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THE FAILURE OF THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
IN THE LIGHT OF
THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS

(THE SOVIET STATE - A NEW TYPE OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM)

by

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(Fr. Ignatius, O.F.M.)

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1823

Thesis presented to the School of
Political, Economic and Social
Sciences of the University of
Ottawa as partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

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INTRODUCTION

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Innate in human nature is a desire for happiness and perfection. The individual, as well as society, is forever dissatisfied with the existing state-forms under which he lives, and is constantly striving for a more perfect way of life. His strivings become the more intense as he realizes the deficiencies and imperfections of his present state. Many men have dreamed of the perfect state, some have tried to create it, but none have succeeded.

The causes of their failures were many. One of the most common errors was, of course, their complete failure to take into account the complexity of the human being. Man is not a creature of matter only, but he has a spirit, a soul with all its functions, reason and free will. No perfect society can be created unless and until it takes this spiritual side of man into account. Well-regulated and disciplined though it may be, the purely materialistic society can never provide man with the inner satisfaction and perfection he seeks. These many theoretically perfect states are usually named "Utopia".¹

¹From the Greek "ou"(not) and "topos"(a place). 1. A book (1516) by Sir Thomas More describing an ideal commonwealth. Utopia is an imaginary island, enjoying perfection in politics, law, etc. 2. Hence, any place of ideal perfection; also an impracticable scheme of social regeneration. Webster's New College Dictionary, 2nd ed., Merriam, Springfield, Mass, 1949, p.938, col.1

The only successful achievement of this perfect state, and that on a far smaller scale than the organized political state-form, is found in small communities of the Catholic Religious Orders and Congregations, where life is based on supernatural and spiritual principles, with the prerequisites of a special vocation and training, and where the aims are not the material things of this world. Even within these communities, there are many difficulties, and the "safety valve" of the continuing permission of withdrawal is present.

Anyone who fails to consider this complexity of man, as a rational human being with free will, and who would base his calculations only on the material side of nature, eliminating the spiritual, while planning a social structure is, a priori, doomed to failure. The only possible avenue open to the maintenance of such an imperfect and crippled structure leads along the paths of violence and oppression.

Communism is such a one-sided and imperfect social structure. It has promised happiness, prosperity and a paradise on earth. Instead it has brought unhappiness, misery, bloodshed, mass executions, genocide and general degradation of humanity. It is not satisfied with the portion of misery already under its trampling heels. It

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must extend its control over the entire world by deceit, halftruths, lies, violence, threats of war, and, if need be, by war itself.

It is a false doctrine, because it is based on false premises, and as such it must necessarily turn to violence and oppression, as we now witness it in Soviet Russia and her captive countries.

In my research I have tried to confront the situation in Communist Russia today with the precepts of Marx and its promises of paradise on earth for all humanity. I have tried further to show how their seizure of power has brought them to oppression, violence, deceit and terror. The slogans and the drive to exploit the universal desire for happiness -- for the old Russian imperialism -- are all that remain of the "idealistic" teachings of Communism.

OTTAWA, Canada,
May 30, 1953.

PART I

FALSE IDEAL

CHAPTER ONE

MARXIST EVOLUTIONARY MATERIALISM

CHAPTER ONE

MARXIST EVOLUTIONARY MATERIALISM

The history of mankind is a history of a constant conflict between good and evil. In our days it is exemplified in the struggle between Bolshevistic atheistic Communism and the Christian civilization which it is determined to undermine. As far back as 1846 the Holy See condemned "that infamous doctrine called Communism which is absolutely contrary to the Natural Law itself, and if once adopted would utterly destroy the rights, property and possessions of all men and even society itself"¹. No idle warning, this. At a later date, Leo XIII defined Communism as "the fatal plague which insinuates itself into the very marrow of human society only to bring about its ruin".²

¹ In Encyclicis Litteris "Qui pluribus": "Huc (spectat) infanda ac vel ipsa naturali iuri maxime adversa de Communismo, uti vocant, doctrina, qua semel admissa, omnium iura, res, proprietates, ac vel ipsa humana societas funditus everterentur" (Litt. Enc. "Qui Pluribus", die 9 nov. 1846: Acta Pii IX, Vol. I, p. 13. Cf. Syllabus (Acta Apostolicae Sedis) Vol. III, p. 170.

² Litt. Enc. "Quod Apostolici Muneris", 28 dec. 1878: Acta Leonis XIII, Vol. I, p. 46. "... lethiferam pestem, quae per artus intimos humanae societatis serpit, eamque in extremum discrimen adducit".

Pius XI has protested in more than one encyclical against the threat Communism poses to the Christian way of life.¹

In "Divini Redemptoris"² Pope Pius XI blueprints carefully the principles of Atheistic Communism as taught by Bolshevism. He has given us, in this encyclical, a sharp contrast between the false doctrines of Communism and the clear instructions of the Church, in setting forth in detail the methods adopted by the Bolsheviks.

I. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION

It is not by chance that Communists today are described as 'zealous' or 'fanatical'. The teaching of communism in these times has taken on a religious hue in its proclamation of a false justice, equality, and fraternity to the 'downtrodden masses' -- those to whom the unequal distribution of the things of this world has brought misery and despair. Wherever Communism has gained a foothold, this doctrine of the

¹ Litt. Enc. "Miserentissimus Redemptor" (8 maii, 1928: A.A.S. Vol. XX, pp. 165-178; "Quadragesimo Anno" (15 maii, 1931: A.A.S. Vol. XXIII, pp. 177-228); "Caritate Christi" (3 maii 1932: A.A.S., Vol. XXIV, 177-194); "Acerba Animi" (29 sept. 1932: A.A.S., Vol. XXIV, pp. 321-332.)

² Litt. Enc. de Communismo atheo: "Divini Redemptoris, 19 martii 1937, A.A.S. An. et vol. XXIX, 31 martii 1937 (Ser. II, v. IV) -Num. 4, pp. 65-106.

new justice is held to be the root-stock of economic development. It is, of course, not to be explained that economic progress may also be due to an intensive industrialization in a hitherto agrarian community, to the headlong development of unbounded natural resources, and to the inhuman (an unrestrained) use of brute force to ensure cheap labour.

Modern Communism developed from the teachings of Karl Marx. In the light of his theories, MATTER is the only reality. From it everything else develops -- plant, animal, man and even human Society. Through some blind law, and the relentless conflict of restless forces, MATTER is gradually moving to a SOCIETY devoid of any class-form. In such teachings, there is no room for God, there is no acknowledgement of an elemental difference between MATTER and SPIRIT, between soul and body. By denying the existence of a spirit and therefore of a soul, they also deny immortality. This class struggle may be accentuated and assisted by man. Hence we have the spectacle of the Communist rallying the masses to 'progress' with slogans of hate and destruction to foment class conflict.

Annihilation of any opposition by man as an individual or by society as a whole is the Communist gospel of destruction.

II. MAN AND THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

Communism strips man of his freedom, his personal dignity, and unfetters human passion completely. The Communist denies the natural rights of man. He is reduced to the status of a cog in the State machine. The dogma of Communism, in its absolute insistence on the equality of man, denies even parental authority. There can be no such thing as private property, because property rights have been confiscated by the State. By repudiating the idea of a sacred value on human life, in its soul-less philosophy, Communism has reduced the family and marriage to a contrived civil convenience governed only by an economic law. There is no indissolubility of marriage. Its duration is subject only to the whim of the State or the individual. Woman has been 'emancipated'. She no longer wears the shackles of the home, but the coveralls of the factory. She has been 'liberated' into the hopper of industrial activity -- one more statistic added to the work-force. The care of the home and the children must then be entirely in the hands of the State. Parents have no rights over the education of their children, and what they do in the matter of the teaching of the young is entirely at the mercy of a capricious State. In this unnatural relationship, the State has become the absolute and unquestionable master, with man reduced to a slave-state.

III. COMMUNIST SOCIETY

In a fully Communist society, all values other than the economic would disappear. There would be no order other than the economic order, and its single aim would be to produce material goods by means of an unrestricted policy of collective labour. Each individual would "give according to his powers" and would "receive according to his needs".¹ Under a collective labour plan, there would be no provision for the wishes or needs of an individual, who would be reduced to the status of a slave-labourer. Law would be replaced by force. By denial of the spiritual part of man, a pseudo-civilized humanity without God would take the place of an obliterated morality. When the 'collective mentality' basic to such a way of life has become an established fact, then there will no longer be a State. Any reason for its existence will have disappeared and so it will "wither away"² in a fully class-less society.

¹ "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". in Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, p.14, (a new translation, New York, International Publishers, 1938); Lenin, State and Revolution, p.79., London, Martin Lawrence Ltd., 1933.

² "... the State will not be 'abolished'; it will wither away". Engels., Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science. p.307., New York, International Publishers, 1939.

Until that day of deliverance is at hand, Communism will use the State and the powers of the State to hasten the arrival of Utopia. This is the new evangelism, the new liberation and salvation presented to an unhappy world. As a way of life Communism can offer only promises, founded on half-truths and outright lies, diametrically opposed to common sense, God's Revelation, and it is the implacable enemy of the social order at whose roots it gnaws unceasingly. It refuses to admit the true origin and purpose of the State, and denies to man his freedom in any spiritual sense, his natural rights, and his dignity as an individual.

IV. - THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM

Alluring Promises

Communism has spread wildly and widely throughout the world because few of its disciples have ever looked below the pretense of its promises. By vehemently preaching the doctrine of bettering the lot of the working man, and exposing the admitted economic abuses of our days, Communism has duped many who would in principle reject any connection with materialism and terror. Yet, without the twin ideas of force and irreligion, there could be no Communism as we know the meaning of the work. Every error contains its own small core of truth, and these partial truths are flung as a challenge

to the non-Communist world as a smoke-screen to cover its own basic brutalities and the utterly callous inhumanity of the Communist doctrines and methods. Because of their extraordinary flexibility of doctrine and the complete discipline of the trained infiltration tacticians guiding Communist groups everywhere, they have managed to deceive many of the keener minds in a community, and these in turn become defenders and teachers of the movement. They are usually unaware of the viciousness of the programme they advocate so strongly. Communism plays upon natural frictions wherever they may be found. Racial antagonisms and political differences are fertile soils for the seeds of Communist-inspired dissensions. The philosophy has an especially easy penetration into universities where agnostic science falls easy prey to its plausibility.

Liberalism prepares the way

The machine age brought the philosophy of Liberalism. It de-Christianized the world of Capital and Labour, and thus paved the way for Communism, Smarting under real and imagined injustices, and stripped of any spiritual outlook on life in the interests of 'efficiency', Labour has turned to the promises of Communism for relief. Blinded to

the demoniac lie beneath, the worker seeks his better social order in the golden words of the New Evangelists.

Silence of the Press

The rapid spread of Communist thought is due in no small measure to a propaganda machine so completely diabolic in its functioning that it is doubtful if a parallel development could ever be found. Although directed from one central spot, it adapts itself chameleon-like to the varying circumstances of location and personal (or political) expediency. It has tremendous financial backing, international organization, and literally thousands of trained personnel. It makes use of every medium of communication -- press, radio, moving pictures, and secures for itself a wide dissemination by infecting the schools from the lower grades through university. It is so insidious and effective that it has been known to sway better-minded groups who are still unaware, or have learned too late, of the nature of the venom injected. For too long, the Press maintained an uneasy silence in the face of mounting suspicion and awareness of the true nature of Communism and the possible dangers of its impact on the democratic way of life.

The Consequences

The effects of this propaganda are not hard to find. Wherever Communism has gained a foothold, it has attacked our Christian civilization as a mortal enemy. We need look no farther than Russia with so many countries behind a so-called 'Iron Curtain'. Here Utopia may be translated to mean men and women tortured to death in the most inhuman fashion or condemned to the living death of imprisonment without trial or even the most elementary forms of justice, to the mockeries of the People's Courts, or to forced labour on a bare subsistence diet. In practice and in propaganda religion must be ripped out of the fabric of living. There is no place for God in the minds of the young, and the elemental laws of survival, the so-called law of the jungle, must replace Him there.

No reasoning individual can be surprised by the blood-soaked pages of present-day Communist history. Obliterate Christ from the minds of men, and leave nothing but the animal raging unchecked and unrestrained. Result -- chaos! Small wonder that the present struggle of the titans is, for the first time in our history, an implacable conflict between man and "all that is called God".¹

¹ Thessalonians, II:4.

Of its nature, Communism is anti-religious. It has openly dismissed religion as "the opiate of the people"¹ because the immortality taught by Christianity repudiates the now-unattainable Soviet dream of paradise here on earth. In spite of a generation of terror and enslavement, Russia has failed in its vaunted objective of a terrestrial heaven. Morality is needed even in the sphere of economics. Having deliberately destroyed morality, nothing but terrorism is left to Russia. Now she is faced with the 'terror state' where sworn comrades of revolutionary days are destroying each other.

¹ Marx, "Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right" from "Selected Essays", translated by H.J. Stenning, New York, International Publishers, 1926.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH

I. GOD, THE SUPREME REALITY

In sharp contrast to the confusions, the vacillations and the violent reversals of direction of Communist tactics together with the smoke-screen techniques they have raised to a state of perfection, we have the unchanging clarity of Christian teaching regarding human society. Above everything else there is God, the all powerful Creator and judge of all men. Man has been given natural and supernatural gifts. The principal aim of man in this life and in the next is God Himself. The divine sanction of the family as a unit should not be lost to sight, because from this single unit development into the larger community of whatever political state-form may develop, we arrive at the Divine approval of the State. This State is to serve man in his larger social needs. It is to help him to Heaven. Man has obligations towards the State, but that does not transfer to the State any power to abrogate his natural rights which have always been considered inviolate, and have been so written into the framework

of law in many civil communities (witness the American Declaration of Independence, "... the 'inalienable rights' ... guaranteed in particular by the Fifth Amendment that no man 'may be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...'").

As man has obligations towards the State, so in turn must the State guarantee for the individual the right to hold property without fear of confiscation, to protect his property and his person, and to grant to the worker the right to receive a living wage adequate for his livelihood and for that of his family. In the ideal State, tempered with the wise and considered application of social justice, Capital and Labour are not considered mortal enemies (as Communism would treat them) but as two complementary parts of a whole. Regardless of its political form, the function of the State is to promote cooperation among its members. No class should receive any special privilege ... but the myth of complete equality has been too long encouraged. All men do NOT have equal rights in society. In every state a lawful natural hierarchy will evolve. There will always be the governors and the governed, the so-called 'white-collar workers' and manual workers, professional and business groups, the

armed services, and the civil servants. It is impossible to legislate 'equality' of ability, as opposed to acquired techniques.

Communism, by attempting to do just this, is running afoul of Reason, and Revelation, quite apart from Human Nature itself. Both Man and the State derive their inter-dependent powers from God. Consequently they cannot deny or diminish the rights of each other. Communism has been bending every effort to replacing this Divine Law with a partisan political effort, limited only by the will of a tightly drawn corps of the elite.

In contradicting the whole fabric of the Communist tissue of lies, the Church is setting forth in the most practical fashion the true meaning of Bethlehem: "... Glory to God in the highest ... and peace on earth to men of good will ..." ¹ The dictum of social justice as expounded in the great encyclicals calls for freedom and disciplines authority, for secured rights, and clearly defined duties and responsibilities of all groups and individuals. The Church does not attempt to divorce a regard for temporal welfare from eternal values. Well does she know that it is outside her field to attempt to define an economic system, but the guiding principles for any economic system destined to promote the welfare of mankind on earth are well within her frame of reference. In its earliest

¹ Luke, 2, 14.

years the Church preached and taught the dignity of man and the brotherhood of man. Through her teachings, human slavery was gradually abolished, and man came to recognize the personal dignity of labour. Unfortunately, the heads of nations strayed too far from the simple doctrines of Christ and built their houses on the foundation stones of liberalism and laicism. Because of the faulty materials used in its construction, the whole house they built is now crashing down around them.

II. A CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMME -- RENEWAL OF CHRISTIAN LIFE

If we want to avoid the dangers of Communism, we must translate into action all the teachings of Christianity. We cannot be less enthusiastic than the Communists, and we must do more than match them in action. Unless we can provide more by Christian action to solve the ills of the human race than can the unenlightened disciples of Moscow, we cannot help but fall behind in the race for men's minds. The first need is a thorough revitalizing of Christian life so that it may truly become the salt of the earth to preserve mankind from total corruption. The Christian who fails to live his religion fully will soon fail to be a Christian at all, in these days of world persecution and unrest.

Two of the teachings of Christ have a distinct bearing on present conditions -- the command of charity and a complete detachment from earthly goods.

Charity, in the original Christ-given sense of the word, is the most important remedy for modern ills. This is "charity that is patient, charity that is kind"¹-- in other words, charity as it is expressed in the performance of the spiritual and corporal works of mercy. This "new precept"² as Christ called it, will unleash an undreamed of invigorating energy. Charity must be proclaimed by pen and by preaching, charity that leads us to believe that our fellow-human in need is in the direst need of all. Observance of Christian charity will give peace to the hearts of man and will finally cure the ills that now weigh humanity heavily beneath their burden.

In these materialistic days, where all things worldly are sought after with a fixed purposefulness that would have done credit to the early martyrs, the crying need is for detachment from the things of earth. It would be well for the rich man to keep in mind that

¹ Corinthians: XIII:4

² St. John, XIII:34

he holds his wealth only as a trust from his Maker. Someday, like the steward of the parable¹ he must give account to God of the uses to which that wealth was put. The poor man must also remember that even while he is struggling to better his lot, comfort and prosperity on earth will always be inferior to the riches of the spirit. Heaven is not to be found here on earth. In the words of St. Paul "... we have not here a lasting city, but we seek one that is to come".²

III. DUTIES OF JUSTICE

True charity includes all the Commandments. It must follow, therefore, that true charity cannot exist without justice. Charity that denies the workman a living wage is not charity at all, but a sham. It is no charity to give in alms to a worker what justice insists is his rightful due. Employers must remember that if they ignore the teachings of the Church on the rights of a worker to a just wage sufficient for himself and the needs of his family, then they are no longer Christians.

There is an obligation of justice between man and man, and there is, too, the obligation of social justice binding employers and employees alike. This demands from each individual all that is necessary for the common good. Taken as a whole, the good of society can only be fulfilled

¹ St. Luke, XVI:1-9

² Hebrews, XIII:7-17

when each individual is supplied with the necessities of life, raised beyond the animal level of mere existence to the dignity of the human.¹

For the worker this means a living family wage. Moreover, it means the provision of sufficient 'extras' to allow some savings. The worker must make provision for avoiding poverty, and through either public or private institutions, insure his wants in time of illness, unemployment, and old age. (It might be well to note in passing that the obligation of social justice weighs equally upon the worker to return full value in terms of productivity to his employer in return for this living wage.) Considering the whole present economic structure, charity and justice will best be served by mutual cooperation and understanding between employers and the employee.

¹ Et enim tum demum res oeconomico-socialis et vere constabit et suos fines obtinebit, si omnibus et singulis bona omnia suppeditata fuerint, quae opibus et subsidiis naturae arte technica, sociali rei oeconomicae constitutione praestari possunt; quae quidem bona tot esse debent, quot necessaria sunt et ad necessitatibus honestisque commodis satisfaciendum, et ad homines provehendos ad feliciorum illum vitae cultum, qui modo prudentior res geratur, virtuti non solum non obest, sed magnopere prodest. (Litt. Enc. "Quadragesimo Anno", 15 maii 1931: A.A.S., Vol. XXXIII, 1931, p. 202.)

As the Social Encyclicals of the Church indicate,¹ there is a great place in our Christian form of life for associations of employers and employees, founded on mutual trust and respect, and tempered in all dealings by a truly Christian understanding of each other's needs.²

The Press can play an important role here by explaining the truth of Catholic social ideas and revealing the specious reasoning behind the propaganda of Communism. Truth must conquer falsehood. In its beginnings, Communism laid no false claims, but it now hides itself behind attractive-sounding phrases and ideas. Calling for peace, the Communist instigates war

¹ "de civilis principatus auctoritate" (Litt.Enc. "Diuturnum illud", 29 iun.1881: Acta Leonis XIII, Vol.II, pp.269-287)

"de Christiana civitatum constitutione" (Litt.Enc. "Immortale Dei", 1 nov.1885: Acta Leonis XIII, Vol.V, pp.118-150)

Litt.Enc. "Rerum Novarum" 15 maii 1891: Acta Leonis XIII, Vol.XI, pp.97-144.

"... qui possunt humana consistere commercia qui vim narcisci factiones, ubi nullum sit conscientiae vadium, ubi nulla sit in Deum fides, nullus Dei timor? Hoc enim sublato fundamento, omnis morum decedit lex, nihilque impedire poterit, quoniam gradatim, at necessario praecipites ruant gentes, familiae res publica ipseque humanae vitae cultus." (Litt.Enc. "Caritate Christi", 3 maii, 1932, A.A.S., Vol.XXIV, p.190.

² Litt.Enc. "Quadragesimo Anno", 15 maii, 1931: A.A.S., Vol.XXIII, 1931, pp.177-228.

between classes. In the mouth of the Communist, democracy, humanitarianism, the popular fronts, are just names calculated to deceive the unwary. Communism is intrinsically wrong and no one may collaborate with it for any end if they are not willing to see Christian civilization destroyed.

The deceptions of agitators seem to fall on most fertile ground among the poor, who are more easily led astray by the glorious promises of Communism. Their sufferings and maladjustments make prime capital for the professional revolutionaries. Although we have at last begun to recognize the need for concerted action, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that when the life of a nation is endangered, everything but a united defence must take second place. Today, there is one vital need -- to protect to the limit the very foundations of the Faith and of Christian civilization. If we allow dissensions between Christians, we play into the hands of an enemy who knows only too well how to twist and distort them in the venomous expanse of their teachings. Neither can the State ignore its responsibility in securing those material conditions for all which are vital to the orderly existence of Society. It has already been proven often enough that excessive wealth in the hands of a few will lead to abuses and should not, therefore, be tolerated, in the interests of the common good. Remedial legislation should be enacted where it is

needed. In the administration of public moneys, no consideration other than the common good is admissible.

PART II

THE SOVIET STATE

CHAPTER THREE

FROM LIBERALISM TO STALINISM

CHAPTER THREE

FROM LIBERALISM TO STALINISM

I. FROM LIBERALISM TO SOCIALISM

Since its earliest days, humanity has followed whatever path of development seemed most likely to lead it to a fuller expression of man as an individual, and to organize his political, economic, and social life so that everyone might find his proper place in the community, to develop his capacity, and to provide for the protection of his personal and public rights. In this development, humanity underwent many changes, and while most of the social reforms were gradual, mankind occasionally had to survive the violent shocks of revolution.

The growth of the European nations as political and social units was marked with a truly Christian spirit. This civilization, in turn, was an adaptation of the best of ancient Greek and Roman justice and morality, and the principles of the rights of the individual and society. The socio-political thinking based on these Christian principles still has the same three-fold aims: to lessen or even completely abolish exploit-

ation of the individual or of society as a whole by the State or political authority; to raise the standard of living; and to provide the best possible spiritual and material conditions and the best political and social rights.

From the development of these ideas in teachings and writings evolved a distinct political thought, or school, called Liberalism. Liberalism has its roots in the Middle Ages, but liberal political thinking began to crystallize in an organic system in the middle of the 18th century, in France with J.J.Rousseau (1712-1778), and D. Diderot (1713-1784); and in England with A.Smith (1723-1790), J. Mill (1773-1836), D. Ricardo (1772-1823), and D. Hume (1711-1776).

Liberalism professed the optimistic ideas that man in his nature is good, and that liberty is necessary for his development. During a struggle for liberty, new ideas spring up, the individual gains new concepts, more strength, and progress is the natural evolution. This Liberal ideology led to the French revolution (1789-1804), and from it sprang the "Declaration of Human and Civil Rights"(1789) and the "Napoleonic Code" (1804).

Philosophical Liberalism brought in its wake political Liberalism which is based on the will of the

people, expressed by universal, direct, and secret ballot; with a parliament as the legislative body, and with the executive branch of government responsible to the legislative branch. Economic liberalism demanded also full freedom for all trade and economic enterprise.

Liberalism played a very important role in the field of culture, civilization, and world politics, although it cannot be regarded as perfect or as the only universal system on which human social life can be organized. It gave no clear conception of the relationship between the individual citizen and the state, or of its organizational concept. It left a great deal to the good will of the individual and to society. The ideal alone of liberty, without clear-cut organization and with no firm direction, will not solve society's problems. As a political philosophy, Liberalism produced many undesirable side-effects along with its almost incalculable contributions to the progress of civilization. For proof, we need look no further than Germany for Frederick Nietzsche (1844-1900), whose theory of the rights of an individual to regard himself as a super-man culminated in the apotheosis of Hitler's 'master-race'. In Russia itself, Liberalism lay at the root of the self-adulation which characterized much of Russian writing; the belief in a special mission so obvious in the works of Dostoyevsky;

the spiritual anarchism of Tolstoy; and Nihilism itself -- fertile ground for the germination of Bolshevism.

What Liberalism could not give, i.e. a true, universal system of a social concept, came to light with Socialism, the Christian-Social doctrine. In the principles of Christianity we find the ideas of equality and the brotherhood of man which Socialism later adopted as its own. They were based on the freedom and the right of the individual to express himself on equal footing on political and social affairs.

Social ideas have been expounded by the most prominent philosophers, scientists, and economists. The founder of the most idealistic socialism is the Greek philosopher Plato (429-347 B.C.), pupil of Socrates. But idealistic Socialism reached its climax in theory in the works of the English Sir Thomas More (1472-1538), whose Utopia, written in 1516, remains the definitive treatise on Socialist theory to this day. Serious scientific thinking in the development of Socialism came in the middle of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, stimulated by the French Revolution. The influential works of St-Simon (1760-1825) and Fourier (1772-1837) in France; and of Robert Owen (1771-1858) in England, appeared at that time, to be followed later by the French Proudhon (1809-1865), founder of the so-called 'Anarchism'; and a German, Lassal (1825-1864).

In the middle of the nineteenth century, social thinking wielded a mighty influence on European culture and had innumerable theorists. Some were convinced that humanity would realize its social aims by gradual changes, and the gradual acquisition of social rights and better living conditions. At the opposite end of the scale, others felt that social aims could be achieved only by violent overthrow of existing forms, by revolution, and by destruction of those organizations which are based on political oppression or economic exploitation. In this way, the organized working masses might seize power in their own hands and gain mastery over their own destiny, and over their living and working conditions. In their view, the masses would have to organize and direct their own form of political and economic government.

Unfortunately, ideal socialism, like ideal equality, is not easy to attain -- if it can be reached at all.

The history of the European social movement is inextricably linked with the history of the labour movement. The factory worker was subjected to greater exploitation by Capital and to more misery than the farm worker, but both groups were equally defenceless against oppression and tyranny in every form. Therefore, socialist leaders of factory and farm groups organized a movement principally among the workers for realization of their aims.

II. - MARXISM

Among socialist ideologies, materialistic socialism, or Marxism, as it has generally become known, led the way. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the two founders of Marxism, Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Frederick Engels (1820-1895) had already formulated their materialistic social theories on the experience of rapidly growing industrialization of the Western European states, especially France, Germany, and England.

To understand the social teachings of Marx, it is well to recall that most of his philosophy is based not only on Kant, but on the dialectical logic developed by Hegel (1770-1831). In this dialectic, one concept or thesis inevitably generates its opposite, or anti-thesis, and the interaction of these leads to a new concept known as a synthesis. As a social philosophy however Hegel assumed that society was a moving balance of antithetical forces generating social change by inherent tensions and struggles. He also held that social history itself is an internal evolution of these forces. In the Hegelian theory, nations themselves were held to be the effective units of social development.

That this philosophy exercised an undoubted influence on the political thinking of the nineteenth

century is due largely to the transformation effected in it by Karl Marx. By substituting social classes for the nations as units in the dialectic, Marx completely altered the entire nationalistic, conservative, and counter-revolutionary character of the philosophy. It then emerged as a very powerful type of revolutionary radicalism. In two important respects, the Marxist philosophy was continuous with that of Hegel. It retained the dialectic as a method, and it expanded the modern concept of the Hegel ideology into a sort of economic determinism. Marx's radicalism largely submerged any intrinsically anti-liberal implications in Hegel's unified philosophy, and convinced most nineteenth century Marxists that socialism would be a continuation and not a reversal of political liberalism.

In essence, Marxism assumed that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles, the struggle invariably taking place between different social strata, and taking the form of a continuous tension between the oppressing and the oppressed. In the Marxist adaptation of the Hegel dialectic, every social order based on class division contains the seeds of its own destruction. Every ruling class is eventually displaced by a new ruling class. In modern society, the so-called "bourgeois" (or capitalist) class had displaced the nobility of feudal days, and the industrial revolutions

had simplified the class structure. By sharpening the contrasts of the strata, the stage was set for a struggle between capital and the non-propertied 'wage-slaves' or proletariat. Although Marx regarded this impending struggle as inevitable, one of the basic tenets of the revolutionary party organized under the aegis of his political philosophy was that it should at all times and under all conditions 'co-operate' with, and hasten, the revolution, by bringing about the union of workers of all countries, and by supporting, as expediency directed, whatever political party favoured the 'momentary interests of the working class'.

Just how closely Marx's social philosophy followed the Hegelian dialectic has been well described by Dr. George Sabine, Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University, in his History of Political Theory:

The purpose of Marx's social philosophy was therefore twofold as Hegel's had been. Both men combined a theory of social development with a plan for taking part in it and influencing it... Marx's philosophy, like Hegel's, was a philosophy of history, setting forth 'the natural phases of evolution' which proceeds under the internal drive of the dialectic.... Whereas Hegel ... anticipated the rise of Germany to a position of spiritual leadership in European civilization, Marx believed that social history

¹ Sabine, George H., A History of Political Theory, Holt and Co., New York, revised ed. 1950. pp.753-4.

had culminated in the rise of the proletariat, and he looked forward to the advance of that class to a dominant place in modern society ... In Hegel's philosophy ... the driving force was a self-developing spiritual principle that embodied itself successively in historic nations; in Marx it was a self-developing system of productive forces that embodied itself in basic patterns of economic distribution and in the social classes consequent thereto. For Hegel the mechanism of progress was warfare between nations; for Marx it was antagonism between social classes. Both men regarded the course of history as rationally necessary, a pattern of stages unfolding according to a logical plan and advancing toward a predetermined goal. At the same time, however, Marx's philosophy even more explicitly than Hegel's was a plan for intervening in the course of development, an incitement to action, a peculiar but under proper circumstances a highly appealing form of moral exhortation. Whereas Hegel appealed to national patriotism, Marx appealed to the fidelity of workers to their class. In both cases the appeal was collective; ... In Marx's philosophy this (appeal) meant providing the working class with the understanding, the plan, and the motive needed to prepare and consummate a social revolution ...

Corner-stone of the Marxist system as outlined in Das Kapital is the theory of "surplus value". In brief, this supposes that the value of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labour (measured in time) required for its manufacture. This also holds for the value of labour itself, which in a capitalistic society, is a commodity like any other. The value of the commodities consumed by the worker is less than the value (in terms of time) of the commodities he produces; the difference, called "surplus value" represents the profit of the capitalist.

Thus the bourgeois class prospers through the labour of the proletariat, which moreover is unable to afford to buy the majority of the goods it produces. As production grows, capital, so increased will grow still more, becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of the producers, thus enabling them to exercise more and more power over the working class. In this vicious spiral, the rich become richer and the poor become poorer. In Marx's view, this trend towards a sharp cleavage between two social groups was becoming increasingly pronounced in the middle of the nineteenth century. In The Communist Manifesto written in 1848 Marx sets out the opinion that the resolution of the conflict between these two social groups must be pursued, not only by pressure, but by the gradual acquisition of greater and fuller rights, and if necessary by violent revolution. This revolution of the proletariat should logically occur first in a country where the social cleavage was most advanced, i.e. in a highly industrialized nation. After becoming itself the ruling class, it was to "wrest by degrees all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state" and to "increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible". As a result, class distinctions would gradually disappear and the public power would lose its political character. To use a later phrase,

it would 'wither away' because the conditions generating such class antagonisms would no longer exist.

The fallacy of the Marxist predictions is demonstrated here. The trade union movement resulted, not in a reactionary working force sullenly awaiting the deliverance of a revolution from their oppressors, the capitalist class, but in a notable improvement in their social and working conditions in all highly industrialized countries. In addition, the first proletarian state was established in Russia which could not, at that time, have been considered as highly industrialized by even the most optimistic of indoctrinated observers. Moreover, although the various branches of socialism and communism have derived a common programme calling for collective ownership of the chief means of production from Marxism, they have split on the political issue of how their object should be attained. The moderate socialist parties preferred gradual evolution by parliamentary methods, and the communist parties advocated world revolution.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the doctrines of Marx and Engels were regarded as of paramount importance. Today, they are no longer considered the ultimate in perfection and finality, and the solution they offer is now criticized freely. Their dogmas admit of many

biased and one-sided hypotheses. To mention only one, they based all of their tenets solely on materialism and Historical Materialism. They held that material conditions are not only the principal, but indeed the only motivation in the formation of a political and social entity, and the only force in the formation of the spiritual expression and universal self-awareness of humanity. They deliberately omitted or opposed any discussion of the spiritual, idealistic, moral, and religious matters which play a more essential part in human progress than materialistic and economic questions. It may be argued that the followers of Marx are not alone in assuming that only economic factors determine human behaviour and in their rejection of Divine Providence. Many defenders of the capitalist system are equally strongly convinced of the primacy of matter, and of the non-existence or the irrelevancy of a God. However, it is impossible to deny that while capitalist society is merely indifferent to metaphysics and religion, and in some instances supports both, Marxism advocates an open hostility and a complete annihilation of any of the so-called 'palliatives' of morality, religion, and even the idealization of the state, as advocated by the Hegelian conservatives. In regarding all premised truths and dogmas as nothing more than illusory satisfactions, Marx was striking deeply into the processes of

philosophical reasoning, and in his materialist interpretation he arrived first and foremost at secularism, a release from the symbolic meanings of religious doctrine and ecclesiastical authority. In general he achieved some success in undermining the influence of religion as one of the great conservative forces in society.

Carrying this neo-absolutism to its ultimate in reasoning, it becomes obvious that the revolutionary rights of man cannot be any less relative than the truths of religion, and a further revolution on another level is implicit in the dialectic. This cannot be a political revolution, but must, in the line of his reasoning, become a social revolution.

This change in the social structure as envisioned by Marx would abolish class altogether. Preceding revolutions of a political nature have taken power from one social group and placed it in the hands of another, different, group. Even in its higher stages of development this process must still admit of the existence of an exploited class. Obviously, then, the civil liberties sought by a political revolution are no liberties at all. Even though religious liberty (which should be interpreted in the sense of freedom from religion) be gained, the religion of private determinism would remain. Though

freedom to control property be gained, the property itself still remains as a private right, and although civil equality be assured, society itself will remain static in its stratification.

In the Marxist concept, no solution can be final unless it unites the man and the citizen, the individual's personal and social capacities, and only a revolution by the proletariat can achieve this end, because in the Marxist philosophy the proletariat is defined as the lowest final class below which no exploitable group exists. In the view of the Marxists, the classless society which will result from the revolution of this proletariat will abolish the division of labour and in fact all compulsory labour ... a sort of irreligious return to the Garden of Eden. Experience in the century since Marx first promulgated his theory has shown the errors in fact if not in reasoning of such a doctrine. In emancipating the worker, the middle class, or bourgeoisie has expanded to include many of the workers themselves, and the experience of Fascist nations has shown how violently this middle class will oppose any relegation to the proletariat contrary to the predictions of the socialist theorists.

The founders of Marxism interwove the class struggle for socialism with the struggle for individual human rights and the struggle for freedom of the nations.

They regarded the political power of the state and capital as equally pernicious and evil for humanity. They were implacable enemies of either private capitalism or of state capitalism. In the Marxist view, imperialism is born of the concentration of capital in the state at the expense of the workers. Among others, Marx and Engels regarded the strength and ambitions of Russia as one of the perils of humanity. Russia, the 'prison for nations', monopolized the wealth and capital of all its subjugated nations for centuries, exploited its own citizens, its own working masses, and used the material strength accumulated in this way to conquer more and more territory.

In presenting capitalism for the first time in what might be called its human relationships, Marx correctly depicted the revolutionary potentialities of the situation. Two separate and distinct groups or classes were easily identifiable; on the one hand, a group owning the means of production and motivated only by the necessity of creating profits, and on the other an industrial proletariat having no power except the pressure of well-organized masses, and obliged by the conditions of the times to set the maintenance or improvement of its standard of living, rather than political liberty, as its immediate goals.

Capitalism, in the decades following the Industrial Revolution, emerged as an institution producing and enlarging a class of men wholly dependent on wages for their livelihood, and therefore related to their employers only by a fiscal transaction. Their power to work was their only economically valuable commodity, and hence their one negotiable asset, and it had to be sold in the open market in competition with their fellow workers with the obligation of the purchaser, or employer, never proceeding beyond the enforced need to meet the current price.

It is not surprising then that the writings of Karl Marx, and those of Engels, became standard programme material for working class groups. They are still regarded as the chief social theorists, and the fathers of social world revolution. The importance of their theory gains in significance when one considers that the organization of the international labour movement was a direct outcropping of Marxism.

This First International was formed in 1864. Socialist, Social-Democrat, and socio-revolutionary parties spread like wildfire through several European states. Increasing state pressure and the growth of capitalism, especially in Germany, Great Britain, and Russia, served only to popularize the socialist movement. In 1900, the Second International was born.

Founded in Paris, it served as the international working-man's union until torn apart by the First World War, which loosened the ties of many of the socialist groups. Later, Russian Bolshevism, through the Third International (Comintern, Cominform) took on the task of wrecking the solidarity of the working masses.

III. - LENINISM

Marxism had immense influence on the Russian social-revolutionary movement. Russia expanded her territory tremendously through the nineteenth century, and her increased strength had brought more and more oppression to her inhabitants. The price of this expansion was paid almost in its entirety by the workers and peasants who gradually lost even their fractional economic and social rights.

In 1932, Gorki wrote thus about Russia:

I make a statement that the worker and peasant in Tsarist Russia had a harder life than any of the working class in other countries of Europe. The working people in Russia were deprived of rights and were more ignorant than elsewhere in Europe. The oppression of the will and intellect of the man in Russia by the State and the Orthodox Church was greater, more severe, and more crippling than in Europe. In no other place did talented men perish more easily and in such great numbers as on Russian soil.¹

¹ Gorki, Maxim, "Pravda", April 27, 1932.

Granted these basic conditions, it is easy to understand why the Russian socialists embraced the Marxist theories with such fervour. For the first time they saw, not only theoretical, but practical solutions to their problems in the struggle against oppression and exploitation. Prior to the infiltration of Marxism, the Russian socialist programme was based primarily on the peasants, because of the relatively light industrialization of Russia, and the small proportion of the proletariat represented by the factory workers. From this sprang the typical Russian socialism -- 'narodnichestvo' -- a system of developing and strengthening workers' organizations on a rather local basis, aimed at the more equal distribution of the produce of a community to the producers of that same group as a whole. Its most prominent representatives were: Herzen (1812-1870), Chernyshevsky (1828-1889) and Dobrolubov (1836-1861). Paralleling this development was "Anarchism", with no clear social programme, and the avowed objective of political revolution and the destruction of the absolute power of the Russian State. Of the Anarchists, Bakunin (1814-1876) and Kropotkin (1842-1921) were probably the most prominent.

Marxism was adopted as a principal doctrine of the Russian Social-Democrats by the end of the nineteenth century. Plekhanov (1856-1918) led the Marxist Social-

Democrats at this period, and indeed, was regarded as one of the chief founders of the League for the Emancipation of Labor, the nucleus of the Russian Social Democratic party. He felt that conditions in Russia would not be ripe for socialism until capitalism and industrialization were more advanced -- a view which was not shared by his one-time co-publisher Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov-Lenin, who headed the more radical branch of the party after the 1903 meeting which split the Social-Democratic party into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions.

Lenin (1870-1924) not only popularized the Marxist theories among the Russian masses, but also adapted them to the needs of the country and to Russian conditions. Conditions in Russia differed very greatly from those in Europe where they had been first conceived. Russia was scarcely industrialized, almost totally dependent on foreign capital, basically agricultural, and with the most primitive socio-political organization. The working class in Russia was weak and unawakened. Briefly, the conditions existing in Russia were diametrically opposed to those that Marx considered elemental for the beginning of a revolution under the banners of socialism and communism. It is not surprising, therefore, that their development failed to take the same path as elsewhere in Europe.

In Western Europe, capital was the main obstacle to the progress and evolution of socialism. In Russia, it was the State itself, centralized, bureaucratic, and despotic. Elsewhere in Europe, the socialist had to struggle with capitalists as individuals or organized in trusts and monopolies. In Russia, the socialists had to struggle for their rights against the State itself with all its machinery. Russian Marxists, therefore, were more interested in problems of the state than in Capital; more were interested in politics, than in social problems.

In the works of Marx and Engels, social problems are not only the main aim in their discussions, but also the only theme of their teaching. The Russian Marxist, and especially Lenin, was primarily concerned with the problems of state. Marx and Engels were convinced that the workers' victory over Capital would automatically destroy the state-form based on this capital, and the victorious proletariat would organize its own form with a predominance of social problems, and not political questions. The Russian Marxist had to consider the theoretical and practical destruction of the State which allowed no formation of strength beyond itself, and did not even permit the accumulation of Capital in the hands of individuals who might become independent of the State and ultimately influence the State itself.

In Lenin's treatises (principally "What to Do?", "Socialism and War" (1915), "Imperialism, the Highest Form of Capitalism" (1916, "The State and Revolution" (1917), and "Infantile Paralysis of the Leftist in Communism" (1920)), the State is the first consideration, as its counterpart, Capital, appears in the works of Marx. Where the latter called for social struggle, for social organization of the proletariat, and the working masses, Lenin called for a political struggle against the State. Proletariat in Marx's conception and the European Marxism, is the social organization of the working class, with a social programme. The proletarian dictatorship in this European sense is not based on political despotism, but on a creative organization which would free for use of all, the vital resources of the nation. The proletariat in the Lenin, and hence the Russian, conception, is a totally politically-aimed organization, the common tool, not only of revolution, but also of the formation of the New Order. The dictatorship of the proletariat in this sense is nothing more than an organization of a new political despotism and a new bureaucracy of the State.

Hence, when European Marxists, struggling against Capitalism as the enemy of the working classes, and the enemy of the progress of humanity, were building a new concept of a social order, the Russian Marxists,

struggling against the political state, were building in the theory itself a new concept of a political form. Once again the oft-repeated peculiarity of Russian development was remarked. From the dawn of her history, all ideas and social concepts which came to her from Europe were changed in practice into political concepts. .

Leninism in its foundations differs basically from Marxism. Where Marxism is primarily a universal social teaching, Leninism is peculiarly Russian, and primarily political. It is a distinct narrowing of the Marxian theory. In consequence, the interpretation of Marx in Europe and in Russia are entirely dissimilar. Even the party organization in Europe and Russia became different. The Russian Communist Party (at first the Social-Democrat, later the Bolshevik) was organized from the beginning on the principle of centralism and very severe discipline exercised from above. The programme was imposed from above by a few professional revolutionary doctrinaires with Lenin at their head. They treated the revolution itself, and their own relationship toward the Party in the manner of a supreme dictatorship.

Lenin himself had some revealing things to say about the meaning of that dictatorship:

The scientific concept, dictatorship,
means nothing more nor less than power which

directly rests on violence, which is not limited by any laws or restricted by any absolute rules. Dictatorship means unlimited power, resting on violence and not on law. There is no dictatorship without violence. Dictatorship likewise signifies a higher organisation of labor than that which previously existed.¹

and again

The Party is the highest form of organization of the proletariat, is the principal guiding force within the class of the proletarians and among the organisations of that class. The Party is an instrument in the hands of the proletariat for achieving the dictatorship where that has not yet been achieved and for consolidating and expanding the dictatorship where it has already been achieved.²

The 1917 Revolution did not break out because of the organized movement of the revolutionary or social parties. The revolution was caused by the weakness and villainy of the bureaucratic machine of the monarchy. The revolution had all the symptoms of anarchy. The Russian Democrats, the Russian Socialists, and even the Russian Revolutionists were not prepared for it. They were taken by surprise. The complete disintegration of the Russian State in such a short time was primarily due to the deep hatred felt by the subjugated nations toward the Russian state organization. Under such

¹ Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.XXV, pp.30, 441, 436, New York, International Publishers, 1927, and as quoted Julian Towster, Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1947, Oxford Univ.Press, New York, 1951, p.28.

² Lenin, Selected Works, Vol.IX, p.132., Martin Lawrence Ltd., London, 1936-39.

conditions of complete chaos, the Social-Democrats, now under the name of Bolsheviks, had no difficulty in seizing complete control. Of all the socialist and revolutionary parties in Russia at that time, they alone had a disciplined and well organized party, and most important of all, they had an attractive doctrine and programme to present to the working masses. By this time, Lenin and others had adapted Marxism to Russian conditions.

Seizing power and strengthening their hold, the Bolsheviks developed the Marxian theory, Lenin-wise, having in mind the advantage of the Russian state only, the state of the victorious revolution. In their country, they lacked all the elements necessary to form a socialist state. There was no proletariat because there was almost no industrialization. Agriculture was disorganized. There was no proper relation between town and village, and there was a very acute problem of 'intelligentsia'. All that the party proposed to do had to be carried out under compulsion, by way of the 'proletarian dictatorship'. From this start, the dictatorship was nothing more or less than a political organization, a centralized and despotic form of the State.

The Revolution annihilated the former organization, eradicated the centuries-old bureaucracy, and transferred

power into the hands of the working classes. But, in reality, the Revolution did not change any scheme of Russian state organization, and contrary to all the doctrines of Marx, brought no new form into the political organization. The Party became the state bureaucracy and instead of bringing a social form into existence, it busied itself with organizing a political machine.

The transformation of the Marxian theory by Lenin did not pass unnoticed. Karl Kautski, Otto Bauer and Rosa Luxemburg led the attack from other European strongholds of Marxism.

After the publication of Lenin's first classical work: "What to Do?" in which he expounds his conviction that the future of the revolution and socialism lie exclusively and solely in the Party, and forms the theory from it that the main task is the political struggle), the European Socialists led by Rosa Luxemburg declared that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were creating a schismatic party, separated from the masses. Rosa Luxemburg wrote that if the Bolsheviks were to liquidate the freedom of the press, and freedom for opposition groups to meet, in this way "it will be strangled by the living spring of the creativeness of the masses, because by order you may destroy, but you cannot create a thing'.

The theory and practice of Leninism brought a split among Russian Marxists. The Russian Marxists opposed the Russian Socialists - the 'narodniks' - who asserted that the peasants must form the base of socialism in Russia. The Social-Democratic Party favoured the organization of agricultural estates, grain-factories, supporting large agricultural owners who they believed would foster Capitalism and industrialization. The peasants, with very little land of their own, formed about 90% of the working masses in Russia at that time, and they mistrusted the programme of the Social-Democratic Party.

When Lenin could not get the support of the masses he launched the idea of building a proletariat to bring socialism by seizure of power through Revolution, with a well-disciplined Party to back up his theories. This Party would have complete control and power after the revolution, but to foment and precipitate this revolution, he was forced to make use of all existing movements and revolutionary organizations, even the aggressively nationalistic and anarchistic groups.

The idea of Lenin's centralized 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and the organizational despotism in the Party led to a split in the ranks of the Social-Democrats after seven years of existence. In 1903 the two factions broke into two different parties -- the

Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Led by Martov, Potresov, and Trotsky, the Mensheviks claimed that in Lenin's scheme, the Party would take the place of the working class, and the Party's organization would replace the Party; the Central Committee would replace the organization of the Party; and finally a dictator would replace the Central Committee. They wanted a party democracy similar to those in Europe and they were against centralization and the despotism of the Party hierarchy. They were violently opposed to Lenin's idea that the revolution is not to be based on the proletarian masses, but on "professional revolutionists".

The war of 1914-1917 brought some popularity to the Bolsheviks (and Lenin) among the Russian masses, thanks to their capitulation policy, which they presented under the slogans 'End the War!' and 'Down with Absolutism!'

The 1917 Revolution reversed Lenin's opinion on the possibility of 'building of Socialism' in Russia. Until then he felt that any sudden social revolution was not possible in Russia, but that only gradual changes could be hoped for. He believed in a revolution in Europe, which Russia could hasten by its own anarchism. When the Bolsheviks seized the control of the state in October, 1917, he expressed a then-new idea of 'imposing

Socialism by force'. Later on Stalin used this idea for a new theory of 'building Socialism in one state',¹ i.e., in Russia, where socialism must continue to be maintained by force until such time as world revolution becomes a reality.

Lenin and the Party began the socialization of Russia by compulsion -- 'nationalizing' and outright seizure of the means of production, banks, transportation, etc., for the government. To gain popularity among the peasants, Lenin took the programme of the 'narodniks' and social-revolutionists for the peasants, temporarily abandoning the large state estates and collectivization programme. In the structural field, Lenin advocated so-called 'soviet government' in which only the workers have the right to vote and in whose hands the entire authority is concentrated -- legislative, executive control, and judiciary. He stipulated that the regulations laid down by higher authorities are mandatory for the lower authorities. He was a stern advocate of the 'revolutionary discipline' and was violently opposed to democracy of the European type. He asserted that 'it is the one form of bourgeois state which is supported

¹ J.V. Stalin in the Report ... to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B), as quoted by Julian Towster "Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1947", Oxford University Press, New York, 1951, 3rd printing, p.14.

by all traitors of socialism'. Lenin founded his power on terror. His Collected Letters and Speeches are dotted throughout with such illuminating phrases as "... he who is afraid to stain his hands with blood ... had not to be a politician...", and elsewhere, "We have to ask everybody: who are you for? For the revolution or against it? If against -- put him in front of a firing squad."

Much blood was spilled as a result of this theory during the Russian revolution, during the anarchy (the period known as 'war communism' 1918-1921), and again during the 'building of socialism'.

In the tactical field, Lenin recommends complete amoral elasticity and opportunism:

It is necessary to bring the masses to revolution, teaching them skillfully on their own political experience, counting on the concrete national and different national sovereignty. The strategy and tactics of the communist party have to be extremely elastic. The parties have to control all methods and sources of fighting: the art of making armed revolutions, and revolutionary exploitation of all, even the most reactionary Trade and Parliamentary Unions; skillfully intertwine legal and illegal activities; boldly and unceasingly attack, and calmly, in an organized manner, retreat; evade, conclude a practical compromise 'even with the devil and his grandmother'; skillfully capitalize on all sorts of frictions, conflicts, quarrels, differences in the camp of the enemy; swiftly change one form of fighting for another whenever the situation demands it.

So wrote Lenin in 1920.

Such an interpretation of socialism and Marxism caused great indignation among all other Russian socialists and democrats. A famous author and Russian socialist, Maxim Gorki, wrote thus in 1917:

Vladimir Lenin is introducing a socialist form in Russia by the method of Nechayev¹ -- 'by whole force through the swamp'. And Lenin and Trotzky, and all others who accompany them to the catastrophe through the bog of the reality, are, of course, convinced with Nechayev that 'it is easiest' to take over the Russians by infamy.

Gorki sensed the blind spot in Lenin's leadership:

Lenin as a 'leader' and Russian aristocrat (certain mental traits of this defunct class are not alien to him) deems himself in the right to perform over the Russian people a cruel experiment, doomed to failure in advance. Exhausted and ruined by war, the people have already paid for that experiment with thousands of lives, and will now be made to pay with tens of thousands more ... This inevitable tragedy does not embarrass Lenin, slave of his dogmas, nor his syncophants -- his slaves. Life, in all its complexity, is unknown to them; only from books has he learned how one can most easily infuriate a man's instincts. The working class is for Lenin what ore is to the metallist. Is it possible, under the existing conditions, to cast a socialistic state out of this age? Apparently, it is not possible; yet -- why not try? What does he risk, if the experiment should fail? He is working as a chemist does in his laboratory, with the difference that the chemist employs dead matter with results valuable for life, whereas Lenin works with living material and leads the revolution to perdition.²

¹ The "Society of the People's Assize" (Narodnaya Rasprava), a secret society founded by Nechayev in 1869. Nechayev, Bakunin's disciple, secured widespread notoriety through his Catechism of Revolution. The periodical "People's Assize" preached absolute negation and pandestruction. Nechayev's programme was condemned by Bakunin and Herzen.

² As quoted by H.B. Parkes in Marxism - An Autopsy, Houghton, Boston, 1939, pp. 261-262.

The period of 'warlike Communism' had already ceased to be 'creative' in Lenin's view, and he introduced his New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, despite his earlier doctrine that any communist proposing a compromise with Capitalism to the bourgeoisie would be ridiculous and miserable. This Policy was based on concessions to foreign investors and on inner relaxation for small business and private enterprise in industry. It represented a return to a limited capitalist system, and was made necessary by the need of conciliating anti-Communist elements in the task of reconstructing Russia. It was to be a temporary measure only.

Lenin's death came at the end of this tactical Bolshevik political manoeuvre. Its next phase -- the transition to the building of a centralized socialism and a unified state -- became the task of Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin (1879-1953).

IV. - STALINISM

The Bolsheviks' political conception of the organization of the State and society had grown in importance in the speeches, writings, and post-revolutionary statements of Lenin; and became the integral and sole essence of the political and social doctrine represented

by Lenin's successor, Stalin. Stalin pursued the Leninist conception of Marxism, not as a universal social idea, but as a universal politico-State conception. Under this view-point he combines perfectly the Marxists' ambitions of spreading revolution and socialism throughout the world, with the ancient Russian ambitions of expanding the Empire to cover all nations.

Stalinism differs much more from Marxism than does Leninism. It is much narrower. The cornerstone of Stalinism is the State and the theory of the State to the exclusion of everything else. Stalinism fails to take into account the particular social characteristics, either natural or cultural, of any given country. It does not recognize any historical traditions or particular development of a state or nation. It asserts that the best organizational form of a state is the Soviet one, and that introduction of this form, either voluntarily or by force, is the only means of seizing the power of any given country.

If a victorious Marxism would bring socialism to a nation, so Leninism and more specifically Stalinism could bring only Sovietization, the political form of State organization which the Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin and Stalin, imposed, consolidated, and extended within three decades over the territory of the Russian Empire.

In his works: Marxism and the National Question (1913), The Foundations of Leninism (1924), and The Dialectical Materialism (1937), Stalin developed the Lenin concept of the State very clearly from a political viewpoint. He formulated, contrary to classical Marxism and to the socialist spirit, a 'theory of building of socialism in one state' and the so-called 'theory of capitalist encirclement'.

In 1928-29 Stalin conceived and gave widespread publicity to a slogan to 'overtake and surpass the Capitalist countries'. He based the building of the political power of the State on the unity and strict discipline of the party as a super- and undivided authority in inner problems, and in the material and social problems of exploiting the working masses, especially those of the peasants.

Lenin, and after him, Stalin, in adapting Marxism to Russian terrain and unceasingly bending it to their own ends, deformed Marxism in theory and in practice. As socialism, organized by the Bolsheviks, has nothing in common with classical socialism, and is a Sovietization only (state socialism), so also in philosophy loaded with specific Russian characteristics, Marxism became a strange phenomenon -- Bolshevism.

As Bolshevism in its sovietized form, producing a strong and powerful Russian state, is, in its essence, completely foreign to any European nation, so, for the most part are its effects on the nations subjugated by the Soviet Union.

Tomas Masaryk, scientist, philosopher, and the first president of the newly formed Republic of Czechoslovakia, a social-democrat by conviction, wrote in 1920:

I know Bolshevik Russia very well and traced carefully the Bolshevik revolution. Therefore, I assert with a clear conscience and to the best of my knowledge, that to us, Czechs, the Russian model does not fit. And if anybody is of the opinion that we also may do what is being done in Russia, he is very much in error ... In Russia there is neither Communism nor Socialism. All Lenin's ideas about the progress of humanity and different nations are Utopian, and his philosophy of history is questionable. Lenin thinks that armed revolution is the main creative tool. Revolution for the Bolsheviks is a revelation, 'fetish' in the whole meaning of the word. The Bolsheviks took the aristocratic, elite point of view -- work and the ability to work are not appreciated -- and they maintain the slavophile, mystical viewpoint of a nation. 'Proletariat' and 'masses' -- they are the two elements of the Bolshevik demagogy. From one side the party hides itself behind the masses; from the other side it is imposing on them its own will. The Bolsheviks accepted Marxism and are sure in their conceit that they and they alone are its faithful followers. They fail to see how

closely they follow Bakunin¹, the enemy of Marx. From Bakunin they draw the mystical faith in Revolution, the Russian nation, in its enlightenment, in its exceptional communistic and socialistic abilities. They want to be the sole possessors of scientific Marxian socialism -- but they don't have it. They are extreme doctrinaires ... They think they are the Apostles of the Absolute Truth. They depend on Marx as on a Bible, and their own literary activity is confined to compilation and discussion. ... The Bolsheviks are dogmatists, and such men are always dangerous. The Bolshevik dictatorship is a political dictatorship of the old absolute Tsarist regime. The Bolshevik State is a terrorist form, and a mere political State.²

The European socialists held that it is not important what the Bolsheviks did, but how they did it. The principle that 'the end justify the means' is a reactionary principle and cannot be accepted by the universal progressive movements which have humanity's development as their principal aim. The famous Russian socialist Herzen wrote: "socialism

¹ Bakunin is of leading importance in connection with the development of the revolutionary movement. His programme was formulated in 1868 in the "Narodnoye Dielo" ("People's Cause"), Bakunin's Genevese organ. Herein the liberalism of the mind is proclaimed as the basis of social and political freedom. The basis of economic organization must rest on the two principles that 1) the land is the property of those who till it, the property of the village communities; and 2) that capital and all the instruments of production belong to the workers' associations. He professed the sentiments of the Nihilists, with large overtones of Anarchism. To him, all things were lawful, but still loved, and loved above all, Russia.

² Masaryk, Tomas Garrigue, "Sur le bolchevisme"... Genève, S.a. des Éditions Sonov, 1921.

which will not allow the political freedom and equality of its citizens, very soon will be converted into absolutistic communism'. Violence, terror, provocation, and despotism, applied as a method to bring humanity to a higher level of progress will degenerate the idealists who seized the power in the first place. Lenin, perhaps, thought that Bolshevism, as a system of political and social compulsion, would be a transitory and short-lived phenomenon. However, it grew to be not only the essential motivating force of the Revolutionary period, but later became the goal in itself of the party, which can no longer renounce any of the privileges consequent on its exercise of complete authority.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET STATE

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I.- THE 'STATE' IN EUROPE AND THE RUSSIAN 'STATE'

In Europe the State as an organization is an outgrowth of the social, economic and spiritual life of a nation or federation of nations, following the deep undercurrents of social and ideological changes. When social, economic and cultural conditions change, and when the social stratification changes, so also the form of the State takes on a new shape. It might be said that in Europe, society and the individual citizen create the State organization.

The situation in Russia is quite a different thing because of the different characteristics of the development of the Russian state. The State is the master of society and of the citizen. It is not the citizen nor the Society, not the social and cultural development, not economic progress which form the structure of the state. Quite the contrary. The definite state form is imposed by a concrete political power, which takes over the whole terrain, imposing a structure formulated by its own interest, directing its own course of cultural, spiritual and economic life and progress. The state absorbs all nations which are part of it, and all individual citizens become its tools.

The Russian State draws all its strength from the exploitation of the individual. In Russia the man serves the interests of the State. The interests of the individual are not protected in any degree. In Russia, the individual has no more importance than a workman's tool, which will be used according to the actual need of the State.

As a result, progress and development are reversing their direction. With an increasing material and political growth, of the power of the State, society and the individual citizen are getting poorer, as much in a material sense as in legal-social position.

When State power gets to be unbearable, an explosion in the form of anarchy and chaos occurs. A new form of government assumes power. It begins to centralize anew under different slogans, but in fact it is the same totalitarianism as before. This phenomenon occurred during the time of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century, during the time of Peter the Great in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, and was repeated in almost the same pattern during the 1917 revolution.

II. - FROM FEDERALISM TO TOTALITARIANISM

The present-day Soviet structure was not imposed on the Russian domains immediately after the Bolsheviks

took power. During the intervening years between the days of the revolution and our own times, the state structure underwent many changes and transformations in which today we can see the beginnings of a definite direction. The Soviet State is developing very clearly from the federalism and voluntary union of states and nations to a totalitarian state, fully centralized, with a specific aim of forming one nation from the mosaic of nations. More and more it is restricting the freedom and social rights of its citizens, and its whole development aims at strengthening the central political power of the State.

Russia disintegrated with revolution into many units. The Russian Empire had come into existence during five centuries of conquest and seizure of territories. Engels wrote about Russia as a 'proprietor of innumerable stolen lands which will be taken away from her by force on the day of judgement'. Most of the territories had been ~~conquered~~ during the preceding two centuries. The nations subjugated by Russia, remembered their own independence and statehood, despite the most intensified Russification and brutal terrorism. The Poles, the Ukrainians, the nations of the Caucasus, and the Finns, among others, had never stopped fighting the Russian invader with every available means. For them, the revolution seemed to be the long-awaited day of freedom from the Moscovite yoke.

Under Lenin, the Bolsheviks knew full well the hatred of the subjugated nations toward Russia. They also realized the latent revolutionary and anarchistic energy in the will of the subjugated nations to free themselves from bondage and to form their own states. The Bolsheviks made a careful study of these nationalistic problems. Stalin was the chief specialist and theorist in this matter. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the hatred and ambition of the oppressed nations and on November 15, 1917, issued the proclamation best known as the 'Declaration of the Rights of the Nations of Russia', in which they acknowledge the right of each nation to secede and to form its own state. At the same time, the Communist Party formulated the principle of inner uniformity of the Party. Lenin clearly stated that the dismembering of Tsarist Russia into smaller states and nations is right, but after the victorious revolution the Communists of all nationalities that formed Russia would unite again in one state under the leadership of one centralized Bolshevik Party.

The right of all the nations forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent states must be recognized ... The recognition by the proletariat of the right of nations to secede can alone bring about complete solidarity among the workers of the various

nations and help to bring the nations closer together ... The interests of the working class demand the amalgamation of the workers of all the nationalities of Russia into a common proletarian organization ...¹

So the slogan of self-determination of all nations taken from Marx was deformed in practice, and misused for purely Party interests, and not for the interests of the subjugated nations exploited by Russia.

III. - THE FORMATION OF 'ONE' STATE

The Revolution of 1917 and the years immediately following it repeated in capsule form the history of Russia, formed from many states and nations having nothing in common with each other in any field -- national, cultural, or economic, but drawn together by political power and the war machinery of Russian imperialism. The revolutionary anarchy put an end to the military unification of these nationalist groups, and the subjugated countries formed their own independent states once again, but the Bolshevik party once again 'united' them by organized political and military force in one State structure.

During the intervening years the unifying process has seen many phases, each more intense than the preceding

¹ Lenin-Stalin, 1917 Selected Writings and Speeches, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1938, p.118-119.

one. In the first post-revolutionary years, the Soviet Union was one federation. The Union Republics had their own constitutions differing from each other. The Moscow government allowed considerable autonomy to the many nationalities. It was a conciliatory measure only -- dictated by revolutionary and political expediency -- for the sake of appearances. The Bolsheviks wanted to attract the largest masses of all nationalities which constituted the former Russian Empire and to get help from them to annihilate the former Tsarist bureaucratic machine, and to destroy the organized military counter-revolutionary forces which for many years dominated the majority of the Russian lands.

The Bolsheviks intended also to organize large politico-military forces to cope with the 'capitalist interventionists' (1918-1921).

But when the inner counter-revolution was extinguished and the danger from foreign 'intervention' disappeared, the Bolshevik party changed its attitude toward the many nationalities. All republics were united into one. On December 30, 1922 Stalin stated:

Today is a day of triumph for the new Russia, which has ... transformed the red flag from a Party banner into a state banner, and

rallied around that banner the peoples of the Soviet Republics in order to unite them into a single state ...¹

This view was embodied in Part I, of the Constitution of 1924. The Constitution of all Union Republics were modified to conform to the 'proto-type' and one unified state machine was introduced everywhere. The Moscovite political directors simply resumed the old march of the Russian Empire, which always abrogated the freedoms and autonomy given to the nationalities seized by it.

Once again, the nations subjugated by Russia lost their freedom and had no opportunity to develop their own state forms. So began a new struggle for freedom and rights, which the Soviet government suppressed as brutally and violently as had the Tsarist regime. The nations were decimated and their people deported and mixed to form mechanically 'one' national and 'one' Soviet culture.

¹ Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, International Publishers, New York, 1935, and as quoted by Julian Towster in Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1947, Oxford University Press, New York, 3rd.ed. p.63.

IV. - THE FORMATION OF 'ONE' NATION

The Marxian international socialist principle was simply exploited for nationalist aims -- the formation of one nation in a structure of one state. This principle was very useful for the 'inner colonization' of 'Socialist' and 'Soviet' Russia, which is much more dynamic than the Tsarist Russia, and tends to enlarge its border and supplant the attractive universal, international socialist ideology.

The Tsarist theory and practice in Russian colonization was based on strengthening the Russian bureaucracy and military elements. The doctrine of Leninism, and afterward Stalinism, enriched the Russian governmental structure in more effective theory. During the first post-revolutionary years a Stalinist thesis was accepted in the Bolshevik dialectic that the cementing element in the Soviet Union as a State is the politically and socially conscious Russian proletariat which has to play a decisive role in unifying the diverse nationalities of the Union into one socialist structure.¹

¹ Statement of P.A.Sharia, Chairman of the Credential Commission of the Council of Nationalities, at the Supreme Soviet sessions of March 14, 1946, "Izvestia", 15 March 1946:

"The great Russian people - the older brother in the equal family of peoples of the USSR, occupies a special place in the Soviet companionship of peoples. The first among all the peoples of our country and of the entire world ... the prestige of the Russian people is so immeasurably high among the other peoples".

The adapted principle of complete and absolute unification and centralization of the party was imposed on parties of all nationalities of the Soviet Federation. The Russian revolution did not create a proletariat and classes in the Marxian sense. It created a Party, as a super-caste over the working masses. In time, with the bureaucratization and stabilization of the party and separation from the proletarian masses and peasants, the Party became the decisive element of the inner Russian colonization, playing the same role as the Tsarist bureaucracy with the addition that the Party was an efficient and more disciplined and more obedient Centralized Russian tool.

The Bolshevik party member began to feel his importance and became the 'boss' of situations limited in his power from above, but unlimited from below. The masses had to obey his orders and could not complain. The unlimited power of the new oligarchy of the Bolsheviks brought renewal of all the worst features of the power of the Tsarist regime in a worse form than ever. At the same time, the 'nationalized' worker and 'collectivized' peasant were losing all their rights and freedoms. The workers were shackled to the factories or to the collective farms, and changes were not allowed. The party was (and still is) an active element; the masses -- just passive.

In the doctrine of the creation of a Soviet nation, not only the materialistic elements were taken into account, but also the spiritual and moral ones. The culture of other nations was integrated into the Russian to claim every invention of Russian origin.

In 1928 the New Economic Policy of limited Capitalism was replaced with the Five-Year Plans which centralized the economic life of the country. It also produced the greatest exploitation by the state of the working masses.

Collectivization of the peasants created the greatest violent resistance in the whole Soviet history. The repressions were most brutal. Many millions of peasants were deported to Siberia or to the North, or simply left to starve to death. As a result, in 1933-34, the most fertile Russian provinces, the Ukraine and the Kuban, had a famine with about six million dead among the peasants.

The war of 1939-45 did much to 'solve' the demographical problem of the Soviet Union. The mobilization, evaluation and deportation was conducted under the guise of 'unification' of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SOVIET AS A TOOL OF IMPERIALISM

I. - THE ESSENCE OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM

The awareness of having undivided culture of an undivided nation gave to the State-minded Stalinist Bolsheviks an active energy. In the past, even the most fanatical Slavophiles, who despised a 'rotten Europe' were not so negatively disposed toward the cultural achievements of Europe as the Bolsheviks now are. If, in the past, foreign influence on the art and literature of Russia was admitted, today, the talk is only of the extent of Russia's influence on the world's literature and art. The captive Baltic states, with Poland, Finland, and Rumania, were told that their whole culture was developed preeminently under Russian influence, if not exclusively so. For example, Mickiewicz, the leading Polish poet, is presented almost as a pupil of Pushkin, and the Polish literature of the second half of the 19th century and of the beginning of the 20th century, including Prus Sienkiewicz and Zeromski, as products of the Russian school.

On such misrepresentations of fact, and on the ambitions of territorial aggrandizement, the Party comprehension of the Stalinist motto of 'one Soviet Nation' is based. So too is the auxiliary motto "...a culture socialist in content and national in form".¹ All of this excessive nationalism in the narrow sense has created a hypertrophy in the territorial ambitions of the Party. It is quite reasonable to say that in Russian history, no one of the oligarchic castes of past regimes from the 'druzyna and boyars' in the early days, through the bureaucracy of the nobility of Tsar Nikolai, was so imperialistically expansionist as the Bolshevik party.

This expansion was not the result of the Utopian ideology of the Communist International preaching the doctrine of World Revolution, but it was an outgrowth of extreme centralization, brought to perfection in the field of inner colonization and the recognition of the immensity of the unified State. It has no social-revolutionary character, but an exclusively politico-state character of conquest. The International socio-revolutionary ideology, Marxist Socialism, ceased, in the mind of the Bolsheviks, to be a social ideology, and became predominantly a political ideology. To this end all official Bolshevik policy and diplomacy was directed.

Rapallo - an agreement of the 'militant Communism' with resurgent reactionary Prussian Junkers - was only the

first of innumerable political acts, diplomatic and military, which give proof that the ideology had become the universal tool of the state. The mere recognition by the Party of the internal and international possibilities of its expansion brought military strength into more and more of a cominant position, and this automatic militarization created, and still creates in the Party, the inner current of an imperialistic state-character.

The last war inflamed still more the dynamism of Russian state imperialism, renewing the old nationalistic slogans from the days of Ivan the Terrible and Suvorov. This soon gave the Russians a deep conviction of the invincibility of the Soviet Army and the Soviet State. In our times we are witnessing how, in the newly acquired "spheres of influence" (the slogan of the partitions agreed upon at Yalta) and even more particularly in the occupied territories, the Soviet government is not only pursuing colonization of the Old Russian type, but is also preparing spiritually and technically new "yenitcher armies" for further conquest and enlargement of the Russian Statehood. We are witnessing the militarization of the Baltic nations, of Poland, and the Balkans, and even of the German prisoners of war, together with a renascent hatred of European culture and heritage. In practice, the Leninist theory of the "right

of nations to self-determination including the right of secession"¹ has been corrupted into a peculiarly imperialistic Soviet state nationalism.

This nationalism differs from European nationalism. It is not founded on ethnographic nationality in the pure sense. It is founded on Statehood. It can be called statehood nationalism. It did not develop the Germanic form of racial hatred, but it is equally chauvinistic and intolerant. It accepts no other state structure than its own form, and in this respect achieves the same self-adulation as German racism.

The last war heightened this chauvinism of the Soviet Union and freed the Great-Russian ambitions, under Stalin, who was a Georgian, not a Russian. During the celebrations of decorating the higher Soviet military commanders on May 24, 1945, Stalin said:

Let us drink to the health of the Soviet nation, and very specially of the Russian nation. Let us drink to the health of the Russian nation because it is the most outstanding nation of the Soviet Union ... which merited the admiration of all the nations of our state ... not only because it is the leading nation, but also because it has a clear mind, a rugged character and patience.²

This address indicates that the political character of the Russian state was fanned during the war with the flames of nationalism.

¹ Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVI, p. 507, New York, International publishers, 1927.

² "Bolshevik", No. 10 (May 1945) pp. 1-2.

This vigorous patriotism, characterized by a mounting emphasis on love of 'homeland', 'motherland', and 'fatherland' is a departure from and contradiction to the early dictum of the Communist Manifesto that 'the workers have no fatherland'.

II. - THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT (BONAPARTISM)

Marxism, adapted to Russian conditions, lost all its universal social characteristics, and through Leninism was transformed into Stalinism, a more political doctrine of power and Statehood. Armed with this doctrine, the Party, in the beginning of the anarchistic revolution reached out for power, seized it, and at once channelled the revolution in its own chosen ways. The natural progress of the Russian revolution was stopped. The moment of Bonapartism (the seizure of power by the dictatorial element formed by the revolution) came, not at the end of a long, stagnant revolutionary period, but at the very beginning of it. The Russian revolution took the form of a directed revolution, and that in itself gave to the revolution a purely political and State character. It follows that Leninism, and even more particularly Stalinism, are very different from Marxism. They lack the character of a universal doctrine, because they grew on Russian soil and were aimed nowhere else. The role

of the Bolshevik revolution in the international forum was and is strictly political, in spite of the Bolsheviks' efforts (for obvious reasons) to present their programme and achievements as universal, and of benefit to all the working masses.

This basic difference between the Leninist doctrine and the Marxist doctrine (a condition which has grown steadily worse) especially the Bonapartist Bolsheviks' practice, has produced opposition and resistance on the part of the conscious socialists of Europe and, among the socialists of the Soviet nations, even within the Party itself.

All this opposition, in the light of the Lenin-Stalinist doctrine of absolute compulsion, was and is 'liquidated' by extreme terror and brutality which can easily bear comparison with the Hitlerite Nazi terror.

During the first years of their regime, the Bolsheviks rose against the Social-Revolutionists, who were, thanks to their agrarian programme, very popular among the peasants. The Social-Revolutionists were very active in 1918-1919 and there were many terrorist uprisings against the Bolsheviks, culminating with that of August, 1918, in the attack on Lenin himself.

It is very important to realize that not only the Socialist and professional-revolutionists, but even

the Russian proletariat, rose against the Bonapartist-political concept of the revolution by the Bolsheviks. This opposition of the workers caused a conflict which lasted for a number of years between the Trade Unions and the Party. Obviously, even those most interested in the victory of the revolution, the Russian working masses, recognized the un-social character of the Bolshevik tactics and programme.

In 1921 the wave of mass-insurrections of the workers and the peasants began. The 'Kronstadt Revolt' in March led the way when the 'pride of the Revolution' -- the marines -- revolted against the Party, although they had helped introduce the Bolshevik regime only a short time before. This revolt, as all the others, was suppressed with the utmost cruelty. These People's Insurrections took on a mass character in those national republics which had been 'united' forcibly with Russia. In the Ukraine, the Kuban, the Caucasus, and Turkistan, it was a general national uprising.

During this period, the Bolsheviks introduced a method of combatting the opposition in the so-called 'demonstration trials'. These had the double objective not only of punishing the defendants themselves but also of discrediting the ideology on which the insurrections

were based. The first big trial was against the Social-Revolutionists in 1922 at which they were portrayed as agents of Capitalist imperialists.

During the NEP period, the rift between the Party and the proletariat widened. The 'workers opposition' as it became known, which arose at this time was ruthlessly and brutally exterminated.

After the death of Lenin, the Party split into two factions. One, headed by Stalin, was based on the political interpretation of the revolution, of socialism (of a peculiarly Russian type) and of the State. The other, spearheaded by Trotsky, advocated the theory of permanent revolution and its relentless expansion on a world scale. In 1925, Stalin began the war on his opponents by tactical manoeuvring and playing one group against the other.

The climax of the Stalinist 'general line' victory came with the three great "political trials". In 1933, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Jevdokhlov were executed for crimes against the state to which they had 'confessed', as were Piatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov in 1937, and Bukharin, Rykov, and many others in 1938.

These trials, with their accompanying terror against members of the Party, of the State machine, and against the Army, coupled with the execution of Marshal

Tukhachevsky together with two other Army Marshals and hundreds of other officers, brought about a formal organizational 'unity' and theoretico-political 'unanimity'. This we find expressed in the 'History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)' elaborated under the direction of Stalin and published in 1938. Here we find the only official 'gospel' of the political, tactical, and philosophical principles of the Party. This work provides the entire theoretical background of the Party for the individual member, in spite of its over-simplification of Leninism, not to mention Marxism, of which little remains but the title and the phraseology.

In 1930-1934 the 'liquidation' of the Kulaks, together with the more enlightened elements of the peasant class as the first Five-Year Plan replaced the New Economic Policy (NEP), ⁱⁿ 1928, with a move to complete collectivization of all agricultural lands, added another bloody page to the already brutal history of Bolshevik internal policy.

As a result of these far-reaching and relentless "purges" the Party saw many changes in personnel. The first Bolshevik Party Congress was held in August of 1917 in Petrograd. Fourteen members and four candidates were elected to the Central Committee. The members were Lenin,

Zinoviev, Trotsky, Nogin, Stalin, Sverdlov, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Kollontay, Artem, Sergei Uricky, Milutin, and Lomov. Of this group, three (Lenin, Artem and Sverdlov) died naturally, and nine were simply 'liquidated'.

The first 'Politburo' and 'Orgburo' of the Central Committee were created by the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress, March 1919. Of its five-man membership, only Lenin died a natural death.

Here is mute evidence of the terror within the Party during the Stalinist drive to power.

III. - THE COMINTERN

As the centralized and despotically ruled Bolshevik Party, the only one for the whole Soviet State, is a tool in the Leninist-Stalinist political manoeuvring within the Soviet Union, so the Comintern -- the Third International -- was the Leninist-Stalinist tool in foreign affairs. Thus, the Bolshevik politicians had two convenient tools at their disposal -- the Soviet state with its army and diplomatic corps and an un-official organ, the Comintern, which, when needed, had the official protection of the Soviet State. It had the advantage of no recognized status, so the State was always in the position of being able to disclaim any responsibility for its actions when circumstances so dictated.

The Third International included in its programme "the forcible overthrow of the existing social conditions"¹ -- a concept of imposed revolution consequent to the seizure of power by the Russian Bolshevik Party.

Moreover, the Comintern advocated a specific internationalism. "The workers have no fatherland" wrote Marx in his Communist Manifesto, doubtless with some deep social and universal significance. It was a slogan designed to counteract chauvinism, political nationalism, and national oppression. But for the Comintern the policy was 'the fatherland of the proletariat of the World is the Soviet Union -- the country of the victorious revolution'. The interests of the 'fatherland' must always be put before the interests of his own nation, regardless of the policies of such a 'fatherland'. It is unnecessary to point out the privileged position in which this puts the Soviet State. The Comintern was based on the same principle as the Bolshevik party itself -- the principle of centralization and the dictatorship of each party in respect of its own state and nation. Add to this, the most submissive centralization of all the separate communist parties to the one highest directive organ which was totally in the

¹ Walsh, Edmund A. Total Empire, Bruce Pub., Milwaukee, 1951, p.276.

² Marx, Karl, Communist Manifesto taken from Elliott, W.Y. and McDonald, Western Political Heritage, New York, 1950, p.812.

hands of the Russian Bolshevik Party. In each state only one party, and that one Communist, was allowed to exist. It had to renounce any idea of discussion within or without its ranks in matters of communist doctrine or revolutionary methods. It must be completely subservient to the directives of the highest organs of the Comintern -- the Congress, and the Central Executive Committee.

For many years the direction of the Comintern was exclusively in the hands of the Bolsheviks. First directors were G. Zinoviev and M. Bukharin. After 1935 the so-called 'representation of the Bolshevik Party in the Executive Committee' directed the activities of the Comintern with Stalin, Manuilsky and Lozovsky at its head. The nominal head, after 1935, was Dimitrov, a Bulgarian, and a puppet of Stalin. The criteria for selecting and training leaders for World Revolution as formulated by Dimitrov at the Seventh World Congress in Moscow, 1935, are revealing:

First, absolute devotion to the cause of the working class, loyalty to the Party tested in the face of the enemy in battle, in prison, and in court; second, the closest possible contact with the masses; third, ability independently to find one's bearing and not to be afraid of assuming responsibility in taking decisions; fourth, discipline and Bolshevik hardening in the struggle against the class enemy as well as in their irreconcilable opposition to all deviations from the Bolshevik line.¹

¹The Resolutions of the VI Congress of the Comintern, 1928, as quoted in Total Empire, by Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., Bruce Pub., Milwaukee, 1951, pp.121-122.

The Comintern Policy, wholly submissive to the interests of a single party and a single state could not take advantage of any of the international social-revolutionary possibilities, but had to follow the course of the policies of the Soviet State. The Soviet State made all the decisions where the labour movement, wholly controlled by the Comintern, was to 'intensify' its pressure and difficulties, and where to lessen them. Stalin was recognized as the 'leader, teacher and friend, and also the only hope of the World Proletariat'.

In 1939 there were 67 Communist Parties as constituent members, but all of them had to act as 'one International Communist Party'. They could not, even in their own State, follow any constructive policy, but a policy of negation and of destruction, because the Comintern professed the policy that "war between the proletarian and bourgeois states is inevitable"¹ and the principle of the policy had to be the 'strengthening of the Soviet State and the weakening of the capitalist states'. In 1929 Manuilsky proclaimed that the Five-Year Plan was a plan to ruin the stabilization of Capitalism!

The Comintern tactics were based entirely on the exigencies of the Soviet State and its influence and possibilities in the international arena. Between 1919-1922 the Comintern

incited revolution in Europe, and from 1922-1930 it concentrated its efforts in Asiatic territories (e.g. India, China, and the Dutch East Indies) and in the Colonies. In 1933-34 it began to feel the danger from the various fascist countries, in Europe and in Japan. So the Comintern initiated a policy of 'United Popular Fronts', i.e. the co-operation of the Communist Parties with all radical parties, organizations and groups.

This elasticity of the Third International, dictated solely by the whims of one state, brought dissatisfaction and repeated protests from the constituent Communist Parties. However, the Moscovite Centre used the same tactics here as they used to combat discussion, opposition, and factionalism within the Bolshevik Party; i.e. 'purges', 'liquidation' and branding the opposition as 'traitors of socialism', provocation, and skillful play of animosities one against the other.

The influence of the Comintern in the hands of Soviet politicians was so great that in the years between 1939 and 1941, when the USSR became a partner with Germany and backed Nazi aggression in Europe, the Communist Parties began an anti-war crusade in the Allied countries and helped to suppress the anti-Nazi underground which in effect helped in no small measure to hasten the downfall of France. The British government was compelled to suspend the publication of 'The Daily Worker' - the British Communist Party Press.

The Third International was dissolved on May 15, 1943, at the behest of Moscow, so that its existence would not embarrass the Soviet in its relations with the Allies. Whether this 'dissolution' was entirely sincere may best be judged by the fact that each of the Communist Parties of the different nations continued to pursue the line laid down by Moscow, to infiltrate all organizations and political groups of any given country and so to establish their own Communist 'inner circle'.

The Popular Front tactics of the Comintern had brought about a split in the solid ranks of the Socialist and Workers Movement. Some realized only too well that the Comintern was nothing but a pressure tool in the realm of foreign affairs wholly controlled by the Soviet Union. The French Socialists allied themselves with the Soviet Union, the British against it. One result was the complete immobilization of the French Socialist group during the years of the Nazi-Bolshevik collaboration in 1939-1941.

IV. - THE COMINFORM

The Third International, or Comintern, was, in theory at least, predicated on the conviction that the Soviet Union was to be defended at any cost. This blind protective sentiment finally replaced Marx in the dogma of Communism. In 1943, the Comintern was dissolved in

what was generally interpreted as a conciliatory move to allay the fears of some of Russia's new Hitler-inspired allies. Conciliatory as the gesture may have been, the existence of the Comintern at the time was a source of acute embarrassment to the Soviet Union.

In 1947, the Cominform, or to use its more descriptive and innocent-sounding title, the Communist Information Bureau, was organized under the auspices of the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party. In appearance at least, it was not of Soviet organization, nor was it to concern itself with policy-making. It was to be an organization for the exchange of information. In this character, it was to publish a bi-weekly (now a weekly) digest of information, whose title echoes strangely the current Soviet policies -- "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy". The first organization meeting was held near Warsaw, and representatives of Russia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy and France assembled at the gathering. The stage-management was perfect. No one could accuse the Soviet Union of exerting undue influence in the new organization! Innocent the organization might have been, but it served one very useful Soviet purpose nevertheless. It declared quite openly that the wartime truce between Soviet Communism and Western Capitalism was over.

THE MOLOTOV PLAN

Present-day observers looking with fear at the blockading tactics of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization are hard put to account for the welcome received by UNRRA in Eastern Europe immediately after the close of World War II. It has never occurred to many that the Soviet Union, weakened by the war, and undergoing a transition from war to a peaceful economy at home was unable as well as unwilling to bolster the shaky economy of the Eastern European states newly liberated from the Nazi regime of terror and exploitation (and by the looting and thievery of the Red Army of Occupation). At that time, the Soviet Union welcomed the work of UNRRA, as that organization strengthened the weaker satellite states and provided an additional channel for strengthening her own. In 1947, the assistance of UNRRA was removed, and in September of the same year, the Cominform was organized. It is an open secret that one of its major tasks was to weaken any ties the Eastern European states might have linked with the West, and to prevent any participation by these states in the Marshall Plan.

The captive countries found themselves in the middle again. Forbidden to deal with the West under the darkening shadows of Red Army intervention, and as yet unable to trade with the Soviet Union, these states were

forced into a scheme of economic recovery founded on interstate trade. The cooperative arrangements made were local, nationalistic, and usually bi-lateral. Not for long. The Soviet Union had forced these states to remain outside the Marshall Plan. Consequently, for political as well as economic reasons, she was forced to provide some alternative assistance to retain the goodwill (however reluctant) of the States involved.

Moreover, the Soviet scheme of things to come included a very considerable dependence of these states, in both political and economic areas, on Russia itself. One eventuality this scheme did not include was any economic-bloc-building directed by any other group than the Soviet Union. Within a very short time, the economy of Eastern Europe was completely re-oriented to the needs and aims of the Soviet Union, but to operate such a drastic realignment, a directing body was needed. By this time, (January 1949), the defection of Tito had brought into the open the first signs of a lack of Party solidarity on an international scale, and the organization of the Komekon, the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, was brought into being in Moscow. More popularly known as "the Molotov Plan", the Council included all the organizing elements of the Cominform, with the notable exception of Yugoslavia, and of Italy and France whose governments had already accepted Marshall Plan aid.

Organization of the Komekon

On paper the Council consists of a general assembly, to be held in rotation with each host country occupying the chair. Nothing was said at its inception of the Executive Committee, but now the permanent headquarters of the organization are in Moscow. In 1949 Bulgaria was host to the first and only session of the Council. Since then, the duties of the Council have been taken over by the Executive Committee, headed originally by Mikoyan, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade and a member of the Politburo.

Theoretically, the Council was organized to plan and make the fullest use of the member nations' economic resources; to facilitate the exchange of goods and commerce; to build a basis for mutual credit agreements, and to replace the bi-lateral trade of the old agreements with multi-lateral trade. All noble ends in themselves!

In practice, however, the operation wanders far from the ideal. Fundamentally, it aims at a complete integration of East European industry with that of the Soviet economy. By an efficient realization of this goal the Russian economists expect to create a surplus with which they can enter world markets. The Molotov Plan bears a striking resemblance to the Nazi 'New Order' -- in reverse! Germany wanted the raw materials of Eastern

Europe to feed her industrial machine, whereas Russia needs the technical skill and know-how of the industries of Eastern Europe to make use of her abundant natural resources. The Molotov Plan is also an extremely important advance post for the Soviet Empire. The USSR now has three industrial-military bases; one in East Europe spreads over Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary; the second covers the natural economic basin of Russia herself, in the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Moscow and Leningrad; and the third extends over the Asiatic centers beyond the Urals, Kuznieck, Karaganda, and the Far East. The development of East Europe is, of course, of prime importance from a military point of view. The Soviet is provided with a dominant position from which to threaten Western Europe, and she has within her control a huge repair shop for her war machinery staffed by skilled workers with generations of industrial war-production already written into the record.

Operations of Komekon

The more immediate goals of the Molotov Plan are simple. The USSR proposes to secure help in its own reconstruction at the expense of its neighbours. Eastern Europe will be industrialized; and the traditional flow of trade to the West will be diverted to the Soviet Union. Komekon is proving a most able coordinator in achieving these aims. To cite one field alone -- 'reconstruction'

of the Soviet Union has taken on many new and strange faces. Troops have been quartered on and paid for by the captive countries, to 'preserve peace for freedom-loving peoples'. It is unimportant that the maintenance of these troops aids the financial upkeep of the largest Army in the world today. Whole industries have been dismantled and shipped to 'safety' within the Soviet Union. Russia accepts with equal impartiality deliveries of goods at less than world market prices, direct confiscations, 'gifts', and deliveries on credit. There seems, in the Russian interpretation, to be no difference between booty and reparations, and the confusion of the terms which are used interchangeably to suit the exigencies of the moment, have enriched the Soviet and depleted the resources of the Eastern European states.

It is interesting to note here the changing patterns of Soviet policy as regards these 'reparations'. Originally, factories were dismantled and shipped, with their equipment, to Russia. Now the installations remain undisturbed, but their production is planned and taken over for Russian purposes. It is possible that this change in tactics represents a growing security in the role of conqueror, but other reasons are discernible as well. For one thing, the skilled labour essential to run the factories is available on the spot; for another, the re-settlement of industrial installations is inefficient at best. More important than either of these is the inescapable fact that retaining a factory

within a given area, coupled with rigid control over its output, gives to the Soviet state a greater measure of power over the entire region than could be gained by any other means. A number of new techniques have been developed to operate these factories, including a control measure known as the 'mixed corporations'. Originally claimed to be German and Italian corporations, Russia claimed as reparations a number of the best and most extensive industrial concerns of Eastern Europe. Production from these firms is considered extraterritorial, a part of the Soviet economy, and they are consequently exempt from inclusion among the reparations payments. Their production is listed as 'imports from the USSR', and they do not show up in local production data. They are tax-exempt and tariff-free, and although their charters stipulate joint ownership, the general manager of each plant is invariably a Soviet citizen.

Soviet control has now been extended to cover all the areas of industry which might have some military significance. The Soviet has tightened its stranglehold on the economy of the captive states by means of mixed companies, mixed trade boards, loans and credits, and technical collaboration. This last control measure might be more easily understood if one recalls that Soviet technicians are used throughout as supervisors (and disciplinarians).

The Soviet press has remained strangely silent about these 'foreign investments'. Part of the silence is understandable when one recalls the Leninist theory of foreign holdings being equal to exploitation of foreign workers, and hence intolerably imperialistic. Since the imputation of imperialism to the country of the glorious revolution is not only unthinkable but treasonable, the controlled press is unlikely to shed much revealing light on the captive economy to the discredit of the Supreme Soviet.

Heavy Industry

The light industry of the satellite states is sure to suffer at the hands of integration into a Soviet-productive-economy. The USSR plan includes an over-emphasis on heavy industry, but such a pattern eventually throws the whole economic picture out of balance and keeps living standards below what the Western world would call normal. The Molotov Plan, although vaunted as the Russian answer to the imperialism of the Marshall Plan, makes no effort to create independent economic entities of the satellite states. Instead, it seeks to create a subjugated supplement to the production of the Soviet itself. Just what could happen to the economy of the individual states should the Soviet alone reach a point of self-sufficiency has

never been made clear. One other factor is important in this subjugated relationship. The living standard of the states of Eastern Europe has always been higher than that of Russia itself. Consequently, by keeping the production of the satellites geared to the heavy-duty lines of the current Soviet needs, the standard of living is unable to rise further, and the Soviet Union can purchase time at least to catch up in its own living standards.

The Difficulties of Komekon

While the Soviet Union may well be able to keep the standard of living in East Europe depressed indefinitely, it is doubtful if in the already uneasy political climate now prevailing the Soviet would care to risk the results of a continual lowering of that standard.

Unless the standard is lowered, investment from capital accumulated in these captive states cannot be drawn upon. There are continual shortages of skilled labour and machines, and worker resistance has added greatly to the difficulties in increasing production as Russia would like to have it increased. Kamekon seems powerless to do much to change this unplanned obstacle to the planned economy. Manpower has too often had to replace horsepower. The 8-hour day is a thing of pleasant memory, and strict work discipline is now the order of the day.

In spite of slave labour, Stakhanovism¹, Socialist competitions and special work pledges, reorganization of the trade unions, incentives and bonuses, the production of the individual worker has not increased as it should have in the Moscow view.

The Imperialist Instrument

There is little room for doubt that the Molotov Plan is an instrument of power politics, as well as an economic weapon. In some respects at least, the 'New Order' of Communism has succeeded in solving certain problems. In a number of ways it has followed the Nazi pattern with a tragic faithfulness. It has wiped out unemployment, and has done much to cut down on agricultural overpopulation. It has also been completely ruthless in its disregard for the rights of man and lavish in its use of forced labour. Basically, however, there is one major difference. The Soviet has used the entire working capacity of these subjugated nations for the convenience of the Soviet State, much as a worker would

¹ Stakhanovism, named for a Soviet coal miner whose team increased its production sevenfold. The Soviet government encouraged the movement and Stakhanovite workers received higher pay and other privileges.... It has been widely criticized outside the USSR as another form of the "speed-up" system, fought by labour unions throughout the world, but its proponents have pointed out that the movement aims at increasing efficiency, not effort, by encouraging the use of ingenuity and technical knowledge. See STAKHANOVISM, The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., 1950, Columbia University Press, p.1880.

use any tool that suited his purpose of the moment. The Eastern European states are little more than industrial-military implements in the conquest of Western Europe. The trade of the countries has been forced out of its accustomed ways and diverted to a single market -- the Soviet Union -- a market that might be closed to it at any time by the caprice of the Kremlin. Barter agreements are made without any regard to the world market price -- and it is not a normal thing for these agreements to be in any sort of equal balance as we understand the term. Costs and prices are arbitrary figures set without regard to any factors other than the Soviet understanding of 'collaboration', 'mutual interests', and the 'principle of fairness'.

The whole industrial structure raised by the Soviet is built on an inadequate reserve of raw materials, and it is now becoming top-heavy. The exploitation of the natural and human resources of the satellites at the hands of the Soviet Union is now almost complete; their labour has been enslaved in Soviet-engineered projects; their armies are now integrated into the glorious Red Army pattern. The subversion of the governments is so effective that the local Communist groups no longer pretend to defend their national interests in any conflict with the power of Russia. This last degradation was underlined recently

when Traicho Kostov, a Bulgarian Vice-Premier, attempted to negotiate a better deal for his country in trade talks with the Soviet Union, and was tried and sentenced to death for 'treason' in December, 1949.¹

It is bad enough for the Western world that the Soviet Union should use the production and trade of these captive states as supplementary to and interchangeable with her own, but it is vital that they realize the place of this Kamekon in the development of the new Soviet Empire. Briefly, Kamekon is the imperialist instrument in Eastern Europe of a new and expansive Soviet plan of aggrandizement, the creation of a "territorium nostrum" in the heart of Europe itself. Behind the mask of economic collaboration among equal and sovereign states, an overall plan imposed by an imperialistic power, bent on world domination, is still discernible.

¹"It appeared that he had withheld information from the Soviet authorities on Bulgaria's trade relations with other countries, and had applied the laws on state secrets to the USSR as to other countries. He had failed to understand that the Soviet Union is not as other countries, is incapable of imperialism ... In the words of George Dimitrov, Kostov was guilty of the 'shameful assumption' that Soviet interests might ever be opposed to Bulgarian interests". Seton-Watson, Hugh, The East European Revolution, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 2nd edition, 1952, p.315.

V. - THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Special attention must be given to the organization and administration of justice in the Soviet Union. The Russian codification premises that the socialist law is the basic law. Hence, because socialism in the Soviet Union means the obligation of complete submission of the citizen to the interests and aims of the State, then the entire Soviet codification of law is based on the prerogatives of the State and its power rather than the protection of the civil rights of the citizens. So all offences against the State are treated as criminal offenses, and treasonable.

Since the defeat of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia is the only state in the civilized world where the political offender is regarded in law and in the courts as worse than a criminal. The Soviet law uses the most draconian methods, which have nothing whatever to do with the universal principles of justice and respect for human rights. For example, Soviet law accepts the principle of collective responsibility. Along with the punishment of the delinquent himself, members of his family and even his friends are equally liable to the same treatment. Soviet criminal procedure in political trials accepts the principle of judging cases without hearing either the defendant or witnesses. The questioning is done by the

police and not by officials of the judiciary. The institute of advocates is nationalized, and the lawyer for the defence is under the same obligation as the prosecutor to protect the interests of the State. The law expounds the obligation of denunciation, trials by analogy, and the retroactivity of the laws.

The whole political organization of the State offers evidence of the impact of the political structure on Soviet life, where the individual as well as society is defenceless and the State is not bound by any restrictions or laws. This also explains the essence of the so-called Soviet Democracy.

As a totalitarian-dictatorial system can not, by its very nature, develop into liberalism, social freedom, or individual and real democracy, it must, of necessity, develop into a more and more restrictive state where the rights of the citizen are concerned, into greater exploitation and oppression of its own workers. Such a system will guard its usurped rights jealously.

VI.- SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 'STATE OF VICTORIOUS SOCIALISM'

The social structure of the Soviet Union differs from that of the socialist and democratic structures of

European countries. Formally, the socialist economic system and socialist ownership of the tools and means of production are keystones of the USSR. In actual practice, under Soviet conditions, the 'Socialist system' and the 'Socialist ownership' mean something totally different from that of Europe. In reality it is a state system and state ownership.

The working masses have no voice in production planning, or in the regulation of working conditions. Planning and work conditions are imposed from the top of the Party which issues the directives and regulations. These directives are no half-hearted suggestions for use as a guide. They are of universal obligation. They favour the interests of the State alone, and do not even pretend to take into account the interests of society or of the good of the working classes. As a result, the worker, along with the peasant, is not the subject of the economic and social life, but a mere tool.

The State alone plans the production for the entire Union. The State establishes what number and kind of workers will be needed where, and sends them there. There is, as a result, no free and natural exchange of employment, but all workers and peasants become state functionaries. The State has not only become the highest and final end of the life and work of each citizen, but

is even the exclusive manager of its workers. The State, as such, does not permit any restriction of its own authority, and the working masses have no recourse through other organizations, such as Trade Unions, Political Parties, or social groups, as is the case outside Russia. Within the Soviet Union, such organizations as do exist are subordinated to the interests of the State and have, therefore, lost their social character entirely. They are reduced to the status of political-administrative and state bureaucratic offices. Consequently, the worker in the Soviet State has no protection from exploitation and oppression by the State. This exploitation has already reached dimensions unheard of in human history.

Any resistance toward the State, any opposition to its avowed interests, any attempt to put social or workers' causes first, not to mention the rights of an individual, are regarded as a crime against the State, in Soviet law. The offenders against the State lose all civil rights and are handled as slave workers exploited by the State under the most horrible conditions, unprotected by any laws, oppressed and terrorized.

With the growth of Soviet 'statism' more and more categories of outcasts were added to the lists of those stripped of their political and civil rights. During the first years after the Revolution, the 'bourgeoisie', the former ruling classes, the members of the Tsarist bureaucracy, etc., suffered most. Later they were joined by

the owners of small factories and free enterprises; the wealthy peasants (kulaks); still later the smaller peasants and those opposed to collectivization. Political criminals included also whole national groups of those subjugated countries who dared to oppose the Soviet regime; the members of all political parties save the Bolshevik Party; all the followers and sympathizers of Trotsky and Zinoviev; the workers' opposition, etc. As the number of 'political criminals' grew, so grew also the number of concentration and forced labour camps.

It has been estimated that during the years 1939-1941 there were about twelve to fifteen million 'political criminals' in the Soviet Union, of all categories, all ages, and of both sexes. They formed a tremendous mass of forced labour which was used for the heaviest jobs, such as road-building, clearing forests, in the mines and in the development of the Arctic regions, in irrigation projects on the deserts and in the wilderness. All of these prisoners are deprived of all of their rights, and the amount contributed by the State to their bare existence is out of all proportion to the immensity of their achievement.

The tremendous expansion of Soviet Russian industry, especially in military equipment, which was mandatory to assure political weight in the international arena, caused revolutionary changes in the structure of the population in Russia.

The worker, as well as the peasant, in the Soviet Union, lost his class characteristics, because he has no trade, no professional or social rights. He cannot make any decisions for himself as to where he will work or what he will produce. He has become nothing more than a clerk of the State. He is not exploited by private capital, but instead he is exploited by the State which completely monopolizes the entire industrial as well as agricultural production.

Such a critically unbalanced structure of living conditions of the nation as a whole mean that the Soviet State, centralized and desiring to 'unify' (although 'subjugate' would be a better word) all the nations of the world, must drink deeply of the individual and collective strength of its citizens to preserve a healthy political organism. Elsewhere in Europe and on other continents, the whole structure of living conditions is ameliorated by progress and social changes. As it accumulates the tremendous force of the political state, the Soviet Union weakens the material living conditions as well as the social rights of the Soviet citizens.

If this lack of balance is allowed to continue past the point where the total work force is reduced to a slave status, then the political load becomes top-heavy and it must crash into anarchy and complete chaos of its

own overweight. Consequently, the machinery of a state based solely on political aims must rely on force within as well as in foreign affairs, to bolster the crumbling masonry of its own defective construction. From its very beginning, the Bolshevik Soviet Government put its principal organizational effort into the formation of the police forces - the tool of persuasion in inner politics - and into the Army - the tool of pressure in foreign affairs.

By December 20, 1917, they had organized the V.C.K. (Che-ka) (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission), a unified and centralized police force for the entire territory covered by the Revolution. It was designed to combat counter-revolution, sabotage, and the black market. Che-ka terrorism wrote a new and shameful page in world history with its blood bath of the guilty and innocent alike. In February, 1922, it was superseded by the dreaded O.G.P.U. (The Unified State Political Bureau) which surpassed even the Che-ka in terror; and it in turn was replaced in 1934 by the N.K.V.D. (Narkomvudnel), or the Security Bureau of the Commissariat of the Interior) and now the M.V.D., (The Ministry of the Interior). The activity of the Soviet Security Forces in the Soviet system is ubiquitous. It is the eye, the ear and the arm of the Party, the tool of compulsion which is used in the 'building of socialism'.

It is also the tool of exploitation of the populace on which this 'building' is based. The Soviet system is an institutionalized violence, i.e. force as a tool of government. The C.P.U. (later N.K.V.D. and now M.V.D.), said Stalin in 1922, was the "indefatigable guardian of the Revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat" which the Soviet state could not safely relinquish.¹

The Soviet Army is an organic part and exponent of the militaristic system and for the war setting which was an integral part of the Soviet policy and economy from the beginning of the revolution. The question of armament took first place in the Soviet programme to industrialize Russia. The armaments budget has grown each year and has always far outstripped all the other nations of the world. Army training has always been 'offensive' for the 'final victory' of the revolution. The Party has reached far back into the most reactionary and oppressive times of the Tsars to whet the offensive appetites of the Army, and to sharpen their ambitions. Especially at the time of the Nazi invasion of Russia, the mythical heroes of the

¹ Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma ("Problems of Leninism"), Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 9th ed., 1933, p.312

Tsarist Army, Suvorov, and Kutuzov were given much prominence. The traditions and legends of the invincible Russian Army were again proclaimed throughout the Union.¹

In a State where everything is based on force, one to which political force is the only end, and where the force itself is based on social and economic exploitation of the individual citizen, the human rights of the individual are forgotten, and are not included in any planning for the future.

In the Constitution the narrower Stalinist concept of the Constitution is discernible, although the Party was very careful about its effects for foreign consumption. The rights of the Soviet citizen are formulated in Articles 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, and 125.

The Constitution stipulates that "the citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to ..." Unfortunately, the constitution imposes no obligation on the state to see that these rights are granted! One 'right' alone is enjoined -- the right to work (Article 118) -- work as a duty and matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat ..." (Article 12).

¹"The unsurpassed strategy of the patriotic war, the brilliant operations of our troops -- are the genius creations of the great Stalin. He was raising and educating the Red Army in the years of peaceful construction ..." "Bolshevik", Moscow, No.3-4(1944), pp 23-24.

Freedom of speech and of the press is granted by Article 125 of the Constitution, but it suffers from the rather narrow interpretation of being for members of the Party only. The Soviet publicists openly declare that in the USSR "there, naturally, is or can be no place for freedom of the press, of speech, et cetera, for the enemies of socialism" and that any attempt by the latter to utilize these freedoms "must be classified as a counter-revolutionary crime".¹

It must be mentioned in passing that citizens of all Soviet Republics have a common citizenship, and are subject to one and the same legislation. They are all equally bound to carry identity cards and they have no right to leave the Soviet State or to have any private correspondence abroad.

The Soviet system is responsible for the growing disproportion of State strength and that of the individual. As the power of the State increases, the strength of society and of the individual decreases. The sole asset of the system is its total unity, its complete concentricity, however unwilling that unification may be. As a businessman whose liabilities outweigh his assets is faced with ruin, so the Soviet today, having passed the

¹ Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo ("The Soviet State and Law") pp. 554-555.

critical balance point, hurtles downward on a sloping decline to a point of complete moral bankruptcy in every non-religious sense of the term.

Unable to satisfy the material and social desires and needs of its citizens, the Soviet authority must now destroy any incipient awareness of its own deficiencies before this embryo unrest can be expressed as a conscious and organized movement. To fill the resulting vacuum they incite political ambitions of world conquest, and use every possible means to create an emotional state of exaltation among the oppressed people of the Union.

That the Soviet system is now basically imperialistic is nowhere better shown than in the words of Stalin himself: "Imperialism is the most barefaced exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of people inhabiting vast colonies and dependent countries."¹ That it is also aggressive cannot be denied in view of the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference:

The existence of two diametrically opposed social systems gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, nothing but a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries can provide the guarantee for the final victory of socialism, that is to say, guarantees against restoration.

¹ Stalinism, Foundations of Leninism, p.14. Little Lenin Library, Vol.18, New York, International Publishers, 1939.

The extent of this aggression has been made quite clear by both Lenin and Stalin:

Of course, for the complete victory of Socialism, for complete security against the restoration of the old order, the united efforts of the proletariat of several countries are necessary ... The sympathy of European workers for our revolution, their readiness to thwart the imperialists' plan of intervention -- is not all that support?¹

Most probably the world revolution will develop along the line of a series of new countries dropping out of the system of the imperialist countries as a result of revolution, while the proletarians of these countries will be supported by the proletariat of the imperialist States but it is likewise beyond a doubt that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of the breaking away of a number of new countries will be more rapid and more thorough, the more thoroughly socialism fortifies itself in the first victorious country

It (assistance to other workers) ... should be expressed by the 'victorious proletariat' of one country having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would rise ... against the rest of the capitalist world, attract to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, raise revolts among them against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity come out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their States.²

¹ Stalin, The October Revolution, a collection of articles and speeches. Preface to the book entitled: On the Way to October, Marxist-Leninist Library, Moscow-Leningrad, Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1934, pp. 107-108.

² Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, "The United States of Europe Slogan." IV. "The October Revolution as the beginning of and premise for the World Revolution", pamphlet, New York, International Publishers, 1927, pp.125.

Stalin, The October Revolution and tactics of the Russian Communists ibidem: pp.127, 128.

The Soviet system is a negation of any possibility of an evolution toward democracy or of the exercise of the basic human rights and freedoms. It cannot, if it is itself to survive, permit of the existence of any other form of government which would acknowledge these rights. This is the fundamental force of its imperialism, all the more dangerous in that it pays lip service to the universal slogans of Marx, and a creed of truly international brotherhood, while cloaking an inner core of specific Soviet Statism. We can, therefore, expect no relaxation in the avowed theory of 'world revolution' regardless of how green the olive branches it would tender may be.

The political strength of the Soviet system is, at the same time, its weakness.

In the history of mankind we cannot find that any single state, based solely on force and exploitation, and the misery and degradation of its citizens, has long survived.

PART III

THE PARTY'S STATUS

CHAPTER SIX

THE MECHANISM OF THE PARTY

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THE MECHANISM OF THE PARTY

I. - THE NEW PARTY'S NAME

The assembling of the Nineteenth Congress on October 5, 1952, was the occasion for much speculation. Before it convened, there was a good deal of supposition as to its significance. When the assemblage had dispersed, there was even greater puzzlement as to why it had been called together at all. Against the background of a purely mechanical formality and a peculiar 'rubber-stamp' quality in the work done by the Congress, one fact stood out very clearly. The balance of power within the State has shifted from the theoretically all-powerful Party to the hierarchy of the Party itself. The self-chosen Party heads and the self-perpetuating dynasty of their leadership are now complete masters of the machinery of the State.

On paper at least, one reason for assembling the Congress was to change the Party name from "All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" to that of the "Communist Party of the Soviet Union". It would, however, appear a little unreasonable at best to summon 1359 highly-

placed Party members to Moscow to ratify a change in title only. The official explanation given for the alteration was that the term "Bolsheviki" (literally, "members of the maximum plan") is now of only historical significance. Originally it was a temporary identification of the Leninist faction at the time of the split with the "Mensheviks" (members of the Minimum plan) at the Second Party Congress in 1903. Of even greater historical significance, although any mention of it has been carefully avoided, was that the now discarded 'All-Union' terminology recalls the 1922-24 period when the Ukrainian, Byelo-Russian, Georgian and other parties were welded into one 'All Union' Party in the illusory hope of an equal and voluntary footing. Unfortunately, this alleged equality no longer conforms to the current Soviet dogma -- in this case the primacy of the Great Russian "elder-brother" over the other Soviet peoples.

At least the new terminology acknowledges the completely centralized control now exercised over the Party, and stifles any echoes of the earlier rallying-cries to the various non-Russian Communist parties who believed that, at least for them, some element of true federalism of both Party and State would be found in the Soviet Union.

The statutes adopted by the Congress make no changes in current practice. Rather, they simply record

it. If further clarification of the ramifications of the hierarchical subordination are needed, they are now clearly spelled out. A Party member can no longer be excluded from the Party cell to which he is attached until his expulsion has been approved by the higher committees -- provincial, regional, or Union Republic. He can continue to take a full part in the work of the cell. This includes attending secret meetings. Obviously, the real right of expulsion is no longer in the self-contained unit of the Party -- the cell -- but it is entirely controlled by the hierarchy of committees. More specifically, it is in the hands of the secretaries who are appointed by the Central Secretariat in Moscow.

By contrast the Party 'apparatus' (the Party Committees at the county, city, district, provincial, regional, and Union Republic levels) is placed in an enviable position. No cell may dare to even consider the expulsion of any of these minor leaders. The decision must be made by a two-thirds majority of the plenary of the Party Committee to which the suspect belongs. Logically, therefore, the new statutes also stipulate that a member of the Central Committee can only be excluded by a Party Congress, which is now to meet every four years, and even more significantly, by the Central Committee itself, meeting

at intervals, between Congresses. These provisions help to guard the position of the hierarchy -- the apparatus -- against any possible control by the rank-and-file membership. Once again we find renewed emphasis on the principle of subservience within the monolith controlled and directed from above.

It goes without saying that there is no mention, in the new statutes, of any limitation on the power of the political police over Party members. In its early years the political police were assumed to exercise some control over the 'enemies of the people', not to spy on members of the Party itself, and to punish them. The Control Commission of the Party was supposed to exercise this function. During the rise of Stalin and the subsequent struggle for dominance and finally monopoly, the powers of the police were extended rapidly, not only over known opposition members, but also over all Party members. In spite of this disunity, some effort to uphold the tradition of Party control over members persisted as late as 1934, led by such men as Satz and Akulov. Rather than limit the complete dominance of the political police over the membership of the Party, Article 13 of the revised Statutes reinforces it. It provides that

'... in cases when a member of the Party has committed misdeeds which are subject to punishment under judicial procedure, he is excluded from the Party together with communication concerning the misdeeds to the administrative and judicial authorities ...'

It would appear that this awkwardly worded proviso only refers to 'misdeeds' which the Party organs have discovered first, and are then to be reported by them to the political police or the State Attorney. There is no reference to any action to be taken by the Party committees in case a Party member is accused or convicted of 'misdeeds' under any of several public or secret procedures. The inference of the unchallenged supremacy of the political police over the 'vanguard of the toiling people' is clear.

II. - THE PRESIDIUM

The disappearance of the Politburo of the Central Committee, with its nine-member, two-alternate body, and its replacement by the Presidium, with 20 members and 11 alternates, has occasioned much speculation. Speaking on the draft statutes in general, Khrushchev was wordy and rhetorical. However, in discussing the merging of the Politburo into the Presidium, he was the soul of brevity and clarity. In a single sentence he dismissed the entire reorganization: "such a reconstruction is opportune because the term 'Presidium' corresponds better to the functions which are, in fact, being carried out at present by the Politburo..." It is worth noting that the 'functions' of the Politburo-Presidium needed no clarification to the Congress, and that the entire draft statute was adopted unanimously without further explanation.

Chart 1 THE PARTY PYRAMID





Chart 2 THE SOVIET PYRAMID



The only way one can appraise the differences between the old and the new instruments of dictatorship is to examine the composition of each. The enlarged Presidium contains three elements. The most important part of its membership comprised Stalin and nine others (Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Beria, Khrushchev and Shvernik), all with long service in the Politburo. The portraits of only these ten leaders were prominent in the November 7 celebrations at Moscow. Aside from the disappearance of Andreyev, following Khrushchev's attack on his methods of organizing collective farm work, this 'leading cadre' has changed very little in many years.

Four Party leaders from three key regions are included in the 15 less prominent members of the Presidium: Andrianov from Leningrad, Aristov from Chelyabinsk, and Korotchenko and Melnikov from the Ukrainian Party. It is probable that of the two Melnikov is the actual representative of the Ukraine, but Korotchenko has at least a family name of the region. In view of the relative unimportance of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, it is doubtful if Otto Kuusinen has been included only because of his nominal role as Party leader in that region. It is perhaps of more significance to recall that he has been included as an adviser on Communist Parties abroad because of his many years' services in the higher offices of the Comintern prior to its formal dissolution in 1943.

The third element in the Presidium consists of important central executives just below the top rank -- men such as Pervukhin, head of the Russian Republic, Kuznetsov, head of the trade unions, Shkiryatov, Chairman of the Party Control Commission, and Saburov, Chairman of the State Planning Office. Mikhailov, Ponomarenko and Suslov are members both of the Presidium and of the all-important Secretariat of the Central Committee. The importance of these three men is more easily recognized when it is realized that the Central Committee controls appointments, promotions, and demotions within the Party machine, and participates in all similar decisions affecting the senior Administrative, Economic, and Military ranks of the bureaucracy. The alternates include second-rankers such as Vishinsky for foreign affairs, Zverev for finance, and Kosygin for light industry.

The ascendancy of Saburov at this time deserves particular comment. When he replaced Voznesensky in 1949 as Chairman of Gosplan (the Russian State Planning Commission which organizes the Five-Year Plans), Saburov was disparagingly referred to abroad as a 'mere technician'. In one sense, Stalin is the only Soviet executive not considered a 'mere technician'. As early as 1945, Saburov was already considered one of the most important economic experts in Stalin's secretariat. Charged with the responsibility of rounding up and shipping to Russia all possible

supplies and equipment found in Eastern Germany, he did a very thorough job as many Western diplomats discovered later, to their regret. His authority exceeded that of the military command -- a mark of his position at the Kremlin. Western negotiators who dealt with Saburov at the Potsdam Conference and later in the Allied Council at Berlin found him efficient, quick at decisions, and extremely well-informed about economic and reparations problems. He was also very direct in his approach to concrete problems, and was considered 'unideological' in that sense. There is some reason to believe that Saburov was one of approximately 80 young Soviet Party specialists sent to the United States to study engineering and production methods between 1931-1933. It is probable that he and Mikoyan are the only two ranking Soviet leaders who have first-hand acquaintance with the industrial power of the United States. It is significant that his speech to the Congress, supplementing and expanding Malenkov's treatment of economic issues, dealt with both the achievements and defects of Soviet production without equivocation.

The system of committees in the operations of the Politburo-Presidium' is its most important, and probably least known, feature. While no definite list can be given, it is believed that standing committees on foreign policy,

on economic development, on military affairs, on ideological controls, on the direction of foreign Communist parties, and perhaps others, do exist. For example, it is probable that Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and perhaps, on occasion, Mikoyan and Beria form a committee on foreign policy, to which Vishinsky and other leading officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would report. Zverev may take financial problems to a committee which might include Molotov, Krushchev, Kaganovich and Saburov. A similar committee on foreign Communist Parties might consist of Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, and Kvusinen.

In the absence of approved channels of free expression of divergent views, 'cabinet committees' of this type, backed up by meticulous staff work, are essential to include competing demands and interests. As the Politburo seems to have transferred itself bodily and largely unchanged to the larger arena of the Presidium, it seems only reasonable to suppose that the system of committee government which it initiated has also been transferred with its functions uninterrupted. The entire character of the Presidium is that of the Politburo with only one modification -- the inclusion of some ten responsible executives who have now been awarded recognition by open inclusion in the very top stratum. Whether the Presidium will ever actually function as one 'Cabinet', or even meet as a body, is a matter of the sheerest possible speculation.

A study of the hierarchical details of the Congress adds weight to the belief that Stalin intended that there should be no one individual ranking immediately below himself. There is no obvious reason to suppose that he ever intended that access to him would be centralized in any individual, however trusted, or that he did not intend to keep close, if quiet, control over important decisions through the committees and their recommendations to him, with which he might or might not agree. The planning of the proceedings did nothing to dispel the impression that active conduct of policy -- 'leadership' must remain unique -- had been passing gradually since the war into the hands of a group of Party members in their fifties, with a record of long experience behind them, and backing up this top-ranking group, a second group of trained, experienced administrators in their forties.

The Congress itself, in its makeup, reflected this significant movement of executive responsibility to the post-revolutionary generations. Of 1192 voting members, 61.1 percent were between 41 and 50, 15.3 percent were over 50, 17.7 percent between 35 and 40, and 5.9 percent were under 35. In terms of length of party membership, 1.2 percent were members before 1917, 6.2 percent joined between 1917 and 1920, 52.1^{percent} between 1920 and 1940, 36.4 percent between 1941 and 1945, and 4.1 percent since the war. The age structure is significant in that it represents a complete reversal of that in the 1920's and even the 1930's.

The importance of higher education for entry into the hierarchy of the Party is indicated by the fact that of 1192 delegates, 709 had completed their higher education, and 84 had received some advanced education.

III. - THE APPOINTMENT POLICY

In effect, the Nineteenth Congress strengthened the bond between Party and State, ^{and}ratified de facto the interdependence between them which had been clearly outlined by the mid-thirties, blended by the great purges of the late thirties, and extended by the influx of military and civilian administrators during the Second World War. Even without any other adhesive force, the power of direct appointment or review of appointment, monopolized more and more by the Party Secretariat, would of itself have cemented the direct authority of the Politburo over all ranks of the Party, in administrative, economic, or military fields.

There is some proof that the appointive powers of the Secretariat includes the posts of Party committee secretaries, down to the level of counties, cities and important factories. All ministerial appointments, both federally and within the separate Republics, are similarly centralized, as are the appointments of the chief

administrative officers in the provinces. All Army appointments above the rank of Colonel are subject to review and approval of the Secretariat.

Within the central government, the State, and the tremendous economic machine, actual policy is laid down by the Politburo-Presidium of the Party. It is unlikely that the unwieldy Council of Ministers ever meets, and in all probability, the ministries are grouped by subject matter under the direction of the relevant committees of the Presidium.

The original parallels between State and Party organs, once visible in such dual offices as the General Secretary of the Party, and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, have now been erased by the unified rule of the Party utilizing both State and Party machinery for its own ends.

The Party fulfills three important tasks for the State: mass indoctrination, supervision of performance and recruiting of personnel. The Nineteenth Congress added nothing to our information on this facet of its work, beyond Krushchev's re-emphasis on the role of the Party as the preaching arm of the State, and the addition of a few recommendations to improve its methods and to strengthen its propaganda efforts. The listing of the principal Party schools, as given by Moskatov, Chairman of the Party's Central Review Commission, gives some

insight into the present state of the organization for indoctrination.

Among such schools he listed one-year courses for the advanced training of first secretaries of provincial committees of regional committees of the Soviet Party and of the central committees of Communist Parties of Union Republics, chairman of provincial and regional executive committees, and of presidents of the Councils of Ministers of Union and Autonomous Republics. The welding of Party and State could not be better illustrated than by the picture of both Party and higher-ranking state officials, including presumably the Presidents of the Union Republics, attending the highest Party school for a year, to receive their final initiation into the Arcana of Soviet rule.

IV. - THE PLACE OF THE PARTY

The exact relationship between the Party and the State has never been very stable. Until the mid-thirties, the two differed considerably in personnel, and the even-lower levels of Party groups or Komsomols interfered at all levels of State in the name of 'Bolshevist vigilance'. With the rapid expansion of the machinery of the State and the economic management of the military and the secret

police during the thirties, the administrative corps acquired greater and greater authority, as more Communists took over the higher posts, and specific tasks, rather than broad ideological functions, were allotted to the best administrators. While some administrators had always been resentful of the over-emphasis of the role of the Party in the supervision of 'practical' work, this trend was accelerated by the purges themselves. During the war, administrative ability was desperately needed to stimulate production and the actual waging of the war, and the 'ideological' emphasis for admission to the Party gave way to the more popular 'patriotic' motives. By the time the War was over, the role of the Party member had degenerated to that of a somewhat artificial creator of public sentiment, useful in emotional appeals to the working masses, but power, prestige, and Party-influence had gone to those who 'did things'.

The renewal of emphasis on Party doctrine, upon the unique role of the Party, and the idea of 'Party duty' as a necessary adjunct to administrative efficiency, did not wait for the war to end.. It has been maintained and increased steadily since that time, culminating in the exhortations of Malenkov and Kurshchev at the Nineteenth Congress. Criticism of the failure of some within the Party to wield the proper degree of supervisory control,

and to provide the right kind of ideological leadership suggests that within the Party, real power continues to be confined in general to the hands of a small coterie of managerial elite who are concerned with the manipulation of large power blocs, and that the lowlier Party 'clerks' are too often unwilling to challenge the power of these industrial and political 'magnates'.

Marshal Vasilevsky's comment on the number of Army leaders now members of the Party (86% of the officers belong either to the Party or to the Young Communist League) gives further evidence of the operational influence and penetration of the Party membership. Of similar significance was his further comment that the principle of 'single command' had been reinforced. It should be remembered that prior to, and indeed during the early years of the Second World War, the politruks or commissars attached as 'political advisers' to the military commands, had too often been able to overrule operational orders of the commanders. This, of course, seriously weakened the real authority of the operational officers over their men. As the war progressed, this debilitating situation was gradually altered. Today, with most of the officers officially members of Party cells, they may retain their 'single command' over the troops, and still be under the direct ideological control of the Party hierarchy.

V. - THE WORK OF THE PARTY

Krushchev's speech on the work of the Party showed many instances of the failure of Party organizations to exercise sufficient supervision over the quality of the work performed by its members and by State officials. Once again he pointed out the duty of Party members to maintain a constant critical re-evaluation of the work of the entire group. According to Malenkov, the basic duties of the Party are: to develop "self-criticism"¹ (officially sanctioned, of course) while punishing "slander"; to improve the discipline of Party members and of all organizations within the Soviet system;² to select personnel for both Party and State organizations;³ and to improve "ideological work" both in the Party and outside it "in the non-Party masses".

¹ Supplement to "New Times" (42), 1952, G. Malenkov, "Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)", page 37. Printed in USSR. (Moscow).

"Criticism and self-criticism are the tried and tested weapons of the Party in combatting shortcomings, errors, and morbid tendencies which undermine the health of the Party organism. Criticism and self-criticism do not weaken, but strengthen the Soviet social system, and this is a sign of its vigour and virility".

² Ibidem: p.39.

"The Party does not need inert and indifferent executives ... it needs men who will fight indefatigably and devotedly to carry out the directives of Party and government, and who place the interests of the State above all else."

THE MECHANISM OF THE PARTY

³ Ibidem: pp.40-41:

"The decisive factor in Party and State leadership is personnel; if personnel is not selected and trained properly, the political line of the Party cannot be carried out effectively ... We must see to it that the selection of personnel and verification of fulfillment really become the chief thing in the directing activities of the central and local Party, Soviet and economic organizations."

⁴ Ibidem: p.41:

"Many Party organizations underrate the importance of ideological work, with the result that it falls short of the Party's requirements, and in many organizations is in a state of neglect."

"Ideological work is a prime duty of the Party...."

Programme would necessitate that the Party was not a

... course but also be able to work actively. It is

... of the Party's requirements, and in many

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Programme

It may be that in the future the Party Programme, in some definition of the present Soviet Party might prove embarrassing to the Communist Parties of the Chinese

and European satellites, to the calling of the branches of the Party in such countries as France and Italy where the Party faithful have already been pledged to the active

CHAPTER SEVEN

defense of the Soviet Union, and the further strengthening of the true Soviet

THE AIMS OF THE PARTY

aimed for what amounted to a complete change in the

I. - THE PROGRAMME

programme of peaceful co-existence with the capitalist world.

The Eighteenth Party Congress, at its meeting in 1939, had appointed a specific group to prepare a new Party programme to replace that drafted in 1918.

Much of the delay in calling a meeting of the Nineteenth Congress had been ascribed to the difficulties of carrying through a postwar reconstruction, and at the same time preparing the ground for the major conversion of 'ideological reconstruction' which a drastically revised programme would necessitate. That the delay was due to other causes may now be accepted with certitude. At the recent Congress in October 1952, the problem of effecting an all-inclusive reiteration of the Party programme was again postponed. A Committee of eleven was appointed to study the question in greater detail. It is significant, however, that no reporting date was established by the Congress.

II. - THE PARTY ABROAD

It may be that in drafting a new Party Programme, an exact definition of the present Soviet Party might prove embarrassing to the Communist Parties of the Chinese

and European satellites, to say nothing of the branches of the Party in such countries as France and Italy where the Party faithful have already been pledged to the active defence of the Soviet Union. Any reasonably frank outline of the true nature of the Soviet Government might make it awkward for that government to advertise itself as the champion of peaceful co-existence with the non-Soviet world, and to a rabid defence of 'national sovereignty', and 'peace' against the evil 'imperialists' and their 'lackeys'.

Whether the newly established committee will draw up a report at all is still in the realm of conjecture. It may be that there will be a statement of policy presented at the next plenary Congress four years hence. It may equally happen that the Party will struggle along 'making do' with the Programme laid down in 1918. As the transition between socialism and communism has now been under way for some time, the people of the Soviet Union will doubtless continue to work as before, and with no perceptible improvement or change in their working conditions, find that, by decree, they have now attained the Utopian heights of 'Communism'.

II. - THE PARTIES ABROAD

Stalin's concluding speech on October 14th was intended principally for the representatives from the

forty-four 'fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties' who had sent delegates to the Congress, and for the parties abroad, including the Communist Party of the United States, who had sent addresses of devotion and 'loyalty'. It dealt, in the main, with the problems of "cooperation" between the Soviet Union and the 'fraternal parties' abroad. The recent declarations by Thorez and Togliatti that "their peoples will not fight against the peoples of the Soviet Union", brought special praise from Stalin himself.¹ In turn, Stalin pledged the support of the Soviet Party to the 'fraternal Parties' and 'their peoples' in "their struggle for liberation, in their struggle for the preservation of peace",² adding, as the waves of applause resounded through the meeting-place, that "as is well-known, that is exactly what it (the Soviet Party) is doing".³

Stalin made it clear that this 'fraternal' support from abroad, while not decisive, was extremely valuable and welcome when he added:

It would be a mistake to think that our Party, having become a mighty force, is no longer in need of support.

¹ "When Comrade Thorez or Comrade Togliatti declare that their peoples of the Soviet Union..." J.V. Stalin, Speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress; Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1952: p.7.

^{2,3} Ibidem, page 8.

⁴ Stalin, op. cit., p. 7.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 11.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 11.

That is not true. Our Party and our country have always needed, and will need, the confidence, the sympathy, and the support of fraternal peoples abroad.¹

In his usual paternalistic approach, Stalin made no effort to minimize the pioneering role of the Soviet. He had no hesitation in assuring the fraternal parties that however difficult their present struggles for power might seem to them, they should not lose sight of the fact that "it is not as hard for them as it was for us Russian Communists in the period of Tsarism".² Further, he asserted that "not a trace of liberalism or of national independence now remains under 'bourgeois' rule", and he exhorted the parties abroad to pick up the forgotten banners of personal freedom and national sovereignty. "It is obvious", he concluded, "that all these circumstances should lighten the work of the Communist and democratic parties which have not yet come to power."³

This condescension was even more obvious in his Bolshevik article discussing the plan for a new textbook on economics. Stalin wrote as follows:

"The textbook is especially needed for the Communists of all countries ... who want to know ... how ... our country, only recently poor and weak, has been transformed into a rich and powerful country ... in order to learn from us and to

¹ Stalin, op.cit., p.6

² ibidem, p.11

³ ibidem, p.15

use our experience in their own countries ... It will be a handbook of Marxist political economy, a fine gift for the young Communists of all countries ... In those countries such a textbook could also be of great benefit to veteran Communists who are no longer young."¹

As all other speeches at the Congress, Stalin's concluding remarks expressed the basic theme of his postwar foreign policy, first expressed in detail by him in 1946. The world is now divided into two camps, one of socialism, peace, national independence, human liberty, (led, of course, by the glorious Soviet Union), and the other of 'capitalist chaos, warmongering, suppression of all national and human rights' which the United States is supposed to lead. Stalin's newest outburst repeats and summarizes the present basic Communist line abroad, calling for the defence of 'freedom' and 'independence' against non-Soviet governments and against American influence. This 'divide and conquer' philosophy is, of course, the root cause of the present Communist support of any forces or ideologies which are hostile to or fearful of American policies.

III.- THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO COMMUNISM






Throughout the last three years, a good deal of discussion has been held on the projected 'transition from

¹ Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR; Int. Publishers, New York, 1952, pp.36-37.

Socialism to Communism'. The Party Congress made frequent references to the 'preparation' for this transition, but it carefully refrained from giving any specific details of how the transition was to take place. Stalin had already rejected an earlier belief that the State would begin to "wither away" during the approach to Communism. Some Soviet economists, however, seem to have anticipated certain dramatic changes in economic life. It was felt, for example, that a basic commodity, such as bread, would be freely distributed. Although there is no direct contradiction of such a theory, in his September article in Bolshevik, Stalin emphasized the continuity of the basic laws of the economy, and insisted, beyond any doubt as to his meaning, that economists would do well to search out the basic laws inherent in the working of Communism and stop "creating" new laws.¹ The handwriting on the wall was obvious. If Stalin, in his first major 'ideological' work since the explosive article on Soviet linguistics, chose not to define the details of the transition, lesser economic "geniuses" would do well not to speculate too far. It could very well be that any definition, however vague,

¹ Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR., International Publishers, New York, 1952, p.7.

These basic industries have grown explosively in 25 years



of "Communism" will be postponed until the new party programme can be presented to the masses.

Malenkov told the Congress that "the Fifth Five-Year Plan marks a big new step forward on the road to our country's development from Socialism to Communism".¹ At least the Congress was encouraged to believe that the transition was still a future goal. The economic aims of the 1951-1955 Plan were more specific than has been usual in recent years. Leaving aside this aspect of the Malenkov and Saburov speeches, or the 'debates' which followed them, we have no reason to disbelieve the Soviet claim that in 1952 the production of steel will reach 35,000,000 metric tons, pig iron 25,000,000, rolled metal 27,000,000, Coal 300,000,000 and petroleum 47,000,000 tons. These figures are not out of line with the generally high tempo of recovery demonstrated by the Soviet economy since 1947. At that time it came out of a postwar recession, with a high rate of investment and a relatively low level of consumption. This rate of consumption is of course fixed by the State, and has been held at a level below that of pre-war days. It has been estimated by experts that the increase of steel production in 1951 as against that the previous year amounted to 12 percent. When the current Five-Year Plan sets a goal of 10.1 percent increase in steel production, then it does not appear either unreasonable or impossible.

¹ Malenkov, Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress, Oct. 5, 1952, Supplement to "New Times", Foreign Languages Pub., Moscow, p. 34.

A striking factor at this time is that the annual percentage rates of increase, as shown in the plan for steel, are slackening off. This is not unexpected in a state system which is attaining a fuller degree of industrialization. The significant part is that this declining percentage of increase, when set against a steadily expanding base, as in the Soviet Union today, means a rapid growth in quantitative terms. While the capacity of the United States steel production has been estimated at 102,000,000 metric tons, as against 31,400,000 for 1951 in the USSR, we would do well to remember that when Hitler challenged the world in 1938, steel production available to him measured only 22,700,000 tons. In 1940, Japan had an annual production of 6,900,000 tons, with which she hurled the gauntlet to the United States. Marshal Bulganin, in his speech on October 12, made one significant point when he remarked that the Soviet economy was well prepared to shift to a war economy.

An increase in productivity per worker has been planned at 50 percent. Whether or not this figure can be reached depends on improved satisfaction of the consumption needs of the non-agricultural labour force, as well as on a continued high rate of investment and on better methods or organization. The work force in 1951 was

and livestock products in 1951 were 10% less than in 1940, at the outset of the industrialization drive.

reported at 40,000,000, and the 1955 planning calls for a total of 44,000,000 workers. The rates of increase in production of consumer goods are, as usual, lower than for the heavy industries. Achievement in this field has not as a rule measured up to the planned goals.

Saburov's statements concerning the industrial development east of the Volga are deserving of special note. It has been claimed that industrial output had been tripled between 1940 and 1952. In 1951, after the reconstruction of industry in European Russia and the Ukraine, the eastern areas accounted for one-half of the entire steel and rolled metal production, and one-third of the total industrial output. Since 1941, there has been a tremendous gain in relative strategic protection of vital industries.

In the past, the ambitious goals in agriculture have failed of achievement. Whether the new, and still ambitious goals for this year can be fulfilled is very doubtful, especially since only 15 percent of the total investment in the Five-Year Plan of 1951-55 is slated for agriculture. It is quite possible that Soviet industry now rests on an inadequate agricultural base, especially in terms of basic foodstuffs. One thing at least is certain, the per capita availability of livestock and livestock products is far less than in 1928, at the outset of the industrialization drive.

In a few flat sentences, Malenkov reported what must have been a profound revolution in the life of the Soviet village, when he stated that 254,000 collective farms have been consolidated into 97,000 amalgamated collectives since January 1950. This has, obviously, been intended as an important improvement in agricultural techniques. It doubtless has had the no less significant effect of tightening the grip of the State on the work and life of the peasantry. That the consolidation process was aimed at improving methods is clear from Malenkov's reiteration of previous criticisms of the "bureaucratic" tendency to amalgamate villages mechanically, by physical transference of the buildings to a central settlement, while neglecting the more important factors of improving farming techniques and planning.

On the topic of agriculture in the State, Stalin's Bolshevik article was more explicit than any of the speeches at the Congress. In his view, before the state of "Communism" can be attained, the present mixed system will have to be abolished. As things stand now, the agricultural land and the machinery are the property of the State, while the produce is the 'property' of the collective farm. In the Utopian state, agricultural produce as well will belong to the State. In this newest

ideological proclamation, Stalin has returned to the idea that all agriculture must be State-operated, with the peasants working, in effect, as hired labourers. Whether this type of 'organization' is the best calculated to secure increased agricultural production is more than doubtful. What is of importance here is the Stalinist view that the best way to solve the agricultural problem is to increase the grip of state control and compulsion on the peasantry.

In an interim step to securing complete control over the lagging agricultural sector, Stalin recommends a more rapid expansion of the system of "product-exchange". This arrangement, which is no new thing, but has long been in use in the government's purchasing of especially valuable crops, such as cotton, sugar-beet, and tobacco, involves deliveries of agreed amounts of consumer goods to the peasants at low prices, in return for fixed amounts of produce delivered by the collectives also at low prices. In other crops, such as grain and livestock, the collective makes some deliveries to the state at low prices, others are delivered in kind to the machine-tractor stations in payment for their services, and sets up reserves. It may then sell the balance to the government under a "product-exchange" contract, sell it in the open market, or divide it among its members, allowing them to sell their shares

directly in the open market. As matters now stand, a great deal of the crops escapes the direct control of the State, and as Stalin stated, a large part of exchange between city and village is regulated by the market. The new proposal would channel all deliveries from the collectives through government agencies. These, will, in turn, meet the peasants' need for consumer goods by supplying them at low prices, under contract. The operators of a planned economy would have us believe that such a plan of exchange would be a great improvement. From the peasants' point of view, they would find even greater improvement if the government were to increase the output of consumer goods, reduce both prices and the extortionate turnover taxes now imposed and extend the retail trade network. Under present conditions, these improvements seem unattainable to the peasant, but it is obvious that they would effectually stimulate farm production, reduce the prices of consumer goods, and save a great deal of time now spent by the worker in seeking scarce, shoddy, and expensive goods -- that that could be utilized for more production, if nothing else. However, until and unless "consumer psychology" becomes a working segment of Soviet planning (and Stalin has always been set against it) the normal expectation is that a stronger campaign will be waged in constant prices, variable prices, constant prices, or

the opposite direction. It is extremely likely that the Stalinist disciples, who follow his every word as law, will demand the abolition of the collective-farm markets, in spite of the fact that these now supply one-third of the foodstuffs for the cities; that they will insist on an end to free-market dealings by the collectives or their members, and that they will champion the cause of government agencies as the sole "organized" channel for exchange between agricultural and industrial elements of the people. In spite of the undeniable fact that the Soviet machine is in a much stronger position now to monopolize trade than back in 1918-1921, and again when it tried so disastrously in 1930-1933, it is unlikely that any great effort on the part of the hierarchy to remove the last vestigial shreds of independence left to the peasants will wring from them any cheerful cooperation. It would appear that such a course of action would hinder rather than help attain a goal of increased agricultural production, even among the peasant managers of the collectives.

Mikoyan, in his report, announced that Soviet foreign trade has tripled in volume over prewar years. This statement would have been more enlightening had he indicated his basis of comparison. There was no question from his listeners to ascertain whether he spoke of constant rubles, variable rubles, constant prices, or any

¹ "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", International Publishers, New York, 1952, p. 7.

quantities. Since the ruble has been termed the 'most stable currency in the world', it is to be hoped for Mikoyan's sake that he was not speaking in terms of dollars either constant or variable! There was no oversight in Mikoyan's failure to make a clear indication of his basic calculations, because he referred to Soviet trade with Finland, measured 'in comparable prices'. In one breath Mikoyan deplored the 'boycott' of Soviet trade by the Western countries, and in the next emphasized that the Soviet economy had no need of such trade. According to him, trade with the 'people's democracies' represented 80% of the foreign trade of the Soviet in 1952. He referred to trade within the Soviet bloc, apparently as distinct from trade with the Soviet, in the sense of all their intranational trade, not just their trade with the Soviet Union. This inter-bloc trading had more than tripled from 1948 to 1952, while exports of machinery to those countries from the Soviet had increased tenfold.

In his Bolshevik article, Stalin seemed to suffer a curious lapse from Marxist concepts. He wrote "the people's democracies are raising their production so rapidly that ... these countries will not only have no need to import goods from capitalist countries but will themselves experience the need to dispose of surplus products of their own production."¹ On paper, the appearance of any

¹ "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", International Publishers, New York, 1952, p.7.

such surplus in a planned economy represents a failure of planning. Any overproduction should be utilized to raise the level of consumption or to increase investment. It is, of course, quite possible that Stalin was indulging in some wishful thinking. If the satellite states were actually to reach the point of no longer needing to import from capitalist countries, this would automatically eliminate any necessity for exporting to them in order to equalize their trading power. They would then be in a much better position to donate their 'surplus products' to the glory of the 'Socialist Motherland', the 'citadel of progressive mankind'.

In his address, Mikoyan outlined a new cold-war weapon, half-hidden under the cloak of the usual anti-American vituperation. In his scornful denunciation of American "enslaving aid" to European and other nations, Mikoyan sketched a new Soviet policy of offering "unselfish" assistance to underdeveloped countries. In the next few years this weapon may become increasingly important, especially in the Middle and Far East. For proof we need seek no farther than the Soviet propaganda efforts in India. There is no doubt that industrial expansion at home and in China will demand much of the production of the Soviet Union, but it is equally true that at its present rate of development, the level of production is

such that it could, by the application of very little more effort, reach a stage where it could establish economic bastions of its own in such countries as Iran or Afghanistan. There is a very real possibility that economic conquest might precede rather than follow political conquest of the weaker neighbours of the Soviet Union. This still unrecognized ambition of the Soviet should be kept in mind in any appraisal of the scope and aims of U.N., U.S., or any other programmes of economic development.

IV. - THE PEACE CAMPAIGN

If foreign supporters of the Soviet-led "peace campaign" are still under illusions of any kind concerning Stalin's attitude towards their efforts, they should take a long and searching look at his words in Bolshevik:

The aim of the present movement for peace is to arouse the masses of the people for the struggle to preserve peace and to avert a new world war ... It is most probable that the present peace movement ... will, should it be successful, result in prevention of a given war, in its postponement, a temporary preservation of a given peace, to the resignation of a belligerent government and its replacement by another government ready to preserve peace for the time being ... With all these successes, imperialism still remains and remains in power, and consequently the inevitability of wars remains ... Under a certain confluence of circumstances, the struggle for peace may possibly develop in one

place or another into a struggle for Socialism. This, however, will no longer be the present peace movement, but a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.¹

The present Soviet strategy is to employ the 'peace campaign' against any government which opposes or resists Soviet policy and is therefore guilty of 'warmongering'. The double equation -- Soviet policy equals peace, therefore opposition to Soviet policy equals warmongering remains unchanged.

In considering this aspect of Soviet policy, stressing as it does Soviet-American conflict as the determining factors of world politics, we come to a paradox. At this point, Stalin has spoken of the inevitability of wars between Capitalism and Socialism. Further on in the same Bolshevik article he states that wars are more likely to break out between the capitalist countries themselves than between the "capitalist world" and the Soviet Union. The assumption that "the contradictions between the camp of Socialism and the camp of Capitalism are greater than the contradictions among the capitalist countries"² is of his own creation. His actions and his own propaganda have given it birth.

¹ Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., Stalin, International Publishers, New York, 1952, p.30. (The sequence of the sentences has been modified)

² Ibidem, p.29.

Now he qualifies his own theories, and goes on to explain why this theoretically true proposition not only need not be, but in practice is not true.

First capitalist Britain, and then capitalist France will ultimately be forced to ... enter into conflict with the United States in order to assure themselves an independent position, and, of course, high profits (While there is) ... no guarantee ... (that) ... Germany and Japan will not again rise to their feet, that they will not try to wrest themselves from American bondage ... it follows from this that the inevitability of wars among the capitalist countries remains ...

Although the conflicts which Stalin offered as obvious examples of dissension do exist openly in the non-Soviet world, it is difficult to see why he assumes that their existence must lead inevitably to wars. If Stalin himself believed even one tenth of his own propaganda he should have been convinced that neither Britain or France, Germany or Japan, had the desire, much less the capacity, to mount a futile war against the United States. Perhaps he underestimated his own abilities as a teacher. It is through his own incomparable efforts that the leading nations of the world now find themselves more united than ever before in their history. They realize only too well through his words and his example, the fate which would in all probability be theirs if they fell to fighting among themselves.

If accepted literally, this newly adopted "ex cathedra" position which Stalin has expounded would mitigate the emotional impact of his "hate-America" campaign. Why then did he say it at all? Surely, if he believed in his own words he would have directed the propaganda machine to bend all efforts to increasing the tensions between the "capitalist" countries, and be content without stirring up the Soviet-American conflicts.

This apparent inconsistency is an inconsistency of logic rather than of real politics. Since the Stalin pronouncement, the Soviet propaganda machine continued to grind out its theme that American 'warmongers' are preparing a new war against the Soviet Union. The only new facet is Stalin's assurance, which amounts almost to reassurance, that the Capitalist world cannot be united, and the instructions to promote disunity and even armed conflicts where necessary in the non-Soviet world. A "good Bolshevik" does not wait for the "inevitable" to happen, once he has been told what will come. He is expected to hasten the "inevitable" with renewed energy and redoubled effort. Stalin's "Bolshevik" article is no scientific prophecy addressed to the masses. It is an instruction to the leaders of the Parties abroad -- nothing more than that. The command has gone out to intensify, with every possible means, the conflicts still

spread abroad the "inevitability" of a East-West conflict, in the incipient stages among the nations of the non-Soviet world. There seems little reason to doubt that the Soviet Union will be the decisive factor in such a conflict, when there will be no room for "diplomacy" and realized. A war within the capitalist world would leave it exhausted and impotent -- and would also find the Soviet Union and its satellites uninvolved and capable in the role of the 50-50. Stalin's announcement was the forewarned 'third round of wars and revolutions' of designed to shake them from their lethargy, daydreaming, establishing Soviet power throughout the world.

about the "inevitability" of this Soviet-American war. In this new pronouncement, Stalin is evidently trying, for tactical reasons, to minimize as far as possible the Soviet and foreign Communist fears of the "inevitability" of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is entirely possible that Soviet propaganda has not entirely convinced the Soviet people of the parallel "inevitability" of a Soviet victory. As the unity and preparedness of the West has mounted in strength and

power since 1948, so too have discouragement, apathy, and inertia mounted in the 'victorious state' among the non-Communists and pseudo-Communists as well as among the Communists outside the Soviet bloc. It is significant that within the Soviet Union itself, the prospect of an "inevitable" war has also brought furtive hope and announcement. Stalin's call to war by the United States and a withdrawal from effort on the part of these less rapid industrialization and armament at home, and a fanatical elements of the population. If Communists

abroad accept the "inevitability" of an East-West conflict, and also agree with the teaching of Stalin himself that the Soviet Union will be the decisive factor in such a conflict, then there will be the tendency to "disarm" and to rely on the "automatism" of history to place them in the position of lesser tyrants exploiting their peoples at the whim of the Soviet. Stalin's pronunciamento was designed to shake them from their lethargic daydreaming about the "inevitability" of this Soviet-American war, to underline the importance he attached to the sharpening of the conflicts between Western nations, and to set out unmistakably his own conviction that in a long-drawn-out period of "cold war", even of indefinite duration, the Soviet hierarchy can safely manoeuvre the country through the maze of "capitalist contradictions" so as to preserve its own power untouched by war.

That this reassurance was forthcoming at all is not without its significance. Stalin's reply to the secret fears of his faithful adherents as they watched the steady, though not always even, growth of the determination of the free world to defend itself, is in itself a recognition of the existence of such fears. Stalin's pronouncement, backed up as it was by the continued rapid industrialization and armament at home, was a trumpet call to his foreign legions to help him in

containing the renascent strength of the West until it can be dissolved, as his logic so conveniently insists it must be, by its own 'inner contradictions', without risking the preservation of the Soviet system in an all-out war. The fear of the hierarchy that some day the "bourgeois relations might be restored"¹ is probably no less real now than at the time of the Fourteenth Congress.

¹ Resolutions of the Fourteenth Party Congress. Stalin, Problems of Leninism

CHAPTER EIGHT

PART IV

THE MARCH OF IMPERIALISM

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE BACKGROUND FOR THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS

political system of the Union. The statement at the

CHAPTER EIGHT

Congress shed light on this subject.

THE BACKGROUND FOR THE NINETEENTH PARTY CONGRESS

During the period of the Congress, the Party was

I. - WHY WAS IT CALLED?

On the day prior to the opening of the Congress, the

The Nineteenth Congress of the Bolshevik party was, among other things, a testimony to the steadily decreasing capacity of the Western World to appreciate or evaluate Soviet affairs and politics. The assembly was well aware that for many years no Party Congress had been held, and for a time there was no real feeling that much would come of the Congress.

On the eve of the Congress, two publications were laid before the delegates, one an instructional document on the subject of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, and the other the new Party regulations. These documents were evidently to be the backbone of the discussions to come. Both were thoroughly misunderstood by the Western nations. The economic instructions were analysed and reviewed literally as an interpretation of directives in economic problems, completely losing sight of the fact that they did not, by any means, unveil the whole Five-Year Plan. The details of the Plan were given no further publication, but are still one of the closely

guarded secrets of the Union. The statement at the Congress shed light on only those elements of Soviet economic life that the Party wished to make generally known. Stalin's economic commentaries were also issued on the day prior to the opening of the Congress, and like the other documents were totally uncomprehended. The only significance attached to them was in Stalin's demand for the total annihilation of imperialism, which seemed to be in complete opposition to his former declarations of the possible peaceful co-existence of a capitalist and a revolutionary world. Stalin's declaration that a war among the capitalist countries is unavoidable and that it will ensue before a possible war with the Soviet Union was treated as a disagreeable witticism of a dictator who tries thus to mask his own fear of war.

Out of all the commentaries, analyses, and conjectures, one salient fact emerged. There could scarcely be better proof of how susceptible the Western World has become to Soviet suggestions, and how pitifully weak is its own insight into Soviet affairs. Most of the discussions seemed to center along the lines of the successor to Stalin, and even here there was little agreement. One favorite topic of Western press interest in

had made a spokesman of L.M. He was the leader, the

Soviet affairs would seem to be the personalities involved. In all probability it is easier to write about the quarrels between Malenkov and Molotov (they are rather difficult to prove) than to discuss, with the grave attention they deserve, concrete Soviet economic policies and political affairs which require intelligent understanding.

II. - WHY MALENKOV?

One of the juiciest items, from the Western correspondents' point of view, of the whole Congress was the absence of Molotov's name anywhere in the programme. Uncounted hypotheses were drawn on this one omission. Molotov appeared to have been shoved into the background. Among Western nations, speculation ran riot.

There can be no doubt that at the Congress, the principal report was read by Malenkov and the West wanted to know why. The reason is obvious to anyone who takes Stalin's pre-meeting letters and his final speeches at the Congress itself into consideration.

Stalin could not demand absolute power for his own politics because he has long since ceased to be responsible to the Bolshevik Party. Soviet propaganda had made a superman of him. He was the leader, the

super-theoretician of the whole communist world, of the entire labouring masses, and of all "peace-loving" mankind. In his final speech, Stalin never mentioned the Bolshevik party! He never so much as shed an apostrophe toward it. He spoke as a commander-in-chief, as a dictator of all the communist parties of the world, and of all revolutionary mankind. In such circumstances, had Stalin reported to the Congress of only one Party, and even to the victorious communist party, about his own achievements in international and internal policies; had he demanded from that one party only, an affirmation and endorsement, then in appearance as well as in fact and in principle he would have lessened his authority and reduced himself to the role of the leader of one party and one nation only. In this regard, Malenkov's report was so constructed as to separate very clearly the person of Stalin as a theoretician and a tactician on a world scale, from the role of the Bolshevik Party which executes Stalin's orders. In this connection it may be said that Stalin appears as a supreme spiritual leader of Bolshevism, taking Bolshevism as an ideology and a way of life, with the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party as his general headquarters and ministry.

As Stalin himself was unable to read the report of the Party, then according to statute, it had to be read by the next highest in the secretariat of the Party, Malenkov. It is equally obvious that if Malenkov was to read the economic statement (as he had done in 1939 during the 18th assembly of the Party) it could not be read by Molotov, even though the latter was formally ranked next to Stalin in the overall Party hierarchy.

III. - WHERE IS THE PROGRAMME?

In all of its musings and conjectures, the most important detail of all was completely overlooked by the West. The entire meeting of the Bolshevik party is unreal, as, in the light of the Soviet documents themselves, the Party now exists only in name. The fundamental essential requisite for any party and especially a political party is its programme. An organization without a programme cannot be termed a political party. But this is the essence of Bolshevism today. It has long since ceased to be a party, because for a long time now it has not had any programme. The 18th congress in March, 1939, had already confirmed that the formal programme of the Party no longer existed, and must be supplanted. That

¹ Reprinted published by International Publishers, New York, 1952, previously cited. Originally appeared as an article in the publication "Holmeska".

programme, remembered by very few in the West, was of no small calibre, as it had been evolved by the "Big Three" -- Lenin, Bukharin, and Zinoviev -- and voted upon at the 8th meeting of the party in March 1919. At the 18th assembly, a committee of twenty-seven, headed, of course, by Stalin, had been selected to work out the new programme for the next Congress. The Congress came and went without any programme being unveiled. Instead, we find a new committee, again led by Stalin, chosen to develop a new programme.

IV. - REVISION OF THE PROGRAMME

The 19th Congress of the Communist Party "chose" an eleven-man commission under the leadership of Stalin to revise the programme. It is reasonably safe to assume that the basis of this revision is to be Stalin's fifty-page article on the Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.¹

In proposing the selection of this committee, Kaganowicz testified that the committee named for this task at the last congress in 1939 was not in a position to fulfill its work because of the death of four members of the committee, and because in the war and post-war periods, other tasks took precedence over its work.

¹ Pamphlet published by International Publishers, New York, 1952, previously cited. Originally appeared as an article in the publication "Bolshevik".

Presupposing that the next Congress will be held within the time provided by the statutes, i.e. in 1956, then it is permissible to say that the leading party of the Communist world will have been formally devoid of a programme for 17 years. Actually, it has been functioning without a programme for longer than that.

That fundamental fact seems to have entirely escaped any notice in the West. However, it has great significance. It gives clear evidence that in the subjective consciousness of the Bolsheviks themselves, the idea of communism having failed in the past, they are now faced with the impossibility of formulating any kind of programme based on Marxism or even on Leninism, in even the sketchiest kind of outline.

To explain their actions, the Bolsheviks base all their tactics and efficiency in the person of Stalin, who

must "invent" at every turn, a new theory, new axioms and theses, must introduce to Marxism and Leninism new "corrections", without taking into account whether they contradict the principles of Marxism or even of Leninism. This at least makes plausible, the origin and propagation of what might be termed the "cult" of Stalin, establishing him as an ingenious universal theorist of socialist communism. If, in the present state of affairs, the development of Bolshevism had not had a Stalin, then the invention or creation of one would have been imperative. Without any new "Marxist" theoretical acquisitions of a Stalin, it would have been necessary to proclaim the failure of the Communist ideology.

Not being in any position to elaborate or to announce a programme, the Bolsheviks have for many years replaced it with the theoretical revelations of Stalin, which have as their aim, first of all, to explain to the communists themselves that their idea of Socialism, Communism or Democracy, of the battle between capitalism and imperialism or of the role of the state, is erroneous, and that in their own interest they should always admit the corrections of Stalin without reservation, regardless of how these corrections might be contradictory not only to the principles of Marxism in general, but even to yesterday's declarations of Stalin himself. In the course of the last few years, Stalin gave a few new formulae which fall under these "corrective" headings --

the linguistic doctrine, and the latest publication of letters on Economic Problems of Socialism are two good examples.

They are, moreover, at the same time a proof of the great battle that Stalin must wage in his own party, and especially with the younger generation of the Party concerning the exact comprehension of the fundamental social and revolutionary ideas, and they are a proof of difficulties which must be met, and the modified views which the Bolshevist Sanhedrin always imposes on the mass of the Party as if they were "objective world views".

Returning to the Congress itself, that assembly was, in essence, a contrast well realized by the Bolsheviks themselves, between their own great capacities outside of the Soviet Union, and the feeling of a great weakness and difficulty within it. That contrast, dictates Bolshevik tactics in relation to state affairs and to the Soviet bloc, as well as in relation to foreign affairs -- the continuation of Bolshevik Imperialism.

From the time that Moscow stood eye to eye in the face of a quite uniform "capitalistic environment", not too ready to lend itself to the easy destruction of its political equilibrium (a fundamental manœuvre of Bolshevik imperialist policy), the leaders of the movement, and

Stalin first of all, have been extraordinarily cautious in their evaluation of the international situation. The Soviet intelligence service makes the most thorough and protracted examination of the rightness of their judgement. It must be admitted that Soviet political and economic intelligence has been greatly deepened since the beginning of the war and that it is founded on serious scientific study.

It must be noted that, immediately after the war, Stalin gave instructions for a famous, practically public, discussion about the economic crisis in the capitalist world. Before the Congress itself, Stalin's letters on the economic problems of Socialism were announced with precision timing, thus closing the discussion. For seven years, the Bolshevik party sought an answer to two main questions -- whether as a result of the last war the economic crisis in the capitalist world was as strong as after the previous war, and also whether the capitalist world would find a new economic, social, and political solution. One outcome of that search was that the Bolshevik now appear ready to admit that at the present time, in international relations, purely political, moral, and psychological problems may arise which cannot always be attributed to economic factors.

It may now be affirmed with certainty, that the convocation of the Congress was delayed just to a time when the international situation would, in that respect, be wholly clarified.

CHAPTER NINE

THE OPERATIONAL PLAN

With regard to the assembly, we are today in possession of five documents which will allow us to define the main guiding principles of Soviet politics. They are: the aforementioned quotation of Stalin's letters on the economic problems of Socialism, the main report of Malenkov, the most essential features of the new Five-Year Plan, the new rules of the Party, and Stalin's final speech at the meeting. It should be emphasized here that these five documents establish one logical and consecutive whole.¹ Not one of them stands alone.

I. - THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENT

The fundamental document is, of course, Stalin's letters. As previously pointed out, they form one of those theoretical revelations of Stalin which serve the

¹On the eve of the Congress a new classic work of J.V. Stalin was published: "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"... "The Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) made by G.M.Malenkov, M.Z.Saburov's report on the draft directives of the Nineteenth Party Congress for the fifth five-year plan of development of the USSR, N.S.Khrushchev's report on the amendments to the Party Rules"... "At the concluding session, J.V. Stalin expressed gratitude ... to all the fraternal parties ...". Quotation from "New Times", (42), 1952, a weekly journal, Four Continent Book Corp., New York, N.Y., p.3 col.1 and 3; p.4 col.1; p.5 col.2.

Bolshevik Party as a substitute for a formal programme. The essence of Stalin's most recent manifesto is that it discloses the failure of Socialism and Communism to measure up to the present Stalinistic grasp of those problems. It discloses, within the party frame-work, the existence of an immense subconscious opposition which could well be termed a psychic and intellectual opposition.

To put it briefly, the Party was given to understand for many years that with the abolition of Socialism, there would be fundamental changes in the production and exchange of goods, that the contrasts between country and city would disappear, that the assets of the countries would be directed to the country internally rather than externally in proportion to the capitalistic environment. Arrived at this point, it is said that "the building up of a Socialism is fulfilled".

Meanwhile, the party groups see no changes in the role based on Leninistic theories and on "problems of Leninism". They see instead, a non-existing programme and an ever more powerful control of the states within the State, and an ever more progressive "bureaucratizing" of the Party. At the same time, there is the beginning of a new era of Soviet architecture -- a transition from Socialism to Communism. Without some theoretical justifications, a powerful contradiction between the

theory and practice of Stalinism threatened an ideological failure in the ranks of the Party itself. It was of vital importance to "correct" Lenin's doctrines, and even Stalin himself from his earliest post-Leninistic years.

How to make the transition
to Communism

Stalin explains the transition thus: To change to Communism, it is necessary to continually increase production, emphasizing an increase in the tools of production; it is necessary to do away with the present system of 'collective farming' and transform it into a form of universal state production. Malenkov's report includes in some measure instructions for fulfilling the theoretical teachings of Stalin. The role of the State is to achieve Utopia. The State is the only common denominator of social effort, the only owner and manager of the goods produced by the mass of workers and the peasant class. The value of production is determined, not with regard for its meaning to society, but rather for its significance to the State. The entire burden of collective and state production in the agricultural field rests on the peasants. We should forget, says Malenkov, with emphasis, about such things as the existence of peasantry.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that in the necessity of its continual modification of Marxism, Stalinism approaches the point of exit of a period of 'primitive gathering' to a kind of 'primitive capitalism'. The great reforms of Frederick the Great or Arakcheyev are reluctantly remembered. The genius of Stalin depends on an infinite capacity to bind his successive 'revelations' to the freely broken quotations from Lenin's works. The new path of Stalinism originates with the teachings of Lenin in 1918:

".... it is necessary to be able to unite with an impetuous person, not as a broadly overflowing spring flood, of a restrained democracy with iron discipline, with a ruthless subordination to the will of man..."

Lenin wrote at the time that

"State capitalism would be a step forward in Russia ... (and that) ... those only have the right to call themselves Communists, who understand, that it is impossible to create or to guide Socialism without learning from the organizers of capitalistic trusts."

In justice to Stalin we do well to remember that he is not only a thoughtful student of Lenin, but equally, if not more so, an intelligent disciple of those sharper practices of capitalism conveyed in the derisive term of "capitalist shark".

Just as every discussion in the Soviet Union is a provocation of opposing atmosphere, likewise every

assembly of a party as well as of all the Soviets is a summation of that which has already been accomplished. If then, Malenkov, in his speech, speaks of the unity of the party and of the state, he speaks of the necessity of a uniform and universal discipline and the need of the subordination of a productive state and of the instrumentality of the state in all its spheres of society. It is safe then, to assume, that before the gathering of the party, there was accomplished in all those spheres, an immense task of suppression of opposition and resistance. We know that during the past several years, repeated purges have been carried out in the State, in the Administration, and finally in the Party itself. These were conducted mainly from the point of view of two problems: world, and personal comprehension of the role of the state as an instrumental factor in the building of Socialism and Communism. In that time, the chief method of the totalitarianization of the multi-states was Russification, based on the historical continuity of the Russian Empire. Towards that end, Stalin was compelled to devise suitable "revelations". These proved to be his theory about linguistics which is the keystone of today's motto in the sovietization of the soviet peoples and satellite states, that the territorial progress and development of the Russian empire was at each moment a positive and progressive historical phenomenon.

The 19th assembly is not only as we see a gathering of a non-existing party. It is also a documentary gathering of the failure of Marxism and Socialism in Bolshevik conceptions. Entangled in their own contradictions, the Bolsheviks seek assistance in the theory and practice of a single national fascist state, and with regard to the economic point of view, in the conductance to absurd theories and to the practice of state capitalism.

From the title, that meeting has an historical meaning not only for the Bolsheviks and for the Soviet Union, but also for the whole world. It marks the end of an era of revolutionary Bolshevik experimentation, and it concludes the period of the theory and practice of a dictatorial proletariat, a struggle of classes. It is a paradox that as the Bolshevik party added the name "communist" to its title, it found itself at the same time with no trace of communism in its practice as well as in its theory.

The Principal Aim: Defeat of
the capitalistic environment

The programme voted upon by the Bolsheviks in 1919, and still not supplanted, declared among other things:

The motto of peace, international disarmament by the preservation of capitalism, arbitration, etc., are not only Utopian reactions, but are the

habitual deceits of workers, directed to the defeat of the proletariat and to distract the workers from their goal of defeating their exploiters. Only a communist proletarian revolution can save mankind from that unsolved condition created by imperialism and the imperialistic war.

A certain meaning, a certain revolutionary logic, a certain consequence of materialistic dialectics was contained in that programme. A world revolution --- in the light of the Bolsheviks of those days --- based itself first of all on the revolutionary tendencies and the dynamics of the mass of workers.

But, thirty-three years have elapsed since then. In the West, the best experts on Soviet problems, the most skilled theorists of Marxism are not in a position to imagine even now how far Marxism and Leninism have been led astray in the U.S.S.R. It is even more amazing that the communists and socialists of Western Europe have only the very smallest idea of the extent of its error, in spite of the fact that they have seen at close range the purges conducted by the active communists in the satellite states. They testify to the numerous international "peace congresses" and others in which "free peoples" took part. For all of these specialists, experts in the doctrine of communism and socialism, with the great libraries of Paris, or of London at their disposal, Marxism is a collection of theories and opinions of all Marxists beginning with Karl Marx and Frederick Engels and ending with Stalin. They can, with no difficulty,

establish an evolution of separate Marxist theses. To them, Stalinism is Marxism of Soviet extraction, taking into full account the theoretical and practical Marxist acquisitions of some ten years.

An American, British, or French Communist will believe only with difficulty that on the indexes to forbidden books in the Soviet Union are not only Marxist works of European Marxists (e.g. Austrian Marxists), not only the works of all the theorists of the Anti-Stalinistic opposition, but also a whole range of the works of even Marx and Engels themselves. Even the works of Lenin have been suitably "revised", and the only truly popular works are those which refer to Stalin.

A private member of the Bolshevik party will not find in any accessible general party library those works, for example, of Lenin, which are controversial with Bukharin or with Kautsky. Stalinism is not any other kind or sort of Marxism, being attained in the manner of a natural empirical development of theory. Stalinism is an ordinary, simplified compendium of theories and deductions freely chosen by Stalin from Marxism and Leninism, all suitably extracted and amended. In actual fact, Stalinism leads exclusively to the "state theory", in which the State as conceived by Stalin differs entirely from the State as conceived by either Marx or Engels.

The latter asserted the Communism will not be able to expand by a simultaneous existence of the state, which they would regard as a tool of oppression and an exploitation by the ruling or an administrative caste; but Stalin, in his theory, led ^{to the} near-deification and the glorification of the state, as the sole instrument in the building of socialism and communism.

In 1922, Lenin wrote that Stalin, who did not possess the confidence of the power of the mass of workers, was a brutal and uncultured man, who acknowledged force and violence exclusively! It is unnecessary to add that that particular commentary is among the proscribed works of Lenin in Russia today!

The 19th Congress of the Party is in a certain sense a closing, an irreparable closing of an era best known as the "October Revolution". In practice, that revolution was over long ago, stifled by the Soviet bureaucratic-police atmosphere, when Stalin personally ordered the annihilation of his entire opposition for the sole purpose of strengthening his dictatorship. Formally, however, that revolution lasted until recent years and was proclaimed to communists and to the international revolutionaries as the real content of the "Days of October". It is interesting to note that Stalin has thus achieved at least one significant illusion, along with the

more practical results. He has conserved in the West an Utopian belief in Marxism as a continuing theory of revolution and socialism. The Western nations no longer possess serious scholars who pride themselves on their classical Marxism. Stalin, as a proponent of Marx, can regard himself as without a rival. He holds a virtual monopoly on Marx, and none remain to challenge his interpretations.

II. THE NEW FRANKNESS

The Nineteenth Congress made a cynical breach in the methods hitherto used to shroud totalitarianism and state capitalism in such words as 'revolution', 'proletariat', 'battle of the classes', 'proletariat dictatorship', 'mass-worker revolutions'. The Nineteenth meeting was a glorification of the state as an implement of force and violence, which, under all circumstances, as long as it is in communist hands (Stalin's of course) can build a Soviet type of socialism and communism, on which Stalin now relies while preserving his ambition for the waging of a 'revolution' to attain a victory on a world-scale, since it is aimed at only in such a theory. But does he not believe in a revolution or communist sympathy of the mass of labourers? Both Stalin and Malenkov

replied to that. Stalin believed in the weakness of the 'capitalist environment' and in an ever deepening political, economic and idealistic crisis of the West. He believed, above all else, in the political discord among the great powers and in the accentuation of the present disharmonies between united countries. Lenin, in his time, believed these same things, but there is an immense difference in the two approaches. Lenin, as we read in the programme of the year 1919, appealed to the mass of labourers to start a 'world revolution'. No one at the recent Moscow Congress spoke about the labouring masses or of a world revolution. Stalin and his praetors appealed to the party itself to strengthen and arm the Soviet Union, appealed to the satellites to establish one political whole with the Soviet Union, and appealed to his adherents in the West to crush and weaken the 'capitalist environment'. The tasks imposed by Lenin bore a universal revolutionary character; those imposed by Stalin are political throughout. Strictly speaking, they are strategically political.

III. - THE FOUNDATION AND THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND

In his concluding articles, Stalin established the theme of his programme: "The struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their

competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp".¹ He concludes with the following proposition: "The inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force". "War with the U.S.S.R. is more dangerous to capitalism than war between capitalist countries".² To attempt an analysis of this assertion would go far beyond my frame of reference. What is important is Stalin's attitude.

Malenkov's report was, so to speak, an executive order, an operational command for the foundation erected by the leader. Malenkov clearly emphasized the Bolshevik view of the lines of demarcation in the capitalist world. "There appear" he said, "two camps": on the one side, the United States is the potential enemy for the whole remaining capitalist world, for they are very much saturated with imperialistic dynamics". Soviet political influence should, then, be extended beyond the line approaching that portion of capitalism which is threatened by the United States and join these other capitalist groups in the treatment of the United States as a common enemy. With this, Malenkov formulates other projects for the Party itself, and Stalin extends them to all the Communists throughout the world. The task he has set is the continual moral and material disarmament of the two capitalist camps. -- the American as well as the one

¹ Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, International Publishers, New York, 1952, p.30
² Ibid. -- 30-32

'menaced' by the United States. From this, one might assume that the Soviet Union proposes to take on the task of protecting, not only its own bloc, but any capitalist country attacked by the United States!

IV. - PRINCIPAL IMPLEMENTS

The principal implement in the suppression of a capitalistic environment is now not an international revolutionary movement. It is the Soviet Union, together with its satellite states and their agents in the form of peoples' fronts, peace movements, etc., identical to those attributes that Lenin emphasized in his programme as 'utopian reactions'.

Stalin's programme, and his instructions for its fulfillment as referred to by Malenkov, are nothing else than a trial of reproducing that same international situation as the Soviet Union had before the second World War, when the 'capitalist environments' were separated into two camps -- Fascist and democratic. It has not yet been forgotten that Moscow, with its political manoeuvring, plotted the course for a war between those two camps. Regardless of whether or not such a plan could be realized under present conditions, and regardless of how far the Bolsheviki will be able to aggravate the existing and in a certain sense natural frictions between

the united countries, it must be affirmed that the formulation itself of such a programme and the use of such tactics indicates on the one hand the Bolshevik assurance of a great and powerful factor in the fifth column in the West. On the other, however, it is an announcement of a steady increase in the aggressiveness of soviet politics in its relation to the West.

How does the Personnel System
of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union appear?

As mentioned above, the assembly places Stalin beyond the pale of the party, as it were. It is cited that Stalin is the whole formal, official, and vital factor in relation not only to the Party of the USSR, but also to all the other Communist Parties of the world, and even to the universal revolutionary movement. The representatives of some forty Communist Parties used almost those identical phrases to chorus their speeches or greetings to the assembly. Their emphasis lay on how they regarded the fraternal Russian party as an older, perhaps wiser brother, whose achievements they hoped to emulate under the tutelage of their common leader, master and guide, Stalin.

It can be anticipated that we shall soon learn of the liquidation or entire reorganization of the Cominform and its bureaux. At the same time, we may hear of a new kind of Chiefs of Staff of World Revolution set up with

the Soviet leader at the head of a 'toiling and peace-loving mankind'.

Such a formal confirmation of the position which Stalin actually usurped in the international revolutionary movement twenty years ago, would not denote by any means that Stalin had stepped down from the leadership of the Soviet state and by the same token from the helm of that state, i.e. from the leadership of the Party.

CHAPTER TEN

THE OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

I. - STALIN'S CHIEFS OF STAFF

The organization of the Communist Party of the USSR voted upon at the last assembly is at the same time the skeletal organization of the Soviet state. The meeting chose a Central Committee consisting of 125 members and 111 representatives. From the preceding Central Committee chosen in 1939, only 39 committee members and 14 representatives reappear in the new Committee.

From within its own membership, the Central Committee in turn chose three principal organisms of the Party: The Presidium of the Central Committee, the Secretariat, and a Committee for the Control of the Party. This latter has no meaning other than as an assistant to the police force within the Party itself. On the other hand, the Presidium and the Secretariat must formally direct all politics and party organizations. They replace the three former organs of the Central Committee: the Politbureau, the Secretariat, and the Orgbureau.

The Presidium consists of 25 members and 11 representatives, the Secretariat on the other hand of ten members (all of whom are either members or representatives of the Presidium).

Commentators outside of the Soviet Union are still unable to agree as to which of the two organisms -- the Presidium or the Secretariat -- is the real organ of the supreme party and thus of the Soviet Union. It would, however, appear that neither has any decisive power, as both are in the relatively advisory position of Chiefs of Stalin's General Staff for the purpose of guiding the state and the party. The Secretariat has the controlling voice in the work of the Party -- but the Presidium functions for the whole state. The fact that all the members of the Secretariat are also included in the Presidium does little to dispel the fears of those who feel that the Party is now too closely identified with the administration of the state.

II. - THE POSITION OF MOLOTOV

In both organisms, Stalin had representatives. In the Presidium it is Molotov, and in the Secretariat, Malenkov. In spite of recent events, there are no data to support any lessening of weight of the role of Molotov in the state hierarchy, and also in the Party hierarchy. Much publicity was recently given to Malenkov in the USSR to popularize his position as the first secretary of the Party. His efforts to ingratiate himself with the hierarchy, followed by the announcement of his "personal succession" to Stalin seemed at first to be a

Chart 3 THE CENTRAL PARTY ORGANS





Chart 4 THE CENTRAL SOVIET ORGANS



groundless diversion. That he laid his plans well has since been dramatically proved. However, it is well to note that even though Malenkov took over the premiership of the Soviet Union on the death of Stalin, Molotov has remained in his strong, uncompromisingly anti-West, position in the background of party politics. Since the death of Stalin, much has happened to confuse the Western powers by way of peace offensives, the weird confusions of the so-called Doctors' Plot¹ and like manoeuvrings. Through the maze of plot and counterplot Molotov's position has been strengthened even formally by his retention of the post of Deputy Premier. This fact in itself is of much significance. Molotov, to the outside world, both Communist and anti-Communist, is the last remaining link with the Stalinist concept. The Party leaders in the outside world, and in the satellite states, are willing to accept the dictum of Molotov whom they know and trust (insofar as one communist ever trusts another). Whether they would even pretend to accept the orders of Georgi Malenkov, who is relatively unknown to them, is quite another question. The rivalry between Laurenti Beria and Malenkov, is gradually becoming clear to the Western world as the smoke-screen of confusion into which Stalin's

¹ Appendix

death plunged the world, is dissipated by the almost tragic-opera progress of events in Russia. Malenkov may have inherited Stalin's position as leader of the Communist world ... but there was no way by which even the all-powerful Stalin could will to his successor the hold he himself had on the minds and hearts of his followers. By heaping disgrace on Ignatiev, who was Malenkov's chosen puppet, Beria has completely reversed the tables on his rival. Malenkov imputed crimes against the state to Beria's secret police in the matter of the arrest of the doctors. Beria countered by offering amnesty to political prisoners. The outcome of this particular political chess-puzzle is still doubtful.

Meanwhile, Molotov has been remaining quietly behind the scenes. Nowhere could a better example of Stalin's own tactics be found. Waiting for the forces of the rivals to exhaust themselves in their struggle for security within, Molotov has been steadily improving his own relations with the Party outside the Soviet Union. By the time one of the two opposing factions has mended its fences within, and seeks to improve its position outside the Soviet Union, it may well find that Molotov has become the only real connecting link between the days of glory under Lenin and Stalin, and moreover the only recognized voice of the Communist Party in the rest of the world.

The origin of the political party report from the Provisional and the Secretariat) -- 10 members and 11 members

That his voice will be raised in a continuation of the present anti-Western crusade, and the extension of dissensions between capitalist countries to the ultimate triumph of the 'state of the victorious revolution' we have no reason to doubt.

As established by the Central Committee, the Presidium included not only Stalin, but also his chiefs and representatives of the most important departments of the general states. It consists of people with a good deal of administrative and political experience. It is significant that this latest assembly was more prudent than its predecessor in that it admitted none of the second young Bolshevik generation to the Presidium or to the Secretariat. After the 18th Congress (1939), Malenkov made his first appearance on the scene, together with the late Shcherbakov, the dismissed "economic genius" Wozniesiensey, Suslov, Kosygin, and others.

Excluding the 36-man segment of the Central Committee which makes up the Presidium, the remaining 200 members and alternates of the Central Committee are divided equally between the party and the exclusively administrative machine.

III. - THE GROWTH OF ARMY INFLUENCE

The exact makeup of the party can be divided as follows: the organ of the central party (apart from the Presidium and the Secretariat) -- 20 members and alternates

of the Central Committee; Russian Federalist Republic, 58 members, and all the remaining united republics only 22 members. If, however, for state and administrative purposes only, you include the army, you find 79 members and representatives of the Central Committee, while in the administration of the united republics, there are 21 members (included in this figure are 9 members in the Russian Federalist Republic). Of the 79 members and alternates on the Central Committee, there are 26 army and navy representatives. It has been noticed of late that the party of the Central Committee is now more militarized than ever.

The most general statistics show to what lengths this centralization of the administration of the Soviet state has already gone. The outlying areas are only partially represented in the Central Committee. The Ukraine republic rates barely 2 representatives in the Committee, despite its estimated 40,800,000 inhabitants, and such republics as Kazakh, Armenia, Belorussia, Tadzykh and Turkmen are not represented at all. These statistics prove that as far as the Party machine itself is concerned, it is represented primarily in the Central Committee by the delegates from the Party organizations of the Russian Federalist Republics.

Out of 36 members in the Presidium and the Secretariat, there are 28 pure Russians. The classification of the remaining 8 as to nationality would present difficulties to even the experts. It would appear that the only pure representative of the minorities in the Presidium of the Central Committees of the Soviet Union is a Georgian, Laurenti Beria. Although now jousting with Malenkov for the supremacy of the Communist Party, if one were to take a close look at the last purge conducted in the party and administrative hierarchy by Beria, that gentleman represents a rather doubtful asset to the blood-soaked republic of Georgia.

It is extremely difficult to discover if at any time in the history of the Russian Empire its political and administrative apparatus was ever so nationalistic and powerful as in the present Bolshevik era.

IV. - THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF OTHER CONGRESSES

Many students of the development of the political movement known throughout the world today as Communism have found a detailed record of the stages of its growth in the records of the accomplishments of each of the Party Congresses. As one journal has phrased it, these records provide an amazing history of how a small under-

ground group of amateur conspirators developed into a world-powerful gang of ruthless professionals.

The first Congress, as its four followers, was held outside of Russia. In 1898, from his Tsarist political prison, Lenin, the founder of the Bolshevik Party, smuggled a copy of a programme for a new Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. Nine delegates convened at Minsk, and the Party manifesto which was issued was the foundation stone of the Communism we know today. In the next four congresses, the Bolsheviks gradually took over complete control of the Party, and Lenin, who had emerged from Siberia in 1900, won the argument in favour of armed revolution. He insisted that the Congress must be, in reality, a Council to organize war. The sixth congress turned out to be a mere confirmation of the actions of the political hierarchy in regulating the country following the October Revolution. The Seventh Congress, held in Petrograd in 1918, was the first open gathering of the Party. Its principal achievement seems to have been the affirmation of the course followed by the triumphant legions of Bolshevism, and the inclusion of the word "Communist" in the formal title of the Party. This meeting, and its three subsequent gatherings, formulated three revolutionary milestones: the Red Army itself; the New Economic Policy (NEP), a transitory measure adopted as a check to the economic chaos brought on by the complete

state ownership and planning; and the Comintern, the international arm of the Party.

The office of General Secretary of the Party was created in 1922 at the last Congress attended by the already ailing Lenin. Joseph Stalin was the first appointee, and his nomination met with some misgivings from the 'little father' of the revolution! Through 1923-1925, the misgivings of the Party's founder seemed to have had good grounds because through the annual congresses ran the pattern of terror that Stalin had begun to spread throughout Russia.

In 1928, the 15th Congress established the first of the Five-Year Plans and put an end to the New Economic Policy. The 16th Congress did little more than speed up the realization of this Plan, and the assessment of the merits of the enforced collectivization was left to the 17th Congress in 1934. At that time, Stalin was able to announce that Russia had managed to switch from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy.

The 18th Congress was interrupted by the Second World War -- not exactly surprising in view of Stalin's denouncement of the Western democracies for urging Nazi Germany to march further east. This unprovoked assault had the Western nations confused until the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 laid bare

the red-herring tactics of Soviet denunciation. Since that time, the nations of the West have had ample opportunity to become more adept in assessing the importance of such announcements within Russia in the light of subsequent Soviet moves on the international chessboard. It is a sort of prior justification of what might otherwise be a situation too awkward to explain.

This Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 of course opened the door for Hitler to march east into Poland, and plunge the entire earth into flame. Stalin's warning to the delegates of the 18th Congress has been too long overlooked ... "it is time for a new re-division of the world ..."

The Nineteenth Congress held in October 1952 brought about the fusion of Party and State, the glorification of Stalin, and the further exaltation of the State.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I. - THE STRUCTURE OF THE TOTALITARIAN STATE

The structural features of the society built by the Communist Party in Russia up to the time of the Nineteenth Congress last October can be summarized as follows:

1. A totalitarian dictatorship, headed by Stalin and a few leaders, which rule ruthlessly through a tight party machine, an all-pervasive secret police, and a State bureaucracy of imposing dimensions;
2. An unbalanced monopoly in the State dominated by heavy industry, largely tied in with the needs of the Soviet war machine. Agriculture and the output of consumer goods have lost ground steadily to such basic industries as steel since 1928.
3. A pyramidal structure of society reflecting the political and economic structure. The large majority of the Russian people are not consumers in the sense generally understood here. Their continued existence depends on the caprice of a State rationing system, while the members of the State machine have a relatively good living.

Per Capita,
1928 = 100

Russia's Garrison Economy... ... It Leaves Little for Consumption

3500 —

3250 —

3000 —

2750 —

2500 —

2250 —

2000 —

1750 —

1500 —

1250 —

1000 —

750 —

500 —

250 —

100 —

0 —

* **MILITARY SPENDING**
takes more and more

* **INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION**
has doubled since war

* **CONSUMPTION**
gets short shift still

WAR YEARS

WAR YEARS

1928


1933

1937

1945

1947

1952



The chart on page 182a shows the social costs of the rise in expenditure for military might. In 1937 the output of industry consumed by the war machine was something less than 20%. Now, the figure is nearer 40%.

The whole totalitarian society is paradoxical to the point of unbelief. On the one hand, Communist Russia has the ability and the facility to produce atom bombs and to build fighter aircraft which have surpassed the best available U.S. aircraft in combat. It has produced 38.6 million net tons of steel in a year, rivalling the combined total production of Britain, France and West Germany over the same period. But, on the other side of the picture, living conditions in Russia are incredible by Western standards.

Totalling these factors, it is not difficult to see why the rulers of Russia are forced to expand their power at home, as well as abroad; forced to create a foreign enemy whether one actually exists or not, and why they are effectually prevented from making any fundamental changes such as a switch from armament production to the making of consumer goods. Any drastic disturbance of their present economy might well undermine the foundations of their own power.

II. - EVOLUTION OF THE TOTALITARIAN STATE


Shortly after the Bolsheviks took over the government, they faced a critical economic situation. Their experiment with 'war communism' and the abolition of private production and trade, brought on economic chaos. This economic distress was relieved only by the switch to a form of limited capitalism and private trade. This New Economic Policy, or NEP as it became generally known, came into being in 1921 and its inception proved fortunate in restoring balance within the nation.

When Stalin took up his Leninist inheritance, the dictatorship was transformed into the totalitarian super-state we now know. If there was one guiding precept in the entire career of Joseph Stalin, it surely was predicated on the decisive power of force. This application was economic as well as political. Under Stalin, Soviet power came to depend on the highly disciplined Communist Party, a constantly growing State bureaucracy, a completely ruthless secret police, and a total monopoly in the name of the state on all economic activities of the country. From the very outset of his dictatorship, Stalin used the threat of 'capitalist encirclement', occasionally a real threat, but more often an imagined enemy, to justify his 'organs of suppression'. It is vital to remember that the cold war is as much a domestic necessity as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.


In 1928, Russia was launched on her first Five-Year Plan. Stalin began to collectivize agriculture and set the stage for the mounting industrialization of the country. As one Five-Year Plan succeeded another, the administrative overhead increased. The growth of the armament industries in the Thirties increased the price of government. Today, the administrative structure which Stalin bequeathed to the nation is the largest and most expensive in the world.

The social tensions growing out of the forced rate of industrialization necessitated a five-fold increase in the personnel of the secret police. In 1939 the police army totalled one and a half million men. Its present strength has been conservatively estimated at two million.

It would be safe to consider that the administrative machine in Russia today is the support of twenty million people, including the families of the state bureaucracy and the state police. Their consumption of the disposable national income is very large indeed. That this bureaucratic machine will continue to grow, there is no reason to doubt, especially in view of Stalin's pronouncement prior to the October Congress. The great industrial expansion anticipated under the current Five-Year Plan cannot but require a similar expansion in the State apparatus.



**Agricultural
output is
rising —
BUT...**




**Population
is rising
FASTER**



Industrial Output:

**Capital goods get
bigger share ...**

**This pushes the
consumer's share down**



III. - INVESTMENT: A POLITICAL OPERATION

The second element basic to the present Soviet concept is the concentration on heavy industry. The chart on page 185a gives a clear idea of how unbalanced the Russian economy has become. From it, it is clear that the output of capital goods this year will be nearly 76% of the entire output of industry. Consumer goods account for only the remaining 24%. By contrast, industrial nations such as the United States, with a high living standard, show almost the reverse.

In comparing these two economies further, some interesting sidelights appear. In the United States, demand for consumer goods governs the annual output. In certain areas of production, federal programmes, such as the mobilization order, would have a marked effect. In Communist Russia, industrial investment has only a political and military character. Industry replaced agriculture in the economy, not to meet the wishes of the people, but to satisfy the needs of the ruling body. As in all fields of endeavour, the two basic motives of Sovietism are at the root of this economic development:

1. The obsession of maintaining power at the top.

In the economic philosophy of Stalin, the "giant plan" is vital, because concentration on industrial production secures his dictatorship, in great measure, against all internal opposition; and

2. The deep-rooted conviction that only military superiority can guarantee the survival of the Soviet state.

However, industrialization, on the scale planned by Stalin, is not secured without a heavy investment of capital. It must be remembered here that the very nature of the Communist doctrine precludes both the investment of foreign capital in Russia and the accumulation of investable wealth in the hands of its citizens. Consequently, the capital needed for industrial expansion has had to come out of the pockets of the Russian consumer.

Collectivization of agriculture was a secondary source of capital. Food was forcibly withdrawn from the farms to feed the workers in the newly established industries. For the most of this food, the farmer got little or nothing in the way of consumer goods.

Under the Soviet system, only two methods are open for the accumulation of capital: the continuous restraint of consumption, whether it be of food, clothing, or housing; and the use of slave labour.

The most important fiscal method in use by the Soviet to restrict and direct consumer goods into pre-chosen channels is the turnover tax. This one tax alone accounts for more than half of the receipts of the Soviet budget. Broken down still further, the sales tax derives only 10% of its total from capital goods, with the remaining 90% charged directly to consumers.



Stalin promised the Russian people a 40% to 60% increase in available consumer goods by 1955. Theoretically, this should do much to assuage the growing discontent among the masses, but it is well to remember that such an increase in consumer goods is linked with a 55% boost in productivity, and a 70% increase in total production. Even if these impossible increases could be achieved by an already over-strained work-force, it is certain that much of the consumer goods produced would ultimately be found in the State stockpile, rather than in the hands of the individuals.

V. - THE INDUSTRIAL ADVANCE

The rate of advance in industry in postwar Russia has been amazing by any standards, especially in the areas behind the Urals. One result is that Stalin has created an industrial structure that may easily outstrip the combined efforts of Western Europe before many years have passed. If the heavy industry of that part of Eastern Europe which is already in the Soviet bloc be included, the point of industrial equality may be reached soon after 1955.

A few figures for comparison between Russian and other economies will convey a more graphic idea of the present rate of expansion. This year's steel output will

Long-Range Planning

KEEPS ITS THUMB
ON EACH MILL

HERE'S HOW THE SOVIETS DO IT

DIRECTOR
OF
METALLURGY

State
Planning
Committee
of
Council of
Ministers

Planning
Group
of
Ministry of
Metallurgical
Industry

Planning
Group
of
Steel
Production
Department

Planning
Group
of
Magnitogorsk
Steel
Mill

be 38.6 million net tons, or more than twice the 1947 level; electricity output will be 117 billion k.w.h., well over twice that of 1947; coal will reach 330.6 million net tons, or almost double 1947. In comparison with Western Europe, Russia will produce 90% as much steel as Britain, France and West Germany combined; 70% as much coal; and 70% as much electric power.


Because Soviet consumption is so rigidly regulated even in peace time, the Russian government can and does use a far greater portion of its steel and oil for military purposes than can be used elsewhere in the world, even in the United States.

The big gains in coal and steel, as well as other industries like aluminum, have been made possible by an enormous production expansion in Siberia, from whence over 50% of the total product now comes. Much of this development is directly due to the use of slave labour. The bulk of Russia's twenty million slave labourers have been assigned to Siberia under the watchful eye of the MVD, Russia's secret police. It has been estimated that at least 30% of the industrial investment in Siberia since the war has been handled by the MVD.

VI. - WHITHER RUSSIA?

What lies ahead for the starved and driven society that Communism has imposed upon Russia? What can the world

RUSSIA'S TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM HAS PRODUCED A SOCIAL STRUCTURE LIKE THIS



outside expect from its rulers? Stalin has shed some light on these two questions in the line he laid down for the Nineteenth Congress. Weak though the evidence is, it seems to point thus:

The Soviet is still too weak to risk any all-out war with the West. (This view is strengthened by the internal and external confusions that have been obvious since Stalin's death). Continued pressure may be expected around the borders of the Communist bloc, because it is there that Communist rulers come into contact with Western influence and they regard this influence, like opposition at home, as a threat to their own authority.

The tensions in the Soviet Union are no myth. Stalin's harsh tenure produced not only despair and hatred, but his constant reminders of the dangers of a capitalist attack have added a different kind of fear. As a result, Stalin tried to relieve some of the tension on the occasion of the 19th Congress by promising the people that they would have more consumer goods, and by assuring them that Russia, in her new strength, now had nothing to fear from a capitalist attack. War between the Communist and non-Communist worlds was no longer inevitable.

There will be no let-up in the driving pace at which the individual in Russia must live. The price of any slight improvement in the standard of living and of

Stalin's success in 'saving the peace' will continue to be paid by the already overworked worker. Stalin's aims of increasing Russian industrial strength to a point where the chances of Soviet victory in a world-war clash of ideologies would be improved are unlikely to be altered by the new regime. He counted on division in the West, especially the growing economic rivalries, to prevent the solidifying of a united Western alliance. That his hopes in this direction are being pursued by the new regime should be obvious to anyone reading today's headlines. It is not of the least importance whether responsible or irresponsible voices are raised in dissent. The deeper the rift, the greater the joy in the Kremlin.

However, the totalitarian Soviet State may yet drive itself inexorably to world war. Alternatively, it might disintegrate under the sheer weight of its own shortcomings. On one occasion, Stalin stated that production divorced from the satisfaction of the needs of society withers and dies. His failure to live by his own words may yet prove the downfall of Communist Russia.

Bolshevism was not and is not able to fulfill any given promise. It promised bread and prosperity — and brought famine and misery; promised palaces — and produced "habitable space" (as many as a dozen working people in one room); promised peace — and brought uninterrupted

war; promised abolition of the state "machine" and a replacement by a social organization -- and produced extreme bureaucracy; promised liquidation of unemployment and created millions of slave workers employed in hard forced labour in achieving this goal; and finally promised extinction of the reactionary Russian Empire -- and revived it and armed it in a hitherto unimagined style.

VII. - THE FOREIGN POLICY SWITCH

A new foreign policy line was laid down by Stalin at the 19th Party Congress. Not that he planned on any peaceful co-existence with the West. Quite the contrary! The Soviet is ready to wage a new kind of cold war against it. Russia will go on building up its armed forces. The phase of U.S.-Russian rivalry that began at the end of World War II has now ended, and a new phase begins.

What Moscow now hopes to do is to generate a third camp to stand as a buffer between Russia and the United States. This will be done if possible by exploiting the economic ills of the Western world, and by splitting the armed coalition built up in such organizations as NATO. (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization). There will be a number of tempting trade offers; attempts to revive Soviet friendship pacts with the Western European nations; and well-implemented offers of support of the full Communist party for various now-neutral states.

This is a new approach in contrast to the years from 1946 to 1950. At that time, when the Cominform was born, Stalin first attempted to take over the Western European nations by insurrection and Civil War. Over all of these more or less local disturbances loomed the shadow of Red Army intervention. When the success of the U.S. Marshall Plan forced him to abandon that plan, he shifted the attack to Asia, and in so doing altered the focal point of world affairs. Not even the most naive can believe that the Communist victory in China was a purely internal agrarian revolution against the corruption of the Chiang-Kai-Shek government.

Its whole form, style and content was too close to the master plan of the Kremlin for it to have originated elsewhere. The Red attack on South Korea was simply a further step in the onward march of Communist conflict.

Unfortunately for the leaders of the Kremlin, these tactics of open aggression boomeranged. The Soviet leaders seem to be convinced that events have now turned against them. The Korean war led directly to U.S. moves to put some teeth into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. More important still, it crystallized public opinion firmly behind the huge defence programme which those leaders who were immune to starry-eyed optimism had been preaching to deaf ears. These

two factors alone have created a new balance of power in Europe, plus a kind of military stalemate. A general war now would be, at best, an extremely dangerous gamble for the Soviet bloc -- which is far from solid yet.

Moscow now feels that it can shatter Western solidarity by concentrating on the economic differences that are an inherent part of any loosely-knit community of interests based on a system of free enterprise. As Stalin saw it, the one important economic result of World War II was "the disintegration of a united, all-embracing world market".¹ Instead of a single world-wide market, today there are two -- the Soviet bloc and the U.S.-dominated Western camp. In the view of the Soviet dictator, the capitalist market is no longer large enough to assure prosperity in Britain and France on one hand, and Germany and Japan on the other. When the defeated powers of the 1939-46 conflict return to their old economic footing, Stalin has freely predicted the collapse of the U.S. coalition. Before dismissing his prophecies, the West would do well to remember that Stalin was an economist and theoretician of considerable facility -- and that large groups of those nations which had at one time absorbed greedily any over-production of German, Japanese, British, French and American industries in the pre-war

¹ Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, International Publishers, New York, 1952, p.26.

years, have now been withdrawn entirely into the Soviet trading orbit.

The Soviets mean to irritate the undenied sores of the West as much as possible. They will make every effort to weaken the Western ties of the underdeveloped countries of the Middle East and South Asia. This will, of course, cut back both raw materials sources and the markets for Western produce. It is much too early yet to tell just what course these new tactics will follow. It is entirely within the bounds of possibility that there will be a decided elasticity about them. This will be especially true in Western Europe. One month may bring tempting trade offers -- the next, veiled threats. One day the drums will beat in arousing the traditional French fears of Germany -- the next, to inflame the old spirit of German unity. And it is so pitifully easy to fit a truce in Korea into the new pattern. It would make a very attractive thing of the idea of a third camp. More than ever, tax-burdened Europe, still groping to recovery from post-war inflation and reconstruction, would question the need of a heavy armament burden.

VIII. - BUILDING A SOVIET SUPER-STATE

The 19th Party Congress launched the most sweeping reforms attempted in Soviet Russia since the Bol-

shevik revolution itself. The aims of Stalin presented to that assembly involved the final stages of the development of a totalitarian super-state, by fusing the Communist Party and the State bureaucracy into a single unit. Thus, Communism has turned its back upon Marx. Instead of the state withering away under Communism, as the philosopher had predicted, it is now to fasten itself more firmly than ever. That is the one essential fact that emerged from the Congress. It is the only piece of domestic news divulged.

What Stalin was most anxious to secure is obviously a unified power apparatus. In typical fashion, he began the tightening process at the top, with the Presidium. Control over the wider areas of the Soviet Union has become essential. The mushrooming industrial regions, such as the trans-Urals, now have their own representative in the Presidium. While it can be construed as a recognition of the importance of their place in the Soviet economy, it also means that they will be more and more under the direct control of Moscow. Furthermore, governor-commissars in all administrative centers, answerable only to the Presidium, have full powers to unify party and government organs.

If this unification and nationalization of the governmental set-up can be fully achieved, its benefits

will soon become apparent in both the administrative and economic fields, but no trace of "party democracy" will remain. The new Presidium and its Secretariat have now been placed beyond the reach of lower-level Party criticism, by the newly adopted statute concerning the right of expulsion of a Party member. With the "right of expulsion" centralized in the hands of the Committee Secretaries in Moscow, the tightening of the "monolithic unity" becomes obvious.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

PRESIDIUM OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Molotov (First Deputy Chairman)

Bulganin (Chairman)

Kaganovich (Deputy Secretary)

Gorkin (Secretary)

Pegov (Deputy Secretary)

PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Voroshilov (Chairman)

Krushchev (Deputy Chairman)

Bulganin (Deputy Chairman)

Molotov (Deputy Chairman)

Mikoyan (Deputy Chairman)

Saburov (Deputy Chairman)

Pervukhin (Deputy Chairman)

Shvernik (Deputy Chairman)

Ponomarev (Deputy Chairman)

Malenkov (Deputy Chairman)

Aristov (Deputy Chairman)

Sustov (Deputy Chairman)

Mikhailov (Deputy Chairman)

S. Ignatiev (Deputy Chairman)

Pospelov (Deputy Chairman)

Shatalin (Deputy Chairman)

PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

Voroshilov (Chairman)

Pegov (Secretary)

Gorkin (Deputy Secretary)

Saburov (Deputy Chairman)

GOSSPLAN

Kosyachenko (Chairman)

ALL UNION CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE TRADE UNIONS COUNCIL

Shvernik (Chairman)

ELECTRICAL POWER STATIONS AND ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY

Pervukhin (Chairman)

TRANSPORT AND HEAVY MACHINE BUILDING

Molotov (Chairman)

MACHINE BUILDING

Saburov (Chairman)

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRADE

Mikoyan (Chairman)

W.A.R.

Bulganin (Chairman)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS


Molotov (Chairman)

STALIN'S HEIRS: THE NEW LINE-UP

Another top party member, Marshal Voroshilov, has been moved upstairs to the honorary job of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

The party leaders have also taken the most important ministries (second row of chart). Vishinsky has been bumped down by Molotov, who again becomes Foreign Minister. Marshal Vasilievsky was similarly demoted to make room for Marshal Bulganin. Other familiar names among the first deputy ministers (third row): Jacob Malik, former U.S. delegate, and Marshal Zhukov, conqueror of Berlin.

Russia's new line-up of power, announced with surprising speed after Stalin's death, shows how the party dominates the state in Soviet Russia. The Big Five (outlined in red) of the new Presidium of the Council of Ministers (a sort of policymaking inner cabinet of the government) are all members of the ruling echelon of the Communist Party, the Presidium of the Central Committee. Malenkov, the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers (i.e., Premier), is listed first in the party hierarchy, with the other members appearing in the order given in the official communiqué.



SATELLITE POLICE STAND GUARD AT MEMORIAL RAISED IN EAST BERLIN



WORKERS ARE Brought TO DUTY



ALL OF UNIONS, WHERE STALIN LIES IN STATE

European, Soviet, International, American, Georgian, Cossack

Soviet

Soviet

AFTERWORD

I. THE NEW RED SET-UP

There is little room to doubt that anticipation of the death of Stalin hung like a cloud over the organization of the Nineteenth Party Congress. His last will and testament, politically speaking, was probated before the assembly. The foundations were laid for a new type of Komintern, and the Party itself was reorganized and welded into an integral part of the State machinery. Soviet totalitarianism must continue to have at its roots the Soviet State constitution, backed up by the new monopoly rule. The role of the governing function was accentuated and the party machine reduced to a watch-dog status in safeguarding the dictatorship. The presumably logical personal hierarchy of the leaders of the State was established and last, but certainly by no means least, the Congress stressed the importance of military problems and the accentuated role of the Army.

That the implied and expressed wishes of Stalin were not sufficient to maintain the continuity of the dictatorship after his death has already been amply proved. At the Congress, a number of reforms and regulations prepared cautiously over a number of years were presented

for formal recognition, as some were already in operation. And yet, the day following the official announcement of the death of Stalin, a joint resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Party and of the Soviet Government was published, reversing these new Stalinist forms and principles of government.

The new decisions took the "capitalist encirclement" completely by surprise and disorganized it to the point of confusion. What then must have been its effects on the people within the USSR and the Soviet bloc? It could admit of only one interpretation there -- an open abandonment of the will and wishes of the departed leader.

However, it would be incorrect to say that this represents any deviation from the principles of Stalinism. The rejection of the Congress-approved principles and rules stressed the importance of the role of the state and the tasks of statehood, and emphasized still more the prime importance of the military in Soviet politics. More and more the party is becoming subservient to the state -- "bent to the role of the servant of the State", as Malenkov phrased it. However, apart from the Stalinist principles which it preserves intact, this decision marks a revolutionary change in the present system of the Stalinist dictatorship.

Undoubtedly, the radicalism of the resolution and the haste in its proclamation were due not only to the

situation in the Soviet Union itself, but also to some special facts or events of which Western powers dare not even hazard a guess. Whether they will ever become known cannot be estimated. It may have been some new directives from Stalin himself before his death -- or it may have been the illness of Molotov. It may be that some new evaluation of the international situation in the light of factors still hidden from us led to a radical and rapid re-grouping of their own forces.

Whatever its cause, this change, while preserving the continuity of the Stalinist political system in the Kremlin is creating a new personal grouping different from that we might logically have expected. Its most obvious characteristic is that no one individual took over the entire "succession" of Stalin. Malenkov has taken over the office of Prime Minister. Malenkov, Prime Minister, however, lacks the weight of Stalin, Prime Minister. Not only because he lacks the gifts of being a Communist theoretician as Stalin certainly was; and not only because of his personal unpopularity with the Party and the Army; but principally because he did not succeed to the post of Generalissimo of the Armed Forces; nor is he the acclaimed leader of International Communism and "peace-loving humanity". The switch of Malenkov from the job of First Secretary of the Party to the post of Prime Minister renders difficult

his access to the basic force of the dictatorship which is the direct management of the Party, even though the role of the Party as the directing force has been substantially reduced.

Instead, the role of the State has been emphasized in the designation of Marshal Clement Voroshilov as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In the West, Voroshilov had usually been disregarded as a Stalinist puppet of no particular significance politically. The error of this opinion now seems to be exploded. In the eyes of the Soviet people, Voroshilov is very popular, as he is connected, for them, with the revolutionary and 'warlike Communist' periods. He is regarded as the founder of the Red Army, and one of the closest friends of Stalin. He will be, as was Kalinin, the "people's president" of the Soviet Union, and will help to offset the lack of personal and moral authority of Malenkov. The appointment of Pegov, a member of the Party's Central Committee, has strengthened the secretariat of the Presidium. On the other hand, the secretariat of the Party has become of secondary importance. Ignatiev, Shatalin, and Pospelov were designated as Party secretaries. All of them are men of less than top calibre in the organizational and theoretical fields. Men like Andrianov, Aristov, Suslov, Judin, Chesnokov, and others

who were well known as backers of Malenkov in the Party have disappeared from the Presidium as well as from the Secretariat.

Very characteristic also is the new grouping of the leadership of the two most important ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Molotov, and the Ministry of the Armed Forces under Marshal Bulganin.

Molotov not only got the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is far more important, he retained direction of the work which he had carried out for many years in the posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Prime Minister, and of Senior Deputy Minister. Malenkov's influence on the direction of foreign policy, if he has any at all, must be slight indeed. If there is any friction between Malenkov and Molotov, as has been suggested (in the absence of any proof) in the West, there can be no doubt that Molotov will have his own way in deciding on foreign policy, backed up by the authority of the whole Party and State machinery as the advocate of the continuity of Stalinism in foreign affairs.

Marshal Bulganin, with his deputy-ministers, Marshal Vasilevsky, Zhukov, and Sokolovsky (as Chief of Staff) are the men who will collaborate with Molotov most closely. In all probability there will be synchronized cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the

continuation of the policy of armament. Molotov and Bulganin both represent the principle of non-retreat and of aggressiveness toward the West, a policy of continuous military strengthening of the State. The introduction of an uncompromising Bolshevik like Marshal Zhukov after so many years of oblivion, and a man who has at the same time fought consistently against the nascent power of the Party in the State and in the Army, may be taken as evidence that the importance of the Army in the Soviet State is even more rapidly growing than it was in the year before Stalin's death.

The principal change in the reorganization of the Soviet state was in the fusing together of many ministries, and the leadership given to these enlarged ministries. It is no accident that the Bolshevik leaders Beria, Mikoyan, Saburov, Malyshev and Pervokhin have been entrusted with their direction. They are all individualists, and as Beria and Mikoyan, men who served their apprenticeship under Molotov when he was the practical, even though not the titular director of the Soviet government. These ministers, directing the almost unlimited resources of the Soviet, together with the four Deputy Prime Ministers, Molotov, Beria, Bulganin and Kaganovitch, in their present grouping are doing nothing to help centralize power in the hands of the Prime Minister, but in fact, they are diffusing it.

It would appear that the dictatorship of one has been replaced by the dictatorship of the clique.

Russia's snowballing "peace offensive" is heaping up evidence that the Kremlin has temporarily at least reversed its cold war tactics in a bold stroke aimed at stalling the defensive buildup of the West, and shattering the unity of the anti-Soviet countries. It is entirely possible that achievement of those twin objectives may be the major goal in Soviet Russia today.

II. - THE ARREST OF THE DOCTORS -- ANTI-SEMITIC OR ANTI-STALIN?

It is extremely doubtful if any news emanating from the Kremlin in recent years has left the world outside the Iron Curtain reeling in such blank surprise and confusion as the announcement in January of this year of the arrest of the Jewish doctors, followed immediately after Stalin's death by a repudiation of that arrest, and the detention of the head of the secret police forces to account for the trumped-up charges against them.

In a two-month period, two entirely different explanations could be worked out to account for the arrest of the doctors. One, innocent enough, reveals nothing worse than a sudden uprising of anti-semitic feeling

among the Party hierarchy, and the other, far more sinister, and more recent chronologically, that these arrests were only a very small part of a still unravelled plot to cloak one of the coolest and most audacious murders in a history of fantastic crime. Both possibilities deserve serious consideration.

ANTI-SEMITES?

Anti-semitism in the Soviet Union is, like many other elements of State politics, a continuation of the old Tsarist Russian anti-semitism. In the early days of the Bolshevik Party, long before they came into power, anti-semitism erupted spontaneously within its ranks. Its most striking occurrence was during the split of the Russian Social Democratic Party into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. The Bolsheviks seemed to be the most zealous destroyers of the "Bund" (the Jewish Workers' Trades Unions in Russia). Contrary to generally held opinion, the Russian Jews in their majority were not supporters of Bolshevism, and the participation of the Jews (who were economically very much exploited and officially persecuted by the Russians) in the Bolshevik Party was comparatively slight, although it is quite true that any kind of revolutionary movement met with a good response from the Jews. During the Bolshevik

regime there were four great waves of anti-semitism: during the revolution and civil war; at the end of the NEP (1926-1929); during the great purges (1936-1938) and during the war with Nazi Germany (1941-1945). All these anti-semitic waves differed in some political and social aspects, but all had one characteristic in common. Even though they were not openly conducted or directed by the government, they encountered no official condemnation from the Soviet itself or from the Party. In 1947, a new assault on the Jews was launched under the guise of a struggle against "cosmopolitanism". It was based on the racial chauvinism of Great Russia, instigated by Stalin after the war.

Why Shcherbakov and Zhdanov?

The Tass announcement indicting a group of Soviet physicians and surgeons (mostly Jews) for an attempt on the life of the leaders of the Party and the commanders of the Red Army by improper medical treatment is, on the face of it, ridiculous. Anyone who has studied some of the tactics of Bolshevism, together with living conditions in Russia, will suspect its grim motives, especially when the "evidence" now turned up is so much out of date. The significant factor lies in the choice of victims for the supposed plot.

Shcherbakov, one of the youngest members of the Politburo during the war, Chief of the Politruk in the Army, and director of the Military Intelligence Service, was widely known for his anti-semitism. During the war he was responsible for the violent removal of the Jews from the Soviet Army. For his part, Zhdanov began the campaign against "cosmopolitanism", thus giving official sanction to the persecution of the Jews. Even if there is no doubt of their natural deaths, the two names have a special meaning to the Soviet masses who may easily be led to believe the accusations against the Jewish doctors.

Interesting too is that part of the accusation dealing with the attempt on the lives of Army Marshals Vasylevsky, Koniev, and Govorov, General Shtemienko and Admiral Levchenko. At the time of the announcement of the accusations, the Army was the favoured child of the Party. It is the showpiece of both the Party and the government. Stalin himself on many occasions underlined the role and importance of the Army in Soviet politics. It is popular with all levels of the masses. Therefore, any accusation of a murder plot directed against the commanding figures of the Army could only have been designed to stir up the feelings of the people.

But it would seem that the Tass communique has some greater and deeper importance, and it should not be

dismissed lightly as just another Soviet political trick. Any act of the Bolshevik party which is given such a significant unveiling will bear the most careful scrutiny in the light of Soviet internal and external aims. The purposes of such acts in Soviet politics are never simple, but often have many ramifications. One solution therefore will not answer the query "What have they in mind?"

Provocation?

One preliminary consideration is that the action against the Jewish doctors has been directed, first of all, at the United States. It could be a further emphasis of the accusations hurled at the Slansky trials in Prague, Czechoslovakia, that the United States, through its Jewish agents, is not only undermining the Soviet bloc by political and economic diversion, but is actually murdering the party leaders and army commanders. It is well to remember that ever since the Republican Party took over the government of the United States, the Bolsheviks have been particularly zealous in accumulating such accusations against the U.S., as though they wish to have proof on hand that the U.S. is actually engaging in open warfare against the USSR.

A bait for Germany?

The German problem may also be at the root of the vehement anti-semitism. Moscow must win Germany to her side with the least possible delay. The Soviets are using every possible means to show how much Germany would gain in economic and political expansion if they leave the West and join the Soviet bloc. The Rapallo is once again paraded before Germany, and it is worthy of mention that it has fallen on good ground, especially among the German revisionists and the neo-Nazis. Anti-semitism might be depicted as a common interest of both countries and would be particularly aimed at the German chauvinists whose only objection to Russia was the judeo-communism.

Domestic affairs are of no less importance. What occurred in the Soviet Union at the time of the sensational arrests may be considered as an orgy of chauvinistic Russian elements. The theory of the Russian leadership in the history and culture of the world was then the all-important factor in Stalinism and the Super-State, and it is doubtful if that characteristic has undergone any change in the last several weeks. Stalin wanted above everything else to be regarded as the new extender of the Russian Empire, and a worthy successor to Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible. Because of that ambition he exterminated

everything that might be dangerous in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union, everything that might possibly come in contact with the ideological organizations of the West, and everything of an international character. The Jews fill the bill on all counts.

The Nineteenth Party Congress revealed the existence of deep inward economic, social, and ideological crises in the Soviet Union. The over-emphasis on military expansion and the general militarization of the Soviet State have resulted in economic failures in other branches of industry and in the supply of consumer goods. The resistance of the peasants is growing, and ideological conflicts within the Party are on the increase. For these crises, for the poverty of the masses, and for the exploitation of the workers, some scapegoat must be found, and, true to the historical pattern, the Soviet Government created a convenient culprit in the person of the Jewish doctors, as had been done before in Tsarist Russia.

Combining all these probabilities, which are only the salient features of a crowded picture, it may be concluded that the Tass revelations are indicative of the depth of the crisis now facing the Soviet government. The only way out for the heads of the State is to release the inner tensions and intensify the national and chauvinistic atmosphere of the Soviet society. By this indictment,

the Bolsheviks laid the groundwork for a battle-rousing cry ... "The Americans began the war with us!" They are carrying the diversion to our lines with the slogan "Kill the Jews! Fight the Americans!" These trumpetings might be a call to mobilization, if the Soviet has now accepted the theory of an inevitable war as its only justification for a continued exploitation and oppression at home, and for the course of ruthless militarization and State totalitarianism which it is committed to follow within the Soviet Union and in the subjugated satellite States.

--- OR ANTI-STALIN?

Semyon D. Ignatiev has been ousted from the five-man Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party for his alleged part in the "Doctors' Plot", according to a Pravda announcement. On April 7, 1953, the official news organ of the Party revealed that Ignatiev had headed the Ministry of State Security during the period when the charges against the 15 doctors were being laid. As is well known, the doctors were accused of murdering two Soviet leaders and plotting against others. Several of the accused were Jewish. All have now been exonerated and unconditionally released. In a reshuffle of party and government posts following the death of Stalin,

Ignatiev had been elevated to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. He has now been unceremoniously demoted -- if not worse.

The entire story of the doctors' plot may never be known, but it certainly raises quite a legitimate question on the death of Stalin. That the master of the Soviet State died a natural death is now very much open to doubt. Putting all the pieces of the bizarre picture together, it is possible to outline what appears to have been a careful preparation for the announcement of the death of Stalin.

After six weeks of the most vitriolic denunciation, the arrested doctors were suddenly dropped as a cause célèbre at the time of Stalin's death. Now, in a complete reversal of tactics, they are declared innocent, and the methods used in securing their alleged "confessions" have been violently repudiated. Before attempting any explanation for such a giddy reversal, it is necessary to recapitulate the events leading up to the fantastic climax.

The Soviet "doctors' plot" burst into the headlines with unparalleled fury in mid-January. The spy plot, with its echoes of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, was explosive material, and it is doubtful if the Kremlin would have dared to play with it without the most urgent considerations.

Then, on February 14th, the Soviet press broke from custom in announcing the death of Lev. Z. Mekhlis, a Jew,

and an old Bolshevik, who had at one time headed the Ministry of State Control, where he answered only to Beria. In reporting on his death, the press issued a long detailed communique on how the death occurred, what doctors attended, and the step-by-step techniques used in his treatment. This was a totally new departure ... but it was repeated, much more extensively, and much more thoroughly when Stalin's illness and death were announced three weeks later.

If Malenkov, with the aid of Beria, actually plotted the death of Stalin, or at least to hasten his end, the arrest of the doctors would have been a handy safeguard for them. If something were to go wrong, if something were accidentally discovered, or if the plans went awry in any way, the doctors would have been convenient scapegoats. They had already been accorded a tremendous buildup as the foulest of criminals. According to the flat assertions of the entire Party press, they had caused the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malenkov's one-time rival for power, in 1948, and the deaths of others as well. Even had the accusations been true, it is doubtful if a four-year-old murder charge would have warranted the vitriolic accusations and the impassioned recounting of their alleged crimes.

According to the reports from inside the USSR, Malenkov shed no tears over the death of Stalin, his mentor and master for a quarter of a century. Neither did Beria. Both were quite businesslike.

All of this adds up to a very grave suspicion at best.

By clearing the doctors on April 4th in such a complete about-face, the Kremlin has added weight to the charge that the blood purge accusations were trumped up in the first place.

Stalin was the last obstacle in the way of Malenkov's succession. Was his a natural death?

The Most Popular Purge

Mr. Harry Schwartz of the "New York Times", a foreign affairs editor and specialist on Soviet problems, writes that Ignatiev was a Malenkov protege. He wound up as a member of the Central Committee when Malenkov was at its head. The American expert is of the opinion that Beria at some time, and certainly before October 1952, lost his hold on the secret police. At that time, his protege Abakumov ceased to be the Minister of State Security Forces. He had occupied that position since 1946, when Beria resigned it, naming Abakumov as his successor. What happened to Abakumov is shrouded in the folds of the

Iron Curtain, but rumour has it that he was shot to death during the past year. It is entirely possible that when Malenkov acquired control of the NKVD he removed Abakumov and replaced him with Ignatiev, his own man. This latter is credited with the creation of the doctors' plot. He has also been discredited in the Kremlin's reversal of form over the laying of the charges.

If all this inter-relationship of personalities be true, it is obvious that Malenkov has insufficient power to protect his own underlings.

If a new purge has begun in the Soviet State, it will differ from the innumerable purges of the past, in that it will be popular among the masses. The trial of the recently arrested superiors of the MVD, the secret police, will create nothing but enthusiasm. The name Ryumin means little to the general public, but his office, as chief of the investigation department of the MVD, was the focal point of the hatred of millions of Soviet citizens. If his superior, the former Minister of State security, Ignatiev, were to appear with him in the role of co-defendant the enthusiasm would in all probability be unbounded in certain of the Union Republics. In the Buriat-Mongol region, Ignatiev gained doubtful fame as a particularly inhuman torturer during the "great purges". Later on, he terrorized White Russia and the Uzbek Republic.

Conqueror of the Conquerors

The blow to the MVD, the branding of the use of "illegal methods" in obtaining confessions by coercion, and the arrest of innocent people at its behest, should in theory at least, weaken the position of Beria. However, the evidence to date points in the opposite direction. If in addition one presupposes a certain guilty knowledge shared by Beria, his position becomes relatively unassailable, at least until such time as Malenkov feels that he himself has sufficient strength to warrant Beria's removal.

When, in January, the doctors' plot was announced to a startled world, and the authorities of the State Security forces were reproved for lack of vigilance, it might have been deduced that Beria was under fire from Malenkov. At that time Beria was directly responsible for the Security Forces. But since the death of Stalin all signs now point away from him. There has been no attempt to identify Beria with the "criminal adventurers" from the former Ministry of State Security. Quite the contrary. Who gave the orders to arrest the high officials of this Ministry? Beria. Who issued the sensational communique on the innocence of the doctors? The Minister of the Interior, i.e. Beria.

It is not the first time that Beria has assumed this role. When he took over the office of the Minister of the Interior in December 1938 it was for the expressed purpose of stopping the purges which by then had got out of hand, and were threatening the government and the Soviet State itself with catastrophe. On that occasion Beria had no qualms about shooting five high-ranking officers of the NKVD in the Ukraine.

Now he will be in a position to throw all responsibilities for the innumerable crimes of the MVD onto lesser officials. It may be that we will yet witness the paradox of this "bloody henchman" already guilty of the violent deaths of hundreds of thousands of his fellow-countrymen, gaining the plaudits of the multitudes as the liberator from the oppression and violence of the MVD.

There is not yet a "Malenkov Myth"

It is also noteworthy that up to the present time there is no evidence to identify Malenkov with many new decrees which might bring popularity to the new regime. He did not sign the amnesty. The declaration on Korea was given, not by Malenkov, but by Molotov, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. (It is not without significance here that during Stalin's lifetime, Molotov, as Prime Minister, and not Vishinsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs at that

time, gave out all pronouncements of the foreign policy of the state.)

Of course, little may be said with complete certainty. It is too early to evaluate the bizarre upheavals still rumbling behind the smoke-screen of Soviet policy, but there is at this writing little evidence of the creation of a myth around Malenkov as a good-hearted and liberal ruler.

The place of one ruler, the "good old Joe" of the Truman expression, has been taken by a collective body, quite probably wracked with the turmoil of an inner struggle for influence and for power.

That the struggle between Beria and Malenkov is still in its incipient stages can be safely assumed. This is especially true if the rumours of guilt in the death of Stalin are to be believed. Certainly, such guilty knowledge cannot be shared for long in the atmosphere of a police state. The only safety lies in the destruction of the other party. Who will emerge victor in this struggle of the giants cannot yet be foretold. Both men have a reputation for ruthlessness. Both have served the Party well, and both no doubt feel entitled to the reward of success. When their struggle has waned, it is possible that a third party, probably Molotov, will emerge as the strong man of Russia.

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