

The Pacification of Favelas of Rio de Janeiro:
A neoliberal twist to an old-fashioned intervention.

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*“...A injustiça vem do asfalto pra favela
Há discriminação à vera
Chegam em cartão postal
Em outdoor a burguesia nos revela
Que o pobre da favela tem instinto marginal
E o meu povo quando desce pro trabalho
Pede a Deus que o proteja
Dessa gente ilegal, doutor
Que nos maltrata e que finge não saber
Que a guerra na favela é um problema social*

*Eu não sou marginal
Eu só imploro a igualdade pra viver, doutor
No meu Brasil, que o negro construiu...”*

(Rap da Igualdade - MC Dolores)

“...The injustice comes from the asphalt to favela
Tons of discrimination
Comes in the postal cards
In the outdoor, the bourgeois teach us
That the poor in favela has criminal instinct
And my people when they go down to work
Ask God to protect them
From this illegal people, doctor
That mistreats us and pretends not to see
That the war in favela is a social problem

I am not a criminal
I only beg for equality
To live in my Brazil that the black has built...”

(Rap of Equality - MC Dolores¹)

¹ MC Dolores is a black artist from the favela of Rocinha. He is a famous singer of funk (a music style of favela) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

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Abstract

In 2008, a policy to address the territorialisation of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro's favelas was developed: the pacification of favelas. It involves two key elements, policing and local development, which are said to work in tandem to conquer the territory from drug dealers and integrate these areas to the city. Drawing from the literature on the governance of marginalized areas and neoliberal practices of security, this study explores how the pacification of favelas unfolds within a neoliberal context. The findings of this study are based on a thematic analysis of twenty-five in-depth interviews with key actors involved in the development and implementation of three core projects of the policy (the Pacifying Police Unit and two projects that coordinates social efforts, UPP Social and Peace Territories). Using the theoretical lenses of pacification proposed by Neocleous (2011) and Rigakos (2011), this research argues that the pacification of favelas can be considered a "project of pacification" (Rigakos, 2011). The analysis demonstrates that the dual strategy of the policy reinforces neoliberal practices to govern through fear, resulting in the militarization of favelas. Moreover, this study also finds that this policy serves capitalist interests when implemented within a neoliberal framework, even though its core elements resemble interventionist initiatives of colonial enterprises. My findings also reveal that some participants resist the implementation of initiatives based on a neoliberal framework. However, although their actions seek to emancipate and build an ethical community in favelas, based on long-term and fraternal bonds, the mainstream approach is still prevalent. As a result, favelas are progressively turned into aesthetic communities in which the interests of the market are the driving force.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Latin-American cities are fragmented spaces that seclude citizens who have access to economic and political means from those who are marginalized and excluded from recognition of full citizenship (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007). Invisible walls divide these cities between formal neighbourhoods and informal urban settings, generally known as slums. The occupation of degraded areas of the city and the emergence of slums are connected to the high rates of unemployment and the dismantling of welfare provisions in the past decades. Without alternatives, the mass of poor individuals produced by the economic crises settled in informal areas (usually by auto-construction), on the fringes of society. These areas became no-go neighbourhoods insofar as they were labeled as violent and morally degenerate spaces. High crime rates and the emergence of parallel groups in these neighbourhoods contributed to further marginalization of its residents. In addition to the socio-economic exclusion, inhabitants of no-go neighbourhoods were labeled and stigmatized due to the characteristics of the place where they live.

The connection between violence and poverty is a discursive phenomenon given that the majority of poor people actually struggle to survive within legal boundaries. Notwithstanding, “poverty and exclusion form the backdrop to violence and fear in the sense that they lower barriers and inhibitions and tend to make non-violent practices less attractive and legitimate.” (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007, p.2) Mainly, crime becomes an alternative to the formal economy in a context where social cohesion has eroded and a large sector of the population has been denied the security of welfare, as result of the state abandoning its social responsibilities through the implementation of neoliberal policies. The withdrawal of the state from these areas, including its policing function, also fostered the emergence of armed

actors that use force to pursue their economic and/or political interests (e.g., militias, political armies, criminal organizations) (Koonings & Kruijt, 2004). These groups do not aim to revolutionize the State and take down the instituted regime. Rather, they coexist with the democratic order, dominating the micro politics of contested or abandoned spaces within Latin-American cities. Therefore, parallel groups are the expression of government's neglect towards the population of no-go neighbourhoods; they occupy the spaces left by governmental voids.

Furthermore, policing strategies implemented in these no-go neighbourhoods have also contributed to the levels of armed violence and consequently, the marginalization and stigmatization of these places. Law enforcement agencies either connive with criminality to their own benefit (e.g., bribing, agreements with drug dealers, extortion groups) or they violently repress crime, transforming these areas into battlefields of an urban war. In the latter, their behaviour is based on a militarized perception of the criminal as an enemy to be combatted. In Latin America, this ideology can be traced back to the authoritarian history of government regimes, characterized by military dictatorships and civil wars.

In Brazil, for instance, the military ruled from 1964 to 1985². This long military regime has left a legacy of authoritarianism that manifests in the current behaviour of police forces in the country. If before the military regime, police were already employed as an instrument of power to repress the masses of poor people, this characteristic was internalized in the policing culture during the dictatorship (Van Reenen, 2004). The regime instilled the

² The military regime was installed after a coup that overthrew the legally constituted government of João Goulart. During this period, although the democratic regime has never been formally revoked, the armed forces kept political participation under strict control, interfering in the political process through Institutional Acts that dissolved the Congress, instituted indirect elections, and applied censorship and political repression (Castro, 2002). As in other countries, powerful civilian groups encouraged and collaborated with the military government, sharing the common aim of economic development. This assimilation of the middle-class and elites interests' with the modernization project implemented by the military regimes was a determinant factor to sustain their long permanency in power (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002).

notions of national security doctrine³ and the framing of crime as a threat to the state among police officers, encouraging illegal and abusive approaches to policing (e.g., extra-judicial killings and practices of torture). Moreover, the military regime created a direct association of police forces with the Armed Forces: it brought the Military Police⁴ “under unified military control and organized on a state level”, subordinating the police forces throughout Brazil to the Military (Van Reenen, 2004, p.39).

The bonds between the Armed Forces and the Military Police were not completely broken following the end of the military regime given that the military actually played a prominent role in the democratic transition. Brazil’s military presidents conducted a “slow, gradual, and safe transition that would have to live side by side with authoritarian instruments” (Castro, 2002, p.98). Essentially, the democratization of the country was controlled by the military in order to avoid the disruption of the order, unlike other Latin American countries, in which the regime had no role in the reinstitution of democracy. In Brazil, this progressive transition to civilian rule has resulted in the preservation of the military ideology in the post-democratic period (Zaverucha, 1998), even though Brazil is considered the most successful country to reinstate a stable and democratic regime (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002). The remnants of the dictatorship are mostly visible in the

³ This doctrine was the ideological framework for the military coup in Brazil. According to this thinking, the main enemies of the state come from within. They threaten capitalism and discipline with their goals to subvert the order and install a communist regime (Castro, 2002).

⁴ Nowadays, there are five law enforcement institutions in Brazil. The two main forces are subordinated to state governments: the State Military Police and the State Civil Police. The civil police are responsible solely for criminal investigations and operate under a non-militarized regime, whereas Military Police account for general law enforcement, such as street policing, traffic enforcement, emergency calls, and riot (Caldeira, 2002). The Military Police has a strict hierarchical structure with a military-style rank system; “they are trained and operated using traditional military tactics, and in poor areas their operations often resemble those more appropriate for a war zone” (Skogan, 2013, p.320).

militarized approach adopted by police forces and the acceptance of violence as a legitimate means to protect its own interests (Castro, 2002).

In regards to the Military Police, the heritage of the dictatorship manifests in different layers. Direct bonds with the military remain strong. For instance, the name of the institution explicitly refers to the Military and it follows the same hierarchical structure of the Military. Moreover, at the ideological level, police officers still operate within the logic of the national security doctrine. The police only replace the figure of the “internal enemy” from the communists to the “marginal, criminal element” that threatens the discipline and order of society (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007, p.18). In addition to the legacy of the military regime, the rise of crime rates has also encouraged repressive policing based on a “tough on crime” agenda.

The combination of both elements results in the adoption of a war-like posture in marginalized areas. This entanglement of parallel groups, militarized police forces, poverty, exclusion, and violence operates in a vicious cycle, contributing to the dismantling of the social fabric in no-go neighbourhoods. It produces a “fractured city”: a city characterized by contested spaces that are “increasingly separated, spatially, socially and culturally, from the (lower and upper) middle-class city of formal employment, public services and law enforcement” (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007, p.7). The Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro is one example of how this cycle of violence and exclusion self-perpetuates. The abandonment of favelas (the no-go neighbourhoods of the city) by government authorities has left room for the domination of the territory by drug networks. Police armed attempts to tackle these networks and drug dealers' reaction to police operations have generated a cycle of armed violence. As a result, the population of favelas is constantly caught in the crossfire between drug dealers and police officers. They are also subjected to maltreatment and misbehaviour

of police officers motivated by the thinking that all residents of favelas are potential threats to the current order.

Consequently, the high levels of armed violence and the territorialisation of the drug trade have deepened the gap between favelas and the formal city, reinforcing its characterisation as a “fractured city.” In light of this, the state has implemented different strategies to reclaim these lost territories. The latest policy involves two key elements, policing and local development, which are said to work in tandem to conquer favelas from drug dealers, reduce the levels of armed violence, and integrate these areas within the formal city. Considering the importance of this policy and its potential effects to the population residing in favelas, this study explores how this policy unfolds within a neoliberal framework. To do so, I first analyze the context in which this policy takes place, describing in details the characteristics of Rio de Janeiro as a “fractured city” as well as the previous attempts to address the territorialisation of the drug trade in the favelas. Then, using the theoretical lenses of pacification proposed by Neocleous (2011) and Rigakos (2011), this research analyzes the content of interviews with key actors involved in the development and implementation of three core projects of the policy: the Pacifying Police Unit and two projects that coordinate social efforts. The results of this investigation are presented in two analytical chapters; the first discusses policing attempts to civilize favelas whereas the second explores the neoliberal approach to initiatives that supposedly promote the urban development of favelas.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

I. Favelas: a brief introduction

Favelas are urban informal settlements with similar characteristics to slums such as lack of public services, widespread poverty, high rates of criminality, marked by squatting and auto-construction (Veloso, 2010). Except on rare cases⁵, they are not formally part of the city; thus, these properties are neither recognized nor subjected to taxes. They are the “no-go neighbourhoods” within the metropolis, synonymous with “poverty-stricken” and “crime-ridden” areas (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007, p.12). Yet, they are far from a homogenous phenomenon. Some favelas are more developed than others, with better coverage of public services and higher income⁶. Furthermore, living conditions also differ among inhabitants of each favela. For instance, although the typical representation of favelas involves high levels of poverty, it is estimated that almost 8% of their residents have a middle-class income (Alves & Evanson, 2013).

The very first favela dates back from the 1890s, when impoverished soldiers returned to the city of Rio de Janeiro and installed their temporary houses in the hill of Providência, located in the port area (Alves & Evanson, 2013). Since then, the number of favelas has rapidly increased and other hills of the city have been progressively occupied. Nonetheless, the *favelização*⁷ of the city only took off after the 1970s when the end of the “development boom”⁸

⁵ Certain urban projects of the city of Rio de Janeiro included some favelas as formal neighbourhoods of the city. Part of this effort was to regularize properties, providing owners with title deeds (Botelho, 2013).

⁶ For instance, favelas in the Southern Area of Rio de Janeiro, a zone of the city that concentrates wealth and services overall, tend to have better living conditions. Meanwhile, favelas in the West and North area of Rio de Janeiro suffer more from a lack of services provision and isolation from the rest of the city (Alves & Evanson, 2013). Further, the level of urbanization of favelas also varies. Those that were subjected to public interventions to upgrade the urban infrastructure are better served than the others (World Bank, 2012).

⁷ *Favelização* refers to the process by which favelas grow faster than other urban areas of the city. Thus, progressively, favelas increase their share of the urban fabric.

⁸ Development boom is the name given to the period of accelerated economic growth of Brazil during the 1970s, mainly driven by the industrialization of Brazilian economy. During this time, the country’s GDP

in Brazil was followed by a reduction in the economic growth of the city and the capacity of the market to absorb unskilled labour (Barreira, 2013, p.130). The economic crisis resulted in uncontrolled rates of inflation that primarily affected the mass of unemployed individuals who could not count on welfare assistance of an indebted state (Botelho, 2013). In light of this, favelas became an urban solution for an impoverished population seeking housing (Barreira & Botelho, 2013).

Although this phenomenon exists in other regions of Brazil, certain characteristics single out the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. The main particularity is the disposition of favelas among the city. Due to the geographic and economic needs of the city, most favelas are located in the many hills of Rio de Janeiro, in the midst of rich and poor neighbourhoods (Veloso, 2010). Geographically, the urban space of Rio is limited; the city is squeezed between its many hills and its long waterfront, which favours “a form of urban occupation whereby houses and roads have historically been built, literally, wherever nature would permit.” (Veloso, 2010, p.256) Moreover, the demand for low-skilled workers by the richer class was an initial booster for the expansion of favelas near high-income areas (Alves & Evanson, 2013). Therefore, as opposed to other cities in Brazil (in which the poor population was pushed towards the peripheral areas), favelas are entrenched into the urban layout of Rio de Janeiro; “formal and informal, upper, middle and lower classes, and the very poor may literally share the same geographic space” (Veloso, 2010, p.254).

The separation of favelas from the rest of the city despite their physical proximity renders Rio de Janeiro the most extreme case of a fractured city in Brazil. Although favelas are closely located to formal neighbourhoods, there are invisible walls that clearly distinguish

increased by an average rate of 8.5%. However, only part of the Brazilian population benefited from the economic growth, as it is demonstrated by the increase of inequality rates in these years.

favelas from the *asfalto*⁹. These walls were built through a history of discrimination and marginalization. As self-occupied sites, favelas are perceived as disorganized and filthy areas resulting from a lack of infrastructure and state capacity (e.g., absence of public lighting, paving, and garbage collection). This unpleasant appearance coupled with the social marginalization of its inhabitants (low education, high levels of poverty) has contributed to the stigmatization of favelas' residents as inferior and second-class citizens. The result of this arrangement is a significant gap between favelas and the *asfalto* that continues to expand with the disproportionate growth of favelas' population. In the past 10 years, the population of favelas have increased by 27.6% compared to 3.4% within the rest of the city. As of 2010, almost 1.4 million people (or 22% of Rio de Janeiro's population) self-proclaim to be living in a favela (IBGE, 2010)¹⁰.

In this chapter I will examine the existing Brazilian literature on favelas, parallel groups, and governmental policies to address the territorialisation of the drug trade in these areas. Firstly, I will elaborate on the context of Rio de Janeiro as a partitioned city, exploring how this characteristic fostered the territorialisation of the drug trade in favelas. Following this, I will provide a brief historical overview of the governmental strategies employed to address the territorialisation of the drug trade and the high levels of armed violence in favelas prior to the development of the current strategy of pacification of favelas. Finally, I will discuss the policy of pacification of favelas, focusing on the literature regarding its three main initiatives: the pacifying police unit (UPP), UPP Social, and Peace Territories.

⁹ It literally translates to asphalt, but it is a symbolic expression used by residents of favelas when referring to dwellers of formal neighbourhoods of the city

¹⁰ The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), a federal Brazilian body responsible for the annual census, calculates that there are 763 favelas in Rio (defined as abnormal urban agglomerations). This number varies according to the criteria to define favelas. For instance, the Instituto Pereira Passos (Rio de Janeiro's municipal body dedicated to urban studies) estimates 599 favelas in the city, divided in 954 communities.

II. Rio de Janeiro: the Partitioned city

The literature presents the population of Rio de Janeiro as being configured by those who live in the favelas and those from the *asfalto*. The geographical proximity between these two worlds exacerbates the need to draw a symbolic distance between favelas and the formal city¹¹. In the popular imagination, *favelados* (residents of favelas) represent criminality, poverty, and lawlessness; in short, the dangerous and different “other” (Leite, 2000). Reflecting on the walls that divide favelas and *asfalto*, a journalist named Ventura (1994) coined the term *cidade partida* (partitioned city) to indicate the abyss in which part of Rio de Janeiro’s population resides. According to him, favelas were historically ignored by the state, giving rise to the establishment of paramilitary organizations that challenge the state’s authority over those areas (Ventura, 1994). Since then, the term “partitioned city” has been adopted by society and politicians alike. It has guided public and private interventions in favelas aiming to tear down these walls and integrate them to the city.

Social scientists have increasingly contested the validity of this term by arguing that favelas and *asfalto* are interdependent. In other words, the formal and informal are mutually reliant. On one hand, the city depends upon the economic workforce of favelas. For instance, the lifestyle of the upper classes relies on the work service of the poor residents of the favelas (Souza e Silva, 2003). On the other hand, private companies interested in the potential of consumption of favelas are increasingly targeting their residents (Alves & Evanson, 2013). Additionally, cultural manifestations that emerged in favelas are constantly embraced by the city (e.g., samba and carnival) (Alves & Evanson, 2013).

¹¹ In fact, experts argue that there are not any considerable objective differences from favelas to other poor neighbourhoods on the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro also marked by low-income housing, irregular lots, and deficient provision of public services (World Bank, 2012). Consequently, in this context, symbolic representation of favelas as distinct sites is even more relevant.

Although interactions between the two worlds occur, they are intermediated by stereotypes and prejudice (as part of the distance-making process) fuelled by the association of violence with favelas. With the end of the “development era” of the 1970s and the economic crises of the 1980s¹², crime rates have sharply increased. By the 2000s, Rio de Janeiro had the second highest rate of homicides in Brazil (with a peak of 62.9 homicides per 100,000 habitants in 2002) (Waiselfisz, 2011). Nonetheless, violence is still unequally spread among the city (Alves & Evanson, 2013). For instance, homicides are concentrated in favelas, due to the intense armed confrontations among drug networks and police officers, where the ratio is 250 homicides per 100,000 habitants (CESeC, 2006). In comparison, areas of privileged neighbourhoods in the Southern Zone of the city have low homicide rates, quite similar to those of developed countries.

The territorialisation of the drug trade in the favelas contributes to the high crime rates of Rio de Janeiro (Cano, 2012). Due to their privileged location in the city (near wealthy and consumer areas) and geographical characteristics that hamper police access (most favelas are situated in hills with few entrances), drug dealers have historically used favelas as the headquarters of their operations. When dealers started to sell cocaine in the internal market, there was a need for “a highly organized and hierarchical control over the territory” to protect the favela from attacks of rival groups and police officers interested in the profits of the cocaine trade (World Bank, 2012, p.22). This process led to an arms race between these groups: as more police officers and other groups armed themselves to invade the favelas, the more dealers employed heavy weapons to keep up with the enemy’s firepower.

¹² The economic crisis of the 1980s created a mass of socially excluded citizens, which reflected in the large inequality of the city (Barreira & Botelho, 2013). Not only has this social and economic crisis forced a mass of low-income residents to live in favelas, it also contributed to the expansion of drug networks in these areas. In the 1980s, the introduction of cocaine to the internal market rendered the drug trade a booming high-profitable business (Dowdney, 2004). It became an alternative for the surplus of the poor and unemployed population who were constrained by the limited social assistance offered by the state and the lack of economic opportunities (Barreira, 2013).

During this time, drug dealers also gained more control of the territory and started to dominate all aspects of community life: they control access to public goods (e.g., water supply, garbage collection, public transportation, and cable TV provision) and impose their own legislation and a parallel justice system to avoid police intervention in favelas (Leeds, 1996). Moreover, they permeate political aspects of favelas, interfering in residents' associations and demanding residents to vote for a certain candidate (with whom they have established deals in exchange for votes). Drug lords also limit physical access to favelas, dictating who is allowed to enter and leave. Nonetheless, it is not possible to generalize the control exercised by these groups as it varies in each favela according to multiple factors, such as personal characteristics of the drug lord and the ties of the drug network with the territory.

Likewise, the relationship with residents is also complex and varies from oppression to financial dependency. However, in general, drug dealers' behaviour towards the community has deteriorated following the territorialisation and armament of drug factions (Alves & Evanson, 2013). Before the encroachment of cocaine, the trade was smaller and familiar. Ties with residents were based on mutual respect and trust since most drug dealers were actually born in favelas and had deep roots with residents either through friends or family. Through the old model, the drug dealer assisted the community by promoting parties, investing in urban infrastructure, and providing social welfare for those in need (Dowdney, 2004). With the professionalization of drug networks, the connection to the community was lost and control was increasingly imposed by force. Favelas were frequently overtaken and controlled by outsiders who did not have ties to local residents and tended to resort more frequently to violence. Further, economic goals were prioritized over moral values and community bonds. As a result, practices previously prohibited, such as the employment of children and the open use of drugs and weapons, became commonplace (Leeds, 2007).

Considering the dominance of drug dealers over social life within favelas, drug factions of Rio de Janeiro are perceived as a *parallel state* or a *parallel power*¹³. The establishment of a parallel force to the state differentiates drug networks in favelas of Rio de Janeiro from other groups that sell drugs in other areas of the city (Cano, 2012). Although the territorialisation of the drug trade and armed violence directly affect mainly the population of favelas, the proximity of favelas (and consequently violence) to formal neighbourhoods has spread high levels of fear among all residents of Rio de Janeiro (Veloso, 2010). Consequently, Rio's society has called for effective governmental measures to tackle the perceived dangerousness of favelas and, in particular, to contain the expansion of the *parallel power* (Veloso, 2010).

III. Governmental strategies to address the territorialisation of drug trade

Governmental strategies to tackle the power of drug networks in favelas have ranged from no interference to violent interventions¹⁴ (Alves & Evanson, 2013). These differences in strategies are connected with changes in political power of the state of Rio de Janeiro¹⁵. They are also usually related to a shift in the urban policies of the city, from the removal of favelas to their urbanization, when it became necessary to contain the violence within those walls. The two mandates of Leonel Brizola, the first governor of Rio de Janeiro since the return to democracy,

¹³ Arias (2006) defines *parallel power* as a structure that meshes together different actors (i.e. local leaders, elected politicians, police officers, militia members, and drug factions) collaborating in their own benefit. This arrangement perpetuates criminality and hinders the establishment of formal institutions by the state. A *parallel power* is a structure that fills the void of governance in a marginalized urban area "deserted by formal, legal institutions" (Kruijt & Koonings, 2007, p.139).

¹⁴ Few attempts were made to overcome this perceived dilemma. In 2000, a pilot experiment to create and install a police unit in the favelas inspired by the ideas behind community policing (GPAE: Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais – Police Group for Special Areas) was put in place in two favelas of the southern area of Rio de Janeiro (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). The concept behind it was to reduce armed disputes through a permanent policing presence. Several GPAEs were implemented in different favelas of Rio de Janeiro after the initial success of the initiative. However, lack of funding, institutional resistance by the Military Police, and widespread corruption undermined the success of the program in the long term.

¹⁵ In Brazil (a federation composed by the Union, the States and Federal District, and the municipalities), the Constitution attributes to the state level most of the responsibility for public safety. The head of the state Military Police, responsible for the maintenance of public order, is subordinated to the Secretary of Public Safety (equivalent to a Deputy Minister of Public Safety in Canada) who in turn responds to the governor of the state. Ultimately, the governor, with the advice of the Secretary of Public Safety, decides which approach should be followed in terms of public safety (e.g., preventive, more police-based or repressive).

was marked precisely by an effort to democratize the police forces of the state. Police strategies were therefore based on respecting the law in the interaction with citizens, particularly when patrolling poor areas. However, the increase of drug and illegal arms trade as well as of homicides lead to harsh criticisms of a governor described as “too lenient”. Consequently, the following governors endorsed violent repression as the cornerstone of their fight against crime. An example of this thinking occurred in 1995 with the incorporation of a bonus payment for police officers that personally achieved a reduction of crime rates. In practice, this bonus payment (commonly known as the “Wild West gratuity”) was paid to police officers that exterminated “criminals”, creating the illusion that the problem of violence was solved (Alves & Evanson, 2013, p.201). Furthermore, the formalization of the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais – BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion), an elite troop of the Military Police, also contributed to the consolidation of the politics of confrontation. BOPE is employed in police incursions in favelas, during which military weapons and vehicles (e.g., rifles and armoured fighting vehicles) were commonly deployed. The level of violence of these operations led to their comparison to military “search and destroy” operations and the description of the state of favelas as an “urban warfare” (Alves & Evanson, 2013, p.4). The lethality of BOPE operations is so elevated that residents of favelas allege that “BOPE *entra para matar e não para prender*” (BOPE enters to kill and not to arrest). Their aggressive behaviour is connected to the warrior mentality of the unit, illustrated on their logo and motto *faca na caveira* (knife in the skull) (Alves & Evanson, 2013).

The current governor, in power since 2007, initially endorsed this same narrative of a war against drug factions as his predecessors. Although his political campaign advocated for a different model of public safety, based on the respect for human rights and less reliance in the use of heavy weaponry in the operations into favelas, the first two years of his mandate were characterised by a politics of confrontation (Alves & Evanson, 2013). Under this model, police

officers (usually from BOPE) raid favelas in search of drugs and arms. These operations usually result in intense shootings among dealers and police officers, which led to a high number of casualties of dealers, police officers, and residents of favelas (caught in the crossfire). For instance, in 2007, there was an average of three events per day resulting in 1,330 deaths caused by the Military Police (Conectas Human Rights, 2012). The shootouts also disrupted regular life of the community; for instance, school classes were cancelled, adults could not commute to work, and businesses closed their doors. In certain occasions, when the area was too unstable after a raid, the police (with the help of special national forces or even the army, when necessary) occupied the favela until the reestablishment of normality. When police officers left, drug dealers quickly re-established their enterprise and territorial control over that favela. Hence, the militarized model with temporary invasions “do not disarticulate the criminal structures and do not prevent the territorial domination by criminal groups” (Cano, 2012, p.4).

IV. The pacification of favelas

The pacification of favelas is said to involve two key elements: policing and local development. In the official discourse, policing is perceived as the entrance door to the consolidation of citizenship’s rights for the residents of favelas. Police forces regain territorial control over those areas, a basic condition for following governmental interventions to boost local development (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). On the other hand, the urban upgrading of favelas and the enhancement of living conditions in these areas provide sustainability for the pacification in the long term (World Bank, 2012). It “contributes to the consolidation of the process of pacification and to the promotion of citizenship in the pacified territories” (“Rio+ Social Programa,” n.d.). The term pacification¹⁶ refers to all the actions involved in the

¹⁶ The term pacification was not initially an official nomenclature of this program. It was coined in practice through the repetitive use of it by authorities, residents of favelas and Rio de Janeiro’s society. It has been informally institutionalized and was a common term in actors’ discourse. Only recently, in February 15th, 2015,

implementation of the police unit in favelas as well as to the social initiatives that follow police forces. It is derived from the name of the police unit (Pacifying Police Unit) and it alludes to the goal of “bringing peace” to favelas.

a. Pacifying Police Unit (UPP – Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora)

At the end of 2008, the state Department of Public Safety of Rio de Janeiro launched the UPP – Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Unit) to address the high rates of armed violence in favelas. The policy was presented as an alternative to the tactics of no-intervention or violent incursions. Although the project is presented as innovative, there are many similarities between the UPP and failed previous attempts to implement community policing in the favelas (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). The core differences appear to be the higher number of UPP officers in each favela and the employment of newly recruited police officers in the UPPs to avoid the contamination of the project by old misconducts of the Military Police (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). The idea behind the project is to regain territorial control of favelas and to cease armed confrontations through the implementation of a permanent police force – the UPP (Cano, 2012). The first UPP was implemented at the end of 2008 in Santa Marta, a small favela in the Southern Zone of Rio de Janeiro. Currently, the project employs 9,293 police officers (“UPP O que é,” n.d.) and operates in 38 favelas within the city of Rio de Janeiro and one in the Baixada Fluminense¹⁷.

the governor of Rio de Janeiro issued a decree formally creating the policy of pacification (Decree 45.146/2015). The decree states the policy is composed by two elements: the Pacifying Police Unit and the Social Occupation. According to the decree, the policy of pacification is a process of political, economic, and social reintegration of war-torn territories. These territories are understood “as communities highly vulnerable, with low state’s capacity and high levels of informality, in which the opportunistic installation of criminal groups ostensibly armed affronts the State of Law, undermining the political, social and economic development of these communities”, and they will be determined as such by the Department of Public Safety. The decree also creates a committee to monitor and evaluate the social occupation of favelas, in addition to the bodies directly responsible for the implementation of the policy.

¹⁷ Baixada Fluminense is an area of the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro, composed by 13 cities. It is the poorest and the most violent region of the state of Rio de Janeiro.

The UPP is a project yet to be institutionalized; there are few regulations concerning the project¹⁸. Within the existent normative, the decree 42.787/2011 determines that poor and highly informal communities, in which armed criminal groups threaten the democratic state and the rule of law, are to receive UPPs. The official objectives of the UPP are

to consolidate state control over communities under heavy influence of armed criminality, to reinstate peace and public order necessary to the full exercise of residents' citizenship that guarantees social and economic development, and to implement more prompt, efficient, and plural instruments to resolve conflicts and occurrences, focusing in mediation of conflict and differentiated treatment for misdemeanours (State Decree 42.787, 2011).

Secondary objectives are: the social and economic development of favelas and their integration to the city by the expansion of public and private services and the formalization of economic activities (Cano, 2012).

The program's objective is not to eliminate the activities of the drug trade *per se*, but to stop the territorialisation of the networks. This "more realistic ambition" appears to give legitimacy to the program precisely because previous projects had the unfeasible goal of eliminating drug trafficking (Cano, 2012, p.19). To regain and maintain territorial control, the project employs a high number of police officers in favelas within a long-lasting timeframe to prevent the return of drug factions (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). As a result, the ratio of police officers per habitant in favelas with UPP is much higher than in other regions of the city (in average there are 18.2 officers per 1,000 habitants in favelas with UPP compared to 2.3 officers per 1,000 habitants in the state of Rio de Janeiro).

¹⁸ Although it has been five years since the launching of the first UPP, the UPPs have not consolidated a normative framework yet; the institutionalization of the program is very low (Cano, 2012). Cano explains that the project advanced in a pragmatic and experimental way, without a previous consolidated plan. The two decrees issued in 2009 (State decree 41.650/2009 and State decree 41.653/2009) only state the establishment of the UPP within the structure of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro and determine a financial incentive to be given to police officers working in the UPPs. Only in 2011, the governor issued a decree that outlined the model of the program, establishing a minimum regulation of the operation of the UPP (State decree 42.787/2011). This decree was modified by another decree in 2013 (State decree 44.177/2013).

The process of pacification of favelas implies four different phases: tactical intervention, stabilization, implementation of UPP, and evaluation and monitoring. Initially, officers from BOPE and other elite squads of the Military Police “stage a massive, coordinated operation to retake control of the favela from the drug gangs” (World Bank, 2012, p.37). It focuses on the arrest of criminals and seizure of guns and, eventually, drugs. Through the next stage of “stabilization”, troops besiege the area and constantly patrol the interior of the favela to ensure territorial control. The timeframe of these two phases varies depending on the characteristics of the area (such as the size of the favela, the number of different factions, and the size of the population) and the level of resistance by drug lords. In most cases, at the time of the occupation, police encountered little resistance from drug dealers. One of the reasons for that was the shift of the mentality from fighting drugs to fighting weapons. The UPP does not have the objective to end drug trade; therefore, drug leaders perceive it as less threatening to their business (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). In addition, the pacification of a favela is announced in advance of the actual operation, providing enough time for drug dealers “to leave voluntarily or turn over their arms”, which contributes for the low level of resistance (World Bank, 2012, p.37).

Only after the favela is considered stable, a unit of the UPP is assigned to the favela and a “headquarters” is installed in previous existent buildings (e.g., public buildings or buildings previously used by drug lords). Wherever this is not possible, the UPP’s offices are temporarily allocated in modified shipping containers until an adequate headquarter is built. Although it was meant to be a provisory measure, many UPPs are still housed in containers (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). This phase represents the permanent arrival of police and is said to prepare the area for other public and private initiatives that will reinsert favelas into democratic society (Decree 42.787/2011). The fourth phase of the pacification, evaluation and monitoring, has not been fully implemented yet; the mechanisms to measure and evaluate the work of UPP are currently being developed by the Department of Public Safety (Cano, 2012).

Proximity policing orients the work of the UPP: the pacifying police approach should be “guided by dialogue and respect to the culture and uniqueness of each community, easing conversation and stimulating the growth of local leaders” (“UPP O que é,” n.d.). Each UPP is integrated by newly recruited police officers that receive special training to work in favelas, particularly in regard to proximity policing. The employment of newly recruited officers in the UPP is listed as an important measure to avoid the reproduction of the past behaviour of the Military Police towards residents of favelas; therefore, increasing the likelihood of the UPP to successfully establish trust with the community (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). It is expected that UPP officers will be less influenced by a warrior mentality and less susceptible to engage in misbehaviour (e.g., abuse of force and corruption) that were already incorporated into the repertoire of the “old timers' used to abusing the poor” (Mitchell & Wood, 1999, in Veloso, 2010, p.265).

Taking the large scope of the UPP and the attention it has gathered, recent literature has evaluated the project through different aspects. Regarding the impact of the UPP in crime, studies have associated the UPP with a decrease in the number of shootouts and deaths in favelas. Violent deaths have gone down by 75% and robberies by almost 50% in areas that have received a UPP (Cano, 2012). However, all other crimes, particularly domestic violence, threats, and rapes, have substantially increased at a faster rate than the rest of the city, which is confirmed by residents accounts. This could be explained by the presence of police officers, which can encourage rates of police reporting, and/or by the end of the authoritarian control and “parallel” order imposed by drug lords, possibly giving rise to these modalities of crime (Cano, 2012). At the city level, homicide and robbery rates in Rio de Janeiro went down by 15% from 2009 to 2011 (Frischtak & Mendel, 2012). The positive impact of UPPs in crime rates has reduced fear of crime in the city, particularly among middle and high-class neighbourhoods surrounded by favelas (Brito, 2013). In terms of drug trafficking, the UPP did not end the illicit

drug trade in the favelas; it reconfigured its characteristics since the permanent policing made it more difficult to circulate with ostensive weaponry (Brito, 2013). As a result, drug dealers replaced heavy weapons for handguns, easily concealed.

In regards to residents' overall satisfaction with the project: the numbers range from 92% to 61% satisfaction with the UPP, depending on the favela analyzed¹⁹ (Instituto Mapear, 2010). They mention the end of armed violence in favelas and an increase in feelings of safety as the main accomplishments of the UPP (Veloso, 2010). Another important improvement in residents' lives is the increase of their freedom of mobility within and outside favelas (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). Before, the UPPs residents of favelas had to respect territorial limits imposed by drug lords (e.g., prohibition to visit a favela dominated by a rival faction and limitations on mobility by shootouts). Following this, however, residents reported more freedom "to come and go" as they please. Likewise, the circulation of "outsiders" (residents of the *asfalto*) in favelas has also grown after the control of favelas' entrances by drug dealers was brought down by the UPP (Rodrigues, Siqueira, & Lisovsky, 2012).

Notwithstanding, residents' also demonstrate lack of confidence in the UPP (Cano, 2012). Their main concern is about the permanency of the project after the Olympic Games in 2016. They believe the UPP was only developed to attend the needs of a safer city as Rio de Janeiro is currently hosting important international events (Military World Games, 2011; FIFA Confederations Cup, 2013; World Youth Day, 2013; FIFA World Cup, 2014; Olympics Games, 2016). This is illustrated by the creation of the "Olympic Belt" (selected favelas are strategically positioned in the proximities of game venues and touristic attractions) (Conectas Human Rights, 2012, p.204), even though the regions with the highest lethal violence are in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, in the Baixada Fluminense (so far it has received only one UPP) (Cano,

¹⁹ This study shows that variation among favelas is an important element to be accounted for, underlining the differences of impact of UPP in each area.

2012). Thus, they fear that after the Olympic Games, the UPP will lose priority in the political agenda of the city and drug networks will return to favelas, punishing all residents that have worked in partnership with the UPP (Cano, 2012). This fear also hinders attempts to establish a trustful relationship between police officers and residents, as residents keep a safe distance from the UPP fearing future retaliation by drug dealers (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012).

In this light, scholars argue that the strategy of pacification cannot be dissociated from the crisis of capitalism and the implementation of neoliberal practices in Brazil, in which the market regulates urban problems (Botelho, 2013). This is illustrated by the connection of the project with the cycle of big events hosted by Rio de Janeiro. To maximize economic profits of these events it was necessary to overcome the image of “disorganized, violent and impoverished” (Barreira, 2013, p.129). The UPP, therefore, is framed as a capitalist urban intervention that replaces the martial rhetoric of the urban warfare²⁰ (Barreira, 2013). The creation of the “Olympic Belt” is the indicator that the pacification of favelas does not concern the inclusion of the marginalized population or the reduction of criminality within the city. Rather, the UPP functions as a marketing strategy to replace the perception of violence in Rio with a peaceful and enjoyable city (Brito, 2013). This is further illustrated by the lack of investment on the social component of the pacification and the timid changes promoted within the Military Police, which results in the consolidation of police management regarding social issues in favelas.

Some residents also complain about the excessive number of police officers (Veloso, 2010). Importantly, it is the constant presence of the police, patrolling and walking around small streets, that has been listed as a cause of discomfort for residents who feel that they are under constant surveillance. Additionally, excessive and brutal behaviour exhibited on part of UPP

²⁰ Although the official discourse presents the UPP as a program to overcome the warfare treatment dispensed to favelas, the literature argues that the project is still embedded with martial ideology. Even the term pacification implies the existence of a previous war and the need for an external intervention to eliminate the enemy (Cano, 2012).

officers has also upset the local population. They accuse police officers of authoritarianism, violence, and abuse of power (Conectas Human Rights, 2012). Considering this behaviour, residents suggest that the control of the favela has only shifted from the drug lord to the commander of the UPP (Veloso, 2010). However, they claim that at least they have access to more and better tools to control police's activities²¹ (Cano, 2012).

In terms of broader social changes in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the pacification of favelas enabled the possibility of imagining a city without invisible walls, with the full integration of favelas to the rest of the city (Veloso, 2010). By tackling the *parallel state*, the UPP facilitates the development of these areas to close the gap between the *asfalto* and favelas. In that sense, the UPP would be the first step to overcome concrete and symbolic barriers of the “partitioned city”. However, Rodrigues et al. (2012) ponder that the walls between the favelas and the rest of the city are also a consequence of a symbolic process of differentiation and exclusion of the residents of the favelas not being addressed by the UPP.

The literature has pointed out other limitations of the UPP. For example, there is little systematization of the UPP and few guidelines in place for its implementation. It follows a practical approach designed and constructed on a daily basis due to the lack of a normative framework (Cano, 2012). Consequently, activities of the UPP vary across favelas depending on the commanders in charge of the unit. Even within the same UPP, the behaviour of police officers differs among different shifts: some shifts are more respectful to residents' rights while others are more abusive (Rodrigues et al., 2012). The limited standardization of the UPP frustrates the goal to establish a proximity policing since most police officers are not personally committed to the model. Moreover, there are no formal channels of dialogue with the community

²¹ For instance, residents have mentioned that the Commander of the UPP has a role in holding police officers accountable for their actions. Before the UPP, denounces of abuse of police officers were ignored by their superiors. In the UPPs, denounces are investigated and police officers are punished. Nonetheless, the same study points out that this is not a consistent tool as it relies in the will of the local Commander.

and therefore the implementation of initiatives to establish trust with the community relies on commanders' will (Cano, 2012). Some commanders promote meetings with local leadership and other public representatives to hear the complaints of the community. In addition, some UPPs employ specific initiatives to make the police closer to residents, such as the promotion of leisure and sports events, educational activities for children, follow-up visits by police officers, and the use of surveys to measure residents' satisfaction with their service. These initiatives of the UPP usually focus on children since, as the next generation, they are more easily influenced by the positive role models of police officers (Cano, 2012). In this light, it is argued that the UPP cannot be considered a programme or a model of policing and it should be understood as a "body of experiences with policing" (Cano, 2012, p.13). The lack of formal and systematic evaluation undermines any possibility to standardize distinct approaches to enhance the project.

Critiques were also drawn in terms of how the UPP was conceptualized. The project was designed within the Secretary of Public Safety, without the consultation of favelas' residents. This directly contradicts the doctrine of community policing, which states, at the core, that the community must be involved in the development of strategies to promote public safety (Cano, 2012). Furthermore, the imposition of the project without the consultation of the community is more troubling in the context of favelas where the relationship of police officers and residents has always been marked by mistrust and prejudices. The top-down approach hinders the reconciliation of these divergent sides since the community's voice is neglected in the process (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012).

Another issue with the implementation of the UPP is the lack of knowledge about the project as well as the lack of support within the Military Police, particularly among the low ranks of the institution²². High-ranked officers identify more with the project, understanding its

²² In Brazil, the entry system to the state Military Polices is dual, divided in low-level personnel and officer corps. This lateral entry into the top officer ranks cements "large social and educational distinctions between

objectives, whereas low-level officers do not show consistency with the ideal of the UPP (Rodrigues et al., 2012). They disagree with key aspects of the model, such as the active engagement with the community. Furthermore, 70% of UPP officers prefer to be allocated to a different unit, which can be explained by the poorer working conditions of UPPs (e.g., physical installations of UPPs in shipping containers, physically challenging foot patrols due to the steepness of the hills and distant location of some favelas) (CESeC, 2011). However, the main factor that explains resistance and dissatisfaction with the UPP is the traditional mentality of the Military Police that associates the role of police officers with that of warriors. Under this lens, the UPP model of policing is not seen as real policing since it does not necessarily involve violent repression of criminals (Rodrigues et al, 2012). Although the UPP employs newly recruited officers to avoid this issue, it does not prevent this thinking. For one thing, the warrior ideal is embedded in the Brazilian society; police officers already start in the institution with the image of the combative officer. For another, UPP officers are discriminated by other police officers that deem the UPP “second class” policing. To refute these claims, UPP officers resist to the model of the UPP to prove their worthiness (Cano, 2012).

Officers’ resistance to proximity policing is particularly troubling in regards to the partnership with the community (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). The foundation of the model is based on building a trustful relationship with residents of favelas, a challenging goal given their past history of violence and mistrust between police and residents of favelas. The combative mindset of police officers further thwarts this goal as it feeds misconduct and abusive behaviour

rank-and-file police and their military-ranked top officer corps.” (Riccio, Ruediger, Ross & Skogan, 2013, p.309) Further, this system generates dissatisfaction and lack of commitment from rank-and-file police officers that can only progress to a certain level in their career.

towards residents of favelas (perceived as potential “criminals”). On the other hand, the militaristic ideology of police officers foster a process by which commanders of UPP turn into the new “*dono do morro*”²³.” (Cano, 2012, p.156) These commanders have a hands-on approach: they consider part of their duties to regularize all informality in favelas (e.g., regulation of transportation and expedition of licenses for parties) (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). In this case, the vacuum of power left by the dismantling of the drug faction is filled by the UPP; in a perverse scenario, the bearers of the gun still dictate decisions about public life (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012)²⁴. The employment of military forces to pacify some favelas is an even more problematic facet of the problem. The fact that the Army was assigned an urban policing function “guaranteeing the law and the order” of favelas is a dangerous precedent for a country that only recently has moved away from a military dictatorship (Brito, Villar, & Blank, 2013, p.222).

Other challenges of the program arise from limitations on the scope of the UPP that can restrict its effectiveness in the long term. For instance, the initiative does not contemplate a specific program to reintegrate “those who were somehow involved with drug networks and remained in the favelas ('the orphans of the drug trade')” into the formal economy (World Bank, 2012, p.125). Similarly, there are suggestions of drug dealers’ displacement to non-pacified favelas and other areas of the state of Rio de Janeiro. In other words, the pacification of favelas would simply have pushed violence associated with drug networks to the outskirts and less visible areas of the city (Oliveira, 2013). It is still not clear how the government will prevent further territorialisation of favelas (World Bank, 2012) or how it will address the problem of

²³ *Dono do morro* literally translated to owner of the hill. This expression is used to refer to the drug lord of the favela, who controls all aspects of social life.

²⁴ This intersection of political power with armed power in Brazil is a phenomenon with historical roots. It is an inherent contradiction of democracy in Brazil: the legal order and democratic rights are constantly suspended to preserve democracy (Brito, 2013). Since the military dictatorship, there is an implicit acceptance of the use of force to guarantee an orderly society and democracy, threatened by enemy forces.

militias²⁵ (so far only one favela that received a UPP was previously dominated by militia), considering that the UPP is an expensive program that could hardly be implemented in all favelas of Rio de Janeiro (Oliveira, 2013).

b. UPP Social and Peace Territories

Considering the need to develop favelas after the implementation of the UPP, in 2010, the Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights of the state of Rio de Janeiro created a project to coordinate social efforts in pacified favelas: the UPP Social²⁶. Until December of 2010, a pilot of the project was implemented in three of the thirteen favelas that had been pacified at that moment. Soon after, in January 2011, following a change in the head of the Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights, the programme was transferred from the state of Rio de Janeiro to the Instituto Municipal de Urbanismo Pereira Passos (Municipal Institute for Urbanism Pereira Passos)²⁷ under municipal administration.

The goal of the UPP Social is to mobilize and articulate municipal services and policies in favour of the development and quality of life in the communities in areas of UPP (“Rio+

²⁵ Militias are vigilante groups that claim to offer a solution to the territorialisation of the drug trade, but often take advantage of residents of favelas. They are usually composed by former or current police officers that “extort ‘taxes’ in exchange for security, protection and other basic services, and often colluded with the drug trade.” (World Bank, 2012, p.36) Motivated by economic profits, by force they monopolized essential activities in favelas (e.g., illegal cable TV provision, public transportation, distribution of gas cylinders) and overcharge dwellers for that (Barreira, 2013). For a while, militias received public and media support, particularly from middle and upper classes, which did not experience their daily oppression. With the exponential increase of favelas dominated by militias (200 favelas until 2009) and the infiltration of militia members in the political process, the government of Rio de Janeiro took several initiatives to fight them. Today, government authorities list them as the real organized crime of Rio de Janeiro (Alves & Evanson, 2013) since they are intertwined with the structure of the state: politicians and police officers collude in a symbiotic relation to exploit favelas through fear and territorial control (Barreira, 2013). While drug networks impose territorial control as an instrument to maximize profits of the drug trade, militias have the territorial control in the backbone of their structure. The control of the territory is the means and the end goal, allowing the exploitation of residents (Oliveira, 2013).

²⁶ In August 2014 (after the collection of data for this thesis), the program UPP Social was renamed as Rio+ Social. Even though the name has changed, the structure of the program (goals, methodology, and personnel) remained the same. Considering that participants refer to the program in the interviews as UPP Social, I will use the original name of the program in this study.

²⁷ The Instituto Pereira Passos is a municipal “institution dedicated to producing data and knowledge about the city in order to support public management” (Rio+Social, n.d.). It is currently responsible for the UPP Social, in partnership with UN-Habitat (United Nations Human Settlements Programme)

Social Programa,” n.d.), considering the “need to unify efforts among the three levels of government to guarantee the success of the UPPs, the multiple attributions of the municipality within the framework of the pacification, and the need to integrate social actions and public services attributed to the municipality in the pacified communities” (Municipal Decree 33.347, 2011). The launching of the UPP Social responded to the increasing challenge to manage all interventions from public and private actors in pacified favelas. Pacified favelas are priority areas for governmental policies and are also appealing to private companies interested in their internal consumer markets. Thus, the UPP Social also aimed to be a governance model to match the supply (actions by government, civil society, and private sector) to the demands of the local population from pacified favelas (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). Additionally, another goal of the UPP Social is to engage the community in the decision-making process. Most governmental interventions in pacified favelas did not involve any consultation process, even if they deeply affect the landscape and residents’ lives (e.g., expropriations and removal of houses in risk areas). Consequently, there was a widespread dissatisfaction of the community with these initiatives. The UPP Social, through an extensive process to listen to dwellers’ needs and demands, attempts to give a more democratic and participative feature to these initiatives being implemented in favelas²⁸ (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012).

The program is structured in three main branches (Acioly Jr., Choumar, & Moraes, 2012). The main responsibility of the Coordination of Territorial management is to gain/ develop knowledge of the area. To do so, field teams, reach out to community leaders and residents to map out the existent services and the main needs of the area. The Coordination of Information Management compiles this information into georeferenced maps and indicators for each favela.

²⁸ Later on, in August of 2012, after the change of the president of IPP, the UPP Social has become more focused on the coordination of inter-levels of governance (municipal, state, and federal level) and on the enhancement of partnerships with the private sector to promote the economic development of the areas (Acioly Jr. et al., 2012). Nonetheless, considering the low level of institutionalization of the UPP Social and the shortage of studies about it, it is hard to identify the current objectives of the project.

Following this, the UPP Social continuously collects information and articulates responses to identified problems in favelas. In order to do this, the Coordination of Institutional Management mobilizes and articulates different actors to formulate and implement adequate responses to the needs of favelas. Hence, the UPP Social is not a direct provider of services as it only supports and helps maximize the services provided by other actors.

Alongside the UPP Social, Peace Territories is another body that focuses on the social aspect of the pacification. By the time the UPP Social was transferred to the municipality, the Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights had already hired field workers to expand the pilot of the UPP Social to other pacified favelas. Thus, the Department created the Territórios da Paz (Peace Territories) to replace the UPP Social and employ these field workers. According to the official pamphlet of the program, Peace Territories is composed by social management teams that aim to “strengthen its workers and local networks, bring to full potential initiatives at the community level, facilitate dialogue between the community and the State and stimulate social development along with the protection and promotion of human rights”. They act as “mediators between the State and the local communities”, carefully listening to the needs of the population and subsequently articulating governmental responses to these demands.

Thus, there are many similarities between the UPP Social and Peace Territories. Both initiatives share common ground in that the pacification of favelas has created a unique opportunity for state intervention to promote social development and urban upgrading of these areas. However, that does not mean that the state was completely absent in these areas prior to the pacification. On the contrary, previous projects were created and implemented to promote the urbanization of the favelas. For example, the project Favela-Bairro aimed to integrate the favelas with other areas of the city through the coordination of different actors involved in the favelas and a holistic approach to the needs of these areas. However, the armed control of the favelas by drug dealers hampered efficiency and continuity of state interventions, creating the perception

that the state had abandoned these areas. The key difference from these previous interventions to the UPP Social and Peace Territories is the communication between the agenda of public safety and the agenda of urbanization (Acioly Jr. et al., 2012). On the other hand, the main difference between UPP Social and Peace Territories seems to be the locus of the programs: whereas the UPP Social focuses on the municipal level, the Peace Territories works with the state level.

One of the main achievements of the UPP Social is the constant production of knowledge about favelas, which enables the development of strategies tailored to the needs of favelas (Acioly Jr. et al, 2012). Moreover, the UPP Social proposes a different model of governance. The articulation of integrated actions in favelas fosters the dialogue between governmental sectors, an important step to break away from the logic of silos that dominates the public sector in Brazil (Acioly Jr. et al, 2012). The methodologies of UPP Social always involve the participation of the community and the strengthening of local networks, a differential that provides an “insider’s view” of the community (Acioly Jr. et al, 2012).

On the other hand, this governance model faces many barriers from government silos. It is a challenge to replace fragmented actions for an integrated strategy focused on the territory. Although the model of the UPP Social is praised by its capacity to overcome the compartmentalization of the public administration, deeper political changes in the way public administrators frame favelas are necessary to achieve economic, social and physical integration of favelas to the rest of the city (Acioly Jr. et al., 2012). Another problem is the government’s disregard of the community’s input in the development of policies. Field teams collect this information that is later ignored by public actors, increasing residents’ distrust in government since the project does not demonstrate ability to produce concrete results out of their actions.

Residents have mixed feelings that vary across communities in regards to the economic and social development that is promised to follow the installation of UPP. In some favelas, the local population felt that the panorama improved, particularly in the provision of public services,

while in others no difference was noted (Cano, 2012). Others denounce that the UPP has failed to accomplish its social component, which is underscored by Conectas Human Rights' (2012) following statement: "So far, the belief that the 'pacification' promoted by the police would be the gateway to the development of welfare policies has not manifested." (p.204) Furthermore, residents mentioned that certain groups suffered from the loss of income associated with the reduction of the drug trade. Drug dealers were the main consumers within the community; in fact, many small legal businesses felt the impact on their sales with their departure from the pacified favelas. Moreover, the cost of living in pacified favelas inevitably rises with the formalization of urban services and the escalation of real estate prices after the implementation of the UPP. These negative effects are aggravated by the lack of public policies to reduce inequality and to foster economic integration of favelas. Without these policies in place, the UPP can reduce the quality of life of residents in favelas, exactly the opposite of its objective (Cano 2012).

Moreover, the lack of social development intersects with the policing branch of the pacification of favelas. In these locations where the UPP is the only body fully present, the resistance to UPP officers is higher than other locations that have improved living conditions (Cano 2012). Furthermore, the absence of governmental representatives encourages the UPP to replace the role of social actors: residents of favelas reach to UPP officers to complain about public services for the lack of an appropriate alternative (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). Quite often, the commander of the UPP then assumes the role of intermediating the relationship between the government and the community. The reduced investment on the social development of favelas compared to the policing component of pacification is another indicator that the project was not conceived in light of the needs of favelas' residents, but due to political and economic interests to revitalize the image of the city.

VI. Conclusion

This review of the literature has shown that favelas have been historically developed as a territory apart from the city of Rio de Janeiro. Even though they are entrenched in the urban fabric, state capacity is less consolidated in favelas compared to the nearby neighbourhoods: public services, policing, and general infrastructure has been denied to or neglected within these informal settlements. The marginalization of favelas is partially explained by the framing of favelas as an urban problem, which for long has justified policies based on the removal of these communities (rather than the enhancement of its living conditions). Despite state efforts to eliminate all favelas of the city, the *favelização* of the city continued to grow due to the increasing economic constraints of the lower classes of Rio de Janeiro. Due to this minimum state intervention and the social exclusion of favelas, paramilitary groups²⁹ established a *parallel power* in these areas. Favelas were then blamed for the high crime rates of the city because of the violence associated with the territorialisation of the drug trade.

The perception of favelas as breeding grounds for crime generated a feeling that something had to be done in order to contain the danger and disorder of these areas. Additionally, there was also a consensus among experts and policy-makers about the inefficiency of the previous governmental strategy, which only deepened violence and increased levels of conflicts. This call to “pacify” favelas is also connected with a shift in the urban policy of Rio de Janeiro from removal of favelas to their urbanization. Due to geographical constraints of Rio de Janeiro, favelas were progressively more accepted as a solution to the housing deficit of the city. Therefore, it became necessary to address violence in favelas, through police forces, to fully formalize (and accept) favelas as spaces of the city (Botelho, 2013). In light of this public call for action, the project of pacification of favelas emerged as an alleged solution to simultaneously

²⁹ If initially these groups were mainly involved with the drug trade, currently militias are progressively taking over their space.

address the territorialisation of the drug trade (and particularly, the high levels of armed violence) and integrate favelas to the urban fabric as formal neighbourhoods of the city.

Considering the characteristics of the policy of pacification and its main initiatives described in this review of the literature, I have noticed that these projects resemble other strategies to govern marginalized areas, such as the Weed and Seed initiative. Weed and Seed is a federal initiative developed in the United States in 1991 to tackle criminality and fear of crime of inner cities' residents, based on a twofold approach. The weeding component targets criminals through swift detention and law enforcement (Dunworth & Mills, 1999). These tactics also deal with the inner city as a war battleground (e.g., extensive use of stop and frisk, drug raids executed by paramilitary units, undercover operations with police officers, and aggressive use of search/arrest warrants) (Shaw, 1993). This initial concentration of "iron fist" actions is said to be a necessary step for the later seeding component, which focuses on neighbourhood revitalization through social and physical investments (e.g., after-school programs, job and life skills development, educational programmes and counselling, and housing and commercial establishments renovation) (Miller, 2001).

Community participation should be the bridge between "weeding" and "seeding"; residents, benefiting from the improvement in their quality of life, would be more likely to collaborate with the police to prevent criminality from returning to the area (Bridenball & Jesilow, 2005). Nonetheless, the project has failed to improve community participation and enhance the quality of life in the high-crime areas targeted (Shaw, 1993). Most of the expenditure went to law enforcement to "weed out" criminals of communities; seeding investments were too low to make a difference in the long term (Goetz & Mitchell, 2003; Allender, 2001). On the contrary, aggressive and militarized actions to combat gangs and drugs have decreased the feeling of safety of residents (Bridenball & Jesilow, 2005). Hence, I see that the pacification of favelas has key elements that have already been tested in previous

experiences: it seeks to conquer the territory initially by force and then institutionalize the state's presence by local development. In this light, this study was motivated by a strong interest to understand the dynamics and characteristics of the process of pacification of favelas giving the failure of previous "weed and seed" initiatives.

The project of pacification of favelas in Rio de Janeiro is certainly a cornerstone in the agenda of the city (Rodrigues & Siqueira, 2012). Many studies in Brazil are currently analysing the impact of the pacification of favelas, particularly in regards to the implementation of the UPP. Nonetheless, the literature is not yet consolidated: most of the studies are exploratory and lack an in-depth analysis. Moreover, some of the main studies in the topic were requested and funded by private and public institutions with vested interests. Consequently, there is a call for more academic research to advance the knowledge about the UPPs (Cano, 2012; Rodrigues et al., 2012). On the other hand, UPP Social and Peace Territories are only mentioned in a subsidiary way in the specialized literature as examples of a public effort to revert the legacy of territorial exclusion of favelas through the enhancement of public provision of services. However, they are not main objects of the research; they only appear in their analysis as a neglected aspect of pacification. Therefore, this study aims to address a gap in the literature in terms of the analysis of the policy of pacification implemented in favelas. It focuses on the process of pacification as a whole, considering the aspects of policing and social development (UPP, UPP Social, and Peace Territories). Furthermore, I mainly seek to analyze how the policy of pacification of favelas, based on an interventionist approach, unfolds within a neoliberal framework³⁰.

³⁰ Some authors suggest that the Brazilian political economy does not follow a typical neoliberal agenda (Fonseca, Cunha, & Bichara, 2003). The 90s, when the country was affected by uncontrolled inflation, was marked by a neoliberal turn in the Brazilian economy. The federal government, followed by state levels, reduced its interference in the market, privatized services, and adopted a rigorous fiscal policy to control inflation that resulted in the widening of inequality gap in the country. However, this model lost strength following the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in 2003. His party put in practice (and continues to do with

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I will present three theories that discuss urban marginalized areas and governmental policies to address problems identified in these spaces. These different theories intersect and provide a theoretical foundation to analyze the policy of pacification of favelas. In the first section, I discuss the political economy and the socio-economic context in which these policies take place; it seeks to contextualize the current approach towards marginalized classes in light of the neoliberal governance through fear. The following section analyzes the characteristics of the main policies put in place to tackle the alleged “dangerousness” of marginalized areas in light of the broad context of militarization and neoliberalism. While section II discusses the strategy to militarize decaying neighbourhoods, section III focuses on the implementation of urban upgrading projects in these regions.

I. Policies of an insecure world

Globalization has profoundly changed the role of nation-states. In a globalized world, power is detached from political control: the circulation of capital and information does not follow national borders while political institutions remain local³¹. The nation-state, subdued to exterritorial forces of the market, implements strategies of deregulation, removing all constraints to economic activities. At the same time, we live in “times of disengagement”, not centered on the capacity of the rulers to surveil and coerce the ruled (Bauman, 2001, p.127). The state no longer takes the responsibility to educate and discipline the disorderly masses into a civilized

his successor, Dilma Rousseff) policies associated with welfare states, such as social welfare programs to assist poor populations, elevated governmental investments to promote economic growth, and regulatory measures to control the market. Nonetheless, neoliberalism has not been totally abandoned. For instance, the government maintains the rigorous fiscal policy and privatizes services via concessions. Considering these changes, experts in Brazil have sustained that currently the political economy of the country is hybrid; it maintains a neoliberal framework, but the state recovers responsibilities for social and economic problems (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2011).

³¹ Conversely, the era of “state-and-nation-building” was characterized by a direct engagement between rulers and the ruled, in which the territory was a key element to delimit the power of the nation-state (Bauman, 2001, p.126).

society, as it used to do during nation-state building³². Hence, the panoptical model of power – too costly and demanding of the powerful to regulate the masses – has been progressively replaced by self-surveillance and self-monitoring. In this new system, domination hinges on the uncertainty and insecurity of life conditions; “the state of permanent precarité – insecurity of social standing, uncertainty about the future of one’s livelihood and the overwhelming feeling of ‘no grip on the present’” rules out any movement of solidarity and resistance (Bauman, 2001, p.42). Discipline is then self-produced by the lack of alternatives and the permanent threat of deterioration of the current arrangements.

Thus, the state is neither responsible to regulate the morality of nationhood nor to protect citizens against uncertainties of life in society and vulnerabilities of the market. Expunged from its role to educate the classes and to regulate the market, the role of the neoliberal state is limited to the protection of individuals from “threats to their human bodies, possessions and habitats” (Bauman, 2001, p.54). Since policing is the only remaining prerogative of weakened nation-states, the understanding of insecurity is limited to personal and property security (Wacquant, 2008a). To maintain its prominence, neoliberal governments channel social and economic insecurities, derived from the market forces (on which they have no capability of intervening), into fears of personal safety (which can be addressed by security strategies)³³. This is done mainly through artificial exaggeration of the threat, keeping economic insecurities in the background. This political use of fear triggers an insecurity loop: insecurities from a “liquid” and “fluid” world³⁴ are constantly reinterpreted into concerns for safety that, in turn, are identified in

³² It required a strong and interventionist state to take up the tasks to enlighten people (eliminating inferior identities of local communities), and build an orderly society. Civilizing efforts were grounded on power inequality; only a powerful ruler could put in place new standards of living, moral orientation, and social rules.

³³ Moreover, politicians use this “culture of fear” to support their conservative agenda. It is a populist measure “to move interest positions and established balances of power (which are now denounced as ‘blocking necessary reforms’) and to mobilize participation, mostly in election campaigns” (Steinert, 2003, p.281).

³⁴ Liquid modernity is characterized by constant mobility and the instability of relationships, identities, and market economies (Bauman, 2001). A liquid society is the result of the failure of the modern project to rationalize and order the world to be controllable and understandable.

the threat of the other. This process is internalized by anguished individuals, who find relief in the replacement of “diffuse and scattered fears” by tangible and known threats that can be tackled; compared to the sources of insecurity, undetermined and concealed in the forces of the market, the sources of unsafety are visible and can be easily pinpointed in the faces of strangers (Bauman, 2001, p.145).

Additionally, disempowered nation-states, unable to address the root causes of social issues due to the dismantling of welfare provisions, frame social problems as security issues (Bauman, 2001). For instance, rising inequality is explained by the consolidation of a consumer society and the abandonment of social welfare. Nonetheless, policing is progressively employed against marginalized individuals, as they are blamed for their own condition. Hence, individuals are called to “seek biographical solutions to systemic contradictions” (Beck in Bauman, 2001, p.144). Contrarily, in the previous welfare model, it was considered a mission of the state to educate and civilize the population. If someone failed to succeed, the responsibility was shared among all; it was not considered a matter of individual responsibility. Presently, in the neoliberal model, those who fail to succeed are condemned to the underclass, a category excluded from society, and are dehumanized into security targets. Consequently, in a neoliberal world, strangers are individually blamed for all sorts of social malaise produced by the free market model in place (Bauman, 2011).

Guided by this rationale, measures are then put in place to secure individuals from the threat of the other. For instance, public spaces are privatized and reshaped to attend to security concerns and defensive walls are erected to keep the other at a distance (Zukin, 1995). Other strategies focusing on the implementation of physical barriers (e.g., gated communities) and the development of projects (e.g., neighbourhood watch) are in place to keep the threats of urban life away. However, paradoxically, security measures perpetuate the feeling of insecurity. They only

serve as a reminder of the danger and increase the distance of those inside from those on the outside, reinforcing the notion that the stranger is a threat.

These security measures operate as gatekeepers (Bauman, 2001); interdictory spaces create communities of sameness for those individuals economic successful who choose to secede (voluntary ghettos). At the same time, it condemns and confines the underclass to the outside (the real and involuntary ghettos). In both ghettos, there is a lack of attachment and long-term commitments among its members; their unity is based on short-lived and friable bonds (success or failure in a consumer society³⁵) rather than long-term communal bonds. In this sense, contemporary communities are aesthetic communities³⁶ that serve neoliberal governance as they reinforce individual responsabilization. Their members briefly share their concerns within the community, only to reassert their autonomy and to reaffirm individual solutions for the problem. There is no moral obligation to assist the “others” who did not have the merit to succeed by themselves. Consequently, marginalized classes aspire for a different community: an ethical community, woven upon inalienable rights and long-term communal commitments. Contrarily to aesthetic community, an ethical community can provide a network of safety, certainty, and security to its members.

Nonetheless, neoliberal governance through security continues to reinforce the division of society in voluntary and involuntary ghettos. In the name of security, freedom is increasingly sacrificed, particularly the freedom of the dangerous other (Bauman, 2001). Security policies not only resort to the confinement of these classes (racially and economically excluded) into inner cities, but they also use “new ‘softer’ forms of social control that are no longer concerned with traditional racial exclusion and are focused more on containing and maintaining class inequality”

³⁵ Additionally, Bauman (2001) suggests that other entities act as bidding material that brings individuals together in contemporary societies, such as idols, festive events, threats, and public enemies.

³⁶ Aesthetic community is a term coined by Kant to describe the transient nature of the bonds between its members (Kant in Bauman, 2001).

(Hutchison, 2012, p. XXVIII). For instance, the prison in the United States emerges as the last instrument of control and confinement of the African-Americans, historically replacing slavery and the Jim Crow regime (Wacquant, 2001). In that sense, the prison – the hyperghetto - serves the same purpose of the ghetto as an institution of closure and control, marked by stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional encasement of certain populations. Both prison and ghetto reinforce each other in a vicious cycle: those living in inner cities, “plagued by antisocial behaviours, acute joblessness, and social isolation” (Wacquant, 2011, p.5), are left unassisted by a state that “downsizes” welfare assistance. This surplus population becomes the main target of the criminal justice system since the “upsizing of the penal system” is used to govern poverty (a social problem exacerbated after the dismantling of the welfare state). On the other hand, prison deepens the marginalization and exclusion of poor individuals (usually from racial minorities) that have no alternative but to return to the inner city.

Not surprisingly, inner cities are a main concern of contemporary societies due to the perception that poverty and other social problems are breeding grounds for crime and disorder. This association of marginalized individuals and crime is not recent, though. In the past decades, ghettos were believed to exacerbate urban problems such as criminality, family breakdown, and economic deprivation (Wacquant, 2012). These concerns were originally given academic credibility by the Chicago School (Wacquant, 2012). Later, in the 1990s, Broken Windows theory promoted the understanding of the social geography of crime, proposing a link between petty crime, nuisance behaviour, and urban disorder and serious offenses. According to this thought, minor offenses generate a spiral of decay that results in the “taking over” of public spaces by the disorderly and criminal (Berti & Sommers, 2010). Consequently, different policies have been developed over time to redevelop, revitalize, and re-urbanize marginalized areas. Currently, within a neoliberal framework, no-go urban areas are militarized in an effort to prevent the danger from spilling out to the city and to expand the barriers of the market (Giroux,

2004). The analysis of this phenomenon in light of the goals of political economy to transform these areas in thriving consumer communities has been theoretically explained as pacification.

Pacification is a “form of police power, securing the insecurity of capitalist order” that focuses on the promotion of peace and security (Neocleous, 2011, p.191). Politics of security have always been in place to secure the order of capital from social insecurities inevitably produced by the forces of the market. In fact, police power and capitalism are intertwined since the origins of this system of production. For instance, the exercise of violence (through brute force, discipline, and regulation) was fundamental to alienate the majority of the population from the means of production, thereby enabling the original accumulation that sustained capitalism (Marx in Neocleous, 2011). Currently, the maintenance of capital, wealth accumulation, and market growth continues to rely on policies to surveil³⁷ and control unfit populations (Kempa, 2011; Rigakos, 2011).

This control is twofold: the micro level attends to the surveillance routine that every citizen is submitted to and to the security practices of everyday life (e.g. identity card and passport controls, stop and search practices, securitization of workplaces and private spaces) and the macro level relates to practices that manage international security (Neocleous, 2011). Internationally, the agenda of pacification can be tracked down from the control of colonies passing through the conquest and suppression of resistance in Vietnam to the development of international relations (Neocleous, 2011). For example, in the colonial enterprise, the main objective was to reduce to peaceful submission the local population as a means to guarantee liberal interests in the land. Likewise, during the Vietnam War, security was considered a

³⁷ It is necessary to point out that the modus operandi of how governments manage and control the insecurities produced by the capitalist system has changed over time. Following Bauman’s (2001) account of the shift from the era of nation-state building to times of disengagement, I argue that the civilizing ethos of the welfare state relied on education of the masses and the idea of shared responsibility. On the other hand, the neoliberal state, restricted into its institutional capacity, resorts to punishment and control to impose the mentality of the productive citizen upon the masses.

fundamental element to pacify the country, which had a wider scope than only military ceasefire and territorial security. The objective was to construct a socio-political environment that would prevent future insurgency. In order to achieve this, administrators were considered more important than soldiers, focusing on land reform, economic development, and the enhancement of the country infrastructure (Neocleous, 2011).

Police power, either through public or private units, is the central instrument to fabricate a social order favourable to economic interests of a capitalist society, enforcing the morals of “the competitive and consumptive citizen” (Kempa, 2011, p.101). This is done through corrective discipline of those that have already been civilized and repressive sovereignty of those considered uncivilized. For instance, the first police unit in the world – the Thames River police – was created to internalize civilizing strategies employed by Britain in Ireland, with the end-goal of transforming the “‘indigent poor’, the criminal classes and eventually the entire English working class” in a productive and docile body (Rigakos, 2011, p.70). Contemporarily, broken windows policing³⁸ illustrates police practices with latent economic purposes. This model promotes proactive policing to stop antisocial behaviour that scares citizens and residents off the streets and, consequently, can reduce consumption. It was initially implemented by the New York Police Department and quickly expanded to outside of United States to stabilize and to pacify communities such as in Baghdad, Iraq. The same economical purposes are also present in this model: zero tolerance practices targeting misdemeanours seeking to civilize those perceived as unproductive, in turn, restoring security (Rigakos, 2011).

Thus, the lens of pacification uncovers the objectives of security measures: neoliberal governance through personal security ensures proper conditions for a consumer society, attending the interests of the market. To do so, governments are constantly trying to “domesticate” and to improve the conditions of marginalized urban spaces, expanding the

³⁸ Broken windows policing is based on broken windows theory.

barriers of capitalism. This is mainly done through a twofold approach: militarization of social problems (e.g., paramilitary policing and zero tolerance practices), and urban upgrading projects to redevelop, revitalize, and re-urbanize marginalized areas. In common, these initiatives are framed in terms of civilizing and development; there is an element of order restoration and education of the population towards the liberal ideology, creating docile bodies for economic exploitation (Rigakos, 2011).

II. From crime-fare to warfare

The militarization of social life is the process through which society returns to force and violence as the means to solve social problems (Kraska, 2007). It glorifies the military technology, power, and weaponry to effectively deal with problems, domestically or internationally. This phenomenon was expanded within the neoliberal framework of governance through fear; the constant reminder of the dangers in the world provides the background for the ultimate and militarized response to the threat. In this discourse, those previously identified, as “at risk” becomes “the risk”, encouraging the adoption of punitive and exemplary measures to control their dangerousness (McCulloch, 2004). Additionally, contemporary events, such as the Vietnam War and the 9/11 attacks³⁹, have contributed to the assimilation of military ideology into domestic and trivial use (Simon, 1999).

Overall, democratic countries have progressively accepted and supported the military response to social issues and crime problems as the only perceived way to promote security (Hill & Beger, 2009). It blurs the historical distinction between the military and the police. The rationale of the military is to dominate a territory and to eliminate the enemies; it is the less restraint force of the state (Steinert, 2003). On the other hand, the police are associated with law

³⁹ The consolidation of the paramilitary culture is associated with the end of the Cold War, when society seeks new common enemies to replace the communist threat (Hill, Beger, & Zanetti, 2007; Simon, 1999). This trend was exacerbated and accelerated after the 9/11 attacks, which brought to light the threat of the “terrorists” and triggered the consolidation of a new “war on terror”.

enforcement in the domestic territory. It is obliged to use minimum force while tackling internal disorders, being the most limited exercise of force by the state. Thus, the main goal of policing is (or should be) to promote peace, whereas the focus of military is to eliminate the enemy. Nonetheless, the framing of social problems as threats to the national security of a state encourages the incorporation of military rationale and practices by police forces.

The militarization of social life is not restricted to the field of policing; it manifests in different strategies that pervade various aspects of urban cities. It is illustrated by the expansive use of the war metaphor (Kraska, 2001; Simon, 1999), the framing of social problems as national security threats (Hill & Beger, 2009), the warfare treatment disposed to marginalized areas, particularly the inner-city and ghettos, (Giroux, 2004), the redistribution of governmental investments from social programmes to militarized interventions (Giroux, 2004), the expansion and normalization of paramilitary policing⁴⁰ (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997; McCulloch, 2004), the use of military in domestic territory (Kraska, 2007; Kraska, 1999), and the normalization of military-style punishments in the criminal justice system (Giroux, 2004; Kraska, 2001). In common, these different militarized practices are predominantly carried on in inner cities and ghettos, considered urban war zones (Chambliss, 1994).

Marginalized urban areas have historically received a distinctive approach from public authorities. Poor and socially disorganized neighbourhoods, composed mainly by racial minorities, have always been framed as a threat to the prosperity of the middle-class values and the capitalist economy (Meeks, 2006). This perception of marginalized spaces as problematic

⁴⁰ By the end of 1995, approximately 89% of the police departments in United States had a police paramilitary unit (commonly known as a SWAT – Special Weapons and Tactics – team), including small cities and locations in the rural area (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). The activities executed by paramilitary units were also expanded; police departments have “mainstreamed” their utilization and most of the callouts made by PPU are not classified under exceptional circumstances. These units have been primarily employed to actively engage in the “war on drugs”, doing no-knock entries into private residences to execute arrest or search warrants (Hill & Beger, 2009). These interventions are characterized by the employment of military weaponry, full combat gear, and use of violence (Chambliss, 1994). Moreover, it has also been reported an increase use of PPU to routinely patrol hot-spots neighbourhoods (Kraska, 2007).

areas was aggravated by the intense urbanization process of the past decades, which brought in criminological and sociological attention to urban areas as the locus of social and economic problems. Different terms, such as ghettos and inner cities, have been applied to designate these multiple areas that struggle with poverty, social exclusion, inequality, unemployment, and urban degeneration. Not surprisingly, these regions are targets of public and private interventions to contain its “dangerousness”. However, under neoliberal governance, the policy shifted from a social to a military intervention. The priority became the control of social and criminal behaviour of the urban underclass (through militarized techniques), rather than investing in the social and economic revitalization of urban communities (Meeks, 2006).

This shift of public policy was accompanied by a change in the public perception about the urban underclass: from a disadvantaged population, who needs to be helped, towards a morally decayed group, who needs to be contained (Goetz, 1996). This sense of lawlessness and disorder of the urban city sets up the security problem; “it is at this moment that the process of internal pacification begins, a process fabricating a ‘peace and security’ within the social order to match the ‘peace and security’ imposed on colonial subjects.” (Neocleous, 2011, p.200) Consequently, the urban underclass is the central target of zero tolerance policies; techniques initially deployed to pacify populations in counter-insurgency contexts are increasingly being implemented in the domestic urban terrain through the construction of a state of urban warfare (Dawson, 2007).

In this urban warfare, there is not a clear defined battleground and the identities of enemies and allies are more fluid and ambiguous (Gibson, 1994). The threat comes from the “broken cities of the world”, where the insecurities of the capitalist order are most exposed (Graham, 2009), while the enemies are failed consumers, those who “deserve to be under siege militarized law enforcement officers, due to their inferior and non-contributory economic, cultural, and social positions in society.” (Meeks, 2006, p.38) Domestic and international arenas

are intertwined. For instance, the persistent use of the metaphor “war on” enables security policies that target both the suspected communities abroad and the enemy within (Neocleous, 2011). The war on drugs sanctioned the control of populations and the exclusion of zones in other countries (e.g., the funding of Colombian military by the United States) whilst creating a “clear and present danger” internally. Further, the use of martial language intensifies society’s response to crime and encourages the adoption of militarized techniques by the civil police (Steinert, 2003), such as military operations armed to respond to natural disorders (e.g., Joint Task Force Katrina) (Graham, 2009), war on drugs with drug-raids executed by paramilitary units (Kraska, 2007), disproportionate incarceration of racial minorities (Meeks, 2006), and federal projects developed exclusively for these areas, in which the core component is law enforcement and aggressive policing (e.g. Weed and Seed) (Meeks, 2006).

In conclusion, the militarization of social life shifted the perspective of crime from crime-fare to warfare. In this permanent warfare (Graham, 2009; Kraska, 2001), the values of democracy are constantly undermined by policies that rely on force as the primary solution for problems (Giroux, 2004). In such a divided society, dissent is discouraged and it is faced as a threat to the security of the “good citizens” (Giroux, 2004). Furthermore, the brunt of collateral damage is calculated and distributed to the underclass; the invisibility of collateral victims converges with the invisibility of the marginalized. Thus, the risks of the military enterprises are unequally distributed. In order to provide a safer world for the privileged, we victimize those that are already victims of political economy (Bauman, 2011).

III. Urban renaissance in the neoliberal era

In the last decades, urban revitalisation projects have been a key aspect of urban governance focused on the renaissance of dead areas, affected by suburbanization and economic globalization (Marquardt & Fuller, 2012). These projects aim to physically re-structure

disorganized areas, to enhance the quality of life of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and to bring economic prosperity to the areas. In practice, these initiatives complement the militarization of urban areas, corroborating with exclusionary and “othering” processes⁴¹.

Since the 1960s, BIDs (Business Improvement District) have increasingly gained popularity as a central actor in this movement. BIDs (or BIAs – Business Improvement Areas - in Canada) are organizations that administer an area through a board of elected local business owners that manages funds collected from a mandatory levy on all commercial property in downtown or commercial areas (Lippert, 2012). BIDs are deemed as successful approaches to achieve urban upgrade and, as such, they are currently key players in the urban renaissance promoted globally. They are listed as an example of neoliberal practices of management of public spaces by private or semi-private administrators (Clough & Vanderbeck, 2006).

The main objective of BIDs is to increase investment and consumption within a targeted urban area through improvements appealing to consumers (Ranasinghe, 2010). They reorganize inner cities and downtown (areas/spaces) for buyers, developers, and city planners, promoting unrestricted passage and a pleasant experience through sidewalks and business retail areas (Marcquardt & Fuller, 2012). BIDs’ administrators believe that concerns for safety and fear of crime are the main cause for less consumption (Belina & Helms, 2003). Thus, most of BIDs describe its mission as the creation of a “vibrant, clean, and safe” downtown or commercial strip (Clough & Vanderbeck, 2006). In order to follow through this mandate, BIDs resort to street enhancements (e.g. street lighting and sidewalk benches), marketing events, and mainly security provision, which have been coined as a “clean and safe” policy (Lippert, 2012). In practice, “clean and safe” means physically removing any obstacles to consumption (e.g. garbage, broken glass, and graffiti), and socially cleaning these areas from dangerous individuals; homelessness,

⁴¹ Othering “includes not only stereotyping the other, but also simply distancing oneself (...) Othering refers to the process of making generalizations regarding a particular group; it is essentially the idea that the 'other is not like us'” (Briscoe, Arriaza, & Henze, 2009, p.53).

panhandling, loitering, and squeegeeing are physical and symbolic barriers to pedestrian flow, referring to the image of unsafe and unclean (Sleiman & Lippert, 2010). BIDs use multiple tactics to clean up the areas under their mandate: private security (Marcquardt & Fuller, 2012), ambassadors (Lippert & Sleiman, 2012), CCTV surveillance (Lippert, 2012), and advocacy for restrictive municipal by-laws integrate BIDs' repertoire (Berti & Sommers, 2010).

Hence, private partners, with the allegiance of public sector, progressively privatize public spaces to attend market interests. By converting public areas into sites of profitability, BIDs heighten the democratic role of public spaces as sites for public manifestations, free political activity, and equal opportunity for all (Clough & Vanderbeck, 2006). Alternatively, inner cities and downtowns are conceived as a secure environment for affluent consumers (Marquardt & Fuller, 2012). This orientation goes along with the "revanchist city", which aims to react (or seek revenge) to the stealing of the city from white middle class by all sorts of minorities (Belina & Helms, 2003).

Most importantly, BIDs' agenda converges with zero tolerance practices; BIDs understanding that crime (or fear of crime) hinders consumption leads to the adoption of law and order agenda to defend good residents from "dangerous strangers" (Belina & Helms, 2003). It fosters an "us versus them" mentality, which emphasizes "the difference between the street person and other citizens." (Berti & Sommers, 2010, p.65) Through partnerships with police and public services, and lobbying for legislative change, BIDs create a framework to manage groups and control spaces that results in social exclusion and, commonly, in the incarceration of the marginalized.

Hence, urban renaissance is another practice of social exclusion that seeks to pacify the "flawed consumers" - homeless, drug addicts, and panhandlers – residing in these areas. Thus, pacification is achieved through the displacement and control of the "human residues of intractable social problems", rather than through policies that address the root causes of social

issues (Lippert, 2012, p.171). The marketplace is merely interested in the “beautification” of the areas, by the removal of the visibility of social problems (Berti & Sommers, 2010). For instance, the use of by-laws to forbid panhandling, begging, and other similar practices do not confront the structural “underlying problems of poverty, addictions, mental illness, and unemployment of this population” (Berti & Sommers, 2010, p.61); rather it only worsens their problems as it criminalizes their means of survival. Nonetheless, by-laws are an effective tool to keep the threat away from “clean and safe” commercial areas. Thus, urban revitalization reaffirms neoliberal policies that criminalize and blame marginalized population for their own problems (Marquardt & Fuller, 2012). The association of crime with poverty legitimizes “exclusionary and elitist strategies for city’s development and governance” under the false pretence of promotion of security (Miraftab, 2012).

IV. Conclusion

The goal of this study is to understand and analyze the main initiatives applied to pacify favelas of Rio de Janeiro considering the theoretical lenses of pacification and governance through security. It seeks to put the pacification of favelas in context with the broad literature of governance of marginalized urban areas worldwide. As I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, the strategy of pacification of favelas is based on two main components: policing and local development. This dual strategy resembles colonial enterprises built on the military occupation and development of colonies to consolidate the metropolis’ power over the dominated territories. However, the current context of the pacification of favelas could not have been more distinct from the era of colonization. Colonizing endeavours were the expression of a mercantile and welfare state that controlled and intervene in all aspects of social life. Presently, the prevailing neoliberalism model in most of Western countries imposes a different configuration of state.

There are certainly different angles to explore the phenomenon of neoliberalism; however, there is a consensus in the literature that it can be defined as an ideology that supports open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference as a means to achieve economic growth (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). To accomplish this, the guidelines of neoliberalism include a set of measures based on the principles of liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. The speed, intensity, and mode by which states adopt these neoliberal practices have been uneven, and often contradictory, across the world.

Hence, this thesis share the understanding that neoliberalism should be understood as a process instead of an end-state (Peck & Tickell, 2002). For instance, the aggressive programs of neoliberal restructuring of the 80s are profoundly different from the current wave of neoliberalism, marked by a strong presence of the state in the social arena to contain the manifestations of “the deleterious social consequences and perverse externalities of neoliberal economic policies.” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.399) That is, the combination of employment market’s deregulation, social retrenchment, and urban disinvestment has given rise to a mass of joblessness, living under precarious conditions, and has plunged “marginalized neighbourhoods into a vortex of social insecurity.” (Wacquant, 2008b, p.67) Faced with these negative effects of the free-market policy, police and prison become the go-to instruments of the neoliberal state to maintain social order.

This so-called neoliberal penalty manifests in a set of practices adopted by governments to regulate, discipline, and contain the marginalized and disposed. As examples of these practices, I highlight the expansion of order-maintenance policing strategies, the increasing militarization of police forces, the imposition of harsher sentencing practices, and the diffusion of video surveillance systems (Harcourt, 2010, p.2). Hence, instead of addressing the roots of social problems, a stronger, punitive, and repressive approach in policing, criminal courts, and prisons is employed to control the drawbacks caused by the own neoliberal policy in place. In

that sense, “the invisible hand of the market calls for the iron fist of the state.” (Wacquant, 2014, p.79) Considering how entangled relationship between the economic aspect of neoliberalism and welfare and criminal justice policy, Wacquant (2014) proposes a sociological understanding of neoliberalism based on four pillars: commodification, supervisory workfare, proactive penal state, and individual responsibility.

Inspired by the theory of pacification, as proposed by Neocleous and Rikagos, and this sociological understanding of the phenomenon of neoliberalism, this thesis seeks to analyze the policy of pacification implemented in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro as projects of pacification⁴² in a neoliberal era. It will explore how an interventionist policy, with elements that resemble the mode of governance of the welfare state, unfolds in the present context of neoliberalization.

⁴² As conceptualized by Rigakos, 2011.

Chapter 4: Methodology

I. Research questions

Considering the apparent paradox of an interventionist policy framed in a neoliberal context, the overarching research question of this study is “How do projects of pacification⁴³ unfold within a neoliberal framework”? In order to do that, I will:

- Analyse the practices and interventions implemented by the programs.
- Examine the rationale of the three programs, revealing the explicit and underlying logics supporting practices and interventions.

II. Epistemological and Ontological foundation

This research is driven by a concern to unveil and expose the governance of marginalized areas, particularly the policy to pacify favelas of Rio de Janeiro. In that sense, this study is “value-determined” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p.10): it contributes to the liberation from oppressive forces through a critique of the programs of pacification. On a broader level, the analysis of the pacification of favelas is a practical tool to expose the arrangement of the neoliberal governance through security. Considering this personal aspiration to expose the perverse aspects of the pacification of favelas, this research follows a critical approach. It calls for “varying degrees of social action, from the overturning of specific unjust practices to radical transformation of entire societies” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p.268)

In order to produce social transformation, it is necessary to denounce the existent forces currently in place. Therefore, ontologically this study adopts a historical realistic perspective wherein there is a “virtual reality” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) shaped by power relations. As a matter of logic, I accept the existence of this “virtual reality” in pacified favelas that I seek to

⁴³ Here, projects of pacification refer to the theoretical concept of Rigakos, 2011.

access and unveil through my research. To do so, this study does not prioritize giving voice to the subjectivity of participants' accounts. Rather, I have used participants' accounts to reveal the objectifying forces that forge the narrative of government intervention in favelas of Rio de Janeiro. In that sense, I recognize that I hold a position of authority over my participants' experiences (Walby, 2007); my analysis was guided by my worldviews of reality and my goals for this study.

III. Data collection

a. Selection of projects and favelas

Three main governmental projects were selected for the sampling of this thesis due to their prominent role in pacified favelas: UPP, UPP Social, and Peace Territories⁴⁴. The UPP presented itself as an obvious choice since it is the starting point for the whole process of pacification and it represents police power in favelas. On the other hand, the UPP Social and Peace Territories were chosen since they were specifically developed to intervene in pacified favelas as a counterpart of the policing facet of pacification. Their goal is to coordinate all social actions, which provided me with indirect access to a vast diversity of social projects. Also, this direct relation of the UPP Social and Peace Territories as social bodies to complement the policing work of the UPP is an important aspect to understand the roles of policing and local development in the securitization of favelas.

Due to the time-constraint of this master's thesis, I limited my project to the study of 5 favelas out of the 34 so far pacified: Batan, Coroa, Fallet and Fogueteiro (Fallet⁴⁵), Complexo da

⁴⁴ It would have been unfeasible within the timeframe of this study to analyze all interventions and initiatives currently in place in pacified favelas.

⁴⁵ Coroa, Fallet and Fogueteiro are three favelas conjoined in a hill of Rio de Janeiro that are covered by the same UPP and field team of the UPP Social. Thus, to avoid confusion, I will refer to this complex of favelas simply as Fallet.

Penha⁴⁶, Rocinha, and Santa Marta. To select these 5 favelas, I used purposive sampling based on a combination of factors that ensured the diversity of the sample: geographic location (the sample has favelas from Downtown, Southern, Northern, and Western Zones of the city), lifespan of UPP (range of favelas from the newest UPPs to the oldest), and history of pacification (favelas with a history of conflicts with the UPP⁴⁷). In addition to that, Batan was chosen not only because it is located in the Western Zone of Rio de Janeiro, but also because it is the only pacified favela previously dominated by a militia group (all the others so far pacified were controlled by drug factions). This sample has given me a high quality of descriptions⁴⁸; my priority was the diversity of accounts and the richness of descriptions to build a better understanding of the pacification of favelas (Ezzy, 2002).

b. Interviews

The purpose of this study is to unveil the characteristics and the conceptual consequences of the governance of marginalized areas through the policy of pacification. Although the data I have collected does not allow me to ascertain the real conditions of favelas, I seek to expose the underlying assumptions, the mindset, and the rationale of the actors developing and implementing the projects of pacification in favelas of Rio de Janeiro. By doing that, I aim to bring to light the rationale of the policy and the theoretical consequences this discourse can have in terms of how neoliberal governments manage and control marginalized areas. To accomplish this goal, I collected the necessary information by engaging in a dialogue with participants

⁴⁶ Complexo da Penha is a complex of favelas composed by Chatuba, Fé/Sereno, Vila Cruzeiro, and Parque Proletário. Due to the territorial extension and the population living in this complex, one UPP was designated for each favela. I have focused my sample on the UPP Vila Cruzeiro and UPP Parque Proletário. Nonetheless, only one team of the UPP Social covers all four favelas (UPP Social Penha). Likewise, Peace Territories Parque do Alemão is responsible for the entire complex (in addition to other favelas close by).

⁴⁷ See Appendix A for a brief description of each favela.

⁴⁸ While it can be said that my sample size is limited in terms of generalizability and representation of the totality of pacified favelas (Berg & Lune, 2012), as a critical researcher doing a qualitative study, I focused on high quality of descriptions rather than the amount of information.

involved in the development and implementation of three main projects of the policy. The sample of this study consists of twenty-five interviews⁴⁹ with key actors and policy-makers of the UPP, UPP Social, and Peace Territories. To recruit participants, I employed purposive sampling⁵⁰. At the policy-development level, my aim was to interview the creators and coordinators of the three initiatives. The sample selection criterion was the position of the participant within the hierarchy of the public administration (particularly its autonomy and degree of authority in the development of the project). At the implementation level, whenever it was possible⁵¹ I interviewed the local commander of the UPP and the local manager of the field teams of the UPP Social and Peace Territories of the five selected favelas. This multiplicity of accounts from different participants of the same favela has allowed me to draw a better picture of government interventions in each favela as I could contrast the perspectives of different actors on the multiple initiatives to pacify a particular favela.

Respondents were recruited through personal contacts. Specifically, I had a key informant that linked me to several participants, particularly at the development level. From then on, participants were recruited by snowball sampling⁵². An email was sent to their professional account with a letter of invitation⁵³ (Appendix B) to inform them of the goals of the research, the purpose of their interview, the voluntary condition(s) of their participation, and the issue of confidentiality and anonymity.

⁴⁹ Although I have conducted 25 interviews, this study has counted with 27 participants. Per request of the field teams of Peace Territories Santa Marta and Batan, these interviews were conducted with the two members of each team simultaneously (local manager and their assistant).

⁵⁰ Purposive sampling is when the researcher uses their judgment to select the participants of the research (Seale, 2012).

⁵¹ For the favela of Batan, I only interviewed the local managers of Peace Territories and UPP Social since the Commander of the UPP cancelled the interview due to an unforeseen circumstance. On the other hand, Peace Territories did not have a local manager for the favela of Fallet by the time of data collection.

⁵² Snowball sampling is a strategy of recruitment that relies on referrals of other potential candidates by earlier participants of the research (Berg & Lune, 2012). This method was mainly used in this study to recruit participants for the second round of interviews; the gap between the first round and second round provided me the opportunity to contact participants that had been previously mentioned by interviewees.

⁵³ Before sending the letter of invitation to participants, I translated it to Portuguese. The same procedure was adopted for the consent form and the interview guide.

The interviews were done in the city of Rio de Janeiro in two rounds. On my first trip to Rio, I interviewed six participants (two of these interviews were supplemented in a follow-up session during the second round of interviews). The majority of the data (nineteen interviews) was collected in my second visit to the city. All interviews were conducted in Portuguese, the native language of all participants⁵⁴, and were held face-to-face in one session⁵⁵ per interviewee that lasted between one and two hours. Participants were given a choice to select the place where the interview took place; the majority of respondents preferred to be interviewed in their working place at a time of their convenience. I assured that, regardless of their choice, the interview was held in a private space (e.g. private meeting rooms) in order to guarantee their privacy.

Considering that my objective was to gain access to the nuances and latent aspects⁵⁶ of the policy, not available in official documents, I decided to use semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. This allowed key actors and policy-makers to provide “a more considered response”, digressing about their “understandings, experiences, and opinions” (information that might have not been encompassed in questionnaires or structured interviews) (Sealer, 2012, p.209). Prior to the interviews, I designed an interview guide to assist me in posing these open-ended questions, which focused mainly on participants’ perception of the policies to tackle the territorialisation of the drug trade in favelas. Based on my notes from the first round of interviews, I modified the interview guide to better reflect the object of this research. The final version of the interview guide (Appendix C) was employed in the second round of interviews.

⁵⁴ In that way, accounts of participants were not constrained by a language barrier. Further, my identification as an insider (a Brazilian researcher and native speaker of Portuguese) “provides a level of trust and openness in your participants that would likely not have been present otherwise” (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009, p.58). Certainly, language is not the only element relevant to establish trust with participants; other aspects, such as age, wealth, level of education, and gender are also significant. Nonetheless, sharing the same language and nationality of participants was a key factor that granted me more access to them than a foreigner research would have had.

⁵⁵ With the exception of the two participants from the first round of interviews that had a second session to complement their first interview during my second stay in the city.

⁵⁶ As oppose to the manifest content, latent meaning refers to the deepest layer, “the underlying meaning” of a content (Babbie, 2000, p. 310).

c. Participants

The twenty-seven respondents of this study are involved either in the development or in the implementation of the three main initiatives of the pacification of favelas: UPP, UPP Social, and Peace Territories. The final composition of my sample by project was as follows:

c.1. UPP

- One current and one former high-ranked police officers of the Coordination of Pacifying Police
- One policy-maker from the Department of Public Safety of Rio de Janeiro
- Commanders of UPP Santa Marta, UPP Parque Proletário, UPP Rocinha, and UPP Fallet
- Vice-commander of UPP Vila Cruzeiro
- Former commander of UPP Rocinha

c.2. UPP Social

- One policy-maker from the Institute Pereira Passos
- Two high-level employees of the UN-Habitat
- Three former policy-makers that have originally conceived the model of the UPP Social
- Local managers of the field teams of UPP Social Santa Marta, Complexo da Penha, Rocinha, Fallet, and Batan

c.3. Peace Territories

- One policy-maker from the Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights of Rio de Janeiro
- Local managers of the field teams of Peace Territories Santa Marta, Rocinha, Batan, and Complexo do Alemão

IV. Data analysis

After researching different methods, I have elected to use a qualitative thematic analysis as it is the most appropriate technique to answer my research question. Thematic analysis enabled an investigation and analysis of the themes and patterns within the data in regard to my research topic (Attride-Stirling, 2011). The coding operation of thematic analysis with different layers (Boyatzis, 1998) was particularly relevant for this study as it allowed me to address the descriptive and theoretical dimension of this research. Moreover, thematic analysis was chosen since it is a method that can be applied to a range of theoretical and epistemological approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2006); therefore, it was compatible with the critical lens of this research. Finally, I could use the participants' accounts to their full potential taking the deep level of engagement with the material propitiated by thematic analysis (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012).

a. Transcription

The first step of my analysis was to transcribe the interviews in Portuguese in *full verbatim*. I maintained the transcribed data in the original language (Portuguese) to avoid the loss of meaning in the translation process (Nikander, 2008). I personally transcribed the interviews soon after my return from my visits to the city of Rio de Janeiro to capture and preserve all its nuances⁵⁷ (e.g. sounds, tones, pauses, and laughter) that would have been lost if the transcription had been done by a third person (Ferrell, 2004). Moreover, the transcription of the interviews is not a mechanical process; it involves the interpretation of the person that is transcribing the content (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). By transcribing the data myself, I

⁵⁷ To do that, I also made use of my field notes taken soon after I did each interview. The transcription in *full verbatim* (preserving pauses, interjections, sounds) combined with my field notes was fundamental to present a “fuller description of the emotional context and other aspects” of the interviews (Poland, 1995, p.292).

have ensured that these choices reflected the theoretical stances of this study (Jaffe, 2007 as cited in Davidson, 2009).

b. Coding

To conduct my analysis, I was inspired by the Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-stage method. The first phase of familiarizing myself with the data, had already started with the conduction of the interviews, considering that I personally interviewed all of the participants. It was further accomplished as I did the transcription of the data. The operation of hearing the voices of participants repeatedly also reminded me of the details from each of the interviews, which would later help with my analysis. After I finished the transcription of each interview, I also read my entire transcripts once more while hearing the audio-content to correct eventual mistakes. I recorded these "initial ideas" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.88) as a cornerstone to my codes.

Following the transcription, I manually coded the data to generate codes and search for themes⁵⁸. To avoid the loss of meaning during the translation of data, I used the transcripts in the original language, Portuguese, while coding them in English⁵⁹. I initially coded one interview per category⁶⁰ with three layers of analysis⁶¹. In the first layer, I coded all of the content of the interviews in a descriptive manner to preserve all information, without predetermining what was

⁵⁸ A theme speaks for a certain pattern or meaning within the data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

⁵⁹ By that I mean that the extracts of data were in Portuguese, while all the codes (and subsequently themes and sub-themes) were generated in English. I only translated the quotes used in the report of my analysis. I have literally translated these quotes, with few adaptations necessary to preserve the original meaning.

⁶⁰ In this context, categories refer to the initiative that the participant is involved with (UPP, UPP Social or Peace Territories). When familiarizing myself with the data, I had noticed that interviews from the same category shared common patterns. Considering the volume of data, I decided to initially focus on three interviews (one of each category) to generate codes and themes. In that sense, I did a mini-analysis within my analysis as I used these three interviews to verify the validity of the themes within the data set. This way, I reduced the likelihood of using codes and themes that would not work across categories.

⁶¹ To manually code the data, I utilized three columns to indicate the three layers of analysis. I employed a color-coded method to signify similar ideas or patterns of the data. At the end of the process, one color was assigned to each theme to facilitate the visual representation of the data.

relevant in the material. As I moved on with the next layers, I progressively generalized the concepts and abstracted the codes into themes and subthemes. I verified the validity of these themes and sub-themes across these three interviews of different categories. Taking into account the themes that emerged in this “mini-analysis” of a sample of my data set and my level of familiarity with the material, I felt comfortable to skip the first layer of the analysis for the remaining interviews; therefore, I did two layers of coding. During this process, I constantly revised my themes and sub-themes, as I perceived new patterns in the data. After I finished the vertical coding, I reviewed the themes that I had created to ensure their coherence with the coded extracts and their complementarity to the entire data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

I approached the data primarily inductively⁶² and therefore the final themes of my analysis, created through the collapsing of codes, are strongly connected to the data (Patton, 2002). Nonetheless, I recognize that certain themes and subthemes are the result of a deductive process as they reflect my theoretical standpoint and/or are tied to prior literature. To create a visual representation of the data, I have compiled the themes and sub-themes that emerged from the coding process into a spreadsheet (Appendix F).

c. Analysis

Once I finished the coding process, I wrote a memo for each category of interviews with my analytical considerations of the data, particularly noting patterns and similarities across the transcripts (Seale, 2012). In this phase, I also “defined and refined” the themes of my analysis “identifying the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about (as well as the themes overall), and determining what aspect of the data each theme captures” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.92). Thus, each memo presented a coherent narrative of the transcripts for each category. Moreover, I

⁶² Inductive analysis is a method in which the researcher does not attempt to fit the data into pre-existing categories (Braun & Clarke, 2006). For this study, inductive reasoning had the advantage to not restrict my analysis in light of the multiplicity of accounts in the data and to avoid theoretical bias.

analysed how each individual theme fit in with the overall data set, already contrasting different perspectives and accounts of participants. These memos (and the theoretical notes I took) were a starting ground to write the report of my analysis, presented in the following chapters.

V. Ethical considerations

I was granted full ethical clearance from the Research Ethics Board in Brazil (Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa da Secretaria Municipal de Saúde de São Paulo) on October 16, 2013 and from the University of Ottawa's Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board (REB) on October 22, 2012⁶³. However, my ethical concerns were not exhausted there. The ethical clearances from the research boards did not resolve all of the ethical challenges I faced while conducting the research; in fact, my ethical considerations went beyond this formality (Guillemin & Guilan, 2004; Haggerty, 2004).

Even though the population that I have interviewed is not vulnerable and the risks involved in their participation on this study were minimal, the topic of discussion is sensitive and delicate (particularly to participants with divergent opinions from their superiors that could potentially compromise them in their workplace). In this light, prior to each interview, I orally reviewed with interviewees the informed consent form (Appendix D) to ensure that they understood their rights to withdraw from the research at any time and their protection through anonymity and confidentiality. In this opportunity, I asked participants if they consented to the audio recording of the interview; only one participant did not consent with the audio recording⁶⁴. Measures were also taken to protect their confidentiality and anonymity. First, I have altered all names and identifying features with the transcription of the data. Participants were referenced

⁶³ See appendix E – Ethical Approvals

⁶⁴ This participant was not comfortable with the audio recording, but he/she allowed me to take notes of the interview. I compared these notes with the themes that emerged in my analysis of the transcribed data to check for eventual new themes. However, this procedure did not result in the emergence of new categories; it appeared that my analysis had reached data saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

through the position that they occupy within government, considering that this is the most important aspect to situate participants' accounts under this study. However, I have safeguarded their anonymity by describing the positions in a general manner that prevents identification (which was particularly challenging and important for those positions at the development level that are only occupied by one person). Furthermore, I have purposively omitted the dates of the data collection, which has allowed me to refer to participants' positions and locations on the ground level without revealing their identity⁶⁵. I believe my precautions have protected participants from eventual risks due to their involvement in this project.

VI. Reflecting upon my research journey

Reflexive research in qualitative studies has been commonly used to counterbalance the accusations of lack of rigour and control for biases. Considering this, in this section, I will briefly expose how I have reflected upon my choices during the data collection and analysis as a tool to enhance my awareness of this project. Here, I exercise transparency about my choices, my experiences, assumptions, biases, and myself in order to “make visible to the reader the constructed nature of research outcomes” (Ortlipp, 2008, p.695).

During the data collection, I went through an emotional journey to navigate the multiple challenges of an inexperienced researcher. I was constantly concerned of my choices and attitudes and if they would be influencing the participant, jeopardizing access to their thoughts on the issue. For instance, I was troubled to find the right balance to gather relevant material without directing participants in their answers (particularly with those interviewees that were

⁶⁵ This measure was employed for participants at the implementation level (UPP Commanders and local managers of UPP Social and Peace Territories). Due to the high turnover of these positions (several individuals have occupied these places during the timeframe of this research), I was able to maintain the name of the favela without identifying the respondents.

more resistant to discuss issues faced with open-ended questions⁶⁶). Moreover, it was difficult to manage and conceal my own preconceptions and judgements about certain participants, particularly about police officers, which I carried from my own past experience as a criminal lawyer. Furthermore, it was also troubling to suppress reactions to interviewees' comments that revealed perspectives about favelas that I personally disagree with. For example, it was daunting to listen quietly to their moralist rhetoric that justifies social control of marginalized populations. At those times, I had to remind myself of my responsibility as a researcher to publicize these practices, so I could critically analyze this information afterwards. On the other hand, I also experience opposite feelings, particularly when I encountered a participant that looked well intentioned and genuinely believed his/her work was positive for the community. At those moments, I felt guilty about the impact my critical lens could have on my interviewees (Lalor, Begley, & Devane, 2006). I was afraid I could harm those participants in an unforeseen manner. Those feelings of remorse were exacerbated by the recognition that for many of them, their job is their livelihood.

It was particularly challenging to cope with these feelings of confusion since I did not have extensive breaks between my interviews (all my fieldwork was condensed in two visits to Rio de Janeiro that lasted 10 and 15 days, respectively), which could have given me the opportunity to reflect upon the interviews and enhance my practice. In order to navigate these feelings and minimize possible flaws in the data collection, I wrote journals after each day of interviews. The act of writing was a learning process; it was an opportunity to reflect on the interviews and improve my practice for the following day. The journal entries also helped to preserve my feelings and afterthoughts (Hannem, 2008), which assisted me when I was transcribing the data and conducting my analysis.

⁶⁶ Interviews with police officers were especially demanding since it is part of the militaristic culture of the institution to not reveal information unless specifically questioned about it.

My concerns were not only restricted to the data collection, though. In other opportunities, I questioned fundamental choices in regards to this study. I was particularly troubled by the voices that I am indirectly publicizing. These initiatives of pacification affect the population of favelas; therefore, inevitably, interviewees mentioned and made claims about residents of favelas without being offered an opportunity for residents to counter-argue those allegations. Nonetheless, I believe to have minimized this limitation by constantly reminding the reader that my analysis does not necessarily represent an accurate portrayal of the reality of the pacified favelas. Rather, it presents the perspective of key actors and policy-makers that attempt to govern and control those areas. Moreover, my choice to focus on the viewpoints of representatives of the government (a class that has traditionally more power and resources to speak up) is justified by my goal to unveil the oppressive dynamic of neoliberal policies to pacify favelas⁶⁷. To critically analyse those practices of pacification, I first need to collect and publicize the accounts of actors that are developing and implementing the policy.

I also worried about how this project could affect the lives of vulnerable populations (Pittaway, Bartolomei, & Hugman, 2010; Mander, 2010), especially concerning the possible outcomes of this research. I acknowledge my position of privilege and power in the Brazilian society (I never have experienced the difficulties of a life in a favela) from which I criticize pacification forces that might represent an improvement on residents' lives (in contrast to the oppression of drug dealers). These anxieties were eased by a certainty that it is my responsibility to critically examine these initiatives in spite of the eventual benefits of the policy to certain groups in favelas. I reminded myself that I started this study to shed light on the underlying assumptions of the governance of marginalized urban areas with the hope that this will assist in the construction of more appropriate policies to empower those populations (even because the

⁶⁷ Even if I wanted to incorporate favelas residents' perspectives into this study, it was unfeasible to establish trust and recruit participants of this vulnerable group within my limited time in Rio de Janeiro.

living conditions afterwards the pacification may not have gotten significantly better all residents of favelas).

Similarly, throughout the process, I have considered my responsibility as a Brazilian researcher conducting an analysis of Brazil in a Canadian University. I wanted to avoid that my research would reproduce colonial perspectives that impose and judge other cultures through Northern values (Bainton & Crossley, 2010; Tikly & Barrett, 2011). To value and highlight local voices, I paid special attention to incorporate Brazilian literature into this project. Moreover, the portrayals of developing countries can be full of stereotypes. In that sense, Brazil is generally represented as an extremely violent country that employs aggressive measures to fight crime. Those accounts have only increased with the international attention given to the big events that Brazil has hosted and will host (e.g., FIFA World Cup and Olympics Games). Hence, as a Brazilian researcher, I was mindful not to further stigmatize my own country while writing my analysis. On the other hand, although I have taken that into account, I have prioritized my ethical responsibility towards my co-citizens who are the silenced targets of violence.

VII. Evaluation criteria

This study is not concerned with traditional positivistic criteria to assess validity and reliability that are more suitable for quantitative studies (Patton, 2002). Nonetheless, it has been suggested that rigour in qualitative research can be demonstrated by other parameters, such as credibility and trustworthiness⁶⁸ (Golafshani, 2003). As such, this research focused on the richness of descriptions and accounts (Ezzy, 2002) to provide its readers a broad understanding

⁶⁸ I recognize that the issue of trustworthiness of my data can be troubling considering that I have interviewed policy-makers and key actors that might be biased by a political agenda and/or institutional obligations. I was concerned whether respondents would hide their opinions and certain nuances of the policy. Nonetheless, I believe that I reduced this possibility by giving the participants the opportunity to refuse participation in this study and withdraw from the study at any given moment (Shenton, 2004). Moreover, the anonymity and confidentiality of the data also contributes to ensure honesty of participants, as they will not have to deal with any negative repercussion of their account.

of how practices to govern urban marginalized areas unfold within a neoliberal framework. In addition, credibility of this study can be assessed contrasting its findings with previous research findings (Shenton, 2004); many aspects of the policy of pacification presented in this research resonate with findings of the literature. I have also exposed and explained to the reader the choices and limitations of this study, in an attempt to “make the process of data analysis as visible and transparent as possible” (Ortlipp, 2008, p.3). This transparency allows the reader to reconstruct my steps and get a more complete picture of how the knowledge that I am presenting was constructed (Chenail, 1995).

The goal of this study has never been to generalize the practices of pacification or the conditions of living to all pacified favelas. Instead, my aim was to stimulate thinking and social transformation (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) towards how we understand neoliberal practices to govern marginalized urban areas. The investigation of multiple perspectives about the phenomenon accomplished my goal to provide an in-depth account of the nuanced and complex reality of the policy of pacification. Even though my sample does not cover all pacified favelas it is particularly large for a qualitative study within a master’s thesis, accounting for different views of the main actors involved in this process. Furthermore, the data set is not limited to the five pacified favelas chosen for my sample. Participants at the development level commented about the entire process of pacification, often referring to experiences in other favelas. Even at the implementation level, respondents’ accounts referred to a broader sample than the selected favelas, as they brought in their perceptions of their previous experiences in other favelas (all participants have worked in more than one pacified favela). As a result, certain themes and ideas were prevalent in the narrative of participants, suggesting that there are aspects of the policy generalizable to all pacified favelas. For instance, most of the participants share a concern with the underinvestment in the local development of favelas compared to the resources directed to the police component of the policy. Another common aspect in their accounts is the trend of the

UPP to dominate and control the social life of favelas. These themes, among others, do not concern to specific favelas and, therefore, are probably recurrent aspects of the policy, regardless of the site of the implementation.

Also, during my data analysis (particularly while writing the analytical memos), I noticed that the study reached the point of theoretical saturation, in which “no new categories or relevant themes” emerge from the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p.148). The theoretical saturation of my data is a strong indicator that my data sample provides an accurate scenario of the policy of pacification of favelas, although I recognize that this does not ensure other patterns and themes would have not emerged from a larger sample⁶⁹.

A limitation of this study is the lack of voices from community leaders and residents of favelas. I recognize that their accounts could have provided a different perspective about the outcomes and impacts of the initiatives to pacify favelas. Nonetheless, this limitation is minimized since my focus was on the governance of marginalized areas; hence, my choice to interview participants involved with the development and implementation of the public policy.

VIII. Conclusion

Having presented the methodology that has guided this research, the following step is a discussion and analysis of the empirical results that emerged from my data. I divided the analysis in two chapters according to practices and strategies adopted by actors to pacify favelas. They discuss the main backbone elements of the strategy of pacification: civilizing and developing favelas. Civilization refers to a set of practices that seek to socially transform favelas, enhancing the morality of its residents to the “superior” standards of the *asfalto*. The following chapter, urban development, looks at how actions supposedly connected with the institutionalization of

⁶⁹ On that note, I believe that a larger sample would probably present more nuances to the policy and variances of its implementation on the ground level. However, participants of this study had a coherent narrative about the policy, which indicates that the main themes and implications of the policy have been covered by my sample.

government's presence serve neoliberal purposes to transform favelas in profitable sites for the market. There, I also examine a movement of few actors on the ground level that resist to the mainstream approach of civilization and urban development. Instead, these practices prioritize the empowerment and emancipation of the community.

Chapter 5: Civilization

In this chapter, I explore the policing component of the strategy of pacification⁷⁰. In the first section, I expose how the framing of favelas as normless spaces justifies the implementation of this policy. The following sections analyze how the strategy of pacification refers to colonial practices. In the second section, I demonstrate how the state seeks to conquer the territory primarily through force. Then, in the third section, I focus on strategies put in place to civilize favelas such as social cleansing, ordering the space, and the production of a docile and cooperative community.

I. The normless favela

Because pacification has the macro goal to transform behaviours, to enforce rules of coexistence for everyone (...) we try to show that there are rules already established for that. Before, it was done differently because the rules there and the power dominance there were different. It wasn't the building manager who controlled the housing development, it was the drug trafficker. It was not a fine that it was paid in case of disobedience to an order, you were shot - Commander B UPP Rocinha⁷¹.

In this section, I analyze how the framing of favelas as “communities of others” (Bauman, 2001, p.90) justifies the policy of pacification, particularly the actions to militarily conquer the territory and to civilize its residents. In order to frame favelas as distinct sites, interviewees usually highlighted high crime rates within these areas and elements of societal disorganization that would evidence their uncivilized character. This state was allegedly caused by the territorialisation of the drug trade that restricted the presence of law enforcement in those areas and, consequently, left room for chaos and normlessness. Therefore, it becomes evident

⁷⁰ The policy of pacification shares the same name as one of the theories that compose the theoretical framework of this thesis. To avoid confusion and to differentiate between these two, I will use italics when referring to the theory proposed by Rigakos and Neocleous (2011): *pacification*.

⁷¹ When there was more than one participant with the same title, I have used letters to distinguish one from the other (a, b, c, subsequently). For instance, in this case, I have interviewed two persons that have been the Commanders of UPP Rocinha at different moments – Commander A UPP Rocinha and Commander B UPP Rocinha.

how this narrative, reproduced particularly by participants involved with the UPP, sets the stage for the military conquering of the territory as a first step to civilize favelas.

In terms of criminality, favelas are described by the interviewees as safe havens for criminal activity, illustrated by the explicit consumption of drugs and the drug trade as well as the open circulation of heavily armed individuals. Moreover, they also represented favelas as urban battlegrounds due to a “war” between police officers and drug dealers, a portrayal similar to the narrative of the specialized literature (Dowdney, 2004). Participants argued that prior to the pacification, police strategies were based on temporary occupations of favelas to seize guns and drugs, resulting in armed confrontations between dealers and police officers. Additionally, armed encounters between different drug factions to control the territory also contributed to the permanent state of insecurity within favelas.

Another key element of this discourse is the alleged negative impact that violence of favelas has on nearby areas due to the spatial configuration of the city. For instance, constant shootouts also disrupted social life in nearby neighbourhoods (e.g., closure of important routes of the city due to crossfire across favelas). This proximity of violence along with the potential of harm increased the impression of constant danger among Rio’s citizens, escalating fears of crime, even if only rarely someone from the *asfalto* would be directly victimized by armed violence. Some respondents even argue that recently this situation has worsened to the point where the “chaotic” state of favelas is directly affecting higher classes. As a result of the arms race between drug factions and police officers, drug dealers commit profitable crimes in the *asfalto* to afford additional, better weapons. Furthermore, the absence of law enforcement turns favelas into trade points for stolen goods and counterfeit products of robberies practiced in the *asfalto*. Hence, the normlessness of favelas negatively impacted the image of the whole city of Rio de Janeiro that came to be associated with violence and disorder. It generated a perception

that crime was out of control and that something had to be done to contain the danger produced by favelas.

Aside from crime, this narrative also portrays favelas as socially disorganized sites. The *parallel power* disregarded civilized⁷² rules of conduct. For instance, participants refer to the frequency of uncontrolled parties in favelas, in which regulations concerning sound control and space safety were disobeyed. Informality also dominated favelas: drug dealers prevented the formalization of goods and services insofar as they restricted providers to reach those areas. Consequently, drug dealers took upon the provision of services, for a lower cost, in a clandestine way (e.g., electricity, water, cable TV). Despite the fact that this description goes along with the specialized literature (Dowdney, 2004; Leeds, 2007), participants decontextualize these elements to build a narrative that justifies the policy. Whereas social scientists provide a historical justification for the emergence of this *parallel society*, these interviewees emphasize the “backwardness” of the society of favelas as if it were an inherent characteristic of its “uncivilized” inhabitants. In fact, this “othering” process of the inhabitants of favelas, framed as barbarians, is used by participants to build a narrative of urban frontier that “rationalises and legitimates a process of conquest.” (Smith, 1996, p.XXIV) It reproduces the same narrative of “us versus them” that has been widely used by contemporary societies to justify civilizing enterprises as a “forward march of us.” (Gray & Mooney, 2011, p.7)

The framing of drug dealers as oppressors of the local population also reinforces the notion of the civilizing pioneer: the UPP is presented as the saviours of the demised residents of

⁷² For this thesis, I did not use a predefined representation of a civilized society. Rather, I drew from participants’ accounts to unveil their understanding of civilization. Throughout my analysis, I highlighted different elements of their discourse employed to discriminate favelas from the society of *asfalto*, exploring how the society of *asfalto* is deemed more evolved than other societal arrangements of favelas. I recognize that I employed some elements of the theory of civilizing process (Elias, 2000) to describe the rational of the participants compared to the European context of colonialism. However, when discussing the attempts to civilize favelas, my primary focus was to critically analyze the use of the term civilization to assert the superiority of a certain society. In that sense, I echo the work of other critical authors who have denounced this value-laden meaning of civilization.

favelas. In that sense, although participants admitted that some of the arrangements of the parallel power could benefit the local population of favelas, drug dealers are typically depicted as oppressors. Interviewees commented that particularly after the professionalization of the drug trade and the creation of drug factions, the relationship with the community deteriorated:

When there is a wave of criticisms to the violence of police, we forget that on the other side are thugs, not poor boys. They are the guys that behead, rape, kill, assassinate, kidnap, expel people from their home, force residents to hide weapons, kill police officers (...) “oh, the police is too bad”. Ok, wanna go back? Because these guys did microwave⁷³, these guys hung people on a pole, these guys raped the girls (...) the history is really bad mainly when you lose the figure of the friendly thug (...) When you create the factions, this is over. The guy has no relationship with the community, in reality he is the manager of a big and super violent operation and he is going to run over everything he has to, civilians and police officers (...) You have problems in the police but they are way less problematic than the drug traffickers that were once there – Coordinator UPP Social.

Thus, this argument resonates with studies that have demonstrated that the introduction of cocaine in the internal market during the 1980s was the turning point in the relationship between drug dealers and local communities of favelas (Alves & Evanson, 2013; Dowdney, 2004).

Favelas are also constructed as backwards cities by detailed descriptions of the “justice” system implemented by the *parallel power*:

Total institution; dominate the economic, religious, political, and legal life of the community. (...) Rape? How was it solved? There is a case in the Alemão⁷⁴, they rip off the balls of the guy in the middle of the public square (...) the two balls of the guy in the public square. This relates to the legal system, right? It is a way of doing justice. I’m not saying that I agree with that. So, yeah, you have an institution before the UPP that was a total institution that dominates, my friend, all different dimensions of social life – Worker UPP Social Penha.

In this passage, the description of drug dealers’ legal system emphasized elements that resemble punishments of pre-modern era, in which defendants had no legal rights and were submitted to cruel physical punishment. Similarly to pre-modernity, trials in favelas are also subjectively oriented according to the personal stances of the judge (the drug lord, in the case of favelas). For

⁷³ “Microwave” is a method to kill people in which a person is killed alive inside burning tires.

⁷⁴ Alemão refers to the Complex of Alemão, a complex of favelas nearby the Complex of Penha.

example, the culpability of the offender is determined based on the character and morality of the victim; drug dealers only punish aggressors if the battered victim is considered pure and innocent (Coordinator UPP Social).

All of these accounts portraying drug dealers' oppression, violence, and social disorganization provide the moral framework to justify the militarized intervention to regain territorial control of favelas. The pacification is then presented as a tailored solution to these specific characteristics of the drug trade in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro:

It cannot be presented as the solution for all and any community; it is a strong medicine for an almost incurable disease (...) It is a solution for where the public authorities could not go in, where you got out of the car, you were shot, a police officer was dead. Where the politician wanted to walk around in his political campaign and the drug trafficking did not allow him because they had an agreement with another politician. Where a person would go to visit a relative and had to inform to the armed guy who he was and who he was going to visit. So in a scenario with this domination, in which the state has lost its capacity to allow people to enjoy their constitutional rights to come and go, is what should have something similar to the UPP – Policy-maker Department of Public Safety.

Thus, the implementation of the UPP is perceived as the alternative to the ineffective strategy of short-term interventions by police forces that are criticized for causing only a high number of casualties and for creating a permanent state of warfare between police officers and residents of favelas.

Nonetheless, the bottom-line of this discourse is the framing of police forces as the saviours of innocent residents living under the savagery of drug dealers. It replicates the imperialist narrative that justified the military domination of colonies as an instrument to liberate the local population from the oppression of tyrannies. Not surprisingly, some of the elements used to characterize favelas as “barbaric” – resorting to cruel and physical punishment, unrestrained use of violence, absence of the rule of law, among others – resonate with the European portrayals of the uncivilized world during the colonialism. Elias describes how by the

end of the civilizing process⁷⁵, the essence of the European society came to be framed as a badge of their superiority over non-European peoples (Elias, 2000). This understanding continues to justify interventionist practices (van Krieken, 2011); it legitimizes civilizing missions to promote the so-called evolved standards across the world. In the case of favelas, the occupation of the territory by the police is presented as a legitimate tool to replace the *parallel power* by the rule of law and society's social contract. Not surprisingly, participants from the UPP underlined the gratefulness of favelas' residents that were freed from the tyranny of the *parallel power*:

I, the secretary, we listened to so many accounts of people, almost getting in their knees, and thanking us to the point we got emotional (...) "thank you, you returned the peace, my daughter has already been raped, I saw my daughter getting inside the house of the traffickers to spend the night with him and I couldn't do anything about it or she and I would die" (...) And with the police presence this ends. Somebody loses power and who loses it are these criminal groups. – Policy-maker Department of Public Safety.

II. The colonial enterprise – regaining the lost territory

In the previous section, I explained how the construction of favelas as normless territories is decisive to legitimize the policy of pacification. It justifies the "strong remedy" (Policy-maker Department of Public Safety) of the UPP, whose main functions are to stop the oppression of the drug trade and to enable the enlightenment of favelas' residents, confined to decades of darkness and segregation from the "civilized" society of *asfalto*. Thus, the process of pacification of favelas resonates with Bauman's (2001) description of the original nation-state building process. As in those colonial enterprises, military domination is the first element to consolidate the government's power over the territory; it is presented as a necessary condition to free favelas from the physical and cultural constraints, imposed by the *parallel power*, which

⁷⁵ Civilizing process has a technical sense in Elias' theory. Elias uses the term to describe the result of long-term psychosocial changes in European society, which were associated with other processes, such as urbanization, emergence of centralized nation-states, and the development of chains of interdependence (Elias, 2000). The civilizing process led to the increased intensity of self-control in interpersonal relations, exemplified by refined table manners, privatization of personal life and body functions, and greater restraints on impulsive behaviour and the use of violence (Mennel, 1990).

have inhibited the civilizing process to develop in favelas as it unfolded in the *asfalto*. The police “opens a door for the other services” (Vice-commander UPP Vila Cruzeiro), which will educate residents of favelas on the standards of the alleged superior national morality.

Initially, to conquer territorial domination, a special task force of police officers occupy and retake the favela from drug dealers. Then, territorial control is constantly ensured by the local UPP. In regards to the initial occupation of favelas, I found concerns among interviewees in their attempt to distinguish the military takeover of favelas (the first phase of the pacification) from the previous temporary occupation of favelas during the “warfare” approach. They argued that the retaking of favelas by tactic teams is based on a guideline to preserve lives and, precisely, not to transform favelas into battlefields. One example of this thinking is the announcement of the date that a favela will be occupied few days in advance to the actual operation:

Every occupation was conducted brilliantly, even the one of Alemão that was the biggest challenge. (...) Even with the guys escaping with guns, it was done brilliantly without any victims. This is the model of the occupation. (...) one of its main elements is that those without a criminal record do not have to run. The guy leaves behind that history, goes home to have lunch and... So who runs is a criminal and a criminal is being searched right? The guy is already being searched and it does not have to be the Military Police who will look for him. Who looks for criminals are the civil police, right? So these guys are being looked for and slowly are being arrested. And it takes long. So the occupation is extremely necessary. The permanence of the Military Police as a pacification unit is extremely necessary – Coordinator UPP Social.

They highlighted that the focus is to regain the territory; therefore, police officers are less concerned if drug dealers escape or if drugs are not seized. It is said that this strategy of non-confrontation expresses a “message of peace”, symbolizing the paradigm shift on the police approach to favelas. The core of the UPP work is directed to law-abiding citizens, instead of constantly hunting “criminals” (Vice-commander UPP Vila Cruzeiro).

Nonetheless, contradictorily to interviewees’ discourse, the retaking of each favela is based on genuine military operations to invade and dominate a territory through armed power.

First, military rationale guides the planning and implementation of the task. For instance, operators at the planning level use a series of classic martial indicators (e.g., criminality of the favela, estimated number of armed individuals, geography of the territory, and population) to determine technical elements of the operation, such as the necessary number of police officers and armament to be employed. This connection with the military is even more blatant in those favelas where Armed Forces were directly employed in the occupation forces to take down armed dealers. Another evidence of the militarization of these operations is the adoption of martial language⁷⁶ by interviewees. For example, the policy-maker of the Department of Public Safety draws a comparison between a complex of favelas and traditional battlegrounds to exult the success of a task force that took control of this region, evaluating efficiency through military criteria. Other symbolic elements indicate the militarization of these occupations. For instance, after the mission is completed, tactical teams raise the Brazilian and the Military Police's flag to celebrate the regaining of the territory. As in military endeavours, the flag is an important symbol that marks the return of that space to the state. More interestingly, the raising of the Military Police's flag is already an indicator of the type of neoliberal intervention to be imposed in the area. Thereafter, the weakened state controls the territory through its only remaining function: policing.

Even though the actual conquest of the territory is done in the first phase of the pacification, the concern over territorial control extends to the posterior phases of the policy. This concern was more prominent among three commanders of the UPP (Rocinha (A), Parque Proletário, Vila Cruzeiro) that argued that the initial occupation of favelas (done by tactical teams and/or armed forces) was poorly carried out. Previous forces of occupation did not combat crime effectively, leaving behind both weapons hidden in remote areas of the favela and criminals. Consequently, they needed to redo the work within the territory, cleaning it up and

⁷⁶ See Steinert, 2003.

reclaiming it from drug dealers. To do so, commanders of UPP adopt different strategies. As it is done in unstable military areas, constant presence and patrol of armed police officers contribute to the maintenance of the territory:

But it gets difficult for the traffickers because the logic is inverted nowadays: before, you had 30 armed traffickers in one region and 4 police officers in a PCC⁷⁷. Today is the opposite; it is 4 armed guys who want to corner 70 officers serving that region (...) He is totally suffocated (...) So the past logic was totally different, there were 4 DPO⁷⁸, but they stayed quietly in their station, they did not mess with anyone. Why? Outside there were 10 men in the Complexo do Alemão, all with rifles. Then we, as police officers of the DPO, weren't crazy to face all the 10 there. So they sold everything (referring to drugs), in all possible ways, without any fear, without any risk – Vice-Coordinator CPP.

According to the interviewees, the permanent presence of an elevated number of UPP officers (the ratio of police officers per habitant in pacified favelas is disproportionately higher than it is other areas of the city⁷⁹) is the distinguishing factor for the success of the pacification since it prevents the return of drug dealers.

Hence, in pacified favelas, at least initially, the nation-state is “empowered” through force:

The amount of police officers we put in that region is exactly with this objective, right? It is the empowerment of the state (...) because I have to strongly intervene in this region, as if it were an occupation. So the police officer is not cornered and it doesn't continue with the same practice: the police enter, exchange fire and leave, the police enter, exchange fire and leave... So it has to be like a “massification” of the policing to not leave room for a confrontation – Vice-Coordinator CPP.

Here, the intersection of the pacification of favelas with neoliberalism that Bauman (2011) describes is evident; the nation-state compensates its diminished role in economic and social matters by expanding policing activity. In favelas, the state has always had limited presence in all matters. When it steps in to retake the lost territory, it does so through the development of

⁷⁷ PCC was one failed attempt to implement community police units in favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

⁷⁸ DPO was a very similar project to the PCC.

⁷⁹ For instance, the vice-coordinator of the CPP mentioned that while in the neighbourhood of Copacabana (one of the most famous neighbourhoods of Rio) there is 1 police officer per 400 habitants, in the pacified favela adjacent there is 1 per 20 habitants.

policies that rely on force as the primary solution for problems (Giroux, 2004): only the saturation of armed police officers prevents the return of drug dealers, ensuring the “peaceful” state of favelas. A participant even referred to this situation as *paz armada* (armed peace) (Commander A UPP Rocinha), a term that perfectly illustrates the current state of favelas: peace (or security, I could argue) is guaranteed by the militarized efforts of the state. Another strong evidence of this is the participant’s consensus about the impossibility to reduce the number of police officers; in the current state of the favelas, it would bring back the *parallel power*.

The promotion of territorial control based on armed force is a point of criticism by interviewees who work for the UPP Social and the Peace Territories. In their view, it is contradictory to speak of a pacified favela when militarized officers, in full tactical gear, are constantly there to guarantee “peace”. Moreover, they commented that residents of favelas are bothered by this “strong intervention” (Vice-Coordinator UPP) of the state. For instance, the local population feels that they are constantly surveilled, even in the privacy of their houses, by police patrols on the narrow alleys of favelas. Residents are also harassed by the constant “stop and frisk” practices of UPP officers. Considering the distress that the UPP causes, interviewees predicted the unsustainability of these practices for the long term, even if immediately efficient. For example, the worker from the UPP Social Fallet mentioned that either residents will violently oppose to the model of the UPP or drug dealers will find a new way to re-impose territorial control with the support of the local community⁸⁰ (as they get tired of the constant militarized surveillance without improvements of their living conditions).

⁸⁰ This argument of the worker echoes the current context of the policy of pacification in Rio de Janeiro. Since the end of 2013, there was a rise in the reporting of negative events associated with UPPs, such as denunciations of police abuse and misbehaviour (e.g., violent repression of residents protests in favelas, accusations of extrajudicial killing of innocents, torture of residents) (Fantástico, 2013; BandNews, 2014; G1 Rio, 2014b). Simultaneously, shootouts and armed confrontations between UPP officers and drug dealers (attempting to retake the territory) have increased in certain pacified favelas, the majority of which is concentrated in the Northern Zone of the city. For instance, between the Complex of Alemão and the Complex of Penha (favelas side by side), there was at least one shootout per day in July 2014, victimizing police officers and inhabitants of favelas (Martins & Brito, 2014). The lethality of these encounters led to the reoccupation of these favelas by

Therefore, residents of favelas are disproportionately impacted by police practices while residents of other areas of the city are not submitted to such intense and strict control. Nonetheless, the narrative of the pacification undervalues these negative effects of the massive presence of police officers in light of the need to preserve the territory from the *parallel power*. The freedom and rights of residents is relativized considering the need for security (and particularly the need to protect state sovereignty) (Bauman, 2001). It is worth pointing out that security here, as commonly employed in the neoliberal discourse, refers exclusively to property and personal security (Wacquant, 2008a). This limited understanding of security is coherent with a policy that can only address the threat of the *parallel power*. The UPP can only secure the city from the insecurity caused by the *parallel power*; the social and economic insecurity of those living in the marginalized favelas remain untouched.

However, according to commanders of the UPP, mere police presence is not sufficient to contain drug dealers' attempts to retake the lost territory; it is necessary to actively fight crime. Commanders prioritize non-confrontation strategies to tackle the drug trade, such as police intelligence and redistribution of police officers in the territory. However, they often resort to direct-armed encounters with drug dealers to reinstate "peace". The intensity of conflicts varies among pacified favelas, depending upon the extension of the area, the geographic conditions, the number of police officers, and the lifespan of the UPP. In some favelas, the description of these encounters between police officers and drug dealers resembles a war battleground:

*Commander UPP Parque Proletário: How were the drug traffickers doing here?
They were putting residents sitting in front of them...*

*Assistant of Commander: Yeah, in this crossfire (...) there were 4 hours of fire
exchange (...). Multiple places in the favela, anywhere we tried to enter there*

BOPE troops (Parkin, 2014). Consequently, many, including social scientists, affirm that the UPP and the pacification are in a crisis (Araújo, 2014; Kiernan, 2014); it is argued that the model has reached its limits, which would be illustrated by the increase of the homicide rates in the state of Rio de Janeiro after consecutive years of descent (Cano, 2013). Some sociologists support the opinion of the worker from UPP Social Fallet that the crisis of the model was caused precisely due to the imposition of militarized control and the lack of social investment in pacified favelas (Carvalho, 2014).

were shots. There were alleys where we tried to enter, we looked, saw the trafficker with a rifle, pistol, they took the resident and put him sat in front of them... like the resident with his head down, face of panic, like, for God's sake do not shoot or I'll die (...) And we do not have anything else to do, will we kill the resident? We have to let them escape – Commander UPP Parque Proletário.

On the other hand, armed conflicts between the UPP and drug factions is said to generate disappointment from the community since the UPP does not deliver its promise of peace. Nonetheless, commanders relativized these criticisms. They argued that these tactics are necessary to stabilize the area and mainly to demonstrate police efficiency to the local population. In this sense, fighting crime is a strategy to regain the confidence of the community in police, bringing them closer to the UPP:

And to gain trust of the community, you have to start tackling some things that are wrong in the community. Crime? Yes. It's not possible to have a police parallel to a parallel power (...) If I were here since the beginning, it wouldn't be like that. It's not like I'm the best and so, it is that I do my work (...) Who was here did not do the job he had to do. It created those gaps and spaces. But slowly we are progressing, 50 arrested, who is denouncing is the resident, right? It's great – Commander UPP Parque Proletário.

Hence, even though the military occupation of favelas is justified upon the narrative of peace, the core of policing activity still revolves around the notion of confrontation. Success is measured by the ability of the state to forcefully “rescue” the territory from the “savages”. So far, the policy is considered successful. The implementation of the UPP has impacted crime, particularly on the reduction of shootouts and armed conflicts:

It has been three years since no one dies, no one is assassinated in Borel⁸¹. Borel had shootings everyday. Do you know what is that? (...) The guy was taking his son to school, (...) a troop entered the favela shooting and the traffickers responded shooting. Tension. All the time someone dying and all. So, you remove the weapons of a place, remove the armed people, remove rifles, remove pistols, the highest crime, the cancer of Rio de Janeiro that used to be the homicide rates drops where there is UPP – Developer C UPP Social.

The control of the barbaric state of favelas is said to bring immediate, positive results in terms of living conditions within the favelas (not constantly disrupted and alarmed by armed violence)

⁸¹ Borel is a pacified favela close by the high-class neighbourhood of Tijuca, in Rio de Janeiro.

and indirect implications to the city (e.g., public hospitals in the surroundings of favelas receive less victims of gunshots, reduction of the city homicide rate). However, some participants reminded us that pacification is not an equal process:

In São Carlos⁸², for example, I saw criminals still heavily armed, with large weapons in an area supposedly pacified. And I felt a way higher tension due to the presence of police and the fact that the traffickers who remained there continued to be heavily armed (...) and in this area there is still a strong presence of the drug trafficking and there are incursions of the UPP and all. It is really tense, a lot of times we did not go to the territory because of that – Worker UPP Social Fallet.

Some areas still experience high levels of armed violence, due to the confrontation between police officers and drug dealers, closer to those from the previous model of warfare. These favelas are even targets of incursions of elite troops to stabilize areas that are supposedly pacified.

III. Civilizing the savages into docile bodies

I think it brings the idea of war, isn't it? I think it's to treat that as something that needs tutelage, a transition towards peace. I think pacification partially comes from the word peace, from this strong desire of peace from Rio de Janeiro's citizens (...) they speak a lot of peace and enough of violence. But pacification I think is a really strong term that did not translate this idea and speaks more to this idea of battle (...) to the appropriation of those areas back to the city. It is a discourse of conquest. So... whom do you pacify? (...) Are you pacifying the trafficking? Are you pacifying an entire population of a favela? You are saying that everyone there needs to be pacified, you have to civilize. I believe this term brings this civilizing notion. And it's not only of war, but more of as "we are going to act differently here because here is different, because here there aren't rules." I think the term pacification has a little of this discourse of superiority – Participant A UN-Habitat.

Once territorial control is ensured by police forces, different actors implement strategies to reform the living standards of favelas. This process bears resemblance to nation-state building projects: residents' fates are also separated by conformity or annihilation (Bauman, 2001). Militarized interventions to clean up the space seek to eradicate favelas from the contamination

⁸² São Carlos is a complex of favelas nearby the favela of Fallet.

of those irreparable individuals, considered too savage to be converted (usually represented by criminalized individuals and drug dealers). Simultaneously, the pacification reserves an array of militarized and educational projects to assist (or arguably, to force) residents of favelas not involved with criminal behaviour in their adaptation to modern society. These individuals are perceived as guiltless outputs of the isolation of favelas and, consequently, should not be blamed for their uncivilized behaviour. Their conformity to the *status quo* relates to a more ambitious project that aims to tame the uncivilized character of favelas, preventing future insurgency. To do so, law enforcement and constant surveillance from the UPP are complemented by non-force initiatives to “gain their hearts and minds” (Neocleous, 2011). The combination of militarized interventions with other persuasive techniques (e.g., awareness campaigns, capacitation courses, channels of dialogue) targets the disorder of favelas to elevate these sites to the civilized standards of the outside world (represented by the society of the *asfalto*⁸³):

We are going to try to bring a scenario of social life in that community like it happens in any other region of Rio de Janeiro (...) bring this experience of life in citizenship for these people that were often prevented from this opportunity to live their citizenship. Rights and duties. I have rights, but I also have duties. So the goal of pacification is to first bring this withdrawal of the parallel power in communities. Then it's to instil this notion of citizenship in people, rights and duties. – Vice-Coordinator CPP.

As exemplified by this quote, the matter of citizenship, particularly the rights and duties of a citizen, is central in the construction of the barbarism of favelas. Most of the participants mention that prior to the pacification it was not possible to exercise citizenship in favelas. Here, it is necessary to point out that the word *cidadania* (citizenship) has two meanings in Portuguese. As in English, *cidadania* can express the idea of nationality, referring to the citizens of a country. However, it is also commonly employed in a broader sense: practicing citizenship would be directly related to the exercise of rights and duties beyond those given by law. These duties are

⁸³ It is worth noting that some participants do not even present reasons to or indicators of the alleged superiority of the society of *asfalto*. Sharing the thought of European folks in 18th century, they understand the characteristics of *asfalto* “simply as an expression of their own high gifts” (Elias, 2000, p.43).

not limited to the duties of a citizen associated to the country of nationality, such as paying taxes, voting, and defending the country. Rather, citizenship's duties refer to a desirable attitude that citizens must keep towards their co-citizens. This concept evokes "the concept of citizenship as a social notion in which human beings should have rights and responsibilities over each other's welfare." (Liberali, Fuga & Gonçalves, 2009, p.42)

Based on this understanding, I propose that this notion of *cidadania* is similar to the concept of "diffuse civility" as proposed by Fyfe, Bannister, and Kearns (2006). Diffuse civility recognizes that the behaviour of one person can impact on the others: "to be civil in this sense would be to have regard for the effects of our actions on others and to care for the space(s) we share with others." (Fyfe et al., 2006, p.855). The lack of diffuse civility (or *cidadania*) of residents of favelas is constructed by participants by referring to elements that arguably demonstrate their disregard for the others, such as the excessive loud music of parties, the garbage scattered in the streets, and the use of clandestine water connection to the prejudice of other residents. Hence, in this discourse of pacification, the lack of diffuse civility (or the lack of citizenship in this broad meaning) of favelas inhabitants is a fundamental indicator of their barbarism.

This narrative recognizes that the pacification will not end all criminality within the favelas, but it can transform these sites into "normal territories", in which residents will resist to the eventual reinstitution of the *parallel power*:

I think the pacified community is the community in which I don't need to count with the massive presence of police officers for the drug trafficking to not return (...) and it can have regular patrolling of the regional unit. Those people that are there, they will not accept the presence of the drug trafficking (...) So I think that today a pacified community would be one in that level where society, people that are there, they start to collaborate with the state in a way that they no longer accept the presence of criminals, drug traffickers hiding in that region; the community by itself would denounce. It will trust so much the state that it wouldn't be afraid of denouncing someone (...) When the community sees a criminal: "Hey, what are you doing here? No, you no longer belong to our

group.” And the community would expel these people by itself. – Vice Commander UPP Vila Cruzeiro.

The goal is to overcome the backwardness of favelas, bringing them to the same state of self-regulation of “liquid” societies (Bauman, 2001). During this process, the panoptical model of power, based on constant control and surveillance, is progressively replaced by a self-regulated and self-monitored society. The government will then be able to reduce its intervention⁸⁴ since the area has already been cleaned up from the “dangerous others” (Bauman, 2001) and “docile bodies” (Rigakos, 2011) have been shaped. Thus, the same transformation from modernity to liquid modernity is noticeable here (Bauman, 2001): the government’s constant engagement to surveil residents of favelas will no longer be necessary. The insecurities of a “fluid” society will successfully replace the UPP forces in the reproduction of the social order.

a. Cleaning up favelas

Immediately after the retaking of favelas, tactic teams and elite squads occupy the territory to “sweep” (Vice-coordinator CPP) the area from criminals and to seize weapons and drugs. The name of this phase, *varredura* (sweeping), indicates the tone of social cleansing of this initiative. Participants involved with the UPP explain that the *varredura* is necessary to prepare the favela for proximity policing. The vice-coordinator of the CPP argued that after the *varredura*, police officers can overcome their approach to favelas as urban battlegrounds since the “enemies” would have already been deposited in this prior phase. Therefore, this posture can be understood in terms of the punitive shift of the neoliberal state⁸⁵: criminals are treated as outside enemies, who should be killed or driven out. Although these same repressive

⁸⁴ The policy-maker from the Department of Public Safety explains that indicators to re-evaluate police presence on pacified favelas have not been established yet, although possible indicators of the normalization of the area would be timespan of the UPP, community satisfaction with the project, and crime rates. It is interesting that that the participant recognizes the need to develop objective criteria to indicate when it is appropriate to reduce the number of UPP officers in favelas and yet, after six years from the implementation of the first UPP, there is still nothing written about it.

⁸⁵ See Steinert, 2003.

governmental practices can be found throughout history, here, they are inserted in a broader context associated with neoliberalism. In other words, the sweeping rounds promoted by the UPP speak to the neoliberal governance of addressing only the visibility of social problems. In favelas, the government has never fulfilled its mission of social and economic protection. In times of neoliberalism, this is no longer a concern of the state. Instead, the state reasserts its authority through the demonstration of force involved in the driven out of criminals (Wacquant, 2008).

This mentality of cleaning up also guides further interventions when the UPP is already in place. Commanders of the UPP are driven by a motivation to eradicate illicit activities even those that are not criminalized. They believe their mission is to “free the community from all evil” (Commander B UPP Rocinha), such as prostitution, illegal gambling, and clandestine connections of electricity, water and cable. Another priority of the UPP is to eliminate the reminiscent drug trade since drug use is framed as a devastating activity that destroys the lives of addicts and their families. Even though the official narrative of UPP clearly states that this is not one of its goals, a drug-free favela is considered part of their responsibility to free the community from the evil.

This ideology of cleaning up shares theoretical grounds with broken windows theory. Strategies to clean up the area from all sort of incivilities, informality, and disorder are justified upon the understanding that urban disorder and nuisance behaviour generates a spiral of decay that contributes to the domination of favelas by the disorderly and criminal (Berti & Sommers, 2010). In fact, some elements of the commanders’ discourse mirrors the reasoning of broken windows theorists, such as the emphasis in re-establishing order and disciplining favelas as a necessary condition to the development of the neighbourhood:

(...) unless we restored order to American streets, poor people, minorities were suffering. We’d abdicated our responsibility to poor communities. There are areas in many cities in the US in which we literally lost control, where drug

dealers would literally control entire neighbourhoods, and people were living in absolute terror. (Kelling, Coles, & Loader, 1998, p.9)

Interestingly, participants involved with the UPP and advocates of broken windows theory also share a common definition of disorder: “street prostitution, graffiti, aggressive begging, youths hanging out on street corners intimidating elderly people, loud music, drug dealing.” (Kelling et al., 1998, p.8)

Inspired by this rationale, the UPP tactics to tackle these activities leads to a militarized and punitive approach. They coincide with military strategies to ensure territorial control, such as police patrolling and intelligence services. For instance, the drug trade and the consumption of drugs drops after the UPP as users and dealers have to find concealed alternatives to consume and sell drugs. Commanders also alleged that the loss of the territory by drug factions wipes out the financial and social power of drug lords, deglamourizing the activity. Before the pacification, children aspired to become drug dealers due to its social status inside favelas and the financial prospects of the drug trade. After the UPP, this reference disappears. On the contrary, the pacification provides more appropriate role models for children, particularly in the image of police officers⁸⁶. This is another element that indicates participants’ framing of favelas pre-pacification as sites of savages, where the only reference of success comes from the drug lord:

You change the reference of someone that only had the trafficker as a model of success; suddenly he starts to see a new perspective. (...) The kid sees himself as a police officer (...) all police officers smiling. Meaning that we started to revert even that child's representation of the guy that only enters in the community to kill, the perception of a police officer focusing on the citizen and not as an exterminator. This is very important for us (...) And our idea to rescue the flags. It's already in the imagination of the children; “How do you see the pacification?”: an armed police officer raising the Brazilian and the BOPE's flag, the car of BOPE there but the children allowed to play (...) Look how interesting, in the window the mothers, the flag of Brazil, and they say “the pacifying police came to protect us.” We rescued a patriotic symbol that was

⁸⁶ The field worker from the UPP Social Fallet questions the reasonability of police officers as role models. This participant argues that children of favelas are still being raised in an aggressive environment, wherein police officers bear rifles in open sight, side by side with a child playing. In that sense, generations are still being socialized in a violent context.

lost, these kids had an ethos of belonging to the Comando Vermelho or the ADA or the TCP⁸⁷. So we are successfully spreading the message: man, you are the Brazil, you are the Rio de Janeiro. – Policy-maker Department of Public Safety.

This concern of agents of the UPP to avoid the cooptation of new bodies by criminal enterprises, which is listed as the anchoring element that gives sustainability to the policy on the long-term, is also a manifestation of the mentality of social cleansing. The inhibition of future criminal associations prevents movements of insurgency against the nation-state, eventually allowing the reduction of the number of police officers in pacified favelas. It seems that the UPP's main focus is on the prevention of children's involvement with drugs and crime⁸⁸ and, on a lesser scale, the rescue of these young individuals already coopted by the drug trade. To achieve this, they argue that it is necessary to couple police presence on the territory with social and local development of favelas that provide legitimate opportunities for its residents.

However, constant attempts of UPPs to clean up favelas tend to escalate the level of violence in the interactions of police officers with the community. Embedded by the ideology that UPP's mission is to protect favelas, police officers resort to illegal practices in the name of security. For example, workers from UPP Social and Peace Territories report that UPP officers commonly abuse force when approaching suspects, torture residents to achieve valuable information, break in houses without a search warrant, and do not respect basic standards when policing (e.g., male police officers frisk female teenagers). Thus, daily practices of UPP officers are still contaminated by the consequentialist militaristic thinking⁸⁹ that any measure is justifiable to take down the enemy, even if they violate citizens' rights.

⁸⁷ Comando Vermelho, ADA, and TCP are the three main drug factions of Rio de Janeiro.

⁸⁸ This concern is justified upon the interviewees' perception that, after the implementation of the UPP, the co-optation of children by drug factions has increased as a result of the transformation of the drug trade. Under this new low-profile arrangement, drug dealers prefer to employ children in their operations since they face lower criminal sanctions in case they are caught (which is more likely in a pacified favela saturated with police officers). Similarly, it is said that low-profile crimes (e.g., thefts) have also increased in pacified favelas and its surroundings, which would be a result of "orphans of the drug trade" moving on to different criminal activities.

⁸⁹ See Koonings and Kruijt, 2007

Hence, my analysis suggests that in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro broken windows theory has also been misinterpreted to legitimize the “sweeping” technique to the disposing of “dangerous others” (Bauman, 2001). The prescription of targeting signs of disorder behaviour is read as an authorization to get rid of the disordered individuals. The underlying logic is that the mere presence of “savages” can undermine the attempts of the UPP to break with the spiral of decay of favelas and to civilize its “innocent” residents; therefore, it is necessary to remove the “evil” that can corrupt the morality of the community. Thus, I observe here the same perversion of broken windows rationale to zero tolerance policing⁹⁰.

Tactics to clean up also suggest that the pacification is based on short-term interventions that do not attend to the root causes of the problem. Consequently, the strategy needs to be constantly reinforced through consecutive “sweeping” rounds (which appears to be the current focus of the UPP):

How did the Duke of Caxias⁹¹ pacify? They kill the dudes, it was pacified. Pacification is that. It isn't a way to solve conflicts, to manage conflicts (...) It is an understanding that there is an anomie, I don't know, maybe a social anomie, I don't know. But there is a dirty group inside that territory that we are going to take out, we are going to clean that territory and from there on it will start a new era. Then it's impossible, it's not going to be clean because other shit will come up and then how it's going to be? Cleaning up every time? It's not possible to sanitize... this strategy is hygienist, right? And that's it. For a society that wants a policy of social cleansing... – Worker UPP Social Penha.

In spite of the lack of long-term results, the social cleansing of favelas answers society's immediate demand to contain the dangerousness of these areas. It appeals to the public

⁹⁰ Zero tolerance policing (ZTP) is often colluded with broken windows policing. Although the former is certainly inspired by the latter, ZTP is said to be a misinterpretation and deviation of the purposes of broken windows theory. Broken windows theory proposes that police officers should engage more with the community, not only to tackle the visible signs of disorder, but also to prevent criminogenic conditions from developing (Herbert, 2001). ZTP focuses only on the repressive aspect of the theory, ignoring the preventive role of police. It is part of a “law and order” agenda, by which police officers have no discretion when enforcing the rules. On the contrary, ZTP prescribes an aggressive approach to any disorderly behaviour, often leading to police violence and abuse of force towards individuals who embody the anti-social behaviour (Innes, 1999).

⁹¹ Duke of Caxias was an army officer, politician, and monarchist of the past Brazilian monarchy. He commanded loyalty forces that suppressed uprisings against the regime.

perception of favelas as a threat to the prosperity and security of the city. Favelas, or more precisely, the irreparable residents of favelas, become a “military target to be contained, targeted, and addressed in order to protect the property of the normalized and largely white suburban and exurban populations.” (Graham, 2009)

b. Ordering the space

Parallel to cleaning up the territory, there is an immediate concern, especially from those involved with the UPP, to order the normless state of favelas since, in their perception, disorganized sites foster illegal and criminal activities. This is another example of how the UPP parallels with the rationale of broken windows theory. Such as advocated by Wilson and Kelling (1982), the UPP believes it has to respond to signs of disorder, both physical and behavioural, to stop the loop of decay and criminality in favelas. In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the adoption of this thinking led to the implementation of zero tolerance policies and the militarization of social life to achieve security and civilize the unproductive bodies⁹². Commanders of UPP take up the responsibility to control social life within favelas: they dictate rules to impose order and discipline (values that are the cornerstone of what they perceive as a superior civilization). They argue that state presence is very limited in pacified favelas (other than through policing), compelling the UPP to assume the role of other bodies to reform the uncivilized territory.

Thus, to fulfill this governmental void, UPP Commanders act as local administrators, controlling and domineering various aspects of community life. Participants reported commanders’ interference in cultural events, alternative transportation, garbage collection, noise regulation, and essentially any other topic that can potentially disrupt the order of the favela. For instance, in the following quote the commander of Parque Proletário explained that they determined the closing of a new commercial establishment since it could harm the community:

⁹² See Rigakos, 2011.

Because a lot of things have to be moralized to start to give an impression of formalization (...) For example, this week two dudes started to implement a car wash here (...) I ordered the police officers to tell them that it wasn't allowed. It has to stop. The manager (referring to himself) fought, told that it cannot, tell them to stop for the last time (...) I told the guy "look, for you to start to claim your rights you have to fulfill your duties too. Do you have the licence, the registry for the company, do you pay for the electricity, do you pay for water? Really? There are old ladies carrying water in buckets in their heads, man. You're going to put a car wash there? Really? How do you think I can allow this thing?" - Commander UPP Parque Proletário.

This crusade of commanders to transform and regulate the chaotic space is another element of the militarization of social life in pacified favelas. Not only are favelas saturated with police officers, but also UPP Commanders have almost absolute power over the regained territory by a process in which social problems are transformed into security problems that can allegedly threaten residents' lives and undermine territorial control:

He has to have technical information about the situation; if that party is only for entertainment or if the guys will benefit from drug sales or it will bring to that location armed individuals that might disturb the community. So these events as well as the alternative transportation inside the communities, sale of gas cylinders and all, they are services indirectly connected to security. Who is selling the gas? It's anyone from the people or is it a representative of the trafficker that is there selling gas for an additional fee? Otherwise we will have a pacified unit still with old practices (...) symbolically, the trafficker still tries to exercise power inside the community. He says "there are police here, but who controls is me." So certain types of services are interesting that the captain or major supervise to avoid this. The mototáxi⁹³ of that community belongs to the previous trafficker there. Well, the community will say ok, is this pacified or not?" (...) It will continue by the logic of the guy... "how this is pacified if I still have to ask the trafficker to use my motorcycle?" - Vice-Coordinator CPP.

In this passage, the vice-coordinator of the CPP explained that commanders of UPP are instructed to interfere in social life only when it impacts the security of the area. The control of the UPP over social life would be necessary to "deconstruct the empowerment of drug dealers" (Vice-coordinator CPP). However, far from being an exceptional circumstance, almost any

⁹³ Mototáxi is an alternative form of transportation. In essence, it is a motorcycle cab that takes passengers up the hill of favelas for cheap fares.

aspect of the community's social order is said to potentially cause insecurity, from parties to the distribution of goods in the community.

The control of UPP over cultural events provides a closer insight of how the narrative of police officers justifies their interference within the social arena:

our goal is not to end the drug trafficking, but to transform that place in a place of peace, free of crimes, of all forms of violence. And then how are we going to do that if we close our eyes to one of the biggest tools that the trafficking has, which is the baile funk⁹⁴? The resident starts to talk because he has the conviction, more than the police, that the baile belongs to the trafficker. And for him is crystal clear, he says "fuck, how the police do not see that? Intelligence, all this structure, and they don't see that". So it's incoherent for us to work in a place and allow these types of events. When these events are related somehow to the trafficking, I believe it's a matter of responsibility and protection for us to inhibit it. – Commander B UPP Rocinha.

Here, the interviewee conceived *bailes funk*⁹⁵ as an alternative tool for the drug trade to assert power and to disseminate their contaminated morality and, consequently, as a direct impediment to transform favelas in a "place of peace, free of crimes". Concerns over security are also manifested by direct incidents that harm individuals. Commanders automatically deny or suspend authorization for cultural events when a criminal incident is reported within its premises or in the surrounding areas, regardless of the actual responsibility of the organizer. As opposed to the rest of the city, where organizers are only responsible for the safety of attendees within the limits of the space event, in pacified favelas it is the organizers' responsibility to prevent any

⁹⁴ *Bailes funk* refers to traditional parties of the favelas. The lyrics of funk (a music style originated in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro) generally describe the everyday life of favelas. The importance of funk for favelas is comparable to the rap music of the marginalized neighbourhoods of the United States (Sneed, 2008).

⁹⁵ *Bailes funk* are likely one of the best examples that illustrates the militarized control of favelas. The Department of Public Safety initially prohibited all events of this type in pacified favelas. After criticisms and outrage from the residents of favelas, this decision was reviewed. Due to this review, authority was then granted to UPP commanders' to authorize these events. Frequently, the decisions are influenced by the commanders' own values. For instance, Commanders depicted *bailes funk* as the breeding grounds for criminal activity, drugs and alcohol, domestic violence, and teenage pregnancy. Based on this negative representation of *bailes funk* and their own moral standards, requests to hold these events are usually denied. Although *bailes funk* are the main focus of the UPP, other cultural events can receive the same militarized approach if the UPP discovers a connection between those events and the drug trade. For instance, the Commander B of UPP Rocinha stated that other parties were prohibited after residents informed UPP officers that they were allegedly promoted by drug dealers.

criminal activity. One commander even mentioned that this measure compels organizers to work in favour of the UPP, as they will actively convince criminals to not bring weapons and drugs to the area of the event (Commander B UPP Rocinha). Thus, the framing of social problems as security problems provides a moral justification for the militarized control of favelas since the promotion of security always “appears as a greater good.” (Rigakos, 2011, p.59)

Additionally, I noticed that commanders justified their intervention in terms of their responsibility to secure residents’ safety. They argued that events remain under police tutelage to guarantee the well-being of the community since organizers, driven only by profits, do not care about their obligations. This is illustrated by organizers’ neglect to fulfill their legal responsibilities in regards to the safety of attendees (e.g., event space capacity, fire safety regulation) and their disregard about disturbing the peace of the community (e.g., violation of sound limits and security standards, disorder outside bars). Some participants of the UPP even mentioned that law-abiding residents – the “good citizens” (Giroux, 2004) - dislike these events and prefer they not occur. However, residents feel intimidated and are afraid of retaliations if they manifest this preference. Thus, to protect them, commanders argued that they bravely take their voice, even if this brings in accusations of the UPP being authoritarian. In this narrative, control of social life is justified upon an “us versus them” mentality, which opposes the good residents of favelas versus the rowdy ones; the UPP protects “those that are being secured from those that are considered the threats” (Rigakos, 2011, p.59). This narrative also justifies the predominance of the UPP over other bodies; the majority of UPP Commanders interviewed expressly stated that they have the authority to stop an event from happening even if the organizer has all of the proper documentation issued by other agents.

Even participants with moderate positions, who recognized the value of favelas’ culture, still attempt to shape it in terms of society’s parameters of order:

And when I was there, I repeatedly talked with the secretary of culture. Listen, let's invest, build here a big funkódromo⁹⁶ (...) with a soundproofing structure. What this will generate here, organize the music... (...) Because you cannot stop a cultural force through force. It's a cultural manifestation, right? But you will leave that in the improvising, in the informality... if we wanna remove informality because the informality brings quickly criminality. It's the risk of informality turning into criminality. Because the moral sensibility widens, right? (...) So the more formalized it is with transition rules, respecting the cultural differences, historical differences – Former Coordinator CPP.

In this quote, the former coordinator of the CPP recognized the importance of funk as a cultural manifestation of favelas. However, they⁹⁷ believed it is vital to tame the informality and disorder of *bailes funk* that can lead to criminality, a logic that parallels with the broken windows theory. This is another element that demonstrates the colonial underlying logic of the control of police over favelas, based on the superiority of the conquerors lifestyle, and the attempt to enforce these parameters in favelas (Neocleous, 2011).

Furthermore, although control of social life is justified upon the need for safer and more ordered favelas, commanders' discretion on this matter is connected with a patronizing discourse concerning favelas. The authorization for parties is perceived as a charitable act for the community and not as residents' rights. Although the Resolução 013⁹⁸ lists minimum requirements to allow these events, commanders recognized that it is unfeasible to demand from organizers the fulfilment of all of its conditions. They then allow events that are not entirely adequate based on a perception that there are limited options of entertainment in favelas. However, as a favour, the authorization can be withdrawn at any time, without proper

⁹⁶ “Funkódromo” is a word created by the participant that refers to the “sambódromo,” a proper space where the carnival parades in Rio de Janeiro take place. Similarly, funkódromo would be a space controlled by authorities to host funk shows.

⁹⁷ To avoid the identification of the gender of participants, the use of the pronoun in the singular was replaced by the plural of the third person.

⁹⁸ When the ban of *baile funks* was lifted, the Department of Public Safety concomitantly issued a regulation (Resolução 013) that invested UPP commanders with the authority to authorize or prohibit a cultural event in pacified favelas. The Resolução 013 also lists conditions that organizers need to fill in order to receive approval for the event.

justification. I noticed the same patronizing discourse in other cases of Commanders interference within the social arena:

Mototáxi is a legal activity? It's not. Can I end it? If I end it, I would be unfair because it has a social function. The old lady that lives up the hill, she cannot be walking up and down under this sun. (...) So I cannot end it, but I can order it. Look, it has to have a helmet, what is applicable to the asfalto works here as well. If you wanna have the status of citizen, you have to fulfill your duties. So helmet, documentation, licence. Then you stop these dudes, half has license, half doesn't it. It's wrong (...) But it's a cultural thing... as much as you talk, you argue, in their conception everything is right. - Commander UPP Parque Proletário.

For instance, in this quote, the commander of Parque Proletário reasons that, although illegal, the alternative transportation provided by motorcycles has social value because it is the only transport modality that accesses narrow steep alleys of favelas. Thus, they deliberately decided to not enforce the legislation that would require the closing down of these businesses. Instead, they created a set of rules to guide its operation. In this case, the commander went beyond the mere regulation of the business. They took control of the activity, managing it as their own business; they determined how many motorcycles would be allowed to ride in the favela according to their criteria of reasonability. Thus, the Commander's decision implies a perception of the favela either as an inferior site that deserves their compassion (or even pity) or as a space to personally benefit from.

These examples demonstrate that the UPP, in many aspects, acts as the new drug lord, which creates dissatisfaction in the community. Their decisions are not accountable or limited by the law, resembling the behaviour of drug lords. In certain ways, this is an unintended risk of replacing the armed control of drug dealers by the armed control of the state, particularly when this is carried out by a militarized police embedded with authoritarian values. Even worse, UPP participants often disqualified community's complaints, problematizing and hindering any possibility to improve their practices:

You see who complains a lot about parties are the guys that promote and make money out of that (...) So I think it is a lack of cultural and social maturity of the community. It's not prejudice, it's really that. Lack of maturity. There are so many demands, so many problems that only in the last case the guy has to think of the "bread and circuses". (...) First, lets think of what? Jobs, education, sanitation... there isn't none of that and the guy is thinking of a party? – Commander UPP Parque Proletário.

They either disregarded the importance of the complaint, as in the previous quote, or they criminalized voices of resistance. For instance, some commanders mentioned that only individuals involved with crime are bothered by and complain about “stop and frisk” practices. On the contrary, law-abiding citizens allegedly support the police since they are interested in having a safer community.

c. Acceptance of the new social order

Regardless of their position, most interviewees had a perception of the pacification as a long-term process that involves a cultural and societal transformation within the favelas. They shared a common understanding of favelas as “differentiated areas” with “differentiated people” that live in a reality with a different set of rules (Commander B UPP Rocinha). Thus, the enforcement of the same rules that apply to the entire city is presented as one element to integrate favelas to the urban fabric. This component of the pacification is a twofold process: it restores residents’ rights denied by drug dealers (e.g., freedom to come and go, freedom of expression) and it introduces citizenship duties that accompany their insertion to society. Due to this dual goal, the consolidation of the pacification is slow since it requires the education of the favelas’ population on their rights and, mainly, the acceptance of their duties as citizens.

This process is complex and time consuming since the formalization of favelas has downfalls for some residents, which increase the community’s resistance to the pacification. According to some participants, the *parallel system* offers economic and social advantages for the community. For instance, clandestine connections provided cheaper services than regular

companies (e.g., electricity, cable TV, water). Moreover, residents of favelas were accustomed to a “lawless” society, where they had the freedom to do everything without a concern for the others; they did not abide by the duties of citizenship (or of diffuse civility). Thus, participants perceive community’s resistance to the pacification as a natural reaction of a group of residents to the loss of their benefits. I could argue that this phenomenon is exacerbated by the inefficiency of the state in replacing the role of drug lords; the pacification has not yet brought tangible benefits for favelas (e.g., education and health services).

Other participants argued that the gap between the *parallel system* and society’s legal standards is so wide that it requires a long time of adaptation, even when the new rules benefit residents. For instance, the policy-maker from the Department of Public Safety compared the reality of favelas to the fictional history of “The Case of the Speluncean Explorers”. As in this fiction, the particular conditions of favelas created a *parallel system* that inevitably clashes with the “order and progress” of the *asfalto’s* society. For example, with the presence of law enforcement agencies, residents will need to learn how to manage the bureaucracy of the formal legal system:

The solution of the problem before the pacification was either death or beating or expulsion. The solution of the process with the pacification is based in laws. There is a police investigation that turns into a legal process judged by a judge. And this takes time? It does. (...) So these rules that were already established for all the society, with the process of pacification, they started to be effective in communities. And this is a big difference. My husband hit me, I go there to the trafficker, trafficker beats him up, but I continue living with him and now he will walk the line. Now, my husband spanked me, I go to the Military Police, my husband is arrested, I have to learn how to live without my husband, without being battered and I have to be happy this way. – Commander B UPP Rocinha.

In their view, community’s resistance to the pacification will diminish as residents accommodate to society’s rules and standards of living. In light of this patronizing discourse that exculpates residents for their “uncivilized” behaviour, strategies to enlighten the population are

put into practice. One of which is the implementation of meetings to educate residents about basic notions of urbanity, such as noise regulation and garbage disposal:

It's a matter of education, really, people are too ignorant because they did not have opportunities or because they don't know better. (...) The person doesn't have the consciousness that at 10pm is not allowed to make noise, bothering the neighbour (...) So what we did is pacts. "Look, noise in the weekend (...) that's ok, you can hang out and have fun until the early morning, the guy doesn't have to work the following day. But look from Sunday to Thursday it's complicated to play a sound because they will call to complain, they will call the police and will question why we don't do something about it". So it was agreed, it was put in a meeting's minute and it had a very positive result. (...) to tell people that citizenship is not only rights, but also duties. (...) even for the issue of garbage we had to do meetings. Dudes used to throw garbage anywhere... – Commander UPP Parque Proletário.

Although these meetings might have an appearance of a participatory approach as it allows residents to manifest their opinion, UPP Commanders still hold a privileged position of power, evidenced by the imposition of rules that they consider the most appropriate.

Considering these limitations in the dialogue of a militarized force with civilians, the UPP Social mediates this period of transition in which residents of favelas progressively accept society's rules⁹⁹. They bring together actors from public and private bodies that provide services to favelas and enforce rules (e.g., electricity, water, parking enforcement) to discuss these changes. In these conversations, they generally agree upon transition rules and also explain to residents the importance of following the law:

Before, everything was allowed: a guy could park his car anywhere, he could ride without a helmet, he could transport everyone in anyway. Today he cannot. Either you want to be city or you don't. "No, I only want the good part. I want water, electricity, other things to come, but I want to park my car in any street". You cannot, there are rules like there is in any part of the world (...) but you have

⁹⁹ The coordinator of the UPP Social mentioned that the body also encourages conversations about the restrictions imposed by the UPP on pacified favelas. Currently, the UPP Social is part of a working group in place to revise the criteria to authorize events. Their role is to guide the process through their knowledge of the territory and connections with community leaders. For instance, they invited cultural producers of favelas to participate in the discussion since they are directly impacted by the resolution. However, field workers of the UPP Social do not engage in this dialogue with the UPP, which appears to be restricted to the development level. Rather, they comment that the orientation is to avoid any dispute with the UPP for safety reasons. One participant mentioned that the field team received anonymous threats after there was an attempt to mediate a conflict between an event organizer and the UPP.

to take into account the history of that place. So you have 40 years that have worked like that. And then we are going to ignore this past that it was like that and now it will be like this. Because the state wants it. It's not going to work, right? (...) For the police is yes or no. So it's not allowed to park. The police officer goes there and he will fine everyone, he will tow, he will do everything he can possibly do, right? And it is not going to change the mentality of people right? (...) And then we bring people to talk. And then we say no, (...) it's not allowed to park on both sides of the street. So what is the side that cars can be parked, it's the left, it's the right, which one is better? (...) Without the participation of the state in this dialogue, the dialogue is empty (...) on the other hand, without the participation of the community you will hardly solve more complex problems – Coordinator UPP Social.

Here, they shared the same concern to regularize the “chaotic” space of favelas that drives UPP Commanders. However, in the understanding of these actors from the UPP Social, success relies on the internalization of rules by the residents of favelas, as opposed to the UPP that tends to impose the rules. Law enforcement and punishment do not suffice; residents need to internalize and adopt the rules of civilization in their daily life. An example of this thinking was the mobilization of the private sector to establish friendly fares for favelas, at least in the initial period of the pacification, as a response to the rise of the living costs that followed the regularization of services in favelas. Additionally, the UPP Social in partnerships with the electricity provider developed a campaign to re-educate residents about energy consumption and ways to reduce billing costs:

\$750 of electricity. Oh, my bill is an absurd. No, it's not my dear. If I leave the air conditioner on (...) when I leave in the morning and it remains on constantly, my bill will also come \$750. So the Light¹⁰⁰ has to talk, has to teach, has to explain that it's different, that now there is a bill and the quality of the energy is good and that is ecologic and there is a differentiated fare but the guy cannot leave the air conditioner on all the time. And then switch fridge, switch the lamps, switch the wires. So you have to do it differently. But the other side has to listen, it has to want to participate, it has to do it. The majority it's like that, they wanna do differently, wanna change. – Coordinator UPP Social.

In this quote, the coordinator of the UPP Social provides a justification for the behaviour and mentality of residents of favelas aligned with a paternalistic view of favelas. They argue that the

¹⁰⁰ Light is the electricity provider for the city of Rio de Janeiro.

majority of the population wants to conform and are willing to learn how to be a “docile body” (Rigakos, 2011): an exemplary citizen that pays their bills, and abides by the law.

Hence, strategies implemented by these programs to achieve a docile favela (collaborative to the ongoing transformation of the social order) employ both state bureaucracy and police powers to produce a new social order; they act as a pacifying policing system to enforce the morals of “the competitive and consumptive citizen” upon favelas (Kempa, 2011, p.101). The pacification of favelas involves the crushing of opposition (cleaning up) and the “shaping of the behaviour of individuals, groups and classes, and thereby ordering the social relations of power around a particular regime of accumulation.” (Neocleous, 2011, p.201)

In terms of governance of marginalized areas, the policy of pacification can be analyzed as a synthesis between strategies that exclude and militarize urban marginalized areas, pioneered by the United States, and the contemporary civilizing offensives launched in some European cities to “integrate” immigrants into society (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). The exonerating discourse of participants regarding the inhabitants of favelas reproduces the paternalistic posture behind European governmental strategies. In Europe and in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, “a sense of moral outrage and fear informed the actions of élites who tried to educate and discipline the ‘dangerous classes’ with language courses, house visits, education in democracy and a proper living environment.” (Uitermark & Ruyvendak, 2008, p.1490) Although residents of favelas are said to be barbarians and uncivil, the policy seems to be driven by a perception that, with the proper guidance of the society of *asfalto*, the values and civility of *asfalto* can be inculcated upon them. On the other hand, for that minority too savage to be converted, American-style policies of exclusion¹⁰¹ and segregation are replicated via the militarized force of the UPP.

¹⁰¹ See Wacquant, 2001.

d. Catechizing the savages

These actions to produce docile bodies aim to change the morality of favelas, also deemed inferior compared to the civilized *asfalto*. Guided by the notion of the society of *asfalto* as a standard of civilization, participants' goal is to enhance (or replace) the culture of residents of favelas based on the "good values" of the *asfalto*:

It was like a catechizing event, it was a religious event (...) The Major took a priest and an evangelical pastor. (...) So it was part with people from the community and the other wing of chairs had only police officers from the UPP Rocinha (...) They sang the anthem of the Military Police, the anthem of Brazil, Beltrame¹⁰² went too. But they gave a religious focus (...) like if they were giving to the population an opportunity of having a religion. But who said they don't have it? (...) what about the spiritism's population? And the indigenous? And the Muslims? Why they didn't select one of each religion to speak, to give an option for those that doesn't follow one? Not only those fixed options there. So this triggered a lot of criticisms, a lot of people left the event angry. – Worker Peace Territories Rocinha.

For instance, this description of a religious event promoted by the UPP in the favela of Rocinha (with the purpose to encourage residents to adopt a religious faith) has elements that parallel with colonial missions to catechize the local population. Lectures by a priest and a pastor and the singing of the National and Military Police's anthem seek to reinforce the control of the new leaders (Military Police) and to subdue the population to the new order. As in colonial enterprises, religion is used by the conquerors to reduce the resistance of local population. It also justifies the validity of the new morality that is being imposed. Moreover, the event assumed that people from the "uncivilized" territory did not have a religious faith (or at least did not have a religion compatible with the values of the new society), in close similarity with the posture of Portuguese colonizers that did not recognize indigenous beliefs.

Similar initiatives are also put in place to introduce the culture of the *asfalto* to the residents of favelas:

¹⁰² Beltrame is the head of the Department of Public Security for the state of Rio de Janeiro.

We also allowed a music school to work in our headquarters, where it was taught instruments usually not taught in favela, like violin, violoncello, flute, piano, choral, right? Favela likes a lot tambourine, pagode¹⁰³. So this is also important and it makes the residents from there start to interact with people from outside the community. (...) For him to open his mind, the dream of the guy to be not only a street-sweeper, you know? I don't know, to be a lawyer... – Commander B UPP Rocinha.

These strategies are based on stereotypical presentations of residents of favelas as uneducated and alienated individuals. The underlying logic is the inferiority of the “culture of ghettos” (Vice-Coordinator CPP); thus, the necessity to offer alternatives to this population to dream bigger, breaking with the limitations of their confinement. Hence, we see how the society of *asfalto* is framed as the standard of progress; it “has come to encompass all and any types of ‘progress’, material and moral.” (van Krieken, 2011, p.27) This use of the term “civilized” gives rise to a “feeling of superiority, of moral censoriousness over those thought to belong in the ‘uncivilized’ world.” (Pratt, 2011, p.220) In that sense, it speaks to the current usage of the word “civilization” proclaimed by the United States, which also serves to legitimize their interventionist foreign and domestic policies¹⁰⁴.

One participant even criticized the hypocrisy of the discourse that, hiding under the value of multiculturalism, continues to marginalize individuals of favelas (Commander UPP Fallet). In their perception, the so-called culture of favela (represented by soccer, funk, and kites) is the result of the absence of other opportunities. Their goal is to expose children to different activities (e.g. classical music, martial arts) to expand their knowledge and improve their cultural tastes up to society’s parameters, which will also give them more chances to succeed in life. Also, the interviews confirmed other studies that described children as the main targets of these initiatives since they are perceived as the “least contaminated” group in a favela (Cano, 2012); therefore, they have better chances of being converted.

¹⁰³ “Pagode” is a musical rhythm similar to samba.

¹⁰⁴ See van Krieken, 2011 and Bowden, 2004.

According to interviewees, it is necessary to provide children with tools and opportunities to empower them to resist the temptation of crime. Even though the drug trade is less profitable in pacified favelas than it is in other favelas, it is still an alternative for impoverished (and usually low-skilled) youth that cannot find a job in the formal market. Participants claimed that social interventions - mainly understood as after-school projects that offer recreational activities, tutoring, sports, and musical classes – provide a safe environment for children, reverting the scenario of violent socialization. Rather than growing up to be a criminal, they will likely become respectable adults and law-abiding citizens. On this point, there is a general complaint of interviewees, particularly those involved with the UPP, about government delay to socially develop favelas and to provide opportunities for residents to overcome their financial strain:

But it continues far short in the social issue. Because it has arrived the armed portion, it has entered the intervention, it has arrived the stabilization of the place, but if does not come education, the possibility of that child to develop some occupation, something like that, it is very difficult. – Commander A UPP Rocinha.

These participants call for training programs, educational activities, and job opportunities to assist them in their mission to permanently transform favelas. In light of government's absence, the UPPs consistently implemented social projects¹⁰⁵, either developed by police officers or in partnership with other actors¹⁰⁶. These projects are deemed to have the potential to

¹⁰⁵ Initiatives cover a variety of activities and are mainly offered to children (e.g. tutoring, sports, music, martial arts, after-school, DARE in public schools). In the favela of Vila Cruzeiro and Parque Proletário, police officers also take children to visit museums and host children's events, such as Christmas celebrations with the presence of Santa Claus. Examples of activities that target different groups are aquafit classes for the elderly and physiotherapy for injured residents.

¹⁰⁶ Private partners and NGO's are constantly mobilized by the UPP to assist them in their mission to rescue children and youth. For instance, participants constantly refer to the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN in the Portuguese acronym) as an important ally for the pacification of favelas. The commander of Santa Marta explains that soon after the implementation of the UPP, the FIRJAN launched projects in the pacified favelas (e.g. professional training, sports classes). It is the so-called "Sistema S", a set of actions designed to fulfill the social responsibility of companies, which targets underdeveloped areas. Further, private partners financially sponsor the activities promoted by the UPP.

prevent criminality and to be another reinforcing strategy to transform the community's constructed perception of "police officers as enemies." (Commander B UPP Rocinha)

d. Building a cooperative community

The UPP also uses proximity policing as a strategy to produce cooperative bodies. Although the definition of proximity policing (and its differences from community policing) varies according to the participant interviewed, most of them agreed that this approach to policing involves the adoption of a proactive behaviour from the UPP to overcome residents' resistance to the police. This proactive behaviour of UPP officers is necessary to revert the mutual animosity¹⁰⁷ between police officers and residents of favelas in order to gain their trust and bring them to work pro-UPP¹⁰⁸. The consolidation of an open channel with the community is associated with more efficiency to tackle crime. For instance, residents can provide information and tips about criminal activity (e.g. points of drugs sale, hideout places of drugs and weapons). Commanders even evaluated the quality of their relationship with the community by indicators that reveal this focus on fighting crime (e.g., increase of anonymous tips). In their view, the success of the pacification relies on the strength of this partnership of the UPP with the community:

To show people that the UPP does not belong to the governor, or to the secretary, it's not mine; the UPP belongs to the community. If the UPP succeeds it's because the community is working together. If it's going poorly it's because there is something wrong in this dialogue between the community and the Military Police, right? So we rely essentially in the community. If the community is supporting, working together with us, we can do a good job. – Commander UPP Parque Proletário.

¹⁰⁷ Participants mentioned that, prior to the pacification, the only interaction police officers had with residents of favelas was in the combative settings of the warfare, which created a gap between the police and the community.

¹⁰⁸ Commanders argued that residents of favelas indirectly support (or at least cover up for) drug dealers due to the previous policy of confrontation, by which police officers were perceived as enemies, and the benefits of the drug trade to certain groups of favelas. Thus, their strategies seek to overcome this culture of favelas to protect criminals.

In this sense, the quote from the commander of Parque Proletário indicates that the responsibility for the success of the policy is shared with the community. This responsabilization of the community is a prevalent aspect of neoliberal policies.

Due to the lack of guidelines for the implementation of the UPP, initiatives to accomplish with proximity policing differ in each favela. They can be divided into two main areas: changes in policing behaviour and implementation of activities not connected with policing. Within the policing activity, commanders of UPP have created initiatives to encourage residents' feedback in an attempt to demonstrate that the "new" police are willing to hear their voices (e.g., regular meetings, follow-up calls and/or visits after a police occurrence). Another aspect of proximity policing is to revisit the police's attitude towards the community, treating residents with respect. Some units also develop educational projects to inform the population about their rights and police activities; information is said to be a valuable tool to reduce community's resistance to police practices and prevent abuse of police officers.

The other set of strategies to bring residents closer to the UPP involves social activities, not concerned with traditional policing activity. For instance, social projects offered by UPP officers provide an opportunity for a friendly interaction with residents, "humanizing" police officers (Commander B UPP Rocinha). Thus, these social initiatives of the UPP have a double goal; they inspire young residents to follow a law-abiding path and they change the image of the police. The vice-coordinator of the CPP argued that, even though these activities are not perceived as policing activities, they are as efficient in preventing crime and consolidating territorial control as traditional policing. Even participants from other projects perceived these strategies as valuable tools to strengthen police ties with the community:

When we got to the UPP Social, the secretary used to say to the command of the UPP: "now we are going to do the work that you are doing, you are only going to do the police work. The judo, karate, the class of guitar, the music school, whatever else, you leave it up to us." The commander didn't like it. (...) So I think this type of activity speaks more about the necessity of the police to be

entrenched and that its work is recognized not only as the annoying work of repression, but also as an activity that the police officer can donate something cool. – Developer C UPP Social.

Attempts of the UPP to manage the social life of favelas and to mediate the dialogue of residents with governments are also interpreted as tools to overcome residents' resistance to the UPP:

The police officer verifies some opportunities to get closer to the population like strategies of prevention and interaction with the community; he starts to act in other fields and sometimes this can even be perceived as the guy that dominates all the areas. But it's not. In reality he is there occupying a space of a daycare that doesn't exist, a sports center that doesn't exist. (...) Sometimes this is even taken as he is the owner of the hill, but studies demonstrate that the resident needs a reference as well. So if the police officer doesn't pay attention to the constant approaching of the residents, of the community, he ends up being pressured all the time to take decisions that will make him be perceived as the new sheriff of the area. (...) It's a very complex phenomenon because some approaches that are done to reach the residents creates an image that the guy wants to establish a police state. And this is not what we truly want. - Policy-maker Department of Public Safety.

Therefore, the militarization of social life and the invasion of armed power into the social sphere are justified upon community policing (or proximity policing, a proactive version of community policing).

Nonetheless, although the absolute majority of the interviewees from the UPP reproduced these civilizing practices in their daily activities, I have to nuance that there was one outlier that resisted delivering a distinct policing treatment in favelas. According to the Commander of the UPP Fallet, proximity policing relates to the behaviour of police officers during their everyday policing activity (e.g., avoid the use of excessive force, treating residents with respect and cordiality during police occurrences) to foster a good relationship with residents of favelas. They emphasized that UPP officers should treat residents of favelas as any other citizens, overcoming the idea of a partitioned city in terms of policing attitude:

Why it has to be different the treatment of the resident of favela? (...) Why be different the treatment of this resident from a resident of Copacabana¹⁰⁹? Do we see a resident of Copacabana (...) being put against the wall? No. And he could be carrying a gun? Yes! And he could be with drugs? Yes! There is this possibility. Here too. But why are we going to treat it differently? – Commander UPP Fallet.

Therefore, in the perspective of this commander, not even the need to maintain territorial control and fight crime would be an appropriate justification for violent and repressive behaviour of police officers. These same goals can be accomplished through intelligence work and tactical operations, without the need for open armed confrontations. Moreover, they argued that proximity policing does not give a free hand for UPP's interference in the social arena; it does not bring the expected positive results and it only creates more resistance to the UPP. Likewise, this commander also opposed to the UPP's control of social life, limiting their interference to the legal responsibility assigned to the police. However, although there are sparse examples of police officers committed to the ideal of a democratic and accountable police, it is also evident that the institutional resistance to the model is prevalent. For instance, the Commander of UPP Fallet complained that police officers resist following the guideline of serving citizens with respect for human rights. Embedded by the militaristic ideology of the police institution, they still frame residents of favelas as enemies to be tackled down.

IV. Conclusion

Hence, the experience of UPP dialogues with international experiences, particularly in terms of the perversion of the initial model of proximity policing into a militarized approach to favelas. In other countries, the movement towards community policing also, paradoxically, stimulated the growth of Paramilitary Police Units (PPUs). In both stances, militarized units are portrayed as community policing units as they arguably target community disorder and

¹⁰⁹ Copacabana is one of the iconic touristic neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro.

proactively re-establish the order. Community policing was developed as a new paradigm to promote democratic police forces, as it requires the engagement of police officers with the community (Kraska, 2007). According to the doctrine, police officers should have a proactive behaviour to prevent criminality and take the lead of crime solving, with the participation of the community. However, in practice, police departments across United States interpreted this shift towards proactive policing as an authorization for the use of PPUs and aggressive police patrols in inner cities to promote healthier communities (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997). Hence, PPUs and UPPs are employed to suppress criminality from communities and are seen as an appropriate means to accomplish communitarian goals (Herzog, 2001).

In the context of Brazil this process of perversion of proximity policing ideals is further facilitated by the history of the Military Police. This institution shares the militarized structure¹¹⁰ of the Armed Forces and is embedded by militaristic ideology, which does not create the right environment for a democratic and accountable police unit:

it was taught that a good police officer (...) was the one that killed (...) And our society has always said that, right? Good criminal is a dead criminal. Our training up to today hasn't changed ok? (...) a representative of human rights questioned me. He said: "Are you trained to kill or to stop the aggression? (...) you are trained to kill. (...) How is your target in the police academy? Have you ever trained to shoot in the leg or arm?" Our targets don't even have arms and legs. Our targets only have chest and head. We are trained to kill, until now, we are trained to kill. – Commander UPP Fallet.

Here, a commander of UPP admitted that the corporation still trains its officers to kill criminals, which is connected with the militaristic perception of criminals as enemies. As a result, the

¹¹⁰ The Military Police of Rio de Janeiro shares the militarized structure of European "gendarmeries", characterized by hierarchical structure and connection with Army Forces (Hill and Beger, 2009, p.26; Lutterbeck, 2004). Although the Military Police is not directly subordinated to the authority of the Ministry of defense (as "gendarmeries" usually are), the institution is a reserve and ancillary force of the Brazilian Army. As such, the war mentality of destroying the enemy has pervaded police forces in Brazil (Alves and Evanson, 2013, p.181-183). Moreover, the entry system is divided in lower ranks and higher ranks (with the same hierarchical classification as the Brazilian Army). Those in lower ranks must obey the orders of their superiors, having no autonomy or decision power in their work. The UPP has this same centralized model, which is listed as one of the challenges to stimulate community policing among the troops since police officers do not have the capacity to make decisions by themselves (Rodrigues et al., 2012, p.11).

values of peacekeeping policing (i.e., negotiation, mediation, and rational control of use of force) that serve as a guideline for the UPP are associated with weakness (Steinert, 2003). Considering this, participants comment that UPP officers are discriminated and mocked by their own peers who disregard them as “second-class policing” (Cano, 2012). This internal resistance to the UPP can trigger misbehaviour by UPP officers in an attempt to overcompensate and assert their masculine “worthiness.”

In light of this ideology of the Military Police, many participants commented that it is unrealistic to expect changes in the behaviour of police officers without structurally reforming the institution, inasmuch as the government tries to foster a new paradigm of policing:

It's very hard, right? I think to achieve proximity you have to have a big investment in the training of the Military Police. And you don't have it. (...) you have an investment in the structural part of the UPPs, so, they have very good cars, right? But the primordial question (...) of training that will take years and it has to have a huge investment that I don't know if it's really happening. I believe it isn't, but I might be wrong. So it's very complicated to think that the same political training of the police from before... not only connected to violence that we are aware of like a stray bullet, which is already really serious. But to violence from a perverse training of a national military policing. So training to torture, all that. So it's really complicated to think of a policy of pacification like it were with the very own torturers. – Worker B Peace Territories Santa Marta.

This account exemplifies the complexity of the challenges at stake in favelas. Police officers that receive militarized training in which they are “trained to kill” the enemies of the state (represented by drug dealers and, quite often, mistaken by any marginalized group in favelas) are expected to behave exemplarily and engage in a friendly and trustful relationship with residents. Moreover, the history of the Military Police in Brazil as an institution that has been shaped by the long decades of the Military Dictatorship further problematizes the overcoming of this “warrior ideal¹¹¹.” Police officers are not accountable, which reflect in their disregard for the law and human rights. Added to society’s pressure over police officers to save them from the evil, this arrangement commonly leads to misbehaviour of police officers that still

¹¹¹ See Hill & Beger, 2009.

perceive favelas as urban battlegrounds¹¹². Guided by this thinking, UPP officers recur to any artifice to secure favelas from the enemies. Participants, mainly from other projects, denounced numerous episodes of UPP officers' misconduct, which range from normalized police brutality in encounters with residents to more serious offenses, such as homicides of residents, torture of suspects, and involvement with corruption. Needless to say, these episodes undermine police's credibility in the community. Nonetheless, some interviewees claimed that the mere presence of the police, as problematic as it is, restores residents' access to law enforcement and the justice system. According to them, even if the police abuse its power as drug dealers typically do, police officers can be (at least) officially held accountable as an institution of the state, whereas drug dealers are not bound by the law.

¹¹² Even when UPP commanders accept the new methodology of the police and truly embody this understanding that police officers are there to serve the community, it is still ambitious to expect that the entire troop will embrace the model. Police officers already enter the institution with "warrior mentality" that is spread by media and society. Moreover, some participants mentioned that the pressure to expand the process of pacification, with the installation of new units, undermines the quality of the admission training. Without proper training, police officers are more likely to engage in misbehaviour. To overcome these barriers, commanders used different strategies: they highlight that it is fundamental to punish improper behaviour (e.g. corruption and abuse of force), which is used as a general deterrence factor. Strategies of positive reinforcement are also put in place, such as constant dialogue with low-ranked officers, spread of good practices, and acknowledgement of good work. For instance, UPP officers receive a day off after positive feedback of the population. On the policy-level, the employment of newly recruited officers and the special training given to UPP officers is said to foster proximity policing.

Chapter 6: Urban development

In the previous chapter, I examined how the state reclaims favelas through armed intervention and imposes a new set of “superior and legitimate” social rules to civilize the untamed local population. In this chapter, I will analyze the second backbone element of the pacification: urban development (urban upgrading and socio-economic development of favelas). I will expose how these social strategies to develop favelas become an instrument to consolidate state ownership and to produce a social order favourable to capitalism.

In the official narrative of the pacification, initiatives to promote the urban development of favelas should follow the militarized interventions to control the territory; there is a notion of continuity from territorial control to socio-economic development, “security preceding opportunities” (Developer A UPP Social). According to participants, the military occupation of the territory is a premise to any other governmental intervention since the *parallel power* limited the presence of public and private actors in those areas. For instance, governmental institutions, private companies, and NGOs had to receive prior authorization and were subject to drug dealers’ conditions to be able to offer their services in favelas. Further, the permanent state of “warfare” constantly disrupted basic services. For example, public schools in favelas did not meet the standard curriculum due to closures in light of shootouts that threatened the students’ safety. Once territorial control is ensured, policies to enhance living conditions and to integrate favelas into the rest of the city should be implemented since they allegedly consolidate territorial control in the long term. Thus, participants argue that, “it was impossible to move further the agenda of reduction of poverty, of inequality, of rearrangement of social organization under an ethos or a pattern of violence that was experienced.” (Developer A UPP Social) In that sense, the policy of pacification dialogues with other interventions to govern marginalized areas. It has a weeding component to clean up the territory from criminals and a seeding element that seeks to

restore and revitalize these areas in order to create a vibrant and economic sustainable community, which would prevent further crime from occurring (Miller, 2001).

The initial design of this model to develop favelas followed a welfare agenda: it was based on a hands-on approach by the government to improve the living conditions of favelas. It involved actions focusing on urban upgrading and the social-economic development of favelas. For instance, one of the goals was to offer to favelas all services already delivered in formal neighbourhoods, with the same standards of quality of the *asfalto*. However, in practice, it has taken a neoliberal contour due to practical challenges faced by actors implementing these initiatives (e.g., lack of governmental investments on social interventions, absence of necessary social actors, an overall disregard to favelas) and the overall neoliberal context of the country (despite the shift on the federal government to welfare policies in the past decade). Particularly, interviewees highlighted lack of resources as the biggest obstacle for their work.

Although in the official discourse, policing and local development are presented as equally important, the only service of the state that has received solid investment is policing. Given the incapacity (or the unwillingness) of the state to implement initiatives to develop favelas, social actors have turned to the private sector. As a result, state actors only facilitate and mediate private interventions in favelas. On the other hand, neither police is delivered in favelas with the same standards of the *asfalto* even with all the financial and political support that it has achieved. For one, the institution continues to treat favelas as distinct territories insofar as it has a particular model to police favelas, the UPPs that have blatant civilizing goals. Secondly, in favelas, police take over functions of social actors due to the abandonment of the state in their role to socially develop the areas. The entanglement of these two elements indicates a scenario of neoliberal governance in favelas, where the left hand of the state (social interventions) is replaced by the right hand (policing) (Wacquant, 2001).

Considering this perspective, in the first section of this chapter I will explore in detail how the initial promise of a welfare state translates into actions that seek to consolidate territorial control and state sovereignty over favelas. In the second section, I move into the analysis of the shift of the welfarist approach to the neoliberal governance of favelas. In this section, I will also demonstrate how both elements of the pacification (civilization and local development) work in tandem to create the necessary conditions for a thriving and secure capitalist society. To conclude the chapter, I look at a resistance movement to the neoliberal model to develop favelas in the last section. There, I expose the fragility of this movement, which confirms the preponderance of capitalist goals in the policy of pacification.

I. Welfare agenda: consolidating state sovereignty

a. The failure of a hands-on approach to urban development

Since the implementation of the UPP, pacified favelas have become a priority in the governmental agenda. The removal of the *parallel power* opened a window of opportunity for policy-makers to implement policies aiming the development of favelas and the reduction of inequality gaps within the city. These strategies aimed to compensate the relative “absence” of the government during the decades of domination by the *parallel power*. Participants pondered that the favelas were never completely free of the government. For instance, certain services were always offered in these areas (e.g., garbage collection, public education, community health clinics). However, the quality of these services was compromised due to the restriction to access the territory imposed by drug dealers as well as to the fragmentation of social policies. According to interviewees, most of the problems identified in favelas are the result of the lack of a coordinated plan to promote their development. Policies were based on the agenda of each silo, without an effective communication with other bodies, creating inefficiencies and overlaps

among initiatives. To address this issue, along with the traditional interventions of other public actors¹¹³, a governance model was proposed to integrate social actions in pacified favelas: the UPP Social. Following this, the Peace Territories was also created with similar goals.

The creator of the UPP Social explained that the conquest of the territory opened a window of opportunity to modify the governmental approach to social policies. In that sense, the development of the UPP Social was the result of a political decision to promote a structural reform on the *modus operandi* of social policies instead of to replicate the previous model based on palliative measures. Considering this, the UPP Social was conceptualized as a coordination centre to organize the provision of services in favelas, and match the supply (actions of multiple bodies) to the demand (needs of communities) through a process of “dialogue with results” (Developer A UPP Social). The design of the project also foresaw a diagnosis of each favela prior to any intervention to avoid the concentration of services in certain favelas (or even in certain areas intra-favela) and the overlapping of actions.

To accomplish these tasks, field teams gathered information through observations and conversations with residents that were systematized in mapping software. This data was then used to mobilize the responsible public actors in developing a solution for the identified problems. During this process, liaison officers and public actors also negotiated on possible indicators of progress and established deadlines to address these gaps. The establishment of targets and a timeframe for the implementation of the solution was a key aspect to recover residents’ trust in government, shaken by a history of political promises that were never fulfilled. Thus, this model was built around the notion that the upgrading of favelas’ living conditions required a heavy state to invest and promote the development of these areas. Furthermore, the

¹¹³ Most public bodies continue to intervene in favelas as they have always done, through top-down and fragmented initiatives, guided by silos agendas and political interests.

enhancement of favelas was also in need of a strong manager to coordinate all actions of the public administration.

However, in practice, the UPP Social and Peace Territories have failed in their attempt to move the agenda of social policies forward regarding favelas. Participants credit this failure to the political prioritization of the law enforcement component of the pacification:

The UPP costs \$250 million dollars per year¹¹⁴. In the past year the resources of this department added to the social work of PAC¹¹⁵ and to the IPP¹¹⁶ (...) didn't even reach \$50 million. It probably has gotten to \$25 million. So when it is said that the social side has to arrive, the money also has to arrive, the resources also have to arrive. Otherwise it is inevitable that with \$250 million dollars, 8,000 police officers, an enormous insertion and support from the media and society (which is really good), the UPP ends up being the protagonists in issues that they claim they don't wanna be. (...) Because this is not a good path. First, because it's not their attribution. Second because this can be a seed of a militia or of a business dominion by an actor of the government. (...) The head of the department of Public Safety, correctly, with the support of the governor, has absolute control of the structure of the security of the state of Rio de Janeiro, even more in the city of Rio de Janeiro. This doesn't exist in the social area – Coordinator Peace Territories.

Compared to the UPP, investments on the development of favelas are slow and insufficient; when services arrive, they do not consider the needs of the community. For instance, the workers from the Peace Territories Batan described the set of social interventions that follow the implementation of the UPP as *pacote UPP* (package UPP). The *pacote UPP* is a set of “one-size-fits-all” initiatives that target education and health assistance, illustrated by the implementation of a community health clinic and the offer of a vocational training program¹¹⁷ in almost all of the pacified favelas. However, these interventions do not attend to the demands of each favela and barely impact the lives of the respective residents. For instance, these free vocational courses and skills training are disconnected from the interests of the community and worse, have low

¹¹⁴ In light of the expansion of UPPs, this cost was estimated in \$360 million for 2014 (Bastos, 2011).

¹¹⁵ PAC is a federal project that finances projects to enhance the urban infrastructure of cities.

¹¹⁶ Instituto Pereira Passos, where the UPP Social is located.

¹¹⁷ They specifically refer to the Sistema S, a set of educational and vocational courses implemented by the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro, described in the previous chapter.

recognition from the market. Residents often receive a degree that is not valued by companies and, therefore, does not assist them in their search for job opportunities. As a result, residents might even get involved in these projects at the beginning for lack of a better alternative. However, they soon realize that the initiative does not fit their needs and consequently, withdraw participation. Thus, it is evident that the *pacote UPP* does not include initiatives that may really trigger the development of favelas in light of residents' needs.

Furthermore, besides financial resources, policing has also received more political support from the government. For instance, policy-makers of the Department of Public Safety have remained in power throughout the policy. In contrast, those actors involved in bodies that deliver social services are constantly being replaced. The head of the Department of Public Safety was nominated at the beginning of the mandate of the current party in power (in 2007); therefore, he has coordinated the policy of public safety and the strategy of pacification since its implementation. Comparatively, the Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights, where the UPP Social was originally conceived, is constantly negotiated between political parties and, consequently, struggles with alteration of direction since the head of the Department has changed at least five times since 2007).

At the micro-level, the UPP Social and the Peace Territories have not received the necessary political support to empower these bodies, illustrated by the constant reformulations in these projects¹¹⁸. Without the full support of the head of the Executive, they are weakened by the micro-politics of the administration. They are not able to overcome the public bureaucracy's resistance to change, particularly from those agents politically interested in the continuity of vicious practices, such as the compartmentalization of government in silos, the politicization of

¹¹⁸ For instance, even though the UPP Social is a relatively recent project, it is constantly under reformulation. In 2013, the UPP Social was almost dissolved after an internal political dispute regarding its usefulness. Although the mayor decided for the continuity of the project, it was again restructured. This instability of the project is another indicator of the lack of care for the social development of pacified favelas. As opposed to the UPP, programs in the social arena are constantly negotiated based on political arrangements.

social policy¹¹⁹, and clientelism¹²⁰. On the other hand, interviewees currently at the coordination level of the UPP Social presented a different explanation. They argued that the UPP Social, in its original design to be a “local manager”¹²¹ (Coordinator UPP Social) of each favela, was set up for failure due to the unfeasibility to fulfil such role.

Initially the UPP Social had a plan to be the big public manager of these territories that was, we say here with tranquility, kind of megalomaniac. So it would be the program that managed the service of all the service providers in these territories. And then you have some issues in relation to that. First problem is that it is politically unfeasible, right? You won't be able to take the “power” that a public actor, a head of a department, the president of a provider has over the service in an important territory. So you cannot get there “no, here it's not the John that controls, who controls everything is the manager, who orders things is the director of the UPP Social”. Secondly, when you do that you are changing the perspective that you really want to insert the favela inside the city (...) if there is a programmed logistic by the service provider for the whole city, why there in the favela has to be different? – Coordinator UPP Social.

In light of this internal resistance, these bodies were re-structured. The UPP Social, particularly, has shifted from its initial role as a coordination centre for social policies to an information center, assisting public and private entities in the construction of more efficient projects through the refined knowledge field teams have of each territory. This shift is already an indicator of how the agenda of welfare state has been weakened in favelas. From the ideal of a powerful manager that would control and ensure the government's intervention in favelas, the

¹¹⁹ It is a common practice to distribute departments to different parties in exchange for their political support. This not only results in political appropriation of the departments' agenda, but also in political disputes within the same administration (which hinders dialogue across sectors).

¹²⁰ Clientelism is a political system marked by the exchange of goods and services for political support. It usually involves an asymmetric relationship between patrons and clients based on the logic of “take there, give here” (Graham, 1990). Clientelism has dominated public interventions in favelas of Rio de Janeiro, particularly after the rising of the *parallel power*. Drug dealers, community leaders, other local actors, and political personalities have benefited from this relationship.

¹²¹ Other participants involved with the implementation of the UPP Social since its beginning disagree with this description. They argue that there was no imposition of demands; the UPP Social has always negotiated with public actors and all decisions involved the dialogue with sectors.

UPP Social has become a mere information channel¹²²; other sectors are neither subordinated to the UPP Social, nor do they have control over their agenda.

The guy will gain intelligence that he doesn't have. And perhaps he doesn't have to have, right? The capacity of these services providers to recognize the new territory is very low because this actor already has a big amount of methodological service to be done (...) So to clean the favela, now he has to recognize the history, he has to go there check if the truck fits, if it doesn't fit, if it is a smaller truck, if it's not, what's the volume of garbage, if it has a dumpcart, if it doesn't, where the guys throw the trash, etc. And then the program focuses a lot in this aspect and turns to the government and says, "look, the history of the Santa Marta is this one. So the volume of garbage is approximately this, (...) it doesn't have streets for cars, and all that". Let's discuss with the service provider and with the population what's the best way to collect this garbage (...) and this is a mediation of dialogue that historically has never been done, right? – Coordinator UPP Social.

Hence, the two main bodies that are responsible for the social aspect of the pacification do not directly bring any concrete improvement to favelas; participants from the UPP Social and the Peace Territories emphasized that they do not deliver services. They only act as a bridge to bring the government (which also includes private providers of basic services) closer to the necessities of favelas, considering that this dialogue has historically being disrupted by the drug trade.

The current approach of the UPP Social and the Peace Territories also reinforces the notion of inferiority of the dominated territories. Government assumed an authority position over the local population; field workers from the UPP Social and the Peace Territories are presented as experts to identify the needs of the community. For instance, during these negotiations to match the supply and demand, workers filter community's demands according to their perception of the reasonability of the claim. The creator of the UPP Social provided an example of this: the majority of residents of pacified favelas request the implementation of a community college in

¹²² While the UPP Social has a more sophisticated system to mediate the relation government/favela, the Peace Territories also act as a channel of dialogue. Field teams of the Peace Territories have elaborated reports with the complaints of residents about services provision and sent it to the proper bodies. They have also invited representatives of these companies to attend meetings with the community and directly debate with residents. Since the Peace Territories is a project from the state level, it mainly deals with services provided by companies within the state administration (e.g. sanitation), whereas the UPP Social gives priority to municipal services.

the area. However, teams commonly diagnose that the supply of community colleges is already adequate and covers the area of favelas while the real gap is the insufficiency of public transportation to these colleges. In this case, the initial wish of the community is ignored and the UPP Social focuses on enhancing public transportation. Another example of how the community's voice is not valued is the abandonment of the previous methodology of "qualified hearing", in which the diagnosis of the problems of the community was built through consultation with the residents. Now, field workers identify the demands of favelas exclusively, based on their perception of the urgent matters. The coordinator of the UPP Social explained that this shift was necessary since the inquiring of residents created expectations about an upcoming solution for the problems reported, which would not always happen. Interviewees also argued that only field workers, with their expertise, could determine priority areas among the multitude of problems in favelas, considering budgetary limitations to fix all issues. Allegedly, they also have a comprehensive view of the favela, avoiding the concentration of programs in more visible areas that could increase inequality intra-favela. Thus, we can see how this discourse assumes that social workers have a better knowledge of the reality of favelas than the "inferior" and "ignorant" local population.

Furthermore, although the UPP Social is said to promote a participatory approach to public policies, I noticed that for the majority of cases, the inclusion of residents in the development of initiatives played more of an instrumental purpose (to guarantee the efficiency of the measure) than a concern to build horizontal policies:

There is a problem in Borel regarding the oldest light poles. What's the problem? The poles are falling down. It doesn't fall out of nowhere. Either it hasn't been properly installed or you have a nest of wires in the pole, people putting wires all over. There are poles that are hung in the wires; it's the opposite way around. They put so many wires there that the pole is loose, hung by the wire. This is a problem for everyone. It's not a problem of the Riolutz¹²³. Yeah, for Riolutz to solve it, it goes there, takes all the wires out, puts a new pole

¹²³ Riolutz is the company responsible for the public lighting of Rio de Janeiro.

and installs only its own wire. Because all the others are clandestine connections. (...) So this is a problem. (...) And then we start to unfold the collective demand. To call Riolut, to call the people and to say, we have to raise awareness that we have a problem, that it's not possible to hang a bunch of wires that people will eventually die electrocuted and then we build a solution together – Coordinator UPP Social.

For example, in this case, residents were involved in the process to replace the utility poles only because part of the problem's solution involved their education about the dangers of clandestine connections. Thus, residents are mere passive objects of the policy and not active subjects of it, which suggests their inferiority; therefore, they have to passively accept what is decided by the *asfalto*. This quote is also an indicator of the neoliberal practice of community's responsabilization; the Coordinator of UPP Social blames residents of favelas for the precarious state of the utility poles.

b. Consolidating state control via social initiatives

The work of the UPP Social and the Peace Territories that is still guided by a welfare agenda refers to the goal of consolidating state sovereignty over the territory. The rationale of this logic is that the institutionalization of government and the formalization of relationships will progressively replace the armed control of the territory by the massive amount of police officers. Participants argued that social and urban interventions would restore the rights and dignity of favelas' residents, preventing further violence and the re-territorialisation of the drug trade. In that sense, socio-economic development is presented as a necessary condition to sustain the policy of pacification on the long term and on a macro-scale since it would enable the expansion of the program to other favelas of Rio de Janeiro (with the reallocation of troops):

First, the project of pacification is thought to enter and leave. Even because the police has to pacify another favela. (...) A promise was made that it was going to be pacified to become a different thing. The resident doesn't want it to not be favela, but he wants the favela to be different. (...) the guy wants water, electricity, he wants to be able to get home. (...) he doesn't want to be frisked everyday. He is frisked everyday because there are 750 police officers there. If

there were 50, he wouldn't be. Because he no longer needs to be. So he wants it to be socially viable. (...) if remains only in the sphere of policing it's impossible, first because is financially impossible since it costs a lot. Second because you cannot expand, you cannot have more, it's in its limits. Maré¹²⁴ needs 1400 officers to be pacified. There aren't. (...) It's set up for failure. But I think there is a perspective that it's not supposed to be this way. I think we have to step up, we have to take to bring to favelas the rest of things. So the police can leave and perhaps it will remain a bigger troop than in the formal city, but that doesn't reach absurd numbers, right? – Coordinator UPP Social.

According to this thought, local administration is more important than mere policing on the long haul; it is the tool to construct a socio-political environment favourable to the current order in place. It speaks to previous attempts to pacify colonies that have prioritized the reconstruction of the land (by the hands of the administrator) as soon as territorial control is established (Neocleous, 2011). The underlying logic is that only the application of brute force breeds a feeling of resentment that threatens territorial control (Neocleous, 2011). Instead, local development is key to restore security in the area and, mainly, to construct “politico-economic programs” favourable to the legitimate regime (Komer, 1970).

The mapping of favelas, promoted by the UPP Social and Peace Territories, is another example of how the welfare approach to favelas contributed to consolidate state's control over the territory. This mapping of favelas¹²⁵ is justified upon the need to produce qualified knowledge about the areas as a first step to enhance the provision of services:

All the garbage points from the Complexo da Penha are here, we georeferenced them together with the manager of COMLURB¹²⁶. And then what's the answer in relation to that? Fuck, information is fundamental to the guy. If the guy doesn't have that georeferenced, how he will do to plan this business? He does in his head, “ah, I know that the point is there, anyway”. Or it's way better for him to

¹²⁴ Maré is one the largest complex of favelas of Rio de Janeiro, with 129,770 inhabitants and 41,579 houses. By the time of this interview, the complex had not yet been pacified. In March 2014, the area was occupied by security forces of Rio de Janeiro to prepare the complex for the implementation of the UPP. It is currently occupied by 2,500 soldiers of the Army and Navy until UPPs are installed in the area.

¹²⁵ It involves the collection of information about objective conditions (e.g. territorial extension, number of houses, population, services provision, level of urbanization, infrastructure) and fluid and interpersonal dynamics (e.g. local leaders, proactive institutions) of pacified favelas, which are then converted into maps to assist local actors. Within the UPP Social, this profile of each favela is systematized and georeferenced into Mapa Rápido Participativo (Rapid Participatory Meeting – MRP).

¹²⁶ COMLURB is the company responsible for garbage collection in the city of Rio de Janeiro.

get a thing in his hands and look “well, here there is a point... this point is complicated, blahblahblah, blahblahblah” – Worker UPP Social Penha.

Although some local actors have used these maps to enhance the provision of services in specific favelas, workers from these programs commented that the demands identified in this process were mostly ignored by higher-levels of the administration. In practice, the mapping of favelas mainly serves the colonial purpose to officially incorporate favelas to the territory of the state. As opposed to favelas in other cities of Brazil, favelas of Rio literally constituted a separated territory from the urban fabric; these areas were not part of the map of the city. To counter that, the UPP Social developed a project to assign postal codes to some pacified favelas, validating these addresses, which were then covered by mail services. In other favelas, the formalization of the addresses went beyond this step; houses were regularized and the property was certified by a deed, followed by the proper taxation. Thus, these examples confirm that the mapping of favelas is another tool to reaffirm nation-state sovereignty over those areas. It is one of the most basic and straightforward methods for the state to reclaim a lost territory, as it formally labels favelas as areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro.

More broadly, the operation of the UPP Social and the Peace Territories also relates to the consolidation of territorial control. Their mapping and actions relates more to the consolidation of territorial control than to a deep commitment to enhance state capacity in favelas. They serve state and private actors with qualified data that may guide their interventions in the territory:

I think under the mandate of Ricardo Henriques¹²⁷ the program was more guided by values and principles than by results. Eduarda¹²⁸ comes from the world of business, it's a person from the finances, so she came here wanting results in a program that is very hard to measure results (...) Eduarda says something here all the time that would astonish a lot of people, that “the client is not the residents, it's the mayor.” Why? Because UPP Social is there to produce

¹²⁷ Ricardo Henriques is one of the original developers of the UPP Social and the previous president of the Institute Pereira Passos.

¹²⁸ Eduarda is the current president of the Institute Pereira Passos.

information for the municipality, in order that the municipality enhances the conditions of its services in favelas. So this is the truth, at the end of the day, it's not the resident that will directly see the results of our program, but it's from this process within the municipality that results will come – Participant A UN-Habitat.

Their role to articulate policies across government silos has been neutralized by the resistance of other bodies. Therefore, this function is now limited to collection of information and minimum integration of actors on the local level. This shift only reinforces the notion that social investment has not followed the pacification of favelas. As a result, residents are frustrated and disappointed since they do not perceive any major changes out of UPP Social and Peace Territories' actions.

At the same time, government and companies still focus their attention on areas with more social capital, undermining the goal of pacification to narrow the gap between favelas and other regions of the city. For example, the worker of the UPP Social Penha established a partnership with the local manager of the garbage collection company and community leaders to clean up the streets and public areas of the favela. Although the project succeeded in maintaining a clean space, the project was suspended in January (touristic high season) since the street-sweepers were reallocated to touristic beaches. As a consequence of the understaffing, garbage returned to accumulating in the alleys of the favela. Worse than the disregard with the condition of favelas is the blaming of residents for a problem caused by the negligence of the government. In a vicious cycle, residents of favelas are deemed as filthy individuals, as evidenced by the garbage in the streets, reaffirming the perception that they are unworthy of high-quality services. We see here an example of the neoliberal practice of emphasizing individual responsibility to blame those impacted by broader social issues for their own dismiss (Harvey, 2005).

Along with that, services continue to be delivered in favelas with low standards based on the notion that “anything is good” (Participant A UN-Habitat) for these areas. For instance, the proposed model of the UPP Social to solve the lack of public lighting in favelas involved the determination of priority areas to be illuminated due to the impossibility of delivering the service

to the entire favela, whereas, in the *asfalto*, all streets are covered by public lighting. Thus, public actors and services providers continue to perceive residents of favelas as second-class citizens:

Do you know why? Because is favela, fuck it. (...) If there is open sewage leaking in Leblon¹²⁹ even the journalist of the Rede Globo¹³⁰ goes there (...) Here in Providência (a pacified favela) there was a permanent waterfall of sewage, they never manage to fix it. (...) Sewage! Pouring in the middle of the main street. (...) it was so disappointing the arrival of services from the market and actions from civil society (...) I thought that it was going to have a flood of investments. Favelas like Babilônia, Chapéu-Mangueira, (...) it's pretty, it's cool, it's safe, it's calm, residents like it. There is everything to do. Why favela continues to be favela, almost as favela as before? (...) The opinions of city's residents about favela continues the same, favela continues to be a very stigmatized place even though it's no longer the place of shootouts (...) I think the prejudices and stereotypes are way stronger than what I imagined them to be. I thought the stereotypes were almost entirely a result of the presence of weapons and the fear of the trafficker (...) the barrier is more solid than what I had imagined. And this barrier is caused for being a favela, it's not because there is a trafficker neither because it was a dangerous place (...) so I think the guy from Light says "it's favela, they are dirty and all" (...) the guy that delivers a fridge says "no, I'm not gonna deliver the fridge inside favela. The resident that comes to pick it up here" The guy from mail services says "no, I continue delivering in the residents' association. I'm not gonna have the work to go from house to house because, in the end, this is a favela". – Developer C UPP Social.

Hence, the pacification did not overcome the state of marginalization and stigmatization of favelas. This cannot be considered a flaw in its implementation; rather, it relates to the underlying logic of the policy. It is paradoxical to expect that this policy integrates favelas to the *asfalto* when it precisely "draws a barrier between the city and a territory where you walk in the street, which is in practice an alley of your own home, and there is a police officer with a rifle." (Participant A UN-Habitat)

Nonetheless, without the integration of favelas to the rest of the city, the contention barrier to violence, created by the UPP, may be brought down at any moment:

If the UPP leaves there, how long do you think it takes for the trafficking to return? Some people say that they bump in each other in the stairs. So there isn't

¹²⁹ One of the most expensive neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro.

¹³⁰ Rede Globo is the biggest national newscast TV of Brazil.

sustainability, it is based in the ostensive presence of police with a number of officers unsustainable to think the UPP for the whole city (...) The UPP is not a program possible for the whole city because it demands a number of police officers that does not fit the budget. And basically you need this number of officers because you are not capable of structuring a policy of local shared responsibility, of effective public policy, of integration favela with asfalto. The military logic still distinguishes Santa Marta from Botafogo, Fallet from Rio Cumprido, Prazeres from Santa Tereza (...) Meaning, if you have to search for your dignity, your citizenship through weapons (...) or if you can find your dignity by public policies, by rights. There isn't this second alternative. (...) The policy of UPPs and other policies need to amplify the sources by which you can find your respect through public policies and not necessarily by your auto-sufficiency. – Developer B UPP Social.

As it is exemplified by the previous quote, some participants shared this understanding that the militarization of favelas only functions as a *band-aid* solution; it does not address the root causes of the emergence of the *parallel power*, which are connected with a “social apartheid” of favelas (Worker B Peace Territories Santa Marta). Besides the slowness to put in place strategies that can effectively develop favelas, participants were surprised that certain policies have still not been created to address drawbacks of the pacification. For instance, many commented about the need for a project to engage the “orphans of the drug trade”¹³¹ in licit activities. Otherwise, they allegedly switch to other crimes, which is said to be associated with the increase of thefts and robberies in the surrounding areas of favelas. Additionally, another problem is the negative impact on the local economy of the withdrawal of drug dealers, who were the main consumers of licit local businesses.

In a macro-level, the implementation of the UPP without social policies to address root causes of criminality can push violence to the peripheries of the city. Some participants commented that drug lords sought asylum in non-pacified favelas, which now suffer with the same effects of the territorialisation of the drug trade. This collateral damage tends to be disregarded since the displacement of criminality to distant areas does not affect privileged

¹³¹ A term coined to designate individuals (usually teenagers and youngsters) that were previously involved with minor tasks of the drug trade and, with the strains put in place on the trade by the pacification, are currently wandering around favelas without an occupation.

classes. Hence, in the governance of favelas of Rio de Janeiro, we see the same neoliberal process by which disempowered nation-states transform social issues into security problems (Bauman, 2011).

c. “Welfare assistance” by police officers

The inaction of social actors also leaves room for the intervention of police officers on the social arena with the excuse that they are only filling a governmental void. Participants involved with the UPP argued that they are forced to replace the roles of social actors due to the absence of representatives of the appropriate governmental bodies. They have explicitly complained about the inefficiency of the UPP Social to embody this function of a representative of the government in favelas. Consequently, residents seek the UPP for varied demands (particularly because the UPP is the only institution present on a 24/7 scale):

The goal of the Military Police there, of the Captain isn't to be a mayor inside the community neither a regional administrator. He is there to bring security, but a lot of times there is so many gaps that the Major, Captain of the UPP end up taking charge of other things because “I'm there, there is nothing, there is no one to offer me something, I'll go to the Captain.” You go to the Captain. She goes to the Captain. Knock, Knock. “Captain, it's lacking food in the daycare.” And what I have to do with that? But there is no one there, no representatives, it's lacking food in the school. “Isn't it possible for you to help me with this? Can you do a request, can you call someone?” (...) it ends up in the Captain and major, for them to absorb the demands, due to the absence of channels that the person should have accessed to complain about the non provision of a service – Vice-Coordinator CPP.

The UPP also takes over functions of the government to enhance the infrastructure of favelas. Commanders of the UPP reported community problems to the responsible bodies and/or invite representatives to community meetings held by the UPP. On some occasions, proactive commanders have directly coordinated actions of public and private actors to ameliorate conditions of the favelas. For instance, the Commander of UPP Parque Proletário has established

a partnership with the company responsible for the garbage collection to improve the cleanliness of the favela via awareness campaigns and the employment of volunteers.

The interference of the UPP in the social arena is another element that demonstrates the abandonment of the initial agenda of the welfare state. The implementation of the UPP was also presented as an effort to equate governmental services in favelas to the ones offered in other areas of the city. In that sense, the UPP was conceived to be a tool to deliver police, as a service offered by the state such as education and public health, to favelas.

It's a model to retake the territory and to deliver to this sector of the population a good that the rest of the city already has, which is policing. That if has an armed guy walking around my building, what do I do? I call the 911, the police officer that will say "no, sir, you cannot walk around here in these alleys. Where is your gun permission? Why are you doing that?" He's going to be arrested, to have his gun taken out, etc. Why in the favela they cannot have this? So, what is going on with the UPPs is the delivery of a service of security, as it is demanded in the field of health and education (...) that for decades favela did not have it. The rest of the city had, but favela didn't. (...) policing is a public good that is expensive. So where are there more police? In the richest areas of the city, where there is more capital and social capital. So I don't think that the UPP is repression and all... (...) basically the idea was to isolate favelas. Partitioned city, inside there we are going to give a different treatment from what we have. No, I don't want this police here in my street, but in the favela it's ok. The guys had license to kill.
– Developer C UPP Social.

In theory, this discourse integrates a welfare state since policing is believed to be a right of citizens, as any other basic service that should be provided by government. Nonetheless, in practice, the pacification has not achieved this goal of bringing the same policing as provided in other areas of the city. On one hand, police continues to treat favelas as inferior sites, demonstrated in the repressive and civilizing approach that I have explained in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the police assume the role of social actors. They are involved with social issues that they do not deal with in the *asfalto* (where the police limits its functions to policing):

The culture of policing with UPPs continues to be a model for favelas. (...) it continues to be a model that gives to the police officer bigger responsibilities and

tasks compared to the police officer here in Glória¹³², right? Meaning, the police officer that is here in Glória has means and resources available that reduces his responsibilities. The police officer that is there in the hill of Zinco, in São Carlos, in Fallet/Fogueteiro, he has way less means and, therefore, his answer, what it is expected from him is way more – Developer B UPP Social.

Rather than promoting a welfare state, these two dimensions of the UPP reinforce neoliberal governance, in which the state abdicates control over any issue other than security (Wacquant, 2001). Thereafter, the police become the main embodiment of the state (Bauman, 2001).

Further, the justification for the interference of the UPP reaffirms the thinking of police as saviours of residents of favelas. This is a recurrent rhetoric of armed forces: hiding under the pretence of a failed state (in this case, represented by the absence of agencies to organize social life), armed forces take political power as a mission to save the country (Kruijt, 2002). In a vicious cycle, the more the UPP takes on these tasks, the more the community relies on armed forces to solve their immediate issues:

The guys closed the street because the community didn't have electricity. And then the Captain went there to talk with them and he managed to take them out of the street. The Captain got in the police car, went to Triagem¹³³ to bring the engineer of the Light because they had already called Light. (...) The community is entirely without electricity, the guys are closing the street, depredating buses and all. And then the engineer went inside the police car, with grudge, to Tijuca, he got the missing component piece and he managed to bring electricity back to half of the hill (...) The Captain had to fill in the role of the president of the resident's association, of the representative of the Light. Why? (...) if he didn't had that posture, more violence could have come up due to the absence of electricity in the community (...) So quite often the managers that are in the UPP are not usurping other actors' functions. It's really the absence of bodies to do the necessary. Why Light's engineer didn't get the missing component and went there? The Captain had to go there as a police officer to talk to him and make him find the component somewhere. (...) So the engineer hadn't done anything, "no, I don't have the component, I'm in the favela, in the hill..." I don't know what was his guiding thought, but he didn't go there to fix the shitty electricity – Vice-Coordinator CPP.

Another problem of this model is the reproduction of the same clientelist logic that has dominated public interventions in favelas. The interference of the UPP solves only the immediate

¹³² Glória is an upper middle-class neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro.

¹³³ Triagem is a neighbourhood in the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro.

and superficial problems of favelas. The solution is individualized and relies on the networking and the authority of the commander that reaches individuals who can address the urgent matter. Alternatively, as in the above example, they use their power derived from their position as the commander of the UPP to compel the agent(s) to act. However, this approach neither institutionalizes public responses to the broader problems of favelas nor does it change the mentality of service providers that continue to perceive favelas as undeserving of attention. Thus, the broader picture of marginalization and sub development remains untouched.

II. The pacification of favelas in service of the capital

a. Favela S.A. – Selling a neoliberal idea of local development

Alongside the weakening of the UPP Social and the Peace Territories as mobilizing bodies to promote a welfare state, the work of the UPP Social was also reoriented towards the economic development of favelas. This movement was a response to their incapacity to promote changes within the public administration:

We accumulated a lot of information, but it reached a point that we had a lot of things and we couldn't develop anything. And then you mainly tension the relationship in the field, in the communities. Because you are there collecting data, trying to understand that reality and you're inside the municipality and you don't succeed in bringing any (...) or only few concrete actions to try to fix the problem that you've identified. (...) And then there was also a change of the program's orientation, the presidency of the IPP changed and we started to focus, obviously, in an area in which there is also a big demand. In local development, in the sense of income generation, productive inclusion, job creation (...) And then local development from the economic perspective, I believe it's moving towards this. – Worker UPP Social Fallet.

To achieve the economic inclusion of favelas, the UPP Social has shifted its focus from the public administration to the private sector considering the “trend” (Participant B UN-Habitat) to

invest in pacified favelas¹³⁴. The removal of the *parallel power* opened up favelas for the intervention of private companies, attracted by this new consumer market. For instance, the pacification has directly benefitted service providers who could regularize clandestine connections offered by drug dealers for a lower fee (e.g., water, electricity, and cable TV). As soon as the favelas are pacified, the access to these clandestine services is interrupted. Compelled by the profits of the regularization of services, participants mentioned that representatives of these providers eagerly follow the first tactic teams to occupy the favelas:

When the BOPE entered there, in the first incursion, they said that the representatives from SKY¹³⁵ were right behind BOPE (...) the BOPE came in, right after they entered in the public square, sat there with their promotion cars (...) they knew that BOPE was going to come in, they were going to interrupt the gatonet¹³⁶ and the SKY was there offering packages and the guys bought packages (...) the amount of contracts with SKY was an unbelievable thing, even the guys from SKY were delighted. How they started to sell buckets of plans inside favelas. - Developer C UPP Social.

Moreover, the perceived sense of security brought by the implementation of the UPP encouraged companies to socially invest in favelas to fulfill corporate social responsibility, while increasing economic returns of it. These social investments are perceived as an efficient strategy to gain support of residents and to win a share of the new market of favelas.

In this light, the UPP Social has prioritized partnerships with the private sector to boost local development of favelas, which has carried along visible changes. The project considered changing its name to Social Public-Private Partnership (Participant A UN-Habitat) and field workers have already adopted the title of “consultants” (suggesting their focus on public-private partnerships - PPPs). Interviewees argue that this shift is positive for several reasons: private companies have already realized the potential of “favelas as an opportunity” (Participant A UN-

¹³⁴ Although on a lesser scale, the Peace Territories and the UPP also work with the private sector. However, they do not present an aligned discourse about the importance of private companies to economically develop favelas, as the UPP Social has. Rather, within the UPP, private partners are used as allies to civilize favelas. On the other hand, the Peace Territories mainly reach private partners to sponsor local activities.

¹³⁵ SKY is a company that offers cable TV.

¹³⁶ Gatonet is an informal expression for the clandestine cable service offered by drug dealers.

Habitat); meanwhile, public actors still push favelas to the background. Moreover, public-private partnerships bypass the bureaucracy of the public administration, bringing faster results to the territory in terms of economic development (e.g., increase of local commerce, job creation). On the other hand, participants admitted that private intervention in favelas can be concentrated in the most visible areas, deepening inequality, and be based on “one-size-fits-all” initiatives, not tailored to the needs of each locality. Contributing to this list, I also argue that the actions of the private sector are time limited since they only last as long as the companies can profit from it. However, these criticisms are used to justify the role of the UPP Social since its database and the methodology of participatory approach are said to minimize these issues¹³⁷:

Sometimes they are one-size-fits-all projects, developed inside a company, by workers that perhaps don't understand the reality of each favela for more knowledge or expertise in social projects they have. And the UPP Social, by bringing quality information about each favela, about which areas are priority (...) brings a different insight to that project that will make the difference, right? Because it's easy to do a cultural project, an arts'... to make something standard, but to identify what's it's really missing there... (...) I think it brings a new perspective for the private action inside favelas that goes beyond philanthropy. So it is to really think how something there can bring value and how the favela can also add value to the initiative, not something that is given, but how it can be constructed. (...) I think now the program is leaning more towards the private sector, this can be good, this can be bad. I think there are criticisms regarding the entrance of the private sector in favelas, I recognize that. But I think at least it is a different entrance with the UPP Social – Participant A UN-Habitat.

Interestingly, part of this different lens that the UPP Social offers to the public sector is the selling of favelas as an “opportunity” due to favelas’ promising markets. The underlying idea is that companies will also have a positive outcome to be gained from their investment. This understanding is thought of as a tool to overcome the model of social responsibility as a charity

¹³⁷ For instance, the UPP Social worker from Batan commented that, when the electricity provider decided to invest in sports and leisure in pacified favelas, the knowledge of the UPP Social (through previous mapping) was decisive to select the soccer field to be renovated, ensuring that the most in need were attended to. Further, residents were also implicated in the process to create ownership and long-term sustainability for the project. The community debated with the public sector and the company’s key aspects of the project, such as maintenance and use of the field.

since it demonstrates to companies that the partnership is a win-win situation. We then see the neoliberal model in which the methodology of the market (e.g., analysis of cost-benefit, economic return) becomes the central element guiding public policies.

Nonetheless, although the UPP Social argues that public-private partnerships are instruments to develop communities, my analysis has showed that these bodies work as efficient tools to accelerate interventions of the market in favelas, not necessarily to the benefit of the residents. For instance, I noticed that the private sector is the main voice of the process, even though the UPP Social supposedly brings a horizontal approach to the public-private partnerships:

The association of bars, hotels, and restaurants reach the UPP Social, they had a lot of job openings (...) for this field of hotels and restaurants. And they needed to find this workforce and there was a perception that in the communities there are a lot of people with this experience, either they have worked or work as a maid, waiter, all that. And then in the São Carlos, specifically, the Commander (of UPP) had asked me to look for courses and jobs because he was building a movement to dialogue mainly with youth, the teenagers that were about to get involved with the trafficking (...) we matched this demand. (...) we went there, made visits and it was a success. We had 40 people referred to a job, in the other day 30ish. It looks like not much but it was a lot, right? – Worker UPP Social Fallet.

This quote sheds light into the process of matching between supply and demand that is clearly guided by the interest of the private partner. The partnership with the hospitality industry was established based on the perception of favelas as sites with a surplus of low-skilled workers. These practices go along with the neoliberal practice of workfare (Wacquant, 2010). They impose the regime of low wage-labour workfare, reaffirming the traditional space of favelas as marginalized sites, at the bottom of the economic pyramid. The other example provided in the quote involved the connection of a cosmetics company with a grassroots organization that produced natural products through a community garden. Again here, the guiding element was the will of the company to build a partnership in a favela close by its headquarters. Thus, we see that residents are not protagonists of the process. The driving force of the partnership is the potential

economic profit for the company that buys the concept of “favela as an opportunity” (Assistant A UN-Habitat).

The power inequality of these relations is further demonstrated by the *modus operandi* of the UPP Social. There is an entire sector of this agency dedicated to the development of partnerships, which mobilizes the private sector, receives, and filters interested partners:

And then the Light reached the Institute Pereira Passos, reached the UPP Social to know in which communities it was going to be done. And then through the territorial management team, the mobilization and partnership team goes to the field and try to identify inside the IPP which favelas would be, which communities better fit the characteristics, more needy and later goes to the field. In this process of the Light, for example, the intention was to do a renewing and a social project too. It wasn't only to get there with a constructor, made the renewing of the sports field, but also to strengthen the community. Of how this is going to be managed, who is going to manage... (...) in this project there is a component that focused on NGOs that were hired by the IPP to do this social work. The UPP Social doesn't lead the project, the UPP Social only allows it to happen (...) So this is only possible because of the mobilization and partnerships and the field teams also gave an opinion in which community should it be done or should not... – Participant A UN-Habitat.

This quote indicates that the central element guiding this department is the agenda of the private sector and not necessarily the needs of the community. Ultimately, if the private sector refuses to work with a certain favela, the UPP Social cannot do anything about it. It is only after this internal process, between private partners and the UPP Social (as the representative of the public sector), that field teams bring the participation of the community to the table.

Therefore, the structure of the UPP Social is oriented to attend to the interests of the market, rather than to that of the local population of favelas. Other actors even identified the UPP Social as a body serving the government (and its private partners) and not the community. Participants from the Peace Territories, for instance, claim that the UPP Social has a vertical approach; it intervenes in favelas to answer to demands of public and private bodies. Meanwhile, the Peace Territories would allegedly work for the community:

I think the UPP Social works for the municipality (...) if the municipal department of health demanded an action x, y, z to happen in the territory, they

will do it. And I think we don't work for the departments, we work for the population of Santa Marta, in the case. So what the population of Santa Marta demands and needs. (...) I think is that, we work more for the population, pro the interest of the population and they work more aligned with this thing of verticality, with policies that already come designed, really shaped of how it has to be done. – Worker A Peace Territories Santa Marta.

This reorientation of the UPP Social¹³⁸ already demonstrates the shift from welfarism to a neoliberal governance of pacified favelas. It goes along with the neoliberal concept of a “minimum state”, which is no longer responsible for social policies and welfare assistance (Bauman, 2001). In this sense, pacified favelas are also a representation of the logic of *pacification* (Rigakos, 2011): the state strongly intervenes with the UPP, a police institution, setting the stage for other neoliberal changes through public-private partnerships.

Respondent A: our work enabled or accelerated the appearance of local initiatives. Because not everything relies on the government, there are a lot of things that is better if the government doesn't even get involved, right? And this you can help through the UPP Social; that these things flourish because on this matter the UPP Social it's not really government. And is even good that it's not, right? It has an opening, a sensibility to strengthen their own initiatives, their business things, microenterprises, cultural, artistic, sports...

Respondent B: You have one there, another here, so it goes beyond the state. It becomes a big unit to articulate initiatives

Respondent A: it might be a new role of the new government, of the new perspective of state right?

Respondent B: Exactly – Coordinators UPP Social.

Here, the coordinators of the UPP Social pondered that the new role of the state is to nurture partnerships, replacing the hands-on approach of welfare states to fix problems. There is an understanding that the integration of favelas to the rest of the city can be done through economic inclusion of these areas; therefore, the inclusion of residents is tied with consumption. At the same time, the state transfers responsibility to the community to solve their own problems:

¹³⁸ The UPP Social shifted its focus from coordination of public actions to public-private partnerships after the re-structuration of the project. However, partnerships with private actors were also celebrated in the first phase of the project, even if in a less prevalent way. For instance, one developer of the UPP Social recalled a partnership with the association of commerce of Rio de Janeiro to recruit youngsters to work for fast-food branches in the city.

The goal hasn't changed to integrate these places to the city and vice-versa (...) when you bring basic services and you allow this population to have the right to come and go, to arrive and leave, that the people that don't live there can visit the place, when you have these type of actions, I think in the end you have contributed to the integration of these places that before had a really more difficult access due to the violence (...) but how to do that, what are the strategies, I think it has changed (...) and really have programs that bring citizenship to these residents, the formalization of small businesses in these places. So nowadays there is this effort of the IPP to take other projects, other programs for these places that goes beyond the UPP Social. UPP Social has a niche of work but they do partnerships with Light, with TIM¹³⁹, with SEBRAE¹⁴⁰, they take courses, workshops, capacitation, they create websites about these communities, about the organizations in these communities. (...) I think today it goes beyond in the sense of trying to work with the theme of productive economy, entrepreneurship, how to strengthen the local initiatives that already exist in the communities, how to strengthen it with the existent community beings. – Participant B UN-Habitat.

However, this neoliberal policy to develop favelas has several limitations. Private interventions are guided by the economic return to the company. In that sense, the private sector does not fully replace the public sector:

So I think we did, we made this change from the public logic to the logic of the third sector and the private initiative (...) it's hard to do both things at the same time. I think both are necessary, but I personally think that it's a way bigger fight within the public administration and anyway, yeah, someone has to do that and we had a major vocation in this matter, right? I'm a little nostalgic of the previous perspective (...) Ok, you improve the local income, people start to make more money and all, but the sewage is still leaking because it's not a company that will have incentive to do this type of construction. It doesn't have return, right? You can fill up Prazeres¹⁴¹ with financial support, from areas of social responsibility of other companies. But what the public sector has to do it has to do because no one else will do for it – Worker UPP Social Fallet.

In this quote, the worker from the UPP Social Fallet recognized that the commitment to develop favelas through public-private partnerships creates a paradoxical situation: favelas may experience an economic development and increase of income, but still lack basic infrastructure that only the state can provide (e.g. sanitation). Likewise, the account from Peace Territories'

¹³⁹ TIM is a cell phone provider.

¹⁴⁰ SEBRAE stands for Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (Brazilian Service to support micro and small enterprises). It is an institution to assist and support the development of micro companies in Brazil.

¹⁴¹ Prazeres is another pacified favela.

workers describes precarious living conditions in the favela of Santa Marta even though it has had many interventions of the private sector since it was the first to be pacified and it is located in the Southern Zone of Rio de Janeiro:

Beyond basic infrastructure, to solve garbage problems. Santa Marta was the first to be pacified and the quality of life of people is outrageous due to a basic thing that is sanitation (...) not only they don't provide basic things, the ones they already had were withdrew. Like the parties, that isn't anything in a community. The characteristic of a community is this collective social space that is different from the asfalto, for example; the asfalto should even learn with communities. So, to not give and to take it away is very complicated, you're only going to create more violence and less and less hope (...) You see people losing faith, less excited; once more a policy that only has a pretty facet. (...) with the problem of garbage is complicated. With deaths there that no one understands how the person died, young person died (...) it probably has diseases there that are being bred with this situation. Imagine with this heat there, there is an area there with a waterfall of garbage, a waterfall. – Worker B Peace Territories Santa Marta.

Moreover, the injection of corporative money can accelerate the process of gentrification in these favelas. Overall, the cost of living has increased in all pacified favelas due to the regularization of services and real estate speculation (a consequence of the perceived sense of security). Gentrification is even more exacerbated in those favelas with more visibility since private interventions pushed up rent and properties prices to the point that residents, unable to support themselves, are forced to move to remote areas. On the other hand, wealthier residents of the city willing to live in a privileged and “exotic” location move in. As a result of this process of “white removal”, favelas lose their original characteristics and their cultural aspects. For example, in the favela of Vidigal, the current community leaders are all foreigners that do not share the common roots of the original dwellers (since they are not even from the country) and lose touch with the history of the community.

Thus, although the concept of “Favela S.A.” (Brito, 2013) might benefit a few residents that are able to adapt to this scenario, it negatively impacts most of the population that continues to suffer with poor services provision and lack of infrastructure. Additionally, they also need to cope with external pressures upon their living conditions. In this case, the militarized

intervention of favelas serves external purposes to appropriate the territory of favelas to the market:

Vidigal¹⁴² is going through an absurd process of real estate speculation because there is a big hotel that will be launched now in Vidigal, really luxurious, that totally contrasts with the reality of the favela even though it's not a favela that is totally "abandoned", right? You see in Rocinha things that you don't see in other areas, other communities. In Vidigal as well. Despite of that, it's still a favela. It doesn't have postal code, it doesn't have water provision as other areas of the city, the accessibility is really complicated... You have cases of diseases that still kill people, the cases of pneumonia, tuberculosis in Rocinha. So it's really obvious the contrast, right? There in Rocinha, in the Acadêmicos of Rocinha¹⁴³, there is the most expensive party of Rio de Janeiro that I'm aware of. (...) The "popular party" more expensive that is called Favorita, a very expensive party attended by TV actors, famous people, soccer players in front of a favela that has serious problems of sanitation, of health, there is a deficit of children registries, adolescents in the social support program, for example – Worker UPP Social Rocinha.

As we see in the example provided by this participant, the sense of security provided by the UPP has enabled economic enterprises (a luxurious hotel) that explore the image of exotic and the privileged locations of favelas. These investments do not enhance the living conditions in these areas, besides being out of the reach of the original impoverished population of favelas. In some cases, the appropriation of the territory by private companies is even more straightforward:

It's the de-territorialisation of real processes that they were already developing, right? For example, that area that is now with the Light Recycle became a terrible thing; it's a thing that you give them cents if they collect a lot of garbage and take to recycling. But Light charges fares out of their means, right? And they don't know to whom they can complain about it, you start to create a very adversary environment. And where they put the Light Recycle it was a space where they, before, precisely had a recycling project. Material that the money would effectively go to the residents. – Worker B Peace Territories Santa Marta.

In this example, a space used by a grassroots cooperative to recycle garbage in the favela of Santa Marta was taken over to accommodate a similar project controlled by the electricity

¹⁴² Vidigal is a favela located in the Southern Zone of Rio de Janeiro, in the high-class neighbourhood of Ipanema. It has a privileged view of the beach of Copacabana.

¹⁴³ Acadêmicos da Rocinha is the "escola de samba" (samba school) from the favela of Rocinha. It annually competes in the Carnival parade of Rio de Janeiro.

provider. However, the latter does not benefit residents as much as the grassroots cooperative did.

We see, thus, the capitalist, exploitive, and imperialist governance of security practices (Rigakos, 2011). The policy of pacification couples a militarized intervention with public-sector market friendly initiatives in order to redesign neoliberal urban landscapes. The goal is to facilitate consumerism¹⁴⁴ through the remaking of these “appealing” favelas according to the private middle-class standards. As a result, the unemployed, squatters and other marginal groups are scattered to the fringes of the city, so these areas can be taken back into the city’s real estate circuit (Gray & Mooney, 2011). Hence, the pacification has international parallels in policies of urban upgrading (Belina & Helms, 2003; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012; Miraftab, 2012; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008; Ward, 2003) that also “have for effect the deepening marginalisation of local residents at the behest of deregulated labour markets and property development strategies.” (Gray & Mooney, 2011, p.8)

b. Militarizing the unworthy favela

Local development by private interventions does not go along with distant communities that do not have visibility and economic appeal, which is illustrated by the lack of public-private partnerships in favelas outside of the Southern Zone. The concept of “Favela S.A.” refers to the economic exploitation of the image of favela as exotic and safe sites (after the implementation of the UPP). It is exemplified by the touristic niche of the “favela experience” (favela tours, lodging in favelas). However, this model only has economic viability in favelas located in privileged and

¹⁴⁴ See Macleod & Johnstone, 2012.

touristic areas. The idea of “Favela S.A.” then reproduces historic geographic inequalities of the city¹⁴⁵:

But overall, when you take all this, Rocinha with its problems, with all its difficulties, Vidigal, and you look to Jacarezinho¹⁴⁶, for example, you will see that in Jacarezinho the associations are really weak. You don't see social projects inside there, you don't see active NGOs, internationally known, you don't see foreigners wandering in the streets as I see in the Southern Zone. You don't see tours; no one goes up Jacarezinho to do tourism (...) Because that's it. Favelas in the Southern Zone have visibility and they are in an area of the city that the riches walk around, the tourists walk around and the tourists, with few exceptions, do not go to the Northern Zone – Worker UPP Social Rocinha.

In comparison, favelas not worthy of the private money are excluded from this neoliberal movement and, consequently, the pacification in these areas is usually restricted to the militarized interventions of the UPP. It is predominantly in these areas with “low media visibility” that “only has UPP” (Coordinator Peace Territories) that the expansion of policing into the social area is justified upon the absence of other bodies. To minimize that, field workers from the UPP Social and the Peace Territories mobilize local private partners, who may have an interest to access this market by its proximity to their business. Nonetheless, they recognized that the UPP is still the most prevalent body of these favelas:

Why? There isn't visibility. But we understand, right? People talk a lot about social responsibility, but we know that social responsibility expects a return in marketing. We haven't had an insertion like that in Batan. What we have achieved is to establish partnerships with universities... these universities work with the question of social responsibility, but they have interest in taking their name to these areas. Why? Because the majority of their students are from the Western Zone. – Worker B Peace Territories Batan.

We see, here, the other aspect of neoliberal policies: the militarization of urban enclaves that are not economically relevant, in which residents “deserve to be under siege by militarized

¹⁴⁵ Historically, public and private investments are concentrated in the Southern Zone of Rio de Janeiro, where most of the touristic points and high-class neighbourhoods are located. Following this logic, favelas of the Southern Zone are better equipped and economically developed, compared to other areas of the city. Civil societies, public sectors, and private sectors have always privileged them in detriment of other favelas (Brito, 2013).

¹⁴⁶ Jacarezinho is a pacified favela in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro.

law enforcement officers, due to their inferior and non-contributory economic, cultural, and social positions in society” (Meeks, 2006, p.38). The UPP becomes a confinement tool of the hyper ghetto (Wacquant, 2001). In these areas, the militarization satisfies economic and social pressures to contain the violence and chaos of favelas. Once the negative effects of violence broke through the invisible walls and reached the city (walls that were historically built upon socio-economic discrimination), it was necessary to put a more efficient system in place (the UPP) to preserve the civilized world from the barbarians. Similar to gated communities (Bauman, 2011), the military control by the UPP creates physical barriers that contain the danger of these areas and relieve the stress of “good citizens” constantly worried about the threat of the “other” (Giroux, 2004).

On the other hand, the socio-economic development of favelas is not in the agenda the market, unless it is promoted within a neoliberal framework to gentrify and commercialize favelas in privileged areas. Rather, the improvement of living conditions of favelas and the advancement of social policies that could promote the social-economic inclusion of its inhabitants clash with the interest of upper classes of Rio de Janeiro, which have historically benefited from the levels of inequality in the city:

The society of Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian society, the media are satisfied with a policy of public security arriving in favelas because for them it's not necessary for social policies to arrive in favelas (...) the support that the UPP has is way more connected with the insecurity of who lives outside favelas than with a concern to democratize access and rights. There is a certain comfort of society that is good as it is, right? And more, it would be almost like privileging a population that doesn't... I mean, to stop the conflicts benefit everyone in the city and then fine, this is ok. (...) to prioritize social policies for the favela would be a discrimination within the city. And then no, this is not ok. For this, equality applies. But in a relationship that has a very big deficit, very unequal, the equality perpetuates the inequality – Developer B UPP Social.

Hence, in the context of neoliberalism, this policy works “to invisibilize problem populations” by forcing them to conform to their roles and perpetuate their conditions “into the peripheral sectors of the booming secondary labor market.” (Wacquant, 2010, p.199)

c. Pacification in service of the capital

Within the logic of neoliberalism, the interests of the market is the decisive element that defines the fate of each pacified favela; whether they will be affected by future gentrification or condemned to further exclusion and militarized control. The coordinator of the UPP Social even suggested that these economic interests were the turning point for the development of the project of pacification as they provided political capital for a high cost intervention:

Economic interests, real estate interests, interests of the city as a city. Yeah, it's not only a matter of going there to pacify that favela because it is violent, right? You have potentialities there in relation to the city to be explored, to be maximized, to be enabled. You have zones that are important for the expansion of the city in the urban sense; but with violence it was impossible, right? You have political demands of favelas in relation to the absence of services that quite often were impossible to be offered. You cannot build a logistic system to collect the garbage that constantly had to be negotiated with the trafficker. (...) You have other things that are involved besides violence per se (...) So it's changing the perspective of these territories, so there are economic interests everywhere (...) it's good that there are economic interests; if it were only because of the issue of violence perhaps it wouldn't have been enough to implement a policy of pacification that has a high cost – Coordinator UPP Social.

Likewise, the Commander of UPP Fallet explained that the project of pacification was developed in light of a study's conclusion that indicated violence, “excess of shootings, robbery”, as the main reason for businessmen to not invest in Rio. The vice-coordinator of the CPP shared this same understanding that the territorialisation of the drug trade impacted in the economic development of areas adjacent to favelas:

Who wanted to invest in that region, regions were properly destroyed (...) So we've seen the degradation of the surroundings of Jacarezinho due to violence. There was the COMPARE there, it left. There was the Café Pimpinela, it left. There were many stores of electronics (...) The surroundings of Jacarezinho is

over, there hasn't any jobs in its proximities anymore, similar to here, in the Complex of Alemão. (...) This headquarters here was from Coke (...) where we are sat here today, there were almost 1000 employees here. Today there is the CPP because Coke left here due to the extreme violence. So the surroundings were also harmed with this violence that happened inside communities. So it was degrading the city with the lack of opportunities too (...) the capacity of job and sustainability of the neighbourhoods, the neighbourhoods were being defeated – Vice-coordinator CPP.

Obviously, this need to modify the image of the city and to tackle high crime rates was accentuated with the choice of Rio de Janeiro to host the World Cup and the Olympic Games. Some even argue that all recent changes and interventions in the city were exclusively motivated by these events (Worker UPP Social Penha).

Not surprisingly, within a neoliberal framework, this same economic agenda that drives public-private partnerships also influences state interventions in favelas. Rather than addressing the needs of the community, social strategies work to create a favourable ambience for capitalist interventions. Some of these initiatives even go against direct interests of residents, deepening community's discontent with the pacification. For instance, in the favela of Rocinha, residents opposed to the construction of a cable car since they would prefer the investment of these resources into the sanitation of the favela (Rocinha has the highest rate of tuberculosis in Rio de Janeiro, which is connected with the lack of sewage collection). However, the construction of a cable car satisfied economic interests to make this “famous” favela more accessible to private investments and tourists. Other examples have even more harmful consequences:

I think in some aspects it is even worse because it also came a social policy, in theory, that does not unfold in a way that benefits residents, like the issue with the Light. Now it's official, there is Light. (...) We received complaints that there are residents paying \$300 in an electricity bill. It's not possible to spend \$300 in a house of that size (...) the issue with the POUSO which is the urbanization program that changes the name of the streets (...) But many residents complain that the new names are not connected with the history of the community, the change of the streets' names make the community lose its original characteristics. Even worse, process of house removals from communities, these are tragic (...) they remove hundreds of people to places very distant. We've seen cases that it's said that they give documents for illiterate people claiming that is something else and it's the destitution of their houses (...) I think that the worst of

all this it's to implement a social policy that is also perverse – Worker B Peace Territories Santa Marta.

In this description, that the state directly violates residents' rights to fulfill an external economic agenda that required the removal of residents from their houses. Thus, not only the nation-state abstains from its role to implement policies to enhance residents' living conditions, but government also triggers processes that negatively affect the community, leading to gentrification and further marginalization of these populations.

III. Resisting to the neoliberal model: in search of an ethical community

Despite the preponderance of the strategies of civilization and urban development that promotes a neoliberal model of governance of marginalized areas, the scenario of each favela is more complex and diverse than this portrayal. The interviews revealed that a second approach emerges on the ground level, as a resistance movement of the field workers who reinterpret their practices according to their personal beliefs. These interviewees criticized both aspects of the pacification – civilizing and urban development - for not being connected with the real needs of the community; they do not promote the emancipation of these communities and only ameliorate living conditions in a very timid way. As a result, they resist to these top-down initiatives and construct strategies to mobilize and empower the community, mainly working with grassroots projects that recognize the value of local participants. This resistance movement yearns for an ethical community, in which all members enjoy the same constitutional rights and strong communal ties.

The main concern of the actors resisting to the mainstream strategy is the living conditions of the local populations of favelas. When describing favelas prior to the intervention of the UPP, the discourse focuses on the oppression of residents by drug dealers who restricted and limited residents' freedom and rights. For instance, residents would not enjoy freedom of

mobility and speech and were denied access to basic services (e.g., access to the justice system). Moreover, dealers constantly abuse their power, subjecting residents through force and threats. As opposed to the official narrative of the pacification, we noticed that these actors of resistance do not perceive the UPP as a cornerstone to overcome this state. Rather, the pacification maintains this state of oppression; it only replaces the figure of the oppressor from drug dealers to the nation-state (mainly represented by police)¹⁴⁷. The state oppresses inhabitants of favelas insofar as militarized police officers restrict resident's rights to promote a so-called sense of security. Often, these violations of residents' rights are quite similar to the restrictions imposed by drug dealers. For instance, the worker from the Peace Territories Santa Marta commented that UPP officers limit the circulation of “dangerous bodies” in favelas, restricting their freedom of movement. Moreover, the repressive approach of the UPP and the absence of policies to develop these areas or, worse, the imposition of social policies not in benefit of residents are also a denial of residents' rights.

This resistance movement is facilitated by the low institutionalization of all three projects (particularly from the UPP Social and the Peace Territories), which leaves room for workers to create their own practices on the ground level. All interviewees commented that there are few guidelines orienting their work: their daily activities are mainly oriented by their personal interpretation of the project's design. Regarding the UPP Social, the consistency and common understanding of its methodology were compromised by its recent restructuration. The Peace Territories, on the other hand, has never had a solid design. Field workers from the Peace Territories explained that they collaboratively drafted the model of the project when the UPP

¹⁴⁷ Nonetheless, the model of the UPP (based on community policing and permanent presence of the police in favelas) is perceived as an evolution from the previous warfare approach. Participants believed that theoretically this approach is closer to a democratic police, which respects human rights and is in the service of the community. However, lack of training and police militarism undermine this approach on the ground level. Unfortunately, in practice, community policing is corrupted to militarization of social life and control of the population.

Social was transferred to the municipality and they remained within the state level administration without a project to work for. Although the project of the UPP Social certainly inspired them, the methodology of the Peace Territories is not consistent since the project was created in the midst of chaos.

a. Building an integrated social agenda at the local level

Although the UPP Social has progressively moved away from their goal to improve social conditions of favelas, I noticed that field workers resisted these changes. They argue that the core of their work should be the enhancement of living conditions of favelas through the integration of social policies:

In this movement, we (field team) chose to go to the ground level and to negotiate with the managers on the local level. So we go to the health clinic and talk with the manager there. We go to the school and talk with the director. Then we try to articulate the two things; I take the responsible of the COMLURB and I talk with him; I take him there to speak with the community leader, to see how they will do to take the garbage out of this area here, how often, in an attempt to fix things in the local level so we can do something (...) We already did this, but after it reoriented we are more focused on doing this. To reach less the department or the liaison officer and see what we can do there in that territory with those people – Worker UPP Social Fallet.

In light of this, field workers from the UPP Social (as well as from the Peace Territories) turn to the local level to achieve concrete results. They seek to empower and hold local actors accountable to addressing problems of the community through the development of comprehensive and inter-sectorial actions. To do so, they create and consolidate spaces to engage public and private actors in a conversation about governmental interventions in favelas (e.g., meetings, local support networks). These networks also provide mutual support for local actors:

to be able to really do networks to support each other and provide feedback because in general there isn't structure for these policies. And this is not us; there isn't structure for the policy of POUSO, there isn't structure for the policy of PAC Social, there isn't structure for the CRAS¹⁴⁸, for the health clinic. It's all

¹⁴⁸ CRAS are social security offices.

very precarious, there isn't financial administration of that (...) we try to put together the misery of each one of us to be able to create a network that can be minimally implemented – Worker B Peace Territories Santa Marta.

This strategy does not have the ambition to impact the high-ranks of the government structure (as it was originally thought for these programmes); policies continue to be elaborated in each silo. However, they are guided by a perception that these sectorial programmes can be enhanced by the support and assistance of other actors at the local level. For instance, the local manager of the company responsible for the garbage collection gathered with a local NGO to transform an open dump into a sustainable garden. This partnership was considered a successful model; today, the garden is a touristic attraction in the favela and it did not mobilize high-levels of the administration to make it happen.

b. Building an empowered community

Alongside workers' efforts to create integrated social strategies in each favela, they also search for alternatives to implement policies and programs that attend the demands of the impacted communities. These strategies are constructed on a daily basis as a direct response to the challenges posed by the implementation of initiatives from the mainstream approach. Thus, there is not a linear narrative among participants' discourse. However, the team of the Peace Territories Santa Marta presents a coherent ideological justification for their actions that encompasses what seems to be the orientation of most of the advocates of this movement: their priority is to create policies based on participatory development, in which residents (and not policy-makers) are the main protagonists of the development-process.

The objectives of this resistance movement correspond to what Bauman (2001) has called "ethical community": their actions foster long-term commitments among the members of each favela. They seek to bring residents working together for the development of a favela that benefits everyone of the community. Instead of imposing a model of the *asfalto* to favelas, these

field teams prioritize local based solutions that respect community's values. To encourage a sense of "ethical responsibility" (Bauman, 2001, p.72) and the engagement of residents with community's problems, these actors create working groups primarily integrated by community leaders and local residents¹⁴⁹ (as opposed to local support networks described in the previous chapter that are spaces for private and public local actors). Similarly, field teams hold meetings and round tables to mobilize the community to develop local-based solutions for their issues. The creation of these spaces for conversation is an important instrument to bring together different groups within the favelas towards a common goal.

Moreover, workers also provide tools to empower residents. Through talks and capacitation sessions, they seek to educate the community about the political process and how to benefit from this system (e.g., courses of how to get public funding for their local initiatives). This is perceived as a key element to emancipate favelas since it creates an independence from the government. It moves away from a charitable approach, in which the community depends on the willing of actors to hear their opinion, to an emancipatory model, where residents are empowered to make their voices heard.

Participant A: Yeah, there was even a protest. (...) But I think it is a trait of our work that had positive points in many occasions. This past year with us there. Perhaps it would not have happened if we weren't there, in this constant exercise to articulate people

Participant B: to foment, even if it is only a little right? But in regards to the importance of them to organize themselves politically (...) Because they are really divided (...) it's a complicated community. So I think we give this feedback that only together they will achieve something. So we were able to promote a course, for example, a public petition... - Workers Peace Territories Santa Marta.

¹⁴⁹ Representatives of the bodies implicated in the issue being discussed can be invited for these working groups, but mostly to hear the voices of the community instead of guiding the process. Interviewees also mobilize public and private actors when their participant is necessary to assist the community in the searching of solutions for problems. For instance, the team of the Peace Territories Santa Marta is reaching out to universities to conduct research and find viable alternatives to solve the issue of garbage in the favela.

Here, participants of the favela of Santa Marta celebrated the organization of a protest as an indicator of positive progress in their attempt to empower residents to speak up. Similarly, they aim to instruct residents about the importance of other tools, such as public petitions, to transform the community according to their own values.

Further, actors of this movement of resistance prioritize grassroots organizations over external NGOs. Both the Peace Territories and the UPP Social have mapped local initiatives of the community and identify how these groups can have their work maximized. Since both programs have budgetary limitations¹⁵⁰, they often recur to partnerships with external sponsors to assist these grassroots organizations:

Then they contact us, we went to a meeting, we explained how it was our work and we made it clear “look, our work is in partnership with the residents. The residents, they are the protagonists. You are going to work together with them” (...) So they have already done a meeting with this group, I wasn’t there, the other worker was there. They did a second meeting in which none of us were there. But the group is already doing this articulation – Worker B Peace Territories Batan.

Although this strategy may look similar to public-private partnerships from the narrative of urban development, here local organizations are the strongest side of this partnership (leading and guiding it according to their priorities). For instance, in the case of a partnership between a community garden and a private investor mediated by the team of Peace Territories Batan, the will of the members of the garden was respected in detriment of the opinion of the workers from Peace Territories. The community chose to invest the resources in a study of the soil conditions whereas the workers from Peace Territories thought that their main need was the construction of a water well. Members of the organization have explained that the study of the soil is a long-term investment, as it will enhance the chances of the garden to be successful; the well will be

¹⁵⁰ In some rare occasions, the Peace Territories directly support local initiatives, helping with the organization of events and providing materials for said events. For instance, they developed a project (*plano de memória* - memory plan) with residents of 8 pacified favelas to register the history of each community in light of the changes triggered by the pacification that progressively strip the community of its original characteristics. In this case, the project directly supported residents to concretize their goal to preserve the history of favelas.

constructed with the income from the sales of the products. Hence, the will of the community was respected and these resources were diverted to the soil study. This is another element that indicates how this resistance movement aspires to an ethical community. By supporting grassroots organizations, these actors encourage an ambiance of “fraternal sharing” (Bauman, 2001) and autonomy from the *asfalto*, where residents have their livelihoods in service of the community.

This movement faces many barriers from actors of the public administration that guided by a perception of residents of favelas as uneducated and inferior individuals disregard their contribution to the development of policies. Thus, this model is often disarticulated when it requires the involvement of other private and public actors. They do not follow-up with strategies developed at the community level:

I have a feeling that we are far away from knowing how to do policies based on the territory in a collaboratively way, which was the big advertisement of this policy of public security as well as of the social policy (...) We worked within a communitarian framework, making meetings with residents, raising questions, raising solutions since residents know the solutions; it's a question to implement it. It's a matter of having the interest to get the public resources in a side and put in the other (...) Not everything depends on public financial resources, but it obviously requires a team that has a minimum interest in changing, for example, the design of the garbage collection, you know? (...) To be able to do something more aligned with the real needs, right? The garbage collection is a good example (...) COMLURB claims that they clean, but they only clean the main street. Favela is made of alleys; the main street is only the little toe of the favela, a minimum part. So there are things that do not depend on financial resources. There are things that only require willpower. – Worker B Peace Territories Santa Marta.

Thus, the bureaucracy of the state works for the consolidation of territorial control and state sovereignty; most of the so-called social policy concerns capitalist tools to implement a thriving market inside favelas. This neoliberal framework discourages communitarian and participatory approaches that aspire to an ethical community since the capitalist regime requires an aesthetic community (Bauman, 2001). Rather than mutual and permanent bonds, the bourgeois order is founded on the “constant disturbance of all social conditions, the unremitting uncertainty and

agitation of all human ties, the melting away of all that is solid into air” (Neocleous, 2011, p.198). In spite of the lack of concrete results, participants highlight the importance of this resistance movement to demonstrate to the community that it is possible to build public policies in a participatory and collaborative way. In this way, it restores their faith in government, even if at a localized and minimal level.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Throughout this study I have discussed in detail the policy of pacification by focusing on each of its two prongs: policing and urban development. Although most of the literature has mainly explored the policing aspect of the policy (the UPP), I have also analyzed the actions of two governmental bodies that represent “social interventions” in favelas (UPP Social and Peace Territories). Hence, this study contributes to the related literature insofar as it addresses the policy of pacification as a whole, revealing how the apparent two sides of pacification - policing and local development - work in tandem to consolidate capitalist objectives of the neoliberal state.

The analysis of the data provides the nuances of a neoliberal state implementing a policy whose core lies on an interventionist approach. At first sight, the pacification of favelas, which mobilizes vast governmental resources, seems contradictory to the current neoliberal tendency of “liquid” societies, served by a minimal state that does not directly engage with social issues. Different components of the policy such as the military occupation of favelas and the initial welfare model of social initiatives might indicate that the policy is one example of a hands-on state intervention to assert sovereignty through territorial control. Moreover, similarly to the era of “state-and-nation-building” (Bauman, 2001, p.126), the UPP, as a representation of a powerful ruler, sets new standards of living and moral orientation to enlighten people and build an orderly society.

In spite of this apparent contradiction, the thesis unveiled the neoliberal twist of this old-fashioned intervention; although the state still preserves part of its original civilizing mission, it does so to create a favourable ambience for the interventions of the free market. The state uses police and social actors to replace the “uncivilized” inhabitants of favelas by docile bodies conformed to the market values of consumption and individualism. Police power is employed to

put away the irreparable bodies, either through literal annihilation or through the use of the criminal justice system, in its own modified version of the hyperghetto¹⁵¹. As seen elsewhere, the police also transform those manageable bodies into obedient and productive individuals within the framework of a capitalist society (Rigakos, 2011). In that sense, the pacification directly speaks with two pillars of neoliberalism as proposed by Wacquant (2014): proactive penal state and supervisory workfare. For one, the UPP works as “border patrols” (Wacquant, 2008b), militarizing disadvantaged neighbourhoods as a direct demonstration of the iron fist of the state. Beyond that, it connects with a broader project to impose a workfare system, based in low and flexible labour, to those at the bottom of the society. The pacification, therefore, is an expression of the current form of neoliberalism sustained by “the iron fist of the state” to control the delectable effects of the “invisible hand of the market.” (Wacquant, 2014)

The exercise of force also goes hand-in-hand with the use of politics, represented by the interventions coordinated by the UPP Social and Peace Territories. These so-called social strategies also promote the replacement of the “gloomy old” practices by “brighter and nicer new lives” around the capitalist pillars of consumption and competition (Neocleous, 2011, p.203). Thus, the pacification of favelas is productive (Gibson, 1986 in Neocleous, 2011): it involves the destruction of the previous social organization of favelas, or “the crushing of opposition” (Neocleous, 2011, p.197), as a premise to construct a new social order aligned with the capitalist regime in place.

In this sense, the pacification of favelas parallels with other international experiences of urban renaissance, which hinged on increasing social control and punitive governmentality (Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). Policies of crime control, particularly represented in the crusade to eliminate uncivil behaviour, are coupled with public-sector market friendly initiatives that promote the reshaping of urban landscapes according to the standards of consumption. It is a

¹⁵¹ See Wacquant, 2001.

similar movement to the revitalisation of downtown areas and inner cities in North America¹⁵². However, the pacification has a fundamental difference in regard to the role of the state. In North America, the state authorizes and encourages the privatization of public spaces through Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) (Clough and Vanderbeck, 2006). However, BIDs are the leading actor and conduct the whole process of revitalisation. They directly develop and implement strategies to transform degraded regions into appealing sites for consumption, following the guidelines of “clean and safe” (Lippert, 2012). This dynamic is inverted in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro: police are employed to secure the “insecurity” of favelas, setting the stage for neoliberal interventions (such as PPPs and private investments) in which the state plays only a supporting role. Hence, the state carries on the “cleaning up” of favelas through the militarization and the implementation of civilizing initiatives. These measures make the territory appealing to the market, which is then handed over to the private sector by the government. This arrangement is a win-win situation, in which the only ones harmed are the residents of the favelas. Investors can exploit and profit out of favelas while the neoliberal government no longer has a responsibility over the development of these areas.

Based on these elements and inspired by the questions proposed by Rigakos – Who is being pacified? Why are they being pacified? What are the real objectives of this pacification project? - I argue that the pacification of favelas can be understood as a “project of *pacification*” (Rigakos, 2011). The appraisal of the likely outputs and implications of the policy on the ground level reveals that the pacification of favelas is not in place to address the violence and the underdevelopment of these areas, although the official rhetoric is constructed around these pillars. This analysis demonstrates that the rhetoric of security is used to legitimize an intervention set up to *pacify* the underclass in order to secure the interests of the market and the privilege of upper classes. For instance, many of the positive outcomes regarding the pacification

¹⁵² See Marquardt and Fuller, 2012 and Ranasinghe, 2013.

of favelas relates to benefits for the *asfalto*. The removal of the *parallel power* and the conquest of territorial control by the state expand the territorial limits of the city, allowing free access to these previous no-go areas. The implementation of the UPP is said to have brought down the invisible walls that secluded favelas from the city since it enables access of “outsiders” (and also of inhabitants of favelas) to “come and go” from favelas without being limited by drug dealers.

However, the removal of these walls promotes a one-way integration with the city: residents of favelas continue to be subjugated and marginalized in their rights and citizenship while favelas become open sites to be exploited and used by outsiders, as illustrated by the “tourism of poverty” (Brito, 2013). Although visits of tourists in favelas located in the Southern Zone of Rio de Janeiro rapidly expanded after the implementation of the UPP¹⁵³, this tourism does not provide an economic, cultural, or social return for the community. On the contrary, tourists explore the living conditions in favelas, without any willingness to interact with the community, to validate their own sense of success and privilege. It is in fact another way of exploiting the residents of favelas: their living conditions are a source of amusement, curiosity, or even a way for tourists to corroborate their self-worth. On the macro level, the increased sense of safety triggered by the implementation of the UPP in the favelas has also resulted in the growth of financial investments and tourism in the entire city, which is particularly advantageous for Rio de Janeiro considering the upcoming Olympics 2016 and the past World Cup 2014.

Territorial control also expands urban barriers for real estate in a city where the construction of new properties is limited by its geographical characteristics (squeezed between hills and the coast). Moreover, certain favelas are located in valuable regions, with privileged views of the city. Therefore, the retaking of the territory from drug dealers was a fundamental step in a bigger project to transform these targeted favelas into formal neighbourhoods for future

¹⁵³ For instance, according to the Commander of UPP Santa Marta, since the pacification of the favela through the implementation of the UPP 10,000 tourists visit the favela per month.

incorporation into the market economy. These practices parallel with the movement of privatizing public spaces through BIDs, based on the orientation of a “revanchist city” that reacts to the stealing of the city from the “good citizens” (Belisa and Helms, 2003). In that sense, the end of the territorialisation of the drug trade is not merely connected with a concern for residents’ wellbeing, but it primarily relates to the appropriation of important areas of the city by government and private actors.

Hence, the two different approaches – civilization and urban development – are complementary instruments to address the demands of the city, not necessarily reflecting the needs and priorities of those living within the favelas. On the contrary, in the agenda of *pacification*, government institutions are employed to consolidate imperial objectives of the expanding market (Rigakos, 2011), in prejudice of the inhabitants of favelas. For instance, I highlighted how the consolidation of public-private partnerships to economically develop favelas leads to real estate speculation and rising costs, and consequently, the gentrification of these areas. Furthermore, territorial control enables access of the private sector into the potential consumer market of favelas, as seen in the regularization of the clandestine connections (e.g., water, electricity, cable, etc.), which also harms impoverished residents who cannot afford the official fares for these services. Thus, the pacification of favelas is *pacification* for us: we pacify “them” to satisfy “us.”

“*Pacification* for us” is also reflected in the prioritization of the law enforcement component of the policy, through being awarded more financial and political capital than the social development of favelas. As a result, the policy of pacification does not alter the state of marginalization or enhance living conditions in these areas. On the contrary, most of the participants mentioned that residents of favelas are still treated as “second-class citizens” (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007), exemplified by the continuity of vertical policies, the charitable approach of investors, the slowness of the public administration to invest in those areas, and the

poor quality of services provided to inhabitants of favelas. In practice, the ideal of urban revitalization of favelas is replaced by the social control of the underclass, particularly in those favelas with less visibility and economic appeal in the periphery of Rio de Janeiro where the UPP is the only effective and operating body.

As a result of this militarization of favelas, the policy of pacification, which had in one of its objectives the integration of favelas to the city, turns out to be another instrument to reinforce those walls of the “fractured city” that seclude the “unappealing” favelas. The differential treatment of favelas, embodied in the militarization of social life and the constant surveillance of its inhabitants, implies a distinction between these areas and the rest of the city. Although society no longer accepts the direct association of political power with armed forces in the Brazilian democracy (Koonings and Kruijt, 2002), in the name of security society appears extremely permissive when it comes to the use of force and the association of law enforcement and social policies in the favelas. We see, then, that the use of extreme violence towards the “other” and the restriction of their freedom are legitimized to protect “us” from the threats these untamed territories pose to our lifestyle (Bauman, 2001).

In the context of Rio de Janeiro, classes with more social capital have always been less concerned with the marginalization of favelas and more preoccupied with the containment of the dangerousness of these areas to ensure that it does not spill over into their privileged lives. The marginalization and exclusion of favelas is disregarded precisely because it is not perceived as an immediate threat to the city (even though I argue that the seclusion and stigmatization of favelas as well as the absence of state capacity are the main contributing factors for the territorialisation of the drug trade). We then see another practice of the neoliberal governance through fear: the territorialisation of the drug trade is framed as a “law and order” issue, rather than being understood as a social problem. Within this logic, pacification appears as a prettier façade of the militarization of social problems (Brito et al., 2013); it prioritizes the UPP as a tool to surveil and

control favelas instead of promoting actions to address the social problems of favelas, of which violence is only the visible manifestation. Consequently, pacification barely touches upon the root causes of the social exclusion of favelas; the few social initiatives implemented only work as palliative measures (Barreira, 2013).

Along with that, my analysis indicates that the concepts of consumption and economic interests¹⁵⁴ are central in the agenda of the pacification of favelas. Similarly to other urban interventions promoted by neoliberal governments, such as the BIDs' approach¹⁵⁵, the driving motive of the policy seems to be the promotion of a "consumption environment free of refuse and risk." (Sleiman & Slippert, 2010, p.326) These policies are anchored in the perception that danger and insecurity are main obstacles to consumption. However, differently from the interventions of BIDs restricted to the areas under their mandate, the pacification operates at a macro-level. The objective is to promote an image of a "clean and safe" city as a whole. To accomplish this, it is necessary to remove "the human residues of intractable social problems" (Lippert, 2012, p.171) from the enclaves of consumption of the city (in other words, the middle-class and high-class neighbourhoods and the touristic zones). Using the UPP and the gentrifying policies in place, the pacification pushes away the "dirt" of the city into its fringes, where they are militarily contained. By doing so, it systematically excludes "those adjudged to be out of place, whose class and cultural positions diverge from those of developers and their target consumers" (Flusty, 2001, p.659) from favelas located in the privileged areas of the city.

¹⁵⁴ Other recent changes promoted in Rio de Janeiro, beyond the scope of this thesis, further implies that the pacification is inserted in a broader movement concerned with the aesthetics of consumption. As an example of these other changes, I cite the public-private partnership currently in place to revitalize the port area of Rio de Janeiro, which has close resemblance to the North-American projects of urban upgrading of downtown areas. Further, the marketing and propaganda of the policy of pacification, particularly of the UPP, is also constructed to sell a new face of Rio de Janeiro as a safer city. For example, all the official publication regarding the UPP (videos, website, pamphlets) are available in English, suggesting that one of the concerns of the policy is to target possible touristic consumers outside of Brazil.

¹⁵⁵ See Berti & Sommers, 2010.

Hence, the neoliberal twist of the policy promotes a “citizenship mediated by consumption” (Brito et al., 2013, p.220). For those favelas “unworthy” of private investments, the militarized control of the UPP serves as a barrier to confine those “failed consumers”¹⁵⁶ in the involuntary ghetto¹⁵⁷. On the other hand, in favelas appealing to the private market, the pacification becomes an instrument to “beautify” these areas. The beautification of favelas promotes the concept of “Favela S.A.” as an exotic and “clean and safe”¹⁵⁸ commodity to be explored by companies and, eventually, by few residents that thrive in the new touristic niche (Brito, 2013).

The success of these inhabitants of favelas to overcome their state of marginalization by taking advantage of the economic appeal of favelas reinforces the notion that the solutions for the social problems lie within the individual realm (Bauman, 2001). Those who are willing to conform can prosper in a capitalist society without the need for welfare assistance. In that sense, the so-called social aspect of the pacification, based on the local development and productive inclusion of favelas' residents, only reaffirms the neoliberal solution for poverty: less welfare, more policing, and more “opportunities” to freely compete in the market (Botelho, 2013).

In short, I have highlighted in my analysis elements of the pacification of favelas that correspond to the characteristics of projects of pacification as listed by Rigakos (2011). The policy has *imperial objectives* demonstrated in its attempt to shape “productive” bodies and fabricate an urban order favourable to consumption. As seen, the “uncontrolled” state of favelas represents an obstacle to the economic interests of the city. For one, the presence of the *parallel power* hampers the access to the favelas, limiting economic possibilities to explore this internal market. Secondly, favelas are said to be the main contributing factor for the widespread image of violence of Rio de Janeiro, which also has economic impacts with the reduction of investments

¹⁵⁶ See Graham, 2009.

¹⁵⁷ See Bauman, 2001.

¹⁵⁸ See Lippert, 2012.

and the flee of tourists. To address that, social control and urban upgrading are used to shape areas of the city into “urban spaces ‘open for business’ and thus ripe for economic exploitation.” (Rigakos, 2011, p.79) The pacification also *employs police networks* along with other bodies of the government to control the residents of favelas. These measures are offered as *civilizing initiatives* aiming to restore the order in favelas and “enhance” their standards to those of the society of *asfalto*. Moreover, this project of education relates to the transformation of social order of favelas to attend economic interests and produce docile and productive bodies, accepting of their role on the bottom of the economic pyramid. Finally, the development of this policy serves as *a cover for war*. The underlying logic of the policy is supported by the same notion of class warfare that contributed to the creation of favelas as contested territories in the first place: it prioritizes the “good citizens¹⁵⁹” of *asfalto* versus the “dangerous others¹⁶⁰” of favelas.

Alongside the mainstream interventions of the pacification, my analysis has also shown a resistance movement by actors on the ground level. One interviewee from the UPP seeks to implement the same policing approach of the *asfalto* to favelas, based on the respect of the individual rights of favelas' residents. On top of that, some agents from the UPP Social and Peace Territories aim to work alongside the local population of favelas and thus contribute to their emancipation. They provide tools to empower residents to build a community that answer to their needs, based on strong ties and mutual assistance. Nonetheless, these local attempts remain marginal in comparison to the predominant approaches guided either by a welfare perspective or by a neoliberal model. In the former, experts of government impose the solutions they perceive as adequate for the community while in the latter favelas are transformed into sites of economic exploitation based on the of consumption and individual responsabilization.

¹⁵⁹ See Giroux, 2004.

¹⁶⁰ See Bauman, 2001.

As a result, the aspiration of favelas for an ethical community¹⁶¹ continues to be undermined. First, the ethical community was attacked by the territorialisation of the drug trade and armed violence that have weakened social bonds among residents of favela. Then, with the policy of pacification, attempts to rebuild communitarian ties continue to be thwarted by initiatives that aim to transform favelas into aesthetical communities, hinged upon the primacy of the individual and the authority of the market. In conclusion, the pacification of favelas was presented as an overarching policy to address both the territorialisation of the drug trade and the underdevelopment of favelas. However, as this thesis has shown, this program is another instrument to reaffirm neoliberal governance, entrenching the exclusion of the marginalized classes.

¹⁶¹ See Bauman, 2001.

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
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Appendix A - Overview of pacified favelas

I. Map of pacified favelas:



Source: G1, 2013

II. Batan

The favela of Batan is located in the neighbourhood of Realengo, in the Western Zone of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The favela was established in the early 1970s. In 2010, its population was 23,932 inhabitants¹⁶² living in 7,614 residences, spread in a large area of 1,076,627 m² (“Rio+Social Batan,” n.d.). This community differentiates from the majority of favelas of Rio de Janeiro because it is situated in a flat area (and not on hills). One of the difficulties of the residents of Batan is its isolation from other areas of the city, which is worsened by the absence of public transportation in the region and the lack of services and businesses within the communities.

This was the third favela to be pacified; the UPP was launched in February 18th, 2009 and it counted with 107 police officers (“UPP Informações UPP Batan,” n.d.). The area covered by the UPP Batan includes the communities of Jardim Batan, Morrinho, Vila Jurema, Cristalina, and Fumacê. It is one of the only three favelas of the Western Zone that has UPPs. Further, it is the only pacified favela that was previously dominated by a militia group (all the others pacified were controlled by drug factions). This favela became famous when that militia kidnapped and tortured journalists who were conducting an investigation about the militia in this favela, in May of 2008 (Freeland, 2008). Soon after, the favela was occupied by police forces and then it was included in the project of pacification, which many claim that is associated to the incident with the journalists.

III. Coroa, Fallet, Fogueteiro

The favelas of Coroa, Fallet, and Fogueteiro are located in downtown Rio de Janeiro, close by the neighbourhood of Santa Teresa, famous for its carnival street parties. The favela of

¹⁶² This is the size of the population of the favela according to official sources. However, the population is estimated to be larger than what measured by the census. The calculation of the actual size of the population living in favelas is hindered by difficulties to access all its areas and the lack of official documents by its residents. The same applies for all favelas here described.

Fallet dates to 1930s, when the impoverished population that worked in downtown sought housing near to their workplace. The occupation of the hill of Coroa, in the 1940s, followed a governmental policy that removed residents of another hill in downtown. Without a place to live, they started to occupy Coroa. According to official sources, the population of the favela is 9,169 inhabitants living in 2,944 residences, spread in an area of 246,546 m² (“Rio+Social Fallet,” n.d.).

The UPP, with 193 police officers, was implemented on February 25th 2011 and its headquarters is located in the favela of Fallet (“UPP Informações UPP Coroa,” n.d.). The beginning of the UPP in these favelas was marked by violence and corruption. For instance, in September 2011, 30 police officers of the UPP, including the Commander and Vice-Commander, were accused of having an agreement with local drug dealers; in exchange of money, the UPP allowed the operation of the drug trade (Fonseca, 2011). As a consequence, these officers were removed from their functions. After the removal of these officers, the UPP was constantly headlines of the media due to armed confrontations between UPP officers and drug dealers. In one of these incidents, in September 2012, a police officer was shot and killed in the favela of Coroa (O Globo, 2012).

IV. Complexo da Penha

The Complexo da Penha is a complex of favelas, composed by 11 communities, in the neighbourhood of Penha in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro. The oldest communities of the complex were occupied during the 1940s. The newest areas date to the 1970s. The population of the entire complex is close to 50,000, with 13,060 residences (“Rio+ Social Complexo da Penha,” n.d.).

In the end of 2010, the Complex of da Penha as well as the Complex of Alemão were occupied by a task force of Armed Forces and tactic teams of the Military Police in preparation for the implementation of UPPs. It was a massive operation with plenty of media coverage that

lasted a week and employed 500 police officers and heavy armament, including 16 armoured personnel carrier (IG Rio de Janeiro, 2010). Following the occupation, the Complex of Penha remained under the armed control of the Brazilian Army (800 soldiers were employed in the complex) for one year and seven months (Monken, 2012). Soldiers left the area in July of 2012; the Complex of Penha then received 4 UPPs (Chatuba, Fé/Sereno, Parque Proletário, and Vila Cruzeiro) that were implemented between June and August 2012. However, only one team of the UPP Social serves all favelas, while a team of Peace Territories from another complex of favelas (Peace Territories Alemão) covers the Complex of Penha when necessary.

Specifically, the UPP Vila Cruzeiro was launched on August 18th 2012, with 300 police officers that serve 17,170 inhabitants in an area of 454,182 m² (“UPP Informações UPP Vila Cruzeiro,” n.d.). The UPP Parque Proletário was implemented in the same date of the UPP Vila Cruzeiro. It has 220 police officers covering the 301,588 m² of the favela with almost 19,000 residents (“UPP Informações UPP Parque Proletário,” n.d.). Since the exit of the Army and the implementation of the UPPs, there are constant attempts of drug dealers to recover control over those favelas. In 2014, particularly, there was a sharp increase in the level of armed violence in the Complex of Penha (Abdala, 2014; G1 Rio, 2014a). Armed confrontations resulted in the death of many UPP officers and allegedly drug dealers.

V. Rocinha

Rocinha is located in the Southern Zone of Rio de Janeiro, between the neighbourhoods of Gávea and São Conrado, one of the wealthier regions of the city. Poor residents started to occupy its hill during 1930s and, nowadays, it is one of the biggest favelas of the Latin America. Officially, it has 71,080 residents (a population larger than 92% of Brazilian municipalities) and 23,970 houses in an area of 887,587 m² (“Rio+ Social Rocinha,” n.d.). In 1993, Rocinha was given the status of an official neighbourhood, a formal change that did not alter the living

conditions of the residents in the area. However, compared to other favelas, Rocinha is considered to have a better urbanized infrastructure and more businesses and services.

A task force of police tactic teams and Armed Forces occupied the favela in the end of 2011, in preparation for the implementation of the UPP. However, the UPP Rocinha was only launched in September 20th, 2012 (Redação Época, 2012); therefore, for almost a year the favela was under the control of Armed Forces. Currently, the UPP Rocinha has 700 police officers (“UPP Informações UPP Rocinha,” n.d.). In July 2013 the disappearance of a Rocinha’s resident caused revolts of the local community and triggered a cycle of violence. In this case, 10 UPP officers, including the Commander of the unit, were charged with the torture and killing of the “missing” resident (Watts, 2013). After this episode, shootouts and armed confrontations in the favela have increased exponentially (Martins, 2014).

VI. Santa Marta

Santa Marta is the smallest pacified favela. It is situated in a hill entrenched in the upper middle-class neighbourhood of Botafogo, in the Southern Zone of Rio de Janeiro. This favela became internationally known in 1996, when the pop singer Michael Jackson recorded a music video there. Its occupation started in the 1920s, but only took over in the 1940s. It has a small population (3,908 inhabitants) concentrated in a limited area of 53,416 m² (“Rio+ Social Santa Marta,” n.d.).

This favela was the first to be pacified; the UPP was launched there on December 19th 2008, and it counts with 123 police officers (“UPP Informações UPP Santa Marta,” n.d.). It is considered the model of success of the UPP; Santa Marta has received many investments from public and private actors and it is considered the most stable favela, with few negative incidents reported. Further, according to the website of the UPP, motivated by numerous attractions of the favela (e.g., the site where Michael Jackson recorded the video with a statue of the singer, an

inclined plane railroad and a lookout with privileged views of the entire city), hundreds of tourists visit the favela each month (“UPP Informações UPP Santa Marta,” n.d.).

Appendix B - Letter of Invitation

Policing, social development, and full citizenship: an analysis of public policies tackling armed violence in favelas of Rio de Janeiro

Pier Angelli De Luca Maciel (M.A. student)
Department of Criminology – University of Ottawa

Maritza Felices-Luna, Ph.D (Associate Professor and Supervisor)
Department of Criminology – University of Ottawa

Invitation to Participate: Considering your professional position as a policy-maker and a key actor in the development of public policies to tackle armed violence in favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, you are invited to participate in the abovementioned research study. The study is a master's thesis project conducted by Pier Angelli De Luca Maciel supervised by Prof. Maritza Felices-Luna, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa, with large experience in the research of armed violence in different countries and contexts.

Purpose of the Study: Overall, the purpose of this study is to analyze public policies put in place to reduce armed violence in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. I am particularly interested in the rationales of these policies, how the different policies intersect and what the issues are both at the planning and implementation level. Thus, this research can potentially clarify important aspects of public policies that address armed violence, moving forward the knowledge of this relevant topic in society.

Participation: Your participation will consist essentially of one interview with the researcher lasting between 1 and 2 hours. However the interview can be interrupted and re-scheduled due to your professional or personal agenda. During the interview you will be requested to answer several questions regarding your professional views and activities on the topic of the elaboration of public policies to tackle armed violence in favelas. The interview will be scheduled during your work hours, according to the availability of your agenda. It will preferentially take place in your professional setting or anywhere else you feel is a calm and adequate environment for a confidential conversation.

Risks: There is not a risk expected for the participant out of this research.

Benefits: The participation in this study will contribute to the development of the knowledge about the public policies to tackle armed violence. Thus, the participants will help enhance the understanding of the phenomenon of armed violence, which can

potentially lead to better practices to tackle it. You will also have an opportunity to reflect about your practices and views on armed violence in the favelas.

Confidentiality and anonymity: The information you will share will remain strictly confidential. The contents of the interview will be used only for the purposes of this master thesis project and your confidentiality and anonymity will be protected. Furthermore, your anonymity will be ensured throughout the process. All the information able to identify the participant will be excluded from the final paper; your name will be replaced by a pseudonym. Only the two researchers above identified will have access to your personal information. The extracts from your interviews quoted in the paper will be identified only by the pseudonym attributed to you or by your professional position, as long as it does not reveal your identity.

Conservation of data: The data collected will be kept in a secure manner for five years. The tape recordings of the interviews and any sources of data retrieved from the interviews will be locked away in the research supervisor's office, which is locked regularly. Eventual electronic data, such as the transcripts and translations of the interviews, will be saved in the notebook of the principal investigator, which is only accessed by her and is protected with password. Each individual file will also be protected with an extra password. After the conservation period, the data will be destroyed.

Voluntary Participation: You are under no obligation to participate and if you choose to participate, you can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If you choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed and not used by any manner in the final project.

Audio recording: The interview will be audio-recorded preferentially. This can avoid interruptions in the course of the interview and will also facilitate the analysis of the content of it afterwards. However, if you do prefer to not have the interview recorded, you can chose to do so. In this case, only notes will be taken.

Other information: If you have any other questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

Appendix C - Interview Guide

Policing, social development, and full citizenship: an analysis of public policies tackling armed violence in favelas of Rio de Janeiro

Presentation of the study and the interview:

The purpose of this study is to analyze public policies aiming to reduce armed violence in favelas of Rio de Janeiro. In order to accomplish this, I will look at the rationales of the policies, how the policies intersect and what the issues are both at the planning and implementation level.

During the interview I would like to discuss your professional views and activities on the topic of the elaboration and/or implementation of public policies to address armed violence in favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

1. What is your take on the phenomenon of armed violence in the favelas?

Key issues to be explored:

- Causes of armed violence
- State of affairs (description of the situation)
- Solutions for the problem
- Challenges to tackle armed violence

2. What can you tell me about the process of creation and/or implementation of policies aiming to reduce armed violence in the favelas?

Key issues to be explored:

- Role played by interviewee
- Difficulties faced in the process
- Conflicts
- Politics
- Connection to broader situation/context
- People involved in the process
- Challenges, limitations
- Goals
- Integration with other policies and levels of governance (federal, state, and municipal)

3. Now, if we look more closely at the UPP/ UPP Social/ Peace Territories, what can you tell me about these programmes? (Project – UPP/UPP Social/ Peace Territories – will be chosen according to the work experience of interviewee; if they have experience with more than one, I will ask about one project at time)

Key issues to be explored:

- Activities, initiatives
- Connection to other programmes or organisations
- Problems being addressed and/or tackled
- Goals

- Institutionalization of the programme (is it a public policy, strategy, programme?)
- Formal evaluation component

4. What is your take on these programmes?

Key issues to be explored:

- Differences, similarities with previous policies
- Limitations, challenges
- Strengths, weaknesses
- Level of success
- Issues with its implementation
- Adaptations/redevelopment of project

5. Is there anything else you think I should know about the creation and/or implementation of these policies?

Face sheet (specific questions that will be asked at the end of the interview to contextualize the information provided by participant):

Date:

Sex:

Age:

Education:

Organisation where you are currently working at:

Current position:

Role or responsibilities:

How long have you been working at your current position:

Previous related work experience (where, when, length of time, position occupied):

Appendix D - Informed Consent

Policing, social development, and full citizenship: an analysis of public policies tackling armed violence in favelas of Rio de Janeiro

Pier Angelli De Luca Maciel (M.A. student)
Department of Criminology – University of Ottawa

Maritza Felices-Luna, Ph.D (Associate Professor and Supervisor)
Department of Criminology – University of Ottawa

Invitation to Participate: You are invited to participate in the abovementioned research study conducted by Pier Angelli De Luca Maciel, M.A. student, and supervised by Prof. Maritza Felices-Luna.

Purpose of the Study: Overall, the purpose of this study is to analyze public policies put in place to reduce armed violence in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. I am particularly interested in the rationales of these policies, how the different policies intersect and what the issues are both at the planning and implementation level. Thus, this research can potentially clarify important aspects of public policies that address armed violence, moving forward the knowledge of this relevant topic in society.

Participation: Your participation will consist essentially of one interview with the researcher lasting between 1 and 2 hours. However the interview can be interrupted and re-scheduled due to your professional or personal agenda. During the interview you will be requested to answer several questions regarding your professional views and activities on the topic of the elaboration of public policies to tackle armed violence in favelas. The interview will be scheduled during your work hours, according to the availability of your agenda. It will preferentially take place in your professional setting or anywhere else you feel is a calm and adequate environment for a confidential conversation.

Risks: There is not a risk expected for the participant out of this research.

Benefits: The participation in this study will contribute to the development of the knowledge about the public policies to tackle armed violence. Thus, the participants will help the comprehensive understanding of these policies, which can potentially lead to better practices to tackle armed violence in the favelas. You will also have an opportunity to reflect about your practices and views on armed violence in the favelas.

Confidentiality and anonymity: The information you will share will remain strictly confidential. The contents of the interview will be used only for the purposes of this master thesis project and confidentiality will be protected. Furthermore, your anonymity will be ensured throughout the process. All the information able to identify the participant will be excluded from the final paper; your name will be replaced by a pseudonym. Only the two researchers identified above will have access to your professional information. The extracts from your interviews quoted in the paper will be identified only by the pseudonym attributed to you or by your professional position, as long as it does not reveal your identity.

Conservation of data: The data collected will be kept in a secure manner for five years. The recordings of the interviews and any sources of data retrieved from the interviews will be locked away in the research supervisor's office. Electronic data, such as the transcripts and translations of the interviews, will be saved in the notebook of the principal investigator, which is only accessed by her and is password protected. Each individual file will also be protected by an extra password. After the conservation period, the data will be destroyed.

Voluntary Participation: You are under no obligation to participate and if you choose to participate, you can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If you choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed and not used by any manner in the final project.

Audio recording: The interview will be audio-recorded preferentially. This can avoid interruptions in the course of the interview and will also facilitate the analysis of the content of it afterwards. However, if you prefer to not have the interview recorded, you can opt out in the end of this consent. In this case, only notes will be taken.

If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher or her supervisor.

If you have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, you may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 154, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5

Tel.: (613) 562-5387

Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

Options:

1. About the audio recording of the interview:

() I consent to the audio recording and transcription of this interview and to the further analysis of its content.

or

() I do not consent to the audio recording and transcription of this interview and I only allow the researcher to take notes of it.

Acceptance: I, _____, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Pier Angelli De Luca Maciel of the Department of Criminology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, *which research is under the supervision of* Prof. Maritza Felices-Luna, under the conditions above established.

There are two copies of the consent form, one of which is for you to keep.

Participant's signature: _____ Date: __/__/__

Researcher's signature: _____ Date: __/__/__

Appendix E - Ethical Approvals

I. Canada

File Number: 04-13-14

Date (mm/dd/yyyy): 10/22/2013



Université d'Ottawa
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche

University of Ottawa
Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

Ethics Approval Notice Social Science and Humanities REB

Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)

<u>First Name</u>	<u>Last Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Role</u>
Maritza	Felices-Luna	Social Sciences / Criminology	Supervisor
Pier Angelli	De Luca Maciel	Social Sciences / Criminology	Student Researcher

File Number: 04-13-14

Type of Project: Master's Thesis

Title: Policing, social development, and full citizenship: an analysis of public policies tackling armed violence in favelas of Rio de Janeiro

<u>Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</u>	<u>Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</u>	<u>Approval Type</u>
10/22/2013	10/21/2014	Ia

(Ia: Approval, Ib: Approval for initial stage only)

Special Conditions / Comments:

Modifications to the purpose/focus, supervisor, title, information letters and consent forms have been approved (Oct 22nd 2013).

The REB acknowledges that a certificate of conditional ethics approval was granted on May 28th, 2013. The condition for obtaining full ethics approval was met when approval from the Committee for Ethics in Research, Ministry of Health, Brazil was received (September 16th, 2013). The REB accepts the confirmation from the researcher that no recruitment or data collection took place prior to the project receiving approval from the Brazilian ethics committee.

550, rue Cumberland¹ 550 Cumberland Street
Ottawa (Ontario) K1N 6N5 Canada Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5 Canada
(613) 562-5387 • Téléc./Fax (613) 562-5338
<http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/index.html>
<http://www.recherche.uottawa.ca/deontologie/index.html>



Université d'Ottawa
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche

University of Ottawa
Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

This is to confirm that the University of Ottawa Research Ethics Board identified above, which operates in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement and other applicable laws and regulations in Ontario, has examined and approved the application for ethical approval for the above named research project as of the Ethics Approval Date indicated for the period above and subject to the conditions listed the section above entitled "Special Conditions / Comments".

During the course of the study the protocol may not be modified without prior written approval from the REB except when necessary to remove participants from immediate endangerment or when the modification(s) pertain to only administrative or logistical components of the study (e.g. change of telephone number). Investigators must also promptly alert the REB of any changes which increase the risk to participant(s), any changes which considerably affect the conduct of the project, all unanticipated and harmful events that occur, and new information that may negatively affect the conduct of the project and safety of the participant(s). Modifications to the project, information/consent documentation, and/or recruitment documentation, should be submitted to this office for approval using the "Modification to research project" form available at: <http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms.html>

Please submit an annual status report to the Protocol Officer 4 weeks before the above-referenced expiry date to either close the file or request a renewal of ethics approval. This document can be found at: <http://www.research.uottawa.ca/ethics/forms.html>


If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Office at extension 5387 or by e-mail at: ethics@uOttawa.ca.

Signature:

Riana Marcotte
Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research
For Barbara Graves, Chair of the Social Sciences and Humanities REB

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<http://www.recherche.uottawa.ca/deontologie/index.html>

II. Brazil



PARECER CONSUBSTANCIADO DO CEP

DADOS DO PROJETO DE PESQUISA

Título da Pesquisa: Violência juvenil: uma análise das políticas públicas canadenses e brasileiras para combater e prevenir a violência juvenil

Pesquisador: Pier Angelli De Luca Maciel

Área Temática:

Versão: 2

CAAE: 20300213.0.0000.0086

Instituição Proponente:

Patrocinador Principal: Financiamento Próprio

DADOS DO PARECER

Número do Parecer: 396.601

Data da Relatoria: 03/10/2013

Apresentação do Projeto:

Essa pesquisa envolve uma comparação entre as políticas públicas desenvolvidas no Canadá e no Brasil para combater e prevenir a violência juvenil. Essa análise comparativa propiciará uma investigação dos modos distintos que países escolhem para reduzir e prevenir violência juvenil. Para que isso seja possível, primeiramente será desenvolvida uma estrutura classificativa que caracterizará as políticas em termos de repressão, controle social e prevenção. Para explorar de modo detalhado o processo de elaboração de políticas públicas nesses dois países, será examinado o entendimento que formuladores de políticas públicas brasileiros e canadenses têm sobre o fenômeno de violência juvenil. A pesquisa foca particularmente na diferença entre os dois países que já foi previamente identificada, qual seja, o Canadá identifica e aborda gangues juvenis de rua enquanto que no Brasil este problema aparentemente não tem grande relevância.

Considerando esses dois níveis de análise, a pesquisa visa a estabelecer uma possível conexão entre as característica das políticas públicas canadenses e brasileiras e o entendimento dos formuladores de políticas públicas sobre o fenômeno da violência juvenil. Assim, esse estudo pode potencialmente esclarecer importantes aspectos das políticas públicas que enfrentam a violência juvenil, avançando o conhecimento desse relevante tópico para a sociedade contemporânea.

Endereço: Rua General Jardim, 36 - 1º andar

Bairro: CENTRO

UF: SP

Município: SAO PAULO

Telefone: (11)3397-2464

CEP: 01.223-010

E-mail: smscep@gmail.com

Continuação do Parecer: 396.601

Objetivo da Pesquisa:

Explorar as políticas públicas canadenses e brasileiras de maneira comparativa, o que permitirá uma profunda investigação das distintas escolhas que estes países fazem para reduzir e prevenir a violência juvenil.

Avaliação dos Riscos e Benefícios:

Não são citados riscos para os participantes e os benefícios residem em uma maior compreensão da violência juvenil, abordada no contexto brasileiro e canadense, o que poderá se traduzir em ações promotoras de saúde relativas à juventude em ambos os contextos.

Comentários e Considerações sobre a Pesquisa:

Trata-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa, a ser desenvolvida por meio de entrevistas com gestores públicos e figuras chave na área, cujo método apresenta-se em consonância com os objetivos propostos e que assume relevância em contextos nos quais diferentes formas de compreensão do fenômeno poderão contribuir para ações mais efetivas na abordagem da questão.

Considerações sobre os Termos de apresentação obrigatória:

A Folha de rosto não informa a instituição proponente (a qual o pesquisador é vinculado) pois a pesquisadora principal desenvolve esta pesquisa no âmbito do seu mestrado em Criminologia, na Universidade de Ottawa, no Canadá. A Plataforma Brasil não admite instituições estrangeiras, somente instituições brasileiras com registro de CNPJ. Pelo mesmo motivo, o formulário não foi preenchido pela universidade.

Não haverá instituições coparticipantes no estudo. Os dados serão colhidos diretamente de gestores públicos e atores que detêm o poder de decisão sobre a entrevista. Em outras palavras, esses atores sociais não dependem de autorização de nenhuma instituição para conceder a entrevista. Eles são pesquisadores autônomos ou gestores com posição hierárquica de autonomia e livre decisão sobre a entrevista. A título de exemplo, a pesquisa se foca em gestores tais como o secretário de desenvolvimento social do estado do Rio de Janeiro, que não precisa de autorização prévia da secretaria para conceder a entrevista já que ele mesmo responde pela secretaria.

A pesquisadora informa que a coleta dos dados não foi iniciada. O cronograma foi retificado e considerado adequado.

A pesquisa será financiada pela própria pesquisa e os custos foram declarados adequadamente.

O TCLE foi retificado e considerado adequado.

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E-mail: smscep@gmail.com

Continuação do Parecer: 396.601

Recomendações:

-

Conclusões ou Pendências e Lista de Inadequações:

Sem pendências ou inadequações.

Situação do Parecer:

Aprovado

Necessita Apreciação da CONEP:

Não

Considerações Finais a critério do CEP:

Para início da coleta dos dados, o pesquisador deverá se apresentar na mesma instância que autorizou a realização do estudo (Coordenadoria, Supervisão, SMS/Gab, etc).

O sujeito de pesquisa (ou seu representante) e o pesquisador responsável deverão rubricar todas as folhas do Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido, TCLE apondo sua assinatura na última página do referido Termo, conforme Carta Circular no 003/2011 da CONEP/CNS.

Salientamos que o pesquisador deve desenvolver a pesquisa conforme delineada no protocolo aprovado. Eventuais modificações ou emendas ao protocolo devem ser apresentadas ao CEP de forma clara e sucinta, identificando a parte do protocolo a ser modificada e suas justificativas. Lembramos que esta modificação necessitará de aprovação ética do CEP antes de ser implementada.

Ao pesquisador cabe manter em arquivo, sob sua guarda, por 5 anos, os dados da pesquisa, contendo fichas individuais e todos os demais documentos recomendados pelo CEP (Res. CNS 196/96 item IX. 2. e). De acordo com a Res. CNS 196, IX.2.c, o pesquisador deve apresentar a este CEP/SMS os relatórios semestrais. O relatório final deverá ser enviado através da Plataforma Brasil, ícone Notificação. Uma cópia digital (CD/DVD) do projeto finalizado deverá ser enviada à instância que autorizou a realização do estudo, via correio ou entregue pessoalmente, logo que o mesmo estiver concluído.

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SECRETARIA MUNICIPAL DA
SAÚDE DE SÃO PAULO -
SMS/SP



Continuação do Parecer: 396.601

SAO PAULO, 16 de Setembro de 2013

Assinador por:
SIMONE MONGELLI DE FANTINI
(Coordenador)

Endereço: Rua General Jardim, 36 - 1º andar

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Página 04 de 04

Appendix F – Coding Table

Themes	Sub-themes	Codes ("Sub-sub" themes)	Codes	Codes
1 - State of the favelas	A - Poder paralelo	Armed violence	Armed conflicts in favelas with UPP	
			Restricted circulation of people	
		Drug trade	Bonds with the community	Drug lord as role model
			Total institution	
			Number of drug factions	
			Level of armament	
		Militia	Easier to pacify	
	B - Perception of community	Residents' perspective on UPP	Disbelief in its permanency	Police is an enemy
			Resistance to police	
		Residents' engagement with social initiatives	More selective when have more options	
		Lack of information about rights		
		Political organization of residents		
		Implementation of UPP	Differences among commanders approach	Meetings with community
				Contact with residents
				Oppression of residents
			Number of officers in foot patrol	
			Relationship police/community	
			Differences in armament of UPP	
		Occasional police presence (favelas not pacified)		
		Lack of social support for individuals at risk		
		Poor quality of life		
		NGO's		
		Businesses		

	C - Infrastructure + services	Services provision	Lack of sewage network	
			Health services	
			Public transportation	
			Lack of integration of services	
			Lack of dialogue (public sector and residents)	
			Education	
			Lack of street lighting	
			Lack of public transportation	
			Lack of garbage collection	Health implications
			Inadequate services provision	
		Infrastructure	Informal houses	Plywood
				Health consequences
			Out of city map	
		Inequality among favelas	Risk areas	
			Southern Zone versus others	Media attention
				Visibility
			Amount of social projects	
			Prioritize strategic areas for big events	
	D - Geography	Remote locations inside favelas		
		Large areas		
		Favelas distant from downtown		
		Flat favelas		
	E - Marginalization of favelas	Stigmatization of youth		
		Division favela/asfalto		
		Society ignores situation inside favelas		
		Acceptance of violence within walls of favela		

	F - Heterogeneity of population	Inequality intra-favela	Economic	Concentration of social projects in certain areas Don't serve entire community
			Services	
			Urbanization	
		Lack of common goals		
	G - Effects outside favelas	Associated violence in rich areas		
		Urban degradation of surroundings of favelas		
		Exacerbated fear of crime		
		Image of the city		
		Flight of investments		
	2 - Strategies to integrate favelas with the rest of the city	Development of community-based solutions	Involvement of residents in the process	
			Working groups	
		Respect specific characteristics of community		
		Support local initiatives		
		Participatory approach	Community's hearing	Focus on collective demands
			Employment of workers from territory	
			Protagonism of community leaders	
			Promote voice of residents	
		Focus on territory	Inexistence of headquarter	
			Dynamic work (meetings throughout favela)	
			Workers adapt their schedule to availability of residents	
		Knowledge-oriented	Actions to inform community	
		Lessons on political process	Transparency about limitations of projects	
			How to do an edital	
			Transience of programs	
			Responsibilities of 3 levels of government	

			Organization of residents in groups	
	B - Increase efficiency of services	Integration of public administration	Dialogue between different sectors	
		Facilitator of dialogue (civil society, public institutions and private sectors)	Matching offer and demand	
			Networks	Promote integrated actions
				Development of creative solutions with universities
		Empowerment of local actors	Optimize limited resources	
			Accountability	Find local solutions
			Equality among local actors	
			Way to bypass barrier of silos	
			Local support networks	
		Increase presence of social facet of State		
		Mapping	Qualified information	
			Qualified hearing	
			Collect demands	
		Enhance quality of life in favelas	Social assistance	
			Meet demands	
			Education	
			Leisure	
		Public-private partnerships	Mediate relationship community and private sector	Take demands to companies
			Local development	Generate jobs
				Foster local initiatives
				Increase income
			Focus of UPP Social in the 2nd moment	
			Companies investing in favelas	Fast private money (no bureaucracies)
	C - Integration of UPP Social and Peace Territories	Integration in practice	Meetings	
			Optimize limited resources	
			Avoid overlapping	
			Ties based on personal affinities	

		Focus on different levels of government	UPP Social: municipality	
			P.T.: state	
	D - New model of policing	Pacifying policing	Focus on relationship with community	Building trust
				Explanation of rights to residents
				Dialogue with community
				Proactive behaviour of police
				Police serving residents of favela
				Meetings with community
			Focus on public safety through partnership with community	Knowledge of community
			Divergence about definition of community policing and proximity policing	Applied to policing activity
				Proximity policing + social services
				Community engagement in the development of strategies
		Employment of newly-recruited officers	Avoid old vices	
		Better qualification of officers (college degree)		
		Treat residents of favelas the same way that treat residents of other areas		
		Enforcement of pacifying approach	Dialogue with low-ranked officers	
			Acknowledgement of good work	Benefits with points system
				Extra activities with family
			Supervision of officers	
			Replacement of bad officers	
			Share good practices	
			Punishment	Disciplinary measures
				General deterrence

		Overcoming of previous war strategy	High number of causalities	
			Inefficiency	
			Police versus residents	
			Focus on drugs and weapons	
			Urban war	
		New training	Focus on human rights	
			Do not attack back	
			Restriction of heavy weapons	
			Mediation of conflicts	
			Focus on community policing	
			Change of police culture	
3 - Strategies for civilizing favelas	A - Territorial control	Military tactics	Saturation of police officers	
			Control hinged on force	Presence of police 24/7 in favelas
				Employment of army
				Use of heavy armaments (rifle)
			Strategic planning to gather information	
			Military criteria for evaluation	
			Strategies to besiege traffickers	
			Police intelligence	
			Permanency of police	
			Territorial positioning of police officers	
		Social strategies	Meet social demands to build trust	
			Social projects to bond with residents	Reduce community resistance to UPP
				Humanize police officer
			Private-public alliances	Sistema S complements work of police
				Foster entrepreneurship

				Sports and social activities for children
			Services offered inside headquarter of UPP	
			Presence of private investment since the arrival of UPP	COMLURB
				Light
				SEDAE
	B - Cleaning up	Crime	Unofficial goal to end drug trade	
			End of all illicit activity	Cable theft
				Clandestine water and electricity connections
				Prostitution
				Illegal gambling games
		Undesirable population		
		Aesthetics	Garbage	
	C - Management of favelas	Police tutelage	Protection of community	
			Teaching residents how to do things	Organization of parties
				Responsibilities of organizers
			Alienation	Ignorance about rights
		Control of social life	Control of commerce	
			Regulation of events	Change of events location
				Previous authorization for events
				Prohibition to do outside parties
			Regulation of community's life	Noise
				Moto-táxi (alternative transportation)
				Garbage
			Connection of events with drug traffickers	
		Police replaces social actors	Meet communities demands	Social work
				Counselling services
				Instructor of sports

			Substitute previous actors	Instructor threatened by drug trade
			Articulação com outros setores	
			Police mediates community's relation with government	
			"Ofícios" to public bodies	
		Police develops social projects	Create channel of dialogue	
			Reverse influence of drug trade	
			Focus on children	After-school classes
				School tutoring
				Partnerships with schools
				Drug prevention taught inside public schools
				Problem of idle children
			Projects with legal actors	
			Multiple activities	Music
				Martial arts
				Physiotherapy
	D - Change lifestyle	Change values of community	Disrespect police	
			Resistance to "abordagem"	
			Support to drug trade	
			Perception of police as enemy	
			Respect laws	
			Police officer as the role model	
			População mais ordeira	
		Fulfill duties of citizenship		
		New culture for favelas	Funk	
			Religion event	
		Change habits	Use of electricity	
		Pacification as a long term process	Hope in the next generation	
			Avoid that children get involved with drug trade	
			Lost generation	

			Focus of work on children	
	A - Resistance (by)	Community	Community's distrust in police	History of mistreatment
				Replacement of traffickers by police
				Everyday conflicts with UPP
			Disbelief in government	History of promises not delivered
				Frustration with UPP Social's incapacity to deliver results
				Distrust in UPP Social (X9)
				Connection of UPP Social to UPP because of name
			Disappointment with pacification	Duties without rights
				Investments don't benefit residents
				Increase of armed conflicts after UPP
				Misunderstanding of what is pacification
				Complaints against control of social life by police
				Didn't improve services
			Discontinuity of UPP	Fear of retaliation by drug trade
				UPP will stay only until Olympics
			Culture of violence	Empowerment by weapons
			Abrupt change in power relations of favela	
		Poder paralelo (criminals, drug trade)	Attempts of drug network to retake territory	Return of heavy weapons
				Organized attacks to favelas
				Armed conflicts with UPP
			Intimidation of residents	
			Disqualification of youth involved with drug trade	
			Ties of drug traffickers with residents	
			Drug trade appeal	
				Way out of poverty (easy money)
				Family business
				Profitable business (high demand)
				Leniency of criminal justice system

4 - Barriers (to implement projects)		Police	Embracement of new model by all officers	Individual factors
				Difficulty to spread the idea
			Discrimination against UPP officers	Perceived as inferior
			Job dissatisfaction	Frustration with results
				Annoying work
				Complicated communities
				Lack of acknowledgement of their work
			Lack sense of belonging	Political use of UPP
				Don't have vocation for work
		Society	Pacification restricted to policing sphere	
			Resistance to police	
			Does not invest in favelas	
		Social actors	Methodology of projects	Vertical approach
			Different expectations of job	
			Distrust in UPP	
	B - Geography	Difficulty to access remote areas		
		Large area to control		
		Urban infrastructure		
		Car patrol versus foot patrol		
		Complicated police patrol		
			Lack of training	Investments focused on structure
				P.T. calls for massive investment on training (human rights, violence, abordagem)
				Still trained for killing criminals
			Insufficient number of officers	Police calls for more officers
				Overloaded police (policing + social services)
			Limitations of UPP	Need broader policy of public safety
				Insufficient UPPs in the city
				Displacement of criminality
			Working conditions	Containers

	C - Infrastructure + services	Police		Lack of resources
				Inadequate buildings
			Turnover of police officers	Hinders proximity with community
			Problems with pre-implementation of UPP	Poor quality of occupation
				Vices of Army
			Limitations of social projects	Benefits are individualized
				Compete with local actors
				Resistance of social actors
				Superficial work
				Don't have skills to do it
				Don't affect image of all police
			Síndico da favela (dono do morro)	Resistance of community
				Community relies on authoritative figure
			Disqualification of community's voice	Criminalize complaints
			Management of large troops	
			Incapacity of UPP to promote full citizenship	UPP promotes segurança pública and UPP Social promotes segurança cidadã
			Low institutionalization of UPP	Distortion of goals
				Personification of UPP
				Lack of monitoring and evaluation
				Localism of practices
				Lack of channels to exchange practices
				Inexistence of guidelines
		Services	Lack of investment on social component	Insufficient programs for demand
				Workers believe that P.T. will be discontinued
				Social services provide long-term sustainability to pacification

			Pacote UPP	One size fits all
				Concentrated on health and education
				Short-term measures
				Sistema S
				Private companies
			Police calling for arrival of other services	Absence of other legal actors
				Police complains about being alone
				Frustration with UPP Social
				Social demands become police problems
			Dynamism of favelas	
			Multiple demands	Historical abandonment
			Safety of favelas	Shootouts disrupt work
			Delay between UPP and arrival of services	
			Limitations of UPP Social and P.T.	UPP Social and P.T. are articulation bodies, do not implement actions
				Lack of monitoring and evaluation - P.T.
				Lack of channels to exchange practices
				UPP Social as information body
				Insufficient workers in UPP Social and P.T.
				Lack of guidance
				Abandonment of fight inside public sector
				Lack of funding
				Lack of political support
				Absence of headquarter
				Lost of strength by UPP Social
		Partnerships with private and voluntary sector	Visibility	lack of visibility of favelas not in Southern Zone

				Concentration of initiatives in most visible areas
				Initiatives that seek self-promotion
			Urban degradation	
			Lack of "projetos"	
	D - Politics	Politicization of social policy	Political dispute involving UPP Social	Development of Peace Territories
				Removal of project from state level to municipality
			Social policy is fragmented by political disputes	
			Community projects are coopted by politics	
			Clientelismo	
			Political nominations of administrators	Lack of qualification
				Commitment to election and not well being of residents
		Political interference in policing	Not a technical work	
			Elections	UPP used in political attacks
		Continuity of programmes	Changes on parties in power	
			Programmes don't transfer knowledge	
			Lack of planning on long term	
		Political arrangement	Government is not guided by best interests of population	Represent elite and not majority of population
				Concentration of investments in certain favelas
				Policies created for wealth people
			Government silos	Not adapted to specificities of territory
				Lack of integrated planning

				Policies are not created thinking about territory
				Department's own agendas
			Dialogue with public sector	Disqualification of residents voice
				Incapacity to put forward community-based strategies
			Slow response of public sector	
			Inefficiency of public sector in general	
			Mediate interests of different actors	High turnover of actors
	E - Society culture	Culture of violence		
		Corruption		
		Lack of initiative (wait for government)		
		Society doesn't know what it wants from police	Traces of dictatorship (what we want from police)	Bandido bom é bandido morto
		New comprehension of violence	Violence tied to societal causes	
	F - Relationship among programmes	Lack of institutional integration	Ties based on personal affinities	
			Integration of UPP Social and P.T. compromised after UPP Social was re-structured	
			Overlapping of work	
		Distance from UPP		
		Lack of communication	Turnover of actors	
			Different division of teams	
			Ignorance about other programmes	
		Power inequality	UPP as the central power	

		Safety of workers	Mediation of problems with police	
		Different philosophies	Involvement of community	Participatory versus top-down approach
			P.T. deals with human rights	Peace Territories more concerned with mediation of UPP/Residents
			UPP Social focuses on mapping	
			UPP Social concerned with self-promotion	
			Focus on different actors	UPP Social works for municipality and P.T. for community
	G - Police culture	Militarism	Warrior ideal	Recruits embedded with idea of confront
				Kill the enemy
				Respect based on violence
			Police not on service of residents	Police protecting governments, companies
				Police not to protect citizens
			Dissociation of community policing and real policing	
		Heritage of dictatorship	Hierarchy	Old officers do not obey new officers
				Low-ranked officers only execute
			History of military training	Torture
				Goal is to kill
			Autonomous institution	Lack of accountability
				Lack of control
			Resistance to human rights	Mocking of human rights workers
		History of conflicts with community	Death of colleagues	
			Residents versus police	
		Superficial changes of police	UPP Social calls for structural changes	
			Pacification with torturers	
			Need to have a new police	
		Misconduct of officers	Corruption	Police doing security of "boca de fumo"

			Excessive "abordagens"	
			Violence	
5 - Changes after implementation of projects	A - Territorial control	Criminality	Drug trade	Tráfico de formiguinha
				Increase involvement of minors
				End of "poder paralelo"
			End of illicit activities	Coexistence of drug trade and police
				Cable theft
				Illegal gambling games
			Alternative way for criminals	
			Emergence of violence restrained by traffickers	Domestic violence
				Robberies
			Reduction of armed violence	
		Freedom of mobility	Tourism of poverty	
			Freedom to circulate in favelas	Freedom from armed traffickers controlling entrances
				Use of favelas as shortcuts by non-residents
			Break wall city and favelas	
			Territorial control is gateway for development	
		Reduction of harm to police		
	B- City level	Increase of tourism in the city	Decrease of fear of crime	
			Image of safe city	
		Increase of investments		
		Attend needs of World Cup and Olympics		
		Reduction of criminality in the surroundings of favelas		
		Media influence		
		Satisfaction of middle-class		

	C - Interaction of police with public and other actors	Building trust	Increase of anonymous tips to police
			Police ties with association of residents
		Overcoming idea of police as enemy	Respect residents
		Accountability of police	Complaints in community meetings
			Acceptance of criticisms
		Priority of life	Shooting not to kill
		Rapprochement with human rights	
		UPP as a seed of a new police	
	E - Private investment in favelas	Regularization of services	
		Increase interest in favelas after pacification	Idea of security
		Investment of Light in sports	
		Partnerships with grassroots movements	
	F - Community (favelas)	Importance of political organization	Bring together different groups (within favelas)
			Protest
			Community petitions
		Creation of networks	
		Behavioural changes	Young generation that didn't experience exacerbated violence
		Projects that follow their needs	

	G - Public sector	Bring capacitated youth to work with public policy		
		Services provision	Garbage collection	
			Assignment of zip codes for houses	
			Enhancement of quality	
			Timid changes in social services	Services do not attend all demand
		Attempt of a new governance	Creation of channels of dialogue	Networks
				Bringing actors together
			Focus on local level	Integrated solutions
			Fight clientelismo	
			Collection of qualified information	Mapa rápido participativo
			Participatory approach	Solid relationship with community
	H - Violation of rights	By police	Control of events	
			Psychological violence	
			Symbolic violence (armed presence)	
			Killing of residents	
			Restriction of mobility	
		By government	Lack of rights	
			Symbolic violence (lack of services)	
			House removals without due process	
	I - Perverse effect of social initiatives	Top-down approach	Change of streets names without community consultation	
			Disqualification of voice of residents	

			Appropriation of communities initiatives by private sector	Light took over recycling project
			UPP Social takes credit of residents' initiatives	
			Investments guided by interests of investor	
		Disconnection with community needs	Investments don't benefit residents	Regularization of services
				House removals to distant areas
				Courses that aren't recognized by market
			Gentrification	Increase cost of life
				Replacement of residents by richer individuals
				Real state speculation
			Investments don't meet residents' priorities	Cable car instead of sewage network
				Elefantes brancos
				Capacitation courses
				Garbage collection in Santa Marta