

Internalizing Resolution 1325

Masters Research Paper

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CRNT	National Council of Timorese Resistance
INSTRAW	United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring and Observation Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GA	Gender Advisor
GEAR	Gender Equality Architecture Reform
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
GPA	Governance and Public Administration Pillar
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
MARWOPNET	Mano River Women's Peace Network
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NGOWG	NGO Working Group on Women, Peace & Security
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
SC	Security Council
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SCRSG	Security Council Report to the Secretary-General
SG	Secretary-General
SGA	Senior Gender Advisor
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund for Women
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor
WANEP-SL	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WFP	World Food Program
WOCEGAR	Women's Centre for Good Governance
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

INTRODUCTION

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 on Women, Peace & Security (WPS), recognizing for the first time both the distinct impacts of war on women as well as the need to include women as crucial participants in all aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding.¹ Moving from traditional positions wherein "soft" security issues such as sexual violence were considered unfortunate but inevitable consequences of conflict, this new position asserted that these constituted a threat to international security, and required more proactive measures, including the active participation of women, in order to reduce instability and strengthen prospects for sustainable peacebuilding.²

Eight years later however, important questions remain about whether or not SCR 1325 has been internalized by actors at all level of governance. In particular, little research has been undertaken to examine how SCR 1325 has informed the gender policies, programs and structures of different organizations within conflict and post-conflict countries.

This paper addresses this gap by first describing the extent to which organizational structures, policies and programs have shifted in two post-conflict countries, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, since SCR 1325 was adopted.

¹ Security Council Resolution 1325. United Nations Security Council. 2000.

² Interview with Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury. March 31, 2009. New York, NY.

Secondly, I explore whether or not we can conclude that SRC 1325 can be credited for observed shifts, and if so, to what extent and in what ways?

This paper adds to the literature on norm diffusion by examining Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's proposition on the norm lifecycles, which describes how international norms move from norm emergence into cascading via a tipping point and finally become internalized in various ways. Starting from the assumption that norm has moved into this final stage of the norm lifecycle with the passing of SCR 1325, I evaluate degrees of internalization of NGOs, governments, and international actors working on gender issues. Specifically, I look for evidence that SCR 1325 is influencing organizational structures, policies and programs. I conclude that there is limited evidence of internalization and that specific challenges complicate this evaluation in practice, which make it neither easy nor obvious to recognize SCR 1325 internalization.

Outline & Methodology

This paper opens with an overview of the norm life cycle advanced by Finnemore and Sikkink, which describes how norms evolve in the international arena.

Secondly, I describe how SCR 1325 came into being and how it is distinct both in terms of process and substance from other instruments addressing gender, but also in how it overlaps with these instruments. Thirdly, I establish criteria for evaluating how we might identify internalization when we see it.

Fourthly, I compare two post-conflict countries, one where sexual violence was a salient issue – Sierra Leone – and one where sexual violence was not a salient issue – Timor-Leste – for evidence of SCR 1325 internalization. Each case study concludes with a summary of the degree to which we can say internalization is occurring at each level.

Finally, I return to the norm life cycle model in order to evaluate two questions:

- 1) How has the situation for women changed in two post-conflict countries, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, since the adoption of SCR 1325?
- 2) To what extent can SCR 1325 be credited for observed change, and can we conclude that the principles of SCR 1325 are being internalized by implementing actors?

The rationale for choosing these two countries for this analysis is that they share a number of common characteristics, which enables a limited degree of control in analysis of causal behavior. In particular, both countries have:

- Recently emerged from conflict and have been on the UNSC agenda for at least five years
- At least 20% of resolutions referencing SCR 1325 directly or indirectly
- Relatively small geographic areas, populations and conflict complexity (e.g. small number of warring parties, non-identity conflicts, etc.)
- Signed and ratified CEDAW, with Timor-Leste acceding CEDAW in 2003.

Each case study begins with a history of the conflict and international interventions. This is followed by analysis of SCR 1325 influence in gender policies, laws, programs and organizational structures at the international, national and local levels. Influence can come in one of two forms:

- *Direct References*, which occur when SCR 1325 is specifically mentioned in reports, resolutions, policies, programs or key strategic documents.
- *Indirect References*, which occur when SCR 1325 is not specifically mentioned, but the language of 1325 is clearly invoked in resolutions, reports, policies, and programs of the organization.

At the international level, I ask:

- Do UN Resolutions and Secretary-General Reports to the Security Council incorporate SCR 1325 and are these references consistently applied? Do missions have gender specialists or gender units within mission structure?
- Do INGOs working on gender advancement in post-conflict countries invoke SCR 1325 into programs and policies at the country level?

National level questions include:

- Have constitutional, legal and legislative reforms on gender evolved since the adoption of SCR 1325, and if so, how? Does evidence suggest that 1325 has informed these policies?
- Do specific ministries exist within national parliaments to address issues on gender and, if so, what do we know about their mandates, priorities and resources? Is there evidence of SCR 1325 influence?

- Do governments actively include the input of women in policy development processes?

At the local level, I ask:

- Do grassroots NGOs working on gender equality invoke 1325 in their policies, programs or organizational objectives?

Limitations

As we will see, answering these questions is complicated by several factors.

First, given the existence of other gender policies and laws, and particularly those that overlap with elements of SCR 1325, it is difficult to establish a specific causal relationship between instrument and output (i.e. policy, program, etc).

Secondly, given UNSC resistance to calls for the establishment of implementation and monitoring mechanisms,³ there is currently no baseline against which systematically measure and compare progress within and across countries and over time.

Another limitation of this research is that the majority of NGOs considered in this analysis are those with sufficient resources to produce web sites. Although it may be possible to assume that these represent the organizations most likely to capitalize on 1325 for advocacy and programming, it nonetheless limits the scope of perspectives presented and has potential to skew results. Moreover, even organizations that do have web sites often fail to update their content

³ Note: Resistance is due in part to the burden of similar mechanisms for evaluating the resolution on Children in Armed Conflict,

regularly, meaning that available information does not necessarily reflect current priorities and influences. Nevertheless, this paper offers a starting place through which more substantive analysis of 1325 can take place.

Much of this research is based on web searches, academic literature, and key document of governments, NGO and UN actors, however where and when possible, I have reinforced this research with interviews by email, by phone or in person with key personnel.

Proposition on Norm Life Cycles

Finnemore and Sikkink's norm lifecycle model proposes how norms move into the international realm through three stages, norm emergence, norm cascading, and norm internalization. (See Table 1) Although this paper concentrates on the internalization stage, I briefly describe the first two stages in order to contextualize the process.

Norm emergence has two features, the presence of *norm entrepreneurs*, who "attempt to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms,"⁴ and *organizational platforms*, which guide the advocacy strategies. Conformance is motivated by altruism and empathy, while entrepreneurs attempt to persuade other states of the utility of this norm. In the second stage, norm cascading, "norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers"⁵

⁴ Sikkink, Katherine. Finnemore, Martha. Norm Dynamics & Political Change. International Organization. 2001. pg. 9

⁵ Ibid.

through a “combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem.”⁶ Diplomatic actors begin to socialize this norm through praise or censure of normative behavior, reinforced by sanctions or incentive structures.

TABLE 1. Stages of norms

	<i>Stage 1 Norm emergence</i>	<i>Stage 2 Norm cascade</i>	<i>Stage 3 Internalization</i>
<i>Actors</i>	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
<i>Motives</i>	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
<i>Dominant mechanisms</i>	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

These first two stages are separated by a tipping point, “after which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm,”⁷ and before which there is limited evidence of normative change. Though scholars differ on what constitutes a tipping point, and why this phenomena occurs, many agree that it is both the number of states and which states adopt a norm that moves it into internalization.

In the third stage, norm internalization, norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and a degree of consensus, and are “no longer a matter of broad public debate.”⁸

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

This phase may include institutionalization of the norm, which defines, “what, exactly, the norm is and what constitutes violation (often a matter of disagreement) and by spelling out specific procedures by which norm leaders coordinate disapproval and sanctions for norm breaking.”⁹ Finnemore and Sikkink purport that in internalization can be seen in the development of professions dedicated to this norm, professional training for socializing stakeholders on norm principles, and laws that reinforce norms. Socialization would be evidenced through language and habitual behavior that is consistent with the principles of the norm. They further argue that internalization may include iterative processes, wherein actors routinely apply lessons from experience in order to strengthen and refine processes and structures moving forward.

We have arguably reached a point in which focusing on women’s circumstances in conflict and calling for their participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding has become a norm in the international community. More specifically, the adoption of SCR 1325 suggests that this norm and has moved beyond the cascading stage, through the support of a critical mass of member-states, and into internalization. This paper accordingly looks for evidence that SCR 1325 has become internalized by relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding processes.

⁹ Ibid. pg. 14

1325 Background & History

Prior to the adoption of Resolution 1325, other international instruments on women's advancement laid the foundation for the development of this policy, including the 1979 Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), the Namibia Declaration and Platform for Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective of Peace Support Operations (2000), the Brahimi Report (2000), and several thematic Security Council Resolutions on the protection of civilians in conflict, all of which have failed to produce effective change for women in many countries.

CEDAW is arguably the strongest legal tool currently available to women.

However despite 185 state signatories committing to eliminate laws favoring men by 2005, 70% of the world's poor are women and they own just 1% of the land.¹⁰

Furthermore, men continue to be favored in inheritance rights, property ownership, in education and in work environments. Beijing's target of 30% female parliamentary representation has yielded less than 18% participation worldwide with only 22 of 192 countries currently meeting this goal in 14 years.¹¹ Both instruments endeavor to strengthen the participation of women in public life, overlapping with some of the principles of SCR 1325.

At its core, SCR 1325 is characterized by three key pillars: incorporating the participation of women at all levels of decision-making into peacebuilding

¹⁰ Women Face Bias Worldwide - UN. United Nations. BBC News. Apr 5, 2008.

¹¹ Women in National Parliaments. Inter-Parliamentary Union. Feb 28, 2009.

strategies; including gender perspectives to prevent and minimize the impacts of on women; and protecting women from conflict and post-conflict violence.¹² (The full text of Resolution 1325 is reproduced in Appendix E.) More specifically, SCR 1325 calls for:

- The increased *representation of women at all levels of decision-making* in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict
- The appointment of more women as *special representatives and envoys to the Secretary-General (SG)* and more nominations of female candidates by member states
- The *expanded role of women in all areas of UN field operations*, especially among observers, police, and humanitarian personnel
- Incorporating and reporting on *gender mainstreaming in UN operations*
- *Providing training and guidelines* on the protection, rights and needs of women, and HIV/ AIDS awareness training to police and military staff
- Increasing *consultation with local and international women's NGOs*¹³
- *Implementing gender perspectives* in all policies including in Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (DDRRR), in refugee camps, conflict resolution processes, and in constitutional, electoral and judicial systems

¹² Statement to the Commission on the Status of Women by Charlotte Bunch. Mar 3, 2009

¹³ Security Council Resolution 1325. United Nations Security Council. Oct. 31, 2000

- All parties to conflict to *respect international law*, including in their duties to protect girls and women from rape and sexual violence, and to respect the humanitarian nature of refugee camps
- *Ending impunity and prosecuting perpetrators* of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, including the exclusion of perpetrators of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions
- Increasing research *on the impact of war on women* and girls, and on *the contributions of women to peacebuilding processes and reconciliation*

However as of 2008, just 1640 of 77,117¹⁴ military personnel in peacekeeping operations are women, a point that is particularly important in places where sexual violence is prevalent.¹⁵ Furthermore, only 12 of 20 active peacekeeping missions have full time Gender Advisors (GA), and of 30 operations worldwide, only one is headed by a woman.¹⁶ According to Clare Hutchinson of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Best Practices Unit, the ability of GAs to exercise influence within missions is largely dependant on support from the mission Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

The logic for the participation-based formula underpinning 1325 evokes the work of economist Amartya Sen whose analysis in *Development as Freedom* offers an illustration of the link between 1325's three pillars. Sen shows that when equality is denied, women lose the ability to decide when, with whom and how many

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Boonstra, John. The Benefits of Female UN Peacekeepers. UN Dispatch. April 8, 2008.

¹⁶ Gender Equality Key to Effective Peacekeeping. INSTRAW. Sept. 21, 2008.

children they will bear, whether or not to attend school, and whether or not to pursue formal employment, among other things. This inequality leads to increased dependency on men and on informal work, wherein rights may not be protected, which in turn decreases socio-economic status of women. This in turn reduces their agency and ability to participate in public life.¹⁷

Extending Sen's logic, the inability of women to participate in public life means unrepresentative parliaments, through which discriminatory practices and incentive structures risk being reinforced, and in which women's devaluation and vulnerability of risks being perpetuated. When conflict occurs, vulnerability and lack of agency increase the likelihood that women will become victims of violence. Unwanted children are born into poverty, inequality and shame, increasing overall instability, and perpetuating this cycle of vulnerability. These factors increase the risk that outside actors may later be called upon to intervene.

Gender perspectives are also an important aspect of SCR 1325. These seek to address the distinct impacts of conflict on women, such as barriers faced by rape victims and former female combatants in reintegrating back into communities. Another example is whether government policies and programs address specific barriers facing the full participation of women in public and private life, such as traditional customs that discourage women from voting, or even lack of access to transportation to vote during elections.

¹⁷ Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. 1999.

For these and other reasons, proponents argue the participation of women in decision-making represents a critical and proactive contribution to post-conflict peacebuilding.¹⁸ For example, Rwandan women have contributed to peacebuilding by restoring shattered infrastructure, participating in government, caring for orphaned children in the aftermath of the genocide, convincing relatives to return home after the genocide, and adopting community oriented perspectives.¹⁹ On this latter point, feminist literature argues that women's experience of conflict particularly motivates them to ensure that violence does not recur, resulting in decisions that are more likely to reflect the greater good instead of self-interest. In these and in other ways, women have helped restore stability and peace at many levels.²⁰

Several converging factors enabled the adoption of SCR 1325: a determined group of women's NGOs who were involved in UNSC negotiations for the first time; a Presidential Statement by Bangladeshi Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury in March 2000 linking gender equality and peace; non-permanent member Jamaica, whose Ambassador Patricia Durant was one of the few ambassadors within the UN at the time; and the October 2000 Security Council Presidency held by Namibia.²¹ The biggest threat came from P5, who were either resistant or indifferent, perceiving the threat to state sovereignty, but also concerned about

¹⁸ Interview with Anwarul Chowdhury. Mar 31, 2009. New York, NY.

¹⁹ Powley, Elizabeth. *Strengthening Governance: The Role of Women in Rwanda's Transition*. Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues. Jan 26, 2004.

²⁰ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwRyRMLXTVA>

²¹ Interview with Cora Weiss. Mar 10, 2009. New York, NY.

broadening the scope of the UNSC.²² Nonetheless, SCR 1325 was adopted on October 31, 2000²³ with a critical mass (38) of supporting states, the endorsement of the Secretary-General,²⁴ strong issue framing, and strong salience of the impacts of conflict on women in places like Rwanda and Bosnia, which has more broadly created space for the human security agenda.²⁵

Since its adoption, however, there is limited evidence that SCR 1325 has produced significant change. Recent research demonstrates that while this resolution has led to a significant increase in the number of references to women in conflict-specific resolutions, these references have tended to focus on protection or prevention aspects of SCR 1325, and very few references call for the inclusion of women in decision-making roles,²⁶ suggesting a failure of the UNSC to fully internalize the principles of this resolution.

In recognition of this failure, the NGOWG has continued to actively advocate to the UN and member states for the full implementation and monitoring of 1325. For the UNSC, these demands present a dilemma: either UNSC inaction risks reinforcing a reputation of lip-service or it imposes on state sovereignty by calling

²² Interview with Sanam Anderlini. April 2, 2009. New York.

²³ Women break through the closed doors of the Security Council. PeaceWomen. Oct 2000.

²⁴ Note: Informal debates are known as the Arria Formula. During these session, Security Council, other states and NGOs are permitted to present statements in effort to shape formal debates.

²⁵ Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Conflict: A Framework for Prevention and Response. OCHA. 2008.

²⁶ Black, Renee. Mainstreaming Resolution 1325? Evaluating the Impact on Security Council Resolution 1325 on Country-Specific UN Resolutions. Unpublished.

on states to develop policies and laws that may be incongruent to current practice.

Possibly in an effort to avoid such a decision, in 2004, the SG called on all member-states to develop and implement 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs),²⁷ which outline how states intend to fulfill the obligations of SCR 1325. For all countries, this should include a review of policies, laws and structures that result in barriers and inequalities for women. For donor countries in particular, this also includes how defense, diplomacy, development, trade and other aspects of foreign policy are informed by 1325. However to date, only 12 countries— Austria, Cote D'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Liberia, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom²⁸ – have launched NAPs, though several other countries have indicated that NAPs are currently in progress. In Fiji, 1325 has been incorporated into national policies in the absence of an NAP, however efforts are vastly under-resourced²⁹ and evidence suggests that following a recent coup, that these policies failed to translate into action, with women again being excluded from the peace process.

The absence of monitoring mechanisms is undoubtedly among the most important challenges in evaluating the impact of SCR 1325 and internalizing its language. While some actors have declared their intent to develop monitoring

²⁷ National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). IANWGE.

²⁸ <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/gps/general/implementation-of-un-scr-1325.html>

²⁹ Stone, Anne. Bhagwon-Rolls, Sharon. Advancing UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Workshop on Women, Peace and Security at the 10th Triennial Conference on Pacific Women. Noumea, New Caledonia. May 2007.

mechanisms, developments to date are incoherent. Nevertheless, the following case studies endeavor to highlight the extent to which we can say that 1325 has been internalized in post-conflict countries absent these tools.

As this paper shows, evaluating internalization is no simple task. First, since SCR 1325 contains many distinct components, which and how many aspects must be covered by an organization or policy in order to declare internalization? Does internalization mean that SCR 1325 informs the broader policies and language of an organization, or is it adequate that influence is isolated to specific operational functions? Should reports contain specific and/ or structural (i.e. direct) references to SCR 1325 or is use of SRC 1325 language sufficient to demonstrate internalization? Can we say that a norm is internalized even if there is limited awareness of specific tools, but where conformance takes place through other policy instruments with over-lapping elements? How do we control for policy influences from other instruments that address aspects of SCR 1325? How long must behavior occur before we can claim that it has become internalized?

For the purposes of this paper, I argue that internalization can come in four forms: sustained and possibly structured references to SCR 1325, whether direct or indirect; sustained references to the inclusion of gender perspectives and/ or to the participation of women in peacebuilding; or sustained evidence that implementing actors are incorporating the input of women into policies and

programs, and institutionalized changes, such as the development of relevant professions, and shifts in organizational structures. An example might include ongoing references calling for the inclusion of women's organizations in conflict prevention. (See Appendix C for a complete list of questions that might indicate SCR.) In all cases, I consider sustained to means for a period lasting at least three years, recognizing that there are several practical limitations to this choice.

CASE STUDIES

In this section, I evaluate the extent to which SCR 1325 has influenced policies, programs and structures in Sierra Leone - where sexual violence was a salient issue in conflict - and in Timor-Leste - where sexual violence in conflict was not a salient issue. I explore whether or not internalization of this norm is taking place, and if so, whether or not this distinction precipitates different levels of norm internalization in post-conflict societies. As the case studies will show, it is currently very challenging to prove both that internalization is taking place in any consistent way and to identify specific programs derive from SCR 1325. The time frame for this analysis begins with the adoption of SCR 1325 on October 31, 2000 and continues to the present (March 2009).

Following these case studies, I will apply norm diffusion models to evaluate the research questions identified.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic, which directly elects a unicameral legislature and a president.³⁰ The government structure features an executive, legislature and judiciary. Presidents can be elected to a maximum of two five-year terms. The two main parties historically have been the All People's Congress (APC) and the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).

Sierra Leone has several tribal and religious groups that have generally integrated and arguably lived peacefully alongside one another since independence from Britain in 1961. Home to 5.9 million people, Sierra Leone's GDP per capita is \$871 USD, and GDP growth is strong at 7.1%. Nevertheless, Sierra Leone is 176 of 177 on the Human Development Index, with life expectancy currently around 41 years.³¹

History of Conflict & International Interventions

Sierra Leone held its first multi-party elections in 1962, but became a single-party state in 1978 under the All People's Congress (APC), whose governance was characterized by corruption, under-development and mismanagement. Multi-party elections were restored following a 1991 referendum, and the first relatively free and fair elections were held in 1996.

³⁰ <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78756.htm>

³¹ MDG Fact Sheet for Sierra Leone. MDG Monitor. 2007.

The root of Sierra Leone's conflict lies in corruption and exploitation of the country's resources – most notably diamonds. These factors undermined development efforts, led to high unemployment, high illiteracy rates, extreme poverty and created breeding grounds for the illicit arms and diamond trade. Under the repressive regime of Joseph Momoh who rose to power in 1985, many disaffected youth were expelled from the country, including the future leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Forday Sankoh, They began forming resistance movements outside of Sierra Leone, including in Libya, where future RUF leaders trained alongside warlord Charles Taylor.³² When Taylor's own revolutionary ambitions were thwarted by the deployment of an ECOMOG peacekeeping force, featuring troops from Sierra Leone, Taylor convinced Forday to launch his coup to distract ECOMOG's efforts in Liberia.

The conflict began in March 1991, when Momoh's regime collapsed and the RUF asserted control over the country, including in the diamond-rich north. Tapping into local resentment, citizens initially supported the RUF, even volunteering their children to fight alongside them, however the RUF began terrorizing and targeting civilians, forcibly recruiting children and raping women, and quickly alienated itself from the local population.

In 1996, the Abidjan Agreement was brokered between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL),³³ and was followed by relatively free and

³² Durch, William. Twenty-first Century Peace Operations. Stimson Centre.2007.

³³ Sierra Leone. The Abidjan Agreement. Conciliation Resources. Nov 1996.

fair elections, which brought Ahmed Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) to power. The RUF, however, rejected the results³⁴ and reverted to violence, forcing the newly elected government into exile.

In 1998, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed, mandated to build local capacity, assist with truth and reconciliation efforts, reform the security sector, reintegrate ex-combatants, prepare for the 2002 elections, and reinforce the ECOMOG force. Following the May 2000 kidnapping of over 400 peacekeepers,³⁵ a UK rapid response force quickly restored security to major centers, freed the hostages and worked in parallel to the UN to restore stability, enabling Kabbah's return. Kabbah was re-elected in 2002 and served till 2007.

Upon the completion of the UNAMSIL mandate in 2005, the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established in January 2006 mandated to build institutions and local capacity, assist with meeting MDG targets, promote good governance, monitor the 2007 elections, strengthen the security sector; and stem the illicit trafficking of arms, human and natural resources."³⁶ Elections returned the APC to power under former insurance broker Ernest Koroma who was elected on the promise to run government as a business.³⁷

³⁴ <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html>

³⁵ Durch, William. *Twenty-first Century Peace Operations*. Stimson Centre. 2007.

³⁶ Security Council Established UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone to Further Address Root Causes of Conflict. Security Council. Aug 31, 2005

³⁷ Country Profile: Sierra Leon. BBC. 2007.

In August 2008, the UNSC mandated the October 2008 deployment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) to resolve remaining tensions within the country, monitor and promote human rights, democracy and rule of law, support governance reform, support constitutional reviews, and supporting decentralization. The SG appointed Michael von der Scuhlenburg of Germany as his Special Representative in January 2009.

In all, over 20,000 people were killed in the course of the conflict, and over two million were displaced. The conflict led to destruction of much of the country's limited infrastructure. Human Rights Watch estimates that up to 257,000 women were raped during the conflict.³⁸ Women also represented as many as 25% of the RUF's forcibly recruited combatants, with many girls being forced into participate in gang rapes of other women and to becoming bush wives for RUF soldiers.³⁹

Developments at the International Level (UN, INGOs)

UN Operations

Over the course of the UN's three missions in Sierra Leone, the UNSC has adopted a total of 19 resolutions and 27 SCRSG reports. (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. Security Council Resolutions and Reports for Sierra Leone

	Sierra Leone					
	Resolutions			SG Reports		
Year	All SCR	Direct	Both	All Rpts	Direct	Indirect

³⁸ We'll Kill You if You Cry. Human Rights Watch. Jan 15, 2003.

³⁹ Cohen, Dara K. The Role of Female Combatants in Armed Groups: Women and War-Time Rape in Sierra Leone (1991-2001). Unpublished.

2000	1	0	0	1	0	1
2001	3	0	0	4	0	2
2002	4	1	2	4	0	0
2003	3	0	2	4	0	3
2004	2	0	0	4	0	3
2005	2	0	2	3	1	3
2006	2	1	1	3	1	2
2007	1	1	1	2	2	2
2008	1	1	1	1	1	1
2009	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	19	4	9	27	5	18
%	100%	21%	47%	100%	19%	67%

* Both refers to direct and indirect references combined.

The first reference to protecting women and the first indirect preambular reference to 1325 - encouraging the Mano River Women's Peace Network and other civil society organizations to continue peacebuilding initiatives promoting regional stability - came in March 2002,⁴⁰ by which time the conflict had largely ended. Virtually all references in resolutions adopted prior to December 2006 focused on preventing abuses (e.g. through UN training, monitoring mechanisms, disciplinary action, calls on combatants to respect human rights, etc.) or on protecting women from sexual violence. The first direct reference to 1325 and the first time a resolution contained an operational reference to the participation of women came in December 2006⁴¹. Language on the participation of women in peacebuilding has been employed consistently in the two resolutions adopted since then.

⁴⁰ Security Council Resolution 1400. UN Security Council. Mar 2002.

⁴¹ Security Council Resolution 1734. UN Security Council. Dec 2006.

Twenty-seven SGRSC reports on Sierra Leone have been submitted since November 2000. Early references to women typically focused on prevention or protection aspects of SCR 1325, and not to SCR 1325, with the notable exception of S/2001/857, which recognized the Mano River Women's Peace Networks' contribution to regional peace. December 2003 marked the first time a UNAMSIL report contained a section on gender,⁴² but it is not until July 2004 that structural reporting on gender issues is seen, and this disappears in mid-2005. In December 2005, the first mention of both 1325 and equality or empowerment is made in the SG's final UNAMSIL report. It is only in the 3rd UNIOSIL report⁴³ in November 2006 that structural reporting on 1325 implementation can be found, and this feature was consistent into the four reports that followed.

While it is unclear what caused this shift in behavior, several possible factors might help to explain this change. First, SCR 1325 was frequently referenced directly and indirectly in country-specific resolutions. Secondly, the SG issued a request to all member-states to develop 1325 NAPs⁴⁴. Thirdly, the SG specifically called on Sierra Leone to strengthen the security sector response to sexual violence⁴⁵ strengthen national legislation through CEDAW to address crimes, and increase the participation of female voters and candidates ahead of the 2007 election. Fourthly, Sierra Leone was referred to the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in June 2006, and though referenced to 1325 are direct, language is weak

⁴² Secretary General Report to the Security Council on Sierra Leone. 2003. S/2003/1201

⁴³ Secretary General Report to the Security Council on Sierra Leone. 2006. S/2006/922

⁴⁴ Secretary General Report to the Security Council on Sierra Leone. 2006. S/2006/269

⁴⁵ Ibid.

and incomplete. Correspondingly, the first UNIPSIL report in February 2009 omits SCR 1325 entirely, and reverts instead to protection language.

The first gender specialist for Sierra Leone was Theresa Kambobe, who was recruited in 2003 in UNAMSIL and was the sole person responsible for incorporating gender perspectives into mission operations. According to one report, gender issues were only incorporated as an afterthought, and Kabobe reported to the Chief Human Rights Officer, and not to the SRSG. As a result, she did not participate in senior staff meetings and had inadequate financial resources for her role, meaning she spent much of her time soliciting funding to address priorities.⁴⁶ UNAMSIL also deployed a GA, Enshrah Ahmed, though it was at least a year after mission deployment before this position was filled.⁴⁷ The title also suggests low positioning within the mission structure, again limiting the ability of this resource to exercise significant influence.

However it is now recognized that in the aftermath of conflict, the UN failed to adopt gender perspectives in important areas of the mission, including in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration processes. For example, it ignored the distinct issues facing female former combatants, many of whom were rejected by their communities, and forced into prostitution in order to survive.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ O'Neill, April. Ward, Leora. Mainstreaming or Maneuvering? Gender and Peacekeeping in West Africa. KAIPTC Monograph, No. 1. April 2005.

⁴⁷ Lyytikäinen, Minna. Gender Training for Peacekeepers. Preliminary Overview of United Nations peace support operations. INSTRAW. 2007.

⁴⁸ Schroven, Anne. Women After War: Gender Mainstreaming and the Social Construction of Identity in Contemporary Sierra Leone. 2008.

To summarize, there is evidence of sustained direct influences to SCR 1325 within country-specific resolutions and SGRSC reports, particularly since late 2006, and which include calls for gender perspectives and the participation of women. There is also evidence of institutionalization as evidenced by the establishment of gender advisors at the mission level, however these positions are insufficiently resourced, and are not high with the mission structure, inhibiting the ability of GAs to consistently influence policy.

International NGOs

Many INGOs have operated in Sierra Leone since the beginning of the conflict.

The Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) Encyclopedia identifies several organizations that work on gender issues: Cause Canada, Christian Aid, Amnesty International (AI), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Action Aid, Search for Common Ground (SFCG), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), American Refugee Committee (ARC), and WeltHungerHilfe (WHW). A review of the web sites and key documents on gender programming for these organizations shows the following:

- Four NGOs - IRC, ActionAid, ADRA, WHW - have projects related to *gender equality*. While there are no direct references to SCR 1325 in project or mission statements, it may be possible to argue for indirect references, however language does not clearly reflect SCR 1325.
- AI and ARC both currently operate projects to halting *violence against women*, but no direct references to 1325 can be found to be influencing these projects, though again indirect influence might be argued.

- MDGs are driving *women's economic empowerment* projects for Christian Aid, Action Aid (Beijing Platform for Action is also cited for the latter project) and Cause Canada, though this organization does suggest that 1325 is also an influence. While SFCG web sites contain many references to 1325, it does not appear to underpin specific projects in Sierra Leone.
- Oxfam UK works to increase female participation in government and all aspects of life, to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.⁴⁹ While there is no direct reference to 1325, these programs do invoke 1325 language and Oxfam's site contains several references to 1325, though not in relation to country-specific programs. This suggests a stronger but indirect reference.
- Though not on the DACO, several New York-based NGOs including Femmes Africa Solidarite, International Women's Tribune Centre, Human Rights Watch, International Alert and other members of the NGOWG⁵⁰ do have projects that directly use 1325 to strengthen local advocacy efforts, strengthen the voice of civil society organizations.⁵¹ If these efforts have been effective, we should expect to see growing salience of SCR 1325 within country-level NGOs.

To summarize, the NGOWG members do demonstrate direct 1325 influence, but apart from these, references are indirect and 1325 influence is debatable. Oxfam otherwise has the strongest influence, but not regarding specific programs.

⁴⁹ www.oxfam.co.uk

⁵⁰ www.womenpeacesecurity.org/

⁵¹ Mano River Peace Union Forum. International Alert.

Developments at the National Level

Government Policy

Both of Sierra Leone's leaders since the conflict have publicly and formally committed to improve the situation of women, through improved participation and by mainstreaming gender perspectives, and while there have been many critical developments in recent years, there remains much room for improvement.

A key gap between law and reality is the Local Government Act of 2004, which requires District and Ward Committees to have at least 50% female representation, but currently only 10.9% of local councilors, 11.5% of cabinet ministers,⁵² 20% of deputy ministers and 6.8% of paramount chiefs are women.⁵³ Furthermore, women's parliamentary representation increased from 6.3% in 1997 to 8.8% in 2000, and again to over 14% in 2003, a level maintained in 2007 despite a shift to first-past-the-post. The government is considering a 30% quota⁵⁴ and has developed a national Gender-in-Development Policy to strengthen women's participation in decision-making at all levels⁵⁵ though details on this plan are not available. Despite this commitment, the electoral model shift in 2007 raises questions of genuine commitment to women, since first-past-the-

⁵² The Republic of Sierra Leone – State House Web Site.

⁵³ Progress Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001 – 2010. Government of Sierra Leone. January 2006.

⁵⁴ Gabel, Katey; Hess, Courtney. Sierra Leone: Women aim for the Presidency by 2012. AllAfrica.com Oct 28, 2007.

⁵⁵ Progress Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001 – 2010. Government of Sierra Leone. January 2006.

post models typically result in fewer women than with proportional representation.⁵⁶

Changes have taken place both in terms of governance structure, policies and legal reform. First, in 1998, Kabbah's administration established the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs (MSWGCA),⁵⁷ which although chronically under-resourced, has been critical to creating awareness of gender issues. Sierra Leone's MDG report also calls for sex-disaggregated data in order to monitor sexual violence, legal inequalities, political participation of women at all levels, funding and structures, and gender mainstreaming.⁵⁸

The 2005 government-led Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper includes a number of gender provisions, influenced largely by MDGs, but data collection has generally been inconsistent and unreliable. Similarly, Vision 2025 contains several gender-related policies, however the executive summary and priorities conspicuously omit gender matters from their analysis. Gender equality discussions focus on education, employment in the non-agricultural sector, and parliamentary representation suggesting MDG influence.

Law & Jurisprudence

Several substantive developments on women's rights have occurred within the judiciary in recent years. Programs have included a committee comprised of

⁵⁶ Ritchie, Rob. Hill, Steven. The Case for Proportional Representation. Social Policy. 1996.

⁵⁷ www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_2mswg.htm

⁵⁸ Millennium Development Goals Report for Sierra Leone. Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone. 2005.

NGOs and GoSL representatives to advise on the first Status Report on CEDAW provisions and on how to integrate provisions into national laws. Evidence clearly points to a primarily to CEDAW influence, to which the GoSL has recently recommitted.

In June 2007 three gender bills came into law the Domestic Violence Act, the Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act and the Devolution of Estates Act, which taken together, have strong potential to dramatically improve the situation of women in Sierra Leone.⁵⁹

According to British Barrister Lolla Teale, “Sierra Leone operates under three sets of law: formal law, customary law and Muslim law.”⁶⁰ These acts “provide protection to women under all three types of law.”⁶¹ She attributes success in passing these laws to two key factors: strong involvement and pressure by certain INGOS and UNIOSIL and political will of President Kabbah’s who, through an executive order, passed these bills two days before Parliament was dissolved ahead of the 2007 elections.

Under the Gender Acts, children cannot marry before the age of 18 and marriage requires consent from both parties. Women now have the right to possess property and can inherit children in the event that the father cannot or is not

⁵⁹ Sierra Leone Parliament Passes the Gender Bills into Law. Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme. Jun 2007.

⁶⁰ Zureik, Alyson. Implementing the Gender Acts in Sierra Leone. Social Edge. Jan 2008.

⁶¹ Ibid.

willing to fulfill these duties. Women are no longer bound to return dowries in the event that a marriage ends in divorce or separation. Furthermore, all marriages and divorces, including customary, must be registered, providing protection to all citizens under all three types of law.⁶²

The Domestic Violence Act introduces penal and protection measures to regulate violent relationships, “including, if necessary, excluding men from the home, and [requiring] the Government to provide temporary safe homes for victims of domestic violence.”⁶³ This has potential to not only reduce spousal abuse, but also to equalize gender dynamics more broadly.

Thirdly, the Devolution of Estates Act strengthens the potential for women to improve their economic standing, since wealth in Sierra Leone is usually inherited. Whereas previously estate reverted to the deceased person’s parents and brothers, now, “the majority will devolve to the wife and children of the deceased, and will also end the widespread practice of wife inheritance.”⁶⁴

These changes theoretically represent monumental shifts in the status of women, however, evidence suggests that implementation has been limited and incoherent.⁶⁵ Recognizing this failure, the GoSL recently launched a 3-year strategic plan to build the foundations for long-term enforcement, education and

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Kamara, Hawa. An Analysis on the Strategic Roll-Out for Implementing Gender Laws. Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme. Jan 2009.

monitoring.⁶⁶ These are promising signs, and while they contain elements consistent with SCR 1325, this link is tenuous and evidence suggests CEDAW influence primarily.

Despite limited evidence of SCR 1325 influence within policies, the GoSL recently hosted national consultations on the development of a 1325 NAP in partnership with Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-SL) and other civil society groups in February 2009. While it is difficult to establish at this time how this came to be, it does suggest that SCR 1325 has been influencing GoSL priorities for some time, and also suggests some degree of 1325 internalization.

Overall, there is emerging evidence to suggest that the GoSL is committed to gender inclusiveness, at least on paper, but there is limited evidence to indicate that it has internalized SCR 1325 specifically, though the intention to develop an NAP is encouraging. While progress is slow, advocates perceive genuine will of the government for advancing gender policies. Examining both the scope of the NAP, as well as how it translates into action will be important contributions to the continued evaluation of government internalization

Development at the Local Level (NGOs)

Sierra Leone is host to many NGOs at the grassroots level, mandated to the advancement of women. Three NGOs in particular stand out: Fifty-Fifty Group

⁶⁶ Ibid.

(FFG), the Women's Centre for Good Governance (WOCEGAR), and the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), all of which have gained international reputation for their work in advancing women's rights.

The most ambitious effort to promote women's parliamentary representation is the Fifty-Fifty Group (FFG), whose mantra, 'A woman's place is in the House of Parliament' is representative of its aggressive advocacy. FFG aims to achieve gender parity in electoral processes, with a short term goal of achieving 30% female representation in the next election. To this end, FFG has called on the Constitutional Review Commission to establish a 30% quota ahead of next election, and has developed programs to prepare female candidates ahead of the elections.⁶⁷ They have also begun developing a talent database of professional women to facilitate the process of identifying qualified women for openings. They attempt to overcome key barriers to women's participation such as resistance from communities, lack of finances, training, experience, education and family responsibilities. Low female literacy rates and low political knowledge also limit women from voting in elections and participating as candidates. Despite their focus on participation, there is no direct reference to 1325, while CEDAW is specifically mentioned on the web site and in key presentations.

The second organization, the Women's Centre for Good Governance (WOCEGEAR), on the other hand is strongly influenced by Resolution 1325. In a

⁶⁷ Gabel, Katey; Hess, Courtney. Sierra Leone: Women aim for the Presidency by 2012. AllAfrica.com Oct 28, 2007.

phone interview with Mary Conteh of WOCEGEAR, 1325 awareness programs within NGO community is top among priorities. To this end, they intend to host training workshops and advocacy campaigns to increase knowledge on 1325 concepts in all parts of the country, and particularly with women's NGOs.

The third organization, the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MANWOPNET) is a network of women's NGOs from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, formed under the auspices of ECOWAS. Headquartered in Freetown, MARWOPNET envisions a peaceful future based on equality, health, education and sustainable development, and is led by many prominent women from local NGOs. MARWOPNET's vision invokes the language of 1325 (e.g. recognizing that women are the principle victims of conflict, women should have a say in the decisions made regarding conflict, etc.) without referring to SCR 1325 specifically. Sierra Leone's country report points to SCR 1325 and CEDAW to support its calls for affirmative action and for the inclusion of women's organizations in peace processes. Its forward-looking vision also invokes 1325 language on issues such as refugees, resettlement, human rights, and Conteh claims that MARWOPNET intends to run 1325 training workshops around the country to increase awareness and promote gender equality in the near future. Perhaps most importantly, MARWOPNET's participation in the recent 1325 national consultations is the strongest sign to date of SCR 1325 influence.

MARWOPNET also has the distinction of being the only civil society organization in Sierra Leone to be mentioned in both an SGRSC report (S/2001/857) and in SCR 1400, which further suggests some evidence that the SG is perceiving value in including women's civil society groups in peacebuilding processes.

Summary

At the international level, indirect references to 1325 language start somewhere around 2003 with SGRSC reports, however references are irregular and incomplete, and it is another 3 years at least before direct references begins to emerge. By late 2006, most UNSC resolutions and SGRSC reports contained specific - and in the case of the latter, structured - references to 1325, with the exception of the most recent report on the establishment of UNIPSIL. There is limited evidence that INGOs have been specifically motivated by SCR 1325, with the notable exception of New York based NGOs that are members of the NGOWG. There is some evidence to suggest that they have successfully increased awareness of SCR 1325 within women's NGOs at the local level.

The presence of GAs is a sign of internalization, however evidence suggests that these positions are inadequately resourced, are not high enough within the mission structure to influence decision-making consistently, and that missions may delay filling these positions, as occurred with Ahmed.

At the national level, evidence suggests that gender policies have more frequently tended to refer to other policy and legal instruments such as CEDAW

and MDGs.⁶⁸ Political will of the GoSL⁶⁹ was critical in driving legal reforms and policies.⁷⁰ The GoSL's intention to develop an NAP suggests salience of SCR 1325 has been growing for some time, though it is difficult to establish precisely when and by which process this occurred.

At the local level, there is increasing evidence of SCR 1325 influence, but it has been indirect until recently and it is not clear when or how this process began. NGO participation in the NAP consultations suggests that 1325 influences these NGOs. NGOs working to promote gender equality, have policy and program language that increasingly shows both direct and indirect influence of SCR 1325. This also suggests that NGOWG members have had success in awareness campaigns on 1325.

Notably, MARWOPNET's recent participation in the 1325 national consultations suggests that salience of this resolution will continue to grow in the short-term and at many levels, including locally, nationally and regionally. Furthermore, the UN's recognition of MARWOPNET's contributions to regional peace and stability suggests that this organization is also effectively demonstrating the value SCR 1325 principles to actors at the international in level.

⁶⁸ <http://www.uniqueservers.net/vision2025/sensitization.htm>

⁶⁹ Interview with Mary Conteh. March 4, 2009.

⁷⁰ Interview with Carolyn McAskie.

Timor-Leste

A parliamentary republic, Timor-Leste is one of the world's youngest states having gained independence from Indonesia in 2002 after 27 years of occupation and a 1999 UN-supervised national referendum.

Prior to independence, Timor-Leste suffered decades of under-investment and under-development. Of roughly 1.1 million⁷¹ citizens, 40%⁷² of its inhabitants live on less than \$0.50 UDS a day. It currently ranks 142 out of 177⁷³ on the Human Development Index,⁷⁴ and it lacks safe drinking water and food security.

Tensions are exacerbated by limited economic opportunities, low literacy levels, poor market access, natural disasters, violence and poor governance. With average fertility rates as high as 7 children per woman as recently as 2006,⁷⁵ life expectancy under 60 years, adult literacy at 50% and infant mortality around 6.1% of live births, Timor-Leste faces serious challenges in its bid to become a self-sustaining state.

History of Conflict & International Interventions

Timor-Leste has experienced two rounds of destabilizing violence. The first occurred in 1999 following the referendum, at which time the UN Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) was on-hand to supervise the referendum. Violence erupted between pro-independence (Timorese) and anti-independence (Indonesian)

⁷¹ Country-Profile: Timor-Leste. Care International. 2007.

⁷² <http://www.oxfam.org.hk> - Timor-Leste

⁷³ http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c=TMP&cd=626

⁷⁴ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

⁷⁵ http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c=TMP&cd=626

supporters, involved over 10,000 militia gangs, and resulted in the death of well over 1,000 people (though numbers are difficult to verify) and the forcible displacement of 250,000 others.⁷⁶

An Australian-led coalition of the willing, called the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) was dispatched to Timor-Leste between September 1999 to February 2000 and was mandated to restore peace and security, protect the UN mission that followed, and facilitate humanitarian assistance to local populations. It largely achieved its objectives within two months.

This was followed by the UN Transitional Administration to East Timor (UNTAET), deployed from October 1999 to May 2002 and mandated to establish effective administration and government services, none of which existed under Indonesian rule. Recognizing the need for longer-term capacity building, the Security Council deployed UNMISSET, between May 2002 and May 2005, mandated to maintain security, implement a rapid and milestone-based gradual drawdown of the mission over two years, and improve mission integration and coordination. The rationale for a quick drawdown of the mission was informed in part by the UN's experience in Bosnia where elected officials developed dependency on UN actors, which compromised prospects for self-sustaining democracy. However in making this decision, the UN over-estimated the stability of the country and capacity of the security sector and government to maintain lasting peace.

⁷⁶ Durch, William. Twentieth Century Peace Operations. Stimson Centre. 2007.

The second round of violence began in April 2006 with clashes between eastern and western factions of the security services over charges of discrimination, though the conflict eventually expanded to gangs⁷⁷. The Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) estimates that 35,000 people fled their homes, settling in one of sixteen camps around the country. UN Office in East Timor (UNOTIL) was deployed between May 2005 and August 2006 to support state capacity building, security sector reform, and to strengthen democratic governance.⁷⁸

In August 2006, the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was mandated to continue to support and develop the capacity of democratic institutions, including the security sector in Timor-Leste and this mission remains active today.

Developments at the International Level (UN, INGOs)

UN

The current UNMIT Country Team is comprised of 21 agencies, departments and international organizations. Since December 2006, Atul Khare has been the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG).

TABLE 3. Security Council Resolutions and Reports for Timor-Leste

	Timor Leste					
	Resolutions			SG Reports		
Year	All SCR	Direct	Both	All Rpts	Direct	Both
2000	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	1	0	0	4	0	0
2002	2	0	1	3	0	0

⁷⁷ Kelly, Paul; Walters, Patrick. "Back for good". The Australian. May 27, 2006.

⁷⁸ <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmit/background.html>

2003	2	0	0	3	0	0
2004	2	0	0	4	0	0
2005	1	0	0	5	0	1
2006	6	0	1	4	1	3
2007	1	1	1	3	0	2
2008	1	1	1	2	0	2
2009	1	1	1	1	0	1
Total	17	3	5	29	1	9
%	100%	18%	29%	100%	3%	31%

* Both refers to direct and indirect references combined.

In spite of being one of the first missions to establish a Gender Advisor in the UN, gender references to 1325 in resolutions are discouraging. (See Table 3.)

Prior to August 2006, only one resolution recognized “the importance of gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations,”⁷⁹ and specifically identified the need for a gender focal point, but did not directly reference SCR 1325. As with Sierra Leone, however, a shift in behavior occurs in late 2006, with all four resolutions since then containing both direct preambular references to 1325 as well as operational references within the resolution, including calls for the protection of women from sexual violence, the prevention of violence through monitoring and training, and to a much lesser extent, the increased participation of women and gender equality.

Despite plans to establish a gender unit in UNTAET, this unit was omitted early on by the late SRSG, Sergio de Mello, who cited inadequate resources and installed much later. De Mello later admitted to not believing that a gender unit would help rebuild effective institutions, but he eventually conceded that women

⁷⁹ Security Council Resolution 1420. United Nations Security Council. 2006.

had a remarkable impact in promoting peacebuilding and development.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, this decision to exclude the gender unit early in the mission has inevitably impacted the effectiveness of subsequent policies.

Only one SGRSC report after 2006 contains references to 1325,⁸¹ both recognizing the critical need to include the voice of women in peacebuilding and highlighting the need to fill a significant gap in gender expertise in all mission-critical aspects of operations. Recommendations include improvements in the security sector, elections, justice, and for the establishment of a senior gender advisor in the office of the SRSG. UNMIT subsequently established a Gender Unit, headed by Senior Gender Advisor Rita Reddy, who reports to the Deputy SRSG and whose mandate includes working within the mission, working with and lobbying to government, and strengthening the capacity of civil society actors to advance gender policies. Reddy discharges her duties with no funding and no personnel. She runs a 30-minute introductory training seminar for all personnel, followed by a one-day training session for all incoming peacekeepers, which she considers inadequate. She states that security remains the top priority to date, and remains a key short-coming of UNMIT.⁸²

She does indicate that although 1325 is not specifically referenced, it is still a guiding factor in many aspects of advancing gender policies within Timor-Leste at various levels.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Secretary General Report to the Security Council on Timor-Leste. 2006. S/2006/628

⁸² Interview with Rita Reddy. Mar 19, 2009.

Finally, in speech on International Women's Day in March 2009, the SRSG spoke to women's groups of the importance of SCR 1325 and of the important need to include women in the preventions and resolution of conflict, stressing the importance of women's equal participation in the promotion of peace and in all aspects of decision-making.⁸³

To summarize, early resolutions contained no references to 1325 – directly or indirectly, and it is only as of late 2006 that there is any notable influence, while SGRSC demonstrate limited knowledge or commitment to SCR 1325. More recently, however, the SRSG has vocalized key support for this resolution. However, while some important changes have taken place at the mission level, the UNTAET mission was hampered by the late establishment of the Gender Unit and the ability of gender advisors in both missions to discharge duties has been limited by inadequate financial and human resources.

INGOs

According to the International NGO Forum roster for Timor-Leste, seven NGOs are known to work on gender policy issues, including Oxfam Australia, Oxfam UK, Oxfam HK, the Stromme Foundation, Unity Service Cooperation Canada East Timor (USC-CET), International Republican Institute, and the Asia Foundation.

⁸³ Interview with Rita Reddy. Mar 19, 2009.

- *Oxfam International* repeatedly references many aspects of 1325 directly and indirectly in a broad advocacy paper such as “For a Safer Tomorrow” which addresses the disturbing trend of targeting of civilians as a tactic of war.⁸⁴
- Organizations working on women’s empowerment issues include: *Oxfam Australia* promotes education, women’s political participation, and stronger legal frameworks for women; *International Republican Institute* has established and supported the Women’s Caucus, which focuses on promoting political participation of women, training potential female political candidates, and strengthening women’s rights but with no direct link to SCR 1325, and;⁸⁵ the *Asia Foundation*, though no information is available on specific programs. None of these organizations appear to be directly working on SCR 1325 and indirect references could be indicative of CEDAW influence.
- The *Stromme Foundation* web site indicates only that it works on gender equality, but limited information is available on specific programs, again making 1325 influence difficult to gauge.
- Neither USC-CET, nor Oxfam UK and Oxfam HK policies reveal any projects related to women in Timor-Leste, despite their NGO forum listings

⁸⁴ www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/papers/downloads/fast_report_eng.pdf - 26 September 2008

⁸⁵ <http://www.iri.org/asia/easttimor.asp>

- Although not listed on the roster, CARE Australia also works in Timor-Leste on women's participation and gender equality.⁸⁶ Programs contain possible evidence of indirect influence of 1325 principles.

In summary, there is little evidence of direct influence of 1325, and tenuous evidence of indirect influence at the INGO, however it is difficult to establish that 1325 and not some other tool such as CEDAW is driving these policies.

Developments at the National Level

Governance & Policy

Although the constitution promotes gender equality, the reality remains that Timor-Leste is dominated by a patriarchal system that assigns gender roles and has specific implications at the policy level. This reality manifest itself throughout society including through higher investment in boys education, and in resistance to promote women to decision-making roles at all levels, including in politics.⁸⁷

The role of women in Timor-Leste has traditionally been confined to bearing children, while the role of men is typically as the provider. These roles are enforced from an early age, and can impact on all aspects of development, including in access to education.

The capacity for women to participate in public life, to pursue formal employment, and to pursue higher education is hampered by illiteracy, lack of knowledge of

⁸⁶ www.careaustralia.org.au/files/Timor%20Leste%20Profile.pdf

⁸⁷ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Equality. 1979.

major languages, lack of access to transportation, poor education, limited knowledge of rights and burdensome domestic duties. Secondary education onward is less accessible for girls, though literacy rates are slightly higher among women. Low numbers of women work in formal employment, and where they do, they tend to work at lower levels than men. Women are more likely to work as unpaid subsistence farmers, and have virtually no access to credit, severely restricting their ability to start businesses and move beyond labor-intensive sectors. Women face clear challenges reentering the workforce after childbirth, and even in obtaining medical services for which traditional custom requires the husband's approval.

Traditional practices also lead to violence and encourage victims to resolve issues within the confines of the family or within traditional dispute resolution mechanisms known as adat. This system is more expedient and has broader community support than the former legal system, but traditional structures tend to prioritize men in disputes. Women are often not included, and compensation is generally awarded to men. For these and other reasons, women-headed households are among the most vulnerable in Timor-Leste.

Despite these challenges, Timor-Leste has made some notable advancements on gender participation, in part through the adoption of affirmative action programs. Women represent 24% of civil servants, 25% of the Electoral

Commission, 30%⁸⁸ of parliamentarians, and hold key ministerial postings including Education, Finance and other areas. Furthermore, women now have the right to become Head of Village or to stand on village Council, though in practice, these rights often remain unrealized and in conflict with traditional practices. Women also represent 18.2% of the police force (among the highest worldwide, according to Reddy) and 10% of the armed forces.

In Timor-Leste's first ever election, 81% of registered voters went to the polls, of which 47% were women. 65 parliamentarians were elected, including 20 female MPs (or 30%). During the election, female candidates committed to pursuing a common goal of prioritizing women's issues on the political agenda while the General Election Monitoring Commission "a group of men and women advocating women's political participation - closely monitored the commitments of political parties to gender equality."⁸⁹

Ambassador Nelson Santos at Timor-Leste's Permanent Mission to the UN admitted that he was not aware of SCR 1325, but indicates that the GoTL is committed to CEDAW and that women have been included in the administration from the beginning, in part because they played key roles in independence. In fact the role of women in clandestine operations in hostile territories is specifically noted in the constitution preamble. He claims that, as a result, no significant behavioral shift was required to include women in all aspects of public life. He

⁸⁸ Interview with Rita Reddy, UNMIT Senior Gender Advisor. Mar 19, 2009.

⁸⁹ State Building for Gender Equality in Timor-Leste. UNIFEM. 2008.

also specifically highlights the role of women and civil society organizations in healing communities, suggesting commitment to SCR 1325 principles, but not to specific influence.

While Reddy points out that all female parliamentarians continue to actively call for gender justice and equality, she believes that the GoTL actions in pursuing women's participation have been very sincere. She notes that Ireland has recently engaged Timor-Leste in a 1325 NAP learning exercise ahead of the development of Ireland's own NAP, suggesting that donors may help push this agenda forward within Timor-Leste in the future.

Law & Jurisprudence

The constitution of Timor-Leste contains several elements that speak to gender equality, but there remain many gaps between word and reality.

First, the GoTL is mandated to “create, promote and guarantee the effective equality of opportunities between women and men,”⁹⁰ with women and men having the same rights and duties in family, political, economic, social and cultural life. Marriage is to be consent-based and equal by all parties and women are to be exempted from work without risk to their careers and benefits in the event that they become pregnant.

However, many of these rights exist primarily on paper for many women.

⁹⁰ Constitution of Timor-Leste. 2002.

Polygamy is outlawed but continues in practice. Marriages are often pre-arranged at birth and inheritance rights favor men, with children often passing to the father's family. Other inequalities exist, including marriage ages (15 for girls, 18 for boys), and perhaps most importantly, the continued use of *barlake*, (effectively dowries), which activists claim are at the heart of discrimination and inequality because they encourage men to perceive women as property.

The constitution further indicates that “direct and active participation by men and women in political life is a requirement of, and a fundamental instrument for consolidating, the democratic system.”⁹¹ Furthermore, the law must “promote equality in the exercise of civil and political rights and non-discrimination on the basis of gender for access to political positions.”⁹²

Since independence, Timor-Leste has ratified both CEDAW and its optional protocol in 2006,⁹³ delivering its first CEDAW report in November 2008. The goal of this report is to provide an initial overview of the situation for women, providing a basis from which to measure future progress on CEDAW obligations. To this end, the GoTL created the Office of the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on the Promotion of Equality (OPE) who is mandated to ensure the implementation of gender mainstreaming throughout government. Reddy points out that this unit has been well funded, through support of UN agencies and other donors.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Initial Report: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Timor-Leste. Nov 24, 2008.

However a significant problem identified by actors at all levels is the issue of, domestic violence, which is very high,⁹⁴ and for which few cases are prosecuted. The OPE has responded to this issue by drafting law to criminalize domestic violence, and expanding the definition of domestic violence to include, “both direct and indirect physical, mental or sexual maltreatment,”⁹⁵ and this document is now ready for final presentation to the Council of Ministers. Police have established a Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU) to respond to complaints, and NGOs and government departments provide medical, counseling, forensic and legal services to victims, though rural women typically have limited access to such services. Both the GoTL and NGOs continue to use CEDAW to strengthen women’s rights.

Reddy clarifies that despite lack of issue salience, sexual violence was a significant problem in the Timorese conflict, and notes court recommendations for the development of mechanisms to support and compensate victims of violence as indications of influence.⁹⁶ Although not clear, CEDAW could likely be the dominant influence for this shift.

Training is also being provided to police, prosecutors, the judiciary, *Suco* heads (regional leaders) and civil society, and efforts have been made to change the

⁹⁴ IRC Study ‘Prevalence of Gender Based Violence in East Timor (2003), cited in ‘Traditional Justice and Gender Based Violence’ (IRC 2003), p. 13.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

attitudes of men on violence. The OPE also conducts a 16-day national advocacy campaign against violence in the media, in schools and at church. Both of these changes represent attempts to institutionalize behavior and socialize civil society, but again CEDAW appear the influential tool.

Developments at the Local Level (NGOs)

Web sites are not available for most gender-focused NGOs in Timor-Leste, however some literature speaks to the role of one organization called Rede Feto.

In her paper on post-conflict Timor, Susanne Alden writes that this umbrella organization of 16 different NGOs was established in March 2000 during the first National Women's Congress (NWC). During this meeting, participants developed a national action plan based on the policies of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) and on the commitment of the Magna Carta (1998). Entitled the "Platform for Action for the Advancement of Women of Timor Loro Sae," this was presented to the SRSG, circulated to all departments within the Governance and Public Administration Pillar (GPA) of UNTAET, and was followed by a call to establish a minimum of 30% of women in parliamentary representation.⁹⁷

The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CRNT) also adopted a general Resolution on Women's Rights with the mandate to advocate to UNTAET "for sufficient resources for the development and empowerment of women; to establish laws prohibiting violence against women; to establish national

⁹⁷ Alden, Susanne. Post-conflict Reconstruction and Women's Security – analyzing political outputs in East Timor. Umea University. April 16th, 2007.

mechanisms to ensure gender equity; and to develop and implement an education campaign on the rights of women and children to eradicate discrimination.”⁹⁸

Despite early resistance, a successful campaign by NWC, supported by the SRSG led to the eventual establishment of the OPE and election quotas. Reddy says that women’s organizations are very well respected, are often consulted by government, and are able to provide input into decision-making processes.⁹⁹ While this might strike of internalization, Ambassador Santos argues that this shift has occurred in spite of and not because of SCR 1325.

Overall, there is limited evidence of direct of even indirect influence of SCR 1325. CEDAW, Beijing and the Magna Carta appear to be primary tools for local advocacy.

Summary

At the international level, there is limited evidence of SCR 1325 influence save within resolutions after late 2006. While resolutions since that time have consistently made direct reference to SCR 1325, only one SGRSC report contains direct references SCR 1325. Even in terms of indirect references, there is limited evidence that SCR 1325 has had much of an impact. While gender units were established in both missions, the first was compromised and late. The UNMIT SGA suggests stronger support, but Reddy still lacks sufficient resources.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Interview with Rita Reddy. Mar 19, 2009.

Sexual violence was a characteristic of this conflict, however it was arguably not a salient issue within the Security Council, as evidenced by the lack of early references, direct or indirect, even for the protection of women. INGOs similarly do not obviously invoke 1325 in their policies and programs, while CEDAW is a clearer influence.

At the national level, there appears to be genuine commitment to addressing women's issues, with the constitution providing the strongest guarantee of rights. However in practice, women are still unable to exercise many of these rights consistently. The OPE is a particularly encouraging sign of institutionalization, though this may be driven more by donors than the government. What developments have occurred appear to be driven mainly by CEDAW. There is limited evidence of GoTL awareness of SCR 1325, though Timor-Leste's intention to participate in Ireland's NAP learning exercise suggests that this could be shifting. Despite the influence of SCR 1325, there is some reason for optimism that the situation of women in Timor-Leste is advancing, if slowly.

At the local level, CEDAW and Beijing appear to be the dominant influence on gender policies and programs, and it is generally difficult to measure indirect influence absent information on specific policies. Further complicating this evaluation is a lack of reliable statistics on the situation of women prior to

independence. Accordingly, it is near impossible to demonstrate accurate shifts in rights over time.

Except with recent UNSC resolutions, there is overall limited evidence that any specific policies, programs and structures at any of the levels analyzed can be derived from SCR 1325. Regardless of this finding, Reddy claims that SCR 1325 is mentioned in discussions on gender policies and programs at various levels within Timor-Leste, and is accordingly having some degree of influence.

SYNTHESIS & ANALYSIS

The questions set out at the start of the paper are:

- 1) Using empirical research, how has the situation for women changed in two post-conflict countries, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, since the adoption of SCR 1325?
- 2) To what extent can SCR 1325 be credited for observed change, and can we conclude that the principles of SCR 1325 are being internalized by implementing actors?

Do these case studies reveal the existence of norm-influenced professions, professional training, laws, bureaucratic behavior and policies in reasonably consistent ways, as suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink? Is observed behavior habitual or institutionalized at different levels within these case studies show? Are either direct or indirect references evident? Do we see calls for gender

perspectives or the participation of women? Are references sustained? And finally, can we explain different degrees of internalization?

In the early years following the adoption of SCR 1325, resolutions at a global level reflected a significant increase in the references to women when compared to pre-1325, however direct references to 1325 were omitted in at least 75% of resolutions.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, resolution language invoked tended to focus on protection and prevention aspects of 1325 and infrequently called for the participation of women or to gender perspectives, pointing to incomplete and inconsistent internalization early on. This latter point characterized early resolutions in Sierra Leone, however in Timor-Leste even those elements were absent in early conflict-specific resolutions.¹⁰¹

For Sierra Leone, this changed in late 2006 when the UNSC began invoking 1325 more consistently and sometimes more robustly in resolutions, a change that may have been attributable to UNSC requests in 2004 and 2005 for UN action within UNIOSIL and broader calls for the development and implementation of 1325 NAP. After this time, SGRSC reports began featuring structural references to SCR 1325 and these continued for the remainder of the UNIOSIL deployment.

¹⁰⁰ Black, Renee. Mainstreaming Resolution 1325? Evaluating the Impact of 1325 on Conflict-Specific Resolutions. 2008. Unpublished.

¹⁰¹ Black, Renee. Mainstreaming Resolution 1325? Evaluating the Impact on Security Council Resolution 1325 on Country-Specific UN Resolutions. Nov 29, 2008. Unpublished.

Another factor that may have supported momentum in Sierra Leone was the emerging awareness of the UN's failure to adopt gender perspectives in areas of the mission including DDR processes, in which the utility of this resolution in post-conflict reconstruction may have become more evident.

However despite structural references to SCR 1325 towards the end of UNIOSIL, the first UNIPSIL report entirely omits SCR 1325 from analysis, which points to several practical challenges, including sustaining momentum across missions and personnel changes. This also demonstrates that absent complete internalization or institutionalization, even sustained references can drop-off and that degrees of internalization can shift rapidly.

By contrast, Timor-Leste shows no early references to SCR 1325 at all, with the first reference to SCR 1325 appearing in 2006. While references since then have been regular, they fail to call for participation, and focus instead on the protection of women and the prevention of violence through capacity building, UN reform, and gender perspectives. The absence of any early resolution references to SCR 1325 may explain why SGRSC reports fail to incorporate gender issues consistently, as well as showing that there was no momentum developed for participation calls.

Despite the absence of direct or indirect resolution language and international salience, sexual violence was an important characteristic of the Timorese

conflict. This demonstrates that resolution language did not reflect the reality on the ground, possibly due to the early absence of a gender unit within UNMIT, an omission that may have hindered progress on gender issues more broadly.

While causal variables for differing levels of SCR 1325 saliency and later participation references within Sierra Leone are difficult to isolate, one could argue that SCR 1325 was used as a framework to evaluate the calls for gender policies in Sierra Leone, through which it emerged that a gap existed for calls related to participation aspects. International saliency of sexual violence during the Sierra Leone conflict may also help explain these results, in that salience precipitated early references to 1325 and generated momentum for 1325.

Alternatively, this evolution could reflect a more organic process in which women began asserting their rights and voices in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes out of desire to avoid conflict impacts on them in the future. It is presently not clear what has influenced this change.

Within the mission structures in both countries, the manifestation of 1325 is also inconsistent within and across missions for both case studies, and SRSGs demonstrate different degrees of commitment to SCR 1325, pointing to a weakness in institutional internalization. The effectiveness of gender advisors has been hindered by lack of material and human resources. In Sierra Leone, the low ranking of the GA within the mission structure has hindered their ability to influence policy. Early on in Timor-Leste, the SRSG's lack of support inhibited the

early establishment of a gender unit, though the current SGA is placed much higher within the mission hierarchy and is has strong support of the current SRSG. However, without financial, material and human resources to implement mandates, the contribution of GAs is inevitably limited, and his demonstrates a significant weakness in the UN's commitment to this office broadly speaking. Nevertheless, these manifestations are evidence of emerging professions and socialization exercises aimed at influencing normative attitudes and behavior. Furthermore, the establishment of the Best Practices Gender Unit within DPKO to continuously evaluate ways to improve these functions is an encouraging sign of DPKO internalization.

At the national level In Sierra Leone, the GoTL's recent 1325 consultations with women's groups on the development of an NAP is presently the only concrete sign of SCR 1325 influence, and suggests that that internalization may become manifest in policies and programs in the future, but it is not yet institutionalized, habitual or even defined at this stage.

There is limited evidence within the GoTL of any influence of SCR 1325, though the exercise with Ireland suggests promise, as do Reddy's claims that 1325 in informing policy development informally. Instead, both the GoTL and civil society organizations invoke CEDAW and other instruments, and there is overall limited evidence of awareness of SCR 1325.

Although both cases demonstrate relevant structures for addressing gender issues, neither are clearly influenced by SCR 1325.

At all levels, civil society networks have emerged as critical actors in generating support at other levels, including the UNSC, and have generally demonstrated the strongest internalization of SCR 1325, directly and indirectly, though in Timor-Leste, CEDAW and Beijing appears to be the predominant influence.

At a donor level, the recent emergence of 1325 NAP is an encouraging sign of engagement, however only a small number of countries to date have developed NAPs, and some advocates claims that many of these plans do not include all relevant stakeholders and generally lack effective government backing to generate real outcomes.¹⁰² Even in countries where political will and financial commitment exists, it will take time for policies to translate into internalization. As more NAPs emerge, it may be worthwhile to compare how consistently NAPs are structured, how comprehensively NAPs address SCR 1325, which stakeholders are involved in NAP development, how effectively NAPs translate into action, and whether the language of 1325 is adopted by implementing departments and agencies.

This paper shows that there remain several ambiguities in evaluating internalization, which present challenges for on-going analysis. First, there is no obvious way to isolate the effects of SCR 1325 from other instruments with

¹⁰² Sanam Anderlini – Senior Policy Advisor, International Alert. Phone Interview: April 2nd, 2009

overlapping policies and laws, including CEDAW, the MDGs, and the Beijing Platform for Action, and if advancement for women is being achieved through other tools, then it is debatable whether or not this is an important question to ask. Secondly, measuring and comparing progress in the absence of baselines and monitoring mechanisms will continue to be difficult, and there is again, no clear solution for remedying this gap. Thirdly, evaluating whether and how political will is sustained across relevant levels of actors is likely be a laborious task, yet it can shed important insight into shifts in behavior.

Ambiguities also remain around whether internalization is always a good thing. If internalization is merely procedural, does that strictly reinforce a norm or might it instead trivialize the norm? A cursory glance at the 1325 language adopted within and across conflict-specific resolutions shows that identical or nearly identical passages can be found from resolutions to resolution. Does this represent internalization or thoughtless routine? If internalization goes beyond structural considerations and into socialization of actors, how can we measure this shift? Probably the best way to answer this question is through analysis of the discourse and program implementation of relevant actors, which requires a broader and more structured interview process with a broader set of actors than has been done here.

This paper finds that consistent institutionalization is lacking at almost every level within these case studies, and this has accordingly produced inconsistent

degrees of internalization. The few examples that do exist are manifestly inadequate to produce strategic and coherent change.¹⁰³ Institutions must not only exist, they must be effectively mandated, designed, staffed, managed and sustained, and must have sufficient financial resources to produce tangible change. The case of gender advisors, particularly in Sierra Leone, demonstrates that while professions are emerging, they can come late in UN missions, and may lack rank, resources and SRSG support, potentially inhibiting their ability to exercise effective influence within the mission and host country.

This opens the broader question of whether internalization manifests itself in venues other than bureaucracies. That is - does internalization translate into positive impact for women in post-conflict environments? While this important question is beyond the scope of this paper, it suggests a gap in the norm lifecycle proposition, which goes only as far as evaluating how ideas diffuse at the global levels, but which ignores whether norms effectively translate into outcomes. In this sense, the norm lifecycle arguably does not go far enough, particularly when considering the authors' discourse on translating "oughtness" into reality.

Finally, this analysis assumes that this global norm had moved from cascading and into internalization when SCR 1325 was formally adopted, yet this is a questionable assumption. Beyond the adoption of this resolution, there is limited evidence of sustained, systematic or sufficiently habitual internalization to

¹⁰³ Lewis, Stephen. The United Nations and Gender: Has Anything Gone Right? Remarks at the Carnegie Council in New York, New York. February 26, 2009.

suggest that this norm would persist over time, and within and across missions, absent advocacy efforts reinforcing its need.

Barriers to Internalization

Two key factors can help to explain limited evidence of internalization to date: 1) lack of political will, financial and material resources, and 2) lack of monitoring mechanism.

Lack of political will is evident in many areas the UN, country missions, the UNSC and in member-states. The UN overall has not given adequate resources, power and mandate to address the issues at the levels where decisions can be effectively made and implemented. Until 2006, the UNSC inconsistently and incompletely invoked its own language in particular with regards to the increased participation of women in missions and in post-conflict peacebuilding, and tended to focus instead on less politically stubborn policies under protection and prevention pillars. SRSGs have also been inconsistent in their understanding of the need to include women and in their treatment of gender issues broadly and of 1325 in particular.

The passive request for the development and implementation of 1325 NAPs into foreign policies creates a lot of room for states to ignore this request, and to not fulfill their own plans once created. Furthermore, the gap between the words and deeds of donors is also arguably an issue. Many donor countries call for policies such as affirmative action and quotas in developing countries, yet demonstrate a

lack of political will and courage to implement such policies at home. If real change is to become manifest and credible, it surely requires that policies do not reflect hypocrisy.

The second barrier is the lack of monitoring mechanism to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of 1325. Absent UN level monitoring, progress on 1325 commitment and implementation has and will continue to be challenging to measure. The development of NAP represents an attempt to address this gap, and has the possible bonus of generating greater ownership at national levels, but at the cost that it will likely be very challenging to systematically compare these tools to one another both in design, implementation and measurement processes. It will be interesting to examine whether or not this process generates greater levels of ownership in countries where NAPs are developed, and how effectively these policies translate into action.

Despite these challenges, there is some hope that the UN Coherence reform, of which the Gender Equality Architecture Reform (GEAR) is a key priority, may overcome these challenges. Proponents are advocating for the development of an international women's agency at the Under-Secretary level featuring both a normative and operational components with \$1 billion to start. Such a model has clear potential to facilitate a more strategic analysis of gender equality issues and would be better positioned to develop a more coherent approach to SCR 1325.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Statement to the Commission on the Status of Women by Charlotte Bunch. Mar 3, 2009

However some have voiced concern that internal actors within the UN are proposing complex models that risk compromising the effectiveness of such an agency.¹⁰⁵ This concern has prompted some member-states, including Canada, to indicate their willingness and intention to intervene if they perceive a threat to the effectiveness of this entity. However, if developed as proposed, this step will surely represent the most important opportunity to strengthen commitment to SCR1325 at all levels both strategically and systematically.¹⁰⁶

The missing fourth dimension?

One level of analysis that has been ignored in this paper, and which might add critical perspective on the topic on 1325 influence is the impact of regionalism. This is particularly relevant in Sierra Leone, where the conflict was highly intertwined with other states, and whose gender policies might be influenced by regional developments. For example, neighboring Liberia has experienced arguably the most dramatic advancement in women's leadership of any country in history, with the first elected female head-of-state in Africa, a female SRSG and DSRSG, female heads of the security sector and the judiciary, the first and second ever all-female UN peacekeeping police units, etc.¹⁰⁷ In March 2009, Liberia also hosted the first Colloquium on Women's Empowerment, Leadership Development, Peace & Security, co-sponsored with Finland and attended by policy-makers, NGOs, ministers and others from all around the world, with

¹⁰⁵ Lewis, Stephen. The United Nations and Gender: Has Anything Gone Right? Remarks at the Carnegie Council in New York, New York. February 26, 2009.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Ambassador Henri-Paul Normandin, Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN. Mar 6, 2009. New York, NY

¹⁰⁷ http://www.undispatch.com/archives/2007/05/interview_with_1.html

particular participation from the West African region countries. The output of that meeting included a call-to-action on the implementation of Resolution 1325¹⁰⁸ and the meeting was followed by the launch of Liberia's own NAP, joining Cote D'Ivoire as the only developing countries to date on this list. This country seems to undoubtedly represent the strongest evidence of national-level internalization of all UN member-states.

MARWOPNET is in fact a regional network, and has been recognized by the UN for its contributions to regional stability since inception in 2000. Regional governance organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS may also be advancing relevant strategies wherein SCR principles would be ideally applied.

Regionalism also has potential implications for Timor-Leste, particularly if principle donor countries implement NAPs. A Defense White Paper for Australia suggests that its own NAP may be in development, and this could influence development priorities in Timor-Leste moving forward.

CONCLUSION

This paper has evaluated the internalization of SCR 1325 on two post-conflict countries by using the norm life cycle model. While there is some evidence that internalization is taking place within certain actors, this analysis reveals both that manifestation is inconsistent within and across levels and countries and that in

¹⁰⁸ The Monrovia Declaration. A Call to Action from the Participants of the International Colloquium on Women's Leadership, Development, International Peace and Security. Monrovia, Liberia. Mar 8, 2009.

practice, recognizing internalization is neither easy nor obvious. It furthermore highlights important gaps in how this norm has become internalized in the policies, programs and structures of various implementing stakeholders, by demonstrating a disproportionate focus, particularly early on, on the protection of women from violence or on the prevention of violence through procedural changes rather than through the active participation of women as a key agents of peacebuilding.

This analysis posits whether or not the salience of sexual violence in Sierra Leone was responsible for a higher proportion of references to SCR 1325 in conflict-specific resolutions, to stronger salience of SCR 1325 generally, and to later calls participation calls specifically. While it is difficult to draw this conclusion, it is worth exploring this question in other case studies. If so, it suggests that NGOs who express resistance to protection-only calls should reconsider their position if it contributes to broader longer-term language.

NGO networks at both the local and international level have been critical in advancing gender issues more broadly, and SCR 1325 more specifically in Sierra Leone, showing that actors other than states are having roles in influencing force in norm diffusion.

This analysis also questions whether or not institutionalization is itself a risk, particularly if norms are improperly or incompletely internalized and become

thoughtless routine that does not actually produce intended change. Institutions require sustained political will, effective design and implementation, and iterative evaluation to produce desired and improved change.

More strategic and coherent efforts to address these issues are required, and it will be very interesting to see what developments take place under the UN Coherence AND GEAR reform, which represent the strongest options for overcoming current barriers to complete internalization.

Finally, this analysis finds that while the life cycle is helpful in evaluating degrees of internalization, it suggests that this model is incomplete and should go a step beyond how norms are internalized by stakeholders to include how they translate into impact to intended beneficiaries. The need for this step should be self-evident: there is limited value in understanding how a norm impacts the language of governing actors if it does not ultimately produce desired change in the lives of those it purports to help.

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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

In-field NGO Interview Questions

- 1) Can you tell me how much you know about Resolution 1325 and whether or not it is a significant factor in shaping policies and programs?
- 2) Can you tell me what steps have been taken to implement the principles of Resolution 1325 within your mission/ operation/ organizations? Specifically, what programs have you implemented to operationalize Resolution 1325?
- 3) How do you intend to measure whether or not these programs have been successful in achieving their goals?
- 4) How successful do you feel these efforts have been in creating tangible results for women?
- 5) How could the programs be improved to produce stronger outcomes?
- 6) In your opinion, what, if any, other critical success factor (i.e. barriers) are needed to produce the strongest chance for change in this area?

Despite sending correspondences to dozens of NGOs across the two countries, I received very few responses from Sierra Leone, and none at all from Timor-Leste.

Other Interviews

Questions for other actors (UN staff, Ambassadors, New York-based NGOs, etc) were drafted on an individual basis and depended significantly on the degree of familiarity with SCR 1325, who the interviewee was, and what role, if any, they have with respect to Resolution 1325.

APPENDIX B – LIST OF INTERVIEWS BY DATE

- 1) Nell Stewart, First Secretary Human Rights and Social Affairs
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
Interview: February 24th, 2009
- 2) Clare Hutchinson, Gender Best Practices
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Interview: February 25th, 2009
- 3) Nicola Popovic, Gender, Peace and Security Advisor
UN-INSTRAW
Phone Interview: February 26th, 2009
- 4) Roland Vanderberg, Program Director
Cause Canada
Email Interview: March 2nd, 2009
- 5) Nelson Santos, Ambassador
Permanent Mission of Timor-Leste to the United Nations
Interview: March 4th, 2009
- 6) Mary Conteh, Director
Women Centre for Good Governance
Phone Interview: March 4th, 2009
- 7) Henri-Paul Normandin, Ambassador
Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN
Interview: March 6th, 2009
- 8) Cora Weiss, President
Hague Appeal for Peace
Phone Interview: March 10th, 2009
- 9) Carolyn MacAskie, Former Assistant Chair
United Nations Assistant-Secretary General on Peacebuilding Support
Phone Interview: March 16th, 2009
- 10) Rita Reddy, Senior Gender Advisor
United Nations Mission in Timor (UNMIT)
Phone Interview: March 19th, 2009
- 11) Anwarul Chowdhury, Past Ambassador
Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the UN
Interview: March 31st, 2009

- 12) Sanam Anderlini, Senior Policy Advisor
Phone Interview: April 2nd, 2009
- 13) Anne-Marie Goetz, Chief Advisor, Governance, Peace & Security
UNIFEM
April 14th, 2009
- 14) Sam Cook, PeaceWomen Project Associate
PeaceWomen/ Women's International League for Peace & Freedom
April 14th, 2009

APPENDIX C – NGO WORKING GROUP CHECKLIST

Questions on Women’s Participation and Gender Perspectives for Drafting Security Council Resolutions.

- 1. References to Resolution 1325:** Is UN SC resolution 1325 referred to in the Preambular section and followed by an Operational Reference?
- 2. UN Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations:** Does the resolution call for the incorporation of a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and the establishment of a gender component within the staff of a mission? Does the resolution call for an expanded role for women in UN field operations among military, police and civilian personnel?
- 3. Conflict Prevention:** In recognizing the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, does the resolution support the creation and strengthening of non-governmental organizations, including women’s organizations, active in conflict prevention work?
- 4. Promotion and Protection of Human Rights:** Does the resolution establish mechanisms to investigate, monitor and report on violations of women’s human rights, including gender-based violence and sexual abuse? Does the resolution call for mechanisms to bring to end impunity for such violations?
- 5. Civil Society:** Does the resolution recognize the important role of civil society in post-conflict peacebuilding? Does the resolution encourage regular consultation with civil society organizations, in particular local women’s groups and peace initiatives, in the planning and implementation of its field operations?
- 6. Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement:** Does the resolution ensure that the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) programme upholds the human rights of women and girls—as ex-combatants as well as associates of ex-combatants - through consideration of their specific needs and circumstances? Does the resolution ensure that women and girls are consulted in the design and planning of DDRRR programmes that affect them?
- 7. Peace Negotiations and Peace Agreements:** Does the resolution call for the equal and active participation of women in peace negotiations as well as in the drafting and implementation of peace agreements? Does the resolution call on all actors to integrate a gender perspective when negotiating a peace agreement?
- 8. Constitution-Creation, Justice and Security Sector Reform:** Does the resolution ensure the full and equal participation of women in the process of creating a constitution and developing a new judiciary? Does the resolution

ensure that women's protection and participation is central to the design and reform of security sector institutions and policies, especially in police, military and rule of law components?

9. Governance and Electoral Processes: Does the resolution call for the formation of a government, which is fully representative of men and women, allows for the full and equal participation of women in its operations, and respects the human rights of women and girls? Does the resolution call for measures to ensure that women may participate without discrimination in all elections and that women are represented equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes?

10. Reporting: Does the resolution request that the Secretary-General ensure that his report on conflict situations integrate a gender perspective?

11. Sexual Exploitation/ Codes of Conduct: Does the resolution, in condemning acts of sexual abuse of women and girls by UN personnel, call for peacekeeping personnel of contributing countries to adhere to pertinent codes of conduct and disciplinary and accountability mechanisms in order to prevent such exploitation?

12. Training of UN Field Personnel: Does the resolution call for gender training to peacekeeping civilian personnel, including police, and other members of peace and field operations on the rights and protection of women and girls, including on issues related to HIV/AIDS?

13. Obligations Under/ Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Does the resolution call for specific measures to strengthen local rule of law and human rights institutions, drawing on existing civilian police, human rights, gender and judicial expertise?

14. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Does the resolution address the particular protection and assistance needs of refugee and internally displaced women and girls? Does the resolution call for the participation of refugee and displaced women in the planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all programmes providing assistance to refugee and other displaced women, including the management of refugee camps and resources?

15. Humanitarian Assistance/ Protection of Civilians: Does the resolution call for the provision and coordination of humanitarian assistance, and access to humanitarian workers by the civilian population, with a focus on the particular protection needs of women and girls?

APPENDIX D – TERMS & DEFINITIONS

Direct Reference refers to 1325 are specifically made in strategic organizational document. For Security Council Resolutions, this means that the preambular text of the resolution specifically refers to 1325, followed by an operational reference to aspects of Resolution 1325 (see Appendix E for the wording of Resolution 1325). For Secretary General Reports to the Security Council and any other strategic document, this means that 1325 is directly referenced in the report, project or policies of an organization.

Impact refers to a specific measurable outcome in the lives of women derived from a policy, program or project specifically influenced by 1325

Indirect Reference refers to evidence where 1325 is not directly referenced, but where the language of 1325 is invoked. For Security Council Resolutions, this means that there is no specific reference to Resolution 1325, but that aspects of the resolution invoke aspects of the language of 1325 (see Appendix E for the wording of Resolution 1325)

Structural reference is a type of output found in periodic reports that contain specific sections related to a certain topic (e.g. a structural reference to 1325

APPENDIX E – RESOLUTION 1325

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women

in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.