Certainty through Flexibility: Intelligence and Paramilitarization in Canadian Public Order Policing

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Abstract

This case study explores public order policing at the Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit in Toronto. The source material is drawn from media coverage of these events. These cases are analyzed using prior theoretical works in order policing in order to achieve two research goals: to discover which theory best explains police actions and the extent of and reasons explaining the involvement of other government agencies in securing protest events in Canada. Using pattern matching methodology, it was found that no one particular theory is best at explaining events at the two cases, rather components of various theories provided the most useful insight. The components of these theories that need to be amalgamated through analytic induction are: the use of intelligence functions; police flexibility; as well as paramilitarization tactics. Finally, it was found that there was a noticeable presence and integration of other government agencies involved in securing both events.

Keywords: public order policing, policing protest, media, policing, Canada.

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Acronyms

APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BCCLA – British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
CBC – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CBSA – Canada Border Services Agency
CF – Canadian Forces
CRG – Community Relations Group
CSIS – Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND – Department of National Defense
ILP – Intelligence-Led Policing
INSET – Integrated National Security Enforcement Team
ISU – Integrated Security Unit
ITAC – Integrated Threat Assessment Center
JIG – Joint Intelligence Group
JTF2 – Joint Task Force 2
JTFG – Joint Task Force Games
LRAD – Long-Range Acoustic Device
NHL – National Hockey League
NORAD – North American Aerospace Defense Command
OAS – Organization of American States
OPP – Ontario Provincial Police
ORN – Olympic Resistance Network
PSEPC – Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
PWPA – *Public Works Protection Act*
RBC – Royal Bank of Canada
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police
TC – Transport Canada
TPS – Toronto Police Service
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
VPD – Vancouver Police Department

Chapter 1 – Introduction

Over the last century, Canada has witnessed an array of public disorder events, from the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 to the confrontational Aboriginal protests of the early 1990s catalyzed by the Oka conflict. It would be naïve to suggest that this social phenomenon will subside or become insignificant in the coming years. For 2011, this was highlighted by the many 'Occupy' movements. From a Canadian perspective, 2010 was a notable year for social protest including the Vancouver Olympics and the G20 Summit in Toronto. These events present criminologists with an important opportunity to better illuminate the limitations and debates in current public order policing literature. The fact that the Vancouver Olympics and the G20 Summit both occurred in Canada during the same year provides a rare opportunity: the ability to fully study, research and analyze public order policing from a contemporary Canadian perspective and to juxtapose two different yet extremely significant events.

The Olympics involved the presence of over 6,000 police officers, not including thousands of military personnel, as well as 4,800 private security personnel (McLean, June 7 2010). Moreover, the Olympics saw the installation of over 900 closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras (*ibid*). Comparatively, the G20 Summits drew approximately 15,000 public police and private security officers, and 5,000 military personnel (Freeze, April 7, 2010). According to the Toronto Star, the costs associated with security at the Olympics is somewhere in the realm of $833 million (McLean, June 7 2010). It has recently been reported by the federal government that security at the G20 Summit this summer surpassed that of the Olympics, and was the largest security event in Canadian history (Alcoba, February 23 2010). A more recent Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) (G8/G20 costs top $857M, November 5, 2010) article states that security for the G8-G20 Summits cost $857 million, however this figure is the subject of ongoing debate (*ibid*). In their *G20 After Action Review* (June 2011), the Toronto Police Service (TPS) state that during the G20, "the TPS and its partner agencies were faced with sustained, serious, and widespread criminality and public disorder … The scope and intensity of the disorder are without precedent in the history of the TPS" (58). These realities exceed all previous security undertakings in Canada, and will indeed be important case studies for academics and the field of criminology.

At the 1997 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Vancouver, there were approximately 3,000 police present, in what the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli called at the time, "the largest and most complex security assignment that the RCMP had ever undertaken" (de Lint & Hall, 2009, 233). The 2001 Organization of American States (OAS) summit in Windsor saw the presence of 3,700 police officers and cost an estimated $3.3 million (238). More significant than this, the 2002 Summit of the Americas conference in Quebec City required 6,000 police, and cost roughly $100 million (244). Finally, the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis included the use of 5,000 military personnel and over 1,500 RCMP officers, and cost a total of $500 million (247). Although significantly less costly, these past events provide context to the magnitude of the security undertakings that occurred at the Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, and illustrate the importance these events hold for researchers.

Figure 1 – Canadian Summit Security Expenses



(Figures taken from Hall and de Lint, 2010, 233-248; G156)

Figure 2 - Canadian Summit Security Personnel Figures



(Figures taken from Hall and de Lint, 2010, 233-248; G307; V17)

As illustrated in the above graphs, in comparison to past security events in Canada, the Olympics and G20 Summit were undoubtedly the largest domestic security undertakings in Canadian history, and will be crucial cases for criminologists to study in order to better understand the current state, organization, and theories of public order policing in Canada. From a Canadian perspective, these two events present researchers with a unique and critical opportunity that has been highlighted by researchers such as Della Porta and Reiter: to better understand the above events and their consequences for criminology.

Problem Statement

Public order is becoming a growing concern for criminological researchers given the nature of social change in modern society and police actions in these situations are highly important because they often frame social narratives. Indeed, there is an increasing potential for social movements to affect the lives of many globally. Moreover, the concern surrounding protest, and by implication public order policing, will continue to increase for researchers (Gordon, 2001). Della Porta and Reiter (1998) have succinctly argued that criminological research is relatively limited with regards to comparative studies concerning public disorder;

> There is…a significant gap to be filled in the literature with comparative studies on protest and policing. Moreover, protest policing is a particularly relevant issue [requiring] a thorough understanding of the relationship between social movements and the state (1).

There are three important justifications for the research problem, outlined above, which are elaborated and analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 2. First, there is a contemporary debate in the literature surrounding the nature and structure of public order policing. Second, more recent conceptual developments in public order policing in Canada have yet to be corroborated by empirical research. Finally, the sheer magnitude of the security surrounding the Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit presents Canadian criminologists with a new precedent in the realm of domestic security operations, as well as an important opportunity to further grasp and elaborate public order policing in Canada.

Background and Purpose of Study

Methodology - The current thesis is a comparative case study of public disorder events and policing at the Vancouver Olympics and the G20 Summit as depicted in public media sources. This study is descriptive and exploratory in nature, rather than explanatory. That is, it does not seek to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between how particular events or situations shape how others occur (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006, 33). Rather, it attempts only to assess the extent to which various explanatory models fit the circumstances of each case, as depicted through public media sources. Through this, cross-case conclusions are drawn in order to better generalize the findings and to corroborate current research in the field.

Pattern matching will be employed to assist in interpreting data. This is a deductive qualitative study, because it moves from the general to specific, beginning with theoretical models and then moving to gather data and develop analysis which can act as a test of those particular theoretical propositions. A linear-analytical structure to the case study has been adopted, which is a systematic method of analyzing cases.

All data has been gathered from the public realm. The bulk of the data gathered is from Canadian news organizations (*N=529*); however, news releases (*N=65*), pictures (*N=250*), and videos (*N=58)* were obtained, analyzed and contributed to the thesis. A case study design is a robust method of dealing with a variety of data (Yin, 2009, 11), and it is for this particular reason that it is the most appropriate methodological approach to the current study. A specific goal of the

current thesis is to corroborate and, where appropriate, to contradict recent research in the field. Case study inquiry utilizes "prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data...analysis" (Yin, 2009, 18). That is, theory development and testing is an important component of case study design (Yin, 2009, 35).

Research Questions - Although the work done by de Lint and Hall (2002; 2003; 2004; and 2009), and Della Porta and Reiter (1998; 2006) has provided criminologists with a framework for understanding public order policing, we still lack the tools to understand important developments in public order policing, particularly in Canada. This is a problem for criminologists because there is a distinct disjuncture in the literature concerning policing public order. These debates are discussed in detail in Chapter 2; however, in order to place this research in proper perspective, it is important to generally question what aspects of public order policing theories can be found in the Canadian context regarding public order policing. Moreover, we examine why and to what extent policing functions are being shared with other entities in public disorder situations.

These general queries present researchers with an obstacle to understanding, and further illumination is required that is lacking in the literature on this topic. There is also an absence of adequate research to corroborate or to contradict recent theoretical propositions in the field. De Lint and Hall's model in 2009 is backed up by their research; however, it has yet to receive outside support. Due to the lack of progress in solving or bridging these debates and contradictions, the following specific research questions have been formulated;

- Which theory of public order policing is best suited to explain and categorize public disorder at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? What factors may help explain the applicability of one over the other?
- How do other federal departments play a role in protest control at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? If so, which theoretical model best explains this?

Hypothesis

There are several hypotheses which can be discussed at this juncture. Firstly, it is possible to hypothesize that recent theoretical developments in public order policing will be effective tools in explaining police actions and categorizing them. Primarily from a Canadian perspective,

'intelligent control' theory will be most appropriate because of its Canadian roots. Finally, the current emphasis placed by many scholars on an increased intelligence function by law enforcement may help to explain the use of outside federal agencies by police.

Objectives and Outcomes

This study will produce the following outcomes: 1) To help articulate the most appropriate theoretical model of public order policing as it applies to these protest events in Canada, as reported through the media; and, 2) To discover and explain the extent to which law enforcement relied on other government agencies to perform policing functions at these two events, as reported through the media.

Limitations

Much like any other research method, case study design has both benefits and drawbacks. A common criticism of case study designs is that they allow for little scientific generalization (Yin, 2009, 15). It is evident that social facts are not based on a single experiment; they are the result of rigorous replication based on systematic rules guiding research methodology. The goal of the current thesis is not to generate concrete social facts, but to produce findings that are "generalizable to theoretical propositions" (Yin, 2009, 15) rather than populations or social phenomena in general. These analytical generalizations help clarify the viability and relevance of current research in the field of public order policing, particularly in Canada.

The current thesis is also limited to publicly available data drawn from media accounts, and neglects interviews, surveys and other direct observation. This is clearly a limitation; however, the sizeable amount of public information readily available for the Olympics and G20 will provide a rich data source that will certainly fulfil the goals of this thesis.

Key Concepts and Definitions

There are several crucial definitions that must be codified at this juncture to facilitate the flow of this thesis.

Intelligence: Intelligence is the combination of information with the value-added of analysis. This can be either human or technological analysis, or both. This involves activities such as monitoring events, people, trends, and other phenomenon, and detecting patterns, anomalies, and knowledge gaps. Intelligence incorporates information from all sources (human, technological and open), and allows for the production of assessments for decision makers (George and Bruce, 2008).

Paramilitarization: As a style of public order policing, paramilitary police forces place an emphasis on: the use of riot gear, specialized units, squad formations, controlled force, intelligence gathering, surveillance, large-scale planning, the imposition of a chain of command and strict command and control practices (Waddington, D., 2007, 27).

Protest: Organized visible public dissent against a particular political entity, policy, or social phenomenon that attempts to address or halt perceived injustices. For the purposes of the current thesis, protest will be synonymous with the term public disorder. Moreover, this by no means implies that protests or public disorders are 'disorderly'.

Public Order Policing: Public order policing is here defined as "the use of police authority and capacity to establish a legitimate equilibrium between governmental and societal, collective and individual, rights and interests in a mass demonstration of grievance" (de Lint, 2004, 2).

Organization of Thesis

Although policing public order is the guiding theme of the thesis, it is essential to first take a step back and broadly discuss the general research problem that has become evident from a review of the appropriate literature. Booth, Colomb, and Williams (2008) argue that too often researchers will simply set out to answer a research question they find appealing, neglecting to consult the broader literature beforehand to see what general research problems exist in their field of study (52). Chapter 2 seeks to avoid this limitation. First we discuss policing in Canada generally, and then elaborate general and specific research problems from related literature and relevant theories. Following this, Chapter 3 outlines the chosen research methodology (multiple case study design) and illuminates ethical concerns, threats to the reliability and validity of the current

study, and discusses specific measurement tools that will be used for data analysis. Chapter 4 analyzes all of the data gathered in order to help answer the general and specific research questions of the current thesis. The final chapter concludes the study by articulating the implications of the conclusions drawn from the research, and flags limitations, barriers to guide future research on the topic.

Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This chapter is a comprehensive review of Canadian policing and the body of contemporary public order policing literature, including crucial theoretical components. In this sense, the boundaries of this chapter end at both theory and relevant literature, which are analyzed and developed parallel to one another.

Although not as comprehensive as other aspects of policing, the body of literature concerning public order policing is diverse, incorporating not only criminological work, but that more generally of sociology, political science, psychology, as well as history. One of the goals of this chapter is to bring together recent developments in the field of public order policing, outlining how it has been informed by historical debates in the literature, as well as how it helps frame and enlighten the current study. Another important goal of the thesis is, through use of media data, to corroborate or contradict contemporary public order policing theory that is developed in the current chapter. Therefore, we will summarize and discuss the limitations of the literature to better emphasize the gaps that can be filled.

In what follows, we clarify and develop competing perspectives and theoretical frameworks relevant to public order policing. First, we broadly discuss the current trajectory of policing, particularly in Canada. This allows for a comprehension of where the current work is situated within the larger criminological field. Secondly, we outline the current work on police accountability, policing powers, and legal issues in Canada to better contextualize the field of study. Thirdly, we narrow the discussion by illuminating the current debates in the more specific field of public order policing and the theoretical developments that will inform the current research. In conclusion, there will be a brief discussion of specific studies that have focused on public order events. Throughout this chapter, we emphasize theoretical frameworks in order to properly employ their components during the analysis phase of the current thesis.

Current Stance of Canadian Policing Literature

Public police in Canada act on behalf of society at large to enforce Canadian laws, assist victims of crime, deter and detect crime, maintain order, prepare and respond to emergencies, and to help in the prosecution of those charged with crimes (Li, 2008). Police powers are derived from the Criminal Code of Canada (CCC), as well as federal, territorial and provincial legislation (*ibid*).

Policing generally falls into two categories, public and private. Public police officers are given authority to enforce Canadian law in the public and private domain; whereas private policing is typically done on private property or at the behest of a private entity (e.g. security guards). In Canada, there are approximately 68,000 public police and 101,000 private officers (Li, 2008). The early distinction between public and private policing began as a geographic one; where public police operated in public space, and private police in private space (Stenning, 2000, 92). This distinction is increasingly blurred, due to the fact that public police operate in private space on a regular basis, and this phenomenon is increasing with the growing technical efficiency of public police forces (*ibid*). Moreover, private police are now involved in the patrol of large public spaces, even though they are private in nature; for example, shopping malls, stadiums, amusement parks, etc. (*ibid*). Stenning (2000) argues that there are no longer functions or responsibilities within a public police force that cannot be carried out under particular circumstances by a private police force, and vice-versa (93). The distinction to be made here is that although private police can carry out many of the duties of public police officers, they do so at the behest of a private employer rather than on behalf of society at large. This conclusion was also recently reached by the Law Commission of Canada (2006).

The Law Commission of Canada's 2006 report, *In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada* reflected on current shifts in Canadian policing and the implications for the social, legal, and policy environment (7). One of the major findings of the report is that although the public police remain the primary law enforcement providers in Canada, there are an increasing number of private organizations that operate alongside of the public police (5). There is a complex continuum in which modern policing operates in Canada, and "policing services are provided by a range of overlapping public police and private security agencies" (2). In this sense, the report

argues that the traditional public police no longer maintain a monopoly over the use of violence, and the legal, policy, and social environments must catch up to this reality.

In addition to this, there is a nuance developing between the public and private realm of law enforcement. There are an increasing number of public servants who perform law enforcement activities (e.g. game wardens, park police, border officials, intelligence officers, and environment officers) (25) who do not fall under either the traditional label of public police or that of private security. The report acknowledges that these inconsistencies have consequences for the policing of protests and large crowds (39) due to the fact that an increasing number of both public, private, and quasi-public entities engage in crowd control during protest events. Rigakos (2006) agrees that there is a new typology of policing in which public and private policing functions are becoming more fluid (261). Currently, various public, private, and quasi-public bodies are engaged in policing with little clear line of distinction (*ibid*). It will be informative when reviewing the data of the current study to question whether these realities are evident in the two cases under study.

According to Shearing and Stenning (2011), following the industrial revolution, Canada adopted the London Metropolitan model of policing for its municipalities, and the Royal Irish Constabulary framework for its newly formed North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) force. Police in Canada rely most heavily on voluntary compliance when carrying out their duties; however, at their disposal is a range of coercive practices. Public police derive their powers from the State, which maintains the capacity for and monopoly over the use of force. In a liberal democracy, the use of force is monitored and regulated by various accountability mechanisms. Generally speaking, the CCC, the *Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (hereafter: Charter)*, as well as other federal and provincial legislation, define the conditions in which the police may carry out their duties. That being said, internal policies, common law, and extraordinary laws (i.e. the *War Measures Act*) also define ways in which the public police can act. Responsibility for police in Canada is articulated succinctly by Stenning and Shearing (2011):

> The provinces, through provincial Police Acts, have followed the British tradition and delegated the responsibility for public policing to municipalities … In most provinces … supervision is undertaken by a police commission established to avoid at least the appearance of direct governmental control over the public police. In addition, at the

> municipal level many towns and cities have established police boards to oversee the operation of the public police.

Although the Federal government does not have the constitutional responsibility for local or provincial policing, the RCMP is the largest Canadian police force and operates in various provincial and municipal capacities through contracting services.

When a police officer neglects to act according to the regulations and laws discussed above, they are held to account through legal sanctions, internal and external disciplinary actions, as well as social repercussions through such things as media reporting. There are also organizational accountability mechanisms, such as police boards and inquiries (Shearing and Stenning, 2011).

Accountability, Policing Powers, and Legal Issues in Canada

Essential to any specific discussion of public order policing is a broad overview of accountability, police powers, and the legal framework within which police operate in Canada. This will provide the reader with the context within which the current thesis is operating.

Accountability

Stone (2007) discusses accountability advocacy as the precursor to the current structural reality of police accountability (253). For our purposes, we will discuss accountability specific to the use of force, rather than use of funds or other criminal acts by police officers and organizations. What began as superficial and hasty reactions to individual incidents of brutality, Stone argues that police accountability has evolved into a performance management regime which focuses on patterns of police performance that act as a type of early warning system for problematic police officers (255). Stone articulates that this accountability process has three complementary and balanced components; internal, governmental, and social (251). The former two accountability controls take the form of internal and external government and police complaint investigative bodies. The latter social controls take many forms where the communities and society at large can hold individual police officers as well as organizations to account. The media can be a powerful method to hold police to account, outside of governmental or legal mechanisms (see Ericson (1995) for more). A fourth category that can be mentioned here from a Canadian

perspective is independent accountability processes, such as ombudsmen and human rights tribunals.

In Canada, police are held to account through many specific mechanisms that fall into Stone's above categories. Internal disciplinary hearings are used regularly; however, due to the perception of conflict of interest, there are also independent complaint bodies. Gross police misconduct can not only lead to criminal prosecution and termination of employment, but it has also been the subject of commissions of inquiry which have led to significant systemic and cultural changes in the public police domain (Shearing and Stenning 2011; Roach 1995). All of these mechanisms are interrelated and mutually dependant. Stone points to the fact that without strong internal accountability, external government mechanisms cannot remedy systemic problems within policing organizations (256).

Police Powers and Legal Issues

The CCC as well as provincial police acts place limits on police powers by outlining under what circumstances a police can act in a given situation. The underlying principle of the Canadian legal system is that the state must be constrained in how it intervenes in the actions of citizens. In other words, a primary role of the criminal justice system and the *Charter* is to reign in the power of the state, including the police, to intervene in the lives of Canadian citizens pursuing legitimate democratic rights. With regards to protests, which are more often peaceful, police intervention is not warranted under the CCC, and the *Charter* guarantees that the state cannot interfere in peaceful dissent unless certain legal thresholds are met. That said, even though police may get involved, it is ultimately Canadian courts that decide whether or not police actions are lawful or violate the *Charter*. The following discussion outlines the circumstances when police may or may not intervene in these types of situations.

There are five legal components that give police the powers to act in the assembly of individuals. First, section 63 of the CCC forbids three or more persons gathering in a manner that causes reasonable people to be afraid that the assembly will disturb the peace. Second, section 31 of the CCC allows police to detain individuals for breaching the peace. Third, as we saw with the Vancouver bylaw prior to the Olympics, municipal laws can be passed which prohibit protests or

activities associated with civil disobedience (signage, noise levels, gatherings, etc.). Fourth, as a primary duty of a police officer is to preserve the peace, ancillary powers allow them to accomplish this. In other words, if it is necessary to disperse, limit, or confine a protest, then common law allows for this. Finally, government can restrict protests when justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The *Charter* articulates that every Canadian has the right of freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, as well as the freedom of peaceful assembly (see sections 2(b) and 2(c)). When an assembly is viewed as not 'peaceful', a government may then intervene. Ultimately, the interpretation as to whether or not an assembly is peaceful rests upon the courts who review police actions. Further, section 1 of the *Charter* states that peaceful assembly is guaranteed only "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". Common law, municipal bylaws, and provincial and federal laws can limit peaceful assembly; however, they are all subject to *Charter* challenges in the courts. Therefore, there are two circumstances where police can break up a protest: if it is not peaceful, which is ultimately up to the courts, and if a particular law (municipal, provincial, or federal) prohibits peaceful assembly as a "reasonable limit" in a "free and democratic society".

The leading common law case regarding public order policing is R. v Knowlton. Here, the Supreme Court concluded that obstruction of a stretch of sidewalk outside of where the then Premier of the Soviet Union was staying in Edmonton, represented a reasonable instance of the police preserving peace and order and protecting public safety (92). This however, was not a blanket statement to give police unlimited and unfettered powers (ibid). This case arose out of a situation where the Edmonton police created a barricade outside of the Edmonton hotel following an attack on the Soviet Premier in Ottawa while he was walking with Prime Minister Trudeau on Parliament Hill in the early 1970s (91).

An example of federal legislation governing the policing of protests is the *Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act* (FMOA) which bestows the RCMP with the primary responsibility to ensure the security of intergovernmental conferences, including the right to control, limit, and prohibit access to any area (101). The *Emergencies Act* further allows the

Governor in Council to prohibit travel, public assembly, and the use of property during "public order emergencies" (ibid). The problem however with both pieces of legislation is that they apply only in certain contexts.

The *Public Works Protection Act* (*PWPA*) is an illustration of legislative powers given to police from provincial legislation. Prior to the G20, the TPS requested that the Government of Ontario enact a provincial regulation pursuant to the *PWPA*, which allowed police officers to arrest, without warrant, any person who refuses to comply with a request or direction, or who enters, attempts to enter, or approaches a designated 'public work', in this case the security zone surrounding G20 Summit locations (McMurtry, 2011, 9). Finally, as discussed above, municipalities can enact bylaws regulating 'peaceful assembly'. Prior to the 2010 Vancouver Olympic, the Vancouver City Council enacted a municipal bylaw which they felt would fill the legal void surrounding public order policing (88). The bylaw authorized the closure of streets and public spaces, use of security checkpoints, unfettered searches of persons and bags, the use of CCTVs, and imposed limitations on signage and megaphones (ibid). Many of these restrictions are currently being challenged in the courts.

Pue and Diab (2010) critically discuss the inefficient manner in which Canadian police deal with protest and civil unrest; through an ad-hoc mixture of ancillary police powers, private property rights, municipal by-laws, and ambiguous legislation (88; 91; 97). These conclusions are by no means novel. Brodeur and Viau (1994) conducted a case study of the 1990 Oka crisis and concluded back then exactly what Pue and Diab are calling for; clarification and reform of the laws surrounding policing in protest and civil unrest situations (283). Brodeur and Viau (1994) found that the current status quo is an ad-hoc mixture of police powers derived from various sources (284). The authors found these concerns to be an extremely pressing issue since "the frequency of [protests] will increase in the future" (ibid).

Theoretical Developments in Public Order Policing Literature

The search for broad criminological theories related to policing is not always the best approach to analyzing public order policing (Beare and Murray, 2007). Academic polarization is not novel, as we will see in the current chapter's discussion of various authors; many of whom can easily be

placed into the anti-police or pro-police categories (for historical perspective on this debate see Grant, 1975). In reviewing the Beare and Murray's (2007) work, Melchers (2009) argues that overarching theories may not always add value to an analysis, and that rich cases and other illustrative source material can exceed the limits of broad theoretical frameworks (126). Therefore, the search for anti-police and pro-police (i.e. consensus and conflict theorists) theories in order to categorize police actions at the Olympics and G20 Summit is not an objective of the current study. We will apply specific theories discussed in this chapter and apply them individually to the cases under study.

Public Order Policing Literature

There is a limited body of comprehensive research on public order policing, especially from a Canadian context. The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science in the US published in 2004 a comprehensive report entitled *Fairness and Effectives in Police – The Evidence*, developed by their Committee to Review Research on Police Policies and Practice, chaired by Wesley Skogan. Broadly, this committee set out to review social science research related to the field of policing in the US since 1968, and provide both policy and research recommendations. The analytical framework that informed this study was divided into two main sections: police effectiveness in controlling crime; and the fairness and impartiality of police actions (NRC, 2004, 12). Although limited to the US, this research endeavour will inform aspects of this study.

The committee concluded that contemporary policing strategies rely heavily on a model of operations that stresses 'reactive' approaches to combating crime (NRC, 2004, 4:17). This is in contrast with recent research that concluded that police organizations are moving away from an ad-hoc and reactive approach to crime control, and toward more integration, proactive engagement, and liaison strategies (King and Waddington, 2006, 77; Hall and de Lint, 2009, 5). The committee acknowledged in their final recommendation that there are "significant gaps in what is known about contemporary policing…[and] there are many important subjects about which there is virtually no scientific research" (NRC, 2004, 10). The NRC articulates the 10 most important topics that researchers studied with regards to policing during throughout the period spanning 1967 – 2000; including such things as discrimination, women, evaluation,

ethics, drugs, accountability, amongst others (NRC, 2004, 26). Although policing 'strategies' is on the list, it is primarily focused on community and problem-oriented policing (*ibid*). There is a noticeable lack of comprehensive research on public order policing when compared to other topics in policing research (46).

The literature that is available on public order policing up until 2000 was reviewed by the NRC, who found noticeable evidence to suggest a shift from the use of escalated force to negotiated management (NRC, 2004, 208). As we will see below, many authors either argue differently or offer nuanced suggestions based on research. The negotiated management strategy for policing protests involves four key policy shifts; a tolerance of a substantial amount of disruption by protestors, communication between police and protestors, minimal aggressiveness by police officers, and minimal use of force (*ibid*). An acknowledgement is made however that none of the research in the policing protest section had conclusive findings (NRC, 2004, 216). Further, the NRC concludes its discussion of policing strategies by stating that "the available evidence is insufficient to draw conclusions and that more research is needed" (NRC, 2004, 214). Given the above discussions by the NRC, the Vancouver Olympics and Toronto G20 Summit provide us with an excellent opportunity to help illuminate and fill these gaps in a Canadian context.

Specific Theoretical Developments

Generally, research by Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter comprise the most influential criminological work specific to public order policing in western society (see; 1996; 2006; Della Porta and Reiter 1998). We broadly discuss the work completed by these authors in order to gain a better understanding of the genesis of contemporary public order policing literature, and to situate more precisely the current thesis.

On the European continent, Della Porta and Reiter (1998) see public order policing taking on various characteristics, depending primarily on the time period and country. For instance, the authors articulate the development in the 1960s in Britain of a repressive militarized police force, resulting primarily from labour strikes (5). In Germany, a more inclusive form of crowd control developed due to an increasing recognition by the police that demonstrations are a basic democratic freedom worthy of tolerance over repression (6). These parallel movements in

Europe paved the way for a European public order policing philosophy that came to fruition in the 1980s and 1990s which adopted tolerant, selective, flexible and consensual policies (4). Thanks to the evolution of the liberal state and the institutionalization of the notion of citizenship, the authors conclude that there has been a decrease in violent confrontation between police and protestors in western democracies up until the turn of the century (255).

In their work, Della Porta and Reiter saw three corresponding issues in public order policing beginning in the 1990s: an attempt to negotiate outcomes; the under-enforcement of the law; and the extensive collection of information (6). Some refer to as intelligence gathering and according to the authors can be traced back to the 1930s, where surveillance and information gathering was an essential tactic to tackle subversion and dissent, particularly in the U.S. (7). In fact, this phenomenon goes back to the late 19th century, when the Pinkerton Agency engaged in the infiltration and intimidation of unions, and general strikebreaking. Moreover, neither of the other two developments (negotiation and underenforcement of the law) are novel, taking shape in policing tactics in the 1960s and 1970s (see D. Waddington, 2007). What is original is their conceptual convergence as a model of public order policing. Although the authors go into some detail regarding the situations in various countries, they do highlight the need for further comparative and focused research. From a Canadian perspective, this is where work completed by Hall and de Lint (2009) becomes relevant, and will be discussed below.

Della Porta and Reiter (2006) later elaborated on the above theory while researching the protests at the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. Here, the authors found evidence to suggest that the contention that public order policing strategies are moving towards de-escalation in western societies is faulty (40). In fact, the authors found that the use of escalated force and coercive strategies were predominant during the Genoa protests (22), and that this re-ignited an almost forgotten debate on citizens' rights and freedoms and the nature of state intervention in protecting the rule of law (15). There are three tactics the authors articulate to categorize the Genoa protests. First, there were coercive strategies deployed, which included specialized weaponry and physical intimidation to control and disperse protestors (13). Secondly, persuasive tactics were employed through the use of discursive contacts with demonstrators as a method of control (*ibid*). Finally, the authors found information strategies which involved large scale

preventative and targeted information gathering in order to identify law-breakers and minimize the need to intervene directly (*ibid*). In Genoa, police deployed persuasive tactics in the form of isolating and fortifying the event rather than direct negotiation (16-17). Large scale information gathering was conducted in order to control the flow of activists into the country, where Italian officials attempted to block entry those known to police as violent protestors (see Chapter 4 for discussion on black bloc) (18). According to the authors, these information strategies, although increasingly common, are typically ineffective due to a lack of police resources (180). Hall and de Lint (2009) disagree with this assessment, arguing instead through their research that intelligence processes are not only common but increasingly effective (6) due to an expansion of police duties and cooperation with other government agencies (268:270).

Della Porta and Reiter (2006) conclude that the policing of the G8 in Genoa was characterized primarily by coercive strategies; e.g. the mass use of riot weaponry (tear gas, live ammunition, armoured vehicles, and mass arrests) (19;21). With regard to public order policing generally, the authors believe this event highlights a reversal of previous moves away from escalated force to a more measured use of liaison and negotiation, known as the theory of 'negotiated management'. This new form of public order policing is referred to as the policing of transnational protest and is characterized by coercive, persuasive, and information strategies. Generally, this new form of policing includes intolerance of minor law violations, large scale police intervention, paramilitarization, and an adandonment of negotiation and liaison strategies that were evident throughout the 1980s and 1990s (175). Therefore, the use of force is no longer viewed only as a last resort by police in protest situations.

A nuanced argument to the above assertions is McPhail et al. (1998), who agrees that in the last four decades there has been a noticeable and steady shift from coercive methods to more conciliatory ones (50). However, McPhail et al. argues that negotiated management has "become the increasingly likely practice of police organizations [in the U.S.]" (68). That is, similar to the above arguments, there has been a shift from escalated force to negotiated management strategies; however, McPhail et al. do not see the return to more coercive and escalated force models that Della Porta and Reiter (2006) observed in their 2001 research. Della Porta and Reiter

argue that the concept central to negotiated management, open lines of communication with protestors, was completely absent from the majority of the recent cases they studied (179).

Similar to Della Porta and Reiter (1998; 2006) and unlike McPhail (1998), P.A.J. Waddington (1998) argues that police seek to manage confrontation through accommodation and negotiation tactics, but that this is not part of larger trend toward more liberal and democratic policing styles (139). P.A.J. Waddington agrees with Della Porta and Reiter (2006) that the shift is more toward a paramilitarization of public order policing, rather than an accommodative one (P.A.J. Waddington, 1998, 139). P.A.J. Waddington further argues that non-confrontational techniques are indeed deployed; however, when an established institution is threatened, police are ready and willing to "die in the ditch" (125) and employ violent confrontational techniques to quell disorder (139). D. Waddington (2007) further highlights this debate while reviewing recent public order policing theories. Here, the author found that recent theoretical developments in this field have articulated a desire by police to pre-empt public order problems through negotiation rather than invoking legal powers and resorting to coercion (13). These strategies vary in terms of openness and legality, and all serve to offset the need for confrontation with, and coercion of, the public (16). This avoidance of coercion contrasts with Della Porta, and Reiter's argument that we are witnessing a return to coercive measures.

Further disagreeing with D. Waddington's above assessment are authors such as P.A.J. Waddington (1993; 1998) and Jefferson (1990) who view there to be a shift less toward overt coercion by the state against protestors, but a more paramilitary approach taken to improve certainty, police discipline, and restraint. P.A.J. Waddington (1993) regards this shift toward paramilitarization as a positive reality that involves the use of specialized military-style units, professional training, centralized and hierarchical leadership, intelligence practices, and significant pre-event planning and strategizing (366). Jefferson (1990) agrees that there is a movement toward increased paramilitarization of policing as articulated above by P.A.J. Waddington, although views this as a negative phenomenon. In brief, Jefferson articulates that this shift in policing creates the capacity to exacerbate the use of violence on all sides (84). In their research, Della Porta and Reiter (1998) agree with Jefferson, finding that police are likely to resort to brutality in more militarized police organizations (11).

Despite the discrepancies in the public order frameworks discussed by the above academics, they all share a similar view that policing has shifted from an earlier form of coercive, or escalated, force, to a more nuanced toolbox of various forms of conciliation, negotiation, paramilitarization, as well as coercion (see D. Waddington, 2007, 34). These shifts have occurred as a result of perceived need on behalf of police to increase their legitimacy, reduce costs, and minimize risks to themselves and citizens (*ibid*). We carry on this debate by touching on a researcher who disagrees with the premise of the above authors, arguing instead that a noticeable shift has occurred toward greater conflict and coercion by police on behalf of the state and ruling (economic) classes.

On the other side of the debate, there are academics such as Fernandez (2008) who clearly stations himself in the school of thought that argues that police, and ultimately the state, seek to control and coerce dissent through violence and repression (see also Donner, 1992; and Earl and Soule, 2010). More specifically, Fernandez argues in *Policing Dissent*, that police seek to regulate and pacify free speech and radical thought, not only on the streets, but in the legal, physical, and psychological fields that surround protests (5-6). The author bases his assessments on four years of fieldwork, completed between 2001 and 2005, where he employed the *verstehen* (sociologist Max Weber's concept of understanding a social phenomenon by participating in it) approach to gather information related to the effects of social control (16). By focusing on the anti-globalization movement Fernandez argues that this type of dissent is composed of interconnected network structures, which police agencies seek to "blunt and possibly destroy" (*ibid*). What Fernandez calls "textures of control" (9) are the tactics employed by police to control dissent (see below). Simply put, Fernandez compares social control techniques to that of disease control (130).

The three broad tactics discussed by Fernandez in his book are: legal; physical; and psychological. First, prior to protest events, police engage in legal manoeuvring (17). This involves the use of city ordinances (70), codes, zoning restrictions (77), pamphlet distribution advising protestors what they can be arrested for (89), as well as permit systems, all aimed at limiting the actions available to demonstrators (81).

Secondly, according to the author, law enforcement agencies control the physical space by selecting and mapping out the environment in which a protest is supposed to occur (93). This attempt to control the physical space during a protest ostensibly blunts the massing and assemblage of protest groups and reduces their effectiveness (*ibid*). The author found in his research that event planners were selecting defensive locations in order to exclude protestors (94). Another physical tactic is the use of intelligence operations, where police infiltrate (107) protest groups to gather covert information, as well as overtly gather open-source data on groups and individuals of interest (102). Constant and repetitive patrolling by police (116), pre-emptive and mass arrests (118; 133), and reducing the anonymity of protestors by video-taping and investigating them (119) are also important findings discussed by Fernandez. An example of a physical tactic employed by police is the fortification of locations (122) with specialized and exclusionary equipment.

Thirdly, the psychological tactic capitalizes on public fear, especially of terrorism (17), in order to frame media and public narratives concerning particular groups. Public relation and communication campaigns are a particularly effective method used by law enforcement to minimize the effectiveness of protest groups (139). Specifically, this technique involves the hiring of communication consultants and firms (*ibid*). Augmenting this psychological attack on protest groups is the formal flow and control of information from law enforcement to media (147). Fernandez also found that this involves a close relationship between reporters and law enforcement officials (149); i.e. by embedding reporters with police (151). A final tactic of the psychological approach is to vilify (161) protestors in the media by framing their actions as violent and/or criminal (156). Whether these techniques can be found in a Canadian context will be an important addition to the literature of public order policing.

Canadian Developments

From a Canadian perspective, work in this field has been composed most notably by authors Willem de Lint and Adam Hall (see 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; and 2009). Drawing on much of the work completed by Della Porta and Reiter, Hall and de Lint tackle the comprehensive development of a theoretical framework for categorizing public order policing from a Canadian

perspective. Unlike Della Porta and Reiter, who generally argue that there has been a broad shift from coercive to conciliatory tactics (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998), and now a shift back towards coercion (Della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter, 2006), de Lint and Hall (2009) argue that the police operate autonomously of overarching political and economic structures and maintain the ability to neutralize public disorder through excessive force as well as conciliatory measures (5). In this sense, the authors view contemporary strategies as a synthesis of negotiation and coercive models of policing. Although the authors have completed much previous work the topic, their 2009 monograph, titled *Intelligent Control: Developments in Public Order Policing in Canada*, fully develops this theory of public order policing, which they term 'intelligent control'.

According to de Lint and Hall (2003), police officers in most Canadian services tend to adopt a minimalist role in protest situations (219). However, in contexts where police recognize a clear threat to public safety and interests (particularly with radical groups), police judgment shifts noticeably to the view that the use of exceptional force is both necessary and justified (*ibid*). This is the same argument made a decade earlier by P.A.J. Waddington (1998) as mentioned above (125). Consider also de Lint's (2004) conclusions when analyzing several public disorder situations in Canada:

> Public order policing [in Canada] is innovating a hybrid police form in which control and service are practised simultaneously in a morphing of intelligence-led and community policing orientations. Public order policing is not simply becoming more "soft hat" or "hard hat": it is both. This kind of policing has occurred at Oka and APEC, the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, the OAS meeting at Windsor, and...Ipperwash (59).

More recently, Hall and de Lint (2009) adopt a similar, yet nuanced, stance to arguments made by Della Porta and Reiter. That is, Hall and de Lint contend that in addition to this hybrid form of public order policing, there is a gradual concentration of countering applications by police in public disorder events through what they call, "real-time information management" (7). This is similar to what Della Porta and Reiter (1998;2006) articulated as their third variable of the new model of public order policing; information gathering strategies.

Hall and de Lint (2009) agree with Della Porta and Reiter that US and European research has indicated that there has been a shift towards minimizing the use of force, and an emphasis placed

on communications, flexibility, and negotiation (11). Similarly, intelligent control argues that there has been a shift in Canadian public order policing tactics, from ad hoc reactionary forms of coercion and accommodation, to what the authors call "a strategic integrated approach" (5). This integration is composed of several key variables discussed in great detail by the authors; liaison strategies to pre-empt and minimize the need to employ force in protest situations, as well as enhanced technical and paramilitary abilities supported by intense intelligence gathering (6).

Broadly, intelligent control theory articulates two capabilities in policing arsenals with regards to policing public disorder; liaison and intelligence strategies. Both strategies occur during the policing of public disorder, but to varying degrees depending on the threat environment. An important key to understanding this theory is preventative action; police actions typically attempt to pre-empt negative counter-forces (Hall and de Lint, 2009, 275). Below, these components, as well as their criticisms, will be unpacked to help inform the current research.

Liaison policing began to emerge during British labour strikes in the 1970s, where police started to view labour protests as a form of communication rather than a threat to peace and security (Hall and de Lint, 2009, 152). In this sense, police acted more as civil mediators who liaised with the parties in order to help achieve a desired outcome.

The interconnectedness of policing and intelligence capabilities has gained much traction in the post-9/11 environment, where risk and threat assessments have become normative tools in policing toolboxes. The intelligence component of policing represents a type of 'boundlessness'; whereby intelligence gatherers can operate relatively unmolested in different social and technological environments (Hall and de Lint, 2009, 270). This component also includes the increased use of surveillance, both human and technological, which generates actionable intelligence and gives police the ability to pre-empt perceived threats (266). The authors also argue that policing agencies are increasingly seeking to enhance the flow of information between governmental agencies (268). According to the authors, this results in enhanced cooperation between seemingly autonomous government structures (both domestic and international) and tends to erode consent bases of modern liberal democracies (270).

Another important component of the intelligence component of intelligent control theory is what the authors call a 'surge' of force (273). This peculiar event involves the dramatization and mobilization of force on behalf of police forces engaging in public order policing. This includes, amongst other things, the displaying of specialized weapons for media and the public, or exercises which play out for an audience the capabilities of specialized police units or tactics (*ibid*). Important to take from this is that intelligence is not only related to the gathering and production of information, but also the control of its flow, in order to manage perceptions of a particular event or series of events (274).

An important criticism of Hall and de Lint's recent work on intelligent control has been levelled by Walby and Hurl (2010) in a recent book review. The reviewers argue that although Hall and de Lint place an important emphasis on the intelligence capabilities of police forces, they provide few empirical illustrations of this phenomenon. Consider the following:

> The gathering and sharing of intelligence requires numerous police, security and intelligence agencies working in different locations with varying jurisdictions to consolidate their knowledge of protestors and cooperate on specific projects, especially large protests..De Lint and Hall do not provide many empirical examples of how organizations like [the Canadian Security Intelligence Service] CSIS become involved in demobilizing local struggles. They mention the work of Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in facilitating surveillance cum social movement suppression, but do not provide many empirical examples to support this claim...These important points deserve to be substantiated (216).

Claims that policing agencies have begun to collaborate with federal agencies with intelligence functions (i.e. CBSA, CSIS, and RCMP) is an extremely important contention, one which needs to be fully explored and developed. This will be important for the current thesis; to seek out opportunities to highlight the link between municipal police forces and federal agencies to foster intelligence capabilities.

A further argument that is made by Walby and Hurl (2010) is related to how Hall and de Lint focus too heavily on the labour movement in their analysis, neglecting the importance of other social movements and civil disobedience (217). Indeed, the authors focus primarily on labour, often dealing with other movements superficially after having fully unpacked the implications intelligent control holds for the analysis of labour movements. This does not preclude the full

application of intelligent control to other social movements however, and seems to beg for a less hasty analysis. As the current thesis will focus solely on protests at the Olympics and G20 Summit, the natural focus will be on other social movements instead of labour. This does not imply labour movements neglected to protest at either event; rather the majority of protest groups were not associated primarily with a labour association. This will allow the current thesis to attempt to fill a hole left by the authors. Therefore, an attempt will be made not only to confirm or contradict the benefits of the intelligent control model, but to help fill in gaps that have been illustrated by authors such as Walby and Hurl.

As we have witnessed, there are many theories of public order policing with varying degrees of emphases on violent and non-violent, or confrontational or non-confrontational tactics used during protest events. The discrepancies lay in the articulation of where the trajectory of public order policing is current heading. Is the shift to more conciliatory forms of policing permanent? Is there a reversal to earlier, more coercive, forms of public order policing? Are coercive practices more discrete or overt? And, what kind of developments are we witnessing in Canada and what conclusions can we draw from them? An objective of the current thesis is not to prove or disprove any of the theories; rather, it is to analyze and interpret which of these theories of public order policing best applies in the Canadian context as reported in the media, and in particular to the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver and the 2010 G20 Summit in Toronto. This will be achieved by applying these theoretical frameworks and their associated concepts to media reports of the cases under study.

Recent Studies in the Field

Peterson (2006) conducted a comparison study in 2002 of two protest campaigns and the police handling of them. The empirical focus was on two European Union (EU) Summits; one in Sweden in 2001 and the other in Denmark in 2002 (43). While focusing on the political nature of each event, the author found that policing campaigns against protestors were radically divergent at both events (43). The primary focus of this research is on the geographical spaces which have been transformed into political arenas by these various summits, and how protestors and police battle for the occupation and disruption of these contentious sites (43). The author refers to this phenomenon as ‘territorialisation’ (45). One particular acknowledgement which is worth

addressing here is that the protest movements at each event were not homogenous entities; rather they represent an eclectic mix of local, national, and global causes which coalesced to oppose the particular event (44). This is important to keep in mind for the current thesis. Peterson refers to these groups as 'rainbow coalitions'.

In Sweden, the author found that police officers were generally unprepared for protest situations due to the fact that they received no training in public order policing, they were not used to giving up their discretionary powers, and had little experience in teamwork situations (55). This led to haphazard tactics and an inability to exert territorial control (*ibid*). In this sense, the police were more likely to promote violence and disruption than prevent it (57), and often promoted civil liberty violations and wide-net arrest techniques due to a lack of public order training (59). In Denmark, the primary goal of police was to exert and maintain maximum control of the protestors and the spaces in which they operated (48). This required flexibility and manoeuvrability. The police employed heavy and light armoured vehicles and engaged all their officers in public order and paramilitary training (59). This was based on a pre-conceived notion that it is possible to "develop tactics that deliver precisely the right degree of force necessary for effective yet legitimate order maintenance" (60). This is what some scholars term the 'magic bullet' approach to public order policing (64). These can include targeted arrests, surveillance, intelligence gathering, undercover agents, the use of informers, and other coercive forms of policing (*ibid*).

Overall, the author concluded that at both events police relied heavily on a process of institutionalization; by routinizing protests through a common script and employing a process of inclusion and exclusion towards protest groups (71). Through this, police create a schism within protest coalitions, applying softer enforcement policies to those who adhere to the common script, and more violent and repressive tactics towards deviators (73).

King and Waddington (2006) seek in a separate study of the anti-globalization movement in Canada to question the consolidation of a trend espoused by many academics which claims there has been a move away from reactive and incident-led public order policing, to a softer and proactive approach which harnesses intelligence techniques and paramilitarization (77). The

authors argue that Canada has indeed witnessed a move towards multi-agency and consultative public order policing practices in the 1990s; however, that perhaps there has been a retreat towards a more authoritative agenda, exemplified by the increased presence of the military at recent high profile political events such as the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis (79).

King and D. Waddington (2006) also found that police tactics in the late 1990s were based on the assumption that a show of excessive force would induce the cooperation of protest groups (84). Proven ineffective, the police then moved to a model which called for a show of potential force, rather than escalating immediately to the use of force (*ibid*). The security deployed for Kananaskis in 2002 was the largest in Canadian history (90) at that time, and employed exclusionary tactics (*ibid*), police-protestor liaisons (91), the increased use of intelligence practices, and significant pre-event planning (93). Although the authors found a heavy reliance by security planners on softer approaches to dealing with protestors, tactical units and large holding facilities were permanently on standby (94). Moreover, the use of plainclothes officers was widespread (94) and intensive and overt surveillance was not only used, but it was heavily pre-publicized by the police (95). These observations lend credence to the above discussion of the fluid nature of Canadian public order policing by Hall and de Lint (2009).

In conclusion, King and D. Waddington (2006) suggest that the argument that there is increasingly a two-pronged approach to public order policing is misleading (95). Rather, policing protest involves significant levels of intrusive intelligence gathering, surveillance, infiltration, and pre-emptive detention (95). The authors view this evidence as suggestive of a subtle, yet coercive, shift in Canadian public order policing (95). According to the authors, the shift in Canadian public order policing is both explicitly as well as covertly coercive (96). This argument is almost identical to that of Della Porta and Reiter (2006), who argue that we are currently witnessing a return to more coercive public order policing strategies.

In the conclusion to their 2006 monograph, *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, Della Porta and Reiter argue in favour of the merits of coercive strategies of public order policing based on neoliberal political economy (189). Massive police presences, heavy riot gear, specialized units and weapons, as well as mass arrests are all characteristic of this new reality of public order

policing (177). These tactics allow for the state to assure internal and external security as well as the free reign of the market economy (189). According to Della Porta and Reiter, coercive policing tactics, often reserved for extremist groups in the 1980s and 1990s, are making a comeback in the early 21st century (177). A new element that Della Porta and Reiter observe is that the use of violence by police is no longer a last resort (178). Alongside these coercive strategies are ones aimed at securing the subordination of protestors through persuasive measures; e.g., border control, blocking access to locations, harassment, and searching protestors' offices (181). Overall, although the authors found widespread use of intimidation and shows of force, these strategies "do not seem to form a coherent new style of protest policing" (185). The authors see 'trends' towards intelligence-led and more proactive public order policing strategies (189), although this is by no means claimed authoritatively. More recent work, specifically in Canada by de Lint and Hall (2009) discussed above, attempted to fill this void in public order policing research.

Conclusion

What emerges out of the current discussion of public order policing research and theory is that there are important discrepancies in the public order policing literature, and that across the board academics are calling for further research. Authors such as Della Porta, Reiter, Hall, and de Lint see a fusion of the negotiated management and escalated force theories. Authors such as Fernandez clearly argue that what we are currently witnessing in the public order policing realm are coercive strategies aimed at delegitimizing, neutralizing, and excluding social movements all together. Authors such as McPhail et al. are a bit more optimistic about the willingness of law enforcement to engage with and accommodate protestors. Based on the literature, the following specific research questions will guide the data analysis phase of this thesis to help fill some of these gaps and answer some of the theoretical debates evident in the above discussion:

- Which theory of public order policing is best suited to explain and categorize public disorder at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? What factors may help explain the applicability of one over the other?
- How do other federal departments play a role in protest control at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? If so, which theoretical model best explains this?

As the specific research questions dictate, the current thesis has two major goals which require the assignment of variables and an outline of their empirical manifestations. The first goal of this thesis, therefore, is the corroboration and/or contradiction of theoretical frameworks evident in the public order policing literature. In this sense, it will be important to effectively categorize police actions for both cases under study to better situate them within particular theories of public order policing. Ultimately, this will allow for better analysis of the merits of all theoretical frameworks. Tables 1-7 in the following chapter attempt to accomplish this. Table 1 shows the variables associated with early public order policing theories as discussed by Della Porta and Reiter (1998:2006): escalated force and negotiated management. Table 2, 3, and 4 are newer theoretical developments espoused by Della Porta and Reiter (2006) in light of their more recent 2001 research. Table 5 is a depiction of intelligent control theory as developed by Hall and de Lint (2009). Table 6 is a description of paramilitary policing theory developed over time by various authors, and table 7 represents fieldwork completed by Fernandez (2008) on police repression in the U.S.

Now that the current chapter has ended with a set of specific research questions, the following chapter will begin by conceptualizing and operationalizing the concepts and variables necessary to answer them.

Chapter 3 – Methodology

Introduction

The previous chapter provided a set of theoretically and practically framed questions the answers to which will advance our understanding of Canadian public order policing. To accomplish this, it is important now to set out how this will be done; what data will be used, how it will be collected, and how it will be analyzed. Punctuating these discussions will be justifications for decisions made, all the while highlighting the shortcomings of the chosen methodology. This chapter sets out the framework in which this thesis operates and the parameters of the research undertaken.

This thesis is decidedly a qualitative one, where an exploration of Canadian public order policing will attempt to enhance understanding of this phenomenon as reported in the media, and will provide a holistic perspective within explained contexts (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, 4). As the general research design of this thesis will be a case study, it will be important to harness the flexible nature of qualitative methodology in order to interpret processes, map meanings, and understand contexts (*ibid*).

Research Design and Cases

We also attempt to enhance understanding of public order policing from a Canadian perspective and to shed light on the merits of particular theoretical frameworks espoused by various scholars. A comparative (multiple) case study methodology was chosen to analyze two specific cases: the Toronto G20 and Vancouver Olympics. These events provide unique and relevant opportunities to gain a better understanding of how law enforcement, as well as the Canadian government more generally, interacts with its citizenry as reported through media sources. Moreover, recent theoretical developments in the Canadian public order policing literature allow for a nuanced theoretical approach to categorizing and analyzing these types of events.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the complex social phenomenon of public order policing in Canada must be better understood. Specifically, what must be explicated are the merits of

competing public order policing theories as they apply to contemporary Canadian events. According to Yin (2009), case study methodology allows researchers to maintain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life phenomena (4). More specifically to public order policing, case study methodology will allow the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of this type of interactive and highly contextualised group behaviour, as reported through the media. The understanding gained through use of this technique will allow for theoretical generalizations and will also facilitate the answering of the research questions. In order to deploy the useful tools of case study methodology, the research questions must follow the form of 'how' and 'why'. Further, the researcher need not explore the possibility of controlling human behaviour, and the focus must be on contemporary events (8). All of these statements apply to the goals of the current thesis.

Yin (2009) describes two components of case study design which directly relate to the stated goals of this research project: the reliance on multiple sources of evidence and the convergence of data, and the ability to benefit from prior theoretical development which will aid in data analysis (18). The current study will use prior theoretical developments (as discussed in the previous chapter) to guide data analysis in order to gauge the merits and applicability of each theory. As will be discussed below, pattern matching and analytic induction will be employed to fulfil the goals of this paper.

A common critique of case study design is that it is unsystematic in nature, sloppy, and allows for biased views to influence research conclusions (Yin, 2009, 14). Moreover, critics of this method argue that case studies provide little basis for scientific generalization (15). As mentioned before, a goal of the current project is to help corroborate or contradict contemporary public order policing theories. Indeed, case study design exploits "prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data...analysis" (18). In other words, generating concrete social facts is not an achievable objective under the current conditions. However, producing findings that are "generalizable to theoretical propositions" (15) rather than to social phenomena is an achievable goal. We will outline systematic procedures, data collection tools, and measurement instruments to alleviate this common critique of qualitative case study methodology.

It is of course imperative that the 'case' in a case study is a real-life phenomenon rather than an abstraction, argument, hypothesis, or topic (Yin, 2009, 32). Public order policing, in the current research paper, represents a social abstraction which will be under investigation. The 'cases' that represent this concept are both the G20 Summit and Vancouver Olympics. These real life events represent the construct of public order policing. In studies discussed in the previous chapter, the 'cases' were perhaps another summit or event which attracted various types of social movements. Because there are two general 'cases' which will be analyzed, case study design is particularly useful because it has the ability to cover multiple cases, but also draw sets of cross-case conclusions (20) based of media reporting of the events.

Units of Analysis

The preceding chapter ended with a set of specific research questions which had been developed in light of the relevant literature on public order policing. Elements of various theoretical frameworks for explaining public order policing were discussed and analyzed; however, how they empirically manifest themselves has yet to be fully developed. This will be accomplished with the tables listed below.

Table 1 - Early Theories	**Escalated Force**	**Negotiated Management**
Legitimacy of Police Actions	Brutal / Illegitimate / Illegal	Soft / Tolerant / Legal
Control of Protest Actors	Generalized	Selective
Police Actions	Pre-emptive	Reactive
Contact with Protestors	Confrontational	Consensual / Conciliatory
Negotiation with Protestors	Used for Intimidation	Used for Partnerships
Training	Professional	Improvised
Flexibility	Rigid	Flexible
Primary Goal / Priority	Security of Event	Right to Demonstrate
Agents Provocateur	Yes	No
Tolerance of Disruption	Low	High
Tolerance of Criminal Acts	Low	High
Coercive Strategies	High	Low
Information Collection	Generalized / Intrusive	Focused / Prosecutorial
Event Access	Highly Controlled	Managed
Use of Detention	High	Low
Use of Arrest	Mass	Selective
Labelling of Protestors	Bad / Illegal / Troublemakers	Peaceful / Pragmatic
Paramilitarization	High	Low
Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Reiter, H. (2006)		

Table 2 - Coercive Strategies	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
Massive Police Presence	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
High Visibility of Police	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Plainclothes Police	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Anti-Riot Gear	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Special Police Units	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Police From Other Jurisdictions	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Visible Identification	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Mass Arrests	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Unconfirmed Arrests	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Encircling / Penning Tactics	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Excessive Use of Force	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Water Cannons	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Tear Gas	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Other Irritants	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Rubber Bullets	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Live Ammunition	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Sound Cannon	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Reiter, H. (2006), p. 178.		

Table 3 - Persuasive Strategies	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
Pre-Negotiation	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Negotiations During Event	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Barriers	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Border Controls	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Blocking Access to Areas	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Preventive Arrests	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Harassment	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Entering and Searching Offices	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Entering and Searching Homes	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Herbert Reiter 2006, p. 181.		

Table 4 - Information Strategies	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
Mass Collection of Information	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Use of Alarmist Information	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
International Information Exchange	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Protest Infiltration	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Agents Provocateur	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Herbert Reiter 2006, p. 182.		

Table 5 - Intelligent Control Theory	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
		Liaison Strategies
Community Policing (275; 197)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Public Relations (275)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Non-intervention (132)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Underenforcement of the Law/Restraint (160)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)

Education/Pamphlets (5; 279)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Negotiation (103)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Meeting with Protestors (103)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Escort Services (133)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Impartiality (151)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Police Emphasis on Self-Policing (156)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Information Brokering (165)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Deferral to Courts (170)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Employing Officers as Liaisons (195)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
		Intelligence Strategies
Human Surveillance	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Technological Surveillance (205)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Preemptive Detention (275;271)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Blurring - Policing and National Security (275)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Reflexive Dramatization (PR) (272)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Control of Information (Asymmetric) (266)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Overt Displays of Authority (273)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Paramilitarization (203; 204)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Hierarchy of Force (276; 208)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Use of Civilian Intelligence Agencies (5)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Covert Intelligence Gathering (6)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Selective and Strategic Use of Force (261)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Denial of Entry (271)	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
Plainclothes Police	Yes/No (n)	Yes/No (n)
		Adapted from Hall and de Lint (2009)

Table 6 - Paramilitary Strategies	**Vancouver Olympics**	**Toronto G20**
Protective Shields	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Specialized Units	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Use of Squad Formations	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Intelligence Gathering	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Early and Large-scale Planning	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Pre-event Surveillance	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Event Surveillance	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Hierarchical Command and Control	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Use of Arrest Squads	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Controlling / Blocking Space	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Animals – Horses and Dogs	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Heavy use of Riot Gear	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Identification of an 'Enemy'	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Command / Operations Center	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Use of Non-Lethal Weaponry	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Stop and Search Tactics	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Adapted from Waddington, D. (2007), p 27; P.A.J. Waddington (1993;1998); and Peterson, A. (2006).		

Paramilitarization in a law enforcement sense is a very precise term. From a purely militaristic standpoint, conflict situations require the identification and elimination of the enemy, and the common use of deadly force. Police do not seek to kill their citizenry; they aim to control,

contain and apprehend adversaries (Peterson, 2006, 51). For example, paramilitary police units deploy weaponry. In this sense, the paramilitarization of the police is the employment of tactics and equipment which closely resemble those of the military; however the ultimate goal is divergent (50). Based on this Peterson's (2006) research, police paramilitarization carries with it several key indicators:

- Strategic and centralized command structures (as opposed to, for example, the beat cop who enjoys relative autonomy and discretionary powers).
- Flexibility fostered through tactical discretion at the field level, and strategic coordination from a centralized chain of command.
- Strategic planning and operational tactics are inspired by military strategy.
- The use of specialized equipment not normally used in daily policing activities; riot gear, body armour, gas masks, special weapons, and intelligence (51).

These are important points that will take on increased significance during the data analysis phase of the thesis. The paramilitarization of public order policing has been a key aspect of all theoretical standpoints; its outcomes and intentions are however hotly debated. It will be important to see whether paramilitarization is a reality of the two case studies, and to then develop a more nuanced analysis of its intricacies and repercussions.

Table 7 - Policing Dissent Theory	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
City Ordinances, Codes, and By-Laws	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Zoning Restrictions	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Police Pamphlet Distribution	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Protest Permit Systems	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Controlling and Restricting Space	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Use of Event Defensive Locations	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Police Infiltration	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Gathering of Covert Intelligence	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Gathering of Overt Intelligence	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Constant and Repetitive Police Patrols	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Pre-emptive Arrests	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Mass Arrests	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Reducing Protestor Anonymity	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Fortification of Event Locations	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Public Relations Consultants	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Control of Information	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
References to Anti-Terrorism	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Close Relationships – Media/Police	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Embedded Journalists with Police	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Framing of Protestors as Violent	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)
Framing of Protestors as Non-Violent	Yes / No (n)	Yes / No (n)

Adapted from Fernandez (2008).

Data Collection Procedures and Analysis

The type of data to be used for the current thesis will be publicly available data. In particular, Canadian mainstream print media news articles provided the bulk of the data collected (*N=529*).. The complete package of collected data amounts to 902 individual pieces of data. This was collated by a program called N'vivo - a qualitative software package designed by QSR International that was designed for researchers working with large volumes of rich text-based data. An important feature of the N'vivo program is that it also supports the organization and analysis of multimedia data.

Sampling Method

The underlying data for this research was gathered based on broad selection criteria which had four qualifying criteria; it had to be related to and mention either the Vancouver Olympics or the G20 Summit; it had to mention the police (or variations thereof); it had to include protest wording, and; it had to be Canadian. Collected data had to include specific wording, or variations of the words. For example, the protest criteria included words such as demonstration, riot, vandalize, protestor, black bloc, march, rally, etc. Table 8 depicts the variations of the words police and protest that were employed in the search criteria.

Table 8 – Variation Wording Used in Search Criteria

Police	• Policing, Police • Cop(s) • Officer(s) • Detective(s) • Constable(s) • Mounties • Law Enforcement • Patrolman • Acronyms: RCMP, VPD (Vancouver Police Department), TPS (Toronto Police Service), OPP (Ontario Police Service), and PRP (Peel Regional Police).
Protest	• Protest(s), Protesting, Protestor(s) • Social Movement(s) • Activist(s)

- March, Marching
- Rally, Rallying
- Sit-in(s)
- Demonstrator(s), Demonstration
- Vandalize, Vandalizing
- Black Bloc
- Riot(s), Rioting

News articles were obtained using two methods. On a weekly basis beginning on *July 1st 2009*, the researcher accessed major news sites (CBC, Vancouver Sun, Toronto Star, Ottawa Citizen, National Post, and Globe and Mail) and searched for news articles that fit the criteria described above. A second method utilized the benefits of setting up a Google Alert for both the G20 Summit and the Vancouver Olympics. As a result, Google sent the researcher a weekly email with all of the news articles that fit the above mentioned criteria. Consequently, the researcher was able to gather data from smaller newspapers and agencies (i.e. Victoria Times, Winnipeg Free Press and Cottage Country Now, amongst others). See Appendix A for a list of all of the newspaper organizations utilized in the current study.

The data gathering sites were accessed solely via the Internet. The six particular newspaper websites (Vancouver Sun, Toronto Star, Toronto Sun, Ottawa Citizen, National Post, and Globe and Mail) provided the primary source for gathering news articles. Moreover, the Google Alerts that were employed allowed the author to collect news articles from lesser known news organizations. These two primary sources of data provided the bulk of the current data.

The sampling frame encompassed eight months - a period of seven months prior to the event and one month after the event. The specific dates are as follows; For the Vancouver Olympics, data was gathered between July 1, 2009 and March 28, 2010, and for the G20 Summit data was gathered between November 26, 2009 and July 27, 2010. Documents collected prior to either the G20 Summit or Vancouver Olympics were done so because they provided details of both police and protestor preparations and public disclosures prior to the event. Furthermore, collection continued when a case ceased because it allowed the researcher to gather data related to consequences and outcomes.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The data collection method outlined above resulted in an abundance of publicly available data which will aid in answering the research questions outlined earlier, and in proving or disproving the hypotheses set out in Chapter 1. Below is a brief summary of the questions;

- Which theory of public order policing is best suited to explain and categorize public disorder at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? What factors may help explain the applicability of one over the other?
- How do other federal departments play a role in protest control at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? If so, which theoretical model best explains this?

Hypothesis - There are several hypotheses which can be discussed at this juncture. First, there may be distinctive differences in policing actions evident in the two case studies, primarily due to the different groups each event attracts. Also, it is possible to hypothesize that recent theoretical developments in public order policing will be effective tools in explaining police actions and categorizing them. Primarily from a Canadian perspective, intelligent control theory will be most appropriate because of its Canadian roots and novelty. Finally, the current emphasis by many scholars of an increased intelligence function by law enforcement may help to explain the use of outside federal agencies by police.

Research Instruments

In order to maximize the accuracy of the research, there is a need to specify and precisely describe the analytical techniques we employ to effectively answer the above research questions. Here, the data amassed is analyzed using pattern matching methodology to determine whether any meaningful relationships emerge, from which one can then draw conclusions and develop generalized theoretical propositions.

The general strategy which guides the empirical process is two-fold. We rely first on the theoretical propositions discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the testing of rival public order policing theories. Second, we employ the specific analytical tools described below to determine which theoretical propositions are best suited when applied to Canadian public disorder events.

Pattern Matching

Pattern matching logic is an appropriate technique in case study design because it allows the researcher to evaluate and contrast empirical relationships with predicted ones (Yin, 2009, 136). When patterns begin to emerge, this contributes to the internal validity of a study (*ibid*). The theories articulated in Chapter 2 seek to predict patterns that the authors believe to be true concerning the phenomenon of public order policing. Theories create expectations, and these expected patterns will be tested in this thesis to see whether they are a viable tool for understanding public order policing in Canada.

Trochim (1989) provides an interesting insight into pattern matching methodology in his work on program evaluation. The author views pattern matching methodology consisting of three distinct steps. Firstly, researchers must specify and explicate the theoretical model, followed by acquiring and describing observed phenomenon, and finally in order to properly deploy the pattern matching tool, the researcher must then equate the component of the specified theory with the observed phenomenon (355). To the extent that these two match, one may conclude that the particular theory can most appropriately explain that particular phenomenon within that context (357). This provides researchers with the ability to elucidate theoretical propositions. For the purposes of the current thesis, a pattern can be described as a describable and non-random arrangement of social phenomenon. In this sense, a pattern can be a verbal, written, visual, or pictorial representation of a particular phenomenon (358). An individual matching of each pattern therefore, will consist of a theoretical component as well as a representation of the real-life experience.

A non-equivalent dependent variable design will be employed for the pattern matching process. Here, patterns of expected dependent variables based on the discussed theoretical categories have been developed (See Tables 1-7). The predicted outcomes in these tables represent dependent variables. Each theory represents a predicted pattern, every one having multiple dependent variables. If, for a predicted result, the variables have been found and substitute patterns have not, then causal inferences can be made (Yin, 2009, 137). The process of seeing whether these

patterns are evident will determine which of the theories have the most substantial overlap with the observed patterns in both cases under study.

Analytic Induction

Analytic induction will also be employed in order to allow for the modification of concepts and theoretical constructs during the final discussion of the data in order to facilitate an accurate representation of observed social phenomena. Znaniecki (1936) states that a primary goal of research is to make statements that, in turn, may be altered or clarified when nuances or contradictions are found (232). These nuances and exceptions to established theories and concepts add to the base knowledge of a particular field of study because they increase the ability to generalize (306). Analytic induction involves the examining of initial theoretical frameworks or hypotheses, followed by a theoretical reworking based new and contradictory evidence (Miller and Brewer, 2003, 156). In this sense, analytic induction involves the generation of empirical generalizations from the data, rather than using theory to interpret findings.

For pattern matching, if the outcomes that were predicted by a particular theory are found to be present in the current cases under study, this result will be justified and further analyzed by the author. An assessment will then be made as to which theoretical framework, or components of various theories, best predicted the outcome at the Toronto G20 Summit and the Vancouver Olympics. In the end, this process will help in answering the first specific research question. Carrying on from pattern matching will be analytic induction, which will allow for the development of reworked theoretical propositions and concepts based on observed discrepancies and nuances in the data. As mentioned before, these methodological approaches are used to better understand contemporary Canadian phenomena, and cannot be generalized beyond that. Following this, whichever of the theoretical frameworks proves to be the most effective in predicting events at both cases will then be employed to answer the second research question. This question focuses on the differences and similarities between police actions during the two events. In the end, one theory will be identified through pattern matching, reworked and clarified through analytic induction, and then applied to the two cases in order to explicate their differences.

Bias and Error

There are many significant benefits and limitations to using documents such as media articles as a data source. As a researcher, it is important to avoid being absolute concerning such topics as objectivity. Every account of an event will be biased, whether it is from the media, the public or public officials. The crucial and overarching concern is that a researcher must fully identify and account for that bias throughout the research process. Print news media is situated among a vast array of possibly useful data sources which could help answer the research questions posed by this study. Media reporting is only a representation of reality rather than reality itself. Direct field observation, interviews with police and protestors, police reports, legal observer reports, and third-party reviews were all equally appropriate sources of data. That said, print news media were chosen due to their wide accessibility and large volumes. We now discuss the inherent bias in this particular type of data.

To begin, Hirschfield and Simon (2010) argue in their study on the legitimization of police use of deadly force - that in some cases police subvert the police-media relationship by offering access in exchange for favourable coverage (158). In another recent study conducted on the relationship between policing authorities and the media, Chermak and Weiss (2005) recognize the existence of this dubious relationship. They found that policing organizations recognize the power of the media, and harness this power through information sharing relationships in order to control images of police and how they are reflected in the media (501). In other words, their study found that police are aware of, and exploit, the power of the media in order to promote positive imaging by giving reporters access to crime data.

Creswell (2009) notes that media articles are widely accessible, do not require transcribing, and are unobtrusive in nature (180). Some limitations to the use of these types of documents as a data type in the current study are that they are limited to the worldview of their author (*ibid*). In this sense, news organizations have editorial processes which may favour various styles of sensationalist reporting. Moreover, due to the relative ease with which news articles may be published, they sometimes can lack impartiality (*ibid*). In addition to documents, analysis for this thesis will also incorporate audio-visual materials. This type of data is unobtrusive and provides an opportunity for individuals to share their full personal experiences; however, they are difficult

to interpret and do raise questions regarding the modification of behaviour motivated by an awareness that they are being filmed or photographed (*ibid*).

To help account for the above limitations of relying on media articles in social science research, the following strategies were executed to make the results as accurate as possible given the data source. To begin with, while gathering data, there were limitations placed on the articles collected and the news agencies (see Appendix A for a list of all news agencies). Limits were also drawn when an article or story was posted to a blogging website or a similar medium. Although videos, pictures, and news articles were gathered as data for this thesis, blogs and other types of alternative media were not collected. The triangulation of sources was used during this study to alleviate some selection bias by accounting for a larger pool of event coverage. Triangulation also helps account for description bias by providing the researcher with numerous accounts of a particular event. Moreover, data was gathered from both regional and national newspapers, as well as different newspaper conglomerates to help ensure a variety of news media sources was maintained. In addition to this, editorial or other rhetorical discourse was excluded from data analysis so as to avoid bias in the representation and description of events. Finally, an important point that must be made clear is that the conclusions and discussion being drawn from the results is limited only to media representations of social phenomenon rather than social facts themselves.

The primary mechanism for ensuring accuracy amongst the print news media items collected is the use of provincial press councils. British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec all have press councils that each promote accuracy and balance amongst their member print news organizations. For example, the Ontario Press Council (OPC) promotes amongst its members the full and fair presentation of facts, avoidance of conflicts of interest, the regular reviewing of conclusions, and the presentation of diverse and critical opinions (OPC, *Codes of Conduct*, 2011). Similarly, the B.C. Press Council (BCPC) code of practice states that their member's first duty is to promote the release of accurate information (BCPC, *Code of Practice*, 2011). If a news organization violates these codes of conduct, they are typically required to publish the entire text of a formal reprimand made by the press council (*ibid*). Because news organizations that adhere to press council standards enforce internal accuracy standards, it will provide this study with the

objective criteria needed to either include or exclude certain print news media from the data set. For example, the Ottawa Citizen, Vancouver Sun, and the Globe and Mail adhere to OPC standards, whereas the Toronto Sun and Ottawa Sun do not. In other words, newspapers such as the Ottawa Citizen, Vancouver Sun, and the Globe and Mail will be included in the data analysis, and Ottawa Sun and Toronto Sun will not be. Although data was collected from a number of sources such as the Toronto Sun and Ottawa Sun, it will not be used in data analysis.

From an 'accuracy' standpoint, events such as the Olympics and G20 Summits can bring out writers who tend to attack established forms of authority. This is not an absolute statement; however, the goal of the current thesis is to gather information that is as objective as possible. For this reason, blogs were excluded from the data collection process. Although news organizations have political biases, there is still a regimented editorial process and accountability through press councils as outlined above. One drawback is that Saskatchewan does not yet have a press council. Newspapers used in the data from Saskatchewan include the Leader Post (Regina) and Star-Phoenix (Saskatoon). Although Saskatchewan does not yet have a press council, both of these print papers are a part of Postmedia Network Inc., who operate other press council certified newspapers such as the Vancouver Sun and the Ottawa Citizen. In addition to these outlets, online news reporting articles were gathered from organizations such as CTV and CBC. Data from alternative media groups such as Toronto Media Co-op, the Tyee, and Rabble were collected initially, although not used for any data analysis in the end. If alternative media is used, it will be explicit.

There are many limits to relying on the mainstream media for objective facts and accounts of protest events. First, there is a bias among mainstream media who have a tendency to report what other media outlets are reporting, thus neglecting potentially informative and productive events that would benefit data analysis. Second, the mainstream media focus on exceptional stories over ordinary or common events can effectively skew data results which could simply be an accumulation of sensational events. This can give the perception that atypical social phenomenon are in fact more frequent than is the case. There also exists the potential for political bias to influence media reports of events, which can affect the tone and conclusions of media stories. For example, in a study of over 100 US print media papers, Kuypers (2002) concluded that there

exists a distinct liberal bias and that liberal editorializing of media stores, as opposed to left-leaning or conservative, occurs in most major news print media in the US (243). In other words, the print media was found to inject belief and judgement while covering news events. Below there will be more discussions concerning the advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of using various media sources for social science research.

In addition to the above, news media often selectively report events which leads to selection bias. Newspaper reporting is not representative due to variables such as reporting norms and editorial policies (Earl et al, 2004, 68). Further, exacerbating selection bias is the fact that media reporting on social phenomenon creates the initial potential selection bias, and then researchers report on a portion of media reporting, generating the further selection bias (Ortiz et al, 2005, 402). Critics of using news media as data argue correctly that articles often erroneously portray information leading to a description bias. (Earl et al, 2004, 67). This can be done by omitting or misrepresenting information, or framing the event in a particular fashion (72). This latter concern can take the form of articulating police actions as more or less violent or aggressive, which would have an impact on the interpreter of the data.

Although these discussions are important to acknowledge, they do not reduce the likelihood that analysis of this data type will yet yield informative results and help to adequately answer the research questions posed.

Validity and Reliability

There are three different forms of validity that are important to consider in case study research. The first is construct validity, which is the extent to which correct operational measures are employed for the concepts under study (Yin, 2009, 40). In order to avoid this shortfall, the author has attempted to clearly articulate the concepts and operationalize them in a comprehensive manner. The tables listed above attempt to do this, and will help ensure that the current study achieves consistency by qualifying what it declares it is measuring. Also, multiple sources of evidence have been employed which encourage convergent lines of inquiry (42).

Another validity concern is ensuring the accurate measurement of what the stated concepts are. This is referred to as face validity. In the latter half of the data analysis, pattern matching will be used to explain why one event led to another event, and it will be important to consider third, or intervening, factors. Here, it is important that the assignment of causal relationships is accurate, rather than spurious in nature (40). Pattern matching can be an effective tool to increasing a study's internal validity (43), and will also act as a determinant to which of the theories most accurately characterizes and explains the events at the Toronto G20 Summit and Vancouver Olympics. After which, that theory will be employed to develop causal relationships between variables and events. This will help ensure internal validity (40) and ultimately make the final conclusions of this study more robust and much more credible.

Finally, external validity is a concern because it relates to the ability of a study to generalize. This concern is not as amplified as the two above because, as already stated, the goal of the current work is not to generalize to social phenomena, but rather to generalize to theoretical propositions in the field of public order policing. This is what is referred to as analytical generalization, rather than statistical generalization, which is common in probability sample survey research (43).

The reliability of any research project is measured by the ability to demonstrate that the operations can be repeated and yield the same results (40). This relates to the subjectivity of gathering, analyzing, and drawing conclusions from data. Because the current study has only one observer, or data analyst, it will be important to firmly establish the procedures employed in advance so repetition is possible in the future. In order to help ensure reliability, tactics such as a case study database and a researcher's journal will be used during the data collection phase. In relation to the former method, Yin (2009) argues that to achieve an accurate case study database, there needs to be a clear distinction between case study data and the narrative presented (119). Here, the author will ensure the data is presentable to third parties, and is entirely separate from the analysis and discussion sections of this thesis.

A principal that will be followed to help ensure the reliability of this study is to develop a chain of evidence. This process is two-fold; first, the use of proper in-report citations in the case study

database; and secondly, there is a data referencing sheet attached to this dissertation which reveals the evidence concisely (123).

Ultimately, these reliability and validity benchmarks will help ensure the current research project is identifying proper relationships, operational measurements, can be repeated, and is analytically generalizable. For qualitative research, it is important to leave a coherent record of how one did something and for what reasons, so it can be later scrutinized.

Ethics

As with any research endeavour, there is a constant challenge to anticipate and formulate potential ethical concerns that may arise out of a particular methodological approach. There are ethical standards that have to be discussed, formulated, and attained before one can begin gathering data. Because the current study deals entirely with publicly secondary available data and thus has no direct research "human subjects", these concerns are minimized. There was no requirement to obtain ethics approval at an institutional level, nor was it practical to consider source confidentiality.

That being said, there are many broad ethical standards to which the current report abides, not only because it is required at a graduate studies level, but also because it facilitates a bond that is created between research and the larger field of inquiry. These include issues such as plagiarism, accurate reporting of data, the consideration of alternative viewpoints, acknowledging the limitations of the data and the reporting of that data, and properly recognizing sources and citing them accurately (Booth et al., 2008, 276). By abiding by these seemingly self-evident standards of ethical research, the author will attain the standard needed to submit the current thesis for approval and defence.

Conclusion

The current research project has two primary stated objectives using the Toronto G20 Summit and Vancouver Olympics as cases: first, to corroborate or contradict theories of public order policing and, second, to understand the extent to which agencies other than the police are

engaging in security at public order events. It is important to bear these objectives in mind, not only because it highlights and illuminates disagreement in the field as to which particular theory applies more aptly to public order policing in Canada, but it also capitalizes on an unique opportunity for researchers to better understand the field of Canadian public order policing during these two historically unprecedented security endeavours in Canada.

The design employed for this thesis is an exploratory case study design, using both the Vancouver Olympics and Toronto G20 Summit as separate cases. The units of analysis have been discussed in Tables 1-7and will effectively guide the categorization and analysis of empirical manifestations to facilitate discussion and the answering of the specific research questions. The sample was drawn from national and local news organizations. Pattern matching will be employed to compare empirical relationships with theoretically predicted ones (the first stated goal). Like all other research studies, there is susceptibility to bias and error, as well as reliability and validity threats. Through the employment of various standards and benchmarks, these will be minimized and credible and noteworthy conclusions will be drawn from the final data analysis.

Chapter 4 – Results

This chapter will present the results of the data analysis phase while avoiding interpretation of the data. Following this will be the Discussion Chapter which will begin by restating the research questions posed in Chapter 2, and will proceed to answer these questions based on the data presented in the current chapter. What follows will be a narrative of each case under study based on the data gathered. Each case account will outline the results in a descriptive and linear fashion in order to ease the burden of repetitive detail. Following that will be a brief presentation of the data for each analysis phase and graphical representations of the numerical representations in order to elucidate patterns and facilitate comparing counts.

When discussing the data results, reference is made to observed phenomenon as reported through the media, as opposed to reality itself. At no time should the results be interpreted as facts in and of themselves, but rather a representation of reality. There are many drawbacks, biases, and repercussions to this that were discussed in the preceding chapter.

Narrative: The 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games

The 21st Winter Olympics Games were held in Vancouver from February 12 – 28, 2010. Approximately 2,600 athletes from 82 countries congregated to participate in the Olympics, which drew large crowds from all over the world, including protestors. Prior to the Olympics, an RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit (ISU) was formed with representation from municipal, provincial, and federal police and other security agencies (V170). The media reported that there would be approximately 7,000 public police, 4,500 military personnel, as well as 5,000 private security guards present during the Olympics (V35). The protest groups that were reported through the media as being present at the Olympics included anti-poverty, anti-war, Aboriginal, and anti-globalization groups (V78). The Olympic Resistance Network (ORN) is an umbrella activist organization for many of the smaller protest groups (V121).

Security preparations included the installation of nearly 1,000 CCTV cameras, the majority of which were installed by the ISU (V82). The opening ceremonies of the Olympics say some 2,000 protestors marched in downtown Vancouver, largely unimpeded by the police (V110). The torch

relay was rerouted by organizers due to these protests (V113). The day following the relatively peaceful opening ceremonies, over 200 masked protestors damaged cars and businesses in downtown Vancouver, in particular the Hudson Bay Company due to its 'colonial' imagery (V117). Several arrests were reported through the media related to this incident (*ibid*; V134). Two days following this event, on February 15, media reports show that anti-poverty groups peacefully established a 'tent city' on West Hastings Street (V127). The following several days were relatively absent of any protest event. The media speculated that this was due to negative publicity associated with the earlier vandalism of downtown businesses (V143).

When police were controlling protest actors at the Olympics, media reporting suggests that there were more instances of selectivity than there were of general control. Consider for instance the following media observation: "police have appeared to show a lot of restraint in the face of Black Bloc provocation" (V129) and police on a number of occasions chose to not to place protestors under arrest (V78; V111; V162). Police-protestor contact was often conciliatory in nature. For example: "Assistant Commissioner Mercer said the ISU's...Community Relations Group has been meeting with local activist organizations in an attempt to facilitate free and democratic protests" (V29). In addition, police articulated in the media that a primary goal was to ensure the right to demonstrate. Highlighting this was a statement by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD): "we want the world to appreciate that Canada is an open and free society that places the highest values on the rights of the individual, not the least of which are the rights to free assembly and speech" (V168).

Several protestors claimed through the media that the police were engaging in harassment. For example, at the Olympics, protestors claimed that, "police are following them and questioning their neighbours and family to learn more about their plans for the Olympic period" (V33). There was only one instance reported in the media of police infiltration, where a police officer posed as a bus driver to drive members of the Olympics Resistance Network (ORN) to a conference in Vancouver (V58). There were also claims by protest groups that police had planted 'agents provocateur' amongst protestors during the Olympics; however, no evidence was found of this during data analysis. During the Olympics, the media reported police references to anti-terrorism. For example:

> The reason for the inflation is that the 2010 Winter Olympics, even though they are in sleepy Vancouver, are now considered a high-risk terrorist target in the post-9/11 world. This is because Canada, while not an active player in the war in Iraq, is seen as part of the broader, U.S.-led coalition to eliminate al-Qaida and other radical Islamic terror groups (V6).

There was evidence found of a relationship between the police and the media at the Olympics. For instance, the VPD employed a media relations officer in order to liaise and communicate with the media (V51). The media also observed that police engaged in non-intervention activities. For example, the following photo shows a police officer standing in between two rival and belligerent protest groups at the Olympics:



(Olympic Picture: OlympicClose2010Demo16-SH)

Further to this, police met with various protest groups. For instance, VPD Constable Lindsey Houghton attended the B.C. Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) legal observer training (V166).

There was also media reporting of international liaison activities between Canadian police forces and foreign agencies at both events. For example, from a US perspective:

> The creation of the US 2010 Olympic Security Committee (the US equivalent of the V2010-ISU) and an integrated Multi-Agency Coordination Centre (MACC) in Blaine, Washington, comprised of representatives from US federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, military representatives, emergency response agencies, and various liaisons from Canadian agencies (Privacy Games, March 2009).

Further, in the development of security clearances to secure access zones, the ISU stated it would "work with its partners abroad to ensure necessary checks are done" (V169).

Olympic security officials also developed strategies during the events to provide real-time intelligence. For example, "officers on the street provided much of the intelligence that enabled police to bring in the riot squad when some of the demonstrators resorted to vandalism" (V126). Similarly, through media reporting it was evidenced that there is an increasing blurring between policing and national security in Canada. For example:

> The "threat assessments" show police have identified several threats to Olympic security, including anti-globalization, anti-corporate and First Nations activists, as well as international extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda (V24).

At the Olympics there was media evidence of the employment of covert intelligence strategies such as the use of "unmanned aerial vehicles flying…over the Olympic venues" (V17). We also saw the use of anti-riot gear such as masks, shields, specialized weaponry, tactical clothing, and the use of animals for crowd control. Consider the following illustrations:

(Olympic Picture: 13ringsblog_protesters-blogSpan)

(Olympic Picture: 32444)

(Olympic Picture: c32ae85d4fe9851c82ac0831d483)

In the end, the games saw some protest events, although most were peaceful, and the BC Solicitor General praised the police and security personnel for their efforts in what was reported as a peaceful and secure Olympic Games (V161). The media reported there being 36 separate

protests during the Olympics, all of which were peaceful (V159), excluding the vandalism that occurred in the downtown area by the 200 masked protestors on Saturday February 13, 2010. There were no formal mentions of arrests made during the Olympics; however it was noted in the media that 93 individuals were arrested for 'breach of the peace' (V164). That said, it is unknown whether these charges were related to public disorder, or other activities such as public intoxication.

Narrative: Toronto G20 Summit

The Toronto G20 Summit was a gathering that took place in Toronto, Ontario, during the weekend of June 26 – 27, 2010. This was the fourth meeting of G20 heads of state who gather to discuss the global economy and financial system. Prior to the G20 weekend, an ISU was formed and consisted of personnel from various regional, provincial, and federal policing and security-related agencies (G366). The G20 required approximately 15,000 public police and private security officers (Freeze, April 7, 2010) and according to media reporting security at the G20 surpassed that of the Olympics, a claim that pegs this event as the largest security event in Canadian history (Alcoba, February 23 2010). Further articles state that security for the G20 Summit cost a minimum of $833 million, however this figure was expected to grow to somewhere around $1 billion (CBC, *G8, G20 security bill at least $833M*, May 25, 2010).

Prior to the G20, the Ontario government approved a temporary regulation based on the *PWPA*. The Ontario Government designated the security zone at the G20 as a 'public work' as defined under the *PWPA*. This piece of legislation allowed "police sweeping powers to interrogate individuals, search without warrant, and deny entry to those deemed to be suspicious who come within five meters of the security fence" (G268). However, both the provincial government and the TPS misinterpret this law to mean that anyone passing within 5 meters of the perimeter can be subject to a search and identification requirements (*ibid*). On the Friday before the G20, two activists are arrested under the authority of this law for refusing police demands for identification (*ibid*). The mistaken 5 meter rule was widely reported in the media during the G20 by both police and protest organizers (i*bid*). In the end, both the Ontario government and TPS acknowledged that the law was misinterpreted during the G20, and that the law did not give police to the right to demand identification from people passing by the security fence (*ibid*).

Protests against the G20 began well before the event itself, starting with the firebombing of an Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) branch in Ottawa which prompted an increase of security by the ISU (G81). Protests in Toronto started a week before the event was scheduled to begin and largely remained peaceful (G215). Prior to the event there was also a large detention centre opened (G195) in anticipation of large-scale arrests. This centre resulted in much criticism on behalf of activists who claimed in the media that their basic human rights were violated (G). For example, the media reported that some protestors housed at the detention centre were denied access to legal services, medical attention (G335), and in one incident over 40 protestors were housed in one cell (G358). A 10 km security fence was also erected around the outer G20 security zone prior to event (G214; G359). Further, to enter the fenced secure zone, individuals had to pass through "five levels of security screening" (G27).

Major protest actions began on the Friday of the G20 weekend, where several main streets were shut down. The first large-scale protest ended peacefully, where the media reported tense confrontations between protestors and police in riot gear (G279). Police estimated there were approximately 2,200 protestors at this specific event (*ibid*). The media reported that the following two days saw large-scale protest events, many involving mass arrests. Punctuating many peaceful protests were the black bloc groups who vandalized businesses in the downtown area (G293) as well as set two police cars on fire (G337):

(G20 Picture: 3206868)

Following the events of Saturday, media representations of Sunday show an increase in confrontation and violence. Police and protestors engaged in often violent confrontations in various parts of the downtown area, resulting in some 600 arrests (G313). In addition, on Sunday morning the police raided a University of Toronto dormitory and arrested 70 people (G325).There was also a high-profile confrontation between protestors and police at the

detention centre, where approximately 150 protesters were confronted by police who used plainclothes police officers to arrest protestors and fired tear gas into the crowds (G322).

Media reporting indicates that there were fewer instances of mass police presence at the Olympics than the G20 Summit. For example:

> Constable Ed Boltuc of the Toronto Police Service said in March that the Vancouver Winter Olympics were "the largest security event ever to take place here in Canada." He went on to boast that the "G20/G8 surpasses that completely. There's going to be a massive – absolutely massive - presence of police and security on the ground like you've never seen before" (G180).

Police actions were observed through media reports as more often pre-emptive and confrontational. For example, the media reported that police used CCTV cameras to conduct pre-event surveillance (G373), police pre-emptively arrested members of particular protest groups (G329), and alternative media claimed that police attended various protestor meetings unwanted and in one case refused to leave after being requested to do so (G47). This was never confirmed through other media sources.

At the G20, media reports suggest there was a significant use of barriers to control the flow of protestors, the media, and G20 attendees, whereas this was not observed to a large extent at the Olympics. Media reports also suggest that event access was highly controlled through the use of multiple security zones and personnel clearance procedures (G27). To get inside in the inner zone, one had to pass through "five levels of security screening" (*ibid*).

There was media evidence found of a relationship between the police and the media at the G20. For example, the ISU held briefings with the media to show off their weaponry, special units, and crowd control tactics (G141). After one such briefing, police requested the media keep the command center location secret due to its potential as a high-profile target (G241). During the G20, the media reported that police were engaged in meeting with various protest groups. For instance, at the G20, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association met with the ISU in order to discuss security arrangements (G109). The G20 also saw the use of a military-style command/operations centre:

(G20 Picture: rcmp29nw1_jpg_733683gm-a)

The above command post was located in a below-ground garage in Toronto (G242), and was staffed by "80 police officers, security agents and military personnel" (G348).

At the G20, media reported that several protestors had claimed the police were engaging in harassment. For example, at the G20 protestors maintained that police harassed them by conducting unlawful searches of protestors (G276). There were also several mass arrest events reported. Take for instance the police raid discussed above were police arrested 70 people at the U of T (G325), or that by the end of the G20 over 900 people had been arrested (G317).

There was media evidence of mass collection of information at the G20. For instance, "the Toronto Police have completed the installation of 77 new video surveillance cameras in the G20 Summit security zone to supplement their 18 existing ones" (G139). Similarly, G20 security officials developed strategies during the events to provide real-time intelligence. For example, TPS officers were equipped with microphones in order to record their interaction with protestors (G71). There was also evidence in the media of the employment of covert intelligence strategies such as the use of both CSIS and undercover police officers (G298; G176). CSIS, on numerous occasions, were noted to have been speaking with activists prior to the G20 (G168; G169; G176).

The use of non-lethal weaponry was widely reported in the media at the G20. Consider one media report: "protesters were beaten with tear gas, sticks, rubber bullets…You can watch police stun cowering protesters" (G303). We also saw the use of anti-riot gear such as masks, shields, specialized weaponry, tactical clothing, and the use of animals for crowd control. Consider the following illustrations:

(G20 Picture: 20100627_protest-videos-g20)

(G20 Picture: 3206924)

(G20 Picture: 3206875)

(G20 Picture: 3206873)

It was revealed in the media that various police forces spent several months prior to the G20 infiltrating activist groups (G454). Specifically, at least 12 undercover police officers took part in covert surveillance in what G20 documents state was an attempt to detect and disrupt threats to the G20 (*ibid*). These documents also reveal that the ISU generated a list of potentially threatening individuals, colour coding them according to their perceived risk level (*ibid*). During the event, this media reporting states that police deployed undercover police officers amongst demonstrators to act as event monitors in order to provide intelligence back to the ISU command centre (*ibid*). Finally, this same media report indicates that this intelligence gathering led to the pre-emptive arrest of some 50 activist organizers on charges of conspiracy, all except 17 of which have been dropped by police (*ibid*).

In the end, over 900 people were arrested during the G20 in what is reported to be the largest in Canadian history (G341):

Figure 3 - Arrests at High-Profile Canadian Events



Presentation of Results – Introduction

The following will be a presentation of the numerical data and is separated into three consecutive phases. Phase 1 matches theoretical patterns developed in Chapter 2 to observed phenomenon at the two cases under study. Phase 2 then explores the extent to which non-policing agencies play roles in protest control in Canada. Because phase 2 involves specifically interpreting the data, results will be fully developed in Chapter 5, rather than here. The data sample for this paper was solely publicly available data. In particular, Canadian mainstream print media news articles provided the bulk of the data collected (*N=528*). The limitations to this source of data were discussed in the preceding chapter.

Research Question #1 Results

The tables that were presented in Chapter 3 are recreated here to facilitate the illustration of the data analysis for phase 1. To begin, the table below illustrates the two early theories found in the public order policing literature as articulated by Della Porta and Reiter (2006). The expected result for each theory is located directly below the appropriate heading. For example, in terms of controlling protestors during public order events, the escalated force theory states that police will use generalized techniques; whereas negotiated management theory argues that police will be reactive in the controlling of protest actors. Below each variable will be a statement whether or not that phenomenon was observed, as well as the number of times it manifested itself through the data, as interpreted by the researcher. Below each table will be a brief synopsis of the

empirical manifestations; however, due to the need for brevity, a verbal presentation of each variable cannot be presented. In addition, numerical values should not be viewed quantitatively. For instance, the value of 'tolerance of criminal acts' below is 6 for negotiated management. This does not mean that there were 6 unique occasions of this type of tolerance, rather 6 manifestations of this variable (i.e. there can be several manifestations concerning one specific incident).

1. Escalated Force and Negotiated Management – Discussion of Research Question #1 Results

Table 9 - Vancouver Olympics	Escalated Force	Negotiated Management
Legitimacy of Police Actions	Brutal / Illegitimate / Illegal No (*n=0*)	Soft / Tolerant / Legal **Yes (*n=1*)**
Control of Protest Actors	Generalized **No (*n=0*)**	Selective **Yes (*n=8*)**
Police Actions	Pre-emptive **Yes (*n=16*)***	Reactive **n/a****
Contact with Protestors	Confrontational **Yes (*n=1*)**	Consensual / Conciliatory **Yes (*n=5*)**
Negotiation with Protestors	Used for Intimidation **No (*n=0*)**	Used for Partnerships **Yes (*n=2*)**
Training	Professional **Yes (*n=1*)**	Improvised **No (*n=0*)**
Flexibility	Rigid **No (*n=0*)**	Flexible **No (*n=0*)**
Primary Goal / Priority	Security of Event **No (*n=0*)**	Right to Demonstrate **Yes (*n=8*)**
Agents Provocateur	Use of **(*n=0*)**	No use of **(*n=3*)**
Tolerance of Disruption	Low **No (*n=0*)**	High **No (*n=0*)**
Tolerance of Criminal Acts	Low **No (*n=0*)**	High **Yes (*n=6*)**
Coercive Strategies	High **(*n=0*)**	Low **(*n=2*)**
Information Collection	Generalized / Intrusive **Yes (*n=9*)**	Focused / Prosecutorial **Yes (*n=3*)**
Event Access	Highly Controlled **No (*n=0*)**	Managed **Yes (*n=3*)**
Use of Detention	High **No (*n=0*)**	Low **Yes (*n=6*)**
Use of Arrest	Mass **No (*n=0*)**	Selective **Yes (*n=32*)**
Labelling of Protestors	Bad / Illegal / Troublemakers **Yes (*n=2*)**	Peaceful / Pragmatic **Yes (*n=1*)**
Paramilitarization***	High **Yes (*n=87*)**	Low **No (*n=87*)**

Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Reiter, H. (2006)
* This is a combination of pre-event negotiation, pre-emptive arrests, and pre-event surveillance variables.
** This value was not quantified, because most police actions were reactive, much too many to count.
*** All instances of Paramilitarization were retrieved from table 15.

Table 10 – Toronto G20	Escalated Force	Negotiated Management
Legitimacy of Police Actions	Brutal / Illegitimate / Illegal **Yes (*n=3*)**	Soft / Tolerant / Legal **No (*n=0*)**
Control of Protest Actors	Generalized **No (*n=0*)**	Selective **No (*n=0*)**
Police Actions	Pre-emptive **Yes (*n=25*)***	Reactive **Yes (*n=1*)**
Contact with Protestors	Confrontational **Yes (*n=6*)**	Consensual / Conciliatory **Yes (*n=4*)**
Negotiation with Protestors	Used for Intimidation **Yes (*n=4*)**	Used for Partnerships **Yes (*n=2*)**
Training	Professional **Yes (*n=3*)**	Improvised **Yes (*n=4*)**
Flexibility	Rigid **No (*n=0*)**	Flexible **No (*n=0*)**
Primary Goal / Priority	Security of Event **No (*n=0*)**	Right to Demonstrate **Yes (*n=3*)**
Agents Provocateur	Use of **(*n=0*)**	No use of **(*n=1*)**
Tolerance of Disruption	Low **No (*n=0*)**	High **No (*n=0*)**
Tolerance of Criminal Acts	Low **No (*n=0*)**	High **No (*n=0*)**
Coercive Strategies	High **Yes (*n=11*)**	Low **No (*n=0*)**
Information Collection	Generalized / Intrusive **Yes (*n=13*)**	Focused / Prosecutorial **Yes (*n=7*)**
Event Access	Highly Controlled **Yes (*n=9*)**	Managed **No (*n=0*)**
Use of Detention	High **Yes (*n=9*)**	Low **No (*n=0*)**
Use of Arrest	Mass **Yes (*n=18*)**	Selective **Yes (*n=21*)**
Labelling of Protestors	Bad / Illegal / Troublemakers **No (*n=0*)**	Peaceful / Pragmatic **Yes (*n=1*)**
Paramilitarization**	High **Yes (*n=280*)**	Low **No (*n=280*)**

Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Reiter, H. (2006)
* This is a combination of pre-event negotiation, pre-emptive arrests, and pre-event surveillance variables.
** All instances of Paramilitarization were retrieved from table 15.

In terms of the Vancouver Olympics, there is a noticeable leaning toward the negotiated management theory of public order policing as developed by Della Porta and Reiter (2006) as reported through media sources. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- Police-protestor contact was often conciliatory in nature.
- Police articulated in the media that a primary goal was to ensure the right to demonstrate.
- Analysis of media reports found there to be a low reliance by the police on arrest and detention.

Standing in contrast to the Olympics, the G20 saw more of a reliance on what Della Porta and Reiter call the 'escalated force' model of public order policing as reported through the media. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- Media reports suggest that police engaged in mass arrest at times.
- It was found that mass information collection was employed (see table 14).
- Media reports suggest that event access was highly controlled through the use of multiple security zones and personnel clearance procedures (G27).
- Media reports suggest that there was a high use of paramilitary strategies employed by the police to control protest actors. This will be elaborated below in table 15.

2. Coercive Strategies – Discussion of Research Question #1 Results

Table 11 - Coercive Strategies	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
Massive Police Presence	Yes (n=*1*)	Yes (*n=14*)
High Visibility of Police	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes*
Plainclothes Police	Yes (*n=7*)	Yes (*n=12*)
Anti-Riot Gear	Yes (n=*21*)	Yes (*n=59*)
Special Police Units	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=5*)
Police From Other Jurisdictions	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=4*)
Visible Identification	Yes (*n=1*)	*No* (*n=0*)
Mass Arrests	*No* (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=18*)
Unconfirmed Arrests	*No* (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Encircling / Penning Tactics	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=4*)
Excessive Use of Force	*No* (*n=0*)	*No* (*n=0*)
Water Cannons	*No* (*n=0*)	*No* (*n=3*)*
Tear Gas	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=18*)
Other Irritants	*No* (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=7*)
Rubber Bullets	*No* (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=23*)
Live Ammunition	*No* (*n=3*)	No (*n=0*)
Sound Cannon	No (*n=0*)**	No (*n=2*)*

Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Reiter, H. (2006), p. 178.

* As will become evident in Chapter 5, the police were highly visible, these incidents were too widespread to warrant a numerical value.

** Both the sound and water cannon were a part of police weaponry, although there is no

indicated they were deployed.

Figure 4 - Coercive Strategies at Both Cases



In terms of coercive strategies observed when analyzing the data, several important points became evident that are worth noting. Generally speaking, there were many fewer media reported coercive strategies observed at the Olympics than the G20. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- Media reporting indicates that there were fewer instances of mass police presence at the Olympics than the G20 Summit
- There were no instances in the media of mass arrest observed at the Olympics
- At the G20 there were several events that were observed through media reporting as mass arrest.
- At the Olympics there were no media indications that police used tear gas or rubber bullets.
- At the G20 non-lethal weaponry was deployed regularly.

3. Persuasive Strategies – Discussion of Research Question #1 Results

Table 12 - Persuasive Strategies	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
Pre-Negotiation	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Negotiations During Event	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Barriers	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=10*)
Border Controls	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=2*)
Blocking Access to Areas	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=16*)
Preventive Arrests	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=2*)
Claims of Harassment	Yes (*n=8*)	Yes (*n=11*)
Entering and Searching Offices	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Entering and Searching Homes	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Herbert Reiter 2006, p. 181.		

Figure 5 - Persuasive Strategies at Both Cases



There were many different persuasive strategies observed at both the G20 and the Olympics. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- Both events saw the use of pre-event negotiations between police and protest groups.
- At the G20, there was a significant use of barriers to control the flow of protestors, the media, and G20 attendees, whereas this was not observed to a large extent at the Olympics.
- At both events protestors claimed through the media that the police were engaging in harassment.

4. Information Strategies – Discussion of Research Question #1 Results

Table 13 - Information Strategies	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
Mass Collection of Information	Yes (*n=9*)	Yes (n=6)
Use of Alarmist Information	No (*n=0*)	No (n=0)
International Information Exchange	Yes (*n=4*)	Yes (n=3)
Protest Infiltration	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (n=5)
Agents Provocateur	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)

Adapted from Della Porta, D., and Herbert Reiter 2006, p. 182.

Figure 6 - Information Strategies at Both Cases



Information strategies are Della Porta and Reiter's (2006) last strategy of public order policing observed in their research. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- It was observed through media reporting that there was a campaign to gather mass amounts of information at the Olympics.
- There were claims by protest groups that police had planted 'agents provocateur' amongst protestors during the Olympics; however, no evidence was found of this during data analysis.
- There was media reporting of international liaison activities between Canadian police forces and foreign agencies at both events.
- There was media evidence of mass collection of information at the G20.
- There were media accounts of police infiltrating protest groups prior to the G20.
- International exchanges of information were also evidenced in the media during the G20.

- The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was involved in providing support to Canadian police agencies during the Summit (G368; G57).

5. Intelligent Control – Discussion of Research Question #1 Results

Table 14 - Intelligent Control Theory	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
		Liaison Strategies
Community Policing (275; 197)	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=0*)
Public Relations (275)	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=2*)
Non-intervention (132)	Yes (*n=2*)	No (*n=0*)
Underenforcement of the Law/Restraint (160)	Yes (*n=2*)	No (*n=0*)
Education/Pamphlets (5; 279)	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=6*)
Negotiation (103)	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Meeting with Protestors (103)	Yes (*n=4*)	Yes (*n=9*)
Escort Services (133)	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Impartiality (151)	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Police Emphasis on Self-Policing (156)	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Information Brokering (165)	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Deferral to Courts (170)	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Employing Officers as Liaisons (195)	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
		Intelligence Strategies
Human Surveillance	Yes (*n=7*)	Yes (*n=18*)
Technological Surveillance (205)	Yes (*n=1*)	No (*n=0*)
Preemptive Detention (275;271)	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=3*)
Blurring - Policing and National Security (275)	Yes (*n=15*)	Yes (*n=18*)
Reflexive Dramatization (PR) (272)	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Control of Information (Asymmetric) (266)	Yes (*n=2*)	Yes (*n=2*)
Overt Displays of Authority (273)	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=3*)
Paramilitarization (203; 204)	Yes (*n=87*)	Yes (*n=280*)
Hierarchy of Force (276; 208)	Yes (*n=2*)	Yes (*n=3*)
Use of Civilian Intelligence Agencies (5)	Yes (*n=12*)	Yes (*n=16*)
Covert Intelligence Gathering (6)	Yes (*n=5*)	Yes (*n=16*)
Selective and Strategic Use of Force (261)	Yes (*n=6*)	Yes (*n=2*)
Border Controls (271)	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=2*)
Plainclothes Police	Yes (*n=6*)	Yes (*n=7*)
		Adapted from Hall and de Lint (2009)

Figure 7 - Intelligent Control at Both Cases



The results for the theory of intelligent control developed by Hall and de Lint (2009) were separated into two categories; liaison and intelligence strategies. Through media reports, liaison strategies were found not to be as prominent as their intelligence counterparts. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- At both the G20 and Olympics, there were dedicated police officers designated as public relations or communications officers (G3; V51).
- At the Olympics, the media observed that police engaged in non-intervention activities.

- During both events, the media reported that police were engaged in meeting with various protest groups.
- The use of human intelligence gathering at both events was reported in the media.
- Prior to both events, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as well as various police forces met 'in confidence' with protestors, their neighbours and associates (G109; V15).
- Security officials also developed strategies during the events to provide real-time intelligence.
- Media reporting suggested that police and CSIS were often engaging in very similar activities.
- Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) (G98) were evidenced at both events, which share intelligence amongst law enforcement and security agencies.
- At both events there was evidence in the media of the employment of covert intelligence strategies.

6. Paramilitary Strategies – Discussion of Research Question #1 Results

Table 15 - Paramilitary Strategies	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
Protective Shields	Yes (*n=4*)	Yes (*n=13*)
Specialized Units	Yes (*n=3*)	Yes (*n=6*)
Use of Squad Formations	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Intelligence Gathering	Yes (*n=27*)	Yes (*n=37*)
Early and Large-scale Planning	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=3*)
Pre-event Surveillance	Yes (*n=2*)	Yes (*n=16*)
Event Surveillance	Yes (*n=2*)	Yes (*n=16*)
Hierarchical Command and Control	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=3*)
Use of Arrest Squads	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=3*)
Controlling / Blocking Space	Yes (*n=15*)	Yes (*n=46*)
Animals – Horses and Dogs	Yes (*n=7*)	Yes (*n=28*)
Heavy use of Riot Gear	Yes (*n=4*)	Yes (*n=58*)
Identification of an 'Enemy'	Yes (*n=3*)	No (*n=0*)
Command / Operations Center	Yes (*n=2*)	Yes (*n=5*)
Use of Non-Lethal Weaponry	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=31*)
Stop and Search Tactics	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=15*)

Adapted from Waddington, D. (2007), p 27; P.A.J. Waddington (1993; 1998); and Peterson, A. (2006).

Figure 8 - Paramilitary Strategies at Both Cases



The use of paramilitary strategies was evident at both the Olympics and G20. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- Both events saw the use of anti-riot gear such as masks, shields, specialized weaponry, and tactical clothing.
- At both events, CCTV cameras were deployed in order to conduct event and pre-event surveillance.
- At both events police blocked and controlled access to space; although this was more prominent at the G20.
- The G20 and Olympics both saw the use of animals for crowd control.
- The G20 also saw the use of a military-style command/operations centre.
- At the Olympics, there was no evidence found of widespread use of non-lethal weaponry or stop and search tactics. By comparison, these tactics were widely seen at the G20.

7. Policing Dissent – Discussion of Research Question #1 Results

Table 16 - Policing Dissent Theory	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20
City Ordinances, Codes, and By-Laws	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (n=1)
Zoning Restrictions	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Police Pamphlet Distribution	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=6*)
Protest Permit Systems	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Controlling and Restricting Space	Yes (*n=15*)	Yes (*n=46*)
Use of Event Defensive Locations	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Police Infiltration	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=5*)
Gathering of Covert Intelligence	Yes (*n=5*)	Yes (*n=16*)
Gathering of Overt Intelligence	Yes (*n=11*)	No (*n=8*)
Constant and Repetitive Police Patrols	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Pre-emptive Arrests	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=2*)
Mass Arrests	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=18*)
Reducing Protestor Anonymity	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Fortification of Event Locations	No (*n=0*)	Yes (*n=8*)
Public Relations Consultants	No (*n=1*)	No (*n=2*)
Control of Information	Yes (*n=2*)	Yes (*n=2*)
References to Anti-Terrorism	Yes (*n=7*)	Yes (*n=4*)
Close Relationships – Media/Police	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=3*)
Embedded Journalists with Police	No (*n=0*)	No (*n=0*)
Framing of Protestors as Violent	Yes (*n=1*)	No (*n=0*)
Framing of Protestors as Non-Violent	Yes (*n=1*)	Yes (*n=1*)
Adapted from Fernandez (2008).		

Figure 9 - Policing Dissent at Both Cases



Aside from controlling and restricting space, the gathering of overt intelligence, and references to anti-terrorism, the Olympics saw little evidence of the policing dissent theory as advocated by Fernandez (2008). The G20 saw more instances of this theory of public order policing. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- Instances of police infiltrating protest groups at the G20 were reported in the media.
- Security officials at the G20 were engaged in covert intelligence gathering.
- Police at the G20 engaged in mass arrest practices as reported in the media.
- It was through the media observed that security officials were engaged in the fortification of event locations.
- At the Olympics, the media reported more police references to anti-terrorism.
- Prior to the G20, the Director of CSIS stated that the G20 did not "appear to be the subject of terrorist chatter" (G239).
- There was evidence found of a relationship between the police and the media at both events.

Research Question #2 Results

The final phase of the current research project is to uncover what role other federal departments played in the security of the Olympics and G20, to explain why, or why not, there is this presence, and which theoretical model best explains this phenomenon. Here, there will be a very brief presentation of the observed presence of other federal agencies, and the next Chapter will discuss the 'why' and potential theoretical implications.

At the Toronto G20 Summit, there were a number of federal agencies involved in security. The RCMP was in charge of coordinating the overall security, and received $131.7 million from the federal government for their efforts. Other departments involved include PSEPC who received $32.1 million, DND who received $11.7 million, and CSIS who reportedly received almost $600,000 (G14). For the Olympics, the RCMP were "the lead agency responsible for developing and implementing all security plans for the designated event in conjunction with local authorities" (Privacy Games, March 2009). There was a presence from the CF/DND, the federal government's Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), Transport Canada, Canada's elite Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) commando unit, as well as CBSA.

Conclusion

These results provide a framework for which the stated research questions can be answered or elucidated upon. The observations outlined in the current chapter will facilitate reasoned inference in the following chapter as the observations are explicated and applied to the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. What will follow is a selection of the most important and significant findings from the data, which will be further analyzed through various theoretical lenses and used to differentiate between police actions at both events.

Chapter 5 – Discussion

Introduction and Research Questions

Based on the literature discussed in Chapter 2, the following specific research questions guided data analysis to aid in illuminating theoretical debates:

- Which theory of public order policing is best suited to explain and categorize public disorder at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? What factors may help explain the applicability of one over the other?
- How do other federal departments play a role in protest control at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? If so, which theoretical model best explains this?

These research questions that were developed to begin this body of work and which have guided all of the underlying research will be the focus of the following chapter - a chapter which will culminate in conclusions being drawn based on what was revealed during data analysis. To begin, detailed discussions and analysis of each of the research questions will consider the extent to which any of the six theories developed in Chapter 2 is appropriate in explaining and categorizing events at the two cases as reported in the media. In the next section there will be an analysis and discussion of the role and presence of other government agencies at both cases. The final section will explain the conclusions reached.

Discussion of Research Question #1

As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a noticeable shift in public order policing literature, moving from authoritative practices in the 1960s to more consensual tactics throughout the 1970s and 80s (Della Porta and Reiter, 2006, 101), primarily as a response to labour strikes (Hall and de Lint, 2010). Moving on from the 1980s there is an evident disjuncture in what the relevant academics view as the trajectory of public order policing. Authors such as Fernandez (2009) view police as an extension of the interests of a powerful elite, the former exerting control over citizens in order to coercively quell peaceful dissent. Fernandez referred to these practices as 'textures of control'. Della Porta and Reiter (2006) agree with Fernandez (2009) that there are coercive methods employed by police against protestors in western democracies (Della Porta and Reiter, 2006, 22). However, in their research of the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy, Della Porta and

Reiter found two other strategies, persuasive and *information strategies*, to be prominent (13), although not as dominant as *coercive strategies* (19; 21).

What became evident was not a complete disjuncture amongst authors, but a package of divergent theories, all attempting to explicate the trajectory of public order policing in western democracies. From a Canadian context, what is needed to overcome existing obstacles to understanding is the application of these theoretical developments to Canadian events in order to clarify, from a criminological perspective, the merits or weaknesses of divergent theories.

In light of this debate and the opportunity for research afforded by the recent Vancouver Olympics and Toronto G20 Summit, an attempt to clarify the phenomenon of Canadian public order policing was undertaken. The first research question aims to accomplish this, and will be answered in the following paragraphs.

> *Which theory of public order policing is best suited to explain and categorize public disorder at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit, as represented in the media? What factors may help explain the applicability of one over the other?*

1. Hall and De Lint's Intelligent Control Theory

Hall and de Lint's (2009) theory of public order policing advocates that in Canada we are witnessing a strategic integration approach to public order policing, where police employ *liaison strategies* to minimize the need to use force at protest events (6). Alongside *liaison strategies, intelligent control* theory argues that Canadian police have developed enhanced technical and paramilitary abilities which are supported by a greatly increased capability to gather intelligence (*ibid*). The specific variables that compose the intelligent control theory of public order policing were conceptualized through Table 5 in Chapter 3. Through data analysis, the intelligent control theory was found to be suitable in describing various aspects of media reports of policing protest at the two cases.

Liaison strategies

At the Olympics, media reporting showed that there was evidence of non-intervention, public relations, under-enforcement of the law, negotiations, meeting with protestors, impartiality, and deferring to the courts. For example, during one incident police protected protestors from violent hockey fans who were throwing items at the protestors (V162). No arrests were made during this event, highlighting the fact that in some instances police did not enforce laws and acted as an intermediary. Police also met and negotiated with protestors. For instance, the ISU had a Community Relations Group (CRG) that met regularly with local activist organizations in order to discuss protesting zones (V29).

At the G20, there were various instances of *liaison strategies* being used by police as reported through the media, and others that were completely absent. For instance, there was no media reporting of police non-intervention, under-enforcement of the law, or the employment of police officers as liaisons. That said the media reported evidence of police public relations, pamphlet distribution, negotiating and meeting with protestors, as well as information brokering. For example, police prior to the G20 distributed approximately a million flyers to Toronto households outlining police authorities during the summit and what the security zones meant for local residents (G343). There was also a CRG developed specifically for the G20, which included members from TPS as well as the RCMP. This CRG created a specific team dedicated to activist and protestor outreach that overtly approached protest groups (Toronto Police Service, *G20 After Action Review*, 55).

The fact that *liaison strategies* were evident at both cases is an interesting point. Despite the fact that the G20 was clearly more confrontational than the Olympics, police deployed early *liaison strategies* as an attempt to avoid or minimize the potential for conflict. Similarly, we saw in the literature review that some authors (see Fernandez, 2008) believe that liaison is a tactic of the past, having been overtaken by more coercive methods of quelling protest. Based on media reported data from these two cases, the current study suggests that there are still evident liaison approaches to public order policing in Canada. Rather than becoming more repressive, police in Canada are still employing liaison as a tactic. The question then remains as to whether these liaison efforts were consequential in the end, and whether they were in good faith. Another

important question is why police employed certain strategies of liaison and not others. In summary, *liaison strategies* were used at both cases and this portion of the *intelligent control* theory was adequate in highlighting the similarities between these two events in relation to liaison tactics used by the police.

Hall and de Lint (2009) also contend that police view less institutionalized protest groups as posing more of a threat than those who are more institutionalized (47). This reality manifested itself in media reporting during both cases. For example, there was a noticeable adverse reaction by police to anarchist and groups that employed black bloc tactics as opposed to labour and environmental groups for instance. This could be due to the fact that the former groups tend to resort to violence. That said there were exceptions, where police were restrained in their actions against groups using "black bloc" tactics. The question now becomes, what accounts for this flexibility? Based on the media reported data presented here, the answer is through agency integration, increased intelligence functions, and a blurring of policing and national security mandates, police are able too exert greater flexibility over public disorder situations.

Intelligence strategies

Simply put, *intelligence strategies* were the most important and informative aspect of the current study. The media-reported evidence outlined below suggests that in Canada we are seeing increased police reliance on strategies not traditionally viewed as a policing function.

Intelligence can be defined as the combination of information-gathering with the value-added of analysis (George and Bruce, 2008). In 1984, the function of security intelligence was severed from the RCMP mandate due to several high-profile controversies, and CSIS was created as a separate government agency. This was due to the incompatibility of the policing and intelligence professions. That is, the primary customer of intelligence traditionally has been the government, who assigns intelligence-gatherers priorities. Whereas, a principal of policing is that it is arms-length of government direction and enforces the law impartially. This is disputed however, by authors such as many presented by Beare and Murray (2007) who argue that there is no consensus regarding police independence of government, and claim that this is a contemporary

argument that is overstated in the literature. Despite this, intelligence agencies by definition are subject to strong government direction; whereas it is at the very least debatable the extent to which police agencies are subject to similar direction. Due to the incompatibility of law enforcement and intelligence work, most liberal democracies have separated the functions policing and intelligence. More recently however, we have seen the increase use of criminal intelligence, typically referred to as intelligence-led policing (ILP). In the end, *intelligence strategies* featured prominently at both cases, and after discussing the findings it will be important to discuss ILP and its value to the *intelligent control* theory of public order policing.

2010 Vancouver Olympics

During the Olympics the media reported instances of security personnel watching and gathering information on potential protestors prior to the games. For example:

> [CSIS] has been monitoring anti-Olympic activities for more than a year and found the strongest opposition to the athletic event to be among "the more extreme elements" of First Nations groups, particularly in alliance with anti-poverty groups, according to an internal government document obtained by Canwest News Service (V15).

The RCMP was reported in the media to have approached potential protestors (both consensually and non-consensually) on numerous occasions to discuss planning and other protestors that were of interest (V33). On one occasion, the media reported that a police officer posed as the bus driver for an Olympic Resistance Network (ORN) group who were traveling from Vancouver to Victoria (V58). The issue of police and government security agencies engaging in similar practices highlights what Hall and de Lint (2009) refer to as the increasing blurring of policing and national security. At the Olympics, this was evident through the RCMP's Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) which was composed of government agencies responsible for security and intelligence (Privacy Games, March 2009, 21). Further, prior to the Olympics a threat assessment was obtained by the media which shows that police identified Canada as a priority target for such groups as Al Qaeda due to our relationship with the US and role in Afghanistan (V22: V24). That said, as the games progressed the ISU released statements indicating that the threat from terrorism to the Olympics was low (V92).

Another feature of the *intelligent control* theory is the asymmetric controlling of information. For instance, at the Olympics it was reported that police used ticketing as a method of collecting information that could be used to ban certain protestors from certain public locations (Privacy Games, March 2009, 53). In addition, it was reported through the media that in the lead up to the Olympics, the RCMP-led JIG asked the federal government if they could ignore all access to information requests, citing this as a threat to security (V26). It is unclear as to whether this request was approved. A hierarchy and selective use of force was employed during the Olympics. The BCCLA acknowledged through the media that despite illegal activities and violence by protestors on February 13, 2010, police restored order without the use of weaponry (V145). This is important because it shows that police were able to show restraint in the face of criminality. There were also several acknowledgements in the media of police containing a crowd without the use of violence or weaponry (V160). Media reporting suggests that controls at the border were also present on both sides of the border, with US officials denying entry to Canada of an anti-Olympic journalist (V78), and Canadian officials stopping and questioning known Olympic activists at the Vancouver Airport (V103). There were also reports through alternative media of police in plainclothes questioning and monitoring protestors (V45: V75: V138), however this could not be corroborated through other media sources.

Finally, there was also the use of many different civilian intelligence agencies, other than CSIS, who supported the police and their mandate during the Olympics reported in the media. For instance, DND coordinated its Olympic operations through the Joint Task Force Games (JTFG) command (Privacy Games, March 2008, 21). Further, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) which is made up of 13 federal agencies involved in the intelligence field provided threat assessments to police and security officials during the games (58).

Toronto G20 Summit

The G20 saw more instances reported in the media of *intelligence strategies* than did the Olympics. There was media evidence found of surveillance, such as each front-line police officer being equipped with microphones that record and wirelessly transmit interactions with protestors (G71). Highlighting the use of intelligence agencies was one incident where video footage was taken of an alleged CSIS employee talking to Aboriginal protestors ahead of the G20 (G169). In

the weeks prior to the summit, the media reported that there were 28 incidents of activists being approached concerning their protest plans, eight of which were approached by CSIS and the remainder by TPS (G176). Further, a CSIS spokesperson acknowledged that the agency had conducted private interviews relating to certain G20 activists (*ibid*).

Media reporting showed the use of pre-emptive arrest as a police tactic, where undercover work led to some 50 pre-emptive arrests ahead of the G20 (G454). In addition, as with the Olympics, there was a noticeable blurring of policing and national security at the G20. For instance, following the RBC firebombing in Ottawa on the 18th of May, 2010, OPS labeled the event 'domestic terrorism' and stated that the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET), which shares intelligences between law enforcement and government agencies, was assisting with the investigation (G98). Also, prior to the G20, the head of CSIS stated to the media the following: "while the RCMP is the lead agency in securing the summits, CSIS has spent the past 12 to 18 months gathering intelligence it hopes could help the RCMP with…breaches of the law that might occur" (G217). This confirms and highlights the potential interconnectedness and cooperation between various organizations ahead of large events such as the G20. Further, the TPS acknowledged in their *G20 After Action Review* that intelligence gathering is "required well in advance of any major event" (59), indicating the extent to which police departments in Canada realize that intelligence functions are now essential to effective public order policing. This highlights the fact that police and security officials use overt and covert intelligence gathering in order to identify threats to public safety. What is absent from the *intelligent control* model, is adequate discussion of the specific processes that occur prior to starting the task of gathering intelligence.

Prior to 9/11, the business of intelligence was highly secretive and fraught with jurisdictional battles. After the most high-profile terrorist attack on US soil, decision-makers began rethinking the benefits of fusing and sharing intelligence on a much larger scale to prevent intelligence gaps. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is an extension of other more reactive policing methods. More importantly, ILP provides a tactical and strategic research component to policing which helps to predict and prevent crime (Hess and Orthmann, 2011, 260). ILP incorporates as its foundation, the traditional cycle of intelligence: receiving direction, planning, collecting

information, processing and analyzing, and finalized through dissemination (261). Originally, one would find ILP being applied primarily to crime problems related to terrorism, extremists, and gangs.

However it has become evident in the study of these two cases that ILP needs to either expand to incorporate in its theoretical explanations the phenomenon of intelligence usage during protests, or newer theories of public order policing must take into account the specific and separate policing function of intelligence as a professional policing discipline. Hall and de Lint's (2009) *intelligent control* model does not detail the extent to which intelligence functions become explanatory tools for public order events. ILP provides that detail, and must be incorporated into public order theories, or expand to include the ability to categorize and explain protest events.

The function of intelligence being used as a policing tool is an important consideration that must be further elaborated in the criminological literature. For example, questions have been raised such as, to what extent are traditional intelligence functions being used, adjusted, or discarded by law enforcement agencies in Canada? Also, to what extent does government play a role in tasking policing agencies with intelligence work, what repercussions will this have on the separation of government and law enforcement? And most importantly, should there be such a separation in times of crisis and public disorder?

In their 2009 study of policing at a high risk soccer game in the UK, Hoggett and Stott (2009) found that one of the drawbacks of the policing of the specific public event was that police lacked reflexivity concerning the potential negative effects that the use of force could potentially have on the dynamics of a crowd (231). The *intelligent control* model argues that in late modernity, public officials are more attentive to how their actions are perceived and represented (Hall and de Lint, 2009, 272). This takes on many forms, but can be seen through public relation campaigns, follow-up reviews, and close relationships with the media (*ibid*). This was evident following the G20, where the TPS published their *G20 After Action Review* (2010) which discussed and highlighted problems, concerns and recommendations they need to consider the next time there was a need for public order policing. This reality lends further credibility to the *intelligent control* model.

Overt displays of authority were evidenced through media reporting, such as when reporters were invited by police to witness crowd control tactics in action:

> Hosted by the summit's RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit, the event was a veritable dog and pony show of law enforcement - quite literally, in some cases, because some demonstrations involved K-9 and horse-mounted units. The phalanx of law enforcement officers included cops on bicycles, cops in riot gear, cops with bomb-defusing robots; security units also demonstrated everything from motorcades to the controversial "sound cannons" or long range acoustic devices (LRADs) that may be used on restive protest crowds (G140).

The fact that police sought out venues to display their tools for quelling potential violence during the G20 is important because it suggests a high degree of planning and a willingness to divulge certain information to the media and public. This event could be viewed as a forewarning to activists or those planning to engage in violence or criminal behaviour during the G20. Hall and de Lint (2009) call these types of activities 'surges': where police stage dramatizations of force in an attempt to display their vigilance and remind citizens of their presence (273). The *intelligent control* was very effective in describing these types of public displays of authority.

In their research, Hall and de Lint (2009) contend that there exists a stepwise process that begins with the exhaustion of more soft and consensual policing tactics before moving on to active and violent responses to protests (276). Prior to the G20, the ISU held a technical briefing where a police spokeswoman stated that protestors who engaged in violence would be met with a staged police response (G140). This shows that, at the very least, there existed a hierarchy or force developed by police prior to the event and that it was strategic in nature. Further highlighting this observation is a statement made by a reporter for the *National Post* following the burning of two police cruisers: "Police went from friendly to extremely edgy, tensing up their formations, putting on their riot helmets, [and] slipping on gas masks" (G297). This media reporting suggests that there was a measured response in place, and that the burning of the police cruisers increased police intensity or allowable force to be used. Regardless, the *intelligent control* theory was very apt in categorizing this aspect of the policing of the G20 protests.

A final variable worth discussion is the use of plainclothes police during the G20. Media reporting suggests that police on numerous occasions were found to be executing their duties

while out of uniform. For instance, police were observed by one journalist in plainclothes talking into microphones in their sleeves, "scanning any crowd for suspicious behaviour" (G218). One incident was observed by the CBC as plainclothes police officers entered a crowd and began to arrest protestors (G313). During a protest outside the detention centre, it was reported in the media that plainclothes police in flack vests exited a van that drove up to protestors and began arresting them (G317). The observable use of plainclothes police at public order events is nothing novel in the Canadian context. That said, this crowd control tactic used by police is not taken for granted in the *intelligent control* theory, and is adequately addressed thereby allowing for a more accurate categorization of the events.

The media reported intelligence tactics employed at both the Olympics and G20, such as surveillance, hierarchy of force, the use of civilian agencies, the selective and strategic use of force, and covert intelligence gathering, illustrate the importance that those responsible for security at major events in Canada place on these strategies. The implications of this conclusion are numerous. Hall and de Lint (2009) argue that there is an increasing fusion of law enforcement and national security in Canada. This study corroborates the increasingly evident observation that police and national security personnel are playing a dual and often integrated role prior to and during high-profile events in Canada. Additionally, important questions arise out of the conclusion that police are increasingly using intelligence functions. Does this new model of policing exist due to the increasing emphasis on *intelligence strategies* after 9/11? Does it exist solely out of convenience? Is the Canadian experience similar to those of other Western democracies? These questions, amongst others, are the critical and consequential research queries that ensue from the current study.

Intelligent control argues that public order policing, at its core, is a model that allows for the hard countering of protestors once the various layers of accommodation are exhausted (281). This is important to note because there were some instances where police seemingly jumped to violent confrontation with no warning (i.e. without 'exhausting' the more consensual and accommodative tactics). For instance, the protest outside the detention centre became confrontational almost without warning, with police arresting allegedly peaceful protestors and deploying weaponry (G317). These bursts of seemingly uninspired actions on behalf of police

occurred in both directions. In other words, police reacted forcefully to peaceful protestors on numerous occasions, and in instances where protestors became overtly violent and destructive, such as setting police cars on fire, police were nowhere in sight. Through analytic induction, there needs to be more flexibility in the *intelligent control* theory to explain these anomalies in police behaviour. Is this controlled flexibility, or rather a logical outcome of the confusion inherent in public disorder? The results of this study suggest that this flexibility is controlled. An obvious follow-up to this observation is this: how can this apparent ultra-flexibility be accounted for in theory while avoiding being general and expansive?

Summary

The *intelligent control* model argues that police have at their disposal an array of responses to the protests, which produce dynamic variables making each public order event distinct (259). This theory allowed for some flexibility in characterizing and explaining police actions at both events. *Intelligent control* was clearly the most effective and appropriate explanatory mechanism for the two cases under study. From a liaison perspective, we saw at both events the media reporting the use of public relations, negotiations and police meeting with protestors, as well as police deferring to the courts. On the intelligence side of this theory, we saw at both events the media reporting the use of pre-emptive and real-time intelligence gathering, civilian intelligence agencies, paramilitarization (to be discussed below), strategic use of force, reflexivity, hierarchy and strategic use of force, as well as an increasing blurring of policing and national security functions. In a broader context, researchers must now consider other flexible theoretical constructs which account for different protest groups, tactics, different events types, as well as legal frameworks. In combination, these theoretical tools packaged in one comprehensive medium will be a powerful explanatory instrument and an influential contribution to the field of policing and criminology more broadly.

2. Paramilitary Theories

Based on D. Waddington (2007), P.A.J. Waddington (1993; 1998), and Peterson's (2006) research, *paramilitarization theories* argue that public order policing uses a strategic and centralized command structure and chain of command, is flexible through the use of tactical

discretion at the field level, uses intelligence practices, and specialized equipment (riot gear, body armour, gas masks, and special weapons) (51). The variables that comprise this theory of public order policing were conceptualized through Table 6 in Chapter 3. Paramilitary theories of public order policing were highly appropriate when applied to the two Canadian protest events.

2010 Vancouver Olympics

At the Olympics, paramilitary tactics were used to a lesser extent than the G20, likely due to the different groups that were attracted to both events. That said, despite the relatively peaceful protests during the Olympics, the media reported numerous occasions of paramilitary tactics being used. The more prominent ones will be discussed here. First, intelligence strategies were employed en mass as discussed above and need no elaboration here. Controlling and blocking space was reported in the media as a tactic used by police. For example, police used ticketing a method of forbidding people from accessing certain locations based on banned behaviour (Privacy Games, March 2009). The extent to which this tactic was used is unclear. In a more traditional technique to control of space, the RCMP stated in a release that those entering Olympic venues would be subjected to screening similar to that at an airport (V169). Further, police never established protest zones, and stated on several occasions that protestors could protest without many restrictions (V167; V47). Nothing found in media reporting went contrary to this. This hands-off approach is important because it shows flexibility on behalf of the police to choose to either engage or disengage. This is made explicit in Hall and de Lint's (2009) work, which espouses an enhanced flexibility in contemporary public order policing. Finally, media reporting showed there to be the use of anti-riot gear such as masks, shields, specialized weaponry, tactical clothing, and the use of animals for crowd control. Consider the following illustrations:

(Olympic Picture: 13ringsblog_protesters-blogSpan)

(Olympic Picture: 32444)

(Olympic Picture: c32ae85d4fe9851c82ac0831d483)

During the G20 and Olympics, media sources reported that police had access to sound cannons (V50),although there is no evidence suggesting that police used them against protestors. This highlights the increased capacity of police in Canada to deploy weaponry during public order events. That said, increased capacity does necessarily equate to increased use, something that is not accounted for in the literature. This further highlights the importance of police flexibility during protest events that is alluded to in the work of Hall and de Lint (2009). An important point to note is that there was no media evidence found beyond normal baton use, that police used any weaponry during the Olympics. Moreover, despite the fact that riot gear was used during the Olympics it was not nearly as heavily relied upon as it was during the G20.

Toronto G20 Summit

According to media reporting, the G20 in Toronto saw the deployment of many paramilitarization variables discussed in the preceding chapters. To begin, during the G20 there was a noticeable use of shields, riot gear, and animals during crowd control as evidenced in the following illustrations.

(G20 Picture: 20100627_protest-videos-g20)

(G20 Picture: 3206924)

(G20 Picture: 3206875)

(G20 Picture: 3206873)

Weaponry was also used whereas during the Olympics it was not. For instance, during the G20 police used tear gas (G304; G314), plastic bullets (G307; G313; G319), bean bag projectiles (G319), and pepper spray (G325). The majority of this weaponry was deployed during the course of high tension incidents, such as the confrontation outside of the detention center, and was not used haphazardly. Again, this highlights police flexibility and the existence of a hierarchy of force.

The statement that police used paramilitarization tactics during the G20 and Olympics is not an astonishing revelation. That said, the continued use of these tactics, and the differences seen between cases become important topics of discussion. Why did we see a noticeable difference between paramilitary tactics used during both cases under study? Further, why were police more circumspect when it came to their image at the Olympics? For instance, police at the Olympics, even though they were in riot gear, typically wore bright reflective vests. Whereas police at the

G20 wore more riot gear and donned black uniforms. As a consequence it seems evident that police were attempting to portray a different image of themselves in these events.

The Olympics drew thousands of spectators who were there to enjoy sporting events. The numbers of protestors as compared to spectators was both quantitatively and qualitatively different between the G20 and Olympics. Police therefore were engaging primarily with a peaceful and willing crowd during the Olympics, rather than a more confrontational and sometimes aggressive group at the G20. A portion of Olympic police resources went to controlling protest, but the majority seemed to have gone to other tasks, such as traffic and venue security. The G20 however, was an international meeting of world leaders, which brought together global activists who use the G20 as a venue to voice grievances against globalization and capitalism. Therefore, the primary focus of police is not the protection of large majority of peaceful spectators, but to provide security to participants of the G20 by quelling the most violent of the protests. Evidence in this thesis suggests that this security-oriented mandate translates into a more confrontational and sometimes violent encounter between police and protestors.

The G20 saw the use of other paramilitarization variables in media reporting such as specialized units to address unique problems, stop and search tactics, as well as the use of arrest squads. To begin, the G20 saw the use of SWAT teams, intelligence units, escort groups (G33), search and rescue teams, negotiation units, sharp shooting teams (G141), and hazardous material units that specialize in nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological materials (G151). Stop and search tactics were epitomized at the G20 by the Ontario Government designating the security zone at the G20 a 'public work' as defined under the *PWPA*, which provided them with extraordinary powers to "interrogate individuals, search without warrant, and deny entry to those deemed to be suspicious who come within five meters of the security fence" (G268).

This legal manoeuvre prior to the G20 is an important observation that shows the extent to which decision-makers may seek to enable police to maximize their powers prior to such an event. In this case, the manoeuvre maximized police powers enabling broader stop and search tactics. It will be important for researchers in the future to study the subsequent manifestations of legal

manipulation. Finally, arrest squads were found in media reporting during the G20. For instance, during a 'kettling' manoeuvre, police spent hours selectively entering the square and extracting individuals for arrest (G358; *Caught in the Act*, December 2010, 23). 'Kettling' is a tactic that allows police to contain potentially threatening crowds without risking the potential for injuries that can result from the use of dispersal techniques. The arrest tactics used during the 'kettling' by police can be an attempt to 'divide and conquer' large groups. It allows police to selectively and quickly burst from behind police lines to arrest seemingly random individuals from protest groups. The fact that there is now evidence of this occurring in Canada is an important highlight of this research. The extent to which it is used in the future and its implications for protest group integrity are important topics for future researchers. Indeed, TPS acknowledges in their *After Action Review* (June 2011) that arrest squad training occurred prior to the event, but that TPS units need to be more proactive in dynamic situations (58). It seems likely that this practice will continue in the future.

Media reporting suggests that police in Toronto made extensive use of intelligence and large scale planning prior to and during the G20. Briefly, intelligence was used in the form of civilian intelligence agencies (G109; G169), threat assessments (G31), audio (G71) and video (G77) surveillance, police infiltration (G298; G454), and the use of truck drivers reporting suspicious behaviour (G90). During the G20, media reporting suggests that large-scale planning manifested itself through training exercises. For instance, the media reported that prior to the G20 the TPS held a simulated hostage taking exercise where blank rounds and paint balls were fired in an underground business court (G41).

Media evidence was found of police creating an operations center as well as controlling and blocking space. Specifically, the media reported that police set up a military-style command post in an underground garage (G242). This command / operations center acted as a nerve centre for all security related matters was staffed by some 80 personnel, including police, security officials, and military members (G348):

(G20 Picture: rcmp29nw1_jpg_733683gm-a)

The controlling and blocking of space at the G20 was widespread and more pronounced than during the Olympics based on media reporting. This was likely due to the fact that the leaders of the most industrialized nations were present during this meeting, and a security breach would reflect negatively on Canada's image. There were two fenced security perimeters, controlled respectively by the TPS and RCMP (G27). In order to enter through both boundaries, one had to pass five separate levels of security screening (*ibid*). Further to this, manholes were welded shut and waste bins removed from streets near the venue (*ibid*). There were also many traffic diversions and identification checkpoints in and around the G20 area (G31). Those living inside the security perimeter were issued passes by police (G53). Finally, a detention center was established which over the course of the summit saw hundreds of protestors being detained on various charges (G70). This mammoth security venture provides an important framework for predicting what will likely occur at future events.

The extent of paramilitary planning and practices at this event provides evidence of the applicability of paramilitarization theories within the Canadian context. Further, the media evidence underlines the reality that police have either become, or are becoming, more militarized when it comes to policing high-profile public order events. Paramilitarization theorists such as D. Waddington (2007), P.A.J. Waddington (1993; 1998), and Peterson (2006) were correct in articulating a move towards this reliance on quasi-military tactics and procedures as an established method of controlling protests. Despite the adverse and off-putting nomenclature associated with the term 'militarized', increased paramilitarization, it is argued, allows police to exert control over particular situations where other tactics are ineffective. This, in turn, helps to protect police, and citizen protestors alike.

3. Della Porta and Reiter: Coercive, Persuasive, and Information Theory

Della Porta and Reiter's (2006) typology of public order policing attempts to fuse together the above theories as well as incorporate research completed at the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. There are three aspects to this theory which views police actions as much more measured and strategic than previously noted (101). The authors concluded in their research that *coercive strategies* such as specialized weaponry and physical intimidation to control and disperse protestors were predominant among public order policing strategies (13). Also, persuasive tactics were employed through the use of discursive contacts with demonstrators (*ibid*). The authors also found evidence of *information strategies* which involved large scale information gathering used to identify law-breakers (*ibid*). The variables that comprise this theory of public order policing were conceptualized through Table 3, 4, and 5 in Chapter 3.

Coercive strategies

Media evidence of *coercive strategies* as described by Della Porta and Reiter (2006) were found in both cases in this study, but were more prominent at the G20. At the Olympics there was evidence of coercive variables such as the use of riot gear (see above discussion), the use of specialized units and police from other jurisdictions (V29; V48), and the practice of encircling and penning of protestors. The latter case is illustrated by the following picture taken during the Olympics:

(Olympic Picture: 3424424234)

Other than these observed variables, *coercive strategies* at the Olympics were relatively few. There were no media reports of variables such as the use of weaponry, mass or unconfirmed

arrests, excessive use of force, or live ammunition. For the Olympics, the *coercive strategies* theorized by Della Porta and Reiter (2006) were not highly applicable.

At the G20 *coercive strategies* were far more prominent in media reporting. There was ample media evidence of a massive police presence, the use of plainclothes police, heavy use of riot gear, the use of specialized units, police deployment from other jurisdictions, mass arrests, and the heavy use of non-lethal weaponry such as tear gas, rubber bullets, and pepper spray. The massive police presence is supported by the fact that by most accounts there were approximately 20,000 security personnel involved in the G20 (G307). In addition, on several occasions police in civilian clothes were observed in protest crowds (G218; G313). As for the mass arrest variable, by the end of the G20 the media reported that police had arrested some 900 individuals (G333). In relation to police tactics, the following highlights the police tactic of penning protestors:

(Olympic Picture: December 2010 Ombudsmen Report on the G20 – Caught in the Act)

Police at both events had at their disposal a 'sound cannon', technically referred to as a Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), although there was no media evidence that it was ever deployed in the field. Although *coercive strategies* are evident at the G20, there were several variables that were absent from media reporting. For example, there was no evidence of excessive use of force, the use or threat of use of live ammunition, or unconfirmed arrests. That said the coercive component of Della Porta and Reiter's theory of public order policing applied aptly to the G20. It is now important to discuss whether the other two components of their theoretical framework were equally applicable.

Persuasive strategies

Persuasive strategies, as formulated by Della Porta and Reiter (2006), were observed in media reporting most at the G20 as compared to the Olympics. At the G20 there was media evidence found of pre-negotiation, the use of barriers, border controls, blocking access to space,

preventive arrests, as well as claims of harassment by protestors. In relation to controlling access and blocking space, police at the G20 erected two fenced security zones, and in order to enter both zones one needed to pass through five levels of screening (G27). Further, police preemptively arrested some 50 protestors prior to the G20 (G454). Many protestors claimed that police were harassing them at both events; however those claims cannot be founded through the current study. In the end, the use of persuasive strategies can be accurately characterized as a tactic used by police at the G20.

The same is not true for the Olympics, where *persuasive strategies* were not described as a useful tool in managing protest events. For instance, there was no media evidence found of variables such as the use of barriers, preventative arrests, or police entering and searching the homes or offices of protestors. The one variable that was more prominent at the Olympics was police pre-negotiating with protestors. For instance, an Assistant Police Commissioner met on several occasions with activists to discuss protests as well as zoning (V29). In fact, negotiations during the torch relay saw an event rescheduled in order to avoid confrontation (V66). This is important because the media reported evidence so far is that police at the Olympics were much more accommodative, consensual, and non-interventionist. This assertion will be explored more as this chapter progresses.

The 'controlling of space' aspect of *persuasive strategies* is an important contribution to our understanding of protest events, especially at the G20. The G20, as opposed to the Olympics, had a number of high-profile attendees which is likely to have caused the larger emphasis on blocking access to space and controlling access to events. This portion of the Della Porta and Reiter's (2006) theory is supported in this sense; however it fails to account for protest events where these types of controls are not as heavily relied upon by police. For example, at the Olympics there was no media evidence found of any strict barrier controls and only one instance of police blocking access to space (Privacy Games, March 2009). Although the persuasive strategies were effective in characterizing certain aspects of police actions at the G20, there is a need for theoretical flexibility to account for differences among events.

Information strategies

There are several important revelations worth discussing in relation to Della Porta and Reiter's (2006) *information strategies* theory. First, at both events there was no media evidence found of policing using alarmist information or injecting 'agents provocateur' into crowds. It was evident however that police used the gathering of information in order to maintain security at both events. For example, at the Olympics there were some 950 CCTV cameras (V169), electronic sensors, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flying overhead of Olympic venues (V17). This level of coverage was achieved with the help of the Canadian military and highlights the ability of public agencies to cooperate on a large scale during high profile events.

At both events there was media evidence of international exchanges of information, in particular with the US. For instance, Olympic police worked with authorities from the US and Mexico in order to test response capabilities in case of a terrorist attack (Privacy Games, March 2009). At the G20, and the NORAD was involved in low-flying rapid response exercises (G57). These discussions illuminate the extent to which a network of interests and mandates is present and involved in the security of contemporary public order events, as reported in the media. A final important point worth discussing is the use of police infiltration of protest groups prior to both events. At the Olympics, a police officer posed as a bus driver that transported protestors from Victoria to Vancouver for the launch of the torch relay (V58). Similar police actions were reported in the media prior to the G20:

> Newly released G8/G20 summit documents reveal the RCMP and various Ontario police forces spent several months infiltrating anti-war, anti-globalization and anarchist groups with the use of undercover officers…The reports by the Joint Intelligence Group formed by the RCMP-led ISU...show that various police services contributed at least 12 undercover officers to take part in covert surveillance of potential "criminal extremists" in a bid to "detect and disrupt" any threats (G454).

The extent to which police attempted to infiltrate potentially threatening groups prior to the G20 brings to bear more questions than potential answers to theoretical inquiries. These covert actions on behalf of police highlight the extent to which police engaged in pre-event planning as well as how seriously they took their roles in promoting security at both events. Which groups were targeted, and why? How successful were police in penetrating these groups? Did the information gleaned from infiltration lead to police being able to more easily maintain security at both

events? These questions highlight the importance of this evidence and its potential to guide further research into this particular topic. As for the information strategy variables developed by Della Porta and Reiter (2006) such as the mass collection of information, protest infiltration, and international exchange of information, they have value in characterizing observed phenomenon at both cases under study. That said, as a standalone framework, it falls short of holding considerable classification capabilities in relation to contemporary protest events in Canada.

As a whole, Della Porta and Reiter's (2006) model of public order policing, which includes *coercive, persuasive, and information strategies*, was more useful in characterizing media reported events at the G20 than the Olympics. In terms of coercive strategies, these results indicate that police and protestors we more confrontational and aggressive at the G20. This observation is perhaps related to the purpose and nature of these events and the different groups that were attracted to each event. Economic summits such as G20 meetings tend to attract anti-globalization and anarchist groups. While confrontation is often a fundamental goal for these groups, it cannot be determined based on the current data whether it was primarily security personnel or activists who initiated confrontation. The persuasive strategy component of the theory was adequate in accounting for the heavy controls seen at the G20, but does not apply in the other case due the lack of these controls during the Olympics. Finally, *information strategies*, as a theory was an important tool in classifying the police reliance found during the G20 and Olympics on information gathering, international cooperation, and protest infiltration. However, it fails to explain the extensive reliance of police on intelligence agencies and functions during both events. In summary, what is important to note is the fact that this theory was unable to account for the differences between the two cases and could use reformulation to include more consensual and non-confrontational approaches that were evident during the Olympics.

4. Fernandez's Policing Dissent Theory

Fernandez's (2008) theory of public order policing argues that police control free speech, not only by reacting to protests on the streets, but also in the legal, physical, and psychological environments (5-6). This theory states that prior to protests, police engage in legal manoeuvring (17), control the physical space by selecting and mapping out the environment in which a protest is supposed to occur (93), as well as capitalize on public fear (particularly through citing terrorism) in

order to frame media and public narratives concerning particular groups (139). The variables that compose this theory of public order policing were conceptualized through Table 7 in Chapter 3. Generally speaking, this theory was found to be negligibly applicable to the Olympics, and slightly more, although far from fully useful or relevant to the G20.

2010 Vancouver Olympics

The Olympics saw few media reported examples of Fernandez's (2008) theory of public order policing. For instance, there were no illustrations of pamphlet distribution, permit systems, use of defensive locations, pre-emptive or mass arrests, fortification of venues, and no embedding journalists with police as a co-option method. There was media evidence found of controlling and restricting space (see discussion in above section on paramilitarization), use of overt and covert intelligence (see discussion in above section on *intelligent control*), control of information, references to anti-terrorism, and the framing of protestors as violent.

To begin, the controlling of information took on the form of police planners requesting that the federal government allow them to ignore access to information requests until after the Olympics were completed (V26). Police cited security threats as the reason for this request. Another, and perhaps more important media reported tactic, is use of references in the media to the terms "terrorism" and "anti-terrorism" by police and security officials. For instance, in the early planning stages the RCMP stated in the media that the Olympics were considered a terrorist target (V6). In one threat assessment, the media reported that the RCMP saw extremist groups such as al-Qaeda as threatening (V23). Further, military planners cited on several occasions the fact that there are a number of terrorist groups present in Canada, some which they claim have the capacity to carry out attacks (V17). These references to terrorism are an important feature of this theory worth discussing. As Hall and de Lint (2009) describe the increasing clouding of policing and national security, Fernandez is much more specific, arguing that references to anti-terrorism legitimize this blurring. This lends more credence to the *intelligent control* theory because references to anti-terrorism are a specific instance of what Hall and de Lint (2009) broadly articulate as an increasingly relevant phenomenon in public order policing.

Toronto G20 Summit

Instances of Fernandez's theory of public order policing were more numerous during the G20. There was media evidence of pamphlet distribution, controlling and restricting space (see discussion in above section on paramilitarization), use of overt and covert intelligence (see discussion in above section on *intelligent control*), pre-emptive and mass arrests, the fortification of event locations, controlling of information, and references to anti-terrorism. That said, there were many other variables of Fernandez's theory that were absent from the data.

To begin, according to TPS Chief Bill Blair, police officers distributed over one million flyers to Torontonians, explaining police intentions. Although Fernandez saw this technique as a method to legitimize police repression, there was no media evidence that pointed to police ulterior motives for pamphlet distribution. There was, however, a clear use of pre-emptive arrest as well as mass arrests that took place during the G20. For instance, the media reported that one individual who planned on participating in the black bloc protests decided against it after he found out police were pre-emptively arresting others who intended to engage in these tactics (G329). This claim cannot be corroborated. Further, following the G20, the media reported on documents that claimed police had infiltrated some of the groups who planned to protest. Here, based on intelligence, it is suggested that some 50 protest organizers were preemptively charged with conspiracy (G454).

The media reported that mass arrests occurred on several occasions during the G20. For example, in a sweep following the vandalism that occurred on the Saturday of the summit, police arrested some 500 people (G305). In addition, on the Sunday morning, police pre-emptively arrested nearly 100 individuals who were staying at the University of Toronto (*Caught in the Act,* December 2010, 22). These incidents highlight the flexibility of police when it comes to reacting to protestors. According to Fernandez, police seek out to control the physical space during protests in order to stop the assembly of protest groups and to ultimately reduce their effectiveness (93). If this were the case, police would have confronted protestors and engaged in mass arrest much earlier in the summit. This was not the case, and highlights the work of Hall and de Lint (2009) which states police maintain flexibility and a hierarchy of force.

Fernandez (2008) also contends that police attempt to control the physical space by fortifying event locations (122). There was media-reported evidence found of this during the G20. For example, manholes were welded shut, obstructions (i.e. "street furniture" such as newspaper and mail boxes, etc.) removed from the streets (G27), two security perimeters of concrete and wire mesh were erected (G153), checkpoints formed, and police escorts made available (G359). References to anti-terrorism, as with the Olympics, were an interesting variable that was evidenced through media reporting at the G20. For example, following the firebombing of the RBC branch, police made several references to domestic terrorists in the media (G98).

Following this, the references made in the media were that the terrorist threat to Canada during the G20 was low (G217; G238; G239). The fact that it was brought up in the media, but in a way that attempted to downplay its likelihood is an important consideration. Is this simply media sensationalism or something more theoretically relevant? Why during the Olympics were there more references to terrorist acts than during the G20? Were there lessons learned from the Olympics that were applied to the G20 regarding the discussion of terrorism in the media? With access only to media reports, these important questions will linger for future researchers interested in the increased blurring of policing and national security.

Similar to Fernandez's theory, recent critical work has been completed based on the G20. This newly critical anti-security work by Rimke (2011) claims that police repression during the G20 is symptomatic of the larger reality that police are a state tool to suppress anti-capitalist resistance, and that the G20 set a new precedent for unlimited police powers (203). Further, Rimke does not view the G20 experience as anomalous, but rather a veritable fact of policing: police exist to demonize and criminalize activists (196), re-enforce the class violence that is capitalism (192), and maintain the dominance of the state (204). It is unclear how these conclusions were drawn as there are few facts provided to sustain such blunt conclusions. Moreover, there is little evidence in the current study to support such claims. Rimke further contends that the G20 "provided the ideal social laboratory to test the general response to police repression of resistance movements" (203). Police misconduct and shows of force were therefore not aberrations according to Rimke, but the necessity of maintaining the current capitalist order. This frames the entire discussion of public order policing in a different light, rendering it subordinate to the bigger issue of class

dominance and state repression. If this is to be adequately tested, Rimke and similar critical thinkers need to explicate their argument in a manner that allows for empirical testing, rather than relying on conspiratorial and nihilistic musings.

A formal and public inquiry into police actions at the G20 would serve no use according to Rimke: "the liberal fantasy that a formal public inquiry will effect systemic, meaningful change fails to understand that the primary purpose of official enquiries is to placate the population by relegitimating political authority through the symbolic appearance of accountability and justice" (202). It is hard to accept this argument given there have been numerous public inquiries which have resulted in historically significant and meaningful changes in Canadian society. That said, this newly formed anti-security critique of the 'neoliberal myth' that policing is for the public good, is worth exploring through further research. Clearly, this type of research must be much more balanced and explicit than authors such as Rimke have allowed for.

In summary, theories developed by Fernandez and by Rimke have limited value in highlighting some important realities of Canadian public order policing, such as references to anti-terrorism, the use of pre-emptive and mass arrest, and the controlling of information. Neither theory, however, adequately frame these variables into a coherent framework that is wholly applicable to Canadian events. Despite Fernandez's (2008) overarching and titillating claim that the policing of protest is reminiscent of disease control, there seems to be little practical use to deploying Fernandez's theory, as a whole, to Canadian public order events.

5. Negotiated Management

The *negotiated management* theory stresses four key strategies: 1) a tolerance of a substantial amount of disruption by protestors; 2) communication between police and protestors; 3) minimal aggressiveness by police officers, and; 4) minimal use of force (NRC, 2004, 208). These variables, amongst others, were conceptualized in Table 1 in Chapter 3. Analysis of the media reported data presented in the previous chapter shows that *negotiated management*, as a standalone theory, is not well suited in explaining contemporary Canadian protest events. The *negotiated management* model states that information collection is selective and used for prosecutorial purposes, and that paramilitarization is low. At both cases under study, however,

information collection was widespread and generalized, and there was a significant presence of paramilitary tactics and equipment.

Information collection took on various forms such as police asking truck drivers to act as lookouts ahead of the G20, and to pass on any suspicious information to police (G90). Further, generalized information collection was accomplished by the use of CCTV cameras: 77 at the G20 (G156) and approximately 950 at the Olympics (V169). There were also many instances of paramilitarization at the G20 (see section 2 of this chapter for a full discussion).

At the Olympics, the media reported that police were very selective in arresting protestors, a strategy which is found in the *negotiated management* model of public order policing. On several occasions police chose to not arrest any protestors, or a select few, even though there may have been a public disturbance or criminal behaviour present (V173; V174). At the G20 there were many instances of selective arrests; however, they were coupled with many instances of mass arrest. The mass arrest variable is not found in the *negotiated management* theory. Rather, by the Sunday morning of the G20 police had already arrested 500 individuals (G305), and in one instance they arrested 70 people in a raid at the University of Toronto (G325). In all, the media reported that police arrested some 900 people during the G20 weekend (G333). This fact is in direct opposition to the theory of *negotiated management*. Variables that are articulated by the *negotiated management* model but were not found in the empirical evidence include the use of improvised police training, police flexibility, and the high tolerance of disruption.

The presence of media reported variables such as mass information gathering and high paramilitarization, and the absence of other variables espoused by the *negotiated management* model suggest that this theory is not, at face value, adequate from a Canadian public order policing perspective. In fact, many theorists presented in Chapter 2 articulated a shift away from the sole reliance of police on conciliatory and *liaison strategies* to control public disorder events (see Della Porta and Reiter, 2006, or Hall and de Lint, 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that this theory on its own is inadequate in categorizing and explaining media reported of the two cases. In other words, *negotiated management* is still an inadequate representation of how police react to protests in Canada. However, there are components of this theory that are worth keeping

in the theoretical toolbox. For instance, at the Vancouver Olympics the media reported that police were selective in their controlling of protests and on several occasions articulated to the public and media that protests had the legal right demonstrate. In addition, the *negotiated management* model states that police are consensual and conciliatory towards protestors. At both events there was media evidence of this, such as police creating a CRG for the G20 in an attempt to reach out to communities and protestors (G404). At the Olympics, police themselves attended legal training for protestors held by the BCCLA for protestors (V166). These variables were evidenced during the Olympics because there are still some components of the *negotiated management* model that are evident within public order policing practices; however, as a whole, the theory is inadequate as an explanatory regime.

6. Escalated Force

The public order policing theory of *escalated force* begins with the assumption that police view crowds as irrational and in need of being coercively controlled (Della Porta and Reiter, 2006, 176). In contrast to the *negotiated management* theory, the main components of this theory include a low tolerance of disruption, minimal use of communication, frequent arrests, and a high use of force (101). The specific variables that compose this theory of public order policing were conceptualized through Table 1 in Chapter 3. The data analysis phase of this research revealed several important points worth discussing.

Aside from generalized information gathering and paramilitarization, the *escalated force* model of public order policing was not useful in describing protest events at the Olympics. Here, there were no media reported instances of any variables such as the use of intimidation by police, generalized control of protestors, infiltration, low tolerance of crime, highly controlled event access, and mass arrests. These variables did, however, manifest themselves at the G20. For instance, the media reported that police relied heavily of pre-emptive and mass arrests. Evidence was found of police pre-emptively arresting some 50 protest organizers on conspiracy charges, all but 17 of which have since been dropped (G454). Another example is the use of coercive policing methods. For example, police at the G20 enacted an obscure and ambiguous law which gave them unprecedented powers of arrest prior to the commencement of the G20 (G268). In addition, it was documented in the media that some protestors housed at the detention centre

were denied access to legal services, medical attention (G335), and in one incident over 40 protestors were housed in one cell (G358).

The idea that *escalated force* is more applicable to the G20 as opposed to the Olympics is an important discussion. Police were more aggressive and controlling at the G20. Clearly, if the *escalated force* model is to be taken in isolation, it is not an adequate explanatory model for contemporary Canadian protest events. Although it is more applicable to the G20 than the Olympics, it still does little to account for instances when police directly and positively engage with protest organizers, instances where a tremendous amount of tolerance on behalf of the police is witnessed, and when police make extensive use of intelligence. Many of these factors which are evidenced in both cases under study are accounted for in part through other theoretical propositions.

The conclusion that when considered in isolation, neither the *negotiated management* or *escalated force* models are adequate theories in explaining either cases of public order policing is not surprising. These theories were developed decades ago and have since been replaced by more nuanced analyses of the phenomenon of public order policing. Nevertheless, it is informative to note that aspects of each theory can still be found in contemporary events.

7. Theoretical Ramifications

Contemporary theory sees the debate between consensus/conflict or hard hat/soft hat as somewhat obsolete. The new debate has become more fluid and complex; however as we have seen, current theory is still somewhat disjointed when applied to media reporting of these two events. The above findings agree with recent assertions by scholars that there is increasingly a hybrid, integrated, and more flexible model of public order policing developing in western countries that emphasizes to varying degrees the use of paramilitary and intelligence practices. That said, there are numerous adjustments required to render future theory more relevant.

Without falling into over-reach, future theory must account for the flexibility police seemed to enjoy in the media reported data presented this paper. That is, no theory was adequate in explicating the degree to which police were able to adapt to various scenarios of public disorder.

Further, the current body of literature does not fully acknowledge or appreciate the extent to which there is integration between law enforcement and other government agencies. This was evidenced through the use of multiple integrative functions and agencies during both the G20 and the Olympics. Other theoretical considerations must include a more fulsome inclusion of current paramilitarization practices, as well as account for future practices that are surely to materialize in the cyber world.

With regards to social media, much more work needs to focus on the current revolution occurring in the use of social media and its implications for both police and protestors. For future work, academics must consider not only how social media facilitates peaceful protests and violent spontaneous riots, but how it can act as an informal accountability mechanism against police brutality. One needs only to reference the so-called 'Arab Spring' and 'Occupy' phenomenon as examples of how social media is transforming the social movement landscape. Indeed, this will require a radical modification of the current theoretical toolbox. Finally, there needs to be a more fulsome rejection in public order policing theory of the dichotomy of coercive and consensual policing. Too often researcher's pigeon-hole their analyses in to one of these camps, neglecting to account for anomalies to their theory that are clearly evident in the policing of contemporary public order events. These theoretical modifications will contribute to the current literature by providing a more nuanced understanding of Canadian public order policing.

8. Conclusion

From the above discussion it becomes evident that both *intelligent control* and *paramilitarization theories* reign in terms of applicability to recent Canadian events. Admittedly, this result was not initially envisaged by the author. I believed that one theory in its entirety would be found to be more pertinent to Canadian public order policing.

The *intelligent control* theory is the most appropriate of the theories when applied to what media reported of the cases under study; however, through analytic induction and the inclusion of a more fulsome paramilitarization component, *intelligent control* can perhaps be considered the more dominant among public order policing theories from a Canadian perspective. Secondly, the above results indicate a constant validity of *paramilitarization theories* within the Canadian

context. Thirdly, Della Porta and Reiter's (2006) model of public order policing (*coercive*, *persuasive*, and *information strategies*) proved more accurate at characterizing events at the G20. The major shortfall of this theory was the observation that the *information strategies* component fell short of explaining the relationship between police and intelligence agencies during both events. Further, this theory fails to account for differences among the cases. Fourthly, Fernandez's critical theory of public order policing was more adequate in explaining events at the G20. It was suitable when stressing references to anti-terrorism, the use of pre-emptive and mass arrest, and the controlling of information; however, it failed to case these variables into a workable framework that is applicable to Canadian events. Finally, neither the *negotiated management* nor *escalated force* models proved adequate theories in explaining either cases of public order policing. These theories had historical merits but have since been replaced by more nuanced analyses.

In conclusion, *intelligent control* was most appropriate in explaining events at the two cases under study, primarily due to its emphasis on flexibility and intelligence. Likewise, other theories of paramilitarization were similarly beneficial in their abilities to explain and characterize events at the two cases.

Table 17 – Theories and Their Applicability

Theory	Vancouver Olympics	Toronto G20 Summit
Negotiated management	N	N
Escalated force	N	N
Coercive strategies	N	N
Persuasive strategies	N	Y
Information strategies	Y	Y
Intelligent Control	Y	Y
Paramilitary Theory	Y	Y
Policing Dissent Theory	N	Y

Discussion of Research Question #2

The final research phase of the current project is to discuss and analyze the role government departments, other than the police, played at the Olympics and G20, to explain why this presence must exist, and which theoretical model best explains this phenomenon. Here, we will begin with

a brief summary of the presence, as found in media reporting, followed by an analysis of 'why' there is this presence, as well as the potential theoretical implications.

As discussed in the previous Chapter, the media reported that the G20 saw a number of federal agencies involved in security. The RCMP coordinated overall security; however other departments involved included PSEPC, DND, and CSIS. PSEPC is the umbrella agency which houses the RCMP, CSIS, and CBSA, and other agencies. It was noted in the data that CSIS engaged with protestors before and during the G20. For example, a spokesperson for CSIS stated in the lead-up to the G20 that they have been conducting private interviews relating to certain activists (G176). In addition, CSIS involvement at the G20 according to their media relations personnel included "assessing the potential for violence resulting from the activities of certain groups and individuals in the lead-up to, during and after the summit" (G168). The CF/DND presence at the G20 is summarized by Public Affairs Officer Captain John-Hugh MacDonald: "The Canadian Forces' contingent for the G20 will be mainly stationed at Pearson [Airport] where it will conduct foot patrols with other units, mostly from Peel Police. Soldiers will be dressed in full fatigues and armed with C7A1 rifles for self defense" (G141). The integrated government anti-terrorism investigation organization, INSET, was also deployed to help with security at the G20. INSET teams are comprised of personnel from CBSA, CSIS, RCMP, and municipal and provincial police forces (G98) and have a specialized role to assist in the investigation of terrorism. NORAD was also involved in the G20, and engaged in exercises near Huntsville prior to the G20 (G57).

The Olympics were designated a 'major event' by the federal Minister responsible for PSEPC, confirming that the overall security of the event rests with the federal government. This designation also assigns the RCMP as "the lead agency responsible for developing and implementing all security plans for the designated event in conjunction with local authorities" (Privacy Games, March 2009). The Olympics saw the CF/DND coordinating a Joint Task Force command group called 'Operation Podium' as their contribution to Olympic security (Privacy Games, March 2009). The media reported that CF/DND however, planned their role to be as discrete as possible: "armed soldiers and helicopters will be present in Vancouver, but military and police planners are hopeful of keeping them in the background" (V17). Further, ITAC,

which is comprised of members from thirteen different federal government agencies (Privacy Games, March 2009), provided the ISU with risk assessments concerning potential threats to the Olympics. Transport Canada received funding from the federal government to improve security on British Columbia's ferry system, which included CCTV cameras, fences, barriers, communications, and the training of security guards (Privacy Games, March 2009). Canada's elite Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) commando unit was based around Vancouver during the games, including in and on top of key buildings (V6). CBSA also had an observed presence during the Olympics:

> "Inland enforcement of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is part of the CBSA's mandate," said spokeswoman Hannah Mahoney in a prepared statement. "It is not a new role. The CBSA has worked closely with the Vancouver Police Department for many years."…"(CBSA agents) have been at every demonstration so far, Legal Observer teams have seen them there," said BCCLA executive director David Eby. "They've been trolling through the back alley of the (Hastings Street) tent city, they've been all over the place" (V132).

Further, CBSA stated that they would not release how suspected protestors traveling from the US to Canada would be handled at the border, but did state that on a case-by-case basis they could be subjected to "in-depth examinations" (V78).

The media reports suggest a robust and often integrated approach to security during major events in Canada. The presence of many government agencies, not just police, suggests that the security associated with large events in Canada is conducted by an array of government departments with different mandates. We need to consider how we can account for this in the literature and, just as importantly, what theoretical implications does this observation hold?

Hall and de Lint (2009) explicitly state in their work that more and more demonstrations are being "countered or managed by joint task forces or operations consisting of sometimes a dozen or more different public agencies" (5). This reality is the result of police agencies, which are typically the lead on major events, attempting to exercise greater control over public order events by maximizing flexibility and reducing the need for direct intervention. This result is achieved by employing front-end strategies such as large scale planning and intelligence gathering. The paramilitarization emphasis evident at Canadian events is an effective way to exert maximum control over protest situations with a hierarchy and strategic use of force. The use of other

government departments seems to be a logical feature of this new ultra-flexible and information hungry form of public order policing. This larger trend is alluded to by Hall and de Lint (2009), who through their research see a move away from ambiguity and dynamism, to a much more controlled, integrated and predicable form of public order policing in Canada (7). This reliance on other government departments is not only evidence of the integration discussed by the authors, but also a method of promoting flexibility by adding the mandates of other agencies to policing toolboxes, in the end creating more control over dynamic situations.

Unexpected Results

There were many unforeseen discoveries found during this research project worth mentioning here. First, the degree of police flexibility was not originally anticipated, and this finding alone could provide the basis for a separate research project. How can we account for this flexibility? How does it manifest itself? And is it a purposeful tactic, or something that has evolved from earlier forms of public order policing? How do police articulate and define this new feature of public order policing? These are all very important questions. A second result that was unanticipated relates to police use of intelligence strategies. As we saw in the discussion of the literature, scholars are becoming more mindful of the extent to which police are embracing intelligence strategies. However, what was unanticipated is the extent to which policing organizations use intelligence tactics for public order policing. This includes technological, human, and analytic intelligence in order to identify and neutralize threats to high-profile events such as the G20 and Olympics. The logical progression from this is what specific tactics are being used, how can we account for them in research, and what are their implications given the current separation of policing and intelligence functions? Most importantly for further criminological research or inquiry, is this intelligence boom isolated to public order policing, or can it be found in other aspects of policing? All of these questions, amongst many others, are left to future researchers.

Chapter Conclusion

Due to its emphasis on intelligence functions, the *intelligent control* model of public order policing was the most appropriate theory when applied to the two cases. Through analytic

induction, a more fulsome inclusion of specific *paramilitarization theory* will render *intelligent control* more applicable to contemporary Canadian events. Other theories of public order policing were less applicable to varying degrees to the two cases. This was found to be due to a failure to account for differences among the cases. Critical theorists such as Fernandez were somewhat adequate in explaining events at the G20 because it saw a more severe and sometimes violent presence by police, but it does little to explain situations where police are more consensual. In sum, the components of various theories that need to be amalgamated include the wide use of intelligence functions, the uses of anti-terrorism rhetoric, police flexibility, as well as paramilitarization tactics.

As mentioned, there were several theories that were not adequate in characterizing events as reported through the media at both cases. In research, an absence of something can be just as informative and its presence, so a theory cannot be discounted on these grounds. It is worth noting that those theories that fell short did so by failing to explain the existence of certain phenomenon rather than illustrating their absence.

Finally, the media reports of a presence of other government departments such as PSEPC, CBSA, CF/DND, CSIS, and Transport Canada brings to light the increasing integration and multi-agency flexibility that characterized the two Canadian cases. It will not only be important to corroborate or contradict these findings through future research, but to further test recent theoretical works that came out of research done at the G20 and Olympics that has recently been, or has yet to be, released.

Chapter 6 – Summary and Conclusions

Our history dictates how we as a nation respond to riots, protests and other public order events. The way European authorities deal with and respond to public disorder is much different than Canadian ones do, owed primarily to our historical experiences. In Canada, the current cases highlight the success with which police can engage in public order policing despite our youth as a nation and relative inexperience with major public disorders. Notwithstanding mass arrests and questionable legal manoeuvring at the G20, police in both cases secured the venues and protected citizens. There were no fatalities or any life threatening injuries as a result of police intervention. What led to this result was a combination of two important components of Canadian public order policing that have been articulated in the policing literature: intelligence and paramilitarization strategies.

We began this research project by illustrating that there are important discrepancies in the public order policing literature, and outlining that academics are calling for further research. Della Porta, Reiter, Hall, and de Lint witnessed a fusion of the negotiated management and escalated force theories; whereas authors such as Fernandez saw the continued use of coercive strategies aimed at delegitimizing, neutralizing, and excluding protestors. Authors such as McPhail et al. were optimistic due their belief that law enforcement is willing to engage with and accommodate protestors.

In light of these debates, specific research questions were developed and adapted into a comparative exploratory case study design, using both the Vancouver Olympics and Toronto G20 Summit as separate cases. Pattern matching was then employed to compare empirical relationships with the theoretically predicted ones outline in Chapter 2. In analyzing the media reported data, it is argued that based on media representations of policing at the two cases, the *intelligent control* model of public order policing was the most appropriate theory applicable to reports of these events. Although, through analytic induction a more fulsome inclusion of specific *paramilitarization theory*, police ultra-flexibility, wider intelligence gathering techniques, and police use of social media would render *intelligent control* more applicable to future events. Finally, this paper concludes that, based on media reporting, presence of other government departments such as PSEPC, CBSA, CF/DND, CSIS, and Transport Canada

suggested that there is an increasing integration and multi-agency flexibility that was articulated best in the *intelligent control* theory.

The data set used in the current research project does not allow for the generalization needed to draw solid conclusions concerning the trajectory of public order policing in Canada. Media reports are a discursive representation of the particular phenomenon of public order policing rather than an accurate representation of reality. This has been addressed in Chapter 3, and attempts have been made to highlight and account for this limitation. Media reports have given us an imperfect lens with which we can look at public order policing at the G20 Summit and Olympics. In the end, media reports are a selective and often biased source of information. For future research it will be invaluable to consider other sources of data to see whether different conclusions can be drawn. For instance, data can and should be collected from direct field observations, press releases, alternative media, social media, as well as police, business owners, and decision-makers themselves.

Despite what critical criminologists might argue is the true reason behind the large security presence at the Olympics and G20, it is my conclusion that these precautions were necessary to protect individuals. After reviewing the media data amassed for this thesis, it is my perspective that both events were relatively successful. This is despite the fact that TPS claimed to have been "overwhelmed" by protestors at the G20, and failed to hold to account the protest elements involved in criminal behaviour. In light of the critical criminological explanations concerning the "repression and violence" seen during the G20 in particular, I would follow-up by asking, aside from claiming a sinister legitimization process, how can one account for police acts of kindness, civility, and common good? And how can critical authors such as Fernandez (2008) and Rimke (2011) account for the many instances where police held back and allowed protestors to engage in peaceful dissent? How can such authors explain the instances where police refrained from things such as arrest, and violence? This is not a definitive conclusion; it is an observation which is subject to time and the data presented in the current study. As with everything else in research, the legitimacy of any observation must be re-tested and re-evaluated under different circumstances.

It is my contention that the paramilitarization evidenced through media reporting in this study was a positive development. In the future, these tactics need to be fully supported with proper communication, planning, a clear hierarchical command, and fusion centers to facilitate communication and information flow thereby avoiding uncertainty. It is indecision and ambiguity that tend to lead to greater violence. This however, was not the case at the G20, as there were no fatalities or cases of severe and irreparable bodily harm.

Further Research & Implications

Chapter 3 included a necessary, although superficial, discussion of police accountability literature. One of the main conclusions from Stone's (2007) work is that police accountability has now become ingrained in the notion of police governance, rather than an elusive desire of the aggrieved that was sparked in 1960s (247). As accountability is now accepted as a systemic governance component of policing, it would be beneficial for future research to investigate how these processes and structures of accountability materialized in the aftermath of the Toronto G20 Summit. This can be in the form of police disciplinary actions, boards of inquiry, and other public or internal inquiries. Further, the National Research Council has stated that more research needs to be conducted on the effectiveness of policing oversight bodies and the imposition of accountability of policing organizations (Skogan and Frydl, 2004, 19). Because of the ongoing and extensive nature of current internal and external investigations being conducted, these realities will not become evident for a few more years. Nevertheless, examining these internal, external, and social accountability mechanisms of police governance would be an important and intriguing contribution to Canadian criminological discourse.

Although limited to media reporting of police actions at the Olympics and G20, there are a number of policy implications that the current study exposes. First, media portrayals of increased policing intelligence functions have repercussions on such things as access to information and information secrecy. Indeed, given the fact that a primary function of intelligence is secrecy, the policy implications for accountability and oversight are immense. This also holds implications for researchers as well, because as secrecy increases, academics will rely more and more on open sources of information, such as media reporting. Second, with the increasing blurring of policing and national security, we are less able to distinguish between terrorism, risk and conventional

crimes. In relation to specific policy, this means an increase in security agency budgets, increased coordination between public agencies (municipal, provincial, federal, and international) and an amplified integrative function being pushed on agencies whether they are prepared for it or not. Thirdly, increased intelligence functions also imply an increase in information flow for law enforcement agencies. That is, police will have to develop strategies to deal with the massive amount of data inherent in the intelligence business. Finally, considering the shift to greater integration and a focus on 'risk', there are implications in how established policies identify, analyze, and neutralize real or perceived security threats.

For future researchers it will be important to expand the current methodology to better understand how police actions at planned protest events compare to spontaneous riots such as those seen after the National Hockey League (NHL) 2011 Stanley Cup finals loss of the Vancouver Canuks and the August 2011 London, UK, riots. As witnessed during these events, their unprompted and impulsive nature presents police with a whole array of problems. Without the luxury of preparation and pre-emptive intelligence gathering, police are often left rudderless. It will be crucial for researchers interested in this field of study to engage in research that penetrates this phenomenon.

A third and final further research topic worth mentioning here moves beyond national borders and would need to integrate the fields of criminology and political science. Much of the focus here and indeed of the literature in general, has been on western democracies. It would be beneficial for international criminological researchers to apply and rework selected theories to the so-called 'Arab Spring' protests that began in Tunisia in early 2011 and are continually spreading across North Africa and the Middle East.

In light of the research presented in this thesis, it can logically be argued that it is most often situational factors that contribute to the violent and often unpredictable outcomes that plague public order events. That is, the fluid nature of police-protestor interaction is a dynamic and complex social phenomenon. In this sense, ad-hoc or singular tactics are often counter-productive. This complexity of factors results in a disconnect between cause and effect, and therefore requires more control and planning on behalf of authorities as well as protestors. There

is a need to remove from the equation the direct, and sometimes violent, conflict situations that often manifest themselves in these types of situations. The question remains then, how can the situation be altered in order to accomplish this goal? Or, how can police and protestors reduce complexity, increase certainty, and ultimately reduce the likelihood (not eliminate!) that violence will occur in the future?

I believe that an important consideration for law enforcement agencies going forward is how to separate the peaceful from the violent elements, both physically and psychologically. Developing lines of communication that allow for such distinctions between protest elements will help avoid heavy handed tactics against peaceful protestors and will promote the identification and neutralization of criminal elements. This can be done through the use of intelligence strategies such as covert intelligence gathering (undercover work), plainclothes police, and interviewing. It is in the interest of all parties involved to isolate violent individuals. In the end, I trust that this research can positively contribute not only to police reflexivity, but will complement the current literature and will allow future researchers to adapt, reformulate, and reconcile theoretical works with forthcoming public order events in Canada.

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G229 - *G8/G20 Communique: An activist's guide to the G20 protests, part one*. Krystalline Kraus. Rabble.ca. **2010 06 22**.

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G233 - *Police respond to shots fired inside G20 traffic zone*. Montreal Gazette. **2010 06 22**.

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G282 - *Protest in Huntsville draws chuckles*. DON PEAT; TAMARA CHERRY. Toronto Sun. **2010 06 25**.

G283 - *Protesters close Huntsville's downtown*. DON PEAT. Ottawa Sun. **2010 06 25**.

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G309 - *Anti-G20 protester 'caged' for 19 hours*. TOM GODFREY. Toronto Sun. **2010 06 27**.

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G366 - *Twitter Introduction*. G8-G20 - ISU Media Release. **2010 02 09**.
G367 - *Metro Toronto Convention Centre will be the official venue*. G8-G20 - ISU Media Release. **2010 02 19**.
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G393 - *Two men arrested by G20 Investigative Team*. Toronto Police - Media Release. **2010 07 16**.
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G403 - *Federal Procurement Notice - Radios*. **No Date Provided**.
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G406 - *G8-G20 ISU Planning for Safe and Secure G8 Summit*. **No Date Provided**.
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G412 - *Mayor Miller's statement from G20 press conference*. **2010 06 28**.
G413 - *Gary Giroux updates the media on the G20 Investigative Team*. Toronto Police Service. **2010 07 07**.
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G424 - *Arrests Made Amidst Violent G20 Protests Part 2*. Global News. **2010 06 26**.
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G443 - *YouTube Video*. Uploaded by Reetreeter - 9m59s. **2010 06 25**.
G444 - *YouTube Video*. Uploaded by Russia Today - 1m14s. **2010 06 26**.
G445 - *YouTube Video*. Uploaded by Russia Today - 1m43s. **2010 06 26**.
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G452 - *YouTube Video*. Uploaded by wbjourdan - 1m48s. **2010 06 26**.
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Additional Material

Data Information
G454 - *G20/G8 summit opponents infiltrated by police*. Dave Seglins. CBC. **2011 06 24**.

Coding Sheets

Escalated Force	Negotiated Management
T1 - EF - Legitimacy of Police Actions // Brutal / Illegitimate / Illegal	T1 - NM - Legitimacy of Police Actions // Soft / Tolerant / Legal
T1 - EF - Control of Protest Actors // Generalized	T1 - NM - Control of Protest Actors // Selective
T1 - EF - Police Actions // Pre-emptive	T1 - NM - Police Actions // Reactive
T1 - EF - Contact with Protestors // Confrontational	T1 - NM - Contact with Protestors // Consensual / Conciliatory
T1 - EF - Negotiation with Protestors // Used for Intimidation	T1 - NM - Negotiation with Protestors // Used for Partnerships
T1 - EF - Training // Professional	T1 - NM - Training // Improvised
T1 - EF - Flexibility // Rigid	T1 - NM - Flexibility // Flexible
T1 - EF - Primary Goal or Priority // Security of Event	T1 - NM - Primary Goal or Priority // Right to Demonstrate
T1 - EF - Agents Provocateur // Yes	T1 - NM - Agents Provocateur // No
T1 - EF - Tolerance of Disruption // Low	T1 - NM - Tolerance of Disruption // High
T1 - EF - Tolerance of Criminal Acts // Low	T1 - NM - Tolerance of Criminal Acts // High
T1 - EF - Coercive Strategies // High	T1 - NM - Coercive Strategies // Low
T1 - EF - Information Collection // Generalized or Intrusive	T1 - NM - Information Collection // Focused and Prosecutorial
T1 - EF - Event Access // Highly Controlled	T1 - NM - Event Access // Managed
T1 - EF - Use of Detention // High	T1 - NM - Use of Detention // Low
T1 - EF - Use of Arrest // Mass	T1 - NM - Use of Arrest // Selective
T1 - EF - Labeling of Protestors // Bad / Illegal / Troublemakers	T1 - NM - Labeling of Protestors // Peaceful or Pragmatic
T1 - EF - Paramilitarization // High	T1 - NM - Paramilitarization // Low

Coercive Strategies	Persuasive Strategies
T2 - CS - Massive Police Presence	T3 - PS - Pre-Negotiation
T2 - CS - High Visibility of Police	T3 - PS - Negotiations During Event
T2 - CS - Plainclothes Police	T3 - PS - Barriers
T2 - CS - Anti-Riot Gear	T3 - PS - Border Controls
T2 - CS - Special Police Units	T3 - PS - Blocking Access to Areas
T2 - CS - Police From Other Jurisdictions	T3 - PS - Preventive Arrests
T2 - CS - Visible Identification	T3 - PS - Harassment
T2 - CS - Mass Arrests	T3 - PS - Entering and Searching Offices
T2 - CS - Unconfirmed Arrests	T3 - PS - Entering and Searching Homes
T2 - CS - Encircling / Penning Tactics	
T2 - CS - Excessive Use of Force	
T2 - CS - Water Cannons	
T2 - CS - Tear Gas	
T2 - CS - Other Irritants	
T2 - CS - Rubber Bullets	
T2 - CS - Live Ammunition	
T2 - CS - Sound Cannon	

Information Strategies	Preventative Theory
T4 - IS - Mass Collection of Information	T6 - PT - Confrontation // Avoidance
T4 - IS - Use of Alarmist Information	T6 - PT - Arrests // Selective
T4 - IS - International Information Exchange	T6 - PT - Invoking Laws or Legislation // Reluctance
T4 - IS - Protest Infiltration	T6 - PT - Negotiation // Pre-Event
T4 - IS - Agents Provocateur	T6 - PT - Coercive Methods // None
	T6 - PT - Information Control // Expertise / Information Monopoly
	T6 - PT - Protestor Relationship // Mutual Partnership / Collaborative
	T6 - PT - Police Presence // Small / Reserve Officers
	T6 - PT - Visibility // Low
	T6 - PT - Intelligence Gathering // Yes
	T6 - PT - Disruption // Yes
	T6 - PT - Spatial Exclusion // Yes

Intelligent Control Theory	Paramilitarization
T5 - IC-L - Community Policing	T7 - PAS - Protective Shields
T5 - IC-L - Public Relations	T7 - PAS - Specialized Units
T5 - IC-L - Non-intervention	T7 - PAS - Use of Squad Formations
T5 - IC-L - Underenforcement of the Law and Restraint	T7 - PAS - Intelligence Gathering
T5 - IC-L - Education/Pamphlets	T7 - PAS - Early and Large-scale Planning
T5 - IC-L - Negotiation	T7 - PAS - Pre-event Surveillance
T5 - IC-L - Meeting with Protestors	T7 - PAS - Event Surveillance
T5 - IC-L - Escort Services	T7 - PAS - Hierarchical Command and Control
T5 - IC-L - Impartiality	T7 - PAS - Use of Arrest Squads
T5 - IC-L - Police Emphasis on Self-Policing	T7 - PAS - Controlling / Blocking Space
T5 - IC-L - Information Brokering	T7 - PAS - Animals - Horses and Dogs
T5 - IC-L - Deferral to Courts	T7 - PAS - Heavy use of Riot Gear
T5 - IC-L - Employing Officers as Liaisons	T7 - PAS - Identification of an 'Enemy'
----------BREAK----------	T7 - PAS - Command / Operations Center
T5 - IC-I - HUMINT	T7 - PAS - Use of Non-Lethal Weaponry
T5 - IC-I - SIGINT	T7 - PAS - Stop and Search Tactics
T5 - IC-I - Preemptive Detention	

Policing Dissent Theory

T5 - IC-I - Blurring of Policing and National Security	**T8 - PDT - City Ordinances, Codes, and By-Laws**
T5 - IC-I - Reflexive Dramatization	**T8 - PDT - Zoning Restrictions**
T5 - IC-I - Control of Information (Asymmetric)	**T8 - PDT - Police Pamphlet Distribution**
T5 - IC-I - Overt Displays of Authority	**T8 - PDT - Protest Permit Systems**
T5 - IC-I - Paramilitarization	**T8 - PDT - Controlling and Restricting Space**
T5 - IC-I - Hierarchy of Force	**T8 - PDT - Use of Event Defensive Locations**
T5 - IC-I - Use of Civilian Intelligence Agencies	**T8 - PDT - Police Infiltration**
T5 - IC-I - Covert Intelligence Gathering	**T8 - PDT - Gathering of Covert Intelligence**
T5 - IC-I - Selective and Strategic Use of Force	**T8 - PDT - Gathering of Overt Intelligence**
T5 - IC-I - Denial of Entry	**T8 - PDT - Constant and Repetitive Police Patrols**
	T8 - PDT - Pre-emptive Arrests
	T8 - PDT - Mass Arrests
	T8 - PDT - Reducing Protestor Anonymity
	T8 - PDT - Fortification of Event Locations
	T8 - PDT - Public Relations Consultants
	T8 - PDT - Control of Information
	T8 - PDT - References to Anti-Terrorism
	T8 - PDT - Close Relationships – Media/Police
	T8 - PDT - Embedded Journalists with Police
	T8 - PDT - Framing of Protestors as Violent
	T8 - PDT - Framing of Protestors as Non-Violent

Police Actions

T1 - EF - Legitimacy of Police Actions // Brutal / Illegitimate / Illegal	T1 - NM - Flexibility // Flexible
T1 - NM - Legitimacy of Police Actions // Soft / Tolerant / Legal	T2 - CS - High Visibility of Police
T5 - IC-L - Non-intervention	T6 - PT - Police Presence // Small / Reserve Officers
T5 - IC-L - Impartiality	T6 - PT - Visibility // Low
T6 - PT - Confrontation // Avoidance	T2 - CS - Visible Identification
T2 - CS - Excessive Use of Force	T3 - PS - Harassment
T5 - IC-I - Hierarchy of Force	T3 - PS - Entering and Searching Offices
T5 - IC-I - Selective and Strategic Use of Force	T3 - PS - Entering and Searching Homes
T5 - IC-I - Overt Displays of Authority	**T1 - EF - Control of Protest Actors // Generalized**
T2 - CS - Massive Police Presence	**T1 - NM - Control of Protest Actors // Selective**
T1 - EF - Police Actions // Pre-emptive	T6 - PT - Disruption // Yes
T1 - NM - Police Actions // Reactive	T8 - PDT - Embedded Journalists with Police
T1 - EF - Flexibility // Rigid	T8 - PDT - Close Relationships – Media/Police

Paramilitarization

T1 - EF - Paramilitarization // High
T1 - NM - Paramilitarization // Low
T5 - IC-I - Paramilitarization
T7 - PAS - Identification of an 'Enemy'
T7 - PAS - Command / Operations Center
T2 - CS - Special Police Units
T7 - PAS - Specialized Units
T2 - CS - Police From Other Jurisdictions
T7 - PAS - Early and Large-scale Planning
T7 - PAS - Hierarchical Command and Control
T8 - PDT - Reducing Protestor Anonymity

Space

T1 - EF - Event Access // Highly Controlled
T1 - NM - Event Access // Managed
T3 - PS - Barriers
T3 - PS - Border Controls
T5 - IC-I - Denial of Entry
T3 - PS - Blocking Access to Areas
T6 - PT - Spatial Exclusion // Yes
T7 - PAS - Controlling / Blocking Space
T8 - PDT - Fortification of Event Locations
T8 - PDT - Protest Permit Systems
T8 - PDT - Controlling and Restricting Space
T8 - PDT - Use of Event Defensive Locations
T8 - PDT - Zoning Restrictions

Arrests/Law

T1 - EF - Use of Detention // High
T1 - EF - Use of Arrest // Mass
T1 - NM - Use of Detention // Low
T1 - NM - Use of Arrest // Selective
T2 - CS - Mass Arrests
T8 - PDT - Mass Arrests
T2 - CS - Unconfirmed Arrests
T3 - PS - Preventive Arrests
T8 - PDT - Pre-emptive Arrests
T5 - IC-I - Preemptive Detention
T6 - PT - Arrests // Selective
T6 - PT - Invoking Laws or Legislation // Reluctance
T8 - PDT - City Ordinances, Codes, and By-Laws
T5 - IC-L - Underenforcement of the Law and Restraint
T5 - IC-L - Deferral to Courts
T7 - PAS - Use of Arrest Squads
T1 - EF - Tolerance of Criminal Acts // Low
T1 - EF - Tolerance of Disruption // Low
T1 - NM - Tolerance of Disruption // High
T1 - NM - Tolerance of Criminal Acts // High

Liaison

T1 - EF - Contact with Protestors // Confrontational
T1 - NM - Contact with Protestors // Consensual / Conciliatory
T1 - NM - Negotiation with Protestors // Used for Partnerships
T1 - EF - Negotiation with Protestors // Used for Intimidation
T3 - PS - Pre-Negotiation
T6 - PT - Negotiation // Pre-Event
T3 - PS - Negotiations During Event
T6 - PT - Protestor Relationship // Mutual Partnership / Collaborative
T5 - IC-L - Public Relations
T8 - PDT - Public Relations Consultants
T5 - IC-I - Reflexive Dramatization (PR)
T5 - IC-L - Education/Pamphlets
T8 - PDT - Police Pamphlet Distribution
T5 - IC-L - Negotiation
T5 - IC-L - Meeting with Protestors
T5 - IC-L - Escort Services
T5 - IC-L - Police Emphasis on Self-Policing
T5 - IC-L - Employing Officers as Liaisons

Intelligence

T5 - IC-I - HUMINT
T5 - IC-I – SIGINT
T8 - PDT - Gathering of Overt Intelligence
T6 - PT - Intelligence Gathering // Yes
T7 - PAS - Intelligence Gathering
T4 - IS - Mass Collection of Information
T5 - IC-I - Use of Civilian Intelligence Agencies
T5 - IC-I - Blurring of Policing and National Security
T8 - PDT - References to Anti-Terrorism
T5 - IC-I - Covert Intelligence Gathering
T8 - PDT - Gathering of Covert Intelligence
T7 - PAS - Pre-event Surveillance
T7 - PAS - Event Surveillance
T1 - EF - Information Collection // Generalized or Intrusive
T1 - NM - Information Collection // Focused and Prosecutorial
T4 - IS - Use of Alarmist Information
T4 - IS - International Information Exchange
T6 - PT - Information Control // Expertise / Information Monopoly
T5 - IC-I - Control of Information (Asymmetric)
T8 - PDT - Control of Information
T5 - IC-L - Information Brokering

Plainclothes and Agents Provocateur

T1 - EF - Agents Provocateur // Yes
T1 - NM - Agents Provocateur // No
T2 - CS - Plainclothes Police
T4 - IS - Protest Infiltration
T8 - PDT - Police Infiltration
T4 - IS - Agents Provocateur

Tactics

T1 - EF - Training // Professional
T1 - NM - Training // Improvised
T2 - CS - Encircling / Penning Tactics
T1 - EF - Coercive Strategies // High
T1 - NM - Coercive Strategies // Low
T6 - PT - Coercive Methods // None
T5 - IC-L - Community Policing
T7 - PAS - Stop and Search Tactics
T7 - PAS - Use of Squad Formations
T8 - PDT - Constant and Repetitive Police Patrols

Other

T1 - EF - Primary Goal or Priority // Security of Event
T1 - EF - Labeling of Protestors // Bad / Illegal / Troublemakers
T1 - NM - Primary Goal or Priority // Right to Demonstrate
T1 - NM - Labeling of Protestors // Peaceful or Pragmatic
T8 - PDT - Framing of Protestors as Violent
T8 - PDT - Framing of Protestors as Non-Violent

Weaponry and Gear

T2 - CS - Anti-Riot Gear
T7 - PAS - Heavy use of Riot Gear
T2 - CS - Water Cannons
T2 - CS - Tear Gas
T2 - CS - Other Irritants
T2 - CS - Rubber Bullets
T2 - CS - Live Ammunition
T2 - CS - Sound Cannon
T7 - PAS - Protective Shields
T7 - PAS - Animals - Horses and Dogs
T7 - PAS - Use of Non-Lethal Weaponry

Appendix A – News Organizations

News Organizations
24 Hours
Calgary Herald
CBC
CTV
Edmonton Journal
Montreal Gazette
National Post
Ottawa Citizen
Times Colonist
Toronto Star
The Globe and Mail
The Leader Post
The Province
The Star Phoenix
Vancouver Sun
Windsor Star
Winnipeg Free Press