order that the enduring object has distributed contents that are then unified in perception. Such a modification would have to be embedded in the act of intentionality directed towards objects, thus enabling objects to be perceived as having temporal qualities such as duration or serial position. Temporal qualities such as serial temporal position in past, present or future must be perceivable, or embedded in to the act of perception.

⁷ Husserl's commentary on Meinong are based on the 1899 article, A. Meinong, "Über Gegenstand höher Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung," *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, Band 21(1899), pp. 182-272. English translation reprinted "On Objects of a Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception," in: M.-L. Schubert Kalsi, *Alexius Meinong. On Objects of Higher Order and Husserl's Phenomenology*, The Hague/Boston/London: Martius Nijhoff, 1978, pp. 137-208. Taken from Kortoom (2002), p. 39.

⁸ Kortooms (2002) p. 41.

⁹ "The duration of sensation and the sensation of duration are two very different things" *Hua X*, p. 12, *CW IV*, p. 12.

Within the debate, this leads to a question posed by Meinong of whether time-consciousness itself is, by nature, temporal, and, if consciousness of temporal sequence (for example) is itself temporally extended. Husserl's answer is yes, the flow of consciousness itself is temporally extended. This very notion causes him to rethink the constitution of internal time-consciousness. This new notion occurs only after Husserl has gone through a rigorous analysis of temporal objects experienced by consciousness. Husserl must first establish that, when we perceive an object unified in a duration of time, we do so via a synthesis of distributed moments that are held simultaneously. How the structures of consciousness unify objects to form an experience of duration is the focus of Husserl's first analysis in his early writings on time. First Husserl presents and criticizes Brentano's theory of time-consciousness in *Hua X*.¹⁰

1.2 Brentano's Theory

For Brentano the fundamental aspect that makes possible the perception of objects in time (i.e. temporality) is the perception of duration and succession. Brentano believed that object contents perceived in the now are accompanied by "reproductions" that have indicators of the serial temporal position associated with the time that they were originally perceived.¹¹ The perception of an association between the original impression of the content and the current perception gives rise to the temporality of the enduring object. Brentano believed that phantasy¹² was the component of consciousness that produces the necessary reproduction of perceptual presentations involved in time-consciousness.

According to Brentano, Husserl writes,

[P]hantasms and more phantasms, qualitatively the same in content although diminishing in fullness and intensity, continuously attach themselves to the primary contents of the perception. Parallel to this process, phantasy adds a new moment, the temporal. *Hua X*, p. 17, *CW IV*, p. 18.

¹⁰ As noted by many authors (e.g. Antonelli, 2002; Jacquette, 2004; Rollinger, 2004) Husserl's portrayal of Brentano's theory of time-consciousness is at best premature and at worst unfair and inaccurate. At the time of Husserl's lectures, Brentano had not published specifically on the topic of time consciousness and his more complete formulation of time-consciousness avoids many of the problems for which Husserl criticizes him. Having that noted, it also may be the case that Brentano heavily revised his theory of time-consciousness based on Husserl's critiques.

¹¹ See Dale Jacquette (2004) for more complete description of Brentano's theory.

¹² Also translated as "imagination".

According to Husserl, Brentano holds that this new temporal moment occurs because of reproductive phantasms that create an original association in which the contents of past objects attach to current contents.

In order to perceive the succession of the perceptions that occur in the now, the reproductions of the original impressions must be modified as past. For example, to return to the analogy of a melody, if tones were not modified, and if the preceding tone of a melody was reproduced in memory such that there was no difference in its presentation from that of the presently heard tone, then both the associated past and the perceived present tones would be “heard” together. The two tones would be undifferentiated. The reproductions, produced by phantasy, of the past tones are attached to the now in order to perceive succession and duration. These attachments qualify their contents as existing in “past moments.” All present moments are accompanied by phantasy-modified moments of the past. Brentano calls this accompaniment the *original association* or “*proteraesthesia*.”

Husserl also points out that, for Brentano, temporal consciousness always takes place in a single *now point* – a now point that is created in phantasy. The modified moments of phantasy attach to the contents a ‘pastness’. An object’s unified duration is caused by the perception of the modified past-contents with the now contents. The synthesis of two moments and the experience of an object enduring through time all takes place in one now point.

Husserl takes issue with Brentano in two ways. First, Husserl sees the present as an “original temporal field,” a “now” surrounded by a continually flowing “temporal halo.” This original field is directly perceived and is not the object of the productive or reproductive imagination. In order for time-consciousness to be successful, the original temporal field must contain some reference to past and future points in time but still be *given* immediately.¹³ Brentano argues that temporality is given in the form of a new moment, produced in the mode of phantasy consciousness. Husserl argues that temporality must be perceivable in the same immediate act that perceives the now.¹⁴ For

¹³ See Antonelli, 2002 for summary, or *Hua X*, section 6, 7 and 8.

¹⁴ See Kortoos, 2002, p. 31, (*Hua X*, p. 13, *CW IV*, p. 14).

Husserl, the now is not a single point; it has to be considered a comet stretching in two directions with a double tail of past and future points from which it is indivisible.¹⁵ Thus, Husserl changes the definition of now slightly to include past and future points in time that occur within a “temporal halo,” which are surrounded by a “fringe” of past and future contents,¹⁶ rather than a single point in time.

In the second and more substantial criticism, Husserl objects to Brentano’s belief that the origin of time-consciousness is an association between the object’s past and present contents. For Brentano, this is achieved by representations that are “phantasms” or representations of past contents connected to now contents. (Note again that in Husserl’s general dichotomy of consciousness there are two components, act and content; the *how* and *what* of consciousness.) Husserl asks how it is possible that the new moment created by the phantasm can be present now, only with the modifier of “past” attached to its content, at the same time as the actual contents given in the now. These predicated “past moments” are phantasms, created by phantasy, and thus are irreal (“not-now”) objects. Husserl puts forward the argument that the irreal not-now contents of phantasy *cannot be given now as real*.

Husserl criticizes this model, stating that it is impossible for something that is irreal (the not-now content) to be perceived in the same way as the real (the now content). If we base temporal origins in an object’s (modified) content, it is impossible to determine whether the thing I am conscious of now, which is actually a thing of the past modified and held in phantasy consciousness, is identical with the content I just held in consciousness. How can a content that is presented now depict something that is in the past? For Husserl, only the now content is presented in the now. To base time-consciousness in acts of phantasy in which contents bear with them an association to their originally given temporal position is impossible because contents themselves have no inherent temporal properties. The relation between the content of the *moment* that has *just past* with the content that is *now present* is the basis for the perception of time and the creation of temporality. Husserl argues that the perception of temporality cannot be

¹⁵ “Every phenomena has its comet’s tail,” *Hua X*, p. 295/355, *CW IV*, p. 306/366.

¹⁶ *Hua X*, p. 147/151, *CW IV*, p. 151/155. “The temporal fringe also has a future,” *Hua X*, 167, *CW IV* p. 172.

constituted in the representational mode of consciousness. A representational mode of consciousness for Husserl is a picture mode of memory in which memories are pictures or representations of the past. An example he gives is a painting of the storming of the Bastille. Memory is not like looking at a painting because in looking at painting all one has is the object of the painting and not the acts that the painting depicts having happened. In the content of the painting of the storming of the Bastille, i.e. the images presented, there is nothing to indicate the duration of the acts involved in the event.

For Husserl, memory that accounts for temporality is possible because of the acts of intentionality that perceive the differences between the now-content and past/future contents. Temporality is created by an intentional act that modifies contents and then perceives the distribution of modified contents. Time-consciousness cannot come from the contents themselves but in the acts of modification directed at objects. Brentano's model is based on the theory that it is the contents themselves, and not the acts of modification in the apprehension of said contents, that account for time-consciousness.

Husserl proposes that the origin of time-consciousness is not actually found in contents of perception but rather in the act-character given in the modes of apprehension that grasp the experienced phenomena (*Hua X*, p. 19, *CW IV*, p. 20). In the process of apprehending, which is a constituted and constitutive act of intentionality, objects gain their temporal character.¹⁷ Temporality does not come from the contents of apprehensions, but rather from the act of apprehending the contents. The different acts of apprehension that are in different modes of consciousness determine the temporal characteristics of the contents being apprehended. However, the act and content must not be considered as separate in Husserl's phenomenology of time. By considering the act of apprehension as the key element in time-consciousness, there is a shift in the debate, and a serious shift for Husserl's philosophy. Husserl goes from looking for the possibility of time-consciousness as a function of objects in the world to looking at how the inner realm of constituted intentionality creates temporality as a function of acts of consciousness.

¹⁷ The nature of the temporal act as constituting and constitutive is key in the discussion of the deepest level of temporal constitution discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

This shift towards the inner realm found in Husserl's early lectures on time-consciousness leads to a clarification of his notion of constitution, which in turn establishes a clear distinction between inner and outer time as well as the immanent and transcendent realms. This distinction allows Husserl to see the nature of the different constitutive levels involved in consciousness. In turn, Husserl is driven to determine exactly what is the ultimate constitution upon which all of consciousness is built. These levels are essential for Husserl to establish in order for him to be able to go from analysing the constitution of immanent consciousness to the phenomenological transcendental makeup of consciousness. The identification of the various levels of temporal consciousness, and their corresponding constitutions, points to pivotal developments in Husserl's depth of understanding concerning constitutional phenomenology.

1.3 Levels of Temporality

In order to make observations about Husserl's developments in his early writings on time-consciousness, one must first examine the various levels of temporality he sets out and the constitution of consciousness at these levels that is necessary for the experience of time.

Husserl's levels of temporal constitution are:

- a) things of experience in objective time;
- b) constituting appearance manifolds of various levels, the immanent units in pre-empirical time;
- c) the absolute, time-constituting stream of consciousness. *Hua X*, p. 73, *CW IV*, p. 77.¹⁸

Level a) refers to the constitution of the acts of intentionality that comprise the "flow of consciousness" as it experiences the objective world (*Hua X*, p. 287, *CW IV*, p. 297). Level b) refers to the constitution of the immanent flow of internal acts of apprehension that are prior to or independent of empirical experience. Husserl also identifies the constitution of level b) with reference to "the tone as 'content of consciousness'" (*Hua X*, p. 287, *CW IV*, p.

¹⁸ The sketches referenced here are number 34 in the primary text and section No. 40 in the supplementary texts of *Hua X*. These sketches date to the period between 1907-09. This breakdown of the levels is used here as a retrospective guideline in order to identify what Husserl is doing, and where he is going, with regards to the analysis of time at various levels. The breakdown of the various levels by Husserl is an obvious indication of a progression in his analysis of levels of temporality. Translation modified by Sokolowski, 1964, p. 428.

297). This implies that we are not referring to the tone of the world, but the tone content that is apprehended, which corresponds to the tone of the world. This places temporal constitution at level b) within the context of the structure of temporality at the level of immanent constitution in which there is the content, i.e. content of the tone, of apprehension and act of apprehension. Level c) is the constitutional level upon which all other temporally constituting acts are constituted. It is at level c) that the possibility for all constitution and intentional acts is generated.

The experience of objective time “of the world” in level a) is constituted for us by level b). Experience of the time at level b) has its own constitution based on the self-generating constitution of the absolute consciousness in level c). But, the “time” of level c) is a-temporal, which means it cannot be “experienced” in the same way as the time at level a). Time at level c) is an internally constituted fabric. The form of constitution at level c) is different than the form of constitution at level b). The form at level c) is absolute and self-generating. The intentional temporal constitution at level b) is situated in the fabric of the intentional temporality created at level c).¹⁹ By identifying the constitution involved at each of these levels, Husserl came to realize that immanent temporality, which constitutes our experience of objective time, is based on the absolute temporal distribution of internal time-consciousness. Immanent objects are constituted in inner-time – something that Husserl calls the “ultimate and true absolute” (*Ideen I*, p. 198). The absolute consists of a self-generating temporality that, in fact, is a-temporal. The absolute does not constitute its own temporality in the same sense as it constitutes all other levels of temporal experience.

In Husserl’s development of the constitution of inner-time, he first looks at the temporalizing acts of intentionality at the immanent level that allow us to have an experience of objective time. He then asks what kind of constitution the intentional acts at this level require. He deals with the temporality of static objects – objects that have a unified constitution in transcendent (external/objective) time, insofar as they are given to consciousness. Explaining the relationship between transcendent temporal objects and

¹⁹ These differing forms of time point to the development in Husserl’s phenomenology that starts with a static notion of constitution and then opens the possibility of field constituted genetically. See Chapter 3.

subjective experience that gives rise to the consciousness of objects moving through time is at the heart of his first analysis of time-consciousness.

Husserl then shifts his method to analyze the temporality of the immanent acts themselves. This is a temporality, i.e. experience of the flow through time, of objects that immanently constitute the experience of external objects. The intentional acts are constituting acts in that they enable a subjective experience of external static objects in time, but they are also constituted in that they provide a flow of internal temporality. When Husserl is at this level of temporal analysis, we can conclude (as did he) that his method is unequipped to perform a phenomenological analysis of absolute (genetic) objects.

Falling within Husserl's identification of three constitutive levels of temporality, we are faced with two descriptions of time-consciousness in Husserl's early writings. These two descriptions are directed at immanent and absolute temporality. The difference between the two descriptions indicates a shift from an analysis of that which constitutes our experience of objective time to that which constitutes our experience of inner time. This points to a development in Husserl's theory of constitution in which he goes from the immanent level to the absolute level.

This important distinction between time and temporality bears reiteration. We can talk about time as something independent from experience: there exists the objective "time of the world." Time has to do with clock-time, measurable independent of experience. This is to say that time does not depend on the existence of our consciousness or the constitution of our acts of intentional experience. The structure of temporality, however, is based on our constitutive experience. Temporality entails an experience of intentional objects that exist in some sort of flow or progression through time – emphasis here on *experience of flow or progression*. Temporality always implies an intentional constitution of acts relating to objects. Time, coincidentally, always implies a *form* that is progressing. Logically, one cannot have temporality without time, but phenomenologically we do not need to account for the correlation between objective time and immanent temporality. Indeed, this is a relationship that Husserl did not fully explain in his early writings on time-consciousness. Nonetheless, it is seemingly meaningless to

speak of temporality without reference to an experience of a flowing or progression through time.²⁰

For example, an object's duration and succession are temporal qualities because, though they occur "in the world," they require an intentional act directed at the temporally distributed object contents in order to come about as phenomena. Duration and succession are not qualities of "time" because "time" is not intentionality – it is merely a matrix or field in which intentionality, i.e. consciousness, operates. Husserl speaks of a "pre-empirical time" that is internal time and is independent of the world and experience of objective time. The creation of the flow of internal-time and the perception that results in internal-temporality is a very different type of constitution that entails a different form of temporal object because it flows through an internally constituted pre-empirical time.

Each temporal level has a constitution that makes possible the experience of temporality. Immanent constitution allows for the experience of time at the objective level. The *absolute* level of temporality is self-constituting. In turn, at the absolute level the experience of immanent temporality is constituted. At first glance, the absolute level is obviously the level that is most confusing and therefore it will receive much deliberation in the later half of this thesis. Initially, it is important to note that each level requires a different constitutive analysis. It is the progression of levels and the method by which they are analyzed that is of interest in addressing Husserl's development in his early writings on time-consciousness.

1.4 Developments: pre-1904/05

Husserl's early conception of time-consciousness was an application of the structure of apprehension to an analysis of time. In his 1901 publication *Logical Investigations (LI)* Husserl established the constitution of intentionality as comprised of apprehensions and apprehension-contents. For Husserl the apprehension-content schema

²⁰ In his discussion of the relationship between objective time and inner temporality that Husserl puts forth, Sokolowski writes, "Although time appearances have a function similar to that of other appearances, however, their status is by no means the same. Inner time, the appearance for external time, is prior to all other appearances... Thus, besides functioning to manifest objective time, inner temporality also serves as the structure basic to all experience," (1964, p.535).

solved many of the problems he identified in Brentano's model of time-consciousness. As opposed to Brentano's model, in Husserl's model the content itself does not hold an "original association" to its past moment of apprehension. Rather, the perception of objects in a temporal flow is made possible in the acts that apprehend contents

In the apprehension-content schema, Husserl argues that intentionality can be broken into the components of act and content. Contents are neutral, which is to say that the contents of an intentional act (which are made up of the qualities of an object) by itself has no specific place in space and time, and thus lacks meaning and unity within the context of experience. Contents gain their character by the act of apprehension. Although it may sound absurd, the cup is a cup floating in space and undetermined time until it is given a context – until it is meaningfully constituted by experience. It is through the act of apprehension (*Auffassung*, manuscript F I 9, 9b²¹), something Husserl calls the "animating" apprehensions, that contents gain their contextual character. Husserl also uses the term "interpretation" (*Deutung*, manuscript F I 9, 10b²²) to describe how a perceived object can come about in consciousness based on the perception of a real object's content. The real content of, for instance, the colour blue, is a neutral content until it is animated by an act of apprehension that combines the blue content with other contents to form knowledge of the object as given to perception. The apprehending act takes the neutral content blue and applies it to the specific object of experience as in the blue of the sky or the blue coffee cup. This forms the backbone of Husserl's earliest notion of what makes time-consciousness possible: the apprehension-content schema.

In Husserl's application of the apprehension-content schema to time-consciousness, each temporal phase contains several apprehended contents simultaneously. For example the now, future, and past modified contents are combined to form a coherent object that is unified and enduring. Husserl writes, "As the time-points are continuously united, so the A is continuously the same. *We are conscious* of the *continuous identity* in time" (*Hua X*, p. 154, *CW IV*, p. 158). The A is the same and we know its identity because the apprehending acts combine the past contents with the now

²¹ From Kortooms, (2002), p. 6.

²² Ibid, p. 6.

contents and future contents. In this sense, identity is the duration or enduring of an object through time.

In 1901 Husserl writes:

To *perceive a temporal flow* means to perceive a present existent A together with a just past B objectively connected with A and C belonging to the further past etc...And this whole succession is perceived; it is a *present* process, since we are looking at the objective unity and perceiving it. *Hua X*, p. 151-52, *CW IV*, p. 156.

At this stage some major principles for Husserl's notion of time-consciousness are evident. The first principle is that temporal perception happens *in the now*; "it is a *present* process." The second is that the temporal objects perceived in the now have a unity that entails an act of intentionality that unifies distributed contents – it places them in relation to one another - in one act. The third principle, which Husserl goes on to devote a great deal of effort to explain in his earliest writings, is the modification process by which contents of the moments A, B and C are connected. It is the modifications in the various modes of consciousness that bestow, for example, the predicate *past* on B and then synthesizes the modified B with the present A and still further past C. This process of modification and synthesis unifies the contents such that an enduring object may be experienced throughout the flow of time. Perception of duration comes with the combination of modified past moments with now moments.

In Husserl's earliest iteration, temporality refers to the experience of time in which contents have qualities such as duration and serial position in past, present or future. An internal process of perception constitutes temporality. Husserl says that this internal process is made up of a temporal fabric which he calls the *original temporal field* (*Hua X*, p. 234, *CW IV*, p. 242). The three temporal moments of this field are just-past, now, and just-future; these are the "three temporal moments [that] comprise the unity of the original temporal field (*originaeres Zeitfeld*)" (*Hua X*, p. 29-30, *CW IV*, p. 31). They form the perceptual continuity under constant progression, flux and flow. The new now constantly pushes back the just-past, just as primary memory contents are constantly modified into moments that get further pushed into the past. Husserl phrases this constant modification as being a series of adumbrations that are continually modifying (and modified) moments (*Hua X*, p. 327, *CW IV*, p. 339).

As referred to in the Introduction of this thesis, Husserl's main example of a temporal object that lends itself to analysis of temporal constitution is the act of hearing a melody. Husserl says that, "In a certain sense, a melody is an objective unity. But in this case the temporal succession belongs essentially to the unity's content," (*Hua X*, p. 149, *CW IV*, p. 153). Later in the sketch, Husserl goes on to write that the melody is known as a whole through each partial apprehension of the individual notes. In perceiving the progression of notes we perceive a temporally distributed object. In the melody, "there exists an enduring, temporally extended act of perceiving," (*Hua X*, p. 167, *CW IV*, p. 171). So, what results is a description of the structure of a temporally extended act that perceives a temporally extended object. Husserl describes the series of notes as parts of the whole:

[Melody], the first tone sounds, then comes the second tone, then the third, and so on... I do not hear the melody but only the single present tone. That the elapsed part of the melody is something objective for me... I owe it to memory; that I do not presuppose, with the appearance of the currently intended tone, that this [present note] is *all*, I also owe it to anticipatory expectation. *Hua X*, p. 23, *CW IV*, p. 24-25.

In order to be meaningful, Husserl's melody and distributed tones require the perception of temporality, as opposed to other phenomenological qualities, such as the concept of space.²³ As each tone flows through time from future to present to past they constantly undergo modification by the apprehending acts. In the act of hearing a melody the synthesis of notes occurs in an inner-temporal environment. It is to the apprehending act that we owe our sense of immediacy, simultaneity, and duration that ultimately leads to unified meaning.

Husserl identifies three distinct temporal phases in which moments, or contents of those moments, are perceived. Each phase is animated by a certain mode of intentionality that Husserl refers to as the "mode of apprehension" or the "manner of appearance" (*Hua X*, p. 25, *CW IV*, p. 27). The modes of apprehension give tonal contents their temporal character. They are the primordial impression, primary memory and primary expectation.

²³ For an analogy to space see *Hua X*, p. 5, *CW IV*, p. 5, or *Hua X*, p. 373, *CW IV*, p. 363. Also See supplementary text No 14, *Hua X*, p. 176, *CW IV*, p. 181, or No 19, *Hua X*, p. 187, *CW IV*, p. 193, for an analogy of a new born baby and their relation to undifferentiated space.

The content of the primordial impression/sensation (*Urimpression*) is given in the now moment (*Hua X*, p. 64, *CW IV*, p. 66). In this moment there can be “momentary simultaneity” (*Momentanzugleich*) in which many contents or impressions are given at once, for instance the many notes heard in a chord played in the melody (*Hua X*, p. 376, *CW IV*, p. 387). The many momentary contents are apprehended at the same time. This comprises the apprehension of the primordial impression; Husserl calls them contents that are given with (*zugleich*, *Hua X*, p. 77, *CW IV*, p. 81).

That the presently heard tone drifts into the past and is still perceived as a part of the unified now, Husserl says, we “owe to memory.” The just-past content is held in the mode of consciousness called primary memory.²⁴ Primary memory allows for the content to trail behind in a temporal “fringe” but still remain attached to the now (*Hua X*, p. 147/151, *CW IV*, p. 151/155). This is characterized as the streaming of a comet’s tail. It is the modifying act in the mode of primary memory that gives the just-past tone its temporal character of “past.” In the act of apprehension, contents are not just given immediately to consciousness: contents that are past are perceived as past as well. Husserl uses the example of a perception of a tone that has passed as still enduring for a period of time:

...[W]hat pertains to its appearance is not a “tone-sensation” (an actually present now) but an “echo” of the sensation, a modification that is no longer a primary content in the sense of something actually present (not an immanent tone-now). On the contrary it is something modified: a consciousness of past sensation. *Hua X*, p. 324, *CW IV*, p. 336.

Husserl then calls this modification that occurs in the apprehension of temporal quality a “radical alteration.” In this alteration animated by the modifying act of apprehension there is the creation of a temporal character of past. This past tone is heard with (*zugleich*) the primal impression.

When the tone has drifted far enough into the past and is no longer meaningfully apprehended within the present perception it “disappear[s] into darkness, into an empty retentive consciousness” (*Hua X*, p. 24, *CW IV*, p. 26). Retentive consciousness of

²⁴ Primary memory is later termed “retention” at the absolute level of time-consciousness. Likewise, primary expectation is termed “protention.” In his first model, Husserl does not use the term *Urimpression* but rather “now-content.” *Urimpression* comes after 1904-05 and is used here out of convenience.

primary memory eventually drifts far enough away so that it is no longer connected to the now-consciousness. Similarly, when the melody has ended and we are no longer engaged in the act of perceiving it, the entire unified object of the melody drifts into secondary memory.

The final moment in time-consciousness is the moment of primal expectation (*Erwartung* or anticipation). We get a sense of primary expectation when we are hearing a recording of a familiar tune and the recording is suddenly stopped. We react with surprise because the unified object of the melody is temporally violated. Husserl also uses the example of sitting down to a dinner table that is set and then no food being served. Our expectations of the future are not fulfilled. Primary expectation intends towards the not-yet-fulfilled primordial impression of the now. Husserl writes in reference to primal expectation, “[W]e frequently have intuitive expectations as well...we cannot be entirely without apprehension directed forwards. *The temporal fringe also has a future*,” (*Hua X*, p. 167, *CW IV*, p. 172).

It is easy to confuse the term “moment” with “content”. When a moment is discussed, it is constituted by an act of intentionality directed at an “object content”. The confusion arises because phenomenologically speaking, all moments, in order to be moments, entail both intentionality and an ‘intentional object’ given to experience via ‘object contents’ in time. For example, the point in time that is now can occur but it is impossible to talk about it as a moment without reference to its content. On the immanent level, a period of time can come and go but to speak of it as “empty” or void of an intentional object is impossible. The moment cannot be a phase denoting an intentional act that is directed at nothing!²⁵ Husserl notes that while contents can stay the same, “their change is attributed to new moments, called apprehension” (*Hua X*, p. 234, *CW IV*, p. 237). Apprehensions always constitute moments. Furthermore, there can be many contents that occur in one moment. In the now moment we must take into consideration the many modified contents of an object that are sensed such that the unified object is

²⁵ Even if there is no specific exterior intentional content that fills the period of a moment, the act itself is considered the intentional (in this case internally constituted) object. This comes up in Chapter Three in the discussion of the self-reflective process that must be a part of consciousness (re: consciousness is always self-consciousness) and by extension consciousness enduring in the flow of time.

experienced as enduring. In every moment there is an act, or many acts, that is/are essentially constitutive.

Contents flow through time such that the contents of primary memory are intentionally filled by (or replaced with) the primordial impressions that directly precede them. The primary impressions are pushed into the past by the flow of time and are thus modified by apprehension in the mode of primary memory that modifies them as past. Primary expectations flow into primordial impressions based on the same structure of flow. Sequentially, the contents of primary memory are 'fulfilled by' or 'flow from' future moment to 'now moment', which is the intended moment of primordial impression. The contents of primary expectation are also fulfilled by moments that happen in the relative future. Both primary memory and primary expectation have the same structure of expectation of fulfillment towards the moments just ahead of them; they are drawn and intend towards the contents of these moments.²⁶

In Husserl's early descriptions he relied heavily on an assumption of structural similarity between the modification of primary memory and primary expectation, saying that one could merely apply the structure of recollection (primary memory) to anticipation (primary expectation).²⁷ In his early writings, he spent more time describing the structure of recollection than anticipation. But he also says that, "All things considered, however, the intuition belonging to expectation is something just as original and unique as the intuition of the [just] past" (*Hua X*, p. 307, *CW IV*, p. 317).²⁸

²⁶ Intentionality has a directionality that is oriented towards the future. This principle will become important in understanding the self-generating nature of the a-temporal field of absolute consciousness. The draw towards 'future contents' is one of the generative forces enacted by and constitutive of the absolute consciousness.

²⁷ See Rodemeyer, 2006, p. 12.

²⁸ We can note for discussion later: what retention gives to consciousness, protention gives to intersubjectivity.

1.5 Memory Distinction

Husserl distinguishes between primary and secondary memory (recollection). Primary memory acts as a constituent of the now consciousness directly modifying what is given in the just past. Secondary memory re-presents more distant past objects and events. Secondary memory occurs in the now in the sense that it recalls past memories in the present moment, but ones that are not necessarily directly related to immanently given now contents.

Husserl is clear that it is the constitution of primary memory that makes time-consciousness possible. He writes,

But if we call perception the *act in which all "origin" lies*, the act that constitutes originally, then *primary memory is perception*. For only in primary memory do we *see* what is past, only in it does the past become constituted – and constituted presentatively, not representatively. *Hua X*, p. 41, *CW IV*, p. 43

Primary memory forms a continuum of modified contents that culminates in the ideal limit of the now. The contents of primary memories flow further and further away until they no longer are sufficiently attached to the now, at which point they pass over into secondary memories. In order to *see* what is past, presentatively and not representatively, perception of the immediately past contents must be constituted in the present.

Husserl makes this distinction because he wants to be sure we are dealing with an analysis at the level of objects given to experience *in the now* moment in which primary memory takes place. True, objects that are remembered in the distant past and expected in the distant future have a temporal constitution but the difference between primary memory and recollection lies in the difference in modification that the contents in each undergo. Primary memory undergoes a constant mediation, a constant transition and an adumbration to the present. Secondary memory refers to temporal events that are not directly linked to the present, but have been distanced enough so that they are in the past, which is removed from the present.²⁹ Husserl says that recollection is not constantly

²⁹ Husserl deals directly with the “space” that lies between the near and far past in some of his later writings on time consciousness such as *Analysis of Active and Passive Synthesis* or *Husserliana XI “Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs – und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926*. This full discussion is not necessary for this thesis. For a summary, see Rodemeyer (2006), p. 82-91. Of note is her comment that in Husserl’s early writings there is much to be added to the clarification of the difference between retention and recollection.

connected to that which is given now, rather it turns back temporally and reiterates a whole perception that is in relation to its own (objective) temporal field.³⁰

In Husserl's reading of Brentano, Brentano fails to distinguish between the two types of memories. In Brentano's time-consciousness model, past contents are modified by phantasy or representational consciousness such that they have an association to the original given content. This association is what gives the object a temporal position and establishes its temporal character. Husserl argues that this makes it impossible to distinguish between temporality that is situated in the now from the temporality that is situated in distant memory.

Husserl would have us consider that, the same object content, for example the note B flat, can be present in many memories (false memories or not – it does not matter). If the content B flat is held by more than one intentional act, such as in a memory of my favourite sonata and in a current experience of my friend's jazz concert, there would be no way of distinguishing the different temporal positions of the two contents. For Husserl, this model is lacking modifications of different modes of memory that would distinguish between past and present experience. Given that even in distant memories there is a temporal structure, Husserl asks, how are the identical contents in different memories supposed to denote different objective temporalities if the contents are apprehended in the same way? Even if the objective temporal positioning of the object content is not of consequence, there is no way for varying temporal relations to be determined if only content denotes temporality (*Hua X*, p. 184-85, *CW IV*, p. 191). Husserl avoids this by positing two modes of memory that are associated with two different modes of modifying apprehending acts.

As we remember, we are conscious of the past object as having associated with it its own impressions, not merely as a past object. To remember the action in the past there must be the same subjective inner flow of time. Even in secondary memory, for an object to have duration it must adhere to the same temporal distribution that beheld it in its original perception. Husserl solves this problem when he asserts that time-consciousness in secondary memory, just as in primary memory, is determined by the act and not the

³⁰ See Bernet, et al., 1993, p. 105.

content of intentionality. The act of apprehension can modify objects in the mode of primary memory as well as undergo a different modification in the mode of secondary memory. Remembered events and objects still have the temporal qualities of perceived events in the sense that they still rely on the same relations of duration and sequence that mediates consciousness of all temporally distributed objects.

If time-consciousness entails perception of an object's distribution, which is, in essence, a combination of many temporally distributed contents, the question arises whether the perception of a temporally distributed object is also temporally distributed. At the turn of the century, in the contemporary debate around time-consciousness, Meinong contended in his model that all the temporally distributed contents of an object are given simultaneously in one moment, thus the presentation itself is undistributed. Husserl, however, argues that the notion of the now as a single indivisible point is a fictitious idealization that leaves no room for perception of distribution. Two points are crucial for Husserl: The now-point as one moment can only contain what is given now – it cannot contain what is given in the past; and, perception of the now is actually not an idealized indivisibility but rather a synthesis of the three temporal contents in a now phase.

A point that will become very important for developments in Husserl's theory of time-consciousness is the premise that Husserl considers (and must do so), the perception of a temporal object as being temporally distributed. It also provides some problems for Husserl that cause him to alter the schema that provides the apprehending modifications that make time-consciousness possible.

1.6 Temporal Distribution of the Act

In section 12, Part B of *Hua X* written prior to 1904, Husserl states,

I perceive a measure, a melody. I perceive it step-by-step, tone-by-tone.
Assuming that no direct interruptions occur, I hear and perceive continuously.
Accordingly, there exists an enduring temporally extended act of perceiving.
Hua X, p.167, *CW IV*, p.171.

Not only is the melody temporally extended, the act that perceives the melody is temporally extended as well. Husserl then goes on to make two more vital points in this sketch:

What is “given” to perception is necessarily something temporally *extended*, not something with the character of a mere point in time...

The evidence of time-consciousness: As far as the unbroken continuity extends, thus far does the evidence extend. *Hua X*, p.168-70, *CW IV*, p. 173-74

In one sense, the evidence of time-consciousness ends at the point that the ‘immediately given’ drifts far enough into the past to become a part of secondary reproductive memory. In another sense, the unbroken continuity is always extending as a process that is constantly occurring in acts of conscious life.

The act of intentionality that constitutes the perception of duration is also temporally extended. In this sketch Husserl speaks of the act of perceiving a temporal object as a “continuously unfolding act, which is constantly an act of perceiving.” Prior to 1904-05, Husserl notes that, in the natural attitude, which he denotes as the everyday unreflective experience of objects in the time, we perceive an object’s extension and duration as we perceive the object. The perception of duration and extension is what gives us unified object perception. In the phenomenological attitude, which is concerned with the constitution of the experience of consciousness, Husserl analyses the appearance of objective time. In order to initiate a phenomenology of temporality, he must suspend objective time and move to the level of immanent-time. For Husserl, what is given in a phenomenological analysis is not just the external fabric of objective time, but rather the relations of objects that are perceptually immanent (*Hua X*, p. 187-88, *CW IV*, p. 187).

Highlighting a major difference between Husserl’s and Brentano’s theories, Husserl, returning to the example of the melody, states, “The tone itself is the same, but the tone ‘in the manner in which’ it appears is continually different” (*Hua X*, p. 25, *CW IV*, p. 27). The “manner of appearance” is central to phenomenological analysis. Husserl established, prior to his 1904-05 lectures, that it is *the manner*, i.e. the modifications of the act of apprehension, in which contents appear that gives us time-consciousness. This is a major move away from Brentano who looked at time-consciousness based on the nature of the content of objects. Determining the constitution of the manner of appearance, and how these manners of appearance are constituted by the acts of intentionality, is the staple of phenomenological analysis. It points to the level of constitution with which Husserl is concerned. Again, in the melody example, the manner

in which the tone appears refers to the modified contents that appear – the manner changes, it undergoes temporal modification constantly in relation to the now even though the content does not change. The tone heard is the same C flat, but its relative temporal position changes; thus the manner in which it is apprehended changes. Prior to 1904-05 Husserl is mainly concerned with the manner of appearance of objects flowing through objective time. Accordingly, his constitutive analysis is directed at the level of “things of experience in objective time” (*Hua X*, p. 73, *CW IV*, p. 77).

Husserl then deals with the criticism that in ‘the now’ moment only the ‘now content’ can be presented. It becomes problematic when ‘not-now’ (past) contents are presented at the same time, which is essential for perceiving the difference between the now and past or future contents that makes possible the perception of time-consciousness. When Husserl examines the acts of perception that occur at the inner level, it gives him cause to delve into the constitution of immanent time-consciousness. He makes this shift in the 1904-05 lectures. By examining the constitution of the immanent level of temporality he comes to reject the apprehension-content schema after the 1904-05 lectures.

1.7.0 1904/05 Winter Semester Lectures

In the 1904-05 lectures, Husserl turns away from the analysis of objective time in order to focus on his description of what is the phenomenological notion of an experience of time. An explanation of the phenomenological experience of objective time is the primary goal, but Husserl begins to deal with its constitution on a deeper level. Husserl now looks for what are the necessary conditions for constitution of inner time-consciousness to take place.

In the introduction to his 1904-05 lectures Husserl asserts two tasks for the lectures: 1) to determine how temporal objectivity is constituted in subjective time-consciousness; 2) to subject time-consciousness to a phenomenological investigation (*Hua X*, p. 3-4, *CW IV*, p. 3-4).³¹ Husserl has gotten to a point at which he recognizes that the experience of objective time is constituted by immanent (subjective) temporality. The

³¹ See Kortooms, 2002, section 1.2.2, p. 21-24 for summary.

developments in the 1904-05 lectures eventually lead him to argue that immanent temporality requires a deeper constitution at an absolute level.

In order for Husserl to initiate a phenomenological investigation of time-consciousness, he suspends objective time and focuses on the experience of temporality. The suspension of objective time yields a phenomenological field of inner time-consciousness and is significant for Husserl's phenomenological method.

In time's case we will have to take into consideration only what is given phenomenologically... that is, not objective time but what is adequately given in the intuition of time or can be reduced from it. *Hua X*, p. 188, *CW IV*, p. 194.

On the surface, the first major similarity we can see in a suspension of objective time is that of terminological similarity to the bracketing involved in the phenomenological reduction.³² Husserl suspends objective time in order to examine how time-consciousness is purely internal and subjectively constituted.³³ Internal time-consciousness modifies contents that allow for perception of relative temporal positioning. Objective temporal positioning may occur in objective time but the perception of it, and the giving of temporality, occurs in subjective inner time-consciousness. It is the possibility of temporality that drives, even makes possible, phenomenological analysis.³⁴ Put differently, the analysis of temporality is the analysis of objects given to experience.

When the modified now-contents of consciousness turn into contents of the past, Husserl needs to preserve the structure of the original intentionality that experienced the object in the original now. The structure of the original intentionality is a constitutive act of time-consciousness. Different constitutive intentional acts occur in different "modes of givenness", which are simply different modes of intentionality that are directed at temporal phases. Contents pass from phase to phase, i.e. from now phase to past phase, and it is the intentionality at work in these phases that creates the experience of the object in past present and future. Husserl calls these modes primary memory, *Urimpression* and

³² Husserl himself notes the Seefelder Manuscript written in the summer 1905 as the advent of his first discovery of the phenomenological reduction. At this point, we make note of Husserl's constitution of time-consciousness and the phenomenological reduction as having reciprocal developmental significance.

³³ It will be discussed later how time-consciousness is actually intersubjectively constituted at a transcendental level.

³⁴ Husserl would argue that an analysis purely of objective time is a problem for the discipline of descriptive psychology – a discipline, at this point in his career, from which he wishes to distance himself (*Hua X*, p. 336, *CW IV*, p. 347).

primary expectation.³⁵ The different modes of intentionality modify the contents, giving them the character of past, present, or future.³⁶ The modifying character is what creates the temporal predicates that are held in relation to one another. The relation between the modified past, present, and future contents is what *gives* time-consciousness.

Husserl develops the idea that subjective temporality and objective time relate to two continuums flowing through time that are distinguishable as: 1) the object of perception; and, 2) the flow of perception of the object. In Section 32 of the 1905 lectures Husserl refers to a “continuum of continua”, one pertaining to the apprehensions of an object in time and the other to the contents of those apprehensions (*Hua X*, p. 231, *CW IV*, p. 238-39). Brough (1972) describes Husserl’s double continuum:

Each momentary slice of consciousness... really embraces, simultaneously, a double continuum – a continuum of apprehension and a continuum of contents...Further, since the perceptual act is a continuum of apprehensions, the total perception may be described as a ‘continuum of continua.’ p. 303.

The double-continua highlight Husserl’s point in his apprehension-content schema that the now is a temporal phase containing many apprehension contents apprehended at once. The temporal experience is apprehended through many simultaneous apprehensions. Borrowing one of William James’s analogies, Husserl sees the now as actually a phase that goes through a transition rather than an indivisible point, it has a halo around it in which the just past and just future also exist; it is a comet with two tails, one projecting to the past and one to the future. The now is a now of simultaneity, of “same-nowness” (*Gleich-Jetztigkeit*, *Hua X*, p. 115, *CW IV*, p. 120). On one continuum, the object flows through time and is apprehended by a temporally distributed intentionality. On the other continuum, the apprehension of modified contents as just-past, now, and just-future, is, as a whole, apprehended such that the first continuum is apprehended with a temporally distributed intentionality.³⁷

³⁵ *Urimpression* is left un-translated here in order to differentiate it from the primal impression of Husserl’s earlier model that is based on the apprehension-content schema.

³⁶ Kortooms, 2002, p. 76.

³⁷ See time diagram in Appendix A. The horizontal line represents the object flowing through time on one continuum, and the vertical line represents the apprehension of a continuum of modified temporally distributed object contents.

Husserl argues that, if we are to be able to experience the synthesis of many apprehensions occurring at once then, there must be a different constitutive intentionality independent from that which apprehends the object content profiles. Furthermore, in order for the perception of succession and distribution to occur, the apprehending acts responsible for such perception require a different temporal field in which to be distributed and thus constituted. If they were in the same temporal field as the presently held objects of perception, there would merely be a succession of perception and not perception of succession. Without a separate level of constitution on which a separate intentionality exists, there would be no intentionality directed at the perceptual act that is responsible for the perception of a distributed temporal object. In this case, the very basis of *temporality would be lost*.

Husserl is well aware that contents have an objective character in the sense that they maintain their temporal positioning (for example where they fall in a sequence of events). This position does not change – objects and events cannot change their objective positioning, nor, for that matter, can the rate of objective flow of temporal distribution change (*Hua X*, p.15, *CW IV*, p.15).

On the one hand, an object, such as Husserl's example of a melody, has points in time in which contents are apprehended. These points have their own intensity that decreases as time moves on until they are no longer in the original temporal field that is 'in the now'. As the presentation of the melody begins, we are presented with the apprehension of the contents of each note, which remain in the original field so long as the melody is present, decreasing in intensity as the melody progresses until it ends and the melody, as a unit, passes (as well) into secondary memory (*Hua X*, p. 233, *CW IV*, p. 241). The apprehensions have their own distribution as well, but it is not the distribution of apprehension that gives rise to the apprehension of distribution. The apprehensions are of distributed temporal contents, those that have been modified as past, present and future. Husserl argues that it is the apprehension of the distributions that give rise to time-consciousness. For this to be possible Husserl puts forth that the apprehension of distribution needs another flow of internal time so that the intentionality responsible for

apprehending the distributed apprehensions does not get caught in an infinite regress. This problem will be dealt with shortly.

For Husserl, two phenomenological problems stem from his examination of the constitution of the temporalizing act. Husserl notes first that in the apprehension-content schema the constitution of consciousness that accounts for perception of time at the immanent level is impossible because one cannot have the now and the not-now held in the same temporal moment. This is because the schema accounts for the duration of sensation but not the sensation of duration. In order for us to have an apprehension of temporality, that is, to hold the now and the not now in conjunction so that perception of distribution would indicate an object's endurance or duration, there would have to be a different intentional act directed at the many sensations that make up a perception of duration.

This leads to the second problem: an infinite regression of apprehending acts would have to occur in order to experience sensations as having a succession that allows for duration. In order to apprehend the sensation of distribution there has to be a temporally distributed intentionality directed at the acts themselves that are temporally distributed. This would result in an infinite regression. To solve this problem of constitution, Husserl turns towards an analysis of the temporalizing act that is constituted in immanent time. The main question that spurs this investigation is a revisiting of the earlier debate around the succession of perception and the perception of succession.

1.7.1 Problem 1: The Now and Not-Now

The first problem that Husserl encounters in his first model of time-consciousness is a similar problem similar to one he identified in Brentano's theory of original association. Husserl argued that Brentano has objects held in memory, which do not exist now, as a part of the experience that exists now. Husserl states that only the now can be perceived in the now, the not-now cannot be presented in the now, "the now cannot stand before me as not now" (*Hua X*, p. 322, *CW IV*, p. 335). In Husserl's reasoning, in order for there to be an experience of duration there must be a perception of the different modified contents of past and future in the now moment. But, he also realizes that only the now contents (which are necessarily not modified as past and present) can be given

now. Husserl must come to a new constitution of the now, one that modifies the past (and future) contents such that they may be perceived at the same point as now contents.

The modified contents occur in the same moment and are perceived as a whole. Husserl writes:

The concrete perception of [a temporal object] has its time... [I]s the temporal not something on which I can focus my attention, something that can be perceived? And, as a given 'moment,' as a character, is [it] not also something that has time? I consider the contents of the visual field in the now, they all exist as the same time, are all now. But each content does not have its own individual now-moment; on the contrary, the total consciousness has one and the same now. *Hua X*, p. 207, *CW IV*, p. 214.

By having many modified contents unified in one now moment, Husserl is able to account for perception of succession without violating his earlier comment that states that only the now is able to stand before me as now. There is one now, filled with many modified contents. This principle is evident in one of his diagrams of the temporal flow and the many contents available at the now moment. In order for the many apprehensions to occur at the same time, i.e. for the now and not-now to be held together, the intentional act responsible for such an apprehension must be constituted at a different level of consciousness.

Husserl's apprehension-content schema accounts for the succession of consciousness of temporal objects, always ordering the phases in the flow of consciousness based on just-past, now, just-to-come modifications. It does not account for consciousness of succession. This is a criticism similar to that which he levelled against Brentano earlier. In an important move, Husserl asks the same question of his model that he previously asked of Brentano's. He asks,

...[C]an a series of coexistent primary contents ever bring succession to intuition? *Hua X*, p. 323 *CW IV* p. 335.

And answers:

[No,] primary contents are not able to switch their temporal function: now cannot stand before me as not now... p. 322/p. 334.

Husserl's apprehension-content model of time-consciousness can account for the apprehension of the temporal qualities of objects. This occurs through the modifying acts of apprehension in the various modes of primary memory, original impression and

primary expectation. However, this apprehension of the succession cannot, as Husserl points out in the above quote, bring about the perception of the succession of intuition. Husserl's earliest apprehension-content schema can account for the unity of an object in time, but does not account for the unity of temporal experience.³⁸

Because contents can only be given in the now they cannot also be given as successive. Husserl writes:

Primal contents that spread out in the now are not able to switch their temporal function: the now cannot stand before me as not-now, the not-now cannot stand before me as now. Indeed, if it were otherwise, the whole continuum of contents could be viewed as now and consequently as coexistent, and then again as successive. That is evidently impossible. *Hua X*, p. 322, *CW IV*, p. 335.

The consciousness of succession must entail the capacity to perceive the difference between the now and the not-now simultaneously in the same moment. According to the constitution of immanent temporality, this is not possible given that Husserl has already pointed out that the now and not-now cannot be held together in the same moment. Husserl writes describes the difference between the object extended and the extension of the act of apprehension. "*The object is not the extension but what is extended*. Evidently we can then always make the extension itself into an object, divide it, and distinguish it" (*Hua X*, p. 241, *CW IV*, p. 249). Husserl has to re-consider the relation between the temporally extended act that constitutes immanent intentionality and the constitution of intentionality that synthesizes the many acts of temporality together.

1.7.2 Problem 2: Infinite Regress

The second problem deals with the threat of the acts of apprehension relying on a constitutive framework that is infinitely regressive. In section 33 Husserl writes, "It belongs to the essence of the perception of a temporal object that it is a temporal object itself. Under all circumstances it has a temporal extension" (*Hua X*, p. 232, *CW IV*, p. 239). The acts that apprehend a temporal object must be unified, and thus constituted, at some level of consciousness. If an object has a temporal extension, its temporality must be evident in the modification of the apprehension of its contents. This would result in

³⁸ See Brough, translator's introduction to *Hua X*, p. XLVIII.

apprehensions that constitute temporal objects having to be apprehended because of their own extension in time (i.e. apprehensions of apprehensions *ad infinitum*...).

Husserl addresses the problem of infinite regress:

Can the infinite regress here be shown to be innocuous?

1. The tone endures, becomes constituted in a continuity of phases.
2. While or as long as the tone endures, there belongs to each point of the duration a series of adumbrations running from the now in question on into the blurry past. We therefore have a continuous consciousness, each point of which is a steady continuum. But this continuum in turn is a temporal series on which we can direct our attention. The drama therefore starts all over again. If we fix any point of this sequence, it seems that there must belong to it a consciousness of the past that refers to the series of past sequences, and so on.

Now even if reflection is not pursued in infinitum and even if no reflection at all is necessary, that which makes possible this reflection – and, so it seems, makes it possible at least on principle *in infinitum* – must nevertheless be given. And there lies the problem. *Hua X*, p. 115, *CW IV*, p. 119.

To reflect on a point in the temporal series or flow entails a reflection on the past and future points with which it is associated. Phenomenologically speaking, reflection on a temporal point entails reflection on the constitutive process that perceives temporality. That which makes possible this reflection is an intentional constitutive act that cannot take place on the same level as the reflection it is trying to constitute. In order for this reflection to take place, it must be constituted in a temporality that will a) not fall victim to an infinite regress, and b) still make possible its own temporal distribution. This level of constitution must be a-temporal, or, quasi-temporal, in order to not fall into an infinite regress. Yet, it still needs to be constituted in some form in order for it to be an object of reflection. “And,” as Husserl says, “there lies the problem.”

With regard to an infinite regress: if the perceptual act is considered a temporal object then it must be perceivable based on the same constitution as all temporal objects, which entails another constitutive act of intentionality. Hence, another temporal object would be created by the fact that the temporal act is itself a temporal object. To avoid this, in 1908-09 Husserl establishes an ultimate constitutional foundation for temporal consciousness that founds the structure of inner time-consciousness.³⁹ Rodemeyer (2006) heralds this development with the following:

³⁹ See Rodemeyer, 2006, p. 27.

In performing a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, Husserl recognizes that he must address how an objective time is constituted by a subjective consciousness...Due to the phenomenological difficulties that arise in these analyses...Husserl introduces the notion of absolute consciousness into his considerations of time-consciousness. p. 28.

The phenomenological difficulty to which Rodemeyer refers is the problem of infinite regress that Husserl encounters in his apprehension-content model of time-consciousness.

In an exciting moment in Husserl's development, he recognizes that there must be an absolute foundation for time-consciousness that is not itself "in" time. The absolute level is not "in" time, because it has no reference to the time of the world – all it has is its own temporal flow and progression. Thus, it also has a different intentional constitution. Husserl writes:

How, analogously, am I supposed to acquire perception of the flow? ... Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an objective movement? Certainly! On the other hand, memory is surely something that itself has its now, and the same now as a tone, for example. No. There lurks the fundamental mistake, the flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process: the consciousness of the now is not itself now. *Hua X*, p. 333, *CW IV*, p. 345.

The consciousness of the now is not itself now! How can this be? In order for it to be true, the now consciousness must fall within the same temporal structure as the rest of immanently constituted time-consciousness. Husserl argues that this leads to an infinitely regressive constitution. The immanent now-consciousness that is responsible for the apprehension of duration (i.e. temporality) must be constituted at the absolute level by an intentionality that is not connected to or dependent on the same temporality as the intentional acts at the immanent level. Husserl goes from an apprehension-content model that modifies contents on the immanent level to a through-and-through model that modifies contents and acts of consciousness at the absolute level of temporal consciousness. The through-and-through modifications are constituted at the absolute level of time-consciousness. These modifications are called 'through-and-through' because they modify modes of givenness, which are already modifying contents as past, present and future, and not object contents that are a manifold of modified profiles. They are 'through-and-through' because they are modifications of already modified contents, profiles of profiles.

1.8 Conclusion

Husserl begins his phenomenology of time-consciousness by responding to Brentano's theory of original association. He establishes in the apprehension-content model that time-consciousness cannot be apprehended in a content's original association. Rather, time-consciousness is constituted in the modifying acts of intentionality that contents undergo in the various apprehending modes of intentionality. Husserl then examines the flow of immanent acts of temporality in light of the debate around whether the perception of duration can account for the duration of perception. This is his answer to his contemporaries' argument that duration of perception does not account for perception of duration. Internal perceptual acts that constitute perception of duration need a further level of constituted intentionality to account for the unity of both temporal object and distributed temporal acts of apprehension.

Because the flow of immanent temporality is experienced as having its own temporality, it needs to be constituted at a different intentional level. Thus, Husserl devises the constitution of an absolute time-consciousness. This allows the acts of modification involved in the apprehension of temporality on the immanent level to be situated temporally and have temporal extension, which in turn allows for the consciousness of succession. That which accounts for the experience of succession and duration, i.e. the holding of modified contents with the predicates "just-past" and "just-future" together in the same "moment," needs intentional acts of modification to occur on a different "absolute" temporal plane. This is to say, if they are held in an a-temporal constitution, then the now and the not-now can be perceived together.

Arguably, this new level of Husserl's analysis does not come until 1908-09. The first significant shift is found when Husserl moves from an analysis that is focused on temporality of external objects as they are given to immanent intentionality, to an analysis of the temporality of internal consciousness that comprises immanent consciousness. It is a shift from analyzing the appearance of objective time to the immanent constitution of internal time – from the experience of objective time to the experience of internal time. A deeper level of consciousness must constitute immanent temporality. The final shift is solidified when Husserl realizes that the deepest level of

consciousness, the absolute level, is a-temporal and self-contained in its self-constitution. Being self-contained means that it opens up a field of transcendental intentionality, and hence the possibility of Husserl's transcendental constitutional phenomenology.

Chapter 2 The Rise of the Absolute Level of Time-Consciousness

2.0 Introduction

This chapter follows the rise of Husserl's notion of the absolute time-constituting level of consciousness. First it will be examined why Husserl introduces an absolute level of constitution as a response to problems he has encountered with his earlier time-consciousness models of time-consciousness. Then the constitution of the absolute is explored. Husserl argues for two intentionalities in the absolute consciousness that work to create a self-constituting flow of time at the absolute level. Secondary readings from Brough and Rodemeyer are employed to help navigate the significance of Husserl's developments at the absolute level of time-consciousness.

It will be argued that moving towards this new level of analysis indicates a shift for Husserl towards a deeper notion of transcendental phenomenology. The method by which this shift is explored is to look at the new terms that Husserl uses to describe the absolute level. Finally, the constitution of the now moment of the absolute level is explored in relation to Husserl's notion of the living present.

One major shift to be explored in this chapter has to do with the nature of intentionality at the absolute level. Husserl argues that there are actually two intentionalities at work at the absolute level that generate unified (temporal) experience: vertical and horizontal intentionality. One intentionality, the vertical, is directed at the acts that unify immanent temporal objects; the other, the horizontal, is directed at, and thus unifies, the modifying acts of immanent temporality that flow through internal time. The absolute level of constitution provides a structural level of time-consciousness for Husserl that is truly foundational. The absolute provides a pre-objective and pre-empirical constitutional framework for the flow of acts and objects in internal time. An analysis of Husserl's new terms and usages of language brings to light the nature of constitution at the absolute level. The new language used to describe the absolute level of time-consciousness in turn points towards the beginning of a shift towards Husserl's transcendental methodology.

For Husserl, the absolute consciousness constitutes acts that are fundamentally constitutive for consciousness. The different structure of the absolute pushes Husserl's phenomenological method to a new level, the level of transcendental constitutive phenomenology. However, this level of analysis leaves some open questions, namely with regard to the self-generating constitution of the absolute that seems to bring together the constituting and constituted structures of intentional objects of consciousness. By examining how Husserl responds to his early models of time-consciousness, it becomes clear that, for Husserl, only a transcendental phenomenological methodology can account for the changing form of time-consciousness. But, as Chapter Three explains, the transcendental shift in his early writings in time-consciousness does not account for the genetic nature of time-consciousness that Husserl seems to be left with as a result of his new analysis of time at the absolute level.

2.1 The New Modifications of Absolute Time: 1906-09 Developments and the rise of the Absolute Consciousness

Husserl argues in the 1904-05 lectures that the subjective appearance of objective time is structured by immanent acts of intentionality that allow for the perception of an inner temporal flow. However, based purely on experience of temporality at the immanent level, Husserl could only account for the appearance of time through an infinitely regressive constitution. Awareness of perception of temporality could only be found distributed within the flow of immanent temporality. He also realized that he needed to account for the temporal flow in which the immanent temporalizing acts are situated.

The problems Husserl identified with his model of immanent temporality lead him to introduce a third level of constituted consciousness: the absolute level. This is reflected in Husserl's three goals for a phenomenological analysis of time. A summary of the new direction of Husserl's analysis of the levels is as follows:

- 1) to answer the question of what is the nature, material and meaning of the intuition of time,
- 2) to describe the “real” content of the sensuous [temporal] contents and apprehension-contents, and finally
- 3) to determine the quasi-temporal underlay of the immanent and immediate experience of temporality. *Hua X*, p. 188-89, *CW IV*, p. 194-95.

Husserl’s turn to an ultimate foundation of time-consciousness corresponds to his shift in analyses from the intuition of transcendent objects at level 1), to immanent temporal constitution at level 2), and finally, after 1906, to the constitution that makes possible the immediate experience of temporality at level 3).⁴⁰ It is at the third level of analysis that he begins to identify transcendental *a priori* laws that govern *the rest* of consciousness. The “quasi-temporal underlay” is constituted by intentional acts at the absolute level, which have thus far only been alluded to as a problematic rather than treated to an analysis.

Husserl seems to distinguish between two realities indicated by two forms of time: the time of *inner-consciousness*, and objective time *in the world*.⁴¹ Throughout the period prior to 1907, Husserl is focused on the temporality of transcendent objects appearing to consciousness, rather than the constitution of the immanent processes involved in the experience of their temporal qualities.⁴² Indeed, the apprehension-content model only accounts for the appearance of temporal objects that are immanently experienced. It falls apart when it is applied to the apprehension of its own modifying acts of apprehension that are also temporally distributed. These immanent processes occur in internal time. Around 1907, Husserl shifts his focus to the analysis of inner-time and the constitution of the absolute flow of consciousness. The constitution of the flow of

⁴⁰ See Rodemeyer (2006), Brough (1972) Bernet (1985). Bernet (1985) also argues that Husserl’s new time schema follows the developments of the “phenomenological reduction” and overall recognition of an absolute consciousness.

⁴¹ Sokolowski (1964) points out that such a distinction would not be made by Husserl after he established the phenomenological reduction in *Ideas I*, where the (inner) reality that is meant and perceived by intentionality is the same as that of the real world (p. 531). Meant reality is the only reality, and meant reality can only be constituted through an experienced temporality. This indicates that Husserl is still developing the phenomenological reduction.

⁴² According to Brough, prior to this point, Husserl only implicitly recognizes the distinction between immanent objects that are experienced and perceived external objects. Brough offers that one could argue that Husserl took for granted the fact that objects appearing to us temporally in phases implies that they must have an accompanying immanent act of constitution. But, Husserl himself does not make this claim. Brough states that if one were to make such a claim, it would give more credence to the argument that Husserl’s attention was directed elsewhere, namely towards the constitution of the appearance of objective time to subjectivity. Brough finishes by saying that in Husserl’s early period of time-consciousness writing, he was concerned with two dimensions of time-consciousness, “...the appearing transcendent temporal object and that of the perceptual act or appearance” (1972, p. 307).

consciousness at the absolute level eliminates the need for an infinite regressive constitution that is responsible for internal temporal awareness. That there is a flow of time at the absolute level makes possible the apprehension of the temporal distribution of immanent objects and the flow of immanent acts that are responsible for the apprehension of immanent objects.

2.2 Husserl's Shift

Post the 1904-05 lectures, two unique characteristics highlight the change Husserl makes in his formulation of the constitutive structure of time-consciousness. First, Husserl no longer explains temporality in terms of apprehensions and contents. Second, Husserl's theory is of the experiencing of immanent temporal objects situated within the flow of the absolute time-constituting consciousness rather than transcendent objects situated in the immanent flow.⁴³

Brough (1972) identifies section 39 in Husserl's lectures as the turning point in which an absolute dimension of consciousness emerges.⁴⁴ He notes that it is the first time Husserl focuses on a "really immanent perception" of an immanent tonal content (*Hua X*, p. 272, *CW IV*, p. 281). Husserl now seeks to direct his analysis at the constituted level of consciousness within which the experience of immanent temporal objects is constituted. Again, the temporally extended musical tone is the immanent temporal object Husserl deals with; it entails a temporal unity that is immanently perceived. Husserl writes, "On...the immanent and transcendent spheres of reality, time is the irreducible form of individual realities in their described modes" (*Hua X*, p. 274, *CW IV*, p. 284). Husserl describes the consciousness of the immanent tone in the same way he earlier described the consciousness of transcendent objects. Each moment of immanent perception contains a continuum of modified sensations as a series of profiles (*Abschattungen*) of

⁴³ See Brough, (1972), p. 313.

⁴⁴ This paragraph follows Brough's argumentation from p. 308-311, (1972). Brough qualifies his identification of section 39 as the first appearance of the absolute consciousness by saying that the absolute consciousness that emerges here is probably different from that which is developed later in the text. Bernet, Kern and Marbach (1993) identify sections 54 and 50 as key texts in Husserl's turn towards the absolute. These two sections, Brough agrees, embody Husserl's new interpretation of the constitution of time-consciousness. He argues that the turn that initially happens in section 39 reaches maturity from 1909 to 1911.

former sensations that serve to present time-apprehensions of the now-phase, elapsed and future phases of the tone.

It is the perception of the series of distributed modifying acts that gives rise to immanent temporality. Thus, the perception of immanent temporality requires a different temporal flow in which to be constituted. Returning to the example of the melody, if we experience a unified tone, then our experience of the tone that is immanent is also temporally distributed. The immanent perception of the experience of the tone is not the same as the tone being perceived. Unity of the experience of the tone needs a different level of consciousness in order to be perceived. Brough identifies the first concrete introduction of the notion of an absolute consciousness in which Husserl states:

Immanent can signify the antithesis of transcendent, and then the temporal thing, the sound, is immanent; but it can also signify what exists in the sense of the absolute consciousness, then the tone is not immanent. *Hua X*, p. 284, *CW IV*, p. 294.

The sound exists as transcendent and is given to immanence, but its temporality - something not constituted by the transcendent content of the sound but founded in the immanent apprehension of it - is *given* to the absolute. For Husserl, only temporal unity is perceived at the absolute level. What is given to absolute consciousness is actually the perception of temporality. It must be clear that the tone is not actually “given as a constituent of the absolute consciousness” but is intended by virtue of the contents and apprehensions that are constituents of the immanent perception that are “given” to absolute consciousness (*Hua X*, p. 284, *CW IV*, p. 294). Constitution of the intentionality directed towards the tone that occurs at the immanent level is made possible by the structures of the absolute level. The constitution of the structures at the absolute level unify the profiles of contents that are perceived and modified at the immanent level.

Husserl writes that constitution of the acts that form the temporal unity of objects at the immanent level are constituted by structures at the absolute level: “[I]t pertains to the nature of this unity as temporal unity to be constituted in the absolute consciousness” (*Hua X*, p. 284, *CW IV*, p. 294). Going even further, Husserl solidifies the importance of the constitutional role of the flow of the absolute consciousness:

The object itself is what it is only as the intentional object of adequate perception, or more precisely, as the object of a certain flow of absolute consciousness that makes such adequate perception possible. *Hua X*, p. 284, *CW IV*, p. 294.

Characterized by the entire paragraph in which this remark lies, we can see that Husserl has shifted his concern toward what structures must found the unity of immanent temporal objects. The question of constitution then must account for what makes “adequate perception possible.” This points to the constitution of the absolute consciousness. Adequate perception, in this case, is adequate temporal perception, which entails the constituted ability to have both perception of duration and duration of perception, and not just one or the other. What is it about constitution at the absolute level that allows Husserl to avoid an infinitely regressive constitution? It is because the absolute constitutes its own temporal flow. This occurs in two acts of intentionality at the absolute level of time-consciousness.

2.3 Double Intentionality: Absolute as self-generating

In order to perceive temporal objects as syntheses of series of temporal phases, they must be perceived on the immanent level. Husserl recalls a fundamental distinction on the one hand of the apprehension and contents in the perceptual flow that occur at the immanent level, and on the other the appearing object in the flow of transcendent time. There is a perception of the unified tone a perception of many profiles that make up the unified tone. He makes a distinction within immanent consciousness:

Immanence of the identical temporal object, the tone, must surely be distinguished from the immanence of the tone-profiles and the apprehensions of these profiles, which make up the consciousness of the givenness of the tone. *Hua X*, p. 283, *CW IV*, p. 293.

Husserl claims that there are two intentionalities that occur in immanent experience - one of which is constituted within/by the other. The tone profiles (i.e. the individual tones that are experienced as distributed in different moments of past, present and future) are apprehended, or grasped as temporal objects. They are modified such that they are experienced as being in a temporal flow or sequence. But, there is another intentionality within consciousness that unifies the intentional acts that grasp those tone profiles. Both of these intentionalities make up the constitution of the consciousness of the givenness of the temporal object.

Husserl's new analysis of the constitution of inner time-consciousness is characterized by a double intentionality in which "the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself becomes constituted at once" (*Hua X*, p. 377-78, *CW IV*, p. 389). Husserl calls this initially shocking and absurd: is it possible that in the "flow's essential constitution" there are two intentionalities working in one act? (*Hua X*, p. 378, *CW IV*, p. 390) One can direct one's intentionality at the immanent object in the flow, which would be intentionality of the tone. At once, one can also direct intentionality "along the flow" that is constitutive of the unity of the section of flow in which the intentional object is given to experience. One intentionality constitutes the remembering act of primary memory of the tone; the other constitutes the unity of contents in primary memory in the flow. "[T]he retention is at once memory of the tone and reproduction of the elapsed tone-sensation" (*Hua X*, p. 378, *CW IV*, p. 390). The immanent object, separate from the flow but constituted in it, is constituted in the flow's unity while at the same time the unity of the absolute flow is also constituted.⁴⁵ The double intentionality thesis Husserl puts forth is precisely the solution to how the absolute flow can constitute itself and avoid the threat of infinite regress.

There are two intentionalities at work in the absolute consciousness: vertical and horizontal intentionality. One unifies the contents of object profiles as they are perceived as temporally distributed; the other retains the many apprehending acts that grasp the distributed objects, uniting the acts in one act. For example, when an object content that is just past is modified and retained such that there is an experience of an enduring object, the act of retention that occurred at the immanent level is retained at the absolute level. What is given in the now moment of the absolute are series of continua that are made up of "retentions of retentions" (*Hua X*, p. 81, *CW IV*, p. 85). *Within the absolute* this creates an *independent temporal sequence* that is not dependent on the flow of time in the world. Absolute intentionality is directed at intentional acts that occur at the absolute level. Retentions at the absolute level hold retained phases that are a part of "now" horizons of retention, primary impression, and protention. The time constituting acts at the immanent level that consist of retention, primary impression and protention, need a temporal fabric

⁴⁵ See Brough, 1972, p. 317.

through which to flow. This temporal fabric is constituted by the two intentionalities at the absolute level. In this way, the absolute is self-constituting and self-temporalizing.

2.3.1 Vertical intentionality (*Querintentionalität*)

Vertical intentionality constitutes the acts that unify objects. In reference to Husserl's earlier apprehension-content model, this is an intentionality whose acts previously were constituted at the immanent level. Vertical intentionality is now constituted by acts at the absolute level. It is made up of three modes of givenness: primary impression (*Urimpression*), retention and protention. Each mode of givenness modifies a content that correlates to contents that are immanently experienced. Primal sensation corresponds to the phase in the absolute flow in which an immanent object is experienced in the mode of now. When the now phase passes, it is retained in the mode of just past: when the now has not yet come, it is protended in the absolute flow. In the absolute consciousness these modes are intended through "vertical intentionality" (*Querintentionalität*) (*Hua X*, p. 380, *CW IV*, p. 391).

Husserl puts forth the different modes of vertical intentionality as retention, *Urimpression*, and protention. Together these modes give at once the object's temporality in the combination of temporalizing acts of intentionality at the immanent level. The image of a slice of the absolute flow is helpful here.⁴⁶ Vertical intentionality gives a slice of the absolute flow in which the retained and protended moments of the absolute flow are capable of giving a phase of the object. In so doing the acts that are intended towards objects in the flow of absolute consciousness are able to constitute a unified experience of the many content profiles all at once. Vertical intentionality is thus responsible for the object's unity through time at any given moment and in the overall experience.

2.3.2 Horizontal intentionality (*Längsintentionalität*)

The horizontal intentionality is responsible for the ability to perceive the unity of the flow of time or, put differently, for the unity of the perception of the flow of temporality (*Hua X*, p. 379, *CW IV*, p. 390). Horizontal intentionality is directed at the experience of the distribution of the temporalizing act. This allows for the perception of

⁴⁶ See later discussion of "*Querschnitte*" or the momentary slice of the "now" at the absolute level.

duration. This perception of duration is not constituted in the same temporal flow as the objects towards which it intends (at the immanent level). Objects given to immanent experience flow through immanent time, the distribution of which, and temporal unity of, is perceived by vertical intentionality. Horizontal intentionality links the acts that directed towards unifying temporal objects as they flow through internal time. When one slice of the absolute flow passes, it is replaced by a new vertical slice of the absolute flow. Each slice of vertically intended contents is linked together by horizontal intentionality. Horizontal intentionality retains and protends towards each vertically intended unified object. There is a double intentionality occurring in each act at the absolute level in that while the vertical intentionality is directed at unifying immanent objects given to experience the horizontal intentionality is directed at unifying all the acts that are responsible for unifying immanent objects.

Each object has a phase that is constituted by combining the contents given in the three modes of intentionality of retention, *Urimpression* and protention. So, within each unified perception of an object there are modifying acts that are themselves temporal objects in that they are perceived in a temporal order. If we are listening to a sequence of many tones in a song, each occurrence of a tone perception is retained. Likewise, each act of retention is also retained. For Husserl, the acts of modification that constitute immanent temporality are actually objects flowing through absolute temporality. Husserl identifies the flow of absolute objects as a series of “retentions of retentions” (*Hua X*, p. 81, *CW IV*, p. 85). If temporality at the immanent level refers to perception of the sequence of the flow of objects through world time, then temporality at the absolute level refers to the flow of immanent acts through internal time. This is Husserl's recursive notion of time at the absolute level that is self-referentially constituted by retentions of retentions.

This ‘retention of retained modified acts’ maintains a continuous flow of retentions that forms a unified sequence of intentional acts in relation to the object in time that is being apprehended. As retention sinks further and further away, it is like a stone sinking deeper into a pond, getting fainter and eventually falling out of sight. At this point, retentions of object contents switch over to secondary memory, or, as Husserl now

calls it, recollection. Between retention and recollection exists ‘near’ and ‘far’ retention, which are modes Husserl does not investigate until his later writings on time-consciousness.⁴⁷

In the second temporal diagram in Appendix A, the vertical line represents that which is given in the now; this of course includes the past, present, and future contents that are given in the retentions and protentions.⁴⁸ The horizontal line represents the flow of *Urimpression* moments. The “now” of the vertical is constituted within the context of a unified flow or continuum of *Urimpressions*. The present is the (abstract) moment in which the *Urimpression* occurs; it coincides with the now that is experienced in objective time at the immanent level.

According to Brough (1972), this coincidence is something Husserl does not account for but stands as a piece of good fortune. An offshoot of this piece of good fortune can be related to the interrelationship between the *Urimpression* and the living present that Husserl develops later in his career. The living present is the moment at which time-consciousness is both experienced and constituted. Both concepts, *Urimpression* and living present, taken separately reveal different aspects of time and temporality. As activities of consciousness they are interrelated and cannot be considered independent. The *Urimpression* must have a field of presence if it is to be found, just as the field of presence would not exist without reference to the *Urimpression*. Rodemeyer (2006) writes:

The Urimpressional phase is the immediate actuality-phase of constituting consciousness that is abstracted from my living consciousness as a whole; as such, it is understood to be “part” of the living present through its necessary interrelation with the activities of retention and protention. Further, the living present requires this phase of actual presencing as the source of its constitution.
p. 37.

The now is known as that which is sensed in the mode of *Urimpression*, and the *Urimpression* is known as the mode that senses the now – the two are phenomenologically interrelated. Bernet (1983) explains that this circular definition of Husserl’s is a necessary circularity:

⁴⁷ For a summary of Husserl’s notion of near and far retention found in the Bernauer Manuscripts (*Hua XXXIII*), see Rodemeyer, 2006, chapter 4, pp.82-104.

⁴⁸ See appendix for time diagram Figure 2.

...This circular definition of the connection between the *Urimpression* and the now, according to Husserl's own admission that there could not be one final definition, expresses a philosophical predicament. This predicament results from the fact that, essentially, we can never talk about the punctually-now present at all, at least not without making reference to a not-now.⁴⁹

So, what to do with this necessarily circular relationship? The punctually present must always be considered in relation to the now, and by extension, the content sensed in the mode of *Urimpression* always makes reference to the contents that are not-now as that which it does not sense – but, the not-now must exist in order for the sensed now to also exist, or at least be known as now.⁵⁰ Perhaps this may be understood as a necessary circular description of the constitution of the absolute consciousness. Rodemeyer writes: “Absolute consciousness becomes the foundation of my experience of constituted objects through its own activity of constitution” (p. 37). It turns out that the absolute is circular in that it is reliant on its own self-constitution.

The now *phase* (sensed in the *Urimpression*) is given in a lived *point* in the present *moment*. This seems impossible and contradictory taken in light of some of Husserl's already established provisions for the experience of time. The now is not a mathematical abstract point (*Hua X*, p.168, *CW IV*, p. 172). Husserl writes: “That all reality lies in the indivisible now-point, that in phenomenology everything ought to be reduced to this point – these are sheer *fictions* and lead to absurdities” (*Hua X*, p.169, *CW IV*, p. 174).⁵¹ Lived experience entails an extended experience of the now as a phase. This can only happen if the acts of intentionality that behold the now are distributed on a different temporally constituted plane at the absolute level.

To return to the matter at hand, the constituting activity of the living present is unified in the synthetic phases of retention-*Urimpression*-protention, which correspond to the constituted moment-phases of our experience of time as past, present and future in immanent consciousness. These two unities have two intentionalities, one directed

⁴⁹Translated by Rodemeyer, 2006, p. 36.

⁵⁰ Other phenomenologists/existentialists take the circularity of now and not-now as the necessary condition for conscious life to exist in the potentiality found between being and nothingness, for example Sartre.

⁵¹ Rodemeyer (2006) deals with the contradiction of Husserl's new *abstract* and *originary now* in pages 31-33. She says that it is based on Husserl's new conception of the notion of “lived” experience. Lived experience becomes a very important notion for Husserl's later phenomenology. One could argue that Husserl's organic notion of the living present has its roots in his notion of the *Urimpression*.

at/unifying the temporalizing acts in the absolute flow; the other directed at/unifying the temporal object in the immanent flow. We must distinguish two moments that occur simultaneously in the two intentionalities; one that constitutes an awareness of a temporal flow, the other that in an awareness that is given-with [*Gegeben Zugleich*] the temporal flow. Both of these acts of experience are perceivable in sequential series. These two sequential series are constituted by intentionalities that are simultaneously directed *horizontally* and *vertically* by the absolute consciousness.⁵² The constitution of the absolute is better understood through an examination of the terms Husserl uses to describe it.

2.4 New terminology⁵³

The goal of this section is to identify some of the developments that Husserl has made in his absolute model of time-consciousness via an exploration of some of the changes he makes in his terminology. Husserl's former terms, "now-perception," "primary memory," and "primary expectation" have thus far indicated modes of intentionality that constitute inner time-consciousness. In these modes, contents are modified by intending acts. These acts have taken place at the level of immanent consciousness. However, the term now-perception becomes confusing when analysis at the absolute level conceives of the "now" as a moment that is made up of the grasping of a manifold of immanent temporal appearances. This grasping entails the holding together of all of the contents that have been modified at the immanent level and all the acts that have done the modifying at the immanent level. The "now" of the absolute is referred to in a marginal sense because the "now" in which intentional acts occur is made up of a different temporal fabric than the "now" in which objects in objective time are constituted in immanent temporality. Some new terms have already been introduced: retention, *Urimpression*, and protention. A closer examination of Husserl's new terminology illuminates the nature of temporality at the absolute level and how its constitution differs from the other levels of temporality.

⁵² This discussion is taken up in the section on the living present as the constitutive moment in which the "now" is made possible at the absolute level.

⁵³ This section follows Brough's (1972) reading, p. 314-316.

Husserl's earlier definition of an extended now becomes very important in his explanation of the "now" of the absolute. His term for the now is "*Querschnitte*" that indicates a perceptual phase (*Hua X*, p. 231, *CW IV*, p. 239). *Querschnitte* can be translated directly as "slice" or "cross-section" and it indicates that the now is comprised of a horizon. This horizon is constituted by a series of acts directed at various phases that apprehend object profiles. Both the objects and the acts are continuously flowing through time, and thus undergoing constant modification as they flow (*Hua X*, p. 326, *CW IV*, p. 338).

Describing the absolute consciousness, Husserl uses the terms "*primal impression*" (*Urimpression*) or "*primal sensation*" (*Urempfindung*) instead of simply "now-perception". Husserl writes that the *Urimpression* is "the absolutely originary consciousness" in which the phase of the immanent object given in the now moment "stands before us, 'in person,' as present itself, as now" (*Hua X*, p. 326, *CW IV*, p. 338). He also says that, "Primal sensation is something abstract... an absolute datum," but it intends something that is concrete and immanent, that being a "point of...duration that we can seize" (*Hua X*, p. 326, *CW IV*, p. 338). Duration is perceivable because the "now" has a horizon, the *Querschnitte* has past and future phases intended within it through the act of vertical intentionality. To characterize this experience of temporality at the absolute level, rather than using a strict term apprehension (*Auffassung*), Husserl uses the word grasping (*Erfassung*) that more aptly points to the animated and synthetic intentionalities of the absolute (*Hua X*, p. 285, *CW IV*, p. 295, footnote 30*).

The point that "stands before us in person" is continuously flowing through inner temporality and must be modified in the absolute consciousness. Modification at the immanent level is performed in the mode of primary memory; as an act at the absolute level, this modification is performed by "retention." Similarly, primary expectation is termed "protention" and primary impression is termed *Urimpression*. In absolute consciousness the intentional correlates of these three modes of intentionality are the inner temporal phases of now, past and to come. The contents of these phases are not temporal objects, but intend towards temporal objects. They cannot be taken singularly

(separated) except in a very abstracted sense; they make up a manifold that forms a continuum that is the *Querschnitte*, or, “now” of the absolute.

Brough (1972) is clear to point out that the three modes are co-actual with the immanent now.⁵⁴ The now has a horizon that is comprised of past and future phases of immanent objects; the horizon is intended in the modes of *Urimpression*, retention and protention in the absolute consciousness, which is constituted in absolute temporality and not immanent temporality. Husserl writes that this does not create an infinite regress:

Going along the flow or going with it, we have a continuous series of memories – retentions – pertaining to the beginning point of the tone...Every earlier point of this series is adumbrated in turn as a now in the sense of ‘memory,’ and therefore a continuity of memorial adumbrations continuously attaches itself to each memory...This does not lead to an infinite regress, since each memory is in itself [a] continuous modification that carries within, so to speak, a heritage of the whole preceding development in the form of a series of adumbrations. *Hua X*, p. 327; *CW IV*, p. 339.

The series of adumbrations forms Husserl’s understanding of the flow of inner temporality at the absolute level. Acts that constitute inner time require a temporal distribution that is independent from the objective time given to immanent experience. In order to avoid an infinitely regressive constitution, the flow of temporality at the absolute level (and the experience of that flow) must be self-constituted, making it unrelated to the flow of immanent temporality that corresponds to objective time. Self-constitution is a function of the ever-flowing series of adumbrations held in retention; its unification occurs via horizontal intentionality.

2.5 Language Points to Transcendental Phenomenology

The goal of this section is to demonstrate that the language shifts that take place in Husserl’s writings on time indicate a shift towards analyzing consciousness at a transcendental level. The method of exploration for this section is to look at how Husserl’s analysis of the absolute level of time-consciousness results in new terms that in turn indicate a shift in his phenomenological method. Drawing on secondary literature, Husserl’s usage of metaphor and scare quotes gives substance to the idea that he is struggling with a level of constitutive analysis that does not fit with his prior models of time-consciousness or his prior method of analysis. This language shift points to the

⁵⁴ See Brough (1972) p. 315-16.

fundamentally developmental aspect of Husserl's writings on time. In looking at Husserl's reflections on language and his invention of new terms, we get the feeling that Husserl is in a phase of development for his phenomenological method.

After 1909 Husserl replaces Now-perception with "primal impression" (*Urimpression*) or "primal sensation" (*Urempfindung*). As previously mentioned he also shifts from using primary memory to *retention*, and primary expectation to *protention*. These terminological shifts are in fact Husserl's names for temporalizing "acts" at the absolute level that were previously identified at the immanent temporal level. The acts that constitute temporality at the absolute level are similar to the acts that constitute immanent temporality in that they allow for an experience of phases that are in the past and future at the same time as objects are experienced in the now. However, they are different from immanent acts because they do not intend towards objects in time; they intend towards temporal phases, with both acts and objects, at the immanent level and exist in a self-generated internal temporal fabric.

Section 36 of *Hua X* entitled "The Time-Constituting flow as Absolute Subjectivity" ends with Husserl's foreboding statement, "For all of this, we lack names" (*Hua X*, p. 74-75, *CW IV*, p. 79). Husserl begins this section by stating that time-constituting phenomena are objectivities fundamentally different from those constituted in time; neither object nor process is distributed as natural objects in time. That he recognizes the limits of his own language points to the self-imposed imperative that Husserl uses to develop his new phenomenological and not yet solidified method of analysis.

At the level of the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness, language is pushed to its limits and exhausts itself. Predicates such as past, present, future, now, simultaneous, successive, enduring etc. may be ascribed to objects constituted in immanent temporality and transcendent time but may not be used to describe the elements that constitute temporality at the absolute level in the same sense. Because the time-constituting phenomena that constitute the temporal objects at this level are neither individual enduring objects or events, "The predicates of such [time-constituting objects]

or events cannot be meaningfully ascribed to them" (*Hua X*, p. 75, *CW IV*, p.79). All of this is coupled with Husserl's recognition that we must acknowledge that,

[A] continuity that is a phase of the time-constituting flow – *belongs* to a now, namely, to the now that it *constitutes*...The flow is something we speak of *in conformity with what is constituted*, but it is not "something in objective time." It is *absolute subjectivity* and has the absolute properties of something to be designated *metaphorically* as "flow." *Hua X*, p. 75, *CW IV*, p. 79.

Thus far in his phenomenology of time, Husserl lacks names to describe this "*absolute subjectivity*" because he has only dealt with subjectivity in an immanent sense, that is, in the sense that it relates to transcendent objects. At the absolute level, inner self-referential experience is all that there is. Only the consciousness of the pastness of the tone exists at the absolute level. For example retention, "really contains consciousness of the past of the tone" and not the tonal content itself that is past (*Hua X*, p. 312, *CW IV*, p. 324). Husserl describes the modifying acts of the absolute as transcendental objects that are not objects in the immanent sense or in the transcendent sense. Absolute time may be referred to metaphorically as flowing, but this is a different type of flowing than that used to describe the transcendent or immanent levels of time.

The introduction of the absolute gives rise to a different kind of intentionality that requires a different terminology and a deeper phenomenological analysis. Because absolute intentionality performs transcendental acts that are separate from, i.e. not situated in, objective time, it can only be analyzed as a constituting and constituted entity at the transcendental level. It constitutes the holding of the appearance of acts, which in turn constitutes the appearance of objects, but it does not constitute intentionality directed at the transcendent objects themselves. Transcendental acts at the absolute level are constitutive while at the same time their own constitution is self-constituted.

Analysis of the self-constituting acts of the absolute consciousness allows Husserl to examine the absolute as a phenomenological level in which reflection avoids an infinitely regressive ground for constitution. We know this because the absolute generates its own "flow of time" through retentions of retentions along the horizontal axis of intentionality. This is a flow that Husserl needs a new language to describe. As the generative force of consciousness, Husserl's analysis and resulting description of the

absolute level of consciousness establishes the rubric of constitutive consciousness, if not the *force* or *motivation* by which the structure of consciousness is generated.⁵⁵

To describe the constitution of the absolute level of consciousness Husserl occasionally puts predicates such as “now” in quotation marks in order to indicate that this is a different usage of the predicate “now” than that which is used for objects at the transcendent/immanent levels. For example, Husserl states that the “absolute flow” is to be designated metaphorically as originating in a point of actuality, in a “primal source-point of the ‘now,’ and so on” (*Hua X*, p. 75, *CW IV*, p. 79). To grasp Husserl’s notion of the absolute time-constituting flow, it is helpful to refer to an absolute “now” constitution as the source of a primal now, rather than as a singular point in time.

Brough (1987) highlights linguistic modifications of “pre” and “quasi” that Husserl uses to indicate the special nature of time-constitution in absolute consciousness. In Section 39, Husserl refers to the “*pre*-phenomenal, *pre*-immanent temporality [that] is constituted intentionally as the form of the time-constituting consciousness and in it itself” (*Hua X*, p. 83, *CW IV*, p. 88). It must be clarified that this “pre” does not refer to temporal or sequential occurrence but rather to a constitutive act that is not constituted in the same field of temporality as immanent acts or objects. Husserl also states, “[T]he unity of the flow itself is constituted in the flow of consciousness as a one-dimensional *quasi*-temporal order...” (*Hua X*, p. 82, *CW IV*, p. 86). The absolute flow is pre-temporal because it constitutes temporality, and its unity is quasi-temporal because it does not exist as a temporal object but, as noted before, “*belongs to*” temporal phases that it constitutes.

Husserl’s new predication of absolute time speaks to the necessity with which one must distinguish the absolute from the other levels of temporality. Brough (1987) believes that the most powerful observation to be gleaned from this new language Husserl uses is that it indicates the limits of language Husserl has found in his early phenomenology. This is also reiterated by Husserl’s declaration that the absolute consciousness is a phenomenological limit. Brough states that when words are used to describe the absolute flow they “come un-glued,” and “they skid” (p. 24). The absolute flow is not like any other act or object: “Language cannot ‘fix’ the flow because language

⁵⁵ This topic will be taken up in chapter 3 of this thesis.

speaks about particular kinds of acts and objects” (p. 24). Yet, the absolute flow is always on the move; it *is* movement, without which we would not have an internal constitution of time.

Brough goes on to note that, “The [absolute] flow faces us with an unparalleled phenomenon prompting an unparalleled use of language” (p. 25). It also provides a new, unparalleled level of phenomenological analysis – a prelude to the fully formed phenomenological reduction. We are aware of and identify objects, thus we can discuss them, at the transcendent (natural attitude) level as well as at the immanent (internal/reflective attitude) level. To identify objects at the absolute level is a matter for philosophy and, more specifically, (constitutive/transcendental) phenomenology. Analysis of experience at the transcendental level allows Husserl to open a phenomenological field that yields ideal and a priori laws about experience.⁵⁶

For Husserl, Brough points out that it is only through the phenomenologist’s ‘borrowed’ language that we may identify and discuss the absolute flow. Brough writes, “*The descriptive language and the reality described tend to merge at this point*” (p. 25). This seems to argue for a sort of linguistic reduction in which the level of the absolute is only real insofar as we are able to describe it; our experience of it is only linguistically descriptive – it becomes a form of transcendental idealism. All parts, levels, and distinctions of the absolute/ultimate level of time-consciousness are “recognized as such *in and through* the language the phenomenologist uses”(p. 25-26). It is only through the phenomenologist’s distilling lens that we may come to know the transcendental laws of consciousness.

Brough argues that the reason we are able to apply language to the level of the absolute is because it is distinguishable, but inseparable, from the level of immanent temporal objects. The immanent and absolute are two levels of an indivisible consciousness that make possible the totality of the experience of time. With regard to language and the absolute, Brough points out that, because of the shared language used to

⁵⁶ The pre-objective and pre-linguistic level of temporality that Brough (1987) refers to J.N. Mohanty (1995) also makes reference to in Husserl’s overall project of developing the basis for logical, mathematical and scientific thinking that is found in the “pre-predicative” constitution of consciousness. For Husserl, this project culminated in the works of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Experience and Judgement*.

describe both, we can observe where the two coincide. But, we have already recognized that Husserl must reserve a special phenomenological (linguistic/methodological) level in which the same analysis yielding the same forms of constitution cannot be used to describe the two levels. The level of the absolute flow requires an as yet unexplored phenomenological analysis, the necessity of which the limits of phenomenological language recognize and impart.

Husserl's construal of time-consciousness necessitates the language and analysis of transcendental phenomenology.⁵⁷ Husserl started his analysis of time at the objective level, at which he sought to explain the appearance of objects in time to subjective intentionality. This involved a notion of immanent constitution. Once at the immanent level, Husserl had to account for the appearance of immanent temporality to internal consciousness, which, avoiding an infinite regress, involved an absolute level of constitution. The absolute level is now once removed from the world of objects of experience. Analysis of the absolute occurs at a transcendental level. To describe the absolute is to describe the constitution of acts of intentionality alone. For Husserl, the essential structures behind the possibility of the givenness of subjective temporality can be analyzed at the transcendental level.

For Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, the absolute provides the potential for time-consciousness, the constitution of which we can reflect upon. By nature of its self-constituted temporal distribution, it is possible to conceive of intentionality at the absolute level as a transcendental object bracketed from experience of transcendent objects in a phenomenological reduction.

Static phenomenology seeks to describe the constitutional form of intentionality that fixes objects in experience. In the case of time-consciousness, it can describe the process that unifies consciousness temporally. When Husserl speaks of the absolute conscious he is not describing a unit fixed in time or a transcendent temporal flow. He is describing a self-creating flow animated by two intentionalities at the absolute level that describes pure intentionality and, in a certain sense, intentionally void of reference to a transcendent object altogether. Husserl refers to absolute inner temporality not as a

⁵⁷ Brough, 1987, p. 25.

perceptual act in immanent time, not a temporal unity, but a moment or a wave in the self-temporalizing inner flow (Husserl, section 37, *Hua X* p. 76-77, *CW IV* p. 80-81).⁵⁸

Husserl employs this same phenomenological linguistic trick, or limit, when he refers to intentionality at the absolute level as a-temporal. To conceive of an a-temporal fabric in which self-generative constitution exists is possible only if Husserl goes to the limit of his early (static) phenomenological methodology. Static phenomenology only deals with the constitution of intentional acts as they relate to objects of the world. However, there arises a question of the origins of the objects or the contents of the objects themselves in consciousness.⁵⁹ Can Husserl's account of time-consciousness bring to light the essential structure of consciousness as constituted and constituting?

Though it gives a sort of *reduction*, Brough recognizes that there is an inherent incorrectness to such a notion of limiting our experience of absolute time-consciousness to a linguistic one. For Husserl there exists a pre-reflective (and pre-linguistic) space of awareness, one that is constituted in the horizontal awareness *for* and *of* itself in the absolute consciousness. This also makes apparent the self-generative nature of consciousness, which Brough calls an essential part of our human nature.

This pre-linguistic/pre-reflective level is essential in a moment that allows us to identify ourselves as individuals. It also is the moment in which objects gain meaning through intentionality. In the following quote, Brough makes an important form/content distinction:

The levels of acts and objects supply the content, so to speak, of my individuality, while the flow supplies the form in which they are at once gathered together and distinguished against the background of the same conscious life. p. 26.

There is a convergence of the constituted and constituting here. The form and content of the absolute coincide in the act of self-generating temporality, which, according to Brough, is an act that is vital to my ability to form and recognize my individuality. We see that the acts and objects of consciousness make up the "background of conscious life"

⁵⁸ See Zahavi, 2003, p. 168.

⁵⁹ This line of questioning approaches a description of why consciousness exists and why it is structured the way that it is structured. These are methodologically different questions than how it is that consciousness is structured.

while the flow, which is also both given (in objective time) and structured by consciousness (in internal and absolute temporality), provides the form in which the acts and objects are “gathered.” The form is (temporal) consciousness, yet time forms it; the acts are the objects of intentional consciousness, yet are formed by temporal structure and sequence.

Husserl writes, “The constituting and the constituted coincide, and yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect” (*Hua X*, p. 381, *CW IV*, p. 393). One implication of Husserl’s distinction between the constituted and constituting levels of consciousness comes from his argument that consciousness is always self-consciousness.⁶⁰ When we are aware of temporal objects, distributed on the vertical intentional horizon, we are necessarily aware of the intentional acts on the horizontal level that unify the vertically distributed temporal phases. So, at the very basic level, time-consciousness is self-consciousness, that is, consciousness of the subject as self-constituting.

2.6 The constitutive level of the pre-reflective Absolute Consciousness

The goal of this section is to establish that the absolute level of consciousness opens a field that Husserl will have to explore in his later phenomenology, that being the generative field of transcendental genetic phenomenology. By examining a parallel problem to that of Husserl’s infinite regress at the immanent level of time constitution, Husserl’s notion that the absolute level of consciousness is truly self-constituting can be explored. Towards the end of this section, a descriptive limit of Husserl’s phenomenology in his early writings is introduced via the notion that the absolute constitution that Husserl introduces is a level of constitutive consciousness that creates both its own form and content.

The nature of the absolute as constituting and constituted comes to the fore in Dan Zahavi’s (2003) discussion about the reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness and its relation to the structures of internal time-consciousness. Zahavi considers the foundational role the absolute plays in consciousness, calling the absolute consciousness a pre-reflective state that enables pre-reflective self-awareness. This observation aligns

⁶⁰ See Brough 1972, p. 316.

with Brough's (1987) reading that the absolute points to a pre-linguistic level of experience that is self-evident in everyday experience but is only reflected upon in the transcendental mode of phenomenology. Perhaps the coincidence of constituted and constituting that Husserl refers to at the absolute level *also occurs* in the pre-reflective self-awareness for which Zahavi argues.

We are aware of the absolute insofar as we experience what it constitutes, which is an awareness of the temporal distribution of acts and objects. Dan Zahavi (2003) argues that the absolute is a level of consciousness that is only analyzable as a *pre-reflective* level of consciousness. Zahavi's notion of pre-reflective is simply that it occurs at a level that we are not readily aware of: we know that it occurs because it makes possible other intentional awareness of, for example, immanent objects. This coheres with the fact that we can only describe it as something that we experience as a constituting entity. The contradiction that has been identified by Husserl is that if the absolute flow constitutes (temporality), it must have some sort of (temporal) constitution itself – some sort of intentionality directed towards it in order for its temporal sequence to be known. As Husserl has pointed out, in order to avoid an infinite regressive constitution, the temporal flow at the absolute level is a self-constituting temporality. The absolute generates the objects of which it is aware, as well as the acts that in turn become the objects of its awareness. The absolute level entails a temporal flow that is experienced as a synthesis of acts that have already been constituted (as retentions of retentions). Zahavi argues, though Husserl himself did not explicitly do so in his early writings, that the self-generating absolute level is the level at which we may also conceive of self-awareness.

Zahavi argues that Husserl establishes in his later works that self-awareness is fundamentally based on intersubjectivity. This avoids the solipsism for which Husserl was criticized and distanced himself from in his later works.⁶¹ Intersubjectivity is the principle by which subjective experience can synthesize many subjective contents and intentionalities at once. In the process of temporal awareness, there is an intersubjective synthesis on a few different levels. At the absolute level, in particular, there are three

⁶¹ In particular, Zahavi refers to the Bernauer Manuscripts in which Husserl deals with intersubjectivity.

different subjective processes that happen simultaneously: the awareness of the unified objects, whose unity is constituted by modifying acts; the awareness of the acts, whose intentionality unifies objects; and a third intentionality that unifies the sequence of acts that are responsible for temporal awareness of objects. In terms of self-awareness, the subjectivity that is aware of itself has to have (at least) two intentional forces at work. They are: the awareness that streams from the self that is directed at the world; and the awareness of the streaming awareness that is directed at the world. For self-awareness to occur there has to be a simultaneous holding of two subjective intentionalities that combine to make one intersubjective intentional act.

Zahavi argues that in order for self-awareness to be possible, it must occur at a pre-reflective absolute level. Zahavi's arguments are in response to various problems others have identified with the reflective model of self-awareness.⁶² To wit, a summary of those problems: if self-awareness relies on a subject-object relationship intended by a reflective awareness, to be aware of the self *reflectively* always implies a subject intending the reflection and, hence, the reflective act would fall prey to becoming an object upon which to reflect. This would cause an infinite regress of deeper levels of subjectivity capable of, and necessary for, self-reflection that must reflect upon the self that is reflecting. The reflective model relies on a duality of moments, one in which the self is something *other* than that of which it is aware. This creates an infinite regress that always requires another intentionality to recognize the likeness of the constituted and constituting self.

Self-reflection seeks to overcome this subject-object duality and identify that which is the object of reflection as that which is also the subject. For self-reflection to take place that avoids an infinite regress there must be a (impossible) simultaneous constitution; the constituter of the intentional act and the constituted intentional object of reflection must be recognized as one and the same.⁶³ This identity is a sort of coincidence of subject and object (constituting *act* and constituted *object*). This cannot be done in the

⁶² See Henrich, Frank and Gloy in Zahavi, (2003), p. 157-59.

⁶³ These are kindred of the problems Husserl faced with the constitution of immanent consciousness summarized in Chapter 1: the holding of the now and the not-now simultaneously = the holding of the self and not-self simultaneously.

reflective mode of awareness because the reflective mode always entails a distancing of the subject from the object – which generates the problem of identity in the first place. The act of reflection cannot distance itself from itself; it can merely recognize that it comes from the object of reflection. Awareness of the intentional origin of the act of reflection and the act of awareness of the act of reflection requires another act of reflection.

With regard to Zahavi's observations about self-awareness, in order to be self-aware we must recognize that the subject and object are identical, and that the subject is creating the awareness of the object (the self) about which it is aware. With regard to Husserl's writings on time-consciousness, we may talk about temporality as created by the subject at the absolute level in the same way. For Husserl, the absolute creates the horizontal temporal horizon through which we know the vertical distribution of the temporally extended immanent object. In order for reflection to occur, there must be a constituted structure to consciousness that makes reflection possible prior to the act of reflection. Again, this structure is self-constituting in the absolute sense. We experience it prior to reflection because it founds our (temporal) experience.⁶⁴ Husserl argues for a model of time-consciousness in which the subject-object split that grounds the problematic notion of self-awareness is no longer coherent. This surpasses a dualistic reading of consciousness and unifies consciousness.⁶⁵

Zahavi identifies pre-reflective self-awareness in absolute intentionality as the level at which the constituted and constituting coincide. One implication of Husserl's phenomenology is that acts of consciousness entail self-consciousness. The absolute provides a constitution that allows for the simultaneous occurrence of acts that are reflective (and temporal) at the immanent level and the pre-temporal constitutive "acts" at the absolute level. The absolute flow is a mode of consciousness that does not fall into the infinite regressive trap of a reflective theory of self-awareness.⁶⁶ In order for self-

⁶⁴ Zahavi points to Husserl's crucial distinction in *Ideas II* between tacit and non-thematic perception. The distinction is made between "internal perception" that is equated to reflection and "internal consciousness" that is equated to non-thematic self-awareness. Internal consciousness precedes reflection on internal perception. See *Ideen II*, p. 118, *Ideas II*, p. 125.

⁶⁵ This meets Zahavi's (2003) criteria for non-dualistic self-awareness.

⁶⁶ Zahavi, 2003, p. 166.

awareness to occur there is an implicit self-manifestation that is an *experienced* coincidence of the constituted and constituting, which takes place at the level of the absolute consciousness.

Zahavi writes that, "Inner time-consciousness simply is the name of the pre-reflective self-awareness of our experiences" (p. 168). Directed towards an understanding of self-awareness coherent with Husserl's early theory of internal time-consciousness, Zahavi proposes that in actual practice (i.e. everyday experience Husserl calls the "natural attitude"), which is prior to reflecting upon one's acts as objects, we skip Husserl's second level of temporality, the level of immanent time. We are only aware of this level when we reflect upon it, but we are not reflective in our everyday experiences. The constitution of experience that occurs at the absolute level falls outside of everyday reflection and inside the (transcendental) phenomenological sphere. The subjective intentionality that founds temporal objects, understood to be objects in the world (i.e. transcendent), is constituted at the immanent temporal level – it must be in order for them to be *experienced*. But, prior to reflecting on the acts that constitute immanent temporal objects, we are implicitly aware of the acts that constitute the absolute flow because it is in the absolute flow that objects are *ultimately* (subjectively) constituted. Our awareness of them precedes our reflection upon them in the phenomenological mode of thinking. Yet the acts of constitution that found our everyday experience are neither prior to nor post constitutional acts at the absolute level.

In the absolute flow objects of experience acquire the possibility of temporal unity and immanent constitution. In so doing, the absolute generates the constitution by which we experience everyday objects. The implication is that we are aware of objects in front of us – we can reflect upon the cup with its identity as a cup, its object unity from moment to moment. Zahavi's point is that, prior to reflecting upon the cup there is a pre-reflective constitution that enables this act of reflection, namely the realm of inner time-consciousness at the absolute level.

We can see a similarity between Husserl's problem of temporal constitution and Zahavi's problem of self-awareness. This is exactly why Zahavi proposes that the *absolute subjectivity* Husserl discovers in his writings on time-consciousness can provide

the solution to the problems that arise in the reflective model of self-awareness. Constitution at the absolute level allows for a pre-reflective self-awareness that in turn avoids the problems of infinite regress associated with the reflective model. Zahavi writes:

Inner time-consciousness *is* the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act, and to say that the act is constituted in inner time-consciousness simply means that it is brought to awareness thanks to itself. It is called *inner* time-consciousness because it belongs *intrinsically* to the *innermost* structure of the act itself. p. 168.

The innermost structure of the act is the self-giving and self-constitutive foundation of absolute consciousness. The innermost structure of the act itself must be *generative* of its own intentionality. This makes it a transcendental act because it relies upon its own intentionality for its constitutive structure – it does not rely on objective time or any relation to external temporal flow in the world (insofar as our consciousness is not “in the world,” which it is). This indicates that inner time-consciousness has opened a new field that must address the genetic forces of consciousness. If, at the deepest level of constitution, consciousness is self-referential and the phenomenologist is no longer primarily concerned with how to account for its relation to the external world, then questions of what are the driving forces of consciousness begin to arise. Descriptions of consciousness must then account for why consciousness exists and what is the genesis of consciousness.

In light of Zahavi's reading of Husserl, it seems obvious to call the absolute a generative or genetic level of constitution. The absolute generates its own *contents* insofar as the immanent intentional acts are the contents of absolute intentionality. It also generates the *form* through which it is self-directed in the intentional act of protention. But, this may be blurring the lines between content and form. This ambiguity points directly towards the clarifications Husserl must make in his more developed system of genetic phenomenology. Noting that Husserl has found in temporality a level of pre-reflective awareness, Zahavi concludes with, “Thus, Husserl would claim that the full structure of pre-reflective self-awareness is primal impression-retention-protention”⁶⁷ (p.173). In this case the constituting and constituted come together as an identification of a level of self-awareness implicit in the absolute consciousness. This is in line with the

⁶⁷ *Analysis of Passive and Active Synthesis*, p. 317, p. 378.

way in which Husserl points to a coming together of the constituted and constituting *in a special sense* (Hua X, p. 381, CW IV p. 393). Zahavi's argues that the absolute consciousness at which pre-reflective self-awareness takes place seems to be only describable using the language of transcendental phenomenology. In relation to Brough's earlier statement that, "*The descriptive language and the reality described tend to merge at this point,*" (p. 25) it seems that the absolute is only knowable through description. Though it is essentially constitutive of consciousness, and thus intrinsically a part of the immediacy of consciousness, Zahavi and Brough both agree that the absolute level is characterized best as pre-reflective and pre-linguistic. In this sense the absolute structures our experience but it cannot be an object of our experience.

2.7 The Living-present and the Now of Absolute Consciousness

In this section Husserl's notion of the constitution of the now moment of absolute consciousness is explored. The constitution of pre-objective time is crucial to understand the constitutive process that occurs in Husserl's *Urimpression* at the absolute level. To gain perspective on the immediacy of consciousness constituted at the absolute level we can examine the relationship that Husserl describes between the *Urimpression* and the now, and ask: When reduced, what is the constitution, i.e. the *form*, of the absolute consciousness? This will facilitate a necessary understanding of the constitutive framework that exists at Husserl's absolute level. The character of the constitution of the absolute level of consciousness is elucidated by secondary literature that treats Husserl's diagrams of time-consciousness to an analysis. In turn, secondary literature is used to explore the dynamic nature of the fabric of time that exists at the absolute level. This all lends itself to an introduction of Husserl's notion of the living present, which is Husserl's later characterization of the synthetic now in which all experience takes place. Parallels are drawn between the absolute and the living present such that we may trace a link between what questions Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness open up for him, and the method of analysis that ensues because of such open questions.

Constitutive acts at the level of absolute consciousness are a-temporal. At first glance this seems like a contradiction, an oxymoron. All objects and acts are temporal; they must exist in a temporal flow in order for us to be able to experience them. Insofar

as all objects and acts exist in some form of sequence, acts at the absolute level can be said to have temporality. However, we cannot experience the absolute in the same sense that we can experience immanently constituted temporal objects. In Husserl's analysis of the absolute consciousness he contends that the absolute is pure experience, absolute subjectivity, it intends towards itself for its own temporal constitution. Through Husserl's use of language, it has been argued that he believes that only through phenomenological reflection can we become aware that it exists as a foundational constitutional process. The *Urimpression* comes with its own horizon at the absolute level comprised of retentions and protentions – all of which happen in a “now” at the absolute level. The constituted moment that is the now of the absolute is perhaps the limit to which Husserl's phenomenological analysis may point. The aspect that allows us to conceive of the ‘now’ of the absolute as having its own temporality is the principle of double intentionality. The double intentionality of absolute consciousness creates a self-generated temporal sequence. The act of retention involved in one intentional act is directed at other acts of retention. The flow is made up purely of a series of retentions of retentions.

At the absolute level of consciousness Husserl calls the form of ‘time’ in which double intentionality is constituted pre-objectivated (*vorobjektivierte Zeit*), pre-empirical, and pre-logical time (*Hua X*, p. 287, *CW IV*, p. 297). The acts that give temporal order to experience at the immanent level of consciousness occur in a temporal flow that is created prior to experience at the immanent level of consciousness. The objective position of the temporal points that determine where they fall in the flow of immanent experience is relative to objective time. The modifying characteristics, i.e. the acts that generate predicated modifiers such as past and future, of the temporal points are in subjective inner time. Constitutive acts that take place in pre-objective time at the absolute level make possible the temporal awareness of subjective acts that constitute the experience of immanent temporality.

This is a point that Husserl has trouble with in the 1904-05 lectures. Without pre-objective time, subjective acts are constituted by a parallel intentionality that takes place in immanent time, which, as we have seen, gives rise to an infinite regress. Since absolute

subjectivity has a self-referential temporality in itself, its constitutive acts occur on a different level of temporal constitution in absolute pre-objective temporality.

For Husserl, the fabric of pre-objectivated time (*vorobjektivierte Zeit*) of the absolute consciousness makes constitution possible.⁶⁸ The absolute flow of time allows for the establishment of the temporal order of sensations at the absolute level, which is key in explaining the sensation of the temporal order of immanent objects. Pre-objectivated time, which is constituted by an absolute level of consciousness, allows Husserl to avoid an infinite regress. There must be two flows, or continua, of internal time in order for there to be unified perception of objects and unified awareness of temporality. The temporal order of object contents happens on one immanent flow of time. The apprehension of the many modified contents happens on another continuum of temporal flow at the absolute level. This continuum is constituted in a pre-objective temporal structure of the absolute. Awareness of the flow of immanent apprehensions occurs in pre-objective time that is constituted by the two intentional acts of absolute consciousness: horizontal and vertical intentionality. So, what actually occurs at the now point at the absolute level is two intentionalities and an awareness of two temporal flows.

In Husserl's earlier works, he uses the term 'now' or 'now-point' to indicate a present that is narrowly extended, a seemingly pure present. *Urimpression* is later used to highlight the moment of pure impression in experience. In the introduction to the *Meiner* edition of *Hua X*, Rudolf Bernet (1985) writes, "The *Urimpression* is pure *intentional* consciousness of the tone-now; it is pure *actuality* of absolute consciousness."⁶⁹ This new temporalizing consciousness is founded not on a mathematical point or linear concept, but on a notion of originary, lived experience.⁷⁰

This phenomenological field of Husserl's absolute consciousness requires, in Larrabee's (1989) words, a *dynamic* description in order to do justice to the lived experience it constitutes. In terms of a picture model, a diagram of temporal constitution at the absolute level must go beyond two or three-dimensional models that depict linear flow. Absolute temporality requires something like a diagram of DNA that incorporates a

⁶⁸Kortooms, 2002, p. 77.

⁶⁹Rodemeyer's translation, 2006.

⁷⁰See Rodemeyer, 2006, p. 32.

fourth constitutive dimension (Larabee, 1989, p. 386). For Larabee, the added dimension is responsible for the characteristic of DNA that is constantly reproducing itself. The self-reproduction is analogous to the inner temporal flow that is created at the absolute level of consciousness. She argues that throughout his early writings on time-consciousness, Husserl's two-dimensional diagrams and spatial metaphors do not adequately depict the absolute temporal matrix.⁷¹ She does, however, point out a terminological method of differentiating between nature of the flow immanent time and absolute temporality. When speaking of the movement of time Husserl often uses the German term *Fluss*. When speaking of the movement of immanent time, Larabee translates this word as *flow*, thus denoting a linear correlation to objective time. When she translates *Fluss* in the context of absolute temporality it becomes *flux*, thus denoting a more nebulous and non-linear synthetic temporal matrix. This differentiation is helpful when conceiving of the generative nature of temporality at the absolute level.

Sokolowski (1964) highlights Husserl's "identification of primal consciousness with time phases [as] the pivot of Husserl's thought in his lectures on time...[It] makes it possible for him to explain how, through a manifold of temporal phases, we are able to experience immanent objects" (p. 541). This revolution actually points to the necessary constitution of inner time-consciousness, namely that time-consciousness is constituted in the flux and fabric of pre-objective absolute consciousness. Primal consciousness must entail a phase of time rather than a point in time. Experience of a *phase* that occurs now in *one intentional act of experience* can only be constituted at the absolute level because only at the absolute level does awareness of the constituting and constituted coincide in one act.

It is important to remember that Husserl's third task in his analysis of time consciousness is to determine the constitution of the "quasi-temporal field" that makes possible immanent time-consciousness (*Hua X*, p. 188-89, *CW IV*, p. 194-95). In so doing, Husserl moves towards a look at the make-up of the *lived now*. Applied to the

⁷¹ Husserl does use three-dimensional diagrams in his later writings in the Bernauer Manuscripts. He folds the time diagram along the horizontal axis to indicate the importance of the *Urimpression* as a space between the flowing toward and flowing away of protention and retention. See Rodemeyer, (2003) "Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness: analysis of protention."

notion of time-consciousness presented thus far, it makes sense to view the now as a lived moment. Calling it a *lived* experience may seem redundant, but it patently recognizes that the now exists as a point in time in which we always flow and that point is constituted by an intentionality that has to be distributed and capable of beholding its own distribution. *Experience in the now* is a lived, organic process that goes far beyond the singular moment in which we are situated in the objective flow of time.

The now experience entails horizons that are constituted by multiple intentional fields. These fields stretch in two temporal directions, vertically and horizontally. Because objects and acts are flowing in two temporal fields it is necessary for more than one intentionality to take place at one time at the absolute level. Because of such a constitution, there arises the possibility, and necessity, of an intersubjective framework for time-consciousness. Intersubjectivity in the case of time-consciousness points to the inherent structures of consciousness that have the capacity to combine many subjective experiences at once in order to create a unified experience. Unified experience consists of an awareness of both objects and acts flowing through time. The absolute constitution is both dynamic and generative. It is dynamic because in the 'lived now' there are many subjectivities that are synthesized together. It is generative because it generates its own temporal sequence and temporal referents.

This notion of the living present that takes place in the *Urimpression* is abstract because what we are referring to is a transcendental act. Klaus Held (1966) notes that, though we may not speak phenomenologically about a limit or infinitely small point of the now, we need to identify a point between that which flows towards and that which flows away from the present as that which limits the conception of both. "Husserl calls this flowing between '*Urimpression*' in the lectures on time from 1905..."⁷² At the space between protention and retention we experience the present, though in the experience of the present we also experience of the *flow* of time as well. This experience of time 'flowing between' should not be considered a point, but rather an experienced phase of lived actual constitution. It is the fullest and narrowest conception of the lived 'presencing' found in Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness, which, for Husserl,

⁷² Translation of Held in Rodemeyer 2006, p. 33.

constitutes how the present is given. Husserl also refers to the now as a ‘small field’ (*Hua X*, p.176, *CW IV*, p. 181). Klaus Held makes further observations about Husserl’s conception of the *living present*: “We must therefore understand the term ‘living’ here, both verbally and transitively, where it means something like ‘bringing-together-while-letting-stream-away’.”⁷³ This bringing-together-while-letting-stream-away is the living present, which is an organizing flow, a ‘constituting’ flow that renders experience understandable and allows for unity in experience. Husserl writes, “An enduring being, and first of all a being that is an experience, necessarily becomes constituted. And to that extent living [*Leben*] is living towards [*Entgegenleben*]. But living is not experience. *Living is the stream of the constituting consciousness.*”⁷⁴ The act of constitution is carried out in the phase of the protention and retention that are connected in a stream to the *Urimpression*. The stream of constituting consciousness is also constituted – it is the absolute consciousness.

Because it entails the immediacy of horizontal and vertical intentionality and the immediacy of intersubjectivity, the living present is a principle that is key for Husserl.⁷⁵ The living present that the absolute consciousness has pointed to as a self-generating, quasi-temporal field of the absolute requires a new type of methodological analysis. Though the objects sensed are constituted in immanent time, acts of sensing are not constituted in immanent time. “The flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now” (*Hua X*, p. 333, *CW IV*, p. 345). This is because the flow of inner time is constituted at the level of absolute consciousness and not at the immanent level. The structure and acts of inner (absolute) time are not the same as those found in the flow of immanent temporal acts.

Number 13 of Part B of the supplementary texts found in *Hua X* is entitled “Perception of Something Temporal and Perception of Temporality.” This title precisely

⁷³ “‘Leben’ muss demnach verbal und transitiv verstanden werden und besagt soviel wie: verstroemenlassendes Zusammennehmen.” From Klaus Held’s paper, *Lebendige Gegenwart: die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik*. Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, Translation by Rodemeyer, 2006, p. 34.

⁷⁴ See Rodemeyer, 2006, p. 34 for quote reference.

⁷⁵ The living present was valued above all by Heidegger in his move to from descriptive transcendental phenomenology to existential phenomenology. The living present influenced Husserl’s later developments, especially intersubjectivity and the shared experience of embodiment.

points to the shift Husserl makes in his analysis that started in the 1904-05 lectures when he introduced the temporality of immanent objects. A full shift towards an analysis of the constitution of temporal consciousness was solidified post those lectures with the analysis of the constitution of absolute temporality. Section 13 reads,

To be the presentation or the positing of something itself is part of the idea of perception... Regarding the perception of something temporal and the perception of temporality itself, the distinction is obviously a question of differences in the act of meaning. For everything is there, as far as the appearance is concerned, and it is the job of the act of meaning to intend selectively what is "there." *Hua X*, p. 170, *CW IV*, p. 175⁷⁶

When looking at the perception of something temporal, we look at the structure of the "act of meaning," i.e. the constitution of the intentional act, that denotes the object's serial temporal position in objective time. In the perception of something temporal, we perceive an object in objective time. The object itself has no intrinsic temporality, i.e. no temporal meaning. It is the time constituting acts at the immanent level that make possible the perception of temporal objects. The perception of temporality itself entails a look at the field in which the temporally constituting acts exist. One constitutive analysis that looks at "what is 'there'" is concerned with the appearance of immanent objects; the other looks at the transcendental field in which the constitutive acts are situated. Reflection on the "act of meaning" underlies the phenomenological process/method for Husserl. The different analyses directed at the different *acts* of meaning indicate that Husserl is aware of constitution on the various levels of temporality. Accordingly, differing processes of analysis, which require different methods, are developed and used.

In dealing with the absolute consciousness, we can see Husserl shifting his analysis to answer the question: What structures must be in place prior to the experience of temporality in order for temporal experience to arise? This is a different methodological question than asking, how are temporal objects constituted by immanent consciousness? It asks: What constitutive acts are responsible for experience to happen at the level of immanent consciousness? Rather than inquiring about how immanent

⁷⁶ Though Husserl wrote this section prior to 1904, he has made notes on it dating sometime around 1909. Thus, not just because of its content does it hold importance for Husserl's shift in levels of analysis, but it also supports developments as they occur chronologically. See footnote 16, *Hua X*, p.170, *CW IV*, p. 175.

consciousness brings objective time to appearance, Husserl shifts his analysis to the absolute level that constitutes the acts of immanent temporality.

Thus, the constitution of the acts at the absolute level can be analyzed as transcendental objects not related to or situated in objective time but in pre-objective time. In this sense, the field of pre-objective time provides Husserl with a transcendental field that is formed on the innermost basic constitutive level of consciousness. This constitutive level, however, also reveals the generative nature of consciousness, one that requires the development of a new genetic approach to transcendental phenomenology.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the emergence of Husserl's introduction of an absolute level of consciousness. For Husserl, the absolute consciousness constitutes acts of intentionality that allow for the perception of objective time at the immanent level. At the absolute level Husserl identifies a transcendental self-generating constitution that is a 'constitution-in-itself.' The self-generating constitution is pre-objective and pre-empirical, and yet its structure determines the structure of immanent temporal experience. Since this constitution is transcendental, it requires a transcendental reduction in order to be properly analysed. This is a shift towards the ideal transcendental phenomenology found in Husserl's statement about *pure consciousness* that began this thesis.

The pre-reflective level of consciousness that the absolute makes possible also necessitates a formulation of the absolute at a transcendental level. The language Husserl uses to describe the absolute level of analysis seems at times unequipped to deal with the dynamic new mode of internal constitution. Likewise, the absolute seems to provide Husserl with a new direction of phenomenological analysis, one that goes beyond static phenomena and looks at the genetic constitution of consciousness. This will become central to my discussion in Chapter Three.

Chapter 3 Patterns of Development and the Significance of Husserl's Early Writings

3.0 Introduction

We see in Husserl's overall phenomenology two fundamental shifts. The first is his move from descriptive psychology to transcendental constitutional phenomenology; the second is within constitutional phenomenology from static phenomenology to genetic. From 1905-1913 Husserl develops the phenomenological reduction and publishes it in *Ideas I*. His first exposition of time-consciousness occurs during roughly the same time period. The second explosion of writings on time-consciousness comes from 1917 to the mid 1920's during which Husserl develops the genetic method. One can speculate that Husserl did not fully address the methodological developments he made in his early writings on time-consciousness until after *Ideas I*.⁷⁷ When he did so, Husserl had to take into account his notion of intersubjectivity. Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity originates from the period of 1910-11 and developed throughout the rest of his career, culminating in the publication of *Cartesian Meditations*.⁷⁸

With the support of a limited but vital body of secondary literature, Husserl's early writings on temporality will be placed in relation to and within the overall context of his later phenomenological and methodological developments. It will be shown how Husserl's development of genetic phenomenology is linked to the later problems he encountered in his early time-consciousness writings. It will also be argued that intersubjectivity, at its very basic constitutional form, is found within the constitution of time-consciousness. It will be further explored how temporality relates to Husserl's development of the idea of the living-present. For Husserl, the notion of the living present provides a description of the generative forces at work within consciousness; it embodies Husserl's idea that there are many constituted acts involved in consciousness at one time that all combine to form a synthetic experience of the world and the self.

There are notable shifts in Husserl's methods of analysis and ensuing models of time-consciousness. These developments precipitate problems that then lead to major

⁷⁷ *Ideas I* Husserl later reflected upon as being "too Cartesian" in *The Crisis in European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, Hua VI*, section 43, p. 57-58.

⁷⁸ See J. H. Mohanty, "The development of Husserl's thought" in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, p. 45-63.

developments in Husserlian phenomenology that we hold as vital today. Of interest for this chapter is the degree to which we can trace elements of Husserl's later phenomenological investigations to his early writings on time-consciousness.

3.1 The Development of Husserl's Method

J.N. Mohanty (1995) traces the development of Husserl's thought throughout his career. He presents a strong thesis that the developments in Husserl's later phenomenology are rooted in principles that he laid down in his years lecturing in Göttingen from 1900-1916. More so, he argues that the seeds of Husserl's later thoughts on phenomenology and philosophy can be specifically traced to the period of 1905-1910. Mohanty writes:

Early in life, Husserl caught hold of a few central problems... Excepting possibly the discovery of epoché in 1905, no major shifts characterize the development of his thought – there is rather a continuous, unceasing attempt to think through the same problems at many different levels. p. 74.⁷⁹

In this thesis, chapters 1 and 2 presented Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness; they have explored how Husserl applies an analysis of constitution to the experience of time. This ongoing process of analysis forced him to examine the deepest constitutive levels of consciousness. The problem of constitution is refined as he pushes his phenomenological method to its limits at every level of analysis.

In his early writings on time-consciousness, we can see that Husserl encountered several problems with his various models. The method of analysis with which he addressed these problems precipitated new models. Reapplication and modification of the method of analysis to the different levels of the constitution of time-consciousness causes Husserl to identify problems that he would later analyse. Put differently, we can see how some of the problems that Husserl examines later in his phenomenology are founded on the problems he encountered in his early writings on time-consciousness.

There seems to be a reciprocal relationship between the constitutional models Husserl puts forth and the constitutional method with which he analyses each model. The pattern of Husserl's methodological development in the lectures on time was:

⁷⁹ Epoché refers to the transcendental phenomenological reduction, which Husserl first discovers in the Seefelder Manuscripts (1905) and develops in *Ideas I* (1913).

identification of a problem pertaining to a structure in consciousness that gives rise to an experience (or type of experience); application of an analysis that produces a model of constitution to account for that experience; analysis of the implications of the structural model; then, modification of the method of the analysis suited to the structure of constitution, which gives rise to a new set of questions and eventually a new constitutional model. This falls in line with Mohanty's observation that Husserl merely thinks through the same problems at different levels of constitutional consciousness. In this case, there is more of a focus on what really may be at the heart of Husserl's philosophical project, which is the refinement of his method of phenomenological analysis.

Although Mohanty covers the full scope of Husserl's philosophical career, he identifies the period of 1905-1910 as being Husserl's most explosive as far as producing the central issues of his phenomenology. Mohanty recognizes the importance, as does Husserl, of the 1905 Seefelder Manuscripts as the first recognition of the phenomenological reduction. In the period leading up to the publishing of *Ideas I* (1913), Husserl applied and tested the phenomenological reduction; one such application was directed at time and time-consciousness. In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 the development of Husserl's notion of static constitutional phenomenology was examined by looking at what problems Husserl faced within his analysis of time and the answers with which he moved beyond these problems.

In light of Mohanty's observation that, after the 1905-1910 period, all of Husserl's later ideas were merely extensions and extrapolations that Husserl had, in some form or another, laid down, I would like to explore some areas developed later in Husserl's career in which the early explorations of time-consciousness play a significant role. Those areas are 1) constitution and the role of intersubjectivity and, 2) the purpose and make up of genetic phenomenology. Time-consciousness helped to establish the principle of intersubjectivity, which, along with some other constitutional developments, helped to open the door for genetic phenomenology.

At this point, observations related to the link between time-consciousness and Husserl's later phenomenology are speculative. Though such links have been pointed to

by many texts⁸⁰ the extent of the influence of the early writings on time-consciousness and manner in which they may have influenced Husserl's later phenomenology requires further investigation. The significance of Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness is the concluding area of exploration for this thesis.

3.2 The Reduction and the Limits of Static Phenomenology

In 1905 on summer vacation Husserl wrote what are now referred to as the *Seefelder Manuscripts on Individuation* (*Hua X* p. 237-268, *CW IV*, p. 245-277). Husserl has written on the bundle of manuscripts that comprise the *Seefelder Manuscripts*, "Historical note: I already find the concept and correct usage of the 'phenomenological reduction' in the Seefeld sheets of 1905" (*Hua* p. 237, *CW IV*, p. 245). From 1905 to the publication of *Ideas I* in 1913, Husserl developed his most useful, and used, philosophical tool: the phenomenological reduction.

There are many incarnations of the phenomenological reduction, but the basic principle Husserl develops in *Ideas* is that of the transcendental reduction, also known as *epoché*. In the reduction, the analysis of consciousness starts with what is given immanently or directly (*primordially*) to consciousness. The analysis raises the question of what is the constitution, or necessary structure, of the acts involved in immanent experience. This yields a breakdown of the contents and acts of intentionality involved in experience. The reduction comes into play when reference to the contents in the objective world is suspended and all that is left is the constitution of the acts that are responsible for experience. In this suspension, the subjective acts of consciousness are bracketed away from experience found in the world and the phenomenologist is able to analyze the constituting acts themselves within their own objective (Husserl calls this the transcendental) field. In determining relations between contents and acts at this level, subjectivity can be dealt with as transcendental, which means subjectivity can be analyzed and broken down as its own entity and the validity of claims about it are not necessarily dependent on reference to the objective world. Analyzing acts on their own allows for the identification of *a priori* laws that govern the constitution of consciousness. In phenomenology, as opposed to psychology, these laws are *a priori*

⁸⁰ Rodemeyer, L., 2006, Kortooms, T., 2002, Welton, D., 2003, Zahavi, D., 2003b, p. 243.

because they use logical and necessary relationships to determine how they relate to objects and acts. This differs from psychology because it does not rely on the empirical world to support or deny any descriptions of consciousness or experience. *Époché* is merely a tool to open up the phenomenological field that yields the essential make up, or constitution, of consciousness. This is why Husserl can speak of the essence of “pure consciousness” as the goal of phenomenological analysis (*Hua X*, p.335-336, *CW IV*, p.347).

With regard to Husserl's writings on time-consciousness, the reduction can apply to two questions. The first is: How is Husserl's analysis of the absolute level of time-consciousness a transcendental phenomenological analysis? The second is: How do Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness lead him to the limits of static phenomenology?

The first question has already partially been presented in Chapter 2. The problems that Husserl encounters with the level of absolute time-consciousness force him to new constitutional structures. In order to identify these deeper constitutional structures Husserl performs a type of transcendental phenomenological reduction. Chronologically, the absolute level of consciousness first arises around the same time, or just slightly after, Husserl's Seefelder Manuscripts. However, a reciprocal relationship may also hold true, and, in light of the pattern of methodological development we have seen in the writings on time-consciousness, a case could be made that the constitutional problems at the immanent level of internal time necessitate the introduction of the absolute. This forces Husserl to bracket his field of analysis away from immanent experience and deal with a transcendental level of constitution at the absolute level of consciousness. Whether the reduction facilitated the absolute or vice versa is not the point here; what is of interest is to solidify how exploration of the absolute pushed Husserl's phenomenological method.

The second question follows where the first ends. Given Husserl's arguments for an absolute level of time-consciousness, what effect does the constitutive model of time-consciousness have on Husserl's static phenomenology? What (constitutional) problems may have arisen but are not explicitly treated in Husserl's early analysis of time-consciousness? The answer lies in the prerogative Husserl's discovery of the absolute

level of temporal consciousness provides for a *complete* account of constitutive phenomenology. In other words, Husserl is pushed to the deepest level possible of static phenomenology. In order for Husserl to develop a new constitutional model of time-consciousness he must examine what aspect of the essence of conscious life is left unexplained by the constitution of absolute temporality. Husserl's next step is in the direction of his next analysis of time-consciousness, which is found in his development of genetic phenomenology in *Analysis of Passive and Active Synthesis* (1918-1926).

3.3 Relation to the reduction

By examining the years spanning Husserl's writing from 1901-1911, John Brough (1981) contends that the ambiguities found in Husserl's writings on time-consciousness mirror the ambiguities found in his development of the phenomenological reduction.⁸¹ These developments give us a view of the parallel progression that Husserl went through when he developed the phenomenological reduction and, during the same period of time, the early models of the constitution of time-consciousness.

As Brough points out in the translator's introduction to *Hua X*, we may observe four phases in which Husserl develops the reduction and then applies it unsystematically to time-consciousness. In Husserl's 1893 sketch (No 1, in the supplementary texts "Part B" of *Hua X*) evidence of the reduction is not apparent as indicated by the descriptive approach Husserl takes. This sketch is also heavily influenced by Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic and is concerned with the *psychological* genesis of our experience of time. The second phase of Husserl's parallel development of the reduction in the analysis of time-consciousness coincides with the publication of *Logical Investigations* (1901). Husserl now aims at an analysis divided between act and act-characteristics through which temporal objects are intended. By 1904-05 Husserl is less concerned with the empirical genesis of time and how our psychic states correspond to the experience of real time, and more concerned with bringing time-consciousness's "essential constitution to light..." (*Hua X*, p. 10, *CW IV*, p. 10).

⁸¹ The following section follows Brough's analysis found in the Introduction to *Hua X/CW IV*.

At this point we should not read these early texts as strong representations of the fully elaborated phenomenological reduction, as presented in *Ideas I*. We must keep in mind that Husserl's phenomenology is not solely concerned with the side of intentionality that consists of the act of intentionality and its components. In this period of Husserl's writing it is the experience of objects that interests him; he still makes reference to temporal reality as "reality meant, objectivated, intuited, or conceptually thought" (*Hua X*, p. 9, *CW IV*, p. 9). Though he is trying to construct a pure phenomenology, one that may later be seen with the fruition of a complete reductive tool, Husserl still situates experience of temporal objects as they appear (i.e. immanently and not transcendently).

Husserl goes through a period between 1904 and 1909 in which competing accounts of inner temporality mingle. He still uses terms of immanent temporality to describe intentional phases of absolute temporality. It is not until he deals directly with the absolute consciousness and he rejects the apprehension-content schema of immanent temporality that he gets closer to a complete model of inner time-consciousness. During this same period Husserl develops the phenomenological reduction that he first formulates in 1905.

By 1909 the reduction is on firm ground. Husserl is clear on what the exclusion of objective time means. Objective time, known by instruments of measurement such as clocks, is no longer of concern. Time is explained through the description of the acts involved in the experience of objective time. This restriction applies to each level of analysis that presents itself to the phenomenologist: the temporal object, the intending act directed towards immanent objects, absolute temporal objects, and the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness in which intentionality is directed inwards. In so restricting, Husserl opens the possibility of reducing analysis to the acts of intentional consciousness at the inner/immanent and then absolute levels.

Initiating a reduction of the experience of temporality seems to present Husserl with a possible paradox. The reduction is supposed to present phenomenologists with an infinite field of analysis, capable of uncovering the essential structures of consciousness. Consciousness as a flow seems to limit the phenomenological field to what is given now, a point that then slips into the past and is gone forever. Analysis can only then be of the

present – a moment that does not allow for the process of reflection; the now has to be fixed in order for one to reflect upon it, but it is always moving into the past. Time-consciousness plays an essential role for consciousness: what the flow of time takes away, the consciousness of time restores. True, what I am conscious of now immediately slips into the past, but I may be conscious of objects that exist in the past. I fix these objects of consciousness in a sense; they belong to my consciousness. They have slipped away, but thanks to time-consciousness I can reflect upon them and, phenomenologically speaking, can reflect on the process and structure of their slipping away in my consciousness.

Written in 1911, Husserl's statements begin to indicate a level of analysis that must require some form of a reduction: "The *primal sensation* with which the now of the tone becomes constituted cannot be the now itself" (*Hua X*, p. 382, *CW IV*, p. 394). Husserl is pointing at two levels of constitution, one at the immanent level, the "now-tone," and the other at the level that constitutes the possibility of the acts that enable the *primal sensing* of temporal objects. For Husserl, this indicates that the possibility of immanent experience is constituted at the absolute level, forcing him to consider the absolute as ultimately constituting. Absolute time-constituting consciousness relies on a stream of absolute subjectivity. To get to the level that can perform an adequate analysis of absolute subjectivity one must *reduce* the experienced object in the world to the objective structures that *produce* the experience. An account of consciousness at the absolute level is an account of what makes consciousness possible. This is similar to saying, "This is what consciousness *is* at the immanent level, and this is what *makes it possible* at the absolute level."

Analysis of time-consciousness at the absolute *truly constitutional* level requires a type of phenomenological reduction. Husserl takes from the objective experience the subjective acts of experiencing and asks: *what are the absolute constitutive elements that make the experience possible?* He essentially *brackets* the sensing act from its objective reference in order to examine the essence of the acts of constitution. What is produced is an analysis of a transcendental object. The result is an analysis of absolute time at the level of absolute constitution. We have reduced, from the experience of an object, the

objective relations that can determine the constitutive laws of relations involved in the subjective experiencing.

In *Ideas I* Husserl puts forth the phenomenological reduction as a tool by which philosophy may analyze the eidetic, or necessary, laws of consciousness in order to come to the essence of conscious life. By the time of the publication of *Ideas I* (1913), the project was by no means complete. Husserl seems to have deliberately omitted his findings about time-consciousness from the text, but, at the same time, admits that they are among the most fundamental to all of phenomenology, and thus a necessary consideration for a complete phenomenological explanation of consciousness.

One possible reason that he excluded his writings on time-consciousness from his first presentation of the reduction is that they had already taken him beyond the methodology that was at the base of his early formulation of the reduction. At the end of his early writings on inner time-consciousness Husserl was already at the limits of the analysis possible under static constitutional phenomenology presented by his initial construal of the reduction in *Ideas I*. To explore the legitimacy of this claim, we must address the question about what aspects of the constitution of consciousness require more analysis, aspect that Husserl's static phenomenology cannot account for in his early writings on time-consciousness.

3.4 Husserl's Shift from Static to Genetic Phenomenology

It remains to be determined how much of the seed of genetic phenomenology is planted in Husserl's early lectures on time. It will be argued that Husserl's early lectures on time caused him to come to a necessarily new formulation of phenomenology that will lay the groundwork for, and ask the questions that spur the development of, his *mature* genetic phenomenology. He does so in two ways. The first is that he develops a notion of intersubjectivity in his lectures on time-consciousness. It is latent because it is not directly dealt with as a central theme – it is implied in his description of inner-temporality as being comprised of a unified field that is a multiplicity of temporal horizons. This is dealt with in the following section on protention (section 3.6).

The second seed of his mature genetic phenomenology is planted in his early writings on time when Husserl must recognize the need for an account of the change in temporal *contents* and not just in temporal *form* involved in the inner temporal flow. It is through his phenomenology of time in *The Analysis of Passive and Active Synthesis* (APS), written just after his early lectures on time-consciousness (1918-1926), that he develops a mature method and constitutional framework for genetic phenomenology. In part, this argument relies on the earlier recognition that developing his idea of intersubjectivity is key to his development of the full application of the genetic phenomenological method. This is dealt with in the section on the Genetic Turn (section 3.7). But first, the main differences between static and genetic phenomenology must be clarified.

3.5 Clarification of Static and Genetic Phenomenology

The goal for this section is to provide an understanding of the differences between static and genetic phenomenology. Husserl's early writings on time will then be placed in relation to this difference. In a letter written in 1918 to Natorp, Husserl states that for a decade he has transgressed his earlier form of static Platonism.⁸² This letter corresponds with the period in which he greatly developed genetic phenomenology in APS. Husserl is referring to the early period of his writings on time-consciousness as a period of static Platonism. The period to which he refers as already having surpassed static Platonism is the period starting roughly around his explorations of the absolute time-constituting consciousness between 1905 and 1910.

Within transcendental constitutional phenomenology Husserl makes a distinction between static and genetic analyses that yield different types of constitutional models of consciousness. Static analysis seeks to determine the constitution of the experience of objects in immanent consciousness. Genetic analysis seeks to explore the constitution of the motivational and generational coming-to-be of objects and of consciousness itself. This could include a temporal coming-to-be. Bernet et al. (1993) write:

⁸² From Welton, 2003.

Static phenomenology [begins] from species of stable objects, both real objects (for example, natural things) and ideal objects (for example, mathematical propositions), and proceeds both noetically and noematically to investigate the complexes of immanent experiences in which these species of objects attain teleologically to givenness. p. 198.

For Husserl, conscious experience can always be broken into two parts: the noema, which is the object of experience that is being phenomenologically described, and the noesis, which is corresponding mental activity involved in beholding the object of experience. The static method examines stable objects given to immanent experience. Static phenomenology starts from ideal and real objects, analyses them noetically and noematically to yield, using a reductive framework, objective structures of consciousness. It inquires into the structure of immanent experiences, with stable objects as its ontological guide. For genetic phenomenology, the focus of investigation is not the stable objects given in immanent experience but rather the genesis of the stable objective unity. Genetic phenomenology provides an account of the motivational forces, or reasons for being, within transcendental consciousness. Genesis designates “a temporal generation and coming-to-be” (Bernet et al., p. 196). Genetic phenomenology must account for not just the form of consciousness through which objects are experienced and processed, but *why* objects come to be for consciousness and why consciousness exists in the way that it does.

As a sort of profound limit to his static phenomenology, Husserl finds that time and the constitutive analysis of temporality/temporalization has led him to a new level of constitution that points to the actual genetic nature of consciousness. In *APS*, written just after his lectures on internal time-consciousness, Husserl notes that the form of time-consciousness actually tells us nothing of the genetic nature of consciousness.

Mere form is, to be sure, an abstraction, so that the intentional analysis of time-consciousness and of its achievement is from the beginning abstractive. It comprehends [and] is interested in nothing but the necessary temporal form of all particular objects and multiplicities of objects, ...the analysis of time alone, precisely because it abstracts from all matters of content, tells us nothing. So too, it provides no notion of those necessary, synthetic structures of either the streaming present or the unified stream of the present that somehow affect the particularity of the content. *APS*, p. 128.

In a way, to say that “time tells us nothing” about consciousness is clearly not true. In fact, Husserl devotes a great amount of effort in showing how temporality fundamentally

forms consciousness. Remember, temporality is the experience of time. The point is that it tells us nothing of the contents of the objects beheld – it merely tells us about the structure of intentionality directed towards such objects, which gives rise to the temporality associated with these objects.⁸³ As a defining aspect of genetic phenomenology, Husserl now looks for what can account for the "affect of the particularity of the content[s]" of experience. He is not just looking at the form of the constitution of inner-time, he wants to know about why the streaming synthetic structures gives us consciousness of time - why do contents pull us towards them, what effect does the streaming present have?

Husserl's basic insight about genetic phenomenology is that it must account for the "I", not as a mere "pole of identity" or mere form; we must account for the "I" who is responsible for intentional acts, as that which brings forth the world through a "horizon of ability." In effect, we must account for the ego's ability to bring any object whatsoever to givenness. This ability is related to the history and habitual patterns of the "I".⁸⁴ The genesis has to do with the history of the "I" and of the experience of the object constituted by it. Static phenomenology illuminates already unified and stable constitutive systems; genetic phenomenology seeks to find the origins of these constitutive systems. For genetic phenomenology the object is something that has come to be through the generation of a constitution. Rather than using the experience of an object as a point from which to gaze back at its constitution, genetic constitution enquires into how the constitution came to be in the first place. Examining the way in which objects are experienced relates to the static structures of intentionality. In the scope of genetic phenomenology when Husserl refers to the motivational force of consciousness he is referring to the forces that constituted the grounds of possibility for consciousness. In Husserl's early writings on internal time-consciousness the constitutive structures that are responsible for generating the possibility of all other consciousness are found at the absolute time-constituting level of consciousness. Just as the immanent level of temporality is constituted by absolute intentionality, these static structures also have a

⁸³ This may beg the question, is this a regress into a sort of dualism that phenomenology seems to combat? No, but, only if genetic phenomenology within the context of a phenomenological reduction is added to the equation.

⁸⁴ This follows Bernet et al., 1993, p.p. 199-200.

genetic constitution. The generative aspects at the absolute level, that is the forces that create the temporal field, are retention and protention. Retention generates the flow of temporality towards the past by constantly retaining acts that are retaining past objects, while protention protends towards objects and further acts of protention into the future. Protention, which will be addressed further in section 3.6, is said to be a truly generative force of consciousness in that, through its self-referential protention of protention, it creates the flow of time by which consciousness directs itself towards to the future and beyond itself.

In *APS* Husserl still seeks to find the universal a priori rules that govern the processes that must be involved in the generation of intentional consciousness. In *APS* Husserl still operates in the mode of transcendental phenomenology facilitated by the phenomenological reduction. In a genetic analysis, the eidetic laws used to determine necessary and essential relationships that govern consciousness are the laws of compossibility and succession, but only insofar as these laws point to the *motivation* that brings about their genesis (cf. *APS*, p. 336ff. and *CM*, sec. 36f). Motivational questions such as, "Why are we drawn to these objects?" or, "What about these objects causes me to unify them in my experience?" are answered by exploring the principles of *passive* and *active* genesis. A full exploration is beyond the scope of the allotted space for this thesis but the major principles are as follows.

The universal principle of passive synthesis is association. The property that accounts for interconnections between object contents that create unity in consciousness is *association*. According to Husserl, association is the "universal principle of passive genesis" (*Cartesian Meditations*, p.113). Active synthesis is characterized by productive reasoning that is based on more basic reasoning found in passive synthesis. For example, Husserl argues that active synthesis is responsible for mental achievements such as the production of cultural artifacts or ideal objects. Notions like "the red" or "that, this S is P" rely on more primitive established concepts of "red" and "S is P." The primal acquisition of the logical structure that give rise to the more complex notions point back to judgments generated by pre-predicative experiences.⁸⁵ In turn, these judgments point

⁸⁵ *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, sections 85 and 86, taken from Bernet et al., 1993, p. 201.

back to rules of association established in passive synthesis. The principles of association found in passive synthesis are governed by, 1) association as a form of unity based on contiguity, similarity, and contrast of intentions directed at moments in immediate consciousness, and, 2) apperceptual association with objects previously experienced, which may involve analogical transference of sense associated with them.⁸⁶ In short, much of passive synthesis has to do with recognition of similar experiences that are established through associations between like experiences. These build upon one another and form rules of association that enable the signification of objects.

The generation of associations that give rise to habitual tendencies that constitute the basic building blocks of the genesis of consciousness must take into consideration the contents of intentionality, and not merely the form intentionality. Husserl's genetic phenomenology deals with the essential structures of the genesis of constitution. In so doing he accounts for the motivational role played by the contents that fall through the form(s) of constituted consciousness. Bernet et al. (1993) write, "Husserl's static phenomenology is guided by the thought that the question of what, and in what sense, any object whatsoever ultimately is, can only be decided by an analysis of its mode of givenness and manifestation within consciousness" (p. 204). But, since static analysis deals with subjectively given objects in their "finished" sense, it cannot explain how these objects are "produced" or "brought forth." In order to do so one must account for the generation of the appearance of objects, and not just their appearances. The motivational forces associated with the appearance of contents must be accounted for. There must be a complementary principle in which the structure of motivational drive behind the generation of constitution is accounted for.

Husserl used the term genesis in *Ideas I* (1913) in order to differentiate phenomenology from ontology. Ontology considers objective unities as stable identities; phenomenology considers the unity within the flow of consciousness that gives rise to these identities, thus examining the unity of a constituting flow. Though Husserl's immature concept of genesis looks at how the object is constituted in consciousness, it only does so insofar as it is a manifold of unified subjective correlates of objects given

⁸⁶ See Bernet et al., 1993, p. 202.

within these correlates, and not to the actual genesis of the object content. “To investigate the constitution is not to investigate the genesis, the latter being precisely the genesis of the constitution” (*PI II*, p. 41).⁸⁷

Husserl also speaks of genesis in relation to time and temporality. Temporality is the universal genetic form, building itself in a self-constitutive structure. In *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl refers to the constitution of time as the “genetic problems of the first and most fundamental order” (p. 169, cf. p. 109).⁸⁸ But, he also makes reference to the need to go beyond the mode of temporal analysis in order to access true genesis (*CM*, p. 110). In so doing Husserl is not just examining the changes in temporal form but also changing temporal contents.

The form of time-consciousness is a primordial flow structured by the constant modification of protention to primordial impression to retention. Husserl says that if we only consider the form of time-consciousness, it has no becoming or genesis. Contents and apperceptions have histories of *in which they have come into consciousness*, but the structure of time-consciousness, though it is self-constituting, does not *become* as a structure, it merely *is* (in a sense this is because it is *beyond* the becoming realm of temporality). Bernet et al. follow this point up with this statement about Husserl’s early model of time-consciousness:

[I]nasmuch as it exhibits the foundation of genesis, it is the foundation of genetic phenomenology. On the other hand, insofar as it does not restrict itself to the mere form of time but also takes contents into account, (as it in fact must do in consideration of Husserl’s concept of protention), then it would indeed be a properly genetic phenomenology. (p. 199)

Husserl develops the links between protention and retention of contents and the role they play in *APS*. These are at play in the principles of passive and active synthesis. Insofar as genesis is based on the temporal structures of protention and retention, Husserl writes, “the universal and essential form of intentional genesis, to which all others are related back, is that of the constitution of the immanent temporality” (*Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 318). This notion has its seed in Husserl’s development of

⁸⁷ *Text on the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity, Second Part*, taken from Bernet et al., 1993, p.197.

⁸⁸ Taken from Bernet et al., 1993, p. 198.

protention, which he first introduces in his early writing but does not fully develop until later.

3.6 Protention

In order to understand the link between Husserl's early writing on time-consciousness and the seeds of his genetic phenomenology we must look at the role that protention plays in his early model. A link to genetic constitution is identifiable when we consider the role that protention plays in the creation of structures that push consciousness forward. This happens when protention is said to orient intentionality towards the future such that it propels itself towards objects and acts that are yet to come. This act of self-propulsion creates a sort of rule of association that, it will be argued, is like an early form of passive synthesis. Bearing in mind that Husserl did not fully develop protention until *APS*, the seeds for the full-blown notion of protention are found within the structure of retention that Husserl explores in his early model of internal time-consciousness.

In this section, Husserl's notion of the structure of protention will be explored. The structure of protention in the early writings will be explored as it relates to the structure of retention. Secondary literature will be introduced in order to understand what impact protention has on consciousness as a whole. This will result in the notion that protention is a driving force of consciousness, an aspect of the constitution of consciousness that goes beyond static structures directed at descriptions of form of consciousness. Though it is an immature rendering, it will be argued that Husserl's introduction of protention into his early writings on time provides a seed of genetic analysis and is structurally similar to passive synthesis. Arguments made by James Mensch will be introduced in order to further explore the generative force or pull that objects and consciousness has in the self-generating constitution of Husserl's protention at the absolute level of consciousness. Finally, in order to solidify just what limit Husserl reaches in his early writings on time, a parallel will be drawn between intersubjectivity and protention.

Protention is a key principle in uncovering the generative aspects of consciousness that found the basic points of enquiry for Husserl's genetic

phenomenology. Husserl does not fully explore protention in his early writings, but is contented with relating its structure as a mirror of retention. At the absolute level there is a flow of events, those events being the apprehension of objects given to immanent experience through acts of apprehension. Each event consists of a series of acts that hold a sequence of contents that themselves are temporally distributed in that they entail many profiles of contents that have been modified as having varying degrees of proximity to the now. Retention is at work on two levels here; it is holding the profiles of objects at the immanent level and it is holding the acts that are at work in the constitution of temporality at the absolute level. At the immanent level retention is of object contents that occur at specific moments; at the absolute level the moments that are retained are filled with the events that consist of retention of object contents. Moments that happen in sequence at the absolute level are merely retentions of previous retentions. Each retention is linked to a past retention.

Protention, for Husserl, is a structural mirror of retention. Husserl argues that in the mode of protention at the immanent level there is an expectation of a future moment-content to come into the now that is in relation to an object-content that is experienced now. Protentions have a series of profiles that relate to future contents. In the mode of protention at the absolute level consciousness intends a series of acts that hold contents that stretch into the future. In this sense, protention at the absolute level generates the sequence of moment-contents that will flow into the now. The act of protention directed towards a series of events that consist of the protention of future objects creates a series of temporality that stretches forwards.

In *APS* Husserl points out that the relationship of expectation and fulfillment between retention and *Urimpression* has a protentional structure. Husserl argues that retentions expect to be filled by the now moment and, as a structure of expectation, this is the same constitutional relation that *Urimpression* has towards protention. Furthermore, it is the same structural projection of expectation toward the future that protentions have towards even further away protention. That its structure is based on the same fulfillment of moments as that of retention means that it has a self-referential structure that exists as protentions of protentions. The generative force of the *structure* of protention towards the

future and the drive towards its *contents* is key in identifying where static phenomenology ends and genetic phenomenology begins.

Protention, as constituted in absolute time-consciousness, provides Husserl with a whole new array of questions that plant the seeds that lead him to develop genetic phenomenology. The orientation of consciousness towards the future is perhaps the first notion Husserl encounters in which we are both structurally and motivationally driven beyond what we experience immediately. This drive towards the future that protention creates through its own acts of self-generation highlights the role that protention plays in establishing the structure for generating laws of association. Consider the example of a three-note melody in which the notes 'A-B-C' are played repeatedly. The law that would be established based on protention would be an expectation of 'B' to follow 'C' which in turn would be followed by 'A' and then 'B' again. The association that 'A' is followed by 'B' and then 'C' is based on an association with similar of past experiences of the sequence 'A-B-C'. These experiences are similar and thus build and identity such that when the first 'A' is played we expect to hear the next 'B-C'. We experienced the first 'A-B-C' melody with the structures of retention, *Urimpression*, and protention of every constituted level of consciousness. Going further with a genetic analysis, we also develop an archetype for the idea of "melody" in which active synthesis solidifies the basic temporal experience of notes played in a sequence and then transplants it to recognize other experiences of notes played in a sequence as melodies. Protention, as a basic principle, allows for experience to go beyond itself, to expect the future to come into the present because in the past it has done so. Within protention there is a latent law of association that draws similarities between past events and events that will occur in the future.

James Mensch (1998) writes about Husserl's notion of the future and the instinctual drives of consciousness. Within the two intentionalities in Husserl's time-consciousness writings that constitute the temporal process, the horizontal and the vertical, Mensch argues that there are three instinctual drives at play in temporal constitution (p. 226). The first two are retention and protention and the third is the unifying instinct that directs itself towards objects. These three drives are in fact

functions of the ego, whose inherent job it is to make sense of and grasp the immediate (temporally extended) world (p. 227).

Mensch argues that for Husserl, intentionality stretches in two directions, towards the future via protention and towards the past via retention. In the case of protention, intentionality actually stretches beyond itself by way of intending towards objects that it has not yet experienced. This makes protention different from retention, in that retention is only oriented towards objects that have been given to experience. Unlike retention directed at objects that have already been experienced, protentional chains project into the unknown future. Characterizing the protention of protention, Mensch calls protention a serial having-in-advance of a series of events that constitute a having-in-advance of objects that are beyond what is actually given to consciousness (p. 227).

For Mensch, protention directs itself towards the future such that looking at the relative directionality of protentional intentionality there is a pattern of fulfillment always directed towards an event or moment that lies just ahead. This forms the basis of an instinctual structural drive that Husserl calls a “universal drive [of] intentionality (*Triebintentionalitaet*).”⁸⁹ Husserl writes that intentionality “unitarily constitutes every primordial present as a lasting temporalization and concretely propels (*forttreibt*) it from present to present...”⁹⁰ Mensch interprets this to mean that there is propulsion towards the future that is intrinsic to the having-in-advance of protentional intentionality. The drive to make sense of our environment from “present to present” in turn drives us towards the future. Via protention the expectation of what is to come fills our experience as it has done before in the fulfillment of every prior present moment.

In the context of Husserl’s early time-consciousness lectures, we can examine the genesis of consciousness in two ways; the way in which Mensch characterizes protention as the instinctual drive of consciousness, or in the way that consciousness has a propensity towards unity, the motivation for which is fulfilled by the temporal unity constituted in/by the absolute flow of consciousness. These are structural or constitutional implications. There is a third way in which there may be said to be a motivational drive

⁸⁹ Taken from Mensch, 1998, p. 227, his translation of, Ms. E III 5, *Hua XV*, p. 595, *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity III (Hua XV)*.

⁹⁰ Taken from Mensch, 1998, p. 227, his translation of, Ms. E III 5, *Hua XV*, p. 595.

of consciousness, that being the fact that objects have an affective pull on intentionality. This is a founding principle of more “mature” form of genetic phenomenology found in Husserl’s *APS*.

Mensch (1999) notes that in order for objects to actually pull us towards them they must have *affectivity*. In the *APS*, Husserl defines affection as “the conscious stimulus (*Reiz*), the unique pull (*Zug*) that an apprehended object exercises on the ego. This is a pull [or tension], which results in the turning of the ego [to the object] and which continues in the striving...to more closely observe the object.”⁹¹ Mensch argues that in *APS* Husserl establishes that it is the affective pull of objects that draws consciousness to the future; it is the motivation behind the horizontal intentionality directed towards the future (p. 48). Husserl writes, “[A]ffection possesses a unitary tendency towards the future. Intentionality is primarily directed to the future” (*APS, Hua XI*, p. 156). Husserl argues that an object’s affective tendency decreases with proximity to the now; retentions further along the continuum of retentions are less affective. The same holds true for protentions that stretch towards the future.

The third instinctual drive that Mensch talks about is associated with the contents themselves that affect us. It pertains to Husserl’s notion of the *hyle*, the indivisible meanings we draw from the world of our experience. *Hyle* is a Greek word that is traditionally translated to mean *matter*. For Husserl, the constitution of consciousness allows for the experience of objects, i.e. matter, such that they have indivisible meanings. Husserl uses the term *hyle* to highlight that consciousness is immediate and complete in its form; the meanings that comprise the events of consciousness, though they can be divided in order to determine the constitution of the acts involved in experiencing, must be considered unified. For Husserl, in order to have a *hyle*, experience must consist of a synthesis of many subjectivities unified in one intentional act that results in meaningful knowledge of matter. Here it may be pointed out that there are parallels between the constitution of the absolute level of consciousness and Husserl’s notion of the *hyletic* flow. The *hyle* is made up of a many aspects of a flowing experience that includes all that is given in our horizon of experience. The constitution of the *hyle* is thus a “noematic

⁹¹ *Hua XI*, p. 148-49, taken from Mensch, 1999, p. 48.

nucleus,” from which Husserl’s notion of the ego, and transcendental ego, arises as the concrete being that is at the center of experience of the hyle.⁹² To ask how or why the contents of intentionality intentionally draw us towards them is to exercise the genetic phenomenological method of analysis and fundamentally speaks to the genesis of the ego itself. This mode of analysis seeks to explain the genesis of the contents and of the constitution of consciousness. Likewise, at the absolute level of time-consciousness Husserl encounters a structurally generative constitutional force.

Husserl introduces the notion of intersubjectivity with precisely the same intention of an explanation of how, and then why, we are capable of sharing an experience of transcendent objects. However, he still goes through the same pattern of development when dealing with intersubjectivity as he does with time-consciousness. He first explores the structures of intentionality and then he deals with the genesis of intersubjectivity. The genesis, he comes to realize, is related to the relationship between the ego and hyle.

There is a link between intersubjectivity and genetic phenomenology that is tied up in the genesis of the relationship between the ego and the hyle. For Husserl, the concept of intersubjectivity seeks to explain how meanings are shared, how we may share subjective experience.⁹³ The generation of the intentionality that holds unified objects is the primary concern for genetic phenomenology. Intersubjectivity accounts for the sharing of meanings between individuals and the creation of meaningful contents (hyle) for individuals. Just as meaningful contents are necessarily unified intersubjectively, for Husserl the transcendental ego is an intersubjective creation as well. Protention is the internal structural basis for intersubjectivity in time-consciousness. Just as a slice of temporal constitution holds many retained and protended contents at the same time as now contents in order to create meaningful objects, intersubjectivity is founded within the inherent structures of time-consciousness. Beyond our capacity to share meaning, Husserl

⁹² See Mensch, 1998, p. 228. Mensch is referencing Ms C 3, III, p. 45b, in translation, “Here, we have the first concept of egological centering, namely as the ego centre that gives the sense of the temporal present, the centre that stands in the present of time and is that to which past and future time are sensibly referred...” “...the ego is the ‘subject’ of consciousness. ‘Subject’ is just another word for the centering that all life has as egologically life and, hence, as living to experience something to be conscious of something” (p. 26a).

⁹³ Zahavi, 2003b.

demonstrates that intersubjectivity is essential in the constitution of our own meaningful experiences. The internal time-consciousness principle that posits intersubjectivity within the context of our own structures of experience is protention.

However, sharing meaning between two individuals requires that one step beyond the bounds of their subjective experience and embrace the possibility that another individual is capable of a similar experience, if not a similar structure to their own experience. Protention, specifically, is the principle by which we may recognize in our own experience that we have the capacity, indeed the necessity, to go beyond what is directly given to us. Through protention we can identify the rule that allows us to go beyond our own experience. In turn, through a process that is similar to passive genesis, we can recognize that the structure of going beyond our immediate experience is what allows for the possibility of a shared experience with others.

Mensch summarizes by saying that affectivity is a necessary condition for temporalization. Since constitution is a temporal process it too is dependent on affectivity (1999, p. 48-49). An object awakens the ego only insofar as the ego is affected by it (*Hua XI*, p. 172). Rodemeyer (2006) agrees with Mensch that affectivity cannot be overlooked when analyzing protention and genetic egological constitution.⁹⁴ However, she notes that, to answer the question of why my consciousness extends beyond itself into the future by stating that it is a simple case of combining *affectivity* and *temporality* assumes that the ego must be fully formed before affectivity can take place. If the ego is fully formed, then my temporality is as well. Rodemeyer notes that for Mensch to make such claims about the role of affectivity the living-present must already be constituted, which is putting the cart before the horse because the living-present *is* the force constituting *and* constituted moment in which objects affect and are constituted by consciousness.⁹⁵ With regards to Mensch's second conclusion that constitution is dependent on affectivity, Rodemeyer notes that in order for this to be so, the object must already be constituted prior to its affectivity.

⁹⁴ See Rodemeyer, 2003, footnote 38, p. 152-53.

⁹⁵ Possible arguments referencing Zahavi's notion of the pre-reflective self may be of use to this debate.

Without dwelling too long in the debates around *APS*, for our purposes we note this: in Husserl's later works he seeks to explore consciousness as a generative force. At the limit of static analysis, Husserl may realize the form of internal time-consciousness is self-perpetuating, always directing itself towards what it does not yet have in the form of protention. But, this also begs the question, as it did for Husserl when he moves beyond static constitution, about the aspect of the contents of intentionality that draw us beyond what we have in the present moment. As Husserl is concerned with the experience of immanent time, he does not treat the constitutive forces behind experience to a genetic analysis. However, at the absolute level of temporality, we can see the important role that Husserl's constitution of protention plays in his ability to move beyond static phenomenology.

In light of Mensch's hypothesis about the generative drive of temporal consciousness towards the future, it is possible to see that in this early mode Husserl planted the seeds of the development of an analysis of the generation of time-consciousness. Put differently, Husserl would not have come to explore the generative force of the ego in genetic phenomenology if he did not examine the static constitution of internal temporality and come to its limits in his early writings. Mensch makes some good arguments that intentionality does have an intrinsic structural pull, if not drive, towards the future. This drive is based on the self-propulsion of the self-constituting that occurs in protention-of-protention that is structurally similar to retention-of-retention. The flow of the sequence of events is constituted in the acts of protention and retention at the absolute level. Temporality at the absolute level is made up of a series of act that are protentions stretching into the future and retentions stretching into the past.

Mensch also makes an argument for a type of association found in protention that constitutes an instinctual drive towards the future. Association is a key element of Husserl's generative drive in passive synthesis in the *APS*. Mensch points out that in Husserl's notion of protention we expect the now to be fulfilled by moment in the future by association with past fulfillments of the future; we pretend the object based on the fact that the protended object fits into an associative pattern (structure) that it fulfilled in the past (1999, p. 49-50). Mensch puts forth that in *Hua X* Husserl argues for the principle

that there is a drive towards temporal unity that is facilitated by a drive towards the future. But, there is also an aspect of motivate generating force that cause Husserl to alter his methodology from static to genetic in order to consider the affective pull of contents.

Rodemeyer (2006) points out that this analysis is not quite complete unless one fully explores the passive and active synthesis that Husserl develops in the rest of the *APS*, much of which has to do with the role affectivity plays in opening up of the horizon of synthesis constituted for and by the ego. But, within the scope of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that there still remains a temporal structure that pre-constitutes or makes possible the *living-present* in which the ego is constantly situated. As discussed in Chapter 2, the living-present is a special formulation of the “now” that allows Husserl to posit a constituted horizon that acknowledges the distributed nature of the multiplicity of acts at the absolute and immanent levels. In light of the affective horizon proposed in *APS*, the living-present now has a genetic aspect.

One consequence that may be taken from Rodemeyer’s observation is the fact that Husserl’s static methodology in his early phenomenology of internal time-consciousness can only go so far. Husserl can apply a static analysis to provide an account of structures of consciousness but in order to fully account for the self-constitutional drive of intentionality as a generative force he has to deal with the affective contents of objects. Thus Husserl does not shift his analysis to the genetic level. In the early writings, as far as affectivity goes, there is only *structural affectivity* that can account for temporality of consciousness at the absolute structural (static) level. Structural affectivity accounts for the self-generating structures or constitution of the absolute flow. Without the complete establishment of the genetic method, the affectivity of consciousness can only be described insofar as it is a structural generative force. There is a sort of generation in that consciousness seems to give itself structure when it self-constitutes in horizontal intentionality at the absolute level. This self-constitution is a structural generative force. If this is true, the *idea* of genetic phenomenology is in place as seen in the framework of the absolute as a self-constituting force, which implies that Husserl includes a generative aspect of constitutional consciousness in his early writings. This is, of course, different than applying genetic phenomenology to intentional contents in its fully elaborated

application and can only draw parallels with and highlight the beginnings of Husserl's fully elaborated genetic phenomenology.

Husserl is already at a level of genetic constitutive analysis in his early writings on time-consciousness insofar as he deals with the generation of constitutional structures; he does so when he identifies the absolute flow of time-consciousness. The absolute *generates* its own temporal flow and awareness. With his recognition that the absolute extends towards the future along a protentional continuum, Husserl identifies a structure of consciousness that drives towards the future and is drawn towards fulfillment of its protended contents. However, in the writings themselves, he only provides structural analysis and does not treat the contents of consciousness to a genetic analysis. Husserl's next logical step is to account for role contents play in the constitution of intentionality, specifically how they direct intentional awareness towards the future.⁹⁶

3.7 Constitutive Phenomenology and the link to the Genetic Turn

In reference to Husserl's transcendental reduction found in *Ideas I*, Donn Welton (2003) writes, "[I]ts descriptions are always structural. Its application uncovers not the fact but the essence of subjectivity, or, to put it more accurately, the essence or the 'possibility' of the fact of subjectivity" (p. 259). Husserl initiates a transcendental reduction in order to identify the essential relations involved in the subjective acts (of intentionality) that constitute conscious experience. Husserl uses the reduction as a methodological tool that enables him to identify phenomenological structures using the language of constitutive phenomenology. By Husserl's assertion that "for all this we lack names,"⁹⁷ he seems to see a need to develop a different descriptive lexicon that comes from a deeper level of analysis. In developing the transcendental reduction he also needs to develop different language that is able to qualify descriptive language in the mode of the phenomenological reduction. There is a shift in both the language used and the method used to describe the new forms of constitution.

In his article, Welton (2003) identifies the two major shifts in Husserl's philosophy, from descriptive to transcendental phenomenology and from static to genetic

⁹⁶ See Mensch 1998 and 1999 discussion, as well as Welton, 2003.

⁹⁷ See section 2.4 in Chapter 2 on New Terminology.

phenomenology. For Welton, these point to methodological shifts that move Husserl from descriptions of aspects of consciousness towards an understanding of the overall systematicity of conscious life. The first is Husserl's development of the transcendental, or constitutive, phenomenological model that culminates in the formulation of the phenomenological reduction. The second is Husserl's shift from static to genetic phenomenology found between the constitutional models he puts forth in *Hua X* and *APS*. Here, Welton argues, Husserl goes from a description of a set of static structures within consciousness to a model of constitution that accounts for the genesis of consciousness that is a complete, synthetic and developing system.

Welton contends that the aspect of consciousness that Husserl does not address in his early writings on time-consciousness, but that becomes clearly necessary for him to include in his later analysis of time-consciousness, is the answer to the question: How are object contents diachronic, that is, how do they change over time?⁹⁸ This is a question of the transformation of *contents* and not just the transformation of the *form* of inner temporality.⁹⁹ For Husserl, descriptions of consciousness aim to account for the structures that give rise to meaningful experience. In Husserl's early time-consciousness model he argues for an account of how an object's identity is created through the flow of time. Temporal identity is just one aspect of an object's identity. Take for example the experience of a sunset. The contents given from moment to moment are temporally distributed by the constitution of inner time; they attain a temporal identity that is an enduring object, the object in this case is the experience of a sunset. However, the contents of a sunset are clearly changing; the quality of the light changes, the hue and spectrum also changes. The identity of a sunset as a whole has to account for the change in contents from moment to moment. This is not just a modification that is based in temporal change; there has to be a form of association of the different contents with one another. This associative principle is a function of passive genesis.

This type of analysis that can identify the change in contents that occurs within time-consciousness is genetic and not just static constitution of consciousness. It pertains to Husserl's drive towards a systematic explanation of the genesis of consciousness, and

⁹⁸ How do we, as phenomenologists, account for our awareness of them as changing over time?

⁹⁹ The following section follows Welton's 2003 article, p. 261-267.

not just the development of a methodological tool with which to treat the static structures of consciousness. In order to deepen his constitutional phenomenology, Husserl must recognize that his constitutive account of inner temporality describes the flow of acts and objects through time but does not account for the change in contents of those objects. The latter fits into a systematic treatment of consciousness, the former still seeks to determine the possible ways by which one can determine the constitutive individual elements of consciousness.

In his early writings on time-consciousness, Husserl pushes the limit of his constitutive analysis by identifying the form of the absolute time-constituting consciousness. In so doing, he identifies modifications that give rise to temporality through various modalities of consciousness. In the mode of retention the acts of apprehension involved modify contents that are given as past. The modalization of contents through acts of intentionality give temporal meaning. By recognizing the need for an account of the change found in an object's contents throughout the flow of time, Husserl has arrived at the need for, but has not yet implemented, a genetic account of temporality. In the period starting around 1918, Husserl develops genetic phenomenology in *APS*. In reflecting upon his early analysis of time, Husserl writes:

With these descriptions, the constitutive ones, there is no question of an explanatory genesis. Nor is there one if we move from original impressions (perceptions) – as generally typical or generic characterization applicable to all apperceptions – to a constitutive characterization, to descriptions of all the modal transformations in retentions, recollections, expectations, etc., and thereby follow a principle systematically ordering the apperceptions, one that [vertically] cuts across the sorting of the apperceptions according to the most general genera of objects. *APS*, p. 340.

The question of genesis seems to be at odds with, or at least in a quite different arena than, the question of constitution. To treat an object's identity as purely based on the modalities of time-consciousness is to deny the generative nature of absolute consciousness. The absolute requires a notion of the living-present. The “span of living retention” and protention that comprises the horizon of the absolute “now” cannot be analyzed as being given in the same type of description as that of immanent consciousness. Within the absolute there is a different generative structure that is a-temporal and thus not descriptive of the mode of consciousness that is responsible for structuring time giving acts. It both creates the flow of temporality and creates the

awareness of the flow of temporality. The “living-present” that the absolute constitutes cannot be modalized (*APS*, p. 111); to consider it as such would concede that it merely gives the structure, and not the meaning, of temporal object. It gives structure to temporality but does not account for the full identity of objects. Welton points out that the relation between nonmodal phases of temporality and temporality itself is not clear in Husserl’s first account of time-consciousness. However, the nature of the absolute as a-temporally and self-constituting leads Husserl to some open questions about what is yet unexplained by constitutive/static phenomenology. Namely, the identity of objects via an account of how their contents change and not just how they progress through temporality is the next field of Husserl’s explorations post his early writings on time.

In his early writings Husserl can account for change in the form of time in the temporalizing acts that constitute a temporal horizon but he cannot account for the change in contents within the confines of his model. Take the example of an object at time points $T_1, T_2, T_3, \dots T_n$. Husserl can account for the form of temporality that changes from point to point such that we experience the object in a flow of time. Welton (2003) highlights that Husserl’s explanation of the change in temporal form, forces him to acknowledge that the static analysis has both synchronic and diachronic aspects. The structures of Husserl’s inner time-consciousness accounts for how the synchronic form of time in that it is capable of accounting for the temporal contents given all at once that are modified by different modalizations of intentionality. It does not, however, account for the diachronic “*transformation* of T_1 into T_2 into T_n ” (Welton, p. 263-64). Such a transformation would have to go beyond just a modal account. That is, modes of consciousness that apprehend contents as past, present and future do not account for contents that are changing. T_1 and T_2 are different incarnations of a changing content that comprises the identity of an enduring object. This, coupled with Husserl’s observation that “the span of living retention” that belongs to the “living present” is not a modalization and requires a different form of analysis than that available to static phenomenology, indicates that this static construal is in need of an explanation of the genesis of the nonmodal transformations of temporal objects.¹⁰⁰ This explanation, of

¹⁰⁰ *Analysis of Passive and Active Synthesis*, p. 111. This section is also available in summary in Welton (2003), p. 264.

course, is impossible, given that static analysis is only directed at form, and not content. Precisely what is called for is a new type of analysis and phenomenological method. Husserl would not come to such a realization were he not to have found the limit of a static account of temporality at the absolute level of time-consciousness.

Husserl admits in *Logical Investigations* that he dealt with objects of experience as already having been constituted immanently, thus forming a closed (static) domain.¹⁰¹ In *Idea X*, he distinguishes between the constitution of sensed and the sensing of immanent contents, which forces him to deal with the constitution of the genesis of immanently structured experience (p. 313). In considering temporal objects Husserl turns towards a phenomenological analysis of the acts of time-consciousness. In turn, his analysis entails a look at the history, i.e. genesis, of the structures behind the possibility of the static constitution of temporality. This is a turn towards, yet not fruition of, genetic phenomenology.

There is further evidence that Husserl is discontented by his early analysis of inner-time, and calls it far too abstract. With regards to the constitutional analysis of time, Husserl writes that, “mere form is obviously an abstraction, and thus the intentional analysis of time and its achievement is, from the outset, an abstractive one.” This results in a lack of, “the necessary structures of the streaming present and the unified stream of the present somehow affecting what is specific to content” (*APS*, p. 128). Content, and the nature of the “concrete present” as filled with streaming contents, is not addressed in the early writings (*APS*, p. 409, p. 128). In Husserl's later exploration of time-consciousness he argues that within the streaming present there is a principle of genesis, one that must account for both the generative form of temporality within consciousness and the contents that seem to generate intentional pulls directed towards them.

As has been previously mentioned Brough's (1972) argues that the within Husserl's theory of time consciousness he does not fully account for the correspondence of objective time with immanent temporality; that the two align is a piece of good fortune for which the theory does not account. In a sense, Husserl's question of the generation of temporal identity to his phenomenology of time seeks to rectify the missing link between

¹⁰¹ See Brough (1972).

objective time and internal time. By analyzing the temporal origins of the contents themselves Husserl seeks to answer the question concerning how object(ive) contents affect the *generation* of internal time-consciousness.

For Husserl's later phenomenology, we have to be able to account for the change in the temporal object, not just the change in our temporal experience that mediates or shows to us the change in the temporal object. In order to account for the full constitutional structure of consciousness we ask: what affect or generative pull does the object have on consciousness such that it shapes the constitution of experience? This question can be applied to the absolute and immanent levels of experience. It is a question directed at structure/form as well as the affective pull that contents have towards consciousness. When Husserl considers the yet-to-come aspect of time-consciousness, first in primary expectation, then in protention at the absolute level, he directs himself towards an analysis of the change and impact of self-generational form on/in time-consciousness. Protention can be said to have its own affective pull directed towards its own constitutional structure. In so doing, Husserl lays the first brick on the path towards genetic phenomenology that accounts for the affective forces that generate consciousness.

3.8 Conclusion

The major contribution of this chapter has been to use observations found in secondary literature and some of Husserl's later text (e.g. *APS*) as grounds for speculation about the impact that Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness may have had on the development of his phenomenological method. By looking at some of the secondary literature that details the shifts in Husserl's phenomenology, for example the differences between static and genetic phenomenology highlighted by Bernet et al. (1993), placed in light of other commentaries on Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, we can begin to build a more global look at how and why Husserl may have developed the phenomenological method in his early writings.

This resulted in an original formulation of the significance of Husserl's developments in his early writings on time-consciousness using two methods of analysis. The first was to inquire about what questions were raised in Husserl's early analysis such that they would eventually spur a new method of analysis with which to address them.

Considered as such, the questions that Husserl is left with may then be looked upon as developmental seeds that open the field of enquiry into other phenomenological methods of analysis. The second way was to find immature manifestations of methodology or analogous structures that are developed and transposed onto later analyses in similar applications. Such structures include the principle of association that governs the structure of protention and the inherent intersubjectivity that governs the holding of many profiles of contents that is necessary for time-consciousness.

Brough's (1985) account of the parallel developments of Husserl's constitutional models of internal-time and the phenomenological reduction demonstrates that there is a significant developmental overlap between the two. Brough argues that there are early rudimentary applications of the phenomenological reduction directed toward the constitution of time-consciousness. This early application results in Husserl refinement of each level of constitution to the point that he is dealing with a transcendental level of absolute time-consciousness. These applications may have served to both develop the phenomenological reductive method as well as develop Husserl's constitutional models of time-consciousness. However, the direction of influence is uncertain between the reductive method and the constantly refined and developing models of constitution of internal time-consciousness. What is worthy of examination is the effect that the moves that Husserl makes in his early time-consciousness writings have on the phenomenological reduction and his understanding of the constitution of consciousness. Clearly the problems he faced that gave rise to new formulations of temporal models impacted his understanding of the levels of constitution within consciousness.

In the Mensch (1998, 1999) papers on protention and instinct we see that protention opens a new field for Husserl that deepens his understanding of the ability and drive of consciousness to go beyond what it is immediately presented. This, in combination with Husserl's notion of the absolute level of analysis, may have played a vital role in establishing the aspect of genetic phenomenology that attempts to account for the genetic self-propelling/constituting nature of consciousness. Rodemeyer's (2003, 2006) comments add a layer of analysis that places intersubjectivity and protention at the heart of Husserl's developments in his early writings on time-consciousness. Rodemeyer

also helps to identify the aspects of genetic phenomenology that may have their immature genesis at the limits of Husserl's static method in the early writings.

Welton (2003) identifies the genetic aspects that are absent in Husserl's early writing on time-consciousness. It can be argued that, when Husserl reflects upon the elements that are left lacking in his early time-consciousness model, he makes a fundamental shift in his method of analysis. This shift is characterized by the difference between Husserl's static and genetic phenomenology. In his static phenomenology Husserl deals with structural aspects of time and the form by which consciousness constitutes them in his early writings. He does not account for the change in the temporal contents as they flow through time and time-consciousness. The latter is dealt with in Husserl's *APS* and form some of the bedrock of the genetic method. This methodological shift can be said to have been precipitated by Husserl's analysis in his early writings that pushed the static method to the limit of its descriptive capacity and thus points Husserl towards yet another new level of phenomenological analysis.

Chapter 4 General Conclusion

In this thesis I have presented Husserl at some interesting crossroads in his development of phenomenology and the phenomenological method. In Chapter One I presented the developments in his early writings on time-consciousness. This period indicates that Husserl's developments were primarily found in his notion of what exactly is the constitution of consciousness. These developments occurred as a result of an analysis of the experience of time, starting with the experience of objects in external time, and then progressing to immanent objects constituted in internal time. The constitution of internal time presented him with two problems, one being the problem of holding the now and not-now contents in the same moment, the other being the problem of the temporality of the internal temporalizing acts having to be constituted by an infinitely regressing series of intentional acts. To solve both of these problems, Husserl introduced a new constitutive level of internal consciousness, that being the absolute consciousness.

In Chapter Two the absolute consciousness was explored; its a-temporal nature and its self-generation were both considered. The absolute self-constitutes its own temporal horizon in horizontal intentionality that streams off into the past in retentions of retentions and into the future in protentions of protentions. Simultaneously, it unifies retentive and protentive acts and moments in vertical intentionality. The double intentionality at the absolute level constitutes internal time such that it is parallel with but prior to objective temporality. We can see an early application, and subsequent development, of the bracketing involved in Husserl's phenomenological reduction. The absolute level of time-consciousness pushed Husserl's method to the level of transcendental analysis. Given the limits of his static phenomenology, the problem of time-consciousness raised new questions for Husserl's phenomenological method.

Chapter Three is an explanation of how Husserl's writings on time-consciousness lay the bedrock for some of his phenomenological developments that come later in his career. These include his turn towards transcendental phenomenology, his development of intersubjectivity and finally the development of genetic phenomenology.¹⁰² The aspect

¹⁰² Husserl did not stop there, beyond genetic phenomenology he also went on to propose *generative* phenomenology and a whole new phenomenological analysis. He also reworked his notion of the

of absolute time-consciousness that was vital for Husserl to be able to push his phenomenological method was that of protention. Protention is directed at future contents, it embodies the instinctual drive of intentionality beyond itself, to grasp what it does not yet have. At this point it is noted that Husserl was able to account for the structural aspects that self-propelled intentionality towards the future, but based on his static phenomenology, he was unable to account for the affective pull generated by the contents of intentionality and the composition of the “living-present.” This can be seen as a catalyst for the need to develop a more complete genetic phenomenology found in *APS*.

There are two theses at work here. The first is an exploration of Husserl’s developmental of time-consciousness – a process clearly laid out in the exploration of the technical aspects of his early writings on time-consciousness. The second, perhaps more in line with Mohanty’s (1995) observations, is directed at an understanding of Husserl’s philosophy as a whole. From the technical developments of Husserl’s early writings on time-consciousness we may see a pattern in which he pushes his phenomenological method.

One way to understand Husserl’s philosophy is to look at the general principles by which he develops his method. A Husserlian notion in itself is to apply a phenomenological analysis, i.e. a methodological analysis that seeks to distill and determine through a reduction the essential constitutional laws of consciousness, to actually determine the generative principle of the method of development. The methodological application of such an investigation plays out as follows. We ask: what question does Husserl ask? And, what questions arise from the answers to his questions? Then ask: how did he go about answering these philosophical questions – what method did he use? By looking at the two parts of the methodological equation, one being the questions, the other being answers based on the method of answering, we may determine the process by which Husserl developed his thinking.

constitution of time-consciousness in which some of his later models he actually scrapped the absolute level of time-consciousness. This has caused some debate in what is the true and final version of Husserl’s construal of internal time-consciousness. See Kortooms, 2002, Chapters 3 and 4, and Zahavi, 2004, for differing opinions in this debate.

As we have progressed in this thesis we have seen that first, Husserl asks questions about the static constitution of time, and then he moves onto the genetic constitution of time-consciousness. In the case of time-consciousness, we may observe the move between the two based on the answers he draws from his first analysis of time-consciousness – ones that constantly cause him to refine his method and constitutional models. He first points out that in order for us to be conscious of objects extended temporally, there must be certain internal acts that constitute our experience. This provides the outline for a constitution of a static notion of time-consciousness. Given the problems with this constitution, he introduces the absolute consciousness and its constituting double-intentionality. This move is a sort of link between static and genetic phenomenology; it answers some of the difficulties posed by the static constitution but also opens up some of its own difficulties, namely around the generative nature of the drive towards objects in the future – a principle that later lies at the heart of the mechanism of association involved in passive synthesis. The method of analysis changes when the nature of the questioning changes. The nature of Husserl's initial questioning around time-consciousness was directed at static constitutive acts – the experience of unified temporal object. Towards the end of the early writings, and extending into his later writings in *APS*, the nature of the questions Husserl asks are directed at the unity of time-consciousness and then transition towards the unity of the changes involved in time-consciousness. Beyond what is of interest in the technical aspects of the writings on time-consciousness, we may take note of the balance that lies between the part of the analytical equation that asks the questions and part that enacts the method of determining the answers involved in the analysis.

Four years before his death, in a 1934 letter to Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, Husserl writes: "Everything I have written so far is only preparatory work; it is only the setting down of methods..."¹⁰³ But, this statement may be commented upon by the conclusion of this thesis with the stipulation that, in the laying down of methods Husserl has refined many fundamental principles of the constitution of consciousness – ones that serve to

¹⁰³ Taken from, Donn Welton, 2003, p. 282. Originally from "Conversations with Edmund Husserl, 1931-1938," *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy I* (2001), p. 336.

balance the equation between the process and outcome of the Husserlian phenomenological method.

Appendix A Time Diagrams

Figure 1





Diagram of the running off modifications found in retention (*Hua X*, p. 93, *CW IV*, p. 98).

The horizontal line $O - E_2$ represents the flow of time from point O to the point in time in which E is experienced in position 2, i.e. E_2 . E is the content of an object. E is apprehended on the line $O - E_2$ at the point E_1 . The diagonal line $O - O'$ represents the flow of retentive consciousness, or in Husserl's early nomenclature, primary memory. $E_1 - E_1'$ represents a process of modification that occurs in primary memory. $E_2 - E_1' - O'$ represents three contents that are "present" in the moment E_2 , those being E_2 apprehended as now, and E_1' as retained and O' as retained further in the just-past sequence. The horizontal line that is parallel with $E_1 - E_2$, stretching from the diagonal line $O - O'$ bisecting the vertical line $E_2 - O'$, represents the flow of internal time that happens between E_1 and E_1' . Along that line, the modification of E_1 into E_1' is constituted. This constitution denotes the constitution of internal time that takes place on the absolute plane, which is a different than, but parallel to, the flow of time at the objective level.

Accompanying this diagram, Husserl states that we have two coincidence here, the "all-inclusive vertical," which belongs to the phenomenological constitution of time that presents a constituted succession of points E_1 and E_2 , by intending at point E_2 the prior content E_1' that is retained in one (now) moment. There is also the coincidence of the real object, the contents, E_1 and E_2 , that are themselves able to be connected because of their likeness (in that they both refer to the same objective object) (*Hua X*, p. 93, *CW IV*, p. 98). This association of likeness could be relative to the role played by association in passive synthesis that occurs in genetic constitution. Husserl goes on to remark that this diagram could also be applied to the fulfillment of protentions, and not just the retaining of retention.

Figure 2



This temporal diagram is a later model found in *Hua XXXIII* (p.22) but is useful to illustrate the constitution of time-consciousness at Husserl's absolute level. The horizontal line bisecting the "+" and "-" halves of the diagram represents the flow of objective time (from left to right). Above the horizontal line represents protended temporal moments that relate to now-perceived, and past-perceived moments. Below the horizontal line represents retentive moments that entail the apprehension of past moments.

E1 (E is an object content) represents the content of an object at the point in time, E1. E2 comes after E1 in the objective flow of time. The vertical lines are simultaneous contents, Husserl's *Querschnitte*, that are given in one moment, or now, in time, that occur. At E2, E'3 is the protentional content of E3 while E1¹ is the retentive content of E1. At E3, E1² is a further pushed back retentive content of E1. There is a double intentionality at work here in both the vertical and horizontal intentional unities. The vertical represents the unified intentionality throughout the duration of intentionality itself, while the horizontal represent the unified intentionality throughout time, or, a unified temporal flow. (Diagram from *Hua XXXIII*, p.22, Reprinted in Rodemeyer, 2006, p.139).

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